IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

IN THE MATTER OF: K. H., A MINOR, 

K H., 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Respondent. 

No. 66352 

FILE 

JUN 1 6 2016 

1" le K. 1_ t vIAN 

l."14141FADS111( 

BY 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

This is an appeal from a juvenile court order affirming the 

findings and recommendation of a hearing master in a juvenile 

proceeding. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark 

County; William 0. Voy, Judge. 

Appellant K.H. argues that his probation violation was a new 

delinquent act that had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that 

the evidence submitted by the State was insufficient. We disagree. 

K.H. claims that his probation violation qualifies as a 

delinquent act pursuant to NRS 62B.330(2)(b) because he violated a "rule 

or regulation having the force of law" when he violated the conditions of 

his probation. 1Under the plain meaning of NRS 62B.330(2)(b), however, 

"rule or regulation" refers to standards and orders that apply uniformly 

and not to conditions specifically imposed on an individual, such as a 

1NRS 62B.330(2) provides for two other delinquent acts, the 

violation of "a county or municipal ordinance" and the commission of "an 

act designated a criminal offense," NRS 62B.330(2)(a), (c), neither of which 

is at issue here. Additionally, NRS 62B.400(4) provides that the escape or 

attempted escape from a facility for the detention or correctional care of 

children is a delinquent act, also not at issue here. 

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probationer. See Clay v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev., Adv. Op. 

48, 305 P.3d 898, 902 (2013) ("When interpreting a statutory provision, 

this court looks first to the plain language of the statute."); see also 

Regulation, Rule, Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (defining a 

regulation as "[t]he act or process of controlling by rule or restriction," or 

"[a] rule or order, having legal force, usu[ally] issued by an administrative 

agency," and defining a rule as Idenerally, an established and 

authoritative standard or principal; a general norm mandating or guiding 

conduct or action in a given type of situation"). Accordingly, K.H.'s 

probation violation was not a delinquent act pursuant to NRS 

62B.330(2)(b). 2 See Jackson v. State, 128 Nev. 598, 603, 291 P.3d 1274, 

1277 (2012) (providing that this court reviews de novo questions of 

statutory construction). 

As K.H.'s probation violation was not a delinquent act, the 

applicable burden of proof was that the court be reasonably satisfied that 

K.H.'s conduct was not as good as required by the conditions of his 

probation. See Naves v. State, 91 Nev. 106, 108, 531 P.2d 1360, 1362 

(1975) (holding that a juvenile is not entitled to any greater rights than 

those afforded to adults at a probation violation hearing); Lewis v. State, 

90 Nev. 436, 438, 529 P.2d 796, 797 (1974) (discussing the standard at an 

adult probation violation hearing as "[Ole evidence and facts must 

reasonably satisfy the judge that the conduct of the probationer has not 

2While K.H. argues that violations of probation are treated as 

delinquent acts, NRS 62B.330(2) and NRS 62B.400(4) outline distinct acts 

that are to be considered delinquent acts, and K.H.'s probation violation is 

not one of those acts. Additionally, we have considered K.H.'s argument 

regarding NRS 62E.710(1) and conclude that no relief is warranted, 

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been as good as required by the conditions of probation"). Here, the 

juvenile court found that K.H.'s active social networking account and his 

admissions that he accessed social networking websites via his mother's 

and his cousin's phones were sufficient to prove to the satisfaction of the 

court that K.H. violated his probation. 3We conclude the juvenile court did 

not abuse its discretion by sustaining the hearing master's findings and 

recommendation. See In re A.B., 128 Nev. 764, 772, 291 P.3d 122, 127-28 

(2012) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion the juvenile court's decision on 

objection from a dependency master's findings and recommendation). 4 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

Dougla 

3As to K.H.'s argument regarding corpus delicti and the use of his 

confession, the corpus delicti rule does not apply to revocation proceedings, 

where the burden of proof is lower than in a criminal prosecution. See 

United States v. Bulger, 728 F.3d 947, 949-51 (9th Cir. 2013) (outlining 

that state courts have consistently held the corpus delicti rule does not 

apply at revocation proceedings). 

4To the extent K.H. claims the State failed to produce probation 

terms signed by him to the hearing master, he fails to present relevant 

authority or cogent argument for this requirement at a probation violation 

hearing. See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1978) ("It 

is appellant's responsibility to present relevant authority and cogent 

argument; issues not so presented need not be addressed by this court."). 

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cc: Hon. William 0. Voy, District Judge, Family Court Division 

Clark County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney/Juvenile Division 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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