1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SAMUEL ROY ABRAM, ) 

 ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) Civil Action No. 23-cv-02678 (RC) 

v. ) 

 ) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

 ) 

Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Samuel Roy Abram, proceeding pro se, initiated this matter on September 12, 

2023, by filing, inter alia, a Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and an Application for Leave to 

Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. Upon review, on October 3, 2023, the Court 

dismissed this matter without prejudice. See Memorandum & Order, ECF No. 5. More 

specifically, the dismissing Court found that Abram, a federal prisoner, had accumulated at least 

“three strikes,” and was thus barred from proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and it 

further found that he had not met the “imminent danger” exception. See id. at 1–2 (collecting 

cases). Abram was notified that, if he still intended to proceed with this case, he must file a motion 

to reopen, and concomitantly submit the full filing fee. See id. at 3. 

On October 23, 2023, Abram filed a Motion to Reopen, ECF No. 6, and a few days later, 

he submitted the full filing fee applicable to civil actions in this District, see Dkt. Entry, at Filing 

Fee Received (entered 10/26/23). Abram’s Motion to Reopen was granted by Minute Order on 

October 30, 2023, and the matter was then assigned to this Court on the following day, see Dkt. 

Entry, at Case Assigned (entered 10/31/23). Consequently, this Court may now review the 

Complaint, and for the reasons explained below, it will be dismissed without prejudice. 
2

As way of background, in November 2004, Abram was convicted in the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Florida of three counts of armed bank robbery, two 

counts of use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and one count of possession 

of a firearm by a convicted felon. See United States v. Abram, No. 04-cr-00090-LC-MD-1, 39 

(N.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2004), at Jury Verdict, ECF No. 39. In February 2005, Abram was sentenced 

to a total term of imprisonment of 648 months. See id. at Judgment, ECF No. 53. 

In his Complaint, Abram alleges that Defendant, the United States, committed various 

crimes against him during the relevant criminal proceedings in the Northern District of Florida, 

also in violation of his due process rights. See Compl. at 2, 4. He contends that the prosecutor 

and the presiding judge, among others, conspired to issue and sell false securities that bonded that 

case, in Abram’s name, with the purpose of defrauding him, see id. at 2–4, in violation of 

provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see id. at 1–2, numerous federal criminal 

statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1, 4, 101, 113, , 241, 513, 872, 911, 912, 1001, 1025, 1341, 1346, 1348, 

1349, 1509, 1512, 1515, 1581, 1583, 1589, 1590, 1621, 1651, 1658, 1951, 1956, 1975, 2382, 2383, 

2499, the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7201, and other miscellaneous authority, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2401, see id. at 4. He asserts that the securities at issue are held, under contract, by Fidelity 

Investments in the “Fidelity Advisors, Small Cap B Fund[,]” with “CUSIP# 315805689[,]” and in 

connection with that account, he asks this Court to order (1) “an equitable accounting[,]” (2) a 

“Disgorgement of ill-gotten profits[,]” (3) an “Equitable Recission of Contract[,]” and (4) a 

“recall” of the security “on deposit[.]” See id. at 2, 4.

Abram further represents that, due to this alleged breach of “fiduciary duty[,]” he is owed 

the profits of the underlying “commercial transaction[,]” see id. at 2–3, and he demands to be 

compensated $48 million dollars, see id. at 4. He also demands that this Court “order case no: 
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3:04-cr-00090-LC-MD-1 to be discharged, settled and closed.” Id. Simply put, Abram faces 

hurdles here that he cannot overcome. 

First, “[a] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint that lacks “an arguable basis 

either in law or in fact” is frivolous, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and a

“complaint plainly abusive of the judicial process is properly typed malicious,” Crisafi v. Holland, 

655 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam). Put differently, a court shall dismiss a 

complaint as frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly 

incredible,” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992), or “postulat[e] events and 

circumstances of a wholly fanciful kind,” Crisafi, 655 F.2d at 1307–08. The instant Complaint 

falls squarely into this category. The Court finds no merit in Abram’s overbroad and dubious 

conspiratorial allegations against the parties who brought about his conviction.

1

1 The Court notes that Abram has previously, on repeated occasions, unsuccessfully raised 

substantially similar allegations in cases filed in other federal jurisdictions. See, e.g., Abram v. 

Mnuchin, No. 2018-cv-00752 (D. Md. filed Mar. 13, 2018), at Dismissal Order (entered June 8, 

2018) (dismissing substantially similar claims for failure to state a claim), ECF No. 8; Abram v. 

Fidelity Investments, No. 2017-cv-12657 (D. Mass. filed Apr. 14, 2017), at Dismissal Order 

(entered Aug. 29, 2017) (dismissing substantially similar claims for want of subject matter 

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim), ECF No. 32; Abram v. United States, No. 16-cv-728 (M.D. 

Fla. filed Dec. 20, 2016), at Dismissal Order (entered Jan. 9, 2017) (dismissing substantially 

similar claims as frivolous), ECF No. 4; Abram v. United States, No. 2016-cv-00309, at Dismissal 

Order (entered June 14, 2016) (dismissing substantially similar claims for want of subject matter 

jurisdiction), ECF No. 8; see also Covad Commc'ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222 

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (A court may take “judicial notice of facts on the public record”); Banks v. York, 

515 F. Supp. 2d 89, 109 (D.D.C. 2007) (A court may take judicial notice of the public docket and 

record).
4

Indeed, this Court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a frivolous complaint.

See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974) (“Over the years, this Court has repeatedly 

held that the federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction 

if they are ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.’”) (quoting 

Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904)); Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 

F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (examining cases dismissed “for patent insubstantiality”). 

Moreover, Abram “offers only ‘a laundry list of wrongful acts and conclusory allegations to 

support h[is] theory of a conspiracy,’” and such allegations are “‘insufficient to allow the case to 

go forward.’” Curran v. Holder, 626 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Richards v. Duke 

Univ., 480 F. Supp. 2d 222, 233 (D.D.C. 2007)); see Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916 

F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (holding that a sua sponte dismissal is appropriate for 

failure to state a claim). 

The Court notes that, on November 16, 2023, Abram filed a First Notice (“Not. I”), ECF, 

along with a Second Notice (“Not.), ECF No. 2, both of which contain: “Notice[s] of Deed of 

Acknowledgement and Acceptance Without Consideration and Release[s] Without 

Consideration[,]” see Not. 1 at 2–4;1 Not. 2 at 2–4; “Recission[s] of Signatures of Suretyship[,]”

see Not. 1 at 5; Not. 2 at 5; “Declaration[s] Re Proper Name[,]” see Not. 1 at 6; Not. 2 at 6;

“Notice[s] of Private Trust Arrangement[,]” see Not. 1 at 7; Not. 2 at 7; “Affidavit[s] of Exemption 

From Withholding[,]” see Not. 1 at 8–10; Not. 2 at 8–10; “Statement[s] of Interest[,]” see Not. 1 

at 11–18; Not. 2 at 11–18; “Notice[s] of Interest[,]” see Not. 1 at 19–29; Not. 2 at 19–25; Not. 2 

Attachment, ECF No. 8-1, at 1, and; “Affidavit[s] of Status of Samuel Roy Abram, American 

1 The Court references the ECF-generated pages in citing to Abram’s Notices and its 

Attachments. 
5

Freeman[,]” see Not. 1 Attachment, ECF No. 7-1, at 1–12; Not. 2 Attachment at 2–9. These

Notices, and their attachments, were intended to supplement the Complaint. See Not. 1 at 1; Not. 

2 at 1. However, these Notices only compound the frivolousness of Abram’s claims because the

attached documents are “associated with what is known as the sovereign citizen movement[,]”

undermining any slight benefit of the doubt that Abram may been afforded. See Abram v. United 

States, No. 2017-cv-00781, 2017 WL 6106389, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2017) (dismissing 

Abram’s substantially similar claims with prejudice as frivolous without leave to amend) (citing 

Gravatt v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 279, 282 (Fed. Cl. 2011) (dismissing with prejudice and 

describing the sovereign citizen movement and noting that “[s]o-called sovereign citizens believe 

that they are not subject to government authority and employ various tactics in an attempt to, 

among other things, avoid paying taxes, extinguish debts, and derail criminal proceedings”)), R&R

adopted, 2017 WL 6096672 at *1 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2017). 

Second, even if Abram’s claims were plausible, which this Court does not concede, Abram 

still does not, and often, fundamentally cannot, bring a cause of action under any of the authority 

upon which he relies. There is simply no express private right to action under the criminal statutes

cited in the Complaint. See Compl. at 4; see also North v. Smarsh, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 3d 63, 77 

(D.D.C. 2015) (citing RJ Prod. Co. v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 10–0584, 2010 WL 1506914, at *2 

n.1 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2010) (holding that because criminal statutes under Chapter 18 of the United 

States Code “do not provide for private causes of action, they cannot be used to grant plaintiff 

access to federal courts”)); Peavey v. Holder, 657 F. Supp. 2d 180, 190–91 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating 

that no private right of action exists to enforce the federal criminal code)), aff’d, No. 09–5389, 

2010 WL 3155823 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2010); Prunte v. Universal Music Group, 484 F. Supp. 2d 

32, 42 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[The] Supreme Court has refused to imply a private right of action in a 
6

bare criminal statute.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Rockefeller v. U.S. Court 

of Appeals Office, for Tenth Circuit Judges, 248 F. Supp. 2d 17, 23 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that 

federal criminal statutes do not convey a private right of action) (collecting cases). 

Similarly, 26 U.S.C. § 7201, see Compl. at 4, “is a criminal provision of the Internal 

Revenue Code that prescribes penalties for attempting to evade or defeat taxes[,]” El v. Wells 

Fargo Bank, No. 19-cv-02538, 2020 WL 1941322, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 2020), R&R 

adopted, 2020 WL 1686252, (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 7, 2020). “Under 26 United States Code Section 

7401, ‘[n]o civil action for the recovery of taxes, or of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture shall be 

commenced unless the Secretary authorizes or sanctions the proceedings and the Attorney General 

or his delegate directs that the action be commenced[,]’” id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7201), and it 

does not provide a private right of action, see id. (citing Woermer v. Hirsh, No. 18-cv-01898, 2018 

WL 7572237, at *4 (D. Conn. Dec. 11, 2018) (“This statute does not create a private right of action. 

Thus, any claims brought under § 7201 must be ‘dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted because there is no private right of action to recover taxes on behalf of the 

government.’”); Payn v. Kelley, No. CIV-15-1089-D, 2015 WL 7779701, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 

2, 2015) (noting that § 7201 does not permit a private right of action); Gipson v. Deutsche Bank 

Nat. Trust Co., No. 13-cv-4820-L, 2015 WL 11120538, at *20 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2015) (same); 

McRae v. Norton, No. 12-cv-1537, 2012 WL 1268295, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2012) (concluding 

that that no private right of action exists under § 7201)); see also Karupaiyan v. Wipro, No. 23-

2005, 2023 WL 4896672, at *3 (D.N.J. July 21, 2023) (finding that “Sections 7201, 7203, and 

7206 of the Internal Revenue Code also do not grant a private right of action. Private civil actions 

for recovery of taxes are not permitted without special authorization from the Executive 

Branch[.]”) (citations omitted); Anderson v. Pollard, No. 18-cv-00582, 2019 WL 10813621, at *3
7

(N.D. Okla. Apr. 8, 2019) (finding that tax evasion is a federal crime against the United States and 

does not provide a private cause of action), aff’d, 775 Fed. Appx. 967 (10th Cir. 2019). 

As for the Securities Exchange Act, Abram cites erroneously to 15 U.S.C. §§ 780, 781, see 

Compl. at 2, as those provisions of the United States Code govern the right to petition the 

Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration for redress, and the Administrator’s 

obligations in drafting and reporting a comprehensive energy plan to Congress and the President. 

Abram’s allegations bear no connection to these statutes. While profoundly unclear, see Johnson 

v. Robinson, 576 F.3d 522, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“[t]he mere suggestion of a federal 

question is not sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of federal courts,” rather, a federal question 

“must affirmatively appear clearly and distinctly.”) (cleaned up) (quoting Bilal v. Kaplan, 904 F.2d 

14, 15 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)); see also Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1194 

(D.C. Cir. 1983) (“While . . . a pro se litigant must of course be given fair and equal treatment, he 

cannot generally be permitted to shift the burden of litigating his case to the courts[.]”), it appears 

that Abram perhaps intended to cite to 15 U.S.C. §§ 780 (“Section 15”) and § 78l (“Section 12”), 

which memorialize requirements regarding the registration and regulation of brokers, dealers, and 

securities.

Generously assuming arguendo that Abram intended to cite to Sections 12 and 15 of the 

Exchange Act, his allegations do not set forth which subsections, if any, were allegedly violated, 

making it impossible for the United States to defend this case, or for this Court to perceive a 

cognizable claim. See Gervais v. Amer. Exp. Centurion Bank, No. 10-cv-1712, 2010 WL 4929077, 

at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012) (dismissing with prejudice Exchange Act claims that were 

“chockablock with vague and conclusory allegations” for failure to state a claim) (citing Sheldon 

v. Vermonty, 246 F.3d 682, 2000 WL 1774038, at *5 (10th Cir. Dec. 4, 2000) (“The Complaint 
8

does not provide sufficient allegations to demonstrate which of these provisions [of the Exchange 

Act], if any, apply to any of the defendants.”)). Furthermore, as presented, Abram has neither 

established his standing to bring such an action, nor met the heightened pleading requirement for 

fraud-related Exchange Act claims. See Brittain v. Alcitepe, 934 F. Supp. 2d 119, 126–27 (D.D.C. 

2013).

Abram concludes with a citation to 28 U.S.C. § 2401, see Compl. at 4, which sets forth 

statutes of limitations applicable to claims brought against the United States. Section 2401 does 

not, in and of itself, provide a means to set forth a claim, nor does it provide its own basis for

federal jurisdiction. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2401. Therefore, Abram has failed to plausibly 

cite to any authority under which he may bring his claims. 

Third, Abram alleges that the United States owes him money derived from a securities 

contract purportedly taken in his name. See Compl. at 2–4. Although Congress limitedly waived 

sovereign immunity with regard to “any claim against the United States . . . upon any express or 

implied contract with the United States[,]” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), “the Tucker Act states that 

‘[t]he United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any

[such] claim[,]’” Coulibaly v. Kerry, 213 F. Supp. 3d 93, 127 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 

1491(a)(1)) (emphasis in original). “If a claimant does not limit the damages sought to an amount 

at or below $10,000, then the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is exclusive.” Id. (citing 

Greenhill v. Spellings, 482 F.3d 569, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“If [Plaintiff] explicitly or in essence 

seeks money damages in excess of $10,000, jurisdiction rests exclusively with the Court of Federal 

Claims.”)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (stating that the United States district courts exercise 

concurrent jurisdiction over “[a]ny . . . claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in 
9

amount, founded . . . upon any express or implied contract with the United States.”). Here, Abram 

seeks $48 million, see Compl. at 4, well beyond the $10,000 jurisdictional limit. 

Fourth, in the Complaint’s introduction, Abram makes passing reference to an 

“Administrative Tort Claim[,]” see Compl. at 1, but then fails to further elaborate. It is unclear if 

Abram intended to invoke the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346 et seq., but 

the Court notes that the FTCA limitedly waives the United States’ immunity as to certain common 

law torts, see id. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2679(b). Notably, however, “[a]lthough the FTCA generally 

waives the government’s sovereign immunity, there are several exceptions[,]” Williams v. Wilkie, 

320 F. Supp. 3d 191, 198 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal dismissed, No. 18-5272, 2019 WL 1150043 (D.C.

Cir. Jan. 9, 2019), more than one of which apply to Abram’s claims. More specifically, the FTCA 

does not waive the sovereign immunity of United States for constitutional claims. See FDIC v. 

Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1994); Clark v. Lib. Of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 102–04 (D.C. Cir. 

1984); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2679(b). Additionally, the FTCA expressly “exempts 

fraud and misrepresentation from the general waiver of sovereign immunity[,]” Maxberry v. Dep't 

of the Army, Bd. of Correction of Military Records, 952 F. Supp. 2d 48, 52 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing 

28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); Stoyanov v. Winter, 643 F. Supp. 2d 4, 10–11 (D.D.C. 2009)), as well as 

claims arising out of alleged “. . . abuse of process, . . . deceit, or interference with contract 

rights[,]” and other similar intentional torts, see Williams, 320 F. Supp. 3d at 198 (quoting 28 

U.S.C. § 2680(h)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, to whatever extent Abram 

intended to raise an FTCA claim, it cannot survive dismissal. 

Fifth, Abram asks this Court to intervene and take specific actions on his behalf in Abram, 

No. 04-cr-00090-LC-MD-1. However, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the 

decisions of other federal courts, to interfere with their cases or administrative matters, or to direct 
10

them to act. See In re Marin, 956 F.2d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied sub 

nom. Marin v. Suter, 506 U.S. 844 (1992); Panko v. Rodak, 606 F. 2d 168, 171 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979) 

(finding it “axiomatic” that a federal court may order judges or officers of another federal court 

“to take an action.”), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 

79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (stating that federal district courts “generally lack[] appellate jurisdiction 

over other judicial bodies, and cannot exercise appellate mandamus over other courts”) (citing 

Lewis v. Green, 629 F. Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986)); Fleming v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 

170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994) (citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 

482 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 416 (1923)), aff’d, No. 94-5079, 1994 

WL 474995 (D.C. Cir. July 27, 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1150 (1995). 

Finally, to that same end, Abram challenges his previous criminal proceedings, and asks 

this Court to, in essence, vacate his criminal conviction and sentence, see Compl. at 2, 4, but once 

again, this Court lacks the authority to grant the relief sought. To the extent that a remedy is 

available to Abram, his claims must be addressed with the sentencing court through a petition for 

writ of habeas corpus. See Taylor v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 194 F.2d 882, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (per 

curiam); Ojo v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 106 F.3d 680, 683 (5th Cir. 1997). Section 

2255 provides that:

[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act 

of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that 

the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of 

the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to 

impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the 

maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral 

attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, 

set aside or correct the sentence. 
11

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Given these clear jurisdictional parameters, Abram must file for such relief 

in the Northern District of Florida. See id. 

For all of these reasons, the Complaint, and this case, are dismissed without prejudice. A 

separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

Date: December 26, 2023 ___________/s/____________

 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS

 United States District Judge