alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# ORIGINAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

AF 06-0536

IN THE MATTER OF THE ELECTION OF A COUNTY COMMISSIONER AND COURT REPORTER TO THE DISTRICT COURT COUNCIL 

# FILED JUL 1 5 2020
Bowen Greenwood Clerk of Supreme Court O R E rr/ of Monta na

The terms of County Commissioner member Randy Brodehl and Court Reporter member Glenda Travitzexpired on June 30,2020. The Court thanks Mr.Brodehl and Ms. Travitz for their service to the District Court Council,to this Court, and to the people of Montana. Pursuant to § 3-1-1602(1)(c)(iii), MCA, an election was held by the Montana Association ofCountiesand Flathead County Commissioner Randy Brodehl wasre-elected as the County Commissioner member to the District Court Council. Pursuant to § 3-1-1602(1)(c)(iv), an election was held by the Montana Court Reporters Association and Court Reporter Glenda Travitz was re-elected as the Court Reporter member to the District Court Council. Now,therefore, I, Mike McGrath,ChiefJustice ofthe Supreme Court ofthe State of Montana, in accordance with the results of said procedure, do hereby CERTIFY that Randy Brodehl and Glenda Travitz were re-elected as members of the District Court Council for three-year terms that expire on June 30,2023. The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Order to Randy Brodehl, Glenda Travitz,the Montana Secretary ofState for filing,the State Bar ofMontana,and the Office ofthe Supreme Court Administrator. IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have set my hand and caused the seal ofthis Court to be affixed this day ofJuly, 2020. 07/15/2020

Case Number: AF 06-0536
Section 91 .119 prescribes that, except when necessary for takeoff or landing, no person may 

operate an aircraft below the following altitudes 

(a) Anywhere. An altitude allowing, it a power unit fails, an emergency landing without 

undue hazard to persons or property on the surface. 

VIc I'IJ/1 not oper .. 1te the Phantom 2 near aoy po11w~r fmfls, !Jgh! post~ or .wy nthflr 

f)<>wered o.'"'S!ar:lt:t 

(b) Over congested areas. Over any congested area of a city, town. or settlement. or over 

any open air assembly of persons. an altitude of 1,000 feet above tile highest obstacle 

within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet of the aircraft. 

We wj/J r)Ol operatfl thP Phantom 2 over anv congested areas. 

(c) Over other than congested areas. An affitude of 500 feet above the surface, except over 

open water or sparsely populated areas. In thOse cases, the aircraft may not be operated 

closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehide, or structure. 

Be<<i.u~e ol ~rnaff s1~--e of tiJP. Phmtt"un 2 (3 t'bs) and the fact there is no tuel on bo.Jrd ;ve 

ft-~ei ;J.s how wo otter no nsk to ffymg less than 500111 other than cx"tg-este<f ar&as. We .t'Otlld !iXo 

to operate /Ji<e powe1t>d p<.-Iradwte~ in that •''R Will PI1SUIA th~)t wn do not pmsom anv haza:d to 

pt-tsons t)t propmry on thC' f;UI1aco_ In addl/ion we ·.w/1 ensure we have perm1ssion from the 

owner of any ve/ude 01 pru~rty ptu)t to gPttmq ;vlt/Jitl tho 500ft ama_ 

(d) Helicopters, powered parachutes, and weight-shift-control aircraft. H the operation is 

conducted without hazard to persons or property on the surface-

(t ) A helicopter may be operated at less than the minimums prescribed in paragraph 

(b) or (c) of this section, provided each person operating the helicopter complies 

with any routes or altitudes specifiCally prescribed for helicopters by the FAA; and 

(2) A powered parachute or weight-shift-control airetaft may be operated at less than 

the minimums prescribed in paragraph (c) of this section. 

Section 91.1 21 requires, in pertin~ part. each person operating an aircraft to maintain 

cruising altitude by reference to an altimeter that is set u ••• to the elevation of the departure 

airport o r an appropriate attimeter setting available before departure." 

T!HJ Phamom 2 doos noc hav(• .;1 barumetnc ;,i/fm;elt>l h1J! uses GPS srgnai:; 10 compute 

~?llltudo We 'llilll set the .:t.'ttlwle to ._~e10 pnn: 10 Mko off so .1s to be able to know altrtude ~1buve 

the ground dt alll1me~. 

Section 91.15t (a) prescribes that no person may begin a flight in an airplane under VFR 

conditions unless (considering wind and forecast weather conditions) there is enough fuel to 

3
*

The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1993

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Western 

v. * District of Missouri.

*

John W. Overcast, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 26, 2005

Filed: May 31, 2005

___________

Before SMITH, FAGG, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

John W. Overcast appeals the sentence the district court*

 imposed after

Overcast pleaded guilty to a firearm offense. His counsel has moved to withdraw and

has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Overcast has

filed two supplemental briefs. We find no merit in any of the arguments raised by

Overcast or his counsel.
-2-

Having conducted an independent review under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,

80 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues. Thus, we grant counsel’s motion to

withdraw, and we affirm.

______________________________
EXHIBIT 32



CAREADVANTAGE, INC

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant to, and for purposes only of, 18 U.S.C. §
1350, I, Dennis J. Mouras, Chief Executive Officer and acting principal financial officer of CareAdvantage, Inc. (the Company), hereby certify that (i) the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended June 30,
2005 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and (ii) information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Dated: August 12, 2005



/s/ Dennis J. MourasDennis J. Mouras, Chief Executive Officer and acting Principal Financial Officer
IV

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 104

Expressing the sense of Congress that the President of the United States

should not proceed toward the normalization of diplomatic and economic

relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam until the Vietnamese

Government has furnished a complete accounting of missing American

servicemen in Southeast Asia and opened its archives to inspection.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 20, 1993

Mr. SANTORUM submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was

referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of Congress that the President of the

United States should not proceed toward the normalization of diplomatic and economic relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam until the Vietnamese Government has furnished a complete accounting of missing

American servicemen in Southeast Asia and opened its

archives to inspection.

Whereas it is established United States policy that progress

in normalizing diplomatic and economic relations with

Vietnam is explicitly tied to their cooperation on resolving

the American prisoners of war and missing in action

(POW/MIA) issue;
2

•HCON 104 IH

Whereas it is established United States policy that the swift

resolution of the POW/MIA issue is a national priority,

and the American people overwhelmingly support this

policy;

Whereas the existing United States economic embargo

against Vietnam has been successful in bringing the families of American prisoners of war and missing in action

more answers than at any time in the past, and that this

cooperation could be lost if the economic embargo is lifted prior to the fullest possible accounting of American

POWs and MIAs by Vietnam;

Whereas the Tighe Task Force concluded in 1986 that there

is a strong probability of live American prisoners of war

in Southeast Asia;

Whereas it has been reported that Vietnam has stored the remains of hundreds of American servicemen;

Whereas recent reports suggest that conclusive information

on the fate of American POWs and MIAs may exist in

the archives of the Government of Vietnam;

Whereas efforts to settle Vietnam’s International Monetary

Fund debt will weaken the effectiveness of the existing

economic embargo; and

Whereas lifting the economic embargo against Vietnam before

the fullest possible accounting of American POWs and

MIAs has been achieved may result in the destruction of

further evidence in Vietnam which may resolve the question of remaining American POWs and MIAs: Now,

therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that the
3

•HCON 104 IH

1 President of the United States should not proceed toward

2 the normalization of diplomatic and economic relations

3 with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam until the Vietnam4 ese Government has provided the fullest possible account5 ing of missing American servicemen in Southeast Asia.

Æ
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANDRES LUJANO MUNOZ, AKA Andres 

Lujano, AKA Lujano Munoz, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 19-70003 

Agency No. A206-402-877 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 14, 2020**

Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges. 

Andres Lujano Munoz, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions pro se for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an 

immigration judge’s decision denying his application for deferral of removal under 

the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 22 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-70003 

§ 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Silaya 

v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008). We review de novo due process 

claims in immigration proceedings. Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 

2014). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because 

Lujano Munoz failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured by or 

with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Mexico. See 

Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009).

Lujano Munoz’s contentions that the agency ignored evidence or otherwise 

erred in its analysis of his case are unsupported by the record. See Lata v. INS, 204 

F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error to prevail on a due process claim). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
#### PERSALL v. STATE.

No. 22432.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 17, 1943.

Walter G. Weaver, of Donna, for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

*489KRUEGER, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of the offense of operation of a motor vehicle upon a public road in Hidalgo County after his driver’s license had been suspended, and his punishment was assessed at confinement in the county jail for a period of three months.

The prosecution was based on Section 34 of Article II of Chapter 173, page 256, of the 47th Legislature and may also be found in the Vernon’s Ann. Civil Statutes as Article 6687b. This article provides that upon conviction of the offense denounced by said section of said article the defendant shall be punished by a fine of not less than $25 and not more than $500, and, in addition thereto, there may be imposed a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding six months. It appears to us that the judgment assessing appellant’s punishment at confinement in the county jail for a period of three months without the imposition of a fine was unauthorized. There may be a fine imposed without imprisonment, but there can not be an imprisonment without first assessing a fine. A fine is a necessary part of the punishment, without which the additional punishment can not legally be imposed. In support of what we have said we refer to the following authorities: Sager v. State, 11 Tex.Cr.App. 110; Johnson v. State, 18 Tex.Cr.App. 7.

For the error noticed, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This Schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Balance
Sheet,  Statement  of  Operations,  Statements  of Cash Flows and Notes  thereto
incorporated  in this Form 10-QSB and is  qualified in its entirety by reference
to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              jun-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   mar-31-1996
<CASH>                                         345,992
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  7,184,456
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               8,919,144
<PP&E>                                         51,528
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 8,970,672
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          3,829,591
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       504,902
<OTHER-SE>                                     4,636,179
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   8,970,672
<SALES>                                        1,915,553
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               1,915,553
<CGS>                                          1,129,472
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               593,958
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             1,011
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                191,112
<INCOME-TAX>                                   76,445
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            114,667
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   114,667
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  .06
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0
        


</TABLE>
```

[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 213 (Thursday, November 2, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 65882]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-28179]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division

Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--Microelectronics and Computer Technology 
Corporation (``MCC'')

    Notice is hereby given that, on September 22, 2000, pursuant to 
Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), Microelectronics and 
Computer Technology Corporation (``MCC'') has filed written 
notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal 
Trade Commission disclosing changes in its membership status. The 
notifications were filed for the purpose of extending the Act's 
provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual 
damages under specified circumstances. Specifically, General Electric, 
Fairfield, CT; Mobil Technology Company, Fairfax, VA; NASA-Ames, 
Moffett Field, CA; National Security Agency, Fort Meade, MD; Rafael, 
Haisa, Israel; and TRW, Inc., Redondo Beach, CA have been dropped as 
parties to this venture. Also, the Infosleuth II, Cobra, PACE, and MEMS 
projects have ended.
    No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned 
activity of the group research project. Membership in this group 
research project remains open, and Microelectronics and Computer 
Technology Corporation intends to file additional written notification 
disclosing all changes in membership.
    On December 21, 1984, Microelectronics and Computer Technology 
Corporation filed its original notification pursuant to Section 6(a) of 
the Act. The Department of Justice published a notice in the Federal 
Register pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act on January 17, 1985 (50 FR 
2633).
    The last notification was filed with the Department on March 31, 
2000. A notice was published in the Federal Register pursuant to 
Section 6(b) of the Act on June 29, 2000 (65 FR 40130).

Constance K. Robinson,
Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 00-28179 Filed 11-1-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
```
#### HILLIN v. STATE.

No. 22247.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 4, 1942.'

Ben M. Payne, Jr., and J. M. Willis, both of Henderson, for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Upon trial under an indictment charging him with rape appellant was convicted of assault with intent to rape and his punishment assessed at three years in the penitentiary.

No bills of exception are brought forward. The facts have been carefully examined. We see no benefit to accrue from a recital of them here. They amply support the verdict and judgment.

The judgment is affirmed.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DAVID SAMBRANO, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No.: 4:21-cv-01074-P

UNITED AIRLINES, INC., 

Defendant.

[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO 

LIFT STAY AND FOR ENTRY OF PARTIAL FINAL JUDGMENT

On September 19, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Lift Stay and for Entry of Partial 

Final Judgment. Having considered Plaintiffs’ motion, any responses filed by the Defendant, and 

any replies filed by Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(b) are satisfied, that there exists no just reason for delay, and that the motion should 

be granted. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

1. The stay in this case is LIFTED for the purposes of resolving Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

Entry of Partial Final Judgment.

2. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Partial Final Judgment is GRANTED.

3. Final Judgment shall be entered for all the claims dismissed in this Court’s 

December 18, 2023 Opinion & Order (ECF No. 231).

_____________ ________________________________

Date MARK T. PITTMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 4:21-cv-01074-P Document 279-1 Filed 09/19/24 Page 1 of 1 PageID 19336
#### JONES FINE BREAD CO. et al. v. CITY OF GROESBECK et al.

No. 2151.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Waco.

March 20, 1941.

Rogers & Scott, W. E. Cureton, and Sleeper, Boynton & Kendall, all of Waco, for appellants.

L. L. Geren and L. W. Shepperd, both of Groesbeck, for appellees.

TIREY, Justice.

This suit was brought by Jones Fine Bread Company against the city of Groes-beck and its officers to enjoin the enforce*235ment of a city ordinance requiring manufacturers of bread to pay an annual license and inspection fee as a prerequisite to selling bread within said city. Hilltop Baking Company intervened and sought the same relief. A trial before the court without a jury resulted in judgment dissolving a temporary writ of injunction theretofore granted, and the plaintiff and the intervener have appealed.

The city of Groesbeck is a municipal corporation incorporated under the general laws of Texas under the terms of Title 28 of the Revised Civil Statutes of 1925. The ordinance in question provides, in effect, that any manufacturer of bread, pies or doughnuts intended for human consumption desiring to sell such products within the city of Groesbeck must first allow his bakery to be inspected by the city health inspector and procure an annual license from the city authorizing it to do so. In order to obtain the license, he must pay an annual license fee of $12.50, and if the bakery is situated outside of the city of Groesbeck, the applicant must pay an additional sum of $2.40 per mile of distance that the bakery is from the city to cover traveling expenses of the inspector. The ordinance requires the inspector to make.at least one inspection each month.

Appellants assail the validity of the ordinance substantially on the following grounds: (1) That the ordinance is void because it seeks, contrary to law, to empower a municipal corporation to go beyond its limits and enforce the right of inspection of appellants’ bakeries; (2) that the ordinance constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of authority and discriminates in favor of local bakeries situated within the limits of the city and thereby constitutes a taking of property without due process of law. Appellants’ contentions aforesaid were duly presented to the Supreme Court for determination by certificate and on February 19, 1941, the Supreme Court answered the certification that the ordinance was invalid. Jones Fine Bread Co. et al. v. City of Groesbeck et al., 148 S.W.2d 195. The question of law so determined by the Supreme Court controls the disposition of this appeal. Therefore, we hold that the ordinance in question is invalid; and the order of the trial court dissolving the temporary injunction is reversed and the application .remanded to said court, with instructions to grant appellants the relief prayed for in their original application.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-3791

_____________________________

MARK P. MONROE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

Mark W. Moseley, Judge.

March 1, 2019

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, ROWE, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Mark P. Monroe, pro se, Appellant.
2

Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.