*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 11, 2006*

Decided May 11, 2006

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 05-3442

MICHAEL D. SAVICKAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROGER WALKER and JESSE

MONTGOMERY,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 05 C 259

Paul E. Plunkett,

Judge.

ORDER

Michael D. Savickas filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging his

placement on electronic detention (ED) as a condition of the term of supervised

release he was serving for an Illinois conviction. Savickas claimed that the ED

condition constituted ex post facto punishment and violated his right to due process,

and that it was imposed in retaliation for his activities as a jailhouse lawyer. In

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-3442 Page 2

dismissing the suit, the district court suggested that it would be barred by previous

actions brought by Savickas on the same grounds, but ultimately the court rested

its decision on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). We affirm. 

Savickas was released from state prison in 2004 and began serving a term of

mandatory supervised release. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-3(c). As a condition of that release,

the Prisoner Review Board placed him on ED so that his movements could be

monitored by his parole officer. 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-3(f). Savickas filed his first suit

challenging the supervised release and its terms under § 1983 in April 2004. The

district court dismissed this suit on the ground that Savickas was challenging the

fact of his confinement, and therefore his suit should have been brought under the

habeas-corpus statute. Savickas filed a petition for habeas corpus in January 2005,

but the district court concluded that the petition was successive to an earlier

petition challenging Savickas's underlying conviction and therefore had to be

dismissed because Savickas never sought permission from us to file a successive

petition for habeas corpus. Savickas did not appeal this dismissal. Indeed, even

before it was entered he already had filed the § 1983 suit now before this court. The

defendants, citing the dismissal of Savickas's prior § 1983 action, moved to dismiss

the new suit as barred by res judicata. The district court ruled in the defendants'

favor but principally relied on Heck.

Savickas makes no serious argument contesting the district court's

conclusion that Heck bars his suit. Heck prevents plaintiffs from seeking damages

for a criminal conviction or sentence without first showing that the conviction or

sentence has been reversed on appeal, expunged by executive order, or declared

invalid by a state tribunal or a federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding. 512

U.S. at 486-87. The ED condition is part of Savickas's sentence, and Savickas has

not shown that it has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid. 

Therefore, by challenging the ED condition in a § 1983 suit, Savickas is attempting

to do exactly what Heck prohibits. See Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 579-80

(7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220, 1225 (7th Cir. 1977))

(explaining that conditions of parole "'define the perimeters of'" confinement and

thus challenges to particular conditions must be brought as habeas corpus petitions

and not as civil suits under § 1983). 

Savickas says for the first time in his appellate brief that his parole officer

removed the ED equipment from his house in June 2005—a few weeks before the

district court dismissed his case. Had the Prisoner Review Board actually rescinded

the ED condition, the district court's Heck analysis might have been undermined.

See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 755 (2004) (per curiam). But all Savickas

says is that his parole officer removed the ED equipment from his house. This

shows that the ED condition was not being enforced at least temporarily, but it does

not show that the condition was eliminated. 
No. 05-3442 Page 3

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.