### NOT FOR PU BLICA TION

U NIT E D ST A T E S BA NK RU PT CYA PPE L L A T E PA N E L

OF T HE NINT H CIRCU IT In re: EDU A RDOEN R IQ U E VA LLEJO,

Deb to r. EDU A RDOEN R IQ U E VA LLEJO,

A p pellant,

v. U .S. BA N KTRU ST, N .A .,

A p pellee. BA P N o . C C -18-1015-FLS Bk. N o . 2:16-b k-16833-SK

M E M ORA ND U M *

A rgued and Sub m itted o n Septemb er 27, 2018

at Lo s Angeles, C a lifo rnia Filed – O c tob er 11, 2018 A ppeal fro m the U nited States Bankruptcy C o urt fo r the C entral Distric t o f C alifo rnia 

# FIL ED
OCT 11 2018
SUSAN M . SPRAUL, CLERK U. S. BKCY

. APP. PANEL O F T HE NI NT H CI RCUI T

*Thi s di sposi ti on i s not appr opr i ate for publi cati on. Although i t may be ci ted for whatev er per suasiv e v alue i t may hav e, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, i t has no pr ecedenti al v alue, see9th Ci r . BAP Rule 8024-1.H o no rab le Sandra R . K lein, Bankruptc y Judge, Presiding

A ppearanc es: A p pellant EduardoEnrique Vallejo argued pro se.

Befo r e: FA R IS, LA FFERTY, and SPRA K ER , Bankruptcy Judges. INT ROD U CT I ON C hapter 13 1 deb to r EduardoEnrique Vallejo appeals fro mthe b ankruptc y c o urt’s o r der granting relief fro mthe auto m a ticstay to c redito r U .S. Bank Trust, N

. A ., as Trustee fo rLSF9 Master Participatio n Trust 13801 (“U .S. Bank”). He argues that U .S. Bank and its servic er, C alib er Ho m e Lo ans Inc
. (“C alib er”) lac ked standing to enfo rc e the deed o f trust and that he has m ade all o f his required lo an paym ents. The b ankruptc y c o urt did no t err. W e A FFIRM.

FA CT U A L BA CK GROU ND 2 A . Prepetition ev e nts O n o r aro und N o vemb er 10, 2004, Mr. Vallejoob tained a $315,000

1 Unless specifi ed other wi se, all chapterand secti on r efer ences ar e to the Bankr uptcy Code, 11 U.S

. C. §§ 101-1532, all “Rule” r efer ences ar e to the Feder a l Rules of Bankr uptcy Pr ocedur e, and all “Ci v i l Rule” r efer ences ar e to the Feder al Rules of Ci v i l Pr ocedur e.

2 Mr
. Vallej o does not pr ov i de excer p ts of r ecor d. We hav e exer ci sed our di scr eti on to r ev i ew the bankr u ptcy cour t’s docket, as appr opr i ate. See Woods & Erickson, LLP v. Leonard (In re AVI, Inc.) , 389 B.R. 721, 725 n.2 (9th Ci r . BAP 2008). 2lo an fro m “GMA C Mo rtgage C o rpo r atio n DBA ditech.c o m ” (“GMA C ”).

The lo an was m em o r ialized b y a pro m isso ry no te (“N o te”). To secu re the N o te, Mr. Vallejo and o thers exec uted a deed o f trust (“Deed o f Trust”)
enc umb ering residential real pro perty lo c ated in Burb ank, C alifo rnia (the “Pro perty”). Mo r tgage Elec t ro nicR egistratio n System s, Inc
. (“MER S ”), as “no m inee” fo r GMA C and its suc c esso rs and assigns, was the b enefic iary under the Deed o f Trust. O n o r aro und June 1, 2010, GMA C (thro ugh its no m inee, MER S) assigned the Deed o f Trust toGMA C Mo rtgage, LLC

. In January 2011, Mr. Vallejoentered into a lo an m o dific atio n agreem ent with MER S, no m inee fo r the then-c urrent ho lder o f the N o te, GMA C Mo rtgage, LLC . The m o dific atio n agreem ent lo wered the m o nthly lo an paym ent. O n o r aro und May 15, 2013, GMA C Mo r tgage assigned the Deed o f Trust toGreen Tree Servic ing LLC (“Green Tree”). In Feb ruary 2016, Green Tree (which was then kno w n as Ditech Financ ial LLC ) rec o rded a no tic e o f default. It also rec o rded a no tic e o f fo rec lo sure sale against the Pro perty, b ut to date, the Pro perty has no t b een so ld. B. Bankruptcy ev ents O n May 23, 2016, Mr. Vallejofiled a chapter 13 petitio n. Ditech Financ ial (which at that tim e held the Deed o f Trust) filed a pro o f o f c laim fo r $299,256.80.

3The b ankruptc y c o urt c o nfirm ed Mr. Vallejo ’s am ended chapter 13

plan. His paym ents to Ditech Financ ial fo rprepetitio n arrears were to to t al $22,389.73 o ver fifty-o ne m o nths. C. M otion for relief fromthe autom a tic s tay Ditech Financ ial assigned the Deed o f Trust toU
. S. Bank. In Dec emb er 2017, C alib er, as U .S. Bank’s atto rney in fac t, filed a m o tio n fo r relief fro mthe auto m atic stay (“Mo tio n fo r R elief”). U .S. Bank asserted that it “is either (1) nam ed as b enefic iary in the sec urity instrum ent o n the subjec t pro perty (e.g., m o rtgage o r deed o f trust) o r(2) is the assignee o f the b enefic iary.” U .S. Bank so ught relief fro mthe auto m aticstay under § 362(d)(1) b ased o n Mr. Vallejo ’s failure tom ake po s tpetitio n m o rtgage paym ents. It alleged that its to tal c laimwas $305,371.97 as of N o vemb er 3, 2017 and that the to t al po s tpetitio n delinquenc y was $19,877.82. In suppor t o f the Mo tio n fo r R elief, U .S. Bank sub m itted c o pies o f the Deed o f Trust, the N o te, an
ac c o u nting o f Mr. Vallejo ’s po stpetitio n lo a n paym ents, the vario u s assignm ents o f the Deed o f Trust, and the lo a n m o dific atio n agreem ent. Mr. Vallejo objec ted to the m o tio n o n several gro unds. He did no t
o ffer his o wn dec laratio n o r any o ther evidenc e in suppo r t o f his legal argum ents. First, he argued that U .S. Bank did no t ho ld the N o te, was no t a valid assignee o f the Deed o f Trust, and is no t the “real party in interest.”

4Sec o nd, he c laim ed that the Deed o f Trust was defec tive at its

inc eptio n b ec ause the o riginal lender is listed as “GMA C Mo rtgage C o rpo ratio n db a ditech.c o m,” b ut o nly “GMA CMo rtgage C o rpo ratio n” is registered in Pennsylvania, while the fic tio nal nam e “ditech.c o m ” is no t. Third, Mr. Vallejoc laim ed that the January 2011 m o dific atio n agreem ent was invalid. Finally, Mr. Vallejo argued b riefly that he had no t m issed any po stpetitio n paym ent and “has m ade all paym ents as agreed.” The b ankruptc y c o urt held a hearing o n the Mo tio n fo r R elief. The
c o u rt granted the m o tio n. It stated at the hearing that the m o vant had estab lished its standing and that Mr. Vallejo ’s failure tom ake po stpetitio n paym ents was “c a use” fo r relief fro m stay. D . T he m otion for rec ons ideration Mr. Vallejo filed a prem ature no tic e o f appeal. He attached to his
no tic e o f appeal a m em o randumentitled “N o tic e o f A ppeal Befo re Entry o f O rder,” in which he argued that he was current o n his m o r tgage paym ents. He stated that the po stpetitio n m o rtgage paym ents were $1,613.41, b eginning June 2016. He represented that he m ade $1,000 paym ents o n June 14, 2016, July 20, 2016, and A ugust 23, 2016. He m ade additio nal paym ents o f $613.41 on A ugust 24, 2016, Septem b er 8, 2016, and O c tob er 5, 2016. These paym ents were allegedly po sted as “unapplied funds,” rather than regular paym ents. He stated that the “unapplied funds” were then

5erro neo usly applied to prepetitio n paym ents (A p ril 1, 2015, May 1, 2015,

and June 1, 2015), rather than as po stpetitio n paym ents. He also c o ntended that the m o nthly paym ents were po sted as $1,510.80, rather than $1,613.41. He did no t o ffer a dec laratio n o r evidenc e to sub stantiate these c laim s. O n Feb ruary 6, 2018, Mr. Vallejofiled an am ended no tic e o f appeal and request fo r rec o nsideratio n. He essentially repeated the argum ents in the first no tic e o f appeal and attached a c o py o f a ledger purpo rting to sho w his po stpetitio n paym ents and b alanc es. The BA P m o tio ns panel c o nstrued the am ended no tic e o f appeal as a C ivil Rule 60 m o tio n fo rrec o nsideratio n (“Mo t io n fo r R ec o nsideratio n”). It granted lim ited rem and fo r the b ankruptcy c o urt to c o nsider the m o tio n. U .S. Bank o ppo sed the Mo tio n fo r R ec o nsideratio n, arguing that it
was no t suppo r ted b y newly disc o vered evidenc e and, in any event, the
c o u rt pro perly granted the Mo tio n fo rR elief b ased o n Mr. Vallejo ’s failure to m ake po stpetitio n m o rtgage paym ents. It attached a ledger sho wing Mr. Vallejo ’s po stpetitio n lo an histo ry and a ledger sho wing the applic atio n
o f all po stpetitio n paym ents. A s o f January 2018, the po stpetitio n arrears to t aled $22,514.98. Mr. Vallejo filed a o ne-page reply m em o randum, arguing that the
o ppo sitio n was “simply no t truthful.” He c o ntended that the paym ent histo ry pro vided b y C alib er was inc o rrec t and no t trustwo rthy. His o nly evidenc e in suppo r t o f this argum ent was a letter and paym ent histo ry
6fro mC alib er that o u t lined his failure to m ake paym ents; the evidenc e did

no t c o nfirm that his paym ents were just a “few do llars sho rt.” The b ankruptc y c o urt held a hearing o n the Mo tio n fo r R ec o nsideratio n and denied the m o tio n fo r reaso ns stated o n the rec o rd. 3 Mr. Vallejo then returned to the BA P to request a resum ptio n o f his appeal. He pro c eeded to file do zens o f b riefs, requests, and m o tio ns, prim arily seeking to augm ent the rec o rd. JU RISD ICT ION The b ankruptc y c o urt had jurisdic tio n pursuant to28 U .S.C . §§ 1334 and 157(b )(1) and (2)(G). W e have jurisdic tio n under 28 U .S.C . § 158. ISSU E Did the b ankruptcy c o urt err when it granted U

. S. Bank relief fro m the auto m aticstay? ST A ND A RD S OF RE V IE W W e review fo r an ab u s e o f disc retio n a b a nkruptc y c o urt’s o rder granting relief fro m the auto m aticstay. F irst Y o rkshire H

o l dings, Inc. v. Pa cificaL 22, LLC

(In re F irst Y

o rkshire H

o ldings, Inc.) , 470 B.R . 864, 868 (9th C ir. BA P 2012). Sim ilarly, “[a] b ankruptcy c o urt’s denial o f a m o tio n fo r

3 Mr
. Vallej o di d not or der a copy of the tr anscr i pt, so i t i s not i n the r ecor d on appeal. We assume that he di d not thi nk that the tr anscr i pt was helpful to hi s appeal. Gionis v. Wayne (In re Gionis) , 170 B.R. 675, 681 (9th Ci r . BAP 1994), aff’d, 92 F.3d 1192 (9th Ci r. 1996) (Because it i s the appellant’s bur den to pr ov e er r or , “[w]e ar e enti tled to pr esume that [an appellant who does not or der a tr anscr i pt] does not thi nk the tr i al tr a nscr i pt helpful in that r egar d .”). 7rec o nsideratio n is reviewed fo r ab use o f disc retio n.” F i rst Ave. W . Bldg., LLCv. Ja m es (In re O neca s t Media , Inc.) , 439 F.3d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 2006). To determ ine whether the b ankruptc y c o u rt ab used its disc retio n, we
c o nduc t a two -step inquiry: (1) we review de no vo whether the b ankruptcy
c o u rt “identified the c o rrec t legal rule to apply to the relief requested” and (2) if it did, whether the b a nkruptc y c o u rt’s applic atio n o f the legal standard was illo gic al, im plausib le, o r “witho ut suppo r t in inferenc es that
m ay b e drawn fro mthe fac t s in the rec o rd.” United S ta tes v. Hinkso n , 585 F.3d 1247, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 2009) (en b a nc ). Mr. Vallejo prim arily challenges U .S. Bank’s standing toenfo rc e the Deed o f Trust. “Standing is a legal issue that we review de novo .” V ea l v. Am . H o m e Mo rtg. S ervicing, Inc. (In re V ea l) , 450 B.R . 897, 906 (9th C ir. BA P 2011) (c iting W

edges/Ledges o

f Ca l., Inc. v. C ity o

f Pho enix, 24 F.3d 56, 61 (9th C ir. 1994); Kro nem yer v. Am . Co ntra cto rs Indem . Co . (In re Kro nem yer) , 405 B.R . 915, 919 (9th C ir. BA P 2009)). De no vo review is independent and gives no deferenc e to the trial c o urt’s c o nc lusio ns. R o th v. Educ. Credit M gm t. Co rp. (In re R o th) , 490 B.R . 908, 915 (9th C ir. BA P 2013). D ISCU SSION A . Relief froms tay requires only a “c olorable” c laim . Sec tio n 362(d)(1) pro vides that, “[o ]n request o f a party in interest and after no tic e and a hearing, the c o urt shall grant relief fro mthe stay . . . fo r c ause . . . .” The person o ppo sing a m o tio n fo r relief fro mstay has the

8b urden o f pro o f o n all issues exc ept fo r the deb to r’s equity in the sub jec t pro perty (if a lac k o f equity is a b asis fo r the m o tio n). § 362(g). The Bankruptcy C o de do es no t define the term “party in interest,” b ut we have held that this status is “determined o n a c ase-b y-c ase b asis, with referenc e to the interest asserted and ho w[that] interest is affec ted b y the auto m aticstay.” In re K ro nem yer , 405 B.R . at 919 (quo ting In re W o o dberry , 383 B.R . 373, 378 (Bankr. D.S.C

. 2008)); see C ruz v. S tein S tra uss Tr. #1361 (In re Cruz ) , 516 B.R . 594, 602 (9th C ir. BA P2014) (“A ‘party in interest’ c an inc lude any party that has a pecuniary interest in the m atter, that has a prac tic al stake in the reso lutio n o f the m atter o r that is im pac ted b y the auto m aticstay.”). “[A ] party seeking stay relief need o nly estab lish that it has a
c o lo rab le c laimto the pro perty at issue.” Ark i nso n v. Griffin (In re Griffin), 719 F.3d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 2013) (c iting In re V ea l, 450 B.R . at 915); see Edwa r ds v. W

ells Fa r go Ba nk , N .A. (In re Edwa rds) , 454 B.R . 100, 105 (9th C ir. BA P 2011) (“a m o vant has a c o lo rab le c laimsuffic ient to b esto w upo n it standing to pro secute a m o t io n under § 362 if it either: (a) o w ns o r has
ano ther fo rm o f pro p erty interest in a no te secured b y the deb to r’s (o r the estate’s) pro perty; o r (b ) is a ‘perso n entitled to enfo rc e’ . . . such a no te under applic ab le state law”).

9B. T he bankruptcy c ourt did not abus e its dis c retion in g ranting relief fromthe autom atics tay. Mr. Vallejo argues that U .S. Bank never estab lished that it was a “party in interest” o r a “real party in interest,” o r that it had standing to enfo rc e the Deed o f Trust. U .S. Bank o ffered evidenc e that it was the b enefic iary o f the Deed o f Trust, in o ther wo rds, that it had a claimagainst Mr. Vallejo ’s pro perty. Mr. Vallejo o ffered no evidenc e to the c o ntrary; his speculatio ns are inadm issib le and his legal argum ents are m eritless. 1. T he D eed of T rus t Mr. Vallejo c o ntends that the Deed o f Trust is invalid b ec a use the lender is identified as “GMA C Mo rtgage C o rpo ratio n db a ditech.c o m ” b ut the fic titio us b u siness nam e “ditech.c o m ” is no tregistered in Pennsylvania
o r C alifo rnia. Mr. Vallejoo ffers no autho rity, ho wever, fo r the pro po sitio n that the failure to register a fic titio us b usiness nam e affec t s a lender’s ab ility to m ake and enfo rc e lo ans o r c arry o n its b u siness. 2. T he Note endors em ent Mr. Vallejo argues that the endo r sem ent o f the N o te is invalid fo r vario us reaso ns. He c o ntends that the endo r sem ent, signed b y “D. Harkness,” is invalid b ec a use it appears tohave a “stam p ed” signature instead o f a “live” signature. Mr. Vallejoo nly o ffers his c o njec ture that the signature “appears” tob e stam ped. In any event, it m akes no differenc e, b ec ause the

10endo rsem ent o f a nego tiab le instrum ent do es no t require a “live” o r “wet”

signature. S eeU .C .C . § 3-204(a) (“‘Indo rsem ent’ m eans a signature” m ade fo r spec ified purpo ses); U .C .C . § 1-201 (“‘Signed’ includes any sym b o l
exec u ted o r ado pted with present intentio n to ado pt o rac c ept a writing.”); id . c m t. 37 (“The sym

b o l m ay b e printed, stam ped o r written . . . .”). He c o m plains that MER S never endo rsed the N o te. But MERS never held the N o t e; rather, it was the nam ed o r iginal b enefic iary under the Deed
o f Trust as no m inee fo r the ho lder o f the N o te. Mr. Vallejo also c o m plains that “the b lank and undated endo rsem ent
o f the no te pro ves that the no te did no t fo llo w the deed o f trust per the
rec o r ded chain o f title and the alleged assignm ents are therefo re a nullity.” This sentenc e is legal no nsense. The fac t that the N o te was endo rsed in b lank pro ves no thing o f the so rt. 3. T he as s ig nm ent fromD itec h Financ ial to U .S. Bank Mr. Vallejo questio ns the validity o f the January 31, 2017 assignment
o f the Deed o f Trust fro mDitech Financ ial to U .S. Bank. He c o ntends that the assignm ent is ineffec tive b ec ause it was c r eated b y C alib er, which ac ted as atto rney in fac t fo r b o th U .S. Bank and Ditech Financ ial; he also argues that C alib er did no t c o rrob o r ate tho s e statuses. Mr. Vallejo fails to explain why it was im pro p er fo r C alib er to ac t as atto rney in fac t fo r b o th U .S. Bank and Ditech Financ ial. Furtherm o re, he presents no evidenc e to c arry his b urden o f pro o f that C alib er was no t the

11autho r ized servic er o r agent fo r either party.

4. U . S. Bank’s authority Mr. Vallejo c o ntends that the b ankruptcy c o u rt sho uld have required U .S. Bank to pro duc e the go verning do c um ents o f the LSF9 Master Partic ipatio n Trust 13801 in o rder to estab lish its autho rity to file the Mo tio n fo r R elief and enfo rc e the N o t e and Deed o f Trust. But the dec laratio n filed in suppo rt o f the m o tio n stated that U

. S. Bank was the trustee o f the trust, and Mr. Vallejofailed to pro vide any evidenc e to the
c o ntrary. The b ankruptc y c o urt did no t err in dec lining to fo r c e U
. S. Bank to c o rrob o rate its unc o ntro verted dec laratio n testim o ny. 5. Caliber’sauthority as U .S. Bank’ss e rv ic er Finally, Mr. Vallejo challenges C alib er’s standing topro s ec ute the Mo tio n fo r R elief o n U .S. Bank’s b ehalf. He argues that the C alib er
em plo yee who signed the dec laratio n to the m o t io n did no t o ffer evidenc e that C alib er is U .S. Bank’s atto rney in fac t o r that she was autho r ized to sign the dec laratio n o n b ehalf o f C alib er. He also argues that there is no evidenc e o f a trust agreem ent that wo uld em po wer C alib er to m anage trust assets fo r U .S. Bank. In V ea l, we c o nsidered the deb to rs’ argum ent that a servic er lac ked standing to enfo rc e a pro m isso ry no te. W e no ted that “[a] servic er, fo r
exam ple, m ight b e delegated all its princ ipal’s rights, o rit c o u ld sim p ly b e asserting its separate right tob e paid o ut o f the m o rtgage paym ents. . . .

12[T]he servic er has standing to request so m e relief fro mthe auto m aticstay.”

450 B.R . at 914. In the dec laratio n attached to the Mo tio n fo rR elief, the dec larant stated under penalty o f perjury that she was “em plo yed as an A s sistant Vic e President b y C alib er Ho m e Lo ans, Inc
. , as atto rney in fac t and servic er fo r U .S. Bank Trust, N .A ., as Trustee fo rLSF9 Master Participatio n Trust.” She also stated that she was “autho rized to exec ute this dec laratio n o n b ehalf o f Mo vant.” Mr. Vallejo o nly o ffered spec u latio n to the c o ntrary. The dec larant’s statem ents under penalty o f perjury are suffic ient, even witho ut
c o r rob o ratio n, in the ab senc e o f any c o u ntervailing evidenc e. (Mo reo ver, a witness do es no tneed autho rity fro ma party to testify; the o nly requirem ent is that the witness b e ab le to pro vide adm issib le evidenc e.) The b ankruptc y c o urt did no t err. 4 C. M r. V allejo’s argum ent about m is applied paym ents is unav ailing . Mr. Vallejo also argues that C alib er m isapplied his paym ents and that he has no t m issed any po stpetitio n paym ents. N either argum ent is suppo rted b y the evidenc e.

4 Mr
. Vallej o ar gues that ther e i s no ev i dence that MERS , as the benefi ci a r y under the Deed of Tr ust, instr ucted U.S . Bank to seek r eli ef fr om the automati c stay. But by the ti me the moti on was fi led, MERS had assi gned i ts benefi c i a l inter est (as nominee for GMAC) to GMAC Mor tgage, LLC; GMAC Mor tgage, LLC assi gned i ts benefi ci al inter est to Gr een Tr ee; then Di tech Fi nanci a l (Gr een Tr ee’s successorenti ty) assi gned i ts benefi c i al inter est to U.S . Bank. MERS was not inv olv ed when U.S

. Bank sought r eli ef fr om stay. 13Mr. Vallejo did no t adequately present this issue tothe b ankruptcy

c o u rt. His m em o randumin o ppo sitio n to the Mo tio n fo rR elief c o ntained a single, c o nc luso ry sentenc e stating that he had “m ade all paym ents as agreed.” He did no t elab o rate o n this argum ent until he filed the two
no tic es o f appeal that we treated as a m o tio n fo r rec o nsideratio n. By then, it was to o late. Aparty m ay no t use a m o tio n fo r rec o nsideratio n “to present a new legal theo ry fo r the first tim e o r to raise legal argum ents which c o uld have b een raised in c o nnec tio n with the o riginal m o tio n . . . [o r] to rehash the
sam e argum ents presented the first tim e o r sim ply to express the o pinio n that the c o urt was wro ng.” W a ll S t. Plaz a, LLCv. JSJFCo rp. (In re JSJF Co rp.) , 344 B.R . 94, 104 (9th C ir. BA P2006), a ff’d a nd rem a nded, 277 F. A pp’x 718 (9th C ir. 2006) (internal c itatio ns o m itted). The c o urt did no t err in denying the Mo tio n fo r R ec o nsideratio n. Even c o nsidering the new evidenc e and argum ents presented b y Mr. Vallejo o n rec o nsideratio n, the b ankruptc y c o urt did no t ab u se its disc retio n. The ledgers pro vided b y U
. S. Bank sho w that C alib er ac c o unted fo r Mr. Vallejo ’s paym ents. His c o nfusio n arises b ec ause C alib er did no t
c redit a particular m o nth as paid in full until it rec eived the entire am o unt due. In the m eantim e, it held his partial paym ents in a suspense ac c o unt. The lo an do c um ents spec ific ally autho rize this treatm ent o f partial paym ents. Bec ause Mr. Vallejoro utinely m ade paym ents less than the

14m o nthly am o u nt due (so m etim es skipping m o nths o rjust m aking a $100

paym ent), he fell further into arrears. In any event, C alib er’s ledgers c learly sho w that Mr. Vallejo had po stpetitio n arrears exc eeding $19,000 as o f N o vemb er 2017. The evidenc e do es no t suppo rt Mr. Vallejo ’s c o ntentio n that he has no t m issed any paym ents. D . M r. V allejo’s m ultitudinous m otions lac k m e r it. Mr. Vallejo has filed do zens o f requests tosupplem ent the rec o rd, fo r judic ial no tic e, fo r evidentiary hearings and sub po enas, and fo r o ther relief. He also c o nc eded at o r a l argum ent that this new evidenc e was no t presented to the b ankruptc y c o urt. These are ob vio us attem pts to have us
c o nsider evidenc e and argum ent that were no t b efo re the b ankruptc y c o urt and to supplem ent the o p ening b rief. W e will no t c o nsider any o f this new evidenc e in the first instanc e o n appeal o r perm it Mr. Vallejo to file
m ultiple appellate b r iefs. S ee R a ich v. Go nz a les , 500 F.3d 850, 868 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is a long-standing rule in the N inth C irc uit that, generally, ‘we will no t c o nsider argum ents that are raised fo r the first tim e o n appeal.’”(c itatio n o m itted)); In re Edwa rds , 454 B.R . at 104 (“Evidenc e, o r purpo rted evidenc e, that was no t pro perly b efo re the b ankruptcy c o urt is
no t part o f the rec o rd o n appeal.”). A ll m o tio ns that Mr. Vallejohas filed to date are DEN IED. W e c a utio n himthat filing additio nal m o tio ns, o ther than any m o tio ns that the applic ab le rules autho rize at this stage, m a y subjec t himto sanc tio ns.
15CONCL U SION

The b ankruptc y c o urt did no t err. W e A FFIRM.

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