No. 05-080 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

 

2007 MT 105 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

APRIL STOMBAUGH, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, 

In and For the County of Jefferson, Cause No. DC 04-1938, 

Honorable Loren Tucker, Presiding Judge 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

 Jack H. Morris, Jardine & Morris, Whitehall, Montana 

For Respondent: 

 

 Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Tammy K. Plubell, 

 Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

 Mathew J. Johnson, County Attorney, Boulder, Montana 

 

 

 Submitted on Briefs: May 10, 2006 

 Decided: May 1, 2007 

Filed: 

__________________________________________ 

Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Appellant April Stoumbaugh (April) appeals from the order of the Fifth Judicial 

District Court, Jefferson County, denying her motion to suppress. We affirm. 

¶2 We consider the following issues on appeal: 

¶3 (1) Did particularized suspicion exist to support a canine sniff of April’s vehicle? 

¶4 (2) Did the District Court err by denying April’s motion to suppress statements 

she made to law enforcement on the grounds that she had not been given Miranda

warnings and, further, had requested an attorney? 

¶5 (3) Was the search warrant issued for April’s vehicle supported by probable 

cause? 

BACKGROUND 

¶6 On April 7, 2004, April called her aunt and uncle, Anna and Vonn Friddle, to 

advise that she was coming to visit them in Boulder. Vonn and Anna had prior 

knowledge of April’s involvement with drugs and were concerned that she was going to 

be on drugs or bring drugs with her to their home. Vonn knew from April’s mother that 

April had outstanding warrants for her arrest in Montana. According to her mother, April 

was also facing felony charges in Washington. Vonn called April’s mother to get more 

information and spoke with April’s stepfather. In the course of the conversation, the 

stepfather commented that he wished law enforcement would “just lock [April] up to get 

her the help she needs.” Vonn offered to let law enforcement know that April was at his 

house so an officer could arrest her on her outstanding warrants. After April’s stepfather 

endorsed this suggestion, Vonn called his brother, Ronnie Hayes (Hayes), who is a 

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dispatcher at the Boulder Police Department. In response to the call, Hayes confirmed 

that April had outstanding arrest warrants and arranged for an officer to arrest her. 

¶7 Shortly thereafter, April arrived at the Friddles’ house. Officer Kosola (Kosola), 

of the Boulder Police Department, was dispatched to the Friddles’ home to arrest April 

on the outstanding warrants. When Kosola arrived he saw a vehicle with Washington 

license plates parked behind Vonn’s car. Kosola knocked on the door of the residence, 

and Anna let him inside. He informed April of the outstanding warrants and placed her 

under arrest. Kosola handcuffed April, checked for weapons, and informed her of her 

Miranda rights.1

 

¶8 After Kosola arrested April, she expressed her concern to him that she would not 

be able to make a timely appearance in Spokane, Washington, to face drug charges. 

Kosola confirmed April’s statements by contacting the local authorities in Spokane and 

verifying through the Criminal Justice Information Network (CJIN) that she had felony 

drug charges pending in Washington.2

 

¶9 Shortly after Kosola arrested April, Deputy Smoke (Smoke) of the Jefferson 

County Sheriff’s Office arrived at the Friddles’ residence. While Kosola was 

transporting April to the police station, Smoke stayed and spoke with the Friddles. Both 

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Testimony from Kosola and Anna indicated that Kosola gave April a Miranda

warning at the Friddle residence, following her arrest. April contested this testimony. In 

its oral findings, the District Court did not address the conflict over this specific Miranda

warning, instead finding generally that “the more credible evidence is that the Defendant 

was given her Miranda rights on more than one occasion over the course of the day.” 

2

In addition to the Washington drug charges, the CJIN report indicated that April 

had seven outstanding Montana misdemeanor warrants, but testimony indicated that a 

number of these were later found to be expired or invalid. 

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Vonn and Anna told Smoke that April had a drug problem, and they were very concerned 

about her. The Friddles also informed Smoke that they wanted April’s car, which was 

parked behind their car, removed from their property. Smoke radioed Kosola to inform 

him of this and also reported that he had observed that the vehicle’s ignition was 

“punched”—a common indicator that the vehicle was stolen. Kosola ran a registration 

check and asked April about the vehicle. April explained that she bought the car from a 

woman in Washington State, and had a bill of sale in the glove box. April agreed to a 

limited search of the glove box and a door panel of the car to collect the ownership 

documentation, which Kosola conveyed to Smoke. 

¶10 Kosola also advised April that the Friddles wanted her car removed, and April 

responded by advising Kosola that she wanted her car towed to her mother’s house in 

Lewis and Clark County. Kosola found April’s response “demanding” and given with an 

urgent sense of wanting the car towed immediately. He advised April that Montana City 

Towing could tow it to that establishment’s property much cheaper than towing it to the 

Lewis and Clark County location, and further suggested that the fee for towing the car 

that far could well exceed the value of the vehicle, which Kosola estimated to be $150. 

However, April insisted on doing so, which Kosola found to be unusual and suspicious. 

A tow truck was dispatched but, upon arriving at the scene, the tow truck operator was 

advised to wait, because by then additional events had occurred and police had decided to 

initiate a canine sniff, as discussed below. Ultimately, April’s mother declined to pay the 

cost of having the car towed to her residence, and the vehicle was impounded. 

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¶11 Smoke searched the glove box and obtained the bill of sale and title documents. 

On a first look, it appeared to Smoke that the seller’s signatures on the bill of sale and on 

the registration did not match, raising a concern that different people had signed the 

seller’s name.3

 While completing that limited search, Smoke noticed a white pill in plain 

view on the dashboard, which he could not identify, but which had numbers imprinted 

thereon. Smoke advised Kosola about the pill and relayed the imprinted numbers. 

Kosola asked April about the pill and, according to Kosola, April answered evasively, 

which Kosola thought suspicious. He testified regarding the pill as follows: 

Q. So this pill at the time, until it’s verified what it is, it would be 

suspicious to you? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And why would that be? 

A. It could be Oxycontin; it could have been anything. I don’t know what 

kind of pill it was. Unknown pill. 

Q. And somebody who has had a drug history, right? 

A. Yes. They’re looking for an easy fix. 

¶12 Smoke testified as follows: 

Q. At that time, you had background information that . . . the potential 

owner had some drug history; is that correct? 

A. Yes. 

Q. So when seeing the pill, did that raise any suspicion for you? 

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April’s ownership of the vehicle was ultimately verified by police, and the 

District Court concluded it would not consider the vehicle issues in determining the 

existence of particularized suspicion or probable cause herein.

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A. That did. I looked through the windshield at the pill, and was able to 

obtain the numbers off of the side facing up . . . . 

Q. When seeing a pill and seeing numbers on it, would that alleviate any 

suspicion that it could be illegal narcotics? 

A. No, it would not, because it could be a prescription drug belonging to 

somebody else, because obviously it wasn’t in the prescription container; or 

it could be a controlled narcotics or something like that. 

¶13 Based on what had transpired, Kosola requested that Deputy Grimsrud (Grimsrud) 

of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office bring his narcotics detection dog to conduct a 

canine sniff of April’s vehicle. The dog “hit” or alerted to the odor of drugs on the 

vehicle. Kosola informed April that the narcotics dog had alerted to her vehicle and 

again gave her a Miranda warning from a printed advisory card. April then indicated that 

there was drug paraphernalia in the vehicle, and Kosola asked her for permission to 

search the vehicle. Kosola testified that April was then “fidgety,” but gave a second 

limited consent to search the vehicle, specifying that police search only the vehicle’s 

console, within which a marijuana pipe would be found in a silver box. This was found 

in the later search. Kosola testified that he drew suspicions from the limiting conditions 

April had placed on both the first and second consents to search. 

¶14 Kosola then contacted his superior, the chief of police, and the county attorney, 

and followed their direction to apply for a search warrant and impound the vehicle. The 

warrant application referenced some, but not all, of the above-described events. Upon 

receiving the warrant, Kosola executed the search, finding marijuana pipes and drug 

paraphernalia in the trunk with marijuana and methamphetamine residue on them. 

¶15 April filed a motion to suppress the evidence, which was denied. April appeals. 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW 

¶16 This Court reviews a district court’s grant or denial of a motion to suppress to 

determine whether the district court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether 

those findings were correctly applied as a matter of law. State v. Ochadleus, 2005 MT 

88, ¶ 16, 326 Mont. 441, ¶ 16, 110 P.3d 448, ¶ 16 (citation omitted). 

DISCUSSION 

¶17 1. Did particularized suspicion exist to support a canine sniff of April’s 

vehicle? 

¶18 April argues that the District Court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence 

should be reversed because there was insufficient objective data to constitute the 

necessary particularized suspicion for police to initiate a canine sniff with the narcotics 

detection dog. The law allows “for a carefully drawn exception to the warrant 

requirement, but still require[s] particularized suspicion when the area or object subject to 

the canine sniff is already exposed to the public.” State v. Tackitt, 2003 MT 81, ¶ 29, 315 

Mont. 59, ¶ 29, 67 P.3d 295, ¶ 29. To establish particularized suspicion, the State must 

show: (1) objective data from which an experienced police officer can make certain 

inferences; and (2) a resulting suspicion that the person is or has been engaged in 

wrongdoing or was a witness to criminal activity. State v. Gopher, 193 Mont. 189, 194, 

631 P.2d 293, 296 (1981). Whether the State has particularized suspicion is a question of 

fact that is analyzed under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Pratt, 286 Mont. 

156, 161, 951 P.2d 37, 40 (1997). In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, a court 

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should consider the quantity, or content, and quality, or degree of reliability, of the 

information available to the officer. Pratt, 286 Mont. at 161, 951 P.2d at 40. 

¶19 April challenges the particularized suspicion determination, first, by noting that 

the initial concerns regarding her car’s ownership were alleviated. She argues that her 

family’s concerns about her drug use were unfounded and uncorroborated, and that there 

was no evidence that the white pill was contraband. Lastly, April argues that the 

suspicions taken by Kosola from the limited consent to search she gave are unfounded 

because such limitation “is not objective evidence” and she retained her constitutional 

right of privacy in the remaining portions of her vehicle. 

¶20 On this last point, the District Court agreed with April, concluding that a limitation 

on permission to search cannot be considered for purposes of determining particularized 

suspicion. Thus, it disregarded the limitation placed upon the search by April in 

analyzing particularized suspicion, and we do likewise. 

¶21 The State responds that after Kosola’s contact with April was lawfully initiated 

pursuant to her arrest on outstanding warrants, officers properly relied on April’s family’s 

concerns about her drug use because Kosola knew the family was concerned enough to 

disclose April’s location, in their own home, so that law enforcement could arrest her 

there. Then, April herself advised Kosola of her pending drug charges in Washington 

and expressed her concerns about being able to timely appear to answer those charges. 

The District Court relied upon these factors and also noted Kosola’s efforts to confirm the 

charges. 

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¶22 As for the white pill, the State contends that it was proper, in light of April’s own 

admission to pending drug charges, to consider it as possible contraband even though it 

was not immediately identifiable as such. In its discussion about the white pill, the 

District Court noted that the pill was “a concern,” but not very significant. The District 

Court did find that April’s “evasive attitude” in response to questioning by Kosola was a 

significant factor supporting particularized suspicion. 

¶23 The District Court identified April’s “urgency” in seeking to arrange the towing of 

her vehicle to Lewis and Clark County, and her willingness to pay more than the car was 

worth for towing, as a consideration in its probable cause analysis, also made from the 

bench, but did not do so in its discussion of particularized suspicion. This may result 

from the mention of this urgency in Kosola’s application for issuance of a search warrant. 

However, the testimony illustrates that Kosola’s suspicions in this regard were also raised 

prior to his decision to seek the canine sniff. A tow truck had been called out to tow the 

vehicle, but the towing was delayed when Kosola, having thereafter been notified of 

Smoke’s discovery of the white pill and hearing April’s evasive answers with regard to 

the pill, determined to initiate a canine sniff of the vehicle. 

¶24 On these facts—the family report about April’s drug use and notification of 

April’s location in their home, April’s admission of pending drug charges in Washington, 

police confirmation of pending felony drug charges, April’s urgency in seeking removal 

of her vehicle out of the county and her unusual desire to pay more than the car was 

worth to do so, the discovery of the white pill and April’s evasiveness about the pill—we 

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conclude that the District Court did not err in holding that the officers had particularized 

suspicion to conduct the canine sniff of April’s vehicle. 

¶25 2. Did the District Court err by denying April’s motion to suppress 

statements she made to law enforcement on the grounds that she had not been given 

Miranda warnings and, further, had requested an attorney? 

¶26 April argues that she was not given her Miranda warnings as required by law, and 

thus the District Court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence should be reversed. 

April contends that she made a request for an attorney that was unambiguous and she 

never waived her Miranda rights. The State argues that the District Court’s finding that 

Kosola read April the Miranda warnings is not clearly erroneous and that the court 

correctly resolved any factual disputes in the testimony. 

¶27 At the suppression hearing, April testified that she could not recall Kosola reading 

her Miranda rights. Kosola, however, testified he was certain that as soon as he placed 

April under arrest, he took a card from his pocket containing the Miranda warning, and 

read it to April. April’s aunt, Anna Friddle, corroborated Kosola’s testimony that the 

warning had been given at her house. The District Court resolved this conflicting 

evidence by finding that April had been advised of her Miranda rights. 

¶28 This Court recognizes that the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given 

their testimony are determined by the trier of fact, and disputed questions of fact and 

credibility will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Bauer, 2002 MT 7, ¶ 15, 308 Mont. 

99, ¶ 15, 39 P.3d 689, ¶ 15. If evidence conflicts, it is within the province of the trier of 

fact to determine which will prevail. Bauer, ¶ 15. Here, the District Court assessed the 

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credibility of the witnesses and found that Kosola gave Miranda warnings to April. We 

conclude that this finding was not clearly erroneous. 

¶29 April also testified that she asked for an attorney after being advised by Kosola 

that the drug dog had alerted to her car. This assertion was contested by Kosola, who 

testified that April did not request an attorney. Unfortunately, the District Court did not 

make a finding on this particular conflict in the testimony. In its verbal findings on these 

issues, the District Court stated as follows: 

The Court finds and concludes that the more credible evidence is that the 

Defendant was given her Miranda rights on more than one occasion over 

the course of the day. Thereafter she volunteered the admission and the 

existence of drug paraphernalia within the vehicle which was to be searched 

. . . . 

¶30 We can only conclude from the District Court’s finding that April “volunteered” 

the information about drug paraphernalia in her car, that she was not also asking for an 

attorney. April’s statement about the paraphernalia was made after Kosola advised her 

about the drug dog hit—the same time which April claimed to have asked for an attorney. 

The District Court found that, at that time, April was volunteering information about the 

drug paraphernalia, which would be inconsistent with a request for legal assistance. We 

thus conclude that April’s Miranda claims were properly denied by the District Court. 

¶31 We note, however, that this factual issue, along with other issues addressed in this 

opinion, demonstrates that a district court’s rendering of findings of fact and conclusions 

of law from the bench can quite easily be inadequate. Without careful drafting, issues 

can be overlooked and a decision issued which is insufficient for appellate review, 

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resulting in remand. We urge the district courts to resolve factual and legal issues 

regarding suppression by way of a written order. 

¶32 3. Was the search warrant issued for April’s vehicle supported by probable 

cause? 

¶33 April argues that the search warrant obtained by the officers was not supported by 

probable cause. The United States and Montana Constitutions protect individuals from 

unreasonable searches and seizures. Amend. IV, U.S. Const.; Art. II, Sec. 11, Mont. 

Const. For a search warrant to issue, the application must state facts sufficient to show 

probable cause. State v. Olson, 2003 MT 61, ¶ 24, 314 Mont. 402, ¶ 24, 66 P.3d 297, 

¶ 24. 

¶34 Probable cause to search exists “if the facts and circumstances within the officer’s 

personal knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe that the 

suspect has committed an offense.” State v. Saxton, 2003 MT 105, ¶ 26, 315 Mont. 315, 

¶ 26, 68 P.3d 721, ¶ 26. Probable cause is evaluated in light of an officer’s knowledge 

and all relevant circumstances. State v. Van Dort, 2003 MT 104, ¶ 19, 315 Mont. 303, 

¶ 19, 68 P.3d 728, ¶ 19. 

¶35 April raises arguments similar to those she offered above against the factors 

considered for determining the existence of particularized suspicion, and also contends 

that her statements to the police should be excised from the warrant application because 

she asked for an attorney, an issue likewise addressed above. Because we have already 

rejected April’s Miranda claims, we do not excise any information from the warrant 

application. 

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¶36 In addition to the factors considered for particularized suspicion, except for the 

white pill, which was not referenced within the warrant application, Kosola’s application 

also described the alert of the drug dog on April’s vehicle, her admission thereafter that 

drug paraphernalia was located within the vehicle, and the officers’ experience and 

qualifications with regard to drug crime investigation. We have previously concluded 

that probable cause for a search existed under similar circumstances. See State v. Hart,

2004 MT 51, ¶ 27, 320 Mont. 154, ¶ 27, 85 P.3d 1275, ¶ 27. Likewise, we hold that the 

District Court correctly concluded that probable cause existed for the issuance of the 

search warrant herein. 

¶37 Affirmed. 

 /S/ JIM RICE 

We concur: 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY 

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON 

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER 

/S/ JOHN WARNER 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART 

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