No. 96-494 

W THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1997 

FLATHEAD COUNTY and THE FLATHEAD CITYCOUNTY BOARD OF HEALTH, 

Plaintiffs and Respondents, 

v. 

ALAN D. ENGEBRETSON, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of 

Flathead, The Honorable Ted 0. Lympus, Judge Presiding 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Teny Wallace, Missoula, Montana 

For Respondents: 

Dennis J. Hester, Deputy County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana 

Allen P. Laming, Conklin, Nybo, LeVeque & Murphy, P.C., Great Falls, 

Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: March 20, 1997 

Decided: April 15, 1997 
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) Montana Supreme Court 1995 Internal 

Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent and shall be published 

by its filing as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its 

result to State Reporter and West Publishing Companies. 

Flathead County and the Flathead City-County Board of Health (Plaintiffs) filed a 

complaint and injunction against Alan Engebretson for violating zoning (Count I), flood 

plain (Count 11), and sewage treatment regulations (Count 111). Engebretson counterclaimed 

for malicious prosecution. The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, granted 

summary judgment to Plaintiffs on Counts 11, 111, and the counterclaim. The court also 

ordered Engebretson to remove his trailer from the property and denied his motions for 

summary judgment. Engebretson appeals. We affirm. 

We restate the issues raised on appeal as follows: 

1. Did the District Court properly find that Engebretson built a structure without 

a permit on the hundred-year flood plain? 

2. Did the District Court properly find that Engebretson altered or operated a 

sewage system without a permit and constructed and maintained a dwelling attached to an 

unpermitted sewage system? 

3. Did the District Court properly find that Gray was not employed by Flathead 

County? 
BACKGROUND 

Flathead County adopted flood plain regulations requiring a permit before new 

construction, substantial improvements, or alterations to structures are undertaken. The 

Flathead City-County Board of Health adopted regulations that apply to sewage treatment 

systems in Flathead County, except municipal systems, and require a permit before a person 

constructs, alters, repairs, or operates a sewage treatment system. The regulations also make 

it unlawful to construct or maintain any dwelling without a sewage treatment system 

approved by the City-County Health Department. 

In 1992, Engebretson moved a trailer onto property located in Flathead County, 

Montana. The property, designated as Tract 2AB, is classified as "R-1 Suburban 

Residential," which prohibits, without a conditional use permit, the use of temporary 

buildings or structures. Tract 2AB is also located on the one-hundred year flood plain of the 

Stillwater River. 

Engebretson began constructing a temporary structure around his trailer. Glen Gray, 

a sanitarian for the Flathead City-County Board of Health, informed Engebretson that the 

continued use of his property violated sewage regulations. Several months later, because 

Engebretson had not taken corrective action and the property was still occupied, Gray 

informed the Flathead County Attorney, who charged Engebretson with violations of zoning, 

flood plain, and sewage treatment regulations. These charges were dropped and replaced by 

this complaint and injunction. 
At the commencement of the civil proceedings, Engebretson had not obtained a flood 

plain development pennit for the placement of his trailer, or for the completed structure 

surrounding it. Nor had he obtained a permit for construction or operation of the sewage 

system serving the trailer. During the District Court proceedings, a dispute arose as to 

whether Engebretson had removed his trailer kom Tract 2AB, or if it had been disassembled 

during construction of the surrounding structure. The issue remains unresolved and is not 

before this Court. 

After Plaintiffs filed their complaint, Engebretson counterclaimed for malicious 

prosecution. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging, in addition to the counts 

contained in the original complaint, that Engebretson's construction of the temporary 

structure around his trailer without a conditional use permit was illegal. Plaintiffs moved for 

summary judgment on Counts I1 and 111, and the counterclaim. Engebretson opposed 

Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on Counts I1 and 111, and the counterclaim. He also 

filed a motion for summary judgment on Counts I, 11, 111, and on his counterclaim, which 

Plaintiffs opposed. 

The District Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summa~y judgment on Counts I1 and 

111, Engebretson's counterclaim, ordered Engebretson to vacate the trailer and surrounding 

structure, and denied Engebretson's motion for summary judgment on Counts I, 11,111, and 

his counterclaim. Engebretson appealed the order granting Plaintiffs' motion for summary 

judgment on Counts I1 and 111, and his counterclaim. Because Count I of Plaintiffs' amended 
complaint had not been disposed of, this Court remanded the appeal to allow Engebretson 

to obtain Rule 54(b), M.R.Civ.P., certification. The District Court certified that final 

judgment on all issues except Count I had been entered. We address the issues certified by 

the District Court as final. 

DISCUSSION 

Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. This Court 

reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same Rule 56(c) 

criteria used by a district court. Carelli v. Hall (Mont. 1996), 926 P.2d 756, 759, 53 St.Rep. 

11 16, 11 17. The moving party has the initial burden of establishing the absence of genuine 

issues of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Once the moving 

party satisfies its initial burden, then the burden shifts to the party opposing summary 

judgment to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. w, 926 P.2d at 

759-60. Mere denial or speculation is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. 

RichlandNat. Bank & Trust v. Swenson (1991), 249 Mont. 410,417, 816 P.2d 1045, 1050. 

1. Did the District Court properly find that Engebretson built a structure without 

a permit on the hundred-year flood plain? 

Engebretson argues that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his 

structure is located on a hundred-year flood plain. In their motion for summary judgment, 

Plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of Eric Mulcahy, Flathead County Floodplain Coordinator, 

who stated that Tract 2AB is classified as being within the one-hundred year flood plain of 

5 
the Stillwater River. The District Court also relied on the results of an elevation survey that 

establish the elevation of Tract 2AB is within the flood plain at the location of Engebretson's 

trailer. 

Engebretson presented no facts to the contrary, other than unsupported allegations that 

he believed his trailer was located outside of the flood plain. It is undisputed that 

Engebretson placed a trailer on Tract 2AB and built a structure around it without a flood 

plain permit. We hold that the District Court did not err when it granted summary judgment 

in favor of Plaintiffs on Count I1 and denied Engebretson's motion for summary judgment 

on Count 11. 

2. Did the District Court properly find that Engebretson altered or operated a 

sewage system without a permit and constructed and maintained a dwelling attached to an 

unpermitted sewage system? 

Engebretson argues that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he 

is operating an unpermitted sewage system. He claims that his father obtained a permit in 

1975. Engebretson presented no affidavit from his father concerning the claimed permit. 

Nor did he submit a copy of the permit. Gray explained in his deposition that a sewage 

pcrmit was not issucd for Tract 2AB in 1975 or any time thereafter. Engebretson's 

unsupported assertions are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. 

Engebretson also argues that because the use of Tract 2AB was continuous, he is 

permitted to attach his trailer to a previous sewage system. This argument fails because 

Engebretson did not provide evidence that his father obtained a permit for the previous 
sewage system. We hold that the District Court properly granted summary judgment to 

Plaintiffs and denied Engebretson's motion for summary judgment on Count 111. 

3. Did the District Court properly find that Gray was not employed by Flathead 

County? 

One of the six elements a plaintiff must prove in a malicious prosecution is that the 

defendant was 1-esponsible for litigating, prosecuting, or continuing the proceeding. Davis 

v. Sheriff (1988), 234 Mont. 126, 130, 762 P.2d 221, 224. The District Court found that 

Gray was not an employee of Flathead County, and therefore, the County could not be held 

responsible for his conduct. Engebretson argues that the court erred when it found that Gray 

was an employee of the City-County Board of Health, rather than an employee of Flathead 

County, because Gray stated in his deposition, "I'm the sanitarian with the Flathead County 

Health Department." 

Gray's statement from his deposition does not create a genuine issue of material fact. 

In his deposition, Gray clarified that he worked for the Flathead City-County Health 

Department. Because there is nothing to indicate that the County is Gray's employer and is 

responsible for his conduct, Engebretson has not established a genuine issue of fact as to 

whether Gray was responsible for litigating, prosecuting, or continuing the proceeding 

against him. The District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. 

We hold that the District Court did not err when it granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs 

on Engebretson's malicious prosecution counterclaim and denied summary judgment to 

Engebretson on his counterclaim. 

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i Affirmed. 

We concur: