Filed 12/14/20 Leon v. Leon CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

JOHN OHANIS LEON,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MAIDA LEON,

Appellant.

 B297337

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 18CHR002133)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Jonathan L. Rosenblum, Judge. Affirmed.

Agavni Tulekyan for Appellant.

Noelle M. Halaby for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Maida Leon appeals from the entry of a domestic violence 

restraining order (DVRO) against her. She contends the trial 

court committed several errors and ultimately abused its 

discretion in granting the DVRO requested by her husband, 

respondent John Leon.1 We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. DVRO Petition 

John filed a request for a DVRO on December 21, 2018. He 

sought protection from Maida for himself and their three-year-old 

son, S.L. At the time, Maida and John were married and living 

together. John also sought a custody order granting him legal 

and physical custody of S.L. 

In an attached declaration, John stated that Maida had a 

“violent temper which has grown over the years,” with “escalating 

aggression.” He claimed that Maida had engaged in verbal abuse 

and “physically attacked” him, and he was terrified of her actions 

and concerned for his and S.L.’s safety. John declared that 

Maida told S.L. he was “stupid,” yelled and screamed at S.L., and 

hit his hands. He noted that S.L. had been diagnosed as autistic 

and had associated behavioral issues.

According to John, on November 30, 2018, Maida was on 

the telephone with her mother. From another room, John heard 

Maida scream angrily at S.L., who began to cry. When John 

went to see what was happening, Maida began yelling at John, 

calling him “stupid.” John picked up S.L. While he was holding 

the child, Maida “hit and pinched me hard enough that she left a 

mark on my arm.” She also continued to scream at him. John 

1We refer to the parties by their first names to avoid 

confusion.
3

called the police the next day, December 1, 2018, and the 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) began an 

investigation. 

John further stated that while a DCFS social worker was 

interviewing him on December 7, 2018, Maida’s brother, Sivak 

Kotoian, arrived at their home and “started screaming at me 

saying he was going to ‘take care of me.’” John called the police. 

John also stated that he had become increasingly concerned for 

his and S.L.’s safety over the last several months, that Maida had 

threatened that she would “have [her] brother take care of [me]” 

and asked him once whether he thought she was going to poison 

his food. John stated that Maida had been acting more erratic 

and her behavior had become more physically violent. He opined 

that Maida’s “volatile attitude” was stressful and detrimental to 

S.L. 

The court granted John’s request and issued a temporary 

restraining order on December 21, 2018. The court set a hearing 

on the permanent restraining order for January 11, 2019. 

II. Maida’s Response

Maida filed a response to the DVRO request on January 3, 

2019. In her declaration, Maida stated that she had filed a 

petition for dissolution of marriage on December 21, 2018, the 

same day John filed the DVRO request. She claimed that she 

and John had been having “irreconcilable differences for several 

months,” and he had been “physically and verbally abusive.” 

Maida also stated that John had been making changes over the 

past six months without her knowledge, including removing 

money from their joint bank accounts, removing her from their 

home business, changing the locks on the home office and storage 

units, taking away her cell phone and social media accounts, 
4

removing her access to their home security cameras, and 

threatening that “if I don’t move out of his home, he will continue 

taking more things away until I have nothing left.” 

Maida stated that when the social worker visited on 

December 7, 2018, Maida called her brother to help with the 

interview because she does not speak English. She claimed that 

John started an argument with her brother and then called the 

police. Maida stated she learned from the social worker that 

John had filed a police report claiming abuse. According to 

Maida, the social worker suggested Maida leave the house with 

S.L., but Maida decided to stay to ensure stability for S.L. 

Maida contended that John “fabricated the facts regarding 

the alleged abuse . . . in order to have me removed from our 

home.” She attached a letter from DCFS reporting that the 

referral was closed based on a determination that the allegations 

of emotional abuse were inconclusive. 

In a supplemental declaration filed February 13, 2019, 

Maida stated she was not able to see S.L. for three weeks after 

the court granted the temporary restraining order on December 

21, 2018. In January 2019, Maida began to have monitored visits

with S.L. She stated that her visits were going “very well” but 

that S.L. was having difficulty adjusting to the drastic change, as 

she had previously been his primary caregiver. She attached a 

letter from the CHIME Institute, stating that she and S.L. had 

participated in a toddler early intervention program from July 

2017 to June 2018 and that S.L. made “great strides” in his 

developmental progress during that time. 

Maida’s attorney also filed a declaration stating that Maida 

retained her on December 18, 2018 to prepare her petition for 

dissolution of marriage, which Maida filed on December 21, 2018. 
5

Maida’s attorney also stated that she first received notice of 

John’s request for a DVRO late in the evening on December 21, 

2018. 

III. DVRO Hearings

The court held hearings on the DVRO on January 11, 

February 26, March 4, and March 12, 2019. An Armenian 

interpreter assisted Maida during the testimony portion of the 

hearings. The trial court admitted into evidence the declarations 

filed by both parties. 

John called his brother, Harry Leon, and himself as 

witnesses. Harry testified that John called him on November 30, 

2018 and reported that Maida had hit John and S.L. John told 

Harry that Maida had hit and pinched him and tried to push him 

while he was holding S.L. John also sent Harry pictures of 

bruises on his arm. 

John testified about the November 30 incident. He stated 

that he was in the living room and Maida and S.L. were in the 

bathroom, when he heard Maida yell, heard a slap, and then S.L. 

started crying. He went into the bathroom and asked what had 

happened. Maida said, “he is not listening to me. Your kid is 

stupid.” She then left the room and John tried to comfort S.L. As 

he was carrying S.L. to his room, Maida hit and pinched John. 

She also said, “[M]y brother is going to come and take care of 

you.” John acknowledged that he did not call the police on the 

day of the incident, because he was afraid that they would take 

S.L. and/or arrest Maida. He went to the police station to file a 

report the following day. On cross-examination, John testified 

that this incident was the first time Maida had hit him. 

John also testified that he had previously seen Maida 

exhibit similar behavior toward S.L. She would call S.L. names 
6

when he would misbehave. He told Maida, “from now on, I am 

going to record you. . . . Every time I hear you, that you are doing 

something, I am going to record you.” Maida responded that she 

did not care. 

John later made two recordings of Maida interacting with 

S.L. Over Maida’s objection, John played the recordings for the 

court.2 As captured on one of the recordings, John heard Maida

say “I will slap you,” and then heard her slap S.L. 

According to John, Maida became angrier at him the prior 

summer when John refused to sponsor her for immigration 

proceedings. He said Maida threatened to take S.L. away if he 

did not sign the required documents. He denied Maida’s 

allegations that he had threatened to take S.L. away from her 

and demanded $25,000 to sign her immigration papers. He 

denied threatening Maida with deportation if she called the 

police. He also denied Maida’s claim that she was unable to 

access any of their community funds, testifying that Maida was 

able to access their joint bank account and had done so with her 

debit card. He confirmed that he put a lock on the door of their 

home office because Maida had “sabotaged the business” by 

throwing out some items. He also denied Maida’s claim that he 

took her cell phone, and presented a phone log showing continued 

use of the phone in January. He also testified that Maida hit 

their home security cameras with an orange cone and tried to 

break them. 

Maida called herself, her brother, Sivak Kotoian, and her 

2The transcript of these recordings is not in the record on 

appeal. The only evidence in the record regarding the recordings 

is the parties’ discussion of it during their testimony. We discuss 

the admission of the recordings in further detail below.
7

mother, Sita Markosian, as witnesses. Maida testified that at the 

time of the incident, she and S.L. were talking to Markosian on 

the phone through Facetime and they were “laughing, happy.” 

John came to the door of the room and told Markosian that she 

and Kotoian “hopefully . . . are going to die.” Maida asked John, 

“What is going on? What are you saying?” S.L. began to cry 

because they were speaking loudly, and John picked him up. 

John also pushed Maida. Maida denied punching or pinching 

John during the incident. 

Maida denied physically abusing John or S.L. at any time. 

She admitted spanking S.L. on the bottom and telling him, “don’t 

be stupid.” She also admitted it was her voice on the audio 

recordings. At one point on the recording, she called S.L. a 

“donkey.” She testified that she often used the word as a joke 

and it made S.L. laugh, but in this instance she was angry and 

S.L. “was crying loudly because I was also yelling.” But she 

claimed that “donkey” in Armenian did not have a derogatory 

meaning. She denied slapping S.L. but then admitted “maybe” 

slapping his hand, which could be heard on the recording.

Although Maida stated in her declaration that John had 

removed her from all social media accounts, she admitted during 

the hearing that she had access to her Facebook and Instagram 

accounts. She also admitted that John did not take away her cell 

phone, but changed the password. She also recanted her prior 

statement in the declaration that John had removed her from 

their joint bank accounts. Maida testified that she “believed” it 

was true because she tried to use her bank card once and it was 

declined. But when she later used her card to access the account, 

it worked. 

Maida’s brother testified that he had never seen Maida
8

abuse S.L. or John. Maida’s mother, Markosian, testified that 

she had never seen Maida abuse S.L., although “sometimes she 

gets angry of course.” Markosian also stated that she would 

never call someone a “donkey” because “it is a curse.” Markosian 

testified that on the day of the incident, she and Maida were on 

the phone when John came in and accused Markosian of sleeping 

with his uncle. Markosian became angry and hung up. 

Markosian also testified that she had never seen Maida abuse 

John. 

IV. Ruling

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued its ruling 

granting the DVRO. The court began by acknowledging that “[i]t 

is always difficult to second guess what a parent does, especially 

when the parent is the parent of a child with special needs. And 

what went through my mind, among other things, as I listened to 

the testimony, is that Ms. Leon might be feeling very isolated and 

quite possibly a little bit burned out caring for her son. And I 

think any child that age can be challenging. You add to it, a 

child’s special needs and it is exponentially more difficult. . . . 

And I know that Ms. Leon’s English, while workable, is not 

perhaps proficient. . . . [¶] All of this is to say that my conclusion 

from this testimony is that Ms. Leon is certainly at times and 

perhaps all the time under a great deal of stress and I think that 

this affects her care-giving and her ability to parent S[.L.]. [¶] So 

then I look at the other evidence. And the recording was in my 

mind the most striking, literally and figuratively in some ways, 

piece of evidence. I think that gave me the closest I will get to a 

front row center seat at what life must be like in this household. 

[¶] I also saw Mr. Leon’s reaction to it, which was tears, and Ms. 

Leon’s reaction to it, which was nothing. [¶] And that made an 
9

impression on me.” 

The court next explained the “three aspects” required for a 

DVRO. First, the court found the parties had a qualifying 

relationship, as they lived together and shared a child. Second, 

the court reviewed “the evidence before me to see whether any of 

it fits within the categories of domestic abuse,” such as whether 

“someone has attacked, struck, threatened, battered.” Here, the 

court found that John alleged Maida struck him and also abused 

S.L. Third, the court stated it “look[ed] to the burden of proof, 

which often is a judge’s best friend, and here it is a lower burden 

of proof, which is a preponderance of the evidence. And from that 

I conclude that abuse may have happened.” 

Additionally, the court indicated it looked at the parties’ 

credibility and found that “Mr. Leon and his brother’s story held 

together and that their emotions aligned with the facts that they 

were telling me. By contrast, when Ms. Leon testified, there were 

inconsistencies and the same was true with her brother.” 

Finally, the court concluded: “So with all of that in mind, and 

with the point that [John’s counsel] made with her closing, which 

was the reaction to the recording that we heard, that there wasn’t 

an apology, there was no statement that this was a bad day, 

there was no acknowledgement that, that Ms. Leon has, I think 

by anybody’s estimation, a difficult and seemingly never-ending 

task in front of her, so I take all of that into account and I 

certainly take no pleasure in granting a restraining order.” 

Accordingly, the court granted a three-year DVRO 

protecting John and S.L. and awarded John sole legal and 

primary physical custody of S.L., with supervised visitation for 

Maida. 
10

Maida timely appealed.3

DISCUSSION

Maida contends the trial court committed several errors in 

granting John’s request for a DVRO against her. First, she 

argues that the court improperly admitted the audio recordings 

made by John over her objection that they were made without 

her consent. She also contends the court relied on her reactions 

to hearing those recordings, even though she was not testifying 

as a witness at the time. Second, she claims the court abused its 

discretion when it excluded her testimony regarding prior abuse 

by John. Finally, she argues that the court failed to make proper 

findings of fact to support the DVRO, relying instead on other 

proceedings. We conclude that Maida has failed to establish any 

of the asserted errors and therefore affirm.

I. Legal Standards

Pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), 

(Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.),4 a court may issue a protective order 

“‘to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a 

recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of 

separation of the persons involved’ upon ‘reasonable proof of a 

past act or acts of abuse.’” (Nevarez v. Tonna (2014) 227 

Cal.App.4th 774, 782 (Nevarez), quoting § 6300.)

The DVPA defines domestic violence, as relevant here, as 

abuse perpetrated against a spouse, cohabitant, or the child of a 

party. (§ 6211, subds. (a), (b), & (e).) “Abuse” includes: “(1) 

Intentionally or recklessly to cause or attempt to cause bodily 

injury[;] . . . (3) To place a person in reasonable apprehension of 

3Respondent has not filed a brief in this appeal.

4All further statutory references are to the Family Code 

unless otherwise indicated.
11

imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another[; or] 

(4) To engage in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined 

pursuant to Section 6320.” (§ 6203.) The behaviors outlined in 

section 6320 include “attacking, striking, . . . threatening, . . . 

battering, [or] harassing.” (§ 6320.) The DVPA requires a 

showing of past abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re 

Marriage of Davila and Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226 

(Davila); see also Cooper v. Bettinger (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 77, 

90, fn. 14; Gdowski v. Gdowski (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 128, 137.)

“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that 

a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and 

the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the 

record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court 

committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” 

(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) We review the 

grant or denial of a request for a DVRO for abuse of discretion. 

(Davila, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 226, citing In re Marriage of 

G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780.) We likewise review the trial 

court’s failure to consider evidence in issuing a DVRO for an 

abuse of discretion. (See Nevarez, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 

785; Davila, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 226.). 

“‘To the extent that we are called upon to review the trial 

court’s factual findings, we apply a substantial evidence standard 

of review.’” (Davila, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 226, quoting In 

re Marriage of G., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 780.) We “view the 

whole record in a light most favorable to the judgment, resolving 

all evidentiary conflicts and drawing all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the decision of the trial court. (Melissa G. v. Raymond M.

(2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 360, 373–374.)
12

II. Admission of Recordings

A. Background

John testified during his case-in-chief that, prior to 

recording Maida, he warned her that he would do so if she was 

acting inappropriately with S.L. John further testified that 

Maida told him she did not care. When John sought to introduce 

the recordings as evidence, Maida’s counsel objected that the 

recordings were made without Maida’s consent. John’s counsel 

argued that the recordings were made with Maida’s knowledge. 

When questioned by the court, John reiterated that Maida

responded after each warning: “Go ahead. Record me. I don’t 

care.” Maida’s counsel asked the court to postpone its ruling on 

the admissibility of the recordings until it heard from Maida, as 

she would testify that she did not know she was being recorded. 

The court agreed that it would “hold off until we have that 

testimony. . . . [¶] I’m not saying it won’t come in. But not at this 

point.” 

At the next hearing, before John rested, his counsel again 

sought to introduce the recordings as part of John’s case-in-chief. 

Maida’s counsel renewed her objection and request that the court 

wait to rule until after Maida testified. The court noted the 

dispute regarding consent to recording, then stated that “just for 

the purposes of moving this along, I don’t think there is any harm 

in having [John] introduce those as part of your case-in-chief.” 

Maida’s counsel again noted that Maida would testify that she 

did not give permission to be recorded. 

John’s counsel replied that in addition to John’s testimony 

that Maida consented, the recordings were also admissible under 

an exception in Penal Code section 633.5, where a person 

reasonably believes a recording is necessary to obtain evidence of 
13

domestic abuse. The court indicated that “I don’t really think 

this is going to be momentous one way or another and I think for 

purposes of credibility, let’s just have this as part of your case-inchief.” 

John resumed testifying and the recordings were played 

and discussed during his testimony. At the close of his case, 

John’s counsel moved to admit his exhibits into evidence, 

including the recordings. Maida’s counsel did not object. 

Maida did not testify about the recordings or whether she 

knew or consented to them. During her closing argument, 

Maida’s counsel referred to the recordings that John “took of my 

client over the objection that it was made without my client’s 

permission.” 

John’s counsel also referenced the recordings during her 

closing argument. She argued that Maida had taken no 

responsibility for her behavior, noting that Maida “had a smirk 

on her face” when John’s counsel asked her: “did you hear your 

son crying [on the recordings] and saying, ‘I’m not a donkey, I’m 

not a donkey,’ when he was crying?” She argued that Maida

“doesn’t accept responsibility. She didn’t come to the testimony 

and say, you know what, I heard that, and I’m really disturbed by 

listening to that. And I would never do that again.” 

B. Analysis

Maida argues that the court erred in admitting the 

recordings over her objection that she did not consent to being 

recorded. Under Penal Code section 632, the intentional 

electronic recording of a confidential communication without the 

consent or knowledge of all parties is illegal, and the recording is 

inadmissible (with certain exceptions) in a judicial proceeding. 

(Penal Code, § 632, subds. (a) and (d).)
14

Here, however, John testified that he warned Maida that 

he was going to record her when she was abusive toward S.L., 

and Maida told him she did not care. Thus, he met his burden to 

establish that the recordings were obtained with Maida’s 

knowledge and consent, and were therefore admissible. Despite 

her counsel’s objection, Maida did not actually present any

evidence to rebut this showing.5 Although her counsel told the 

court that Maida planned to testify to the contrary, she never did 

so, and Maida never renewed her objection or asked the court to 

revisit its ruling at the close of evidence. As such, it was not an 

abuse of discretion for the court to rely on John’s uncontroverted 

testimony that Maida knew of and consented to being recorded

and to admit the recordings on that basis.

We also reject Maida’s contention that the trial court 

improperly relied on Maida’s courtroom demeanor—specifically, 

her lack of a response when the recordings were played—as 

evidence. Contrary to Maida’s suggestion, the record 

demonstrates that the trial court considered Maida’s demeanor 

and lack of remorse while she was testifying at the hearing. In 

her closing arguments, John’s counsel remarked on Maida’s 

failure to offer any apology or explanation for her conduct, 

although she had the chance to do so when she testified after the 

recordings were played. The court expressly cited this same 

evidence when finding Maida was less credible because of her 

reaction to the recording, noting that “there wasn’t an apology, 

there was no statement that this was a bad day, there was no 

acknowledgement” by Maida that she was having a difficult time 

caring for her son. We find no basis in the record to conclude that 

5We note that Maida’s recitation of the facts supporting this 

argument is incomplete, if not misleading. 
15

the trial court relied on Maida’s demeanor off the witness stand. 

As such, Maida has not established error.6

III. Exclusion of Prior Abuse

Maida next argues that the court erred in excluding her 

testimony regarding past abuse by John. When Maida sought to 

testify regarding abuse by John against her over the past two 

years, the court sustained John’s relevance objection. Maida

contends the court was required to consider the “totality of the 

circumstances” before issuing a DVRO, and that her testimony 

regarding past abuse was relevant as evidence of self-defense and 

a “basis for her alleged behavior.” 

Maida acknowledges that she was permitted to testify 

regarding her version of the November 30 incident at issue, 

including her claim that John pushed her and that she did not 

punch or pinch John or S.L. Although she asserts that her 

testimony regarding past abuse would have been relevant to a 

claim of self-defense, she does not explain how a claim of selfdefense would have been consistent with her testimony here. 

Because she testified that she did not respond with force when 

John pushed her, there would be no basis for her to claim that 

she reacted in self-defense with force she believed necessary to 

protect herself. (See Civ. Code, § 50 [“Any necessary force may be 

6We similarly reject Maida’s argument that the trial court 

improperly relied on the “lack of an apology” to grant the DVRO. 

Maida fails to cite to any authority supporting this assertion. 

(See Nein v. HostPro, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 833, 855 [where 

a party “fails to make a legal argument or to cite any legal 

authority” in support of a contention, the claim is forfeited on 

appeal].) Moreover, as discussed, the court cited Maida’s failure 

to apologize or offer an explanation for her behavior heard on the 

recordings as evidence supporting its credibility findings.
16

used to protect from wrongful injury the person or property of 

oneself, or of a . . . child.”]) Nor does she explain the relevance of 

any past abuse by John to the evidence that she verbally abused 

S.L. and struck the child on more than one occasion. As such, we 

find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s exclusion of the 

evidence as irrelevant to John’s allegations of abuse supporting 

the DVRO.

IV. Errors in Court’s Findings

Maida also contends the trial court failed to make proper 

findings of fact to support issuance of a DVRO, citing the court’s 

statement that “abuse may have happened.” We are not 

persuaded.

As an initial matter, Maida improperly relies on the 

requirements for issuing mutual orders restraining both parties 

under section 6305. That section requires “detailed findings of 

fact indicating that both parties acted as a primary aggressor.” 

(§6305, subd. (a)(2); see also Melissa G. v. Raymond M., supra, 27 

Cal.App.5th at p. 373 [“[t]he court erred when it issued the 

mutual order without making the findings required under section 

6305”].)

Here, issuance of the single restraining order did not 

trigger the requirements of section 6305. As noted above, under 

section 6300, the trial court may issue a restraining order under 

the DVPA upon proof of “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of 

abuse.” (Nevarez, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 783; see also 

Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 334 [“A trial 

court is vested with discretion to issue a protective order under 

the DVPA simply on the basis of an affidavit showing past 

abuse.”].)
17

We also disagree that the evidence was insufficient to 

support a finding of reasonable proof of past acts of abuse by 

Maida. Her description of the alleged abuse as “a single incident 

where Respondent accused Maida’s mother of sleeping with his 

uncle and thereafter Appellant pinched or hit Respondent one 

time” is both inaccurate and incomplete. In addition to the 

November 30 incident, John testified that Maida was verbally 

abusive to him and to S.L. on numerous occasions, and that she 

hit or slapped S.L. John also presented two recordings to support 

his allegations regarding Maida’s behavior toward S.L., as well as 

photographs showing bruising to John’s body from the November 

30 incident. The court found John and his brother’s testimony 

credible. Conversely, while it sympathized with Maida’s position, 

the court found her testimony, as well as her brother’s, lacked 

credibility. The court was entitled to consider all of the evidence 

and to weigh the credibility of the parties. We will not revisit 

these assessments on appeal. “‘It is the trial court’s role to assess 

the credibility of the various witnesses, to weigh the evidence to 

resolve the conflicts in the evidence. We have no power to judge 

the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to 

consider the credibility of witnesses or to resolve conflicts in the 

evidence or the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from 

that evidence.’” (Nevarez, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 786, 

quoting In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52–53.) The 

trial court’s statement at the hearing that “abuse may have 

happened,” cannot be considered alone. When considered in 

combination with the court’s detailed findings regarding the 

parties’ credibility, the evidence of abuse, and the burden of 

proof, substantial evidence supports a finding of abuse by Maida.
18

Maida also argues that the court “decided to grant the 

restraining order based on the answers to his questions regarding 

the parallel divorce proceedings.” This contention is not 

supported by the record. Following closing arguments, the court 

indicated it had “a couple questions” for both parties “and then I 

will, based on your answers, I will rule.” The court then asked 

whether, if it granted the DVRO and issued visitation orders, 

those orders would be “at cross-purposes” with any orders made 

at an upcoming hearing in the divorce proceeding. John’s counsel 

answered that there was no conflict. The court also confirmed

with John’s counsel that the requested permanent DVRO was the 

same in scope as the previously-issued temporary order, and that 

the visitation monitor was a professional monitor. 

Maida suggests that these questions and statements by the 

court show an improper reliance on other proceedings. We

disagree. The record here demonstrates that the court inquired 

about the divorce proceedings for the sake of consistency in ruling 

on child custody and visitation. We find no indication, nor does 

Maida point to any, that the court relied on findings made in 

another proceeding as a substitute for the requisite finding of 

abuse here. As such, the cases Maida cites are inapposite. (See

Lugo v. Corona (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 865, 870 [finding that 

“criminal and civil protective orders may coexist, and . . . [t]he 

trial court therefore erred by summarily denying Lugo’s DVRO 

request on the basis that a criminal protective order was already 

in place”]; Isidora M. v. Silvino M. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 11, 23 

[“the trial court erred in substituting the bare fact of Isidora’s 

guilty plea to a charge of domestic violence for detailed findings 

of fact indicating that she acted primarily as an aggressor and 

not primarily in self-defense as required by section 6305” for
19

entry of mutual restraining orders].)

Accordingly, we conclude that Maida has not established 

that the court erred in granting the DVRO. Because we have 

found no error, we also reject Maida’s claim that the combination 

of errors cumulatively “resulted in an unfair trial.” 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent may recover his 

costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

MANELLA, P. J.

CURREY, J.