2017 UT App 48

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

MARTIN J. MACNEILL,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20140873-CA

Filed March 16, 2017

Fourth District Court, Provo Department

The Honorable Derek P. Pullan

No. 121402323

B. Kent Morgan and Jonathan T. Nish, Attorneys

for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Tera J. Peterson, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and STEPHEN L. ROTH concurred.

VOROS, Judge:

¶1 Martin J. MacNeill was convicted of murdering his wife 

by overmedicating her then drowning her in a bathtub. At trial

the prosecution presented testimony from five jailhouse 

informants, all of whom reported hearing MacNeill admit or 

imply that he had killed his wife. MacNeill’s principal claim on 

appeal is that the prosecution team withheld information about 

promises of assistance the State’s lead investigator, Jeff 

Robinson, had made to one of the jailhouse informants. After 

meticulous analysis, the trial court agreed with MacNeill that the 

prosecution had wrongly suppressed relevant impeachment 

evidence, but concluded that the evidence would not have 

altered the trial outcome. We affirm.
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BACKGROUND1

The Crime

¶2 MacNeill lived with his wife, Michele, and their four 

minor daughters in Pleasant Grove, Utah. The MacNeills also 

had three adult children; two lived in Utah and one attended 

graduate school out of state. MacNeill practiced psychiatry, and 

Michele tended to their home and children.

¶3 MacNeill met Gypsy Gillian Willis online, and the two

began an affair in November 2005. In March 2007 Michele 

expressed concern to her adult daughter, Alexis, who attended 

graduate school, that MacNeill might be having an affair. After 

reading through his telephone records, Michele discovered the 

identity of MacNeill’s girlfriend. When she confronted MacNeill, 

he claimed she was being “ridiculous.” Shortly after this 

confrontation, MacNeill surprised Michele with a facelift as a 

“present.” He also indicated that he wanted to take her on a twoweek cruise after her surgery.

¶4 Around the same time, during a “heartfelt, tearful lesson” 

at church, MacNeill announced that he had cancer and had “less 

than a year” to live. His health appeared to deteriorate—he 

began limping, walking with a cane, and wearing a surgical 

boot. Despite his claim to neighbors that he “had some 

procedures done [and] was having some complications,” 

MacNeill painted a somewhat different picture of his condition 

at work. He told one colleague that he had a “peripheral 

neuropathy” in his toe that “wouldn’t get better,” another 

colleague that he had “cancer in his big toe,” and yet another 

 

1. “When reviewing a jury verdict, we examine the evidence and 

all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 

favorable to the verdict, and we recite the facts accordingly.”

State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ¶ 2, 6 P.3d 1116.
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20140873-CA 3 2017 UT App 48

colleague that he had a “neurological . . . problem similar to 

MS.” But despite his scattered claims of various illnesses during 

that spring, MacNeill remodeled his basement on his own and 

appeared to have no difficulty carrying “giant [slabs] of sheet 

rock” down the stairs.

¶5 MacNeill scheduled a consultation with a plastic surgeon

in March 2007 and attended the consultation with Michele. 

MacNeill was the “dominant personality” at the appointment 

and did “more of the talking” than Michele. Although Michele 

was nervous about having surgery and concerned about the 

associated risks, the recovery, and the downtime, she agreed to 

schedule comprehensive facial surgery for the following month.

¶6 MacNeill next scheduled an examination for Michele with 

a primary care physician to determine if it was safe for her to 

proceed with surgery. MacNeill was anxious to complete the 

evaluation so Michele could proceed with the surgery without 

delay. At the appointment, the three discussed Michele’s high

blood pressure. The primary care physician said that it would be 

ideal to control Michele’s blood pressure before surgery and 

suggested that she postpone the operation. MacNeill expressed 

disappointment with this suggestion. Other than Michele’s 

elevated blood pressure, the primary care physician determined 

that she was in “excellent health.” An EKG revealed that

Michele’s heart was normal without any arrhythmias or 

evidence of heart disease.

¶7 Although the primary care physician recommended that 

Michele delay the procedure, Michele and MacNeill kept the 

appointment for the preoperative evaluation with the surgeon. 

Alexis came home from graduate school to attend the 

appointment with them. Before the appointment, Alexis saw 

MacNeill in his room writing down medications that he wanted 

the doctor to prescribe, using a “dusty” reference book that she 

hadn’t seen him use in perhaps ten or fifteen years. On the way 
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 4 2017 UT App 48

to the appointment, Michele said that she wanted to push the 

appointment back until summer so she could make sure her 

blood pressure would be under control. MacNeill became angry,

raised his voice, told Michele she could not do that, and said, “If 

you don’t have the surgery now, you’re not getting it.”

¶8 At the appointment, neither Michele nor MacNeill 

disclosed the primary care physician’s recommendations, 

although MacNeill did mention that she had “some high blood 

pressure” and “had been prescribed some medication” for it. 

MacNeill directed the discussion about Michele’s postoperative 

medication regimen. After performing a facelift, the surgeon

typically prescribed a pain reliever (Lortab), an antibiotic 

(cephalexin), a sleeping medication (Ambien), an antiinflammatory (Medral Dose Pack), and an eye ointment 

(erythromycin). Occasionally, he prescribed an anti-nausea 

medication (Phenergan) to patients that complained of nausea 

associated with anesthesia.

¶9 Consulting the list he brought with him, MacNeill 

requested four deviations from the surgeon’s usual protocol. 

First, he requested an additional, stronger pain reliever, 

oxycodone, also known as Percocet. Second, he requested Lortab 

in liquid form. Third, he requested more than the typical amount 

of Phenergan, and he requested it in suppository form. Finally, 

he requested the anti-anxiety drug, Valium. MacNeill said that 

“he was just concerned that [Michele] wouldn’t do well without 

having these other options available,” and that he wanted to 

have “all of the options available to [him],” even though Michele 

had told him that she didn’t like to take a lot of medicine. The 

surgeon complied with MacNeill’s requests and gave Michele 

instructions to take one pill at a time and “certainly” to avoid 

taking all of them together. Michele assured the surgeon she 

“was going to try and minimize the amount of medication that 

she took.”
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¶10 Two days later, MacNeill drove Michele and Alexis to the 

surgical facility for the operation. The surgery lasted all day, but 

the surgeon told Alexis that he was happy with the results.

Michele was “in a little bit of pain and groggy” and “wanted to 

stay the night at the hospital.” MacNeill returned to drive 

Michele and Alexis home. When Michele said she wanted to stay 

the night, he became angry and told Michele that they needed to 

go home. But he acquiesced when the surgeon explained that he 

prefers to keep his patients overnight. The surgeon released 

Michele the next morning.

¶11 On the day Michele returned home, Alexis acted as her 

caregiver, giving her medications, dressing her wounds, and 

helping her to the bathroom, because Michele was “effectively 

blind.” Alexis kept a log of Michele’s medications on a pad of 

paper and included the time she took each pill and the dose. 

Alexis also kept a log of Michele’s vital signs and food intake in 

what she called her “little black book.” She later combined the 

two logs and placed the pad of paper in a drawer next to 

Michele’s bed. That evening MacNeill insisted that Alexis leave 

the room because he would be taking over Michele’s care. Alexis 

left and slept in her youngest sister’s room.

¶12 The next morning Alexis entered her mother’s room and 

noticed that she “appeared to be very sedated.” When Alexis 

tried to wake Michele, she stirred a bit but did not wake up. 

Alexis asked MacNeill what had happened, and he responded 

that he “must have given her too much medicine.” When Alexis 

pressed further, he said he had given Michele Lortab, Valium, 

and Ambien, at which point Michele threw up. He then gave her 

Phenergan, Percocet, and more Lortab. Alexis told her father that 

he was “not to give her any more medicine,” because she 

(Alexis) was “taking over.”

¶13 Later that evening Michele told Alexis that MacNeill 

“kept giving [her] medication” and “telling [her] to swallow,” 
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 6 2017 UT App 48

and when she started to throw up he gave her more and more 

medication. Michele stated that she did not want MacNeill to 

give her any more medicine; she felt each different pill “so that if 

[MacNeill] tried to give her anything, she would know what he 

was giving her.”

¶14 Alexis continued to care for her mother. Once Michele’s 

bandages came off, her recovery accelerated. By April 10 Michele 

was able to walk around and care for herself. She took no

Valium, Phenergan, or Ambien. Because Michele was sensitive 

to medications, she tried to take less than the prescribed dosage. 

Although Michele was tapering off her medications, MacNeill 

called the surgeon and asked him to refill Michele’s 

prescriptions for Percocet and Phenergan, which he did at a 

follow-up appointment. Alexis attended the appointment with 

Michele, then returned to school.

¶15 The next day MacNeill took the couple’s younger 

daughters to school. Before leaving for school, one of the girls

entered Michele’s room and found her mother sitting on the 

couch in front of her TV. The girl noticed “nothing odd about 

[Michele’s] behavior.” The two “had a perfectly . . . normal 

conversation” before the girl said goodbye and went to school. 

Alexis called at 8:45 a.m. and Michele said she was “doing great”

and planned to pick the girls up from school. She did not sound 

confused, and her speech did not sound slurred. At 9:15 a.m., 

MacNeill called Alexis and left a voicemail urging her to call her 

mother and tell her to stay in bed. Alexis found this strange in 

light of her earlier phone conversation with her mother. Alexis 

called her mother, but Michele did not answer.

¶16 MacNeill was to receive an award at work that morning. 

Before the event MacNeill adamantly told the event coordinator 

that he needed his picture taken at the event. After receiving the 

award, he asked the photographer, “Did you get me in that 

picture? Make sure you got me in that picture.” After the 
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 7 2017 UT App 48

photographer assured MacNeill that he was in the picture, 

MacNeill pressed him again, saying, “Maybe you better take a 

second one and make sure you got me in that picture.” After the 

event, MacNeill picked up the couple’s youngest daughter from 

kindergarten at 11:30 a.m.

¶17 When MacNeill and his youngest daughter got home, she

called, “Mom, I’m home.” Michele didn’t answer. The girl

followed her father into the bathroom and found her mother “all 

the way” in the bathtub, lying in the water, still in her clothes.

MacNeill told his daughter to run next door for help.

¶18 Meanwhile, MacNeill called 911. MacNeill gave the 

dispatcher a false address and hung up. MacNeill called again

and said, “My wife has fallen in the bathtub . . . [s]he is 

unconscious. She’s under water.” MacNeill said he “couldn’t lift 

her” so he let the water out of the tub. Although the dispatcher 

asked him to stay on the phone, MacNeill hung up again. The 

dispatcher called back, and MacNeill told her that he had “CPR 

in progress.” Although the dispatcher requested that he stay on 

the phone, MacNeill again hung up. He then called a colleague 

at work and told him he was “doing a code on his wife.” At this 

time, MacNeill’s phone rang again—it was Alexis. He told her, 

“Your mother’s in the tub and she’s not breathing.” Alexis 

immediately went to the airport to fly home.

¶19 The daughter returned to the bathroom with their 

neighbor. They found MacNeill “hunched over” Michele’s face. 

Michele was face up, her head under the faucet, her legs and feet 

inside the bathtub. Two more neighbors came in and observed 

Michele’s body in the same position: face up, with her head 

under the faucet, and her legs and feet inside the bathtub. They

lifted Michele out of the tub and MacNeill began CPR. One of 

the neighbors performed chest compressions while MacNeill 

leaned over Michele’s head to periodically administer rescue 

breaths. However, the neighbor did not observe MacNeill’s 
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 8 2017 UT App 48

mouth ever touching Michele’s, nor did Michele’s chest rise and 

fall when MacNeill administered the rescue breaths. Two

paramedics arrived and took over CPR. When the paramedics

began CPR, Michele’s color instantly changed from bluish to a 

pink fleshy color. A gurgling sound came from her chest, and 

she expelled quite a lot of fluid from her mouth more than 

once—at least three to four cups the first time and a substantial 

amount the second time.

¶20 While the paramedics performed CPR, MacNeill told 

them that he had only been away from the home “for a short 

period of time,” during which Michele “overdosed on her pain 

medication,” slipped in the tub, and hit her head. MacNeill said 

he found Michele face down, “slumped over the tub” with her 

upper body inside the tub and her lower body out of the tub. 

MacNeill then began yelling and became increasingly loud and 

agitated—to the point that the officers and paramedics feared for 

their safety and removed him from the room. Shortly thereafter, 

the ambulance arrived, and MacNeill accompanied Michele to 

the hospital.

¶21 Michele was pronounced dead on arrival. The emergencyroom doctor saw no injuries consistent with falling into the 

bathtub. Because the doctor could not determine the cause of 

death, he called the Medical Examiner’s Office.

¶22 The MacNeills’ adult son returned home that evening 

with the son’s girlfriend. MacNeill asked the two to accompany 

him to the bathroom where MacNeill had found Michele that 

morning. The son’s girlfriend noticed that the bathroom was 

clean, with no trace of blood, although MacNeill told her when 

he found Michele that day “there was blood everywhere.” 

MacNeill asked the girlfriend to retrieve Michele’s pills. She 

found various drugs, but some of the bottles had very few pills 

in them. MacNeill and his son counted the pills; MacNeill kept 

repeating, Michele “was not taking her pills.” MacNeill became 
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 9 2017 UT App 48

frustrated, said he “did not want to do this anymore,” and had 

his son’s girlfriend flush the pills down the toilet.

¶23 When Alexis returned home that evening, she went

straight to the bedroom to look for the medications. But the 

room had been “cleaned out.” Items that had been there the day 

before—a hospital bed, stuffed animals, and blankets—had been 

removed. The bathroom rug was gone. While looking for her 

mother’s medication around the house, Alexis found the 

bathroom rug, a pile of wet towels and clothing, and other of 

Michele’s belongings in the garage.

¶24 Also gone was the “little black book” in which Alexis 

tracked her mother’s medication intake. Alexis asked MacNeill 

where her mother’s medication was; he told her, “I don’t know. I 

think the police might have taken it.” Alexis found the small pad 

of paper she had tracked Michele’s medication on for the first 

few days after surgery in the drawer where she left it.

¶25 When Alexis asked MacNeill what happened, he took her 

into the bathroom to show her how he found Michele. MacNeill 

gave Alexis the same description he had given the paramedics: 

Michele was face down, “slumped over the tub” with her upper 

body inside the tub and her lower body outside the tub. He told 

Alexis that the bath was full and the water was off.

¶26 Rachel, the MacNeills’ other adult daughter, arrived later 

that evening. MacNeill said that they “needed to get the autopsy 

done . . . right away” because “he was concerned that there 

would be a police investigation,” and he “didn’t want . . . anyone 

to think he murdered [Michele].”

¶27 Although MacNeill had spent his day performing CPR on 

his wife, accompanying her to the hospital, cleaning up her 

personal belongings, tending to his family, and providing his 

neighbors with a tour of the renovations he completed in the 

home, he also spent time that day communicating with Gypsy. 
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 10 2017 UT App 48

The two talked on the phone twice and texted each other thirty 

times.

¶28 Several days later, MacNeill spoke with the Medical 

Examiner, Dr. Maureen Frikke. He gave the same account he had 

given the emergency responders and his daughters: he found 

Michele slumped over the tub with her face “completely 

submerged” and her lower body hanging outside of the tub. Dr. 

Frikke determined that the manner of Michele’s death was 

“natural,” and her cause of death was cardiovascular disease 

with hypertension and myocarditis.

¶29 Michele’s funeral was held three days later. Before the 

service, MacNeill helped set up, running back and forth from the 

church to his car without a cane. As people started arriving, 

however, he began limping and using the cane. Gypsy attended 

the funeral, and the two texted throughout the service. After the 

funeral, a family friend approached MacNeill and offered to help 

care for his minor daughters. MacNeill told her that he had 

already hired a nanny.

¶30 MacNeill’s adult daughters also offered to care for their 

younger siblings, but MacNeill asked Rachel to go with him to 

church to “pray about getting a nanny.” When Rachel arrived, 

MacNeill did not want to go inside, but instead remained on a 

bench outside the church. Soon, a woman approached Rachel 

and MacNeill from the parking lot and said, “I’m so sorry for 

your loss. I was at the funeral.” She told them that her name was 

Gillian and that she had attended nursing school. MacNeill 

asked for her phone number, and “Gillian”—who was actually 

Gypsy Gillian Willis—left. Nine days after Michele’s death, 

MacNeill hired Gypsy as the family nanny and moved her into 

the MacNeill home. However, Gypsy never fulfilled the role of a 

nanny in the MacNeill household—the children were “left 

alone” and took care of themselves.
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 11 2017 UT App 48

¶31 Gypsy and MacNeill travelled to Wyoming, where Gypsy 

introduced him to her family as her fiancé. By the end of the 

summer she held herself out to the public as Gillian MacNeill. 

The two applied for an identification card that listed the date of 

their marriage as April 14, 2007—the day of Michele’s funeral.2

¶32 Having witnessed MacNeill’s behavior after Michele’s 

death, Alexis, Rachel, and Michele’s sister asked investigators to 

re-examine Michele’s manner of death. The Utah County 

Attorney’s Office asked a toxicologist to examine Dr. Frikke’s 

toxicology report from Michele’s autopsy. The report stated that 

at the time of death, Michele’s blood contained Valium, Percocet, 

Phenergan, and Ambien in concentrations likely to render her 

“severely obtunded,” “difficult to arouse,” potentially “asleep,” 

and “unable to respond constructively to [her] environment.” 

The Utah County Attorney’s Office also asked Dr. Todd Grey, 

Dr. Frikke’s successor, to review Dr. Frikke’s conclusions. Dr. 

Grey changed the manner of death from “natural” to 

“undetermined” and changed her cause of death from heart 

disease to the combined effects of heart disease and drug 

toxicity.

¶33 In addition to re-examining the physical evidence, the 

State interviewed the MacNeills’ youngest daughter at the 

Children’s Justice Center. She reported that, on the day of 

Michele’s death, MacNeill had picked her up from school and 

the two returned home to find Michele in the bathtub and still in 

her clothes. She explained that MacNeill asked her to go next 

door for help, and after she brought her neighbor back to the 

MacNeill home, the neighbor sent her next door to play with the 

neighbor’s two children, where she remained for the rest of the 

afternoon. Following the CJC interview, state investigators 

 

2. MacNeill filled out an application for a military identification 

card to provide Gypsy access to a military base in Ogden.
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 12 2017 UT App 48

requested that Alexis ask the girl several follow-up questions. 

Alexis complied, and the girl provided more detail about the 

position of Michele’s body in the tub, the amount of water in the 

tub, and the items of clothing Michele was wearing.

¶34 The State charged MacNeill with murder, a first degree 

felony, and obstruction of justice, a second degree felony.

The Trial

¶35 Before trial, MacNeill moved to exclude the MacNeills’ 

youngest daughter from testifying. MacNeill argued that, while 

questioning the girl after the CJC interview, Alexis had used

improper interview techniques, resulting in “false memories.” 

The trial court granted MacNeill’s motion in part and denied it 

in part. The court ruled that the girl was not competent to testify 

at trial because “after the Children’s Justice Center interview, 

[the youngest MacNeill daughter] was subjected to suggestive 

and repeated questioning about material facts by an untrained 

interviewer with bias as to the suspect’s guilt or innocence and 

bias as to her own pecuniary interests.” But the trial court 

admitted the girl’s CJC interview, and she appeared in court at 

trial for cross-examination.

¶36 MacNeill also moved to exclude the testimony of five 

jailhouse informants that the prosecution planned to call. Four 

were federal inmates who had served time with MacNeill before 

the State charged him with murder.

3 One (the State Inmate) 

knew MacNeill from time served together in the Utah County 

Jail. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that “(1) the 

weaknesses of jailhouse informant testimony could be exposed 

through rigorous cross-examination; and (2) the jury would be 

instructed on how to judge the credibility of witnesses, and may 

 

3. MacNeill served time in federal prison for charges unrelated 

to Michele’s murder.
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20140873-CA 13 2017 UT App 48

be instructed on the heightened motive of jailhouse informants 

to misrepresent.” The trial court also ordered that “the State, in 

writing, disclose to the defense with respect to each inmate who 

will testify, any and all benefits promised, expressed or implied, 

realized now or to be realized in the future, in exchange for 

testimony in the MacNeill case, together with any documentation 

of the deal.”

¶37 In response to the trial court’s order, the State filed a 

Notice of Benefits Offered or Provided to Jailhouse Informants. 

The State disclosed consideration given to the State Inmate. It 

also represented—falsely, as it turned out—that the four federal 

inmates had not “requested any recommendations [from the 

State], nor has anyone else on [their] behalf. If any such request 

is made it will be honored. Other than that, there is no 

agreement to exchange [the federal inmates’] testimony for 

consideration from the State of Utah. Nothing has been given to 

[them], and there are no promises outstanding.”

¶38 On the first day of trial, the court ordered that all 

witnesses be excluded from the courtroom while not testifying 

and also ordered that “fact witnesses shall not watch or listen to 

television, radio, or internet news coverage of the trial while 

under trial subpoena.” The prosecution did not inform the 

federal inmates of the exclusion order for almost a week.

A. Medical Testimony

¶39 At trial a cardiologist testified that the inflammation in 

Michele’s heart was “benign” and not “severe enough to present 

a significant risk of cardiac death.” Dr. Grey also testified that 

the inflammation was “not very severe.” The State called an 

expert in forensic pathology, who testified that he found no 

evidence of myocarditis. The expert also presented a new theory 

on Michele’s cause of death: drowning.
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20140873-CA 14 2017 UT App 48

¶40 The forensic pathologist based his conclusion on five 

facts. First, Michele regurgitated large amounts of water while 

emergency responders performed CPR, indicating that she had 

swallowed water. Second, she had water in her airway, which 

indicated that she had inhaled a significant amount of water.

Third, her lungs were twice as heavy as typical lungs. Fourth, 

fluid was found in the chambers of her lungs. Finally, her blood 

was significantly diluted, which occurs when someone inhales 

water and it streams into the blood vessels and into general 

circulation.

B. The Jailhouse Informants

¶41 All five jailhouse informants testified against MacNeill.4

Inmate One testified that he knew MacNeill from a prison 

computer class. One night, Inmate One saw a picture of 

MacNeill on a television news show, and while he could not 

hear the audio, he could tell that the show claimed that MacNeill 

had murdered his wife. When Inmate One told MacNeill about 

the television show, MacNeill replied that “[t]hey’re just 

[running the show] because my girlfriend is about to get out.” 

But MacNeill later “opened up about it.” He said that he “gave 

[his wife] some oxy and some sleeping pills and then he . . . got 

her in the bathtub.” MacNeill then said “he had to help her out,” 

and he “held her head under the water for a little while.” When 

Inmate One asked MacNeill why he killed Michele, MacNeill 

responded that “she was in the way” and “she wanted the house 

and the kids,” but that the authorities “couldn’t prove that 

he . . . did anything.”

 

4. The trial court ordered that the four federal inmates be 

referred to by number to protect their privacy and safety. We 

refer to them by number as well.
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20140873-CA 15 2017 UT App 48

¶42 Inmate One testified that he had not “made any request 

for any consideration.” MacNeill cross-examined Inmate One 

using phone records he had obtained from the prison. In one

phone call Inmate One told his mother that the State was going 

to offer him a deal, and he would speak with his lawyer to find 

out the details of the deal. In numerous phone calls, he told

family members that he planned on being released from prison 

by Christmas in exchange for his testimony because MacNeill’s 

trial was scheduled for October 9 to November 9, and he would 

have “from November 9 up until Christmas to get out.” And in a 

phone call with his federal defense investigator, Inmate One 

explained that Jeff Robinson, the Utah County Attorney’s Office 

investigator assigned to MacNeill’s case, had told him that he 

was “willing to help [Inmate One] out in any way that he could.”

¶43 MacNeill also confronted Inmate One with evidence of 

communications between Inmate One and Robinson in which 

Robinson stated, “What I really want is to get you out 

[early]. . . . You really are one of my key, absolute key witnesses. 

So it’s really important to us to make sure that you are taken care 

of, and kept safe, and . . . to make sure that your needs are taken 

care of.” MacNeill also pointed out that Robinson had expressed 

a desire to communicate with Inmate One by phone rather than 

email so that MacNeill’s defense attorneys would not learn of the 

communications between the two.

¶44 Inmate Two testified that he was MacNeill’s cellmate for 

two years. Inmate Two “heard rumors” that “supposedly 

[MacNeill] murdered his wife” and asked MacNeill whether it 

was true. Inmate Two testified that MacNeill told him that “they 

couldn’t prove it,” and that the medication she was taking was 

prescribed.

¶45 Inmate Three testified that he noticed an article about 

MacNeill in People magazine that claimed MacNeill murdered 

his wife. Inmate Three asked MacNeill if he had murdered his 
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 16 2017 UT App 48

wife, to which MacNeill responded, “No, I didn’t murder my 

wife. If I did, they don’t have any evidence of it.”

¶46 Inmate Four testified that he had heard that MacNeill 

killed his wife. When Inmate Four asked MacNeill about it, 

MacNeill responded, “The bitch drowned.”

¶47 The State Inmate testified that he was housed in the same 

jail unit as MacNeill while MacNeill awaited the murder trial. 

The State Inmate asked MacNeill why he did not wear the same 

required jail-issued shoes as the other inmates, and MacNeill 

responded that he could “get away with a lot of things. For 

instance, . . . I’m getting away with my murder.” When asked if 

MacNeill elaborated on his statement, the State Inmate testified 

that MacNeill stated: “I’m getting away with murdering my 

wife.” The State Inmate testified that when he offered 

condolences for Michele’s death, MacNeill said “Oh, no, I’m glad 

the bitch is dead.”

¶48 The jury convicted MacNeill of murder, a first degree 

felony, and obstruction of justice, a second degree felony.

¶49 MacNeill filed a post-trial Motion to Arrest Judgment or 

For a New Trial on the ground that the Utah County Attorney’s 

Office failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in the form of 

consideration for Inmate One’s testimony. MacNeill based the 

motion on emails and telephone call recordings from August 

through October. The various communications revealed that 

Inmate One planned on being released from prison in December 

2013 in exchange for his testimony at MacNeill’s trial. And sure 

enough, one week after trial, Robinson wrote letters to the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office and Inmate One’s federal defender highly 

recommending that “leniency be shown to [Inmate One] for his 

truthful and courageous testimony.” Inmate One was released 

from federal custody on December 13, 2013. The communications 

also revealed that, in violation of the court’s exclusion order, 
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20140873-CA 17 2017 UT App 48

Inmate One viewed portions of the trial testimony on the news 

before his scheduled date to testify.

¶50 The trial court found that, although the State failed to 

disclose evidence of the deal between Inmate One and Robinson, 

“a jury possessed of this additional information would not have 

rendered a different verdict.” The court came to this conclusion 

because cross-examination demonstrated (1) that Inmate One 

“was ready to procure and accept early release by whatever 

means it could be obtained,” and (2) that Inmate One believed 

“testifying for the prosecution in Utah [would be] the catalyst for 

his early release.” The trial court found that although the State 

suppressed exculpatory evidence related to Inmate One, the new 

information provided by MacNeill in his post-trial motion was 

cumulative and “would not have been reasonably likely to affect 

the outcome of the trial.” The trial court therefore denied 

MacNeill’s motion.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶51 MacNeill raises three issues on appeal. First, MacNeill 

contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence to 

support a conviction of murder. “When we consider an 

insufficiency of the evidence claim, we review the evidence and 

all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the 

light most favorable to the verdict of the jury.” State v. Nielsen, 

2014 UT 10, ¶ 46, 326 P.3d 645 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). We will reverse a guilty verdict “only when the 

evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 

improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 

which he or she was convicted.” Id. (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

¶52 Second, MacNeill contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it denied his new trial motion on the ground
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 18 2017 UT App 48

that newly discovered impeachment evidence did not create a 

reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would 

have been different if it had been presented at trial. “A trial court 

has discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a motion 

for a new trial, and we will not reverse a trial court’s decision 

absent clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 

262, 265–66 (Utah 1998).

¶53 Third, MacNeill contends that cumulative prejudice 

stemming from prosecutorial misconduct resulted in the denial 

of his right to a fair trial. When reviewing a claim of cumulative 

error, we “apply the standard of review applicable to each 

underlying claim of error.” State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶ 33, 322 

P.3d 624 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶54 MacNeill contends that “the circumstantial evidence in 

this case was far from sufficient to support a conviction.” He 

argues that because “there were no eyewitnesses in this case to 

any event that would have explained the cause of [Michele’s] 

death” and “the investigation failed to reveal any physical 

evidence that would demonstrate that anyone intentionally 

contributed to [Michele’s] death,” “the evidence is insufficient 

for a reasonable jury to convict.”

¶55 At trial the State bore the burden of proving beyond a 

reasonable doubt that MacNeill intentionally or knowingly 

caused Michele’s death. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2)(a) 

(LexisNexis 2012).

¶56 When determining the sufficiency of circumstantial 

evidence, we must “determine (1) whether there is any evidence 

that supports each and every element of the crime charged, and 
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 19 2017 UT App 48

(2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence 

have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient 

to prove each legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶57 It is “a well-settled rule that circumstantial evidence alone 

may be sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused.” State v. 

Harris, 2015 UT App 282, ¶ 9, 363 P.3d 555 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the idea that “circumstantial 

evidence is necessarily less convincing and of less value than 

direct evidence . . . is a misstatement of the law.” State v. Clayton, 

646 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

On the contrary, “[c]ircumstantial evidence may even be more 

convincing than direct testimony.” State v. Housekeeper, 588 P.2d 

139, 140 (Utah 1978). In sum, “‘[d]irect evidence is not required’

to establish guilt.” Harris, 2015 UT App 282, ¶ 9 (quoting State v. 

Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 47, 326 P.3d 645). Rather, the prosecution 

may present “a mosaic of circumstantial evidence that 

considered as a whole constitutes proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” State v. Mercado, 635 A.2d 260, 264 n.4 (R.I. 1993).

¶58 “[C]redibility is an issue for the trier of fact,” and “in 

reviewing a jury verdict we assume that the jury believed the 

evidence supporting the verdict.” Brown, 948 P.2d at 343–44 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When “the jury 

returns a verdict that is reasonably sustained by circumstantial 

evidence and the inferences drawn from it, we must uphold the 

jury’s verdict.” Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 47.

¶59 “A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all 

record evidence that supports the challenged finding.” Utah R.

App. P. 24(a)(9). We view this requirement “as a natural 

extension of an appellant’s burden of persuasion.” Nielsen, 2014 

UT 10, ¶ 41.
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 20 2017 UT App 48

¶60 To support his insufficiency claim, MacNeill argues that 

“the only postulation presented by the State suggesting that there 

was a murder and that [MacNeill] committed the alleged murder 

was introduced through testimony of convicted and incarcerated 

felons.” (Emphasis added.) MacNeill further maintains that 

“only one of these informants, [Inmate One,] testified that 

[MacNeill] affirmatively insinuated that he did anything of a 

criminal nature.”

¶61 First, Inmate One did testify that MacNeill told him that 

he “gave [his wife] some oxy and some sleeping pills and 

he . . . got her . . . in the bathtub,” and that “he held her head 

under the water for a little while.” But Inmate One was not the 

only inmate witness who testified that MacNeill explicitly 

admitted his guilt. The State Inmate testified that MacNeill told 

him, “I’m getting away with murdering my wife.” He also 

testified that MacNeill said that, before Michele’s death, his 

relationship with her “was going downhill” because she was 

“trying to get his money” and “was not going to let him keep 

cheating.”

¶62 Furthermore, a jury verdict is supported not only by the 

testimony admitted into evidence, but also by the inferences that 

a jury may reasonably draw from that testimony. Inmates Two,

Three, and Four also testified that they asked MacNeill whether 

he murdered his wife. MacNeill answered that “they couldn’t 

prove it,” and, following a denial, that “[i]f I did, they don’t have 

any evidence of it,” and also that “[t]he bitch drowned.” A 

reasonable person could interpret these responses as more likely 

to be offered by a guilty man than an innocent man. Thus, a juror 

believing this testimony could, in light of the totality of evidence 

presented at trial, reasonably infer that MacNeill acknowledged 

having killed his wife.

¶63 MacNeill also argues that “the testimony of jailhouse 

informants is known to be unreliable and has a long history of 
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 21 2017 UT App 48

leading to wrongful convictions.” This may be true. See, e.g., R. 

Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope”: Giglio, Accomplice 

Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 Nw. U. L. 

Rev. 1129, 1130 (2004) (“It is now widely accepted that the 

practice of conditioning leniency on cooperation in criminal 

cases is rife with the potential for abuse.”). But “credibility is an 

issue for the trier of fact, in this case the jury.” State v. Brown, 948 

P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “We do not ‘sit as a second trier of fact.’” State v. Davis, 

2014 UT App 77, ¶ 4, 324 P.3d 678 (quoting State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 

30, ¶ 16, 25 P.3d 985). Rather, “‘[i]t is the exclusive function of 

the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of 

the witnesses.’” Id. (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 

(Utah 1985)).

¶64 As explained in the next section of this opinion, defense 

counsel’s cross-examination of the jailhouse witnesses exposed 

cracks in their credibility. Defense counsel thoroughly crossexamined both Inmate One and the State Inmate. On crossexamination, defense counsel elicited testimony from the State 

Inmate about his prior theft and shoplifting charges, lying to 

police, defrauding his landlord, and running a counterfeit watch 

scheme, as well as his expected consideration in exchange for 

testifying against MacNeill at trial, including consideration that 

the State failed to disclose prior to trial.

¶65 Furthermore, the trial court gave an exemplary jury 

instruction on the issue of in-custody-informant credibility. The 

court instructed the jury, “A witness who believes that he may 

be able to obtain his own freedom, or receive a lighter sentence 

by giving testimony favorable to the prosecution, has motive to 

testify falsely. Therefore, you must examine his testimony with 

caution and weigh it with great care.” The court also instructed 

the jury to consider the “criminal history of the informant,”

whether “the informant has ever changed his or her testimony,” 

whether “the informant has received anything (including 
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 22 2017 UT App 48

leniency in prosecution, personal advantage, or vindication) in 

exchange for testimony,” and “[a]ny other evidence related to 

the informant’s credibility.”

¶66 In sum, the premise of MacNeill’s argument—that a 

criminal conviction must rest on direct evidence—is incorrect as 

a matter of law, and MacNeill’s claim that only one jailhouse 

informant testified that MacNeill explicitly confessed to the 

murder is incorrect as a matter of fact. Two such informants 

testified that MacNeill admitted to killing his wife, and three 

more testified that MacNeill made statements from which jurors 

could, in light of the totality of the trial evidence, reasonably 

infer that MacNeill killed his wife. So the shortcomings MacNeill 

identifies in the trial evidence simply do not exist. We reject his 

sufficiency claim on this ground alone.

¶67 Moreover, as explained above, an appellant challenging a 

jury verdict must “first marshal all record evidence that supports 

the challenged finding.” Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). An argument 

that does not fully acknowledge the evidence supporting a 

verdict has little chance, as a matter of logic, of demonstrating 

that the verdict lacked adequate factual support. See Dillon v. 

Southern Mgmt. Corp. Ret. Trust, 2014 UT 14, ¶ 59, 326 P.3d 656 

(citing State v. Mitchell, 2013 UT App 289, ¶ 31, 318 P.3d 238). 

Accordingly, “[a]n appellant cannot demonstrate that the 

evidence supporting a factual finding falls short without giving 

a candid account of that evidence.” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

¶68 MacNeill’s brief does not give a candid account of the 

evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. On the contrary, he 

ignores much of that evidence. He argues that the testimony of 

Inmate One constituted “the sole evidence of a homicide.” But 

he fails to acknowledge any of the evidence laid out in 

paragraphs 2 through 33 and 61 through 62 above.
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 23 2017 UT App 48

¶69 Ignoring incriminating evidence does not make it go 

away. The circumstantial evidence recited above gave the jury “a 

basis in logic and reasonable human experience” to conclude 

that MacNeill wanted Michele out of the picture so he could be 

with Gypsy; that MacNeill manipulated Michele into having a 

facelift despite the physician’s concerns about her blood 

pressure; that MacNeill arranged to have available an abundance 

of prescription medications; that Michele was unlikely to have 

voluntarily taken those drugs, because she did not need them, 

did not like taking drugs, and normally used less than 

prescribed; that MacNeill attempted to manufacture a partial 

alibi by ensuring his photograph was taken at his award 

ceremony; that MacNeill gave a false description of the 

positioning of Michel’s body in the tub; that, contrary to his 

explanation, Michele, heavily drugged, drowned in the tub; that 

MacNeill pretended to, but did not, perform CPR on Michele;

that MacNeill destroyed or attempted to destroy evidence of 

Michele’s murder; that MacNeill manufactured an excuse for his 

inability to lift Michele’s body out of the tub by reporting 

scattered claims of various illnesses to his family and 

coworkers—in short, that MacNeill intentionally or knowingly 

caused Michele’s death. See State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 

(Utah 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶70 Because the jury returned “a verdict that is reasonably 

sustained by circumstantial evidence and the inferences drawn 

from it, we must uphold the jury’s verdict.” See State v. Nielsen, 

2014 UT 10, ¶ 47, 326 P.3d 645. Although MacNeill maintains 

that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support his 

conviction, we are satisfied that the evidence presented at trial 

supports every element of the crime charged, and “the 

inferences that can be drawn from that evidence have a basis in 

logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each 

legal element of [murder] beyond a reasonable doubt.” See 

Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). MacNeill has presented nothing suggesting that the 
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 24 2017 UT App 48

evidence was “sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 

that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant committed the crime of which he [or she] was 

convicted.” See id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we reject MacNeill’s 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

II. Impeachment Evidence

¶71 MacNeill challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion 

to arrest judgment or for a new trial. MacNeill contends that “the 

prosecution withheld impeachment evidence that would have 

undermined the credibility of the State’s only witness” who

supported the State’s murder case. Specifically, MacNeill argues 

that he “suffered extreme prejudice by being denied the 

opportunity to fully cross-examine [Inmate One] with the facts 

that would demonstrate his lack of credibility.”

¶72 The withholding “by the prosecution of evidence 

favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 

the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 

irrespective of the good faith or the bad faith of the prosecution.” 

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also State v. Bakalov, 

1999 UT 45, ¶ 30, 979 P.2d 799. The duty to preserve such 

evidence “applies both to substantively exculpatory evidence 

and to that which may be used for impeachment.” State v. Bisner, 

2001 UT 99, ¶ 32, 37 P.3d 1073 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 

U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55

(1972)).

¶73 “[A] Brady violation occurs only where the state 

suppresses information that (1) remains unknown to the defense 

both before and throughout trial and (2) is material and 

exculpatory, meaning its disclosure would have created a 

‘reasonable probability’ that ‘the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.’” Id. ¶ 33 (additional citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). It is “the cumulative or collective 
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 25 2017 UT App 48

effect of the evidence that is weighed when determining whether 

the disclosure would have created a reasonable probability of a 

different result.” Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, ¶ 32, 128 P.3d 1123. 

However, when evidence is “cumulative of other impeachment 

evidence available at trial,” it does “not constitute material 

evidence for Brady purposes.” Id. ¶ 37.

¶74 Before trial, the State filed a Notice of Benefits Offered or 

Provided to Jailhouse Informants asserting that the State had 

promised and could promise Inmate One nothing in exchange 

for his testimony:

The State of Utah has no authority over federal 

inmates and had nothing to offer Inmate #1 in 

exchange for his cooperation in the investigation 

and his testimony at trial. There is no agreement 

[to] exchange Inmate #1’s testimony for 

consideration from the State of Utah. Nothing has 

been given to him, and there are no promises 

outstanding. (If Inmate #1 were to request a 

recommendation from Investigator Robinson or 

the prosecution, that request would be honored. To 

date, however, he has not made any requests for 

any consideration.)

Before filing the Notice of Benefits, a prosecutor met with 

Robinson and asked him what Inmate One had asked for in 

return for his cooperation in the case. Robinson responded that 

Inmate One “had not asked me for anything.”

¶75 Despite the State’s claim that it did not offer Inmate One 

any consideration for his testimony and that no promises were 

outstanding, MacNeill discovered evidence during trial showing 

that Robinson had offered to write a letter to the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office and Inmate One’s federal defender in exchange for his 

testimony. MacNeill used that evidence to great effect at trial.
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 26 2017 UT App 48

¶76 Inmate One testified on direct examination that the Notice 

of Benefits was completely accurate—that his only motives for 

testifying were (1) to protect others and (2) to do the right thing 

as part of Inmate One’s rehabilitation, and that he had done 

nothing to pursue a possible benefit for testifying. But on crossexamination, MacNeill confronted him with the following 

evidence: a phone call with his mother, during which he 

admitted that the State was planning to cut him a deal for 

testifying; a statement to his mother that he was “putting that 

date, I’m putting Christmas in my head because the [trial] is

going from October to November”; a statement to his mother 

that he was planning to “talk with [his niece] and have her crack 

down and see what [Robinson] is going to do . . . . And make 

sure he do the right thing, . . . Because if he ain’t, then I ain’t”; a 

statement to his niece referring to his testimony for the State as 

“Operation Utah”; a statement by his federal defense 

investigator explaining that if his testimony was “really great 

and kind of puts the nail in the guy’s coffin, then you know, you 

might get the two-and-a-half off”; Inmate One’s statement to his 

federal defense investigator that Robinson had told him he was 

“willing to help me out in any way that he could”; a telephone 

call between Inmate One and Robinson in which Robinson told 

Inmate One, “What I really want is to get you out before, and I 

just wish we could do that somehow, some way . . . . [You] really 

are one of my key, absolute key witnesses. So it’s really 

important to us to make sure that you are taken care of, and kept 

safe, and you know, I just want to make sure that your needs are 

taken care of”; a statement by Robinson that he would call 

Inmate One’s federal public defender and defense investigator; 

and a statement by Robinson to Inmate One that he preferred to 

communicate with Inmate One by phone rather than email so 

MacNeill would not learn of the communications. This 

uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that Inmate One had 

falsely testified that he had received no promises of leniency 

from Robinson and that Robinson had falsely represented that 

he had offered no promises of leniency to Inmate One.
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 27 2017 UT App 48

¶77 But the matter did not end there. After trial, MacNeill 

filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act seeking 

information from the federal prison where Inmate One was 

incarcerated. MacNeill obtained Inmate One’s email and 

telephone correspondence for the months of September and 

October 2013. These communications revealed that Inmate One

planned on being released from prison in December 2013 in 

exchange for his testimony at MacNeill’s trial. MacNeill also 

obtained an email from Inmate One’s federal defense 

investigator informing Inmate One that he had “talked with the 

investigator out there, that Jeff Robinson will be providing us 

and the U.S. Attorney’s Office with information after the trial 

about what all you did, you know testimony and assistance.” 

And one week after trial, as promised, Robinson wrote a letter to 

the U.S. Attorney’s Office and Inmate One’s federal defender 

highly recommending that “leniency be shown to [Inmate One] 

for his truthful and courageous testimony.”

¶78 After receiving this information, MacNeill filed a Motion 

to Arrest Judgment or For a New Trial on the ground that the 

Utah County Attorney’s Office failed to disclose exculpatory 

evidence in the form of consideration for Inmate One’s 

testimony. In support of the State’s opposition to MacNeill’s 

motion for a new trial, Robinson filed an affidavit stating that a 

prosecutor for the State had inquired whether Inmate One had 

asked for anything in return for his cooperation in the case and 

Robinson responded that Inmate One “had not asked me for 

anything.” In the same affidavit, Robinson also stated that he 

“did not think to inform [the prosecutor that talked to him] or 

any of the prosecutors that Inmate #1’s attorney had asked for a 

recommendation if [Robinson] felt comfortable with his 

assistance.”

¶79 The trial court meticulously analyzed this issue in a 40-

page ruling. The court entered 60 findings of fact and 61 

subsidiary findings, and devoted 18 pages to setting forth 
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 28 2017 UT App 48

conclusions of law. In making its conclusions, the court relied on 

two journal articles, one practice guide, and 16 state and federal 

cases. The court scrupulously examined the evidence withheld 

by the State and declared that Robinson’s claim that he merely 

forgot to tell prosecutors that Inmate One had requested 

consideration for his testimony and he had agreed to give it “in 

the face of direct questioning tests the bounds of credulity.”5

¶80 The trial court concluded that the State suppressed 

exculpatory evidence related to Inmate One, specifically, 

evidence showing that Inmate One had asked for a 

recommendation letter and that Robinson had agreed to provide 

one. The court further concluded that “[t]his information 

remained unknown to defense counsel before and throughout 

trial.” The court also observed that “the State’s attempt to downplay the importance of Inmate 1’s trial testimony rings hollow,” 

 

5. The court made an in-depth examination of the inherent risk 

of using jailhouse informant testimony. The court quoted a 2007 

policy review that explained jailhouse informants’ motives to 

fabricate testimony and opined that “there is a high risk of 

pivotal, but perjured testimony” and therefore “the prosecutor’s 

professional responsibilities are a critical safeguard to 

preventing wrongful convictions.” The court emphasized that 

“[p]rosecutors do not have a duty to ‘make an investigation on 

behalf of the defendant’ or to ‘search[] for exculpatory and 

mitigating evidence,’” but “[g]iven the powerful incentive 

informants have to fabricate evidence favorable to the 

government and the prosecutor’s primary duty to do justice, 

prosecutors should undertake meaningful efforts to corroborate 

information provided by jailhouse informants, and to investigate 

informant reliability.” (Quoting State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, ¶ 9, 974 

P.2d 279). The court concluded that in this case it was “unclear 

what effort prosecutors took to arrive at a reasonable belief that 

Inmate[] 1 [was] providing truthful information.”
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 29 2017 UT App 48

and that if “MacNeill had only to show that the State committed 

serious errors in this case, his motion for new trial would be 

granted.” But, as the trial court explained, “the law requires 

more.”

¶81 The trial court concluded that “after careful review of the 

record, . . . disclosure of Inmate 1’s request for a 

recommendation letter, and Robinson’s promise to provide it 

would not have been reasonably likely to affect the outcome of 

the trial” in light of defense counsel’s “withering crossexamination.” The court reasoned that by the “use of Inmate 1’s 

prison emails and telephone conversations, defense counsel 

painted Inmate 1 for what he was—a calculating and 

sophisticated convict, ready to say or do anything necessary to 

get out of prison early.” The court characterized Inmate One’s 

cross-examination as “long, pointed, and devastating.” The court

explained that Inmate One’s “true motives for testifying in Utah 

were revealed. It was clear that he had every intention of asking 

for and accepting anything he could get . . . to secure his early 

release.” After careful review of Inmate One’s trial testimony on 

cross-examination and the evidence withheld by the State, the 

court concluded that “a jury possessed of this additional 

information would not have rendered a different verdict.”

¶82 MacNeill claims that in ruling on his motion for new trial, 

“the trial court erroneously neglected to discern the prejudice 

resulting from the introduction of the only damning evidence in 

this case: tainted testimony from an informant who had been 

given consideration, in this case a release from prison, and who 

attempted to conform his story by observing prior evidence 

introduced in the case that he saw while watching trial 

testimony on television.” But in challenging the trial court’s 

ruling, MacNeill fails to refute or even acknowledge the trial 

court’s exhaustive memorandum decision. He has made no 

attempt to identify any flaws in the court’s findings or 

conclusions. Because MacNeill has failed to address “the basis of 
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 30 2017 UT App 48

the district court’s ruling, we reject this challenge.” See Golden 

Meadows Props., LC v. Strand, 2010 UT App 257, ¶ 17, 241 P.3d 

375.

¶83 Nor has MacNeill analyzed his claim under the 

framework of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). An 

adequately briefed argument must “contain the contentions and 

reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, 

including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in 

the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and 

parts of the record relied on.” Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). “An 

appellant that fails to devote adequate attention to an issue is 

almost certainly going to fail to meet its burden of persuasion. A 

party must cite legal authority on which its argument is based 

and then provide reasoned analysis of how that authority should 

apply in the particular case, including citations to the record 

where appropriate.” Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 13.

In short, an issue is inadequately briefed “when the overall 

analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of 

research and argument to the reviewing court.” State v. Thomas, 

961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998).

¶84 MacNeill cites Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972),

in support of his claim that “failure to provide evidence of any 

understanding or agreement with a key witness in exchange for 

testimony that would be relevant to that witness’s credibility,”

“will result in the reversal of any verdict of guilt and will require 

a new trial.” But he fails to develop any analysis beyond that

assertion. He does not engage in an analysis under either 

Giglio or Brady to demonstrate why the evidence he received 

after trial was “material either to guilt or punishment.” See 

Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Because MacNeill has failed to address the 

trial court’s detailed ruling, failed to develop his citation to 

authority, and failed to provide any reasoned analysis based on 

that authority, we conclude that he failed to carry his burden of 

persuasion on appeal. See State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶ 18, 345 
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 31 2017 UT App 48

P.3d 1226 (holding that “our adequate briefing requirement 

is . . . a natural extension of appellant’s burden of persuasion”

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We reject his 

claim on this ground.

¶85 Moreover, we discern no flaw in the trial court’s ruling. 

Robinson’s blatantly false statements had the potential to 

subvert the course of justice. But in the end, they did not. The 

jury learned that Inmate One expected the State to cut him a deal 

for testifying; that he expected to be released before Christmas; 

that if Robinson would not “do the right thing,” neither would 

Inmate One; that the federal defense investigator encouraged 

him to give testimony that “kind of puts the nail in the guy’s 

coffin”; that Inmate One told his federal defense investigator that 

Robinson was “willing to help me out in any way that he could”; 

that Robinson had told Inmate One that he wanted to make sure 

that Inmate One’s “needs are taken care of”; that Robinson told 

Inmate One that he would call his federal public defender and 

defense investigator; and that Robinson preferred to 

communicate by phone rather than email so that MacNeill 

would not learn of the communications.

¶86 The jury did not learn that Inmate One’s federal defense 

investigator told Inmate One that Robinson “will be providing 

us and the U.S. Attorney’s Office with information after the trial 

about what all you did, you know testimony and assistance.” 

And of course the jury did not learn that one week after trial, as 

promised, Robinson wrote a letter to the U.S. Attorney’s Office 

and Inmate One’s federal defender highly recommending that 

“leniency be shown to [Inmate One] for his truthful and 

courageous testimony.” But the trial court correctly ruled that 

this additional evidence was “cumulative of other impeachment 

evidence available at trial,” and therefore it does “not constitute 

material evidence for Brady purposes.” See Tillman v. State, 2005 

UT 56, ¶ 37, 128 P.3d 1123. Therefore, the trial court did not 

exceed its discretion in denying MacNeill’s motion for a new 
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 32 2017 UT App 48

trial on this ground. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 265–66 

(Utah 1998).

III. Cumulative Error

¶87 MacNeill finally contends that he was “denied a fair trial 

as a result of numerous instances of prejudicial prosecutorial 

misconduct.” MacNeill argues that three specific errors denied 

him the right to a fair trial. First, he claims that the State 

“unfairly and improperly coached [Alexis] to convey an 

unsubstantiated non-factual version of the discovery of 

[Michele’s] body and the crime scene for the purpose of 

manufacturing corroboration for the informant’s false 

testimony.” MacNeill argues that the State approached Alexis on 

multiple occasions and asked her to discuss the facts of the case 

with the youngest daughter, who was in her custody at the time.

Second, MacNeill claims that the State “failed to disclose 

alternative suspects.” Third, he claims that the State “failed to 

follow the trial judge’s order to exclude witnesses.”6 Under the 

 

6. MacNeill also seems to claim that the prosecutors’ failure to 

“adhere to their duty to provide discovery after [MacNeill] made 

numerous requests” constitutes error. However, MacNeill 

describes this claim in only two sentences, stating that “trial 

counsel, after discovering thousands of documents that [the 

State] failed to disclose, then filed a motion to disqualify the 

Utah County Attorney’s office from the case. These motions and 

findings of the attorneys and trial judge are illustrative of the 

overall failure and bad faith of the prosecution in discovery 

matters in this case.” The “motions and findings” referenced by 

MacNeill comprise 822 pages of the appellate record. An 

adequately briefed argument must “contain the contentions and 

reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 

presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts 

of the record relied on.” Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). MacNeill did 

(continued...)
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 33 2017 UT App 48

doctrine of cumulative error, “we will reverse only if the 

cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our 

confidence . . . that a fair trial was had.” State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 

1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (omission in original) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted).7

A. The CJC Interview

¶88 MacNeill argues that the trial court erred in admitting the

CJC interview into evidence. Specifically, MacNeill argues that 

admitting the interview was erroneous because the trial court 

found that Alexis improperly influenced the girl’s memory of 

the events on April 11, 2007 by using improper interview 

 

(...continued)

not specify which discovery requests the State failed to comply 

with in his claim that prosecutors “failed to adhere to their duty 

to provide discovery after [MacNeill] made numerous requests.” 

Nor does MacNeill indicate any authority that supports his 

assertion that failure to comply with a discovery request 

constitutes error that denied him a fair trial. Accordingly, 

MacNeill has failed to uphold his burden of persuasion on this 

point. See Bank of America v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 13 (holding 

that an appellant who “fails to devote adequate attention to an 

issue is almost certainly going to fail to meet its burden of 

persuasion”).

7. A claim of cumulative error—or more accurately, cumulative 

prejudice—generally asserts that errors discussed earlier in the 

brief, even if individually harmless, caused prejudice in 

combination. But MacNeill’s cumulative error argument asserts 

three claims of error not asserted elsewhere in his brief. In any 

event, because we conclude that none of these alleged errors 

were prejudicial, his claim of cumulative prejudice necessarily 

fails.
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20140873-CA 34 2017 UT App 48

techniques that planted false memories. “A trial court has broad 

discretion to admit or exclude evidence and its determination 

typically will only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of 

discretion.” State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ¶ 20, 989 P.2d 52. “A 

trial court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably.” Id.

¶89 With respect to the CJC interview, the trial court found 

that it “was not tainted” because her memories “as expressed in 

that interview are largely consistent with prior statements to 

Alexis and are corroborated by the statements of other witnesses, 

including [MacNeill].” But the court found that “(1) after the CJC 

interview, [the youngest daughter] was subjected to suggestive 

and repeated questioning about material facts by an untrained 

interviewer with bias as to the suspect’s guilt, and with bias as to 

a pecuniary interest; and (2) there is a substantial likelihood that 

these interview techniques implanted false memories or 

distorted real memories in [the youngest daughter],” and 

therefore she was “not competent to testify.”

¶90 MacNeill’s claim fails because of chronology. MacNeill 

challenges the trial court’s admission of the CJC interview and 

claims that the trial court erred because it found that Alexis had 

improperly influenced the girl’s testimony. But the improper 

influence that MacNeill claims tainted the girl’s memory 

occurred after the CJC interview. The trial court made detailed 

findings about the unreliability of the girl’s later testimony. 

Based on those findings, it admitted statements made in the CJC 

interview before Alexis questioned the girl, but excluded 

statements made by the girl during or after Alexis’s questioning.

MacNeill has not demonstrated how the girl’s testimony in the 

CJC interview could be rendered unreliable by later questioning.

And MacNeill does not challenge the trial court’s finding that,

“[i]nsofar as her CJC interview is concerned, [the youngest

daughter] is a competent witness.” Given the trial court’s “broad 

discretion to admit or exclude evidence,” we affirm its decision 

to admit the girl’s CJC interview. See Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ¶ 20.
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20140873-CA 35 2017 UT App 48

B. Alternative Suspects

¶91 MacNeill next argues that the State did not disclose 

information that his son expressed homicidal ideations, because 

doing so would have suggested an alternative perpetrator. The 

record reflects otherwise. During the investigation, investigators

sent an email to his son’s school about “troubling” comments 

they discovered on his son’s Twitter account. In that email, 

investigators made clear that the young man was “not a suspect 

in the death of his mother.” MacNeill received a copy of this 

email ten months before trial. MacNeill’s claim that the State 

failed to disclose this information at trial thus lacks factual 

support.

C. Exclusionary Order

¶92 MacNeill finally argues that “the prosecution failed to 

follow the trial judge’s order to exclude witnesses.” The trial 

court ruled on this issue in denying MacNeill’s motion for a new 

trial, but MacNeill does not address the detailed findings made 

by the trial court and makes no attempt to challenge the trial 

court’s conclusion that MacNeill failed to prove prejudice.

¶93 “A trial court has discretion in determining whether to 

grant or deny a motion for a new trial, and we will not reverse a 

trial court’s decision absent clear abuse of that discretion.” State 

v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 265–66 (Utah 1998). “When an exclusion 

order has been violated, the burden is on the accused to 

demonstrate that he has been prejudiced to the extent that a 

mistrial should be granted.” State v. Billsie, 2006 UT 13, ¶ 12, 131 

P.3d 239 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶94 After opening statements, the trial court ordered that all 

fact witnesses “not watch or listen to television, radio, or internet 

news coverage of the trial while under trial subpoena” and that 

the parties shall “inform their respective fact witnesses of this 

exclusion order.” In the words of the trial court, “for reasons that 
State v. MacNeill

20140873-CA 36 2017 UT App 48

remained unexplained—the State did not inform the federal 

jailhouse informants of the exclusion order for almost a week.” 

After trial MacNeill filed a Freedom of Information Act request 

with the Federal Bureau of Prisons and sought disclosure of 

Inmate One’s September and October 2013 telephone 

conversations. These conversations showed that Inmate One 

watched television coverage of the trial even though he testified 

that he did not.

¶95 However, Inmate One’s trial testimony was consistent 

with his report to Robinson before trial, with one exception. In 

his initial interview with Robinson, Inmate One reported that 

MacNeill gave Michele “Oxycontin.” At trial, Inmate One 

testified that MacNeill gave Michele “oxy.” When asked on 

cross-examination whether “oxy” meant “Oxycontin,” Inmate 

One responded that “Oxycontin and Oxycodone are the same 

thing. Basically one of them has Tylenol in it or Acetaminophen, 

the other one doesn’t . . . so I might have said Oxycontin or 

Oxycodone, either one.”

¶96 The trial court concluded that the State’s failure to inform 

the federal inmates about the exclusion order for almost a week 

did not prejudice MacNeill. We agree. Inmate One’s testimony 

did not change materially, and MacNeill required Inmate One to 

address the inconsistency in his testimony about whether 

MacNeill gave Michele “Oxycontin” or “Oxy.” MacNeill failed 

to demonstrate prejudice, because he could not show that this 

slight difference between Inmate One’s version of events before 

and after viewing television coverage had any effect on the 

verdict. Accordingly, the trial court did not exceed its discretion 

in denying MacNeill’s motion for a new trial on this ground.

¶97 In sum, MacNeill has demonstrated no abuse of discretion 

by the trial court. Because “we have found no error in this case, 

the requirements of the cumulative error doctrine are not met.” 

See State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ¶ 62, 191 P.3d 17.
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20140873-CA 37 2017 UT App 48

CONCLUSION

¶98 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court 

is affirmed.