UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4542

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LARRY RAY JOHNSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones, 

District Judge. (2:12-cr-00015-JPJ-PMS-1)

Submitted: August 28, 2014 Decided: September 3, 2014

Before WILKINSON, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles M. Henter, HENTERLAW, PLC, Charlottesville, Virginia, 

for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, 

Zachary T. Lee, Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Larry Ray Johnson was convicted by a jury of eight 

counts of mailing threatening communications, 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) 

(2012), and was sentenced to an above-Guidelines sentence of 240 

months’ imprisonment. He appeals, claiming that the district 

court erred in denying his request for a second mental health 

evaluation and in imposing a sentence substantially above the 

Guidelines range of 78-97 months’ imprisonment. Finding no 

error, we affirm.

Johnson, a Virginia inmate since 1973, mailed nine 

graphically violent, threatening letters to various public 

officials between 2007 and 2010. In April 2012, a federal grand 

jury returned a nine-count indictment based on each of the 

letters. At his initial appearance before a magistrate judge, 

Johnson requested — and was granted — a psychiatric evaluation 

to determine his competency to stand trial. Johnson was then 

sent to the Federal Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky, where 

he underwent a mental health evaluation. The forensic report 

included an analysis of Johnson’s responses to questions posed 

to him, a review of his mental health and prison record, 

investigative material involving the nine threatening letters, 

and his behavior with other inmates and staff during the period 

of evaluation. The report concluded that Johnson was diagnosed 

with malingering as well as antisocial personality disorder. At 
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Johnson’s competency hearing, the magistrate judge reviewed the 

forensic report and determined that Johnson was competent to 

stand trial. A January 2013 trial date was set. 

On December 19, 2012, Johnson’s attorney moved to 

withdrew from representation. At the hearing the following day, 

Johnson requested a second psychiatric examination. A new 

attorney was appointed to represent Johnson and, on February 14, 

2013, after meeting with Johnson, Johnson’s newly-appointed 

counsel filed a motion to withdraw Johnson’s motion for an 

additional psychiatric evaluation. On March 1, Johnson filed a 

pro se motion to remove his court-appointed attorney and to 

proceed pro se. The court denied Johnson’s motion to proceed 

pro se, and convened another hearing to determine Johnson’s 

competency. Johnson then filed another a motion for a second

psychological evaluation. At a hearing held the day before 

Johnson’s scheduled trial date, the district court denied his 

motion and found him fully competent to stand trial. 

The jury found Johnson guilty of Counts One and Three 

through Nine; he was acquitted on Count Two. Based on a total 

offense level of 26, and a criminal history category of III, 

Johnson’s advisory Guidelines range was 78-97 months. However, 

the Government filed a Motion and Notice of Intent to Seek 

Upward Departure and Upward Variance, in which it requested a 

sentence of 300 months, arguing that Johnson’s criminal history 
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category substantially underrepresented the seriousness of his 

criminal history and the likelihood that he would commit other 

crimes. The district court imposed a 240-month sentence (120 

months on each count, to run partly concurrently). Johnson 

noted a timely appeal.

Johnson first argues that the district court erred in 

denying his request for a second mental health evaluation. A 

district court must hold a competency hearing “if there is 

reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be 

suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally 

incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the 

nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to 

assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2012). 

Whether reasonable cause has been demonstrated is left to the 

discretion of the district court. United States v. Mason, 52 

F.3d 1286, 1289 (4th Cir. 1995). In determining whether there 

is reasonable cause to order a competency hearing, a trial court 

must consider “evidence of irrational behavior, the defendant’s 

demeanor at trial, and medical opinions concerning the 

defendant’s competence.” Id. at 1290. “Medical opinions are 

usually persuasive evidence on the question of whether a 

sufficient doubt exists as to the defendant’s competence.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Applying these standards, we find that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Johnson’s request 

for a second competency evaluation. First, Johnson was granted 

a thorough evaluation beginning in July 2012 and offers no 

evidence — nor does he suggest — that his condition somehow 

deteriorated between the time of the first evaluation and his 

motion for a second one. Second, the record amply supported the 

district court’s conclusion that there was no reasonable cause 

to order another competency hearing. The initial examination, 

along with other supporting evidence, established that Johnson 

did not suffer from a mental disease or defect rendering him 

unable to assist in his defense and was, therefore, competent to 

stand trial. 

Johnson also challenges his 240-month sentence, 

arguing that the district court did not adequately explain its 

reasons for imposing a sentence substantially above the 

applicable Guidelines range. We review a sentence for 

reasonableness, applying “an abuse-of-discretion standard.” 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This court must 

first review for “significant procedural error[s],” including, 

among other things, improperly calculating the Guidelines range. 

Id. Only if we find a sentence procedurally reasonable may we

consider its substantive reasonableness. Id. Regardless of 

whether a district court varies or departs, this court reviews 
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the substantive reasonableness of an above-Guidelines sentence 

with regard to “whether the District Judge abused his discretion 

in determining that the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors 

supported [the] sentence . . . and justified [the] deviation 

from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 56. In doing so, 

we “take into account the totality of the circumstances, 

including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” 

Id. at 51.

Johnson does not challenge the procedural 

reasonableness of his sentence. Rather, he argues that his 

sentence was 250% above the top of the Guidelines range and, 

therefore, required more explanation from the district court in 

order to sustain the extent of the variance. We find that the 

district court clearly and adequately explained its reasoning 

for the higher sentence. The court identified the relevant 

§ 3553(a) factors underlying its decision and explained the 

reasoning for a sentence significantly above the Guidelines 

range. Johnson cannot show that his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. 

Accordingly, we affirm Johnson’s conviction and 

sentence. We deny Johnson’s motion to file a pro se 

supplemental brief and we dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 
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materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED