NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETER SZANTO , Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. EVYE SZANTO , et al. , Defendant s- Appellee s. No. 21

- 35151
D.C. No s. 3 : 18

- cv - 00951

- SI 3:18

- cv - 00952

- SI

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael H. Simon, District Judge, Presiding Submitted January 3, 2024 * *

Before: WALLACE, O’SCANNLAIN, and FERNANDEZ , Circuit Judges. Peter Szanto appeals pro se from the D istrict C ourt ’ s order affirming the
B ankruptcy C ourt ’ s order in an Adversary Proceeding , which dismiss ed Szanto ’ s claims against various members of his family (“the Relatives”) . We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo the D istrict C ourt ’ s decision on appeal

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JAN 3 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 from the B ankruptcy C ourt without deference to the D istrict C ourt

. In re Thorpe Insulation Co. , 677 F.3d 869, 879 (9th Cir. 2012). In particular, w e review de novo the B ankruptcy C ourt ’ s grant of summary judgment

. In re Sabban , 600 F.3d 1219 , 1221

- 1222 (9th Cir. 2010)

. We affirm.
I The B ankruptcy C ourt correctly granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Relatives by dismissing all of Szanto’s claims against them in the Adversary Proceeding. Szanto’s claims against the Relatives for conversion and emotional distress a re time

- barred. To the extent that these claims have any basis in reality, Szanto knew of them by no later than June 5, 2009 , when he brought similar claims against many of the same defendants in San Mateo County Superior Court

. The Oregon statu t e of limitations requires that a conversion claim must be commenced within six years after the claim for relief accrues

. Or. Rev. Stat. ( ORS ) 73.0118(7)

. California’s statute of limitations is shorter, providing only three years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code ( CCP ) 338(c)(1). Thus, regardless of which state law is applied, Szanto was well beyond the statu t e of limitations when he commenced this Adversary Proceeding on September 21, 2016. Szanto’s emotional distress claim is similarly barred, since under both Oregon and California law the statute of limitations is two
years. See CCP 335.1 ; ORS 12.110(1)

. Szanto argues that his claims in the Adversary Proceeding should be treated3 as compulsory counterclaims to the San Mateo County Superior Court case
. A ssuming that this were true , however, counterclaims are not tolled indefinitely, but only for the time allotted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a) to file a responsive pleading. The B ankruptcy C ourt did not err i n dismissing Szanto’s claims as time

- barred.
II Szanto argues that the B ankruptcy C ourt exhibited bias. Szanto is prone to making this argument

. S ee e.g., Szanto v. United States Tr. (In re Szanto) , 703 F. App’x 581 , 582 (9th Cir. 2017) (“We reject as unsupported by the record Szanto's contentions concerning bias of the bankruptcy judge or that the judge ’ s impartiality might reasonably be questioned”). It is unclear precisely how Szanto believes that this bias led to a reversible error by the B ankruptcy C ourt. However, assuming that Szanto is requesting that this C ourt reverse the B ankruptcy C ourt on the basis of general judicial misconduct,

see Duckett v. Godinez , 67 F.3d 734 , 740 (9th Cir. 1995) , w e again reject as unsupported by the record Szanto ’ s contentions concerning bias on the part of the b ankruptcy j udge

. We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.