United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 07-3873

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Baraka Jerry Dukuly, *

*

Petitioner, *

* Petition for Review 

v. * of an Order of the 

* Board of Immigration Appeals.

Michael B. Mukasey, *

Attorney General, *

*

Respondent. *

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Submitted: September 25, 2008

Filed: December 24, 2008

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Before WOLLMAN, SMITH, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Baraka Dukuly petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)

decision upholding the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of an adjustment of status. We

dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

I.

Dukuly is a male Liberian citizen who apparently entered the United States in

1996. In December 2003, Dukuly filed an application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In his asylum
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application, Dukuly claimed that he entered the United States on April 12, 2002, after

suffering more than a decade of persecution in Liberia. Dukuly stated that his parents

had been killed by Charles Taylor rebels when he was nine years old, and he claimed

that the rebels had tortured and sexually abused him. He described being freed from

the rebels by a kind elderly woman; wandering for several years through Ivory Coast

refugee camps; and finally being placed by a friend on a ship headed for the United

States. A government background check, however, revealed that Dukuly had been

arrested in the United States as early as 1999, three years before he claimed to have

arrived. Dukuly then sought to amend his asylum application, and later he withdrew

it altogether.

On January 28, 2005, the Department of Homeland Security commenced

removal proceedings against Dukuly. Dukuly conceded removability but sought

adjustment of status (based upon his recent marriage to a naturalized American

citizen) and waiver of inadmissability for filing a fabricated asylum application.

During the removal hearings, Dukuly admitted that he had falsified information in his

original asylum application, but claimed that his dishonesty was caused by his extreme

reticence to disclose traumatic details about past abuse. He testified that after his

parents were killed, he was befriended by a man named Hamidou Solko, who initially

appeared to be kind but ultimately proved to be a pedophile who subjected Dukuly to

six years of sexual abuse. Dukuly claimed that, shortly after he turned fourteen years

old, Hamidou sent him to the United States. He stated that he entered the country by

plane on September 19, 1996, clearing customs inspection at JFK Airport with a

visitor visa procured by Hamidou. Government records appear to corroborate this

entry date.

 

Several witnesses testified on Dukuly’s behalf. Christian Flah testified that he

had known Dukuly as a child and that he had heard that Dukuly’s family was

apprehended by Charles Taylor forces. Dukuly’s wife testified that she had various

disabilities and would be seriously harmed if her husband were deported. Finally,
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Charles Tracy, Dukuly’s social worker, spoke about the nature of the abuse Dukuly

had suffered. In Tracy’s opinion, Dukuly’s original dishonesty was attributable to

abuse trauma and was consistent with deep psychological injury. 

On June 26, 2007, the IJ granted the fraud waiver but denied Dukuly’s request

for adjustment of status, concluding that Dukuly did not merit a favorable exercise of

discretion. The BIA upheld the decision, and Dukuly appeals. 

II.

Adjustment of status is a discretionary decision committed to the Attorney

General. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255. We lack jurisdiction to review the exercise of that

discretion “unless the petition for review raises a constitutional claim or question of

law.” Hailemichael v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 878, 886 (8th Cir. 2006); see also 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). A petitioner cannot evade this jurisdictional barrier by couching

a factual argument in legal or constitutional terms; he must present a colorable legal

or constitutional claim. See Higuit v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 2006)

(“We are not free to convert every immigration case into a question of law, and

thereby undermine Congress’s decision to grant limited jurisdiction over matters

committed in the first instance to the sound discretion of the Executive.”). To

establish a violation of due process rights, a petitioner must show fundamental

unfairness or procedural irregularities that prejudiced his case. Salkeld v. Gonzales,

420 F.3d 804, 810 (8th Cir. 2005). Dukuly has not overcome this jurisdictional

hurdle.

Several of Dukuly’s arguments must be dismissed as disagreements with the

IJ’s factual determinations. Dukuly argues, for example, that the IJ’s decision was

arbitrary and unfair because it ignored important evidence that supported his claim:

in particular, Tracy’s expert testimony attributing Dukuly’s fabrications to sexual

abuse trauma, and government records that corroborated Dukuly’s second purported
1

The IJ also expressed skepticism of Dukuly’s motivation for originally

asserting a 2002 entry date. Dukuly’s counsel insists that his only possible motivation

was fear of disclosing Hamidou and the associated sexual abuse. But this contention

ignores an obvious rebuttal: Dukuly’s last arrest was in December 2001, and his

original story allowed him to omit his criminal record. 

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entry date. The record, however, does not sustain Dukuly’s assertion that the IJ

ignored this evidence. Instead, it shows that the IJ considered the evidence but found

it unpersuasive when weighed against other factors—including Dukuly’s

demonstrated propensity to lie about his past and the readiness of his social workers,

family, and friends to believe and support a story that later proved false.1

 Compare

Tun v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 1014, 1026 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that improper

exclusion of expert testimony violated the petitioner’s due process rights). We do not

have jurisdiction to second-guess this determination. 

Dukuly argues that two other aspects of the IJ’s decision violated his due

process rights. First, he asserts that the IJ refused his adjustment of status application

to punish him for lying; second, he contends that the IJ’s simultaneous grant of the

fraud waiver and denial of adjustment of status was arbitrary and capricious. Neither

of these arguments presents a colorable constitutional claim. The IJ’s opinion

weighed humanitarian considerations against the gravity of lying to the United States

government. The IJ was also cognizant of the impact his decision would have on the

immigration system, expressing his concern about promoting dishonesty in the asylum

process. The IJ’s sensitivity to these issues does not make the decision unduly

punitive. Likewise, the IJ’s decision to grant the fraud waiver—in deference to

Dukuly’s citizen wife and with the intent to enable Dukuly to someday return—was
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not arbitrary or capricious. To the contrary, the IJ carefully explained that his ruling

was an effort to temper justice with lenity, and we see no constitutional error in that

decision. 

III.

The petition for review is dismissed.

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