1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 05 Sy llabu s
N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

Sy llabu s DIXON v . UNITE D STATE S
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 05–7 05 3. Ar g u ed Apr i l 25, 200 6—D e c i ded Ju n e 22, 2006 Pet i t i oner wa s cha r g ed wit h receivin g afir e a r m while un der indict men t

inv i olationof 18 U. S. C. §922(n) an d w i thmakin gfalse sta t emen t s inc o n n e c t ion w i thth e ac qu isit ionof a fir e ar m inv i olationo f §922( a)(6). S h e admit t ed a ttr ial th at sh e kn ewsh e was u n d erin

dict mentwhen s h e purc ha s e d t h e firea r ms a n d knew t h a tdoing s o wa s acrime, b u tcla i med tha ts h e wa s act i ng u n der d ures s b e ca us e her b o yfrie n d ha d t hrea t e ned t o ha rm hera n d her da ught ers if s h e did not b u y t h e guns for him. Bound b y Fift h Circuit precedent , t h e Dis t rictCourt declined her req u es tfor aj ury ins t ruct ion pla c ing u p onth e G o ver n m en t th e bu r d ento dispr o v e , bey o n da r e ason abl e doub t , her dur e s s defens e. Ins t ea d, t h e j u r ywa s ins t ruct ed t h a tpet i

tion erh a d th e bu r d ento establi s hh e rdefen s e bya pr epon der a n c e of t h e evidence

. S h e wa s convi c t e d, a n d t h e Fift h Circuita ffirmed. Held: 1

. The j u r y i n s t ruct ions did notrun a f oul of t h e D u e Proces s Clau se. Th e c r i mes of c o nvic tionr e qu ir e th at peti tion erh a v e ac ted “kn o w i n g ly,” §922( a)(6)—w h i c h“mer elyr e qu ir es pr oof of kn ow ledg e of th e fac t s th at c o n s titu te t h e offen s e,” Bryan v. Uni t ed States , 524 U. S. 184, 19 3—or“w illfu l l y ,” §924( a)(1)( D ) —w h i chr e qu ir es ac tin g
“ w it h knowled g e t h a t[t he] conductwa s unla w ful,” ibi d

. Thus , t h e G o v e rn men tbor e th e bu r d enof pr ov ingbey o n da r e ason able dou b t th at pe tit i on er kn ew th at sh e w a s makin gfalse st atemen t s an d kn ew th at sh e w a s br eakin gth e laww h e nsh e ac qu ir ed a fi r e ar m w h ile under indict m e nt

. Itclea rlymetits b urden whe n pet i t i oner t e s t ified to that effect. Petitioner co ntends that she cannot have formed the neces s a ry mens reab e ca us e s h e did not freely choos e t o commit t h e crimes. Howe ver, while the duress defense may excuse conduct that would ot herwi s e b e punis h ab le, s e e United States v. Bailey , 444 U. S

.2 D I X O N v. UNITED STATE S Sy llabu s 394, 40 9– 410, th e ex isten c eof dur e ss n o rmallydoes n o t c o n t r o v e r t any of the ele m ents of the offense it self. Th e fac tth at petition er ’s crimes are statutory offense s with no counterpart in the common law s u pport s t h is conclus ion. T h e j ury i n s t ru ct ions were co ns is t e ntwith th e r e qu ir emen t th at th e G o v e r n m en t pr ov e th e men tal state s spec i

fied in§§922(a)(6) an d 924( a)(1)(D ) an d did n o t ru n afoul of du e pr oc ess byplac in gth e bu r d enonpetition erto est abli s hdu r e ss bya pr e pon d er an c e of th e ev iden c e . Pp. 3–5.

2

. Modernco mmon la w does notreq u iret h e Gove rnm entt o b e a r t h e b urden of dis p roving pet i t i oner’s dures s defens e b e yond area s on able dou b t. Th e lon g -establ ish e d c o mmon - lawr u l e, wh ic hplac es th e bu r d enof pr ov in gth at defen s e onth e defen dan t , w a s n o t u p set by Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469. Th er e, th e Cou r t in ter p r e ted a defendant’s insanity to controvert the necessary mens re a for a mur

der commit t e d “ felonious ly, wilfully, a n d of his ma lice a f oret hought ,” id., at 474, a n d required the Governme nt to prove t h e defendant’s san i tybey o n da r e a s on able dou bt bec a u s e th e ev iden c e ten d in gto pr ov e in san i tyalso ten d ed t o disp rove an essential element of the of

fen se. Th e dur e ss ev iden c e th at pet i tion e raddu c e d at t r ial does n o t c o n t r a dic torten dto dispr o v e an yelemen t of h e rstatu to r yoffen s es. Sh e is also n o t h e lped byth e r e su ltin g“Davis rule , ” wh ich wa s not constitutionally mandated, and whi ch Congress overrule dby statute , req u iring ade fenda ntt o prove ins a nit yb yclea r a n d conv incin gevi

dence.

Petitioner’s reliance on Davis also ig n o r e s th e f a c tth at feder a l c r i mes ar e “s olelyc r e atu r e s of st atu te,” Liparotav. U n ited Sta t es , 471 U. S. 4 19, 424, an d th u s th e Co u r tmu st effec t u ate th e du r e ss de

fen se as Con g r e ss “m ayh a v e c o n t emplate d” itinth e c o n t ex t of th es e specific offenses, United St ates v. Oak land Cannab i s Buyers ’ Coop

erativ e , 532 U. S. 483, 490, n . 3. Th e Cour t c a nassu me th at, w h e n pass in gth e r e lev a n t1968 Ac t, Con gr e ss w a s famili arw i thth e long

es t a b l is hed common-la w rule a n d t h e rule of McKelve yv. United States, 260 U. S. 353, 3 57—t h at th e on e r e ly in gonanaffir m ativ e de

fen se mu st se t it u p an d es tabl ishit— a n dw o u l d h a v e ex pec t ed fed

eral courts to apply a similar appr oach to any affirmative defense or excus e fo r viol a t i ng t h e newla w. To a cce ptpet i tioner’s cont ra r yh y poth esis th a t Davis dra m a t i ca lly ups e twell-s e tt led la w would req u ire an overwhelming co nsensus among fed er al c o ur ts plac in gth e bur d en on t h e Go ver n ment , b u tco nflicta m ong t h e Circuit s demons t r a t e s t h a ts uch co n s ens u s ha s never e x is t e d. For as i milar rea s on, no weight is due the 19 62 M o d e l Penal Code. There is no e v idence that Congres s endors ed t h e Code’s views or incorpo r a t e d them int o t h e 196 8 Ac t. Infac t , w h e nCong r e ss amen de d th e Ac t to a dd a mens rea r e qu ir emen t, i tpu n i sh ed “w illfu l” v i olat io n s , a men tal s tate n o t em

-3 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Sy llabu s braced by the Code. Effectu ating th e affir m ative defense as Congress ma y ha ve cont emplat ed it , the Courtpresumes t h at , in t h e cont extof the firearms offenses here and the long-es tabl ished com m on-law rule, Con g r e ss in ten d ed petition e rto bearth e bu r d enof pr ov i n gth e du r e ss defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Pp. 5–15. 413 F. 3d 52 0, affir m ed.

S TEVENS , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in whi ch R OBERTS , C. J., and S CALI A , K ENNEDY , T HOMAS , G IN SB U R G , an d ALITO , JJ., joined. K ENNEDY , J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO , J ., filed acon cur rin g opinion, in which S CALI A , J., joined. B RE Y E R , J., filed adi ssenting opin

ion, in whic hS OUTER , J., joi n ed._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p r in t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o r t e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u r t of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on s m a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp r in t go es t o p r es s . 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–7 05 3
KES H IA C H ERI E AS HF OR D DI XON, P E TI TIONE R v. UNITE D STATE S ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT [Ju n e 22, 2006 ] J USTICE S T EVEN S delivered the opi n ion of the Court. In January 2003, peti tioner Keshia Dixon purchased multiple fir e arms at two gun shows, during the course of which she p r ovided an i n correct a d dress and falsely stated that she was not under indictment for a felony. As a result of t h ese illegalacts, petitioner was indicted and convicted o none count of receiving a firearm while unde r indictment in violationof 18 U. S. C. §922(n) and eight counts of m a king false statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm in violation of §922(a)(6). At trial, petitioner admitted that she k n ew she was under indict

ment when she made the purchases and that she k n e w doing so w a s a crime; her defense was tha tshe acted under duress because her boyfriend threatened to kill h e r or hurt her daughters i f she did not buy the gu ns for him. Petitioner contends that the trial j u dge’s instr u ctions t o the jury er roneously required her to prove duress by a preponderance of the evidence i n stead of requiring the Government to prove beyond a rea s onable doub t that she did not act under duress. Th e Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s contention, 413 F. 3d 520 (CA5 2005); given2 D I X O N v. UNITED STATE S Opinion of t h eCourt contrar ytr eatment of the issue by other federal court s , 1 we granted certiorari, 546 U. S. __ (2006). I At trial, in her request for juryinstructions on her defense of duress, petitioner contended that she “shoul d have the bu rden of pro d uction, and then thatthe Govern

ment shoul dbe required to di sprove beyond a reasonab le doubt the duress.” App. 300. Petitioner a d mitted th at this request was contr a ry to FifthCircuit pre c edent, and the trial court, correc t ly finding itself bound by Circuit precedent, denied petitioner’ s request. Ibid

. Instead, the judge’s inst ructions to the jury defined the elements of the duress defense 2 and sta t ed that petitioner has “the burden of proof to establish th e defens e of duress by a preponder

ance of the evidence.” Id. , at 312. Petitioner a r gues here, as she did in the Dist rict Cour t and the Court of App e als, that federal law requires the Government to bear th e burde n of disproving her defense beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court’s erro

-

——————

1 Cf., e. g. , Unit ed Stat es v. Talbot t , 78 F. 3d 118 3, 118 6 (CA7 1 9 9 6 ) (per curiam); United States v. Riff e , 28 F. 3d 565, 5 68, n

. 2 (CA6 199 4) ; United States v. Simpson , 979 F. 2d 1282, 1 287 (C A8 19 92 ).

2 There is no fe deral statute defini ng the e l ements of the duress de

fense. We have not specified the eleme n ts of the defense, see, e.g
. , United S t atesv. Bailey , 444 U. S. 394, 40 9 –41 0 (19 80), a n d n e ed n o t do s o t o da y. Ins t ea d, we pres ume t h e a ccura cy o f t h e Dis t rictCourt ’s description of these elements: (1) Th e defenda n twa s under a nunla w f u l a n d imminentt hrea tof s uch ana t ure a s t o induce a well-grou nded apprehension of death orserious bodily injury; (2) the defendant had notreckles s l y or negligent l y pla c ed herself in a s i t u a t ion in which it wa s prob ab le t h a ts h e would b e forced t o perform t h e cr imina lconduct ; (3) the defend a nt had no re asonable, legal alternative to violating the law , th at is, a c h a n c e bothto r efu se to per f or m th e c r i min a l ac t an d als o to av oid th e t h r e aten e d h a r m ; an d, (4) th at adir e c tc a u s al r e l ation sh i p maybe r e ason ablyan tic i pa t e d betw eenthe c r i min a l ac t an d th e av oid

an c e of th e thr e aten e d h a rm. See App. 312 –3 13; see g e n e r a lly United States v. Harp er , 802 F. 2d 115, 118 (C A5 1 986).3 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt neous instruction on t h is point entitles her to a new t r ial. There are two aspects to petitioner’s argume nt in suppor t of her prop osed instruction that merit separ a te discussion. First, petitioner contends that her defense “c ontroverte d the mens rearequired for conviction” and therefore that the Due Pr ocess Clause requires t h e Government to retain the burden of persuasion on that element. Brief for Peti

tioner 41. Second, petitioner argues that Fi fth Circuit’s rule is “contrary to mod e rn common law.” Id ., at 14. II The crimes for which petitioner was convict e d require that she have acted “knowingly,” §922(a)(6), or “willfully,” §924(a)(1)(D). 3As we have explai ned, “unles s the text of the statute dictates a d i fferent result, the ter m ‘knowin g l y’ merely requires proof of knowledg e of the facts that const i

tute the offense.” Bryan v. Uni t ed Sta t es , 5 24 U. S. 18 4, 193 (1998) (footnote omitted). And the term “willfully” in §924(a)(1)(D) requires a defendant to have “acted with knowledge that his co nduct was unlawful.” Ibid

. In th is case, then, the Gover n ment bore the burden of proving beyond a r e asonabl e d o ubt that petitioner knew she w a s making fal s e statements in conn ection withthe acquis i

tion of firea r ms and that she k n ew she was break i ng the law when s h e acquired a firearm while under indictmen t. See In re Winship , 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970). Although th e Government may have proved these e l eme n ts in othe r ways, it clearly met its burde n when petitioner testified that she knowingly c o mmitted c e rtain acts —she put a false address on the forms she completed to purchase th e firearms, falsely claimed that she was the actual buyer of the firearms, and falsely stated that she was not under indictment at the time of the purchase—and when she

——————

3 Although §92 2 (n) does not contain a mensrea r e qu ir em en t, th e r e le

v a n tsen t en c i n gpr ov ision , §924( a)(1)(D ), r e qu ir es th at a v i olat ionbe commit t e d willfully.4 D I X O N v. UNITED STATE S Opinion of t h eCourt testified that she kne wshe was breaking th e law when, as an individual under in dictment at the time, s h e purchased a firearm. App. 221–2 22. Petitioner contends, however, that she cannot have formed the necessary mens reaf o r these crimes because she did not freely choose to co mmit the acts in questi o n. But even if we assume that petitioner’s will was overborne by the thre ats made a g ainst her and her da ughters, sh e still knew that she was making false statemen ts and knew that she was breaking the law by buying a fi rearm. The duress defense, like the defense of necessity that we con sidered in United States v. Bail ey , 444 U. S. 394, 409–410 (1980), may excuse con d uct that would other w ise be pu n ishable, bu t the existence of duress normally does not controvert any of the e l ements of the offens e i t self. 4A s w e explained in Bailey , “[c]riminal li ability is normally based upon the concurrence of two factors, ‘an evil-meaning mind [and] and evil-doi n g hand .

. . .’ ” Id ., at 402 (quotin g Morisse tte v. Uni t ed Sta t es , 342 U. S. 246, 251 (1952)). Lik e the de fense of ne cessity, the defense of duress does not negate a defendant’s criminal state of mind when th e applicable offense req u ires a defendant to have acted knowingly or willfully; instead, it allows the defendant to “avoid liability .

. . beca use coe rcive conditions or necessity negates a conclusion o f guilt even though the necessary mens reawas present.” Bailey , 444 U. S., at 4 02. 5

——————

4 As th e G o v e rn men tr e c o g n ized at or al ar g u men t , ther e maybe crimes where t h e na t ure of t h e men s rea w o uld req u iret h e Go vernmen t to dispr o v e th e ex isten c e of du r e ss bey o n da r e ason able dou bt. See Tr

. of O r a l Ar g . 26–2 7; see a l so , e.g
. , 1 W. LaFav e , Su bstan tiv e Cr imin al Law§5.1, p. 333 (2d ed. 2 003) (h er ein a fterLaFav e ) (ex p lain in gtha t s o me common-la w crimes req u ire t h a tt h e crime be done “ ‘mali

cious l y’ ”); Blac k’s LawD i c t i o n a r y968 (7thed. 1999) (def in in gmalic e as “[t]h e in ten t , w i th ou t ju stifi c ationorexc u se, to c o mmit a w r o n gfu l ac t” ).

5 Professor LaFave has explained the duress defense as follows: “The rationale of the defense is not that the defendant, faced with th e unne rvin g t h r e a tof ha rm unles s he does a na c twhic hviola t e s t h e5 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt The fact that petitioner’s crimes are statutory offenses that have n o counterpart in the common law also supports our conclusion that her duress defense in no way disprove s an element of those crimes. We have observed that “[t]h e definition o f the el em ents of a criminal of fense is en

trusted to t h e legislature, particul a rly in the case of fed

eral crimes, which are solely creat ures of stat ute.” Lipa

rotav. U n it e dSt at es , 471 U. S. 4 19, 424 (1985). Here , consistent with the movementaway from t h e traditional dichotomy of general versus spec ific intent and towar da more speci f ically defi ned hierarchy of culpable ment al states, see Bailey , 444 U. S., at 403–404, Con gress defined the crimes at issue to punish defendants who act “know

ingly,” §922(a)(6), or “willfully,” §924(a)(1)(D). It is these specific mental states, rather thansome vague “evil mind,” Brief for Petitioner 42, or “ ‘cri minal’ intent,” Martin v. Ohio , 480 U. S. 228, 235 (1987), that the Government is required to prove beyon da reasona b le doubt, see Patterson v. New Yor k , 432 U. S. 197, 211, n. 12 (1977) (“The a ppli

cability of the reasonable-doubt standard, however, h a s always been dependent on how a State defines the offense that is charged in any given case”). The jury instruction s in this case were consistent with t h is requirement and, as such, did not run afou l of the Due Process Clause whe n they placed the burden on peti tioner to e s tablish the existence of duress by a preponderance of the e v idence. III Having found no cons tituti onal basis for placing upo n the Govern ment the burden of disproving petitioner’s

—————— lit era lla ngua ge of t h e c r imina lla w, s o mehow los e s his ment a lca pa cit y to c o mmi t th e c r i me inqu es tion

. Noris i tth atth e def e n d an t h a s n o t en g a g e d ina volu n tar yac t. Rath erit is th at, ev enth oughh e h a s don e th e ac t th e c r ime r e qu ir es an d h a s th e men tal s tate w h i c hth e cr ime req u ires , his conductwhic hviola t e s t h e litera l la ngua ge of t h e criminal law is excused . . . .” 2 LaFave §9 .7(a), at 72 (footnote omitted).6 D I X O N v. UNITED STATE S Opinion of t h eCourt duress defense beyonda reasonab le doubt, we next ad

dress petitioner’s argu ment that t h e modern common law requires the Governm e nt to bear that burde n. In maki ng this argument, petitioner recognizes that, until the end of the 19th century, com m on-law courts genera lly adhered to the rule that “the pro p onent of an issue bea r s the burden of persuasion on the factual pre m ises for applying the rule.” Fletcher, Two Kinds of Lega l Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-PersuasionPractices in Crimi nal Cases, 77 Y a le L. J. 880, 898 (196 7–1968). In petitioner’s view, however, two important development s have estab

lished a contrary com m on-law rule that now prevails in federal courts: this C o urt’s decision in Davisv. Uni t ed Sta t es , 160 U. S. 469 (1895), which placed the burden on the Government to prove a defendant’s sanity, and the publication of the Model Penal Code in 1962. Although undisputed in this case, it bears repeatin g that, at co mmon law, the burde n of provin g “affirma t ive defenses—i ndeed, ‘allcircumsta nces . . . of justification, excuse or a lleviation’—rested on t h e defenda n t.” Patter

son , 432 U. S., at 202 ( quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commen

taries *201 ); see als o Martin v. Ohio , 480 U. S., at 23 5; Mullaney v. Wilbur , 421 U. S. 684, 693 (1975). This com

mon-law rule accords with the g e neral evidentiary rul e that “the burdens of p r oducing evidence and of persuasi o n with rega rdto any given issu e are both generally allocated to the same party. ” 2 J. Strong, McCormic k on Evidence §337, p. 41 5 (5th ed. 1999). And, in the c o ntext of the defense of duress, it acc o rds witht h e doctrine that “ w here the facts with regar dto an issue lie pec u liarly in t h e k n owledge of a party, that pa rty has the burden of proving the issue.” Id. , at 413. Although she claims that th e common-law rule placing the b u rden on a defendant to prove the existence of duress “was the product of flawed reasoning,” petitioner accepts tha tthis was the general rule, at least until this Court’s deci sion in Davis

. Brief for7 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt Petitioner 18. Accor d ing to petitioner, however, Da v i s initiated a revolution that overthr e w the old common-law rule and established her proposed rule in its pl ace. Davis itsel f , however, does notsupport petitioner’s position. In that case, we reviewed a defendant’s convic

tion for having commi tted mur d er “feloniously, wilfully , and of his malice aforethought.” 160 U. S., a t474. It was undisputed that the prosecution’ s evidence “i f alon e co n sidered, made it the duty of th e jury to returna verdict of guilty of t h e crime charged”; th e defendant, however, adduced evi d ence at tri al tend ing to show that he did not have the m e ntal capaci ty to form t h e requisite intent. Id ., at 475. At issue befor e the Court was the correctness of the trial judge’s instru ction to the jury tha tt h e law “ ‘pr e sumes ever y man is sa ne, and the burden of showing it i s not true is upon the party who a sserts it.’ ” Id. , at 476. Under this instruction, “if the evidence was in equilibri o as to the a ccused being sane, tha tis, capabl e of compre

hending th e nature and effect of his acts, he was to be treated just as he would be if t h ere were no defence of insanity or if there was an enti re absence of proof that he was insane. ” Id. , at 479. In reversing the defendant’s conv iction, we found our

selves “unable to assen tto the doctrine that i na p rosecu tion for murder

. . . it is the duty of the jury to convic t where the evidence is equally bal anced on the issue as t o the sanity of the accused at the time of the killi ng.” Id ., at 484 (emphasis added). Instead, we conclu ded that this defendant was “entitl e d to an acquittal of the spe c ifi c crime cha r ge dif upon all the evidence there i s reasonabl e doubt whet her he was capable in law of committing t h e crime.” Ibid . (emphasis added). Our opinion focused on the “definition of murder,” explaining that “it is of the ver y essence of that heinous crime that it be committed by a person of ‘sound memory and disc retion,’ and with ‘malic e aforethought.’ ” Ibid

. (citations omitted). Reviewing “the8 D I X O N v. UNITED STATE S Opinion of t h eCourt adjudged cases” and “elementary treatises upon criminal law,” we found that “[ a]ll admit that the cri me of murder necessarily involves the possessi on by the accused of such mental capacity as will render hi m criminall yresponsib l e for his acts.” Id ., at 48 5. Thus, when we ulti mately foun d that the burden of proving the accused’s sanity rested on the Government, our holding rested on the conclusio n that: “[Davis’] guilt cannot be saidto h a ve beenproved be

yond a reasonable doub t—his will and his acts cannot be heldto have join ed inperpetrating the murder charged—if the jury, upon all the evidence, have a reasonable doubt whether he was legally ca pable of committingcrime, or(which is the same thing) whether he wilfully, deliberately, unlawfully, and of malice afor ethought tookthe life of the dece ased. As the crime of murder inv o lves sufficient capacit yto dis

tinguish between rightand wron g , the legal interpre

tation of ev ery verdict of guilty as charged is that the jury believe d from all the evidence beyond a reason

able doubt t hat the accused was guilty, and was there

fore responsible, criminally, for his acts. H o w then upon principle or cons istently with humanity can a verdict of g u ilty be properly retur n ed, if the jury en

tertain a reasonable doubt as to th e existence of a fact which is essential to gu ilt, namely, the capacity in la w of the accused to commit that c r ime?” Id. , at 488. Our opinion in Davis , then, interpreted a defendant’s sanity to controvert th e necessary mens reaf o r the crime of murder committed “f e l o ni o u s l y , wi lfull y , a n d of hi s mal

ice afo r e tho ugh t ,” id

. , a t 4 7 4 , as “[o]ne who takes huma n life cannot be said to be act uated by malice aforethought, or to have deliberately intended to tak e life, or to have ‘a wicked, depraved, and malignant heart,’ .

. . unless at t h e9 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt time he had sufficient mind to co mprehend t h e criminality or the righ t and w r ong of such a nact,” id ., at 485. We required the Government to pr ove the defen d ant’ s sanity beyond a reasonable doubt because the evi d e n c e th a t ten d e d to prove i n s ani ty also ten d e dto di s p ro ve an es sen ti al eleme n t of the offe nse charge d. S e e Davis v. United S t a t es , 165 U. S. 3 73, 378 (1897) (“[T]he fact of sanity, as an y other ess ential fac tinthe ca se , mu st be established to th e satisfaction of the jury beyond areasonable doubt” (e m p h a s i s a d d e d) )

. Whe the r or no t th is rea s oni n g co rr e c tl y trea te d i n s ani ty as ne ga tin g th e mens rea fo r m u rde ra s define d i nthe sta tu t e at i s su e, cf., n. 4, su p ra , i tdo es n o t h e lppe ti ti on er : Th eevid e n c e o f du res ss h e a d du ce d a t tri al does no t co nt r a di ct o rten dtodi s p ro ve a n y element of the s t at ut ory offe n s es th atsh e c o m m i tt ed

. Nor does the proposition for whi c h Davi shas come to stand help petitioner’s cause. Although writtenmore narrowly inthe context of a prosecution for the crime of murder, Da vis was later interprete d to establish a general “rule for federal prosecutions .

. . that an accused is ‘enti

tled to an a c quittal of the specific c r ime charged if upon a l l the evidence there is reasonable doubt whether he was capable in law of com m itting c r i m e.’ ” Leland v. Or egon , 343 U. S. 7 90, 797 (1952) (quoting Davis , 160 U. S., a t 484); see a l so Lynch v. Ov erhols e r , 369 U. S. 705, 713 (1962) (explaining that the Davis rule applied in allfed

eral courts). After Davis , if a federal defendant introduce d sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to h i s sanity, it w a s sufficient to create aquestion for the ju ryon which the Government bore the ultimate burden of p e r suasion beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g. , Hall v. UnitedStates , 295 F. 2d 26, 28 (CA4 1961); Holloway v. United Sta t es , 148 F. 2d 665, 666 (CADC 1 945); Post v. United Sta t es , 135 F. 1, 10 (CA5 1905).

In apparent recognition of the fact that Davis relied on the heightened mens reaapplicable to the pa rticular stat

-10 D I X O N v. UNITED STATE S Opinion of t h eCourt ute at issue, we heldin Lelandthat this rule was not constitutionally mandated, 343 U. S., at 797 , and Con

gress overruled it by statut e in 1984, requiring a defe n dant to prove his ins anity by cl ear and convincing evi

dence, 98 Stat. 2057, codified at 18 U. S. C. §17(b). Moreover, Congress has treated the defense of insanity differently from that of duress not only by codi fying it bu t by requiring defendants who intend to rely on an insanit y defense to provide advance noti ce t o the Gover n ment. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 1 2 .2(a). Thu s , even if the rule aris

ing from Davismay h a ve once been relevant to an evalua

tion of other affirmative de fenses, Congress’ differenti a l treatment of the insanity defense and its rejection of the Davis rule are inconsistent with petitioner’s invitation to follow Davis ’ lead in this case. Indeed, petitioner’ s rel i ance on Davis ignore s the fact that federalcrimes “a r e solely creatures of st atute,” Li p a rota , 471 U. S., at 424, and therefore that we are required to effectuate the duress de fense a s Congress “may have contemplated” it in th e context of these spec ific offens es , United S t a t es v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative , 532 U. S. 4 83, 491, n. 3 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); se e also id ., at 499 (S TEVEN S , J., concurring in judgment) (explaining that Court was addressing wheth e r the statute at issue foreclosed a necessity defense to s p e cific charge s brought u n der the statute); Bail ey , 444 U. S., at 410 (“We need notspeculate now, however, on the precise con t ours of whatever defenses of duress ornece s sity are available against charges brought under [1 8 U. S. C.] §7 51(a)”). Th e offenses at issue in this case were created by statute in 1968, when Congress enacted th e Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (hereinafter Safe Streets Act or Act). See 82 Stat. 197. There is no evidence in the Act’s structu re or history that Congre ss actually con s idered the question of how the du ress defense should work in this context, and there is n o suggestion11 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt that the offenses at iss u e are incompatible with a defense of duress. 6C f

. Oakland Cannab i s Buyers’ Cooperative , 532 U. S., at 491. Assuming that a defense of duress i s available to the statuto r y crimes at issue, 7then, we mus t determine what that defense would look l i ke as Congr e ss “may have contemplated” it. As discussed above, the common law long re quired the defendant to bear the burden of proving the existence of duress. Similarly, even where Congress has enacted an affirmative defense in t h e proviso of a statute, the “ s e t tl e d ru l ein th is j u ri sdicti on[i s ] th at a nindi ct mentorother ple a din g . . . nee dno t ne ga tive th e ma tte rof an e x ce pti o n ma de b y a pro vis o o ro the r dis ti n ct cl au se . . . an d th a t i tis incumbe n t on one whorelies on such an e x ce ptio n to se t it up a n d es tablis h i t .” McK e lveyv. U n ite d St ates , 2 60 U. S. 353 , 3 57 (1 922 ); see al so Uni t ed S t ates v. Di c k son , 15 Pet. 141, 165 (1 841) (c al l i n g th i s “the general rule of law which has always prevailed, and become consecrated almost as a maxim in the interpretation of statutes”). Ev e n th o u gh th e Sa fe S t ree t s Ac t does no t men tio n the defense of dure ss, we c a ns a f e ly as s u me th atth e 19 68C o n gr e s s w a sf a mi l i arw i th both the lo ng-e stab lis h e d com m o n -la wrule 8and th e rule

——————

6 Wh ile Con g r e ss’ fin d in g s insu ppor tof t h e Safe Str e e t s Ac t sh ow t h a tCongres s wa s concerne d b e ca us e “t he ea s e wit hwhich a n y pers on c a nac qu ir e fi r e ar ms . . . is a sig n ific an t fac t orinth e pr ev alen c e of law l essn es s a n d v i olen t c r i me inth e Un it ed St ates,” §9 01(a)( 2 ), 82 St at. 225, it would be unrealistic to read this co ncern with the proliferation of fir e ar m-bas ed v i olen t cr ime as implic i t lydoin g aw ay w i tha defen s e as strongly rooted in histo r y as the duress defense, see, e.g. , 4 W. Blac kston e , C o mmen tar ies onth e Law s of En g l an d 30 (1769).

7 We ha ve p r e v ious ly ma de t h is a s s u mpt i on whe n a ddr es s i ng com mon-law affir m ative defenses, seeUnited States v. Oak land Cannab i s Buyers’ Cooperative , 532 U. S. 483, 491 (2 001); Bailey , 444 U. S., at 41 0, an d th e par t ies g i v e u s n o r e asonto qu esti onit h e r e .

8 Indeed, whenacon g res s i ona lcommitt ee did cons ider c o difying t h e duress defense, it would have had the courts determine the defens e “ac c o r d in gto th e pr in c i ples of th e c o mmonlawas th eymaybe in ter

pr eted inth e ligh tof r e aso nan d ex per i en c e .” S. 14 37, 95 thCon g ., 2d12 D I X O N v. UNITED STATE S Opinion of t h eCourt ap pli e d i n McK e lvey a n d th a ti twoul d have e x pe cte dfe de ra l co urts to a p pl y a si mi la r appro a ch to a n y affi rm ativ e de

fen s e th at mi gh t be a s serte das a ju stifi c a tio n or e x cuse for vio l a ti n g th e ne wla w . 9 This conclusion is surely more reasonabl e than peti

tioner’ s hypothesis that Dav i sdra m atically upset a wellsettled rule of law. Petition er cites only one federal case decided before 1968 for the propo s ition that it has been well establi s hed in f e deral la w that the Government bears the burden of disproving dures s beyond a reasonab le doubt. Bu t that case i n volved a defendant’s claim that h e “lacked the specific intent to defraud required by the statute for the reason that he committed the offense und er duress and coercion.” Johnson v. UnitedStates , 291 F. 2 d 150, 152 ( CA8 1961). Thus, wh en the Cou rt of Appeals explained that “there i s no burden upon the defendant to prove his defense of co ercion,” id ., at 155, that statement is best understood in context as a corollary to the by-then

unremarka ble proposit ion that “the burden of proof res t s upon the Government to prove th e defendant’s guilt be

yond a reasonable d o ubt,” ibid

. Properly understood, Johnsonprovides petitioner little help in her uphill strug

gle to prove that adra m atic shift in the federal commonlaw rule occ u rred betw een Davisa n d the enactment of th e Safe Streets Act in 1968. Indeed, for us to be able to accept petitioner’s proposi

tion, we would need to find an overwhelming consensus among federal courts t hat it is the Governme nt’s bur den to disprove the existenc e of dures s beyond a reasonab le doubt. The existence today of disagreemen t among the

—————— Sess., §501 (1978).

9 Duress , like th e defen se atissue in McKe lve y , is anex c u s e th at al low s anex c e ptionfr om liabil i ty

. See, e.g
. , 2 La Fav e §9.7, at 72 (“Th e r atio n ale of th e defe n s e of du r e ss is th at th e defen d an t ou gh t to be ex c u s ed when he ‘is t h e vict im of at hrea tt h a ta pers on of rea s onab l e moral s t rengt hco uld notfa irly b e e x pect ed t o res i s t ’ ”).13 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt Federal Courts of Ap peals on t h is issue, however—t h e very disag r eement that caused u s to grant certiorari in this case, see n. 1, supra—dem onstrates t hat no suc h consensus h a s ever existed. See also post , at 6– 8 (B REYER , J., dissenti n g) (discussing differences in treatment of the duress defense by the various Courts of Appeals). Also undermining petitioner’s argument is the fact that, i n 1970, the National Commissionon Refor m of Federal Criminal Laws proposed thata defendant prove the exis

tence of duress by a pr eponderance of the evi d ence. See 1 Working Papers 278. Moreover, while there seem to be few, if any, post- Davis , pre-1968 cases placin g the burde n on a defe ndant to prove the existe nce of dure ss, 10or even discussing the issue in any way, this lackof evidence does not help p e titioner. The long-established common-la w rule is that the burd e n of proving duress rests on the defendant. Petitioner hypothesizes that Davi sfomented a revolution upsetting t h is rule. If this were tr ue, one would expect to fi nd cases di scussing th e matter. But no suc h cases exist. It is for a similar reason t hat we give no weight to th e publication of the Model Penal Code in 1962. As petitioner notes, the Code would place the burden on the government to disprove the existe nce of dure ss beyond a reasonable doubt. See ModelPenal Code §1.12, 10A U. L. A. 88 (2001) (hereinafter Model PenalCode or Code) (stating that each element of a noffense m u st be proved beyond a reasonable doubt); §1. 13(9)(c), at 91 (defini n g as an ele

-

——————

10 In D ’ Aq ui nov. United States , 192 F. 2d 338 , 358 , n . 11 (CA91951 ), th e trial cour tin structed th e j uryth at itwou l d b ew arr a n ted in ac qu itting th e defen da n ton the basis th atshe acted under duress “ ‘if yo u be liev e fr o m th e evid en c e th atth e d efe n d an t c o m m i tt e d th e s e ac t sth atth e G ov e r n men t alleg e s . . . und er a w e ll groun d e d ap pr ehen sio no f imme di ate de ath or seri ou s bodily injury

. . . .’ ”Th isins tru cti o n di d no trequ ir e th eG ov ern m en tto disprov eduress beyon d a reas onabl e doub t , and itseemi n gly plac edthe bur d en on th e def e n d a n t to pr ove the existenc e o f dur e ss.14 D I X O N v. UNITED STATE S Opinion of t h eCourt ment anyth ing that ne gatives an excuse for the conduct at issue); §2. 0 9, at 131–132 (establis hing affirmative defense of duress). Petitioner argues that the Code r e flects “well established” federal law as it exis ted at the time. Brief for Petitioner 25. But, as discussed above, no su ch consensus existed wh en Congress passed the Safe St reets Act i n 1968. And even if we assume Congress’ familiarity with the Code and the rule it would establish, there is no evi

dence that Congress endorsed the Code’ s views or incorpo

rated them into the Safe Streets Ac t. In fact, the Ac t itself p r ovides evidence to th e contrar y . Despite the Code’ s careful delineat i on of m e ntal states, se e Model Pena l Code §2.02, 10A U. L. A., at 94– 95, the Safe Streets Actattached no explicit mens rearequirementto the crime of receiving a firearm while under indictment, §924(a), 82 Stat. 233 (“Whoever violates any provision of this chapter .

. . shall be fined n o t more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both”). And when Congress amended the Act to impose a mens rearequire

ment, it punished people who “willfully” viol ate the stat

ute, see 10 0 Stat. 456, a mental state that has not been embraced b ythe Code, see Model Penal Code §2.02(2), 10A U. L. A., at 94–95 (defining “purposely,” “knowingl y ,” “recklessly,” and “negl i gently”); Explanatory Note, p. 97 (“Though the term ‘ w ilfully’ is not used in the definitio n s of crimes contained in the Code, it s currency and its exis

tence in of fenses outside the criminal code suggest the desirability of clarifica t ion”). Ha d Congress intended to adopt the Code’s structure wh en it enactedor amende d the Safe St reets Act, o n e would expect the Act’s form an d language to adhere much more closely to that used by th e Code. It does not, and, for tha tre ason, we ca nnot rely o n the Model Penal Code to provide evidence as to how Con

gress woul d have wa nted us to effectuate the duress de

fense in this context.15 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt IV Congress can, if it cho o ses, enact a duress defense that places the burden on the Govern ment to disprove dures s beyond a reasonabl e doubt. In li ght of Congress’ silence on the issue, however, it is up to the federal courts t o effectuate the affirmative defense of duress as Congres s “may ha ve contemplated” it in anoffense-specific context. Oakland Ca nnabis Bu yers’ Coope r ativ e , 532 U. S., at 49 1, n. 3. In the context of the firearms offenses at issue—as will usually be the cas e , given th e long-established com

mon-law rule—we presume thatCongress intended the petitioner to bear the burden of proving the defense o f duress by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the judgme nt of the Court of Appe als is affirm ed.
It is so orde red._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006)
K ENNEDY , J ., c o ncu rrin g 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–7 05 3
KES H IA C H ERI E AS HF OR D DI XON, P E TI TIONE R v. UNITE D STATE S ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT [Ju n e 22, 2006 ] J USTICE K E NNEDY , concurring. No one disputes tha t , subject to constitu tional con

straints, Congress has the aut hority to determine the content of a duress defense wi th respect to federal crimes and to dire ct whether the burden of proof rests with the defense or the prosecution. The question h e re is h o w to proceed wh en Congress has enacted a criminal statute, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197 et seq . (hereinafter Safe Streets Act), without explicit instructions regarding the duress defense or its burden of proof. See ante, at 10. When issues of congressionalintent with resp ect to the nature, extent, and definition of f e deral crimes arise, w e assume Congress acted against certain background under

standings set forth in judicial decisions in the AngloAmerican legal tradition. See U n it ed Statesv. Ba iley, 44 4 U. S. 3 9 4 , 415, n . 11 (1 980 ). T h o s e d e c i s i o n s , i nt u r n , c o n sult sources such as legal treatises and th e American Legal Insti t ute’s Model PenalCode. See, e.g., Un i t ed Statesv. Ji me nez Reci o, 53 7 U. S. 2 7 0 , 275 –27 6 (2 00 3) ; Sa li nasv. U n ite d St ates, 52 2 U. S. 52 , 64–6 5 ( 1 99 7)

. Al l o f these sourc e s rely upo nthe insigh t gained over time as t h e legal process continues. Abse nt some contrar yindication in the statute, we can assume that Congress would n o t want to for e close the c o urts from consulting these newer2 D I X O N v. UNITED STATE S
K ENNEDY , J ., c o ncu rrin g sources and considerin g innovative arguments in resolvi n g issues not confronted in the stat ute and not within th e likely purvi e w of Congress when it enacted the criminal prohibition applicable i nthe particular case. While the Court looks to the state of the law at the time the statute was enacte d, see ante, at 12, the b e tter readin g of the Court’s opinion is that isolated authori ties or writ

ings do notcontrol unless theywere indicative of guiding principles upon which Congress likely would have relied. O t h e r w i s e , it se ems al to ge the ra fi c ti o n to at t rib u t eto C o ngres sany int e nton e way or the othe r in assigning the b u rd e nof pr o o f

. It s e em sunl i k e ly , m o r e ov er , th at C o ngr e ss wo ul d h av ewa n t e dth e bu r d en of proof for duress t ov a ry from statute to statutedepe nding upo nthe date o f enact

m e n t

. Cons istent with these propositions, the Court looks not only to our precede n ts and common-law traditions, but also to the treatment of the ins anity defense in a 19 84 statute and a proposal of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, even though they both postdated the passage of the Safe Streets Act. See ante, at 10, 13.

As there is no reasonto suppose t hat Congress wanted to depart f r om the trad i tional principles for allocating the burden of proof, the proper ap proach is si mply to appl y these principles to th e context of duress. See, e.g., Schafferv. Wea s t, 546 U. S. ___, ___ (2005) (slip op., at 6– 7) (where the plain text of the s t atute is “s ilent on the allocation of the burden of persuasion,” we proceed to consider the “ordinarydefault rule” and its exceptions). The facts needed to prove or disprove the defense “l ie peculiarly in the kno w ledge of” the defendant. 2 K. Broun , McCormick on Evidence §337, p. 475 (6th ed. 2006); see ante, at 6. The claim of duress in most instances depends upon conduct tha tta ke s place before the crimi nal act; and , as the person who allegedly coerced the defendant is often unwilling to come forward an d testify, the prosecution3 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006)
K ENNEDY , J ., c o ncu rrin g may be wi thout any practical m e ans of disproving th e defendant’ s allegations. There is good reason, then, to maintain the usual ru le of pl acing the burden of produc

tion and persuasion t o gether on the partyraising the issue. Se e 2 Broun, supra, §337; ante , at 6

. The analysi s may come to a different resu lt, of course, for other de

fenses. With these observations, I join the Court’s opi n ion._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006)
ALITO , J ., con c urrin g 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–7 05 3
KES H IA C H ERI E AS HF OR D DI XON, P E TI TIONE R v. UNITE D STATE S ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT [Ju n e 22, 2006 ] J USTICE ALITO , withwhom J USTICE S CALIA joins, concurring. I join the opinion of the Court w i th the understandin g that it does not hold that the allocation of the burden of persuasion on the defense of duress may vary from one federal criminal statute to another. Duress was an establis hed defense at common law. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 30 (1769). When Congress began to enact federal criminal statutes, it presumptively intended for those offenses to be subject to this defens e. Moreover, Congress presumptively intended for the burdens of produ ction and persuasion to be placed, as they were at common law, on the defendant. Although C o ngress is certainly fr ee to alter this pattern and place one or both burdens on the prosecution, eithe r for all or selected federal crime s, Congress has not done so but instead has contin ued to revise the federal criminal laws and to create ne wfederal cri mes without add r essing the issue of duress. Under these circumstan c es, I believ e that the burdens remain where they were wh en Congress began enacting federal criminal statutes. I do n o t as sume that Congress makes a n e w, implicit judgment about the all o cation of these burde ns whenever it creates a new federal crime or, for that matter, when

ever it substantially revises an existing cri minal statute.2 D I X O N v. UNITED STATE S
ALITO , J ., con c urrin g It is unrealistic to as sume that on every s u ch occasion Congress surveys the allocation o f the burdens of proof on duress und er the exist i ng federal case law an d under the law of the States and tacitly adopts whatever the pre

dominant position hap pens to be at the time. Such a methodology would cre ate serious problems for the distric t courts and the courts of appeals when they are required to decide where the burden of persuasion shouldbe allocated for federal c r imes enacted on differ e nt dates. I f the alloca

tion differed for different offe nses, there mi ght be fede ral criminal ca ses in which the trial j u dge wouldbe forced t o instruct th e jury tha tthe defendant bears t h e burden of persuasionon this defense forsome of the offense s charged in the indictment and that the prosecution bears the burden on others. I would also not assume, as J US TICE B RE YER does, see post , at 2–3, that Congress has implicitly delegated to th e federal courts the tas kof decidi ng in the manner of a common-law cour t wh ere the burden of persuasion shoul d be allocated. The allocation of this burden is a debatable policy question with a nimportan tempiricalcomponent. In the absence of specific directionfrom Cong ress, cf. Fe d. Rule Evid. 501, I would not assume that Congress has conferred t h is authority on the Judiciary._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006)
B REYER , J., dissenting 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–7 05 3
KES H IA C H ERI E AS HF OR D DI XON, P E TI TIONE R v. UNITE D STATE S ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT [Ju n e 22, 2006 ] J USTICE B REYER , wi t hwhom J USTICE S OUTERjoins, dissenting. Courts hav e long recognized that “duress” constitutes a defense to a criminal charge. Hi storically, that defense “excuse[d] criminal conduct” if (1) a “th reat of imminen t death or serious bodily i n jury” led t h e defendant to commit the crime, (2) the d e fendant had no reas onable, leg a l alternative to breaking the law, an d (3) the defendant was not responsible for creating the threat. U n ite d Statesv. Ba ile y, 4 44 U. S. 39 4, 4 09– 41 0 (1 98 0); seea l so 2 W

. L a F a v e , Substantive Criminal Law §9.7(b), pp. 74–82 (2003) (here

inafter LaFave); an te , at 2, n. 1 (opinion of the Co urt). T h e Court decid e s today in respect to federal cri mes that the defense mu st bear the burden of both produci n g evidence of duress and persuadi n g the jur y . I agree wi th the majo r ity that the burden of productio nlies on t h e defenda n t, that here the burden of persuasi o n issue is not constitu

tional, and that Congress may all o cate that burden as i t sees fit. But I also believe that, in the abs ence of any indication of a different congressional intent, the burden of persuading the jury beyond a reasonable doub t should lie where such burdens normally lie in criminalcases, upon the prosecution. I My disag r eement withthe majori ty in partr e flects my2 D I X O N v. UNITED STATE S
B REYER , J., dissenting different view about how we should determine the rele

vant congressional intent. Where Congress speaks about burdens of proof, we must, of co urse, follow what it sa ys. But sup p ose, as is normally the case, that the relevan t federal statute is silen t? The majority proceeds on the assumption that Con gr e ss wished courts to fil lthe gap b y examining judicial practice at t h e time th at Co ngr e s s enac ted the par ticula r criminal statute in qu estion. An te , at 10–14 (opinion of the Court). I w o u l d n o t f o l l o w th a t appr oach. To believe Congress intended the placement of such burdens to vary from s t atute to s t atute and time to time is both unrealistic and risks unnecessary com p lexity, ju ry confusion, and unfairness. It is unrealistic because the silence cou l d well mea nonly that Congress did not specifi

cally consider the “bur den of persuasion” in respect to a duress defense. It simply did not think about that secon

dary matter. Had it do ne so, woul d Congress have wante d courts to freeze current pra ctice statu t e-by-statut e ? Would it h a ve wanted to impos e different burden-of-proof requirements where cl aims of duress are identical, where statutes are similar, where the only relevant difference is the time of enactment? Why? Indeed, individual in

stances of criminal con d uct often violate several statutes. In a trial for those violations, is t h e judge to instruct th e jury to apply different standards of proof to a duress de

fense depending upon when Cong ress enacted the partic u lar statute in question? What if in this very case the defendant’s boyfriend had given her drug money and insisted (un d er threat of death) not only that she use some of the money to buy h i m a gun, b u t that she launder th e rest? See 18 U. S. C. §1956 (2000 ed. and Supp. II); see infra , at 6– 7. I would ass u me instea d that Con gress’ silence typicall y means that Congress expected the courts to d e velop bur

den rules governing affirmative defenses as they ha ve3 Cite as: 54 8 U

. S. ____ (2006)
B REYER , J., dissenting done in the past, by beginning with the common law a n d taking full account of the subsequ e nt need for that law to evolve through judicia lpracti ce informed by reason and experience. See Davisv. UnitedStates, 16 0 U. S. 469 (1895); McNabb v. Uni t e dS t at es , 318 U. S. 332, 34 1 (1943); ante , at 11, n. 8 (opinion of the Court) (propose d general rev i sion of the fede ral cri minal code would hav e instructed c o urts to det e rmine the contours of affirmative defenses “ ‘accordingt o the princi ples of the common law as they may be inter p reted in the light of reason and experience’ ”); 9 J. Wi gmore, Evi d ence §2486, p. 291 (J. Chadbournrev. ed. 1981) (alloc a tion of th e burdens of proof present courts w i th questions “of policy and fairn e ss based on experience in the different situations”). Tha t approach w o uld produce uniform federal pr actice acros s different affirmative defenses , as well as across statutes passed at different points in time. II My app r oac hleads me to conclude that in fede ral crimi

nal cases, the prosecution should bear the duress defense burden of p e rsuasion. The issue i s a clos e on e. In Blackstone’s time the accused bore the burden of proof for all affirmative defenses. S ee 4 W. Bla c k s tone, Commentaries *201; Patte rsonv. Ne w Yo rk, 4 32 U. S. 1 97, 201–202 (1977). And 20th-ce ntury expe rts have ta ken differe nt positions on the matter. The Model Penal Code, for exam

ple, recommends placing the burden of pers uasion on the prosecution. ALI, Model Penal Code §1.12, p. 16, §1.13(9)(c), p. 18, §2. 09, pp. 37–38 (1985). The Brown Commission recommends placing it upon th e defendan t. National Commissionon Reform of Fede ral Criminal Laws, 1 W o rking Papers 278 (1970). And the proposed revision of the federal criminal code, agnostically, would have turne dthe mat t e r over to the courts for decision. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., §501 (1979 ). Moreover,4 D I X O N v. UNITED STATE S
B REYER , J., dissenting there is a practi cal argument t hat favors the Gover n ment’s position here, namely that defendants should bear the burden of persuasion because defendants often have superior acc e ss to the relevant proof. Nonetheless, several factors favor placing the burden on the prosecution. For one thing, in certain respects th e question of duress res e mbles that of mens rea, an issu e that is always for the prosecution to pro v e b e yond a re a sonable doubt. See I nr eW i ns hi p , 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970); Martin v. Oh i o , 480 U. S. 228, 234 (1987). Th e questions a r e not the same. T h e defenda n t’s criminal activityher e was volun t ary; no ext e rnal princi ple, such as the wind, propelled her when she acted. The Nico

machean Ethics of Aristotle, p. 54 (R. W. Browne transl. 1865). Moreover, her actions were intention a l. Whether she wanted to buy the guns or not, and whether sh e wanted to lie while doi n g so ornot , she decided to do these things and k n ew that she was do ing them. Indeed, her action was willful in the sense that she kne wtha tto do them was t o break the law. Ante , at 3–4 (opinion of the Court); see also Ratz laf v. Unite dStates, 510 U. S. 135, 136–137 (1994). Nonetheles s, where a defendant acts under duress, she lacks any s e mblance of a meaningful choice. In that sense her choice is not free. As Blackst o ne wrote, the criminal law punishes “abuse[s ] of th[e] free will”; hence “it i s highly just and equitable that a m an should be excused fo r those acts, which are done through unavoidable force and compulsion. ” 4 Commentaries *27. And it is i nthis “force and compu l sion,” acting upon th e will, that the resem

blance to la ck of mens rea lies. Cf. Austin, Ifs and Cans, in Proceedings of the British Academy 123–124 (1956) (not

i n g diffe r ence be twee n choosing t o d o s o m e t h i n gw h e r e o n e has the opp o rtunity and ability to do otherwise and choos

ing to do something wh ere one lac k s any suchopportunit y or ability). Davisv. U n ite d States, su p ra , allo ca te d th e5 Cite as: 54 8 U

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B REYER , J., dissenting fede ral ins a ni ty defe ns e bu rde ntoth e Go ve rnme nt pa rtly fo r the s e r e aso n s. Th atcas e , re ad in li gh t of Lela nd v. Oreg on, 34 3 U. S. 79 0 , 7 97 (1 95 2 ) , s u gges tsth at , eve nif ins ani ty do es no t al wa ys s h o w theabse n ce of mensrea, it does sho wthe abse nce of a “ ‘ vi ci ous will.’ ” Davis, s u pra, at 484 (ci t in g Bl acks ton e ; empha s is a d ded). For another thing, fed e ral courts (as a matter of statu

tory constr uction or superv isory power) have imposed the federal-crime burdenof persuas ion uponthe prosecution in respect t o self-defense, insanity, and entra pment, whi c h resemble the duress defense in certain relevant wa ys. I n respect to both duress and se lf-defense, for example, the defendant’s illegal act is vol untary, indeed, intentiona l; but the circumstances deprive the defendant of any mean

ingful ability or oppor t unity to a ct otherwis e , deprivin g the defendant of a choice that is free. Insan i ty, as I said, may involve circumstances that resemble, but are not identical to, a lack of mens rea. A n d entrapment requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant was “predis

posed” to c o mmit the crime —a matter sometimes best known to th e defendant. As to self-defense, see First Cir c uit Patte r nCriminal Jury Instru ctions §5.04 (1998); Uni t e dSt at es v. Thoma s , 34 F. 3d 44, 47 (CA2 1994); Gover n ment of Virgin Island s v. Smith , 949 F. 2d 67 7, 680 (CA3 1991); U n it e dSt at e s v. Har r is , No s. 95–5637, 95–5638, 1996 U. S. App. LEXI S 22040, *4– * 5 (CA4, Aug. 27, 1996); Unite dStates v. Branch , 91 F. 3d 699, 714, n. 1 (CA5 1996); Sixth Circuit Pattern Cri m inal Jury Instructions §6.06(2 005); United Sta t es v. Ja ckson , 569 F. 2d 1003, 1008, n. 12 (CA7 1978); United S t a t es v. Pie rre , 254 F. 3d 872, 876 (CA9 2001); United States v. Corri ga n , 548 F. 2d 879, 883 (CA10 1977); United States v. Alvarez , 755 F. 2d 830, 842 (CA11 1985); Bynum v. United S t a t es , 408 F. 2d 1207 (CADC 1968); see also Mullaneyv. Wi lb ur , 4 2 1 U

. S

. 6 8 4 , 702 , n. 30 ( 1 9 7 5 ) (noting this as the “ ‘majority rule’ ”).6 D I X O N v. UNITED STATE S
B REYER , J., dissenting As to insanity, see Davis, 160 U. S., at 4 86; Leland, supra, a t7 97 (making clear that Davis determined burden allocations as a matter of fede ral, but not constitutional, law); but s ee 18 U. S. C. §17(b) (overruling this default rule to pla c e the burden on the defendant by clear a n d convincing evidence). As to entra pment, see Jacobsonv. United S t a t es, 503 U. S. 540, 554 (1992) (reversing the judgment a ffirming the conviction because “the prosecu

tion failed, as a matterof law, to adduce evid ence to sup

port the j u ry verdi c tthat petit i oner was predisposed, independen t of the Government’s acts and beyond a rea

sonable doub t” to commit the crime). See also Patterso n, 432 U. S., at 202 (noting that Da vis “had wide impact on the practice in the federal courts with respec t to the bur

den of proving various affirmative defenses” ) ; Patte rson , supra, at 2 31 (Powell, J., dissenti n g) (“[S]ince this Cour t’s decision in Davis

. . . federal prosecutors have borne the burden of persuasion with respec t to factors like insanit y , self-defense , and malic e or prov ocation, once the defenda n t has carried this burden of producti on”). Further, m o st federal courts, in r e spect to most federal crimes, have imposed the burden of persuasi o n in respect to the duress defense upon the Government, following Johnsonv. United States , 291 F. 2 d150, 155 (CA8 1961), and authorities such as E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Pra c tice and In structions §13.14, p. 293 (2d ed. 1970), and the Federal Judicial Center Patte rn Crimina l Jury Instru ctions §56 (1988). By the mid-1 990’s, seven circuits had squarely placed the burden of persuasion upon the prosecution; one Circuit (the Fifth) placed the burden on the defendant; and four (the Th ird, Fourth , Eleventh, and District of Columbia) did not, as far as I can tell, have a definitive practice. C o m p a r e U n ite d Statesv. Arthu rs , 7 3 F. 3 d 44 4, 44 8 (CA1 1996); United Sta t esv. Mitchell , 72 5 F. 2d 832, 836 (CA2 1983); United Sta t esv. Campbell , 6 75 F. 2d 81 5, 821 (CA6 1982); U n it e dSt at e s v.7 Cite as: 54 8 U

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B REYER , J., dissenting Talbott , 78 F. 3d 118 3, 1186 (CA7 1996) ( p er curiam ); UnitedStates v. Camp bell , 609 F. 2d 922, 925 (CA8 1979); United S t a t es v. He arst , 563 F. 2d 1331, 1336, and n. 2 (CA9 1977); United S t a t es v. Fal c on , 766 F. 2d 1469, 1477 (CA10 1985), with United States v. Willis , 3 8 F. 3d 170 , 179 (CA5 1994) (putting the burden on the defendant by a preponderance). Co mpare also First Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instru ctions §5.05 (1998); Sixth Ci rcuit Pattern Cri m inal Jury Instructions §6.05 (19 91); Seventh Circuit Pa ttern Crimi nal Jury I n structions §6.08 (1998); and EighthCircuit P a ttern C r iminal Jury Instructio n s §§3.09, 9.0 2 (2000), with Fifth Circuit Pattern Crimina l Jury Instructions §1.3 6 (2001). Petitioner adds, withou t contradictio n , that the States alloc a te the bur den similarly by a ratio of 2 to 1. Brief for Petitioner 32 –34; Brief for United States 38, n. 30. Beginning in 1991, the matter became more complicate d because the Ninth Circuit began to require t h e defenda n t to bear the burden of proving d u ress in certain circu m stances. Uni t e dSt at esv. Dominguez-Mestas , 929 F. 2 d 1379, 1382, 1384 (199 1) (per curi am). And a few years later the Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuit s followed suit in cases concerning a closely rela ted justification defens e. See UnitedStates v. Dodd , 225 F. 3d 340, 347–350 (CA3 2000); United S t ates v. Brown , 3 67 F. 3d 5 49, 555–556 (CA6 2004); United Statesv. Dele v eaux , 205 F. 3d 1292, 1298-1300 (CA11 2000); Eleventh Circuit Pa ttern Crimi

nal Jury Instructions §16 (2003) . But see Sixth Circu i t Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions §6.05 (2 005) (statin g that the burden of pro o f issue forduress is undecided in that Circuit). These latter cases, however, putthe burden on the defendant only where the crimi nal statute narrows i t s mens rea requirement , i.e., the burden is the defendant ’ s where the statute requires that the defendant act with “knowledge ” but not, suggest t h ese courts, where t h e8 D I X O N v. UNITED STATE S
B REYER , J., dissenting statute req u ires that the defe ndant act “willfully,” “inte n tionally,” or “voluntarily.” See, e.g. , Dominguez-Mestas, supra , a t1 382, 1384; UnitedStates v. Meraz-Solomon , 3 F. 3d 298, 300 (CA9 1993); Ninth Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instru ctions §§6.5 , 6.6 (2003); but see United S t a t es v. Fei Lin , 139 F. 3d 1303, 1307–1308 (CA9 1998). See also Eleventh Circuit Pattern C r iminal Jury Instructions §16 (2003); United S t atesv. Diaz , 285 F. 3 d92, 97 (CA1 2002) (indicating that this bifurcated rule might be appro

priate, but noting Circuit prece d ent to the contrary)

. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit placed the burden of provin g duress upon the defendant in “strict liability” cases where mens rea is not an element of the crime at all. United Sta t esv. U n ser , 165 F. 3d 755, 763–765 (CA10 1999). The appare nt upshot i s that four Circuits no w place the burden of persuasion on the prosecution across the boar d; one places the burden on the prosecution if the statute requires mens reabut n o t otherwise; and four have held or suggested that the burden should be on the p r osecution i f the statute requires an intentional or willful state of mind, but not if t h e statute requires onl yknowledge. Wh ile the Circuits a r e divided, a p parently only one (the Fifth) agrees with the position taken by the Court today. Further, w h ile I concede the logic of the Gov e rnment’s practical a r gument—th a t defendants have superior access to the evidence—I remain uncertain of the argument’s strength. Af ter all, “[i]n every cri minal case the defendan t has at least an equal familiarity wi th the facts and in most a greater fa miliarity wi th them tha nthe prosecution.” Tot v. U n ite d States, 3 1 9 U. S

. 46 3 , 469(1 94 3)

. An d th e stri ct co nt ou rs o f thed u res s def e ns e, as we ll a sth edef e n d a n t ’ s b u rd e nof pr oducti on , al r e ady sub s ta ntial l y n a rr ow th e c i rc umsta n ces und erwh ic h th e d e f e ns e may b eu s ed

. A def e n d a n t ma y fi n dit di ffi cul t , f o r exa m ple, to sho wd u re s s whe r e the rele vant co nduct too kplace too lo ng be fo re the crim in al a c t. Cf. ante , a t2 (o pi nio nof KENNE DY , J.)

. Thatis9 Cite as: 54 8 U

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B REYER , J., dissenting becau s e the defen d a n t mus ts h o w tha the h a d no al te rn a tiv e to b r ea ki n g thela w . Su p ra , a t 1. And thatw i ll be the more di ffi c u l tto sho wth e m o re re mo te the th rea t

. See al so L a Fave , § 9.7 , p. 77 -7 9 (du r es s gen e ral ly re qui res an “i mme di

ate ” o r“im m ine n t” th reat, th a tth e de fe ndan t “ta k e a dva n ta geof a reaso n ab le o p po rtun ity to e s ca pe ,”an d th a tth e d e fend ant“t er mi na te hi sconduct ‘a ss o onas th e cl ai med du re ss . . . h a d los ti t s coercivefo rce’”). Mo re i m po rtan t, th e n e edt o p r ove mensrea can easily present pre c isely the same pr acti c a l diff ic ulti es of pr oof fo r the prose c uto r . Suppose fo r exam ple thedefe n d an t claim stha ta nold l a dy told h i m tha t th e wh i t ep o wd erh etr an sp ort e d ac ro s s th e b o rd erw a s medi cinefo r h e r dyin g son. Cf

. U n it ed Statesv. Mares , 441 F. 3 d11 52 (CA1 0 20 06). Se e also Mullaneyv. Wi lb u r , 4 21 U

. S

. , at 7 0 2 (r equi ri ng th e go v e rnment t opr ov e a nab s e nce of pas s io n i n a mu rde rco nvi c tion i m po ses “no uni que ha rd

ship o nthe prose c ution”). It is particularly difficult to see a practical distinctio n between this affirmative defense and, say, self-defense

. The Government says that the prosecution ma y “be unabl e to call the witness most likely to have information bearing on the point,” namely, the defendant. B ri e f f o r U ni t e d S t a t e s 2 1

. But what i s the differ e nce in this respect be

tween the defendant here, who says her boyfriend threat

ened to killher, and a battered woman who s a ys that she killed her husband in self-defens e , where the husban d’s evidence is certainly u navailable? See also Jaco b s o n , 503 U. S. 540 (entrapment; need to prove “propensity”). Re

gardless, unless th e d e f e n d a n t t e s ti f i e s , i tc o u l d p r o v e difficultt o satisfy the d e f e nd ant’ sburd enof producti on; and , of co urse , once the de fe ndant testifies, cross-e x aminatio n is pos s ib le

. In a word, I cannot evaluate the claim of practicality without somewhat more system atic evidence of the exi s tence of a problem, say, in those Circuits th at for man y years have imposed th e burden onthe prosecutor. And, of10 D I X O N v. UNITED STATE S
B REYER , J., dissenting course, if I am wrong about the Government’s prac tic a l need (and were my v i ews to pr evail), the Governmen t would remain free to ask Cong ress to reallocate the burden. Fi nall y , the r e is a vi rtue in u nifo r m i ty, in treatin g the fed e rals t a t uto ry b u rd e no f pe rs ua sionsi mil a rly in res p e c t to ac tus reu s , mens rea , mistak e, self-defense, e n trapment, and duress. The Seco nd Circuit, when imposing the bu r den of pers uasion for d u ress on the prosecution, wrote th a t differences in this res p ect create “a grave possibility of juror confusion.” United Sta t esv. Mitchell , 7 25 F. 2d 83 2, 836 (1983) (Newman, J., joined by Feinberg, C. J., an d Friendly, J.). They risk unfairness as well. For these reasons I believe that, i n th e ab s e n c e o f a n indi ca tio no f c o n gres s io nal i n ten t t oth e con t r a ry , f e d e r a l criminal law should place the burden of persuasionin respect to the duress defense uponthe prosecution, which, as is now common in respect to many affirmati v e defenses, it must prove beyond a reasonabl e doubt. With respect, I dissent.