Filed 10/18/22 In re B.E. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re B.E., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

2d Juv. No. B315115

(Super. Ct. No. PJ53315)

(Los Angeles County)

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

B.E.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

B.E. appeals from an order requiring him to pay victim 

restitution. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6)1 He contends the 

juvenile court abused its discretion when it declined to impose 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code, unless otherwise stated.
2

restitution jointly and severally on appellant’s co-offender. We 

affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant was found to have committed felony first degree 

residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) after he and another 

person broke into the victim’s home and stole several items. The 

juvenile court declared appellant a ward of the court and placed 

him home on probation.

Thereafter, the juvenile court conducted a contested 

restitution hearing. The victim testified and provided evidence 

as to the approximate value of the stolen and damaged items, 

including, among other things, a Rolex watch worth 

approximately $14,000. 

Appellant’s counsel argued it would be inequitable to order

appellant liable for the full amount of victim restitution because 

he did not act alone during the burglary. Counsel argued that 

the juvenile court could reopen the sealed and dismissed case of 

co-offender to require that he pay restitution. The juvenile court 

declined to do so. In the alternative, counsel argued appellant 

should only be liable for half the amount of restitution ordered. 

Again, the juvenile court declined, stating, “[t]he court chooses 

not to do that.” 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court ordered 

victim restitution in the amount of $17,115.44. It terminated 

jurisdiction, ordered appellant’s record sealed, and entered the 

restitution order as a civil judgment. 

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion 

when it ordered him to pay the full amount of victim restitution

rather than opening the sealed case of appellant’s co-offender and 
3

“investigat[ing]” why restitution was not imposed in that case. 

This contention is meritless. 

Victim restitution for economic loss suffered as a result of 

criminal conduct is constitutionally as well as statutorily 

mandated in California. (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 28.) “Section 730.6 

governs restitution in cases where a minor is adjudicated a ward 

of the court pursuant to section 602. [Citation.] Section 730.6 

parallels Penal Code section 1202.4, which governs adult 

restitution. [Citation.]” (In re M.W. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1, 4.) 

The purpose of an order for victim restitution is to rehabilitate 

the defendant, deter future delinquent behavior, and make the 

victim whole by compensating him for his economic losses. (In re 

Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1387 (Brittany L.).) In 

fashioning such an order, “‘“‘judges are given virtually unlimited 

discretion as to the kind of information they can consider’”’” and 

the “‘“‘source’”’” of that information. (Id. at pp. 1391-1392.)

We review a restitution order for abuse of discretion. (In re 

Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132.) In so doing, the 

victim’s right to restitution is to be broadly and liberally 

construed. (Ibid.) Where there is a rational and factual basis for 

the amount of restitution ordered, no abuse of discretion will be 

found. (People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542.)

Section 730.6, subdivision (a)(1) provides that “a victim of 

conduct for which a minor is found to be a person described in 

Section 602 who incurs an economic loss as a result of the minor’s 

conduct shall receive restitution directly from that minor.” The

juvenile court “shall order full restitution unless it finds 

compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so . . . .” (Id., 

subd. (h)(1).)
4

Here, there was a rational and factual basis for the juvenile 

court’s restitution order. First, appellant admitted that he 

committed the burglary. Second, as a condition of his probation, 

he agreed to pay the victim for damages caused by his and cooffender’s criminal conduct. Third, the order reflected the 

“economic loss” suffered by the victim as determined by the 

juvenile court after a contested restitution hearing. This is 

consistent with the statutory purpose of rehabilitating appellant 

and making the victim whole. (See Brittany L., supra, 99 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1387; § 730.6, subd. (a)(1).) 

Nevertheless, appellant contends the juvenile court should 

have, “at the very least, investigated why joint liability had not 

attached” to co-offender. However, appellant’s reliance on section 

786, subdivision (h)(2) for this contention is inapt because that 

section permits a court to access sealed records “for the limited 

purpose” of enforcing a civil judgment or restitution order, not to 

investigate why restitution was not imposed. (See § 786, subd. 

(h)(2).) He also cites section 730.6, subdivision (h)(2), which

provides, “If feasible, the court shall also identify on the court 

order, any co-offenders who are jointly and severally liable for 

victim restitution.”

Here, co-offender was not found to be jointly and severally 

liable for restitution. Moreover, nothing in the statutory 

language required the juvenile court to investigate or explain 

why restitution was not imposed in that case. “[W]here a 

statement of reasons is not required and the record is silent, a 

reviewing court will presume the trial court had a proper basis 

for a particular finding or order.” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 

Cal.4th 1107, 1114.) 
5

Finally, while courts should consider the culpability of a cooffender, that is just one factor to be considered. The obligation 

to pay restitution “does not hinge upon” the liability of a cooffender. (In re Brian S. (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 523, 533; People 

v. Zito (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 736, 746; People v. Goss (1980) 109 

Cal.App.3d 443, 460-461.) Accordingly, the juvenile court did not 

abuse its discretion because there was a rational and factual 

basis for the victim restitution order, and appellant is liable for 

the full amount of economic loss caused by his criminal conduct.

DISPOSITION

The judgment (restitution order) is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.
Morton Rochman, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller, Amanda V. Lopez, 

Gabriel Bradley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.