[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2023-Ohio-4724.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MAHONING COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

NICHOLE R. TAYLOR,

Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Case No. 23 MA 0008

Criminal Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio

Case No. 20 CR 127A

BEFORE:

Carol Ann Robb, David A. D’Apolito, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.

JUDGMENT:

Affirmed.

Atty. Gina DeGenova, Mahoning County Prosecutor, Atty. Edward A. Czopur, Assistant 

Mahoning County Prosecutor, Mahoning County Prosecutor's Office, for Plaintiff-Appellee

and

Atty. James R. Wise, for Defendant-Appellant.

Dated: December 21, 2023
– 2 –

Case No. 23 MA 0008

Robb, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Nichole R. Taylor appeals after sentencing on the 

guilty plea she entered in the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court. She contests the 

constitutionality of the indefinite sentencing statutes known as the Reagan Tokes Law. 

For the following reasons, the trial court’s sentencing judgment is affirmed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

{¶2} On March 12, 2020, Appellant was indicted for aggravated burglary, two 

counts of attempted murder, two counts of felonious assault, and attempted arson. 

Firearm specifications were attached to all counts except attempted arson. On October 

31, 2022, she pled guilty to aggravated burglary, two counts of attempted murder, and 

the firearm specifications attached to those offenses.

{¶3} At the December 28, 2022 sentencing hearing, the court imposed prison 

terms of 9 to 13.5 years for each attempted murder, 3 to 4.5 years for aggravated burglary, 

and 3 years for the firearm specifications. Despite the state’s consecutive sentencing 

recommendation, the court imposed concurrent terms on the offenses, plus the 

mandatory consecutive term of 3 years for one firearm specification, for a total of 12 to 

16.5 years in prison. (12/29/22 J.E.).

{¶4} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On request, the case was stayed 

pending an Ohio Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes 

Law. The stay was lifted when the decision was released in State v. Hacker, __ Ohio 

St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-2535, __ N.E.3d __.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶5} Appellant’s sole assignment of error contends:

“Sentencing Defendant pursuant to the Reagan-Tokes Act violates the Separation 

of Powers and Due Process.”

{¶6} The Reagan Tokes Law went into effect on March 22, 2019. Under this law, 

the sentencing court imposes an indefinite sentence for a felony of the first or second 

degree; the court must impose both a minimum term and a maximum term. R.C. 

2929.144(C). The maximum term of imprisonment is based on a formula applied to the 
– 3 –

Case No. 23 MA 0008

minimum term chosen by the court from those available (or required) under R.C. 

2929.14(A)(1)(a) and (A)(2)(a). R.C. 2929.144(B)(1). The end of the minimum term is 

the presumptive release date. R.C. 2967.271(B) (unless “earned early release” occurs1). 

The propriety of releasing the offender on the presumptive date is rebuttable at a hearing 

if the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) determines the prisoner's 

institutional conduct meets one of the criteria in R.C. 2967.271(C)(1)-(3), in which case 

the DRC can “maintain” incarceration for an additional period not to exceed the maximum 

sentence. R.C. 2967.271(D)(1). The prisoner will receive notice of the hearing in the same 

manner applicable to hearings regarding possible release on parole. R.C. 2967.271(E).

{¶7} First, Appellant argues the sentencing scheme in the Reagan Tokes Law 

violates separation of powers principles. She says the legislative branch 

unconstitutionally provided the executive branch with power to encroach upon the powers 

reserved to the judicial branch. She equates the Reagan Tokes Law with the state’s 

former “bad time” law (R.C. 2967.11), which was found unconstitutional by the Ohio 

Supreme Court because it was viewed as allowing the executive branch to try, convict, 

and sentence prisoners for offenses committed in prison. See State ex rel. Bray v. 

Russell, 89 Ohio St.3d 132, 136, 729 N.E.2d 359 (2000).

{¶8} The Ohio Supreme Court recently rejected this comparison in Hacker where 

the Court pointed to a subsequent decision on the post-release control statute (R.C. 

2967.28), wherein the Court explained that any additional sentence was part of the 

sentence imposed by the sentencing court. Hacker, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-2535, 

¶ 17-25, citing Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000) (superseded 

by statute on other grounds). The Hacker Court found sentencing under the Reagan 

Tokes Law was analogous to the post-release control statute analyzed in Woods because 

if the DRC determines “the presumption of release is rebutted as the result of an 

offender's behavior during his incarceration, [then] the additional time that the offender 

may have to serve is limited by the sentence that has already been imposed by the trial 

court.” Id. at ¶ 23. 

1 The DRC director may also recommend to the sentencing court a prisoner's early release from the 

minimum, giving rise to a rebuttable presumption of early release. R.C. 2967.271(A)(2),(F).
– 4 –

Case No. 23 MA 0008

{¶9} Accordingly, the Court in Hacker concluded: “allowing the DRC to rebut the 

presumption of release for disciplinary reasons does not exceed the power given to the 

executive branch and does not interfere with the trial court's discretion when sentencing 

an offender. Therefore, we hold that the Reagan Tokes Law does not violate the 

separation-of-powers doctrine.” Id. at ¶ 25. Upon such precedent, Appellant’s separation 

of powers argument is hereby overruled.

{¶10} Second, Appellant argues the Reagan Tokes Law violates the due process 

clause of the federal and state constitutions. She emphasizes a prisoner retains some 

due process rights during their incarceration. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467, 103 

S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (while observing, “[if] the conditions or degree of 

confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him 

and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, [then] the Due Process Clause does not 

in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight”). She 

points out the challenged statute specifically calls the extended term an “additional period 

of incarceration.” R.C. 2967.271(D). She concludes the rebuttable presumption of 

release at the end of the minimum term in R.C. 2967.271(B) and (C) creates a liberty 

interest that invokes due process protections including a right to fair procedures and a fair 

hearing before she can be “maintained” in prison. 

{¶11} Appellant reasons the imposition of an additional period of incarceration 

after the minimum sentence is served is violative of these principles because DRC will 

use discretion in an adversarial manner to adjudicate the merits of its own evidence 

presented in rebuttal of her presumptive release date without providing the right to a 

neutral magistrate. She quotes: “It is a fundamental tenet of due process that the 

decision to restrict an individual's freedom can only be made by a neutral magistrate, not 

by law enforcement officials whose primary purpose is to place offenders in jail.” White 

v. Konteh, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 99-T-0020 (Mar. 23, 1999) (finding the bad time statute 

violated due process). We note the appeal of the White case was consolidated with the 

Supreme Court’s Bray case, wherein the Court based the ruling only on separation of 

powers grounds. Bray, 89 Ohio St.3d at 133-134.

{¶12} In the recent Hacker decision, the Supreme Court rejected due process 

claims that the Reagan Tokes Law was void for vagueness, provided inadequate notice 
– 5 –

Case No. 23 MA 0008

about what would trigger continued incarceration, and provided “unfettered discretion” to 

DRC officials. Hacker, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-2535 at ¶ 30-34. The Supreme 

Court also rejected the argument that the law was insufficient to protect procedural due 

process rights, pointing out the statute provides for a hearing before offenders are 

deprived of the interest granted by the statute. Id. at ¶ 35-40, citing R.C. 2967.271(C). 

The Court concluded the terms of the Reagan Tokes Law do not deprive offenders of 

notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 

Id. at ¶ 39 (refusing to speculate on any hypotheticals involving the specifics of a future 

hearing). 

{¶13} In previously analyzing due process arguments on the Reagan Tokes Law, 

we looked to parole hearings where “the procedures required are minimal” but provide 

adequate due process if the inmate is provided meaningful notice and opportunity to be 

heard. State v. Rose, 2022-Ohio-3529, 202 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 75 (7th Dist.), quoting Swarthout 

v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220, 131 S.Ct. 859, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011). We pointed out the 

Reagan Tokes Law provides notice before a hearing and concluded DRC’s discretion 

when determining whether to extend the minimum incarceration term (where the 

maximum was also imposed by a court at sentencing) is not distinguishable from the 

discretion exercised when determining parole issues. Id. at ¶ 74, 77. Based on these 

observations and the ruling in Hacker, Appellant’s second argument is without merit.

{¶14} For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment sentencing Appellant 

under the Reagan Tokes Law is affirmed.

D’Apolito, P.J., concurs.

Hanni, J., concurs.
[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2023-Ohio-4724.]

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error is 

overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the Court 

of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs waived.

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in 

this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a 

certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.