alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

CLIFFORD COLE, PAMELA WEST, BRIAN WEIRBACK, KATHY WEIRBACK, TODD

SHELLY AND CHRISTINE SHELLY

v.

PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

PETITION OF: ADELPHIA GATEWAY, LLC :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 415 MAL 2021

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the

Commonwealth Court

WEST ROCKHILL TOWNSHIP

v.

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION

PETITION OF: ADELPHIA GATEWAY,

LLC :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 416 MAL 2021

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the

Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 3rd day of August, 2023, the Petitions for Allowance of Appeal are

GRANTED . The issues as stated by Petitioner are:

(1) The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has ruled five times that it has “original and exclusive” jurisdiction over the rev iew of the Department’s issuance of permits in connection with interstate natural gas pipeline[ 415 MAL 2021 ]

- 2 projects regulated under the federal Natural Gas Act. Did the Commonwealth Court err on an important question of first impression in holding that the EHB has du al jurisdiction over such appeals, contrary to the plain language of the Natural Gas Act?

(2) Did the Commonwealth Court depart from accepted judicial practices and abuse its discretion in determining that the federal Natural Gas Act does not preempt the EHB from reviewing the Department’s permits, given the contrary holdings of other courts, and given that those permits are issued pursuant to, and required by, federal law governing interstate natural gas pipeline projects?

(3) Did the Commonwealth Court depart f rom accepted judicial practices and abuse its discretion in adopting a dual

- jurisdiction approach that is contrary to the plain language of the federal Natural Gas Act’s judicial review provision, undermines Congress’s clear legislative purpose, is without precedent in this or any other jurisdiction, and creates an unworkable framework that will produce uncertainty, inconsistency, and conflict among

state and federal courts?

The Prothonotary is directed to list these cases for argument together with the

ap peals granted at 312

- 313 EAL 2021.

Justice Brobson did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 26 (Tuesday, February 8, 2000)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 5999]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-2774]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 71

[Airspace Docket No. 99-ASO-17]


Establishment of Class E Airspace; Puerto Rico, PR

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This action corrects errors in the geographic coordinates of a 
final rule that was published in the Federal Register on January 18, 
2000, (65 FR 2538), Airspace Docket No. 99-ASO-17.

EFFECTIVE DATE: This correction is effective February 8, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nancy B. Shelton, Manager, Airspace 
Branch, Air Traffic Division, Federal Aviation Administration, P.O. Box 
20636, Atlanta, Georgia 30320; telephone (404) 305-5627.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

History

    Federal Register Document DOCID: fr18ja00-6, Airspace Docket No. 
99-ASO-17, published on January 18, 2000, (65 FR 2538), amended Class E 
airspace at Puerto Rico, PR. Errors were discovered in the geographic 
coordinates of the San Juan Fernando Luis Ribas Dominicci Airport, PR, 
and in the airspace description. This action corrects those errors.

Correction to Final Rule

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me, the 
geographic coordinates for San Juan Fernando Luis Ribas Dominicci 
Airport, PR, and the airspace description as published in the Federal 
Register on January 18, 2000 (65 FR 2538) (Federal Register Document 
DOCID: fr18ja00-6: page 2538, column 3 and page 2539, column 1), are 
corrected as follows:


Sec. 71.71  [Corrected]

* * * * *

ASO PR E Puerto Rico, PR [Corrected]

    By removing ``Lat. 18 deg.27'41" N, long. 66 deg.05'89" W'' and 
substituting ``lat. 18 deg.27'25" N, long. 66 deg.05'53" W'' for the 
airport coordinates, and by removing ``long. 5 deg.45' W'' and 
substituting ``long. 65 deg.45' W'' in the airspace description.
* * * * *

    Issued in College Park, Georgia, on January 26, 2000.
Wade T. Carpenter,
Acting Manager, Air Traffic Division, Southern Region.
[FR Doc. 00-2774 Filed 2-7-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
‘THE ,iTJ?ORNEY GENERAL 

OF TEXAS 

Aun~riw ILTRXAR 

WILL WILSON 

Ax-rORNmzY G~Nl.xaAI. November 12, 1957 

, 

Honorable Robert S. Calvert 

Comptroller of Public Aacounts 

Capitol Station 

Austin, Texas 

Dear Mr. Calvert: 

Opinion No, ww-320 

Re: The status of the State 

Dairy and Hog Farm and 

other related questions. 

You have requested an opinion of this office concerning the status of the State Dairy and Hog Farm. 

The following questions were submitted to our office 

to be answered: 

"(1) Ts the Dairy and Hog Farm a separate 

institution? 

"(2) If not, to what institution should it 

be attached as of this date?" 

The 51st Legislature, Regular Session, made and constituted the State Dairy and Hog Farm one of the institutions 

which became a unit of the "Texas State Hospitals and Special 

Schools". (See Article 3174a, Section 1, and Article 3174b, 

Section 3, 'urernonrs Civil Statutes). 

House Bill 133, Acts 55th Legislature, 1957, Chapter 

385, page 905, appropriated $20,000.00 for the establishment 

of a Hog Farm Revolving Fund to be used in the operation of a 

Hog Farm at Leander, Texas, which farm was to be operated on a 

reimbursable basis to serve institutions under such rules and 

regulations as may be established by the Hospital Board, and 

which fund, together with all receipts deposited to its credit, 

could be used to pay salaries, purchase supplies and equipment, 

and pay such other expenses as may be necessary for the efficient operation of the Hog Farm. This appropriation was to the 

"Hospitals and Special Schools Central Office". 

Therefore, it is the opinion of this office that the 

State Dairy and Hog Farm is a part of the Texas State Hospitals 

and Special Schools and any sum of money appropriated to the 

State Dairy and Hog Farm has been appropriated to the Central 

office of the Board for Texas State Hospitals and Special 
Honorable Robert S. Calvert, page 2. (m-320) 

Schools and is to be expended by that branch for the purposes 

indicated in the appropriation bill, 

SUMMARY 

It is the opinion of this office that 

the State Dairy and Hog Farm is a part 

of the Texas State Hospitals and Special 

Schools and any appropriation to the Central Office of the Board for Texas State 

Hospitals and Special Schools for the 

State Dairy and Hog Farm is to be expended by that branch for the purposes 

indicated in the appropriation bill. 

Very truly yours, 

WILL WILSON 

Attorney General of Texas 

LS:wam:zt 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Geo. P. Blackburu, Chairman 

Fred Werkenthin 

W. V. Geppert 

J. Milton Richardson 

C. K. Richards 

Wayland C. Rivers, Jr. 

E. M. DeGeurin 

Mrs. Marietta Payne 

REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

BY: James N. Ludlum 

Assistant
NO. 07-04-0588-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL A

JANUARY 6, 2005

______________________________

LAWRENCE HIGGINS, APPELLANT

V.

WOODBURN, SEARS & WATKINS, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE 251ST DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY;

NO. 050573C; HONORABLE PATRICK PIRTLE, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before JOHNSON, C.J., and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Lawrence Higgins, proceeding pro se, filed a notice of appeal, received by this

court on September 3, 2004, stating that he was appealing an order dated August 23, 2004,

dismissing his case for want of prosecution. Appellant did not pay the filing fee of $125 for the

appeal or submit an affidavit of indigence before or at the time he filed his notice of appeal. Tex.

R. App. P. 20.1(c)(1).
-2-

By letter dated December 22, 2004, the clerk of this court notified appellant that the filing

fee had not been paid, and that failure to pay it could result in dismissal. Tex. R. App. P. 5, 42.3.

He responded with a “Motion to Proceed on Appeal in Forma Pauperis.” The motion does not

comport with the requirements of an affidavit of indigence described under Rule 20.1(b), nor was

it filed within the deadline prescribed by Rule 20.1(c)(1). In addition, appellant did not file a

timely motion requesting an extension of time to file his affidavit of indigence. Tex. R. App. P.

20.1(c)(3). 

Appellant refers us to documentation of his indigence filed with the trial court as proof of

his inability to pay trial court costs. Filing an affidavit of inability to pay trial court costs does not

comply with the requirement that, for appeal, an affidavit of indigence be filed in accordance with

Rule 20.1. Holt v. F.F. Enterprises, 990 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 1998, pet. denied).

Failure to timely file an affidavit of indigence, or a motion for extension of time to file the

affidavit, precludes appeal without the payment of costs. See Ford v. Whitehead, 2 S.W.3d 304,

306 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 1999, no pet.). Appellant is not excused by statute or the Rules of

Appellate Procedure from paying the filing fee and has failed to comply with the requirement that

he pay the fee this court is obligated to collect. Tex. R. App. P. 5.

 All parties having had more than ten days’ notice that dismissal could result from

appellant’s continued failure to comply with the rules, the appeal is dismissed. Tex. R. App. P.

5, 42.3(c). 

James T. Campbell

 Justice
-3-
Take notice that on January 28, 2000, Columbia Gulf Transmission Company (Columbia Gulf) tendered for filing to become part of its FERC Gas Tariff, Second Revised Volume No. 1, the tariff sheets listed on Appendix A to the filing, with a proposed effective date of March 1, 2000.

Columbia Gulf is making the instant filing to reflect various administrative revisions to its FERC Gas Tariff, Second Revised Volume No. 1 to reflect items including, but not limited to, changes to date references on various forms of service agreements and revisions to company contact information.

Columbia Gulf states further that copies of this filing have been mailed to all of its firm and interruptible customers and affected state regulatory commissions.

Any person desiring to be heard or to protest said filing should file a motion to intervene or a protest with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Sections 385.214 or 385.211 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations. All such motions or protests must be filed in accordance with Section 154.210 of the Commission's Regulations. Protests will be considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the proceedings. Any person wishing to become a party must file a motion to intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and are available for public inspection in the Public Reference Room. This filing may be viewed on the web at http://www.ferc.fed.us/​online/​rims.htm (call 202-208-2222 for assistance).

David P. Boergers,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 00-2788 Filed 2-7-00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3391 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3391

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude from gross income 
  payments under the Indian Health Service Loan Repayment Program and 
     certain amounts received under the Indian Health Professions 
                         Scholarships Program.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 30, 2013

Mr. Valadao (for himself, Mrs. Kirkpatrick, Mr. Grijalva, Ms. McCollum, 
Mr. Cole, Mr. Cook, Mr. Larsen of Washington, Mr. Blumenauer, Mr. Ruiz, 
 Mr. LaMalfa, Mr. Calvert, Mr. Huffman, Mr. Kind, Mr. Young of Alaska, 
 Mr. Pearce, Mr. Joyce, and Mr. Costa) introduced the following bill; 
         which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exclude from gross income 
  payments under the Indian Health Service Loan Repayment Program and 
     certain amounts received under the Indian Health Professions 
                         Scholarships Program.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Indian Health Service Health 
Professions Tax Fairness Act of 2013''.

SEC. 2. EXCLUSION FROM GROSS INCOME FOR PAYMENTS UNDER INDIAN HEALTH 
              SERVICE LOAN REPAYMENT PROGRAM.

    (a) In General.--Paragraph (4) of section 108(f) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by inserting ``under section 108 of the 
Indian Health Care Improvement Act,'' after ``338I of such Act,''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The heading for section 108(f)(4) of such 
Code is amended by striking ``and certain'' and inserting ``, indian 
health service loan repayment program, and certain''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to payments made after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3. EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN AMOUNTS RECEIVED UNDER INDIAN HEALTH 
              PROFESSIONS SCHOLARSHIPS PROGRAM.

    (a) In General.--Paragraph (2) of section 117(c) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking ``or'' at the end of 
subparagraph (A), by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (B) 
and inserting ``, or'', and by adding at the end the following new 
subparagraph:
                    ``(C) the Indian Health Professions Scholarships 
                Program under section 104 of the Indian Health Care 
                Improvement Act.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to amounts received in taxable years beginning after December 31, 
2013.
                                 <all>
```
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-6670

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

MARCUS DARRELL MACK,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Norman K. Moon, District Judge.

(CR-97-40, CA-01-973-7)

Submitted: August 6, 2003 Decided: August 25, 2003

Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Marcus Darrell Mack, Appellant Pro Se. Joseph William Hooge Mott,

Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Marcus Darrell Mack seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying relief on his petition filed under §28 U.S.C. § 2255

(2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order n a § 2255

proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate

of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate

of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)

(2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that

reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are

debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the

district court are also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, , 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1040 (2003); Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683

(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 941 (2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Mack has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
#### ELLIS v. URESTE et al.

No. 11099.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

Feb. 4, 1942.

Rehearing Denied March 4, 1942.

*227C. C. Carsner, of Victoria, for appellant.

J. W. Ragsdale, of Victoria, for ap-pellees.

MURRAY, Justice.

This suit was instituted in the District Court of Victoria County by W. L. Ellis against Samuel Ureste and his .mother, Mary Ureste, to set aside as fraudulent a deed from Samuel Ureste to Mary Ureste, purporting to convey a one-twelfth interest in and to 218 acres of land located in Victoria County.

The trial was before the court without the intervention of a jury and resulted in judgment that plaintiff, W. L. Ellis, take nothing. From this judgment W. L. Ellis has prosecuted this appeal.

Appellant first contends that the court erred in finding that there was no evidence of any attempt to defraud creditors.

The trial judge’s finding of fact No. 8 reads as follows: ‘T find that there is no evidence of any attempt to defraud creditors, and particularly to defraud this plaintiff by said conveyance.”

A finding by the trial judge, where he is the trier of facts, that there is no evidence of any attempt to defraud creditors by the conveyance under attack, necessarily embraces a finding that the evidence was insufficient to establish by a preponderance thereof that such fraud did exist. Rodriguez Higginbotham-Bailey-Logan Co., Tex.Civ.App., 144 S.W.2d 993, and authorities there cited. The burden of proof was upon appellant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the conveyance was actuated by fraud. 20 Tex.Jur. p. 496, § 143.

The trial judge being the trier of facts and having found against appellant on all fact issues, it is immaterial to this appeal whether or not there was some evidence of fraud. 20 Tex.Jur. p. 528, § 176. Appellant could not complain unless fraud was shown as a matter of law, -or the findings of the trial judge were so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to show prejudice. The trial judge made a negative finding on the issue of fraud, and such a finding is not required to be supported by evidence when the burden of proof is upon the losing party. It simply means that the court docs not find, from a preponderance of the evidence, that there was fraud.

The trial judge found, among other things, in substance, that Samuel Ureste was indebted to his mother, Mary Ureste, in an amount exceeding $500; that he conveyed his one-twelfth interest in 218 acres of land to his mother in payment of a portion of this debt; that Samuel’s one-twelfth interest in the land had a value of *228between $500 and $600. It is not contended that the evidence is insufficient to sustain these findings. These findings alone would support the judgment rendered.

The judgment is affirmed.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA
F OURTH D ISTRICT

ABBEY ROAD PLAZA, LLC, ANTHONY L. GRAHAM and ROSS F. PERSON , Appellant s ,

v.

MAIDA VALE, INC. , Appellee

.

No s . 4D 16

- 2882 and 4D17

- 826

[ March 22, 2018 ]

Consolidated a ppeal s and cross

- appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; Gregory M. Keyser and Janis Keyser , Judge s ; L.T. Case No. 50

- 2012

- CA

- 007504

- XXXX

- MB

.
S. Brian Bull, John M. Jorgensen and Derek M. Jorgensen of Scott, Harris, Bryan , Barra & Jorgensen, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for appellants.

Julie H. Littky

- Rubin of Clark, Fountain, La Vista, Prather, Keen & Littky

- Rubin, LLP, West Palm Beach; and Scott W. Zappolo of Zappolo & Farwell, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.
Affirmed.

W ARNER , C IKLIN and K LINGENSMITH , JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

**DAVID L. SCRIP, JR.**

**v.**

**WASHINGTON COUNTY JUVENILE**

**PROBATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT**

**COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW**

**PETITION OF: WASHINGTON COUNTY**

**JUVENILE PROBATION :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 89 WAL 2016** 

**Petition for Allowance of Appeal from**

**the Order of the Commonwealth Court**

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 6 th**  **day of September, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal** 

**and the ancillary Motion for Leave to Supplement Pet ition for Allowance of Appeal are** 

**hereby** DENIED.
Docket Info.: FAA- 2016 - 0465 Dir ID 2015 - NM - 096 - AD

**Contacts.** With whom outside the FAA has this proposal been discussed?

Organization Person Contacted **Date** Response **National Business Ai rcraft Association**  **Eli Cotti** 6/11/15 **Regional Airline Association** 6/11/15 **Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association Robert Hackman**  6/11/15 **Airlines for America Robert Ireland**  6/11/15
**WASHINGTON FEDERAL, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES**

**EXHIBIT 32**

**SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO THE**

**SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

**WASHINGTON FEDERAL, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES**

**CERTIFICATION**

**PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE**

**SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Washington Federal, Inc. (the “Company”)on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant tosection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the undersigned’s best knowledge and belief: 

(a) the Report fully complieswith the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and 

(b) the information contained inthe Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

Dated this 9th day of May 2008. 

 
Washington Federal, Inc.(Company)/s/ Roy M. WhiteheadROY M. WHITEHEADChairman, President andChief Executive Officer/s/ Brent J. BeardallBRENT J. BEARDALLExecutive Vice President andChief Financial Officer
**EXHIBIT 99.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OFTHE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

            In connection with the Quarterly Report of Superior Uniform Group, Inc. (the “Company”) onForm 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Gerald M. Benstock, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

            (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

            (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|                                                                                              |   |               |        |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------------------|--------|
| /s/ Gerald M. Benstock                                                                       |   |     |   |
|   Gerald M. BenstockChief Executive OfficerAugust 13, 2002     |