An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-21

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 5 August 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Wake County

No. 11CRS214547

RODNEY NIGEE PLEDGER TAYLOR,

Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from Judgment entered on or about 23 

January 2013 by Judge Carl R. Fox in Superior Court, Wake

County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 June 2014.

Attorney General Roy A. Cooper III, by Assistant Attorney 

General Kathleen N. Bolton, for the State.

Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate 

Defender Constance E. Widenhouse, for defendant-appellant.

STROUD, Judge.

Rodney Taylor (“defendant”) appeals from the judgment 

entered after a Wake County jury found him guilty of first 

degree murder. We find no error at defendant’s trial.

I. Background

Defendant was indicted for first degree murder on 12 June 

2011. He pled not guilty and proceeded to jury trial. Before 
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trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he made 

to police. He argued that he had been unconstitutionally seized 

and that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without the 

benefit of Miranda warnings. The trial court denied defendant’s 

motion by order entered 17 January 2013.

At trial, the State’s evidence tended to show that on the 

evening of 23 June 2011, defendant (also known as “Sponge Bob”), 

Alex Walton (also known as “Biz” or “Mr. Business”), and Floyd 

Creecy (also known as “Bruno” or “Big Bs”) got together to hang 

out and smoke marijuana. All three men were involved in a local 

gang named “Bounty Hunters,” which was affiliated with the 

larger “Crips” gang.1 The three men went to a store on Poole 

Road in east Raleigh to buy some cigars to make “blunts.” They 

all rode together in the black Chrysler Pacifica owned by Mr. 

Creecy’s wife.

After buying what they needed from the store, the three men 

got back into Mr. Creecy’s car and drove back down Poole Road. 

Mr. Creecy was driving, defendant was in the passenger seat, and 

Mr. Walton was sitting in the back. As they were riding down 

Poole Road, defendant said, “There’s Polo,” and told Mr. Creecy 

 

1 Mr. Creecy denied being in a gang, but Mr. Walton testified 

that Mr. Creecy was “mentor” to the two younger men in the 

“Bounty Hunters.”
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to pull over. There were three individuals walking down the 

sidewalk—Darius Johnson (also known as “Polo”), Damal O’Neil, 

and Kyonatai Cleveland. Mr. Creecy pulled into a church parking 

lot behind them. Defendant exited the car and approached the 

three; Mr. Walton then got out and followed defendant.

As defendant and Mr. Walton approached, Mr. Johnson took 

out what he had in his pockets, including his cell phone, and 

gave it to Ms. Cleveland. He also took out a wine opener that he 

had in his pocket, opened a small knife at the end of the 

opener, then closed the knife and put the opener back in his 

pocket. Defendant said to Mr. Johnson, “Why didn’t you get back 

to us?” Mr. Johnson responded, “I don’t know.” Defendant then 

said, “Well, I gave you more than enough time.” At that point, 

defendant said to Mr. Walton, “Watch out, Biz,” pulled out a 

black revolver and began shooting at Mr. Johnson.

During this encounter, Ms. Cleveland called 911. However, 

she was unable to tell the operator what was happening because 

when they saw the gun, Mr. Johnson and his two friends tried to 

run. Mr. Johnson was hit by one bullet in his front left 

abdomen. The forensic evidence suggested that the bullet was 

fired from a close distance—perhaps less than two feet. After 

shooting Mr. Johnson, defendant and Mr. Walton ran back to the 
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black Pacifica, which Mr. Creecy had pulled around to the next 

street. The gun was still in defendant’s hand when he got back 

into Mr. Creecy’s car.

At trial, Mr. O’Neil, Ms. Cleveland, Mr. Walton, and Mr. 

Creecy all testified to the events of that night. The three men 

all positively identified defendant as the shooter. Mr. Walton 

and Mr. Creecy testified that defendant and Mr. Johnson had an 

argument approximately a week before the shooting. Mr. Johnson 

had been asking defendant about joining the Bounty Hunters. 

Defendant told Mr. Johnson to call him. When Mr. Johnson failed 

to call him, defendant said that he was going to “bang,” i.e. 

shoot, Mr. Johnson.

Defendant was asked to come to the police station to be

interviewed by detectives. He initially denied knowing anything 

about the shooting, but later admitted that he was in the SUV. 

He said that the shooter was someone named “Chuck.” He later 

conceded that there was no one named Chuck but continued to deny 

that he was the shooter. Defendant claimed that after the 

shooting, he brought the gun back to his house. The detectives 

went to defendant’s grandmother’s house, where he was living. 

When they arrived, defendant’s grandmother informed them that 

she had found a gun in her grandson’s room, under his bed. She 
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explained that she did not want the gun in her house, so she 

took it outside and hid it in her backyard. The police recovered 

the gun—a black .38 caliber revolver. Four spent shell casings 

were found in the revolver. Once the gun was recovered and the 

interview was complete, defendant was placed under arrest. Upon 

being transported to the jail, two deputies searched defendant’s 

pockets and found two .38 caliber bullets.

The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. The 

trial court accordingly sentenced defendant to life in prison 

without the possibility of parole. Defendant gave notice of 

appeal in open court.

II. Motion to Suppress

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police. He 

contends that the statements should have been suppressed because 

they were fruits of an unconstitutional seizure and taken in 

violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. We disagree. 

A. Standard of Review

The standard of review in evaluating the 

denial of a motion to suppress is whether 

competent evidence supports the trial 

court’s findings of fact and whether the 

findings of fact support the conclusions of 

law. However, when . . . the trial court’s 

findings of fact are not challenged on 

appeal, they are deemed to be supported by 
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competent evidence and are binding on 

appeal. Conclusions of law are reviewed de 

novo and are subject to full review. Under a 

de novo review, the court considers the 

matter anew and freely substitutes its own 

judgment for that of the lower tribunal.

State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167-68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

First, we address defendant’s argument that he was 

unconstitutionally seized. Defendant argues that the police 

lacked any reasonable suspicion to stop him even though he was 

driving a car known to be associated with a murder suspect, at 

least once they realized that he was not the suspect they were 

initially seeking. Defendant does not contest the findings of 

fact relating to the initial stop and detention other than part 

of Finding 11, so those findings are binding on appeal.

An investigatory stop must be justified by a 

reasonable suspicion, based on objective 

facts, that the individual is involved in 

criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio and its 

progeny have taught us that in order to 

conduct a warrantless, investigatory stop, 

an officer must have a reasonable and 

articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

A court must consider the totality of the 

circumstances—the whole picture—in

determining whether a reasonable suspicion 

to make an investigatory stop exists. The 

stop must be based on specific and 

articulable facts, as well as the rational 

inferences from those facts, as viewed 

through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious 
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officer, guided by his experience and 

training. The only requirement is a minimal 

level of objective justification, something 

more than an unparticularized suspicion or 

hunch. As a result, the ultimate issue 

before the trial court in a case involving 

the validity of an investigatory detention 

is the extent to which the investigating 

officer has a reasonable articulable 

suspicion that the defendant might be 

engaged in criminal activity.

State v. Mello, 200 N.C. App. 437, 443-44, 684 S.E.2d 483, 488

(2009) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

The suspicion here was not of ongoing criminal activity, 

but of connection to a completed murder.

[P]olice are not automatically shorn of 

authority to stop a suspect in the absence 

of probable cause merely because the 

criminal has completed his crime and escaped 

from the scene. The precise limits on 

investigatory stops to investigate past 

criminal activity are more difficult to 

define. The proper way to identify the 

limits is to apply the same test already 

used to identify the proper bounds of 

intrusions that further investigations of 

imminent or ongoing crimes. That test, which 

is grounded in the standard of 

reasonableness embodied in the Fourth 

Amendment, balances the nature and quality 

of the intrusion on personal security 

against the importance of the governmental 

interests alleged to justify the intrusion.

United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228, 83 L.Ed. 2d 604, 

611-12 (1985).
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“[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in 

specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was 

involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, 

then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.” 

Id. at 229, 83 L.Ed. 2d at 612. “It is well settled that 

information given by one officer to another is reasonably 

reliable information for the purpose of supporting a search or 

seizure.” State v. Ellison, 213 N.C. App. 300, 307, 713 S.E.2d 

228, 234 (2011), aff’d, 366 N.C. 439, 738 S.E.2d 161 (2013).

Moreover, “[i]t has long been the law that a brief stop of a 

suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to 

maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more 

information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known 

to the officer at the time.” State v. McDaniels, 103 N.C. App. 

175, 181, 405 S.E.2d 358, 362 (1991) (citation, quotation marks, 

and brackets omitted), aff’d per curiam, 331 N.C. 112, 413 

S.E.2d 799 (1992).

Here, the trial court found, in relevant part, that:

1. On 24 June 2011, Detective Gory Mendez was 

employed with the City of Raleigh as a 

detective with the Raleigh Police 

Department’s Technical Response Unit. 

Detective Mendez has been a detective for 

two years, although he has been employed 

as a police officer for over eleven years. 
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He also worked as a police officer for the 

City of Winston-Salem for over two years. 

2. On 24 June 2011, Detective Mendez was 

attempting to locate a homicide suspect 

named Alexander Walton. A vehicle Mr. 

Walton was known to operate, a green Dodge 

Stratus, was found in North Raleigh in the 

parking lot of some apartments . . . .

3. Detective Mendez was assigned to maintain 

visual surveillance on the green Dodge 

Stratus automobile . . . . 

4. Alexander Walton is a light-skinned black 

male who is approximately five feet ten 

inches tall, weighing 135 pounds and wore 

his hair in dreadlocks. 

5. Detective Mendez conducted surveillance on 

the green Dodge Stratus for an hour or 

two.

6. While conducting surveillance on Mr. 

Walton, Detective Mendez noticed a suspect 

wearing something on or over his hair left 

the apartment nearby and went straight to 

the Stratus. He entered the vehicle and 

sat in the driver’s seat. 

7. At that time, Detective Mendez moved his 

police car directly behind the green Dodge 

Stratus, exited his vehicle wearing a 

tactical vest with “RPD” on the front with 

his gun drawn at the low-ready position 

and approached the vehicle.

8. Detective Mendez ordered the occupant to 

show him his hands and exit the vehicle. 

9. The occupant got out of the vehicle as 

ordered. He was directed to place his 

hands on top of the vehicle which he did. 
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Detective Mendez holstered his weapon and 

attempted to identify the suspect.

10. The suspect had some form of 

identification on him and he was 

identified as the Defendant, Rodney 

Taylor.

11. After the Defendant was identified, he 

was detained for “officer safety,” to 

control the scene and because the vehicle 

was “associated with” Alexander Walton. 

The defendant is a light-skinned black 

male approximately six feet tall and 

weighing approximately 140 pounds. He has 

a smallish, thin build and wears his hair 

somewhat closely cut with a very thin 

beard.

12. Detective Mendez walked the Defendant 

over to the curb and sat him down on the 

curb where he was detained and remained 

there for twenty to twenty-five minutes. 

Detective Mendez did not place the 

Defendant in handcuffs during his 

encounter with the Defendant and the 

Defendant was not handcuffed while seated 

on the curb.

13. Detective Mendez conducted a “frisk” of 

the green Dodge Stratus for “officer 

safety” reasons and discovered a backpack 

[i]n the rear seat of the vehicle which 

contained roughly one-half of a box of 

live .38 caliber ammunition. 

14. Alexander Walton was subsequently 

located and arrested [i]n an apartment in 

the immediate area. At that time, the 

officers believed Mr. Walton had committed 

the homicide they were investigating and 

they considered him their suspect.
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When Detective Mendez stopped defendant, he believed that 

defendant could be Mr. Walton, who was wanted as a suspect in a 

recent homicide. Defendant—who is approximately the same height 

and size as Mr. Walton—was driving a car Mr. Walton was known to 

operate. Thus, the initial stop was justified. See Hensley, 469 

U.S. at 229, 83 L.Ed. 2d at 612. Defendant argues that even if 

the initial detention was constitutional, the continued 

detention could not be justified once Detective Mendez 

discovered that defendant was not Mr. Walton. 

After detaining defendant, Detective Mendez “frisked” the 

vehicle being driven by defendant and discovered a backpack 

containing approximately one-half of a box of live .38 caliber 

ammunition. At the time, police were still actively searching 

for Mr. Walton. “[A] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in 

order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo 

momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most 

reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the 

time.” McDaniels, 103 N.C. App. at 181, 405 S.E.2d at 362

(citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). The stop here 

lasted approximately twenty to twenty-five minutes: the time it 

took to ascertain defendant’s identity, secure the vehicle, and 

find Mr. Walton. The police detained defendant—who apparently 
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had the keys to and got into the suspect’s vehicle—simply to 

maintain the status quo while they searched for Mr. Walton, as 

they are permitted to do. See id. Once Mr. Walton was arrested, 

the detention ended and Detective Mendez asked defendant if he 

would accompany him to the police station. Defendant was not in 

handcuffs while being detained. Under these facts, we conclude 

that both the initial and continued detention were 

constitutional.

Next, we must consider whether the interrogation of 

defendant at the police station violated his rights under the 

Fifth Amendment. Defendant contends that he unequivocally asked 

for an attorney, so continued questioning violated his rights 

under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 69 L.Ed. 2d 378 (1978). 

Defendant did not raise this argument before the trial court, 

either in his written motion or at the motion hearing, so it is 

not preserved for our review. N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1).

Accordingly, we find no error in the admission of defendant’s 

statement taken after he had been detained.

III. Relevance of Text Messages
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Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in 

admitting a variety of irrelevant text messages over objection.2

We disagree.

“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to 

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more probable or less probable than 

it would be without the evidence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 

401 (2013). “Even though a trial court’s rulings on relevancy 

technically are not discretionary and therefore are not reviewed 

under the abuse of discretion standard applicable to Rule 403, 

such rulings are given great deference on appeal.” State v. 

Peterson, 205 N.C. App. 668, 674, 695 S.E.2d 835, 840 (2010)

(citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

The contested evidence consists of a series of text 

messages sent by defendant to various women and to “Mr. 

Business.” The messages to the women were mostly sexual in 

nature. The trial court required the State to redact all 

incoming messages from anyone other than “Mr. Business,”

totaling 94 of 207 text messages, but allowed the State to 

introduce the outgoing messages. The State argues that these 

messages show that defendant premeditated and deliberated 

 

2 He does not argue that the unfair prejudice of the messages

outweighed their probative value under Rule 403.
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because within hours of the shooting he “was sending messages to 

several recipients indicating he was laughing out loud, was 

horny, and wanted to see pictures of girls . . . .” The State 

contends that this fact “makes it more probable that he shot 

[Mr. Johnson] in a cool state of blood.”

Defendant was charged with first degree murder. To show 

that defendant was guilty of the charge, the State had to prove 

that defendant intentionally and unlawfully killed Mr. Johnson 

with premeditation and deliberation. State v. Clark, ___ N.C. 

App. ___, ___, 752 S.E.2d 709, 711 (2013), disc. rev. denied, 

___ N.C. ___, 755 S.E.2d 619 (2014). “Generally, premeditation 

and deliberation must be proved by circumstantial evidence 

because they are not susceptible of proof by direct evidence.”

Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). One of the factors 

relevant to determining whether a defendant acted with 

premeditation and deliberation is his conduct “before and after 

the killing.” State v. Horskins, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 743 

S.E.2d 704, 709 (citation and quotation marks omitted), disc. 

rev. denied, ___ N.C. ___, 752 S.E.2d 481 (2013).

Although these text messages may not have had great 

probative value, we cannot say that “the proffered evidence has 

no tendency to prove a fact in issue in the case[.]” State v. 
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Coen, 78 N.C. App. 778, 780-81, 338 S.E.2d 784, 786 (emphasis 

added), app. dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 317 N.C. 709, 347 

S.E.2d 444 (1986). Defendant principally argued at trial that 

the shooting was a “mistake” for which he had shown remorse, or 

a “reaction” to the fact that Mr. Johnson pulled out the wine 

opener. We agree with the State that defendant’s texting 

girlfriends within several hours after the killing tends to show 

that he acted in a cool state of mind—killing Mr. Johnson did 

not seem to shake him or to make him alter his behavior in any 

apparent manner. See State v. Singletary, 344 N.C. 95, 106, 472 

S.E.2d 895, 901 (1996) (considering, inter alia, evidence that 

the defendant “turned and walked away, as if he had done what he 

wanted to do” after shooting the victim). Therefore, the 

messages had at least some probative value and the trial court 

did not err in concluding that they were relevant.

IV. Closing Argument

Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in 

failing to intervene ex mero motu during the prosecutor’s 

closing argument, which defendant contends was grossly improper 

because it misstated the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 

The standard of review for assessing alleged 

improper closing arguments that fail to 

provoke timely objection from opposing 

counsel is whether the remarks were so 
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grossly improper that the trial court 

committed reversible error by failing to 

intervene ex mero motu. In other words, the 

reviewing court must determine whether the 

argument in question strayed far enough from 

the parameters of propriety that the trial 

court, in order to protect the rights of the 

parties and the sanctity of the proceedings, 

should have intervened on its own accord 

and: (1) precluded other similar remarks 

from the offending attorney; and/or (2) 

instructed the jury to disregard the 

improper comments already made.

State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 133, 558 S.E.2d 97, 107 (2002).

We will not find error in a trial court’s 

failure to intervene in closing arguments ex 

mero motu unless the remarks were so grossly 

improper they rendered the trial and 

conviction fundamentally unfair. In 

determining whether argument was grossly 

improper, this Court considers the context 

in which the remarks were made, as well as 

their brevity relative to the closing 

argument as a whole[.]

State v. Taylor, 362 N.C. 514, 536, 669 S.E.2d 239, 259 (2008) 

(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted), cert. 

denied, 558 U.S. 851, 175 L.Ed. 2d 84 (2009).

In a case where the prosecutor misstated the reasonable 

doubt standard during his closing argument, our Supreme Court 

held that any error was cured by the trial court’s subsequent 

correct instruction on reasonable doubt. State v. Jones, 336 

N.C. 490, 496, 445 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1994). Similarly, in State v. 

Alston, the prosecutor misstated the reasonable doubt standard 
-17-

during voir dire, but the Supreme Court held that “any 

misstatement in the law by the prosecutor was cured by the trial 

court’s subsequent correct jury instruction defining reasonable 

doubt.” 341 N.C. 198, 224, 461 S.E.2d 687, 700-01 (1995), cert. 

denied, 516 U.S. 1148, 134 L.Ed. 2d 100 (1996). There is no 

dispute here that the trial court correctly instructed the jury 

on reasonable doubt. Therefore, as our Supreme Court did in 

Alston and Jones we conclude that, even assuming the prosecutor

misstated the reasonable doubt standard in his closing argument, 

“any misstatement in the law by the prosecutor was cured by the 

trial court’s subsequent correct jury instruction defining 

reasonable doubt.” Id.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that defendant has 

failed to show any error at his trial.

NO ERROR.

Judges STEPHENS and MCCULLOUGH concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).