# Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali C 334/2014

| | ISSN 1977-0987 |
| --- | --- |
| Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali
  tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334 |
| | |
| Edizzjoni bil-Malti | Informazzjoni u Avviżi | Volum 5725 ta' Settembru 2014 |

ISSN 1977-0987

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali

tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334

Edizzjoni bil-Malti

Informazzjoni u Avviżi

Volum 5725 ta' Settembru 2014

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| Avviż Nru | Werrej | Paġna |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Komunikazzjonijiet |
| | KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2014/C 334/01 | Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Il-Każ M.7361 — Kaindl/DB ML/CTE) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2014/C 334/02 | Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Il-Każ M.7386 — KKR/Riverstone/Trinity) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Avviż Nru

Werrej

Paġna

II   Komunikazzjonijiet

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2014/C 334/01

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Il-Każ M.7361 — Kaindl/DB ML/CTE) (
  1
  )

1

1

2014/C 334/02

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Il-Każ M.7386 — KKR/Riverstone/Trinity) (
  1
  )

1

1

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| | IV   Informazzjoni |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2014/C 334/03 | Rata tal-kambju tal-euro | 2 |
| 2014/C 334/04 | Opinjoni tal-Kumitat Konsultattiv dwar il-ftehimiet restrittivi u l-pożizzjoni dominanti mogħtija waqt il-laqgħa tiegħu tat-3 ta’ Marzu 2014 rigward l-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni relatata mal-Każ AT.39952 Skambji ta’ Enerġija — Rapporteur: Il-Pajjiżi l-Baxxi | 3 |
| 2014/C 334/05 | Rapport Finali tal-Uffiċjal tas-Seduta — Skambji tal-Enerġija (AT.39952) | 4 |
| 2014/C 334/06 | Taqsira tad-Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni tal-5 ta’ Marzu 2014 — Li tirrigwarda proċedimient skont l-Artikolu 101 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea u l-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE (Il-Każ AT.39952 — Skambji ta’ Enerġija) (notifikat bid-dokument C(2014) 1204 final) | 5 |
| | Il-Qorti Ewropea tal-Awdituri |
| 2014/C 334/07 | Rapport Speċjali Nru 13/2014 Appoġġ mill-UE għar-riabilitazzjoni wara t-terremot f’Ħaiti | 7 |
| | INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2014/C 334/08 | Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja fir-rigward tal-għajnuna allegata mogħtija lil Innovation Norway rigward l-attivitajiet tagħha fis-suq ta’ infrastruttura tal-Internet u servizzi relatati, kif ukoll il-possibbiltà ta’ għajnuna favur il-bordijiet tat-turiżmu reġjonali (BTR) u l-organizzazzjonijiet tal-ġestjoni tad-destinazzjonijiet (OĠD) | 8 |
| 2014/C 334/09 | Opinjoni tar-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u tal-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA ppreżentata fil-laqgħa tal-Kumitat Konsultattiv KE dwar ftehimiet restrittivi u pożizzjoni dominanti tat-3 ta’ Marzu 2014 rigward abbozz preliminari ta’ deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni fil-Każ: AT.39952 Power Exchanges — Relatur: Il-Pajjiżi l-Baxxi | 28 |

IV   Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2014/C 334/03

Rata tal-kambju tal-euro

2

2014/C 334/04

Opinjoni tal-Kumitat Konsultattiv dwar il-ftehimiet restrittivi u l-pożizzjoni dominanti mogħtija waqt il-laqgħa tiegħu tat-3 ta’ Marzu 2014 rigward l-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni relatata mal-Każ AT.39952 Skambji ta’ Enerġija — Rapporteur: Il-Pajjiżi l-Baxxi

3

2014/C 334/05

Rapport Finali tal-Uffiċjal tas-Seduta — Skambji tal-Enerġija (AT.39952)

4

2014/C 334/06

Taqsira tad-Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni tal-5 ta’ Marzu 2014 — Li tirrigwarda proċedimient skont l-Artikolu 101 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea u l-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE (Il-Każ AT.39952 — Skambji ta’ Enerġija) (notifikat bid-dokument C(2014) 1204 final)

(notifikat bid-dokument C(2014) 1204 final)

5

Il-Qorti Ewropea tal-Awdituri

2014/C 334/07

Rapport Speċjali Nru 13/2014 Appoġġ mill-UE għar-riabilitazzjoni wara t-terremot f’Ħaiti

7

INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2014/C 334/08

Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja fir-rigward tal-għajnuna allegata mogħtija lil Innovation Norway rigward l-attivitajiet tagħha fis-suq ta’ infrastruttura tal-Internet u servizzi relatati, kif ukoll il-possibbiltà ta’ għajnuna favur il-bordijiet tat-turiżmu reġjonali (BTR) u l-organizzazzjonijiet tal-ġestjoni tad-destinazzjonijiet (OĠD)

8

2014/C 334/09

Opinjoni tar-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u tal-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA ppreżentata fil-laqgħa tal-Kumitat Konsultattiv KE dwar ftehimiet restrittivi u pożizzjoni dominanti tat-3 ta’ Marzu 2014 rigward abbozz preliminari ta’ deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni fil-Każ: AT.39952 Power Exchanges — Relatur: Il-Pajjiżi l-Baxxi

28

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| | V   Avviżi |
| --- | --- |
| | PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2014/C 334/10 | Avviż ta’ kompetizzjoni ġenerali | 29 |
| | PROĊEDURI TAL-QORTI |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2014/C 334/11 | Azzjoni mressqa fis-17 ta' Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Islanda (Kawża E-12/14) | 30 |
| 2014/C 334/12 | Azzjoni mressqa fis-17 ta’ Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Islanda (Kawża E-11/14) | 31 |
| 2014/C 334/13 | Azzjoni mressqa fis-17 ta’ Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Islanda (Kawża E-13/14) | 32 |
| 2014/C 334/14 | Azzjoni mressqa fis-17 ta' Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Islanda (Kawża E-14/14) | 33 |
| 2014/C 334/15 | Azzjoni mressqa fit-18 ta’ Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Islanda (Kawża E-15/14) | 34 |
| 2014/C 334/16 | Azzjoni mressqa fil-25 ta’ Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Prinċipat tal-Liechtenstein (Kawża E-17/14) | 35 |
| | PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2014/C 334/17 | Avviż minn qabel ta’ konċentrazzjoni (Il-Każ M.7372 — AXA/Hammerson/The real estate portfolio) — Każ li jista’ jiġi kkunsidrat għal proċedura ssimplifikata (
  1
  ) | 36 |

V   Avviżi

PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2014/C 334/10

Avviż ta’ kompetizzjoni ġenerali

29

PROĊEDURI TAL-QORTI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2014/C 334/11

Azzjoni mressqa fis-17 ta' Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Islanda (Kawża E-12/14)

30

2014/C 334/12

Azzjoni mressqa fis-17 ta’ Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Islanda (Kawża E-11/14)

31

2014/C 334/13

Azzjoni mressqa fis-17 ta’ Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Islanda (Kawża E-13/14)

32

2014/C 334/14

Azzjoni mressqa fis-17 ta' Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Islanda (Kawża E-14/14)

33

2014/C 334/15

Azzjoni mressqa fit-18 ta’ Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Islanda (Kawża E-15/14)

34

2014/C 334/16

Azzjoni mressqa fil-25 ta’ Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Prinċipat tal-Liechtenstein (Kawża E-17/14)

35

PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2014/C 334/17

Avviż minn qabel ta’ konċentrazzjoni (Il-Każ M.7372 — AXA/Hammerson/The real estate portfolio) — Każ li jista’ jiġi kkunsidrat għal proċedura ssimplifikata (
  1
  )

1

36

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| | Rettifika |
| --- | --- |
| 2014/C 334/18 | Rettifika għall-Aġġornament tal-lista ta’ punti tal-qsim tal-fruntieri msemmija fl-Artikolu 2(8) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 562/2006 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill li jistabbilixxi Kodiċi Komunitarju dwar ir-regoli li jirregolaw il-moviment ta’ persuni minn naħa għal oħra tal-fruntiera (Kodiċi tal-Fruntieri ta’ Schengen) ( ĠU C 316, 28.12.2007, p. 1 ; ĠU C 134, 31.5.2008, p. 16 ; ĠU C 177, 12.7.2008, p. 9 ; ĠU C 200, 6.8.2008, p. 10 ; ĠU C 331, 31.12.2008, p. 13 ; ĠU C 3, 8.1.2009, p. 10 ; ĠU C 37, 14.2.2009, p. 10 ; ĠU C 64, 19.3.2009, p. 20 ; ĠU C 99, 30.4.2009, p. 7 ; ĠU C 229, 23.9.2009, p. 28 ; ĠU C 263, 5.11.2009, p. 22 ; ĠU C 298, 8.12.2009, p. 17 ; ĠU C 74, 24.3.2010, p. 13 ; ĠU C 326, 3.12.2010, p. 17 ; ĠU C 355, 29.12.2010, p. 34 ; ĠU C 22, 22.1.2011, p. 22 ; ĠU C 37, 5.2.2011, p. 12 ; ĠU C 149, 20.5.2011, p. 8 ; ĠU C 190, 30.6.2011, p. 17 ; ĠU C 203, 9.7.2011, p. 14 ; ĠU C 210, 16.7.2011, p. 30 ; ĠU C 271, 14.9.2011, p. 18 ; ĠU C 356, 6.12.2011, p. 12 ; ĠU C 111, 18.4.2012, p. 3 ; ĠU C 183, 23.6.2012, p. 7 ; ĠU C 313, 17.10.2012, p. 11 ; ĠU C 394, 20.12.2012, p. 22 ; ĠU C 51, 22.2.2013, p. 9 ; ĠU C 167, 13.6.2013, p. 9 ; ĠU C 242, 23.8.2013, p. 2 ; ĠU C 275, 24.9.2013, p. 7 ; ĠU C 314, 29.10.2013, p. 5 ; ĠU C 324, 9.11.2013, p. 6 ; ĠU C 57, 28.2.2014, p. 4 ; ĠU C 167, 4.6.2014, p. 9 ) ( ĠU C 244, 26.7.2014 ) | 37 |

Rettifika

2014/C 334/18

Rettifika għall-Aġġornament tal-lista ta’ punti tal-qsim tal-fruntieri msemmija fl-Artikolu 2(8) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 562/2006 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill li jistabbilixxi Kodiċi Komunitarju dwar ir-regoli li jirregolaw il-moviment ta’ persuni minn naħa għal oħra tal-fruntiera (Kodiċi tal-Fruntieri ta’ Schengen) ( ĠU C 316, 28.12.2007, p. 1 ; ĠU C 134, 31.5.2008, p. 16 ; ĠU C 177, 12.7.2008, p. 9 ; ĠU C 200, 6.8.2008, p. 10 ; ĠU C 331, 31.12.2008, p. 13 ; ĠU C 3, 8.1.2009, p. 10 ; ĠU C 37, 14.2.2009, p. 10 ; ĠU C 64, 19.3.2009, p. 20 ; ĠU C 99, 30.4.2009, p. 7 ; ĠU C 229, 23.9.2009, p. 28 ; ĠU C 263, 5.11.2009, p. 22 ; ĠU C 298, 8.12.2009, p. 17 ; ĠU C 74, 24.3.2010, p. 13 ; ĠU C 326, 3.12.2010, p. 17 ; ĠU C 355, 29.12.2010, p. 34 ; ĠU C 22, 22.1.2011, p. 22 ; ĠU C 37, 5.2.2011, p. 12 ; ĠU C 149, 20.5.2011, p. 8 ; ĠU C 190, 30.6.2011, p. 17 ; ĠU C 203, 9.7.2011, p. 14 ; ĠU C 210, 16.7.2011, p. 30 ; ĠU C 271, 14.9.2011, p. 18 ; ĠU C 356, 6.12.2011, p. 12 ; ĠU C 111, 18.4.2012, p. 3 ; ĠU C 183, 23.6.2012, p. 7 ; ĠU C 313, 17.10.2012, p. 11 ; ĠU C 394, 20.12.2012, p. 22 ; ĠU C 51, 22.2.2013, p. 9 ; ĠU C 167, 13.6.2013, p. 9 ; ĠU C 242, 23.8.2013, p. 2 ; ĠU C 275, 24.9.2013, p. 7 ; ĠU C 314, 29.10.2013, p. 5 ; ĠU C 324, 9.11.2013, p. 6 ; ĠU C 57, 28.2.2014, p. 4 ; ĠU C 167, 4.6.2014, p. 9 ) ( ĠU C 244, 26.7.2014 )

37

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| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE |

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(1)   Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE

1

| MT | |
| --- | --- |

MT

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II Komunikazzjonijiet

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 25.9.2014 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/1

---

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata

(Il-Każ M.7361 — Kaindl/DB ML/CTE)

(Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE)

(2014/C 334/01)

Fil-11 ta’ Settembru 2014, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq intern. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)(b) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1). It-test sħiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss bil-Ġermaniż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitneħħa kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista’ jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

| — | Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta’ amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali, |
| --- | --- |

—

Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta’ amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,

| — | f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=mt) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32014M7361. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-Internet għal-liġi Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

—

f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=mt) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32014M7361. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-Internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

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(1)  ĠU L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

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| 25.9.2014 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/1

---

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata

(Il-Każ M.7386 — KKR/Riverstone/Trinity)

(Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE)

(2014/C 334/02)

Fid-19 ta’ Settembru 2014, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq intern. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)(b) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1). It-test sħiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss bl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitneħħa kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista’ jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

| — | Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali, |
| --- | --- |

—

Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,

| — | f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=mt) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32014M7386. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-Internet għal-liġi Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

—

f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=mt) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32014M7386. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-Internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

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(1)  ĠU L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

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IV Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 25.9.2014 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/2

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Rata tal-kambju tal-euro (1)

L-24 ta’ Settembru 2014

(2014/C 334/03)

1 euro =

| | Munita | Rata tal-kambju |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | Dollaru Amerikan | 1,2826 |
| JPY | Yen Ġappuniż | 139,50 |
| DKK | Krona Daniża | 7,4436 |
| GBP | Lira Sterlina | 0,78230 |
| SEK | Krona Żvediża | 9,1825 |
| CHF | Frank Żvizzeru | 1,2077 |
| ISK | Krona Iżlandiża | |
| NOK | Krona Norveġiża | 8,1790 |
| BGN | Lev Bulgaru | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Krona Ċeka | 27,497 |
| HUF | Forint Ungeriż | 310,22 |
| LTL | Litas Litwan | 3,4528 |
| PLN | Zloty Pollakk | 4,1695 |
| RON | Leu Rumen | 4,4022 |
| TRY | Lira Turka | 2,8672 |
| AUD | Dollaru Awstraljan | 1,4460 |
| CAD | Dollaru Kanadiż | 1,4207 |
| HKD | Dollaru ta' Hong Kong | 9,9425 |
| NZD | Dollaru tan-New Zealand | 1,5908 |
| SGD | Dollaru tas-Singapor | 1,6239 |
| KRW | Won tal-Korea t'Isfel | 1 332,05 |
| ZAR | Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel | 14,2735 |
| CNY | Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż | 7,8716 |
| HRK | Kuna Kroata | 7,6248 |
| IDR | Rupiah Indoneżjan | 15 339,21 |
| MYR | Ringgit Malażjan | 4,1560 |
| PHP | Peso Filippin | 56,995 |
| RUB | Rouble Russu | 48,9600 |
| THB | Baht Tajlandiż | 41,337 |
| BRL | Real Brażiljan | 3,0850 |
| MXN | Peso Messikan | 17,0409 |
| INR | Rupi Indjan | 78,2386 |

Munita

Rata tal-kambju

USD

Dollaru Amerikan

1,2826

JPY

Yen Ġappuniż

139,50

DKK

Krona Daniża

7,4436

GBP

Lira Sterlina

0,78230

SEK

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(1)  Sors: rata tal-kambju ta' referenza ppubblikata mill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew.

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| 25.9.2014 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/3 |
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25.9.2014

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/3

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Opinjoni tal-Kumitat Konsultattiv dwar il-ftehimiet restrittivi u l-pożizzjoni dominanti mogħtija waqt il-laqgħa tiegħu tat-3 ta’ Marzu 2014 rigward l-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni relatata mal-Każ AT.39952 Skambji ta’ Enerġija

Rapporteur: Il-Pajjiżi l-Baxxi

(2014/C 334/04)

| 1. | Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqsam l-istess tħassib tal-Kummissjoni espress fl-abbozz tagħha tad-Deċiżjoni hekk kif ikkomunikat lill-Kumitat Konsultattiv. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqsam l-istess tħassib tal-Kummissjoni espress fl-abbozz tagħha tad-Deċiżjoni hekk kif ikkomunikat lill-Kumitat Konsultattiv.

| 2. | Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni li l-imġiba antikompetittiva koperta mill-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni tikkostitwixxi ftehim u/jew prattika miftiehma bejn il-partijiet fil-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tat-tifsira tal-Artikolu 101 tat-TFUE u l-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni li l-imġiba antikompetittiva koperta mill-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni tikkostitwixxi ftehim u/jew prattika miftiehma bejn il-partijiet fil-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tat-tifsira tal-Artikolu 101 tat-TFUE u l-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE.

| 3. | Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-valutazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni fir-rigward tal-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tal-prodotti u dak ġeografiku tal-ftehim u/jew il-prattiki miftiehma miġbura fl-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-valutazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni fir-rigward tal-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tal-prodotti u dak ġeografiku tal-ftehim u/jew il-prattiki miftiehma miġbura fl-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni.

| 4. | Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni li l-impriżi kkonċernati mill-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni pparteċipaw fi ksur uniku u kontinwu tal-Artikolu 101 tat-TFUE u tal-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim ŻEE. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni li l-impriżi kkonċernati mill-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni pparteċipaw fi ksur uniku u kontinwu tal-Artikolu 101 tat-TFUE u tal-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim ŻEE.

| 5. | Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni li l-għan tal-ftehim u/jew tal-prattiki miftiehma kien li jillimita l-kompetizzjoni skont it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 101 tat-TFUE u tal-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim ŻEE. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni li l-għan tal-ftehim u/jew tal-prattiki miftiehma kien li jillimita l-kompetizzjoni skont it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 101 tat-TFUE u tal-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim ŻEE.

| 6. | Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni li l-ftehimiet u/jew il-prattiki miftiehma kienu kapaċi jeffetwaw b’mod sinifikanti l-kummerċ bejn l-Istati Membri tal-UE. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni li l-ftehimiet u/jew il-prattiki miftiehma kienu kapaċi jeffetwaw b’mod sinifikanti l-kummerċ bejn l-Istati Membri tal-UE.

| 7. | Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-valutazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni fir-rigward id-durata tal-ksur. |
| --- | --- |

7.

Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-valutazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni fir-rigward id-durata tal-ksur.

| 8. | Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni li għandha tiġi imposta multa fuq id-destinatarji tal-abbozz tad-deċiżjoni. |
| --- | --- |

8.

Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni li għandha tiġi imposta multa fuq id-destinatarji tal-abbozz tad-deċiżjoni.

| 9. | Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni dwar il-valur tal-bejgħ. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni dwar il-valur tal-bejgħ.

| 10. | Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni dwar l-ammonti bażiċi tal-multi. |
| --- | --- |

10.

Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni dwar l-ammonti bażiċi tal-multi.

| 11. | Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni li ma hemmx ċirkustanzi aggravanti u l-ebda ċirkustanzi mitiganti applikabbli f’dan il-każ. |
| --- | --- |

11.

Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni li ma hemmx ċirkustanzi aggravanti u l-ebda ċirkustanzi mitiganti applikabbli f’dan il-każ.

| 12. | Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni li ma tapplikax kwalunkwe żieda fil-multi għall-iskop ta’ deterrenza f’dan il-każ. |
| --- | --- |

12.

Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni li ma tapplikax kwalunkwe żieda fil-multi għall-iskop ta’ deterrenza f’dan il-każ.

| 13. | Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni fir-rigward tat-tnaqqis tal-multi abbażi tan-Notifika ta’ Riżolviment ta’ Tilwim tal-2008. |
| --- | --- |

13.

Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni fir-rigward tat-tnaqqis tal-multi abbażi tan-Notifika ta’ Riżolviment ta’ Tilwim tal-2008.

| 14. | Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni fuq l-ammonti finali tal-multi. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jaqbel mal-Kummissjoni fuq l-ammonti finali tal-multi.

| 15. | Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jirrakkomanda li l-opinjoni tiegħu tiġi ppubblikata f’Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

15.

Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv jirrakkomanda li l-opinjoni tiegħu tiġi ppubblikata f’Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

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| 25.9.2014 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/4 |
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25.9.2014

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/4

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Rapport Finali tal-Uffiċjal tas-Seduta (1)

Skambji tal-Enerġija

(AT.39952)

(2014/C 334/05)

Fit-22 ta’ Marzu 2013, il-Kummissjoni bdiet il-proċedimenti skont l-Artikolu 11(6) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1/2003 (2) kontra l-iskambji tal-enerġija fis-suq EPEX Spot (“EPEX”) u Nord Pool Spot AS (“NPS”) (flimkien “il-partijiet”).

Wara diskussjonijiet dwar riżolviment u sottomissjonijiet dwar riżolviment skont l-Artikolu 10a(2) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 773/2004 (3), il-Kummissjoni adottat Dikjarazzjoni ta’ Oġġezzjonijiet (“DO”) li tiddikjara li kienu pparteċipaw fi ksur uniku u kontinwu tal-Artikolu 101 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea u tal-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE. Id-DO allegat li l-partijiet kienu impenjaw ruħhom fi ftehim ta’ nonkompetizzjoni li kien jinkludi allokazzjoni tat-territorji, bl-għan li jirrestrinġu l-kompetizzjoni bejniethom, b’konnessjoni mas-servizzi ta’ kummerċ tal-elettriku fis-suq.

Fit-tweġibiet tagħhom għad-DO, kemm EPEX u kemm NPS ikkonfermaw li d-DO rriflettiet il-kontenut tas-sottomissjonijiet dwar riżolviment tagħhom.

Skont l-Artikolu 16 tad-Deċiżjoni 2011/695/UE, jien eżaminajt jekk l-abbozz tad-deċiżjoni indirizzat lil EPEX u NPS jirrigwardax biss l-oġġezzjonijiet li fir-rigward tagħhom il-partijiet ingħataw l-opportunità li jesprimu l-fehmiet tagħhom, u jien wasalt għal konklużjoni pożittiva.

Fid-dawl ta’ dan t’hawn fuq, jien nikkunsidra li l-eżerċiżżju effettiv tad-drittijiet proċedurali tagħhom f’dan il-każ ġie rrispettat.

Brussell, it-3 ta’ Marzu 2014.

Wouter WILS

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(1)  Skont l-Artikoli 16 u 17 tad-Deċiżjoni 2011/695/UE tal-President tal-Kummissjoni Ewropea tat-13 ta’ Ottubru 2011 dwar il-funzjoni u t-termini ta’ referenza tal-uffiċjal tas-seduta f’ċerti proċedimenti dwar il-kompetizzjoni (ĠU L 275, 20.10.2011, p. 29) (id-Deċiżjoni 2011/695/UE).

1

(2)  Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1/2003 tas-16 ta’ Diċembru 2002 dwar l-implimentazzjoni tar-regoli tal-kompetizzjoni mniżżlin fl-Artikoli 81 u 82 tat-Trattat (ĠU L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1).

2

(3)  Ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 773/2004 tas-7 ta’ April 2004 dwar it-tmexxija tal-proċedimenti mill-Kummissjoni skont l-Artikoli 81 u 82 tat-Trattat tal-KE (ĠU L 123, 27.4.2004, p. 18).

3

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| 25.9.2014 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/5 |
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25.9.2014

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/5

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TAQSIRA TAD-DEĊIŻJONI TAL-KUMMISSJONI

tal-5 ta’ Marzu 2014

Li tirrigwarda proċedimient skont l-Artikolu 101 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea u l-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE

(Il-Każ AT.39952 — Skambji ta’ Enerġija)

(notifikat bid-dokument C(2014) 1204 final)

(It-test bl-Ingliż biss hu awtentiku)

(2014/C 334/06)

Fil-5 ta’ Marzu 2014, il-Kummissjoni adottat deċiżjoni li tirrigwarda proċediment skont l-Artikolu 101 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea u l-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim ŻEE. B’konformità mad-dispożizzjonijiet tal-Artikolu 30 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1/2003
   (1)
  , il-Kummissjoni b’dan qed tippubblika l-ismijiet tal-partijiet u l-kontenut prinċipali tad-deċiżjoni, inklużi kwalunkwe pieni imposti, wara li kkunsidrat l-interess leġittimu tal-impriżi fil-ħarsien tas-sigrieti kummerċjali tagħhom.

1.   INTRODUZZJONI

| (1) | Id-Deċiżjoni tikkonċerna ksur wieħed u kontinwu tal-Artikolu 101 tat-Trattat u tal-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE rigward servizzi ta’ kummerċ fil-pront tal-elettriku. Servizzi ta’ kummerċ fil-pront tal-elettriku huma pprovduti permezz ta’ skambji ta’ enerġija biex jiġi ffaċilitat il-kummerċ ta’ prodotti tal-elettriku fil-pront. Dawn jinkludu servizzi li jiffaċilitaw il-kummerċ reali nnifsu (jiġifieri l-operazzjoni ta’ skambju tal-enerġija), il-ġestjoni tal-allokazzjoni impliċita ta’ kapaċitajiet ta’ interkonnessjoni transfruntiera permezz ta’ akkoppjament tas-swieq, u servizzi għal partijiet terzi għall-iżvilupp u l-operazzjoni ta’ kummerċ tal-elettriku fil-pront. Id-Deċiżjoni hija indirizzata lil EPEX Spot (“EPEX”) u lil Nord Pool Spot AS (“NPS”). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Id-Deċiżjoni tikkonċerna ksur wieħed u kontinwu tal-Artikolu 101 tat-Trattat u tal-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE rigward servizzi ta’ kummerċ fil-pront tal-elettriku. Servizzi ta’ kummerċ fil-pront tal-elettriku huma pprovduti permezz ta’ skambji ta’ enerġija biex jiġi ffaċilitat il-kummerċ ta’ prodotti tal-elettriku fil-pront. Dawn jinkludu servizzi li jiffaċilitaw il-kummerċ reali nnifsu (jiġifieri l-operazzjoni ta’ skambju tal-enerġija), il-ġestjoni tal-allokazzjoni impliċita ta’ kapaċitajiet ta’ interkonnessjoni transfruntiera permezz ta’ akkoppjament tas-swieq, u servizzi għal partijiet terzi għall-iżvilupp u l-operazzjoni ta’ kummerċ tal-elettriku fil-pront. Id-Deċiżjoni hija indirizzata lil EPEX Spot (“EPEX”) u lil Nord Pool Spot AS (“NPS”).

2.   DESKRIZZJONI TAL-KAŻ

2.1.   Proċedura

| (2) | Fi Frar 2012, il-Kummissjoni wettqet spezzjonijiet għall-għarrieda fl-istabbilimenti ta’ EPEX (fi Franza) u NPS (fil-Finlandja, in-Norveġja u l-Isvezja). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Fi Frar 2012, il-Kummissjoni wettqet spezzjonijiet għall-għarrieda fl-istabbilimenti ta’ EPEX (fi Franza) u NPS (fil-Finlandja, in-Norveġja u l-Isvezja).

| (3) | Il-Kummissjoni fetħet proċedimenti f’dan il-każ fit-22 ta’ Marzu 2013. Bejn it-3 ta’ Ġunju 2013 u l-14 ta’ Novembru 2013 saru diskussjonijiet biex tinstab soluzzjoni. Sussegwentement, EPEX u NPS (imsejħa konġuntement bħala “l-partijiet”) ressqu t-talba formali ta’ saldu tagħhom lill-Kummissjoni skont l-Artikolu 10a(2) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 773/2004. Fil-11 ta’ Diċembru 2013, il-Kummissjoni adottat dikjarazzjoni ta’ oġġezzjonijiet u ż-żewġ partijiet ikkonfermaw li l-kontenut tagħha kien jirrifletti s-sottomissjonijiet tagħhom kif ukoll li huma baqgħu impenjati li jsegwu l-proċedura ta’ saldu. Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv dwar prattiki restrittivi u pożizzjonijiet dominanti ħareġ opinjoni favorevoli fl-20 ta’ Frar 2014 u l-Kummissjoni adottat id-Deċiżjoni fil-5 ta’ Marzu 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Il-Kummissjoni fetħet proċedimenti f’dan il-każ fit-22 ta’ Marzu 2013. Bejn it-3 ta’ Ġunju 2013 u l-14 ta’ Novembru 2013 saru diskussjonijiet biex tinstab soluzzjoni. Sussegwentement, EPEX u NPS (imsejħa konġuntement bħala “l-partijiet”) ressqu t-talba formali ta’ saldu tagħhom lill-Kummissjoni skont l-Artikolu 10a(2) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 773/2004. Fil-11 ta’ Diċembru 2013, il-Kummissjoni adottat dikjarazzjoni ta’ oġġezzjonijiet u ż-żewġ partijiet ikkonfermaw li l-kontenut tagħha kien jirrifletti s-sottomissjonijiet tagħhom kif ukoll li huma baqgħu impenjati li jsegwu l-proċedura ta’ saldu. Il-Kumitat Konsultattiv dwar prattiki restrittivi u pożizzjonijiet dominanti ħareġ opinjoni favorevoli fl-20 ta’ Frar 2014 u l-Kummissjoni adottat id-Deċiżjoni fil-5 ta’ Marzu 2014.

2.2.   Id-destinatarji u d-durata tal-ksur

| (4) | L-impriżi li ġejjin kisru l-Artikolu 101 tat-Trattat u l-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE billi, waqt il-perjodi indikati hawn taħt, ipparteċipaw f’attivitajiet antikompetittivi fir-rigward ta’ servizzi ta’ kummerċ fil-pront:






  (a) | EPEX, mill-21 ta’ Ġunju 2011 sas-7 ta’ Frar 2012; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(4)

L-impriżi li ġejjin kisru l-Artikolu 101 tat-Trattat u l-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE billi, waqt il-perjodi indikati hawn taħt, ipparteċipaw f’attivitajiet antikompetittivi fir-rigward ta’ servizzi ta’ kummerċ fil-pront:

(a)

EPEX, mill-21 ta’ Ġunju 2011 sas-7 ta’ Frar 2012;

| (b) | NPS mill-21 ta’ Ġunju 2011 sas-7 ta’ Frar 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

NPS mill-21 ta’ Ġunju 2011 sas-7 ta’ Frar 2012.

2.3.   Taqsira tal-ksur

| (5) | EPEX u NPS daħlu f’arranġament nonkompetittiv li jkopri s-servizzi ta’ kummerċ fil-pront tal-elettriku fiż-ŻEE u lil hinn minnha. L-għan kien li l-kompetizzjoni tkun ristretta bejniethom, biex iħarsu s-swieq fejn huma tradizzjonalment popolari, u jaqblu dwar l-espansjoni lejn pajjiżi ġodda, filwaqt li jżommu l-bilanċ tal-poter bejniethom. Il-partijiet, b’mod ġenerali qablu li ma jikkompetux bejniethom. Il-ftehim inkluda, b’mod partikolari, allokazzjoni ta’ territorji. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

EPEX u NPS daħlu f’arranġament nonkompetittiv li jkopri s-servizzi ta’ kummerċ fil-pront tal-elettriku fiż-ŻEE u lil hinn minnha. L-għan kien li l-kompetizzjoni tkun ristretta bejniethom, biex iħarsu s-swieq fejn huma tradizzjonalment popolari, u jaqblu dwar l-espansjoni lejn pajjiżi ġodda, filwaqt li jżommu l-bilanċ tal-poter bejniethom. Il-partijiet, b’mod ġenerali qablu li ma jikkompetux bejniethom. Il-ftehim inkluda, b’mod partikolari, allokazzjoni ta’ territorji.

| (6) | Sett kontinwu ta’ kuntatti antikompetittivi li involvew il-partijiet tqiesu li bdew mhux wara l-21 ta’ Ġunju 2011 u ntemmu fis-7 ta’ Frar 2012. Il-kuntatti bejn il-partijiet kienu fil-forma ta’ laqgħat fiżiċi, telefonati u vidjokonferenzi u e-mails. Huma involvew lill-maniġment superjuri taż-żewġ partijiet. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Sett kontinwu ta’ kuntatti antikompetittivi li involvew il-partijiet tqiesu li bdew mhux wara l-21 ta’ Ġunju 2011 u ntemmu fis-7 ta’ Frar 2012. Il-kuntatti bejn il-partijiet kienu fil-forma ta’ laqgħat fiżiċi, telefonati u vidjokonferenzi u e-mails. Huma involvew lill-maniġment superjuri taż-żewġ partijiet.

2.4.   Rimedji

| (7) | Il-multa ġiet ikkalkulata b’konformità mal-Linji Gwida tal-2006 dwar il-Multi (2). Id-deċiżjoni timponi multi kemm lil EPEX u kemm lil NPS. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Il-multa ġiet ikkalkulata b’konformità mal-Linji Gwida tal-2006 dwar il-Multi (2). Id-deċiżjoni timponi multi kemm lil EPEX u kemm lil NPS.

2.4.1.   L-ammont bażiku tal-multa

| (8) | L-ammont bażiku tal-multa huwa stabbilit għal 16 % tal-bejgħ ta’ servizzi ta’ kummerċ fil-pront tal-elettriku minn kull waħda mill-impriżi. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

L-ammont bażiku tal-multa huwa stabbilit għal 16 % tal-bejgħ ta’ servizzi ta’ kummerċ fil-pront tal-elettriku minn kull waħda mill-impriżi.

| (9) | L-ammont bażiku huwa mmultiplikat bl-għadd ta’ snin li matulhom l-impriżi ħadu sehem fil-ksur sabiex jitqies b’mod sħiħ kemm damet tieħu sehem fil-ksur kull waħda mill-impriżi. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

L-ammont bażiku huwa mmultiplikat bl-għadd ta’ snin li matulhom l-impriżi ħadu sehem fil-ksur sabiex jitqies b’mod sħiħ kemm damet tieħu sehem fil-ksur kull waħda mill-impriżi.

2.4.2.   Aġġustamenti għall-ammont bażiku

2.4.2.1.   Ċirkustanzi aggravanti u mitiganti

| (10) | Ma hemm l-ebda ċirkustanza aggravanti jew mitiganti f’dan il-każ. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Ma hemm l-ebda ċirkustanza aggravanti jew mitiganti f’dan il-każ.

2.4.2.2.   Żieda speċifika bħala deterrent

| (11) | F’dan il-każ, ma hemmx bżonn li tiżdied il-multa sabiex jinkiseb effett ta’ deterrent kbir biżżejjed. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

F’dan il-każ, ma hemmx bżonn li tiżdied il-multa sabiex jinkiseb effett ta’ deterrent kbir biżżejjed.

2.4.3.   Applikazzjoni tal-limitu tal-fatturat ta’ 10 %

| (12) | F’dan il-każ, (fuq il-bażi tal-aħħar ċifri tal-fatturat disponibbli), il-multi għaż-żewġ partijiet qabżu l-10 % tal-fatturat totali fl-2012. Għalhekk, il-multi għaż-żewġ partijiet huma limitati għal 10 % tal-fatturat totali rispettiv tagħhom. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

F’dan il-każ, (fuq il-bażi tal-aħħar ċifri tal-fatturat disponibbli), il-multi għaż-żewġ partijiet qabżu l-10 % tal-fatturat totali fl-2012. Għalhekk, il-multi għaż-żewġ partijiet huma limitati għal 10 % tal-fatturat totali rispettiv tagħhom.

2.4.4.   Saldu

| (13) | B’riżultat tal-applikazzjoni tan-Notifika ta’ Saldu (3), l-ammont tal-multi li għandu jiġi impost fuq EPEX u NPS tnaqqas b’10 %. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

B’riżultat tal-applikazzjoni tan-Notifika ta’ Saldu (3), l-ammont tal-multi li għandu jiġi impost fuq EPEX u NPS tnaqqas b’10 %.

3.   MULTI IMPOSTI MID-DEĊIŻJONI

| (14) | Għall-ksur imsemmi hawn fuq, jiġu imposti l-multi li ġejjin:






  (a) | EPEX Spot: EUR 3 651 000, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(14)

Għall-ksur imsemmi hawn fuq, jiġu imposti l-multi li ġejjin:

(a)

EPEX Spot: EUR 3 651 000,

| (b) | Nord Pool Spot AS: EUR 2 328 000. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Nord Pool Spot AS: EUR 2 328 000.

---

(1)  ĠU L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1.

(2)  ĠU C 210, 1.9.2006, p. 2.

(3)  ĠU C 167, 2.7.2008, p. 1.

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Il-Qorti Ewropea tal-Awdituri

| 25.9.2014 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/7

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Rapport Speċjali Nru 13/2014 “Appoġġ mill-UE għar-riabilitazzjoni wara t-terremot f’Ħaiti”

(2014/C 334/07)

Il-Qorti Ewropea tal-Awdituri b’dan tinfurmak li r-Rapport Speċjali Nru 13/2014 “Appoġġ mill-UE għar-riabilitazzjoni wara t-terremot f’Ħaiti” għadu kif ġie ppubblikat.

Ir-rapport jista’ jiġi kkonsultat jew imniżżel mill-websajt tal-Qorti Ewropea tal-Awdituri: http://eca.europa.eu

Verżjoni stampata tar-rapport tista’ tinkiseb mingħajr ħlas fuq talba lill-Qorti tal-Awdituri:

| Il-Qorti Ewropea tal-Awdituri |
| --- |
| Pubblikazzjonijiet (PUB) |
| 12, rue Alcide De Gasperi |
| 1615 Lussemburgu |
| LUXEMBOURG |
| Tel. +352 4398-1 |
| e-mail: eca-info@eca.europa.eu |

Il-Qorti Ewropea tal-Awdituri

Pubblikazzjonijiet (PUB)

12, rue Alcide De Gasperi

1615 Lussemburgu

LUXEMBOURG

Tel. +352 4398-1

e-mail: eca-info@eca.europa.eu

jew billi timla formola ta’ ordni elettronika fuq l-EU-Bookshop.

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INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 25.9.2014 | MT EN | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

MT EN

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/8

---

Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja fir-rigward tal-għajnuna allegata mogħtija lil Innovation Norway rigward l-attivitajiet tagħha fis-suq ta’ infrastruttura tal-Internet u servizzi relatati, kif ukoll il-possibbiltà ta’ għajnuna favur il-bordijiet tat-turiżmu reġjonali (“BTR”) u l-organizzazzjonijiet tal-ġestjoni tad-destinazzjonijiet (“OĠD”)

(2014/C 334/08)

Permezz tad-Deċiżjoni Nru 300/14/COL tas-16 ta’ Lulju 2014, riprodotta fil-lingwa awtentika fil-paġni li jsegwu dan is-sommarju, l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA bdiet proċedimenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u ta’ Qorti tal-Ġustizzja (“il-Protokoll Nru 3”). L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi ġew infurmati permezz ta’ kopja tad-deċiżjoni.

Permezz ta’ din in-notifika l-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA (“l-Awtorità”) tavża lill-Istati tal-EFTA, lill-Istati Membri tal-UE u lill-partijiet interessati biex iressqu l-kummenti tagħhom dwar il-miżura kkonċernata fi żmien xahar mid-data tal-pubblikazzjoni lil:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Il-kummenti se jkunu kkomunikati lill-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi. L-identità tal-parti interessata li tissottometti l-kummenti tista’ tinżamm milli tkun żvelata wara talba bil-miktub li tiddikjara r-raġunijiet għat-talba.

SOMMARJU

Proċeduri

Permezz ta’ ittra bid-data tal-5 ta’ Lulju 2013, TellUs IT AS, li fil-frattemp, amalgamat ma’ New Mind (“New Mind | tellUs”, magħrufa wkoll bħala “l-ilmentatur”), ressqet ilment quddiem l-Awtorità kontra Innovasjon Norge AS (“IN”) li fih allegat li IN kienet qed tirċievi għajnuna mill-istat għall-attivitajiet kummerċjali tagħha fl-infrastruttura tal-Internet u s-suq tas-servizzi relatati tagħha fis-settur tat-turiżmu.

L-Awtorità kellha diversi skambji ta’ korrispondenza mal-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi u mal-Ilmentatur, u ltaqgħet maż-żewġ partijiet.

Il-fatti tal-każ

IN hija kumpanija tal-istat b’responsabbiltà limitata stabbilita fl-2003 mill-Gvern Norveġiż permezz tal-Att dwar Innovation Norway (“Lov om Innovasjon Norge” (1)). Il-kumpanija ġiet stabbilita bl-għan li tikkontribwixxi għall-innovazzjoni tan-negozju, l-iżvilupp f’żoni rurali u li tiżdied il-kompetittività ta’ kumpaniji Norveġiżi. Il-promozzjoni tan-Norveġja bħala destinazzjoni turistika hija wkoll waħda mill-kompiti ta’ IN.

IN hija maħsuba biex tippromwovi żieda fil-profitabilità fi ħdan l-oqsma varji tal-industrija tat-turiżmu fil-livell nazzjonali, filwaqt li l-bordijiet tat-turiżmu reġjonali (“BTR”) u l-organizzazzjonijiet tal-ġestjoni tad-destinazzjonijiet (“OĠD”) huma l-atturi ewlenin fil-livell reġjonali u lokali. Il-BTR u l-OĠD huma impriżi li l-ishma tagħhom huma proprjetà tal-kontea jew l-awtoritajiet lokali flimkien ma’ negozji privati tat-turiżmu attivi fiż-żoni ġeografiċi rispettivi tagħhom.

L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi ddeċidew dan l-aħħar li jadottaw strateġija tat-turiżmu ġdida sabiex l-appoġġ pubbliku tas-settur isir aktar effiċjenti, jitnaqqas in-numru ta’ atturi u tkun żgurata aktar koordinazzjoni bejniethom. B’dawn l-għanijiet f’moħħhom, l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi pproponew struttura ġdida tat-turiżmu bl-għan, inter alia, li jnaqqsu n-numru ta’ BTR u OĠD u biex jikkonsolidaw l-isforzi ta’ promozzjoni għat-turiżmu tan-Norveġja u tal-paġna web tagħha visitnorway.com.

Fl-ittra tal-Baġit tal-2013 għal IN (2), il-kompiti ta’ IN fis-settur tat-turiżmu imniżżla kif ġej: “Innovation Norway għandha tiżgura distribuzzjoni tajba tal-esperjenzi tal-ivvjaġġar fin-Norveġja permezz ta’ visitnorway.com u tgħin biex l-atturi fl-industrija tat-turiżmu jsiru aktar kompetenti biex idaħħlu l-prodotti tagħhom fis-soluzzjoni tal-booking nazzjonali marbut ma’ visitnorway.com”. L-ittra tal-Baġit tal-2013 tikkjarifika li: “Innovation Norway ma toffrix servizzi mħallsa li huma f’kompetizzjoni diretta jew indiretta ma’ setturi privati. Sal-punt li Innovation Norway toffri servizzi li setgħu ġew imwettqa minn fornituri privati, il-prezz li Innovation Norway qed titlob għandu jirrifletti l-ispiża dovuta reali, inkluż dak li hu dovut, kopert minn spejjeż bażiċi”.

Bħala konsegwenza, f’din il-fażi tal-proċedura, l-Awtorità tifhem li mill-2013, l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi fdaw lil IN bil-mandat li tippromwovi b’mod attiv it-turiżmu permezz ta’ visitnorway.com filwaqt li trendi din il-pjattaforma attur prinċipali fl-istruttura tat-turiżmu. Barra minn hekk, għall-ewwel darba, IN qed titħalla tidħol f’attivitajiet ekonomiċi fis-settur tat-turiżmu.

Suq upstream mill-attività għall-promozzjoni tat-turiżmu huwa l-provvista ta’ infrastruttura tal-Internet u servizzi relatati. Dawn is-servizzi jippermettu lill-klijenti li jissottomettu u jaġġornaw regolarment informazzjoni dwar (pereżempju) siti turistiċi, lukandi, ristoranti u avvenimenti simultanjament fuq is-sit tal-Internet tagħhom stess u fuq kanali esterni oħrajn bħal visitnorway.com, Google Maps, il-kjoskijiet ta’ informazzjoni għat-turisti, il-portali mobbli, kif ukoll gazzetti stampati.

Preċedentment, IN kellha kuntatt ma’ New Mind tellUs għas-servizzi tal-IT meħtieġa għat-tħaddim ta’ visitnorway.com. Madankollu, IN żviluppat il-funzjonalitajiet tagħha stess. Barra minn hekk IN qed toffri dawk is-servizzi (jiġifieri l-infrastruttura tal-Internet u s-servizzi relatati) lil BTR u lil OĠD bħala parti mis-servizzi pprovduti f’visitnorway.com. L-infrastruttura u s-servizzi fuq l-Internet relatati ta’ IN mhumiex offruti lil suq ġenerali, iżda biss lil BTR u lil OĠD li jużaw is-sit visitnorway.com.

Il-BTR u l-OĠD kontraenti ma’ visitnorway.com waqfu milli jkomplu s-siti tal-Internet tagħhom stess u, b’konsegwenza ta’ dan, temmew il-ftehimiet ta’ servizz preċedenti tagħhom ma’ operaturi privati (bħal pereżempju l-Ilmentatur). Skont l-Ilmentatur, it-tmiem ta’ dawn is-siti tal-Internet u l-ftehimiet huwa kundizzjoni imposta minn Innovation Norway fuq il-BTR u l-OĠD. L-Ilmentatur jiddefinixxi dan l-obbligu allegat bħala kundizzjoni b’rabta indiretta li tikser il-liġi tal-antitrust.

L-allegati miżuri ta’ għajnuna mill-Istat

Il-miżuri disponibbli fid-deċiżjoni huma kif ġej: (i) l-allegat sussidjar reċiproku tal-infrastruttura tal-Internet ta’ IN u s-servizzi relatati b’fondi intenzjonati għal attivitajiet mhux kummerċjali; (ii) l-allegati profitti mitlufa permezz tal-orjentazzjoni mingħajr qliegh tal-attivitajiet ta’ IN, inklużi l-infrastruttura tal-Internet u s-servizzi relatati; u (iii) l-għajnuna allegatament mogħtija minn IN lill-BTR u lill-OĠD fil-forma ta’ prezzijiet taħt il-prezz tas-suq.

Valutazzjoni tal-miżura

Eżistenza ta’ għajnuna mill-Istat

L-Artikolu 61(1) tal-Ftehim ŻEE jaqra kif ġej: “Bla ħsara għal dispożizzjonijiet kuntrarji f’dan il-Ftehim, kull għajnuna, ta’ kwalunkwe forma, mogħtija mill-Istati Membri tal-KE, mill-Istati tal-EFTA jew permezz ta’ riżorsi tal-Istat li twassal biex ixxekkel jew thedded li xxekkel il-kompetizzjoni billi tiffavorixxi ċerti impriżi jew il-produzzjoni ta’ ċerti prodotti, safejn tolqot il-kummerċ bejn il-Partijiet Kontraenti, tkun inkompatibbli mal-funzjonament ta’ dan il-Ftehim.”

L-Awtorità hija tal-fehma preliminari li abbażi tal-ittra tal-Baġit 2013, IN daħlet f’suq ġdid f’kompetizzjoni ma’ operaturi privati, li joffru servizzi bi ħlas. Dawn is-servizzi jaqgħu barra l-mandat ta’ IN biex tippromovi n-negozji fin-Norveġja. Hija wkoll il-fehma preliminari tal-Awtorità li l-provvista tal-infrastruttura tal-Internet u tas-servizzi relatati timplika l-offerta ta’ servizzi ekonomiċi fis-suq. Bħala konsegwenza, jidher li IN għandha tiġi kkunsidrata bħala impriża għall-finijiet tar-regoli dwar l-għajnuna mill-Istat fir-rigward ta’ dawk is-servizzi speċifiċi.

L-informazzjoni disponibbli f’dan l-istadju ma tippermettix lill-Awtorità biex tasal għal konklużjoni dwar jekk il-miżuri inkwistjoni jinvolvux għajnuna mill-Istat.

Fl-istadju attwali tal-proċedura, l-Awtorità għandha dubji jekk is-separazzjoni kurrenti tal-kontijiet f’IN tippermettix lil IN tiddistingwi bejn il-kostijiet u d-dħul relatati ma’ attivitajiet ekonomiċi u mhux ekonomiċi, f’kull wieħed mill-proġetti tagħha, b’mod partikolari, fil-proġett visitnorway.com. L-Awtorità tfakkar li meta entità twettaq kemm attivitajiet kummerċjali kif ukoll attivitajiet mhux kummerċjali, għandha tiġi stabbilita sistema ta’ cost-accounting biex ikun żgurat li l-attivitajiet kummerċjali ma jiġux sussidjati permezz ta’ riżorsi tal-Istat allokati għal attivitajiet mhux kummerċjali.

Barra minn hekk, l-Awtorità tinnota li kull imprenditur jew investitur normalment jeħtieġ li jagħmel qligħ fuq l-investiment tiegħu f’impriża kummerċjali. Madankollu, mhuwiex ċar mill-informazzjoni disponibbli jekk IN tagħmilx qligħ bħal dan minn kull servizz ekonomiku li tidħol għalih biex tipprovdi l-infrastruttura tal-Internet u servizzi relatati.

Jekk il-politika tal-prezzijiet ta’ IN ma tiżgurax biżżejjed qligħ f’kapital, filwaqt li jitqiesu l-ispejjeż diretti u indiretti kollha tagħhom, il-BTR u l-OĠD jistgħu jkunu wkoll benefiċjarji ta’ għajnuna mill-Istat minħabba li jkunu qed jirċievu servizzi għal inqas mill-ispiża reali tagħhom.

Għajnuna ġdida

L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi jargumentaw li jekk il-miżuri inkwistjoni kienu kkunsidrati bħala għajnuna mill-Istat, dawn ikunu għajnuna eżistenti skont l-Artikolu 1(b)(i) jew l-Artikolu 1(b)(v) tal-Parti II tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim dwar is-Sorveljanza u l-Qorti. F’dan l-istadju tal-proċedura, l-Awtorità hija tal-fehma preliminari li jekk il-miżuri kienu kkunsidrati bħala għajnuna mill-Istat, dawn kienu jkunu wkoll klassifikati bħala għajnuna ġdida illegali.

Dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-Artikolu 1(b)(i) tal-Parti II tal-Protokoll 3, l-Awtorità hija tal-fehma preliminari li d-dħul f’suq ġdid ta’ IN (jiġifieri l-infrastruttura tal-Internet u servizzi relatati), li fih operaturi privati huma diġà preżenti, huwa barra l-mandat li IN irċeviet mill-Gvern Norveġiż. Jidher ukoll li s-sistema ta’ finanzjament tagħha hija differenti. L-attivitajiet ta’ promozzjoni ta’ IN huma ffinanzjati minn riżorsi pubbliċi, iżda l-ittra tal-Baġit 2013 tiċċara li d-dispożizzjoni tas-servizzi ekonomiċi għandhom ikunu ffinanzjati mir-riċeventi tas-servizzi, permezz ta’ remunerazzjoni. B’konsegwenza ta’ dan, hija l-opinjoni preliminari tal-Awtorità li kull għajnuna mogħtija lil IN meta tipprovdi dawn is-servizzi għandha tiġi kkwalifikata bħala għajnuna ġdida.

Fl-aħħar nett, l-Awtorità ma tqisx li, f’dan l-istadju, l-miżura tista’ tkun iddikjarata bħala għajnuna eżistenti skont l-Artikolu 1(b)(v) fil-Parti II tal-Protokoll 3.

Kompatibilità

L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi argumentaw li jekk il-miżuri inkwistjoni kellhom jitqiesu bħala għajnuna ġdida mill-Istat, huma jkunu kompatibbli skont l-Artikolu 61(3)(c) tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE, bħala għajnuna għas-settur tat-turiżmu. Madankollu, l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi ma pprovdewx biżżejjed informazzjoni biex juru l-opinjoni tagħhom.

F’kull każ, l-Awtorità attwalment għandha dubji dwar jekk il-miżuri tal-għajnuna jikkorrispondux ma’ falliment tas-suq reali u jekk humiex proporzjonati.

Fir-rigward tal-kundizzjoni indiretta allegata msemmija hawn fuq, l-Awtorità hija tal-fehma preliminari li jekk teżisti u hija imposta minn IN, tista’ tkun kuntrarja għall-Artikoli 53 jew 54 tal-Ftehim ŻEE u għaldaqstant, il-miżuri ma setgħux jiġu ddikjarati li jikkostitwixxu għajnuna kompatibbli fl-applikazzjoni tal-ġurisprudenza ta’ “Matra” (3).

Konklużjoni

Fid-dawl tal-kunsiderazzjonijiet ta’ hawn fuq, l-Awtorità għandha dubji dwar jekk jistax jiġi eskluż li l-miżuri msemmija hawn fuq huma għajnuna mill-Istat skont l-Artikolu 61(1) tal-Ftehim ŻEE. L-Awtorità hija tal-fehma li, f’dan l-istadju tal-proċedura, jekk il-miżuri kellhom jiġu ddefiniti bħala għajnuna mill-Istat, ikunu għajnuna ġdida. Fl-aħħar nett, l-Awtorità għandha wkoll dubji dwar jekk il-miżuri jikkonformawx mal-Artikolu 61(3) tal-Ftehim ŻEE.

Fid-dawl ta’ dan ta’ hawn fuq, l-Awtorità ddeċidiet li tiftaħ proċedura ta’ investigazzjoni formali skont l-Artikolu 1(2) tal-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 fir-rigward tal-għajnuna allegata mogħtija lil IN li tikkonċerna l-attivitajiet tagħha fl-infrastruttura tal-Internet u s-servizzi relatati tas-suq, kif ukoll għajnuna possibbli favur il-BTR u l-OĠD.

Il-partijiet interessati huma mistiedna jressqu l-kummenti tagħhom fi żmien xahar mill-pubblikazzjoni ta’ dan l-avviż f’Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

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(1)  LOV-2003-12-19-130. Disponibbli fuq: http://www.innovasjonnorge.no/no/om-oss/lov-om-innovasjon-norge/

(2)  Id-dokument huwa disponibbli fuq:

http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/NHD/Vedlegg/Brev/2013_oppdragsbrev_innovasjonnorge.pdf#search=OPPDRAGSBREV®j_oss=1

(3)  Il-Kawża C-225/91 Matra v il-Kummissjoni [1993] il-Ġabra I-3203, il-para. 41. Skont din il-ġurisprudenza, l-għajnuna mill-Istat li tinkorpora kondizzjonijiet li jiksru dispożizzjonijiet oħra tal-Ftehim ŻEE ma tistax tiġi approvata bħala għajnuna kompatibbli.

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EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 300/14/COL

of 16 July 2014

to initiate the formal investigation into the alleged aid granted to Innovation Norway for its activities within the market of web infrastructure and related services, as well as possible aid in favour of the Regional Tourist Boards and the Destination Management Organisations

(Norway)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 61 thereof,

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(3) of Part I and Articles 4(4) and 6 of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | By letter dated 5 July 2013 (Event No 678002 and Annexes at Events No 678003-678007, 678010-678013 and 678017), TellUs IT AS (now merged with New Mind (1), and henceforth referred to as ‘New Mind | tellUs’ or ‘the Complainant’), made a complaint to the Authority in which it alleged that Innovasjon Norge AS (‘Innovation Norway’ or ‘IN’) receives state aid for its commercial activities in the web infrastructure and related services market, within the tourism sector. The complaint was received and registered by the Authority on 8 July 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

By letter dated 5 July 2013 (Event No 678002 and Annexes at Events No 678003-678007, 678010-678013 and 678017), TellUs IT AS (now merged with New Mind (1), and henceforth referred to as ‘New Mind | tellUs’ or ‘the Complainant’), made a complaint to the Authority in which it alleged that Innovasjon Norge AS (‘Innovation Norway’ or ‘IN’) receives state aid for its commercial activities in the web infrastructure and related services market, within the tourism sector. The complaint was received and registered by the Authority on 8 July 2013.

| (2) | By a letter dated 27 August 2013 (Event No 679974), the Authority requested the Norwegian authorities to provide their comments on the alleged state aid. On 24 and 25 September 2013, the Authority attended two meetings in Oslo. On 24 September 2013, the Authority received a presentation from New Mind | tellUs (Event No 684995). On 25 September 2013, the Authority discussed the complaint with the Norwegian authorities. At this meeting, IN (on behalf of the Norwegian authorities) provided the Authority with a presentation on the case (Event No 684996). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By a letter dated 27 August 2013 (Event No 679974), the Authority requested the Norwegian authorities to provide their comments on the alleged state aid. On 24 and 25 September 2013, the Authority attended two meetings in Oslo. On 24 September 2013, the Authority received a presentation from New Mind | tellUs (Event No 684995). On 25 September 2013, the Authority discussed the complaint with the Norwegian authorities. At this meeting, IN (on behalf of the Norwegian authorities) provided the Authority with a presentation on the case (Event No 684996).

| (3) | By a letter dated 4 October 2013 (Event No 685187), the Authority sent an information request to the Norwegian authorities. The Norwegian authorities replied to this request by forwarding two letters from IN, dated 28 October 2013 (Events No 688213 and 688215, together with Annexes at Events No 688214 and 688216-25). |
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(3)

By a letter dated 4 October 2013 (Event No 685187), the Authority sent an information request to the Norwegian authorities. The Norwegian authorities replied to this request by forwarding two letters from IN, dated 28 October 2013 (Events No 688213 and 688215, together with Annexes at Events No 688214 and 688216-25).

| (4) | By an e-mail dated 15 November 2013 (Event No 690346), the Complainant commented on the Norwegian authorities' replies. IN submitted its observations on the Complainant's comments by way of a letter dated 20 December 2012, which was forwarded by the Norwegian authorities (Event No 694258). |
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(4)

By an e-mail dated 15 November 2013 (Event No 690346), the Complainant commented on the Norwegian authorities' replies. IN submitted its observations on the Complainant's comments by way of a letter dated 20 December 2012, which was forwarded by the Norwegian authorities (Event No 694258).

| (5) | By an e-mail dated 10 January 2014 (Event No 695364), the Norwegian authorities provided the Authority with additional information. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

By an e-mail dated 10 January 2014 (Event No 695364), the Norwegian authorities provided the Authority with additional information.

| (6) | By emails dated 17 January 2013 and 3 March 2013 (Events No 696111 and 702175), New Mind | tellUs provided the Authority with additional information. |
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(6)

By emails dated 17 January 2013 and 3 March 2013 (Events No 696111 and 702175), New Mind | tellUs provided the Authority with additional information.

2.   Background

2.1.   The Complainant

| (7) | The Complainant is an IT company which delivers online distribution solutions for the tourism industry. The company is active in several EEA countries and has a large portfolio of clients including several destination organisations (2) and travel agencies. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The Complainant is an IT company which delivers online distribution solutions for the tourism industry. The company is active in several EEA countries and has a large portfolio of clients including several destination organisations (2) and travel agencies.

2.2.   Innovation Norway (IN)

| (8) | IN is a limited liability state-owned company, which was established in 2003 by the Norwegian Government through the Act on Innovation Norway (‘Lov om Innovasjon Norge’ (3), hereafter ‘Act on IN’). The Norwegian Ministry of Industry and Trade owns 51 % of IN's shares, and the Norwegian counties own the remaining 49 % (4). IN enjoys a general exemption from Norwegian corporate income tax, pursuant to Section 2-30(1)(e)(5) of the Norwegian Tax Act of 1999 (5). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

IN is a limited liability state-owned company, which was established in 2003 by the Norwegian Government through the Act on Innovation Norway (‘Lov om Innovasjon Norge’ (3), hereafter ‘Act on IN’). The Norwegian Ministry of Industry and Trade owns 51 % of IN's shares, and the Norwegian counties own the remaining 49 % (4). IN enjoys a general exemption from Norwegian corporate income tax, pursuant to Section 2-30(1)(e)(5) of the Norwegian Tax Act of 1999 (5).

| (9) | The company was established with the purpose of contributing to business innovation, the development of rural areas and increasing the competitiveness of Norwegian companies. Section 1 of the Act on IN explicitly entrusts IN with the task ‘to promote corporate and social-economic development throughout the country, and trigger different regions industrial opportunities to contribute to innovation, internationalisation and promotion’ (6). IN manages and implements several Norwegian state aid schemes. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The company was established with the purpose of contributing to business innovation, the development of rural areas and increasing the competitiveness of Norwegian companies. Section 1 of the Act on IN explicitly entrusts IN with the task ‘to promote corporate and social-economic development throughout the country, and trigger different regions industrial opportunities to contribute to innovation, internationalisation and promotion’ (6). IN manages and implements several Norwegian state aid schemes.

| (10) | The tasks currently carried out by IN were previously accomplished by its four predecessor organisations: the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (‘SND’), the Government Consultative Office for Inventors (‘SVO’), the Norwegian Tourist Council (‘NTC’) and the Norwegian Export Council (‘NEC’) (7). In 2004, those four entities were discontinued and merged into IN. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The tasks currently carried out by IN were previously accomplished by its four predecessor organisations: the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (‘SND’), the Government Consultative Office for Inventors (‘SVO’), the Norwegian Tourist Council (‘NTC’) and the Norwegian Export Council (‘NEC’) (7). In 2004, those four entities were discontinued and merged into IN.

2.3.   The Norwegian tourism structure and the new tourism strategy

| (11) | Several different entities are involved in the promotion of Norway as a tourism destination at national, regional and local level (8). |
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(11)

Several different entities are involved in the promotion of Norway as a tourism destination at national, regional and local level (8).

| (12) | IN is intended to promote increased profitability within various segments of the tourism industry at a national level, continuing the tasks of its predecessors (9). The Norwegian Government has been an active stakeholder within the tourism sector since 1903 (10). |
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(12)

IN is intended to promote increased profitability within various segments of the tourism industry at a national level, continuing the tasks of its predecessors (9). The Norwegian Government has been an active stakeholder within the tourism sector since 1903 (10).

| (13) | At the regional and local levels, the tourism promotion is ensured by the Regional Tourist Boards (in Norwegian ‘Regionalt selskap’, here referred to as ‘RTBs’) and the Destination Management Organisations (in Norwegian ‘Destinasjonsselskap’, here referred to as ‘DMOs’) (11). |
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(13)

At the regional and local levels, the tourism promotion is ensured by the Regional Tourist Boards (in Norwegian ‘Regionalt selskap’, here referred to as ‘RTBs’) and the Destination Management Organisations (in Norwegian ‘Destinasjonsselskap’, here referred to as ‘DMOs’) (11).

| (14) | The RTBs are companies that serve the tourist industry in a regionally-defined geographical area (12). Those entities normally have public and private shareholders. According to information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the RTBs' tasks are international marketing; tourist information; regional marketing activities and knowledge; regional coordination of activities, and regional public relations activities. |
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(14)

The RTBs are companies that serve the tourist industry in a regionally-defined geographical area (12). Those entities normally have public and private shareholders. According to information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the RTBs' tasks are international marketing; tourist information; regional marketing activities and knowledge; regional coordination of activities, and regional public relations activities.

| (15) | The DMOs are companies that serve a defined number of destinations, products, attractions and tourist industry within a geographic region served by an RTB (13). DMOs are normally local and their structure varies. Their shareholders are normally public bodies and private companies. Their tasks under the national tourism strategy are product development; booking and sales; tourist information; destination development; competence development; destination market knowledge, and destination public relations activities. |
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(15)

The DMOs are companies that serve a defined number of destinations, products, attractions and tourist industry within a geographic region served by an RTB (13). DMOs are normally local and their structure varies. Their shareholders are normally public bodies and private companies. Their tasks under the national tourism strategy are product development; booking and sales; tourist information; destination development; competence development; destination market knowledge, and destination public relations activities.

| (16) | However, at the beginning of the 2010s, the Norwegian Government decided to adopt a new tourism strategy aimed at improving its national tourism structure. The objectives of the new strategy are to render the public support to the sector more efficient, reduce the number of actors and ensure more coordination among them (14). Moreover, the Norwegian authorities have stated that they aim to avoid a diversification of websites dealing with tourism in Norway, with different layouts, booking engines, languages and so on, which are funded by various Government bodies, counties or municipalities. |
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(16)

However, at the beginning of the 2010s, the Norwegian Government decided to adopt a new tourism strategy aimed at improving its national tourism structure. The objectives of the new strategy are to render the public support to the sector more efficient, reduce the number of actors and ensure more coordination among them (14). Moreover, the Norwegian authorities have stated that they aim to avoid a diversification of websites dealing with tourism in Norway, with different layouts, booking engines, languages and so on, which are funded by various Government bodies, counties or municipalities.

| (17) | With these objectives in mind, the Norwegian authorities proposed a new tourism structure aiming, inter alia, to reduce the number of RTBs and DMOs and to consolidate Norway's tourism promotion efforts around IN and its webpage visitnorway.com. |
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(17)

With these objectives in mind, the Norwegian authorities proposed a new tourism structure aiming, inter alia, to reduce the number of RTBs and DMOs and to consolidate Norway's tourism promotion efforts around IN and its webpage visitnorway.com.

| (18) | The Authority understands that the Norwegian authorities intend to change the existing structure of the tourism industry, by proposing a new one based, inter alia, on the promotion and development of the platform visitnorway.com, which is currently managed by IN. This implies changes in the way IN acts in the market and changes in the structure of visitnorway.com
   (15). |
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(18)

The Authority understands that the Norwegian authorities intend to change the existing structure of the tourism industry, by proposing a new one based, inter alia, on the promotion and development of the platform visitnorway.com, which is currently managed by IN. This implies changes in the way IN acts in the market and changes in the structure of visitnorway.com
   (15).

| (19) | As part of the Norwegian authorities' new tourism strategy, on 1 February 2013, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries issued its 2013 State Budget for IN (hereafter ‘the 2013 Budget letter’) (16). The 2013 Budget letter entrusted IN with the mandate of ‘ensuring a good distribution of Norwegian travel experiences through visitnorway.com, and help to make the players in the tourist industry competent to enter their products into the national booking solution –linked to visitnorway.com
  ’ (17). |
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(19)

As part of the Norwegian authorities' new tourism strategy, on 1 February 2013, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries issued its 2013 State Budget for IN (hereafter ‘the 2013 Budget letter’) (16). The 2013 Budget letter entrusted IN with the mandate of ‘ensuring a good distribution of Norwegian travel experiences through visitnorway.com, and help to make the players in the tourist industry competent to enter their products into the national booking solution –linked to visitnorway.com
  ’ (17).

| (20) | The 2013 Budget letter also stated that: ‘Innovation Norway shall not offer user-paid services that are in direct or indirect competition with private actors. To the extent that Innovation Norway offers services that could have been carried out by a private provider, the price that Innovation Norway asks must reflect the real accrued cost, including what is covered by the basic costs’
   (18). |
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(20)

The 2013 Budget letter also stated that: ‘Innovation Norway shall not offer user-paid services that are in direct or indirect competition with private actors. To the extent that Innovation Norway offers services that could have been carried out by a private provider, the price that Innovation Norway asks must reflect the real accrued cost, including what is covered by the basic costs’
   (18).

2.4.   The market for web infrastructure and related services

| (21) | The present case relates to IN's activities in the market for web infrastructure and related services. |
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(21)

The present case relates to IN's activities in the market for web infrastructure and related services.

| (22) | Web infrastructure and related services in the tourism sector are provided through ‘Destination Management Systems’ (‘DMS’), which are defined as ‘[s]ystems that consolidate and distribute a comprehensive range of tourism products through a variety of channels and platforms, generally catering for a specific region, and supporting the activities of a destination management organisation within that region. DMS attempt to utilise a customer centric approach in order to manage and market the destination as a holistic entity, typically providing strong destination related information, real-time reservations, destination management tools and paying particular attention to supporting small and independent tourism suppliers’
   (19). |
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(22)

Web infrastructure and related services in the tourism sector are provided through ‘Destination Management Systems’ (‘DMS’), which are defined as ‘[s]ystems that consolidate and distribute a comprehensive range of tourism products through a variety of channels and platforms, generally catering for a specific region, and supporting the activities of a destination management organisation within that region. DMS attempt to utilise a customer centric approach in order to manage and market the destination as a holistic entity, typically providing strong destination related information, real-time reservations, destination management tools and paying particular attention to supporting small and independent tourism suppliers’
   (19).

| (23) | Through its DMS, an IT company such as the Complainant will offer a database service where its clients (destination companies) can submit and regularly update information about tourist sites, hotels, restaurants, events and similar simultaneously on their own webpage and on other external channels such as visitnorway.com, Google Maps, tourist information kiosks, mobile portals, and in printed newspapers. |
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(23)

Through its DMS, an IT company such as the Complainant will offer a database service where its clients (destination companies) can submit and regularly update information about tourist sites, hotels, restaurants, events and similar simultaneously on their own webpage and on other external channels such as visitnorway.com, Google Maps, tourist information kiosks, mobile portals, and in printed newspapers.

| (24) | These services allow clients to insert input data into the database and this information is then automatically disseminated on a number of different websites (including visitnorway.com). The information is then used by visitors for booking or informational purposes. These services are defined as web infrastructure and related services. They include different functionalities: (i) the ‘destinator’ functionality (the creation of points of interest or information flash to be published on the website); (ii) the ‘distribution’ functionality (the information stored in a database is distributed to many different channels and platforms) or (iii) the ‘search’ functionality (used on every website to search and present tourism products). |
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(24)

These services allow clients to insert input data into the database and this information is then automatically disseminated on a number of different websites (including visitnorway.com). The information is then used by visitors for booking or informational purposes. These services are defined as web infrastructure and related services. They include different functionalities: (i) the ‘destinator’ functionality (the creation of points of interest or information flash to be published on the website); (ii) the ‘distribution’ functionality (the information stored in a database is distributed to many different channels and platforms) or (iii) the ‘search’ functionality (used on every website to search and present tourism products).

| (25) | According to the Norwegian authorities (20), the Complainant was alone on the Norwegian market offering those services for the last 17 years. However, in 2012-2013, a new international competitor, Citybreak, entered the Norwegian market offering the ‘destinator’ functionality, i.e. allowing tourism providers to create their points of interest. A graphic illustration of the functioning of these services is included in paragraph (31) below. |
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(25)

According to the Norwegian authorities (20), the Complainant was alone on the Norwegian market offering those services for the last 17 years. However, in 2012-2013, a new international competitor, Citybreak, entered the Norwegian market offering the ‘destinator’ functionality, i.e. allowing tourism providers to create their points of interest. A graphic illustration of the functioning of these services is included in paragraph (31) below.

2.5.   IN's entrance into the market for web infrastructure services and related services

| (26) | The promotion of Norway as a tourism destination is one of IN's tasks. IN has developed and managed the platform visitnorway.com in order to fulfil its promotion task. Before 2013, IN only offered online marketing and promotion services on its visitnorway.com website. These services included web-advertising to the RTBs and the DMOs for an annual subscription fee, which represented a certain percentage of their turnover. |
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(26)

The promotion of Norway as a tourism destination is one of IN's tasks. IN has developed and managed the platform visitnorway.com in order to fulfil its promotion task. Before 2013, IN only offered online marketing and promotion services on its visitnorway.com website. These services included web-advertising to the RTBs and the DMOs for an annual subscription fee, which represented a certain percentage of their turnover.

| (27) | However, IN has developed its own system and functionalities (21) and it is offering them to the RTBs and the DMOs which have migrated their websites to visitnorway.com. These RTBs and DMOs were previously clients of the Complainant. The Authority understands, at this stage of the procedure, that the strategy of offering these services to the RTBs and DMOs is closely linked to the decision of the Norwegian authorities to promote visitnorway.com by making it the main internet platform for tourism promotion in the country (see paragraphs (16) to (18), above). |
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(27)

However, IN has developed its own system and functionalities (21) and it is offering them to the RTBs and the DMOs which have migrated their websites to visitnorway.com. These RTBs and DMOs were previously clients of the Complainant. The Authority understands, at this stage of the procedure, that the strategy of offering these services to the RTBs and DMOs is closely linked to the decision of the Norwegian authorities to promote visitnorway.com by making it the main internet platform for tourism promotion in the country (see paragraphs (16) to (18), above).

| (28) | In order to enter this new market, IN launched ‘Pilot ALFA’ between 2012-2013 – running two pilot projects called VisitSørlandet and VisitTrondheim. |
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(28)

In order to enter this new market, IN launched ‘Pilot ALFA’ between 2012-2013 – running two pilot projects called VisitSørlandet and VisitTrondheim.

| (29) | Once Visit Sørlandet AS (an RTB), and Visit Trondheim AS (a DMO) were selected to participate in Pilot ALFA, they signed a partnership agreement with IN, in order to use visitnorway.com templates, functionalities and content. As a consequence of the agreement, both companies redirected their URL (22) to visitnorway.com and discontinued their own homepages. The information available on those pages was migrated to visitnorway.com. |
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(29)

Once Visit Sørlandet AS (an RTB), and Visit Trondheim AS (a DMO) were selected to participate in Pilot ALFA, they signed a partnership agreement with IN, in order to use visitnorway.com templates, functionalities and content. As a consequence of the agreement, both companies redirected their URL (22) to visitnorway.com and discontinued their own homepages. The information available on those pages was migrated to visitnorway.com.

| (30) | When these two companies had their own website, they were clients of the Complainant. Accordingly, they used ‘tellUs destinator’ and ‘tellUs search’ functionalities, and paid a licence fee to the Complainant for this use. However, upon redirecting their URL to visitnorway.com and terminating their own website, these companies put to an end the contract for the search functionality, since within visitnorway.com only IN's search functionality can be used. They still have to contract with the Complainant or CityBreak for the ‘destinator’ functionality. |
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(30)

When these two companies had their own website, they were clients of the Complainant. Accordingly, they used ‘tellUs destinator’ and ‘tellUs search’ functionalities, and paid a licence fee to the Complainant for this use. However, upon redirecting their URL to visitnorway.com and terminating their own website, these companies put to an end the contract for the search functionality, since within visitnorway.com only IN's search functionality can be used. They still have to contract with the Complainant or CityBreak for the ‘destinator’ functionality.

| (31) | The uses of the different functionalities, before and after Pilot ALFA, are represented in the following graphic: |
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(31)

The uses of the different functionalities, before and after Pilot ALFA, are represented in the following graphic:

Image

| (32) | The services that IN was previously offering to these two types of companies (online marketing and promotion services on the visitnorway.com website), were offered for a fee calculated on the basis of their annual turnover. This pricing system was also applied during Pilot ALFA, with no additional charge made for the additional services provided by IN (i.e. web infrastructure and related services). |
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(32)

The services that IN was previously offering to these two types of companies (online marketing and promotion services on the visitnorway.com website), were offered for a fee calculated on the basis of their annual turnover. This pricing system was also applied during Pilot ALFA, with no additional charge made for the additional services provided by IN (i.e. web infrastructure and related services).

| (33) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that the reason behind not charging extra for these additional services relates to the fact that the new services were under development, and the two companies involved in the pilot project invested time and effort in giving feedback to finalise the development of IN's functionalities; thereby ‘reimbursing’ the (unfinished) new services with their inputs. |
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(33)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that the reason behind not charging extra for these additional services relates to the fact that the new services were under development, and the two companies involved in the pilot project invested time and effort in giving feedback to finalise the development of IN's functionalities; thereby ‘reimbursing’ the (unfinished) new services with their inputs.

| (34) | From July 2013 to November 2013, IN undertook a project called ‘Pilot Beta’. During this pilot project, IN studied new alternatives, new business models, and the possibility of promoting new partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs. The Authority understands that during the Pilot Beta phase no new partnership agreements were signed. |
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(34)

From July 2013 to November 2013, IN undertook a project called ‘Pilot Beta’. During this pilot project, IN studied new alternatives, new business models, and the possibility of promoting new partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs. The Authority understands that during the Pilot Beta phase no new partnership agreements were signed.

| (35) | As from 1 January 2014, IN has offered partnership agreements (see paragraph (5)) to all interested DMOs and RTBs on a non-discriminatory basis. IN offers its services exclusively to the RTBs and the DMOs as part of the Norwegian tourism structure, but not to other interested private companies (e.g. individual hotels, shops, or museums). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

As from 1 January 2014, IN has offered partnership agreements (see paragraph (5)) to all interested DMOs and RTBs on a non-discriminatory basis. IN offers its services exclusively to the RTBs and the DMOs as part of the Norwegian tourism structure, but not to other interested private companies (e.g. individual hotels, shops, or museums).

| (36) | The Authority understands that as from 1 January 2014, IN introduced a new pricing model for the new services it is providing, where the price charged is intended to reflect the costs of the services provided by IN, plus a reasonable profit margin of between 5 to 10 % per year. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The Authority understands that as from 1 January 2014, IN introduced a new pricing model for the new services it is providing, where the price charged is intended to reflect the costs of the services provided by IN, plus a reasonable profit margin of between 5 to 10 % per year.

3.   The complaint

| (37) | The complaint submitted by New Mind | tellUs separates IN's business promotion activities (including tourism promotion) from its activity related to the provision of web infrastructure and related services. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The complaint submitted by New Mind | tellUs separates IN's business promotion activities (including tourism promotion) from its activity related to the provision of web infrastructure and related services.

| (38) | The Complainant considers that IN's promotion activities and its tasks in relation to visitnorway.com, as a national tourism portal, can be considered to be a service of general economic interest (‘SGEI’) in line with the EEA state aid rules. However, since 2013, IN is entering a new market (23), offering economic services. Those new services are not part of the mandate received by IN and are not provided in line with the Altmark
   (24) case-law. As a consequence, IN's behaviour in the market should be in line with the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The Complainant considers that IN's promotion activities and its tasks in relation to visitnorway.com, as a national tourism portal, can be considered to be a service of general economic interest (‘SGEI’) in line with the EEA state aid rules. However, since 2013, IN is entering a new market (23), offering economic services. Those new services are not part of the mandate received by IN and are not provided in line with the Altmark
   (24) case-law. As a consequence, IN's behaviour in the market should be in line with the state aid rules.

| (39) | The Complainant refers to three different forms of alleged state aid:






  a. | the non-implementation of a separation of accounts for commercial activities within IN; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(39)

The Complainant refers to three different forms of alleged state aid:

a.

the non-implementation of a separation of accounts for commercial activities within IN;

| b. | the profits foregone through the non-profit orientation of economic activity referred to above, and |
| --- | --- |

b.

the profits foregone through the non-profit orientation of economic activity referred to above, and

| c. | the general exemption from the income tax granted to IN, also applicable to IN's economic activities. |
| --- | --- |

c.

the general exemption from the income tax granted to IN, also applicable to IN's economic activities.

| (40) | According to the Complainant, IN is not required to generate any profit and the company does not maintain separate accounts for its economic and non-economic activities. This implies spill-over effects, allowing IN to finance its economic activities with the funds that should be devoted to non-economic activities. Therefore, the measures entail state aid pursuant to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

According to the Complainant, IN is not required to generate any profit and the company does not maintain separate accounts for its economic and non-economic activities. This implies spill-over effects, allowing IN to finance its economic activities with the funds that should be devoted to non-economic activities. Therefore, the measures entail state aid pursuant to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (41) | New Mind | tellUs also alleges that IN requests its clients to terminate their previous contracts with New Mind | tellUs. The Complainant takes the view that this is a tie-in condition in breach of antitrust law (25). |
| --- | --- |

(41)

New Mind | tellUs also alleges that IN requests its clients to terminate their previous contracts with New Mind | tellUs. The Complainant takes the view that this is a tie-in condition in breach of antitrust law (25).

| (42) | In New Mind | tellUs' view, the aid measures have to be considered as new state aid since the entrance into a new market (i.e. offering web infrastructure and related services to the RTBs and the DMOs) falls outside the mandate received by IN and its predecessors. The Complainant considers that IN's mandate was limited to a general promotion of the country. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

In New Mind | tellUs' view, the aid measures have to be considered as new state aid since the entrance into a new market (i.e. offering web infrastructure and related services to the RTBs and the DMOs) falls outside the mandate received by IN and its predecessors. The Complainant considers that IN's mandate was limited to a general promotion of the country.

| (43) | New Mind | tellUs also states that the general tax exemption granted to IN should be considered to be state aid when it relates to income obtained by the performance of economic activities. This exemption would also be considered to be new state aid because it is related to the recent entrance of IN into economic activities. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

New Mind | tellUs also states that the general tax exemption granted to IN should be considered to be state aid when it relates to income obtained by the performance of economic activities. This exemption would also be considered to be new state aid because it is related to the recent entrance of IN into economic activities.

| (44) | Finally, the Complainant considers that as IN is not charging market prices for the services that it is providing to the RTBs and the DMOs, those companies are also beneficiaries of unlawful state aid (26). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

Finally, the Complainant considers that as IN is not charging market prices for the services that it is providing to the RTBs and the DMOs, those companies are also beneficiaries of unlawful state aid (26).

4.   Comments by the Norwegian authorities

| (45) | The Norwegian authorities disagree with New Mind | tellUs' legal assessment (27). |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The Norwegian authorities disagree with New Mind | tellUs' legal assessment (27).

| (46) | Firstly, the Norwegian authorities state that IN's purpose is to help to create profitable business in all parts of Norway, inter alia, by promoting the country as a holiday destination. IN's core activity is to promote business in Norway and not to operate any business itself. In functional terms, IN is merely a tool for the Norwegian authorities to grant aid, but it does not offer goods or services in the market. As a consequence, IN cannot be regarded as an undertaking being a recipient of state aid. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Firstly, the Norwegian authorities state that IN's purpose is to help to create profitable business in all parts of Norway, inter alia, by promoting the country as a holiday destination. IN's core activity is to promote business in Norway and not to operate any business itself. In functional terms, IN is merely a tool for the Norwegian authorities to grant aid, but it does not offer goods or services in the market. As a consequence, IN cannot be regarded as an undertaking being a recipient of state aid.

| (47) | In its view, since the core activities of IN are of a non-economic nature, the potential classification of secondary activities undertaken by IN as economic activities would not alter the fact that IN cannot be considered to constitute an undertaking (28). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

In its view, since the core activities of IN are of a non-economic nature, the potential classification of secondary activities undertaken by IN as economic activities would not alter the fact that IN cannot be considered to constitute an undertaking (28).

| (48) | The Norwegian authorities accept that IN carries out some activities of a particular nature. In particular, IN is involved in market loans, seed capital and investment funds. However, in these areas, certain ‘mechanisms’ have already been established to avoid any possible distortion of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The Norwegian authorities accept that IN carries out some activities of a particular nature. In particular, IN is involved in market loans, seed capital and investment funds. However, in these areas, certain ‘mechanisms’ have already been established to avoid any possible distortion of competition.

| (49) | Regarding the web infrastructure and related services, the Norwegian authorities emphasise that IN does not provide services to the general tourism market as such, but only to the RTBs and the DMOs (see also paragraph (35)). |
| --- | --- |

(49)

Regarding the web infrastructure and related services, the Norwegian authorities emphasise that IN does not provide services to the general tourism market as such, but only to the RTBs and the DMOs (see also paragraph (35)).

| (50) | The Norwegian authorities point out that the 2013 Budget letter states that: ‘Innovation Norway is to ensure a good distribution of Norwegian travel experiences through visitnorway.com, and help to make the players in the tourist industry competent to enter their products into the national booking solution – linked to visitnorway.com.’ Therefore, the web infrastructure and related services are part of this mandate to promote Norway as a tourism destination and support the tourism industry. In the opinion of the Norwegian authorities, visitnorway.com is a modern marketing and information tool and in order to make it operative, an IT platform infrastructure service is required. In other words, IN offers to the RTBs and the DMOs full web editorial services, through visitnorway.com, and not a stand-alone service, as offered by the Complainant. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Norwegian authorities point out that the 2013 Budget letter states that: ‘Innovation Norway is to ensure a good distribution of Norwegian travel experiences through visitnorway.com, and help to make the players in the tourist industry competent to enter their products into the national booking solution – linked to visitnorway.com.’ Therefore, the web infrastructure and related services are part of this mandate to promote Norway as a tourism destination and support the tourism industry. In the opinion of the Norwegian authorities, visitnorway.com is a modern marketing and information tool and in order to make it operative, an IT platform infrastructure service is required. In other words, IN offers to the RTBs and the DMOs full web editorial services, through visitnorway.com, and not a stand-alone service, as offered by the Complainant.

| (51) | The Norwegian authorities have also argued that those services are being offered to the RTBs and the DMOs as part of Norway's destination management tourism structure. All the entities involved in the tourism structure work closely together; they are all dependent on public funding, and they are closely integrated in the public sector. As a consequence, the Norwegian authorities take the view that IN is not acting on the market as such when providing internal services and coordinating the different levels of organisation within the national tourism structure. It is, rather, fulfilling its task as part of the body responsible for organising regional and local bodies within the management of Norwegian tourism. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

The Norwegian authorities have also argued that those services are being offered to the RTBs and the DMOs as part of Norway's destination management tourism structure. All the entities involved in the tourism structure work closely together; they are all dependent on public funding, and they are closely integrated in the public sector. As a consequence, the Norwegian authorities take the view that IN is not acting on the market as such when providing internal services and coordinating the different levels of organisation within the national tourism structure. It is, rather, fulfilling its task as part of the body responsible for organising regional and local bodies within the management of Norwegian tourism.

| (52) | The Norwegian authorities have, moreover, stated that IN does not impose a condition on the RTBs and DMOs to terminate its previous contract with the Complainant as alleged by the latter (see paragraph (41), above). |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The Norwegian authorities have, moreover, stated that IN does not impose a condition on the RTBs and DMOs to terminate its previous contract with the Complainant as alleged by the latter (see paragraph (41), above).

| (53) | Moreover, if the web infrastructure and related services could be considered to be economic activities, the Norwegian authorities consider that the alleged measures would be granted on the basis of an existing aid scheme (29), because the IN's financial system existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway. In the alternative, the Norwegian authorities have suggested that at the time the measure was put into effect, it did not constitute aid, and subsequently became aid as a consequence of the evolution of the European Economic Area without having been altered by the EFTA State (30). |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Moreover, if the web infrastructure and related services could be considered to be economic activities, the Norwegian authorities consider that the alleged measures would be granted on the basis of an existing aid scheme (29), because the IN's financial system existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway. In the alternative, the Norwegian authorities have suggested that at the time the measure was put into effect, it did not constitute aid, and subsequently became aid as a consequence of the evolution of the European Economic Area without having been altered by the EFTA State (30).

| (54) | Concerning the alleged aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs, the Norwegian authorities recall that as of 2014, IN intends to promote partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs. They nevertheless underline that, in the framework of these partnership agreements, the services provided by IN (i.e. the web infrastructure and related services) will be provided for an annual fee. The Norwegian authorities state that their intention is to adopt a fully transparent pricing policy and apply a price close to the market price. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Concerning the alleged aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs, the Norwegian authorities recall that as of 2014, IN intends to promote partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs. They nevertheless underline that, in the framework of these partnership agreements, the services provided by IN (i.e. the web infrastructure and related services) will be provided for an annual fee. The Norwegian authorities state that their intention is to adopt a fully transparent pricing policy and apply a price close to the market price.

| (55) | Finally, the Norwegian authorities have stated that, in the event that the Authority finds any of the measures to constitute state aid, those should be considered compatible aid pursuant to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Finally, the Norwegian authorities have stated that, in the event that the Authority finds any of the measures to constitute state aid, those should be considered compatible aid pursuant to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

5.   Material scope of the investigation

| (56) | Based on the facts described above, the Authority considers it necessary to clarify the material scope of the investigation, as defined in the present opening Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Based on the facts described above, the Authority considers it necessary to clarify the material scope of the investigation, as defined in the present opening Decision.

| (57) | First, the present Decision refers to the activities of IN within the market of web infrastructure and related services. The Decision neither concerns the activities of IN regarding the general promotion of Norway as a tourist destination, nor the development of visitnorway.com. Nor does it refer to the role of IN as a vehicle of the Norwegian State to support business in Norway. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

First, the present Decision refers to the activities of IN within the market of web infrastructure and related services. The Decision neither concerns the activities of IN regarding the general promotion of Norway as a tourist destination, nor the development of visitnorway.com. Nor does it refer to the role of IN as a vehicle of the Norwegian State to support business in Norway.

| (58) | The present Decision only refers to the alleged state aid in favour of IN and/or the RTBs and the DMOs in the market of web infrastructure and related services. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

The present Decision only refers to the alleged state aid in favour of IN and/or the RTBs and the DMOs in the market of web infrastructure and related services.

| (59) | Second, the potential aid measures are the following:






  (i) | the alleged cross-subsidisation of IN's web infrastructure and related services with funds meant for non-commercial activities; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(59)

Second, the potential aid measures are the following:

(i)

the alleged cross-subsidisation of IN's web infrastructure and related services with funds meant for non-commercial activities;

| (ii) | the alleged foregoing of profits through the non-profit orientation of IN's economic activities, including the web infrastructure and related services; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the alleged foregoing of profits through the non-profit orientation of IN's economic activities, including the web infrastructure and related services;

| (iii) | the alleged aid granted by IN to the RTBs and the DMOs in the form of prices not sufficient to obtain a reasonable return on the investments; |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the alleged aid granted by IN to the RTBs and the DMOs in the form of prices not sufficient to obtain a reasonable return on the investments;

| (iv) | the general exemption from income tax granted to IN. |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

the general exemption from income tax granted to IN.

| (60) | The first three measures are linked to IN's entrance in the market of web infrastructure and related services. The legal assessment of those measures as possible state aid depends on the nature of such services, including whether they can be considered to be economic services. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

The first three measures are linked to IN's entrance in the market of web infrastructure and related services. The legal assessment of those measures as possible state aid depends on the nature of such services, including whether they can be considered to be economic services.

| (61) | Furthermore, the qualification of IN's activities as constituting possible new aid depends on the terms of the mandate received by IN and on the new activities allowed by the 2013 Budget letter. Taking into account that the legal assessment of those three measures depends on the result of a common analysis, the Authority considers that they can be assessed together within the scope of the present Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

Furthermore, the qualification of IN's activities as constituting possible new aid depends on the terms of the mandate received by IN and on the new activities allowed by the 2013 Budget letter. Taking into account that the legal assessment of those three measures depends on the result of a common analysis, the Authority considers that they can be assessed together within the scope of the present Decision.

| (62) | On the contrary, the last measure (iv) relates to a general income tax exemption and is not tied to IN's activities within the market of web infrastructure and related services (31). A legal assessment of this measure does not necessarily involve an analysis of IN's activities with regard to the tourism sector, or its tasks as manager of visitnorway.com. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

On the contrary, the last measure (iv) relates to a general income tax exemption and is not tied to IN's activities within the market of web infrastructure and related services (31). A legal assessment of this measure does not necessarily involve an analysis of IN's activities with regard to the tourism sector, or its tasks as manager of visitnorway.com.

| (63) | Because of these differences, the Authority will not assess whether the income tax provisions related to IN constitute state aid in the present decision. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Because of these differences, the Authority will not assess whether the income tax provisions related to IN constitute state aid in the present decision.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (64) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows: ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement’. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows: ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement’.

| (65) | A measure constitutes state aid pursuant to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if it fulfils four conditions. First, the measure must be funded by the State or through state resources and imputable to the State. Second, the measure must confer an advantage. Third, the measure must favour selected undertakings or economic activities. Fourth, the measure must be liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and liable to distort competition in the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

A measure constitutes state aid pursuant to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if it fulfils four conditions. First, the measure must be funded by the State or through state resources and imputable to the State. Second, the measure must confer an advantage. Third, the measure must favour selected undertakings or economic activities. Fourth, the measure must be liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and liable to distort competition in the EEA.

| (66) | The alleged foregoing of profits and the cross-subsidisation measures in favour of IN (measures (ii) and (i)) are assessed separately from the possible aid to the RTBs and the DMOs (measure (iii)), see paragraph (59) above. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The alleged foregoing of profits and the cross-subsidisation measures in favour of IN (measures (ii) and (i)) are assessed separately from the possible aid to the RTBs and the DMOs (measure (iii)), see paragraph (59) above.

1.1.   Possible aid measures in favour of IN

| (67) | It follows from Article 61(1) EEA that state aid rules only apply to advantages granted to undertakings. Prior to examining whether the conditions for state aid are met in this case, it is necessary first to examine whether IN qualifies as an undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

It follows from Article 61(1) EEA that state aid rules only apply to advantages granted to undertakings. Prior to examining whether the conditions for state aid are met in this case, it is necessary first to examine whether IN qualifies as an undertaking.

1.1.1.   Whether IN can be considered to be an ‘undertaking’

| (68) | It is settled case-law that undertakings are entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (32). Economic activities are those consisting of offering goods or services on a market (33). Offering goods and services on a market without making a profit can also constitute an economic activity (34). All entities that are legally distinct from the State and which engage in economic activities are considered to be ‘undertakings’, irrespective of whether these are public or private undertakings (35). |
| --- | --- |

(68)

It is settled case-law that undertakings are entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (32). Economic activities are those consisting of offering goods or services on a market (33). Offering goods and services on a market without making a profit can also constitute an economic activity (34). All entities that are legally distinct from the State and which engage in economic activities are considered to be ‘undertakings’, irrespective of whether these are public or private undertakings (35).

| (69) | If an entity is providing economic activities, it is to be considered as an undertaking in relation to those specific services alone, without reference to the way in which its other activities should be classified (36). |
| --- | --- |

(69)

If an entity is providing economic activities, it is to be considered as an undertaking in relation to those specific services alone, without reference to the way in which its other activities should be classified (36).

| (70) | As a consequence, the first step of the Authority's legal assessment requires an analysis of whether IN can be defined as an undertaking for the purposes of state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

As a consequence, the first step of the Authority's legal assessment requires an analysis of whether IN can be defined as an undertaking for the purposes of state aid rules.

| (71) | The Norwegian authorities have argued that IN is not an undertaking, but a mere vehicle used by the State to grant aid (see paragraph (46), above). They contend that IN is acting as an instrument of the State, and that it does not offer goods or services on a market. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The Norwegian authorities have argued that IN is not an undertaking, but a mere vehicle used by the State to grant aid (see paragraph (46), above). They contend that IN is acting as an instrument of the State, and that it does not offer goods or services on a market.

| (72) | Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities have argued that, within the scope of its task to promote businesses in Norway, IN is also entrusted with the mandate of promoting Norway as a tourist destination, which is the final goal of the platform visitnorway.com. As a consequence, since tourism promotion is a non-economic activity, IN is not offering web infrastructure and related services on the market. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities have argued that, within the scope of its task to promote businesses in Norway, IN is also entrusted with the mandate of promoting Norway as a tourist destination, which is the final goal of the platform visitnorway.com. As a consequence, since tourism promotion is a non-economic activity, IN is not offering web infrastructure and related services on the market.

| (73) | The Complainant, on the contrary, defines IN's task of promoting businesses in Norway as an SGEI, but an SGEI which is limited mere promotion activities, including tourism activities (37) (see paragraph (38), above). |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The Complainant, on the contrary, defines IN's task of promoting businesses in Norway as an SGEI, but an SGEI which is limited mere promotion activities, including tourism activities (37) (see paragraph (38), above).

| (74) | The Authority's preliminary view, at this stage, is that IN's main purpose appears to be to provide support to Norwegian businesses on behalf of the State. The Authority agrees that when IN is acting as a mere instrument of the State, IN does not provide services or goods on the market and its activities fall outside the scope of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Authority's preliminary view, at this stage, is that IN's main purpose appears to be to provide support to Norwegian businesses on behalf of the State. The Authority agrees that when IN is acting as a mere instrument of the State, IN does not provide services or goods on the market and its activities fall outside the scope of the state aid rules.

| (75) | The 2013 Budget letter establishes that IN should promote Norway as a tourism destination. In order to do so, the letter clarifies that IN should not provide services in competition with private operator and if it does, IN must apply market prices. The Authority understands that by the 2013 Budget letter the Norwegian authorities have allowed IN to provide economic services in competition with private operators, on condition that for those services IN must require an adequate remuneration. Thus, it is the Authority's preliminary understanding that such activities fall outside the scope of the mandate for IN regarding the use of public funds for the promotion of businesses in Norway. They are services which are economic in nature: neither an SGEI nor a non-economic activity (38). |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The 2013 Budget letter establishes that IN should promote Norway as a tourism destination. In order to do so, the letter clarifies that IN should not provide services in competition with private operator and if it does, IN must apply market prices. The Authority understands that by the 2013 Budget letter the Norwegian authorities have allowed IN to provide economic services in competition with private operators, on condition that for those services IN must require an adequate remuneration. Thus, it is the Authority's preliminary understanding that such activities fall outside the scope of the mandate for IN regarding the use of public funds for the promotion of businesses in Norway. They are services which are economic in nature: neither an SGEI nor a non-economic activity (38).

| (76) | Furthermore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that since those services (outside IN's mandate) seem to qualify as economic services, IN might also be defined as an undertaking regarding the provision of those services. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Furthermore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that since those services (outside IN's mandate) seem to qualify as economic services, IN might also be defined as an undertaking regarding the provision of those services.

| (77) | The Authority notes that IN enjoys, pursuant to the text of the 2013 Budget letter, a certain discretion in determining its course of action when providing economic services and it therefore is not acting under a specific mandate. IN is not forced to provide economic services on the market: the 2013 Budget letter only allows it to do so. These discretionarily elements have been seen by the General Court as relevant in differentiating between economic and non-economic activities provided by a single entity (39). |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The Authority notes that IN enjoys, pursuant to the text of the 2013 Budget letter, a certain discretion in determining its course of action when providing economic services and it therefore is not acting under a specific mandate. IN is not forced to provide economic services on the market: the 2013 Budget letter only allows it to do so. These discretionarily elements have been seen by the General Court as relevant in differentiating between economic and non-economic activities provided by a single entity (39).

| (78) | The Authority also underlines that IN's promotional activities are financed by the State (see paragraph (83), below) and that IN as such is not required to generate a return on capital (40). However, the 2013 Budget letter underlines that for the provision of those services, IN must cover the actual costs it has incurred, so that those services are not financed by public funds. The different methods of financing IN's activities illustrates the different natures of those activities: non economic activities or SGEIs, versus economic services. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

The Authority also underlines that IN's promotional activities are financed by the State (see paragraph (83), below) and that IN as such is not required to generate a return on capital (40). However, the 2013 Budget letter underlines that for the provision of those services, IN must cover the actual costs it has incurred, so that those services are not financed by public funds. The different methods of financing IN's activities illustrates the different natures of those activities: non economic activities or SGEIs, versus economic services.

| (79) | The Authority notes that the conclusion as to whether IN carries out an economic activity when providing web infrastructure and related services cannot be based on IN's objectives or on its general non-profitmaking orientation, but must be exclusively founded on an analysis of the services themselves (41). The Authority further notes that whatever IN's objectives are while providing these services, IN requests a remuneration for those services. Accordingly, it seems to the Authority that the objective of promoting tourism coexists with an economic objective (42). The Authority recalls in this respect that the definition of an entity as an undertaking depends on the nature of the specific activity under scrutiny. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority notes that the conclusion as to whether IN carries out an economic activity when providing web infrastructure and related services cannot be based on IN's objectives or on its general non-profitmaking orientation, but must be exclusively founded on an analysis of the services themselves (41). The Authority further notes that whatever IN's objectives are while providing these services, IN requests a remuneration for those services. Accordingly, it seems to the Authority that the objective of promoting tourism coexists with an economic objective (42). The Authority recalls in this respect that the definition of an entity as an undertaking depends on the nature of the specific activity under scrutiny.

| (80) | It is established case-law that in defining a service as economic, a significant factor is whether some kind of competition exists (i.e. if there are other entities offering the same or substitutable goods and services) (43). The Authority takes the preliminary view that this condition is met in the present case, since the services at hand are also provided by private operators, such as the Complainant. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

It is established case-law that in defining a service as economic, a significant factor is whether some kind of competition exists (i.e. if there are other entities offering the same or substitutable goods and services) (43). The Authority takes the preliminary view that this condition is met in the present case, since the services at hand are also provided by private operators, such as the Complainant.

| (81) | Furthermore, the Court of Justice has also underlined that the economic activities are normally offered against remuneration (44). The Authority notes that both the Complaint and IN provide for remuneration the services at issue in this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Furthermore, the Court of Justice has also underlined that the economic activities are normally offered against remuneration (44). The Authority notes that both the Complaint and IN provide for remuneration the services at issue in this Decision.

| (82) | Consequently, insofar as web infrastructure and related services are concerned, the Authority draws the preliminary conclusion that it cannot be excluded that IN is an undertaking within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement with regard to those services in question. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

Consequently, insofar as web infrastructure and related services are concerned, the Authority draws the preliminary conclusion that it cannot be excluded that IN is an undertaking within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement with regard to those services in question.

1.1.2.   Presence of state resources and imputability

| (83) | It is well-established case-law that public resources at the disposal of public undertakings owned or controlled by the State are considered to be state resources (45). IN is mainly financed by public funds (46). |
| --- | --- |

(83)

It is well-established case-law that public resources at the disposal of public undertakings owned or controlled by the State are considered to be state resources (45). IN is mainly financed by public funds (46).

| (84) | Foregoing profits is equivalent to granting a financial advantage. This kind of measure is mentioned in the Authority's Guidelines on State aid provisions to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector, which require transparency where the State foregoes profits (47). By foregoing profits, state resources are consumed. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Foregoing profits is equivalent to granting a financial advantage. This kind of measure is mentioned in the Authority's Guidelines on State aid provisions to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector, which require transparency where the State foregoes profits (47). By foregoing profits, state resources are consumed.

| (85) | Cross-subsidisation also consumes public resources, since the State is not only compensating for the cost of the non-economic activities with which an entity has been entrusted but also for some of the costs linked to the commercial activities of the same entity. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

Cross-subsidisation also consumes public resources, since the State is not only compensating for the cost of the non-economic activities with which an entity has been entrusted but also for some of the costs linked to the commercial activities of the same entity.

| (86) | The measures are imputable to the State, since IN is mainly financed through the public budget (see paragraph (83)). |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The measures are imputable to the State, since IN is mainly financed through the public budget (see paragraph (83)).

1.1.3.   The measure contains a potential advantage

1.1.3.1.   Cross-subsidisation of the web infrastructure and related services

| (87) | When an entity carries out both commercial and non-commercial activities, a cost-accounting system should be put in place to ensure that the commercial activities are not subsidised through state resources allocated to the non-commercial activities of that entity (48). Objective and transparent cost allocation mechanisms should be in place to ensure that the economic activities cover all the costs related to these operations (including all the costs related to that activity plus an appropriate share of the common costs). Without such mechanisms in place the commercial activities may gain advantages from the public funds granted to the non-commercial activities. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

When an entity carries out both commercial and non-commercial activities, a cost-accounting system should be put in place to ensure that the commercial activities are not subsidised through state resources allocated to the non-commercial activities of that entity (48). Objective and transparent cost allocation mechanisms should be in place to ensure that the economic activities cover all the costs related to these operations (including all the costs related to that activity plus an appropriate share of the common costs). Without such mechanisms in place the commercial activities may gain advantages from the public funds granted to the non-commercial activities.

| (88) | This rule is in line with the principles set out in the Transparency Directive (49) which requires financial transparency for public undertakings and separate accounts for companies enjoying special or exclusive rights granted by the State or entrusted with a service of general economic interest. The objective of those provisions is precisely to avoid advantages for public companies which are liable to distort free competition by means of state aid (50). |
| --- | --- |

(88)

This rule is in line with the principles set out in the Transparency Directive (49) which requires financial transparency for public undertakings and separate accounts for companies enjoying special or exclusive rights granted by the State or entrusted with a service of general economic interest. The objective of those provisions is precisely to avoid advantages for public companies which are liable to distort free competition by means of state aid (50).

| (89) | The Norwegian authorities have informed the Authority about the separation of accounts within IN. IN's annual accounts contain a total account for the company. This consolidated account is further separated into eight accounts, one for each type of activities/schemes (for example loans and funding projects). As a consequence, there is also a separate account for visitnorway.com. However, following a preliminary analysis, it seems to the Authority that neither the visitnorway.com account nor other account of IN differentiate the figures related to the provision of web infrastructure and related services. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Norwegian authorities have informed the Authority about the separation of accounts within IN. IN's annual accounts contain a total account for the company. This consolidated account is further separated into eight accounts, one for each type of activities/schemes (for example loans and funding projects). As a consequence, there is also a separate account for visitnorway.com. However, following a preliminary analysis, it seems to the Authority that neither the visitnorway.com account nor other account of IN differentiate the figures related to the provision of web infrastructure and related services.

| (90) | On the basis of the above, the Authority notes that the Norwegian authorities have not, at this stage of the procedure, provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that IN implements separate accounts for its economic activities, thereby avoiding possible cross-subsidisation. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

On the basis of the above, the Authority notes that the Norwegian authorities have not, at this stage of the procedure, provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that IN implements separate accounts for its economic activities, thereby avoiding possible cross-subsidisation.

1.1.3.2.   Profits foregone through the non-profit orientation of IN

| (91) | Any business owner or investor will normally require a return on its investment in a commercial undertaking. Such a requirement represents a normal and expected business cost for the undertaking. The Authority has already stated in its Manufacturing Guidelines that: ‘[i]f a public enterprise has an inadequate rate of return, the EFTA Surveillance Authority could consider that this situation contains elements of aid, which should be analysed with respect to Article 61. In these circumstances, the public enterprise is effectively getting its capital cheaper than the market rate, i.e. equivalent to a subsidy’
   (51). No state resources are involved only where a full-cost prices policy is adopted, so as to cover the total costs (variable and fixed costs) plus a mark-up to remunerate equity capital (52). |
| --- | --- |

(91)

Any business owner or investor will normally require a return on its investment in a commercial undertaking. Such a requirement represents a normal and expected business cost for the undertaking. The Authority has already stated in its Manufacturing Guidelines that: ‘[i]f a public enterprise has an inadequate rate of return, the EFTA Surveillance Authority could consider that this situation contains elements of aid, which should be analysed with respect to Article 61. In these circumstances, the public enterprise is effectively getting its capital cheaper than the market rate, i.e. equivalent to a subsidy’
   (51). No state resources are involved only where a full-cost prices policy is adopted, so as to cover the total costs (variable and fixed costs) plus a mark-up to remunerate equity capital (52).

| (92) | In the case at hand, the Authority currently has doubts as to whether IN obtains profits — sufficient to generate a reasonable return on the investment — from its services to the RTBs and the DMOs. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

In the case at hand, the Authority currently has doubts as to whether IN obtains profits — sufficient to generate a reasonable return on the investment — from its services to the RTBs and the DMOs.

| (93) | The 2013 Budget letter states that if IN provides commercial services, it should act in line with the market conditions. This would imply, inter alia, requiring a reasonable profit margin. In the same line, according to the information provided to the Authority, in the framework of the partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs, IN foresees obtaining a profit of between 5 and 7 %. However, at the time being it is not clear to the Authority if IN is taking into account all relevant costs (including all the investment costs — not only operating costs — plus an appropriate share of the common costs) in calculating these margins. The Authority also has been given no information as to what is the average profit margin that a private operator would request for this type of investments. This is necessary for the purposes of determining whether a profit between 5 and 7 % is enough. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The 2013 Budget letter states that if IN provides commercial services, it should act in line with the market conditions. This would imply, inter alia, requiring a reasonable profit margin. In the same line, according to the information provided to the Authority, in the framework of the partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs, IN foresees obtaining a profit of between 5 and 7 %. However, at the time being it is not clear to the Authority if IN is taking into account all relevant costs (including all the investment costs — not only operating costs — plus an appropriate share of the common costs) in calculating these margins. The Authority also has been given no information as to what is the average profit margin that a private operator would request for this type of investments. This is necessary for the purposes of determining whether a profit between 5 and 7 % is enough.

| (94) | The Authority therefore has doubts, at this stage of the investigation, as to whether it can be excluded that IN is benefiting from an advantage in the form of the general non-profit orientation of its commercial activities. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

The Authority therefore has doubts, at this stage of the investigation, as to whether it can be excluded that IN is benefiting from an advantage in the form of the general non-profit orientation of its commercial activities.

1.1.4.   Selectivity

| (95) | Only IN could benefit from the alleged advantages described above. Private operators competing with IN do not receive comparable possible advantages. Accordingly, the alleged advantages under assessment in this section of the Decision represent selective measures, as they only concern one particular undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

Only IN could benefit from the alleged advantages described above. Private operators competing with IN do not receive comparable possible advantages. Accordingly, the alleged advantages under assessment in this section of the Decision represent selective measures, as they only concern one particular undertaking.

1.1.5.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (96) | According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, in order to assess whether a measure is liable to distort competition and liable to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement, a party in the position of the Authority ‘[i]s required, not to establish that such aid has a real effect on trade between Member States and that competition is actually being distorted, but only to examine whether that aid is liable to affect such trade and distort competition’
   (53). The mere fact that aid strengthens an undertaking's position compared to that of other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade is enough to conclude that the measure is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement (54). |
| --- | --- |

(96)

According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, in order to assess whether a measure is liable to distort competition and liable to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement, a party in the position of the Authority ‘[i]s required, not to establish that such aid has a real effect on trade between Member States and that competition is actually being distorted, but only to examine whether that aid is liable to affect such trade and distort competition’
   (53). The mere fact that aid strengthens an undertaking's position compared to that of other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade is enough to conclude that the measure is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement (54).

| (97) | The Authority considers that IN's shareholders should require it to generate a profit from its economic activities. Therefore, if the web infrastructure and related services were to be defined as economic activities, by not requiring a reasonable profit, IN would be obtaining certain advantages as compared to private operators active in the same market (such as the Complainant). The same can be said regarding the risk of cross-subsidisation, since IN could be funding its commercial activities with the funds intended for its non-economic activities. |
| --- | --- |

(97)

The Authority considers that IN's shareholders should require it to generate a profit from its economic activities. Therefore, if the web infrastructure and related services were to be defined as economic activities, by not requiring a reasonable profit, IN would be obtaining certain advantages as compared to private operators active in the same market (such as the Complainant). The same can be said regarding the risk of cross-subsidisation, since IN could be funding its commercial activities with the funds intended for its non-economic activities.

| (98) | The Authority also notes that the measures concerned, and the consequent advantage for IN, could create an obstacle for companies from the EEA wishing to offer their services in Norway and therefore trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement is liable to be affected (55). |
| --- | --- |

(98)

The Authority also notes that the measures concerned, and the consequent advantage for IN, could create an obstacle for companies from the EEA wishing to offer their services in Norway and therefore trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement is liable to be affected (55).

| (99) | Finally, the Authority underlines that the clients of the private operators competing with IN are private tourism entities as well as the RTBs and the DMOs. If the measures at issue in the present Decision allow IN to provide cheaper services to the RTBs and the DMOs and, as a consequence, they move to visitnorway.com, it seems to the Authority that an important part of the market could be excluded from fair competition. Accordingly the measures are liable to distort competition and affect trade. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

Finally, the Authority underlines that the clients of the private operators competing with IN are private tourism entities as well as the RTBs and the DMOs. If the measures at issue in the present Decision allow IN to provide cheaper services to the RTBs and the DMOs and, as a consequence, they move to visitnorway.com, it seems to the Authority that an important part of the market could be excluded from fair competition. Accordingly the measures are liable to distort competition and affect trade.

| (100) | The Authority therefore concludes at the current stage of the procedure that the measures at issue are liable to affect trade and distort competition between undertakings within the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

The Authority therefore concludes at the current stage of the procedure that the measures at issue are liable to affect trade and distort competition between undertakings within the EEA.

1.2.   Preliminary conclusion

| (101) | For the reasons set out above, and on the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether it can be excluded that the measures at issue in the present section constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

For the reasons set out above, and on the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether it can be excluded that the measures at issue in the present section constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.3.   Possible state aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs

| (102) | The existence of possible state aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs will depend on the conclusions reached by the Authority regarding the alleged state aid measures in favour of IN. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

The existence of possible state aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs will depend on the conclusions reached by the Authority regarding the alleged state aid measures in favour of IN.

| (103) | The Authority's assessment in this respect will depend on the conclusion which it reaches on the alleged foregoing of profits by IN (see paragraphs (91) to (94), above). If IN were to charge, for the services provided to its clients (exclusively the RTBs and the DMOs), a price sufficient to generate adequate profits, the existence of aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs would be excluded. On the contrary, if the prices are not sufficient to cover the costs, the Authority considers that, in this specific case, those companies might in turn be beneficiaries of state aid. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

The Authority's assessment in this respect will depend on the conclusion which it reaches on the alleged foregoing of profits by IN (see paragraphs (91) to (94), above). If IN were to charge, for the services provided to its clients (exclusively the RTBs and the DMOs), a price sufficient to generate adequate profits, the existence of aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs would be excluded. On the contrary, if the prices are not sufficient to cover the costs, the Authority considers that, in this specific case, those companies might in turn be beneficiaries of state aid.

| (104) | Taking into account that, at this stage of the procedure, the Authority has doubts as to whether the existence of a state aid measure by means of profit foregoing can be excluded, the Authority will therefore also assess, on a preliminary basis, the question of possible aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

Taking into account that, at this stage of the procedure, the Authority has doubts as to whether the existence of a state aid measure by means of profit foregoing can be excluded, the Authority will therefore also assess, on a preliminary basis, the question of possible aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs.

1.3.1.   Presence of state resources and imputability

| (105) | It is established case-law that a measure is financed through state resources if it results in a burden on the budget of a public undertaking, provided that the measure is imputable to the state (56). The concept of state aid covers all the financial means by which the public authorities may actually support undertakings (57). |
| --- | --- |

(105)

It is established case-law that a measure is financed through state resources if it results in a burden on the budget of a public undertaking, provided that the measure is imputable to the state (56). The concept of state aid covers all the financial means by which the public authorities may actually support undertakings (57).

| (106) | On this basis, the Authority considers that offering services at prices lower than the price prevailing on the market, without recovering their total costs, implies a loss of revenue equivalent to a consumption of state resources. The Authority has doubts whether all costs (operating and investments costs) are taken into account while setting the final price for RTBs and DMOs. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

On this basis, the Authority considers that offering services at prices lower than the price prevailing on the market, without recovering their total costs, implies a loss of revenue equivalent to a consumption of state resources. The Authority has doubts whether all costs (operating and investments costs) are taken into account while setting the final price for RTBs and DMOs.

| (107) | Furthermore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the measure is imputable to the Norwegian authorities (58). The Authority notes that there is a close relationship between the State and IN. IN is normally used as an instrument to grant aid measures. Furthermore, IN is fully owned by public bodies, controlled by them and instructed by the Norwegian authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(107)

Furthermore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the measure is imputable to the Norwegian authorities (58). The Authority notes that there is a close relationship between the State and IN. IN is normally used as an instrument to grant aid measures. Furthermore, IN is fully owned by public bodies, controlled by them and instructed by the Norwegian authorities.

1.3.2.   The measure contains an ‘advantage’

| (108) | It is established case-law that a state intervention favours an undertaking if it provides the undertaking with an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions (59). This will be the case if the RTBs and the DMOs are being offered services below their real cost, without IN obtaining a sufficient return on its investment costs. |
| --- | --- |

(108)

It is established case-law that a state intervention favours an undertaking if it provides the undertaking with an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions (59). This will be the case if the RTBs and the DMOs are being offered services below their real cost, without IN obtaining a sufficient return on its investment costs.

| (109) | The fact that the RTBs and the DMOs are part of the national tourism structure (see paragraph (11), above) does not alter this conclusion. The Authority notes in particular that the shareholders of the RTBs and DMOs are not only public entities, but also private companies. Accordingly, it does not seem possible to qualify the measure as a mere cooperation amongst public entities. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

The fact that the RTBs and the DMOs are part of the national tourism structure (see paragraph (11), above) does not alter this conclusion. The Authority notes in particular that the shareholders of the RTBs and DMOs are not only public entities, but also private companies. Accordingly, it does not seem possible to qualify the measure as a mere cooperation amongst public entities.

1.3.3.   Selectivity

| (110) | According to the available information, IN only provides web infrastructure and related services to the RTBs and the DMOs (see paragraph (49), above). The Authority therefore takes the view that the measure is at least selective de facto. |
| --- | --- |

(110)

According to the available information, IN only provides web infrastructure and related services to the RTBs and the DMOs (see paragraph (49), above). The Authority therefore takes the view that the measure is at least selective de facto.

1.3.4.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (111) | It is established case-law that a measure distorts or threatens to distort competition in a way that affects trade between Contracting Parties if it strengthens the position of the recipient compared to other companies (60) and if the recipient is active in a sector in which trade between Contracting Parties takes place (61). |
| --- | --- |

(111)

It is established case-law that a measure distorts or threatens to distort competition in a way that affects trade between Contracting Parties if it strengthens the position of the recipient compared to other companies (60) and if the recipient is active in a sector in which trade between Contracting Parties takes place (61).

| (112) | According to the available information, the Authority considers, on a preliminary basis, that the RTBs and the DMOs are carrying out some economic activities, since they are marketing, booking and selling tourism products in competition with private companies from other parts of the EEA, inter alia, tour-operators (see also paragraphs (14) and (15), above). As a consequence, if they are obtaining services at prices below the real value of the services, this will strengthen their position in the market to the detriment of their competitors (i.e. other destination and travel agencies). |
| --- | --- |

(112)

According to the available information, the Authority considers, on a preliminary basis, that the RTBs and the DMOs are carrying out some economic activities, since they are marketing, booking and selling tourism products in competition with private companies from other parts of the EEA, inter alia, tour-operators (see also paragraphs (14) and (15), above). As a consequence, if they are obtaining services at prices below the real value of the services, this will strengthen their position in the market to the detriment of their competitors (i.e. other destination and travel agencies).

| (113) | The Authority takes the view that the fact that the RTBs and the DMOs are mainly regional or local operators is not decisive, and does not exclude the conclusion that the measure would be liable to affect trade between the contracting parties. According to settled case-law, intra-state trade is liable to be affected when undertakings established in a Contracting Party have less chance of providing their services in another Contracting Party (in the case at hand, in Norway) (62). |
| --- | --- |

(113)

The Authority takes the view that the fact that the RTBs and the DMOs are mainly regional or local operators is not decisive, and does not exclude the conclusion that the measure would be liable to affect trade between the contracting parties. According to settled case-law, intra-state trade is liable to be affected when undertakings established in a Contracting Party have less chance of providing their services in another Contracting Party (in the case at hand, in Norway) (62).

1.4.   Preliminary conclusion

| (114) | Based on the foregoing, the Authority has doubts as to whether it can be excluded that the measure at stake constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(114)

Based on the foregoing, the Authority has doubts as to whether it can be excluded that the measure at stake constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

2.   Existing aid or new aid

| (115) | The Norwegian authorities have submitted that in the event that the measures at issue in the present Decision were to be classified as state aid, they should be defined as existing aid. Following a preliminary analysis, and for the reasons set out below, the Authority considers at this stage of the procedure that if the measures at issue were to be classified as state aid, they would also be defined as new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(115)

The Norwegian authorities have submitted that in the event that the measures at issue in the present Decision were to be classified as state aid, they should be defined as existing aid. Following a preliminary analysis, and for the reasons set out below, the Authority considers at this stage of the procedure that if the measures at issue were to be classified as state aid, they would also be defined as new aid.

| (116) | Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘existing aid’ is to mean: ‘all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement’. |
| --- | --- |

(116)

Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘existing aid’ is to mean: ‘all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement’.

| (117) | In its judgment in Case E-14/10 (63), the EFTA Court stated that:

  ‘Whether the aid granted [...] constitutes existing aid’[...] depends upon the interpretation of the provisions of Protocol 3 SCA [...]


  [...] to qualify as an ‘existing aid measure’ under the EEA State aid rules, it must be part of an aid scheme that was put into effect before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement' |
| --- | --- |

(117)

In its judgment in Case E-14/10 (63), the EFTA Court stated that:

‘Whether the aid granted [...] constitutes existing aid’[...] depends upon the interpretation of the provisions of Protocol 3 SCA [...]

[...] to qualify as an ‘existing aid measure’ under the EEA State aid rules, it must be part of an aid scheme that was put into effect before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement'

| (118) | It follows that the definition of public measures as existing aid requires the existence of a previous aid scheme covering the activities of the public body under evaluation. |
| --- | --- |

(118)

It follows that the definition of public measures as existing aid requires the existence of a previous aid scheme covering the activities of the public body under evaluation.

| (119) | The Authority considers, at this point in time, that the measure at hand is not related to any of the schemes in force used by IN to grant state aid (see paragraph (9), above). The present Decision does not assess whether one of the schemes used by IN has been modified in substance, as required by the case-law to identify a new aid (64). Rather, the Authority takes the view that the case at hand relates to the entrance of IN on the market of web infrastructure and related services – which the Authority considers, at this stage of the procedure, to fall outside the mandate received by IN to promote business or to promote Norway as a tourism destination. The objective of this Decision is to assess IN's behaviour when it acts as an undertaking in the relevant market, if this qualification is confirmed during the formal procedure (see paragraphs (74) to (82), above). |
| --- | --- |

(119)

The Authority considers, at this point in time, that the measure at hand is not related to any of the schemes in force used by IN to grant state aid (see paragraph (9), above). The present Decision does not assess whether one of the schemes used by IN has been modified in substance, as required by the case-law to identify a new aid (64). Rather, the Authority takes the view that the case at hand relates to the entrance of IN on the market of web infrastructure and related services – which the Authority considers, at this stage of the procedure, to fall outside the mandate received by IN to promote business or to promote Norway as a tourism destination. The objective of this Decision is to assess IN's behaviour when it acts as an undertaking in the relevant market, if this qualification is confirmed during the formal procedure (see paragraphs (74) to (82), above).

| (120) | The Authority understanding at this point in time is that the legal basis for IN's entrance into a new market, offering economic services, is the 2013 Budget letter. The 2013 Budget letter allows IN, for the first time (65), to provide services in the tourism market in competition with private operators. Moreover, it allows IN to enter into economic activities, outside its general mandate to promote businesses in Norway, irrespective of whether this qualifies as a non-economic activity or a SGEI. |
| --- | --- |

(120)

The Authority understanding at this point in time is that the legal basis for IN's entrance into a new market, offering economic services, is the 2013 Budget letter. The 2013 Budget letter allows IN, for the first time (65), to provide services in the tourism market in competition with private operators. Moreover, it allows IN to enter into economic activities, outside its general mandate to promote businesses in Norway, irrespective of whether this qualifies as a non-economic activity or a SGEI.

| (121) | The Norwegian authorities have argued that IN's system of financing has not been substantially modified after the entrance into force of the EEA Agreement in the country. They take the view that if IN is obtaining state aid, the measure qualifies as existing aid (66). |
| --- | --- |

(121)

The Norwegian authorities have argued that IN's system of financing has not been substantially modified after the entrance into force of the EEA Agreement in the country. They take the view that if IN is obtaining state aid, the measure qualifies as existing aid (66).

| (122) | However, the Authority recalls that the financing system in force before 1994 relates to IN's core activities, and not to the provision of economic activities. In particular, the Act on IN establishes that: ‘The company's resources may be used for: 1. Financing, hereunder subsidies, loans, guarantees and equity capital arrangements, 2. Advising and competence enhancing measures, 3. Network and infrastructure, and 4. Marketing of Norwegian industry abroad’. No reference is made to the possible financing of economic activities. The 2013 Budget letter departs from this system in stating that if IN provides services in competition with private operators it must apply market prices. |
| --- | --- |

(122)

However, the Authority recalls that the financing system in force before 1994 relates to IN's core activities, and not to the provision of economic activities. In particular, the Act on IN establishes that: ‘The company's resources may be used for: 1. Financing, hereunder subsidies, loans, guarantees and equity capital arrangements, 2. Advising and competence enhancing measures, 3. Network and infrastructure, and 4. Marketing of Norwegian industry abroad’. No reference is made to the possible financing of economic activities. The 2013 Budget letter departs from this system in stating that if IN provides services in competition with private operators it must apply market prices.

| (123) | As a consequence, the Authority takes the preliminary view that if the alleged state aid measures (i.e. the absence of separate accounts between economic and non-economic activities and the forgoing of profit) are demonstrated, the measures should be defined as new state aid measures. |
| --- | --- |

(123)

As a consequence, the Authority takes the preliminary view that if the alleged state aid measures (i.e. the absence of separate accounts between economic and non-economic activities and the forgoing of profit) are demonstrated, the measures should be defined as new state aid measures.

| (124) | Concerning the alleged aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs, the Authority takes the preliminary view that if it is demonstrated during the formal state aid procedure that they are receiving services at a price below their real cost, the measure should likewise be considered to be new aid. The provision of these new services also finds its origin in the 2013 Budget letter – which, as described above, allows IN, for the first time, to provide services in competition with private operators, and to depart from the scope of its general task of businesses promotion. |
| --- | --- |

(124)

Concerning the alleged aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs, the Authority takes the preliminary view that if it is demonstrated during the formal state aid procedure that they are receiving services at a price below their real cost, the measure should likewise be considered to be new aid. The provision of these new services also finds its origin in the 2013 Budget letter – which, as described above, allows IN, for the first time, to provide services in competition with private operators, and to depart from the scope of its general task of businesses promotion.

| (125) | Finally, at the time the measures at issue in the present Decision were put into effect, the market for web infrastructure and related services was open to competition. As a consequence, Article 1(b)(v) of Part II of Protocol 3 is not applicable (67). |
| --- | --- |

(125)

Finally, at the time the measures at issue in the present Decision were put into effect, the market for web infrastructure and related services was open to competition. As a consequence, Article 1(b)(v) of Part II of Protocol 3 is not applicable (67).

| (126) | In conclusion, the Authority considers, on a preliminary basis, that in the event that the measures under the scope of this Decision are finally classified as aid, they should be classified as new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(126)

In conclusion, the Authority considers, on a preliminary basis, that in the event that the measures under the scope of this Decision are finally classified as aid, they should be classified as new aid.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (127) | Insofar as the measures at issue in the present Decision may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement, and that these measures constitute ‘new aid’ within the meaning of Article 1(c) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Norwegian authorities should have notified the aid before putting it into effect, pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(127)

Insofar as the measures at issue in the present Decision may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement, and that these measures constitute ‘new aid’ within the meaning of Article 1(c) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Norwegian authorities should have notified the aid before putting it into effect, pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3.

| (128) | It should be recalled that any new aid which is unlawfully implemented and which is finally not declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement is subject to recovery in accordance with Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(128)

It should be recalled that any new aid which is unlawfully implemented and which is finally not declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement is subject to recovery in accordance with Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

| (129) | In principle, state aid as defined by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is prohibited. However, Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement provides that certain types of aid can be declared compatible. |
| --- | --- |

(129)

In principle, state aid as defined by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is prohibited. However, Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement provides that certain types of aid can be declared compatible.

| (130) | The Norwegian authorities have submitted that if the measures at issue in the present Decision were to be considered to be state aid, they would be compatible with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, as aid to promote tourism activities. However, at this point in time the Norwegian authorities have not provided sufficient evidence to support this statement. |
| --- | --- |

(130)

The Norwegian authorities have submitted that if the measures at issue in the present Decision were to be considered to be state aid, they would be compatible with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, as aid to promote tourism activities. However, at this point in time the Norwegian authorities have not provided sufficient evidence to support this statement.

| (131) | Since at the present time there are no Guidelines on state aid to promote the tourism sector, the compatibility assessment will be carried out by way of direct reference to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(131)

Since at the present time there are no Guidelines on state aid to promote the tourism sector, the compatibility assessment will be carried out by way of direct reference to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

| (132) | In assessing whether an aid measure can be said to be compatible with the EEA Agreement, the Authority balances the positive impact of the aid measure in reaching an objective of common interest against its potentially negative side effects by distortion of trade and competition. The assessment is based on the following steps:






  — | Is the aid measure aimed at a well-defined objective of common interest (e.g. growth, employment, cohesion, environment, etc.)? |
| --- | --- | --- |

(132)

In assessing whether an aid measure can be said to be compatible with the EEA Agreement, the Authority balances the positive impact of the aid measure in reaching an objective of common interest against its potentially negative side effects by distortion of trade and competition. The assessment is based on the following steps:

—

Is the aid measure aimed at a well-defined objective of common interest (e.g. growth, employment, cohesion, environment, etc.)?

| — | Is the aid well designed to deliver the objectives of common interest, i.e. does the proposed aid address the market failure or another objective? |
| --- | --- |

—

Is the aid well designed to deliver the objectives of common interest, i.e. does the proposed aid address the market failure or another objective?

| — | Is state aid an appropriate instrument? |
| --- | --- |

—

Is state aid an appropriate instrument?

| — | Is there an incentive effect, i.e. does the aid change the behaviour of the firms? |
| --- | --- |

—

Is there an incentive effect, i.e. does the aid change the behaviour of the firms?

| — | Is the aid measure proportional, i.e. could the same change in behaviour be obtained with less aid? |
| --- | --- |

—

Is the aid measure proportional, i.e. could the same change in behaviour be obtained with less aid?

| — | Are the distortions of competition and effect on trade limited, so that the overall balance is positive? |
| --- | --- |

—

Are the distortions of competition and effect on trade limited, so that the overall balance is positive?

| (133) | The information provided by the Norwegian authorities to the Authority during its preliminary examination of the measures at issue does not enable the Authority to make a definitive assessment of this question. The Norwegian authorities are accordingly invited to provide additional information on this matter. The Authority recalls that according to established case-law the burden of proof of the compatibility of state aid measures rests on the State concerned, which must show that the conditions for the derogation from Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are satisfied (68). |
| --- | --- |

(133)

The information provided by the Norwegian authorities to the Authority during its preliminary examination of the measures at issue does not enable the Authority to make a definitive assessment of this question. The Norwegian authorities are accordingly invited to provide additional information on this matter. The Authority recalls that according to established case-law the burden of proof of the compatibility of state aid measures rests on the State concerned, which must show that the conditions for the derogation from Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are satisfied (68).

| (134) | However, on a preliminary basis, the Authority notes that in order for the measure to be declared compatible a market failure regarding the web infrastructure and related services must be demonstrated. The mere fact that there are private operators providing these services suggests that there is no market failure and therefore no need for aid. |
| --- | --- |

(134)

However, on a preliminary basis, the Authority notes that in order for the measure to be declared compatible a market failure regarding the web infrastructure and related services must be demonstrated. The mere fact that there are private operators providing these services suggests that there is no market failure and therefore no need for aid.

| (135) | Furthermore, the balancing test for a measure of state aid, as described above, also requires the aid to be proportional and limited to the smallest possible amount. However, taking into account the nature of the measures, which cannot be described as transparent aid (69), it will be difficult to calculate the intensity of aid granted. |
| --- | --- |

(135)

Furthermore, the balancing test for a measure of state aid, as described above, also requires the aid to be proportional and limited to the smallest possible amount. However, taking into account the nature of the measures, which cannot be described as transparent aid (69), it will be difficult to calculate the intensity of aid granted.

| (136) | The Authority finally recalls that, by analogy with settled case-law (70), state aid incorporating conditions which contravene other provisions of the EEA Agreement cannot be approved as compatible. On this issue the Authority notes that if the tie-in clauses referred to in paragraph (41), above, exist and are imposed by IN, they might be contrary to Articles 53 or 54 of the EEA Agreement. In this event, the measures could not be declared compatible aid. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

The Authority finally recalls that, by analogy with settled case-law (70), state aid incorporating conditions which contravene other provisions of the EEA Agreement cannot be approved as compatible. On this issue the Authority notes that if the tie-in clauses referred to in paragraph (41), above, exist and are imposed by IN, they might be contrary to Articles 53 or 54 of the EEA Agreement. In this event, the measures could not be declared compatible aid.

| (137) | In conclusion, the Authority considers, at this stage of the procedure, that it cannot be excluded that the measure at issue in the present Decision may not comply with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, and may have to be considered to be incompatible aid. |
| --- | --- |

(137)

In conclusion, the Authority considers, at this stage of the procedure, that it cannot be excluded that the measure at issue in the present Decision may not comply with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, and may have to be considered to be incompatible aid.

5.   Conclusion

| (138) | Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, at this stage of the procedure the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the measures at hand in this Decision constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(138)

Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, at this stage of the procedure the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the measures at hand in this Decision constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (139) | The Authority currently takes the view that if those measures entail state aid, they would constitute ‘new aid’, which pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 should have been notified to the Authority prior to its implementation. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

The Authority currently takes the view that if those measures entail state aid, they would constitute ‘new aid’, which pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 should have been notified to the Authority prior to its implementation.

| (140) | The Authority has also doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority, therefore, has doubts as to whether that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

The Authority has also doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority, therefore, has doubts as to whether that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (141) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open proceedings is without prejudice to the final Decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question do not constitute state aid, are to be classified as existing aid or are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open proceedings is without prejudice to the final Decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question do not constitute state aid, are to be classified as existing aid or are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (142) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(142)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision.

| (143) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to provide within one month of receipt of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the nature and compatibility of the measure covered by this decision. |
| --- | --- |

(143)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to provide within one month of receipt of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the nature and compatibility of the measure covered by this decision.

| (144) | The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential aid recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(144)

The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential aid recipients of the aid immediately.

| (145) | The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law, |
| --- | --- |

(145)

The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the possible aid measures implemented by the Norwegian authorities.

The possible aid measures are:

| (i) | the alleged foregoing of profit in favour of IN, |
| --- | --- |

(i)

the alleged foregoing of profit in favour of IN,

| (ii) | the alleged lack of accounting separation among and a clear cost allocation methodology regarding IN's economic and non economic activities and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the alleged lack of accounting separation among and a clear cost allocation methodology regarding IN's economic and non economic activities and

| (iii) | the alleged aid granted through IN to the RTBs and the DMOs in form of prices not sufficient to obtain a reasonable return on the investments. |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the alleged aid granted through IN to the RTBs and the DMOs in form of prices not sufficient to obtain a reasonable return on the investments.

The measures falling within the scope of this Decision relate to IN's activities in the market of web infrastructure and related services within the tourism sector.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 18 August 2014.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide by 18 August 2014, all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done in Brussels, 16 July 2014.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Helga JÓNSDÓTTIR

College Member

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(1)  In October 2013, the original complainant tellUs IT AS merged with the company New Mind forming New Mind | tellUs. See www.newmind.co.uk

1

(2)  In the tourism sector, the term ‘destination organisation’ or ‘destination company’ generally means a local company that handles arrangements for tours, meetings, transportation, etc. for groups originating elsewhere. See http://wsdmo.org/index.php/Educate/TourismAcronyms/

2

(3)  LOV-2003-12-19-130 (in Norwegian ‘Lov om Innovasjon Norge’), available at:

3

http://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2003-12-19-130?q=lov+om+innovasjon+norge

(4)  Section 2 of the Act on IN.

4

(5)  LOV-1999-03-26-14, (in Norwegian ‘Skatteloven’).

5

Skatteloven

(6)  Translation by the Authority.

6

(7)  In Norwegian: ‘Statens nærings- og distriktsutviklingsfond’, ‘Statens Veiledningskontor for Oppfinnere’, ‘Norges Turistråd’ and ‘Norges Eksportråd’.

7

Statens nærings- og distriktsutviklingsfond

Statens Veiledningskontor for Oppfinnere

Norges Turistråd

Norges Eksportråd

(8)  Report entitled ‘The Government's tourism strategy. Destination Norway. National strategy for the tourism industry’, dated April 2012 and sent to the Authority as Annex 4 to IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213). Available at:

8

‘The Government's tourism strategy. Destination Norway. National strategy for the tourism industry’,

http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/37646196/Lenke_til_strategien-engelsk.pdf

(9)  A description of IN's task in the tourism sector can be found in the report quoted in footnote 8.

9

(10)  IN's letter dated 20 December 2013 (Event No 694258). The National Association of Tourism, which was the joint body for the State, municipal and private stakeholders in the tourism industry, was established in 1903 and continued until 1984. From that point, marketing efforts of the National Association of Tourism were continued by the foundation NORTRA, which in 1999 changed its name to the NTC. Since 2004, the NTC's tasks have been carried out by IN, following the merger of these two entities.

10

Further information on the entities that have traditionally been entrusted with the mandate to promote Norway as a holiday destination was also provided in IN's letter dated 20 December 2013 (Event No 694258).

(11)  For further information, see the project plan for a new national tourism structure by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries (Version 1.2 dated 20.06.2013):

11

http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/NHD/Temasider/Reiseliv/Riktigprosjektplan.pdf

(12)  In Norwegian: ‘Regionalt selskap: Selskap som betjener reiselivsnæringen i et definert geografisk område’.

12

Regionalt selskap: Selskap som betjener reiselivsnæringen i et definert geografisk område

(13)  In Norwegian: ‘Destinasjonsselskap: Selskap som skal betjene et definert antall reisemål, produkter, attraksjoner og reiselivs-næring innen et geografisk område innenfor det regionale selskapet’.

13

Destinasjonsselskap: Selskap som skal betjene et definert antall reisemål, produkter, attraksjoner og reiselivs-næring innen et geografisk område innenfor det regionale selskapet

(14)  See report quoted in footnote 8.

14

(15)  According to p. 8 of IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213), the ‘[o]bjective of IN's New Structure project is to streamline visitnorway.com so that the tourist has one place to search and find information about all the destinations in Norway, in order for the tourist to choose Norway as a holiday destination’.

15

‘[o]bjective of IN's New Structure project is to streamline visitnorway.com so that the tourist has one place to search and find information about all the destinations in Norway, in order for the tourist to choose Norway as a holiday destination’

(16)  In Norwegian: ‘Statsbudsjett 2013 – oppdragsbrev Innovasjon Norge’ of 1 February 2013 (Event No 688224). Available at:

16

http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/NHD/Vedlegg/Brev/2013_oppdragsbrev_innovasjonnorge.pdf#search=OPPDRAGSBREV®j_oss=1

(17)  Translation by the Authority.

17

(18)  Translation by the Authority.

18

(19)  Definition of ‘DMS’ available at http://www.newmind.co.uk/technology-platform/destination-management-system

19

(20)  IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213).

20

(21)  Until that moment, New Mind | tellUs provided the web infrastructure and related services for IN's tourism website: visitnorway.com. See Event No 678005. Annex 3 to the complaint.

21

visitnorway.com

(22)  URL stands for Uniform Resource Locator. A URL is a formatted text string used by web-browsers, e-mail clients and other software to identify a network resource on the internet.

22

(23)  According to the Complainant: ‘to date, the offering of IT platform infrastructure services to the tourism industry has not been part of IN's activities’. Complaint (Event No 678002), p. 8.

23

‘to date, the offering of IT platform infrastructure services to the tourism industry has not been part of IN's activities’.

(24)  According to Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg [2003] ECR I-7747, the compensation of services fulfilling the four criteria established in paras. 89-93 of the judgment does not entail state aid.

24

Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

(25)  E-mail dated 15 November 2013 (Event No 690346).

25

(26)  E-mail dated 3 March 2014 (Event No 702175).

26

(27)  IN's letters dated 28 October 2013 (Events No 688213 and 688215).

27

(28)  IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213), p. 25.

28

(29)  According to Article 1 (b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3.

29

(30)  See the definition of existing aid provided in Article 1(b)(v) of Part II of Protocol 3.

30

(31)  Corporate entities in Norway are subject to corporate income tax according to Section 2-2 of the Tax Act. Taxable income is subject to corporate income tax at the general rate of 27 %. Accordingly, limited liability companies (‘AS’ or ‘ASA’), savings banks and financial institutions, mutual insurance companies, cooperatives, state-owned enterprises, inter-municipal companies, foundations etc. are subject to corporate tax under the general regime, i.e. Section 2-2. However, State institutions, public authorities such as counties and municipalities, and a number of other entities listed exhaustively in Section 2-30(1) of the Tax Act, including IN, benefit from a corporate tax exemption.

31

(32)  Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v Macroton [1991] ECR I-1979, paras. 21-23; Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavlov and Others [2000] ECR I-6451 and Case E-5/07 Private Barnehagers Landsforbund v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2008] EFTA Ct. Rep. p. 61, para.78.

32

Höfner and Elser

Macroton

Pavlov and Others

Private Barnehagers Landsforbund

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(33)  Case C-222/04 Ministero dell'Economica e delle Finanze v Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA [2006] ECR I-289, para. 108.

33

Ministero dell'Economica e delle Finanze

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA

(34)  Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78 Van Landewyck [1978] ECR 2111, paras. 18-21 and Case C-244/94 FFSA and others [1995] ECR I-4013, para. 21.

34

Van Landewyck

FFSA and others

(35)  Joined Cases T-443/08 Freissart Sachen and Land Sachsen-Anhalt and T-455/08, Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzing-Halle [2011] ECR II-1311, para. 128 et seq.

35

Freissart Sachen and Land Sachsen-Anhalt

Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzing-Halle

(36)  Economic and non-economic activities can co-exist within the same sector and sometimes be provided by the same organisation. In this scenario, the entity is to be regarded as an undertaking only with regard to its economic activities. See, for example, European Commission Decision in State Aid C-22/2003 (Italy) Reform of the training institutions (OJ L 81, 18.3.2006, p. 25), para. 43.

36

Reform of the training institutions

(37)  Para. 45 of the complaint.

37

(38)  See Case T-347/09, Germany v Commission, not yet published, p. 34 et seq., on how to differentiate between the nature of different activities provided by one single entity.

38

Germany

Commission

(39)  Case T-347/09, Germany v Commission, not yet published.

39

Germany

Commission

(40)  IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213), p. 34.

40

(41)  Commission Decision: State aid NN 8/2009. Germany. Nature conservation areas. OJ C 230, 24.9.2009, p. 1, para. 36.

41

Nature conservation areas

(42)  The Commission reached a similar conclusion in its decision in footnote 41, above (para. 40).

42

(43)  AG Opinion in Case C-205/03 Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN) v Commission, [2006] ECR I-6295, para. 31.

43

Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN)

Commission

(44)  Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, Pavel Pavlov and Others, [2000] ECR I-6451, para. 76; C-475/99, Ambulanz Glockner, [2001] ECR 9089, para. 20.

44

Pavel Pavlov and Others

Ambulanz Glockner

(45)  See, for instance, Article 2 of the Transparency Directive. (Referred to at point 1a of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement, OJ L 266 11.10.2007 p. 15 and EEA Supplement No 48 11.10.2007 p. 12, as Commission Directive 2006/111/EC of 16 November 2006 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings as well as on financial transparency within certain undertakings. Consolidated version: OJ L 318, 17.11.2006, p. 17–25). Implemented in Norwegian law by Regulation FOR-2006-09-07-1062, Section 9-1-1.

45

(46)  According to Chapter 2, Articles 7-9 of the IN Act, IN is financed by capital provided by its owners (i.e. the Norwegian Government and the Counties (ref. Article 7, ref. Article 2) and grants and loans from the Government and the Counties. IN can also obtain funding from other sources (Article 8), and Government and Counties guarantee for all obligations (Article 9).

46

(47)  See the Authority's Guidelines on application of State aid provisions to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector, paragraph 2 (OJ L 231, 3.9.1994, p. 1 and EEA Supplement No 32, 3.9.1994, p. 1) (the ‘Manufacturing Guidelines’). Section 1(3) of the Manufacturing Guidelines provides that ‘[t]his Chapter does not deal with the question of compatibility under one of the derogations provided for in the EEA Agreement and it is limited to the manufacturing sector. This does not, however, preclude the EFTA Surveillance Authority from using the approach in these rules in individual cases or sectors outside manufacturing to the extent these principles apply in these excluded sectors and where it feels that it is essential to determine if state aid is involved.’ The Manufacturing Guidelines can be found at: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=16995&1=1

47

Guidelines on application of State aid provisions to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector

t]his Chapter does not deal with the question of compatibility under one of the derogations provided for in the EEA Agreement and it is limited to the manufacturing sector. This does not, however, preclude the EFTA Surveillance Authority from using the approach in these rules in individual cases or sectors outside manufacturing to the extent these principles apply in these excluded sectors and where it feels that it is essential to determine if state aid is involved

(48)  See, for example, the Authority's Decision No 142/03/COL Regarding Reorganisation and Transfer of Public Funds to the Work Research Institute (OJ C 248, 16.10.2003, p. 6); Decision No 343/09/COL on the property transactions engaged in by the Municipality of Time concerning property numbers 1/152, 1/301, 1/630, 4/165, 2/70, 2/32 (OJ L 123, 12.5.2011, p. 72), and Decision No 174/13/COL Concerning the financing of municipal waste collectors (OJ C 263, 12.9.2013, p. 5).

48

Regarding Reorganisation and Transfer of Public Funds to the Work Research Institute

on the property transactions engaged in by the Municipality of Time concerning property numbers 1/152, 1/301, 1/630, 4/165, 2/70, 2/32

Concerning the financing of municipal waste collectors

(49)  See footnote 45.

49

(50)  AG Opinion, Case C-295/05, Asemfo [2007] ECR I-2999, para. 116.

50

Asemfo

(51)  Section 7.4(2) of the Manufacturing Guidelines. Also see Section 1(2) of the Manufacturing Guidelines, which provides that ‘[t]his Chapter firstly focuses on, the one hand, on the act referred to in point 1 of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the Transparency Directive and, on the other hand, it develops the principle that where the State provides finances to a company in circumstances that would not be applicable to an investor operating under normal market economy conditions, it does this in contradiction to the market economy investor principle, and state aid is involved’. See the reference to the Manufacturing Guidelines in footnote 47.

51

his Chapter firstly focuses on, the one hand, on the act referred to in point 1 of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the Transparency Directive and, on the other hand, it develops the principle that where the State provides finances to a company in circumstances that would not be applicable to an investor operating under normal market economy conditions, it does this in contradiction to the market economy investor principle, and state aid is involved’

(52)  Joined Cases C-83/01 P and C-94/01P Chronopost SA v Commission [2003] ECR I-6993.

52

Chronopost SA

Commission

(53)  Case C-372/97 Italy v Commission [2004] ECR I-3679, para. 44.

53

Italy

Commission

(54)  Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission [1980] ECR 2671, paras. 11-12 and Joined Cases E-5/04, E-6/04, E-7/04 Fesil ASA and Finnfjord Smelteverk AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2005] EFTA Ct. Rep. 117, para. 94.

54

Philip Morris Holland BV

Commission

Fesil ASA and Finnfjord Smelteverk AS

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(55)  Case T-301/02 AEM v Commission [2009] ECR II-01757, paras. 104 and 105.

55

AEM

Commission

(56)  Case C-482/99 France v Commission (Stardust) [2002] ECR I-4397, para. 52.

56

France

Commission (Stardust)

(57)  Case C-677/11 Doux Elevage, not yet published, para. 34, Case T-139/09 France v Commission, not yet published, para. 36.

57

Doux Elevage,

France

Commission

(58)  For listing of the relevant indicators of imputability, the Authority refers to Case C-482/99 France v Commission (Stardust Marine) [2002] ECR I-4397, paras. 55-56.

58

France

Commission (Stardust Marine)

(59)  Case E- 17/10 and E-6/11 Liechtenstein and VTM Fundmanagement v EFTA Surveillance Authority, para. 50, and the case-law cited therein; Case C-301/87 France v Commission [1990] ECR I-307, para. 41; Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community [1961] ECR 50, para. 19; Case C-241/94 France v Commission (Kimberly Clark) [1996] ECR I-4551, para. 34; and Case T-109/01 Fleuren Compost [2004] ECR II-132, para. 53.

59

Liechtenstein and VTM Fundmanagement

EFTA Surveillance Authority,

France

Commission

De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen

High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community

France

Commission (Kimberly Clark)

Fleuren Compost

(60)  Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission [1980] ECR, 2671, para. 11.

60

Philip Morris Holland BV

Commission

(61)  Case 102/87 France v Commission (SEB) [1988] ECR 4067; Case C-310/99 Italian Republic v Commission [2002] ECR I-289, para. 85; Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark) [2003] ECR I-7747, para. 77; and Case T-55/99, Confederación Española de Transporte de Mercancías (CETM) v Commission [2000] ECR II-3207, para. 86.

61

France

Commission

Italian Republic

Commission

Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark)

Confederación Española de Transporte de Mercancías (CETM)

Commission

(62)  Case T-301/02 AEM v Commission, [2009] ECR II-01757, para. 103.

62

AEM

Commission

(63)  E-14/10 – Konkurrenten.no AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority, EFTA Ct. Rep [2011] p. 266.

63

Konkurrenten.no AS

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(64)  It follows from Article 1(c) to the same Protocol that alterations to existing aid schemes constitute new aid. The case-law has also confirmed that measures to alter aid must be regarded as new aid. See Case 91/83 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paras. 17 and 18, and Case C-44/93 Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office Nationale du Ducroire [1994] ECR I-3829, para. 13.

64

Heineken Brouwerijen

Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA

Office Nationale du Ducroire

(65)  The Authority notes that in White Paper no. 14 of 2003-2004 on the IN Act it is clearly stated that IN should ‘not offer products in competition with the private market’ (In Norwegian: ‘Ot.prp. nr. 14 (2003-2004) om Lov om Innovasjon Norge’). Therefore, the Authority's current understanding is that, before 2013 and the adoption of the 2013 Budget letter, IN was not authorised to provide economic services in the tourism sector. In that regard, reference is made to Proposition No 51 to the Norwegian Parliament, entitled ‘measures for an innovative and business development’ (St.prp.no. 51 (2002-2003, in Norwegian: ‘Virkemidler for et innovativt og nyskapende næringsliv’), which states (in relation to the former entity NTC) that ‘services paid by the user should, however, not be offered in areas where there is a well-developed offer from private consultants or where these services come into conflict with the priority areas of this new unit (i.e. IN)’. The original text reads: ‘Brukerbetalte tjenester ikke bør tilbys på områder hvor det eksisterer et godt utviklet tilbud fra private aktører’. St.prp. no. 51 (2002-2003), p. 37, first column.

65

not offer products in competition with the private market

Ot.prp. nr. 14 (2003-2004) om Lov om Innovasjon Norge

measures for an innovative and business development

Virkemidler for et innovativt og nyskapende næringsliv

services paid by the user should, however, not be offered in areas where there is a well-developed offer from private consultants or where these services come into conflict with the priority areas of this new unit

Brukerbetalte tjenester ikke bør tilbys på områder hvor det eksisterer et godt utviklet tilbud fra private aktører

(66)  The Norwegian authorities underline that ‘[t]he system of financing IN and its predecessors has been more or less the same since the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in 1994. The changes made are not of a nature turning the existing financing system into new aid’. IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213), p. 39.

66

‘[t]he system of financing IN and its predecessors has been more or less the same since the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in 1994. The changes made are not of a nature turning the existing financing system into new aid’

(67)  Article 1(b)(v) of Part II of Protocol 3 reads as follows: Existing aid shall mean: ‘[a]id which is deemed to be an existing aid because it can be established that at the time it was put into effect it did not constitute an aid, and subsequently became an aid due to the evolution of the European Economic Area and without having been altered by the EFTA State. Where certain measures become aid following the liberalisation of an activity by EEA law, such measures shall not be considered as existing aid after the date fixed for liberalisation’.

67

‘[a]id which is deemed to be an existing aid because it can be established that at the time it was put into effect it did not constitute an aid, and subsequently became an aid due to the evolution of the European Economic Area and without having been altered by the EFTA State. Where certain measures become aid following the liberalisation of an activity by EEA law, such measures shall not be considered as existing aid after the date fixed for liberalisation’

(68)  Case T-68/03 Olympiaki Aeroporia Ypiresies AE v Commission [2007] ECR II-2911, para. 34.

68

Olympiaki Aeroporia Ypiresies AE

Commission

(69)  Transparent aid is defined in Article 5.1 of Regulation (EC) No 651/2014, General Block Exemption Regulation, of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1, incorporated as point 1j into Annex XV of the EEA Agreement by Decision No 152/2014 of 27 June 2014) as ‘aid in respect of which it is possible to calculate precisely the gross grant equivalent of the aid ex ante without any need to undertake a risk assessment’.

69

aid in respect of which it is possible to calculate precisely the gross grant equivalent of the aid ex ante without any need to undertake a risk assessment

(70)  Case C-225/91 Matra v Commission [1993] ECR I-3203, para. 41, and Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] I-6857, para. 78 and case-law cited.

70

Matra

Commission

Germany

Commission

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| 25.9.2014 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/28 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/28

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Opinjoni tar-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u tal-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA ppreżentata fil-laqgħa tal-Kumitat Konsultattiv KE dwar ftehimiet restrittivi u pożizzjoni dominanti tat-3 ta’ Marzu 2014 rigward abbozz preliminari ta’ deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni fil-Każ: AT.39952 Power Exchanges

Relatur: Il-Pajjiżi l-Baxxi

(2014/C 334/09)

| 1. | Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA għandhom l-istess tħassib tal-Kummissjoni espress fl-abbozz tad-Deċiżjoni tagħha hekk kif ikkomunikat lill-Kumitat Konsultattiv. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA għandhom l-istess tħassib tal-Kummissjoni espress fl-abbozz tad-Deċiżjoni tagħha hekk kif ikkomunikat lill-Kumitat Konsultattiv.

| 2. | Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni li l-imġiba antikompetittiva koperta mill-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni tikkostitwixxi ftehim u/jew prattika miftiehma bejn il-partijiet skont it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 101 tat-TFUE u l-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni li l-imġiba antikompetittiva koperta mill-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni tikkostitwixxi ftehim u/jew prattika miftiehma bejn il-partijiet skont it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 101 tat-TFUE u l-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE.

| 3. | Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-valutazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni tal-prodotti u u l-ambitu ġeografiku tal-ftehim u/jew il-prattiki miftiehma miġbura fl-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-valutazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni tal-prodotti u u l-ambitu ġeografiku tal-ftehim u/jew il-prattiki miftiehma miġbura fl-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni.

| 4. | Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni li l-partijiet ikkonċernati mill-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni pparteċipaw fi ksur uniku u kontinwu tal-Artikolu 101 tat-TFUE u tal-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim ŻEE. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni li l-partijiet ikkonċernati mill-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni pparteċipaw fi ksur uniku u kontinwu tal-Artikolu 101 tat-TFUE u tal-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim ŻEE.

| 5. | Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni li l-oġġett tal-ftehim u/jew tal-prattiki miftiehma kien li jillimita l-kompetizzjoni skont it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 101 tat-TFUE u tal-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim ŻEE. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni li l-oġġett tal-ftehim u/jew tal-prattiki miftiehma kien li jillimita l-kompetizzjoni skont it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 101 tat-TFUE u tal-Artikolu 53 tal-Ftehim ŻEE.

| 6. | Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni li l-ftehim u/jew il-prattika miftiehma kienu kapaċi jeffetwaw b’mod sostanzjali l-kummerċ bejn l-Istati Membri tal-UE. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni li l-ftehim u/jew il-prattika miftiehma kienu kapaċi jeffetwaw b’mod sostanzjali l-kummerċ bejn l-Istati Membri tal-UE.

| 7. | Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-valutazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni rigward id-durata tal-ksur. |
| --- | --- |

7.

Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-valutazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni rigward id-durata tal-ksur.

| 8. | Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni li għandha tiġi imposta multa fuq id-destinatarji tal-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni. |
| --- | --- |

8.

Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni li għandha tiġi imposta multa fuq id-destinatarji tal-abbozz ta’ deċiżjoni.

| 9. | Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni dwar il-valur tal-bejgħ. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni dwar il-valur tal-bejgħ.

| 10. | Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni dwar l-ammonti bażi tal-multi. |
| --- | --- |

10.

Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni dwar l-ammonti bażi tal-multi.

| 11. | Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni li ma hemm l-ebda ċirkostanzi aggravanti u mitiganti li japplikaw f’dan il-każ. |
| --- | --- |

11.

Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni li ma hemm l-ebda ċirkostanzi aggravanti u mitiganti li japplikaw f’dan il-każ.

| 12. | Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni li ma tapplika l-ebda żieda fil-multi għall-iskop ta’ deterrenza f’dan il-każ. |
| --- | --- |

12.

Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni li ma tapplika l-ebda żieda fil-multi għall-iskop ta’ deterrenza f’dan il-każ.

| 13. | Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni fir-rigward tat-tnaqqis ta’ multi bbażati fuq in-Notifika ta’ Riżolviment tal-2008. |
| --- | --- |

13.

Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni fir-rigward tat-tnaqqis ta’ multi bbażati fuq in-Notifika ta’ Riżolviment tal-2008.

| 14. | Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni dwar l-ammonti finali tal-multi. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati tal-EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jaqblu mal-Kummissjoni dwar l-ammonti finali tal-multi.

| 15. | Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jirrakkomandaw il-pubblikazzjoni tal-opinjoni tagħhom f’Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

15.

Ir-rappreżentanti tal-Istati EFTA u l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA jirrakkomandaw il-pubblikazzjoni tal-opinjoni tagħhom f’Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

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V Avviżi

PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 25.9.2014 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/29 |
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25.9.2014

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/29

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AVVIŻ TA’ KOMPETIZZJONI ĠENERALI

(2014/C 334/10)

L-Uffiċċju Ewropew għas-Selezzjoni tal-Persunal (EPSO) qed jorganizza din il-kompetizzjoni ġenerali:

EPSO/AST-SC/02/14 — Aġenti tas-sigurtà interna (SC 1)

L-avviż tal-kompetizzjoni hu ppubblikat f’24 lingwa fil-Ġurnal Uffiċjali C 334 A tal-25 ta’ Settembru 2014.

Għal aktar tagħrif ikkonsulta l-websajt tal-EPSO http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/eu-careers.info/

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PROĊEDURI TAL-QORTI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 25.9.2014 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/30 |
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25.9.2014

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/30

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Azzjoni mressqa fis-17 ta' Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Islanda

(Kawża E-12/14)

(2014/C 334/11)

Fis-17 ta' Lulju 2014 inġiebet quddiem il-Qorti tal-EFTA azzjoni kontra l-Islanda mill-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA, irrappreżentata minn Markus Schneider u Catherine Howdle, li aġixxu bħala Aġenti tal-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA, Rue Belliard 35, 1040 Brussell, il-Belġju.

L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA titlob lill-Qorti tal-EFTA biex:

| 1. | Tiddikjara li billi naqset milli tadotta, u/jew tinnotifika lill-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA minnufih bil-miżuri kollha meħtieġa sabiex jiġi implimentat l-Att imsemmi fil-punt 6 tal-Kapitolu IV tal-Anness II tal-Ftehim taż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea (id-Direttiva 2009/125/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-21 ta' Ottubru 2009 li tistabbilixxi qafas għall-iffissar ta' rekwiżiti għall-ekodisinn għal prodotti relatati mal-enerġija), kif adattat għall-Ftehim permezz tal-Protokoll 1 tiegħu, fiż-żmien preskritt, l-Islanda ma ssodisfatx l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Att u skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Tiddikjara li billi naqset milli tadotta, u/jew tinnotifika lill-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA minnufih bil-miżuri kollha meħtieġa sabiex jiġi implimentat l-Att imsemmi fil-punt 6 tal-Kapitolu IV tal-Anness II tal-Ftehim taż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea (id-Direttiva 2009/125/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-21 ta' Ottubru 2009 li tistabbilixxi qafas għall-iffissar ta' rekwiżiti għall-ekodisinn għal prodotti relatati mal-enerġija), kif adattat għall-Ftehim permezz tal-Protokoll 1 tiegħu, fiż-żmien preskritt, l-Islanda ma ssodisfatx l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Att u skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE.

| 2. | Tordna lill-Islanda tħallas l-ispejjeż tal-proċedimenti. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Tordna lill-Islanda tħallas l-ispejjeż tal-proċedimenti.

L-isfond ġuridiku u fattwali u l-eċċezzjonijiet miġjuba bħala sostenn:

| — | L-applikazzjoni tindirizza n-nuqqas tal-Islanda li tikkonforma, sa mhux aktar tard mit-3 ta’ Settembru 2013, ma’ opinjoni motivata mogħtija mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA fit-3 ta Lulju 2013 dwar in-nuqqas ta' dan l-Istat li jimplimenta fl-ordinament ġuridiku nazzjonali tiegħu, id-Direttiva 2009/125/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-21 ta’ Ottubru 2009 li tistabbilixxi qafas għall-iffissar ta' rekwiżiti għall-ekodisinn għal prodotti relatati mal-enerġija (“l-Att”), kif imsemmi fil-punt 6 tal-Kapitolu II tal-Anness II tal-Ftehim taż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea, u kif adattat għal dan il-Ftehim permezz tal-Protokoll 1 tiegħu. |
| --- | --- |

—

L-applikazzjoni tindirizza n-nuqqas tal-Islanda li tikkonforma, sa mhux aktar tard mit-3 ta’ Settembru 2013, ma’ opinjoni motivata mogħtija mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA fit-3 ta Lulju 2013 dwar in-nuqqas ta' dan l-Istat li jimplimenta fl-ordinament ġuridiku nazzjonali tiegħu, id-Direttiva 2009/125/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-21 ta’ Ottubru 2009 li tistabbilixxi qafas għall-iffissar ta' rekwiżiti għall-ekodisinn għal prodotti relatati mal-enerġija (“l-Att”), kif imsemmi fil-punt 6 tal-Kapitolu II tal-Anness II tal-Ftehim taż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea, u kif adattat għal dan il-Ftehim permezz tal-Protokoll 1 tiegħu.

| — | L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA ssostni li l-Islanda ma ssodisfatx l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Artikolu 23 tal-Att u skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE billi ma adottatx, u/jew ma nnotifikatx lill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA, bil-miżuri kollha meħtieġa sabiex jiġi implimentat l-Att fiż-żmien preskritt. |
| --- | --- |

—

L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA ssostni li l-Islanda ma ssodisfatx l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Artikolu 23 tal-Att u skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE billi ma adottatx, u/jew ma nnotifikatx lill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA, bil-miżuri kollha meħtieġa sabiex jiġi implimentat l-Att fiż-żmien preskritt.

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| 25.9.2014 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/31

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Azzjoni mressqa fis-17 ta’ Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Islanda

(Kawża E-11/14)

(2014/C 334/12)

Fis-17 ta’ Lulju 2014 inġiebet quddiem il-Qorti tal-EFTA azzjoni kontra l-Islanda mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA, irrappreżentata minn Markus Schneider u Janne Tysnes Kaasin, li aġixxu bħala Aġenti tal-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA, Rue Belliard 35, 1040 Brussell, il-Belġju.

L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA titlob lill-Qorti tal-EFTA biex:

| 1. | Tiddikjara li billi naqset milli tadotta, u/jew tinnotifika lill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA minnufih bil-miżuri meħtieġa sabiex jiġi implimentat l-Att imsemmi fil-punt 2 tal-Anness XII tal-Ftehim taż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea (id-Direttiva 2011/7/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta’ Frar 2011 dwar il-ġlieda kontra l-ħlas tard fi transazzjonijiet kummerċjali), kif adattat għall-Ftehim taż-ŻEE permezz tal-Protokoll 1 tiegħu, l-Islanda ma ssodisfatx l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Artikolu 12 ta’ dak l-Att u l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Tiddikjara li billi naqset milli tadotta, u/jew tinnotifika lill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA minnufih bil-miżuri meħtieġa sabiex jiġi implimentat l-Att imsemmi fil-punt 2 tal-Anness XII tal-Ftehim taż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea (id-Direttiva 2011/7/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta’ Frar 2011 dwar il-ġlieda kontra l-ħlas tard fi transazzjonijiet kummerċjali), kif adattat għall-Ftehim taż-ŻEE permezz tal-Protokoll 1 tiegħu, l-Islanda ma ssodisfatx l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Artikolu 12 ta’ dak l-Att u l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE.

| 2. | Tordna lill-Islanda tħallas l-ispejjeż tal-proċedimenti. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Tordna lill-Islanda tħallas l-ispejjeż tal-proċedimenti.

L-isfond ġuridiku u fattwali u l-eċċezzjonijiet miġjuba bħala sostenn:

| — | L-applikazzjoni tindirizza n-nuqqas tal-Islanda li tikkonforma, sa mhux aktar tard mit-18 ta’ Frar 2014, ma’ opinjoni motivata mogħtija mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA fit-18 ta Diċembru 2013 dwar in-nuqqas ta’ dan l-Istat li jimplimenta fl-ordinament ġuridiku nazzjonali tiegħu, id-Direttiva 2011/7/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta’ Frar 2011 dwar il-ġlieda kontra l-ħlas tard fi transazzjonijiet kummerċjali (“l-Att”), kif imsemmi fil-punt 2 tal-Anness XII tal-Ftehim taż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea, u kif adattat għal dan il-Ftehim taż-ŻEE permezz tal-Protokoll 1 tiegħu. |
| --- | --- |

—

L-applikazzjoni tindirizza n-nuqqas tal-Islanda li tikkonforma, sa mhux aktar tard mit-18 ta’ Frar 2014, ma’ opinjoni motivata mogħtija mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA fit-18 ta Diċembru 2013 dwar in-nuqqas ta’ dan l-Istat li jimplimenta fl-ordinament ġuridiku nazzjonali tiegħu, id-Direttiva 2011/7/UE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta’ Frar 2011 dwar il-ġlieda kontra l-ħlas tard fi transazzjonijiet kummerċjali (“l-Att”), kif imsemmi fil-punt 2 tal-Anness XII tal-Ftehim taż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea, u kif adattat għal dan il-Ftehim taż-ŻEE permezz tal-Protokoll 1 tiegħu.

| — | L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA ssostni li l-Islanda ma ssodisfatx l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Artikolu 12 tal-Att u skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE billi ma adottatx, u/jew ma nnotifikatx lill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA, bil-miżuri kollha meħtieġa sabiex jiġi implimentat l-Att fiż-żmien preskritt. |
| --- | --- |

—

L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA ssostni li l-Islanda ma ssodisfatx l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Artikolu 12 tal-Att u skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE billi ma adottatx, u/jew ma nnotifikatx lill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA, bil-miżuri kollha meħtieġa sabiex jiġi implimentat l-Att fiż-żmien preskritt.

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| 25.9.2014 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/32 |
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25.9.2014

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/32

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Azzjoni mressqa fis-17 ta’ Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Islanda

(Kawża E-13/14)

(2014/C 334/13)

Fis-17 ta’ Lulju 2014 inġiebet quddiem il-Qorti tal-EFTA azzjoni kontra l-Islanda mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA, irrappreżentata minn Markus Schneider u Maria Moustakali, li aġixxu bħala Aġenti tal-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA, Rue Belliard 35, 1040 Brussell, il-Belġju.

L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA titlob lill-Qorti tal-EFTA biex:

| 1. | Tiddikjara li billi naqset milli tadotta, u/jew tinnotifika lill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA minnufih bil-miżuri kollha meħtieġa sabiex jiġi implimentat l-Att imsemmi fil-punt 21c tal-Anness XVIII tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE (id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 2004/113/KE tat-13 ta’ Diċembru 2004 li timplimenta l-prinċipju ta’ trattament ugwali bejn l-irġiel u n-nisa fl-aċċess għal u l-provvista ta’ merkanzija u servizzi), kif adattat għall-Ftehim permezz tal-Protokoll 1 u bid-Deċiżjoni tal-Kumitat Konġunt Nru 147/2009 tiegħu, fiż-żmien preskritt, l-Islanda ma ssodisfatx l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Att u skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Tiddikjara li billi naqset milli tadotta, u/jew tinnotifika lill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA minnufih bil-miżuri kollha meħtieġa sabiex jiġi implimentat l-Att imsemmi fil-punt 21c tal-Anness XVIII tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE (id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 2004/113/KE tat-13 ta’ Diċembru 2004 li timplimenta l-prinċipju ta’ trattament ugwali bejn l-irġiel u n-nisa fl-aċċess għal u l-provvista ta’ merkanzija u servizzi), kif adattat għall-Ftehim permezz tal-Protokoll 1 u bid-Deċiżjoni tal-Kumitat Konġunt Nru 147/2009 tiegħu, fiż-żmien preskritt, l-Islanda ma ssodisfatx l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Att u skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE.

| 2. | Tordna lill-Islanda tħallas l-ispejjeż tal-proċedimenti. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Tordna lill-Islanda tħallas l-ispejjeż tal-proċedimenti.

L-isfond ġuridiku u fattwali u l-eċċezzjonijiet miġjuba bħala sostenn:

| — | L-applikazzjoni tindirizza n-nuqqas tal-Islanda li tikkonforma, sa mhux aktar tard mis-26 ta’ Awwissu 2013, ma’ opinjoni motivata mogħtija mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA fis-26 ta Ġunju 2013 dwar in-nuqqas ta’ dan l-Istat li jimplimenta fl-ordinament ġuridiku nazzjonali tiegħu d-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 2004/113/KE tat-13 ta’ Diċembru 2004 li timplimenta l-prinċipju ta’ trattament ugwali bejn l-irġiel u n-nisa fl-aċċess għal u l-provvista ta’ merkanzija u servizzi (“l-Att”), kif imsemmi fil-punt 21c tal-Anness XVIII tal-Ftehim taż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea, u kif adattat għal dan il-Ftehim permezz tal-Protokoll 1 tiegħu. |
| --- | --- |

—

L-applikazzjoni tindirizza n-nuqqas tal-Islanda li tikkonforma, sa mhux aktar tard mis-26 ta’ Awwissu 2013, ma’ opinjoni motivata mogħtija mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA fis-26 ta Ġunju 2013 dwar in-nuqqas ta’ dan l-Istat li jimplimenta fl-ordinament ġuridiku nazzjonali tiegħu d-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 2004/113/KE tat-13 ta’ Diċembru 2004 li timplimenta l-prinċipju ta’ trattament ugwali bejn l-irġiel u n-nisa fl-aċċess għal u l-provvista ta’ merkanzija u servizzi (“l-Att”), kif imsemmi fil-punt 21c tal-Anness XVIII tal-Ftehim taż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea, u kif adattat għal dan il-Ftehim permezz tal-Protokoll 1 tiegħu.

| — | L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA tiddikjara li l-Islanda ma ssodisfatx l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Artikolu 17 tal-Att u skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE billi ma adottatx, u/jew ma nnotifikatx lill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA dwar il-miżuri kollha meħtieġa biex jiġi implimentat l-Att fiż-żmien preskritt. |
| --- | --- |

—

L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA tiddikjara li l-Islanda ma ssodisfatx l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Artikolu 17 tal-Att u skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE billi ma adottatx, u/jew ma nnotifikatx lill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA dwar il-miżuri kollha meħtieġa biex jiġi implimentat l-Att fiż-żmien preskritt.

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| 25.9.2014 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/33

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Azzjoni mressqa fis-17 ta' Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Islanda

(Kawża E-14/14)

(2014/C 334/14)

Fis-17 ta' Lulju 2014 l-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA, irrappreżentata minn Markus Schneider u Janne Tysnes Kaasin, li kienu qegħdin jaġixxu bħala Aġenti tal-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA, li tinsab f'Rue Belliard 35, 1040 Brussell, il-Belġju, ħadet azzjoni kontra l-Islanda fil-Qorti tal-EFTA.

L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA titlob lill-Qorti tal-EFTA biex:

| 1. | Tiddikjara li billi l-Islanda naqset li tadotta, u/jew tinnotifika lill-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA minnufih bil-miżuri kollha meħtieġa sabiex jiġi implimentat l-Att imsemmi fil-punt 1a tal-Kapitolu XXIII tal-Anness II tal-Ftehim taż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea (id-Direttiva 2009/48/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-18 ta' Ġunju 2009 dwar is-sikurezza tal-ġugarelli), kif adattat għall-Ftehim taż-ŻEE permezz tal-Protokoll 1 u bid-Deciżjoni tal-Kumitat Konġunt Nru 127/2012 tiegħu, fiż-żmien preskritt, l-Islanda ma ssodisfatx l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Att u skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Tiddikjara li billi l-Islanda naqset li tadotta, u/jew tinnotifika lill-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA minnufih bil-miżuri kollha meħtieġa sabiex jiġi implimentat l-Att imsemmi fil-punt 1a tal-Kapitolu XXIII tal-Anness II tal-Ftehim taż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea (id-Direttiva 2009/48/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-18 ta' Ġunju 2009 dwar is-sikurezza tal-ġugarelli), kif adattat għall-Ftehim taż-ŻEE permezz tal-Protokoll 1 u bid-Deciżjoni tal-Kumitat Konġunt Nru 127/2012 tiegħu, fiż-żmien preskritt, l-Islanda ma ssodisfatx l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Att u skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE.

| 2. | Tordna lill-Islanda tħallas l-ispejjeż tal-proċedimenti. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Tordna lill-Islanda tħallas l-ispejjeż tal-proċedimenti.

L-isfond ġuridiku u fattwali u l-eċċezzjonijiet miġjuba bħala sostenn:

| — | L-applikazzjoni tindirizza n-nuqqas tal-Islanda li tikkonforma, sa mhux aktar tard mill-5 ta’ Mejju 2014, ma’ opinjoni motivata mogħtija mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA fil-5 ta Marzu 2014 dwar in-nuqqas ta' dan l-Istat li jimplimenta fl-ordinament ġuridiku nazzjonali tiegħu, id-Direttiva 2009/48/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-18 ta’ Ġunju 2009 dwar is-sikurezza tal-ġugarelli (“l-Att”), kif imsemmi fil-punt 1a tal-Kapitolu XXIII tal-Anness II għall-Ftehim taż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea, u kif adattat għal dan il-Ftehim permezz tal-Protokoll 1 tiegħu. |
| --- | --- |

—

L-applikazzjoni tindirizza n-nuqqas tal-Islanda li tikkonforma, sa mhux aktar tard mill-5 ta’ Mejju 2014, ma’ opinjoni motivata mogħtija mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA fil-5 ta Marzu 2014 dwar in-nuqqas ta' dan l-Istat li jimplimenta fl-ordinament ġuridiku nazzjonali tiegħu, id-Direttiva 2009/48/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-18 ta’ Ġunju 2009 dwar is-sikurezza tal-ġugarelli (“l-Att”), kif imsemmi fil-punt 1a tal-Kapitolu XXIII tal-Anness II għall-Ftehim taż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea, u kif adattat għal dan il-Ftehim permezz tal-Protokoll 1 tiegħu.

| — | L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA tiddikjara li l-Islanda ma ssodisfatx l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Artikolu 54 tal-Att u skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE, billi ma adottatx, u/jew ma nnotifikatx lill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA dwar il-miżuri kollha meħtieġa biex jiġi implimentat l-Att fiż-żmien preskritt. |
| --- | --- |

—

L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA tiddikjara li l-Islanda ma ssodisfatx l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Artikolu 54 tal-Att u skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE, billi ma adottatx, u/jew ma nnotifikatx lill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA dwar il-miżuri kollha meħtieġa biex jiġi implimentat l-Att fiż-żmien preskritt.

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| 25.9.2014 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/34

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Azzjoni mressqa fit-18 ta’ Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Islanda

(Kawża E-15/14)

(2014/C 334/15)

Fit-18 ta’ Lulju 2014 l-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA, irrappreżentata minn Markus Schneider u Janne Tysnes Kaasin, li kienu qegħdin jaġixxu bħala Aġenti tal-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA, li tinsab f’Rue Belliard 35, 1040 Brussell, il-Belġju, ħadet azzjoni kontra l-Islanda fil-Qorti tal-EFTA.

L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA titlob lill-Qorti tal-EFTA biex:

| 1. | Tiddikjara li l-Islanda naqset milli twettaq l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE billi naqset milli tadotta l-miżuri meħtieġa sabiex tagħmel parti mill-ordinament ġuridiku intern tagħha, fiż-żmien stipulat, l-Att imsemmi fil-punt 4d tal-Kapitolu XI tal-Anness II għal dan il-Ftehim,
  Ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 1007/2011 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-27 ta’ Settembru 2011 dwar l-ismijiet ta’ fibri ta’ tessuti u t-tikkettar u l-immarkar relatati tal-kompożizzjoni tal-fibri ta’ prodotti tat-tessut u li jħassar id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 73/44/KEE u d-Direttivi 96/73/KE u 2008/121/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill,
  kif emendat bi
  Ir-Regolament ta’ Delega tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 286/2012 tas-27 ta’ Jannar 2012 li jemenda, l-Anness I biex jinkludi isem ġdid ta’ fibra tat-tessuti, u bl-għan li jiġu adattati għall-progress tekniku l-Annessi VIII u IX tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1007/2011 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar l-ismijiet ta’ fibri ta’ tessuti u t-tikkettar u l-immarkar relatati tal-kompożizzjoni tal-fibri ta’ prodotti tat-tessuti,
  u kif adattat għall-Ftehim taż-ŻEE permezz tal-Protokoll 1 tiegħu. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Tiddikjara li l-Islanda naqset milli twettaq l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE billi naqset milli tadotta l-miżuri meħtieġa sabiex tagħmel parti mill-ordinament ġuridiku intern tagħha, fiż-żmien stipulat, l-Att imsemmi fil-punt 4d tal-Kapitolu XI tal-Anness II għal dan il-Ftehim,

Ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 1007/2011 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-27 ta’ Settembru 2011 dwar l-ismijiet ta’ fibri ta’ tessuti u t-tikkettar u l-immarkar relatati tal-kompożizzjoni tal-fibri ta’ prodotti tat-tessut u li jħassar id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 73/44/KEE u d-Direttivi 96/73/KE u 2008/121/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill,

kif emendat bi

Ir-Regolament ta’ Delega tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 286/2012 tas-27 ta’ Jannar 2012 li jemenda, l-Anness I biex jinkludi isem ġdid ta’ fibra tat-tessuti, u bl-għan li jiġu adattati għall-progress tekniku l-Annessi VIII u IX tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1007/2011 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar l-ismijiet ta’ fibri ta’ tessuti u t-tikkettar u l-immarkar relatati tal-kompożizzjoni tal-fibri ta’ prodotti tat-tessuti,

u kif adattat għall-Ftehim taż-ŻEE permezz tal-Protokoll 1 tiegħu.

| 2. | Tordna lill-Islanda tħallas l-ispejjeż tal-proċedimenti. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Tordna lill-Islanda tħallas l-ispejjeż tal-proċedimenti.

L-isfond ġuridiku u fattwali u l-eċċezzjonijiet miġjuba bħala sostenn:

| — | L-applikazzjoni tindirizza n-nuqqas tal-Islanda li tikkonforma, fil-limiti taż-żmien stipulati, ma’ żewġ opinjonijiet motivati mogħtija mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA dwar in-nuqqas ta’ dan l-Istat li jimplimenta fl-ordinament ġuridiku nazzjonali tiegħu, ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 1007/2011 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-27 ta’ Settembru 2011 dwar l-ismijiet ta’ fibri ta’ tessuti u t-tikkettar u l-immarkar relatati tal-kompożizzjoni tal-fibri ta’ prodotti tat-tessut u li jħassar id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 73/44/KEE u d-Direttivi 96/73/KE u 2008/121/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill, kif ukoll in-nuqqas tagħha li tagħmel parti mill-ordinament ġuridiku nazzjonali tagħha r-Regolament ta’ Delega tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 286/2012 tas-27 ta’ Jannar 2012 li jemenda, sabiex jinkludi isem ta’ fibra tat-tessut ġdida, l-Anness I, u għall-iskopijiet tal-adattament tagħhom għall-progress tekniku, l-Annessi VIII u IX għar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1007/2011 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar l-ismijiet ta’ fibri ta’ tessuti u t-tikkettar u l-immarkar relatati tal-kompożizzjoni tal-fibri ta’ prodotti tat-tessut (“l-Atti”), it-tnejn li huma kif imsemmija fil-punt 4d tal-Kapitolu XI tal-Anness II tal-Ftehim dwar iż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea, u kif adattat għal dan il-Ftehim permezz tal-Protokoll 1 tiegħu. |
| --- | --- |

—

L-applikazzjoni tindirizza n-nuqqas tal-Islanda li tikkonforma, fil-limiti taż-żmien stipulati, ma’ żewġ opinjonijiet motivati mogħtija mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA dwar in-nuqqas ta’ dan l-Istat li jimplimenta fl-ordinament ġuridiku nazzjonali tiegħu, ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 1007/2011 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-27 ta’ Settembru 2011 dwar l-ismijiet ta’ fibri ta’ tessuti u t-tikkettar u l-immarkar relatati tal-kompożizzjoni tal-fibri ta’ prodotti tat-tessut u li jħassar id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 73/44/KEE u d-Direttivi 96/73/KE u 2008/121/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill, kif ukoll in-nuqqas tagħha li tagħmel parti mill-ordinament ġuridiku nazzjonali tagħha r-Regolament ta’ Delega tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 286/2012 tas-27 ta’ Jannar 2012 li jemenda, sabiex jinkludi isem ta’ fibra tat-tessut ġdida, l-Anness I, u għall-iskopijiet tal-adattament tagħhom għall-progress tekniku, l-Annessi VIII u IX għar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1007/2011 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar l-ismijiet ta’ fibri ta’ tessuti u t-tikkettar u l-immarkar relatati tal-kompożizzjoni tal-fibri ta’ prodotti tat-tessut (“l-Atti”), it-tnejn li huma kif imsemmija fil-punt 4d tal-Kapitolu XI tal-Anness II tal-Ftehim dwar iż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea, u kif adattat għal dan il-Ftehim permezz tal-Protokoll 1 tiegħu.

| — | L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA tiddikjara li billi naqset milli tadotta l-miżuri neċessarji biex tagħmel l-Atti parti mill-ordinament ġuridiku intern tagħha, fil-limitu taż-żmien preskritt, l-Islanda naqset milli twettaq l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE. |
| --- | --- |

—

L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA tiddikjara li billi naqset milli tadotta l-miżuri neċessarji biex tagħmel l-Atti parti mill-ordinament ġuridiku intern tagħha, fil-limitu taż-żmien preskritt, l-Islanda naqset milli twettaq l-obbligi tagħha skont l-Artikolu 7 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE.

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| 25.9.2014 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/35 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/35

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Azzjoni mressqa fil-25 ta’ Lulju 2014 mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA kontra l-Prinċipat tal-Liechtenstein

(Kawża E-17/14)

(2014/C 334/16)

Fil-25 ta’ Lulju 2014, tressqet azzjoni kontra l-Prinċipat tal-Liechtenstein quddiem il-Qorti tal-EFTA mill-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA, irrappreżentata minn Xavier Lewis u Janne Tysnes Kaasin, li kienu qegħdin jaġixxu ta’ Aġenti tal-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA, f’Rue Belliard 35, 1040 Brussell, il-Belġju.

L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA titlob lill-Qorti tal-EFTA biex:

| 1. | Tiddikjara li billi żamm fis-seħħ regoli nazzjonali bħall-Artikolu 63 tal-Att dwar is-Saħħa u d-dispożizzjoni tranżitorja fl-Att dwar ir-revoka tal-Att dwar is-Saħħa, inkluża l-applikabbiltà tal-Artikolu 63 paragrafu 2 tal-Att dwar is-Saħħa f’dawk l-aspetti, li jeħtieġu li “Dentist” awtorizzat għandu jeżerċita l-professjoni tiegħu bħala impjegat, taħt is-superviżjoni diretta, it-tagħlim u r-responsabbiltà ta’ dentist kwalifikat bis-sħiħ, il-Prinċipat tal-Liechtenstein naqas milli jissodisfa l-obbligi tiegħu li jirriżultaw mill-Artikolu 31 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Tiddikjara li billi żamm fis-seħħ regoli nazzjonali bħall-Artikolu 63 tal-Att dwar is-Saħħa u d-dispożizzjoni tranżitorja fl-Att dwar ir-revoka tal-Att dwar is-Saħħa, inkluża l-applikabbiltà tal-Artikolu 63 paragrafu 2 tal-Att dwar is-Saħħa f’dawk l-aspetti, li jeħtieġu li “Dentist” awtorizzat għandu jeżerċita l-professjoni tiegħu bħala impjegat, taħt is-superviżjoni diretta, it-tagħlim u r-responsabbiltà ta’ dentist kwalifikat bis-sħiħ, il-Prinċipat tal-Liechtenstein naqas milli jissodisfa l-obbligi tiegħu li jirriżultaw mill-Artikolu 31 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE.

| 2. | Tordna lill-Prinċipat tal-Liechtenstein biex iħallas l-ispejjeż tal-proċedimenti. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Tordna lill-Prinċipat tal-Liechtenstein biex iħallas l-ispejjeż tal-proċedimenti.

L-isfond ġuridiku u fattwali u l-eċċezzjonijiet miġjuba bħala sostenn:

| — | L-Artikolu 63 tal-Att dwar is-Saħħa tal-Liechtenstein jistipula li “Dentist” jista’ biss jaħdem taħt is-superviżjoni diretta, it-tagħlim u r-responsabbiltà ta’ dentist kwalifikat bis-sħiħ (Zahnarzt). |
| --- | --- |

—

L-Artikolu 63 tal-Att dwar is-Saħħa tal-Liechtenstein jistipula li “Dentist” jista’ biss jaħdem taħt is-superviżjoni diretta, it-tagħlim u r-responsabbiltà ta’ dentist kwalifikat bis-sħiħ (Zahnarzt).

| — | Id-dritt tal-istabiliment garantit skont l-Artikolu 31 taż-ŻEE jeżiġi li ma jkun hemm l-ebda restrizzjonijiet fuq il-libertà tal-istabiliment, inkluż id-dritt li jibdew u jeżerċitaw attivitajiet bħala persuni li jaħdmu għal rashom. |
| --- | --- |

—

Id-dritt tal-istabiliment garantit skont l-Artikolu 31 taż-ŻEE jeżiġi li ma jkun hemm l-ebda restrizzjonijiet fuq il-libertà tal-istabiliment, inkluż id-dritt li jibdew u jeżerċitaw attivitajiet bħala persuni li jaħdmu għal rashom.

| — | L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA tiddikjara li l-Liechtenstein naqas milli jwettaq l-obbligi tiegħu skont l-Artikolu 31 taż-ŻEE. Fil-fehma tagħha, l-Artikolu 63 tal-Att dwar is-Saħħa u d-dispożizzjonijiet tranżitorji fl-Att dwar ir-revoka tal-Att dwar is-Saħħa, inkluża l-applikabbiltà tal-Artikolu 63 paragrafu 2 tal-Att dwar is-Saħħa f’dawk l-aspetti, jammonta għal restrizzjoni skont l-Artikolu 31 taż-ŻEE. |
| --- | --- |

—

L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA tiddikjara li l-Liechtenstein naqas milli jwettaq l-obbligi tiegħu skont l-Artikolu 31 taż-ŻEE. Fil-fehma tagħha, l-Artikolu 63 tal-Att dwar is-Saħħa u d-dispożizzjonijiet tranżitorji fl-Att dwar ir-revoka tal-Att dwar is-Saħħa, inkluża l-applikabbiltà tal-Artikolu 63 paragrafu 2 tal-Att dwar is-Saħħa f’dawk l-aspetti, jammonta għal restrizzjoni skont l-Artikolu 31 taż-ŻEE.

| — | Il-gvern tal-Liechtenstein isostni li l-għan tal-Artikolu 63 tal-Att dwar is-Saħħa huwa li jiżgura l-protezzjoni tas-saħħa pubblika. |
| --- | --- |

—

Il-gvern tal-Liechtenstein isostni li l-għan tal-Artikolu 63 tal-Att dwar is-Saħħa huwa li jiżgura l-protezzjoni tas-saħħa pubblika.

| — | L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA ssostni li dan imur lil hinn minn dak li hu meħtieġ biex jinkiseb il-ħarsien tas-saħħa pubblika li “Dentist” imħarreġ u kwalifikat bis-sħiħ, li jixtieq jeżerċita l-attività professjonali tiegħu f’konformità mad-diploma miksuba tiegħu, għandu jiġi impjegat minn dentist fil-Liechtenstein. |
| --- | --- |

—

L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA ssostni li dan imur lil hinn minn dak li hu meħtieġ biex jinkiseb il-ħarsien tas-saħħa pubblika li “Dentist” imħarreġ u kwalifikat bis-sħiħ, li jixtieq jeżerċita l-attività professjonali tiegħu f’konformità mad-diploma miksuba tiegħu, għandu jiġi impjegat minn dentist fil-Liechtenstein.

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PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 25.9.2014 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/36

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Avviż minn qabel ta’ konċentrazzjoni

(Il-Każ M.7372 — AXA/Hammerson/The real estate portfolio)

Każ li jista’ jiġi kkunsidrat għal proċedura ssimplifikata

(Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE)

(2014/C 334/17)

| 1. | Fit-18 ta’ Settembru 2014, il-Kummissjoni rċeviet notifika ta’ konċentrazzjoni proposta skont l-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1) li permezz tagħha l-impriżi SCI Vendome Commerces (Franza) u Hammerson plc (“Hammerson”, ir-Renju Unit) jakkwistaw fit-tifsira tal-Artikolu 3(1)(b) tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet, il-kontroll konġunt ta’ portafoll ta’ proprjetà immobbli permezz ta’ xiri ta’ ishma. |
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1.

Fit-18 ta’ Settembru 2014, il-Kummissjoni rċeviet notifika ta’ konċentrazzjoni proposta skont l-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1) li permezz tagħha l-impriżi SCI Vendome Commerces (Franza) u Hammerson plc (“Hammerson”, ir-Renju Unit) jakkwistaw fit-tifsira tal-Artikolu 3(1)(b) tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet, il-kontroll konġunt ta’ portafoll ta’ proprjetà immobbli permezz ta’ xiri ta’ ishma.

| 2. | L-attivitajiet kummerċjali tal-impriżi kkonċernati huma:






  — | SCI Vendome Commerces hija 100 % sussidjarja tal-kumpaniji ta’ AXA France Insurance. AXA huwa grupp ta’ assigurazzjoni globali attiv fl-assigurazzjoni tal-ħajja, tas-saħħa u forom oħra ta’ assigurazzjoni, kif ukoll fil-ġestjoni tal-investiment, |
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2.

L-attivitajiet kummerċjali tal-impriżi kkonċernati huma:

—

SCI Vendome Commerces hija 100 % sussidjarja tal-kumpaniji ta’ AXA France Insurance. AXA huwa grupp ta’ assigurazzjoni globali attiv fl-assigurazzjoni tal-ħajja, tas-saħħa u forom oħra ta’ assigurazzjoni, kif ukoll fil-ġestjoni tal-investiment,

| — | Hammerson hija attiva fl-iżvilupp tal-proprjetà immobbli kummerċjali u l-kiri u l-operazzjoni tal-proprjetà immobbli kummerċjali tagħha stess. Hammerson hija żviluppatur u sid-maniġer ta’ ċentri kummerċjali u parkeġġi bl-imnut primarjament fir-Renju Unit u anki fi Franza, |
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Hammerson hija attiva fl-iżvilupp tal-proprjetà immobbli kummerċjali u l-kiri u l-operazzjoni tal-proprjetà immobbli kummerċjali tagħha stess. Hammerson hija żviluppatur u sid-maniġer ta’ ċentri kummerċjali u parkeġġi bl-imnut primarjament fir-Renju Unit u anki fi Franza,

| — | Il-portafoll tal-proprjetà immobbli jikkonsisti f’ċentru kummerċjali u unità residenzjali tas-sjieda tal-madwar, kif ukoll jinsabu fi Bristol (ir-Renju Unit), parkeġġ tal-karozzi b’ħafna sulari u l-art tal-madwar fi Bristol City Centre. |
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Il-portafoll tal-proprjetà immobbli jikkonsisti f’ċentru kummerċjali u unità residenzjali tas-sjieda tal-madwar, kif ukoll jinsabu fi Bristol (ir-Renju Unit), parkeġġ tal-karozzi b’ħafna sulari u l-art tal-madwar fi Bristol City Centre.

| 3. | Wara analiżi preliminari, il-Kummissjoni tqis li t-tranżazzjoni notifikata tista’ taqa’ fil-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet. Madankollu, id-deċiżjoni finali dwar dan il-punt hija riżervata. Skont l-Avviż tal-Kummissjoni dwar proċedura simplifikata għat-trattament ta’ ċerti konċentrazzjonijiet skont ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (2) ta’ min jinnota li dan il-każ jista’ jiġi kkunsidrat għal trattament skont il-proċedura stipulata f’dan l-Avviż. |
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3.

Wara analiżi preliminari, il-Kummissjoni tqis li t-tranżazzjoni notifikata tista’ taqa’ fil-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet. Madankollu, id-deċiżjoni finali dwar dan il-punt hija riżervata. Skont l-Avviż tal-Kummissjoni dwar proċedura simplifikata għat-trattament ta’ ċerti konċentrazzjonijiet skont ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (2) ta’ min jinnota li dan il-każ jista’ jiġi kkunsidrat għal trattament skont il-proċedura stipulata f’dan l-Avviż.

| 4. | Il-Kummissjoni tistieden lill-partijiet terzi interessati biex jibagħtu lilha l-kummenti li jista’ jkollhom dwar l-operazzjoni proposta.
  Il-kummenti jridu jaslu għand il-Kummissjoni mhux aktar tard minn għaxart ijiem wara d-data ta’ din il-pubblikazzjoni. Il-kummenti jistgħu jintbagħtu lill-Kummissjoni permezz tal-faks (+32 22964301), permezz tal-email lil COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu jew permezz tal-posta, bin-numru ta’ referenza M.7372 — AXA/Hammerson/The real estate portfolio, f’dan l-indirizz:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Il-Kummissjoni tistieden lill-partijiet terzi interessati biex jibagħtu lilha l-kummenti li jista’ jkollhom dwar l-operazzjoni proposta.

Il-kummenti jridu jaslu għand il-Kummissjoni mhux aktar tard minn għaxart ijiem wara d-data ta’ din il-pubblikazzjoni. Il-kummenti jistgħu jintbagħtu lill-Kummissjoni permezz tal-faks (+32 22964301), permezz tal-email lil COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu jew permezz tal-posta, bin-numru ta’ referenza M.7372 — AXA/Hammerson/The real estate portfolio, f’dan l-indirizz:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  ĠU L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (ir-“Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet”).

(2)  ĠU C 366, 14.12.2013, p. 5.

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Rettifika

| 25.9.2014 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 334/37 |
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25.9.2014

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 334/37

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Rettifika għall-Aġġornament tal-lista ta’ punti tal-qsim tal-fruntieri msemmija fl-Artikolu 2(8) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 562/2006 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill li jistabbilixxi Kodiċi Komunitarju dwar ir-regoli li jirregolaw il-moviment ta’ persuni minn naħa għal oħra tal-fruntiera (Kodiċi tal-Fruntieri ta’ Schengen) (
  ĠU C 316, 28.12.2007, p. 1
  ;
  ĠU C 134, 31.5.2008, p. 16
  ;
  ĠU C 177, 12.7.2008, p. 9
  ;
  ĠU C 200, 6.8.2008, p. 10
  ;
  ĠU C 331, 31.12.2008, p. 13
  ;
  ĠU C 3, 8.1.2009, p. 10
  ;
  ĠU C 37, 14.2.2009, p. 10
  ;
  ĠU C 64, 19.3.2009, p. 20
  ;
  ĠU C 99, 30.4.2009, p. 7
  ;
  ĠU C 229, 23.9.2009, p. 28
  ;
  ĠU C 263, 5.11.2009, p. 22
  ;
  ĠU C 298, 8.12.2009, p. 17
  ;
  ĠU C 74, 24.3.2010, p. 13
  ;
  ĠU C 326, 3.12.2010, p. 17
  ;
  ĠU C 355, 29.12.2010, p. 34
  ;
  ĠU C 22, 22.1.2011, p. 22
  ;
  ĠU C 37, 5.2.2011, p. 12
  ;
  ĠU C 149, 20.5.2011, p. 8
  ;
  ĠU C 190, 30.6.2011, p. 17
  ;
  ĠU C 203, 9.7.2011, p. 14
  ;
  ĠU C 210, 16.7.2011, p. 30
  ;
  ĠU C 271, 14.9.2011, p. 18
  ;
  ĠU C 356, 6.12.2011, p. 12
  ;
  ĠU C 111, 18.4.2012, p. 3
  ;
  ĠU C 183, 23.6.2012, p. 7
  ;
  ĠU C 313, 17.10.2012, p. 11
  ;
  ĠU C 394, 20.12.2012, p. 22
  ;
  ĠU C 51, 22.2.2013, p. 9
  ;
  ĠU C 167, 13.6.2013, p. 9
  ;
  ĠU C 242, 23.8.2013, p. 2
  ;
  ĠU C 275, 24.9.2013, p. 7
  ;
  ĠU C 314, 29.10.2013, p. 5
  ;
  ĠU C 324, 9.11.2013, p. 6
  ;
  ĠU C 57, 28.2.2014, p. 4
  ;
  ĠU C 167, 4.6.2014, p. 9
  )

(
  Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea C 244 tas-26 ta’ Lulju 2014
  )

(2014/C 334/18)

Fil-paġna 22, fil-punt (2):

minflok:

“Fruntiera Bulgara-Maċedona”,

aqra:

aqra:

“Fruntiera bejn il-Bulgarija u dik li kienet ir-Repubblika Jugoslava tal-Maċedonja”.

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