### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 07 -0 01 59 -C R

______________________________ J ESSI E J OE PAYAN, A

ppellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appea l from the 159th J udicial District Court

Ang elina County , Texas Trial Court No. CR-27083

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by J ustice Carte r ConcurringOpinion by

J ustice Moseley" [T]he jud g e sh a ll, be fo re argume nt b e g ins , d e liv e r t o th e jur y . . . a wr itt e n c ha

rg e dis tin c tly 1 s et t i n g forth the law applicable to the case ; not ex pressing any opinion as to the weig ht of the evi den ce . . . . " T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 36.14 (V ernon 2007)
. 2 MEMORANDUM OPI

NI ON J essie J o e P ay an was convicted by a jury of four counts of indec ency

with a child and sentenc ed to twelve y ear s' confine ment. Pay an bring s this appeal urg ing that the trial court e rre d by commenting on the weig ht of the evide nce in a jury charge i n s t ru ct i on. We ag ree err or wa s 1 committed, but finding the ha rm that resulted was not e g reg ious, w e aff irm the judg ment of the trial
c ourt
. I. F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound Ha vin g re c e ive d r e po rt s o f a se xua l c ri me by

Pay an, De te c tiv e Da

vid C ros s of th e Luf

kin Police Depa

rtment reque sted that Pay an come to the pol ice station for an interview. When Pay an
arr ived, Cross advised him that he wa s fre e to leave , was not under arres t , an d co u l d stop the interview. B ut Cross did not tell Pay an that he was re cordingthe interview . When the discussion
was c ompleted, Pay an lef t and was arr ested thi rtee n day s later on charg es which w ere the subject of the interview
. The State off

ere d the vi deotape d interview into evidence a nd, afte r establishing that Pay an was not told it would be rec orded, Pay an moved the c ourt to disallow the rec ording contendingthat the fa ilure to n oti fy

him that it wo uld be re c or de d r e su lte d in his makin g an invo lun tary state me nt. The trial court overr

uled this objection, but stated that an instruction reg ardingthe voluntariness ofPara g ra ph7 of Payan' s pro po se d ch arg e wa s an ins tr uc tio n tha t the jur

y sh ou ld ac qu it i f i t 2 found the touchingto have be en ac cidental or if it was done with no intent to arouse or g ratify sexual desires. We further

note other problems with Payan' s proposed char g e—it contained a definition of 3 "r easona ble doubt" that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has rejecte d. Pa uls on v . S tat e , 28 S.W .3d 570, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 3 the statement would be subm itted to the jury . After the evidenc e wa s conclude d, the State re quested the cour t to add to the ty

pical ins truction on voluntariness of a st atement the following : "The law does not requir e that a suspec t be informed by a pea ce of

fice r that his statement is being rec orded elec tronically ." T he trial c ourt so instructed the jury
. II. P rese rvation of E rror When the trial court g ave Payan an oppor tunity , Pay an did not object to t his instruction, but of fe re d th e tr ia l c ourt an en tir e omn ibu s p ro po se d c ha rg e , c on sis tin g of

fi ft e e n p a g e s o f i ns tr

uc tio ns . Pay an did not call to the court' s attention that his pr oposed char g e did not contai n t h e a d d i t i o nal ins tr uc tio n c on c e rn ingvo lun tari ne ss o f the state me nt, bu t e xpla ine d to the c ourt that it wa s " ba sic a lly the same a s the State' s except for Para g raph 7." Pay an ar g ues that this submiss ion of an e ntire jury 2 char g e, which did not contain the c omplained-of a ddition, preserve s the alleg ed er ror. 3 We disag ree . This Court has previously held that, when a

party fails to object to an instruction, the submissi on on an omnibus c harg e on the entire case , without more, ca nnot be see n as a sufficient, specific request pursuant to Article 36.15 of t he Tex as C ode of Criminal Proce dure."T he def endant may , by

a spec ial reque sted instruction, call the trial court' s attention to error 4 in t he c ha rg e , . . . a nd no oth e r e xce pti on or ob je c tio n to the c ourt ' s c ha

rg e sh a ll b e ne c e ssa

ry to pres erve any erro r reflect ed by any sp eci al r equ est ed i ns tr uct io n wh ich th e tr ial cou rtrefu ses ." See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 36.15. 4 See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 36.15 (V ernon 2007) ; Tay lor v . S tat e , 146 S.W .3d 801, 806 4 (Tex. A pp.—Texarkana 2004, pet. ref ' d) (punishment char g e consisting of six pag es was not
s u ff i ci en tt o p r e s e r v e re gar d i n g i mp ro p er p ar o l e i n s t ru ct i o n ) ( ci t i n g Arana v
. Sta te , 1 S.W .3d 824 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999, pet. re f' d)). He re, not only did Pay an fa il to object to the ins tr uc tio n, the fu

rt he r s ta te me nt t o th e c ourt that hi s c ha

rg e wa s b a sic a lly

the same a s th e State ' s, except for a

n issue irrele vant t o this discussion, did not apprise the trial court that he was proposing
so me thi ngdif

fe re nt. Ac c or din g ly , w e fi nd Pay an f a ile d t o o bje c t to the ins tr uc tio n a nd mus t demonstrate that the jury

char g e er ror r esulted in " eg reg ious harm" to him to war rant a reve rsal. See Ab dn or v . S tat e , 871 S.W .2d 726, 731–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). III. Jury Charge Err or I nan al y z i n g a j u ry

ch ar ge c o mp l ai n t , we fi rs t d et er m i n e (1 ) w h et h er erro r e x i s t s i nt h e c h ar ge and, then, if c harg e er

ror is fo und (2) whe ther suff icient har m resulted fr om the err or to compel
reve rsal. Ngo v . S

tat e , 1 7 5 S. W. 3 d 7 3 8 , 7 4 3

– 4 4 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . 2 0 0 5 )
. T h e d e g r e e o f harm
nece ssary for r ever sal depe nds on whether the def endant r aised the objection below. Id. at 743. When a def

endant fa i l s t o o bject, we will not reverse unless the re cord shows that the defe ndant
su ffered "egreg io us harm ." Id. a t 74 3–44 ; Bl uit t v . S tat e , 137 S.W .3d 51, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)5

(h o l d i n g al s o t h at af

fi rm at i v e d en i al o f o b

j ec t i o ni s eq u i v al en tt o fa i l u re t o o b j ec tt o j u ry

c h ar ge
err or). T h e a d d i t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n g i v e nt h a t" t h e l aw d o e s n o tr e qu i r e a s u s p e c tb e i n f

o r m e d b y a peac e off icer that his statement is being rec orded e lectronic ally " is a corr ect st atement of law. Article 38.22 no long er c ontains this requirement. SeeT EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 38.22 , § 3 (Ve rnon 2007); Mo or e v . S tat e , 882 S.W .2d 844, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Fur ther, the e vidence demonstrates t h at P ay an ' s statement was not take n during a custodial interr og ation. But, whe ther the state me nt is a le g a lly c or re c t on e is no t the iss ue in t his c a se . M any

ins tr uc tio ns re qu e ste d b oth by the State and

a de fe nd ant a

re c or re c t st a te me nts of the law, bu t are no t pr op e r j ur y ins tr uc tio ns . The Texas Court of Criminal Appe als has explained that e ven a se eming ly neutra l instruction may violate Article 36.14 by singling out a particular piece of evidenc e for specia l attention. Rocha v

. Sta te , 16 S.W .3d 1, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). I n Rocha , the def ense r equeste d an instruction on the voluntariness of a

confe ssion that advised the jury that, if the def

endant was i l l , medicate d, or phy sically

or mentally

incapa citated to the e x tent as t o rende r hi s or her confe ssion involunt ary , the jury should disreg ard it. Id. I n finding this an improper instruction, the c ourt stated: " Even a
se e min g ly ne utr a l ins tr

uc tio n a bo ut a pa rt ic ula r ty pe of e vid e nc e c on sti tut e s an imp e rm iss ibl e comment on the we ight of the evidenc e in violation of Article 36.14 beca use such a

n instruction si ngles ou t a par ti cul ar pi ece of evi den ce fo r sp eci al a tt ent io n. " Id
. (c i t i n g Ma tam or os v . S tat e , 901 S.W. 2d 47 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 )) ; se e als o P e nr yv . S tat e , 9 03 S.W. 2d 71 5, 74 8 ( Te x. Cr im.6

Ap p. 19 95 ) ( sp e c ia l in str

uc tio n s ing lin g ou t is su e of me nta l r e tard a tio n in de te rm ini ngvo lun tari ne ss of conf ession was improper ). Pay an re lies on Rocha , but the State made no attempt to ex plain why its rational e is not applicable in this case. Indeed, the State' s brief f ails to even c ite Rocha
. Rece ntly , the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has r eaf firmed that a

n instruction focusing on a par ticular fa ctor that may

rende r a state ment involuntary is an impermissible comment on t he weig ht of the evide nce. Ga llo v . S tat e , 239 S.W .3d 757, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A cor ollary of th a t p r o p o s it io n a

p p li e s
— an in s tr

u c ti o n th at f

o c u s e s o n a p arti c u la

r f a c to r th a t ma

y r e nder a statement voluntary

is an impermissible comment on the weig ht of the evide nce. This instruction focuses on a particula r fa ctor (ta

ping did not have to be disclosed to Pay an) that mi g ht h e lp p e rs ua de the jur y the state me nt w a s a

vo lun tary

on e . T he S tat e recog nize d th is ins tr uc tio n w a s u se fu l in

c on vin c ingthe jur

y that th e state me nt w a s a vo lunt ary on e wh e n it specific ally

ref err ed to this instruction during its argument on volunta ri n es s. The additional instruction was an e rrone ous comment on the we ight of the evidenc e. I V. E g re g i o u s H a rm Havingdeter

mined that there was e rror in the char g e, the issue is whe ther suff icient harm was
cause d by the err or to r equire a re versa l. Se e Hu tc h v . S tat e , 9 22 S.W. 2d

16 6, 17 0– 71 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ). Th e sta

nd ard to de te rm ine wh e the r suf fi c ie nt harm re su lte d fr om t he c ha rg inge rr or

to require reve rsal depe nds on whether the appellant objected. Se e Ol iv as v . S tat e , 202 S.W .3d 137,7

1 4 4 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 6 ) ( i n t er p re t i n g Al ma nz a v . S

tat e , 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on r eh' g )). Be cause Pay an did not object at tria l to the error in the court' s char g e, the issue is whe ther the e r r o r c r e a te d s u c h h ar m t h a t P ay and id

n o t h a v e a

f a ir an d im p arti a l t r ia l— in s h o rt, th at "e g reg ious harm" has occurre d. Abdnor , 8 71 S.W. 2d a t 73 1– 32 ; Al

ma nz a , 6 86 S.W. 2d

a t 17 1; see T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . a rt . 3 6. 19 (V e rn on

20 06 ); Hutch , 922 S.W .2d at 171. To de te rm ine " e g re g iou s har m," a re vie wi ng c ourt e xami ne s the e nti re jur y c ha rg e , th e state of the e vid e nc e , in c lud ingthe c on te ste d iss ue s a nd we ig ht of the pr ob a tiv e e vid e nc e , th e argume nts of counse l, and any

o t h er re l evant infor

mation reve aled by

the re cord of

the trial as a

whole. The appellant must have s u ffered a ctual, rather than the oretica l, harm. Err ors that re sult in egr eg ious ha rm are de sc ri be d as tho se that af fe c t th e ve ry

ba sis of the c a se , d e pr ive the de fe nd ant o f a va lua ble rig ht, or vi tally aff

ect a defe nsive theory
. W

ar ne r v . S tat e , N o s . PD
- 1 6 8 0
- 0 5 , PD
- 1 6 8 1
- 0 5 , 2 0 0 8 WL 37 55 03 , at *2 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. F e b. 13 , 2 00 8) ; see also Hutch , 922 S.W .2d at 171. The trial e vidence included not only Pay an' s inculpatory statements, but a lso the testimony of the two minors, who de tailed the sexual crimes, a nd an outcr

y witness. There is no claim that the evidenc e is insufficient to support the ve rdict of the jur y . Absent the instruction in question, the charg e is unexceptional. The a pplication para g raph proper ly instructs the jury

conce rning the voluntariness of Payan' s statement; it contains no other
err oneous or que stionable sections and corre ctly there afte r instructs the jury in apply ing the criminal8

statute to the alleg ations in this case. Com pa re He ss v . S tat e , 224 S.W .3d 511, 515 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2007, pet. ref' d). The State did br iefly ref er to this improper ins t ru ct i o n d u ri ng its jury argument. F ur the r, the re is n o o the r r e le va nt i nf or ma tio n th a t in dic a te s Pay an suf fe re d e g re g iou s h a rm . Pay an ar g ues that his statement play ed a m aj o r ro l e in t he jury convicting him. But, it is not t he admission of Pay an' s statement that is at issue, as no challeng e is made to its admissi bility , but to the additional instruction. There is no evidenc e to show how P ay an' s lack of knowledg e of the taping aff ecte d his decision to speak to the off icer . After

examining the ev i dence , the jury char g e, arguments of counse l, and re levant informa tion, it does not ap p ea r t h at t he trial c ourt' s improper
e mph a sis of

thi s pa rt ic ula r e vid e nc e a ff

e c te d the ve ry ba sis of the c a se , de pr ive d Pay an of a va lua ble rig ht, or vitally

aff ecte d a def

ensive theor

y . Eg reg ious harm has not bee n shown. We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

J ack Ca

rter J ustice
CONCURRI

NG OPI NI ON During trial, Pay an had made it plain that he (e rrone ously) believe d that if a pe rson has not been pr eviously

informed by

law enf orce ment office rs t hat an interview with them is being taped, that lack of

fore war ning r ender s the resulting rec ording i n ad m i s s i b l e in the same fashion as a n9

involuntary

statement. This issue was the subject of a hear ing outside the pre sence of the jury . At the time the trial court overr uled this objec tion, it noted that Pay an' s defe nse counsel c ould stil l arg ue t h e v o l u n t ar i n e s s o f

t h i s s t a t e m e n tt o t h e j u r

y. B e c a us e Pay an h a d s tr e nu ou sly a dv anc e d th is a

rgume nt dur ingtr ia l, t

he tr ia l c ourt

c ou ld
re a so na bly a ssume that th e re wa s a su bs tanti a l likel ihood

that Pay an w ou ld r a ise thi s sa me contention in closing arguments to the jury . (One might assume that this would, i ndeed, ha ve bee n done if the tria l court had not inc luded an instruction to the jury that a wa rning to an interview ee that a recording was being made was not a necessar y predic ate to the admissibi lity of the re cording .) Ha d that argument been made, the jury could easily have been confuse d as to appropr iate law c oncer ning the voluntariness of the statements containe d in the rec ording
. Ar tic le 36 .1 4 o f t

he Te xas C od e of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure dic ta te s th a t th e tr ia l ju dg e is t o del iv er t he j ury

a "a wri tt en ch arge di st in ctl y set ti ng for th th e la w ap pl ica bl e to th e cas e." T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 36.14 (Ve rnon 2007). Trial judge s are not automatons; as such, they are not fo rc e d to re ly

so le ly on pr int e d f or ms f or the ir ins tr uc tio ns to a ju ry . No form b oo k is g oin g to include par ag raphs or

instructions pertaining to e very possible circumstanc e in which the a pplication of law to the f

acts of the case neede d to be explained to a jury
. The saf er c ourse f

or a tria l court is to remain a long the well-traveled path in jury char g es be c a us e pr e c ipi c e s o f e rr or

y awn on the sid e s o f t

he re g ula r pa ths wh ic h ar e tr od
. Ho we ve r, it i s a lso
nece ssary to provide a jury with the i nformation about the l aw which it needs to arr ive at a pr oper10

conclusion. Given the particula r circ umstances of this c ase, I believe that the trial cour t did nothing more than that. The majority has found that the instruc tion was er ro r, but that the er ror wa s harmless; I

would find that no err or wa s committed.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: Marc h 24, 2008 Date D ecide d: May 23, 2008 Do No t Pu

bli sh