alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-6631

NEVELL ROGERS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

MICHAEL W. MOORE; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Charleston. Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior

District Judge. (CA-97-3736-2-10)

Submitted: July 2, 1998 Decided: July 29, 1998

Before NIEMEYER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and HALL, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Nevell Rogers, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Nevell Rogers filed an untimely notice of appeal. We dismiss

for lack of jurisdiction. The time periods for filing notices of

appeal are governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4. These periods are “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson,

361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). Parties to civil actions have thirty

days within which to file in the district court notices of appeal

from judgments or final orders. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The only

exceptions to the appeal period are when the district court extends

the time to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the

appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).

The district court entered its order on February 19, 1998;

Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed on April 28, 1998, which is

beyond the thirty-day appeal period. Appellant’s failure to note a

timely appeal or obtain an extension of the appeal period leaves

this court without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant’s appeal. We therefore deny a certificate of appealability and

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERALOF TEXAS AUSTIN

Iionorable Royal1 R. Watkins, President &-ix? Board of Eduoation ,.ustin, Texam ,

“The A&&ulturaiYJivtilon of the State Soard 

### for Vooatlcinal Tduc@tiAn has requested the &ate &,ard of ‘qdu tertbdokb FarmW da11 for bids upon a ggmen$f whloh 18.to be used

. in .the hlg4 sohoolh ol th#’ State of Texas in the tnaohiiig“ef agrloulturbhnder the terms of the eontraot with the’zederal Government andthe State Board ?9r Vooatfohq!. tiIucatlon. xs ‘

. ‘\ %,lkewi~e :the HomemakingDivision of the State Boar;i’for+.Y&athml Education has asked for a textbook t&be usud in the hlghsohoole of the state teaohlng’Cnmily relatlona~ and homemanagement, this being a subjeot under HomeEConomiOS.

“In vicar of the fact that no suoh books or oouraes ae authorized under andby virtue OS Art. 2,&a-44044a of the Revised Civil Statutes, the state %ard of Zduoatlon desires to seek your advice and upon the following question: "Underrirtiole2080 of the Revised civil Statutes can such textbooks be oalled ior in a proolamatiou to 3s issued in August, 1944, and oonaldered for adoptfon by the Board at Its meeting in October, 19447

### 535

iionorable aogall R. hatkina, page 2

“Y.noonaidering this question please bear in mind that the Boardwill have to issue a proolamation rAekingfor the aubmisaion of bids at ita next meting, August I, in order that suoh bids araybe flled in due time to be oonaidered by the Board at the Ootober meeting, andweshall greatly appreolate your early reply to thla inquiry.*

ifs rind no’ statute providing for the adoption bythe &ate Board of Eduoation of rree textbooks to be purohaaed by the &ate of Texas on the subjects of farm management, or on teaohing f&ly relations andhomemanagement. As observed in your letter, .rticles 2843, 2844 and 2844a, Vernon’6 Annotated Citll Statutes, donot mke provision therefor. The list of authorized free textbooks is expressly limited to those enumerated in the statutes. .article 2843, supra.

Article 2680, Revised Statutea, to which you refer, is aa

### rollowe:

“Besides the subjects presoribed by law to be taught In the pub110 sohools oi Texas, suoh additional subjsots as agrioulture, manual training, doneatio soonomy or other vooationql branches shall be inoluded in the course of study in all high sohoola provided for herein which are looated outside of lncorporated towns and oitlea, and speoial attention

. shall be given to teaohing said aubjeots.”

The subject matter of this statutory provision is n& the adoption of free textbooks, but ia merely authority for the teaohing In high aohools outside of incorporated cities andtowns of the subjects listed in the statute. YDUare, therefore, advised that Jirticle 2680 does not oonfer upon the State Board of Eduoatlon authority to call for bids in andto adopt free textbooks upon the subjects outlined in your inquiry. Very truly youra
#### CALLOWAY v. STATE.

No. 25112.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 24, 1951.

*901McCarthy, Snodgrass, Aikman & Haynes, by George S. McCarthy, Amarillo, for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

The appeal is from a conviction for murder with a sentence of fifteen years in the penitentiary.

On the pight of March 29, 194-8, the appellant was engaged with a crowd of other Negroes' at 303 Monroe Street in Amarillo, which is within a section known as the “Flats”. The only reference to the nature O'f the party was that they were drinking wine and all seemed to be happy. There were no disagreements and no disturbance of any kind.

At about ten o’clock Willie Foster left the residence by the front door, apparently going to the adjoining apartment. Some five minutes later appellant left by the side door. Some ten minutes after appellant left the deceased returned to 303. He gained entrance, whereupon it was discovered that blood was flowing from the front part of his body. The police were called and Foster was escorted by friends to a drug store across the street where he collapsed. He died some time later. The record shows no statement from him involving appellant, though it was four days before he died.

The State relies for a conviction on the statement of the witness Harris, who lived some three blocks away from the scene of the crime. He says that at a late hour that night appellant came to his house, woke him up and tried to borrow some money for the purpose of leaving, and made the statement that he had stabbed a man with an ice pick and that he had to do it. The witness gave -appellant ho money. It ’was the conclusion of the witness that appellant just told him .that to get the'witness to give him some money. They had known each other in Panola County, Texas.

An officer testified that they arrested appellant some two years later in Lubbock. There were other parties present at 303 Monroe Street on the night of the crime who have not been located by the officers.

There is no other evidence in the case whatsoever that in the remotest way creates a circumstance against appellant and the State relies solely upon this extrajudicial statement for a conviction. The State’s Attorney has .expressed doubt about the sufficiency of the evidence. We concur in his statement.

Because of the insufficiency of the evidence the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
EXHIBIT 23.1

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

The Board of Directors

Turnstone Systems, Inc.:

We consent to the incorporation by
reference in the Registration Statements (No. 333-36342 and No. 333-57224) on Form S-8 of Turnstone Systems, Inc. of our report dated March 30, 2007, with respect to the consolidated statement of net assets in liquidation of Turnstone Systems, Inc.
and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2006, and the related consolidated statements of changes in net assets in liquidation for each of the years in the two-year period ended December 31, 2006, which report appears in the December 31, 2006, annual
report on Form 10-KSB of Turnstone Systems, Inc.



|                         
|-------------------------
|/s/ KPMG LLP             
|                         
|Mountain View, California
|March 30, 2007           



29
Exhibit 31.3


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                                 SECTION 302 OF
                         THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, James A. Mitarotonda, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of Dynabazaar, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual
report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

             Date:  April 17, 2007              By:     /s/ James A. Mitarotonda
                                                        ------------------------
                                                        James A. Mitarotonda
                                                        Chief Executive Officer
A01A1113.

#### GOSIER v. THE STATE.

(548 SE2d 107)

Mikell, Judge.

Jermaine Gosier pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault and was sentenced to serve eleven years on probation on con*380dition, among others, that he serve not less than 270 nor more than 360 days in a Department of Corrections detention center, followed by a minimum of 180 days in a diversion center until his fine and restitution were paid in full. Gosier does not challenge the trial court’s authority to order such limited confinement as a special condition of probation.1 At the end of the sentencing hearing, however, Gosier asked the court to permit him to remain out on bond pending the availability of a bed at the detention center. The court replied: “Not today. We’ll see what the bed opening situation is, and then I’ll review it at that time.” On appeal, Gosier alleges that the trial court lacked the authority to impose confinement after sentencing him to probation. We disagree.

Decided April 25, 2001.

*Ronald L. Beckstrom,*for appellant.

Gosier’s argument misinterprets *Pitts v.*State2 and its progeny. In *Pitts,*we held that a trial court cannot impose any period of continuous and uninterrupted incarceration in a jail or penitentiary as a special condition of probation.3 Subsequently, in *Jones v.*State4 and *Johnson v.*State5 we held that the trial court could not order, *as a condition of probation,*that the defendants remain incarcerated until space became available for them in a boot camp. Here, in contrast, the trial court’s ruling that the defendant be held in jail until space became available in the detention center was not included in his conditions of probation. While this difference may be purely semantic, nevertheless it suffices to distinguish *Jones*and *Johnson*from the instant case. Moreover, in *Penaherrera v. State**6***we observed: “The fact that defendant was not transferred to the detention center until 27 or 28 days after sentencing does not invalidate the sentence or violate its terms. The types of confinement designated in the sentence were within the bounds of the law and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.” Here, too, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to release Gosier on bond pending the availability of a bed in the detention center.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Blackburn, C. J., and Pope, P. J., concur.*

*381*J. David Miller, District Attorney, Bradfield M. Shealy, Assistant District Attorney,*for appellee.

1

 In *Penaherrera v. State,*211 Ga. App. 162, 163 (1) (438 SE2d 661) (1993), this court held that a trial court has the discretion to condition probation upon limited confinement in a detention or diversion center or in the defendant’s own home.

2

206 Ga. App. 635 (426 SE2d 257) (1992).

3

Id. at 637 (3).

4

**224 Ga. App. 340, 341 (1) (480 SE2d 618) (1997).

5

219 Ga. App. 547, 550 (3) (466 SE2d 63) (1995), rev’d on other grounds, 267 Ga. 77 (475 SE2d 595) (1996).

6

 Supra at 164.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    Exhibit 10.2


                       ASSIGNMENT OF CONSULTING AGREEMENT


         Net 1 Holdings S.a.r.l., a Luxembourg corporation ("Assignor") hereby
assigns all liability and responsibility in and to that certain Consulting and
Advisory Agreement by and between Assignor and Claude Guerard, dated October 1,
1999, and attached hereto as Exhibit "A", to Net 1 UEPS Technologies, Inc., a
Florida corporation ("Assignee"), effective October 1, 1999.

         Assignee does herewith accept said assignment and shall assume all of
Assignor's liability and responsibility for the Consulting Agreement including
consulting fees and reimbursement expenses.

         DATED THIS 25th day of October, 1999.


                                              Assignor:

                                              Net 1 Holdings S.a.r.l.,
                                              a Luxembourg corporation



                                              By: /s/ B. Stewart
                                                  -----------------------------
                                              Title: Director
                                              Print Name: Brenda Lynn Stewart



                                              Assignee:

                                              Net 1 UEPS Technologies, Inc.,
                                              a Florida corporation



                                              By: /s/ Serge Belamant
                                                  -----------------------------
                                              Title: Chairman
                                              Print Name: S.C.P. Belamant
IV

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 136

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

AUGUST 6 (legislative day, JUNE 30), 1993

Received

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Providing for an adjournment of the House from Friday,

August 6, 1993, Saturday, August 7, 1993, Monday,

August 9, 1993, or Tuesday, August 10, 1993, to

Wednesday, September 8, 1993, and a recess or adjournment of the Senate from Friday, August 6, 1993, Saturday, August 7, 1993, or Sunday, August 8, 1993, to

Tuesday, September 7, 1993.

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring), That when the House adjourns on Friday,

3 August 6, 1993, Saturday, August 7, 1993, Monday, Au4 gust 9, 1993, or Tuesday, August 10, 1993, pursuant to

5 a motion made by the Majority Leader, or his designee,

6 it stand adjourned until noon on Wednesday, September

7 8, 1993, or until noon on the second day after Members

8 are notified to reassemble pursuant to section 2 of this

9 concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first; and that
2

HCON 136 RDS

1 when the Senate recesses or adjourns at the close of busi2 ness on Friday, August 6, 1993, Saturday, August 7,

3 1993, or Sunday, August 8, 1993, pursuant to a motion

4 made by the Majority Leader, or his designee, in accord5 ance with this resolution, it stand recessed or adjourned

6 until Tuesday, September 7, 1993, at such time as may

7 be specified by the Majority Leader or his designee in the

8 motion to recess or adjourn, or until noon on the second

9 day after Members are notified to reassemble pursuant to

10 section 2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs

11 first.

12 SEC. 2. The Speaker of the House and the Majority

13 Leader of the Senate, acting jointly after consultation with

14 the Minority Leader of the House and the Minority Lead15 er of the Senate, shall notify the Members of the House

16 and the Senate, respectively, to reassemble whenever, in

17 their opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.

Passed the House of Representatives August 6,

1993.

Attest: DONNALD K. ANDERSON,

Clerk.
#### NICHOLS v. STATE.

No. 24567.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 11, 1950.

Milburn, Milburn & Milburn, Odessa, Mike R. Mason, Odessa, for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

The appeal is from a conviction for sodomy. The penalty assessed is confinement in the state penitentiary for' a term of five years.

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction.

It appears' from the record that Mr. H. E: Biehl resided in Ector County, Texas, and was employed by the Arrow Drilling Company. He 'ha"d a very young female calf in his barn on the night in-question; that about 10:45 P.M., after he had retired for the night, his wife called him and told him that she heard -the calf bawling; that he went out to the barn with a lantern; that when he entered the barn he saw the calf lying down and its rear end was all bloody; that he had three barrels in the barn which were covered with a canvas; that he saw a couple of- feet protruding from under the canvas; that after his son appeared on the scene, whom he had called, the person came out from under the canvas ; that this person was the defendant; that when he ,came out from under the c.anvas his pants were off and his B. V. D.’s were bloody. The foregoing is, in substance, the ..testimony adduced by the State.

Appellant did not testify or offer any defense. There is-no evidence from any source what caused the blood on the calf or where it came from. The witness could not be positive that what he saw on appellant’s B. V. D.’s was blood, however, he thought so. Assuming that appellant caused the bloody condition of the calf, this is not enough without some fact or circumstance that it was due to an act of copulation by appellant with the animal in question. That the State’s case rests entirely upon circumstantial evidence is obvious. This being true, we do not believe the circumstances exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of appellant. See Langford v. State, 48 Tex.Cr.R. 561, 89 S.W. 830; Mullins v. State, *84245 Tex.Cr.R. 465, 76 S.W. 560; and Dewberry v. State, 80. Tex.Cr.R. 514, 191 S.W. 1164. The facts do not prove a crime was committed and amount to nothing more than a strong suspicion in favor of the charge made. The State should have had the animal examined to prove penetration, or. the part from which the blood came. Had this been- done, the facts and circumstances might have been sufficient .to support a finding that appellant was the guilty party.

Having reached the conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to justify and sustain appellant’s conviction, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is .remanded. .