J-S73003-17

____________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

HENRY CHRISTOPHER STUBBS, III 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 766 MDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order March 29, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-40-CR-0000844-2002

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED DECEMBER 15, 2017

Appellant, Henry Christopher Stubbs, III, appeals pro se from the 

order entered on March 29, 2017, dismissing as untimely his third petition 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§

9541-9546. Upon review, we affirm.

We briefly set forth the facts and procedural history of this case as 

follows. Appellant is currently serving two consecutive life sentences 

imposed after a jury convicted him of the first-degree murders of a woman 

and her six-year-old daughter. The jury also convicted Appellant of rape,

burglary, two counts of theft by unlawful taking or disposition, robbery,

persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms,

and two counts of access device fraud. On April 4, 2005, this Court affirmed 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence and our Supreme Court subsequently 

denied further review. On May 22, 2006, the United States Supreme Court 
J-S73003-17

- 2 -

denied Appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari. Appellant filed his first PCRA 

petition in May of 2007. The PCRA court denied relief. After remanding for 

additional proceedings, this Court eventually affirmed the denial of relief in 

an unpublished memorandum filed on March 24, 2010. Appellant filed a 

second PCRA petition in 2011, but later withdrew it. On April 12, 2016, 

Appellant filed the pro se PCRA petition currently at issue. The PCRA court 

held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief by order entered on March 30, 

2017. This timely appeal resulted.1

Appellant presents the following issues, pro se, for our review:

1. Whether the exception clause of Title 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(i) (interference by government officials) and 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(c) (after-discovered evidence), supersede the 

provisions set forth in Title 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(A)(3) and 

§ 9544, et seq. (previous litigation and wavier), where during [] 

Appellant’s previous state and federal appeals, attorneys on 

behalf of the Commonwealth withheld Brady v. Maryland, 373 

U.S. 83 [(1963)] material (the bench warrant of Angela M. 

Mayfield) and asserted [] that Brady was not violated at trial 

and that no agreement was made and no warrant exist[ed] for 

Mayfield; and whether such assertions (if not true) that were 

____________________________________________

1

 Appellant filed his notice of appeal on May 1, 2017. Because the 30-day 

appeal period fell on a Saturday, filing the notice of appeal on the following 

Monday was timely. See Pa.R.A.P. 903; 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908. Moreover, 

because Appellant is incarcerated, the prisoner mailbox rule applies. See

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 931 A.2d 710 (Pa. Super. 2007) (where the 

date of filing indicates an incarcerated appellant likely placed the notice of 

appeal in the hands of prison authorities before the expiration of the 30-day 

appeal period, the notice is deemed timely). Here, the notice of appeal was 

filed on Monday, May 1, 2017. Thus, it follows that Appellant placed the 

notice of appeal in the hands of prison authorities prior to the expiration of 

the appeal period on Saturday, April 30, 2017. 
J-S73003-17

- 3 -

made by the [Commonwealth] in judicial proceedings amount to 

perjury in violation of Title 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4902(A), and in 

violation of [] Appellant’s right to due process of law under the 

14th Amendment to the United States Constitution?

2. Whether the exception clause of Title 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(i)(interference by government officials), supersede 

the provisions set forth in Title 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(A)(3); and 

§ 9544. et seq. (previous litigation and waiver), where the 

Luzerne County Office of the Clerk of Courts unlawfully 

destroyed [] Appellant’s [Pa.R.A.P. 1926(b)] motion and exhibits 

during [] Appellant’s first PCRA and habeas corpus proceedings, 

and whether [] Appellant is entitled to equitable tolling of his 

current appeal due to that interference by government officials 

where such interference undermined [] Appellant’s hearings in 

violation of [] Appellant’s right to due process of law under the 

14th Amendment to the United States Constitution?

3. Whether [Appellant] was denied a fair trial and due process of 

law where police investigators tampered with physical evidence 

and documents in violation of Title 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4910(1) and 

(2), and committed perjury at trial in violation of Title 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 4902(A), in support of tainted evidence; and 

whether such violations amount to the prosecution committing 

fraud upon the court to procure conviction in violation of [] 

Appellant’s rights under the 6th and 14th Amendments to the 

United States Constitution?

4. Whether the PCRA court’s refusal to assert jurisdiction over this 

matter or enforce its inherent power to proceed further on [] 

Appellant’s above claims is an abuse of discretion where [] 

Appellant submitted argument and reliable evidence to show and 

prove that (1) the prosecution knowingly committed fraud upon 

the court at trial to procure conviction; (2) the prosecution 

knowingly (in bad faith) withheld Brady [] material in violation

of a court order to produce such evidence; (3) the Luzerne 

County Office of the Clerk of Courts destroyed Appellant’s 

documents to undermine court proceedings; and (4) the 

[Commonwealth] on appeal committed perjury by lying to both 

state and federal courts?

Appellant’s Brief at iii-iv (suggested answers omitted).

On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, 
J-S73003-17

- 4 -

our standard and scope of review is limited to determining 

whether the PCRA court's findings are supported by the record 

and without legal error. [... Our] scope of review is limited to the 

findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in 

the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA court 

level. [T]his Court applies a de novo standard of review to 

the PCRA court's legal conclusions. Additionally, courts will not 

entertain a second or subsequent request for PCRA relief unless 

the petitioner makes a strong prima facie showing that a 

miscarriage of justice may have occurred. Appellant makes a 

prima facie showing of entitlement to relief only if he 

demonstrates either that the proceedings which resulted in his 

conviction were so unfair that a miscarriage of justice occurred 

which no civilized society could tolerate, or that he was innocent 

of the crimes for which he was charged.

[...T]he timeliness of a PCRA petition implicates the jurisdiction of 

this Court and the PCRA court. Pennsylvania law makes clear no 

court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition. 

The PCRA confers no authority upon this Court to fashion ad 

hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar. This is to accord 

finality to the collateral review process. A petition for relief 

under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must 

be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final 

unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an 

exception to the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), is met. 

Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1215 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

Moreover, Appellant must show that his allegations of error have not 

been previously litigated. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). A claim is 

previously litigated under the PCRA if the highest appellate court in which 

the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the 

merits of the issue. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2).

Initially, we note that Appellant’s conviction became final on May 22, 

2006, when the United States Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for 
J-S73003-17

- 5 -

writ of certiorari. Thus, Appellant’s current PCRA petition, filed on April 12, 

2016, is patently untimely. Appellant attempts to invoke the governmental 

interference and unknown facts exceptions to the PCRA under 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(i) and (ii) to support his first and fourth claims as presented 

above. Appellant claims that on March 22, 2017, he received evidence that, 

at the time of trial, there was an active bench warrant in New Jersey against 

witness, Angela M. Mayfield, who is Appellant’s step-sister. See Appellant’s 

Brief at viii-ix. Appellant attached the warrant to his current PCRA petition. 

Appellant claims that the Commonwealth withheld Mayfield’s warrant from 

him in violation of Brady.

Upon review of the record, we conclude that this issue was previously 

raised and litigated on his first PCRA petition. The PCRA court, in denying 

Appellant relief on his first PCRA petition, stated:

During the [first] PCRA hearing stand-by counsel represented he 

discerned no Brady violation[.] “The question is, does [the] 

Commonwealth have a deal with Ms. Mayfield. I’m not aware of 

anything that I’ve read through the trial transcript, any 

documents that I have received that there was any proof or 

evidence that show there may have been a deal for her 

testimony which would have been a Brady violation. Unless 

[defense counsel at trial] has anything to add to that, I would 

say I didn’t recognize a Brady violation.” [Defense counsel at 

trial] added[,] “I can tell you that our mitigation specialist [] 

spent considerable time with the family and there was never an 

indication that a deal was cut with this woman.” [Defense 

counsel at trial] also provided a lengthy response outlining why, 

even if an outstanding warrant existed, he would not have 

attempted impeach[ment of Mayfield]. First[,] the referenced 

witness provided positive testimony for the defense. Second, 

and more importantly, the defense planned to use this witness 

during the penalty phase[.] [He stated,] “I surely didn’t want to 
J-S73003-17

- 6 -

get into a situation in the guilt phase of the trial where I’m 

telling the jury, don’t believe [Mayfield]. And God forbid if we 

got to the sentencing phase, then I have to tell the jury to 

believe her. That would be pretty contradictory and pretty 

hypocritical on my part.” [The PCRA court] noted [Mayfield] did 

in fact testify on [Appellant’s] behalf during the penalty phase.

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/16/2009, at 19-20. Thus, the PCRA court 

previously determined that Appellant failed to prove trial counsel was 

ineffective.2 We adopted the PCRA court’s reasoning and affirmed on the 

basis of the PCRA’s court’s opinion. See Commonwealth v. Stubbs, 981 

A.2d 322 (Pa. Super. 2009) (unpublished memorandum) at *9.

While Appellant currently claims that he is entitled to relief because he 

just recently uncovered Mayfield’s New Jersey bench warrant, the PCRA 

court had already analyzed the claim in 2009 on two distinct bases. First, it 

determined that there was no evidence of a bench warrant against Mayfield

(which obviously Appellant currently refutes). However, the PCRA court also 

determined, in the alternative, that counsel had a reasonable strategy in 

purposefully not impeaching Mayfield, because she was a positive witness for 

Appellant at trial and her credibility was important to Appellant during the 

____________________________________________

2

In analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we begin with the 

presumption that counsel is effective. See Commonwealth v. Domek, 167 

A.3d 761, 764 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). In order to succeed on 

such a claim, an appellant must establish, by a preponderance of the 

evidence: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable 

basis existed for counsel's actions or failure to act; and (3) appellant 

suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's error, with prejudice measured by 

whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id.
J-S73003-17

- 7 -

penalty phase. Thus, even though Appellant currently has a physical copy of 

Mayfield’s New Jersey bench warrant, the PCRA court already determined 

that trial counsel was effective because he had a reasonable basis for not 

impeaching Mayfield. Hence, the issue was previously litigated.

Appellant claims that he has uncovered newly discovered evidence

when he obtained a copy of the Mayfield warrant. This Court has 

consistently determined that a petitioner must allege and prove previously 

unknown “facts,” not merely a “newly discovered or newly willing source for 

previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Smallwood, 155 A.3d 1054, 

1067 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). Here, the Mayfield warrant was 

not a new fact, because this claim was previously litigated. Accordingly, 

Appellant is not entitled to relief on his first claim.

Next, in his second issue presented, Appellant claims that when he 

filed his first PCRA petition in 2007, he also filed a motion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1926(b) to correct the record with attached exhibits. Appellant’s 

Brief at 11. He currently claims, in sum, that:

Appellant’s [Rule] 1926(b) motion and exhibits were never filed 

or docketed by the Luzerne County Office of the Clerk of Courts, 

and records reflect that the [Rule] 1926(b) motion or exhibits 

were not returned to Appellant to date. The exhibits held the 

merits to the claims raised on appeal and due to the obvious 

destruction of [] Appellant’s motion and exhibits, the reviewing 

courts including the PCRA court; the Superior Court at 871 MDA 

2008; and the U.S. District Court at No. 1:10-CV-1849, could 

not reach the merits of [] Appellant’s claims throughout the 

course of the first appellate proceedings.

Id. at 11-12.
J-S73003-17

- 8 -

Appellant’s claim fails for several reasons. First, Appellant baldly 

claims interference by governmental officials without identifying the 

substance of the documents allegedly filed as a Rule 1926(b) motion to 

correct the record. It is Appellant’s duty to plead and prove entitlement to 

relief. Moreover, when invoking an exception to the PCRA’s one-year 

jurisdictional timing requirement, a petitioner must file a PCRA petition 

“within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Appellant claims that he filed his motion to correct 

the record in 2007. He does not aver when he learned that it was not 

docketed or omitted from the certified record. However, Appellant claims 

that the omission of record documents precluded this Court from reaching 

the merits of his prior PCRA claims in 2009. Appellant has not explained 

why he would not have known about the alleged omission before filing his 

current PCRA petition in 2016. Thus, Appellant’s claim is wholly 

undeveloped and could have been raised earlier. Accordingly, Appellant has 

not complied with Section 9545(b)(2) to establishing jurisdiction before the 

PCRA court and his second issue fails.

In his third pro se issue presented, Appellant claims he “was denied a 

fair trial and due process of law where police investigators tampered with 

physical evidence and documents[.]” Id. at 13. Appellant does not identify 

the physical evidence and/or documents with which the police allegedly 

tampered. We could find this issue waived. See Commonwealth v. 

Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 809, 624 Pa. 446, 470 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted) 
J-S73003-17

- 9 -

(claims waived for failure to develop). However, we also note that Appellant 

raised the following ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his first PCRA 

petition:

Appellant [] suggest[ed] [t]rial [c]ounsel was ineffective for 

failing “to challenge the Commonwealth’s misrepresentation of 

DNA evidence.” Here he essentially argue[d] the adult victim’s 

sexual assault evidence collection kit arrived at the State Police 

Crime Laboratory “improperly sealed.” Appellant suggest[ed] 

[t]rial [c]ounsel should have challenged the admissibility of this 

evidence in contrast to that of the six-year-old murder victim 

which was “properly sealed.” Appellant additionally argue[d] 

that [the] Pennsylvania State Trooper[’s] examination of the 

adult victim’s body during the autopsy with a “forensic light 

source” [was] inconsistent with multiple deposits of semen 

discovered on the adult victim’s clothing.

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/16/2009, at 7. The PCRA court determined that 

Appellant did not deny having sexual intercourse with the adult victim and 

admitted to ejaculating. Id. at 8-9. Thus, the PCRA court concluded that 

trial counsel articulated a reasonable basis for not raising a claim of 

tampering. Because the PCRA court already examined issues pertaining to 

evidence tampering by the police and Appellant since does not otherwise 

develop the issue further, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief 

on his third claim.

In his final claim, Appellant argues that trial counsel “aided the 

prosecution in obtaining” his convictions and “the current fraud upon the 

court” should “invoke the [PCRA] court[’]s inherent power regardless of 

lapse of time.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. As previously stated, 
J-S73003-17

- 10 -

“[t]he PCRA confers no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable 

exceptions to the PCRA time-bar.” Medina, 92 A.3d at 1215. “The period 

for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling[, 

i]nstead, the time for filing can be extended only if the PCRA permits it to be 

extended, i.e., by operation of one of the statutorily enumerated exceptions 

to the PCRA time-bar” listed at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). Smallwood, 155 

A.3d at 1059–1060. Having already determined that Appellant’s PCRA was 

untimely, and not subject to exception, this claim is meritless. 

Finally, on August 2, 2017, Appellant filed a petition for the remission 

of the record and remand to the lower court pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 123. 

However, because we have already determined that Appellant’s PCRA 

petition is untimely, we deny the petition to remit.

Order affirmed. Petition for remission of the record and remand 

denied.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/15/2017