If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

MICHIGAN AMBULATORY SURGICAL 

CENTER,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

FOR PUBLICATION

November 19, 2020

v No. 349706

Oakland Circuit Court

FARM BUREAU GENERAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY OF MICHIGAN,

LC No. 2019-172994-NF

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and O’BRIEN and SWARTZLE, JJ.

SWARTZLE, J. (dissenting).

Philosophically, I have deep sympathy for the majority opinion. The freedom to contract

is one of the cornerstones of the rule of law, along with due process, equal protection, private 

property, and the First Amendment. There is nothing in this record to suggest that, when entering 

into the settlement agreement with the anti-assignment clause, Tracy was incompetent or somehow

coerced into agreeing to the clause. Tracy received valuable consideration in exchange for the 

clause and the settlement agreement’s other provisions, and ordinarily, that would be the end of 

the story—enforce the anti-assignment clause and grant summary disposition in favor of 

defendant.

Jurisprudentially, however, I cannot sign onto the majority opinion, as this case does not 

come to us tabula rasa. Rather, we are bound by another cornerstone of the rule of law—the 

principle of stare decisis, especially in the context of binding precedent from both a prior panel 

and a higher court. See MCR 7.215(C)(2). Because I can find no legitimate basis for 

distinguishing this case from this Court’s earlier published decision in Jawad A Shah, MD, PC v 

State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 324 Mich App 182, 200; 920 NW2d 148 (2018), I must dissent. 

From my reading of Shah, the material factual points are these: (1) the insured had coverage 

for no-fault benefits with the insurer; (2) the insured was injured in a motor-vehicle accident; (3) 

the insured and the insurer had a contract with an anti-assignment clause; (4) after executing the 

contract with the anti-assignment clause, the insured received medical services, and, in exchange 
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for the services, the medical provider was owed payment; (5) the insured had an accrued claim

against the insurer for payment of the medical services; (6) the insured assigned the accrued claim 

to the medical provider in satisfaction of the insured’s liability to the medical provider; and (7) the 

medical provider sought payment from the insurer, but based on the anti-assignment clause, the 

insurer refused to pay. Id. at 186-190. Despite the general freedom to contract, the Court in Shah

held that the anti-assignment clause was unenforceable as against public policy, and as a result,

the medical provider could pursue an action against the insurer for the unpaid claim.

Each one of the material factual points in Shah exists in the current case. Why it matters 

that the anti-assignment clause was found in the original insurance contract (Shah) or in a 

subsequent settlement agreement (here) is lost on me, given that the key feature—the insured “had 

an accrued claim against his [or her] insurer for payment of healthcare services that had already 

been provided before [the insured] executed the assignment,” Shah, 324 Mich App at 200—is the 

same in both situations.

The majority places great weight on the rather thin reed that the anti-assignment clause in 

this case is found in a settlement agreement with a merger clause, whereas the anti-assignment 

clause in Shah was found in an insurance contract. But while asserting that the distinction matters, 

the majority does not explain why it matters, except to say that setting aside the anti-assignment 

clause in the settlement agreement may increase the liability of the insurer under the terms of that 

separate agreement. (Maj op at __.)

As all rather thin reeds must do, this one collapses upon inspection. In Shah, while setting 

aside the anti-assignment clause did not increase the insurer’s liability under the insurance policy, 

it certainly did increase the risk that the insurer would be exposed to future litigation by 

unanticipated assignees. Thus, in Shah, the insurer did not get the full benefit of its bargain with 

the insured, as the insurer presumably put some value on the anti-assignment clause in the 

insurance policy and factored that value into the price of the policy. Similarly, were the majority 

to follow Shah here, setting aside the anti-assignment clause would not increase defendant’s 

liability under the insurance policy (as the majority recognizes), but it certainly would increase the 

risk that defendant would be exposed to future litigation by unanticipated assignees—as this 

lawsuit aptly demonstrates. Thus, here (and tracking Shah), defendant would not get the full 

benefit of its bargain with Tracy, as defendant presumably put some value on the anti-assignment 

clause in the settlement agreement and factored that value into the consideration paid. From both

a contractual and an economic perspective, the two scenarios are identical with respect to the risk 

of increased liability to the insurer. Simply put, the majority’s distinction is without a difference.

Likewise with the merger clause. Whether found in a single insurance policy or in an 

insurance policy and a subsequent separate agreement, the fact remains that the relevant 

contractual provisions and factual scenarios are materially indistinguishable between the two 

cases. If the existence of a merger clause is actually the material distinction, then the majority has 

pointed future parties to a simple way to get around Shah at the outset—(1) enter into an insurance 

policy that (a) has no anti-assignment clause but (b) does have a merger clause; and, immediately 

following execution of that policy, (2) enter into a separate agreement that (a) has an antiassignment clause and (b) also has a merger clause. The substance of the contractual relationship

will be no different than in Shah, though the legal import will now be 180 degrees different.
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With respect to MCL 500.3143, I have no truck with the majority’s analysis, as the statute 

is silent with respect to anti-assignment clauses. Rather, the fundamental problem in Shah and this 

case is the weak foundation underlying our Supreme Court’s decision from over 125 years ago, 

Roger Williams Ins Co v Carrington, 43 Mich 252; 5 NW 303 (1880). In that case, the Court 

referred to a purported “statute” that granted “the absolute right to every person . . . to assign such 

claims, and such a right cannot be thus prevented.” Id. at 254. The Court did not actually cite to 

a statute, however, and my research has not yet unearthed that statute. The Court seems to have 

announced the absolute right to assign such a claim as a matter of public policy. Maybe there are 

good reasons to have this policy, but it does fly against the bedrock principle of freedom to 

contract. In my opinion, exceptions to the freedom to contract should be few-and-far between, 

and certainly should be better supported with law and logic than what is found in Roger Williams.

With that said, the holding in Roger Williams is clear, as is the holding in Shah, and I do 

not believe that we have a sound basis for distinguishing either one. Until (hopefully) our Supreme 

Court revisits Roger Williams, we are bound by the holding in that decision, as Shah recognized.

Accordingly, contrary to the majority’s holding, I conclude that Shah controls here and the antiassignment clause in the parties’ settlement agreement should not preclude the medical provider’s 

cause of action.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle