Filed 6/30/21 In re William M. CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re WILLIAM M. II, et al., 

Persons Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

B307619, B308854

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. Nos. 

19CCJP03005A

19CCJP03020A

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

WILLIAM M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Sabina Helton, Judge. Appeals as to William M. II are 

affirmed. Appeal as to Levi M. is dismissed. 

Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant. 
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Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Senior Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

_____________

William M., the father of 15-year-old William M. II and 

nine-year-old Levi M., appeals the juvenile court’s disposition 

orders removing his sons from his custody after the court 

sustained amended petitions alleging William had used 

inappropriate physical discipline that placed both children at 

substantial risk of serious physical harm. Without disputing the 

court’s jurisdiction findings, William contends its disposition 

orders are not supported by substantial evidence and there were 

less restrictive means other than removal to keep his children 

safe.

William also appeals the juvenile court’s order, made while 

his appeals were pending, terminating dependency jurisdiction 

over William II with a juvenile custody order awarding 

William II’s mother, T.Q., sole physical and legal custody and 

limiting William to monitored visitation. William contends the 

court erred in granting T.Q. sole legal custody of William II. 

We affirm the juvenile court’s orders as to William II. 

While these matters were pending on appeal, the juvenile court 

terminated its jurisdiction over Levi. Because William has not 

appealed that termination order, we dismiss the appeal 

challenging Levi’s removal as moot. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

William and T.Q. are divorced. At the time these 

dependency proceedings were initiated, they shared custody of 

William II pursuant to a family court order. William lived with 
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his girlfriend, Sylvia C., and their child, Levi, and with William II 

when William II was in William’s custody. T.Q. lived separately. 

1. The Dependency Petitions 

On May 13, 2019 the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (Department) filed a petition 

pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 alleging 

William had physically abused William II by striking him with 

his hands and with belts and inflicting marks, grabbing him by 

the ears, throwing him against a wall and furniture, and choking 

him. The petition also alleged William had physically abused 

William II’s then-seven-year-old sibling, Levi, by striking him 

with belts and inflicting marks; this behavior placed William II at 

substantial risk of serious physical harm (§ 300, subd. (a), (b), (j)); 

and T.Q. knew of the abuse and failed to protect William II 

(§ 300, subd. (b)). (Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 19CCJP03005A.) 

The same day the Department filed a nearly identical 

petition as to Levi alleging William’s conduct toward Levi and 

William II placed Levi at substantial risk of serious physical 

harm (§ 300, subd. (a), (b), (j)), and Sylvia knew of the abuse and 

failed to protect Levi (§ 300, subd. (b)). (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 

No. 19CCJP03020A.) 

Both children were detained from William. William II was 

released to T.Q., and Levi to Sylvia.

2. The Contested Jurisdiction Hearing for Both Children 

At a joint contested jurisdiction hearing on the 

two petitions, William II testified his father had, from the time 

William II was in kindergarten, routinely hit him for 

misbehaving. Sometimes William would strike him with a belt, 

1 Statutory references are to this code.
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sometimes with his hands. More recently the beatings had 

become more violent and left marks on William II’s body. 

William instructed him in these instances to tell his teachers and 

T.Q. the marks were from sports, which William II did. 

When William II was in the fourth grade, William slammed 

his head against bunk beds, causing bruising to William II’s eye. 

In 2018 William threw William II against a couch and choked 

him after learning he had failed to turn in his assignments at 

school. William II suffered a black eye during that incident. A 

few months prior to the initiation of dependency proceedings, 

William became angry at William II for delaying the family’s 

plans to go on an outing. He cursed at William II and choked, 

punched and kicked him. 

William also used a belt to punish Levi when he 

misbehaved. William disciplined William II or Levi in their 

shared bedroom with the door closed. No one else witnessed the 

beatings. Sylvia saw the bruises afterward and would help 

William II relieve the pain and swelling. (Sylvia confirmed 

William disciplined William II and Levi behind closed doors. 

However, she testified she helped William II attend to injuries 

she believed he had suffered in sports, not from discipline.) 

William testified concerning the incident that led to the

filing of the dependency petitions: On April 26, 2019 William II 

was suspended from school after he was caught vaping 

marijuana. William picked him up from school. When they 

returned home, William told him to get inside and close the door 

because William II “did not know what was coming to him.” 

William II knew that meant William would beat him. William II 

used his cell phone to call his mother and fled the house despite 

his father’s warning “not to run.” William chased him, yelling at 
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him that things were only going to get worse for him. A female 

passerby William II did not know saw William II fleeing and 

asked if he needed help. William II got into the woman’s car and 

asked her to drive him to the local park, where he met T.Q. 

William II told T.Q. and law enforcement officers who had been 

called to the scene that he feared William would hurt him and he 

did not want to be near him again. William II said his father had 

frequently beat him and he was tired of covering it up. 

T.Q. obtained a restraining order against William to keep 

him away from her and William II. T.Q. also told social workers 

she had been the victim of domestic violence when she was 

married to William. She knew he was a strict parent, but had 

not known he had bruised and battered William II. William II 

never told her. 

The Department had received several referrals relating to 

William’s discipline of William II over the years. After 

investigation, most were determined to be “unfounded.” A 

referral in 2015, after William II told his teacher his father hit 

him daily with a belt, was determined “inconclusive.” During the 

Department’s 2015 investigation, William refused the 

Department’s offer of services, telling the investigator he knew 

how to discipline his children and did not need any help.

William testified at the hearing that he was a strict parent 

who made sure his children were well-mannered and suffered 

consequences for misbehavior. He acknowledged using physical 

discipline on both his children, including slapping them with 

open hands or using a belt or a sandal to spank them. He 

insisted such discipline was appropriate and legal unless it left 

marks, which, he insisted, it did not. William acknowledged 

William II frequently had bruises on his body, but claimed they 
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were the result of William II’s participation in contact sports, 

including wrestling. William denied William II’s accusations that 

he had choked, punched and slammed his head into furniture. 

William testified William II had been “hyped up” on 

concentrated marijuana on the day he fled the house. He 

believed William II was scared because he knew William despised 

drug use of any kind. William had also concluded that money 

missing from the house had been taken by William II to purchase 

drugs. According to William, William II was lying about abuse to 

get attention from his mother and to avoid consequences from his 

father for his behavior. William said he had no intention of 

changing his parenting style unless the court ordered him to do 

so. He believed he used appropriate discipline. 

Following the hearing the court sustained petitions 

amended by interlineation to allege that William had 

inappropriately physically disciplined both children and that the 

discipline was excessive and caused the children unreasonable 

pain and suffering (§ 300, subds. (a),(b), (j)). ~(CT 361, RT 449.)~ 

The court found Sylvia had failed to protect Levi and found T.Q. 

nonoffending. 

3. The Disposition Hearing 

Proceeding immediately to disposition, the court declared 

both children dependents of the court, finding by clear and 

convincing evidence they were in substantial danger in William’s 

custody and there were no less restrictive means to protect them 

other than removal. The court released William II to T.Q.’s 

custody under the supervision of the Department and ordered 

family enhancement services for William, including participation 

in parenting classes, individual and conjoint counseling, and 
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monitored visitation. ~(RT 460-461, CT 375-378.)~ The court set 

a section 364 hearing for November 3, 2020.

The court released Levi to Sylvia’s custody with family 

maintenance services for Sylvia and family enhancement services 

for William, who had earlier moved out of the home so that Levi 

could remain in Sylvia’s custody. The court ordered monitored 

visitation for William and set a review hearing.

William appealed both disposition orders. 

4. The Court’s Order Terminating Dependency Jurisdiction 

Over William II 

In its report prepared for the November 3, 2020 review 

hearing for William II, the Department informed the court 

William was noncompliant with the case plan—he had not 

enrolled in counseling. According to the report, William told the 

Department he was working 80 hours a week at two jobs and had 

not been able to find a counselor he could afford who could also 

accommodate his schedule. ~(308854 CT 3 et seq.)~ The 

Department provided William with additional referrals. In a 

last minute report the Department advised the court William had 

registered for a parenting class on October 12, 2020, but had not 

yet completed it. He registered for individual counseling on 

October 26, 2020, a few days prior to the hearing, but had not yet 

been assigned a counselor. The Department questioned William’s 

commitment to participating in services and recommended the 

court terminate its jurisdiction with a custody order granting 

T.Q. sole physical and legal custody and William monitored 

visitation. ~(308854 CT 65.)~ 

At the section 364 hearing William submitted evidence he 

had completed his parenting program one day earlier, on 

November 2, 2020. He had also enrolled in counseling services. 
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He requested an order terminating jurisdiction with a custody 

order that awarded T.Q. sole physical custody with unmonitored 

visitation for William and joint legal custody. 

Following the hearing the court adopted the 

recommendations of the Department and William II’s counsel 

and terminated its jurisdiction with a custody order granting 

T.Q. sole physical and legal custody of William II with sibling 

visitation and monitored visitation for William. William filed a 

timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

1. Governing Law and Standard of Review

Before the court may order a child removed from the 

physical custody of a parent with whom the child was residing at 

the time the dependency proceedings were initiated, it must find 

by clear and convincing evidence that the child would be at 

substantial risk of physical or emotional harm if returned home 

and there are no reasonable means by which the child can be 

protected without removal. (§ 361, subd. (c); In re Anthony Q. 

(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 336, 347; In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 

126, 135.) “The parent need not be dangerous and the minor 

need not have been actually harmed before removal is 

appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the 

child.” (In re T.V., at pp. 135-136.)

In reviewing the propriety of a disposition order removing a 

child from a parent pursuant to section 361, in view of the 

requirement that the juvenile court make the requisite findings 

based on clear and convincing evidence, we “must determine 

whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial 

evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made 

the finding of high probability demanded by this standard of 
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proof.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005 

(O.B.); see In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 155 [O.B. is 

controlling in dependency cases].) We draw all reasonable 

inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of 

the juvenile court and review the record in the light most 

favorable to the court’s determinations; issues of fact and 

credibility are the province of the juvenile court. (In re I.C. (2018)

4 Cal.5th 869, 892; In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) 

2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Disposition 

Order Removing William II from William’s Custody 

Relying on In re A.E. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 820, 826, 

William contends the court erred in removing William II from his 

custody. In In re A.E. the juvenile court sustained a section 300 

petition alleging the father had disciplined his two-year-old child 

by striking her backside with a belt, inflicting welts and bruising. 

The father stated he had come to realize his method of discipline 

was excessive and caused his child unreasonable suffering and, if 

he had known it at the time he inflicted it, he would have 

behaved differently. The father explained it was a one-time 

incident and insisted he had learned from his mistake. 

Emphasizing the child’s young age, the juvenile court removed 

her from her father’s custody and ordered parenting classes and 

individual counseling for the father with monitored visitation. 

Our Division Eight colleagues reversed, concluding there 

was not substantial evidence to support removal. (In re A.E., 

supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 826.) The court stated, “[I]t is clear 

that this was an isolated incident that is unlikely to recur. 

Evidence of past abuse, standing alone, does not meet the clear 

and convincing standard of proof required to justify her removal 

from Father’s physical custody. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] The record in this 
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case shows the risk to [the child] of future abuse is low. Father 

expressed remorse and is committed to learning better discipline 

methods. He testified that he understood a young child like A. 

may misbehave because she is frustrated that she cannot 

communicate her needs. He also understood that there were 

other methods of discipline such as giving her a time out, telling 

her she would not get any candy, or taking away something she 

liked. That is not substantial evidence of a ‘profound lack of 

understanding of child development.’ It is quite the opposite.” 

(Id. at p. 826.) 

Citing his testimony at trial that he would change his 

methods of discipline if ordered to do so, William contends he is 

in the same position as the father in In re A.E. He did not realize 

his methods of discipline were excessive and now that the court 

has said they were, he would change. In marked contrast to the 

father in In re A.E., however, William did not acknowledge the 

impropriety of his conduct at trial; he steadfastly insisted it was 

proper. He also claimed that William II was lying about the more 

severe forms of discipline, including punching, kicking and 

choking, behaviors the court found had occurred. Moreover, the 

discipline at issue In re A.E. was a “one-time” occurrence, not, as 

here, a pattern of behavior that had continued, and escalated, for 

more than a decade. 

William’s reliance on In re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 

139 is similarly misplaced. There, the court of appeal reversed a 

disposition order removing a three-year-old child (Hailey) from 

her parents’ custody after the juvenile court sustained allegations 

under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (j), that the parents had 

inflicted an injury on Hailey’s four-month-old sibling. The court 

of appeal explained there was no evidence the parents had ever 
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inflicted any harm on Hailey, who, by all accounts, appeared to 

be thriving in their custody. Moreover, both parents had 

demonstrated a commitment to services “at the earliest 

opportunity” and showed meaningful progress in those services 

by the time of the disposition hearing. (Id. at pp. 148-149.) The 

court also found there were less restrictive alternatives that the 

juvenile court had utterly failed to consider that could have 

protected Hailey, such as unannounced visits by the Department 

to the family home and the father’s willingness to move out of the 

family home. (Ibid.) 

Unlike the parents in In re Hailey T., William resisted 

counseling when it was offered and continued to deny the 

harmful effects of his behavior on William II. Unannounced 

visits by the Department in these circumstances would do little to 

protect William II. (See generally In re Gabriel K. (2012) 

203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“[o]ne cannot correct a problem one 

fails to acknowledge”]; In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 

1036, 1044 [same].) The court recognized William’s testimony 

that he would follow a court order to refrain from imposing 

excessive discipline; but it remained concerned about William’s 

ability to accomplish such a dramatic shift without professional 

assistance, particularly since William had always believed, up to 

and including at trial, that his actions were appropriate. Until 

William had the benefit of counseling to promote insight and

behavior modification, the court explained, William II would not 

be safe in his custody. Substantial evidence supports the court’s 

removal order. (See In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 217 

[“‘[t]he trial court is in the best position to determine the degree 

to which a child is at risk based on the assessment of all the 

relevant factors in the each case’”].) 
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3. The Court Did Not Err in Granting T.Q. Sole Legal 

Custody of William II

Section 362.4 authorizes the juvenile court, when 

terminating jurisdiction over a dependent child, to issue a 

custody and visitation order that “will become part of the parents’ 

family law file and remain in effect in the family law action ‘until 

modified or terminated by a subsequent order.’” (In re Anna T. 

(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 870, 871, fns. omitted; see § 362.4, 

subd. (a) [“[i]f the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a 

minor who has been adjudged a dependent child of the juvenile 

court prior to the minor’s attainment of 18 years, and proceedings 

for dissolution of marriage, for nullity of marriage, or for legal 

separation, of the minor’s parents . . . are pending in the superior 

court of any county, or an order has been entered with regard to 

the custody of that minor, the juvenile court on its own motion, 

may issue . . . an order determining the custody of, or visitation 

with, the child”].) 

When making a custody determination under section 362.4, 

“it is the best interests of the child, in the context of the peculiar 

facts of the case before the court, which are paramount.” (In re 

John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 965; accord, In re Nicholas H. 

(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 268.) This determination is made 

without reference to any preferences or presumptions ordinarily 

applicable in family court. (See In re John W., at p. 972 

[“presumption of parental fitness ‘that underlies custody law in 

the family court just does not apply to dependency cases’”]; see 

also In re C.M. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 101, 108 [“[a]lthough both 

juvenile and family courts have authority to make orders 

regarding custody and visitation, the two courts operate under 

separate statutory schemes and serve distinct purposes”].) 
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We review a juvenile court custody order for abuse of 

discretion. We “may not disturb the order unless the court 

‘“‘exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, 

capricious or patently absurd determination.’”’” (Bridget A. v. 

Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 300-301; accord, In re 

M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 902.) 

William does not challenge the court’s order terminating 

jurisdiction under section 364 with a custody order granting T.Q. 

sole physical custody of William II. However, he contends the 

court abused its discretion in awarding sole, rather than joint, 

legal custody to T.Q. because there was no evidence he could not 

cooperate with T.Q. on making decisions for William II. Although 

William emphasizes his and T.Q.’s past cooperation in their 

shared custody arrangement to support this argument, 

circumstances had dramatically changed since the initiation of 

dependency proceedings: William II had expressed overwhelming 

fear of his father; T.Q. had obtained a restraining order against 

him to protect her and William II; and William had described 

T.Q. as on a “power trip now.” The court found shared legal 

custody was not in William II’s best interests. William has not 

demonstrated that decision was arbitrary or irrational. 

4. William’s Appeal from the Disposition Order Removing 

Levi from His Custody Is Moot 

On February 2, 2021, while William’s appeals were 

pending, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction over Levi, 

releasing him to the home “of his parent(s).” William has not 

appealed that termination order and has not demonstrated in 

response to our letter inviting briefing on the question why this 

court should not dismiss his appeal from the court’s disposition 

order as moot. (See In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 
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164-165 [“because the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction 

over [the child] and that termination is final, a remand for 

further proceedings in the juvenile court would be meaningless”; 

accordingly, the appeal is properly dismissed as moot because the 

court cannot provide any effective relief]; see generally In re N.S. 

(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 [“the critical factor in considering 

whether a dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate 

court can provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error”].) 

DISPOSITION

The disposition order removing William II from William’s 

custody and the order terminating dependency jurisdiction over 

William II and awarding sole legal and physical custody of 

William II to T.Q. are affirmed. The order removing Levi from 

William’s custody is dismissed as moot. 

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J

FEUER, J.