Memorandum Opinion and Order – Page 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §

§

v. § Criminal No. 3:21-MJ-1152-BK

§ 

SERAFINA LYNN LICCARDI §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Defendant Serafina Lynn Liccardi’s Motion to Revoke Detention Order

(with Incorporated Brief in Support) (“Motion”) (Doc. 16), filed on December 17, 2021. 

Defendant Serafina Lynn Liccardi moves, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b), for the court to review 

the detention order entered by the Magistrate Judge. After consideration of the Motion, the 

Government’s Response (Doc. 18), filed on December 30, 2021, the record, and applicable law, 

the court denies Defendant’s Motion to Revoke Detention Order (Doc. 16); and affirms the Order 

of Detention Pending Trial (Doc. 11), entered by the Magistrate Judge on December 3, 2021.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On November 30, 2021, Federal Protective Service Inspector Joseph Beranek (“Inspector 

Beranek”) filed the Criminal Complaint against Defendant Serafina Lynn Liccardi (“Defendant” 

or “Ms. Liccardi”), attaching his sworn and signed affidavit (“Affidavit”). Def.’s Ex. 1. The 

Criminal Complaint and Affidavit allege that Ms. Liccardi “[a]ssault[ed] a federal officer or 

employee” using “physical contact” when she struck a Federal Protective Services Officer1

(“PSO”) after she breached security at the Earle Cabell Federal Building on November 29, 2021, 

1 The record supports that Ms. Liccardi struck PSO Karen Wheeler (“Officer Wheeler”). Detention Hr’g 

Tr., December 3, 2021 (“Hr’g Tr.”) 6. In particular, the testimony of Inspector Beranek, video, and photo 

of Officer Wheeler support that Defendant struck Officer Wheeler in the face.

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in violation of 18 U.S.C. 111(a).

2

 Id. at 2, 3. In his Affidavit, Inspector Beranek swore that 

Defendant “refus[ed] to comply with a federal mask mandate in place at the Earle Cabell Federal

Building.” Id. at 3. Ms. Liccardi was taken into custody that same day, and an arrest warrant was 

returned on November 30, 2021. Arrest Warrant (Doc. 13).

In its motion for detention, the Government stated that this case involves a “crime of 

violence,” see 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4), and contended that Ms. Liccardi should be detained 

“because there are no conditions of release which will reasonably assure . . . Defendant’s 

appearance as required [and the] [s]afety of any other person and the community.” Gov’t’s Mot. 

for Detention (Doc. 3) 1-2. On December 3, 2021, Defendant appeared before United States 

Magistrate Judge Renée Toliver for her detention hearing. At the hearing, the Government 

amended its motion “to indicate eligibility [for detention] under serious flight risk.” Hr’g Tr. 2. 

Following the hearing, Magistrate Judge Toliver determined that, based on the weight of the 

evidence against Defendant, her prior criminal history, and her history of violence or use of 

weapons, no condition or combination of conditions of release would reasonably assure the safety 

of any other person and the community.3 Order of Detention Pending Trial (Doc. 11). For these 

reasons, she ordered Defendant detained pending trial.

In her Motion, Ms. Liccardi contends that this case is not eligible for detention under 18 

U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A), as felony assault under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a) does not qualify as a “crime of 

violence” as defined in the Bail Reform Act of 1984. Def.’s Mot. 4. Alternatively, Defendant 

2 This statute penalizes “[w]hoever . . . forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes 

with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the performance 

of official duties.” 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1). 

3 Significantly and as discussed below, the Magistrate Judge did not find that the Government proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure Ms. 

Liccardi’s appearance as required.

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argues that the Government failed to prove that no combinations of conditions would ensure public 

safety or her appearance at trial. Id. at 1, 12. The Government responds that the Magistrate Judge

properly ordered Ms. Liccardi’s detention because the offense charged against her constitutes a 

crime of violence, and she is a “clear danger to the community.” Gov’t’s Resp. 6. In the 

alternative, it argues that Defendant “is eligible for pretrial detention as a serious flight risk.” Id.

II. Legal Standard

A district court reviews a pretrial detention order de novo and makes an independent 

determination of the pretrial detention or the proper conditions for release. United States v. 

Karriem, 2006 WL 1489484 at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 18, 2006) (citing United States v. Fortna, 769 

F.2d 242, 249 (5th Cir. 1985)). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b), “[i]f a person is ordered detained by 

a magistrate judge, . . . the person may file, with the court having original jurisdiction over the 

offense, a motion for revocation or amendment of the order.” This review does not mandate a new 

evidentiary hearing, and the court may rely on the evidence introduced before the magistrate judge. 

Id. (citing United States v. Baker, 703 F. Supp. 34, 36 (N.D. Tex. 1989)). Under the Bail Reform 

Act of 1984, “pretrial detention can be ordered only in a case that involves one of the circumstances 

listed in [18 U.S.C.] § 3142(f) and in which the judicial officer finds, after a hearing, that no 

condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as 

required and the safety of any other person and [the] community.” United States v. Zaccaria, 347 

F. App’x 984, 985 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Byrd, 969 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1992)) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

As a threshold matter, and in accordance with the guidance in Byrd, the Government must 

demonstrate that one of the circumstances listed in Section 3142(f) applies that warrants a 

detention hearing. Section 3142(f) provides:

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(f) Detention hearing. The judicial officers shall hold a hearing to determine 

whether any condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (c) of 

this section will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the 

safety of any other person and the community—

(1) upon motion of the attorney for the Government, in a case that involves—

(A) a crime of violence, a violation of section 1591, or an offense listed in 

section 2332b(g)(5)(B) for which a maximum term of imprisonment of 

10 years or more is prescribed;

(B) an offense for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or 

death;

(C) an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or 

more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et 

seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 

et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46;

(D) any felony if such person has been convicted of two or more offenses 

described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of this paragraph, or two or 

more State or local offenses that would have been offenses described in 

subparagraphs (A) through (C) of this paragraph if a circumstance 

giving rise to Federal jurisdiction had existed, or a combination of such 

offenses; or

(E) any felony that is not otherwise a crime of violence that involves a 

minor victim or that involves the possession or use of a firearm or 

destructive device (as those terms are defined in section 921), or any 

other dangerous weapon, or involves a failure to register under section 

2250 of title 18, United States Code; or

(2) upon motion of the attorney for the Government or upon the judicial 

officer’s own motion, in a case that involves—

(A) a serious risk that such person will flee; or

(B) a serious risk that such person will obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, 

or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure, or 

intimidate, a prospective witness or juror.

18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).

Once the Government proves that one of these circumstances applies, the court may order 

pretrial detention only if it also finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably 

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assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the 

community. Thus, in the Fifth Circuit, “a defendant’s threat to the safety of other persons or to 

the community, standing alone, will not justify pre-trial detention.” Byrd, 969 F.2d at 110.

“[I]n determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the 

appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person or the community,” a court 

must consider: “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged . . . ; (2) the weight of the 

evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person . . . ; and (4) the nature 

and the seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the 

person’s release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). In determining whether a defendant is a flight risk, the 

court must determine by a preponderance of the evidence that no condition or combination of such 

will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance. Fortna, 769 F.2d at 250. 

“With respect to the quantum or character of proof, . . . the [Bail Reform] Act 

provides that the facts the judicial officer uses to support a finding pursuant to 

subsection (e) that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure 

the safety of any other person and the community shall be supported by clear and 

convincing evidence.”4

Id. (quoting § 3142(f)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Analysis

After reviewing the record and applicable authority, the court determines that the 

Magistrate Judge should not have ordered Ms. Liccardi’s pretrial detention pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3142(e)(1).

5 The Magistrate Judge correctly found that this case involves a crime of violence, 

4

“Clear and convincing evidence” is “that weight of proof which produces in the mind of the trier of fact a 

firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct 

and weighty and convincing as to enable the fact finder to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of 

the truth of the precise facts of the case.” Shafer v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 376 F.3d 386, 396 (5th 

Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

5 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1), “[i]f, after a hearing pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f) of this 

section, the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the 

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see Hr’g Tr. 62-63; however, the court disagrees with the Magistrate Judge’s finding “that the 

Government has established by clear and convincing evidence that there are no conditions or 

combination of conditions of release which would reasonably assure the safety of another person 

and the community.” Id. at 63. Moreover, the Magistrate Judge did not find that the Government 

proved by a preponderance of the evidence that no condition or combination of conditions will 

reasonably assure Defendant’s appearance as required. Accordingly, pretrial detention was not 

proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).

The Bail Reform Act allows a judicial officer to hold a hearing to make a pretrial detention

determination “upon motion of the attorney for the Government, in a case that involves . . . a crime 

of violence, a violation of section 1591, or an offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) for which a 

maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more is prescribed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3141(f)(1)(A). 

The term “crime of violence,” as used in this section, means:

(A) an offense that has as an element of the offense the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another;

(B) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial 

risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used 

in the course of committing the offense; or

(C) any felony under chapter 77, 109A, 110, or 117.

18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4). 

The parties agree that an offense in violation of Section 111(a) does not specifically have 

as an element the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” See 18 U.S.C. § 

3156(a)(4)(A); see also Def.’s Mot. 7-9; Gov’t’s Resp. 9-10. Ms. Liccardi argues that, although 

an offense under Section 111(a) may involve physical contact, this does not satisfy the “elements 

appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, such judicial 

officer shall order the detention of the person before trial.” 

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clause” of Section 3156(a)(4)(A). See Def.’s Mot. 9. The Government does not dispute this. See 

generally Gov’t’s Resp. Similarly, both parties contend that the so-called “residual clause” of 

3156(a)(4)(B) applies here.6 Def.’s Mot. 4-5; Gov’t Resp. 7-8. Moreover, Defendant argues that, 

under the categorical approach,

7 Section 111(a) is “categorically nonviolent.” Def.’s Mot. 10. On

the other hand, applying the modified approach,8the Government contends that Ms. Liccardi’s 

6

In contradiction of her argument that it is applicable here, Ms. Liccardi simultaneously argues that the 

residual clause of Section 3156(a)(4)(B) is unconstitutionally vague. According to her: 

Simply put, this Court cannot meaningfully apply the statutory language of § 3156(a)(4)(B) 

without devolving into arbitrary confusion. The language requires the Court to apply an 

uncertain risk standard to the judicially imagined ordinary case of a crime. That “ordinary 

case” must exclude cases involving weapons or “physical injury,” as that term is used in § 

111(b). It is a hopeless enterprise, and the process required by the statutory text is 

untenable and inconsistent with the judicial function.

Def.’s Mot. 11 (emphasis in original). The Government responds that 

[t]he Supreme Court has thus “invalidated two kinds of criminal laws as ‘void for 

vagueness’: laws that define criminal offenses and laws that fix the permissible sentences 

for criminal offenses. [Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017)] (emphasis in 

original). But standards that “merely guide the exercise of a court’s discretion”—like the 

United States Sentencing Guidelines—do not define a criminal offense or “fix the 

permissible range of sentences.” Id. Nor do they trigger the primary concerns of the voidfor-vagueness doctrine: “providing notice and preventing arbitrary enforcement.” Id. at 

894. Accordingly, they are not subject to a void-for-vagueness challenge under the Due 

Process Clause. Id. at 895. . . . Like the Sentencing Guidelines, Section 3156(a)(4)(B)’s 

crime-of-violence definition, which applies for purposes of pretrial-detention eligibility 

under Section 3142, is not subject to a void-for-vagueness challenge.

Gov’t’s Resp. 8. The court agrees with the Government that § 3156(a)(4)(B) does not define a criminal 

offense or fix a sentence for a criminal offense. The statute, in conjunction with Section 3142(f)(1), simply 

assists courts in determining whether a detention hearing is proper. Therefore, the court determines that 

Defendant’s claim that Section 3156(a)(4)(B) is unconstitutional fails. 

7 Under the “categorical approach,” courts “consider whether the elements of the offense are of the type that 

would justify its inclusion within the residual provision, without inquiring into the specific conduct of this 

particular offender.” James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202 (2007), overruled on other grounds by

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (emphasis in original).

8 Courts apply the “modified categorical approach” when a statute is divisible or has “multiple alternative 

elements.” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016). According to the Government, Section 

111(a) is such a divisible statute, Gov’t’s Resp. 9, that requires, in part, a finding that Defendant completed 

the offense by “forcibly assault[ing], resist[ing], oppos[ing], imped[ing], intimidat[ing], or interfer[ing]

with [a] person designated in section 1114,” 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), and thus “by its nature, involves a 

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offense qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 3156(a)(4)(B) because “[i]t is possible to 

both violate Section 111(a) and make physical contact with a victim during this violation without 

using physical force against the victim.” Gov’t’s Resp. 11 (citing United States v. Ramirez, 233 

F.3d 318, 322 (5th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 

625 (2002)). According to the Government, “there is a ‘strong probability’ that forcibly assaulting, 

resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, or interfering with a federal officer in a manner that 

involves physical contact will result in the application of physical force or devolve into a violent 

confrontation.” Id. (citation omitted). The Government points out, however, that “[t]he Fifth 

Circuit has not squarely addressed whether courts should use the categorial [or modified 

categorical] approach to determine what constitutes a crime of violence under the Bail Reform 

Act.” Id. at 12. As such, the court is not inclined to use either the categorial or modified categorical 

approach here.

“[T]he Government need not show that the ‘charged offense’ itself presents one of the 

circumstances in [section] 3142(f) so long as the defendant’s case involved any offense or other 

[section] 3142(f) factor that could serve as the statutory basis for detention.” Zaccaria, 347 F. 

App’x at 986 (citing Byrd, 969 F.2d at 110). “In other words, it is not necessary that the charged 

offense be a crime of violence; only that the case involve a crime of violence or any one or more 

of the [section] 3142(f) factors.” Byrd, 969 F.2d at 110. “But the proof of a nexus between the 

non-violent offense charged and one or more of the six [section] 3142(f) factors is crucial.” Id. 

The record indicates that Ms. Liccardi violently breached the Earle Cabell Federal Building on 

November 29, 2021, giving rise to this charge against her. Inspector Beranek testified that “[s]he 

substantial risk that physical force against the person . . . of another may be used in the course of committing 

the offense[.]” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(B)) (citing United States v. Picazo-Lucas, 821 F. App’x 

335, 339-40 (5th Cir. 2020)).

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violently threw her body, getting herself away from the two PSOs, then shoved [a] PSO [], reset 

herself, and then threw a punch, hitting [the] PSO [] in her face.” Hr’g Tr. 6. Therefore, even if 

the court accepts Ms. Liccardi’s contention that Section 111(a) is not a crime of violence as true, 

there is a clear nexus between that charged offense and the “crime of violence” factor of Section

3142(f), as Defendant allegedly physically assaulted another individual. See 18 U.S.C. § 

3142(f)(1)(A). Furthermore, while Defendant may be correct that a Section 111(a) offense does 

not necessarily include specific elements of violence—that is, a jury could properly find that she 

violated Section 111(a) without finding that she used violence—this does not prevent the court 

from determining that her alleged offense and violation of the statute involved a crime of violence 

based on her actual and specific conduct during the alleged offense. See Zaccaria, 347 F. App’x 

at 986; Byrd, 969 F.2d at 110. Accordingly, the court determines that Ms. Liccardi’s charged 

offense involved a crime of violence pursuant to Section 3142(f)(1)(A), and thus the Magistrate 

Judge properly held the detention hearing.

The court’s determination that one of the Section 3142(f) factors applies is not a sufficient 

basis for it to properly order Ms. Liccardi’s pretrial detention. See Byrd, 969 F.2d at 110. To order 

pretrial detention, the court must also determine that no condition or combination of conditions 

will reasonably assure her appearance as required and the safety of any other person and the 

community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The Magistrate Judge determined at the detention 

hearing that the Government did not “establish[] that this is a case involving serious risk of flight.”

Hr’g Tr. 62. After conducting a de novo review, the court agrees, and it finds that the Government 

has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. Liccardi is a serious flight risk. 

The Government urges the court to find that no condition or combination of conditions will 

reasonably assure Defendant’s appearance as required, but the only evidence it presents is the 

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testimony of Inspector Beranek in which he states that she moved to the Dallas, Texas9 area from 

North Carolina; that, aside from her partner, Mr. Miller, she has no contact with family members; 

and that he—Inspector Beranek—does not believe that Defendant “is an individual likely to 

comply with authority over her.” See id. at 14, 34. The court is not persuaded by this evidence 

alone. As such, the court determines that the Government has not proved by a preponderance of 

the evidence that Ms. Liccardi is a flight risk. Accordingly, the court need not discuss whether 

there is any condition or combination of conditions that will reasonably assure Defendant’s 

appearance as required.

The record, however, does support a determination that Defendant poses a threat to the 

safety of others and the community. The Magistrate Judge concluded that a finding that no 

condition or combination of conditions of release would reasonably assure the safety of any other 

person and the community is supported by clear and convincing evidence. In reaching this 

conclusion, the Magistrate Judge explained as follows:

The credible evidence establishes Defendant committed the offense alleged in the 

Complain; thus, the Court finds probably cause to believe that Defendant 

committed that offense. Defendant admits to a significant history of mental health 

diagnosis and treatment, which she voluntarily ceased. Defendant’s reaction of 

November 29, 2021, to the officers securing the federal building was wholly 

irrational and violent. Viewing Defendant’s prior violent offense and her social 

media posts advocating violence, not in a vacuum, but through this lens, the Court 

concludes that none of the conditions of release it could impose would reasonably 

assure the safety of the community or another person.

Order of Detention Pending Trial (Doc. 11); see Hr’g Tr. 63-64.

Ms. Liccardi disagrees and argues as follows: 

What the Court was confronted with is a 53 year-old woman, who receives 

disability, who has a single prior from more than 15 years ago, for which she 

received a probationary sentence, who behaved terribly one afternoon, physically 

9 According to Defendant’s counsel, Ms. Liccardi has lived in Dallas, Texas, area for five years. Hr’g Tr. 

51. 

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lashing out at a security guard in a moment of true distress. The video shows that 

Ms. Liccardi certainly pushed Officer Wheeler off of her; the video shows that Ms. 

Liccardi apparently took a swipe at Officer Wheeler, possibly missing, or possibly 

making contact with her mask or even her face. She did not cause injury. She did 

not carry a weapon. She has made nasty Facebook posts, but in an age when U.S. 

Congressmen are being reprimanded for posting cartoons videos of themselves 

murdering a fellow Congresswoman, that hardly seems to be a legitimate basis for 

detention. While the Court announced that Ms. Liccardi “voluntarily ceased 

maintaining” and was “refusing to continue” her mental health treatment, the 

information provided in the Pretrial Services Report actually reported that Ms. 

Liccardi had sought treatment for her PTSD and Bipolar Disorder within the last 

few years, that she had been prescribed the wrong medication, and as a result had 

“lost trust in the system and stopped seeking services.” There was no indication 

that Ms. Liccardi was refusing mental health treatment. To the contrary, Ms. 

Liccardi is absolutely willing to undertake mental health counseling as part of a 

release plan. 

While Ms. Liccardi’s behavior on November 29th was inexcusable, this is 

not a case in which she should be detained. There are certainly release conditions 

that would both ensure Ms. Liccardi’s attendance at hearings and protect people in 

the community. The Court could order Ms. Liccardi to adhere to any combination 

of: GPS tracking, home confinement, restricting courthouse visits to criminal case 

appearances, third-party custodian supervision, mental health counseling. This just 

is not a person who cannot be safely released. This is a case in which a probationary 

sentence would not be unheard of.

Def.’s Mot. 18-19.

The court addresses each of these arguments in turn. With respect to Defendant’s argument 

that she “physically lash[ed] out at a security guard in a moment of true distress,” this is not 

supported by evidence in the record. From what the court can reasonably infer, Ms. Liccardi was

upset because the PSOs would not permit her to enter the building without a mask. Frankly, any 

“distress” at the time of her “lashing out” was caused solely by Defendant. The video shows there 

was a confrontation—initially a verbal confrontation—in which the PSOs attempted to stop 

Defendant from passing through the magnetometers without a mask. This was followed by the 

PSOs holding or restraining her, which was then followed by Ms. Liccardi resisting or trying to 

get away. Ultimately, according to Inspector Beranek, Ms. Liccardi hit Officer Wheeler in the

face, see Hr’g Tr. 6, 22-24. In her Motion, Ms. Liccardi acknowledges that she “apparently took 

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a swipe at Officer Wheeler, possibly missing, or possibly making contact with her mask or even 

her face.” Def.’s Mot. 18. Defendant minimizes what actually occurred. 

The court determines that, whether with a closed fist or open hand,10 Ms. Liccardi made 

contact with Officer Wheeler’s person. Not only is this supported by Inspector Beranek’s 

testimony, but a photograph of Officer Wheeler taken after the incident also shows a large area of 

redness on the right side of her face. Def.’s Ex. 4. This is consistent with some type of force used 

against Officer Wheeler. Stated differently, there is no doubt in the court’s mind that physical 

contact was made, whether it was made with a closed fist or slap is wholly beside the point. The 

video also shows Officer Wheeler recoiling or stepping back as the blow is thrown or quickly 

thereafter. The complete view of this portion of the incident is partially blocked because of the 

position of another PSO. Further, to maintain order and bring the situation under control, Inspector 

Beranek threatened Ms. Liccardi with the use of his taser if she did not calm down and stop 

resisting or struggling. This is supported by the video recording of the incident that shows 

Inspector Beranek placing his taser against her back as he pinned her to a table in the security area,

as well as his testimony explaining what occurred. See Hr’g Tr. 6. 

Ms. Liccardi further acknowledges that she “has made nasty Facebook posts.” Def. Mot. 

18. She contends, essentially, that if United States Congressman Paul Gosar (“Congressman 

Gosar”) is “reprimanded”11 for posting a cartoon video depicting him “murdering” fellow United 

States Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, her Facebook posts “hardly seem[] to be a 

10 During the cross-examination of Inspector Beranek at the detention hearing, defense counsel attempted 

to make a distinction as to whether Ms. Liccardi struck Officer Wheeler with an open hand or closed fist. 

See Hr’g Tr. 30. This is of no moment, as either manner of striking Officer Wheeler involves physical 

contact and force, and probable cause exists to show that the blow was done knowingly and intentionally.

11 Congressman Gosar was censured by Congress, not “reprimanded” as Defendant contends, for the video 

posting Ms. Liccardi references. 

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legitimate basis for detention.” Id. This argument is a red herring. One incident has nothing to 

do with the other. While the court certainly does not condone Congressman Gosar’s video 

posting—or any similar posting by any member of Congress—the matter before it is whether Ms. 

Liccardi (and no one else) is a danger to the safety of another and the community and, if so, whether 

there is any condition or combination of conditions that the court could impose to reasonably 

assure the safety of another and the community. Congressman Gosar’s social media posts or any 

subsequent consequence of such posts does not assist the court in making the determination that it 

needs to make in this case. 

Furthermore, the court agrees with Ms. Liccardi’s characterization of her Facebook posts 

as “nasty,” but some fall within the realm of free speech. Although not models of pellucid

draftsmanship or displays, some of Defendant’s posts can be read to mean that Ms. Liccardi will 

defend herself if she is physically attacked, robbed, or threatened. Others, however, go “beyond 

the pale” by condoning violence and murder. Some of Defendant’s posts presented to the court 

include: 

• Pictures of a dagger or knife concealed on an armband, with a caption in which Ms. 

Liccardi states, “My New Medieval Blade Cuff Concealed Carry Weapon of Scissors. Yes, 

I will be running with scissors.” Def.’s Ex. 2.

• Pictures of a bat wrapped in red fabric with a set of chains attached to the top, with a caption 

in which Ms. Liccardi states, “Turning my mini Louisville Slugger into a Medieval Flail.” 

Id.

• A picture of “[a] dagger or knife . . . concealed on an arm band [sic] and some type of small 

bat object with chains attached to the end of it,” with a caption in which Ms. Liccardi states, 

“The next scumbag that thinks they’re going to get away with robbing me is going to get 

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murdered. I’m prepared to f*** up anyone that approaches me wrong.” Hr’g Tr. 12; see 

Def.’s Ex. 2.

• A graphic stating, “I’m about to turn some heads. If you don’t know me by now... YOU 

WILL SOON[.]” Def.’s Ex. 2.

• An article titled, “BREAKING: At least 8 people dead in mass shooting at Indianapolis 

FedEx facility,” with a caption in which Ms. Liccardi states, “GO, GUNMAN!!! SEE 

FEDEX... I TOLD YOU IT WAS COMING FOR YOU!! GODS [sic] EYES ARE ON 

YOU AND BEZOS NOW, MOTHERF*****S.” Def.’s Ex. 22; see Hr’g Tr. 13-14.

Of particular concern to the court are the last two posts previously listed. In the first of the 

two last quotes, the court has no pause in reasonably inferring that she is about to do something of 

such a nature that “causes a stir,” draws attention to herself, or “acts up.” This is so because of the 

plain nature of these posts, her history of violent behavior—which include the conviction for 

assault with a vehicle in 2005 and the protective order issued against Defendant in New Jersey on 

November 8, 2008, and still in effect today according to Court’s Exhibit 1. 12, 13 

This last post speaks for itself in which Defendant emphatically praises the gunman for 

killing eight people at a Federal Express facility in Indianapolis, Indiana. Publicly condoning the 

killing of eight persons is beyond “nasty.” It is frightening that a person would have the temerity 

to post such statements in support of a gunman who murdered eight persons. 

12 Protective orders are usually issued against a person because of violence or stalking, or some other 

conduct that places another person in harm’s way.

13 See Court’s Ex. 1, 5. Although the Pretrial Services Report was not admitted into evidence at the 

detention hearing, it was discussed at the detention hearing as part of the record, and the court finds it 

helpful in resolving the issues before it; thus, the Pretrial Services Report is hereby admitted as Court’s 

Exhibit 1, and the court directs the clerk of court to file this exhibit under seal.

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Memorandum Opinion and Order – Page 15

Additionally, Ms. Liccardi acknowledges she has mental health disorders. According to 

the United States Probation Officer who prepared the Pretrial Services Report:

[D]efendant stated [that] she was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 

(PTSD), bipolar disorder, depression, and mania. . . . At the time of her diagnosis, 

she recalled being prescribed and using Lexpro; however, she advised she stopped 

using the medication in 2007. [D]efendant described her mental illnesses as 

“situational.” The defendant recalled a time in 2017, when she attempted to seek 

mental health treatment through Metrocare Services in Dallas. She indicated 

medical staff had prescribed her the wrong medication and when confronted, they 

advised her to take them regardless. The defendant revealed at that time she lost 

trust in the system and stopped seeking services.

Court’s Ex. 1. The court agrees, therefore, with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that “Ms. Liccardi 

admitted to a significant history of mental health diagnos[e]s and treatment [that] she has 

voluntarily ceased maintaining, [and] that she is refusing to continue.” Hr’g Tr. 63. Moreover, 

for someone who is bold enough to attempt to breach a security checkpoint secured by at least four 

armed officers and ultimately resists and attacks one of those officers, the court has no way of 

knowing how Defendant will act or respond under any given circumstance or situation. Although 

Ms. Liccardi’s full medical or mental health records were not presented during the hearing, the 

court is nevertheless convinced that no condition or combination of conditions it could impose 

against her would reasonably assure the safety of another or the community. 

Ms. Liccardi argues that there are a number of conditions or combinations of conditions

that the court could impose to protect persons and the community from her. The court disagrees 

and will address in turn each condition presented or advanced by Defendant.

With respect to GPS tracking, the device attached to a person can be removed. An alert 

goes to the probation officer that the device has been removed or is malfunctioning. The alert is 

not received, at a minimum, until several minutes have elapsed. Once the device is removed, 

however, the person being monitored cannot be tracked and it takes only a few minutes for a person 

to commit a crime and abscond. 

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Memorandum Opinion and Order – Page 16

Regarding home confinement, this is not a viable option. Defendant has suggested that her 

live-in boyfriend, Mr. Paul Miller (“Mr. Miller”), serve as a third-party custodian. The record 

indicates that Mr. Miller works full time for the City of Dallas. No evidence in the record indicates 

whether Mr. Miller telecommutes or how much time he spends at his employer’s place of 

buisniess. There is nothing in the record to establish that he can effectively assume this role. 

Obviously, when he is away at work, he will not have sufficient knowledge of what Ms. Liccardi 

is doing, or be in a position to stop her from leaving the residence. Persons who are on home 

confinement can only leave their residence for employment purposes, medical treatment, religious 

activities, and other matters approved by the probation officer. When Mr. Miller is at work, there 

is no way that he can effectively control or supervise Ms. Liccardi’s actions. 

Finally, with respect to mental health counseling, this argument is unconvincing. The 

record establishes that Ms. Liccardi was prescribed Lexapro in 2006 for Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder (“PTSD”); however, she stopped using the medication in 2007. No explanation is 

provided for her cessation. Further, she attempted to seek mental health services in 2017 through 

Metrocare Services in Dallas. She and Metrocare staff disagreed about the suitability of the 

medicine prescribed, and she lost trust in the system and ceased seeking mental health treatment. 

From what the court can ascertain from the record, Defendant has not sought any mental health 

treatment since 2017 and has not been prescribed any medications for any mental diagnosis.

Defendant now is willing to seek mental health counseling as part of a release plan. Ms. 

Liccardi has long known that she suffers from several serious mental disorders, yet she has not 

sought treatment for PTSD, bipolar disorder, depression, or mania for more than four years. The 

court is doubtful that she would adhere to any court-ordered conditions regarding mental health 

counseling in light of her past history and view toward mental health treatment. 

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Memorandum Opinion and Order – Page 17

Ms. Liccardi’s criminal history includes a conviction for assault with a vehicle, which 

occurred in 2004, Court’s Ex. 1, 5; a current and “valid” protection order issued against her in 

2008, id.; her various social media posts condoning or threatening violence; and her admitted 

mental health disorders, taken together with the video evidence of her conduct related to this 

offense are clear indications to the court that she poses a safety threat to another person and the

community. See Court’s Ex. 1; Gov’t’s Exs. 1, 2. Therefore, the court agrees with the Magistrate 

Judge, and it concludes that clear and convincing evidence establishes that no condition or 

combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of another person and the community. 

IV. Conclusion

The court concludes, for the reasons herein explained, that the record in this case supports 

Defendant’s pretrial detention. The court, therefore, denies Defendant’s Motion to Revoke 

Detention Order (Doc. 16); and affirms the Order of Detention Pending Trial (Doc. 11), entered 

by the Magistrate Judge on December 3, 2021. Accordingly, Defendant shall remain detained

pending the trial or other disposition of this case.

It is so ordered this 21st day of January, 2022.

_________________________________

Sam A. Lindsay

United States District Judge

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