IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

DAVID SAMBRANO, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

 v.

UNITED AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 4:21-01074-P

DEFENDANT’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS 

PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 

Case 4:21-cv-01074-P Document 58 Filed 10/11/21 Page 1 of 13 PageID 534
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

-iI. There Is No General Jurisdiction Over United in Texas.................................................... 1

II. There Is No Specific Jurisdiction For Claims Unconnected to United’s Texas 

Conduct.............................................................................................................................. 2

A. Absent Class Members Whose Claims Are Not Connected to Texas................... 3

B. Three Named Plaintiffs Whose Claims Are Not Connected to Texas................... 5

CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................. 7

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-iiTABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn,

563 U.S. 125 (2011)...................................................................................................................3

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., San Francisco Cnty.,

137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017)..................................................................................................... passim

Canaday v. Anthem Cos., Inc.,

9 F.4th 392 (6th Cir. 2021) ........................................................................................................4

Coffey v. Mesa Airlines Inc.,

2019 WL 4492952 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2019) ...........................................................................7

Daimler AG v. Bauman,

571 U.S. 117 (2014)...............................................................................................................1, 2

Devlin v. Scardelletti,

536 U.S. 1 (2002).......................................................................................................................3

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.,

545 U.S. 546 (2005)...................................................................................................................4

Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court,

141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021)...........................................................................................................1, 6

Fowler v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP,

2017 WL 1293983 (W.D. La. Mar. 24, 2017)...........................................................................7

Johnson v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,

2019 WL 7987679 (N.D. Tex. June 26, 2019) ..........................................................................7

Libersat v. Sundance Energy, Inc.,

978 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2020) .....................................................................................................6

Lyngaas v. Curaden AG,

992 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2021) .....................................................................................................4

Martinez v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,

2021 WL 1289898 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2021) ....................................................................3. 4, 5

Case 4:21-cv-01074-P Document 58 Filed 10/11/21 Page 3 of 13 PageID 536
-iiiSnyder v. Harris,

394 U.S. 332 (1969)...................................................................................................................4

Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble,

255 U.S. 356 (1921)...................................................................................................................4

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,

141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021)...............................................................................................................3

Vallarta v. United Airlines, Inc.,

497 F. Supp. 3d 790 (N.D. Cal. 2020).......................................................................................2

Walden v. Fiore,

571 U.S. 277 (2014)...........................................................................................................1, 6, 7

Washington v. Reno,

35 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1994) .....................................................................................................5

Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co.,

414 U.S. 291 (1973)...................................................................................................................4

Zito v. United Airlines, Inc.,

523 F. Supp. 3d 377 (W.D.N.Y. 2021)......................................................................................2

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. 1332.................................................................................................................................4

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.........................................................................................................................7

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Plaintiffs’ opposition (“Opp.”) to United’s motion (“Mot.”) fails to come to grips with 

governing law. As to general jurisdiction, plaintiffs try to return to the old approach of “continuous 

and systematic” contacts, instead of the “essentially at home” standard adopted in Daimler AG v. 

Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138-39 (2014). As to specific jurisdiction for the putative class members 

whose claims are unconnected to Texas, plaintiffs try to distinguish Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 

Superior Ct. of Cal., San Francisco Cnty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017), on the ground that this is 

a class action, but neither they, nor any of the non-binding cases they cite, can overcome the 

precedent and principle that Rule 23 cannot exempt absent class members from due process rules. 

And as to specific jurisdiction over named plaintiffs Mr. Turnbough, Ms. Kincannon, and Mr. 

Sambrano, plaintiffs rest on the proposition that they will “suffer[] in Texas” due to United’s 

policies, Opp. 2, but any in-state effect of United’s denial of their requested out-of-state workplace 

accommodation does not make their claims sufficiently connected to United’s in-state conduct, 

see Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014).

I. THERE IS NO GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER UNITED IN TEXAS

Although plaintiffs grudgingly concede that a “corporation that operates in many places 

can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them,” Opp. 6 (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20), 

they nevertheless invoke the “continuous and systematic” approach that was largely abandoned in 

Daimler for that very reason. Compare Opp. 3 (asserting that this “Court has general jurisdiction 

over United because of United’s continuous and systematic affiliation with Texas”), with Daimler, 

571 U.S. at 138-39. The proper question, instead, is whether United’s connections to Texas 

“render [it] essentially at home” there, and they plainly do not. Id. Likewise, plaintiffs’ heavy 

reliance on Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021), is entirely 

misplaced. Ford’s main holding concerned specific personal jurisdiction, precisely because the 

Court recognized that, even though Ford’s “business is everywhere,” it was subject to general 

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jurisdiction only in its place of incorporation and principal place of business. Id. at 1022, 1024. 

This makes sense, as the “business is everywhere” approach is the opposite of being “at home” in 

one or two locations. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138-39. 

Here, Texas is just one of seven United “hubs,” where less than 30% of business is 

conducted and less than 20% of employees work. Opp. 5; App. 2-3 ¶¶ 6-7, 10. To characterize 

United as being “at home” in Texas is self-refuting. In fact, courts have routinely rejected attempts 

to establish that United is at home anywhere other than Delaware and Illinois—including in states 

where United has even greater connections than Texas. E.g., Vallarta v. United Airlines, Inc., 497 

F. Supp. 3d 790, 799 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (no general jurisdiction in California, where United has two 

hubs and “a substantial number of employees”); Zito v. United Airlines, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 3d 377, 

383-84 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (no general jurisdiction in New York). Notably, while plaintiffs purport 

to distinguish cases from United’s motion (Opp. 4-5), plaintiffs do not cite even a single postDaimler case holding in any circumstance that a corporation is at “home” in a forum other than 

place of incorporation or principal place of business.1

In short, both law and logic foreclose general jurisdiction over United in this forum, which 

would allow even employees whose claims are entirely unconnected to Texas to sue here. 

II. THERE IS NO SPECIFIC JURISDICTION FOR CLAIMS UNCONNECTED TO 

UNITED’S TEXAS CONDUCT

As the Supreme Court’s Bristol-Myers decision and this Court’s Martinez decision make 

clear, plaintiffs’ assertion that some of the named plaintiffs may have claims that are sufficiently 

connected to Texas (Opp. 10-13) is not enough to establish specific jurisdiction for other named 

 1 As for the cases cited by United (Mot. 3), United did not cite Victor Elias and Agher to suggest 

that they are factually identical, but rather to illustrate how demanding the general jurisdiction analysis is 

and how unprecedented it would be for this Court to deem this to be the “exceptional case” Daimler reserved 

as a theoretical possibility. As for Hardin, while the plaintiff there did not address United’s arguments as 

to personal jurisdiction, the Court still analyzed general and specific jurisdiction on the record before it.

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plaintiffs and absent class members whose claims lack the requisite connection. Bristol-Myers, 

137 S. Ct. at 1781; Martinez v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2021 WL 1289898, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 

2021) (Pittman, J.). Plaintiffs erroneously dispute that this principle extends to absent members in 

a putative class action, and although plaintiffs acknowledge that the principle applies to each of 

the named plaintiffs, they erroneously contend that all of them satisfy it. 

A. Absent Class Members Whose Claims Are Not Connected to Texas 

1. Plaintiffs make only two substantive arguments in defense of the proposition that 

Bristol-Myers does not apply to putative class actions. Each one disregards binding precedent. 

First, plaintiffs heavily emphasize that courts before Bristol-Myers did not object to class 

actions even though absent class members lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Opp. 

10-11. But none of those cases specifically addressed the question, and the Supreme Court has 

held that “[w]hen a potential jurisdictional defect is neither noted nor discussed in a federal 

decision, the decision does not stand for the proposition that no defect existed.” Ariz. Christian 

Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 144 (2011). 

Second, plaintiffs invoke the reasoning of post-Bristol Myers decisions by the Sixth and 

Seventh Circuits (and similar district court cases), but they ignore United’s explanation (Mot. 8) 

of the flawed reasoning used in those cases. Plaintiffs simply repeat the theory that “absent class 

members” are “not full parties to the case for many purposes.” Opp. 11. But “for many purposes” 

is not the same thing as “for all purposes.” And critically, plaintiffs disregard that the Supreme 

Court held just this year that absent class members must have Article III standing. Mot. 8 

(discussing TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021)); see Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 

U.S. 1, 14 (2002) (treating absent class members as “parties” for appealing orders approving class 

settlement over their objections). Plaintiffs provide no explanation why absent class members 

must satisfy Article III but not the Due Process Clause—both are constitutional limits on the 

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Court’s adjudicatory power that no rule of civil procedure can abrogate.

By contrast, the contexts in which absent class members are disregarded are all materially 

different. See Lyngaas v. Curaden AG, 992 F.3d 412, 443 (6th Cir. 2021) (Thapar, J., dissenting). 

For example, contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s suggestion, absent class members traditionally were

considered parties who independently needed to satisfy the amount in controversy in diversity 

suits. See Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). Although this is no longer the rule, that 

is only because Congress expressly abrogated it by statute, see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 

Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 566-67 (2005), and it has done no such thing here. To the contrary, 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k) incorporates state due process limits. See Martinez, 2021 WL 1289898, at *4; 

Canaday v. Anthem Cos., Inc., 9 F.4th 392, 399 (6th Cir. 2021) (Sutton, J.). Likewise, while the 

Seventh Circuit is correct that absent class members traditionally were not considered for purposes 

of determining the statutory requirement of complete diversity of citizenship, see Exxon Mobil, 

545 U.S. at 583 n.3 (citing Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921)), that 

rule was not based on the view that the absent class members were “not full parties”: rather, it was 

based on an analogy to the principle that diversity of citizenship is determined at the time of the 

complaint regardless of later addition of parties. See Ben Hur, 255 U.S. at 366; see also Snyder v. 

Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 355 n.23 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting). Moreover, that is not even the 

current rule, because Congress has abrogated it and made the citizenship of absent class members 

relevant to the diversity determination. 28 U.S.C. 1332(d); see Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 571. 

Accordingly, plaintiffs have not identified any principled reason why absent class members 

should be excused from satisfying due process requirements, and they have ignored Supreme Court 

precedent and common sense to the contrary. In short, they simply ask this Court to follow some 

poorly reasoned, non-binding opinions. This Court should decline “to follow th[ose] flawed, nonCase 4:21-cv-01074-P Document 58 Filed 10/11/21 Page 8 of 13 PageID 541
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binding, non-textual, and unpersuasive” cases, as it did in Martinez. 2021 WL 1289898, at *4.

2. Plaintiffs also object that United’s personal-jurisdiction objection about absent 

class members is unripe. But this Court rejected that argument in Martinez: plaintiffs’ “reliance 

on Cruson is misplaced because, in that case, the [Fifth Circuit] analyzed whether a personal 

jurisdiction defense had been brought too late instead of whether it was premature, which is the 

issue in this case.” 2021 WL 1289898, at *2. Plaintiffs try to distinguish Martinez on the ground 

that determining personal jurisdiction from the outset “makes sense” in cases involving collective 

actions, which require absent plaintiffs to opt-in, but not “where class certification is a prerequisite 

to any class member even coming within the Court’s jurisdiction.” Opp. 14. That distinction is 

illusory, however, given that plaintiffs seek a class-wide preliminary injunction now, which 

likewise demands a prompt determination whether the absent class members whose claims are not 

connected to Texas are properly part of this case at all. Just as in Martinez, “prolonging this 

determination would only sow confusion.” 2021 WL 1289898, at *2.2

 

B. Three Named Plaintiffs Whose Claims Are Not Connected to Texas

United moved to dismiss the three named plaintiffs whose employment with United is 

based in states other than Texas. Mot. 4-6. Plaintiffs’ only response is to ask the Court to rule that 

because they will be harmed in Texas (on the theory that Mr. Sambrano and Ms. Kincannon reside 

here and that Mr. Turnbough, an Illinois resident, has occasionally flown through here), there is 

 2 Plaintiffs defend their contention (Opp. 13 n.4) that they may seek preliminary class-wide relief 

even absent class certification by invoking Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1097 (6th Cir. 1994). But 

in Washington, the Sixth Circuit upheld the class-wide injunction only “[b]ecause relief for the named 

plaintiffs in this case would also necessarily extend to [the whole class].” Id. at 1103-04. That is not so 

here, because accommodating the named plaintiffs alone would fully redress their injuries. And insofar as 

Washington could be read to more broadly support class-wide preliminary relief absent class certification 

or even a likelihood thereof, that out-of-circuit decision is contrary to binding precedent and fundamental 

principles of Article III standing, equitable limitations, and Rule 23 certification. See Defendant’s 

Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Dkt. 41, at 3-5. 

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specific personal jurisdiction over United for their claims. That argument flouts Walden’s holding 

that in-state injury alone is insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction. 571 U.S. at 284; Libersat 

v. Sundance Energy, Inc., 978 F.3d 315, 322 (5th Cir. 2020) (rejecting plaintiffs’ specific 

jurisdiction argument that defendant’s “harming him in Louisiana[] provides a sufficient contact 

with Louisiana,” and explaining that, under Walden, “the proper question is not where the plaintiff 

experienced a particular injury or effect” (cleaned up)). 

Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Walden on the ground that the defendant there had no 

general connections with the forum state. Opp. 7-8. But specific jurisdiction requires that 

plaintiffs’ own claims must be connected to the defendants’ forum conduct. See Bristol-Myers 

Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1781-782. It thus is insufficient that, as plaintiffs emphasize, United does 

business in Texas, as plaintiffs’ failure-to-accommodate claims are “unrelated to that activity.” Id.

at 1781 (cleaned up). And similarly, this is not a case like Ford, where the company did substantial 

business in the forum states and their “products malfunctioned” there (the critical distinction from 

Bristol-Myers). See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1031. Here, plaintiffs bring an employment-law challenge 

to United’s vaccination accommodation policies (adopted and implemented in Illinois), but Mr. 

Turnbough, Ms. Kincannon, and Mr. Sambrano are employed by United, respectively, in Illinois, 

California, and New Jersey, and Mr. Turnbough does not even live here.

As to Mr. Turnbough, plaintiffs rely on his having sometimes flown to DFW in the past. 

Opp. 9-10. But that hardly shows he would do so in the future while the challenged policies are 

in effect, especially since it appears he intends to take leave instead. Regardless, his claim 

challenging the denial of his preferred workplace accommodation is connected to United’s conduct 

in Illinois, where he works (and also lives), not in every state where he would fly on the job. Cf. 

Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1028 n.4 (distinguishing between “isolated or sporadic transactions” and 

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“continuous ones”); id. at 1031 (distinguishing between the Bristol-Myers plaintiffs who “were 

engaged in forum-shopping” and the Ford plaintiffs who “brought suit in the most natural State”). 

As to Ms. Kincannon and Mr. Sambrano, plaintiffs do not even try to argue that they travel with 

United in Texas, relying instead exclusively on the fact that they live in Texas, such that United’s 

accommodation “directly affects them in Texas because while they are on unpaid leave, they will 

be grounded in their home states.” Opp. 9. But again, that is insufficient under Walden. E.g., 

Coffey v. Mesa Airlines Inc., 2019 WL 4492952, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2019) (no specific 

jurisdiction when airline’s employment decisions made outside the forum even though it knew 

plaintiff lived in the forum). 

Finally, plaintiffs did not respond to the point (Mot. 4) that these three plaintiffs’ claims 

also must be dismissed for lack of venue. Even if their claims “arise out of or relate to” United’s 

Texas conduct for personal jurisdiction, that would not establish Texas as “the State in which the 

unlawful employment practice” occurred for venue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3); see Johnson v. U.S. 

Dep’t of Transp., 2019 WL 7987679, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 26, 2019) (no venue because defendant 

made the employment decision elsewhere (collecting cases)); Fowler v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 

2017 WL 1293983, at *8 (W.D. La. Mar. 24, 2017) (“[A]n employment practice is ‘committed’ 

where the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred, rather than where its effects are felt.”). 

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion to dismiss should be granted, such that non-Texas putative class claims 

and the individual claims of Mr. Turnbough, Ms. Kincannon, and Mr. Sambrano are dismissed.3

 

 3 There is no basis for discovery here (Opp. 3 n.1). The lack of personal jurisdiction for the class 

is a purely legal question that will not change based on discovery; as for specific jurisdiction with respect 

to the three named plaintiffs, the proper inquiry is whether their own claims are connected to United’s 

conduct, and so any relevant facts are already in plaintiffs’ possession.

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Dated: October 11, 2021 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jordan M. Matthews 

Jordan M. Matthews

IL Bar No. 6300503

JONES DAY

77 W. Wacker Drive, Suite 3500

Chicago, Illinois 60601

Telephone: (312) 782-3939

Facsimile: (312) 782-8585

Email: jmatthews@jonesday.com

Donald J. Munro

D.C. Bar No. 453600 

JONES DAY

51 Louisiana Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20001

Telephone: (202) 879-3939

Facsimile: (202) 626-1700

Email: dmunro@jonesday.com

Alexander V. Maugeri

N.Y. Bar No. 5062666

JONES DAY

250 Vesey Street

New York, NY 10281-1047

Telephone: 212.326.3939

Facsimile: 212.755.7306

Email: amaugeri@jonesday.com

Russell D. Cawyer

State Bar No. 00793482

Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP

201 Main St., Ste. 2500

Fort Worth, Texas 76102

Telephone: (817) 878-3562 

Facsimile: (817) 335-2820 

Email: russell.cawyer@kellyhart.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On October 11, 2021, I electronically submitted the foregoing document with the clerk of 

court for the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, using the electronic case filing system 

of the court. I hereby certify that I have served all counsel and/or pro se parties of record 

electronically or by another manner authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2).

/s/ Jordan M. Matthews

Jordan M. Matthews

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