Opinion filed January 29, 2015

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-12-00357-CV

__________

KELLY SPURLOCK, AS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE 

ESTATE OF J.O. SPURLOCK, Appellant

V.

BEACON LLOYDS INSURANCE COMPANY AND 

GRANTHAM-ADKINS INSURANCE AGENCY, Appellees

On Appeal from the 29th District Court

Palo Pinto County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. C43924

O P I N I O N

This appeal involves the interpretation of a homeowner’s insurance policy. 

Specifically, we must construe the policy to determine if coverage exists for a 

personal property loss alleged to have occurred after the death of the named
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insured. Appellant, Kelly Spurlock (Spurlock), as legal representative for the 

Estate of J.O. Spurlock, brought suit against Beacon Lloyds Insurance Company 

(Beacon) to recover proceeds under a homeowner’s insurance policy for the loss of 

personal property that was allegedly stolen from a residence. Spurlock also named

Grantham-Adkins Insurance Agency (Grantham-Adkins) as a defendant. Spurlock 

asserted that, if the homeowner’s insurance policy that was issued by Beacon did 

not provide coverage for the loss of personal property, Grantham-Adkins was 

negligent in failing to procure coverage for the loss. Beacon and Grantham-Adkins 

filed motions for summary judgment on Spurlock’s claims. The trial court granted 

the motions in separate orders. Spurlock appeals the trial court’s orders. We 

affirm. 

Background Facts

J.O. Spurlock owned and lived in a house in Mineral Wells, Texas, that he 

insured with Beacon. The policy that Beacon issued to J.O. Spurlock was a Texas 

Homeowners Policy Form HO-A No. 42 TLO 7009742. J.O. Spurlock was the 

only named insured under the policy. The policy was effective from May 31, 

2008, to May 31, 2009. The “RESIDENCE PREMISES/DWELLING” listed in 

the declarations page of the policy was identified by the legal description of J.O. 

Spurlock’s house. The street address of the house was 704 Cedar in Mineral 

Wells. The policy provided dwelling coverage and personal property coverage.

J.O. Spurlock died in January 2009. Spurlock was appointed as the 

representative of J.O. Spurlock’s estate. In April 2009, Spurlock discovered that 

items of personal property had been removed from J.O. Spurlock’s house at 704 

Cedar in Mineral Wells. Spurlock contended that the missing personal property 

items had been stolen and that the policy issued by Beacon provided coverage for 

the stolen personal property. Accordingly, Spurlock filed a claim with Beacon in 

which he sought to recover for the loss that resulted from the theft. Beacon 
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concluded that the policy did not provide coverage for the stolen property. 

Therefore, Beacon denied Spurlock’s claim.

Spurlock filed suit against Beacon and Grantham-Adkins, the insurance 

agent that procured the Beacon policy for J.O. Spurlock. Spurlock alleged claims 

against Beacon for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair 

dealing, common-law fraud, fraud by nondisclosure, violations of the Unfair 

Settlement Practices Act, violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and 

violations of the Prompt Payment of Claims Act. Spurlock alleged claims against 

Grantham-Adkins for common-law fraud, fraud by nondisclosure, violations of the 

Unfair Settlement Practices Act, violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 

violations of the Prompt Payment of Claims Act, negligent procurement, and 

negligent misrepresentation. Spurlock sought to recover actual damages, a 

statutory penalty, additional damages under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 

exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

Beacon filed a combined traditional and no-evidence motion for summary 

judgment. Beacon moved for summary judgment on all of Spurlock’s claims 

against it. Spurlock filed a response to the motion. The trial court entered an order 

granting Beacon summary judgment on Spurlock’s breach of contract claim.

Grantham-Adkins filed a traditional motion for summary judgment on all of 

Spurlock’s claims against it. Spurlock filed a response to the motion. On the same 

day, Spurlock filed an amended petition in which he alleged only claims for breach 

of contract and violations of the Prompt Payment of Claims Act against Beacon 

and a claim for negligent procurement of insurance coverage against GranthamAdkins. Thus, in his amended petition, Spurlock abandoned the other claims that 

he had alleged in his earlier petition. See Wheeler v. Methodist Hosp., 95 S.W.3d 

628, 634 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
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The trial court entered an order granting summary judgment to Beacon on 

Spurlock’s remaining claim against it for its alleged violations of the Prompt 

Payment of Claims Act. The trial court entered a separate order granting summary 

judgment to Grantham-Adkins on Spurlock’s claim against it for negligent 

procurement. Collectively, the trial court’s summary judgment orders disposed of 

all of Spurlock’s claims against Beacon and Grantham-Adkins. 

Issues on Appeal

Spurlock presents two issues for review. In his first issue, he contends that 

the Beacon policy provided coverage for his claim for loss of personal property 

and that, therefore, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Beacon. 

In his second issue, he contends that, if the policy did not provide coverage for his 

claim, Grantham-Adkins was negligent in failing to procure insurance to cover 

such a claim and that, therefore, the trial court erred by granting summary 

judgment to Grantham-Adkins.

Standard of Review

Beacon moved for traditional summary judgment on Spurlock’s claims for 

breach of contract and for violations of the Prompt Payment of Claims Act. 

Grantham-Adkins moved for traditional summary judgment on Spurlock’s claim 

for negligent procurement of insurance coverage.

We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 

315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). The movant for traditional summary judgment 

must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & 

Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). In reviewing a 

summary judgment, we must consider all of the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference in favor of the 

nonmovant and resolving any doubts against the movant. Goodyear Tire & 
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Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 756 (Tex. 2007). We must consider 

whether reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions in light 

of all of the summary judgment evidence presented, and we may not ignore 

undisputed summary judgment evidence that cannot be disregarded. Id. at 755, 

757. 

Interpretation of Insurance Policy

We construe insurance policies according to the same rules of construction 

that apply to contracts. Don’s Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., 267 

S.W.3d 20, 23 (Tex. 2008); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Crocker, 246 S.W.3d 603, 

606 (Tex. 2008). In applying these rules, our primary concern is to ascertain the 

parties’ intent as expressed in the policy’s language. Tanner v. Nationwide Mut. 

Fire Ins. Co., 289 S.W.3d 828, 831 (Tex. 2009); Kelley-Coppedge, Inc. Highlands 

Ins. Co., 980 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex. 1998). We give policy terms their ordinary 

and commonly understood meaning unless the policy itself shows the parties 

intended a different, technical meaning. Tanner, 289 S.W.3d at 831; Don’s Bldg. 

Supply, 267 S.W.3d at 23. No one phrase, sentence, or section of a policy should 

be isolated from its setting and considered apart from other provisions. Forbau v. 

Aetna Life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex. 1994). In addition, we must give 

the policy’s words their plain meaning, without inserting additional provisions into 

the contract. Crocker, 246 S.W.3d at 606.

If an insurance policy uses unambiguous language, we must enforce it as 

written. Don’s Bldg. Supply, 267 S.W.3d at 23. If policy language is worded so 

that it can be given a definite or certain legal meaning or interpretation, then it is 

unambiguous and is construed as a matter of law. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 

Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 157 (Tex. 2003); Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 

(Tex. 1983). If, however, the policy is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
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interpretation, then it is ambiguous, and we will resolve the ambiguity in favor of 

coverage. Don’s Bldg. Supply, 267 S.W.3d at 23.

The Homeowner’s Policy

The only named insured under the policy was J.O. Spurlock. The policy 

provided dwelling coverage (Coverage A) and personal property coverage

(Coverage B). The dwelling coverage provided that Beacon covered “the dwelling 

on the residence premises shown on the declarations page including structures 

attached to the dwelling.” The personal property coverage provided that Beacon 

covered “personal property owned, worn or used by an insured while on the 

residence premises.” The coverage for a loss of personal property occurring on 

the residence premises had a limit of liability of $52,400. Under the policy, 

Beacon also covered “personal property owned, worn or used by an insured

anywhere in the world.” The coverage for a loss of personal property occurring off 

the residence premises had a limit of liability of $5,240.

The underlined terms in the policy were defined in the policy. The policy 

defined “residence premises” as “the residence premises shown on the 

declarations page.” The “residence premises” included “the one or two family 

dwelling, including other structures, and grounds, where an insured resides or 

intends to reside within 60 days after the effective date of this policy.” The 

residence premises/dwelling shown on the declarations page was identified as 

Lot 9-10, Block 2, Westwood Hills, which was the legal description of J.O. 

Spurlock’s house and property at 704 Cedar in Mineral Wells. As defined in the 

policy, the term “insured” meant J.O. Spurlock and “residents of [his] household 

who [were his] relatives; or other persons under the age of 21 and in the care of 

any person named above.”

The policy provided that “[Beacon] insure[d] against physical loss to the 

property described in Coverage A (Dwelling) and Coverage B (Personal Property) 
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caused by a peril listed below, unless the loss is excluded in Section I Exclusions.” 

One of the listed perils was “[t]heft, including attempted theft and loss of property 

from a known place when it is likely that the property has been stolen.”

The policy contained various conditions to coverage for the dwelling and 

personal property. One of the conditions provided as follows:

9. Death. If the named insured dies, we insure:

a. the named insured’s spouse, if a resident of the same 

household at the time of death.

b. the legal representative of the deceased. However, if this 

legal representative was not an insured at the time of 

death of the named insured, this policy will apply to such 

legal representative only with respect to the premises of 

the original named insured.

c. any person who is an insured at the time of such death, 

while a resident of said premises.

The term “premises,” which was used in Sections 9.b. and 9.c., was not a defined 

term in the policy. 

Analysis of Coverage Issue

As stated above, the personal property coverage provided that Beacon 

covered “personal property owned, worn or used by an insured while on the 

residence premises.” Section 9.b. of the conditions provided that, upon the death 

of the named insured, Beacon would insure the legal representative of the 

deceased. However, Section 9.b. also provided that, if the legal representative was 

not an insured under the policy at the time of the named insured’s death, the policy 

would apply to the legal representative “only with respect to the premises of the 

original named insured.” Unlike the residency requirements set forth in 

Sections 9.a. and 9.c. for the named insured’s spouse and other persons who were 
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insureds at the time of the named insured’s death, Section 9.b. did not contain a 

requirement that the legal representative reside at the premises to obtain coverage 

under the policy.

Spurlock was not an insured under the policy when J.O. Spurlock died. 

Therefore, under Section 9.b., the policy applied to Spurlock “only with respect to 

the premises of the original named insured.” The word “premises” is not defined 

in the policy. Under Spurlock’s interpretation of the provision, he contends that, 

following J.O. Spurlock’s death, the policy provided coverage for losses of 

personal property that occurred on the subject premises at 704 Cedar in Mineral 

Wells but that the policy did not provide coverage for losses of personal property 

that occurred off the premises. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that, 

following J.O. Spurlock’s death, the policy did not provide coverage for any loss 

of personal property. Therefore, we disagree with Spurlock’s contention that the 

policy provided coverage for losses of personal property that occurred on the 

subject premises. 

Because “premises” is not defined in the policy, we must give the term its 

ordinary and commonly understood meaning. Tanner, 289 S.W.3d at 831; Don’s 

Bldg. Supply, 267 S.W.3d at 23. The definition of “premises,” in relevant part in 

the Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, is “a tract of land with the buildings 

thereon” or “a building or part of a building usu[ally] with its appurtenances (as 

grounds).” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 980 (11th ed. 2004). 

Similarly, “premises” is defined in relevant part by Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a] 

house or building, along with its grounds.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1371 (10th 

ed. 2014). The San Antonio Court of Appeals has stated that, “[u]nder the 

dictionary definitions of the word ‘premises’ a tract of land may be intended, as 

when used in a conveyance, or a building located upon land, as is generally the 

case in a fire insurance policy.” Associated Indem. Corp. v. Nat’l Sur. Corp., 287 
9

S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1956, no writ.). The Beacon 

policy defines the term “residence premises” in a similar manner. Under the 

policy, the definition of “residence premises” includes “the one or two family 

dwelling, including other structures, and grounds where an insured resides.”

The above dictionary definitions establish that the ordinary meaning of 

“premises” is a house or building and the grounds upon which the house or 

building is located. None of the above definitions includes “personal property” in 

the definition of “premises.” Accordingly, we conclude that the plain meaning of 

“premises” as used in the Beacon policy is unambiguous and does not include 

personal property. Based on its plain meaning, the undefined term “premises” in 

the Beacon policy includes J.O. Spurlock’s house and the grounds upon which it 

was located. The Beacon policy insured the legal representative of the named 

insured only with respect to the “premises” of the original named insured. Given 

the ordinary meaning of “premises,” we conclude that, upon J.O. Spurlock’s death, 

the policy provided dwelling coverage to Spurlock but did not provide personal 

property coverage to him, whether the loss of personal property occurred on or off

the premises.

We find it significant that Section 9.b. of the Beacon policy did not 

specifically refer to “personal property” of the original named insured. In 

Hundley, the policy provided that, upon the death of the named insured, the 

insurance company would insure “the legal representative of the deceased but only 

with respect to the premises and property of the deceased covered under the policy 

at the time of death.” Mun. Mut. Ins. Co. of W. Va. v. Hundley, 723 S.E.2d 398, 

400 (W. Va. 2011). In Long, the policy provided that, in the event of the death of

the named insured, “the Named Insured shall mean . . . the legal representative

but only with respect to the premises and property of the deceased covered under 

this policy at the time of such death.” Long v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 431 F. 
10

Supp. 473, 474 (W.D. Tenn. 1976). In this case, the parties could have included 

similar language in Section 9.b. had they intended for the policy to provide 

coverage for a loss of personal property after the death of J.O. Spurlock. For 

example, Section 9.b. could have provided that the policy would apply to the legal 

representative “only with respect to the premises and personal property of the 

original named insured.” The absence of such language supports our conclusion 

that the policy did not provide coverage to Spurlock for a loss of personal property 

occurring after J.O. Spurlock died. 

The language in Section 9.c. of the Beacon policy also supports the 

conclusion that the undefined term “premises” does not include personal property. 

Section 9.c. provides that, if the named insured dies, Beacon will insure “any 

person who is an insured at the time of such death, while a resident of said 

premises.” If the parties intended the undefined term “premises” to include the 

house and personal property, the use of the word “premises” in Section 9.c. would 

require the insured to be a resident of J.O. Spurlock’s house and his personal 

property, which would not be possible.

We conclude that the language in the Beacon policy unambiguously 

provided that, upon J.O. Spurlock’s death, the policy did not provide personal 

property coverage to Spurlock. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting 

Beacon a traditional summary judgment on Spurlock’s claim that Beacon breached

the insurance contract.

Spurlock also alleged a claim against Beacon for violations of the Prompt 

Payment of Claims Act. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 542.051–.061 (West 2009 &

Supp. 2014). To recover on such a claim, an insured must show that the insurer “is 

liable for a claim under an insurance policy.” Id. § 542.060(a). There can be no 

liability under the Act if the insured’s claim is not covered by the policy. 

Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 177 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. 2005). 
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Because Spurlock’s claim for loss of personal property was not covered by the 

Beacon policy, Spurlock cannot succeed on his claim that Beacon violated the Act. 

See id. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting Beacon a traditional 

summary judgment on Spurlock’s claim that Beacon violated the provisions of the 

Prompt Payment of Claims Act.

The trial court properly granted summary judgment to Beacon on Spurlock’s 

claims against it. Spurlock’s first issue is overruled.

Analysis of Negligent Procurement Issue

In his second issue, Spurlock contends that, if the Beacon policy did not 

cover his claim for the theft of personal property that occurred after J.O. 

Spurlock’s death, then Grantham-Adkins was negligent in failing to procure 

insurance that would have covered the claim. The elements of a negligence claim 

are (1) a legal duty owed by one person to another, (2) a breach of that duty, and 

(3) damages proximately caused by the breach. D. Houston, Inc. v. Love, 92 

S.W.3d 450, 454 (Tex. 2002). In Texas, an insurance agent, such as GranthamAdkins, owes the following common-law duties to a client for whom it undertakes 

to procure insurance: (1) to use reasonable diligence in attempting to place the 

requested insurance and (2) to inform the client promptly if unable to do so. 

May v. United Servs. Ass’n of Am., 844 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Tex. 1992); Sonic Sys. 

Int’l, Inc. v. Croix, 278 S.W.3d 377, 389 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, 

pet. denied). A client’s request to an insurance agent for a specific type of 

insurance gives rise to these duties on the part of the agent. See Moore v. WhitneyVaky, Ins. Agency, 966 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.). 

J.O. Spurlock died on January 26, 2009. Spurlock alleged in his petition 

that, prior to J.O. Spurlock’s death, J.O. Spurlock requested coverage for contents 

from Grantham-Adkins in connection with his purchase of insurance. Spurlock 

also alleged that he or his representative notified Grantham-Adkins of J.O. 
12

Spurlock’s death, that he or his representative requested Grantham-Adkins to 

continue to provide the coverage provided by the Beacon policy, and that 

Grantham-Adkins never informed J.O. Spurlock or him that the Beacon policy did 

not provide coverage for contents upon J.O. Spurlock’s death. Spurlock further 

alleged that, on or about March 12, 2009, he made a claim under the Beacon policy 

for the damage or loss due to theft or vandalism of personal property that occurred 

at 704 Cedar in Mineral Wells.

We note that the allegations in Spurlock’s petition are not competent 

summary judgment evidence. Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dallas), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 

904 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. 1995). Grantham-Adkins presented summary 

judgment evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment. The evidence 

included Spurlock’s deposition testimony. The evidence showed that Stephanie 

Lou Cordell was J.O. Spurlock’s caretaker and lived with J.O. Spurlock before he 

died. Cordell claimed that she was J.O. Spurlock’s common-law wife and that she 

owned J.O. Spurlock’s house. In April 2009, Spurlock obtained an order from a 

justice of the peace evicting Cordell from the premises. Spurlock testified that he 

did not obtain access to J.O. Spurlock’s house until after Cordell was evicted. 

After the eviction, Spurlock entered the house and discovered that contents had 

been removed from the house. Spurlock believed that Cordell had stolen the 

property.

Spurlock testified that he and his friend, John Backer, contacted GranthamAdkins after J.O. Spurlock died. Spurlock believed that he and Backer made two 

telephone calls to Grantham-Adkins. However, Spurlock did not know when 

either of the calls occurred. Spurlock said that, during the first call, he and Backer 

informed Grantham-Adkins that J.O. Spurlock had died and that Spurlock was in 

the process of being appointed as the administrator of J.O. Spurlock’s estate. 

Spurlock also said that he and Backer requested Grantham-Adkins to renew the 
13

Beacon policy and to change the mailing address on the policy. Spurlock testified 

that, during the second call, he and Backer informed Grantham-Adkins about the 

theft of personal property from J.O. Spurlock’s residence.

Backer stated in correspondence to Spurlock’s attorney that “Kelly Spurlock 

informed the Grantham-Adkins Agency about J.O.’s death and the theft in April 

2009.” When asked about this statement in his deposition, Spurlock acknowledged 

that his first contact with Grantham-Adkins following J.O. Spurlock’s death may 

have occurred in April 2009, after Spurlock entered J.O. Spurlock’s house and 

discovered the theft. 

Backer’s statement constituted summary judgment evidence that Spurlock 

did not contact Grantham-Adkins until after the loss occurred. During his 

deposition, Spurlock could only speculate as to when he contacted GranthamAdkins. Spurlock filed an affidavit in response to Grantham-Adkins’s motion for 

summary judgment. In the affidavit, Spurlock did not provide any additional 

information as to his contact with Grantham-Adkins. Spurlock did not present 

summary judgment evidence that he requested any type of insurance coverage 

from Grantham-Adkins before the loss occurred. Specifically, there was no 

summary judgment evidence that Spurlock requested Grantham-Adkins to procure 

insurance to cover a theft of contents from J.O. Spurlock’s home. Spurlock neither 

alleged in his petition nor presented summary judgment evidence that J.O. 

Spurlock requested coverage from Grantham-Adkins that would have covered a 

theft of personal property from his residence after his death.

The summary judgment evidence did not raise a fact issue on whether 

Spurlock requested insurance coverage from Grantham-Adkins before the theft. In 

the absence of such a request, Grantham-Adkins did not owe a duty to Spurlock to 

use reasonable diligence to obtain insurance. See Moore, 966 S.W.2d at 692. 

Grantham-Adkins established that there was no genuine issue of material fact on 
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Spurlock’s negligent procurement claim and that it was entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err by granting 

summary judgment to Grantham-Adkins. Spurlock’s second issue is overruled.

This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the orders of the trial court in which it granted the summary 

judgments.

JOHN M. BAILEY

JUSTICE

January 29, 2015

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.