[Cite as Liles v. Keith, 2009-Ohio-6874.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

AUGLAIZE COUNTY 

 

STACEY J. LILES, 

 PETITIONER-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 2-09-22 

 v. 

JAMES P. KEITH, II, O P I N I O N 

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Auglaize County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 2009 CV 210 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: December 28, 2009 

 

APPEARANCES: 

John C. Huffman for Appellant 

Stacey Liles, Appellee 
Case No. 2-09-22 

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SHAW, J. 

{¶1} The respondent-appellant, James P. Keith, II, appeals the June 26, 

2009, judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Auglaize County, Ohio, granting 

the request of petitioner-appellee, Stacey Liles, for a stalking civil protection order 

(“CPO”). 

{¶2} The facts of this case are as follows. On June 12, 2009, Liles filed a 

petition for a stalking civil protection order against Keith, her former boyfriend. 

In her petition, Liles alleged that Keith engaged in numerous acts against her that 

made her fear for her safety. On June 16, 2009, the trial court held an ex parte 

hearing on Liles’ petition but denied her request for an emergency order. 

However, the court set the matter for a full hearing on June 26, 2009, to determine 

whether to issue a permanent order of protection. 

{¶3} On June 26, 2009, the trial court held the hearing. Liles testified in 

support of her petition. During her testimony, Liles testified that on multiple 

occasions, spanning from January 8, 2009, until June of 2009, Keith had driven 

past her, shouting and raising his middle finger to her. On one such occasion, in 

April of 2009, Liles testified that Keith was driving behind her on Breese Road 

when he raised his middle finger to her and began moving closer to her vehicle. 

She testified that at this time she “was afraid he was going to rear end me. My 

boys were in there asking me if he was going to rear end us. They were scared.” 
Case No. 2-09-22 

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(Hrg., 6/26/09, p. 11.) On another occasion, in January of 2009, she testified that 

she saw Keith at the Taco Bell drive-thru on Shawnee Road in Lima and that she 

left the restaurant. She further testified that as she was driving down Ft. Amanda 

Road and approached a stop light, she testified that Keith drove into the turn lane, 

“looked over at all of us, pointing his finger up like a gun like he was going to 

shoot us all. Then he squealed his tires and took off.” (id.) On yet another 

occasion, in March of 2009, she testified that Keith was passing her in his vehicle 

on State Route 65 when he swerved towards her vehicle. Although he did not 

actually enter her lane of travel, Liles stated that she felt threatened. She further 

testified that she simply wanted Keith to act like he did not know her if they 

happened to encounter one another so that she did not have to feel threatened by 

him making hand gestures towards her. 

{¶4} After Liles testimony, Keith testified on his own behalf and denied 

making any gestures towards Liles or driving his vehicle in any way as she 

described. Keith’s son also testified for his father. His testimony related to one 

incident in June where Liles had testified that Keith stopped his vehicle in front of 

hers in Cridersville, Ohio, raised his middle finger to her, and appeared to be 

shouting at her although she could not hear what he was saying. Keith’s son stated 

that he recalled seeing Liles at a stop sign in Cridersville when he was a passenger 
Case No. 2-09-22 

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in his father’s vehicle but that the only thing his father did was wave at Liles and 

state under his breath, “Hi, Stacey.” 

{¶5} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated that it chose to 

believe Liles’ testimony. Consequently, the court granted her petition for a CPO. 

This appeal followed, and Keith now asserts two assignments of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 

FAILING TO APPLY THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD 

FOR WHETHER A CIVIL STALKING PROTECTION 

ORDER SHOULD BE ISSUED. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II

THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION TO GRANT A CIVIL 

STALKING PROTECTION ORDER WAS AGAINST THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶6} As Keith’s assignments of error are related, we elect to address them 

together. When reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant a civil protection order, 

we will not reverse such a decision absent an abuse of discretion. Kramer v. 

Kramer, 3rd Dist. No. 13-02-03, 2002-Ohio-4383. Abuse of discretion “connotes 

more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is 

unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 

Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140. Further, if there is some competent, 

credible evidence to support the trial court’s decision, there is no abuse of 
Case No. 2-09-22 

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discretion. Ross v. Ross (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 203, 414 N.E.2d 426; see also, C.E. 

Morris Co. v. Foley Const. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 280, 376 N.E.2d 578. 

{¶7} Revised Code section 2903.214 governs the issuance of a civil 

stalking protection order. This section provides that a person may seek civil relief 

against an alleged stalker by filing a petition containing “[a]n allegation that the 

respondent engaged in a violation of section 2903.211 of the Revised Code against 

the person to be protected by the protection order * * *, including a description of 

the nature and extent of the violation.” R.C. 2903.214(C)(1). Thus, in order to 

obtain a civil stalking protection order, Liles had to establish by a preponderance 

of the evidence, that Keith engaged in a violation of R.C. 2903.211, the menacing 

by stalking statute, against her. Kramer, supra, at ¶ 14. 

{¶8} Revised Code section 2903.211(A)(1), Ohio’s menacing by stalking 

statute, provides that “[n]o person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall 

knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to 

the other person or cause mental distress to the other person.” A pattern of 

conduct is defined as “two or more actions or incidents closely related in time, 

whether or not there has been a prior conviction based on any of those actions or 

incidents.” R.C. 2903.211(D)(1). Additionally, one incident is not sufficient to 

establish a “pattern of conduct.” Kramer, supra, at ¶ 15, citing State v. Scruggs

(2000), 136 Ohio App.3d 631, 737 N.E.2d 574. 
Case No. 2-09-22 

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{¶9} In this case, Keith correctly contends that the trial court could not 

merely rely upon the fact that Liles filed the petition as a basis for granting the 

order. However, the court did not rely merely upon the filing of the petition. It 

relied upon the statements that she made in court as well, which it was entitled to 

do. Specifically, the court stated that it had considered the testimony of the parties 

and that it simply came to a question of who to believe. The court then decided to 

believe Liles. 

{¶10} Keith contends that instead of properly considering the evidence, the 

trial court seemed to improperly base its decision merely by reasoning that Liles 

would not have filed the petition if the allegations were not true. Keith points to 

the following statement of the trial court from the bench prior to announcing its 

decision: “Court just finds it unlikely that someone would go to the extent of 

filing such a thing and making the allegations that are made if they aren’t true, 

especially when that proceeding has been done in the past.” (Hrg., 6/26/09, p. 55.) 

{¶11} While it is somewhat unclear exactly what the trial court meant by 

this remark, we do not believe that it reflects the basis of the trial court’s decision 

in light of the ample evidence in the record supporting the decision – and 

particularly in view of the trial court’s explicit reference to weighing the testimony 

of Liles and Keith and finding Liles’ testimony more credible. 
Case No. 2-09-22 

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{¶12} In sum, given the testimony of Liles, which the court, having been 

able to examine all the witnesses and their respective demeanors, was within its 

prerogative as the trier of fact to believe, the trial court did not err in granting the 

CPO. As noted, Liles testified to numerous incidences wherein Keith raised his 

middle finger to her and appeared to be yelling something to her. Further, she 

testified as to two different incidences where she actually felt threatened. These 

incidences involved Keith driving his vehicle in a manner that caused her to fear 

that his moving vehicle would collide with hers. In addition, she testified that she 

felt threatened by his hand gestures and described an incident where he used his 

fingers to form the shape of a gun, which he pointed at her. Thus, the trial court 

had some competent, credible evidence that Keith, while engaging in two or more 

actions or incidents closely related in time, knowingly caused Liles to believe that 

Keith would cause physical harm to her. Accordingly, Keith’s two assignments of 

error are overruled. 

{¶13} For these reasons, the judgment of the Common Pleas Court of 

Auglaize County, Ohio, is affirmed. 

 Judgment Affirmed 

WILLAMOWSKI and ROGERS, J.J., concur. 

/jlr