1

SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the 

convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the 

interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

State v. Cesar A. Lipa (A-31-12) (071011)

Argued February 3, 2014 -- Decided September 25, 2014

RODRÍGUEZ, P.J.A.D. (temporarily assigned), writing for a unanimous Court.

In this appeal, the Court considers the application of the standards set forth in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 

(2009) and Rule 3:21-1, in the context of defendant’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to firstdegree aggravated sexual assault. 

Defendant, Cesar A. Lipa, pleaded guilty to first-degree aggravated sexual assault, based on allegations that 

he committed sexual acts against M.G. on three occasions when she was between the ages of thirteen and sixteen. 

The State agreed to dismiss related charges and to recommend defendant be sentenced as if convicted of a seconddegree crime. During the plea colloquy on January 9, 2009, defendant gave answers to counsel’s leading questions 

that established all of the elements of the offense to which he intended to plead guilty.

On October 27, 2009, after retaining new counsel, and before his sentencing hearing, defendant moved to 

withdraw his guilty plea and to compel production of certain agency records (DYFS). Defendant certified that 

“[m]y prior attorney failed to obtain the necessary documentations to support my innocence.” In particular, 

defendant claimed that he told his first counsel “that alleged victim M.G. had on at least two other occasions made 

false allegations of sexual assault which were investigated by DYFS.” According to the certification, “DYFS found 

that the allegations of both matters were without merit.” The judge reviewed the DYFS records, noted that they 

provided “no basis of a false allegation,” and denied defendant’s request to compel production. 

The judge then reviewed defendant’s certification in support of his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 

Defendant certified that he was “innocent of the[] charges,” that “[t]he allegations by M.G. are false,” and that he 

“did not sexually assault her at any time.” He certified that at the time of his plea, his attorney told him that he “had 

no other option than to take the plea offer since [he] did not have a chance of winning at [t]rial.” Defendant further 

claimed to have been recovering from knee surgery at the time of the second incident making him physically unable 

to commit the alleged act – namely, climbing through a window into M.G.’s second-floor bedroom while 

intoxicated. Defendant introduced a photograph depicting the condition of his leg at that time and photographs 

showing the exterior of M.G.’s home.

After reviewing the test established in Slater, 198 N.J. at 158-59, the court denied defendant’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. The judge found that defendant had not properly asserted a claim of innocence because his

claim merely made a “bald assertion” without factual support, and that the facts he relied on were not unknown to 

him at the time of the plea. The judge concluded that defendant was adequately and correctly informed of the 

consequences of his plea, and his expectations under the plea were met. The court proceeded to sentence defendant 

to an eight-year term, subject to a period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. 

Defendant appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea. The panel concluded that the judge’s decision was well within his discretion in light of the insubstantial facts 

asserted by defendant in support of the motion. The Court granted defendant’s petition for certification. State v. 

Lipa, 213 N.J. 396 (2013).

HELD: In the face of a general denial and specific, potentially plausible facts negating guilt, defendant’s argument 

that the trial court misapplied the standard for deciding a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea has merit. 

Balancing the evidence and arguments in this case against all of the Slater factors, defendant is entitled to withdraw 

his guilty plea in the interest of justice. 
2

1. Before a court can accept a defendant’s guilty plea, it first must be convinced that (1) the defendant has provided 

an adequate factual basis for the plea; (2) the plea is made voluntarily; and (3) the plea is made knowingly. R. 3:9-2. 

Once it is established that a guilty plea was made voluntarily, it may only be withdrawn at the discretion of the trial 

court. State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 444 (1999). A trial judge’s finding that a plea was voluntarily and knowingly 

entered is entitled to appellate deference so long as that determination is supported by sufficient credible evidence in 

the record. State v. McCoy, 222 N.J. Super. 626, 629 (App. Div. 1988), aff’d, 116 N.J. 293 (1989). “[T]he trial 

court’s denial of defendant’s request to withdraw his guilty plea will be reversed on appeal only if there was an 

abuse of discretion which renders the lower court’s decision clearly erroneous.” Simon, 161 N.J. at 444. (pp. 9-10) 

2. Rule 3:21-1, which governs the withdrawal of guilty pleas, provides that “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 

or non vult shall be made before sentencing, but the court may permit it to be made thereafter to correct a manifest 

injustice.” Rule 3:21-1 explicitly provides that the post-sentencing standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea is 

manifest injustice. Before sentencing, the standard is “the interests of justice.” R. 3:9-3(e). (pp. 10-11) 

3. In Slater, the Court outlined a framework to assess a claim to withdraw a guilty plea, and directed trial courts to 

consider the following factors: “(1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the 

nature and strength of defendant’s reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether 

withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused.” 198 N.J. at 150. Here, 

defendant certified that he is innocent, claiming that he was physically unable to commit the alleged assault because

he had surgery on one of his knees around the alleged date of the incident and would have been further hampered if 

he had been intoxicated as M.G. described. Defendant categorically denied guilt and submitted photographs to 

support his contentions. He also certified that a DYFS investigation found that M.G.’s previous accusations of 

sexual assault against defendant and a family friend lacked merit. (pp. 11-12)

4. The Court considers defendant’s claim in light of the Slater factors. With respect to the first factor, a colorable 

claim of innocence, defendant must make a showing beyond a mere assertion of innocence. He must point to 

specific, credible facts that support his claim. Under the “colorable claim of innocence” standard, the evidence 

presented in support of the claim of innocence must be specific and raise a legitimate dispute for the jury, but need 

not clearly exonerate the defendant. Here, although the admissibility and veracity of defendant’s evidence has not 

been tested, defendant has provided more than “a bald assertion” of innocence. The specific facts that defendant 

asserted could provide a plausible basis to impeach M.G.’s testimony and cause a reasonable jury to find reasonable 

doubt as to defendant’s guilt. Thus, defendant satisfies Slater’s first requirement. With regard to the second Slater

factor, defendant has presented sufficient reasons to support his request for withdrawal. Defendant asserts that he is 

innocent and explains that his counsel induced him to plead guilty, despite his innocence. As support for this claim, 

defendant offers some evidence that contradicts the State’s charges. The third factor, the presence of a plea 

agreement, weighs against defendant, but, given that the “vast majority of criminal cases are resolved through plea 

bargains[,]” this factor is not given the greatest weight. Although the trial judge did not reach the question of 

prejudice to the State, nothing in particular in the record demonstrates that the State would be prejudiced by 

defendant’s plea withdrawal in this case. Balancing the evidence and arguments in this case against all of the Slater

factors, defendant has met his burden and is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea in the interest of justice. (pp. 12-16) 

5. In light of its holding, the Court does not reach the merits of defendant’s contention that the judge failed to 

adequately inform him of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea. The Court also does not address

defendant’s alternative argument that his sentence must be reduced because the judge failed to find and apply 

existing mitigating factors. (pp. 2, 16) 

The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, the judgment of conviction is VACATED, the 

charges dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement are REINSTATED, and the matter is REMANDED to the trial 

court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, and FERNANDEZVINA; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ’s opinion. 
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

A-31 September Term 2012

071011

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CESAR A. LIPA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Argued February 3, 2014 – Decided September 25, 2014

On certification to the Superior Court, 

Appellate Division.

Daniel V. Gautieri, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, argued the cause for appellant 

(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, 

attorney).

Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney 

General, argued the cause for respondent 

(John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General of 

New Jersey, attorney).

JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ (temporarily assigned) delivered the 

opinion of the Court.

Defendant asks this Court to reverse the Appellate 

Division’s affirmance of the denial of his motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea to first-degree aggravated sexual assault. 

Defendant argues that the Law Division judge misapplied the 

standard for deciding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior 

to sentencing, as set forth in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 
2

(2009), and Rule 3:21-1. In the face of a general denial and 

specific, potentially plausible facts negating guilt, we find 

merit in this argument and reverse the judgment of the Appellate 

Division. Given this holding, we do not reach the merits of 

defendant’s second contention: that the judge failed to 

adequately inform him of the deportation consequences of his 

guilty plea. We also do not address defendant’s alternative 

argument that his sentence must be reduced because the judge 

failed to find and apply existing mitigating factors.

I.

A.

Pursuant to an agreement with the State, defendant Cesar A. 

Lipa, a Peruvian citizen, pleaded guilty to first-degree 

aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(2). The charge 

was based on allegations that he committed sexual acts on three 

occasions against M.G., who was between the ages of thirteen and 

sixteen at the time. 

The record reveals that on February 5, 2008, then sixteenyear-old M.G. informed her teacher that defendant sexually 

assaulted her on three occasions between January 1, 2005, and 

August 1, 2007. In a subsequent interview with the Division of 

Youth and Family Services (DYFS),1 M.G. stated that the first

 

1 This agency has been renamed the Division of Child Protection 

and Permanency. L. 2012, c. 16, eff. June 29, 2012. 
3

incident occurred in 2005, when she was thirteen years old. 

According to M.G., defendant, who was inebriated at the time, 

entered her bedroom and forcibly penetrated her vagina with his 

fingers, fleeing after she screamed. 

The second incident allegedly occurred in the summer of 

2005, when defendant climbed into her second-floor bedroom 

through a window and penetrated her vaginally with his fingers 

and penis. According to M.G., she told defendant to stop, but 

he did not cease until she kneed him in the groin. During this 

assault, M.G. reported that defendant also touched her breasts 

and kissed her on the lips. Once again, she said that defendant 

was drunk.

The third assault allegedly took place in July 2007, when 

M.G. was sixteen years old. She stated that defendant, while 

drunk, entered her bedroom and penetrated her vaginally with his 

fingers. 

Defendant was arrested and later indicted. Pursuant to a 

plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to count one, firstdegree aggravated sexual assault “on diverse dates.” The State 

agreed to dismiss related charges and to recommend defendant be 

sentenced as if convicted of a second-degree crime. 

During the plea colloquy on January 9, 2009, defendant gave 

answers to leading questions by his counsel. The questions 

established all of the elements of the offense to which he 
4

intended to plead guilty. The judge then asked another leading 

question: “And the only reason why you give up all those rights 

[waived as a result of the guilty plea] is because you’re in 

fact guilty. Is that true?” Defendant answered, “yes,” and the 

judge accepted defendant’s plea.

On October 27, 2009, after retaining new counsel, and 

before his sentencing hearing, defendant moved to withdraw his 

guilty plea.2 Defendant also moved to compel production of 

certain DYFS records. Defendant certified that “[m]y prior 

attorney failed to obtain the necessary documentations to 

support my innocence.” In particular, defendant claimed that he 

told his first counsel “that alleged victim M.G. had on at least 

two other occasions made false allegations of sexual assault 

which were investigated by DYFS.” One incident allegedly 

involved defendant; another allegation involved a friend of 

M.G.’s father. According to the certification, “DYFS found that 

the allegations of both matters were without merit.”

The judge first reviewed the DYFS records and noted that 

they provided “no basis of a false allegation.” The judge 

therefore denied defendant’s request to compel production as 

irrelevant. 

 

2 The record does not reveal the reason for the substantial 

interval between the entry of the plea and the hearing on the 

motion.
5

The judge then reviewed defendant’s certification in 

support of his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. With respect 

to the allegations against him, defendant certified as follows: 

The alleged victim states that on three 

separate occasions I sexually assaulted her. 

She is not telling the truth and I am 

innocent of these charges. The allegations 

by M.G. are false and I did not sexually 

assault her at any time.

Defendant certified that “[a]t the time of my plea, my 

prior attorney told me that I had no other option than to take 

the plea offer since I did not have a chance of winning at 

[t]rial.” Defendant claimed to have been recovering from knee 

surgery at the time of the second incident, thus making him 

physically unable to commit the alleged act. In support of that 

claim, defendant introduced a photograph depicting the condition 

of his leg at that time. He also presented ten photographs 

depicting the exterior of the building where M.G. lived. He 

argued that the photographs illustrated that it was “almost 

impossible” to climb out of the bathroom window and into M.G.’s 

bedroom window, particularly if he was intoxicated at the time.

The judge denied defendant’s motion to withdraw the guilty 

plea after reviewing the test set by this Court in Slater, 

supra, 198 N.J. at 158-59. The judge found that defendant had 

not properly asserted a claim of innocence because defendant’s 

claim merely made a “bald assertion” without factual support, 
6

and that the facts he relied on were not unknown to him at the 

time of the guilty plea. 

The judge concluded that defendant was adequately and 

correctly informed of the consequences of his guilty plea, and 

his expectations under the plea were met. Moreover, the judge 

noted that defendants bear a heavier burden to withdraw guilty 

pleas entered as part of a plea agreement. 

Thereafter, the judge proceeded to sentencing. The judge 

found that two of the aggravating factors enumerated in N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1a applied: “(3) the risk that the defendant will commit 

another offense”; and “(9) the need for deterring the defendant 

and others from violating the law.” The judge found no 

applicable mitigating factors and imposed an eight-year term, 

subject to a period of parole ineligibility under the No Early 

Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. 

B.

Defendant appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the 

judge’s denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The 

Appellate Division concluded that the judge’s decision was well 

within his discretion in light of the insubstantial facts 

asserted by defendant in support of the motion. The panel 

pointed out that the DYFS records sought by defendant pertained 

to allegations of events in 2002, which had no bearing on 

whether the acts in 2005 and 2007 had been committed. In 
7

addition, the panel observed that defendant’s claim that he 

could not have committed the second assault due to his knee 

injury does not “preclude the likelihood that defendant was able 

to engage in the conduct he admitted to at the plea hearing.” 

Defendant sought certification. We granted the petition. 

State v. Lipa, 213 N.J. 396 (2013). 

II.

Defendant argues that the trial court misapplied the 

holding in Slater in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea. Defendant asserts that he not only provided possible 

motivations to explain M.G.’s fraudulent claims, but he also 

provided photographic evidence of the back of the house and the 

condition of his knee at the time of the alleged assault, which 

contradict M.G.’s allegation. Thus, defendant contends that he 

advanced more than a “bald assertion” of innocence. He 

therefore argues that sufficient evidence existed to satisfy the 

first Slater factor.

As to the second Slater factor, defendant relies on his 

innocence claims and the ineffectiveness of his counsel to 

justify his reasons for withdrawal. He claims that counsel 

induced him to plead guilty. 

Defendant also claims that the existence of a plea 

agreement in the present case is immaterial under the third 

Slater factor because such agreements are common in the criminal 
8

context. Regarding the fourth Slater factor, defendant contends 

that he moved to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing, 

when a more liberal standard of review applies, and the State 

offered no evidence showing that prejudice would result from 

permitting his plea to be withdrawn. Defendant argues that he 

has met the burden for three of the four factors in the Slater

balancing test, and thus should succeed on his motion. 

The State submits that defendant bears the burden of 

showing that withdrawal of his plea is in the interest of 

justice -- an evaluation that is ultimately within the 

discretion of the court. The State argues defendant entered his 

guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily and in accordance with 

Rule 3:9-2. With regard to defendant’s claim that the judge did 

not inform him of the possibility of deportation, the State 

highlights the trial judge’s statement during the colloquy and 

plea agreement that defendant signed and initialed, 

acknowledging his awareness of the deportation consequences. 

Moreover, the State argues that the Slater factors weigh 

heavily against defendant. When assessing claims of innocence 

under the first Slater factor, defendant must offer more than 

“bald assertions” of innocence. Here, defendant offers evidence 

contending it would have been “almost impossible” for him to 

enter M.G.’s window after his knee surgery. According to the 

State, however, defendant fails to offer any evidence supporting 
9

his innocence for the first and third assaults. Further, the 

State notes that the evidence presented was known to defendant 

at the time of the plea and was reviewed with counsel prior to 

his plea. 

The State argues that the remaining Slater factors 

similarly weigh against defendant. The State maintains that the 

second factor, fair and just reasons for withdrawal, does not 

warrant withdrawal of defendant’s guilty plea because the record 

provides no indication defendant was misled or unaware of the 

deportation consequences at the time his plea was entered. 

Further, the State asserts that defendant did not explain why 

the “knee surgery” defense was not raised earlier. In addition, 

because defendant’s plea resulted from prosecutorial 

negotiations, the State argues that defendant faces a heavier 

burden under factor three. Finally, the State contends that 

permitting defendant to withdraw his plea would result in 

significant prejudice to the State, particularly given the 

sensitive nature of child-sexual-assault cases for all parties 

involved. 

III.

Before a court can accept a defendant’s guilty plea, it 

first must be convinced that (1) the defendant has provided an 

adequate factual basis for the plea; (2) the plea is made 

voluntarily; and (3) the plea is made knowingly. R. 3:9-2; see 
10

also State v. Crawley, 149 N.J. 310, 318 (1997). In short, a 

trial court must not accept a guilty plea unless it is satisfied 

that the defendant is in fact guilty. The judicial system 

cannot countenance the miscarriage of justice that enures when a 

defendant pleads guilty to an offense but defendant is not

guilty and is doing so out of fear, intimidation, or to gain 

some other objective.

Once it is established that a guilty plea was made 

voluntarily, it may only be withdrawn at the discretion of the 

trial court. State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 444 (1999). A trial 

judge’s finding that a plea was voluntarily and knowingly 

entered is entitled to appellate deference so long as that 

determination is supported by sufficient credible evidence in 

the record. State v. McCoy, 222 N.J. Super. 626, 629 (App. Div. 

1988), aff’d, 116 N.J. 293 (1989). “Thus, the trial court’s 

denial of defendant’s request to withdraw his guilty plea will 

be reversed on appeal only if there was an abuse of discretion 

which renders the lower court’s decision clearly erroneous.” 

Simon, supra, 161 N.J. at 444.

Rule 3:21-1 governs the withdrawal of guilty pleas. It 

provides that “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or non 

vult shall be made before sentencing, but the court may permit 

it to be made thereafter to correct a manifest injustice.” R.

3:21-1. The rule explicitly provides that the post-sentencing 
11

standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea is manifest injustice. 

Ibid.; see also State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232, 237 (2004). 

Before sentencing, the standard for plea withdrawal is “the 

interests of justice.” R. 3:9-3(e); State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 

113, 123-24 (1988).

This Court outlined a framework to assess claims to 

withdraw a plea in Slater, supra, 198 N.J. at 150:

[I]n evaluating motions to withdraw a guilty 

plea, trial courts should consider the 

following factors: (1) whether the 

defendant has asserted a colorable claim of 

innocence; (2) the nature and strength of 

defendant’s reasons for withdrawal; (3) the 

existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether 

withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice 

to the State or unfair advantage to the 

accused.

In Slater, the defendant consented to a search of a motel 

room. Police officers saw what appeared to be a small bag of 

marijuana in a dresser drawer that was open about six inches. 

Ibid. After frisking and handcuffing Slater, the officers 

opened the drawer and, in addition to the marijuana, found 

approximately fifteen grams of crack cocaine. Ibid. The 

defendant entered a guilty plea to second-degree possession of a 

controlled dangerous substance with the intent to distribute but 

subsequently moved to withdraw the plea before sentencing. Id.

at 152. To support the motion, the defendant “claim[ed] that he 

was just visiting the motel room where the cocaine was found, 
12

that the room was registered to another person, and that he had 

no knowledge or control of the drugs.” Id. at 162. The motion 

was denied. Id. at 153.

The Appellate Division affirmed. Ibid. This Court 

reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and concluded 

that the defendant “presented specific, potentially plausible 

facts, and not simply a bald assertion.” Id. at 163. 

IV.

Here, defendant has presented a certification asserting 

that he is innocent because he was physically unable to climb 

into the victim’s bedroom window in order to commit an assault 

due to the fact that he had surgery on one of his knees around 

the alleged date of the incident. According to M.G., defendant 

was inebriated at the time. His condition thus would have 

further hampered his ability to commit the assault in the manner 

M.G. described. In support of this argument, defendant 

categorically denied guilt and submitted photographs of his knee 

after the surgery and the exterior of the building in question. 

He also certified that a DYFS investigation found that M.G.’s 

previous accusations of sexual assault against defendant and a 

family friend lacked merit. 

We consider defendant’s claim in light of the Slater

factors. With respect to the first factor, a colorable claim of 

innocence, defendant must make a showing beyond a mere assertion 
13

of innocence. Slater, supra, 198 N.J. at 158-59. He must point 

to specific, credible facts that support his claim. Id. at 159. 

The motion judge, however, need not be convinced that the proofs 

a defendant puts forward to support his claim of innocence 

create a “winning argument.” State v. Munroe, 210 N.J. 429, 442 

(2012). This is “because, in the end, legitimate factual 

disputes must be resolved by the jury.” Ibid. 

This Court addressed the “colorable claim of innocence”

standard in Munroe. There, the motion judge denied the 

defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea even though he 

raised a self-defense claim during his presentence interview, 

which was never contradicted at his plea colloquy. Id. at 445. 

The motion judge “was dismissive of defendant’s self-defense 

claim” because the defendant was armed with a gun, while the 

victim was armed with only a knife. Id. at 446. The Court 

determined, however, that the disparity in weaponry was an issue 

for a jury rather than the motion judge. Ibid. As a result, 

“[t]he issue is not whether in the mind of the trial court, ‘the 

likelihood of [defendant] winning on a self-defense [claim] was 

next to nothing.’ Rather, the issue is whether defendant raised 

a colorable claim of innocence that should rightly have been 

decided by a jury.” Ibid. Thus, the evidence presented in 

support of the claim of innocence must be specific and raise a 
14

legitimate dispute for the jury, but need not clearly exonerate 

the defendant.

We are mindful that the admissibility and veracity of 

defendant’s evidence has not been tested. Nevertheless, the 

specific facts that defendant asserted could provide a plausible 

basis to impeach M.G.’s testimony and cause a reasonable jury to 

find reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt. In our view, 

defendant has provided more than “a bald assertion.” His 

showing meets Slater’s first requirement. In fact, he presented 

evidence as strong as what the defendant in Slater presented.

The second Slater factor “focuses on the basic fairness of 

enforcing a guilty plea” and calls on defendant to present “fair 

and just reasons for withdrawal.” Slater, supra, 198 N.J. at 

159. Courts must assess “whether those reasons have any force.” 

Ibid. Slater instructs that 

[i]n assessing the nature and strength of 

the reasons for withdrawal, courts should 

not approach them with skepticism. At the 

same time, trial judges must act with “great 

care and realism” because defendants often 

have little to lose in challenging a guilty 

plea. 

[Slater, supra, 198 N.J. at 160 (quoting 

State v. Taylor, 80 N.J. 353, 365 (1979)).]

Here, defendant asserts he is innocent. He also explains 

why, despite being innocent, he agreed to plead guilty. He 

asserts that his first counsel was ineffective in preparing the 
15

case and, later, gave defendant no option but to accept the plea 

agreement. Defendant thus claims that his counsel induced him 

to plead guilty. As support for this claim, defendant offers 

some evidence that contradicts the State’s charges. We find 

that defendant has presented sufficient reasons to support his 

request for withdrawal. The third factor, the presence of a 

plea agreement, weighs against defendant. Defendant entered his 

plea as part of a plea agreement. In exchange for his plea, 

defendant was sentenced as a second-degree offender rather than 

a first-degree offender. In addition, related charges that 

could have resulted in consecutive sentences were dismissed. 

However, given that the “vast majority of criminal cases are 

resolved through plea bargains[,]” this factor is not given the 

greatest weight. Id. at 161. 

The judge did not reach the question of prejudice to the 

State, despite the pronouncement in Slater that courts should 

consider all four factors. Id. at 162. In any event, nothing 

in particular in the record demonstrates that the State would be 

prejudiced by defendant’s plea withdrawal in this case. 

Slater presents a balancing test. Here, defendant’s 

showing on the first factor is quite strong. After balancing 

the evidence and arguments in this case against all of the 

Slater factors, we conclude that defendant has met his burden 
16

and is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea in the interest of 

justice.

In light of these conclusions we need not reach the other 

issues defendant raised. 

V.

Therefore, the judgment of the Appellate Division, 

affirming the denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea, is reversed. The judgment of conviction is 

vacated, the charges dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement 

are reinstated and the matter is remanded to the Law Division 

for trial or other proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, 

and FERNANDEZ-VINA; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join 

in JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ’s opinion.
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

NO. A-31 SEPTEMBER TERM 2012

ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CESAR A. LIPA,

Defendant-Appellant.

DECIDED September 25, 2014

Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING

OPINION BY Judge Rodríguez

CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY

DISSENTING OPINION BY 

CHECKLIST

REVERSE/

VACATE/

REINSTATE/

REMAND

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X

JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X

JUSTICE ALBIN X

JUSTICE PATTERSON X

JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA X

JUDGE RODRÍGUEZ (t/a) X

JUDGE CUFF (t/a) X

TOTALS 7