Opinion filed April 4 , 202 4



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

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_____ 

### No. 11

- 2 4

- 00039

- C V

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### IN RE COMMITMENT OF RIC ARDO ISLAND

On Appeal from the 441st District Court Midland County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CR54554

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant has filed a pro se “Consolidated Notice of Appeal and Informal Appeal Brief” that alleges three issues, one of which relates to the trial court’s pretrial commitment of Appellant for the restoration of his competency to stand trial. Appellant’s counsel has submitted a letter inform ing this court that Appellant’s competency was restored , that he pleaded guilty to the charged offense in the underlying case , and request ing that we dismiss th is matter as moot. This court is prohibited from deciding moot controversies. Nat ’ l Collegiate
Athletic Ass ’ n v. Jones , 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999). When an appeal becomes
moot, we must dismiss it for want of jurisdiction. Heckman v. Williamson C n ty. , 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012).2 To the extent the “consolidated” notice of appeal relate s to pretrial issues in
his then

- pending criminal case, we lack jurisdiction to address the appeal because Appellant has pleaded guilty to the charged offense pursuant to a plea bargain agreement and has waived his right to appeal. Rule 25.2(a)(2) p rovides that, in a plea bargain case in which the punishment imposed does not exceed the punishment agreed to by the parties, “a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, (B) after gett ing the trial court’s permission to appeal, or (C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized by statute.” T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(a)(2)

. Subsections (A), (B), and (C) are not applicable here , and Appellant’s notice of appeal does not appear to rela te to matters that were raised by a filed written
motion and ruled on before trial . Nevertheless, w ith regard to subsection (A), a defendant may waive , as here, his right to appeal a trial court’s rulings on pretrial motions, as long as the waiver is “vol untarily, knowingly, and intelligently” made.
Marsh v. State , 444 S.W.3d 654, 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing T EX

. C ODE C RIM

. P ROC

. A NN

. art. 1.14 (Wes t 2005 ) ) ; Ex parte Broadway , 301 S.W.3d 694, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A waiver of this right “will prevent a defendant from appealing without the consent of the trial court.” Broadway , 301 S.W.3d at 697 (citing Monreal v. State , 99 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). The t rial

court has not grant ed permission for Appellant to appeal, and the trial court’s certification states that Appellant does not have the right of appeal and that Appellant has waived his right to appeal. Rule 25.2 provides that, in the absence of the tr ial court’s certification showing that the defendant has a right of appeal, the appeal
“must be dismissed.” T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(d).3 Accordingly , we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See T EX

. R.
A PP

. P. 25.2(d); 42.3(a).

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

April 4 , 202 4
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter , J., and W illiams, J.