NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

EDUARDO HARIM AGUILERA, JR., Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0848

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2015-129233-001 DT

The Honorable Margaret R. Mahoney, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix

By Dawnese C. Hustad

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 9-26-2017
STATE v. AGUILERA

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Chief Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge James P. Beene joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Eduardo Harim Aguilera, Jr. (“Appellant”) appeals his 

convictions and sentences for two counts of aggravated assault. 

Appellant’s counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Smith v. Robbins, 

528 U.S. 259 (2000); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); and State v. Leon, 

104 Ariz. 297 (1969), stating that she has searched the record on appeal and 

has found no arguable question of law that is not frivolous. Appellant’s 

counsel therefore requests that we review the record for fundamental error. 

See State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999) (stating that this court 

reviews the entire record for reversible error). This court allowed Appellant 

to file a supplemental brief in propria persona, and Appellant has done so, 

raising several issues that we address.

¶2 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the Arizona 

Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) 

sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).1 Finding no reversible 

error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

¶3 On July 1, 2015, a grand jury indicted Appellant on two counts 

of aggravated assault, each a class five felony. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1203, 13-

1204.

¶4 Before trial, Appellant’s counsel raised concerns as to 

Appellant’s competency to stand trial, and the court ordered Appellant to 

 

1 We cite the current version of the applicable statutes because no 

revisions material to this decision have occurred since the date of the 

offenses.

2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict 

and resolve all reasonable inferences against Appellant. See State v. Kiper, 

181 Ariz. 62, 64 (App. 1994).
STATE v. AGUILERA

Decision of the Court

3

be evaluated pursuant to Rule 11, Ariz. R. Crim. P. After reviewing the 

medical evaluations, the court found Appellant understood the nature of 

the proceedings and the charges brought against him, and was competent 

to stand trial.

¶5 Appellant moved to represent himself in the proceedings, and 

the trial court granted Appellant’s motion after verifying that Appellant 

was “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” waiving his right to 

representation. Thereafter, before each hearing, the court asked Appellant 

whether he wanted to continue to represent himself, and each time, 

Appellant confirmed his decision. Appellant represented himself at trial

until closing arguments, when he asked for the assistance of his advisory 

counsel.

¶6 At trial, the State presented the following evidence: On June 

24, 2015, Appellant, who was in custody for charges related to a 2014 

aggravated D.U.I., was brought to the Maricopa County Superior Court to 

begin trial. However, Appellant’s trial was postponed due to a scheduling 

conflict.

¶7 Upon hearing his trial was postponed, Appellant became 

verbally combative with the court commissioner assigned to his case. The 

commissioner warned Appellant that if he did not calm down he would be 

removed from the courtroom. Appellant continued to be verbally 

combative, and the commissioner ordered a detention officer to remove 

Appellant from the courtroom.

¶8 Detention Officer Norris (“Officer Norris”) commanded 

Appellant to leave and placed his hand on Appellant’s shoulder to direct 

him out of the courtroom. Appellant did not comply with Officer Norris’ 

commands and continued arguing with the commissioner. Officer Norris 

took hold of Appellant by his shirt. Appellant then reached out to grab

Officer Norris. As Officer Norris successfully pushed Appellant’s hands 

away, he struck his own hands on Appellant’s handcuffs. Officer Norris 

sustained abrasions on his hands from this interaction.

¶9 A second detention officer and Phoenix police officers arrived

to help Officer Norris remove Appellant from the courtroom. Appellant

refused to leave, and the officers carried Appellant out of the courtroom.

Additional officers, including Detention Officer Blood (“Officer Blood”),

helped place Appellant in a holding tank outside the courtroom.

¶10 In the holding tank, the officers commanded Appellant to his 

knees in order for them to safely exit, but Appellant would not comply with 
STATE v. AGUILERA

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4

their commands. Officer Blood eventually forced Appellant to the ground

and placed his knee on Appellant’s back to allow the other officers to exit 

the holding tank. As Officer Blood removed his knee from Appellant and 

began to exit the holding tank, Appellant rolled onto his back, pushing his 

feet into Officer Blood’s shins several times. Officer Blood then used his 

knee to hold Appellant’s legs against his body and commanded Appellant 

to roll onto his stomach before Officer Blood exited the holding tank.

¶11 In his defense, Appellant presented evidence that neither 

Officer Norris nor Officer Blood were seriously injured during their 

interactions with Appellant. Appellant further alleged that he was 

unlawfully incarcerated at the time of the assault due to what he believed 

were wrongful aggravated D.U.I. charges.

¶12 The jury found Appellant guilty as charged of two counts of 

aggravated assault. The trial court found, based on Appellant’s own 

testimony, that Appellant had been convicted of two prior felonies. The 

court sentenced Appellant to concurrent, presumptive prison terms of five 

years, to be served concurrent with his six-year term for his aggravated 

D.U.I. convictions. The court credited Appellant for 512 days of 

presentence incarceration on each of the aggravated assault counts. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

¶13 Appellant raises numerous arguments in his supplemental 

brief. We address his arguments as follows.

I. Alleged Violation of Appellant’s Constitutional Rights

A. Speedy Trial Rights

¶14 Appellant argues the court violated his right to a speedy trial 

under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 

2, Section 11, of the Arizona Constitution.

¶15 Appellant argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated 

because he was subjected to a Rule 11 examination. This argument is 

without merit. Although a defendant held in custody must generally be 

tried within 150 days of arraignment, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.2(a)(1),

exceptions to this time limit exist, including delays that result from hearings 

to determine competency or intellectual disability, which are excluded from 

the computation of the time limit under Rule 8.2. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.4(a); 

State v. Wassenaar, 215 Ariz. 565, 570, ¶ 8 (App. 2007). Appellant’s Rule 11 
STATE v. AGUILERA

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5

hearing falls under this exception, and thus, tolls the calculation of time to 

start Appellant’s trial.3

¶16 Moreover, even if Appellant is correct in claiming his trial was 

untimely, there was no fundamental error that would require reversal. To 

determine whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has 

been violated, “court[s] must consider the length of the delay, whether the 

defendant has demanded a speedy trial, the reason for the delay, and the 

prejudice to the defendant.” State v. Tucker, 133 Ariz. 304, 307 (1982); accord

Wassenaar, 215 Ariz. at 571, ¶ 18. Out of the reasons assessed, the length of 

the delay is the least important and the prejudice the defendant suffered is 

the most important. Tucker, 133 Ariz. at 307. For a defendant to establish 

prejudice he must show that his defense was harmed by the delay of the 

trial. Id. Thus, “[a] defendant who fails to establish that his defense was 

prejudiced or that he was deprived of a fair trial has not established 

prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal of his conviction.” Wassenaar, 215 

Ariz. at 571, ¶ 16.

¶17 Appellant has not alleged that he suffered any prejudice due 

to a delay in his trial. Further, the record, viewed as a whole, does not 

reflect that Appellant suffered any prejudice.

B. Eighth Amendment Rights

¶18 Appellant also argues the trial court violated his Eighth 

Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. Underlying his 

argument, Appellant relies on his contention that he was falsely 

incarcerated and wrongfully convicted of the aggravated D.U.I. charges. At 

trial, the court informed Appellant that it had no power during that 

proceeding to decide any issue related to Appellant’s previous aggravated 

D.U.I. charges and convictions. The court further explained that even if 

Appellant was found to be wrongfully convicted or incarcerated for 

aggravated D.U.I., that finding would not affect Appellant’s charges and 

trial for aggravated assault. The court explained to Appellant numerous 

times that his sentence and imprisonment as it related to the aggravated 

D.U.I. convictions had no bearing on his aggravated assault charges. The 

trial court’s explanations were legally correct, and we find no error. 

Further, to the extent that Appellant wishes to challenge the 

 

3 Appellant’s time deadline for trial was also properly tolled due to 

Appellant’s own requests for continuances. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.4(c), (e).
STATE v. AGUILERA

Decision of the Court

6

constitutionality of the D.U.I. laws, he must do so in a separate appeal of 

his aggravated D.U.I. convictions.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶19 Appellant appears to argue that there was insufficient 

evidence to convict him of aggravated assault because neither Officer 

Norris nor Officer Blood sustained substantial injury. However, 

Appellant’s argument mischaracterizes the nature of the charges.

¶20 In Count I, the State charged Appellant with intentionally, 

knowingly, or recklessly causing physical injury to an employee of the 

Maricopa County Sherriff’s Office acting in his official capacity. See A.R.S. 

§§ 13-1203(A)(1), 13-1204(A)(8)(a). As charged, the State only needed to

prove any physical injury to Officer Norris, not serious physical injury. See

A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(1). There is no requirement under either § 13-

1203(A)(1) or § 13-1204(A)(8)(a) that the assault victim suffer substantial, 

permanent, or serious harm. Here, the State met its burden of showing that 

Officer Norris suffered physical injury through testimony that he scraped 

his hands and through photo evidence of the injuries. Officer Norris’ 

testimony that he suffered minimal pain and was able to continue working 

does not preclude a finding of guilt as charged.

¶21 In Count II, the State charged Appellant with knowingly 

touching Officer Blood, an employee of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s 

Office acting in his official capacity, with the intent to injure, insult, or 

provoke the officer. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(3), 13-1204(A)(8)(a). Contrary 

to Appellant’s assertions, the State did not need to prove injury for Count 

II. Here, the State met its burden by producing evidence that Appellant’s 

feet made contact with Officer Blood’s legs multiple times and by showing 

that Appellant kicked or intended to kick Officer Blood.

III. Appellant’s Claim of Self-Defense

¶22 Appellant also argues that he was wrongfully convicted 

because he was merely “standing up” for himself. However, even if 

Appellant believes he acted in self-defense, this justification defense is 

inapplicable in this situation.

¶23 Generally, a defendant may assert self-defense as justification 

for his use of force to protect himself against another’s use or attempted use 

of unlawful physical force. A.R.S. § 13-404(A). Even if Appellant is correct 

in his assertion that he was wrongfully detained on June 24, 2015, he was 
STATE v. AGUILERA

Decision of the Court

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still not allowed to use physical force to prevent the detention officers from 

lawfully fulfilling their job duties.

IV. Other Issues

¶24 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and 

find none. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300; Clark, 196 Ariz. at 537, ¶ 30. The 

evidence presented at trial was substantial and supports the verdicts. 

Appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to 

counsel, and had the assistance of advisory counsel at all stages of the 

proceedings. Appellant was given the opportunity to speak at sentencing. 

The proceedings were conducted in compliance with Appellant’s 

constitutional and statutory rights and the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure.

¶25 After the filing of this decision, defense counsel’s obligations 

pertaining to Appellant’s representation in this appeal have ended. 

Counsel need do no more than inform Appellant of the status of the appeal 

and of his future options, unless counsel’s review reveals an issue 

appropriate for petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. See State 

v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85 (1984). Appellant has thirty days from the 

date of this decision to proceed, if he desires, with a pro per motion for 

reconsideration or petition for review.

CONCLUSION

¶26 Appellant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.