22-438 

United States v. Gutierrez-Campos

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL 

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY 

COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held 

at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New 

York, on the 16th day of August, two thousand twenty-four. 

PRESENT: 

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

MICHAEL H. PARK,

MYRNA PÉREZ,

Circuit Judges. 

_______________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Appellant, 

 v. No. 22-438 

RAUL GUTIERREZ-CAMPOS, also known 

as Sealed Defendant, also known as Moises 

Garcia Campos, also known as Moises R. 

Campos, also known as Oscar Ramirez, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

_______________________________________ 
2 

FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL D. MAIMIN (David Robles, Won S. 

Shin, on the brief), Assistant United States 

Attorneys, for Damian Williams, United States 

Attorney for the Southern District of New York, 

New York, NY. 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: DANIEL HABIB, Federal Defenders of New York, 

Inc., Appeals Bureau, New York, NY. 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (John P. Cronan, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED, and this case is 

REMANDED for further proceedings.

Defendant-Appellee Raul Gutierrez-Campos was charged in an Information with 

one count of illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and 1326(b)(2). He moved 

to dismiss the Information, raising several arguments to collaterally challenge the validity 

of the original removal order issued at his immigration court proceedings.1 The district 

court granted the motion to dismiss; the Government appeals. We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history of the case, and issues on appeal. 

A defendant “may not challenge the validity of the deportation order” that 

underlies an alleged illegal reentry offense “unless”: 

1 Below, Gutierrez-Campos challenged the immigration court’s jurisdiction to enter his removal 

order. The district court rejected that challenge. Gutierrez-Campos has not appealed the

district court’s jurisdictional analysis; we find no error in it. 
3 

(1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may 

have been available to seek relief against the order;

(2) the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued 

improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial 

review; and 

(3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.

8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). The statute requires that all three conditions be satisfied before a

defendant can collaterally attack a prior removal order in a subsequent prosecution for 

illegal reentry. See United States v. Palomar-Santiago, 593 U.S. 321, 326 (2021). 

In this appeal, we address only the first requirement—that Gutierrez-Campos had 

to exhaust “any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief 

against” his prior removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(1). The district court stated that 

“the parties agree” that Gutierrez-Campos “has not exhausted his administrative 

remedies.” United States v. Gutierrez-Campos, No. 21 CR. 40 (JPC), 2022 WL 281582, at 

*18 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2022). The district court nevertheless proceeded to excuse 

Gutierrez-Campos from exhausting those remedies by relying on our precedent in United 

States v. Sosa, 387 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2004), and similar cases. In so doing, the district court 

interpreted Sosa to “recognize[] that while the requirements under section 1326(d) are 

mandatory as a statutory matter, the statutory exhaustion requirement may be excused as 

a constitutional matter where the noncitizen’s waiver of appeal was not knowing and 

intelligent.” Gutierrez-Campos, 2022 WL 281582, at *19 (emphases in original). The 

district court then concluded that Gutierrez-Campos’s waiver was not knowing and 
4 

intelligent—in part because he had not been informed of his right to seek voluntary 

departure, and in part because he did not appear to have “fully comprehended the nature 

of the immigration court proceeding.” Id. at *20. 

We express no view about the district court’s interpretation of Sosa. Instead, we 

remand for the district court to revisit its statutory analysis. It is not clear whether the 

district court—having concluded that Gutierrez-Campos did not exhaust any

administrative remedies—determined that such remedies were “available” as that term 

is provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(1). See Palomar-Santiago, 593 U.S. at 327–28 (citing Ross 

v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643 (2016) (contemplating circumstances where an administrative 

remedy may not be “available” because that “remedy, although officially on the books, 

is not capable of use to obtain relief”)); see also United States v. Portillo-Gonzalez, 80 F.4th 

910, 920 (9th Cir. 2023) (assuming, without deciding, that Ross applies to the § 1326(d)(1) 

exhaustion requirement). Employing proper sequencing, the district court must

necessarily consider whether Gutierrez-Campos had “available” remedies to exhaust 

before it could excuse him from exhausting those remedies.2

2 At oral argument, the Government argued repeatedly that the term “available” builds in a 

statutory safeguard for defendants.

 See, e.g., Oral Arg. Audio at 3:24–3:33 (emphasizing that the 

statute’s first requirement “builds into it that administrative remedies that must be exhausted are 

only those that are ‘available’”); id. at 3:47–4:15 (contending that the immigration judge’s error

must affect the “availability” of review); id. at 12:38–13:05 (“As long as we can emphasize the 

word . . . ‘available’ does an awful lot of work there.”); id. at 36:40–36:42 (“That all falls under 

availability.”); id. at 38:17–38:25 (explaining that because the district court viewed this as a 

constitutional “excusal” case, it “wasn’t finding that the remedy wasn’t ‘available’ . . . . If that’s 

what [the district court] found, this would have been a very different situation”).
5 

To the extent that the district court passed over this antecedent statutory analysis

to reach a constitutional analysis, it erred. “Prior to reaching any constitutional 

questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.” Jean v. 

Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985) (citation omitted). And if “nonconstitutional questions 

have not been passed on by the lower court, we may vacate the decision below and 

remand with instructions that those questions be decided.” United States v. Locke, 471 

U.S. 84, 92 n.9 (1985) (citation omitted); see also Ross, 578 U.S. at 648 (“On remand, the 

court below must consider how that modifying term affects [the defendant’s] case—that 

is, whether the remedies he failed to exhaust were ‘available’ under the principles set out 

here.”). 

Because we remand for further proceedings regarding the statute’s first 

requirement, § 1326(d)(1), we need not decide whether Gutierrez-Campos satisfied the 

statute’s second and third requirements, §§ 1326(d)(2) and 1326(d)(3). 

* * * 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is VACATED, and 

this case is REMANDED for further proceedings. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court