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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before

publication in the New York Reports.

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No. 45 

The People &c.,

 Respondent,

 v.

Clemon Jones, 

 Appellant.

John A. Cirando, for appellant.

Geoffrey Kaeuper, for respondent.

READ, J.:

On March 16, 2007, defendant Clemon Jones was

convicted, following a jury trial, of criminal possession of a

forged instrument in the second degree (Penal Law § 170.25 [two

counts]). On April 6, 2007, the People applied to County Court

to have defendant adjudicated a persistent felony offender,

pursuant to Penal Law § 70.10. Subdivision (1) of this provision

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defines a "persistent felony offender" as

"(a) . . . a person, other than a persistent

violent felony offender . . . , who stands

convicted of a felony after having previously

been convicted of two or more felonies, as

provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this

subdivision.

(b) A previous felony within the meaning of

paragraph (a) of this subdivision is a

conviction of a felony in this state, or of a

crime in any other jurisdiction, provided:

(i) that a sentence to a term of imprisonment

in excess of one year, . . . was imposed

therefor; and 

(ii) that the defendant was imprisoned under

sentence for such conviction prior to the

commission of the present felony; . . . 

(c) For the purpose of determining whether a

person has two or more previous felony

convictions, two or more convictions of

crimes that were committed prior to the time

the defendant was imprisoned under sentence

for any of such convictions shall be deemed

to be only one conviction (emphasis added)."

In support of their application to County Court, the

People relied on three sets of defendant's prior felony

convictions. First, on March 14, 1991, defendant was convicted

in the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Florida

of two federal felonies -- making a false statement on a Bureau

of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms form (18 USC § 924 [a]), and

being a convicted felon possessing a firearm (id. § 922 [g]). 

Neither federal crime has a New York counterpart. Second, on

January 3, 1994, defendant was convicted in New York of the

felony of attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance

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in the fifth degree (Penal Law §§ 110; 220.06). And third, on

March 17, 1995, defendant was convicted in New York of three more

felonies: second-degree criminal sale of a controlled substance

(id. § 220.41) and third-degree criminal possession of a

controlled substance (id. § 220.16 [two counts]). 

After two days of hearings in July 2007, County Court

issued a decision and order on September 4, 2007, finding that

defendant was a persistent felony offender and concluding that a

recidivist sentence was warranted by virtue of his "history and

character . . . and the nature and circumstances of his criminal

conduct" (see id. § 70.10 [2]; see also CPL 400.20 [9]). As

relevant to his finding that defendant had previously been

convicted of the "two or more" felonies required to qualify as a

persistent felony offender (Penal Law § 70.10 [1] [a]), the judge

observed that although defendant correctly contended that

"the [1994 and 1995] state court convictions

at issue may only be counted as one pursuant

to Penal Law § 70.10 (1) (c) (since defendant

was not imprisoned for the first crime[s]

until after he had committed the second), the

earlier federal convictions stand separate

and apart from the state convictions and are

unaffected by this statutory provision."

County Court sentenced defendant to two concurrent

indeterminate terms of incarceration of 15 years to life for his

forgery crimes. On February 14, 2014, the Appellate Division

unanimously affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence (114

AD3d 1239 [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 1038 [2014]).

Meanwhile, prior to the disposition of his direct

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appeal, defendant moved pro se in July 2009 for an order pursuant

to CPL 440.20 to set aside his sentence as "unconstitutional,

unauthorized, illegally imposed and invalid as a matter of law

since the two felony convictions . . . relied upon . . . do not

have equivalent elements to crimes under New York State Law." 

Defendant contended that County Court impermissibly "determine[d]

that [he] was a persistent felony offender instead of a second

felony offender and sentenced him accordingly in violation of his

due process rights."

County Court denied defendant's CPL 440.20 motion by

order dated August 26, 2009; on November 30, 2009, a Justice of

the Appellate Division granted defendant permission to appeal to

that court; and in September 2013, the Appellate Division

unanimously affirmed County Court's order (109 AD3d 1108 [4th

Dept 2013]). The court noted that defendant "primarily relie[d]

upon cases interpreting the second felony offender statute [Penal

Law § 70.06]," which -- unlike Penal Law § 70.10 -- specifies

that a predicate conviction "'must have been in [New York] of a

felony, or in any other jurisdiction of an offense for which a

sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year . . .

was authorized and is authorized in [New York] irrespective of

whether such sentence was imposed'" (id. at 1110, quoting Penal

Law § 70.06 [1] [b] [i] [emphasis added]). By contrast, the

persistent felony offender statute "contains no language

requiring that the underlying out-of-state conviction be for a

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crime that would constitute a felony in New York" (id.). 

The Appellate Division also pointed out that "the

legislative history of the persistent felony offender statute

reflects that the drafters specifically considered and rejected

the contention advanced by defendant" (id. at 1111, citing

Griffin v Mann, 156 F3d 288, 291 [2d Cir 1998]). Additionally,

the court declined to follow Third Department cases relied upon

by defendant, noting that they "trac[ed] back" to People v Morton

(48 AD2d 58 [3d Dept 1975]), which was "effectively overruled" by

us in People v Parker (41 NY2d 21 [1976]) (109 AD3d at 1111,

1112). A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal

(22 NY3d 1157 [2014]), and we now affirm.

New York's persistent felony offender statute, by its

plain terms, does not require that, in order to classify someone

as a persistent felony offender, an out-of-state predicate felony

must have a New York counterpart. Section 70.10's silence with

regard to New York equivalency is dispositive. As the Second

Circuit explained in Griffin, when holding that section 70.10 was

rational as applied to the defendant in that case,

"[s]ection 70.10 (1) (b) does not distinguish

among felony convictions that arise under

federal, New York State, or out-of-state law. 

Thus, if the acts constitute a felony under

federal or another state's law, they will be

deemed a felony for purposes of persistent

offender status under [s]ection 70.10 even if

there is no counterpart felony in New York

law" (Griffin, 156 F3d at 290 [emphasis

added]; see also People v Ortiz, 283 AD2d

256, 256 [1st Dept 2001], lv denied 96 NY2d

922 [2001]).

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Further, section 70.10's legislative history shows that

the New York equivalency test, as construed in People v Olah (300

NY 96 [1949]), was "explicitly considered and rejected at the

time of [section 70.10's] enactment" (Griffin, 156 F3d at 291;

see also 109 AD3d at 1111, quoting Staff Notes of Temp St Commn

on Rev of Penal Law and Crim Code, 1964 Proposed NY Penal Law

[Study Bill, 1964 Senate Intro 3918, Assembly Intro 5376] § 30.10

at 285). Accordingly, like the Appellate Division, we refuse to

adopt defendant's proposed construction of Penal Law § 70.10. 

Finally, defendant's facial constitutional challenge to

Penal Law § 70.10 is unpreserved, and his as-applied

constitutional challenge lacks merit. Accordingly, the order of

the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Order affirmed. Opinion by Judge Read. Chief Judge Lippman and

Judges Pigott, Rivera, Abdus-Salaam and Stein concur. Judge

Fahey took no part.

Decided March 26, 2015

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