alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### WORKS v. PHOENIX AUTO FINANCE CO. et al.

No. 15036.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Fort Worth.

April 22, 1949.

Virgil R. Sanders, Jr., Joe M. Hill and C. A. Mattay, all of Dallas, for appellant.

Alto B. Cervin and K G. Moseley, both of Dallas, for appellee.

*841HALL, Justice.

On March IS, 1947, the Phoenix Auto Finance Company of Dallas, Texas, sued, in a district court of Dallas County, Texas, G. S. Dorsey for debt and foreclosure of a chattel mortgage lien on an automobile, and B. F. Works as a mechanic who had the car in possession and-who was at that time proceeding to enforce his constitutional mechanic’s lien.

Trial was to the court. ' G. S. Dorsey filed a disclaimer of any right, title of interest he may have had in the automobile; in the meantime same was sold under receivership for the sum of $750. The court rendered judgment in favor of Phoenix Auto Finance Company, hereafter styled appellee, and against Dorsey for the sum of $979.80, balance due on note and mortgage; distributed the proceeds of sale as follows: first, court costs; second, receiver’s fee of $50; balance payable to appellee, and granted appellee a deficiency judgment for the difference.

To such action of the court appellant B. F. Works gave notice of appeal and perfected same by presenting seventeen points of error.

Appellant’s fifteenth point is as follows: “The error of the court in failing to render judgment in favor of B. F. Works oh his cross-action for the amount of his debt as prayed for against G. S. Dorsey; that the judgment does not dispose of defendant Works’ cross-action and is, therefore, not a final judgment.”

Appellant' filed a cross-action against Dorsey, asking for judgment for his repair bill and certain storage charges, introduced evidence in support thereof, and the trial court found that the amount of such bill and storage charge was $434.70. The judgment entered, however, contains no language which expressly or by implication disposes of appellant’s cross-action against Dorsey.

Under the circumstances we are compelled to hold that the judgment lacks finality, that it is not appealable, and -that this court has no jurisdiction to do other than dismiss the appeal. The following decisions are directly in point: Owen v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 237 S.W. 955; Kosse Nat. Bank v. Derden, Tex.Civ.App., 36 S.W.2d 295; Davis v. McCray Refrigerator Sales Corp., 136 Tex. 296, 150 S.W.2d 377; Holifield v. Cosden Petroleum Corp., Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 500.

Appeal dismissed.
#### Ex parte JOHNSON.

No. 26331.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 4, 1953.

On Motion to Reinstate Appeal April 15, 1953.

Schlesinger, Goodstein & Semaan, San Antonio, for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Commissioner.

This is an extradition case wherein relator seeks, by writ of habeas corpus, his discharge from arrest and custody under the executive warrant of the Governor of this State, issued upon the requisition of the Governor, of the Commonwealth of, Virginia, where relator stands charged by affidavit with the crime of murder.

Construing the order of the Judge of the Criminal District Court of Bexar County, Texas, of date: January 9, 1953, as a final judgment denying the relief prayed 'for and remanding relator to the custody of the arresting officer, we find no notice of appeal therefrom to this court, as required by law.

The appeal is therefore dismissed because of the absence of a notice of appeal.

Approved by the Court.

On Motion to Reinstate Appeal

BELCHER, Commissioner.

The record having been perfected so as to show that notice of appeal was given in the trial court at the required time, appellant’s motion to reinstate his appeal is. granted, and the appeal is reinstated.

This is an extradition case. The Governor of this State issued his executive warrant based upon the requisition and supporting papers of the Governor of the State of Virginia, authorizing the arrest, delivery, and return of appellant to the State of Virginia, to answer a charge of murder.

By writ of habeas corpus filed in the Criminal District Court of Bexar County, Texas, the appellant sought his discharge. After a hearing, appellant was remanded to the custody of the sheriff of Bexar County, Texas, to be returned .to the State of Virginia,, and from said order gave notice of appeal.

The requisition and all accompanying' papers were introduced in evidence upon the-hearing.

The executive warrant of the Governor of this State and the requisition and accompanying papers made out a prima facie case that the accused is a fugitive from justice and is subject to extradition.

Appellant and his witnesses testified that he was in the State of Texas at the time the offense was alleged to have been committed and, therefore, could not have been in the State of Virginia on said date.

*571Among the papers accompanying the requisition of the Governor of the State of Virginia is an affidavit stating that appellant was in said state at the time the offense was committed and. that he committed the •offense.

The trial court, in remanding appellant ■for extradition, resolved the issue of his presence in the demanding state at the time ■of the alleged ■ commission of the offense •against him.

Under the executive warrant of the Gov•ernor of this State, the requisition and accompanying papers, and the evidence, the trial court was authorized to conclude as "he did, and remand the appellant for extradition. Delgado v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 252 S.W.2d 935.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 00-50285

Summary Calendar

 

REMIGIO A. MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

NANCY HEES; TX. BOARD OF PARDONS;

S.O. WOODS, JR.; KATHY CLEERE;

STEPHEN L. ROGERS, Warden; VERONICA

BALLARD,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. A-98-CV-696-SS

- - - - - - - - - -

December 1, 2000

Before GARWOOD, HIGGINBOTHAM and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Remigio A. Martinez, Texas prisoner # 799604, appeals the

district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for

failure to state a claim. In his complaint, Martinez challenged

the issuance of a pre-revocation warrant of arrest for his

alleged violation of the terms of his mandatory supervision

stemming from his conviction for carrying a weapon on school

property. He admits that while he was serving his term of
No. 00-50285 

-2-

mandatory supervision, he committed robbery and theft. He

pleaded guilty to the theft charge prior to the expiration of his

term of mandatory supervision and was sentenced to nine months of

incarceration. Subsequent to the expiration of his term of

mandatory supervision, but while he remained incarcerated on the

theft charge, he was bench warranted to Bexar County to stand

trial on the robbery charge. The day after this bench warrant

was issued, the pre-revocation warrant he challenges was issued. 

The pre-revocation warrant was withdrawn after Martinez was

sentenced on the robbery charge, and his mandatory supervision

was not revoked. On appeal, Martinez argues that the issuance of

the pre-revocation warrant violated his rights under the Due

Process and Double Jeopardy Clauses. 

Because Martinez was incarcerated for the theft charge and

as a result of the bench warrant issued in the robbery case, he

has not established that he was punished or that his liberty was

infringed as a result of the allegedly mistaken issuance of the

pre-revocation warrant after his discharge date for the

underlying conviction passed. Therefore, he has not shown the

denial of a constitutional right, see Doe v. Rains County Ind.

Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1402, 1406 (5th Cir. 1995), and the judgment

of the district court is AFFIRMED.
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 16** 
**- 209**  **9**

CRYSTAL WEAVER BROWN,

Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ,
Defendant

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Orangeburg

. Kaymani Daniels West , Magistrate Judge. ( 5:15

- cv
- 0032 1

- KDW )

Submitted : January 31 , 2017 Decided: February 2, 2017

Before WILKINSON , KEENAN , and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Crystal Weaver Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Barbara Murcier Bowens, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding pre cedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Crystal Weaver Brown appeals the magistrate judge’s order
upholding the Commissioner’s denial of Brown’s applications for
disability benefits and supplemental security income. * We have

reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly,
we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Brown

v. Colvin , No. 5:15

- cv
- 0032 1

- KDW (D.S.C. Aug. 22, 2016) . We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

* The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2012).
`[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 222 Engrossed in House (EH)]

103d CONGRESS

  2d Session

                            H. CON. RES. 222

_______________________________________________________________________

Authorizing the placement of a bust of Raoul Wallenberg in the Capitol.






103d CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. CON. RES. 222

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That the Joint Committee on the Library is authorized to accept a bust 
of Raoul Wallenberg and to place the bust in an appropriate location in 
the Capitol, as determined by the Joint Committee on the Library.

            Passed the House of Representatives April 18, 1994.

            Attest:






                                                                 Clerk.`
MOTION for Release of Work Emails

Further Attempt to Request Email History 

with Defendant

Willie Lee HavMmeri, Plaintiff

vs.

Methodist Health Systems, Defendant

Case No. 3:22-cv-00594-E-BT

U.S. District Court Northern District of Texas (Dallas)

Assigned Judge: Ada Brown

Magistrate Judge: Rebecca Rutherford

Defendant’s Legal Team: Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC 

(Employment Law Firm – Dallas, Texas) 

Cause: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination) 

Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Employment 

Date Filed: 03/14/2022

Today’s Date: June 30, 2023

Greetings Judge Ada Brown

Greetings to the Court. I would like to make a further request for my complete email history 

with the Defendant (Methodist). This would be my 2nd attempt before the court to secure 

these documents. This is my 4th request to the Defendant. 

1.From the time of my impromptu Termination on April 10th 2020, I have made several 

attempts (while representing myself) to secure the emails from my previous employer to which 

I can show a long history of informing the company of several instances of having to endure 

workplace violence and my frustrations with Gender Discrimination, as I allege in my Case 

before the court regarding WRONGFUL TERMINATION, DUE TO RETALIATION AND GENDER 

DISCRIMINATION. 

2. These emails are critical to my case regarding RETALIATION, GENDER BIAS with regards to 

consequences and ultimately WRONGFUL termination for manipulation of financial documents. 

3. Please do not dismiss my case before justice is served. 

Case 3:22-cv-00594-E-BT Document 78 Filed 06/30/23 Page 1 of 2 PageID 329
4. The Defendant has yet to prove my termination as justified nor have they offered any 

evidence that it was lawfully executed. 

5. The Defendant has willfully and intentionally withheld pertinent information (emails with my 

immediate supervisor in the chain of command) that completely exonerate me of wrong doing, 

as alleged. 

6. Please grant me the request of securing my emails to further provide the proof necessary 

regarding my claims. 

7. Please allow my case to move forward towards discovery/disclosure.

8. The Defendant has provided the Court with no evidence that I manipulated any financial 

documents over the course of the past year of docket submissions before the Court. 

I look forward to hearing from you and pray that justice prevails. 

Thank you for your patience with me in regards to my limited legal knowledge and experience with 

addressing the Court. 

Respectfully submitted, 

By: _____/s/ Willie HavMmeri_________ 

Willie Lee HavMmeri, self-represented “Pro se” 

godcolored@gmail.com

(214) 600-6207

Case 3:22-cv-00594-E-BT Document 78 Filed 06/30/23 Page 2 of 2 PageID 330
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.1

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Charles E. Moran, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of SkillSoft Public
Limited Company;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) [Not applicable]

c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: December 10, 2004

                                        /s/ Charles E. Moran
                                        -------------------------------------
                                        Charles E. Moran
                                        President and Chief Executive Officer
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

JAMES K. REED, §

PLAINTIFF, §

 §

V. § CASE NO. 3:22-CV-722-N-BK

 §

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, §

Acting Commissioner of the SSA, §

DEFENDANT. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pursuant to Special Order 3-346, Plaintiff’s Motion for Fees Under the Equal 

Access to Justice Act, Doc. 20, is now before the Court for the issuance of findings and a 

recommended disposition. For the reasons below, the motion should be GRANTED.

Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), a court must award attorney’s 

fees and expenses if: (1) the claimant is a “prevailing party,” (2) the position of the 

United States was not “substantially justified,” and (3) there are no special circumstances 

that make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); Sims v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 597, 599-

600 (5th Cir. 2001). The award of attorney’s fees must be reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 

2412(b).

Plaintiff seeks $5,879.50 in attorney’s fees. Doc. 20 at 1. Having considered 

Plaintiff’s motion, Defendant’s no-opposition response, Doc. 21, and the applicable law, 

the Court finds the request reasonable. Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion for Fees Under the Equal 

Access to Justice Act, Doc. 20, should be GRANTED in the amount of $5,879.50. 

Case 3:22-cv-00722-N-BK Document 22 Filed 03/07/23 Page 1 of 2 PageID 952
2

EAJA awards are payable directly to the prevailing party, not the attorney. Astrue 

v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 592-93 (2010). Accordingly, the award of attorney’s fees should 

be made payable directly to Plaintiff but sent in care of her attorney. Jackson v. Astrue, 

705 F.3d 527, 531 n.11 (5th Cir. 2013).

SO RECOMMENDED on March 7, 2023.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner 

provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation 

must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or 

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and 

indicate where in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation the disputed 

determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to 

the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written 

objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, 

except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 

1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).

Case 3:22-cv-00722-N-BK Document 22 Filed 03/07/23 Page 2 of 2 PageID 953
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-06-035-CR

CURTIS LESLIE HARRIS	APPELLANT

	V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS	STATE

	------------

	FROM THE 367TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

	------------

	Appellant Curtis Leslie Harris appeals his conviction for intoxication assault.  After Harris filed his notice of appeal, he filed a timely motion for new trial, which the trial court timely granted.  See Tex. R. App. P. 21.8(a).  The granting of a motion for new trial restores the case to its position before the former trial.  Tex. R. App. P. 21.9.  Therefore, the appeal has become moot, and on our own motion we dismiss the appeal as moot.  Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).

	Harris shall pay all costs of this appeal, for which let execution issue.

								PER CURIAM

PANEL D:	WALKER, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and MCCOY, J.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: May 11, 2006
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                                9

<MULTIPLIER>                                         1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                               5,093
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               4,964
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                    10,012
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                         0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                          6,551
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                              91,052
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                88,520
<LOANS>                                            203,886
<ALLOWANCE>                                            725
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     331,642
<DEPOSITS>                                         274,626
<SHORT-TERM>                                           471
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                                  8,041
<LONG-TERM>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                             5,196
<OTHER-SE>                                          43,308
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                     331,642
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                     14,337
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                    6,505
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                         0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                    20,842
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                                  12,965
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  13,009
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                                7,833
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                           39
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                       0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                      2,841
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      5,353
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                           3,464
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                         3,464
<EPS-BASIC>                                          .69
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          .69
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                         2.6
<LOANS-NON>                                          2,800
<LOANS-PAST>                                             0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                         0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                          0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                       723
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                           37
<RECOVERIES>                                             0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                      725
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                     0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                                725



</TABLE>