JIM MATTOX Attorney General

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# The Attorney General of Texas

July 10. 1986

HonorableMark W. S~:iles Chairman StateAffairs Commi:tee Texas House of Representatives P. 0. Box 2910 Austin,Texas 787159 OpinionNo. JM-514

Ret Whether a citymay require a school district to apply for a special building use permit in order to converta school facility to an administrativefacility

Dear RepresentativeStiles:

You inform us that the Beaumont Independent School District has operated an element:aryschool in a residential area of the city of Beaumont. In June, 1985, however, the board of trustees voted to convert that facility to a central administrativeoffice building for the school distric,t. In order to obtain the requisite building permits for the conrersion,the city required that the schooldistrict comply with city z,,ningordinances requiring it to make application for a specificuse ,?ermit. Although the school board complied with all city fire and building codes, it a,bjectedto the city's requirements on the ground that the city has no authority to require the school district to follow the specific use applicationprocess. The city has, in fact, granted the required permit, but asserts that it has the authority to require the school district to comply with the permit procedures and conditions. In that regardyou ask whether a municipalitymay require a school district to complywith city zoning ordinancesrequiring the schooldistrict to applyfor a specificuse permit in order to convert a school facility t) an administrativefacility.
The issue as presented is governed by the principles of Port Arthur Independent School District v. City of Groves, 376 S.W.Zd?% (Tex. 19641,and Austin Independent SchoolDistrict v. City of Sunset Valley, 502 S.W.2rg70 (Tex. 1973); see also Attorney General Opinion JM-180 (1984). In Groves, supra, the issue was whether a school district had to c:omplywith the city's building regulations in constructing a school facility on school property located within the boundaries of a t,omerule city. The school district in Groves contended that the city could not exercise its police power against the school district because a school district is an independent political subdivision of the state. State property is exempt from

p. 2358HonorableMark W. Stiles - Page 2 (JM-514)

municipal zoning. Attorne:rGeneral~Opinion JM-117 (1983). The Texas Supreme Court rejected the school district's contention because a schooldistrict.'s property shouldnot be classifiedas stateproperty. 376 S.W.2d at 333. The court held that school buildings of an independent schooi district are subject to reasonable ordinances of the city. 376 S.W.2d at 334. The Texas Supreme Court in Sunset Valley consideiedwhether t'hecity could, through its zoning regulations, wholly_prohibit the location of school facilities within its boundaries. 502 S.W.2d at 671. The court emphasized that the reasonablenessof the scIioc1 district'sactionwas not before.it. 502 S.W.2d at 672. Relying on well-establishedprinciples of zoning law, the court held that the c:.tycould not totally exclude schools from areas zoned residential.~ Id. In both Groves and Sunset Valley, the proposedbuildingswere sdool facilities,not administrativeoffices. School facilities traditicnally receive special treatment in zoning law. See 502 S.W.2d at 67i. - At issuehere is the t:ransformation of a school facility into an administrative office bulLding. The court of appeals in City of Addison v. Dallas Indepen(.entSchool District, 632 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ..App~.- Dallas 1982,w;it ref'd n.r.e.), held that a city cannot declare a legitimate school district action to be a nuisance per ;e and thereby prohibit the action. At issue was the school district s use of its property for a b,us:parkingfacility. The court left open thepossibility that the activity couldbecome a nuisanceby reason of its locality, surroundings, or manner of operation. 632 S.W.2d at 774. In essence, the cm.rt held that the city could not totally foreclose this use of the property simply by declaring the use to be a nuisance per se. Although the case is not directly applicable because it turned on nuisance law rather than on zoning law, we believe that.when it is readwith Groves and SunsetValley, it stands for theproposition that the city cannot exclude the school district's administrativeoffices.

As indicated, however,,the city has not totally excluded the school district's administrative facility. The city has, in fact, granted the specific use permit. The city's permit procedure and conditions are designed to :providea reasonablemeans to assure that thehealth, safety,property andwelfare of thepeople affectedby the proposed land use are prote,cted. The Texas Supreme Court's decision in Groves makes it clear that a school district's facilities are subject to reasonable tit],ordinances. 376 S.W.2d at 334. As the court stated: "To hold smherwise would be to leave a hiatus in regulationnecessary to th6: health and safety of the community." Id. Accordingly, so long as a city's specific use permit procedures and conditions do not attempt to totally exclude a school district's facilitiesand are reasonablyrelated to theprotectionof thehealth, safety, and welfare of the cmmunity. the school districtmust comply with thoseproceduresand conditions.

p. 2359HonorableMark W. Stiles - P.sge 3 (JM-514)

S U.MM.ARY
The Beaumont Independent School District must comply with reasonable city of Beaumont's zoning ordinances in order to convert a classroom facility to an administrative facility. The city may not, howe.rer, use its zoning powers unreasonably toprohibit the conversion.
Very ruly your 

# s/ka%

A;,

JACK HIGHTOWER First AssistantAttorney General

MARY KELLER ExecutiveAssistantAttorney General
RICK GILPIN Chairman,Opinion Committee Preparedby Tony Guillory and JenniferRiggs AssistantAttorneysGeneral JIM MATTOX Attorney General of Texas

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