UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before

COOK, CAMPANELLA, and HAIGHT

Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee

v.

Private E1 JORDAN J. JONES

United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20110974

Headquarters, I Corps (Rear) (Provisional)

David L. Conn, Military Judge

Colonel Kurt A. Didier, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Colonel Patricia A. Ham, JA; Captain Matthew R. Laird, JA (on 

brief).

For Appellee: Colonel John P. Carrell, JA; Lieutenant Colonel James L. Varley, JA; 

Major Catherine L. Brantley, JA; Captain Samuel Gabremariam, JA (on brief).

31 December 2013

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION

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Judge HAIGHT:

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, in 

accordance with his pleas, of attempted larceny, conspiracy to commit larceny (nine 

specifications), failure to repair (eight specifications), absence without leave (two 

specifications), willfully disobeying a superior commissioned officer 1, larceny,

(sixteen specifications), obstruction of justice, and bank fraud, in violation of

Articles 80, 81, 86, 90, 121, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 

 

1 We note the military judge, during the providence inquiry, neither defined “willful 

disobedience” for appellant nor provided the Military Judge’s Benchbook 

explanation of that element as “an intentional defiance of authority.”
JONES—ARMY 20110974

2

§§ 880, 881, 886, 890, 921, 934 (2006) [hereinafter UCMJ].2 The military judge

sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, to be confined for four years, and 

forfeiture of all pay and allowances. The convening authority approved the 

adjudged sentence and credited appellant with 168 days of confinement credit 

against the sentence to confinement.

This case is before us for review under Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant raises 

one assignment of error to this court as well as matters pursuant to United States v. 

Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982). However, a separate issue must first be

addressed and resolved.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

“In a case referred to it, the Court of Criminal Appeals may act only with 

respect to the findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority.” UCMJ 

art. 66(c). In this case, the convening authority’s action makes no mention of the 

findings of the court-martial. Rule for Courts-Martial [hereinafter R.C.M.] 1107(c) 

provides that “[a]ction on the findings is not required.” However, “a convening 

authority who does not expressly address findings in the action impliedly acts in 

reliance on the statutorily required recommendation of the [staff judge advocate

(SJA)] and thus effectively purports to approve implicitly the findings as reported to 

the convening authority by the SJA.” United States v. Diaz, 40 MJ 335, 337 

(C.M.A. 1994) (internal citation omitted). 

Here, neither the staff judge advocate’s recommendation (SJAR) to the 

convening authority nor its addendum lists or details the findings adjudged at 

appellant’s court-martial, but both instead properly rely upon the Result of Trial, 

included as an enclosure to the SJAR. In accordance with R.C.M. 1106, the SJAR is 

required to contain “a copy of the report of results of the trial, setting forth the 

findings, sentence, and confinement credit to be applied.” R.C.M. 1106(d)(3)

(emphasis added). However, in this case, the standard DA Form 4430 Report of 

Result of Trial that was enclosed with the SJAR omitted The Charge and its two 

specifications. Instead, the findings and specifications listed and detailed on the DA 

Form 4430 begin with Additional Charge I. 3 

 

2

The Charge consisted of two specifications of Article 134, UCMJ, for wrongfully 

communicating a threat and obstructing justice. The remaining offenses were 

contained in Additional Charges I-VIII.

3

This clerical omission of The Charge and its specifications is somewhat 

understandable given that appellant was ultimately charged with seventy-six 

specifications under nine charges.
JONES—ARMY 20110974

3

Therefore, we are unable to determine whether the convening authority was 

aware of the findings of the court with respect to The Charge and its specifications, 

and we do not know if he approved the finding of guilty to Specification 2 of The 

Charge.

4

“Simply put, if the SJAR omits or misstates a finding of guilty, we have no 

jurisdiction to affirm it. We may either affirm only those findings of guilty (or 

portions thereof) that are correctly and unambiguously stated in the SJAR, or return 

the case to the convening authority for a new SJAR and action.” United States v. 

Henderson, 56 M.J. 911, 913 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2002). We opt to return this 

case as the obstruction of justice offense formed at least part of the basis for 

appellant’s pretrial confinement. Nor do we find this crime, which carries a 

maximum punishment that includes five years confinement and a dishonorable 

discharge, to be insignificant.

CONCLUSION

The convening authority’s initial action, dated 17 May 2012, is set aside. The 

record of trial is returned to The Judge Advocate General for a new staff judge 

advocate recommendation and a new action by the same or different convening 

authority in accordance with Article 60(c)-(e), UCMJ. 

Senior Judge COOK and Judge CAMPANELLA concur.

 

4

Specification 1 of The Charge was dismissed.

ANTHONY O. POTTINGER

Chief Deputy Clerk of Court

FOR THE COURT: