IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

CHARISE CAUDLE, § 

 Plaintiff, § 

v. § Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-00527-C-BH 

 § 

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, § 

 Defendant. § Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack 

of Jurisdiction, filed March 7, 2022 (doc. 6), should be GRANTED. 

I. BACKGROUND

On January 31, 2022, Charise Caudle (Plaintiff) filed this pro se action against the Social 

Security Administration (SSA) in the Justice of the Peace Court, Precinct 1, Place 1, of Dallas 

County, Texas. (doc. 1-5.)2

 In its entirety, the one-page small claims petition states: 

Wrongful termination of benefits, fraud, tampering with mail, bullying and 

violating my civil rights, adding wrong income and refusing to fix it, refusing 

appeal, and refusing to send my mail or requested documents. 

(Id.) Plaintiff seeks $5,000 in damages. (Id.) 

On March 6, 2022, the SSA removed this action under 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1); the next day, 

it moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (docs. 1, 6.) Plaintiff responded on 

1

By Special Order 3-251, this pro se case has been referred for full case management, including the 

determination of non-dispositive motions and issuance of findings of fact and recommendations on dispositive 

motions. 

2

Citations to the record refer to the CM/ECF system page number at the top of each page rather than the 

page numbers at the bottom of each filing. 

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March 11, 2022, and on April 6, 2022, the SSA submitted its reply in support of the motion to 

dismiss (docs. 8, 9.) 

II. RULE 12(b)(1) 

The SSA moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (doc. 6.) 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges a federal court's subject matter 

jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without 

jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and statute, they lack the power to adjudicate 

claims. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). 

They “must presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing 

federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 

F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). 

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion “may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at 

any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 

546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006). A court must dismiss the action if it determines that it lacks jurisdiction 

over the subject matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 

144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) “is not a determination of the merits,” 

and it “does not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does have proper 

jurisdiction.” Id. 

The district court may dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on (1) the 

complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the 

complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed 

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facts. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981). A motion to dismiss based on the 

complaint alone presents a “facial attack” that requires the court to merely decide whether the 

allegations in the complaint, which are presumed to be true, sufficiently state a basis for subject 

matter jurisdiction. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1998). “If sufficient, 

those allegations alone provide jurisdiction.” Id. Facial attacks are usually made early in the 

proceedings. Id.

If the defendant supports the motion with evidence, however, then the attack is “factual” 

and “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed 

material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional 

claims.” Williamson, 645 F.2d at 413. A factual attack may occur at any stage of the 

proceedings. Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980). Regardless 

of the nature of attack, the party asserting federal jurisdiction continually carries the burden of 

proof to show it exists. Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. 

Here, the SSA relies solely on the complaint to support its motion to dismiss, so it presents 

a facial attack that does not require the resolution of factual matters outside the pleadings. See 

Williamson, 645 F.2d at 412–13. 

A. Sovereign Immunity 

The SSA first moves to dismiss on grounds that Plaintiff failed to identify a waiver of 

immunity that would allow a claim against it. (doc. 6 at 2-3.) 

“The basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued at 

all without the consent of Congress.” Block v. N.D. ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 

273, 287 (1983). “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its 

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agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Because federal sovereign 

immunity is jurisdictional in nature, the consent or waiver must be unequivocally 

expressed. Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2009). The terms of the consent 

or waiver define the jurisdictional boundaries to entertain the suit. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475. In 

general, the scope of a waiver of sovereign immunity is strictly construed “in favor of the 

sovereign.” Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 491 (2008). The plaintiff has the burden to show 

an “unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity.” St. Tammany Parish ex rel. Davis v. FEMA, 556 

F.3d 307, 315 (5th Cir. 2009). 

Here, Plaintiff has not identified a waiver of sovereign immunity that would allow her any 

of her claims against the SSA to proceed. See Martin v. Hyundai Translead, Inc., No. 3:20-CV2147-K, 2020 WL 6701806, at *8–9 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2020) (holding that failure to meet burden 

to satisfy burden to identify express waiver of sovereign immunity that would permit claims to 

proceed required dismissal of those claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). As further 

discussed below, subject matter jurisdiction over her claims does not exist. 

B. Federal Tort Claims Act 

The SSA argues that no jurisdiction exists over any fraud claim under the Federal Tort 

Claims Act (FTCA) because it is an improper party. (doc. 6 at 3.) 

Under the FTCA, “Congress waived the United States’ sovereign immunity for claims 

arising out of torts committed by federal employees.” Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 

217–18 (2008); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671–2680. To successfully sue under the 

FTCA, a claim must be: (1) against the United States; (2) for money damages; (3) for injury or 

loss of property, or personal injury or death; (4) caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 

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omission of any employee of the federal government; (5) while acting within the scope of his office 

or employment; and (6) under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would 

be liable to the plaintiff in accordance with the state law where the act or omission occurred. 28 

U.S.C. § 1346(b); Meyer, 510 U.S. at 477–78. 

Although the FTCA waives sovereign immunity for a tort claim, an agency is not a proper 

defendant in a suit under this statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a); Galvin v. Occupational Safety & 

Health Admin., 860 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1988). The only proper defendant in an FTCA action 

is the United States. Id. Claims against federal agencies under the FTCA are properly dismissed 

for lack of jurisdiction. Id.; see also Williams v. Army and Air Force Exchange Serv., No. 3:21-

CV-2085-G-BH, 2022 WL 1594309, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 2022)(recommending dismissal of 

FTCA claim against federal agency for lack of jurisdiction because it was an improper defendant), 

rec. adopted, 2022 WL 1592831 (N.D. Tex. May 19, 2022); Jones v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:18-

CV-1792-L, 2018 WL 5631504, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2018) (dismissing fraud claim under the 

FTCA against the SSA based on sovereign immunity). Any fraud claims against the SSA should 

be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity. 

C. Derivative Jurisdiction 

The SSA also argues that subject matter jurisdiction is also lacking based on the doctrine 

of derivative jurisdiction. (doc. 6 at 4.) 

Under the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction, “when a case is removed from state to federal 

court, the jurisdiction of the federal court is derived from the state court’s jurisdiction.” Lopez v. 

Sentrillon Corp., 749 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2014). “[W]here the state court lacks jurisdiction of 

the subject matter of the parties, the federal court acquires none, although in a like suit originally 

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brought in a federal court it would have had jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted). Although the 

doctrine of derivative jurisdiction no longer applies to cases removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, it 

still applies to cases removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, like this one. Id. at 351. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases 

arising under the FTCA. Id. They also have exclusive jurisdiction over cases seeking review of 

final decisions regarding social security benefits. See Tiffith v. Saul, No. 20-617-BAJ-EWD, 2021 

WL 1521588, at *2 & n. 4 (M.D. La. Jan. 4, 2021) (citing 42 U.S.C. §405(g)), rec. adopted, 2021 

WL 1518874 (M.D. La. Apr. 16, 2021); see also Jones, 2018 WL 5631504, at *2-3 (“The Social 

Security Act makes clear that any challenge to an SSA decision must be brought in a federal district 

court.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. §405(g)). Because the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s claims against the SSA for fraud or wrongful termination of her social security benefits 

when she filed her petition in small claims court, jurisdiction in this court is likewise lacking, and 

those claims must be dismissed. See Lopez, 749 F.3d at 350 (affirming dismissal of FTCA claims 

originally filed in state court under the derivative jurisdiction doctrine); Tiffith, 2021 WL 1521588, 

at *2 (recommending dismissal of case seeking review of denial of disability insurance benefits 

that was originally filed in state court against Commissioner of Social Security Administration for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the derivative jurisdiction doctrine); Guevara v. United 

States, No. 3:20-CV-0022-D, 2020 WL 1529005, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2020)(dismissing 

FTCA claim filed in state court under the derivative jurisdiction doctrine); Jones, 2018 WL 

5631504, at *3 (dismissing FTCA claim for alleged fraud in connection with his social security 

benefits originally filed against the SSA in state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 

the derivative jurisdiction doctrine). 

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D. Bivens

The SSA does not specifically move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for violation of her civil 

rights. 

As noted, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be raised by a court on its own initiative. Arbaugh, 

546 U.S. at 506. In fact, courts have “a continuing obligation to examine the basis for jurisdiction” 

and may sua sponte raise the issue at any time. See MCG, Inc. v. Great Western Energy Corp., 

896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1990); Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 465-66 (5th 

Cir. 1999). 

Plaintiff’s claims against the SSA for violation of her civil rights may be interpreted as 

arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 

(1971). In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that the violation of a person’s constitutional rights by 

a federal official may give rise to an action for monetary damages in federal court. Bivens, 403 

U.S. 388. Bivens mirrors but is not “‘the substantial equivalent of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.’” Ziglar v. 

Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017) (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit has stated that a Bivens

claim against the United States, a federal agency, and federal officers in their official capacities is 

barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Gibson v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 121 F. 

App’x 549, 551 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Correctional Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 

61, 71-72 (2001); see also Williamson v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 815 F.2d 368, 380-81 

(1987) (noting Bivens only applies to federal officers in their individual capacities but “[t]he 

United States and its officers in pursuit of their official duties remain protected by sovereign 

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immunity”). Any Bivens claim for violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights is also subject to dismissal 

for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity. 

III. RULE 12(b)(6) 

Rule 12(b)(6) allows motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6). Under the 12(b)(6) standard, a court cannot look beyond the 

face of the pleadings. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Spivey v. 

Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1229 (2000). Pleadings must 

show specific, well-pleaded facts, not mere conclusory allegations to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. 

Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992). The court must accept those well-pleaded 

facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker, 75 F.3d at 196. “[A] 

well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the 

alleged] facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, a plaintiff must provide 

“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do.” Id. at 555; accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasizing that “the 

tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable 

to legal conclusions”). The alleged facts must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In short, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Id. at 570. 

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. 

The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more 

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than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads 

facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line 

between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). When plaintiffs “have not nudged their claims across 

the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570; accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It is well-established that “pro se complaints are held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986, 

988 (5th Cir. 1981). 

A court may sua sponte dismiss a plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state 

a claim “as long as the procedure employed is fair;” this requires notice of the intent to dismiss 

and an opportunity to respond. Carter v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Davoodi 

v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 755 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 2014)). “Pre-dismissal notice and

opportunity to respond are not needed ‘if the plaintiff has [already] alleged his best case,” which 

includes “(1) repeatedly declar[ing] the adequacy of that complaint in ... response to [the] 

defendant's motion to dismiss and (2) refus[ing] to file a supplemental complaint even in the face 

of a motion to dismiss.” See id. at 498 n.1 (citing Brown v. Taylor, 829 F.3d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 

2016)) (internal quotations omitted). The recommendation of a United States Magistrate Judge 

that a case be dismissed sua sponte with an opportunity for the plaintiff to object satisfies this

requirement. See Alexander v. Trump, 753 F. App’x 201, 208 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Magouirk v. 

Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1998)). 

Bivens only provides a remedy for victims of constitutional violations by government 

officers in their individual capacities; it does not provide for a cause of action against a federal 

agency or the United States. Affiliated Prof’l Home Health Care Agency v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 282, 

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286 (5th Cir. 1999); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994); Moore v. United States Dep’t 

of Agric., 55 F.3d 991, 995 (5th Cir. 1995). This is because the purpose of a Bivens action is to 

deter a federal officer from violating a person’s constitutional rights. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485; 

Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001). To the extent that jurisdiction exists over 

Plaintiff’s claims for violation of her civil rights, any Bivens claims against the SSA should be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Govea v. ATF, 207 F. App’x 369, 373 (5th Cir. 2006) 

(per curiam) (affirming dismissal of Bivens action against a federal agency under Rule 12(b)(6) 

for failure to state a claim). 

IV. RECOMMENDATION

The SSA’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction should be GRANTED, and all of 

Plaintiff’s claims against it should be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. To the extent that jurisdiction exists over Plaintiff’s claims for violation of her civil 

rights under Bivens, her Bivens claims should be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state 

a claim. 

 SO RECOMMENDED on this 22nd day of August, 2022. 

 

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT 

 A copy of these findings, conclusions and recommendation shall be served on all parties in 

the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions and 

recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a 

copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must 

identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the 

objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates 

by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file 

specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and 

legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except 

upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 

(5th Cir. 1996). 

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