IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-1379

Filed June 17, 2020

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

OSCAR VILLAFANA-RAY,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Brook 

Jacobsen, District Associate Judge.

A defendant appeals his conviction of possession of a controlled substance. 

AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Mary K. Conroy, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and May and Greer, JJ.
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MAY, Judge.

Following a trial on the minutes, the district court convicted Oscar VillafanaRay of a drug offense. On appeal, Villafana-Ray argues the district court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.

On February 5, 2019, Officer Robert Michael was on routine patrol. He 

randomly ran the license plate number of a Buick automobile that was sitting

outside a grocery store. The system reported the Buick’s registered owner was 

named Mateo Gutierrez. It also reported that Mateo had a suspended driver’s 

license. So Officer Michael parked nearby and waited for someone to move the 

car. While waiting, he obtained Mateo’s Department of Transportation picture.

Someone got in the Buick and started driving it. Officer Michael thought the 

driver looked like Mateo. But before Officer Michael could initiate a traffic stop, the 

driver pulled over and quickly got out of the vehicle. Officer Michael approached 

the driver and asked if he was Mateo. The driver—who was later identified as 

Villafana-Ray—denied being Mateo. Instead, he said his name was “Oscar” and 

explained he was Mateo’s brother. Officer Michael asked him if he had 

identification. Villafana-Ray said he did not. So Officer Michael decided to detain 

Villafana-Ray while he investigated his identify. 

Before putting Villafana-Ray in the back of the police car, Officer Michael 

performed a pat-down search. He felt a suspicious item. Later testing would show 

the item was synthetic marijuana.

Once Villafana-Ray was in the backseat, Officer Michael ran Villafana-Ray’s 

provided information. Officer Michael also radioed dispatch to confirm Villafana-
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Ray’s identity. Officer Michael then learned Villafana-Ray had a suspended 

license and a warrant out for his arrest. So Officer Michael arrested Villafana-Ray.

The State charged Villafana-Ray with possession of a controlled substance 

in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2019). Villafana-Ray filed a motion 

to suppress. He argued any reasonable suspicion for the stop ended after 

Villafana-Ray informed Officer Michael that he was not the registered owner of the 

vehicle. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion and noted “the 

statement from the individual alone is not enough to completely dispel the 

reasonable suspicion that was the basis for the stop.” Villafana-Ray agreed to a 

trial on the minutes of evidence. He was convicted of possession of a controlled 

substance (synthetic marijuana), first offense. Villafana-Ray appeals.

“We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress on 

constitutional grounds de novo.” State v. Coleman, 890 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Iowa 

2017). “We examine the entire record and ‘make an independent evaluation of the 

totality of the circumstances.’” State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Iowa 2019) 

(quoting State v. Meyer, 543 N.W.2d 876, 877 (Iowa 1996)). “We give deference 

to the district court’s fact findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of

the witnesses, but we are not bound by those findings.” State v. Storm, 898 

N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 2017) (quoting State v. Brown, 890 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Iowa 

2017)). 

Villafana-Ray contends the district court erred in concluding State v. 

Coleman, 890 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 2017), did not require suppression. He argues 

that, once Officer Michael “was made aware that Villafana-Ray was not the 

registered owner of the vehicle, under Coleman, his further detention of Villafana-
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Ray and the checking of Villafana-Ray’s license status unconstitutionally extended 

the traffic stop.” 

We start with the general rule that

an officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop 

of a vehicle to investigate whether the driver has a valid driver’s 

license when [1] the officer knows the registered owner of the vehicle 

has a suspended license, and [2] the officer is unaware of any 

evidence or circumstances indicating the registered owner is not the 

driver of the vehicle. 

State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Iowa 2010). Coleman elaborated on this 

rule. 890 N.W.2d at 301. Like the case at bar, Coleman involved a traffic stop 

after a police officer performed random license plate checks. Id. at 285. The officer 

in Coleman stopped a vehicle because the owner of the vehicle, who was female,

had a suspended driver’s license. Id. But when the officer approached the vehicle, 

“it was clear . . . that the driver was male, not female.” Id. This discovery, the 

Coleman court held, should have ended the stop. See id. at 301. The court 

explained “that when the reason for a traffic stop is resolved and there is no other 

basis for reasonable suspicion, article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution requires 

that the driver must be allowed to go his or her way without further ado.” Id.

Villafana-Ray does not dispute that, because Officer Michael knew the 

Buick’s owner had a suspended license, there was reasonable suspicion to initiate 

the traffic stop. But he argues that, once he denied being the registered owner of 

the vehicle, any reasonable suspicion was dispelled and Coleman prohibited any 

further inquiry. We disagree. “Coleman only applies if outward attributes make it 

obvious that the gender, race, or age of the driver or other occupants of the 

stopped vehicle do not match the identity of the registered owner, who is the focus 
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of the investigation.” State v. Kilpatrick, No. 17-0817, 2018 WL 3060259, at *3 

(Iowa Ct. App. June 20, 2018). Conversely, police officers are “entitled to extend 

[a] stop long enough to resolve any ambiguity concerning the occupants’ identities” 

when the driver “generally matche[s]” the registered owner’s description. Id. Here, 

Officer Michael believed Villafana-Ray looked similar to the description of the 

registered owner—Mateo—who had no valid license to drive the Buick. And 

although Villafana-Ray denied being the owner, Officer Michael was not obligated 

to just take his word for it, especially since Villafana-Ray could provide no 

identification. Cf. id. (“In the officers’ experience, suspects are not always truthful 

about their identities.”). Instead, Officer Michael was entitled to detain VillafanaRay until “any ambiguity” about his identity was resolved. See id. 

Alternatively, Villafana-Ray asserts that “it is clear from the record that the 

only additional information needed to verify that Villafana-Ray was not the 

registered owner was his full name and birthdate.” So once this information was 

confirmed, “the reasonable suspicion for the stop had been resolved and further 

detention of Villafana-Ray—including the time it took to run his driver’s license 

status and discover it was suspended and Villafana-Ray had an outstanding arrest 

warrant—was unlawful.” But Officer Michael testified he confirmed Villafana-Ray’s 

identity and simultaneously learned about his license status and outstanding 

warrant. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015) (noting “[a]n 

officer . . . may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic 

stop,” so long as it does not prolong the stop). So reasonable suspicion had not 

yet ended. See Coleman, 890 N.W.2d at 301. 
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We note also that, even if there had never been a question about VillafanaRay’s identity, Officer Michael’s actions were still justified. As the State correctly 

notes, Iowa Code section 321.174(3) requires anyone who drives on Iowa 

roadways to have their driver’s license in their “immediate possession at all times 

when operating a motor vehicle.” It also requires drivers to “display” their license 

“upon demand of a . . . peace officer.” Iowa Code § 321.174(3). So when 

Villafana-Ray told Officer Michael he had no form of identification, there was 

probable cause to believe Villafana-Ray had operated the Buick without a license 

in his possession. There was also reasonable suspicion Villafana-Ray had no 

license at all. So we agree with the State that, “[r]ight off the bat, Officer Michael 

had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to determine the extent of VillafanaRay’s infractions.” 

The district court appropriately denied Villafana-Ray’s motion to suppress.1

AFFIRMED.

 

1 We note that Villafana-Ray also contends the pat-down was unconstitutional. 

The district court concluded, and the State does not dispute, that the pat-down was 

unwarranted. But the district court also found that, even if the pat-down would not 

have occurred, the drugs in Villafana-Ray’s pants would still have been discovered 

during his ultimate arrest. So the district court ruled the doctrine of inevitable 

discovery applies. See State v. Christianson, 627 N.W.2d 910, 912 (Iowa 2001) 

(noting that under the inevitable-discovery doctrine, “relevant, probative evidence 

gathered despite Fourth Amendment violations is not constitutionally excluded 

when the police would have inevitably discovered the same evidence acting 

properly”). Villafana-Ray does not challenge this ruling. And we decline to explore 

the issue on his behalf. See Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa 1996) 

(“[W]e will not speculate on the arguments [an appellant] might have made and 

then search for legal authority and comb the record for facts to support such 

arguments.”).