IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

 March 8, 2013 Session

 A. JULIAN AHLER v. WALTER STEPHEN STEWART, ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Roane County

No. 11CV4 Russell E. Simmons, Jr., Judge

No. E2012-02510-COA-R3-CV-FILED-MARCH 8, 2013

This is an appeal from an order transferring the action below from the Circuit Court for

Roane County to the Chancery Court for Roane County. Because the order appealed from

does not resolve any issues raised in the proceedings but merely transfers those claims to

another court, we dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, JOHN W. MCCLARTY, AND THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JJ.

Mark N. Foster, Rockwood, Tennessee, for the appellants.

Richard L. Hollow, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Rebecca K. McClurkan and

Ahler Trust.

Jack H. McPherson, Jr., Kingston, Tennessee, for the appellee, A. Julian Ahler.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

1

Upon review of the record for this appeal, the Court directed the appellants to show

cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because there is not

“a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of the parties” from which

Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals provides as follows: 1

ThisCourt, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may

affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum

opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When

a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall be designated

“MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not be

cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.
an appeal as of right would lie. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Counsel for the appellants filed a

response to the show cause order arguing that the term “final judgment” is not defined in the

Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and that this Court should consider the challenged

transfer order a final judgment because it “resolve[d] all of the claims between the parties in

the Circuit Court.” Counsel further asserts that the lack of resolution by the Chancery Court

of the claims between the parties “does not change the character of the Circuit Court’s order

as a final judgment leaving the Circuit Court with nothing else to do.”

2

Counsel correctly asserts in his argument that “[a] final judgment is one that resolves

all the issues in the case, ‘leaving nothing else for the trial court to do.’ ” In Re: Estate of

Henderson, 121 S.W.3d 643, 645 (Tenn. 2003) (quoting State ex rel. McAllister v. Goode,

968 S.W.2d 834, 840 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). However, he is incorrect in his assertion that

the appellate rules do not define the term “final judgment.” Rule 3(a) of the Rules of

Appellate Procedure defines what a “final judgment” is by making clear what it is not.

Specifically, “any order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities

of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to revision at any

time before entry of a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all

parties.” Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Because the challenged order in this case did not resolve

any of the claims at issue between the parties, this Court does not have subject matter

jurisdiction to adjudicate this appeal. See Bayberry Assocs. v. Jones, 783 S.W.2d 553, 559

(Tenn. 1990) (“Unless an appeal from an interlocutory order is provided by the rules or by

statute, appellate courts have jurisdiction over final judgments only.”). As this Court has

pointed out before, if a party wishes to appeal from an order adjudicating a request to transfer

a case between the circuit and chancery courts of a particular county, seeking permission to

appeal from both the trial court and this Court pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules of Appellate

Procedure would be the appropriate method by which to seek review. See Williams v. City

of Milan, No. W2010-00450-COA-R9-CV, 2011 WL 538868, * 3 n.5 (Tenn. Ct. App.,

Jackson, Feb. 16, 2011).

Because the order transferring the case below is not a final judgment, this appeal is

dismissed. Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellants, Walter Stephen Stewart and Leah Jan

Stewart, for which execution may issue if necessary.

PER CURIAM

In his response, counsel also attempts to distinguish a memorandum opinion from the Middle 2

Section of this Court that dismissed for lack of jurisdiction an appeal from an order that merely transferred

a case from one county to another. See Miller v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2011-01887-COA-R3-CV, 2011

WL 5865201 (Tenn. Ct. App., Nashville, Nov. 21, 2011). Memorandum opinions are “not to be cited or

relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.” Tenn. R. Ct. App. 10. 

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