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Filed 6/17/14 P. v. Alcala CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

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THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. EVA M. ALCALA,

Defendant and Appellant. C074390 (Super. Ct. Nos. 12F08006, 12M08505)

Following her plea of no contest to fraudulent receipt of public assistance and
batter y of her child ’ s father , defendant Eva M. Alcala was placed on three years ’ probation conditioned on her serving 90 days in county jail. Approximately six months after entering the plea, defendant made a motion to withdraw the plea. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant appeals that denial.2 BACKGROUND 1
An information c harged d efendant with felony counts of fraudulent receipt of public assistance (Welf & Inst. Code, § 109 8 0, subd. (c) (2) ) and filing a false claim (Pen. Code, § 118, subd. (a))

. 2 A separate complaint charged defendant with misdemeanor
counts of corporal injury of her child ’ s father (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and battery of her
child ’ s father (§ 243, subd. (e)(1))

. Defendant pleaded no contest to misdemeanor counts of fraudulent receipt of public assistance and battery of her child ’ s father. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court granted defendant probation and sentenced her to serve 90 days in county jail ; the remaining counts were dismissed

. Approximately six months after entering the plea, defendant filed a motion to withdraw the plea on two grounds, mental incapacity and newly discovered evidence

. As to mental incapacity, defendant claimed that on the morning of the plea , the staff at the Sacramento County Main Jail administered Flexeril and Tramadol to her, each of which

can “ cause sid e effects that may impair a persons [ sic ] thinking or reactions. ” Defendant declared she is not given Flexeril by her own treating physician as it “ makes her have
difficult y understanding things and following things and concentrating on things. ”
Defendan t also declared there was newly discovered evidence that the victim, Raymond Mata, had “ admitted essentially lying to the police to put [her] in jail. ” Specifically, she
averred that in May 2013, she and her son Michael were in a car with Mata when Michael
said to Mata that “ he could not believe that [Mata] put his mom in jail. [Defendant] then

s aid, yea h , just to get out of child support. Mata [ ’s ] reply was to laugh and say yeah,
that ’ s right, I did, so get over it. ”

1 The substantive facts underlying the convictions are not relevant to any issue on appeal and are not recounted here.

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.3

The trial court read and co nsidered defendant ’ s motion , including the attached
declarations and medical information , and the People ’ s opposition to the motion. At the hearing, t he trial court also heard oral argument from both parties. The trial court found clear and convincing ev idence that defendant was on medication as indicated in her motion; however, the trial court did not find defendant had established she was “ under the influence to such [an] extent she did not fully understand what was going on at the time of her plea. ” T he trial court also noted that having reviewed the transcript of the plea, there was no indication in the transcript that defendant was confused or hesitant during the taking of the plea and her responses to questions were appropriate. As to the
claim of newly discovered evidence, the trial court found defendant had not established
that Mata “ actually lied. Neither defendant nor her son Michael attested the victim said he had lied to the police, rather they attested the victim only admitted that he had th e defendant put in jail. ” The trial court also noted the People had indicated there was
additional evidence supporting the conviction, including observed injuries on the victim
and defendant ’ s admission she had punched the victim in the face. The court o bserved defendant had not provided a “ description of what allegedly occurred or was reported by the victim nor of any medical report that could detail any injuries suffered by the victim,

nor has the defendant set forth any defense she had available and wh at the strength was of
that evidence in her favor. ” Accordingly, the trial court denied the motion

. DISCUSSION Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow her to withdraw her plea. We disagree.
S ection 1018 provides in pertinent part: “ On application of the defendant at any time before judgment

. . . the court shall, for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted. ” The showing for postjudgment motions to withd raw a guilty plea is essentially identical to that required
under section 1018

. ( People v. Castaneda (1995) 37 Cal. App.4th 1612, 1617.) To4

establish good cause to withdraw her plea , the defendant must show that s he was operating under mistake, ignorance, inadvertence, fraud, duress, or any other factor overriding her free judgment. ( People v. Shaw (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 492, 496; People v.
Huricks (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208.) However, a defendant must establish that
her free will was overcome, not m erely that s he had a change of heart. ( People v. Nance (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1456.) A trial court ’ s decision to grant or deny a defendant ’ s motion to withdraw his guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( People v.
Mickens (1995) 38 Cal. App.4th 1557, 1561.) Discretion is abused when a court acts in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner, which results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. ( People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 308, 316.) In determining
whether a defendant has shown good cause for granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the reviewing court must adopt the trial court ’ s factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal. 4th 1223, 1254.)
1. Me ntal Incapacity

- - As noted by the trial court, defendant offered no evidence
the medications she was given prior to the plea hearing actually incapacitated her to such a degree as to override her free judgment or otherwise render her plea involuntary.
Defendant stated s he was “ loopy” because of the medications , but that does not necessarily mean her capacity to enter the plea knowingly and voluntarily was affected. Further, t he trial court, as the sole judge of credibility, could find defendant ’ s declaration regarding h er mental state at the time of the plea was not credible . (See People v. Hunt (1985) 174 Cal. App.3d 95, 103 [ “ [I]n determining the facts, the trial court is not bound by uncontradicted statements of the defendant ” ]; People v. Beck (1961) 188 Cal. App.2d 549, 553 [trial courts need not give full credence to a defendant ’ s uncontradicted statements in light of defendant ’ s interest in the outcome].) Nor was any claimed incapacity apparent in the record of the plea. Defendant expressed no confusion and
respo nded appropriately to questions. T he judge who accepted the plea was charged with determining the voluntariness. (§ 1192.5.) The trial judge went over each part of the5

plea agreement with defendant and she indicated that she understood the plea and
know ingly and willingly entered into it. The trial judge did not observe or note any concerns regarding defendant ’ s mental capacity at the time of the plea. Defendant was represented by counsel at the time of the plea and counsel expressed no concerns regard ing defendant ’ s capacity to understand the advisements or knowingly and
vol untarily enter a plea.
2. Newly Discovered Evidence

- - Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying the motion based on “ newly discovered evidence. ” Defendant cites no authority to support the proposition that newly discovered evidence would be an appropriate basis for granting a motion to withdraw her plea . Defendant attempts to analogize her motion
to withdraw her plea to a motion for new trial based on newly disco vered evidence and
utilize th e criteria applicable to a motion for new trial for assessing this case

. The problem with that analytical approach is that this case was resolved by way of plea. There was no preliminary hearing and there is no probation report. T he resolution by plea rather than trial leaves no basis upon which the court can conduct a comparative evidentiary analysis or assess the likelihood a plea would have been entered had the
defendant known the “ new ” infor mation , as is required to conduct the appropriate analysis applying the criteria applicable to motions for new trial

. 3
E ven if newly discovered evidence were good cause for withdrawal of the plea,
the statem ent proffered by defendant is insufficient to me et defendant ’ s burden. The statement allegedly made by Mata is not an unambiguous recantation of his accusation against defendant or an admission he lied to the police . Nor is the statement exculpatory
for defendant . At most, it “ admits ” Mata reported defendant to the police to have her

3 The statements in the People’s opposition to the motion regarding the evidence that was available against defendant, including physical injuries on the victim and defendant’s admission to hitting the victim, do not constitute evidence.6

incarcerated to avoid paying child support . That is a far cry from admitting that what he reported to police was untrue. While t his statement may bear on the victim ’ s credibility ,

s uch evidence has a mor e attenuated connection to defendant ’ s free judgment to enter a plea than the type of evidence which directly supports the defendant ’ s factual innocence. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “ [i]t is particularly difficult to characterize imp eachment information as critical information of which the defendant must always be aware prior to pleading guilty given the random way in which such information may, or may not, help a particular defendant. ” ( United States v. Ruiz (2002)
536 U.S. 622, 630 [153 L.Ed.2d 586, 595].) S uch information bears more on the fairness of a trial rather than the voluntariness of a plea. ( Id . at p. 633.) I mpeachment evidence is

not “ critical information ” that a defendant needs to determine whether to plead guilty,
si nce its exculpatory value is remote and highly speculative. ( Id . a t p. 630 .)
The trial court properly considered the arguments of counsel and the evidence defendant put forward in support of her claim. The record supports the conclusion the
trial cour t understood the scope of its discretion and exercised it. The decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or absurd. There was no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION The order of the trial court denying the motion to withdraw the plea is affirmed.

NICHOLSON , J.

We concur:

BLEASE , Acting P. J.

DUARTE , J.