Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

Order 

September 27, 2013

145702 & (58)(59)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 145702

COA: 301762

Saginaw CC: 03-022744-FC

CHARLES HENRY ARTHUR,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________________________/

By order of February 6, 2013, while retaining jurisdiction, we remanded this case 

to the Saginaw Circuit Court for an evidentiary hearing regarding the decision to keep the 

defendant in shackles during the trial. On order of the Court, the trial court having 

submitted a transcript of the hearing, along with its findings of fact and conclusions of 

law, the application for leave to appeal the June 26, 2012 judgment of the Court of 

Appeals is again considered. The motion for leave to file a supplemental brief is 

GRANTED. Pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we 

REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and REINSTATE the defendant’s 

convictions and sentences. 

The trial court did not unconstitutionally “nullify” the defendant’s right to selfrepresentation by declining to remove the defendant’s leg shackles. That the defendant 

elected to relinquish his right of self-representation rather than exercise that right while 

seated behind the defense table does not amount to a denial of the defendant’s right of 

self-representation. See, e.g., Lefevre v Cain, 586 F3d 349 (CA 5, 2009) (shackling does 

not violate a defendant’s right to self-representation), cert den 559 US 1016 (2010). 

Moreover, the trial court did not violate the defendant’s due process rights by 

ordering the defendant to wear leg shackles in the first place because the court was 

justified in imposing those limited restraints to avoid the risk of flight and to ensure the 

safety of those present in light of the defendant’s reported escape attempt and the fact that 

the defendant required extra police security when he was transported to court.
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 September 27, 2013

h0924

2

Clerk

While a defendant’s right to self-representation encompasses certain specific core 

rights, including the right to be heard, to control the organization and content of his own 

defense, to make motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to question 

witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at times, the right to self-representation is 

not unfettered. McKaskle v Wiggins, 465 US 168, 174, 176-178 (1984). The defendant, 

who undeniably possesses physical prowess, posed a physical danger because of his 

history of violent acts: he was a convicted double murderer before the instant case began, 

serving life without parole for shooting two victims in the head during a carjacking. The 

judge had presided over both the previous trial in this case and the other murder trial, and 

understandably formed an impression that the defendant was not only violent, but 

cunning, improvisational, and bent on the execution and concealment of his criminal acts. 

The court addressed these concerns by placing the defendant in the most reasonable 

restrictive restraints available.

The court’s decision does not violate Deck v Missouri, 544 US 622 (2005), where 

the defendant was shackled with not only leg irons, but also handcuffs and a belly chain, 

all of which were visible to the jury. The core rule of Deck is that “the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a 

trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state 

interest specific to a particular trial.” Deck, 544 US at 629 (emphasis added). That is not 

the case here as the court sought to shield the defendant’s leg restraints from the jury’s 

view. Further, the record on remand makes clear that no juror actually saw the defendant 

in shackles.