J-S08038-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

HECTOR CASTELLANOS

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1095 WDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 30, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0012036-2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and SOLANO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MAY 2, 2017

Appellant, Hector Castellanos, appeals from the order entered in the 

Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his first petition 

brought pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),1 which 

Appellant styled as a “Petition for Post-Conviction Relief/Writ of Habeas 

Corpus/Writ of Coram Nobis.” We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

On September 21, 2015, police received a report of a possible intoxicated 

male sleeping on a bench near the inbound platform of the Fallowfield train 

station. Officers approached Appellant and roused him. Appellant awoke 

upon verbal commands and exhibited several signs of intoxication. 

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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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Appellant had slurred and repetitive speech, glassy, bloodshot eyes, and a 

strong odor of alcohol on his breath. Appellant admitted he had been 

drinking and said he was waiting for an inbound train. When the officers 

asked for identification, Appellant stated: “I got nothing on me.” Appellant 

then voluntarily emptied his pockets (presumably to show the officers he 

had no identification), and a clear baggie containing a white powdery 

substance fell out of his pocket. Suspecting the substance was cocaine, the 

officers arrested Appellant for possession of a controlled substance and 

public drunkenness. 

The court scheduled Appellant’s preliminary hearing for October 1, 

2015. On that date, Appellant waived his right to a preliminary hearing, 

opting to plead guilty. Appellant executed a negotiated plea agreement,2in 

which he would plead guilty to possession of a controlled substance 

(cocaine) in exchange for a sentence of six (6) months’ probation.3 

Appellant signed the written plea colloquy and initialed each page. Appellant 

confirmed in the written plea colloquy that he could read, write, and 

understand the English language. Additionally, question nineteen stated: 

“Do you understand that if you are not a citizen of the United States, it is 

possible you may be deported if you plead guilty to the charged offense(s)?” 

____________________________________________

2 Appellant entered his guilty plea as part of an expedited plea disposition. 

3 The Commonwealth withdrew the public drunkenness charge. 
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(Negotiated Guilty Plea Colloquy/Explanation of Appellant’s Rights, 10/1/15, 

at 5 ¶19). Appellant responded affirmatively. Appellant also completed a 

waiver of counsel form and appeared before the court pro se to enter his 

guilty plea. After conducting a full oral colloquy, the court accepted both 

Appellant’s waiver of counsel and his guilty plea as knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary, and imposed the agreed-upon sentence of six (6) months’ 

probation to commence on that date, plus applicable fees and costs. The 

court explained Appellant’s post-sentence and appellate rights; Appellant 

said he had no questions. Appellant did not file post-sentence motions or a 

direct appeal. As a result of his conviction, Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement subsequently instituted removal proceedings against Appellant, 

who was a foreign national illegally in the United States. 

Appellant’s probationary sentence expired on April 1, 2016. On May 

23, 2016, Appellant filed a counseled petition titled, “Petition for PostConviction Relief/Writ of Habeas Corpus/Writ of Coram Nobis.” Appellant 

challenged the validity of his guilty plea, claiming, inter alia, the court 

violated his substantive due process rights by failing to inform him that he 

had a right to an interpreter or advise him that he would face automatic 

deportation as a result of his guilty plea. Appellant filed an amendment to 

his PCRA petition the next day to fix a typographical error. The 

Commonwealth filed an answer on May 26, 2016. 

The court treated Appellant’s filings as a PCRA petition and, on June 1, 
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2016, issued notice of intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. The court decided Appellant was ineligible for 

PCRA relief pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i) because he was no 

longer serving a sentence. Appellant filed a “response and motion to 

reconsider” on June 20, 2016, arguing the court should have treated 

Appellant’s prayer for relief as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Appellant 

also attacked the constitutionality of Section 9543(a)(1)(i) on various 

grounds. Alternatively, Appellant claimed the court retained jurisdiction 

because Appellant still owed fees and costs, so he was in “technical” 

violation of his probation, such that the court could revoke his probation and 

resentence him. The court denied Appellant’s request for reconsideration on 

June 21, 2016. On June 30, 2016, the court entered a final order denying 

PCRA relief. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on July 28, 2016. On 

August 10, 2016, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); 

Appellant timely complied on September 7, 2016. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

WHETHER 42 PA.C.S. § 9543(A)(1)(I) VIOLATES THE 

RIGHT TO COUNSEL, THE RIGHT TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE 

PROCESS, THE RIGHT TO APPEAL AND/OR THE RIGHT TO 

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 

WHETHER SUCH VIOLATED APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO 

SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS?

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING [APPELLANT’S] 

PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF/WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS/WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS WITHOUT A 
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HEARING BASED SOLELY ON THE COMMONWEALTH’S 

ARGUMENT THAT APPELLANT’S PETITION WAS A PCRA 

AND THUS THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO REVIEW 

THE WITHIN MATTER DESPITE BOTH THE 

COMMONWEALTH AND COURT FAILING TO RESPOND TO 

THE WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS AND CORAM NOBIS.

(Appellant’s Brief at 4). 

Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to 

examining whether the record evidence supports the court’s determination 

and whether the court’s decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. 

Ford, 947 A.2d 1251 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 779, 959 

A.2d 319 (2008). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the 

PCRA court if the record contains any support for those findings. 

Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164 (Pa.Super. 2001). A petitioner is 

not entitled to a PCRA hearing as a matter of right; the PCRA court can 

decline to hold a hearing if there is no genuine issue concerning any material 

fact, the petitioner is not entitled to PCRA relief, and no purpose would be 

served by any further proceedings. Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 549 

Pa. 450, 701 A.2d 541 (1997). 

For purposes of disposition, we combine Appellant’s issues. Appellant 

argues the PCRA eligibility requirement at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i), 

requiring a petitioner be currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, 

probation or parole to obtain relief, is not narrowly tailored to serve any 

legitimate state interest because it provides no exceptions for those serving 

short sentences. Appellant asserts the legislature ignored the real and 
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substantial penalties offenders can face following expiration of their 

sentences, such as deportation, sex offender registration, and employment 

consequences. Appellant claims the eligibility requirement violates the right 

to counsel because many individuals serving a short sentence would be 

unable to litigate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim before their 

sentences expired. For the same reason, Appellant insists the eligibility 

requirement violates the right to appeal from the denial of PCRA relief. 

Appellant submits this eligibility requirement also offends procedural 

due process because it deprives individuals serving a short sentence, like 

Appellant, an opportunity to be heard. Likewise, Appellant contends the 

eligibility requirement violates substantive due process because the entire 

post-sentence litigation scheme looks unfavorably upon any non-direct 

appeal issue and does not allow exceptions when a PCRA petition is timely 

filed but the person is no longer serving his sentence. Appellant maintains 

he was denied substantive due process resulting from a systematic 

breakdown of the criminal justice system because the court failed to advise 

Appellant that he had a right to an interpreter and did not inform Appellant 

that he would face automatic deportation as a result of his guilty plea. 

Appellant protests Section 9543(a)(1)(i) is unconstitutional on its face 

because it has no “plainly legitimate sweep,” and is also unconstitutional as 

applied to him. 

Even if the PCRA eligibility requirement at Section 9543(a)(1)(i) is 
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constitutional, Appellant argues the PCRA court still had jurisdiction to 

consider his petition because Appellant owed court costs and fees, so 

technically he was in violation of his probation; and the court could have 

revoked Appellant’s probation and resentenced him. Appellant further 

contends the court erred by treating his petition as a PCRA petition when his 

underlying claims are not cognizable under the PCRA, which offers no 

remedy for his claims. Appellant suggests the court should have treated 

Appellant’s petition as a writ of habeas corpus or coram nobis. Appellant 

concludes the PCRA court erred by dismissing his first petition for collateral 

relief, and this Court must vacate and remand for further proceedings. We 

disagree. 

Pennsylvania law makes clear that any petition for post-conviction 

collateral relief will generally be considered a PCRA petition, even if 

captioned as a request for habeas corpus relief, if the petition raises issues 

for which the relief sought is available under the PCRA. See generally 

Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214 (1999); 

Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564 (1999); 

Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 722 A.2d 638 (1998); 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (stating PCRA shall be sole means of obtaining collateral 

relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for 

same purpose, including habeas corpus and coram nobis). The writ of 

habeas corpus continues to exist as a separate remedy only if the claim 
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raised is not cognizable under the PCRA. Peterkin, supra at 552, 722 A.2d 

at 640. See also Commonwealth v. Beck, 848 A.2d 987 (Pa.Super. 

2004) (explaining petition for writ of habeas corpus will be deemed PCRA 

petition if it raises issues that are generally cognizable under PCRA). When 

considering what types of claims fall within the ambit of the PCRA, “the 

scope of the PCRA eligibility requirements should not be narrowly confined to 

its specifically enumerated areas of review.” Commonwealth v. Hackett, 

598 Pa. 350, 363, 956 A.2d 978, 986 (2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1285, 

129 S.Ct. 2772, 174 L.Ed.2d 277 (2009). “Such narrow construction would 

be inconsistent with the legislative intent to channel post-conviction claims 

into the PCRA’s framework, and would instead create a bifurcated system of 

post-conviction review where some post-conviction claims are cognizable 

under the PCRA while others are not.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 

The relevant statutory eligibility requirements for relief under the PCRA 

are as follows:

§ 9543. Eligibility for relief

(a) General rule.—To be eligible for relief under this 

subchapter, the petitioner must plead and prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence all of the following:

(1) That the petitioner has been convicted of a crime 

under the laws of this Commonwealth and is at the time 

relief is granted:

(i) currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, 

probation or parole for the crime;

(ii) awaiting execution of a sentence of death for the 
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crime; or

(iii) serving a sentence which must expire before the 

person may commence serving the disputed sentence.

(2) That the conviction or sentence resulted from one 

or more of the following:

(i) A violation of the Constitution of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the 

United States which, in the circumstances of the 

particular case, so undermined the truth-determining 

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or 

innocence could have taken place.

(ii) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined 

the truth-determining process that no reliable 

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken 

place.

(iii) A plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the 

circumstances make it likely that the inducement 

caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner 

is innocent.

(iv) The improper obstruction by government officials 

of the petitioner’s right of appeal where a meritorious 

appealable issue existed and was properly preserved in 

the trial court.

(v) Deleted.

(vi) The unavailability at the time of trial of 

exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become 

available and would have changed the outcome of the 

trial if it had been introduced.

(vii) The imposition of a sentence greater than the 

lawful maximum.

(viii) A proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction.

(3) That the allegation of error has not been 
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previously litigated or waived.

<Subsec. (a)(4) is permanently suspended insofar as it 

references “unitary review” by Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court Order of Aug. 11, 1997, imd. effective.>

(4) That the failure to litigate the issue prior to or 

during trial, during unitary review or on direct appeal 

could not have been the result of any rational, strategic 

or tactical decision by counsel.

(b) Exception.—Even if the petitioner has met the 

requirements of subsection (a), the petition shall be 

dismissed if it appears at any time that, because of delay 

in filing the petition, the Commonwealth has been 

prejudiced either in its ability to respond to the petition or 

in its ability to re-try the petitioner. A petition may be 

dismissed due to delay in the filing by the petitioner only 

after a hearing upon a motion to dismiss. This subsection 

does not apply if the petitioner shows that the petition is 

based on grounds of which the petitioner could not have 

discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence before 

the delay became prejudicial to the Commonwealth.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a), (b). 

The statute plainly states, under Section 9543(a)(1)(i), that a PCRA 

petitioner must be currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation 

or parole for the conviction at issue to be eligible for PCRA relief. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i); Commonwealth v. Williams, 977 A.2d 1174 

(Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 605 Pa. 700, 990 A.2d 730 (2010). “As 

soon as his sentence is completed, the petitioner becomes ineligible for 

relief, regardless of whether he was serving his sentence when he filed the 

petition.” Id. at 1176 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hart, 911 A.2d 939, 

942 (Pa.Super. 2006)). “To grant relief at a time when [the petitioner] is 
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not currently serving...a sentence would be to ignore the language of the 

statute.” Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 548 Pa. 544, 548, 699 A.2d 718, 

720 (1997) (emphasis in original). See also Commonwealth v. 

Descardes, ___ Pa. ___, 136 A.3d 493 (2016) (holding petitioner’s “petition 

for writ of coram nobis” claiming counsel was ineffective for failing to advise 

petitioner of automatic deportation consequences associated with his guilty 

plea raised issues cognizable under PCRA; while petitioner’s ultimate goal 

may be to obtain relief from deportation consequences of his conviction, to 

advance his goal he must seek relief from his judgment of sentence, which 

brings his claim within ambit of PCRA; pursuant to plain language of Section 

9542, where claim is cognizable under PCRA, PCRA is sole method to obtain 

collateral review; petitioner was no longer serving probationary sentence 

when he filed petition, so he was ineligible for PCRA relief; both PCRA court 

and Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain petition). 

States are under no constitutional mandate to provide for collateral 

attacks on convictions; if a state does provide means, however, then the 

procedures must comport with fundamental fairness required by the Due 

Process Clause. Commonwealth v. Turner, 622 Pa. 318, 335, 80 A.3d 

754, 764 (2013), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1771, 188 L.Ed.2d 

602 (2014). “To deny due process, the complained-of aspect of the state 

post-conviction procedures must be fundamentally inadequate to vindicate 

the defendant’s liberty interest, and must offend some principle of justice so 
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rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 

fundamental or transgress any recognized principle of fundamental fairness 

in operation.” Id. at 336, 80 A.3d at 764. 

When an appellant challenges the constitutionality of a 

statute, he...presents this Court with a pure question of

law, for which our standard of review is de novo and our 

scope of review in plenary. As a threshold matter, a 

statute is presumed to be constitutional and will only be 

invalidated as unconstitutional if it clearly, palpably, and 

plainly violates constitutional rights. Further[,] a 

defendant may contest the constitutionality of a statute on 

its face or as-applied.

A facial attack tests a law’s constitutionality based on 

its text alone and does not consider the facts or 

circumstances of a particular case. An as-applied 

attack, in contrast, does not contend that a law is 

unconstitutional as written but that its application to 

a particular person under particular circumstances 

deprived that person of a constitutional right. A 

criminal defendant may seek to vacate his conviction 

by demonstrating a law’s facial or as-applied 

unconstitutionality. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 26 A.3d 485, 493 (Pa.Super. 2011) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). A statute is facially unconstitutional 

only where no set of circumstances exist under which the statute would be 

valid; in other words, “the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.” 

Commonwealth v. McKown, 79 A.3d 678, 687 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 625 Pa. 648, 91 A.3d 162 (2014). 

In Turner, supra, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court confronted a 

challenge to the constitutionality of the PCRA eligibility requirement of 

“currently serving” a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole, to 
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obtain PCRA relief. In rejecting the petitioner’s argument that this eligibility 

requirement violated procedural due process rights, the Court explained:

We agree with the Commonwealth that due process does 

not require the legislature to continue to provide collateral 

review when the offender is no longer serving a sentence. 

* * *

Because individuals who are not serving a state sentence 

have no liberty interest in and therefore no due process 

right to collateral review of that sentence, the statutory 

limitation of collateral review to individuals serving a 

sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole is 

consistent with the due process prerequisite of a protected 

liberty interest. Of course, the legislature was free to 

extend a statutory right of collateral review to individuals 

like [p]etitioner who had completed their sentence and, 

had [the legislature] done so, [it] would be constitutionally 

obligated to ensure that those rights were impacted only in 

accord with due process. However, the legislature did not 

do so. Rather, the General Assembly, through the PCRA, 

excluded from collateral review those individuals who were 

no longer subject to a state sentence, thereby limiting the 

statutory right of collateral review to those whose liberty 

was constrained. 

The legislature was aware that the result of the custody or 

control requirement of Section 9543(a)(1)(i) would be that 

defendants with short sentences would not be eligible for 

collateral relief. Indeed, that was the apparent intent: to 

restrict collateral review to those who seek relief from a 

state sentence. ... 

The PCRA provides eligibility for relief for cognizable 

claims, ...and is the sole means of obtaining collateral relief 

in Pennsylvania. Petitioners are required to satisfy, inter 

alia, the criteria for eligibility for relief, and the timeliness 

restrictions. By further limiting the eligibility for relief 

under the PCRA to petitioners serving sentences, our 

legislature chose not to create any statutory entitlement to 

collateral review for defendants who have completed their 

sentences. 
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We therefore find no support for the PCRA court’s 

conclusion or [p]etitioner’s argument that this legislative 

enactment runs afoul of due process, as due process does 

not afford relief absent a protected liberty interest.

... [T]he constitutional nature of the claims asserted by 

[p]etitioner does not overcome the statutory restrictions 

on her eligibility for relief, subject, of course, to due 

process. Such due process, however, does not require 

infinite opportunity to attack a conviction under any and all 

circumstances; rather, it permits our legislature through 

the PCRA statute to place limitations on claims of trial 

error and strikes a reasonable balance between society’s 

need for finality in criminal cases and the convicted 

person’s need to demonstrate that there has been an error 

in the proceedings that resulted in conviction. As noted 

earlier, [p]etitioner had the ability to bring [her claims] on 

direct appeal. Her failure to proceed in this regard does 

not mean she is entitled to additional opportunities to 

attack her conviction. 

Turner, supra at 338-41, 80 A.3d at 766-68 (holding petitioner had no due 

process right to be heard outside limits of Section 9543(a)(1)(i) of PCRA; 

due process does not require perpetual opportunities for collateral review of 

constitutional claims; state can impose rational limits in support of finality of 

judgments; petitioner had opportunity to vindicate her claim on direct appeal 

or within time frame permitted by PCRA; Section 9543(a)(1)(i) is 

constitutional as applied to petitioner) (internal citations, quotation marks, 

and footnotes omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Volk, 138 A.3d 659 

(Pa.Super. 2016), appeal denied, 2016 WL 7105901 (Pa. Dec. 6, 2016) 

(rejecting petitioner’s facial and “as applied” challenge to constitutionality of 

Section 9543(a)(1)(i); relying on Turner’s holding that statutory eligibility 
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requirement of Section 9543(a)(1)(i) is consistent with due process 

prerequisite of protected liberty interest; absent valid liberty interest, 

challenge to both procedural and substantive due process must fail). 

Instantly, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea on October 1, 

2015, to one count of possession of a controlled substance. The trial court 

sentenced Appellant that day to six months’ probation to commence 

immediately, plus applicable fees and costs associated with his prosecution. 

Appellant did not file a direct appeal. After the expiration of his sentence on 

April 1, 2016, Appellant filed, on May 23, 2016, a petition titled, “Petition for 

Post-Conviction Relief/Writ of Habeas Corpus/Writ of Coram Nobis.” In his 

petition, Appellant challenged the validity of his guilty plea, claiming the 

court violated his substantive due process rights by failing to inform him that 

he had a right to an interpreter or advise him of the possibility of deportation 

resulting from Appellant’s guilty plea. Notwithstanding the title of his 

petition and his attempt to distance his claims from the ambit of the PCRA, 

Appellant’s claims are cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9543(a)(2)(i) (stating claim that conviction or sentence resulted from 

violation of constitution is cognizable under PCRA); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9543(a)(2)(iii) (stating claim that conviction or sentence resulted from 

unlawfully induced guilty plea is cognizable under PCRA). See also 

Hackett, supra; Beck, supra. Therefore, the PCRA court properly treated 

Appellant’s prayer for relief as a PCRA petition. 
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As Appellant’s sentence had already expired when he filed the current 

petition, the PCRA court properly decided Appellant was statutorily ineligible 

for relief.4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9543(a)(1)(i); Descardes, supra; Ahlborn, 

supra; Williams, supra. Our Supreme Court has rejected the claim that 

Section 9543 is facially unconstitutional, holding individuals who are not 

currently serving a sentence have no liberty interest to protect and therefore 

no due process right to collateral review. See Turner, supra. See also 

Volk, supra. Because the PCRA is consistent with the due process 

prerequisite of a protected liberty interest and has been declared facially 

valid, Appellant’s companion claims that Section 9543 violates substantive 

due process, the right to counsel, and the right to appeal, also fail. Id.; 

McKown, supra. 

Further, Appellant had the opportunity to file a direct appeal raising 

any trial court error and/or deficiencies with the guilty plea colloquy. 

Likewise, Appellant did not pursue PCRA relief until after his sentence had 

____________________________________________

4 We reject Appellant’s assertion that he is eligible for PCRA relief because 

the court retained jurisdiction to revoke Appellant’s probationary sentence 

and re-sentence him for non-payment of all fees and costs. The court 

imposed applicable fees and costs associated with Appellant’s prosecution as 

part of Appellant’s sentence, not as a condition of his probation. Whether 

the court could have revoked Appellant’s probation and resentenced him on 

this basis is irrelevant; Appellant was not serving a sentence of probation 

when he filed his petition for relief, so he is ineligible for relief under the 

PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i). Appellant’s reliance on 

Commonwealth v. Ortega, 995 A.2d 879 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 

610 Pa. 607, 20 A.3d 1211 (2011), is misplaced because the facts and 

circumstances of Ortega are wholly inapposite. 
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expired. See Turner, supra (holding Section 9543(a)(1)(i) was not 

unconstitutional as applied to petitioner; petitioner has burden to prove 

unconstitutionality of state-law post-conviction procedures as applied and 

cannot complain of insufficient time to obtain relief when petitioner made no 

attempt to obtain direct review or collateral review within statutorily 

authorized time). Therefore, the court properly denied PCRA relief. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

Order affirmed. 

President Judge Emeritus Ford Elliott joins this memorandum.

Judge Solano concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/2/2017