[Cite as In re A.H., 2014-Ohio-5717.]

STATE OF OHIO, JEFFERSON COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

IN THE MATTER OF A.H. AND H.H., 

MINOR CHILDREN, E.C., 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 

V. 

MICHELE HECK, 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, 

AND 

EUGENE HECK, 

 DEFENDANT. 

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CASE NOS. 13 JE 21 

 13 JE 22 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Court of Common 

Pleas, Juvenile Division of Jefferson 

County, Ohio 

Case Nos. 2007CU00014, 

2007CU00015 

JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 
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APPEARANCES: 

DATED: December 24, 2014 

For Plaintiff-Appellee 

For Appellee 

JCDJFS 

Emily Curtiss, Pro-se 

2504 Crabbe Street, Apr. D 

Steubenville, Ohio 43952 

Attorney Edward Littlejohn 

16001 S.R. 7 

Steubenville, Ohio 43952 

For Defendant-Appellant 

For Defendant 

Michele Heck, Pro-se 

1040 Cadiz Road 

Lot 17 

Wintersville, Ohio 43953 

Eugene Heck, Pro-se 

1603 North 1st Street 

Neodesha, KS 66757 

 

 

 
[Cite as In re A.H., 2014-Ohio-5717.]

DONOFRIO, J. 

{¶1} Appellant, M.H., appeals from a Jefferson County Common Pleas 

Court, Juvenile Division decision denying her motion for legal custody of her two 

teenage children and ordering that the children remain in the legal custody of their 

maternal grandmother. 

{¶2} This case involves the legal custody of appellant’s two children: H.H. 

(d.o.b. 3/16/99) and A.H. (d.o.b 5/9/00). The children resided with appellant and their 

father for some time. But in 2007, both parents were incarcerated. Appellant was 

serving a one-year prison term for sexual battery of a minor and the children’s father 

was serving a sentence for sexual imposition of a minor. 

{¶3} On March 26, 2007, with the parents’ consent, the trial court granted 

legal custody of the children to E.C, .the children’s maternal grandmother. 

{¶4} On February 11, 2013, appellant filed motions for reallocation of 

parental rights and responsibilities. She requested that the court grant her 

permanent custody of her children. She noted that she had completed her 

incarceration and five years of postrelease control. Appellant also stated that she 

has been very active in the children’s lives and that they spend a considerable 

amount of time with her. 

{¶5} The matter proceeded to a hearing before a magistrate. Appellant and 

E.C. both appeared pro-se. E.C. indicated that she was in agreement with granting 

legal custody to appellant. (Tr. 3). She stated that she waived her rights to a 

hearing, counsel, confrontation of witnesses, and compulsory process. (Tr. 3-4). 

E.C. stated that she believed it was in the children’s best interest for the court to 

transfer custody to appellant. (Tr. 4). 

{¶6} The magistrate asked appellant why the children were placed with E.C. 

in 2007. Appellant told the magistrate that she “had a very bad lapse in judgment” 

and she ended up incarcerated because she had “a consensual sexual relationship 

with somebody who was 17-1/2.” (Tr. 5). She then stated she completed her oneyear prison term and her five years of post-release control. (Tr. 5). Appellant also 

stated that she had four years left on her ten-year requirement for registering as a 
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sexual offender. (Tr. 6). 

{¶7} Appellant also told the magistrate that since she had been out of prison, 

the children had spent every weekend with her and she supported them by 

purchasing their clothing. (Tr. 6). She stated that she now lives with her husband 

(not the children’s father) and the children have their own furnished bedrooms at her 

house. (Tr. 7). 

{¶8} The magistrate recommended, based on appellant’s testimony and 

E.C.’s agreement, that the trial court grant appellant’s motion and designate 

appellant as the children’s legal custodian. The magistrate further recommended that 

the trial court order appellee, the Jefferson County Department of Job and Family 

Services Children Services Division, to have protective supervision over the children. 

The magistrate provided a copy of his decision to appellee. 

{¶9} Upon receiving the magistrate’s decision, appellee filed objections with 

the trial court. Appellee argued that appellant should not be granted custody of the 

children due to her history of sexual abuse of her stepson. It stated that it had not 

been made aware of appellant’s motion for reallocation of parental rights and 

responsibilities and, therefore, did not appear at the hearing on the motion. Appellee 

noted that it did not have an open case plan at the time because the children were 

placed in their grandmother’s custody when appellant went to prison. 

{¶10} Appellee then set out numerous factual allegations. It stated that it had 

been involved in the investigation dealing with appellant and her stepson. It further 

provided many details surrounding appellant’s affair with her stepson and other 

allegations of inappropriate sexual behavior alleged to have occurred in appellant’s 

house. Appellee requested that the court deny appellant’s motion for custody and 

maintain E.C. as the children’s legal custodian. 

{¶11} Appellant then filed objections to appellee’s objections. In her 

objections to the objections, appellant also set out numerous factual allegations to 

rebut those factual allegations appellee set out. 

{¶12} The trial court overruled appellant’s objections to the objections. It then 
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denied appellant’s motions for custody. It ordered that the children were to remain in 

E.C.’s custody. It further ordered appellant was to have supervised visitation with the 

children and was not to have overnight visits. 

{¶13} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on August 8, 2013. 

{¶14} Because appellee was not a party to the custody proceedings between 

appellant and E.C., this court put on an order asking appellee to explain why it should 

be considered a party to this appeal. Appellee responded by stating that it did not file 

a dependency case when appellant went to prison because the children were placed 

in E.C.’s custody. It acknowledged that it was not a party to the proceedings on 

appellant’s motion for legal custody. But appellee notes that the magistrate granted 

the motion and returned the children to appellant subject to its protective supervision. 

Appellee notes that it then filed objections, which the trial court sustained. It 

maintains that the grant of protective supervision confers to it an interest in the 

subject matter of the action. 

{¶15} Because the magistrate recommended protective supervision to 

appellee, appellee had standing to raise objections in the trial court and to pursue the 

matter in this court. Therefore, we will consider its brief on appeal. 

{¶16} Appellant, acting pro se, does not set out assignments of error 

presented for review or a statement of the issues for review as required by App.R. 

16(A)(3)(4). But it is clear from her argument that she is asserting the trial court erred 

in overruling her motion to grant legal custody of her two children to her. 

{¶17} Appellant argues that for the last five years, while the children have 

been in E.C.’s custody, she has been in close contact with her children without any 

problems. She asserts that her children want to reside with her and their interests 

should be considered. She further states that E.C. is in agreement with relinquishing 

custody to her. Appellant asks this court to place the children in her custody. In the 

alternative, she asks that we reverse that part of the trial court’s judgment requiring 

her to have only supervised visitation with her children. 

{¶18} A trial court's decision regarding the custody of a child which is 
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supported by competent and credible evidence will not be reversed absent an abuse 

of discretion. Bechtol v. Bechtol, 49 Ohio St.3d 21, 550 N.E.2d 178 (1990), syllabus; 

Rohrbaugh v. Rohrbaugh, 136 Ohio App.3d 599, 603, 737 N.E.2d 551 (7th 

Dist.2000). A trial court has broad discretionary powers in child custody proceedings. 

Reynolds v. Goll, 75 Ohio St.3d 121, 124, 661 N.E.2d 1008 (1996). This discretion 

should be accorded the utmost respect by a reviewing court in light of the gravity of 

the proceedings and the impact that a custody determination has on the parties 

involved. Trickey v. Trickey, 158 Ohio St. 9, 13, 106 N.E.2d 772 (1952). 

{¶19} In this case, in 2007, appellant and the children’s father agreed to grant 

E.C. legal custody of the children. “Legal custody” is 

a legal status that vests in the custodian the right to have physical care 

and control of the child and to determine where and with whom the child 

shall live, and the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the child 

and to provide the child with food, shelter, education, and medical care, 

all subject to any residual parental rights, privileges, and 

responsibilities. 

R.C. 2151.011(B)(21). Legal custody is not the same as the termination of parental 

rights and, therefore, a parent may regain custody of their child at some later time. In 

re A.S., 8th Dist. Nos. 100530, 100531, 2014-Ohio-3035, ¶24. 

{¶20} The problem in this case is that there was never an evidentiary hearing. 

Because E.C. agreed to appellant’s motion, no testimony was taken. And because 

appellee was not involved in the case at that time, it did not have an opportunity to 

present evidence. The only “facts” the trial court had before it in rendering its 

decision were those alleged by appellee in its objections to the magistrate’s decision 

and those alleged by appellant in her objections to the objections. The court never 

heard any testimony or took any evidence. There is no way to determine if the trial 

court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for reallocation of parental 

rights and responsibilities. 
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{¶21} Once the magistrate recommended that appellee be granted protective 

supervision in this case, the court should have held a hearing where both appellant 

and appellee could have presented witnesses and evidence. Then it could have 

made a decision based on the evidence instead of on the parties’ allegations. 

Therefore, this matter will be remanded to the trial court so that it can hold an 

evidentiary hearing on appellant’s motion. 

{¶22} Accordingly, appellant’s argument has merit. 

{¶23} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby 

reversed and the matter is remanded for the court to hold a hearing where appellant 

and appellee can present evidence. 

Waite, J., concurs. 

DeGenaro, P.J., concurs.