UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________ _______________ In re: GARY WOODROW FLANDERS, individually and as officer, director, shareholder Canyon Quarry Co ., Farmer & Merchants Bank, Great Northern Land Co., MetroBank, N.A., Debtor.

------------------------------ GARY WOODROW FLANDERS,
Pl aintiff - Appellant,

v. EVELYN JANE LAWRENCE; DANIEL A. WEST; MOYE WHITE LLP; JAMES T. BURGHARDT,
De fendants - Appellees. No. 15-1327 (BAP No. 14-055-CO) (Bankruptcy Appellate Panel)

__________________ _______________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

__________________ _______________

* The parties have not as ked for oral argument, and we conclude that oral argument would not ma terially aid our consid eration of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Thus, we have decided the appeal based on the briefs. Our order and judgment do es not constitute bindin g precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however , for its persuasive valu e under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### August 5, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Before BRISCOE , BACHARACH , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

__________________ _______________ This case grew out of two other cas es. One was in st ate court, where Mr. Gary Flanders and his wife, Ms. Evelyn Lawrence, di vorced. The other case was in bankruptcy cour t, where Mr. Flanders was discharged from his pre-petition debts. In th e present action, Mr. Flan ders sues Ms. Lawrence and her attorneys, alleging that the state court er roneously divided marital

assets. The bankruptcy court gr anted summary judgment to Ms. Lawrence and her attorneys, concluding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded jurisdiction over some of the claims, that other clai ms were subject to issue preclusion, and that Mr. Flanders ei ther lacked standi ng to pursue, or simply lost on, the rest of his claims. The Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed, and Mr. Flande rs appeals. We co nclude that each claim fails based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, issue preclusion, or lack of standing. 1 I. The Bankruptcy an d Divorce Proceedings Mr. Flanders filed for bankruptcy in 1998. Two years later, divorce proceedings began in Colorado state court. The bankrupt cy trustee then

1 The defendants also asserted laches as a defense. Given our disposition, however, we decline to reach that issue.3 filed an adversary proceeding to assert fraudulent-transfer claims against Mr. Flanders, Ms. Lawren ce, and a number of entities that Ms. Lawrence owned or controlled, including the Great Northern Transportation Company. In 2001, the trustee entered into a settlement agreement with Ms. Lawrence and her entities, releasin g the bankruptcy estates “from any and all claims and causes of action that have been made or could have been made in the Adversary Proceeding, whether known or unknown, from the beginning of the world, to the date of [t he] Release.” R. at 341. Mr. Flanders received a Chapter 7 discharge in 2002. This discharge (1) “void[ed] any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment [was] a determin ation of the personal lia bility of [Mr. Flanders] with respect to any debt discharged,” and (2) “operate[d] as an injunction against the commencem ent or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of [Mr. Flanders].” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1)–(2). In 2007, it became appare nt that Mr. Flanders ’s bankruptcy estate would enjoy a surplus of roughly $231,000. The expectation of a surplus led the federal district court to ask the state court to determine how much of the bankruptcy surplus would have been considered marital property. Mr. Flanders argued in state cour t that the settlement agreement and bankruptcy discharge had precluded any award to Ms. Lawrence from the4 bankruptcy surplus. The state court disagreed, finding that the surplus constituted marital proper ty. The state court ultima tely awarded judgment
to Ms. Lawren ce for $563,822.

Mr. Flanders appealed. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed on most grounds but vacated and remanded for further findings on one issue not relevant to the matters now befo re this court. The Colorado Supreme Court denied Mr. Flanders’s pe tition for a writ of certiorari. Mr. Flanders then filed an advers ary proceeding in his bankruptcy case. There he asserted eleven claims against Ms . Lawrence, her divorce attorney (Daniel West), her bankrupt cy attorney (James Burghardt), and her bankruptcy attorney’s law firm (M oye White LLP). In these claims, Mr. Flanders alleged that (1) the stat e court’s orders had been void ab initio , (2) the state court ha d made erroneous factual findings and legal conclusions, and (3) the d efendants had acted in contempt of the discharge injunction and in brea ch of the settlement a nd release agreements by asserting pre-petition claims in state court. In the back ground section of5 the second amended complaint, Mr. Flanders also alleged violation of the bankruptcy court’ s automatic stay. The bankruptcy cour t ruled that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevented rejection of the state court’s factual findings, but not Mr. Flanders’s request for a finding of contempt or sanctions for willfully violating the discharge injunction. Ultimately, however , the bankruptcy court determined that those claims were subject to issue preclusion because they required the partie s to relitigate the eff ect of the discharge. In addition, the bankruptcy court addressed Mr. Flanders’s arguments that the state court’s fi ndings had been void ab initio . In part, Mr. Flanders argued that the state court had viol ated the automatic stay and the discharge injunction . According to the bankruptc y court, both of these arguments were invalid, but for di fferent reasons. Reliance on the discharge injunction was impermissi ble because of issue preclusion; reliance on the au tomatic stay was impermissi ble because Mr. Flanders lacked standing to assert the claim. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel a ffirmed. It conc luded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because none of Mr. Flanders’s claims asked the bankruptcy court to review the state-court judgments. The Bankruptcy Appellat e Panel then affirmed base d on issue preclusion and lack of standing.6 II. Standard of Review We review the bankruptcy court’s decision rather than the Bankruptcy Appe llate Panel’s. Alderete v. Educ. Cred it Mgmt. Corp. (In re Alderete) , 412 F.3d 1200, 1204 (10th Cir. 2005). In reviewing the bankruptcy court’s gran t of summary judgment, we apply the de novo standard. Spears v. St. Paul Ins. Co. (In re Ben Kennedy & Assocs.) , 40 F.3d 318, 319 (10th Ci r. 1994). Under this st andard, we view the evidence favorably to Mr. Flanders. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Manager of Revenue & Exofficio Treasurer (In re W. Pac. Airlines, Inc.) , 273 F.3d 1288, 1291 (10th Cir. 2001). 2
III. Mr. Flanders has forfeited hi s argument that the bankruptcy court used the wrong versio n of the bankruptcy code. According to Mr. Flanders, the ba nkruptcy court erred by using the current version of 11 U.S. C. § 523 rather th an the version th at had been in effect when his bankruptcy petition wa s filed. Mr. Flanders claims that if the earlier statutory version had been used, the bankr uptcy court would have concluded that his debt to Gr eat Northern Tran sportation Co. had been discharged and that the bankruptcy court had enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction over dischargeability.

2 Because Mr. Flanders proceeds pr o se, we liberally construe his filings but do not ac t as his advocate. See Yang v. Archuleta , 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).7 Prior to this appeal, Mr. Flanders had not questioned the bankruptcy court’s or the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s reliance on the current statutory version. Thus, we consider this argument forfeited. See Foster v. Hill (In re Foster) , 188 F.3d 1259, 1264 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that an appeal point wa s forfeited because th e litigant failed to make the same argument when appealing fr om the bankruptcy court to the district court). Mr. Flanders points out that

 he raised other challenges to th e state court’s jurisdiction and

 in his adversary complaint, he mentioned one of the relevant statutes, referred to Ms. Lawrence’ s obligation to file a § 523 complaint, and asked the bankrupt cy court to reso lve his claims using applicable bankruptcy law. But these steps were insufficient to avoid forfe iture, for they did not alert the bankruptcy cour t to the need to consider the prior version of the

statute. 3
Mr. Flanders contends that the is sue is jurisdictional, requiring consideration notwithstanding a forfeiture. See, e.g. , Daigle v. Shell Oil
Co. , 972 F.2d 1527, 1539 (10th Cir. 1992). We reject this contention. In

3 Ordinarily we can consider forfe ited arguments under the plain-error standard. Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc. , 634 F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011). But Mr. Flanders ha s not argued plain error. As a result, we decline to consider whether use of the current statutory version would constitute plain error. See id. at 1130-31 (stating that the failure to argue for plain error “surely marks the end of the ro ad” for an argument that had been forfeited).8 our view, the ju risdictional nature of the underlying argument does not insulate the issue from forfeiture, fo r this exception is confined to forfeited jurisdictional arguments made during th e pendency of the action in which jurisdiction is at issue. Here, Mr. Flande rs brings a collateral attack on the jurisdiction of a different court. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee , 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982) (“A party that has had an oppor tunity to litigate the question of subject-matter jurisdiction may not . . . reopen that ques tion in a collatera l attack upon an adverse judgment.”). Thus, the jurisdic tional nature of the issue does not preclude a forfeiture.
IV. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Mr. Fl anders’s claims that allege injury caused by the state court’s rulings. The defendants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes consideration of Mr. Flanders’s clai ms. We agree with respect to the claims that seek invalidation of the state court’s rulings. A. Mr. Flanders did not waive his arguments on the RookerFeldman doctrine. In their dispositive motion, the defendants argued that relief is precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Bank ruptcy Appellate Panel did not agree, and Mr. Flanders did not discuss the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in his op ening brief. In responding to that brief, however, the defendants ar gued that9  the Rooker-Feldman doctrine presents an alternative ground for dismissal and

 Mr. Flanders waived the issu e by declining to address the Rooker-Feldman issue in his opening brief. We do not regard the issue as waiv ed. “When an appellee raises in its answer brief an alternat ive ground for affirmance, the appellant is entitled to respond in its reply brief.” United States v. Brown , 348 F.3d 1200, 1213 (10th Cir. 2003). But even if the issue had been waived, we could address it sua sponte . The Rooker-Feldman doctrine involves subject-matter jurisdiction, whic h the court can raise on its own. See PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner , 603 F.3d 1182, 1193 (10th Ci r. 2010) (stati ng that the RookerFeldman doctrine involves subj ect-matter jurisdiction); Gonzales v. Thaler , __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct . 641, 648 (2012) ( sua sponte consideration of requirements that i nvolve subject-matte r jurisdiction).
B. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes jurisdiction of Mr. Flanders’s claims that seek invalidation of the state court’s rulings. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, one cannot complain in federal court of an injury caused by a j udgment rendered in state court. Exxon10 Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indu s. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 4 Some of Mr. Flanders’s claims invo lve this sort of complaint. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar an in dependent claim even if the claim had already b een rejected in state court. Id. at 293. In that situation, th e outcome is governe d by state-law prec lusion principles rather than the Rooker
- Feldman doctrine. Id. In the second amended complaint, Mr. Flanders identified eleven claims. But as Mr. Flanders stated in the introduction to the complaint, all involved “a collatera l attack on a state court j udgment.” R. at 801 (“This adversary proceeding cons titutes a collateral att ack on two State Court judgments that are void by law ab initio .” (footnote omitted)). Ordinarily, collateral a ttacks on a state-court judgment are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Erlandson v. Northglenn Mun. Ct. , 528 F.3d

4 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only if the state-court proceedings became final before the federal proceedings began. Exxon Mobil Corp. , 544 U.S. at 284. Th e bankruptcy court co ncluded that because the Colorado Supreme Court had denied review on the issues relevant to Mr. Flanders’s adversar y case, the state-court proceedings had become final for Rooker-Feldman purposes even though the action was remanded on an unrelated matter of state law. Mr. Flanders does not question the finality of the state-court proceedings , and we agree with the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that there was sufficient finality for RookerFeldman purposes. See Guttman v. Khalsa , 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (defining finality to include when the state courts have finally resolved all federal questi ons and only state-law or factual questions remain).11 785, 789 (10th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, we indepe ndently consider each claim against the backdrop of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 5 Though Mr. Flanders has identified eleven discrete claims, they overlap in substance. Eigh t of the claims (1-4, 6-7, and 10-11) are based on alleged violations of the bankruptcy di scharge. And two of the claims (8-9) involve contempt and sanctions. Two ot her claims (1 and 4) are based, at least in part, on alleged breaches of the settlement agreement. 1. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes consideration of the claims to invalidate the state- court rulings by invoking the bankruptcy discharge, but do es not preclude consideration of other claims. In eight of the claims, Mr. Flande rs alleges that the state court deprived him of the value of his bank ruptcy discharge. This contention

5 Some courts have f ound an exception to Rooker-Feldman when a state court wrongly constr ues a bankruptcy cour t’s discharge order. See, e.g. , Hamilton v. Herr (In re Hamilton) , 540 F.3d 367, 373 -75 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that “a stat e court judgment that mo difies a discharge in bankruptcy is void ab initio and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not bar federal court jurisdiction”); Pavelich v. McCorm ick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth LLP (In re Pavelich) , 229 B.R. 777, 783-84 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (sub stantially the same); cf. Ellis v. Consol. Diesel Elec. Corp. , 894 F.2d 371, 372 (10th Cir. 1990) (rec ognizing “that any action taken in violation of the [autom atic bankruptcy] st ay is void and without effect”). Other courts, however , have declined to recognize such an exception. See, e.g. , Ferren v. Searcy Winne lson Co. (In re Ferren) , 203 F.3d 559, 559-60 (8th Cir. 2000); In re Candidus , 327 B.R. 112, 119 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Toussaint , 259 B.R. 96, 102-03 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2000). We foll ow our precedents, which have not recognized such an exception.12 grows out of the state court’s characterization of Great Northern Transportation Co. as a marital asse t to be awarded to Ms. Lawrence. Before the divorce or th e beginning of bankruptcy proceedings, Mr. Flanders and Ms. Lawrence signed prom issory notes to Great Northern in exchange for roughl y $2 million.

But the bankruptcy court discharged Mr. Flanders’s debt under his promissory note.13 The state court did not question the discharge. 6 But in valuing Great Northern as a marital a sset, the state court considered Mr. Flanders’s failure to pay on his promisso ry note to Gr eat Northern. According to Mr. Flanders, the state court’s valuation of Great Northern effectively nu llified any benef it from the bankru ptcy discharge.

6 The state court charact erized the Great Northern debt as “an account receivable from Ms. Lawr ence.” R. at 361. This statement reflects recognition of Mr. Flande rs’s discharge as enco mpassing his personal liability on the Great No rthern note. Thus, the state court implicitly concluded that Mr. Flanders ’s liability on the Great Northern note had been discharged in bankruptcy.14 The state court assessed owne rship of Great Northern as a liability, in part because Mr. Flanders had not paid on his promissory note. Based on this valuation of Great Northern, the state court allegedly required Mr. Flanders to pay his ex-wife more than he would otherwise have had to pay. To determine the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we focus on the relief sought by Mr. Flanders. See PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner , 603 F.3d 1182, 1193 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[O]ur recent RookerFeldman jurisprudence has emphasized th e relief sought by federal-court plaintiffs.”). In the second amended complaint, Mr. Fl anders asked the bankruptcy court to gran t declaratory relief nulli fying the state court’s orders. For example, Mr. Flanders’s el eventh claim for relief requested an order declaring that

 “the State Court’s Orders recorded February 10, 2009 and June 22, 2009 , offsetting the $2 Million Commerc ial Promissory Note owed by Lawrence to [Great Northern Transportation Co.] against the value of [Great No rthern], and correspondingly, against the valuation of the Marital Estate, constitutes an attempt to collect and recover one half of that amount ($1 Million) from Flanders, and is a violation of the Discharge Order of September 4, 2002 , and the State Cour t orders to the contrary are void ab initio in these regards”;

 “the State Court’s deci sion to delete or om it $3,148,843.84 of accrued interest, owed by Lawrence to [Great Northern], from the valuation of [Great Northe rn], and correspondingly, from the valuation of the Marital Esta te, constitutes an attempt to collect and recover by offset a discharged pre-petition debt of Flanders, and the State Court’s or ders to the contrary are void ab initio in these regards”;15  “the State Courts [sic] Order of February 7, 2007 , is void ab initio , as Lawrence’s pre-petition cl aim to those funds was lost by her failure to assert such a claim in the bankruptcy, and thus any such claim was discharged by this Court’s Discharge Order of September 4, 2002 ”; and

 “the State Court’s Orders recorded February 10, 2009 and June 22, 2009 , claiming the Net Equity as sets remaining at the end of the bankruptcy case, specifi cally the [Great Northern Land Co.] stock, [Canyon Quarry Co.] stock, and 6 burial lots, constitute a pre-petiti on claim, and are void ab initio in these regards, as those assets are not marital property, but rather, are Flanders’ post-petition, after-acquired assets acquired from the Net Equity of the Bankruptcy Estate.” R. at 824-25 (footn ote & boldface omitted). These requests trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, for they depend on a finding that the state court erre d and entail relief from the erroneous orders. See Mann v. Boatright , 477 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that a claim for a decl aratory judgment , which sought nullification of a probate co urt’s orders, is “precisely the type[] of claim[] encompassed by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine”); Ebel v. Ebel (In re Ebel) , 139 F. App’x 26 (10th Cir. 2005). 7

7 Though our opinion in In re Ebel is not precedential, it is instructive. There a couple divo rced and the husband filed bankruptcy. 139 F. App’x at 27-28. While the ba nkruptcy proceedings remained pending, the state court divided the marital property. Id. at 28. The divorcing husband objected and asked the federal court to vacate the state court’s division of property, contending that it had been based on a void stipulation and had involved a denial of due process. Id. at 28. We held that this contention was (continued)16 Other requests do not facially require relief from the state court’s orders. For example, Mr. Flanders sought

 restitution from Ms. Lawrence for benefits she had obtained in state court by asserting claims that had been discharged in bankruptcy court,

 issuance of contempt and sanctions for pursuing claims discharged in bankr uptcy court, and

 injunctions against fu rther collection effort s based on claims discharged in ba nkruptcy court. Id. at 821-25. These re quests are inconsistent with the state court’s orders, as discussed below. But that in consistency does not trigger the RookerFeldman doctrine. See Campbell v. City of Spencer , 682 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating that a fede ral claim is not precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine solely because the claim requests relief inconsistent with a state-court judgment). We gave a similar example in Bolden v. City of Topeka , 441 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2006): To illustrate, say a father was de prived of custody of his child by a state-court judgment. If he files suit in federal court, seeking to invalidate the stat e-court judgment on the ground that the state-court proceedings deprived him of due process or that the judgment was otherwise contrary to federal law, his suit would be barred by Rooker-Feldman ; the suit usurps the Supreme Court’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction because it

unreviewable because the husband’s challenge to th e state court’s division of property fell under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 29.17 seeks to set aside th e judgment based on a review of the prior proceedings. If, howev er, the father simp ly brought suit in federal court seeking custody of his child, without raising any complaint about the state-court proceedings, Rooker-Feldman cannot be invoked; his federal cl aim would have been the same even in the absence of the state-court j udgment. A myriad of doctrines, including re s judicata, would almo st certainly bar the suit. But because he is not seek ing to overturn a state-court judgment, Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable, regardless of whether a favorable judgment in federal court would be inconsistent with that judg ment and would “deny a legal conclusion that the st ate court has reached.” 441 F.3d at 1145 (brackets omitted) (quoting Exxon Mobil , 544 U.S. at 293). Our case involves a st ate court’s division of property in a divorce rather than an award of child cu stody. But the prin ciple is equally applicable. While some of Mr. Flande rs’s claims are for relief from the state court’s orders themselves, othe r claims could theoretically proceed independently of the state court’s orders. All of these claims are inconsistent with the divorce court’s orders, but the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars only those claims seeking relief from those orders, like the claims seeking relief from th e child-custody or ders in the Bolden illustration. See Loubser v. Thacker , 440 F.3d 439, 441-42 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not preclude a claim for damages based on wrongdoing that had led to an er roneous judgment in a divorce pr oceeding).18 2. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes consideration of the claims that seek to invalidate the state-cour t rulings based on a breach of the settlement agreement. Similarly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes consideration of some, but not all, of the claims involving alleged breaches of the settlement agreement. In the bankruptcy proceeding s, Ms. Lawrence settled litigation against the trust ee. In the present suit, Mr . Flanders claims that the defendants breached the settlement agreement an d that the state court allowed the breaches to take place. As a result, Mr. Flanders seeks remedies directed at both the defendants and the state court. Some of these remedies were targeted to Ms. Lawrence based on her alleged breach of the settle ment agreement, such as a declarator y judgment stating that

 “Lawrence’s claim to $231,789.70 of surplus cash, part of the Net Equity in the Bankruptcy Es tate, and or against Flanders, was a pre-petition claim that had been released by the Settlement Agreement and the Mutual Release”;

 “Lawrence’s $1 Million pre-petition contribution claim against Flanders toward her $2 Million Promissory Note obligation to [Great Northern Transportation Co.], which was accomplished by an offset against Flanders’ sh are of the Marital Estate, is a claim that had been released under both the Settlement Agreement and the Mutual Release”;

 “Lawrence’s $1,574, 421.91 pre-petition co ntribution claim against Flanders for half of th e accrued interest on the Note through June 22, 2009 , which was accomplished by deleting the accrued interest on the Note fro m the valuation of [Great Northern Transportation Co.], func tioned as an offset against19 Flanders’ share of the Marital Estate, and is a pre-petition claim that had been released under . . . the Settlement Agreement and the Mu tual Release”; and

 “Lawrence’s claim to 1000 shares of Grea t Northern Land Company stock, 1000 sh ares of Canyon Qua rry Company stock, and 6 of 8 burial plots at the Evergreen Cemetery as marital assets are pre-petition claims th at had been rele ased under both the Settlement Agreement an d the Mutual Release.” R. at 165-66 (footnot e & boldface omitted). Though relief to Mr. Flanders would conflict with the state court’s rulings, this conflict is not enough to trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
See p. 16, above. These claims are akin to a claima nt’s federal action for child custody after being rebuffed in state court. In Bolden , we explained that these claims woul d fall outside of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See pp. 16-17, above. Th e same is true of Mr. Flanders’s claims involving breach of the settlement agreement after being rebu ffed in state court. But these are not all of Mr. Flanders’s claims. In others, Mr. Flanders asks the bankruptcy court to overturn the stat e court’s rulings. For example, Mr. Flanders asks for a declaratory judgment providing that

 the state court lacked “jurisdiction to make any determination as to ‘the performa nce or interpretation of the Settlement Agreement’” and

 “the State Court’s orders recorded February 10, 2009 and June 22, 2009 , claiming the Net Equity as sets remaining at the end of the bankruptcy case, specifi cally the [Great Northern Land Co.] and [Canyon Qu arry Co.] stock, and 6 burial lots, constitute a pre-petiti on claim and are void ab initio in those20 regards, as those assets are not marital property, but rather, are Flanders’ post-petition, after-acquired assets acquired from the Net Equity of the Bankruptcy Estate.”
R. at 825. Through these claims, Mr . Flanders seeks inva lidation of the state court’s orders. These claims are akin to a request for a federal court to invalidate a child-custody order, which we said in Bolden would trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See pp. 16-17, above. Under this doctrine, we cannot entertain Mr. Flanders’s request for invalidation of the state court’s orders.
* * * These conclusions leave some clai ms for violation of the automatic stay and discharge order, breach of the settlement agreement, contempt, and sanctions. V. Issue preclusion fore closes relief on Mr. Flanders’s remaining claims, which involve violation of the discharge order, breach of the settlement agreement, contempt, and sanctions. Mr. Flanders claims that the defend ants violated the discharge order, breached the settlement agreement, and acted in a way that was contemptuous and sanctionab le. We conclude that these claims are barred by issue preclusion because their su ccess would requir e the parties to relitigate issues that the st ate court already decided.21 To determine the preclusi ve effect of a state-co urt judgment in a later federal action, we look to the pr eclusion law of the forum state. Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Ort hopaedic Surgeons , 470 U.S. 373, 380 ( 1985). Colorado is the forum state; and under Colora do law, [i]ssue preclusion bars relitigation of an issue if: (1) the issue sought to be precluded is iden tical to an issue actually determined in the prior proceeding; (2) the party against whom estoppel is asserted has been a pa rty to or is in privity with a party to the prior pr oceeding; (3) there is a final judgment on the merits in the prior procee ding; and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted ha d a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. Sunny Acres Villa, Inc. v. Cooper , 25 P.3d 44, 47 (Colo. 2001). The bankruptcy court co rrectly concluded that these requirements were met with respect to two key issues: 1. whether the settlement agreem ent released Ms. Lawrence’s claims to the proper ty remaining after the conclusion of Mr. Flanders’s bank ruptcy case and 2. whether Mr. Flanders’s discharge prevented the state court from considering his promissory note when valuing and dividing the marital property.
See R. at 900-02. In the state-court proceedings, Mr. Flanders contended that the settlement agreement precluded award of the bankruptcy surplus to Ms.
Lawrence. See id. at 348. The state court expressly rejected this contention:22 Mr. Frank [Mr. Flanders’s attorney in state court] argues that the Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release between Ms. Flanders and the Bankruptcy Trustee in 2001 operated to release any claim she might have to the surplus. The Court has carefully read and reviewed those documents and concludes that they did not release any cl aim Ms. [Flanders] might have to the surplus. Bankruptcy surplu ses are returned to the debtor, in this case Mr. Flanders. At th e time the bankr uptcy was filed the parties were marri ed thus the assets that went into the Bankruptcy estate were marital property and any surplus coming out is marita l property. The Releas e specifically related only to claims that could have been raised in the adversary proceeding that had been filed against Ms. Flanders by the Trustee. The adversar y proceeding claims related to fourteen different claims fo r relief including fr audulent conveyance claims against both Mr. Flanders and Ms. Flanders. The Court further concludes that a bankrupt cy surplus does not exist with certainty until the bankruptcy is completed and all creditors and interest paid. Id. The court repeated this holding in a subsequent order: In addition [Mr. Flanders] argues that the Settlement Agreement of March 23, 2001 and Mutual Release of April 30, 2001 that settled the bankruptcy adversar y proceeding that alleged fraudulent transfer clai ms against Mr. Flanders, Ms. [Flanders] and their companie s acted to discharge any responsibility he might have for any debts. This Court disagrees. The Bankrupt cy court did not have jurisdiction over the entire marital estate. Furthe r it appears that most of the remaining debt occurred afte r Mr. Flanders’ [sic] filed bankruptcy in October 1998. Id. at 357. Mr. Flanders has repackaged the same contention through four allegations in his second amended complaint:23 1. The state court’s orde r “constituted a breach of the Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release, for lack of Divorce Court jurisdiction in this matter.”
2. The state court’s order was “void ab initio ” because “the Settlement Agreement of March 23, 2001 reserved jurisdiction to the Federal Bankruptcy Court regarding matters of ‘the performance or interp retation of the Settle ment Agreement.’”
3. The assets awarded to Ms. Lawrence could not constitute marital property because “the [bankruptcy court] approved both the Settlement Agreemen t and the Mutual Rel ease, releasing all claims against the Bankru ptcy Estate . . . .”
4. “The State Court, acting upon Lawrence’s claims , allegations, and arguments, granted all 4 of Lawrence’s invalid claims, in complete disregard of the Discharge Injunction, Settlement Agreement and the Mutu al Release, despite the fact that the State Court approved each of thes e agreements, the result of which produced State Court orders that were a nullity and void ab initio .” Id. at 810, 818, 820 (citati on & emphasis omitted). The same is true of Mr. Flanders’s claims involving the discharge order. Here, too, Mr. Flanders argued in state court th at Ms. Lawrence’s claims would require violation of the bankruptcy court’s discharge order. Id . at 357 (“Mr. Flanders ha s also argued that si nce all his debts were discharged by the Bankrupt cy Court, he is not responsible for any of the remaining debt in the marriage.”). 8 The state court disagreed, reasoning

8 The record on appeal does not contain the partie s’ filings in the state district court. As a result, we must depend on the stat e district court’s orders to ascertain wh at the parties argued.24 that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over the entire marital estate. Id. Mr. Flanders renews the claim here , arguing that the state court’s division of property “was . . . a viol ation of [the bankruptcy court’s] Discharge Injunction.” Id. at 150; see also id. at 160 (alleging that the state court’s division of property wa s “clearly an attemp t to collect on a discharged debt”). The issue here is identical to the on e decided in state court, triggering issue preclusion. 9 Mr. Flanders argues that issue pr eclusion does not apply because the bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction on the issue of dischargeability. This argument is based on a misunderstanding of Mr. Flanders’s claims and the state cour t’s orders. The state court did not purport to decide whether any debts were dischargeable, for dischargeability had already been determined in the bankruptcy proceedings. The st ate court was called upon to in terpret the e ffect of the discharge on the marital division of property. Mr. Flanders does not suggest that the bankruptcy court had exclusive juri sdiction to interpret the effect of a discharge order. See State Fin. Co. v. Morrow , 216 F.2d 676, 679 (10th Cir. 1954) (“[T ]he right to a discharg e and the effect of a

9 Although identity of issues is only one of the four elements of issue preclusion, there is no doubt that the other three elements are met here.25 discharge are entirely distinct propositions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 10
When the state court se t out to divide assets , Mr. Flanders argued that the discharge orde r prevented any award to Ms. Lawrence. In addressing Mr. Flanders’s argument, the state court had to interpret the effect of the bankruptcy court’s disc harge order. That interpretation is entitled to issue-preclusive effect here even if the antecedent determination of dischargeability had fa llen within the bankrupt cy court’s exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, Mr. Flanders canno t relitigate the same argument here. See Rally Hill Prod s., Inc. v. Burs ack (In re Bursack) , 65 F.3d 51, 53 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that th e bankruptcy court’s excl usive jurisdic tion does not alter the rule requir ing preclusive effect to state-court judgments).

10 In his second amended complaint and his appellate briefs, Mr. Flanders characterizes the st ate court’s orders as “void ab initio ” because they violated the discha rge order. This character ization is incorrect. The state court clearly had jurisdiction over the division of property between Mr. Flanders and Ms. Lawrence. If Mr. Flanders is correct on his underlying claims, the stat e court’s division of pr operty might have been erroneous, but that error would not render the orders void. See Union Joint Stock Land Bank of Detroit v. Byerly , 310 U.S. 1, 7-8 ( 1940) (stating that the district court’s erroneous appli cation of a statute, which governed administration of a bankruptcy estate, rendered the order voidable (rather than void) and could not be attacked collaterally in a subsequent statecourt action); see also FDIC v. Shears on-American Express, Inc. , 996 F.2d 493, 498 (1st Cir. 1993) (sta ting that even if a cour t had erred in finding no violation of a bankr uptcy court’s automatic st ay, the finding would be “entitled to respect” an d invulnerable to collateral attack).26 VI. Mr. Flanders forfeited his argu ment that the bankruptcy court had erred in determining that he lacked standing to allege violation of the automatic stay. Mr. Flanders argues that the bank ruptcy court erre d in determining that he lacked standing to assert that the state- court orders violated the automatic stay. But he admits that he did not raise this issue before the Bankruptcy Appellat e Panel. As a result, this issue was not preserved. See pp. 6-8, above. 11 VII. Disposition The bankruptcy court and Bankruptcy Appellate Panel concluded that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment. We too conclude that Mr. Flanders’s claims fail as a matter of law, but summary judgment is not the correct disposition for the cl aims invalidated based on the RookerFeldman doctrine or lack of standing. Th ese are defects precluding subjectmatter jurisdiction. See PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner , 603 F.3d 1182, 1193 (10th Cir. 2010) ( Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Cornhusker Cas. Co. v. Skaj , 786 F.3d 842, 851 (10th Ci r. 2015) (standing). For such jurisdictional defects, summary judgment is ordinarily improper. See 10A Charles Alan

11 Unlike the general ex ception to forfeit ure for belated arguments that a district court or this court lacks s ubject-matter jurisdiction, we generally do not consider unprese rved arguments in fa vor of subject-matter jurisdiction. United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century He althcare Corp. , 90 F.3d 1514, 1518 n.2 (10th Cir. 1996).27 Wright, Arthur R. M iller, Mary Kay Kane, Fed. Practice and Procedure , § 2713, at 235 (3d ed . 1998) (“In general, courts have ruled that summary judgment is an inappropriate vehicle for raising a questi on concerning the courts[’] subject-matter jurisdiction . . . .”), quoted with approval in Shikles v. Sprint/United Mgt. Co. , 426 F.3d 1304, 1317- 18 (10th Cir. 2005). Instead, these claims should have been dism issed without prejudice. See Garman v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 , 630 F.3d 977, 985 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[A] dismissal fo r lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without prejudice and does not ha ve a preclusive effect.”). Thus, we remand with instructions to dismiss thes e claims without prejudice. See Shikles , 426 F.3d at 1318 (“When a di strict court correctly de termines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a case, but incorrectly dete rmines that the lack of subject matter jurisdiction ju stifies the entry of summary judgment, we have vacated the judgment and rema nded the case to th e district court for entry of an order dismissing the case.”). In all other respects, we affirm.

Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge