[Cite as State v. Cassell, 2017-Ohio-769.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HIGHLAND COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : Case No. 16CA15 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

v. : DECISION AND 

 JUDGMENT ENTRY 

RODGER CASSELL, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED: 2/22/2017

APPEARANCES: 

Rodger Cassell, Orient, Ohio, pro se appellant. 

Anneka Collins, Highland County Prosecuting Attorney, and James Roeder, Highland 

County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Hillsboro, Ohio, for appellee. 

Harsha, J. 

{¶1} Rodger Cassell pleaded guilty to drug possession and engaging in a 

pattern of corrupt activity with forfeiture specifications under Ohio’s Racketeer 

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. After accepting the plea the court 

convicted him, imposed consecutive sentences, and ordered certain of Cassell’s 

personal property forfeited. 

{¶2} Approximately five years later Cassell filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea to the RICO count. He argued that after he pleaded guilty, the Supreme Court of 

Ohio, in a case involving two of his co-defendants, held that the RICO statute was 

ambiguous concerning the monetary threshold necessary to obtain a conviction, and 

that the minimum threshold must be applied to each individual within the enterprise, 

rather than to the enterprise as a whole. Cassell argues that he did not have a complete 

understanding of the RICO charge at the time he pleaded guilty because the Supreme 
Highland App. No. 16CA15 2 

Court of Ohio had not yet clarified that the $500 threshold applied to each individual, 

rather than collectively to the enterprise. He argued that this created a manifest injustice 

justifying the withdraw of his guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion. 

{¶3} On appeal Cassell claims that the trial court violated the supremacy, due 

process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution when it refused 

to give the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Stevens, 139 Ohio St.3d 247, 

2014-Ohio-1932, 11 N.E.3d 252 retroactive application. However, the trial court was 

not required to apply the decision retroactively. Stevens is a plurality opinion and 

therefore not binding on anyone beyond the parties in that case. Moreover, the trial 

court in effect applied Stevens retroactively when it indicated Cassell was charged with 

personally receiving more than $36,000 from his activity within the enterprise. We reject 

this assignment of error. 

{¶4} Cassell also claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

overruled his motion without a hearing because he established that a manifest injustice 

occurred due to an incorrect application of the RICO statute’s monetary threshold at his 

plea hearing. We reject this contention for two reasons. First, Cassell’s guilty plea was 

an admission that he personally received more than $500 from his activity in the 

enterprise. Second, our review of the plea colloquy discloses that the trial court 

explained the nature of the Ohio RICO count. Cassell did not profess any confusion, ask 

any questions, or give any indication that he did not understand the nature of the 

charges. And, any possible confusion that may have existed about the monetary 

threshold was immediately dispelled when the trial court informed Cassell that the 

monetary amount the state alleged against him individually exceeded the minimum 
Highland App. No. 16CA15 3 

threshold of $500, i.e. more than $36,000. Because the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying his motion to withdraw without a hearing, we reject this assignment 

of error. 

{¶5} Cassell also contends that his guilty plea was void, as being involuntary, 

because he could not be expected to understand a statute that the Supreme Court 

subsequently determined was ambiguous. Thus, Cassell argues that his guilty plea was 

not knowingly entered, making it void. Based upon our rejection of his first and second 

assignment of errors, the premise for his claim that he could not have knowingly entered 

a guilty plea is false. Moreover, to the extent that he argues the trial court failed to 

comply with Civ. R. 11, the record clearly refutes that contention. 

{¶6} Last Cassell contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion 

because the court improperly relied upon his guilty plea to other drug charges in 

reaching its decision. Cassell misconstrues the trial court’s decision. The trial court did 

not deny his motion to withdraw his RICO plea because he had also pleaded guilty to 

drug possession. Instead the trial court noted that in the absence of manifest injustice 

justifying the withdrawal of Cassell’s RICO plea, the entire plea agreement should 

remain enforceable. We overrule Cassell’s fourth assignment of error. 

{¶7} Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment denying his postsentence 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

I. FACTS 

{¶8} A Highland County grand jury charged Cassell with engaging in a pattern 

of corrupt activity (the Ohio RICO count), tampering with evidence, drug possession, 

drug trafficking, drug trafficking in a school zone, and a forfeiture specification 
Highland App. No. 16CA15 4 

associated with the Ohio RICO count. The indictment included a total of 62 counts and 

9 defendants. Cassell was charged in 57 of the 62 counts. The state alleged that 

Cassell was the leader of an illegal drug enterprise and, as leader, he obtained heroin 

and cocaine for distribution, and directed the drug trafficking activities of his codefendants. The forfeiture specification alleged that Cassell used, derived, or realized 

property in his RICO activities, including $36,569.00 in U.S. currency seized from him, 

four vehicles, two televisions and a GPS. 

{¶9} Cassell pleaded guilty to one Ohio RICO count, the forfeiture count, and 

one count of drug possession. He agreed to forfeit all interest in the monies and 

property identified in the indictment. The state dismissed the remaining charges and 

recommended a total sentence of 9 years. The trial court conducted a colloquy to 

determine whether Cassell was fully informed of his rights and understood the 

consequences of his guilty plea. Upon being satisfied that Cassell knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily entered his plea and waived his constitutional rights, the 

court accepted his plea, convicted him, sentenced him to nine years in prison and 

ordered the forfeiture of the listed property and money. 

{¶10} Co-defendants Jeffrey Stevens and Zachary Bondurant went to trial and 

ultimately had their RICO convictions reversed by the Supreme Court in State v. 

Stevens, 139 Ohio St.3d 247, 2014-Ohio-1932, 11 N.E.3d 252. Five years later Cassell 

filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court denied it, and Cassell appealed. 

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

{¶11} Cassell assigns the following errors for our review: 

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED JUDICIAL DISCRETION 

WHEN OVERRULING THE POST-SENTENCE MOTION TO 
Highland App. No. 16CA15 5 

WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT A HEARING BECAUSE THE 

MOTION SET FORTH A MANIFEST INJUSTICE IN NEED OF 

CORRECTION AS DEFINED BY OHIO CRIM. R. 32.1. (DOC. NO. 

100, 04/28/16). 

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, ABUSED JUDICIAL DISCRETION, 

AND VIOLATED THE SUPREMACY, DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL 

PROTECTIONS [SIC] CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION BY OVERRULING THE POST-SENTENCE 

MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT A HEARING 

WHEN REFUSING TO RETROSPECTIVEY [SIC] APPLY STATE V. 

STEVENS & BONDURANT (2014), 139 Ohio St.3d 247, 11 N.E.3d 

252, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN 

FIORE, BUNKLEY, MONTGOMERY, AND AGEE. (DOC. NO. 100, 

04/28/16). 

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED JUDICIAL DISCRETION 

WHEN OVERRULING THE POST-SENTENCE MOTION TO 

WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT A HEARING WHEN PROVEN 

THAT THE GUILTY PLEA WAS “VOID” BECAUSE IT WAS 

PREDICATED ON AN AMBIGUOUS INTERPRETATION OF OHIO’S 

“RICO ACT” THAT WAS SUBJECTED TO A LATTER 

CLARIFICATION AND DEFINITIONAL CORRECTION BY THE 

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO IN APPELLANT’S CO-DEFENDANTS’ 

CASE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN 

FIORE, BUNKLEY, MONTGOMERY, AND AGEE. (DOC. NO. 100, 

04/28/16). 

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, ABUSED JUDICIAL DISCRETION, 

AND VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTIONS 

[SIC] CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION WHEN 

OVERRULING THE POST-SENTENCE MOTION TO WITHDRAW 

GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT A HEARING BY RULING THAT 

APPELLANT WAS NOT ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY 

PLEA TO THE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY INTERPRETED OHIO RICO 

CHARGE, STANDING ALONE, BECAUSE HE ALSO PLEAD [SIC] 

GUILTY TO ANOTHER DRUG CHARGE. (DOC. NO. 100, 04/28/16). 

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS 

A. Constitutional Claims 

1. Background 
Highland App. No. 16CA15 6 

{¶12} Initially we address Cassell’s second assignment of error to facilitate a 

more logical discussion of all the issues. Cassell contends that the trial court violated his 

supremacy, due process and equal protection constitutional rights by refusing to apply 

the holding in State v. Stevens, 139 Ohio St.3d 247, 2014-Ohio-1932, 11 N.E.3d 252 

retroactively to his motion. 

{¶13} In Stevens, supra (a consolidated appeal) the Supreme Court of Ohio 

found that the RICO convictions of two of Cassells co-defendants, Stevens and 

Bondurant were erroneous. In doing so in a plurality opinion they ruled that the state 

failed to prove Stevens and Bondurant profited individually by more than $500 as a 

result of their personal involvement with the illegal drug enterprise. On their appeal to 

our court we held that the state only needed to establish the enterprise as a whole 

received more than $500 from the activity for any of the individual participants to be 

guilty of violating the RICO statute. See State v. Bondurant and Stevens, Highland No. 

11CA25 and 11CA27, 2012-Ohio-4912, 982 N.E.2d 1261 (4th Dist.) 

{¶14} In Stevens, the Supreme Court rejected our analysis, but its opinion did 

not have a majority of four justices who agreed upon a clear statement of the analysis 

and requirements relating to the monetary threshold element of the crime. See the 

discussion below that follows. 

2. Retroactivity 

{¶15} Generally, new judicial rulings are not “applied retroactively to a conviction 

that has become final, i.e., where the accused has exhausted all * * * appellate 

remedies.” Ali v. State, 104 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-6592, 819 N.E.2d 687, ¶ 6. 

However, there is an exception to the rule against retroactivity in cases in where the 
Highland App. No. 16CA15 7 

court addresses the meaning of a statute for the first time. In that situation the rule 

against retroactive application does not apply because the court is not announcing a 

new rule of law, i.e. changing the existing law. Rather the court is determining what the 

relevant statutes have meant since their enactment. State v. Ketterer, 140 Ohio St.3d 

400, 2014-Ohio-3973,18 N.E.3d 1199, ¶ 14 citing Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 

395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, ¶ 23–25, and Agee v. Russell, 92 Ohio St.3d 540, 

543–544, 751 N.E.2d 1043 (2001). Cassell argues that Stevens, supra, should be 

applied retroactively because it did not announce a new rule of law; it removed an 

ambiguity and stated what existing law was at the time when he was convicted. 

{¶16} However, Stevens is a plurality opinion, written by Justice O’Neill, with 

Justices Pfeifer and Lanzinger concurring that the RICO statute was ambiguous. As a 

result, the O’Neill opinion stated the threshold monetary limit applied to each individual, 

not collectively to the enterprise as a whole. But Justice French concurred in judgment 

only and concluded that the statute is not ambiguous and does not require proof that the 

defendant personally profited in excess of the threshold – a defendant could be 

convicted even if the defendant received no profit as long as the total proceeds shared 

by everyone participating in a violation, or combination of violations, exceeded the $500 

threshold. Justices Kennedy and O’Donnell concurred in part, dissented in part, and 

concluded that the statute is not ambiguous and does not require that each individual 

defendant must participate in activities involving proceeds of more than $500. They 

adopted the collective enterprise approach used in our opinion and concluded Stevens 

and Bondurant were properly convicted of the RICO count. But they determined Steven 

was only guilty of a felony of the second degree, rather than a first degree felony as 
Highland App. No. 16CA15 8 

determined below. They would have reversed only on that ground. Chief Justice 

O’Connor dissented and concluded that the statute was not ambiguous and the 

threshold applies to the combination of violations committed by all those involved in the 

enterprise, i.e. the collective enterprise approach. Chief Justice O’Connor would have 

affirmed our decision. Thus four Justices declared the statute was not ambiguous. Only 

three found otherwise. Three justices voted to reverse the judgment based upon the 

O’Neill opinion. But, Justice French joined Justices O’Neill, Pfeifer, and Lanzinger only 

in the result, i.e. reversal, but not the rationale or law espoused by Justice O’Neill’s 

opinion. 

{¶17} Though it may be persuasive, a plurality opinion is not controlling because 

it fails to receive the support of the majority of the court. State v. Reed, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 08AP-20, 2008-Ohio-6082, ¶ 57 citing Hedrick v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 

22 Ohio St.3d 42, 44, 488 N.E.2d 840 (1986) overruled on other grounds; see generally 

Kraly v. Vannewkirk, 69 Ohio St.3d 627, 633, 635 N.E.2d 323 (1994) (decision had 

“questionable precedential value inasmuch as it was a plurality opinion which failed to 

receive the requisite support of four justices of this court in order to constitute controlling 

law”). Thus, the trial court did not err when it refused to acknowledge Stevens as 

controlling authority, and concluded, “the ruling of the Ohio Supreme Court has not 

really clarified anything.” Decision, p. 4. In other words, only the result of the Supreme 

Court’s decision is clear and binding, i.e. the reversal of the RICO convictions of 

Stevens and Bondurant. 

{¶18} More importantly, here the trial court in effect applied the law as the 

O’Neill opinion and Cassell himself propose. The charges in the indictment and the 
Highland App. No. 16CA15 9 

colloquy at the plea hearing show that the state alleged that the monetary amount 

involved in the Ohio RICO count against Casell exceeded the $500 amount as applied 

to him individually. In fact, it exceeded $36,000. Cassell is not the “petty criminal” or potdealing “high school senior” the Stevens decision is crafted to protect. Stevens at ¶ 15. 

{¶19} The trial court sufficiently explained the nature of the Ohio RICO charge 

under R.C. 2923.32(A)(1). Cassell did not profess that he was confused, ask any 

questions, or give any indication that he did not understand the nature of the charges. 

Cassell raised no question about the $500 monetary threshold set forth in former R.C. 

2923.31(I)(2(c) (which is now $1,000). 

{¶20} Even if Cassell had harbored some unexpressed confusion about whether 

the state was required to prove the $500 threshold against him individually, as opposed 

to the enterprise as a whole, any confusion was dispelled a few moments later. The 

trial court explained that the value of the property and the proceeds obtained in violation 

of the Ohio RICO statute used by Cassell individually exceeded the $500 threshold. The 

value of the property attributed solely to Cassell included four vehicles and $36,569.00 

in U.S. currency: 

THE COURT: All right[.] And then Count 62 is a forfeiture specification. And it 

alleges that the following property that is indicated in Count 62, uh, was used in 

the course, or was intended to be used in the course of a violation of ORC 

2923.32(A)(1), and that’s Count One (1); or it was used in, intended for, or for 

use in, or derived from directly or indirectly, or realized through conduct in 

violation of the same section, Count One (1) and that any interest that you have 

is subject to forfeiture under 2923.32, which is the corrupt activity statute. And 

the property is identified as, No. 1, a 2005 Dodge Magnum, * * *, a 2004 Dodge 

Truck, * * *, a 2002 Jaguar, * * *, $36,569.00 in U.S. currency seized from you; a 

Magellan GPS seized from you; a Sony television seized from you; a Sonia, or 

Sonya, * * * television also sized from you[.] And that is property that the State 

alleges either was used in the commission of these offenses, or was proceeds 

from profits, or proceeds from the conduct of those activities. You understand 

that? 
Highland App. No. 16CA15 10 

DEFENDANT CASSELL: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Do you understand what it is the State is saying, uh, was done, 

and how, when, and where it was done? 

DEFENDANT CASSELL: Yes, sir. 

{¶21} Cassell’s constitutional claims are based on an erroneous premise that 

Stevens established binding precedent. It did not. Moreover, because the trial court was 

not required to apply Stevens as pronounced by the O’Neill opinion, but did in fact do 

so, Cassell’s constitutional arguments are meritless. Thus, we overrule his second 

assignment of error. 

B. Motion to Withdraw & Voluntariness of Plea 

{¶22} Cassell’s first and third assignment of error are closely interrelated to each 

other and his second assignment of error. First, he argues the trial court erred by 

rejecting his motion without conducting a hearing. He contends his motion established 

he suffered a manifest injustice because he entered his guilty plea without an accurate 

understanding of the RICO statute. He claims this uninformed plea resulted from the 

fact that the Supreme Court of Ohio did not decide the appeal of his co-defendants, 

Stevens and Bondurant, until after Cassell entered his guilty plea. Thus he argues he 

had no way of knowing whether the $500 minimum statutory threshold applied to the 

enterprise collectively, or to him individually. This assignment of error contends he was 

entitled to a hearing based upon the facts alleged in his motion. 

{¶23} The purported involuntariness of his plea also forms the basis of the 

argument in his third assignment of error that the plea was somehow rendered void by 
Highland App. No. 16CA15 11 

the Supreme Court’s subsequent “clarification” that the focus of monetary threshold is 

upon the individual actors, not upon the enterprise as a whole. 

1. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 

{¶24} In his first assignment of error Cassell asserts that the trial court erred 

when it overruled the motion without a hearing because he established a need to 

correct a manifest injustice. Crim.R. 32.1 provides that “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of 

guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct 

manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and 

permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.” 

{¶25} “A defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea of guilty after the imposition of 

sentence has the burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice.” State v. 

Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus; 

State v. Ogle, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 13CA18, 2014-Ohio-2251, ¶ 8. A manifest injustice 

is a clear and openly unjust act; it relates to a fundamental flaw in the proceedings 

resulting in a miscarriage of justice or a deprivation of due process. See State ex rel. 

Schneider v. Kreiner, 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208, 699 N.E.2d 83 (1998); Ogle at 8; Hall, 

10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-433, 2003-Ohio-6939, at ¶ 12. “This is an ‘extremely high 

standard’ that permits a defendant to withdraw his plea ‘only in extraordinary cases.’ ” 

State v. Walton, 4th Dist. Wash. No. 13CA9, 2014-Ohio-618, ¶ 10, quoting State v. 

Darget, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 12CA3487, 2013-Ohio-603, ¶ 21. 

{¶26} The decision to grant or deny a Crim.R. 32.1 postsentence motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court; appellate 

review of the denial of the motion is thus limited to a determination of whether the trial 
Highland App. No. 16CA15 12 

court abused its discretion. Walton at ¶ 11; see also Smith at paragraph two of the 

syllabus (“A motion made pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 is addressed to the sound discretion 

of the trial court, and the good faith, credibility and weight of the movant’s assertions in 

support of the motion are matters to be resolved by that court”). “A trial court abuses its 

discretion when it makes a decision that is unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.” 

State v. Darmond, 135 Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 34. 

{¶27} An evidentiary hearing is not required for deciding postsentence motions 

to withdraw a guilty plea where the record conclusively and irrefutably contradicts the 

allegations in the motion. See State v. Pasturzak, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 08CA3252, 

2009-Ohio-4222, ¶ 18; State v. Iafornaro, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 01CA007967, 2002-Ohio5550, ¶ 12. Cassell’s contentions were conclusively and irrefutably contradicted by the 

record of the proceedings before the court. Therefore, the trial court properly exercised 

its broad discretion in determining that Cassell did not satisfy his burden of establishing 

the extremely high standard of manifest injustice that would have warranted a 

withdrawal of his guilty plea. There was no clear and openly unjust act or a 

fundamental flaw in the proceedings resulting in a miscarriage of justice or a deprivation 

of due process. 

{¶28} In our discussion of Cassell’s second assignment of error we already 

determined that Stevens is a plurality opinion that has only persuasive value. It did not 

conclusively establish the law controlling the monetary threshold under Ohio RICO’s 

statute, or that the statute was ambiguous. What it did establish is that four of the seven 

Justices found the statute was unambiguous. It also established that Stevens and 

Bondurant were entitled to have their RICO convictions reversed. However, the error 
Highland App. No. 16CA15 13 

complained of in Stevens was not present in Cassell’s case. Here the indictment and 

the trial court’s explanation of the charges clearly advised Cassell that his individual 

involvement and profit from engaging in the enterprise exceeded the $500 minimum 

threshold. See ¶ 20 above; and ¶ 34, below. 

{¶29} Cassell’s contentions that Stevens changed the game are unfounded. The 

trial court did not need to conduct an evidentiary hearing to make that decision. 

Accordingly, it did not abuse its discretion in deciding Cassell’s delayed motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea without holding an evidentiary hearing. We overrule Cassell’s 

first assignment of error. 

2. Crim. R. 11. Voluntariness 

{¶30} “ ‘When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be 

made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders 

enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and 

the Ohio Constitution.’ ” State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 

N.E.2d 621, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 

(1996). “An appellate court determining whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily conducts a de novo review of the record to ensure that the 

trial court complied with the constitutional and procedural safeguards.” State v. Moore, 

4th Dist. Adams No. 13CA965, 2014-Ohio-3024, ¶ 13. 

{¶31} “Crim.R. 11(C) governs the process that a trial court must use before 

accepting a felony plea of guilty or no contest.” Veney at ¶ 8. Before accepting a guilty 

plea in a felony case a trial court must address the defendant personally and determine 

that “the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of 
Highland App. No. 16CA15 14 

the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the defendant 

is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the 

sentencing hearing.” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). The court must also inform the defendant of 

both the constitutional and nonconstitutional rights he is waiving and determine that he 

“understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon 

acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.” Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(b). Finally, the court must determine that the defendant understands that he 

“is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have 

compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the 

state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the 

defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.” Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(c). 

{¶32} Substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) is sufficient for a 

valid plea because they do not involve constitutional rights. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio 

St.3d 176, 2008–Ohio–5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 14. “ ‘Substantial compliance means 

that, under the totality of the circumstances, appellant subjectively understood the 

implications of his plea and the rights he waived.’ “ State v. McDaniel, 4th Dist. Vinton 

No. 09CA677, 2010–Ohio–5215, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Vinson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

08AP–903, 2009–Ohio–3240, ¶ 6. However strict compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) 

is required because constitutional rights are involved. “However, failure to [literally 

comply] will not necessarily invalidate a plea. The underlying purpose, from the 

defendant's perspective, of Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey to the defendant certain 

information so that he can make a voluntary and intelligent decision whether to plead 
Highland App. No. 16CA15 15 

guilty.” Veney at ¶ 18 quoting State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480, 423 N.E.2d 

115 (1981). 

{¶33} Substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) does not necessarily 

require a detailed recitation of the elements of a charge by the court. State v. Wright, 

4th Dist. Highland No. 94CA853, 1995 WL 368319, *4 (Jun. 19, 1995). “In order for a 

trial court to determine that a defendant is making a plea with an understanding of the 

nature of the charge to which he is entering a plea, it is not always necessary that the 

trial court advise the defendant of the elements of the crime, or to specifically ask the 

defendant if he understands the charge, so long as the totality of the circumstances are 

such that the trial court is warranted in making a determination that the defendant 

understands the charge.” State v. Rainey, 3 Ohio App.3d 441, 442, 446 N.E.2d 188 

(10th Dist. 1982). 

{¶34} The trial court was not required to recite or explain each definition and 

subpart in R.C. 2923.31 when it determined if Cassell understood the nature of an Ohio 

RICO charge, “as long as the totality of the circumstances are such that the trial court 

was warranted in making the determination.” Rainey, supra. A review of the plea 

hearing shows that the trial court explained the nature of the Ohio RICO charges: 

THE COURT: Okay. Now, Count One (1) indicates, or states in the indictment, 

that on or about the period of September 1, 2010, continuing through March 30, 

2011, in Clinton County, Ohio, and as a continuing course of criminal conduct in 

Highland County, Ohio, that you, along with several other folks – I believe eight 

others – did recklessly while being employed by or associated with, directly or 

indirectly, conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern 

of corrupt activity, in violation of Section 2923.32(A)(1) of the Revised Code. And 

that is the charge of Engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, a first degree 

felony, carrying a sentence of three (3) years to ten (10) years actual 

incarceration; and a fine of up to twenty thousand dollars, and a license 

suspension of six (6) months to five (5) years, do you understand that charge? 
Highland App. No. 16CA15 16 

DEFENDANT CASSELL: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Do you understand what the State has said you’ve done, and 

when, where and how you’ve done it? 

DEFENDANT CASSELL: Yes, sir. 

{¶35} See also, ¶ 20 above. 

{¶36} Under these circumstances Cassell could not establish any violation of 

Crim.R. 11. Our rejection of Cassell’s first and second assignments of error renders the 

premise of Cassell’s third assignment of error false. Moreover, a review of the plea 

hearing reveals the trial court complied with all the requirements of Crim.R. 11, 

rendering Cassell’s plea voluntary. A defendant who challenges his guilty plea on the 

basis that it was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made must show a 

prejudicial effect. The test is whether the plea would have otherwise occurred. State v. 

Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). We find no evidence of any 

prejudice to Cassell, particularly where the state had alleged a monetary threshold 

against him personally in an amount well in excess of $500. We overrule Cassell’s third 

assignment of error. 

C. Drug Possession/Forfeiture Pleas 

{¶37} In his fourth assignment of error Cassell argues that the trial court’s 

refusal to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea to the Ohio RICO count was erroneously 

based upon the fact that he also pled guilty to another drug charge. He argues that the 

rule of law that a defendant cannot collaterally attack a plea’s validity because he later 

decides it was a “bad deal” should also apply to the prosecution. Cassell’s “bad deal” 

analogy is nonsensical; the prosecution is not attacking the plea agreement as a “bad 

deal” for the state. Cassell misinterprets the trial court’s decision. The trial court did not 
Highland App. No. 16CA15 17 

deny his motion to withdraw his Ohio RICO plea because he had also pleaded guilty to 

drug possession and forfeiture. Rather, the trial court’s rationale for rejecting the motion 

to withdraw the RICO plea was that Cassell had failed to establish the requisite manifest 

injustice necessary to grant the motion. And in the absence of a basis for allowing the 

withdrawal of that plea, the entire plea agreement remained enforceable. 

{¶38} We overrule Cassell’s fourth assignment of error. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

{¶39} Having overruled the assignments of error, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
Highland App. No. 16CA15 18 

JUDGMENT ENTRY 

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that Appellant shall pay the 

costs. 

 The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Highland 

County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. 

 IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS 

BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is 

temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously 

posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme 

Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. 

If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 

sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the 

Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of 

the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court 

of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as 

of the date of such dismissal. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Abele, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion. 

McFarland, J.: Concurs in Judgment Only. 

 

 For the Court 

 BY: ________________________ 

 William H. Harsha, Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

 Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment 

entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing 

with the clerk.