J-S44032-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LINDA R. NOLAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1002 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 23, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-28-CR-0000017-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 2, 2023

Linda R. Nolan (Nolan) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County (trial court) following her 

jury conviction of four counts of endangering the welfare of a child (EWOC).

1

 

Nolan challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction and 

claims a new trial is necessary because of prejudicial comments made by a

prospective juror during voir dire. We affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1), (b)(2) (child under 6 years of age). The jury found 

Nolan not guilty of two counts of EWOC concerning other children.
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I.

This case arises from Nolan’s conduct during her tenure as owner of 

Miracle Bush Daycare Center (the Daycare) and her treatment of four children

under the age of six years old who attended the daycare program — W.M., 

C.H., A.R. and J.M.2 The evidence showed that Nolan verbally berated these 

children, used age-inappropriate “bucket seats” and highchairs as restraining 

and disciplinary tools for inordinate periods of time, and labeled some of them 

autistic although they were too young for a formal diagnosis. On October 19, 

2018, after an incident involving Nolan and W.M., four employees quit their 

positions at the Daycare and contacted authorities out of concern for the 

welfare of the children. EWOC charges were brought based on Nolan’s conduct 

involving each of the four children.

A.

The trial court conducted jury selection in November 2021 during which 

venireperson #131 made the follow remarks indicating that she could not 

remain impartial:

[Juror #131]: Through my business I have heard stories. From 

another daycare center they have heard stories. I pretty much 

already figured that they are guilty from the stories that I have 

heard.

[The Court]: All right. Well I’m going to ask you to not—

____________________________________________

2 Nolan’s husband, Michael Nolan, worked at the Daycare as a cook and was 

her co-defendant at trial. Mr. Nolan was found not guilty of one count of 

EWOC.
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[Juror #131]: I mean, I have heard—

[The Court]: Hold on. Could you stop, please?

[Juror #131]: Yeah.

[The Court]: All right. I want you to respect the fact that these 

two individuals are going to come before the Court for trial where 

the Commonwealth has the burden of proving their guilt and so I 

respect the fact you believe that you can’t be fair, but what I would 

ask you to do is to keep your stories to yourself so that all the rest 

of these folks have an opportunity to decide the case based on the 

evidence presented at trial.

[Juror #131]: I have heard a lot of stories and I can’t be impartial.

[The Court]: All right. Thank you.

(N.T. Jury Selection, 11/22/21, at 13-14). Defense counsel requested a 

sidebar, where the following discussion took place:

[Defense Counsel:] My concern is this Juror 131 that keeps 

opining about—she mentioned that she believes my clients are 

guilty in front of the panel and then she won’t be quiet despite the 

Court’s admonitions for her to be quiet. I’m concerned one, that 

she may have already tainted the jury pool, but secondly, I’m 

concerned that her remaining, even if we proceed, that she will 

not shut up.

[The Court]: Okay. So I agree with you, I need to get rid of her, 

because despite my efforts to try to explain why it was important 

that she not continue to talk, she doesn’t seem to get it and wants

to tell everyone all about it. I agree. I’m going to ask her — I’m 

going to send her home.

(Id. at 14).

Defense counsel then asked the trial court to question Juror #131 as to 

whether “she’s had access to anyone else” in the jury pool. (Id. at 15). While

the trial court declined to do so, it stated that it would question the remaining 
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venirepersons as to their ability to remain impartial in light of any outside 

information they may have heard, including from other potential jurors that 

day. Defense counsel did not object to this approach and did not request 

dismissal of the entire jury pool. The trial court continued voir dire and 

queried:

I’m going to ask a more general question and that is whether any 

of you believe you have heard about this case from a less formal 

source than maybe the media, read about it on Facebook, 

somebody talked about it at work, you heard the comments of a 

fellow juror member here today such that you believe—what you 

have heard about this case has caused you to believe that you 

cannot decide the case based on the evidence and the law? 

Specifically, you may have heard something about it, but do you 

have the ability to set that aside and wait to hear the evidence, 

wait to be instructed by the Court on the law, wait to deliberate 

with your fellow jurors and arrive at a fair verdict? Is there anyone 

who believes they can’t based on what they’ve heard?

(Id. at 19). None of the venirepersons answered in the affirmative except for 

one who had previously raised an issue.

B.

During the four-day jury trial, several former employees of the Daycare, 

including Tasha Shetter (Shetter), Jane Auchmoody (Auchmoody), Rachel 

Bricker (Bricker), Jacquelyn Miller (Miller) and Madison Platter (Platter)

testified to the purported abuse suffered by each of the children for which 

charges were brought. Many of the witnesses have backgrounds in early 

childhood education and testified regarding Nolan’s inappropriate treatment 

of those children at the Daycare.
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Ms. Shetter testified that she began working full-time at the Daycare in 

October 2019 and was hired as a head teacher for the one-year-olds. During

nap time, which typically lasted three hours, three or four-year-old A.R. was 

brought back to Shetter’s room and put in the bucket seats, although most of 

the children slept on mats. These seats were generally used at mealtimes and 

Shetter described them as “tables with little buckets inside of them that you 

buckled the children in, so if they weren’t able to sit up correctly or were 

younger . . . [the seats] made it easier for them to sit up correctly to eat[.]” 

(N.T. Trial, 11/29/21, at 148).

Shetter recounted an incident where A.R. was in a bucket seat and “I 

was told that she had misbehaved, and she was in time-out, and was in there 

for at least an hour after I had gotten there, and I mentioned she had marks.

And at that point she was taken out of them.” (Id. at 156). Shetter explained 

A.R. had marks “from the seats because they are not meant for someone her 

age.” (Id.). Although the room was mostly quiet, “[A.R.] was kicking and 

screaming . . . [because] those seats in general were way too small for her . 

. . [and her] feet touched the ground [and] she could actually drag one of her 

feet across the floor.” (Id. at 158-59). Shetter recounted that she could hear 

Nolan “every day though my two doors I could hear her screaming at [A.R.] 

[. . . saying:] ‘I don’t know why you can’t listen to me you stupid son of a 

gun—or other curse words[.]’” (Id. at 162-63). Shetter testified that Nolan 
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routinely verbally attacked A.R. and sent her to the one-year-old room for nap

time because she considered her a nuisance. (See id. at 163).

Ms. Auchmoody testified that Nolan hired her as director of the Daycare 

in September 2018 and that she had previously operated her own in-home 

daycare business. Auchmoody recalled that Nolan would yell at A.R. 

frequently and put her in the one-year-old room at nap time in the bucket 

seats. (See id. at 196). In one instance, Auchmoody asked Nolan if she could 

switch rooms so that she could put A.R. on a mat and attempt to get her to 

sleep, but Nolan refused. (See id. at 197-98; 220, 223). Auchmoody 

explained that bucket seats are typically used in daycare settings for eating 

or for a defined activity, and that state regulations provide for their use by 

children ages five to 24 months. However, in A.R.’s case, her feet were 

touching the floor and “that’s going to do harm to the child. So that’s 

endangerment [and] trapping a child.” (Id. at 221).

Auchmoody testified that in her experience in the daycare business, she 

rewarded the children’s good behavior with a sticker or some similar item.

When she attempted to implement a rewards system at the Daycare, Nolan 

instructed her not to do so because “kids were born to behave.” (Id. at 199). 

She recalled that Nolan “would always yell” and that she yelled at W.M. very 

loudly. (Id. at 200). Auchmoody described C.H. as autistic and explained 

that C.H. had a tic where she “liked to flap” by moving her hands back and 

forth at the wrist. (Id. at 201). Nolan sometimes withheld snacks from the 
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children as a group as punishment for what she perceived as bad behavior.

When this happened, Auchmoody disregarded Nolan’s instructions and gave

snacks to the children anyway, as she wanted to comply with state 

regulations. (See id. at 227-29).

Ms. Bricker testified that she is a second-grade teacher and that she 

worked at the Daycare for about three weeks in the fall of 2018 on a parttime basis, primarily with toddlers. Bricker relayed that A.R. was placed in 

the toddler room rather than in the preschool room because she was nonverbal and had developmental delays. (See N.T. Trial, 11/30/21, at 16-17).

Bricker described A.R. as a normal young child who “wanted to get into toys, 

wanted to play with things” but that this was not an option because she was 

“confined typically in one of those bucket seats” with straps around her waist.

(Id. at 17). The bucket seats were positioned around tables and A.R. was so 

tall that her legs did not hang and dangle from the seat, but instead dragged

back and forth on the floor. (See id. at 25-26).

Nolan also placed one-year-old J.M. in the bucket seats often and

referred to him as autistic although he was too young for a formal diagnosis. 

(See id. at 18-19). Bricker explained that the bucket seats were used as a 

form of discipline and that the children would be strapped into the bucket 

seats for prolonged periods of time with no projects or activities put in front 

of them. (See id. at 19-20). When Bricker was alone with the children, she 

removed them from the bucket seats to play and interact with them. J.M. was 
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placed in the bucket seat frequently during nap time and for behaving “out of

control trying to play with things all over the place.” (Id. at 24). Bricker

recalled that Nolan also routinely yelled at W.M., who was about three years 

old, for not sitting still and that she could hear the yelling “often and in [] a 

loud, raised voice.” (Id. at 27-28).

Bricker testified that C.H. was placed in the toddler room even though 

she was about three years old because she was non-verbal and Nolan “deemed 

[her] autistic as well.” (Id. at 30). Because C.H. needed a lot of assistance 

with the bathroom and had developmental delays, Nolan “preferred her to be 

in the back [toddler room] so she did not have to interact with her.” (Id. at 

31). Bricker also relayed that Nolan withheld snacks from the children as a 

form of punishment for not cleaning up or for “being out of control.” (Id. at 

36).

Ms. Miller testified that she worked at the Daycare in the fall of 2018 for 

less than one month while she was a college student majoring in early 

childhood and special education. She worked as an aide and floated between 

the different age groups. Miller recalled that A.R. was frequently placed with 

the younger children instead of with her own age group and she had observed 

marks in the middle of A.R.’s back near her spine that looked like scratches.

When Miller asked about these marks, Nolan blamed her for causing them. 

(See id. at 65-69). Miller recounted an instance when, during nap time, J.M. 

was rolling around on his mat and she tried to comfort him by patting his back. 
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When Nolan saw that J.M. was awake, she “grabbed him and put him into the 

bucket seats and said ‘this is going to help him fall asleep; this is where he 

sleeps.’ And then she buckled him in [and] he cried, kicked for about five to 

ten minutes . . . [then] fell asleep.” (Id. at 70-71).

Regarding her last day at the daycare, Miller testified that the children 

had been sitting down since 7:00 a.m. with no physical activity. When W.M. 

got out of his seat at about 9:00 a.m., Nolan grabbed him by the arms from 

behind and said “Why can’t you listen? You should be sitting down, and threw 

him into this chair.” (Id. at 80). Miller recounted that she could hear W.M.’s 

body hit the chair as Nolan continued to hold him by the side of his arms and 

yell loudly at him in front of the other children. Nolan then “started shaking 

him, and all you could see was his head go back and forth, probably three, 

four times, going back and forth still shaking him saying ‘Why can’t you 

listen?’” (Id.). Miller relayed that when Nolan stopped shaking W.M., he 

looked very frightened and started crying immediately. When Nolan walked 

away, Miller ran to him to comfort him. Miller quit her job because of “how 

[Nolan] treated the kids and seeing [W.M.], how she physically put her hands 

on him — I just couldn’t do it anymore.” (Id. at 90-91). Miller testified that 

she contacted police out of concern for the children’s safety. (See id. at 93-

94).

Ms. Platter testified that she worked at the Daycare part-time in the fall 

of 2018 as an assistant teacher while she was a sophomore in college majoring 
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in early childhood and special education. Platter recalled that A.R. had trouble 

remaining still at nap time and “was placed back on her mat aggressively 

multiple times by Linda Nolan.” (Id. at 113-14). Nolan also sent A.R. to the 

toddler room frequently to be put in the bucket seats for discipline for up to 

four hours throughout the day. Nolan would strap A.R. into the seat with the

belt and angrily “tell her she was bad, that she needed to learn how to act.” 

(Id. at 118-19). Platter testified that A.R. was too tall for the bucket seats 

and that when Platter tried to take her out of it, Nolan directed her not to. 

(See id. at 141).

Platter recalled that Nolan often yelled at W.M. when he rocked or 

scooted his chair and told him that “he was bad and that he didn’t know how 

to act.” (Id. at 131). Regarding J.M., Platter testified to one instance where 

he “was left in a bucket seat [by Nolan] all day from the beginning of my shift 

until the end of it” when she worked a ten-hour shift. (Id. at 133). When 

Nolan left the room, Platter removed J.M. from the seat to let him move 

around. Platter testified that J.M. “was too big for the bucket seat . . . the 

plastic of the bucket seat would [] poke him so he would move around, he 

would cry, he would scream until he just kind of gave up, and then he would 

just sit there.” (Id. at 139). J.M. would not be given a toy or book to play 

with until it was close to the time when his mother was scheduled to pick him 

up.
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C.H. was deemed autistic and was moved between the preschool, 

toddler and infant rooms because of her tics and tendency to move her hands 

back and forth in a flapping motion. C.H. would be placed in a highchair with 

her “arms at her side and the tray [] over them so she would be hitting the 

bottom of the tray instead of flapping out.” (Id. at 144). Platter explained 

that the incident with W.M. served as the impetus for several employees to 

quit the Daycare and recounted that W.M. would not sit in his chair anymore 

while the rest of the children were seated in the preschool room. (See id. at 

146). When W.M. started wiggling in his chair, Nolan grabbed the back of his 

chair, pulled it out, “grabbed him by the upper arms and slammed him back 

down into the chair and started shaking him so his head was going back and 

forth, and she was in his face the whole time yelling at him that he was bad 

and needed to listen . . . and then she grabbed the back of his chair and 

slammed his chair back into the table with him in it.” (Id. at 147-48). Platter 

recalled that W.M. started crying immediately and looked terrified. She quit

her job because she did not feel comfortable and “was concerned specifically 

about the welfare of the children[.]” (Id. at 151).

C.

On December 2, 2021, the jury found Nolan guilty of four counts of 

EWOC. The trial court sentenced Nolan in March 2022 to an aggregate term 

of 60 months’ probation. Nolan filed a post-sentence motion challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence and the impartiality of the jury pool based on the 
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comments of Juror #131, which the trial court denied by order and opinion 

entered June 28, 2022. In doing so, the trial court detailed the voluminous 

testimony presented at trial as it related to W.M., C.H., A.R. and J.M. and 

concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Nolan had 

endangered their physical, psychological and emotional welfare, thereby 

violating her duty of care. (See Trial Court Opinion, 6/28/22, at 35-46). The 

court found that “a daycare provider who voluntarily assumes the 

responsibility of caring for young children should have better ways of handling 

[the children’s] behavior,” that her methods were not appropriate for their age 

or level of understanding, and that her actions crossed the line from discipline 

to conduct harmful to their well-being. (Id. at 45-46). As to the issue 

concerning Juror #131, the trial court determined that it acted within its 

discretion in declining to dismiss the entire jury pool, and that it appropriately 

addressed the remarks by immediately dismissing her and conducting a 

thorough voir dire of the remaining venirepersons. (See id. at 49-50). Nolan 

timely appealed and she and the trial court complied with Rule 1925. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)-(b).
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II.

Nolan first contends the evidence was insufficient3to sustain her EWOC 

convictions as to W.M., C.H., A.R. and J.M. Nolan maintains that her conduct 

did not rise to the level of EWOC where the testimony presented consisted 

primarily of allegations that she “yell[ed] and stop[ed] the children’s 

movement.” (Nolan’s Brief, at 9). Nolan claims the Commonwealth’s 

witnesses “exaggerated or fabricated testimony” because they did not agree 

with her methods, that she violated no duty concerning the children, and that 

even if the allegations are true, they amount only to “disciplinary or safety 

actions.” (Id. at 10, 13).

Our Crimes Code defines the offense of EWOC as follows: “A parent, 

guardian or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of 

age, or a person that employs or supervises such a person, commits an 

____________________________________________

3 A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question

of law and is subject to plenary review. In reviewing a sufficiency 

of the evidence claim, we must determine whether the evidence 

admitted at trial, as well as all reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict 

winner, are sufficient to support all elements of the offense. 

Additionally, we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our 

own judgment for that of the fact finder. The evidence may be 

entirely circumstantial as long as it links the accused to the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The factfinder is free to believe all, 

part, or none of the evidence presented.

Commonwealth v. Vela-Garret, 251 A.3d 811, 815 (Pa. Super. 2021) 

(citations omitted).
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offense if [she] knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by violating a 

duty of care, protection or support.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1). The phrase 

“person supervising the welfare of a child” means a person “other than a 

parent or guardian that provides care, education, training or control of a child.” 

Id. at (a)(3). To convict a defendant of EWOC, the Commonwealth must 

establish that she is aware of her duty to protect the child; is aware that the 

child is in circumstances that could threaten the child’s physical or 

psychological welfare; and has either failed to act or has acted so weak that 

such actions cannot reasonably be expected to protect the child’s welfare. 

See Vela-Garrett, supra at 815.

In considering the circumstances of this case, we are mindful that child 

welfare statutes such as EWOC are designed to cover a broad range of conduct

in order to safeguard the welfare and security of children. See

Commonwealth v. Krock, 282 A.3d 1132, 1137 (Pa. Super. 2022). In

evaluating whether an individual’s conduct violates Section 4304, “the 

common sense of the community, as well as the sense of decency, propriety, 

and the morality which most people entertain is sufficient to apply the statute 

to each particular case, and to individuate what particular conduct is rendered 

criminal by it.” Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, the EWOC statute does 

not require the actual infliction of physical injury or include a requirement that 

the child be in imminent threat of physical harm. See id. at 1139. The terms

of the statute are “necessarily drawn broadly to capture conduct that . . .
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involves the endangering of the physical or moral welfare of a child by an act

or omission in violation of a legal duty.” Commonwealth v. Lynn, 114 A.3d

796, 819 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). Additionally, the language employed

as to endangerment of a child’s welfare and a person’s duty of care to that

child are not esoteric and are instead “easily understood and given context by

the community at large.” Id. at 818 (citation omitted).

In this case, the trial court rejected Nolan’s sufficiency claim, stating:

The evidence presented to the jury in its entirety revealed a

clear pattern of mistreatment towards some of the children

Defendant was trusted (and paid) to care for. The evidence

showed that Defendant berated and talked down to the children,

deprived them of stimulation, activity and play essential to their

healthy growth and development . . . and imposed punishment

excessive in both frequency and duration and inappropriate for

the children’s age and development.

(Trial Ct. Op., at 34).

The trial court went on to detail Nolan’s treatment of W.M., C.H., A.R.

and J.M. in the context of its finding that she violated the duty of care she

owed to each child:

[Nolan’s] conduct in grabbing [W.M.] from behind without

warning, throwing or slamming him into a chair hard enough to

make noise, grabbing him and shaking him so that his head was

being jerked back and forth, and slamming his chair, while he was

in it, back into the table until it made contact with his stomach

clearly threatened W.M.’s physical well-being. The reaction of the

other employees to this incident at that time speaks volumes

about the harm they felt was present upon what they saw. 

Specifically, Miller, Auchmoody, Platter and [Bricker] all abruptly

quit their jobs at Miracle Bush that day[.] . . .

In addition to any physical danger, the employees also

testified about the psychological effect this incident had on W.M. 
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Platter described him as visibly terrified and said he started crying

immediately. Miller corroborated Platter’s account, explaining

that when Defendant stopped shaking him, W.M. started crying

and looked frightened. While several employees immediately ran

up to W.M. to ask him if he was okay and comforted and hugged

him, Defendant merely walked away like nothing happened. . . .

[Regarding C.H.] although it was clear she exhibited tics

[consistent with an autism spectrum disorder] involuntarily and as

a calming mechanism, Defendant took deliberate actions to

prevent her from doing so. When C.H. engaged in flapping,

[Nolan] removed her to another room and put her in a highchair

with her arms at her side, under her highchair’s tray, so she could

not flap. The employees believed that Defendant deliberately

used the highchair instead of a bucket seat because C.H.’s arms

would not be restrained in a bucket seat. . . . C.H. was often

removed from the classroom with children her age and put in the

room for younger children by Defendant because C.H. was

nonverbal and needed more assistance and Defendant did not

want to interact with her or give her assistance. When she did

interact with C.H., witnesses saw Defendant yell at C.H. for not

following directions or processing things as quickly, due to her

developmental delays. Employees saw C.H. become visibly upset,

crying and making fussy noises, in response to Defendant yelling

at her.

. . . There was sufficient evidence demonstrating that

Defendant knowingly placed A.R. in circumstances that threatened

her physical and/or psychological welfare. A.R. was a three-or

four-year-old girl who should have been in the classroom with

children her age, but was instead frequently moved to the oneyear-old classroom because she was non-verbal, and had some

developmental delays. . . . Witnesses stated A.R. was kept in

bucket seats at times when all the other children were allowed to

nap; they testified to her kicking and screaming while in the

bucket seats. . . . A.R. was kept in the bucket seats for so long

she developed marks on her body from the seats.

Though too young for a formal diagnosis, Defendant

referred to J.M. as “autistic.” J.M. was too big for the bucket seats,

but he was repeatedly forced to sit in them for long periods of

time without any activity or breaks. J.M. was strapped into the

bucket seat so he could not get out. Defendant also prevented

other employees from removing J.M. by using intimidation to
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ensure compliance. Defendant withheld toys, coloring books, and

activities from J.M. during the hours-long periods he was

restrained in bucket seats. The evidence shows this depravation

was methodical and planned, as Defendant would specifically

instruct other employees to put a toy in front of J.M. fifteen

minutes before his parents were scheduled to pick him up. . . . 

J.M. was punished almost daily for moving around and trying to

get into the toys and exploring like young children do. He was

frequently retrained and isolated in a bucket seat while the other

children were allowed to play, for hours and hours at a time.

(Id. at 36-39, 42-44, 46).

Based on the foregoing and our independent review of the extensive

record in this case, and mindful of the precept that the EWOC statute covers 

a broad range of conduct in order to safeguard the welfare and security of 

children, we conclude that Nolan’s conduct concerning these four children

while acting in her supervisory role as caregiver at the Daycare amounted to

criminal behavior. Contrary to Nolan’s self-serving characterization of the

testimony, her actions constituted much more than discipline and were so

extreme as to be flagrantly contrary to the “common sense of the community, 

as well as the sense of decency, propriety, and the morality which most people 

entertain[.]” Krock, supra at 1137 (citation omitted). Nolan had a clear 

duty to provide care, protection and support for the children entrusted to her 

care by their parents, and she abdicated that responsibility by verbally 

berating them and physically restraining them for inordinate amounts of time

as punishment. Her mistreatment of the children escalated when she thew 

W.M. into a chair and visibly shook him in front of his peers and caregivers, 

prompting police intervention. To the extent that Nolan challenges the 
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veracity of the testimony of the Daycare’s former employees, the jury as 

factfinder was free to credit their testimony in weighing the evidence 

presented. See Vela-Garret, supra at 815. Nolan’s first issue merits no 

relief.

III.

Nolan next contends the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the entire 

jury pool after Juror #131 made remarks during voir dire indicating that she 

had “inside information” regarding Nolan’s guilt from her apparent work at 

another daycare center. (Nolan’s Brief, at 13-14). Nolan claims that a new 

trial is warranted because these comments likely tainted the remaining juror’s 

views, and the remedial action taken by the court was insufficient to cure any

prejudice. (See id. at 15-16).

4

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 

guarantee a defendant the right to an impartial jury, and the jury selection 

process is crucial to the preservation of that constitutional right. See Davis,

supra at 1239. Thus, the trial court has an obligation to remove prospective 

jurors who are unable to impartially follow its instructions and evaluate the 

evidence presented, and “the purpose of voir dire is solely to ensure the 

____________________________________________

4 The scope of voir dire is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See 

Commonwealth v. Davis, 273 A.3d 1228, 1239 (Pa. Super. 2022). In 

reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a challenge to the empaneling of a jury, “we 

employ a standard of review which affords great deference to the trial judge.” 

Id. (citation omitted).
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empaneling of a competent, fair, impartial, and unprejudiced jury capable of 

following the instructions of the trial court.” Id. at 1239-40 (citation omitted). 

However, “[e]ven [a juror’s] exposure to outside information does not 

ineluctably mean that a jury is unfair and partial.” Commonwealth v.

Williams, 220 A.3d 1086, 1092–93 (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied, 230 

A.3d 1022 (Pa. 2020) (citation omitted).

In this case, the trial court ensured the jury’s impartiality and fairness 

by immediately dismissing the juror who indicated that she could not remain 

impartial and by extensively questioning the remaining venirepersons to 

determine their ability to proceed. The statements made by Juror #131 did 

not disclose any actual information about Nolan or the potential evidence in 

this case, as the trial court quickly intervened to stop her from speaking. 

Given that the purpose of jury selection is to identify the venirepersons’ 

potential biases, vague references to outside knowledge is not so prejudicial 

as to render the entire jury pool tainted or incapable of remaining fair and 

impartial. The trial court questioned the remaining jurors at length to ensure 

that they could decide the case fairly based on the evidence presented in 

court, even in the event that they had heard outside information about the 

case. Nolan’s final issue merits no relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
J-S44032-22

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 02/02/2023