NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 23a0114n.06

No. 22-3233

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

DOCTOR LORA FREIER-HECKLER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DENIS RICHARD MCDONOUGH, 

Secretary, Department of Veteran Affairs; 

VA MEDICAL CENTER OF 

CLEVELAND,

Defendants-Appellees.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO

OPINION

Before: MOORE, STRANCH, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Dr. Lora Freier-Heckler, a Veterans Administration 

employee, brings this Title VII hostile work environment and retaliation case against her employer. 

Because the Plaintiff cannot establish either a hostile work environment or retaliation claim, we 

AFFIRM the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to Defendants.

I. BACKGROUND

Dr. Freier-Heckler began working at the VA’s Cleveland Medical Center in 1990. She was 

promoted in 2014 to Assistant Chief of the Logistics Service, where she reported to Philip 

Rutledge, the Chief of the Logistics Service. Dr. Freier-Heckler testified that Rutledge conducted 

the interviews for the Assistant Chief position and was not only on a panel that hired her, but was 

the ultimate decision-maker who selected her. In August 2015, she assumed the position of

Assistant Chief of Logistics and began reporting to Rutledge. The parties agree that over the 
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course of her 5-year tenure in that position, Dr. Freier-Heckler met with VA personnel over 180 

times to discuss her complaints about Rutledge, and that she filed 87 complaints with the VA 

Director and Deputy Director and several complaints with the Human Resources Department.

In June 2020, Dr. Freier-Heckler filed the operative complaint against the VA Medical 

Center of Cleveland and the Secretary of the Department of Veteran Affairs. The complaint alleges

that Rutledge discriminated against Dr. Freier-Heckler based on her gender and created a hostile 

work environment, that the VA failed to take any action to address Rutledge’s discrimination, and 

that the VA retaliated against her when she complained about this discrimination. The district 

court granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims. Dr. Freier-Heckler 

appeals the grant of summary judgment only as to her hostile work environment and retaliation 

claims. She points to the following series of incidents as the basis for her Title VII claims. We 

construe these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

First, Dr. Freier-Heckler points to a draft organizational chart that Rutledge created but 

never implemented that would have removed the Assistant Chief position from the managerial 

structure. She relies on evidence that Rutledge moved her office to a management suite located 

30 feet from where her subordinates sat. She also notes that on January 3, 2017, Rutledge removed

her access to his daily calendar while allowing male employees to retain access, and on January 5, 

Rutledge told her to stop talking and dismissed her from a meeting, but allowed male subordinates 

and other employees to stay. Dr. Freier-Heckler argues that Rutledge restricted her calendar access 

and dismissed her from the meeting in retaliation for complaints that employee Kenneth Smith 

made to VA officials about Rutledge’s treatment of her. 
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Dr. Freier-Heckler argues that the VA’s EEO process concluded and the VA’s Deputy 

Director, Andy Pacyna, acknowledged, that Rutledge created a “borderline hostile work 

environment.” She points to an email that she sent herself in which she wrote “Dir stated that is 

[sic] was border line Hostile,” alleging that the email memorializes a meeting with VA 

management. She also points to Rutledge’s statement that he was familiar with the phrase 

“borderline hostile work environment.” 

Dr. Freier-Heckler testified to one occasion on which Rutledge asked her to watch his tenyear-old son for the afternoon. She additionally charges that Rutledge intentionally 

mispronounced her name and refused to call her “Doctor” after she received her Doctorate in 

Health Administration, although he used that title for at least two male supervisors who had 

doctorates. She claims that in April 2017, Pacyna told Rutledge to apologize for not calling her 

“Doctor,” and that he refused to do so. Rutledge acknowledged that he may have been told to 

apologize for a comment related to this issue and that he did not. And finally, in an incident that 

Dr. Freier-Heckler did not reference in discovery or other proceedings in this case, in her 

opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, she alleges that Rutledge humiliated her 

by shooting a rubber band at her in front of her co-workers, striking her “on the left part of [her] 

posterior.” 

Relevant to Dr. Freier-Heckler’s retaliation claim, record evidence shows that the VA 

asked her to lead multiple audits while she served as Assistant Chief. First, in 2016, she was 

assigned to audit VA employee Bill Precht, who reported to Rutledge, and uncovered that Precht

made over $7,000,000 in unlawful purchases. Later in 2017, Dr. Freier-Heckler was asked to lead 

a second audit, this time of the Logistics Services’ Transportation Section, during which she 
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discovered serious anomalies attributable to Chavtz Seals, who also reported to Rutledge. Seals 

was removed for cause from his position and demoted multiple levels as a result. 

The record also reflects that in 2018, the VA convened an Administrative Investigative 

Board (“AIB”) to investigate allegations that Dr. Freier-Heckler created a “hostile work 

environment by engaging in bullying, threatening, and other unprofessional behaviors.” The AIB 

was comprised of three individuals that Dr. Freier-Heckler did not know, and it considered over 

50 exhibits, including testimony from 21 different employees. The final AIB report recommended 

that Dr. Freier-Heckler no longer hold a managerial position, concluding that she engaged in 

workplace bullying and did not exhibit the qualities a supervisory position required. The AIB 

reported that “[a]lmost every witness” testified that Dr. Freier-Heckler made frequent negative 

comments to subordinates about other management officials. It also credited testimony that Dr. 

Freier-Heckler yelled at employee Chavtz Seals and used profanities during a meeting; reports 

from additional witnesses that Dr. Freier-Heckler yelled at Seals on a separate occasion; and 

another employee’s allegation, corroborated by witnesses, that Dr. Freier-Heckler yelled at the 

employee and used profanities. 

The VA demoted Dr. Freier-Heckler to a non-supervisory position in 2019. Six months 

later, she applied and was hired for another non-supervisory position at the same GS salary level 

as her former Assistant Chief role. The record establishes that Dr. Freier-Heckler’s demotion 

resulted in lost wages of less than $1,000. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Gillis v. Miller, 845 

F.3d 677, 683 (6th Cir. 2017). A movant is entitled to summary judgment “if the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
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matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court should grant summary judgment when the 

evidence raises no genuine issues of material fact “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving 

party bears the burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 

Once the moving party establishes that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the burden 

shifts to the nonmoving party to produce “specific facts” showing a “genuine issue” for trial. Id. 

at 324. 

III. ANALYSIS

1. Hostile Work Environment 

Title VII prohibits an employer from maintaining a hostile work environment due to sexual 

harassment. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). A successful hostile work 

environment claim under Title VII requires a plaintiff to establish that (1) “she is a member of a 

protected class,” (2) she was subjected to harassment based on sex, (3) “the harassment had the 

effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance and creating an objectively 

intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment;” and (4) there is “some basis for liability on 

the part of the employer.” Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655, 678 (6th Cir. 2008). The VA does not 

dispute that the first and fourth prongs of the test are met. The remaining questions from the 

second and third prongs are whether Dr. Freier-Heckler was subjected to harassment based on sex, 

and whether the harassment unreasonably interfered with her work and created an objectively 

hostile work environment. 

To establish that harassment created a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show that 

“the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is 
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‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an 

abusive working environment.’” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. 

Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986)). Because the discriminatory intimidation alleged must be 

severe and pervasive, “isolated incidents” of discrimination “will not amount to discriminatory 

changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment’” unless they are “extremely serious.” 

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). 

Acknowledging that this is not “a mathematically precise test,” the Supreme Court has 

provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider, including: “the frequency of the 

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere 

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work 

performance.” Harris, 510 U.S at 23. Abusive behavior needs to be objectively hostile to be 

actionable, and a court must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether 

an environment is hostile. Id. at 21; Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 

(2002). Under the totality of the circumstances test, “the issue is not whether each incident of 

harassment standing alone is sufficient to sustain the cause of action in a hostile environment case, 

but whether—taken together—the reported incidents make out such a case.” Johnson v. Ford 

Motor Co., 13 F.4th 493, 505 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 

553, 562 (6th Cir. 1999)); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998) 

(“The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding 

circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation 

of the words used or the physical acts performed.”).
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In sum, on appeal, Dr. Freier-Heckler claims that: 

• Rutledge moved her office to a management suite; 

• Rutledge had an employee create, but did not implement, a separate 

organizational chart in which her position did not have direct reports; 

• Rutledge removed her from access to his daily calendar but allowed male 

employees to retain access; 

• Rutledge once dismissed her from a meeting but allowed male employees to 

stay; 

• Dr. Freier-Heckler was assigned by the VA to audit employee Bill Precht;

• The VA’s EEO process concluded that Rutledge’s actions were “borderline 

hostile environment”; 

• Rutledge once asked her to babysit his son; 

• Rutledge mispronounced her name and neglected to call her “Doctor” after she 

received her doctorate, although he used the title for male supervisors who had 

doctorates;

• The VA’s Deputy Director instructed Rutledge to apologize and that he refused 

to do so; and

• Rutledge once shot a rubber-band at her, hitting her in the posterior.

“Any unequal treatment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee’s 

gender” may be considered in the hostile environment analysis. Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 

220 F.3d 456, 463 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Williams, 187 F.3d at 565). But Title VII is directed 

only at gender discrimination and “does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the 

workplace.” Id. (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80). Facially neutral incidents may be considered 

in the hostile work environment analysis “when there is ‘some circumstantial or other basis for 

inferring that incidents sex-neutral on their face were in fact discriminatory.’” Waldo v. 

Consumers Energy Co., 726 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 

365, 378 (2d Cir. 2002)). Therefore, we require some basis to infer that the incidents that 
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Dr. Freier-Heckler points to were based on her gender to include them in the gender-based hostile 

work environment analysis. See Bowman, 220 F.3d at 464.

Dr. Freier-Heckler first argues that the proposed organizational chart constituted an effort 

to “isolate her out of the chain of command.” She does not dispute, however, that it was never 

implemented and points to no evidence that it was motivated by her gender or had any impact on 

her responsibilities or ability to do her work. Nor does she point to evidence that Rutledge moved 

her office because of her gender. Rutledge testified—and Dr. Freier-Heckler does not contest—

that after the department expanded, he moved Dr. Freier-Heckler to the office next to his own, in 

a management suite. And the record does not show that she was denied access to her subordinates, 

as her location in the management suite was only 30 feet away from her reports. 

Dr. Freier-Heckler also points to no evidence indicating that the removal of her access to 

Rutledge’s daily calendar was based on her gender. There was no requirement that access be

shared, other supervisors did not have access, and the only male employees who retained access 

were administrative employees responsible for making calendar appointments. She similarly 

points to no evidence establishing that Rutledge asked her to stop talking and leave the January 5, 

2017, meeting based on her gender. Though Dr. Freier-Heckler argues that Rutledge intentionally 

mispronounced her name, she does not contest that Rutledge grew up in Germany and used the 

German pronunciation, and does not point to any evidence that might show that he mispronounced 

her name because of her gender. 

Regarding her claim that the VA’s EEO process concluded that Rutledge’s behavior 

created a “borderline hostile environment,” Dr. Freier-Heckler points to no evidence indicating

that the VA made a formal or memorialized finding that his conduct constituted a hostile work 

environment. Besides her own email, she points only to Rutledge’s statement that he was familiar 
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with the phrase “borderline hostile work environment.” And though his testimony related to factfinding concerning allegations by Dr. Freier-Heckler, it was made during an investigation that did 

not involve the EEO investigator here. Instead, the record shows that an independent investigation 

of Dr. Freier-Heckler’s complaint concluded that it did not constitute a hostile work environment. 

And to the extent Dr. Freier-Heckler argues Pacyna admitted that Rutledge engaged in 

“‘borderline’ hostile work environment behavior,” that argument is precluded by her allegation in 

the complaint that “Assistant Director Pacyna . . . concluded that Rutledge’s actions were, in his 

view, not found by him to be borderline hostile.” 

Finally, in support of her hostile work environment claim, Dr. Freier-Heckler seems to 

imply that Rutledge was retaliating against her for auditing his colleague Bill Precht and 

discovering improper purchases he made. But she does not attempt to connect this with her gender 

in any way. Dr. Freier-Heckler’s audit activities, moreover, were supported by VA management, 

and she continued to be assigned to lead or perform important audit work. 

In contrast, Dr. Freier-Heckler describes three incidents that are more plausibly based on 

her gender: that Rutledge once asked her to babysit, that he failed to use her proper title, and that 

he once hit her posterior with a rubber band. Rutledge admits that he asked Dr. Freier-Heckler to 

babysit on one occasion but maintains that he did so because he considered her a friend, although 

she argues that the two were not friendly. This could give rise to a reasonable inference that 

Rutledge’s request was based on gendered stereotypes of women as caregivers, and that he would 

not have made the request if she were a man. But Dr. Freier-Heckler does not allege that the 

request impacted her ability to do her job, that she was afraid to refuse the request, or that Rutledge 

made any explicit or implicit threats if she did not agree. 
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The single incident with the rubber band was clearly inappropriate and unwanted contact 

with a sensitive area, which a reasonable factfinder could find constituted sexual harassment. 

There is, however, an evidentiary problem with this incident. Dr. Freier-Heckler described this 

incident for the first time in affidavits from herself and a coworker witness that were attached to 

her opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. She did not include the rubber band 

incident in her complaint, and she never mentioned it in her deposition testimony, despite being 

repeatedly asked to describe every incident supporting her hostile work environment claim. 

Because “a party should not be able to create a disputed issue of material fact where earlier 

testimony on that issue by the same party indicates that no such dispute exists,” the court could 

disregard this incident. Aerel, S.R.L. v. PCC Airfoils, LLC, 448 F.3d 899, 907 (6th Cir. 2006). 

And because the babysitting request occurred only once in the relevant five-year span, it may be 

considered an infrequent “isolated incident” that did not rise to the level of an actionable hostile 

work environment. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. 

Finally, Rutledge’s failure to call Dr. Freier-Heckler “Doctor” after she obtained her 

doctorate, despite using that title for male supervisors with doctorates, could reasonably be found 

to be conduct that was based on her gender and rooted in stereotypes of women as less-competent 

professionals. Rutledge’s admission that Pacyna may have asked him to apologize for a comment 

related to Dr. Freier-Heckler’s title also lends some support to the argument that his failure to use 

her title was inappropriate. Although Rutledge failed to call Dr. Freier-Heckler “Doctor,” this 

conduct is likewise insufficiently severe, even in combination with the other incidents, to amount 

to conduct that alters the terms or conditions of her employment. 

Dr. Freier-Heckler also argues that the district court improperly disaggregated her claims 

and did not consider all her allegations together. She is correct that a court must consider all the 
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circumstances when determining whether an actionable hostile work environment claim exists and 

may not “rob[] [a plaintiff’s claims] of their cumulative effect” by disaggregating them. Williams, 

187 F.3d at 561; see Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. But the opinion below shows that the district court 

considered the combined effect of each incident alleged. For instance, the court framed its analysis 

by acknowledging that a plaintiff may prove a hostile work environment claim “[w]hen individual 

acts do not independently rise to the level of an actionable ‘adverse action,’ but combine together 

to create harassment and intimidation.” The court then described the incidents individually, found 

that Dr. Freier-Heckler failed to show that any alleged incident was motivated by her gender, and 

concluded that the “actions, comments, and situations that she found subjectively offensive and 

demoralizing” were insufficient to create a gender-based hostile work environment. This satisfies 

the totality of the circumstances inquiry that Title VII requires. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116.

Considering the totality of the record, the conduct here does not rise to the level that our 

circuit has treated as sufficiently severe and pervasive that it creates a hostile work environment. 

See Williams, 187 F.3d at 563-64 (hostile work environment claim survived summary judgment 

where plaintiff’s supervisor targeted her with humiliating sexual innuendo and her co-workers 

repeatedly used gendered insults and sabotaged her work); Wyatt v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 999 F.3d 

400, 411 (6th Cir. 2021) (hostile work environment claim survived summary judgment where a 

plaintiff’s supervisor subjected her to persistent unwanted touching and a sexual proposition); 

Waldo, 726 F.3d at 815 (district court did not abuse discretion in finding hostile work environment 

existed where plaintiff’s coworkers used gender-specific demeaning language, denied her access 

to a bathroom, and kept sexually explicit magazines in work trucks). On the record submitted, Dr. 

Freier-Heckler has failed to establish that she was subject to conduct that was “sufficiently severe 
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or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working 

environment.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 67).

2. Retaliation Claim

Dr. Freier-Heckler also argues that the VA retaliated against her for her gender 

discrimination complaints. Title VII prohibits retaliation against employees for engaging in 

conduct protected by Title VII. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 729 (6th Cir. 2014). 

Because Dr. Freier-Heckler does not point to direct evidence of retaliation, the burden-shifting 

framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green applies. 

Laster, 746 F.3d at 730. Under the first stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff 

must establish a prima facie case. Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2009). If 

the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to 

produce a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse actions alleged. Laster, 746 F.3d 

at 730. If the employer produces such a reason, the burden returns to the plaintiff to show by a 

preponderance of evidence that the stated reason is “designed to mask retaliation.” Imwalle v. 

Reliance Med. Prods. Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 544 (6th Cir. 2008). 

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) the plaintiff engaged 

in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the plaintiff’s exercise of such protected activity was known 

by the defendant; (3) afterwards, the defendant took an action that was “materially adverse” to the 

plaintiff; and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the materially 

adverse action. Laster, 746 F.3d at 730. “Title VII retaliation claims ‘must be proved according 

to traditional principles of but-for causation,’ which ‘requires proof that the unlawful retaliation 

would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.’” 

Id. at 731 (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013)).
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First, Dr. Freier-Heckler appears to argue that after Smith reported that Rutledge’s conduct 

towards her was biased, Rutledge retaliated against her by removing her access to his daily 

calendar on January 3, 2017, and then by asking her to leave a meeting on January 5. But 

Dr. Freier-Heckler never pointed to Smith’s deposition testimony regarding his complaints to 

management until this appeal. Because she did not raise this evidence before the district court, we 

need not consider it now. Cf. Inland Bulk Transfer Co. v. Cummins Engine Co., 332 F.3d 1007, 

1012 (6th Cir. 2003).

Second, Dr. Freier-Heckler argues that the VA demoted her in retaliation for her reports of 

gender discrimination. As to this claim, Dr. Freier-Heckler meets the first three prongs of the 

prima facie analysis: She made numerous EEOC complaints and HR reports of gender 

discrimination to the VA, which is clearly protected conduct of which the VA was aware, and she 

was later demoted, a straightforwardly adverse action. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 

White, 548 U.S. 53, 54 (2006) (a “materially adverse” action in the retaliation context is any action 

that “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 

discrimination.” (quotations omitted)). Whether Dr. Freier-Heckler meets the “causal connection” 

prong of the prima facie case is less clear. Although she points to the timing of her demotion and

argues that the results of the second audit that she performed prompted the VA to demote her, she 

points to no evidence linking the demotion to her gender discrimination complaints, let alone 

establishing that those complaints were the “but-for” cause of her demotion. Laster, 746 F.3d at 

731. 

Even if we assume that these claims establish a prima facie retaliation case, Dr. FreierHeckler fails to show that the Defendants’ proffered explanation is pretextual. The Defendants 

assert that the VA demoted Dr. Freier-Heckler because the AIB’s extensive investigation and 
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report found that she should be removed from a management role, a conclusion that the panel 

supported with findings that Dr. Freier-Heckler had acted inappropriately towards employees 

reporting to her by yelling at them, using profanities, and complaining to them about cosupervisors. This is a “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” that satisfies the VA’s burden under 

McDonnell Douglas. The burden therefore shifts back to Dr. Freier-Heckler to show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that this reason is pretextual. To demonstrate pretext, a plaintiff 

must “produce evidence sufficient that a reasonable finder of fact could reject the employer’s 

proffered reason.” Rogers v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 897 F.3d 763, 777 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting 

Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 496 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007)). A plaintiff may 

establish pretext by showing that the defendant’s stated reasons have no basis in fact, are not the 

actual reasons, or are insufficient to explain the defendant’s actions. Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 

F.3d 476, 491 (6th Cir. 2013). 

Dr. Freier-Heckler first argues that the Defendants’ stated reason is insufficient to explain 

the demotion because the AIB recommended only that she receive counseling before managing 

employees, not that she be demoted. But this claim is contradicted by the record. The AIB also 

recommended that Dr. Freier-Heckler no longer hold a managerial position and “strongly 

caution[ed]” the VA against allowing her to continue performing supervisory duties. 

Dr. Freier-Heckler also points to evidence that VA executives trusted her to head another 

sensitive audit after her demotion, which she argues shows a continued confidence in her abilities 

that was inconsistent with the demotion. But her assignment to an additional audit is not 

inconsistent with the VA’s stated reasons for the demotion. Defendants assert only that they 

removed Dr. Freier-Heckler from a supervisory position because the AIB determined that she was 

unfit to supervise employees—they do not contest that she competently performed other aspects 
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of her job, particularly audits. Defendants’ assertion that the VA demoted Dr. Freier-Heckler only 

due to her failures as a manager is supported by her later promotion to a nonsupervisory position 

at the same salary level as the Assistant Logistics Chief position. Accordingly, even if Dr. FreierHeckler set forth a prima facie case of retaliation, she failed to show that Defendants’ stated reason 

for demoting her was pretextual. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision.