alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Salt River Electric

Distribution Pole Replacement Costs

28-Oct-11

General Information: Tsharp

1. Standard distribution transformer Pole is 40 foot Class 4 Souther Yellow Pine

2. Replacement pole is a 40 foot Class 3 Southern Yellow Pine

3. Replacement is performed while circuit is energized.

4. No salvage value is given to the pole being retired since it will not be re-used.

5. Labor, transportation, and overheads are estimated to complete the retirement of the original pole

 and replace it with a new pole in the energized circuit as described above including the cost of the n

6. Cost of new transformer in not included.

Estimated cost of this pole replacement process on a single phase line 

Estimated cost of this pole replacement process on a three phase line 
 Yellow Pine

he retirement of the original pole

d above including the cost of the new pole.

ss on a single phase line is $ 1,380.27.

ss on a three phase line is $ 2,944.91.
Exhibit 13.1



CERTIFICATION OF CEO AND CFO

PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002



In connection with the annual report of ESSA Pharma Inc. (the
"Registrant") filed under cover of Form 20-F for the period ended September 30, 2015, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Robert Rieder as Chief Executive Officer of the Registrant and
David Wood as Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant
to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of his knowledge that:



| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|/s/ Robert Rieder |                        
|----------------- | -----------------------
|Name:             | Robert Rieder          
|Title:            | Chief Executive Officer
|Date:             | December 14, 2015      



|/s/ David Wood |                        
|-------------- | -----------------------
|Name:          | David Wood             
|Title:         | Chief Financial Officer
|Date:          | December 14, 2015      



This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to §
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed
filed by the Registrant for purposes of §18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
#### SHIELDS v. COMMONWEALTH.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

April 24, 1953.

Motion to Set Aside Order Denied June 11, 1953.

Lester & Riedinger and Lawrence Reid-inger, Jr., Newport, for movant.

J. D. Buckman, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Zeb A. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., opposed.

PER CURIAM.

We are of the opinion that the Judge of the Campbell Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the case. Therefore, Shields had no basis for the plea of former jeopardy when he was placed on trial in the Kenton Circuit Court. 15 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, § 361, page 41.

The judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court is affirmed because that court had jurisdiction of the case. There was ample evidence to support the finding of the jury.
Opinion filed April 4, 2024

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals ___________

No. 11-24-00039-CV

___________

IN RE COMMITMENT OF RICARDO ISLAND

On Appeal from the 441st District Court

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CR54554

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant has filed a pro se “Consolidated Notice of Appeal and Informal 

Appeal Brief” that alleges three issues, one of which relates to the trial court’s 

pretrial commitment of Appellant for the restoration of his competency to stand trial.

Appellant’s counsel has submitted a letter informing this court that Appellant’s 

competency was restored, that he pleaded guilty to the charged offense in the 

underlying case, and requesting that we dismiss this matter as moot. 

This court is prohibited from deciding moot controversies. Nat’l Collegiate 

Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999). When an appeal becomes 

moot, we must dismiss it for want of jurisdiction. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 

369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012).
2

To the extent the “consolidated” notice of appeal relates to pretrial issues in 

his then-pending criminal case, we lack jurisdiction to address the appeal because 

Appellant has pleaded guilty to the charged offense pursuant to a plea bargain 

agreement and has waived his right to appeal. Rule 25.2(a)(2) provides that, in a 

plea bargain case in which the punishment imposed does not exceed the punishment 

agreed to by the parties, “a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were 

raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, (B) after getting the trial 

court’s permission to appeal, or (C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized 

by statute.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). 

Subsections (A), (B), and (C) are not applicable here, and Appellant’s notice 

of appeal does not appear to relate to matters that were raised by a filed written 

motion and ruled on before trial. Nevertheless, with regard to subsection (A), a 

defendant may waive, as here, his right to appeal a trial court’s rulings on pretrial 

motions, as long as the waiver is “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently” made. 

Marsh v. State, 444 S.W.3d 654, 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing TEX. CODE 

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14 (West 2005)); Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 697 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A waiver of this right “will prevent a defendant from 

appealing without the consent of the trial court.” Broadway, 301 S.W.3d at 697 

(citing Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). The trial 

court has not granted permission for Appellant to appeal, and the trial court’s 

certification states that Appellant does not have the right of appeal and that Appellant 

has waived his right to appeal. Rule 25.2 provides that, in the absence of the trial 

court’s certification showing that the defendant has a right of appeal, the appeal 

“must be dismissed.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d). 
3

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 25.2(d); 42.3(a).

W. STACY TROTTER

JUSTICE

April 4, 2024

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
JUNE TERM, 1709.

Lib. P. L. No. 2. folio 586.

#### Thomas Bordley *against*Philemon Lloyd.

UPON motion made by *Thomas*Bordley, that whereas he being discharged by the Secretary of this Province, from *28being clerk of *Anne Arundel*County Court, prayed this Court to be restored to the said office. Whereupon all and singular the premises by the Court here, seen, heard, and fully understood by both parties, It is the opinion or this Court, that the said Secretary had power to dis= charge him without shewing cause, it being usual by all former Secretaries so to do, the commission given the said Bordley, for the said office, being only during pleasure. Motion being moved by the said *Thomas*Bordley, for an appeal from the judgment of this Court, it is by this Court rejected, there being no regular proceedings to ground the same on.

Memorandum. Upon the hearing of the above controversy the Hon. Col. *Thomas*Smyth, one of the Justices of the Court, withdrew himself from the bench, as also *Philemon Lloyd.*

Ordered that *mandamus*issue, directed to *Thomas*Bordley, late clerk of *Anne Arundel*County Court, to deliver the records and seal of *Anne Arundel*County Court, and all things thereto relating, to the Secretary of this Province, returnable next Court.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 12.1
 
                        COMMUNICATIONS INSTRUMENTS, INC.
 
               COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
                                 (IN THOUSANDS)
                                  (UNAUDITED)
 
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                           PREDECESSOR                      COMPANY
                                  -----------------------------------------------------
                           NINE     4.5     7.5
                          MONTHS  MONTHS   MONTHS    YEAR     YEAR      YEAR     YEAR
                          ENDED    ENDED   ENDED    ENDED    ENDED     ENDED    ENDED
                         12/31/92 5/10/93 12/31/93 12/31/94 12/31/95  12/31/96 12/31/97
                         -------- ------- -------- -------- --------  -------- --------
<S>                      <C>      <C>     <C>      <C>      <C>       <C>      <C>
Earnings (Loss) Before
 Taxes and Minority
 Interest...............  $3,079   $141    $(999)   $1,004  $(2,498)   $2,782  $ 6,938
                          ------   ----    -----    ------  -------    ------  -------
Fixed Charges:
  Interest Charges......      93     77      639     1,189    2,172     3,139    5,243
  Amortization of
   Financing Costs......     --     --        79        90      137       252      401
  Environmental
   Interest.............     --     --       --        --       --        147      119
  Estimated Interest
   Factor of Rental
   Expense..............      30     17        8        21       40       272      351
                          ------   ----    -----    ------  -------    ------  -------
    Total Fixed Charges.     123     94      726     1,300    2,349     3,810    6,114
                          ------   ----    -----    ------  -------    ------  -------
    Total Earnings
     Available for Fixed
     Charges............  $3,202   $235    $(273)   $2,304  $  (149)   $6,592  $13,052
                          ======   ====    =====    ======  =======    ======  =======
Ratio of Earnings to
 Fixed Charges..........    26.0x   2.5x     N/A       1.8x     N/A       1.7x     2.1x
</TABLE>
#### GRAVES v. STATE.

No. 26376.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 8, 1953.

*577Paul Petty, Ballinger, for appellant.

Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

BELCHER, Commissioner.

Upon his plea of guilty before the court, appellant was, on April 11, 1951, convicted under art. 567b, Sec. 4, Vernon’s Ann.P.C., for the third offense of obtaining property by drawing a worthless check in the sum of less than $50, with intent to defraud, and punishment assessed at two years in the penitentiary. No statement of facts accompanies the record.

The court imposed sentence upon appellant on the day of the trial, April 11, 1951, and appellant was placed upon probation for a period of two years, under the authority conferred by the Adult Probation and Parole Law, art. 781b, Vernon’s Ann. C.C.P.

The probation was, among other things, conditioned upon appellant’s not committing any offense against the laws of the state.

Thereafter, on the 12th day on November, 1952, came on to be considered by said court the revocation of the probation in this case because of a violation of one or more of the above mentioned conditions.

After a hearing on this issue in said cause, the court found that the terms and conditions of such probation had been violated in that appellant had given checks without sufficient funds in the bank to pay them, and two indictments had been returned against him by a grand jury after April 11, 1951, -and thereupon revoked and set aside the order of probation, remanding the appellant to the' custody of the sheriff and ordering him to serve the sentence originally imposed.

From the order revoking the probation» appellant excepted and gave notice of appeal to this Court.

In appeals of this nature, the only matter presented for review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the order granting probation. Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., No. 26165, - S.W.2d - .

In the absence of a statement of facts, this Court is unable to determine whether such discretion was abused.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

YVON PLAISIR
, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 16

- 1683

[ October 12, 2017 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County ; James W. McCann , Judge; L.T. Case No.

562014CF003716B

.

Ana Gomez

- Mallada, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Matthew Steven Ocksrider, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affir med.

D AMOORGIAN

, C ONNER and F ORST

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
MAY TERM, *1756.*

Lib. B. T. No. 1. fol. *72.*

#### Mathew Dockery’s Lessee *against*William Maynard.

EJECTMENT for a tract of land, lying in *Queen Anne’s*County, called *Dangerjield.*

At the the trial of this cause at the Assises, the plaintiff proved his title to the land mentioned in his declaration, but made no proof as to the boundaries of the land. The defendant insisted, that the plaintiff should proceed to prove the bounds and location of Dangerjield, as located upon the plot, and that he should be admitted to offer evidence to disprove them; but the plaintiff insisted, that as no defence was taken for any lands, that lay within the bounds of the land called Dangerjield, as located by the *plaintiff;*that the bounds of the land was not in issue upon the plot, and that the plaintiff need not go into proof of the bounds of the land, and also, that the defendant should not go into the proof of the bounds of any land laid down by him for illustration, the same being out of the issue in this cause. Of this opinion was the Court, and ruled accord» ingly. To which the defendant excepted.

The Provincial Court overruled the exception, and gave judgment for the plaintiff
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 146 Received in Senate (RDS)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 146

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

             October 19 (legislative day, October 13), 1993

                                Received

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
 Authorizing the use of the Capitol building and grounds for events to 
 commemorate the 200th anniversary of the laying of the cornerstone of 
                              the Capitol.

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 

SECTION 1. USE OF CAPITOL BUILDING AND GROUNDS.

    The Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Capitol 
(hereinafter in this resolution referred to as the ``Commission'') may 
use the Capitol building and grounds on October 23, 1993, or on such 
other date as the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
President pro tempore of the Senate may jointly designate, for events 
to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the laying of the cornerstone 
of the Capitol.

SEC. 2. TERMS AND CONDITIONS.

    The events referred to in section 1 shall be free of admission 
charge to the public and arranged under conditions to be prescribed by 
the Architect of the Capitol and the Capitol Police Board.

SEC. 3. EVENT PREPARATIONS.

    (a) Structures and Equipment.--Subject to the approval of the 
Architect of the Capitol, the Commission is authorized to erect upon 
the Capitol grounds such stages, sound amplification devices, and other 
related structures and equipment as may be required for the events 
referred to in section 1.
    (b) Additional Arrangements.--The Architect of the Capitol and the 
Capitol Police Board are authorized to make any such additional 
arrangements, including the use of voluntary and uncompensated staff 
and services, as may be required to carry out the events referred to in 
section 1.
    (c) Representations.--The Architect of the Capitol shall take such 
actions as may be necessary to ensure that sponsors of the events 
referred to in section 1 do not make representations that such 
sponsorship in any way constitutes an endorsement by the Federal 
Government.

            Passed the House of Representatives October 18, 1993.

            Attest:

                                           DONNALD K. ANDERSON,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
OFFICER'S CERTIFICATE
  (1)  The undersigned has caused a review of the activities of the Company, in its capacity as Servicer, during the 12-month period ended March 31, 2017 (the “Reporting Period”), and of its performance pursuant to the Sale and Servicing Agreement, dated as of April 14, 2015 (the “Agreement”), by and among the Company, individually and as servicer, Nissan Auto Receivables Corporation II, as seller, and Nissan Auto Receivables 2015-A Owner Trust, to be conducted under his supervision; and
 (2)  To the best of the undersigned’s knowledge, based upon such review, the Company has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.
  rd /s/ Mark KaczynskiMark KaczynskiPresident and Chief Executive Officer
 22
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 178 Agreed to House (ATH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 178

Providing for an adjournment of the House from Wednesday, November 10, 
1993, to Monday, November 15, 1993, and an adjournment or recess of the 
  Senate from Wednesday, November 10, 1993, to Tuesday, November 16, 
                                 1993.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 10, 1993

 Mr. Gephardt submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was 
                        considered and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

 
Providing for an adjournment of the House from Wednesday, November 10, 
1993, to Monday, November 15, 1993, and an adjournment or recess of the 
  Senate from Wednesday, November 10, 1993, to Tuesday, November 16, 
                                 1993.

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That when the House adjourns on Wednesday, November 10, 1993, it stand 
adjourned until noon on Monday, November 15, 1993, or until noon on the 
second day after Members are notified to reassemble pursuant to section 
2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first; and that when 
the Senate recesses or adjourns at the close of business on Wednesday, 
November 10, 1993, pursuant to a motion made by the majority leader or 
his designee, in accordance with this resolution, it stand recessed or 
adjourned until noon on Tuesday, November 16, 1993, or at such time as 
may be specified by the majority leader or his designee in the motion 
to recess or adjourn, or until noon on the second day after Members are 
notified to reassemble pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent 
resolution, whichever occurs first.
    Sec. 2. The Speaker of the House and the majority leader of the 
Senate, acting jointly after consultation with the minority leader of 
the House and the minority leader of the Senate, shall notify the 
Members of the House and the Senate, respectively, to reassemble 
whenever, in their opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.

                                 <all>
```
#### DORSEY v. STATE.

No. 25163.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 21, 1951.

Rehearing Denied April 11, 1951.

No attorney for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

The appeal is from a conviction for forgery, with a sentence of two years in the penitentiary.

The appellant waived trial by jury and. .entered his plea of guilty before the court. The proceedings appear regular in every respect. No question is presented for our consideration since the record is brought forward without a statement of facts or bill of exception.

The judgment is affirmed.
COHEN & KAMENY CPA'S PLLC
                       3530 Henry Hudson Parkway, Suite B
                            Riverdale, New York 10463


              CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT


We hereby consent to the use in the Form 10 Registration Statement of our report
as of March 31, 2000, dated April 12, 2000, relating to the financial statements
of Model Capital, Corp. that appear in such Form 10.


                            Cohen & Kameny CPA'S PLLC
                          Certified Public Accountants


Riverdale, New York
April 12, 2000

                                                                              60
Motion Granted and Order filed August 13, 2019 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-19-00488-CV

____________

GENSETIX, INC., Appellant

V.

BAYLOR COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, DIAKONOS RESEARCH, LTD., 

AND WILLIAM K. DECKER, Appellees

On Appeal from the 129th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2019-02003

ORDER

The parties’ agreed motion to set a briefing schedule is GRANTED. 

Appellant’s initial brief is due on or before September 27, 2019. Appellees’ brief is 

due on or before November 26, 2019. Appellant’s reply brief is due on or before 

December 20, 2019.

PER CURIAM
#### DAVIS v. STATE.

No. 24442.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 26, 1949.

None on appeal for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of the offense of driving an automobile upon a street in *931the City of Austin, Travis County, Texas, while intoxicated. His punishment was assessed at a fine of $100, from which judgment he prosecutes this appeal.

The record is before us without a statement of facts or any bills of exceptions, and the complaint and information being in due form, there is nothing presented for review.

The judgment of the trial court is df-firmed. ; '

Opinion approved by the Court.
From: <Alicea.Jezebele@epamail.epa.gov>

To: "Di Ciolli, Thomas A." <TDiciolli@rrienergy.com>

Date: 7/21/2010 12:14 PM

Subject: Re: RRI Energy - Mandalay Generating Station Request for ICR Extension

Attachments: pic22511.jpg; Extension Request - RRI Mandalay - Steam Electric Questionnaire 7-1-

10.pdf

Greetings,

EPA has reviewed your extension request for the steam electric effluent

guidelines questionnaire for the RRI Energy, Mandalay Generating

Station. Your request for extension has been denied. The deadline for

your plant to submit Version 4 of the completed questionnaire remains 90

days after receipt.

If you need assistance during the completion of the steam electric

questionnaire, please contact the steam electric helpline via e-mail at

steamhelp@erg.com or by phone at 1-877-353-7560.

Sincerely,

(Embedded image moved to file: pic22511.jpg)

 

 From: "Di Ciolli, Thomas A." <TDiciolli@rrienergy.com> 

 To: Jezebele Alicea/DC/USEPA/US@EPA 

 Date: 07/01/2010 11:46 PM 

 Subject: RRI Energy - Mandalay Generating Station Request for ICR Extension 

Alicea,

Please find attached RRI Energy, Mandalay Generating Station

correspondence for EPA’s consideration to extend the deadline to

complete and comply for the RRI steam-electric generating facilities

Effluent ICR requirements.

If there are any questions, do not hesitate to contact me.

Tom

Tom Di Ciolli

RRI Energy

Mandalay / Ellwood

(805) 984-5241 (Mandalay)

(805) 207-3516 (Cellular)
 (See attached file: Extension Request - RRI Mandalay - Steam Electric

Questionnaire 7-1-10.pdf)