1

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 121,959

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

STEVEN ALLEN HERRON,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Riley District Court; MERYL D. WILSON, judge. Opinion filed May 7, 2021.

Affirmed.

Rick Kittel, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. 

David Lowden, deputy county attorney, Barry R. Wilkerson, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, 

attorney general, for appellee.

Before GREEN, P.J., MALONE and WARNER, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Before finding him guilty of possessing heroin, interfering with a 

law enforcement officer, driving on a suspended license, and possessing drug 

paraphernalia at a bench trial on stipulated facts, the trial court denied Steven Allen 

Herron's motion to suppress all evidence obtained during his encounter with Troopers 

Michael Paynter and Jodi Wolf of the Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP) on August 9, 2015. 

Herron appeals the denial of his suppression motion. He argues that the trial court erred 

by denying his motion because the troopers violated his rights under the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution during this encounter in two ways: First, 
2

he contends that Trooper Paynter turned his initially valid public safety stop into an 

illegal investigatory detention by asking him for identification. Second, he argues that 

Troopers Paynter and Wolf failed to follow proper impoundment and inventory search 

procedures when searching his mother's disabled car. Nevertheless, we conclude that 

because Herron's arguments are not persuasive under the facts of his case, the trial court's 

judgment denying his suppression motion should be affirmed.

On Sunday, August 9, 2015, at 6:38 p.m., KHP Trooper Michael Paynter noticed a 

disabled car parked partially on the grass and partially on the westbound shoulder of I-70 

near mile marker 319 in Riley County, Kansas. Thus, Trooper Paynter pulled over to 

check the welfare of the car's driver, who was standing next to the disabled car. As 

Trooper Paynter parked his patrol car behind the disabled car, he provided dispatch with 

the disabled car's license plate; dispatch responded that the car belonged to Claudette 

Cornelius of Kansas City. Trooper Paynter then left his patrol car and started speaking to 

the driver.

The driver told Trooper Paynter that his front passenger tire had blown out and 

that he did not have a spare tire. Trooper Paynter asked the driver if he had help coming. 

The driver told Trooper Paynter that he did have help coming "out of Salina." He then 

asked Trooper Paynter how far away the nearest rest area was. Trooper Paynter told the 

driver that the nearest rest area was about 7 miles away. At this point, the driver stated 

that the rest area would be "more of a designated pick up point" and that he "could get 

over [in the grass] and try to walk." He added that his mother was calling his brother, and 

they would bring him a spare tire from Salina.

Trooper Paynter asked the driver how long it would be before help arrived. The 

driver responded that he did not know because he had just blown the tire minutes before 

he arrived. Trooper Paynter explained that "the reason why [he was] inquiring" was 

because he did not want him "to be stranded for a long period of time." The driver replied 
3

that he understood why Trooper Paynter was asking him this question. He then started 

telling Trooper Paynter about his recent car troubles. Once the driver stopped talking, 

Trooper Paynter double-checked that his plan was to have his mother and brother bring 

him a spare tire from Salina; the driver confirmed that this was his plan.

At this point, Trooper Paynter, who had noticed that the driver had his cell phone 

with him, provided the driver with KHP's phone number should he need further 

assistance. The driver indicated that he would probably be okay because he had "Subaru 

protection" and it "covered everything." Immediately after saying this, however, the 

driver and Trooper Paynter had the following exchange:

"Driver: "I don't know. I'll stay over here in the grass [inaudible]. I'm sure 

somebody is going to be nice enough to pick me up. The rest stop would be a focal point.

"Trooper: Well, did you want to go to the rest area? 

"Driver: I would appreciate it.

"Trooper: Oh, sure. I can give you a ride there.

"Driver: I really appreciate. 

"Trooper: All you had to do was ask. Do you have a driver's license on you? 

"Driver: No. I forgot it this weekend. But . . .

"Trooper: Any type of ID? 

"Driver: No. I forgot everything. I had to run to Kansas City to a doctor's 

appointment. 

"Trooper: Okay. Are you the registered owner, then?

"Driver: No. My mom is.

"Trooper: Your mom is.

"Driver: My mom is.

"Trooper: Okay. Then, what's your name?

"Driver: Steve Cornelius.

"Trooper: Steve Cornelius.

"Driver: Yes.

"Trooper: And what's your date of birth?

"Driver: 8-26-56."
4

Once the driver gave Trooper Paynter this information, Trooper Paynter returned 

to his patrol car and asked dispatch to check the KHP computer system for anyone named 

Steve Cornelius who was born on August 26, 1956. But the dispatch operator told 

Trooper Paynter that she could not find anyone in their computer system by that name. 

As a result, Trooper Paynter returned to the driver, who was now on his cell phone.

On finishing his phone call, the driver told Trooper Paynter either that "they" were 

"on the way" or that "a tow" was "on the way." Trooper Paynter asked the driver what 

state his driver's license was from. The driver stated that "it was" from Kansas. At this 

point, Trooper Paynter told the driver that he could not find anybody by his name with a 

driver's license in Kansas. He thus asked the driver for his name again. The driver said 

his name was "Steven Allen Cornelius." When telling Trooper Paynter this, the driver 

spelled out "Steven" and "Allen."

After getting this clarification from the driver, Trooper Paynter returned to his 

patrol car and asked dispatch to check the KHP computer system for anyone named 

Steven Allen Cornelius. The dispatch operator responded that she was still unable to find 

anyone with a Kansas driver's license with that name. Trooper Paynter next asked 

dispatch if anyone other than Claudette Cornelius owned the car. The dispatch operator 

responded that Claudette Cornelius was the only registered owner of the car.

After receiving this information from dispatch, Trooper Paynter returned to the 

driver and told him that he could not find a driver's license for anybody named Steven 

Allen Cornelius in Kansas. He thus gave the driver a pen and paper. He asked the driver 

to write his full name to ensure he was spelling it correctly. The driver provided Trooper 

Paynter with the same name, writing down "Steven Allen Cornelius." After seeing that 

the driver had provided the same information, Trooper Paynter asked the driver if he ever 
5

had a driver's license through a different state. The driver stated that he previously had a 

driver's license from Iowa.

After learning this, Trooper Paynter returned to his patrol car and asked dispatch 

to search the KHP computer system for anyone with the name of Steven Allen Cornelius

who had ever had a driver's license from Iowa. The dispatch operator responded that she 

could still find no one with that name.

As a result, Trooper Paynter returned to the driver. As Trooper Paynter 

approached the driver, the driver told Trooper Paynter that he would wait as long as it 

took his help "to get to Kansas." Trooper Paynter responded to this comment by telling 

the driver that he could not find any record of him in the KHP computer system. He then 

explicitly asked the driver if he had a valid driver's license. The driver stated that he did 

have a valid driver's license from Kansas, that the information he had previously 

provided was correct, and that he owned the car with his mother.

At this point, Trooper Paynter asked the driver if he had any papers from the 

doctor's appointment that he was returning from that would have his name on it. The 

driver indicated that he had some "appointment papers" in the disabled car. Thus, both 

the driver and Trooper Paynter walked to the disabled car. Within seconds of returning to 

the disabled car, however, the driver said that he did not know where he had put his 

doctor's appointment papers. Trooper Paynter then asked if the driver had any documents 

related to the car, like insurance or registration information, that would have his name on 

it. After digging through the disabled car's glovebox, the driver gave Trooper Paynter 

some documents indicating that the car was bought at "Advanced Chevrolet." But those 

documents did not have the driver's name on it.

Eventually, after directing the driver to keep looking for his doctor's appointment 

paperwork, Trooper Paynter returned to his patrol car. Once inside his patrol car, Trooper 
6

Paynter asked dispatch to call the phone number that Claudette Cornelius had listed on 

the disabled car's registration. But shortly after making this request, the dispatch operator 

responded that the phone number listed on the disabled car's registration was 

disconnected.

Trooper Paynter returned to the driver again. At this point, the driver had found 

the disabled car's registration information. In turn, Trooper Paynter reviewed the disabled 

car's registration information. In doing so, he noted that the driver's mother's name, 

Claudette Cornelius, was on the car's registration but the name Steven Allen Cornelius 

was not on the car's registration. The driver responded that even though his name was not 

on the registration, he co-owned the car because he helped his mother with the car 

payments. On saying this, Trooper Paynter confronted the driver. He explained that he 

had "pulled up every Steve Cornelius in the state, and none of them [were the driver]." 

The driver "promised" Trooper Paynter that he had a valid driver's license from Kansas. 

He told Trooper Paynter that he did not have anything in the car with his name on it 

because "he does not carry shit like that" and because he "tried to keep the car half-ass 

clean." He further told Trooper Paynter that he had called his mother, who was coming 

from Salina and may be bringing his brother along.

At this juncture, Trooper Paynter told the driver that "[they had] a problem 

because [he could not] find a driver's license for [him]." The driver responded that he 

"understood." Trooper Paynter then explicitly confronted the driver about whether he had 

a valid driver's license:

"Trooper: Be straight with me. 

"Driver: I am straight with you. 

"Trooper: Is Steve not your name?

"Driver: Yes. 

"Trooper: It's not your name?

"Driver: Yes. It's Steve. It's Steven Allen Herron. 
7

"Trooper: Steven Allen, what?

"Driver: Steven Allen Cornelius!

"Trooper: Okay. 

"Driver: See, well, okay. But, uh, no, see we got the car, she got the car. And I 

help her pay for it by working, you know? By helping her . . . . I understand where you're 

coming from. 

"Trooper: The problem is, I can't find any identification for you. I can't find any 

driver's license for you.

"Driver: I'm thinking if I had anything [in the car], but I don't. Because I went up 

to pay my bill. And I didn't have ID to pay my bill. And I was like oh shit. So, I stayed in 

Kansas City for the weekend. And came down today. I mean, I'm sorry. I don't know 

what to say. I mean. I don't get caught like this. I usually stay with my mom all the time. I 

mean, [she is] 80. We both kind of retired down here. 

"Trooper: Does your mom have a phone number?

"Driver: What?

"Trooper: Does your mom have a phone number?

"Driver: She [does not] have one. They had to get over to my brother. I don't 

know where he is at now. I've been trying to get ahold of him. He called from the 

landline. [Inaudible.] . . . . I'm trying to think, guys.

"Trooper: Okay, sir. I have to find a driver's license for you, and I can't find one. 

Okay. And I will tell you, I've never had it where somebody has legitimately had a 

driver's license and it never showed up in the computer. 

"Driver: Steve Cornelius.

"Trooper: It's a Kansas driver's license. Why is not on the computer then? There's 

no record of you even having one.

"Driver: Uh, I had one in Iowa, too.

"Trooper: We checked Iowa. 

"Driver: I'm sorry. I have no idea." (Emphases added.) 

After having the preceding conversation, Trooper Paynter returned to his patrol car 

and continued to work with dispatch to identify the driver. Dispatch was still unable to 

find a record of Steven Allen Cornelius. Trooper Paynter thus remained in his patrol car 

until Trooper Jodi Wolf arrived on scene. On her arrival, Trooper Paynter left his patrol 
8

car, at which point the driver told Trooper Paynter that "Subaru Tow" was coming "right 

now." When Trooper Paynter asked from what town "Subaru Tow" was coming, the 

driver responded that it was coming from "[w]hatever [was] the closest town." He then 

added: "Road runner service is what they have in Kansas City. It would be whatever tow 

service."

At this point, the driver received a call on his cell phone and walked back over 

towards the disabled car. The driver remained on his cell phone for about 20 minutes. 

And when the driver next spoke to the troopers, he had an envelope in his hand. During 

the conversation that ensued, Trooper Wolf asked the driver if the envelope was 

addressed to him. The driver stated that the envelope was not addressed to him and 

instead addressed to his mother. When the troopers pointed out that the envelope seemed 

to be addressed to a man named "Steven Herron," who had the same address as the 

address listed on his mother's car's registration, the driver again denied that "Steven 

Herron" was his name. At first, the driver asserted he "had no idea" who Steven Herron 

was. A few seconds later, though, the driver told the troopers that he had just remembered 

that Steven Herron was a man who had used to live downstairs from his mother.

After the driver told the troopers this, Trooper Paynter returned to his patrol car 

yet again. Once there, he searched the KHP computer system within his patrol car for the 

name Steven Herron. This search revealed that there was a man named "Steven Allen 

Herron," born on August 26, 1956, who had previously had a Kansas driver's license and 

looked similar to the driver. Trooper Paynter gave this information to dispatch for further 

investigation. About two minutes later, the dispatch operator responded that "Steven 

Allen Herron" had a suspended Kansas driver's license.

On learning this information, Trooper Paynter returned to the driver, telling him: 

"I got a Steve Herron, he looks exactly like you, has the same date of birth as you, and 

the same address as your mom. Now, I want you to tell me right now, is that not you?" At 
9

this point, the driver admitted that he was Steven Allen Herron. He told Trooper Paynter 

that he had lied about his name because he believed that he may have a warrant. At the 

same time, he alleged that he did not realize he was causing a problem because he started 

using the last name Cornelius, which was his mother's last name upon her remarriage, 

many years ago. He alleged that he never uses the last name Herron anymore. Once 

Herron admitted to the preceding indiscretion, Trooper Paynter arrested Herron for 

interference with a law enforcement officer and directed Herron to sit in his patrol car.

After Trooper Paynter placed Herron under arrest, he told Herron that the KHP 

was going to have his mother's disabled car towed. He explained that Trooper Wolf was 

going to have to stay with his mother's disabled car until then. But Herron countered that 

he already had a tow coming. As a result, Trooper Paynter once again asked Herron from 

what town the tow service was coming. And he also asked Herron for the tow service's 

phone number. Outside of alleging that a tow was coming "from the nearest township," 

Herron had no answers to Trooper Paynter's questions. When Trooper Paynter warned 

Herron that the tow truck had to be there "in a timely manner" or else KHP would tow it, 

Herron simply responded that when he previously had car troubles, it had taken about 30 

to 45 minutes for a tow truck to arrive.

Immediately after Herron stated the preceding, Trooper Wolf entered the 

conversation. She stated that "we're going to call it in." She then explained to Herron that 

he "could call [the tow company] and answer them but . . . ." Trooper Paynter followed 

Trooper Wolf's comment by telling Herron that "if he needed to call [the tow], he could 

go ahead." Trooper Paynter therefore allowed Herron access to his cell phone even 

though he was already under arrest. After saying this, the troopers told Herron they had to

do an inventory search of the disabled car. Also, when Trooper Wolf asked Herron if 

there was going to be anything illegal in the car, Herron stated that there "shouldn't be" 

anything illegal in the car.
10

Yet, within seconds of starting the inventory search, Troopers Paynter and Wolf 

found a purple Crown Royal bag containing numerous syringes and an unknown black 

substance. When Trooper Paynter returned to his patrol car, he Mirandized Herron and 

confronted Herron with this information. Herron initially claimed to have no knowledge 

of the purple Crown Royal bag. Seconds later, however, Herron stated that the items must 

have belonged to a friend who he had recently given a car ride. He alleged that this friend 

was addicted to drugs.

At this point, Trooper Paynter returned to Herron's mother's disabled car, where he 

and Trooper Wolf continued their search of the car. By the end of their search, the 

troopers had found 66 syringes, 1 plastic baggie containing a black substance, 4 metal 

cups containing black residue, and multiple prescription bottles with the name "Steven 

Allen Herron" on them. Later testing confirmed that the black substance in the plastic 

baggie and the black residue on the metal cups was heroin.

Nevertheless, as the troopers continued the process of searching the disabled car, 

Herron, who remained sitting alone in Trooper Paynter's patrol car, placed a phone call to 

a tow company. During this phone call, Herron told the tow company where the disabled 

car was currently located, where he wanted the disabled car towed to, why he needed the 

disabled car towed, that is, that the front passenger tire was flat and he did not have a 

spare tire, as well as the disabled car's make and model. When Trooper Paynter returned 

to his patrol car after Herron placed this call, Herron told him that Jodie's Tow Service or 

Joey's Tow Service was on its way. Trooper Paynter simply responded that he was 

unfamiliar with either a Jodie's Tow Service or Joey's Tow Service.

It seems because Trooper Paynter told Herron that he was unfamiliar with either a 

Jodie's Tow Service or Joey's Tow Service, as soon as Trooper Paynter exited his patrol 

car again, Herron called back the tow service that he had just been speaking to. During 

this second phone call, Herron asked the tow service what it was called and how long it 
11

would take for a tow truck to arrive at his location. When Trooper Paynter returned to his 

patrol car just a few seconds after Herron ended this second phone call, Herron told 

Trooper Paynter that "John's Wrecker" said it would take 30 to 40 minutes for a tow truck 

to arrive. He then stated that the tow truck should be there sooner since he had called 

them earlier. Seconds after Herron made this statement, the dispatch operator contacted 

Trooper Paynter, telling him that John's Wrecker had just called to ask about a car that 

needed towing near mile marker 319 on I-70.

In the end, Trooper Paynter started driving Herron to the local jail about 96 

minutes after he initially stopped to check on Herron's welfare. John's Wrecker had still 

not arrived to tow Herron's mother's disabled car when Trooper Paynter started driving 

Herron to the local jail.

The State relied on the preceding events to charge Herron with possessing heroin, 

interfering with a law enforcement officer, driving with a suspended license, and 

possessing drug paraphernalia. After the State filed its charges, Herron moved to suppress 

all evidence Troopers Paynter and Wolf discovered during their August 9, 2015 

encounter with him. In his motion, Herron first argued that the trial court should suppress 

all the evidence the troopers discovered because Trooper Paynter had violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights by "demand[ing] identification" from him. According to Herron, when 

Trooper Paynter "could not find [his] name," the stop turned from a valid public safety 

stop to an illegal investigatory detention. Alternatively, Herron argued that the trial court 

should at the very least suppress the evidence found during the troopers' search of his 

mother's disabled car because the troopers never actually impounded his car, rendering 

the troopers' search illegal and otherwise unreasonable.

When the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Herron's motion to suppress,

the only person who testified at this hearing was Trooper Paynter. Trooper Paynter first 

testified about his experience as a KHP trooper, noting that he had been a KHP trooper 
12

for about 15 years. He then testified about his interaction with Herron on the evening of 

August 9, 2015. Trooper Paynter explained that he asked Herron for identification 

because Herron wanted a ride to the nearest rest area. He testified that although he did not 

initially suspect that Herron was committing a crime, once he was unable to find "his 

name or driver's license," his suspicion "began to grow." As for the search of the disabled 

car, Trooper Paynter testified that he and Trooper Wolf conducted an inventory search of 

the disabled car because it was being towed at his direction. He explained that the 

inventory search did not last long because Trooper Wolf discovered the "contraband" 

within a minute of starting that search. Trooper Paynter asserted that once they found the 

contraband, they completed the search of the car under the "Carroll doctrine."

Although Trooper Paynter agreed (1) that Herron had initially called John's 

Wrecker and (2) that John's Wrecker was the company that finally removed Herron's 

mother's disabled car, he asserted that the tow was still at his direction under KHP 

policies. He explained that although Herron had told him that he had called for a tow, he 

did not believe Herron when he said this for two reasons: (1) because he was unfamiliar 

with either "Road Runner Tow Services" or "Joey's Tow Service," which were the two 

tow companies he could remember Herron initially referencing; and (2) because he had 

spent "the previous hour" lying to him about his name. He then relied on the KHP 

"Vehicle Tow/Inventory" policy, which stated that troopers may conduct an inventory 

search whenever a vehicle is being towed at their direction and "[t]he person driving or in 

control of such vehicle is arrested and taken into custody and the vehicle is not validly 

parked." He alleged that he could impound and then search Herron's mother's disabled car 

because he had arrested Herron and because Herron's mother's disabled car was not 

validly parked as it was on the Interstate.

After Trooper Paynter finished testifying, the State asked the trial court to deny 

Herron's motion to suppress, arguing that Troopers Paynter and Wolf acted within 

Herron's Fourth Amendment rights by asking for identification and by searching the car. 
13

Herron countered the State's argument by repeating the arguments in his previously filed 

suppression motion. But the trial court rejected Herron's arguments from the bench. 

The trial court first found that as Trooper Paynter was conducting a valid public 

safety stop, "a discussion took place about giving [Herron] a ride." It found that this 

discussion ended after Trooper Paynter "indicated [that] he could" take Herron to the rest 

area 7 miles away, at which point Trooper Paynter asked Herron for identification. It 

found that although Herron "had no legal duty" to provide his name, Trooper Paynter had 

the "right to know the name of the person [who] he [was] going to be transporting" for 

his own safety. Also, it found that Trooper Paynter also had the right to ask dispatch to 

search the names Herron gave to ensure there were not "any issues" with Herron before 

transporting him in the patrol car. Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that 

after Trooper Paynter learned from dispatch that the KHP computer system had no 

information about anybody by the name "Steve Cornelius," "any reasonable police officer 

or trooper would have reasonable suspicion that something was going on" as this 

indicated Herron was hiding some criminal behavior.

Regarding the search of Herron's mother's disabled car, the trial court found that 

Trooper Paynter reasonably believed that Herron was lying about having already called a 

tow because over the course of their encounter, Herron had repeatedly lied about his 

name, had no identification, and had only mentioned tow services that Trooper Paynter 

was unfamiliar with. It found that once Trooper Paynter had arrested Herron for 

interference with a law enforcement officer, Trooper Paynter "had control of the vehicle" 

and its disposition. It found that although Herron mentioned a tow service that Trooper 

Paynter was familiar with, that is, John's Wrecker, Herron did not mention this tow 

service until after his arrest and after the troopers had already started their inventory 

search. It noted that Trooper Paynter testified that the disabled car was illegally parked 

and that there was no evidence that the troopers conducted the inventory search in bad 

faith. Thus, it found that "[r]egardless of who called the tow company, the troopers had 
14

the right to either allow that company to tow it or deny that tow company the right to 

remove it." In turn, it concluded that under the preceding facts as well as the KHP 

Vehicle/Tow Inventory policy, the troopers' search of the disabled car was legal.

Once the trial court denied his motion to suppress, the State and Herron reached an 

agreement on stipulated facts under which Herron had a continuing objection to the 

denial of his suppression motion. At his bench trial on these stipulated facts, the trial 

court found Herron guilty on all counts. It then sentenced Herron to an underlying term of 

17 months' imprisonment, to a controlling term of 12 months' probation, followed by 12 

months' postrelease supervision.

Herron timely appealed the denial of his suppression motion to us.

Did the Trial Court Err by Denying Herron's Motion to Suppress?

On appeal, Herron continues to argue that Trooper Paynter violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights by exceeding the scope of his initially valid public safety stop by 

asking him to identify himself. He also continues to argue that Troopers Paynter and 

Wolf's inventory search was illegal and otherwise unreasonable under the KHP Vehicle 

Tow/Inventory policy. So Herron contends that we should reverse his convictions, 

reverse the trial court's denial of his suppression motion, and remand to the trial court 

with directions to suppress all evidence obtained from the violation of his Fourth 

Amendment rights.

The State counters we should affirm the trial court's denial of Herron's suppression 

motion because none of Herron's arguments have merit. It asserts that Trooper Paynter 

did not exceed the scope of his initially valid public safety stop because Trooper Paynter 

asked Herron only for identification after Herron had "accepted [Trooper Paynter's] offer 

for a ride to the rest area." In making this argument, the State stresses that as Trooper 
15

Paynter tried to identify Herron, Herron was not seized. Instead, he was "moving freely 

about and making phone calls." Also, the State counters Herron's contention that the 

search of his mother's disabled car was illegal by maintaining that Troopers Paynter and 

Wolf search complied with the KHP's Vehicle Tow/Inventory policy. Alternatively, the 

State argues that we should affirm the trial court's denial of Herron's suppression motion 

because any unlawful conduct by the troopers was sufficiently attenuated from the 

discovery of the contraband in Herron's mother's disabled car.

Applicable Law

The Fourth Amendment provides people with the right "to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." In 

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), the United 

States Supreme Court held that a person's rights under the Fourth Amendment are 

enforceable against the states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution.

So far, "Kansas courts have recognized four types of police-citizen encounters:

(1) voluntary encounters, (2) investigatory detentions, (3) public safety stops, and (4) 

arrests." State v. McKenna, 57 Kan. App. 2d 731, 734, 459 P.3d 1274 (2020). As 

indicated by the four separate categories of police-citizen encounters, "[a] public safety 

stop is not for investigative purposes." State v. Gonzales, 36 Kan. App. 2d 446, Syl. ¶ 4, 

141 P.3d 501 (2006). Thus, a law enforcement officer violates a person's Fourth 

Amendment rights if the officer's public safety stop is actually a pretext to investigate 

that person for a crime. In turn, the legality of a public safety stop can be evaluated under 

the following three steps:

"First, as long as there are objective, specific, and articulable facts from which an 

experienced officer would suspect that a citizen is in need of help or is in peril, then that 
16

officer has the right to stop and investigate. Second, if the citizen is in need of aid, then 

the officer may take appropriate action to render assistance or mitigate the peril. Third, 

once, however, the officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or is no longer in need 

of assistance or that the peril has been mitigated, then any actions beyond that constitute a 

seizure implicating the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution." 36 Kan. App. 2d 446, Syl. ¶ 3. 

Still, a valid public safety stop may turn into a valid investigatory detention if a 

law enforcement officer acquires a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person in 

need of help has committed a crime, is about to commit a crime, or is actively committing 

a crime. See State v. Ellis, 311 Kan. 925, 942, 469 P.3d 65 (2020) (holding that a public 

safety stop may turn into an investigatory detention if an officer develops reasonable 

suspicion of criminal conduct while completing the public safety stop); Nickelson v. 

Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 33 Kan. App. 2d 359, 367, 102 P.3d 490 (2004) (holding that 

the officer did not impermissibly expand the scope of a valid public safety stop by 

investigating Nickelson for driving under the influence because the obvious odor of 

alcohol coming from Nickelson's person provided the officer reasonable suspicion to 

investigate Nickelson for driving under the influence). "Determining what is reasonable 

is based on the totality of the circumstances and is viewed in terms as understood by 

those versed in the field of law enforcement." State v. Hanke, 307 Kan. 828, Syl. ¶ 3, 415 

P.3d 966 (2018). Also, a law enforcement officer need only have a minimum level of 

objective justification of the person's potential criminal activity to acquire a reasonable 

and articulable suspicion. 307 Kan. at 828. 

As for impoundment of a person's car following arrest, our Supreme Court has 

explicitly held that Kansas caselaw "does not create a Fourth Amendment right to a 

police consultation regarding the disposition of the vehicle before impoundment may be 

lawful." State v. Shelton, 278 Kan. 287, 296, 93 P.3d 1200 (2004). Instead, our Supreme 

Court has explained: "What is required under the Fourth Amendment is that the 

impoundment be reasonable under the totality of circumstances. The officer's inquiry of 
17

the driver regarding disposition is but one of the circumstances that is considered in the 

court's determination of whether the impoundment is reasonable." 278 Kan. at 293. Thus, 

even "[i]f the police do not have express authority to impound a vehicle, they may still 

take lawful custody of a vehicle when there are 'reasonable grounds' for impoundment." 

State v. Teeter, 249 Kan. 548, 550-51, 819 P.2d 651 (1991). Alternatively, law 

enforcement may impound a vehicle and then conduct an inventory search of a vehicle 

when authorized by statute. 249 Kan. at 550.

Meanwhile, "[i]nventory searches are recognized as exceptions to the probable 

cause warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment." Shelton, 278 Kan. at 292-93. 

And it is a well-known rule that "inventory searches conducted pursuant to standard 

police procedures are reasonable." 278 Kan. at 299 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 

428 U.S. 364, 372, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 [1976]).

Lastly, when considering the trial court's denial of a suppression motion, we apply 

a bifurcated standard of review: Under the first step of our review, we must consider if 

the trial court's fact-findings are supported by substantial competent evidence. Hanke, 

307 Kan. at 827. "Substantial competent evidence" is evidence that "possesses both 

relevance and substance and which furnishes a substantial basis in fact from which the 

issues can reasonably be resolved." State v. Sharp, 289 Kan. 72, 88, 210 P.3d 590 (2009). 

Also, when considering the trial court's fact-findings for substantial competent evidence, 

we must not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses. Hanke, 307 

Kan. at 827. On the other hand, under the second step of our review, we consider the 

validity of the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion while exercising de novo review. 307 

Kan. at 827.
18

Public Safety Stop

Herron specifically argues that Trooper Paynter exceeded the scope of his initially 

valid public safety stop because Trooper Paynter asked him to identify himself without 

"any suspicion of criminal activity." Although Herron concedes that Trooper Paynter 

could offer him a ride to the rest area as part of his public safety stop, Herron contends 

that after he told Trooper Paynter that "he had contacted a tow company and that his 

brother was coming to pick him up," "a reasonable officer would have known that [he 

did] not need any further assistance."

In making this argument, Herron stresses that that it was Trooper Paynter who 

offered him a ride to the nearest rest area. He also relies heavily on our decision in State 

v. Messner, 55 Kan. App. 2d 630, 419 P.3d 642 (2018). Herron contends that his case is 

similar to Messner because like the officer in Messner, Trooper Paynter "exceeded his 

authority when he requested identification and kept [him] at the scene over an hour 

conducting a criminal investigation."

But there are some obvious problems with Herron's arguments. For starters, 

although it was Trooper Paynter who asked Herron if he "want[ed] to go to the rest area," 

Herron had plainly indicated that he wanted a ride to the rest area. Indeed, immediately 

before Trooper Paynter asked Herron if he "want[ed] to go to the rest area," Herron had 

told Trooper Paynter that he was "sure somebody [was] going to be nice enough to pick 

him up." He then continued by telling Trooper Paynter that "[t]he rest stop would be a 

focal point."

Also, as evidenced in Trooper Paynter's dashcam video, the tone of Herron's voice 

while making the preceding comments establishes that he wanted something from 

Trooper Paynter. That is, his intonation while telling Trooper Paynter that he was "sure 

somebody [was] going to be nice enough to pick him up" indicated that he would assume 
19

somebody nice was going to pick him up and drive him to the nearest rest area unless 

Trooper Paynter told him something to the contrary. In short, Herron's comments about 

wanting to go to the rest area coupled with his intonation establishes that even if Herron 

did not directly ask Trooper Paynter for a ride, he was nonetheless seeking a ride from 

Trooper Paynter.

Next, even if we were to ignore that Herron effectively asked Trooper Paynter for 

a ride to the rest area, Herron's argument shows an unwillingness to acknowledge that his 

comments sufficiently established that he needed further assistance from Trooper 

Paynter. Despite Herron's assertion to the contrary, Herron had not told Trooper Paynter 

that he had contacted a tow company before Trooper Paynter asked him if he wanted a 

ride to the nearest rest area. Trooper Paynter's dashcam video establishes that Herron 

never mentioned a tow truck before Trooper Paynter asked him if he wanted a ride. 

Instead, the first time Herron referenced a tow truck was after Trooper Paynter had asked 

Herron to identify himself and after the dispatch operator had told Trooper Paynter that 

she could find no information in the KHP computer system on anybody named "Steve 

Cornelius."

Thus, before Trooper Paynter asked for identification, the only information 

Trooper Paynter had about Herron's incoming help was that his mother and brother, who 

were driving out of Salina, would bring him a spare tire. On top of this, by the time 

Trooper Paynter asked Herron if he "want[ed] to go to the rest area," Herron had twice 

indicated that the rest area would be a good place for him to wait for help. And he had 

told Trooper Paynter (1) that he "could get over [in the grass] and try to walk" and (2) 

that he was "sure somebody [was] going to be nice enough to pick him up" and drive him 

to the rest area. Clearly, although Herron argues otherwise, his comments to Trooper 

Paynter implied that he was unhappy with his current location, that he wanted to get to 

the rest area, and that he was willing to walk along the Interstate or hitchhike to get there. 
20

It would be absurd to say that walking along the Interstate for 7 miles or 

hitchhiking are safe activities. Because an officer conducting a public safety stop has the 

right to stop and investigate as long as objective, specific, and articulable facts indicate 

that a person is still in need of help or is in peril, Herron's comments about his 

willingness to walk or hitchhike to the nearest rest area furnished Trooper Paynter with a 

legitimate reason to ask Herron if he wanted a ride. See Gonzales, 36 Kan. App. 2d 446, 

Syl. ¶ 3. Thus, Herron's contention that Trooper Paynter could not ask for his 

identification because a reasonable officer would have realized that he was no longer in 

need of assistance is entirely absurd. 

Notwithstanding the preceding problems, Herron's arguments that Messner

establishes that Trooper Paynter exceeded the scope of his initially valid public safety 

stop by asking him for identification is unpersuasive. Herron relies on Messner because it 

involves an officer's request for identification. Yet, in Messner, we did not hold that a law 

enforcement officer exceeds the scope of an otherwise valid public safety stop by asking 

for identification. Instead, it held that even if the officer could ask Messner for 

identification under the specific facts of his case, the officer "exceeded the scope of the 

safety stop by actually seizing Messner's driver's license and checking for warrants." 

(Emphasis added.) Messner, 55 Kan. App. 2d at 637-38. Here, although Trooper Paynter 

asked Herron if he had a driver's license on him, he never seized Herron's driver's license 

because it is undisputed that Herron had no driver's license with him. Thus, Herron's case 

is factually distinguishable from Messner. 

More significantly, Herron has ignored other Kansas caselaw that clearly 

contradicts his arguments. First, our Supreme Court has already held that "an officer's 

mere request for identification or information about one's identity does not, by itself, 

constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution." State 

v. Pollman, 286 Kan. 881, 888, 190 P.3d 234 (2008). Instead, "if a law enforcement 

officer retains a driver's license, this can be a factor considered in the totality of the 
21

circumstances and may, absent offsetting circumstances, mean a reasonable person would 

not feel free to leave without his or her license." 286 Kan. at 888. Second, in McKenna, a 

recent public safety stop decision by us, we relied on the preceding Kansas Supreme 

Court precedent to reject McKenna's argument that a law enforcement officer turned an 

otherwise valid public safety stop into an illegal investigatory detention by asking her for 

identification and then checking her name through dispatch. 57 Kan. App. 2d at 737.

In McKenna, a law enforcement officer on patrol in a residential neighborhood 

saw a woman sleeping in her car with her driver's side window rolled down and her 

interior car lights on. The officer stopped and attempted to wake the driver up. Once the 

driver started to wake up, it became clear to the officer that she may be unwell or 

intoxicated. After identifying himself, the officer asked the driver for her name. The 

officer later asserted that he asked the driver for her name because he was concerned 

about the driver's well-being, believing that she may need a ride home. Then, after the 

driver responded that she was Tia McKenna, the officer asked dispatch to check 

McKenna's name. Dispatch responded that McKenna had an outstanding warrant for her 

arrest; thus, the officer arrested Mckenna. Following her arrest, a different officer found 

illegal drugs on McKenna's person.

Once the State charged McKenna with drug possession, McKenna filed a motion 

to suppress. The trial court denied McKenna's motion because it found that the officer's 

conduct fell within the scope of his community caretaking functions. McKenna appealed 

this decision to us, arguing that the officer exceeded the scope of his initially valid public 

safety stop by asking her name and checking for warrants. Nevertheless, we rejected 

McKenna's argument. 

In affirming the trial court, we first pointed to our Supreme Court precedent 

establishing that an officer's mere request for identification does not, by itself, constitute 

a seizure for Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution purposes. 57 Kan. 
22

App. 2d at 737 (citing Pollman, 286 Kan. at 888). We then noted that previous panels of 

our court have "repeatedly held that an officer may request identification during a public 

safety stop." 57 Kan. App. 2d at 737. Based on this precedent, we rejected McKenna's 

argument that the officer's request for identification constituted a per se violation of her 

Fourth Amendment rights. It concluded that although officers may not force people to 

provide identification, they can request identification without exceeding the scope of their 

community caretaking functions. 57 Kan. App. 2d at 739. 

Lastly, we rejected McKenna's argument that the officer's warrants check 

exceeded the scope of his otherwise valid public safety stop for the following reasons:

"McKenna contends that running a name for wants and warrants is generally 

inconsistent with a community caretaking function. That may or may not generally be 

true. Generally, an officer gets and keeps some identification papers when checking for 

warrants. That did not happen here. And asking for and verbally getting a name, given the 

situation McKenna found herself in, coupled with the facts established by [the officer's] 

testimony, is not necessarily for investigative purposes. [The officer] testified that his 

practice in similar situations was to drive the intoxicated person home, and that is what he 

anticipated doing here. And if he were to drive her home in his car, it is reasonable for 

him to want to know whether she was wanted for a violent crime and may pose a danger 

to him. For that matter, doing a quick limited check for warrants while interacting with 

McKenna was reasonable as a check for potential dangers. [The officer's] act of running a 

local warrants check, under these circumstances, was directly tied to the public safety 

concern that instigated the stop." 57 Kan. App. 2d at 738. 

Simply put, although there are some factual distinctions between Herron's case and 

McKenna, the key tenets of McKenna apply equally to Herron's case. As the trial court 

found when denying Herron's suppression motion, when Trooper Paynter asked Herron 

for his name, he could have refused to answer, at which point Trooper Paynter could not 

legally force Herron to answer. But this is not what happened. Instead, like in McKenna, 

Herron voluntarily provided Trooper Paynter with a name, albeit a fake name. Because 
23

an officer may ask a person for identification without violating that person's Fourth 

Amendment rights, Trooper Paynter's questioning of Herron about his identity was 

proper. In turn, despite Herron's contention to the contrary, Trooper Paynter could ask 

him to identify himself without having reasonable suspicion that he had committed a 

crime.

As for Trooper Herron's decision to ask dispatch to search their computer system 

for records of anybody named "Steve Cornelius," Herron does not explicitly argue that 

checking his identity through dispatch constituted a violation of his Fourth Amendment 

rights. As a result, Herron has abandoned his ability to make this argument on appeal. See 

State v. Salary, 309 Kan. 479, 481, 437 P.3d 953 (2019) (holding that an issue not briefed 

is deemed waived and abandoned). Still, even if Herron had raised this argument, 

McKenna's precedent establishes that such an argument would fail. Like the officer in 

McKenna, because Trooper Paynter would have to share his patrol car with Herron to 

drive him to the rest area, it was reasonable for Trooper Paynter to want to know whether 

Herron was wanted for a violent crime or may pose a danger to him. See 57 Kan. App. 2d 

at 738. 

Finally, Herron's argument does not explicitly address the trial court's finding that 

once Trooper Paynter and dispatch could not find any records for a person by the name of 

"Steve Cornelius" in the KHP computer system, Trooper Paynter acquired reasonable 

suspicion that Herron was committing a crime. As with his other unbriefed argument, by 

not addressing the trial court's reasonable suspicion finding in his brief, Herron has 

abandoned his ability to challenge this finding on appeal. See Salary, 309 Kan. at 481. 

All the same, even if Herron had challenged this finding, it is readily apparent that this 

challenge would fail. 

Once again, at the evidentiary hearing, Trooper Paynter testified that although he 

did not initially suspect that Herron was committing a crime, once he was unable to find 
24

"his name or driver's license," his suspicion "began to grow." Also, as shown in his 

dashcam video, before Trooper Paynter had even arrested Herron, he told Herron that in 

his nearly 15 years of experience as a KHP trooper, he "never had it where somebody [] 

legitimately had a driver's license and it never showed up in the computer." Given the 

preceding evidence, the trial court properly determined that Trooper Paynter acquired a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion that Herron had engaged in some criminal conduct 

upon dispatch notifying him that the KHP computer system had no records for anybody 

named "Steve Cornelius." 

To conclude, Herron's arguments why Trooper Paynter exceeded the scope of his 

otherwise valid public safety stop by asking him to identify himself are unpersuasive. 

Under the facts of this case, Trooper Paynter's questioning was not inconsistent with his 

community caretaking functions as his questions were directed at identifying Herron after 

Herron accepted his offer for a courtesy ride to the nearest rest area. As a result, the trial 

court properly found that Trooper Paynter had the authority to ask Herron to identify 

himself without violating Herron's Fourth Amendment rights or exceeding the scope of 

his otherwise valid public safety stop. 

Search of Disabled Car

Herron's argument about Troopers Paynter and Wolf's search of the disabled car is 

similarly unpersuasive. According to Herron, because he initially contacted John's 

Wrecker and John's Wrecker was the tow service that ultimately towed his mother's 

disabled car, the car was never impounded by the KHP. Thus, he contends that the 

troopers never had lawful possession of his mother's disabled car, rendering their search 

unconstitutional. Alternatively, Herron contends that Troopers Paynter and Wolf lacked 

reasonable grounds to impound and then search his mother's disabled car because he was 

capable of disposing of the car himself for two reasons: (1) because he was of "sound 

mind" and (2) because nothing in the record indicates that Troopers Paynter or Wolf 
25

would have been further delayed had he been allowed to control the tow. In making all of 

his arguments, Herron alleges that "he arranged for [the] car to be towed prior to his 

arrest," which establishes that "[h]is efforts were not made to avoid impoundment by law 

enforcement officers."

But Herron's primary argument about Troopers Paynter and Wolf never 

impounding the disabled car ignores the timing of when he first contacted John's 

Wrecker. Although Herron alleges that he had contacted John's Wrecker before his arrest, 

Herron never mentioned John's Wrecker before his arrest. Instead, before his arrest, the 

only tow service Herron mentioned by name was "Subaru Tow." And he did not mention 

"Subaru Tow" until Trooper Wolf arrived to assist Trooper Paynter. Then, following his 

arrest, it was about another 15 minutes before Herron told Trooper Paynter that either a 

"Jodie's Tow Service" or "Joey's Tow Service" was on its way.

Also, although Trooper Paynter's dashcam video indicates that Herron simply 

misspoke when he referred to the tow service as "Jodie's" or "Joey's" instead of "John's 

Wrecker," between his arrest and when he first told Trooper Paynter about this tow 

service, Troopers Paynter and Wolf had both already told Herron that KHP was going to 

tow the disabled car. Moreover, even though Troopers Paynter and Wolf allowed Herron 

to call the tow service that he claimed he had already called following his arrest, they did 

not tell Herron that he was in control of the tow. To the contrary, after both troopers had 

told Herron that KHP was going to tow his mother's disabled car, Trooper Paynter told 

Herron that "if he needed to call [the tow service], he could go ahead." (Emphasis added.) 

In other words, Trooper Paynter told Herron that if he believed it necessary to call the 

tow service, then he could. He did not say that Herron could control the disposition of the 

car. 

Herron's contention that KHP never actually impounded his car is also inconsistent 

with what ultimately happened to his mother's disabled car. Again, Trooper Paynter 
26

started driving Herron to jail before any tow truck arrived to remove his mother's 

disabled car. Also, although Trooper Paynter's dashcam video establishes that Herron 

wanted the car towed to his mother's house, John's Wrecker towed the car to its lot. There 

is no explanation in the record on appeal why the car was towed to John's Wrecker's lot 

as opposed to Herron's mother's house. The clear takeaway from this fact, however, is 

that Herron was not in control of the disposition of the car because KHP had impounded 

it. Thus, Herron's contention that KHP never impounded the car is simply not supported 

by the record on appeal. 

Next, Herron's contention that Troopers Paynter and Wolf otherwise acted 

unreasonably by impounding and then searching his mother's disabled car ignores both 

Kansas caselaw as well as the various lies Herron told the troopers during the hour that 

preceded his arrest.

In his brief, Herron contends that he should have been allowed to dispose of the 

car himself by pointing to Kansas caselaw indicating that the owner, operator, or person 

in charge of a car should be allowed to determine the disposition of the car. See Teeter, 

249 Kan. at 552 ("'If the owner, operator or person in charge of the vehicle is readily 

available to make a determination as to the disposition of the vehicle then he may do 

so.'"). But in Shelton, our Supreme Court clarified its earlier position about allowing the 

owner, operator, or person in charge of a car to determine the disposition of the car, 

explaining as follows:

"Perhaps our court has placed too much reliance upon the opportunity of a 

driver to dispose of the vehicle rather than submit to its impoundment. However, a 

careful reading of Teeter as well as other decisions by this court on the subject establish 

that impoundment is lawful if there are 'reasonable grounds' for impoundment. Those 

earlier decisions from this court do not create a Fourth Amendment right to a police 

consultation regarding the disposition of the vehicle before impoundment may be lawful. 

Consultation is but one factor, although an important factor to be considered among the 
27

totality of the circumstances in the determination of whether impoundment is 

reasonable." 278 Kan. at 295-96. (Emphases added.) 

Based on the preceding holding, it is readily apparent that Herron's complaint about not 

being able to determine the disposition of the car cannot by itself establish that Troopers 

Paynter and Wolf's decision to impound the car was unreasonable. 

Also, the specific facts of Herron's case establish that Troopers Paynter and Wolf's 

decision to impound and then search the disabled car was entirely reasonable. For 

starters, although the State has never relied upon K.S.A. 8-1570(c)(3) to support the 

troopers' impoundment, it seems the State could have. K.S.A. 8-1570(c)(3) provides that 

law enforcement officers are

"authorized to remove or caused to be removed to the nearest garage or other 

place of safety any vehicle found on the highway when . . . the person driving or in 

control of such vehicle is arrested for an alleged offense for which the officer is required 

by law to take the person arrested before a judge of the district court without unnecessary 

delay."

Notwithstanding the fact that K.S.A. 8-1570(c)(3) seemingly provided the troopers 

with the authority to impound Herron's mother's disabled car, even under our Supreme 

Court's older precedent, our Supreme Court recognized that law enforcement may 

reasonably impound a car "'where the person responsible for its possession is unable . . . 

or unwilling to instruct the arresting officers as to the vehicle's disposition . . . .'" Teeter, 

249 Kan. at 552. Here, Herron's conduct both before and after his arrest established that 

he was unable and otherwise unwilling to instruct Troopers Paynter and Wolf as to the 

disposition of his mother's disabled car. 

To begin with, it is undisputed that Herron concealed his true identity for over an 

hour after "promis[ing]" Trooper Paynter that he was neither lying about his identity nor 
28

lying about having a valid Kansas driver's license. Indeed, even after his arrest, Herron 

continued to lie about why he had given Trooper Paynter the name "Steven Allen 

Cornelius." He alleged that telling Trooper Paynter "Steven Allen Herron" never crossed 

his mind because he had not used the last name Herron for years. Plainly, however, this 

was not true. Although Trooper Paynter did not hear him clearly, at one point during 

Trooper Paynter's questioning of Herron, Herron slipped up and said that his name was 

"Steven Allen Herron." If it had truly never crossed Herron's mind to tell Trooper Paynter 

that his name was Steven Allen Herron, then Herron would not have made this gaffe.

But this was not the only thing Herron evidently lied to Trooper Paynter about 

during their encounter. During their encounter, Herron also volunteered the following 

inconsistent information to Trooper Paynter before his arrest: 

• At first, Herron told Trooper Paynter that his mother and brother would 

bring him a spare tire. Later, he stated he was unsure if his mother 

would pick up his brother.

• At first, Herron told Trooper Paynter that his mother and brother were 

driving from Salina, Kansas. Later, he implied that his family was 

coming from out of state to help him with the disabled car.

• At first, Herron told Trooper Paynter that he had called his mother. 

Later, Herron told Trooper Paynter that his mother did not have a 

phone. 

• At first, Herron implied that only his mother owned the car. Later, he 

alleged that they both owned the car. 

• At first, Herron stated that he had doctor's appointment papers with his 

name on it in the car. As soon as Trooper Paynter asked Herron to 

produce these papers, he claimed he did not know where they were 

located.
29

In short, Herron's attempt to hide his true identity, as well as his numerous 

inconsistent statements, supports Trooper Paynter's testimony about distrusting 

Herron. And in turn, Herron's various lies before his arrest supports Trooper 

Paynter and Trooper Wolf's decision to impound Herron's mother's disabled car 

because they did not believe that Herron had actually already called a tow.

Yet, even if we were to ignore the preceding lies, Herron continued to make 

misleading statements to Troopers Paynter and Wolf following his arrest. For instance, 

the only tow service Herron had mentioned by name before his arrest was "Subaru Tow." 

And during the entire encounter with Troopers Paynter and Wolf, he mentioned "Subaru 

Tow" just once. The next reference to any tow service occurred shortly after his arrest. At 

that point, right after Trooper Paynter told Herron that KHP would be towing the disabled 

car, Herron told Trooper Paynter that he already contacted a tow. But when Trooper 

Paynter asked Herron from what town the tow truck would be coming and for the tow 

service's phone number, Herron could not answer Trooper Paynter's questions.

One would assume that if Herron had very recently used his cell phone to call 

"Subaru Tow," he could have easily provided Trooper Paynter with this information 

when asked. Even on appeal, Herron provides no explanation about what happened to the 

tow from "Subaru Tow," which he had allegedly called nearly 30 minutes before his 

arrest. Although Trooper Paynter never mentioned Herron's reference to "Subaru Tow" 

while testifying, he did testify that he did not believe Herron about having already called 

for a tow because, in addition to Herron's lies about his identity, the tow services Herron

had mentioned were unfamiliar to him.

In a nutshell, the fact that Herron claimed to have called "Subaru Tow" yet has 

never provided an explanation why "Subaru Tow" did not respond to his request for a 

tow supports that Trooper Paynter's suspicion about Herron not having called a tow was 

justified. And it further undermines Herron's contention that Troopers Paynter and Wolf 
30

should have allowed him to determine the disposition of the disabled car because he was 

"of sound mind" and because allowing him to do so would have caused no further delay. 

Clearly, throughout their encounter, Herron repeatedly obstructed with Troopers Paynter 

and Wolf as they tried to complete their duties. Indeed, this is why he was convicted for 

interference with a law enforcement officer.

Finally, Troopers Paynter and Wolf's decision to impound and then search the 

disabled car was consistent with the KHP Vehicle Tow/Inventory policy. KHP's Vehicle 

Tow/Inventory policy states that it applies "any time a vehicle is towed, transported or 

otherwise removed as an arrest authorized by K.S.A. 22-2401." Of note, K.S.A. 22-

2401(c)(1) states that a law enforcement officer may arrest a person if the officer has 

probable cause that the person committed a felony. Thus, in effect, the KHP Vehicle 

Tow/Inventory policy states that it applies any time a vehicle is towed, transported, or 

otherwise removed after an officer arrests the vehicle's driver because there is probable 

cause that the driver has committed a felony. It goes on to list several instances that are 

deemed lawful tows and searches. Section III.A.4 of the policy states that officers may 

impound and then search a vehicle when there is "[a]n arrested driver who is unable to or 

unwilling to instruct the officer as to the vehicle's disposition." And Section III.A.3 of the 

policy states that officers may impound and then search a vehicle when "[t]he person 

driving or in control of such vehicle is arrested and taken into custody and the vehicle is 

not lawfully parked." At the evidentiary hearing, Trooper Paynter explicitly testified that 

he relied on Section III.A.3 to impound and then search the disabled car.

Although Trooper Paynter did not explicitly testify that he relied on the KHP 

Vehicle Tow/Inventory policy provision about impounding and searching a vehicle when 

the arrested driver is unable to or unwilling to instruct the officer as the vehicle's 

disposition, he could have relied on this provision to impound and search the disabled 

car. Also, it is readily apparent that Trooper Paynter properly invoked Section III.A.3 of 

the policy to impound and then search Herron's mother's disabled car. Again, it is 
31

undisputed that Herron was under arrest for interfering with a law enforcement officer, 

which is a severity level 9 nonperson felony. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5904(a)(3), 

(b)(5)(A). Additionally, Herron has not disputed Trooper Paynter's testimony that the 

manner in which Herron parked his mother's disabled car on I-70's shoulder was illegal. 

See also K.S.A. 8-1571(a)(1)(ix) (stating that "no person shall . . . park a vehicle . . . [o]n 

any controlled-access highway").

Thus, to summarize, the record does not support Herron's contention that Troopers 

Paynter and Wolf never impounded his mother's disabled car and could therefore not 

legally search his mother's disabled car. Nor does the record support Herron's contention 

that the troopers otherwise lacked reasonable grounds to impound and then search his 

mother's disabled car. Instead, given Herron's repeated lies and inconsistent statements 

both before and after his arrest, the troopers reasonably decided to impound the car and 

conduct an inventory search. Their decision was consistent with our statutes, our 

Supreme Court's holdings, as well as KHP's Vehicle Tow/Inventory policy. So we 

conclude that the trial court's denial of Herron's suppression motion should be affirmed. 

Because we are affirming, it is not necessary for us to consider the State's alternative 

argument about the attenuation doctrine.

Affirmed.