United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 11-1999

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Southern

* District of Iowa.

Salvador Mendoza, also known as *

Victor Quintero, also known as *

Arthur Gallegos, *

*

Appellant. *

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Submitted: November 16, 2011

Filed: May 14, 2012

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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BEAM and BYE, Circuit Judges.

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RILEY, Chief Judge.

Salvador Mendoza pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and

possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of federal law. On appeal,

Mendoza challenges (1) the district court’s denial of Mendoza’s motion to suppress

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and (2) his sentence. We affirm.

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, United States District Judge for the Southern 1

District of Iowa.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

In July of 2007, a concerned neighbor alerted Iowa City Police Department

(ICPD) Officer Matthew Hansen about “unusual activity” occurring at a residence on

the 1700 block of Louis Place in Iowa City, Iowa (Louis Place residence). The

neighbor reported no one appeared to occupy the residence on a regular basis, but

various people and vehicles came to the residence at “all different hours,” parked

their vehicles some distance from the residence, and carried packages in and out. 

Upon investigation, Officer Hansen discovered the residence’s electricity service was

in the name of Victor Quintero. 

Neighbors also said a man who drove a red truck acted suspiciously on his

frequent visits to the Louis Place residence, either parking the truck away from the

residence or parking the truck in the garage and quickly shutting the door in an

apparent effort to avoid being seen. Officer Hansen determined the red truck was

registered to Michael Valencia of Muscatine, Iowa. 

Neighbors also reported a black Hummer associated with the residence, and

gave Officer Hansen its license plate number. Officer Hansen determined the

Hummer was registered to Quintero at an address in the Forest View Trailer Park in

Iowa City. Officer Hansen previously had received an anonymous tip that an

individual driving a black Hummer had been selling cocaine at the trailer park. 

Officer Hansen contacted the Muscatine County Drug Task Force regarding

Valencia’s red truck and spoke with officer Ardith Orr. Officer Orr wasfamiliar with

both Valencia and Quintero, and suspected both were involved in cocaine distribution

in the Muscatine area. Officer Orr informed Officer Hansen that “Quintero” was an

alias used by Mendoza. Officer Orr agreed to join Officer Hansen in surveilling the

Louis Place residence. 

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The surveillance began on August 1, 2007, around 6:00 p.m. At least 10 or 12

officers in separate unmarked vehicles at different locations participated in the

surveillance. At some point, the officers received a radio announcement about a

vehicle matching the description of Valencia’s red truck leaving the area, and three

or more of the unmarked surveillance vehiclesfollowed it. The officers followed the

truck as it drove to the post office in downtown Iowa City and then out of town. The

driver of the red truck began to drive erratically—constantly changing directions,

driving in circles or turning around with no apparent destination; making sudden

turns, turning without signaling, and driving in the wrong lane; or stopping on the

side ofthe road so the surveillance vehicles would drive past. The surveilling officers

believed these were counter-surveillance maneuvers and the driver ofthe vehicle was

aware of the police presence. 

The officers decided to discontinue the surveillance, and stopped on a gravel

road to regroup. While the officers were stopped, the red truck drove past. The

officers decided to stop the truck, so they pursued. The red truck then pulled over of

its own accord, and the driver exited the vehicle. Detective Paul Batcheller of the

ICPD Street Crimes Unit activated a warning light for safety and then exited his

vehicle and made contact with the driver.

The driver identified himself as Quintero, and eventually produced

identification in that name. The officers subsequently identified him as Mendoza. 

When Detective Batcheller discovered Mendoza spoke Spanish and had very limited

English language ability, he called for assistance from ICPD Officer Jeff Fink, a

highly proficient Spanish language interpreter. Detective Batcheller also summoned

ICPD K-9 handler Officer Kevin Berg and his narcotic-detection dog Naton. Officer

Berg arrived ten to fifteen minuteslater, and, with Naton, conducted an investigatory

sniff on the exterior of Mendoza’s vehicle. Officer Berg and Naton conducted two

passes. On the second pass, Naton indicated at the vehicle’s driver’s side door,

signaling to Officer Berg that Naton had detected a drug odor.

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Officer Fink arrived twenty to twenty-five minutes after receiving the call, just

as Officer Berg and Naton finished the sniff. Officer Fink began translating for

Detective Batcheller. At the officers’ request, Mendoza consented to a search of his

vehicle and his person. The officers discovered a cell phone and more than $800 on

Mendoza’s person. In the vehicle, the officers discovered a “Fix-a-Flat” tire-repair

canister with a false bottom and a hidden compartment containing cocaine residue.

Mendoza told Officer Fink and Detective Batcheller he lived at the Louis Place

residence. The officersrequested Mendoza’s permission to search the residence, and

Officer Fink informed Mendoza he did not have to consent to the search. Mendoza

did not initially agree to the request. After discussing the consent-to-search formwith

Officer Fink, Mendoza said he might consent if the officers promised not to question

him afterwards. Officer Fink and Detective Batcheller refused to add a clause to the

consent-to-search form promising not to question him. Mendoza did not verbally

consent to a search of the residence and did not sign the consent-to-search form, but

Mendoza did not object when Officer Fink and Detective Batcheller informed him

they were going to his house to search. In fact, Mendoza gestured in the direction of

the residence in a way that indicated consent and then headed to the house.

Mendoza drove his own vehicle back to the Louis Place residence and let the

officers inside. Mendoza informed the officers a man named Ivan or Evan occupied

a basement bedroom, and said the officers should not go downstairs. At the

suppression hearing, Officer Fink testified that, at the time, he believed Mendoza had

consented to a search of the basement so long as the officers avoided this bedroom. 

Mendoza was present in the house for the duration of the search and did not object

to the officers’ search of the basement.

In the basement, the officers discovered a room coated so thickly with white

residue the officers initially thought it was drywall dust. A field test of the white

powder indicated it was, in fact, cocaine residue. The room contained what Officer

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Hansen described as a shrine to Saint Mary, with candles; Inositol powder; scales;

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a wooden press; mixing bowls and equipment; industrial-sized rollers of plastic wrap;

and air filters or purifiers. In the kitchen, the officers discovered wooden boards with

brick-shaped outlines of cocaine residue and cloths on which matching brick-shaped

imprints of cocaine residue were visible. In Officer Hansen’s experience, all of this

indicated a large-scale cocaine operation.

B. Procedural History

Mendoza was indicted for conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess

with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 846, 841(a)(1), and (b)(1)(A), and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams

or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), and (b)(1)(B) and 18

U.S.C. § 2. Mendoza moved to suppress the evidence derived from the roadside stop

and search of the Louis Place residence. The district court denied the motion, and

Mendoza conditionally pled guilty. The district court found Mendoza was

responsible for between fifteen and fifty kilograms of cocaine, resulting in a base

offense level of 34. See United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.)

§ 2D1.1(C)(3) (drug quantity table). The district court sentenced Mendoza to two

concurrent 180-month terms of imprisonment. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Suppress

Mendoza argues the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress

the “Fix-a-Flat” can discovered during the search of his vehicle and the evidence

discovered during the search of the Louis Place residence. When reviewing the

denial “of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de

novo and its findings of fact for clear error.” United States v. Frasher, 632 F.3d 450,

453 (8th Cir. 2011).

Inositol is a dietary supplement that can be used to dilute or “cut” cocaine.

2

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1. Traffic Stop

The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and

seizures requires that an investigatory traffic stop “be supported by at least a

reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” United States v.

Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30

(1968). When the police observe the driver of a vehicle commit a traffic violation,

even a minor one, probable cause exists to stop the vehicle. See Frasher, 632 F.3d at

453.

The district court assumed, without deciding, the August 1 roadside encounter

constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure of Mendoza, and found the seizure was

supported by probable cause because the officers (1) observed Mendoza committing

numerous traffic violations, and (2) had probable cause to believe Mendoza was

driving without a driver’s license. We agree the officers had probable cause to

conduct a Fourth Amendment seizure based on Mendoza’s erratic driving and traffic

violations.

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Mendoza argues Officer Hansen’s testimony concerning Mendoza’s alleged

traffic violations was “implausible on its face,” United States v. Prokupek, 632 F.3d

460, 462 (8th Cir. 2011), because Officer Hansen’s contemporaneous police report

merely stated Mendoza made “random turns and stops,” but did not describe any

specific violations of the traffic code. Id. (explaining “when documents or objective

evidence contradict the witness’ story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent

or implausible on its face that a reasonable fact-finder would not credit it, the court

of appeals may well find clear error even in a finding purportedly based on a

credibility determination”) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470

We do not decide whether the officers had probable cause or reasonable 3

suspicion to conclude Mendoza was driving without a driver’s license. Mendoza’s

driving violations alone were sufficient to justify the stop. See Frasher, 632 F.3d at

453.

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U.S. 564, 575 (1985)) (internal marks omitted). However, when the trial judge’s

credibility determination is based upon “a coherent and facially plausible story that

is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent,

can virtually never be clear error.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575. Officer Hansen’s

testimony was consistent with his contemporaneous report and believable, so the

district court was entitled to accept it. The mere fact an incident report omits certain

details is not sufficient to render the officer’s testimony concerning the underlying

action facially implausible. 

Mendoza also complains that the prosecution failed to show which specific

traffic laws Mendoza allegedly violated. This “failure” does not affect the validity

of the district court’s probable cause determination. The district court accepted

Officer Hansen’s testimony that he observed “traffic violations,” including “not

signaling, . . . [driving] in other lanes of traffic, [and] driving erratically.” Iowa law

requires motorists to signal turns and drive on the right-hand side of the road during

normal operations, and prohibits reckless and careless driving. See Iowa Code

§§ 321.315, 321.297, 321.277, 321.277(A). Thus, the officers had probable cause to

stop Mendoza based upon Mendoza’s apparent violations of the traffic laws.

Having conducted a lawful traffic stop, the officers were then justified in

detaining Mendoza for a time reasonably necessary to conduct a limited investigation. 

See, e.g., United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc). 

“An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary

to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Id. at 916 (quoting United States v. Willis, 967

F.2d 1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 1992)) (internal marks omitted). At a minimum, a

reasonable investigation can include “asking for the driver’s license, the vehicle’s

registration, as well as inquiring about the occupants’ destination, route, and

purpose.” United States v. Sanchez, 417 F.3d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting

United States v. Munroe, 143 F.3d 1113, 1116 (8th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 915.

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The officers were entitled to investigate officer Orr’s report that “Victor

Quintero” was Mendoza’s alias and Mendoza was using false identification. In order

to do so, it was necessary to summon a translator; thus, it was not unreasonable to

detain Mendoza for the twenty to twenty-five minutes needed for Officer Fink to

respond. Cf. United States v. Orta, 228 F. App’x 633, 634-35 (8th Cir. 2007)

(unpublished per curiam) (deciding where a police officer made a “diligent effort” to

investigate suspicious circumstances, it was not unreasonable to extend the duration

of a traffic stop to summon a translator); Sanchez, 417 F.3d at 975 (concluding a

forty-five minute investigative detention while the police verified the identity of a

suspect carrying suspiciousidentification did not exceed the scope of an investigatory

traffic stop).

It is well settled that a drug-dog sniff, without more, is not a “‘search’ within

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707

(1983); see also United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 647

(8th Cir. 1999). The exterior vehicle sniff here was completed around the time

Officer Fink arrived to translate; consequently, the drug-dog sniff did not extend the

scope or duration of the seizure in any way. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,

407-08 (2005). The drug dog’s alert gave probable cause to detain Mendoza further

and to search the vehicle. See $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d at 647, 649. 

The roadside stop and detention were entirely reasonable, and we detect no Fourth

Amendment violation.

2. Residence Search

The Fourth Amendment protects the sanctity of the home against unreasonable

searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Absent a valid exception to the

warrant requirement, a warrantless search of a person’s home presumptively violates

the Fourth Amendment. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 

The police may, of course, search a person’s home with his or her consent, provided

the consent is voluntary. See id. at 222. The government has the burden of showing

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a reasonable officer would have believed the suspect actually consented to the search. 

See United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 773 (8th Cir. 2005). The validity of

consent is a question of fact, which we review for clear error. See id.

The district court recognized the factual record made this case a close call. On

the one hand, Mendoza did not explicitly state the officers were permitted to search

the Louis Place residence or sign the consent-to-search form, and the significant

police presence at the roadside stop and the residence raise the possibility Mendoza

merely acquiesced to police authority. See id. at 773. On the other hand, Mendoza’s

gestures and body language indicated his consent. Officer Fink and Detective

Batcheller specifically informed Mendoza of his right to refuse consent, and Mendoza

clearly understood thisright, because he initially refused consent and bargained with

the officers regarding the terms of his consent. 

As the district court found, on balance, Mendoza’s behavior leading up to and

during the search were consistent with consent. The record does not indicate any use

of force, coercion, intimidation or deception by the officers. See United States v.

Hampton, 260 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 2001) (deciding the lack of any police use of

force, coercion, or deception, and the fact that the defendant let the police into his

home suggested the defendant consented to the police entry); United States v.

Gleason, 25 F.3d 605, 607 (8th Cir. 1994) (determining the defendant’s general

demeanor and lack of hostility suggested consent to the search). The district court

found, based on all the facts and circumstances, that Mendoza voluntarily consented

to the search. This finding was not clear error.4

Mendoza has not argued, and we decline to consider, whether the search of the

4

basement exceeded the scope of his objective consent. See United States v. Shafer,

608 F.3d 1056, 1064-65 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The boundaries of a consensual search are

confined to the scope of the consent, which is measured by a standard of objective

reasonableness.”).

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B. Sentencing

Mendoza argues the district court erred in calculating the quantity of drugs

involved in Mendoza’s cocaine distribution conspiracy. The United States Probation

Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report estimating Mendoza was

responsible for at least 150 kilograms of cocaine, resulting in a base offense level of

38. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(C)(1) (drug quantity table). The district court found, based

upon the evidence discovered in the Louis Place residence, that Mendoza was

responsible for between fifteen and fifty kilograms of cocaine. Mendoza conceded

the evidence supported a finding of five to fifteen kilograms, but denied the evidence

could support a greater weight. We review the district court’s drug-quantity

determination for clear error and will affirm unless “the entire record definitely and

firmly convinces us that a mistake has been made.” United States v. SicarosQuintero, 557 F.3d 579, 581-82 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Minnis, 489

F.3d 325, 329 (8th Cir. 2007)).

When the amount of drug seized by the government does not

reflect the scale of the drug trafficking offense, asin this case, “the court

shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance” for

sentencing purposes. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment (n.12). “The court

may make a specific numeric determination of quantity based on

imprecise evidence.” United States v. Roach, 164 F.3d 403, 413 (8th

Cir. 1998). It “may consider relevant information without regard to its

admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided

that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its

accuracy.” U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a).

Id. at 582.

The district court declared, “This is an unusual case and a difficult one to

ascertain drug quantity.” Nevertheless, the drug-quantity calculation was amply

supported by the evidence. As the court reasoned, “Mr. Mendoza’s lack of legitimate

employment, the cash seized from his person and his residences, his history of

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possessing substantial cash, and sending substantial cash to Mexico” and, most

importantly, the cocaine-processing room at the Louis Place residence—which was

literally coated in cocaine dust and contained a wide variety of cocaine-processing

paraphernalia—provided ample evidence of a cocaine operation involving at least

fifteen to fifty kilograms of cocaine, and possibly much more.

Mendoza also challenges the district court’s drug-quantity finding on the

ground that the testimony of a jailhouse informant wasinsufficient to prove Mendoza

was a large-scale cocaine trafficker described by the informant as “Elesod” or

“Primo.” The flaw in Mendoza’s argument isthat the district court did not rely on the

informant’s testimony. While the district court “genuinely entertain[ed] a suspicion

that the quantity revealed by the informant may [have been] greater than” the drugquantity calculation the court ultimately adopted, the district court was “simply not

comfortable making that finding by a preponderance of the evidence.” Because the

district court’s drug quantity determination was not based on the challenged evidence,

there could be no error.

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment and sentence are affirmed.

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