Filed 9/9/15 Dinaali v. Rohani CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ALADDIN DINAALI,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ANOUSHIRVAN ROHANI et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B252423 c/w B253398

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC427532)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

Ruth A. Kwan, Judge. Affirmed.

Aladdin Dinaali, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Offices of Ehsan Afaghi and Ehsan Afaghi for Defendants and Respondents.

_____________________
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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Aladdin Dinaali appeals the trial court’s order granting Defendant 

Anoushirvan Rohani’s motion to quash service of the summons due to defective service. 

Dinaali also appeals the court’s orders awarding Defendant Shariar Rohani attorney fees 

in association with granting Shariar’s motion to quash Dinaali’s subpoena and denying 

Dinaali’s motion for sanctions against Shariar pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure1

section 128.7. We affirm because Dinaali’s service on Anoushirvan was deficient and 

because sanctions were proper. In addition, Shariar requests this Court to declare Dinaali 

a vexatious litigant pursuant to section 391, subdivision (b)(3). We decline to do so 

because Shariar’s arguments are not supported by citations to the record.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This is one of several appeals before us involving Dinaali and the Rohani brothers. 

Each appeal arises out of an underlying dispute regarding the musical recordings and 

memorabilia of the late Iranian singer and actress, Banoo Ezat Roohbakhsh. In the 

present case, filed in 2009, Dinaali sued Shariar and Anoushirvan Rohani, claiming that 

the brothers committed fraud and interfered with Dinaali’s contract to obtain the 

Roohbakhsh catalog of recordings and memorabilia from a third party who had 

possession of it.

1. Dinaali’s Failure to Serve Anoushirvan

Four years after Dinaali had filed the fraud complaint against the brothers, the 

court ordered Dinaali to file proof of service as to Anoushirvan. On July 23, 2013,

Dinaali filed a document entitled “Proof of Service of Summons,” which purported to 

show that Anoushirvan was sub-served on June 30, 2013 with the summons and first 

amended complaint. Anoushirvan specially appeared and brought a motion to quash this 

service of summons supported by declarations showing that he did not live, work, or stay 

at the address where the summons and first amended complaint were served. 

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise indicated.
3

Anoushirvan provided a declaration from the person who was allegedly served with the 

documents, within which that person attested that he had never received any such 

documents. Based on this evidence, the court quashed Dinaali’s service of summons.

2. Shariar’s Summary Judgment and Subsequent Dealings with Dinaali

After answering the complaint, Shariar obtained summary judgment against 

Dinaali. Dinaali appealed and we affirmed summary judgment in appeal No. B245126. 

During the litigation regarding the contractual interference, Dinaali created the website 

www.ShariarRohani.com, which described Shariar as a criminal and disparaged him. 

Dinaali also contacted Shariar’s clients, disparaging him to them and causing Shariar to 

lose business. Following summary judgment on the underlying case, Dinaali sent Shariar 

emails, which berated, insulted, and called Shariar derogatory names.

In a different court and as a separate case from the contractual interference action 

discussed above, Shariar filed a request for a civil harassment restraining order against 

Dinaali, describing Dinaali’s harassment, explaining how he suffered from anxiety and 

depression due to the harassment, and stating that he feared for his own safety due to 

Dinaali’s mental state. At the hearing, Shariar testified that Dinaali had made a death 

threat to him over the phone the day before the hearing. Based on the foregoing, the trial 

court issued the civil harassment restraining order against Dinaali. Dinaali appealed that 

court’s ruling and we affirmed the issuance of the civil harassment restraining order in 

appeal No. B248236.

Subsequently, Dinaali subpoenaed Shariar to provide him with “[a]ll and any 

[h]ome, [c]ell or any other phone logs for 3/23/13,” the date that Shariar had told the 

court that Dinaali made the death threat to Shariar over the phone. Dinaali issued the 

subpoena in association with the first action for fraud during the timeframe when the 

order granting summary judgment in that case was on appeal to this Court. This 

subpoena was not made in association with the civil harassment case. Dinaali asserted 

that he wanted the phone records because he sought to amend his first amended 

complaint to include new causes of action against Shariar. On June 25, 2013, Shariar 

filed a motion to quash, or in the alternative, for a protective order as to the subpoena 
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served on Shariar for phone records and requested sanctions against Dinaali. Shariar 

argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to compel compliance with the subpoena as the 

case was on appeal, and that the documents sought were not relevant to the case. Dinaali 

opposed the motion and filed his own motion to compel Shariar to comply with the 

subpoena and request for sanctions, supported by his declaration and separate statement. 

The court granted Shariar’s motion to quash the subpoena and request for sanctions in the 

reduced amount of $2,000. The court also denied Dinaali’s motion to compel compliance 

with the subpoena and request for sanctions.

Dinaali then brought a motion for section 128.7 sanctions against Shariar and his 

attorney for fraud upon the Court, alleging that Shariar and his attorney submitted 

documents to the court for an improper purpose. Shariar opposed the motion and 

requested sanctions against Dinaali. The trial court concluded that Dinaali failed to 

identify the specific papers allegedly presented for an improper purpose by Shariar, failed 

to submit admissible evidence to support his fraud arguments, and failed to comply with

the safe-harbor rule stated in section 128.7(c)(1). The court further stated that Dinaali 

improperly sought sanctions against Shariar and failed to identify the amount of sanctions 

sought. Based on these findings, the court denied Dinaali’s motion for sanctions and 

granted Shariar’s request for sanctions in the reduced amount of $2,000.

DISCUSSION

This appeal addresses (1) the court’s order quashing the service of the summons 

on Anoushirvan, (2) the court’s order sanctioning Dinaali $2,000 for pursuing the phone 

records subpoena, (3) the court’s order sanctioning Dinaali $2,000 for seeking sanctions 

against Shariar for fraud on the court, and (4) Shariar’s request on appeal that Dinaali be 

declared a vexatious litigant pursuant to section 391, subdivision (b)(3).

1. The Court Properly Quashed Service of the Summons on Anoushirvan

Dinaali argues that the court erred in quashing the service of the summons and 

first amended complaint on Anoushirvan. “On a motion to quash service of summons, 

the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that all 

jurisdictional criteria are met. [Citations.] The burden must be met by competent 
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evidence in affidavits and authenticated documents; an unverified complaint may not be 

considered as supplying the necessary facts. [Citation.] Where there is no conflict in the 

evidence, the question of personal jurisdiction is one of law. [Citation.]” (Nobel Floral, 

Inc. v. Pasero (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 654, 657-658; see § 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)

Here, Anoushirvan specially appeared and moved to quash the service of 

summons, arguing that Dinaali failed to obtain jurisdiction over him because the service 

was defective. The proof of service filed by Dinaali on July 23, 2013, states that 

Anoushirvan was served via “substitute service on ‘Mr. Blanco, Fellow 

Resident/Business Owner’ at 7036 Grant Avenue, Carmichael, CA, on June 30, 2013.” 

The proof of service had both boxes for home and business checked off. It also indicated 

that the person who served the papers was not a registered California process server, was 

named Jared Giambrone, and had the same address as Dinaali. 

In support of his motion Anoushirvan submitted declarations from multiple 

individuals showing that he was not properly sub-served with the summons and first 

amended complaint. Anoushirvan personally attested that he never lived at 7036 Grant 

Avenue in Carmichael, California, and did not have a neighbor, fellow resident, or fellow 

business owner named “Blanco.” Anoushirvan further stated that he resides in Tehran, 

Iran with his family, where he owns a house and conducts business, and that he has never 

owned, rented or leased a dwelling in the United States or in Carmichael, California. 

Anoushirvan also attested that he never received any documents, legal papers, or 

pleadings from a “Mr. Blanco.”

Anoushirvan also supported his motion with a declaration from Paul Blanco. 

Blanco stated that he resided at 7036 Grant Avenue in Carmichael, California, but that he 

had never been given any documents, papers, or legal forms from anyone to deliver to 

another person. Blanco attested that he would never have accepted such documents.

In opposition, Dinaali failed to produce admissible evidence showing that service 

was effective. Dinaali asserted that Anoushirvan was lying and committing fraud on the 

court, and supported his allegations with printouts from websites that purportedly showed 
6

Anoushirvan lives and works at 7036 Grant Avenue. As the trial court pointed out, these 

website printouts lacked foundation and proper authentication, and contained hearsay. 

On appeal, Dinaali does not dispute that these documents were inadmissible. Nor 

does Dinaali identify admissible evidence supporting his argument that service was 

effective. Rather, Dinaali asserts that the court improperly denied his request for a 

continuance to obtain Anoushirvan’s bank records via subpoena in order to prove that he 

lives and works at the address. Dinaali provides no citation to the record for us to review 

this contention and thus has waived this argument on appeal. (Duarte v. Chino 

Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856 (Duarte).)

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Dinaali failed to meet his burden of 

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that service was effective on Anoushirvan. 

The court therefore properly granted the motion to quash.

2. The Court Properly Awarded Sanctions Against Dinaali 

Dinaali asserts that the court erred in sanctioning Dinaali in two instances: (1) the 

$2,000 sanction ordered by the court when Dinaali moved to compel compliance with the 

subpoena and opposed Shariar’s motion to quash the subpoena, and (2) the $2,000 

sanction imposed by the court on Dinaali when Dinaali moved for sanctions against 

Shariar and his attorney for fraud on the court. We address each in turn. 

a. Sanctions Associated with the Subpoena

Pursuant to section 1987.2, the court ordered Dinaali to pay $2,000 in sanctions to 

Shariar because Dinaali’s opposed the motion to quash the improper subpoena and then 

brought his own motion to compel compliance with the subpoena. “We review the trial 

court’s ruling on a discovery sanction under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.”

(In re Marriage of Chakko (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 104, 108.) “A court’s decision to 

impose a particular sanction is ‘subject to reversal only for manifest abuse exceeding the 

bounds of reason.’ [Citation.]” (Electronic Funds Solutions, LLC v. Murphy (2005) 

134 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1183.)
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Pursuant to section 1987.2, subdivision (a), when quashing a subpoena or issuing a 

protective order, “the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable 

expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s 

fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial 

justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” 

Contrary to Dinaali’s assertion on appeal that “Shariar failed to establish that Dinaali’s 

motion was made in bad faith or without justification,” the burden rested on Dinaali, as 

the losing party, to prove that there was a substantial justification for opposing Shariar’s

motion to quash the subpoena and for bringing his motion to compel compliance with the 

subpoena. (Doe v. United States Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1435.)

Here, Dinaali argued below that he intended to amend his complaint to include 

new causes of action based on information obtained through the subpoena and that the 

subpoena was “absolutely essential in establishing the required elements of the tort” he 

intended to allege. Yet, the court found that the subpoenaed documents were invasive of 

Shariar’s privacy and not relevant to the action, which was based on a claim for 

contractual interference. It is well established that the scope of discovery is limited to 

subject matter relevant to the pending action. (§ 2017.010 [“Unless otherwise limited by 

order of the court . . . any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 

privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved . . . if the matter either is itself 

admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 

admissible evidence.”].) “For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it ‘might 

reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating 

settlement . . . .’ ” (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546, italics 

omitted.) The court specifically noted that the phone logs were related to the civil 

harassment case, and not with the contractual interference case before it, and that Dinaali 

acknowledged this fact. Dinaali fails to explain on appeal and failed to explain below 

how the phone records are relevant to the contractual interference allegations.
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Based on our own review of the record, we too conclude the phone records were 

clearly irrelevant to the contractual interference case and are thus not within the 

permissible scope of discovery case. As the phone records were not relevant, Dinaali 

lacked substantial justification for seeking to compel compliance with the subpoena and 

for opposing Shariar’s motion to quash. The court thus did not abuse its discretion in 

awarding attorney fees.

To the extent that Dinaali argues on appeal that “Shariar’s motion for a protective 

order was defective and in bad faith,” we disagree. Dinaali specifically argues that the 

protective order motion was defective because (1) “Shariar did not qualify to quash [the] 

subpoena as a consumer,” (2) “Shariar did not comply with requirements of [California 

Rules of Court, rule] 3.1345 as he did not allege in his separate statement as to how or 

under what statute he was legally entitled to a protective order,” (3) “Shariar’s [sic] did 

not comply with requirements of Code of Civil Procedure[,] § 2025.420,” and 

(4) “Shariar’s [sic] did not comply with requirements of Code of Civil Procedure[,]

§ 2016.040 and meet and confer in good faith before filing his motion.”

As the trial court noted, Shariar need not be a consumer to quash the subpoena 

because he is a party to this action. (See § 1987.1, subd. (b)(1).) Furthermore, Shariar 

complied with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345 by filing a separate statement 

explaining how the phone logs were not relevant to a case pending before the court and 

production of the phone logs violated his right to privacy. Likewise, the record indicates 

that Shariar complied with the meet and confer requirements set forth in sections 

2025.420 and 2016.040, as evidenced by Shariar’s counsel’s declaration and the attached

letters and emails from Shariar’s counsel to Dinaali regarding his objections to the

subpoena. We conclude that Shariar’s motion was not defective or made in bad faith.

Since the phone records were not relevant to the case, and because Dinaali lacked 

substantial justification for seeking to compel compliance with the subpoena and for 

opposing Rohani’s motion to quash, we conclude that the court did not abuse its 

discretion in awarding $2,000 in attorney fees to Shariar.
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b. Sanctions Associated with Dinaali’s Fraud on the Court Allegations

Dinaali contends that the court erred in sanctioning him for bringing the motion 

against Shariar for fraud on the court pursuant to section 128.7. “We review a . . . section 

128.7 sanctions award under the abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] We presume 

the trial court’s order is correct and do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial 

court. [Citation.] To be entitled to relief on appeal, the court’s action must be 

sufficiently grave to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (Peake v. Underwood

(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 428, 441.)

Pursuant to section 128.7, subdivision (c), the court may “impose an appropriate 

sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties” when it determines that section 128.7, 

subdivision (b) has been violated. Under Section 128.7, subdivision (b), by signing, 

filing, or submitting a pleading, petition, or motion to the court, the litigant represents 

that the document is not being presented primarily for an improper purpose, that the 

“allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support,” and that the legal 

contentions are warranted by law. (§ 128.7, subd. (b)(1)-(3).)

Here, the trial court determined that Dinaali “failed to identify the specific 

pleadings, petitions, written notices of motion, or other similar papers allegedly presented 

for an improper purpose. . . . [Dinaali] failed to show that he complied with the SafeHarbor rule. . . . Finally, [Dinaali] improperly [sought] sanctions against Defendant 

Shariar Rohani, a represented party, and failed to identify the amount of sanctions sought 

in the instant motion . . . .” The court then explicitly stated that sanctions against Dinaali 

were warranted because Plaintiff’s motion was not supported by evidence. (See §128.7, 

subd. (b)(3).)

On appeal, Dinaali asserts that he “did present admissible evidence as to his 

claims” but provides no citation to the record to support this argument. Dinaali thus 

waives his argument that the court erred in sanctioning him for his motion’s lack of 

evidentiary integrity. (Duarte, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 856.) Moreover, based on our 

own review of the record, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion as 

Dinaali’s motion for sanctions against Shariar and his counsel for committing fraud on 
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the court was not supported by any evidence. Dinaali never submitted a declaration or 

documentary evidence to accompany the motion and show that Shariar and his attorney 

committed fraud on the court.

We affirm the court’s order awarding Shariar and his counsel $2,000 in attorney 

fees against Dinaali.

3. Shariar Has Waived Arguments Regarding Dinaali’s Status as a Vexatious 

Litigant

Shariar requests this Court to declare Dinaali a vexatious litigant pursuant to 

section 391, subdivision (b)(3). Under that section, a person can be deemed a vexatious 

litigant when, “while acting in propria persona, [he] repeatedly files unmeritorious 

motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary discovery, or engages in other 

tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” 

(§ 391, subd. (b)(3).)

Yet, Shariar has failed to provide us citations to the record supporting his 

contention that Dinaali has repeatedly filed unmeritorious motions or pleadings, has 

repeatedly conducted unnecessary discovery, or engages in frivolous tactics. As a 

practical matter, this Court cannot adequately evaluate which facts Shariar believes 

support his request without citations to the record. (See Bernard v. Hartford Fire Ins. 

Co. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1203, 1205.) We thus deem Shariar’s arguments regarding 

Dinaali’s status as a vexatious litigant waived as to this appeal. (Utility Consumers’

Action Network v. Public Utilities Com. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 688, 697 [“If a party 

fails to . . . support an argument with the necessary citations to the record, we may deem 

the argument waived. [Citations.]”].)
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DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed on all grounds. Defendants Anoushirvan Rohani and 

Shariar Rohani are awarded their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KITCHING, J.

I concur:

EDMON, P J.

ALDRICH, J.