Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 63A01-1412-CR-527 | July 8, 2015 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Steven E. Ripstra

Ripstra Law Office

Jasper, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Christina D. Pace

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Eric L. Carter,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

July 8, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

63A01-1412-CR-527

Appeal from the Pike Circuit Court

The Honorable Jeffrey L. 

Biesterveld, Judge

Cause No. 63C01-1403-FB-124

Brown, Judge.
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[1] Eric L. Carter appeals his sentence for possession of a firearm by a serious 

violent felon as a class B felony. Carter raises two issues which we revise and 

restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him; and

II. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and the character of the offender.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 30, 2011, Carter was convicted of Count I, burglary as a class C 

felony, and Count II, burglary as a class B felony, under cause number 63C01-

0902-FB-76 (“Cause No. 76”). 

[3] On June 14, 2013, Carter knowingly possessed a firearm or firearms, 

specifically a “RG 22 caliber revolver” and an “Iver Johnson 32 caliber 

revolver.” Transcript at 16. On March 31, 2014, the State charged Carter with 

unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon as a class B felony 

under cause number 63C01-1403-FB-124 (“Cause No. 124”). On April 1, 2014, 

the State filed a motion to revoke probation under Cause No. 76. On August 4, 

2014, the State charged Carter with theft as a class D felony under cause 

number 63C01-1408-FD-355 (“Cause No. 355”). 

[4] On October 7, 2014, pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement, Carter pled 

guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon as a class B 

felony under Cause No. 124, he agreed to admit to the violation of the terms of 
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his probation in Cause No. 76, he agreed to a cap of twelve years on his total 

sentence, and the State agreed to dismiss the charges in Cause No. 355. 

[5] On November 12, 2014, the court held a sentencing hearing. Carter’s father

testified that he received a lung transplant in July, that he would have to find 

someone in the family to help him or hire someone should Carter be 

incarcerated, and that he had hired someone to help him for the last few 

months but that paying someone was a financial strain. He testified that after 

Carter became a felon, they discussed guns and that Carter was not to own or 

possess one. He indicated that Carter told him that Carter had guns as 

collateral for a loan and “was just holding them for the night” and “some 

people were coming back to pick ‘em up the next day.” Id. at 53. He also 

testified that the guns were not loaded and on a shelf in a closet. 

[6] Carter testified that he told his father around 2001 after he was convicted that 

his father needed to take his guns or find somebody to buy them. He testified 

that if he had known “the concept of possessory interest is the equivalent of 

actual possession under this statute, we wouldn’t be having this hearing today.” 

Id. at 71. With respect to the guns the State alleged he possessed, Carter stated 

that he had no interest in the guns “other than that they were an assurance that 

[he] was going to get [his] money back.” Id. at 66. He testified that he could 

not reach the shelf where the guns were stored because he had a full arm cast on 

one arm, his fingers were sprained and swollen, and he had a broken neck with 

a rigid neck brace. He stated that the police knocked on the door to his father’s 

house and said they had talked to “the guys that the firearms came from” and 
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that they knew the firearms were in the house. Id. at 67. He testified that he 

initially pretended like he had no idea what the officers were talking about, but 

one of the officers said he knew that Carter was on probation, that Carter could 

either cooperate and let the police gain access to the firearms, or he would go 

with them. He provided a written statement to the police naming two 

individuals involved in his receipt of the guns. During cross-examination, 

Carter admitted that the written statement he made to the police when they 

came to his house was not a true and accurate statement because he was under 

the impression that if he did “what they wanted [him] to do, that this, that we 

weren’t going to, that this wasn’t going to be an issue.” Id. at 79. 

[7] At the hearing, the court found the most substantial aggravating factor to be 

Carter’s criminal history. The court also found the fact that Carter was on 

probation at the time of the offense as an aggravator. The court stated that it 

considered the fact that Ind. Code § 35-50-2-2 “makes this a non-suspendable 

offense” and that “is because this is a Class ‘B’ felony and the person has a prior 

unrelated felony conviction.” Id. at 93. The court also considered that prior 

lenient treatment, probation, and community corrections had not been 

successful. The court found Carter’s guilty plea and that Carter “has made 

restitution in the original case, for which probation revocation is being sought”

as mitigators. Id. The sentencing order found that Carter “did plead guilty and 

saved the Court’s time and resources” as a mitigator. Appellant’s Appendix at 

157. The order stated that the court considered: (1) Carter’s prior criminal 

history; (2) Carter was on probation at the time when the new offense was 
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committed; (3) prior lenient treatment and the prior consideration of probation 

and placement in community corrections had not been successful; (4) Carter’s 

testimony that he knew he was not supposed to possess a firearm; and (5) Ind. 

Code § 35-50-2-2 makes this a non-suspendable offense “because this a [sic] call 

[sic] ‘D’ [sic] Felony and the Defendant has a prior non-related offense.” Id. 

The court sentenced Carter to ten years under Cause No. 124 and two years 

under Cause No. 76 to be served consecutively. 

Discussion

I.

[8] The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing 

Carter. We review the sentence for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 

868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). 

An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, 

probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. A trial court 

abuses its discretion if it: (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) 

enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence –

including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any – but the record 

does not support the reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits 

reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for 

consideration;” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.” 

Id. at 490-491. If the trial court has abused its discretion, we will remand for 

resentencing “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have 
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imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy 

support in the record.” Id. at 491. The relative weight or value assignable to 

reasons properly found, or those which should have been found, is not subject 

to review for abuse of discretion. Id. 

[9] Carter argues that the trial court should have considered his cooperation with 

the police and how the cooperation led to two burglary convictions1 and the 

undue burden on his father. He contends that the sentencing order omits the 

second mitigator that the court mentioned during the sentencing hearing that he 

made restitution in the original case for which probation revocation was being 

sought. Lastly, he asserts that “any argument made that the court abused its 

discretion when sentencing the defendant on the new charge in [Cause No. 

124], should be applied to the probation violation proceedings.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 14-15. 

[10] The State argues that Carter’s cooperation with the police was merely a 

pragmatic decision and downplays his involvement. With respect to the burden 

of incarceration on Carter’s father, the State points out that Carter’s adult sister 

and his mother are still living but there was no discussion of these family 

members at his sentencing hearing. 

 

1 Carter cites a letter he previously sent to the trial court dated November 3, 2014, to support his contention 

that his cooperation led to the arrests of two individuals. 
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[11] The determination of mitigating circumstances is within the discretion of the 

trial court. Rogers v. State, 878 N.E.2d 269, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. 

denied. The trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant’s argument as to 

what constitutes a mitigating factor, and a trial court is not required to give the 

same weight to proffered mitigating factors as does a defendant. Id. An 

allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor 

requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both 

significant and clearly supported by the record. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. 

If the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has 

been argued by counsel, it is not obligated to explain why it has found that the 

factor does not exist. Id.

[12] With respect to his cooperation with the police, the record reveals that Carter 

testified that he initially pretended like he had no idea what the police were 

talking about. He conceded during cross-examination that the written 

statement he made to the police when they came to his house was not a true 

and accurate statement. We cannot say that Carter has demonstrated that the 

mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.

[13] As for the burden on Carter’s father, “absent special circumstances, trial courts 

are not required to find that imprisonment will result in an undue hardship.” 

Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 1999); see also Benefield v. State, 904 

N.E.2d 239, 247-248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing that incarceration 

“almost always” works a hardship on others and concluding that the defendant 

failed to show “special circumstances” because there were other people who 
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could take care of the defendant’s mother while she was incarcerated), trans. 

denied. Again, we cannot say that Carter has demonstrated that the mitigating 

evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.

[14] To the extent that Carter asserts that the sentencing order did not include his 

restitution as a mitigator, we observe that the trial court found that Carter’s 

restitution in the original case for which probation revocation was being sought 

was a mitigator during the sentencing hearing. “The approach employed by 

Indiana appellate courts in reviewing sentences in non-capital cases is to 

examine both the written and oral sentencing statements to discern the findings 

of the trial court.” McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ind. 2007). We 

examine the oral statement alongside the written sentencing statement to assess 

the conclusions of the trial court. Id. Under the circumstances, we cannot say 

that the court abused its discretion.2

II.

[15] The next issue is whether Carter’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Ind. Appellate Rule 

7(B) provides that we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due 

consideration of the trial court’s decision, [we find] that the sentence is 

 

2 Carter also argues that the sentencing order differs from the statement given by the court at the conclusion 

of the sentencing hearing because the order states that Ind. Code § 35-50-2-2 makes this a non-suspendable 

offense “because this a [sic] call [sic] ‘D’ [sic] Felony and the Defendant has a prior non-related offense.” 

Appellant’s Appendix at 157. We cannot say that the scrivener’s error referring to the offense as a class D 

felony constitutes an abuse of discretion in sentencing Carter.
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inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” Under this rule, the burden is on the defendant to persuade the 

appellate court that his or her sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 

N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).

[16] Carter argues that he agreed only to accept the three guns as collateral for a 

loan, the guns were kept on a shelf in his father’s house where he was living and 

he was unable to reach the shelf due to physical limitations, he consented to the 

police seizing the firearms and gave a written statement about how they came 

into his possession after the police promised not to arrest him or charge him 

with a firearm violation, his statement was ultimately used to convict two 

people of burglary, and he was unaware that merely having any property 

interest in a firearm qualified as a crime. With respect to his character, he 

argues that he is a college graduate, suffers from bipolar disorder, attention 

deficit disorder, and obsessive compulsive disorder, none of his previous 

offenses involved a firearm, he had less than two weeks remaining on his 

probation, he believed his medication was a factor in clouding his decision to 

accept a possessory interest in the guns, and he pled guilty. 

[17] Our review of the nature of the offense reveals that Carter knowingly possessed 

a firearm or firearms as a serious violent felon. Our review of the character of 

the offender reveals that Carter pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm 

by a serious violent felon as a class B felony under Cause No. 124 and agreed to 

admit the violation of the terms of his probation in Cause No. 76, and the State 

agreed to dismiss the charge in Cause No. 355 of theft as a class D felony. As 
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an adult, Carter was convicted of illegal possession of alcohol by a minor as a 

class C misdemeanor in 1994, possession of marijuana as a class A 

misdemeanor in 1999, and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated as a 

class A misdemeanor in 1999. In 1999, he pled guilty to possession of a 

controlled substance as a class D felony.3 He was convicted of possession of 

marijuana as a class A misdemeanor, possession of marijuana as a class D 

felony, operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated as a class D felony in 2001; 

two counts of burglary as class C felonies, two counts of theft as class D 

felonies, and reckless driving as a class B misdemeanor in 2003; theft as a class 

D felony, criminal conversion as a class C misdemeanor, and possession of 

marijuana as a class A misdemeanor in 2006; burglary as a class C felony in 

2007; burglary as a class C felony, burglary as a class B felony, and possession 

of paraphernalia as a class A misdemeanor in 2011. 

[18] The presentence investigation report indicates that Carter had been diagnosed 

with attention deficit disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and bipolar 

disorder. Carter first started using alcohol at age nineteen, marijuana at age 

fifteen, and methamphetamine at age twenty. He also used or abused 

“Adderall (prescribed), cocaine powder, crack cocaine, hashish, ecstasy, heroin, 

LSD/acid, Librium/Valium (prescribed), marijuana, synthetic marijuana, 

Xanax, methamphetamine, opium, Ritalin (prescribed), Klonopin (prescribed) 

and peyote/mushrooms.” Appellant’s Appendix at 249. He has failed multiple 

 

3 The presentence investigation report indicates that the disposition for this offense is unknown. 
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drug screens while being under the supervision of the court by means of 

community corrections and/or probation. The report also indicates that 

Carter’s overall risk assessment score puts him in the high risk category to 

reoffend. 

[19] After due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we cannot say that the 

advisory sentence of ten years imposed by the trial court in Cause No. 124 and 

a consecutive two years in Cause No. 76 is inappropriate in light of the nature 

of the offense and the character of the offender.

Conclusion

[20] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Carter’s sentence.

[21] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.