IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

July 13, 2016 Session

JONELLE HYDE v. SOUTH CENTRAL TENNESSEE DEVELOPMENT 

DISTRICT

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County

No. 14C2157 Joseph P. Binkley, Jr., Judge

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No. M2015-02466-COA-R3-CV – Filed July 14, 2017

___________________________________

Defendant that admitted liability for vehicle accident appeals the award of damages to the 

injured Plaintiff, contending that the awards for lost wages, lost future earnings, pain and 

suffering, past and future, loss of ability to enjoy life, past and future, and permanent 

impairment awards, are against the preponderance of the evidence. Upon a thorough 

review of the record, we modify the award for past medical expenses; affirm the awards

for past pain and suffering, permanent impairment, past loss of ability to enjoy life and 

for loss of ability to enjoy life in the future, and for lost wages; reverse the award for 

future pain and suffering; and vacate the award for loss of earning capacity and remand 

the case for further consideration of the award.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Modified in 

Part, Affirmed in Part, Vacated in Part, and Reversed in Part; Case Remanded

RICHARD H. DINKINS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G.

CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., and ANDY D. BENNETT, J., joined.

Keith F. Blue, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, South Central Tennessee 

Development District.

Stanley A. Davis, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Jonelle Hyde.

OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On June 14, 2013, Ms. Jonelle Hyde was involved in a motor vehicle accident 

when Michael Crabtree, an employee of South Central Tennessee Development District 

(“South Central”), ran a red light and caused the South Central van he was driving to 

collide into the driver’s side of Ms. Hyde’s car. Ms. Hyde, the driver and sole occupant 
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of her car, was taken to Summit Medical Center, where she was diagnosed with a strain 

in her thoracic spine and a contusion to her right leg, and discharged with pain 

medication. On June 16, Ms. Hyde went to St. Thomas Midtown Hospital complaining 

of pain in her head as a result of hitting her head on the window during the accident; she 

was examined, diagnosed with a headache, and discharged with a prescription for pain 

medication. 

On June 19, 2013, complaining of muscle spasms in her lumbar spine and aches 

throughout her body, Ms. Hyde sought treatment from Dr. Casey Bearden, a chiropractor. 

From June 19 to October 10, she was treated by Dr. Bearden a total of thirty-three times, 

receiving physical therapy, electrical muscle stimulation therapy, and therapeutic 

exercises. On August 20 and November 20, 2013, and January 27, 2014, Ms. Hyde 

visited her primary care provider, Dr. Arikana Chihombori of the Bell Family Medical 

Center, seeking treatment for conditions which she reported were related to the accident. 

Ms. Hyde filed suit on May 23, 2014, against Mr. Crabtree and South Central; 

inasmuch as South Central is a governmental entity covered under the Governmental Tort 

Liability Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-101, et seq., Mr. Crabtree 

invoked his immunity from suit under section 29-20-310(b) and was dismissed from the 

case. In due course, South Central admitted liability for the accident, and a non-jury trial 

on the issue of damages to Ms. Hyde was held on November 9, 2015. On November 19, 

2015, the court entered an order awarding $271,378.95 in compensatory damages, 

allowed as follows:

1. Past medical expenses: $11,079.50

2. Future medical expenses: 00.00

3. Lost Wages: $1,257.75

4. Lost Future Earnings: $169,041.60

5. Pain and suffering — past: $15,000.00

6. Pain and suffering — future: $50,000.00

7. Loss of ability to enjoy life — past: $5,000.00

8. Loss of ability to enjoy life — future: $15,000.00

9. Permanent impairment: $5,000.00

South Central appeals, articulating the following issues:

1. The preponderance of the evidence at trial is contrary to the trial court’s 

decision on the amount of past medical expenses proximately caused and 

necessitated by the accident.

2. Trial court erred in its conclusion of law by using the incorrect legal 

standard it applied to its decision to award $169,042.60 for lost future 

earnings and/or loss of future earning capacity and further awarded an 
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amount not supported by the preponderance of the evidence in the case, 

when the preponderance of the evidence was that plaintiff did not suffer a 

loss of earning capacity.

3. Trial court’s award for pain and suffering – past, in the amount of 

$15,000 for injuries alleged to have been received in the June 14, 2013 

accident, is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence, and that the 

preponderance of the evidence is that plaintiff/appellee Hyde did not suffer 

an extended past period of pain and suffering.

4. Trial court’s award of $50,000.00 for future pain and suffering was 

contrary to the preponderance of the evidence which was the 

plaintiff/appellee Hyde failed in her burden of proof to prove by a 

preponderance of evidence to a reasonable certainty that plaintiff/appellee 

Hyde would experience future pain and suffering.

5. Trial court’s award of $5,000.00 for permanent impairment is contrary to 

the preponderance of the evidence, and the preponderance of the evidence 

shows no award should be given for permanent impairment.

6. Court’s award of $15,000.00 for loss of ability to enjoy life in the future 

is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence, which was 

plaintiff/appellee Hyde had not suffered a loss of ability to enjoy life in the 

future.

7. Trial court’s award for $5,000.00 for loss of ability to enjoy life in the 

past is not supported by the preponderance of the evidence, and the 

preponderance of the evidence is that she did not suffer as a result of the 

accident a loss of ability to enjoy life in the past.

8. Trial court erred as a matter of law in its decision to allow a document, 

Exhibit 16, that was inadmissible hearsay into evidence as to her rate of pay 

and the number of hours she allegedly missed from work after the accident, 

and therefore the award of $1,257.75 for lost wages should be vacated.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Review of the trial court’s findings of fact is de novo upon the record accompanied 

by a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. 

See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Kaplan v. Bugalla, 188 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tenn. 2006). 

However, where the trial court fails to make specific findings of fact on an issue, we may 

conduct an independent review of the record to determine where the preponderance of the 

evidence lies. Gooding v. Gooding, 477 S.W.3d 774, 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015). Review 
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of the trial court’s conclusions of law are de novo with no presumption of correctness 

afforded to the trial court’s decision. See Kaplan, 188 S.W.3d at 635.

In the appeal of a damages award, the appellate review of “[w]hether the 

trial court has utilized the proper measure of damages is a question of law 

that we review de novo.” Beaty v. McGraw, 15 S.W.3d 819, 829 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1988); see also Taylor v. Fezell, 158 S.W.3d 352, 357 (Tenn. 2005). 

The amount of damages awarded, however, is a question of fact so long as 

the amount awarded is within the limits set by the law. Beaty, 15 S.W.3d at 

829. Thus, in a non-jury case such as this, we review the amount of 

damages awarded by the trial court with a presumption of correctness, 

unless the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates otherwise. See 

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Beaty, 15 S.W.3d at 829 (citing Armstrong v. 

Hickman County Highway Dep’t, 743 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1987)). Great weight is given to factual findings that are based on the trial 

court’s assessment of witness credibility. Smith v. Smith, 93 S.W.3d 871, 

875 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). This is because the “trial judge as the trier of 

fact had the opportunity to observe the manner and demeanor of all of the 

witnesses as they testified from the witness stand.” Whitaker v. Whitaker, 

957 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); McCaleb v. Saturn Corp., 910 

S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn. 1995).

Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Starkey, 244 S.W.3d 344, 352 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2007).

III. ANALYSIS 

Evidence relating to Ms. Hyde’s injuries came from the testimony of Ms. Hyde; 

her son, Quinn Hyde; her friend, Lartedris Banks; Dr. Bearden; the deposition of Dr. 

C.M. Salekin, a physician engaged by Ms. Hyde’s counsel to examine her; and the 

medical records of Summit Medical Center, St. Thomas Hospital, and Dr. Chihombori. 

We shall discuss the evidence pertinent to each item of damages. 

A. Past Medical Expenses

An injured party is entitled to recover for medical expenses reasonably and 

necessarily incurred in the treatment of the injury. Roberts v. Davis, No. M2000-01974-

COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 921903, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2001).

Ms. Hyde introduced into evidence medical bills totaling $13,434.53, for treatment 

of injuries she asserted were sustained in the accident. In its oral ruling following the 

trial, which was incorporated into the Final Order, the court reduced the expenses by 

$566.00 for an August 20, 2013, doctor’s visit Ms. Hyde made to Bell Family Medical 
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Center that Dr. Salekin testified was unrelated to the accident, and by $1,788.40, for an 

MRI which the court found was not medically necessary. 

South Central contends that the reasonable and necessary medical expenses Ms. 

Hyde incurred as a result of the accident totaled $8,078.10, composed of expenses 

incurred for hospital visits to Summit Hospital Emergency Room on June 14 and St. 

Thomas Hospital on June 16, 2013, and a visit to Spinal Kinetics Radiology on July 2, 

2013, along with medical expenses for visits to Dr. Bearden from June 19, 2013, to 

August 28, 2013. South Central argues that the weight of the evidence is that Ms. Hyde

had recovered from injuries from the accident by August 28, 2013, that the spinal pain 

had subsided, and that Ms. Hyde was not entitled to reimbursement for a back brace she 

purchased in December 2013. 

On the record before us, the medical expenses incurred by Ms. Hyde from June 

14, 2013, until October 10, 2013, were proven reasonable and necessary by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Dr. Bearden testified that he treated Ms. Hyde from June 

19 to October 10, and that when he released her, “I felt that she had been restored to 

preinjury status of the cervical spine, which would have been a continuation of an 8 

percent permanent impairment from the prior injury.” Dr. Bearden also testified that 

“[Ms. Hyde] had performed quite well to [his] treatment and recovered somewhat 

favorably.” 

The expenses for the back brace of $189.00, incurred December 2, 2013, and for 

visits to Bell Family Medical Center on November 20, 2013 ($179.01), and January 27, 

February 3, and March 25, 2014 ($96.01, $96.00, and $405.01, respectively), were 

incurred after Ms. Hyde was discharged from Dr. Bearden’s treatment, and were not 

proven necessary for the treatment of injuries sustained in the accident; however, they 

were included in the medical expense award. Accordingly, we modify the award to 

$10,115.10. 

B. Loss of Future Earning Capacity

In the final order, the trial court identified the $169,041.60 award as damages for 

“Lost Future Earnings”; in the oral ruling the court identified the formula used in making 

the award as “loss of earning capacity in the future.” The standard for the award was set 

forth in Overstreet v. Shoney’s, Inc.: 

Loss or impairment of future earning capacity is an element of damages in a 

personal injury action. Earning capacity refers not to actual earnings, but 

rather to the earnings that a person is capable of making. 

The extent of an injured person’s loss of earning capacity is generally 

arrived at by comparing what the person would have been capable of 
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earning but for the injury with what the person is capable of earning after 

the injury. If the injury is permanent, this amount should be multiplied by 

the injured person’s work life expectancy, and the result should be 

discounted to its present value.

The injured party has the burden of proving his or her impairment of 

earning capacity damages. In order to recover these damages, the injured 

person must first prove with reasonable certainty that the injury has or will 

impair his or her earning capacity. Then, the injured party must introduce 

evidence concerning the extent of the impairment of his or her earning 

capacity.

The proof concerning impairment of earning capacity is, to some extent, 

speculative and imprecise. However, this imprecision is not grounds for 

excluding the evidence.

The courts have found competent and admissible any evidence which tends 

to prove the injured person’s present earning capacity and the probability of 

its increase or decrease in the future. Thus, the courts have routinely 

admitted evidence concerning numerous factors, including the injured 

person’s age, health, intelligence, capacity and ability to work, experience, 

training, record of employment, and future avenues of employment.

Impairment of earning capacity is not necessarily measured by an injured 

person’s employment or salary at the time of the injury. . . .

Overstreet v. Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 703–05 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (internal 

citations and footnote omitted).

In making the award, the court ruled: 

Loss of earning capacity in the future – let’s see. I think we got to start 

from today and go to age 65, retirement age. She is 44 today. 65 is another 

21 years. And let me say this: The life expectancy table -- and I can’t quote 

from the Tennessee Pattern of Instruction, but it says that “The trier of fact 

should be mindful of the fact that some people live longer than the life 

expectancy and some people live shorter than the life expectancy.” Life 

expectancy is just an average. Then, of course, for work life, I mean, how 

do we know that she is going to go to 65? But, you know, I mean, I think 

people that do that type of work, my common sense tells me that you can 

go to age 65. I mean, that is retirement age. It’s probably going to get 

higher as we move along, but right now I think that’s the accepted 

retirement age; so 44 to 65 is 21 years. And I think Mr. Davis’s calculation 
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is accurate. I mean, I just don’t think she is going to be able to -- I think 

she has that loss of 8 hours per week. At $19.35 an hour, that’s $154.80 a 

week. . . . $154.80 times 52 weeks, is $8,049.60 per year. Let’s see. And 

multiply that by 21 years. That $169,041.60 for loss of earning capacity 

future. 

With regard to loss of future earning capacity, Ms. Hyde testified that she was 

employed as a hairdresser at Great Clips earning $19.35 per hour and was “down to 30, 

32 hours a week since this wreck” from 40 hours per week prior to the accident.1 Ms. 

Hyde also testified that she cuts hair at her home on her days off stating, “I do probably 

three people at home and they don’t come on a regular basis.” Her friend, Lartedris 

Banks, also testified that “[Ms. Hyde has] a few clients that come to her house.” When 

asked about Ms. Hyde’s restrictions after the crash, Dr. Salekin testified:

Q. Okay. Let me ask you, Doctor, what restrictions does Ms. Hyde have 

related to the injury she sustained in this crash?

A. She should avoid pushing, pulling and lifting more than thirty to thirtyfive pounds. That’s the maximum I recommend because it will make her 

soft tissue injury worse and she’ll have more pain. And she should not 

stand for a long time. She should not sit for a long time and bend her neck 

for a long time. So if she – she’s a hair stylist. If she continues to cut 

people’s hair, at least she should take five-or ten-minute breaks; otherwise, 

sometimes that kind of continuous work may induce pain in the neck and 

back.

The evidence shows that Ms. Hyde has lost income since the accident and suffers 

some continued discomfort as a result of the injuries sustained. The court, however, did 

not make a finding relative to the extent of any impairment of Ms. Hyde’s future earning 

capacity, a finding required by Overstreet; rather, the award was based on a calculation of 

lost earnings. We vacate this award of damages and remand the case for the court to 

 

1 The court found this testimony credible, holding:

She worked at Great Clips then and she does work there now. She gets paid hourly at 

$19.35 an hour, no testimony to the contrary. I find that to be credible. ... Regarding Ms. 

Hyde’s ability to work a full week since the motor vehicle accident of June 14, 2013, now 

32 hours a week, 5 days a week rather than 40 hours a week, 6 days a week, as she did 

before the June 14, 2013, motor vehicle accident. She has to have less time at work now 

because of too much back pain and can’t stand to work for that long anymore. ... Back 

and neck before the motor vehicle accident of June 14, 2013, no problems. She could 

work full-time without problems, I find that to be credible. ... She now hurts too bad to 

work like she did. She now works two days on and two days off because of the pain level. 

I believe that. That’s credible testimony.
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reconsider the award, to make appropriate findings as to the extent of Ms. Hyde’s future 

earning capacity and, if warranted, compute any award of damages in accordance with 

the formula set out in Overstreet. 

In this regard, South Central also contends that Ms. Hyde did not adequately prove 

that the injuries she suffered in the accident caused her to lose eight hours per week. 

South Central first argues that Ms. Hyde’s testimony was inconsistent and not supported 

by other evidence; next, South Central contends that a Wage Loss Statement which had 

been prepared by her lawyer, completed by her, and signed by a representative of her 

employer, was improperly admitted into evidence. We find no error in the court’s 

consideration of these matters. The trial court heard Ms. Hyde’s testimony, resolved any 

conflicts therein, and determined that her testimony was credible. The court allowed Ms. 

Hyde to use the form, which she had filled out, to refresh her recollection as to the hours 

she missed. 

 

C. Pain and Suffering 

The trial court awarded Ms. Hyde $15,000 for past pain and suffering and $50,000 

for future pain and suffering. Citing evidence that Ms. Hyde did not see a treating 

physician for almost two years before the trial, that Dr. Bearden’s report on August 28, 

2013, notes that Ms. Hyde’s spinal pain had subsided, and that an MRI taken of Ms. 

Hyde’s lumbar spine on February 6, 2014, showed “normal lumbar alignment,” South 

Central argues that the awards were contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. 

A succinct statement of the nature of damages for pain and suffering was 

articulated in Overstreet, in which the court held that “Pain and suffering encompasses 

the physical and mental discomfort caused by an injury. It includes the ‘wide array of 

mental and emotional responses’ that accompany the pain, characterized as suffering, 

such as anguish, distress, fear, humiliation, grief, shame, or worry. . . .” 4 S.W.3d at 715. 

Further, this Court has held that “[d]amages for pain and suffering . . . are not easily 

quantified and do not lend themselves to easy valuation.” Duran v. Hyundai Motor Am., 

Inc., 271 S.W.3d 178, 210 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Pomeroy v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.,

No. W2004-01238-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1217590, at * 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 

2005).

While the trial court in its oral ruling summarized the testimony relating to Ms. 

Hyde’s pain and suffering, particularly medical conditions that could cause pain, the 

court did not make findings as to the nature, location, frequency or source of the pain, 

relate her pain to a specific condition or treatment, or explain whether the pain was in the 

past or anticipated for the future. Consequently, we review the record to determine where 

the preponderance of the evidence lies. Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566, 570 

(Tenn. 2002) (When the trial court makes no specific findings of fact . . . we must review 

the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies”) superseded on 
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other grounds by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(c); see also Burnett v. Burnett, No. 

M2014-00833-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 5157489 at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2015).

Evidence relating to Ms. Hyde’s injuries came from the testimony of Ms. Hyde; 

her son, Quinn Hyde; Lartedris Banks; and Drs. Bearden and Salekin, as well as certain 

medical records and test results. 

Ms. Hyde testified that she experiences back and neck pain daily, specifying that 

her “[neck] hurts daily, but it’s not - - it hurts daily, but maybe, I’d say, I can go two or 

three days, and then it will start back hurting worse in the next two or three days....” Ms. 

Hyde also testified that she cannot participate in the activities she enjoys because of the 

discomfort caused by her pain, and that her medication “as soon as [she] take[s] them, 

they put [her] to sleep.”

Quinn Hyde testified that his mother is unable to continue her daily chores and 

activities due to the pain, stating that:

[N]ow she can’t clean her own bathroom because of her back pain. She 

can’t bend down and do all of that cleaning. She can’t lift a lot of stuff.

He further testified:

She is tired. Her back is hurt. She always has, like, a little warmer on her 

neck. She has a warmer on her neck every night, and she has pain 

medicine. 

Lartedris Banks testified that Ms. Hyde is unable to do her daily chores and 

activities because of the pain she feels, stating he has assisted her in shampooing clients’ 

hair when she works from home, and Quinn Hyde now does all of the household chores. 

Dr. Bearden testified that Ms. Hyde has painful injuries as a result of the crash that 

will interfere with her daily activities and ability to work, stating Ms. Hyde is more 

vulnerable to injuries as a result of an automobile accident in 2011. Dr. Bearden also 

testified that after his final examination Ms. Hyde “was continuing to experience some 

mild to moderate, intermittent, reoccurring muscle spasms of the . . . lumbosacral area . . . 

and [her] range of motion was limited proportionately . . . [but that she] had performed 

quite well to [his] treatment and recovered somewhat favorably.” Dr. Bearden’s final 

report noted:

Ms. Hyde was in a great deal of pain for the first two weeks. Since then, 

she has shown generalized progressive improvement with some intermittent 

exacerbation caused by various daily activity. Such exacerbations become 

more easily controlled and more easily resolvable as time passed. 
10

Due to the absence of any neurological involvement and the fact that Ms. 

Hyde was improving favorably under my treatment, I saw no need to refer 

her out for further medical consult.

Ms. Hyde reported that she felt pain immediately after the accident. A 

study by Radanov found that patients who reported pain immediately after 

their accidents were more likely to have [it] again at two years post-injury. 

It is generally recognized that patients with immediate symptoms are at a 

higher risk of long-term pain from whiplash. [Citation to Radanov article]. 

As of 10/10/13, I feel that Ms. Hyde’s condition has reached a point of 

maximum medical improvement (MMI) and should be considered 

permanent and stationary. Manual muscle testing of the thoracolumbar and 

lumbosacral spine reveals mild-to-moderate muscle weakness upon 

extension and bilateral rotation. Muscle spasms continue to reoccur on a 

mild-to-moderate basis and tend to be proportional to the amount of 

increased usage and/or stress applied to the injured tissues. Joint restriction 

is apparent at the lumbosacral region upon all planes of movement. I have 

recommended that Ms. Hyde perform a series of home rehabilitative 

exercises and continue treatment at my facility at a frequency of twice per 

month for the next six months for follow-up supportive care and to 

minimize exacerbations. 

Dr. Salekin testified that Ms. Hyde has suffered soft tissue injuries to her neck and 

back that cause her pain and will continue to do so, leading to an inability to enjoy daily 

life activities, stating that Ms. Hyde’s pain “causes a limitation of her physical 

activities....” Dr. Salekin also noted that the MRI of Ms. Hyde’s lumbar spine taken in 

February 2014 “also showed that her back was normal so I don’t expect any disc problem 

or any significant problem with the bones or any structural problems.”

Ms. Hyde’s testimony and her medical records support the award for past pain and 

suffering. The trial court found Ms. Hyde to be credible in testifying as to the pain she 

experienced as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident; that her hospital visits and 

treatment regime with Dr. Bearden provided additional evidence of pain she experienced 

in her back; and that the cause of this pain was resolved in October 2013, when she was 

released from his care. 

The award of future pain and suffering, however, is contradicted by Dr. Bearden’s 

final diagnosis and prognosis; the MRI taken of Ms. Hyde’s back in February 2014; and 

the absence of evidence that Ms. Hyde has been receiving treatment and prescription 

medication from a physician since January of 2014. The MRI did not indicate any 

permanent injury or injury to Ms. Hyde’s back from which pain would be forthcoming. 

Dr. Bearden did not diagnose a permanent injury for her neck, and the court held that Dr. 
11

Bearden’s testimony about “the permanency of the neck and back injuries are more 

credible and more believable and have more weight than the testimony of Dr. Salekin.”

Accordingly, we affirm the award of $15,000.00 for past pain and suffering and 

reverse the award for future pain and suffering.

D. Permanent Impairment

Permanent impairment of a physical function is a type of permanent injury for 

which damages are awarded to redress an “injury from which the plaintiff cannot 

completely recover.” Overstreet, 4 S.W.3d at 715.

The court awarded $5,000.00 for permanent impairment; in so doing the court held 

that Ms. Hyde retained a five percent impairment to her back, as measured by the AMA 

guidelines, and did not retain an impairment relative to her neck injuries. The 

impairment rating for Ms. Hyde’s back was supported by the testimony of Dr. Bearden: 

[S]he was continuing to experience some mild to moderate, intermittent, 

reoccurring muscle spasms of the . . . lumbosacral area, and range of 

motion was limited proportionately. Muscle testing in various planes of 

movement were weak compared to what they should have been. And 

consequently, I gave her a 5 percent permanent impairment according to the 

AMA guidelines 

The court rejected Dr. Bearden’s opinion that Ms. Hyde will have a nineteen percent 

disability to the neck, holding Dr. Bearden’s opinion was not credible.2 

 

2 Dr. Bearden did not assign Ms. Hyde a permanent impairment rating related to her neck in his final 

report; he testified at trial that he supported Dr. Salekin’s opinion that she retained a nineteen percent 

impairment to the whole person based on the injury. The court did not find Dr. Bearden’s acceptance of 

Dr. Salekin’s rating credible:

I don’t find that Dr. Bearden’s testimony supports a finding by me by a preponderance of 

the evidence that Ms. Hyde sustained the permanent impairment rating given by Dr. 

Salekin at 19 percent. I don’t find that his testimony supports that, even though Dr. 

Bearden testified here at trial today that he now finds that his opinion is consistent with 

the opinion of Dr. Salekin in that regard.

The court further held that it did not find Dr. Salekin’s rating of permanent impairment to Ms. Hyde’s 

neck was supported by the evidence:

Dr. Salekin’s permanent impairment rating for the neck injury, he corrected -- he said Dr.

Glaser’s percent rating was used -- the 5th edition of the AMA Guides was used. The 6th 

edition says that it should be 19 percent. I don’t believe either one are accurate. I just 

don’t believe there’s enough evidence to establish a radicular component with Ms. 

Hyde’s injury.
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South Central argues that Ms. Hyde did not prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that she suffered a permanent injury to the low back or cervical spine or 

anywhere else caused by the June 14, 2013, accident, citing to Dr. Bearden’s testimony 

that when he released Ms. Hyde “[he] felt she [had] been restored to preinjury status of 

the cervical spine, which would be a continuation of an 8% permanent impairment from 

the prior injury.” South Central also argues that there is no factual basis for the court’s 

inference of permanent injury to the neck by the trial court, after Dr. Bearden testified 

there was no permanent impairment from the accident to her neck.

Contrary to South Central’s argument, the court did not hold that Ms. Hyde had a 

permanent impairment due to the injury to her neck. Dr. Bearden’s testimony supports 

the holding that Ms. Hyde has a five percent impairment to her lower back and that the 

impairment would interfere with her ability to engage in activities. Ms. Hyde also 

testified to such limitations, including bowling, taking road trips, and going out to eat. 

We have not been cited to any testimony that the amount of the award is not reasonable. 

The award is supported by the law and evidence, and we affirm the same. 

E. Loss of Ability to Enjoy Life

Damages for loss of enjoyment of life are awarded to “compensate the injured 

person for the limitations placed on his or her ability to enjoy the pleasures and amenities 

of life.” Overstreet, 4 S.W.3d at 715. “This type of damage relates to daily life activities 

that are common to most people.” Id. at 716. 

1. Past

The court awarded $5,000.00 for past loss of ability to enjoy life. South Central 

asserts that Ms. Hyde did not prove that the accident resulted in injuries that caused her to 

suffer a loss of ability to enjoy life. South Central contends that the following evidence 

preponderates against the award: Ms. Hyde’s testimony that her spinal pain subsided in 

August of 2013; that a “duties under duress” form she completed at Dr. Bearden’s office 

on October 10, 2013, stated that the pain in her lower back was due to her standing at 

work for three to four hours; and that Ms. Hyde did not report to Dr. Salekin during her 

visit on September 17, 2014, that she needed to wear a back brace or that she had pain in 

her lower back.

The trial court did not make factual findings as to the basis for the award; it did, 

however, summarize the testimony of Ms. Hyde, Quinn Hyde, and Mr. Banks relating to 

her inability to participate in and enjoy activities she engaged in prior to the accident. 

Each testified as to specific activities, such as bowling, taking road trips, or going for 

walks, in which she is now limited. As noted earlier, Dr. Bearden testified that she 

retains some degree of permanent impairment or limitation of movement. Taken 
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together, this evidence supports the award for past loss of her ability to enjoy life; 

accordingly we affirm the award. 

2. Future 

The court awarded $15,000.00 for future loss of ability to enjoy life. South 

Central asserts that Ms. Hyde has not introduced evidence that proves she has suffered a 

loss of ability to enjoy life in the future, asserting that there are no medical records or 

testimony of Ms. Hyde seeing a treating physician after her January 24, 2014, visit with 

Dr. Chihombori, or of the prescription medications Ms. Hyde was taking as a result of the 

accident. South Central further argues in its brief that Ms. Hyde “does what she wants to 

do,” asserting that she cuts hair at home during her off days, even though she reduced her 

hours at work because cutting hair causes her the most pain.

South Central’s argument does not address the limitations on Ms. Hyde’s ability to 

enjoy life; rather, the argument is directed toward the evidence of a permanent injury. 

We have addressed that award previously in this opinion. The testimony relative to her 

limitations summarized in the immediately preceding section applies equally to the award 

for loss of ability to enjoy life in the future, and we affirm that award as well. 

F. Inadmissibility of Exhibit 16

South Central contends that the trial court erred in admitting a document from Ms. 

Hyde’s employment containing her salary and hours lost from work as a result of the 

accident; South Central argues that the document was inadmissible hearsay and was not 

properly authenticated. The court overruled South Central’s objection, ruling that the 

document was provided to her to refresh her recollection; the court later used her 

testimony in determining the amount of her lost wages.3

This issue is without merit. The evidence at issue in this document was properly 

admitted pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(5), and we affirm the award of 

$1,257.75 for lost wages.

 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we modify the award for past medical expenses to 

$10,115.10; we affirm the award of $15,000.00 for past pain and suffering and reverse 

 

3 With respect to Ms. Hyde’s lost wages, the court ruled:

She worked at Great Clips then and she does work there now. She gets paid hourly at 

19.35 an hour, no testimony to the contrary. I find that to be credible. The work time 

missed was 65 hours at $19.35 an hour $1,257.75. That’s past lost wages.
14

the award of $50,000.00 for future pain and suffering; we vacate the award for loss of 

earning capacity and remand the case for the court to make appropriate findings as to Ms. 

Hyde’s future earning capacity and to make an award commensurate with those findings; 

we affirm the award of $5,000.00 for permanent impairment; we affirm the award of 

$5,000.00 for past loss of ability to enjoy life and $15,000.00 for loss of ability to enjoy 

life in the future; and we affirm the award of $1,257.75 for lost wages. 

_________________________________

RICHARD H. DINKINS, JUDGE