IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

DAVID SAMBRANO, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v.

UNITED AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 4:21-01074-P

DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS

FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

-iINTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS ...................................................................................... 1

DISCUSSION................................................................................................................................ 2

A. United Is Not Subject to General Jurisdiction in This Court................................. 2

B. United Is Not Subject to Specific Jurisdiction With Respect To Absent 

Putative Class Members Whose Claims Are Not Connected To Texas................ 3

CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................. 9

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-iiTABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Agher v. Envoy Air Inc.,

No. CV 18-6753-R, 2018 WL 6444888 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2018)...........................................3

Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor,

521 U.S. 591 (1997)...................................................................................................................8

Bassett v. Sinterloy Corp.,

No. 01 C 3141, 2002 WL 1888477 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2002)...................................................7

BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell,

137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017)...............................................................................................................2

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., San Francisco Cnty.,

137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017)..................................................................................................... passim

Canaday v. Anthem Co.,

9 F.4th 392 (6th Cir. 2021) ........................................................................................................7

Coffey v. Mesa Airlines Inc.,

No. CV 18-3688-DMG, 2019 WL 4492952 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2019)....................................6

Daimler AG v. Bauman,

571 U.S. 117 (2014)...................................................................................................................2

Hardin v. United Airlines, Inc.,

No. H-20-3893, 2021 WL 3771768 (S.D. Tex. July 15, 2021) .............................................3, 6

King v. Enter. Leasing Co. of DFW,

No. 3:05-CV-0026-D, 2006 WL 784885 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2006)........................................7

Martinez v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,

No. 4:20-cv-00528-P, 2021 WL 1289898 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2021) (Pittman, 

J.)...................................................................................................................................... passim

Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc.,

952 F.3d 293 (D.C. Cir. 2020)...................................................................................................8

Case 4:21-cv-01074-P Document 47 Filed 10/07/21 Page 3 of 15 PageID 448
-iiiMonkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter,

768 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 2014) .................................................................................................3, 5

Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc.,

953 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2020) .....................................................................................................8

Stacker v. Intellisource, LLC,

No. 20-2581-JWB, 2021 WL 2646444 (D. Kan. June 28, 2021) ..............................................8

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,

141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021)...............................................................................................................8

Victor Elias Photography, LLC v. Leonardo Worldwide Corp.,

No. H-18-2142, 2019 WL 3713724 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2019)..................................................3

Walden v. Fiore,

571 U.S. 277 (2014)...................................................................................................................5

Williams v. NIBCO, Inc.,

No. SA-20-CV-0048-JKP-RBF, 2021 WL 1069044 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 

2021) ..........................................................................................................................................4

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1332..............................................................................................................................8

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.....................................................................................................................4, 5

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NOW COMES Defendant, United Airlines, Inc. (“United”) and moves for partial 

dismissal, for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2).1

 

INTRODUCTION

This putative nationwide class action—which would have implications for United’s 68,000 

domestic active employees located in airports across the country and United’s corporate 

headquarters in Chicago, Illinois—cannot be brought in the Northern District of Texas. The case 

cannot proceed in this forum on behalf of a nationwide putative class because the Court lacks 

personal jurisdiction over United for purposes of out-of-state putative class members. Even if 

plaintiffs could ultimately satisfy Rule 23 and obtain class action certification—and they cannot—

the claims of any putative class members that are not connected to Texas, as well as any analogous 

claims by named plaintiffs (including Seth Adam Turnbough), should be dismissed now for lack 

of personal jurisdiction. 

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

United employs 68,000 domestic active employees and has the most comprehensive route 

network among North American carriers. App. 1 ¶¶ 2, 5. It has its principal place of business and 

headquarters in Chicago, Illinois, where its senior leadership team manages its worldwide 

operations. Id. 1-2 ¶¶ 3, 4, 6. It is incorporated in Delaware. Id. 1 ¶ 3.

Like other large carriers, United operates its aircrafts from airports across the country and 

operates hubs at seven airports throughout the United States, only one of which is in Texas: 

Chicago-O’Hare, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Newark, San Francisco and Dulles. Id. 2 ¶ 7. 

United operates over 600 individual aircrafts and approximately 1,800 flights every day; of those, 

 1 United also brings this motion pursuant Rule 12(f), to the extent a motion to strike is the 

appropriate method to contest personal jurisdiction over the putative class members’ claims that are not 

connected to Texas. 

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only 27% begin or end at an airport in Texas. Id. 2 ¶ 6. Only 16% of United’s over 60,000 

U.S. workforce are employed in Texas. Id. 3 ¶ 10. 

United does not operate a hub at the Dallas Fort Worth Airport (DFW); instead, its Texas 

hub is in Houston at the George Bush Intercontinental Airport. Id. 3 ¶ 9. Only 160 United 

employees are based out of DFW, and no flight attendants or pilots are based out of DFW. Id. 

There are only approximately 30 United flights in and out of DFW each day. Id. Relative to 

United’s other operations DFW accounts for less than 2% of all United mainline flights. Id. 

Plaintiffs—six United employees (one who lives in Illinois and five in Texas)—filed suit 

here in the Northern District of Texas to challenge United’s vaccine policy under Title VII and the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiffs ask the Court for an injunction (on behalf of 

an as-yet uncertified putative class action) that would apply nationwide to all United employees 

who have requested religious or medical accommodations from United’s vaccine policy.

DISCUSSION

The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction As To Putative Class Members Whose Claims Are 

Not Connected To Texas.

When a nonresident defendant objects to “personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the 

burden of establishing that in personam jurisdiction exists.” Martinez v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 

4:20-cv-00528-P, 2021 WL 1289898, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2021) (Pittman, J.) (quoting Stuart 

v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985)). 

A. United Is Not Subject to General Jurisdiction in This Court.

Absent an “exceptional case,” a corporation only is “at home” and subject to general 

personal jurisdiction where it is incorporated and where it has its principal place of business. 

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138-39, 139 n.19 (2014); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. 

Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017) (railroad not subject to general personal jurisdiction in Montana despite 

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over 2,000 miles of railroad track and 2,000 employees within the state). United is “at home” in 

Delaware and Illinois. App. 1 ¶ 3; see Compl. ¶ 11 (“United is a Delaware corporation with its 

principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois.). 

And this is not an “exceptional case” in which United could be deemed “at home” in Texas. 

The Fifth Circuit has held that it is “incredibly difficult” to establish exceptional circumstances. 

Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs have not—and 

cannot—carry that burden here. Indeed, the Southern District of Texas recently held that a plaintiff 

had not “allege[d], or produce[d] evidence showing” that “United’s operations are so substantial 

as to render it essentially at home in Texas.” Hardin v. United Airlines, Inc., No. H-20-3893, 2021 

WL 3771768, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 15, 2021) (United not “subject to general jurisdiction in 

Texas”); see also, e.g., Agher v. Envoy Air Inc., No. CV 18-6753-R, 2018 WL 6444888, at *2 

(C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2018) (airline not subject to general personal jurisdiction in California where 

it employed 8,500 people and had 16% of its flights); Victor Elias Photography, LLC v. Leonardo 

Worldwide Corp., No. H-18-2142, 2019 WL 3713724, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2019) (Marriott 

not subject to general personal jurisdiction in Texas despite being alleged to “operate[], franchise[], 

and/or license[] more properties in Texas than any other state” and having, through affiliates, 487 

properties in Texas.”). 

B. United Is Not Subject to Specific Jurisdiction With Respect To Absent 

Putative Class Members Whose Claims Are Not Connected To Texas.

“In order for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a claim, there must be an 

‘affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an 

occurrence that takes place in the forum State.’” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 

San Francisco Cnty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 

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S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918 (2011)). “When there is no such connection, specific jurisdiction 

is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the State.” Id. 

Accordingly, in Bristol-Myers, when confronted with a mass-action suit in state court by 

plaintiffs “consisting of 86 California residents and 592 residents of 33 other states,” all raising 

the same state-law claim, “[t]he Supreme Court held that the California court did not have specific 

jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendants because the out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims had no 

connection to California.” Martinez, 2021 WL 1289898, at *3. In contrast to those named 

plaintiffs whose claims arise in Texas because they will be subject to the United vaccine policy 

while working from Texas, personal jurisdiction over United is lacking as to all putative class 

members and named plaintiffs whose claims are not connected to Texas because they will not be 

subjected there to the challenged policy. (Likewise, such plaintiffs and putative class members 

also cannot establish venue in Texas under the specific venue provision that governs suits brought 

under Title VII and the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), because, as to them, Texas is not “the 

State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed” (nor is it 

where they otherwise would have worked or where the relevant employment records are 

maintained and administered).)

For example, as to the named plaintiffs, Mr. Turnbough’s claims are not connected to 

Texas.2

 As Plaintiffs concede, Mr. Turnbough is “a 737 Captain with United Airlines and based 

in Chicago.” Pl. App. in Support of Mem. Supporting Mot. for TRO and PI at 13 ¶ 2 (hereinafter 

“Pl. App.”). Mr. Turnbough also is “a resident of Schaumburg, Illinois.” Id. 13 ¶ 2. His sole 

purported connection to Texas is an assertion that he “regularly fl[ies] into the [DFW] Airport for 

United on business and travel[s] there on [his] ride share passes from the company to visit [his] 

 2 See Williams v. NIBCO, Inc., No. SA-20-CV-0048-JKP-RBF, 2021 WL 1069044, at *6 (W.D. 

Tex. Mar. 18, 2021) (“[P]laintiffs must establish personal jurisdiction for each named representative.”). 

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family in the Dallas area.” Id. This is incorrect. Mr. Turnbough has not flown through DFW 

using his ride share passes since summer 2019. App. 4 ¶ 16. In fact, since January 2016, he has 

only taken two total flights through DFW on ride share travel. Id. In terms of Mr. Turnbough’s 

business trips for United, out of hundreds of trips taken since the beginning of 2016, less than ten 

of those trips have involved DFW.3

 Id. This information is also irrelevant. These contacts with 

Texas are not “suit-related conduct” because none involve the application of the vaccine policy to 

his job, and thus they cannot establish the necessary connection between the forum and his 

employment discrimination claims. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (“For a State 

to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the defendant’s suit-related conduct must 

create a substantial connection with the forum State.”). In addition, the two other named plaintiffs 

who do not work at DFW—Genise Gale Kincannon, a flight attendant based in San Francisco, 

California, and David Eric Sambrano, a Captain based in Newark, New Jersey, App. 3 ¶¶ 14-15—

also have failed to establish personal jurisdiction in Texas. Because “the plaintiff cannot be the 

only link between the defendant and the forum,” the mere fact that they live in Texas does not 

demonstrate that their claims challenging United’s policy are connected to Texas. See Walden, 

571 U.S. at 285; Monkton, 768 F.3d at 433 (same). United’s records reflect that, for the period 

from October 2018 through present, Ms. Kincannon has not worked a single flight through DFW 

as a flight attendant; similarly, for the period from January 2016 through present, Mr. Sambrano 

has not flown a single flight through DFW as a captain. App. 4 ¶¶ 17-18. Nor is it sufficient that 

 3 Moreover, Mr. Turnbough has not taken a single business trip involving DFW since United 

announced its COVID-19 Vaccination Policy on August 6, 2021. App. 4 ¶ 16. 

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one or both of these plaintiffs may “commute” to work using United flights, because that alone 

does not prove that United’s challenged policy applies to them while in Texas.4 

More importantly, there is no evidence whatsoever as to whether the putative absent class 

members’ claims are connected to Texas, and it is highly likely that many of their claims do not 

because the employees at issue will not be subjected to the United vaccination policy while in 

Texas. And under Bristol-Myers, the claims of all such putative class members and of the named 

class members whose claims also are not connected to Texas cannot simply tag along with the 

claims of any plaintiffs who can establish specific personal jurisdiction in Texas. See 137 S. Ct. 

at 1781 (“The mere fact that other plaintiffs were [injured] in [Texas]—and allegedly sustained 

the same injuries as did the nonresidents—does not allow the [State] to assert specific jurisdiction 

over the nonresidents’ claims.”). 

Indeed, in Martinez, this Court applied Bristol-Myers to grant a motion to dismiss for lack 

of personal jurisdiction the “claims of out-of-state putative collective members” in a collective 

action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). 2021 WL 1289898, at *2 (concluding that 

Fifth Circuit case law enables a defendant to assert this argument in a Rule 12(b)(2) motion prior 

to the class certification stage). In so holding, this Court rejected attempts to limit Bristol-Myers 

to state-law claims in state court, explaining that Bristol-Myers generally applies with full force to 

federal-law claims in federal court as well. 

 4 United does not dictate where its flight attendants or pilots live: many employees elect to live 

near their base airports and others elect to commute to work. App. 3 ¶ 11. Although employees are 

permitted to use their flight privileges to travel on United flights when space is available, United does not 

actively assist them in commuting regardless of the mode of transportation except in rare circumstances. 

Id. Finally, consistent with this, the Vaccine policy does not apply to United employees using use ride 

share. Id. 3 ¶ 12. The kinds of other alleged connection to Texas (Pl. App. 28 ¶¶ 2-3, Pl. App. 2 ¶¶ 4) 

also fall short. See, e.g., Hardin, 2021 WL 3771768, at *3 (no specific personal jurisdiction for United 

flight attendant’s Title VII claim despite various contacts with Texas); Coffey v. Mesa Airlines Inc., No. 

CV 18-3688-DMG, 2019 WL 4492952, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2019) (no specific personal jurisdiction 

over airline in California in ADA failure-to-accommodate suit by pilot who lived in California but was 

based out of Texas when challenging employment decisions made by managers in Texas and Arizona).

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In particular, this Court declined “to follow the flawed, non-binding, non-textual and 

unpersuasive” cases that had distinguished Bristol-Myers on the basis that FLSA claims are 

“federal claim[s] created by Congress specifically to address employment practices nationwide.” 

Martinez, 2021 WL 1289898, at *4. As this Court correctly recognized, that distinction fails in 

light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k). Rule 4(k) provides, in relevant part, that “filing a 

waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant” either (i) “who is subject to 

the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located” or 

(ii) “when authorized by a federal statute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1). 

Like the FLSA at issue in Martinez, neither Title VII nor the ADA “authorize nationwide 

service of process.” E.g., King v. Enter. Leasing Co. of DFW, No. 3:05-CV-0026-D, 2006 WL 

784885, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2006) (“Title VII does not provide for nationwide service of 

process.”); Bassett v. Sinterloy Corp., No. 01 C 3141, 2002 WL 1888477, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 

2002) (explaining that “the ADA does not provide for nationwide service of process”). And thus, 

pursuant to Rule 4(k), federal district courts adjudicating claims under the FLSA, Title VII, and 

the ADA “are bound to the same limits as state courts.” Martinez, 2021 WL 1289898, at *4; see 

Canaday v. Anthem Co., 9 F.4th 392, 399 (6th Cir. 2021) (Sutton, J.) (holding that when a federal 

statute “does not offer nationwide service of process,” “Rule 4(k) does not fill this gap; instead, it 

ties “personal jurisdiction over a defendant to the host State’s jurisdiction over it”). Because the 

Texas long-arm statute extends to the constitutional maximum, Rule 4 requires the forum court to 

conduct the same Due Process Clause analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment that the Supreme 

Court conducted in Bristol-Myers. See 137 S. Ct. at 1779 (evaluating how “the Fourteenth 

Amendment limits the personal jurisdiction of state courts”); Martinez, 2021 WL 1289898, at *2-

4 (same). 

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Nor can plaintiffs here try to distinguish Bristol-Myers and Martinez on the grounds that 

those cases involved “mass” or “collective” actions, rather than a certified class action under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. Rule 23. See Stacker v. Intellisource, LLC, No. 20-2581-JWB, 2021 WL 2646444, at 

*8 (D. Kan. June 28, 2021) (“While there are differences between Bristol-Myers’ mass action and 

a Rule 23 nationwide class action, the court agrees that the due process concerns recognized in 

Bristol-Myers and other Supreme Court precedent would foreclose a nationwide class action that 

is not limited to a nonresidents defendant’s conduct in the forum state.”). To be sure, some courts 

have held otherwise, reasoning that “absent class members are not full parties to the case” and thus 

are sometimes disregarded for certain statutory purposes (like assessing complete diversity of 

citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332). See Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 447 (7th Cir. 2020). 

But the reasoning of those cases has been abrogated by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), which held that “[e]very class member must 

have Article III standing” because “Article III does not give federal courts the power to order relief 

to any uninjured plaintiff, class action or not.” Id. at 2208. The same equally applies with respect 

to the Due Process Clause limitations on adjudicating claims of out-of-state plaintiffs. See Molock 

v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d 293, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Silberman, J., dissenting) 

(refusing to ignore Bristol-Myers based on “party status” because, “like the class action mechanism 

cannot circumvent the requirements of Article III, it is not a license for courts to enter judgment 

on claims over which they have no power” (emphasis added)). A class action is merely a 

“procedural” device for aggregating claims of multiple plaintiffs that cannot “abridge, enlarge, or 

modify any substantive right,” Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997), and so 

it obviously cannot be used to obliterate a constitutional defense that the defendant otherwise 

would have in a suit brought independent of that rule.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 

should be granted and the case limited to only those plaintiffs’ claims as to whom personal 

jurisdiction over United can be established. And of course, for the same reason, any preliminary 

injunctive relief this Court may otherwise grant should in no circumstance extend beyond such 

persons.

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Dated: October 7, 2021 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jordan M. Matthews 

Jordan M. Matthews

IL Bar No. 6300503

JONES DAY

77 W. Wacker Drive, Suite 3500

Chicago, Illinois 60601

Telephone: (312) 782-3939

Facsimile: (312) 782-8585

Email: jmatthews@jonesday.com

Donald J. Munro

D.C. Bar No. 453600 

JONES DAY

51 Louisiana Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20001

Telephone: (202) 879-3939

Facsimile: (202) 626-1700

Email: dmunro@jonesday.com

Alexander V. Maugeri

N.Y. Bar No. 5062666

JONES DAY

250 Vesey Street

New York, NY 10281-1047

Telephone: 212.326.3939

Facsimile: 212.755.7306

Email: amaugeri@jonesday.com

Russell D. Cawyer

State Bar No. 00793482

Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP

201 Main St., Ste. 2500

Fort Worth, Texas 76102

Telephone: (817) 878-3562 

Facsimile: (817) 335-2820 

Email: russell.cawyer@kellyhart.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On October 7, 2021, I electronically submitted the foregoing document with the clerk of 

court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the electronic case filing system 

of the court. I hereby certify that I have served all counsel and/or pro se parties of record 

electronically or by another manner authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2).

/s/ Jordan M. Matthews

Jordan M. Matthews

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