UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 99-4735

MICHELLE DENISE CHAMBERS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.

Graham C. Mullen, Chief District Judge.

(CR-97-924, CR-98-166)

Argued: January 22, 2001

Decided: March 20, 2001

Before WILKINS, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Richard Andrew Culler, CULLER & CULLER, P.A.,

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Kenneth Michel Smith,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North

Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Mark T. Calloway, United States

Attorney, Brian Lee Whisler, Assistant United States Attorney,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North

Carolina, for Appellee. 
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Michelle Denise Chambers appeals the sentence imposed by the

district court following her plea of guilty to bank larceny, see 18

U.S.C.A. § 2113(b) (West 2000); bank fraud, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1344

(West 2000); and money laundering, see 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (West 2000). She contends that the district court

erred in refusing to group her bank larceny and money laundering

convictions and in holding her responsible for laundering more than

$6 million. Finding no merit in either of these claims, we affirm. 

I.

On October 4, 1997, Chambers’ husband, Steven, and several

coconspirators stole a truckload of currency from the Loomis Fargo

Armored Car facility in Charlotte, North Carolina. Chambers was a

member of the conspiracy and assisted with preparations for the theft.

After abandoning over $3 million for lack of space, the coconspirators

netted nearly $14 million. 

The Chamberses concealed their share of the proceeds through a

variety of methods, which included enlisting accomplices to rent

safety deposit boxes. The Chamberses also deposited small amounts

of the stolen funds in several bank accounts. Chambers wrote checks

against one of these accounts to buy a number of high-priced items;

she then withdrew her money before any of the checks cleared. 

Chambers subsequently was indicted and pled guilty to one count

of bank larceny, one count of bank fraud, and seven counts of money

laundering. At sentencing, the district court adopted the recommendations of the presentence report (PSR) and clustered Chambers’ convictions into three groups—one for all of the money laundering

convictions, and one "group" each for the bank larceny and bank

2 UNITED STATES v. CHAMBERS
fraud convictions. See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§§ 3D1.1(a)(1), 3D1.2 (1998). The court also adopted the offenselevel calculations recommended for each group in the PSR. These calculations included an eight-level enhancement for the money laundering convictions based on an estimate that Chambers’ relevant conduct

involved "at least $8,750,000.00." J.A. 149; see U.S.S.G.

§ 2S1.1(b)(2)(I) (providing for an eight-level enhancement for laundering activities involving more than $6 million). Ultimately, the

court sentenced Chambers to 92 months imprisonment. 

II.

Chambers contends that the district court erred in refusing to group

her bank larceny conviction with her money laundering convictions

and in holding her responsible for more than $6 million worth of

money laundering conduct. The first issue entails the application of

law to undisputed facts, so we review the decision of the district court

de novo. See United States v. Toler, 901 F.2d 399, 402 (4th Cir.

1990). With respect to the second issue, we will not overturn the findings of the district court unless they were clearly erroneous. See

United States v. Dawkins, 202 F.3d 711, 714 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,

120 S. Ct. 1989 (2000). 

A.

Chambers’ claim concerning the grouping of offenses implicates

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, which provides in pertinent part:

All counts involving substantially the same harm shall be

grouped together into a single Group. Counts involve substantially the same harm within the meaning of this rule: 

. . . 

(b) When counts involve the same victim and two or more

acts or transactions connected by a common criminal

objective or constituting part of a common scheme or

plan. 

. . . 

UNITED STATES v. CHAMBERS 3
(d) When the offense level is determined largely on the

basis of the total amount of harm or loss, the quantity

of a substance involved, or some other measure of

aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is ongoing

or continuous in nature and the offense guideline is

written to cover such behavior. 

Chambers contends that her bank larceny conviction (which arose

from the Loomis Fargo heist) and her money laundering convictions

(which arose from efforts to conceal proceeds from the heist)

involved the same victim and therefore should have been grouped

under § 3D1.2(b). Alternatively, she asserts that these offenses constituted "ongoing or continuous" criminal conduct within the meaning

of U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d). Because we see no connection among these

offenses other than the fact that the laundered money was acquired

during the larceny, and because that connection is insufficient to justify grouping, we deny relief. 

Section 3D1.2(b) provides for grouping if two or more offenses

(1) "involve the same victim" and (2) are "connected by a common

criminal objective or . . . a common scheme or plan." U.S.S.G.

§ 3D1.2(b). The offenses here satisfy neither of these requirements.

For purposes of § 3D1.2(b), the term "victim" refers to the person

who was the primary target of the offense or, when society at large

is the victim, to the societal interest harmed by the offense; "indirect

or secondary victims" are specifically excluded. Id. comment. (n.2).

The victim of Chambers’ bank larceny was Loomis Fargo. Chambers

asserts that her money laundering activities also victimized Loomis

Fargo by impeding recovery of the stolen funds. We disagree; Loomis

Fargo may have been an indirect victim, but society is the primary

victim of money laundering undertaken for purposes of concealment.

See, e.g., United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 7-8 (2d Cir. 1999), cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 1162 (2000); United States v. O’Kane, 155 F.3d 969,

972-73 (8th Cir. 1998). See generally United States v. Bartley, 230

F.3d 667, 675-76 (4th Cir. 2000) (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (analyzing the societal interests affected by money laundering). It is significant, moreover, that laundering stolen funds will always impair

recovery efforts by the theft victim; thus, adopting Chambers’ view

would compel grouping in virtually all cases involving laundering of

4 UNITED STATES v. CHAMBERS
stolen (or fraudulently acquired) funds, in contravention of "common

sense and . . . § 3D1.2’s mission to incrementally punish significant

additional criminal conduct." United States v. Porter, 909 F.2d 789,

793 (4th Cir. 1990). 

Furthermore, even if Chambers’ bank larceny and money laundering offenses did involve the same victim, they did not share a "common criminal objective" or arise from "a common scheme or plan."

U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b). We presume that all of Chambers’ conduct was

motivated by the desire to be wealthy, but the term "common criminal

objective" requires "a more particularized definition of the defendant’s intent." United States v. Pitts, 176 F.3d 239, 245 (4th Cir.),

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 911 (1999). Here, Chambers manifested one

criminal objective when committing the bank larceny (stealing

money) and a separate objective when laundering the proceeds

(avoiding detection). Furthermore, because the bank larceny and the

money laundering involved separate conduct and different personnel,

there is no evidence of a unifying scheme. See id. at 244-45 (listing

factors relevant to grouping decisions, including "persons involved"

and "means used"). Thus, Chambers cannot satisfy any of the requirements of § 3D1.2(b). 

For the same reasons, Chambers’ request for grouping under

§ 3D1.2(d) is unavailing. Just as these crimes were not connected by

a "common scheme," U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b), they were not "ongoing or

continuous in nature," U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d). Rather, the record shows

that the Chamberses executed one plan to steal money from Loomis

Fargo and then implemented a separate plan (involving a separate

group of confederates) to launder money. Thus, these crimes were not

sufficiently integrated to justify grouping. Cf. United States v. Walker,

112 F.3d 163, 167 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that grouping was appropriate under § 3D1.2(d) because laundered funds were used to promote an ongoing fraudulent enterprise). We therefore affirm the

refusal to group Chambers’ bank larceny conviction with her money

laundering convictions. 

B.

Chambers next contends that she should not have received an

eight-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2), which proUNITED STATES v. CHAMBERS 5
vides for graduated enhancements in money laundering cases based

on the amount of money involved. The PSR recommended an eightlevel enhancement because a "conservative estimate of the amount of

money involved in the money laundering portion of this scheme [was]

at least $8,750,000.00." J.A. 149; see U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(I).

Chambers claims that the conduct for which she was charged and

convicted involved only $5.7 million, and therefore she should have

received only a seven-level enhancement. See U.S.S.G.

§ 2S1.1(b)(2)(H). We hold that the determination of the district court

was not clearly erroneous. 

Chambers initially asserts that the district court engaged in double

counting. This argument arises from a statement by the district court

that $500,000 used by the Chamberses to purchase a house should be

added to the $5.7 million figure proffered by defense counsel. The

district court subsequently retracted this statement, however. 

Instead of relying on the money used to purchase the house, the

district court adopted the recommendation of the PSR that Chambers

be held liable for both the $5.7 million she was directly involved in

laundering and an additional $3 million her husband laundered separately. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (providing that a defendant’s

"relevant conduct" includes "all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of . . . jointly undertaken criminal activity"). Chambers contends that it is inconsistent to hold her responsible

for Steven’s conduct while refusing to group the bank larceny conviction with the money laundering convictions. We perceive no inconsistency. The district court found, in effect, that the Chamberses jointly

executed two separate plans, one to steal money from Loomis Fargo

and another to conceal the proceeds. This determination was not

clearly erroneous. 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court did not err

in its sentencing determinations. We therefore affirm Chambers’ sentence. 

AFFIRMED

6 UNITED STATES v. CHAMBERS