NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL G. CRAMER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-35215 

D.C. No. 2:15-cv-00640-MAT 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Mary Alice Theiler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 11, 2017**

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and TROTT and SILVERMAN, Circuit 

Judges

Michael Cramer appeals the district court’s decision affirming the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Cramer’s application for disability 

insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

DEC 13 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-35215 

Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de 

novo, Rounds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015), 

and we affirm.

Substantial evidence supports the determination by the Administrative Law 

Judge (ALJ) that Cramer’s hepatitis C and degenerative disc disease had no more 

than a minimal effect on his ability to work, and fibromyalgia was not a medically 

determinable impairment. See Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686-87 (9th Cir. 

2005) (explaining that impairments are non-severe if they have no more than a 

minimal effect on a claimant’s ability to work). Any error in failing to specifically 

discuss lumbar spondylosis, joint pain, myalgia, and myositis at step two is 

harmless because the ALJ considered all the evidence in assessing Cramer’s 

residual functional capacity (RFC), and Cramer fails to identify any medical 

evidence supporting additional functional limitations that the ALJ did not consider. 

See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007) (any error in failing to find 

an impairment severe at step two is harmless if the ALJ considers any resulting 

limitations in assessing a claimant’s RFC).

The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons to reject Dr. Knapp’s 

opinion, reasoning that Dr. Knapp’s opinion as to Cramer’s ability to work was 

inconsistent with: (1) Dr. Knapp’s own conclusion that Cramer could perform most 

daily activities, (2) Cramer’s actual work history, and (3) Cramer’s volunteer work, 
3 16-35215 

which included spending four hours a day on the computer. See Ghanim v. Colvin, 

763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that inconsistency with a 

claimant’s activities is a proper reason to reject a physician’s opinion); Bayliss v. 

Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the ALJ properly 

rejected physicians’ opinions based on inconsistency with the claimant’s past 

ability to work despite their limitations and inconsistency with a physician’s own 

clinical observations).

The ALJ reasonably rejected Dr. Harmon’s opinion because it relied entirely 

upon Dr. Knapp’s opinion, which the ALJ reasonably rejected. See Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (the ALJ does not need to accept a 

medical opinion that is inadequately supported by clinical findings).

The ALJ did not err by failing to discuss additional treatment notes that were 

neither significant nor probative. See Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 

2012).

The ALJ provided several clear and convincing reasons to reject Cramer’s 

testimony. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, the ALJ 

reasonably discredited Cramer’s testimony regarding the extent of his functional 

limitations based on his inconsistent statements regarding the dates and duties of 

his previous employment. See Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1163 (including inconsistent 

statements as a reason that the ALJ may rely on to discredit claimant testimony). 
4 16-35215 

Second, the ALJ reasonably discredited Cramer’s testimony of debilitating 

symptoms based on inconsistency with Cramer’s activities. See Molina v. Astrue, 

674 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2012). Third, the ALJ properly discredited 

Cramer’s testimony based on inconsistencies with relatively mild mental status 

examinations. Id. at 1113 (concluding that the ALJ properly discredited claimant 

testimony that was inconsistent with the medical record). Fourth, the ALJ 

reasonably discredited Cramer’s testimony based upon Cramer’s inadequately 

explained failure to take any medications. Id. at 1112.

The ALJ properly included all limitations that were supported by substantial 

evidence in the RFC and hypothetical to the vocational expert (VE). See StubbsDanielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174-76 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the 

claimant fails to raise a fresh issue based on the RFC and VE testimony by 

restating earlier arguments about the medical evidence).

Substantial evidence continues to support the ALJ’s opinion despite the new 

evidence considered by the Appeals Council. See Gardner v. Berryhill, 856 F.3d 

652, 658 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that this Court must determine whether 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s reasoning considering new evidence 

considered by the Appeals Council). Although the ALJ did not consider the new 

evidence medical opinion evidence that Cramer would be precluded from work due 

to an inability handle social interactions, supervision, and agitation, the ALJ 
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considered similar limitations, and rejected them as inconsistent with Cramer’s 

activities, past work, and volunteer work. The same reasoning applies to discredit 

the new evidence, and substantial evidence continues to support the ALJ’s 

determination.

AFFIRMED.