alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 204 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. CON. RES. 204

                To correct the enrollment of H.R. 3759.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 8, 1994

 Mr. Solomon submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was 
    referred jointly to the Committees on House Administration and 
                             Appropriations

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
                To correct the enrollment of H.R. 3759.

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That, in the enrollment of H.R. 3759, making emergency supplemental 
appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1994, and for 
other purposes, the Clerk of the House shall make the following 
correction:
    At the end of title II, add the following new section:
    ``Sec. 202. The rescissions made by this title shall only be used 
for offsetting the emergency supplemental appropriations made by this 
Act and shall not be counted as congressional actions in determining 
the fiscal year 1994 deficit or discretionary spending amounts for 
fiscal year 1994 for purposes of the enforcement provisions of the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.''.

                                 <all>
```
#### MARSHALL v. STATE.

No. 24888.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 15, 1950.

Ben Henderson, Dallas, for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

The appeal is from a conviction for aggravated assault, with a’ fine of One Thousand Dollars.

The appellant, a male person seventy-seven years of age, was,'charged with an aggravated assault on a female. H.e was the owner and operator of a business known as the Bama Pie Company, with plants in nine large cities over the country, and was assisting his daughter in the operation of the Dallas plant. Prose-cutrix, a young girl, was employed in the Dallas factory. According to her story, appellant had been getting around close to her in her work, winking at her, etc. She says she went into the Stock room 'for supplies and was followed by appellant who grabbed her from behind and fondled her person. ’ She says he asked her to kiss him and called' her “sweetie-pie”. She claims that she reported the matter to her superior immediately, but this does not seem to be verified by any circumstances or the evidence of any other witness in the case. She reported the matter to her parents who caused her to file a complaint.

The bills of exception were not filed in time and cannot be considered by this Court. They did not come forward with the record. Appellant has filed a motion in this Court asking that the clerk be directed to send a supplemental transcript containing the bills. This motion is accompanied' by a copy of the bills. The State has contested same with a certificate of the trial judge which controverts the grounds alleged upon which the writ for certiorari is sought. We have examined the copies of the bills accompanying the application and find no error shown by them, even if they had been approved and in the record. It therefore becomes a useless procedure to order them sent up with the record. The contest of the-State is not denied and, accordingly, the writ is refused.

We find no reversible error in the procedure reflected by the record and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §

§

v. § 2:22-CR-00026-Z-BR

§

ROSALBA SOTELO (1) §

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

CONCERNING PLEA OF GUILTY

ROSALBA SOTELO (1), by consent, under authority of United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 1997), has 

appeared before me pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, and has entered a plea of guilty to Count 2 of the Indictment. After 

cautioning and examining ROSALBA SOTELO (1) under oath concerning each of the subjects mentioned in Rule 11, I 

determined that the guilty plea was knowledgeable and voluntary and that the offense charged is supported by an 

independent basis in fact containing each of the essential elements of such offense. I therefore recommend that the plea of 

guilty be accepted, and that ROSALBA SOTELO (1) be adjudged guilty of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) -

POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE METHAMPHETAMINE and have sentence imposed accordingly. After 

being found guilty of the offense by the District Judge,

☒ The defendant is currently in custody and should be ordered to remain in custody.

☐ The defendant must be ordered detained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) unless the Court finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community 

if released.

☐ The Government does not oppose release.

☐ The defendant has been compliant with the current conditions of release.

☐ I find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other 

person or the community if released and should therefore be released under § 3142(b) or (c).

☐ The Government opposes release.

☐ The defendant has not been compliant with the conditions of release.

☐ If the Court accepts this recommendation, this matter should be set for hearing upon motion of the 

Government.

☐ The defendant must be ordered detained pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) unless (1)(a) the Court finds there is a 

substantial likelihood that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted, or (b) the Government has 

recommended that no sentence of imprisonment be imposed, or (c) exceptional circumstances are clearly shown 

under § 3145(c) why the defendant should not be detained, and (2) the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence 

that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community if released.

Date: July 19, 2022

______________________________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE

Failure to file written objections to this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days from the date of its 

service shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking such Report and Recommendation before the assigned United States 

District Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

Case 2:22-cr-00026-Z-BR Document 75 Filed 07/19/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 182
Exhibit 12(a)(2)  CERTIFICATION  I, Juan Antonio Quiroga
García, certify that:  1.  I have reviewed
this annual report on Form 20-F of Gruma, S.A. de C.V.;  2.  Based on my
knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;  3.  Based on my
knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included
in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for,
the periods presented in this report;  4.  The companys
other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining
disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the company and have:  a.  designed such disclosure controls and
procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed
under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others
within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is
being prepared;  b.  evaluated the effectiveness of the companys
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions
about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the
end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  c.  disclosed in this report any change in the
companys internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
period covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the companys internal control over
financial reporting; and  5.  The companys
other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the companys
auditors and the audit committee of companys board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):  a.  all significant deficiencies and material
weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls over financial
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the companys ability
to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  b.  any fraud, whether or not material, that
involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the
companys internal control over financial reporting.   /s/ Juan Antonio
  Quiroga GarcíaName:
  Juan Antonio Quiroga
  GarcíaTitle:
  Chief Corporate Officer
   Date: June 30, 2006  1
#### FITZGERALD v. STATE.

No. 24972.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 11, 1950.

None on appeal for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s ’Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Conviction was for the theft of cattle, punishment assessed being five years’ confinement in the penitentiary.

Appellant perfected his. appeal to this court. He now files his personal affidavit advising that he desires no further to prosecute his appeal, and asking that he be permitted to withdraw the same.

At his request the appeal is dismissed.
#### GALBERT v. STATE.

No. 21701.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 29, 1941.

John Davenport, of Wichita Falls, for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Conviction is for operating an open saloon; punishment assessed at a fine of $250.

The record is before this court without bills of exception or statement of facts, in which condition nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      Exhibit 16

                    [JONES, JENSEN & COMPANY LLC LETTERHEAD]


April 17, 2000

Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20549

Ladies and Gentleman:

We were previously the independent accountants for Titan Motorcycle Co. of
America. On December 28, 1998, we were dismissed as the independent accountants
of Titan Motorcycle Co. of America.

We have read Titan Motorcycle Co. of America's statements included under Item 4
of its 2000 Form 10-KSB dated April 17, 2000, and we agree with such statements.

Very truly yours,


/s/ Jones, Jensen & Company

Jones, Jensen & Company
#### The Western Bank & Trust Co., Appellant, *v.*Atkinson, Admr. of Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, Appellee.

(No. 27861

Decided November 27, 1940.)

*353*Messrs. Pech, Shaffer, Williams & Gorman,*for appellant.

*Mr. Thomas J. Herbert,*attorney general, and *Mr. John P. Walsh,*for appellee.

Weygandt, C. J.

The answer to the single question requiring the attention of this court is found in Section 1345-lc(E)4, General Code, which reads in part as follows:

> “E. The term employment shall not include: * * *

> “ (4) Service performed in the employ of any governmental unit, municipal or public corporation, political subdivision, or instrumentality of the United States or of one or more states or political subdivisions in the exercise of purely governmental functions.”

Is the plaintiff an “instrumentality of the United States” by reason of the sole fact that it is a voluntary member of the Federal Reserve System? If so, it is exempt from payment of the assessments required by the Unemployment Compensation Act; otherwise the plaintiff must pay the assessments, and its employees will be entitled thereby to the benefits of the act.

Without attempting to formulate a rigid definition of the term “instrumentality of the United States,” as employed in Section 1345-lc(E)4, General Code, this court, experiences little difficulty in reaching the unanimous conclusion that the plaintiff fails to answer that description. It is a privately organized and owned corporation, existing under and by virtue of the statutory law of this state alone. Its authorized purpose is the conduct of a general banking and trust business in this state for profit to its shareholders. Under these circumstances the usual presumption of taxability clearly would apply. However, the plaintiff contends that the additional circumstance of voluntary membership in the Federal Reserve System *ipso facto*transforms its essential character into that of an instrumentality of the United States. That no such im*354portance attaches to this incidental feature is apparent upon a study of the petition.

Numerous cases are cited in the briefs, but counsel cannot agree that any one of them is exactly in point.

Since this court is of the opinion that the plaintiff is not an instrumentality of the United States, no question of constitutionality arises.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals sustaining the defendant’s demurrer to the plaintiff’s petition is hereby affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Day, Zimmerman, Turner, Williams, Matthias and Hart, JJ., concur.
#### HARLEY v. STATE.

No. 22249.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 4, 1942.

Leo C. Brady, Drew Davis, and Dick Young, all of Houston, for appellant.

*465Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

The offense is negligent homicide in the first degree. The punishment assessed is confinement in the county jail for a period of seven months.

The only question presented for review is the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction. It appears from the evidence that on the day in question and a very short time prior to the commission of the offense charged, appellant shot a man; that immediately after the shooting he ran to his home, got into his automobile and started to leave the city; that while driving down Morrison Street he ran upon and against Mrs. L. S. Hamilton, knocking her down and inflicting severe injuries upon her from the effects of which she died within two hours. The evidence also shows that after he had struck the lady his car left the pavement and ran upon a dump near the bayou, where it hogged down and appellant was unable to extricate it. He did not go to the person whom he had struck to ascertain if she was hurt or to render her any aid whatever, but, on the ■ contrary, he fled on foot to Hempstead and from there to San Antonio. He later came back to the city of Houston where he remained in seclusion for more than two weeks, at which time he surrendered to the officers after he had conferred with his lawyers.

■ We think the evidence justifies the conclusion that appellant was operating the car at the time in question at a higher speed than was prudent under the circumstances. It seems that he was 'in a hurry from the time he shot the man, because he ran to his home, got into his car and began driving it. Just why he was leaving his home at 6:00 P. M., when it was getting dark and where he was intending to go is unexplained by him. The fact that the car left the pavement after it struck Mrs. Hamilton and ran upon the dump where it bogged down indicates that he was operating the car in such a careless manner as to be inconsistent with the safety of pedestrians upon the streets of the city. That he was in a hurry, that he struck a lady, together with the fact that his automobile left the street, were facts and circumstances upon which the court could base his conclusion that appellant operated his car, at the time in question, in a careless manner.

From what we have said it follows that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, and it is- so ordered.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ABILENE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

NO. 1:22-CR-028-01-H

FERNANDO ENRIQUEZ (1),

Defendant.

After reviewing all relevant matters of record, including the Notice Regarding Entry

of a Plea of Guilty, the Consent of the Defendant, and the Report and Recommendation

Conceming Plea of Guilty of the United States Magistrate Judge, and no objections thereto

having been filed within fourteen (14) days of service in accordance wift 28 U.S.C.

S 636OX1), the undersigned District Judge is of the opinion that the Report and

Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge conceming the Plea of Guilty is correct, and it is

hereby accepted by the Court. Accordingly, the Court accepts the plea of guilty and

Defendant is hereby adjudged guilty.

Sentence will be imposed in accordance with the Court's scheduling order.

SO ORDERED.

oatedtriry ?L,2022.

JAME WESLEY HENDRIX

D STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

OR"DER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNTTED STATES MAGISTRATE JIJDGE

CONCERNING PLEA OF GUILTY

Case 1:22-cr-00028-H-BU Document 28 Filed 07/22/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID 62
EXHIBIT 21 

SUBSIDIARIES OF STANADYNE HOLDINGS, INC. 

Precision Engine Products Corp. 

Stanadyne Automotive Holding Corp., a Delaware corporation 

Stanadyne Corporation, a Delaware corporation 

Stanadyne, SpA, a S.p.A. company incorporated in Italy 

StanadyneAmalgamations Private Limited a private limited company incorporated in India (fully consolidated based on the company’s 51% controlling share, while the remaining 49% is recorded as a minority interest) 

SUBSIDIARIES OF STANADYNE CORPORATION 

Precision Engine Products Corp.

Stanadyne, SpA, a S.p.A. company incorporated in Italy 

Stanadyne Amalgamations Private Limited a private limited company incorporated in India (fully consolidated based on the company’s 51% controlling share, while the remaining 49% is recorded as a minority interest)
## PaULl^Bl^L p<^L JofM CoyrVr& Cj \ rM a cAjfVflggg-^-

gje: Qe^r Clerk OEC 31 2014 AQS" &«q« FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS Abel Acosta, Clerk 

### 5?rtC€/t-Vy, 

# Jk##

cu c T tA^5^ 

### ^w re**-i&* lor^M

## fk\c erf 6rrAU^uj^kll^. 

# dgi/^l* for Co^VA?folA^_gS^^ 4 

# To 4W \W<^ 3^ 6^ £^ csu^

TO C3 (WVJVN^cWiWli TcnA t sSteC«Wy,7cX^~7£Z£&_

## 60^ tvxA^Oc Code cH^-\ ^^^' ^oW, ^ l|.W6oc^>Ac\5c-a^l c<L*yt±\* Le*^ e«e cocx4r 4o QroeeU l/vtiKm^^^^. (9*V -1- H<HX. r\o ^x£e o4 Income e*~ Sfoo&ftY 9 aos*w«-. 

## ^ Oof'"5 rv^ XACC^e/f^— '* •HtTo^s ^t^4m^W(lflmM«V-Su&+ef 3rMo« » . . • . . „\^ ^x „r D1i;UcrvJ income -fr©/r\cw Soiree

# tTn: \W w«\ Oeb^ J A^-^rll^^-' (f>7} 3T cue S M'A ^ ca\ikM^ •
TO C5 **" l^5J2iz^
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE FORM 10-KSB FOR THE YEAR ENDED 12-31-99
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                       5,884,827
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  278,393
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (40,000)
<INVENTORY>                                    536,494
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             6,894,966
<PP&E>                                         768,943
<DEPRECIATION>                               (176,532)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               8,238,060
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,242,634
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         7,496
<OTHER-SE>                                   6,863,232
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 8,238,060
<SALES>                                      1,674,174
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,674,174
<CGS>                                        2,029,208
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,029,208
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,201,499
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            (81,615)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (3,474,918)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (3,474,918)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,474,918)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.58)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.58)


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM STANADYNE
AUTOMOTIVE CORP.'S ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,
1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FORM 10-K.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                           4,057
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   40,906
<ALLOWANCES>                                       610
<INVENTORY>                                     36,582
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                90,746
<PP&E>                                         148,709
<DEPRECIATION>                                  29,098
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 306,105
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           56,159
<BONDS>                                        136,263
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      61,681
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   306,105
<SALES>                                        281,580
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               281,580
<CGS>                                          224,204
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  259,720
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              14,098
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  8,284
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,128
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              5,156
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    750
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     5,906
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>