Docket Operations, M-30 ' R Ai 1SP0RTATI0_N 

nhPARTMENT OF 

;SPORTATION 

<=! OPERATIONS U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200NewJerseyAvenue, SE. RoomW12-140 o A c i 9 

West Building Ground Floor 3i0 ilGV-2 A S: U^ 

Washington, DC 20590-0001. 

27 October 2010 

Kevin Douglas McLemore 

515 Idlewood Drive 

Clarksville, TN 37043 

Reference: Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 14 CFR 

Parts 1, 91, 120, and 135, docket No. FAA-2010-0982; Notice No. 10-13, RIN 2120-

AJ53 ^ .- _. _ 

To Whom It May Concern, 

1. The NPR M states the following: Operations control centers (Sec. 

135.617) 

The FAA is proposing to add Sec. 135.617 to require certificate 

holders with 10 or more helicopters engaged in helicopter air ambulance 

operations to establish operations control centers. Certificate holders 

would be required to staff these operations control centers with 

operations control specialists trained and equipped to communicate with 

pilots, advise pilots of weather conditions, and monitor the progress 

of each flight. Each certificate holder covered by this requirement 

would be responsible for establishing its own individual operations 

control center. Each certificate holder would be required to provide 

enough operations control specialists at each operations control center 

to ensure proper operational control of each flight. 

FAA regulations currently do not require helicopter air ambulance 

operators to have an operations control center. In 2008, the FAA issued 

AC 120-96, which provides recommendations to assist helicopter air 

ambulance operators with the development, implementation, and 

integration of an operations control center, and enhanced operational 

control procedures similar to those found in part 121. Members of the 

helicopter air~'SrffiuIance industry have noted that the AC is a" "~product 

of a survey of best practices in the air medical industry and gives 

guidance to other air medical services as to the benefits of this type 

of operation.'' \19\ In developing this proposal, the FAA sought to 

standardize operations control centers by codifying the concepts of AC 

120-96 into a framework appropriate for helicopter air ambulance 

operations. The FAA notes that a January 2009 FAA survey of inspectors 

with oversight of helicopter air ambulance operations showed that 89 

percent of helicopter air ambulance operators have voluntarily 

established some type of operations control center. 

So the point of the proposed 135.617 is to require what 89 percent of operators already 

do, but exempt the other 11 percent, many of whom have less than 10 helicopters? It is, 

in fact, a nearly worthless addition to Part 135. Either having a comm. Center is a good 

idea, or it isn't. It does not matter how many aircraft the certificate holder operates. For 
all the reasons cited, it is clearly a good idea, meets with industry best practices, and 

provides a level of safety to the flying public that is clearly not met by operators without 

a comm. Center. So, by what justification does the FAA propose exempting any HEMS 

operators? By doing so they are clearly rewarding the least equipped and least safe. If 

an operator needs to contract comm. Center services because their operation is of so 

limited a scope they cannot afford one of their own, so be it. That cost is passed on to 

the customer and makes it a more level playing field for those operators who have 

already made that investment and are already providing that intended level of safety. 

Delete the exemption based on number of helicopters. This is 2010, not 1930.1 can talk 

to anyone anywhere via ACH 1000. It is time the government regulated the industry to a 

modern standard, not a standard based on what operators think may or may not cut too 

deeply into their profit margin. 

2. The NPR M states the following: Certificate holders would be required 

to comply with this provision "' 

by the effective date of the final rule. 

2. Equipment Requirements 

a. Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (HTAWS) (Sec. 

135.605) 

The FAA is proposing to add Sec. 135.605(a) to require that all 

helicopters used in air ambulance operations be equipped with HTAWS. 

The FAA believes that HTAWS would assist helicopter air ambulance 

pilots in maintaining situational awareness of surrounding terrain and 

obstacles, and therefore help prevent accidents caused by CFIT, loss of 

control, inadvertent flight into IMC, and night operations. HTAWS has 

particular relevance to helicopter air ambulance operations, which 

often are conducted at night and into unimproved landing sites. 

In 2006, RTCA, Inc. established a special committee that developed 

RTCA/DO-309, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for 

Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System (HTAWS) Airborne 

Equipment. The FAA subsequently issued TSO-C194, which sets out the 

minimum performance standards for HTAWS. A survey of FAA inspectors 

revealed that 41 percent of certificated helicopter air ambulance 

operators have started equipping their helicopter fleets with TAWS. 

However, the FAA did not ask in its survey whether these devices were 

compliant with TSOs for TAWS (TS0-C151, Terrain Awareness and Warning 

System) or HTAWS (TSO-C194). The FAA recognizes that some certificate 

holders voluntarily equipped their helicopters with TAWS, or other 

TAWS-like devices, that may not meet the standards of TSO-C194 for 

HTAWS. Nevertheless, the FAA is proposing that these certificate 

holders equip their helicopter air ambulances with HTAWS because of the 

differences between TAWS and HTAWS. The FAA proposes to incorporate the 

standards articulated in TSO-C194 by reference in Sec. 135.605(a). 

The FAA believes the following accident is illustrative of the type 

of accident that may be prevented if helicopters are equipped with 

HTAWS. On March 21, 2002, a Eurocopter AS-350B helicopter, returning to 

its base in Susanville, California, collided with the surface of a 

lake. The pilot became disoriented as they flew over the ''glassy 

smooth'' water, and subsequently descended ''within 20 to 50 feet of 

the lake surface'' and eventually struck the lake surface causing fatal 

injuries to the pilot and serious injuries to the medical personnel. 

The NTSB determined that the causal effect of the accident was the 
pilot's failure ''to maintain sufficient altitude/clearance above the 

water while performing a low altitude flight.'' The NTSB also cited as 

contributing factors the ''the glassy water conditions, and lack of 

visual cues concerning perception of altitude.'' See NTSB Accident 

Report LAX02FA114 (Apr. 28, 2004). 

I believe the FAA is setting up an unintended competition between HTAWS and NVGs 

by the wording of this proposal. It is perhaps somewhat disingenuous that the FAA is 

using a day CFIT accident to illustrate the need for HTAWS. By far the CFIT risk in 

HEMS operations is greater at night. Yet by tying the proposed Table 1 weather minima 

to NVG or HTAWS, the FAA is giving the certificate holder's a cheaper out by allowing 

them to operate at reduced minimums at night using only HTAWS. HTAWS is cheaper, 

does not require initial pilot training and aircraft modification, and recurrent training as 

NVGs do. These same certificate holders will have crews fly into lower minimums based 

on being HTAWS equipped, but without the ability to maintain adequate outside visual 

reference for helicopter control, they will still eventually crash. HTAWS is a wonderful 

tool for preventing inadvertent collision with terrain or obstacles - once. It does not 

provide you with the means to continue flight, or see to land the aircraft, once outside 

visual references are lost. It the example provided above the AS-350 may still have 

crashed even with HTAWS, if the pilot had not switched to instrument flight. Lower 

weather minima need to be based on the ability to maintain control of the aircraft, not 

just avoiding impact with terrain. The lower minima in Table 1 should be tied to HTAWS 

and an IFR equipped aircraft and 135.297 current pilot for day, and either HTAWS and 

NVG, or HTAWS and IFR equipped aircraft and 135.297 current pilot for night 

operations. 

3. While I believe this NPRM is a step in the right direction, I don't believe it is a 

big enough step. The HEMS industry is still killing the flying public in the same way they 

were back in the 1980s. We still have VFR only aircraft legally operating in less than 

1000 foot ceilings and 3 miles visibility, at night, with patients on board - often with a 

minimum equipment list that allows even further degradation of navigation or flight 

instruments. If this NPRM is adopted without modification, that will still be the case. I 

find the wording of the proposed 135.293 illustrative: Initial and recurrent pilot 

testing requirements. 

(a) * * * 

(9) For rotorcrsft pilots, procedures for—aircraft handling in 

flat-light, whiteout, and brownout conditions, including methods for 

recognizing and avoiding those conditions. 

*•*•* * * 

(c) Each competency check for a rotorcraft pilot must include a 

demonstration of the pilot's ability to maneuver the rotorcraft solely 

by reference to instruments. The check must determine the pilot's 

ability to safely maneuver the rotorcraft into visual meteorological 

conditions following an inadvertent encounter with instrument 

meteorological conditions. For competency checks in non-IFR-certified 

rotorcraft, the pilot must perform such maneuvers as are appropriate to 

the rotorcraft's installed equipment, the certificate holder's 

operations specifications, and the operating environment. 
This is not providing the flying public with the greatest due care. The answer to 

transporting patients in poor weather is NVGs and HTAWs, or HTAWS and IFR - not 

sending a VFR only aircraft out in weather less than 1000 and 3 to fetch them. 

Particularly in an aircraft where the pilot is trained "appropriate to the rotorcraft's 

installed equipment". 

It is time for the FAA to be a good steward for the taxpaying and flying public, 

and not the 135 certificate holders. If the standard is raised, perhaps fewer patients will 

be flown in helicopters and more driven in ambulances in poor weather. However, 

almost certainly fewer patients will be killed in CFIT accidents. 

Kevin Douglas McLemore 

ATP 3137036