Filed 1/17/18

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARIA INES PINEDA AREVALO,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G054483

 (Super. Ct. No. 14NF1456)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Robert 

Alan Knox, Judge. Affirmed.

Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, Supervising Attorney General, Kristine Gutierrez 

and Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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A jury convicted Maria Arevalo of possessing methamphetamine for sale 

(Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). The trial court suspended execution of sentence and 

granted three years formal probation on several conditions. On appeal, Arevalo contends

the probation condition requiring her to maintain a residence approved by her probation 

officer is unconstitutionally overbroad and violates her right to travel and freedom of 

association. She also requests that this court independently review the in camera hearing 

of her Pitchess motion. We find her first contention lacks merit, and the Attorney 

General agrees this court should review the confidential records. We have done so, and 

we affirm the judgment.

FACTS

In 2014, Orange County Sheriff’s Department Investigator Ashra 

Abdelmuti conducted a “controlled buy” between a confidential informant (CI) and 

Arevalo. After the CI purchased methamphetamine from Arevalo, deputies obtained a 

search warrant for Arevalo, her vehicle, and her apartment. 

Abdelmuti spoke to Arevalo at her mother’s house in Anaheim. After 

learning the deputies intended to search her apartment, Arevalo gave them the keys. 

Inside Arevalo’s apartment, deputies found 5.6 ounces of methamphetamine, two large 

digital scales, a box of empty plastic baggies, a plastic sifter, and $1,116 in cash. The 

methamphetamine had a street value between $5,314 and $7,086. Abdelmuti opined the 

items seized indicated the methamphetamine was possessed for sale. 

Arevalo testified in her defense. She stated she was afraid of her exboyfriend Daniel Jose Leon. Leon possessed two guns, and Arevalo once saw him hit a 

friend in the head with a gun. 

Arevalo ended her relationship with Leon in the middle of 2013, but during 

their relationship, she had borrowed $1,500 from him and had not repaid the loan. In

January 2014, Arevalo testified she was employed and dating someone new. Arevalo 

testified Leon was jealous about her new relationship and angry that she had not repaid 
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him the money she owed. Arevalo claimed Leon gave her the methamphetamine and 

drug-related items detectives found in her apartment, and that he forced her to sell 

methamphetamine as a way to repay the money she owed him. She did not want to take 

the drugs but agreed to do so because she believed she and her family (including her then 

five-year-old daughter) were in danger. Leon threatened Arevalo by putting a ninemillimeter gun to her head. Leon was sometimes physically violent towards Arevalo, and 

he said he would hurt her and her daughter if she reported anything to the police. 

Arevalo admitted she sold drugs to the CI. She drove her car to deliver the 

drugs but she did not collect any money from the CI. Arevalo claimed the buyer wanted 

to give the money directly to Leon. She explained the money found in her apartment was 

not related to selling drugs, but was money she was saving “for [her] new visa.” She 

admitted she did not ask her family for the money to repay Leon. She also never told her 

family or the police about Leon’s threats. 

Deputies arrested Leon. During their search of his apartment, they found a 

nine-millimeter gun and a bag of ammunition. 

DISCUSSION

I. Probation Condition

Arevalo maintains the probation conditions requiring her to maintain a 

residence approved by her probation officer are unconstitutionally overbroad and must be 

stricken. The Attorney General maintains the condition is narrowly tailored to serve the 

state’s interests in rehabilitation and reformation. We conclude the approval condition is

constitutionally valid.

Generally, trial courts are given broad discretion in fashioning terms of 

probation in order to foster the reformation and rehabilitation of the offender while 

protecting public safety. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) Therefore, 

we review the imposition of a particular condition of probation for abuse of that 

discretion. “As with any exercise of discretion, the court violates this standard when it 
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imposes a condition of probation that is arbitrary, capricious or exceeds the bounds of 

reason under the circumstances. [Citation.]” (People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 

698, 702.)

However, we review constitutional challenges under a different standard. 

Arevalo’s claim the probation term is unconstitutionally overbroad presents a question of 

law, which we review de novo. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888-889.) Not 

all terms that require a defendant to give up a constitutional right are per se 

unconstitutional. (People v. Mason (1971) 5 Cal.3d 759, 764-765, overruled on a 

different point as stated in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, fn. 1.) “If a 

probation condition serves to rehabilitate and protect public safety, the condition may 

‘impinge upon a constitutional right otherwise enjoyed by the probationer, who is “not 

entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as other citizens.”’” (People v. 

O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355.)

A probation condition cannot be unconstitutionally overbroad. “A 

restriction is unconstitutionally overbroad . . . if it (1) ‘impinge[s] on constitutional 

rights,’ and (2) is not ‘tailored carefully and reasonably related to the compelling state 

interest in reformation and rehabilitation.’ [Citations.] The essential question in an 

overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the 

restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in 

mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity 

will justify some infringement.” (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.) 

Although conditions requiring prior approval of a probationer’s residence 

may affect the constitutional rights to travel and freedom of association (People v. Bauer

(1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 937, 944 (Bauer)), courts have the authority to do so if there is an 

indication the probationer’s living situation contributed to the crime or would contribute 

to future criminality. (People v. Soto (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1228.) A trial court 

may impose probation conditions that place limits on constitutional rights if they are 
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reasonably necessary to meet the twin goals of rehabilitation of the defendant and 

protection of the public. (Bauer, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 940-941.) 

Arevalo relies upon the Bauer case, in which the appellate court struck a 

residence approval condition. (Bauer, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 945.) A jury found 

defendant guilty of false imprisonment and simple assault. (Id. at p. 940.) The trial court 

imposed the restriction to prevent defendant from living with his parents because they 

were overprotective. (Id. at p. 944.) Nothing in that record suggested defendant’s home 

life contributed to the crimes or that his residence was reasonably related to future 

criminality. (Ibid.) Defendant had no prior criminal history and the restriction was not 

proposed by the probation department. (Id. at p. 943.) While noting probation conditions 

requiring approval before traveling or moving can be appropriate under certain 

circumstances, the appellate court determined the restriction in this case impinged on 

defendant’s constitutional right to travel and freedom of association. “Rather than being 

narrowly tailored to interfere as little as possible with these important rights, the 

restriction is extremely broad. The condition gives the probation officer the discretionary 

power, for example, to forbid [defendant] from living with or near his parents—that is, 

the power to banish him. It has frequently been held that a sentencing court does not 

have this power. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 944-945.)

Here, there is nothing in the record to suggest the approval condition was 

designed to banish Arevalo from a particular neighborhood or stop her from living where 

she desires. (See People v. Stapleton (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 989, 995 (Stapleton)

[distinguishing Bauer because “residence condition imposed here is not a wolf in sheep’s 

clothing; it is not designed to banish defendant”].) Moreover, the legal landscape has 

changed since publication of the Bauer opinion. Our Supreme Court stated in People v. 

Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 (Olguin), “A probation condition should be given ‘the 

meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 382.) 

The condition here presumes a probation officer will not withhold approval for irrational 
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or capricious reasons (Id. at p. 383) and will appreciate there are limited housing options 

in Orange County. The approval condition allows the probation officer to supervise 

Arevalo’s residence, because the nature of her crime suggests a need for oversight. The 

probation officer can limit her exposure to sources of temptation for future criminality by, 

for example, not approving residences in close proximity to other drug dealers. Living in 

an area having easy access to drug suppliers could negatively affect her rehabilitation. 

And, if the probation officer disapproves of a particular residence for any arbitrary 

reason, Arevalo may file a petition for modification of her probation condition. (Pen. 

Code, §§ 1203.2, subd. (b)(1), 1203.3, subd. (a); see People v. Keele (1986) 178 

Cal.App.3d 701, 708 [trial court retains jurisdiction to review probation officer’s 

actions].) 

We are also mindful of the legal tenet, “[P]robation is a privilege and not a 

right, and adult probationers, in preference to incarceration, may validly consent to 

limitations upon their constitutional rights. [Citation.] For example, probationers may 

agree to warrantless search conditions or restrictions on their constitutional right of 

association. [Citations.]” (Stapleton, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 994.) “If a defendant 

believes the conditions of probation are more onerous than the potential sentence, he or 

she may refuse probation and choose to serve the sentence. [Citations.]” (Olguin, supra,

45 Cal.4th at p. 379.) For all of the above reasons, we conclude the residence approval 

condition is constitutionally valid. 

II. Review of Record

During discovery, Arevalo requested and was granted review of 

confidential police personnel files. The court provided the witnesses’ names, addresses,

and contact information regarding one incident. Arevalo requests we independently 

review the Pitchess hearing conducted by the trial court. The Attorney General agrees 

we may review the sealed transcript.
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We can independently examine the record made by the trial court “to 

determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a defendant’s motion 

for disclosure of police personnel records.” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 

1285.) We have reviewed the reporter’s transcript and conclude the trial court complied 

with the required Pitchess procedures. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1225.) 

The custodian of records was present and placed under oath. The court independently 

reviewed the relevant personnel file. The proceedings were stenographically recorded.

(Id. p. 1229.) Our independent review finds the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining there was discoverable information with respect to only one incident. We 

conclude the remaining records in the personnel file were not related to false reports or 

dishonesty and were properly withheld from production.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IKOLA, J.

THOMPSON, J.