NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL DUMARK SUEING, Appellant.

Nos. 1 CA-CR 21-0363

1 CA-CR 21-0367

(Consolidated)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

Nos. CR2021-101881-001

CR2018-120668-001

The Honorable Suzanne E. Cohen, Judge

The Honorable Peter A. Thompson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Michael O’Toole

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Kyle Kinkead

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 12-01-2022
STATE v. SUEING

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Michael Sueing appeals his convictions and sentences in two 

separately tried cases. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2018, Sueing went out for dinner and a drink with a woman 

he met at a bus stop. After dinner, Sueing and the woman smoked 

marijuana behind a nearby dumpster. At the end of their outing, Sueing 

insisted on walking the woman home “at least halfway.” On their walk, 

Sueing grabbed the woman, forced his hand down her pants and up her 

shirt but stopped when she told him, “No.” At home, the woman found 

Sueing’s marijuana in her pocket and contacted him to give it back. That 

same night Sueing came to the woman’s apartment to pick up his marijuana 

and used her restroom. Sueing grabbed the woman, choked, hit, and raped 

her, and made her perform nonconsensual sexual acts on him. The woman 

pleaded with him to leave, and he eventually did. The woman called the 

police.

¶3 The State charged Sueing with three counts of sexual assault, 

one count of aggravated assault, and one count of threatening or 

intimidating (“the 2018 case”). Sueing decided to represent himself after 

several different attorneys had represented him. After the trial started, but 

before a jury was empaneled, Sueing said that he wanted his advisory 

attorney to take over. The trial court gave counsel time to prepare and 

advised Sueing that he would not be allowed to “flip-flop back” to selfrepresentation.

¶4 Before the trial recommenced, Sueing’s attorney asked to 

withdraw because of a conflict with Sueing over the defense and Sueing’s

statements that caused the attorney to fear for his safety sitting beside 

Sueing at trial. The court allowed counsel to withdraw and denied Sueing’s 

request to represent himself again. The case was transferred to a different 

judge for trial. Not long before trial, Sueing’s new attorney moved to 
STATE v. SUEING

Decision of the Court

3

withdraw because Sueing had threatened him. The court broached the 

possibility of shifting the attorney to an advisory capacity and allowing 

Sueing to represent himself, but Sueing chose to proceed to trial with 

representation. The court informed him that if he was disruptive at trial, he 

would forfeit his right to be present in the courtroom.

¶5 Several days into the trial, as jurors entered the courtroom

and took their seats, Sueing physically assaulted his attorney. Law 

enforcement personnel subdued Sueing, and the court declared a mistrial.

The court permitted defense counsel to withdraw and ruled that Sueing had

forfeited his “right to be present in the courtroom for any future trial in this 

matter.” The court found that Sueing had “demonstrated that he w[ould]

act on a threat,” was “a danger to anyone and everyone else in the 

courtroom as demonstrated by his actions,” and could not “be trusted to 

not act out again.” It also found that he had “gone through five (5) attorneys 

in this current case and ha[d] demonstrated an inability to work with any 

of them.” The court further found that Sueing “was previously granted pro 

per status but asked to withdraw that status with a warning that he would 

not be allowed to represent himself in the future” and might “very well act 

out again” if his “new attorney proceed[ed] to trial with [Sueing] present.”

The court left it to the next trial judge to determine how Sueing might view 

any future trial in the case.

¶6 Based on Sueing’s conduct in court, the State charged him

with aggravated assault and interfering with judicial proceedings (“the 

2021 case”). Before either case was transferred to a new trial judge, Sueing 

asked to represent himself and be present in the courtroom at both trials.

He asserted that because his misconduct related to disagreements with his 

previous attorney—who no longer represented him—his presence in the 

courtroom was not a concern. The court denied both requests, relying on 

the court’s findings and the previous court’s own experience with Sueing.

The court found that Sueing posed risks to the safety of himself and others.

It also found that it could not trust his assurances given that Sueing could 

not control, and the court could not predict, when he would erupt. The 

court also reasoned that although Sueing could be present in the courtroom 

if adequately restrained, the restraints needed would be obvious, which 

could tarnish the jury’s view of him. Sueing also posed an additional risk 

of acting out to deliberately cause a mistrial. The court further observed that 

Sueing had been warned that he would not be allowed to reclaim the right 

to self-representation after forfeiting it and that allowing him to represent 

himself would threaten the safety of those interacting with him as well as 

an orderly trial process.
STATE v. SUEING

Decision of the Court

4

¶7 The court allowed Sueing to participate virtually in the 

pretrial proceedings for the 2018 and 2021 cases. He repeatedly declined to 

do so. A different judge presided over the retrial of the 2018 case—which 

began about three months after the mistrial. The court informed Sueing that 

he would not be allowed in the courtroom but could watch the proceedings 

from a tablet in a holding area adjoining the courtroom. Sueing refused 

transport for jury selection on the first day of trial. He was transported on 

the second day but was dissatisfied with his viewing arrangement. Sueing 

banged on the door of the holding area and told an officer that he would 

continue to do so because he could not see the jury over the video feed. The 

courtroom heard the banging. The court found “that the banging [was] 

absolutely disruptive,” Sueing had “shown over and over again that he 

[could not] comport himself in a manner appropriate for these 

proceedings,” and that he had forfeited the right to observe the proceedings 

virtually. The court ordered Sueing returned to jail and brought back to the 

courthouse only if and when he testified. When a deputy told Sueing that

he was being removed, the court heard him banging again. Later that day, 

defense counsel asked if Sueing could watch the proceedings from a tablet 

at the jail. The court told counsel that it had inquired about that possibility 

and was informed that no resources existed to accommodate it.

¶8 On the fourth day of trial, defense counsel told the court that 

Sueing asked for another opportunity to watch the trial from a tablet in the 

courthouse and “that he promise[d] no more disturbances.” The court 

denied the request because Sueing’s “avowal [was not] enough for this 

court to risk bringing him back” given his prior conduct, which had 

disturbed not only that courtroom but another one as well.

¶9 Sueing elected to testify and was brought to the courthouse 

on the sixth day of trial. The court allowed him to watch the proceedings 

from a tablet in the holding area before he testified, informing him that 

because it was a live feed accessible to the public, he would be unable to see

the jury. The court warned Sueing that his disruptive conduct would lead 

to another expulsion.

¶10 During his testimony, Sueing was often argumentative and 

unresponsive. He disobeyed the court’s admonitions to comply with trial 

rules and made impromptu remarks that counsel was not eliciting 

information that jurors should know. After he was examined and the court 

excused the jury for the evening recess, Sueing continued to speak in 

defiance of the court’s directives and warnings, complaining that the court 

and counsel were keeping important evidence from the jury and calling out 

to jurors directly what he believed that evidence to be. The court had Sueing
STATE v. SUEING

Decision of the Court

5

removed, and the defense rested its case. He was not brought back to the 

courthouse.

¶11 The trial court instructed the jury that Sueing’s absence was 

“not evidence” and that they “must not consider it” in deciding whether 

the State proved the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found 

Sueing not guilty of one count of sexual assault but guilty of the other four 

charges.

¶12 The 2021 case went to trial about two months after trial in the 

2018 case, with the same judge presiding. Before trial, Sueing’s attorney 

moved to reconsider Sueing’s exclusion from the courtroom, arguing that 

jurors would infer that he was absent because “the Court ha[d] already 

convicted him of disrupting the courtroom” and likely to be “dangerous 

because he assault[ed] courtroom participants.” The court summarily 

denied the motion. Sueing was not transported to court for jury selection 

on the first day of trial. When defense counsel asked about his ability to 

view the proceedings from outside the courtroom, the court stated that he 

“lost that right when he proceeded to bang on the wall and yell and scream” 

during the previous trial and no means existed for him to watch the 

proceedings from the jail.

¶13 Sueing was transported to court the next day with the 

expectation that he would testify, but he was not allowed to observe the 

proceedings. The attorney that Sueing attacked and the officer who 

observed the attack testified. After the State rested its case, defense counsel

again moved to reconsider Sueing’s presence. The court denied the motion, 

“reiterat[ing] its previous findings” that “Mr. Sueing’s actions and Mr. 

Sueing’s actions alone . . . have resulted in his ability to not control himself 

in a court proceeding, and therefore not be present in any court 

proceedings, other than if he should choose to testify.”

¶14 When Sueing was brought into the courtroom to testify, he 

told the court that he had decided not to testify because his inability to see 

the proceedings left him unable to “ga[u]ge whether it would be better for 

[him] to testify or not.” He also complained about the court’s refusal to let 

him watch the trial from outside the courtroom. He asserted that he had 

been sitting quietly in the holding area next to the courtroom that day and 

had disrupted the last trial from the holding area because he was “given a 

tablet with no sound” and believed that he had a right to see the jury.

Sueing was removed from the courtroom and brought back to the jail. The 

case went to the jury that day. Jurors were instructed that Sueing’s absence 

was “not evidence” to consider in determining whether the State proved 
STATE v. SUEING

Decision of the Court

6

the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found Sueing guilty as 

charged.

¶15 Sueing was present at his sentencing. In the 2018 case, the trial

court sentenced him to concurrent and consecutive terms totaling 40 years’ 

imprisonment. In the 2021 case, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of 

3.75 years’ imprisonment, to run consecutive to the sentences in the 2018

case. Sueing timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶16 Sueing argues that the trial court violated his constitutional 

rights to be present and to represent himself at trial, as well as the court’s 

duties under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 9.2 to enable his 

participation at trial after expelling him from the courtroom. Sueing does 

not challenge the court’s initial ruling excluding him from the courtroom 

during the 2018 case trial. But he contends that the trial court erred by not 

revisiting that ruling despite his promise of future good behavior, the 

passage of time, and the court’s affirmative duty to facilitate his 

participation at trial. We review a constitutional challenge to the trial 

court’s expulsion of a defendant for disruptive conduct for an abuse of 

discretion. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970). The court “must be given 

sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case” and “[n]o one 

formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best 

in all situations.” Id.; cf. State v. Stewart, 139 Ariz. 50, 54 (1984) (citing Allen

in support of applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to the trial court’s 

decision to shackle a defendant with a history of violence and escape). We 

review the denial of a motion for self-representation for an abuse of 

discretion. State v. Dunbar, 249 Ariz. 37, 44 ¶ 10 (App. 2020).

I. The trial court permissibly excluded Sueing from his trials.

A. The court did not violate Sueing’s constitutional right to be 

present.

¶17 The United States and Arizona Constitutions protect a 

defendant’s right to be present at trial. See U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; 

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24; Allen, 397 U.S. at 338 (confrontation clause); United 

States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (due process). But that right is not 

absolute. The trial court has both the right and the responsibility to conduct 

trials without disruption, and it may take measures necessary to dispose of 

cases in an orderly fashion. State v. Delvecchio, 110 Ariz. 396, 400 (1974). A

defendant may forfeit his right to be present at trial if, “after he has been 

warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive 
STATE v. SUEING

Decision of the Court

7

behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so 

disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be 

carried on with him in the courtroom.” Allen, 397 U.S. at 343; see also Rule 

9.2(a) (“A defendant who engages in disruptive conduct, after being 

warned that such conduct will result in expulsion from a proceeding, 

forfeits the right to be present at that proceeding.”). He can reclaim this 

right “as soon as [he] is willing to conduct himself consistently with the 

decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial

proceedings.” Allen, 397 U.S. at 343; see also Rule 9.2(a) (“At the time of 

expulsion, the court must inform the defendant that he or she can return 

upon a promise to the court of future orderly conduct.”). 

¶18 The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Sueing 

from his trials. In the 2018 case, the record supports the trial court’s 

determination that Sueing’s violent, obstreperous, and unpredictable 

behavior warranted his removal from the courtroom, and after further 

misconduct, from the courthouse entirely. Sueing’s argument that the court 

could have done more to understand why he was disruptive in the holding 

area adjoining the courtroom—which is largely based on self-serving 

statements he made months after those disruptions—does not establish an 

abuse of discretion. Nor did Sueing’s promise of “no more disturbances” 

entitle him to return to court. Given his recent history of belligerence, the 

court did not have to accept his promise of “no more disturbances.” See, e.g., 

Douglas v. State, 214 P.3d 312, 323–24 (Alaska 2009) (interpreting Allen as 

allowing a trial court to forbid a defendant’s return to the courtroom based 

on its determination that the defendant’s prior conduct undermined the 

credibility of his promise to behave); United States v. Munn, 507 F.2d 563, 

568 (10th Cir. 1974) (interpreting same). Indeed, Sueing’s insubordinate 

conduct while on the stand in the 2018 case discredited his earlier promise 

of good behavior. 

¶19 Nor did the trial court err in adhering to its earlier rulings on 

exclusion when the 2021 case went to trial. Ten weeks elapsed between 

Sueing’s trials in the 2018 and 2021 cases. Between the end of trial in the 

2018 case—which was punctuated by Sueing’s contumacious behavior on 

the stand—and the start of trial in the 2021 case, Sueing never signaled that 

he was “willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and 

respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings.” Allen, 

397 U.S. at 343. He provided no verbal assurances of future good behavior,

nor did he show, through his conduct, that he could control himself in court 

proceedings. Cf. State v. Forte, 222 Ariz. 389, 393 ¶ 10 (App. 2009) (holding 

that a defendant’s “disruptive behavior at an earlier hearing was not, 

standing alone, a sufficient ground for excluding [the defendant] from [a 
STATE v. SUEING

Decision of the Court

8

later hearing]” where the defendant demonstrated good behavior at an 

intervening hearing that “indicated he was willing to cooperate with the 

process”). The mere passage of time and change of case, combined with

defense counsel’s requests that Sueing be allowed to attend trial, did not 

require the court to permit his return. Therefore, the court did not violate 

Sueing’s constitutional right to be present at his trials.

B. The court complied with Rule 9.2.

¶20 Sueing does not challenge his initial expulsion from the 

courtroom under Rule 9.2(a). But he contends that the trial court violated 

Rule 9.2(b) and (c) by (1) preventing him from watching the trial virtually 

without conducting a more thorough inquiry into his disruption from the 

holding area during trial in the 2018 case, (2) denying his request to return 

upon a promise not to engage in further disruptive behavior, and (3) not 

complying with its “continuing duty” to permit his participation in the trial 

proceedings. 

¶21 Sueing does not establish error. The trial court did not violate 

Rule 9.2(b) or (c). After the defendant’s expulsion, “the court must use every 

feasible means to allow the defendant to watch, hear, and be informed of 

the proceeding’s progress, and to consult with counsel at reasonable 

intervals. The court should inquire periodically if the defendant wishes to 

reacquire the right to be present.” Rule 9.2(b). If the defendant “personally 

assures the court of future good behavior,” then “[t]he court must allow the 

defendant to return to the proceeding.” Rule 9.2(c). But upon later 

disruptive conduct, “the court may exclude the defendant from the 

proceeding without additional warning.” Rule 9.2(c).

¶22 Here, the trial court “use[d] every feasible means” to allow 

Sueing to follow the trial proceedings after expelling him from the 

courtroom. First, the court allowed him to watch the proceedings from an 

area adjoining the courtroom. Sueing does not dispute that upon receiving 

that opportunity, he began banging on the door to the courtroom and told 

an officer that he would continue to do so. Rule 9.2(b) did not oblige the 

court to inquire further into Sueing’s discontent before expelling him from 

the courthouse entirely. And the court continued to comply with its duty

under the rule by investigating whether Sueing could watch the trial from 

the jail. Cf. State v. Chapple, 36 P.3d 1025, 1031–32 (Wash. 2001) (holding that 

trial court’s refusal to allow the defendant to watch trial from a courtroomadjacent area after expelling him for disruptive conduct complied with the 

“least restrictive means” requirement where the court had personal 
STATE v. SUEING

Decision of the Court

9

knowledge of the defendant’s misconduct and potential for violence and 

where it had investigated other alternatives).

¶23 Given the short proximity in time between trials in the 2018 

and 2021 cases, the relationship of the two cases, and the continuity of 

presiding judges in the cases, the court’s efforts to allow Sueing to follow 

the trial in the 2018 case also satisfied its duties in the 2021 case. Nothing in 

Rule 9.2(b) requires the trial court to disregard a defendant’s prior 

misconduct simply because a new trial is at issue. 

¶24 The trial court also did not breach the other provisions of Rule 

9.2(b). Contrary to Sueing’s assertions, the record shows that Sueing was 

able to “consult with counsel at reasonable intervals,” Rule 9.2(b), during 

his absence from court in the 2018 case. On the fourth day of trial, defense 

counsel referred to having a 40-minute conversation with Sueing the day 

before and “talking continuously to [him].” Even if Sueing did not speak 

with his attorney during the State’s presentation of evidence in the 2021 

case, the court did not violate its obligation to enable such communication.

The phrase “at reasonable intervals” inherently entails some degree of 

discretion and consideration of the circumstances. Cf. Seven Springs Ranch, 

Inc. v. State ex rel. Ariz. Dep’t of Water Resources, 156 Ariz. 471, 474 (App. 

1987) (holding that a statute requiring an official to “give reasonable notice 

of [a] hearing appropriate to the circumstances” gave the official discretion 

to determine whether actual notice should be used in addition to notice by 

publication). Trial in the 2021 case was brief. The State called only two 

witnesses—the attorney whom Sueing attacked and an officer who 

observed the attack—with the latter examination being particularly short.

The record shows that Sueing spoke with his attorney after the State rested 

its case. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not violate Rule 9.2(b) 

by not enabling Sueing to speak with his attorney while the State presented 

its two witnesses. 

¶25 Nor did the trial court violate Rule 9.2(b) by failing to “inquire 

periodically if [Sueing] wishe[d] to reacquire the right to be present.” Like 

“reasonable intervals,” a “periodic inquiry” inherently entails an exercise

of discretion in consideration of the circumstances. Such inquiry was futile 

here. Jury selection and the presentation of evidence in the 2018 case lasted 

six days. Sueing refused transport on the first day. He was expelled for 

disruptive conduct on the second day. He asked for and was denied the 

opportunity to return on the fourth day, and he was present, and again 

expelled for disruptive conduct, on the sixth day. 
STATE v. SUEING

Decision of the Court

10

¶26 The court’s inquiry about Sueing’s potential return on day 

three or five of trial would have served no purpose given the timeline of 

events. Cf. United States v. Nunez, 877 F.2d 1475, 1478 (10th Cir. 1989) 

(holding that Allen did not require the trial court, after the defendant’s 

expulsion, to bring him back “at least once a day to ascertain whether he 

would promise to behave properly and if he did so promise, [allow him] to 

stay in the courtroom unless, and until, his next outbreak, ad infinitum”). 

Similarly, the court’s inquiring about Sueing’s return to trial in the 2021 case

would have had no purpose given the brevity of the proceedings in that 

matter. Further, Rule 9.2(b)’s “periodic inquiry” instruction may be 

interpreted as directory, not mandatory, given its contrasting use of “must” 

in the “must use every feasible means” provision. See Manhattan-Dickman 

Constr. Co. v. Shawler, 113 Ariz. 549, 555 (1976) (“‘Should’ can be used to 

indicate desirability or preference rather than an obligation or mandate.”).

¶27 The trial court also complied with Rule 9.2(c)’s requirement 

that it “allow the defendant to return to the proceeding” upon the 

defendant’s “personal[ ] assur[ance] . . . of future good behavior.” His 

argument suggests that the court should have made an effort “every day” 

at trial to reintegrate him. But the court did not err. After the court excluded 

Sueing from the courthouse during the 2018 trial, he made just one 

overture, through counsel, “promis[ing] no more disturbances.” The court 

determined that his avowal did not justify his return, and Sueing’s 

subsequent conduct while on the stand confirmed that he could not keep 

his promise to behave. Rule 9.2 does not specify whether every promise of 

future good behavior, no matter the circumstances, triggers a duty to allow 

the defendant’s return. Consistent with decisions affording the trial court 

discretion to evaluate the credibility of a defendant’s promise under Illinois 

v. Allen, Rule 9.2(c) gives the trial court discretion to determine whether a 

defendant’s assurance of future good behavior is credible. The record 

supports the court’s finding here that Sueing’s promise was unreliable. 

Therefore, the court did not violate Sueing’s constitutional right to be 

present.

II. The trial court did not violate Sueing’s right to represent himself.

¶28 The trial court did not violate Sueing’s right to represent 

himself. The right to represent oneself is constitutionally protected. State v. 

Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, 359 ¶ 16 (2009) (citing U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; 

Ariz. Const. art. II, § 24); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834–36

(1975). But like the right to be present, the right of self-representation is not 

absolute. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) (referring to various 

limitations on such right). Nor does it “exist in a vacuum.” State v. De Nistor, 
STATE v. SUEING

Decision of the Court

11

143 Ariz. 407, 412 (1985). By forfeiting his right to attend trial through his

disruptive conduct, Sueing effectively forfeited any right, or possibility, of 

self-representation. Cf. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (“[T]he trial judge may 

terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in 

serious and obstructionist misconduct.”); Delvecchio, 110 Ariz. at 402

(finding no error where the trial court allowed advisory counsel to take over 

the defense of a self-represented defendant when he was expelled from the 

courtroom for disruptive conduct).

¶29 Even if we disregard the impossibility of Sueing representing 

himself while being excluded from the courtroom, the trial court did not err 

in denying his requests for self-representation. Sueing surrendered the 

right to represent himself in the 2018 case after being warned that he would 

not be allowed to “flip-flop back.” He then declined to reclaim that right 

when the court offered it to him. Under the circumstances, the court did not 

abuse its discretion by denying Sueing’s further requests for 

self-representation in the 2018 case. See State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, 338 

¶ 62 (2008) (finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the 

defendant’s second request for self-representation after the defendant

relinquished such right upon being warned that he would not be allowed 

to reclaim it); Dunbar, 249 Ariz. at 46 ¶ 17 (holding that the defendant 

“forfeited his right to self-representation through his vacillating positions” 

after being warned that the court “was not going to allow him to continually 

change his mind”).

¶30 Sueing argues that he did not engage in misconduct when he 

represented himself before. But the record supports the trial court’s 

findings that allowing Sueing to represent himself in either case could 

endanger others and run the risk of him deliberately creating a mistrial. See 

De Nistor, 143 Ariz. at 412 (observing that a defendant’s right of 

self-representation must be balanced against the government’s right to an 

orderly, judicious trial); United States v. Mack, 362 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 

2004) (noting that “the defendant’s right to self-representation [does not] 

overcome[] the court’s right to maintain order in the courtroom and 

conduct proceedings in a manner consonant with our trial traditions”).

Sueing’s argument that the trial court should have allowed him to represent 

himself, rather than be represented by counsel during his exclusion from 

the court, is unconvincing because of his disruptive behavior. The court did 

not err.
STATE v. SUEING

Decision of the Court

12

CONCLUSION

¶31 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Sueing’s convictions and 

sentences in both cases.