* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of

Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. Proc. 43(c),

Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E.

Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defendant in this action. 

Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption,

in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate

party at the time of the underlying decision. 

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

*** Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 9/11/96

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

EMILY J. BOLIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SHIRLEY S. CHATER,

Commissioner, Social Security

Administration,*

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 96-5007

(D.C. No. 94-C-1035-W)

(N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT**

Before TACHA, ALDISERT,*** and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
1 The parties consented to disposition of the case by the magistrate judge,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Our jurisdiction is therefore secured by

§ 636(c)(3), in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Plaintiff Emily J. Bolin appeals from an order of the magistrate judge1

affirming the Secretary’s denial of supplemental security income benefits. We

carefully examine the record to determine whether the Secretary’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence and adheres to applicable legal standards. 

Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994). As with any other

appeal, however, the scope of our review is limited to the issues properly

preserved and presented by the appellant. See Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388,

1389-90 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1994); Crow v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir.

1994). Guided by these principles, we affirm for the reasons stated below. 

Plaintiff raises several objections to the ALJ’s decision. However, only

two of these were preserved in district court: (1) the ALJ improperly evaluated

plaintiff’s complaints of chest pain, and (2) the ALJ erred in finding plaintiff

capable of performing medium work. Compare Appellant’s Br. at 15-16 with
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“Plaintiff’s Memorandum Brief” (attached to Appellant’s Br.) at 3-5 and R. Vol. I

at 7-8 (recitation of issues by magistrate judge). All other matters are, therefore,

deemed waived. Crow, 40 F.3d at 324. Moreover, since the ALJ also relied on

plaintiff’s ability to perform a number of light and sedentary jobs identified by

the vocational expert, see R. Vol. II at 19, 20, any error relating only to medium

work would not undermine the ALJ’s disposition. See Murrell, 43 F.3d at

1389-90 (affirmance appropriate where claimant challenges only one of

alternative grounds supporting ALJ’s decision). Consequently, we are concerned

here solely with the ALJ’s assessment of plaintiff’s chest pain.

All of the medical documentation cited in support of plaintiff’s allegation

of chest pain derives from Dr. Carver, her treating physician. Dr. Carver initially

diagnosed mild congestive heart failure with functionally disabling angina based

on a preliminary finding of 70% mid-LAD aortic stenosis, see R. Vol. II at

150-58, 206-07, which led him to specify the following plan: “Repeat selected

coronary angiograms [to confirm the degree of stenosis, seen only in a single

view] and if anatomically indicated will consider percutaneous transluminal

coronary angioplasty to her mid-LAD.” Id. at 207. As the ALJ noted, the

confirming angiograms revealed only a 20-30% mid-LAD stenosis, leading Dr.

Carver to revise his initial impression, now finding only “Insignificant Coronary

Disease” and ascribing plaintiff’s subjective complaints to “[c]hest pain of
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uncertain etiology.” Id. at 200. A year later, Dr. Dahlmann examined plaintiff

and, consistent with Dr. Carver’s final diagnosis, concluded she “does not appear

to have any medical abnormality that would preclude her participation in the labor

force . . . .” Id. at 177. Furthermore, plaintiff has stated that her sporadic pain is

not exertional and is controlled by medication, to which she has not attributed any

side effects. See id. at 51-52; see also id. at 174-75, 178 (chest pain is “not

exertional” and “stops completely” 15-20 minutes after medication). Under these

circumstances, the ALJ did not err in concluding that plaintiff’s chest pain would

impose no significant limitation on her work activities. Cf. Dixon v. Heckler, 811

F.2d 506, 508 (10th Cir. 1987)(because medical conditions are “well-controlled

. . . without negative side effects,” “we cannot reverse the ALJ’s finding that

[plaintiff] was capable of performing a full range of light work, not significantly

compromised by her nonexertional limitations”).

The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District

of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Deanell Reece Tacha

Circuit Judge