FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LIEKE LOHO, 

Petitioner, No. 04-73136

v. Agency No. 

M A95-178-821 ICHAEL B. MUKASEY, Attorney

General, OPINION

Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

March 5, 2008—Pasadena, California

Filed July 8, 2008

Before: John R. Gibson,* Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, and

Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain

*The Honorable John R. Gibson, Senior United States Circuit Judge for

the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

8163
COUNSEL

Joseph S. Porta, Esq., Law Offices of Cohen, Porta & Kim,

Los Angeles, California, argued the cause for the petitioner

and was on the briefs. 

Anthony Norwood, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., argued the cause for the respondent and was on

the briefs; Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Civil

Division, Terri J. Scadron, Mark L. Gross, Gregory B. Friel,

and Christopher C. Wang, Attorneys, Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C., were on the briefs. 

LOHO v. MUKASEY 8165
OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge: 

We must decide whether an immigration judge properly

discredited an asylum applicant’s claim that she suffered persecution in her native country of Indonesia, when previous to

her applications she twice visited the United States and yet

voluntarily returned to Indonesia following each sojourn.

I

Lieke Loho, a native and citizen of Indonesia, was admitted

into the United States as a non-immigrant visitor on July 9,

2001. Shortly thereafter, Loho filed applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”). At the heart of her applications

were claims that indigenous Indonesians persecuted her

because of her Chinese ethnicity and Christian faith. 

At the removal hearing that followed, Loho alleged, among

other things, that she twice was attacked by assailants uttering

racial slurs, that her house was robbed by indigenous Indonesians, and that her workplace and church were damaged during riots aimed at Indonesians of Chinese ancestry. Loho also

testified that she visited family in the United States on two

occasions during the period of alleged persecution, once in

1998 for two weeks and once in 2000 for ten days. Loho voluntarily returned to Indonesia after each visit without applying for asylum or otherwise seeking to remain in the United

States. When asked by the immigration judge (“IJ”) why she

failed to apply for asylum during her visits, Loho explained

that “the time was so short and [she] didn’t know about asylum,” and that she “didn’t have a chance” to look into filing

such an application. In discussing her 2000 visit, Loho

acknowledged that she was informed by a cousin who was a

United States citizen and resident about the possibility of not

returning to Indonesia. The cousin, however, “was busy” and

8166 LOHO v. MUKASEY
therefore could not assist her. While Loho testified that she

“actually was afraid to return” to Indonesia, she explained that

she did anyway because she was excused from her job as a

manager of a “food business” for only ten days and thus “had

to work.” 

The IJ found that Loho was not credible and therefore

denied her asylum, withholding of removal and CAT claims.

The IJ based his adverse credibility finding, in relevant part,

on Loho’s “astonishing” explanation that she did not “have

time” to look into the possibility of applying for asylum during her previous visits to the United States, despite the severe

mistreatment she claimed to have suffered in Indonesia. The

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) adopted and affirmed

the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. 

II

To be eligible for asylum, Loho must proffer sufficient

credible evidence that she is unwilling or unable to return to

her country of origin “ ‘because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of future persecution on account of [her] race,

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,

or political opinion.’ ” Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1139, 1142

(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). We have

defined persecution as “the infliction of suffering or harm

upon those who differ (in race, religion or political opinion)

in a way regarded as offensive,” but have noted that it is an

“extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment

our society regards as offensive.” Mansour v. Ashcroft, 390

F.3d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

[1] It is well established in this court that an alien’s history

of willingly returning to his or her home country militates

against a finding of past persecution or a well-founded fear of

future persecution. See, e.g., Kumar v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d

520, 524 (9th Cir. 2006) (denying a petition for review where

LOHO v. MUKASEY 8167
“[t]he IJ stated that Mr. Kumar’s voluntary return to Fiji was

indicative of Kumar’s own belief that it would be safe and

appropriate for him to live in Fiji”); Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales,

418 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that “return trips

can be considered as one factor, among others,” in determining whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of future

persecution).

[2] As the foregoing precedent demonstrates, we have considered a petitioner’s voluntary return to his or her home

country solely in the context of assessing whether such petitioner suffered past persecution or possessed a well-founded

fear of future persecution. In this case, however, the IJ considered Loho’s voluntary return as detracting from the credibility

of her testimony altogether. We fail to see why the IJ’s reliance on such fact in rendering his adverse credibility finding

was inappropriate. Loho’s admission that she twice was

offered a clear opportunity to flee her native land, and yet

willingly returned, inherently undermines her testimony that

she experienced past suffering or that she feared returning

home. It therefore is of little surprise that two of our sister circuits have upheld adverse credibility findings founded in part

on a petitioner’s voluntary return. See Tarraf v. Gonzales, 495

F.3d 525, 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2007); Jean v. Gonzales, 461

F.3d 87, 89, 91 (1st Cir. 2006). 

[3] Although we have never held as much, our caselaw has

implied that a petitioner’s voluntary return may be considered

in rendering an adverse credibility finding. In Ding v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2004), we rejected an adverse

credibility finding where the IJ relied in part on its conclusion

that the petitioner “was unable or unwilling to explain why

she did not seek refuge in another country nor why she voluntarily returned to the country where she claimed to have been

persecuted.” Id. at 1139-40 (internal quotation marks omitted). There, we held that the IJ improperly ignored Ding’s testimony “that her travel documents were held by the leaders of

her trip, under whose control she remained at all times” and

8168 LOHO v. MUKASEY
that she “was not even aware that the United States could

offer her asylum.” Id. at 1140.

Here, by contrast, Loho alleged in her asylum application

that she was “especially fearful that [she and her family]

could be . . . victims because of the consuming hatred the

Muslim native Indonesians have against them and their aims

to eliminate all Non-Muslims from Indonesia.” Nevertheless,

she twice voluntarily returned to Indonesia after reaching a

point of safety in the United States. Unlike the petitioner in

Ding, Loho was not coerced into returning. Rather, Loho testified that she stepped back into the den of the “consuming

hatred” she feared for the purpose of returning to work. We

also note that Loho was put on notice of the possibility of

staying in the United States by her cousin, yet when Loho

learned that her cousin was too busy to assist her, she failed

to take any additional steps to avoid returning to Indonesia. 

[4] We are persuaded that Loho’s two voluntary returns to

her home country support the IJ’s adverse credibility finding

even though she was not specifically aware of the possibility

of applying for asylum. What cuts against Loho’s credibility

is not that she failed to submit an asylum application during

her previous visits, but that after leaving her home country for

the safety of the United States, Loho took minimal steps to

investigate the availability of some means of avoiding a return

to the country she claims to have feared. In light of the “extremely deferential” review of an IJ’s decision that applies,

see Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d 1250, 1257 (9th Cir. 2003), such

evidence is sufficient to support the IJ’s adverse credibility

finding. See Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir.

2007). Accordingly, we must conclude that Loho has produced insufficient evidence to compel the conclusion that she

suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future

persecution in Indonesia. Kohli v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1061,

1071-72 (9th Cir. 2007).

LOHO v. MUKASEY 8169
III

[5] Because Loho’s asylum claim fails, she necessarily cannot satisfy the more stringent standard of proof required to

demonstrate eligibility for withholding of removal. See Farah

v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). Moreover,

in light of the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, we are satisfied

that substantial evidence supports denial of Loho’s claim

under CAT. See Malhi v. INS, 336 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir.

2003) (noting that relief under CAT requires a showing that

“it is ‘more likely than not’ that [the petitioner] will be tortured if returned to [his native land]” (quoting 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.16(c)(2)); see also Farah, 348 F.3d at 1157 (noting that

“[the petitioner’s] claims under the Convention Against Torture are based on the same statements . . . that the BIA determined to be not credible”).

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

8170 LOHO v. MUKASEY