J-S61022-17

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ISIAH A. ALLEN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 218 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 15, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0009990-2014, 

CP-51-CR-0011255-2014, CP-51-CR-0011256-2014, 

CP-51-CR-0011257-2014, CP-51-CR-0011263-2014, 

CP-51-CR-0011264-2014

BEFORE: LAZARUS, RANSOM, and PLATT,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 13, 2017

Appellant, Isiah A. Allen, appeals from the order entered December 15, 

2016, denying his petition for collateral relief filed under the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

Appellant was charged with various offenses arising from the theft of 

cellular phones and tablets, which he removed from the displays of various 

Verizon and AT&T stores between January 8, 2014, and February 6, 2014. 

Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 5/11/2015, at 10-11. On May 11, 2015, Appellant 

entered into a non-negotiated guilty plea in six consolidated cases to three 

counts each of misdemeanor retail theft and misdemeanor conspiracy in the 

first degree, two counts each of felony retail theft in the third degree and 

felony conspiracy in the third degree, and one count of misdemeanor 
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possession of an instrument of crime.1

On August 13, 2015, Appellant was sentenced to one and one-half to 

five years of incarceration on each of the charges to run concurrently with 

each other, with credit for time served and without RRRI eligibility. Appellant 

did not file a post-sentence motion or direct appeal from the judgment of 

sentence. 

On December 11, 2015, Appellant pro se filed a PCRA petition. Counsel 

was appointed and filed an amended petition on May 6, 2016, asserting 

ineffective assistance of plea counsel. On November 15, 2016, the PCRA court 

served Appellant with notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. 

Thereafter, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition without an evidentiary 

hearing. See Order, 12/15/2016.

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and court-ordered 1925(b) 

statement, asserting two issues: (1) the court erred in denying relief on his 

substantive claim and (2) the court erred in failing to holding an evidentiary 

hearing. See Appellant’s 1925(b) Statement, 2/13/2017, at 1. The PCRA 

court issued a responsive opinion.

On appeal, Appellant pursues only one issue:

1. Did the [l]ower [c]ourt err in failing to hold an evidentiary 

hearing to determine substantial issues of material fact alleged 

in Appellant’s PCRA petition?

Appellant’s Br. at 9.

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3929(a)(1), 903, 907(a), respectively.
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Appellant challenges an order denying his petition for collateral relief in 

which he asserted ineffective assistance of plea counsel. Generally, the

following standards apply. 

We review an order denying a petition under the PCRA to determine 

whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the evidence of 

record and free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 

1170 (Pa. 2007). We afford the court’s findings deference unless there is no 

support for them in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 

1275, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing Commonwealth v. Anderson, 995 

A.2d 1184, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2010)). 

We presume counsel is effective. Commonwealth v. Washington, 

927 A.2d 586, 594 (Pa. 2007). To overcome this presumption and establish 

the ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must prove, by a 

preponderance of the evidence that: “(1) the underlying legal issue has 

arguable merit; (2) counsel’s actions lacked an objective reasonable basis; 

and (3) actual prejudice befell the petitioner from counsel’s act or omission.” 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 533 (Pa. 2009) (citations 

omitted). “A petitioner establishes prejudice when he demonstrates ‘that 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Id. (quoting 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). A claim will be 

denied if the petitioner fails to meet any one of these requirements. 
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Commonwealth v. Springer, 961 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Natividad, 938 A.2d 310, 322 (Pa. 2007)); 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

We review allegations of counsel’s ineffectiveness in connection with a 

guilty plea as follows:

Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a 

guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness 

caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. 

Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the 

voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice 

was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases.

Thus, to establish prejudice, the defendant must show that there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would 

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. 

The reasonable probability test is not a stringent one; it merely 

refers to a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.

Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 192 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a plea was 

entered knowingly and voluntarily, this Court considers the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the plea. Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 854 

A.2d 489, 513 (Pa. 2004).

In the issue he pursues on appeal, Appellant asserts that an evidentiary 

hearing is required to determine whether counsel was ineffective. Appellant's 

Br. at 13. Appellant avers that he alleged facts in his PCRA petition which, if 

true, established that counsel’s advice caused him to enter an unknowing plea. 

See Appellant's Br. at 15 (suggesting he could have withdrawn his plea). 
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Specifically, according to Appellant, he relied on representations by plea

counsel regarding the credit he would receive for time served, and such 

representations turned out to be incorrect. See Appellant's Br. at 13. 

Appellant suggests that these allegations raise factual issues regarding 

counsel’s effectiveness. Id. at 13. Thus, Appellant requests that this Court 

remand for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 19.

Notably, Appellant concedes that there is no evidence in the record to 

establish plea counsel’s ineffectiveness. See Appellant's Br. at 13. Thus, 

Appellant has abandoned the substantive claim that he preserved in his 

1925(b) statement. Id. at 19. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (“No question will be 

considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly 

suggested thereby.”). Accordingly, we limit our analysis to Appellant’s request 

for remand for a hearing and apply the following standard.

The right to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition 

is not absolute. A PCRA court may decline to hold a hearing if the 

petitioner's claim is patently frivolous and is without a trace of 

support in either the record or from other evidence. A reviewing 

court on appeal must examine each of the issues raised in the 

PCRA petition in light of the record in order to determine whether 

the PCRA court erred in concluding that there were no genuine 

issues of material fact and denying relief without an evidentiary 

hearing. The controlling factor in determining whether a petition 

may be dismissed without a hearing is the status of the 

substantive assertions in the petition.

Commonwealth v. Payne, 794 A.2d 902, 906 (Pa. Super. 2002) (internal 

citations omitted). Where factual proffer, even if believed, fails to establish 

substantive claim, no evidentiary hearing is required. Commonwealth v. 
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Ligons, 971 A.2d 1125, 1146 (Pa. 2009). 

Appellant’s allegations are not supported by the record established at 

his plea and sentencing hearings. “A person who elects to plead guilty is 

bound by the statements he makes in open court while under oath and he 

may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the 

statements he made at his plea colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832

A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super. 2003); see also Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 

794 A.2d 378, 384 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“one is bound by one’s statements 

made during a plea colloquy, and may not successfully assert claims that 

contradict such statements”).

The PCRA court found that the record of oral and written guilty plea 

colloquies demonstrate that Appellant entered his plea voluntarily, knowingly, 

and intelligently. See PCRA Ct. Op., 4/5/2017, at 3. At the guilty plea 

hearing, Appellant denied that any promises had been made to him. See

Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 5/11/2015, at 9. Appellant was informed of the 

potential range of sentences that could be imposed on each count. See id. at 

12-14. On each of his written plea colloquies Appellant certified that no 

promises were made to him. See PCRA Ct. Op., at 3. Further, “the question 

of his time credit was specifically discussed at sentencing by [Appellant’s] 

counsel.” Id. at 4. Plea counsel specifically said: “I don’t think he has any 

time credit.” Id. (quoting N.T., 8/13/2015, at 11). Plea counsel informed the 

court on the record that any credit for time served for Appellant’s Philadelphia 

convictions would be limited because he was also serving time in connection 
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with convictions in Montgomery and in Delaware County, as described in 

Appellant’s Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI). N.T., 8/13/2015, at 11. 

Appellant’s sentence specified that credit for time served would be determined 

by the Department of Corrections (DOC). Id. at 19; see also Sentencing 

Order, 8/13/2015. “At no point did Appellant question those statements or 

assert that he had been made specific time credit promises.” PCRA Ct. Op., 

at 4.

Appellant is bound by his statements and they cannot be contradicted. 

See Pollard, supra. Based on the evidence from the guilty plea, PSI, and 

plea counsel’s statements at sentencing, there exist no genuine substantive 

issues of material fact raised by Appellant’s petition. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 

907(2); see Ligons, supra. Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err in 

dismissing Appellant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing. See Payne, 

794 A.2d at 906-907 (affirming PCRA court order dismissal of petition without 

a hearing where record revealed no genuine issues of material fact).2

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Lazarus joins the memorandum. 

Judge Platt concurs in the result. 

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2 Should Appellant dispute the DOC’s calculation, then he would still have 

redress in a proceeding in an original action in the Commonwealth Court 

challenging DOC’s computation. “A challenge to DOC's computation or 

construction of a sentence is not a cognizable claim under the PCRA. Rather, 

if the alleged error is the result of DOC's erroneous computation, then the 

appropriate mechanism for redress is an original action in [the 

Commonwealth] Court challenging DOC's computation.” Allen v. 

Commonwealth, 103 A.3d 365, 373 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/13/2017