[Cite as S.P. v. M.G. , 2021-Ohio-1744.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY [S.P.] Plaintiff-Appellee

v. [M.G.] Defendant-Appellant : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case No. 2020-CA-42

Trial Court Case No. 2017-DM-98 (Domestic Relations Appeal)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 21st day of May, 2021.

. . . . . . . . . . . BRIAN A. SOMMERS, Atty. Reg. No. 0072821, 10532 Success Lane, D ayton, Ohio 45458 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee ADAM ARMSTRONG, Atty. Reg. No. 0079178 and MATTHEW D. DICICCO, Atty. Reg. No. 0072889, 40 North Main Street, Suite 2010, Dayton, Ohio 454 23 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

WELBAUM, J.-2- {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant M.G. (“Father”) appeals from several judgme nts of the trial court. He appeals from a judgment terminating the partie s’ shared parenting plan and reallocating their parental rights. Father also appeals fr om two judgments addressing the parties’ various contempt motions, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to hold Plaintiff-Appellee S.G. (“Mother ”) in contempt for interfering with his parenting time and ordering Father to pay unreimbursed medical expenses. 1 In an amended notice of appeal, Father also appeals from the trial court’s decision to replace the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) originally assigned to the case. According to Father, the trial court erred in terminating the parenting plan, in restric ting his parenting time, in failing to hold Mother in contempt, in removing the guardian ad litem, and in calculating expense reimbursements. For the reasons discussed below, we find Fathe r’s assignments of error to be without merit, other than his complaint about the e xpense reimbursements, which is sustained. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment te rminating shared parenting will be affirmed. The second judgment related to the contempt motions will be reversed insofar as it ordered Father to reimburse medical expenses, and the matter will be remanded for the trial court to correct the judgment entry; in all other respects, that judgment is affirmed. We decline to address the trial court’s first judgment related to the contempt motions, because Father does not raise any argument ch allenging that judgment. We also decline to separately address the trial court’s ruling on the removal of the GAL, because it was not a final order and merged into th e order terminating shared

1 Because this case involves sex ual abuse allegations, we will u se initials for the child’s name and will refer to the parents as “Mother” and “Father” in order to protect the child’s privacy

.-3- parenting, which we affirm.

I. Facts and Course of Proceedings {¶ 2} On June 30, 2017, Mother and Father filed a petition in the tri al court to dissolve their marriage. They had one child, a daughter, E.G., who had been born in July 2014 and was nearly three years old at the time. Neither parent was represented by counsel during the dissolution; instead, Mother prepared the paperwork. Tr. 4 at p. 57; Tr. 2 at p. 196. 2 {¶ 3} The parties filed a shared parenting plan under which each pare nt was designated E.G.’s legal custodian and residential parent, with Mother being the residential parent for school purposes. The parents were also required to consult with each other concerning E.G.’s medical care needs, but in situations where t hey could not agree, Mother’s decision would control. Shared Parenting Plan, p. 2. At the time, Mother was a physician’s assistant in orthopedic surgery. Tr. 2, p. 14. Father did not recall specifically discussing this subject with Mother, but agreed af ter learning about it, because Mother had a medical background and he had no reason to distrust her at that point. Tr. 4, p. 78. {¶ 4} Under the shared parenting plan, parenting time with E.G. was t o be in accordance with the court’s Standard Order of Parenting, and Fa ther was designated as the non-residential parent for purposes of the order. Shared P arenting Plan at p. 2.

2 There were five transcripts involving the final custody and co ntempt hearings in this case, which were held on January 23, May 11, May 12, May 28, an d September 28, 2020. To simplify, we will refer to these transcripts, respectively, as Tr. 1, Tr. 2, Tr. 3, Tr. 4, and Tr. 5.-4- Under the Standard Order, Father would be entitled to parenting time for three hours on

Wednes days and on alternating weeken ds from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. The parties further agreed to deviate from the child supp ort calculation to zero support, despite the fact that Mother made $170,000 per year an d Father made $95,000. {¶ 5} On August 21, 2017, the court filed a judgment entry dissolving the parties’ marriage and approving the Shared Parenting Plan. Judgment Ent ry of Dissolution of Marriage with Children. However, although the parties had agre ed to the Standard Order, they did not follow it. Instead, they split time with E .G. on a 50-50 basis, with Father having parenting time from Sunday at 1:00 p.m. to Wednes day at 1:00 p.m.; Mother would then have E.G. from Wednesday at 1:00 p.m. until S aturday at 1:00 p.m. They then would have parenting time on alternating weekends fro m 1:00 p.m. on Saturday until 1:00 p.m. on Sunday. Tr. 4 at p. 60. This sche dule lasted from August 1, 2017, until December 2018. Id . at p. 61. {¶ 6} At the end of July 2018, Father noticed redness in E.G.’s vagin al area and sent Mother a photo, asking if he should do anything other than make sure E.G. was dry. Mother told him to put hydrocortisone on the outer portion of t he vagina, and to make sure the area was dry after a bath. Tr. 2 at p. 21, 22, and 25-26; Tr. 4 at p. 240. 3 {¶ 7} On August 24, 2018, E.G. had a four-year well checkup with her pediatrician. Both parents were present. Mother believed she mentioned that E.G. had a little irritation in the vaginal area, but nothing was documented. At the time, Mother was not concerned. Tr. 2 at p. 34-35. The pediatrician said to apply a thin layer of Vaseline on

3 After this point, most instances of redness were documented fi rst by Mother, as the reports primarily were that Mother observed redness when E.G. w as returned to her following Father’s parenting time.-5- the area, and Mother instructed Father on how to apply it. Tr. 4 at p.72. {¶ 8} On August 29, 2018, E.G. returned from Father’s parenting time with vaginal redness and sores, and Mother texted Father about this. Mother stated that E.G.’s vagina looked terrible, the worst it had ever been, and had ope n sores. Tr. 2 at p. 32- 33; Tr. 4 at p. 87-88. Mother testified that usually E .G.’s vagina had a grimy residue on it that she could feel and wipe clean, and that could have been due to the Vaseline they were using. Tr. 2 at p. 122. Mother’s interpretation was that Father was not cleaning E.G. hard enough. Id . at p. 124. {¶ 9} During a text discussion on August 29, 2018, Mother told Father that E.G. had said Father did not wash the area, and Father responded tha t E.G. did not wipe at school. Tr. 2 at p. 33-34. Mother discussed bathing protocol, and Father stated that maybe he was not washing E.G.’s vagina hard enough. Id . at p. 34. Father also said

that E.G. had told him Mother’s nails hurt when Mother washed h er. Id

. See also Tr. 4 at p. 90-91. 4 Mother admitted that Father had told her that, but said her n ails were short due to being in surgery; she also said E.G. never told her thather nails hurt. Tr. 2 at p.

34-35 and 193. {¶ 10} On September 5, 2018, E.G. was returned to Mother again with re dness

and sores. Id . at p. 35. Mother took a picture of the child’s vagina and se nt it to Father. During Mother’s parenting time on September 5, 6, 7, and 8, the redness persisted but was improving. Id . at p. 36-38 and 41-42. At that time, Mother was still trying to figure out the cause of the irritation; Father thought perhaps his bat htub slip pad was the cause.

4 Mother’s testimony is contained in Tr. 2 and Tr. 3, while Fath er’s testimony is in Tr. 4. Concerning E.G.’s comment about Mother’s nails, both parents ag reed that Father told Mother about this during the August 29, 2018 text messages.-6- Id . at p. 37-38. Because there did not appear to be an infectio n, the parties were still using Vaseline. Id . at p. 42. {¶ 11} Mother wanted E.G. to stay with her until the redness cleared, but Father wanted to exercise his parenting time. As a result, E.G. was r eturned to Father on September 8, 2018, and Father and the child spent the night at his mother’s house. Id

. at p. 40. When E.G. was returned to Mother on September 10, 20 18, the redness was

worse. Id . at p. 39. {¶ 12} Because the redness appeared to be coming and going, Mother con sulted a friend, Ami, who was a nurse practitioner in dermatology. Id . at p. 43. Ami worked for a Dr. Rupert in Columbus, Ohio. Id. Ami prescribed a steroid cream, Fluticasone, and the parties began applying it daily in the morning and evening to E.G.’s vaginal area, beginning around September 11, 2018. Tr. 2 at p. 43-45 and 81. The cream was used from this time until October 9, 2018, when the redness had clea red up. Id . at p. 53. By September 17, 2018, the redness was markedly better. Id . at p. 220. {¶ 13} After mid-October, and based on instructions, the parents appli ed the cream on weekends and applied Vaseline during the week. Id . at p. 53 and 57; Tr. 4 at p. 82. Mother instructed Father on how to apply the cream, and the app lication process both parents used was the same: they put a thin layer over the inner labia region and used their fingers to smooth the cream over the genital area. Tr. 2 at 183 and 185; Tr. 3 at p. 25; Tr. 4 at p. 82-84 and 92. When the use of the cream was ta pered off, redness would return. Tr. 4 at p. 93. {¶ 14} After Father’s parenting time on October 10 and during his pare nting time on October 16 (when the child was staying at her paternal grand mother’s house), E.G.’s-7- vagina was red. Tr. 2 at p. 54-56. Mother did not take E.G. t o the emergency room or report it to the police or Children Services because she had no idea what was causing the problem. Id . at p. 55. The duration of the redness could vary from a few days to a

week or sometimes l onger, depending on how severe the irritatio n was. Id . Mother did not note any further irritation the rest of October 2018. Id . at p. 59. {¶ 15} By late November 2018, about 30 days had elapsed since the last flare-up.

Id . at p. 61. On December 5, 2018, after Father had E.G. the two prior nights, Mother noticed that E.G.’s vagina was red, and she told Father. Id . at p. 62-63. After a night’s stay with Father on December 7, E.G. returned again with rednes s on December 8. Id

. at p. 64. At that point, Mother began to wonder if something a t Father’s house was causing the redness. She therefore suggested that E.G. stay wi th her. Id . at p. 65. After E.G. continued to have redness on December 10 and 11, 201 8, while staying with Father, Mother said that E.G. would stay with her until it clea red up and E.G. stayed well. Mother stated that this was not up for debate. Id . at p. 66-69. {¶ 16} After December 12, 2018, Father had no more overnight parenting time until December 27, 2018. By agreement, Father exercised his parentin g time at Mother’s

house. Id . at p. 71-72; Tr. 4 at p. 61. During that time, on Su ndays, Mondays, and Tuesdays, and on alternating Saturdays, Father would either pic k E.G. up and take her to his parents’ house, do something in public away from his hou se, or do his parenting time at Mother’s house Tr. 4 at p. 62. {¶ 17} From December 2018 through mid-March 2019, Father exercised his parenting time primarily at Mother’s house, where he would playwith E.G., eat dinner, and put E.G. to bed together with Mother. This was a bit awkwa rd on all sides. Tr. 4 at-8- p. 68-69; Tr. 2 at p. 73. Father stated that he was willing to do this because he was attempting to do what he could to figure out what was causing t he redness, which Mother said primarily occurred at Father’s house. Father also did wat er and radon tests on his house in December 2018 and April 2019, respectively, but the te sts were negative. Tr. 4 at p. 69, 98, and 99. {¶ 18} On December 27, 2018, E.G. was ill, and Father took care of her that day. E.G. returned with an irritation in her vagina. Tr. 2 at p. 74 -75. As a result, Mother asked that Father change E.G.’s soap and hand lotion to what Mo ther was using; Father stated that he used the same products as Mother did. Id . at p. 75. According to Mother, after Father took E.G. to his parents’ house on December 29 fro m 9:30 a.m. to 7:45 p.m. to celebrate Christmas, E.G. returned with redness in her vagin a. Id . at p. 75-76. {¶ 19} Between then and January 17, 2019, E.G. stayed at Mother’s hous e, with Father exercising parenting time as he had during December 2018 , and no redness occurred. Father had parenting time with E.G. overnight for fo ur days from January 17 through January 20, 2019, while Mother was on a business trip. Tr. 2 at p. 80-81. During the trip, Father texted Mother about irritation in E.G.’ s vagina. Id . at p. 81. Mother suggested, and Father agreed, that they would continue h is parenting time at her

house. Id . at p. 82. They discussed having E.G. see Dr. Rupert, who was a dermatologist. Id

. {¶ 20} For many weeks, no further redness occurred while E.G. was excl usively at Mother’s house. Again, according to Mother, E.G. came back wit h redness after Father had taken her to a birthday party in February for a few hours. Id . Also, in late February 2019, Father asked Mother to sign a form to modify the shared p arenting agreement to-9- reflect the schedule they had been following. However, Mother refused. Tr. 4 at p. 101- 103. Mother denied that this impacted her decision to make an appointment with Dr. Rupert a few weeks later. Tr. 2 at p. 234. {¶ 21} Both parents then took E.G. to Dr. Rupert’s office on March 11, 2019. Id

. at p. 83. Dr. Rupert conducted a physical exam of E.G., which was normal. Tr. 1 at p. 77. During doctor visits, Mother was the one giving the history and doing most of the talking, as she was in the medical field. Tr. 1 at p. 100 and 116. Mother told Dr. Rupert that the redness occurred primarily at Father’s house. Tr. 4 a t p. 260. Mother admitted this. However, at trial, Mother insisted that she told Dr. Rup ert that E.G. only had symptoms with Father and that the doctor had documented her com ment differently. Tr. 2 at p. 238. {¶ 22} Dr. Rupert’s working diagnosis at the time was lichen sclerosus . In a majority of cases, this is “a chronic relapsing condition,” whi ch as it “progresses, * * * can cause scarring and permanent thinning and white patches of the skin.” Tr. 1 at p. 87 and Tr. 2 at p. 84. Dr. Rupert recommended that E.G. undergo patch testing in the event that there might be an allergy component, and she also made a referr al to social services to rule out abusive factors. Following the appointment, Dr. Ruper t made a mandated reporting referral to Children’s Services. Tr. 1 at p. 150; Tr . 4 at p. 110; Tr. 2 at p. 84. However, on March 13, 2019, Children Services declined to do an assessment/investigation. Mother’s May 2, 2019 Motion for Emer gency Orders, Termination of Shared Parenting, and for Custody and for Appoin tment of Guardian ad Litem, verified Memorandum, p. 3-4 and Plaintiff’s Ex. 1, p. 2 attached to the Memorandum (“Mother’s Motion to Terminate Shared Parenting”).-10- {¶ 23} Shortly after the March 11 appointment with Dr. Rupert, Mother said she did not want Father to continue exercising parenting at her house b ecause it was confusing to E.G. Tr. 2 at p. 239; Tr. 4 at p. 112. As a result, Father began exercising his parenting time away from Mother's house and primarily in public or at his parents' house. He tried to stay away from his house because he was concerned about envi ronmental factors. Tr. 4 at p. 113. {¶ 24} On March 18, 2019, Dr. Carpenter, a general dermatologist, saw E.G. for an initial evaluation and the start of allergy testing, which i s called patch testing. Tr. 1 at p. 69-71. Both parents were present, and the history given was that “in the summer of 2018, [E.G.] started to develop episodes of redness, sometimes associated with fissures in the skin, bleeding, pain. They seemed to be intermittent” a nd seemed “to flare when

she’s at father’s house.” Id . at p. 72. Mother did say during this appointment that the episodes seemed to happen only when E.G. was at Father’s house. Id . at p. 75. {¶ 25} Dr. Carpenter did not have a working diagnosis on March 18 but thought allergy testing could shed light on why E.G. flared. Id . at p. 73. Both parents were aware that E.G. had very sensitive skin. For example, when E.G . got bug bites, the bite would get bigger than a quarter and stick up on the skin a few centimeters unless hydrocortisone was applied immediately. Tr. 4 at p. 73; Tr. 3 at p. 86. E.G. also could not wear necklaces or earrings that were not pure silver or gol d. Id

. {¶ 26} On March 18, the parents declined a physical exam because Dr. R upert had done an exam a week earlier, and no flare-ups had occurred since. Tr. 1 at p. 76- 77. Dr. Carpenter applied 80 test substances to E.G.’s arms an d back, which were allowed to stay in place for 48 hours. The doctor then saw E.G . again on March 20,-11- 2019, to remove the patches and check the results. Id . at p. 78-79. No reactions showed after 48 hours, which is typical for patch testing, so E .G. returned again on March 22 and on March 25, 2019. Id . at p. 81-84. Both parents were present for all these appointments. Id

. {¶ 27} The testing showed allergic reactions to fragrances, cobalt met al, and possibly Cinnamic Alderhyde. Tr. 1 at p. 71 and 83 and Plainti ff’s Ex. 9, p. 235. Fragrances can be part of soap, detergents, and other products people use on their skin, including toilet paper and wipes. Id . at p. 83. C obalt is a natural earth metal that can be found in jewelry as well as foods. Id . at p. 83-84. Based on her testing and examination (which was done on March 25, 2019), Dr. Carpenter’s differential diagnoses or list of possible diagnoses, in order of most likely to least likely, were “irritant contact dermatitis, allergic contact dermatitis, * * * psoriasis, and * * * lichen sclerosus.” Id . at p. 85-86 and Plaintiff’s Ex. 9, p. 235-236. {¶ 28} Lichen sclerosus was least likely because the doctor did not se e any scarring, thinning, or white patches. Id . at p. 88. Psoriasis, an autoimmune condition, can cause redness, but also tends to leave some longer-lasting but not permanent discoloration, which the doctor did not find on the March 25, 2 019 visit. Id . at p. 91-92. Irritant contact dermatitis is common. A classic example is re dness and chapping caused by a person washing her hands too much. Chemical or mec hanical factors can also play a part, but patch testing does not test for irritant contact dermatitis; it only tests for allergic contact dermatitis. Id . at p. 92. Skin diseases can exist independently of sexual abuse, and all the listed potential diagnoses could be a lso induced by friction, trauma, or abuse. Id . at p. 93.-12- {¶ 29} During the March 25, 2019 appointment, Dr. Carpenter gave the p arents a safe product list and wanted them to use the products at both h ouses. Before instituting these recommendations, Mother and E.G. went to Father’s house f or a two-and-a half hour visit on March 26, 2019. Tr. 2 at p. 89-90. As noted, Fa ther also had a radon test performed on April 2, 2019. Tr. 4 at p. 69 and 99. {¶ 30} Based on the March 26, 2019 visit, Mother and Father talked abo ut Father’s implementing the suggested changes, and about the fact that, af ter he did, E.G. could go over to Father’s house to stay. The parenting time in question occurred on April 6, 2019, when E.G. went over to Father’s house to stay. Tr. 2 at p. 91. On April 6, 2019, Mother

did an exam on E.G. before she went over to Father’s house beca use she wanted a baseline; she also did an exam when E.G. came back on April 7, 2019. Id . at p. 92. To do an exam, Mother would visually inspect E.G.’s vagina by spre ading her labia with her fingers. Id . at p. 93-94. According to Mother, w hen E.G. returned from Father’s parenting time on April 7, 2019, she had redness in her vagina. Id . at p. 92. {¶ 31} Mother notified Father that day that E.G. was red. Id . Mother also sent him a photo of E.G. lying naked on the bed. Mother said she ha d stripped E.G., had checked her, and had changed her to get her ready to go to Temp le. Tr. 4 at p. 117. Father told Mother that E.G. had been fine the night before and was fine when she got dressed that morning. Id . at p. 125. In addition, Father asked Mother if they could g et an appointment with the dermatologist the next day. Because itwas Sunday, Mother said she would try the next morning. However, Mother then told Father the next day that she had called and was unable to get in to see the doctor. Id. at p. 126. When Father asked when the next time slot was, Mother did not respond. Id

.-13- {¶ 32} Mother also claimed that E.G. had redness on April 15, 2019, af ter Father picked E.G. up at daycare and delivered her two hours and fifte en minutes later to Mother’s house. Tr. 2 at p. 96-97. Mother did not know if E.G . had redness while at daycare; she only knew she had it when she came back. Id . at p. 97. 5 Mother then made an appointment with Dr. Carpenter for April 19, 2019. Tr. 2 at p. 242. {¶ 33} Under the Shared Parenting Plan, both parents had a right to pa rticipate in major decisions concerning the child’s health, the right to aut horize medical treatment and to obtain second opinions, and the right to be present with the child at all medical examinations and treatment. Shared Parenting Plan at p. 1-2. The Plan further required the parents to consult with each other about the child ’s medical care needs, and each parent must “immediately notify the other parent about all major non-emergency medical decisions before authorizing a course of treatment.” Id . at p. 2. {¶ 34} Mother testified that she sent Father a text message from the s urgical suite at work about the appointment on April 19, 2019, but the messag e apparently failed to

send. Id . at p. 99. This message was sent about two hours before the s cheduled appointment. Id . at p. 242-243. Mother claimed she did not realize that the m essage had not gone through, due to other text messages she later rece ived from Father that intervened and displayed on her phone’s screen. Id. at p. 244. {¶ 35} According to Father, this had never happened before. He stated that the

5 At the custody hearing, Father presented evidence that he obta ined later from his cellphone, which tracked his movements on April 15, 2019. This evi dence indicated that during this parenting time, Father was in public places with E. G. other than when he was in transit from E.G.’s daycare to a playground, from the playgr ound to a pizza parlor, and from the pizza parlor to Mother’s house. Tr. 4 at p. 119-120. The same was true of Father’s parenting time on April 22, 2019, and April 29, 2019. Id . at p. 120-122.-14- parties had always communicated directly with each other about E.G.’s medical appointments so they could both be present. Tr. 2 at p. 126. Father did not attend the April 19, 2019 appointment with Dr. Carpenter. {¶ 36} The history that Mother gave during the appointment was that sh e had been with E.G. at Father’s house for a supervised visit and no flare -up had occurred; Mother then took E.G. for a second visit after the recommended changes were made, and a flareup occurred. Tr. 1 at p. 94. Dr. Carpenter was the first doc tor who had seen E.G. during a flare-up; she saw “some ill-defined redness that was o n both [E.G.’s] labia and extending to the skin from her labia to her anal area.” Id . at p. 95. “Ill-defined means that where the redness stops and starts can be a little hard to define. It's not sharply

demarcated.” Id . at p. 163-164. Dr. Carpenter “felt it was still non-specific and could fit with multiple diagnoses, the same ones she had listed before.” Id . at p. 95. {¶ 37} Nonetheless, Dr. Carpenter recommended no more unsupervised vis its with Father and to consider a biopsy if E.G. flared despite tha t. Id . at p. 98 and Plaintiff’s Ex. 9 at p. 238. The doctor did not make a referral to Childre n’s Services because one had already been made (the Rupert referral). Tr. at p. 151. {¶ 38} Mother did not tell Father about Dr. Carpenter’s appointment fo r about a week. She was concerned that if Father found out, he would tryto enforce standard parenting time and would have E.G. from Friday to Sunday. Tr. 2 at p. 244-245. Mother did let Father have parenting time on April 20, 2019, but claim ed that a video her boyfriend took showed that E.G. was upset about going with Father. Id . at p. 247-248 and 253- 257, and Defendant’s Supplemental Ex. YYY. According to Mother , the video was taken to show that E.G. had a drastic behavior change at that time in terms of not wanting to go-15- with Father. Id . at p. 252 and 255. 6 {¶ 39} On March 31 and April 1, 2019, Father video-recorded his time w ith E.G. because Mother was becoming more aggressive and hostile toward him and acting as if he had done something wrong. Tr. 4 at p. 151. After his visit ation was reinstated on August 25, 2019, he continued video-recording until January 202 0, when he scaled back somewhat. He then switched to audio in February 2020. Id . at p. 152-153. {¶ 40} Father told Mother about the video-taping at the end of March 2 019. Id . at p. 152; Tr. 2 at p. 239. Mother admitted knowing that Father h ad said that he taped E.G.’s visit at the end of March or early April. However, whil e Father said he told Mother that he was taping all visits, Mother denied knowing this until June 2019. Tr. 2 at p. 151; Tr. 4 at p. 239. {¶ 41} On April 26, 2019, Mother notified Father that Dr. Carpenter wa nted him supervised when he was with E.G. Tr. 4 at p. 122-123. Mother then filed a motion on May 2, 2019, requesting an emergency order for supervised paren ting time for Father. Mother also asked to terminate the shared parenting agreement a nd to be appointed sole

custodian of E.G. See Mother’s May 2, 2019 Motion to Terminate Shared Parenting. Father was served with the motion on May 3, 2019. Tr. 4 at p. 134. The day before, Father and his mother had taken E.G. to an appointment with the urology department at Dayton Children’s Hospital (“DCH”), because he wanted to take E .G. to an expert and not a general dermatologist who treats all ages. He also wanted to get a second opinion.

6 The trial court was not impressed with this video, and it conc luded that the child was initially upset about going outside before she knew Father was there and did not want to go anywhere with anyone. Tr. 2 at p. 257. Mother also showed the Children’s Services caseworker this video but did not show her a video Father sent Mother about ten minutes later, showing E.G. completely fi ne in the car and laughing wit h Father. Tr. 1 at p. 324.-16- Id . at p. 133-134 and Tr. 1 at p. 176. Father sent Mother a text message about the appointment on the way there. Id . at p. 144. Mother was not at this appointment. Tr. 4 at p. 108. According to Father , the urologist said that E.G. ’s vaginal irritation was due to poor hygiene. Tr. 1 at p. 176 and 184; Tr. 4 at 241. Mothe r denied any hygiene problems at her house or being told that E.G. had hygiene probl ems at school. Tr. 1 at p. 175; Tr. 2 at p. 29 and 67. 7 {¶ 42} In the memorandum supporting the motion, which Mother verified, Mother alleged that E.G. had “[s]ince June 2018, a rash recurring betw een twelve (12) and twenty-four (24) times with bleeding, ulcerations, and fissures on the minor child’s genitalia that occurs after unsupervised parenting time with Fa ther.” Mother’s May 2, 2019 Motion to Terminate Shared Parenting at p. 3. Mother did not mention that there had been no bleeding, ulceration or fissures in the nine months before she filed the motion. Tr. 2 at p. 284-285 and 286. Before the motion was fi led, E.G. had not made any disclosures about inappropriate touching by Father, althoug h she had told Mother’s father about her “pee pee” hurting at her Dad’s. Tr. 3 at p. 92

. {¶ 43} On May 2, 2019, the court filed an ex parte order suspending Fa ther’s parenting time. The court then set a hearing for May 22, 2019. {¶ 44} On May 14, 2019, Mother took E.G. to an appointment with France s

7 Dr. Liker, an expert in pediatric medicine and child sexual ab use, testified that irritant contact dermatitis has many causes such as harsh soaps, bubble baths, and hygiene issues, especially in children E.G.’s age. She stated that som etimes children do not wipe properly, retain urine, or itch or scratch as young children do at that age. Tr. 3 at p. 39- 40. Father also presented testimony from the director of the c enter where E.G. attended preschool. The director stated that there was a note in the fil e in the spring of 2019 concerning an incident where E.G. was itchy after going to the restroom. When E.G. was asked if she had wiped, she said no. E.G. was then sent ba ck to do so. Tr. 3 at p. 75-76.-17- Duncan, a therapist who specializes in sexual abuse. Tr. 1 at p. 169 and 170-171. Father was not present. Duncan met with Mother and then talked to E.G. According to Duncan, “Mother stated client has had a chronic severe problem with vaginal and anal redness, pain, very bad ulcerations, and irritation,” that Moth er had “taken E.G. to a dermatologist over a period of time,” that “[t]hese episodes of vaginal irritation seem to occur after visits with her Father,” that “client’s dermatologi st suggested client have a onemonth break from visits with Father to see what happens,” that “[t]he dermatologist reported her concerns to Children Services,” and that “Mother s tated client disclosed to her that Father rubs her down there at night – meaning down the re, meaning vagina –

and that his nails hurt her.” Id . at p. 175-176 and Plaintiff’s Ex. 10. Mother also told Duncan that Father was addicted to pornography. Id

. 8 {¶ 45} Mother testified that she did not mention E.G.’s disclosure to Mother in the May 2, 2019 emergency motion because it happened afterwards, so metime between May 2 and May 14. Tr. 3 at p. 99. {¶ 46} After talking with Mother, Duncan met with E.G. for about 15 to 20 minutes. During the interview, E.G. stated, “I have a problem with my pe e pee. It hurts when I’m at my Dad’s.” Tr. 1 at p. 177. When Duncan asked what made he r “pee pee” hurt, E.G. said that her Daddy rubs it. Id . Duncan then asked E.G. where she was when this happened, and E.G. stated she was at her Dad’s in her bed. Id . As a result of this disclosure, Duncan made a referral to Greene County Children’s Protective Services. Id

. {¶ 47} Children’s Services received the referral on May 21, 2019. Tr. 1 at p. 27.

8 Neither E.G.’s alleged disclosur e nor Father’s alleged addicti on had ever been mentioned before. The alleged addiction was also not discussed during the custody hearings, other than the therapist’s statement that Mother had reported this.-18- After a May 22, 2019 hearing during which Dr. Carpenter was the only witness, a magistrate ordered that the shared parenting plan be modified o n an interim basis until further investigation could be concluded. The magistrate appoi nted David Mesaros as the GAL and ordered that Father be allowed supervised visitatio n at the County Visitation Center for 90 minutes a week. Magistrate’s Order, p. 1-2. Fat her was also allowed to

attend E.G.’s school and extra-curricular activities. Id . at p. 2. A further hearing was set for July 16, 2019. {¶ 48} On May 24, 2019, Allivia Clement conducted a forensic interview with E.G. Tr. 1 at p. 27. Clement was a Family Services Coordinator who was employed at DCH,

Michael’s House. Id . at p. 24-25. A Greene County Children’s Services Intake Work er, Eve Wojtowicz, observed the interview. Id . at p. 283. During the interview, E.G. made

disclosures to Clement. E.G. stated “that on one occasion that she was in her bed in her bedroom at her father’s house. She was in her pajamas. Her fa ther was in her room, in her words, standing on his knees on the floor. That he touc hed her – he had rubbed her vagina underneath of her pajamas, and then she went to bed. ” Id . at p. 31-32. Based on the May 24 interview, Clement made an appointment with the Care Clinic at DCH, where E.G. was seen by Dr. Liker. Id . at p. 37. {¶ 49} On May 29, 2019, Dr. Liker performed an evaluation of E.G. Dr. Liker is the Chief of the Division of Child Advocacy for DCH and is an e xpert in pediatric medicine and child sexual abuse. Tr. 3 at p. 7 and 13. Both parents ta lked to Dr. Liker on the day of the visit. Id . at p. 11. Dr. Liker reviewed the medical records and spoke t o Clement about the forensic interview. Id . at p. 11-14, and 32. A written summary of the interview was also provided to her. Id . at p. 32. In addition, Dr. Liker tested E.G. for all-19- diseases that could be obtained from urine, and they were negat ive. Id . at p. 31. There

was no medical evidence of abuse. Id . A normal exam neither negates nor refutes a history of sexual abuse. Id . at p. 46. {¶ 50} At trial, Dr. Liker stated that, assuming that E.G. turned four years old in July 2018, “and that was shortly before the genital irritation symptoms started,” that it is “very common” “for children of that age to have genital irritat ion and redness that is not caused by sexual abuse.” Id . at p. 17. During trial, Dr. Liker reviewed Protective Exhibits 33, 36, 34, 39, 42, and 41, which were photos of E.G.’ s vaginal area taken, respectively, on April 1, April 6 (Exs. 36 and 34), April 20, A pril 23, and April 27, 2019. Tr. 3 at p. 22; Tr. 2 at p. 275, 277-278, 283, and 285. Mother took all these photos except

one. Id

. {¶ 51} According to Mother, Ex. 33, Ex. 36, Ex. 39, and Ex. 42 (which were taken during or after Father’s parenting time on April 1, April 20, a nd April 23, 2019), showed redness. Tr. 2 at p. 275, 281, 283, and 284. Mother further i ndicated that no redness appeared during her parenting time before Father got E.G. on Ap ril 27, 2019, or at any other times Mother had E.G. before Father exercised parenting t ime, other than April 6, 2019. Tr. 1 at p. 126-127; Tr. 2 at p. 21, 25-26, 32, 35, 37, 40, 43, 49, 54, 56, 60, 62, 64, 69, 75-76, 80, 91, 97-98, 100, 137, 241, 279. 281, and 285. 9 {¶ 52} When Dr. Liker testified about reviewi ng the April 2019 photos (Protective Exhibits 33, 36, 34, 39, 42, and 41), the following exchange oc curred:

9 The photo on April 6, 2019, was taken at 8:30 p.m. during Fath er’s parenting time and Mother did not see any redness. However, Mother testified that E.G. was red the next day, on April 7, when she was returned from overnight parenting time with Father. Tr. 2 at p. 241, 275, 283.-20- A. I think that what can be visualized in the photos is fairly normal. There is an area of, pink or red pigment in the area of the lab ia minora. This pigment can be, can be normal and can be persistent or can be a sign or some sort of irritation or redness that would – that may go away as well. It’s hard to discern from the photos. There is a lit tle bit of redness

there. Q. The redness that you see, would you describe it as severe o r mild?

A. Mild. Q. Is there anything in those photographs that you see there concern you or cause you to have a concern about abuse?

A. No. Q. Are any of those photographs in your opinion consistent wit h trauma associated with rubbing or abuse? A. No. Not definitively. Q. Would any of those photographs cause you concern enough to make a report to Children Services or law enforcement?

A. No. Tr. 3 at p. 22-23. {¶ 53} The following further exchange also occurred concerning opinion s Dr. Liker gave to the GAL: A. I did communicate that the findings that I was presented wi th or

made aware of would not have risen to the level of reasonable s uspicion for-21- me to make a report myself.

* * * A. [Reasonable suspicion] * * * really is an individual thresh old because we’re all held responsible as individually as [sic] man dated reporters, so it really comes down to any findings medically or history that I’m given which for me would have equated to reasonable suspici on, in which case I would have been obligated to make a report. Q. So based upon the history provided by Mother, by Father, th e photographs you reviewed of Mother, the forensic interviews tha t you were made aware of, the disclosures of the child, all that put toget her, everything that you reviewed, you did not feel that there was even a reaso nable suspicion of abuse that would justify a report? A. That’s correct. The – when we use the word disclosure, it presumes a disclosure of abuse, so I just want to clarify that I am aware that the child made statements, but in the context of the medical fi ndings and the treatments that had been administered by both parents, I, I would not have interpreted that as a disclosure of sexual abuse specifica lly.

* * * A. The, the May disclosure involved her disclosure of contact to that area with Dad’s fingers, and I was also aware of the fact that they had used multiple over-the-counter and prescribed medications over a per iod of months in that area to treat the symptoms that she was experien cing, so I

would not have been – I would not have concluded that that was a-22- disclosure as opposed to a statement of events in the context o f that history. Tr. 3 at p. 23-25. {¶ 54} The Bellbrook Police Department also investigated the May 2019 disclosure, but it declined to pursue charges and closed its in vestigation. Tr. 4 at p. 178; Tr. 2 at 203; Tr. 3 at p. 217. The GAL, Sean Vallone, talked t o Detective Vetter of that department and was told that the police did not take the case t o a grand jury because they did not feel they had even enough probable cause to take i t to the grand jury. Tr. 3 at p. 217. After the police sent a letter closing their invest igation, Father emailed Duncan (E.G.’s therapist) multiple times to ask if he could be involve d in E.G.’s therapy because the investigation was closed, but he got no response. Tr. 4 at p. 233. {¶ 55} After May 2, the first time Father saw E.G. was on May 23, 2019 , at a swim meet. According to Father, E.G. ran up to him, grabbed his han d, and said that she was hoping to see him. She also asked where he had been and wanted him to go play toys with her. Tr. 4 at p. 141. Mother reported to the Children Se rvices caseworker (Wojtowicz) that E.G. urinated herself when she saw Father. Tr . 1 at p. 309 and 325. During the custody hearings, Mother then stated that E.G. was c hanging in the changing area at the swim meet and Father was standing outside. Tr. 3 a t p. 105. E.G. asked if Father was coming in, and then urinated on the floor. Id

. {¶ 56} Mother did not testify about this during the hearings, but Fath er’s testimony was quite different. As indicated, he said E.G. was quite happ y to see him. At some point afterward (neither parent said whether the urinating inci dent occurred before or after swim practice), Mother and E.G. were in a changing room and Fat her was nowhere near them; instead, he was out by the bulletin boards and saw Mother leaving the changing-23- area and walking to the bathroom. He asked Mother what happene d, and Mother stated that E.G. had wet her pants. Tr. 4 at p. 142. {¶ 57} E.G.’s next therapy appointment with Duncan was on June 3, 2019 . During this session, Duncan did a “green flag/red flag explanation,” m eaning that a red flag touch is one where someone touches E.G. in private areas of her body where she wears underwear and she is to say “no” in a strong voice. Tr. 1 at p . 181. When Duncan asked E.G. if someone had ever given her a red flag touch, she said n o. Id . at p. 231. {¶ 58} Father’s first visitation at the visitation center was on June 24, 2019. Tr. 4 at p. 149. On June 26, 2019, E .G. had another therapy appointment. Duncan asked her how her visit went with Father, and she said “good.” E.G. did not make any disclosures at this appointment. Tr. 1 at p. 232-233. On July 10, 2019, E.G. and Duncan played a game where E.G. could draw a red card and say n o in a strong voice or talk about what she was angry about or a red flag touch. Dunca n asked E.G. if anyone had ever given her a red flag touch and she said “no.” Id . at p. 186-188 and 233. {¶ 59} On July 16, 2019, the magistrate held a review hearing on the i nterim order. During the hearing, Eve Wojtowicz testified that she was workin g on substantiating abuse and said that if the court ordered unsupervised visitation, she would go to juvenile court and file for protective supervision. July 16, 2019 Hearing Tra nscript, p. 10 and 11. {¶ 60} During the final custody hearing, Wojtowicz described the facts known to her in July 2019 that, to her, substantiated abuse. Tr. 1 at p . 308-309. Specifically, Wojtowicz stated: [E.G.’s] disclosure was concise, and it was clear. The fact th e child used the terminology that she [sic] stood on her knees was very compelling-24- to me. That she discussed how it hurt, and how her Dad would r ub his fingers and his nails, and that it would hurt her. The conversations I’d had with Mom about the little girl urinat ing

herself when she saw her Father. And video footage I saw of [E.G.] genuinely scared to go see he r Father. She was screaming and crying. 10 Tr. 1 at p. 309. {¶ 61} During the interim custody hearing on July 16, 2019, Clements d iscussed the forensic interview she conducted with E.G. The GAL, Mesaro s, was present at the hearing and also testified. Mesaros stated that he was not pre pared to make a final report, as he was asked when he was appointed to “try to get en ough information to be of some assistance” at the July 2019 hearing. July 16, 2019 He aring Tr. at p. 76. {¶ 62} Mesaros further indicated that he had seen the medical records and therapy records and their reports. He had also reviewed the Visitation Center information, had physically viewed visitation between Father and E.G., and had s poken with both parents, who had provided him with a lot of information. Id . at p. 77. Mesaros had also reached out to the Bellbrook detective, who had not returned his call. Id . At the hearing, Mesaros outlined his background as a prosecutor for 18-19 years and as an advocate for protecting children from abuse. Id . at p. 78-79. He also said, given his background, his

10 Father was the one allegedly rubbing E.G. Tr. 1 at p. 309. T he video in question was of the April 20, 2020 visit (Ex. YYY), that the trial court vie wed. Mother did not show Wojtowicz the entire video. Tr. 1 at p. 324; Tr. 2 at p. 268-2 69; Tr. 3 at p. 87-88. Instead, the video was split into three parts. Id. at 268-269. Mother also never told Wojtowicz that E.G. had complained about Mother’s nails hurting her, that she had showed Father how to apply cream, or that the cream was applied at bedtime on E.G.’s bed. Tr. 1 at p. 312; Tr. 3 at p. 113-114.-25- threshold was pretty low for getting an investigation started a nd considering prosecution.

Id . However, he was not convinced the case had anything to do wi th sexual abuse, and

based on his observations of the interaction between Father and E.G., visitation at the visitation center was unnecessary. Id . at p. 79-82. Mesaros, therefore, recommended phased in visitation on Wednes days for a couple of hours, with someone supervising, and perhaps a Saturday for three or four hours, again with supervis ion and initially in public places. If those visits proceeded for some time without incide nt, Mesaros recommended that the Saturday visit could be extended to all day and overni ght to Sunday. Id . at p.

82-84. {¶ 63} After the July 16, 2019 hearing, Wojtowicz’s supervisors told h er that she

was not allowed to find that abuse was substantiated and declin ed to take the case any further. Tr. 1 at p. 290 and 297-298. Wojtowicz left the agen cy and took a job with Daybreak on July 22 or 23, 2019, but stated this case had nothi ng to do with ending her employment at Children Services. Id . at 296-297. The Bellbrook police also declined to prosecute Father. Tr. 3 at p. 220. {¶ 64} Between June 24 and August 19, 2019, Father visited E.G. at the visitation center. Tr. 4 at p. 149. In an August 1, 2019 therapy session , E.G. stated that she was sad because she did not want to go to her Dad’s house. When as ked why she did not want to go, E.G. said she was scared there. Tr. 1 at p. 190. {¶ 65} On August 14, 2019, E.G. again saw the therapist, Duncan. Tr. 1 at p. 191. At trial, Duncan testified about this session as follows: She presented as more comfortable in this session. In most previous sessions, she presented as guarded and reluctant to pa rticipate.-26- During playing and feeling games, she stated, I’m going to tell you something. This therapist asked, what she wants to tell me? She stated, my Dad hurt my pee pee and rubbed it with his finge rs and his nails. She stated, my Mother told me to tell you. She said it’s good to tell the truth. I ask her, is this the truth? And she said, yes. This therapist asked her, where she was when this happened? She stated, she was in her bed. Tr. 1 at p. 192. After August 14, 2019, E.G. did not make any further disclosures to

Duncan. {¶ 66} On August 22, 2019, the magistrate issued an order agreeing wit h the GAL that interim parenting time should be increased, but with “an a bundance of caution.” Magistrate’s Order, p. 2. The magistrate therefore ordered tha t Father would have parenting time outside the visitation center on Wednesdays from 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. and on Sundays from noon until 4:00 p.m. Parenting was to occu r in public places such as a mall or restaurant, and Father was to have another adult k nown to E.G. present at

all times. Id. In addition, Father was not to accompany E .G. to the bathroom alone, nor was he to apply any ointments to E.G. Id. The order also stated that motions to set

aside the order could be filed but that the order would not be stayed unless the court or magistrate entered a stay. Id . at p. 3. A final hearing was set for December 5, 2019. {¶ 67} On August 22, 2019, Mother filed a motion to set aside the magi strate’s-27- order. {¶ 68} Father’s first visit with E.G. after the magistrate’s decision was on Sunday, August 25, 2019, from noon to 4:00 p.m. Both of Father’s paren ts were there, and Father stated that the visit went great. Tr. 4 at p. 150. The next v isit was on Wednesday, August 28, 2019, from 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. From the time the visit started until Father dropped E.G. at Mother’s, the paternal grandfather, W.G., super vised the visit. Tr. 4 at p. 151. Father recorded the entire visit. Id . W.G. also testified that he was with Father and E.G. for the entire visit and there was never an opportunit y for Father to be alone with

E.G. Id . at p. 33. {¶ 69} According to Mother, when E.G. returned home from the August 28 visit, E.G. had redness and stated that Father had touched her pee pee . E.G. made that statement on the way to the bathroom, and Mother observed redne ss when E.G. sat on the toilet. Tr. 2 at p. 105-106. {¶ 70} Mother immediately took E.G. to DCH, alleging abuse. Tr. 2 at p. 107 and Tr. 3 at p. 14. During the hospital visit, E.G. was again exam ined and tests were run. Tr. 2 at p. 105-106; Tr. 4 at p. 167. Detective Strayer of the Sugarcreek Township Police Department also came to DCH and ta lked with Mother. In additio n, Mother spoke with a social worker, and another referral was made to Children Servic es. Tr. 2 at p. 106; Tr. 4 at p. 155. E.G. was at the hospital for five hours, into the e arly hours of the morning. Tr. 4 at p. 229 and 184-185; Tr. 3 at p. 229. Mother did not t ell Father that E.G. was taken to the hospital until the following day, nor did she tell Father about the abuse allegations. Tr. 4 at 175; Tr. 3 at p. 229. {¶ 71} The next day, Allivia Clement conducted another forensic interv iew with-28- E.G. Tr. 1 at p. 38. During that interview, E.G. made the fol lowing disclosure: A. She disclosed that the previous day she had been with her Father. They were going back to her Mom’s house; and as he was carrying up to her mother’s house, he had reached in between – the way t hat she described it – in between her legs, underneath of her vaginal a rea to carry

her to the home. She stated that his, his hand touched her vagina on the outside of her clothes, and she was wearing a skirt with shorts underneath of it. Q. Now, you used your hands to demonstrate. Did the child do anything? A. She did. She used her arm to describe herself, and she reac hed in between her legs underneath of her vagina during the intervi ew. Q. She actually stood up to do that?

A. Yes. Tr. 1 at p. 39. {¶ 72} E.G. never made a disclosure about the August 28, 2019 incident to her therapist. Tr. 1 at p. 254. {¶ 73} As noted, W.G. was present during the entire August 28 visit. W.G. testified that, when they arrived at Mother’s house, Father pul led the car into the usual spot in the driveway. W.G. got out of the car and walked aroun d the back of the car to say goodbye to E.G. From where he stood, he was able to see Fa ther and E.G. walk to the front door, but he did not walk all the way to the door. H e estimated that the walk took 10 seconds. Tr. 4 at p. 28-29.-29- {¶ 74} Father videoed the entire August 28, 2019 visit. He sent this two-hour video to Mesaros, who was then still the GAL, and Father’s atto rney sent the video to law enforcement. Tr. 4 at p. 222. Mother also had video from driv eway surveillance and a

doorbell camera. Id . at p. 213. Mother’s claim was that Father had abused E.G. on the walkway from Mother’s driveway to the front door. Id . at 157. {¶ 75} According to the evidence on the videos, the trip from the driv eway to the front door took 30 seconds. Tr. 4 at p. 166. During that time , while carrying E.G., Father had his cell phone in his right hand with the phone pointing to wards his s houlder a nd had

E.G.’s shoes in his left hand. H e did not have a hand availabl e to reach around E.G. as she had described to touch her genitals, nor did he set E.G. do wn at any time and take things out of his hand. Id . at p. 216-217. {¶ 76} According to the GAL, Vallone, Det ective Strayer said the Augus t 28, 2019

disclosure did not even rise to the level of abuse and was less strong than the May disclosure, which had already been declined. The police again declined to pursue charges against Father. Tr. 3 at p. 220. Vallone had also wat ched the videos and the forensic interview and had heard Clement’s testimony at the cus tody hearing. Id . at p. 209. The GAL stated that “during that time, it seems highly un likely that abuse could

have occurred.” Id . at p. 213. {¶ 77} On September 10, 2019, Father filed an emergency motion to term inate the shared parenting plan and to reallocate parental rights. He als o asked the court to establish child support and parenting time and, alternatively, asked the court to modify the parenting plan. See Father’s Motion to Terminate Shared Parenting. In the motion, Father alleged that Mother was coaching the child and was attem pting to alienate her-30- from Father. Id. at p. 3-6. Father also testified that he filed the motion bec ause he was concerned about E.G.’s being probed and photographed at the hos pital and how that impacted E.G. mentally, physically and psychologically. Tr. 4 at p. 167. {¶ 78} Mother responded to the motion, and on September 11, 2019, she filed a motion to remove Mesaros as GAL and appoint a new GAL. In the motion, Mother argued, among other things, that the GAL had totally failed to properly investigate the

case and seemed more concerned with Father’s best interest than that of the child. Id

. at p. 6-7. {¶ 79} On September 18, 2019, the court overruled Mother’s motion to s et aside the magistrate’s decision. On the same day, Mother filed a mot ion asking the court to hold Father in contempt for picking the child up and returning her on September 8, 2019, without having another adult in the car. Mother also asked tha t Father’s visitation with E.G. be returned to being supervised at the visitation center. Motion to Show Cause, p. 1-2. A hearing on this motion was scheduled for December 12, 2 019. {¶ 80} On September 30, 2019, Mesaros filed a request asking the court to award Civ.R. 11 sanctions against Mother’s attorney for the comments he made in the motion to remove Mesaros as GAL. In response, Mother’s attorney filed a motion for Civ.R. 11 sanctions against Mesaros. The court then set a hearing for Oc tober 18, 2019, on the motion to remove Mesaros. At the hearing, the court heard test imony from Mesaros, who was questioned by both parties and also made a statement. In addition, Mother presented testimony from an attorney who discussed what he woul d have done as guardian ad litem. Transcript of Proceedings on October 18, 20 19. {¶ 81} On October 25, 2019, the court filed an order concluding that M esaros did-31- not violate any of his responsibilities or duties as a GAL unde r Sup.R. 48 and that Mother’s motion was baseless. Decision and Order, p. 1. However, the c ourt also held that a new GAL should be appointed because it was clear that Mother wo uld not have full

confidence in the court’s decisions if Mesaros remained as GAL. Id . at p. 2. The court therefore removed Mesaros as GAL and appointed Sean Vallone as the new GAL. The court also set a January 27, 2020 hearing on the motion for Civ .R.11 sanctions and rescheduled the final custody hearing to begin on January 23, 2 020. {¶ 82} On January 21, 2020, Father filed a motion to continue the fina l hearing due to newly-discovered evidence (about alleged coaching of E.G. by Mother) and because Vallone had not submitted a GAL report seven days before the he aring as required by Sup.R. 48. Subsequently, on January 23, 2020, Father filed a m otion to replace the GAL and to strike his report. Father also again asked to continue the final hearing. Doc. #128. In the motion, Father made the same complaints that Moth er did about the prior GAL’s failure to talk to witnesses, including parties who treat ed the child and investigators. {¶ 83} At the January 23, 2020 hearing, the trial court heard from the parties concerning the motion to remove the GAL, and it overruled the m otion. Tr. 1 at p. 21. The court then heard the evidence. During the first day, the c ourt heard testimony from

Mother’s witnesses: A llivia Clement, Dr. Carpenter, Frances Dun can, and Eve Wojtowicz. On January 28, 2020, the parties agreed to the GAL’s recommenda tions for Father’s increased parenting time. Tr. 1 at p. 348-357. The court then put on an entry providing Father with additional parenting time on Tuesdays and Thursdays and every other Saturday from 9:00 a.m. to 7:30 p.m. The court also stated tha t the parties could take video of E.G. but that “it must be done surreptitiously so that the child is not aware of the-32- camera.” {¶ 84} January 25, 2020, was the first parenting time for Father after the January 23, 2020 hearing. On that day, Father was never alone with E.G . Either Father’s Mother was there or hundreds of people were there (at a father/ daughter dance). Father

even had his mother drive E.G. to the dance so he would not be alone in the car in the dark with E.G. Tr. 2 at p. 168-170. Mother then picked up E.G . from the dance, and she texted Father a few hours later, alleging that E.G. was red

. Id . at p. 170. Father and Mother talked for a combined period of about an hour, discu ssing the situation. Id

. at p. 170-171. No reports to the police or medical appointment s resulted from this

incident. {¶ 85} On February 3, 2020, Mesaros moved to dismiss his motion for sa nctions against Mother’s attorney, and the motion was granted the same day. Mother then filed another show cause order for contempt on May 1, 2020, alleging that Father had violated the court’s January 28, 2020 ord er by failing to videotape E.G. surreptitiously and by failing to reimburse M other for his part of E.G.’s counseling b ills from May 24, 2019 through January 2020. The court then set the contempt motion f or hearing on May 12,

2020. {¶ 86} On May 11, 2020, the court heard further testimony from Mother. Then, on May 12, 2020, the following individuals testified: Mother, Sean Vallone, and two of Father’s witnesses – the Director of Early Education at the chi ld’s preschool, and Dr. Liker. Finally, on May 28, 2020, the court heard testimony fro m a friend of Father, W.G. (the paternal grandfather), and Father. {¶ 87} On July 2, 2020, Father filed a motion for contempt based on Mo ther’s-33- interference with parenting time, but the parties reached an ag reement and the motion was dismissed. The court then filed an entry on August 21, 202 0, indicating it needed further evidence on the medical expenses. As a result, the cou rt scheduled another hearing for September 28, 2020. {¶ 88} On September 2, 2020, Father filed another contempt motion agai nst Mother for interfering with parenting time, for refusing to all ow him telephone contact with E.G., and for refusing and interfering with Father’s ability to participate in medical decision-making and treatment appointments. This contempt moti on was also scheduled for hearing on September 28, 2020. On that date, the court heard evidence on the pending contempt issues and the medical bills. {¶ 89} Finally, on October 13, 2020, the trial court filed three judgm ent entries. In the first one (First Judgment Regarding Contempt Motions, Doc. #180), the court denied Mother’s motion for contempt as to Father’s failure to have an adult present in the car on September 8, 2019, and found Father’s motion to compel discover y moot. In the second judgment entry (Second Judgment Regarding Contempt Motions, Doc . #181), the court denied Mother’s contempt motion as to videoing the child and he r motion concerning medical bills, but ordered Father to pay $25.97. As to Father’ s contempt motion for denial of parenting time, the court found that Mother’s interpr etation of the January 28, 2020 parenting order was incorrect. The court declined to hold Mother in contempt, however, because the parties had agreed that Father was entitle d to make-up parenting time. The court also awarded Father the expenses incurred for a process server after

certified mail to Mother failed. {¶ 90} In the third judgment entry (Judgment Terminating Shared Parent ing, Doc.-34- #182), the court terminated shared parenting, designated Mother as the legal custodian and residential parent, and granted the Court’s Standard Order of Parenting Time to Father. The court also made other orders pertaining to E.G., i ncluding forbidding both parties from taking pictures of the child’s genitals and forbid ding examination of such unless the child complained. In that event, another appropriat e adult, rather than the parents, would do any examination. Other orders were also made to aid the parents in communicating with each other and to prevent further disputes. {¶ 91} On October 25, 2020, Father filed a timely notice of appeal of the two judgments regarding contempt motions and the judgment terminati ng shared parenting; on November 12, 2020, he filed an amended notice of appeal in w hich he additionally appealed from the trial court’s October 2019 order granting Mot her’s request to appoint a new GAL. In our view, the trial court’s judgment ordering that a new GAL be appointed was an interlocutory order, not a final order; therefore, that order merged into the judgment terminating shared parenting, and it was not separatel y appealable. See In

the Matter of C.J ., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-862, 2019-Ohio-1863. Neverthel ess, we will address all four assignments of error that Father raises o n appeal. We will consider these alleged errors in order, beginning with the court’s decis ion to remove Mesaros as

GAL.

II. Removal of GAL {¶ 92} Father’s First Assignment of Error states that: The Trial Court Erred by Removing David Mesaros as the Guardian

ad Litem.-35- {¶ 93} Under this assignment of error, Father contends that the trial court erred in removing the first GAL, David Mesaros. According to Father, Me saros was very experienced in the child abuse field, and Mother’s motion to re move him was improperly based on the fact that Mesaros failed to find support for her a buse claims. Father argues that the court’s decision gave Mother exactly what she wanted –another chance to convince a new GAL that a basis existed for terminating shared parenting. {¶ 94} In responding, Mother argues that Father waived this assignment of error because he failed to object to the court’s decision as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv). Mother further states that while plain error is the appropriate standard, the trial court’s decision was appropriate even under an abuse of discretion revi ew. Specifically, Mother reasons that the court’s decision was proper because Mesaros’s filing of a Civ.R. 11 motion for sanctions created a potential conflict with his cont inued performance as GAL. {¶ 95} As a preliminary matter, Mother is incorrect in contending that Father waived this argument by failing to object to the trial court’s decision. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) and the waiver concept apply only to decisions of magistrates. E.g., Woodbury v. Woodbury , 2d Dist. Greene No. 2017-CA-57, 2018-Ohio-2026, ¶ 50 (failure to object to magistrate’s decision waives error other than plai n error on appeal). Here, the trial judge himself held a hearing on the motion to remove the GAL and then issued a

decision. See October 18, 2019 Hearing Transcript, and October 25, 2019 Orde r. Thus, Father did not need to object and did not waive any error for purposes of appeal. {¶ 96} Generally, abuse of discretion is the standard used to review t rial court

decisions in domestic relations cases. Edwards v. Edwards , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 10-DR-279, 2013-Ohio-117, ¶ 17, citing Booth v. Booth , 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541-36- N.E.2d 1028 (1989). In the specific context of removal of guar dians, the abuse of discretion standard applies. E.g., In re S.M.K. , 2d Dist. Miami No. 2008 CA 17, 2008- Ohio-6733, ¶ 44, citing In re M.E.H. , 4th Dist. Washington No. 08CA4, 2008-Ohio-3563, ¶ 25. “Abuse of discretion is a term used to indicate that a tr ial court's decision is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Montei v. Montei , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2013- CA-24, 2013-Ohio-5343, ¶ 28, citing Blakemore v. Blakemore , 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). {¶ 97} After reviewing the record, we find no abuse of discretion on t he trial court’s part. Based on our review, we first do agree with the court th at Mother’s motion to remove the GAL was “baseless.” October 25, 2019 Order at p. 1. Rather than having merit, the motion appears to have been premised on Mother’s dis agreement with the GAL’s recommendations at the July 16, 2019 interim custody hear ing. At that time, the

GAL stated that he was “not convinced” the child’s rash “had an ything to do with sexual abuse,” and he described the child and father’s “wonderful” int eraction at the visitation center. July 16, 2019 Hearing Transcript at p. 79. However, t he GAL did recommend that resumption of non-visitation center parenting time should take place on a gradual basis, in public (to make Father and E.G. more comfortable), an d with another person around to protect against more allegations. Id . at p. 83. {¶ 98} As noted, after the magistrate granted Father parenting time in late August 2019, Mother filed a motion to set the decision aside and then filed a motion to remove Mesaros as GAL in early September 2019. In response to the mot ion to remove, Mesaros filed a request for Civ.R. 11 sanctions against Mother’ s attorney, who reciprocated by filing a motion asking the court to issue Civ.R . 11 sanctions against-37- Mesaros. The court then held a hearing on October 18, 2019, co ncerning the motion to

remove the GAL. {¶ 99} Although Mesaros testified at the hearing that he felt he could continue as GAL and that he harbored no ill will against Mother, he also sa id that he felt he was being attacked and that the reason for doing so was “based more on po sturing and trying to influence the proceedings than it has anything to do with the m erits.” October 18, 2019 Hearing Tr., p. 47. In view of the contentious circumstances, the trial court made the

difficult decision to remove the GAL. We find no abuse of disc retion, while disapproving of what does appear to have been Mother’s gamesmanship. It is important to note the court’s emphasis that Mesaros “ did not violate any of his duties or responsibilities,” and that the court had “no concern whatsoever in the integrity and honesty of the GAL.” (Emphasis sic.) Oct. 25, 2019 Order at p. 1-2. With the recip rocal sanction requests between the GAL and Mother’s attorney having been filed, the co urt’s decision was not

an abuse of discretion. {¶ 100} We note that the day the final custody hearing began, Father al so filed a motion to remove Sean Vallone as GAL, which the trial court den ied. In responding to the motion, Vallone stated that “[t]he final motion to remove b asically impugning my competency by implying that I didn't do my job, frankly is a li ttle offending and insulting just as I think Mr. Somers was to Mr. Mesaros.” Tr. 1 at p. 22 . The trial court agreed with this statement but said it did not believe delaying trial any further was in E.G.’s

interests. Id . at p. 23. Again, the trial court did not abuse its discretio n. At that point, the proceedings had been pending with disruptions to parenting and to E.G. for a substantial period of time. In addition, Vallone, while likelybeing irritated, had already-38- provided the parties and court with a written GAL report, where as Mesaros’s recommendations were only preliminary. {¶ 101} Accordingly, the First Assignment of Error is overruled.

III. Termination of Shared Parenting {¶ 102} Father’s Second Assignment of Error is as follows: The Trial Court Erred by Terminating the Shard Parenting Plan a nd Limiting Father's Parenting Time. {¶ 103} Under this assignment of error, Father makes several points in arguing that the trial court erred in terminating shared parenting. He contends no evidence was introduced at the hearing to support the court’s conclusion tha t the parties’ ability to cooperate and make joint decisions had been compromised. Fathe r further argues that Vallone’s recommendations were tainted by his statement that, w hile the evidence weighed against abuse, Vallone could not “conclusively determin e that it had not” occurred. Appellant’s Brief at p. 26, citing the GAL’s Supplem ental Report at p. 205. According to Father, he has been put in the impossible position of proving a negative fact. {¶ 104} Father also contends that the trial court overlooked the fact t hat GAL amended his recommendation when he testified by saying that he “agreed with shared parenting continuing with one party being the ultimate decision maker after a decision making process.” Id . at p. 27, citing Tr. 3 at p. 236-237. {¶ 105} As indicated, we apply an abuse of discretion standard in revie wing

decisions in domestic relations cases. Edwards , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25309, 2013- Ohio-117, at ¶ 17. Furthermore, trial courts have broad discr etion in allocating parental-39- rights and responsibilities. Miller v. Miller , 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 523 N.E.2d 846 (1988). “In reviewing trial court decisions, appellate courts must also give deference to a trial court's findings, because ‘ “the trial judge is best able to vi ew the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these o bservations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” ’ ” Schutz v. Schutz , 2017-Ohio-695, 85 N.E.3d 481, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.), quoting Davis v. Flickinger , 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997). (Other citation omitted.) {¶ 106} In Davis , the Supreme Court of Ohio stressed that “we are mindful that custody issues are some of the most difficult and agonizing dec isions a trial judge must make. Therefore, a trial judge must have wide latitude in cons idering all the evidence

before him or her * * * and such a decision must not be reverse d absent an abuse of

discretion.” Davis at 418, citing Miller at 71. This observation is certainly true here, as

the trial court stressed that its “decision to terminate shared parenting and designate Mother the residential parent is difficult,” and that the court had “painstakingly reviewed the testimony of the experts and the parties in an attempt to d efinitively determine whether Father abused the child.” Judgment Terminating Shared Parentin g at p. 4. {¶ 107} The shared parenting plan involved in the case before us was ad opted pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(A)(1)(i), which covers plans where “bo th parents jointly make the request in their pleadings or jointly file the motion and a lso jointly file the plan.” In that situation, R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(c) provides that “[t]he court may terminate a prior final shared parenting decree that includes a shared parenting plan * * * upon the request of one or both of the parents or whenever it determines that share d parenting is not in the best interest of the children.” Here, both parents asked for t ermination of shared-40- parenting, and the court also decided that termination should o ccur. {¶ 108} In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio distinguished b etween modifying shared parenting plans and terminating a plan, based on the application of various parts of R.C. 3109.04(E) to those requests. Bruns v. Green , Ohio Slip Opinions No. 2020-Ohio-4787, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 8-13 (discussing R.C. 310 9.04(E)(1)(a)(1) and R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(a) and (b) (modification), and R.C. 3109.04( E)(2)(c) (termination)). The court clarified that “a trial court is not required to find a change in circumstances, in addition to considering the best interest of the child, before terminating a shared-parenting plan and decree and designating one parent as the residential p arent and legal

custodian.” Id . at ¶ 21. Once the plan is terminated, “the court shall proc eed and issue a modified decree for the allocation of parental rights and res ponsibilities for the care of the children under the standards applicable under divisions (A) , (B), and (C) of [R.C. 3109.04] * * * as if no decree for shared parenting had been gr anted and as if no request for shared parenting ever had been made.” R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(d ). Accord Bruns at ¶ 14. {¶ 109} This is what the court did here. First, the court held that te rminating the plan was in E.G.’s best interes t. In making this decision, the court considered the factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), the factors in R.C. 3119.23, and the fac tors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(2). Judgment Terminating Shared Parenting at p. 3-4. The court the n applied the factors in R.C. 3109.04(F) to decide how to allocate the parental rights a nd responsibilities. Id . at p. 5-7. {¶ 110} Rather than placing the burden on Father to conclusively prove a lack of abuse, the court simply noted that it had tried to figure out i f abuse had occurred, but was-41- unable determine that it had happened. {¶ 111} In deciding if termination was in E.G.’s best interest, the cou rt relied on R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)(a), (b), and (e). These factors are: “(a) T he ability of the parents to cooperate and make decisions jointly, with respect to the child ren; * * * (b) The ability of each parent to encourage the sharing of love, affection, and co ntact between the child and the other parent; * * * [and] (e) The recommendation of the guardian ad litem of the child, if the child has a guardian ad litem.” {¶ 112} In discussing these factors, the court noted that “the parents’ ability to cooperate and make decisions jointly has been severely compromi sed by this litigation.” Judgment Terminating Shared Parenting at p. 3. Having reviewed the record we cannot say that the court abused its discretion. While the parties su ccessfully co-parented for a time, the trial court’s conclusion that the parents had lost th e ability to cooperate for the

sake of the child's best interest was reasonable. In this vein , the trial court noted that Father’s frustration and anger over the situation had been tran sferred to anger at Mother.

Id . This was supported by the GAL’s testimony. See Tr. 3 at p. 267-268. {¶ 113} Furthermore, while the court focused more on Father’s anger and frustration, the record also indicated that Mother was “very co mbative with counsel” during her testimony at trial. Tr. 3 at p. 110 (trial court’s admonis hment of Mother). In addition, the contempt motions filed during the proceedings indicated tha t Mother was inflexible on minor parenting time matters, and Father was less than accommod ating in paying medical bills, such that the trial court eventually ordered the parties to use “Our Family Wizard” to communicate and to use “the Information Bank, MyFiles, and Expe nse Log tools on the website to have a future record of all potentially reimbursable expenses in order to-42- mitigate the necessity to litigate in the future over such matt ers.” Judgment Terminating Shared Parenting at p. 9-11. The trial court reasonably conclu ded that this does not represent a scenario of parents who are able to successfully co operate in co-parenting

their child. {¶ 114} The trial court did acknowledge that “[t]o terminate shared par enting without a conclusion that Father abused the child seems to puni sh Father for acts the Court cannot say he committed." Id . We agree. However, the court went on to emphasize that it "must place the child's best interest above a ll else. There is no doubt the minor child in this case has endured significant stress ove r the past two years.” Id

. {¶ 115} Having reviewed the record, we recognize the difficulty that th is case presented. It was a very close decision, and we may have held otherwise with respect to designating the residential parent. However, we cannot subs titute our decision for that of the trial court and must defer to the court’s findings, as t he court spent many hours hearing testimony and had a better opportunity to observe the w itnesses. {¶ 116} Furthermore, some of Mother’s actions appear to have been desig ned to control and restrict Father’s parenting. As previously noted, s he was deceptively selective and manipulative in the information she provided to investigato rs. The first GAL did state, when discussing Dr. Liker’s examination of E.G. on May 29, 2018 , that “[t]here were findings that the doctor made that mom describes far more serio usly and dramatically than what the doctor described.” July 16, 2019 Tr. at p. 103. However, the court weighed this information in exercising its discretion. {¶ 117} Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in te rminating the shared parenting plan. Once that occurred, the court was faced with deciding which-43- parent should be designated legal custodian and residential par ent and how to otherwise allocate the parental responsibilities. As indicated, the cour t applied the factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). Judgment Terminating Shared Parenting at p. 5-7 . After doing so, the

court said that: The decision to name Mother residential parent and legal custod ian required significant thought and an excessive review of the rec ord. As stated, most of the best interest factors did not weigh in favo r of either party. The Court’s decision to name Mother residential parent boiled d own to two facts. First, Mother has been the child’s primary caregiver for the last fourteen months. There has been significant disruption to the minor child’s life and routines. In order to begin stabilizing the minor chi ld’s life, the

Court finds it is in the child’s best interest to continue maki ng her primary

residence with Mother. Second, the GAL recommended that Mother be named the residential parent after an extensive investigation, and the cr eation of a GAL Report and Supplemental GAL Report. These facts also weighed h eavily in the Court’s determination of Father’s parenting time schedul e. Ultimately, the Court has determined it is in the child’s best interest to adopt the GAL’s recommendations for parenting time with some

modifications.

Id. at p. 7-8. The court then gave Father the Standard Order of P arenting Time, but allowed Father to begin that time immediately, rather than foll owing the GAL’s recommendation of continuing monitoring for a period of time, t hen going to the Standard-44- Order. Tr. 3 at p. 214. {¶ 118} Father is correct that it does seem unfair to weigh Mother’s ti me as primary care giver for the prior fourteen months in her favor consideri ng her manipulative behavior. However, again, we review the court’s decision for ab use of discretion as to

what is in the best interests of the child. As an initial matt er, as the trier of fact, the court decides what credibility and weight to give to a GAL’s report. In re E.M.W. , 2d Dist. Champaign No. 08-CA-25, 2009-Ohio-3016, ¶ 18. A trial court is not required to follow a GAL’s recommendations, but may do so if the court agrees. E.g., Bomberger-Cronin

v. Cronin , 2d Dist. Greene No. 2014-CA-4, 2014-Ohio-2302, ¶ 42. Here, w hile the court agreed with the GAL and gave weight to his opinions, the court also deviated where it thought appropriate. {¶ 119} This was a very difficult case. Both the trial court and GAL agreed that “the child’s been put through some extreme trauma.” Tr. 3 at p . 252. This is a reason for the restrictions in the judgment entry, which prohibit both parties from photographing or examining E.G.’s genitals unless she complains, and even the n, any examination must be done by another appropriate adult. In addition, Mother was prohibited from interrogating or questioning E.G. after Father’s parenting time , and both parties were prohibited from discussing the situation with E.G. Judgment Te rminating Shared Parenting at p. 8-9. In the end, E.G.’s welfare was the main c oncern, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in selecting the method it found b est to stabilize her life. {¶ 120} During discussion with the court at the May 12, 2019 hearing, t he GAL did say that he would not object if shared parenting stayed in plac e, but in that event, Mother

should be the final decision-maker on matters like extracurricu lar activities and school-45- residence. Tr. 3 at p. 236-237. However, the GAL stressed tha t both parents had asked to terminate shared parenting, and his role was to recommend wh o should be the sole custodian and residential parent in that situation. Id . at p. 237-238. The GAL further said he would adamantly oppose shared parenting if it involved joint decision-making.

Id . at p. 238. As we have already discussed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that these parties do not have the ability at pre sent to cooperate with each

other. {¶ 121} Father spends a substantial amount of time in his brief discuss ing the trial court’s failure to consider Mother’s interference with parentin g time; Father’s theory that Mother turned a “minor genital irritation into an abuse allegat ion as a preemptive defense to [Father’s] intention to formally amend the parties’ shared p arenting agreement to reflect equal parenting time”; Mother’s doctoring of a parenting time e xchange to support her emergency motion and “to deceptively reflect the child’s reluct ance to spend time with her Father”; Mother’s coaching of E.G. “to make disclosures in prox imity to hearings when she perceived the case was not going in her favor”; and the fac t that Mother subjected E.G. “to several physical examinat ions, multiple forensic inter views, * * * and convinced this little girl that her dad sexually abused her.” Appellant’ s Brief at p. 28-30. {¶ 122} We are troubled by some of Mother’s behavior, most particularlythe events surrounding the August 28, 2019 accusations of abuse, wh ich are literally impossible to have occurred in the manner suggested. We also n ote the trial court’s concern over giving Mother “the power to say now, this, this al legation was made and now there’s another six-month’s process,” and the child’s comme nt that “Mom told me to say this. Mom told me to tell you.” Tr. 3 at p. 254 and 256. In this context, the court-46- observed that “I can tell you and everyone in this room where t hat heads if Mom continues to do that, she’s heading down to the – down the road of losing custody. * * * And if there’s any sort of abuse going from Dad’s side, and that’s later prove d, he’s heading down the road of probably going to prison.” Id . at p. 255-256. {¶ 123} Again, we may not have made the same decision, but we cannot su bstitute our judgment for that of the trial court, given that the court had the ability to see and hear the witnesses and to judge their credibility. As we stressed, in the final analysis, the child’s stability and welfare we re the predominant concerns (as they should be for the parents), and the trial court made a very conscientious and tho rough analysis in coming

to its decision. {¶ 124} We agree with Father that he should not have had to provide “co nclusive proof” that he did not commit abuse. However, the trial court did not require such proof. In fact, the court allowed Father unsupervised parenting time d espite the fact that Mother and the GAL wanted supervision to continue. The court was focu sed on E.G.’s best

interest. {¶ 125} As a final point, “ ‘[w]e have previously emphasized, and stres s once again, that children have certain rights, including “ ‘the righ t to love each parent, without feeling guilt, pressure, or rejection; the right not to choose sides; the right to have a positive and constructive on-going relationship with each paren t; and most important * * * the right to not participate in the painful games parents play to hurt each other or to be put in the middle of their battles.’ ” ’ ” Owais v. Costandinidis , 2d Dist. Greene No. 2014- CA-5, 2014-Ohio-4103, ¶ 66, quoting Bell v. Bell , 2d Dist. Clark No. 97-CA-105, 1998 WL 288945, *1 (June 5, 1998). (Other citation omitted.). In Owais , a parent lost legal custody-47- based on her history of unfounded abuse allegations and failure to facilitate parenting

time with the child’s father. Id . at ¶ 13, 15, 21, 49, 56, and 63. We affirmed the court’s

decision. Id . at ¶ 91. {¶ 126} Based on the preceding discussion, Father’s Second Assignment o f Error

is overruled.

IV. Contempt Motion {¶ 127} Father’s Third Assignment of Error states that: The Trial Court Erred by Failing to Hold Mother in Contempt for Her Repeated Interference with Father’s Parenting Time. {¶ 128} Under this assignment of error, Father argues that the trial co urt erred by not finding Mother in contempt when she failed to follow the co urt’s January 28, 2020 parenting time order. In this regard, Father points to his Jul y 2020 motion for contempt, which was resolved and dismissed by an agreement based on Mothe r’s position that if Father failed to agree to her proposal, the parties could wait for resolution until after a scheduled hearing on August 11, 2020 took place. Tr. 5 at p. 3 7-41. According to Father, after he agreed, Mother then began interfering with par enting time again, resulting in the need to file another motion for contempt in September 20 20. {¶ 129} “Contempt of court” is defined as “ ‘disobedience of an order o f a court. It is conduct which brings the administration of justice into disr espect, or which tends to embarrass, impede or obstruct a court in the performance of its functions.’ ” Denovchek v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Commrs ., 36 Ohio St.3d 14, 15, 520 N.E.2d 1362 (1988), quoting Windham Bank v. Tomaszczyk , 27 Ohio St.2d 55, 271 N.E.2d 815 (1971), paragraph one-48- of the syllabus. “ ‘[T]he purpose of contempt proceedings is t o secure the dignity of the courts and the uninterrupted and unimpeded administration of ju stice.’ Therefore, since the primary interest involved in a contempt proceeding is the a uthority and proper functioning of the court, great reliance should be placed upon the discretion of the trial judge.” Id ., quoting Windham Bank at paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 130} Although contempt proceedings are said to be neither civil nor criminal, courts often need to classify them as either civil or criminal. Id. at 16. “The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is based on the character a nd purpose of the contempt sanctions. If sanctions are primarily designed to ben efit the complainant through remedial or coercive means, then the contempt proceedin g is civil. Often, civil contempt is characterized by conditional sanctions, i.e., the c ontemnor is imprisoned until he obeys the court order. Criminal contempt, on the other hand , is usually characterized by an unconditional prison sentence or fine. Its sanctions are punitive in nature, designed to vindicate the authority of the court.” (Citations omitted). Id

. {¶ 131} “ ‘A prima facie case of civil contempt is made when the moving party proves both the existence of a court order and the nonmoving pa rty's noncompliance with

the terms of that order.’ ” Jenkins v. Jenkins , 2012-Ohio-4182, 975 N.E.2d 1060, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), quoting Wolf v. Wolf , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-090587, 2010-Ohio-2762, ¶ 4. “ ‘Clear and convincing evidence is the standard of proof in ci vil contempt proceedings.’ ”

Id ., quoting Flowers v. Flowers , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP 1176, 2011-Ohio-5972, ¶ 13. “We review the trial court's decision whether to find a party i n contempt under an abuseof-discretion standard.” Id ., citing Wolf at ¶ 4. {¶ 132} In this case, the trial court declined to find Mother in contem pt because her-49- violation was not willful. Second Judgment Regarding Contempt at p. 4. The court’s decision was based on the fact that, while Mother’s interpretat ion of the January 28, 2020 order was incorrect, the parties did agree that Father was owed make-up parenting time.

Id . In apparent recognition that Mother was more at fault, the c ourt required her to pay for Father’s cost in obtaining a process server. Id

. {¶ 133} The hearing transcript indicates that Mother had a particular i nterpretation of the court’s order, but offered to make up the parenting time if her interpretation was incorrect. Tr. 5 at p. 71. Therefore, the trial court did not act unreasonably in refusing to find that Mother acted willfully. {¶ 134} Nonetheless, our review of the record in its entirety indicates that Mother’s conduct was controlling and somewhat inflexible. For example, the trial court overruled Mother’s contempt motion about Father’s failure to have an adul t in the car with him, noting that the order did not specifically prohibit Father from driving to a public place without a supervisor, and that “ Mother had plenty of time to seek clarification of the order,

but did not.” (Emphasis added) First Judgment Regarding Contempt at p. 2

. See also Tr. 2 at p. 69 (in December 2018, Mother told Father that E.G. would stay with her until the redness cleared up and that the subject was “not up for deb ate”); Tr. 3 at p. 269 (Mother told Father he was no longer allowed to have parenting time at her house). Whether these latter pronouncements were appropriate or well-in tended is not the issue; they were made when the parties had shared parenting and were s upposed to cooperate and make joint decisions. Thus, while we agree that Mother’s a ctions may not have been willful, the court could consider future actions to be so if Mo ther continues to unilaterally interpret court orders in a manner that limits Father’s parenti ng time.-50- {¶ 135} Based on the preceding discussion, the Third Assignment of Erro r is

overruled.

V. Expense Reimbursements {¶ 136} Father’s final assignment of error states that: The Trial Court Erred in Its Calculation of Expense Reimburseme nts. {¶ 137} Father contends that the trial court erred in finding that he was required to pay Mother $25.97 toward a $75 medical bill that was owed. Father argues that the

court should have ordered zero reimbursement because the Shared Parenting Plan required that Mother pay the first $100 of unreimbursed medical expenses for the calendar year. {¶ 138} In response, Mother focuses on other medical bills that Father allegedly failed to pay. However, the trial court rejected those claims during the hearing because Mother failed to provide Father with copies of uncovered medica l bills on a quarterly basis as required by the Shared Parenting Plan. Tr. 5 at p. 24-25 an d 29-33. Instead, only one $75 payment was properly submitted to Father as required by the Plan. {¶ 139} The Shared Parenting Plan designated Father as the Obligor for purposes of providing health insurance coverage. Shared Parenting Plan at p. 4. The Plan further provided, in pertinent part, that: Obligee shall be responsible for the first $100.00 insured per child per calendar year of uninsured medical, dental, and optical exp enses. Costs of the remaining medical, dental, optical, and all psycho logical expenses not covered by health insurance shall be shared by Obl igor and-51- Obligee in amounts equal to their percentage of total income fo und on the Child Support Computation Worksheet * * * The parties shall provide each other with a copy of all medical bills, amounts paid, and by whom for the minor child(ren) on a quarter ly basis.

The uncovered medical bills sha ll be provided on the last day o f the months of March, June, September, and December. Payment for all uncov ered medical expenses shall be made within thirty (30) days.

Id . As the Obligee, Mother was responsible for the first $100 of unreimbursed expenses for the calendar year. {¶ 140} As noted, Mother did not comply with the requirement to provide timely notice of uncovered medical bills, with the exception of one $7 5 bill. At the hearing, the trial court stated that Father therefore did not owe Mother any thing. Tr. 5 at p. 32-33. In contrast, however, the judgment entry required Father to pay $25.97 as his proportionate share, which was incorrect. Accordingly, the Fou rth Assignment of Error

is sustained. This matter will be remanded so the trial court can amend its October 13, 2020 judgment entry (the Second Judgment Regarding Contempt, Do c. #181), to indicate that Father does not owe Mother any money and that Mother is to remit to Father the $25.97 she was credited for unreimbursed medical expenses.

VI. Conclusion {¶ 141} The trial court’s Judgment Terminating Shared Parenting, which included, among other issues, its determination that the GAL should be re placed, is affirmed. The trial court’s Second Judgment Regarding Contempt Motions is aff irmed in part and-52- reversed in part, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for correction of the judgment entry regarding the treatment of medical expenses. Be cause Father’s appeal raises no issues with respect to the trial court’s First Judgme nt Regarding Contempt Motions, we take no action with respect to that judgment.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

HALL, J. and EPLEY, J., concur.

Copies sent to:

Brian A. Sommers Adam Armstrong Matthew D. DiCicco Sean J. Vallone, GAL Hon. Cynthia Martin