alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Order entered March 20 , 2020

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05
- 19
- 00987
- CR
BRANDON CHARLES SAMP SON, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 28 2 nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F18
- 75082
- S

ORDER Before the Court are pro se appellant’s March 3, 2020 and March 17, 2020 motion s for extension of time to file his pro se response to counsel’s Anders brief.
We GRA NT the motion s an d extend the time to file appellant’s pro se response to June 5 , 2020

. We DIRECT the Clerk to transmit a copy of this order by electronic transmission to counsel for the parties.– 2

–

We further DIRECT the Clerk to send a copy of this order, b y first class mai l, to Brandon Charles Sampson; TDCJ No. 02287033; Coffield Unit; 2661 FM 2054; Tennessee Colony, Texas 75884

- 5000.

/s/ CORY L. CARLYLE JUSTICE
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

RESEARCH TRIANGLE PARK, NC 27711 

The Honorable Jamilah Nasheed 

State Senator 

District 05 

201 West Capitol Avenue 

Jefferson City, Missouri 65101-6806 

Dear Senator Nasheed: 

AUG 2 2 2014 

OFFICE OF 

AIR QUALITY PLANNING 

AND STANDARDS 

Thank you for your letter of July 29, 2014, to United States Environmental Protection Agency 

Administrator McCarthy regarding the EPA's review of the national ambient air quality standards 

(NAAQS) for ozone. The Administrator asked that I respond on her behalf. 

The EPA is currently in the midst of reviewing the ozone NAAQS. We expects to complete its review 

and issue a proposed rule reflecting the Administrator's decision about the appropriateness of revising 

the standards by December 1, 2014. As we move forward, we will take into account your comments in 

favor of tightening the 8-hour primary ozone standard to a level of 60 parts per billion (ppb ). 

Under the Clean Air Act, decisions regarding the NAAQS must be based solely on an evaluation of the 

health and environmental effects evidence. The EPA is prohibited from considering costs or ease of 

implementation in setting the NAAQS. However, once the Administrator has determined the appropriate 

level for the standards, costs are carefully considered as part of the implementation process. 

Your comments and recommendations will be forwarded to the docket for this rulemaking (Docket ID 

No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2008-0699) so that they may be considered, along with the recommendations of 

the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, and other comments received, as the EPA develops its 

proposed decision. 

Again, thank you for your letter. I appreciate the opportunity to be of service, and hope this information 

has been helpful to you. 

Sincerely, 

vrvv)\" {\,, ___ <i)~ tephenD.~ Director 

Office of Air Quality Planning 

and Standards 

Internet Address (URL) • http://www.epa.gov 

Recycled/Recyclable • Printed wHh Vegetable Oil Based Inks on Recycled Paper (Minimum 25% Postconsumer)
#### BYRD v. STATE.

No. 24732.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 5, 1950.

*859None on appeal for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

The appeal is from a conviction for assault to murder with malice, in which' the jury fixed a penalty of fifteen years in the penitentiary.

The record is before us without bills of ■exception and without statement of facts. No brief has begn filed- in behalf of appellant and we are not advised of any issue iupon which a reversal is sought.

The judgment in this case contains the jury’s verdict assessing the penalty at fifteen years. It then declares that •appellant shall be confined in the penitentiary “for a term of not less than 2 nor more than 15 years.” We have consistently held such judgments to-be void when assessed by the court upon a plea of guilty without a jury verdict fixing a definite penalty. However, when a case is appealed to this court, and the jury’s verdict gives us the basis for correcting the judgment, we have consistently done so. Accordingly, the judgment is reformed so as to read: It is therefore considered, ordered and adjudged by the Court that the Defendant, James Byrd, is guilty of the offense of Assault with intent to murder, as found by the jury, and that he be punished by confinement in the State Penitentiary for a term of fifteen years, and that the State of Texas do have and recover of the said Defendant James Byrd all costs in this prosecution expended, for which let execution issue.

The judgment must state a specific term of years. In this case the sentence correctly applies the indeterminate sentence law.

The judgment of the trial court as reformed is hereby affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 210 (Monday, October 30, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 64696]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-27766]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. RT01-34-000]


Southwest Power Pool, Inc.; Notice of Filing

October 24, 2000.
    Take notice that on October 20, 2000, Southwest Power Pool, Inc. 
(SPP) filed a corrected version of Exhibit No. SPP-3 which includes a 
redlined SPP RTO Membership Agreement that highlights all of the 
changes to the existing Membership Agreement. SPP also submitted the 
attached Exhibit List of all SPP exhibits includes in the October 13 
filing.
    Any person desiring to be heard or to protest such filing should 
file a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20426, in 
accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice 
and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). All such motions and 
protests should be filed on or before November 20, 2000. Protests will 
be considered by the Commission to determine the appropriate action to 
be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the 
proceedings. Any person wishing to become a party must file a motion to 
intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and 
are available for public inspection. This filing may also be viewed on 
the Internet at http://www.ferc.fed.us/online/rims.htm (call 202-208-
2222 for assistance). Beginning November 1, 2000, comments and protests 
may be filed electronically via the internet in lieu of paper. See, 18 
CFR 385.2001(a)(1)(iii) and the instructions on the Commission's web 
site at http://www.ferc.fed.us/efi/doorbell.htm.

David P. Boergers,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 00-27766 Filed 10-27-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3268 

Eliminating the debt ceiling for a period defined, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

OCTOBER 5, 2013 

Mr. GRAYSON introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

Eliminating the debt ceiling for a period defined, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Fiscal Sanity Act for 

5 the National Debt’’. 

6 SEC. 2. NONAPPLICABILITY OF DEBT CEILING. 

7 Section 3101(b) of title 31, United States Code, shall 

8 not apply for the period beginning on the date of the en9 actment of this Act and ending 300 days thereafter. 

Æ 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### JOHNSON v. STATE.

No. 23892.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 28, 1948.

Merrill & Scott, of Houston, for appellant.

A. C. Winborn, Cr. Dist. Atty., and E. T. Branch, Asst. Cr. Dist. Atty., both of Houston, and Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

The offense is negligent homicide. The punishment assessed is confinement in the county jail for a period of six months.

The complaint and information contain two counts. In the first count appellant was charged with negligent homicide in the second degree. In the second count he was charged with negligent homicide in the first degree. A trial before the court without the intervention of a jury resulted in his conviction of negligent homicide in the first degree. Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction of negligent homicide in the first degree.

The record shows that appellant was driving an automobile on the right side of Harrisburg Blvd. at nighttime at the rate of 20 to 25 miles per hour; that when he reached a point about half-way between two diagonal streets intersecting Harrisburg Blvd. he struck the deceased who was either coming from between two parked automobiles or emerging from his own automobile on the left side thereof. No one, so far as the record shows, saw the collision who might have related just how it occurred. Appellant testified that he kept a proper lookout but did not see the deceased; that he did not know he had struck anyone; that he realized he had struck something but was under the impression that he had scraped the fender of a parked car; that he did not stop to investigate what he had struck since he did not see any person whom he might have struck.

Art. 1231, Vernon’s Ann.P.C., provides as follows:

> “Whoever in the performance of a lawful act shall by negligence and carelessness cause the death of another is guilty of negligent homicide of the first degree. A lawful act is one not forbidden by the penal law and which would give no just occasion for a civil action.”

Art. 1232, Vernon’s Ann.P.C., provides as follows:

> “To constitute this offense there must be an apparent danger of causing the death of the person killed or some other.”

 As pointed out above, in order to constitute the offense of negligent homicide in the first degree there must be an apparent danger of causing the death of the person killed or some other. In the instant case, there is no evidence that appellant saw the deceased, or could have seen him, nor did he know that he was there. Hence, there was no apparent danger. Therefore, the evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment.

*872For the error herein pointed out, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal' Appeals and approved by the Court.
RUSTY TABAIS MIMS

- OLIVER, JR.

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 14

- 5 832

_____________________________/

Opinion filed June 3, 2015.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Escambia County

. Ross Goodman , Judge

.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public

Defender, Tallahassee , for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, C.J., ROWE, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                         384,229
<SECURITIES>                                   990,383
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,997,436
<ALLOWANCES>                                   490,000
<INVENTORY>                                  1,027,625
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             5,499,383
<PP&E>                                         545,810
<DEPRECIATION>                                 809,669
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               6,045,193
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,501,337
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        66,848
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,274,824
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 6,045,193
<SALES>                                      7,745,484
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<CGS>                                        3,655,709
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,655,709
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             4,004,793
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              30,555
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</TABLE>
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS**

 

I, Barry L. Edwards, certify that:

 

1.     Ihave reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of *SOURCECORP*, Incorporated (the “registrant”);

 

2.     Basedon my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.     Basedon my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.     Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

(a)   Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

(b)   Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusion about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

(c)   Disclosedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting;

 

5.     Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

(a)   Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

 

(b)   Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.

 

 
| Date: March 23, 2005 | By:    | /s/ Barry L. Edwards                                  |
|---------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------------------|
|                      |   | Barry L.  Edwards                                     |
|                      |   | Executive Vice President and  Chief Financial Officer |

 

----
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-14-00024- CV

Melinda Gre enhaw , Appellan t

v. HSB C Bank

USA, as Trustee for P HH Alternative M ortgage Trust, Series 2007-3, A ppellee

F ROM TH E CO UNTY COURT AT LAW NO . 3 O F B ELL COUNTY NO. 76,0 94, H ONO RAB LE REB ECCA DEP EW, J UDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
This is an appea l f

rom a judgme nt a

war ding possession in a forc ible detainer case . 1 The cler k’s rec ord in this appea l was d u e i n t h i s C o u rt on Fe bruar y 12, 2014. On April 8, 2014, Melinda Gre enhaw was notified that n o cl er k ’s re cord had been filed due to her failure to pay
or make arr ang ements to pay the d i s t rict cler k’s fee for prepa

ring the cler

k’s rec ord. The notice reque sted that Gre enhaw make arr ang ements for the cler k’s re co rd and submit a status repor t
re gar d i n g t h i s appea l by April 18, 2014. Gre enhaw has not filed a status repor t or otherwise responde d to this C ourt’s notice.

I f the trial court cler

k fails to f

ile the cler

k’s rec ord due to a

ppellant’s failure to pay
or make arr ang ements to pay the cler k’s fee for prepa

ring the rec ord, the appellate court may dismiss
Although the underly ing suit named Dar rel Gre enhaw and/or all occupa nts of the proper

ty 1 as defe ndants, the notice of appea l is in the name only of Melinda Gre enhaw
. But even if the other defe ndants wer e par

ties to this appeal, our disposition would be the same.the appea l for want of prosec ution unless the appellant was entitled to proce ed without pay ment of costs. Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(b). Be cause Gre enhaw has failed to pa y or make arr ang ements to pa y the cler k’s fe e for

prepa ring the cler

k’s re cord, this appe al is dismis sed for want of pr osecution.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pemberton a nd Rose Dismissed for Want of Prosecution Filed: May

16, 2014

2
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 1203** 

DANIELLE STANLEY, MSW , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v.

T HE CHILDREN’S GUILD INCORPORATED , Defendant

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Baltimore

. J. Frederick Motz , Senior District Judge. ( 1:10

- cv
- 02280

- JFM )

Submitted : June 30, 2011 Decided: July 5, 2011

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Danielle Stanley , Appellant Pro Se. James Sunderland Aist, Ryan Keith Bautz, ANDERSON, COE & KING, Baltimore, Maryland , for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Danielle Stanley appeals the district court ’ s order granting The Children’s Guild Inc.’s motion to dismiss her
employment discrimination action . We have reviewed the record
and find no error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons
stated by the district court. Stanley v. The Children’s Gui ld

Inc. , No. 1:10

- cv
- 02280

- JFM (D. Md. Feb. 10, 2011) . We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

November 29, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

132009 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. IMAD SAAD, Stephen J. Markman, Plaintiff, Justices Counter-Defendant-Appellant, 

v SC: 132009 

 COA: 268638 

Macomb CC: 04-001252-CK 

DART PROPERTIES, INC., a/k/a LAUREL 

VALLEY APARTMENTS, 

Defendant,

Counter-Plaintiff-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 28, 2006 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded 

that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

t1120 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

November 29, 2006 

 Clerk
<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.30


                             THE HOLMES GROUP, INC.
                              233 Fortune Boulevard
                                Milford, MA 01757

January 8, 2004

Jordan A. Kahn
21 Pierce Road
Wellesley, MA  02481

Dear Jerry:

This letter agreement (this "Letter Agreement") sets forth certain agreements
between The Holmes Group, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation (the "Corporation"),
and Jordan A. Kahn (the "Executive") with respect to the Executive Employment
and Non-Competition Agreement dated February 1, 2002 by and between the
Corporation and the Executive, as amended by a letter agreement dated March 6,
2003 (as so amended, the "Agreement"). In consideration of the mutual promises
contained herein and in the Agreement, and for other good and valuable
consideration (the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged),
the Corporation and the Executive hereby agree as follows:

1.       The "Term" of the Agreement is hereby extended until April 30, 2004, on
         and subject to all the terms and provisions of the Agreement, except as
         amended and extended hereby; and

2.       Section 2 of the Agreement is hereby amended by deleting in its
         entirety the last sentence thereof which presently reads "The parties
         agree to meet to discuss an extension of the Term hereof and the terms
         thereof no later than November 30, 2003."

By its or his respective signature below, each of the Corporation and the
Executive hereby acknowledges and affirms that, (i) except as amended and
extended by this Letter Agreement, all provisions of the Agreement remain in
full force and effect, and (ii) this Letter Agreement shall be deemed a part
thereof for all purposes.

This Letter Agreement is executed as of the date first noted above.

Very truly yours,

THE HOLMES GROUP, INC.                      ACCEPTED AND AGREED:

By: /s/   Peter J. Martin                   /s/ Jordan Kahn
    ---------------------                   ---------------
Name:  Peter J. Martin                      Jordan A. Kahn
Title: President