### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE December 11, 2001 Session STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RAND ALL TAYLOR Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Franklin County No. 13163 Thomas W. Graham, Judge

No. M2001-00018-CCA-R3-CD - Filed April 29, 2002
Defendant

contends there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction f or driving on a revoked license. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed
J OHN E VERETT W ILLIAMS , J., delivered the opinion of the cour

t, in which J OE G. R ILEY and J AMES C URWOOD W ITT , J R ., JJ., joined. Philip A. Condra, District Public Defender, and David O. McGovern, Assistant Public Defender, for the appellant, Randall Taylor. Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Jennifer L. Bledsoe, Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Taylor, District Attorney General; and William Bobo Copeland, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION On March 6, 2000, a Franklin County Grand Jury returned a seven count indictment a

gainst defendant,

Randall Taylor, charging him with driving unde r the i nfluence of an intoxicant, third offense; driving on a revoked license, second offense; and reckless driving.
A jury trial was conducted, and defendant was found guilty of driving on a revoked license, secondoffense. The trial court dismissed the count of reckless driving, and a mistrial was entered on the count of DUI

because the jury

could not reach a

verdict. Defendant

was ordered to serve eight months of the eleven-month, twenty-nine day sentence in the county jail with the balance on probation. He was also ordered to pay a fine of $3,000.00.-2-

Defendant

successfully sought a reinstatement of his bond on November 8, 2000. Defendant filed a motion for new trial which was denied by the trial court on December 1, 2000. Defendant’s notice of appeal was timely filed on January 2, 2001. On this appeal, defe

ndant specifica lly challenges the sufficiency of t

he evidence as t

o whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was driving on February 3, 2000. This issue is presented because defendant was charged with driving on a revoked license on February 3, 2000, and defe ndant’s driv

ing record stat us on February 3 was that of revoked as set forth in a trial exhibit consisting of a report that showed that on February 3, 2000, the defendant’s driving privileg es we re revoked. De fendant contend

s that the wreck ma

y well have occur

red late on February 2, 2000, and the jury had insufficient evidence to conclude that defendant was driving on February 3, 2000. Facts During the early morning hours of February 3, 2000, a resident of Huntland, Tennessee, called911 to report that a suspicious person was knocking on the door of the caller’s house. The 911 dispatcher

reported this over the police radio, which was heard by Officer Thomas Davidson. The caller’s location was at the intersection of David Crocket t Highway and Post Oak Road. Officer Davidson verified the location as he was not familiar with the address. He then realized that he was already near the locatio

n, and as he pulled

onto Post

Oak Road, he saw d

efendant walk

across the street. Officer Davids

on pulled off to the

si de of the road and questioned defendant. Defendant stated that he was looking for a ride, and Officer Davidson noticed a truck “half-way in the ditch.” Officer Davidson asked defendant if the truck

belonged to defendant, and defendant responded that the truck belonged

to a friend. Officer Davidson asked defendant if he was driving the truck, and defendant responded, “Yes, I

was.” Officer

Davidson then aske

d to see defendant’s drivers license. Officer Davidson testified that defendant appeared to be having difficulty standing, s o Officer Davidson aske d defenda nt to sit on the tailgate of the truck. Officer Davidson testified that he noticed an odor of alcohol on defendant and stated that defendant appeared to be under the influenc e of an intoxicant. Of

ficer Davidson th

en returned to

his patrol car to check the status of defendant’s license and wait f

or Sergeant Wayne Morris of the Franklin County Sheriff’s Office to arrive. Officer Davidson testified that he did not find out how long the truck had been there. Sergeant Morris arrived

on the scene “sometime after midnight, probably 1:00, 1:30, maybe 2:00.” He described his involvement as being “in a very early morning of February 3, 2000. ” Sergeant Morris conducted an accident investigation and stated that the truck “had i mp acted something, and the right front tire was bent back under the frame of the vehicle.” Defendant stated that he hit a fire hydr

ant on the corner

but did not damage it

. Sergeant Mo

rris too k defendant approximately

300 yards to a wate

r hydrant, had him sit in his patr ol car for appro

ximately twenty minutes, and later had Deputy Seth Isbell transport defendant to the jail. Defendant was booked by a guard at the jail a

t approximately 2:5

4 a.m. Sergeant

Morris stated that defendant was taken to the-3-

jail approximately an

hour to an hour-a

nd-a-half afte

r Morris’ initial c

ontact with defen

dant. Sergeant Morris statedthat he inspected the fire hydrant and did not find any damage, and further, “had no idea when the accident occurred.” Sergeant Morris statedthat he ran a che ck of defendant

’s drivers licens

e and discovered that the license had been revoked. Sergeant Morris also stated that defendant had an odor of alcohol on him and was having trouble standing.
A report was introduced as an exhibit at trial to show thatdefendant’s driving privileges on February 3, 2000, were revoked. This Court has previously recognized this as acceptable practice under State v. Sisk

, No. 01C01-9803-CC-00143, 1999 WL 298221, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. Ap p., at Nashville, May 12, 1999). However, no evidence was presented as to defendant’s driving status on February 2, 2000. Analysis
On appeal, the State

is entitled to the str

ongest legitima

te vie w of the evid

ence, and all re asona ble inferences which may be drawn therefrom. State v. Ca bbage , 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (T enn. 1978). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony , a nd th e reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted exclusively to the jury as the trier of fact. Byrge v. State , 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). A guilty verdict, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in the proof in favor of the State’s theory. State v. Hatchett , 560 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tenn. 1978). An offense may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone. Price v. State , 589 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979). Our scope of review is

the same when the conviction is based upon circumstantial evidence as it is when it is based upon direct evidence. State v. Brown , 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 197

7); Farmer v. State

, 208 Tenn. 75, 343 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1961).

De fendant

was indicted for a

nd convicted of dr

iving on a revoke

d license in vio

lation o f Code section 55-50-504(a)(1) (1998). Section 55-50-504 makes it a crime f

or any per

son to drive a motor vehicle on a

ny public hig

hway of this

state at a time whe

n th e person’s privile

ge to do so is cancelled, suspended, or revoked.

Defendant contends that the wreck occurred before or near midnight on February 2, 2000. Further, the State

introduced evidence that defendant’s drivers license was revoked on February 3, 2000. So, in order for a jury to have sufficient evidence upon which to convict defendant for driving on a revoked licen

se on February 3, 2000, it must have sufficient evidence to conclude that the wreck occurred on February 3, 2000, as opposed to Febr uary 2, 2000.-4-

When viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence reveals tha t defenda nt admitted to driving a friend’s truck when it struck a fire hydrant approximately 300 yards from the truck’s final resting place. As evidence of a collision, the truck’s right front tire was bent under the frame of the vehicle. O

fficer Davidson

was dispatched to

the lo cation of a 91 1 caller in the ea rly morning hours of Februa ry 3 and subs

e que ntl y encountered defendant and the wrecked vehicle. Fin all y, an inv est igation of the circumstances was conducted, and defendant was booked at approximately 2:54 a.m.

From the totality o

f the circumst

ance s in the instant case, we believe a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was dr iving some

time after midnig

ht or in the early morning hours of February 3. A jury could reasonably infer that defendant wrecked the truck he was driving sometime after midnight and went to a nearby house seeking assistance, at which time the homeowner

called 911, and an

officer was imme

diately dispatched and arrived on the scene before defendant had returned to his truck, thus precipitating defendant’s arrest.

CONCLUSION Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

___________________________________ JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE