UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

DAVID SAMBRANO, individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No.: 4:21-cv-01074-P

UNITED AIRLINES, INC., 

Defendant.

PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1

ARGUMENT.................................................................................................................................. 1

I. The Court Applied the Incorrect Legal Standard................................................................... 1

II. The Court Incorrectly Dismissed Plaintiffs’ Retaliation Claims. .......................................... 3

III. The Court Also Incorrectly Dismissed Several Failure-to-Accommodate Claims................ 6

IV. The Court Incorrectly Held that Certain Claims Were Time Barred..................................... 8

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................. 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662 (2009).................................................................................................................... 2

Brandon v. Sage Corp.,

808 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2015) ...................................................................................................... 2

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 

548 U.S. 53 (2006)...................................................................................................................... 7

Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 

924 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2019) ...................................................................................................... 6

Crawford v. U.S. Steel Corp., 

660 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1981) .................................................................................................... 10

Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 

765 F.3d 480 (5th Cir. 2014) ...................................................................................................... 2

Eyob v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift Am., Inc., 

745 F. App’x 209 (5th Cir. 2018) ............................................................................................... 2

Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki, 

522 U.S. 389 (2008).................................................................................................................... 9

Greer v. Fowler,

2022 WL 394762 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2022)................................................................................ 3

Groff v. DeJoy,

600 U.S. 447 (2023).................................................................................................................... 7

Hamilton v. Dallas County, 

79 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2023) ............................................................................................... 4, 6, 8

Harrison v. Brookhaven Sch. Dist., 

82 F.4th 427 (5th Cir. 2023) ................................................................................................... 6, 8

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Hibernia Nat’l Bank v. Carner, 

997 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1993) ........................................................................................................ 2

Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 

634 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2011) ...................................................................................................... 2

Lewis v. Fresne, 

252 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2001) ...................................................................................................... 1

Lewis v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 

12 F. Supp. 3d 418 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) .......................................................................................... 5

Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 

565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009) .................................................................................................. 4, 7

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

411 U.S. 792 (1973)................................................................................................................ 2, 6

McNeill v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 

2023 WL 8532408 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2023) .................................................................... passim

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 

536 U.S. 101 (2002).................................................................................................................... 9

Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,

398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968) .................................................................................................... 10

Sambrano v. United Airlines, Inc., 

2022 WL 486610 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 2022) ................................................................................. 9

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 

534 U.S. 506 (2002).................................................................................................................... 6

Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 

296 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................................... 6

Wilson v. Birnberg, 

667 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 2012) ...................................................................................................... 2

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12............................................................................................................................ 3

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15............................................................................................................................ 3

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INTRODUCTION

The rhetoric and complaints about timing in United’s opposition to reconsideration do not 

obscure the ways that the Court’s dismissal decision relied on manifest errors of fact and law. 

Those errors are made clear by the recent McNeill decision, issued just days before this Court’s 

decision, which engaged in a thorough analysis of binding precedent and held that a plaintiff 

similarly situated to Plaintiffs here stated plausible claims for retaliation and failure to 

accommodate in a case involving a vaccine mandate and an accommodation of unpaid leave.

United’s only response is to claim that McNeill got it wrong. That argument is meritless. To be 

sure, there may be questions about the reach of recent Fifth Circuit decisions. But United has no 

answer for the failure to “resolve[]” any such ambiguities “in the plaintiff’s favor.” Lewis v. 

Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the Court should reconsider its decision 

and deny United’s motion to dismiss, or, at the very least, allow Plaintiffs to seek leave to amend. 

ARGUMENT

The Court made four errors that require reconsideration. The Court applied the incorrect 

legal standard, overlooked facts and law when dismissing Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims, incorrectly 

held as a matter of law that Plaintiffs Hamilton and Castillo could not assert failure-toaccommodate claims, and misapplied the facts and law when holding certain claims time barred. 

I. The Court Applied the Incorrect Legal Standard.

As Plaintiffs demonstrated, the Court applied the incorrect legal standard when requiring 

that Plaintiffs “show[]” various elements of their claims. Mot. at 5–6 (Doc. 242). That is not what 

the binding precedent requires at the pleading stage. Id. (citing cases). And the Court further 

misapplied those standards when it dismissed the claims with prejudice.

United has two responses, each of which falls flat. First, United tries to recast this issue 

as semantics. Opp’n at 4–5 (Doc. 244). But pleading standards cannot be so glibly ignored. 

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Rather, they are the basis for reversal. As the Fifth Circuit confirms, it cannot “affirm [a] district 

court’s dismissal of [a] claim unless we determine it is beyond doubt that [the plaintiff] cannot 

prove a plausible set of facts to support his allegations.” Wilson v. Birnberg, 667 F.3d 591, 600 

(5th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). And, in this Circuit, that does not allow courts to “look 

behind [the] allegations and independently assess the likelihood that the plaintiff will be able to 

prove them at trial.” Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 803 n.44 (5th Cir. 2011). 

Rather, the allegations need only demonstrate that there is more than “a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Because Plaintiffs’ 

complaint amply demonstrated that there is more than a “sheer possibility” that United violated 

Title VII and the ADA, the Court’s application of a more rigorous standard was improper.1

Second, United cherry picks words from the Court’s opinion to suggest that the Court was 

nonetheless applying the plausibility standard. Despite the Court’s reference to plausibility, a fair 

reading of the opinion confirms that the Court was holding Plaintiffs’ complaint to a significantly 

higher standard. For instance, the Court analyzed certain allegations “under a burden-shifting 

framework akin to the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), burden-shifting 

framework.” Op. at 4 (quoting Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 765 F.3d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 2014)) (Doc. 

231). But that is not the test on a motion to dismiss. Indeed, the very case the Court cited—

Davis—was reviewing a summary judgment decision.2

1 What United calls “insuperable legal barrier[s] to relief” (at 5) are merely contested facts about 

United’s actions and the resulting harm. Those cannot be determined at the pleading stage.

2 The same is true of the case the Court cited when dismissing the failure-to-accommodate claims. 

Op. at 7 (citing the Fifth Circuit’s review of a summary-judgment decision in Eyob v. Mitsubishi 

Caterpillar Forklift Am., Inc., 745 F. App’x 209 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)). And United 

commits the same error, discussing cases (at 7) that analyzed what a “reasonable jury would find.” 

That is the standard on summary judgment. Hibernia Nat’l Bank v. Carner, 997 F.2d 94, 98 (5th 

Cir. 1993). United’s reliance (at 9) on Brandon v. Sage Corp., 808 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2015), is 

equally misplaced, as it also addressed summary judgment. Rather Brandon confirms the Court’s 

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Under the correct standard, the Court, at most, would have dismissed the claims without 

prejudice. On this, United criticizes Plaintiffs (at 5) for relying on material outside the complaint. 

United misses the point. The outside material underscores why it is routine practice for Rule 

12(b)(6) dismissals to be without prejudice. Mot. at 6. Because United moved for dismissal after 

this case has been proceeding for years, Plaintiffs now have extensive evidence in hand to bolster 

various allegations. A cursory review of Plaintiffs’ reconsideration motion and class certification 

motion confirms as much. Accordingly, if the Court were concerned with the sufficiency of the 

allegations, the standard practice would have been dismissal without prejudice.3

 

Accordingly, the Court should reconsider its decision and apply the correct pleading 

standard, which Plaintiffs easily satisfy. And, if the Court still concludes that Plaintiffs have not 

satisfied the correct pleading standard, the Court should convert its dismissal to being without 

prejudice to allow Plaintiffs to request leave to amend. Without a hint of irony, United criticizes 

this request (at 20–21) for allegedly proposing delays. But the parties are only now completing 

class certification briefing, and it would be most efficient to update that briefing now, rather than 

try to put the pieces back together after an appeal.

II. The Court Incorrectly Dismissed Plaintiffs’ Retaliation Claims.

The Court also misapplied the law and facts when it dismissed Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims. 

At each turn, these errors are made clear by reviewing the recent decision in McNeill v. Tyson 

Fresh Meats, Inc., 2023 WL 8532408 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2023). Although United understandably 

wishes to diminish that decision (at 8), there is no better comparison to this case than McNeill. 

errors here, as it analyzed the factual record to determine if the possibility of lost income might 

have a deterrent effect. Id. at 271. Plaintiffs must be permitted to develop similar facts here. 

3 United also confuses Rule 15 and Rule 12(b)(6) when suggesting that Plaintiffs were required to 

submit a proposed amended complaint. Opp’n at 21 (citing Greer v. Fowler, 2022 WL 394762 

(N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2022), which dealt with a request for leave to amend). 

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McNeill addressed a COVID-19 vaccine mandate, an employer that developed a plan to offer only

extended unpaid leave as an accommodation, and a plaintiff who claimed retaliation and failure to 

accommodate after the pressure of facing lost income caused him to abandon his beliefs and 

receive the COVID-19 vaccine. Mot. at 9–10. Under those strikingly similar facts, McNeill

applied Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent and concluded that the plaintiff had stated a 

claim for retaliation. 2023 WL 8532408, at *6–7. The same result should follow here.

1. Plaintiffs plausibly pleaded a materially adverse action, and the Court and United are 

mistaken on the facts and law when suggesting that this question turns on whether Plaintiffs were 

treated “materially worse” than those who were terminated. Opp’n at 6.

4

 On the facts, the Court’s 

presentation of the issue as a binary choice—accommodation or termination—was mistaken. 

Rather, as McNeill confirms, United’s actions presented three choices, “[n]one of [which] pass[es] 

muster”—“(1) capitulate on [their] religious belief so to comply with the policy; (2) accept 

immediate termination; or (3) accept up to one-year unpaid leave until either the policy was 

rescinded, the employee complied, or the leave period expired—culminating in termination.”5 

2023 WL 8532408, *6. And on the law, this misunderstands binding precedent, as McNeill again 

confirmed: The Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Hamilton v. Dallas County, 79 F.4th 494 (5th 

Cir. 2023), “now guides” courts that facing a “‘realistic, drastic pay cut threat’ amounts to a 

4 In an attempt to equate “materially worse” with the Supreme Court’s “materially adverse” 

employment action requirement, United baldly suggests (at 16) that “worse” and “adverse” are 

synonyms and that these standards are the same. United’s failure to cite any support speaks 

volumes, and it confirms that the Court’s “treated materially worse” standard is distinct from the 

applicable Supreme Court test, which only asks whether Plaintiffs suffered a “materially adverse” 

employment action. Mot. at 7–8. Moreover, the adverse impact of United’s actions are hotly 

disputed, and the Court incorrectly adopted United’s factual argument about Plaintiffs’ being 

treated better than other employees, when “all reasonable inferences [were to be drawn] in the 

plaintiff’s favor.” Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232–33 (5th Cir. 2009). 

5 United’s plan was even harsher, threatening six years of unpaid leave. SAC ¶ 83 (Doc. 156). 

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‘materially adverse’ employment action.” McNeil, 2023 WL 8532408, at *6 (citing cases). United 

offers no response, other than suggesting that McNeill is wrong. But a reading of McNeill easily 

puts that accusation to bed, as it closely applied Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent.

2. Further, the Court overlooked a wealth of authority confirming that Plaintiffs may rely 

on the same events at the pleading stage to state claims for retaliation and failure-to-accommodate. 

Mot. at 10–12 (citing cases). Although United curiously states (at 9) that Plaintiffs have not 

identified “any authority” to support this argument, that is false. Rather, Plaintiffs have identified 

several cases. Most significantly, McNeill applied Fifth Circuit authority and concluded that a 

plaintiff may plead claims of retaliation and failure-to-accommodate based on the same facts. 2023 

WL 8532408, at *12. Rather than follow this authority, the Court incorrectly held as a matter of 

law that retaliation claims cannot factually overlap with failure-to-accommodate claims. United 

offers no response other than to quibble (at 9–10) with the holdings of the various courts that held 

retaliation and failure-to-accommodate claims may rely on the same factual allegations.

By trying to distinguish this authority, United only underscores Plaintiffs’ point. For 

instance, United suggests (at 10) that Lewis is inapposite because the plaintiff in that case was 

“treat[ed] ... worse” than others.6

 Not only is that the incorrect standard, but it confirms that 

whether an employee is treated “worse” is a highly fact-intensive question that cannot be decided 

on a motion to dismiss. See Lewis v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 12 F. Supp. 3d 418 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)

(deciding these issues on summary judgment). 

3. The Court also misapplied facts and law when it found no causal link between Plaintiffs’ 

protected activity and harm. The Court was again applying the incorrect standard at the pleading 

6 United’s suggestion (at 10) that the transfer in Lewis “was not an accommodation at all” would 

likely surprise the Lewis court, which extensively discussed the accommodation and its lawfulness. 

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stage. According to the Court (at 16), because United previously discussed unpaid leave as an 

accommodation, it was not retaliatory as a matter of law when United instituted that policy after 

receiving accommodation requests. While it is possible that Plaintiffs will be unable to prove the 

causal link, the allegations suffice to state a claim, as McNeill again confirms. Taking Plaintiffs’ 

allegations as true and “constru[ing] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[s],” the 

complaint sufficiently alleged that United only began implementing its unpaid leave 

accommodation after Plaintiffs’ protected activity. Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 

378 (5th Cir. 2002). 

III. The Court Also Incorrectly Dismissed Several Failure-to-Accommodate Claims.

As to Hamilton’s and Castillo’s failure-to-accommodate claims, the Court again erred 

when it subjected Plaintiffs’ complaint to the evidentiary standard in McDonnell Douglas. The 

Fifth Circuit confirms that doing so is reversible error. Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 

924 F.3d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 2019). And the Supreme Court has explained that it “has never

indicated that the requirements for establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas also 

apply to the pleading standard that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to survive a motion to dismiss.” 

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002). Plaintiffs were thus not required to plead 

facts satisfying each of the McDonnell Douglas factors. That burden comes later. See Hamilton,

79 F.4th at 502 n.45. At the pleading stage, Plaintiffs’ only obligation was to plausibly allege 

discrimination “in the terms, conditions, or privileges of his or her employment.” Harrison v. 

Brookhaven Sch. Dist., 82 F.4th 427, 430 (5th Cir. 2023).

7

7 United’s response relies on a misleading quote of the Fifth Circuit’s Cicalese decision. 

According to United (at 11), Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 766, held that a plaintiff “must plead sufficient 

facts on all of the ultimate elements of [the] claim.” (alteration in original). But United fails to 

note that the sentence continues, stating that: (1) “plaintiffs do not have to submit evidence to 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination at this stage”; and (2) plaintiffs “must plead sufficient 

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Plaintiffs cleared that hurdle by alleging that they suffered more than “very small or 

trifling” harms.

8

 For instance, the complaint details the harms that Hamilton and Castillo suffered 

from United’s informing them that they would be placed on unpaid leave for several years. Mot. 

at 17–18. That is enough on its own, as McNeill confirms. 2023 WL 8532408, at *2. And it is 

supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern, which recognized the 

“deterrent” effect of a period “without pay.” 548 U.S. 53, 72–73 (2006).

But contrary to the Court’s conclusion (at 18), Plaintiffs also plausibly alleged that 

Hamilton and Castillo were not subject to the types of rules about masks and testing that were 

commonplace during the COVID-19 pandemic. Rather, the complaint alleges that United 

developed a scheme to impose a particularly harsh “accommodation” to punish religious 

requesters. Mot. at 18–20. And the factual record developed through discovery confirms that this 

was exactly what Scott Kirby desired—use harsh masking-and-testing requirements to punish 

“accommodated” employees.9 Further, the complaint detailed various ways that United devised a 

unique and burdensome accommodation process to pressure its employees. Mot. at 15 (discussing 

allegations about United’s accommodation process). These are far from “workplace trifles.”10

United has no response to the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ allegations, other than 

facts on all of the ultimate elements of a disparate treatment claim to make [their] case plausible.” 

Id. (alteration in original; quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs satisfy these thresholds. 

8 United offers no reason (at 11 n.7) that the Supreme Court’s definition of “de minimis” in Groff 

v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 469 (2023)—a Title VII case—would be somehow inapplicable to the 

Fifth Circuit’s use of that same term. 

9 United’s quibbling about Mr. Kirby’s motivations underscores the inappropriateness of 

dismissal. United may believe it has arguments for why it needed to subject accommodated 

employees to harsh standards. But those are arguments for summary judgment. At the pleading 

stage, the Court was to accept Plaintiffs’ allegations as true. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 232–33.

10 United’s dismissive suggestion (at 12) that Plaintiffs are complaining about “trivial” impacts of 

its masking-and-testing accommodation ignores that United was sanctioned for failing to provide 

trainings for the respirators it required “accommodated” employees to wear. Doc. 239 at 20 n.17.

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mischaracterizing the law and relying on alternative facts. For instance, United tries (at 13) to 

rewrite history when suggesting that its unpaid leave accommodation was only a “tentativ[e] 

announce[ment.]” As the Court no doubt recalls from the preliminary injunction proceedings, 

there was nothing “tentative” about United’s plans, other than the fact that it subsequently 

scrambled to change course slightly after this lawsuit began to hold the company accountable. But 

the fact that Hamilton and Castillo were not ultimately forced onto unpaid leave is irrelevant, as 

the plaintiff in McNeill also did not go on unpaid leave, but he still pleaded an “adverse 

employment action” due to his employer’s threat of unpaid leave. 2023 WL 8532408, at *2, *4.

Similarly, United is mistaken when it baldly suggests (at 12) that context has “no bearing” 

here. True, Plaintiffs have not alleged a hostile work environment claim in their complaint. But 

that is of no moment. Rather, Hamilton’s discussion of hostile work environments underscored 

that Plaintiffs like Hamilton and Castillo can suffer a “materially adverse employment action” 

without financial harms, as the Court suggested were necessary under Harrison. See Mot. at 16–

17. And Plaintiffs Hamilton and Castillo sufficiently alleged non-economic harms to the “terms

and conditions” of their employment, which sufficiently alleged failure-to-accommodate claims.

IV. The Court Incorrectly Held that Certain Claims Were Time Barred.

With respect to Plaintiffs Medlin, Rains, and Castillo, United has no answer for the fact 

that the Court erred in concluding that their claims are time barred. 

1. As to Medlin, two critical facts confirm that her claims are timely. First, because she 

was on maternity leave at the time, her September 2021 accommodation denial had no effect until 

March 2022, when she sought to return to work. Second, Medlin again asked for—and was again

denied—a religious accommodation in March 2022, thus resetting the clock on her claims. SAC 

¶ 177. United ignores these properly pleaded facts. Thus, even assuming there was no continuing 

violation, Medlin’s EEOC charge was indisputably timely because of the March 2022 events.

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Yet, under National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002), the 

March 2022 denial only matters if United’s September 2021 actions were “independently 

discriminatory”—i.e., there was no causal link between the September 2021 denial and the March 

2022 termination. But United’s treatment of Medlin in March 2022 was indisputably linked to 

September 2021. Indeed, the Court correctly recognized that an unlawful termination claim is

available to Medlin. Op. at 22. And that claim must be based on the denied accommodation, as 

that was United’s sole reason for terminating Medlin. Accordingly, there is no way to separate the 

denied accommodation and the ultimate termination.11

2. Likewise, United cannot refute two separate facts with respect to Rains. First, because 

Rains’s TWC request asked for remedial action and such a request sets the administrative 

machinery into motion—both with TWC and EEOC—Rains’s claims are timely. The TWC charge 

satisfied Holowecki, and it should have been sent to the EEOC. United never explains why Rains 

should be punished for TWC’s mistake. Second, United ignores that the Fifth Circuit has already 

held that United’s actions created harm by daily subjecting employees “to ongoing coercion based 

on their religious beliefs.” Sambrano v. United Airlines, Inc., 2022 WL 486610, at *3 (5th Cir.

Feb. 17, 2022). Under the law of the case, United’s coercive unpaid-leave scheme created ongoing 

harm—the very definition of a continuing violation—that reset the clock each day.

3. Finally, United continues to insist that Castillo’s active lawsuit—pending during the 

EEOC process—failed to put United on notice of a claim. Contrary to United’s assertions (at 18), 

Plaintiffs did not suggest that the EEOC charge satisfied Holowecki or that Holowecki did not 

11 It is revealing that United argues (at 16) that denying an accommodation request is a “discrete 

and salient event[] that should put an employee on notice that a cause of action has accrued.” At 

the same time, however, United continues to argue that effectively terminating employees through 

indefinite, unpaid leave is not functionally a denied accommodation that also provides a cause of 

action. United cannot have it both ways.

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matter because the EEOC regarded Castillo’s inquiry as a charge. Rather, Plaintiffs showed that 

Holowecki is irrelevant because a charge was prepared for his case—only missing a signature. 

Op. at 25. Additionally, United disingenuously claims(at 18) there is “no indication that the EEOC 

investigated Mr. Castillo’s pre-charge filing, issued a determination about his allegations, or 

attempted conciliation[.]” Not so. The EEOC investigated the facts of this case for months and 

United engaged with the EEOC at length, leading to United submitting one of the form denials it 

was using in this case, no matter what the individual said. As Plaintiffs will further demonstrate 

in this case, United communicated with the EEOC specifically about Castillo’s charge and filed a 

form response. Thus, rejecting Castillo’s claims as untimely undermines Holowecki.

Of course, United’s argument (at 18) about interactions with the EEOC is particularly 

misguided because the Fifth Circuit has long recognized that “[i]t would be wasteful, if not vain, 

for numerous employees, all with the same grievance, to have to process many identical 

complaints with the EEOC. If it is impossible to reach a settlement with one discriminatee, what 

reason would there be to assume the next one would be successful[?]” Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach

Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1968). The Circuit has thus held that, “in an action involving 

claims of several persons arising out of similar discriminatory treatment, not all of them need to 

have filed EEOC charges as long as one or more of the plaintiffs had satisfied the 

requirement.” Crawford v. U.S. Steel Corp., 660 F.2d 663, 665 (5th Cir. 1981).

CONCLUSION

Because the Court’s decision dismissing certain of Plaintiffs’ claims relied on significant 

errors of fact and law, reconsideration is necessary. Accordingly, the Court should reconsider its 

decision and deny United’s motion to dismiss. Or, at the very least, the Court should convert its 

dismissal to being without prejudice. 

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February 20, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Mark R. Paoletta

Mark R. Paoletta*

D.C. Bar No. 422746

Gene C. Schaerr*

D.C. Bar No. 416368

Brian J. Field*

D.C. Bar No. 985577

Cristina Martinez Squiers

Texas Bar No. 24093764

SCHAERR |JAFFE LLP

1717 K Street NW, Suite 900

Washington, DC 20006

Telephone: (202) 787-1060

Facsimile: (202) 776-0136

mpaoletta@schaerr-jaffe.com

*Admitted pro hac vice 

/s/ John C. Sullivan

John C. Sullivan

Texas Bar No. 24083920

David Austin R. Nimocks

Texas Bar No. 24002695

S|L LAW PLLC

610 Uptown Boulevard, Suite 2000

Cedar Hill, TX 75104

Telephone: (469) 523-1351

Facsimile: (469) 613-0891

john.sullivan@the-sl-lawfirm.com

Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On February 20, 2024, I filed the foregoing document with the clerk of court for the United 

States District Court, Northern District of Texas. I hereby certify that I have served the document 

on all counsel and/or pro se parties of record by a manner authorized by Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 5(b)(2) (ECF System).

/s/ Brian J. Field 

Brian J. Field

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