# Diario Oficial C 334/2014

| | ISSN 1977-0928 |
| --- | --- |
| Diario Oficial
  de la Unión Europea | C 334 |
| | |
| Edición en lengua española | Comunicaciones e informaciones | 57° año25 de septiembre de 2014 |

ISSN 1977-0928

Diario Oficial

de la Unión Europea

C 334

Edición en lengua española

Comunicaciones e informaciones

57° año25 de septiembre de 2014

---

| Número de información | Sumario | Página |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Comunicaciones |
| | COMUNICACIONES PROCEDENTES DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2014/C 334/01 | No oposición a una concentración notificada (Asunto M.7361 — Kaindl/DB ML/CTE) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2014/C 334/02 | No oposición a una concentración notificada (Asunto M.7386 — KKR/Riverstone/Trinity) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Número de información

Sumario

Página

II   Comunicaciones

COMUNICACIONES PROCEDENTES DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

2014/C 334/01

No oposición a una concentración notificada (Asunto M.7361 — Kaindl/DB ML/CTE) (
  1
  )

1

1

2014/C 334/02

No oposición a una concentración notificada (Asunto M.7386 — KKR/Riverstone/Trinity) (
  1
  )

1

1

---

| | IV   Información |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMACIÓN PROCEDENTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2014/C 334/03 | Tipo de cambio del euro | 2 |
| 2014/C 334/04 | Dictamen del Comité Consultivo en materia de prácticas restrictivas y posiciones dominantes emitido en su reunión, de 3 de marzo de 2014, en relación con un proyecto de decisión relativa al Asunto AT.39952 Bolsas de intercambio de electricidad — Ponente: Países Bajos | 3 |
| 2014/C 334/05 | Informe final del Consejero Auditor — Bolsas de intercambio de electricidad (AT.39952) | 4 |
| 2014/C 334/06 | Resumen de la Decisión de la Comisión, de 5 de marzo de 2014, relativa a un procedimiento en virtud del artículo 101 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea y el artículo 53 del Acuerdo EEE (Asunto AT.39952 — Bolsas de intercambio de electricidad) [notificada con el número C(2014) 1204 final] | 5 |
| | Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo |
| 2014/C 334/07 | Informe Especial no 13/2014 — Ayuda de la UE a la rehabilitación tras el terremoto de Haití | 7 |
| | INFORMACIÓN RELATIVA AL ESPACIO ECONÓMICO EUROPEO |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2014/C 334/08 | Invitación a presentar observaciones en aplicación del artículo 1, apartado 2, de la parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC sobre el establecimiento de un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia por lo que se refiere a supuestas ayudas concedidas a Innovasjon Norge para sus actividades en el mercado de las infraestructuras de internet y servicios conexos, así como a la posible ayuda en favor de organismos regionales de turismo y organizaciones de gestión de destinos | 8 |
| 2014/C 334/09 | Dictamen de los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC presentado en la reunión del Comité Consultivo en materia de prácticas restrictivas y posiciones dominantes de la CE, de 3 de marzo de 2014, relativo a un anteproyecto de Decisión de la Comisión en el Asunto: AT.39952 Bolsas de intercambio de electricidad — Ponente: Países Bajos | 28 |

IV   Información

INFORMACIÓN PROCEDENTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

2014/C 334/03

Tipo de cambio del euro

2

2014/C 334/04

Dictamen del Comité Consultivo en materia de prácticas restrictivas y posiciones dominantes emitido en su reunión, de 3 de marzo de 2014, en relación con un proyecto de decisión relativa al Asunto AT.39952 Bolsas de intercambio de electricidad — Ponente: Países Bajos

3

2014/C 334/05

Informe final del Consejero Auditor — Bolsas de intercambio de electricidad (AT.39952)

4

2014/C 334/06

Resumen de la Decisión de la Comisión, de 5 de marzo de 2014, relativa a un procedimiento en virtud del artículo 101 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea y el artículo 53 del Acuerdo EEE (Asunto AT.39952 — Bolsas de intercambio de electricidad) [notificada con el número C(2014) 1204 final]

[notificada con el número C(2014) 1204 final]

5

Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo

2014/C 334/07

Informe Especial no 13/2014 — Ayuda de la UE a la rehabilitación tras el terremoto de Haití

o

7

INFORMACIÓN RELATIVA AL ESPACIO ECONÓMICO EUROPEO

Comisión Europea

2014/C 334/08

Invitación a presentar observaciones en aplicación del artículo 1, apartado 2, de la parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC sobre el establecimiento de un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia por lo que se refiere a supuestas ayudas concedidas a Innovasjon Norge para sus actividades en el mercado de las infraestructuras de internet y servicios conexos, así como a la posible ayuda en favor de organismos regionales de turismo y organizaciones de gestión de destinos

8

2014/C 334/09

Dictamen de los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC presentado en la reunión del Comité Consultivo en materia de prácticas restrictivas y posiciones dominantes de la CE, de 3 de marzo de 2014, relativo a un anteproyecto de Decisión de la Comisión en el Asunto: AT.39952 Bolsas de intercambio de electricidad — Ponente: Países Bajos

28

---

| | V   Anuncios |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2014/C 334/10 | Convocatoria de concurso-oposición general | 29 |
| | PROCEDIMIENTOS JURISDICCIONALES |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2014/C 334/11 | Recurso interpuesto el 17 de julio de 2014 contra Islandia por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC (Asunto E-12/14) | 30 |
| 2014/C 334/12 | Recurso interpuesto el 17 de julio de 2014 contra Islandia por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC (Asunto E-11/14) | 31 |
| 2014/C 334/13 | Recurso interpuesto el 17 de julio de 2014 contra Islandia por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC (Asunto E-13/14) | 32 |
| 2014/C 334/14 | Recurso interpuesto el 17 de julio de 2014 contra Islandia por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC (Asunto E-14/14) | 33 |
| 2014/C 334/15 | Recurso interpuesto el 18 de julio de 2014 contra Islandia por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC (Asunto E-15/14) | 34 |
| 2014/C 334/16 | Recurso interpuesto el 25 de julio de 2014 por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC contra el Principado de Liechtenstein (Asunto E-17/14) | 35 |
| | PROCEDIMIENTOS RELATIVOS A LA APLICACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA DE COMPETENCIA |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2014/C 334/17 | Notificación previa de una operación de concentración (Asunto M.7372 — AXA/Hammerson/The Real Estate Portfolio) — Asunto que podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado (
  1
  ) | 36 |

V   Anuncios

PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Comisión Europea

2014/C 334/10

Convocatoria de concurso-oposición general

29

PROCEDIMIENTOS JURISDICCIONALES

Comisión Europea

2014/C 334/11

Recurso interpuesto el 17 de julio de 2014 contra Islandia por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC (Asunto E-12/14)

30

2014/C 334/12

Recurso interpuesto el 17 de julio de 2014 contra Islandia por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC (Asunto E-11/14)

31

2014/C 334/13

Recurso interpuesto el 17 de julio de 2014 contra Islandia por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC (Asunto E-13/14)

32

2014/C 334/14

Recurso interpuesto el 17 de julio de 2014 contra Islandia por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC (Asunto E-14/14)

33

2014/C 334/15

Recurso interpuesto el 18 de julio de 2014 contra Islandia por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC (Asunto E-15/14)

34

2014/C 334/16

Recurso interpuesto el 25 de julio de 2014 por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC contra el Principado de Liechtenstein (Asunto E-17/14)

35

PROCEDIMIENTOS RELATIVOS A LA APLICACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA DE COMPETENCIA

Comisión Europea

2014/C 334/17

Notificación previa de una operación de concentración (Asunto M.7372 — AXA/Hammerson/The Real Estate Portfolio) — Asunto que podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado (
  1
  )

1

36

---

| | Corrección de errores |
| --- | --- |
| 2014/C 334/18 | Corrección de errores de la actualización de la lista de pasos fronterizos mencionados en el artículo 2, apartado 8, del Reglamento (CE) no 562/2006 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, por el que se establece un código comunitario de normas para el cruce de personas por las fronteras (Código de fronteras Schengen) ( DO C 316 de 28.12.2007, p. 1 ; DO C 134 de 31.5.2008, p. 16 ; DO C 177 de 12.7.2008, p. 9 ; DO C 200 de 6.8.2008, p. 10 ; DO C 331 de 31.12.2008, p. 13 ; DO C 3 de 8.1.2009, p. 10 ; DO C 37 de 14.2.2009, p. 10 ; DO C 64 de 19.3.2009, p. 20 ; DO C 99 de 30.4.2009, p. 7 ; DO C 229 de 23.9.2009, p. 28 ; DO C 263 de 5.11.2009, p. 22 ; DO C 298 de 8.12.2009, p. 17 ; DO C 74 de 24.3.2010, p. 13 ; DO C 326 de 3.12.2010, p. 17 ; DO C 355 de 29.12.2010, p. 34 ; DO C 22 de 22.1.2011, p. 22 ; DO C 37 de 5.2.2011, p. 12 ; DO C 149 de 20.5.2011, p. 8 ; DO C 190 de 30.6.2011, p. 17 ; DO C 203 de 9.7.2011, p. 14 ; DO C 210 de 16.7.2011, p. 30 ; DO C 271 de 14.9.2011, p. 18 ; DO C 356 de 6.12.2011, p. 12 ; DO C 111 de 18.4.2012, p. 3 ; DO C 183 de 23.6.2012, p. 7 ; DO C 313 de 17.10.2012, p. 11 ; DO C 394 de 20.12.2012, p. 22 ; DO C 51 de 22.2.2013, p. 9 ; DO C 167 de 13.6.2013, p. 9 ; DO C 242 de 23.8.2013, p. 2 ; DO C 275 de 24.9.2013, p. 7 ; DO C 314 de 29.10.2013, p. 5 ; DO C 324 de 9.11.2013, p. 6 ; DO C 57 de 28.2.2014, p. 4 ; DO C 167 de 4.6.2014, p. 9 ) ( DO C 244 de 26.7.2014 ) | 37 |

Corrección de errores

2014/C 334/18

Corrección de errores de la actualización de la lista de pasos fronterizos mencionados en el artículo 2, apartado 8, del Reglamento (CE) no 562/2006 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, por el que se establece un código comunitario de normas para el cruce de personas por las fronteras (Código de fronteras Schengen) ( DO C 316 de 28.12.2007, p. 1 ; DO C 134 de 31.5.2008, p. 16 ; DO C 177 de 12.7.2008, p. 9 ; DO C 200 de 6.8.2008, p. 10 ; DO C 331 de 31.12.2008, p. 13 ; DO C 3 de 8.1.2009, p. 10 ; DO C 37 de 14.2.2009, p. 10 ; DO C 64 de 19.3.2009, p. 20 ; DO C 99 de 30.4.2009, p. 7 ; DO C 229 de 23.9.2009, p. 28 ; DO C 263 de 5.11.2009, p. 22 ; DO C 298 de 8.12.2009, p. 17 ; DO C 74 de 24.3.2010, p. 13 ; DO C 326 de 3.12.2010, p. 17 ; DO C 355 de 29.12.2010, p. 34 ; DO C 22 de 22.1.2011, p. 22 ; DO C 37 de 5.2.2011, p. 12 ; DO C 149 de 20.5.2011, p. 8 ; DO C 190 de 30.6.2011, p. 17 ; DO C 203 de 9.7.2011, p. 14 ; DO C 210 de 16.7.2011, p. 30 ; DO C 271 de 14.9.2011, p. 18 ; DO C 356 de 6.12.2011, p. 12 ; DO C 111 de 18.4.2012, p. 3 ; DO C 183 de 23.6.2012, p. 7 ; DO C 313 de 17.10.2012, p. 11 ; DO C 394 de 20.12.2012, p. 22 ; DO C 51 de 22.2.2013, p. 9 ; DO C 167 de 13.6.2013, p. 9 ; DO C 242 de 23.8.2013, p. 2 ; DO C 275 de 24.9.2013, p. 7 ; DO C 314 de 29.10.2013, p. 5 ; DO C 324 de 9.11.2013, p. 6 ; DO C 57 de 28.2.2014, p. 4 ; DO C 167 de 4.6.2014, p. 9 ) ( DO C 244 de 26.7.2014 )

o

37

---

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE |

---

(1)   Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE

1

| ES | |
| --- | --- |

ES

---

II Comunicaciones

COMUNICACIONES PROCEDENTES DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

| 25.9.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/1

---

No oposición a una concentración notificada

(Asunto M.7361 — Kaindl/DB ML/CTE)

(Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE)

(2014/C 334/01)

El 11 de septiembre de 2014, la Comisión decidió no oponerse a la concentración notificada que se cita en el encabezamiento y declararla compatible con el mercado interior. Esta decisión se basa en el artículo 6, apartado 1, letra b), del Reglamento (CE) no 139/2004 del Consejo (1). El texto íntegro de la decisión solo está disponible en alemán y se hará público una vez que se elimine cualquier secreto comercial que pueda contener. Estará disponible:

| — | en la sección de concentraciones del sitio web de competencia de la Comisión (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sitio web permite localizar las decisiones sobre concentraciones mediante criterios de búsqueda tales como el nombre de la empresa, el número de asunto, la fecha o el sector de actividad, |
| --- | --- |

—

en la sección de concentraciones del sitio web de competencia de la Comisión (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sitio web permite localizar las decisiones sobre concentraciones mediante criterios de búsqueda tales como el nombre de la empresa, el número de asunto, la fecha o el sector de actividad,

| — | en formato electrónico en el sitio web EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=es) con el número de documento 32014M7361. EUR-Lex da acceso al Derecho comunitario en línea. |
| --- | --- |

—

en formato electrónico en el sitio web EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=es) con el número de documento 32014M7361. EUR-Lex da acceso al Derecho comunitario en línea.

---

(1)  DO L 24 de 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

| 25.9.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/1

---

No oposición a una concentración notificada

(Asunto M.7386 — KKR/Riverstone/Trinity)

(Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE)

(2014/C 334/02)

El 19 de septiembre de 2014, la Comisión decidió no oponerse a la concentración notificada que se cita en el encabezamiento y declararla compatible con el mercado interior. Esta decisión se basa en el artículo 6, apartado 1, letra b), del Reglamento (CE) no 139/2004 del Consejo (1). El texto íntegro de la decisión solo está disponible en inglés y se hará público una vez que se elimine cualquier secreto comercial que pueda contener. Estará disponible:

| — | en la sección de concentraciones del sitio web de competencia de la Comisión (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sitio web permite localizar las decisiones sobre concentraciones mediante criterios de búsqueda tales como el nombre de la empresa, el número de asunto, la fecha o el sector de actividad, |
| --- | --- |

—

en la sección de concentraciones del sitio web de competencia de la Comisión (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sitio web permite localizar las decisiones sobre concentraciones mediante criterios de búsqueda tales como el nombre de la empresa, el número de asunto, la fecha o el sector de actividad,

| — | en formato electrónico en el sitio web EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=es) con el número de documento 32014M7386. EUR-Lex da acceso al Derecho de la Unión Europea en línea. |
| --- | --- |

—

en formato electrónico en el sitio web EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=es) con el número de documento 32014M7386. EUR-Lex da acceso al Derecho de la Unión Europea en línea.

---

(1)  DO L 24 de 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

IV Información

INFORMACIÓN PROCEDENTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

| 25.9.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/2

---

Tipo de cambio del euro (1)

24 de septiembre de 2014

(2014/C 334/03)

1 euro =

| | Moneda | Tipo de cambio |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dólar estadounidense | 1,2826 |
| JPY | yen japonés | 139,50 |
| DKK | corona danesa | 7,4436 |
| GBP | libra esterlina | 0,78230 |
| SEK | corona sueca | 9,1825 |
| CHF | franco suizo | 1,2077 |
| ISK | corona islandesa | |
| NOK | corona noruega | 8,1790 |
| BGN | leva búlgara | 1,9558 |
| CZK | corona checa | 27,497 |
| HUF | forinto húngaro | 310,22 |
| LTL | litas lituana | 3,4528 |
| PLN | esloti polaco | 4,1695 |
| RON | leu rumano | 4,4022 |
| TRY | lira turca | 2,8672 |
| AUD | dólar australiano | 1,4460 |
| CAD | dólar canadiense | 1,4207 |
| HKD | dólar de Hong Kong | 9,9425 |
| NZD | dólar neozelandés | 1,5908 |
| SGD | dólar de Singapur | 1,6239 |
| KRW | won de Corea del Sur | 1 332,05 |
| ZAR | rand sudafricano | 14,2735 |
| CNY | yuan renminbi | 7,8716 |
| HRK | kuna croata | 7,6248 |
| IDR | rupia indonesia | 15 339,21 |
| MYR | ringit malayo | 4,1560 |
| PHP | peso filipino | 56,995 |
| RUB | rublo ruso | 48,9600 |
| THB | bat tailandés | 41,337 |
| BRL | real brasileño | 3,0850 |
| MXN | peso mexicano | 17,0409 |
| INR | rupia india | 78,2386 |

Moneda

Tipo de cambio

USD

dólar estadounidense

1,2826

JPY

yen japonés

139,50

DKK

corona danesa

7,4436

GBP

libra esterlina

0,78230

SEK

corona sueca

9,1825

CHF

franco suizo

1,2077

ISK

corona islandesa

NOK

corona noruega

8,1790

BGN

leva búlgara

1,9558

CZK

corona checa

27,497

HUF

forinto húngaro

310,22

LTL

litas lituana

3,4528

PLN

esloti polaco

4,1695

RON

leu rumano

4,4022

TRY

lira turca

2,8672

AUD

dólar australiano

1,4460

CAD

dólar canadiense

1,4207

HKD

dólar de Hong Kong

9,9425

NZD

dólar neozelandés

1,5908

SGD

dólar de Singapur

1,6239

KRW

won de Corea del Sur

1 332,05

ZAR

rand sudafricano

14,2735

CNY

yuan renminbi

7,8716

HRK

kuna croata

7,6248

IDR

rupia indonesia

15 339,21

MYR

ringit malayo

4,1560

PHP

peso filipino

56,995

RUB

rublo ruso

48,9600

THB

bat tailandés

41,337

BRL

real brasileño

3,0850

MXN

peso mexicano

17,0409

INR

rupia india

78,2386

---

(1)  Fuente: tipo de cambio de referencia publicado por el Banco Central Europeo.

---

| 25.9.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/3

---

Dictamen del Comité Consultivo en materia de prácticas restrictivas y posiciones dominantes emitido en su reunión de 3 de marzo de 2014 en relación con un proyecto de decisión relativa al Asunto AT.39952 Bolsas de intercambio de electricidad

Ponente: Países Bajos

(2014/C 334/04)

| 1. | El Comité Consultivo comparte la preocupación de la Comisión expresada en su proyecto de Decisión comunicado al Comité Consultivo. |
| --- | --- |

1.

El Comité Consultivo comparte la preocupación de la Comisión expresada en su proyecto de Decisión comunicado al Comité Consultivo.

| 2. | El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en que el comportamiento contrario a la competencia contemplado por el proyecto de Decisión constituye un acuerdo o prácticas concertadas con arreglo al artículo 101 del TFUE y al artículo 53 del Acuerdo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

2.

El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en que el comportamiento contrario a la competencia contemplado por el proyecto de Decisión constituye un acuerdo o prácticas concertadas con arreglo al artículo 101 del TFUE y al artículo 53 del Acuerdo EEE.

| 3. | El Comité Consultivo coincide con la valoración de la Comisión sobre el producto y el alcance geográfico del acuerdo o de las prácticas concertadas que se incluyen en el proyecto de Decisión. |
| --- | --- |

3.

El Comité Consultivo coincide con la valoración de la Comisión sobre el producto y el alcance geográfico del acuerdo o de las prácticas concertadas que se incluyen en el proyecto de Decisión.

| 4. | El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en que las empresas afectadas por el proyecto de Decisión han participado en una infracción única y continuada del artículo 101 del TFUE y del artículo 53 del EEE. |
| --- | --- |

4.

El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en que las empresas afectadas por el proyecto de Decisión han participado en una infracción única y continuada del artículo 101 del TFUE y del artículo 53 del EEE.

| 5. | El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en que el objeto del acuerdo o de las prácticas concertadas era restringir la competencia a los efectos del artículo 101 del TFUE y el artículo 53 del EEE. |
| --- | --- |

5.

El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en que el objeto del acuerdo o de las prácticas concertadas era restringir la competencia a los efectos del artículo 101 del TFUE y el artículo 53 del EEE.

| 6. | El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en que el acuerdo o las prácticas concertadas han podido afectar significativamente al comercio entre los Estados miembros de la UE. |
| --- | --- |

6.

El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en que el acuerdo o las prácticas concertadas han podido afectar significativamente al comercio entre los Estados miembros de la UE.

| 7. | El Comité Consultivo coincide con la valoración de la Comisión respecto a la duración de la infracción |
| --- | --- |

7.

El Comité Consultivo coincide con la valoración de la Comisión respecto a la duración de la infracción

| 8. | El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en que debe imponerse una multa a los destinatarios del proyecto de Decisión. |
| --- | --- |

8.

El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en que debe imponerse una multa a los destinatarios del proyecto de Decisión.

| 9. | El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en cuanto al valor de las ventas. |
| --- | --- |

9.

El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en cuanto al valor de las ventas.

| 10. | El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en cuanto a los importes básicos de las multas. |
| --- | --- |

10.

El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en cuanto a los importes básicos de las multas.

| 11. | El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en que en el presente asunto no hay circunstancias agravantes ni atenuantes aplicables. |
| --- | --- |

11.

El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en que en el presente asunto no hay circunstancias agravantes ni atenuantes aplicables.

| 12. | El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en que en el presente asunto no corresponde ningún incremento de las multas a efectos de disuasión. |
| --- | --- |

12.

El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en que en el presente asunto no corresponde ningún incremento de las multas a efectos de disuasión.

| 13. | El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en cuanto a la reducción de las multas en aplicación de la Comunicación sobre el desarrollo de los procedimientos de transacción de 2008. |
| --- | --- |

13.

El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en cuanto a la reducción de las multas en aplicación de la Comunicación sobre el desarrollo de los procedimientos de transacción de 2008.

| 14. | El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en cuanto a los importes definitivos de las multas. |
| --- | --- |

14.

El Comité Consultivo coincide con la Comisión en cuanto a los importes definitivos de las multas.

| 15. | El Comité Consultivo recomienda la publicación de su dictamen en el Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea. |
| --- | --- |

15.

El Comité Consultivo recomienda la publicación de su dictamen en el Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea.

---

| 25.9.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/4

---

Informe final del Consejero Auditor (1)

Bolsas de intercambio de electricidad

(AT.39952)

(2014/C 334/05)

El 22 de marzo de 2013, la Comisión incoó un procedimiento con arreglo al artículo 11, apartado 6, del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 (2) en relación con las bolsas de intercambio de electricidad al contado EPEX Spot («EPEX») y Nord Pool Spot AS («NPS») (conjuntamente, «las Partes»).

Tras las conversaciones con vistas a una transacción y las solicitudes de transacción con arreglo al artículo 10 bis, apartado 2, del Reglamento (CE) no 773/2004 (3), la Comisión adoptó el 11 de diciembre de 2013 un pliego de cargos cuyos destinatarios eran EPEX y NPS en el que señalaba que habían participado en una infracción única y continuada del artículo 101 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea y del artículo 53 del Acuerdo EEE. En el pliego de cargos se alegaba que las Partes habían suscrito un acuerdo de no competencia que incluía un reparto de territorios, con el objeto de restringir la competencia entre ellos en relación con sus servicios de negociación de electricidad al contado.

En sus respuestas al pliego de cargos, tanto EPEX como NPS confirmaron que este reflejaba el contenido de sus solicitudes de transacción.

De conformidad con el artículo 16 de la Decisión 2011/695/UE, he examinado si el proyecto de Decisión cuyos destinatarios son EPEX y NPS atiende únicamente objeciones respecto de las cuales las Partes hayan tenido ocasión de dar a conocer sus puntos de vista, y he llegado a una conclusión positiva.

A la vista de todo lo anterior, considero que se ha respetado el ejercicio efectivo de sus derechos procesales en este asunto.

Bruselas, 3 de marzo de 2014.

Wouter WILS

---

(1)  De conformidad con los artículos 16 y 17 de la Decisión 2011/695/UE del Presidente de la Comisión Europea, de 13 de octubre de 2011, relativa a la función y el mandato del consejero auditor en determinados procedimientos de competencia (DO L 275 de 20.10.2011, p. 29) (Decisión 2011/695/UE).

1

(2)  Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 del Consejo, de 16 de diciembre de 2002, relativo a la aplicación de las normas sobre competencia previstas en los artículos 81 y 82 del Tratado constitutivo de la Comunidad Europea (DO L 1 de 4.1.2003, p. 1).

2

o

(3)  Reglamento (CE) no 773/2004 de la Comisión, de 7 de abril de 2004, relativo al desarrollo de los procedimientos de la Comisión con arreglo a los artículos 81 y 82 del Tratado CE (DO L 123 de 27.4.2004, p. 18).

3

o

---

| 25.9.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/5

---

RESUMEN DE LA DECISIÓN DE LA COMISIÓN

de 5 de marzo de 2014

relativa a un procedimiento en virtud del artículo 101 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea y el artículo 53 del Acuerdo EEE

(Asunto AT.39952 — Bolsas de intercambio de electricidad)

[notificada con el número C(2014) 1204 final]

(El texto en lengua inglesa es el único auténtico)

(2014/C 334/06)

El 5 de marzo de 2014, la Comisión aprobó una decisión relativa a un procedimiento en virtud del artículo 101 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea y el artículo 53 del Acuerdo EEE. De conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 30 del Reglamento (CE) no 1/2003 del Consejo
   (1)
  , la Comisión publica por la presente los nombres de las partes y el contenido principal de la decisión, incluidas las sanciones impuestas, teniendo en cuenta el interés legítimo de las empresas por que no se revelen sus secretos comerciales.

1.   INTRODUCCIÓN

| (1) | La decisión se refiere a una infracción única y continuada del artículo 101 del TFUE y del artículo 53 del Acuerdo EEE relativa a los servicios de comercio de electricidad al contado. Dichos servicios los ofrecen las bolsas de intercambio de electricidad para facilitar el comercio de productos de electricidad al contado. Incluyen servicios para facilitar el comercio propiamente dicho (efectuado por una bolsa de intercambio de electricidad), la gestión de la asignación implícita de capacidad de interconexión transfronteriza mediante acoplamiento de mercados y servicios a terceros para el desarrollo y el funcionamiento del comercio de electricidad al contado. Los destinatarios de la decisión son EPEX Spot (en lo sucesivo, «EPEX») y Nord Pool Spot AS (en lo sucesivo, «NPS»). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

La decisión se refiere a una infracción única y continuada del artículo 101 del TFUE y del artículo 53 del Acuerdo EEE relativa a los servicios de comercio de electricidad al contado. Dichos servicios los ofrecen las bolsas de intercambio de electricidad para facilitar el comercio de productos de electricidad al contado. Incluyen servicios para facilitar el comercio propiamente dicho (efectuado por una bolsa de intercambio de electricidad), la gestión de la asignación implícita de capacidad de interconexión transfronteriza mediante acoplamiento de mercados y servicios a terceros para el desarrollo y el funcionamiento del comercio de electricidad al contado. Los destinatarios de la decisión son EPEX Spot (en lo sucesivo, «EPEX») y Nord Pool Spot AS (en lo sucesivo, «NPS»).

2.   DESCRIPCIÓN DEL ASUNTO

2.1.   Procedimiento

| (2) | En febrero de 2012, la Comisión llevó a cabo inspecciones sin preaviso en las instalaciones de EPEX (en Francia) y de NPS (en Finlandia, Noruega y Suecia). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

En febrero de 2012, la Comisión llevó a cabo inspecciones sin preaviso en las instalaciones de EPEX (en Francia) y de NPS (en Finlandia, Noruega y Suecia).

| (3) | La Comisión incoó el procedimiento en el presente asunto el 22 de marzo de 2013. Las conversaciones con vistas a una transacción tuvieron lugar entre el 3 de junio de 2013 y el 14 de noviembre de 2013. Posteriormente, EPEX y NPS (en lo sucesivo, denominadas conjuntamente «las partes») presentaron a la Comisión su solicitud formal de transacción con arreglo al artículo 10 bis, apartado 2, del Reglamento (CE) no 773/2004. El 11 de diciembre de 2013, la Comisión adoptó un pliego de cargos y ambas partes confirmaron que su contenido reflejaba sus escritos y que seguían comprometidas a continuar con el procedimiento de transacción. El Comité Consultivo en materia de Prácticas Restrictivas y Posiciones Dominantes emitió un dictamen favorable el 20 de febrero de 2014 y la Comisión adoptó su Decisión el 5 de marzo de 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

La Comisión incoó el procedimiento en el presente asunto el 22 de marzo de 2013. Las conversaciones con vistas a una transacción tuvieron lugar entre el 3 de junio de 2013 y el 14 de noviembre de 2013. Posteriormente, EPEX y NPS (en lo sucesivo, denominadas conjuntamente «las partes») presentaron a la Comisión su solicitud formal de transacción con arreglo al artículo 10 bis, apartado 2, del Reglamento (CE) no 773/2004. El 11 de diciembre de 2013, la Comisión adoptó un pliego de cargos y ambas partes confirmaron que su contenido reflejaba sus escritos y que seguían comprometidas a continuar con el procedimiento de transacción. El Comité Consultivo en materia de Prácticas Restrictivas y Posiciones Dominantes emitió un dictamen favorable el 20 de febrero de 2014 y la Comisión adoptó su Decisión el 5 de marzo de 2014.

2.2.   Destinatarios y naturaleza de la infracción

| (4) | Las siguientes empresas han infringido el artículo 101 del Tratado y el artículo 53 del Acuerdo EEE al participar, en los períodos indicados, en actividades contrarias a la competencia respecto a los servicios de comercio al contado:






  a) | EPEX desde el 21 de junio de 2011 hasta el 7 de febrero de 2012; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(4)

Las siguientes empresas han infringido el artículo 101 del Tratado y el artículo 53 del Acuerdo EEE al participar, en los períodos indicados, en actividades contrarias a la competencia respecto a los servicios de comercio al contado:

a)

EPEX desde el 21 de junio de 2011 hasta el 7 de febrero de 2012;

| b) | NPS desde el 21 de junio de 2011 hasta el 7 de febrero de 2012. |
| --- | --- |

b)

NPS desde el 21 de junio de 2011 hasta el 7 de febrero de 2012.

2.3.   Resumen de la infracción

| (5) | EPEX y NPS participaron en un acuerdo inhibitorio de la competencia que abarcaba todos sus servicios de comercio de electricidad al contado en el EEE y fuera de él. El objetivo era restringir la competencia entre ellos, a fin de proteger sus dominios tradicionales, y acordar la expansión a nuevos países manteniendo el equilibrio de poder entre ellos. En general, las partes aceptaron no competir entre sí. El acuerdo incluía, en concreto, una asignación de territorios. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

EPEX y NPS participaron en un acuerdo inhibitorio de la competencia que abarcaba todos sus servicios de comercio de electricidad al contado en el EEE y fuera de él. El objetivo era restringir la competencia entre ellos, a fin de proteger sus dominios tradicionales, y acordar la expansión a nuevos países manteniendo el equilibrio de poder entre ellos. En general, las partes aceptaron no competir entre sí. El acuerdo incluía, en concreto, una asignación de territorios.

| (6) | Se considera que, entre el 21 de junio de 2011, a más tardar, y el 7 de febrero de 2012, se mantuvo una comunicación continua entre las partes relativa a asuntos contrarios a la competencia. La comunicación entre las partes adoptó la forma de reuniones presenciales, llamadas telefónicas, videollamadas y correos electrónicos e implicó a la alta dirección de ambas partes. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Se considera que, entre el 21 de junio de 2011, a más tardar, y el 7 de febrero de 2012, se mantuvo una comunicación continua entre las partes relativa a asuntos contrarios a la competencia. La comunicación entre las partes adoptó la forma de reuniones presenciales, llamadas telefónicas, videollamadas y correos electrónicos e implicó a la alta dirección de ambas partes.

2.4.   Medidas correctivas

| (7) | La multa se ha calculado de acuerdo con las Directrices sobre multas de 2006 (2). La decisión impone multas tanto a EPEX como a NPS. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

La multa se ha calculado de acuerdo con las Directrices sobre multas de 2006 (2). La decisión impone multas tanto a EPEX como a NPS.

2.4.1.   Importe de base de la multa

| (8) | El importe de base de la multa se fija en el 16 % de las ventas de servicios de comercio de electricidad al contado en el EEE de cada empresa. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

El importe de base de la multa se fija en el 16 % de las ventas de servicios de comercio de electricidad al contado en el EEE de cada empresa.

| (9) | El importe de base se multiplica por el número de años de participación en la infracción para tener plenamente en cuenta la duración de la participación en la infracción de cada una de las empresas. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

El importe de base se multiplica por el número de años de participación en la infracción para tener plenamente en cuenta la duración de la participación en la infracción de cada una de las empresas.

2.4.2.   Ajustes del importe de base

2.4.2.1.   Circunstancias agravantes y atenuantes

| (10) | En el presente asunto no hay circunstancias agravantes ni atenuantes. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

En el presente asunto no hay circunstancias agravantes ni atenuantes.

2.4.2.2.   Incremento específico con fines disuasorios

| (11) | En el presente asunto no es necesario incrementar la multa para conseguir un efecto disuasorio suficiente. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

En el presente asunto no es necesario incrementar la multa para conseguir un efecto disuasorio suficiente.

2.4.3.   Aplicación del límite del 10 % del volumen de negocios

| (12) | En el caso que nos ocupa y sobre la base de las últimas cifras del volumen de negocios disponibles, las multas impuestas a ambas partes superan el 10 % de su volumen total de negocios en 2012. Dichas multas deben, por tanto, limitarse al 10 % de sus respectivos volúmenes totales de negocios. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

En el caso que nos ocupa y sobre la base de las últimas cifras del volumen de negocios disponibles, las multas impuestas a ambas partes superan el 10 % de su volumen total de negocios en 2012. Dichas multas deben, por tanto, limitarse al 10 % de sus respectivos volúmenes totales de negocios.

2.4.4.   Liquidación

| (13) | En aplicación de la Comunicación sobre el desarrollo de los procedimientos de transacción (3), el importe de las multas impuestas a EPEX y NPS se ha reducido en un 10 %. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

En aplicación de la Comunicación sobre el desarrollo de los procedimientos de transacción (3), el importe de las multas impuestas a EPEX y NPS se ha reducido en un 10 %.

3.   MULTAS IMPUESTAS EN VIRTUD DE LA DECISIÓN

| (14) | Por las infracciones a que se hace referencia anteriormente, se imponen las siguientes multas:






  a) | EPEX Spot: 3 651 000 EUR. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(14)

Por las infracciones a que se hace referencia anteriormente, se imponen las siguientes multas:

a)

EPEX Spot: 3 651 000 EUR.

| b) | Nord Pool Spot AS: 2 328 000 EUR. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Nord Pool Spot AS: 2 328 000 EUR.

---

(1)  DO L 1 de 4.1.2003, p. 1.

(2)  DO C 210 de 1.9.2006, p. 2.

(3)  DO C 167 de 2.7.2008, p. 1.

---

Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo

| 25.9.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/7

---

Informe Especial no 13/2014 — «Ayuda de la UE a la rehabilitación tras el terremoto de Haití»

(2014/C 334/07)

El Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo anuncia que acaba de publicar su Informe Especial no 13/2014, «Ayuda de la UE a la rehabilitación tras el terremoto de Haití».

El Informe puede consultarse o descargarse en el sitio web del Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo: http://eca.europa.eu

También puede obtenerse gratuitamente en versión papel, enviando una petición a la dirección siguiente:

| Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo |
| --- |
| Publicaciones (PUB) |
| 12, rue Alcide De Gasperi |
| 1615 Luxemburgo |
| LUXEMBURGO |
| Tel. +352 4398-1 |
| Correo electrónico: eca-info@eca.europa.eu |

Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo

Publicaciones (PUB)

12, rue Alcide De Gasperi

1615 Luxemburgo

LUXEMBURGO

Tel. +352 4398-1

Correo electrónico: eca-info@eca.europa.eu

o rellenando una orden de pedido electrónico en EU-Bookshop.

---

INFORMACIÓN RELATIVA AL ESPACIO ECONÓMICO EUROPEO

Comisión Europea

| 25.9.2014 | ES EN | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES EN

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/8

---

Invitación a presentar observaciones en aplicación del artículo 1, apartado 2, de la parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC sobre el establecimiento de un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia por lo que se refiere a supuestas ayudas concedidas a Innovasjon Norge para sus actividades en el mercado de las infraestructuras de internet y servicios conexos, así como a la posible ayuda en favor de organismos regionales de turismo y organizaciones de gestión de destinos

(2014/C 334/08)

Mediante Decisión no 300/14/COL, de 16 de julio de 2014, reproducida en la versión lingüística auténtica en las páginas siguientes al presente resumen, el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC incoó el procedimiento establecido en el artículo 1, apartado 2, de la parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC por el que se instituyen un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia. El Gobierno noruego fue informado mediante una copia de la Decisión.

Mediante el presente anuncio, el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC invita a los Estados de la AELC, a los Estados miembros de la UE y a las terceras partes interesadas a que presenten sus observaciones sobre dicha medida en el plazo de un mes, a partir de la fecha de publicación de la presente comunicación, enviándolas a:

| Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC |
| --- |
| Registro |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC

Registro

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Dichas observaciones serán comunicadas a las autoridades noruegas. Podrá preservarse la identidad de las partes interesadas que presenten comentarios previa solicitud por escrito aduciendo las razones para ello.

RESUMEN

Procedimiento

Por carta de 5 de julio de 2013, TellUs IT AS, entretanto objeto de una concentración con New Mind («New Mind-TellUs», también denominado «el denunciante»), presentó una denuncia ante el Órgano de Vigilancia contra Innovasjon Norge AS («IN») en la que alegaba que IN recibía ayudas estatales para sus actividades comerciales en el mercado de los servicios relacionados con la infraestructura de internet y servicios conexos en el sector turístico.

El Órgano de Vigilancia mantuvo varios intercambios de correspondencia con las autoridades noruegas y el denunciante, y se reunió con ambas partes.

Hechos

IN es una empresa pública de responsabilidad limitada creada en 2003 por el Gobierno noruego mediante la Ley de Innovación de Noruega («Lov om Innovasjon Norge» (1)). Se creó con el fin de contribuir a la innovación, el desarrollo de empresas en las zonas rurales y al aumento de la competitividad de las empresas noruegas. La promoción de Noruega como destino turístico es también una de sus tareas.

IN pretende fomentar una mayor rentabilidad de los distintos segmentos de la industria turística a escala nacional, mientras que los organismos regionales de turismo y las organizaciones de gestión de destinos son los principales participantes a escala regional y local. Ambos tipos de entidades son empresas cuyas acciones son propiedad de las autoridades de los condados o locales, junto con empresas turísticas privadas activas en sus respectivas zonas geográficas.

Recientemente, las autoridades noruegas decidieron adoptar un nuevo enfoque estratégico del turismo con objeto de que el apoyo público al sector sea más eficiente, de reducir el número de agentes y de garantizar una mayor coordinación entre ellos. Teniendo en cuenta estos objetivos, las autoridades noruegas han propuesto una nueva estructura destinada, entre otras cosas, a reducir el número de organismos regionales de turismo y organizaciones de gestión de destinos y consolidar los esfuerzos de promoción turística de Noruega a través de IN y su página visitnorway.com.

En la carta de presupuesto de 2013 para IN (2), las tareas de IN en el sector turístico se exponen en los siguientes términos: «IN tiene por objeto lograr una buena distribución de viajes por Noruega a través de visitnorway.com y contribuir a que los agentes del sector turístico puedan introducir sus productos en el mecanismo nacional de reservas vinculado a visitnorway.com». Y añade: «IN no deberá ofrecer servicios de pago que estén en competencia directa o indirecta con los de agentes privados. En la medida en que IN ofrezca servicios que podrían haber sido ejecutados por proveedores privados, el precio que IN aplique deberá reflejar el coste real, incluidos los costes devengados, cubierto por los costes básicos».

Por consiguiente, en esta fase del procedimiento, el Órgano de Vigilancia entiende que, desde 2013, las autoridades noruegas han confiado a IN la tarea de promover activamente el turismo a través de la plataforma visitnorway.com, convirtiéndola en un elemento principal de la estructura turística. Además, por primera vez, se permite a IN realizar actividades económicas en el sector del turismo.

Un mercado previo de la actividad de promoción turística es el suministro de infraestructuras de internet y servicios conexos que permiten a los clientes presentar y actualizar periódicamente información sobre, por ejemplo, lugares turísticos, hoteles, restaurantes y actos, simultáneamente en su propia página y en otros canales exteriores como visitnorway.com, Google Maps, quioscos de información turística, portales móviles y periódicos.

IN había celebrado previamente un contrato con New Mind-TellUs que cubría los servicios informáticos necesarios para operar visitnorway.com. Sin embargo, IN ha desarrollado sus propias funcionalidades. Asimismo, ofrece dichos servicios (es decir, infraestructura de internet y servicios conexos) a organismos regionales de turismo y organizaciones de gestión de destinos como parte de los servicios prestados por visitnorway.com. La infraestructura de internet y los servicios conexos de IN no se ofrecen al mercado general, sino únicamente a organismos regionales de turismo y organizaciones de gestión de destinos utilizando el sitio visitnorway.com.

Los organismos regionales de turismo y las organizaciones de gestión de destinos que contratan con visitnorway.com están cerrando sus propios sitios de internet y, en consecuencia, finalizando sus anteriores acuerdos de servicio con operadores privados (como el denunciante). Según el denunciante, el cierre de los sitios de internet y la finalización de los acuerdos es una condición impuesta por IN a los organismos regionales de turismo y las organizaciones de gestión de destinos. El denunciante define esta supuesta obligación como una condición asociada que infringe la legislación de defensa de la competencia.

Presuntas medidas de ayuda estatal

Las medidas objeto de la Decisión son las siguientes: i) la supuesta subvención cruzada entre los servicios de infraestructura de internet y servicios conexos de IN con fondos destinados a actividades no comerciales, ii) la presunta existencia de beneficios no percibidos debido a la orientación no lucrativa de las actividades de IN, incluidos los servicios de infraestructura de internet y servicios conexos, iii) la supuesta ayuda concedida por IN a los organismos regionales de turismo y organizaciones de gestión de destinos en forma de precios inferiores a los de mercado.

Evaluación de la medida

Existencia de ayuda estatal

El artículo 61, apartado 1, del Acuerdo EEE establece que: «Salvo que el presente Acuerdo disponga otra cosa, serán incompatibles con el funcionamiento del presente Acuerdo, en la medida en que afecten a los intercambios comerciales entre las Partes Contratantes, las ayudas otorgadas por los Estados miembros de las CE, por los Estados de la AELC o mediante fondos estatales, bajo cualquier forma, que falseen o amenacen con falsear la competencia favoreciendo a determinadas empresas o producciones».

El Órgano de Vigilancia considera preliminarmente que, basándose en la carta de presupuesto de 2013, IN ha entrado en un nuevo mercado en competencia con operadores privados que ofrecen servicios a cambio de una remuneración. Estos servicios quedan fuera del mandato de IN para promover actividades comerciales en Noruega. El Órgano también considera preliminarmente que prestar servicios de infraestructura de internet y servicios conexos implica ofrecer servicios económicos en el mercado. Por consiguiente, parece que IN debe ser considerada una empresa a efectos de las normas sobre ayudas estatales en relación con dichos servicios específicos.

La información de que dispone en este momento no permite al Órgano llegar a una conclusión sobre si dichas medidas implican ayuda estatal.

En la fase actual del procedimiento, el Órgano tiene dudas sobre si la actual separación de cuentas en el seno de IN permite diferenciar los costes e ingresos relacionados con las actividades económicas y no económicas, en cada uno de sus proyectos, en particular en el caso del proyecto visitnorway.com. El Órgano recuerda que, cuando una entidad efectúa actividades tanto comerciales como no comerciales, debe disponerse de una contabilidad analítica para asegurarse de que las actividades comerciales no sean subvencionadas mediante recursos estatales asignados a las actividades no comerciales.

Además, el Órgano de Vigilancia constata que normalmente cualquier empresario o inversor exigirá que una empresa comercial ofrezca un rendimiento a su inversión. Sin embargo, no queda claro a partir de la información disponible si IN obtiene un beneficio por los servicios de tipo comercial (infraestructura de internet y servicios conexos) que presta.

Si la política de precios de IN no garantiza un rendimiento suficiente en términos de capital, teniendo en cuenta todos sus costes directos e indirectos, los organismos regionales de turismo y las organizaciones de gestión de destinos también pueden ser beneficiarios de ayuda estatal, puesto que serán destinatarios de servicios a un precio inferior a su coste real.

Nueva ayuda

Las autoridades noruegas alegan que si las medidas que nos ocupan se consideran ayuda estatal, se trataría de ayuda existente con arreglo al artículo 1, letra b), inciso i), o al artículo 1, letra b), inciso v), de la parte II del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo de Vigilancia y Jurisdicción. En esta fase del procedimiento, el Órgano de Vigilancia considera preliminarmente que si las medidas fueran consideradas ayuda estatal, también estarían clasificadas como ayudas nuevas ilegales.

Por lo que se refiere a la aplicación del artículo 1, letra b), inciso i), de la parte II del Protocolo 3, el Órgano considera preliminarmente que la entrada de IN en un nuevo mercado (el de servicios de infraestructura de internet y servicios conexos) en el que ya están presentes operadores privados, queda fuera del mandato encomendado por el Gobierno de Noruega a IN. Su sistema de financiación también parece ser diferente. Las actividades de promoción de IN se financian mediante recursos públicos, pero la carta de presupuesto de 2013 aclara que la prestación de servicios económicos debe ser financiada por los destinatarios de los servicios. En consecuencia, el Órgano de Vigilancia considera preliminarmente que cualquier ayuda concedida a IN para la prestación de dichos servicios debe considerarse como ayuda nueva.

Por último, el Órgano de Vigilancia no considera, en esta fase, que la medida pueda calificarse como ayuda existente con arreglo al artículo 1, letra b), inciso v), de la parte II del Protocolo 3.

Compatibilidad

Las autoridades noruegas han alegado que si las medidas fuesen consideradas nueva ayuda estatal, serían compatibles con arreglo al artículo 61, apartado 3, letra c), del Acuerdo EEE, como ayuda al sector turístico. Sin embargo, las autoridades noruegas no han facilitado información suficiente para demostrar su punto de vista.

En cualquier caso, actualmente el Órgano alberga dudas sobre si las medidas de ayuda corresponden a una auténtica deficiencia del mercado y si son proporcionadas.

En relación con el supuesto requisito de vinculación mencionado anteriormente, el Órgano adopta el punto de vista preliminar de que, si existe y es impuesto a IN, podría ser contrario a los artículos 53 y 54 del Acuerdo EEE y, por lo tanto, las medidas no podrían considerarse que constituyen una ayuda compatible en aplicación de la jurisprudencia «Matra» (3).

Conclusión

Vistas las anteriores consideraciones, el Órgano tiene dudas sobre si puede excluirse que las medidas anteriormente mencionadas son ayudas estatales con arreglo al artículo 61, apartado 1, del Acuerdo EEE. El Órgano considera, en esta fase del procedimiento, que si las medidas fuesen consideradas como ayuda estatal, constituirían una nueva ayuda. Por último, el Órgano tiene también dudas sobre si las medidas se ajustan a lo dispuesto en el artículo 61, apartado 3, del Acuerdo EEE.

A la luz de todo lo anterior, el Órgano de Vigilancia ha decidido incoar el procedimiento formal de investigación de conformidad con el artículo 1, apartado 2, de la parte I del Protocolo 3 en lo que se refiere a las supuestas ayudas concedidas a IN para sus actividades en el mercado de servicios de infraestructuras de internet y servicios conexos, así como la posible ayuda a favor de organismos regionales de turismo y organizaciones de gestión de destinos.

Se invita a las partes interesadas a que presenten sus observaciones en el plazo de un mes a partir de la publicación de la presente Decisión en el Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea.

---

(1)  LOV-2003-12-19-130. Disponible en: http://www.innovasjonnorge.no/no/om-oss/lov-om-innovasjon-norge/

(2)  Documento disponible en:

http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/NHD/Vedlegg/Brev/2013_oppdragsbrev_innovasjonnorge.pdf#search=OPPDRAGSBREV®j_oss=1

(3)  Asunto C-225/91 Matra/Comisión, Rec. 1993, p. I-3203, apartado 41. Con arreglo a esta jurisprudencia, las ayudas estatales que incorporen condiciones que infrinjan otras disposiciones del Acuerdo EEE no podrán aprobarse como ayudas compatibles.

---

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 300/14/COL

of 20140925

to initiate the formal investigation into the alleged aid granted to Innovation Norway for its activities within the market of web infrastructure and related services, as well as possible aid in favour of the Regional Tourist Boards and the Destination Management Organisations

(Norway)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 61 thereof,

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(3) of Part I and Articles 4(4) and 6 of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | By letter dated 5 July 2013 (Event No 678002 and Annexes at Events No 678003-678007, 678010-678013 and 678017), TellUs IT AS (now merged with New Mind (1), and henceforth referred to as ‘New Mind | tellUs’ or ‘the Complainant’), made a complaint to the Authority in which it alleged that Innovasjon Norge AS (‘Innovation Norway’ or ‘IN’) receives state aid for its commercial activities in the web infrastructure and related services market, within the tourism sector. The complaint was received and registered by the Authority on 8 July 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

By letter dated 5 July 2013 (Event No 678002 and Annexes at Events No 678003-678007, 678010-678013 and 678017), TellUs IT AS (now merged with New Mind (1), and henceforth referred to as ‘New Mind | tellUs’ or ‘the Complainant’), made a complaint to the Authority in which it alleged that Innovasjon Norge AS (‘Innovation Norway’ or ‘IN’) receives state aid for its commercial activities in the web infrastructure and related services market, within the tourism sector. The complaint was received and registered by the Authority on 8 July 2013.

| (2) | By a letter dated 27 August 2013 (Event No 679974), the Authority requested the Norwegian authorities to provide their comments on the alleged state aid. On 24 and 25 September 2013, the Authority attended two meetings in Oslo. On 24 September 2013, the Authority received a presentation from New Mind | tellUs (Event No 684995). On 25 September 2013, the Authority discussed the complaint with the Norwegian authorities. At this meeting, IN (on behalf of the Norwegian authorities) provided the Authority with a presentation on the case (Event No 684996). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By a letter dated 27 August 2013 (Event No 679974), the Authority requested the Norwegian authorities to provide their comments on the alleged state aid. On 24 and 25 September 2013, the Authority attended two meetings in Oslo. On 24 September 2013, the Authority received a presentation from New Mind | tellUs (Event No 684995). On 25 September 2013, the Authority discussed the complaint with the Norwegian authorities. At this meeting, IN (on behalf of the Norwegian authorities) provided the Authority with a presentation on the case (Event No 684996).

| (3) | By a letter dated 4 October 2013 (Event No 685187), the Authority sent an information request to the Norwegian authorities. The Norwegian authorities replied to this request by forwarding two letters from IN, dated 28 October 2013 (Events No 688213 and 688215, together with Annexes at Events No 688214 and 688216-25). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

By a letter dated 4 October 2013 (Event No 685187), the Authority sent an information request to the Norwegian authorities. The Norwegian authorities replied to this request by forwarding two letters from IN, dated 28 October 2013 (Events No 688213 and 688215, together with Annexes at Events No 688214 and 688216-25).

| (4) | By an e-mail dated 15 November 2013 (Event No 690346), the Complainant commented on the Norwegian authorities' replies. IN submitted its observations on the Complainant's comments by way of a letter dated 20 December 2012, which was forwarded by the Norwegian authorities (Event No 694258). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

By an e-mail dated 15 November 2013 (Event No 690346), the Complainant commented on the Norwegian authorities' replies. IN submitted its observations on the Complainant's comments by way of a letter dated 20 December 2012, which was forwarded by the Norwegian authorities (Event No 694258).

| (5) | By an e-mail dated 10 January 2014 (Event No 695364), the Norwegian authorities provided the Authority with additional information. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

By an e-mail dated 10 January 2014 (Event No 695364), the Norwegian authorities provided the Authority with additional information.

| (6) | By emails dated 17 January 2013 and 3 March 2013 (Events No 696111 and 702175), New Mind | tellUs provided the Authority with additional information. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

By emails dated 17 January 2013 and 3 March 2013 (Events No 696111 and 702175), New Mind | tellUs provided the Authority with additional information.

2.   Background

2.1.   The Complainant

| (7) | The Complainant is an IT company which delivers online distribution solutions for the tourism industry. The company is active in several EEA countries and has a large portfolio of clients including several destination organisations (2) and travel agencies. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The Complainant is an IT company which delivers online distribution solutions for the tourism industry. The company is active in several EEA countries and has a large portfolio of clients including several destination organisations (2) and travel agencies.

2.2.   Innovation Norway (IN)

| (8) | IN is a limited liability state-owned company, which was established in 2003 by the Norwegian Government through the Act on Innovation Norway (‘Lov om Innovasjon Norge’ (3), hereafter ‘Act on IN’). The Norwegian Ministry of Industry and Trade owns 51 % of IN's shares, and the Norwegian counties own the remaining 49 % (4). IN enjoys a general exemption from Norwegian corporate income tax, pursuant to Section 2-30(1)(e)(5) of the Norwegian Tax Act of 1999 (5). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

IN is a limited liability state-owned company, which was established in 2003 by the Norwegian Government through the Act on Innovation Norway (‘Lov om Innovasjon Norge’ (3), hereafter ‘Act on IN’). The Norwegian Ministry of Industry and Trade owns 51 % of IN's shares, and the Norwegian counties own the remaining 49 % (4). IN enjoys a general exemption from Norwegian corporate income tax, pursuant to Section 2-30(1)(e)(5) of the Norwegian Tax Act of 1999 (5).

| (9) | The company was established with the purpose of contributing to business innovation, the development of rural areas and increasing the competitiveness of Norwegian companies. Section 1 of the Act on IN explicitly entrusts IN with the task ‘to promote corporate and social-economic development throughout the country, and trigger different regions industrial opportunities to contribute to innovation, internationalisation and promotion’ (6). IN manages and implements several Norwegian state aid schemes. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The company was established with the purpose of contributing to business innovation, the development of rural areas and increasing the competitiveness of Norwegian companies. Section 1 of the Act on IN explicitly entrusts IN with the task ‘to promote corporate and social-economic development throughout the country, and trigger different regions industrial opportunities to contribute to innovation, internationalisation and promotion’ (6). IN manages and implements several Norwegian state aid schemes.

| (10) | The tasks currently carried out by IN were previously accomplished by its four predecessor organisations: the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (‘SND’), the Government Consultative Office for Inventors (‘SVO’), the Norwegian Tourist Council (‘NTC’) and the Norwegian Export Council (‘NEC’) (7). In 2004, those four entities were discontinued and merged into IN. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The tasks currently carried out by IN were previously accomplished by its four predecessor organisations: the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (‘SND’), the Government Consultative Office for Inventors (‘SVO’), the Norwegian Tourist Council (‘NTC’) and the Norwegian Export Council (‘NEC’) (7). In 2004, those four entities were discontinued and merged into IN.

2.3.   The Norwegian tourism structure and the new tourism strategy

| (11) | Several different entities are involved in the promotion of Norway as a tourism destination at national, regional and local level (8). |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Several different entities are involved in the promotion of Norway as a tourism destination at national, regional and local level (8).

| (12) | IN is intended to promote increased profitability within various segments of the tourism industry at a national level, continuing the tasks of its predecessors (9). The Norwegian Government has been an active stakeholder within the tourism sector since 1903 (10). |
| --- | --- |

(12)

IN is intended to promote increased profitability within various segments of the tourism industry at a national level, continuing the tasks of its predecessors (9). The Norwegian Government has been an active stakeholder within the tourism sector since 1903 (10).

| (13) | At the regional and local levels, the tourism promotion is ensured by the Regional Tourist Boards (in Norwegian ‘Regionalt selskap’, here referred to as ‘RTBs’) and the Destination Management Organisations (in Norwegian ‘Destinasjonsselskap’, here referred to as ‘DMOs’) (11). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

At the regional and local levels, the tourism promotion is ensured by the Regional Tourist Boards (in Norwegian ‘Regionalt selskap’, here referred to as ‘RTBs’) and the Destination Management Organisations (in Norwegian ‘Destinasjonsselskap’, here referred to as ‘DMOs’) (11).

| (14) | The RTBs are companies that serve the tourist industry in a regionally-defined geographical area (12). Those entities normally have public and private shareholders. According to information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the RTBs' tasks are international marketing; tourist information; regional marketing activities and knowledge; regional coordination of activities, and regional public relations activities. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The RTBs are companies that serve the tourist industry in a regionally-defined geographical area (12). Those entities normally have public and private shareholders. According to information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the RTBs' tasks are international marketing; tourist information; regional marketing activities and knowledge; regional coordination of activities, and regional public relations activities.

| (15) | The DMOs are companies that serve a defined number of destinations, products, attractions and tourist industry within a geographic region served by an RTB (13). DMOs are normally local and their structure varies. Their shareholders are normally public bodies and private companies. Their tasks under the national tourism strategy are product development; booking and sales; tourist information; destination development; competence development; destination market knowledge, and destination public relations activities. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The DMOs are companies that serve a defined number of destinations, products, attractions and tourist industry within a geographic region served by an RTB (13). DMOs are normally local and their structure varies. Their shareholders are normally public bodies and private companies. Their tasks under the national tourism strategy are product development; booking and sales; tourist information; destination development; competence development; destination market knowledge, and destination public relations activities.

| (16) | However, at the beginning of the 2010s, the Norwegian Government decided to adopt a new tourism strategy aimed at improving its national tourism structure. The objectives of the new strategy are to render the public support to the sector more efficient, reduce the number of actors and ensure more coordination among them (14). Moreover, the Norwegian authorities have stated that they aim to avoid a diversification of websites dealing with tourism in Norway, with different layouts, booking engines, languages and so on, which are funded by various Government bodies, counties or municipalities. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

However, at the beginning of the 2010s, the Norwegian Government decided to adopt a new tourism strategy aimed at improving its national tourism structure. The objectives of the new strategy are to render the public support to the sector more efficient, reduce the number of actors and ensure more coordination among them (14). Moreover, the Norwegian authorities have stated that they aim to avoid a diversification of websites dealing with tourism in Norway, with different layouts, booking engines, languages and so on, which are funded by various Government bodies, counties or municipalities.

| (17) | With these objectives in mind, the Norwegian authorities proposed a new tourism structure aiming, inter alia, to reduce the number of RTBs and DMOs and to consolidate Norway's tourism promotion efforts around IN and its webpage visitnorway.com. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

With these objectives in mind, the Norwegian authorities proposed a new tourism structure aiming, inter alia, to reduce the number of RTBs and DMOs and to consolidate Norway's tourism promotion efforts around IN and its webpage visitnorway.com.

| (18) | The Authority understands that the Norwegian authorities intend to change the existing structure of the tourism industry, by proposing a new one based, inter alia, on the promotion and development of the platform visitnorway.com, which is currently managed by IN. This implies changes in the way IN acts in the market and changes in the structure of visitnorway.com
   (15). |
| --- | --- |

(18)

The Authority understands that the Norwegian authorities intend to change the existing structure of the tourism industry, by proposing a new one based, inter alia, on the promotion and development of the platform visitnorway.com, which is currently managed by IN. This implies changes in the way IN acts in the market and changes in the structure of visitnorway.com
   (15).

| (19) | As part of the Norwegian authorities' new tourism strategy, on 1 February 2013, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries issued its 2013 State Budget for IN (hereafter ‘the 2013 Budget letter’) (16). The 2013 Budget letter entrusted IN with the mandate of ‘ensuring a good distribution of Norwegian travel experiences through visitnorway.com, and help to make the players in the tourist industry competent to enter their products into the national booking solution –linked to visitnorway.com
  ’ (17). |
| --- | --- |

(19)

As part of the Norwegian authorities' new tourism strategy, on 1 February 2013, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries issued its 2013 State Budget for IN (hereafter ‘the 2013 Budget letter’) (16). The 2013 Budget letter entrusted IN with the mandate of ‘ensuring a good distribution of Norwegian travel experiences through visitnorway.com, and help to make the players in the tourist industry competent to enter their products into the national booking solution –linked to visitnorway.com
  ’ (17).

| (20) | The 2013 Budget letter also stated that: ‘Innovation Norway shall not offer user-paid services that are in direct or indirect competition with private actors. To the extent that Innovation Norway offers services that could have been carried out by a private provider, the price that Innovation Norway asks must reflect the real accrued cost, including what is covered by the basic costs’
   (18). |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The 2013 Budget letter also stated that: ‘Innovation Norway shall not offer user-paid services that are in direct or indirect competition with private actors. To the extent that Innovation Norway offers services that could have been carried out by a private provider, the price that Innovation Norway asks must reflect the real accrued cost, including what is covered by the basic costs’
   (18).

2.4.   The market for web infrastructure and related services

| (21) | The present case relates to IN's activities in the market for web infrastructure and related services. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

The present case relates to IN's activities in the market for web infrastructure and related services.

| (22) | Web infrastructure and related services in the tourism sector are provided through ‘Destination Management Systems’ (‘DMS’), which are defined as ‘[s]ystems that consolidate and distribute a comprehensive range of tourism products through a variety of channels and platforms, generally catering for a specific region, and supporting the activities of a destination management organisation within that region. DMS attempt to utilise a customer centric approach in order to manage and market the destination as a holistic entity, typically providing strong destination related information, real-time reservations, destination management tools and paying particular attention to supporting small and independent tourism suppliers’
   (19). |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Web infrastructure and related services in the tourism sector are provided through ‘Destination Management Systems’ (‘DMS’), which are defined as ‘[s]ystems that consolidate and distribute a comprehensive range of tourism products through a variety of channels and platforms, generally catering for a specific region, and supporting the activities of a destination management organisation within that region. DMS attempt to utilise a customer centric approach in order to manage and market the destination as a holistic entity, typically providing strong destination related information, real-time reservations, destination management tools and paying particular attention to supporting small and independent tourism suppliers’
   (19).

| (23) | Through its DMS, an IT company such as the Complainant will offer a database service where its clients (destination companies) can submit and regularly update information about tourist sites, hotels, restaurants, events and similar simultaneously on their own webpage and on other external channels such as visitnorway.com, Google Maps, tourist information kiosks, mobile portals, and in printed newspapers. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Through its DMS, an IT company such as the Complainant will offer a database service where its clients (destination companies) can submit and regularly update information about tourist sites, hotels, restaurants, events and similar simultaneously on their own webpage and on other external channels such as visitnorway.com, Google Maps, tourist information kiosks, mobile portals, and in printed newspapers.

| (24) | These services allow clients to insert input data into the database and this information is then automatically disseminated on a number of different websites (including visitnorway.com). The information is then used by visitors for booking or informational purposes. These services are defined as web infrastructure and related services. They include different functionalities: (i) the ‘destinator’ functionality (the creation of points of interest or information flash to be published on the website); (ii) the ‘distribution’ functionality (the information stored in a database is distributed to many different channels and platforms) or (iii) the ‘search’ functionality (used on every website to search and present tourism products). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

These services allow clients to insert input data into the database and this information is then automatically disseminated on a number of different websites (including visitnorway.com). The information is then used by visitors for booking or informational purposes. These services are defined as web infrastructure and related services. They include different functionalities: (i) the ‘destinator’ functionality (the creation of points of interest or information flash to be published on the website); (ii) the ‘distribution’ functionality (the information stored in a database is distributed to many different channels and platforms) or (iii) the ‘search’ functionality (used on every website to search and present tourism products).

| (25) | According to the Norwegian authorities (20), the Complainant was alone on the Norwegian market offering those services for the last 17 years. However, in 2012-2013, a new international competitor, Citybreak, entered the Norwegian market offering the ‘destinator’ functionality, i.e. allowing tourism providers to create their points of interest. A graphic illustration of the functioning of these services is included in paragraph (31) below. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

According to the Norwegian authorities (20), the Complainant was alone on the Norwegian market offering those services for the last 17 years. However, in 2012-2013, a new international competitor, Citybreak, entered the Norwegian market offering the ‘destinator’ functionality, i.e. allowing tourism providers to create their points of interest. A graphic illustration of the functioning of these services is included in paragraph (31) below.

2.5.   IN's entrance into the market for web infrastructure services and related services

| (26) | The promotion of Norway as a tourism destination is one of IN's tasks. IN has developed and managed the platform visitnorway.com in order to fulfil its promotion task. Before 2013, IN only offered online marketing and promotion services on its visitnorway.com website. These services included web-advertising to the RTBs and the DMOs for an annual subscription fee, which represented a certain percentage of their turnover. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

The promotion of Norway as a tourism destination is one of IN's tasks. IN has developed and managed the platform visitnorway.com in order to fulfil its promotion task. Before 2013, IN only offered online marketing and promotion services on its visitnorway.com website. These services included web-advertising to the RTBs and the DMOs for an annual subscription fee, which represented a certain percentage of their turnover.

| (27) | However, IN has developed its own system and functionalities (21) and it is offering them to the RTBs and the DMOs which have migrated their websites to visitnorway.com. These RTBs and DMOs were previously clients of the Complainant. The Authority understands, at this stage of the procedure, that the strategy of offering these services to the RTBs and DMOs is closely linked to the decision of the Norwegian authorities to promote visitnorway.com by making it the main internet platform for tourism promotion in the country (see paragraphs (16) to (18), above). |
| --- | --- |

(27)

However, IN has developed its own system and functionalities (21) and it is offering them to the RTBs and the DMOs which have migrated their websites to visitnorway.com. These RTBs and DMOs were previously clients of the Complainant. The Authority understands, at this stage of the procedure, that the strategy of offering these services to the RTBs and DMOs is closely linked to the decision of the Norwegian authorities to promote visitnorway.com by making it the main internet platform for tourism promotion in the country (see paragraphs (16) to (18), above).

| (28) | In order to enter this new market, IN launched ‘Pilot ALFA’ between 2012-2013 – running two pilot projects called VisitSørlandet and VisitTrondheim. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In order to enter this new market, IN launched ‘Pilot ALFA’ between 2012-2013 – running two pilot projects called VisitSørlandet and VisitTrondheim.

| (29) | Once Visit Sørlandet AS (an RTB), and Visit Trondheim AS (a DMO) were selected to participate in Pilot ALFA, they signed a partnership agreement with IN, in order to use visitnorway.com templates, functionalities and content. As a consequence of the agreement, both companies redirected their URL (22) to visitnorway.com and discontinued their own homepages. The information available on those pages was migrated to visitnorway.com. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Once Visit Sørlandet AS (an RTB), and Visit Trondheim AS (a DMO) were selected to participate in Pilot ALFA, they signed a partnership agreement with IN, in order to use visitnorway.com templates, functionalities and content. As a consequence of the agreement, both companies redirected their URL (22) to visitnorway.com and discontinued their own homepages. The information available on those pages was migrated to visitnorway.com.

| (30) | When these two companies had their own website, they were clients of the Complainant. Accordingly, they used ‘tellUs destinator’ and ‘tellUs search’ functionalities, and paid a licence fee to the Complainant for this use. However, upon redirecting their URL to visitnorway.com and terminating their own website, these companies put to an end the contract for the search functionality, since within visitnorway.com only IN's search functionality can be used. They still have to contract with the Complainant or CityBreak for the ‘destinator’ functionality. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

When these two companies had their own website, they were clients of the Complainant. Accordingly, they used ‘tellUs destinator’ and ‘tellUs search’ functionalities, and paid a licence fee to the Complainant for this use. However, upon redirecting their URL to visitnorway.com and terminating their own website, these companies put to an end the contract for the search functionality, since within visitnorway.com only IN's search functionality can be used. They still have to contract with the Complainant or CityBreak for the ‘destinator’ functionality.

| (31) | The uses of the different functionalities, before and after Pilot ALFA, are represented in the following graphic: |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The uses of the different functionalities, before and after Pilot ALFA, are represented in the following graphic:

Image

| (32) | The services that IN was previously offering to these two types of companies (online marketing and promotion services on the visitnorway.com website), were offered for a fee calculated on the basis of their annual turnover. This pricing system was also applied during Pilot ALFA, with no additional charge made for the additional services provided by IN (i.e. web infrastructure and related services). |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The services that IN was previously offering to these two types of companies (online marketing and promotion services on the visitnorway.com website), were offered for a fee calculated on the basis of their annual turnover. This pricing system was also applied during Pilot ALFA, with no additional charge made for the additional services provided by IN (i.e. web infrastructure and related services).

| (33) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that the reason behind not charging extra for these additional services relates to the fact that the new services were under development, and the two companies involved in the pilot project invested time and effort in giving feedback to finalise the development of IN's functionalities; thereby ‘reimbursing’ the (unfinished) new services with their inputs. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that the reason behind not charging extra for these additional services relates to the fact that the new services were under development, and the two companies involved in the pilot project invested time and effort in giving feedback to finalise the development of IN's functionalities; thereby ‘reimbursing’ the (unfinished) new services with their inputs.

| (34) | From July 2013 to November 2013, IN undertook a project called ‘Pilot Beta’. During this pilot project, IN studied new alternatives, new business models, and the possibility of promoting new partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs. The Authority understands that during the Pilot Beta phase no new partnership agreements were signed. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

From July 2013 to November 2013, IN undertook a project called ‘Pilot Beta’. During this pilot project, IN studied new alternatives, new business models, and the possibility of promoting new partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs. The Authority understands that during the Pilot Beta phase no new partnership agreements were signed.

| (35) | As from 1 January 2014, IN has offered partnership agreements (see paragraph (5)) to all interested DMOs and RTBs on a non-discriminatory basis. IN offers its services exclusively to the RTBs and the DMOs as part of the Norwegian tourism structure, but not to other interested private companies (e.g. individual hotels, shops, or museums). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

As from 1 January 2014, IN has offered partnership agreements (see paragraph (5)) to all interested DMOs and RTBs on a non-discriminatory basis. IN offers its services exclusively to the RTBs and the DMOs as part of the Norwegian tourism structure, but not to other interested private companies (e.g. individual hotels, shops, or museums).

| (36) | The Authority understands that as from 1 January 2014, IN introduced a new pricing model for the new services it is providing, where the price charged is intended to reflect the costs of the services provided by IN, plus a reasonable profit margin of between 5 to 10 % per year. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The Authority understands that as from 1 January 2014, IN introduced a new pricing model for the new services it is providing, where the price charged is intended to reflect the costs of the services provided by IN, plus a reasonable profit margin of between 5 to 10 % per year.

3.   The complaint

| (37) | The complaint submitted by New Mind | tellUs separates IN's business promotion activities (including tourism promotion) from its activity related to the provision of web infrastructure and related services. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The complaint submitted by New Mind | tellUs separates IN's business promotion activities (including tourism promotion) from its activity related to the provision of web infrastructure and related services.

| (38) | The Complainant considers that IN's promotion activities and its tasks in relation to visitnorway.com, as a national tourism portal, can be considered to be a service of general economic interest (‘SGEI’) in line with the EEA state aid rules. However, since 2013, IN is entering a new market (23), offering economic services. Those new services are not part of the mandate received by IN and are not provided in line with the Altmark
   (24) case-law. As a consequence, IN's behaviour in the market should be in line with the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The Complainant considers that IN's promotion activities and its tasks in relation to visitnorway.com, as a national tourism portal, can be considered to be a service of general economic interest (‘SGEI’) in line with the EEA state aid rules. However, since 2013, IN is entering a new market (23), offering economic services. Those new services are not part of the mandate received by IN and are not provided in line with the Altmark
   (24) case-law. As a consequence, IN's behaviour in the market should be in line with the state aid rules.

| (39) | The Complainant refers to three different forms of alleged state aid:






  a. | the non-implementation of a separation of accounts for commercial activities within IN; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(39)

The Complainant refers to three different forms of alleged state aid:

a.

the non-implementation of a separation of accounts for commercial activities within IN;

| b. | the profits foregone through the non-profit orientation of economic activity referred to above, and |
| --- | --- |

b.

the profits foregone through the non-profit orientation of economic activity referred to above, and

| c. | the general exemption from the income tax granted to IN, also applicable to IN's economic activities. |
| --- | --- |

c.

the general exemption from the income tax granted to IN, also applicable to IN's economic activities.

| (40) | According to the Complainant, IN is not required to generate any profit and the company does not maintain separate accounts for its economic and non-economic activities. This implies spill-over effects, allowing IN to finance its economic activities with the funds that should be devoted to non-economic activities. Therefore, the measures entail state aid pursuant to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

According to the Complainant, IN is not required to generate any profit and the company does not maintain separate accounts for its economic and non-economic activities. This implies spill-over effects, allowing IN to finance its economic activities with the funds that should be devoted to non-economic activities. Therefore, the measures entail state aid pursuant to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (41) | New Mind | tellUs also alleges that IN requests its clients to terminate their previous contracts with New Mind | tellUs. The Complainant takes the view that this is a tie-in condition in breach of antitrust law (25). |
| --- | --- |

(41)

New Mind | tellUs also alleges that IN requests its clients to terminate their previous contracts with New Mind | tellUs. The Complainant takes the view that this is a tie-in condition in breach of antitrust law (25).

| (42) | In New Mind | tellUs' view, the aid measures have to be considered as new state aid since the entrance into a new market (i.e. offering web infrastructure and related services to the RTBs and the DMOs) falls outside the mandate received by IN and its predecessors. The Complainant considers that IN's mandate was limited to a general promotion of the country. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

In New Mind | tellUs' view, the aid measures have to be considered as new state aid since the entrance into a new market (i.e. offering web infrastructure and related services to the RTBs and the DMOs) falls outside the mandate received by IN and its predecessors. The Complainant considers that IN's mandate was limited to a general promotion of the country.

| (43) | New Mind | tellUs also states that the general tax exemption granted to IN should be considered to be state aid when it relates to income obtained by the performance of economic activities. This exemption would also be considered to be new state aid because it is related to the recent entrance of IN into economic activities. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

New Mind | tellUs also states that the general tax exemption granted to IN should be considered to be state aid when it relates to income obtained by the performance of economic activities. This exemption would also be considered to be new state aid because it is related to the recent entrance of IN into economic activities.

| (44) | Finally, the Complainant considers that as IN is not charging market prices for the services that it is providing to the RTBs and the DMOs, those companies are also beneficiaries of unlawful state aid (26). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

Finally, the Complainant considers that as IN is not charging market prices for the services that it is providing to the RTBs and the DMOs, those companies are also beneficiaries of unlawful state aid (26).

4.   Comments by the Norwegian authorities

| (45) | The Norwegian authorities disagree with New Mind | tellUs' legal assessment (27). |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The Norwegian authorities disagree with New Mind | tellUs' legal assessment (27).

| (46) | Firstly, the Norwegian authorities state that IN's purpose is to help to create profitable business in all parts of Norway, inter alia, by promoting the country as a holiday destination. IN's core activity is to promote business in Norway and not to operate any business itself. In functional terms, IN is merely a tool for the Norwegian authorities to grant aid, but it does not offer goods or services in the market. As a consequence, IN cannot be regarded as an undertaking being a recipient of state aid. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Firstly, the Norwegian authorities state that IN's purpose is to help to create profitable business in all parts of Norway, inter alia, by promoting the country as a holiday destination. IN's core activity is to promote business in Norway and not to operate any business itself. In functional terms, IN is merely a tool for the Norwegian authorities to grant aid, but it does not offer goods or services in the market. As a consequence, IN cannot be regarded as an undertaking being a recipient of state aid.

| (47) | In its view, since the core activities of IN are of a non-economic nature, the potential classification of secondary activities undertaken by IN as economic activities would not alter the fact that IN cannot be considered to constitute an undertaking (28). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

In its view, since the core activities of IN are of a non-economic nature, the potential classification of secondary activities undertaken by IN as economic activities would not alter the fact that IN cannot be considered to constitute an undertaking (28).

| (48) | The Norwegian authorities accept that IN carries out some activities of a particular nature. In particular, IN is involved in market loans, seed capital and investment funds. However, in these areas, certain ‘mechanisms’ have already been established to avoid any possible distortion of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The Norwegian authorities accept that IN carries out some activities of a particular nature. In particular, IN is involved in market loans, seed capital and investment funds. However, in these areas, certain ‘mechanisms’ have already been established to avoid any possible distortion of competition.

| (49) | Regarding the web infrastructure and related services, the Norwegian authorities emphasise that IN does not provide services to the general tourism market as such, but only to the RTBs and the DMOs (see also paragraph (35)). |
| --- | --- |

(49)

Regarding the web infrastructure and related services, the Norwegian authorities emphasise that IN does not provide services to the general tourism market as such, but only to the RTBs and the DMOs (see also paragraph (35)).

| (50) | The Norwegian authorities point out that the 2013 Budget letter states that: ‘Innovation Norway is to ensure a good distribution of Norwegian travel experiences through visitnorway.com, and help to make the players in the tourist industry competent to enter their products into the national booking solution – linked to visitnorway.com.’ Therefore, the web infrastructure and related services are part of this mandate to promote Norway as a tourism destination and support the tourism industry. In the opinion of the Norwegian authorities, visitnorway.com is a modern marketing and information tool and in order to make it operative, an IT platform infrastructure service is required. In other words, IN offers to the RTBs and the DMOs full web editorial services, through visitnorway.com, and not a stand-alone service, as offered by the Complainant. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Norwegian authorities point out that the 2013 Budget letter states that: ‘Innovation Norway is to ensure a good distribution of Norwegian travel experiences through visitnorway.com, and help to make the players in the tourist industry competent to enter their products into the national booking solution – linked to visitnorway.com.’ Therefore, the web infrastructure and related services are part of this mandate to promote Norway as a tourism destination and support the tourism industry. In the opinion of the Norwegian authorities, visitnorway.com is a modern marketing and information tool and in order to make it operative, an IT platform infrastructure service is required. In other words, IN offers to the RTBs and the DMOs full web editorial services, through visitnorway.com, and not a stand-alone service, as offered by the Complainant.

| (51) | The Norwegian authorities have also argued that those services are being offered to the RTBs and the DMOs as part of Norway's destination management tourism structure. All the entities involved in the tourism structure work closely together; they are all dependent on public funding, and they are closely integrated in the public sector. As a consequence, the Norwegian authorities take the view that IN is not acting on the market as such when providing internal services and coordinating the different levels of organisation within the national tourism structure. It is, rather, fulfilling its task as part of the body responsible for organising regional and local bodies within the management of Norwegian tourism. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

The Norwegian authorities have also argued that those services are being offered to the RTBs and the DMOs as part of Norway's destination management tourism structure. All the entities involved in the tourism structure work closely together; they are all dependent on public funding, and they are closely integrated in the public sector. As a consequence, the Norwegian authorities take the view that IN is not acting on the market as such when providing internal services and coordinating the different levels of organisation within the national tourism structure. It is, rather, fulfilling its task as part of the body responsible for organising regional and local bodies within the management of Norwegian tourism.

| (52) | The Norwegian authorities have, moreover, stated that IN does not impose a condition on the RTBs and DMOs to terminate its previous contract with the Complainant as alleged by the latter (see paragraph (41), above). |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The Norwegian authorities have, moreover, stated that IN does not impose a condition on the RTBs and DMOs to terminate its previous contract with the Complainant as alleged by the latter (see paragraph (41), above).

| (53) | Moreover, if the web infrastructure and related services could be considered to be economic activities, the Norwegian authorities consider that the alleged measures would be granted on the basis of an existing aid scheme (29), because the IN's financial system existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway. In the alternative, the Norwegian authorities have suggested that at the time the measure was put into effect, it did not constitute aid, and subsequently became aid as a consequence of the evolution of the European Economic Area without having been altered by the EFTA State (30). |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Moreover, if the web infrastructure and related services could be considered to be economic activities, the Norwegian authorities consider that the alleged measures would be granted on the basis of an existing aid scheme (29), because the IN's financial system existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway. In the alternative, the Norwegian authorities have suggested that at the time the measure was put into effect, it did not constitute aid, and subsequently became aid as a consequence of the evolution of the European Economic Area without having been altered by the EFTA State (30).

| (54) | Concerning the alleged aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs, the Norwegian authorities recall that as of 2014, IN intends to promote partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs. They nevertheless underline that, in the framework of these partnership agreements, the services provided by IN (i.e. the web infrastructure and related services) will be provided for an annual fee. The Norwegian authorities state that their intention is to adopt a fully transparent pricing policy and apply a price close to the market price. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Concerning the alleged aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs, the Norwegian authorities recall that as of 2014, IN intends to promote partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs. They nevertheless underline that, in the framework of these partnership agreements, the services provided by IN (i.e. the web infrastructure and related services) will be provided for an annual fee. The Norwegian authorities state that their intention is to adopt a fully transparent pricing policy and apply a price close to the market price.

| (55) | Finally, the Norwegian authorities have stated that, in the event that the Authority finds any of the measures to constitute state aid, those should be considered compatible aid pursuant to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Finally, the Norwegian authorities have stated that, in the event that the Authority finds any of the measures to constitute state aid, those should be considered compatible aid pursuant to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

5.   Material scope of the investigation

| (56) | Based on the facts described above, the Authority considers it necessary to clarify the material scope of the investigation, as defined in the present opening Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Based on the facts described above, the Authority considers it necessary to clarify the material scope of the investigation, as defined in the present opening Decision.

| (57) | First, the present Decision refers to the activities of IN within the market of web infrastructure and related services. The Decision neither concerns the activities of IN regarding the general promotion of Norway as a tourist destination, nor the development of visitnorway.com. Nor does it refer to the role of IN as a vehicle of the Norwegian State to support business in Norway. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

First, the present Decision refers to the activities of IN within the market of web infrastructure and related services. The Decision neither concerns the activities of IN regarding the general promotion of Norway as a tourist destination, nor the development of visitnorway.com. Nor does it refer to the role of IN as a vehicle of the Norwegian State to support business in Norway.

| (58) | The present Decision only refers to the alleged state aid in favour of IN and/or the RTBs and the DMOs in the market of web infrastructure and related services. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

The present Decision only refers to the alleged state aid in favour of IN and/or the RTBs and the DMOs in the market of web infrastructure and related services.

| (59) | Second, the potential aid measures are the following:






  (i) | the alleged cross-subsidisation of IN's web infrastructure and related services with funds meant for non-commercial activities; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(59)

Second, the potential aid measures are the following:

(i)

the alleged cross-subsidisation of IN's web infrastructure and related services with funds meant for non-commercial activities;

| (ii) | the alleged foregoing of profits through the non-profit orientation of IN's economic activities, including the web infrastructure and related services; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the alleged foregoing of profits through the non-profit orientation of IN's economic activities, including the web infrastructure and related services;

| (iii) | the alleged aid granted by IN to the RTBs and the DMOs in the form of prices not sufficient to obtain a reasonable return on the investments; |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the alleged aid granted by IN to the RTBs and the DMOs in the form of prices not sufficient to obtain a reasonable return on the investments;

| (iv) | the general exemption from income tax granted to IN. |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

the general exemption from income tax granted to IN.

| (60) | The first three measures are linked to IN's entrance in the market of web infrastructure and related services. The legal assessment of those measures as possible state aid depends on the nature of such services, including whether they can be considered to be economic services. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

The first three measures are linked to IN's entrance in the market of web infrastructure and related services. The legal assessment of those measures as possible state aid depends on the nature of such services, including whether they can be considered to be economic services.

| (61) | Furthermore, the qualification of IN's activities as constituting possible new aid depends on the terms of the mandate received by IN and on the new activities allowed by the 2013 Budget letter. Taking into account that the legal assessment of those three measures depends on the result of a common analysis, the Authority considers that they can be assessed together within the scope of the present Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

Furthermore, the qualification of IN's activities as constituting possible new aid depends on the terms of the mandate received by IN and on the new activities allowed by the 2013 Budget letter. Taking into account that the legal assessment of those three measures depends on the result of a common analysis, the Authority considers that they can be assessed together within the scope of the present Decision.

| (62) | On the contrary, the last measure (iv) relates to a general income tax exemption and is not tied to IN's activities within the market of web infrastructure and related services (31). A legal assessment of this measure does not necessarily involve an analysis of IN's activities with regard to the tourism sector, or its tasks as manager of visitnorway.com. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

On the contrary, the last measure (iv) relates to a general income tax exemption and is not tied to IN's activities within the market of web infrastructure and related services (31). A legal assessment of this measure does not necessarily involve an analysis of IN's activities with regard to the tourism sector, or its tasks as manager of visitnorway.com.

| (63) | Because of these differences, the Authority will not assess whether the income tax provisions related to IN constitute state aid in the present decision. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Because of these differences, the Authority will not assess whether the income tax provisions related to IN constitute state aid in the present decision.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (64) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows: ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement’. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows: ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement’.

| (65) | A measure constitutes state aid pursuant to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if it fulfils four conditions. First, the measure must be funded by the State or through state resources and imputable to the State. Second, the measure must confer an advantage. Third, the measure must favour selected undertakings or economic activities. Fourth, the measure must be liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and liable to distort competition in the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

A measure constitutes state aid pursuant to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if it fulfils four conditions. First, the measure must be funded by the State or through state resources and imputable to the State. Second, the measure must confer an advantage. Third, the measure must favour selected undertakings or economic activities. Fourth, the measure must be liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and liable to distort competition in the EEA.

| (66) | The alleged foregoing of profits and the cross-subsidisation measures in favour of IN (measures (ii) and (i)) are assessed separately from the possible aid to the RTBs and the DMOs (measure (iii)), see paragraph (59) above. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The alleged foregoing of profits and the cross-subsidisation measures in favour of IN (measures (ii) and (i)) are assessed separately from the possible aid to the RTBs and the DMOs (measure (iii)), see paragraph (59) above.

1.1.   Possible aid measures in favour of IN

| (67) | It follows from Article 61(1) EEA that state aid rules only apply to advantages granted to undertakings. Prior to examining whether the conditions for state aid are met in this case, it is necessary first to examine whether IN qualifies as an undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

It follows from Article 61(1) EEA that state aid rules only apply to advantages granted to undertakings. Prior to examining whether the conditions for state aid are met in this case, it is necessary first to examine whether IN qualifies as an undertaking.

1.1.1.   Whether IN can be considered to be an ‘undertaking’

| (68) | It is settled case-law that undertakings are entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (32). Economic activities are those consisting of offering goods or services on a market (33). Offering goods and services on a market without making a profit can also constitute an economic activity (34). All entities that are legally distinct from the State and which engage in economic activities are considered to be ‘undertakings’, irrespective of whether these are public or private undertakings (35). |
| --- | --- |

(68)

It is settled case-law that undertakings are entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (32). Economic activities are those consisting of offering goods or services on a market (33). Offering goods and services on a market without making a profit can also constitute an economic activity (34). All entities that are legally distinct from the State and which engage in economic activities are considered to be ‘undertakings’, irrespective of whether these are public or private undertakings (35).

| (69) | If an entity is providing economic activities, it is to be considered as an undertaking in relation to those specific services alone, without reference to the way in which its other activities should be classified (36). |
| --- | --- |

(69)

If an entity is providing economic activities, it is to be considered as an undertaking in relation to those specific services alone, without reference to the way in which its other activities should be classified (36).

| (70) | As a consequence, the first step of the Authority's legal assessment requires an analysis of whether IN can be defined as an undertaking for the purposes of state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

As a consequence, the first step of the Authority's legal assessment requires an analysis of whether IN can be defined as an undertaking for the purposes of state aid rules.

| (71) | The Norwegian authorities have argued that IN is not an undertaking, but a mere vehicle used by the State to grant aid (see paragraph (46), above). They contend that IN is acting as an instrument of the State, and that it does not offer goods or services on a market. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The Norwegian authorities have argued that IN is not an undertaking, but a mere vehicle used by the State to grant aid (see paragraph (46), above). They contend that IN is acting as an instrument of the State, and that it does not offer goods or services on a market.

| (72) | Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities have argued that, within the scope of its task to promote businesses in Norway, IN is also entrusted with the mandate of promoting Norway as a tourist destination, which is the final goal of the platform visitnorway.com. As a consequence, since tourism promotion is a non-economic activity, IN is not offering web infrastructure and related services on the market. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities have argued that, within the scope of its task to promote businesses in Norway, IN is also entrusted with the mandate of promoting Norway as a tourist destination, which is the final goal of the platform visitnorway.com. As a consequence, since tourism promotion is a non-economic activity, IN is not offering web infrastructure and related services on the market.

| (73) | The Complainant, on the contrary, defines IN's task of promoting businesses in Norway as an SGEI, but an SGEI which is limited mere promotion activities, including tourism activities (37) (see paragraph (38), above). |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The Complainant, on the contrary, defines IN's task of promoting businesses in Norway as an SGEI, but an SGEI which is limited mere promotion activities, including tourism activities (37) (see paragraph (38), above).

| (74) | The Authority's preliminary view, at this stage, is that IN's main purpose appears to be to provide support to Norwegian businesses on behalf of the State. The Authority agrees that when IN is acting as a mere instrument of the State, IN does not provide services or goods on the market and its activities fall outside the scope of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Authority's preliminary view, at this stage, is that IN's main purpose appears to be to provide support to Norwegian businesses on behalf of the State. The Authority agrees that when IN is acting as a mere instrument of the State, IN does not provide services or goods on the market and its activities fall outside the scope of the state aid rules.

| (75) | The 2013 Budget letter establishes that IN should promote Norway as a tourism destination. In order to do so, the letter clarifies that IN should not provide services in competition with private operator and if it does, IN must apply market prices. The Authority understands that by the 2013 Budget letter the Norwegian authorities have allowed IN to provide economic services in competition with private operators, on condition that for those services IN must require an adequate remuneration. Thus, it is the Authority's preliminary understanding that such activities fall outside the scope of the mandate for IN regarding the use of public funds for the promotion of businesses in Norway. They are services which are economic in nature: neither an SGEI nor a non-economic activity (38). |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The 2013 Budget letter establishes that IN should promote Norway as a tourism destination. In order to do so, the letter clarifies that IN should not provide services in competition with private operator and if it does, IN must apply market prices. The Authority understands that by the 2013 Budget letter the Norwegian authorities have allowed IN to provide economic services in competition with private operators, on condition that for those services IN must require an adequate remuneration. Thus, it is the Authority's preliminary understanding that such activities fall outside the scope of the mandate for IN regarding the use of public funds for the promotion of businesses in Norway. They are services which are economic in nature: neither an SGEI nor a non-economic activity (38).

| (76) | Furthermore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that since those services (outside IN's mandate) seem to qualify as economic services, IN might also be defined as an undertaking regarding the provision of those services. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Furthermore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that since those services (outside IN's mandate) seem to qualify as economic services, IN might also be defined as an undertaking regarding the provision of those services.

| (77) | The Authority notes that IN enjoys, pursuant to the text of the 2013 Budget letter, a certain discretion in determining its course of action when providing economic services and it therefore is not acting under a specific mandate. IN is not forced to provide economic services on the market: the 2013 Budget letter only allows it to do so. These discretionarily elements have been seen by the General Court as relevant in differentiating between economic and non-economic activities provided by a single entity (39). |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The Authority notes that IN enjoys, pursuant to the text of the 2013 Budget letter, a certain discretion in determining its course of action when providing economic services and it therefore is not acting under a specific mandate. IN is not forced to provide economic services on the market: the 2013 Budget letter only allows it to do so. These discretionarily elements have been seen by the General Court as relevant in differentiating between economic and non-economic activities provided by a single entity (39).

| (78) | The Authority also underlines that IN's promotional activities are financed by the State (see paragraph (83), below) and that IN as such is not required to generate a return on capital (40). However, the 2013 Budget letter underlines that for the provision of those services, IN must cover the actual costs it has incurred, so that those services are not financed by public funds. The different methods of financing IN's activities illustrates the different natures of those activities: non economic activities or SGEIs, versus economic services. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

The Authority also underlines that IN's promotional activities are financed by the State (see paragraph (83), below) and that IN as such is not required to generate a return on capital (40). However, the 2013 Budget letter underlines that for the provision of those services, IN must cover the actual costs it has incurred, so that those services are not financed by public funds. The different methods of financing IN's activities illustrates the different natures of those activities: non economic activities or SGEIs, versus economic services.

| (79) | The Authority notes that the conclusion as to whether IN carries out an economic activity when providing web infrastructure and related services cannot be based on IN's objectives or on its general non-profitmaking orientation, but must be exclusively founded on an analysis of the services themselves (41). The Authority further notes that whatever IN's objectives are while providing these services, IN requests a remuneration for those services. Accordingly, it seems to the Authority that the objective of promoting tourism coexists with an economic objective (42). The Authority recalls in this respect that the definition of an entity as an undertaking depends on the nature of the specific activity under scrutiny. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority notes that the conclusion as to whether IN carries out an economic activity when providing web infrastructure and related services cannot be based on IN's objectives or on its general non-profitmaking orientation, but must be exclusively founded on an analysis of the services themselves (41). The Authority further notes that whatever IN's objectives are while providing these services, IN requests a remuneration for those services. Accordingly, it seems to the Authority that the objective of promoting tourism coexists with an economic objective (42). The Authority recalls in this respect that the definition of an entity as an undertaking depends on the nature of the specific activity under scrutiny.

| (80) | It is established case-law that in defining a service as economic, a significant factor is whether some kind of competition exists (i.e. if there are other entities offering the same or substitutable goods and services) (43). The Authority takes the preliminary view that this condition is met in the present case, since the services at hand are also provided by private operators, such as the Complainant. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

It is established case-law that in defining a service as economic, a significant factor is whether some kind of competition exists (i.e. if there are other entities offering the same or substitutable goods and services) (43). The Authority takes the preliminary view that this condition is met in the present case, since the services at hand are also provided by private operators, such as the Complainant.

| (81) | Furthermore, the Court of Justice has also underlined that the economic activities are normally offered against remuneration (44). The Authority notes that both the Complaint and IN provide for remuneration the services at issue in this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Furthermore, the Court of Justice has also underlined that the economic activities are normally offered against remuneration (44). The Authority notes that both the Complaint and IN provide for remuneration the services at issue in this Decision.

| (82) | Consequently, insofar as web infrastructure and related services are concerned, the Authority draws the preliminary conclusion that it cannot be excluded that IN is an undertaking within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement with regard to those services in question. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

Consequently, insofar as web infrastructure and related services are concerned, the Authority draws the preliminary conclusion that it cannot be excluded that IN is an undertaking within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement with regard to those services in question.

1.1.2.   Presence of state resources and imputability

| (83) | It is well-established case-law that public resources at the disposal of public undertakings owned or controlled by the State are considered to be state resources (45). IN is mainly financed by public funds (46). |
| --- | --- |

(83)

It is well-established case-law that public resources at the disposal of public undertakings owned or controlled by the State are considered to be state resources (45). IN is mainly financed by public funds (46).

| (84) | Foregoing profits is equivalent to granting a financial advantage. This kind of measure is mentioned in the Authority's Guidelines on State aid provisions to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector, which require transparency where the State foregoes profits (47). By foregoing profits, state resources are consumed. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Foregoing profits is equivalent to granting a financial advantage. This kind of measure is mentioned in the Authority's Guidelines on State aid provisions to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector, which require transparency where the State foregoes profits (47). By foregoing profits, state resources are consumed.

| (85) | Cross-subsidisation also consumes public resources, since the State is not only compensating for the cost of the non-economic activities with which an entity has been entrusted but also for some of the costs linked to the commercial activities of the same entity. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

Cross-subsidisation also consumes public resources, since the State is not only compensating for the cost of the non-economic activities with which an entity has been entrusted but also for some of the costs linked to the commercial activities of the same entity.

| (86) | The measures are imputable to the State, since IN is mainly financed through the public budget (see paragraph (83)). |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The measures are imputable to the State, since IN is mainly financed through the public budget (see paragraph (83)).

1.1.3.   The measure contains a potential advantage

1.1.3.1.   Cross-subsidisation of the web infrastructure and related services

| (87) | When an entity carries out both commercial and non-commercial activities, a cost-accounting system should be put in place to ensure that the commercial activities are not subsidised through state resources allocated to the non-commercial activities of that entity (48). Objective and transparent cost allocation mechanisms should be in place to ensure that the economic activities cover all the costs related to these operations (including all the costs related to that activity plus an appropriate share of the common costs). Without such mechanisms in place the commercial activities may gain advantages from the public funds granted to the non-commercial activities. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

When an entity carries out both commercial and non-commercial activities, a cost-accounting system should be put in place to ensure that the commercial activities are not subsidised through state resources allocated to the non-commercial activities of that entity (48). Objective and transparent cost allocation mechanisms should be in place to ensure that the economic activities cover all the costs related to these operations (including all the costs related to that activity plus an appropriate share of the common costs). Without such mechanisms in place the commercial activities may gain advantages from the public funds granted to the non-commercial activities.

| (88) | This rule is in line with the principles set out in the Transparency Directive (49) which requires financial transparency for public undertakings and separate accounts for companies enjoying special or exclusive rights granted by the State or entrusted with a service of general economic interest. The objective of those provisions is precisely to avoid advantages for public companies which are liable to distort free competition by means of state aid (50). |
| --- | --- |

(88)

This rule is in line with the principles set out in the Transparency Directive (49) which requires financial transparency for public undertakings and separate accounts for companies enjoying special or exclusive rights granted by the State or entrusted with a service of general economic interest. The objective of those provisions is precisely to avoid advantages for public companies which are liable to distort free competition by means of state aid (50).

| (89) | The Norwegian authorities have informed the Authority about the separation of accounts within IN. IN's annual accounts contain a total account for the company. This consolidated account is further separated into eight accounts, one for each type of activities/schemes (for example loans and funding projects). As a consequence, there is also a separate account for visitnorway.com. However, following a preliminary analysis, it seems to the Authority that neither the visitnorway.com account nor other account of IN differentiate the figures related to the provision of web infrastructure and related services. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Norwegian authorities have informed the Authority about the separation of accounts within IN. IN's annual accounts contain a total account for the company. This consolidated account is further separated into eight accounts, one for each type of activities/schemes (for example loans and funding projects). As a consequence, there is also a separate account for visitnorway.com. However, following a preliminary analysis, it seems to the Authority that neither the visitnorway.com account nor other account of IN differentiate the figures related to the provision of web infrastructure and related services.

| (90) | On the basis of the above, the Authority notes that the Norwegian authorities have not, at this stage of the procedure, provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that IN implements separate accounts for its economic activities, thereby avoiding possible cross-subsidisation. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

On the basis of the above, the Authority notes that the Norwegian authorities have not, at this stage of the procedure, provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that IN implements separate accounts for its economic activities, thereby avoiding possible cross-subsidisation.

1.1.3.2.   Profits foregone through the non-profit orientation of IN

| (91) | Any business owner or investor will normally require a return on its investment in a commercial undertaking. Such a requirement represents a normal and expected business cost for the undertaking. The Authority has already stated in its Manufacturing Guidelines that: ‘[i]f a public enterprise has an inadequate rate of return, the EFTA Surveillance Authority could consider that this situation contains elements of aid, which should be analysed with respect to Article 61. In these circumstances, the public enterprise is effectively getting its capital cheaper than the market rate, i.e. equivalent to a subsidy’
   (51). No state resources are involved only where a full-cost prices policy is adopted, so as to cover the total costs (variable and fixed costs) plus a mark-up to remunerate equity capital (52). |
| --- | --- |

(91)

Any business owner or investor will normally require a return on its investment in a commercial undertaking. Such a requirement represents a normal and expected business cost for the undertaking. The Authority has already stated in its Manufacturing Guidelines that: ‘[i]f a public enterprise has an inadequate rate of return, the EFTA Surveillance Authority could consider that this situation contains elements of aid, which should be analysed with respect to Article 61. In these circumstances, the public enterprise is effectively getting its capital cheaper than the market rate, i.e. equivalent to a subsidy’
   (51). No state resources are involved only where a full-cost prices policy is adopted, so as to cover the total costs (variable and fixed costs) plus a mark-up to remunerate equity capital (52).

| (92) | In the case at hand, the Authority currently has doubts as to whether IN obtains profits — sufficient to generate a reasonable return on the investment — from its services to the RTBs and the DMOs. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

In the case at hand, the Authority currently has doubts as to whether IN obtains profits — sufficient to generate a reasonable return on the investment — from its services to the RTBs and the DMOs.

| (93) | The 2013 Budget letter states that if IN provides commercial services, it should act in line with the market conditions. This would imply, inter alia, requiring a reasonable profit margin. In the same line, according to the information provided to the Authority, in the framework of the partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs, IN foresees obtaining a profit of between 5 and 7 %. However, at the time being it is not clear to the Authority if IN is taking into account all relevant costs (including all the investment costs — not only operating costs — plus an appropriate share of the common costs) in calculating these margins. The Authority also has been given no information as to what is the average profit margin that a private operator would request for this type of investments. This is necessary for the purposes of determining whether a profit between 5 and 7 % is enough. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The 2013 Budget letter states that if IN provides commercial services, it should act in line with the market conditions. This would imply, inter alia, requiring a reasonable profit margin. In the same line, according to the information provided to the Authority, in the framework of the partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs, IN foresees obtaining a profit of between 5 and 7 %. However, at the time being it is not clear to the Authority if IN is taking into account all relevant costs (including all the investment costs — not only operating costs — plus an appropriate share of the common costs) in calculating these margins. The Authority also has been given no information as to what is the average profit margin that a private operator would request for this type of investments. This is necessary for the purposes of determining whether a profit between 5 and 7 % is enough.

| (94) | The Authority therefore has doubts, at this stage of the investigation, as to whether it can be excluded that IN is benefiting from an advantage in the form of the general non-profit orientation of its commercial activities. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

The Authority therefore has doubts, at this stage of the investigation, as to whether it can be excluded that IN is benefiting from an advantage in the form of the general non-profit orientation of its commercial activities.

1.1.4.   Selectivity

| (95) | Only IN could benefit from the alleged advantages described above. Private operators competing with IN do not receive comparable possible advantages. Accordingly, the alleged advantages under assessment in this section of the Decision represent selective measures, as they only concern one particular undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

Only IN could benefit from the alleged advantages described above. Private operators competing with IN do not receive comparable possible advantages. Accordingly, the alleged advantages under assessment in this section of the Decision represent selective measures, as they only concern one particular undertaking.

1.1.5.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (96) | According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, in order to assess whether a measure is liable to distort competition and liable to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement, a party in the position of the Authority ‘[i]s required, not to establish that such aid has a real effect on trade between Member States and that competition is actually being distorted, but only to examine whether that aid is liable to affect such trade and distort competition’
   (53). The mere fact that aid strengthens an undertaking's position compared to that of other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade is enough to conclude that the measure is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement (54). |
| --- | --- |

(96)

According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, in order to assess whether a measure is liable to distort competition and liable to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement, a party in the position of the Authority ‘[i]s required, not to establish that such aid has a real effect on trade between Member States and that competition is actually being distorted, but only to examine whether that aid is liable to affect such trade and distort competition’
   (53). The mere fact that aid strengthens an undertaking's position compared to that of other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade is enough to conclude that the measure is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement (54).

| (97) | The Authority considers that IN's shareholders should require it to generate a profit from its economic activities. Therefore, if the web infrastructure and related services were to be defined as economic activities, by not requiring a reasonable profit, IN would be obtaining certain advantages as compared to private operators active in the same market (such as the Complainant). The same can be said regarding the risk of cross-subsidisation, since IN could be funding its commercial activities with the funds intended for its non-economic activities. |
| --- | --- |

(97)

The Authority considers that IN's shareholders should require it to generate a profit from its economic activities. Therefore, if the web infrastructure and related services were to be defined as economic activities, by not requiring a reasonable profit, IN would be obtaining certain advantages as compared to private operators active in the same market (such as the Complainant). The same can be said regarding the risk of cross-subsidisation, since IN could be funding its commercial activities with the funds intended for its non-economic activities.

| (98) | The Authority also notes that the measures concerned, and the consequent advantage for IN, could create an obstacle for companies from the EEA wishing to offer their services in Norway and therefore trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement is liable to be affected (55). |
| --- | --- |

(98)

The Authority also notes that the measures concerned, and the consequent advantage for IN, could create an obstacle for companies from the EEA wishing to offer their services in Norway and therefore trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement is liable to be affected (55).

| (99) | Finally, the Authority underlines that the clients of the private operators competing with IN are private tourism entities as well as the RTBs and the DMOs. If the measures at issue in the present Decision allow IN to provide cheaper services to the RTBs and the DMOs and, as a consequence, they move to visitnorway.com, it seems to the Authority that an important part of the market could be excluded from fair competition. Accordingly the measures are liable to distort competition and affect trade. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

Finally, the Authority underlines that the clients of the private operators competing with IN are private tourism entities as well as the RTBs and the DMOs. If the measures at issue in the present Decision allow IN to provide cheaper services to the RTBs and the DMOs and, as a consequence, they move to visitnorway.com, it seems to the Authority that an important part of the market could be excluded from fair competition. Accordingly the measures are liable to distort competition and affect trade.

| (100) | The Authority therefore concludes at the current stage of the procedure that the measures at issue are liable to affect trade and distort competition between undertakings within the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

The Authority therefore concludes at the current stage of the procedure that the measures at issue are liable to affect trade and distort competition between undertakings within the EEA.

1.2.   Preliminary conclusion

| (101) | For the reasons set out above, and on the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether it can be excluded that the measures at issue in the present section constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

For the reasons set out above, and on the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether it can be excluded that the measures at issue in the present section constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.3.   Possible state aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs

| (102) | The existence of possible state aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs will depend on the conclusions reached by the Authority regarding the alleged state aid measures in favour of IN. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

The existence of possible state aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs will depend on the conclusions reached by the Authority regarding the alleged state aid measures in favour of IN.

| (103) | The Authority's assessment in this respect will depend on the conclusion which it reaches on the alleged foregoing of profits by IN (see paragraphs (91) to (94), above). If IN were to charge, for the services provided to its clients (exclusively the RTBs and the DMOs), a price sufficient to generate adequate profits, the existence of aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs would be excluded. On the contrary, if the prices are not sufficient to cover the costs, the Authority considers that, in this specific case, those companies might in turn be beneficiaries of state aid. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

The Authority's assessment in this respect will depend on the conclusion which it reaches on the alleged foregoing of profits by IN (see paragraphs (91) to (94), above). If IN were to charge, for the services provided to its clients (exclusively the RTBs and the DMOs), a price sufficient to generate adequate profits, the existence of aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs would be excluded. On the contrary, if the prices are not sufficient to cover the costs, the Authority considers that, in this specific case, those companies might in turn be beneficiaries of state aid.

| (104) | Taking into account that, at this stage of the procedure, the Authority has doubts as to whether the existence of a state aid measure by means of profit foregoing can be excluded, the Authority will therefore also assess, on a preliminary basis, the question of possible aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

Taking into account that, at this stage of the procedure, the Authority has doubts as to whether the existence of a state aid measure by means of profit foregoing can be excluded, the Authority will therefore also assess, on a preliminary basis, the question of possible aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs.

1.3.1.   Presence of state resources and imputability

| (105) | It is established case-law that a measure is financed through state resources if it results in a burden on the budget of a public undertaking, provided that the measure is imputable to the state (56). The concept of state aid covers all the financial means by which the public authorities may actually support undertakings (57). |
| --- | --- |

(105)

It is established case-law that a measure is financed through state resources if it results in a burden on the budget of a public undertaking, provided that the measure is imputable to the state (56). The concept of state aid covers all the financial means by which the public authorities may actually support undertakings (57).

| (106) | On this basis, the Authority considers that offering services at prices lower than the price prevailing on the market, without recovering their total costs, implies a loss of revenue equivalent to a consumption of state resources. The Authority has doubts whether all costs (operating and investments costs) are taken into account while setting the final price for RTBs and DMOs. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

On this basis, the Authority considers that offering services at prices lower than the price prevailing on the market, without recovering their total costs, implies a loss of revenue equivalent to a consumption of state resources. The Authority has doubts whether all costs (operating and investments costs) are taken into account while setting the final price for RTBs and DMOs.

| (107) | Furthermore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the measure is imputable to the Norwegian authorities (58). The Authority notes that there is a close relationship between the State and IN. IN is normally used as an instrument to grant aid measures. Furthermore, IN is fully owned by public bodies, controlled by them and instructed by the Norwegian authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(107)

Furthermore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the measure is imputable to the Norwegian authorities (58). The Authority notes that there is a close relationship between the State and IN. IN is normally used as an instrument to grant aid measures. Furthermore, IN is fully owned by public bodies, controlled by them and instructed by the Norwegian authorities.

1.3.2.   The measure contains an ‘advantage’

| (108) | It is established case-law that a state intervention favours an undertaking if it provides the undertaking with an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions (59). This will be the case if the RTBs and the DMOs are being offered services below their real cost, without IN obtaining a sufficient return on its investment costs. |
| --- | --- |

(108)

It is established case-law that a state intervention favours an undertaking if it provides the undertaking with an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions (59). This will be the case if the RTBs and the DMOs are being offered services below their real cost, without IN obtaining a sufficient return on its investment costs.

| (109) | The fact that the RTBs and the DMOs are part of the national tourism structure (see paragraph (11), above) does not alter this conclusion. The Authority notes in particular that the shareholders of the RTBs and DMOs are not only public entities, but also private companies. Accordingly, it does not seem possible to qualify the measure as a mere cooperation amongst public entities. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

The fact that the RTBs and the DMOs are part of the national tourism structure (see paragraph (11), above) does not alter this conclusion. The Authority notes in particular that the shareholders of the RTBs and DMOs are not only public entities, but also private companies. Accordingly, it does not seem possible to qualify the measure as a mere cooperation amongst public entities.

1.3.3.   Selectivity

| (110) | According to the available information, IN only provides web infrastructure and related services to the RTBs and the DMOs (see paragraph (49), above). The Authority therefore takes the view that the measure is at least selective de facto. |
| --- | --- |

(110)

According to the available information, IN only provides web infrastructure and related services to the RTBs and the DMOs (see paragraph (49), above). The Authority therefore takes the view that the measure is at least selective de facto.

1.3.4.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (111) | It is established case-law that a measure distorts or threatens to distort competition in a way that affects trade between Contracting Parties if it strengthens the position of the recipient compared to other companies (60) and if the recipient is active in a sector in which trade between Contracting Parties takes place (61). |
| --- | --- |

(111)

It is established case-law that a measure distorts or threatens to distort competition in a way that affects trade between Contracting Parties if it strengthens the position of the recipient compared to other companies (60) and if the recipient is active in a sector in which trade between Contracting Parties takes place (61).

| (112) | According to the available information, the Authority considers, on a preliminary basis, that the RTBs and the DMOs are carrying out some economic activities, since they are marketing, booking and selling tourism products in competition with private companies from other parts of the EEA, inter alia, tour-operators (see also paragraphs (14) and (15), above). As a consequence, if they are obtaining services at prices below the real value of the services, this will strengthen their position in the market to the detriment of their competitors (i.e. other destination and travel agencies). |
| --- | --- |

(112)

According to the available information, the Authority considers, on a preliminary basis, that the RTBs and the DMOs are carrying out some economic activities, since they are marketing, booking and selling tourism products in competition with private companies from other parts of the EEA, inter alia, tour-operators (see also paragraphs (14) and (15), above). As a consequence, if they are obtaining services at prices below the real value of the services, this will strengthen their position in the market to the detriment of their competitors (i.e. other destination and travel agencies).

| (113) | The Authority takes the view that the fact that the RTBs and the DMOs are mainly regional or local operators is not decisive, and does not exclude the conclusion that the measure would be liable to affect trade between the contracting parties. According to settled case-law, intra-state trade is liable to be affected when undertakings established in a Contracting Party have less chance of providing their services in another Contracting Party (in the case at hand, in Norway) (62). |
| --- | --- |

(113)

The Authority takes the view that the fact that the RTBs and the DMOs are mainly regional or local operators is not decisive, and does not exclude the conclusion that the measure would be liable to affect trade between the contracting parties. According to settled case-law, intra-state trade is liable to be affected when undertakings established in a Contracting Party have less chance of providing their services in another Contracting Party (in the case at hand, in Norway) (62).

1.4.   Preliminary conclusion

| (114) | Based on the foregoing, the Authority has doubts as to whether it can be excluded that the measure at stake constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(114)

Based on the foregoing, the Authority has doubts as to whether it can be excluded that the measure at stake constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

2.   Existing aid or new aid

| (115) | The Norwegian authorities have submitted that in the event that the measures at issue in the present Decision were to be classified as state aid, they should be defined as existing aid. Following a preliminary analysis, and for the reasons set out below, the Authority considers at this stage of the procedure that if the measures at issue were to be classified as state aid, they would also be defined as new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(115)

The Norwegian authorities have submitted that in the event that the measures at issue in the present Decision were to be classified as state aid, they should be defined as existing aid. Following a preliminary analysis, and for the reasons set out below, the Authority considers at this stage of the procedure that if the measures at issue were to be classified as state aid, they would also be defined as new aid.

| (116) | Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘existing aid’ is to mean: ‘all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement’. |
| --- | --- |

(116)

Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘existing aid’ is to mean: ‘all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement’.

| (117) | In its judgment in Case E-14/10 (63), the EFTA Court stated that:

  ‘Whether the aid granted [...] constitutes existing aid’[...] depends upon the interpretation of the provisions of Protocol 3 SCA [...]


  [...] to qualify as an ‘existing aid measure’ under the EEA State aid rules, it must be part of an aid scheme that was put into effect before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement' |
| --- | --- |

(117)

In its judgment in Case E-14/10 (63), the EFTA Court stated that:

‘Whether the aid granted [...] constitutes existing aid’[...] depends upon the interpretation of the provisions of Protocol 3 SCA [...]

[...] to qualify as an ‘existing aid measure’ under the EEA State aid rules, it must be part of an aid scheme that was put into effect before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement'

| (118) | It follows that the definition of public measures as existing aid requires the existence of a previous aid scheme covering the activities of the public body under evaluation. |
| --- | --- |

(118)

It follows that the definition of public measures as existing aid requires the existence of a previous aid scheme covering the activities of the public body under evaluation.

| (119) | The Authority considers, at this point in time, that the measure at hand is not related to any of the schemes in force used by IN to grant state aid (see paragraph (9), above). The present Decision does not assess whether one of the schemes used by IN has been modified in substance, as required by the case-law to identify a new aid (64). Rather, the Authority takes the view that the case at hand relates to the entrance of IN on the market of web infrastructure and related services – which the Authority considers, at this stage of the procedure, to fall outside the mandate received by IN to promote business or to promote Norway as a tourism destination. The objective of this Decision is to assess IN's behaviour when it acts as an undertaking in the relevant market, if this qualification is confirmed during the formal procedure (see paragraphs (74) to (82), above). |
| --- | --- |

(119)

The Authority considers, at this point in time, that the measure at hand is not related to any of the schemes in force used by IN to grant state aid (see paragraph (9), above). The present Decision does not assess whether one of the schemes used by IN has been modified in substance, as required by the case-law to identify a new aid (64). Rather, the Authority takes the view that the case at hand relates to the entrance of IN on the market of web infrastructure and related services – which the Authority considers, at this stage of the procedure, to fall outside the mandate received by IN to promote business or to promote Norway as a tourism destination. The objective of this Decision is to assess IN's behaviour when it acts as an undertaking in the relevant market, if this qualification is confirmed during the formal procedure (see paragraphs (74) to (82), above).

| (120) | The Authority understanding at this point in time is that the legal basis for IN's entrance into a new market, offering economic services, is the 2013 Budget letter. The 2013 Budget letter allows IN, for the first time (65), to provide services in the tourism market in competition with private operators. Moreover, it allows IN to enter into economic activities, outside its general mandate to promote businesses in Norway, irrespective of whether this qualifies as a non-economic activity or a SGEI. |
| --- | --- |

(120)

The Authority understanding at this point in time is that the legal basis for IN's entrance into a new market, offering economic services, is the 2013 Budget letter. The 2013 Budget letter allows IN, for the first time (65), to provide services in the tourism market in competition with private operators. Moreover, it allows IN to enter into economic activities, outside its general mandate to promote businesses in Norway, irrespective of whether this qualifies as a non-economic activity or a SGEI.

| (121) | The Norwegian authorities have argued that IN's system of financing has not been substantially modified after the entrance into force of the EEA Agreement in the country. They take the view that if IN is obtaining state aid, the measure qualifies as existing aid (66). |
| --- | --- |

(121)

The Norwegian authorities have argued that IN's system of financing has not been substantially modified after the entrance into force of the EEA Agreement in the country. They take the view that if IN is obtaining state aid, the measure qualifies as existing aid (66).

| (122) | However, the Authority recalls that the financing system in force before 1994 relates to IN's core activities, and not to the provision of economic activities. In particular, the Act on IN establishes that: ‘The company's resources may be used for: 1. Financing, hereunder subsidies, loans, guarantees and equity capital arrangements, 2. Advising and competence enhancing measures, 3. Network and infrastructure, and 4. Marketing of Norwegian industry abroad’. No reference is made to the possible financing of economic activities. The 2013 Budget letter departs from this system in stating that if IN provides services in competition with private operators it must apply market prices. |
| --- | --- |

(122)

However, the Authority recalls that the financing system in force before 1994 relates to IN's core activities, and not to the provision of economic activities. In particular, the Act on IN establishes that: ‘The company's resources may be used for: 1. Financing, hereunder subsidies, loans, guarantees and equity capital arrangements, 2. Advising and competence enhancing measures, 3. Network and infrastructure, and 4. Marketing of Norwegian industry abroad’. No reference is made to the possible financing of economic activities. The 2013 Budget letter departs from this system in stating that if IN provides services in competition with private operators it must apply market prices.

| (123) | As a consequence, the Authority takes the preliminary view that if the alleged state aid measures (i.e. the absence of separate accounts between economic and non-economic activities and the forgoing of profit) are demonstrated, the measures should be defined as new state aid measures. |
| --- | --- |

(123)

As a consequence, the Authority takes the preliminary view that if the alleged state aid measures (i.e. the absence of separate accounts between economic and non-economic activities and the forgoing of profit) are demonstrated, the measures should be defined as new state aid measures.

| (124) | Concerning the alleged aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs, the Authority takes the preliminary view that if it is demonstrated during the formal state aid procedure that they are receiving services at a price below their real cost, the measure should likewise be considered to be new aid. The provision of these new services also finds its origin in the 2013 Budget letter – which, as described above, allows IN, for the first time, to provide services in competition with private operators, and to depart from the scope of its general task of businesses promotion. |
| --- | --- |

(124)

Concerning the alleged aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs, the Authority takes the preliminary view that if it is demonstrated during the formal state aid procedure that they are receiving services at a price below their real cost, the measure should likewise be considered to be new aid. The provision of these new services also finds its origin in the 2013 Budget letter – which, as described above, allows IN, for the first time, to provide services in competition with private operators, and to depart from the scope of its general task of businesses promotion.

| (125) | Finally, at the time the measures at issue in the present Decision were put into effect, the market for web infrastructure and related services was open to competition. As a consequence, Article 1(b)(v) of Part II of Protocol 3 is not applicable (67). |
| --- | --- |

(125)

Finally, at the time the measures at issue in the present Decision were put into effect, the market for web infrastructure and related services was open to competition. As a consequence, Article 1(b)(v) of Part II of Protocol 3 is not applicable (67).

| (126) | In conclusion, the Authority considers, on a preliminary basis, that in the event that the measures under the scope of this Decision are finally classified as aid, they should be classified as new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(126)

In conclusion, the Authority considers, on a preliminary basis, that in the event that the measures under the scope of this Decision are finally classified as aid, they should be classified as new aid.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (127) | Insofar as the measures at issue in the present Decision may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement, and that these measures constitute ‘new aid’ within the meaning of Article 1(c) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Norwegian authorities should have notified the aid before putting it into effect, pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(127)

Insofar as the measures at issue in the present Decision may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement, and that these measures constitute ‘new aid’ within the meaning of Article 1(c) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Norwegian authorities should have notified the aid before putting it into effect, pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3.

| (128) | It should be recalled that any new aid which is unlawfully implemented and which is finally not declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement is subject to recovery in accordance with Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(128)

It should be recalled that any new aid which is unlawfully implemented and which is finally not declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement is subject to recovery in accordance with Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

| (129) | In principle, state aid as defined by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is prohibited. However, Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement provides that certain types of aid can be declared compatible. |
| --- | --- |

(129)

In principle, state aid as defined by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is prohibited. However, Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement provides that certain types of aid can be declared compatible.

| (130) | The Norwegian authorities have submitted that if the measures at issue in the present Decision were to be considered to be state aid, they would be compatible with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, as aid to promote tourism activities. However, at this point in time the Norwegian authorities have not provided sufficient evidence to support this statement. |
| --- | --- |

(130)

The Norwegian authorities have submitted that if the measures at issue in the present Decision were to be considered to be state aid, they would be compatible with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, as aid to promote tourism activities. However, at this point in time the Norwegian authorities have not provided sufficient evidence to support this statement.

| (131) | Since at the present time there are no Guidelines on state aid to promote the tourism sector, the compatibility assessment will be carried out by way of direct reference to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(131)

Since at the present time there are no Guidelines on state aid to promote the tourism sector, the compatibility assessment will be carried out by way of direct reference to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

| (132) | In assessing whether an aid measure can be said to be compatible with the EEA Agreement, the Authority balances the positive impact of the aid measure in reaching an objective of common interest against its potentially negative side effects by distortion of trade and competition. The assessment is based on the following steps:






  — | Is the aid measure aimed at a well-defined objective of common interest (e.g. growth, employment, cohesion, environment, etc.)? |
| --- | --- | --- |

(132)

In assessing whether an aid measure can be said to be compatible with the EEA Agreement, the Authority balances the positive impact of the aid measure in reaching an objective of common interest against its potentially negative side effects by distortion of trade and competition. The assessment is based on the following steps:

—

Is the aid measure aimed at a well-defined objective of common interest (e.g. growth, employment, cohesion, environment, etc.)?

| — | Is the aid well designed to deliver the objectives of common interest, i.e. does the proposed aid address the market failure or another objective? |
| --- | --- |

—

Is the aid well designed to deliver the objectives of common interest, i.e. does the proposed aid address the market failure or another objective?

| — | Is state aid an appropriate instrument? |
| --- | --- |

—

Is state aid an appropriate instrument?

| — | Is there an incentive effect, i.e. does the aid change the behaviour of the firms? |
| --- | --- |

—

Is there an incentive effect, i.e. does the aid change the behaviour of the firms?

| — | Is the aid measure proportional, i.e. could the same change in behaviour be obtained with less aid? |
| --- | --- |

—

Is the aid measure proportional, i.e. could the same change in behaviour be obtained with less aid?

| — | Are the distortions of competition and effect on trade limited, so that the overall balance is positive? |
| --- | --- |

—

Are the distortions of competition and effect on trade limited, so that the overall balance is positive?

| (133) | The information provided by the Norwegian authorities to the Authority during its preliminary examination of the measures at issue does not enable the Authority to make a definitive assessment of this question. The Norwegian authorities are accordingly invited to provide additional information on this matter. The Authority recalls that according to established case-law the burden of proof of the compatibility of state aid measures rests on the State concerned, which must show that the conditions for the derogation from Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are satisfied (68). |
| --- | --- |

(133)

The information provided by the Norwegian authorities to the Authority during its preliminary examination of the measures at issue does not enable the Authority to make a definitive assessment of this question. The Norwegian authorities are accordingly invited to provide additional information on this matter. The Authority recalls that according to established case-law the burden of proof of the compatibility of state aid measures rests on the State concerned, which must show that the conditions for the derogation from Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are satisfied (68).

| (134) | However, on a preliminary basis, the Authority notes that in order for the measure to be declared compatible a market failure regarding the web infrastructure and related services must be demonstrated. The mere fact that there are private operators providing these services suggests that there is no market failure and therefore no need for aid. |
| --- | --- |

(134)

However, on a preliminary basis, the Authority notes that in order for the measure to be declared compatible a market failure regarding the web infrastructure and related services must be demonstrated. The mere fact that there are private operators providing these services suggests that there is no market failure and therefore no need for aid.

| (135) | Furthermore, the balancing test for a measure of state aid, as described above, also requires the aid to be proportional and limited to the smallest possible amount. However, taking into account the nature of the measures, which cannot be described as transparent aid (69), it will be difficult to calculate the intensity of aid granted. |
| --- | --- |

(135)

Furthermore, the balancing test for a measure of state aid, as described above, also requires the aid to be proportional and limited to the smallest possible amount. However, taking into account the nature of the measures, which cannot be described as transparent aid (69), it will be difficult to calculate the intensity of aid granted.

| (136) | The Authority finally recalls that, by analogy with settled case-law (70), state aid incorporating conditions which contravene other provisions of the EEA Agreement cannot be approved as compatible. On this issue the Authority notes that if the tie-in clauses referred to in paragraph (41), above, exist and are imposed by IN, they might be contrary to Articles 53 or 54 of the EEA Agreement. In this event, the measures could not be declared compatible aid. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

The Authority finally recalls that, by analogy with settled case-law (70), state aid incorporating conditions which contravene other provisions of the EEA Agreement cannot be approved as compatible. On this issue the Authority notes that if the tie-in clauses referred to in paragraph (41), above, exist and are imposed by IN, they might be contrary to Articles 53 or 54 of the EEA Agreement. In this event, the measures could not be declared compatible aid.

| (137) | In conclusion, the Authority considers, at this stage of the procedure, that it cannot be excluded that the measure at issue in the present Decision may not comply with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, and may have to be considered to be incompatible aid. |
| --- | --- |

(137)

In conclusion, the Authority considers, at this stage of the procedure, that it cannot be excluded that the measure at issue in the present Decision may not comply with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, and may have to be considered to be incompatible aid.

5.   Conclusion

| (138) | Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, at this stage of the procedure the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the measures at hand in this Decision constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(138)

Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, at this stage of the procedure the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the measures at hand in this Decision constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (139) | The Authority currently takes the view that if those measures entail state aid, they would constitute ‘new aid’, which pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 should have been notified to the Authority prior to its implementation. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

The Authority currently takes the view that if those measures entail state aid, they would constitute ‘new aid’, which pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 should have been notified to the Authority prior to its implementation.

| (140) | The Authority has also doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority, therefore, has doubts as to whether that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

The Authority has also doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority, therefore, has doubts as to whether that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (141) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open proceedings is without prejudice to the final Decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question do not constitute state aid, are to be classified as existing aid or are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open proceedings is without prejudice to the final Decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question do not constitute state aid, are to be classified as existing aid or are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (142) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(142)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision.

| (143) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to provide within one month of receipt of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the nature and compatibility of the measure covered by this decision. |
| --- | --- |

(143)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to provide within one month of receipt of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the nature and compatibility of the measure covered by this decision.

| (144) | The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential aid recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(144)

The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential aid recipients of the aid immediately.

| (145) | The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law, |
| --- | --- |

(145)

The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the possible aid measures implemented by the Norwegian authorities.

The possible aid measures are:

| (i) | the alleged foregoing of profit in favour of IN, |
| --- | --- |

(i)

the alleged foregoing of profit in favour of IN,

| (ii) | the alleged lack of accounting separation among and a clear cost allocation methodology regarding IN's economic and non economic activities and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the alleged lack of accounting separation among and a clear cost allocation methodology regarding IN's economic and non economic activities and

| (iii) | the alleged aid granted through IN to the RTBs and the DMOs in form of prices not sufficient to obtain a reasonable return on the investments. |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the alleged aid granted through IN to the RTBs and the DMOs in form of prices not sufficient to obtain a reasonable return on the investments.

The measures falling within the scope of this Decision relate to IN's activities in the market of web infrastructure and related services within the tourism sector.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 18 August 2014.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide by 18 August 2014, all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done in Brussels, 16 July 2014.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Helga JÓNSDÓTTIR

College Member

---

(1)  In October 2013, the original complainant tellUs IT AS merged with the company New Mind forming New Mind | tellUs. See www.newmind.co.uk

1

(2)  In the tourism sector, the term ‘destination organisation’ or ‘destination company’ generally means a local company that handles arrangements for tours, meetings, transportation, etc. for groups originating elsewhere. See http://wsdmo.org/index.php/Educate/TourismAcronyms/

2

(3)  LOV-2003-12-19-130 (in Norwegian ‘Lov om Innovasjon Norge’), available at:

3

http://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2003-12-19-130?q=lov+om+innovasjon+norge

(4)  Section 2 of the Act on IN.

4

(5)  LOV-1999-03-26-14, (in Norwegian ‘Skatteloven’).

5

Skatteloven

(6)  Translation by the Authority.

6

(7)  In Norwegian: ‘Statens nærings- og distriktsutviklingsfond’, ‘Statens Veiledningskontor for Oppfinnere’, ‘Norges Turistråd’ and ‘Norges Eksportråd’.

7

Statens nærings- og distriktsutviklingsfond

Statens Veiledningskontor for Oppfinnere

Norges Turistråd

Norges Eksportråd

(8)  Report entitled ‘The Government's tourism strategy. Destination Norway. National strategy for the tourism industry’, dated April 2012 and sent to the Authority as Annex 4 to IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213). Available at:

8

‘The Government's tourism strategy. Destination Norway. National strategy for the tourism industry’,

http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/37646196/Lenke_til_strategien-engelsk.pdf

(9)  A description of IN's task in the tourism sector can be found in the report quoted in footnote 8.

9

(10)  IN's letter dated 20 December 2013 (Event No 694258). The National Association of Tourism, which was the joint body for the State, municipal and private stakeholders in the tourism industry, was established in 1903 and continued until 1984. From that point, marketing efforts of the National Association of Tourism were continued by the foundation NORTRA, which in 1999 changed its name to the NTC. Since 2004, the NTC's tasks have been carried out by IN, following the merger of these two entities.

10

Further information on the entities that have traditionally been entrusted with the mandate to promote Norway as a holiday destination was also provided in IN's letter dated 20 December 2013 (Event No 694258).

(11)  For further information, see the project plan for a new national tourism structure by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries (Version 1.2 dated 20.06.2013):

11

http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/NHD/Temasider/Reiseliv/Riktigprosjektplan.pdf

(12)  In Norwegian: ‘Regionalt selskap: Selskap som betjener reiselivsnæringen i et definert geografisk område’.

12

Regionalt selskap: Selskap som betjener reiselivsnæringen i et definert geografisk område

(13)  In Norwegian: ‘Destinasjonsselskap: Selskap som skal betjene et definert antall reisemål, produkter, attraksjoner og reiselivs-næring innen et geografisk område innenfor det regionale selskapet’.

13

Destinasjonsselskap: Selskap som skal betjene et definert antall reisemål, produkter, attraksjoner og reiselivs-næring innen et geografisk område innenfor det regionale selskapet

(14)  See report quoted in footnote 8.

14

(15)  According to p. 8 of IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213), the ‘[o]bjective of IN's New Structure project is to streamline visitnorway.com so that the tourist has one place to search and find information about all the destinations in Norway, in order for the tourist to choose Norway as a holiday destination’.

15

‘[o]bjective of IN's New Structure project is to streamline visitnorway.com so that the tourist has one place to search and find information about all the destinations in Norway, in order for the tourist to choose Norway as a holiday destination’

(16)  In Norwegian: ‘Statsbudsjett 2013 – oppdragsbrev Innovasjon Norge’ of 1 February 2013 (Event No 688224). Available at:

16

http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/NHD/Vedlegg/Brev/2013_oppdragsbrev_innovasjonnorge.pdf#search=OPPDRAGSBREV®j_oss=1

(17)  Translation by the Authority.

17

(18)  Translation by the Authority.

18

(19)  Definition of ‘DMS’ available at http://www.newmind.co.uk/technology-platform/destination-management-system

19

(20)  IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213).

20

(21)  Until that moment, New Mind | tellUs provided the web infrastructure and related services for IN's tourism website: visitnorway.com. See Event No 678005. Annex 3 to the complaint.

21

visitnorway.com

(22)  URL stands for Uniform Resource Locator. A URL is a formatted text string used by web-browsers, e-mail clients and other software to identify a network resource on the internet.

22

(23)  According to the Complainant: ‘to date, the offering of IT platform infrastructure services to the tourism industry has not been part of IN's activities’. Complaint (Event No 678002), p. 8.

23

‘to date, the offering of IT platform infrastructure services to the tourism industry has not been part of IN's activities’.

(24)  According to Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg [2003] ECR I-7747, the compensation of services fulfilling the four criteria established in paras. 89-93 of the judgment does not entail state aid.

24

Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

(25)  E-mail dated 15 November 2013 (Event No 690346).

25

(26)  E-mail dated 3 March 2014 (Event No 702175).

26

(27)  IN's letters dated 28 October 2013 (Events No 688213 and 688215).

27

(28)  IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213), p. 25.

28

(29)  According to Article 1 (b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3.

29

(30)  See the definition of existing aid provided in Article 1(b)(v) of Part II of Protocol 3.

30

(31)  Corporate entities in Norway are subject to corporate income tax according to Section 2-2 of the Tax Act. Taxable income is subject to corporate income tax at the general rate of 27 %. Accordingly, limited liability companies (‘AS’ or ‘ASA’), savings banks and financial institutions, mutual insurance companies, cooperatives, state-owned enterprises, inter-municipal companies, foundations etc. are subject to corporate tax under the general regime, i.e. Section 2-2. However, State institutions, public authorities such as counties and municipalities, and a number of other entities listed exhaustively in Section 2-30(1) of the Tax Act, including IN, benefit from a corporate tax exemption.

31

(32)  Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v Macroton [1991] ECR I-1979, paras. 21-23; Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavlov and Others [2000] ECR I-6451 and Case E-5/07 Private Barnehagers Landsforbund v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2008] EFTA Ct. Rep. p. 61, para.78.

32

Höfner and Elser

Macroton

Pavlov and Others

Private Barnehagers Landsforbund

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(33)  Case C-222/04 Ministero dell'Economica e delle Finanze v Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA [2006] ECR I-289, para. 108.

33

Ministero dell'Economica e delle Finanze

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA

(34)  Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78 Van Landewyck [1978] ECR 2111, paras. 18-21 and Case C-244/94 FFSA and others [1995] ECR I-4013, para. 21.

34

Van Landewyck

FFSA and others

(35)  Joined Cases T-443/08 Freissart Sachen and Land Sachsen-Anhalt and T-455/08, Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzing-Halle [2011] ECR II-1311, para. 128 et seq.

35

Freissart Sachen and Land Sachsen-Anhalt

Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzing-Halle

(36)  Economic and non-economic activities can co-exist within the same sector and sometimes be provided by the same organisation. In this scenario, the entity is to be regarded as an undertaking only with regard to its economic activities. See, for example, European Commission Decision in State Aid C-22/2003 (Italy) Reform of the training institutions (OJ L 81, 18.3.2006, p. 25), para. 43.

36

Reform of the training institutions

(37)  Para. 45 of the complaint.

37

(38)  See Case T-347/09, Germany v Commission, not yet published, p. 34 et seq., on how to differentiate between the nature of different activities provided by one single entity.

38

Germany

Commission

(39)  Case T-347/09, Germany v Commission, not yet published.

39

Germany

Commission

(40)  IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213), p. 34.

40

(41)  Commission Decision: State aid NN 8/2009. Germany. Nature conservation areas. OJ C 230, 24.9.2009, p. 1, para. 36.

41

Nature conservation areas

(42)  The Commission reached a similar conclusion in its decision in footnote 41, above (para. 40).

42

(43)  AG Opinion in Case C-205/03 Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN) v Commission, [2006] ECR I-6295, para. 31.

43

Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN)

Commission

(44)  Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, Pavel Pavlov and Others, [2000] ECR I-6451, para. 76; C-475/99, Ambulanz Glockner, [2001] ECR 9089, para. 20.

44

Pavel Pavlov and Others

Ambulanz Glockner

(45)  See, for instance, Article 2 of the Transparency Directive. (Referred to at point 1a of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement, OJ L 266 11.10.2007 p. 15 and EEA Supplement No 48 11.10.2007 p. 12, as Commission Directive 2006/111/EC of 16 November 2006 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings as well as on financial transparency within certain undertakings. Consolidated version: OJ L 318, 17.11.2006, p. 17–25). Implemented in Norwegian law by Regulation FOR-2006-09-07-1062, Section 9-1-1.

45

(46)  According to Chapter 2, Articles 7-9 of the IN Act, IN is financed by capital provided by its owners (i.e. the Norwegian Government and the Counties (ref. Article 7, ref. Article 2) and grants and loans from the Government and the Counties. IN can also obtain funding from other sources (Article 8), and Government and Counties guarantee for all obligations (Article 9).

46

(47)  See the Authority's Guidelines on application of State aid provisions to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector, paragraph 2 (OJ L 231, 3.9.1994, p. 1 and EEA Supplement No 32, 3.9.1994, p. 1) (the ‘Manufacturing Guidelines’). Section 1(3) of the Manufacturing Guidelines provides that ‘[t]his Chapter does not deal with the question of compatibility under one of the derogations provided for in the EEA Agreement and it is limited to the manufacturing sector. This does not, however, preclude the EFTA Surveillance Authority from using the approach in these rules in individual cases or sectors outside manufacturing to the extent these principles apply in these excluded sectors and where it feels that it is essential to determine if state aid is involved.’ The Manufacturing Guidelines can be found at: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=16995&1=1

47

Guidelines on application of State aid provisions to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector

t]his Chapter does not deal with the question of compatibility under one of the derogations provided for in the EEA Agreement and it is limited to the manufacturing sector. This does not, however, preclude the EFTA Surveillance Authority from using the approach in these rules in individual cases or sectors outside manufacturing to the extent these principles apply in these excluded sectors and where it feels that it is essential to determine if state aid is involved

(48)  See, for example, the Authority's Decision No 142/03/COL Regarding Reorganisation and Transfer of Public Funds to the Work Research Institute (OJ C 248, 16.10.2003, p. 6); Decision No 343/09/COL on the property transactions engaged in by the Municipality of Time concerning property numbers 1/152, 1/301, 1/630, 4/165, 2/70, 2/32 (OJ L 123, 12.5.2011, p. 72), and Decision No 174/13/COL Concerning the financing of municipal waste collectors (OJ C 263, 12.9.2013, p. 5).

48

Regarding Reorganisation and Transfer of Public Funds to the Work Research Institute

on the property transactions engaged in by the Municipality of Time concerning property numbers 1/152, 1/301, 1/630, 4/165, 2/70, 2/32

Concerning the financing of municipal waste collectors

(49)  See footnote 45.

49

(50)  AG Opinion, Case C-295/05, Asemfo [2007] ECR I-2999, para. 116.

50

Asemfo

(51)  Section 7.4(2) of the Manufacturing Guidelines. Also see Section 1(2) of the Manufacturing Guidelines, which provides that ‘[t]his Chapter firstly focuses on, the one hand, on the act referred to in point 1 of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the Transparency Directive and, on the other hand, it develops the principle that where the State provides finances to a company in circumstances that would not be applicable to an investor operating under normal market economy conditions, it does this in contradiction to the market economy investor principle, and state aid is involved’. See the reference to the Manufacturing Guidelines in footnote 47.

51

his Chapter firstly focuses on, the one hand, on the act referred to in point 1 of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the Transparency Directive and, on the other hand, it develops the principle that where the State provides finances to a company in circumstances that would not be applicable to an investor operating under normal market economy conditions, it does this in contradiction to the market economy investor principle, and state aid is involved’

(52)  Joined Cases C-83/01 P and C-94/01P Chronopost SA v Commission [2003] ECR I-6993.

52

Chronopost SA

Commission

(53)  Case C-372/97 Italy v Commission [2004] ECR I-3679, para. 44.

53

Italy

Commission

(54)  Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission [1980] ECR 2671, paras. 11-12 and Joined Cases E-5/04, E-6/04, E-7/04 Fesil ASA and Finnfjord Smelteverk AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2005] EFTA Ct. Rep. 117, para. 94.

54

Philip Morris Holland BV

Commission

Fesil ASA and Finnfjord Smelteverk AS

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(55)  Case T-301/02 AEM v Commission [2009] ECR II-01757, paras. 104 and 105.

55

AEM

Commission

(56)  Case C-482/99 France v Commission (Stardust) [2002] ECR I-4397, para. 52.

56

France

Commission (Stardust)

(57)  Case C-677/11 Doux Elevage, not yet published, para. 34, Case T-139/09 France v Commission, not yet published, para. 36.

57

Doux Elevage,

France

Commission

(58)  For listing of the relevant indicators of imputability, the Authority refers to Case C-482/99 France v Commission (Stardust Marine) [2002] ECR I-4397, paras. 55-56.

58

France

Commission (Stardust Marine)

(59)  Case E- 17/10 and E-6/11 Liechtenstein and VTM Fundmanagement v EFTA Surveillance Authority, para. 50, and the case-law cited therein; Case C-301/87 France v Commission [1990] ECR I-307, para. 41; Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community [1961] ECR 50, para. 19; Case C-241/94 France v Commission (Kimberly Clark) [1996] ECR I-4551, para. 34; and Case T-109/01 Fleuren Compost [2004] ECR II-132, para. 53.

59

Liechtenstein and VTM Fundmanagement

EFTA Surveillance Authority,

France

Commission

De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen

High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community

France

Commission (Kimberly Clark)

Fleuren Compost

(60)  Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission [1980] ECR, 2671, para. 11.

60

Philip Morris Holland BV

Commission

(61)  Case 102/87 France v Commission (SEB) [1988] ECR 4067; Case C-310/99 Italian Republic v Commission [2002] ECR I-289, para. 85; Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark) [2003] ECR I-7747, para. 77; and Case T-55/99, Confederación Española de Transporte de Mercancías (CETM) v Commission [2000] ECR II-3207, para. 86.

61

France

Commission

Italian Republic

Commission

Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark)

Confederación Española de Transporte de Mercancías (CETM)

Commission

(62)  Case T-301/02 AEM v Commission, [2009] ECR II-01757, para. 103.

62

AEM

Commission

(63)  E-14/10 – Konkurrenten.no AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority, EFTA Ct. Rep [2011] p. 266.

63

Konkurrenten.no AS

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(64)  It follows from Article 1(c) to the same Protocol that alterations to existing aid schemes constitute new aid. The case-law has also confirmed that measures to alter aid must be regarded as new aid. See Case 91/83 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paras. 17 and 18, and Case C-44/93 Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office Nationale du Ducroire [1994] ECR I-3829, para. 13.

64

Heineken Brouwerijen

Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA

Office Nationale du Ducroire

(65)  The Authority notes that in White Paper no. 14 of 2003-2004 on the IN Act it is clearly stated that IN should ‘not offer products in competition with the private market’ (In Norwegian: ‘Ot.prp. nr. 14 (2003-2004) om Lov om Innovasjon Norge’). Therefore, the Authority's current understanding is that, before 2013 and the adoption of the 2013 Budget letter, IN was not authorised to provide economic services in the tourism sector. In that regard, reference is made to Proposition No 51 to the Norwegian Parliament, entitled ‘measures for an innovative and business development’ (St.prp.no. 51 (2002-2003, in Norwegian: ‘Virkemidler for et innovativt og nyskapende næringsliv’), which states (in relation to the former entity NTC) that ‘services paid by the user should, however, not be offered in areas where there is a well-developed offer from private consultants or where these services come into conflict with the priority areas of this new unit (i.e. IN)’. The original text reads: ‘Brukerbetalte tjenester ikke bør tilbys på områder hvor det eksisterer et godt utviklet tilbud fra private aktører’. St.prp. no. 51 (2002-2003), p. 37, first column.

65

not offer products in competition with the private market

Ot.prp. nr. 14 (2003-2004) om Lov om Innovasjon Norge

measures for an innovative and business development

Virkemidler for et innovativt og nyskapende næringsliv

services paid by the user should, however, not be offered in areas where there is a well-developed offer from private consultants or where these services come into conflict with the priority areas of this new unit

Brukerbetalte tjenester ikke bør tilbys på områder hvor det eksisterer et godt utviklet tilbud fra private aktører

(66)  The Norwegian authorities underline that ‘[t]he system of financing IN and its predecessors has been more or less the same since the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in 1994. The changes made are not of a nature turning the existing financing system into new aid’. IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213), p. 39.

66

‘[t]he system of financing IN and its predecessors has been more or less the same since the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in 1994. The changes made are not of a nature turning the existing financing system into new aid’

(67)  Article 1(b)(v) of Part II of Protocol 3 reads as follows: Existing aid shall mean: ‘[a]id which is deemed to be an existing aid because it can be established that at the time it was put into effect it did not constitute an aid, and subsequently became an aid due to the evolution of the European Economic Area and without having been altered by the EFTA State. Where certain measures become aid following the liberalisation of an activity by EEA law, such measures shall not be considered as existing aid after the date fixed for liberalisation’.

67

‘[a]id which is deemed to be an existing aid because it can be established that at the time it was put into effect it did not constitute an aid, and subsequently became an aid due to the evolution of the European Economic Area and without having been altered by the EFTA State. Where certain measures become aid following the liberalisation of an activity by EEA law, such measures shall not be considered as existing aid after the date fixed for liberalisation’

(68)  Case T-68/03 Olympiaki Aeroporia Ypiresies AE v Commission [2007] ECR II-2911, para. 34.

68

Olympiaki Aeroporia Ypiresies AE

Commission

(69)  Transparent aid is defined in Article 5.1 of Regulation (EC) No 651/2014, General Block Exemption Regulation, of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1, incorporated as point 1j into Annex XV of the EEA Agreement by Decision No 152/2014 of 27 June 2014) as ‘aid in respect of which it is possible to calculate precisely the gross grant equivalent of the aid ex ante without any need to undertake a risk assessment’.

69

aid in respect of which it is possible to calculate precisely the gross grant equivalent of the aid ex ante without any need to undertake a risk assessment

(70)  Case C-225/91 Matra v Commission [1993] ECR I-3203, para. 41, and Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] I-6857, para. 78 and case-law cited.

70

Matra

Commission

Germany

Commission

---

| 25.9.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/28 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/28

---

Dictamen de los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC presentado en la reunión del Comité Consultivo en materia de prácticas restrictivas y posiciones dominantes de la CE, de 3 de marzo de 2014, relativo a un anteproyecto de Decisión de la Comisión en el Asunto: AT.39952 Bolsas de intercambio de electricidad

Ponente: Países Bajos

(2014/C 334/09)

| 1. | Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC comparten las dudas de la Comisión expresadas en su anteproyecto de Decisión comunicado al Comité Consultivo. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC comparten las dudas de la Comisión expresadas en su anteproyecto de Decisión comunicado al Comité Consultivo.

| 2. | Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión en que el comportamiento contrario a la competencia cubierto por el anteproyecto de Decisión constituye un acuerdo y/o prácticas concertadas con arreglo al artículo 101 del TFUE y al artículo 53 del Acuerdo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión en que el comportamiento contrario a la competencia cubierto por el anteproyecto de Decisión constituye un acuerdo y/o prácticas concertadas con arreglo al artículo 101 del TFUE y al artículo 53 del Acuerdo EEE.

| 3. | Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la valoración de la Comisión sobre el producto y el alcance geográfico del acuerdo y/o prácticas concertadas incluidos en el anteproyecto de Decisión. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la valoración de la Comisión sobre el producto y el alcance geográfico del acuerdo y/o prácticas concertadas incluidos en el anteproyecto de Decisión.

| 4. | Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión en que las empresas afectadas por el anteproyecto de Decisión han participado en una infracción única y continuada del artículo 101 del TFUE y del artículo 53 del Acuerdo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión en que las empresas afectadas por el anteproyecto de Decisión han participado en una infracción única y continuada del artículo 101 del TFUE y del artículo 53 del Acuerdo EEE.

| 5. | Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión en que el objeto del acuerdo y/o prácticas concertadas era restringir la competencia a los efectos del artículo 101 del TFUE y al artículo 53 del Acuerdo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión en que el objeto del acuerdo y/o prácticas concertadas era restringir la competencia a los efectos del artículo 101 del TFUE y al artículo 53 del Acuerdo EEE.

| 6. | Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC están de acuerdo con la Comisión en que el acuerdo y/o prácticas concertadas han podido afectar significativamente al comercio entre los Estados miembros de la UE. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC están de acuerdo con la Comisión en que el acuerdo y/o prácticas concertadas han podido afectar significativamente al comercio entre los Estados miembros de la UE.

| 7. | Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la valoración de la Comisión respecto a la duración de las infracciones. |
| --- | --- |

7.

Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la valoración de la Comisión respecto a la duración de las infracciones.

| 8. | Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión en que debe imponerse una multa a los destinatarios del anteproyecto de Decisión. |
| --- | --- |

8.

Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión en que debe imponerse una multa a los destinatarios del anteproyecto de Decisión.

| 9. | Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión sobre el valor de las ventas. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión sobre el valor de las ventas.

| 10. | Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión sobre los importes de base de las multas. |
| --- | --- |

10.

Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión sobre los importes de base de las multas.

| 11. | Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC están de acuerdo con la Comisión en que en el presente asunto no hay circunstancias agravantes ni atenuantes aplicables. |
| --- | --- |

11.

Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC están de acuerdo con la Comisión en que en el presente asunto no hay circunstancias agravantes ni atenuantes aplicables.

| 12. | Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión en que no es aplicable ningún incremento de las multas con fines disuasorios en el presente caso. |
| --- | --- |

12.

Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión en que no es aplicable ningún incremento de las multas con fines disuasorios en el presente caso.

| 13. | Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión en cuanto a la reducción de las multas en aplicación de la Comunicación sobre el desarrollo de los procedimientos de transacción de 2008. |
| --- | --- |

13.

Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión en cuanto a la reducción de las multas en aplicación de la Comunicación sobre el desarrollo de los procedimientos de transacción de 2008.

| 14. | Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión en cuanto a los importes definitivos de las multas. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC coinciden con la Comisión en cuanto a los importes definitivos de las multas.

| 15. | Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC recomiendan la publicación de su dictamen en el Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea. |
| --- | --- |

15.

Los representantes de los Estados de la AELC y del Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC recomiendan la publicación de su dictamen en el Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea.

---

V Anuncios

PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Comisión Europea

| 25.9.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/29

---

CONVOCATORIA DE CONCURSO-OPOSICIÓN GENERAL

(2014/C 334/10)

La Oficina Europea de Selección de Personal (EPSO) convoca el siguiente concurso-oposición general:

EPSO/AST-SC/02/14 — Agente de seguridad interna (SC 1)

La convocatoria de concurso-oposición se publicará en 24 lenguas en el Diario Oficial C 334 A de 25 de septiembre de 2014.

Más información en la página web de la EPSO: http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/eu-careers.info/

---

PROCEDIMIENTOS JURISDICCIONALES

Comisión Europea

| 25.9.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/30

---

Recurso interpuesto el 17 de julio de 2014 contra Islandia por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC

(Asunto E-12/14)

(2014/C 334/11)

El 17 de julio de 2014, el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC, representado por Markus Schneider y Catherine Howdle, agentes de dicho Órgano, con dirección en Rue Belliard 35, 1040 Bruselas, Bélgica, presentó un recurso ante el Tribunal de la AELC contra Islandia.

El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC solicita al Tribunal que:

| 1. | Declare que, al no haber adoptado y/o notificado inmediatamente al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC todas las disposiciones necesarias para incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico el acto al que se hace referencia en el anexo II, capítulo IV, punto 6, del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo (Directiva 2009/125/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 21 de octubre de 2009, por la que se instaura un marco para el establecimiento de requisitos de diseño ecológico aplicables a los productos relacionados con la energía), tal y como se adaptó al Acuerdo mediante su Protocolo 1, en el plazo fijado, Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud de dicho acto y del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declare que, al no haber adoptado y/o notificado inmediatamente al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC todas las disposiciones necesarias para incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico el acto al que se hace referencia en el anexo II, capítulo IV, punto 6, del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo (Directiva 2009/125/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 21 de octubre de 2009, por la que se instaura un marco para el establecimiento de requisitos de diseño ecológico aplicables a los productos relacionados con la energía), tal y como se adaptó al Acuerdo mediante su Protocolo 1, en el plazo fijado, Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud de dicho acto y del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE.

| 2. | Condene en costas a Islandia. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Condene en costas a Islandia.

Antecedentes de hecho y de Derecho y motivos invocados:

| — | La solicitud se refiere al incumplimiento por Islandia, a más tardar el 3 de septiembre de 2013, de un dictamen motivado emitido por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC el 3 de julio de 2013 en relación con el incumplimiento por dicho Estado de la obligación de incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico nacional la Directiva 2009/125/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 21 de octubre de 2009, por la que se instaura un marco para el establecimiento de requisitos de diseño ecológico aplicables a los productos relacionados con la energía («el acto»), a que se hace referencia en el anexo II, capítulo IV, punto 6, del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo, y adaptado a dicho Acuerdo mediante su Protocolo 1. |
| --- | --- |

—

La solicitud se refiere al incumplimiento por Islandia, a más tardar el 3 de septiembre de 2013, de un dictamen motivado emitido por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC el 3 de julio de 2013 en relación con el incumplimiento por dicho Estado de la obligación de incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico nacional la Directiva 2009/125/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 21 de octubre de 2009, por la que se instaura un marco para el establecimiento de requisitos de diseño ecológico aplicables a los productos relacionados con la energía («el acto»), a que se hace referencia en el anexo II, capítulo IV, punto 6, del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo, y adaptado a dicho Acuerdo mediante su Protocolo 1.

| — | El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC aduce que Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 23 del acto y del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE al no adoptar y/o notificar al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC las disposiciones necesarias para la aplicación del acto en el plazo prescrito. |
| --- | --- |

—

El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC aduce que Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 23 del acto y del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE al no adoptar y/o notificar al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC las disposiciones necesarias para la aplicación del acto en el plazo prescrito.

---

| 25.9.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/31

---

Recurso interpuesto el 17 de julio de 2014 contra Islandia por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC

(Asunto E-11/14)

(2014/C 334/12)

El 17 de julio de 2014, el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC, representado por Markus Schneider y Janne Tysnes Kaasin, agentes de dicho Órgano, con dirección en Rue Belliard 35, 1040 Bruselas, Bélgica, presentó un recurso ante el Tribunal de la AELC contra Islandia.

El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC solicita al Tribunal que:

| 1. | Declare que, al no haber adoptado y/o notificado inmediatamente al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC todas las disposiciones necesarias para incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico el acto al que se hace referencia en el punto 2 del anexo XII del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo (Directiva 2011/7/UE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 16 de febrero de 2011, por la que se establecen medidas de lucha contra la morosidad en las operaciones comerciales), tal y como se adaptó al Acuerdo EEE mediante su Protocolo 1, Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 12 de dicho acto y del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declare que, al no haber adoptado y/o notificado inmediatamente al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC todas las disposiciones necesarias para incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico el acto al que se hace referencia en el punto 2 del anexo XII del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo (Directiva 2011/7/UE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 16 de febrero de 2011, por la que se establecen medidas de lucha contra la morosidad en las operaciones comerciales), tal y como se adaptó al Acuerdo EEE mediante su Protocolo 1, Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 12 de dicho acto y del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE.

| 2. | Condene en costas a Islandia. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Condene en costas a Islandia.

Antecedentes de hecho y de Derecho y motivos invocados:

| — | La solicitud se refiere al incumplimiento por Islandia, a más tardar el 18 de febrero de 2014, de un dictamen motivado emitido por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC el 18 de diciembre de 2013 en relación con el incumplimiento por dicho Estado de la obligación de incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico nacional la Directiva 2011/7/UE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 16 de febrero de 2011, por la que se establecen medidas de lucha contra la morosidad en las operaciones comerciales («el acto»), a que se hace referencia en el punto 2 del anexo XII del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo, y adaptado al Acuerdo EEE mediante su Protocolo 1. |
| --- | --- |

—

La solicitud se refiere al incumplimiento por Islandia, a más tardar el 18 de febrero de 2014, de un dictamen motivado emitido por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC el 18 de diciembre de 2013 en relación con el incumplimiento por dicho Estado de la obligación de incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico nacional la Directiva 2011/7/UE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 16 de febrero de 2011, por la que se establecen medidas de lucha contra la morosidad en las operaciones comerciales («el acto»), a que se hace referencia en el punto 2 del anexo XII del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo, y adaptado al Acuerdo EEE mediante su Protocolo 1.

| — | El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC aduce que Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 12 del acto, y del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE al no adoptar o notificar al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC las disposiciones necesarias para la aplicación del acto en el plazo prescrito. |
| --- | --- |

—

El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC aduce que Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 12 del acto, y del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE al no adoptar o notificar al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC las disposiciones necesarias para la aplicación del acto en el plazo prescrito.

---

| 25.9.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/32

---

Recurso interpuesto el 17 de julio de 2014 contra Islandia por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC

(Asunto E-13/14)

(2014/C 334/13)

El 17 de julio de 2014, el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC, representado por Markus Schneider y Maria Moustakali, agentes de dicho Órgano, con dirección en Rue Belliard 35, 1040 Bruselas, Bélgica, presentó un recurso ante el Tribunal de la AELC contra Islandia.

El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC solicita al Tribunal que:

| 1. | Declare que, al no haber adoptado y/o notificado inmediatamente al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC todas las disposiciones necesarias para incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico el acto al que se hace referencia en el punto 21c del anexo XVIII del Acuerdo EEE (Directiva 2004/113/CE del Consejo, de 13 de diciembre de 2004, por la que se aplica el principio de igualdad de trato entre hombres y mujeres al acceso a bienes y servicios y su suministro), tal y como se adaptó al Acuerdo EEE mediante su Protocolo 1, y mediante la Decisión del Comité Mixto no 147/2009, en el plazo fijado, Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud de dicho acto y del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declare que, al no haber adoptado y/o notificado inmediatamente al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC todas las disposiciones necesarias para incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico el acto al que se hace referencia en el punto 21c del anexo XVIII del Acuerdo EEE (Directiva 2004/113/CE del Consejo, de 13 de diciembre de 2004, por la que se aplica el principio de igualdad de trato entre hombres y mujeres al acceso a bienes y servicios y su suministro), tal y como se adaptó al Acuerdo EEE mediante su Protocolo 1, y mediante la Decisión del Comité Mixto no 147/2009, en el plazo fijado, Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud de dicho acto y del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE.

| 2. | Condene en costas a Islandia. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Condene en costas a Islandia.

Antecedentes de hecho y de Derecho y motivos invocados:

| — | La solicitud se refiere al incumplimiento por Islandia, a más tardar el 26 de agosto de 2013, de un dictamen motivado emitido por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC el 26 de junio de 2013 en relación con el incumplimiento por dicho Estado de la obligación de incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico nacional la Directiva 2004/113/CE del Consejo, de 13 de diciembre de 2004, por la que se aplica el principio de igualdad de trato entre hombres y mujeres al acceso a bienes y servicios y su suministro («el acto»), a que se hace referencia en el punto 21c del anexo XVIII del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo, y adaptado a dicho Acuerdo mediante su Protocolo 1. |
| --- | --- |

—

La solicitud se refiere al incumplimiento por Islandia, a más tardar el 26 de agosto de 2013, de un dictamen motivado emitido por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC el 26 de junio de 2013 en relación con el incumplimiento por dicho Estado de la obligación de incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico nacional la Directiva 2004/113/CE del Consejo, de 13 de diciembre de 2004, por la que se aplica el principio de igualdad de trato entre hombres y mujeres al acceso a bienes y servicios y su suministro («el acto»), a que se hace referencia en el punto 21c del anexo XVIII del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo, y adaptado a dicho Acuerdo mediante su Protocolo 1.

| — | El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC aduce que Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 17 del acto y del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE al no adoptar y/o notificar al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC las disposiciones necesarias para la aplicación del acto en el plazo prescrito. |
| --- | --- |

—

El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC aduce que Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 17 del acto y del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE al no adoptar y/o notificar al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC las disposiciones necesarias para la aplicación del acto en el plazo prescrito.

---

| 25.9.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/33

---

Recurso interpuesto el 17 de julio de 2014 contra Islandia por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC

(Asunto E-14/14)

(2014/C 334/14)

El 17 de julio de 2014, el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC, representado por Markus Schneider y Janne Tysnes Kaasin, agentes de dicho Órgano, con dirección en Rue Belliard 35, 1040 Bruselas, Bélgica, presentó un recurso ante el Tribunal de la AELC contra Islandia.

El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC solicita al Tribunal que:

| 1. | Declare que, al no haber adoptado y/o notificado inmediatamente al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC todas las disposiciones necesarias para incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico el acto al que se hace referencia en el anexo II, capítulo XXIII, punto 1a, del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo (Directiva 2009/48/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 18 de junio de 2009, sobre la seguridad de los juguetes), tal y como se adaptó al Acuerdo EEE mediante su Protocolo 1 y mediante Decisión del Comité Mixto no 127/2012, en el plazo prescrito, Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud de dicho acto y del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declare que, al no haber adoptado y/o notificado inmediatamente al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC todas las disposiciones necesarias para incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico el acto al que se hace referencia en el anexo II, capítulo XXIII, punto 1a, del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo (Directiva 2009/48/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 18 de junio de 2009, sobre la seguridad de los juguetes), tal y como se adaptó al Acuerdo EEE mediante su Protocolo 1 y mediante Decisión del Comité Mixto no 127/2012, en el plazo prescrito, Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud de dicho acto y del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE.

| 2. | Condene en costas a Islandia. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Condene en costas a Islandia.

Antecedentes de hecho y de Derecho y motivos invocados:

| — | La solicitud se refiere al incumplimiento por Islandia, a más tardar el 5 de mayo de 2014, de un dictamen motivado emitido por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC el 5 de marzo de 2014 en relación con el incumplimiento por dicho Estado de la obligación de incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico nacional la Directiva 2009/48/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 18 de junio de 2009, sobre la seguridad de los juguetes («el acto»), a que se hace referencia en el anexo II, capítulo XXIII, punto 1a, del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo, y adaptado al Acuerdo mediante su Protocolo 1. |
| --- | --- |

—

La solicitud se refiere al incumplimiento por Islandia, a más tardar el 5 de mayo de 2014, de un dictamen motivado emitido por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC el 5 de marzo de 2014 en relación con el incumplimiento por dicho Estado de la obligación de incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico nacional la Directiva 2009/48/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 18 de junio de 2009, sobre la seguridad de los juguetes («el acto»), a que se hace referencia en el anexo II, capítulo XXIII, punto 1a, del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo, y adaptado al Acuerdo mediante su Protocolo 1.

| — | El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC aduce que Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 54 del acto y del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE al no adoptar y/o notificar al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC las disposiciones necesarias para la aplicación del acto en el plazo prescrito. |
| --- | --- |

—

El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC aduce que Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 54 del acto y del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE al no adoptar y/o notificar al Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC las disposiciones necesarias para la aplicación del acto en el plazo prescrito.

---

| 25.9.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/34

---

Recurso interpuesto el 18 de julio de 2014 contra Islandia por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC

(Asunto E-15/14)

(2014/C 334/15)

El 18 de julio de 2014, el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC, representado por Markus Schneider y Janne Tysnes Kaasin, agentes de dicho Órgano, con dirección en Rue Belliard 35, 1040 Bruselas, Bélgica, presentó un recurso ante el Tribunal de la AELC contra Islandia.

El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC solicita al Tribunal que:

| 1. | Declare que Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE al no haber adoptado las disposiciones necesarias para incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico el acto al que se hace referencia en el punto 4d del capítulo XI del anexo II de dicho Acuerdo,
  el Reglamento (UE) no 1007/2011 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 27 de septiembre de 2011, relativo a las denominaciones de las fibras textiles y al etiquetado y marcado de la composición en fibras de los productos textiles y por el que se derogan la Directiva 73/44/CEE del Consejo y las Directivas 96/73/CE y 2008/121/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo,
  modificado por el
  Reglamento Delegado (UE) no 286/2012 de la Comisión, de 27 de enero de 2012, por el que se modifica el anexo I, con objeto de incluir una nueva denominación de fibra textil, y los anexos VIII y IX, a efectos de su adaptación al progreso técnico, del Reglamento (UE) no 1007/2011 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, relativo a las denominaciones de las fibras textiles y al etiquetado y marcado de la composición en fibras de los productos textiles,
  tal y como se adaptó al Acuerdo EEE mediante su Protocolo 1. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declare que Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE al no haber adoptado las disposiciones necesarias para incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico el acto al que se hace referencia en el punto 4d del capítulo XI del anexo II de dicho Acuerdo,

el Reglamento (UE) no 1007/2011 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 27 de septiembre de 2011, relativo a las denominaciones de las fibras textiles y al etiquetado y marcado de la composición en fibras de los productos textiles y por el que se derogan la Directiva 73/44/CEE del Consejo y las Directivas 96/73/CE y 2008/121/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo,

modificado por el

Reglamento Delegado (UE) no 286/2012 de la Comisión, de 27 de enero de 2012, por el que se modifica el anexo I, con objeto de incluir una nueva denominación de fibra textil, y los anexos VIII y IX, a efectos de su adaptación al progreso técnico, del Reglamento (UE) no 1007/2011 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, relativo a las denominaciones de las fibras textiles y al etiquetado y marcado de la composición en fibras de los productos textiles,

tal y como se adaptó al Acuerdo EEE mediante su Protocolo 1.

| 2. | Condene en costas a Islandia. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Condene en costas a Islandia.

Antecedentes de hecho y de Derecho y motivos invocados:

| — | La solicitud se refiere al incumplimiento por Islandia, en el plazo prescrito, de dos dictámenes motivados emitidos por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC en relación con el incumplimiento por dicho Estado de la obligación de incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico nacional el Reglamento (UE) no 1007/2011 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 27 de septiembre de 2011, relativo a las denominaciones de las fibras textiles y al etiquetado y marcado de la composición en fibras de los productos textiles y por el que se derogan la Directiva 73/44/CEE del Consejo y las Directivas 96/73/CE y 2008/121/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, así como el incumplimiento de la obligación de incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico nacional el Reglamento Delegado (UE) no 286/2012 de la Comisión, de 27 de enero de 2012, por el que se modifica el anexo I, con objeto de incluir una nueva denominación de fibra textil, y los anexos VIII y IX, a efectos de su adaptación al progreso técnico, del Reglamento (UE) no 007/2011 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, relativo a las denominaciones de las fibras textiles y al etiquetado y marcado de la composición en fibras de los productos textiles («el acto»), a que se hace referencia en el punto 4d del capítulo XI del anexo II del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo, y adaptado a dicho Acuerdo mediante su Protocolo 1. |
| --- | --- |

—

La solicitud se refiere al incumplimiento por Islandia, en el plazo prescrito, de dos dictámenes motivados emitidos por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC en relación con el incumplimiento por dicho Estado de la obligación de incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico nacional el Reglamento (UE) no 1007/2011 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 27 de septiembre de 2011, relativo a las denominaciones de las fibras textiles y al etiquetado y marcado de la composición en fibras de los productos textiles y por el que se derogan la Directiva 73/44/CEE del Consejo y las Directivas 96/73/CE y 2008/121/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, así como el incumplimiento de la obligación de incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico nacional el Reglamento Delegado (UE) no 286/2012 de la Comisión, de 27 de enero de 2012, por el que se modifica el anexo I, con objeto de incluir una nueva denominación de fibra textil, y los anexos VIII y IX, a efectos de su adaptación al progreso técnico, del Reglamento (UE) no 007/2011 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, relativo a las denominaciones de las fibras textiles y al etiquetado y marcado de la composición en fibras de los productos textiles («el acto»), a que se hace referencia en el punto 4d del capítulo XI del anexo II del Acuerdo sobre el Espacio Económico Europeo, y adaptado a dicho Acuerdo mediante su Protocolo 1.

| — | El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC aduce que Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE al no adoptar las disposiciones necesarias para incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico nacional los actos en el plazo prescrito. |
| --- | --- |

—

El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC aduce que Islandia ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 7 del Acuerdo EEE al no adoptar las disposiciones necesarias para incorporar a su ordenamiento jurídico nacional los actos en el plazo prescrito.

---

| 25.9.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/35 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/35

---

Recurso interpuesto el 25 de julio de 2014 por el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC contra el Principado de Liechtenstein

(Asunto E-17/14)

(2014/C 334/16)

El 25 de julio de 2014, el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC, representado por Xavier Lewis y Janne Tysnes Kaasin, agentes de dicho Órgano, rue Belliard 35, 1040 Bruselas, Bélgica, interpuso un recurso ante el Tribunal de la AELC contra el Principado de Liechtenstein.

El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC solicita al Tribunal que:

| 1. | Declare que, al mantener en vigor normas nacionales como el artículo 63 de la Ley de sanidad y las disposiciones transitorias de la Ley por la que se deroga la Ley de sanidad, incluida la aplicabilidad del artículo 63, apartado 2, de la Ley de sanidad en este sentido, exige que un «dentista» autorizado tenga que ejercer su profesión como trabajador por cuenta ajena, bajo la supervisión, la instrucción y la responsabilidad directas de un odontólogo plenamente cualificado, el Principado de Liechtenstein ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 31 del Acuerdo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declare que, al mantener en vigor normas nacionales como el artículo 63 de la Ley de sanidad y las disposiciones transitorias de la Ley por la que se deroga la Ley de sanidad, incluida la aplicabilidad del artículo 63, apartado 2, de la Ley de sanidad en este sentido, exige que un «dentista» autorizado tenga que ejercer su profesión como trabajador por cuenta ajena, bajo la supervisión, la instrucción y la responsabilidad directas de un odontólogo plenamente cualificado, el Principado de Liechtenstein ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 31 del Acuerdo EEE.

| 2. | Condene en costas al Principado de Liechtenstein. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Condene en costas al Principado de Liechtenstein.

Antecedentes de hecho y de derecho y motivos invocados:

| — | El artículo 63 de la Ley de sanidad dispone que un «dentista» solo puede trabajar bajo la supervisión, la instrucción y la responsabilidad directas de un odontólogo plenamente cualificado (Zahnarzt). |
| --- | --- |

—

El artículo 63 de la Ley de sanidad dispone que un «dentista» solo puede trabajar bajo la supervisión, la instrucción y la responsabilidad directas de un odontólogo plenamente cualificado (Zahnarzt).

| — | El derecho de establecimiento garantizado por el artículo 31 del Acuerdo EEE exige que no se restrinja la libertad de establecimiento, incluido el derecho a emprender y ejercer actividades como trabajadores por cuenta propia. |
| --- | --- |

—

El derecho de establecimiento garantizado por el artículo 31 del Acuerdo EEE exige que no se restrinja la libertad de establecimiento, incluido el derecho a emprender y ejercer actividades como trabajadores por cuenta propia.

| — | El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC aduce que Liechtenstein ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 31 del Acuerdo EEE. En su opinión, el artículo 63 de la Lay de Sanidad y las disposiciones transitorias de la Ley por la que se deroga la Ley de sanidad, incluida la aplicabilidad del artículo 63, apartado 2, de la Ley de sanidad en este sentido, constituyen una restricción a tenor del artículo 31 del Acuerdo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

—

El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC aduce que Liechtenstein ha incumplido las obligaciones que le incumben en virtud del artículo 31 del Acuerdo EEE. En su opinión, el artículo 63 de la Lay de Sanidad y las disposiciones transitorias de la Ley por la que se deroga la Ley de sanidad, incluida la aplicabilidad del artículo 63, apartado 2, de la Ley de sanidad en este sentido, constituyen una restricción a tenor del artículo 31 del Acuerdo EEE.

| — | El Gobierno de Liechtenstein sostiene que el objetivo del artículo 63 de la Ley de sanidad es garantizar la protección de la salud pública. |
| --- | --- |

—

El Gobierno de Liechtenstein sostiene que el objetivo del artículo 63 de la Ley de sanidad es garantizar la protección de la salud pública.

| — | El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC considera que excede de lo necesario a efectos de protección de la salud pública que un «dentista» plenamente capacitado y cualificado que desee ejercer su actividad profesional de acuerdo con su título tenga que ser empleado de un odontólogo en Liechtenstein. |
| --- | --- |

—

El Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC considera que excede de lo necesario a efectos de protección de la salud pública que un «dentista» plenamente capacitado y cualificado que desee ejercer su actividad profesional de acuerdo con su título tenga que ser empleado de un odontólogo en Liechtenstein.

---

PROCEDIMIENTOS RELATIVOS A LA APLICACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA DE COMPETENCIA

Comisión Europea

| 25.9.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/36

---

Notificación previa de una operación de concentración

(Asunto M.7372 — AXA/Hammerson/The Real Estate Portfolio)

Asunto que podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado

(Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE)

(2014/C 334/17)

| 1. | El 18 de septiembre de 2014, la Comisión recibió la notificación, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 4 del Reglamento (CE) no 139/2004 del Consejo (1), de un proyecto de concentración por el cual las empresas SCI Vendome Commerces (Francia) y Hammerson plc («Hammerson», Reino Unido) adquieren el control conjunto, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 3, apartado 1, letra b), del Reglamento de concentraciones, de una cartera inmobiliaria mediante adquisición de acciones. |
| --- | --- |

1.

El 18 de septiembre de 2014, la Comisión recibió la notificación, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 4 del Reglamento (CE) no 139/2004 del Consejo (1), de un proyecto de concentración por el cual las empresas SCI Vendome Commerces (Francia) y Hammerson plc («Hammerson», Reino Unido) adquieren el control conjunto, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 3, apartado 1, letra b), del Reglamento de concentraciones, de una cartera inmobiliaria mediante adquisición de acciones.

| 2. | Las actividades comerciales de las empresas en cuestión son las siguientes:






  — | SCI Vendome Commerces es una filial al 100 % de AXA France Insurance. AXA es un grupo asegurador mundial activo en seguros de vida, enfermedad y otras formas de seguro, así como en la gestión de inversiones; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Las actividades comerciales de las empresas en cuestión son las siguientes:

—

SCI Vendome Commerces es una filial al 100 % de AXA France Insurance. AXA es un grupo asegurador mundial activo en seguros de vida, enfermedad y otras formas de seguro, así como en la gestión de inversiones;

| — | Hammerson se dedica al desarrollo de propiedad inmobiliaria comercial y a alquilar y explotar sus propias propiedades inmobiliarias comerciales. Hammerson es un promotor y gestor-propietario de centros comerciales y parques minoristas principalmente en el Reino Unido y también en Francia; |
| --- | --- |

—

Hammerson se dedica al desarrollo de propiedad inmobiliaria comercial y a alquilar y explotar sus propias propiedades inmobiliarias comerciales. Hammerson es un promotor y gestor-propietario de centros comerciales y parques minoristas principalmente en el Reino Unido y también en Francia;

| — | la cartera inmobiliaria incluye un centro comercial y una unidad residencial, así como una serie de propiedades circundantes situadas en Bristol (Reino Unido), un edificio de aparcamientos y terrenos circundantes en el centro urbano de Bristol. |
| --- | --- |

—

la cartera inmobiliaria incluye un centro comercial y una unidad residencial, así como una serie de propiedades circundantes situadas en Bristol (Reino Unido), un edificio de aparcamientos y terrenos circundantes en el centro urbano de Bristol.

| 3. | Tras un examen preliminar, la Comisión considera que la operación notificada podría entrar en el ámbito de aplicación del Reglamento de concentraciones. No obstante, se reserva su decisión definitiva al respecto. En virtud de la Comunicación de la Comisión sobre el procedimiento simplificado para tramitar determinadas concentraciones en virtud del Reglamento (CE) no 139/2004 del Consejo (2), este asunto podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado establecido en dicha Comunicación. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Tras un examen preliminar, la Comisión considera que la operación notificada podría entrar en el ámbito de aplicación del Reglamento de concentraciones. No obstante, se reserva su decisión definitiva al respecto. En virtud de la Comunicación de la Comisión sobre el procedimiento simplificado para tramitar determinadas concentraciones en virtud del Reglamento (CE) no 139/2004 del Consejo (2), este asunto podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado establecido en dicha Comunicación.

| 4. | La Comisión invita a los interesados a que le presenten sus posibles observaciones sobre el proyecto de concentración.
  Las observaciones deberán obrar en poder de la Comisión en un plazo máximo de diez días a partir de la fecha de la presente publicación. Podrán enviarse por fax (+32 22964301), por correo electrónico a COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu o por correo, con indicación del no de referencia M.7372 — AXA/Hammerson/The Real Estate Portfolio, a la siguiente dirección:





  Comisión Europea |
| --- | --- |
| Dirección General de Competencia |
| Registro de Operaciones de Concentración |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

La Comisión invita a los interesados a que le presenten sus posibles observaciones sobre el proyecto de concentración.

Las observaciones deberán obrar en poder de la Comisión en un plazo máximo de diez días a partir de la fecha de la presente publicación. Podrán enviarse por fax (+32 22964301), por correo electrónico a COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu o por correo, con indicación del no de referencia M.7372 — AXA/Hammerson/The Real Estate Portfolio, a la siguiente dirección:

Comisión Europea

Dirección General de Competencia

Registro de Operaciones de Concentración

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  DO L 24 de 29.1.2004, p. 1 («el Reglamento de concentraciones»).

(2)  DO C 366 de 14.12.2013, p. 5.

---

Corrección de errores

| 25.9.2014 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 334/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 334/37

---

Corrección de errores de la actualización de la lista de pasos fronterizos mencionados en el artículo 2, apartado 8, del Reglamento (CE) no 562/2006 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, por el que se establece un código comunitario de normas para el cruce de personas por las fronteras (Código de fronteras Schengen) (
  DO C 316 de 28.12.2007, p. 1
  ;
  DO C 134 de 31.5.2008, p. 16
  ;
  DO C 177 de 12.7.2008, p. 9
  ;
  DO C 200 de 6.8.2008, p. 10
  ;
  DO C 331 de 31.12.2008, p. 13
  ;
  DO C 3 de 8.1.2009, p. 10
  ;
  DO C 37 de 14.2.2009, p. 10
  ;
  DO C 64 de 19.3.2009, p. 20
  ;
  DO C 99 de 30.4.2009, p. 7
  ;
  DO C 229 de 23.9.2009, p. 28
  ;
  DO C 263 de 5.11.2009, p. 22
  ;
  DO C 298 de 8.12.2009, p. 17
  ;
  DO C 74 de 24.3.2010, p. 13
  ;
  DO C 326 de 3.12.2010, p. 17
  ;
  DO C 355 de 29.12.2010, p. 34
  ;
  DO C 22 de 22.1.2011, p. 22
  ;
  DO C 37 de 5.2.2011, p. 12
  ;
  DO C 149 de 20.5.2011, p. 8
  ;
  DO C 190 de 30.6.2011, p. 17
  ;
  DO C 203 de 9.7.2011, p. 14
  ;
  DO C 210 de 16.7.2011, p. 30
  ;
  DO C 271 de 14.9.2011, p. 18
  ;
  DO C 356 de 6.12.2011, p. 12
  ;
  DO C 111 de 18.4.2012, p. 3
  ;
  DO C 183 de 23.6.2012, p. 7
  ;
  DO C 313 de 17.10.2012, p. 11
  ;
  DO C 394 de 20.12.2012, p. 22
  ;
  DO C 51 de 22.2.2013, p. 9
  ;
  DO C 167 de 13.6.2013, p. 9
  ;
  DO C 242 de 23.8.2013, p. 2
  ;
  DO C 275 de 24.9.2013, p. 7
  ;
  DO C 314 de 29.10.2013, p. 5
  ;
  DO C 324 de 9.11.2013, p. 6
  ;
  DO C 57 de 28.2.2014, p. 4
  ;
  DO C 167 de 4.6.2014, p. 9
  )

(
  Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea C 244 de 26 de julio de 2014
  )

(2014/C 334/18)

En la página 22, en el punto 2:

donde dice:

«Frontera búlgaro-macedonia»,

debe decir:

debe decir:

«Frontera entre Bulgaria y la antigua República Yugoslava de Macedonia».

---