1

Filed 4/13/23 (unmodified opn. attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOUNDATION,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD,

Defendant and Respondent;

EAST SAN JOAQUIN WATER QUALITY 

COALITION,

Real Party in Interest and Respondent;

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY RESOURCE 

CONSERVATION DISTRICT et al.,

Interveners and Respondents.

C093513

(Super. Ct. No. 

34201880002851CUWMGDS)

ORDER MODIFYING 

OPINION

[NO CHANGE IN 

JUDGMENT]

PROTECTORES DEL AGUA SUBTERRANEA,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD,

(Super. Ct. No. 

34201880002852CUWMGDS)
2

Defendant and Respondent;

CENTRAL VALLEY REGIONAL WATER 

QUALITY CONTROL BOARD et al.,

Real Parties in Interest and Respondents;

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY RESOURCE 

CONSERVATION DISTRICT et al.,

Interveners and Respondents.

MONTEREY COASTKEEPER et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD 

et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

EAST SAN JOAQUIN WATER QUALITY 

COALITION et al.,

Interveners and Respondents.

(Super. Ct. No. 

34201880002853CUWMGDS)

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the published opinion filed herein on March 17, 2023, be 

modified as follows: 

1. At page 11, in the third paragraph, modify the sentence that begins with “The State 

Water Board adopted” so that it reads in its entirety:
3

The State Water Board adopted the Antidegradation Policy in 

response to an earlier iteration of this directive.

2. At page 26, in the second sentence of the second full paragraph, “In additional” 

should be modified to say “In addition” so that the sentence reads in its entirety:

In addition to verification of proper [management practice] 

implementation (Key Element 2), feedback mechanisms are needed to 

clearly indicate whether and when additional or different [management 

practices] or [management practice] implementation measures must be 

used, or other actions taken.

3. At page 58, before the first paragraph that begins with “Finally, Protectores argues 

the State Water Board misinterpreted or misapplied AGUA” add a subheading 

numbered and worded as follows:

3. Application of AGUA

There is no change in the judgment. 

 /S/

 

ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/S/

 

MAURO, J.

/S/

 

RENNER, J.
1

Filed 3/17/23 (unmodified opinion)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOUNDATION,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD,

Defendant and Respondent;

EAST SAN JOAQUIN WATER QUALITY 

COALITION,

Real Party in Interest and Respondent;

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY RESOURCE 

CONSERVATION DISTRICT et al.,

Interveners and Respondents.

C093513

(Super. Ct. No. 

34201880002851CUWMGDS)

PROTECTORES DEL AGUA SUBTERRANEA,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD,

(Super. Ct. No. 

34201880002852CUWMGDS)
2

Defendant and Respondent;

CENTRAL VALLEY REGIONAL WATER 

QUALITY CONTROL BOARD et al.,

Real Parties in Interest and Respondents;

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY RESOURCE 

CONSERVATION DISTRICT et al.,

Interveners and Respondents.

MONTEREY COASTKEEPER et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD 

et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

EAST SAN JOAQUIN WATER QUALITY 

COALITION et al.,

Interveners and Respondents.

(Super. Ct. No. 

34201880002853CUWMGDS)

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Steven M. 

Gevercer, Judge. Affirmed.

James R. Wheaton, Lowell Chow and Nathaniel H. Kane for Plaintiff and 

Appellant Environmental Law Foundation.

Leadership Counsel for Justice and Accountability, Michael K. Claiborne and 

Phoebe S. Seaton for Plaintiff and Appellant Protectores del Agua Subterranea.
3

Deborah A. Sivas, Matthew J. Sanders, Stephanie L. Safdi; Helen H. Kang, Lucas 

C. Williams; California Rural Legal Assistance and Marisol F. Aguilar for Plaintiff and 

Appellant Monterey Coastkeeper.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Robert W. Byrne, Assistant Attorney General, 

Tracy L. Winsor, Evan Eickmeyer, Allison Goldsmith and Sierra Arballo, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent State Water Resources Control Board 

and for Real Party in Interest and Respondent Central Valley Regional Water Quality 

Control Board.

Kahn, Soares & Conway and Theresa A. Dunham for Real Party in Interest and 

Respondent East San Joaquin Water Quality Coalition and for Intervener and Respondent 

Kings River Watershed Coalition Authority. 

Spaletta Law and Jennifer L. Spaletta for Intervener and Respondent San Joaquin 

County Resource Conservation District. 

Kari E. Fisher for Intervener and Respondent California Farm Bureau Federation.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Central Valley is home to some of the most productive agricultural land in the 

nation. But some of the same practices that have made the Central Valley an agricultural 

powerhouse have also adversely impacted the region’s water quality and environmental 

health. Runoff from irrigated lands comes into contact with fertilizers and pesticides

used to produce crops at industrial scales. Fertilizers produce nitrates, which can 

percolate into groundwater and contaminate drinking water, endangering public health. 

Pesticides can be carried to groundwater or enter surface waters, threatening aquatic life. 

Even irrigation water poses a threat to water quality, as concentrated levels of salt from 

long-term irrigation adversely affects groundwater. 

Regulating waste discharges from irrigated agriculture involves an unusually 

complex set of policy judgments and trade-offs. Regulators must balance the need to 

ensure a reliable food supply and preserve the economic viability of agriculture against 
4

the need to protect the waters of the state. They must consider the economic and 

technological feasibility of monitoring minute concentrations of waste emanating from 

numerous dispersed activities over a vast area. Respondents State Water Resources 

Control Board (State Water Board) and Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control 

Board (Central Valley Water Board) are responsible for regulating waste discharges from 

irrigated agricultural operations in the Central Valley. (Wat. Code, § 13263.)1 The State 

and Central Valley Water Boards have traditionally worked with growers to address 

water quality issues, often through third-party grower/discharger coalitions. Respondent 

and real party in interest East San Joaquin Water Quality Coalition (Coalition) is one 

such third-party. 

The State Water Board adopted order WQ 2018-0002 (Order) in February 2018. 

The Order authorizes discharges from irrigated lands to waters of the state within the 

Eastern San Joaquin River Watershed (watershed) and assigns monitoring and reporting 

responsibilities to the Coalition and growers within the watershed who are members of 

the Coalition (Members).2 

As relevant here, the Order requires that Members meet receiving water 

limitations and implement management practices that minimize waste discharge to 

surface water and groundwater and protect wellheads from surface water intrusion. The 

Order further requires that Members conduct farm evaluations describing implemented 

management practices and prepare and implement nitrogen management plans. 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Water Code.

2 The watershed region encompasses all of Madera, Tuolumne, and Mariposa counties, 

and portions of Stanislaus, Merced, Calaveras, Fresno, and Alpine counties. There are 

approximately one million acres of irrigated lands in the watershed region, on which over 

100 crops are grown, predominantly almonds, hay, silage, corn, grapes, tomatoes, 

irrigated pasture, wheat, cotton, and walnuts. 
5

The Order assigns a separate set of responsibilities to the Coalition (sometimes 

called the “Third Party”). Specifically, the Order requires that the Coalition collect data 

from Members regarding management practice implementation and nitrogen management 

plans and report aggregated results to the Central Valley Water Board. The Coalition 

must also conduct surface and groundwater quality monitoring, and prepare and 

implement management plans when exceedances of water quality objectives occur. 

Perhaps most importantly, the Order adopts new metrics for reporting nitrogen 

use. The Order applies to Members and establishes precedential guidance for agricultural 

regulatory programs statewide.3 

Environmental Law Foundation (Foundation), Monterey Coastkeeper 

(Coastkeeper), and Protectores del Agua Subterranea (Protectores) (together, appellants) 

brought petitions for writs of mandate challenging various aspects of the Order. The trial 

court consolidated the cases and granted a motion for leave to intervene by the Coalition 

and others (cumulatively, the Coalition). Following a hearing on the merits, the trial 

court denied the petitions. 

Appellants appeal, advancing numerous claims of error. The Foundation argues 

the Order violates the State Water Board’s policy for implementation and enforcement of 

the nonpoint source pollution control program (the Nonpoint Source Policy) by: (1) 

keeping data secret; (2) failing to provide sufficient feedback mechanisms; and (3) failing 

to require permanent recordkeeping. 

Coastkeeper argues the Order violates the Nonpoint Source Policy by: (1) failing 

to describe specific management practices; and (2) failing to include sufficient feedback 

mechanisms. 

3 A majority of growers operating irrigated lands in the watershed are members of the 

Coalition. 
6

Protectores argues the Order violates resolution No. 68-16, statement of policy 

with respect to maintaining high quality of waters in California, also known as the 

antidegradation policy (the Antidegradation Policy) because the State Water Board and 

Central Valley Water Board: (1) failed to make required findings; and (2) improperly 

distinguished the opinion of another panel of this court in Asociacion de Gente Unida por 

el Agua v. Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th

1255 (AGUA). 

We will reject these arguments and affirm the judgments.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework 

The Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act (Act) (§ 13000 et seq.) governs 

water quality regulation in California. The Act establishes as state policy that “activities 

and factors which may affect the quality of the waters of the state shall be regulated to 

attain the highest water quality which is reasonable, considering all demands being made 

and to be made on those waters and the total values involved, beneficial and detrimental, 

economic and social, tangible and intangible.” (§ 13000.) The Act is administered by the 

State Water Board and nine regional water quality control boards (Regional Boards), 

including the Central Valley Water Board. (§§ 13001, 13200.) The State Water Board 

formulates statewide water quality control policies and oversees the Regional Boards. 

(§§ 13100, 13140-13141, 13146, 13200-13201, 13240.) Together, the State Water Board 

and Regional Boards are charged with “primary responsibility for the coordination and 

control of water quality.” (§ 13001.) 

1. Basin Plans and Waste Discharge Requirements

Regional Boards formulate water quality control plans for their regions, 

commonly known as “basin plans.” (§§ 13240, 13245; see also Monterey Coastkeeper v. 

California Regional Water Quality Control Board (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1, 8 (Monterey 

Coastkeeper II).) Basin plans must specify, for the waters within the region, the 
7

beneficial uses to be protected (e.g., drinking water supply, agricultural water supply,

freshwater habitat), applicable water quality objectives, and a program of implementation 

for achieving those objectives. (§ 13050, subds. (h)-(j)(1)-(3); Monterey Coastkeeper II, 

supra, at p. 8.) Water quality objectives set “the limits or levels of water quality 

constituents or characteristics for reasonable protection of beneficial uses of water or the 

prevention of nuisance in the specific area.” (County of Sacramento v. State Water 

Resources Control Board (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1579, 1583.)

Regional Boards are also responsible for regulating discharges of waste through 

“permitting, inspection, and enforcement actions.” (Monterey Coastkeeper II, supra, 76 

Cal.App.5th at p. 8.) The Act generally requires that any person “discharging waste, or 

proposing to discharge waste,” file a report with the Regional Board. (§ 13260, subd. 

(a)(1).) The Regional Board must then “ ‘prescribe requirements as to the nature’ of the 

discharge, implementing any applicable water quality control plans.” (Department of 

Finance v. Commission on State Mandates (2016) 1 Cal.5th 749, 756.) Such “waste 

discharge requirements” (WDRs) are similar to permits, inasmuch as they authorize 

persons to make specified discharges in accordance with specified requirements. (§§ 

13263, subd. (f), 13264, 13265, 13374.)4 

The State Water Board or a Regional Board may also “prescribe general waste 

discharge requirements for a category of discharges.” (§ 13263, subd. (i), emphases 

added.) General waste discharge requirements may be appropriate where discharges are 

produced by the same or similar operations, involve the same or similar types of waste, 

require the same or similar treatment standards, and are more appropriately regulated 

under general discharge requirements than individual ones. (Ibid.) The Order sets forth 

4 As we shall discuss, the Order started out as a set of WDRs. 
8

general waste discharge requirements for a category of growers; namely, Members of the 

Coalition.

“Basin plans cover both point source and nonpoint source pollution.” (Monterey 

Coastkeeper v. State Water Resources Control Board (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 342, 348 

(Monterey Coastkeeper I).) Point source pollution emanates from discrete or discernable 

sources, such as pipes, ditches, or canals. (Ibid.) Nonpoint source pollution, by contrast, 

“arises from many dispersed activities over large areas, and is not traceable to any single 

discrete source.” (League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project 

v. Forsgren (9th Cir. 2002) 309 F.3d 1181, 1184.) Nonpoint source pollution typically 

results from “contact between pollutants and land runoff, precipitation, atmospheric 

deposition, drainage, seepage, or hydrologic modification.” Examples of nonpoint source 

pollution include runoff from animal grazing operations (Monterey Coastkeeper I, supra, 

at p. 348), and runoff from irrigated agricultural and silvicultural activities (Oregon 

Natural Resources Council v. U.S. Forest Service (1987) 834 F.2d 842, 849, fn. 9). We 

are concerned here with discharges from irrigated lands that directly or indirectly reach 

waters of the state (including surface waters and groundwaters) and may thus be nonpoint 

source pollution.5 

Nonpoint source pollution presents unique regulatory challenges, which cannot be

readily addressed by strategies designed to control point source pollution. (League of 

Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren, supra, 309 F.3d 

at p. 1184 [“Because it arises in such a diffuse way, [nonpoint source pollution] is very 

difficult to regulate through individual permits”].) These challenges are especially acute 

in the context of irrigated agriculture, where “the same activities that are essential to 

producing a crucial, reliable food supply—e.g. pesticide use to control pests, nitrogen to 

5 We note that discharges from irrigated lands are not themselves waste but may contain 

constituents considered to be waste under section 13050, subdivision (d). 
9

fertilize crops, irrigation to water crops—also underlie many of its critical impacts.” 

Regulatory programs aimed at reducing nonpoint source pollution “ ‘typically depend, at 

least in part, upon discharger implementation of management practices (MPs) to control 

nonpoint sources of pollution.’ ” (Monterey Coastkeeper I, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 

349.)

2. State Water Policies 

Basin plans must be consistent with “state policy for water quality control.” (§ 

13240; Monterey Coastkeeper I, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 349.) As indicated above, 

two such policies are relevant here: the Nonpoint Source Policy and the Antidegradation 

Policy. We provide an overview of each policy here, adding greater detail in the analysis

to come. 

a. The Nonpoint Source Policy

The Act requires that the State Water Board “prepare a detailed program for the 

purpose of implementing the state’s nonpoint source management plan.” (§ 13369, subd. 

(a).) The State Water Board adopted the Nonpoint Source Policy in May 2004 in 

response to this directive. (Monterey Coastkeeper II, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 9; Cal.

Code Regs., tit. 23, § 2915.) 

The Nonpoint Source Policy provides guidance for structuring nonpoint source 

pollution control implementation programs to achieve water quality objectives. The 

Nonpoint Source Policy recognizes that the challenges to implementing such programs 

are “significant.” The Nonpoint Source Policy explains: “Current land use management 

practices that have resulted in [nonpoint source] pollution have a long and complicated 

physical, economic and political history. In addition to the need for resources, forging a 

new history of pollution control will take time and commitment, as well as a willingness 

to examine the use of practices that have resulted in current [nonpoint source] pollution 

discharges and the barriers to change. Therefore, it is expected that it will take a 

significant amount of time for the [Regional Boards] to approve or endorse [nonpoint 
10

source] control implementation programs throughout their regions, and even longer for 

those programs to achieve their objectives.” 

The Nonpoint Source Policy encourages Regional Boards to be “as creative and 

efficient as possible in devising approaches to prevent or control [nonpoint source] 

pollution.” The Nonpoint Source Policy emphasizes that Regional Boards “have broad 

flexibility and discretion in using their administrative tools to fashion [nonpoint source] 

management programs,” and approves reliance on third-party programs to “avoid 

unnecessary duplication of effort” and leverage the State and Regional Water Boards’ 

limited staffing and financial resources. 

The Nonpoint Source Policy requires that nonpoint source control implementation 

programs incorporate five key elements. (Monterey Coastkeeper I, supra, 28 

Cal.App.5th at p. 349.) The key elements are as follows: 

“KEY ELEMENT 1: [A nonpoint source] control implementation program’s 

ultimate purpose shall be explicitly stated. Implementation programs must, at a 

minimum, address [nonpoint source] pollution in a manner that achieves and maintains 

water quality objectives and beneficial uses, including any applicable antidegradation 

requirements.”

“KEY ELEMENT 2: [A nonpoint source] control implementation program shall 

include a description of the [management practices] and other program elements that are 

expected to be implemented to ensure attainment of the implementation program’s stated 

purpose(s), the process to be used to select or develop [management practices], and the 

process to be used to ensure and verify proper [management practice] implementation.”

“KEY ELEMENT 3: Where a [Regional Board] determines it is necessary to 

allow time to achieve water quality requirements, the [nonpoint source] control 

implementation program shall include a specific time schedule, and corresponding 

quantifiable milestones designed to measure progress toward reaching the specified 

requirements.”
11

“KEY ELEMENT 4: [A nonpoint source] control implementation program shall 

include sufficient feedback mechanisms so that the [Regional Board], dischargers, and 

the public can determine whether the program is achieving its stated purpose(s), or 

whether additional or different [management practices] or other actions are required.”

“KEY ELEMENT 5: Each [Regional Board] shall make clear, in advance, the 

potential consequences for failure to achieve [a nonpoint source] control implementation 

program’s stated purposes.” (See also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 23, § 2915 [summarizing the 

Nonpoint Source Policy’s key elements].)6

b. The Antidegradation Policy

Federal regulations require that states develop and adopt antidegradation policies 

to ensure that “[e]xisting instream water uses and the level of water quality necessary to 

protect [those] uses [are] maintained and protected.” (40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a).) The State 

Water Board adopted the Antidegradation Policy in response to this directive. (AGUA, 

supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1261.) 

The Antidegradation Policy establishes a state policy to regulate the granting of 

permits and licenses for the disposal of wastes into the waters of the state “so as to 

achieve the ‘highest water quality consistent with maximum benefit to the people of the 

State.’ ” (AGUA, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1262.) The Antidegradation Policy 

applies where an activity will discharge waste into “high quality waters,” defined as “the 

best water quality achieved since the adoption of the antidegradation policy by the [State 

Water Board] in 1968.” (Id. at p. 1259.) It is undisputed the Antidegradation Policy 

applies to the Order. 

6 As we shall discuss, each of the key elements appears in underlined text (as above), 

followed by several paragraphs of non-underlined text. Some of the parties disagree as to 

which text, exactly, constitutes each key element. We will conclude that the underlined 

text constitutes the key element, and the non-underlined text constitutes commentary. 
12

B. The Order

The Central Valley Water Board issued an order establishing general waste 

discharge requirements (General WDRs) for Members in December 2012. (§§ 13263 & 

13267.) The State Water Board received petitions challenging the General WDRs. The 

State Water Board reviewed and revised the General WDRs, incorporating 

recommendations from an agricultural expert panel (Panel) and nitrogen tracking task 

force (Task Force). The State Water Board adopted the Order in February 2018. The 

Order embraces the basic structure and requirements of the General WDRs, but adopts 

new metrics for reporting nitrogen use, requires more specificity in reporting 

management practice implementation, and expands surface and groundwater quality 

monitoring programs. 

The Order establishes receiving water limitations for surface water and ground 

water in the watershed, and includes the following statement of “ultimate purpose”: 

“Wastes discharged from Member operations shall not cause or contribute to an 

exceedance of applicable water quality objectives in surface water [or underlying 

groundwater], unreasonably affect applicable beneficial uses, or cause or contribute to a 

condition of pollution or nuisance.” 

The Order contemplates that compliance with receiving water limitations will be 

achieved in three steps. First, all Members must implement management practices that 

minimize waste discharge in surface water, minimize percolation of waste to 

groundwater, and protect wellheads from surface water intrusion.7 Members must record 

7 The Order defines “management practices,” as they pertain to the protection of water 

quality, as “[a] practice or practice or combination of practices that is the most effective 

and practicable (including technological, economic, and institutional considerations) 

means of controlling nonpoint pollutant sources at levels protective of water quality.” 
13

and report implemented management practices in farm evaluations, irrigation and 

nitrogen management plans, and irrigation and nitrogen summary reports. 

Second, Members are required take additional action where conditions suggest the 

existence of possible water quality problems. Some Members may be required to obtain 

additional training or employ an expert for certification of an irrigation and nitrogen 

management plan. Others may be required to prepare sediment and erosion control plans 

or management practice implementation reports. The Coalition, for its part, may be 

required to prepare surface quality management plans or groundwater quality 

management plans. 

Third, the Central Valley Water Board must verify that implemented management 

practices are effective in addressing water quality problems. To facilitate verification, the

Order requires that the Coalition aggregate and anonymize data from Members’ farm 

evaluations and irrigation and nitrogen summary reports. The Coalition then uses the 

data to prepare tables for submission to the Central Valley Water Board. We will 

describe the process by which the Coalition aggregates and summarizes information from 

farm evaluations and irrigation and nitrogen summary reports in the discussion of farm 

evaluations and irrigation and nitrogen summary reports post. Having considered the 

structure of the Order, we now take a closer look at some of its more salient 

requirements. 

1. Planning and Reporting

As noted, the Order requires that Members prepare plans and reports addressing

implemented management practices and nitrogen use. The most significant of these, for 

our purposes, are farm evaluations, irrigation and nitrogen management plans, and 

irrigation and nitrogen summary reports. Also significant, though less so, are sediment 

and erosion control plans and management practice implementation reports. 
14

a. Farm Evaluations

The Order requires that all Members prepare and submit farm evaluations 

describing implemented management practices and identifying farms by location, type 

and acreage of crops, surface water discharge points, and wells. Farm evaluations are 

prepared on a form approved by the Central Valley Water Board. Members must submit 

completed farm evaluation forms to the Coalition every five years, unless water quality 

conditions suggest that more frequent reporting may be appropriate. The Coalition then 

aggregates and summarizes the information for the Central Valley Water Board. It is 

here that one of the Foundation’s principal points of contention arises. 

The Order directs the Coalition to permanently associate each Member with a

unique, anonymous identifier (an Anonymous Member ID). The Order further directs the 

Coalition to submit management practice implementation data from farm evaluations to 

the Central Valley Water Board for each field (or other reporting area) in tabular form, 

with each field linked to an Anonymous Member ID (Table 1). As we shall see, Table 1 

is one of four tables required by the Order. Samples of Tables 1 through 4 are attached as 

an appendix to this opinion. 

The Order directs the Coalition to submit Table 1 to the Central Valley Water 

Board. The Central Valley Water Board can then analyze the data for trends in 

management practice implementation. The Central Valley Water Board can also request 

individual field-level data from the Coalition. As we shall discuss, the Foundation 

contends the anonymization of farm evaluation data violates key element four of the 

Nonpoint Source Policy. 

b. Irrigation and Nitrogen Management Plans and Irrigation and 

Nitrogen Management Summary Reports
15

The Order acknowledges that nitrate pollution in groundwater is a significant 

public health threat in parts of the Central Valley.

8

 High levels of nitrates in on-farm 

drinking water supply wells impact public health. Nitrates consumed in water at 

concentrations above the maximum contaminant level of 10 milligrams per liter pose 

especially serious risks to pregnant women and infants. 

The Order directs Members to prepare two types of reports regarding nitrogen use: 

irrigation and nitrogen management plans, and irrigation and nitrogen summary reports. 

Irrigation and nitrogen management plans are retained by Members and provided to the 

Central Valley Water Board upon request. Irrigation and nitrogen management summary 

reports are submitted to the Coalition annually. The Coalition then analyzes the 

information and prepares a report for the Central Valley Water Board. 

Irrigation and nitrogen management plans and irrigation and nitrogen management 

summary reports prepared by Members contain “AR data.” AR data refers to nitrogen 

applied (A) and removed (R) from a field. Nitrogen applied includes nitrogen proactively 

added to the field from any source, including fertilizers, manure, and irrigation water. 

Nitrogen removed includes nitrogen present in materials removed from the field or 

sequestered in permanent plantings. 

AR data can be expressed as a ratio (nitrogen applied over nitrogen removed or 

A/R) or a difference (nitrogen applied minus nitrogen removed or A-R). Both metrics are 

8

 According to one authority: “Consumers who drink from regulated public water 

systems are generally protected from the health effects of nitrates because the water is 

treated prior to consumption. However, a significant part of the population in impacted 

areas obtains drinking water directly from wells or relies on systems smaller than the 

threshold for regulation. The problem disproportionately impacts socioeconomically 

disadvantaged populations, including farm workers, and has been a priority issue of 

advocacy for environmental justice organizations in the Central Valley.” (Wadhwani, 

Fertilizers and Nitrates in Drinking Water: State Water Board Tackles the Public Health 

Threat of Contaminated Groundwater (2018) 24 Hastings Envtl. L.J. 237, 238-239, 

footnotes omitted.)
16

new—so new, in fact, that “[t]here is insufficient information currently available to 

calculate the R value for most crops.” The Order directs the Coalition to develop 

coefficients for calculating nitrogen removed by crop and publish them for crops 

covering 99 percent of all acreage in the watershed by March 2023. 

The Order directs Members to record AR data in irrigation and nitrogen 

management plans, and report the data to the Coalition in irrigation and nitrogen 

management plan summary reports.9 The Order directs the Coalition to calculate A/R 

ratio and A-R difference for each Member and each field and report the results to the 

Central Valley Water Board. The Coalition reports Members’ AR data in anonymized 

form, similar to the reporting of information from farm evaluations. 

The Order explains that some Members view AR data—specifically, total nitrogen 

applied (A)—as confidential and proprietary. The Order expresses skepticism on this 

point, noting that “the timing and frequency of nitrogen applications, rather than data 

regarding the total amount, [is] more likely to implicate competitive business practices.” 

The Order also questions whether “the maintenance of confidentiality, in and of itself, is 

a legitimate goal of a regulatory program that must have transparency and accountability 

to the public.” Despite these reservations, the Order acknowledges that “many growers 

have varying levels of business sophistication, limited experience with regulatory 

programs, and a reluctance to disclose data that they have never before disclosed to the 

public.” In recognition of these privacy concerns, the Order concludes the State Water 

Board should “proceed cautiously at this time and not require more information than we 

find is necessary to effectively manage the irrigated lands regulatory program and 

provide the public with the essential assurance that we are doing so.” The Order further

concludes that “the goals of the program can be carried out effectively if field-level data 

9 The term “AR data,” as used in the Order, encompasses both “the multi-year A/R ratio 

and all data required to be reported in support of that ratio, including the A-R difference.” 
17

is linked to anonymous identifiers, with the Third Party [the Coalition] withholding name 

and location data, at least in the early stages of the program.” The Order advises, 

however, that the State Water Board “may require disclosure of name and location data in 

the future if we find that the framework we adopt here is not functioning properly.” 

For the time being, however, the Order requires that the Coalition submit three

AR-oriented data sets to the Central Valley Water Board, all in tabular form.

10

 First, the 

Coalition must submit a data set associating each field with an Anonymous Member ID 

(described above), and displaying the crop grown, the annual A/R ratio, the annual A-R 

difference, and the three-year A/R ratio, as well as some of the underlying data, on a per 

acre basis (Table 2). “This data set facilitates comparison of the reported A/R ratio and 

A-R difference for Members growing the same crop.” 

Second, the Coalition must submit a data set associating each field with an 

anonymous location-identifier (an Anonymous APN ID) and displaying the other 

information required by the first data set (the crop grown, the annual A/R ratio, etc.) 

(Table 3). “The purpose of this data set is to track nitrogen application data and its 

potential impacts with regard to a physical location, where Member data obscures such 

impacts because Members may be changing the fields they operate from year to year.” 

Third, the Coalition must submit a data set aggregating AR data by crop at the 

township level (Table 4). “The purpose of this data set is to provide researchers and 

other interested persons township-level data to facilitate trend analysis and nitrogen 

loading modeling.” 

10 As previously discussed, the Coalition must also submit management practice 

implementation data from farm evaluations for each field (or other reporting area), with 

each field linked to an Anonymous Member ID in Table 1. 
18

Taken together, the Order anticipates that the anonymized and aggregated datasets 

will be “sufficient for the Central Valley Water Board to verify that implemented 

management practices are making progress towards achievement of the water quality 

goals of the program,” while respecting Members’ privacy concerns. The Order notes 

“the Central Valley Water Board may at any time request the names and locations 

corresponding to the anonymous identifiers.” 

c. Sediment and Erosion Control Plans

As previously discussed, the Order imposes additional requirements on some 

Members where conditions suggest the existence of possible water quality problems. 

(See Section II.B, ante.) Among other things, the Order imposes additional requirements 

on Members with the potential to cause erosion and discharge sediment that may degrade 

surface water. Specifically, the Order requires that these Members propose and 

implement sediment discharge and erosion prevention practices to minimize or eliminate 

the discharge of sediment and prepare sediment and erosion control plans. Sediment and 

erosion control plans are kept by Members and provided to the Central Valley Water 

Board upon request. 

2. Monitoring

The Order requires monitoring of surface water and groundwater to verify current 

conditions, observe changes over time, and confirm that Members ultimately achieve 

receiving water limitations. However, the Order recognizes that, “in a landscape-based, 

nonpoint source program such as the irrigated lands regulatory program, monitoring the 

numerous and sometimes indeterminate set of all farm discharge points to surface water 

and groundwater is an impractical, prohibitively costly, and often ineffective method for 

compliance determination.” Accordingly, the Order emphasizes representative and 

regional monitoring, rather than farm-specific monitoring. We describe the Order’s

monitoring requirements below. 
19

a. Surface Water Monitoring

The General WDRs established a framework for monitoring water quality in 

receiving waters, rather than individual fields or farms. That framework divides the 

watershed into six zones, each with two “core” sites and additional “represented” sites.11 

The two core sites are continuously monitored for two years at a time on an alternating 

basis. When monitoring reveals an exceedance at a core site, the Coalition monitors the 

site for an additional year, and evaluates nearby represented sites to determine whether 

water quality problems may be occurring there as well. The Coalition uploads all 

monitoring data to the State Water Board’s data system. 

The Order maintains the monitoring framework established by the General WDRs. 

But the Order also acknowledges differing schools of thought with respect to surface 

water monitoring, with some favoring monitoring of individual fields or farms, and others 

favoring monitoring of receiving waters. The Order explains that the Panel considered

the relative merits of field-specific and receiving water monitoring, and concluded that 

“monitoring of surface water discharges from individual fields or farms is costly and 

complicated, as well as subject to serious challenges in identifying the appropriate timing 

for periodic sampling and coordinating with shifting field crew operations, pesticide 

applications, and sediment runoff events, and with schedules for lab operations.” The 

Panel explained: “For surface water issues, the Panel recommends water quality 

monitoring of receiving water and a clear understanding of the watershed hydrology. 

Sufficient samples should be taken in the watershed streams to detect if problems do 

indeed exist. The sampling should be of sufficient density (spatially and temporally) to 

identify general locations of possible pollution. . . . When/if problems are identified, 

11 Represented sites are sites with characteristics similar to the core sites “such that a 

water quality issue detected at the core site may be an indication of a similar issue at a 

represented site.” 
20

sampling should move upstream to locate the source of the problem.” The Order adopts 

the Panel’s recommendation and likewise concludes: “Receiving water monitoring is a 

reliable and effective methodology for identifying water quality issues without resorting 

to more costly end-of-field measures.” 

Even as the State Water Board preserves the monitoring framework established by 

the General WDRs, the Order raises questions concerning its sufficiency. As relevant 

here, the Order queries whether the required surface monitoring “is ‘of sufficient density 

(spatially and temporally) to identify general locations of possible pollution.’ ” The 

Order further queries whether “the current monitoring and reporting program 

requirements constitute a sufficient feedback system to verify that appropriate 

management practices are being proposed and implemented.”12 The Order concludes 

that these and other questions should be considered as part of an independent peer 

review. 

Accordingly, the Order directs the Central Valley Water Board to implement an 

expert review process to evaluate the monitoring framework and make recommendations 

for improvements if needed. In the meantime, the Central Valley Water Board and 

Coalition “shall continue to implement the existing program.” 

b. Groundwater Monitoring

The General WDRs established three requirements for groundwater quality 

monitoring and management practice assessment and evaluation. First, the General 

WDRs require preparation of a groundwater quality assessment report, which provides a 

baseline for groundwater quality conditions in the watershed. Second, the General 

WDRs require implementation of a management practice evaluation program, in which 

studies are conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of management practices geared to 

12 As we shall discuss, Coastkeeper contends it does not. (See Section III.C.2, post.) 
21

groundwater quality. Third, the General WDRs require groundwater quality trend 

monitoring to determine regional groundwater quality trends. The Order retains these 

requirements with modifications not relevant here. But the Order goes a step further, 

adding new monitoring and reporting requirements for on-farm drinking water supply 

wells. 

The Order explains that nitrates consumed at concentrations above the maximum 

contaminant level of 10 milligrams per liter can pose serious health risks to pregnant 

women and infants. To address these risks, the Order requires that Members conduct 

annual testing of on-farm drinking water supply wells for nitrate concentrations. Results 

of drinking water supply well monitoring are submitted to a database maintained by the 

State Water Board, with the location of the well identified by APN number. If 

monitoring reveals that a maximum contaminant level exceedance for nitrate in a 

drinking water supply well, the Member must provide notice to well users and the Central 

Valley Water Board within 10 days. Members are then expected to work with the Central 

Valley Water Board to provide users with safe drinking water. 

c. Surface Water Quality Management Plans and Groundwater Quality 

Management Plans

The Order imposes additional requirements on Members and the Coalition when 

water quality objectives are exceeded and irrigated agriculture may have caused or 

contributed to the exceedance. The Coalition must prepare a surface water quality 

management plan where a Member exceeds an applicable water quality objective or 

trigger limit two times in three years, and irrigated agriculture caused or contributed to 

the exceedance. The Coalition must prepare a groundwater quality management plan

where there has been a “confirmed exceedance” of an applicable water quality objectives 

or trigger limit in a groundwater well, and irrigated agriculture may have caused or 
22

contributed to the exceedance.13 The executive officer for the Central Valley Water

Board must approve a surface water quality management plan or groundwater quality 

management plan following public review and comment. 

Surface water quality management plans and groundwater quality management 

plans must identify management practices that will be used to control the exceedance and 

provide a specific schedule for implementing such practices. The time for complying 

with a surface water quality management plan or groundwater quality management plan 

“must be as short as practicable, but may not exceed 10 years” from the time of 

submission to the executive officer of the Central Valley Water Board. If exceedances 

continue, the Central Valley Water Board may take further action, including identifying 

individual sources, revoking the waiver of waste discharge requirements for individual 

members, and requiring submission of additional waste discharge reports. 

Members subject to surface water quality management plans or groundwater 

quality management plans must submit management practice implementation reports to 

the Coalition, identifying new or improved management practices implemented to 

address water quality issues. The Coalition anonymizes and reports the data in a 

management plan progress report. The management plan progress report is submitted to 

the Central Valley Water Board annually and includes a list of recommended 

management practices, an evaluation of management practice effectiveness, and an 

evaluation of progress in meeting performance goals and schedules. 

 

13 The Coalition must also prepare groundwater quality management plans for Members 

in high vulnerability groundwater areas, where required by applicable basin plans, and 

where a Regional Board determines that irrigated agriculture has caused or contributed to 

an exceedance. 
23

3. Recordkeeping

Finally, the Order requires that the Coalition maintain records—including 

nonanonymized and unaggregated farm evaluations, irrigation and nitrogen management 

summary reports, and management practice implementation reports—for a period of 10 

years. 

C. Trial Court Proceedings

As noted, the State Water Board adopted the Order in February 2018. Appellants 

filed separate petitions for writ of mandate. The trial court consolidated the cases for trial 

and granted the Coalition’s motion to intervene. Following briefing and argument, the 

trial court denied the petitions and entered judgment in favor of the State Water Board, 

the Central Valley Water Board, and the Coalition. These appeals timely followed. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Our review is governed by section 13330, subdivision (e), which directs us to 

Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. (AGUA, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.) 

That statute, in turn, asks, “whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of 

jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of 

discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the 

manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the 

findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) 

We are tasked here with deciding whether the Order implements state policies for 

water quality control—the Nonpoint Source Policy and Antidegradation Policy—in the 

manner required by law. These are questions of law subject to independent review. 

(AGUA, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1268; Hoitt v. Department of Rehabilitation (2012) 

207 Cal.App.4th 513, 522 [“Issues of law raised in a petition for a writ of administrative 

mandate, including the interpretation of applicable statutes or regulations, are for the 

courts to resolve de novo”].) 
24

We exercise our independent judgment in interpreting administrative regulations, 

such as the Nonpoint Source and Antidegradation Policies. (AGUA, supra, 210 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1267-1268.) We accord an administrative agency’s interpretation of its 

own regulation considerable weight and deference unless the interpretation is 

unauthorized or clearly erroneous. (Lusardi Construction Co. v. California Occupational

Safety & Health Appeals Board (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 639, 645.) We extend such 

deference, however, “only where the administrative agency has an interpretive advantage 

over the court because of the scientific and technical nature of the issues.” (AGUA, 

supra, at p. 1268.) We will not defer to an agency interpretation that “flies in the face of 

the clear language and purpose of the interpreted provision.” (Communities for a Better 

Environment v. State Water Resources Control Board (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1089, 

1104.)

The Order may comply with the Nonpoint Source Policy or Antidegradation 

Policy if the State Water Board made the requisite findings. (AGUA, supra, 210 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1268.) A trial court exercises its independent judgment to determine 

whether the State Water Board’s factual findings are supported by the weight of the 

evidence. (§ 13330, subd. (e); see also AGUA, supra, at p. 1267 [“In cases in which the 

court is authorized to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, ‘abuse of 

discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the 

weight of the evidence’ ”].) “In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must 

afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and 

the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court 

that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda v. 

City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817.) 

We review the trial court’s factual determinations on the administrative record for 

substantial evidence. (Building Industry Assn. of San Diego County v. State Water 

Resources Control Board (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 866, 879; Fukuda v. City of Angels, 
25

supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 824 [“Even when, as here, the trial court is required to review an 

administrative decision under the independent judgment standard of review, the standard 

of review on appeal of the trial court’s determination is the substantial evidence test”]; 

AGUA, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267 [“on appeal from the decision of a trial court 

that exercises its independent judgment on the evidence, review of the factual 

determinations of the trial court is limited to substantial evidence”].) “In reviewing the 

findings, we must determine both whether the weight of the evidence supports the 

findings, and whether the findings support the decision.” (AGUA, supra, at p. 1268.) 

B. The Foundation’s Appeal

The Foundation argues the Order fails to implement the Nonpoint Source Policy in 

the manner required by law. Specifically, the Foundation argues the Order violates key 

element four, which requires that nonpoint source control implementation programs 

include “sufficient feedback mechanism[s]” so the Regional Boards and public can 

determine whether the programs are achieving their stated purposes. According to the 

Foundation, the Order violates key element four by: (1) keeping data secret; (2) failing to 

provide sufficient feedback mechanisms; and (3) failing to require permanent 

recordkeeping. We consider and reject each of these arguments below. 

1. Anonymization of Data

The Foundation’s first argument focuses on the Order’s requirements for farm 

evaluations and nitrogen management plan summary reports. As previously discussed, 

the Order requires that Members report management practice implementation data in 

farm evaluations, and AR data in nitrogen management plan summary reports. The 

Coalition then aggregates and anonymizes the data for submission to the Central Valley 

Regional Board. The Foundation argues the anonymization of data allows Members to 

keep data secret, in violation of key element four. We perceive no violation.

We should clarify what we mean by “key element four.” As we have explained, 

key element four is one of five key elements in the Nonpoint Source Policy. Each key 
26

element appears with one or two sentences of underlined text, followed by several 

paragraphs of non-underlined text. For example: 

“KEY ELEMENT 4: [A nonpoint source] control implementation program shall 

include sufficient feedback mechanisms so that the [Regional Board], dischargers, and 

the public can determine whether the program is achieving its stated purpose(s), or 

whether additional or different [management practices] or other actions are required.

“Verification measures to determine whether [a nonpoint source] control 

implementation program is meeting its stated purpose is a key element of all [nonpoint 

source] control implementation programs. In additional to verification of proper 

[management practice] implementation (Key Element 2), feedback mechanisms are 

needed to clearly indicate whether and when additional or different [management 

practices] or [management practice] implementation measures must be used, or other 

actions taken. Designing the appropriate types and frequency of verification and 

feedback measures (e.g.[,] reporting, inspection, monitoring, etc.) is an integral part of 

implementation program development and success. 

“In all cases the [nonpoint source] control implementation program should 

describe the measures, protocols, and associated frequencies that will be used to verify 

the degree to which the [management practices] are being properly implemented and are 

achieving the program’s objectives, and/or to provide feedback for use in adaptive 

management. These efforts are necessary to determine whether the program is on time 

and on track in achieving its goals.

“Depending on the water quality problem, the cause, the beneficial uses at risk, 

and the purpose for which the monitoring will be used (e.g.[,] adaptive management or 

regulatory purposes) the appropriate type(s) of monitoring should be used. Some 

monitoring approaches include photo monitoring; assessing residual dry matter on 

rangelands; various indicators of healthy instream habitat; riparian and wetland habitat 

structure, density and cover; and bioassessment. Some programs may involve collecting 
27

and reporting ambient water quality monitoring data. Those programs should be 

consistent with the [State Water Resources Control Board] Surface Water Ambient 

Monitoring Program (SWAMP) Data Quality Management Plan (DQM), which provides 

for more than one level of data quality. The DQM approach to data quality recognizes 

that the rigor needed to monitor for regulatory purposes may not be necessary for other 

purposes. Consequently, the SWAMP DQM provides data quality and reporting 

objectives for both regulatory and screening studies. Regardless of which approach is 

used, all monitoring programs should be reproducible, provide a permanent/documented 

record and be available to the public.” 

The Foundation argues all of the above-quoted language, both underlined and nonunderlined, constitutes key element four. The State Water Board, Central Valley Water 

Board, and Coalition respond that only the underlined language constitutes key element 

four, and the succeeding paragraphs are commentary. We agree with the latter view, 

which more closely comports with the usual meaning of the word, “element.” (See, e.g., 

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2003) pp. 402-403 (Merriam-Webster) 

[defining “element,” in part, as “the simplest principles of a subject of study,” and noting 

that the word “often connotes irreducible simplicity”].)14 Accordingly, we will refer to 

the underlined language as “key element four” and the succeeding paragraphs as 

14 We find further support for this view in California Code of Regulations, title 23, 

section 2915, which summarizes the Nonpoint Source Policy and describes key element 

four as follows: “4. Feedback mechanisms must be included in the implementation 

program so that the [Regional Water Quality Control Board], dischargers and the public 

can determine whether the program is achieving its stated purpose(s), or if additional or 

other actions are required.” The regulation aptly summarizes the underlined text in the 

Nonpoint Source Policy and omits the nonunderlined text, suggesting that the State Water 

Board has consistently treated the underlined text as key element four, and the 

nonunderlined text as commentary. 
28

commentary. We will follow the same convention in discussing other key elements 

elsewhere in this opinion. 

We now turn to the Foundation’s contention that the anonymization of data 

violates key element four. The Foundation directs our attention to the last sentence of the 

commentary, which provides, in pertinent part, that “all monitoring programs should be 

reproducible . . . and . . . available to the public.” In the Foundation’s view, this sentence 

prohibits the anonymization of management practice implementation and AR data by the 

Coalition. We need not decide whether the commentary to key element four prohibits the 

anonymization of management practice implementation and AR data, because the 

commentary appears to us to be advisory and nonbinding. Nothing in key element four 

prohibits the anonymization of management practice implementation and AR data; 

accordingly, we can readily reject the Foundation’s argument. 

But even assuming the commentary were part of key element four, we see nothing 

that would prohibit the anonymization of data. While the commentary says monitoring 

programs “should be” reproducible and publicly available, nothing suggests that 

monitoring data should be reproducible and publicly available. Nor does anything 

suggest that monitoring data must be reproducible and publicly available, as the 

Foundation would have us conclude. 

The State Water Board, in implementing the Nonpoint Source Policy, could 

reasonably construe the comments to key element four as a recommendation that the plan 

or system by which the Coalition collects information “should be” reproducible and 

available to the public, while the underlying information need not be. The State Water 

Board could also reasonably conclude that the requirements for reporting management 

practice implementation data from farm evaluations and AR data from nitrogen 

management plan summary reports could and should strike an appropriate balance 

between transparency, on the one hand, and confidentiality on the other. The Order 

reveals that the State Water Board considered the challenges involved in launching a new 
29

regulatory program, including Members’ confidentiality concerns, and exercised 

discretion to “proceed cautiously,” requiring no more information than necessary to 

manage the program. The State Water Board could reasonably determine, in the exercise 

of its discretion, that such an approach was necessary and desirable to build support for 

the program and allay Members’ concerns.15 (See Monterey Coastkeeper II, supra, 76 

Cal.App.5th at p. 19 [“Application of the [Nonpoint Source] Policy necessarily involves 

discretionary acts by the regional and state boards”].)

The Foundation argues the State Water Board had no such discretion. In the 

Foundation’s view, the Nonpoint Source Policy leaves the State Water Board with no 

choice but to make all monitoring data public. The Foundation’s argument is not 

supported by the Nonpoint Source Policy. Even accepting the premise that “monitoring 

programs” are coextensive with “monitoring data,” the commentary says only that such 

programs “should be” reproducible and available to the public, not that they must be. 

(See, e.g., Kucera v. Lizza (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1152 [the words “may” and 

“should” are ordinarily permissive]; Boam v. Trident Financial Corp. (1992) 6 

Cal.App.4th 738, 745, fn. 6 [“should” used in the present or future tense, while more 

forceful than “may,” can convey only a moral obligation or strong recommendation]; 

United States v. Marcucci (9th Cir. 2002) 299 F.3d 1156, 1159 [unlike “shall” or “must,” 

the word “should” leaves discretion to do otherwise].) The commentary thus makes clear 

that the State Water Board has discretion to decide whether and to what extent 

monitoring programs—and data—should be reproducible and available to the public. We 

15 The Order explains: “We heard extensive testimony in these proceedings from third 

parties and growers stressing that the continuation of a third-party framework in irrigated 

lands regulatory programs depends in part on an expectation of privacy and 

confidentiality for growers who prefer to interface with a third party rather than the 

regulatory agency.” 
30

cannot say the State Water Board abused its discretion in deciding that Members’ names 

and locations should be anonymized, if only for the time being. Nor can we say that the 

State Water Board’s interpretation and implementation of the commentary “flies in the 

face of the clear language and purpose” of the Nonpoint Source Policy. (Communities 

for a Better Environment v. State Water Resources Control Board, supra,109 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1104.) Accordingly, we reject the Foundation’s argument.

16

2. Sufficiency of Feedback Mechanisms

The Foundation’s second argument focuses, again, on the anonymization of 

management practice implementation data from farm evaluations and AR data from 

nitrogen management plan summary reports. As before, the Foundation argues the

Order’s reporting rules violate key element four. Where before the Foundation argued 

the anonymization of data constitutes a violation of key element four’s commentary, the 

Foundation now argues the anonymization of data violates the requirement that nonpoint 

source control implementation programs include “sufficient feedback mechanism[s].” 

Again, we disagree.

As previously discussed, key element four requires that nonpoint source control 

implementation programs include “sufficient feedback mechanism[s]” so the Regional 

Board and public “can determine whether the program is achieving its stated purpose(s).” 

The Order describes the required feedback mechanism, in part, as one that allows a 

16 The Foundation raises a related claim, which warrants only brief mention. The trial 

court’s ruling states: “As the Coalition aggregates and summarizes the field-level data 

provided by individual Members, before sending it to the Regional Board, this program is 

reproducible and publicly available.” The Foundation characterizes this part of the trial 

court’s ruling as a “finding” that the monitoring program is reproducible, which fails for 

lack of supporting evidence. Given our conclusion that the Nonpoint Source Policy does 

not require that monitoring data be reproducible and available to the public, we deem it 

unnecessary to consider whether the trial court made any “finding” concerning 

reproducibility, and if so, whether it was supported by the evidence. 
31

nonpoint source control program to “link its implementation requirements, with some 

level of confidence, to expected water quality outcomes, and incorporate monitoring and 

reporting sufficient to verify that link.” The Foundation argues the Order does not 

provide sufficient feedback mechanisms, because aggregated and anonymized data does 

not allow any direct correlation between Members’ management practice implementation 

and their locations, and thus fails to provide the necessary “link.” 

The Foundation is correct in saying the Order offers an imperfect window into 

Members’ management practice implementation and water quality outcomes. That point 

is well illustrated by the previously described tables. To reiterate, the Order requires the 

Coalition to prepare and submit four tables to the Central Valley Water Board. Table 1 

reflects management practice implementation data from farm evaluations, with each field 

linked to an Anonymous Member ID. Table 2 reflects field-level AR data by 

Anonymous Member ID. Table 3 reflects field-level AR data by Anonymous APN ID. 

Table 4 reflects township-level AR data. 

As the Foundation observes, Tables 1 and 2 provide the Central Valley Water 

Board and public with information concerning Members’ management practice 

implementation and AR data, respectively, but no information concerning their identities 

or locations. Tables 3 and 4 provide the Central Valley Water Board and public with 

information concerning Members’ AR data by field and township, respectively, but no 

information concerning their management practice implementation. None of the tables, 

by themselves, allow the Central Valley Water Board or public to correlate any particular 

Member’s management practices with that Member’s location. Without location data, 

the Foundation argues, the Central Valley Water Board and public cannot connect 

management practice implementation requirements to water quality results, and cannot 
32

know whether the program is achieving its stated purposes. The State Water Board found 

otherwise.

17

 

The State Water Board found “anonymous field-level data is sufficient for the 

Central Valley Water Board to verify that implemented management practices are 

making progress toward achievement of the water quality goals of the program.” The 

State Water Board noted the Central Valley Water Board could always request Members’ 

names and locations from the Coalition. The State Water Board also noted the public 

could always request that the Central Valley Water Board obtain targeted data from the 

Coalition. According to the Order, “all data obtained by the Central Valley Water Board 

17 The State Water Board devoted considerable attention to the question whether the 

Order could rely on aggregated and anonymous data and still provide sufficient feedback 

mechanisms. The State Water Board described its thought process as follows: 

“Instituting effective management practices requires sufficient monitoring and reporting 

to determine if existing management practices are leading to compliance with water 

quality requirements and implementation of improved water quality practices where they 

are not. This feedback mechanism—that a nonpoint source discharge control program 

link its implementation requirements, with some level of confidence, to expected water 

quality outcomes, and incorporate monitoring and reporting sufficient to verify that 

link—is a fundamental tenet of the Nonpoint Source Policy, captured in Key Elements 1, 

2, and 4. But the Nonpoint Source Policy does not specify a particular level of 

granularity in monitoring and reporting and therefore leaves significant discretion to the 

water boards to determine the appropriate level of data gathering and reporting for 

different programs and different program components. The water boards must strike a 

balance that, on the one hand, requires sufficient data collection and reporting to allow 

for meaningful feedback on the program, but, on the other hand, avoids extensive data 

requirements that demand excessive and unwarranted time and cost to produce and 

analyze by the growers, the third party, and water board staff. In striking that balance, 

the water boards also take into consideration grower concerns with disclosure of trade 

secrets, private economic and proprietary business information, and general concerns 

regarding privacy.” 
33

will be subject to public disclosure in accordance with the Public Records Act.”

18

Accordingly, the State Water Board concluded the Order’s feedback mechanisms were 

sufficient, at least for present purposes.

19

 

The trial court independently reviewed the administrative record and determined 

the State Water Board’s finding was supported by the weight of the evidence. (§ 13330, 

subd. (e); see also AGUA, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267.) The trial court relied, in

part, on evidence in the administrative record from Dr. Thomas Harter, professor and 

chair of water management policy at the University of California, Davis. Dr. Harter 

testified before the State Water Board as part of the petition review process on May 17, 

2016. He emphasized that nonpoint source pollution arises from dispersed activities over 

large areas, which cannot be traced to any single source. Discharges from nonpoint 

sources may be transported to groundwater laterally across the landscape, from places of 

higher water table to places of lower water table. Those waters may mix with other 

waters from different places and periods of time, making it “very difficult” to say which 

growers may have been responsible for which discharges. As a result, Dr. Harter said, “if 

I’m asked to tell you where water comes from in any particular well, I couldn’t point to 

an area that’s much smaller than a township.” Given these uncertainties, Dr. Harter 

opined that aggregated data at the township level would be “completely sufficient” for 

assessing water quality outcomes and analyzing long-term trends.20 

18 We express no opinion as to the availability of such materials under the Public Records 

Act.

19 The Order notes that the State Water Board may require that an APN-based location 

identifier be added to a separate table in the future, if it later determines that management 

practices should be tied to a fixed location. 

20 Dr. Harter summarized his testimony in a comment letter to the State Water Board, in 

which he reiterated that “aggregated information, for each crop in each township, on total 

A, total R, and mean A/R and their respective areas, provides sufficient information to 
34

The trial court also relied on a report by the Panel entitled, “Conclusions of the 

Agricultural Expert Panel: Recommendations to the State Water Resources Control 

Board pertaining to the Irrigated Lands Regulatory Program” (the Report). The Report 

observes that regulatory data collection efforts have traditionally placed a premium on 

“understanding how nitrate moves into first-encountered groundwater, how the 

groundwater moves, and how nitrate levels in the groundwater might be related to surface 

water.” The Report explains: “Collecting data on changing nitrate levels in the 

groundwater, to indicate success or failure of overlying surface [nitrogen] management 

practices on individual fields and farms directly above a data collection point, is typically 

problematic at best.” This is so, the Report says, because total nitrogen loads depend 

upon the concentration and flow of deep percolation, which are extremely difficult to 

estimate with any degree of accuracy. In light of these uncertainties, the Report 

recommends that data be evaluated on a multi-year basis, rather than annually. The 

Report explains: “It is emphasized that the collected data should be used to examine 

regional, multiple-year conditions and trends of nitrogen applications. Analysis of these 

data on too-short time frames (e.g., year-to-year) will introduce random error and 

potentially misleading results because many confounding variables, such as residual soil 

nitrogen and nitrogen removal rates, vary by year and by crop rotation. These differences 

tend to even out over multiple years. It is also emphasized that the data should not be 

used for regulatory enforcement because the possibility of regulatory consequences will 

compromise the accuracy of the data.” 

The trial court weighed Dr. Harter’s expert opinion and the Report against the 

Foundation’s evidence, which consisted of a single comment letter to the State Water 

guide regulators with information needed to implement the program and assess and 

evaluate the potential nitrate discharges to groundwater and trends in such discharges.” 
35

Board.

21

 The trial court found the comment letter failed to establish a violation of key 

element four, a conclusion the Foundation does not challenge. Instead, the trial court 

found the weight of the evidence supported findings that “aggregated data is sufficient” 

and “individual data points are not necessary and may be misleading.” 

The Foundation argues Dr. Harter’s expert opinion and the Report are not 

substantial evidence supporting the finding that aggregated and anonymous feedback 

mechanisms are sufficient. The Foundation offers two reasons why the evidence was 

supposedly not substantial. First, the Foundation observes Dr. Harter’s expert opinion

and the Report predate the State Water Board’s adoption of the Order in February 2018, 

and thus cannot be seen as commenting on the feedback mechanisms in the final version. 

Second, the Foundation argues the Order’s data collection and reporting requirements are 

“more granular” than the feedback mechanisms suggested by Dr. Harter’s expert opinion 

and the Report, and thus reveal that the State Water Board disagreed with these views. 

The Foundation’s arguments are unavailing.

The usual meaning of “substantial evidence” is “evidence that is ‘of ponderable 

legal significance,’ ‘reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value,’ and ‘ “substantial” 

proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case.’ ” (Conservatorship of 

O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1006.) In determining whether evidence is substantial, the test 

is whether it is “ ‘ “reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of 

the whole record.” ’ ” (In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992; see also Code 

Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c) [in administrative mandamus action, court reviews whole 

record to determine whether findings are supported by substantial evidence].) That Dr. 

21 The trial court directed the Foundation to identify expert testimony supporting the 

contention that aggregated and anonymous feedback mechanisms are insufficient. The 

Foundation identified the comment letter for the first time at the hearing on the merits. 

The Foundation does not discuss the comment letter in the opening brief, and so we do 

not consider it either. 
36

Harter’s testimony and the report predate the Order does not make them any less 

substantial. The Foundation does not argue that intervening changes in scientific 

understanding rendered Dr. Harter’s expert opinion or the Report obsolete or unreliable. 

Nor does the Foundation suggest any other reason Dr. Harter’s expert opinion and the 

Report are not “ ‘of ponderable legal significance,’ ‘reasonable in nature, credible, and of 

solid value.’ ” (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, at p. 1006.) 

The State Water Board could reasonably exercise discretion to require “more 

granular” feedback without rejecting Dr. Harter’s opinion that aggregated feedback at the 

township-level would be sufficient. Likewise, the State Water Board could reasonably 

exercise discretion to require that Members collect and report field-level data to the 

Coalition, without undermining the views expressed in the Report. That the Report 

characterizes individualized data points as problematic does not mean they are not worth 

collecting or reporting to the Coalition. But it could mean they are ill-suited for use as a 

feedback mechanism. Regardless, even assuming some minor inconsistency between the 

Order and Dr. Harter’s opinion or the Report, both are substantial proof that aggregated 

and anonymous feedback mechanisms are sufficient. That the State Water Board elected 

to require “more granular” feedback mechanisms does not render the evidence 

insubstantial. The Foundation’s challenges to the sufficiency of the supporting evidence 

lack merit.22 

The Foundation also argues the findings fail to support the State Water Board’s 

decision. This is so, the Foundation says, because only individualized data points can 

provide sufficient feedback mechanisms, and anything short of that must necessarily be 

22 The State Water Board’s interpretation and application of the Nonpoint Source Policy 

is an area where it has “ ‘ “expertise and technical knowledge,” ’ ” and “ ‘ “the legal text 

to be interpreted is technical, obscure, complex, open-ended, [and] entwined with issues 

of fact, policy, and discretion.” ’ ” (North Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Resources 

Control Board (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1577, 1589.)
37

insufficient. The Foundation finds support for this argument in the Order’s statement of 

ultimate purpose, which the Foundation characterizes as “individual compliance” with 

receiving water limitations. Building on this premise, the Foundation reasons that 

compliance must be individual and site specific; therefore, feedback mechanisms must 

also be individual and site specific. We disagree for two reasons. 

First, the Foundation misstates the Order’s ultimate purpose. The Order does not 

express an ultimate purpose of “individual compliance.” Rather, the Order says its 

ultimate purpose is establishing receiving water limitations so “[w]astes discharged from 

Member operations shall not cause or contribute to an exceedance of applicable water 

quality objectives.” The Order holds Members individually responsible for complying 

with receiving water limitations, but also recognizes the current state of science does not 

allow regulators to say with certainty that any particular Member has or has not caused or 

contributed to any particular exceedance. Accordingly, the Order aims to improve water 

quality outcomes for “Member operations” through implementation of management 

practices, monitoring, and reporting, rather than “individual compliance.” That purpose 

is narrower than the one the Foundation describes. 

Second, and related, the findings support the State Water Board’s decision that the 

Order contains sufficient feedback mechanisms to allow the Central Valley Water Board 

and public to determine whether the program is achieving its ultimate purpose. As 

previously discussed, Table 1 discloses implemented management practices at the fieldlevel by Anonymous Member ID. Table 2 discloses field-level AR data by Anonymous 

Member ID. Neither Table 1 nor Table 2 disclose the location of the field. Nevertheless, 

the Central Valley Water Board and public can correlate implemented management 

practices to wastes discharged from Member operations by Anonymous Member ID. 

Because Anonymous Member IDs are permanently assigned, the Central Valley Water 
38

Board and public can also observe Members’ progress towards achieving water quality 

objectives over time.23 

Table 3 discloses field-level AR data by Anonymous APN. Table 4 discloses AR 

data at the township level. Together, Tables 3 and 4 allow the Central Valley Water 

Board and public to correlate wastes discharged from Member operations to water quality 

objectives by location, albeit not with the specificity the Foundation would like. This is 

where the real issue lies.

The Foundation would like feedback mechanisms linking Members to 

management practice implementation data and AR data by field. Only then, the 

Foundation suggests, would the Central Valley Water Board and public have sufficient 

feedback mechanisms to know whether the program is achieving its ultimate purpose, 

that “[w]astes discharged from Member operations shall not cause or contribute to an 

exceedance of applicable water quality objectives.” But even complete datasets with 

non-anonymized, individual data points would not allow the Central Valley Water Board 

or public to conclusively establish whether any particular Member has caused or 

contributed to any particular exceedance, because that cannot currently be determined. 

The best that current science can do, so far as the administrative record reveals, is to 

connect nitrate discharges to groundwater at the township-level. The Order does this and 

more. The Order’s feedback mechanisms are thus sufficient for determining whether the 

program is achieving this purpose. 

23 The Central Valley Water Board and public can also monitor the progress of Members 

with exceedances, who are subject to surface water quality management plans or 

groundwater quality management plans, through management practice implementation 

reports. Those reports identify new or improved management practices implemented to 

address the exceedance by Anonymous Member ID and Anonymous APN ID. 
39

The Foundation also argues the findings do not support the State Water Board’s 

decision because the Order grants the Central Valley Water Board greater access to 

information than the public. According to the Foundation, key element four requires that 

the Central Valley Water Board and the public have equal access to such information. 

We are not persuaded.

Key element four requires that the Order provide “sufficient feedback 

mechanisms,” not perfect transparency. Nothing in key element four says the public 

must have access to the same data set as the Central Valley Water Board. The 

Foundation makes much of the fact that the State Water Board found it “essential to 

continue to allow the Central Valley Water Board to require submittal of specific names 

or locations, or names or locations generally, should the Central Valley Water Board 

make a determination that it is necessary.” If the ability to access the complete data set is 

“essential” for the Central Valley Water Board, the Foundation urges, then the same must 

be true for the public. But the Central Valley Water Board and the public are not 

similarly situated with respect to water quality regulation. Moreover, and more 

importantly, the Nonpoint Source Policy does not require that the public have the same

feedback mechanisms as the Central Valley Water Board, only that both have “sufficient” 

ones. As we have shown, the trial court’s finding that the Order provides sufficient 

feedback mechanisms is supported by substantial evidence, including evidence that 

individualized data points are “typically problematic.” We cannot say that the Order’s 

feedback mechanisms are insufficient as a matter of law merely because they do not 

provide the public with the same regulatory tools as the Central Valley Water Board. The 

Foundation’s second argument is rejected.

3. Permanent Recordkeeping

Finally, the Foundation argues the Order violates key element four by failing to 

require permanent recordkeeping. The commentary to key element four provides, in 

pertinent part, that, “all monitoring programs should . . . provide a 
40

permanent/documented record.” The Foundation argues the Order violates the 

commentary by only requiring that Members and the Coalition maintain records 

reflecting field-level management practice implementation data and AR data for 10 years. 

As before, we perceive no violation.

Here, again, the commentary says only that monitoring programs “should . . . 

provide a permanent/documented record,” not that they must. (See, e.g., Kucera v. Lizza, 

supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 1152; Boam v. Trident Financial Corp., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 745, fn. 6; United States v. Marcucci, supra, 299 F.3d at p. 1159.) The commentary 

does not mandate that the Order provide a permanent or documented record of the 

monitoring program, but instead leaves the matter to the State Water Board’s discretion. 

The State Water Board could reasonably exercise that discretion to require that Members 

and the Coalition maintain records of field-level management practice implementation 

data and AR data for 10 years, rather than permanently, given the evidence that 

aggregated and anonymized data provides a sufficient feedback mechanism, and 

individualized data points are not helpful. We cannot say that the Order’s recordkeeping 

requirements fly in the face of the Nonpoint Source Policy. Accordingly, we reject the 

Foundation’s third and final argument.

C. Coastkeeper’s Appeal 

Coastkeeper’s appeal also focuses on the Nonpoint Source Policy. Coastkeeper 

argued in the trial court that the Order violates every element of the Nonpoint Source 

Policy, as well as the Antidegradation Policy. Coastkeeper now argues that the Order 

violates key elements two and four of the Nonpoint Source Policy. We reject these 

contentions for the reasons discussed below. 

1. Key Element Two

Coastkeeper argues the Order violates key element two of the Nonpoint Source 

Policy. Key element two requires that nonpoint source control implementation programs 

“include a description of the [management practices] and other program elements that are 
41

expected to be implemented to ensure attainment of the implementation program’s stated 

purpose(s).” (Emphasis omitted.) 

The commentary to key element two provides: 

“A [Regional Board] must be able to determine that there is a high likelihood that 

the program will attain water quality requirements. This will include consideration of the 

[management practices] to be used and the process for ensuring their proper 

implementation. It also will include other factors such as the level of discharger 

participation and the effectiveness of the [management practices] implemented.

“[Management practices] must be tailored to a specific site and circumstances, and 

justification for the use of a particular category or type of [management practice] must 

show that the [management practice] has been successfully used in comparable 

circumstances. If [a management practice] has not previously been used, documentation 

to substantiate its efficacy must be provided by the discharger. A [Regional Board] must 

be convinced there is a high likelihood the [management practice] will be successful. A 

schedule assuring [management practice] implementation and assessment, as well as 

adaptive management provisions must be provided. We recognize that in the earlier 

stages of some pollution control programs, water quality changes may not be 

immediately apparent, even with the implementation of pollution control actions. 

Although [management practice] implementation never may be a substitute for meeting 

water quality requirements, [management practice] implementation assessment may, in 

some cases, be used to measure nonpoint source control progress.” 

Coastkeeper argues the Order violates key element two in two ways. First, 

Coastkeeper argues the Order fails to include a description of the management practices 

expected to be implemented to ensure attainment of the program’s stated purposes. 

According to Coastkeeper, the Order gives the appearance of describing specific 

management practices, but actually offers “only reporting requirements, general 

instructions, and plans to make plans.” None of these things are management practices, 
42

Coastkeeper says. Second, Coastkeeper argues that no evidence supports the finding that 

the activities required by the Order (whether or not they are management practices) are 

highly likely to attain water quality requirements. We reject both contentions. 

Coastkeeper argues the Order violates key element two by failing to describe 

specific management practices. But key element two applies to nonpoint source control 

implementation programs, not orders. As the State and Central Valley Water Boards

observe, the Nonpoint Source Policy defines a nonpoint source control implementation 

program as “a program developed to comply with [State Water Board or Regional Water 

Board waste discharge requirements], waivers of [waste discharge requirements], or basin 

plan prohibitions.” Thus, the State and Central Valley Water Boards assert, the program 

logically includes both the Order and the contents of the plans that Members and the 

Coalition must prepare and implement to comply with the Order. This point is welltaken. We therefore consider whether the program as a whole satisfies key element two. 

We conclude it does. 

a. Description of Management Practices

As previously discussed, the Order requires that Members “implement 

management practices that minimize waste discharge offsite in surface water, minimize 

percolation waste to groundwater, and protect wellheads from surface water intrusion.” 

Coastkeeper argues these are “[v]ague instructions to further general goals,” (italics 

omitted) and we do not disagree. But the Order does not stop there. The Order also 

requires that all Members prepare planning documents, beginning with farm evaluations, 

irrigation and nitrogen management plans, and sediment and erosion control plans. 

Farm evaluations are prepared with templates approved by the Central Valley 

Water Board. The templates call for Members to check boxes identifying implemented 

management practices, including pesticide application practices, primary and secondary 

irrigation practices, irrigation efficiency practices, nitrogen management practices, and 
43

sediment and erosion control practices. The templates also require that Members certify 

the accuracy of their responses under penalty of perjury. 

Irrigation and nitrogen management plans, irrigation and nitrogen summary 

reports, and sediment and erosion control plans can also be prepared with templates, if 

the Coalition so chooses.24 Irrigation and nitrogen management plans and irrigation and 

nitrogen summary reports must describe irrigation management practices and nitrogen 

management practices to minimize leaching past the root zone. Sediment and erosion 

control plans must describe management practices implemented to minimize or eliminate 

the discharge of sediment above background levels. All such plans and reports must be 

certified under penalty of perjury by a specialist, or self-certified by a Member who has 

completed an approved training program. Coastkeeper argues farm evaluations, 

irrigation and nitrogen management plans, and sediment and erosion control plans are

well and good, but they are not management practices, and do not require management 

practices. We will address this argument momentarily. 

Coastkeeper raises similar objections to surface water quality management plans 

and groundwater quality management plans. As a reminder, the Order requires that the 

Coalition prepare surface water quality management plans and groundwater quality 

management plans when water quality objectives are exceeded and irrigated agriculture 

may have caused or contributed to the exceedance. Surface water quality management 

plans and groundwater quality management plans must identify management practices 

that will be used to control exceedances and provide specific schedules for implementing 

such practices. These requirements may sound substantive, Coastkeeper says, but they 

are mere “plans to make a plan.” According to Coastkeeper, they do not require 

Members to implement any particular management practices and leave the selection of 

24 The parties do not tell us whether the Coalition has elected to use templates for 

irrigation and nitrogen management plans and irrigation and nitrogen summary reports.
44

management practices to the Coalition’s discretion. As such, Coastkeeper contends, 

surface water quality management plans and groundwater quality management plans 

cannot be considered management practices either. We disagree. 

When the program is viewed as encompassing both the Order and planning and 

reporting activities required by the Order, it becomes clear that the program as a whole 

includes an adequate “description of the [management practices] and other program 

elements that are expected to be implemented to ensure attainment of the implementation 

program’s stated purpose(s).” (Emphasis omitted.) As previously discussed, the Order 

requires that Members implement management practices and prepare certified records 

specifying which management practices have already been implemented and which are 

expected to be implemented. Together, the Order and planning and reporting activities 

required by the Order describe the management practices and other program elements 

that are expected to be implemented, thereby satisfying key element two.

Coastkeeper directs our attention to the commentary to key element two, which 

require that management practices “be tailored to a specific site and circumstances.” 

However, all of the above-described plans and reports—farm evaluations, irrigation and 

nitrogen management plans, irrigation and nitrogen summary reports, sediment and 

erosion control reports, surface water quality management plans, and groundwater quality 

management plans—require that Members consider management practices at field level. 

That being so, we conclude that management practices are ”tailored to a specific site and 

circumstances,” as required by the commentary to key element two. 

Coastkeeper also directs our attention to section 13360, which provides, in 

pertinent part: “No waste discharge requirement or other order of a regional board or the 

state board or decree of a court issued under this division shall specify the design, 

location, type of construction, or particular manner in which compliance may be had with 

that requirement, order, or decree, and the person so ordered shall be permitted to comply 

with the order in any lawful manner.” (§ 13360, subd. (a).) Another panel of this court 
45

has explained: “Section 13360 is a shield against unwarranted interference with the 

ingenuity of the party subject to a waste discharge requirement; it is not a sword 

precluding regulation of discharges of pollutants. It preserves the freedom of persons 

who are subject to a discharge standard to elect between available strategies to comply 

with that standard.” (Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. State Water Resources 

Control Board (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1421, 1438; see also Monterey Coastkeeper I, 

supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 351 [“Neither a waste discharge requirement nor a waiver 

thereof is permitted to specify a particular manner of compliance with the discharge 

standard”].) Coastkeeper argues the trial court failed to appreciate that nonpoint source 

control implementation programs can comply with section 13360 and key element two by 

“describing specific, tailored management practices and giving growers flexibility to 

choose among them.” But that is exactly what the templates do: They describe specific, 

tailored management practices and give Members the flexibility to choose among them. 

Coastkeeper fails to show that the trial court misapplied section 13360.

Exercising our independent judgment, we conclude the program satisfies key 

element two by including an adequate description of the management practices and other 

program elements that are expected to be implemented to ensure attainment of the 

program’s stated purpose. We therefore reject Coastkeeper’s argument.

25

25 Coastkeeper directs our attention to an apparent inconsistency in the trial court’s 

ruling. The trial court ruled, on the one hand, that the Order “does not specify particular 

management practices” and, on the other hand, that the Order “requires Members to 

immediately follow a host of management practices,” including planning and reporting 

activities. We do not view these statements as necessarily inconsistent. The Order 

requires Members to immediately implement management practices but does not specify 

which ones. Management practices are instead specified by the templates required to be 

completed by Members. We need not resolve the purported inconsistency, as our review 

focuses on the correctness of the trial court’s ruling, not its reasoning. (Oiye v. Fox 

(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1049.) 
46

b. Sufficiency of Evidence to Support a “High Likelihood” Finding

Coastkeeper argues the program violates key element two in another way. The 

commentary to key element two provides, in part, that a Regional Board “must be able to 

determine that there is a high likelihood that the program will attain water quality 

requirements.” The trial court found the Order provides “a clear link between 

management practices and outcomes.” Coastkeeper argues the trial court’s finding is not 

supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.

The trial court found evidentiary support for a “high likelihood” finding in the 

Order’s three-part structure. As previously discussed, the Order contemplates that: (1) all 

Members will immediately implement management practices and report those practices 

to the Coalition through farm evaluations, irrigation and nitrogen management summary 

reports, and management practice implementation reports; (2) some Members will 

implement additional management practices as part of a surface water quality 

management plan or groundwater quality management plan, or receive additional training 

as AR outliers; and (3) the Coalition will submit field-level data to the Central Valley 

Water Board, allowing the Central Valley Water Board to verify that Members are 

implementing management practices leading to improved multi-year A/R ratios or 

improved water quality results. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding

that the program is highly likely to attain water quality requirements. 

Irrigation and nitrogen management plans and irrigation and nitrogen management 

summary reports provide an apt illustration. The Order explains that irrigation and 

nitrogen management plans and irrigation and nitrogen summary reports are expected to 

improve water quality outcomes in two ways. First, irrigation and nitrogen management 

plans require that Members project the total nitrogen a given crop will require for a single 

cropping cycle. This is done by considering the amount of nitrogen already available in 

soil and irrigation water, which allows the Member to plan for the appropriate amount of 

fertilizer to be applied to meet crop requirements. Such planning helps Members avoid 
47

over-application of nitrogen fertilizer that may lead to excess loss of nitrogen to 

groundwater or surface water. Second, the data contained in irrigation and nitrogen 

management summary reports enables the Coalition and Central Valley Water Board to 

consider the range of nitrogen application values reported for similar crops, and allows 

the Coalition to identify outliers for follow-up actions with the goal of reducing overapplication. Thus, the Order anticipates that irrigation and nitrogen management plans 

will help Members avoid over-application of nitrogen, and irrigation and nitrogen 

management summary reports will help the Coalition and Central Valley Water Board 

identify outliers for follow-up. The State Water Board could reasonably expect these 

management practices would lead to improved water quality outcomes. Substantial 

evidence thus supports the existence of a link between management practices and water 

quality outcomes, which in turn supports a finding that the program is highly likely to 

attain water quality requirements. 

Coastkeeper challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing no link can be 

inferred because the Order depends entirely on things the Coalition and Members may or 

may not do in the future (such as develop meaningful surface water quality management 

plans and groundwater quality management plans) rather than things they must do now. 

Coastkeeper directs our attention, again, to surface water quality management plans and 

groundwater quality management plans, which are required when water quality 

objectives are exceeded and irrigated agriculture may have caused or contributed to the 

exceedance. Coastkeeper argues the Order gives “unfettered discretion” to the Coalition 

to develop surface water quality management plans and groundwater quality management 

plans, and leaves the task of identifying management practices that will address the 

exceedance to the indefinite future. Coastkeeper suggests the Coalition cannot be relied 

upon to develop meaningful plans for Members, and Members cannot be trusted to 

regulate themselves. These arguments fail for several reasons. 
48

First, surface water quality management plans and groundwater quality 

management plans are not as toothless as Coastkeeper suggests. True, they are developed 

by the Coalition, and the Coalition may not know in advance which management 

practices should be implemented to address which exceedances. But the Nonpoint 

Source Policy recognizes that management practice implementation must be iterative and 

adaptive, and the Order requires that surface water quality management plans and 

groundwater quality management plans identify management practices that will be used 

to control the exceedance and provide a specific schedule for implementing them. The 

Order further requires that surface water quality management plans and groundwater 

quality management plans be submitted to the Central Valley Water Board and approved 

by the executive officer following public review and comment. And the Order requires 

that Members comply with management plans once approved by the executive officer, 

and submit management practice implementation reports to the Coalition verifying that 

they have done so. The Coalition, for its part, must evaluate the Member’s 

implementation of management practices and assess their effectiveness in annual 

management plan progress reports to the Central Valley Water Board. Thus, surface 

water quality management plans and groundwater quality management plans are more 

than mere “plans to make a plan.” 

Second, Coastkeeper’s challenge to surface water quality management plans and 

groundwater quality management plans does not establish any insufficiency of the 

evidence. Ultimately, Coastkeeper argues the program cannot be considered highly 

likely to attain to water quality requirements because the Coalition cannot be counted on 

to develop meaningful surface water quality management plans and ground water quality 

management plans. However, the Nonpoint Source Policy encourages the State Water 

Board and Regional Boards to build upon third-party programs. That Coastkeeper may 

harbor doubts about the Coalition’s ability to regulate Members does not mean the trial 
49

court’s ruling lacks substantial evidence. Coastkeeper fails to establish any violation of 

key element two.

2. Key Element Four

Coastkeeper’s next set of arguments focus on the Order’s surface water 

monitoring program and key element four.26 As previously discussed, the General 

WDRs divide the watershed into six zones, each with two core sites and additional 

represented sites. (See Section II.B.2.a, ante.) The two core sites are continuously 

monitored, with each site monitored for two years at a time on an alternating basis. 

When monitoring reveals an exceedance, the Coalition monitors the core site for an 

additional year and evaluates nearby represented sites to determine whether water quality 

problems may be occurring there as well. The Order maintains this framework but 

questions whether “the current monitoring and reporting program requirements constitute 

a sufficient feedback system to verify that appropriate management practices are being 

proposed and implemented.” The Order concludes such questions should be considered 

as part of an independent peer review, and directs the Central Valley Water Board to 

implement an expert review process to evaluate the monitoring framework and make 

recommendations for improvements. 

Coastkeeper argues the surface water monitoring program violates key element 

four in several ways. First, Coastkeeper argues the surface water monitoring program 

violates key element four by relying on an approach rejected in a declaratory judgment 

and order in California Sportfishing Protection Alliance, et al. v. California Regional 

Water Quality Control Board, et al., Sacramento Superior Court case No. 34-2012-

26 Key element four provides that “[a nonpoint source] control implementation program 

shall include sufficient feedback mechanisms so that the [Regional Board], dischargers, 

and the public can determine whether the program is achieving its stated purpose(s), or 

whether additional or different [management practices] or other actions are required.” 

(Emphasis omitted.) 
50

80001186 (CSPA). Although Coastkeeper spends considerable time on CSPA, the trial 

court here did not rely on that case, and it is neither citable nor binding on us. 

Accordingly, we decline to consider Coastkeeper’s arguments based on CSPA. 

Second, Coastkeeper argues the surface water monitoring program violates key 

element four by relying on aggregated and anonymized data from farm evaluations and 

irrigation and nitrogen management summary reports. According to Coastkeeper, 

aggregated and anonymized data obscures the link between implemented management 

practices and expected water quality outcomes, and thus fails to provide sufficient 

feedback mechanisms. Although Coastkeeper focuses on the Order’s surface water 

monitoring program, rather than monitoring programs generally, Coastkeeper’s 

arguments are fundamentally the same as the Foundation’s and we reject them for the 

same reasons. 

Third, Coastkeeper argues the surface water monitoring program does not generate 

enough data to allow the Central Valley Water Board and public to determine whether the 

program is working. This is so, Coastkeeper says, because the program divides the 

watershed into overly large zones, the Coalition only monitors core sites for two years at 

a time on an alternating basis, and the Coalition only monitors representative sites for the

particular contaminant found to have caused an exceedance at the core site, rather than all

contaminants of concern. Given these deficiencies and the State Water Board’s 

unanswered questions, Coastkeeper argues the State Water Board “could not have found 

a ‘high likelihood’ that the [Order] would meet water-quality objectives, as the Nonpoint 

Source Policy requires.” But Coastkeeper here paraphrases the commentary to key 

element two, not key element four.27 Key element four does not require a “high 

27 As previously discussed, the commentary to key element two provides, in part, that a 

Regional Board “must be able to determine that there is a high likelihood that the 

program will attain water quality requirements.” (See Section III.C.1, ante.)
51

likelihood” finding, and Coastkeeper does not argue the surface water monitoring 

program violates key element two. Coastkeeper’s argument thus fails. 

Fourth, and finally, Coastkeeper takes aim at the trial court’s determination that 

the weight of the evidence supports a finding that “properly scaled representative 

monitoring [is] appropriate.” Coastkeeper argues no evidence supports any such finding, 

and suggests the State Water Board effectively conceded as much by directing the 

Central Valley Water Board to implement an expert review process.28 We are not 

persuaded. 

As previously discussed, the Order explains that the Panel considered appropriate 

frameworks for surface water quality monitoring and expressed the view, shared by the 

State Water Board, that receiving water monitoring is preferable to field-specific 

monitoring for reasons of cost and efficiency. Accordingly, the State Water Board found: 

“Receiving water monitoring is a reliable and effective methodology for identifying 

water quality issues without resorting to more costly end-of-field measurements.” The 

General WDRs call for receiving water monitoring, and substantial evidence supports the 

trial court’s implied finding that receiving water monitoring is appropriate. 

28 Coastkeeper advances additional arguments that require only brief consideration. 

First, Coastkeeper argues the trial court confused the Order’s requirements for 

groundwater monitoring with its requirements for surface water monitoring. Even 

assuming that Coastkeeper is correct, the error would not deprive the trial court’s finding 

of substantial evidence, for the reasons stated in the text. 

Second, Coastkeeper argues the trial court failed to give due consideration to an opinion 

by Dr. Revital Katznelson. As the trial court explained, however, Coastkeeper did not 

offer Dr. Katznelson’s opinion until its reply brief. As such, the trial court was not 

required to consider it at all.

Third, Coastkeeper argues the trial court incorrectly viewed the Order as a waiver of 

waste discharge requirements, rather than waste discharge requirements. However, the 

trial court corrected the error, and we review the corrected ruling. The error, in any case, 

does not change our review or conclusions.
52

The General WDRs also call for “representative” monitoring. We understand the 

term “representative monitoring” to refer to monitoring that takes place at representative 

sites, rather than farm-specific sites. The State Water Board, in finding that receiving 

water monitoring is reliable and effective, implicitly recognized that some form of 

representative monitoring was also appropriate. (See Monterey Coastkeeper I, supra, 28 

Cal.App.5th at p. 366 [“both . . . section 13269 and the [Nonpoint Source Policy] 

expressly allow the use of group or watershed monitoring”].) 

The Panel recommended that “sampling” of receiving waters “should be of 

sufficient density (spatially and temporally) to identify general locations of possible 

pollution.” “For example,” the Panel continued, “a single measurement point at the 

downstream discharge of a very large watershed would be insufficient.” But the Panel 

did not say what density of sampling would be sufficient. This was chief among the 

questions the State Water Board referred to the new expert panel. 

The State Water Board found the surface water monitoring program established by 

the General WDRs reflects “a studied decision by the Central Valley Water Board to 

balance the [Coalition’s] monitoring costs with the need to increase funds for 

management practice implementation.” (See § 13267, subd. (b) [“The burden, including 

costs, of [monitoring program reports] shall bear a reasonable relationship to the need for 

the report and the benefits to be obtained from the reports”].) The State Water Board 

further found the Central Valley Water Board’s representative monitoring approach 

“appears to have some merit” and “may be reasonable.” 

The State Water Board clearly believed the representative monitoring approach set 

forth in the General WDRs was appropriate (or sufficient) until the question of density 

(or scale) could be considered by the new expert panel. Thus, the State Water Board 

found that representative monitoring was appropriate, and monitoring should be 

“properly scaled” (in the trial court’s parlance) or “of sufficient density” (in the Panel’s). 

Substantial evidence thus supports the trial court’s finding that the State Water Board 
53

“concluded that properly scaled representative monitoring was appropriate.” That the 

State Water Board referred the question of what constitutes “sufficient density” to 

another expert panel does not mean the surface water monitoring program was not 

appropriate (or sufficient) based on information available to the State Water Board at the 

time, and does not render the trial court’s finding unsupported by the evidence. We reject 

Coastkeeper’s argument.

D. Protectores’ Appeal

Unlike the Foundation and Coastkeeper, Protectores argues the Order violates the 

Antidegradation Policy, rather than the Nonpoint Source Policy. Specifically, Protectores 

argues: (1) the State Water Board’s maximum benefit finding either was not supported by 

substantial evidence or was contrary to the evidence; (2) the trial court failed to exercise 

independent judgment in concluding the weight of the evidence supported the finding;

and (3) the State Water Board “improperly distinguished” AGUA. We address these

contentions in turn. 

1. The Maximum Benefit Finding

As we have explained, the Antidegradation Policy requires that the State Water 

Board or Regional Board make findings that any change in water quality (1) will be 

consistent with the maximum benefit to the people of the state, (2) will not unreasonably 

affect beneficial uses, and (3) will not violate water quality standards. (AGUA, supra, 

210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1260.) The trial court independently reviewed the administrative 

record and found the State Water Board made each of the required findings. Protectores 

challenges the evidence supporting the maximum benefit finding. Protectores argues the 

finding was not supported by substantial evidence or was contrary to the evidence 

because the State Water Board failed to consider costs to the public of discharges 

authorized by the Order, including treatment and health costs. We disagree. 

The Antidegradation Policy does not define “maximum benefit to the people of the 

state.” However, the State Water Board has discussed the maximum benefit finding in a 
54

guidance memorandum. (State Water Board, Guidance Mem. (Feb. 16, 1995) (Guidance 

Memorandum).) The Guidance Memorandum, which was excerpted in AGUA, explains 

that maximum benefit determinations should be made on a case-by-case basis, with 

consideration given to various factors, including “ ‘economic and social costs, tangible 

and intangible, of the proposed discharge compared to the benefits.’ ” (AGUA, supra, 

210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1279, quoting Guidance Mem. at pp. 4-5.) 

The trial court found the State Water Board made the maximum benefit finding, 

and the finding was supported by the weight of the evidence. Substantial evidence 

supports the trial court’s determination. The Order reveals that the State Water Board 

upheld the Central Valley Water Board’s maximum benefit finding, which was based on 

findings from an environmental impact report that was attached as an exhibit to the 

Order. That report includes findings that the state depends on central valley agriculture 

for food and central valley communities rely on agriculture for employment. 

The State Water Board observed that the Central Valley Water Board considered 

social costs of the discharges authorized by the Order and found the Order’s requirements 

“should ensure that local communities not incur any additional treatment costs.” The 

State Water Board also observed that the new monitoring program for drinking water 

supply wells would mitigate social costs by requiring that Members provide replacement 

water to affected communities. Accordingly, the State Water Board found “considerable 

societal benefits outweigh the costs associated with the effects of irrigated agriculture 

under the [Order],” and any degradation authorized by the Order “is consistent with the 

maximum benefit to the people of the state.” Substantial evidence supports the trial 

court’s determination that the State Water Board made the maximum benefit finding, and 

the finding was supported by the weight of the evidence. 

Protectores offers a different perspective. Protectores directs our attention to the 

following sentence from the Order’s discussion of the maximum benefit to the people of 

the state: “The Central Valley Water Board considered social costs of the discharges and 
55

reasonably concluded that the General WDRs’ requirements to address all exceedances of 

water quality objectives according to the terms of a time schedule, implement best 

practicable treatment and control where irrigated agricultural waste discharges may cause 

degradation, and the inclusion of performance standards that work to prevent further 

degradation of surface and groundwater quality, should ensure that local communities not 

incur any additional treatment costs associated with the limited degradation authorized 

by the General WDRs.” (Emphasis added.) Protectores interprets the italicized language

in the above-quoted sentence as a “finding that the public will incur no costs.” 

Protectores challenges the purported finding that “the public will not incur costs” 

at length. Protectores explains that discharges from irrigated agriculture are a primary 

cause of nitrate pollution, nitrates are dangerous in drinking water, many people rely on 

groundwater contaminated with nitrates for drinking water, treating contaminated water 

is costly, and the Order allows such discharges to continue. Protectores then concludes 

the State Water Board’s purported finding cannot be squared with the evidence. 

There are at least two problems with Protectores’ argument. First, Protectores 

invites us to make our own maximum benefit finding, placing greater weight on evidence 

of social costs than the State Water Board did, which we cannot do. Second, the State 

Water Board did not say the public would incur “no costs” associated with the 

degradation authorized by the Order. The State Water Board said the public should not 

incur “any additional treatment costs” associated with the degradation authorized by the 

Order. 

We see an obvious difference between the finding the State Water Board actually 

made and the one Protectores attributes to it. That the State Water Board found local 

communities would be unlikely to incur “any additional treatment costs” as a result of the 

degradation authorized by the Order does not mean they would incur “no costs,” as 

Protectores contends. It means only that local communities would be unlikely to incur 

additional costs, above and beyond those already being incurred. This much seems clear 
56

from the very next sentence of the Order, which provides, in part, “if monitoring of 

drinking water supply wells indicates that [maximum contaminant levels] are being 

exceeded, we expect dischargers that are causing or contributing to the exceedance to 

provide replacement water to the affected population.” The State Water Board thus 

found, not “that the public will incur no costs,” but that local communities would be 

unlikely to incur “additional treatment costs,” because the new requirements for 

monitoring drinking water supply wells would ensure that the costs of treating 

exceedances would be borne by Members. Protectores does not suggest the State Water 

Board’s actual finding was contrary to the evidence or unsupported by substantial 

evidence, and so we have no occasion to consider that question. Substantial evidence 

supports the trial court’s determination that the State Water Board’s maximum benefit 

was supported by the weight of the evidence.29 We therefore reject Protectores’ first 

argument.

2. The Trial Court’s Independent Judgment

Protectores next argues the trial court failed to exercise independent judgment in 

evaluating the evidence supporting the maximum benefit finding. As before, Protectores 

attempts to demonstrate error by mischaracterizing the State Water Board’s maximum 

benefit finding. Once again, the argument fails. 

Protectores’ argument focuses on the following portion of the trial court’s ruling: 

“Protectores argues that degradation is occurring, which imposes costs, but the [Order] 

will allow dischargers up to [10] years to come into compliance. Protectores does not 

quantify these costs, but suggests that such costs are borne by persons in communities 

29 Protectores also argues the State Water Board failed to consider the severity and extent 

of the degradation authorized by the Order in making the maximum benefit finding. That 

argument is not properly before us, as Protectores presented it to the trial court for the 

first time in its reply papers. 
57

served by groundwater wells, or communities which must pay for additional treatment of 

nitrate-contaminated groundwater. Protectores also suggests that because the order only 

requires township-level groundwater protection targets, groundwater monitoring will 

allow exceedances at ‘hot spots’ within communities that may go undetected. The Court 

does not doubt that such costs exist. However, Protectores bears the burden of 

demonstrating that the State Board did not appropriately consider these costs.” 

(Emphasis added.) 

Protectores seizes on the trial court’s statement that “such costs exist.” As 

Protectores reads the ruling, the trial court believed degradation authorized by the Order 

would cause local communities to incur costs, but deferred to the State Water Board’s 

purportedly contrary finding that they “would not incur additional treatment costs,” 

thereby abdicating its responsibility to exercise independent judgement. This argument 

fails for much the same reason as the last: Saying that social costs “exist” does not deny

that “additional treatment costs”—i.e., treatment costs over and above the existing ones—

are unlikely to become necessary. 

That no conflict exists between the trial court’s statement and the State Water 

Board’s finding is clear from the relevant sentence of the Order, which can be truncated

as follows: “The Central Valley Water Board considered social costs of the discharges 

and reasonably concluded that the General WDRs’ requirements . . . should ensure that 

local communities not incur any additional treatment costs associated with the limited 

degradation authorized by the General WDRs.” The Order thus acknowledges that social 

costs “exist,” and were reasonably considered by both the Central Valley Water Board 

and State Water Board. Nothing suggests the trial court abdicated its responsibility to 

exercise independent judgment, and we will not assume the court misunderstood or 

misapplied the law. (People v. Jeffers (1987) 43 Cal.3d 984, 1000 [“It is generally 

presumed that a trial court has followed established law”].) 
58

Finally, Protectores argues the State Water Board misinterpreted or misapplied 

AGUA. Apart from its challenge to the evidence supporting the maximum benefit finding 

(which we have already rejected), Protectores does not suggest the State Water Board 

failed to make any of the findings required by the Antidegradation Policy. Instead, 

Protectores suggests the State Water Board went wrong by distinguishing AGUA and

conducting a “nontraditional” antidegradation analysis. This argument goes nowhere. 

AGUA concerned an order authorizing waste discharges from dairy farms in the 

Central Valley (dairy order). (AGUA, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1258-1259.) The 

Central Valley Water Board, in adopting the dairy order, found the Antidegradation 

Policy did not apply. (Id. at p. 1260.) The AGUA court disagreed. (Ibid.) The court 

then considered whether the dairy order complied with the Antidegradation Policy. (Id.

at p. 1278.) 

Relying on the Guidance Memorandum, the AGUA court concluded that the 

Antidegradation Policy requires that Regional Boards make required findings as part of a 

“two-step process.” (AGUA, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1278.) The court explained: 

“ ‘The first step is if a discharge will degrade high quality water, the discharge may be 

allowed if any change in water quality (1) will be consistent with maximum benefit to the 

people of the State, (2) will not unreasonably affect present and anticipated beneficial use 

of such water, and (3) will not result in water quality less than that prescribed in state 

policies (e.g.[,] water quality objectives in Water Quality Control Plans). The second 

step is that any activities that result in discharges to such high quality waters are required 

to use the best practicable treatment or control of the discharge necessary to avoid a 

pollution or nuisance and to maintain the highest water quality consistent with the 

maximum benefit to the people of the State.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Guidance Mem. at p. 2.) 

Protectores argues the State Water Board erred in distinguishing AGUA. 

However, the Order does not announce any departure from AGUA. The Order observes 

that the State Water Board “has, to date, provided relatively little specific direction to the 
59

regional water boards on how to apply the Antidegradation Policy to nonpoint sources.” 

The Order continues: “We recently explained that a traditional antidegradation analysis 

for a discrete point source discharge has limited value when considering antidegradation 

in the context of storm water discharges from diffuse sources, conveyed through multiple 

outfalls, with multiple pollutants impacting multiple water bodies within a region.” The 

Order opines that the same practical considerations “make it inappropriate to apply a 

discrete point source discharge approach in the context of a general order regulating both 

surface water and groundwater discharges from irrigated agriculture operations across a 

large landscape.” The Order does not discuss AGUA, except to say “[t]he diffuse, 

landscape level groundwater discharges regulated under the . . . General WDRs[,] are 

unlike the concentrated discharges from dairy retention ponds and corral areas that were 

the subject of” AGUA. The Order thus observes that discharges from irrigated 

agricultural operations are different from discharges from dairy operations. This 

observation does not appear to have been offered as a shot across AGUA’s bow. Rather, 

the State Water Board appears only to have been commenting upon the lack of guidance 

addressing application of the Antidegradation Policy and noting that what little guidance 

exists has involved discrete point source pollution or forms of nonpoint source pollution 

more concentrated and less diffuse than discharges from irrigated agriculture (such as 

manure), and therefore more amenable to a “traditional antidegradation analysis.” 

The Order does not “distinguish” AGUA by suggesting the Antidegradation Policy 

does not apply to nonpoint source pollution. The Order does not reject or refuse to 

follow the “two-step process” described in AGUA. (AGUA, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 

1278.) To the contrary, the Order undertakes an antidegradation analysis, making the 

findings described in AGUA. (Id. at pp. 1278-1286.) The trial court determined the State 

Water Board and Central Valley Water Board made the required findings, and substantial 

evidence supports the court’s determination, as we have shown. (See Section III.D.1, 

ante.)
60

Protectores makes much of the Order’s use of the phrase “traditional 

antidegradation analysis,” suggesting the State Water Board, in recognizing the “limited 

value” of such an analysis in the context of storm water discharges from diffuse sources, 

declared an intention to employ a “nontraditional” analysis here. But again, Protectores 

does not tell us how the Order breaks with tradition. Indeed, the only part of the 

antidegradation analysis that appears to us at all “nontraditional” is the Order’s discussion 

of baseline water quality. 

As previously discussed, the Antidegradation Policy requires that the Regional 

Board compare the baseline water quality (the best quality that has existed since 1968) to 

the water quality objectives. (AGUA, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1270.) Here, the State 

Water Board determined that “it will be impossible for the regional water boards to 

establish an accurate numeric baseline for potentially hundreds of waterbodies and 

dozens of waste constituents in an area covered by a general order.” Rather than require 

an “impossible” undertaking, the State Water Board concluded that “regional water 

boards must conduct a general assessment of the existing water quality data that is 

reasonably available.” The Central Valley Water Board’s “general antidegradation 

analysis” was the only part of the Order that can fairly be described as meaningfully 

different from a “traditional antidegradation analysis.” And that analysis merely 

determined that the Antidegradation Policy applies. It did not do violence to the 

Antidegradation Policy or AGUA. Protectores argument to the contrary is without merit.
61

III. DISPOSITION

The judgments are affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)

/S/

 

RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

 

ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/S/

 

MAURO, J.
62

APPENDIX
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