Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-SC-126 | November 21, 2018 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT, PRO SE

Antone Atkins

Henryville, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Antone Atkins,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Leroy Guthrie,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

November 21, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-SC-126

Appeal from the Clark Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Kenneth R. 

Abbott, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

10C01-1711-SC-1545

Pyle, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Antone Atkins (“Atkins”), pro se, appeals the small claims court’s judgment 

entered after Atkins’ landlord, Leroy Guthrie (“Guthrie”), filed a notice of 

eviction against Atkins and sought unpaid rent. Atkins challenges the small 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-SC-126 | November 21, 2018 Page 2 of 7

claims court’s order, which granted possession of the premises to Guthrie and 

entered judgment against Atkins for past due rent in the amount of $6,000.00. 

Concluding that Atkins’ challenge is nothing more than a request to reweigh the 

evidence, we affirm the small claims court’s judgment. 

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the small claims court erred by entering judgment against 

Atkins.

Facts

[3] On June 3, 2008, Atkins and Guthrie entered into a one-year lease agreement in 

which Atkins agreed to pay Guthrie $650.00 per month to rent Guthrie’s 

property (“the rental property”). After the lease expired, the parties proceeded

with a month-to-month tenancy.1 In October 2015, Guthrie moved out of the 

rental property, but he did not provide written notification to Guthrie to inform 

him that he was leaving nor did he surrender the keys to Guthrie. Instead, 

Atkins’ sister, who had been living with him, continued to live in the rental 

property. Atkins’ sister did not have a lease agreement with Guthrie, and 

Atkins continued to make automated rental payments to Guthrie. At some 

 

1

See IND. CODE § 32-31-1-2 (explaining that “[a] general tenancy in which the premises are occupied by the 

express or constructive consent of the landlord is considered to be a tenancy from month to month”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-SC-126 | November 21, 2018 Page 3 of 7

point, another of Atkins’ family members moved into the rental property, again 

without any lease agreement with Guthrie.

[4] In November 2017, Guthrie filed, in the small claims court, a notice of eviction

against Atkins and sought unpaid rent of more than $7,000.00. Thereafter, 

Atkins filed a motion to dismiss the notice of eviction. Atkins argued that he 

was no longer a tenant because he had moved out of the rental property in 

October 2015.

2

 Additionally, he asserted that Guthrie was not entitled to any 

unpaid rent or damages because Guthrie, contrary to INDIANA CODE § 32-31-3-

14, had not sent Atkins a statutorily-required itemized list of damages within 

forty-five days of Atkins terminating his tenancy in October 2015.

[5] In December 2017, the small claims court held an eviction hearing. During the 

hearing, the small claims court reviewed the lease agreement and discussed it 

with the parties.3 Guthrie also offered the court financial statements regarding 

Atkins’ payments or lack thereof. The testimony during the hearing revealed 

the facts as stated above. Atkins’ defense, as was raised in his motion to 

dismiss, was that Guthrie was not entitled to judgment and damages because: 

(1) Atkins had moved out of the rental property in October 2015 and was, 

 

2 Atkins’ motion indicated that he had moved out in October 2014; however, during trial, he clarified that he 

had actually moved out in October 2015. 

3 Atkins did not include a copy of the lease agreement in his Appellant’s Appendix. “[T]he duty of 

presenting a record adequate for intelligent appellate review on points assigned as error falls upon the 

appellant.” Bambi’s Roofing, Inc. v. Moriarty, 859 N.E.2d 347, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). See also Ind. 

Appellate Rule 50(A). To the extent that Atkins relies on the lease, it was incumbent upon him to assure that 

the lease was offered and admitted into evidence during the hearing, and thus, made part of the record on 

appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-SC-126 | November 21, 2018 Page 4 of 7

therefore, no longer a tenant; and (2) once Atkins had stopped occupying the 

rental property in October 2015, Guthrie was then required to, but had not 

provided, him with an itemized list of damages as set out in the security deposit 

statute.4 

[6] At the end of the hearing, the small claims court stated that it would enter an 

order of possession to Guthrie, and it explained to Atkins that it was rejecting 

his defense because he had not provided proper notice to terminate the monthto-month tenancy in October 2015. The small claims court stated:

Okay. You [Atkins] want me to believe that you terminated this 

lease and he [Guthrie] agreed to it. He tells me he didn’t agree to 

it. It should have been in writing. It wasn’t in writing. So if he 

tells me it wasn’t agreed to and you tell me it was agreed to, then 

there’s no agreement. That means the written agreement covers 

the situation. He received payments from you. If you had 

wanted to terminate this lease, you would have given him written 

notice that I’m terminating the lease and I’m surrendering 

possession to you and here are the keys. The proper way to 

terminate your responsibility on this is not to let someone else 

move in and you move out and then let some other person move 

in, and then him continue to get payments from you. He didn’t 

get payments from her because he has no agreement with her. 

He didn’t get payments from this other person because he, not 

only has no agreement for them to pay money, there’s not even 

an agreement for that person to even be there. So, you’re the 

person responsible under the lease. You had the right, under the 

lease, to terminate it the correct way, and you can’t come in 

today, after you move out years ago and say, oh, I’m not a tenant

 

4

See IND. CODE § 32-31-3-14.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-SC-126 | November 21, 2018 Page 5 of 7

because the definition of a tenant is someone in possession and 

I’m not in possession. That means somebody at the beginning. 

Doesn’t mean somebody at the end. You can’t be sued for 

eviction and say, well, I moved out three (3) weeks ago, so I’m 

not a tenant, so you can’t sue me. It doesn’t work that way, 

okay. So you’re going to be responsible for whatever money is 

owed because you have a lease that says you’re going to be 

responsible.

(Tr. 17-18). Thereafter, the small claims court entered a written order, granting

possession of the premises to Guthrie and entering judgment against Atkins for 

past due rent in the amount of $6,000.00.5 Atkins now appeals. 

Decision

[7] Atkins appeals from the small claims court’s judgment entered against him. 

Judgments in small claims actions are “subject to review as 

prescribed by relevant Indiana rules and statutes.” Ind. Small 

Claims Rule 11(A). Under Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), the clearly 

erroneous standard applies to appellate review of facts

determined in a bench trial with due regard given to the 

opportunity of the trial court to assess witness credibility. This

“deferential standard of review is particularly important in small 

claims actions, where trials are’ informal, with the sole objective 

of dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to the 

rules of substantive law.’” City of Dunkirk Water & Sewage Dep’t v. 

Hall, 657 N.E.2d 115, 116 (Ind. 1995) (quoting S.C.R. 8(A)).

 

5 The trial court’s order noted that Guthrie had waived his right to claim any damages above the statutory 

limit of $6,000.00.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-SC-126 | November 21, 2018 Page 6 of 7

Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1067-68 (Ind. 2006). Guthrie did 

not file an appellee’s brief. In such a situation, we will reverse the small claims 

court’s judgment only if Atkins presents a case of prima facie error, which is 

defined as, “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. at 1068 

(Ind. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

[8] Initially, we note that Atkins proceeds pro se in this appeal. “It is well settled

that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” 

Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied. “This 

means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of 

procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to 

do so.” Id. at 983-84. “We will not become an advocate for a party, or address 

arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be 

understood.” Id. at 984.

[9] Atkins challenges the small claims court’s determination that Atkins had not 

provided proper notice to terminate the month-to-month tenancy in October 

2015. The evidence presented during the hearing reveals that after Atkins 

moved out of the rental property, he did not provide written notice to Guthrie 

nor did he surrender the keys to him. Instead, Atkins continued to make 

automated rental payments to Guthrie while he let his sister continue to live in 

the property. Atkins argument is nothing more than a request to reweigh the 

evidence and the credibility of witnesses, which we will not do. See Trinity 

Homes, 848 N.E.2d at 1067. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-SC-126 | November 21, 2018 Page 7 of 7

[10] We also reject Atkins’ argument that Guthrie was not entitled to unpaid rent 

because he had failed to comply with the security deposit statutes, and we reject 

his reliance on Skiver v. Brighton Meadows, 585 N.E.2d 1345, 1347 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1992) because this case was abrogated by Klotz v. Hoyt, 900 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. 

2009). In Klotz, our supreme court held that “a landlord’s failure to provide to 

the tenant a timely and adequate notice of damages under Sections 12 through 

16 of Indiana Code § 32-31-3 precludes the landlord only from recovering 

damages for physical harm to the rented premises and does not bar the landlord 

from seeking unpaid rent and other damages.” Klotz, 900 N.E.2d at 5. 

Accordingly, Atkins’ argument is without merit, and we affirm the small claims 

court’s judgment. 

[11] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Crone, J., concur.