[Cite as State v. Schulze, 2016-Ohio-470.] 

 

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: February 10, 2016 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams,

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant, 

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Marguerite Slagle, 

Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

ZACHARY SCHULZE, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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APPEAL NO. C-150272 

TRIAL NO. B-1405512 

 O P I N I O N.

 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2 

Per Curiam.

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Zachary Schulze has appealed his conviction for 

attempted failure to notify of an address change. Because we hold, under Ohio 

Supreme Court precedent, that there is no valid order in place requiring Schulze to 

register as a sex offender, we must reverse Schulze’s conviction. 

Facts and Procedure 

{¶2} In December 2002, Schulze, who was then 14 years old, was 

adjudicated delinquent for committing an act that, had it been committed by an 

adult, would have constituted gross sexual imposition. He was classified under 

Megan’s Law as a juvenile-offender registrant, but not a predator or habitual sexual 

offender. An end-of-disposition hearing was scheduled for April 23, 2008. Schulze 

was classified as a Tier II juvenile-offender registrant under the Adam Walsh Act 

(“AWA”). 

{¶3} On October 2, 2014, Schulze, now an adult, was indicted for failing to 

notify of an address change as a third-degree felony. He filed a motion to dismiss the 

indictment, which the trial court overruled. He then pleaded guilty to attempted 

failure to notify of an address change as a fifth-degree felony. He was found guilty 

and sentenced as appears of record. Schulze has timely appealed. 

Analysis 

{¶4} Schulze’s sole assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in 

overruling his motion to dismiss the indictment. The question is whether there was a 

valid order in place requiring Schulze to register as a sex offender. 

{¶5} Under Ohio Supreme Court precedent and prior case law from this 

court and other Ohio appellate courts, the end-of-disposition order classifying 

Schulze as a Tier II offender under the AWA is void. See State v. Williams, 129 Ohio 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108 (applying the AWA to sex offenders 

who committed their sex offenses prior to its enactment violates the Ohio 

Constitution, Article IV, Section 28, which prohibits the General Assembly from 

enacting retroactive laws); In re E.S., 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-110163 and C110490, 2012-Ohio-1363, aff’d, 135 Ohio St.3d 135, 2012-Ohio-5911, 984 N.E.2d 

1056 (juvenile court erred in holding end-of-disposition hearing and classifying the 

juvenile under the AWA where the juvenile had committed his sex offense prior to 

the enactment of the AWA and initially had been classified under Megan’s Law); In 

re C.W., 2013-Ohio-2483, 991 N.E.2d 1167 (4th Dist.) (where the juvenile had 

committed his sex offense prior to the enactment of the AWA the juvenile court’s 

order classifying the juvenile under the AWA was void, because it violated the Ohio 

Constitution’s prohibition against retroactive laws). Therefore, Schulze cannot be 

required to register under it. 

A. The Effect of the Void End-of-Classification Order 

{¶6} The state argues that even though Schulze’s classification under the 

AWA was void, he was still required to register pursuant to the initial order 

classifying him under Megan’s Law because that order was revived or still in effect 

once the end-of-disposition order was entered without jurisdiction. 

{¶7} Because Schulze was 14 when he committed his sex offense, he was 

initially classified under former R.C. 2152.83(B). Former R.C. 2152.83(D) required 

the juvenile court to include in the classification order a statement that upon 

completion of the disposition for the sex offense, a hearing would be held pursuant to 

former R.C. 2152.84, at which the classification order was subject to modification or 

termination. Former R.C. 2152.84(A)(1) provided that when the juvenile court 

classified the juvenile under former R.C. 2152.83, “upon completion of the 

disposition of that child made for the sexually oriented offense on which the juvenile 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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sex offender registrant order was based, the judge * * * shall conduct a hearing to 

review the effectiveness of the disposition * * * and to determine whether the prior 

classification * * * should be continued, modified or terminated * * *.” 

{¶8} The end-of-disposition hearing under former R.C. 2152.84 was 

statutorily mandatory. The original classification order was entered subject to 

modification or termination after the former-R.C. 2152.84 hearing. See former R.C. 

2152.83(F). The juvenile was entitled to have an end-of-disposition hearing to 

determine his classification going forward. See former R.C. 2152.84. Every juvenile 

classified after a former-R.C. 2152.83(B)(2) hearing was to receive a hearing at the 

end of his or her disposition to determine if the classification continued to be 

appropriate. In order to complete the process of classifying a juvenile as a sexoffender registrant, the juvenile court was required to hold an end-of-disposition 

hearing. See id.

{¶9} That hearing, however, as a matter of law, had to be held under 

Megan’s Law for the order to be valid. In In re E.S., 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C110163 and C-110490, 2012-Ohio-1363, we held that where the juvenile court had 

initially properly classified E.S. under Megan’s Law, but had improperly held the 

end-of-disposition hearing under the AWA, the remedy was to reverse the AWA 

classification and remand the cause for a new end-of-disposition hearing under 

Megan’s Law. E.S. at ¶ 8. We did not hold that the initial classification under 

Megan’s Law was revived or still in effect. See Williams at ¶ 22 (where the offender 

was unconstitutionally classified under the AWA, the classification was reversed and 

the cause was remanded for a classification hearing under Megan’s Law, the law 

applicable at the time the offender had committed the sex offense); In re J.P., 7th 

Dist. Jefferson No. 10 JE 23, 2012-Ohio-3343, ¶ 8-9 (where the juvenile was 

unconstitutionally classified under the AWA the classification was reversed and the 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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cause was remanded for a classification hearing under Megan’s Law, the law 

applicable at the time the juvenile had committed the sex offense). We have found 

no case law, and the state has not cited any, holding that the initial order was 

automatically revived. 

{¶10} Schulze was entitled to an end-of-disposition hearing under Megan’s 

Law. His end-of-disposition hearing was held and Schulze was classified under the 

AWA. That AWA classification order was void, and the juvenile court never properly 

completed the required process for classifying Schulze as a juvenile-offender 

registrant under Megan’s Law. Therefore, under these facts, there is no valid order 

in place requiring Schulze to register as a sex offender. 

B. The Initial Classification Order 

{¶11} Schulze also argues that the initial order classifying him as a juvenileoffender registrant under Megan’s Law was invalid because (1) the magistrate’s 

decision classifying Schulze was not properly filed with the clerk of courts and (2) the 

judge’s approval of the magistrate’s decision classifying Schulze was “not recorded on 

the docket contained in the juvenile case management system.” We need not address 

whether the initial order was valid. We have held that that order was not revived or 

still in effect, and Schulze cannot be required to register under it. Whether it was 

invalid on some other basis is moot. 

Conclusion

{¶12} We sustain the assignment of error. The judgment of the trial court 

convicting Schulze of attempted failure to notify of an address change is reversed, 

and this cause is remanded with instructions to the trial court to dismiss the 

indictment. 

Judgment reversed and cause remanded. 

FISCHER, P.J., MOCK and STAUTBERG, JJ.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry this date.