1The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 99-3416

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Rebecca Howard, *

 *

Appellant, *

 *

v. * Appeal from the United States

 * District Court for the

Boatmen’s National Bank of * Eastern District of Missouri 

St. Louis, *

 * [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

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 Submitted: September 25, 2000

 Filed: September 29, 2000

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Before McMILLIAN, BOWMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit

Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Rebecca Howard appeals from the final judgment entered in the District Court1

for the Eastern District of Missouri, granting summary judgment to Boatmen’s National

Bank of St. Louis (Boatmen’s) in her employment discrimination action. In August

1996, while her charge before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
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(EEOC) was pending, Howard relocated and did not provide the EEOC with her new

address. On May 7, 1997, the EEOC sent Howard a right-to-sue letter, but it was

returned with a note that Howard had moved and had left no forwarding address.

Howard filed her suit on September 4, some 120 days after the EEOC sent the right-tosue letter, indicating in her unverified complaint that an EEOC representative had told

her she could file her complaint within ninety days of the day she actually received the

letter at her new address. The district court granted summary judgment for Boatmen’s,

concluding that Howard’s complaint was filed untimely, and that she was not entitled

to equitable tolling because she had failed to notify the EEOC of her address change.

For reversal, Howard argues the district court abused its discretion in declining to apply

equitable tolling, because (1) she was proceeding pro se at the time she filed her suit,

and (2) she was misled by the information the EEOC representative provided her. For

the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Although Howard was proceeding pro se, “[c]ourts have generally reserved the

remedy of equitable tolling for circumstances which were truly beyond the control of

the plaintiff.” See Hill v. John Chezik Imports, 869 F.2d 1122, 1124 (8th Cir. 1989).

We agree with the district court that, although Howard was proceeding pro se, notifying

the EEOC of her address change, which was her duty, was a task within her control.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7(b) (2000) (Title VII plaintiff has responsibility to provide

EEOC with notice of any address change); Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown,

466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (“One who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable

principles to excuse that lack of diligence.”); Heideman v. PFL, Inc., 904 F.2d 1262,

1266 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Equitable tolling is appropriate only when the circumstances

that cause a plaintiff to miss a filing deadline are out of his [or her] hands.”), cert.

denied, 498 U.S. 1026 (1991).

We also agree with the district court that Howard did not provide any evidence

beyond her unsubstantiated, unverified complaint allegation, of the EEOC

representative’s alleged advice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Jetton v. McDonnell
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Douglas Corp., 121 F.3d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 1997) (when motion for summary judgment

is made, nonmoving party may not rest on complaint alone and “must introduce

affidavits or other evidence to avoid summary judgment”). Accordingly, we affirm the

district court’s judgment.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.