PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

In Re: RARE EARTH MINERALS, 

Debtor.

MARY HAZELBAKER,

Creditor-Appellant,

v.

HOPE GAS, INCORPORATED; DOMINION

FIELD SERVICES, INCORPORATED;

TRI-COUNTY OIL AND GAS,

INCORPORATED,

Creditors-Appellees,  No. 04-2526

STEPHEN L. THOMPSON,

Trustee-Appellee,

v.

DEBRA A. WERTMAN; DODDRIDGE

COUNTY COMMISSION; LUCILLE

WAGONER; THOMAS WAGONER;

MICHAEL L. BIALEK; SARA C.

MULLINS; STEPHEN E. MULLINS;

CLARENCE E. SIGLEY, Trustee of the

Carolyn E. Farr Trust,

Parties-in-Interest. 
Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg.

Irene M. Keeley, Chief District Judge.

(CA-04-156-1)

Argued: March 15, 2006

Decided: April 18, 2006

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion,

in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Duncan joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Judy L. Shanholtz, MCNEER, HIGHLAND, MCMUNN

& VARNER, L.C., Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Stephen

L. Thompson, BARTH & THOMPSON, Charleston, West Virginia,

for Appellees. ON BRIEF: James A. Varner, Robert W. Trumble,

MCNEER, HIGHLAND, MCMUNN & VARNER, L.C., Clarksburg,

West Virginia, for Appellant. Francis L. Warder, Jr., Fairmont, West

Virginia, for Appellees. 

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge: 

In this case we consider the "statutory mootness" of an appeal challenging a bankruptcy court’s authorization of the assumption and sale

of an oil and gas lease. Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11

U.S.C. § 363(m) (2000), curtails the power of appellate courts to undo

the authorized sale of estate assets to a good faith purchaser unless the

sale has been stayed pending appeal. Plaintiff here failed to obtain

such a stay, and the district court consequently dismissed her appeal

2 IN RE: RARE EARTH MINERALS
as moot. We affirm, because to hold otherwise would undercut

§ 363(m)’s express concern with the finality of bankruptcy sales.

I.

Plaintiff Mary Hazelbaker owns an undivided fractional interest in

the oil and gas located on certain West Virginia property. In 1982, her

predecessors in interest leased these rights in an agreement that came

to be assigned to Rare Earth Minerals, Inc. The terms of the lease

required Rare Earth to make royalty payments on whatever oil or gas

was produced or sold, or to pay a "‘shut-in’ royalty" of $300 per year

for each well producing gas that was not sold, marketed, or used off

the premises. Hazelbaker asserts that as of 1995, Rare Earth ceased

paying her either type of royalty. In 2001, believing Rare Earth to

have abandoned the lease, she re-leased the oil and gas rights to a

third party, and notice to this effect was filed in the county records.

On August 19, 2002, Rare Earth filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy

protection. Stephen L. Thompson is the trustee of the estate. On June

9, 2003, the trustee moved for approval to assume the Hazelbaker

lease into the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000). On June 23,

Hazelbaker lodged an objection. She requested that the bankruptcy

court partially lift the automatic stay that accompanies bankruptcy filings, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (d), to allow her to petition a state

court for a judgment that the lease had been abandoned. In the alternative, she requested that the bankruptcy court itself adjudicate the

issue of state-law abandonment. The bankruptcy court held a hearing

on her motion four days after it was filed, but did not resolve the

abandonment question, instead granting the parties’ request for a continuance so that they could negotiate. A status conference on July 15

resulted in another continuance for negotiation. 

The automatic stay ended of its own accord thirty days after the filing of Hazelbaker’s motion, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(e), but at no time did

Hazelbaker ever file suit in state court or request an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court. Two further status conferences were

held on October 22 and November 17, 2003, during which the trustee

notified the court that he was close to finding a purchaser for the

assets of the estate. After the November 17 conference, Hazelbaker

and the trustee did not communicate for nearly half a year. 

IN RE: RARE EARTH MINERALS 3
On April 24, 2004, the trustee petitioned the bankruptcy court for

approval to, inter alia, assume and sell Rare Earth’s leases to TriCounty Oil and Gas, Inc. As provided under 11 U.S.C.

§ 365(b)(1)(A), the motion included a proposal to pay a "cure"

amount to various landowners — including Hazelbaker — to whom

Rare Earth owed payments. The court served a notice of sale on

Hazelbaker, informing her that the proposed cure amount for her lease

was $444.85. On May 11, 2004, Hazelbaker sent the trustee a letter

proposing that the cure amount be increased to $2800. On June 2,

2004, she filed an objection to the trustee’s sale motion, in which she

again asserted her abandonment argument. But, according to the district court, she did not request an adversary hearing or file a proof of

claim. In a letter dated June 4, 2004, the trustee formally accepted

Hazelbaker’s proposal to increase the cure amount to $2800. 

On June 18, 2004, the bankruptcy court issued an order approving

the assumption of leases under 11 U.S.C. § 365 and authorizing the

sale of estate assets to Tri-County pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and

363(b), (f), and (m). The order was subsequently amended on June

24, 2004. In both the original and amended versions, the court ordered

that

should an appeal of this Order be filed, Tri-County shall be

entitled to the benefits of 11 U.S.C. 363(m) and . . . the

Trustee and Tri-County may proceed with closing notwithstanding any such appeal, unless a stay pending appeal has

been issued and is in effect at the time of such closing.

Both orders further stated that Tri-County was "acquiring the Assets

in good faith and is a good faith purchaser within the meaning of 11

U.S.C. § 363(m) . . . and is entitled to the protection provided

therein." 

On June 28, 2004, Hazelbaker filed a notice of appeal and sought

from the bankruptcy court a stay of the sale pending appeal. She did

not seek an expedited hearing on the stay request, and in fact

requested a continuance from the original hearing date set by the

bankruptcy court. As a result, the hearing was set for July 12, eleven

days after the sale had already been finalized in accordance with the

court-approved schedules. At the hearing, the bankruptcy court denied

4 IN RE: RARE EARTH MINERALS
Hazelbaker’s motion. As part of the completion of the sale, the trustee

paid the $2800 cure amount to Hazelbaker, though she claims she has

not yet deposited the check. 

Hazelbaker appealed to the district court, contending that the bankruptcy court violated her rights by approving the assumption and sale

of the lease without formally adjudicating her state-law abandonment

claim. The trustee moved to dismiss, arguing that the failure to obtain

a stay rendered the appeal moot under § 363(m). The district court

granted the trustee’s motion. In both its original order and a second

order denying Hazelbaker’s motion for rehearing, the district court

rejected Hazelbaker’s arguments that her abandonment claim be heard

on the merits and that Tri-County was a bad faith purchaser unentitled

to the protections of § 363(m). The district court stated that Hazelbaker’s "request that this Court now find that her lease was abandoned under West Virginia law, or to reverse the bankruptcy judge’s

sale order, flies in the face of uncontested evidence that Tri-County

was a good faith purchaser." 

Hazelbaker appeals.

II.

In full, 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) provides that:

The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization

under subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease

of property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease

under such authorization to an entity that purchased or

leased such property in good faith, whether or not such

entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such

authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending

appeal.

This subsection creates a rule of "‘statutory mootness.’" See L.R.S.C.

Co. v. Rickel Home Ctrs., Inc. (In re Rickel Home Ctrs., Inc.), 209

F.3d 291, 298 (3d Cir. 2000). Where a sale of a bankrupt’s assets has

not been stayed, an appeal challenging the sale’s validity is moot

because "the court has no remedy that it can fashion even if it would

IN RE: RARE EARTH MINERALS 5
have determined the issues differently." Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Miller (In re Stadium Mgmt. Corp.), 895 F.2d 845, 847 (1st Cir. 1990)

(collecting cases); see also In re Vlasek, 325 F.3d 955, 961-62 (7th

Cir. 2003) (same). Thus, even if the bankruptcy court erred in authorizing the sale, the appeal must be dismissed. See, e.g., Canzano v.

Ragosa (In re Colarusso), 382 F.3d 51, 62 (1st Cir. 2004). 

Section 363(m) codifies Congress’s strong preference for finality

and efficiency in the bankruptcy context, particularly where third parties are involved. See In re Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc., 788 F.2d 143,

147 (3d Cir. 1986). Without the protection of § 363(m), purchasers of

bankruptcy estate assets could be "dragged into endless rounds of litigation to determine who has what rights in the property." In re Sax,

796 F.2d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 1986). This would not only impose unfair

hardship on good faith purchasers, but would also substantially reduce

the value of the estate. See, e.g., In re CGI Indus., Inc., 27 F.3d 296,

299 (7th Cir. 1994). An asset that provides a near-certain guarantee

of litigation and no guarantee of ownership is likely to have a low sale

price; by removing these risks, § 363(m) allows bidders to offer fair

value for estate property. See Licensing by Paolo, Inc. v. Sinatra (In

re Gucci), 126 F.3d 380, 387 (2d Cir. 1997); Seaboard Sys. R.R. v.

United States (In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co.), 799

F.2d 317, 330 (7th Cir. 1986). This in turn, of course, greatly benefits

both the debtor and its creditors.

Section 363(m) hardly represents a harsh means for achieving these

important ends. It does not, of course, interfere with a claimant’s ability to have her claim adjudicated by the bankruptcy court. Nor, for

that matter, does it preclude the possibility of an appeal. It simply

requires that the claimant request, and be granted, a stay of the sale

pending the appeal. Requesting such a stay is in the claimant’s own

best interest: a stay keeps the disputed property within the jurisdiction

of the bankruptcy court, see, e.g., Wintz v. Am. Freightways, Inc. (In

re Wintz Cos.), 219 F.3d 807, 811 (8th Cir. 2000), and it forestalls the

transactional complexities that arise if the sale to a third party is completed prior to a final resolution of the claim. But in allowing for the

possibility that the stay may not be granted, § 363(m) recognizes that

the claimant’s interests are not the only ones at stake. For example,

a strong "public policy interest in . . . the swift and efficient administration of the bankrupt’s estate," Scott v. Nat’l Century Fin. Enters.

6 IN RE: RARE EARTH MINERALS
(In re Balt. Emergency Servs. II, Corp.), 432 F.3d 557, 560 (4th Cir.

2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), may in certain cases outweigh the claimant’s desire for a second bite at the apple on appeal.

III.

The bankruptcy court approved the sale of Hazelbaker’s lease to

Tri-County pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), and Hazelbaker has failed

to obtain a stay of the sale pending appeal. Section 363(m) would end

the matter there, but for two arguments Hazelbaker now raises as to

why it ought not to apply. We shall address each in turn. 

A.

Hazelbaker first contends that she falls within an implicit exception

to § 363(m). Citing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mann v. Alexander

Dawson Inc. (In re Mann), 907 F.2d 923, 926 (9th Cir. 1990), she

argues that the statutory mootness rule does not apply in circumstances where state law would allow a sale to be set aside. 

As a threshold matter, we are unable to locate this exception in the

text of the statute itself, which "states a flat rule governing all appeals

of section 363 authorizations." Cargill, Inc. v. Charter Int’l Oil Co.

(In re Charter Co.), 829 F.2d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir. 1987) (per

curiam). Indeed, the exception would appear to undermine the finality

that § 363(m) expressly seeks to create. While the statute erects a dam

to staunch the tide of post-sale litigation, the exception creates a leak

through which the appeals of clever litigants may continue to flow.

But even if this exception were somehow implicit in the statute,

Hazelbaker seriously misconstrues its scope in arguing that it would

apply here. The Ninth Circuit does not permit § 363(m) to be avoided

any time a claimant has a state-law property claim, but instead limits

the exception to circumstances where the claimant "has the right

under [state] law to set aside a foreclosure sale after the sale has taken

place, after deeds have been recorded, and after the property has been

sold to a third party." Rosner v. Worcester (In re Worcester), 811 F.2d

1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 1987); see also In re Mann, 907 F.2d at 926.

Hazelbaker does not even attempt to show that she is entitled to a setIN RE: RARE EARTH MINERALS 7
aside remedy under West Virginia law. To be sure, she argues that the

trustee had no right to assume her lease into the estate, because Rare

Earth had abandoned it or it had otherwise terminated. But even if she

were correct on this point, she does not demonstrate that this would

provide an adequate basis under state law for setting aside an already

completed foreclosure sale. 

To recognize an exception to statutory mootness whenever a claimant asserts that her property was wrongly assumed into the estate

"would seriously undermine the purpose of § 363(m) and could

destroy the rule altogether." In re Sax, 796 F.2d at 998. Such claims

are commonplace, and the entire point of § 363(m) is to ensure that

they are resolved prior to the completion of the sale. Indeed, we have

previously dismissed as moot an appeal very similar to the one here,

in which the claimant contended that a debtor’s lease had terminated

and thus should not have been sold to a third-party purchaser. See

Dev. Co. of Am. v. Adamson Co. (In re Adamson Co.), 159 F.3d 896,

897-98 (4th Cir. 1998). We see no reason to reach a different result

here. 

B.

Hazelbaker next contends that § 363(m) is inapplicable because

Tri-County is not "an entity that purchased . . . in good faith." See,

e.g., Willemain v. Kivitz (In re Willemain), 764 F.2d 1019, 1023-24

(4th Cir. 1985) (addressing good faith question on appeal to determine applicability of § 363(m)). She argues that the recordation of a

second oil and gas lease on her property — the one she entered into

in 2001 after unilaterally determining that Rare Earth’s rights had

been abandoned — demonstrates Tri-County’s bad faith in purchasing

Rare Earth’s lease. 

Addressing the good faith question in the first instance, the bankruptcy court determined that Tri-County was "acquiring the Assets in

good faith and is a good faith purchaser within the meaning of 11

U.S.C. § 363(m)." In a hearing before the district court on appeal,

Hazelbaker appears to have mentioned for the first time the existence

of the second lease. Following that hearing, the district court issued

an order dismissing Hazelbaker’s appeal as moot, noting that her

request for relief "flies in the face of uncontested evidence that Tri8 IN RE: RARE EARTH MINERALS
County was a good faith purchaser." Undeterred, Hazelbaker sought

rehearing in the district court, again broaching the topic of the second

lease. Though the district court considered the second-lease issue to

be a "new argument," its opinion denying the motion for rehearing

addressed the argument on the merits and found it "insufficient to

infer bad faith." 

As a threshold matter, Hazelbaker may well have waived the

second-lease argument by her apparent failure to raise it to the bankruptcy court, despite having known of it since well before the inception of the proceedings. See Lane v. Sullivan (In re Lane), 991 F.2d

105, 107 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that failure to raise an issue before

bankruptcy court waives it on appeal); see also Ginther v. Ginther

Trusts (In re Ginther Trusts), 238 F.3d 686, 689 (5th Cir. 2001) (per

curiam) (declining to review good faith where plaintiff had not challenged it before the bankruptcy court); Gilchrist v. Westcott (In re

Gilchrist), 891 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1990) (same). But even if the

argument is preserved, we find no reason to overturn the good faith

determinations made by both lower courts. 

Moreover, were we to find for Hazelbaker here, we would hardly

be furthering Congress’s interest in the prompt resolution of bankruptcy proceedings. At any point, Hazelbaker could have easily

advised the trustee or Tri-County of the existence of the second lease.

Yet she apparently did not do so until nearly four months after the

estate sale was finalized. By keeping her cards hidden, Hazelbaker

was able to play both sides and hedge her bets. On the one hand, the

assumption of her lease into the estate would entitle her to cure payments, see 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A), obviating the need for her to

seek the unpaid royalties through the less certain mechanisms available to other creditors. Hazelbaker promptly took advantage of this to

negotiate a sixfold increase in her guaranteed share of the profits of

the estate sale. On the other hand, she simultaneously sought to keep

alive the inconsistent claim that the lease had reverted back to her. To

this end, she weakly pursued an objection to the assumption of the

lease: repeatedly requesting continuances and passively allowing the

substance of her claim to remain unadjudicated. Despite ample time,

she never filed an action in state court, requested an adversary hearing

in the bankruptcy court, or informed the trustee of the competing

lease. However aggressively she may press her claims now, the winIN RE: RARE EARTH MINERALS 9
dow of opportunity has closed, as the clear statutory dictates of

§ 363(m) render her appeal moot.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court dismissing Hazelbaker’s appeal as moot is 

AFFIRMED.

10 IN RE: RARE EARTH MINERALS