F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

J O S H U A C A L E B B O H M K

E R ; L A R R Y C O O N ; W A L T E R R. E V E N S ; G A L I C E M I N I N G D I S T R

I C T ; J A S O N G I L L ; M I C H A E L H U

N T E R ; M I C H A E L P. L O V E T T ; J O E L G R

O T H E ; M I L L E N N I U M D I G G E R S ; W I L L A M E T T E V A L L E Y M I

N E R S ; D O N V A

N O R M A N ; J .O.G. M I

N I N G L L C, Plaintiffs-Appellants

,

v.

S T A T E O F O R

E G O N ; E L L E

N R O S E N B L U M , in her official capacity as the Attorney

General of the State of Oreg on; M A R Y A B R A M S , in her official capacity as the Director of the Oreg on Department of State L ands,

D efendants-Appellees

,

R O G U E R I V E R

K E E P E R ; P A C I F I C C O A S T F E D E R

A T I O N O F F I S H E R M A N ’ S A S S O C I A T I O N S ; I N S T I T U T E F O R F I S H E R I E S R E S O U R C E S ; O R E G O N C O A S T A L L I A N C E ; C A S C A D I A W I L D L A N D S ; N A T I V E F I S H No. 16-35262

D.C. No. 1:15-cv-01975-CL

OPI NI ONB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 2

S O C I E T Y ; C E

N T E R F O R B I O L O G I C A L D I V E R S I T Y , Intervenor-Defendants-Appellees.

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oreg on Mark D. Clarke, Mag istrate J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted March 8, 2018

Portland, Oreg on

F iled September 12, 2018

B efore: Ray

mond C. F isher, N. Randy Smith and Andrew D. Hurwitz

, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J udg e F isher; Dissent by

J udg e N.R. SmithB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 3

SUMMARY *

Mining Law / P reem ption

Affirming the district court’s summary judg ment in favor of defendants, the panel held that mining restrictions set forth in Oreg on Senate B ill 3 are not preempted by federal law.

To protect threatened fish popula t i ons, Senate B ill 3 prohibits the use o f motoriz ed mining equipment in r ivers a nd
streams c ontaining essential salmon habitat. The r e strictions apply th r o u g hout the state, including on rivers and streams locat ed on federal lands. Plaintiffs have mining claims on federal land in Oreg on.

Assuming without d eciding that federal law p reempts the

ex tension of state land use plans onto unpa t e n t ed mining claims on federal land, the panel held that Senate B ill 3 is not p r e empted because it constitutes an environmental reg u l a t i o n , not a state land use p lanning law. I n addition, Sen a t e Bi l l 3 does not stand as an obstacle to the accomp l i s hment of the full purpo s es and objectives of Cong ress. T h e panel concluded that reasonable state environmental r e strictions such as those f

ound in Senate B ill 3 are consistent with, rather than at odds with, the purposes of federal mining and land use laws. The panel held that Senate B ill 3 therefore is neither field preempted nor conflict preempted.

Dissenting

, J udg e N.R. Smith w rote t h a t the National F orest Man a gement Act and the F ederal L and Policy a nd

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 4

Manag ement Act occupy the f ield of land use planning
reg ulation o n f

ederal lands. He wrote that because the permanent ban on motoriz e d mining in Oreg o n Senate B ill 3 does not identify the enviro n mental standard to be achieved but instead restricts a particular u se of federal land, it must be deemed a land use reg

ulation preempted by

federal law.

COUNSEL

J ames L

. B u chal (arg

u ed), Murphy & B uchal L L P, Portland, Oreg on, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Carson L eonard W h i t ehead (arg ued), Assistant Attorney General; B enjamin Gutman, Solicitor General; Ellen F

. R o s e n b l u m, A ttorney General; Oreg on Department of Ju s t i c e , Salem, Oreg on; for Defendants-Appellees.

Peter M.K. F rost ( a r gued), Western Environmental L aw Center, Eug ene, Oreg on; Rog e r F ly nn, W ester n M i ning Action Project, L y ons Colorado; for I ntervenor-DefendantsAppellees.

J ulio N. Colomba, J onathan W ood, an d D a m ien M. Schiff, Pacific L eg al F oundation, Sacramento, California, f or Amici C u r i a e Pacific L eg a l F o undation a nd W estern Minin g Alliance.

Sean Patrick Smith, Mountain States L eg al F ou n dation, L akew o o d

, Colorado, f o r Amicus Curiae American Ex ploration & Mining Association.

L ane N. McF adden, Attorney ; J o h n C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General; Env i r onment & Natural ResourcesB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 5

D i vision, United States Department of J ustice, W ashing ton , D.C.; Kendra Nitta and Roy W

. F uller, Office of the Solicitor, United States Department of the I nterior, W ashing ton, D.C.; J ohn Eichhorst, Deputy Reg ional Attorney
, Office of the General Counsel, Pacific R e g ion, United States Department of Ag riculture, San F rancisco, California; for Amicus Curiae United States of America.

Marc N. Melnick, Deputy Attorney Gene r a l; Gavin G

. McCabe, Supervising D eputy Attorney General; J oshua A

. Klein, Deputy S o l i citor General; Robert W

. B y rne, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, Oakland, California; Robert W

. F erg uson, Attorney General; Office of the A ttorney G e n e ral, Oly mpia, W ashing ton; for Amici Curiae States of California and W ashing ton.

Nicholas Stevens B ry

ner and Sean B. H echt, UCL A School of L a w, L os Ang eles, California; Eri c Bi b er, UC B erkeley S c h ool of L aw, B erkeley

, California; for Amici Curiae W e stern Public L and L aw Professors.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 6

OP INION

F I SHER, Circuit J udg e :

To protect threatened fish populations, Oreg on prohibits the use o f motoriz e d mining equipment in rivers and streams containing essential salmon habitat. T h e restrictions, adopted into law as Senate B ill 3
, a p p l y throug hout the state, including on rivers and streams located o n federal lands. The district court concluded the r estrictions are not preempted b y federal law, and we ag ree. Assuming without deciding that federal law preempts the ex tension of state la n d use plans
onto unpatented mining claims on federal lands, Senate B ill 3 is not preempted, because it cons t itutes an environmental
reg ulation, not a state land use plan n i n g law. Senate B ill 3,

m o r e o ver, does not stand as an obstacle to t h e accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives o f Cong r ess. As the United States points o u t in its amicus brief opposing the plaintiffs’ preemption ch alleng e, reasonable environmental restrictions such as those f o u nd in Senate B ill 3 are consistent with, rather than a t o d ds w ith, the
pu rp o s e s of federal mining a nd land use laws. See Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. G ranite Rock Co.
, 480 U.S. 572, 588–89 (1987) (rejecting the propo sition that federal law preempts the a pplication of reasonable state environmental reg ulations
to the operation of un p a t e n ted mining claims on federal lands).

B A C K G R O U N D

The Oreg on leg islature adopted Senate B ill 838 in 2013. The B ill’s leg islative finding s recog niz e both the state’s rich
tr a d i t i o n of small scale prospecting and mining and itsB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 7

environmental interest in protecting w at e r quality and fish habitat. The finding s state:

(1) Prospecting

, small scale mining a nd recreational mining are part of the unique heritag e of the State of Oreg on.

(2) Prospecting

, small scale mining a nd

r e c r e a t i o n a l m i n i n g p ro v i d e e c o n o m i c benefits t o the State of Oreg on and local communi t i es and support tourism, small businesses and recreat i o n al opportunities, all of which are e conomic drive r s i n O reg on’s rural communities.

(3 ) Ex ploration of p otential mine sites is

nec e s s a ry to discover the minerals that underlie the surface and inherently invo l v e s natural resource disturbance.

(4) Mining that uses motoriz ed equipment in the beds and banks of the rivers of Oreg on can pose sig nifican t risks to Oreg on’s natural
resources, including f

i sh and other wildlife, riparian areas, water quality

, the investments of this state in habitat enhancement and areas of cultural sig nificance to I ndian tribes.

(5) B etween 2007 and 2013, mining that uses motoriz ed equipment in the beds and banks o f the rivers of Ore go n increased sig nificantly

, raising conce r n s about the cumulative environmental impacts.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 8

(6) The reg ulatory sy stem related to mining that uses motoriz ed equipment in the beds a nd banks of the rivers o f Oreg on s hould be efficient and structur e d to best protect environmental values.

2013 Or. L aws ch. 783, § 1.

Consistent with these finding s, the law imposed a f i v ey ear moratorium, beg inning in 2016, on motoriz ed mining techniques in areas desig

nated as essential fish habit:

A moratorium is imposed until J anuary 2, 2021, on mining t h a t uses any form o f motoriz ed equipment for the purpose o f

ex tracting g old, silver or a n y other precious

m e tal from placer deposits of the be d s o r banks of the w aters o f this state, as defined in ORS 196.800, o r f

r o m other placer deposits, that results i n the removal or disturbance o f streamside veg etation in a manner tha t may impact water q

uality

. The moratorium a

pplies
up to the line of ordinary hi gh w ater, a s defined in ORS 274

. 0 0 5
, and 100 y ards upland pe r

pendicular to the line of ordinary hig h wa t er that is located above the lowest

ex tent o f the spawning habitat in any river a nd tributary thereof in this state containing essential indig e n ous anadromous salmonid habitat, as defined in ORS 196.810, o r natura lly reproducing p opulations of bull trout, ex cept in areas that do not support populations of anadromous sal monids o r

na t ural reproducing populations of bull troutB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 9

due to a naturally occurring or lawfully placed phy sical barrier to fish passag e.

Id. § 2(1). “ ‘Essenti al i ndig enous anadromous salmonid habitat’ means the habita t t hat is necessary to prevent the depletion of indig enous anadromous salmonid species during their life histo r

y stag es of spawning and rearing .” O r. Rev. Stat. § 196.810(1)(g )(B ).

The plaintiffs filed this action in October 2015, th r e e months b e fore the moratorium was to take effect. The 12 p laintiffs h ave mining claims on federal lands in O reg on and use a form of motoriz ed mining k nown a s suction d

r edg e mining to search for and ex tract g old deposits from rivers a nd
streams. 1 The plai n t i ffs alleg ed that many of their mining claims were located in “ess e n tial indig enous anadromous salmonid h abitat” and that the mo ratorium on motoriz ed mining imposed by Senate B ill 838 would prevent them from mining these claims. They arg ued that S e nate B ill 838 was preempted by federal law because it “i n t e rfere[ d] w ith the federal purpose o f fostering and e n c o urag ing mineral development on federal property , a n d s t [ ood] as an obstacle

1 Su ctio n d red g in g is

a tech n iq u e u sed by m i n ers to rem o v e m atter f ro m th e b o tto m o f w aterw ay s, ex t ract m in erals, an d retu rn th e resid u e to th e w ater. A h ig h

- po w ered su ctio n h ose

v acu u m s lo o se m aterial f

ro m th e b o tto m o f a stream b ed

. Heav ier m atter, in clu d in g g old

, is sep arated
at t h e su rf ace b y p assag e th ro u g h a f lo atin g s lu ice b o x , a nd th e ex cess w ater, san d

, an d g rav el is d isch arg ed b ack in to th e w aterw ay

.

Peo p le v. Rin eh a rt , 3 7 7 P .3 d 8 1 8 , 8 20 (Cal. 2 0 1 6 ).B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 10

to the a c complishment and ex ecution of the purposes a nd objectives of Cong ress.” Compl. ¶ 49. The plaintiffs soug ht

an injunction restraining the state from e nforcing Senate B ill 838 and a declaration that the B ill was preempted by federal law. Compl. 14.

The d istrict court g ranted the state’s motion for summary judg ment, ruling that, because Senate B ill 838 was a reasonable environmental reg u lation, it was n o t p r e empted. After the court entered judg ment in favor o f the state, the plaintiffs timely

appealed.

After briefing in this c ourt was completed, the O reg on leg islature adopted Senate B ill 3. Senate B ill 3 repealed the moratorium imposed by S e n a t e B ill 8 38 and imposed a permanent restriction o n the u s e o f motoriz ed mining equipment in waters desig nated as essential indig e nous anadromous salmonid habitat. I t states:

I n order to protect indig enous anadromou s salmonids and hab i t a t essential to the
recovery and c onservation of Pacific lamprey

, motoriz ed in-stream placer mining may not be permitted to occur up t o the line of ordinary hig h water in any river in this state containing essential indig e nous anadromous salmonid habitat, from the l o w est e x tent of e ssential indig enous anadromous salmonid habitat to the hig hest ex tent of essential indig enous anadromous salmonid habitat.

2 0 17 Or. L aws ch. 300, § 4(2). Althoug h the restri c t i o n s i mposed b y Senate B ill 3 differ in some respects from those in Senate B ill 838, both l a w s prohibit motoriz ed mining inB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 11

rivers a nd streams desig nated as e ssential salmon habitat. 2 The parties therefore ag ree that the adoption of Senate B ill 3 does not moot thi s appeal. See Ne. F la. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v

. City of Jacksonville, Fla.

, 508 U.S. 656, 662 & n.3 (1993) ( h olding that the repeal of a challeng ed ordinance and its replacement with a different ordinance did not render the plaintiff’s claims moot where the ordinance h a d n o t b een “sufficiently altered so as to present

a substantially different controversy from the one the District Court orig inally d ecided” and the two ordina n c e s “disadvantag e[ d ] [the p laintiff] in the same fundamental
way ”). The parties also ag ree that we should treat this appeal as a challeng e to Senate B ill 3. W e now proceed to do so.

J U R I S D I C T I O N A N D S T A N D A R D O F R E V I E W

W e have jurisdiction u nder 28 U.S.C. § 1291. B ecause at least some o f the plaintiffs have sta n ding to pursue this appeal, we need not address the standing of add itional plaintiffs. S

ee Nat’l Ass’n of Optometris t s & Opticians LensCrafters, Inc. v. Brown
, 567 F .3d 521, 52 3 (9th Cir. 2009) ( “As a g eneral rule, in an injunctive c ase this court need not address standing of each plaintiff if it concludes that

one p laintiff has s t anding .”). 3 Our review is de novo. See

2 Un lik e Sen ate B i l l 83 8
, f o r ex am p le, S en ate B ill 3 d o es n ot p ro h i b i t

m o to rized m i n in g in b u ll tro u t h ab itat. In ad d itio n , alth o u g h th e

m o rato riu m im

p o sed b y S en ate B ill 83 8 ex t en ded to m in in g in areas u p to 1 0 0 y ard s f

ro m w aterw ay s, th e restrictio n s o n m o to rized m in in g in Sen ate B ill 3 ap p ly

o n ly w ith in riv ers an d stream s th em selv es.

3 W e th eref

o re n eed n o t ad d ress w

h eth er p lain tif

f s Galice Mi ni n g District, Millen n iu m Dig g ers an d Willam ette Valley Min er s h av e estab lish ed stan d in g , e i t h er in t h eir o w n rig h t o r o n beh alf of th eir

m em b ers. S ee Asso cia ted Gen

. Co n t

ra cto rs o f Am., S a n Dieg o C

h a p ter,B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 12

Lopez-V a l en z u ela v

. Arpaio
, 770 F .3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (g rant or denial of summary judg ment); Ting

v. AT& T
, 319 F .3 d 1 1 2 6
, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003) (federal preemption).

D I S C U S S I O N

A. Background Legal P rinciples

1. Federal Laws Governing Mining on Federal Lands

W e beg in with an overview of the f ederal laws respecting mining on federal lands. W e con s i d e r only those laws the parties have identified as r elevant to the preemption issues presented in this appeal.

“Historically

, the F ederal minin g law has b een desig n ed
to encourag e individual p rospecting

, ex plorat i o n, a nd development of the public domain.” H .R

. Rep. No. 84-730 (1955), as reprinted in 1955 U .S.C.C.A.N. 2474, 2476.

“ U n der these laws, prospectors may g o out on the pub l i c domain n o t oth e r w i se withdrawn, locate a mining c laim, search out its mineral w ea l th and, if discovery of mineral is made, can then obtain a patent.” Id.

The Mining Act o f 1872, 1 7 S tat. 9 1, for ex ample, provides that:

In c. v. Ca l. Dep ’t o

f Tra n sp

. , 7 1 3 F.3 d 11 8 7
, 1 1 9 4 (9 th Cir. 20 1 3) (ex p lain in g th at, to estab lish asso ciatio n al stan d in g , a p lain ti ff m u st p ro v id e sp ecif

ic al l e g a t i o n s sh o w i n g th at at least o n e id en tif ied m em ber h as su f f ered o r w o u ld su f

f er h arm ).B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 13

E x c ept as otherwise p rovided, all valuabl e mineral deposits in lands belong ing t o the United States, b oth survey ed and unsurvey ed, shall be free and open to exploration and purchase

, a n d the lands in which they a re found to o ccupation and p urchase, by citiz ens of the United States an d t h o se who have declared their intention to become such, under regulations prescribed by law

, a nd according
to the local customs o r rules of miners in the several mining districts, so far a s the same a re applicable and not inconsistent w ith the laws of the United States.

30 U.S.C. § 22 (emphasis added). U n d er this Act, prospectors c ould acquire u n p a tented mining claims b y discovering valuable mineral reso u r c es on federal lands, marking the location of their claims a n d recording their claims in accordance with state law:

Rig hts to mineral lands, owned by the United States, are initiated by prospecting

, that is, searching for minerals thereon, and, u pon the discovery of mineral, by locating t h e lands
upon which such discovery has been made, o r lands which the prospector b elieves to be valuable for minerals. A location is made by staking the corners o f t h e claim, posting a notice of location the r eo n, and comply ing with the State laws reg a

rding the recording o f the location in t h e c ounty recorder’s o ffice, discovery work, etc.

H.R. Rep. No. 84-730, 1955 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2477.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 14

O n ce the prospector staked out a claim, “the locato r, without further r equi re ment under F e d eral law, as of that moment, acquire[ d] t h e immediate rig h t to ex clusive possession, control, and use of the land within the corners o f his location stakes.” Id. at 2478. As the Mining A ct

ex p lains:

T h e locators of all mining locations made o n any min e ral vein, lode, or ledg e, situated on the public doma i n , their heirs and assig ns, where no adverse clai m ex isted on the 10th day of May 1872 so long as they comply with the laws of the United States, and with State, territorial, and local reg ulations not in conflict wit h the laws of the United States g overning their possessory title, shall have the exclusive right of poss e ssion a nd enjoyment of all the surface included within the l i n es of their locations

, and o f all veins, lodes, and ledg e s throug hout their entire depth . . . .

30 U.S.C. § 2 6 (emphasis added). To p r o t ect this rig ht to

ex c lusive possession, a locator ann u ally must perform $100 worth of labor or carry o u t i m p r o vements w orth $100 in value. S ee id. § 28.

The locator o f an un p a tented mining claim either “may

remove the minerals from the land without first proceeding to patent,” H.R. Rep. No. 84-730, 1 955 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2478,

or may obtain a patent by

, inter alia, filing an app l ication und e r o ath, showing that $500 worth of labor h as been

ex p ended or improvements made with respect to the claim and making a pay

ment to t h e p roper officer of $5 per acre,

see 30 U.S.C. § 2 9

. A lthoug h “[ a] n ‘unpatented’ claim is aB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 15

possessory

interest in a particular area solely for the purpose of mining ,” the owner of a patented claim “g ets a fee simple interest f rom the United States

. ” Clouser v. Espy
, 4 2 F .3d 1522, 1 525 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994). The mining claims at issue in this case are unpatented.

B y 1955
, Cong ress had become increasing ly aware o f “abuses u nder the g eneral mining laws by those persons w ho locate[ d] mining claims on p ublic lands for purpo s e s o t her than that of leg itimate mining a c tivity .” H.R. Rep. No. 84- 730, 1955 U .S.C.C.A.N. a t 2478. Sham claims, for ex ample, “could be used for selling timber f rom national forests, o r obtaining free residential or ag r icultural land.” United States

v. Shumway

, 1 99 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing United S tates v. Curtis Nev. Mines, Inc.
, 611 F .2d 1 277, 1282 (9th Cir. 1980)). Cong ress was also concerned that according the holders o f unpatented mining cla i ms ex clusive surface

r i g h t s p r e v e n t e d t h e “ e f f i c i e n t m a n a g e m e n t a n d administration of the surface resources of the public l a nds.” H.R. Rep. No. 84-730, 1955 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2474. Mining locations made under ex isting law, for ex ample,

frequen tly block[ ed] access: to water needed in g raz ing u se of the nati o n al f orests or other public lands; to valuable recreational areas; to ag ents of the F ederal Government desiring to reach adjacent lands for purposes of manag ing wild-g ame h abitat or imp r o ving fishing
streams so as to thwart the public harvest a nd
proper manag ement of fis h a nd g ame

resources on the p u blic lands g enerally

, both on the located lands and on adjacent lands.

Id. at 2478–79.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 16

To address these c oncerns, Cong ress adopted the Surface Resources and Multiple Use Act of 1955, Pub. L

. No. 8 4-167, 69 Stat

. 367 ( 1955). This law prohibits the location of any

m i n i n g claim for purposes other than mining

, see 30 U. S

. C

. § 612(a), and reserves in the United States – rather than
g ranting t o l o c ators – the rig ht to manag e the surface

resources o f unpatented mi n i n g claims located a fter 1955, subject t o t h e i mportant proviso that “any use of the surface of any such mining claim by the United States, its permittees

or licensees, shall b e such as n o t t o e ndang er or materially interfere w ith prospecting

, mining or processing operations o r

uses reasonably incident theret o,” id. § 612(b). The law
states:

Rig hts under any mi n i ng claim hereafter located under the m ining laws of the United States shall be subject, pr i o r to issuance o f patent therefor, to the rig ht of the United States to manag e a

nd dispose of the veg etative surface resources thereof and to manag e other surface resources thereof (ex cept mineral deposits subject to location under the mining laws of the United States). Any such mining claim shall also be su b

j e c t , prior to issuance

o f patent therefor, to the rig ht of the Unite d States, its permittees, and licensees, to use so much of the surface thereof as m ay be
necessary for such purposes or for access to adjacent land: Provided, however, That a ny

use of the surface of any such mining claim by the U nited States, its permittee s or licensees, shall be such as not to endanger or materially interfere with pr o s

p e c t i n g , m i n i n g or processing operations or uses re a sonablyB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 17

incident ther e t o : Provided f u rther, T hat if at any time the locator requires more timber for his mining operations than is available to him from the claim after disposition of timber therefrom b y the United States, subsequent to the location of the claim, he shall be entitled, free of charg e , to be supplied with timber for such requirements from the nearest timber administered by the disposing ag ency which is ready for ha r v esting under the rules a nd
reg ulations of that ag ency a n d which is substantially equivalent in k ind and quantity
to the timber estimated by the disposing
ag ency to ha v e b een disposed of from the claim: Provided further, That nothing in this subchapter and se ctions 601 and 603 of this title shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or in any way interfere with

or modify the law s of the States which lie wholly or in part westward of the ninetyeighth meridian relating to the ownership, control, appropri a t ion, u se, and distribution of g round or surfac e w aters within a ny unpatented mining claim

.

Id. § 612(b) (emphasis added). T h e leg islation soug h t to “encourag e mining activity o n

. . . public lands c ompatible with u tiliz ation, manag ement, and c o nservation o f surface

resources such as w a t er, soil, g rass, timber, parks, monuments, recreation areas, fish, wildlife, and waterfowl.” H.R. Rep. No. 84-730, 1955 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2475.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 18

I n 1970, Cong ress a d o pted the Mining and M i n e rals Policy Act of 1970, Pub. L

. No. 91-631, 8 4 Stat. 1876 (1970). This law declares it t h e p o l i c y of the U nited States to foster th e d e velopment o f an “economically sound and stable domestic mining ” industry

, but subject to “environmental needs,” 30 U.S.C. § 21a, making clear that “Cong ress did not, and d o e s n ot, intend mining to be p ursued at all costs,” Rinehart , 377 P.3d at 825. I t states:

The Cong ress declares that it is the continuing policy of the Fe d eral Government in the national interest to f

oster and enc o u rag e private enterprise in (1) the develop m e n t o f economically sound and stable domestic

m i n i n g, m i n e r a l s , m e t a l a n d m i n e ra l reclamation indus t r ies, (2) the orderly a nd economic development o f domestic mine ra l
resources, reserves, and reclamation of metals and minerals to he l

p assure satisfaction o f industrial, s e curity and environmental needs

, (3) mining

, mineral, and metallurg ical research, includ i ng the use and recy cling o f
scrap to p romote the wise and e f ficient use o f

our n atural and reclaimable mineral resources, and (4) the study and development of methods for the disposal, c o ntrol, an d reclamation o f mineral waste p roducts, and the rec l amation of m i ned land, so as to lessen any adverse impact of mineral extraction and processing
upon the physical environment that may result from mining or mineral activities.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 19

30 U.S.C. § 21a (emphasis added). 4

2. Federal Laws Governing National Forests

The Org anic Administration Act, 30 Stat. 11, 35–36 (1897), provides that nothing in 16 U.S.C. §§ 473–82 and 551 “shall

. . . prohibit a

n y p erson from entering upon

. . . n ational forests f o r a l l proper and lawful purposes, including that o f prospecting

, locating

, a

nd developing the mineral resources thereof.” 1 6 U.S.C. § 478. I t a l s o provides, however, that “[ s] uch persons must comply with the rules and re g ulations coverin g such n ational forests.” Id. The Org anic Act,
moreover, requires th e Secretary of Ag riculture to “make provisions for the protectio n ag ainst destruction by fire a nd d epredations upon the public forests and national fore s t s , ” and it authoriz es the Secre t a ry to “make such rules a nd
reg ulations” reg arding “occupancy and use” as may be
necessary “ to preserve the forests thereon from destruction.” Id. § 551.

Under this rulemaking authority

, the U.S. F orest Service has promulg ated rules reg ulating min i n g on national forest lands. These reg ulations require mining operators to comply with applicable f

ederal and state air quality standards, water quality standards and standards for the d isposal and treatment of solid wastes. See 36 C.F .R. § 228.8(a)–(c).

4 In 19 7 7
, Co n g ress ad o p ted th e Su rf ace Min in g C o n tro l an d Reclam atio n A ct o f 1 9 7 7
, P ub

. L

. No

. 9 5

- 8 7
, 9 1 Stat. 4 45 (1 9 7 7 ). In relev an t p art, th is law allo w s t h e g o v ern o r o f a state to ask th e Secretary

o f th e In terio r to d esig n ate l a nd s as u n su itab l e f o r m in in g o n th e g ro u n d th at “ m in i n g o p eratio n s w ou ld h av e an ad v ers e im p act o n lan d s u s ed
p r i m a r i l y f

o r resid en tial o r related p u rp o ses.” 3 0 U.S.C. § 1 2 8 1 (a)– (b ). T h e p lain tif

f s d o n o t su g g est th is pro v isio n p resen ted an o p tio n f or Oreg on h ere.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 20

The Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, Pub. L

. No. 86-51 7
, 7 4 Stat. 215 (1960), directs the Secretary o f Ag riculture “ to develop and a dminister the renewable surface

resources of the national forests f or multiple use a

nd sustained y ield.” 16 U.S.C. § 529. After declaring it “ t he policy o f the Cong ress that the n ational forests are e stablished and s h a ll be administered for outdoor recreation, rang e , timber, watershe d

, a n d wildlife and fish purposes,” the A ct st a t es t hat “ [ n] othing h erein shall be construed as affecting the jurisdiction o r responsibilities of the sev e r a l States with respect to wildlife a

nd f ish on the n a tional forests.” Id. § 528. I t further states that “[ n] othing herein shall be construed so a s to affect the u se or administration of the mineral resources o f national forest lands or to affect the use or administration of F ederal lands not within national forests.” Id.

The National F orest Manag ement Act of 1976 (NF MA), Pub. L

. N o. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976)

, r e q uires the Secretary of Ag riculture to “develop

. . . land a n d r e s ource manag ement plans for units of the Natio n a l Forest Sy stem, coordinated w ith the land and resource manag ement planning
processes of State and local g overnm en ts and o ther F ederal
ag encies.” 16 U.S.C. § 1 604(a ). I n developing such plans, the Secretary shall assure that they “provide for multiple use and sustained y ield of the products a n d serv ices obtained ther e f r o m in accordance w ith the Multiple-Use SustainedYield Act of 1960.” Id. § 1604(e)(1).

I n addition, federal lands, including those falling outside national forests, a

re g overned b y the F ederal L and Policy a nd Manag ement Act of 1 976 (F L PMA), Pub. L

. No. 94-579, 90 S t a t

. 2743 (1976). F L PMA requires the Secretary of t h e I nterior to develop land u s e plans for public lands, see 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a), and to “ manag e the public lands underB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 21

principles of multiple use and sustained y ield,” id. § 1732(a). F L PMA d irect s t h at, “ [ i] n manag ing the public lands the Secreta ry shall, by reg ulation or otherwise, take any action
necessary to prevent u nnecessary or undue deg radation of the lands.” Id. § 1732(b). Thi s “ unnecessary or undue deg radation” mandate a p p l ies not only to land use g enerally but a lso to the reg ulation of mining operations i n p articular. See id

. ( p roviding that nothing in F L PMA, other than the
p r o v i s i o n es t a b l i s h i n g t h e “ u n n e c e s s a r y o r u n d u e deg radation” standard, “shall in any way amend the Mining L aw of 1872 o r impair the rig hts of any locator s or c laims under that A ct, including

, but not limited to, rig hts o f ing ress

a n d eg ress”). F L PMA further provides that “nothing in this Act shall be c o n s trued as

. . . enlarg ing or diminishing the responsibility

and authority of the States for manag ement of fish and resident wildlife.” Id.

Under F L PMA, the B ureau of L and Manag ement (B L M) has issued reg ulations requiring mining operators to “comply with applicable F ederal and state” air quality standards, water quality standards and standards for the disposal and treatment of solid wastes. 43 C.F

. R. § 3809.4 2 0 ( b)(4)–(6). Another B L M regu lation requires mining operators to comply with
state environmental reg ulations that do n ot conflict with federal l a w : “ I f State laws o r reg u lations conflict with this subpart reg arding operations on public lands, y ou must f ollow the requirements of this su b p a rt. H owever, there is no conflict if the State law or reg ulation require s a hig her standard of protection f

or public lands than this subpart.” Id. § 3809.3.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 22

3. Overview of Applicable Federal Laws

The f oreg oing law s , in the ag g r eg ate, reflect Cong ress’ intent to foster a p roductive mining industry but a lso its intent
to protect the environment. These laws d eclare many federal lands “free and o pen” to ex ploration, 30 U. S.C. § 22, preclude the United States f r o m using the surface area o f certain mining claims in a m a nner that would “endang er o r materially interfere” with the u nderl y i n g mining claims, id. § 6 1 2(b), d eclare it to be the policy o f the United Stat es t o foster “ the dev e l o p ment of economically sound and stable domestic mining

. . . industries,” id. § 21a, and preserve a role for p r o specting and mining in national forests, see 16 U .S.C. §§ 478, 528. At the same time, these laws require miners to comply with state laws, see 30 U.S.C. § 22, including s tate environmental laws, see, e.g. , 36 C.F .R. § 228.8; 4 3 C.F .R. §§ 3809.3, 3809.420(b), declare it the policy of t h e U nited States to a s s u re that mining satisfies the n ation’s “environmental needs,” 30 U.S.C. § 21a, require the Secretary of Ag riculture to p rotect n at i o n a l forests from “depredations” and “destruction,” 16 U.S.C. § 551, require the Secretary of the I n terior to pro t ec t public lands from “unnecessary o r undue deg radation,” 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b), and r ecog niz e the states’ broad authority to manag e fish and wildlife, se e 1 6 U.S.C. § 5 2 8; 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). I n lig ht of these provisions, it is commo n ground among the parties that the holders of u npatented mining claims do not h ave an “unfettered” rig ht to ex plore a nd mine federal lands, unencumbered by federal and state environmental reg ulation. Nor does any one arg ue that states’ environmental reg ulatory authority in this a

r ea is unbounded. Cong ress plainly intended to draw a line between these two ex tremes.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 23

4. The Granite Rock

Decision

The Supreme Court addressed this line drawing in California Co a stal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.
, 480 U.S. 572 ( 1 9 8 7 )

. After the Granite Rock Company secured unpatented mining claims on national forest land a nd the F orest Service approved the company ’s plan of operations for the removal of limestone, the California Coastal Commission instructed the company to apply for a p ermit under the California Coast a l Act, which prohibits any development, including mining

, in the state’s c oastal z o ne without a permit. See id. at 575–76. The com p a n y s u e d to enjoin the enforcement o f the pe r mit requirement, arg uing federal preemption. See id. at 577.

The Supreme Court rejected the c ompany ’ s claims. The Court beg an by

observing that

[ S] tate law can be pre-empted in either of two g eneral way s. I f Cong ress evidences an intent
t o occupy a g iven field, any state law fallin g within that field i s p r e-empted. I f Cong ress has not entirely displaced state r eg ulation over the matter in question, st a t e law is still preempted to the ex tent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, w h en it is impossible to comply with b o t h state and federal law, o r wh e r e the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the f ull p urposes a

nd objectives of Cong ress.

Id. at 581 (alteration in orig inal) (citations omitted) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. , 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)).B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 24

The Court nex t summarily r eje cted the proposition that the Mining A ct o f 1872 demonstrates an inten t t o preempt any sta t e e n v ironmental reg ulation on federal lands. As the Court e x plained, “Granite Rock concedes that the Mining A ct of 1872, as orig inally

passed, ex pressed no leg islative intent

on the as y et rarely contemplated subject of environ m ental
reg ulation.” I

d. at 582.

Nex t, the Court re

j e c ted G ranite Rock’s arg ument that “the F ederal Government’s environmental reg u lation o f unpatented mining claims in national forests demonstrates an intent to pre-empt any state reg ulation.” Id. at 581–82. The Court concluded that

the F orest Service reg ulations t h a t Granite Rock alleg es p re-empt any state permit requirement n o t o nly are devoid of any

ex p ression of intent to pre-empt state law, but rather appear to assume that those submitting plans o f operations will comply w ith state laws.

. . . I t is impossible to divine from these
reg ulations, which e

xpressly contemplate

c o i n c ident compliance with state law a s wel l

as with federal law

, a n intention to pre-empt all state regu l a tion of unpatented mining claims in national forests.

Id. at 583–84 (emphasis added) (citing 36 C.F .R. §§ 228.5(b), 2 2 8

. 8(a)–(c), (h)). The Court added that “[ n] either Gran i t e Rock n or the United States contends that these F orest Service
reg ulations are i n c o n sistent with their authoriz ing statutes.” Id. at 584.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 25

T h e Court then turned to Granite Rock’s arg ument th at “federal land manag e ment statutes demonstrate a leg islative intent to limit States to a purely advisory role in federal land
manag ement decisions, and that the Coastal Commission permit requirement is therefore p re-empted as an impermissible state land u s e reg ulation.” Id. The Court assumed a

rg uendo that “ the combination of the NF MA a nd the F L PMA pre-empts the ex t e n s i o n of state land use plans onto unpatented mining claims in national forest lands.” Id.
at 5 85. B ut e ven u nder this a ss u m p t i o n , the Court held that only “state land use plans” wo u l d be p reempted, not state “environmental reg

ulation.” Id. at 585–86.

The Court di d n o t d efine the terms “land use planning ” and “environmental reg ulation,” but it offered some g uidance as to the distinction between the two:

T h e l i n e b e t w e e n e n v i r o n m e n t a l
reg ulation and land u se planning will not alway s be brig h t ; f

or ex ample, one may hy pothesiz e a state environmental reg ulation

so severe that a particula r l and use would b e c o m e c o m m e r c i a l l y i m p r a c t i c a b l e

. However, the core activity d escribed by e ach phrase is undoubtedly d ifferent. L a nd use planni n g in e ssence chooses particular uses f o r the land; e n vironmental reg ulation, at it s core, does not mandate p articular uses of the land but req u i res only that, h owever the land is used, damag e to the en v i ronment is kept within prescri bed limits. Cong ress hasB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 26

indicated its u nderstanding o f land use planning a

n d environmental reg ul a t ion a s distinct activities.

Id. at 587.

The Court sug g ested that a state’s decision to “prohibit”

or “ban” mining would constitute land use p l a nning

, a nd hence would be preempted. S e e id. at 586–87. I t f

urther intimated that a law would be preempted if, althoug h c ouched

as environmental reg ulation, its “true purpos e” was to prohibit mining

. Id. a t 5 8 8

. At bottom, however, the Court made clear that “reasonable state environmental reg ulation is not pre-empted.” Id. at 589; see also id. at 593.

B. The P laintif

fs’ Argum ents

The plaintiffs arg ue: (1) Senate B ill 3 is field p reempted because it constitutes state “land use planning ” under Granite Rock ; ( 2) Senate B ill 3 is conflict p reempted because it is “prohibitory

, not reg ulatory

, in its f u n damental character,” S.D. Mining Ass’n v. Lawrence County
, 155 F .3d 1005, 1011 (8th Cir. 1 998); (3) Senate B ill 3 is conflict p reempted because it d oes no t c o n s titute “ r easonable state environmental
reg ulation”; and (4) g enuine issues of material fact preclude the entry of summary judg ment in favor of the state. W e address these arg

uments in turn.

1. Field Preemption: The Plaintiffs’ Argument That Senate Bill 3 Constitutes State Land Use Planning

Granite Rock a ssumed without decidi n g t h at “the

c ombination of the N F MA and the F L PMA p re-empts the

ex tension of state land use p l a n s o nto unpatented miningB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 27

claims in national forest lands.” 480 U.S. at 585. W e make the same assumption here. 5 B ut l i k e the Supreme Court in Granite Rock

, we rejec t the plaintiffs’ preemption c laim. Senate B ill 3 is an environmental reg u lation rather than a land

use planning law. I t doe s n ot choose or mandate land uses, has an ex press environmental purpose of protecting sensitive fish h abitat, is not part o f Oreg on’s land use s y s t e m and is carefully and r easonably tailored to achieve its environmental
purpose without unduly interfering with mining op erations. S enate B ill 3 is precisely the kind of reasonable st a t e environmental reg ulation that the Supreme Court recog niz ed in Granite R ock properly supplements rather th a n displaces federal land use planning decisions. To be sure, by restricting motoriz ed s u c t ion dredg e mining in rivers and streams desig nated as essential habitat fo r threatened salmonids, Senate B ill 3 will adversely impact the ability of some miners
to ex tract g old deposits from their mining claims. B u t these impacts are the u navoidable consequences o f a federal scheme that seeks to f

oster both the d evelopment of valuable mineral resources and proper stewardsh i p and protection o f the nation’s natural resources.

T h e plaintiffs do not arg ue that Senate B ill 3 beco m e s a l and u se law under Granite R o ck simply because i t m a y render some of their mining cl a ims commercially

5 W e v iew t

h e ap p licatio n o f th is a s su m p t io n , as d o th e p arties, as a q u estio n of f

ield p reem

p t io n rath er th an co n f

l ict p reem p tio n

. B u t , ev en if

w e w ere t o v i ew it as a q u estio n o f co n f lict p reem p tio n , w e w o u ld f

in d n o

co n f lict, b ecau s e Sen ate B i ll 3 is n o t a lan d u s e law

.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 28

impracticable. 6 W e ag ree with the U n i t e d States that the preemption inquiry

does not turn on profitability :

To be sure, there w ill be miners (including

some Plaintiffs) who cannot p rofitably ex tract

c er t ain minerals from their mining claims without the u se of motoriz ed equipment in the
water. B u t

. . . specific limitations on specific mining methods or activities have long been
p a r t of the business of mining

. A State law
cannot be deemed preempted s o l e ly on the basis that the cost of mining i n compliance with the law makes a particular miner unable to profit from a particular mining claim.

B rief of the United States as Amicus Curiae 26–27. B ecause “[ v] irtually a ll forms of

. . . reg ulation of mining claims – for instance, limiting the permissible m e t h o ds of mining a nd prospecting in o rder to r educe incidental e n vironmental damag e – w ill result in increased o peratin g c o s ts,” Clouser

,

6 T h e dissen t co n t en d s th e p l ain tif f s h av e m ad e a co m

m ercial im p racticab ility arg u m en t. Disse nt 6 8

. W e h av e, h o w ev er, caref u lly

rev iew ed th eir o p en in g an d rep ly brief s on ap p eal, an d n o su ch arg u m en t

ex ists th ere. T h e p l a i n t i f f s arg u e Sen ate B ill 3 is p reem p ted b ecau se i t p ro h ib its m in i n g , n o t b ecau se it ren d ers th eir claim s u n p ro f itab le. A s th e p lain tif f s m ak e clear, “[ t ] h i s ap p eal is n o t ab o u t p ro f itab i lity

, b u t ab o u t p ro h ib itio n .” Rep ly B r. 4 1. T h e plain tif f s h av e th eref

ore w aiv ed th e arg u m en t. S

ee In d ep

. To w ers o

f W a sh

. v. W a sh in g to n , 3 5 0 F.3 d 9 25
, 9 2 9 (9 th Cir. 2 0 03 ) (“ [W ]e w i ll n o t co n sid er an y claim s th at w ere n o t actu ally
arg u ed in ap p ellan t’ s o p en i n g b rief .”); S mith v. Ma rsh

, 1 9 4 F.3 d 1 0 4 5
, 1 0 5 2 (9 th Cir. 1 9 9 9 ) ( “[ A ]rg u m en ts n o t raised b y a p arty in its o p en in g b rief are deem ed w aiv ed .”); Green wo o d v. Fed

. Avia tio n Ad

m in

. , 2 8 F.3 d 9 7 1
, 9 7 7 (9 th Cir. 1 9 9 4 ) (“ W e w ill n o t m an u f actu re arg u m en ts f

o r an ap p ellan t

. . . .”). T h is ru le ap plies w ith p articu lar f o rce w h ere, as h ere, th e p lain tif

f s h av e ex p ressly

d isclaim ed th e arg u

m en t in q u estio n

.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 29

42 F .3d at 1530, virtually every environmental reg ulation will render at least s ome mining claims commercially impracticable, and virtually ev e ry environmental reg ulation would therefore be preempted under a commercial i mpracticability test, a proposition that is impossib l e t o reconcile with Granite Rock ’s c entral hold i n g that “reasonable state e nvironmental reg ulation is not preempted

, ” Granite Rock

, 480 U.S. at 589 (emphasis added). A commercial impr a cticability theory

, moreover, would

r equire the preemption analy sis to turn on each mine r’ s individual financial c ircum s t a nces: the law would be preempted a s to some miners but not a s to others. I ndeed, a commercial impractica

b ility test would g ive the g reatest protection t o t he least p r ofitable mining operations, a nd it would h andcuff reg u lators from r estricting even the most environmentally destructive mining m e t h ods. So long a s a particularly destructive method of mining – such as blasting

– presented the only commercially practicable means o f

ex tracting m i n erals, reg u lators would be barred from restricting that practice. W e do not r e a d Granite Rock a s supporting that result. As the California Supreme Court has

ex p lained, federal law does not show that Cong ress “ viewed mining as the hig hest and best u s e of federal land w h erever minerals were found.” Rinehart , 377 P.3d at 830.

Rathe r , t he plaintiffs contend that Senate B ill 3 constitutes

a state land u se planning law because it “prohibi t s ” a particular “ use” of the land (motoriz ed mining methods) in particular “z ones” (rivers and streams desig nated as essential salmonid habitat )

. The plaintiffs base this arg ument on lang uag e in Granite Rock ex plaining that

the core activity described by [environmental
reg ulation and land u se planning ] isB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 30

undoubtedly different

. L and u se planning in

essence choo s es particular uses for the land; environmental reg ulation, a t its core, does not mandate particular uses of th e land but requires o nly that, however the land is u sed, damag e to th e environment is kept within prescribed limits.

48 0 U .S. at 587. The plaintiffs arg ue Senate B ill 3 is state land use planning under this lang uag e because (1) it chooses particular u ses of the land and ( 2) does not prescribe limits on environmental damag e by

, for e x ample, promulg a ting a pollution standard.

W e disag ree. F irst, Senate B ill 3 does not “choose[ ] ” o r “mandate particular uses of the land.” Id. I t simply restricts one method of mining

. 7

7 L ik e th e p erm it req u i re m e n t i n Gra n ite Ro ck

, m o reo v er, Sen ate B ill 3 is n o t a “ b an ” o r “ pro h ib itio n ” on m in in g

. S ee 4 8 0 U.S. at 5 8 6

– 8 7

. Sen ate B ill 3 d o es n o t p ro h ib it th e p lain tif f s’ m in in g o p eratio n s. Man y of th e p lain tif

f s en g ag e in u

plan d m in in g , m in e in riv ers an d stream s th at are

n o t d esig n ated as essen tial h ab itat or u s e n o n

- m o to rized m in in g m eth o d s

su ch as g o ld p an

n in g

. Plain tif

f L arry Co o n , fo r e x a m

p le, d i d n o t testif

y th at all o f h is m in i n g claim s are lo cated i n essen tial salm o n h ab itat, an d h e

co n ten d s o n ly th at th e l eg islatio n w i ll si g n i fi c a n tly lim it h is m in in g

o p eratio n s, n o t elim in ate th em

. Co o n d ecl. ¶ ¶ 2
, 5

. On l y h alf o f p lain tif f Millen n iu m D ig g ers’ m in in g claim s are lo cated w ith in essen t i al salm on h ab itat. Darn ell d ecl. ¶ 4. So m e o f its m em b ers, m o reo v er, “ u tilize n o n

m o to rized t e ch n iq u es, su ch as g old p an n in g .” Id

. ¶ 3

. P lain tif f J aso n Gill’ s m in in g o p eratio n s o ccu r b etw een 5 0 an d 3 0 0 f eet f ro m a creek

. Gill d e cl. ¶ ¶ 3 –4

. T h ese o p eratio n s w o u ld n ot be af f ected b y Sen a t e B i l l 3
, w h ich ap p l ies s o l e l y t o i n

- stream m in i n g

. T h e d ep o sits asso ciated w i th
p lain tif f J o el Gro th e’ s claim f

all n o t o n ly w ith in th e creek b o tto m b u t also

w i t h i n 1 0 0 y ard s o f th e creek

. Gro t h e d ecl. ¶ 7

. On ly so m e o f p lain tif f W illam ette Valley Min ers’ m in i n g claim s are lo cated in essen tial salm on h ab itat. Hu n ter d ecl. ¶ 9

. Its m em b ers’ m in in g , m o reo v er, in clu d es “ n o n

-B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 31

Second, Senate B i l l 3 does n ot constitute land use planning simply because it prohibits a parti cular mining method rather than “prescrib[ ing ] limits” on environmental damag e by a dopting a p ollution standard. Granite Rock does
not hold that only standards, not restrictions on activities, a re permissible e nvironmental reg ula t i o n

. On the contrary , Granite Rock say s only that “environmental r eg u lation, a t its

core , does not mandate particular uses of the land but requires only that, h owever the land is used, d a m a g e to the environmen t i s k e pt within prescribed limits.” 480 U.S. at 587 (em p h as i s added). 8 I t does not purport to d efine the entire universe o f environmenta l r eg u lation as consisting solely of limit-presc r ibing standards. That formalistic approach ig nores the practical re a l i ty that environmental
reg ulation may take se v e r al forms, and it w ould make no sense, g iven that reg ulation s i m p o s i n g pollution standards can

m o to rized tech n iq u es, su ch as g o ld p an n i n g .” Id

. ¶ 8. P lain tif f Mich ael L o v ett testif

ied th at Sen ate B ill 3 w o u ld sig n i fi c a n tly lim i t h is m in in g

o p e r a t i o n s, b u t n o t th at it w o u ld elim in ate th em

. L o v ett d ecl. ¶ 4

. W e tak e serio u sly th e p lain tif f s’ co n ten tio n s th at Sen ate B ill 3 w ill s erio u sly im p act th eir m in in g o p eratio n s w ith resp ect to at l east so m e o f th eir

m in in g claim s. B u t th e p lain tif f s’ o w n d eclaratio n s m ak e clear th at Sen ate B ill 3 is n ot a b an

o n m in in g

.

8 T h e d issen t in g o p in io n ch aracterizes u s as treatin g th is lan g u ag e as

“ n o n

- b i n d in g d icta (Dissen t 5 8 n .2 ),” b u t th at is n o t th e case. In ad d itio n , th e d issen t’ s th eo ry th at a d istin ctio n b etw een reg u latio n s d ictatin g “ u ses”

an d reg u latio n s d ictatin g “ stan d ard s” w o u ld p ro v id e a “ clear lin e b etw een lan d u se p lan n in g an d en v iro n m en tal reg u latio n ” (Dissen t 5 8 ) elu d es u s. W o u ld a reg u latio n lim itin g t h e size o f su ctio n d red g e h oses p ro h ib it a

“ u se” (o f larg er h o ses) o r p rescrib e a “ stan d ard ” (o n th e size o f th e h ose

an d

, co n seq u en t l y , t h e v o l u m e o f m aterial to be d red g ed )? W o u ld a reg u latio n lim itin g th e s ize o f th e v eh icles m in ers co u l d u s e to reach th eir claim s p ro h ib i t a “ u se” (o f h eav y v eh icles) o r p rescrib e a “ stan d ard ” (o n th e w eig h t o f v eh ic l e s a n d t h e resu ltin g d am ag e to th e su rf ace o f th e f o rest)?B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 32

impact mining operati ons every bit or even more than
reg ulations r e stricting particular mining methods. The plaintiffs concede, for ex ample, that “Oreg on’s water quality standard f

or turbidity ” c o nstitutes a permissible, nonpreempted “environmental reg ulation” under Granite Ro c k

. A string ent turbidity standard, however, mig ht have a g reater adv erse impact on the plaintiffs’ mining operations than Senate B ill 3’s targ eted restrictions on motoriz ed mining

.

Senate B ill 3 a l s o is not part of Oreg on’s ex tensive a nd distinct land use sy s t e m

. That sy stem requires the development of comprehensive plans by local g overnments, implemented throug h z oning

, and reviewed by the O reg on L and Con s ervation and Development Commission. Those decisions, in turn, are reviewed by a State L and Use B oard o f Appeals, which has developed sig n ificant land use case law. See generally Or. Rev. Stat. § § 1 9 7

. 0 05–197.860, 215.010–215.990. Senate B ill 3 stands apart from that
reg ime.

The plaintiffs’ arg ument, moreove r , overlooks Senate B ill 3’s obvious and important environmental p urpose. 9 The Oreg on leg islature adopted Senate Bi ll 3’s restrictions on motoriz ed mi n ing “[ i] n order to protect indig e nous anadromous salmonids and habitat e s s e ntial to the r e covery

9 A lth o u g h th e p lain tif

f s co n t en d O reg o n ’ s p u

rp o se in ad op tin g Sen ate B ill 3 is ir r e l e v a n t to th e p reem ptio n an aly s is, o u r case law is to th e

co n trary

. S

ee Pu en te Ariz. v. Arp aio
, 82 1 F.3 d 10 9 8
, 1 10 6 n .8 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 6 ) (rej ectin g th e pro po sitio n “ th at th e state’ s p u rp o s e i n p a s si n g a statu te is n o t relev an t to o u r p reem p tio n an aly sis, as b o th th is co u rt an d th e Su p rem e Co u rt h av e an aly zed p u rp o se in preem

p tio n cases”). In Gra n i te Ro ck

, m o r eo v er, th e Su

p rem e Co u rt ex pressly co n sid ered w h eth er th e state’ s “ tru e p u rp o se in

en f o rcin g a p erm it req u irem en t [w as] to p ro h i b i t [th e p lain tif

f ’ s] m in in g en tirely .” Gra n ite Ro ck , 4 8 0 U.S. at 5 8 8

.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 33

and conservation of Pacific lamprey

. ” 20 1 7 O r

. L aws ch. 300, § 4 (2). “‘Essential indig enous a n adrom ous salmonid habitat’ means the habitat that i s necessary to prevent the depletion of indig enous anadromous salmonid species during their life history stag es of s p awning and rearing .” O r. Rev. Stat. § 196.810(1)(g )(B ). “‘I ndig enous anadromous salmonid’ means chum, sockey e, Chinook and Coho salmon, and steelhead and cutthroat trout, that are member s o f the family Salmonidae and are listed as sensitive, threatened o r

e n dang ered by a state or federal authority

. ” I d

. § 196.810(1)(g )(C).

Similarly

, in Senate B ill 838, t h e leg islature found that “[ m] ining that uses motoriz ed equipment in the beds a nd banks of the rivers of Oreg on can pose sig nificant ris k s t o Oreg on’s natural resources, including fish and other w ildlife, riparian areas, water quality

, th e i n v e s tments of this state in habitat enhancement a

nd areas of cult u r a l sig nificance to I ndian trib e s

. ” 2013 Or. L aws ch. 783, § 1(4). The leg islature found that, “[ b] e tween 2 007 and 2013, mining that

uses motoriz ed equipment in the beds and banks of the rivers of Oreg on increased sig nificantly

, raising concerns about the cumulative environmental impacts.” Id. § 1(5). I t found that “[ t] he reg ulatory sy stem related to mining that uses motoriz ed equipment in the b e d s and banks of the rivers o f O reg on should be e fficient a nd structured to best p r otect environmental values.” I d. § 1(6).

The plaintiffs’ attempts to cast doubt on Senate B ill 3’s environmental purpose are unconvincing

. They contend that Senate B ill 3’s restrictions were not “ r equired to advance any bona fide environmental interest of the State of Oreg on” a nd instead were “primarily m otivated by objections from otherB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 34

users of the waterway s.” Their evide n c e , however, fails to substantiate these broad claims.

They rely

, first, o n tw o Oreg on statutes, b u t neither o ne und e rmines the Oreg on leg islature’s determination that restrictions on motoriz e d mining are necessary to protect fish habitat. The first of these statutes, former Or

. R e v. Stat. § 517. 1 2 3(3), adopted in 1999, simply found that “prospecting

, small scale mining and recreational mining

. . . [ c] an be conducted in a manner that is not harmf u l a n d m ay be beneficial to fish habitat and fish propag ation.” 1999 Or. L aws ch. 354, § 2(3). T h er e i s , of course, no inconsistency between the g eneral finding that small scale mining can be conducted i n a non-harmful manner and Senate B ill 3’s conclusion that it was nece s sary , “[ i] n order to protect indig enous a

nadromous salmonids and habitat essential to the
recovery and conservation o f Pacific lamprey ,” to restrict o ne particular ty

pe of small scale mining – “motoriz ed in-stream placer mining ” – in certain e nvironmentally sen s i t ive areas. 2017 Or. L aws c h. 3 00, § 4(2). I n a ny eve n t , t he O reg on l eg islature r epealed the 1999 finding in 2013, notin g a “sig nificant[ ] ” increase in motoriz ed mining between 2007 and 2013 that “pose[ d] sig n i ficant r isks to Oreg on’s natural
resources, including fish and other wildlife.” 2013 Or. L aws ch. 783, §§ 1(4)– ( 5 )

, 1 0

. T h e 1999 finding

, therefore, does nothing to undermine Senate B ill 3’s avowed and self-evident environmental purpose.

The secon d statute upon which the plaintiffs rely

, Or. Rev. Stat. § 517.005, say s only that

Technolog ical advances in the m ining industry

, coupled with reclamation efforts, have g reatly reduced the envir onmentalB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 35

impacts of m i n ing operations. The siz e a nd
scope of modern operations is such that t h e operations do not cause i n terference with other natural r esource u ses, p articularly in an area as vast as eastern Oreg on.

Or. Rev. Stat. § 517.005(4). B ecause this provision pertains
to mining g enerally

, and not to the p articular environmental

concerns a d d re ssed by Senate B ill 3, it too does nothing
to undermine the validity of Senate B ill 3’s stated environmental purpose.

B e y ond these two statutes, the plaintiffs’ evid e n ce reg arding Senate B ill 3 ’s pu r p o s e consists solely of a sing le
stateme n t in the record by plaintiff Michael Hunter. Hunter testified that, “[ i] n [ the W illamette Valley Miners’]

ex p erience, the State of Oreg on reg ulates in utter disreg ard to the National interest in mineral development, instead seeking
t o placate other user g roups w ho resent, and de s i r e t o eliminate the presence of miners on p u b l i c l a nds.” Hunter decl. ¶ 12. E ven g ranting this statement may reflect Hunter’s sincere personal opinion, it is whol l y l acking in the specific factual support that would be needed to create a g enuine issue of material fact as to Sena t e B ill 3’s purpose. See FTC v

. Publ’g Clearing House, Inc.
, 104 F. 3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997) (as amended) (“A conclusory

, self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidenc e , is insufficient to create a g enuine issue of material fact.”).

I n sum, because Senate B ill 3 has a clear e n v i r onmental
purpos e , is tailored to that purpose, and does not prohibit mining

, c hoose land uses or f all within Oreg on’s distinct land

use planning sy stem, w e h o ld that it is an environmental
reg ulation rather than a state l a n d u s e p lanning law. Thus,B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 36

even a ssuming for p urposes of o ur ana l y s i s that f ederal law preempts the e x tensio n of state land u se plans on federal lands, Senate B ill 3 is not preempted.

Our d i s s e nting colleag ue takes the view that any state environmental reg ulation – w hether in the f orm of a “use” restriction or a “standard” – constitutes a “de f a c t o land use reg ula t i o n p reempted b y f ederal law” whenever it renders
reg ulated mining claims c ommercially i m p r a c t i c a b l e

. D i s s ent 70–71. W here a conflict ex ists between reg ulated mining claims and a need to protect the environment, the mining claims must alway s take precedence.

The dissent a ssur e s u s that a commercial practicability
test would n ot undermine environme n t al protection because it would affect only state r e gulation, not federal reg ulation. Dissent 6 9 (“Even if federal law preempts Oreg on’s attempt
to apply S e n a t e Bi l l 3 to federal lands, the miners must still comply w ith all environmental laws and s tandards imposed

ex p ressly by federal statutes and reg ulations.”). B ut t his is
not how environmental protection o n federal lands is achieved. A s Granite Rock recog niz es, th e federal scheme relies o n the states to provid e e n v i ronmental reg ulation o f mining claims o n f

e deral lands. B ecause federal law “ex p r e ssly c ontemplate[ s] coincid e n t compliance with state

as well as with federal law,” Granite Rock

, 480 U.S. at 584, “reasonable state environmental reg ulation is n ot p reempted,” id. at 5 89. That is w hy the U.S. Depa rtments o f Ag riculture and the I nterior, which are the federal ag encies charg ed w ith manag e ment and e nvironmental p r o tection o f the federal lands impacted by Senate B ill 3, have joined this

case on the side o f Oreg on, urg ing us to uphold Senate B ill 3
ag ainst the plaintiffs’ preemption challeng e.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 37

U n d e r t h e d i s s e nt’s c ommercial impracticability test, eve n

a patently destructive method o f mining would be p ermitted

as long a s it represented the o nly commercially viable means of ex tracting minerals from the g round, irrespective of the h a v o c it would w reak on wildlife and habitat. This i s t h e mining “at all costs” approach that the plaintiffs e x p r essly disclaim. Reply B r. 29. W e can find no support for that approach in federal mining law or case law. On the contrary , federal minin g l a w, see, e.g. , 3 0 U.S.C. § 21a, the Supreme Court and t he United States as amicus curiae all ag ree that mining must be pursued consistent with environmental needs,
not irrespective o f e nvironmental cost

. T h at is why “reas o n able state environmental reg ulation is not preempted.” Granite Rock

, 480 U .S. at 589. W e respectfully decline the dissent’s sug g estion to hold that reasonable state environmental reg ulation is p r e empted merely because it renders reg ulated mining claims u nprofitable. That approach
cannot be reconciled with the balance Cong ress has soug ht to achieve.

2. Conflict Preemption: The Plaintiffs’ Argument That Senate Bill 3 I

s Preempted Because It Is “Prohibitory” Rather Than “Regulatory”

W e nex t consider the plaintiffs’ contention that Senate B ill 3 is conflict preempted b ecause it is “prohibitory ” rather
t h a n “reg ulatory ” in its fundamental character. There is, o f
course, so m e o v e r lap between this arg u ment and the field preemption arg ume n t we have just addressed. I n both instances, the plaintiffs contend Senate B ill 3 is p reempted becaus e i t prohibits a particular mining method rather than merely subjecting that m ining method to an environmental standard. Despite these similarities

, h owever, we treat the
two arg uments as distinct. The p l a i ntiffs’ field preemptionB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 38

arg ument is based o n Granite Rock ’s distinction b etween land

use planning on the o ne hand and e nvironmental reg ulation on the other. B y

contrast, their current arg ument – finding a distinction between “prohibitory ” and “reg ulatory ” s t ate environmental reg ulation and deeming the former conflict preempt e d – is larg ely based on S outh Dakota Mining Association v. Lawrence County
, 155 F .3d 1005 (8th Cir. 1998).

I n South Dakota Mining
, county voters approved a n ordinance that amended the county ’s z oning laws to prohibit the issuance of ne w o r a m ended permits for surface metal mining in the 40,000-acre Spearfish Cany on Area, 9 0 percent of which f

el l w ithin a national f

orest. See id. at 1006–07. The plaintiffs arg ued the ordinanc e w a s preempted because it stood as a

n obstacle to the a c co m p l ishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Cong ress embodied in the Mining Act of 1872. See id. at 1009.

“To determine the purposes a nd objectives that a

re embodied in the Mining Act,” the Eig hth Circuit considered the lang uag e o f the Mining and Minerals Policy A ct of 1970, 30 U.S.C. § 21a, and the Minin g A ct itself, 30 U.S.C. § 22. As noted, § 21a states:

The Cong ress declares that it is the continuing policy of the F ederal Go v ernment in the national interest to f

oster an d encourag e private enterprise in (1) the d e v elopment o f economically sound and stable domestic

m i n i n g , m i n e r a l s , m e t a l a n d m i n e r a l reclamat i o n industries, (2) the orderly a nd economic development o f domestic mine ra l
resources, reserves, and reclamation of metalsB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 39

and minerals t o help assure satisfaction o f industrial, s e curity and environmental needs, (3) mining

, mineral, and metallurg ical research, incl u d ing the use and recy cling o f
scrap to promote the w ise a nd efficient use o f

our n atural and reclaimable mineral resources, and (4) the study and d evelopment of methods for the disposal, c o ntrol, an d reclamation o f mineral waste p roducts, and t h e reclamation of mined land, so as to lessen a n y adverse impact of mineral ex traction a n d processing
upon the phy sical environment that may result from mining or mineral activities.

30 U.S.C. § 21a. The Mining Act, in turn, states:

Ex cept as o therwise provided, all v aluable mineral deposits in lands be l o n g ing to the United States, b oth survey ed and unsurvey ed, shall be fre e a nd open to ex ploration a nd
purc h ase, and the lands in which they a re found to o ccupation and p urchase, by citiz ens of the United States and those w h o have declared their intention to become such, under
reg ulations prescribed by law, and according
to the local customs o r rules of miners in the several mining districts, so far a s the same a re applicable and not inconsistent with the laws of the United States.

Id. § 22. I n lig ht of these statutes, the Eig hth C ircuit concluded the Mining Act e mbodies several cong ressio nal purposes, includingB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 40

the e ncourag e ment of e x ploration for a nd

m i ning of valuable minerals located o n f ederal lands, providing federal reg ulation o f mining to protect the phy sical environment while allowing the efficient and economica l

ex traction and use of mi n er als, a nd allowing
state and local reg ulation of mining so long a s such reg ulat i on is consistent with federal mining law.

South Dakota Mining , 155 F .3d at 1010.

The Eig hth Circuit ne x t considered whether the challeng ed ordinance stood as an o bstacle to these purpos e s and objectives. At the out set, the court observed that, because surface metal mining was the o nly p r a c tical way to “actually mine the valuable mine r a l deposits located on federal land in the area,” the ordinance was “a de facto ban on mining in the area.” Id. at 1011. T he court then held that, a s a de facto ban on mining , the ordinance was preempted:

The o rdinance’s d e f

acto b an on mining

on fe d e r a l land acts as a clear obstacle to the

a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f t h e C o n g r e s s i o n a l
purposes a

nd objectives em b odied in the Mining Act. Cong ress has encourag ed

ex p loration a nd mining of v aluable mineral deposits located o n fe d e r a l land and has
g ranted certain rig hts to tho se who discover such minerals. F ederal law also encourag e s the economi c al ex traction a nd use of these mi n erals. The L awrence County ordinance completely frustrates the accomplishment o f these federally e ncourag ed activities. A localB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 41

g over n m e nt cannot prohibit a lawful use o f
t he sovereig n’s land that the superi o r sovereig n itself permits and encourag es. T o do so offends b o th the Property Clause a nd the Supremacy Cla u s e of the federal Constitution. The ordin ance is prohibitory,

no t r egulatory, in its fundamental character

. T h e district court correctly ruled that the ordinance was preempted.

Id. (emphasis added).

T h e plaintiffs discern from South D akota Mining
, a n d f r om federal statutes g overning mining

, a g e neral princip l e that state environmental reg ulations are preempted, categ orically

, whenever they a r e “prohibit o ry ” r ather than “reg u latory ” in their “fundamental c haracter.” “Even prohibitions on the use of particular mining m e t hods,” they
say , “create an obstacle to the full accomplish m ent o f Cong r essional purposes.” W e disag ree.

L ike the United States, “ [w] e w o u l d ag ree that were a state to completely prohibit a l l m ining activity on federal lands, federal mining law w o uld preempt the ban.” B r ief o f the United States a s Amicus Curiae 21. W e cannot ag r ee

w i t h the plaintiffs, however, that conflict preemption in this

area turns on whether a state environmental reg ulation could be viewed a s “ p rohibitory ” or “reg ulatory ” in its “fundamental character.” F or o n e t h ing

, as the g overnment

ex p lains, the distinction likely would be unworkable:

I t is unclear how this Court w o u l d determine whether [ Senate B ill 3] is “prohibitory

. . . in its fundamental charact er.” South DakotaB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 42

Mining
, 155 F .3d at 1 005. Certainly it proh ibits some very specific ty pes of mining activity in very specific places

. . . , but in the
process of identi fy ing where its prohibitions

a p p ly it seems “reg

ulatory ” in nature. I n a sense, [ Senate B ill 3] i s b o th reg ulatory a nd
pro h i bitory

, but whether that makes it preempted is a q

uestion to b e answered b y long -established preemption law. Reg ardless

o f w hether a state reg ulatory prohibition is considered “prohibitory ” or “ reg ulatory ,” it is permissibl e so long as it does not pose an obstacle to Cong ressional purposes or make compliance with f

e d eral law phy sically impossible.

Id. at 22. 1 0

W e a re not persuaded, moreover, that federal statutes g overning mining evince a cong ressional purpose to preempt, categ orically

, state environmental reg ulations that a re “prohibitory ” in their “fundamental c haracter.” 1 1 The Mining Act of 1872, upon which the pl a i n t i ffs heavily rely

, states

1 0 W e h av e d raw

n a d istin ctio n b etw een “ reg u lato ry ” a n d

“ pro h i b ito ry ” law s in o th er co n tex ts, bu t t h o s e a n a ly ses are n o t h elp f u l h ere. E.g

. , Un ited S ta tes v. Do tso n , 6 15 F.3 d 1 1 6 2
, 1 1 68 (9 th Cir. 20 1 0) (A ssim ilativ e Crim es A ct).

11 T h is co n clu sio n is a co n sisten t w i th a lead in g t reatise o n m in in g law

. S ee 5 A m erican L aw o f Min in g § 1 7 4.0 4 [2 ][c] (2 d ed

. 2 0 1 8 ) (n o tin g th at “ state law req u irem en ts p ro h ib itin g a f ed erally au th o rized activ i ty on f ed eral l an d are less lik ely to b e u p h eld ,” b u t “ th e Gra n ite Ro ck d ecisio n in d icates th at state law req u i rem en ts th at can b e h arm o n ized w ith f ed eral
reg u latio n s m ay

b e en f o rceab l e”).B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 43

only that “all valuable mineral deposits in lands belong ing to the U nited States.

. . shall be free and open to ex ploration a nd purchase.” 30 U.S.C. § 2 2. The p laintiffs c o n t en d that this statute’s “free and open” lang uag e “create[ s] a Cong ressional mining objective inconsiste n t w i t h state-law based prohibitions of mining activity

. ” B ut the Mining A ct

ex p ressly incorpora t e s state r e g ulation of mining a ctivity

, stating t h a t e x ploration a

uthoriz ed by the statute must occur

“ under r eg ulations prescribed b y law.” Id. 1 2 Nothing i n t h e

12 A lth o u g h t

h e p h rase “ u n d er reg u latio n s p rescrib ed b y law ” ap p lies
to state as w ell as f

ed eral law – a co n clu sio n th at f o llo w s f ro m § 22 ’ s l ater

r ef eren ce to “ law s o f th e Un ited States,” s ee Co rley v. Un ite d S t a t e s , 5 5 6 U .S. 3 0 3
, 3 1 5 (2 0 0 9)

– t h e p lain tif

f s su g g est it in co rp o rates o n ly state p r o p e r t y law

, n o t state en v iro n m en tal law

, p o in tin g o u t th at a sep arate p ro v isio n of th e Min in g A c t i n co rp orates state l aw o n ly w ith resp ect to p o sse s s o r y title. S

ee 3 0 U .S.C. § 2 6 (g ran t in g rig h ts o f p o ssessio n an d

en j o y m en t to lo cato rs w

h o “ co m ply w ith th e law s o f th e Un i ted S tates,

an d w ith S ta te , territo rial, an d l o cal reg ula tio n s n o t in co n fli c t w i t h th e la ws o f t h e Un ited S t

a tes g o vern in g t

h eir p ossesso ry title ” (em p h asis ad d ed )). B u

t th ere is n o t

h in g su rp risin g in th e f

act th at § 2 6
, a p ro v isio n ad d ressin g po ssesso ry title, ref ers o n l y to state law s resp ectin g t itle. T h is tells u s n o th i n g ab o u t th e s co p e of th e state law in co r p o r a ted b y § 2 2
, w h ich deals w ith th e m

u ch b ro ad er su

b j ect o f m ak in g f

ed eral l a nd s f

ree

an d op en to ex p lo ratio n

. In d eed

, t h a t § 2 6 ex p ressly lim its th e in co rp o ratio n

o f state law to law s resp ectin g “ p o ssesso ry t itle,” an d § 2 2 d o es n o t, su

p p o rts th e co n clu sio n th at th e sco pe of state law s in co rp orated b y § 2 2 is n ot lim ited to th o s e resp ectin g t itle. S ee Ru s sell o v

. Un ited S ta tes , 4 6 4 U.S. 1 6
, 2 3 (1 9 8 3 ) (“ [W ]h ere C o n g ress in clu des p articu lar lan g u ag e i n o n e sectio n o f a statu te b u t o m i ts it in an o th er sectio n o f th e

sam e A ct, it is g en erally p resu m ed th a t Co n g ress acts in ten tio n ally an d
p u rp o s ely in th e d isp arate in clu s io n o r ex clu sio n .” (alteratio n in o rig in al) (q u o tin g Un i ted S t a t es v. W o n g Kim Bo
, 4 7 2 F.2 d 7 2 0
, 7 22 (5 th Cir. 1 9 7 2 ))); see a lso Rin eh art , 3 7 7 P .3 d at 8 2 4 ( e x p lain in g t h at § 2 2 ’ s

“ ex p ress ack n o w l ed g em en t[] o f th e ap p licatio n o f state an d lo cal l aw to f ed eral m i n in g cl a i m s su g g est[s] an ap p aren t w illin g n ess o n th e p art of Co n g ress to let f

ed eral an d state reg u latio n b ro ad ly co ex ist”).B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 44

Mining Act sug g ests a categ orical distinction b etween “prohibitory ” and “reg

ulatory ” state laws.

W e likewise find no support for the plaintiffs’ p osition in the Surface Resources and Multiple Use Act of 1955. This law g ives the United States the r i gh t to manag e surface

resources on unpatented mining claims, subject to the important proviso that “any use o f the surface of a n y such mining claim by the United States, its permittees or licensees, shall be such as n ot to e ndanger or materially interfere with prospecting

, mining or proc e s sing operations or u ses

reas o n ably incident thereto.” 30 U.S.C. § 612(b) (emphasis added). As w ith the Mining Act of 1872, nothing in this law
sug g ests Cong ress intend e d t o draw a distinction b etween “prohibitory ” and “reg ulato ry ” measures. W e have,
moreover, already held that this law permi t s e nvironmental
reg ulations, such as Senate B ill 3, that prohibit the use o f particular mining methods. See U nited S tates v. Richardson

, 599 F .2d 290, 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1979) ( h o lding the F orest Service could, without running afoul of § 612(b), require the locators of unpatented mining claims on national forest lands
to use nondestructive methods of prospecting

, w here the

T h e p lain tif

f s’ relian ce o n 3 0 U.S.C. § 2 8 is sim ilarly u n p ersu asiv e. T h at p ro v isio n req u ires l o cato r s to p erf o rm an n u al w ork on th eir

u n p aten ted claim s to m ain t ain th eir ex clu s i v e rig h ts. S ee 3 0 U .S.C. § 2 8

. No th in g i n S e n ate B ill 3 p reclu d es m in ers f ro m p erf o rm in g w o rk o n or

m ak in g im

p ro v em en ts to th eir claim s, an d to th e ex ten t m in ers elect n o t to p erf orm w o rk becau se state en v iro n m en tal reg u latio n m ak es w or ki n g

o r im p ro v i n g th eir claim s u n

p ro f itab l e , t h at scen ario is as lik ely to arise f ro m a “ reg u lato ry ” m easu re as it is f ro m a “ pro h ib ito ry ” o n e.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 45

locators’ utiliz ation of blasting a nd bulldoz ing was destructive to the surface resources). 1 3

The plaintiffs’ arg ument similarly finds no support in the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970. Under this law:

The Cong ress declares that it is the continuing policy of the F ederal G overnment in the national interest t o foster and encourag e p r i v ate enterprise in (1) the d e v elopment of economically sound and stable domestic

m i n i n g, m i n e r a l s , m e t a l a n d m i n e r a l reclamation indu s t ries, (2) the orderly a nd economic dev e l opment of domestic mineral
resources, reserves, and reclamation of metals and minerals to h e l p assure satisfaction o f industrial, security and en v i ronmental needs

, (3) mining

, mineral, and metallurg ical research, including the use and recy cling o f
scrap to p romote the wise and efficient use o f

our n atural and reclaimable mineral resources,

13 We also f

in d n o t h in g in th e 19 55 law t o su g g est Co n g ress in ten ded
to lim it state en v iro n m en tal reg u latio n

. On its f ace, § 6 12 (b ) i m

p o ses lim its o n o n l y t h e f

ed eral g o v ern m en t, n o t states, an d it ex p ressly
p reserv es state w ater q u ality co n tro ls:

[N]o th i n g in th is s u

b ch ap ter

. . . sh all b e co n stru ed as af f ectin g o r in ten d ed to af

f ect or in a n y w ay in terf

ere

w ith o r m o d if

y th e law s o f th e S tates w h ich lie w h o lly

o r in p a rt w estw ard o f t h e n in ety

- eig h th m erid ian relatin g to th e o w

n ersh ip

, co n tro l, ap p ro p riatio n , u se,

an d d istrib u tio n o f g ro u n d o r su rf ace w aters w ith in an y

u n p aten ted m in in g claim

.

3 0 U.S.C. § 6 1 2 (b ).B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 46

and (4) the study and d evelopment of methods for the disp o s a l

, control, and reclamation o f mineral waste p roducts, and the reclamation of mined land, so as to lessen any adverse impact of mineral e

xtraction and processin g upon the physical environment that may result from mining or mineral activities.

30 U.S.C. § 21a (emphasis added).

The plaintiffs read this statutory lang uag e to sug g e st that Cong r ess intended to meet the nation’s environmental needs solel y throug h the process of reclamation, not throug h
reg ulation of mining itself. This reading

, however, lacks any basis in the statutory tex t or in case law. The plain tiffs alternatively look to the st a tute’s reference to “lessen[ ing ] ” adverse environmental impacts. They c ontend “[ l] essening impact is a reg ulatory action,” disti nct from p rohibiting mining activities. W e ag ain d isag ree. The statute’s r e ference
to lessening impacts relates solely to r e c l a mation. I n any

e vent, reg ulators can lessen impacts throug h eith e r “prohibitory ” or “reg

ulatory ” a c tion. E.g.
, Ric h a r d son , 599 F .2d at 295.

The p laintiffs’ reliance on the S u r f ace Mining Control a

nd Reclamation A ct of 1 977 is equally flawed. This law a llows

a state to ask the Secretary of the I nterior to declare residential a

reas u nsuitable for m i n ing

. See 30 U .S.C. § 1281. The plaintiffs contend that “Cong ress’ provision o f this and o ther federal processes for resolving state /federal conflict over mining on federal land is utterly i n consistent

w ith any Cong ressional intent to allow states to sim p l y p r o h i b i t the mining themselves.” W e ag ree, of course, that

s t a t es c annot simply prohibit mining on federal lands. Bu tB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 47

nothing i n § 1281 sug g e sts Cong ress intended to preempt environmenta l reg ulations prohibiting particular mining methods in specified, environmentally sensitive areas.

The plaintiffs’ r e liance on federal land mana ge m e nt statutes suffers from similar problems. The Supreme C o u r t has ex amined these statutes and c oncluded that Cong ress did
not intend by these laws to preempt reasonable s tate environme ntal reg ulation. See Granite Rock

, 480 U.S. at 582–93. N othing in these statutes, moreover, sug g ests a distinction bet w e en “prohibitory ” a nd “reg ulatory ” state environmental reg

u lation.

I n sum, t h e plaintiffs’ proposed distinction b etween reg ulations that are “prohibitory ” or “ reg ulatory ” in t h ei r “fundamental c haracter” is neither workable nor g rounded in the f ederal statutes u

pon w hich the plaintiffs rely

. W e find in these statutes no indication that Cong ress intended to preempt state environmental reg ulation merely b e c a use it mig h t be viewed as “prohibitory .” W e therefore reject t h e plaintiffs’ contention that Senate B ill 3 stands a s a n o b stacle to the accomplishment of the full p urposes and objectives o f Cong r ess merely because it “prohibits” a particular method o f mining in th e portions of rivers a nd streams c ontaining essential h a bitat for threatened and endang ered salmonids. 1 4

14 T h is co n clu sio n

is co n sisten t w ith th e C alif o rn ia Su p rem e Co u rt’ s

recen t d ecisio n in Rin eh a r t , 3 7 7 P .3 d 8 1 8
, cert. den ied su b n o m. Rin eh art

v. Ca l i f o r n i a , 1 3 8 S. Ct. 63 5 (2 0 1 8 ). In rej ectin g a co n f lict p reem

p tio n ch allen g e t o a Calif

o rn ia law pro h ib i tin g su ctio n d red g e m in in g in o rd er to p ro tect en d an g ered co h o salm o n h ab it a t s , Rin eh a rt co n clu d ed th at

“ [t]h e f ed eral statu to ry sch em e d o es n o t p rev en t states f ro m restrictin g th e

u se o f p articu lar m in in g t e ch n iq u es based on th eir assessm en t o f th e

co llateral co n seq u en ces f o r o th er reso u

rces.” Id

. at 8 2 9

.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 48

This conclusion does n ot place u s at odds with South Dakota Mining

. Althoug h the Eigh th Circuit drew a distinction between “prohibitory ” and “reg ulatory ” measures, it did so in the contex t of a county ordinance amounting to a “de facto b a n on mining ” that applied broadly a nd indiscriminately to f

ederal lands within the county

. 155 F .3d
at 1011. The ordinance at issue effe ctively p rohibited mining

, covered 40,000 acres, targ eted federal l a nds (9 0 percent of the land affected by the ban was in a n ational forest), lacked any environmental purpose and w as part o f the county ’s z oning law. Senate B ill 3, by c ontrast, is not part o f Oreg on’s z oning law, is not a de facto ban on mining

, has an

ex p ress e nvironmental purpose, does not sing l e o u t federal land a nd carefully targ e ts only desig nated essential salmonid habitat. Whereas the ordinance in South Dakota Mining was

an a ttempt by county v o ters to overrule federal land use decisions, Senate B ill 3 complem e n ts those decisions b y play ing the traditional role served by s t a t e environmental
reg ulation. See, e.g. , 36 C.F .R. § 228.8( a)

– ( c); 43 C.F .R. §§ 3809.3, 3809.420(b)(4)–(6). W ere Senate B ill 3 an encroachment on federal land use decisions, we would e x pect the United States to say so. The U nited S t a t e s, however, takes the p osition that Senate B ill 3 “ i s not preempted b y federal law.” B rief of the United States as Amicus Curiae 28. 1 5

The plaintiffs’ reliance on S kaw v. United States
, 7 40 F .2d 932 (F ed. Cir. 1984), V

entura Co u n ty v. Gulf Oil Corp.
, 601 F .2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979), Brubaker v. Board of County

15 T h e Un ited States’ am icu s brief is f iled o n b eh a l f o f th e U .S. Dep artm en t o f th e In terio r, th e U .S. Dep artm en t o f A g ricu ltu re a n d t h e U.S. Dep artm en t o f J u stice’s En v iro n m en t an d Natu ral Reso u rces Div isio n

.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 49

C o m m i s sioners, El Paso County
, 652 P.2d 1050 (Colo. 1 982)

, State ex rel. A ndrus v. Click

, 554 P.2d 969 (I daho 1976), a nd Elliott v. Oregon International Mining Co.
, 654 P.2d 663 (Or. Ct. A pp. 1982), does not require a different conclusion. Each

case predates the Suprem e Court’s holding in Granite Rock that reasonable state e n vironmental reg ulat i o n is not pre e m p ted by federal law. See Granite Rock

, 480 U.S. at 589; R i n e hart

, 377 P.3d at 829. Similar to South D akota Mining
, moreover, most of these cases involved i m p roper attempts by local g overnments to displ ace, rather than supplement, federal land use decisions. See Ventura County
, 601 F .2d at 1084–8 5 ( p recluding the county from a pply ing “land u se p lanning controls” “in an attempt to substitute its judg ment for that of Cong ress”); Brubaker

, 652 P.2d a t 1059 (“This is not denial of a permit b ecause of failure to comply wi t h r e a sonable reg ulations supplementing the federal mining laws, but reflects simply a policy j udg ment as to the

a ppropriate use of the land.”); Elliott

, 654 P.2d at 665, 668 (barring the a

pplication of county z oni n g laws p rohibiting

m i n ing b ecause they d id “not simply supplement federal mining law”). I n addition, Ventura County involved t he Mineral L ands L easing Act of 1 920, not the laws a t issue here, and, in contrast to the case b e f o r e us, the d

rilling operations at issue in Ventura County were sub j e c t to “detailed [ federal] supervision” a n d an “ex tensive federal scheme refl e c ting concern f or the local environment.” 601 F .2d at 1084.

3. Conflict P reemption: The Plaintiffs’ A r g u m ent That Senate B ill 3 Does Not Constitute Reasonable Environmental Regulation

W e h ave consistently held that Cong ress intended to permit reasonable environmental reg ulation of mining c laimsB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 50

on federal lands. I n U

nited States v

. W

e iss
, 642 F .2d 296 (9th Cir. 1981), for ex ample, after considering the purposes underly ing the Mining Act of 1872 and the Org an i c A c t o f 1897, including 1 6 U.S.C. §§ 475, 478 and 5 51, we concluded:

The Secretary o f Ag riculture h as been g iven the r esponsibility and the p ower t o maintain and p rotect our national forests and the lands therein. W hile prospecting

, loc a t ing

, a nd develop i n g of mineral resources in the national forests may not be p rohibite d n o r so unreasonably circumscribed as to amount to a p r o h i b i t i o n , t h e S e c r et a r y m a y a d o p t reasonable rules and reg ulations which do not impermissibly e n c r oach upon th e r i g ht to the

use and enjoy

ment of placer claims for mining
purposes.

642 F .2d at 299. I n United States v. Shumway

, 199 F .3d 1093 (9th Cir. 1999), where we considered not only the Mining A ct and the Org anic Act but a lso the “ e ndang er or ma t e r i ally interfere” standard embodied in 30 U.S.C. § 612(b), we once ag ain h eld t h a t “the F o rest Service may reg u late use o f National F orest lands by h olders of unpatented mining c laims

. . . to the ex tent that the regulations are ‘reasonable’ and do
not impermissibly encroach on leg itimate uses i n c i d ent to mining and mill site claims.” 199 F .3d at 1107.

Cong r ess, moreover, clearly intended reasonable state environmental reg u lation to g overn mining on federal lands. I n Granite Rock

, the S u p r e m e Court held that “reasonable
state environmental reg ulation is not p re-empted.” 480 U.S. at 589; see also id. at 593. The plaintiffs do not dispute thatB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 51

a reasonableness standard applies her e , but they arg ue that Senate B ill 3 is p reempted becau se it constitutes an unreasonable environmental reg ulation.

The plaintiffs’ arg uments reg arding unreasonableness echo those we have already considered. T hey contend Senate B ill 3 is an unreas o n a b l e reg u lation b ecause it prohibits a particular method of mining in desig nated habitat, rather than subjecting th at mining to a “prescribed limit” o r pollution standard, a nd because it alleg edly was “enacted f or reasons

ex p ressly bey ond protection of t h e e nvironment.” W e have already addressed these arg uments. The preemption analy sis does not turn o n a formalistic d istinction betw een “prohibitory ” and “reg

u latory ” measures, and the plaintiffs’ evidence d oes not create a g enuine dispute as to Senate B ill 3’s important e nvironmental purpose. W e recog niz e that unreasonable, ex cessive or pretex tua l state environmental
reg ulation that unnecessarily interferes w ith development o f mineral r esources on federal land may stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the f ull purposes a n d objectives o f Cong r ess. W e ag ree with the United States, however, that in this case that line has n ot b een c r o ssed. As the g overnment

ex p lains, “[ a] state law such as [ Senate B ill 3 ] that is clearly intended to protect the n atural environment by p rohibiting the

use of particular mining methods or equipment in carefully [ ] desig nated locations is not so a t odds wit h C o n gress’s
purpose s t hat it is preempted by federal law.” B r ief o f the United States as Amicus Curiae 2–3.

4. The Plaintiffs’ Argument That Genuine Is s u e s of Material Fact Preclude Summary Judgment

The plaintiffs a

rg ue that g enuine issues of material f act preclude summary judg ment in f av o r of the state. F o rB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 52

purposes of our de novo revie w o f t he summary judg ment record, however, we h a v e viewed the e vidence in the lig ht
most favorable to t h e p laintiffs, and we h ave assumed

– solely for purposes of determining whether Oreg on is entitled to judg ment as a matter of law – that Senate B ill 3 will have

a sig nificant a dverse impact on the mining operations of the plaintiffs, making it effectively impossible fo r a t least some of them to recov e r t h e valuable mineral deposits present on their claims. The only material dispute is whether, assuming these facts, Senate B ill 3 is p r eempted. B ecause that issue is

one of law, sum m a ry j udg ment is appropriate. See I nland Empire C

h a p t e r of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v

. Dear
, 77 F .3d 2 96, 2 99 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding a “finding o f no preemption is a leg al question”). 1 6

C O N C L U S I O N

T he district court properly rejected the plaintiffs’
p reemption claims. We hold that Senate B ill 3 is not preempted by federal law. The judg ment of the district court is therefore affirmed.

AF F IRMED.

16 C o n trary to th e dissen t, w e d o n o t t o d ay q u estio n t h e v alid ity of asap p lied p reem

p t io n ch allen g es. Dissen t 6 6 & n .7

.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 53

N.R. SMI TH, Circuit J udg e , dissenting :

The National F orest Manag ement Act of 1976 (NF MA), Pub. L

. No. 94-588, 90 S t a t. 2949 (1976), a nd the F ederal L and Policy and Manag ement A ct of 1976 (F L PMA), Pub. L

. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2 743 (1976), o ccupy the field of land use planning r eg ulation on federal lands. B ecause the p ermanent ban on m o toriz ed mining in Oreg on Senate B ill 3 does not identify a n environmental standard to be achieved but instead restricts a particular use of federal land, it must b e deemed a land use reg ulation p r eempted by federal law. S e e Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co.
, 480 U.S. 5 72, 586–88 (1987). Therefore, I

must dissent.

I

. Althoug h technically a

n open question, there is little dispute that Cong ress has o ccupied t h e fi el d of land use planning on f

ederal lands throug h its enac t m e n t of NF MA and F L PMA. 1 See id. at 585 (“F o r purposes of this discussion

a n d w ithout deciding this issue, we may assume that t h e combination of the N F MA and the F L PMA p re-empts the

e x tension of state land use plans o nto unpatented m i n i n g claims in national f

o r e s t lands.”); id. at 612–13 (Scalia, J
., dissenting ) (“The Court is willing to assume that California lacks such authority on account o f [ NF MA] and [ F L PMA]

. I believe that assumption is correct.”).

F ield preemption arises when “federal law so thoroug hly occupies a leg is lative field as to make reasonable the

1 T h e m a j o rity (lik e th e co u

rt in Gra n ite Ro ck

) assu m es th is p o i n t

w ith o u t d ecid i n g it. I ad d ress t h e m erits o f th e issu e b ecau se it is n ecessary to m y d eterm in atio n

th at f ed eral law

p reem p ts Sen ate B ill 3

.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 54

inference that Cong ress left n o r o om for the States to supplement it.” Nat’l Fed’n of the B l i n d v. United Airlines Inc.
, 813 F

. 3d 718, 7 33 (9th Ci r

. 2 0 1 6 ) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc.
, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)). “The essential f ield p r eem p tion inquiry is w hether the density and detail of federal reg ulation merits the inference that any state reg ulation within the same field will necessarily interfere with the federal reg ulatory scheme.” Id. at 734. To make this determination, o u r cases require first “ delineat[ ing ] the pertinent reg ulatory f ield.” Id. W e have “emphasiz ed the importance o f delineating the pertinent area of reg ulation with specificity before proceeding with the f ield preemption inquiry

. ” Id. Here the pertinent field involves any

land use reg

ulation of federal lands.

The nex t step in our analy sis r eq uires us to “survey the
scope of the federal reg ulation w i t h i n th[ is] field.” Id. Here, the relevant statutes are NF MA and F L PMA. Taken tog ether,
t h e s e s tatutes e stablish a comprehensive reg ulatory r eg ime for land use planning on federal lands, including the r ole of states in the planning process. F irst, NF MA v ests the authority to enact federal land use plans with r espect to forest service lands in the Secretary o f Ag r iculture, and F L PMA vests the authority to enact f

e d eral land use plans with respect to all other fed e r a l l a

nd in the Secretary of the I nterior. 1 6 U .S.C. § 1604(a) (“[ T] he Sec re tary [ of Ag riculture] shall develop, maintain, and, as appropria t e , revise land and resource manag ement p l a n s for units of the National F o rest Sy stem

. . . .”); 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (“The Secretary [ of the I nterior] shall, with public involvement and consistent with the terms and conditions of t h i s Act, develop, maintain, and, when appropriate, revise land use plans which provide by tracts or

areas for the use of the public lands. L and use plans shall be d eveloped f

or the public lands reg a

r dless of whether s u c hB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 55

lands previously h a ve been c lassified, withdrawn, set aside, or otherwise desig nated for one or more uses.”).

Se c o n d, NF MA and F L PMA ex pressly desig nate the level of state participation cont e m p l ated by federal law. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a); 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9). NF MA requires

“ c oordin[ ation] with the land and resource manag emen t planning p rocesses of State and local g overnments and other F ederal a g encies.” 16 U.S.C. § 1 6 0 4(a). F L PMA requires similar coor dination w ith states, b ut the requirement is limited “to the ex tent consistent with the laws g overning the administration of p u

blic lands.” 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9). Moreover, F L PMA directs that the Secretary of the I nterior

shall, to the extent he finds practic a l

, keep
ap p rised of State, local, and tribal land use plans; assure that consideration is g iven to those State, local, and tribal plans that a re g ermane in the development o f land use plans for public l a n d s; assist in resolving

, to the
exte n t practical

, inconsistencies b etween F ederal and non-F ederal Government pl a ns, and shall provide for meaning f u l public involvement o f State a n d local g overnment of f i c ials, both elected and a ppointed, in the development of land use p r o g rams, land use reg ulations, and land use decisions for public lands, including ear l y public notice o f proposed dec i sions which may have a sig nificant impact on non-F ederal lands.

Id. (emphasis added). As J ustice Scalia noted in Granite Rock

, ag reeing (in his dissent) with the majority ’s assumption of preemption, these “ requir em e n ts w ould be superfluous,B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 56

and the limitation upon federal accommodation meaning less, if the S t a t es were meant to have independent land use authority over federal lands.” 4 8 0 U

. S. at 613 (Scalia, J
., dissenting ).

Thus, the combination o f NF MA and F L PMA occupy the field of land use re gu l ation on federal lands. A c cording ly

, federal law preempts the ex tension of any state land use planning r eg ulation or ordinance onto federal lands. Arizona

v. United States
, 5 6 7 U.S. 387, 401 (2012) (“W here Cong ress

oc cu p i e s an entire field

. . . even complementary state reg ulation is impe r m i ssible. F ield p reemption reflects a cong ressional decision to foreclose any state reg ulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal standards.”).

I I

. Assuming that N F MA and F L PMA o ccupied the field o f federal land use reg ulation, G ranite Rock identified the leg al framework f

o r determining whether state environmental
reg ulation impermissibly enters the cong ressionally occupied field of federal land use planning

. F irst

, t he Court identified the dividing line between environmental reg ulation and land

use planning

. “L and u se planning in e s s e n ce chooses particula r u ses for the land; e n vironmental reg ulation, a t its
core, does n ot mandate particular uses of the land but requires only th a t , h o w ever the land is used, damag e to the environment is kept w ithin prescribed limits.” G ranite Rock

, 480 U.S. at 5 8 7

. The Court also made clear that the inquiry requires ex amination not simply of the tex t of the law, b ut o f its p r actical effect. “The line between environmental regulation and land u se p lanning w ill not alway s be brig ht; for ex a mple, one may hy pothesiz e a st a t e e nvironmentalB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 57

reg ulation so severe that a particular land use would become commercially

impracticable.” I

d.

The plaintiff miners and mining org aniz ations (collectively “ the miners”) challeng e Senate B ill 3 on both
g rounds. They assert that Senate B ill 3 imp e rm i ssibly (A) identifies a particular use of the land tha t i s p rohibited without referenc e to an identifiable environmental standard and ( B ) renders mining within the ide n t i f i ed z ones impracticable. B o th arg

uments have merit.

A.

Granite R ock instructs that “environmental reg ulation, at its core,

. . . r equi r e s o nly that, h owever the land is used

, damag e to the environment is k e pt within prescribed limits

. ” Id. ( emphasis added) B y contrast land u se reg ulation identifies or restricts “particular uses” of land. I d.

A brief review o f the tex t of Senate B ill 3 reveals its true character as a land u se r eg u lation. T h e operative lang uag e reads “moto r i z e d in-stream placer mining may not be permitted to occur up to the line of ordinary hig h water in any river in this state containing essential indig enous anadromous

sa l m o nid habitat, from the lowest e x tent o f essential indig enous a

n a dromous salmonid habitat to the hig h est ex tent of essential indig en o u s anadromous salmonid habitat.” 2017 Or. L aws ch. 300, § 4(2)

. T h e operative lang uag e identifies particular tract s of land and prohibits a particular

use of these lands. The operative lang uag e does not i d en t ify

a “prescribed limit[ ] ” on “ d amag e to the environment” that

m u st be avoided “however the land is used.” G ranite R o c k

, 480 U.S. at 587. According ly

, federal law preempts S e n a t eB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 58

B ill 3 as an improper attempt to ex tend a s t a t e land use reg ulation onto federal land.

The majority disag rees for f our reasons: (1) Senate B ill 3 permits non-motoriz ed mining

, (2) it is not located in the land

use sec t i o n of the Oreg on state code, (3) it h as an environmental purpo s e , a n d (4) it is reasonably tailored to accomplish the e nvironmental purp o s e without unduly interfering with mining operations. The majority ’s arg uments lack merit for the reasons set forth below.

1.

The majority first asserts (without a ny citation o r authority ) that, because Senate B ill 3 r e s tricts only one ty pe of mining

, it is not a land us e p l a nning reg ulation. The majority ’s analy sis not only conflic t s w i th Supreme Court precedent in G ranite Rock

, b ut it also e rases any c l e a r l i n e between land use planning and environmental reg

ulation.

The majority c riticiz es the Granite Rock principle t h at environmental reg ulation “at its c ore” “ p rescribe[ s] limits” on “damag e to the e nvironment” (“however the land is used”). Granite Rock

, 4 8 0 U .S. at 587. 2 To the majority

, this

2 T h e m aj o rity g o es so f

ar as t o assert th at th e Gra n ite Ro ck stan d ard is so m eh o w n o n

- b in d in g d icta. S ee M a j

. at 3 1 (“ Gra n ite Ro ck do es n o t h o ld th at o n ly stan d ard s, n o t rest r i c t i o n s o n activ ities, are p erm issib le

en v iro n m en tal reg u l atio n .”). G ra n i te Ro ck f u ll y an aly zed th e d i stin ctio n b etw een en v iro n m en tal reg u latio n an d lan d u se p lan n in g , an d th e f ram ew o rk it an n o u n ced w as n ecessary to its h o ld in g

. 4 8 0 U.S. at 5 8 5

– 8 9

. B ecau se t h e c ou rt assu m ed th at l an d u se plan n in g reg u latio n w as p reem p ted

, it w as n ecessary to d ecid e w h eth er Calif

o rn ia’ s p er m i t t i ng sy stem w as a lan d u se p lan n i n g reg u latio n o r an en v iro n m en tal reg u latio n

. Id

. at 5 8 6. T h e Co u rt ap p lied th e Gra nite Ro ck f ram ew o rk an d determ in edB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 59

distinction is “f

o r malistic” and “make[ s] no sense.” Maj. at 31. Yet
, a l ine must be drawn, because “Cong r ess has indicated its understanding of land use pla n n ing a nd

e n v ironmental reg u lation as distinct activities.” G r a n i t e R o c k

, 480 U.S. at 587.

Fa r f r om being nonsense, the formalism of the G ranit e Rock line m akes it clear and easy to apply in deciding facial challeng e s t o state e nvironmental laws. 3 Moreover, the majority offers n o alternative standard for draw ing a line between environmental reg ulation (not ordinarily preempted) and land use reg ulation (alway s preempted). W i thout a standard, the majority h as no ba s i s t o reject the miners’ challeng e.

th at Calif o rn ia’ s p erm it sy stem w as a m ean s o f id en tif y in g en v iro n m en t al
stan d ard s to b e ap p lied to th e m in in g o peratio n , n o t an attem p t to reg u l ate p articu lar u ses o f th e lan d at issu e. S ee id

. at 58 6 (“ W h ile th e [Calif o rn ia law ] g iv es lan d u se as w ell as en v iro n m en tal reg u lato ry au t h ority to th e Co astal Co m

m i ssio n , th e sta te sta tu te a lso g ives th e Co a sta l C o mmissio n th e a b ility to limit th e req u iremen ts it w ill p la ce o n th e p ermit

. . . . Sin ce th e state s tatu t e d o es n o t d etail ex actly w h at sta te sta n d

a rd s w ill an d w i l l

n o t ap p ly in co n n ectio n w ith v ario u s f ed eral activ ities, th e statu t e m u st b e

u n d ersto o d to allo w th e Co astal C o m m i ssio n to limit th e reg u la tio n s i t w i l l im p o s e in th o se circu m stan ces.” (em p h asis ad d ed )). T h is is p lain ly

su f f icien t to b in d o u r d ecisio n h ere. Cf. Ceta cea n Cmty. v. Bu sh

, 3 8 6 F.3 d 1 1 6 9
, 1 1 7 3 (9 th Cir. 2 00 4 ) (“ [W ]h ere a p an el co n f ro n ts an issu e g erm an e t o t h e ev en tu al reso lu tio n o f t h e case, an d reso lv es it af t er reaso n ed

co n sid eratio n in a p u

b lish ed op in io n , th at ru lin g b eco m es th e law o f th e circu it, reg ard less o f w

h eth er d o in g so is n ecessary in so m e strict lo g i cal

sen se.” (citatio n

o m itted )).

3 T h e su ctio n h o se s i ze an d v eh icle w eig h t h y p o th eticals raised b y th e

m aj o rity are n o t d if

f i cu l t cases u n d er t

h e clear lin e d raw

n in Gra n ite Ro ck

. Neith er reg u latio n

id en tif ies an en viro n men ta l

stan d ard to b e ach iev ed

.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 60

Specifi c a l ly

, the majority ’s sug g estion that the law is permissible because i t r e g ulates only one means of mining beg s the question of the approp r i ate level of g e nerality at which a law must prohib i t a p a rticular use to be d eemed a land use p lanning reg u lation. Does land u se planning involve only broad categ ories of uses, for ex ample commercial versus noncommercial uses? Or can land use planning also include dividing t r acts for commercial fishing from those for commercial mining ? W ould a law prohibiting the use of any mining tools (motoriz ed or not) w ithin identified z o nes amount to envir o n m e n tal reg ulation or land use planning ? W h at i f t h e law also required miners to tie one hand behind their backs? The majority ’s bare as sertion that prohibiting a ty pe o f mining does not amount to reg ulating “particular u ses for the land” fails to articulate a meaning ful standard and f lies in the face of framework set forth in Granite Rock

. 480 U.S. at 587. 4

The premise of the majority ’ s insistence that the Granite Rock line is nonsense also lacks merit

. S e e Maj. at 31. I n

4 T h e m aj o rity n o tes th at m an y o f th e m in ers are still ab le t o m i n e

o th er p o rtio n s o f th eir claim s or are still p erm i tted to m in e b y h an d in th e

zo n es co v ered b y th e law

. I k n o w o f n o au th o rity

f o r th e p ro p ositio n th at

a law ceases to b e a lan d u se p lan sim p ly b ecau se it g o v ern s o n ly a su bset

o f l an d

, a n d n ot all lan d

. In d eed

, m o st lan d u se p lan s d i v id e lan d in to d if f eren t zo n es p rescrib in g a d if f eren t s et o f p e r m i ssib le u ses f o r each

zo n e. A cco rd in g ly

, th e f

act th at so m e m in ers h av e i n -s t r e am as w ell as

o u t- o f

- s trea m o p e r atio n s (o r o p eratio n s in sid e an d o u t sid e o f essen tial salm o n id h ab itat) m atters n o t at all in ou r d eterm i n atio n o f w h eth er Sen ate B ill 3 is a l an d u se reg u latio n

. L ik ew ise, th e f act th at th e law p erm i t s

m in in g by h an d d o es n o t m ean its p ro h i b itio n o n m o t o rized m in in g is n o t

a lan d u se o rd in an ce. L an d u se p lan s reg u late p articu lar u ses all th e tim e. F o r e x am

p le, a lan d u se p lan m ig h t sp ecif y th at w ith in a resid en t i a l

n eig h b o rh o o d in

- h o m e b u sin esses are perm itted

, b u t o f f ice b u ild in g s are

n o t.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 61

addition to being clear, the line drawn in Granite Rock serves important fu n c tions. F or ex ample, standards identify an environmental en d to be achieved a nd offer a means o f measuring the deg ree to which a particular use conflicts with

an environmental o bjective. T hey are also facially ne utral towards vary

ing uses o f the land. The majority is ri gh t that environmental reg ulations certainly can impact mining practicability

. B u t the Supreme Court made clear t h at this impact matters only in the ex ceptional c ircumstance where an environmental standard is “so severe” a s to render any mining within an identified zone “commercially impracticable.” See Granite Rock

, 480 U.S. at 5 8 7. The p ossibility of a narrow

ex c e ption, does not eliminate the value of the g eneral r ule. I address this narrow ex c e ption in g reater detail in Part I I .B

.

The Supreme Court meaning fully considered the d ifficult issue of h ow to dis c e r n land use reg ulations from environmental ones. The majority errs in failing to follow its instruction. Apply ing the G ranite Rock framewor k h ere, Senate B ill 3 is a land u se reg ulation t h a t i s preempted a s applied to federal lands.

2.

The majority nex t asserts that Se n a t e Bill 3 is not a land

u s e reg u lation, because it is codified outside the sections of the Oreg on Code g overning l a n d use planning

. However, I know of no canon of construction (and the majority cites none) that sug g ests that a la w ’ s placement w ithin the code

can override the substantive import of its tex t. F urther, there

are other Oreg on land use statutes outside the c o d e s ections the majority identifies. See, e.g. , Or. Re v

. S t a t

. § 390.250 (authoriz ing land use planning “to promote the public scenic, park and recreational us e o f lands along B ear Creek”); Or.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 62

R e v. Stat.§ 390.308 (authoriz ing land use planning t o complete the “Oreg on Coast Trail”); Or. Rev. Stat. § 390.112 (“The State Parks and R e c reation Department shall propose to the State Parks a

nd Recreation Commission additional criteria for the acquisition and development o f new historic sites, parks and recreation areas.”).

3.

Th e majority nex t asserts that Senate B ill 3 is an environmental reg ulation b e cause of its “obvious a nd important environmental purpose.” Maj. at 32. To be sure, t h e prefatory lang uag e in Senate B ill 3 identifies an environmental pur

p ose “to protect indig enous anadromous salmonids and habitat e s s e n tial to the recovery a nd conservation of Pacific lampre y

. ” 2 017 Or. L aws ch. 300, § 4(2). 5 B ut many land use plans h a v e environmental

5 T h e m aj o rity

also cites leg islativ e f

in d in g s th at “ [m ]in i n g th at u ses

m o to rized eq u ip m en t i n th e b ed s an d b an k s o f t h e riv ers o f Oreg o n can p o se sig n if

i can t risk s to Oreg o n ’ s n atu ral reso u r c e s , i n clu din g f ish an d

o th e r w ild lif

e, rip arian areas, w ater qu ality

, th e in v estm en ts o f t h is state in h ab itat en h an cem en t an d areas o f cu ltu ral sig n i f ican ce to In d ian trib es.” 2 0 1 3 O r. L aw s ch

. 7 8 3
, § 1 (4 ). Maj

. at 3 3. Y et th ere is little s u b stan ce to th is f i n d in g

. T h e l eg islatu

re id en tif

i ed o n ly th e p o ssib ility of

en v iro n m en tal h arm b ecau se it u sed th e lan g u ag e “ ca n p o s e sig n if ica n t risk s.” Id

. (em p h asis ad d ed ). A lm o st an y th in g “ can p o se s ig n i f

i can t risk s ”
to th e en v iro n m en t. No th in g i n th ese f in din g s su g g ests th at a n y fo r m of

m o to rized m i n in g n ece s s a r i l y cau ses an ad v erse ef f ect o n w ild lif

e

reso u rces. L ik e t

h e p ref ato ry lan g u ag e i n Sen ate B ill 3
, th is lan g u ag e d oes

n o t p u rp o rt to id en tif

y an en v iro n m en tal stan d ard to b e ach iev ed

. T h e

sam e is tru e f

o r th e m aj o rity ’ s o t

h er citatio n s to Oreg o n

law

. S ee Maj . at 3 2

.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 63

purposes as well. 6 Sy stems of national parks, state parks, a nd d e s i gnated wilderness areas are prime ex amples o f land u s e planning aimed a t accomplishing obvious a nd important environmental purposes.

Here, the means o f accomplishing the envir o n mental
purpose undisputedl y p rohibit a p articular use of the land, without r eference to an environmental standard t o be achieved. Unlike the permit sy stem in Granite Rock

, this law does not i n volve a flex ible reg ime that “ must be u nderstood
to allow [ Oreg on] to limit the reg u lations it wil l i m p o s e” in

a manner consistent with allowing permissible federal mining to continue. See Granite Rock , 480 U.S. at 586.

I n contrast to Sen a t e B ill 3, the federal reg ulations
g overning mining on public lands c ited by t h e majority a re g ood ex amples of standards based environmental reg ulation. Maj. at 2 2. Each identifies environmental standards to be achieved, rather than particular uses to be pro h i b ited. See,
e.g. , 36 C.F .R. § 228.8 (identify ing fe d e r a l and state air, water, and solid waste standards that must be complied with and requiring operators to “take a l l p racticable measures to maintain and protect fisheries a nd wildlife habitat which may be affected by the operations” (emphasis added)); 43 C.F .R. § 3809.3 (requiring o per ators to follow “a h ig her standard ” under state law if one has been enacted (emphasis a dded)); 43 C.F .R. § 3 809.4 2 0 ( b ) (identify ing f ederal and state air, water, and solid waste standards that must be complied with

6 A s t h e m aj o rity n otes, p u rp ose is certain ly relev an t to ou r p reem p tio n an aly sis. S

ee Maj

. at 3 2 n .9

. B u t n oth in g in o u r cases su g g ests th at a g en u in e p u rp o se can in n o cu late a law t h at su b stan t iv ely in tru d es on

a f ield p reem

p ted b y Co n g ress. T h e m aj ority ’ s e m p h asis on p u rp ose p ro v es to o little.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 64

and requiring operators to “take such action a s may be needed
to prevent adverse impacts to threat en e d or endang ered species, and their h a b itat w hich may be affected b y operations” (emphasis added)).

Simply

, th e environmental purpose behind Senate B ill 3 does not identify an environmental standard. I ndeed, nothing in the la w ’ s tex t (or the record in this case) indicates that motoriz ed mining —in any form or at a n y scale—necessarily

causes harm to indig enous anadromous salmonids o r Pacific lamprey

. On its face, Senate B ill 3 would prohibit a

m o t oriz ed mining operation irrespective of the miner ’s compliance with all state and f ederal environme n tal standards, including the f e deral Endang ered Species Act, National E nvironmental P o l icy Act, and Clean Water Act. This remains true, even if federal (or state) envir o n m ental review d etermines that the net effect of a motor i z e d

- mining operation is positive for anadromous sal m o n i ds and Pacific lamprey

. Senate B ill 3 simply mandates that—irrespective o f the actual e nvironmental impact—motoriz ed mining is a prohibited use of land in the identified z ones. Cong ress has preempted this ty

pe of intrusion into the field of federal land use planning

.

4.

L astly

, the majority persistently makes the bare assertion that federal law does not preempt Senate B ill 3, because it is “tailored to” its environmental p urpo s e

. See Maj. at 27 (asserting (without elaboration) that t he law is “tailored to achieve its environmental purpose without unduly interfering with mining operations”); Maj. a t 35 (concluding that Senate B i l l 3 “is tailored” to its environmental purpose). The majority cites n o leg al authority (and I am aware of none) forB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 65

the proposition t h a t federal preemption analy sis includes an assessment of the f

it between the substance of a state law a nd its stated purpose.

F urther, the majority fa i ls to ex plain how it reaches its reasonably tailored conclusion. As to the merits of the majority ’s conclusion that the law is reasonabl y t ai lored, I have my doubts. F irst, the parties have no t arg ued the issue
one way or the other.

Second, the tailoring issue necessarily turns on facts that

are d isputed or not in evidence, including the ex tent to which motoriz ed mining n e g a

tively impacts fish habitat and whether there are some me a n s o f motoriz ed mining that would not adversely impact fish habitat. A t ailoring analy sis would involve actually assessing the deg ree to which a law advances its stated purpose (i

. e. the state’s interest). Cf., e.g. , Italian Colors Rest. v. Becerra
, 878 F

. 3d 1165, 1178 (9th Cir. 2 018) (discussing narrow tailoring as an anal y s i s focused on the deg ree o f fit between ends and means). Yet
, t h e majority
appears to use the laws’ stated purpose as the premise for its reasonable tailoring conclusion. Goo d intentions are never enoug h to e stablish that a l a w i s properly tailored. Cf. id. (striking down a commercial speech restriction because there

were alternatives t hat “ would restrict less speech a nd would

more directly advance California’s asserted interest in preventing consumer deception”).

I t remains unclear to me how a tailoring analy sis aids us in deciding the preemption q u e stion. B ut to the ex tent the inquiry is r elevant, the o bvious a nd less r estrictive reg ulation h e r e w ould b e to simply require that mining activity i n essential habitat areas be conducted in a manner that does not adversely affect fish habitat—th u s prohibiting non-motoriz edB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 66

mining adverse to fish p opulations and p ermitting motoriz ed mining that can be conducted consistent with r equirement to preserve essential habitat.

B

.

F ed e ra l l a w not only p r eempts Senate B ill 3 on its face, but the miners also identified disputed issues of material fact precluding summar y j udg ment on their Granite Rock asapplied pree m p tion challeng e. Contrary to the majority ’s
sug g estion, Maj. at 50, the law r ec o g n iz es as-applied preemption challeng es that turn on the effect in operation o f the alleg edly preempted state law. Gade v. Nat’l Solid W astes Mgmt. Ass’n
, 505 U.S. 88, 105 ( 1992) (“Althoug h ‘part o f the pre-empted field is defined by reference to the purpose of the
state law in ques t i o n , . . . another part of the field is defined by the s tate law’s actual effect.’” (alterations in orig inal) (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co.
, 496 U .S. 72, 8 4 (1990))); id. (“In assessing the impact of a state l a w on the federal scheme, we have r efused to rely solely o n t h e leg islature’s professed purpose and have looked as w e l l to the effects o f the law.”). 7

7 Man y oth er cases reco g n ize as- ap p lied p reem p tio n ch allen g es. S

ee, e.g

. , G o b eille v. Lib erty Mu t. In s. Co

. , 1 3 6 S

. Ct. 9 3 6, 9 4 3– 45 (2 0 1 6) (id en tif y i n g f actu al issu es lik e th e “ ‘ acu te, alb eit in d irect, eco n o m ic ef f ects’ o f [a] state l a w ” a s o n e m ech an ism f o r sh o w i n g a s tate law is
p reem p ted b y ERISA (citatio n o m i tted )); Ad ria n & Blissfield R.R. C

o

. v. Vill. o f Blissfield

, 5 5 0 F.3 d 5 3 3
, 5 40 (6 th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ) (id e n t i fy i ng circu m s tan ces f

o r p ro v i n g a law is “ p reem p ted as a

p p lied ” a n d

“ req u ir[in g ] a f

actu al assessm en t” (em

p h asis i n o rig in al, in tern al q u o tatio n

m ark s an d citatio n s o m itted )); New Orlea ns & Gu lf Co a st Ry. C o

. v. Ba rro is
, 5 3 3 F.3 d 3 2 1
, 3 3 2 (5 th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ) (sam e). Co mp a re Pu en te Arizo n a v. Arp a i o , 8 2 1 F.3 d 1 0 9 8, 1 1 1 0 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 6 ) (rem an d in g a case f o r co n s id eratio n o f th e as- ap p l ied p reem p tio n ch allen g e), with Pu en te Arizo n a v. Arp a io
, No

. CV- 1 4

- 0 1 35 6

- P HX- DGC, 2 0 1 6 W L 6 8 7 3 2 9 4
, atB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 67

Granite Rock ex pressly r e c og n iz ed this possibility in the
contex t of state envi r o n mental reg ulation v ersus land use planning

. 480 U.S. at 587. As the court noted, “[ t] h e l i ne between environmental reg ulation and land use planning will
not alway s be brig ht; for e x ample, one may h y pothesiz e a state environmental reg ulation so severe that a particular land

u s e would become commercially impracticable.” Id. Th e Court we n t on to endorse “ reasonable state environmental
reg ulation” a s not preempted by federal law. Id. a t 589. W h ether dicta or holding

, these statements by the Supreme Court reach the correct conclusion. B ecause Cong ress has occupied the field o f land use planning

, federal law preempts any environmental reg ulation that (when applied to federal land) has the e ffect of p rohibiting ( for all practical purposes)

a particular land use in the reg ulated z one. To hold otherwise would allow an end-run around federal preemption.

Here, the miners contend that mining without motors is (if
not impossible) entirely impracticable w it hin the in-stream

z ones g overned by Senate B ill 3

. Thus, they arg ue the law has the effect of prohibiting mining within the reg ulated a rea. At oral arg u ment, the State essentially conceded this fact. United States C o urt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1 6-35262 Joshua Bohmker v. State o f Oregon
, YouTube (Mar. 8, 2018), https://y o utu.be/I rC_pz 9CNh4, a t 21:09 to 21:15, 24:00 to 25:00 (acknowledg ing that Senate B ill 3 effectively prohibits mining in the in-stream a

reas g overned by the law). Thus, the miners a

rg ue that entry of summary judg ment i s inappropriate.

* 7

– 1 3 (D. A riz. No v

. 22
, 2 01 6 ) (co n d u ctin g an as- ap p lied p reem p tio n

an aly sis an d co n clu d in g th at th e law w as f ield p reem

p ted as ap plied to a

n arro w set o f p ro h ib ited co n d u ct).B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 68

The majority sug g ests that the miners wai v e d this challeng e because they “do not arg ue that Senate B ill 3 is preempted simply because it may render some o f their mining claims commercially im p r a c ticable.” Maj. at 27–28. Come

on. That cannot be the b a s i s for our decision. T h e record amply establishes that the miners h ave consistently r aised both a facial and as-applied challeng e to Senate B ill 3 before the distr i c t court and on appeal. Ex cerpts of R. at 102, 106- 07, 118, 121, 124, 130, 135, 143, 150 (identify ing declaration testimony by the miners reg arding the impact of t h e law on practicability o f m ining in the z ones g overned by Senate B ill 3 that was provided to the district c ourt in opposition to
summary judg ment); Ex c erpts of R. at 21–23 (identify ing the district court’s rejection of the miners’ Granite Rock commercial impracticability standard); Appellants’ Opening B r

. at 45–48 (identify ing Granite Rock commercial impracticability standard and a sserting the Oreg on law is not

a r easonable environmental reg ulation); Appellants’ Opening B r. at 52–57 ( identify ing the record ev i d e n c e establishing disputed issues o f material fact reg arding t h e impact of the Oreg on law on the practicability of m i n i n g in the r eg ulated

z ones); United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 16-35262 Joshua Bohmker v

. S tate of Oregon
, YouTube ( M ar. 8, 2018), https://y outu.be/I rC_pz 9CNh4, a t 8:30 t o 17:30 (identify ing the a r gument by the miners’ counsel that the practica

b i l i t y o f mining is an a lternative basis for the
court to c onclude un d er Granite Rock that federal law preempts Senate B ill 3). 8

8 T h e m aj ority d o u

b les do w n on i ts erro n eo u s co n clu sio n th at th e

m in ers h av e w aiv ed an as- ap plied ch alle n g e t o S e n ate B ill 3

. In su p p o rt

o f its co n clu sio n , th e m aj ority cites a sin g l e lin e in th e m in ers’ rep ly statin g th at “ [t]h i s ap p eal is n o t ab ou t p ro f itab ility

, b u t ab o u t p ro h ib itio n .” Maj

. at 28 n .6 (citin g Rep ly B r. at 4 1 ). N o t h i n g i n t h e q u o ted l an g u ag eB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 69

T h e m ajority nex t rejects the merits of an as-appli e d theory of preemption, asserting that considerations o f

c o m m e r c i a l p r a c t i c a b i l i t y w o u l d e n d a n g e r e v e r y environmental reg

u lation. Not so.

W e are p resented with a narrow b ut importan t i s s u e o f preemption. Even if federa l law preempts Oreg on’s attempt to apply Senate B ill 3 to federal land s , t h e m i ners must still comply w i t h all environmental laws a nd standards imposed

ex p ressly b y federal statutes and reg ulations. T h e Granite Ro c k p racticability ex ception does not apply to federal
reg ulation. Cf., e.g. , Clouser v

. Espy
, 42 F .3d 1522, 1530 (9th C ir. 1 9 94) (affirming forest service access r eg ulation that diminish e d value of mining claims). Moreover, O reg on remains free to coordinate its land use p lans with the relevant federal a g encies in seeking an outrig ht federal prohibition on mining within essential habitat on f ederal lands. Oreg on may also amend its statute to incorporate an environmental standard to require mining activity in ess e n t i a l h abitat be conducted in a manner that a voids damag e to fish habitat. I n short, a w in for the miners is no t likely to lead to environmental disaster as the majority portends.

Second, commercial practicability is a judicially

ma nag eable standard. “[ V ] irtually every environmental
reg ulation” is not a t r isk. See Maj. at 2 8–29. Contrary to the

fo r e c l o ses th e arg u m en t th at S en ate B ill 3 effectively f u n ctio n s as a p ro h ib itio n in th e re g u l a t ed zo n es. W aiv er req u ires an “ in ten tio n al

r e l in q u ish m en t o f a k

n ow n rig h t.” E.g

. , Oelb erma n n v. To yo Ki s e n Ka b ush iki Ka ish a , 3 F.2 d 5
, 5 (9 th Cir. 19 2 5 ) (citatio n o m itted ). T h e

m in ers h av e co n sisten tly arg u ed th at S en ate B i ll 3 m ak es it ef f ectiv ely im p o s sib le to rem o v e m in erals f ro m th eir claim s. In co n clu d in g t h a t th e issu e i s w aiv ed

, th e m a

j o r i t y sim p ly ig n ores t

h e su b stan tial b rief

in g an d
arg u m en t cited ab o v e.B O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 70

majority ’s assertion, nothing in Granite Rock sug g ests a caseb y

- c a s e, m i n e r

- b y

- m i n e r a s s e s s m en t o f c o m m e r c i al practicability

. Rather

, Granite Rock sug g ests an approach focused on the overall effect of the state reg ulation on mining practicability

. See Granite Rock , 480 U.S. at 586–89.

The ex ception applies only where the reg ulation’s effect is “ so severe” that it renders mining on t h e r e gulated lands “commercially imp r a cticable” as a g eneral matter. The finances or circumstances of individua l m iners are not relevant to the analy sis. A court simply ex amines the effect of the reg ulation on the scope of c ommercial mining operations that could permissibly be e mploy ed in the absence of the reg u lation. W here a state e n v i ronmental reg ulation eliminates all previously permissi b le means of commercial mining on federal land, it r u ns afo u l o f the Granite Rock

ex c e ption. I f viable means of com mercial mining remain available in most (if not a ll) tracts o f land g overned by the
reg ulation, it falls within the g e neral rule that “rea s onable
state environmental reg ulation is not pre-empted

. . . .” Id. at 589.

Here, the miners identified suffici e nt factual support for the proposition that Senate B ill 3 renders mining commercially impracticable within the areas reg ulated by the
statute. I c annot a g ree with the m a j o rity ’s assertion that Senate B ill 3 is not a d e facto ban on mining b ecause it a llows non-motoriz e d mining (i.e. p anning for g old by hand). This would be similar to say ing to a man that he is not prohibited from building a h ouse on h is property , he is only pr o hibited from using any power to ols, trucks, or other motoriz ed equipment in d oing so. I n a n imag inary world, it is certainly still possible that over the c o ur s e o f his life he could dig the foundation, mix the c oncrete, h aul the lumber, and constructB O H M K E R V

. S T A T E O F O R

E G O N 71

a house eventually

. Nonetheless, such a law would render the man’s rig ht t o build a house a nullity

. I f the miners proved impracticability on remand, I would conclude that the O reg on l a w i s a de facto land use reg ulation preempted b y fed e ra l law.

I I I

.

I n short, there are two alternative g rounds to re v erse the district court. F irst, the mi n e r s are entitled to summary j u d gm e n t b e c a u s e f

e d e r a l l a w p r e e m p t s O r ego n ’s impermissible attempt t o r eg ulate particular uses of federal land under Senate B ill 3. Alternatively

, I would recog n iz e the as-applied theory for establishin g preemption outlined in G r a n i t e R o ck

. F ederal law preempts e nvironmental reg ul a t i o n that is so severe that it operates a s a de facto land use plan b y rendering a particular use of the r e gu l ated land utterly impracticable. The miners put on suff i c i e nt evidence to establish at least a g enuine issue for trial on t h i s theory

. According ly

, I respectfully d issent from the ma jority ’s decision to affirm summary judg ment in favor of the State o f Oreg on.