UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-2124

GUALBERTO ZURIEL CRUZ-MACHORRO,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals.

Submitted: October 2, 2012 Decided: October 18, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Christopher T. Handman, Adam N. Bitter, A. Elizabeth King, HOGAN 

LOVELLS US LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Stuart F. 

Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Erica B. Miles, 

Senior Litigation Counsel, James A. Hunolt, Senior Litigation 

Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Gualberto Zuriel Cruz-Machorro, a native and citizen 

of Guatemala, petitions for review of an order of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“Board”) granting in part his motion to 

reconsider and amending its decision of August 19, 2010, which

affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of Cruz-Machorro’s 

requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 

under the Convention Against Torture. For the reasons set forth 

below, we deny the petition for review.

A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or 

withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial 

evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings of 

fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 

compelled to decide to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) 

(2006). Legal issues are reviewed de novo, “affording 

appropriate deference to the [Board]’s interpretation of the 

[Immigration and Nationality Act] and any attendant 

regulations.” Li Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th 

Cir. 2008). This court will reverse the Board only if “the 

evidence . . . presented was so compelling that no reasonable 

factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of 

persecution.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84; see Rusu v. 

INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 n.14 (4th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, 
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“[t]he agency decision that an alien is not eligible for asylum 

is ‘conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an 

abuse of discretion.’” Marynenka v. Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 600 

(4th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D) (2006)).

We have reviewed the evidence of record and conclude 

that substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that 

Cruz-Machorro failed to establish that his membership in a 

particular social group was at least one central reason for any 

persecution he suffered in Guatemala. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006) (providing that an asylum applicant 

must establish that the protected ground asserted “was or will 

be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant”); 

Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164-65 (4th Cir. 

2009) (finding that money and personal animosity, not religion 

or political opinion, motivated initial assaults on alien and 

concluding that alien “provided no evidence that his religious 

or political beliefs were more than incidental or tangential to 

any part of the persecution he suffered”). We therefore uphold 

the denial of Cruz-Machorro’s requests for asylum and 

withholding of removal. See Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 

367 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Because the burden of proof for 

withholding of removal is higher than for asylum — even though

the facts that must be proved are the same — an applicant who is 
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ineligible for asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding 

of removal under [8 U.S.C.] § 1231(b)(3).”). 

Additionally, Cruz-Machorro challenges the denial of 

his request for protection under the Convention Against Torture. 

To qualify for such protection, a petitioner bears the burden of 

proof of showing “it is more likely than not that he or she 

would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of 

removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2012). Based on our review 

of the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports 

the denial of his request for relief. See Dankam v. Gonzales, 

495 F.3d 113, 124 (4th Cir. 2007) (setting forth standard of 

review). 

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED