FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JOHN DOE, an individual; et al.,

Plaintiffs

- Appellants,

v. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 21

- 56259 D.C. No. 3:21

- cv - 01809

- CAB

- LL Southern District of California, San Diego ORDER

Before: BERZON, IKUTA, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges. Order by Judges BERZON and BENNETT; Dissent by Judge IKUTA. Appellants , a 16

- year - old high school student and her parents, filed an emergency motion for an injunction pending appeal, seeking to enjoin San Diego Unified School District (“SDUSD”) from requiring compliance with a student vaccination mandate. On November 28, 2021, we granted A ppellants’ motion in par t. We ordered that an injunction shall be in effect only while a “per se” deferral of vaccination is available to pregnant students under SDUSD’s student vaccination mandate, and that the injunction shall terminate upon removal of the “per se” deferral op tion for pregnant students. On November 29, 2021, appellees filed a letter and supporting declaration 

# FILED
DEC 4 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

from Interim Superintendent Lamont Jackson explaining that the deferral option for pregnant students has been removed from the mandate. Appellants’ res ponsive letter does not dispute that the pregnancy deferral option has been validly removed. Given the removal of the “per se” deferral option for pregnant students, the injunction issued in the November 28, 2021 order has terminated under its own terms
. This order provides our reasoning for why an injunction pending appeal is not warranted as to the now

- modified student vaccination mandate.

*** SDUSD’s student vaccination mandate provides that students who are 16 years or older as of November 1, 2021, and who are not fully vaccinated against COVID

- 19, will not be permitted to participate after January 2 4 , 2021 in on

- site education or extracurricular activities without a qualified exemption or conditional enrollment. 1 SDUSD allows for medical ex emption s to the mandate as well as conditional enrollment in on

- site education for 30 days for certain categories of newly enrolling students (students who are homeless , in “ migrant ” status, in foster care,

1 Some record materials refer to January 21 as the start date for the spring semester, but it appears that date has now been amended to January 24. See Covid

- 19 Status: Safety Comes First , San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., https:// sandiegounified.org/covid

- 19_status (last visited Dec. 3 , 2021).3

or in military families)

. 2 The mandate also pro vides certain procedural protections and accommodations to students with Individualized Education Programs (IEPs) , to comply with statutory “stay put” requirements

. See, e.g. , 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)

. Previously, t he mandate provided for a “per se” pregnancy deferral, under which a pregnant student could defer vaccinatio n until after pregnancy ; as noted, t he “per se” pregnancy deferral no longer exists. SDUSD does not allow for an exemption to the mandate on the basis of religious belief. Appellant s allege that the student vaccination mandate violates the Free Exercise C lause , both facially and as applied, by failing to exempt Jill Doe , the high school student plaintiff, in light of a religious belief that prohibit s her from taking any of the availa ble vaccines , 3 and by treating “comparable secular activity

2 T h ese categories were drawn from California state law provisions applicable to other immunizations required for students. See, e.g. , Cal. Educ. Code §§ 48204.7, 48850, 48852.7, 49069.5, 49701; Cal. Health & Safety Code § 120341. 3 The complaint and emergency motion explain that Jill Doe ’s reason for abstaining from vaccination is that “[a]ll three of the[] vaccines have been manufactured or tested using material derived from stem cell lines from aborted fetuses.” The on e vaccine approved for use in 16

- year - olds is the Pfizer

- BioNTech vaccine

. S

ee COVID

- 19 Vaccines for Children and Teens , Ctr s . f or Disease Control & Prevention (Nov. 23, 2021) , https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019

- ncov/vaccines/recommendations/children

- teens.html . That vaccine i s not manufactured using stem cells

. T hird parties test ed the vaccine using fetal cell lines, which are laboratory

- grown cells originally derived from t wo fetuses aborted in 197 3 and 198 5
. See, e.g. , COVID

- 19 Vaccine and Fetal Cell Lines , L.A. Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Health (Apr. 20, 2 021) , http://publichealth.lacounty.gov/media/ Coronavirus/ docs/ vaccine/VaccineDevelopment_FetalCellLines.pdf

. Jill Doe explains that her Christian faith prevents her from using any vaccines that depend4

more favorabl y than religious exercise” through the granting of medical exemptions , conditional enrollments for certain categories of students , and procedural protections for students with IEPs
. See Tandon v. Newsom , 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam)

. To determine whether to grant an injunction pending appeal, this court applies the test for preliminary injunctions. S e . Alaska Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs , 472 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that [she] is likely to succeed on the merits, that [she] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equitie s tips in [her] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The Ninth Circuit applies a “sliding scale” approach to preliminary injunctions such that a preliminary injunction ca n issue “where the likelihood of success is such that ‘serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharping in [plaintiff ’s] favor.’” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell , 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011) (alte ration in original) ; see

on use of fetal cell lines at any stage of their development. We may not and do not question the legitimacy of Jill Doe’s religious beliefs regarding COVID

- 19 vaccinations

. Cf. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n , 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018).5

also id. at 1131

– 35 (explaining that the sliding scale test “remains viable after the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter ”). T he Supreme Court has held that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes ) .’” Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 879 (ci tations omitted). “[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice . . . . A law failing to satisfy the se requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah , 508 U.S. 520, 531

– 32 (1993). Appellants have not demonstrated a s ufficient likelihood of success in showing that the district court erred in applying rational basis review, as opposed to strict scrutiny, to the student vaccination mandate

. 4

4 We note that although a “published motions panel order may be binding a s precedent for other panels deci ding the same issue,” its analysis is not binding on panels deciding distinct issues. See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden , 993 F.3d 640, 66 0 (9th Cir. 2021). “In deciding whether the court should stay the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction pe nding appeal, ” for example, “ the motions panel is predicting the likelihood of success of the appeal. ” Id. Put differently, the6

First, in our view, the plaintiffs have not raised a serious question as to

w hether the mandate is neutral. The terms of the mandate do not make any reference to religion or “a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable from the language or context.” Lukumi , 508 U.S. at 533 (describing minimum requirement of facial neutrality). Looking beyond facial neutrality, A ppellants have not shown a likelihood of establishing that the mandate was implemented with the aim of suppressing religious belief, rather than protect ing the h ealth and safety of students , staff

, and the community

. See id. at 533

– 42 (examining direct and circumstantial evidence in the record to determine the object of a law)

. Second, the plaintiffs have not raised a serious question as to whether the mandate is generally applicable. The only currently enrolled students who are fully exempt from the requirement to be vaccinated for on - site learning and extracurricular activities are students who qualify for a medical exemption. The

m edical exemption is limited to students with contraindications or precautions recognized by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or the vaccine motions panel is forecasting how the merits panel might rule , a nd its reasoning is
“ an additional step removed from the underlying merits.” Id. at 66 0

– 6 1. “Such a predictive analysis should not, and does not, forever decide the merits of the parties’ claims.” Id. at 661. “This sort of pre

- adjudication adjudication would defeat the pur

pose of a stay, which is to give the reviewing court the time to act reasonably , rather than doling out justice on the fly.” Id. ( citation omitted) ( internal quotation marks omitted). Because this order is similarly “predicting the likelihood of success of the appeal,” our legal analysis is “persuasive but not binding” on future merits panels. Id. at 660

– 62.7

manufacturer , and the request must be certified by a physician. Limitation of the medical exemption i n this way serves the primary interest for imposing the mandate

—

protecting student “ health and safety ”

— and so does not undermine the District’s interest s as a religious exemption would. 5 See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia , 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (2021) (“ A law

. . . lacks general applicability if it prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government’s asserted interests in a similar way.”); Tandon , 141 S. Ct. at 1296 (“[W]hether two activities are comparable for pur poses of the Free Exercise Clause must be judged against the asserted government interest that justifies the regulation at issue.”) ; Smith , 494 U.S. at 874, 878

– 82 (state law prohibiting possession of a controlled substance , but containing exception for substances prescribed by a medical practitioner , was generally applicable ) ; We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul , No. 21

- 2179, 2021 WL 5121983 , at *12 (2d Cir. Nov. 4, 2021) ( medical exemption from healthcare worker COVID

- 19 vaccina tion mandate differ ed from religious exemption in that mandating the vaccination of people with medical

5 The dissent insists on a narrower formulation of SDUSD’s asserted interest, characterizing that interest as “ensur[ing] ‘the safest environment po ssible for all students and employees ’ by preventing the transmission and spread of COVID

- 19. ” See, e.g. , Dissent at 8. Although promoting a safe school environment is undoubtedly one of SDUSD’s interests in promulgating both a student and employee vaccination mandate , the interest the District emphasizes most frequently in the record with respect to the student vaccin ation mandate is protecting the “health and safety” of students.8

contraindications or precautions “would not effectively advance” the government’s interest in “protecting the health” of such individuals ). Additionally , although the record does not disclose the number of students who have sought or are likely to seek a medical exemption, if that number is very small and the number of students likely to seek a religious exemption is large, then the medical exemption woul d not qualify as “comparable” to the religious exemption in terms of the “risk” each exemption poses to the government’s asserted interests. See We The Patriots USA, Inc. , 2021 WL 5121983, at *12

– 13
. Moreover, some of the medical exemptions are likely to be “limited in duration , ” unlike a religious exemption. Id. at *12. SDUSD’s medical exemption form expressly states that “[n]o medical exception is per manent” and that any such exemption is valid only until the earliest date out of a list of da t es, such as “[t]he end date specified by the physician ” who fills out the exemption form. Students with health issues justifying a longer

- term medical exemption will need to reapply for an exemption each year. A ccordingly, a lthough “ it may be feasible f or [SDUSD] to manage the COVID

- 19 risks posed by a small set of objectively defined and largely time

- limited medical exemptions ,” “ it could pose a significant barrier to effective disease prevention to permit a much greater number of permanent religious ex emptions .” Id. ; see also Lukumi , 508 U.S. at 542

– 43 (the requirement of general applicability prohibits imposition of a burden only on9

conduct motivated by religious belief, while failing to prohibit nonreligious conduct “that endangers [legitimate govern mental] interests in a similar or greater degree”). The 30

- day “conditional enrollment” period for the specified categories of newly enrolling students also does not raise a serious question concerning the mandate’s general applicability. As wa s the case with currentl y enrolled students like Jill Doe , 6 conditionally enrolled students are simply given a g race period to provide documentation proving that they have been vaccinated before they may continue with on

- site education ; they are not exempted from the vaccination requirement itself. Thus , A ppellants have not demonstrated that t he mandate treats conditional enrollees more favorably than students who invoke religious beliefs as their ground for r emaining un vaccin at ed

. See Tandon , 141 S. Ct. at 1296 (strict scrutiny triggered whenever government regulations “treat any comparable secular activity more favorably than religious exercise ” ). And, in line with the above

6 Currently enrolled students and their families were notified about the student vaccination mandate by letter on September 29, 2021. The letter advised students to receive their first dose of the vaccine by November 29, 2021 and their second dose by December 20, 2021. The letter also notified students that if they are not fully vaccinated prior to the start of the semester

— which will occur on January 2 4 , 2021

— then they will be transitioned into a remote

- learning “alternative education program” and will not be permitted to participate in extra

- curricular activities. Currently enrolled students therefore received a grace period of well over 30 days in which to receive their vaccinations and provide documentation of those vaccinations.10

analysis, the conditional enrollment period is both of temporary duration and of limited scope , and so does not undermine SDUSD’s asserted interests in student health and safety the way a religious exemption would. See Lukumi , 508 U.S. at 542

– 43 ; We The Patriots USA, Inc. , 2021 WL 5121983, at *12

– 13
. T he dissent recognizes that in

- person attendance by unvaccinated students with an IEP is not comparable to in

- person attendance by students with religious objections to vaccination because federal law

— the IDEA

—

requires that a school “follow certain procedu res before it can bar students [with IEPs] from in

- person attendance.” Dissent at 6 n. 3 . Although California does not yet require proof of COVID

- 19 vaccination for school attendance as a matter of state law, the Governor has announced plans to direct the California Department of Public Health to adopt such a requirement in the near future. See California Becomes First State in Nation to Announce COVID

- 19 Vaccine Requirement for Schools , Off

. of Governor Gavin Newsom (Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.gov.ca.gov /2021/10/01/california

- becomes

- first

- state
- in

- nation

- to
announce - covid

- 19

- vaccine

- requirements

- for

- schools/; see also Cal. Health & Safety Code § 120335 (requiring student immunization for a list of diseases as well as “[a]ny other disease deemed appropria te by the department, taking into consideration the recommendations of” several health advisory bodies). At that point, SDUSD’s policy of conditional enrollment for students who are homeless, in11

“ migrant ” status, in foster care, or in military families wi ll also be required by law. See Cal. Educ. Code §§ 48204.7, 48850, 48852.7, 49069.5, 49701; Cal. Health & Safety Code § 120341. For now, it parallels the requirements set by state law for other vaccines. Id. Plaintiffs also take issue with the student vaccination mandate’s procedural p rovision regarding students with IEPs. SDUSD maintains that once an IEP is in place, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act require s SDUSD to implement the IEP

. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415( j). The IEP cannot be changed unilaterally ; it may be adjusted only through a process that provides the student with certain procedural protections. Until that process is complete, the IEP “shall remain” in effect. Id. The student vaccination mandate a ccounts for that legal requirement by declining to set a universal vaccination deadline for students with IEPs and by instead permitting conditional enrollment

. This provision of the mandate is not comparable to a religious exemption. It provides tempora ry procedural protections to students with IEPs but does not grant them a permanent exemption from the mandate. Additionally, any delay in vaccination caused by this provision is likely to be brief and limited to a small number of students. T hus, for the reasons explained above, it is unlikely that the “risk” to the government’s asserted interest posed by this provision would qualify as “comparable” to the risk12

posed by a religious exemption provision. We The Patriots USA, Inc. , 2021 WL 5121983, at *12

– 13. Moreover, in light of the rigidity of the medical exemption and the limited time period for conditional enrollees to obtain records or vaccine doses

— which does not appear to be subject to discretionary extension

— there is no “mechanism for ‘indivi dualized exemptions’” in this case. See Does 1

– 3 v. Mills , --- S. Ct.

---- , 2021 WL 5027177, at *2 (Oct. 29, 2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from the denial of an application for injunctive relief ) (quoting Lukumi , 508 U.S. at 537); Fulton , 141 S. Ct. at 18 78 (concluding that “the inclusion of a formal system of entirely discretionary exceptions” rendered the regulation at issue not generally applicable) ; We The Patriots USA, Inc. , 2021 WL 5121983, at * 14

– 15
. Finally, plaintiffs gesture toward the inclusio n of a religious accommodation procedure in SDUSD’s employee vaccination mandate as evidence that the student vaccination mandate is not generally applicable. But that procedure does not apply to students and, in any event, is not a religious exemption . T o the contrary, it is a legally required interactive process that may ultimately result in a denial of the requested accommodation. The EEOC has released guidance explaining tha t , although Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on religion , an employee’s request for an exemption from a COVID

- 19 vaccination mandate c an be denied on the ground that the employee’s belief is not truly religious in nature13

or is not sincer ely held , or on the ground that such an exemption would pose an “undue hardship ” by burdening “ the conduct of the employer’s business” through increasing “the risk of the spread of COVID

- 19 to other employees or to the public.” What You Should Know About COVID

- 19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws at L.2 to L. 3 , U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n (Oct. 25, 2021) , https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what

- you should

- know

- about

- covid

- 19

- and

- ada

- rehabilitation

- act
- and

- other

- eeo - laws#L

. The EEOC’s guidance also suggests that SDUSD was right to circulate a religious accommodation form and information sheet

. Id. at L.1 (“As a best practice, an employer should provide employees .

. . with information about whom to contact, and the procedure s (if any) to use, to request a religious accommodation.”). Appellants’ emergency motion therefore fails to raise a serious question as to whether the vaccination mandate is not neutral and generally applicable. Accordingly, A ppellants have not demonstr ated a likelihood of success in showing that the district court erred by applying rational basis review. And A ppellants do not argue that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their free exercise claim if rational basis review applies. See Parents for Privacy v. Barr , 949 F.3d 1210, 1238 (9th Cir. 2020) (stating standard for rational basis review ). Because A ppellants have not established serious questions going to the merits of their f

ree e xercise claim, we need not consider the remaining factors for14

an injunction. See Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc. , 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017). Nonetheless, we briefly note that A ppellants may not have demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury and have not established that the public interest tilts in favor of granting the emergency motion pending appeal , for several reason s . First, t his case is meaningfully distinct from the recent cases involving COVID

- 19 restrictions on worship in churches and private homes. See, e.g. , Tandon , 14 1 S. Ct. at 1296

– 97. In those cases, the plaintiffs were literally prevented from exercising their religion in group settings

. Id. Here, in contrast, Jill Doe may exercise her religion by declining to receive the vaccination. Appellants argue that the student vaccination mandate nevertheless causes irreparable injury because it “burdens” their religion by making an “important benefit” contingent upon conduct that violates their faith

. See Thomas v. Re v . B d. of the Ind

. Emp. Sec. Div. , 450 U.S. 707, 717

– 18 (1981). But the record is devoid of evidence indicating that SDUSD’s remote
- learning “alternative education program” is inferior to in

- person education. And although Jill Doe states that , as she is a “preeminent athlete , ” the mandate would cause her irreparable injury by “doom ing ” her otherwise promising chance s of receiving a sports scholarship, she15

did not submit any details to support that claim. 7 She also elected to proceed anonymously in this case

— including remaining anonymous to the District and its lawyers

—

thereby preventing SDUSD from contesting the truth of that statement

. 8 C ritical facts going to the “irreparable injury” inquiry are therefore unknowable in this case

. Appellants thus have probably not carried their burden of showing that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. Last, for completeness, we note that th e public interest weighs strongly in favor of denying Appellants’ motion. T he COVID

- 19 pandemic h as claimed the lives of over three quarters of a million Americans. Covid Data Tracker , C tr s . for Disease Control & Prevention , https://covid.cdc.gov/ covid

- data

- tracker/

7 The dissent states that Doe is “ an athlete who believes she could earn a college scholarship if she completed a successful season.” Dissent at 2. In her complaint, Doe claimed that “she hopes to draw the attention of college recruiters ” and
“ believes that, with a good season , she can earn a sports scholarship.” Even s etting aside her anonymity and her alleged status as a “preeminent” athlete, her belief that she can win a scholarship is speculative. “Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunctio n.” Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige , 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9 th Cir. 1988); see also Winter , 555 U.S. at 21

– 22 (“Our frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely ” and not merely speculative (emphasis in original) ). 8 The district court temporarily allowed Appellants to proceed anonymously but indicated that it was “not persuaded” that , in the final analysis , Appella nt s could overcome the presumption that parties must use their real names in litigation. See , e.g. , Doe v. Kamehameha Sch s ./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Est. , 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010).16

#datatracker

- home (last visited Dec. 1 , 2021). The record indicates that vaccines are safe and effective at preventing the spread of COVID

- 19, and that SDUSD’s vaccin ation mandate is therefore likely to promote the health and safety of SDUSD’s students and staff , a s well as the broader community. And as the Supreme Court has long recognized, “the right to practice religion freely” is not “beyond regulation in the public interest,” including regulation aimed at reduc ing t he risk of “expos[ing] the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health o r death.” Prince v. Massachusetts , 321 U.S. 158, 166

– 67 (1944) ; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton , 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) ( noting that First Amendment rights “are different in public schools than elsewhere,” including because, “ [f ] or their own g ood and that of their classmates, public school children are routinely required .

. . to be vaccinated against various diseases”)

. The public interest therefore favors SDUSD’s mandate. In sum, Appellants have not carried their burden to establish a likel ihood of success on the merits, or that they will suffer irreparable harm if this Court does not issue an injunction, or that the public interest weighs in their favor. Appellants’ motion for an injunction pending appeal is therefore DENIED
.J

ill Doe e t al. v . San Die

go Unifie d Sc hool Distric t e t al. , No. 21-56259 Ikuta , C i rc uit Judge , disse nting Jill Doe is a

junior a t Sc ripps R a nc h High Sc hool, whic h is pa rt of Sa n Die go Unifie d

Sc hool Distric t (he re ina fte r the “ Sc h ool Distric t” ). The Sc hool Distric t re c e ntly

im ple m e nte d a

C OVID-19 va c c ine m a nda te in orde r to pre ve nt the tra nsm ission a

n d spre a d of C OVID-19 in its sc hools, a nd thus “ e nsure the highe stqua lity instruc t ion in the sa fe st e nvironm e nt possible for a ll stude nts a nd

e m ploy e e s.” As e xpla ine d in the Sc hool Distric t’ s “ B a c k to Sc hool FAQ,” Sa n Die go Unifie d

is re quiring stude nt va c c i na tions be c a use : Sc ie ntific e vide nc e shows tha t va c c ina tions a

re a n e sse n tia l pa

rt of prote c ting our c om

m u n itie s. Va c c ine s a

re the most pre v e ntiv e of a ll stra te gie s. Unlike m a sking, ve ntila tion, a nd te sting, va c c i na tion prote c ts stude nts be fore the v irus is introduc e d into the se tting , re duc ing dise a se a nd ne w m uta tions. B e c a use , a s the Sc hool Distric t a sse rts, va c c i na tions inte rrupt “ the c ha in of tra nsm ission” of C OVID-19, its va c c ine m a n d a te prote c ts the he a lth a nd sa fe ty of stude nts a nd sta ff by

pre ve n ting tra

nsm ission from

infe c te d individua ls to othe r stude nts a nd e m p l oy e e s . Ac c ording to the

a ppe lla n ts’ e m e rge nc y

m otion, a ll stude nts sixte e n a nd olde r we re re quire d to re c e ive the ir first dose of the va c c ine by Nove m be r 29, 2021, a nd the ir se c ond dose by De c e m be r 20, 2021. Unva c c ina te d stude nts a re 

# FIL ED
DEC 4 2021 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALSge ne ra lly

not a llowe d to a

tte n d in-pe rson c la sse s or pa rtic ipa te in e xtra c urric ula r
a c tivitie s. B ut the Sc hool Distric t

provide s e xe m

ptions to this m

a nda te for the be ne fit of stude nts who ha

ve m e dic a l re a sons for not ge tting va c c ina te d. It a lso provide s
e xe m ptions for thirty da

y s for stude nts who a

re “ c onditiona l e nrolle e s” (m e a ning hom e le s s a

n d m igra tory c h ildre n, foste r y outh, a nd stude nts from

m ilita ry fa m ilie s) who e nroll in the

Sc hool Distric t in the future a nd m a y ha ve logistic a l diffic ultie s in obta ining va c c ine s or proof of va c c ina tion sta tus. 1 The se e xe m

pte d stude nts, de spite be ing unva c c i na te d, a re pe rm itte d

to a tte nd in-pe rson c la sse s a

nd pa rtic i pa te in e xtra c urric ula r a c tivitie s if the y c om

ply with “ non-pha

rm a c e utic a l inte rve ntions ( e .g. , fa c e c ove rings, re gula r a sy m ptom a tic te sting).” No sim i la r
a c c om m oda tion is offe re d to stude nts who a re unva c c ina te d for re ligious re a sons. Doe is a C hristia n a nd is oppose d to a

bortion on re ligious grounds. Doe ’ s fa ith pre ve nts he r from

ta king a ny of the C O VID-19 va c c ine s be c a u se the y we re de ve lope d using a

borte d fe ta l c e ll line s. Doe is a lso a n a thle te who be lie ve s she

c ould e a rn a c olle ge sc hola rship if she c om

p le te d a suc c e ssful se a son. B ut unde r

1 The Sc hool Distric t a l so a llowe d pre gna nt stude nts to de fe r va c c ina tion until a fte r the ir c hild wa s de live re d. Howe ve r, the Sc hool Distric t re m o ve d the pre g na nc y de fe rra l from

its polic y a fte r the m a

jority gra nte d Doe a n e m e rge nc y injunc tion tha

t would be in e ffe c t “ o nly while a ‘ p e r se ’ de fe rra l of va c c ina tion is a va ila ble to pre gna

nt stude nts.” 2the Sc hool Distric t’ s va c c ine m a nda te , Doe will not be pe rm itte d to a

tte nd inpe rson c la sse s a

nd will not be

a ble to pa rtic ipa te in e xtra c u rric ula r sports. Doe a rgue s tha

t the Sc hool Distric t ’ s va c c ine m a n da te viola

te s the Fre e Exe rc i se C la

use of the First Am e ndm e nt to the Unite d Sta t e s C onstitution, 2 be c a use it inc lude s e x e m

ptions for se c ula

r a c tivity without a sim ila

r
a c c om m oda tion for re ligious be lie fs. B e c a u se we should gra

nt Doe ’ s m otion for

a n injunc tion pe nding a

ppe a l, I disse nt. I A pa rty m oving for pre lim ina

ry injunc tive re lie f m

ust e sta blish (1) a like lihood of suc c e ss on the m e rits; (2) a like lihood of irre pa

ra ble ha rm ; (3) tha

t the b a la nc e of ha rm tips in the

m ova nt’ s fa vor; a

nd (4) tha t the injunc tion is in the public inte re st. Se e All. for the W ild Roc k ie s v . C ottre ll , 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th C ir. 2011). W

he n a pa rty se e ks a pre lim ina

ry injunc t ion a ga inst the gove rnm e nt, the b a la nc e of the e quitie s a

nd public inte re st fa c tors m e rge . Drak e s Bay Oy ste r C o. v . J e w e ll , 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th C ir. 2014) (c iting N k e n v . Holde r , 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)).

2 “ C ongre ss sha ll m a ke no la w re s pe c ting a

n e sta blishm e nt of re ligion, or prohibiting the

fre e e xe rc ise the re of . . . .” U.S. C onst. Am e nd. 1. 3Additiona lly , this c i rc uit e m ploy s a “ sliding sc a le ” a

p proa c h to the four fa c t ors re le va

nt to pre lim i na

ry injunc tive re lie f. W

ild Roc k ie s , 632 F.3d a

t 1131, 1134. Unde r the sliding sc a le a pproa c h, “ ‘ se rious que s tions going to the m e rits’

a nd a ba la nc e of ha rdships tha

t tips sha rply towa rds the pla i ntiff c a n support issua nc e of a pre lim ina

ry injunc tion, so long a s the pla intiff a lso shows tha t the re is

a like lihood of irre p a ra

ble injury a nd tha t the injunc tion is in the

public inte re st.” Id. a t 1135. II W e should gra

nt Doe ’ s m otion for a

n injunc tion pe nding a

ppe a l be c a

use Doe e sta b lishe d tha

t the re a re “ se rious que stions going to the m e rits” of he r Fre e Exe rc i se c la im

a nd a like lihood of irre pa

ra ble injury , a

nd tha t the ba l a nc e of ha rdships a nd public inte re st tip sha

rply in he r fa vor. Id. A In e va lua t ing whe the r the re a re se rious que stions going to the m e rits, we

m ust first de t e rm ine the a

ppropria te le v e l of sc rutiny

for Doe ’ s Fre e Exe rc ise

c la im . “ [L] a ws inc ide nta lly burde ning re ligion a

re ordina rily not subje c t to stric t
sc rutiny u nde r the Fre e Exe rc ise C la use so long a s the y

a re ne utra l a

nd ge ne ra lly

a pplic a ble ” to se c ula

r a nd re l igious a c tivity

a like

. Fulton v . C

ity of Philade lphia, Pe nnsy lv ania , 141 S. C t. 1868, 1876 (2021) (c iting Emp. Div ., De p’t of Hum. Re

s.
4of Or. v . Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 878–82 (1990)). “ [G] ove rnm e nt re gula tions a re not
ne utra l a n d ge ne ra lly

a pplic a ble , a nd the re fore trigge r stric t

sc rutiny unde r the Fre e Exe rc i se C la

use , whe ne ve r the y

tre a t any c om pa ra ble se c ula r a c tivity m ore fa vora bly tha n re l igious e xe rc ise .” Tandon v . N e w som , 141 S. C t. 1294, 1296 (2021) (c iting Roman C

atholic Dioc e

se of Brook

ly n v . C uomo , 141 S.C t. 63, 67–68 (2020)).

“ [W ] he the r two a c tivitie s a re c om pa ra ble for purpose s of the Fre e Exe rc ise C la use m ust be judge d a ga inst the a s se rte d gove rnm e n t inte re st tha

t justifie s the

re gula tion a t issue .” Id. (c ita

t ion om itte d). C ourts m

u st c o m pa re “ the risks va

rious

a c tivitie s” pose to the gove rnm e nt’ s a sse rte d inte re s t. Id. A la w is not ge ne ra lly

a pplic a ble if se c ula

r a c tivity a nd re ligious a c tivity

pre se nt “ sim ila

r risks,” but only the s e c ula r a c tivity is a llowe d. Id. (c ita

tion om itte d). In light of the

Supre m e C ourt’ s guida

nc e , the fra m e work for de te rm ining whe the r a la w is ge ne ra lly

a pplic a ble for purpose s of the Fre e Exe rc i se C la use proc e e ds a s follows. First, a c o urt m ust ide ntify

the gove rnm e nt’ s a sse rte d inte re st tha t justifie s the la

w a t issue . Ne xt, the c ourt m ust ide ntify

the re ligious a c tivity

a nd se c ula

r a c tivity tha t the pla intiff c la im s a re c om pa ra ble for purpose s of the Fre e Exe rc ise C l a

use , but tha

t the la w tre a t s diffe re ntly . Fina lly , the c ourt m ust ide n tify the risk pose d by

both the re ligious a c tivity a nd the se c u l a r a c t ivity to the
5gove rnm e nt’ s a s se rte d inte re st. If the re ligious a c tivity a nd se c ula

r a c t ivity pose

“ sim i la r risks” to the gove rnm e nt inte re st but a re tre a te d diffe re ntly

by the la w, the n the la w is not ge ne ra lly

a pplic a ble

. Id. He re , the Sc hool Distric t ’ s a sse rte d inte re st justify ing the va c c ine m a nda te is to “ e nsure the highe st-qua lity instruc tion in the s afe

st e nv ironme nt p ossible for a ll stude nts a nd e m p l oy e e s ” by

pre ve nting the tra

nsm ission a

n d spre a d of C OVID-19. The two a c tivitie s tha

t Doe c l a im s a

re c om pa ra b le a re in-pe rson a

tte nda nc e by stude nts who a

re unva c c ina te d

for re ligious re a sons a

nd in-pe rson a

tte nda nc e by stude nts who a

re unva c c ina te d

for m e dic a l or logistic a l re a sons. 3 The s e re ligious

a nd se c ula

r a c tivitie s pose ide ntic a l risks to the gove rnm e nt’ s a sse rte d

inte re st in

e nsuring the “ sa fe st e nvironm e nt possible for a l l stude n ts a

n d e m ploy e e s,” be c a

u se both re sult in the

pre se nc e of unva c c ina te d stude nts in the c la s sroom , who c ould spre a d C OVID-19 to othe r stude nts a nd e m p loy e e s.

3 Doe a lso a

rgue s tha t in-pe rson a

tte nda nc e by unva c c ina te d stude nts who a re s ubje c t to a

n Individua liz e d Educ a tion Progra m (IEP) is c om

p a ra ble to inpe rson a tte nda n c e by stude nts who a

re unva c c ina t e d for re ligious re a s ons. This is inc o rre c t . Stude nts with a n IEP a re prote c te d by

a fe de ra l la

w tha t re quire s the Sc hool Distric t to follow c e rta i n proc e dure s be fore it c a n ba r stude nts from

inpe rson a tte nda n c e . Se e 2 0 U.S.C . § 1415(j) (a stude nt’ s IEP “ sha ll re m a in” in e ffe c t pe n ding c om

ple tion of proc e e dings re quire d to m o dify the IEP). B e c a

use the v a c c ine m a

nda te is not a

pplic a ble to IEP stude nts by

forc e of fe d e ra l la

w, we do not ta ke the in-pe rson a

tte n da nc e of unva c c ina te d IEP stude nts into a c c ount in de te rm i ning whe the r the Sc hool Distric t ha s im pose d a m a nda te tha

t is ge n e ra lly a pplic a ble

. 6B ut the Sc hool Distric t ’ s m a nda te tre a t s se c ula r a nd re ligious a c tivity diffe re ntly

. Spe c ific a lly , the polic y a llows in-pe rson a

tte nda nc e by stude nts
unva c c ina te d for m e dic a l re a sons, a nd in-pe rson a

tte n da nc e by unva c c ina te d ne w
e nrolle e s who m e e t c e rta in c rite ria . B y c ontra st, the polic y doe s not a l low any form of in-pe rson a

tte nda nc e by stude nts unva c c ina te d for re l igious re a sons. B e c a use in-pe rson a

tte n da nc e by stude nts who a

re unva c c ina te d for re ligious

re a s ons pose s “ sim ila

r risks” to the sc hool e n vironm e nt a s in-pe rson a tte nda nc e by stude nts who a

re unva c c ina te d

for m e dic a l or logistic a l re a sons, the m a nda te is not ge ne ra lly a p plic a ble

. 4 Tandon , 141 S. C t. a t 1296. W e m

ust the re fore a

pply stric t
sc rutiny t o the m a nda te
. Id. In c onc luding othe rwise , the m a jority fa ils to follow the

le ga l fra m e work for de te rm i ning whe the r a

la w is ge ne ra l ly

a p p lic a ble

. First, the m a

jority a rgue s tha

t the m e dic a l e xe m

ption doe s not unde rc ut the m a nda te ’ s ge ne ra l a pplic a b i lity

4 This doe s not m e a n

tha t a va c c ine m a nda te c a nnot be ge ne ra lly a pplic a ble if it a llows in-pe rson a

tte nda nc e for a ny

unva c c ina t e d stude nt. For insta nc e , suppose the e vide nc e e sta blishe d tha

t na tura l im m unity ( i.e

. , im

m u nity from prior infe c tion) is just a s e ffe c tive a s im m unity through va c c ina tion. (The re is signific a nt dispute

re ga rding this issue , inc l uding in this c a se , a nd so this e xa m

ple is offe re d m e re ly

a s a hy pothe tic a l.) If the re we re suc h e vide nc e , a va c c ine m a nda te tha

t a llowe d stude nts with na t ura l im m unity to a t te nd in-pe rson c la sse s would be ge ne ra l ly

a pplic a ble be c a use stude nts with na

tura l im m unity would pose le ss of a risk to the sc hool e nvironm e nt tha n stude nts who a

re unva c c ina te d (a nd the re fore ha ve no im

m unity ) on re ligious grounds.

7be c a

use it furthe rs the Sc hool Distric t’ s inte re st in “ prote c ting stude nt he a lth a nd

sa fe ty ” by prote c ting the he a l th of the pa rtic ula r stude nt c la i m ing the m e dic a l

e xe m ption. M a

j. a t 7. This a

rgum e nt inc orre c tly

foc use s on the re a sons for the

e xe m ption ra the r tha n the a s se rte d inte re s t tha t justifie s the m a nda te . No doubt the Sc hool Distric t ha s a

good re a son for providing a n e x e m ption for m e dic a lly vulne ra ble stude nts in orde r to prote c t the i r he a lth, a lthough the Sc hool Distric t
c ould furthe r this inte re s t by a llowing suc h

stude nts to pa

rtic i pa te in the re m ote
le a rning option. B ut “ the re a sons why ” the Sc hool Distric t a llows in-pe rson
a tte nda nc e for som e unva c c ina te d stude nts a re irre le va

n t. Tandon , 141 S. C t. a t 1296 (c ita tion om itte d ). Inste a d, “ [c ] om pa ra bility is c onc e rne d with the risks” inpe rson a tte nda n c e by a n unva c c ina te d

stude nt pose s to the “ a sse rte d gove rnm e nt inte re s t.” Id. (c ita

tion om i tte d). He re , the Sc hool Distric t’ s a sse rte d inte re s t for im posing the va c c i ne m a nda te in the first pla c e is to e nsure “ the sa fe st e nvironm e nt possible for a ll stude nts a nd e m ploy e e s ” by

pre ve nting the tra nsm ission a nd spre a d of C OVID-19. 5 Allowing stude nts who a re unva c c ina te d for m e d ic a l re a sons to

5 The m a jority a rgue s tha

t the Sc hool Distric t’ s inte re st is not a n inte re st in
“ e n suring the sa fe st e nvironm e nt possible for a l l stude n ts a

n d e m ploy e e s” but ra the r the inte re s t in “

prote c ting the ‘ he a lth a

nd sa fe t y ’ of stude nts.” M a

j. a t 7 n.5. The m a jority ’ s quibble ove r wording is irre le v a nt in this c onte xt. The Sc hool Distric t ha s m a de c le a

r tha t its justific a t ion for the va c c ine m a nda te is to pre ve nt the t ra n sm i ssion a

nd spre a d of C OVID-19 from infe c te d stude nts to othe r

(c ontinue d...) 8a tte nd sc h ool in pe rson unde rm ine s this inte re st. Thus, the m a jority e rrs a t the first ste p in the fra m e work by

foc using on the

Sc hool Distric t’ s re a s ons for offe ring a n
e xe m ption, ra the r tha n the inte re st tha

t the Sc hool Distric t a c tua lly a sse rts to justify the m a nda te
. Se c ond, the m a

jority c l a im s tha

t the risks pose d by

in-pe rson a

tte nda n c e of stude nts unva c c ina te d

for m e d i c a l re a sons a

re not c o m

pa ra ble to the risks pose d by stude nts unva c c ina te d

for re ligious re a sons be c a use fa r fe we r stude nts will se e k

m e dic a l e xe m

ptions tha n re ligious e x e m

ptions. 6 M a

j. a t 8. This ra

tiona le is

e ntire l y spe c ula t ive . As the m a

jority a c knowle d ge s, “ the re c ord doe s not disc lose the n um be r of stude nts who ha

ve sought or a

re like ly to se e k a m e dic a l

e xe m ption.” Id. N or is the re a ny e vide n c e in the re c ord a

bout how m a n y

stude nts

5 (...c ontinue d) individua ls a

t the sc hool. Any

m e dic a l e xe m

ption unde rc uts this goa

l , e ve n if the re a re g ood re a sons for the e xe m ption.
6 This c la im

is unde rc ut by

te stim ony

from the Sc hool Distric t’ s e xpe rt, who de sc ribe s the m e dic a l e xe m p tion a s ha

ving a pote ntia lly broa d sc ope : “ If a stude nt’ s own phy sic i a n c onfirm s, through the sa m e proc e ss use d for othe r va c c ina tions, tha

t a n unde rly ing m e dic a l proble m mak e s the v ac c ine unsafe

for the i r patie nt , a

nd tha t phy sic ia n is m a de a va ila

ble to disc uss this issue

with the Distric t’ s phy sic ia

n, the stude nt is e ligible for a m e dic a l e xe m

ption.” This c ha ra c te riz a tion of the m a nda te not only c a sts doubt on the m a j ority ’ s vie w tha

t the e xe m ption c ove rs only

a sm a l l num

be r of stude n ts, but a lso sugge sts tha t the m e dic a l e xe m

ption m a y be a n e xa m

ple of the “ individua l iz e d e x e m ptions” tha

t re nde r gove rnm e nt re gula tions not ge ne ra lly a

pplic a ble

. Fulton , 141 S. C t. a t 1877 (c le a ne d up). 9would se e k re ligious e xe m ptions. A c ourt m a y

not ba se its rulings on suc h fre e floa ting gue sswork. Thus, the re is no ba sis for the m a

jority ’ s c la im

tha t the Sc hool Distric t will be floode d with re que sts for re ligious e xe m ptions if the y

we re offe re d. The m a jority furthe r e rrs in a

rguing tha

t be c a use the m a nda te give s stude nts
c la im ing a

m e d ic a l or logistic a l e xe m ption only te m

p o ra ry re lie f, the risk pose d by the i r in-pe rson a

tte nda nc e is not c om

pa ra ble to the risk pose d by

the in-pe rson
a tte nda nc e of stude nts c l a im ing a re ligious e xe m

ption. 7 M a

j. a t 8–10. B u t the

m a jority ide ntifie s no a

uthority sugge sting tha

t the Sc h ool Distric t c a n tre a t se c ula r
a c tivity m ore fa vora

bly tha n re ligious a c tivity

sim ply be c a use the dispa

ra te tre a tm e n t is only

te m p o ra ry . C f. Elrod v . Burns , 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (c ita tion

om i tte d) (“ T he loss of First Am e ndm e nt fre e dom s , for e ve n m inim a l pe riods of tim e , unque stiona

b ly c onstitute s irre p a ra

b l e injury .” ); se e also Armste r v . U.S. Dist.

7 The re is no ba sis for c h a ra c te riz ing the m e dic a l e xe m ption a s te m

pora ry . Ac c ording to the

Sc hool Distric t’ s m e dic a l e xe m ption form

(a s oppose d to the te stim ony of its e xpe rt, se e supra a t 9 n.6), stude nts qua l ify for a m e dic a l e xe m ption only

if the y ha ve a “ c ontra indic a t ion” or “ p re c a ution” re c ogniz e d by

the C DC or the va c c ine m a nufa c ture r. The only suc h c ontra indic a tion is a se ve re a lle rgic re a c tion or known dia gnose d a lle rgy

to the va c c ine or its ingre die nts, a nd the o nly pre c a ution is a history of im

m e dia te a lle rgic re a c t ion to othe r va c c ine s or inje c ta ble the ra pie s. Se e C DC , Va c c ine s & Im m uniz a t ions – C ontra indic a t ions a nd Pre c a u tions, https://www.c dc .gov/va c c i n e s/c ovid-19/c linic a l -c onside ra tions/c ovid-19-va c c ine sus.htm l#C ontra indic a tions (la st upda te d Nove m

be r 29, 2021); se e also id. Appe n dix B

. Nothing in the re c ord sugge sts tha

t suc h a lle rgie s a

re te m pora ry . 1 0C

t. for the C e nt. Dist. of C

alifornia , 792 F.2d 1423, 1430 (9th C ir. 1986) (“ A de nia l of a

right ne e d not be a

bsolute be fore the C o nstitution is im plic a t e d. A te m pora ry de priva tion of a right, or a

lim ita tion on it, m

a y viola te the C onstitution

a s we ll.” ). Eve n a

te m pora ry de fe rra l would provide a re l igious stude nt with som e
re lie f. Fina lly , the m a

jority a rgue s tha

t c onditiona l e nrollm e nt de fe rra l s a re not
c om pa ra ble to a re ligious e xe m

ption be c a

use Doe ha d the sa

m e a m ount of tim e to
c om ply with the m a nda te tha

t ne w e nrolle e s will ha

ve . M a j. a t 9. This a ga in

c onfuse s the re asons for the e xe m ption with the asse rte d inte re st tha t justifie s the

m a nda te . W hile the Sc hool Distric t m a y ha ve a good re a son to give

ne w e nrolle e s who m e e t c e rta in c rite ria

thirty da y s to c om ply with the m a nda te , the in-pe rson
a tte nda nc e of suc h

unva c c ina te d

c onditiona l e nrolle e s pose s a n ide ntic a l risk to the Sc hool Distric t’ s a sse rte d inte re st in pre ve n ting the spre a d of C O VID-19 a s the inpe rson a tte nda n c e of unva c c ina te d stude nts se e king a re ligious e xe m

ption. Se e Tandon , 141 S. C t. a t

1296. The re fore , the m a nda te is not ge ne ra lly a pplic a ble

. M ore o ve r, the va c c i ne m a nda te doe s not give e ve n a ne w e nrolle e ( e .g. , a stude nt who m ove s to the Sc h ool Distric t ne xt y e a r) who se e ks a c c o m m oda tion on

re ligious grounds the sa m e a m ount of tim e to c om ply with the m a nda te a s a

“ c o nditiona l e nrolle e ” whose logistic a l diffic ultie s e ntitle the m to a thirty -da y
1 1de fe rra l. This furthe r e sta blishe s tha

t the va c c i ne m a nda te is not ge ne ra lly

a pplic a ble

. 8 B e c a use the Sc hool Distric t’ s m a nda te is not ge n e ra lly a pplic a ble , stric t
sc rutiny a pplie s . Se e id. Stric t sc rutiny re q uire s tha t the m a nda te be na

rrowly ta ilore d to se rve a

c om pe lling inte re st. Dioc e

s e of Brook

ly n , 141 S. C t. a t 67. The Sc hool Distric t’ s m a nda te doe s not sa tisfy this sta nda rd. “ Ste m

m ing the spre a d of C OVID–19 is unque stiona bly a c o m pe lling inte re s t.” Id. B ut if “ the gove rnm e nt pe rm its othe r a c t ivitie s to proc e e d with pre c a utions, it m

ust show tha

t the re ligious

e xe rc ise a t issue is m ore da nge rous tha

n those a c tivitie s e ve n whe n the sa m e pre c a utions a re a pplie d.” Tandon , 141 S. C t. a t 1297. “ Othe rwise , pre c a u tions tha t

8 The m a jority a rgue s tha

t the Sc hool Distric t’ s m a nda te a nd e xe m ptions m a y soon be c onsiste nt with sta te la w, be c a use C a lifornia

m a y im ple m e nt a C OVID-19 va c c ine m a nda t e for sc hools in the “ ne a r future ,” a nd sta

te la w a lre a dy re quire s im

m e dia te e nrollm e nt of c onditiona l e nrolle e s e v e n if the y ha ve not re c e ive d va c c ine s c urre ntly re quire d by

sta t e la w. M a j. a t 10–11. Of c ourse , spe c ula tion a

bout a pote ntia l sta

te m a nda te provide s no support for the m a j ority ’ s position tha

t the Sc hool Distric t ’ s e xisting m a nda te is c o n stitutiona

l. Am ong othe r things, the

c urre nt proposa l for a

C a lifornia

C O VID-19 va c c ine m a nda te inc lude s a pe rsona l be lie fs e x e m

ption. M ore ove r, a ny future C a lifornia C OVID-19 va c c ine m a nda te c ould be a

p p lie d e qua lly

to c onditiona l e nrolle e s a nd stude nts c la im ing re ligious e xe m

p tions be c a

use the C a lifornia

Educ a tion C ode doe s not re quire the in-pe rson atte ndanc e of unva c c ina te d c onditiona l e nrolle e s, who c o uld im m e dia te ly e nroll a nd pa rtic ipa te in online le a rning until the y c o m ply with the m a nda te
. 1 2suffic e for othe r a c tivitie s suffic e for re ligious e xe rc ise too.” Id. (c ita t ions

om i tte d). He re , the Sc hool Distric t

ha s not m e t

its burde n

of showing tha

t the “ nonpha rm a c e utic a l inte rve ntions ( e .g. , fa c e c ove rings, re gula r a s y m ptom a tic te sting)” tha t e xe m pte d stude nts m

ust follow do not “ suffic e for re ligious e xe rc ise too.” Id. Additiona lly , the Sc hool Distric t a lre a dy a c c om m oda t e s te a c h e rs a

nd sta ff who

re m a in unva c c i na te d due to pe rsona l be lie fs by a l lowing the m

a c c e ss to the

c a m pus, whic h shows tha

t the Sc hool Distric t ha s de te rm ine d tha t it c a n sa tisfy its

sa fe ty inte re sts while still a l lowing pe rsons unva c c ina t e d on re ligious grounds to

a c c e ss c a m

pus. Ac c ordingly , the va c c ine m a nda t e is stric te r tha n ne c e ssa ry to
m e e t the Sc hool Distric t’ s a s se rte d goa ls, a nd the re fore is not na

rrowly ta i lore d. Fina lly , C a lifornia ’ s propose d m a nda te will a llow a pe rsona l be lie fs e xe m

ption, se e C a l. He a lth & Sa fe ty C ode §§ 120335(b)(11), 120338, whic h furthe r sugge sts tha

t the Sc hool Distric t’ s m a nda te is stric te r tha n ne c e ssa ry , s e e Dioc e

se of Brook

ly n , 141 S. C t. a t 67 (finding C OVID re stric t ions not na rrowly ta ilore d whe re the y we re
m ore re stric tive tha

n “ othe r jurisdic tions ha

rd-hit by the pa nde m i c ” ). Ac c ordingly , I would c onc lude tha t, a t a m inim

um , Doe ha s e sta

blishe d tha

t the re a re “ se rious que stions going to the m e rits.” Se e W

ild Roc k i e s , 632 F.3d a

t 1135.
1 3B

Doe ha s a lso e s ta

blishe d irre pa

ra ble injury be c a use “ the loss of First Am e ndm e nt fre e dom s, for e ve n m inim a l pe riods of tim e , unque stiona bly

c onstitute s irre pa

ra ble injury .” Dioc e

se of Brook

ly n , 141 S. C t. a t 67 (c le a ne d up). The m a jority a rgue s tha

t Doe fa ils to e sta

b lish irre pa

ra b le injury be c a use Doe m a y
e xe rc ise he r re ligion by

de c lining to re c e ive the va c c ina t ion a nd fore go a t te nding in-pe rson le a rning. 9 M a

j . a t 14–15. B ut “ it is too la te in the da

y to doubt tha

t the libe rtie s of re ligion a

nd e xpre ssion m a y

be infringe d by

the de nia l of or pla c ing of

c onditions upon a

be ne fit or privile ge .” Trinity Luthe ran C

hurc h of C

olumbia, Inc

.
v . C ome r , 137 S. C t. 2012, 2022 (2017) (c l e a ne d up). M o re ove r, in a rguing tha

t Doe ’ s c a s e is unlike re c e nt c a se s involving C OVID-19 re s tric tions on c hurc h ga the rings be c a

use the pla intiffs in those

c a se s we re “ lite ra lly

pre ve nte d from

e xe rc ising the ir re ligion in group se ttings,” M a

j. a t 14, the m a

j ority im p rope rly prioritiz e s som e a c ts of re l igious e xe rc ise ove r othe rs. C f . Thomas v . Re v . Bd. of Indiana Emp. Se c . Div

. , 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (e xpla ining tha t the

9 The m a jority sugge sts tha

t the Sc hool Distric t’ s re m ote -le a rning option is not infe rior to in-pe rson e duc a t ion. M a j . a t 14. B ut if tha

t we re true , the n all unva c c ina te d stude n t s should pa rtic ipa te in re m ote le a rning. Othe rwise , the Sc hool Distric t’ s m a nda te would be se ve re ly unde rinc l usive

. Se e C

hurc h of the

Luk umi Babalu Ay e

, Inc . v . C ity of Hiale ah , 508 U.S. 520, 544 (1993) (finding gove rnm e nt ordina nc e unc o nstitutiona

lly unde rinc lusive be c a

use it fa ile d to prohibit se c ula r a c tivity tha t a lso unde rm ine d gove rnm e nt’ s a sse rte d inte re st). 1 4“ de te rm ina tion of wha t is a ‘ re l igious’ be l ie f or pra c tic e . . . is not to turn upon a judic ia l pe rc e ption of the pa rtic ula r be lie f or pra c tic e in que stion; re ligious be lie fs

ne e d not be a c c e pta

ble , logic a l, c onsiste nt, or c om pre he n sible to othe rs in orde r to
m e rit First Am e ndm e nt prote c t ion.” ). 1 0 Fina lly , the ba l a nc e of ha rdships a nd public inte re st (whic h m e rge in this

c a se , se e Drak

e s Bay , 747 F.3d a

t 1092) tip sha

rply in Doe ’ s fa vor. C ourts “ ha ve
c onsiste n tly

re c ogniz e d the signific a nt public inte re st in upholding First Am e ndm e nt princ iple s,” Assoc iate d Pre ss v . Otte r , 682 F.3d 821, 826 (9th C ir. 2012) (c le a ne d up), a

nd the Sc hool Distric t c ite s no e vide nc e tha t gra nting a stude nt’ s m otion for te m

pora ry re lie f on re ligious grounds “ will ha rm the public , ”

1 0 In a rguing tha

t Doe fa ils to e s ta

blish a like lihood of irre pa ra ble ha rm , the m a jority fa u lts Doe for proc e e ding a nony m ously

. M a

j. a t 15. B ut the m a

jority fa ils to note

the c om pe lling re a sons for doing so. As Doe e xpla ine d in he r de c la ra tion: Sta nding up for m

y be lie fs ha s a lre a dy

be e n a n a c t of c oura ge . I le a rne d tha t one of the te a c he rs a t m

y sc hool re a d a

ne ws a rtic le to the c la ss a

b out this c a se . In re sponse , c e rta in stude nts a t m y sc hool got a

ngry a n d upse t a

bout wha t I a m doing. The y ’ re so upse t

tha t the y c la i m

tha t the y wa nt to find out who I a m a nd hurt m e . The m a jority a lso c o n c lude s tha

t Doe ’ s ina

bility to obta in a

n a t hle t ic sc hola

rship due to the Sc h o ol Distric t’ s m a nda te is too spe c ula tive to c onstitute irre pa ra ble injury for the purpose s of a

pre lim ina

ry injunc t ion. M a

j. a t 15 n.7. This a

rgum e nt m isse s the point: Doe ’ s irre p a ra ble injury is not he r ina

bility to obta in a

n a thle tic sc hola rship, but the loss of he r First Am e ndm e nt rights, whic h “ unque stiona bly c onstitute s irre pa

ra ble injury .” Dioc e

se of Brook

ly n , 141 S. C t. a t 67 (c le a ne d up). 1 5or tha

t “ public he a lth would be im pe rile d if le ss re s tric tive m e a sure s we re im pose d,” Dioc e

se of Brook

ly n , 141 S. C t . a t 68. To the c ontra ry , the Sc h ool Distric t a lre a dy o ffe rs c a m pus a c c e ss to som e unva c c ina te d te a c he rs a nd sta ff, a nd

a lso to unva c c ina t e d stude nts if the y c om p ly with “ non-pha

rm a c e utic a l inte rve ntions ( e .g. , fa c e c ove rings, re gula r a sy m ptom a tic te sting).” B e c a use Doe e sta

b lishe d tha t the re a re “ se rious que stions going to the

m e rits” a nd a like lihood of irre pa ra ble injury , a

nd the ba la

nc e of ha rdships a nd public inte re st tip sha

rply in he r fa vor, we should gra nt Doe ’ s m otion for a

n injunc tion pe nding a

ppe a l. Se e W

ild Roc k i e s , 632 F.3d a

t 1135. I the re fore disse nt.

1 6