Th is und e rl yingc us tod y dis pute is th e su

bje c t of an a pp e a l no w p e nd ingin t

his Court
. 1 Che rry v . S

e rio , No. 03–07-00126-CV (Tex. A pp.—Austin, notice of appea l filed Fe b. 28, 2007). 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 629 -CV

In re Vanessa Cher ry

OR IG IN A L PR OC E E D IN G FR OM WI L L IA MS ON C OU N T Y

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Relator Va

nessa C herr

y filed a pe tition for writs of mandamus and pr ohibition, which she subse quently amende d, as we ll as a motion for tempora ry emer g ency

relief
. SeeTe x. R. App. P. 52.1, 52.10. We will deny the amende d petition f

or writs of mandamus and prohibition and dismiss as moot the motion for temporar y relief
. Th is p ro c e e din g is r e late d to Che rr y ’s c ri min a l pro se c uti on fo r he r c on du c t in a c hil d custody dispute with h er ex -husband. On or a bout October

18, 2004, Cherry

absconde d to New 1 York with the couple’s onl y child. She was a

rre sted in New Y ork on or a bout Dece mber 3, 2004,
an d s u b s e qu e n t l y i n d i c t e d i n W i l l i am s o n C o u n t y f o r t h e o f f e n s e o f i n t e r f

e r e n c e w i t hc h i l d

c u s t o dy. On August 15, 2005, Cherry pleade d g uilty

t o the offe nse in exchang e for the State’s
re c omm e nd a tio n th a t sh e re c e ive thr e e y e ars’ def e rr e d a dju dic a tio n, a

$1 ,5 00 fi ne , a

nd 15 da y s in ja il. Che rr

y sig ne d a wr itt e n p le a

a g re e me nt r e fl e c tin g thi s re c omm e nd a tio n, and a c kn ow le dg e d it2

on the re cord in ope n court. Two a dditional hearing s were held re g ardingsentenc ing a nd conditions of community

supervision, afte r which the district court sig ned an “ Orde r of De fer red A djudication; C o m m u n i t y

S u p erv i s i o n ” t h at , i nre l ev an tp ar t , re ci t edt h e f o l l o wi n g:
DATE OF J UDGMENT : October18, 2005 * * * OFF ENSE: Int e r fer e nc e with Chi ld C ust ody STATUTE F OR OFF ENSE: Se c ti on 2 5. 03 , P e nalCo de APPL I CABL E PUNI SHMENT RANGE: St at e Ja il F e lon y
DATE OF OFF ENSE: October18, 2004 CHARGI NG I NSTRUMENT: Indi c tm e nt TERMS OF PL EA AGREEMENT . . .: 3 Ye ar s De fer r e d Ad judic at ion ; $1 ,5 00 F ine ; 1 5 D ay s J ail
PL EA TO OF FEN SE: Guilty * * * DATE ORDER TO COMMENCE: October18, 2004 PERI OD OF SUPERVI SI ON: Three (3) years F I N E : $1,500

* * *3

Of sig nificanc e to this procee ding a re the order ’s re citations of the date o f t he off ense ( October 18, 2004), the date of

judgme nt (Octobe r 18, 2005—exactly one y ear afte r the date of the of

fense ), and the date the orde r wa s to commence (Oc tober 18, 2004, the same date as t he date of the off ense)
. Thus, the orde r literally

provided that th e t h ree -y ear period of c ommunity

supervision for which Cherry had plea -bar g ained would be g in not on the date of judg ment, but one y ear ear lier, on pr e c ise ly the same da

y sh e c omm itt e d he r o ff

e ns e , b e fo re sh e wa s a

pp re he nd e d b y

law e nf or c e me nt. I n this procee ding, Che rry seeks to cha lleng e a nunc pro tunc orde r ente red by the district c ourt on November 19, 2007. This nunc pro tunc order is ide ntical to the orig inal “Or der of Def err ed Adjudication; C ommunity Supervision” except that the commenc ement date is chang ed to “ Oc tob e r 1 8, 20 05 .” Che rr y c ite s th e e sta

bli sh e d p ri nc ipl e that nu

nc pr o tu nc is a va ila ble on ly to
corr ect the c ourt’s re cords to accur ately ref lect the judgme nt actua lly rende red, not to modify

or add provisions to the judgme nt a ctually rende red. S ee In re Hanc ock, 212 S.W .3d 922, 927 (T e x. Ap p. —F or

t Wor th 2 00 7, or ig . p ro c e e din g ); Sm ith v . S tate , 15 S.W .3d 294, 299 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 0, no pe t.) ; see also Ex parte Dopps , 723 S.W .2d 669, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (the “ corr ection ca

n be only as to what wa s done and not a s to what should have be en done.” ). Che rr y argue s th a t th e so le e vid e nc e in t he re c or d re g ard ing the date he r c omm un ity se rv ic e wa s to be g in i s th e re c itatio n o f “ Oc tob e r 1 8, 20 04 ” in t he or ig ina l ju dg me nt a

nd th at “th is is n ot a

c a se wher e the rec ord is silent or wher e the rec ord reve als a contra diction.” Thus, Cherry maintains, the
or ig ina l or de r a c c ur a te ly

re fl e c te d th e jud g me nt a c tua lly re nd e re d b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt
. I f the orig inal order

did not accur ately

ref lect the judgment the district cour t had actua lly rende red, Cher

ry continues, the discr epanc y was the r esult of a “judicial err or,” not a mer e4

cler ical er

ror. A nu n c p ro tunc orde r may be used only

to corre ct a c lerica l error —the fa ilure to rec o rd o r ac curately

ref lect the judg ment actua lly rende red—not a

judicial err or, one that is the product of judicia l rea soning or deter mination. S

ee In r e H

a n cock , 212 S.W .3d at 927; J im ine z v . S tate , 953 S.W .2d 293, 295 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet
. ref ’d). Examples of jud ic ia l e rr or s in c lud e mis take s o f l aw o r j ud g me nts ba se d on mi sund e rs tand ing s o f u nd e rl yingfa c ts. In re Hanc ock, 212 S.W .3d at 927-28 (trial court’s modification and “e x tension” of de fendant’s teny ear community

supervision period to six y ea rs , b as ed on misunderstandingthat orig inal period had bee n only

five y ear s, “re quired ju d i cial re asoning ” and e rror was judicial in nature ); Sm ith , 15 S.W .3d at 300 (g ranting of motion base d on mistake of law was in nature of judicial err or). Whether an err or is c lerica l or judicial in nature is a question of law. S ee In re Hanc ock, 212 S.W .3d at 927.

B a se d o n th ese pr e mis e s, Che rr y a sse rt s th a t he r t

hr e e -ye ar p e ri od

of c omm un ity supervision expired on October 17, 2007 and that the district court’s subse quent nunc pr o tunc order is void beca

use “[a] trial court has no jurisdiction to extend a per iod of community supervision
a ft e r the pe r i o d

o f s u p e r v i s i o nh a s e xp i r e d , u n l e s s a m o t i o nt o r e v o k e i s f

i l e d an d a c a p i a s is issued befor e the period of community supervision ends.” In re Hanc ock, 212 S.W .3d at 928 (c iting Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 42.12, §§ 21(c ), 22(c ) (West Supp. 2007)). I t i s u n d i s p u t ed that neither e vent occ urre d here
.

A def endant ha s the rig ht to appeal f rom a nunc pro tunc judg ment, even if he or she waived the rig ht to appea l the underlying c onviction, where the cha ng e has the eff

ect of incre asing the defe ndant’s punishment. Se e Ex pa rteCur

ry , 712 S.W .2d 878, 880 (Tex. App.—Austin 1986,5

pe t. r e f’ d) ; Ra bs att

v . S tate , No. 03-06-00668- CV, 20 0 7 Tex. App. L EXI S 9031, at *2 n.1 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin No v. 15 , 20 07 , no pe t. h. ) (m e m. op ., no t de sig nate d f or pu bli c a tio n) . T he State maintains that Cherry thus has an adequate appellate remedy and that mandamus, t here fore , will not lie. Cherry

responds that re cent de cisions of the Texas Supreme Court hold that wher e a trial c ourt’s order is void, as she asser

ts the nunc pro tunc order here i s, “the relator need not show that it did not have a n adequate appe llate re medy , and mandam u s is appropriate.” In reSo uth weste rn Be ll Telephone Co. , 3 5 S
. W
. 3 d 6 0 2 , 6 0 5 (T ex . 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g In r e Dickason , 987 S.W .2d 570, 57 1 ( Te x. 19 98 )) ; see also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 148 S.W .3d 124, 135-36 (Te x . 2004). Ev e n if Che rr y la c ks an a de qu a te a

pp e llate re me dy , we c on c lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its discretion in enteringthe nunc pr o tunc orde r.

Th e re c or d b e fo re us re fl e c ts that Ch erry e nte re d into a

wr itt e n p le a

a g re e me nt t o plead guilty

to interfer ence with child cus t ody in exchang e for

the State’s re commendation of “3 y ear s defe rre d adjudication; $1,500 fine; 15 day s in ja il.” When acc epting her ple a, the district court inquired of Cherry whether it was her understanding of the agr eeme nt that “the State’ s ag ree d to r e c omm e nd

thr e e de fe rr e d, a

$1 ,5 00 fi ne , an d 15 day s in jail ,” to whic h Ch e rr y re sp on de d, “ Ye s, y our honor.” Consist ent with the plea a g ree m en t , the orig inal “Or der of Def err ed Adjudication; Communi ty Supervision” ref lected the “ter

ms of plea ag ree ment” as “3 Yea rs De ferred Adjudication; $1,500 Fine; 15 Da y s J ail”; that Cherr

y pleade d g uilty ; and the “ period of supe rvision” of “Three (3) Year s.” During sentenc ing, the district court inquired, a nd Cherry acknow ledg ed, that “the plea ag ree ment called f

or y ou to rec eive thre e y ear s’ defe rre d, a $1,500 fine, 15 da y s in jail.” These statements are consistent with an expectation by both the district court and Cher ry t h at herWe ne ed not a ddress the admissibili ty or implications of the evide nce the State prese nted 2 at the hea ring reg ardingthe cha lleng ed nunc pr o tunc orde r. 6 community

supervision period would be imposed prospec tively . Other tha n the sing le re citation of “Oc tober 18, 2004” as the “ date or der to c ommence” in the orig inal order , there is no evidenc e that the dis tr ic t c ourt

so me ho w c ou ld h ave int e nd e d to imp os e the a g re e d thre e -ye ar c omm un ity supervision period r etroa ctively , to be g in a y ear befor e judgme nt, on the date of Cherry ’s offe nse, and befor e Cherry was even appre hended by authorities. This r ecor d prese nts suf ficien t evidenc e that th e dis tr ic t c ourt a c tua lly re nd e re d ju dg me nt t

hat Ch e rr y be g in h e r t

hr e e -ye ar c omm

un ity supervision p er i od on October 18, 2005, not 2004. We further conclude that the inconsistent 2
rec itation in the origina l order w as in the nature of a c lerica l error , not a jud i ci al err or that is the product of judicia l rea soning or deliberation. Se e Ra bs att , 2007 Tex. App. L E XIS 9 0 31, at *2 (omission of deadly wea

pon finding from original judgment was in nature of clerical error ; court had made t h at fi n ding or ally

on the re cord) . Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the nunc pro tunc orde r
c ha lle ng e d b y

Che rr y is n ot v oid

and tha t th e dis tr ic t di d n ot a

bu se its dis c re tio n in

e nte ri ngit.

____________

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pury ear and Pember

ton Filed: January

11, 2008