This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellant, 3

v. NO. 36,207 4 JEREMY WOOD, 5 Defendant-Appellee. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SIERRA COUNTY 7 Matthew G. Reynolds, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellant 11 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 12 Allison H. Jaramillo, Assist ant Appellate Defender 13 Margaret Kennedy, Practicing Law Student 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellee 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 HANISEE, Judge. 182 {1} The State appeals from the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion 1 to suppress evidence. We previously issu ed a notice of proposed summary disposition 2 in which we proposed to reverse the distri ct court’s decision. Defendant has filed a 3 memorandum in opposition. After due cons ideration, we are unpersuaded. We 4 therefore reverse. 5 {2} The pertinent background information was set forth in the notice of proposed 6 summary disposition. We will avoid undue repetition here and fo cus instead on the 7 content of the memorandum in opposition. 8 {3} In the memorandum in opposition, Defe ndant challenges our proposed finding 9 that the search warrant affidavit contained sufficient information for the issuing court 10 to conclude that the informant upon whose tip the affiant relied was credible. [MIO 11 4] See State v. Hernandez , 1997-NMCA-006, ¶ 28, 122 N.M. 809, 932 P.2d 499 (“In 12 New Mexico, probable cause can be base d on an informant’s tip only when the 13 responding officers have a substantial basis for believing the informant is reliable and 14 the informant’s basis of knowledge is established.”). Initially, wenote that Defendant 15 argues that the informant had been accused of stealing a rifle and some tools by his 16 employer and, therefore, tried to shift the blame to Defendant by telling the affiant that 17 Defendant possessed guns and tools. [MIO 1] However, th e search warrant affidavit 18 did not include information re garding any such accusations against the informant, and 19 we thus do not consider these facts. [State’s exhibit 1] See State v. Williamson , 2009- 203 NMSC-039, ¶ 31, 146 N.M. 488, 212 P.3d 376 (holding that, where a search warrant 1 is obtained, “[o]ur review is limited tothe four corners of the search warrant 2 affidavit”). Defendant further claims that the informant admitted to being “high” at 3 the time he spoke with the affiant. [MIO 1] This fact is likewise not in the search 4 warrant affidavit, and we therefore do not consider it. [State’s exhibit 1] See id. 5 {4} Defendant challenges our reliance on State v. Barker , 1992-NMCA-117, 114 6 N.M. 589, 844 P.2d 839, and argues that, to the extent the informant’s admission that 7 he had violated his parole by smoki ng methamphetamine and marijuana with 8 Defendant was a statement agai nst penal interest, the samewas insufficiently related 9 to a crime forming the basis of probable cau se for the search warrant. [MIO 6, 11-15] 10 We are not persuaded. The affiant requested a warrant authorizing, in part, the search 11 for evidence of possession of drug paraphernalia. [State’s exhibit 1; MIO 2-3] The 12 informant admitted to consuming controlled substances by using three pipes that 13 belonged to Defendant and provided a detailed description of each pipe. [Id.] 14 Therefore, unlike the situation in Barker , see id. ¶ 7, in this case the informant’s 15 statement against his penal interest was cl osely related to the criminal activity for 16 which probable cause to search was being es tablished. For the same reason, the facts 17 in State v. Vest , 2011-NMCA-037, ¶ 14, 149 N.M. 548, 252 P.3d 772, are likewise 18 distinguishable. [MIO 14-15] 194 {5} Defendant further argues that the in formant’s admission to having violated 1 parole a fourth time was not a statement against penal interest because “he was already 2 handcuffed and in custody for violating his parole[.]” [MIO 13] We are unpersuaded. 3 In Barker , we held that “[t]here mu st be information in the affidavit that tends to show 4 that the informant would have had a reas onable fear of prosecution at the time he 5 made the statement.” 1992-NMCA-117, ¶ 12. Here, the informant was facing the 6 possibility that his parole w ould be revoked, subject to proof of the new violation at 7 a parole revocation hearing, and his admission of the violation increased the 8 likelihood of such revocation. Therefore, we hold that the requirements of Barker 9 were satisfied; we find Defendant’s reliance on facts not in the record and cases 10 interpreting the admissibility of hearsay evidence at trial unpersuasive. [MIO 12-15] 11 {6} Defendant also appears to argue that th e saliva test performed on the informant 12 was insufficient corroboration of his statement that he had smoked marijuana and 13 methamphetamine with Defendant because it was performed prior to the affiant’s 14 arrival at the scene. [MIO 1, 4, 13] Defe ndant does not challenge the results of this 15 test, and we fail to see how its timing aloneaffects the test’s corroborating function. 16 {7} Defendant further argues that the informant’s statement that Defendant 17 unlawfully possessed firearms was not credible because it was not against the 18 informant’s penal interest and was not sufficiently corroborated by independent 19 investigation. [MIO 6, 15] We agree with Defendant that this statement was not 205 against the informant’s penal interest. As we stated in our calendar notice, however, 1 we believe that this statement was su fficiently corroborated by the affiant’s 2 independent investigation into Defendant’s criminal history and the discovery that he 3 was in fact a convicted felon. [State’s e xhibit 1] Defendant asserts, without providing 4 any supporting authority or suggestions as to what additional inve stigation could have 5 been conducted, that independent corrobor ation of each element of the suspected 6 crime was required. [MIO 16] See In re Adoption of Doe , 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 7 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 (stating that where a party cites no authority to support an 8 argument, we may assume no such authority exists). Therefore, we remain 9 unpersuaded. 10 {8} Defendant next argues that “[t]he double hearsay in this case does not provide 11 a basis for establishing the reliability of [the informant].” [MIO 16-17] Defendant 12 appears to refer to Defendant’s statement to the informant that he possessed firearms, 13 which the informant relayed to the affian t. [MIO 15] “[T]he presence of ‘double 14 hearsay,’ in itself, does not render [a search warrant] affidavit legally insufficient.” 15 State v. Perea , 1973-NMCA-123, ¶ 15, 85 N.M. 505, 513 P.2d 1287; see also State 16 v. Alderete , 1975-NMCA-058, ¶ 10, 88 N.M. 14, 536 P.2d 278 (holding that search 17 warrant affidavit containing double hearsay established probable cause for arrest 18 warrant where information at issue “woul d have provided probable cause if given 19 directly to the affiant detective”). De fendant does not develop his argument beyond 206 stating that hearsay is unreliable, and we therefore decline to address it further. [MIO 1 16] See Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp. , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 2 P.3d 1076 (declining to entertain a cursory argument). 3 {9} Lastly, Defendant asks us to affirm th e district court’s order under the right-for4 any-reason doctrine, arguing that the inform ation in the search warrant affidavit 5 pertaining to the firearms was stale. [MIO2, 17-20] We refuse to do so. “Probable 6 cause to authorize the issuan ce of a search warrant requires a factual showing that an 7 accused, at the time of the application for warrant, is in possession of illegal property 8 or the fruits of a crime or that evidence relating to the commission of a crime exists 9 on the premises sought to be searched.” State v. Lovato , 1994-NMCA-042, ¶ 8, 118 10 N.M. 155, 879 P.2d 787 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant 11 relies heavily on the fact that , when the affiant arrived at the scene on November 10, 12 2015, the informant’s parole officer told hi m that the informant had indicated that he 13 had been at Defendant’s apartment “on Sunday afternoon,” which would have been 14 November 8, 2015. [MIO 3, 6, 17-20] However, the affidav it further states that when 15 the informant spoke directly with the affi ant, the informant stated that he had 16 discussed the unlawfully possessed firearms with Defendant on November 9, 2015. 17 [State’s exhibit 1] Therefore, the affidavit established that the information was one 18 day old. Defendant further a sserts that the informant stated that “[Defendant] was 19 getting rid of his guns” [MIO 21], “knew that th e Housing Authority would arrive at 207 any moment to search his house and was activ ely trying to get rid of the guns in his 1 vents[,]” [MIO 19] and was trying to “quicklyget rid of [the guns]” [MIO 20]. In fact, 2 the affidavit merely stated th at Defendant “needed to get ri d of [the firearms], and that 3 he hid them in the vent system of the ap artment because he was alerted by the Housing 4 Authority that they were going to do an inspection [of] his ap artment[.]” [State’s 5 exhibit 1] Contrary to De fendant’s interpretation, a common sense reading of this 6 statement indicates that Defendant believed that hiding the guns “in the vent system” 7 was sufficient to address the risk of di scovery during an inspection, and does not 8 communicate the heightened urgency argued by Defendant. Therefore, even assuming 9 that the information was two days old, weconclude that it was not stale for purposes 10 of probable cause. 11 {10} Accordingly, for the reasons statedabove and in the notice of proposed 12 summary disposition, we reverse. 13 {11} IT IS SO ORDERED. 14

__________________________________ 15 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 16 WE CONCUR: 17

_________________________________ 18 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 198 _________________________________ 1 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 2