JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General 

Supreme Court Building 

P. 0. Box 12548 

Austin. TX. 78711. 2548 

512,4752501 

Telex 91018761367 

Telecopier 5121475.0268 

714 Jackson, Suite 700 

Dallas, TX. 752024506 

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El Paso, TX. 79905-2793 

91515333484 

-1 Texas, Suite 700 

,uston, TX. 77002-3111 

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808 Broadway, Suite 312 

Lubbock. TX. 79401-3479 

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512/582-4547 

200 Main Plaza, Suite 400 

San Antonio. TX. 78205-2797 

51212254191 

An Equal Opportunityi 

Affirmative Action Employer 

The Attorney General of Texas 

July 10. 1986 

Honorable Mark W. S~:iles 

Chairman 

State Affairs Commi:tee 

Texas House of Representatives 

P. 0. Box 2910 

Austin, Texas 787159 

Opinion No. JM-514 

Ret Whether a city may require a 

school district to apply for a 

special building use permit in 

order to convert a school facility 

to an administrative facility 

Dear Representative Stiles: 

You inform us that the Beaumont Independent School District has 

operated an element:ary school in a residential area of the city of 

Beaumont. In June, 1985, however, the board of trustees voted to 

convert that facility to a central administrative office building for 

the school distric,t. In order to obtain the requisite building 

permits for the conrersion, the city required that the school district 

comply with city z,,ning ordinances requiring it to make application 

for a specific use ,?ermit. 

Although the school board complied with all city fire and 

building codes, it a,bjected to the city's requirements on the ground 

that the city has no authority to require the school district to 

follow the specific use application process. The city has, in fact, 

granted the required permit, but asserts that it has the authority to 

require the school district to comply with the permit procedures and 

conditions. In that regard you ask whether a municipality may require 

a school district to comply with city zoning ordinances requiring the 

school district to apply for a specific use permit in order to convert 

a school facility t) an administrative facility. 

The issue as presented is governed by the principles of Port 

Arthur Independent School District v. City of Groves, 376 S.W.Zd?% 

(Tex. 19641, and Austin Independent School District v. City of Sunset 

Valley, 502 S.W.2rg70 (Tex. 1973); see also Attorney General Opinion 

JM-180 (1984). In Groves, supra, the issue was whether a school 

district had to c:omply with the city's building regulations in 

constructing a school facility on school property located within the 

boundaries of a t,ome rule city. The school district in Groves 

contended that the city could not exercise its police power against 

the school district because a school district is an independent 

political subdivision of the state. State property is exempt from 

p. 2358 
Honorable Mark W. Stiles - Page 2 (JM-514) 

municipal zoning. Attorne:r General~Opinion JM-117 (1983). The Texas 

Supreme Court rejected the school district's contention because a 

school district.'s property should not be classified as state property. 

376 S.W.2d at 333. The court held that school buildings of an 

independent schooi district are subject to reasonable ordinances of 

the city. 376 S.W.2d at 334. The Texas Supreme Court in Sunset 

Valley consideied whether t'he city could, through its zoning regulations, wholly_ prohibit the location of school facilities within its 

boundaries. 502 S.W.2d at 671. The court emphasized that the 

reasonableness of the scIioc1 district's action was not before.it. 502 

S.W.2d at 672. Relying on well-established principles of zoning law, 

the court held that the c:.ty could not totally exclude schools from 

areas zoned residential.~ Id. In both Groves and Sunset Valley, the 

proposed buildings were sdool facilities, not administrative offices. 

School facilities traditicnally receive special treatment in zoning 

law. See 502 S.W.2d at 67i. - 

At issue here is the t:ransformation of a school facility into an 

administrative office bulLding. The court of appeals in City of 

Addison v. Dallas Indepen(.ent School District, 632 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. 

Civ..App~. - Dallas 1982, w;it ref'd n.r.e.), held that a city cannot 

declare a legitimate school district action to be a nuisance per ;e 

and thereby prohibit the action. At issue was the school district s 

use of its property for a b,us:parking facility. The court left open 

the possibility that the activity could become a nuisance by reason of 

its locality, surroundings, or manner of operation. 632 S.W.2d at 

774. In essence, the cm.rt held that the city could not totally 

foreclose this use of the property simply by declaring the use to be 

a nuisance per se. Although the case is not directly applicable 

because it turned on nuisance law rather than on zoning law, we 

believe that. when it is read with Groves and Sunset Valley, it stands 

for the proposition that the city cannot exclude the school district's 

administrative offices. 

As indicated, however,, the city has not totally excluded the 

school district's administrative facility. The city has, in fact, 

granted the specific use permit. The city's permit procedure and 

conditions are designed to :provide a reasonable means to assure that 

the health, safety, property and welfare of the people affected by the 

proposed land use are prote,cted. The Texas Supreme Court's decision 

in Groves makes it clear that a school district's facilities are 

subject to reasonable tit], ordinances. 376 S.W.2d at 334. As the 

court stated: "To hold smherwise would be to leave a hiatus in 

regulation necessary to th6: health and safety of the community." Id. 

Accordingly, so long as a city's specific use permit procedures and 

conditions do not attempt to totally exclude a school district's 

facilities and are reasonably related to the protection of the health, 

safety, and welfare of the cmmunity. the school district must comply 

with those procedures and conditions. 

p. 2359 
Honorable Mark W. Stiles - P.sge 3 (JM-514) 

S U.MM.ARY 

The Beaumont Independent School District must 

comply with reasonable city of Beaumont's zoning 

ordinances in order to convert a classroom 

facility to an administrative facility. The city 

may not, howe.rer, use its zoning powers 

unreasonably to prohibit the conversion. 

Very ruly your s A;, /ka% 

JACK HIGHTOWER 

First Assistant Attorney General 

MARY KELLER 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

RICK GILPIN 

Chairman, Opinion Committee 

Prepared by Tony Guillory and 

Jennifer Riggs 

Assistant Attorneys General 

JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 

p. 2360