2015 UT App 69

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### T H E 

### U TA H 

### C O U RT O F 

### A P P E A L S

A AR ON W. Z UND E L, Z A C HAR Y D. T AF T

, AND S T E V E N L. S T O O KE Y , Plainti ffs, Appellants, and Cross-app ellees,

v. S C HAF E R D. M A G ANA; L E GA CY T OWI N G , I N C .; L E G A CY T OW I N G H OL D I N G S

, LLC; D AN M A G ANA; ASA P T OWI N G; AND ASA P

T OWI N G R E C OV E R

Y , Defendan ts, Appellees, and Cross-app ellants.

Opin i on No. 20130210-CA Filed March 26, 2015

Thi rd Di stric t Co urt, S alt Lake Depart ment The Honorable Paul G . Maughan

No. 120902064

H. Denn i s Pi ercey, A tto rney fo r Appellants
Heather L. Thuet and Nathan R. Whi te, At tor neys

for Appellees

J UD G E M I C H E L E M. C H RI S T I AN S E N authore d thi s Opini on, i n whi ch J UD G E S G RE G OR Y K. O R M Eand J O H N A. P E ARC Econcu rr ed.

CHRIS TIANSEN, Judge:

¶1 Plainti ffs Aaro n W. Zundel, Zachary D. Taft, and St even L. St ook ey appeal fr om the di str ict co urt’s or der gr anti ng sum mary judgment to Defendan ts Schafer D. Magana; Legacy Towing, Inc.; Legacy T owing H oldi ngs, LLC; Dan Magana; ASA P Towing; and ASA P Towing Recove ry (collectively , Legacy) and denyi ng Plainti ffs ’ motion for sum ma ry judgment. Legacy cross-appeals from the di stric t court’s deni al of i ts motion requestin g atto rney fees. We affi rm in part, rev erse in part, and remand for further proceedings c onsi stent wi th this opin i on.Zun del v. Maga na

BACKGRO UND

¶2 Legacy i s authorized to tow the vehic les of those who park in the lot of, but who are not cus tomer s of, bus iness es located at the 33rd St reet St ation shopping complex in So uth Salt Lake Ci ty. On 1 the evening of Mar ch 16, 2012, Legacy towed Plainti ffs ’ vehic les from the 33rd St reet St atio n parking lot after Plainti ffs allegedly parke d in the lot but did n ot fr equent any of the business es at the

com p l e x. Before allowing Plainti ffs to ret rieve their towed vehic les, Legacy charged Plainti ffs numerous fees, inclu ding a towin g fee, a stor age fee, an admini strat i ve fee, and a fuel- surcharge fee. Legacy also charged two of the Plainti ffs an after-hours fee for ret rieval of their vehi cles outsi de Legacy’s nor mal bu siness hours.

¶3 Plainti ffs brought sui t again st Legacy, allegin g that i ts towin g of their vehic les and the fees charged for the ret urn of their vehic les amounted to decepti ve or unc onsci onable acts or practic es under the Utah Consumer Sales Practi ces Ac t (UCS PA). P lainti ffs also alleged that Legacy v io l a ted the federal Fair Debt Collection Practi ces Act (FDCPA) and that Legacy’s refusal to ret urn Plainti ff Zundel’s vehic le wi thout payment of the required fees consti tuted

conver si on. Legacy sub sequently fi led a motion for sum mary judgment, and Plainti ffs fi led a cross-m otion for sum mary judgment. The di stric t court, wi th o ut ho l ding a hearin g on the motions, gr anted Legacy ’s motion and deni ed Plainti ffs ’ motion. After the d ist r ict court i ssu ed i ts ruli ng, Plainti ffs moved for reconsi derat i on and Legacy fi led a motion requestin g atto rney fees

1. 33rd St reet St ation i s l o ca t e d on the southeast corner of 3300 So uth and St ate St reet in So uth Salt Lake Ci ty. There are a few fastfood resta ur a nt s contai ned wi thi n 33rd St reet St ation, and the parking lot i s li mi ted for the u se of those customers who frequent those bus iness es. Across 3300 So uth to the no r t h i s a large movie t he a ter wi th li mi ted parking, and di rectly to the south of 3 3 r d St reet St ation i s a restaurant whose cus tomer s are no t allowed to use 33rd Str eet S tation’s parking lot.

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p ur suan t to the atto rney-fee prov i si ons of the UCSPA and t he FDCPA. The di stric t court deni ed both motions. Plainti ffs appeal from the di stric t court’s sum mary judgment ruli ngs. Legacy crossappeals from the di stric t court’s or der deny ing i ts request for atto rney fees.

ISS UES AND STANDARDS O F REVIEW

¶4 Plainti ffs arg ue that the di stric t court err ed by gr a nt ing

sum mary judgment to Legacy, becau se the court noted the exis tence of a di sputed factual i ssu e that Plainti ffs co ntend i s material. Plaint iffs assert that thi s err or was exacerbate d by the court’s refusal t o ho l d a hearin g on the sum mary judgment motions pursuant to rule 7(e) of the Utah Rules of Ci vil Procedure. We rev i ew a di stric t court’s “gr ant or deni al of sum mary judgment for corr ectness.” Orvi s v

. Jo h n s on , 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (ci tation and internal quotat io n ma rk s omi tte d). The questi on of whether the court err ed in gr anti ng sum mary judgment wi thout a hearin g i s gov erned by rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Ci vil Procedure. See Price v. Armour

, 949 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah 1997). “To the ext ent thi s i ssu e requires us to interpr et rules of ci vil proce d ur e, i t ‘presents a questi on of law which we rev i ew for corr ectness.’” Harris v. IES Assocs., In c

. , 2003 UT App 112, ¶ 25, 69 P.3d 297 (quoti ng Nun ley v. Westa tes Casing S ervs., Inc. , 1999 UT 100, ¶ 42, 989 P.2d 1077). We there fore rev i ew the di stric t court’s deci si on not to hold a hearin g for corr ectness. Pri ce, 949 P.2d at 1254; Harris , 2003 UT App 112, ¶ 25.

¶5 Plainti ffs also challen ge the di stric t court’s deter mination that Legacy’s chargin g and collecti on of the after-hours fees, admini strat i ve fees, and fuel- surcharge fees di d not consti tute UCSPA and FDCPA violati ons. However , becau se we rev erse the di stric t court’s or der gr anti ng Legacy’s motion for sum mary judgment and beca us e a hearin g on sum mary judgment may i llumi na t e i ssu es that affec t the di stric t court’s analysi s of these clai ms, w e do notreach the merits of thi s argument.

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¶6 Fin ally, in i ts cross-appeal, Legacy arg ues that the di stric t court abused i ts di screti on by denyi ng i ts request for an award of atto rney fees under the UCSPA and the FDCPA

. B o t h statutes prov i d e t hat a court “may award” atto rney fees only i f the court

ma k e s certain findings. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19(5 ) (Lexi sNexi s 2009); 1 5 U .S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) (2012). We rev i ew for

corr ectness the di stric t court’s deter minati on that t he “ legal prer equi si tes for awarding atto rney fees” were not met

. Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen , 2005 UT 46, ¶ 8, 122 P.3d 55 6

. The question of whether an acti on was brought in bad fai th i s a questi on of fact, and we rev i ew the di stric t court’s finding for clear

err or

. Id.

ANALYS IS

I. The Di stric t Co urt Er red by No t Holdin g a Hearing on the

Parties ’ Summary Judgment Mo tions

.

A. The Exi stence of a Potential Material Factual Iss ue
¶7 “Summary judg me nt i s appropr i ate ‘i f the pleadings, d e posi tions, answ ers to interr ogat or i es, and admi ssi ons on fi le, tog ether wi th the affi davits, i f a ny , show that there i s no genuine i ssu e as t o any material fact and t ha t t he moving par ty i s ent i tled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Orvis v. Johnson , 2008 UT 2, ¶ 13, 177 P.3d 600 (quoting Utah R. Ci v. P. 5 6 (c)). In i ts or der gr anti ng Legacy’s motion for sum ma r y judgment and denyi ng Plainti ffs ’ motion for sum ma r y judgment, the di stric t court stated that i t i s “undi sputed that all three plainti ffs p ark ed their vehic les at 33rd St reet St ation, but were not cus tomer s of 33rd St reet St ation.” However , the court inclu ded a foot note to that statement in whi ch the court recog ni zed “[t]here i s a n issue about whether parking si gns adequately informed indi vidu als about whi ch bus iness es compri sed 33rd St reet St ation.” The parties’ motion s and supp or tin g affi davits c onfi rm the ex i stence of thi s fac tual i ssu e.

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¶8 In i ts memorandum in supp or t of i ts mo tion for sum mary judgment, Legacy stated that i t w as undi sputed that the “parking stalls in 33rd St reet St ation are for cus tomer s of 33rd St reet St ation.” To supp or t thi s fa ct ual asserti on, Legacy attached to i ts memorandum the sworn declaration of Schafer Magana, presi dent of Legacy Towing, Inc., indi cating that the parking stalls at the 33rd St reet St ati on p a rk in g l ot a re re served exclusi vely for the cus tomer s of that shopping complex. Legacy also quoted in i ts memorandum the exact language used on the numerous si gns posted at the 33rd St reet St ation parking lot on the ni ght Le g a cy towed Plainti ffs ’

v e hi cles. Legacy attached photo gr aphs of those si gns that clea r l y read:

33RD St. S tation PARKING ONLY Vi olato rs wi ll be TOWED at owners expense. TOWING ENFORC ED by Legacy Towing, Inc.

¶9 In their collecti ve memorandum opposi ng Legacy’s motion for sum mary judgment and supp or tin g their collecti ve motion for

su mmar y judgment, Plainti ffs responded to Legacy’s factual asserti ons r egar ding the si gn by st atin g that “i t was unclear fr om the si gns and the surroundi ng area whi ch bus iness es compri se ‘33rd St reet St a t i on.’” Thi s factual i ssu e i s potent i ally material to L e ga cy’ s motion for sum mary judgment on Plainti ffs ’ second cau s e of acti on—Plainti ffs ’ clai m that L e gacy’s conduc t in placing ambi guous si gnage “insu ffi ci ent to warn cus tomer s what areas of the parking lot service whi ch surr ounding bui ldings” was
unc onsci onable. 2

2. In i ts mot io n fo r sum mary judgment, Legacy addressed Plainti ffs ’ c lai m that the fees Legacy charge d violated the UCSPA but di d not address the other clai ms alleged in Plainti ffs ’ second

caus e of acti on. Thus, thi s factual i ssu e was not material to the legal arg uments Legacy actually made in i ts motion for su mmary judgment, but i t may be ma ter i al to Plainti ffs ’ clai m that Legacy acted unc onsci onably.

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¶10 E a ch of the Plainti ffs attached to the sum mary judgment memorandum sworn declarations supp or tin g t he response to Legacy’s motion for sum mary judgment, statin g that “the si gnage p os ted di d not explain whi ch bus iness es were part of the compl e x. ” “[I]t only take s one sworn sta t e me nt under oath to di spute the

aver ments on the other si de of the contro ver sy and create an i ssu e of fact.” Draper City v. Estat e of Bernardo , 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1995) (ci tation and internal quotat i on marks omi tt e d ); accord Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobia s , 2005 UT 36, ¶ 32, 116 P.3d 323. The di stric t court observe d that there was a genuine factual i ssu e as to whether the s i gnage at the 33rd St reet St ation adequately notifi ed indi vidu als parkin g the re whi ch b u s in e s s e s in thi s bus y commerci al

area compri sed that shopping complex. Yet “the mere exis tence of i ssu es of fact does not preclude sum mary judgment. The i ssu es of fact mus t be ma t e rial to the appli cable rule of law.” Norton v. Blackham , 669 P.2d 857, 8 5 9 (U t a h 1983). Thus, our inqui ry would normally turn t o t he questi on of whether the factual i ssu e concerning the adequacy of the sig na g e was material to the gov ernin g law in thi s case. However , for the reasons di sc us sed below, we are unabl e to reach thi s step of the analysi s.
¶11 After recog ni zing that “[t]here i s an i ssu e about whether parking si gns adequately informed indi vidu als about whi ch bus iness es compri sed 33rd St reet St ation,” the di stric t court stated that “the pl ainti ffs acknowledge that thi s di spute i s not material.” However , the court prov i ded no addi tional explanation or analysi s
as to the materiali ty of the si gnage i ssu e. Rather , i t appears the court based i ts materiali ty determinati on en tirely u pon asserti ons made by Plainti ffs in thei r summary judgment memor andum

.
¶12 Whi le i t i s tr ue that Plainti ffs a ss e r ted in their sum mary judgment memorandum that the si gnage i ssu e was not material, they arg ue t ha t their conces si on was in refer ence to their own motion for sum mary judgment a nd no t Legacy’s motion. “In context,” arg ue Plainti ffs, “the di stric t court should have understood [Plainti ffs ’] arg ument to be t ha t those material facts presented by [Legacy], though disp uted, were not material to

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[ Plaintiffs’ ] motion for summ ary judgme nt becau se [Plainti ffs ] contended that, even were the tow rea so nable, they sti ll were entitled to prev ai l due to the towin g compani es chargin g an i llegal amount, valid tow or not.” P l a in ti ffs maintai n that the si gnage i ssu e
was indeed material to Legacy’s motion for sum mary judgment becau se that i ssu e was di rectly relat ed to the “clai med justifi cati on for the tow” and whether Legacy acted unc onsci onably in placing ambi guous si gns in the lot in vi olation of the UCS PA.

¶13 Plainti ffs ’ posi tion i s consi stent wi th thi s c ou rt ’s explanation that sum mary judgment “cross-m otions may be view ed as involv ing a contention by each movant that no genuine i ssu e of fact exis ts under the theor y i t advances, but not as a conces si on that no di spute remain s under the theor y advanced by i ts adver sary.” Wycalis v. Guardian Title of U tah , 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). “In effect, each cross-m o v ant i mpli ci tly contends that i t i s entitled to judgment as a matt e r o f l a w, but that i f the court deter mines o t he rwi se, factual di sputes exis t whi ch preclude judgment as a matter of law in favor of the other si de.” Id. Sim i larly, the Utah Supreme Court has explain ed that a d ist ric t court “mu st recog ni ze that a party ’s clai m that there are no i ssu es of fact r elates to that part y ’ s t he o ry of the case and should not be construed as supp or t for the adver sary’s arg ument or motion.” Newman v. White Wat er Wh i r l p ool , 2008 UT 79, ¶ 15, 197 P.3d 654 (ci tation and internal quot ation marks omi tte d).

¶14 Legacy arg ues that Plainti ffs bore the res p o nsi bi li ty of clearly setting fort h whi ch facts they clai med to be material to each par t y’s motion for sum mary judgment and o f showi ng that there

was a genuine factual i ssu e for tr i al. Legacy contends that a “court i s not supp osed to rewrite a party ’s responses to statements of facts

or make out a better arg ument on that party ’s behalf than the party i tself made.” Legacy’s arg ument on thi s poin t i s not wi thout some

3

3. Legacy also arg ues that Plainti ffs ’ “repr esentations that the facts reg ardin g the si gnage were ‘not material’

. . . co ns t i tute invited (continued...)

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force; however , Plainti ffs a re corr ect in their contention that the di stric t court should not have relied on their purpor ted conces si on
as to materiali ty in ruli ng on sum mary judgment, a s d iscuss ed

3. (...continued)

err or .” We di sagree. The invited err or doctrine “aris es fr om the prin ci ple that a party cannot take advantag e of an err or commi tte d at t r i al when that party led the tr i al court into commi tting the

err or .” Pratt v. Nelson , 2007 UT 41, ¶ 17, 164 P.3d 366 (ci tation and internal quotat i on marks omi tte d). “By pr e cludi ng appellate

rev i ew, the doctrine furthers thi s prin ci ple by di scouragi ng parties from intentionally mi sleading the tr i a l court so as to preserv e a hi dden gr ound for rev ersal on appeal.” Id. (c it a t i on and internal quotat i on marks omi tte d). The invited-er r o r doctrine encourages
couns el to “acti vely partici pate in all proceedings and to rais e any possi ble er r o r a t the tim e of i ts occurrence” so as to “fort i f[y] our long-establi shed poli cy that the tr i al court should have the fi rst oppor t un i ty to address a clai m of err or .” Id. (alterat i on added) (ci tation and internal quot ation marks omi tte d). The recor d clearly indi cates that Plainti ffs both acti vely partici pated, or at lea st so ught to acti vely partici pate, in all proceedings and so ug ht to bri ng the exis tence of the err or to the di stric t court’s atte nti on at the t i me of i ts occurrence. First, consi stent wit h our holding in thi s opin i on, i t i s li kely that the apparent mi sun derstanding that led to the court’s err or could have been avo i ded had the court held a hearin g as contemplated by our rules as di scu ss e d below. Second, upon receiving the di stric t court’s or der denying their motion for su mm a ry judgment and gr anti ng sum mary judgment to Legacy, Plainti ffs di scovered the

c l a i m e d e rr or commi tte d by the di stric t court and atte mpted to giv e the c ourt the “fi rst oppor tuni ty to address [the] clai m of err or ” by fi ling a motion for reconsi derat i on pursuant to rules 52 and 59 of the Utah Rules of Ci vil Procedure. See id. (ci tation and intern al quotat i on marks omi tte d). Plainti ffs speci fi cally addressed the materiali ty of the si gnage i ssu e in thi s motion. Accordi ngly, Plainti ffs di d not lead the di stric t court in to commi tting the clai med

err or and the doctrine of invited erro r doe s not apply.

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below. See infr a ¶¶ 17–18. Mor eov er, i t i s li kely that much o f the confus i on surro unding whether the si gnage di spute wasmaterial could have been avo i ded had the di stric t court held a hearin g after receiving the parties’ motions for sum mary jud g me nt, especi ally where Plainti ffs expr essly requested a hearin g.

B. Rule 7 and the D i stric t Court’s D eni al of Plainti ffs ’ Request for a Hear ing
¶15 Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Ci vil Procedure instructs that the “court shall gr ant a request for a hearin g on a motion under Rule 56

or a motion that would di spose of t he acti on or any clai m or defense in the acti on unles s the court finds that the mot i on or opposi tion to the motion i s fri vo lous or the i ssu e has been authoritatively deci ded.” Utah R. Ci v. P. (7)(e) (emphas i s added)

. Thus, the di stric t court i s required to hold a hearin g on a sum mary judgment motion unles s i t deter mines that the motion or opposi tion i s fri vo lous or that the i ssu es have been authoritatively d e cid e d

. See Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Utah 1997) (explaining that the near-i denti cal language of a predecessor rule under the Utah Code of Judi ci al Admini strat i on “c learly requi red that the [di stric t] court gr ant [a party ’s] request for a hearin g unles s ei ther of the two exceptions appli ed”). Ho wever, i f we deter mine that the di stric t co urt’s fai lure to hold a hearin g was err or , “[f] or
such err or to compel rev ersal of t he [dis tr i ct] court’s sub stanti ve ruli ng,

. . . i t mus t have been prej udi ci al. If the err or was harmless, that i s, i f the err or was suffi ci ently inconsequ ential that there i s no reasonable li kelih ood that i t affec ted the outcome of the case, then

a rev ersal i s not i n order .” Id.

¶16 In i ts or der, the court recog ni zed that Plainti ffs had “requested a hearin g on their [m] otio n.” Notwiths tandi ng that request, the court ruled on the sum mary judgment motions wi thout a hearin g becau se the court deter mined that “the material facts in this ca se [were] undi sputed and the parties’ wri tte n sub mi ssi ons [had] adequately appri s e d the c ou rt of their respecti ve legal posi tions .” Nothing in thi s statement indi cates that the court

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found the i ssu es rais ed by the parties to be fri vo lous. I nd eed, in
r ejecting Legacy’s clai m for atto rney fees, the court stated t ha t it could not “find based on the recor d before i t that [Plainti ffs ’] acti on
was wi thout basi s or brought in bad fai th or for i mproper purposes.” Nor does the court’s statement explain whe ther i t consi dered the i ssu e s in thi s case to have been “authoritatively deci ded.” Though one mi ght infer fr o m t he court’s analysi s of Plainti ffs ’ c lai ms that the court cons i dered s ome of those i ssu es to have been authoritatively deci ded, the court di d not clear ly find that the factual is sue concerni ng the adequacy o f t he si g nage and whether thi s i ssu e was ma ter i al, to have been authoritatively deci ded. The co ur t ’ s only analysi s of thi s i ssu e i s contained in a foot note in the court’s or der, and the court ’ s deter minati on apparently relied entirely upon one party’s pu rpor ted c oncess i on that the i ssu e was not material. Li kewi se, nothin g in the court’s

or der denyi ng Plainti ffs ’ request for reconsi derat i on indi cates that the court had speci fi cally c on s i dered the si gnage i ssu e and whether that is sue w as materialto hav e been authoritatively deci ded.

¶17 Upon i denti fyi ng the sig na g e i ssu e, the court should have made an independent deter minati on as t o whether that factual i ssu e was material. As our supreme court has instructed, “[t]he [di stric t] court i s obli gate d to ascertai n wh e t he r ei ther party ’s request for judgment as a matter of law shoul d be gr anted.” Newman , 2008 UT 79, ¶ 15 (alterat i on in or i gin al) (ci tation and in ternal quotat i on marks omi tte d). “In othe r w or d s, s i m p l y b e c au s e
a pa rt y clai ms there are no di sputed factual i ssu es,”—or, as a
coro llary, a party ’s conces si on that a factual i ssue is no t material—“d o e s no t relieve the [di stric t] court of i ts obli gation to deter mine whether the i ssu e i s actually proper for sum mary judgment.” Id. Had the court held a hearin g, the parties may have helped the court better understand their posi tions on all key i ssu es,
such a s whether the si gnage i ssu e was material, along wi th the supp or tin g facts and legal authority for those posi tions

. A hearin g would have also ai ded the court and t he parties b y allowi ng both parties to hear and respond to the arg uments of the opposing si de. Thus, in a case li ke thi s, where the di stric t court was presented wi th

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multi ple clai ms and competi ng motions for sum mary judgment, a hearin g could have assi sted the court in understanding the parties’ arg uments and avo i ding t he t y pe of mi sun derstandi ng apparent here. And given our i denti fi cati on of a potent i ally material factual i ssu e above, see supra ¶¶ 10–14, there i s a reasonable li kelih ood that

a hearin g would have affec ted the di stric t court’s resolution of the parties’ su mmary j udgment motions.

¶18 Therefore , even though the questio n of whether sum mary judgment was ulti mately appropr ia t e p resents a questi on of law, whi ch we rev i e w fo r corr ectness, Orvis v. Johnson , 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600, we are currently not in the best posi tion to deter mine whether the si gnage i ssu e was material. We si mply do not have the benefi t of the parties’ complete arg uments or the c ourt ’s response to those arg uments. Under these ci rcums tances, we mus t conclu de that there i s a “rea so na bl e li kelih ood” that the di stric t court’s fai lure to hold a hearin g “affected the outcome of [thi s] case.” See Price, 949 P.2d at 1255. We ther e fo r e r e ver se the di stric t court’s

sum mary judgment ruli ng and remand wi th instructi ons to hold a hearin g or to enter findings demonstrating that all i ssu es rais ed by the parties have been authoritatively deci ded under Utah law, consi stent wi th rule 7(e). If, upon hol d ing such a hearin g or enter ing appropr i ate fin d in gs, the di stric t court deter mines that the si gnage i ssu e i s material, the court mus t allow thi s case to proceed to tr i al. See Orvis , 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6. Becaus e any acti on the court take s
o n remand may alter the context in whi ch Plainti ffs ’ other clai ms have been presented to us on appeal, w e decline to address t hose clai ms.

II. The Di stric t Co urt Di d Not Abuse i ts Di screti on by Denyi ng

Legacy’s Request for Att or ney Fee s.
¶19 After the di stric t court en t e r e d i ts sum mary judgment ruling , Legacy fi led a motion requestin g that the court award i t atto rne y fe e s

. Legacy arg ued before the di stric t court and on appeal

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that i t i s entitled to receive i ts atto rney fees under both the UCSPA and the FDCPA. 4

¶20 The UCSP A prov i des that the di stric t court “may award” reasonable atto rney fees to the defendant in a UCSPA clai m i f “the

consu mer complaining of the act or pract ice that violates thi s chapter has brought or maintai ned an acti on he k ne w to be gr oundless .” Utah Code Ann. § 13-11 -1 9 (5) (Lexi sNexi s 2009). Sim i larly, the FDCPA p r o v i des that “[o]n a finding by the court that an acti on under thi s section was bro ught in bad fai th and for the purpose of harassmen t, the court may award to the defendant atto rney’ s fees reasonable in relat i on to the work expended and costs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) (2012)

.
¶21 In denyi ng Legacy’s request, the di st ric t court conclu ded that even though i t had ruled again st Plainti ffs on their UCSPA and FDCPA clai ms, the court could not “find based on the recor d before i t that their acti on was wi thout basi s or brought in bad fai th

or for i mproper purposes.” “When challe ng ing a di stric t court’s findings of fact, the challen gin g party mus t show that the evidenc e, view ed in a li ght most fa vo rable to the [di stric t] court, i s legally insu ffi ci ent to supp or t the contes t e d findin g.” Blum v. Dahl , 2012 UT App 198, ¶ 5, 283 P.3d 963 (alterat i on in or i gin al) (ci tation and internal quotat i on marks omi tt e d )

. L e ga cy has not done so. Instead,

4. Our rev e r sal of the di stric t court’s sum mary judgment ruling would also require us to vacate the di stric t co ur t ’ s ruli ng on atto rney fees i f Legacy’s request were ba se d on i ts status as the prev a ilin g p art y. See John Holmes Constr., Inc. v. R.A. McKell Excavat ing, Inc. , 2005 UT 83, ¶ 17, 131 P.3d 199. However, becau se Legacy’s request i s gr ounde d in the theor y that Plainti ffs ’ clai ms
were brought in bad fai th at t hei r incepti on, the di stric t court’s

sum mary judgment ruling d oes not affect that determin ation and

we may rev i ew t he di stric t court’s atto rney-fees deci si on wi thout fi rst remanding for the di stric t court to reconsi der the parties’ motions for sum mary judgment. The di stric t court is free to reconci le thi s i ssu e i n li ght o f any further pr oceedings.

20130210-CA 12 2015 UT App 69Zun del v. Maga na

Legacy merely i denti fi es the evidenc e i t beli eves demonstrate s bad fai th on the part of Plainti ffs and Plainti ffs ’ knowledge that t he i r clai ms were gr oundless, and assert s that the di stric t court sh o uld hav e found in Legacy’s favor

. Legacy does not undertake to demonstrate a lack of evidenti ary supp or t for the di stric t court ’ s findings and Legac y ha s there by fai led to show that the di stric t court clearly err ed in t his r e spect. We there fore conclu de that the di stric t courtdi d not err in denying Legacy’s r equest for at tor ney fees.

CONCLUS ION

¶22 We rev erse the di stric t court’s or der gr anti ng Legacy’s motion for sum mary judgment and denyi ng Plainti ffs ’ motion for

sum mary judgment. We remand thi s case to the di stric t court so that t he court may deter mine whether to hold a hearin g and there by deter mine whet he r the factual i ssu e concerning the adequacy of the si gnage at the 33rd St reet St ation on the ni ght that Legacy towed Plainti ffs ’ vehic les is material t o the applic able law gov ernin g thi s case. Should the court deter min e that the si gnage i ssu e i s material, the court mus t then allow thi s case to proceed, as appropr i ate, and reev aluate any other clai ms or i ssu es possi bly affec ted by that deter minati on. We affi rm the di stric t court’s deni al of Legacy’s motion requestin g att or ney fees.

20130210-CA 13 2015 UT App 69