### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE SE PT E MB E R 3 , 200 8 S es sio n
JULIE A . B ELLA MY v. C RA CKE R B ARREL OLD CO UN TRYSTORE,

IN C

. an d P A U L L U D OV IS SI E

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Wilson Cou nty No. 06145 Charles K . Sm ith, Chan cellor

No. M2008- 00294-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Dece m ber 30, 2008

I n th is a pp e a l, w e are a sk e d to det e rm ine wh e the r the tr ia l ju dg e e rr e d b y fa ili ngto e xer c ise his ro le
a s th i rt e e n t h j u r o r i n d e n y i n g Ap p e l l an t ’ s m o t i o n f o r a n e w t r i a l

. I n s u

p p o rt o f h e r a rg ume nt, Ap pe lla nt u rg e s th is C ourt

to con sid e r c omm e nts the tr ia l ju dg e ma de in r uli ngon Ap pe lle e s’ motions for a di rec ted verdict; the S tatement of the Evidenc e, Response, Reply , and Surre ply ; and Appellee s’ proposed or der, in whic h the trial judg e struck c erta in lang uag e. Appe llees, howe ver, contend that this materia l is either not properly revie wable by

this Court or does not bear on the issue of whe ther the thirtee nth juror standar d was met. We re verse and re mand for a new tria l.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t R e ve r se d and Rem anded

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , P.J .,W.S ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., and J. S TEVE N S T A FF O RD , J ., joined.
Doug las B. Janney , I I I , Nashville, TN, f or Appe llant
Robert W. Horton, L eslie Goff Sanders, Na shville, TN, for Appe lleesT e n n . C o d e A n n . § 4 -2 1 -1 0 1 , et s eq. 1

T en n

. Code An n

. § 50- 1- 304. 2

-2- OP IN ION

I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY

J ulie Be llamy

(“A ppellant” or “Ms. Be llamy ”) was employ ed by Cracke r B arr el Old Country Store, I nc. (“ Appellee ” or “ Cracke r B arr el”) as a Restaurant Manag er or as a G ener al Mana g er f

rom June 20 03 un til Marc h 17, 20 06 . Pa ul L ud ov iss ie (“ Ap pe lle e ” or “ Mr . L ud ov iss ie ” ) w a s a lso
e mpl oy e d b y

Cr a c ke r B arr e l a s a Di str ic t Ma na g e r a nd ha d s up e rv iso ry

a uth or ity ov e r M s. B e llamy afte r her promotion to General Manag er. O n May 3, 2006, Ms. Be llamy

filed an A mended Com pla int in t he Cha nc e ry Court fo r Wils on County

a g a ins t bo th C ra c ke r B arr e l and Mr . L ud ov iss ie (collec tively

“Appe llees”) for da

mag es for

g en d er discrimination, hosti le work e nvironment hara ssment, and re taliation under the Te nness e e H u ma n Ri gh ts A c t, th e T e nnessee Public Protection

1 Act, and Tenne ssee common law. Appellant conte nded that L udovissie maintained a hostile and 2 abusive wor

king e nvironment by

“inquir[ing] into [ Appellant’s] persona l and private life during
wo rkh o u rs , as k [ i n g] wh o s h e w as d at i n g, t [ el l i n g] h er n o tt o d at e c er t ai ni n d i v i d u al s , an d t r[ y i n g] to exercise contr ol over [her] pe rsonal life.” Fur thermore , Appellant’s Ame nded Complaint alleg ed that Mr . L

ud ov iss ie “ tr e ate d [he r] d if fe re ntl y and le ss f a vo ra bly tha n s imi larl y si tu ated m a le employ ees be cause she [ was] fema le[,] ” “freque ntly y elled and curse d at [ Appellant] while she wa s a t w or k[,]” “ ma de be littli ng and ina pp ro pr iate state me nts to [App e lla nt, ]” “ thr e a te ne d [App e lla nt]
and he r c on tin

ue d e mpl oy

me nt[, ]” a

nd “ kn oc ke d o ve r c ha ir s, str uc k o bje c ts, and

thr e w o bje c ts i n [Appellant’s] presence and vicinity .” Appe ll an t stated that whe n she re ported Mr. L udovissie’s conduct, “ [ Ap p ellees] reta liated ag ainst [her] and took st eps to ensure that she would be f ired for repor ting L udovissie’s conduct.” Acc ording to Ms. Bellamy ’s Amended Complaint, Crac ker B arr el stated that her

termination was due to “spec ific re asons re lated to her job perfor

mance [; ]”however , “other manag eria l employ ees [who had] eng ag ed in the same or worse alleg ed conduct . . . [had] not been f ired.”

I n their Answe r, Appe llees denie d that Appellant wa s entitled to the relief reque sted. I nstead, Appellee s maintained that it was only afte r Crac ker B arr el s u s p en d ed Appellant pending a n investigation “ into numer ous alleg ations of wrong doing at the Cracke r Ba rre l r estaura

nt under he r manag ement, including sexual harass me nt a n d d r u g d e a ling [,] ” that Appe llant complained about Mr. L udovissie’s conduct. Appe llees fur ther noted that Cracke r B arr el “c onducted a th o ro u gh investigation into [ Appellant’s] complaints” and that none of the witnesses identified by Appellant
corr oborate d her a lleg ations. Appellant voluntarily

dismiss ed her

g ender discrimination and hostile work envir onment clai ms an d

a ju r y tr ia l w a s h e ld

f r o m N o v e mb e r

2 6 , 2 0 0 7 thr o u g h N o v e mb e r 3 0 , 2 0 0 7 on Appellant’s r etaliation claim. The jury returne d a verdict for the Appellee s answe ring “no” to the following question: “[D] o y ou find by a pre pondera

nce of t h e ev i d ence that plaintiff ac tually andT hi s O rder D enyi ng P l ai nt i f f ’ s M o t i o n f

o r a N ew T ri al , da t ed January 11 , 20 0 8 , was r e- ent ered on Ja nuary 3
1 6 , 2 0 0 8

.
A ltho u g h the p o rtio n o f A p p e llee s’ ap p e llate b rie f e n tit le d S ta te m e n t o f Issu e P re se n te d fo r R e v ie w li sts o n ly

4

t he i ssue p rese nted b y A p p ell an t , A p p ell ee ’ s S t atem en t o f t he F ac t s and S um m ary o f A rg um en t sec t i o ns raise these

a d d iti o n a l sub -issue s w h ic h m u st b e a n sw e re d in o rd e r to re so lve A p p e llan t’s i ssu e

. -3- rea sonably believed that the conduct of P aul L udovissie about which she c omplained was ba sed on her g ender [.] ” Following the t rial, on J anuar y 7, 2008, the Chance llor entere d an Or der a cce pting the finding of the jury

and di s m i ssing with pre judice Appe llant’s reta liation claims under the Tenne ssee Huma

n Rights Act, the Tenne ssee Public Protection Act, and Te nnessee common law.
Ap pe lla nt f ile d a Mo tio n f or Ne w T ri a l on

De c e mbe r 1 1, 20 07 , p ro vid ingse ve ra l g ro un ds , including that the verdic t was “ag ainst the weig ht of the evidenc e” and “contr ary to the law.” A fter a hea ring , the Chance ry Court denied Appe llant’s motion and entere d an Or der D enying Plaintiff’ s Motion for a Ne w Trial on January 11, 2008. This appea l followed.

3

II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED Appellant has timely

filed her notice of appea l and presents the following issue for r eview: 1. Whether the Court must reve rse the tr ial court’s judgme nt denying Plaintiff- Appellant’s motion for a new

trial and re mand this case f or a ne w trial whe re th e t ri al cour t made state me nts and

too k a c tio n d e mon str a tin g that it mis c on c e ive d an d f

a ile d to pe rf

or m it s function as thirtee nth juror. Additionally , Appellee prese nts the following issues f or re view: 4 2. Whether this Court may proper ly revie w the trial court’ s comments during the hea ring on the mot ion fo r a dir e c te d v e rd ic t;

3. Whether this Court may proper ly revie w the propose d order ; 4. Whether this Court may proper ly revie w the trial c ourt’s statements d u ri n g the hea ring on the mot ion

fo r a ne w tri a l a s th e State me nt o f t he Ev ide nc e , Re sp on se , Re ply , a nd Sur re ply provide c onflicting acc ounts of the hea ring

.
F or the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , w e re ve rs e the de c isi on of the c ha nc e ry c ourt

.-4- III
. S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW
Th is C ourt

wi ll s e t a sid e a

jur y ’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t on ly if th e re is n o ma

te ri a l e vid e nc e to support the verdict. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 3( d)

. “‘When a ddressingwhether there is material evide nce to suppor t a verdic t, a

n appellate court shall: (1) take the strong est leg itimate view of a ll the evidence in f a vo r o f t he ve rd ic t; ( 2) a ssume the tr uth of a ll evid e nc e that su

pp or ts the ve rd ic t; ( 3) a llo w a ll
rea sonable infe renc es to sustain the verdic t; and (4) disca rd all [counterva iling] evidence .’” Mabey v. Maggas , No. M2006-02689-COA- R3-CV, 2007 WL 2713726, at *4 (T en n . Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g W

haley v . Perkins , 197 S.W .3d 665, 671 (Tenn. 2006) ). This Court, in considering a jury ver d i ct , m u st not reweig h the evidenc e or de cide whe re the preponde ranc e lies. Crabtree Masonry Co., In c. v. C & R Const r. Inc. , 575 S.W .2d 4, 5 (Tenn. 1978) . I nstead, we “ar e limited to d e te r mi n in g w h e th e r

th e r e is ma

te r ia l e v id e n c e to s u

p p o rt t h e v e r d ic t.” Id. “I f there is any materia l evidence to support the verdic t, it mus t be af firmed, or else the pa

rties would be de prived of their c onstitut ional rig ht to a trial by jury .” Mabey , 2 0 0 7 W L2 7 1 3 7 2 6 , at * 4 (c i t i n g Crabtree , 575 S.W .2d at 5).

IV. D I S CUS S I ON

“ Th e du ty

of a tr ia l ju dg e to a c t a s th ir te e nth jur or in a

c ivi l tr ia l in

Te nn e sse e is w e ll established.” Holden v. Rann ick , 6 82 S.W. 2d 90 3, 90 4-05 ( Te nn . 1 98 4) . O ur Sup re me Court

in Cumberland Telephone Co. v. Sm ithwi ck, 7 9 S

. W

. 8 0 3 , 8 0 4 (1 9 0 4 ), d es cr i b edt h e r u l e b y s t at i n g: [T]hi s is o ne of

the fu nc tio ns the c ir c uit

jud g e po sse sse s a

nd sh ou ld
exer c is e

– a s it w e r e , th a t o f a th ir te e n th ju r o r

. So it is s a id th a t he must be satisfied, as we ll as the jury ; that it is h i s d u t y to weig h the evidenc e; and if, he i s d i s s atisfied with the ver dict of the jury , he should set it aside.
Thus, when a

motion for a new

trial is filed, the trial cour t is required to “ independe ntly weig h the evidenc e and de termine whe ther the e vidence ‘pre ponderates’ in favor of or ag ainst the verdic t.” Blackburn v. C

SX Tran sp., Inc. , No. M2006-01352-COA- R10-CV, 2008 WL 2278497, at *6 (May 3 0 , 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g W

oods v. W alldorf & Co. Inc. , 2 6 S.W. 3d 86 8, 87 3 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 19 99 ); Sh iv e rs v. Ramse y , 9 37 S.W. 2d

94 5, 94 7 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 99 6) ; W itt e r v . Ne

sb it , 8 7 8 S

. W.2d 116, 121 ( T e n n

. Ct

. A p p

. 1 9 9 3 ) )

. I f , in th e tr ia l ju d g e ’ s o p in io n , th e v e r d ic t is “ a g a in s t th e w e ig h t of the evidenc e or c ontrary

to law,” the trial judge must g rant a new tria l, “and he cannot r efuse it to save time or avoid the e x pense of another trial.” Wakefield v. Baxter , 297 S.W .2d 97, 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1 9 5 6 ) ( ci t i n g State ex re l. Richardson v. Kenner , 109 S.W .2d 95, 97 (Tenn. 1937) ; Turner v. Turner , 3 S.W . 121 (Tenn. 1887)). I n 2003, our Supreme Court, in Davidson v. Lindsey , 104 S.W .3d 483, 488 (Tenn. 2003) , “re aff

i rm ed ” the thirtee nth juror standar d “that had be en the law in Tennesse eT h e thirte e n th j u ro r ru le , w ith re sp e c t to c rim ina l c a se s, w a s ju d ic ia lly a b a n d o n e d in t h is sta te fo r a tim e in 5
St at e v. Cabbage , 5 7 1 S .W .2 d 8 3 2 (T e n n . 1 9 7 8 ), b u t wa s re ins ta te d b y T e n n . R . C rim . P . 3 3 (f) in 1 9 9 1

. S ta te v . M o a ts , 9 0 6 S .W .2 d 4 3 1 , 4 3 4 , 4 3 4 n.1 (T e n n . 1 9 9 5 ).

-5- [f o r ] a lm o s t 1 0 0 y e ar s [, ]” Bla c kb urn , 2008 WL 2278497, at *6-7, and examined the rule ’s 5 rationale :
The re asons g iven for the rul e ar e, in substance , that the

c ir c u it ju d g e h e ar s th e te s ti mo n y , ju s t a s th e ju r y d o e s , sees the wi tne sse s, and ob se rv e s th e ir de me ano r u

po n th e wi tne ss s tand ; th a t, by his training a

nd experience in the weig hing of testimony , and the application of le g al rules ther eto, he is espe cially qualified for the
corr ection of any

err ors into which the jury by inexperience may

have fallen, w here by they have failed, in their verdict, to rea ch the justice and rig ht of the ca se, under the testimony

and the c harg e of the court

. . . . Id. (q u o t i n g Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. , 79 S.W . at 804). Be fore approvinga ver dict, a trial judg e must a lway s weig h the evidenc e and deter mine that the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rates in favo r of th e ve rd ic t, s uc h th a t th e tr ia l ju dg e is “ ind e pe nd e ntl y satisfied” w ith the verdict. Mabey , 2 0 0 7 W L2 7 1 3 7 2 6 , at * 6 (c i t i n g Holden , 682 S. W

. 2d at 906). Howe v er , t h e t ri al judg e is not require d to expos e his mental proc esses in exercising his role as thirteenth juror. “ I n d ec i d i n g [ a m otion for a ne w trial], the . . . judge is not bound to give a ny rea sons, any

more than the jury

itself is bound to do so.” Wa ke fi e ld , 297 S.W .2d at 99. He is not require d to “make a

n express statement that the pre pondera nce of the evidenc e supported the verdic t.” Mabey , 2 0 0 7 W L 2 7 1 3 7 2 6 , at * 7 (c i t i n g Taylor v. Jone s , G r e e n e L aw N o

. 1 4 8 , 1 9 9 1 WL 69049, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. W .S. Apr. 30, 1991)). I f the trial judge s i m p l y approves the ver dict without co mment, this C ourt “must presume that the trial judg e . . . we ighe d the evidenc e and adequately

perf ormed his func tion as the thirteenth juror.” Mabey , 2007 WL 3713726, at *6 (c iting Holden , 6 82 S.W. 2d

a t 90 5; Gordon’s Transps., Inc. , 294 S.W .2d at 321). I t is for this rea son that we sug g ested in Miller v. Doe , 8 7 3 S

. W

. 2 d 3 4 6 , 3 4 9 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 3 ), t h at “w h en a t ri al j u d ge ov e rr ule s a mot ion fo r n e w tri a l, .

. . he sim

ply state that he ha s r e vie we d th e e vid e nc e re le va nt t o the issues and a

pproves the ve rdict. Any

thing more unnece ssarily

runs the risk of a

n unwanted ne w trial.” When a trial judg e fa ils to heed our advice and off ers c omments conce rning a motion for a
ne w tr ia l, we mus t de te rm ine wh e the r the tr ia l jud g e , a ft e r re vie wi ng the e vid e nc e , wa s satis fi e d w ith the ver dict. Mabey , 2 0 0 7 W L 2 7 1 3 7 2 6 , at * 6 (c i t i n g Heath v. Mem phis Radiological Prof’l Corp. , 79 S.W. 3d

55 0, 55 4 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 20 01 )) . “ I f i t a pp e ars fr om a

ny re a so ns a ssi g ne d o r s tate me nts made in passingon a moti o n fo r a n ew t rial that the trial judg e wa s not actually satisfied with the verdic t, it is the duty of the appellate courts to g rant a new tria l . . . .” Id. (c i t i n g Holden , 682 S.W .2d at 905 ; J am es E . S tra te s S ho ws, In c . v . J

ak ob ik, 5 54 S.W. 2d

61 3, 61 5 ( Te nn . 1 97 7) ; Sh iv e rs , 937-6-

S.W. 2d a t 94 7; Miller , 8 73 S.W. 2d a t 34 8; Sh e rli n v. Robe rson , 5 51 S.W. 2d 70 0, 70 0 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 76 )) ; se e als o Miller , 873 S.W .2d at 347 (“ [I ]f in dis char g ing his duty as thirteenth juror , the trial judge makes comments which clea rly indicate that he has misconc eived his duty or cle arly has not followed it, this court must reverse and re mand the ca se for a new trial.”).

Af te r r e vie wi nga

numbe r o f c a se s invo lvi ngc ha lle ng e s to a tr ia l ju dg e ’s e xec uti on of his ro le
a s t hi rt eenthjur or , th is C ourt fi nd s tw o in te r- re late d p ri mary e rr or s o ft e n ma de by

tr ia l ju dg e s in
r u l i n g o nm o t i o n s f

o r a n e wt r i a l

. F i r s t , m an y t r i a l j u d g e s h a v e e r r e d b y s i mp l y d e f

e r r i n g t o t h e j u r

y. For example, in Miller , 8 73 S.W. 2d a t 347- 48 , the tr ia l judg e , in rul ing on a mot ion fo r a ne w tri a l, stated:

Wel l, what makes the jud g e any sma rt e r t ha n th e jur y in t his c a se ; I mean, you had a sy

mpathetic client. I

have to s ay

that. No per son, judg e in c lu d e d , w o u ld

f e e l o th e r th an e mp a thy to w ar d th e s it u a tion in which [plainti ff’ s] found herself . . . Well, the jury

in this case had the benef it of two prepared a

nd g ood lawy ers, whic h i s n ’t alway s the ca se. The c ase w as we ll presented. Ithink the issues were clea r, althoug h obviously

contested.

I ’m not inclined to interfer e with the ver dict of the jury , and I approve the ver dict of the j u ry

. Iunderstand your ar g uments, but the jury hear d all these thing s and the jury decide d the ca se ag ainst y ou. Your motion for a new

trial is respec tfully

overr uled. Although the trial judg e at one point stated, “I approve the verdict of t he jury [,] ” this court found that the “r emar

k [could] not be dissociated f rom the surrounding comments by the trial court . . . a ll of wh ic h in dic a te [d] th a t . . . h e sim ply de fe rr e d to the ve rd ic t of the jur y wi tho ut i nd e pe nd e ntl y weig hing the evidenc e and f ulfilling his role in passing on the issues prese nted to the jury .” Id. at 349-50. Thus, bec ause the trial judg e neg lected his duty und er t he thirtee nth juror standar d, we
rema nded the c ase f

or a ne w trial. Id. L ikewise, in McLaughlin v. Broyle s , 255 S.W .2d 1020, 1022- 2 3 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 5 3 ), i nru l i n g o nt h e p l ai n t i ff ’s m o t i o nfo r a n e w t r i a l , t h e t ri al j u d ge commented, “ I n these c ases whe re the evidenc e is in sharp c onflict the Court does not fe el that he has a rig ht to interfe re with the verdic t of the jury , and overr ules the motions.” I n rema nding f or a ne w tri a l, t

his Court e xpla ine d, “ I t af

fi rm a tiv e ly a

pp e ars that the le arn e d tri a l ju dg e did no t e xer c ise t h at ex cl u s i v e an d

i n d ep en d en tj u d gm en tre qu i re d o f h i m as t h e t h i rt ee n t h j u ro r.

. . . T h e t ri al j u d ge cannot e vade or

avoid his duty

in this resp ec t b y

placingthe re sponsibili ty upon the jury .” Id. at 1023. Finally , in Holden , o u r S u p re m e C o u rt re m an d edfo r a n ew t ri al wh er e t h e t ri al j u d ge appea red to “ approve [] the ver dict beca use he f elt that the ca se wa s fairly prese nted and he was not shocked by

the ver dict, rathe r than be cause he re ache d the same ve rdict as the jur y afte r independe ntly

weig hing the evidenc e and passing upon the i ssues.” 682 S.W.2d at 905-06 (“Tw ice the trial j udg e st ated that the court does not substitut e it s judgme nt for that of the jury . Be cause the trial judg e stopped short of making a n independe nt decision on the issues prese nted by the ca se, and-7-

defe rre d to the j udg ment of t he jury , he failed to perf orm his duty as t hirteenth juror.”). These ca ses cl ea rl y s h o w t h at b y

d ef erri n g t o a j u ry ’s v er d i ct , a tr i al j u d ge f ai l s i nh i s d

u t y t o i n d ep en d en t l y

we i gh the evidenc e and to e nsure his satisfac tion with the verdict, as r equire d by the thirteenth juror standard.

The sec ond primary

err or commonly

committed by

trial judg es i n ruling on motions for a new trial is indicating indiff

ere nce to the jur

y ’s ver dict. For

example, in Holden , 682 S.W .2d at 905, the t r i a l j u d g e c o m m e n t e d

t h a t“ [ h e ] w o u l d

j u s ta s r e a d i l y h a v e a g r e e d w i t h t h e v e r d i c tt h e o t h e r w ay. The ve rdict neither

way would have shoc ked the Court fr ankly .” We found t hat “[ a]lthough the trial judge s ai d t h at h e ag ree d with the verdic t for the de fenda nt, he indicated that he would also have agr ee d wi t h a v er d i ct fo r t h e p l ai n t i ff [ , ] ” an d t h i s “p o s i t i o n[ wa s ] i n co n s i s t en twi t h h i s d u t y t o we i gh the evidenc e and pa ss on the issues.” Id. Simi larly , in Sh e rli n , 5 5 1 S

. W

. 2 d at 7 0 0 -0 1 , t h e t ri al j u d ge stated:

Ican’ t say the jury rea ched the wrongverdic t. Ican’ t say that they
rea ched the rig ht verdict. Be fore I would as a thirteenth juror . . . set the ve rd ic t a sid e , it wou ld hav e ha d to have be e n a ve rd ic t th a t I
c ou ldn ’t liv e wi th, and that wa s no t the c a se in thi s c a se

. Itho ug ht i t
was a case that could have g one either w ay , very much so. . . . Ican’ t say that Ican’ t ag ree with what the jury did.

I n rema nding f or a ne w trial, this Court noted:

Wit h defe renc e to t he trial judge, it see ms to us that when he said he could not say

the ver dict of the jury

was rig ht t h ere was a

clea r disavowal of approva l. The statement immediately following , that he could not say the ver dict was wr ong , cannot be taken a s neutralizing the first statement. Taking the two statements and c onsidering them t o g e t h e r w o u l d i n d i c a t e t h a tt h e j u d g e h a d n o o p i n i o ne i t h e r

w ay. These statements consider ed in context with the pr o forma a pproval of the ve rdict wit h wh i ch he concluded his re marks see m to show that, notwithstanding his l ack of conviction, t he court was de fer ring to the v e r d ic t o f th e ju

r y an d d is c la im in g an y o p in io n o f h is ow n. When he stated he could not say the verdic t w as rig ht he fa iled to do pr e c ise ly wh a t he mus t do bef

or e re nd e ri ngjud g me nt o n th e ve rd ic t.

. . . [T he jud g e ’s re mark s] make it a pp e ar h e dis a sso c iate d h ims e lf from the de liberative pr ocess whic h i s the pec uliar and e x clusive p rovi nce of the jury of which the presiding judge is a s much a member a s jurors sitting in the jury box

. . . . To say . . . that befor e the tr ia l ju dg e , a c tin g a s th ir te e nth jur or , s ho uld

se t a sid e a verd ict it
wo uld have to be a ve rd ic t th a t he c ou ld n ot l ive wi th w ou ld b e to ad opt a standar d relievingthe judg e of the duty to take an unbia sed and dispassionate vie w of the ev i d en ce, weig h it and deter mine-8- whethe r t he evide nce pr eponder ates in favor of the pla intiff or defe ndant or is equally balanc ed. I f t he judge abdicates this i mportant duty justice could often misca rry

. She rli n , 551 S.W .2d at 701. Additionally , this Court, i n Cra ig v. Dison , No. M2003-00419-COAR3-CV, 2004 WL 1756056, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Au g. 5 , 2 0 0 4 ), found that the thirte enth juror standard ha d not been c omplied with where the trial judg e stated that he “c ould not disag ree with the verdic t.” We found that this statement indicated the trial jud ge’ s failure to make an inde pendent
e va luatio n o f t

he ve rd ic t’ s c or

re c tne ss. Id. Finally , in a nother case , our Supreme Court remande d for a new tria l where the trial judg e ac knowledg ed that h e “[ could not] say that the ver dict was
unrea sonable in lig ht of the evide nce pr esente d by both sides in this case.” Ja ko bik , 554 S.W .2d at 615. The Court found t h at “t he trial judg e af firmatively

predic ated his ruling upon a findingthat there was some e vidence to support the verdic t and that viewing all of the evidenc e[,] the ver dict was not unrea sonable[,] ” such that the thirteenth juror standa rd wa s not satisfied. Id. at 616. On appe al, Appellant a sserts that the cha ncer y court made statements and took ac tion demonstrating that it mis conce ived and f ailed to pe rf

orm its function as thirteenth juror . The appellant c arr ies the burden of aff irmatively

proving that the trial judg e fa iled to exercise his function as thirteenth juror

. Mabey , 2 0 0 7 W L2 7 1 3 7 2 6 , at * 6 (c i t i n g Gordon’s Transps., Inc. v. Bailey , 294 S.W .2d 313, 321 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956)) . Appellant points to t h re e pieces of e vidence that she claims show the Chanc ellor fa iled to fulfill hi s d u ty as thirteenth juror : (1) the Chanc ellor’s comments following Appellee s’ Motions for Dire cted Ve rdict; (2) Cra cker Ba rre l’s Proposed Orde r; and (3) Appellant’s Statement of the Evidenc e, De fenda

nt’s Response, Plaintiff’s Reply , and Def endant’ s Surreply . We addre ss the admissibili ty and substance of ea ch, in turn.

A. C hanc e llo r’

s Co mm e nts Ap pe lla nt a sk s th is C ourt

to c on sid e r s tate me nts the tr ia l ju dg e ma de in d e nyingAp pe lle e s’ motions for a direc ted verdict. The transcript of the ex cer pt of the trial proc eeding s reve als that the trial judg e did make se vera l statements in ruling on A ppellees’ motion for a direc ted ver dict at the close of A ppellant’s case

. Howeve r, at the close of all proof, when Appellee s rene wed their motion, the trial judg e simply

stated t hat “I ’m g oing to deny it on the same r eason that Istated the other day .” Appellant conte nds that these comment s d em o n s trated that “the cour t disag ree d with the position that th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d did not e sta bli sh that the c on du c t [ Ap pe lla nt] re po rt e d wa s bas e d at le a st in p art on se x or g e nd e r” and

thu s d isa g re e d w iththe jur y ’s fi nd ing that the pla int if f d id n ot a c tua lly and re asonably

believe tha t M r. L u d o vissie’s conduct wa s based on Appe llant’s g ender . The pe rt ine nt c omm e nts , ma de a t th e c los e of Ap pe lla nt’ s p ro of , a re a s f oll ow s:

Ijust . . . don’t believe [Mr. L udovissie] would have . . . the re’ s proof in h e r e th a t h e d id

n ’ t d o th a t t o w ar d

an y me n

. A n d

Ic an ’ t i ma g ine that happening toward a

man any way , wanting to know who they
wer e g oing to be dating afte rwa rds or g etting upse t beca

use this guy-9- tol d h im h e wa sn ’t

g oin g to g o out wit

h some pa

rt ic ula r g ir l and did g o o ut w iththe g ir l.
You know, I

see a sexual overt o n e here, a

nd Ithink the jury

. . . c ou ld d

ra w that.

. . . . Ibelieve a lmost any

body with any common s en s e

. . . beca use he apolog ized for asking about who – the only thing h e co u ld have apolog ized ab o u t was, he apolog ized to her about, [“]who are you g oing to stay

with . . . that’s more important than the team and spe nd the nig ht w ith [”] .

. . . H e a po log ize d f

or that.
Wel l, o bv iou sly

Mr . Warn e r [M r. Lud ov iss ie ’s su pe rv iso r, to whom Ms. Be llamy complained] . . . knew that she was c omplaining about him tr eating her differ ently – about him treatingher or asking he r ab ou t – inv a din g he r pr iva c y or se x lif e or g e nd e r or wh a te ve r t

his is he re

. He kn e w that or he wo uld n’ t have c a lle d and tol d h im, [“] You don’t nee d to do that.[ ”]

I t was obviousl y ab o u t that. He knew – Warner is not an idiot. He knew wha

t was g oing on.

. . . . Well, now, Ifind – this is what Ifind. [Ms. Bellamy ] put the company on no t i ce of this conduct . . . whe n she ca lled Warner a nd said to Warner . . . [“]L ook, this guy is prying into my persona l life. He wa nts to know who I ’m g oing to be g oing out with, who I ’m g oing to be staying w ith, and who it’ s more important for me to be
s ta y in g w it h th anh is g r o u

p in b lu e

. [” ]

I do n’ t lik e that. I do n’ t thi nk [Mr

. Lud ov iss ie ] ha s a ri g ht t o do that. And see . . . Warner kne w that she was co m p l ai n i n g about that, a nd that put hi m on

a de qu a te no tic e of

that c on du c t. We find that the trial judg e’s state ments made in the co n t ex t of the motion for a dire cted verdic t do not indicate that he f ail ed t o apply

the thirteenth juror

standard. I

n Mabey , 2 0 0 7 WL 2713726, at *7, we f

ound the trial judg e’s state ments in d en y i n g appellant’ s motions for directe d verdic t, that “I

believe the re’ s a continuing issue of mater ial fac t f or the jury to decide,” and “I think it i s a jur y qu e sti on [,]” did

no t su g g e st that

the tr ia l ju dg e fa ile d to pe rf or m hi s d uty a s th ir te e nth juror. Instead, we noted that the judge was “mer ely rec og niz[ ing] that there was ample evide nce f or the ca se to g o to the jury

beca use re asonable minds could differ a s to the conclusion to be re ache d.”-10-

Id. L ikewise, we find in the instant case, a s these stateme nts were made in the c ontext of a motion fo r dir e c te d ve rd ic t, that the tr ia l jud g e wa s me re ly e xpla ini ng his g ro un ds fo r d e nyingAp pe lle e s’ motions–t hat there exis ted “mater ial evidenc e in the re cord w hich would support a ve rdict for the plaintiff.” Jam estown on Sign al, Inc. v. First F ed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n , 807 S.W .2d 5 5 9 , 564 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). B. Proposed Order Additionally , Appellant asks this Court to consider, a s evidenc e of the trial judg e’s f ailure to exercise his duty

as thirteenth juror, Appellee s’ proposed order in which the trial judg e cr ossed throug h the sentenc e, “A s thirteenth juror, the Court a g ree s with the jury verdic t and ag ree s that the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is in favor of the de fenda

nts.” Both pa

rties a gree that at the conclusion of the he aring , afte r the trial court denied Appellant’s Motion for a New T rial, Appe llees asked the trial court to sig n an orde r that re ad:

Th is c a us e c a me to b e he ard

on [Ap pe lla

nt’ s] motio n for a

ne w tri a l,
me mor and a , a

nd state me nts of c ouns e l, and the e nti re re c or d in thi s case , from all of wh i ch i t appea rs that the motion is not well taken and should be denied. As thirteenth juror, the Court agrees with the jur yv e rd ic t an d agr e es th at t

he pr e po nd e ra nc e of the e v ide nc e is i n fav or of t hede fe nd an ts . (empha sis added). Although the re is dispute as to why , both parties ag ree that the t rial court struck the last sente nce of t h e p ro p o s edo rd er , an d

i n s t ea d en t er edan o rd er

re ad i n g:
Th is c a us e c a me to be he ard on [Ap pe lla nt’ s] mot ion fo r a

ne w tri a l,
me mor and a , a

nd state me nts of c ouns e l, and the e nti re re c or d in thi s case , from all of w hich it appea rs that the m o t i o n is not well taken and should be de nied. Appellant maintains that af ter mar king thr oug h the last sentenc e of the proposed order , “[t] he Court then expressly

stated that it did not ag ree wit h t h e order as it wa s written.” How ever , Appellee s contend that the c o u

r t m e r ely “expressed r eluctanc e at includingthe [last] sentenc e[,] ” as “ he thoug ht the standar d was inappr opriate.”

I n their brief, Appellee s maintain that this Court should not consider the proposed order as it is not a “ple ading ,” “de position or other discover y ,” or a n “evide ntiary filing . . . a uthenticated or stipulated to by

the par ties.” We nee d not consider whe ther the pr op o s ed o rd er i s appropr iate for
a pp e llate re vie w. B e c a

us e Ap pe lla

nt’ s State me nt o f t

he Ev ide nc e and

Ap pe lle e s’ Re sp on se dis pu te t h e trial judg e’s motive for striking the la

ng uag e, we cannot de termine whe ther such a ction was take n b e c a

us e the tr ia l ju dg e did

no t a g re e tha

t th e pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e wa s w ith Appellee s or bec ause he simply believed the lang uag e super fluous. Thus, provi n g t h at t h e trial-11-

jud g e str uc k a po rt ion of the pr op os e d o rd e r d oe s n ot m e e t App ell ant’s burd e n o f “ a ff ir mativ e ly proving that the trial judg e fa iled to exercise his function as thirtee nth juror.”

C. St atem ent of the Evidence Finally , Appellant asks this Court to f ind, ba sed on the trial judge ’s statements at the he aring on the motion for new tr ial, that th e t ri al j u d ge failed to e x erc ise his duty as thirteenth juror

. Tenne ssee Rule of A

ppellate Proc edure 24(b) pr ovides that “the a ppellant s h al l have pr epar ed a transcr ipt of such par

t of the evidenc e or proce eding s as is ne cessa ry to convey

a fa ir, ac curate and complete accou

n t o f w h a t t r an s p ir e d w it h r e s p e c t t o th o s e is s u e s th a t a r e th e b a s e s o f

a p p e a l.” Howeve r, if no t ra n s cr i p t is available, “ the appe llant shall prepar e a statement of the e vidence or proce eding s from the best available means, includingthe appe llant’s rec ollection.” Te nn. R . A pp. P . 24(c)

. We must note t hat t his Court has not bee n provided a transcr ipt of the hea

ring on Appellant’s motion for a new trial. Appellant, under Rule 24( c), did submit a Statement of the Evide nce f rom such hea ring . Howeve r, pursua

nt t o Ru le 24(c ), Appe llees filed a Response to Appellant’s Stateme nt of the Evidenc e, esse ntially providing their own statement of evidenc e, by objecting to Appellant’s
rec ollection of the proc eeding , and setting fo rt h Ap p el lees’ ve rsion of the he aring . Rather than
re c on c ili ngthe c on tr a dic tor y ve rs ion s, a s c on te mpl ate d b y Rul e 24 (e ) a

nd re qu e ste d b y

Ap pe lle e s, the trial cour

t merely cer

tified both Appellant’s and Appellee s’ ac counts by cer tify ing the rec ord, which included the Statem ent of the Evide nce, A ppellees’ Response, Appe llant’s Response, and Appellee s’ Surreply

. Th is C ourt

ha s c on sid e re d th e dif

fi c ult sit uatio n w he n th e tr ia l c ourt a pp ro ve s b oth

pa rt ie s’ statements of the e vidence or fa ils to settl e inconsistencie s betwee n a par ty ’s statement of the evidenc e and the objections to it. I n Armstrong v

. Armstrong , No. D13665-1, 1988 WL 5679, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S. J an. 28, 1988), aft er the appe llant filed his statement of the e vidence , the
a p p e l l e e i n i t i a l l y f

i l e d ano b j e c t i o n , b u tl a t e r

f i l e d h e r o w ns t a t e m e n to f

t h e e v i d e n c e

. S u

b s e qu e n t l y, both parties submitted a consent orde r askingthe trial cour t to approve both pa

rties’ stateme nts of the evidenc e, as the y

wer e not inconsistent. Id. The t ri al court did so. Id. On appe al, this Court acknow ledg ed that “[ t ] h e fili ng of two counte rvailing statements of the e vidence in the trial court
and the ir su bmi ssi on , w iththe a

pp ro va l of

the tr ia l c ourt , to the a

pp e llate c ourt s o f t hi s st ate is unknown to and outside of the intent a nd purpose of the Rules of Appe llate Proce dure.” Id. at *2. We further

noted:

I n proposing to the chancellor that he appr ove both statements of the evidenc e to be include d in the rec ord on appe al, [appellant’s] counsel lured the tria l court into a trap a nd then in turn jumped into the trap with him. I n our opi n i o n , h aving two proposed state ments of the evidenc e such a s we have her e is the same a s having none.-12-

Id. Be cause the appe llant provided no transc ript, and the di ff er i n g s tatements of the e vidence equate d to having none, this Court affirme d the trial cour t’s ruling

. Id. (“O ur Courts ha ve held on
nume ro us oc c a sio ns tha

t in the a bs e nc e of a tr ans c ri pt or state me nt o f t he e vid e nc e , it

is c on c lus ive ly presumed that the action of the trial court wa s supported by the evidenc e.” Id. (c i t i n g B r o o ks v. United Unif. Co. , 682 S.W. 2d 91 3 (T e nn . 1 98 4) ; Rhea v . Marko Constr. Co. , 652 S.W .2d 332 (Tenn. 19 83 ); Re agor

v . D y e r Co un ty , 6 51 S.W. 2d

70 0 ( Te nn . 1 98 3) ; In re Ro c k we ll , 673 S.W .2d 512 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983))

.
I n this case we are fac ed with the unenvia ble tasking of ana ly

zing Appellant’ s Statement of the Ev ide nc e , App e lle e s’ Re sp on se , App e lla nt’ s Re ply , a

nd Ap pe lle e s’ Sur

re ply , to de te rm ine wh a t, if any thing, the pa

rties a g ree transpire d at the hea ring on the motion for a ne w trial. Appe llant contends that there ar e no “sig nificant diff ere nces” betwee n her Stateme nt of the Evidenc e and the Appellee s’ Response. We disag ree

.
I n her Stateme nt of the Evidence , Appellant stated that she asked the trial court to “pla ce the evidenc e on the sc ales,” to “independe ntly weig h the eviden ce ,” and, “ as thirteenth juror ,” “make a ruling as to whethe r the e vidence preponde rate d in favor of , or ag ainst, the jury ’s l o n e finding .” Howeve r, she c laims the trial court “ never stated or r

uled that ‘the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e was in favor of [Appellee s],’ or ag ainst Plaintiff[ ,]” but instead “stated that the par ties ‘aske d for a jury and g ot a jury ’ and ‘ had a f air jury [,] ’ . . . and [he] . . . was ‘go i n g t o l et them dec ide.’” Howeve r, Appe llees conte nd that trial court did not indicate its failure to a pply the thirteenth juror standard, but instea d mere ly expressed its dissatisfaction with the standard. A ccor ding to the Appellee s, “[t] he Court expressed displeasur e at being require d to either a g ree or disag ree with the jury ’s verd i ct an d h aving to state that the pre pondera nce of the evidenc e wa s in favor of the [Appellees], noti ng that if the [Appellant] had wanted a bench tr ial, she would not have asked f or a jury trial and that it seeme d inappropriate t o him to have to e ssentially independe ntly

rule on the
c a se wh e n th e pa

rt ie s h a d r e qu e ste d a

jur y tr ia l.” Ho we ve r, Ap pe lla nt’ s Re ply

dis pu te d App e lle e s’ char acte rization of t he judge’ s comments as expressing dissatisfaction with the standar d, and stated that “ [t]he te no r o f t

he Court ’s de c isi on

wa s n ot a t a ll a

bo ut its tho ug hts on

‘t he sta nd ard [.]’ ” Ag a in in their S urre ply , the Appellees indicated that the t rial j udg e “absolutely voiced [ his] conce rn about the appr opriate standa

rd when fac ed with a motion for ne w trial and w hether the appr opriate standa

rd was not simply

whether there was suff

icient evidenc e to support the ver dict of the jury .” Although the above la

ng uag e illustrates what we f ind to be “sig nificant diff

ere nces” betwee n Appellant’s a

nd Appellee s’ ac counts of the he aring , we do f ind cer tain rele vant ac tions and state me nts up on wh ic h the pa rt ie s are in a g re e me nt. I n a dd iti on to t he pa rt ie s’ a g re e me nt t

hat c e rt a in lang uag e wa s struck fr om the proposed or der, both pa rties also ag ree conce rning a stateme nt made by the trial judg e. Appellee s’ Response claims that, afte r beingprese nted with Appellee s’ proposed order , the t rial j udg e “expressed reluc tance at i ncluding the s entenc e ‘As thirteenth juror, the Court ag ree s with the jury

verdic t and ag ree s that the preponde ranc e of the evidence i s i n fa vor of the d efendants.’” Howeve r, in expressing this re luctance , Appellee s contend that “ [t ]he [ trial judg e] specific ally

noted t hat he was not saying that he agr eed or disag ree d with the jury ’s dec ision, and that he was not say ing that he would have ruled in favor of Plaintiff[.] ” Appellant, in her Reply , does not-13-

dis p u te th e s u

b s ta n c e o f th e tr ia l j u d g e ’ s s tate me n t, b u t a s s e rts o n ly th a t t h e “ d is c u s s io no c curr ed befor e [Appellees] prese nted [their] proposed order to the Court.” Thus, despite a dispute as to the timing of the state ment, both parties ag ree that at t he hearingon the motion for a ne w trial, the trial judge stated “that he was not saying that he agr eed or disag ree d with the jury ’s dec ision, and that he was not say

ing that he would have ruled in favor of Plaintiff[.] ”

As we state d a

bo ve , in c on sid e ri nga

mot ion fo r a ne w t ri a l, t he tr ia l ju dg e mus t “indepe ndently

weig h the evid ence,” Bla c kb urn , 2 00 8 WL 22 78 49 7, a t *6 , to e ns ur e that he is independe ntly

satisfied with the ver dict, Mabey , 2007 WL 2713726, at *6, and if he finds the verdict to b e “again st th e we ig ht o f [that] e vid e nc e or c on tr ary to [the ] law, ” he mus t g ra nt a ne w tri a l. Wa ke fi e ld , 297 S.W .2d at 99. I f he simply denies the motion for a new trial, we must pre sume that he has satisfied his role as thirtee nth juror. Mabey , 2007 WL 2713726, at *7 (c it i n g Kear v. Bi rd we ll , No. 03A01-9301- CV-00089, 1993 WL262910, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. E.S. July 13, 1993)). Howeve r, if he c hooses to comment on t he motion, we must review his comments to ensure they do not evidence a fa ilure to comply with the thirteenth juror standa rd. See id. at *6.

We f ind the tr ia l ju dg e ’s c omm e nt “ that he wa s not saying that he ag re e d or d isa g re e d w ith th e ju r y ’ s d e c is io n s , an d

th a t h e w a s n o t s ayin g th a t h e w o u ld h a v e r u le d in f av o r o f [Ap p e ll an t] ”
e vid e nc e s a mis c on c e pti on of his du ty a s thi rt e e nth jur or , thu s re qu ir ing a ne w tr ia l. As the thi rt e e nth juror, the tria l judge must do prec isely what the trial judg e fa iled to do in this case –ag ree with the jury ’s verdict. Be cause “it appea rs from

. . . statements m ade in passing on a motion for a ne w trial that the trial judg e wa s not ac t ually satisfied with the ver dict,” Mabey , 2007 WL 2713726, at *6 (citations om itted), or at least “stopped short of makingan indepe ndent dec ision concer ning whether the j ury verdic t was c ontrary to the weig ht of the evide nce,” Cra ig , 2004 WL 1756056, at * 3, we
are re qu ir e d to g ra

nt A pp e lla nt a ne w t ri a l.

V. C ONCL US I ON

For the af oreme ntioned rea sons, we re verse the dec ision of the chanc ery court a nd rema nd the ca se for a new trial. Costs of this appeal ar e taxed to Appellees, Cra cker Ba rre l Old Country S t o r e , In c

. an d

P a u l Lu d o v i s s i e , f

o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ ALANE. HI GH ERS , P. J., W.S

.