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Filed 6/17/14 P. v. Alcala CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

EVA M. ALCALA,

Defendant and Appellant.

C074390

(Super. Ct. Nos. 

12F08006, 12M08505)

Following her plea of no contest to fraudulent receipt of public assistance and 

battery of her child’s father, defendant Eva M. Alcala was placed on three years’

probation conditioned on her serving 90 days in county jail. Approximately six months 

after entering the plea, defendant made a motion to withdraw the plea. The trial court 

denied the motion. Defendant appeals that denial.
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BACKGROUND1

An information charged defendant with felony counts of fraudulent receipt of 

public assistance (Welf & Inst. Code, § 10980, subd. (c)(2)) and filing a false claim (Pen. 

Code, § 118, subd. (a)).

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 A separate complaint charged defendant with misdemeanor

counts of corporal injury of her child’s father (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and battery of her 

child’s father (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)). Defendant pleaded no contest to misdemeanor counts 

of fraudulent receipt of public assistance and battery of her child’s father. Pursuant to the

plea agreement, the trial court granted defendant probation and sentenced her to serve 90 

days in county jail; the remaining counts were dismissed. 

Approximately six months after entering the plea, defendant filed a motion to 

withdraw the plea on two grounds, mental incapacity and newly discovered evidence. As 

to mental incapacity, defendant claimed that on the morning of the plea, the staff at the 

Sacramento County Main Jail administered Flexeril and Tramadol to her, each of which 

can “cause side effects that may impair a persons [sic] thinking or reactions.” Defendant 

declared she is not given Flexeril by her own treating physician as it “makes her have 

difficulty understanding things and following things and concentrating on things.” 

Defendant also declared there was newly discovered evidence that the victim, Raymond 

Mata, had “admitted essentially lying to the police to put [her] in jail.” Specifically, she 

averred that in May 2013, she and her son Michael were in a car with Mata when Michael 

said to Mata that “he could not believe that [Mata] put his mom in jail. [Defendant] then 

said, yeah, just to get out of child support. Mata[’s] reply was to laugh and say yeah, 

that’s right, I did, so get over it.” 

 

1 The substantive facts underlying the convictions are not relevant to any issue on 

appeal and are not recounted here.

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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The trial court read and considered defendant’s motion, including the attached 

declarations and medical information, and the People’s opposition to the motion. At the 

hearing, the trial court also heard oral argument from both parties. The trial court found 

clear and convincing evidence that defendant was on medication as indicated in her 

motion; however, the trial court did not find defendant had established she was “under 

the influence to such [an] extent she did not fully understand what was going on at the 

time of her plea.” The trial court also noted that having reviewed the transcript of the 

plea, there was no indication in the transcript that defendant was confused or hesitant 

during the taking of the plea and her responses to questions were appropriate. As to the

claim of newly discovered evidence, the trial court found defendant had not established 

that Mata “actually lied. Neither defendant nor her son Michael attested the victim said 

he had lied to the police, rather they attested the victim only admitted that he had the 

defendant put in jail.” The trial court also noted the People had indicated there was 

additional evidence supporting the conviction, including observed injuries on the victim 

and defendant’s admission she had punched the victim in the face. The court observed 

defendant had not provided a “description of what allegedly occurred or was reported by 

the victim nor of any medical report that could detail any injuries suffered by the victim, 

nor has the defendant set forth any defense she had available and what the strength was of 

that evidence in her favor.” Accordingly, the trial court denied the motion. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow her to 

withdraw her plea. We disagree.

Section 1018 provides in pertinent part: “On application of the defendant at any 

time before judgment . . . the court shall, for a good cause shown, permit the plea of 

guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.” The showing for 

postjudgment motions to withdraw a guilty plea is essentially identical to that required 

under section 1018. (People v. Castaneda (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1612, 1617.) To 
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establish good cause to withdraw her plea, the defendant must show that she was 

operating under mistake, ignorance, inadvertence, fraud, duress, or any other factor 

overriding her free judgment. (People v. Shaw (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 492, 496; People v. 

Huricks (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208.) However, a defendant must establish that 

her free will was overcome, not merely that she had a change of heart. (People v. Nance

(1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1456.) A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a defendant’s 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. 

Mickens (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1561.) Discretion is abused when a court acts in 

an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner, which results in a manifest 

miscarriage of justice. (People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308, 316.) In determining 

whether a defendant has shown good cause for granting a motion to withdraw a guilty 

plea, the reviewing court must adopt the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported 

by substantial evidence. (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.) 

1. Mental Incapacity -- As noted by the trial court, defendant offered no evidence 

the medications she was given prior to the plea hearing actually incapacitated her to such 

a degree as to override her free judgment or otherwise render her plea involuntary. 

Defendant stated she was “loopy” because of the medications, but that does not 

necessarily mean her capacity to enter the plea knowingly and voluntarily was affected. 

Further, the trial court, as the sole judge of credibility, could find defendant’s declaration

regarding her mental state at the time of the plea was not credible. (See People v. Hunt

(1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 95, 103 [“[I]n determining the facts, the trial court is not bound 

by uncontradicted statements of the defendant”]; People v. Beck (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 

549, 553 [trial courts need not give full credence to a defendant’s uncontradicted 

statements in light of defendant’s interest in the outcome].) Nor was any claimed 

incapacity apparent in the record of the plea. Defendant expressed no confusion and 

responded appropriately to questions. The judge who accepted the plea was charged with 

determining the voluntariness. (§ 1192.5.) The trial judge went over each part of the 
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plea agreement with defendant and she indicated that she understood the plea and 

knowingly and willingly entered into it. The trial judge did not observe or note any 

concerns regarding defendant’s mental capacity at the time of the plea. Defendant was 

represented by counsel at the time of the plea and counsel expressed no concerns 

regarding defendant’s capacity to understand the advisements or knowingly and 

voluntarily enter a plea. 

2. Newly Discovered Evidence -- Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion by 

denying the motion based on “newly discovered evidence.” Defendant cites no authority 

to support the proposition that newly discovered evidence would be an appropriate basis 

for granting a motion to withdraw her plea. Defendant attempts to analogize her motion 

to withdraw her plea to a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence and 

utilize the criteria applicable to a motion for new trial for assessing this case. The 

problem with that analytical approach is that this case was resolved by way of plea. 

There was no preliminary hearing and there is no probation report. The resolution by 

plea rather than trial leaves no basis upon which the court can conduct a comparative 

evidentiary analysis or assess the likelihood a plea would have been entered had the 

defendant known the “new” information, as is required to conduct the appropriate 

analysis applying the criteria applicable to motions for new trial.

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Even if newly discovered evidence were good cause for withdrawal of the plea, 

the statement proffered by defendant is insufficient to meet defendant’s burden. The 

statement allegedly made by Mata is not an unambiguous recantation of his accusation 

against defendant or an admission he lied to the police. Nor is the statement exculpatory 

for defendant. At most, it “admits” Mata reported defendant to the police to have her 

 

3 The statements in the People’s opposition to the motion regarding the evidence 

that was available against defendant, including physical injuries on the victim and 

defendant’s admission to hitting the victim, do not constitute evidence.
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incarcerated to avoid paying child support. That is a far cry from admitting that what he 

reported to police was untrue. While this statement may bear on the victim’s credibility, 

such evidence has a more attenuated connection to defendant’s free judgment to enter a 

plea than the type of evidence which directly supports the defendant’s factual innocence. 

As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “[i]t is particularly difficult to 

characterize impeachment information as critical information of which the defendant 

must always be aware prior to pleading guilty given the random way in which such 

information may, or may not, help a particular defendant.” (United States v. Ruiz (2002) 

536 U.S. 622, 630 [153 L.Ed.2d 586, 595].) Such information bears more on the fairness 

of a trial rather than the voluntariness of a plea. (Id. at p. 633.) Impeachment evidence is 

not “critical information” that a defendant needs to determine whether to plead guilty, 

since its exculpatory value is remote and highly speculative. (Id. at p. 630.) 

The trial court properly considered the arguments of counsel and the evidence 

defendant put forward in support of her claim. The record supports the conclusion the 

trial court understood the scope of its discretion and exercised it. The decision was not 

arbitrary, capricious, or absurd. There was no abuse of discretion. 

DISPOSITION

The order of the trial court denying the motion to withdraw the plea is affirmed.

 NICHOLSON , J.

We concur:

 BLEASE , Acting P. J.

 DUARTE , J.