ORDER AND OPINION

Before the Court are Defendant Trooper Mark Strange’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14), 

filed June 17, 2022; Defendant Trooper Will Richter’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15), filed June 

17, 2022; Defendants Director and Colonel Steve McGraw, Lieutenant Dwight Mathis, Chief 

Orlando Alanis, Lieutenant Colonel Jeoff Williams, Chief Michelle Farris, and Regional Director 

Joe Longway’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18), filed July 5, 2022; Plaintiffs’ Response to 

Troopers Strange and Richter’s Motions (ECF No. 20), filed July , 2022; and Plaintiffs’ Response 

to the Supervisory Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 21), filed July 25, 2022. For the reasons 

discussed below, the Court finds that the Motions should be, and are, hereby GRANTED in part 

and DENIED in part. 

I. Factual Background1

In the early morning hours of September 23, 2020, Plaintiffs Russell Thompson and 

Demetrius McChester started driving from Las Vegas, Nevada, back to New Boston, Texas, where 

they reside. McChester was driving Thompson’s 2019 Mercedes Benz CLS250. Defendant 

1 The Court’s recitation of the facts is taken from Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. See Am. Compl. ECF 

No. 12. At the 12(b)(6) stage, these facts are taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff. See Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WICHITA FALLS DIVISION

RUSSELL THOMPSON AND 

DEMETRIUS MCCHESTER,

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

TROOPER WILL RICHTER, et al.,

Defendants.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

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Trooper Will Richter noticed the Mercedes and followed the vehicle for a short distance before 

activating his emergency lights to signal McChester to pull over. McChester complied, and when 

Trooper Richter approached the vehicle, he told McChester that the reason for the stop was because 

of speeding. 

Trooper Richter obtained both McChester and Thompson’s drivers’ licenses. He then asked 

McChester to exit the Mercedes. Once McChester had exited the vehicle, Trooper Richter asked 

him multiple questions regarding where the pair were driving from, going to, and with whom they 

had associated during their trip. McChester answered all of Trooper Richter’s questions. Trooper 

Richter then asked Thompson similar questions, which Thompson answered. Trooper Richter then 

asked the men if he could search the Mercedes, to which Thompson said no.

At this point, ten minutes into the traffic stop, Trooper Richter went back to his patrol car 

to request a cover unit and a K-9 unit to conduct a free air sniff. He had yet to run a criminal 

background check on either man.

Twenty minutes into the traffic stop, Trooper Richter returned to the Mercedes and 

continued to question McChester and Thompson. Thirty minutes into the stop, Plaintiffs state

Trooper Richter asked McChester if he had any weapons on him. He told McChester that he was 

detained and that he needed to search McChester for officer safety purposes. Forty minutes into 

the stop, the K-9 Unit arrived, and Defendant Trooper Mark Strange and his K-9 conducted the 

open-air sniff. 

After circling the Mercedes three times, the K-9 alerted to the front of the vehicle, alerting 

to the smell of marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, or heroin. Trooper Strange then searched 

the trunk of the vehicle and located a loaded handgun. Trooper Richter ran a check to see if there 

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was any criminal conduct connected with the handgun and found none. At this point, McChester 

and Thompson had been stopped for over an hour.

Trooper Richter then returned to his patrol car and checked Thompson’s criminal 

background. His search revealed Thompson’s criminal history for crimes in Clark County, 

Nevada; Bell County, Texas; and the state of Georgia. Thompson had been charged with felonies 

but had no felony convictions on his record. Trooper Richter arrested Thompson for being a felon 

in possession of a handgun. After arresting Thompson, Trooper Richter released the Mercedes to 

McChester. Trooper Richter did not give McChester a speeding ticket nor a ticket for driving with 

an expired driver’s license.

Thompson spent days following the traffic stop in jail. The Wichita County Prosecutor’s 

Office then dismissed the charges against Thompson, as there was no underlying felony conviction 

on which the felon in possession of a firearm charge could stand.

Plaintiffs filed this action on February 28, 2022. They filed an Amended Complaint on 

May 9, 2022. In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs claim six causes of action, alleging:

(1) Trooper Richter is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Plaintiffs’ Fourth 

Amendment rights by utilizing the alleged speeding violation as a pretext to seize Plaintiffs 

and by detaining Plaintiffs beyond the necessary time to effectuate and conclude the 

allegedly pretextual traffic stop. 

(2) Troopers Richter, Strange, and John Doe are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating 

Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights by detaining Thompson beyond the necessary time to 

effectuate and conclude the allegedly pretextual traffic stop, and by arresting Thompson 

without probable cause. 

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(3) Troopers Richter, Strange, and John Doe are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving 

Thompson of his Second Amendment right to own and bear arms.

(4) Troopers Strange and John Doe are liable for failing to intervene when Trooper Richter 

allegedly violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 

(5) Director and Colonel Steve McGraw, Lieutenant Dwight Mathis, Chief Orlando Alanis, 

Lieutenant Colonel Jeoff Williams, Chief Michelle Farris, and Regional Director Joe 

Longway are liable for failing to properly train Troopers Richter, Strange, and John Doe.

(6) Trooper Richter is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Plantiffs’ Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. 

Trooper Strange filed a Motion to Dismiss all claims against him on June 17, 2022.2 Also, 

on June 17, 2022, Trooper Richter filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss, moving to dismiss only 

Plaintiff McChester’s claims against him.3 Director and Colonel Steve McGraw, Lieutenant 

Dwight Mathis, Chief Orlando Alanis, Lieutenant Colonel Jeoff Williams, Chief Michelle Farris, 

and Regional Director Joe Longway (“the Supervisory Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss all 

claims against them on July 5, 2022.4 All three motions are now ripe for the Court’s review. 

II. Legal Standard

A. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 “does not require 

‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

2 Strange Mot., ECF No. 14, 

3 Richter Mot., ECF No. 15.

4 Supervisory Defs. Mot., ECF No. 18. 

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). If a plaintiff fails to satisfy Rule 8(a), the defendant may file 

a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted.” 

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead “enough facts 

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The 

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where 

a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the 

line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 557) (cleaned up). A court may not accept legal conclusions as true. Id. at 678–79. When wellpleaded factual allegations are present, a court assumes their veracity and then determines whether 

they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id.

B. Qualified Immunity 

All Defendants in this case assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. The 

doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

“from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 

“Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials 

accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from 

harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. at 815. This 

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doctrine protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley 

v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 

Courts generally apply the two-pronged analysis established in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 

194 (2001), in determining whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity for an 

alleged constitutional violation. The first prong of the Saucier analysis asks whether the facts 

alleged or shown are sufficient to make out a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right. 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If the record sets out or establishes no violation, no further inquiry is 

necessary. On the other hand, if the plaintiff sufficiently pleads or establishes the violation of a 

constitutional or federal statutory right, the Court then turns to the second prong and asks whether 

the right was clearly established at the time of the government official’s alleged misconduct. Id. 

When considering this second prong, the relevant question is whether a reasonable officer could 

have believed that his conduct was lawful in light of clearly established law and the information 

possessed by him. Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1991). If public officials or 

officers of “reasonable competence could disagree [on whether the conduct is legal], immunity 

should be recognized.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 

277 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994)). Courts must 

consider “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established” and must 

undertake this inquiry “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general 

proposition.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (citations and internal quotations marks 

omitted).

The Supreme Court has clarified that it is no longer mandatory for courts to consider the 

two prongs set out in Saucier in order, although the Court noted that it may be beneficial to do so. 

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Under Pearson, courts are now permitted to exercise their sound 

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discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be 

addressed first, in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand. Id. 

III. Analysis

A. Defendant Trooper Richter 

Defendant Trooper Richter moves to dismiss all claims asserted against him by Plaintiff 

McChester. He argues he is entitled to qualified immunity as McChester fails to establish any 

constitutional violation assignable to Trooper Richter and fails to demonstrate objective 

unreasonableness of Trooper Richter’s conduct in light of settled law. 

McChester brings a Fourth Amendment claim against Trooper Richter under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983.5 McChester alleges that Trooper Richter deprived him of his Fourth Amendment right to be 

free from unreasonable government searches and seizure “by not only utilizing the alleged 

speeding violation as a pretext to seize Plaintiffs, but by detaining Plaintiffs beyond the necessary 

time to effectuate and conclude the pretextual traffic stop.”6

A traffic stop for a suspected violation of law is a “seizure” of the occupants of the vehicle 

and therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. Heien v. North 

Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014). In the Fifth Circuit, challenges to traffic stops are processed 

under a two-step inquiry. See United States v. Bams, 858 F.3d 937, 942 (5th Cir. 2017); United 

States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 832 (5th Cir. 2013). The district court first must determine 

“whether the stop was justified at its inception,” that is, whether the officer had an “objectively 

reasonable suspicion” that a traffic offense occurred or was occurring. See Bams, 858 F.3d at 942. 

If the stop was justified, the next step is to determine “whether the officer’s subsequent actions 

were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop of the vehicle in the 

5 Am Compl. ¶ 65, ECF No. 12. 

6

Id.

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first place.” Id. (quoting Andres, 703 F.3d at 832). A traffic stop must “last no longer than is 

necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, unless further reasonable suspicion, supported by 

articulable facts, emerges.” Id. (quoting Andres, 703 F.3d at 832). Reasonable suspicion is defined 

as “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped” of breaking 

the law. Heien, 574 U.S. at 536. 

In this case, the parties do not dispute that Thompson was speeding or that the initial stop 

was not justified. However, they do dispute whether Trooper Richter had reasonable suspicion to 

extend the traffic stop for longer than it reasonably should have taken for him to complete the tasks 

typically associated with a traffic infraction. 

Via the Amended Complaint, less than ten minutes into the traffic stop, Trooper Richter 

(1) had both men’s drivers’ licenses; (2) knew the car was insured; (3) knew the men were related; 

(4) knew where the men currently lived; and (5) knew that they had been in Las Vegas, Nevada.7

Other than running a computer criminal check on their licenses, Trooper Richter had done 

everything needed to complete the traffic stop. The question is whether there was reasonable 

suspicion at that point to prolong the stop, calling for the K-9 sniff and further questioning 

Plaintiffs about matters unrelated to the traffic stop. 

Trooper Richter claims he received inconsistent information about Plaintiffs’ travels and 

where Thompson lived, giving him reasonable suspicion to call for the K-9 sniff. The only 

inconsistencies reflected in the Complaint were that McChester told Trooper Richter both men had 

lived in New Boston all their lives, except for when Thompson was in the Army, and Thompson 

said he had lived in Georgia when he was working as a commercial trucker.8 McChester told 

Trooper Richter the men had been in Long Beach and stopped through Las Vegas on their way 

7 Am. Compl. ¶ 31. 

8

Id.

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home while Thompson simply said the men were driving from Las Vegas.9 Also, Trooper Richter, 

when calling for the K-9 sniff, told dispatch that the navigation in the vehicle indicated the two 

were travelling to Memphis, Tennessee, not New Boston, Texas, as the men said.

10

At the point Trooper Richter called for the K-9 sniff, the only articulated facts potentially 

giving rise to reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop and call for the K-9 sniff were the 

inconsistencies in Plaintiffs’ answers and the discrepancy between the men’s stated travel plans 

and what was noted on the car’s navigation. The Fifth Circuit has explained that the reasonable 

suspicion inquiry is a “totality of the circumstances” analysis, where “the proper question is 

whether or not the entire set of circumstances, taken together, created reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity.” United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 358 (5th Cir. 2010). Minor inconsistencies 

in answers, however, do not give rise to reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Estrada, 459 

F.3d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Mere ‘uneasy feelings’ and inconsistent stories between a driver 

and a passenger do not constitute articulable facts that support a reasonable suspicion of [criminal 

activity].”); see also United States v. Spears, 636 F. App'x 893, 902 (5th Cir. 2016) (“[M]inor, 

insignificant, illusory, or reconcilable inconsistencies in a [suspect’s] story are not probative of 

criminal activity”). Inconsistent answers have been held to create reasonable suspicion only in 

cases where the inconsistent answers are but one factor relied upon to establish reasonable 

suspicion and/or when the inconsistencies are serious or seemingly intentionally deceptive. Pack, 

612 F.3d at 360–61; see also United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 508–09 (5th Cir. 2004). 

“[T]he question is whether it was reasonable for someone in [the officer’s] shoes to view the 

answers as suspicious.” United States v. Pena–Gonzalez, 618 Fed.Appx. 195, 200 (5th Cir. 2015).

9

Id. at ¶¶ 26, 29.

10 Id. at ¶ 34. 

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When a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense at the motion to dismiss stage, the 

district court is required to apply Rule 8(a)(2)'s ‘short and plain’ standard to the complaint.

Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 590 (5th Cir. 2016). In analyzing whether the plaintiff has 

sufficiently pleaded a constitutional violation under this standard, the court “must accept all wellpleaded facts as true, draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and view all facts and 

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 

F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009). Viewing the factual details in McChester’s favor, it was not 

reasonable for an officer in Trooper Richter’s position to view the minor inconsistencies in this 

case as suspicious. Both men acknowledged that they were driving from Las Vegas, Nevada. The 

fact that McChester mistakenly said both men had lived in New Boston all their lives does not 

support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, nor does the fact that the car’s navigation 

system indicated the men were travelling to Memphis, Tennessee when they said they were driving 

to New Boston, Texas. Overall, at the pleading stage of the lawsuit, the inconsistencies presented

did not create reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop. Therefore, McChester has sufficiently 

stated a claim against Trooper Richter for a violation of McChester’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

Turning to the second prong of the qualified immunity defense, the Court finds that no

objectively reasonable trooper in Trooper Richter’s position could have believed that Trooper 

Richter’s conduct was lawful in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by 

him at the time. The Court finds ample caselaw establishing that minor, immaterial inconsistencies 

in answers alone cannot justify a trooper prolonging a traffic stop and calling for a K-9 sniff. See

Spears, 636 F. App'x at 902; Estrada, 459 F.3d at 631; Pack, 612 F.3d at 360–61. 

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The Court ultimately finds that Trooper Richter is not entitled to qualified immunity as to 

McChester’s Fourth Amendment claim at the motion to dismiss stage. Trooper Richter’s motion 

is hereby DENIED. 

B. Defendant Trooper Strange

Defendant Trooper Strange asserts qualified immunity and moves to dismiss all claims 

brought against him by Plaintiffs McChester and Thompson.11 Thompson brings causes of action 

against Strange for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights,

12 violation of his Second 

Amendment right,

13 and failure to intervene.14 McChester joins in Thompson’s cause of action for 

failure to intervene.15 Plaintiffs’ claims as to Trooper Strange can be summarized as: Trooper 

Strange had a duty to intervene when he learned of the unsupportable basis on which Trooper 

Richter had concluded he had reasonable suspicion to detain the men, and his act and involvement 

led to Thompson’s wrongful arrest, in violation of Thompson’s Constitutional rights.

16

Trooper Strange contends his sole involvement in the matter was arriving on the scene, 

conducting the K-9 sniff, and assisting in the resulting vehicle search once the K-9 alerted to a 

scent emanating from the front of the vehicle.17 Trooper Strange states Plaintiffs fail to plead facts 

demonstrating Trooper Strange had individual, on-scene knowledge of the facts determining 

whether Thompson’s arrest was proper.18 He further states that Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate why 

11 Strange Mot. 3, ECF No. 14. 

12 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 68–73, ECF No. 12. 

13 Id. at ¶¶ 74–80. 

14 Id. at ¶¶ 81–88. 

15 Id. 

16 Id. at ¶¶ 70–80; Pls. Resp. 5, ECF No. 20. 

17 Strange Mot. 6, ECF No. 14. 

18 Id. at 7. 

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it was unreasonable for Trooper Strange to rely on Trooper Richter’s probable cause determination 

leading to Thompson’s arrest.19

The Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to plead facts sufficient to establish their Fourth and 

Second Amendment claims. The Amended Complaint, as pertains to Plaintiffs’ claims under the 

Second and Fourth Amendment, focuses on the prolonged traffic stop and Thompson’s arrest.20

Via the Amended Complaint, it was Trooper Richter who initially detained and eventually arrested 

Thompson, after looking up his criminal history.

21 Trooper Strange reportedly did not arrive until 

approximately forty minutes after the initial traffic stop.22 As Trooper Strange is not the officer 

who prolonged the traffic stop or arrested Thompson, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled that 

Trooper Richter violated Thompson’s Fourth and Second Amendment rights. Looking at the 

second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, Plaintiffs cite to no caselaw to suggest that it was 

unreasonable for Trooper Strange to rely on Trooper Richter’s determination of reasonable 

suspicion to call for the K-9 search.23 They further cite no caselaw to suggest that it was 

unreasonable for Trooper Strange to rely on Trooper Richter’s determination of probable cause to 

arrest Thompson.24 Finally, Plaintiffs cite to no caselaw to support their contention that Trooper 

Richter had a duty to intervene on these facts.25 Therefore, Trooper Strange is entitled to qualified 

immunity, and Plaintiffs’ claims against Trooper Strange are DISMISSED. 

19 Id.

20 Plaintiffs seemingly do not bring a Fourth Amendment claim that the search of the vehicle itself was 

unconstitutional (i.e., the troopers conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle that went beyond its 

constitutional scope), but rather, that the troopers unconstitutionally seized Plaintiffs through the 

prolonged traffic stop and through Thompson’s arrest. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs leave to amend to 

bring claim regarding the constitutionality of the search itself. 

21 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17–49, ECF No. 12. 

22 Id. at ¶ 42. 

23 See Pls. Resp. 4–6, ECF No. 20.

24 Id. 

25 Id.

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C. Supervisory Defendants McCraw, Mathis, Williams, Alanis, Farris, and Longway

Lastly, the Supervisory Defendants assert qualified immunity and move to dismiss all 

claims against them. Plaintiffs bring a claim of failure to train against the Supervisory Defendants, 

alleging that the Supervisory Defendants were aware that DPS Troopers were not properly trained 

in retrieving accurate information from the Texas and National Crime Information Centers, the 

databases used by Troopers to run criminal checks.

26 Plaintiffs also claim that the Supervisory 

Defendants were aware that the resources troopers use to run suspects’ criminal backgrounds, the 

Texas Crime Information Center (“TCIC”) and the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”),

provide inaccurate conviction information, and again failed to train DPS Troopers on the subject.27

Plaintiffs contend the Supervisory Defendants failed to properly train Troopers Richter and 

Strange in determining whether troopers have the requisite authority to detain citizens.28 Plaintiffs 

asserts that the Supervisory Defendants’ alleged failure to train was the direct or proximate cause 

of the alleged constitutional violations complained of in this matter.29

Looking at the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the Court finds Plaintiffs fail 

to adequately plead facts to show the Supervisory Defendants violated their constitutional rights. 

To succeed on a § 1983 claim for failure to supervise or train, the plaintiff must show that: “(1) 

the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists 

between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure 

to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.” Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 

395 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911–12 (5th Cir. 1998)). To 

establish deliberate indifference, “a plaintiff usually must demonstrate a pattern of violations and 

26 Am Compl. ¶ 59, ECF No. 12. 

27 Id. at ¶¶ 60–61. 

28 Id. at ¶ 92. 

29 Id. at ¶¶ 90–99. 

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that the inadequacy of the training is obvious and obviously likely to result in a constitutional 

violation.” Id. (quoting Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 637 (5th Cir. 2003)). Where a plaintiff fails 

to establish deliberate indifference, the court need not address the other two prongs of supervisor 

liability. Id. (citing Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 382 

(5th Cir.2005)).

In this case, Plaintiffs have not pleaded facts to show the Supervisory Defendants acted 

with deliberate indifference. Plaintiffs make only conclusory allegations that the Supervisory 

Defendants were aware that TCIC and NCIC could provide inaccurate conviction information.30

Plaintiffs further fail to plead facts to establish any pattern or past instances of constitutional 

violations resulting from any alleged failure to train, other than the isolated incident complained 

of in this lawsuit.31 Therefore, the Supervisory Defendants did not act with deliberate indifference 

and Plaintiffs have not successfully pleaded that the Supervisory Defendants violated their 

constitutional rights. Therefore, the Supervisory Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and 

Plaintiffs claim against the Supervisory Defendants is DISMISSED. 

IV. Conclusion

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Trooper Strange and the Supervisory 

Defendants are DISMISSED. Therefore, the only claims remaining are Plaintiffs’ claims against 

Trooper Richter. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs leave solely to amend their Fourth Amendment 

claim against Trooper Strange to address the constitutionality of the vehicle search itself if 

they feel they can do so. Any amended complaint must be filed on or before January 30, 2023. 

SO ORDERED this 11th day of January, 2023. 

30 Id. at ¶¶ 60–61. 

31 See generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 12. 

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