Filed 9/15/20 P. v. Dixon CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MARKEISHA NICOLE DIXON,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B299415

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. KA073169)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. David C. Brougham, Judge. Affirmed.

J. Kahn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Charles S. Lee, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * * * * * *
2

Defendant and appellant Markeisha Nicole Dixon appeals 

from the denial of her petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal 

Code section 1170.95. 

Defendant was one of three individuals charged with the 

first degree murder of a college student kidnapped, robbed and 

left for dead in the mountains after her throat was slit. 

Defendant pled guilty to first degree murder in exchange for the 

dismissal of the robbery-murder and kidnapping-murder special 

circumstance allegations. The record of conviction demonstrates 

defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless 

indifference to human life. Defendant is ineligible for 

resentencing relief under the changes in the law regarding 

liability for felony murder since her 2007 conviction.

Defendant raises numerous contentions challenging the 

order denying her petition, all of which were forfeited by her 

failure to object in the trial court at the evidentiary hearing. We 

therefore affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In April 2006, defendant was charged, along with 

codefendant Henry Arnold Singer, with one count of first degree 

murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) Robbery-murder and 

kidnapping-murder special circumstances were also alleged. 

(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) The charges arose from the August 2001 

murder of Christina Burmeister. In a separate information, 

James Dixon was also charged with the Burmeister murder.1 

Neither Henry Arnold Singer or James Dixon is a party to this 

appeal. 

1 Because of the common surname, we will refer to James 

Dixon as Dixon and Markeisha Dixon as defendant. 
3

Two witnesses testified at the preliminary hearing, 

Sergeant Joseph Purcell of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 

Department and Chanson Tyrone. Sergeant Purcell investigated 

the death of Ms. Burmeister. Mr. Tyrone was a witness to the 

crimes.

On August 18, 2001, a deputy sheriff discovered 

Ms. Burmeister’s body in the front passenger seat of her truck on 

a gravel turnout on Highway 39 in Azusa Canyon. Her throat 

was cut and blood smears in the truck indicated she was killed in 

that location. A later autopsy determined the cause of death to 

be a knife wound to the throat, causing the victim to have 

“drowned on her own blood.” 

Sergeant Purcell recovered a cigar butt on the floorboard 

beneath the driver’s seat of the victim’s truck. Later testing 

established that DNA taken from the cigar butt matched the 

DNA profile for Dixon. The investigation also revealed that 

three ATM withdrawals, totaling $400, were made from 

Ms. Burmeister’s account at Washington Mutual bank within the 

span of 90 seconds on the evening of August 17, 2001. Security 

footage from the bank showed a person making the withdrawals 

holding the hood of their sweatshirt down to obscure their face. 

Ms. Burmeister’s family told Sergeant Purcell that she had gone 

out that night in her new truck to a fraternity party at her 

college. 

Mr. Tyrone testified he was with Singer on the night of 

August 17, 2001. They were in San Bernardino walking down 

the street headed to a liquor store when Dixon and defendant 

pulled up alongside them in a sedan. Defendant, who was 

driving, called over to them and asked if they wanted to go get 

some “cheese,” a slang term for money. Defendant lived in the 
4

same building as Mr. Tyrone. He had seen Dixon before with 

defendant at the building and Mr. Tyrone said “[h]e looked 

crazy.” Both Singer and Mr. Tyrone got into the sedan with 

defendant and Dixon. They pulled onto the freeway and headed 

toward Pomona. 

Defendant stopped the car on a residential street where 

some sort of party was going on. Mr. Tyrone noticed Dixon had a 

handgun in his lap. Defendant and Dixon got out of the car and 

walked off. Mr. Tyrone and Singer stayed by the car, talking and 

smoking cigarettes. 

After a few minutes, Dixon returned walking next to a 

white female unknown to Mr. Tyrone (Ms. Burmeister) who was 

holding her hands up. Dixon appeared to whisper something in 

her ear and she put her hands down. They walked toward a blue 

truck, parked a couple of spaces away from the sedan, and both 

Dixon and Ms. Burmeister got in the passenger side of the truck. 

Defendant said “come on” and then got in the driver’s seat of the 

truck and drove off. 

Singer and Mr. Tyrone got into the sedan, with Singer 

driving, and followed the truck. They eventually arrived at a 

Washington Mutual bank in Montclair. Singer parked the sedan 

a short distance away from where defendant had parked the 

truck. Defendant, who was wearing a black hooded shirt, got out 

of the truck and walked toward the ATM machine. She never 

said what she was going to do, but it was “pretty easy to figure 

out.” When she was walking back from the ATM, she had money 

in her hands and was counting it. 

Defendant walked over to Singer and Mr. Tyrone and told 

them she was having difficulty driving the truck because it was a 

manual transmission. Singer, who knew how to drive a manual 
5

transmission, got into the truck and drove out of the parking lot, 

as did defendant and Mr. Tyrone in the sedan. 

They drove to “a secluded little dark area” up in the 

mountains. Defendant parked the sedan a little bit away from 

where Singer parked the truck. Singer got out of the truck, 

walked over to the sedan and got in with defendant and 

Mr. Tyrone. Mr. Tyrone could see that Dixon was still in the 

truck with Ms. Burmeister. After a few moments, he saw 

Ms. Burmeister appear to grab at her neck “like she was gasping 

for air or something.” Dixon got out of the truck and came back 

to the sedan. Mr. Tyrone did not see any weapon in his hands. 

Defendant then drove them all back to San Bernardino. She and 

Dixon dropped off Singer and Mr. Tyrone at Mr. Tyrone’s 

apartment. 

In November 2007, defendant pled guilty to first degree 

murder. As part of the plea agreement, defendant admitted 

certain facts on the record, including that she was present when 

Ms. Burmeister was abducted in Pomona; she saw Dixon force 

Ms. Burmeister into her truck at gunpoint; she then got into the 

truck and drove it to a Washington Mutual bank in Montclair; 

Dixon gave her the victim’s ATM card and pin number and she 

withdrew money from the account; she followed the truck in 

another car up to the mountains to a dark turnout area; she saw 

Dixon approach Ms. Burmeister with a knife; she saw Dixon 

throw the knife over a fence; Dixon returned to where she and the 

two other accomplices were, with Ms. Burmeister’s panties in his 

hand; and Dixon told defendant “everything was taken care of.” 

The court accepted defendant’s waivers on the record. In 

accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, defendant was 

sentenced to prison for 25 years to life and the prosecution 
6

dismissed the special circumstance allegations. Defendant was 

awarded 708 days of custody credits. 

In January 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing 

pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 which became effective 

January 1, 2019. The trial court appointed defendant counsel 

and the parties submitted briefs. The court ordered the People to 

show cause in accordance with section 1170.95, subdivision (c). 

At the evidentiary hearing on May 29, 2019, the court 

identified the relevant evidence as the record of conviction, 

including the transcript of the preliminary hearing. The parties 

agreed and did not offer any additional evidence, nor did any 

party raise any objections. 

After entertaining argument from the parties, the court 

denied defendant’s petition, finding the prosecution met its 

burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 

acted as an aider and abettor with the intent to kill and also as a 

major participant in the underlying felonies who acted with 

reckless indifference. The court found that defendant was 

therefore ineligible for resentencing. 

This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the trial court erroneously relied on 

the transcript of the preliminary hearing which she contends is 

not part of the record of conviction and is insufficient to establish 

guilt, and further because the transcript consisted of 

uncorroborated accomplice testimony. Defendant also argues her 

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the court’s reliance 

on the preliminary hearing transcript.

Defendant concedes she did not object to the court 

considering the preliminary hearing transcript as the relevant 
7

evidence to resolve her petition. Defendant’s appellate 

contentions have therefore been forfeited. “ ‘ “An appellate court 

will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous 

rulings, in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, 

where an objection could have been, but was not, presented to the 

lower court by some appropriate method.” ’ ” (People v. Saunders

(1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590.) The doctrine of waiver or 

forfeiture is intended “ ‘ “to encourage a defendant to bring errors 

to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected or 

avoided and a fair trial had.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 590.) “ ‘ “No procedural 

principle is more familiar . . . than that a constitutional right,” or 

a right of any other sort, “may be forfeited in criminal as well as 

civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right 

before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.” 

[Citation.]’ ” (Ibid.) 

Defendant nonetheless urges us to resolve her contentions 

on the merits because she views them as issues of first 

impression that involve important questions of public policy and 

affect the validity of her judgment of conviction. Even were we to 

consider the substance of defendant’s contentions, we would 

reject them. 

The preliminary hearing transcript is a part of the record of 

conviction. (People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 223.) As the 

Supreme Court explained, a preliminary hearing transcript is 

properly considered a part of the record of conviction because of 

“the procedural protections afforded the defendant. . . . Those 

protections include the right to confront and cross-examine 

witnesses and the requirement those witnesses testify under 

oath, coupled with the accuracy afforded by the court reporter’s 

verbatim reporting of the proceedings.” (Ibid.) Where, as here, 
8

the conviction is based on a guilty plea, a preliminary hearing 

transcript is a reliable record reflecting the facts of the offense for 

which the defendant was convicted. 

Defendant asserts a preliminary hearing only establishes 

sufficient cause to hold the defendant to answer and does not 

establish guilt. The contention lacks merit. A court reviewing a 

preliminary hearing transcript in a resentencing proceeding does 

not look to the legal conclusion reached by the magistrate at the 

hearing, but to the facts established by the testimony, and then 

draws its own legal conclusions about those facts to decide if a 

defendant is eligible for resentencing. 

As for the argument the preliminary hearing consisted only 

of uncorroborated accomplice testimony, defendant has not 

provided authority or argument to persuade us that Penal Code 

section 1111 applies to a postconviction resentencing proceeding 

pursuant to section 1170.95. In any event, the testimony of 

Mr. Tyrone was not uncorroborated. 

The preliminary hearing consisted of the testimony of 

Sergeant Purcell as well as Mr. Tyrone. Their testimony was 

corroborated by defendant’s numerous factual admissions made 

during her plea colloquy. The trial court did not have only 

uncorroborated accomplice testimony upon which to base its 

conclusion that defendant was a “major participant in the 

underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human 

life.” (Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (e).) 

We also reject defendant’s contention her counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object to the court’s consideration of the 

preliminary hearing transcript at the evidentiary hearing. 

Defendant has not shown there was any valid basis for an 

objection. Defendant’s argument that counsel purportedly 
9

admitted the testimony was unreliable because it was “not under 

oath” misconstrues counsel’s remarks. The comment by counsel 

about statements not being under oath was not directed at the 

witness testimony during the preliminary hearing, which plainly 

was under oath, but at the additional argument counsel made 

regarding his discussions with his client about her reasons for 

pleading guilty. 

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying Markeisha Nicole Dixon’s 

petition for resentencing is affirmed. 

GRIMES, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR: 

STRATTON, J. 

WILEY, J.