IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

DALLAS DIVISION 

DE-ERIC COOPER, § 

 Plaintiff, § 

v. § Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-0521-K-BH 

 § 

NATIONAL CREDIT ADJUSTERS, LLC, § 

 Defendant. § Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Before the Court is Defendant National Credit Adjusters, LLC.’s Motion to Dismiss 

Pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1) and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed June 6, 2022 (doc. 

13). Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the motion to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction should be GRANTED, and the motion for judgment on the pleadings should 

be DENIED AS MOOT. 

I. BACKGROUND

On March 4, 2022, De-Eric Cooper (Plaintiff) sued National Credit Adjusters, LLC 

(Defendant) for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. 

(FDCPA). (doc. 3.) He contends that on or about November 3, 2021, Ta’Daria Lee (Third Party) 

reviewed her credit report and observed a trade line from Defendant for $451 allegedly owed to 

“Speedy Cash.” (Id. at 3.)2

 She disputed the debt via mail on December 14, 2021, and Defendant 

responded by letter dated February 17, 2022. (Id.) When she checked her credit reports on March 

1

By Special Order 3-251, this pro se case was automatically referred for full case management. 

2

 Citations to the record refer to the CM/ECF system page number at the top of each page rather than the 

page numbers at the bottom of each filing. 

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4, 2022, she found that Defendant had not reported the dispute. (Id. at 3.) This materially lowered 

her credit score, which severely damaged her personal and credit reputation and caused her severe 

humiliation, emotional distress and mental anguish. (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant 

violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) of the FDCPA by failing to disclose to consumer reporting agencies 

that the debt was under dispute. (Id. at 4.) Third Party allegedly assigned “100 percent of these 

claim(s)” to Plaintiff. (Id. at 2.) He seeks actual damages, statutory damages and costs under 15 

U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1), § 1692k(2)(A), and § 1692k(3), respectively. (Id. at 1, 4-5.) 

On June 6, 2022, Defendant moved to dismiss this action under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. (doc. 13.) Plaintiff did not respond. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges a federal court's subject matter 

jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without 

jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims. 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). They 

“must presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing 

federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 

F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). 

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion “may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at 

any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 

546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006). A court must dismiss the action if it determines that it lacks jurisdiction 

over the subject matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 

144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). “When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 

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motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any 

attack on the merits.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 

A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) “is not a determination of the merits,” and it “does not prevent 

the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does have proper jurisdiction.” Id. Accordingly, 

considering Rule 12(b)(1) motions first “prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely 

dismissing a case with prejudice.” Id.

The district court may dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on (1) the 

complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the 

complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. 

Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981). A motion to dismiss based on the 

complaint alone presents a “facial attack” that requires the court to merely decide whether the 

allegations in the complaint, which are presumed to be true, sufficiently state a basis for subject 

matter jurisdiction. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1998). “If sufficient, 

those allegations alone provide jurisdiction.” Id. Facial attacks are usually made early in the 

proceedings. Id. Regardless, the party asserting federal jurisdiction continually carries the burden 

of proof to show it exists. Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. 

Here, Defendant’s motion to dismiss relies solely on Plaintiff’s original complaint. (See

doc. 14.) The motion therefore presents a facial attack that does not require the resolution of factual 

matters outside of the pleadings. See Williamson, 645 F.2d at 412-13. 

III. STANDING 

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue claims based on alleged harm to 

Third Party. (doc. 14.) 

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 Under the United States Constitution, the “judicial Power of the United States” extends 

only to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. CONST. Art. III. §§ 1-2; U.S. Parole Comm’n v. 

Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395 (1980)(“Article III of the Constitution limits federal ‘Judicial Power,’ 

that is, federal-court jurisdiction, to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’”). “No principle is more 

fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional 

limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare 

Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)). “One element 

of the case-or-controversy requirement is that [plaintiffs], based on their complaint, must establish 

that they have standing to sue.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). Like other jurisdictional 

requirements, this requirement is “not subject to waiver,” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 n.1 

(1996), and the Supreme Court “insist[s] on strict compliance” with it, Raines, 521 U.S. at 819. 

Courts must decide issues of standing before all other issues because it “determines the court’s 

fundamental power even to hear the suit.” Ford v. NYLCare Health Plans of Gulf Coast, Inc., 301 

F.3d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 2002). 

 To establish standing, “[the] plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is 

fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by 

a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan 

v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). “The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal 

jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing these elements[, and when] a case is at the pleading 

stage, the plaintiff must ‘clearly... allege facts demonstrating’ each element.” Id. (citations 

omitted); see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1998) (“The triad of 

injury in fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of Article III’s case-or-controversy 

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requirement, and the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its 

existence.”). “[I]f the plaintiff does not carry his burden clearly to allege facts demonstrating that 

he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute, then dismissal for lack of standing 

is appropriate.” Hotze v. Burwell, 784 F.3d 984, 933 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. City 

of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)). 

 Injury in fact is “the ‘[f]irst and foremost’ of standing’s three elements.” Spokeo, 136 S. 

Ct. at 1547 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)). “To 

establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally 

protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical.’” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560) (quotations omitted). A “particularized” injury 

“affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548. A “concrete” 

injury actually exists, which means it is real and not abstract. Id. (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 

479 (9th ed. 2009)). 

 Here, Plaintiff does not allege facts to show he suffered a particularized injury that affects 

him in a personal and individual way. Rather, he alleges that Third Party suffered a particularized 

injury that gives rise to an FDCPA claim against Defendant, i.e., that her credit score was lowered 

because Defendant did not list her debt as disputed, and that she assigned 100 percent of her 

FDCPA claim to him. Although Plaintiff attaches a document purporting to be an assignment, the 

document is unsigned. Nevertheless, his allegation that Third Party assigned her FDCPA claim to 

him is presumed to be true for purposes of Defendant’s facial attack on his complaint. See 

Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523. 

Neither the United Supreme Court nor the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

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Circuit appears to have addressed whether the FDCPA claim asserted by Plaintiff in this case may 

be assigned. District courts which have recently considered this issue have noted that the FDCPA 

does not expressly permit assignment, and that it specifically provides for recovery of damages by 

the person who is a victim of an FDCPA violation. See Lottie v. Midland Credit Management, 

Inc., No. CIV-21-1171-PRW, 2022 WL 2286768, at *2 (W.D. Okla. June 23, 2022); James v. 

Puget Sound Collections, No. 22-5237 RJB, 2022 WL 2357050, at *2–3 (W.D. Wash. June 30, 

2022). For this reason, they have looked to state law to determine assignability of a claim under 

that statute. See Jones v. Credit Control Corp., No. 4:22cv5, 2022 WL 3924215, at *2–4 (E.D. Va. 

Aug. 29, 2022) (finding that FDCPA claim was not assignable under Virginia law, which only 

permitted assignment of causes of action for damage to real or personal property and contract 

claims); Lottie, 2022 WL 2286768, at *2 (turning to state law for guidance “[g]iven th[e] silence 

from the federal regime”, and finding that an FDCPA claim could not be assigned because 

Oklahoma prohibits assignment of claims not arising out of a contract); James, 2022 WL 2357050, 

at *2–3 (finding that Washington law required “specific statutory authorization” for assignment of 

a claim, including one under the FDCPA, and that the plaintiff had failed to identify such 

authorization). 

Resort to state law is likewise appropriate in this case. “There is no federal law of 

assignments, and the Fifth Circuit has held that the validity of a particular assignment of a federal 

cause of action is governed by the state law that the appropriate conflict of laws principles dictate 

should control the contract” of assignment. Nicolls Pointing Coulson, Ltd. v. Transportation 

Underwriters of Louisiana, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 493, 496 (E.D. La.1991) (citing Martin v. Morgan 

Drive Away, Inc., 665 F.2d 598 (5th Cir.1982). In Martin, the Fifth Circuit looked to state law to 

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determine whether assignment of a federal antitrust claim, which was not precluded by federal 

law, was void under state law champerty doctrines. See 665 F. 2d at 604 (citing Sampliner v. 

Motion Picture Patents Co., 255 F. 244 (2d Cir.1918), rev’d on other grounds, 254 U.S. 233 (1920) 

(finding Sherman Act claim assignable but applying Ohio law to decide whether the assignment 

was invalid for champerty)). “In doing so, the court distinguished between the federal nature of 

the claims and the law governing the form of the assignment of the claims.” In re East Cameron 

Partners, L.P., No. 2011 WL 4625368, at *2–3 (Bankr. W.D. La. June 23, 2011) (discussing 

Martin). In contrast to the federal antitrust claim in Martin, however, no court appears to have 

found that an FDCPA claim is assignable under federal law. 

Although the Texas Supreme Court does not appear to have specifically addressed the 

assignability of claims under the Texas Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, it has considered the 

assignability of claims under another consumer protection law, the Texas Deceptive Trade 

Practices Act (TDTPA). See PGG Indus. v. JMB/Houston Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship, 146 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. 

2004). In that case, it observed generally that: 

With respect to the assignment of claims, we have recognized the collapse of the 

common-law rule that generally prohibited such assignments. But the assignability of 

most claims does not mean all are assignable; exceptions may be required due to equity 

and public policy. Courts addressing assignability have often distinguished between 

claims that are property-based and remedial and claims that are personal and punitive, 

holding that the former are assignable and the latter are not. 

PGG Indus., 146 S.W.3d at 87 (cleaned up). TDTPA claims, it found, “clearly fall in the latter 

category.” Id. It also found that the permitting assignment of those claims to a non-consumer was 

inconsistent with the purpose of the statutory cause of action. See id. at 92; see also Southwestern 

Bell Telephone Co. v. Marketing on Hold Inc., 308 S.W.3d 909, 916–17 (Tex. 2010) (citing PPG 

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Indus., 146 S.W.3d at 92, as an example of an assignment invalidated as inconsistent with statutory 

purpose); Encompass Office Solutions, Inc. v. Ingenix, Inc., 775 F.Supp.2d 938, 961–62 (E.D. Tex. 

2011) (noting that the Texas Supreme Court has held that DTPA claims generally cannot be 

assigned because it would defeat the primary purposes of the statute, which is to encourage 

individual consumers to bring the claims themselves). This reasoning is equally applicable to the 

FDCPA claim that Plaintiff asserts. There appears to be no basis for finding that assignment of 

this consumer claim is consistent with, or would be permitted by, Texas law. Accordingly, the 

purported assignment of Third Party’s FDCPA claim to Plaintiff is invalid under Texas law. 

Because the purported assignment of the FDCPA claim is invalid, Plaintiff cannot show an 

injury in fact for purposes of standing to bring this action. District courts in other circuits which 

have considered the assignability of FDCPA claims under state law have uniformly reached the 

same result. See Jones, 2022 WL 3924215, at *2–4 (finding that a plaintiff who “ha[d] been 

assigned 100 percent” of another’s FDCPA claim lacked standing because the assignment was 

invalid under state law) (collecting cases); Dotson v. Transworld Sys., No. CIV-22-29, 2022 WL 

2655785 (W.D. Okla. July 8, 2022) (same); Lottie, 2022 WL 2286768, at *2 (noting that on at 

least three separate occasions, judges in that district had examined the precise issue and concluded 

that the attempted assignment of FDCPA claims to the same plaintiff was barred by state law, and 

he had no standing to prosecute those claims against credit collectors); James, 2022 WL 2357050, 

at *2–3 (finding that the plaintiff failed to show that he had standing under the FDCPA or that the 

assignment was valid under state law). 

This is also the same conclusion reached under substantially similar facts by the Eastern 

District of Texas, although it did not expressly consider the applicability of Texas law. In Young 

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v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, No. 6:22-cv-00081-JCB-JDL, 2022 WL 2163821, *2 (E.D. 

Tex. May 20, 2022), rec. adopted, 2022 WL 2161027 (E.D. June 15, 2022), the plaintiff also sued 

under the FDCPA based on the alleged lowering of another person’s credit score due to the 

defendant’s failure to list that person’s debt as disputed, alleging that the claim had been assigned 

to him. Noting a lack of authority allowing assignment of the FDCPA claim, the Eastern District 

found that the plaintiff had failed to allege an injury suffered by him or any basis that would give 

him standing to bring the claim as alleged. See id. As in Young, Plaintiff has likewise alleged no 

other basis that would support standing. 

In conclusion, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the requirements for Article III standing to 

bring this action under the FDCPA, and subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.3

IV. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND 

 Notwithstanding their failure to plead sufficient facts, the Fifth Circuit is inclined to give pro 

se plaintiffs several opportunities to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Rodriguez 

v. United States, 66 F.3d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1995). Courts therefore typically allow pro se plaintiffs 

to amend their complaints when the action is to be dismissed pursuant to a court order. See Thomas 

v. Texas, No. 3:17-CV-0348-N-BH, 2017 WL 11496979, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 19, 2017). A pro 

se plaintiff may also obtain leave to amend his complaint in response to a recommended 

dismissal. See id. Nonetheless, courts may appropriately dismiss an action with prejudice without 

giving an opportunity to amend when the plaintiff fails to respond to a motion to dismiss after 

3 Because Plaintiff has not shown that he has standing to sue under the FDCPA, it is unnecessary to reach 

Defendant’s alternative ground for dismissal, i.e., that the assignment would constitute or abet the unauthorized 

practice of law. (See doc. 14 at 8-9.) Defendant’s alternative motion for judgment on the pleadings is moot. 

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being specifically invited to do so by the court, the defendant has specifically noted the failure to 

respond, and the plaintiff has had ample opportunity to amend the complaint. Rodriguez, 66 F.3d 

at 97. Dismissal with prejudice is also appropriate if a court finds that the plaintiff has alleged his 

or her best case. Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999). 

Here, Plaintiff failed to respond to the motion to dismiss despite being specifically invited 

to do so. In addition, he has alleged his best case because the alleged assignment upon which this 

action is based is not valid, and he has alleged no other basis that would support a finding that he 

has standing to sue under the FDCPA. No further opportunity to amend is warranted. 

V. RECOMMENDATION

 Defendant’s motion to dismiss should be GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s complaint should be 

DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The alternative motion for 

judgment on the pleadings should be DENIED AS MOOT. 

 SO RECOMMENDED on this 28th day of November, 2022. 

 

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT 

 A copy of these findings, conclusions and recommendation shall be served on all parties in 

the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions and 

recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a 

copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must 

identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the 

objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions and 

recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates 

by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file 

specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and 

legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except 

upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 

(5th Cir. 1996). 

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