IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

March 19, 2014 Session1

IN RE JUSTIN A. H.

JUSTIN A. H., BY AND THROUGH HIS NEXT FRIENDS, WORLD

ASSOCIATION FOR CHILDREN AND PARENTS AND LEONID

LVOVICH MITYAEV, AS THE LEGAL CUSTODIAN OF THE MINOR CHILD,

AND THE WORLD ASSOCIATION FOR CHILDREN AND PARENTS, 

AND NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR ADOPTION, AS THE DESIGNATED

LIAISON FOR LEONID LVOVICH MITYAEV, THE

LEGAL CUSTODIAN OF THE MINOR CHILD IN MOSCOW

v. 

TORRY HANSEN

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bedford County

No. 12062 Franklin L. Russell, Judge

No. M2013-00292-COA-R3-CV - Filed July 7, 2014

This is a petition for dependency and neglect, child support, and breach of contract arising

out of an international adoption. The respondent adopted the subject child from Russia. A

few months later, after experiencing difficulties with the child, she placed the child on a oneway flight to Russia and sought to annul the adoption. The adoption agency that brokered

the adoption filed this lawsuit against the respondent in juvenile court, seeking child support

and alleging that the child was dependent and neglected. The juvenile court dismissed the

case, and the case was appealed to the circuit court below. On appeal to circuit court, the

petition was amended to add the child as a petitioner and to seek child support and damages

arising out of the adoption contract. After protracted proceedings, the trial court granted the

petitioners’ motion for default judgment against the respondent for failing to file an answer

to the petition and failing to cooperate in discovery. The trial court later conducted a hearing

on damages, at which the respondent did not appear. The trial court awarded damages to the

petitioners and ordered the respondent to pay child support. It later denied the respondent’s

At oral argument, the parties were ordered to provide supplemental briefs on the issue of subject matter

1

jurisdiction. The supplemental briefing was completed on April 21, 2014.
motions for post-judgment relief. The respondent now appeals. Discerning no error, we

affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed

HOLLY M. KIRBY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DAVID R. FARMER,J., and

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, J., joined.

Jennifer Lynn Thompson, Nashville, Tennessee,for the Defendant/Appellant, Torry Hansen

2

Larry L. Crain, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the Plaintiff/Appellee, Justin Hansen, by and

through his next friends, World Association for Children and Parents and Leonid Lvovich

Mityaev, as the Legal Custodian of the minor child, and the World Association for Children

3

and Parents, and National Council for Adoption, as the Designated Liaison for Leonid

Lvovich Mityaev, the Legal Custodian of the minor child in Moscow

MEMORANDUM OPINION

4

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The procedural history in this case is convoluted and complicated by the fact that separate

legal proceedings took place in Russia. We will endeavor to simplify and streamline our

presentation of the facts.

Appellant Hansen was formerly represented by Edward M. Yarbrough and D. Gil Schuette, but they were

2

permitted to withdraw after the appellate briefs were filed in this case.

Mr. Mityaev’s surname has been spelled various ways in the record and in the documents filed by the 3

parties. In this opinion, we will spell his name “Mityaev,” as it was spelled in the first documents filed in

his name in the trial court. 

Rule 10. Memorandum Opinion 4

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse

or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion

would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall

be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION”, shall not be published, and shall not be cited

or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.

Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10.

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Adoption

The child at issue in this lawsuit, Petitioner/Appellee Justin A. H., was born in Russia in

April 2002. In 2009, Defendant/Appellant Torry Hansen sought to adopt Justin through

5

Russian adoption procedures. The World Association for Children and Parents(“WACAP”),

based in the State of Washington, was the adoption and placement agency that processed

Justin’s adoption.

6

As part of the adoption process, WACAP and Ms. Hansen entered into a “Child Acceptance

and Placement & Post-Placement Agreement” (“Placement Agreement”). In the Placement

Agreement, WACAP agreed to provide Ms. Hansen with all of the information it had about

the child, but it did not “guarantee the present or future mental or physical health of the

child(ren).” In turn, Ms. Hansen agreed to “remain financially responsible for all costs of

care for the child(ren)” if the child were removed from Ms. Hansen’s home. Ms. Hansen

agreed to “reimburse WACAP for any and all costs incurred by WACAP for the care of the

child after removal from [Ms. Hansen’s] home.”

On September 18, 2009, Ms. Hansen officially adopted Justin in proceedings before the

Primorsky Krai Court of the Russian Federation. By virtue of the adoption, Justin became

7

a United States citizen. Ms. Hansen then returned to the United States with the child to live

in Bedford County, Tennessee.

Not long after Ms. Hansen returned to Tennessee with Justin, she began experiencing

behavioral difficulties with the child. She was unable to handle those difficulties, so Ms.

Hansen took steps to reverse or annul the adoption.

Child Returned to Russia

In April 2010, Justin was taken to Dulles Airport in Virginia and placed on a one-way flight

to Russia. On the transnational flight, the child was unaccompanied and had no provisions

and no luggage, only a backpack. Ms. Hansen pinned a note to the child’s backpack

Justin’s birth name is Artem Vladimirovich Saveliev. 5

WACAP is a licensed child adoption and placement agency within the meaning of Tennessee Code 6

Annotated § 36-1-113, licensed by the State of Washington, with its principal offices located in Washington.

It was founded in April 1976 as a non-profit adoption agency, specializing in international placement and

adoption of children with parents in the United States.

The parental rights of Justin’s biological mother were terminated in August 2008, and none of his relatives 7

were willing or able to take him into their home.

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addressed to the Ministry of Education in Moscow. The note described Justin as “mentally

unstable” and asserted that Ms. Hansen was “lied to and misled by the Russian Orphanage

workers and director regarding his mental stability and other issues.” For those reasons, Ms.

Hansen said, she no longer wanted to parent the child. In the note, Ms. Hansen indicated that

she was “returning [the child] to [the Ministry of Education’s] guardianship and would like

the adoption disannulled [sic].” Ms. Hansen had arranged for a third party in Russia to pick

up Justin at the airport in Moscow and take him to the Ministry of Education. After the child

was delivered to the Ministry, he was placed in a Russian children’s home/orphanage.

On April 20, 2010, the City Council of the Tverskoy Intra-City Municipality in the City of

Moscow in Russia filed a petition in a Moscow City Court seeking to annul or “revoke”

Justin’s adoption. Ms. Hansen was named as a defendant. The petition was later amended

to include a request on behalf of the child that Ms. Hansen be required to pay child support.

Ms. Hansen filed a counterclaim in that action. In her counterclaim, Ms. Hansen sought a

“no-fault” annulment, that is, an annulment granted “through no fault of the adoptive

parent.”

Tennessee Lawsuit

On May 11, 2010, WACAP filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Bedford County,

Tennessee, against Ms. Hansen and her mother, Nancy Hansen Gishere (collectively,

“Respondents”). The petition was entitled “Verified Petition for Appointment of Guardian

and Guardian Ad Litem.” WACAP asserted in the petition that the Respondents had

abandoned the child and asked the court to conduct a hearing to determine whether the child

was dependent and neglected. WACAP asked the trial court to appoint it as the child’s

guardian. WACAP also asked the trial court to appoint a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) to

consider whether to seek child support and other relief for the child.

8

The Bedford County circuit court lawsuit generated widespread media attention. Ms. Hansen

in particular was vilified. On May 19, 2010, shortly after she was served with process in the

circuit court lawsuit, Ms. Hansen relocated from Tennessee to an undisclosed location in

California.

Contemporaneously, the National Council for Adoption (see infra note 9) filed an “Amicus Petition,” in 8

which it asked the trial court to grant the relief requested in WACAP’s petition. Though denoted as a

petition, it is essentially an amicus brief. The “Amicus Petition” was apparently dismissed or abandoned at

some point during the lower court proceedings. In any event, it is not at issue in this appeal and does not

affect our analysis.

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On July 19, 2010, WACAP filed an amended petition in circuit court. The amended petition

added Jennifer Terhune, an adoptive mother of three children, all born outside of the United

States, as a petitioner. In the prayer for relief, the petitioners asked the Juvenile Court to (1)

appoint a GAL to make recommendations on abandonment, child support, and termination

of Ms. Hansen’s parental rights; (2) determine whether the child is dependent and neglected;

(3) hold that Ms. Hansen breached her obligations under the Placement Agreement and the

Russian decree of adoption; and (4) appoint Ms. Terhune as the guardian for the child.

WACAP filed a motion to transfer the circuit court case to the Juvenile Court of Bedford

County because it included a dependency and neglect petition and, under Tennessee Code

Annotated § 37-1-103, the juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over dependency and

neglect actions. By agreement of the parties, the case was transferred to the Bedford County

Juvenile Court.

On October 11, 2010, WACAP and Ms. Terhune filed a motion in the juvenile court for

permission to file a second amended petition. The second amended petition added as a

petitioner the National Council for Adoption (“Adoption Council”), the designated liaison

9

for Leonid Lvovich Mityaev, the director of the orphanage in which the child was residing.

The Adoption Council asserted that Mr. Mityaev, as the child’s representative, had

authorized it to serve as liaison on Mr. Mityaev’s behalf to seek an order requiring Ms.

Hansen to pay child support. Basically, the second amended petition sought the same relief

as the prior petition, except that it included a direct request for child support for Justin

through the Adoption Council as the liaison for the child’s representative, Mr. Mityaev.

On December 28, 2010, the Respondents filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

They claimed that Tennessee was not the child’s “home state” under the relevantstatutes, and

that the termination proceedings in Russia precluded the juvenile court from exercising

jurisdiction over the dependency and neglect proceedings. Even if the juvenile court had

subject matter jurisdiction over the dependency and neglect action, the Respondents argued,

it should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the case because Tennessee was an

inconvenient forum. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-222(a) (2010). “Because these actions

contain common legal issues, it is clear that they both cannot be simultaneously maintained

. . . .” Lastly, the Respondents argued that, even if the juvenile court had subject matter

The Adoption Council describes itself as “the leading national adoption advocacy nonprofit, incorporated 9

in Texas with members throughout the United States.” Located in Alexandria, Virginia, the Adoption

Council claims that “[i]ts focus is infant adoption out of foster care and inter-country adoption. It serves

children, birthparents, adoptive families, adoption agencies, U.S. and foreign governments, policymakers,

media, and the general public as the authoritative voice for adoption.”

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jurisdiction, under the circumstances presented, the juvenile court could not award child

support.

The Petitioners filed a memorandum in support of their position that the juvenile court had

jurisdiction over the matter. They argued that the Tennessee juvenile court had jurisdiction

10

over the lawsuit because (1) the child was a citizen and resident of Tennessee when the acts

at issue were committed, and (2) Tennessee, not Russia, has jurisdiction over the child

support issue. They contended that the Tennessee juvenile court had personal jurisdiction

over Ms. Hansen under Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-15-401(d)(2), so it could hold Ms.

Hansen liable for criminal abuse or neglect of the child.

Subsequently, the Respondentsfiled a “comprehensive” motion to dismiss. The motion made

additional arguments in support of their original motion to dismiss.

On May 2, 2011, the Petitioners filed a “Notice of Filing Re: Russian Proceedings.” This

notice indicated that, on April 4, 2011, the Moscow City Court issued a decision in the

pending Russian proceedings. In its decision, the Moscow City Court indicated that the

original suit for annulment and child support had been voluntarily dismissed and that, after

an evidentiary hearing, the court had rejected Ms. Hansen’s counterclaim for a no-fault

annulment. The Moscow City Court stated that the manner in which Ms. Hansen returned

11

the child to Russia inflicted “psycho trauma” on the child, and that Ms. Hansen’s “behavior

. . . cannot be found innocent.”

Juvenile Court Decision

On June 24, 2011, the juvenile court below entered an order dismissing the Petitioners’

petition in toto. The order characterized the petition as largely a “dependency and neglect”

proceeding and said that the Petitioners’ breach of contract claims were “not under the

jurisdiction of this Court.” The order added, “[I]t is the Court’s understanding that those

particular issues [claims based in contract] are withdrawn” by the Petitioners. Addressing

12

the dependency and neglect claim, the order said that the juvenile court had received

“disturbing” ex parte communications from a Russian official, informing the juvenile court

This pleading was filed before the Respondents filed their motion to dismiss, apparently in anticipation of 10

the Respondents’ motion.

Ms. Hansen was represented by counsel in the Moscow City Court, but she did not attend those 11

proceedings. 

It is unclear from the record whether the juvenile court granted the Petitioners permission to file the second 12

amended petition.

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that the Russian government had suspended the Russian termination proceeding so as not to

interfere with the Tennessee petition filed by the Petitioners to obtain child support. The

juvenile court described the decision to suspend the Russian proceedings in order to make

way for a child support claim as “a concept that is foreign to the American philosophy of

obtaining permanency for our children.” Overall, the juvenile court concluded that it was not

“in the best interest of the child nor the public for this proceeding to continue,” and so

dismissed the petition.

Russian Federation Supreme Court Decision

Meanwhile, unbeknownst to either the parties or the juvenile court, on June 7, 2011, the

Russian Federation Supreme Court had issued a decision vacating the Moscow City Court’s

April 4, 2011 order. In its decision, the Russian Federation Supreme Court annulled Ms.

Hansen’s adoption of the child. It upheld the lower court’s finding of “cruel treatment by

Torry Ann Hansen of [the] minor child” but reversed the dismissal of the suit for annulment,

finding that dismissal on these facts “violates norms of substantive law.” It reasoned that

annulment of an adoption is “aimed at terminating the legal relationship with the adoptive

parent . . . when the adoption is no longer in the interests of the child.” Thus, the Russian

Federation Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Moscow City Court and granted

the annulment. It rejected Ms. Hansen’s request to denote the annulment as “no-fault.”

Appeal to Circuit Court

On July 8, 2011, the Petitioners filed a notice of appeal to the circuit court below, seeking

a de novo review of the juvenile court’s decision. Around that time, Attorney Jennifer Lynn

Thompson, counsel for Respondents, filed a motion to withdraw.

On July 28, 2011, the circuit court below held a hearing. The appellate record does not

include a transcript of that hearing. The record reflects that the Respondents did not attend

the hearing and were not represented at the hearing. On August 8, 2011, the trial court

entered an order granting Attorney Thompson’s motion to withdraw and setting the case for

trial on September 5, 2011.

On August 11, 2011, the Petitioners filed a motion to compel the Respondents to appear for

a deposition, because they both had failed to appear for a deposition that had been noticed

for August 2, 2011, in Brentwood, Tennessee. The Petitioners’ motion asserted, “This was

13

The deposition notice attached to the motion indicates that the Respondents were notified of the scheduled

13

deposition by service on Attorney Thompson, apparently prior to entry of the order permitting Attorney

(continued...)

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the second time the Respondents failed to appear for a previously noticed deposition.”

(Emphasis in original).

On August 17, 2011, Attorney Sandra L. M. Smith filed a notice of appearance on behalf of

the Respondents. At her request, the scheduled trial was continued.

Motion to Amend Petition in Circuit Court

On September 14, 2011, the Petitioners filed a motion in the trial court below for leave to file

an amended petition. At the same time, they filed the proposed amended petition. The

proposed amendment added as Petitioners WACAP, on its own behalf, as well as Justin “by

and through his next friends” WACAP and Leonid Lvovich Mityaev “as the Legal Custodian

of the minor child.” As the designated liaison for Mr. Mityaev, the Adoption Council was

also added as a Petitioner. The amended petition stated that Mr. Mityaev “is the Russian

official who serves as [the child’s] legal custodian in Russia,” and that Mr. Mityaev “has

consented to serve as next friend for the minor child in seeking on his behalf” child support

from Ms. Hansen. The amended petition included all of the claims asserted against Ms.

Hansen in the juvenile court pleadings, and it specifically included a breach of contract claim

against her. The amended petition named only Ms. Hansen as a Respondent; her mother Ms.

Gishere was not named. The Respondents objected to the motion to amend.

On September 21, 2011, the Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition.

The motion to dismiss claimed, among other things, that the Tennessee circuit court did not

have jurisdiction over the case because Ms. Hansen’s relationship with the child had been

nullified by the Russian Federation Supreme Court’s June 7, 2011 decision to annul the

adoption.

On November 14, 2011, the Respondents filed an amended and supplemental motion to

dismiss, as well as an amended and supplemental memorandum of law in support. Also on

November 14, 2011, the Respondentsfiled an amended and supplemental response/objection

to the Petitioners’ motion for leave to file an amended petition. The Petitioners filed

responses to those new filings.

(...continued) 13

Thompson to withdraw from representing the Respondents. 

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Motion to Amend Granted

On November 21, 2011, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to amend. Ms. Hansen

was represented by Attorney Smith at the hearing, but Ms. Hansen herself did not appear.

According to Attorney Smith, the Respondents did not object to the amendment of the

petition, except insofar as they objected to the addition of party petitioners, specifically Mr.

Mityaev and the Adoption Council as liaison for Mr. Mityaev. At the conclusion of the

hearing, the trial court granted the motion to amend the petition. The trial court noted that

this ruling rendered moot the Respondents’ motions to dismiss.

During the November 21, 2011 hearing, the trial court asked counsel for the parties about the

status of discovery. The Petitioners told the trial court that, since June 2011, Ms. Hansen and

Ms. Gishere had failed to appear for two scheduled depositions. They also told the trial court

that written discovery propounded in approximately July 2011 had not been answered. The

Petitioners told the trial court that they “desperately need[ed] to depose the Hansens” and

asked the trial court to set a date for their depositions. The trial court commented, “If folks

don’t come to their depositions, then there are consequences.” The trial court gave the

parties time during the hearing to confer to schedule depositions and agree on a trial date.

A few days after the hearing, on November 28, 2011, the Petitioners propounded written

discovery requests to Ms. Hansen. Apparently Ms. Hansen never answered them.

Petitioners’ Motion to Set and Motion to Compel

On January 10, 2012, the Petitioners filed two motions, namely, a motion to compel Ms.

Hansen to respond to the outstanding written discovery requests and a motion to set the case

for trial on March 27, 2012. On January 11, 2012, the Petitioners served upon Ms. Hansen

and Ms. Gishere a notice to take their depositions on February 2, 2012.

On January 25, 2012, Ms. Hansen filed a motion to quash. Ms. Hansen asserted that neither

she nor Attorney Smith were available on February 2, 2012, so the notice of her deposition

should be quashed. Due to the distance, burden, and expense of traveling to Tennessee, Ms.

Hansen asked the trial court to grant her permission to give her testimony via telephone,

video, or some other media. She also asked the trial court to quash the deposition notice for

her mother, Ms. Gishere, because Ms. Gishere was no longer a party.

Ms. Hansen filed four other pleadings on January 25, 2012. First, she filed a motion to

register the decree entered by the Russian Federation Supreme Court, asking the trial court

to give it full faith and credit. Second, Ms. Hansen filed a supplemental response to the

Petitioners’ motion to compel and motion to set the trial date; she claimed that she was

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diligently searching for the documents requested in discovery and that setting a trial date was

premature. Third, Ms. Hansen filed a motion to dismiss for lack of proper venue. Fourth and

finally, Ms. Hansen filed a request to access the court file. She said that, because some of

the court file documents were sealed, she had been unable to review the court file fully. Ms.

Hansen claimed that this had hindered her ability to understand the procedural history of the

case and fully respond to opposing counsel.

First Hearing

On February 1, 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Petitioners’ motion to compel

discovery, motion to set the trial date, and other outstanding items. At that time, Ms. Hansen

still had not responded to the written discovery propounded in November 2011. Ms. Hansen

also maintained that neither she nor her counsel were available for her deposition scheduled

for the next day. At the hearing, the trial court ordered Ms. Hansen to respond to the written

interrogatories within 15 days of the hearing. The trial court also rescheduled Ms. Hansen’s

deposition for February 20, 2012. The trial court suggested that the parties try to take Ms.

Hansen’s deposition by an alternative method so she would not have to travel to Tennessee.

However, if the parties could not work out an alternative method, the trial court said, an inperson deposition in Tennessee on the scheduled date would be required. The parties were

directed to work together to agree on a comprehensive scheduling order with expert

disclosure deadlines, deposition deadlines, a trial date, and the like. The trial court deferred

ruling on the other pending motions until after discovery was completed.

After the hearing, the parties agreed on a scheduling order. Attorney Smith mailed the

scheduling order to Ms. Hansen at her last known address.

A few days later, on approximately February 6, 2012, Ms. Hansen terminated the services

of Attorney Smith. Consequently, Attorney Smith filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for

Ms. Hansen.

14

Second Hearing

On February 23, 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing on Attorney Smith’s motion to

withdraw and related matters. Attorney Smith was present at the hearing, but Ms. Hansen

was not. The trial court informed those present that Ms. Hansen, representing herself, had

sent the trial court two letters, through the clerk’s office, requesting court-appointed counsel.

The trial court stated at the hearing that it did not consider Ms. Hansen’s letters to be

legitimate requests for counsel. Attorney Smith confirmed that Ms. Hansen knew about the

Attorney Smith’s motion to withdraw is not included in the appellate record. 14

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hearing and about Attorney Smith’s motion to withdraw. Attorney Smith confirmed that Ms.

Hansen was notified that she had been ordered to provide opposing counsel her responses

to the outstanding written discovery by February 15, 2012, and that Ms. Hansen was notified

that she was required to appear for her deposition on February 20, 2012, and Ms. Hansen had

done neither of those things. The trial court expressed concern that Ms. Hansen was

“abandoning” the litigation and her pretrial discovery obligations:

[O]bviously my concern is this. And there’s an allegation that she abandoned

her child. That has not been determined. We haven’t even had any evidence

. . . in this forum on that, so I have no conclusions about that, but I am

concerned that she is sort of conditionally abandoning the litigation. She has

three times not shown up for a deposition. So regardless of whether the child

was abandoned, it appears to me that she is to a degree abandoning, at least,

the discovery process.

Counsel for the Petitioners indicated at the hearing that they had filed a motion for sanctions

against Ms. Hansen based on her failure to file an answer to the amended complaint and her

failure to appear for three noticed depositions, and that they also filed a motion for default

judgment based on her failure to file an answer to the amended complaint. A hearing on

15

the Petitioners’ motion was set for March 7, 2012. Counsel for the Petitioners suggested that

the trial court use the scheduled hearing as the date on which Ms. Hansen must “put up or

shut up” in the defense of her case.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued an oral ruling granting Attorney

Smith’s motion to withdraw. It further ruled that Ms. Hansen would be required to

personally appear at the March 7, 2012 hearing “and to be prepared to address, among other

things, the issue of whether or not counsel should be appointed” for her. The trial court

added: “So she must physically be present, and I want that unambiguous [in the order] that

a letter to the judge, a fax to the judge, or a call to my friends at the Times Gazette will not

be accepted in lieu of her physical appearance in that courtroom . . . .”

On the same day, the trial court entered a written order permitting Attorney Smith to

withdraw. The written order stated expressly that, on March 7, 2012, Ms. Hansen would be

required to appear “in person before this court regarding any request by her for courtappointed counsel; the court shall not accept, in lieu of her personal appearance[,] any other

form of communication from Tory [sic] Hansen.” The order directed Attorney Smith to

provide the Petitioners and the trial court Ms. Hansen’s personal contact information by

The motion for default judgment referred to in the hearing is not in the appellate record. 15

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March 22, 2012. The order continued all other pending matters until March 7, 2012. As

16

her final task in representing Ms. Hansen, Attorney Smith was directed to mail Ms. Hansen

a copy of the trial court’s order.

Ms. Hansen received the order entered after the February 23, 2012 hearing. She did not

respond favorably. On March 6, 2012, Ms. Hansen, acting pro se, sent a letter to the court

clerk. She said that the purpose of the letter was “to safeguard my legal and constitutional

rights.” The letter acknowledged that, in February 2012, Ms. Hansen had been noticed to

appear at a deposition in Tennessee, and also acknowledged that the trial court had ordered

Ms. Hansen to appear in court on March 7, 2012. Ms. Hansen claimed that she had not been

available to appear in Tennessee for the February 2012 deposition, and would not be

available to appear for the March 7, 2012 hearing because of “financial hardship and

standing of the petitioners to pursue this lawsuit.” She argued that it was “oppressive” for

the trial court to require her to travel to Tennessee, and also asserted that “the Petitioners

have no legal authority to obtain sensitive and invasive information from me.” Ms. Hansen

said in her letter that she had twice requested via fax the “paperwork” necessary to file a

motion for a court-appointed attorney but had received no response to these requests; the

letter to the court clerk included another request asking that the clerk send her this

“paperwork.” Ms. Hansen insisted in the letter that the trial court had a duty to address her

argument that the Petitioners did not have standing to pursue this lawsuit, and that it also had

a duty to appoint a GAL for the child. She accused the trial judge of bias, alleged he

conspired with counsel for the Petitioners, and asserted other unspecified judicial

misconduct. As a result, Ms. Hansen claimed, she could not get a fair trial. Ms. Hansen’s

letter declared: “The court cannot make an ‘unprecedented’ ruling if it means breaking

Federal and State law and abusing my due process and constitutional rights in order to do so.

Default or not a judgment will not stand if made due to fraud or abuse of judicial power.”

Default Judgment Granted

On March 7, 2012, the trial court conducted the hearing on the motion for default judgment

as scheduled. Ms. Hansen did not appear at the hearing and did not have counsel present at

the hearing; however, she retained a court reporter to record it. At the conclusion of the

hearing, the trial court rendered an oral ruling granting the Petitioners a default judgment

against Ms. Hansen:

At the hearing, Attorney Smith informed the trial court that Ms. Hansen’s contact information was given 16

to her in confidence. Attorney Smith, therefore, took the position that the information was protected by the

attorney-client privilege. Counsel for the Petitioners pointed out that the outstanding written discovery

included a request for Ms. Hansen’s contact information, and that Ms. Hansen had thus far refused to provide

the information. 

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So both as a sanction for the failure to cooperate in the discovery

process and also in the form of a default judgment for failure to file a

responsive pleading, I am granting the relief sought.

I am finding her to be liable and precluding her from presenting, at a

future hearing, any testimony, any evidence, on the issue of liability.

However, we still have the issue of damages.

. . .

[Ms. Hansen] has chosen not to participate in the process. And I don’t know

how we can wait any longer on that and hope to get justice to your clients. So

we’re going to proceed in this manner.

Thus, the trial court granted the default judgment both as a sanction for failing to cooperate

in discovery and as a consequence of failing to file a responsive pleading to the amended

petition.

On the same day, the trial court entered a written order consistent with its oral ruling. It held

Ms. Hansen in contempt of court for failing to comply with the February 23, 2012 order that

required her to appear in person for the hearing on her request for court-appointed counsel.

It found that default judgment was warranted in light of Ms. Hansen’s failure to file a

responsive pleading to the November 2011 amended petition, failure to appear for a properly

noticed deposition on February 20, 2012, and failure to respond to written discovery requests

by the established deadline. Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure,

the trial court granted the Petitioners’ request for discovery sanctions in the form of attorney

fees, and it also granted the Petitioners’ motion for a protective order. A hearing on the

17

issue of damages was set for May 17, 2012.

Ms. Hansen then attempted a collateral attack on the Tennessee default judgment against her.

On April 18, 2012, she filed a lawsuit in California state court against Mr. Mityaev and other

Russian representatives. In her complaint, Ms. Hansen asked the California court to register

and enforce the June 7, 2011 decision of the Russian Federation Supreme Court, arguing that

it is conclusive on all of the issues pending in the instant Tennessee lawsuit. In the California

On March 12, 2012, the trial court entered an order granting the Petitioners’ request for attorney fees and 17

expenses of $4,963 charged by local counsel. The trial court later entered an order granting the Petitioners

attorney fees of $765 for the amount paid to out-of-town co-counsel.

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proceedings, Ms. Hansen claimed that, to the extent that the Tennessee court’s decisions

conflict with the order of the Russian court, the order of the Russian court should control.

18

Hearing on Damages

On May 17, 2012, the Tennessee trial court conducted its hearing on damages, as scheduled.

Again, Ms. Hansen was not represented by counsel at the hearing and did not appear, but she

retained a court reporter to record the proceedings. At the hearing, the Petitioners submitted

proof of the expenses incurred by WACAP as a result of Ms. Hansen’s breach of her

Placement Agreement. Evidence was also submitted regarding amounts due to the child for

his care and maintenance.

On May 18, 2012, the trial court issued a written order awarding damages to the Petitioners.

Taking the factual allegations in the petition as true, and in light of the undisputed evidence

submitted at trial, the trial court held that the damages to the child caused by Ms. Hansen’s

breach of the Placement Agreement at the time of the hearing totaled $58,240.46. The trial

court held that Ms. Hansen owed this amount to the child as the third-party beneficiary of the

Placement Agreement between Ms. Hansen and WACAP. The trial court found that the

child “shall remain in need of future care, maintenance and support going forward until he

reaches the majority age of eighteen, or is re-adopted.” Consequently, the trial court held the

child to be dependent and neglected. Based on Ms. Hansen’s income at the time she adopted

the child, the trial court ordered Ms. Hansen to pay $1,000 per month in child support. See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(b)(2). The trial court ordered Ms. Hansen to deposit the

amounts owed in a Russian bank account established for the benefit of the child.

The trial court awarded WACAP $28,361 for the damages suffered directly as a result of Ms.

Hansen’s abandonment of the child. In addition, pursuant to an attorney fee provision in the

Placement Agreement, the trial awarded WACAP $62,735 in attorney fees incurred to

enforce the Placement Agreement.

19

Thus, in sum, the trial court awarded $58,240.46 in damages to the child, awarded $91,996

in damages and attorney fees to WACAP, and ordered Ms. Hansen to pay child support of

$1,000 per month.

The record does not indicate the resolution of the California litigation. 18

This amount included the $4,963 awarded to counsel for the Petitioners in the March 12, 2012 order. 19

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Post-Judgment Motions

On June 15, 2012, Attorney Edward M. Yarbrough entered an appearance in the trial court

on behalf of Ms. Hansen. On the same day, Mr. Yarbrough filed two post-judgment motions

on Ms. Hansen’s behalf: a motion to set aside the March 7, 2012 default judgment pursuant

to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55.02 and 60.02, and a motion to alter or amend the May 18, 2012

judgment pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ P. 59. In the motions, Ms. Hansen argued that, because

of the default judgment, the May 18, 2012 final order was based on proof presented only by

the Petitioners; consequently, the final order should be altered or amended. Ms. Hansen

contended that many excusable factors led to the entry of default judgment

including financial hardship, inadequate counsel (and lack of counsel at critical

times), child care issues, medical issues, insufficient notice to allow her to

travel to Tennessee, a misunderstanding of the Court’s order regarding the

appearance in February, and an undue amount of fear related to all of these

factors and the extreme publicity surrounding her case.

If the default judgment were set aside and Ms. Hansen were allowed to present proof, she

maintained, the trial court would learn that there have been “dramatic changes in her

financial condition” as well as “other factors” that would materially alter the court’s

assessment of the case and result in a different holding. In support of her arguments, Ms.

Hansen attached her own affidavit.

On July 13, 2012, the trial court held a hearing on Ms. Hansen’s post-judgment motions. The

appellate record does not include a transcript of that hearing. On July 19, 2012, the trial court

entered a written order on the motions. In the order, the trial court found affirmatively that

Ms. Hansen’s failure to file an answer to the amended petition, failure to answer written

discovery, failure to appear for her deposition, and failure to appear at the March 7, 2012

hearing were all willful. It held that Ms. Hansen had not shown a likelihood of success on the

dependency and neglect claim, and that the Petitioners would suffer significant prejudice if

the trial court set aside the default judgment. For these reasons, the trial court denied Ms.

Hansen’s motion to set aside the default judgment and her motion to alter or amend the final

order.

From this order, Ms. Hansen now appeals.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

In her appellate brief, Ms. Hansen argues that the trial court erred in denying her postjudgment motions, namely, the motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rules

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55.02 and 60.02, and the motion to alter or amend the final order pursuant to Rule 59. At oral

argument, Ms. Hansen argued that neither the juvenile court nor the circuit court had subject

matter jurisdiction, so all of the orders of both courts should be deemed void, and the

appellate court should dismiss this appeal.

ANALYSIS

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

We first address the threshold issue of subject matter jurisdiction. The concept of subject

matter jurisdiction implicates a court’s authority to hear a given matter. “The concept of

subject matter jurisdiction involves a court’s power to adjudicate a particular type of

controversy.” Dishmon v. Shelby State Comm. College, 15 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1999). “Courts derive their subject matter jurisdiction from the Constitution of Tennessee or

from legislative act and cannot exercise jurisdictional powers that have not been conferred

directly on them expressly or by necessary implication.” Id. (citations and internal citations

omitted). “[P]arties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a trial or an appellate court

by appearance, plea, consent, silence, or waiver,” and “orders entered by courts without

subject matter jurisdiction are void.” Id.

The issue of subject matter jurisdiction “may be raised at any time in any court.” Johnson v.

Hopkins, No. M2012-02468-SC-S09-CV, 2013 WL 6699490, at *2 (Tenn. 2013). The issue

of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case is a question of law,

subject to de novo review. Id.

Because the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was raised in this appeal for the first time at

oral argument, this Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing only the

issue of subject matter jurisdiction. In her supplemental brief, Ms. Hansen argues that

20

neither the juvenile court nor the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit

because:

• The juvenile court and the circuit court did not have subject matter

jurisdiction over a claim for child support, because

a. the petitioners requesting child support did not

have “physical custody” of the child, and

Ms. Hansen attached several documents to her appellate brief that were not made part of the record in the 20

trial court below. As those documents are not in the official appellate record, we cannot consider them in

reaching our decision. See Reid v. Reid, 388 S.W.3d 292, 294-95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). 

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b. Ms. Hansen is not the legal parent of the child,

because the adoption was nullified by the Russian

Federation Supreme Court; and

• The juvenile court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the

breach of contract claim.

We address each issue in turn.

Child Support

Ms. Hansen first argues that neither the juvenile court nor the circuit court had subject matter

jurisdiction over the Petitioners’ claim for child support on behalf of the child. She asserts:

“Tennessee law clearly states that in order to make a claim for child support, the claimant

must have physical custody of the child.” She also claims, “The law is clear that persons

without physical custody of the child have no standing whatsoever to petition for child

support.” Because none of the Petitioners ever had “physical custody” over Justin, Ms.

Hansen argues, neither the juvenile court nor the circuit court ever had jurisdiction to award

child support. She maintains that Mr. Mityaev is not a proper representative for the child

because the child was moved from the children’s home at which he was director. Ms. Hansen

contends that when the child “no longer resided at the institution where Mr. Mityayev [sic]

was employed, hislegal authority to representJustin A. H. dissolved.” Therefore, Ms. Hansen

argues, neither the juvenile court nor the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to award

child support on behalf of Justin in the dependency and neglect action.

To support her “physical custody” argument, Ms. Hansen relies on Tennessee Code Annotated

§ 36-5-101(b). By its language, Section 36-5-101(b) applies when the Department of

21

The statute provides:

21

(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, neither the department

of human services, nor any Title IV-D child support contractor of the department, nor any

recipient of public assistance in this or any other state or territory, nor any applicant for

either public assistance in this or any other state or territory or for Title IV-D child support

services from the department or any other Title IV-D agency in this or any other state or

territory, shall be required to demonstrate to a court or administrative tribunal that the

caretaker of the child for whom child support is sought is vested with any more than

physical custody of the subject child or children, in order to have standing to petition for

child support from the legal parent of the child or children for whom support is sought, or

to seek enforcement or modification of any existing orders involving such child or children.

(continued...)

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Children’s Services (“DCS”) or other recipients of public assistance seek child support on

behalf of a child. It states that legal custody is not a prerequisite for the child’s caretaker to

obtain an order for child support; the caretaker need not show “any more than physical

custody of the [child]” in order to have standing to seek such support. Ms. Hansen cites no

authority to support her assertion that this statute applies under the circumstances of this case.

This case is unusual because the child at issue is no longer in the United States; after Ms.

Hansen sent him back to Russia, a Russian orphanage took custody of the child. The juvenile

court petition identified Mr. Mityaev as the director of the orphanage where Justin was

located, and Mr. Mityaev as Petitioner brought the dependency and neglect action on Justin’s

behalf. After the case was appealed to circuit court, the petition was amended to add Justin

himself as a Petitioner through Mr. Mityaev, his next friend. “An inquiry into whether a party

has standing requires a ‘careful judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain

whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.’”

In re Estate of Glasscock, No. M2011-01725-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 5383074, at *3 (Tenn.

Ct. App. June 11, 2012) (quoting City of Brentwood v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 149

S.W.3d 49, 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)).

Ms. Hansen concedesthat Mr. Mityaev wasthe proper representative forJustin when the child

was in Mr. Mityaev’s orphanage. In this appeal, she claims that Justin has been relocated to

a different orphanage, so Mr. Mityaev is no longer the appropriate representative. The

appellate record, however, contains no properly-submitted evidence to support this assertion.

22

Ms. Hansen had ample opportunity to make this argument to the trial court and submit

evidence to support it; she chose not to do so.

Our review of the trial court’s decision on whether Justin is a proper party and the identity of

the appropriate party to represent the child in these proceedings is necessarily limited to the

appellate record, i.e., the trial court pleadings and the evidence in the record. See Reid v.

Reid, 388 S.W.3d 292, 294-95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). The record in this case supports the

trial court’s decision that Justin is a proper party to the lawsuit and that Mr. Mityaev is the

appropriate representative. Accordingly, we reject Ms. Hansen’s argument that neither the

(...continued) 21

(2) Legal custody of a child to whom a child support obligation is owed shall not be a

prerequisite to the initiation of any support action or to the enforcement or modification of

any support obligation in such cases, whether or not the obligation has been assigned to this

state or any other state or territory by operation of law.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(b)(1) & (b)(2) (Supp. 2013).

This Court denied Ms. Hansen’s motion to consider the post-judgment facts upon which she now relies. 22

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juvenile court nor the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate matters

involving child support based on lack of proper standing of Justin or his representatives.

Ms. Hansen also argues that neither the juvenile court nor the circuit court had jurisdiction to

adjudicate the claims for child support because her adoption of Justin was nullified by the

Russian Federation Supreme Court. She contends that, as a matter of law, when parental

rights are terminated, all of the parent’s rights and responsibilities as to the child are also

terminated. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)(1) (Supp. 2013).

We do not disagree with the basic premise of Ms. Hansen’s argument. “An order terminating

parental rights shall have the effect of severing forever all legal rights and obligations of the

parent . . . .” Id. This argument, however, does not implicate the trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, its authority to adjudicate a claim for child support. Rather, it is a substantive

defense to a claim for child support. It might have been a terrific argument in the trial court

below, had Ms. Hansen chosen to engage in the proceedings. But she cannot now assert a

substantive defense to a claim under the guise of a challenge to the trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. For this reason, we must respectfully reject Ms. Hansen’s argument that the

annulment of her adoption of Justin by the Russian tribunal left the lower courts without

jurisdiction over this action.

23

Breach of Contract

Ms. Hansen next argues that the juvenile court did not have subject matter jurisdiction as to

the breach of contract claim. She asserts that, under Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-103

and 37-1-104, breach of contract claims are not among those that can be brought in juvenile

court. In this case, she notes, the breach of contract claim was joined with the dependency

and neglect action. Ms. Hansen asserts: “Because the law grants juvenile court continuing

jurisdiction in dependent neglect cases, the breach of contract claim and the dependent neglect

claim are now forever joined.” She concedes that the circuit court generally has jurisdiction

over breach of contract claims but contends that the joining of the breach of contract claim

with the dependency and neglect action in the juvenile court defeats the jurisdiction of the

circuit court in the appeal from juvenile court.

The juvenile court below recognized that it did not have jurisdiction over a breach of contract

claim and stated that, for this reason, the breach of contract issues were “withdrawn” by the

Petitioners at the juvenile court level. In any event, when the Petitioners filed their amended

petition in circuit court in November 2011, the petition was amended to include a breach of

Our decision herein pretermits the question of whether the decision of the Russian Federation Supreme 23

Court should be recognized or given full faith and credit.

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contract claim. Once the breach of contract claim was added, the circuit court had jurisdiction

over both the appeal of the dependency and neglect petition and the initial filing of the breach

of contract action. This is analogous to amending a claim in circuit court after a de novo

24

appeal from general sessions court — also a court of limited jurisdiction — to include a claim

that is not justiciable in general sessions. For example, after an appeal from general sessions

court to circuit court, a party can amend his petition to add claims and defenses that are

outside the jurisdictional limits for general sessions court. Ware v. Meharry Med. College,

898 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tenn. 1995) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-729). “The Tennessee

Rules of Civil Procedure favor using a single proceeding to resolve all the parties’ disputes

on the merits.” Id. at 186 (citing Karash v. Pigott, 530 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Tenn. 1975);

Quelette v. Whittemore, 627 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)). Therefore, regardless

of whether the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction over the Petitioners’ breach of

contract claim, the circuit court had jurisdiction to adjudicate all of the claims that were

asserted in the amended circuit court petition.

Therefore, we reject Ms. Hansen’s argument that this case should be dismissed based on

jurisdictional grounds. We now turn to the substantive issues raised on appeal.

Post-Judgment Motions

Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment

Ms. Hansen argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to set aside the default

judgment. On appeal, we review the denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment for

abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Reynolds v. Battles, 108 S.W.3d 249, 251 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2003) (citing Tenn. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Barbee, 689 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tenn.

1985)). “In reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant or deny relief pursuant to Rule 60.02,

we give great deference to the trial court.” Henry v. Goins, 104 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Tenn.

2003). An abuse of discretion occurs only if the trial court has “applied an incorrect legal

standard, or reached a decision which is against logic or reasoning that caused an injustice to

the party complaining.” Id. (citations omitted). “The abuse of discretion standard does not

permit an appellate court to merely substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” Id.

“In deciding whether to grant a rule 60.02 motion to set aside [a] default judgment, courts

consider three criteria: 1) whether the default was willful; 2) whether the defendant has

asserted a meritorious defense; 3) the amount of prejudice which may result to the

non-defaulting party.” Reynolds, 108 S.W.3d at 251 (citing Barbee, 689 S.W.2d at 866). The

We express no opinion on the propriety of joining a breach of contract claimwith a dependency and neglect

24

action, as resolution of this question is not necessary to determine subject matter jurisdiction. 

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first element — willfulness — is a threshold inquiry when a party seeks relief from a default

judgment based on excusable neglect. Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 493-94

(Tenn. 2012). “If the court finds that the defaulting party has acted willfully, the judgment

cannot be set aside on ‘excusable neglect’ grounds, and the court need not consider the other

factors.” Id. at 494. “Deliberate choices” and “conduct that is flagrant and unexplained” are

characteristics of willful conduct. Id. at 493.

To some extent, the default judgment entered against Ms. Hansen was a Rule 37 sanction for

her failure to cooperate in discovery. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37.02. Trial courts are afforded

wide discretion to determine the appropriate sanction for abuse of the discovery process.

Mercer v. Vanderbilt Univ., 134 S.W.3d 121, 133 (Tenn. 2004). “The trial court’s

determination of the appropriate sanction to be imposed will not be disturbed on appeal unless

the court commits an abuse of discretion.” Lyle v. Exxon Corp., 746 S.W.2d 694, 699 (Tenn.

1988) (citing Brooks v. United Unif. Co., 682 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tenn. 1984)).

In its July 19, 2012 order, the trial court found specifically that Ms. Hansen acted willfully in

failing to file an answer, respond to written discovery, appear at her deposition, or appear at

the March 7, 2012 hearing. A trial court’s finding of “willfulness” is a factual finding. We

review this and all other factual findings de novo on the record, presuming the trial court’s

finding to be correct unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. In re W.B., IV, Nos.

M2004-00999-COA-R3-PT & M2004-01572-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 1021618, at *9 (Tenn.

Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2005); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).

After a careful review, we find that the record contains substantial evidence to support the

trial court’s finding that Ms. Hansen’s conduct was willful. She chose not to file an answer

to the amended petition, declined to answer written discovery, failed to appear for her noticed

deposition on at least three occasions, and disobeyed the trial court’s direct order to appear

in person to request court-appointed counsel. Days after Attorney Smith mailed Ms. Hansen

the trial court’s scheduling order, which indicated that Ms. Hansen had to complete discovery

and appear for a deposition, Ms. Hansen fired Attorney Smith and did not comply with the

directives in the scheduling order. Ms. Hansen was notified of the hearing on damages; she

hired a court reporter to record it but did not show up to participate in it. As the trial court

commented, Ms. Hansen simply abandoned the lawsuit. Ms. Hansen’srecalcitrance is evident

in her March 6, 2012 letter to the trial court, explaining the reasoning for her decisions. In

the letter, Ms. Hansen claimed on one hand that financial hardship prevented her from

fulfilling her responsibilities in the litigation. At the same time, however, she asserted

defiantly that she refused to cooperate in discovery because “the Petitioners have no legal

authority to obtain sensitive and invasive information from me,” accused the trial judge of

conspiring with the Petitioners, and declared that any order entered by the trial court would

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be based on fraud or abuse of judicial power. All of this says loudly and clearly that Ms.

Hansen’s failure to participate in the lawsuit was a deliberate decision.

Ms. Hansen’s motion to set aside the default judgment listed several other reasons for her

failure to cooperate in discovery or follow the trial court’s orders. She claimed that her

conduct was due to financial burdens, mental issues, and the like. The record indicates that

Ms. Hansen personally appeared at the hearing to testify about these assertions; however,

since the appellate record does not include a transcript of the hearing, we do not know what

Ms. Hansen said in her testimony. Regardless, the trial court apparently did not find Ms.

Hansen’s testimony to be credible. As an appellate court, we afford great deference to trial

court decisions that are based on the trial court’s assessment of witnesses’ credibility; we will

not reverse a decision based on witness credibility absent clear and convincing evidence to

the contrary. Wells v. Tenn. Bd. of Regents, 9 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999). Without a

transcript, we must presume that the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to set aside is

supported by the evidence. In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

In any event, because the record supports the trial court’s factual finding that Ms. Hansen’s

conduct was willful, we need not examine the other factors to determine whether she has

established excusable neglect. Discover Bank, 363 S.W.3d at 494. Therefore, under the

circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in

denying Ms. Hansen’s motion to set aside the default judgment, and so affirm the trial court’s

decision.

Motion to Alter or Amend Final Judgment

A trial court’s denial of a motion to alter or amend a final order pursuant to Rule 59 is also

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Chambliss v. Stohler, 124 S.W.3d 116, 120

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

On appeal, Ms. Hansen’s challenge to the trial court’s denial of her motion to alter or amend

is based wholly on the premise that the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the default

judgment. Neither in this Court nor in the lower court did Ms. Hansen question the

sufficiency of the proof on damages, and she makes no other challenge to the trial court’s

decision apart from her insistence that the default judgment should have been set aside. We

25

have already affirmed the trial court’s denial of Ms. Hansen’s motion to set aside the default

judgment. Because Ms. Hansen makes no other argument on this issue, we also affirm the

trial court’s denial of the motion to alter or amend the final order.

An issue not raised in the trial court will not be considered by the appellate court on appeal. See In re 25

M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 394 (Tenn. 2009).

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CONCLUSION

The decision of the trial court is affirmed. Costs on appeal are to be taxed to

Respondent/Appellant Torry Hansen and her surety, for which execution may issue, if

necessary.

________________________________

HOLLY M. KIRBY, JUDGE

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