United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued July 10, 2013

Decided July 25, 2013

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 12‐2656

YADWINDER SINGH,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,

Attorney General of the United States,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the Board

of Immigration Appeals.

No. A096‐298‐571

O R D E R

Yadwinder Singh, a citizen of India, petitions for review of the denial by the Board of

Immigration Appeals of his motion to reconsider. He previously sought review of the

agency’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal. We partly dismiss and partly

deny his petition.

Singh immigrated as a young man to the United States in 1990, using another

person’s passport. Immigration authorities began removal proceedings against him (the

record does not say how he came to their attention) in 2007, at which point Singh conceded

his removability and applied for cancellation of removal. Since arriving in the United States,

Singh had married and had three children (all under the age of 10 at the time of the hearing

in 2009); though his wife is also an Indian citizen residing in the United States illegally, their

U.S.‐born children are American citizens.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 12‐2656 Page 2

In the removal proceedings, the parties focused on the hardship to Singh’s children if

he were ordered removed, as Singh had to show that his removal would cause extremely

unusual hardship to a relative who is a citizen or permanent legal resident of the United

States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D); Cruz‐Moyaho v. Holder, 703 F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 2012).

Singh testified that if he were removed, he would bring his wife and children with him and

they would live in his hometown in the state of Punjab in northwestern India. Singh

worried that the move would be difficult for his children because they could speak but not

read or write Punjabi, the most commonly spoken language in Punjab; they could not speak,

read, or write Hindi, the language spoken in public schools in India, and he would not be

able to afford to send them to English‐speaking private schools; and he doubted he would

be able to find medication to treat his 8‐year‐old son’s hay fever (“allergic rhinitis”) and

rashes. He testified that, although he had some extended family in India, he had lost touch

with them and doubted they would help him.

The IJ concluded that Singh had not shown that the hardship factors, either

individually or cumulatively, were extraordinary enough to warrant cancellation of

removal. First, the IJ explained that English is widely spoken in the school system and

among the educated in India and Singh had not shown that learning Punjabi or Hindi

would be particularly difficult for his children. Next, the IJ noted that hay fever is not

difficult to treat and Singh had not shown that cetirizine, the over‐the‐counter medication

his son had been taking, would be unavailable in India. The Board agreed with the IJ’s

conclusions, and added one more reason to question the extent of the expected hardship:

Singh, the Board suggested, “may be able to call upon [his relatives in India] for some form

of support during his transition.”

Singh then, on the same day, both petitioned this court for review of the Board’s

decision, and moved the Board to reconsider its ruling. Pet. for Review, Singh v. Holder,

No. 11‐1187 (7th Cir. Jan. 21, 2011). In both proceedings he challenged the Board’s failure to

consider the hardship factors in the aggregate, as well as its presumption that he could

count on his family’s support in India. Pet’r’s Br. at 14–19, Singh v. Holder, No. 11‐1187 (7th

Cir. June 8, 2011). We acted first, partly denying and partly dismissing Singh’s petition.

Singh v. Holder, 448 F. App’x 619 (7th Cir. 2011). We concluded first that the Board’s silence

about the cumulative effect of the hardship factors was unimportant because the IJ had

expressly considered those factors in the aggregate. Id. at 622. As for Singh’s challenge to the

Board’s finding that he could rely on family support, we concluded that we lacked

jurisdiction to review Singh’s argument because it presented a factual question, and we may

review only legal challenges to discretionary final decisions (like the denial of an

application for cancellation of removal). Id. at 623.

Some time later, the Board denied Singh’s motion for reconsideration. The Board

stated that it had considered the hardship factors in the aggregate, even if it had not
No. 12‐2656 Page 3

expressly said so. The Board also said that its statement that Singh may be able to rely on his

relatives in India for help was consistent with his testimony that he had relatives in India

and, since he had not asked them for help, he did not know that they would refuse to help

his family.

Singh once again seeks review of the Board’s ruling. He maintains that the Board did

not consider the hardship factors in the aggregate. But we rejected this argument in our

prior order, Singh, 448 F. App’x at 622, so the issue is governed by the law of the case,

see Ramos v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 800, 803 (7th Cir. 2005); Pilch v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 585, 586–87

(7th Cir. 2003). In Singh’s first petition, the Board’s silence about considering the hardship

factors in the aggregate led us to review the IJ’s decision on that point, Sarhan v. Holder, 658

F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 2011); Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 547 (7th Cir. 2006), and we

concluded that the IJ’s assessment was adequate. Singh has not proposed any reason why

the result should be different now.

Next, Singh maintains, as he did in his earlier petition, that the Board legally erred

by concluding that he may be able to rely on family in India; the Board, he asserts,

overlooked his testimony that he is not close to his family in India. Yet again this issue is

governed by the law of the case, see Ramos, 414 F.3d at 803; Pilch, 353 F.3d at 586–87, and as

we previously explained, Singh, 448 F. App’x at 623, we lack jurisdiction to review

challenges to the agency’s factual findings in the denial of an application for cancellation of

removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Delgado v. Holder, 674 F.3d 759, 765 (7th Cir.

2012); Bachynskyy v. Holder, 668 F.3d 412, 416–17 (7th Cir. 2011). The Board did not overlook

Singh’s testimony—the Board noted that despite his lack of close contact with his relatives,

he may still get some help from them—and Singh’s argument presents only a factual issue

over which we lack jurisdiction.

Last, Singh contends that the Board failed to consider his argument in his motion for

reconsideration that his children would generally suffer hardship by being forced to

relinquish their American citizenship. But Singh never mentioned this argument in his

motion for reconsideration, so the Board understandably did not address it. Furthermore,

we may not consider unexhausted arguments. See Muratoski v. Holder, 622 F.3d 824, 830–31

(7th Cir. 2010).

Accordingly, we DISMISS Singh’s petition as to his claim of factual error, and

otherwise DENY his petition.