COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Annunziata and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

ANGIE JONES MAYHUGH 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 1200-96-2 BY JUDGE MARVIN F. COLE 

 MARCH 4, 1997 

GENE A. MAYHUGH 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPOMATTOX COUNTY 

Kenneth W. Farrar, Judge Pro Tempore

 Philip B. Baker (Joseph A. Sanzone 

Associates, on brief), for appellant. 

 John J. O'Keeffe, Jr. (Jennifer E. Stille; 

O'Keeffe & Spies, on brief), for appellee. 

 On this appeal from a final decree of divorce, Angie Jones 

Mayhugh (wife) contends that the trial court erred by (1) 

granting Gene A. Mayhugh (husband) a divorce on the grounds of 

post-separation adultery, (2) evaluating the marital residence 

without consideration of the passive appreciation of wife's 

separate portion, (3) determining that the tanning business was 

marital property, (4) failing to apportion to husband a share of 

the debts associated with the tanning business, and (5) assessing 

all of the debt of the rental property to wife without giving her 

benefit of the asset. We affirm the judgment. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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 I. 

 The parties were married in August, 1984 and separated in 

November, 1993. A divorce decree was granted to husband on the 

ground of adultery on April 30, 1996. 

 In 1985, wife received the marital residence as a gift from 

her father. An appraisal indicated that the value of the house 

at the time wife received it was $19,400. The property was never 

jointly titled. However, husband made significant improvements 

to the residence by constructing an addition and renovating the 

existing portion of the house. The real estate appraisal valued 

the house as improved at $53,000 at the time of the evidentiary 

hearing. The trial court found that $19,400 of the value of the 

marital residence was the separate property of wife, resulting in 

a $33,600 marital portion of the marital residence. 

 During the marriage, the parties financed the acquisition of 

a rental property and two lots by taking two mortgages on the 

marital residence. The trial court awarded the marital residence 

to wife and directed her to pay the first and second mortgages on 

the residence because she received that property. The trial 

court awarded the rental property and two lots to husband. 

 Wife testified that, in 1983 before she was married, she 

started a tanning business, using her own money and loans 

acquired from her father. Husband testified that he gave $13,000 

to wife in order to start the tanning business. The business 

operated from the parties' Appomattox house until 1990. 
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 In the summer of 1990, wife started another tanning business 

in Lynchburg, borrowing money to fund this business. Testimony 

conflicted as to whether husband assisted in the operation of the 

tanning salons. The trial court classified the tanning business 

as marital property, awarded wife the business, and directed her 

to pay debts associated with the business. The trial court 

assessed the value of the business by averaging the valuations 

given by the parties. 

 II. 

 Wife first challenges the trial court's ruling granting 

husband the divorce based on the ground of wife's adultery. She 

argues that the adultery occurred post-separation and was not the 

sole cause for the dissolution of the marriage. 

 The fact that the adultery occurred after the 

parties separated does not lead inexorably to 

the conclusion that the adultery had nothing 

to do with the breakdown of the marriage. 

"The commission of adultery during that 

period [of separation] by either party to a 

marriage in trouble is the one act most 

likely to frustrate and prevent a 

reconciliation." Moreover, the ground for 

divorce need not have caused the 

deterioration of the marriage in order to 

award a divorce on such basis. The ground 

may be only the legal requirement which the 

legislature has recognized must exist before 

public policy will permit courts to dissolve 

a failed marriage. 

Derby v. Derby, 8 Va. App. 19, 24, 378 S.E.2d 74, 76 (1989) 

(citations omitted). 

 Wife admits that she committed post-separation adultery. 

Although she argues that her adultery was not the sole cause for 
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the dissolution of the marriage, "[i]t is well established that 

'[w]here dual or multiple grounds for divorce exist, the trial 

judge can use his sound discretion to select the grounds upon 

which he will grant the divorce.'" Williams v. Williams, 14 Va. 

App. 217, 220, 415 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1992) (citation omitted). 

Because Code § 20-91 authorizes a divorce on the ground of 

adultery, and because the evidence supports the conclusion that 

wife committed adultery, the trial court did not err. 

 III. 

 "The goal of equitable distribution is to adjust the 

property interests of the spouses fairly and equitably." Booth 

v. Booth, 7 Va. App. 22, 27, 371 S.E.2d 569, 572 (1988). In so 

doing, the trial court is required to "tak[e] into consideration 

the factors presented in Code § 20-107.3(E)." Marion v. Marion, 

11 Va. App. 659, 665, 401 S.E.2d 432, 436 (1991). "This division 

or transfer of jointly owned marital property and the amount of 

any monetary award, subject to the enumerated statutory factors, 

is within the sound discretion of the trial court." Dietz v. 

Dietz, 17 Va. App. 203, 216, 436 S.E.2d 463, 471 (1993). "There 

is no presumption in Virginia favoring equal division of marital 

property . . . ." Williams v. Williams, 4 Va. App. 19, 22, 354 

S.E.2d 64, 65 (1987). 

 Wife argues that the trial court erred by not considering 

the passive appreciation of her separate portion of the marital 

residence when placing a value on the marital residence. The 
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trial court accepted wife's appraisal that the value of the 

marital residence was $53,000. The trial court also found that 

wife's separate interest in the marital residence was $19,400, 

the value of the property when she received it as a gift from her 

father in 1985. However, wife argues that the appraisal also 

indicates that the present value of her separate interest is 

$28,922, which represents an annual appreciation of 4% over ten 

years. Wife, while acknowledging that husband made improvements 

on the property, contends that the increase in value of her 

separate interest in the property is attributable only to passive 

appreciation and that her separate interest should have been 

$28,922, resulting in a readjusted value of the marital interest 

of $24,078, rather than $33,600. 

 Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(a) provides: 

 In the case of the increase in value of 

separate property during the marriage, such 

increase in value shall be marital property 

only to the extent that marital property or 

the personal efforts of either party have 

contributed to such increases, provided that 

any such personal efforts must be significant 

and result in substantial appreciation of the 

separate property. 

 The definition of "personal effort" includes labor, effort, 

and physical skill applied directly to the separate property. 

Id.

 Husband presented evidence that he is a contractor and that 

he constructed an addition onto the marital residence that more 

than doubled the square footage of the residence. Husband also 
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testified that he substantially renovated the existing portion of 

the residence, including installing replacement windows, a new 

roof and a porch. The appraisal applied a value of 41% to the 

original portion of the house and a value of 59% to the addition. 

 The record contains considerable evidence that the value of 

the house increased through husband's personal efforts to the 

marital residence. The trial court's award is not to be 

disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it. Bosserman v. Bosserman, 9 Va. App. 1, 5, 384 S.E.2d 

104, 107 (1989). We find that there was sufficient evidence to 

support the findings of the trial court concerning the 

classification and valuation of the marital residence. 

 Wife further argues that the trial court erred when it 

ordered that she was responsible for the two mortgages on the 

marital residence because these mortgages were used to acquire 

rental property and two lots, all of which were awarded to 

husband. Thus, wife argues that the value of the marital 

residence should have been reduced by the amount of the 

indebtedness on the property. 

 Code § 20-107.3(C) provides that the court shall have the 

authority to apportion and order the payment of debts of the 

parties. In addition, this section states that the apportionment 

of marital debts shall be determined by the court after 

consideration of the factors listed in Code § 20-107.3(E). The 

trial court specifically stated in its opinion letter that it 
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considered all of the factors set forth in Code § 20-107.3(E) in 

making the property distribution. Although the trial court found 

that the parties' monetary and non-monetary contributions to the 

marriage and to the acquisition and care of the marital property 

were equal, the trial judge considered that the wife caused the 

marriage to dissolve when she left to live with another man. See

O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 20 Va. App. 522, 527, 458 S.E.2d 323, 

325 (1995). In addition, the trial court specifically stated 

that it considered all of the factors set forth in Code 

§ 20-107.3(E) with respect to the marital debt. 

 When dividing the equity in the marital residence, the trial 

court considered the nature and character of the debts on the 

martial residence. Although the trial court awarded wife a total 

value of $67,733 in marital property and awarded husband a total 

value of $39,250 in marital property, resulting in a difference 

of $28,483, the wife was directed to pay the two deeds of trust 

on the marital residence, which totaled $32,000 and other debt. 

In view of the finding of fault in the dissolution of the 

marriage, we cannot say that the trial court abused its 

discretion in directing that wife pay the two deeds of trust and 

other debt resulting in a greater award to the husband. "In 

reviewing an equitable distribution award on appeal, we recognize 

that the trial court's job is a difficult one. Accordingly, we 

rely heavily on the discretion of the trial judge in weighing the 

many considerations and circumstances that are presented in each 
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case." Artis v. Artis, 4 Va. App. 132, 137, 354 S.E.2d 812, 815 

(1987), appeal after remand on other grounds, 10 Va. App. 356, 

392 S.E.2d 504 (1990). 
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 IV. 

 Wife contends that the trial court erred in finding that the 

tanning business was marital property. The evidence of husband's 

contribution to the tanning business was in conflict. Wife 

claims that she started the business herself, with her own money, 

and with funds borrowed by her. She contends that husband was 

paid for his labor at the Lynchburg salon just like any other 

employee, and she disputes his contribution to the operation of 

the business. 

 Husband claims that the parties started the business 

together and that it was jointly financed by them. He claims 

that he contributed to the operation of the business and that 

income from the business sustained the marriage. 

 "The weight to be given evidence and the resolution of 

conflicts in the evidence are for the fact finder. . . . The 

trial court's factual findings must be accorded great deference." 

Gamer v. Gamer, 16 Va. App. 335, 345, 429 S.E.2d 618, 625 

(1993). The trial court was entitled to believe husband's 

evidence regarding his participation in and his contribution to 

the tanning business. Id. Because credible evidence supports 

the trial court's finding that the tanning business was marital 

property, we will not disturb the trial court's ruling. See

Brown v. Brown, 5 Va. App. 238, 245, 361 S.E.2d 364, 368 (1987). 

 V. 

 Wife contends that the trial court erred in determining a 
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value for the tanning business and erred in not considering the 

debt against the property. Wife presented evidence that the 

tanning salon had a value of $7,000 to $8,000. Husband testified 

that the value of the business was $21,525. The trial court 

averaged the figures presented by the parties and valued the 

business at $14,762. After classifying the tanning business as 

marital property, the trial judge awarded the entire business to 

wife, and required that she pay the debts associated with the 

business. 

 Initially, wife challenges the trial court's acceptance of 

husband's testimony concerning the value of the business, 

asserting that husband has no expertise in valuing a business. 

However, as stated above, the weight to be given the evidence and 

resolution of conflicts in the evidence are questions for the 

trial court. Gamer, 16 Va. App. at 345, 429 S.E.2d at 625. The 

trial court was not obligated to select the specific value 

offered by either party, regardless of their relative 

qualifications as experts. See Zipf v. Zipf, 8 Va. App. 387, 

395, 382 S.E.2d 263, 268 (1989). We cannot say that the trial 

court was plainly wrong in choosing a figure within the range 

supported by the evidence, and we find that there was sufficient 

evidence in the record to support the trial court's valuation. 

 Wife next argues that the trial court erred in not reducing 

the value of the tanning business by the amount of debt on the 

business. The trial court first classified the business as 
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marital property, then awarded the entire value of this property 

to wife. The trial court indicated that it considered the 

factors set forth in Code § 20-107.3(E) when assigning marital 

debt. 

 Code § 20-107.3(E)(7) provides that the 

debts of each spouse shall be considered as a 

factor when determining how to distribute 

jointly owned marital property or to fashion 

a monetary award. The purpose and nature of 

the debt, and for and by whom any funds were 

used, should be considered in deciding 

whether and how to credit or allot debt. 

Gamer, 16 Va. App. at 341, 429 S.E.2d at 623. 

 The purpose of the debt associated with the tanning business 

was to start and operate the tanning business, a business wife 

was awarded in the equitable distribution award. The nature of 

the debt associated with the tanning business was wife's personal 

loans and personal credit card debts. Evidence showed that 

$5,600 in loans for the business involved loans from wife's 

father which were ten and six years old and toward which no 

payments had ever been made. 

 Moreover, as stated above, when the entire equitable 

distribution award is reviewed, husband received $39,250 in 

marital property. Deducting the total debts assigned to wife, 

wife received marital property with a total value of $24,730. 

While the husband received a higher percentage of the marital 

estate, "this alone does not indicate an improper division 

between the parties. Virginia's statutory scheme of equitable 

distribution does not have a presumption favoring an equal 
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distribution of assets." Alphin v. Alphin, 15 Va. App. 395, 404, 

424 S.E.2d 572, 576 (1992). Credible evidence was presented 

concerning both parties' contributions to the tanning business. 

The record also contains credible evidence that the trial court 

properly considered the statutory factors in awarding the 

property and the marital debt, including the factor that wife's 

conduct was primarily the cause of the dissolution of the 

marriage. See Code § 20-107.3(E)(5). Accordingly, wife's 

challenge to the trial court's ruling is without merit. 

VI. 

 Wife asserts that, when the trial court awarded the rental 

property and lots to husband, the trial court did not allow wife 

credit for payments she made on the mortgages for these 

properties and for the payments she made for the homeowner's 

insurance for the rental property from the date of separation. 

However, in its opinion letter, the trial court stated that wife 

was not entitled to any credit for the homeowner's insurance 

because she paid this expense voluntarily, and she did not 

request that the husband pay any of this expense. Moreover, the 

trial court indicated that wife received the benefit of the 

parties' time share property since the parties' separation. 

Further, as discussed in Section III above, we find no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court's directive that wife pay the first 

and second mortgages on the marital residence. 

 For the above stated reasons, the trial court's decision is 
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affirmed. 

 Affirmed.