UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-1401

GERMAIN DIDIER NDONGO, 

 Petitioner, 

 v. 

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals.

Submitted: October 7, 2009 Decided: October 27, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Petition dismissed in part and denied in part by unpublished per 

curiam opinion. 

Germain Didier Ndongo, Petitioner Pro Se. Carol Federighi, 

Senior Litigation Counsel, Rebecca Ariel Hoffberg, Office of 

Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Germain Didier Ndongo, a native and citizen of 

Cameroon, petitions for review of an order of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal from the 

immigration judge’s denial of his motion to reopen. For the 

reasons discussed below, we dismiss in part and deny in part the 

petition for review. 

 Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2006), we lack 

jurisdiction, except as provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) 

(2006), to review the final order of removal of an alien 

convicted of certain enumerated crimes, including an aggravated 

felony. Because Ndongo was found removable for having been 

convicted of an aggravated felony, under § 1252(a)(2)(C), we 

have jurisdiction “to review factual determinations that trigger 

the jurisdiction-stripping provision, such as whether [Ndongo] 

[i]s an alien and whether []he has been convicted of an 

aggravated felony.” Ramtulla v. Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 202, 203 

(4th Cir. 2002). Once we confirm these two factual 

determinations, then, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D), we 

can only consider “constitutional claims or questions of law.” 

See Mbea v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 276, 278 n.1 (4th Cir. 2007). 

 Based on our review of the record, we find that 

Ndongo’s conviction under Virginia law for assault and battery 

amounted to a “crime of violence” and was therefore an 

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aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2006); 18 

U.S.C. § 16(a) (2006). Accordingly, Ndongo is indeed an alien 

who has been convicted of an aggravated felony, and 

§ 1252(a)(2)(C) divests us of jurisdiction over the petition for 

review absent a colorable constitutional claim or question of 

law. 

 To the extent that Ndongo argues that the immigration 

court did not provide him with proper notice of his hearing in 

violation of his due process rights, see Gordon v. Leeke, 574 

F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978) (stating that the court 

liberally construes pro se pleadings), we find that the 

immigration judge properly complied with the notice requirements 

set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2006) by sending a hearing 

notice to the last known address provided by Ndongo. We 

therefore find that the immigration judge properly declined to 

rescind the in absentia removal order and reopen Ndongo’s 

proceedings on this ground. 

 Finally, Ndongo claims that he served in the United 

States Army* and has lost his Cameroonian citizenship as a 

 *

 Ndongo implies that he is entitled to some sort of legal 

status in the United States based on his alleged military 

service. Ndongo, however, cannot meet the good moral character 

requirement for naturalization in light of his status as an 

aggravated felon. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a), (e), 1440 (2006); 

O’Sullivan v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 453 F.3d 

809, 812-16 (7th Cir. 2006). 

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result. To the extent that this claim can be considered a 

question of law, we find that Ndongo is not entitled to relief. 

This argument has no bearing on whether Ndongo is entitled to 

reopening or whether he is removable from the United States. 

Instead, Ndongo raises a challenge to the designation of 

Cameroon as the country of removal--a designation that he 

requested during his removal hearing. Additionally, to the 

extent that Ndongo’s military service prevents his removal to 

Cameroon, the Attorney General is authorized to select an 

alternative country pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2) (2006). 

 Accordingly, we dismiss in part and deny in part the 

petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

PETITION DISMISSED IN PART 

AND DENIED IN PART