alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTlONAGENCY REGION 4 ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER 61 FORSYTH STREET ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8960 KAY 0 6 2018 John Lyons, Director Division for Air Quality Department for Environmental Protection Commonwealth of Kentucky Environmental and Public

Protection Cabinet 200 Fair Oaks, First Floor Frankfort, Kentucky 40601

Dear Mr. Lyons:
Enclosed is the final end-of-year report for your agency's 

### FY 2009 Air Pollution Control grant authorizedby 

### 5 105 of the CleanAir Act. This report outlines your agency's various grant commitments and their status. Since there were no issues, your report is now finalized and the grant has been closed out. This letter documents the conclusionof thejoint evaluationprocess required by 40 Code of Federal Regulations 35.115 and identified as a commitmentin your FY 2009 Air Planning Agreement under Cross CuttingIssues.

We appreciate the progress you made in 

### EY 2009 and look forward to working with you in 

### FY 2010 and future years to continue our joint effortsto protect and improve air quality. 

### If you have any questions or comments, please contact me at (404)562-9097
or Marie Persinger at (404)562-9048. Sincerely,



### R.Douglas Neeley &' Chief 

### Air Toxics and Monitoring Branch Air, Pesticides and Toxics Management Division

Enclosure

Internet Address (URL) http://www.epa.gov Recycled/Recyclable Printed with Vegetable Oil Based Inks on RecyW Paper (Minimum 30%Postconsumer)
#### ARNOLD v. STATE.

No. 25852.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 14, 1952.

■ R. L. Wade and H. E. Tarpley, W. R. Sessions, Dallas, By H. E. Tarpley, for appellant.

Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., Charles S. Potts, Asst. Dist. Atty., and Robert L. Shaw, Asst. Dist. Atty. all of Dallas, George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

The. appeal is from a conviction for keeping a bawdy house, there being alleged five different offenses at different dates, in which a jail sentence of 20 days and a $200 fine was imposed in each case, making 100 days in jail and $1,000 fine.

In the progress of the trial it was shown that the officers obtained a search warrant from a justice of the peace, by virtue of which they seized certain articles and introduced them as exhibits for the purpose of showing that the premises were used as a house of prostitution. Objection was made to the introduction of these articles in evidence. Bill of Exception No. 6 shows that both the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself were introduced in evidence, over the defendant’s objection. This was clearly error.

 It is contended' in brief filed by the District Attorney’s office that the objection is insufficient in that the grounds were based on the claim of an invalid search warrant. We have always held that it is not admissible for any purpose and, therefore, it is not necessary to state the grounds. We do observe, however, that the search warrant fails to comply with Article 316, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., in that *739it does not “ * * * state the particular offense for which such implements are designed.” It follows, further, that the search warrant is invalid and the fruits of the search are not admissible in evidence.

Other errors complained of in the appeal should not occur on another trial and it is not deemed necessary to. discuss them herein. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded.
#### DAVIS et al. v. STEWART et al.

No. 9891.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.

June 7, 1950.

Rehearing Denied June 28, 1950.

Sneed & Vine, Jerome Sneed, Jr., all of Austin, for appellees.

HUGHES,- Justice.

This suit originated in the County Court of Travis County and was an action brought by appellant, Annie Laurie Barrow Davis, to declare the heirship of William Barrow, deceased.

Appellant alleged that she is the only surviving child of William Barrow and wife, George Ann Barrow, both deceased, and hence his only heir.

Appellees are the collateral kindred of William Barrow.

It is conceded that appellant is not the natural child of William Barrow, but she claims to be his child by adoption by estop-pel.

This is a companion case to Davis v. Cavanaugh, Tex.Civ.App., 231 S.W.2d 959. The evidence in the two cases is identical and the two records are, for all practical purposes, identical.

The questions presented are the same and our rulings are the same. We, therefore, refer to such opinion for all purposes and make the same a part hereof.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed and this cause is remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

ARCHER, C. J., not sitting.

On Motions for Rehearing

HUGHES, Justice.

Appellant has filed a motion for rehearing, in which she prays that we render judgment for her. Appellees, in their motion, pray that there be an affirmance.

Our judgment reversing and remanding the case, if construed as a general remand on the ground that the evidence was insufficient, cannot stand, because appellant made no assignment of error to such effect. Wisdom v. Smith, 146 Tex. 420, 209 S.W.2d 164.

There can be no mistaking the import of our opinion. Clearly, it was that under the *964undisputed .facts and circumstances appellant was the child of William Barrow by-adoption by estoppel.

We, therefore, grant appellant’s motion for rehearing, set aside our former judgment remanding this cas.e, and here render judgment establishing appellant’s status as a child of William Barrow.

Appellees’ motion for rehearing is overruled.

Appellant’s motion granted — judgment of renjand set aside and judgment rendered for appellant. Appellees’ motion overruled.

ARCHER, C. J., not sitting.
H. R. 3095 

One Hundred Thirteenth Congress 

of the 

United States of America 

AT THE FIRST SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Thursday, 

the third day of January, two thousand and thirteen 

An Act 

To ensure that any new or revised requirement providing for the screening, testing, 

or treatment of individuals operating commercial motor vehicles for sleep disorders 

is adopted pursuant to a rulemaking proceeding, and for other purposes. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO SLEEP DISORDERS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Transportation may implement or enforce a requirement providing for the screening, testing, 

or treatment (including consideration of all possible treatment alternatives) of individuals operating commercial motor vehicles for sleep 

disorders only if the requirement is adopted pursuant to a rulemaking proceeding. 

(b) APPLICABILITY.—Subsection (a) shall not apply to a requirement that was in force before September 1, 2013. 

(c) SLEEP DISORDERS DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘sleep 

disorders’’ includes obstructive sleep apnea. 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
#### HICKS v. STATE.

No. 22352.

Court, of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 13, 1943.

John Davenport, of Wichita Falls, for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of selling whisky on Sunday, and by the jury assessed a penalty of thirty days in jail.

There are no bills of exceptions in the record.

It is shown by the facts offered by the State that an agent of the Liquor Control Board purchased two bottles of whisky from appellant at the Grand Hotel in Wichita Falls on November 16, 1941, same being Sunday, and paid therefor the sum of $2.

*523Appellant took the stand and denied such sale, and offered further proof that he was not at such hotel during such month of November.

An issue of fact was thus presented to the jury for their decision, and they decided the same against appellant’s contention. This was their province, and we do not think their verdict should be 'disturbed.

No error appearing, the judgment is affirmed.
#### McCARTY v. STATE.

No. 24271.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 23, 1949.

No attorney for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

The conviction is for the unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor in a dry area. The penalty assessed is a fine of $100.00 and confinement in the county jail for 30. days.

The State’s Attorney before this court has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for the reason that the transcript contains no notice of appeal as required by Article 827, C.C.P., in order to confer jurisdiction herein.

The State’s motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is ordered dismissed.
In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

 Submitted April 22, 2005

Decided May 9, 2005

Before

 Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 03-3078

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ELIZABETH R. ROACH,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 00 CR 411

Matthew F. Kennelly, 

Judge.

ORDER

This case comes to us on remand from the Supreme Court for further consideration in light of

United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). Each party has filed a statement of position pursuant

to Circuit Rule 54. 

At Roach’s original sentencing hearing, the district court granted her motion for downward

departure based on diminished capacity pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. Absent the downward

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 03-3078 Page 2

departure, Roach would have been required to serve a minimum of 12 months in prison. Instead, the

district courtsentencedRoachto five years of probation, six weeks ofwork release at the SalvationArmy

Center, six weeks of home confinement with weekend electronic monitoring, and prohibited her from

obtaining credit cards without the court's prior permission. In vacating this sentence, we held that the

district court abusedits discretioningranting the downward departure,stated that the sentencing guidelines

significantlylimitedthe district court’s abilityto fashiona sentence based onconsiderations suchasRoach’s

undisputed diminished mental capacity, and remanded the case for resentencing. See United States v.

Roach, 296 F.3d 565, 573 (7th Cir. 2002). 

On remand, the district court specifically stated on the record that it felt that the low end of the

sentencing range was in far excess of what was warranted in this case, but resentenced according to the

guidelinessetting aside its own personalopinion. After Booker and United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d

471 (7th Cir. 2005), we now understand that the district court should have been free to fashion the very

sentence it intended to impose originally. 

In Paladino, we determined that sentencing errors under Booker were indeed errors that were

both plain and constituted a miscarriage of justice. 401 F.3d at 481-83. In contrast to Paladino,

however, afterreview ofthe record and theRule 54 statements, we canbe certain that the sentencing judge

inthis case would have imposed a lightersentencethandictated bythe guidelines had he not thought himself

bound by the guidelines. As a result, we find thatRoachwas prejudiced by the illegal sentenced imposed

by the district court, and, therefore, has survived plain-error review outright making the limited remand

prescribed in Paladino unnecessary. 

Accordingly, Roach’s sentence is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for resentencing in

accordance with Booker.
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                          94,787
<SECURITIES>                                     6,142
<RECEIVABLES>                                  104,890
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,034
<INVENTORY>                                     92,456
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               322,845
<PP&E>                                          30,076
<DEPRECIATION>                                  11,606
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 349,762
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          157,173
<BONDS>                                          1,747
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            35
<OTHER-SE>                                     190,807
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   349,762
<SALES>                                        186,196
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               186,196
<CGS>                                          144,570
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  144,570
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                30,548
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                  (54)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (192)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 11,324
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,397
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              7,927
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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```

[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 213 (Thursday, November 2, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 65882]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-28178]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division

Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--Financial Services Technology Consortium, Inc.

    Notice is hereby given that, on September 28, 2000, pursuant to 
Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), Financial Services 
Technology Consortium, Inc. (``Consortium'') has filed written 
notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal 
Trade Commission disclosing changes in its membership status. The 
notifications were filed for the purpose of extending the Act's 
provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual 
damages under specified circumstances. Specifically, Cardinal 
Commerce.com, Mentor, OH; Inetco, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada; 
NeoIT, Inc., San Ramon, CA; Online Resources, McLean, VA; and SQN, 
Rancocas, NJ have joined the Consortium as associate members.
    No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned 
activity of the group research project. Membership in this group 
research project remains open, and Financial Services Technology 
Consortium, Inc. intends to file additional written notification 
disclosing all changes in membership.
    On October 21, 1993, Financial Services Technology Consortium, Inc. 
filed its original notification pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Act. 
The Department of Justice published a notice in the Federal Register 
pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act on December 14, 1993 (58 FR 65399).
    The last notification was filed with the Department on March 31, 
1999. A notice was published in the Federal Register pursuant to 
Section 6(b) of the Act on May 26, 1999 (64 FR 28517).

Constance K. Robinson,
Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 00-28178 Filed 11-1-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
```
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

HABIBOLLAH ELAHINEJAD,

Claimant

- Appellant,

and

VARIOUS RESTAURANT FURNITURE

AND GOODS OF IRANIAN ORIGIN,

Defendant. No. 16

- 55559

D.C. No. 2:15

- cv

- 00259

- GW

- E

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 11, 2017 **

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

Habibollah Elahinejad appeals pro se from the district court’ s summary

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JUL 17 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 16

- 55559

judgment in a civil forfeiture ac tion under 21 U.S.C. § § 1595a(c)(1)(A) and

1595a(c)(2)(B) for goods seized from a shipment fr om Dubai, United Arab

Emirates. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.

United States v. $133, 420.00 in U.S. Currency , 672 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2012).

W e affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Elahinejad

failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he had a colorable

interest in the property. See id. at 638 ( “[I]n a civi l forfeiture action, a claimant’ s

bare assert ion of an ownership or possessory interest, in the absence of some other

evidence, is not enough to survive a motion for summary judgment.” ).

We reject as unsupported by the record Elahinejad’s contention that the

district court did not consider his eviden ce submitted in opposition to summary

judgment.

Because we affirm summary judgment, we do not reach Elahinejad’s other

contentions on appeal. See United States v. $15,500 in U.S. Currency , 558 F.2d

1359, 1361 (9th Cir. 1977) ( when a claimant fails to establish the threshold

requir ement of standing, the claimant ’ s challenges to the merits of the forfeiture

action cannot be reached).

AFFIRMED.
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<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
                            FOHP, INC. & SUBSIDIARIES
           (SUCCESSOR TO FIRST OPTION HEALTH PLAN OF NEW JERSEY, INC.)
                                   EXHIBIT 27
                             FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE

THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-Q
FOR THE QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
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<PERIOD-END>                                       JUN-30-1997
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<SECURITIES>                                                 0 
<RECEIVABLES>                                        1,233,595 
<ALLOWANCES>                                           183,729 
<INVENTORY>                                                  0 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   103,077,109 
<PP&E>                                               3,538,934 
<DEPRECIATION>                                       1,840,588 
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     107,827,732 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              102,629,764 
<BONDS>                                             50,000,000 
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                        0 
<PREFERRED>                                                  0 
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<OTHER-SE>                                         (44,824,582)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       107,827,732 
<SALES>                                                      0 
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   179,344,856 
<CGS>                                                        0 
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      168,987,287 
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                             0 
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                             0 
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                     532,450 
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    (20,635,049)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             2,036 
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</TABLE>
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A17A0217. TIYE MUHAMMAD et al. v. ACCEPTANCE AUTO SALES, INC. 

This case began as an action for damages in magistrate court. Following an

adverse ruling in that court, plaintiffs Tiye Muhammad and Sharron Banks appealed

to the superior court, which ruled in favor of Acceptance Auto Sales, Inc. 

Muhammad and Banks then appealed directly to this Court. We, however, lack

jurisdiction.

“[A]ppeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of lower

courts by certiorari or de novo proceedings shall be by application for discretionary

appeal.” Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 (581 SE2d 333) (2003) (punctuation

omitted);see also OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). The plaintiffs’ failure to follow the proper

appellate procedure deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby

DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

09/21/2016

September 21, 2016
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 212 (Wednesday, November 1, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 65316]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-28046]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION


Notice of Agreement(s) Filed

    The Commission hereby gives notice of the filing of the following 
agreement(s) under the Shipping Act of 1984. Interested parties can 
review or obtain copies of agreements at the Washington, DC offices of 
the Commission, 800 North Capitol Street, N.W., Room 940. Interested 
parties may submit comments on an agreement to the Secretary, Federal 
Maritime Commission, Washington, DC 20573, within 10 days of the date 
this notice appears in the Federal Register.
    Agreement No.: 011375-054.
    Title: Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement.
    Parties: Atlantic Container Line, A.P. Moller-Maersk Sealand, 
Hapag-Lloyd Container Line GmbH, Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A., 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Orient Overseas Container Line Limited, P&O 
Nedlloyd Limited.
    Synopsis: The proposed agreement amendment authorizes the parties 
to agree on the temporary withdrawal of one or more vessels commencing 
with sailings in the United States or Europe from mid-December to mid-
February, and authorizes those parties withdrawing vessels to charter 
space from parties not withdrawing vessels in the trade.

    Dated: October 27, 2000.

    By Order of the Federal Maritime Commission.
Bryant L. VanBrakle,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 00-28046 Filed 10-31-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6730-01-P