1 

SYLLABUS 

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office 

of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor 

approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion. 

State v. Calvin Fair (A-20-22) (086617) 

Argued September 12, 2023 -- Decided January 16, 2024 

WAINER APTER, J., writing for a unanimous Court. 

 The Court considers whether a prosecution for terroristic threats under 

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) premised on a mens rea of recklessness is constitutional. 

 In February 2015, State Police seized several handguns from defendant Calvin 

Fair’s home. In April 2015, defendant referenced the search on Facebook, noting 

that none of the guns the police found were his and that he still had all of his guns. 

On May 1, 2015, officers responded to a domestic-violence call at defendant’s 

home. After a few verbal exchanges with an officer, defendant yelled: “Worry 

about a head shot, [epithet].” At no point did defendant brandish a weapon. About 

two hours after the officers left, defendant made Facebook posts stating in part, 

“THN YU GOT THESE . . . OFFI$ERS THINKIN THEY KNO UR LIFE!!! . . . . I 

KNO WHT YU DRIVE & WHERE ALL YU MOTHERFU$KERS LIVE AT[.]”

After reviewing the public posts, police issued a terroristic threats complaint 

against defendant. An officer testified that in addition to the “[w]orry about a head 

shot” comment, he was concerned from the Facebook posts that defendant still had 

his guns and knew where the officers lived and what cars they drove. 

The terroristic threats statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3, has two subsections. 

Subsection (a) provides that “[a] person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he 

threatens to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another . . . 

or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.” (emphasis added). 

Subsection (b) applies to threats to kill another. Defendant was indicted for actions 

“contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3a and/or b.”

 Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing, among other things, that 

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) is unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalizes 

terroristic threats made with a mens rea of recklessness. At trial, the State asked that 

the court charge the jury on N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) and/or (b). And the verdict sheet 

mirrored the indictment, directing the jury to determine whether the State had 
2 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed third-degree terroristic 

threats in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) and/or (b). During deliberations, the jury 

sent a note, asking: “Do both 2C:12-3(a) and 2C:12-3(b) have to be proven beyond 

a reasonable doubt or just one or the other?” With the consent of both parties, the 

court responded that “it could be . . . one or the other.” Twenty minutes later, the 

jury reached a guilty verdict. 

 Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, agreeing with 

defendant both that the “reckless disregard” portion of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) is 

“facially invalid” and that, “[w]ithout an instruction that would have made . . . clear 

to the jury” that they needed to be unanimous on whether defendant violated 

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), (b), or both, “we can have no confidence that the jury did not 

produce an impermissibly fragmented verdict.” 469 N.J. Super. 538, 548, 558 (App. 

Div. 2021). The State appealed as of right pursuant to Rule 2:2-1(a)(1). 

HELD: A mental state of recklessness -- defined in this context as “morally 

culpable conduct, involving a ‘deliberate decision to endanger another,’” 

Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 79 (2023) -- is constitutionally sufficient for 

a “true threats” prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a). An objective component is 

also necessary for a “true threats” prosecution to survive constitutional scrutiny: the 

State must prove that a reasonable person similarly situated to the victim would have 

viewed the message as threatening violence. Here, defendant was charged with 

terroristic threats in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) and/or (b). On remand, the 

jury should be charged that they must unanimously agree as to whether defendant 

violated N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), (b), or both. 

1. The Court reviews the doctrine of “true threats” -- which “lie outside the bounds 

of the First Amendment’s protection,” Counterman, 600 U.S. at 72 -- as developed 

through Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Court substantially adopts the 

Counterman standard and holds that in a criminal prosecution for a true threat of 

violence under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), a mens rea of recklessness suffices for purposes 

of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 6 

of the New Jersey Constitution. Under this standard, to be found guilty of a 

violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), a defendant must have consciously disregarded a 

substantial and unjustifiable risk that their threat to commit a crime of violence 

would terrorize another person, and that conscious disregard must be a gross 

deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person in a defendant’s 

situation would observe. In the context of true threats, a mens rea of recklessness is 

demanding: it “means that a speaker is aware ‘that others could regard his 

statements as’ threatening violence and ‘delivers them anyway.’” Id. at 79. 

Although it is not purposeful or knowing, “recklessness is morally culpable conduct, 

involving a ‘deliberate decision to endanger another.’” Ibid. This understanding of 

recklessness requires more than the standard of recklessness conveyed in the judge’s 
3 

instructions to the jury in this case, which provided in part that “[o]ne is said to act 

recklessly if one acts . . . heedlessly, or foolhardily.” (emphasis added). With this 

understanding of recklessness as “morally culpable conduct” in the context of true 

threats, the Court agrees that it is constitutionally sufficient for a prosecution of a 

threat of violence under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a). The Court does not decide whether a 

different intent requirement should apply to prosecutions for dissenting political 

speech, because no such speech was prosecuted here. (pp. 16-29) 

2. In addition to a subjective mens rea of at least recklessness, an objective 

component is necessary for a prosecution for a threat of violence under N.J.S.A. 

2C:12-3(a) to survive First Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 6 scrutiny. On the 

objective element, the Court departs from Counterman and from the charge that the 

trial court provided to the jury in this case in one minor respect: the objective 

inquiry, in which the jury determines whether a reasonable person would have 

viewed the defendant’s words as threatening violence, must be undertaken not from 

the perspective of an anonymous ordinary person, but from the perspective of a 

reasonable person similarly situated to the victim. This is another way of saying that 

context matters. Considering the perspective of one similarly situated to the victim, 

which entails consideration of prior interactions between the parties, protects against 

convictions for statements made in jest, political dissent, or angry hyperbole, while 

allowing the State to prosecute true threats of violence that would instill fear of 

injury in a reasonable person in the victim’s position. (pp. 29-32) 

3. The Court remands for a new trial correctly charging the jury on both the 

objective and subjective components of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), consistent with this 

opinion. The Court also asks the Model Criminal Jury Charges Committee to revise 

the model charge for N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), as to both the subjective recklessness 

standard -- including by removing the terms “heedlessly” and “foolhardily” -- and 

the objective standard discussed in its opinion. (pp. 32-33) 

4. Jurors must unanimously agree that the defendant committed every element of 

the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. On remand, the 

court should additionally charge the jury that it must agree unanimously on whether 

defendant violated N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), (b), or both. The terroristic threats statute 

does not identify an individual element of which subsections (a) and (b) are mere 

examples, but rather lists in the disjunctive two separately enumerated, alternative 

crimes of terroristic threats. (pp. 22-23, 33-35) 

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part. REMANDED to the trial court. 

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, 

PIERRE-LOUIS, FASCIALE, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE WAINER 

APTER’s opinion. 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

A-20 September Term 2022 

086617

State of New Jersey, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

Calvin Fair, 

Defendant-Respondent. 

On appeal from the Superior Court, 

Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 

469 N.J. Super. 538 (App. Div. 2021). 

Argued 

September 12, 2023 

Decided 

January 16, 2024 

Alecia Woodard, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause 

for appellant (Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County

Prosecutor, attorney; Daniel I. Bornstein, Designated 

Counsel, of counsel and on the briefs).

Daniel S. Rockoff, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora,

Public Defender, attorney; Daniel S. Rockoff, of counsel 

and on the briefs). 

Michael L. Zuckerman, Deputy Solicitor General, argued 

the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New

Jersey (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; 

Jeremy M. Feigenbaum, Solicitor General, Michael L.

Zuckerman, David M. Galemba, Tim Sheehan, and Catlin 
2

A. Davis, Deputy Attorneys General, of counsel and on 

the briefs). 

Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae

American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American 

Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation and 

Rutgers Constitutional Rights Clinic Center for Law & 

Justice, attorneys; Alexander Shalom and Jeanne 

LoCicero, of counsel and on the briefs, and Ronald K. 

Chen, on the briefs). 

Bruce S. Rosen argued the cause for amicus curiae 

Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey 

(Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; CJ Griffin, of 

counsel and on the briefs, and Bruce S. Rosen and Dillon 

J. McGuire, on the briefs). 

JUSTICE WAINER APTER delivered the opinion of the Court. 

This case requires us to decide whether a prosecution for terroristic 

threats under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) premised on a mens rea of recklessness is 

constitutional under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and 

Article I, Paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) 

provides that a person is guilty of third-degree terroristic threats “if he 

threatens to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another 

or . . . in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or 

inconvenience.” 
3

Defining recklessness in this context as “morally culpable conduct, 

involving a ‘deliberate decision to endanger another,’” Counterman v. 

Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 79 (2023) (quoting Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 

686, 694 (2016)), we hold that a mental state of recklessness is constitutionally 

sufficient for a “true threats” prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a). We also 

hold that an objective component is necessary for a “true threats” prosecution 

to survive constitutional scrutiny: the State must prove that a reasonable 

person similarly situated to the victim would have viewed the message as 

threatening violence. 

Finally, defendant Calvin Fair was charged with terroristic threats in 

violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) and/or (b). We agree with the Appellate 

Division that on remand, the jury should be charged that they must 

unanimously agree as to whether defendant violated N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), (b), 

or both. 

We thus affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate 

Division and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion. 
4

I.

A.

In February 2015, State Police executed a search warrant at the home 

defendant shared with his mother and tenants in Freehold. They seized several 

handguns. In April 2015, defendant referenced the search in three public 

Facebook posts or comments: (1) “And all thm hammers[1] they found inn my 

house! None of thm was mines, I still got all of mines lol”; (2) “This is a post 

for, Freehold Boro poli$e, . . . keep wall wat$hin ur not gonna get my life from 

fb”; (3) “I hope they burn freehold down!!! . . . & yu if look my way again, im 

joinin ISIS. Lol.” 

On May 1, 2015, three Freehold Borough Police Department officers, 

including Officer Sean Healey, responded to a 911 domestic-violence call at 

defendant’s home. Healey knew defendant and was aware that firearms had 

been recovered during the February raid. 

When police arrived, they saw defendant’s girlfriend L.W. outside with 

her children and some of her belongings. She told police that she had been 

“thrown out of the house” but wanted to retrieve her television, which was still

1

 “Hammers” is a commonly used slang term for guns.
5

inside. Officers repeatedly knocked on the door, trying to speak to defendant 

to get the TV returned. Defendant did not answer. 

L.W. stated that she did not want to file a complaint or seek a restraining 

order against defendant. While the police were filling out a victim-notification 

form, defendant stuck his head out of a second-floor window and yelled: 

“Please. Just leave. Just leave this property. Because I don’t want nothing --

I don’t want to talk. There’s nothing to talk about. All I did was put her stuff 

out and she can leave. . . . Please just leave. . . . You all causing too much 

chaos over here for nothing.”

 Police moved off defendant’s front yard and onto the sidewalk. They 

asked defendant if he would return L.W.’s television. Defendant appeared to 

become more agitated, calling the situation “petty” and shouting, “[h]ow many 

times y’all been through this? How many times y’all came over here? . . . . 

Just leave my property. Just leave my property. I’m taking care of my 

mother.” Officer Healey yelled, “[w]e’re going to go. Have a good day, 

Calvin. Thank you for your cooperation.”

Instead of leaving, Officer Healey told L.W. they were going to sign a 

complaint on her behalf “right now.” L.W. said “Calvin, go in the house before 

you get in trouble,” but defendant began yelling profanities at Officer Healey, 
6

repeatedly calling him the “f---ing devil.” When Officer Healey said, “[w]e’ll 

be back with your warrant. . . . So, have fun,” defendant shouted, “[y]ou talking 

crazy, [epithet], talking about signing a f---ing complaint. . . . Always trying to 

break somebody’s a--. That’s all you think about, breaking somebody’s a--. 

Sign a complaint to what? I never did anything to you . . . . Absolutely nothing. 

I never did anything. . . . Get the f--- out of here, [epithet].” Healey responded, 

“That’s disorderly conduct, too.” 

Defendant then yelled: “F---ing thirsty a-- [epithet]. You thirsty. 

Worry about a head shot, [epithet].” Officer Healey replied, “And that there is 

a threat.” Another officer on the scene agreed, “That is threats right there.” 

At no point did defendant brandish a weapon. 

The officers then got in their cars and left. 

Approximately two hours later, defendant posted the following on 

Facebook: 

I think its about tht time to give Mr. Al Sharpton & Mr 

Rev[] Jackson, internal affairs & my law[yer] a $all, 

one thg yu wont do is disrespe$t me or my 84 year old 

mother kause yu $arry a badge & another thg yu not 

doin is tryin to keep me inn system with patty fines & 

$omplaints whn im not ur job . . . . My 84 year old 

mother didnt deserves her door bein ki$k inn by 30 

armed offi$ers with aks & shields drawn. . . . YU WILL 

PAY, WHOEVA HAD ANY INVOLVEMENT. 

WASTIN TAX PAYERS MONEY! BRINING ALL 
7

THM OFFI$ERS OUT FOR A 84 YEAR OLD 

WOMEN! SO SAD BUT WE WILL HAVE THA 

LAST LAUGH! #JUSTWAITONIT[.] 

Defendant then replied to his own post, “THN YU GOT THESE . . . 

OFFI$ERS THINKIN THEY KNO UR LIFE!!! . . . . I KNO WHT YU DRIVE 

& WHERE ALL YU MOTHERFU$KERS LIVE AT[.]” 

After reviewing the public posts, police issued a terroristic threats 

complaint against defendant. Officer Healey testified that in addition to the 

“[w]orry about a head shot” comment, he was concerned from the Facebook 

posts that defendant still had his guns and knew where the officers lived and 

what cars they drove. 

B.

The terroristic threats statute under which the police charged defendant 

reads, in relevant part: 

(a) A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if 

he threatens to commit any crime of violence with the 

purpose to terrorize another . . . or in reckless disregard 

of the risk of causing such terror . . . . 

(b) A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if 

he threatens to kill another with the purpose to put him 

in imminent fear of death under circumstances 

reasonably causing the victim to believe the immediacy 

of the threat and the likelihood that it will be carried 

out.
8

[N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3 (emphasis added).] 

On August 13, 2015, a Monmouth County Grand Jury indicted defendant 

on one count of third-degree terroristic threats for 

threatening to commit a crime of violence with the 

purpose to terrorize [Officer Healey], or in reckless 

disregard of the risk of causing such terror, or by

threatening to kill [Officer Healey], with the purpose to 

put him in imminent fear of death under circumstances 

reasonably causing [Officer Healey], to believe the

immediacy of the threat and the likelihood that it would 

be carried out, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 

2C:12-3a and/or b.

 Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing, among other 

things, that N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) is unconstitutionally overbroad because it 

criminalizes terroristic threats made with a mens rea of recklessness. The trial 

court denied the motion, finding defendant’s statements, including the “worry 

about a head shot” comment and the subsequent Facebook post about knowing 

“what cars the officers drove and where they lived,” were a true threat that was 

not protected by the First Amendment. The court also concluded that 

defendant’s statements were “properly categorized as a threat to kill or to 

harm” Healey, and “were not political and were not made in a political 

context.”
9

At trial, the State asked that the court charge the jury on N.J.S.A. 2C:12-

3(a) and/or (b). Defendant did not object. The court charged the jury on 

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) as follows:

The first element that the State must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt is that defendant threatened to commit 

any crime of violence. The State alleges that defendant 

threatened to kill Patrolman Sean Healey. 

The words or actions of the defendant must be of such 

a nature as to convey menace or fear of a crime of 

violence to the ordinary person. It is not a violation of 

this statute if the threat expresses fleeting anger or was 

made merely to alarm. 

The second element the State must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt is that the threat was made with the 

purpose to terrorize another or in reckless disregard of 

the risk of causing such terror. In this case, the State 

alleges the defendant intended to terrorize Sean Healey. 

The State need not prove the victim actually was 

terrorized.

. . . .

A person acts recklessly with respect to the result of his 

conduct if he consciously disregards a substantial and 

unjustifiable risk that the result will occur from his 

conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree 

that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s 

conduct and the circumstances known to the actor, its 

disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard 

of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in 

the actor’s situation. One is said to act recklessly if one 

acts with recklessness, with scorn for the consequences, 

heedlessly, or foolhardily. 
10

The court then charged the jury on N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b), along with the 

lesser included offense of disorderly conduct. On unanimity, the court 

instructed: “The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror 

and must be unanimous as to each charge. This means you must all agree if 

the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the charge.”

The verdict sheet mirrored the indictment, directing the jury to 

determine whether the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that 

defendant committed third-degree terroristic threats in violation of N.J.S.A. 

2C:12-3(a) and/or (b): 

Defendant Calvin Fair did commit the crime of 

Terroristic Threats by threatening to commit a crime of 

violence with the purpose to terrorize Sean Healey, or 

in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror, 

or by threatening to kill Sean Healey with the purpose 

to put him in imminent fear of death under 

circumstances reasonably causing Sean Healey to 

believe the immediacy of the threat and the likelihood 

it would be carried out. With respect to this charge, 

how do you find? 

Defendant did not object to any portion of the charge or verdict sheet. 

During deliberations, the jury sent a note, asking: “Do both 2C:12-3(a) 

and 2C:12-3(b) have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or just one or the 
11

other?” With the consent of both parties, the court responded: “the answer is 

it could be . . . one or the other . . . .” 

Twenty minutes later, the jury reached a guilty verdict. They were not 

polled as to whether they found defendant guilty of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), (b), 

or both. 

Defendant was sentenced to three years in prison. 

C.

Defendant appealed, arguing that the “reckless disregard” portion of 

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) is unconstitutionally overbroad and that the indictment, 

jury instructions, and verdict sheet were “‘poorly structured,’ making it 

‘[im]possible to know whether the jury reached a . . . unanimous verdict.’” 

State v. Fair, 469 N.J. Super. 538, 541 (App. Div. 2021) (alteration in original).

The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, agreeing with defendant 

that the “reckless disregard” portion of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) is “facially 

invalid.” Id. at 548. According to the Appellate Division, in order to comply 

with the First Amendment, a prosecution for true threats “requires proof that a 

speaker specifically intended to terrorize.” Ibid. The Appellate Division relied 

on the United States Supreme Court’s statement in Virginia v. Black that 

“‘[t]rue threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to 
12

communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 

violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” 538 U.S. 343, 359

(2003) (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)); Fair, 469 

N.J. Super. at 550. 

The court also agreed with defendant that “[w]ithout an instruction that 

would have made . . . clear to the jury” that they needed to be unanimous on 

whether defendant violated N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), (b), or both, “we can have no 

confidence that the jury did not produce an impermissibly fragmented verdict.” 

Fair, 469 N.J. Super. at 558. When the jury asked if both (a) and (b) had to be 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or if it could be just one or the other, “[t]he 

judge should have explained, for example, that a guilty verdict could not be 

rendered if only some of the jurors found a violation of subsection (a) but not 

(b), and the others found a violation of subsection (b) but not (a).” Id. at 556. 

The Appellate Division therefore dismissed the portion of the indictment 

that charged defendant with acting “in reckless disregard of the risk of 

causing” terror under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) and remanded for a new trial on the 

remainder of the indictment. Id. at 558.

The State filed a notice of appeal as of right to this Court, pursuant to 

Rule 2:2-l(a)(l), based on a substantial question “arising under the Constitution 
13

of the United States or this State.” Defendant moved to dismiss the appeal. 

We denied defendant’s motion to dismiss and ordered the appeal to proceed. 

We also granted leave to the Attorney General, the American Civil Liberties 

Union of New Jersey (ACLU), and the Association of Criminal Defense 

Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) to appear as amici curiae. 

While the State’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided 

Counterman v. Colorado, which establishes the federal constitutional 

requirements for a true threats prosecution. 600 U.S. 66 (2023). 

II.

The State maintains that N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) is constitutional because 

Counterman “clarified that true threats are not protected under the First 

Amendment if they are communicated with a mens rea of recklessness.” 

According to the State, “[d]efendant was not prosecuted for expressing any socalled political opinions. He was prosecuted for threatening to shoot Officer 

Healey in the head.” That threat was not protected by the First Amendment 

under Counterman, and this Court should not “afford greater protection to true 

threats under the New Jersey Constitution than that which is afforded under the 

First Amendment,” the State contends. The State also argues that “[t]here was 

no need for a specific unanimity instruction as to the particular subsection of 
14

the statute that was violated, or the particular factual predicate for a finding of 

guilt, especially in the absence of a request for either type of instruction.” 

The Attorney General agrees with the State that Counterman controls the 

First Amendment inquiry, and that there are no sound reasons to depart from 

that rule under the New Jersey Constitution. According to the Attorney 

General, defendant was not engaged in “political speech,” and in any event, 

any rule varying the mens rea depending on whether the threat involved 

political speech would be both “unworkable” and unjustified in light of the 

speech-protective safeguards built into Counterman.

Defendant contends that Counterman did not resolve the First 

Amendment question in this case because while the speech in Counterman 

involved interpersonal stalking, defendant’s statements amounted to “political 

dissent . . . about his government’s criminal justice policies.” According to 

defendant, because political speech has more First Amendment value than 

interpersonal harassment, it is “not too much to require the government to 

prove that a protesting speaker intended to make a threat before it can imprison 

its critic.” Defendant further maintains that the “more protective” New Jersey 

Constitution should be interpreted more broadly than the First Amendment to 

require a specific intent to threaten. Defendant also asks us to affirm the 
15

Appellate Division’s “well-reasoned and unexceptionable application of the 

relevant case law” on unanimity. Because of the way the verdict sheet was 

phrased, according to defendant, it is impossible to know if all twelve jurors 

found him guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), (b), or both. 

The ACLU argues that there “can be no clearer example of political 

protest and advocacy” than defendant’s speech in this case. It also contends 

that we should interpret our State Constitution to require “specific intent to 

place the victim in fear of bodily harm” in all true threats cases. 

The ACDL agrees that our State Constitution “require[s] a higher mens 

rea than recklessness” in a prosecution for true threats. As a fallback, the 

ACDL advocates for “at [] least . . . a more exacting standard of recklessness.” 

The ACDL also argues that a specific unanimity instruction was required here 

because N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) and (b) “are not merely different means of 

committing the crime of terroristic threats, but separate theories of guilt based 

upon different acts and different evidence.” 

III.

A.

We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo, owing no deference 

to the Appellate Division in deciding a question of law. State v. Pomianek, 
16

221 N.J. 66, 80 (2015). Where the Supreme Court has pronounced the relevant 

standard under the United States Constitution, “we are bound to follow it as 

the minimal amount of constitutional protection to be provided.” State v. 

Adkins, 221 N.J. 300, 313 (2015). The New Jersey Constitution may of course 

provide protections beyond the federal minimum. See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 

84 N.J. 535, 557 (1980).

B.

1.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable 

to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “Congress shall 

make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I; 

Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 585 U.S. ___, 

138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018). 

But “[t]rue threats of violence . . . lie outside the bounds of the First 

Amendment’s protection.” Counterman, 600 U.S. at 72. The canonical case 

setting forth the doctrine of “true threats” is Watts v. United States. In Watts, 

the petitioner attended a rally on the Washington Monument grounds. 394 

U.S. at 706. During a small-group discussion about police brutality, the 

petitioner stated that he had received a draft classification of 1-A and was 
17

supposed to report for a physical, but “‘I am not going. If they ever make me 

carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.’ ‘They are not 

going to make me kill my black brothers.’” Ibid. The petitioner and the crowd 

then laughed. Id. at 707. 

The petitioner was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 871(a), which 

prohibited any person from “knowingly and willfully . . . [making] any threat 

to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United 

States.” Id. at 705 (alteration and omission in original). The Supreme Court 

held that the statute was “[c]ertainly . . . constitutional on its face” but 

reversed petitioner’s conviction because he had not made any true threat to 

harm the President. Id. at 707. As the Court explained, a statute which 

criminalizes “a form of pure speech” must, consistent with the “commands of 

the First Amendment,” distinguish between actual threats of violence and 

constitutionally protected speech. Ibid. Because petitioner’s statement, 

“[t]aken in context,” did not truly threaten to kill President Johnson and was 

instead only a “very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to 

the President,” the Supreme Court reversed the conviction. Id. at 708. 
18

Under Watts, a person may be convicted of a true threat only if their 

speech, when taken in context, actually threatens violence. “[P]olitical 

hyperbole” is simply not a “true ‘threat.’” Ibid. 

In several subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court discussed, but did 

not definitively determine, what mens rea is required for a true threats 

prosecution under the First Amendment. 

In Black, the Court explained that “‘[t]rue threats’ encompass those 

statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an 

intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular” person or group of 

people. 538 U.S. at 359. The Court went on: “The speaker need not actually 

intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats ‘protects 

individuals from the fear of violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear 

engenders,’ in addition to protecting people ‘from the possibility that the 

threatened violence will occur.’” Id. at 359-60 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. 

Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)). Black struck down a portion of a Virginia 

statute that prohibited cross burning with “intent to intimidate a person or 

group of persons” and provided that any cross burning would itself “be prima 

facie evidence” of such intent. Id. at 347-48 (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-

423). A plurality of the Court explained that the prima facie provision was 
19

unconstitutional because it allowed the state to convict a defendant not only 

for a cross burned on a person’s front yard to intimidate or threaten, but also 

for a cross burned at a public rally as “a statement of ideology” or “symbol of 

group solidarity.” Id. at 364-67. 

Similarly, in Elonis v. United States, the Court reasoned that criminal 

conduct requires “awareness of some wrongdoing,” but interpreted a federal 

statute that prohibited transmitting “any threat to injure the person of another” 

through interstate commerce to include a knowing or purposeful mental state. 

575 U.S. 723, 738-40 (2015). The Court expressly declined to address whether 

a mens rea of recklessness would suffice for a true threats prosecution under 

the First Amendment. Id. at 740-42. 

The Supreme Court conclusively answered the question in Counterman, 

holding that a true threats prosecution “requires proof that the defendant had 

some subjective understanding of the threatening nature of his statements,” but 

that a “specific intent to threaten the victim” is not required. 600 U.S. at 69, 

73. Instead, a mental state of recklessness “is enough.” Id. at 73. 

Counterman reiterated that true threats of violence must be objectively 

threatening to a reasonable observer when taken in context. As the Court 

explained, the word “true” “distinguishes what is at issue from jests, 
20

hyperbole, or other statements that when taken in context do not convey a real 

possibility that violence will follow (say, ‘I am going to kill you for showing 

up late’).” Id. at 74 (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added). 

In other words, a court must consider “what the statement conveys” to the 

victim before deciding if a threat is objectively “true.” Ibid. 

But the Court held that in addition to this objective component, the 

defendant must also have a subjective mental state in order for a true threats 

prosecution to comport with the First Amendment. Id. at 73. After reviewing 

the mens rea requirements for some other forms of historically unprotected 

speech -- recklessness for defamation and purpose or knowledge for incitement 

and obscenity -- the Court concluded that recklessness was the correct mens 

rea to require for true threats. Id. at 78-82. 

The Court reasoned that it would make little sense to “offer greater 

insulation” to true threats of violence than to defamatory statements. Id. at 80. 

First, the societal interests in preventing threats of violence are at least as 

strong as the societal interests in preventing “truthful reputation-damaging 

statements about public officials.” Id. at 80-81. Second, any “protected 

speech near the borderline” of a true threat of violence against another person 
21

is “further from the First Amendment’s central concerns” than protected 

speech approaching defamation of a public official. Id. at 81. 

Acknowledging that a mental state of purpose or knowledge is required 

for incitement, the Court held it is not necessary for true threats of violence. 

Ibid. The Court explained that although prosecutions for “incitement to 

disorder [are] commonly a hair’s-breadth away from political ‘advocacy’ --

and particularly from strong protests against the government and prevailing 

social order,” the same is not true for prosecutions for threatening actual 

violence against a specific person or group of people. Ibid. (quoting 

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).

2.

Article I, Paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution provides that 

“[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all 

subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed 

to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.” 

In setting forth “an affirmative right” to free speech, the first sentence of 

Article I, Paragraph 6 goes beyond the text of the First Amendment, and is 

“broader than practically all other[]” free speech clauses “in the nation.” 

Green Party v. Hartz Mountain Indus., Inc., 164 N.J. 127, 145 (2000). 
22

Although we often interpret Article I, Paragraph 6 as being “co-extensive with 

the First Amendment,” and allow “federal constitutional principles [to] guide 

[our] analysis,” E & J Equities, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Bd. of Adjustment of 

Franklin, 226 N.J. 549, 568 (2016), in certain contexts we have held that our 

State Constitution’s free speech clause provides “greater protection than the 

First Amendment.” Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, 210 

N.J. 482, 492 (2012). 

C. 

Both the United States and the New Jersey Constitutions require jurors 

to reach a unanimous verdict in a criminal case. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; 

N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 9; see Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 

1397 (2020); State v. Parker, 124 N.J. 628, 633 (1991); see also R. 1:8-9. 

Unanimity generally requires that jurors “‘be in substantial agreement as to 

just what a defendant did’ before determining his or her guilt or innocence.” 

State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 596 (2002) (quoting United States v. Gipson, 553 

F.2d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1977)). Jurors must unanimously agree that the 

defendant committed “every element of the crime with which he is charged, 

beyond a reasonable doubt”; however, they need not unanimously agree as to 

“which of several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular 
23

element, or which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an 

element of the crime.” State v. Macchia, 253 N.J. 232, 252-53 (2023) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

IV.

A.

1.

We substantially adopt the Counterman standard and hold that in a 

criminal prosecution for a true threat of violence under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), a 

mens rea of recklessness suffices for purposes of both the First Amendment to

the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 6 of the New Jersey 

Constitution. 

Under this standard, to be found guilty of a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-

3(a), a defendant must have consciously disregarded a substantial and 

unjustifiable risk that their threat to commit a crime of violence would 

terrorize another person, and that conscious disregard must be a gross 

deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person in a 

defendant’s situation would observe. 

In the context of true threats, a mens rea of recklessness is demanding. 

As the Court explained in Counterman, “[i]n the threats context,” a mens rea 
24

of recklessness “means that a speaker is aware ‘that others could regard his 

statements as’ threatening violence and ‘delivers them anyway.’” 600 U.S. at 

79 (quoting Elonis, 575 U.S. at 746). Although it is not purposeful or 

knowing, “recklessness is morally culpable conduct, involving a ‘deliberate 

decision to endanger another.’” Ibid. (quoting Voisine, 579 U.S. at 694). 

Indeed, “reckless defendants have done more than make a bad mistake. They 

have consciously accepted a substantial risk of inflicting serious harm.” Id. at 

80. 

This understanding of recklessness for purposes of a true threats 

prosecution is generally consistent with, although more specific than, the 

general definition of recklessness in the Criminal Code, set forth in N.J.S.A. 

2C:2-2(b)(3): 

A person acts recklessly with respect to a material

element of an offense when he consciously disregards a 

substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material 

element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk 

must be of such a nature and degree that, considering 

the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the 

circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a 

gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a

reasonable person would observe in the actor’s 

situation.

But it requires more than the standard of recklessness conveyed in the 

judge’s instructions to the jury in this case, which provided in part that “[o]ne 
25

is said to act recklessly if one acts . . . heedlessly, or foolhardily.” (emphasis 

added). That language, drawn from the relevant model charge, see Model Jury 

Charges (Criminal), “Terroristic Threats (N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a))” (rev. Sept. 12, 

2016), is not consistent with the standard we announce today.

With this understanding of recklessness as “morally culpable conduct” in 

the context of true threats, we agree that it is constitutionally sufficient for a 

prosecution of a threat of violence under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a). We agree with 

Counterman that a mens rea of recklessness, so understood, correctly balances 

the need to avoid chilling protected speech with the need to protect individuals 

and society from the profound harms that threats of violence engender.

Like Counterman, we see no reason to “offer greater insulation” to true 

threats of violence than to true statements made about public figures. 600 U.S. 

at 80. And like Counterman, we decline to impose incitement’s knowing or 

purposeful standard on true threats of violence under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a). 

While the context for an incitement charge is often “political advocacy” that 

can easily “bleed over . . . to dissenting political speech at the First 

Amendment’s core,” id. at 81, that is not true for a threat of violence directed 

against a specific individual. 
26

Defendant argues that a mens rea of recklessness could “fall short in 

prosecutions for abrasively criticizing officials in positions of power, who are 

often stand-ins for displeasure at the government” and “in prosecutions for 

civil rights advocacy, especially when such rallying for social change involves 

interactions with law enforcement officers, who are historically suspicious 

about the alleged threats posed by reform movement sympathizers.” 

Therefore, at least in prosecutions for “dissenting political speech at the First 

Amendment’s core,” defendant contends, like his speech in this case, the State 

must be held to a “strong intent requirement.” (quoting Counterman, 600 U.S. 

at 81). 

We need not decide whether a different intent requirement should apply 

to prosecutions under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) for dissenting political speech, 

because no such speech was prosecuted here. 

As earlier noted, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) makes a person guilty of a crime 

only “if he threatens to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to 

terrorize another . . . or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror.” 

It does not, on its face, criminalize political speech in the form of disparaging 

government officials, criticizing law enforcement, or even condemning the 

government itself. 
27

And in this case, defendant was prosecuted for no such thing. He was 

prosecuted for threatening to shoot a police officer in the head. 

Defendant claims that he was prosecuted because he “engaged in a 

heated debate with an officer . . . and then spoke critically to his Facebook 

followers, about his government’s criminal justice policies.” Further, 

defendant submits, he was “punish[ed]” because he “challenged [the] officers’ 

policies and called for reform,” while “protest[ing] against the government and 

[the] prevailing social order.” 

That is incorrect. At trial, the State argued that defendant was guilty of 

terroristic threats when he said, “[w]orry about a head shot, [epithet].” And 

the State urged that the threat to kill Officer Healey was given “weight,” 

“immediacy,” and “legitimacy” from defendant’s April Facebook post that he 

still had his guns, and defendant’s comment on Facebook, made less than three 

hours after the threat, “I KNO WHT YU DRIVE & WHERE ALL YU 

MOTHERFU$KERS LIVE AT[.]”

The State did not assert that defendant was guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 

2C:12-3 because he told the police they were “causing too much chaos over 

here for nothing”; because he called Officer Healey “the f---ing devil”; or 

because he said that Officer Healey was “[a]lways trying to break somebody’s 
28

a--.” Instead, the State repeatedly maintained that defendant was guilty of 

terroristic threats because he threatened to shoot Officer Healey in the head. 

The same is true for defendant’s Facebook posts. Defendant was not 

prosecuted for writing “I hope they burn freehold down!!!” or “im joinin ISIS. 

Lol.” He was not prosecuted for posting that it was time to contact the 

Reverend Al Sharpton, the Reverend Jesse Jackson, Internal Affairs, or his 

lawyer. He was not prosecuted for berating the police for disrespecting his 

mother and trying to keep him in the system with petty fines and complaints. 

And he was not prosecuted for writing “YU WILL PAY, WHOEVA HAD ANY 

INVOLVEMENT. WASTIN TAX PAYERS MONEY! ... SO SAD BUT WE 

WILL HAVE THA LAST LAUGH! #JUSTWAITONIT[.]” Defendant was 

prosecuted for threatening to shoot Officer Healey in the head, and then 

concretizing the threat mere hours later with the words “I KNO WHT YU 

DRIVE & WHERE ALL YU MOTHERFU$KERS LIVE AT[.]”

Quite simply, it is clear from the entirety of the trial that defendant was 

not prosecuted for “dissenting political speech.” He was prosecuted for 

threatening to shoot a police officer in the head. 

And defendant made this statement not at a political protest, march, 

demonstration, or rally, but when police responded to a domestic-violence call 
29

at his home. We therefore decline to consider whether a mens rea other than 

recklessness would be required if the State attempted to prosecute “dissenting 

political speech” as a true threat of violence under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a).

We also disagree with defendant that Watts would have been decided 

differently under the recklessness standard we adopt today. Watts did not turn 

on the defendant’s subjective mens rea. It turned on the objective component 

of a prosecution for true threats: whether the defendant’s words, taken in 

context, would be understood as threatening to a reasonable observer. Watts, 

394 U.S. at 708. In holding that they would not, the United States Supreme 

Court looked at the “context” of the defendant’s statement during a smallgroup discussion about police brutality at the Washington Monument, its 

conditional phrasing, and the reactions of others in the group (laughter), and 

concluded that the defendant’s statement was “political hyperbole” and not a 

true threat. Ibid. Watts concluded that there was no true threat because the 

statement at issue was not objectively threatening; the defendant’s subjective 

mens rea did not come into play. 

2.

In addition to a subjective mens rea of at least recklessness, we hold that 

an objective component is necessary for a prosecution for a threat of violence 
30

under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) to survive First Amendment and Article I, 

Paragraph 6 scrutiny. 

On the objective element, we depart from Counterman and from the 

charge that the trial court provided to the jury in this case in one minor respect. 

The trial and appellate courts in Counterman had assessed the threat under “an 

objective reasonable person standard,” requiring the State to prove “that a 

reasonable person would have viewed the . . . messages as threatening.” 

Counterman, 600 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). And the trial court here charged the jury that the threat 

“must be of such a nature as to convey menace or fear of a crime of violence to 

the ordinary person. It is not a violation of this statute if the threat expresses 

fleeting anger or was made merely to alarm.” (emphasis added). 

But we have previously held that for a prosecution under N.J.S.A. 

2C:12-3(b), which requires that a threat be made “under circumstances 

reasonably causing the victim to believe the immediacy of the threat and the 

likelihood that it will be carried out,” proof “must be measured by an objective 

standard” that must include consideration of “a [victim’s] individual 

circumstances and background.” Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 402-03 

(1998) (emphasis added). 
31

Similarly, in H.E.S. v. J.C.S., we explained that the “cause a reasonable 

person to fear” element in N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b), which criminalizes domesticviolence stalking, requires consideration of “whether a reasonable person in 

[the victim’s] situation, knowing what [the victim knew about the defendant] 

under the totality of the circumstances, would have feared bodily injury as a 

result of [the defendant’s] alleged speech and conduct.” 175 N.J. 309, 330 

(2003) (emphasis added). Our interpretation was in keeping with the 

Legislature’s instruction in N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(a)(4) that, “[a]s used in this act . 

. . ‘[c]ause a reasonable person to fear’ means to cause fear which a reasonable 

victim, similarly situated, would have under the circumstances.” 

We therefore hold that the objective inquiry, in which the jury 

determines whether a reasonable person would have viewed the defendant’s 

words as threatening violence, must be undertaken not from the perspective of 

an anonymous ordinary person, but from the perspective of a reasonable 

person similarly situated to the victim. As the Indiana Supreme Court has 

explained, because “the particular facts and circumstances known to each 

victim are the very facts from which threatening implications are generally 

drawn,” the objective element of a true threats prosecution must consider 

“whether it was objectively reasonable for the victim to fear for their safety” in 
32

the context of their experiences with the perpetrator. Brewington v. State, 7 

N.E.3d 946, 969 (Ind. 2014) (requiring a “‘reasonable victim’ test,” rather than 

a “reasonable person” test, in a true threats prosecution, to capture “what a 

reasonable person would perceive if similarly situated to the victim” (emphasis 

added)). 

This is another way of saying that context matters. Considering the 

perspective of one similarly situated to the victim, which entails consideration 

of prior interactions between the parties, protects against convictions for 

statements made in jest, political dissent, or angry hyperbole, while allowing 

the State to prosecute true threats of violence that would instill fear of injury in 

a reasonable person in the victim’s position. The inquiry in this case is thus 

not whether any ordinary person would have feared for their safety, but 

whether a reasonable police officer in Officer Healey’s position would have 

feared for their safety, given the entire interaction with defendant. 

3.

We thus remand for a new trial correctly charging the jury on both the 

objective and subjective components of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), consistent with 

this opinion.
33

We also ask the Model Criminal Jury Charges Committee to revise the 

model charge for N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), both as to the subjective recklessness 

standard -- including by removing the terms “heedlessly” and “foolhardily” --

and the objective standard discussed herein.

B.

On remand, the court should additionally charge the jury that it must 

agree unanimously on whether defendant violated N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), (b), or 

both. 

The difference between an element of an offense and a means of 

committing an offense can be difficult to parse. The definition of “element” in 

the criminal code does not provide help: it defines “element” and “material 

element” to include different means or brute facts that would satisfy a single 

element of a crime. See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(h) (“‘Element of an offense’ means 

(1) such conduct or (2) such attendant circumstances . . . as (a) Is included in 

the description of the forbidden conduct in the definition of the offense; 

(b) Establishes the required kind of culpability . . . .”); N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(i) 

(“‘Material element of an offense’ means an element that does not relate 

exclusively to the statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue or to any other 

---
34

matter similarly unconnected with (1) the harm or evil, incident to conduct, 

sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense . . . .”). 

As we explained in Macchia, if a statute required the use of a deadly 

weapon as a single element of a crime and provided that the element could be 

satisfied through use of a “‘knife, gun, bat, or similar weapon,’” then the use 

of a knife, gun, bat, or other weapon would be different types of “conduct” that 

would be “included in the description of the forbidden conduct in the 

definition of the offense,” and would “[e]stablish[] the required kind of 

culpability” -- making each fall within the statute’s definition of “material 

element” in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(i). Macchia, 253 N.J. at 254 (quoting Mathis v. 

United States, 579 U.S. 500, 506 (2016) and N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(h) and (i)). Yet 

the four weapons would undeniably be means of satisfying one single element 

of the crime: use of a deadly weapon. 

Here, it suffices to note that the terroristic threats statute, N.J.S.A. 

2C:12-3, “does not identify an individual element of which subsections [(a) 

and (b)] are mere examples,” but rather “lists in the disjunctive [two] 

separately enumerated, alternative” crimes of terroristic threats. United States 

v. McCants, 952 F.3d 416, 426 (3d Cir. 2020) (analyzing N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1). 

That is clear from the plain text of the statute, which does not consist of one 
35

section setting forth a crime of terroristic threats that can be satisfied through 

various alternative means, and instead sets forth two separate crimes of 

terroristic threats. See N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3 (“(a) A person is guilty of a crime of 

the third degree if he threatens to commit any crime of violence with the 

purpose to terrorize another . . . or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing 

such terror . . . . (b) A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he 

threatens to kill another with the purpose to put him in imminent fear of death 

under circumstances reasonably causing the victim to believe the immediacy of 

the threat and the likelihood that it will be carried out.”). Given the structure 

of the statute, we conclude that a jury must unanimously agree as to whether a 

defendant is guilty of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a), (b), or both, and must be so 

charged. 

V.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed in part and reversed 

in part, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, 

PIERRE-LOUIS, FASCIALE, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE WAINER 

APTER’s opinion.

---