[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-13935

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 0:18-cr-60061-FAM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ANTHONY CHARLES DWIGHT BOX, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_______________________

(July 12, 2019)

Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Anthony Charles Dwight Box appeals his 36-month sentence imposed 

pursuant to a guilty plea for theft of government money in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 641.1 Box argues that the sentence is unreasonable because, in imposing an 

upward variance from the sentencing Guideline range of 24 to 30 months, the 

district court erred in relying upon (1) his education level, (2) his 1989 conviction 

for possession of counterfeit currency with the intent to defraud, and (3) his failure 

to pay restitution. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

A federal grand jury indicted Box on one count of theft of government 

money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 and five counts of money laundering in 

 1

Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use 

of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher, 

money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency 

thereof, or any property made or being made under contract for the United States 

or any department or agency thereof; or

Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it to his use 

or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted—

Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but 

if the value of such property in the aggregate, combining amounts from all the 

counts for which the defendant is convicted in a single case, does not exceed the 

sum of $1,000, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one 

year, or both.

The word “value” means face, par, or market value, or cost price, either wholesale 

or retail, whichever is greater.

18 U.S.C. § 641.

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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. Box pleaded guilty to the theft of government 

money count in exchange for the dismissal of the other counts.

According to the Presentence Investigation Report, Box falsely reported on 

his 2011 tax return that he had gross gambling winnings of $3,775,000 from a 

poker tournament, $1,057,000 in tax withholdings, and $3,525,266 in gambling 

losses, resulting in a claimed refund of over $900,000. The IRS approved payment

of the refund, applied $250,000 to Box’s 2005 and 2006 tax liabilities, and issued a

check to Box for the remaining $735,463.69.

Box’s base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(2) was six. 

Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b), a 14-level increase was imposed because the loss 

amount was greater than $550,000 but less than $1,500,000. After a 3-level 

decrease for acceptance of responsibility, the total offense level was 17. Box’s

criminal history reflected a 1989 conviction for possession of counterfeit federal 

reserve notes with the intent to defraud that had resulted in a sentence of two years 

of probation. The PSI did not add any criminal history points for the conviction, 

resulting in a criminal history category of I. Based on the total offense level and 

criminal history category, the Guideline range was 24 to 30 months. The PSI also 

reflected that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663A and U.S.S.G. § 5E1.1, Box owed 

mandatory restitution to the IRS in the amount of $988,175.

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At the sentencing hearing, the court asked what happened to the money that 

Box had received from the IRS. Box explained that, due to offsets, the check Box 

received from the IRS was in the amount of $735,000, $260,000 went to the person 

who helped Box file the tax return, $200,000 went to a broker, $120,000 was 

invested in a business that failed, and $150,000 was “just spent on, you know, 

living life.” Box explained that he had not paid any money toward restitution. Box 

requested a Guideline sentence, and the government recommended a sentence at 

the low end of the guidelines range.

The court expressed concern over the government’s recommendation 

because of Box’s 1989 conviction, which meant that “he should have known 

better.” Further, the court noted that the crime of conviction was a fraud-related 

offense similar to that at issue here and that “[p]eople who commit fraud have a 

tendency to repeat their fraud.” The court also explained that Box’s law degree and 

master’s degree counseled in favor of a harsher sentence “because [he’s] been 

given opportunities.” In sum, the court explained that it was imposing an upward 

variance because of the 1989 conviction, Box’s educational background, and the 

fact that no restitution had been paid. The court sentenced Box to 36 months 

imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release and imposed restitution in the 

amount of $988,175. The court gave Box an opportunity to object to the 

reasonableness of the sentence, but he did not do so.

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II. DISCUSSION

Box says that he is challenging his sentence on the grounds of 

reasonableness without specifying whether he means procedural or substantive 

reasonableness. The government reads his brief as raising only substantive 

reasonableness. We agree with that assessment.2

This Court generally reviews the substantive reasonableness of a sentence 

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 

2014). However, in this case, Box failed to object to the substantive reasonableness 

of his sentence, which raises the issue of whether we should review his sentence 

for plain error. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to decide whether 

abuse of discretion or plain error review applies when the defendant has failed to 

object to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, Holguin-Hernandez v. 

United States, -- S. Ct. --, 2019 WL 429919 (June 3, 2019). Accordingly, in an 

abundance of caution, and because Box’s arguments fail under either standard of 

review, we apply the more lenient standard of abuse of discretion.

 2 To the extent Box challenges his sentence on grounds of procedural reasonableness, because he 

did not so object at the time of sentencing, this Court reviews for plain error. United States v. 

Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). To prevail on plain error review, the 

appellant must “demonstrate (1) that the district court erred; (2) that the error was ‘plain’; and (3) 

that the error ‘affect[ed his] substantial rights.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 

725, 732, 734 (1993)). A district court commits procedural error when it miscalculates the 

Guideline range, treats the Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the relevant § 3553(a) 

factors, selects a sentence based on erroneous facts, or fails to explain the sentence selected. Gall 

v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The district court did not commit any of these errors, 

and thus, did not plainly err. 

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“The party challenging a sentence has the burden of showing that the 

sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a) factors, and the 

substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 

789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015). “A district court abuses its considerable 

discretion and imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence only when it 

‘(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant 

weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or 

(3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.’” Id.

(quoting United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)).

When reviewing the reasonableness of an out-of-guidelines sentence, we

“may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to the 

district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of 

the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We will vacate a sentence “if, but only if, we 

‘are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a 

clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence 

that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the 

case.’” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (quoting United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 

(11th Cir. 2008)).

Under § 3553(a), a sentencing court must impose a sentence that is 

“sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” in 

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§ 3553(a)(2), which include the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, 

promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal 

conduct, and protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court must also consider other statutory factors, 

including, as relevant here, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant; “the kinds of sentences available”; and 

“the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar 

records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), 

(3), (6). The court is not required to discuss or state each factor explicitly; it is 

sufficient for the court to acknowledge that it has considered the defendant’s 

arguments and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 

1324 (11th Cir. 2008). Although the court must consider all applicable § 3553(a) 

factors, the weight given to any specific factor is committed to the sound discretion 

of the district court. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. A district court is permitted 

to consider lack of remorse in its § 3553(a) analysis “as to several factors, such as 

the characteristics of a defendant, the need to promote respect for the law, and the 

need to protect society.” United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1231 (11th Cir. 

2010).

Box has not met his burden of proving his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. We address each of Box’s three specific objections to his sentence in 

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turn. The district court made an individualized assessment based on the facts 

before it and the § 3553(a) factors. Although the court focused on Box’s history 

and characteristics as well as deterrence, it was within its discretion to give great 

weight to these factors. See Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. The district court’s 

upward variance resulting in a 36-month sentence that was 6 months more than the 

Guideline range is significantly less than the statutory maximum of ten years, 18 

U.S.C. § 641, which is another indicator of reasonableness. See Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 

at 1324. For the reasons that follow, none of Box’s four specific objections to his 

sentence persuade us that the sentence is nevertheless unreasonable. 

First, Box argues that the sentence is unreasonable because the district court 

relied on his failure to pay any money toward his $988,175 mandatory restitution.

This Court has recognized that a defendant’s “inability to pay restitution in full [is]

an impermissible factor in so far as it is not among the factors listed in § 3553(a).”

United States v. Plate, 839 F.3d 950, 957 (11th Cir. 2016). However, that is not to 

say that restitution is irrelevant as § 3553 requires the district court to consider “the 

need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.” Id. at n.6 (quoting 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7).

Here, the context shows that district court did not consider restitution in 

terms of Box’s inability to pay but with respect to the appropriate factor of the 

nature and circumstances of the offense and the characteristics of the defendant.

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The court asked Box how much money he received from the IRS to which Box 

responded that he received $735,000. The court then asked where the money went.

Box responded that $260,000 went to the person who helped him file the tax 

return, $200,000 went to a broker, $120,000 was invested in a business that failed, 

and $150,000 was “just spent on, you know, living life.” The district court then 

asked how much Box had paid back to which he responded “zero.” The district 

court then said that it was imposing an upward variance based on the fact that “no 

amount of restitution has been paid,” Box’s educational background, and Box’s 

previous conviction.

The district court could within its discretion, and as one factor in the 

analysis, consider Box’s lack of remorse and callous disregard for the 

consequences of his actions in stealing money from the government, failing to give 

an accounting of where a substantial amount of that money went, and failing to pay

any of it back or develop a plan to do so. See McNair, 605 F.3d at 1231. Although 

the district court did not state explicitly that it was considering restitution in this 

light, it is clear from the court’s discussion that it was. See United States v. 

Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013) (“the district court should set forth 

enough information to satisfy the reviewing court [that it] has considered the 

parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for making its decision” but need not 

state that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors).

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Second, Box argues the district court abused its discretion in considering his 

level of education, including his master’s degree and law degree. The district court 

explained that it thought a more severe sentence appropriate for someone who is 

more highly educated because that person has had more opportunities than 

someone who is less educated. The government expressed that it did not 

necessarily agree with this general proposition but that in Box’s case, his level of 

education showed that he “knew better.” One of the § 3553(a) factors is the history 

and characteristics of the defendant, which could include the defendant’s education 

level. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information 

concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an 

offense” for sentencing purposes). 

Third, Box argues the district court abused its discretion in considering his 

1989 conviction for possession of counterfeit currency with the intent to defraud. 

He argues that the court should not have considered the conviction because it was 

25 years old and it would not have increased his Guidelines range even if it had 

been counted toward his criminal history. The conviction was nevertheless an 

appropriate consideration for the court as it relates to “the history and 

characteristics of the defendant.” See United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 

1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that consideration of previous fraud-related 

crimes “fits squarely into one of the § 3553(a) factors, the history and 

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characteristics of the offender”). Further, the court explained that its specific 

concern with the conviction was that it was another fraud-related conviction, and

thus it was appropriate for the court to consider Box’s previous conviction in order 

“to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B). 

Finally, Box argues that the court should have considered his involvement in 

civic organizations as a mitigating factor. However, the court is not required to 

discuss every mitigating factor, and here, Box’s involvement in civic organizations

does not “compel the conclusion that the sentence crafted in accordance with the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors was substantively unreasonable.” United States v. 

Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 873 (11th Cir. 2010). 

In sum, Box failed to meet his burden of showing that the district court 

abused its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence. Because the district 

court did not abuse its discretion, Box has also failed to show plain error. 

AFFIRMED. 

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