6044 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 26 / Tuesday, February 8, 2000 / Proposed Rules

transiting. The notification must include

the following information regarding the

poultry to transit the United States:

(i) Permit number;

(ii) Times and dates of arrival in the

United States;

(iii) Time schedule and route to be

followed through the United States; and

(iv) Serial numbers of the seals on the

containers.

(4) The poultry carcasses, parts, or

products transit the United States under

Customs bond and are exported from

the United States within the time limit

specified on the permit. Any poultry

carcasses, parts, or products that have

not been exported within the time limit

specified on the permit or that have not

transited in accordance with the permit

or applicable requirements of this part

will be destroyed or otherwise disposed

of as the Administrator may direct

pursuant to section 2 of the Act of

February 2, 1903, as amended (21 U.S.C.

111).

* * * * *

(Approved by the Office of Management and

Budget under control number 0579–0145)

Done in Washington, DC, this 2nd day of

February 2000.

Bobby R. Acord,

Acting Administrator, Animal and Plant

Health Inspection Service.

[FR Doc. 00–2778 Filed 2–7–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410–34–U

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

[Docket No. PRM–50–69]

Westinghouse Electric Company LLC;

Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; notice

of receipt.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) has received and

requests public comment on a petition

for rulemaking filed by Westinghouse

Electric Company LLC (petitioner). The

petition has been docketed by the

Commission and has been assigned

Docket No. PRM–50–69. The petitioner

is requesting that the NRC regulations

governing pressure and temperature

limits for the reactor pressure vessel be

amended to eliminate requirements for

the metal temperature of the closure

head flange and vessel flange regions.

The petitioner believes the elimination

of the flange requirement has no impact

on Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) and

could improve plant safety in

Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs).

DATES: Submit comments by April 24,

2000. Comments received after this date

will be considered if it is practical to do

so, but assurance of consideration

cannot be given except as to comments

received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments to:

Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555.

Attention: Rulemakings and

Adjudications staff.

Deliver comments to 11555 Rockville

Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30

am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays.

For a copy of the petition, write:

David L. Meyer, Chief, Rules and

Directives Branch, Division of

Administrative Services, Office of

Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001. Documents related to this action

are available for public inspection at the

NRC Public Document Room (PDR)

located at the Gelman Building, 2120 L

Street, NW, Washington, DC 20555.

Documents created or received at the

NRC after November 1, 1999 are also

available electronically at the NRC’s

Public Electronic Reading Room on the

Internet at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/

ADAMS/index.html. From this site, the

public can gain entry into the NRC’s

Agencywide Document Access and

Management System (ADAMS), which

provides text and image files of NRC’s

public documents. For more

information, contact the NRC Public

Document Room (PDR) reference staff at

1–800–397–4209, 202–634–3273, or by

email to pdr@nrc.gov.

You may also provide comments via

the NRC’s interactive rulemaking

website through the NRC home page

(http://ruleforum.llnl.gov). This site

provides the availability to view and

upload comments as files (any format),

if your web browser supports that

function. For information about the

interactive rulemaking website, contact

Ms. Carol Gallagher, 301–415–5905 (email: CAG@nrc.gov).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

David L. Meyer, Office of

Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555.

Telephone: 301–415–7162 or Toll Free:

1–800–368–5642 or E-mail:

DLM1@NRC.GOV.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission

received a petition for rulemaking dated

November 4, 1999, submitted by

Westinghouse Electric Company LLC

(petitioner). The petitioner is requesting

that Table 1 in 10 CFR part 50, appendix

G, be amended by removing

requirements related to the metal

temperature of the closure head flange

and vessel flange regions. Specifically,

the petitioner is requesting that

footnotes 2 and 6 be removed from

Table 1. The removal of these footnotes

would eliminate requirements that

restrict heat-up and cool-down pressure

temperature curves.

In support of its petition, the

petitioner has attached a Westinghouse

document, WCAP–15315, ‘‘Reactor

Vessel Closure Head/Vessel Flange

Requirements Evaluation for Operating

PWR and BWR Plants’’ (October 1999).

The petitioner believes that this

document sets forth the technical basis

for the proposed modification, the

grounds for and interest in the requested

action, and the specific issues and facts

that support the petition.

On the basis of the information in

WCAP–15315, the petitioner has

concluded that the requirements

pertaining to the reactor vessel closure

head flange in 10 CFR part 50,

Appendix G, Table 1, are not necessary

and believes that removal of these

requirements will have no impact on

BWRs and could improve plant safety in

PWRs. The petitioner requests that the

regulations in 10 CFR part 50 be

amended by removing footnotes 2 and 6

in Table 1 of Appendix G that pertain

to the reactor vessel closure head flange.

The NRC has determined that the

petition meets the threshold sufficiency

requirements for a petition for

rulemaking under 10 CFR 2.802. The

petition has been docketed as PRM–50–

69. The NRC is soliciting public

comment on the petition for rulemaking.

Discussion of the Petition

The petitioner notes that requirements

pertaining to the reactor vessel closure

head flange are contained in 10 CFR

part 50, appendix G, Table 1 entitled,

‘‘Pressure and Temperature

Requirements for the Reactor Pressure

Vessel.’’ These requirements appear in

footnotes 2 and 6 of Table 1. These

footnotes require that the metal

temperature of the closure flange

regions must exceed the material

unirradiated RTNDT by at least 120° F for

normal operation when the pressure

exceeds 20 percent of the pre-service

hydrostatic test pressure (621 psig for a

typical PWR and 300 psig for a typical

BWR). The petitioner believes that these

requirements are unnecessary and

requests that these footnotes be

eliminated.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 26 / Tuesday, February 8, 2000 / Proposed Rules 6045

In support of its petition, the

petitioner has attached a Westinghouse

document, WCAP–15315, ‘‘Reactor

Vessel Closure Head/Vessel Flange

Requirements Evaluation for Operating

PWR and BWR Plants’ (October 1999)

that it believes sets forth the technical

basis for the proposed modification, the

grounds for and interest in the requested

action, and the specific issues and facts

that support the petition. The

Westinghouse document indicates that

the method used to develop pressuretemperature limits on the reactor vessel

closure head flange in NRC

requirements is based on fracture

toughness data from the mid 1970s.

Specifically, the margin of 120° F and

the pressure limitation of 20 percent of

hydrotest pressure were developed

using the KIA fracture toughness curve

provided in Appendix G to Section XI

of the American Society of Mechanical

Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure

Vessel (B&PV) Code. The petitioner does

not specify the editions of the ASME

B&PV Code that contain the KIA or the

KIC fracture toughness curves. The

petitioner believes that improved

knowledge of fracture toughness and

other factors affecting the integrity of

the reactor vessel have led to the recent

change to permit the use of the KIC

fracture toughness curve, provided in

Appendix A to Section XI of the ASME

B&PV Code, in the development of

pressure-temperature curves as

specified in ASME Code Case N640,

‘‘Alternative Reference Fracture

Toughness for Development of P–T

Limit Curves for Section XI, Division 1.’’

The petitioner also believes the

Westinghouse report demonstrates that

a typical heat-up curve for both PWRs

and BWRs using the KIC curve provides

for a much higher allowable pressure

through the entire range of

temperatures. The petitioner concludes

that the higher specified limits for a

typical PWR are negated by the current

NRC closure flange requirement. The

petitioner contends that the

Westinghouse report shows that the use

of the KIC curve recently adopted by the

ASME for flange considerations will

lead to the conclusion that the current

flange requirement can be eliminated.

The petitioner contends that the

Westinghouse report demonstrates that

irradiation effects studies lead to the

conclusion that the location of the

closure flange region is in an area of the

reactor where irradiation levels are very

low, meaning that the fracture

toughness of the closure head flange is

not measurably affected. The

Westinghouse report indicates that

steady state operation stresses in several

PWR designs are not very high, but in

other designs the stresses are much

higher. Loadings are primarily

membrane stress with somewhat lower

bending stresses for two PWR designs.

In other PWR designs, the bending

stresses are approximately twice (or

more) the membrane stresses. In BWRs,

the membrane stress is very similar to

that in PWRs, but the bending stresses

are higher in BWR designs, due to the

larger diameter and smaller thickness.

The report indicates that the relative

impact of these stresses is best

addressed through a fracture mechanics

evaluation that postulates a semi-elliptic

surface flaw at the outer surface of the

closure head flange. The petitioner

believes the report demonstrates that in

both BWRs and PWRs, the stress

intensity factors and fracture toughness

variables at boltup provide a significant

margin of safety and concludes that the

integrity of the closure head/flange

region is not a concern for any operating

plant using the KIC fracture toughness

curve. The petitioner also believes the

report concludes that there are no

known mechanisms of degradation in

this region other than fatigue and that

the calculated design fatigue usage level

is so low that flaws are unlikely to

initiate in the closure head/flange

region.

The Westinghouse document

indicates that for PWRs the boltup

temperature ranges from 10° F to 51° F,

with a nominal boltup temperature of

60° F. For BWRs the boltup temperature

using the KIC fracture toughness curve

ranges from 10° F to 66° F, with a

nominal boltup temperature of 80° F.

The petitioner believes that these

comparisons make it clear that no

additional boltup requirements are

necessary and concludes that the

requirements in footnotes 2 and 6 of

Table 1 in 10 CFR part 50, appendix G

can be eliminated.

The Westinghouse report states that

an important safety concern is the

narrow operating window at low

temperatures forced by the closure

flange requirement. Because the flange

requirement sets a pressure limit of 621

psi for a PWR (20 percent of hydrotest

pressure), the pressure-temperature (P–

T) limit curve may be superceded by the

flange requirement for temperatures

below RTNDT + 120° F. The report also

states that although this requirement

was originally imposed to ensure the

integrity of the flange region during

boltup, it is no longer a concern as

specified in the ‘‘Flange Integrity’’

analysis section of the report.

The report indicates that the flange

requirement can cause severe

operational limitations when instrument

uncertainties are added to the lower

limit (621 psi) for the Low Temperature

Overpressure Protection (LTOP) system

of PWRs. Because the minimum

pressure required to cool the seals of the

main coolant pumps is 325 psi, the

operating window between minimum

system pressure necessary for seal

cooling and maximum system pressure

to comply with PT limits on the flange

sometimes becomes very small. The

report states that if the operator allows

the pressure to drop below the pump

seal limit, the seals could fail and cause

the equivalent of a small break loss of

cooling accident (LOCA), a significant

safety problem. The petitioner believes

that elimination of the flange

requirement will significantly widen the

operating window for most PWRs as

stated in the report, reducing the

likelihood of such an occurrence.

The Westinghouse report cites the

Byron Unit 1 facility as an example of

a PWR that the petitioner believes

illustrates how elimination of the flange

requirement could improve plant safety.

According to the report, Byron has

LTOP setpoints significantly below the

flange requirement of 621 psi, because

of a relatively large instrument

uncertainty. The setpoints of the two

power-operated relief valves (PORVs)

are staggered by about 16 psi to prevent

a simultaneous activation. Because the

two PORVs have different instrument

uncertainties, the higher uncertainty is

used for conservatism. The report states

that:

‘‘Elimination of the flange requirement for

Byron Unit 1 would mean that the PORV

curve could become level at 604/587 psig,

which are the leading/trailing setpoints to

protect the PORV downstream piping,

through the temperature of the 350° F down

to boltup at 60° F. The operating window

between the leading PORV and the pump

seal limit rises from 121 psig (446–325) to

262 psig (587–325). This change will make a

significant improvement in plant safety by

reducing the probability of a small LOCA,

and easing the burden on operators.’’

The report acknowledges that the

Byron situation is only one example of

the flange requirement’s impact. The

report also states that although each

operating PWR facility will have

different parameters, the operational

safety will generally be improved by

elimination of the flange requirement.

The Westinghouse report further

states that elimination of the flange

temperature requirement would have no

impact on BWRs:

‘‘The saturation temperature corresponding

to the 300 psig operating pressure (20% of

the pre-service hydrostatic test pressure) is

420° F. This is well in excess of the RTNDT

+ 120° F requirement. Therefore the flange

temperature requirements are satisfied

regardless of whether they exist or not.

6046 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 26 / Tuesday, February 8, 2000 / Proposed Rules

Therefore, elimination of the flange

temperature requirement has no impact on

BWR flange integrity.’’

The Petitioner’s Conclusions

The petitioner has concluded that the

NRC requirements governing pressure

and temperature limits for the reactor

pressure vessel should be amended to

eliminate reactor vessel closure head

flange requirements. The petitioner has

also concluded that the elimination of

the flange requirement has no impact on

BWRs and could improve plant safety in

PWRs. The petitioner requests that the

reactor vessel closure head flange

requirement be eliminated from the

regulations at 10 CFR part 50, appendix

G, Table 1 as presented in its petition

for rulemaking.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day

of February, 2000.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Annette Vietti-Cook,

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 00–2833 Filed 2–7–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 99–NM–358–AD]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Fokker

Model F.28 Mark 1000, 2000, 3000, and

4000 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the

adoption of a new airworthiness

directive (AD) that is applicable to

certain Fokker Model F.28 Mark 1000,

2000, 3000, and 4000 series airplanes.

This proposal would require a one-time

review of the maintenance records to

determine if tripping of the fuel boost

pump circuit breakers has been

recorded, repetitive inspections to

detect fuel leakage from the fuel boost

pump wiring conduits, and corrective

actions, if necessary. This proposal also

would require replacement of the three

single wires inside the metal conduit

sleeve of the fuel boost pumps with new

wires protected by a polyamide sleeve,

which would terminate the repetitive

inspections. This proposal is prompted

by issuance of mandatory continuing

airworthiness information by a foreign

civil airworthiness authority. The

actions specified by the proposed AD

are intended to prevent the fuel boost

pump wiring from chafing, which could

result in electrical arcing and a possible

fuel tank ignition source.

DATES: Comments must be received by

March 9, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–114,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 99–NM–

358–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Comments may be inspected at this

location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00

p.m., Monday through Friday, except

Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in

the proposed rule may be obtained from

Fokker Services B.V., P.O. Box 231,

2150 AE Nieuw-Vennep, the

Netherlands. This information may be

examined at the FAA, Transport

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Norman B. Martenson, Manager,

International Branch, ANM–116, FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington

98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–2110;

fax (425) 227–1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications shall

identify the Rules Docket number and

be submitted in triplicate to the address

specified above. All communications

received on or before the closing date

for comments, specified above, will be

considered before taking action on the

proposed rule. The proposals contained

in this notice may be changed in light

of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report

summarizing each FAA-public contact

concerned with the substance of this

proposal will be filed in the Rules

Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice

must submit a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket Number 99–NM–358–AD.’’ The

postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this

NPRM by submitting a request to the

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,

ANM–114, Attention: Rules Docket No.

99–NM–358–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue,

SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Discussion

The Rijksluchtvaartdienst (RLD),

which is the airworthiness authority for

the Netherlands, notified the FAA that

an unsafe condition may exist on certain

Fokker Model F.28 Mark 1000, 2000,

3000, and 4000 series airplanes. On July

17, 1996, a Boeing Model 747 series

airplane was involved in an accident

shortly after takeoff from John F.

Kennedy International Airport in

Jamaica, New York. Subsequent to the

accident, the RLD advises that the

manufacturer has conducted a Fuel

System Safety Program (FSSP)

investigation. This investigation

revealed that, on an F.28 ‘‘Fellowship’’

series airplane, the wiring insulation

layers of the fuel boost pumps can be

damaged during removal and

installation of the wiring, or by chafing

within the conduits. Additionally, two

separate incidents of arcing have been

found in the metal conduits of the

wiring of the fuel boost pumps.

Circumferential cracks were found in

the insulation layering of the fuel boost

pump wiring. In some cases, the cracks

extended down to the conductor of the

wiring. This condition, if not corrected,

could result in electrical arcing and a

possible fuel tank ignition source.

Explanation of Relevant Service

Information

The manufacturer has issued Fokker

Service Bulletin SBF28/28–046, dated

September 1, 1999, which describes

procedures for the following:

• Part 1 of the Accomplishment

Instructions: A one-time review of the

maintenance records to determine if

tripping of the fuel boost pump circuit

breakers has been reported, and

repetitive visual inspections to detect

fuel leakage of the fuel boost pumps.

• Part 2, paragraph D., of the

Accomplishment Instructions:

Corrective actions for tripping of the

fuel boost pump circuit breakers. These

actions involve performing a resistance

check of the wiring, and, if necessary,

installing a new or serviceable fuel

boost pump and correcting any system

problems between the circuit breaker

and the main landing gear (MLG) wheel

bay connector, and repairing any fuel