Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 204 / Wednesday, October 22, 2014 / Notices 63141 

capabilities, which precludes DNDO or 

any other Federal Agency from 

providing a real-time and accurate 

accountability to decision-makers 

regarding available domestic R/N 

detection assets. 

There is no assurance of 

confidentiality provided to respondents. 

There will be no collection of trade 

secret or business proprietary 

information. Furnishing this 

information is voluntary; however, 

failure to furnish the requested 

information may prevent a user from 

contributing radiological or nuclear 

detection information to RECE. This 

could cause a hindrance when 

attempting to allocate resources during 

a global nuclear detection architecture 

related threat incident. 

The Office of Management and Budget 

is particularly interested in comments 

which: 

1. Evaluate whether the proposed 

collection of information is necessary 

for the proper performance of the 

functions of the agency, including 

whether the information will have 

practical utility; 

2. Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden of the 

proposed collection of information, 

including the validity of the 

methodology and assumptions used; 

3. Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

4. Minimize the burden of the 

collection of information on those who 

are to respond, including through the 

use of appropriate automated, 

electronic, mechanical, or other 

technological collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology, 

e.g., permitting electronic submissions 

of responses. 

Analysis 

Agency: Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office, DHS. 

Title: Regional Equipment and 

Capabilities Exchange. 

OMB Number: 1601–NEW. 

Frequency: Annually. 

Affected Public: State, Local, Tribal 

Governments. 

Number of Respondents: 102. 

Estimated Time per Respondent: 1 

hour. 

Total Burden Hours: 102. 

Dated: October 9, 2014. 

Margaret H. Graves, 

Deputy Chief Information Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2014–25050 Filed 10–21–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–9D–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Office of the Secretary 

United States Secret Service Protective 

Mission Panel 

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, 

Department of Homeland Security. 

ACTION: Committee management: notice 

of committee establishment. 

SUMMARY: In order to facilitate an 

effective review of the security provided 

by the U.S. Secret Service to the White 

House compound, the Department of 

Homeland Security (Department or 

DHS) is creating the U.S. Secret Service 

Protective Mission Panel (USSSPMP or 

Panel). Pursuant to the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002, the Department is 

taking immediate measures to establish 

this independent panel of experts to 

inquire into recent incidents at the 

White House compound and to provide 

to the Secretary of Homeland Security 

recommendations for potential new 

directors of the U.S. Secret Service and 

whether there should be a broader 

review of the U.S. Secret Service. 

Name of Committee: U.S. Secret 

Service Protective Mission Panel. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Peter Boogaard, Office of Public Affairs, 

(202) 282–8010, MediaInquiry@

HQ.DHS.GOV. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

DHS is establishing an independent 

panel to review the recent fence 

jumping incident at the White House on 

September 19, 2014 and related issues 

concerning security at the White House 

compound; to provide 

recommendations for potential new 

directors of the Secret Service; and to 

recommend whether there should be a 

broader review of the Secret Service. 

This time-sensitive and important 

review will entail discussion of 

classified information. 

This Department has recognized in 

the past that some highly critical issues 

cannot be discussed in public without 

jeopardizing the security and 

confidentiality of sensitive homeland 

security information. For example, in 

2006, the Department established the 

Critical Infrastructure Partnership 

Advisory Council (CIPAC) to aid in the 

communication and coordination 

between critical private sector entities 

and the Federal agencies charged with 

regulating them. See 71 FR 14930 (Mar. 

24, 2006). Discussions between the 

members of that Council involve 

intelligence and law enforcement 

information and remain non-public to 

avoid giving our nation’s enemies 

information they could use to effectively 

attack a particular infrastructure. 

Many of the issues to be reviewed by 

the Panel will require access to, and 

discussion of, non-public classified 

information and other non-public law 

enforcement sensitive information. 

These matters include protective 

measures at the White House, sensitive 

law enforcement techniques and 

methods, and the management of these 

protective and law enforcement 

missions of the Secret Service. 

II. Identifying Solutions 

The Department recognizes the 

importance of the Federal Advisory 

Committee Act (FACA). The FACA, 

when it applies, generally requires 

advisory committees to meet in open 

session and make publicly available 

associated written materials. It also 

requires a 15-day notice before any 

meeting may be closed to public 

attendance. These requirements, 

however, would prevent the Department 

from convening on short notice a panel 

to discuss the sensitive and classified 

information surrounding the review of 

protective measures at the White House 

compound and other U.S. Secret Service 

law enforcement missions in an 

appropriate setting. The FACA contains 

a number of exceptions to its general 

disclosure rules, but the applicability of 

those exceptions are not sufficient to 

address the proper handling of 

classified material and the protection of 

law enforcement sensitive information 

in this unique context. The information 

that will be discussed and reviewed by 

this panel will be deliberative in nature 

and will involve classified information 

that, if discussed in public, would result 

in the unauthorized disclosure of 

information that could reasonably be 

expected to result in threats or damage 

to national security. Furthermore, the 

information discussed will involve 

techniques and procedures for law 

enforcement investigations. The release 

of this information would enable 

criminals and enemies to use that 

information to circumvent the law and 

could reasonably be expected to 

endanger the life or physical safety of 

individuals. 

Section 871 of the Homeland Security 

Act provides the Secretary of Homeland 

Security with the authority to establish 

advisory committees and exempt them 

from the FACA. 6 U.S.C. 451(a). This 

authority allows the Department to 

freely and completely review the 

security procedures, to discuss potential 

vulnerabilities, and to provide the 

Department with information and 

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63142 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 204 / Wednesday, October 22, 2014 / Notices 

recommendations that otherwise could 

not be discussed. 

III. Exercise of Section 871 Authority 

To Establish the U.S. Secret Service 

Protective Mission Panel 

The Department respects the 

principles of open government and has 

judiciously exercised the authority 

Congress provided in Section 871. 

Given that the use of this authority will 

allow the Department to fully and 

completely review the issues and make 

recommendations surrounding the U.S. 

Secret Service as described above, the 

Department is invoking that authority. 

Collaboration among the panel 

members must involve many activities 

to include: planning, coordination, 

protective security implementation, 

operational activities related to 

protective service security measures, as 

well as leadership issues, 

vulnerabilities, protective measures, 

best practices, and lessons learned. An 

effective panel must be able to have 

ongoing, immediate, and multidirectional communication and 

coordination under highly exigent 

circumstances. 

In furtherance of DHS’ mission to 

provide protective services, the public 

interest requires the establishment of 

the Panel under the authority of 6 U.S.C. 

451. The Panel will review recent 

incidents, provide recommendations on 

potential new directors, and recommend 

whether there should be a broader 

review of the Secret Service. The Panel 

will interact with federal officials and 

representatives from the security and 

law enforcement communities. The 

Panel has no authority to establish 

Federal policy or otherwise undertake 

inherently governmental functions. 

Exemption from the FACA (Pub. L. 

92–463): In recognition of the highlysensitive, and often confidential or 

classified nature of the subject matter 

involved in the activities of the 

USSSPMP, under the authority of 

section 871 of the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 451), the panel is 

hereby deemed exempt from the 

requirements of Public Law 92–463 (5 

U.S.C. App.). The decision to exercise 

the exemption authority in section 871 

will support the free flow of classified 

and law enforcement sensitive 

information concerning U.S. Secret 

Service protective measures and its 

operations as a law enforcement 

organization. 

IV. Membership and Structure 

The specific membership of the 

USSSPMP will consist of individuals 

with expertise in: (a) National security, 

(b) protective security, (c) leading 

complex organizations, and (d) other 

experts as the investigation dictates. The 

members are identified below at 

Appendix A. 

Membership Status: Non-Federal 

members of the USSSPMP serve as 

special government employees. 

Meetings: The USSSPMP may meet as 

a whole or in any combination of 

subgroups that is most conducive to the 

effective conduct of its activities 

including, without limitation, in groups 

encompassing discrete topics to address 

specific issues and concerns (e.g., a 

meeting of the members to discuss 

security specific issues, or a meeting of 

leaders of complex organizations). As 

independent bodies, meetings 

consisting solely of members of these 

subgroups shall not constitute meetings 

of the USSSPMP. In addition, the 

USSSPMP may establish informal 

working groups for the purpose of factfinding, issue development, or other 

preliminary non-deliberative activities. 

Such activities in support of the 

USSSPMP shall also be within the scope 

of the exemption noted above. 

Duration of Committee: Six months, 

subject to extension pursuant to section 

871(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 

2002 (6 U.S.C. 451(b)). 

Dated: October 15, 2014. 

Jeh Charles Johnson, 

Secretary. 

Appendix A—Membership of the U.S. 

Secret Service Protective Mission Panel 

Thomas J. Perrelli 

Mark Filip 

Danielle C. Gray 

Joseph W. Hagin 

[FR Doc. 2014–25052 Filed 10–21–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–9B–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Federal Emergency Management 

Agency 

[Docket ID FEMA–2014–0002] 

Changes in Flood Hazard 

Determinations 

AGENCY: Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, DHS. 

ACTION: Final Notice. 

SUMMARY: New or modified Base (1- 

percent annual chance) Flood 

Elevations (BFEs), base flood depths, 

Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA) 

boundaries or zone designations, and/or 

regulatory floodways (hereinafter 

referred to as flood hazard 

determinations) as shown on the 

indicated Letter of Map Revision 

(LOMR) for each of the communities 

listed in the table below are finalized. 

Each LOMR revises the Flood Insurance 

Rate Maps (FIRMs), and in some cases 

the Flood Insurance Study (FIS) reports, 

currently in effect for the listed 

communities. The flood hazard 

determinations modified by each LOMR 

will be used to calculate flood insurance 

premium rates for new buildings and 

their contents. 

DATES: The effective date for each 

LOMR is indicated in the table below. 

ADDRESSES: Each LOMR is available for 

inspection at both the respective 

Community Map Repository address 

listed in the table below and online 

through the FEMA Map Service Center 

at www.msc.fema.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Luis 

Rodriguez, Chief, Engineering 

Management Branch, Federal Insurance 

and Mitigation Administration, FEMA, 

500 C Street SW., Washington, DC 

20472, (202) 646–4064, or (email) 

Luis.Rodriguez3@fema.dhs.gov; or visit 

the FEMA Map Information eXchange 

(FMIX) online at 

www.floodmaps.fema.gov/fhm/fmx_

main.html. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) makes the final flood hazard 

determinations as shown in the LOMRs 

for each community listed in the table 

below. Notice of these modified flood 

hazard determinations has been 

published in newspapers of local 

circulation and 90 days have elapsed 

since that publication. The Deputy 

Associate Administrator for Mitigation 

has resolved any appeals resulting from 

this notification. 

The modified flood hazard 

determinations are made pursuant to 

section 206 of the Flood Disaster 

Protection Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. 4105, 

and are in accordance with the National 

Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 

4001 et seq., and with 44 CFR part 65. 

For rating purposes, the currently 

effective community number is shown 

and must be used for all new policies 

and renewals. 

The new or modified flood hazard 

information is the basis for the 

floodplain management measures that 

the community is required either to 

adopt or to show evidence of being 

already in effect in order to remain 

qualified for participation in the 

National Flood Insurance Program 

(NFIP). 

This new or modified flood hazard 

information, together with the 

floodplain management criteria required 

by 44 CFR 60.3, are the minimum that 

are required. They should not be 

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