Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-233 | November 14, 2018 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

R. Patrick Magrath

Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP

Madison, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Angela Sanchez

Assistant Section Chief, Criminal 

Appeals

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Shane T. Wilson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

November 14, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-233

Appeal from the Ripley Superior 

Court

The Honorable Jeffrey L. Sharp, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

69D01-1707-F6-111

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-233 | November 14, 2018 Page 2 of 6

Statement of the Case

[1] Shane T. Wilson appeals his 830-day sentence following his conviction for 

attempted arson, as a Level 6 felony. Wilson raises a single issue for our 

review, namely, whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offense and his character. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 13, 2017, Wilson poured gasoline on Ashley Wilson, his wife of nine 

years, while she was in the marital bed and threatened to set her and the bed on 

fire. Ashley called police, and officers arrested Wilson. The State charged 

Wilson with arson and intimidation, and he pleaded guilty to attempted arson, 

as a Level 6 felony.

[4] In January of 2018, the trial court held a sentencing hearing, and Ashley 

testified. Following the hearing, the court found as follows:

The Court appreciates both parties’ well-thought out arguments, 

but[,] really, when you cut this thing, it is very simple. We have 

a situation where a man threatened his wife to set her on fire. I 

kind of think that is enough said. The Court does find the 

criminal history to be an aggravating factor, two prior OWIs. 

The Court gives that the weight the two OWIs get, it is not a 

first-time offense and this is his third offense. . . . The Court 

considers the impact on the victim[] as a[n] aggravating factor,

that being her own statement that indicates that she constantly 

lives in fear with this situation and has constant nightmares and 

that it has not only affected her, but it has affected her children. 
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The other aggravators the State’s indicated . . . is just the nature 

and the circumstance. On[c]e again, you end up with a situation 

where you have a domestic situation that escalates to the point 

where the Defendant had removed all of the telephones from the 

home, disconnected the wires to the battery of the . . . vehicles 

and doused the bed with gasoline and threatened her with a 

lighter. I honestly can’t think, that is a very terrifying situation 

and I think it is a heinous, heinous act, probably one of the worst. 

The Court does consider the mitigating factor that Mr. Wilson 

ple[aded] guilty with no plea agreement. Balancing the 

aggravators and mitigators, the Court finds the aggravators 

clearly outweigh the mitigators and sentence[s] Mr. Wilson to 

830 days, with all of that time executed . . . .

Sent. Tr. at 28-29. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[5] On appeal, Wilson asserts that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides 

that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due 

consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” The Indiana Supreme Court has recently reiterated that: 

The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to 

leaven the outliers . . . but not achieve a perceived “correct” 

result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 

2008). Defendant has the burden to persuade us that the 

sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. 

State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind.), as amended (July 10, 2007), 

decision clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).
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Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 2017) (omission in original).

[6] Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate 

sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should 

receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we 

regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of 

the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to 

others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. 

Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence 

portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by 

restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s character (such as 

substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson 

v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). 

[7] Again, the trial court ordered Wilson to serve 830 days, about 82 days shy of 

two and one-half years. For a Level 6 felony conviction, a sentence may be 

between six months and two and one-half years, with an advisory term of one 

year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b) (2018). In support of Wilson’s aggravated 

sentence, the court relied on Wilson’s criminal history, the impact of the crime 

on his victim, and the nature and circumstances of the offense.

[8] Wilson asserts that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense because he and Ashley had had marital trouble and the nature and 

circumstances of the offense do not exceed the statutory elements of the offense. 

He also asserts that, while Ashley was negatively impacted, “[s]he received no 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-233 | November 14, 2018 Page 5 of 6

physical injury.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. And, with respect to his character, 

Wilson states that he has a history of mental illnesses, that his prior criminal 

history is unrelated and remote in time, that he quickly pleaded guilty without 

the benefit of a plea agreement, and that he has abided by the court’s no-contact 

order.

[9] We cannot say that Wilson’s 830-day sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense. Rather, we agree with the trial court that the nature and 

circumstances of the offense reflect its “heinous” and “terrifying” nature. Sent. 

Tr. at 28-29. Wilson pleaded guilty to attempted arson under Indiana Code 

Section 35-43-1-1(d), which is a Level 6 felony as a property offense, and he 

contends that the facts show nothing more than the elements of that offense. 

But that is manifestly incorrect. Wilson threatened to set his wife on fire in 

their marital bed after he had hidden phones in the residence and disabled the 

family vehicles. This was more than a mere property offense. Further, Ashley 

and her children continue to suffer from the terrifying nature of Wilson’s act—

Ashley has constant nightmares and the children now fear their former father

figure. 

[10] Likewise, we cannot say that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his 

character. While his guilty plea is deserving of mitigating weight and his 

criminal history is unrelated and remote, the trial court considered those factors 

in the first instance and we cannot say that its balancing of them was erroneous. 

Instead, we agree with the trial court that the fact that this was Wilson’s third 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-233 | November 14, 2018 Page 6 of 6

criminal offense reflects poorly on his character, as does the domestic nature of 

his threatened violence. We affirm Wilson’s 830-day sentence.

[11] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.