3ln tbe mlniteb $>tates (!Court of jf eberal QClaints 

No. 17-495C 

(F'iled June 24, 2019) 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

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JODY D. KJl\iBRELL, 

Plaintiff, 

V. 

THE UNITED STATES, 

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Defendant. * 

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ORDER 

On May 14, 2019, the Clerk's Office received from plaintiff Jody D. Kimbrell a 

copy of a document Ms. Kimbrell apparently filed in an Illinois state court. The 

document, entitled "Notice of Removal," purports to inform the Circuit Court of the 

10th Judicial Circuit, in Peoria, Illinois, that Ms. Kimbrell was removing to our 

court a civil action filed against her (and others) by the Bank of America. A copy of a 

similar document was received by the Clerk's Office on May 17, 2019, this one 

purporting to notify the same state court of J'v1s. IGmbrell's removal to our court of a 

foreclosure action filed against her (and others) by the Federal National Mortgage 

Association (Fannie Mae)---a case in which Ii'annie Mae apparently obtained 

judgment. As these documents were captioned for cases in another court and were 

not accompanied by a motion explaining why they should be filed in this case, the 

Clerk's Office did not file them when received.1 

By submitting these documents to our court, plaintiff believes that she is 

complying with the procedure for removing civil actions from state courts, fuund at 

28 U.S.C. § 1446. But Ms. Kimbrell, a non-lawyer representing herself in this 

matter, misunderstands the federal removal statute upon which she relies. The 

1 A third document, received on l\,fay 20, 2019, was also not filed when received---as 

this was the certificate of service for the second "Notice of Removal," a document 

that was itself not filed. 
removal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, allows for the removal of cases to a "district 

court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). And the procedure Ms. Kimbrell 

thought she was following requires the filing of a notice in a "district court of the 

United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Although our court, like U.S. district courts, is 

a federal trial court, it is not a district court. Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 81- 133 

(identifying and creating district courts) with 28 U.S.C. § 171 (creating United 

States Court of Federal Claims); Ledford v. United States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. 

Cir. 2002) (dismissing claim for lack of jurisdiction beca use "[t]he United States 

Court of Federal Claims is not a district court of the United States"). The 

jurisdictional statutes make it clear that our court and the district courts are 

different entities. See, e.g. , 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a). Plaintiff is also mistaken in 

believing that the statutes conferring federa l question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, on district courts can also 

empower our court. They cannot. See Proxtronics Dosimetry, LLC v. United States, 

128 Fed. Cl. 656, 669 n .9, 673 (2016) (citing, inter alia, Allbritton v. United States, 

178 F.3d 1307, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 

As the removal statute does not apply to our court, the three unfiled 

documents that plaintiff submitted---the two removal notices and the one certificate 

of service---are irrelevant to our proceedings and should be returned to Ms. 

Kimbrell unfiled. 2 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Senior Judge 

2 A fourth document that was not filed when received, indicating that Ms. Kimbrell 

h as notified several entities of the filing of her pending motion for a temporary 

restraining order, ECF No. 70, may be filed as a status report. 

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