2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/698* The Honorable Louis H. Pol lak, Senior Dist rict Judge for the Eastern Distri ct of Pennsyl vania, sitting by designation. NOT PRECEDE NTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

____________ No. 02-3423

____________ CL AU DE NO LA N, J R.,

Appellant
v. FRANK D. GILLIS; NO RT HA M PT ON DIS TR ICT AT TO RN EY S O FFIC E;

ATTORNE Y GENERAL

____________ App eal from th e Un ited States District Co urt for the M iddle D istrict of P enns ylvania (D.C. No. 4: CV-02-0315) Distric t Judg e: Ho nora ble M alcolm M uir

____________ Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

May 7, 2004 Be for e: S LO VI TE R a nd F UE NT ES , Circuit Judges , and PO LL AK , Distri ct Judge * (Fil ed: May 18, 2004)

____________ OPINI ON OF THE COURT

____________ PO LL AK , Distri ct Judge
.2

Claude Nolan , Jr. is serving consecu tive sentences totaling 121⁄2 to 25 years at SC ICo al To wn ship in No rthum berlan d C oun ty, Penns ylvania, pu rsuan t to his co nvictio ns in 1984 and 1985 for volunt ary manslaughte r, aggr avated as sault , carr yi ng a fire arm, and possessi ng an inst

rument of a crime. Three months before Mr. Nolan became eli gible f or parole, the Pennsy lvania Board of Probati on and Parole ( “Board”), after a heari ng, is sued a one-pa ge w ritten opinion den ying parole. After ex hausting his state rem edies, M r. Nolan fil ed a peti tion for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, cont ending that th e Bo ar d’ s d ec is io n vi ol at ed th e Ex Pos t F ac to Cl au se of th e Co ns ti tu ti on i n t wo respect s: (1) by appl yi ng to him a 1996 amendment to Pennsyl vania’s parole s tatute, 61 P.S. § 331 .1, ena cted m ore tha n a de cade after h is incarc eration ; and (2 ) by failing to applyan automati c parolepolicy alle gedlyin plac e at the time of hi s incarceration. The Distri ct Court de nied thepetit ion, fi nding no ex po st facto violat ion. Subsequentl y, this court dec ided Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn , 321 F.3d 374 ( 3d Cir. 2003 ) (“ Mickens-Thom as I”), r uling t hat the1996 amendment to 61 P.S. § 331.1, wh ich fo r the firs t time ide ntified pub lic safe ty as the prin cipal c once rn in p arole decisio ns, vio lated th e Ex Post F acto C lause w hen a pplied retroac tively. In light o f this decision, we granted Mr. Nolan’s request for a certifi cate of appealabilit y on his ex post facto clai ms. Because our holding i n Mickens-Thom as I undermines t

he rati onale behi nd the District Cou rt’s order, we va cate the order a nd rem and fo r the District Cou rt’s reconsi derati on in li ght of our dec isi on in Mickens-Thom as I .1 In cust ody si nce June 1983, Mr. Nolan would have been el igibl e for parol e on

December 26, 1995. Whil e in pri son, he was sentenced to si xtyadditi onal months, or five years, f or w hat M r. N olan des crib es in his o pen ing brie f on app eal a s “p aro le vio latio ns.”

2 The Board also deni ed Mr. Nolan’s r enewed application for parole t he foll owing year , on October 1, 2001. The 2001 denial , communicat ed to Mr. Nolan i n a letter virtually iden tical to the letter rep orting th e 200 0 den ial, is not at iss ue in th is app eal. 3 I. Because we write s olely for the parti es and the Dis tri ct Court, we limit our discuss ion of thebackground fact s to those rel evant t o the is sues on appeal . On June 22, 1984, Mr. Nolan was sentenced in the Philade lphia Court of Common Pleas to a pri son term of fi ve to te n year s for aggr avated as sault and carrying a fi rearm. On October 15, 1985, he was sentenced to a cons ecuti ve term of se ven-and-a- half t o fift een ye ars for
vo lu nt ar y m an sla ug ht er an d p os se ss in g a n i ns tru m en t o f a cr im e. H e h as alw ays maintai ned his i nnocence of the of fenses for

which he was convicted. Mr. Nolan became eli gible f or parol e on December 26, 2000. 1 In ad vanc e of th is date, the Pen nsylvan ia De partm ent of Co rrection s reco mm ende d aga inst gra nting h im paro le base d on “a nu mb er of f actors , not the least of wh ich is w hethe r or no t an inm ate takes responsibi lit

y for his/ her cri me.” Joi nt Appendix (“J .A.”) at 120a. On September 26, 2000 , the Board , after a hearing, issued a one-pa ge w ritten opinion den ying Mr. Nolan’s appl ication on the ba sis t hat “the fair

administ rati on of justice cannot

be achieved through y our rel ease on parol e.” Id. at 121a. T he Bo ard subseq uently denied M r. Nolan’s re quest for

administ rati ve reli ef. 23 In the D istrict Co urt, M r. No lan also allege d a third violatio n ofthe E x Po st Fac to

Clause, along with vi olati ons of his dueprocess and equal protecti on right s. He has not pursued these claims on appeal , and we do not consi der them her e.

4 The Pennsyl vania Supreme Court has sinc e held that it

is within the Commonw ealth Court’s originaljuri sdiction to hear mandamus peti tions rais ing questions wh ethe r Pa role Bo ard dec ision s vio late th e E x P ost F acto Cla use . Coady v. Vaughn , 770 A.2d 2 87, 290 (P a. 2001). 4 Mr. Nolan fil ed a peti tion for a writ of mandamus i n the Commonwealth Court of Pennsyl vania re questi ng review of the Board’s deci sion on the grounds that it violated, inter alia , the E x Po st Fac to Cla use b y (1) app lying to him an am endm ent to Pennsyl vania’s parole s tatute, 61 P.S. § 331.1, e nacted after his incarc erati on, and (2) fail ing to apply a pol icyor practice i n place at the ti me of his inc arceration. 3 This “poli cy or practice” pu rportedly provided f or autom atic parole upo n the exp iration of an inm ate’s minimum sentencein the absence of anyClass I mi sconduct ci tati ons withi n the previ ous nine months. The Comm onwealth Court dismis sed the pet

iti on on November 22, 2000, ruli ng that t

he decisi on whether to gr ant parol e is di scretionaryand, therefore, not subj ect to mandamu s. 4 M r. No lan’s p etition fo r allow ance of ap peal to the P enns ylvania Supreme Court was denie d on July23, 2001. On September 14, 2001, Mr. Nolan, acting pro se , fil ed a peti tion for a writ of habeas c orpus un der 28 U .S.C. § 225 4 in the U nited States D istrict Court for the W estern Dis trict o f Pe nns ylvan ia, as sertin g, inter alia , ex po st facto clai ms identi cal t o those he
ra is ed i n the p ro cee di ngs bef or e the Co mmonwe al th Court a nd Pe nns y lv ani a Su pr eme Co urt. Th e case wa s transf erred to the U nited S tates D istrict Co urt for the M iddle5 We also directed the parties to address whether M r. Nolan’s ex po st facto cl ai ms

could properlybe considered exhauste d. The court and the parties agree that, by r aisi ng his ex po st facto claim s with both the C om mo nw ealth C ourt an d the P enns ylvania Supreme C ourt, Mr. Nolan has exhausted his state remedies. 5 Dis trict o f Pe nns ylvan ia (“D istrict Co urt” ), w hich den ied th e pe tition on A ugu st 20 , 200 2. On A pril 24, 2003, we granted a certifi cate of appealabilit y on Mr. Nolan’s ex po st facto claims. 5 II. We h av e app el l ate j uri sd i cti on pu r su an t t o 2 8 U
. S. C. §§ 12 91 an d 2 25 3. We review a di stri ct court ’s le gal concl usions i n a habeas proc eeding de novo and any fa ctual find ing s fo r clea r erro r. See Sierr a v. Romaine , 347 F.3d 559, 564 (3d Cir. 200 3). The Ex Post Facto Claus e, U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl . 1, prohibit s stat utoryor policy changes that “ret

roacti velyalte r the def

init ion of cri mes or increase thepunishment for cri minal act s.” Cal. Dep’t of Correct ions v. Morales , 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995) (quotations omitted). A new law or policyviolates the Ex Post Facto Clauseif it

is (1) retrosp ective , i.e. applying to eve nts pre dating its enac tmen t, and (2 ) disad vanta geou s to the o ffe nde r aff ecte d by it. Weaver v. Graham , 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981). Retroactive chan ges in the rule s of p arole m ay violate th e pro hibition again st ex po st facto law s. Garner v. Jones , 529 U .S. 244, 250 (2000). A. M r. No lan co ntend s that the Bo ard v iolated the E x Po st Fac to Cla use w hen, in6 The com plete stat ute reads as follows: The p ar ol e s y st em provi des se ver al ben efi ts to th e crimi nalju stic e s y st em, includ ing the prov ision o f ade quate supe rvision of the offe nder wh ile protect ing the publ ic, the opport unity for the off

ender to be come a useful me mb er o f so ciety a nd t he d iver sion of a ppr opr iate o ffe nde rs fr om priso n. In pro viding these b enef its to the c rimina l justice system , the bo ard sh all first and forem ost see k to p rotect th e safe ty of the p ublic. In additio n to this goal, th e boa rd sha ll addre ss inpu t by crime victim s and assist in th e fair administ rati on of justice byensuri ng the custody, controland treatment of paroled offenders. 61 P.S. § 331. 1.

7 From 1941 to 1996, t

he stat ute provi ded: The value of p arole a s a disc iplinary an d cor rective influe nce a nd p roces s is hereb y recogn ized, an d it is dec lared to be the pub lic policy of this Common weal th th atper son s s ubj ect orse nt enc ed to i mpr is onme ntfor cr ime shall , on rel ease the refrom, besubjected to a period of parol e during which their rehabil itat

ion, a djustment, and restor ation to socialand economic li fe and acti viti es shal l be ai ded and facil itated by gui dance and supervisi on 6 denying his ap plication for p arole in Sep temb er 20 00, it relied upo n a 19 96 am endm ent to the P enns ylvania sta tute go vern ing p arole s tanda rds, 61 P.S. § 331 .1. En titled “P ublic Policy as to Par ole, ” 61 P.S. § 331. 1 repres ents t he “aspir ational int

roductory pr ovisi on of the Pennsy lvania

parole s tatutes.” Mickens-Thom as I , 321 F.3d at 377. Since 1996, when the P enns ylvania leg islature m odifie d the C om mo nw ealth’s p arole s tatute, this introdu ctory pro vision has in structed that, in m aking paro le dec isions, “ the bo ard sh all firs t and fore most seek t o protect the safe tyof the publ ic. ” 61 P.S. § 331. 1. 6 From 1941 to 19 96 – and th us at the time o f M r. No lan’s c onv ictions in 198 4 and 198 5 – th e paro le sta tu te m ad e n o s pe cif ic m en tio n o f p ub lic sa fe ty. 7 Mr. N olan argue s that the Bo ardund er a co mp etent a nd ef ficien t parole adm inistration , and to that en d it is

the intent of this act

to create a uni form and exclus ive sy stem for t he administ rati on of parole in thi s Commonw ealth. 61 P.S. § 3 31.1 (pre-19 96 version ). 7 applie d the amended vers ion of 61 P.S. § 331.1 to hi s parol e request , decre asing t he likel iho od h e w oul d be gra nted par ole. T he D istrict Co urt re jecte d M r. N olan ’s arg um ent. Even assuming that the Boar d reli ed upon the amended ver sion of the parolestat ute, the Distri ct Court he ld that

such rel iance di d not give rise t o an ex po st facto violatio n, as it did n ot crea te a sign ifican t risk of increa sing th e me asure of M r. No lan’s p unish men t. Subsequentl y, on February21, 2003, we i ssued our dec isi on in Mickens-Thom as I . In that case, an inmate el igibl e for parol e sought fede ral habe as rel ief, alle ging that the Board’s appl ication to hi m of 61 P.S. § 331. 1 as amended in 1996, resul ting i n the deni al ofpa ro le, vi ol ate d t he Ex Po st F ac to C lau se . W e f ou nd th at w hi le t he B oa rd ha d a lw ays considered the pot ential ri sk to publ ic safe tyin making par ole deci sions, prior to 1996 the Bo ard wa s req uire d to ma ke its dec ision on t he to tality of the f acto rs pe rtine nt to par ole. Mickens-Thom as I , 321 F .3d at 3 86. A fter 19 96, in c ontras t, the B oard , as w e put it in Mickens-Thom as I , was requ ired to a ssign “ forem ost im portan ce to th e pub lic safe ty factor .” Id. at 384. Therefore, we concluded, t he amendment to 61 P. S. § 331.1, by alteri ng the manner in wh ich the Board weighed pu blic safetyin making parole decisions, vio lated the E x P ost F acto Cla use wh en a ppl ied r etro activ ely. Id. at 393. We instructed the B oard to reco nside r M r. M icken s-Th om as’s pa role ap plication und er the p arole8

gui delin es in exis tenc e pr ior to 199 6. Id . Whe n the Bo ard, once ag ain applying factors that vi olate d the Ex Post Facto clause, denied Mr. Mickens- Thomas’s appli cati on on remand, a determination upheld by the dis tri ct court , we iss ued a mandate di recti ng the Bo ard to re leas e M r. M icke ns-T hom as o n pa role
. Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn , 355 F.3d 294, 296 (3d Cir. 200 4) (“ Micke ns-Tho mas II ”). Mr. Nolan’s convi ctions occurred i n 1984 and 1985, l ong before the 1996 amendment of 61 P.S. § 331. 1. Consequently , if t he Board did i n fact r elyon the
am end ed p aro le sta tute i n de nying M r. N olan ’s ap plica tion , Mickens-Thom as I dictates that t he Board’s deci sion const ituted an ex po st facto violat ion. The questi on that remains is whether theBoard in fact applie d the pre- 1996 versi on or the pos t-1996 ver sion of the parolestat ute in reaching i ts deci sion. While the Distri ct Court appeared skept icalas to Mr. Nolan’ s all egati on that t he Board rel ied upon the p ost-1 996 statu te, sta ting that t he c laim wa s “b ase d on spe cula tion and con jectu re,” J.A. at 7a, the District Court

did not ul timat elymake a finding on t his poi nt. I nstead, the Distri ct Court e xplaine d that “ [f]or t he purposes of

this order, in view of the fact t hat Nolan is pr oceeding pro se , we will presume that the Board i n fact r elie d upon the amended versi on of 61 P.S. § 331. 1 . . . in refus ing to parole him. ” Id . The D istrict Court is in a better position than this co urt to determine in the first instance w hether the B oard relie d up on t he a me nde d ve rsion of 6 1 P .S. § 331 .1 in den ying M r. N olan par ole. Accordingly , we will vacate t he District Court ’s deci sion i n light of Mickens-Thom as I8 The Comm onwealth sugges ts that Mr. Nolan might have mistakenlyinter

preted as the Bo ard’s parole p olicy a directive related to the D epartmen t of Co rrections’ wo rk relea se program. Under Administr ativeDirecti ve 805, according to t he Commonw ealth, one requirement of eligibil ityfor work release is that t he inmate has had no C lass I misco ndu cts, and no m ore tha n on e Cla ss II m iscon duct, d uring the nin e mo nths p rior to his appl ication. 9 and remand for the District Court to make the relevant

factualdetermi nation. If the Distric t Cou rt conc ludes that the Bo ard d id in fa ct rely on th e am ende d par ole statu te, it will be app ropriate unde r Mickens-Thom as I for the Distric t Cou rt to ord er the B oard to re-adj udicat e Mr. Nolan’s par ole appl ication under t he standards articulated in the pre1996 versi on of 61 P.S. § 331. 1. B. M r. No lan also main tains tha t the B oard violate d the E x Po st Fac to Cla use w hen it fa ile d t o a pp ly a p ol icy o r p ra cti ce th at e xi ste d a t th e ti m e o f h is i nc ar ce ra tio n – na m ely, the aut omatic par ole of an i nmate upon expir ation of his mini mum sentence in t he absence of anyClass I mi sconduct ci tati ons withi n the previ ous nine months . The Commonw ealth assert s that no such poli cy has ever exi sted. 8 The D istrict Court summarily

rejec ted Mr. Nolan’s alle gation of an “automati c parole ” polic y, observi ng that Mr. Nolan had put forth no evidence of other inmates who, despite adverse recommendations from the Department of Corrections, were automati call y par oled upon their first a pplica tion. W e agre e w ith the D istrict Co urt that, b ased on th e reco rd, there is no evidence t

hat such a pol icyever exi sted. Therefore, no ex po st facto violat ion can10

aris e from the Board’ s fail ure to appl y the all eged poli cy, and the Dist rict Court did not err in denyi ng M r. Nolan’s ex po st facto claim on these grounds. III. For the foregoing rea sons, we wil l vacate the orde r of the Dis tri ct Court and remand for furt

her procee dings i n accordance wit h this opinion.