No. 95-3491

 

Joseph Evans, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Shirley S. Chater, *

Commissioner, Social Security *

Administration, *

*

 Appellee. *

 

Submitted: March 13, 1996

 Filed: May 30, 1996

 

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, FLOYD R. GIBSON, and HEANEY, Circuit

Judges.

 

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Joseph Evans, a black male born November 17, 1955, has a high school

equivalency and prior work experience as a truck driver. He was hit by a

truck in May 1982 and suffered severe injuries to his right lower back and

hip. He was treated for this injury, and in 1984, he returned to work as

a truck driver for three years. He has not worked since that time.

In January 1992, Evans filed a claim for Social Security disability

insurance and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, alleging an

inability to work beginning April 15, 1989. He contended that he was

disabled due to chronic, lower back pain, arthritis, uncontrolled

hypertension, chest pain, headaches, and depression. His claim was denied

initially and on reconsideration. 
2

A hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ) on August 26,

1993. The ALJ found that Evans was unable to perform his past work as a

truck driver, but that he could perform a full range of sedentary work.

The Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ's decision. Evans sought review in

the district court, which denied relief. He now appeals from that

decision.

We hold that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports

the ALJ's decision that Evans was able to perform sedentary work at least

until September 30, 1991, the date on which he last qualified for

disability-insured status. We have doubts, however, as to whether he

remained able to perform sedentary work after that date. We thus remand

to the district court with directions to remand to the Secretary for a

determination of whether, after Septemer 30, 1991, Evans became eligible

for SSI benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 1382.

The record, including Evans' medical history, supports the ALJ's

determination that Evans was not disabled within the meaning of Title XVI

of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d as a result of his 1982

accident. Indeed, Evans returned to work as a truck driver and continued

in that occupation until 1987. Beginning in 1990, however, Evans' physical

condition deteriorated significantly. Since then, he has been in and out

of the hospital numerous times for high blood pressure and related

complications. In May 1990, Evans was hospitalized with chest pain and an

elevated blood pressure of 200/150. Thallium stress tests revealed no

evidence of stress-induced ischemia (a deficiency of blood supply to the

heart) and other cardiac tests were essentially negative. He was

discharged with directions to lose weight, to exercise, and to take

medication to control his blood pressure. His condition continued to

deteriorate after that date.

Evans was hospitalized again on January 26, 1992, with chest pains

and accelerated hypertension (200/140). He was not taking
3

any medication at the time and he was treated for high blood pressure, back

problems, pain, and obesity. He complained of headaches during the fourday hospitalization and his discharge diagnosis included "uncontrolled

hypertension with headache." Tr. 437. He continued to have elevated blood

pressure after his release: on June 16, 1992, his blood pressure

fluctuated greatly from 140/98 in the morning to 220/140 that evening; on

July 1, 1992, it was 220/124; and on August 8, 1992, he suffered from both

hypertension and congestive heart failure.

Evans was again hospitalized on May 25, 1993 with a blood pressure

of 160/130 and weighing 300 pounds. He was discharged after his blood

pressure reportedly responded to medication. On July 6, 1993, however, an

internal medicine specialist hospitalized Evans because of increasing

angina and blood pressure that was not controlled by increased medication.

This condition continued, including a week-long hospitalization in August

1993 for malignant hypertension, documented coronary atherosclerosis, and

angina pectoris. On October 11, 1993, Evans underwent angioplasty and was

discharged from the hospital five days later.

Evans was readmitted on December 22, 1993 for chest pain,

atherosclerotic heart disease, hypertension, and glucose intolerance.

After an adjustment in his medication, Evans was discharged only to be

readmitted on January 24, 1994, again for hypertension and atherosclerotic

heart disease.

It must be noted that because the hearing before the ALJ was held on

August 26, 1993, the ALJ did not consider Evans' medical history after that

date. The Appeals Council, on the other hand, considered the subsequent

history, but it determined that it did not affect the ALJ's finding of no

disability. We question the Appeals Council's decision.
4

The record reveals that Evans now suffers, and has suffered for some

time, from significant nonexertional impairments: hypertension, obesity,

pain, and atherosclerotic heart disease. Thus, the question is whether

these impairments at any time after September 30, 1991 became severe enough

to have prevented Evans from performing the full range of activities listed

in the Medical-Vocational Guidelines found in Appendix 2 to Subpart P of

Part 404, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501-1599 ("Guidelines"). The Guidelines can

be used to determine disability, provided that the nonexertional

impairments do not significantly diminish the claimant's residual capacity

to perform the activities listed in them. Reed v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 812,

816 (8th Cir. 1993); Thompson v. Bowen, 850 F.2d 346, 349-50 (8th Cir.

1988). Here, however, where there is substantial evidence as to

significant nonexertional limitations during the period in question, the

Guidelines are not applicable.

Rather, on remand a vocational expert should be called and asked a

proper hypothetical question detailing Evans' medical and activity history

from September 30, 1991 to the present. O'Leary v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d

1334, 1343 (8th Cir. 1983) (hypothetical must precisely set out all of the

claimant's impairments); Cole v. Harris, 641 F.2d 613, 615-16 (expert must

focus on individual complainant's capacity to work). The expert should be

requested to give an opinion as to whether, in light of his nonexertional

impairments, Evans was able to perform any jobs in the local or national

economy on a full-time basis from September 30, 1991 through the date of

the Appeals Council's decision. Easter v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1128, 1130 (8th

Cir. 1989) (claimant must be able to perform the requisite physical acts

on a full-time basis in a sometimes competitive and stressful environment

of the working world); McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1147 (8th Cir.

1982) (same). On remand, the Secretary and the claimant should be

permitted to present current medical reports of treating or consulting

doctors.
5

We therefore reverse the district court's denial of relief and remand

to the district court with directions to remand to the Secretary for

disposition consistent with this opinion.

A true copy.

Attest:

 CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.