MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Page 1 of 47

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

MICHAEL POLICE, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-00712-E

§

NAVARRO COLLEGE and §

OFFICER DAVID ARNETT. §

§

Defendants. §

Order and Memorandum Opinion

Plaintiff Michael Police filed this suit against Defendant Navarro College and Defendant 

Officer David Arnett of the Navarro College Department of Public Safety. Plaintiff asserts against 

both Defendant Officer David Arnett and Defendant Navarro College: (1) various claims under 

Texas state law; and (2) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged violation of his 

constitutional rights. Both defendants moved to dismiss the claims against them under Rule 

12(b)(6). (Doc. 12; Doc. 13). On March 31, 2023, the Court issued a separate Order, (Doc. 28), 

that: (1) granted in part and denied in part Defendant David Arnett’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Original Complaint, (Doc. 12); and (2) granted Defendant Navarro College’s Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Original Complaint. The Order stated that “[a]n opinion containing the grounds for the 

Court’s decision is forthcoming.” (Doc. 28). Hereunder, the Court explains its reasoning for the 

Court’s decision.

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I. BACKGROUND

This action arises out of an interaction between Plaintiff Michael Police (“Plaintiff”) and 

David Arnett (“Arnett”)—an officer with the Navarro College Department of Public Safety

(”NCDPS”). The following facts are alleged in Plaintiff’s Original Complaint (the “Complaint”), 

(Doc. 1), and, at this stage, must be accepted by the Court as true.1 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (“[F]or the purposes of a motion to dismiss [courts] must take all of the factual 

allegations in [a] complaint as true[.]”) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, at 555

(2007)).

On March 28, 2020, Plaintiff, an African-American male, was a nineteen-year-old student 

living in a dormitory on the campus of Navarro College in Corsicana, Texas. As alleged on that 

day, Plaintiff and his friend Drewshard Bell (“Bell”), also an African-American male, walked

down a street and then sat outside of an apartment complex outside of the College. The apartment 

complex was near the College. Plaintiff was smoking a cigar when Arnett stopped his patrol car 

and allegedly “ordered” Plaintiff and Bell to walk towards his car. Plaintiff alleges that, based on 

“information and belief, Defendant Arnett has a history of targeting African-American male 

students at Navarro College[,]” and—despite “awareness of Defendant Arnett’s history”—the 

college has not only retained Arnett but promoted him. (Doc. 1, pg. 3, ¶ 9).

Plaintiff and Bell walked from the apartment complex stairwell to Arnett’s car and 

identified themselves by giving their names and dates of birth. “Plaintiff was casually smoking a 

cigar in full view of Arnett, [making] no attempt to conceal it.” (Doc. 1, pg. 3, ¶ 9). Arnett “asked 

Plaintiff if he could search him after accusing [Plaintiff and Bell] of smoking marijuana.” (Doc. 1, 

1 In deciding both Arnett’s and the College’s motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court construes the Original

Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, and draws all 

reasonable inferences in his favor. See, e.g., Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004). 

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pg. 4, ¶ 10). Plaintiff acknowledges in his Complaint that he consented to the search. (Doc. 1, pg. 

4, ¶ 10). Arnett searched Plaintiff’s person by patting him down and reaching into his pockets. In 

one of Plaintiff’s pant pockets, Arnett found a “clear empty cylinder tube.” (Doc. 1, pg. 4, ¶ 11). 

Arnett told Plaintiff and Bell that “he could smell a faint odor of marijuana emanating from the 

tube,” but Arnett did not find any marijuana residue in or around the tube. (Doc. 1, pg. 4, ¶ 12). 

Plaintiff told Arnett that the tube was the packaging for a “CBD cigarette,” which may be legally 

marketed, sold, and purchased in the State of Texas. 

Arnett then asked Bell, “Do you mind if a search you?” (Doc. 1, pg. 4, ¶ 13). Bell 

responded, “Yes.” (Doc. 1, pg. 4, ¶ 13). Arnett searched Bell, but Bell denied giving consent after 

the search was completed. Arnett then handcuffed Bell, saying that Bell “looked nervous.” (Doc. 

1, pg. 4, ¶ 13). Arnett then, according to the Complaint, “commanded” Plaintiff and Bell to 

accompany Arnett to the outdoor stairwell of the apartment complex, where Plaintiff and Bell had 

been originally seated. (Doc. 1., pg. 5, ¶ 14). Arnett searched the stairwell area for marijuana and 

repeatedly asked the two students where the marijuana was. The search of the area around the 

stairwell turned up no marijuana or evidence of criminal activity whatsoever.

After finding no marijuana or other contraband in the area around the stairwell, Arnett 

asked Plaintiff and Bell whether he could search their dormitory rooms on the College campus.

Both students declined to give consent to a search of their respective College dormitories. Arnett, 

the Complaint alleges, responded by telling the students, “That’s okay, I’m going to search [them] 

anyway.” (Doc. 1, pg. 5, ¶ 15). Arnett then, according to Plaintiff’s Complaint, “demanded” that 

both Plaintiff and Bell accompany Arnett to their College dormitory rooms, where he conducted a 

search of each student’s dormitory room with two other safety and welfare College employees. 

(Doc. 1, pg. 5, ¶ 16). Arnett did not obtain a warrant for the search of the dormitories. Before 

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conducting the search of Plaintiff’s dormitory room, according to the Complaint, Arnett “stated to 

Plaintiff and Bell that since they had denied consent to search their dormitory rooms, that any 

contraband or evidence of a crime would not be prosecuted in a criminal court of law but could be 

used against them in a college administrative punishment proceeding.” (Doc. 1, pg. 5, ¶ 15). 

Plaintiff was present in his College dormitory during the search. Arnett continued to ask 

Plaintiff where the marijuana was located, and Plaintiff continued to deny having any marijuana

in his dormitory room. The search of Plaintiff’s dormitory room revealed no marijuana or 

contraband. The search of Bell’s dormitory also revealed no marijuana or contraband. Arnett wrote 

and issued both Plaintiff and Bell citations for possession of marijuana paraphernalia based on the 

cylindrical tube Arnett found on Plaintiff’s person. Local prosecutors took the charges against 

Plaintiff to trial, and Plaintiff was eventually acquitted. 

On March 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed suit against both Arnett and the College. (Doc. 1). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts the following claims against Arnett: (1) a state-law claim for

malicious prosecution; (2) a state-law claim for both assault and battery; (3) a state-law claim for 

false imprisonment; (4) a state-law claim for intrusion on seclusion; and (5) a federal-law claim 

for the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Complaint 

also asserts the following claims against the College: (1) a state-law claim for malicious 

prosecution; and (2) a federal-law for governmental liability for the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

On May 5, 2022, Arnett filed his Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original Complaint 

(“Arnett’s Motion”), asserting a defense of qualified immunity. (Doc. 12). On May 6, 2022, the 

College filed its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original Complaint (“the College’s Motion”). (Doc. 

13). Both motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for consideration. For the reasons discussed 

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below, the Court partially grants and partially denies Arnett’s Motion and grants the entirety of 

College’s Motion. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 

12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 

“[t]he court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). “The court’s review is limited to the complaint, any 

documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that 

are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays 

Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “Threadbare recitals of 

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678. A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

“The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Id. Thus, a claim “is implausible on its face when ‘the well-pleaded facts do not 

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” Harold H. Huggins 

Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679); see 

also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019).

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III. ANALYSIS

A. Defendant Arnett’s Motion to Dismiss Is Granted in Part and Denied in Part

For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Arnett’s 

Motion. (Doc. 12). Specifically, the Court grants in part the motion with respect to Plaintiff’s statelaw claims against Arnett and dismisses those claims with prejudice. However, the Court denies 

in part the motion with respect to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Arnett based on the alleged 

violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and 

seizures. 

1. State-Law Claims

In his Original Complaint, Plaintiff asserts the following state-law claims against Arnett: 

(1) malicious prosecution; (2) assault and battery; (3) false imprisonment; and (4) intrusion on 

seclusion. (see Doc. 1, pgs. 8-9, ¶¶ 28-33). In his motion to dismiss, Arnett argues that these claims 

are barred by § 101.106 of the Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”). (Doc. 12, pgs. 9-11). “The 

[TTCA] provides a limited waiver of immunity for certain suits against governmental entities and 

caps recoverable damages.” Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 

(Tex. 2008). Section 101.106 of the TTCA—entitled “Election of Remedies”—requires plaintiffs, 

at the time a suit is filed, to decide whether they are going to sue a governmental unit or the 

governmental employee who allegedly committed the tortious act. Id. at 656. Section 101.106(f) 

states:

If a suit is filed against an employee of a governmental unit based on conduct within 

the general scope of that employee's employment and if it could have been brought 

under this chapter against the governmental unit, the suit is considered to be against 

the employee in the employee's official capacity only. On the employee's motion, 

the suit against the employee shall be dismissed unless the plaintiff files amended 

pleadings dismissing the employee and naming the governmental unit as defendant 

on or before the 30th day after the date the motion is filed.

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TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.106(f) (emphasis added). 

In response, Plaintiff abandoned the state-law claims against Arnett, stating that the “state[-

]law causes of action . . . will not be pursued against Defendant Arnett[.]” (Doc. 19, pg. 15). 

Plaintiff also stated that he would “timely amend his Complaint and name only Defendant Navarro 

College on any or all such causes of action.” (Doc. 19, pg. 15). Arnett filed his motion to dismiss 

on May 5, 2022. (Doc. 12). As of the issuance of this order and memorandum opinion, Plaintiff 

has not amended his Original Complaint. Because Plaintiff has affirmatively abandoned his statelaw claims against Arnett, the Court GRANTS IN PART Arnett’s Motion with respect to those 

state-law claims and dismisses them with prejudice. Terry Black's Barbecue, L.L.C. v. State Auto. 

Mut. Ins. Co., 22 F.4th 450, 459 (5th Cir. 2022) (“A plaintiff abandons claims when it fails to 

address the claims or oppose a motion challenging those claims.”); see Kovac v. Wray, 363 F. 

Supp. 3d 721, 747 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (“When a party fails to pursue a claim or defense beyond the 

party's initial complaint, the claim is deemed abandoned or waived.”).

2. Section 1983 Claims

Plaintiff alleges that Arnett “acted willfully, deliberately, maliciously, or with reckless 

disregard for Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

(Doc. 1, pg. 8, ¶ 27). The Complaint alleges: (1) excessive force stemming from Arnett’s search 

of Plaintiff’s person; (2) malicious prosecution; (3) unreasonable seizure in the form of illegal 

detention stemming from Arnett’s stopping Plaintiff and Bell; (4) unreasonable search of both 

Plaintiff’s person and dormitory. (Doc. 1, pg. 8, ¶ 27). In his motion to dismiss, Arnett raises the 

affirmative defense of qualified immunity. (Doc. 12, pgs. 7-9).

To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege: (1) “some person has deprived [them] 

of a federal right” guaranteed by the United States Constitution or federal law; and (2) “the person 

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who deprived [them] of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.” Gomez v. Toledo, 

446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). While § 1983 claims “implicating qualified immunity are subject to the 

same Rule 8 pleading standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal as all other claims[,]” the doctrine 

of qualified immunity does “add[] a wrinkle to § 1983 pleadings when [it] is relevant.” Arnold v. 

Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). “Qualified immunity gives 

government officials breathing room to make reasonable[,] but mistaken judgments, and protects 

all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 

3, 5 (2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The Fifth Circuit has explained that:

[B]ecause qualified immunity is “not simply immunity from monetary liability” but 

also “immunity from having to stand trial,” there is an interest in qualified 

immunity entering a lawsuit “at the earliest possible stage of litigation.” Westfall v. 

Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 542 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Brown v. Glossip, 878 F.2d 871, 

874 (5th Cir. 1989)).

This immunity-from-suit interest does not require that the plaintiff's original 

complaint exceed the short-and-plain-statement standard of Rule 8. [Anderson v. 

Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 589–90 (5th Cir. 2016)]. Rather, “a plaintiff seeking to 

overcome qualified immunity must plead specific facts that both [(1)] allow the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he 

has alleged and [(2)] that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal 

specificity.” Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012). That is, a plaintiff 

must plead qualified-immunity facts with the minimal specificity that would satisfy 

Twombly and Iqbal.

Arnold, 979 F.3d at 267. 

Thus, to overcome a defense of qualified immunity, a complaint must allege facts that—if 

true—establish that: (1) an official’s conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right of the 

plaintiff; and (2) the right was “clearly established” at the time of the violation. See Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 

The second step of the qualified immunity analysis “turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ 

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of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was 

taken.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 

(1987)). The two steps of the qualified immunity inquiry may be performed in any order. Pearson, 

555 U.S. at 236. “A court may rest its analysis on either prong,” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 

380 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has satisfied the “under color of law” element of his § 1983 

claim. He alleges that, at all relevant times, “Defendant[] Arnett . . . [was] acting under the color 

of the laws and regulations of the State of Texas.” (Doc. 1, pg. 7, ¶ 23). Thus, the Court must 

consider whether Plaintiff has (1) plausibly alleged that Arnett violated Plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights and (2) alleged sufficient facts to defeat Arnett’s defense of qualified immunity. 

Two of Plaintiff’s four constitutional claims should be dismissed. First, Plaintiff has 

affirmatively abandoned his excessive force claim against Arnett in his corresponding response. 

(Doc. 19, pg. 10) (“Plaintiff does not intend to pursue his claim his claim for excessive force.”). 

Plaintiff has also abandoned his malicious prosecution claim insofar as he makes no mention of it 

in his response despite Arnett specifically addressing it in his motion to dismiss. See In re Dallas 

Roadster, Ltd., 846 F.3d 112, 126 (5th Cir. 2017) (finding that plaintiff abandoned his malicious 

civil prosecution claim where he failed to respond to defendant's arguments in motion to dismiss); 

Black v. North Panola School Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 588 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that plaintiff's 

failure to defend her retaliatory abandonment claim in response to defendant's motion to dismiss 

“constituted abandonment”). Moreover, even if Plaintiff had addressed the malicious prosecution

claim in his response, the Court would be compelled to conclude that Plaintiff has not stated a 

viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because—as the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly explained—

“there is no free standing right under the Constitution to be free from malicious prosecution.” 

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Arnold, 979 F.3d at 270 (citing Morgan v. Chapman, 969 F.3d 238, 246 (5th Cir. 2020)).

2 “Rather, 

facts amounting to malicious prosecution are properly alleged as part of an actual Fourth 

Amendment claim, such as unreasonable search or seizure.” Id.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff maintains his claims of unreasonable seizure and unreasonable 

search in his response to Arnett’s Motion. (Doc., 19, pgs. 10-14). Hereunder, the Court addresses 

each of these claims in the context of the alleged Fourth Amendment constitutional violations—

considering: (1) the initial stop of Plaintiff; (2) the initial search of Plaintiff’s person; (3) the search 

of the apartment complex area; and (4) the search of the College dormitory. 

(i) Arnett’s Motion to Dismiss is Denied with Respect to Plaintiff’s Unreasonable 

Seizure Claim

The Court now considers whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 for the violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. For 

the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that: (1) Plaintiff has, in part, sufficiently alleged 

that Arnett violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures in the form 

of an illegal detention; and (2) Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to defeat Arnett’s defense of 

qualified immunity. Thus, Arnett’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, (Doc. 12), 

is DENIED IN PART with respect to Plaintiff’s unreasonable seizure claim.

(a) Whether Any Constitutional Violation Occurred

The Fourth Amendment provides that “the right of people to be secure in the persons, 

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S.

CONST. amend. IV. “[T]he Supreme Court has recognized three distinct levels or tiers of policecitizen contact within the context of the [F]ourth [A]mendment.” United States v. Hanson, 801 

2 See also Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 169 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he federal Constitution does not include a 

“freestanding” right to be free from malicious prosecution.”); Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 945 (5th Cir. 

2003) (en banc) (“No . . . freestanding constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution exists.”).

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F.2d 757, 760-61 (5th Cir. 1986). First, is mere “communication between police and citizens 

involving no coercion or detention and therefore [outside the scope of] the Fourth Amendment[.]” 

United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). Second, is an investigative 

detention—also known as a Terry stop—in which “[a]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth 

Amendment, temporarily detain a person when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion 

that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” United States. v. Chavez, 281 F.3d 

479, 485 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)); see also United States v. 

Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 520 (5th Cir. 2014 (quoting United States v. Zukas, 843 F.2d 179, 181 (5th 

Cir. 1988)). “Finally, the third tier is a full-scale arrest which must be supported by probable

cause.” Massi, 761 F.3d at 520. (citing Zukas, 843 F.2d at 181-82) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted) (alterations incorporated). “This three-tiered approach presents . . . court[s] with 

two questions: when [was] the [person] ‘seized’ and which tier does that seizure occupy?” Hanson, 

801 F.2d at 761. “A seizure has occurred if ‘in view of all the circumstances surrounding the 

incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave.’” Id. (quoting United 

States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). 

For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes: (1) a Terry stop occurred when 

Arnett handcuffed Bell and commanded Plaintiff and Bell to accompany him to the apartment 

stairwell; (2) Arnett had reasonable suspicion to support initiating the Terry stop; but (3) the stop 

was nevertheless unreasonable as alleged because it exceeded the scope of the circumstances 

justifying its initiation in the first place.

(1) Whether a Seizure Occurred

The Court first assesses Plaintiff’s contention that Arnett’s “initial police action” of 

requesting Plaintiff and Bell approach his patrol car was unreasonable seizure. (Doc. 19, pg. 10). 

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Plaintiff’s argument regarding the initial encounter is two-fold. First, Plaintiff argues that Arnett’s 

action of “pulling up in a marked police vehicle and immediately demanding Plaintiff and Bell . . 

. stop what they were doing and come to his presence” constituted an investigatory stop under the 

Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 19, pg. 10). Second, Plaintiff argues the investigative stop was 

unreasonable because “Arnett did not have reasonable suspicion that a crime was being 

committed.” (Doc. 19, pg. 10). The Court concludes the allegations contained in the Complaint 

about this initial encounter—taken as true—do not state a claim for the violation of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights because the encounter—as alleged—did not amount to a Terry stop.

As noted above, the first tier of police-citizen contact is “mere communications between a 

citizen and an officer, involving no element of detention or coercion[,]” which does not implicate 

the Fourth Amendment. Hanson, 801 F.2d at 761 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, n. 16). The Supreme 

Court has stated that its “cases make it clear that a seizure does not occur simply because a police 

officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 

(1991). An “encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required” so long as “a 

reasonable person would feel free ‘to disregard the police and go about his business[.]’” Id.

(quoting California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)). “Only when [an] officer, by means of 

physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may [courts] 

conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, n. 16; see e.g., Florida v. Royer, 

460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth 

Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking 

him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing 

to listen”). 

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Plaintiff does not plead any facts demonstrating that Arnett’s initial act of calling Plaintiff

and Bell over to his patrol car constituted a Terry stop. The Complaint states that Arnett “stopped 

his patrol car . . . and ordered Plaintiff and Bell to walk over towards him.” (Doc. 1, pg. 3, ¶ 9).

Plaintiff voluntarily walked toward the patrol car and voluntarily gave Arnett his name and date 

of birth. At this stage of the interaction, Plaintiff does not allege that Arnett used coercion, physical 

force, or any show of authority, other than Plaintiff’s allegation that Arnett “ordered” Plaintiff and 

Bell to walk towards Arnett. Plaintiff does not allege that, during this portion of the interaction, he 

(1) did not feel free to disregard Arnett and go about his business or (2) felt as though he was 

restrained in some way. Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that a reasonable person 

would have felt free to terminate the encounter and, thus, Plaintiff has not alleged that this initial 

encounter was an illegal Terry stop unsupported by reasonable suspicion. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 

434 (“[A] seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks 

a few questions.”); see also United States v. Wolfe, 983 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding that 

no Terry stop occurred when police officer stopped his patrol car, backed it up to see what was 

going on, yelled questions to five men as they waked across the street, and gave no indication that 

they were not free to leave).

The Court next considers whether an unreasonable seizure occurred when Arnett 

handcuffed Bell and allegedly “commanded” Plaintiff and Bell to accompany Arnett to the outdoor 

apartment stairwell at which they were initially seated. By this point, Plaintiff had consented to a 

search of his person while standing next to Arnett’s patrol car. It is uncontested that Arnett found 

a cylindrical container in Plaintiff’s pocket, which Arnett claimed smelled of marijuana. Arnett 

then asked Bell if he consented to being searched. After an allege miscommunication,

3 Arnett 

3 Plaintiff alleges that Arnett asked this question in the negative to elicit an unclear response. (Doc. 1, pg. 4, ¶ 13).

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searched and handcuffed Bell, stating that “he looked nervous.” Plaintiff does not allege that Arnett 

ever placed him in handcuffs. Arnett then, according to the Complaint, demanded the two young 

men accompany him to the outdoor stairwell at which they were originally sitting while Arnett 

searched the area surrounding the stairwell for marijuana.

The Court concludes that, based on the well-plead facts in the Complaint, Plaintiff has 

alleged a Terry stop occurred when Arnett handcuffed Bell and commanded Plaintiff and Bell to 

move from next to the patrol car to the stairwell. In determining whether a police-citizen encounter 

constitutes a Terry stop, courts must determine whether a seizure has occurred in light of Bostick

and Terry. Taking as true the well-pled facts in the Complaint, the Court concludes that, while 

Plaintiff was not himself handcuffed, a reasonable person in Plaintiff’s position would have 

believed he was not free to leave after Arnett handcuffed Bell and commanded that Plaintiff and 

Bell relocate themselves so that Arnett could conduct a search of the area around the apartment 

complex stairwell. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434. Thus, the Court concludes Plaintiff has adequately 

alleged that a seizure occurred under the Fourth Amendment. 

(2) Whether the Seizure Was Legal

Having concluded that Arnett initiated a Terry stop once he handcuffed Bell and ordered 

Bell and Plaintiff to relocate to the stairwell, the Court must next assess the legality of the 

investigative stop. Such an analysis is two-pronged. United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 349-50 

(5th Cir. 2010). First, the Court considers whether Arnett’s “decision to make the stop was justified 

at its inception.” United States v. Bass, 996 F.3d 729, 737 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Pack, 612 F.3d 

at 350). Second, the Court considers whether Arnett’s “subsequent actions were reasonably related 

in scope to the circumstances that caused him to [initiate the Terry stop] in the first place.” Id. 

(citing Pack, 612 F.3d at 350). For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes: (1) Arnett 

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was justified in initiating a Terry stop in the first place; but (2) Arnett’s subsequent actions were 

not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop because Arnett extended the 

Plaintiff’s detention beyond its initial purpose and without additional reasonable suspicion.

First, the well-pled facts in the Complaint support the conclusion that Arnett was justified 

in initiating the Terry stop. A Terry stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion, which “has 

been described as a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal 

activity.” Chavez, 281 F.3d at 485 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ornelas v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). “While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than 

probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the 

Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.”

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000). “Reasonable suspicion exists when the detaining 

officer can point to specific facts that, when taken together with rational inferences from those 

facts, reasonably warrant the search and seizure.” United States. v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 631 

(5th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Santiago, 310 F.3d 336, 338-39 (5th Cir. 2002)). The 

determination of whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify an investigatory detention “must 

be based on the totality of the circumstances and the collective knowledge and experience of the 

officer[.]” Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 2000)). 

The Court concludes, based on the well-pled facts in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Arnett had 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when Arnett initiated the Terry stop. Arnett’s search of 

Plaintiff’s person resulted in Arnett finding a clear cylindrical tube that Arnett claimed smelled of 

marijuana. Plaintiff alleges Arnett did not find any residue in or around the tube; Plaintiff also 

alleges he informed Arnett that the tube was the original package for a legal CBD cigarette. 

Nonetheless, the Court concludes Arnett’s ability to smell what Arnett perceived to be the odor 

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marijuana emanating from the tube found on Plaintiff’s person provided the basis for a reasonable 

suspicion that Plaintiff had engaged in criminal activity—namely, the criminal possession of 

marijuana, and/or possession of drug paraphernalia, both of which are crimes in Texas. See TEX.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 481.121 (possession of marijuana), 481.125 (possession of drug 

paraphernalia); see also United States v. Reed, 882 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1988) (smell of burnt 

marijuana alone justified the warrantless search of a vehicle).

4 Thus, the Court concludes that—

taking the well-pled facts as true—Arnett was justified in initiating the Terry stop.

Next, the Court considers whether Arnett’s subsequent actions were reasonably related in 

scope to the circumstances justifying the investigative detention. In evaluating an officer’s 

subsequent actions after the initiation of a Terry stop, courts must evaluate whether “both the scope 

and the length of the officer’s investigation [was] reasonable in light of the facts articulated as 

having created the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Pack, 612 F.3d at 357. “[I]f 

additional reasonable suspicion arises in the course of the stop and before the initial purpose of the 

stop has been fulfilled, then the detention may continue until the new reasonable suspicion has 

been dispelled or confirmed.” United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 431 (5th Cir. 2005). 

The Court considers the reasonableness of Arnett’s subsequent actions in two parts: (1) Arnett’s

search of the area around the stairwell at which Plaintiff and Bell were originally seated; and (2) 

Arnett’s alleged demand that Plaintiff and Bell accompany Arnett to Plaintiff and Bell’s dormitory

rooms after the stairwell search turned up no evidence of criminal activity.

4 See United States v. Villareal, 565 F.2d 932, 937 (5th Cir. 1978) (smell of marijuana furnished officer with probable 

cause to search the trunk of a vehicle); Bazan v. Whitfield, 754 F. App’x 280, 281 (5th Cir. 1978) (smell of marijuana 

provided sufficient probable cause to justify warrantless search of a vehicle); United States v. Alberti, No. 3:14-cr0007-L, 2014 WL 2159259, at *7 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2014) (smell of marijuana from a vehicle gave officers, at 

minimum, reasonable suspicion to support investigatory stop).

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The Court concludes Arnett’s initial actions after moving Plaintiff and Bell to the stairwell 

was reasonably related to his reasonable suspicion that the two young men either were or had been 

in possession of marijuana and/or drug paraphernalia. Here, Arnett allegedly ordered both Plaintiff 

and Bell accompany Arnett to the apartment stairwell where they were initially seated. According 

to the Complaint, Arnett “searched the area of the stairwell and repeatedly asked Plaintiff and Bell 

where the marijuana was.” (Doc. 1, pg. 5, ¶ 14). Arnett’s search of the area surrounding the 

apartment stairwell turned up neither marijuana nor other contraband. Nevertheless, Arnett’s 

actions in searching the apartment stairwell were reasonably related to the circumstances justifying 

the Terry stop. That is, Arnett believed Plaintiff and Bell either were or had recently been in 

physical possession of marijuana and/or drug paraphernalia; therefore, Arnett’s search of Plaintiff 

and Bell’s persons as well as Arnett’s search of the area in which they had been sitting for evidence 

to confirm his suspicion that a crime had been committed was proper. Thus, the Court concludes 

Arnett’s acts relating to the stairwell portion of the interaction was not unreasonable. 

However, the Court nonetheless concludes—in light of the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s

Complaint—Plaintiff has adequately alleged Arnett violated Plaintiff’s right to be free from 

unreasonable seizure when Arnett extended Plaintiff’s detention without additional, articulable 

reasonable suspicion. With respect to whether an officer’s actions following a legitimate Terry 

stop are reasonable, the Fifth Circuit has explained that:

[W]e require that an officer’s actions after a legitimate stop be “reasonably related 

to the circumstances that justified the stop, or to dispel[] his reasonable suspicion 

[that] developed during the stop.” [United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th

Cir. 2004)]. A reasonable detention “must be temporary and last no longer than is 

necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, unless further reasonable suspicion, 

supported by articulable facts, emerges.” Id.

Johnson v. Thibodaux City, 887 F.3d 726, 734 (5th Cir. 2018) (second and third alteration in 

original). While “[t]here is no ‘constitutional stopwatch’ on investigatory stops[,]” the Court 

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“must assess whether [Arnett] ‘diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to 

confirm or dispel [his] suspicions quickly.’” Bass, 995 F.3d at 738 (quoting Brigham, 382 F.3d at 

511). The Court concludes Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for unreasonable seizure because 

the well-pled facts indicate Arnett: (1) detained Plaintiff for longer that was necessary to confirm 

or dispel his suspicion that Plaintiff was or had been in possession of marijuana and/or possession 

of drug paraphernalia; and (2) extended Plaintiff’s detention without additional reasonable 

suspicion.

It is undisputed the stairwell search did not turn up any evidence of a crime. Thus, once 

Arnett completed the stairwell search, the “purpose of the stop”—to confirm or obtain evidence of 

a crime relating to possession of marijuana and/or drug paraphernalia—was completed. Royer, 460 

U.S. at 500. At that point, the reasonable suspicion justifying Arnett’s initiation of a Terry stop 

was dispelled. Yet, Arnett extended his detention of Plaintiff. As noted above, a seizure occurs 

when an officer, “by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the 

liberty of a citizen[.]” Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, n. 16. Based on the well-pled facts in the Complaint, 

the Court concludes Arnett continued his detention of Plaintiff by a show of authority when he (1) 

told Plaintiff that he would search Plaintiff’s dormitory even though Plaintiff did not give his 

consent to do so and (2) “demanded” that Plaintiff accompany Arnett to Plaintiff’s dormitory so 

Arnett could conduct further investigation. The Court concludes that, based on the facts alleged, 

Arnett had no legal justification to detain Plaintiff longer than Arnett already had.

The Supreme Court has explained that “a person may not be detained even momentarily

without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 498 (emphasis added). For 

Arnett to continue Plaintiff’s detention, additional reasonable suspicion—supported by articulable 

facts—would have had to emerged during the stairwell search. Brigham, 382 F.3d at 506; see also 

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Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d at 431. Based on the well-pled facts in the Complaint, the stairwell search 

did not turn up any objective grounds for Arnett’s further detention of Plaintiff to see if Plaintiff 

had marijuana and/or drug paraphernalia in his dormitory. Thus, Arnett’s continued detention of 

Plaintiff by ordering Plaintiff to accompany Arnett to Plaintiff’s dormitory was not supported by 

any additional reasonable suspicion. Consequentially, the Court concludes Plaintiff has alleged 

sufficient facts in his Complaint to support the reasonable inference that Arnett’s continued

detention of Plaintiff was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Johnson, 887 F.3d at 

734 (an investigative detention that “lasted longer than necessary to effect the purpose of the stop” 

was unlawful); United States v. Valdez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[O]nce an officer’s 

suspicions have been verified or dispelled, the detention must end unless there is additional 

articulable, reasonable suspicion.”); Emesowem v. Cruz, 756 F. App’x 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2018) 

(detaining plaintiff handcuffed in the back of a squad car believing plaintiff was attempting to 

burglarize a car despite law enforcement knowing the car belonged to plaintiff was unreasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment).

In sum, the Court concludes Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Arnett violated Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures in the form of illegal detention.

Plaintiff has adequately alleged Arnett initiated an investigatory detention of Plaintiff when Arnett

handcuffed Bell and ordered the two young men to relocate from next to the patrol car to the 

stairwell. Arnett had reasonable suspicion to justify initiating this detention, and Arnett’s initial 

act of searching the stairwell area was reasonably related to that originally reasonable suspicion. 

However, the well-pled facts in the Complaint indicate that Arnett’s detention of Plaintiff lasted 

longer than was necessary to effectuate its original purpose—to determine whether Plaintiff was 

or recently had been in possession of marijuana and/or drug paraphernalia. See Johnson, 887 F.3d 

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at 734. Once Arnett found no evidence of either possession of marijuana or drug paraphernalia in

the stairwell area, his initially reasonable suspicion was dispelled, and his detention of Plaintiff 

should have ended. See Valdez, 267 F.3d at 398. However, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that 

Arnett continued Plaintiff’s detention despite lacking additional reasonable suspicion to do so. See 

Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d at 431. Thus, taking as true the facts alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff 

has plausibly alleged that Arnett violated the Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

unreasonable seizures.

(b) Whether a Violation of Clearly Established Law Occurred

Having determined that Plaintiff has adequately pled his unreasonable seizure claim to 

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, the Court must next determine whether Arnett’s conduct—as 

alleged in the Complaint—violated a constitutional right that clearly established at the time of the 

incident. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01. In its unpublished but persuasive opinion in Emesowum v. 

Cruz, the Fifth Circuit explained:

It was clearly established at the time of this incident that “an investigative detention 

must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 

the stop.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319; see also Turner v. Lieutenant 

Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 693–95 (5th Cir. 2017) (reversing grant of motion to dismiss 

on qualified immunity grounds where detention amounted to warrantless arrest); 

Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 413–14 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of 

summary judgment based on qualified immunity in § 1983 suit for unlawful arrest); 

[Brigham, 382 F.3d at 510] (collecting cases holding that continued questioning 

when “there remained no reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing” unconstitutionally 

prolonged detentions). 

756 F. App’x at 379.5 While the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Emesowum is not itself controlling

precedent, each of the decisions the Fifth Circuit cited in support of its conclusion that the officer 

in Emesowum violated plaintiff’s clearly established rights are published opinions and therefore

5 “An unpublished opinion issued after January 1, 1996 is not controlling precedent, but may be persuasive authority.” 

Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4).

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constitute controlling precedent that place the instant “constitutional question beyond debate.” alKidd, 563 U.S. at 741. 

Plaintiff alleges Arnett “acted willfully, deliberately, maliciously, or with reckless 

disregard for Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights,” including the right to be free 

from the unreasonable seizure of his person. (Doc. 1, pgs. 7-8, ¶ 25-27). Based on the facts alleged, 

the Court concludes Plaintiff has pled facts with sufficient specificity to “defeat a qualified 

immunity defense.” Backe, 691 F.3d at 648. When Arnett ordered Plaintiff to accompany Arnett

to Plaintiff’s dormitory on the College campus, no reasonable officer could have concluded that 

the Fourth Amendment permitted such a continued detention of Plaintiff—because Arnett’s 

reasonable suspicion of a crime (that Plaintiff was or had been in possession of marijuana and/or 

drug paraphernalia) had already been dispelled. See Valdez, 267 F.3d at 398 (detention became 

unlawful once suspicion was dispelled); see also Emesowum, 756 F. App’x at 379-80 (detention 

became unlawful after officer uncovered evidence plaintiff owned the car the officer had 

previously believed plaintiff was attempting to burgle). Accordingly, Plaintiff has adequately pled 

facts allowing the Court to draw the reasonable inference that not only that Arnett is liable for the 

conduct alleged but also that Plaintiff can defeat Arnett’s defense of qualified immunity. See

Backe, 691 F.3d at 648. As such, Arnett’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, (Doc. 

12), is DENIED IN PART with respect to Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Arnett 

violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure in the form of 

illegal detention. 

(ii) Arnett’s Motion to Dismiss is Denied in Part with Respect to Plaintiff’s 

Unreasonable Search Claim

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The Court next considers whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 for the violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. For 

the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes Plaintiff has, in part, alleged an unreasonable 

search claim. Thus, Arnett’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, (Doc. 12), is DENIED IN 

PART with respect to Plaintiff’s unreasonable search claim. 

(a) Whether Any Constitutional Violation Occurred

“The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that the ‘right of the people to be secure 

in their persons, their houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 

not be violated.’” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 

“Simply put, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, unless 

they fall into one of the few specifically established and well-defined exceptions to the general 

rule.” United States v. Jenkins, 46 F.3d 447, 451 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 

412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). Thus, warrantless searches violate the Fourth Amendment unless “they 

fall within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.” Bass, 996 F.3d at 738. Plaintiff bases 

his unreasonable search claim on: (1) Arnett’s search of Plaintiff’s person after Arnett called him 

over to the squad car; and (2) Arnett’s search of Plaintiff’s dormitory. (see Doc. 1, pgs. 3-4, ¶¶ 8-

11; Doc. 1, pgs. 5-6, ¶¶ 15-16). For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff has partly, adequately 

alleged that Arnett violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.

(1) Search of Plaintiff’s Person

The Court first considers whether Plaintiff stated an unreasonable search claim based on 

Arnett’s search of Plaintiff’s person. Based on the well-plead facts in the Complaint, Plaintiff

failed to allege that Arnett’s search of his person violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

“[O]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and 

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probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219. 

However, consent to a warrantless search must be validly given. See United States v. Jenson, 462 

F.3d 399, 406 (5th Cir. 2006). “To determine whether consent was validly given, [courts] ask[:] 

(1) whether consent was voluntary[;] and (2) whether it was an independent act of free will.” Id.

(citing Santiago, 310 F.3d at 342). 

Plaintiff admits in his Complaint that he consented to the search of his person. Plaintiff 

alleges however, Plaintiff consented to the search because, “[a]s a young African American male 

acutely aware of the rash of recent high profile police killings of unarmed African Americans that 

quickly escalated from minor encounters[,]” he wanted “the encounter to end as quickly as 

possible[.]” (Doc. 1, pg. 4, ¶ 10). Plaintiff makes the conclusory argument—without citation to 

any underlying facts—that Arnett unlawfully “parlayed” his “intimidation power” into “obtaining 

the ‘consent’ of Plaintiff to search his person.” (Doc. 19, pg. 11). Plaintiff also appears to argue 

that the search of his person constituted an unconstitutional Terry pat down. (Doc. 19, pg. 11). In 

reply, Arnett argues that Plaintiff’s consent was validly given because: (1) Plaintiff does not 

expressly plead that his consent was involuntary; and (2) an alleged general knowledge of fear of 

police violence—even though Plaintiff does not specifically plead that that he feared such violence 

from Arnett—is insufficient to render Plaintiff’s consent involuntary. (Doc. 24, pg. 3). The Court 

agrees with Arnett on both counts. 

Courts use a multi-factor test to determine whether consent was voluntary. The Fifth 

Circuit has explained those factors in the context of a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal 

case:

(1) the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status; (2) the presence of coercive 

police procedures; (3) the extent and level of the defendant's cooperation with the 

police; (4) the defendant's awareness of his right to refuse consent; (5) the 

defendant's education and intelligence; and (6) the defendant's belief that no 

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incriminating evidence will be found. United States v. Wise, 877 F.3d 209, 221–22 

(5th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Williams, 365 F.3d 399, 406–07 (5th Cir. 

2004)). “Although all six factors are relevant, no single factor is dispositive.” 

United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 438 (5th Cir. 1993).

United States v. Perales, 886 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2018). Upon careful consideration of these 

factors, the Court concludes—even viewing the facts alleged in the Complaint in the light most 

favorable to Plaintiff—Plaintiff has not alleged that his consent to the search of his person was 

involuntary. 

First, Plaintiff was not in custody when he consented to the search of his person. Plaintiff 

consented to Arnett’s search after Arnett called Plaintiff and Bell over to his patrol car and before 

Arnett handcuffed Plaintiff and ordered the two young men to relocate from next to the patrol car 

to the stairwell. “Voluntariness of custodial status turns on whether a reasonable person in the 

defendant's position would feel free to terminate the encounter.” United States v. Soriano, 976 

F.3d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 2008)). 

As discussed above, Plaintiff was not in custody when he walked to the patrol car from the stairwell 

because a reasonable person in Plaintiff’s situation would have felt free to terminate the encounter

with Arnett. See supra III.A.2.i.a. Thus, this factor weighs Arnett’s favor. 

Second, Plaintiff does not plead any facts from which the court can infer the presence of 

coercive police procedures at the time Plaintiff consented to the search. At that point of the 

interaction, Arnett had only called the young men over to his squad car. The only potentially 

coercive police procedure the Court can deduce from the Complaint is Arnett’s act of placing Bell 

in handcuffs; however, that conduct took place after Plaintiff had already consented to the search 

of his person. Plaintiff alleges that he consented to the search because he was aware of a “recent 

rash of high-profile police killings of unarmed African Americans that quickly escalated from 

minor encounters[.]” (Doc. 1, pg. 4, 10). However, Plaintiff does not allege he was fearful of 

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violence, nor does he allege any facts from which the Court can conclude that a reasonable person 

would have been fearful of violence. As Arnett correctly notes, general nervousness during an 

encounter with police does not render consent to a search involuntary. See United States v. 

Galberth, 846 F.2d 983, 988 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Galberth’s nervousness . . . does not preclude a 

finding of voluntariness[.]”); United States v. Martinez, 410 F. App’x 759, 764 (5th Cir. 2011)

(holding that “the mere presence of armed officers does not render a situation coercive” when 

officers were merely standing and engaging in a “relatively polite conversation”); United States v. 

Olivier-Becerril, 861 F.2d 424, 426 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that, even though defendant was not 

free to leave the inspection area, consent to search was voluntary when there was no evidence that 

officers “employed coercion, tricks, or threats” to induce consent). Thus, the second factor weighs 

in Arnett’s favor. 

The third factor weighs in Arnett’s favor as well because Plaintiff was cooperative with 

Arnett insofar as he voluntarily walked from the stairwell to the squad car and allowed Arnett to 

search his person. See United States v. Olivarria, 781 F. Supp. 2d 387, 395 (N.D. Miss. 2011)

(defendant was cooperative with police during a roadside encounter when defendant voluntarily 

allowed officer to examine defendant’s cell phone), aff'd, 495 F. App'x 512 (5th Cir. 2012) The 

fourth factor also weighs in Arnett’s favor. Plaintiff does not plead any facts that—if true—would 

establish Plaintiff believed he did not have the right to deny consent to the search. Plaintiff does 

not plead that Arnett informed him that he had the right to refuse consent. However, even if 

Plaintiff had done so, an officer’s failure to inform a suspect of their right to deny consent does 

not, alone, preclude a finding that consent was voluntarily given. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 

248-49 (“while the subject’s knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account” 

when determining the voluntariness of consent, it is not “a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary 

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consent”); Galberth, 846 F.2d at 988 (“The district court’s finding of a valid consent to be searched 

is not outweighed by the fact that Galberth was never told that she had the right to withhold her 

consent[.]”). 

The fifth factor also weighs in Arnett’s favor. At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was a 

nineteen-year-old college student and Plaintiff neither alleges he was susceptible to coercion due 

to a lack of education, nor does Plaintiff allege he has anything other than ordinary intelligence. 

See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558 (holding that a twenty-two-year-old woman who had not 

graduated high school could voluntarily consent to a search); United States v. Michalik, 5 F.4th 

583, 590 (5th Cir. 2021) (education and intelligence factor weighed in favor of finding voluntary 

consent for forty-year-old defendant who possessed a high school education).

Finally, the sixth factor weighs in Arnett’s favor. “An awareness or belief that no 

incriminating evidence will be found weighs in favor of a finding of voluntariness.” Soriano, 976 

F.3d at 458. Plaintiff states in his Complaint that he “knew he did not possess anything illegal and 

he was hoping to satisfy . . . Arnett so the encounter would end without physical harm or worse.” 

(Doc. 1, pg. 4, ¶ 10). Moreover, after Arnett found the cylindrical tube from which he claimed a 

“faint odor of marijuana” was emanating, Plaintiff alleges he told Arnett that “the tube was the 

original package used to store a CBD cigarette” and that it was the type of CBD product that can 

be legally bought and sold in Texas. (Doc. 1, pg. 4, ¶ 12). Thus, the Court concludes, based on the 

facts alleged, Plaintiff did not believe any incriminating evidence would be found during the search 

of his person. As such, all six factors weigh in Arnett’s favor, and the Court must conclude Plaintiff 

voluntarily gave his consent for Arnett to search his person. 

The second prong of the valid consent analysis is whether consent was given as “an 

independent act of free will.” Jenson, 462 F.3d at 406 (citation omitted). The purpose of this 

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inquiry is “to determine whether there was a ‘break in the causal chain’ between the constitutional 

violation and the consent; that is to say, consent cannot be the product of the illegal detention.” Id.

(citation Santiago, 310 F.3d at 343). As discussed above, the Court has already concluded—based 

on the facts alleged—Plaintiff was not detained at the time he gave his consent to search his person. 

See supra III.A.2.i.a. Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged facts from which the Court can reasonably 

infer Plaintiff’s consent for Arnett to search him was invalid. 

Finally, in response to Arnett’s Motion, Plaintiff appears to argue that he has stated a claim 

for unreasonable search because the search of his person constituted an illegal Terry pat-down. 

(see Doc. 19, pg. 11) (arguing that an officer may—for the protection of himself and others—only 

conduct a carefully limited search of a person’s outer clothing for weapons when the officer has a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and that the person may be armed and dangerous, which 

Plaintiff argues Arnett lacked) (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000) (citing, in turn, 

Terry, 392 U.S. at 30)). However, Arnett’s search of Plaintiff was not a Terry pat-down because it 

was consensual. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 7-8; see also United States v. Jackson, 390 F.3d 393, 399 

(5th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 544 U.S. 917 (2005) (concluding that an initially 

consensual encounter did not become a Terry stop until the officer patted down the defendant 

without consent); United States v. Berry, 25 F. Supp. 3d 931, 944 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (“Unless a patdown is consensual, before it can be conducted, a police officer must have reasonable suspicion

that criminal activity may be afoot.”) (emphasis added) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 7-8; Jackson, 

390 F.3d at 399).

In sum, the Court concludes Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Arnett’s search of his 

person was unreasonable and thus violative of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, the 

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Court grants Arnett’s motion to dismiss as it relates to Plaintiff’s claims regarding an unreasonable 

search of Plaintiff’s person. 

(2) Search of Plaintiff’s Dormitory Room

Next, the Court considers whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Arnett’s 

warrantless, non-consensual search of Plaintiff’s dormitory room violated the Fourth Amendment. 

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has. “Physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which 

the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 

313 (1972). “It is ‘a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a 

home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 

403 (2006) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004)). However, “because the ultimate 

touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ the warrant requirement is subject to 

certain exceptions.” Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403 (citing Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999) 

(per curiam); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). The Fifth Circuit has explained

that “a student who occupies a college dormitory room enjoys the protections of the Fourth 

Amendment.” Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 274, 289 (5th Cir. 1971).

It is undisputed that Arnett searched Plaintiff’s dormitory room without a warrant. 

However, Arnett argues that his warrantless search of the dormitory did not violate Plaintiff’s 

Fourth Amendment rights because Arnett expressly informed Plaintiff that any contraband or 

evidence of a crime that might be obtained during the search of Plaintiff’s dormitory would not be 

used in any subsequent criminal prosecution of Plaintiff. (Doc. 12, pg. 19). Arnett argues that 

because the subsequent criminal prosecution of Plaintiff did not involve anything discovered 

during the warrantless search, Plaintiff cannot state a claim under § 1983 for a Fourth Amendment 

violation based on the search of Plaintiff’s dorm. (Doc. 12, pg. 19). 

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Arnett relies on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Piazzola. 442 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1971). 

Arnett argues that Piazzola stands for the proposition that universities have “broad supervisory 

powers” over campus dormitories, which—Arnett claims—empowers university officials to

conduct warrantless searches of dormitories without complying with the Fourth Amendment 

warrant requirement so long as the searches are not conducted for the “primary purpose of a 

criminal prosecution.” (Doc. 12, pg. 12) (citing Piazzola, 442 F.2d at 289). Reviewing the Fifth 

Circuit’s reasoning in Piazzola, as well as cases from other courts considering the constitutionality 

of warrantless dormitory searches, the Court is unconvinced that Arnett can escape the Fourth 

Amendment’s requirements by informing Plaintiff that evidence potentially gathered from the 

search of Plaintiff’s dormitory would not be used in any subsequent criminal prosecution of 

Plaintiff. 

In Piazzola, two Troy State University students were convicted of possession of marijuana 

and sentenced to prison after police searched their dormitories without a warrant after the fruits of 

those searches were used in subsequent criminal prosecutions of the students. Piazzola, 442 F.2d 

at 285-86. The searches in Piazzola were pursuant to university regulations empowering the 

university to: (1) enter dormitory rooms for inspection purposes; and (2) search dormitories and 

students’ personal effects if the administration deemed such a search necessary. Id. at 286. The 

Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s granting habeas corpus relief and the district court’s 

ordering the release of the prisoners after holding the dormitory searches violated the Fourth 

Amendment. Id. at 289. The Fifth Circuit explained:

[T]he University retains broad supervisory powers which permit it to adopt the 

regulation heretofore quoted, provided that regulation is reasonably construed and 

is limited in application to further the University’s function as an educational 

institution. The regulation cannot be construed or applied so as to give consent to 

a search for evidence for the primary purpose of a criminal prosecution. Otherwise, 

the regulation itself would constitute an unconstitutional attempt to require a 

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student to waive his protection from unreasonable search and seizure as a 

condition to his occupancy of a college dorm.

Id. (emphases added). In other words, Piazzola indicates the following: (1) college dormitory 

residents retain Fourth Amendment protections over their domiciles; (2) college policies and 

regulations that allow college personnel to search students’ dormitory rooms constitute the 

students’ consent to such searches; and (3) such consent is only valid if: (a) the searches are tied 

to the institution’s educational purpose; (b) the dormitory residents are aware of the regulations; 

and (c) the searches are not conducted primarily for the purposes of criminal prosecution. See id.

The pleadings before the Court contain no Navarro College policy or regulation allowing

College personnel to conduct warrantless searches of the students’ dormitory rooms. The 

Complaint contains no reference to any such policy and neither Arnett nor the College has provided 

the Court with evidence of any such policy as an attachment to their respective motions to dismiss.6

Nevertheless, Arnett argues that his warrantless search of Plaintiff’s dormitory without Plaintiff’s 

consent did not violate the Fourth Amendment merely because he told Plaintiff any evidence 

gathered would not be used in any subsequent criminal prosecution. 

The Fifth Circuit has not revisited the question of warrantless dormitory searches since its 

decision in Piazzola. Arnett has not identified, nor can the Court find, any case standing for the 

proposition that—in the absence of regulations authorizing dormitory searches—university 

personnel may escape the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and perform warrantless 

searches of students’ dormitories without a warrant by merely informing students stating that any 

evidence found will not be used in any subsequent criminal prosecution of the students. Every 

6 The Court notes here that its review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motions is “limited to the complaint, any documents attached 

to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by 

the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), 594 F.3d at 387. Thus, had the Complaint referenced any such policy and 

Arnett or the College attached evidence of such policy to their respective motions, the Court could properly consider 

the policy without converting the motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment. 

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pertinent case the Court found addressing warrantless dormitory searches involves, at the very 

least, regulations empowering such searches. See, e.g., Medlock v. Trustees of Indiana University, 

738 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that: (1) plaintiff consented to warrantless search by resident 

advisors inspecting for health and safety violations when plaintiff agreed to the university’s

housing policy; and (2) the subsequent search by police officers was supported by a warrant that 

was issued after the Court found probable cause once the university’s resident advisors informed 

officer they saw marijuana in plaintiff’s dorm room); Wagner v. Holtzapple, 101 F. Supp. 3d 462 

(M.D. Pa. 2015) (holding that university students consented in advance to dormitory searches by 

agreeing to university housing policy handbook, but that students sufficiently alleged that 

university defendants did not comply with contents of the university’s handbook when conducting 

the dormitory search at issue); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988 (D. N.H. 1976) (holding that 

college personnel could perform administrative searches of dormitories for health and safety 

violations pursuant to college policy because such regulations were tied to educational purpose but 

intrusive searches for stolen property violated the Fourth Amendment even though evidence 

obtained was only used in internal disciplinary proceedings and not in any subsequent criminal 

prosecution of students); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (holding that the 

dormitory housing contract to which plaintiff agreed allowed college personnel to enter 

dormitories when, inter alia, they have “reasonable cause to believe students are continuing to 

violate federal, state, or local laws or College regulations” was unconstitutional even though 

evidence obtained was only used for internal disciplinary purposes because college personnel were 

searching specifically for evidence plaintiff was violating the law); Devers v. Southern University, 

97-0259 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/29); 712 So.2d 199, 204-07 (holding that university policy allowing 

police to conduct random sweeps of students’ dormitories was unconstitutional because it was not 

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tied to university’s educational purpose). Each of these cases analyzed the issue of warrantless 

dormitory searches pursuant to a university or college’s housing policy as turning on consent—

that is, courts consider a student’s agreement to dormitory policies allowing university or college 

personnel to conduct searches of their dormitory as advanced consent to such searches. 

Without a Navarro College policy allowing campus personnel to search College dormitory 

rooms, and without any indication that Plaintiff was aware of such policy, the Court cannot 

conclude Plaintiff gave advanced consent to a warrantless search of Plaintiff’s dormitory room.7

Moreover, the Court has found no basis for concluding that Arnett’s act of informing Plaintiff that 

any evidence gathered from the warrantless search of Plaintiff’s dormitory would not be used in 

any subsequent criminal prosecution of Plaintiff makes Arnett’s search of Plaintiff’s dormitory 

room lawful.8 As such, the Court must conclude that Plaintiff has adequately alleged Arnett 

7 The Court notes, however, that the mere existence of a policy allowing for warrantless searches of the College’s 

dormitory rooms may not, on its own, overcome Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy in his dormitory. In 

Devers v. Southern University, the First Circuit Court of Appeals of Louisiana explained that, in the context of 

eliminating weapons and drugs from the educational environment:

[L]aw enforcement agencies do not have the authority to sweep entire residential areas without a 

warrant. This is the very essence of the Fourth Amendment protection.

. . . . 

We agree with the court in Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, that a check of a student's dormitory 

room is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless Southern University can show that the 

search furthers its functioning as an educational institution. Southern University's housing 

regulation, as written, clearly authorizes unconstitutional searches. The search must further an 

interest that is separate and distinct from that served by Louisiana's criminal laws. See Morale v. 

Grigel, 422 F. Supp. at 998.

We reject Southern University's argument that by agreeing to the provisions of the housing contract, 

students consent to the dormitory sweeps. The state, in operating a public school system of higher 

education, cannot condition attendance at one of its schools on the student's renunciation of his 

constitutional rights. Robinson v. Board of Regents of Eastern Kentucky University, 475 F.2d 707, 

709 (6th Cir. 1973).

Devers, 712 So.2d at 206-07.

8 Criminal prosecution notwithstanding, Arnett informed Plaintiff that results of the dormitory search “could be used 

against them in a college administrative punishment proceeding.” Here, there is nothing in the pleadings that would 

support an administrative search of the dormitory beyond a general desire to eliminate drugs from the educational 

environment as discussed in Devers. See Devers, 712 So. 2d at 206–07. In other words, nothing in the pleadings 

supports reasonable suspicion or an administrative search of the dormitory for either (1) evidence of a possession 

crime or (2) drugs in the educational environment.

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violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches based on 

Arnett’s search of Plaintiff’s dormitory room without either a search warrant or Plaintiff’s consent.

(b) Whether a Violation of Clearly Established Law Occurred

Having determined Plaintiff has adequately pled his unreasonable search, the Court must 

next determine whether Arnett’s conduct—as alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint—violated a 

constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the incident at issue. Saucier, 533 

U.S. at 200-01. As discussed at length above, the Fifth Circuit has explained that “a student who 

occupies a college dormitory room enjoys the protections of the Fourth Amendment.” Piazzola, 

442 F.2d at 289.

Plaintiff alleges Arnett “acted willfully, deliberately, maliciously, or with reckless 

disregard for Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights,” including Plaintiff’s right to be 

free from unreasonable searches. (Doc. 1, pgs. 7-8, ¶ 25-27). Based on the facts alleged in the 

Complaint, the Court concludes Plaintiff has pled facts with sufficient specificity to “defeat a 

qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.” Backe, 691 F.3d at 648. At the time Arnett 

searched Plaintiff’s dormitory without either a search warrant or without Plaintiff’s consent, no 

reasonable officer could have concluded Plaintiff was not entitled Fourth Amendment protection

as a dormitory resident. See Piazzola, 442 F.2d at 289. Accordingly, Plaintiff has pled sufficient 

facts allowing the Court to draw the reasonable inference not only that Arnett is liable for the 

conduct alleged but also that Plaintiff can defeat Arnett’s defense of qualified immunity if such 

facts are true. See Backe, 691 F.3d at 648. As such, Arnett’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original 

Complaint, (Doc. 12), is DENIED IN PART with respect to Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim 

that Arnett violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches 

based on the search of Plaintiff’s dormitory room.

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B. Defendant Navarro College’s Motion to Dismiss is Granted

For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the College’s Motion. (Doc. 13). 

Specifically, the Court grants the motion with respect to Plaintiff’s state-law claim against the 

College and dismisses this claim with prejudice. The Court grants Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against 

the College and dismisses this claim without prejudice. 

1. State-Law Claims

In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserted a state-law claim for malicious prosecution against the 

College. (See Doc. 1, pg. 8, ¶ 29). The College moved to dismiss this claim under the TTCA. (see 

Doc. 13, pgs. 32-34). In his response, Plaintiff affirmatively abandoned the claim. (Doc. 20, pg. 

20) (“Plaintiff does not intend to pursue his state-law claims against Defendant Navarro College.”). 

Because Plaintiff has affirmatively abandoned his state-law claims against the College, the Court 

grants the College’s Motion with respect to that state-law claim and dismisses it with prejudice. 

Terry Black's Barbecue, 22 F.4th at 459; Kovac, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 747.

2. Section 1983 Claims

The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the College. As 

noted above, to state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiffs must allege: (1) “some person has deprived 

him of a federal right” guaranteed by the United States Constitution or federal law; and (2) “the 

person who deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law.” Gomez, 446 

U.S. at 640 (1980). The existence of a constitutional violation is a “threshold” requirement in any 

claim § 1983 claim. Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 844 (5th Cir. 2009). “[W]ithout 

an underlying constitutional violation, there can be no § 1983 liability[.]” Becerra v. Asher, 105 

F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original).

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The Supreme Court has explained that a governmental entity—such as a public community 

college—may not be held liable under § 1983 “unless action pursuant to official municipal policy 

of some nature caused the constitutional tort.” Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 

U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis added). While governmental entities “can be sued directly under 

§ 1983, Monell establishes that they ‘cannot be found liable on a theory of vicarious liability or 

respondeat superior.’” Webb v. Town of Saint Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting 

Davidson v. City of Stafford, 848 F.3d 384, 395 (5th Cir. 2017), as revised (Mar. 31, 2017) (citing, 

in turn, Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91))). “In other words, ‘the unconstitutional conduct must be 

directly attributable to the municipality through some sort of official action or imprimatur; isolated 

actions by municipal employees will almost never trigger liability.” Id. (quoting Piotrowski v. City 

of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir.2001)). Thus, to assert claim for liability under Monell, a 

plaintiff must allege that “(1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) 

was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Peterson, 588 F.3d at 847 

(citing Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578)).

Plaintiff alleges the College violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by using 

excessive force. (Doc. 1, pg. 7, ¶ 25). Plaintiff also alleges he was unconstitutionally “detained, 

interrogated, searched, assaulted, . . . and maliciously and baselessly prosecuted.” (Doc. 1, pgs. 7-

8, ¶ 25). Plaintiff alleges the College’s “policies and/or customs” violated Plaintiff’s clearly 

established rights under the United States Constitution. (Doc. 1, pg. 7, ¶ 25). The Complaint makes 

the following allegations relating to the College’s policies and customs:

The exercise of established custom of and/or policy by Defendant Navarro College 

violated Plaintiff’s clearly established rights under the U.S. Constitution against the 

racial profiling, unlawful detention, illegal search and interrogation, baseless 

criminal prosecution, and physical assault against him. (Doc. 1, pg. 7, ¶ 22).

At all times Defendants Arnett and Navarro College were acting under the color of 

the laws and regulations of the State of Texas. Defendant Navarro College had a 

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policy and/or custom in place that enabled its agents and employees to act with 

indifference to the constitutional rights of individuals. Such policies and/or customs 

included tolerating misconduct by police officers and encouraging misconduct by 

failing to adequately supervise, discipline, or train such officers. Such policies 

and/or customs include the use of excessive force, false arrests and fictious charges, 

retaliation against citizens who complain of improper police conduct, racial 

profiling, discrimination based on race and abuse of proper police and prosecutorial 

standards.

(Doc. 1, pg. 7, ¶¶ 22-23). Thus, Plaintiff bases his Monell claim against the College on theories of: 

(1) policy liability; (2) failure to train or supervise; and (3) ratification. While Plaintiff “need not 

provide proof of [these] allegations at this stage, he must still plead facts that plausibly support” 

each element of a Monell claim under any of these theories. Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 

F.3d 613, 621 (5th Cir. 2018). For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to do 

so and, as such, the Court concludes Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 claim against the College must 

be dismissed.

(i) Constitutional Violations

Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts four constitutional claims: (1) excessive force; (2) malicious 

prosecution; (3) unreasonable seizure by way of illegal detention; and (4) unreasonable search. 

(Doc. 1, pgs. 7-8, ¶¶ 25-26). Additionally, the Complaint makes vague reference to a retaliation 

claim under the First Amendment and an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

(see Doc. 1, pg. 7, ¶ 23). 

As with the excessive force claim against Arnett, Plaintiff has affirmatively abandoned his 

excessive force against the College. (Doc. 20, pg. 10) (“Plaintiff does not intend to pursue his 

claim for excessive force against Defendant Navarro College). Plaintiff has also abandoned his 

malicious prosecution claim and his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim—to the extent 

he attempted to assert it—against the College by virtue of his failure to respond to the College’s 

arguments as to those claims in its motion to dismiss. See In re Dallas Roadster, Ltd., 846 F.3d at

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126; Black, 461 F.3d at 588 n.1. Finally, aside from Plaintiff’s vague reference to a policy of 

“retaliation against citizens who complain of improper police conduct,” Plaintiff makes no factual 

allegations whatsoever to supporting any potential First Amendment retaliation claim. Thus, 

Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the College cannot be predicated on a claim of excessive force, 

malicious prosecution, equal protection, or retaliation. See Peterson, 588 F.3d at 844; Becerra, 

105 F.3d at 1047.

As detailed above, the Court concludes Plaintiff has plausibly alleged Arnett violated 

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See supra 

Section III.A.2(i)-(ii). Thus, these claims could potentially underpin a § 1983 claim against the 

College. However, for the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes Plaintiff has failed to state 

a § 1983 claim against the College because the Compliant does not plead facts which—if true—

would establish that such violations were the result of: (1) an unconstitutional policy or custom; 

(2) a constitutionally inadequate policy for the training or supervision of Navarro College 

Department of Public Safety (“NCDPS”) officers; or (3) the College’s ratification of

unconstitutional practices. 

(ii) Plaintiff’s Policy Liability Theory

Plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim against the College under a theory of policy 

liability. The Fifth Circuit has explained that, for the purposes of § 1983, an official policy is:

1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted 

and promulgated by the [governmental entity’s] lawmaking officers or by an 

official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or

2. A persistent, widespread practice of [the entity’s] officials or employees, which, 

although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so 

common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents [entity] 

policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the 

governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom that body had 

delegated policy-making authority. Actions of officers or employees do not render 

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the municipality liable under § 1983 unless they execute official policy as above 

defined. 

Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), on reh’g, 739 F.2d 

993 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). Thus, to state a claim a § 1983 against a governmental entity based 

on a theory of policy liability, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that—if true—establish that 

the “challenged policy [or custom] was promulgated or ratified” by the governmental entity’s final 

policymaker. Groden v. City of Dallas, 826 F.3d 280, 285 (5th Cir. 2016). 

Pleadings asserting a policy liability claim under § 1983 are sufficient “when they make 

specific factual allegations that allow a court to reasonably infer that a policy or practice exists and 

that the alleged policy or practice was the moving force” behind the alleged constitutional 

violation. Balle v. Nueces County, 962 F.3d 552, 559 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). To survive 

a motion to dismiss, a complaint’s “description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the 

underlying constitutional violation . . . cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.” Spiller 

v. City of Texas City, Police Dep’t., 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). An 

action asserting municipal policy liability under § 1983 cannot “proceed past the pleadings stage” 

if the complaint does not meet the requirements set forth in Spiller. Peña, 879 F.3d at 622 (citing 

Spiller, 130 F.3d at 167). Here, Plaintiff has neither identified a “policy statement, ordinance, 

regulation, or decision” of the College nor a “persistent, widespread practice” that is so pervasive 

at the College “as to as to constitute a custom that fairly represents [official] policy” and therefore 

fails to state a § 1983 claim against the College. Webster, 735 F.3d at 841.

As an initial matter, the Complaint does not make any factual allegations regarding a 

written policy statement, ordinance, or decision regarding the search and seizure of College 

students that is allegedly unconstitutional. As such, to state a § 1983 claim against the College 

under a theory of policy liability for the constitutional violations Plaintiff has plausibly alleged, 

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the Complaint must contain facts that—if true—establish “‘a persistent, widespread practice of 

[College] officials or employees which, although not authorized is so common and wellestablished as to fairly represent [College] policy.” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579 (quoting Webster, 

735 F.2d at 841).

Just as merely alleging, in a conclusory manner, that official written policy exists will not 

do, “[t]he description of . . . custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation 

. . . cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.” Spiller, 130 F.3d at 167. “Actual or 

constructive knowledge of such a custom” must be attributable to the final policymaker of a 

governmental entity or to “an official to whom that [policymaker] has delegated policy-making 

authority” Webster, 735 F.2d at 841. Plaintiff neither pleads specific facts describing a widespread, 

persistent practice of unconstitutional searches and seizures nor any facts whatsoever establishing 

that College policymakers had any knowledge—either actual or constructive—of those supposed 

customs. 

Aside from Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations—excerpted above—that the College has a 

policy and/or custom of unlawful detentions and illegal searches, the only specific facts in the 

Complaint relating to unreasonable searches and seizures are those describing Arnett’s detention 

of Plaintiff and search of Plaintiff’s person and dormitory room. In Peña v. City of Rio Grande

City, the Fifth Circuit explained that:

[To plausibly] plead a practice “so persistent and widespread as to practically have 

the force of law,” [Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)], a plaintiff must 

do more than describe the incident that gave rise to his injury. In Spiller, 130 F.3d 

at 167, we rejected, as “vague and conclusory,” a claim by a black motorist, arrested 

without probable cause, that his arrest resulted from the police department's general 

policy of “disregard[ing] ... the rights of African American citizens” and of 

“engag[ing] [African Americans] without regard to probable cause to arrest.” 

Though Peña characterizes the relevant policy with greater particularity, her 

allegations are equally conclusional and utterly devoid of “factual enhancements.” 

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 

1955).

Peña 879 F.3d at 622 (first and second alterations added). As in Spiller and Peña, Plaintiff does 

not plead any specific facts describing an allegedly unconstitutional custom or practice other than 

the facts of the interaction between Plaintiff and Arnett on March 28, 2020. The Complaint

contains no facts whatsoever relating to any other instances of allegedly unconstitutional searches 

and seizures by College officials or employees. While Plaintiff alleges that Arnett has a “history 

of targeting and harassing African[-]American male students at Navarro College for accusations, 

arrests, searches, and/or detentions,” Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation—without any factual 

support—is insufficient to establish the existence of a custom or practice of unreasonable searches 

and seizures. Compare Spiller, 130 F.3d at 167 (vague and conclusory allegation about police 

department targeting African-Americans and disregarding their rights was insufficient to plead a 

custom or practice) with Harvey v. Montgomery County, 881 F. Supp. 2d 785, 798 (S.D. Tex. 

2012) (allegations describing several specific incidents of excessive force and asserting that there 

had been hundreds of complaints against the police department for excessive force and unlawful 

detentions in a ten-year span were sufficient to plead a custom or practice). As the Fifth Circuit 

explained in Webster: 

If actions of [governmental] employees are to be used to prove a custom for which 

the [governmental entity] is liable, those actions must have occurred for so long or 

so frequently that the course of conduct warrants the attribution to the governing 

body of knowledge that the objectionable conduct is the expected, and accepted, 

practice of [government] employees.”

Webster, 735, F.2d at 842. Plaintiff’s facts, as alleged in his Complaint, describing the encounter 

between Plaintiff and Arnett at issue in this case does not suffice to identify a “persistent, 

widespread practice” that is “so common and well settled as to constitution a custom that fairly 

represents [College] policy.” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 579 (citations omitted).

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Courts in this circuit have routinely dismissed Monell policy liability claims based on the 

failure to identify a pattern of unconstitutional behavior similar to the incident giving rise to the 

claim. See, e.g., Peña, 879 F.3d at 623 (affirming dismissal of pleadings that failed to identify a 

pattern of tasing non-suspect minors); Spiller, 130 F.3d at 167 (affirming dismissal of pleading 

that failed to identify a pattern of unlawful arrests); Self v. City of Mansfield, 369 F. Supp. 3d 684, 

702-03 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (dismissing complaint that, inter alia, failed to plausibly allege a “pattern 

of repeated constitutional violations” or “persistent, repeated, and constant violations rights by 

virtue of [an] alleged failure to train”); Harvey, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 798 (dismissing First 

Amendment claims for failure to allege a pattern of similar violations); Monacelli v. City of Dallas, 

No. 3:21-cv-2640-L, 2022 WL 4668054, *6-8 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 30, 2022) (dismissing complaint 

after finding, inter alia, no alleged pattern of police officers using excessive force against peaceful 

protestors and journalists aside from two incidents, separated by two years); Pinedo v. City of 

Dallas, No. 3:14-cv-958-D, 2015 WL 5021393, at *5 (“To establish a custom, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate (and, at the pleading stage, must plausibly plead) ‘a pattern of abuses that transcends 

the error made in a single case.’”) (quoting Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 582). Like the courts in those 

cases, the Court concludes Plaintiff’s Complaint does not plausibly allege a custom or practice of 

constitutional violations because Plaintiff does not plead any facts beyond the incident giving rise 

to this suit.

Plaintiff’s Complaint also fails § 1983’s “policymaker prong.” As the Fifth Circuit 

explained in Peña:

In Groden v. City of Dallas, 826 F.3d 280, 286 (5th Cir. 2016), we clarified that, 

because the identity of the policymaker is a legal question, courts should not “grant 

motions to dismiss for failing to plead [a] specific identity.” Rather, “the complaint 

need only allege facts that show an official policy, promulgated or ratified by the 

policymaker, under which the municipality is said to be liable.” Id. at 284. The 

plaintiff in Groden carried his burden of connecting the policy to the city council 

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by alleging that the city “publicly announced” the policy and that its “spokesman” 

gave “media interviews describing the new policy.” Id. at 286.

A city cannot be liable for an unwritten custom unless “[a]ctual or constructive 

knowledge of such custom” is attributable to a city policymaker. [Hicks-Fields v. 

Harris County, 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017)]. Peña's complaint invites no 

more than speculation that any particular policymaker, be it the chief of police or 

the city commission, knew about the alleged custom. Without more, her allegation 

fails the second prong of § 1983 as well.

Peña, 879 F.3d at 622-23. Under Texas law, the final policymaker for a Texas community college 

is its board of trustees. See generally TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 130.082, 130.084; Saenz v. Dallas 

County Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 3:10-cv-742-O, 2011 WL 1935742, at *4 *N.D. Tex. May 16, 2011). 

Thus, to state a § 1983 claim against the College, Plaintiff must plead facts that—if true—

sufficiently connect the College’s board of trustees, or an official to whom the board of trustees 

delegated relevant policy-making authority, to the allegedly unconstitutional practices of illegal 

searches and seizures by NCDPS officers for the Court to conclude that the policymakers had 

actual or constructive knowledge of such practices. Webster, 735 F.2d at 841. As with the 

complaint in Peña, Plaintiff’s Complaint invites no more than mere speculation that any 

policymaker had knowledge—be it actual or constructive—of the alleged practices. Without more, 

Plaintiff’s allegations fail the “policymaker” prong of § 1983. Thus, the Court must conclude 

Plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim against the College based on a policy liability theory.

(iii) Plaintiff’s Failure to Train or Supervise Theory

The Court next turns to Plaintiff’s failure to train or supervise theory. The failure to train 

or supervise government employees “may fairly be said to represent a policy for which [a

governmental entity] is responsible, and for which [the entity] may be liable if it actually causes 

injury.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). However, a governmental entity’s

failure to train or supervise its employees regarding their obligation to respect constitutional rights 

only constitutes an “official policy” if it “amounts to deliberate indifference.” Id. at 388; 

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Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 608, 625 (5th Cir. 2015); Madden v. Gribbon, No. 3:21-CV-1168-

S, 2022 WL 4360558, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2022). 

“Defects in the particular training [or supervision] program must be specifically alleged.” 

Quinn v. Guerrero, 863 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 

F.3d 287, 293 (5th Cir. 2005)). The training or supervision inadequacies must be “closely related 

to the [constitutional] injury” underpinning the Monell claim. Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 

325, 332 (5th Cir. 2002). The deliberate indifference standard is not satisfied by showing 

negligence or even gross negligence. Instead, it is a “stringent standard, requiring proof that a 

municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Valle v. City of 

Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 547 (5th Cir. 2010). Generally, just as with establishing a custom or 

practice, establishing deliberate indifference “requires a showing ‘of more than a single instance 

of the lack of training or supervision causing a violation of constitutional rights.” Burge v. St. 

Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 390 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Thompson, 245 F.3d at 459). “Rather, 

deliberate indifference generally requires that a plaintiff demonstrate at least a pattern of similar 

violations” that are “so clearly inadequate as to be obviously likely to result in a constitutional 

violation.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Court concludes Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a § 1983 claim against the 

College based on a failure to train or supervise theory for much the same reason that Plaintiff has 

failed to state a claim based on a policy liability theory—Plaintiff has not pled facts establishing a 

pattern of similar violations to support the conclusory allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff 

only alleges that the College’s “policies and/or customs included tolerating misconduct by police 

officer and encouraging misconduct by failing to adequately supervise, discipline, or train such 

officers.” (Doc. 1, pg. 7, ¶ 23). This allegation is entirely conclusory and is supported neither by 

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any facts describing the training or supervision of NCDPS officers nor any assertion of how such 

training or supervision is closely related to the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment 

rights. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against the College under a failure to train or 

supervise theory. 

Plaintiff also adduces no facts which, if true, would establish a pattern of alleged violations 

of the constitutional rights of the College’s students to be free from unreasonable searches and 

seizures. While—in narrow circumstances—“a single incident with proof of the possibility of 

recurring situations that present an obvious potential for violation of constitutional rights,” may 

support a finding of deliberate indifference, that narrow exception does not apply here. Garza v. 

City of Conna, 922 F.3d 626, 637-38 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal quotations omitted); see Little v. 

Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 627 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Without a pattern of constitutional 

violations, deliberate indifference can be inferred only in narrow and extreme circumstances.”). 

The narrow “single-incident exception” is “generally reserved for those cases in which the 

government actor was provided no training whatsoever.” Peña, 879 F.3d at 624 (citing Brown v. 

Bryan County, 219 F.3d 450, 453-54, 462 (5th Cir. 2000)). However, Plaintiff makes no allegation 

that Arnett was not trained whatsoever in how not to violate students’ Fourth Amendment rights. 

As such, the incident giving rise to this suit—the encounter between Plaintiff and Arnett—cannot 

form the basis for concluding that the College either consciously chose, or was deliberately 

indifferent to, an inadequate policy of training and supervision with respect to unreasonable 

searches and seizures by NCDPS officers. Accordingly, the Court must conclude Plaintiff has 

failed to state a facially plausible claim that the College is liable under § 1983 on a failure to train 

or supervise theory.

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(iv) Plaintiff’s Ratification Theory

The Court next turns to Plaintiff’s ratification theory. A governmental entity can be liable 

for a constitutional violation via ratification “[i]f the authorized policymakers approve a 

subordinate’s decision and the basis for it[.]” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 

(1988). In Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, a case in which a police chief determined that a police

officer’s knee strike to a handcuffed person complied with department policy, the Fifth Circuit 

discussed the limits of the ratification theory. 588 F.3d at 848. There, the Fifth Circuit found—

while the knee strike amounted to the use of excessive force—the chief’s approval of the strike 

did not amount to ratification for the purposes of imposing § 1983 liability on the city because:

[O]ur precedent has limited the theory of ratification to “extreme factual 

situations.” See Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir.1998). Under that 

precedent, we cannot say that this case presents an extreme factual situation. 

Compare Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir.1985) (finding 

ratification in case in which officers “poured” gunfire onto a truck and killed 

innocent occupant), with Snyder, 142 F.3d at 798 (refusing to find ratification in 

case in which officer shot fleeing suspect in the back). Moreover, we have also 

explained that a policymaker who defends conduct that is later shown to be 

unlawful does not necessarily incur liability on behalf of the municipality. See Coon 

v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1161–62 (5th Cir.1986) (precedent “does not stand for 

the broad proposition that if a policymaker defends his subordinates and if those 

subordinates are later found to have broken the law, then the illegal behavior can 

be assumed to have resulted from an official policy”). Our precedent thus forecloses 

ratification liability in this case.

Id. Plaintiff’s ratification theory fails for two reasons: (1) Plaintiff has not plead facts establishing 

that the College ratified either Arnett’s previous allegedly unconstitutional behavior or Arnett’s 

behavior at issue in this case; and (2) even if Plaintiff did plead facts establishing that the College 

ratified Arnett’s behavior in this case, Arnett’s behavior does not amount to the sort of “extreme 

factual situation” contemplated by the Fifth Circuit. 

With respect to Plaintiff’s allegation that the College promoted Arnett despite having 

knowledge of his “history of targeting and harassing African[-]American male students,” Plaintiff 

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pleads no facts establishing any previous constitutional violations by Arnett. Moreover, even if 

Plaintiff’s Complaint did include such facts, the Complaint does not include any facts establishing 

that any policymaker—whether the College’s board of trustees or an official to whom the

College’s board delegated relevant policymaking authority—ever approved of unconstitutional 

conduct by Arnett and the basis for that conduct. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding 

Arnett’s alleged history of past constitutional violations cannot underpin Plaintiff’s ratification 

theory. 

Moreover, the constitutional violations that the Court has concluded Plaintiff adequately 

alleged in his Complaint also cannot underpin Plaintiff’s ratification theory because the Complaint 

contains no facts regarding the College’s response to Arnett’s actions that are at issue here. While 

a policymaker’s silence on unconstitutional conduct can amount to ratification, such conduct must 

constitute extreme “incompetence and catastrophic performance[.]” Grandstaff, 767 F.2d at 171. 

Plaintiff pleads no such facts to establish that a College policymaker ratified Arnett’s conduct at 

issue in this case. Fifth Circuit case law makes clear the Court cannot conclude Arnett’s conduct 

constitutes the sort of “extreme factual situation” required for the College’s silence to amount to 

ratification. See Peterson, 588 F.3d at 848; Snyder, 142 F.3d at 798; Grandstaff, 767 F.2d at 161. 

As such, the Court must conclude Plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim against the College 

based on a theory of ratification. 

In sum, taking all non-conclusory facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in 

favor of Plaintiff, as the Court is required to do at this stage, the Court concludes the Complaint 

has failed to plausibly allege facts from which the Court can infer the College is liable for the 

constitutional violations Plaintiff has adequately alleged. Plaintiff has also failed to adequately 

plead: (1) the College has a policy, custom, or practice of unreasonable searches and seizures; and 

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(2) the College has a constitutionally inadequate training and supervision program that led to the 

unreasonable search and seizure violations alleged by Plaintiff; or (3) the College has ratified 

Arnett’s allegedly unconstitutional behavior. As such, the Court must conclude Plaintiff has failed 

to state a facially plausible claim that the College is liable under § 1983. For these reasons, the 

Court grants the College’s Motion, (Doc. 13), with respect to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim and 

dismisses that claim without prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court (1) grants in part and denies in part Defendant Arnett’s 

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, (Doc. 12), and (2) grants Defendant Navarro 

College’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, (Doc. 13). Specifically, the Court 

grants in part Arnett’s Motion with respect to Plaintiff’s state-law claims against Arnett for: (1) 

malicious prosecution; (2) assault and battery; (3) false imprisonment; and (4) intrusion on 

seclusion. These claims are hereby dismissed with prejudice. The Court denies in part Plaintiff’s 

§ 1983 claim against Arnett for the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be 

free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court grants the College’s Motion with respect 

to Plaintiff’s state-law claim of malicious prosecution claim against the College. This claim is 

dismissed with prejudice. Finally, the Court grants the College’s Motion with respect to Plaintiff’s 

§ 1983 claim against the College. This claim is dismissed without prejudice. 

SO ORDERED: May 10, 2023.

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