NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JESSICA C., JOEL A., Appellants,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.Z., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 17-0424

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD529489

The Honorable Robert H. Oberbillig, Judge Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

John L. Popilek, PC, Scottsdale

By John L. Popilek

Counsel for Appellant Jessica C.

The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Christopher Stavris

Counsel for Appellant Joel A.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Jennifer L. Holder

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 5-29-2018
JESSICA C., JOEL A. v. DCS, J.Z.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Jessica C. (“Mother”) and Joel A. (“Father”) appeal the 

superior court’s order severing their parental rights as to their child, J.Z. 

For reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 J.Z. was born in July 2010. Father had a relationship with the 

child early on, but he was convicted of a drug offense when J.Z. was 

approximately two years old, and he was deported to Mexico (while J.Z. 

remained in the United States) in mid-2013. Father returned to the United 

States one year later, but was again incarcerated beginning in mid-2015.

¶3 Mother, meanwhile, had a years-long history of abusing 

methamphetamine. In late 2015, while Father was still incarcerated, the 

Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) removed J.Z. from Mother’s care due 

to the risk Mother’s methamphetamine use posed to the child. The superior 

court found J.Z. to be dependent as to both parents.

¶4 Over the first ten months of the case, DCS offered Mother a 

variety of services targeting her substance abuse. DCS referred her for 

substance abuse treatment three times, but on each occasion Mother either 

expressly refused services or failed to participate after intake. Mother 

reported that she had engaged in a different treatment program, but never 

successfully completed it. DCS also required that Mother complete random 

drug testing, but she did not call in consistently, did not test consistently 

even when she did call in, and frequently tested positive (for 

methamphetamine and on occasion for cocaine) when she did test.

¶5 Father last saw J.Z. in mid-2015, and although he had spoken 

to the child by phone from prison before the dependency, he only sent J.Z. 

one letter (a drawing) after J.Z. was taken into care. Father was released 

from confinement around October 2016 and was deported to Mexico, where 

Mother soon joined him. The DCS case manager and supervisor contacted 

Father and Mother there in early November 2016 and scheduled weekly 
JESSICA C., JOEL A. v. DCS, J.Z.

Decision of the Court

3

phone calls with J.Z. (to be connected and supervised through a DCS case 

aide); Mother and Father completed two scheduled calls with the child, but 

then stopped calling.

¶6 The case manager and supervisor also discussed with Father 

and Mother services they could obtain through DIF (Mexico’s analogue to 

DCS). The case supervisor then sent a formal request to the Mexican 

consulate for DIF to provide services for both parents, including parenting 

classes, substance abuse testing and treatment, and a home study. Father 

completed several services, including the home study, several parenting 

classes, and drug tests (negative for included substances).

¶7 Mother, however, ended up in jail in Arizona in December 

2016, then contacted DCS in January 2017 to request services in Arizona 

instead of Mexico. At that time, Mother tested positive for amphetamines 

and admitted that she had used methamphetamine while in Mexico, but 

she asserted that her drug use aided rather than hindered her parenting 

ability. DCS again referred her for drug testing and treatment, but the 

service was soon closed for non-compliance. Despite requesting services in 

Arizona, Mother apparently returned to Mexico, without contacting DCS 

or requesting that DCS put services in place in Mexico.

¶8 In March 2017, DCS moved to terminate Father’s and 

Mother’s parental rights. Father thereafter contacted the case manager and 

sent J.Z. two packages of clothes and toys. As of May 2017, DCS received 

information that Mother was participating in a substance abuse treatment 

program in Mexico, but by the end of the month she had left the program 

and was again in jail in Arizona.

¶9 In July, the superior court found that statutory grounds 

existed to sever each parent’s rights (Father’s based on abandonment;

Mother’s based on chronic substance abuse, nine months’ time in care, and 

fifteen months’ time in care), and that severance would be in J.Z.’s best 

interests. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 8-533(B)(1), (3), (8)(a), (c). Mother 

and Father timely appealed from the termination order, and we have 

jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶10 The superior court is authorized to terminate a parent–child 

relationship if clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one 

statutory ground for severance, and a preponderance of the evidence shows 

severance to be in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Kent K. v. 

Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). We review a severance ruling for 
JESSICA C., JOEL A. v. DCS, J.Z.

Decision of the Court

4

an abuse of discretion, deferring to the superior court’s credibility 

determinations and factual findings. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 

207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004); Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 

278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002).

I. Mother.

¶11 Each of the three statutory severance grounds applicable to 

Mother—chronic substance abuse, nine months’ time in care, and fifteen 

months’ time in care—require a showing that DCS made reasonable and 

diligent efforts to preserve the family by providing the parent rehabilitative 

services. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (8)(a), (c); Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 211 Ariz. 450, 453 & n.3, ¶ 12 (App. 2005). To fulfill this requirement, 

DCS must provide services with a “reasonable prospect of success” to allow 

the parent an opportunity to become a safe and effective parent; DCS need 

not, however, provide “every conceivable service” or undertake any 

measures that would prove futile, and DCS is not responsible for ensuring 

that the parent in fact participates in the services provided. Mary Ellen C. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶¶ 33–34, 37 (App. 1999); 

Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994); see 

also Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 96, ¶ 31 (App. 2009).

¶12 Mother argues that the superior court erred by severing her 

parental rights because DCS failed to provide her with the requisite 

reunification services; she does not otherwise challenge the severance 

grounds or the court’s best interests finding. Specifically, Mother argues

that DCS wrongfully failed to arrange services for her in Mexico after 

agreeing to do so.

¶13 Contrary to Mother’s assertion, however, the DCS case 

supervisor did request services for Mother in Mexico. The services were 

not ultimately put in place in Mexico because Mother returned to the 

United States soon thereafter and affirmatively requested services be 

initiated in Arizona instead. DCS initiated those services, but Mother did 

not participate. Moreover, DCS had provided services for Mother for 

several months before she briefly moved to Mexico after Father’s release, 

and she failed to participate during that time. Accordingly, the record 

supports the superior court’s finding that DCS made reasonable and 

diligent efforts to provide Mother appropriate reunification services.
JESSICA C., JOEL A. v. DCS, J.Z.

Decision of the Court

5

II. Father.

¶14 Father argues that the evidence did not support the court’s 

finding that severance was warranted based on abandonment or that 

severance would be in J.Z.’s best interests.

¶15 Section 8-533(B)(1) authorizes severance on the ground that 

“the parent has abandoned the child.” “Abandonment” is defined as:

the failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to 

maintain regular contact with the child, including providing 

normal supervision. Abandonment includes a judicial 

finding that a parent has made only minimal efforts to 

support and communicate with the child. Failure to maintain 

a normal parental relationship with the child without just 

cause for a period of six months constitutes prima facie 

evidence of abandonment.

A.R.S. § 8-531(1). A finding of abandonment is premised on the parent’s

conduct, not the parent’s subjective intent. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249–50, ¶ 18 (2000). The key consideration is 

whether, under the particular circumstances of the case, the parent “has 

provided reasonable support, maintained regular contact, made more than 

minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child, and 

maintained a normal parental relationship.” Id. at ¶¶ 18, 20; see also A.R.S. 

§ 8-531(1).

¶16 Father urges that the record did not support an abandonment 

finding because he had a relationship with J.Z. before the dependency and 

attempted to maintain that relationship during the dependency. Father 

asserts that he attempted to contact J.Z. (albeit unsuccessfully), sent him 

gifts, and completed services with DIF to facilitate reunification. But Father 

last saw J.Z. in mid-2015 (two years before severance), and from December 

2015 to October 2016, Father’s only communication with J.Z. was a single 

letter. After Father’s release from prison, DCS arranged weekly phone calls 

with J.Z., but Father only completed two calls. Although he testified that 

he attempted to call and was unable to get through, the record does not 

reflect that he made any substantial efforts to correct the phone issue. 

Father did not provide any support for J.Z. throughout the dependency and 

did not send any gifts until a few weeks before the severance hearing. And 

although Father demonstrated a desire to engage in reunification services,

the superior court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the sum 

total of Father’s contact with the child over the 20-month dependency—one 
JESSICA C., JOEL A. v. DCS, J.Z.

Decision of the Court

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letter, two phone calls, and two gifts—represented only minimal efforts 

insufficient to avoid a finding of abandonment.

¶17 Father also argues that the court erred by finding severance 

to be in J.Z.’s best interests, urging that he showed commitment to 

completing reunification services and could protect J.Z. from Mother’s 

substance abuse. Termination is in a child’s best interests if the child would 

benefit from severance or if a continued relationship with the parent would 

harm the child. Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 50, ¶ 19. Evidence that a child is 

adoptable or that an existing placement is meeting the child’s needs may 

support a best interests finding. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, 

¶¶ 14–16 (2016). Ensuring stability and security for the child is “[o]f 

foremost concern.” Id. at 4, ¶ 15. Here, the record reflects that J.Z. was 

thriving in a stable and loving placement with relatives who were meeting 

all his needs and who wished to adopt him. The superior court thus did 

not abuse its discretion by finding that severance would serve J.Z.’s best 

interests.

CONCLUSION

¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.