alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1
                                  EXHIBIT 99.2

                          [PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP]

                        REPORT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

To Option One Mortgage Corporation

We have examined management's assertion about Option One Mortgage Corporation's
compliance with the minimum servicing standards identified in the Mortgage
Bankers Association of America's Uniform Single Attestation Program for Mortgage
Bankers (USAP) as of and for the year ended April 30, 2000. Management is
responsible for Option One Mortgage Corporation's compliance with those minimum
servicing standards. Our responsibility is to express and opinion on
management's assertion about the entity's compliance based on our examination.

Our examination was made in accordance with standards established by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and, accordingly, included
examining, on a test basis, evidence about Option One Mortgage Corporation's
compliance with the minimum servicing standards performing such other procedures
as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our examination
provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a
legal determination on Option One Mortgage Corporation's compliance with the
minimum servicing standards.

In our opinion, management's assertion that Option One Mortgage Corporation
complied with the aforementioned minimum servicing standards as of and for the
year ended April 30, 2000 is fairly stated, in all material respects.

/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

June 12, 2000



<PAGE>   2
                  [OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION LETTERHEAD]

As of and during the year ended April 30, 2000, Option One Mortgage Corporation
has complied in all material respects with the minimum servicing standards set
forth in the Mortgage Bankers Association of America's Uniform Single
Attestation Program for Mortgage Bankers. As of and during the same period,
Option One Mortgage Corporation had in effect a fidelity bond and errors and
omissions policy in the amount of $5 million.

/s/ William L. O'Neill, CFO
---------------------------
William L. O'Neill, CFO

July 28, 2000
_______________________

Date
#### HINOJOSA v. STATE.

No. 22873.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 31, 1944.

Maxwell Burket, of San Antonio, for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted oi an assault with intent to rob one Samuel H. Edwards, and by the jury given six years in the penitentiary.

The testimony shows that Edwards, a soldier, stationed at Kelly Field, Texas, was on the west side of San Antonio, Texas, on the night of August 1, 1943, and while walking west on some street therein he saw appellant and another person crossing such street. It was dark, and these two persons came up on the sidewalk where Edwards was walking, about fifteen' feet away, and when he started by them they crowded up on him real close, and one of them put a sharp object in his side. This appellant, or his companion, put his hands upon the person of Edwards, and when they did so Edwards called to two other soldiers near by and these came towards Edwards; whereupon appellant and his companion ran away, closely pursued by Edwards, who *627finally caught appellant, knocked him down and held him until the officers arrived. Edwards did not see the sharp object, and was not cut thereby, and did not know what it was. The record does not show one word to have been spoken by appellant or his companion, and nothing further shown as to what was their purpose in thus crowding into appellant, stopping him, putting this sharp object in his side, and placing their hands upon him.

We do not think the facts are sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the intent of the appellant was to rob Mr. Edwards. Neither appellant nor his companion spoke one word, and the testimony does not show on what portion of Edwards’ body they placed their hands.

On account of the insufficiency of the evidence, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002









In
connection with the Annual Report of PDI, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Jeffrey E. Smith, as
Chief Financial and Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:




(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
  and




(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
      Company.









Date:
      March 11, 2009
            /s/
      Jeffrey E. SmithChief
      Financial Officer(Principal
      Financial Officer)




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### MARTINI v. STATE.

No. 23782.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 12, 1947.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 10, 1947.

*989See also 199 S.W.2d 784.

Ennis Favors, ‘of Stephenville, and William C. McDonald, of San Angelos, for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of seriously threatening to take human life and fined the sum of $200.

We are early met herein with the contention that the information is fatally defective in that it was filed on the 17th day of May, 1946, and therein it is alleged that the offense complained of took place on the 17th day of May, 1946, which was the same day as the filing of the information. It is also seen that the information fails to allege that such offense took place “anterior to the filing of the information”.

Article 414, Section 6, C.C.P., giving the requisites of an information, says: “That the time mentioned be some date anterior to the filing of the information, and that the offense does not appear to be barred by limitation.”

True it is that the complaint does allege that this offense was committed before the making and filing of this complaint, but this allegation is not found in the information and such omission cannot be supplied by the complaint. See Hoot v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 194 S.W.2d 97; Cobb v. State, 139 Tex.Cr.R. 337, 139 S.W.2d 272; Kennedy v. State, 22 Tex.App. 693, 3 S.W. 480, and cases there cited.

Our State’s Attorney confesses error herein and we agree with him.

The judgment is 'reversed and the cause remanded.

On Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

By motion for rehearing, appellant insists that we should have ordered the prosecution dismissed rather than to have remanded the case for a new trial.

As pointed out in the opinion, the. complaint was sufficient. The defect is in the allegations of the information. A new information may be presented by the county attorney upon the complaint.

The order remanding the case was therefore proper, in order that the State may avail itself of the opportunity to file a new information if it desires to do so.

The motion is overruled. .

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
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<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-03-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-03-1999
<CASH>                                           1,809
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,687
<ALLOWANCES>                                        96
<INVENTORY>                                      1,529
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 5,626
<PP&E>                                           2,306
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   8,422
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            5,129
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      9,215
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     (7,745)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     8,422
<SALES>                                          3,213
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 3,750
<CGS>                                            1,503
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    4,656
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  38
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (939)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (939)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (939)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.10)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.10)
        

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

SHEDzuCK THORNTON,

Plaintiff,

DR. MICHAEL PITTMAN, er a/.,

Defendants. Civil Action No . 3 :22-CY -0605 -C

ORDER

Before the Court are the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United

States Magistrate Judge therein advising the Court that Plaintiffs request for declaratory and

injunctive relief should be denied.r

The Court conducls a de novo review ofthose portions ofthe Magistrate Judge's report or

specified proposed findings or recommendations to which a timely objection is made. 28 tl.S.C.

$ 636(bXlXC). Portions ofthe report or proposed findings or recommendations that are not the

subject ofa timely objection will be accepted by the Court unless they are clearly erroneous or

contrary to law. See united States v. llilson,864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989)'

After due consideration and having condrtcted a de novo review, the court finds that

Plaintiffs objections should be oVERRULED. The Court has further conducted an

independent review of the Magistrate Judge's findings and conclusions and finds no error. It is

therefore ORDERED that the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation are hereby

ADOPTED as the findings and conclusions of the Court. For the reasons stated therein, the

I plaintiff has filed tirnely objections 1o the Magistrate Judge's Findings, Conclusions, and

Recorntnendation,

Case 3:22-cv-00605-C-BT Document 19 Filed 04/19/22 Page 1 of 2 PageID 133
Court ORDERS that Plaintiffs request for declaratory and injunctive relief--construed as a

request for prelirninary injunctive relielor a temporary restraining order-be DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated April /f ,zOzz.

R.

S OR

GS

STATES D JUDGE

2

4

Case 3:22-cv-00605-C-BT Document 19 Filed 04/19/22 Page 2 of 2 PageID 134
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12 - 6509

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,

Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. STEVEN LAVOUR TWITTY ,

Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Rock Hill
. Cameron McGowan Currie , District Judge. ( 0:98

- cr - 00826

- CMC

- 1 )

Submitted : May 24, 2012 Decided: May 31, 2012

Before MOTZ and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Steven Lavour Twitty, Appellant Pro Se. Jane Barrett Taylor, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2

PER CURIAM:

Steven L avour Twitty appeals the district court’s orders denying his motions for a reduction of sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) and for reconsideration. Twitty pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of co caine and cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). He is current ly serving the statutory maximum sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment for that offense. But for that statutory maximum, the low end of Twitty’s Guidelines range both before and after Amendment 750 exceeded 240 months. Therefore, the district court properly found that Amendment 750 had no effect on Twitty’s Guidelines range. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s orders. We dispense with oral argument because the
fact s and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Impact on NA Regional Emissions

• Avoided emissions due to total carbon life cycle

– In use lifetime savings – total product footprint

Insulation lifetime building = 50 years

6 NA Insulation Plants = 20 years of production

Three applications of equal volume

DOW
#### FRELS v. CONSOLIDATED THEATRES, Inc., et al.

No. 10835.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

Jan. 8, 1941.

Rehearing Denied July 9, 1941.

C. C. Carsner, C. C. Carsner, Jr., and Edw. C. Thomas, all of Victoria, for appellant.

Crain, Vandenberge & Stofer, of Victoria, C. A. Erickson, of Bay City, J. W. Ragsdale, of Victoria, Orgain, Carroll & Bell, of Beaumont, and L. M. Rice, R. R. Conner, and R. A. Conner, all of Dallas, for appellee.

SMITH, Chief Justice.

The appeal is from an order sustaining pleas of privilege of some of the several defendants below.

The suit was brought by Rubin Freís against numerous corporate and individual defendants for actual and exemplary damages; for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from continuing certain alleged unlawful practices in alleged violation of anti-trust laws, and for temporary injunction prohibiting certain specific acts. Similar relief was denied plain tiff in a former trial and appeal. Freís v. Consolidated Theatres et al., Tex. Civ. App., 134 S.W.2d 369. We refer to the report of the former appeal for further statement of the nature of this action.

The real issues in the litigation are ob scured in quite lengthy pleadings below and presentation here, .and it would be futile and without benefit to any interest concerned, to cumber the record and the law books with an opinion as long as would be required in eking out and discussing and disposing of the numerous propositions and counter propositions propounded by the several parties in 170 pages of printed briefs. We deem it sufficient to say that after an exhaustive study of the record and consideration of the briefs we have reached the firm conclusion that the learned and lamented trial judge did not err in sustaining the pleas of privilege, and that the judgment must be affirmed. The case is such that the jurisdiction of this Court thereon is final, and as this Court is not required to file written opinion in affirming such judgment (Associated Indemnity Corporation v. Gatling, Tex. Civ. App., 75 S.W.2d 294), we refrain from doing so, in the interest of economy of time, effort and space.

Affirmed.

Opinion delivered and filed January 8, 1941.
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3442 

To direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to make grants to eligible nonprofit entities to establish clearinghouses for local information about 

employment opportunities and services for veterans. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

OCTOBER 30, 2013 

Ms. TITUS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL 

To direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to make grants 

to eligible non-profit entities to establish clearinghouses 

for local information about employment opportunities and 

services for veterans. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS GRANT 

4 PROGRAM FOR VETERANS’ EMPLOYMENT 

5 AND SERVICES CLEARINGHOUSES. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Veterans Affairs 

7 shall make grants to 75 eligible entities to be used in ac8 cordance with subsection (c). 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3442 IH

1 (b) ELIGIBLE ENTITIES.—To be eligible to receive a 

2 grant under this section an entity shall— 

3 (1) be a non-profit organization located in one 

4 of 75 cities selected by the Secretary for such pur5 pose; and 

6 (2) submit to the Secretary an application con7 taining such information and assurances as the Sec8 retary may require. 

9 (c) SELECTION OF CITIES.—For purposes of the pro10 gram under this section, the Secretary shall select the 75 

11 cities in the United States with the largest populations 

12 of veterans. 

13 (d) LIMITATION.—The Secretary may not award a 

14 grant under this section to more than one eligible entity 

15 located in the same city. 

16 (e) USE OF FUNDS.—The recipient of a grant under 

17 this section shall use the grant to establish a clearinghouse 

18 to serve as a central location for veterans who reside in 

19 the city where the recipient is located to receive informa20 tion about employment opportunities and services avail21 able for veterans in that city. 

22 (f) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than Decem23 ber 31, 2015, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a 

24 report containing an assessment of the grant program 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 3442 IH

1 under this section and any recommendations of the Sec2 retary regarding such program. 

Æ 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 211 (Tuesday, October 31, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 64926]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-27900]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE


Manufacturing Extension Partnership National Advisory Board; 
Notice of Renewal

    In accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 2, and the General Services Administration (GSA) 
rule on Federal Advisory Committee Management, 41 CFR Part 101-6, and 
after consultation with GSA, the Secretary of Commerce has determined 
that the renewal of the Manufacturing Extension Partnership National 
Advisory Board is in the public interest in connection with the 
performance of the duties imposed on the Department by law.
    The Committee was first established in October 1996 to advise MEP 
regarding their programs, plans, and policies. In reviewing the Board, 
the Secretary has established it for an additional two years. During 
the next two years, the Board plans to address center service mix 
standardization, eBusiness, moving toward high performance centers, 
training and education of field staff, MEP University, national 
awareness of the MEP program, international services, and others.
    The Board will consist of nine members to be appointed by the 
Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology to 
assure a balanced membership that will represent the views and needs of 
customers, providers, and others involved in industrial extension 
throughout the United States.
    The Board will function solely as an advisory body and in 
compliance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. 
Copies of the Board's revised charter will be filed with the 
appropriate committees of the Congress and with the Library of 
Congress.
    Inquiries or comments may be directed to Linda Acierto, Senior 
Policy Advisor, Manufacturing Extension Partnership, National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau Drive, Shop 4800, Gaithersburg, 
Maryland 20899-4800; telephone: 301-975-5020.

Karen H. Brown,
Deputy Director, NIST.
[FR Doc. 00-27900 Filed 10-30-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-13-M
. 

414 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 

Eonorrblb +Ano~ &awkinr 

county Auditor 

E4ndorson county 

Athens, Taxar 

ptoabar 82, 1939, 

the faatr nhortly 

ho tollowlry queeStatuter, 1988, fo-; 

taxa...eha l! be 

Or 00%0&W and thr 

iols 8955, Rarlsed Clril Statater, 1985, proia part, as tollowrr 

l . . . prorlded that amy totof who 

18 rubjoat to pay a poll tu under the 

lawr of this Stata . . . shall Herr pal4 

arid tax before offaring to votr at v 

l lrotion in thh 8tate and holds a foo*lpt rhowl 

"52 

that aald poll tax wae p&U 

befor. tbo i yytof tobraary 

iwdi~ ma l l 0 1 4 . # . Thr 9rer =H= a OM 
4,15 

of thle Artiolm as to oaating ballot8 

shall apply at &ll al*otioa* inaluding 

general, ipeoial aad primmy uleotion8.w 

Your attention 1s oallod to the opinion of Honorable Soott Gaines, Assistant Attorney General, rendered 

Maroh 31, 1931, in responss to the Sollow!ng qmstlont 

Vho la a qualltlod voter la a 

boa6 eleotion?" 

The opinion, la part, raada a8 rollmax 

*In order thut one be antitled 

to vote in said rleotlon, it would be 

aeoe88ary that he or she #hall hare 

paid a poll tax rlor to Tebnuary 

18t of the year P II whloh the person 

8eekks’to .vote aad holda a 9ropar poll 

tar reodipt lame6 thenror, or ia 

exempted themfrom . . .- 

We believe this opinion 18 equally appliaabla to 

the quoatlon you ask. 

No oall your attention to the oases OS E&ml1 et al 

v. Pllo ot al, found la I5 S. 8. (2) 899. In thl6 @ILSO, 

8o~0 twenty persons presented their 1953 poll.kr,noilptrr 

and were allowed to vote by virtue thereof, in EJI l lootlon 

held January 9, 1935. The aourt u8es the fellowlag 1-r 

*The eleatloa wu8 held on tam&y 

9, 1939, and only pursoas who ho1.b 1932 

poll tax reosipt8 were q\uliried to 

Vote, tULbs8 they W6X’U Usqpt mm the 

payment of a poll tu un4er Mom proviaioa of the 1.a~~~ 

The rule $6 olear in Teur8 that a permon must quaI%- 

fy beroro Februmy 1st of the year in whlah he or a&a uok8 

to votec It foblow that a puaoa who has not paid hla 11 

tcu, or has not othemvlae qunlifie4, botore February 1, p" 939, 
416 

Eonoreblo &hay Hawkins, Page S 

oanaot rote in an eleotlon to br hell In 3otober, 1939. 

Your8 very truly 

-@--a . ATTOIUUU GENER