1 TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSAT I ON APPEALS BOARD

Jamie Henderson, as Surviving Spouse of ) D ocket No

. 2020

- 06

- 1 0 13

David Joe Turner )

) S tate File N o

. 44049

- 2020

v. )

)

Pee Dee Country Enterprises, Inc.

, et al. )

)

)

Ap peal from the Court of Workers’ )

Compensation Claims )

Kenneth M . Switzer

, Chief Judge )

Reversed and Remanded

This is the second appeal in this death case . As in the initial appeal, the issue concerns

the trial court’s award of attorney ’ s fees

. In both appeals

, the trial court entered orders

awarding substantially less than the fees requested by the surviving spouse’s attorney and

provided for in a contract between the surviving spouse and her attorney

. The underlying

claim for death ben efits w a s resolved without a trial, but the employer objected to the

amount of the attorney ’ s fees sought by the surviving spouse’s attorney and to the

payment of those fees in a lump sum. Following a hearing on the request for attorney’s

fees, the trial court awar ded a lump sum fee but reduced the fee from 20% to 7.5% of the

difference between the recovery achieved under Tennessee law and the maximum

recovery available under Mississippi law

. Following the first appeal by the surviving

spouse, we vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for further consideration

of the statutory provisions governing the review and approval of attorney ’ s fees

. The

trial court subsequently issued an order addressing the statutory provisions

, and it again

awarde d a lump s um fee based on 7.5% of the difference between the recovery achieved

in Tennessee and the potential recovery in Mississippi. The surviving spouse has again

appealed. Upon careful consideration of the statutory provisions at issue, w e reverse th e

trial co urt’s order and remand the case for entry of an order approving the attorney’s fee

agreed to by the surviving spouse and her attorney.

Judge Pele I. Godkin delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding

Judge Timothy W. Conner joi ned

. Judg e David F. Hensley dissented

.

M. Reed Martz and J. Hale Freeland, Oxford, Mississippi

, for the surviving spouse

appell ant

, Jamie Henderson 

### FILED

Jul 23, 2021

01:15 PM(CT)

TENNESSEE

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

APPEALS BOARD2 Lee Anne Murray and Taylor R. Pruitt

, Brentwood , Tennessee, for the employe r

appellee, Pee Dee Country Ent erprises, Inc.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is the second appeal in this case concerning a dispute over attorney’s fees.

T he factual and procedural background of the case was summarized in our earlier opinion

as follows:

On September 18, 201 9 (or soon after midnight on September 19),

while traveling in California in the course and scope of his employment

with Pee Dee Country Enterprises , Inc. (“Employer”), David Joe Turner

(“ Employee” ) was tragically killed in a motor vehicle accident. Em plo yer

mainta ined its business in Davidson County, Tennessee, while Employee

and his wife, Jamie Henderson (“Surviving Spouse”) lived in Lafayette

County, Mississippi. The claim was accepted as compensable by

Employer

, and its insurer began paying death b ene fits under the laws of the

State of Mississippi soon after Employee’s death

.

In December 2019 , Surviving Spouse retained her current counsel,

who advised her to pursue death benefits under Tennessee law instead of

Mississippi law

. In January 2020, Survi ving Spous e advis ed Employer of

her intent to pursue death benefits in Tennessee. Employer, through its

insurer, promptly agreed to pay death benefits pursuant to Tennessee law.

It is undisputed that Surviv ing Spouse had agreed to pay her attorneys

twent y percent of the difference between the maximum amount of death

benefits payable under Mississippi law ($199,714.50) and the maximum

amount payable under Tennessee law ($432,000.00). Twenty percent of

the di fference of $232,285.50 would equal $46,457.10.

Although the underlying claim for death benefits was resolved, the

parties could not resolve the issue of attorneys’ fees. Employer declined to

pay the attorneys’ fee in a lump sum and objected to the exte nt of the fee.

On September 16, 2020, the trial court ent ered an order requiring Surviving

Spouse’s counsel to supplement his affidavit in support of the request for

approval of the attorneys’ fees with information documenting the actual

t ime and labor re quired for his firm’s representation of Survivin g Spouse.

Surviving Spouse’s counsel filed this supplemental information as ordered

but argued “the appropriate measurement is the reasonableness of the

contingency fee rather than the retrospective review o f time and labor

versus the work actually perfor med.”3 A hearing to approve the underlying settlement was conducted on

October 9, 2020, and the underlying settlement was approved with the

exception of the attorneys’ fee. Following a subsequent hearing to address

the attorneys’ fee issue, the trial cou rt issued an order granting an attorneys’

fee but reducing the fee from twenty percent of the additional benefit

amount to seven

- and

- one

- half percent of the additional benefit amount.

Henderson v. Pee Dee Co untry Enter s. , Inc.

, No. 2020

- 06

- 1013, 2021 TN W rk. Comp.

App. Bd. LEXIS 8 , at * 2

- 4 (Tenn. Work ers’ Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 8, 2021) (footnote

omitted)

.

In the first appeal, we concluded the trial court failed to address the applicability

of certain statutory provisions governing the approval of attorney ’ s fees in w orkers’

compensation cases , and we vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for

further consideration in light of those provisions. The parties submitted additional briefs

to the tria l court, after which the court concluded that “ th e Court of Workers’

Compensation Claims has sole jurisdiction and statutory authority to approve attorney s’

fees, ” and that judges of the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims “must review the

requested fee for reasonableness ‘as appropriate’ under Supreme Court Rul e 8 and make

required findings applying the factors within that rule.” The court reiterated its award of

$17,421.41 in attorney’s fees , or 7.5 % of the increase in S urviving S pouse’s recovery, to

b e paid in a lump sum. S urviving S pouse has appea led the tr ial court’s order.

Standard of Review

The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the

court’s factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50

- 6

- 239(c)( 7) (20 20 ). T he interpretation and application of

statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with no

presumption of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Manse ll v.

Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC , 417 S.W.3d 39 3, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are

also mindful of our obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly,

impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” a nd in a

way that does not favor either the employ ee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50

- 6

- 116 (20 20 ).

Analysis

On appeal, Employee asserts the trial court erred in its interpretation and

application of the second sentence of section 50

- 6

- 226(a)(1) and by awarding an

“arbitrary attorney’s fee of only 7.5% of t he increased benefits” available to Employee

under Tennessee law. Conversely, Employer contends the trial court correctly held the

second sentence of Tennessee Code Annotated s ection 50

- 6

- 226(a)( 1) “does not apply to4 this case.” In addressing t his issue

, we must first interpret certain statutes in the workers’

compensation law governing attorney ’ s fees. Specifically, we must determine whether

the second sentence of Tennessee Code Annotated secti on 50

- 6

- 226(a)(1) (20 19 )

, which

mandat es “[t]he de partment s hall deem the attorney ’s fee to be reasonable if the fee does

not exceed twenty percent (20%) of the award to the injured worker,” appl ies to this case.

For the reasons explained below , we conclu de it does.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has, on numerous o ccasions, addressed the

principles of statutory construction :

The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to carry out legislative intent

with out ex pa nd ing or re s tricting the intended scope o f the statute. In

determining legislative intent, we first must look to the text of the statute

and give the words of the statute “their natural and ordinary meaning in the

context in which they appear and in light of the statute’s general purpose.”

When a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce t he statute

as written; we need not consider other sources of information. We apply

the plain meaning of a statute ’ s word s in normal and accepted usage

without a forced interpretation. We do not alter or amend statutes or

substitute our policy j udgment fo r that of the Legislature.

Coleman v. Olson

, 551 S.W.3d 686, 694 (Tenn. 2018) (citations omitted)

. In addition,

the Supreme Court has stated:

In construing legislative enactments, we presume that every word in a

statute has meaning and purpose and shoul d be give n full effect if the

obvious intention of the General Assembly is not violated by doing

so.

. . . It is only when a statute is ambiguous that we may reference the

broader statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources

. Further

, the language of a statute cannot be considered in a vacuum, but

“should be construed, if practicable, so that its component parts are

c onsistent and reasonable.” Any interpretation of the statute that “would

render one section of the act repug nant to an other” should be avoided. We

also must presume that the General Assembly was aware of any prior

enactments at the time the legislation passed.

In re Estate of Tanner

, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613

- 14 (Tenn. 2009) (cita tions omitted)

. In

applying these p rinciples, we have explained previously that

we must construe a statute so that no part will be inoperative, superfluous,

void

, or insignificant. We are required to give effect to every word, phrase,

clause

, and senten ce of the act in order to achieve th e Legislature ’ s intent

and we must construe a statute so that no section will destroy another

.5 Thompson v. Comcast Corp.

, No. 2017

- 05

- 0639, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS

1, at *25 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Jan. 30, 2018) (emphasis added ) ( citation s

omitted )

.

As pertinent her e

, the statute at issue, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50

- 6

- 226(a)(1)

, provides as follows:

The fees of attorneys for services to employees under this chapter , shall be

subject to the approval of the workers’ compensation judge befo re which

the matter is pending, as appropriate; provided, that no attorney’s fees to be

charged employees shall be in excess of twenty percent (20%) of the

amount of the recovery or award to be paid by the party employing the

attorney. The depar tment shal l deem the attorney’s fee to be reasonable if

the fee does not exceed twenty percent (20%) of the award to the injured

worker, or, in cases governed by § 50

- 6

- 207(4), twenty percent (20%) of

the first four hundred fifty (450) weeks of the award.

Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 50

- 6

- 226(a)(1) (emphasis added)

.

The plain language of the initial sentence makes clear that attorney’s fees are

subject to the approval of the workers’ compensat ion judge before whom the matter is

pending. Like all authority exercise d by judge s on the C ourt of W orkers’ C ompensation

C laims, the authority to approve attorney’s fees is subject to the terms and limitations of

the statutory language and the rules gove rning the operation of that court.

Here, t he crux of th e appeal hinges o n the seco nd sentence of section 226(a)(1),

which mandates “ the department” to deem fees for attorneys representing employees to

be reasonable in certain circumstances. Specifically, that sentence presents two scenarios

where the discretion to refuse to a pprove att orney’s fees is limited : (1) when an attorney ’ s

fee does not exceed 20% of the “award to the injured worker” and (2) when an attorney ’ s

fee does not exceed 20% of the first 450 weeks under section 50

- 6

- 207(4). 1 In both

circumstances described in this sent ence, the only entity vested with authority to approve

attorney ’ s fees is the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims. 2 Moreover, there is a

1 Tennessee Code Annotated section 50

- 6

- 207(4) concerns cases where the employee is adjudged to be

permanently and totally disabled as the result of a work

- related injury.

2 We conside red the trial court’ s de termination that the term “the department” as used in the second

sentence of section 226(a)(1) refers to other employees of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation but not

to the judges of the Court of Workers’ Compensation Cl aims. Spe cifically, the tria l cou rt cited Tennessee

Code Annotated section 50

- 6

- 210(f), which governs claims involving the death of an employee whose

dependent s are citizens of another country. That section authorizes the Administrator of the Bureau of

W orke rs’ Co mpensation to approve se ttlement s in such claim s . However, nothing in section 210(f)

references any type of authority by non

- judges to approve a claim for attorney’s fees. We also considered

other statutory provisions, including those a dd ressin g the Unin sured Employer’s Fund, go verned by6 clear statutory link between th e Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims and the phrase

“the department.” F irst, the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims operate s under the

auspices of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50

- 6

- 237.

Second, the term “bureau” is de fined to mean “the bureau of workers’ compensation of

the department of lab or and wor kforce development.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50

- 6

- 102(5)

(emphasis added) . Finally, the word “department” is statutorily defined to mean “the

department of labor and workforce development.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50

- 6

- 102(10). 3

Therefore, w hen consideri ng the pla in and ordinary meaning of the statutory language

within the context of th is section and the entire workers’ compensation law

, we conclude

the phrase “the department” incl udes judges on the Court of Workers’ Compensation

Claims , and this sentence limits th eir discretion to refuse to approve attorney ’s fees in

either of the scenarios specified in that sentence

.

In his dissent, o ur colleague asserts that if the G eneral A ss embly’s intent was to

limit the discretion of workers’ compensation judges in approv ing attorney’s fees under

the scenarios described in the second sentence of section 226(a)(1)

, it could easily have

used the phrase “ workers’ compensation judges ” rather th an the term “ the department

. ”

We conclude, conversely

, that if t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a d i n t e n d e d t o e x c l u d e workers’

compensation judges from the class of p e r s o n s a u t h o r i z e d t o r e v i e w a n d a p p r o v e

a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s i n w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n cases

, a s d e s c r i b e d i n t h e s e c o n d s e n t e n c e o f

s e c t i o n 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 1 )

, i t c o u l d j u s t a s easily have made t hat clear

. 4

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50

- 6

- 801 et seq. , and penalties, governed by Tennessee Code

Annotated section 50

- 6

- 118, but none of those provisions addresses any authority to approve claims for

attorney’s fees . Fi nally , we considered that the Tennessee Claims Commission has the authority to make

an “ award ” to “injured worker[s].” However, the Tennessee Claims Commission , which reviews

workers’ compensation claims of state employees, operates under the auspice s of the T ennessee

Department of Tr easury, not the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development. Thus, we

cannot conclude that the phrase “the department” as used in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50

- 6

- 226(a)(1) refers to the Tennessee Claims Comm issio n.

3 As noted by the tri al court, we also considered that the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation is an

“autonomous unit” of the Department of Labor and Workforce Development. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4

-

3

- 1409(a). Nevertheless, we conclude there is a clea r sta tutory link between the p hrase “the department”

as used in the context of section 226(a)(1) and the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims in light of the

relevant definitions contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50

- 6

- 102

.

4 In his disse nt, o ur co lleague emphasizes the mo re than 100

- year history of Tennessee’s workers’

compensation law in which judges have had the authority to consider the reasonableness of claims for

attorney’s fee s . However, it is undisputed that the legislature crea te d the Cour t of Workers’

Compensatio n Claims by statute in 2013

. A ll authority vested in that court is derived from the statute and

rules promulgated in accordance with statutory authority. Thus, we do not find it dispositive that, prior to

the enactmen t of the 201 3 Workers’ Compensation R eform Act, judges on other courts historically had

the authority to review attorney’s fee claims without the limitations specified in section 226(a)(1).7 Furthermore, if the t erm “the department” as used i n section 226(a)(1) does not

include judges on the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claim s

, then it is unclear to

whom that term applies. As discussed above, we have identified no other persons or

entiti es with in the Tennessee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation or the Department of

Labor and Workforce Development who have the authority to review and approve

attorney’s fees based on an “award to the injured worker” or in cases “governed by § 50

-

6

- 20 7(4).” In short, Employer, the tr ial court, and our dissenting colleague have not

offered any reasonable alternative explanation as to the meaning of the second sentence

of section 226(a)(1). Hence , if there are no other persons or entities connected to “the

depar tment” who have the auth ority to review and approve claims for attorney’s fees in

the circumstances described in the second sentence of section 226(1)(a), then the

interpretation sought by Employer and a ccepted by the trial judge and our dissenti ng

colleag ue renders the second se ntence of that section meaningless and superfluous,

something the Tennessee Supreme Court has counseled against. See, e.g.

, Y oung v. Frist

Cardiology, PLLC

, 599 S.W.3d 568, 571 (Tenn. 2020) ( statute s must be construed “ so

that no p art will be inoperative, superfluous, void[,] or insignificant ”)

.

Finally, we note that, when the Workers’ Compensation Reform Act of 2013

(“Reform Act”) was drafted, the language at issue in this appeal , which previously

appeared in Tennessee Code Annot ated section 50

- 6

- 226(a) (2)(B), was retained , revised,

and moved to section 226(a)(1). The pre

- reform version read :

For cases submitted to the department for approval pursuant to § 50

- 6

- 206(c) that are resolved prior to trial or pursuant to a b enefit rev iew

conference, the depa rtment shall deem the attorney’s fee to be reasonable if

the fee does not exceed twenty percent (20%) of the award to the injured

worker, or, in cases governed by § 50

- 6

- 207(4), twenty percent (20%) of

the first four hundr ed (400) w eeks of the award.

Tenn . Code Ann. § 50

- 6

- 226(a)(2)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). The portion that was

retained and moved was also revised to change the phrase “the first four hundred (400)

weeks” to “the first four hundred fifty (450) weeks.” T hus, it is apparent that the draft ers

con sidered this very sentence, updated it to conform to other provisions of the Reform

Act, and moved it to another paragraph of this section. Hence , we find no basis to

conclude that the drafters erred in retaining t his senten ce from pre

- reform statu tes.

I nstead, we conclude the drafters intended to revise and retain the sentence when it was

included in the Reform Act.

In sum, we conclude that the second sentence of Tennessee Code Annotated

section 50

- 6

- 226(a)(1), w hich limit s t he discretion to refu se to a pprove attorney’s fees in

circumstances where the fee does not exceed 20% of the award to the injured worker or

20% of the first 450 weeks of benefits in claims brought pursuant to section 207(4),8 applies to the jud ges on the Court of Workers’ Compe nsation Claims. 5 The policy

arguments espoused by our dissenting colleague, while persuasive, are within the

purview of the G eneral A ssembly. Despite what we may wish the law to be, we are

obligated to interpret statutor y language in a way that is consis tent with the rules of

statutory construction and not in a way that renders statutory language meaningless or

superfluous.

Conclusion

Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand this case for entry

of an order approving the claim for attorney’s fees consistent with this opinion

. 6

5 In his dissent, our colleague warns that subjecting the judges o n the Court of Workers’ Compensation

Claims to the limitations contained in the second sentence of section 226(a)(1) could result in attorneys

being forced to “negotiate” with trial judges for the approval of attorneys’ fees, and other “consequences

detrim en tal to the workers’ compensation la w

. ” W e note , however, that, wholly separate and apart from

the provisions of Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation Law governing attorney’s fees, attorneys

representing injured workers or their dependents must abide by Rul e 8 of the R ules of the Tennessee

Sup reme Court, RPC 1.5, and any other rules

, statutes , or regulations that govern fees in contingency fee

cases.

6 It remains within the tria l court’s discretion to determine whether the attorney’s fee should be commut ed

to a lump su m as provided in Tennesse e Code Annotated section 50

- 6

- 229(a).1 TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSAT I ON APPEALS BOARD

Jamie Henderson, as Surviving Spouse of ) D ocket No

. 2020

- 06

- 1 0 1 3

David Joe Turner )

) S tate File N o

. 4 4 0 4 9

- 2 0 2 0

v. )

)

Pee Dee Country Enterprises, Inc.

, et al. )

)

)

Ap peal from the Court of Workers’ )

Compensation Claims )

Kenneth M . Switzer

, Chief Judge )

D i s s e n t

H e n s l e y

, J

. , d i s s e n t i n g

.

R e s p e c t f u l l y

, I d i s s e n t

. I n t h e m o r e t h a n o n e

- h u n d r e d

- y e a r h i s t o ry o f T e n n e s s e e

w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n l a w

, j u d g e s b e f o r e w h o m a c l a i m i s p e n d i n g h a v e h a d t h e

a u t h o r i t y t o c o n s i d e r t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f t h e a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e s c h a r g e d f o r s e r v i c e s t o

e m p l o y e e s

. T h e m a j o r i t y a l t e r s t h i s h i s t o ry t o r e q u i r e j u d g e s o f t h e C o u r t of W o r k e r s ’

C o m p e n s a t i o n C l a i m s t o “ d e e m ” a n e m p l o y e e ’ s a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e s t o b e r e a s o n a b l e i n c a s e s

t h a t d o n o t p r o c e e d t o t r i a l s o l o n g a s t h e f e e s d o n o t e x c e e d 2 0 % o f t h e a m o u n t o f t h e

r e c o v e r y o r a w a r d

. T h e m a j o r i t y ’ s r a t i o n a l e i s g r o u n d e d i n t h e f a c t t h a t j u d g e s o f the

C o u r t o f W o r k e r s ’ C o m p e n s a t i o n C l a i m s a r e e m p l o y e e s o f t h e B u r e a u o f W o r k e r s ’

C o m p e n s a t i o n o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f L a b o r a n d W o r k f o r c e D e v e l o p m e n t ( “ B u r e a u ” )

.

T h e B u r e a u i s “ a separate a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e n t i t y [ o f t h e E x e c u t i v e B r a n c h ] f o r

p r o g r a m s

, p e r s o n n e l

, a n d b u d g e t s

, ” t h e s u p e r v i s i o n o f w h i c h i s p l a c e d i n t h e

a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f t h e B u r e a u

. T e n n

. C o d e Ann

. § 4

- 3

- 1 4 0 8 ( b )

, 1 4 0 9 ( b ) ( 1 )

. 1 T h e B u r e a u

i s “ a n a u t o n o m o u s u n i t

. . . a t t a c h e d t o t h e d e p a r t m e n t o f l a b o r a n d w o r k f o r c e

d e v e l o p m e n t f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a t t e r s o n l y

. ” T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 4

- 3

- 1 4 0 9 ( a ) ( 2 0 1 9 )

( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. S e e a l s o A c t s 2 0 1 3

, c h

. 2 8 9 § 1

. N o n e t h e l e s s

, t h e m a j o r i t y c a n n o t

c o n c e i v e o f a n i n s t a n c e i n w h i c h a n y o t h e r e m p l o y e e i n t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f L a b o r a n d

W o r k f o r c e D e v e l o p m e n t m i g h t b e c a l l e d u p o n t o a p p r o v e a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e s i n a c l a i m

s u b

j e c t t o t h e 2 0 1 3 A c t

, a n d f o r t h a t r e a s o n i n t e r p r e t s T e n n e s s e e C o d e A n n o t a t e d s e c t i o n

1 A s o rig inally enacted

, the administrative entity was identified in the Workers ’ Compensation Re form

Act of 2 013 as the “ Division of Workers ’ C o mpensation

. ” T h e name was changed to t he “ Bureau of

Workers ’ C o mpensation ” in 2015. See Acts 2015 , ch. 341 § 16.2 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 1 ) t o r e q u i r e j u d g e s o f t h e C o u r t o f W o r k e r ’ s C o m p e n s a t i o n C l a i m s t o

“ d e e m ” a n e m p l o y e e ’ s a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e t o b e r e a s o n a b l e i n c a s e s t h a t d o n o t p r o c e e d t o t r i a l

i f t h e a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e d o e s n o t e x c e e d 2 0 % o f t h e a m o u n t o f t h e r e c o v e r y o r a w a r d t o t h e

i n

j u r e d w o r k e r o r

, i n cases o f p e r m a n e n t t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y

, 2 0 % o f t h e f i r s t 4 5 0 w e e k s o f t h e

a w a r d

. T h e m a j o r i t y ’ s c o n c l u s i o n i s c o u n t e r t o T e n n e s s ee S u p r e m e C o u r t R u l e 8

, R P C

1

. 5

, a n d

, i n m y o p i n i o n

, t h e l e g i s l a tu r e n e v e r i n t e n d e d t h i s r e s u l t

.

I n a n e f f

o r t t o g i v e m e a n i n g t o t h e s e c o n d o f t h e t h r e e s e n t e n c e s i n s e c t i o n 5 0

- 6

-

2 2 6 ( a ) ( 1 )

, t h e m a j o r i t y i n t e r p r e t s t h e t e r m “ d e p a r t m e n t

, ” t o i n c l u d e t h e j u d g e s o f t h e

C o u r t o f W o r k e r ’ s C o m p e n s a t i o n C l a i m s

. T h e s t a tu t e p r o v i d e s a s f o l l o w s :

T h e f e e s o f a t t o r n e y s f o r s e r v i c e s t o e m p l o y e e s u n d e r t h i s c h ap t e r

, s h a l l b e

s u b

j e c t t o t h e ap p r o v a l o f t h e w o r k

e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n j u d g e b e f o r e w h i c h

t h e m a t t e r i s p e n d i n g

, a s a p p r o p r i a t e ; p r o v i d e d

, t h a t n o attorney’s f e e s t o b e

c h a r g e d e m p l o y e e s s h a l l b e i n e x c e s s o f t w e n t y p e r c e n t ( 2 0 % ) o f t h e

a m o u n t o f t h e r e c o v e r y o r a w a r d t o b e p a i d b y t h e p a r t y empl oying t h e

attorney

. T h e departm ent s h a l l d e e m t h e a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e t o b e r e a s o n a b l e i f

t h e f e e d o e s n o t exceed t w e n t y p e r c e n t ( 2 0 % ) o f t h e a w a r d t o t h e i n j u r e d

w o r k e r

, o r

, i n c a s e s g o v e r n e d b y § 5 0

- 6

- 2 0 7 ( 4 )

, t w e n t y p e r c e n t ( 2 0 % ) o f

t h e f i r s t f o u r h u n d r e d f i f

t y ( 4 5 0 ) w e e k s o f t h e a w a r d

. A l l a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s

f

o r a t t o rn e y s r e p r e s e n t i n g e m p l o y e r s s h a l l b e s u b

j e c t t o r e v i e w f o r

re asonableness o f t h e f e e a n d s h a l l b e s u b j e c t t o a p p r o v a l b y a w o r k

e r s ’

c o m p e n s a t i o n j u d g e w h e n t h e f e e e x c e e d s t e n t h o u s a n d d o l l a r s ( $ 1 0

, 0 0 0 )

.

T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( 2 0 1 9 ) ( e m p h a s e s a d d e d )

. C i t i n g s e c t i o n 5 0

- 6

-

1 0 2 ( 1 0 ) ( 2 0 1 9 )

, t h e m a j o r i t y n o t e s t h a t “ d e p a r t m e n t ” i s d e f i n e d t o m e a n “ t h e d e p a r t m e n t

o f l a b o r a n d w o r k f o r c e d e v e l o p m e n t

, ” b u t t h e m a j o r i t y g l o s s e s o v e r t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e

t e r m ’ s i n c l u s i o n i n t h e w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n l a w

, w h i c h

, i n m y o p i n i o n

, i s p e r t i n e n t a n d

s i g n i f i c a n t

.

T h e W o r k

e r s ’ C o m p e n s a t i o n R e f

o r m A c t s o f 1 9 9 2 a n d 1 9 9 6

T h e W o r k e r s ’ C o m p e n s a t i o n R e f o r m A c t o f 1 9 9 2 b r o u g h t s ub s t a n t i a l c h a n g e s t o

t h e w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n l a w

, i n c l u d i n g t h e a d v e n t o f t h e w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n

s p e c i a l i s t p r o g r a m a n d b e n e f i t r e v i e w c o n f e r e n c e s t h a t w e r e d e s i g n e d t o

, a m o n g o t h e r

t h i n g s

, “ [ f ] a c i l i t a t e t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f i s s u e s w i t h o u t t h e e x p e n s e o f l i t i g a t i o n o r a t t o r n e y s ’

f

e e s f o r e i t h e r p a r t y

. ” S e e A c t s 1 9 9 2

, c h

. 9 0 0 § § 1 1

, 1 2

. F r o m t h e e f f

e c t i v e d a t e o f t h e

1 9 9 2 A c t

, w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n s p e c i a l i s t s w e r e a u t h o r i z e d t o o r d e r t h e init iation o f

t e m p o r a r y d i s a b i l i t y a n d / o r m e d i c a l b e n e f i t s t o a n e m p l o y e e

, I d

. a t § 1 3

, a s s i s t p a r t i e s i n

r e s o l v i n g d i s p u t e s “ b y m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t o r i n a s e t t l e m e n t

, ” I d

. a t § 1 5

, a n d “ r e d u c e t h e

a g r e e m e n t o r t h e s e t t l e m e n t t o w r i t i n g

. ” I d

. H o w e v e r

, c o n s i s t e n t w i t h p a s t l a w

, t h e

s e t t l e m e n t s

, e v e n w h e n r e d u c e d t o w r i t i n g

, w e r e n o t e f f

e c t i v e u n t i l t h e y w e r e “ a p p r o v e d

b y t h e c o u r t

. ” I d

. T h e 1 9 9 2 A c t a u t h o r i z e d w o r k e r s w h o w e r e p e r m a n e n t l y t o t a l l y3 d i s a b l e d t o r e c o v e r w e e k l y i n d e m n i t y b e n e f i t s “ u n t i l t h e e m p l o y e e r e a c h e s t h e a g e o f

s i x t y

- f i v e

, ” a n d i t p r o v i d e d t h a t a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e s “ i n c o n t e s t e d c a s e s o f p e r m a n e n t t o t a l

d i s a b i l i t y s h a l l b e c a l c u l a t e d u p o n t h e f i r s t f o u r h u n d r e d ( 4 0 0 ) w e e k s o f d i s a b i l i t y o n l y

. ”

I

d

. a t § 1 7

. F u r t h e r

, t h e A c t p r o v i d e d t h a t a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s “ m a y b e p a i d a s a p a r t i a l l u m p

s u m f r o m a n y a w a r d w h e n ap p r o v e d a n d o r d e r e d b y t h e t r i a l j u d g e

. ” I d

. a t § 2 5

. T h e

1 9 9 2 A c t d i d n o t

, h o w e v e r

, a u t h o r i z e a n y t r i b u n a l o t h e r t h a n j u d i c i a l c o u r t s t o a p p r o v e

s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t s

. S e e T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 0

- 6

- 2 0 6 ( 1 9 9 3 )

. T h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e

C o m m i s s i o n e r o f L a b o r t o ap p r o v e a w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t a n d t o

a p p r o v e a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s c h a r g e d f o r s e r v i c e s t o i n j u r e d w o r k e r s c a m e f o u r y e a r s l a t e r

.

T h e W o r k e r s ’ C o m p e n s a t i o n R e f o r m A c t o f 1 9 9 6 a u t h o r i z e d “ [ t ] h e C o m m i s s i o n e r

o f L a b o r o r t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r ’ s d e s i g n e e [ t o ] a p p r o v e a p r o p o s e d [ w o r k e r s ’

c o m p e n s a t i o n ] s e t t l e m e n t a m o n g t h e p a r t i e s ” i f c e r t a i n r e q u i r e m e n t s w e r e m e t

. A c t s

1 9 9 6

, c h

. 9 4 4 § 1 4 ( c )

. T h e 1 9 9 6 A c t a m e n d e d s e c t i o n 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) r e g a r d i n g a t t o rn e y ’ s

f

e e s t o m a k e a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e s “ s ub j e c t t o t h e ap p r o v a l o f t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r o r t h e c o u r t

b e f o r e w h i c h t h e m a t t e r i s p e n d i n g

, a s appropriate

, ” a n d t h e A c t c o n t i n u e d t h e 2 0 %

c e i l i n g o n a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e s

. S e e T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 1 9 9 7 ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. T h e 1 9 9 6 A c t m a d e a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e s f o r a t t o rn e y s r e p r e s e n t i n g emp loyers “ s u b

j e c t t o

r e v i e w f o r r e a s o n a b l e n e s s ” a n d “ s ub j e c t t o ap p r o v a l b y a c o u r t w h e n t h e f e e e x c e e d s t e n

t h o u s a n d d o l l a r s ( $ 1 0

, 0 0 0 )

. ” I d

. a t § 1 7 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. I n a d d i t i o n

, t h e 1 9 9 6

A c t s p e c i f i c a l l y a d d r e s s e d a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s i n c a s e s s u b m i t t e d t o t h e “ d e p a r t m e n t ” f o r

s e t t l e m e n t a p p r o v a l a n d i n c a s e s t h a t p r o c e e d e d t o t r i a l :

For ca s es subm itted t o the depar tment for approval pursua nt to Section 50

-

6

- 206(c) which are resolved pr ior to trial or pursuant to a benefit review

conference, the department shall deem the attorney [ ’ ] s fee t o b e reasonable

if su ch fee does n ot exce ed the lesse r of twe nty p er cent (20%) of the award

to the injur ed worker or ten thousand dollars ($ 10,000). F or fees in excess of ten thousand dollars ($ 10,000), any court with jurisdiction to he ar a

matter pursua nt to Section 50

- 6

- 225 shall review such c as e so lely f o r t he

p urpos e of approvin g such fees as are reason ab le.

In cases that proceed to trial, an empl o yee ’ s at torney shall file an

application for approval of a proposed attorney [ ’ ] s fee

. Where the awar d o f

an attorney ’ s fee exceeds ten thou sand do ll ars ($ 10,0 0 0), the cour t shall

m ake specific findings as to t he factors which justify such a fee as provide d

in DR 2

- 1 06 of Rule 8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

I

d

. a t § 1 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B )

, ( C ) ( e m p h a s e s a d d e d )

. N e i t h e r t h e 1 9 9 2 A c t n o r t h e 1 9 9 6 A c t

d e f i n e d “ d e p a r t m e n t

. ” H o w e v e r

, t h e 1 9 9 2 A c t d e f i n e d “ C o m m i s s i o n e r ” t o m e a n “ t h e

C o m m i s s i o n e r o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f L a b o r

. ” A c t s 1 9 9 2

, c h

. 9 0 0 § 2

.4 T h u s

, f o l l o w i n g t h e e f f

e c t i v e d a t e o f t h e 1 9 9 6 A c t

, t h e p a r t i e s i n a c a s e i n w h i c h a

s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t w a s r e a c h e d p r i o r t o t r i a l o r i n a b e n e f i t r e v i e w c o n f e r e n c e c o u l d

s e e k ap p r o v a l f r o m t h e C o m m i s s i o n e r o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f L a b o r o r t h e C o m m i s s i o n e r ’ s

d e s i g n e e

, o r f r o m a c o u r t h a v i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n t o h e a r w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n c a s e s

. I f t h e

p a r t i e s p r e s e n t e d t h e s e t t l e m e n t t o t h e C o m m i s s i o n e r o r t h e C o m m i s s i o n e r ’ s d e s i g n e e

, t h e

“ d e p a r t m e n t ” w a s s t a tu t o r i l y r e q u i r e d t o “ d e e m t h e a t t o rn e y [ ’ ] s f e e t o b e r e a s o n a b l e i f t h e

f

e e d i d n o t e x c e e d t h e l e s s e r o f t w e n t y p e r c e n t ( 2 0 % ) o f t h e a w a r d t o t h e i n j u r e d w o r k e r

o r t e n t h o u s a n d d o l l a r s ( $ 1 0

, 0 0 0 )

. ” B u t

, i f t h e e m p l o y e e ’ s a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e i n s u c h c a s e

e x c e e d e d $ 1 0

, 0 0 0

, i t w a s n e c e s s a ry f o r a c o u r t h a v i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n t o “ r e v i e w s u c h c a s e

s o l e l y f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f ap p r o v i n g s u c h f e e s a s a r e r e a s o n a b l e

. ” I d

. a t § 1 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B )

. F u r t h e r

, i n c a s e s th a t p r o c e e d e d t o t r i a l

, t h e e m p l o y e e ’ s a t t o r n e y w a s r e q u i r e d t o f i l e a n

ap p l i c a t i o n w i t h t h e c o u r t f o r ap p r o v a l o f a p r o p o s e d a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e

, a n d

, i n t h o s e c a s e s

t h a t p r o c e e d e d t o t r i a l i n w h i c h t h e i n j u r e d e m p l o y e e ’ s a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e e x c e e d e d $ 1 0

, 0 0 0

,

t h e c o u r t w a s r e q u i r e d t o m a k e s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s a s t o t h e f a c t o r s t h a t j u s t i f i e d t h e f e e “ a s

p r o v i d e d i n D R 2

- 1 0 6 o f R u l e 8 o f t h e R u l e s o f t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t

. ” I d

. a t § 1 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( C ) ;

s e e a l s o T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( C ) ( 1 9 9 7 )

. 2

A s p r o v i d e d i n t h e 1 9 9 6 A c t

, o n l y t h e “ d e p a r t m e n t ” w a s r e q u i r e d t o d e e m

attorney’s f e e s t o b e r e a s o n a b l e

, a n d o n l y i f s u c h f e e s d i d n o t e x c e e d t h e l e s s e r o f

$ 1 0

, 0 0 0 o r t w e n t y p e r c e n t o f t h e i n j u r e d e m p l o y e e ’ s r e c o v e r y o r a w a r d

. “ D e p a r t m e n t ”

w a s n o t d e f i n e d i n the w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n l a w u n t i l 1 9 9 9 w h e n s e c t i o n 5 0

- 6

- 1 0 2 w a s

a m e n d e d t o d e f i n e “ D e p a r t m e n t ” t o m e a n “ t h e d e p a r t m e n t o f l a b o r a n d w o r k f o r c e

d e v e l o p m e n t

. ” A c t s 1 9 9 9

, c h

. 5 2 0 § 4 1

. F o l l o w i n g t h e 1 9 9 6 A c t

, i f t h e a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e s

c h a r g e d t o a n i n j u r e d e m p l o y e e e x c e e d e d $ 1 0

, 0 0 0

, i t w a s n e c e s s a r y “ f o r a n y c o u r t w i t h

j u r i s d i c t i o n

. . . [ t o ] r e v i e w s u c h c a s e solel y f o r t h e purpose o f a p p r o v i n g s u c h f e e s a s a r e

r e a s o n a b l e

. ” I d

. a t § 1 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ; s e e a l s o T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( 1 9 9 7 )

. T h e p a r t i e s i n t h i s a p p e a l h a v e n o t c i t e d l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o ry a d d r e s s i n g w h e t h e r t h e

r e q u i r e m e n t f o r t h e C o m m i s s i o n e r t o d e e m a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s i n a p r o p o s e d s e t t l e m e n t t o b e

reasonable w a s i n t e n d e d t o a v o i d n o n

- a t t o r n e y s r e v i e w i n g t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f

a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s

, a n d t h e j u d g e s o f t h e A p p e a l s B o a r d a r e n o t a w a r e o f a n y s u c h h i s t o ry

.

S e c t i o n 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ) w a s f u r t h e r m o d i f i e d i n 2 0 0 7 t o d e l e t e t h e p r o v i s i o n

r e q u i r i n g t h e d e p a r t m e n t t o d e e m t h e a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e t o b e r e a s o n a b l e i f t h e f e e d i d n o t

e x c e e d “ t h e l e s s e r o f t w e n t y p e r c e n t ( 2 0 % ) o f t h e a w a r d t o t h e i n j u r e d w o r k e r o r t e n

t h o u s a n d d o l l a r s ( $ 1 0

, 0 0 0 )

. ” I n s t e a d

, t h e 2 0 0 7 a m e n d m e n t r e q u i r e d t h e d e p a r t m e n t t o

d e e m t h e at torney’s f e e s c h a r g e d t o e m p l o y e e s t o b e r e a s o n a b l e s o l o n g a s t h e f e e s d i d

n o t e x c e e d 2 0 % o f t h e recovery o r a w a r d t o t h e i n j u r e d w o r k e r

. S e e A c t s 2 0 0 7

, c h

. 3 0 0 §

2 ; T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( 2 0 0 8 )

. I n a d d i t i o n

, a d d r e s s i n g a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s

i n c a s e s o f p e r m a n e n t t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y

, t h e 2 0 0 7 a m e n d m e n t r e q u i r e d t h e d e p a r t m e n t t o

d e e m t h e a ttorney’s f e e t o b e r e a s o n a b l e i f t h e f e e d i d n o t e x c e e d “ t w e n t y p e r c e n t ( 2 0 % )

2 I n 2003, sect ion 50

- 6

- 226 (a)(2)(C) was amended to subst itute “ Ten nessee S upreme C o urt Rul e 8, R PC

1. 5 ” f or “ DR 2

- 106 of Rule 8 of the Ru l es of th e S up rem e C o urt

. ” Ac t s 2003, ch. 112 § 4

.5 o f t h e f i r s t f o u r h u n d r e d ( 4 0 0 ) w e e k s o f t h e a w a r d

. ” F i n a l l y

, t h e 2 0 0 7 a m e n d m e n t

d e l e t e d t h e l a s t s e n t e n c e o f s e c t i o n 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ) t h a t r e q u i r e d a c o u r t t o r e v i e w

,

“ s o l e l y f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f ap p r o v i n g s u c h f e e s a s a r e r e a s o n a b l e

, ” t h e a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e s i n

a n y c a s e i n w h i c h t h e f e e s e x c e e d e d $ 1 0

, 0 0 0

. S e e T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B )

( 2 0 0 8 )

.

F o l l o w i n g t h e e f f

e c t i v e d a t e o f t h e 2 0 0 7 a m e n d m e n t s

, sectio n 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 1 )

p r o v i d e d t h a t “ [ t ] h e f e e s o f a t t o rn e y s f o r s e r v i c e s t o e m p l o y e e s

. . . [ w e r e ] s u b

j e c t t o t h e

a p p r o v a l o f t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r o r c o u r t b e f o r e w h i c h t h e m a t t e r i s p e n d i n g

, a s ap p r o p r i a t e ;

p r o v i d e d

, t h a t n o a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s t o b e c h a r g e d e m p l o y e e s s h a l l b e i n e x c e s s o f t w e n t y

p e r c e n t ( 2 0 % ) o f t h e a m o u n t o f t h e r e c o v e r y o r a w a r d

. . . . ” T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 0

- 6

-

2 2 6 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( 2 0 0 8 )

. I n a d d i t i o n

, t h i s s e c t i o n p r o v i d e d t h a t “ [ a ] l l a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e s f o r

a t t o r n e y s r e p r e s e n t i n g e m p l o y e r s [ w e r e ] s ub j e c t t o r e v i e w f o r r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f t h e f e e

a n d [ w e r e ] s u b j e c t t o ap p r o v a l b y a c o u r t w h e n t h e f e e e x c e e d s t e n t h o u s a n d d o l l a r s

( $ 1 0

, 0 0 0 )

. ” T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( 2 0 0 8 ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. S ub s e c t i o n 5 0

-

6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ) c o n t i n u e d t o r e q u i r e t h e “ d e p a r t m e n t ” t o d e e m t h e a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e t o b e

r e a s o n a b l e i n c a s e s s u b m i t t e d t o t h e d e p a r t m e n t f o r a p p r o v a l t h a t w e r e r e s o l v e d p r i o r t o

t r i a l o r i n a b e n e f i t r e v i e w c o n f e r e n c e s o l o n g a s t h e f e e d i d n o t exceed t h e 2 0 % c e i l i n g

. F u r t h e r

, s e c t i o n 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( C ) c o n t i n u e d t h e re quireme n t t h a t “ [ f ] o r c a s e s t h a t

p r o c e e d t o t r i a l

, a n e m p l o y e e ’ s a t t o r n e y s h a l l f i l e a n a p p l i c a t i o n f o r ap p r o v a l o f a

p r o p o s e d a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e

, ” a n d w h e r e t h e a w a r d o f a n a tt orne y’s f e e e x c e e d e d t e n t h o u s a n d

d o l l a r s

, t h e c o u r t w a s r e q u i r e d t o “ m a k e s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s a s t o t h e f a c t o r s t h a t j u s t i f y t h e

f

e e a s p r o v i d e d i n T e n n e s s e e S u p r e m e C o u r t R u l e 8

, R P C 1

. 5

. ” T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 0

- 6

-

2 2 6 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( C ) ( 2 0 0 8 )

.

T h e W o r k

e r s ’ C o m p e n s a t i o n R e f

o r m A c t o f 2 0 1 3

T h e W o r k e r s ’ C o m p e n s a t i o n R e f o r m A c t o f 2 0 1 3 b r o u g h t m o r e c h a n g e s t o t h e

w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n s y s t e m i n T e n n e s s e e f o r i n j u r i e s o c c u rr i n g a f t e r J u n e 3 0

, 2 0 1 4

. C h a p t e r 2 8 9 o f t h e 2 0 1 3 A c t s a m e n d e d T e n n e s s e e C o d e A n n o t a t e d s e c t i o n 4

- 3

- 1 4 0 8 t o

i d e n t i f y t h e B u r e a u o f W o r k e r s ’ C ompensation a s “ a s e p a r a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e n t i t y f o r

p r o g r a m s

, p e r s o n n e l

, a n d b u d g e t s

, ” a n d i t p l a c e d t h e s u p e r v i s i o n o f t h e B u r e a u i n t h e

a d m i n i s t r a t o r o f t h e B u r e a u

. A c t s 2 0 1 3

, c h

. 2 8 9 § 1

. S e e a l s o T e n n

. C o d e Ann

. § 4

- 3

-

1 4 0 8 ( b )

, 1 4 0 9 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( 2 0 1 4 )

. A s p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d

, t h e B u r e a u b e c a m e “ a n a u t o n o m o u s

u n i t t h a t s h a l l b e a t t a c h e d t o th e d e

p a r t m e n t o f l a b o r a n d w o r k f

o r c e d e v e l o p m e n t f o r

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m a t t e r s o n l y

. ” A c t s 2 0 1 3

, c h

. 2 8 9 § 2 ( a )

. S e e a l s o T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 4

-

3

- 1 4 0 9 ( a ) ( 2 0 1 4 ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. 3

3 A s previously noted, t h e adm inistr ative entity was identif ied in the Workers ’ Compensation Reform Act

of 2013 as the “ Division of Workers ’ C o mpen sation

, ” a n d the name was ch ang ed to t he “ Bureau of

Work ers ’ C o mpensation ” in 2015. See Ac ts 2015, ch. 341 § 16

.6 T h e 2 0 1 3 A c t c r e a t e d t he C o u r t o f W o r k e r s ’ C o m p e n s a t i o n C l a i m s t o p e r f o r m

“ t h e a d j u d i c a t i v e f u n c t i o n w i t h i n t h e [ b u r e a u ] o f w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n

. ” A c t s 2 0 1 3

, c h

. 2 8 9 § 9

. S e e a l s o T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 0

- 6

- 1 0 2 ( 8 ) ( 2 0 1 4 )

. T h e c o u r t w a s g i v e n “ o r i g i n a l

a n d e x c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r a l l c o n t e s t e d c l a i m s f o r w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s

w h e n t h e d a t e o f the a l l e g e d i n j u r y i s o n o r a f t e r J u l y 1

, 2 0 1 4

. ” T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 0

- 6

-

2 3 7 ( 2 0 1 4 )

. J u d g e s o f t h e c o u r t w e r e r e q u i r e d t o b e “ T e n n e s s e e l i c e n s e d a t t o r n e y s i n

g o o d s t a n d i n g w i t h a t l e a s t f i v e ( 5 ) y e a r s e x p e r i e n c e i n w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n m a t t e r s

. ”

A c t s 2 0 1 3

, c h

. 2 8 9 § 7 9

. S e e a l s o T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 0

- 6

- 2 3 8 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( 2 0 1 4 )

. J u d g e s

w e r e g i v e n “ t h e d u t y

. . . t o h e a r a n d d e t e r m i n e c l a i m s f o r c o m p e n s a t i o n

, t o ap p r o v e

s e t t l e m e n t s o f c l a i m s f o r c o m p e n s a t i o n

, t o c o n d u c t h e a r i n g s

, a n d t o m a k e o r d e r s

, d e c i s i o n s

, a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n s

. ” T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 0

- 6

- 2 3 8 ( a ) ( 3 ) ( 2 0 1 4 )

.

A s c o n c e rn s a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s

, t h e 2 0 1 3 A c t a m e n d e d s e c t i o n 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 1 ) t o

d e l e t e a n y r e f e r e n c e t o t h e “ c o m m i s s i o n e r ” o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f L a b o r a n d W o r k f o r c e

D e v e l o p m e n t h a v i n g t h e a u t h o r i t y t o ap p r o v e “ t h e f e e s o f atto rney s f o r s e r v i c e s t o

e m p l o y e e s

. ” S e e A c t s 2 0 1 3

, c h

. 2 8 9 § 6 1

. I n s t e a d

, t h e 2 0 1 3 A c t p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e f e e s

w e r e “ s ub j e c t t o t h e ap p r o v a l o f t h e w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n j u d g e b e f o r e w h i c h t h e

m a t t e r i s p e n d i n g

, a s ap p r o p r i a t e

. ” I d

. S e e a l s o T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 1 )

( 2 0 1 4 )

. I n a d d i t i o n

, s e c t i o n 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ) w a s d e l e t e d b y t h e 2 0 1 3 A c t

, b u t

, a s t h e

m a j o r i t y n o t e s

, p a r t o f t h e s t a t u t e w a s r e t a i n e d a n d m o v e d t o s ub s e c t i o n 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 1 )

a n d s e r v e s a s t h e b a s i s f o r t h e m a j o r i t y ’ s d e c i s i o n

.

I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e

, t h e a t t o r n e y f o r t h e s u r v i v i n g s p o u s e a r g u e s o n a p p e a l t h a t

, i n

t h e 2 0 1 3 R e f o r m A c t

, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e “ t h o u g h t i t w a s a p p r o p r i a t e t o l i m i t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ’ s

d i s c r e t i o n o n t h e ap p r o v a l o f c o n t i n g e n t a ttorney f e e s

, ” a n d c o u n s e l s p e c u l a t e s a s t o w h y

t h e l e g i s l a t u r e m i g h t h a v e t h o u g h t i t a p p r o p r i a t e t o l i m i t t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e j u d g e s o f

t h e C o u r t o f W o r k e r s ’ C o m p e n s a t i o n C l a i m s

. H o w e v e r

, n o a u t h o r i t y w a s c i t e d a n d

n e i t h e r t h e m a j o r i t y n o r I h a v e l o c a t e d l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o ry a d d r e s s i n g w h e t h e r t h e

l e g i s l a tu r e i n t e n d e d t o l i m i t t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f a w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n j u d g e b y

m a n d a t i n g t h e j u d g e s “ d e e m t h e attorney’s f e e t o b e r e a s o n a b l e i f t h e f e e d o e s n o t e x c e e d

t w e n t y p e r c e n t ( 2 0 % )

. ” I n d e e d

, i t w o u l d h a v e b e e n a s i m p l e m a t t e r f o r t h e l e g i s l a tu r e t o

s a y s o

. I t w o u l d h a v e a v o i d e d t h e p r e s e n t a m b i g u i t y h a d t h e s t a tu t e s t a t e d t h a t “ [ t ] h e

w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n j u d g e s h a l l d e e m t h e a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e t o b e r e a s o n a b l e

. . . , ” i f t h a t

w a s t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ’ s i n t e n t

. T h e A c t c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e s t h e l e g i s l a tu r e ’ s i n t e n t t h a t t h e

judges o f t h e C o u r t o f W o r k e r s ’ C o m p e n s a t i o n C l a i m s a r e t o p e r f o r m “ t h e a d j u d i c a t i v e

f u n c t i o n w i t h i n t h e [ b u r e a u ] o f w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n

. ” T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 0

- 6

- 1 0 2 ( 9 )

(2019)

. T h e 2 0 1 3 A c t

, a s a m e n d e d

, m a d e t h e B u r e a u “ a n a u t o n o m o u s u n i t t h a t s h a l l b e

a t t a c h e d t o t h e d e p a r t m e n t o f l a b o r a n d w o r k f o r c e d e v e l o p m e n t f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e

m a t t e r s o n l y

. ” I r r e s p e c t i v e t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y f i n d s “ a c l e a r s t a tu t o r y l i n k b e t w e e n t h e

C o u r t o f W o r k e r s ’ C o m p e n s a t i o n C l a i m s a n d t h e p h r a s e ‘ t h e d e p a r t m e n t

, ’ ” i t i s m y

c o n c l u s i o n t h e “ d e p a r t m e n t

, ” a s u s e d i n s e c t i o n 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( 2 0 1 9 )

, d o e s n o t i n c l u d e

t h e j u d g e s o f t h e C o u r t o f W o r k e r s ’ C o m p e n s a t i o n C l a i m s

.7 F u r t h e r

, I s e e t h e i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e t o b e w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t a b u s e d i t s

d i s c r e t i o n i n a w a r d i n g a n a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e o f $ 1 7

, 4 2 1

. 4 1

, o r 7

. 5 % o f t h e i n c r e a s e d b e n e f i t s

. A trial court’s a w ard of attorney ’ s fees is discreti onary

, and an appellate cour t’s rev iew of

such a deci sion appli es an “a buse of discretion” stand ard of revi ew. Grisso m v. U n i t e d

P a r c e l S e r v i c e

, I n c

. , No. M2016

- 00127

- SC

- R3

- WC, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 4, at * 7 (Tenn.

Work ers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 9, 2017).

T h e T e n n e s s e e S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y r e f e rr e d t o t h e t e n f a c t o r s s e t f o r t h

i n T e n n e s s e e S u p r e m e C o u r t R u l e 8

, R u l e s o f P r o f e s s i o n a l C o n d u c t 1

. 5 ( a ) a s t h e s t a n d a r d

f

o r d e t e r m i n i n g t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e s

. S e e W r i

g

h t e x r e l

. W r i

g

h t v

. W

r i

g

h t

, 3 3 7 S

. W

. 3 d 1 6 6

, 1 6 9

- 1 7 0 ( T e n n

. 2 0 1 1 ) ; D e n i s o n v

. V I

P H o m e N u r s i n g & R e h a b

. S

e r v

. , L L C

, 2 0 2 0 T e n n

. L E X I S 2 7 2 ( T e n n

. W o r k e r s ’ C o m p

. P a n e l J u n e 1 9

, 2 0 2 0 )

. S e c t i o n 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( C ) ( 2 0 1 9 ) r e q u i r e s w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n j u d g e s t o “ m a k e

s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s a s t o t h e f a c t o r s t h a t j u s t i f y t h e f e e a s p r o v i d e d i n T e n n e s s e e S u p r e m e

C o u r t R u l e 8

, R P C 1

. 5

. ” H o w e v e r

, t h i s s t a tu t e i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e i n t h i s c a s e b e c a u s e t h e

c a s e d i d n o t p r o c e e d t o t r i a l

. R e q u i r i n g a w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n j u d g e t o m a k e t h o s e

f

i n d i n g s i n c a s e s t h a t p r o c e e d t o t r i a l d o e s n o t forec lose a j u d g e f r o m c o n s i d e r i n g t h o s e

f

a c t o r s w h e n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f at t orney’s f e e s i n c a s e s t h a t d o n o t

p r o c e e d t o t r i a l

. I n d e e d

, t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t S p e c i a l W o r k e r s ’ C o m p e n s a t i o n A p p e a l s

P a n e l h a s ap p l i e d t h o s e f a c t o r s i n i n s t a n c e s i n w h i c h t h e w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n s t a tu t e s

d i d n o t m a n d a t e t h e i r a p p l i c a b i l i t y

. S e e G r i s s o m

, 2 0 1 7 T e n n

. L E X I S 4

, a t * 5

- 6 ( “ T h e

s t a tu t e d o e s n o t s e t o u t a n y s p e c i f i c f a c t o r s t o b e c o n s i d e r e d b y a t r i a l c o u r t [ w h e n

m a k i n g a n a w a r d o f a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e s a r i s i n g f r o m a n e m p l o y e r ’ s r e f u s a l t o p r o v i d e m e d i c a l

c a r e r e q u i r e d b y a s e t t l e m e n t o r j u d g m e n t ]

. A r e c e n t d e c i s i o n o f o u r S u p r e m e C o u r t

p r o v i d e s u s w i t h s o m e guidance

, a l b e i t i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a m i n o r ’ s s e t t l e m e n t

. ” ( C i t i n g

W

r i

g

h t e x

. R e l

. W r i

g

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, 3 3 7 S

. W

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.

T h e m a j o r i t y h a s f o r e c l o s e d n o t o n l y a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e s e f a c t o r s i n a w o r k e r s ’

c o m p e n s a t i o n c a s e t h a t d o e s n o t p r o c e e d t o t r i a l

, b u t a n y r e v i e w b y a j u d g e o f t h e

a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e s c h a r g e d a n e m p l o y e e b e y o n d d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t h e f e e s e x c e e d 2 0 % o f

t h e r e c o v e r y o r a w a r d

. T h e T e n n e s s e e S u p r e m e C o u r t d e c l a r e d n e a r l y t h i r t y y e a r s a g o

t h a t “ t h e 2 0 p e r c e n t c e i l i n g s e t o u t i n t h e s t a t u t e i s a m a x i m u m

, w h i c h m a y o r m a y n o t b e

r e a s o n a b l e d e p e n d i n g o n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e c a s e

. ” P e r d u e v

. G r e e n B r a n c h M i n i n g

C

o

. , 8 3 7 S

. W

. 2 d 5 6 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 2 )

. S e e a l s o S o w e l l v

. C h r i s t

y

, N o

. M 2 0 0 4

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R 3

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, 2 0 0 6 T e n n

. A p p

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, a t * 9 ( T e n n

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. T

o t

s & T e e n s P e d i a t r i c s

, N o

. E 2 0 1 1

- 0 2 2 1 0

- W C

- R 3

- W C

, 2 0 1 2 T e n n

. L E X I S 7 4 8

, a t * 1 3

( T e n n

. W o r k e r s ’ C o m p

. P a n e l O c t

. 1 7

, 2 0 1 2 )

. U n d e r t h e m a j o r i t y ’ s h o l d i n g

, h a d t h e

a t t o r n e y f o r t h e s u r v i v i n g s p o u s e c h a r g e d a f e e o f 2 0 % o f t h e “ r e c o v e ry o r a w a r d

, ” r a t h e r

t h a n 2 0 % o f t h e d i f f

e r e n c e i n t h e b e n e f i t s a w a r d e d a n d t h e b e n e f i t s a v a i l a b l e u n d e r

M i s s i s s i p p i l a w

, t h e w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n j u d g e w o u l d h a v e b e e n r e q u i r e d t o d e e m

t h o s e f e e s t o b e reasonable

.8 S e c t i o n 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 6 ( a ) ( 1 ) r e q u i r e s “ [ t ] h e f e e s o f a t t o rn e y s for s e r v i c e s t o

e m p l o y e e s

. . . [ t o b e ] s ub j e c t t o t h e a p p r o v a l o f w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n j u d g e b e f o r e

w h i c h t h e m a t t e r i s p e n d i n g

. ” S e c t i o n 5 0

- 6

- 2 4 0 ( 2 0 1 9 ) requires “ a l l s e t t l e m e n t s [ t o b e ]

r e d u c e d t o w r i t i n g a n d

. . . ap p r o v e d b y a j u d g e o f t h e c o u r t o f w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n

c l a i m s

. ” M o r e o v e r

, i t i s “ t h e d u t y o f t h e j u d g e o f the c o u r t o f w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n

c l a i m s t o w h o m a n y s e t t l e m e n t i s p r e s e n t e d f o r a p p r o v a l

. . . t o e x a m i n e t h e p r o p o s e d

s e t t l e m e n t t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e e m p l o y e e i s receiving

, s ub s t a n t i a l l y

, t h e b e n e f i t s

p r o v i d e d b y t h e W o r k e r s ’ C o m p e n s a t i o n A c t

. ” T e n n

. C o d e A n n

. § 5 0

- 6

- 2 4 0 ( a )

. C a n a

w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n j u d g e r e f u s e t o f i n d t h a t a s e t t l e m e n t s e c u r e s s ub s t a n t i a l l y t h e

benefits t o w h i c h t h e i n j u r e d w o r k e r i s e n t i t l e d b e c a u s e t h e 2 0 % attorney ’ s f e e i s

u n r e a s o n a b l e o r t h o u g h t b y t h e j u d g e t o b e u n r e a s o n a b l e ? W i l l t h e m a j o r i t y ’ s c o n c l u s i o n

e f f

e c t i v e l y r e q u i r e a ttorney s f o r i n j u r e d w o r k e r s t o n e g o t i a t e t h e a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e w i t h t h e

j u d g e t o w h o m a s e t t l e m e n t i s p r e s e n t e d ? I n m y o p i n i o n

, e n d i n g t h e o n e

- h u n d r e d

- y e a r

h i s t o r y o f a l l o w i n g t h e j u d g e b e f o r e w h o m a s e t t l e m e n t i s p e n d i n g t o r e v i e w t h e

reasonableness o f t h e a t t o rn e y ’ s f e e s i n c a s e s t h a t d o n o t p r o c e e d t o t r i a l w i l l h a v e

d e t r i m e n t a l c o n s e q u e n c e s t o t h e w o r k e r s ’ c o m p e n s a t i o n l a w a n d t o e m p l o y e r s a n d

i n

j u r e d e m p l o y e e s

. T h e l e g i s l a t u r e s h o u l d a c t t o p r e v e n t t h e c h a r g i n g o f u n r e a s o n a b l e

a t t o r n e y ’ s f e e s f o r w h i c h t h e m a j o r i t y h a s o p e n e d t h e d o o r

. I w o u l d a f f

i r m t h e w o r k e r s ’

c o m p e n s a t i o n j u d g e ’ s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e j u d g e s o f t h e C o u r t o f W o r k e r s ’

C o m p e n s a t i o n C l a i m s “ m u s t r e v i e w t h e r e q u e s t e d f e e f o r r e a s o n a b l e n e s s

, ” a n d t h e n tu rn

t o t h a t r e v i e w

.TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSAT ION APPEALS BOARD

Jamie Henderson, as Surviving Spou se of ) Docket No. 2020-06-1013

David J oe Turner )

) State File No. 44049-2020

v. )

)

Pee Dee Country Enterprises, Inc., et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )

Compensation Claims )

Kenneth M. Switzer

, Chief Judge )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced

case was sent to th e following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 23 rd

day of July, 2021.

Name Certified

Mail First Class

Mail Via

Fax Via

Email Sent to:

M. Reed Martz

Penny Robinson X reed@freelandmartz.com

penny@freelandmartz.com

Lee Anne Murray

A shley McGe e X leeamurray@feeneymurray.com

ash ley@feeneymurray.com

Kenneth M. Switzer

, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of

Workers’ Compensation Claims X penny.patterson

- shrum@tn.gov

Olivia Yearwood

Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B

Nashville, TN 37243

Telephone: 615-253-1606

Electronic Mail: WCAppeal s.Clerk@tn.gov