No. 13-14-498-CR 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT CORPUS CHRISTI

GILDA HERNANDEZ, 

APPELLANT, 

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE.

ON APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW # 2

NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

BRIEF FOR THE STATE

Douglas K. Norman

State Bar No. 15078900

Assistant District Attorney

105th Judicial District of Texas

901 Leopard, Room 206

Corpus Christi, Texas 78401

(361) 888-0410

(361) 888-0399 (fax)

douglas.norman@co.nueces.tx.us

Attorney for Appellee

ORAL ARGUMENT IS NOT REQUESTED 

 

ACCEPTED

13-14-00498-CR

THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEAL

CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS

3/25/2015 2:23:14 PM

DORIAN RAMIREZ

CLERK

 RECEIVED IN 13th COURT OF APPEALS CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS 3/25/2015 2:23:14 PM DORIAN E. RAMIREZ Clerk
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................... ii

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT..............................................................1

ARGUMENT...................................................................................................1

Reply Point

The evidence was legally sufficient to support the theft conviction..........1

I. Statement of Fact. ............................................................................1

II. Standard of Review. .......................................................................3

III. Application to the Present Theft Conviction..............................4

PRAYER..........................................................................................................7

RULE 9.4 (i) CERTIFICATION.....................................................................8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE........................................................................8
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)..............................3

Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265 (2nd Cir. 1952). ......................................6

Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).............................4

Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). ................................6

United States v. Heath, 970 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1992)...................................6

Hill v. State, 633 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). ............................. 4, 5

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). ......................... 3, 4

Jones v. State, 900 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995,

pet. ref’d)..........................................................................................................5

Obigbo v. State, 6 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.). ...............5

Padilla v. State, 326 S.W.3d 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)..................... 3, 4, 6

Roberson v. State, 821 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, pet. 

ref'd). ................................................................................................................5

Saenz v. State, 976 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998,

no pet.). ............................................................................................................6

Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)................................4

Turro v. State, 867 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)..................................4

Wawrykow v. State, 866 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1993, pet ref'd). 6

Statutes & Rules

Tex. Penal Code § 7.02....................................................................................3

ii
Tex. Penal Code § 31.01..................................................................................4

Tex. Penal Code § 31.03..................................................................................4

iii
NO. 13-14-498-CR

GILDA HERNANDEZ, § COURT OF APPEALS

Appellant, §

§

V. § FOR THE THIRTEENTH 

§

THE STATE OF TEXAS, §

Appellee. § DISTRICT OF TEXAS

BRIEF FOR THE STATE

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Hernandez’s active participation in placing items of merchandise in 

Esparza’s bag while shopping in Hobby Lobby sufficiently showed an 

exercise of control and an intent to deprive the owner of the items in 

question to support her theft conviction.

ARGUMENT

Reply Point

The evidence was legally sufficient to support the theft conviction.

I. Statement of Fact.

Gilda Hernandez was charged by information with theft of property 

valued at more than $50 from Hobby Lobby. (CR p. 5) 

Police Officer Javier Cantu testified that Jasmine Esparza had been 

detained in the office at the Hobby Lobby store and was found to have 
property in her purse worth over $200 belonging to Hobby Lobby. (RR vol. 

2, p. 76) 

Hobby Lobby store manager Andy Moreno testified that Hernandez 

and Esparza were both selecting merchandise randomly and placing it in 

Esparza’s bag (RR vol. 2, p. 83), and that Hernandez was side-by-side with 

Esparza and was herself placing items in Esparza’s bag. (RR vol. 2, p. 92) 

Specifically, Hernandez was taking down merchandize, including jewelry 

and children’s clothing, which was later recovered from Esparza’s bag. (RR 

vol. 2, pp. 84-85) Esparza then left the store without paying for the 

merchandise, but was caught and escorted back into the store. (RR vol. 2, p. 

86) 

Gilda Hernandez testified that she went to Hobby Lobby with 

Esparza, who was a friend of her daughter. (RR vol. 2, p. 103) Hernandez 

specifically denied that she intended to take anything from Hobby Lobby. 

(RR vol. 2, pp. 106, 111) Hernandez claimed that, at some point, she found 

out that Esparza was “taking things,” but she denied helping Esparza take 

any items or picking out any items for Esparza to place in her bag. (RR vol. 

2, pp. 106, 109) Hernandez also denied that she was walking around with 

Esparza in Hobby Lobby. (RR vol. 2, p. 120) 

2
The Jury Charge submitted the theory of party liability to the jury, 

instructing them that Hernandez was criminally responsible “if, acting with 

intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, she solicit[ed], 

encourage[d], direct[ed], aid[ed], or attempt[ed] to aid [another] person to 

commit the offense.” (CR pp. 9, 11) See Tex. Penal Code § 7.02 (a) (2).

Hernandez was found guilty by a jury and was sentenced by the trial 

court to 25 days in jail. (CR p. 18)

II. Standard of Review.

In order to determine if the evidence is legally sufficient, the appellate 

court reviews all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict 

and determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). In Brooks v. State, 323 

S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), the Court of Criminal Appeals 

abandoned factual sufficiency review and determined that the Jackson v. 

Virginia legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing 

court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient. This 

“familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact 

fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to 

draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Padilla v. 

3
State, 326 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 319). 

The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and 

the strength of the evidence, Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1999), and, as such, may choose to believe or disbelieve any

portion of the witnesses' testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1986). When faced with conflicting evidence, the 

reviewing court should presume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in favor 

of the prevailing party. Padilla, 326 S.W.3d at 200; Turro v. State, 867 

S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 

III. Application to the Present Theft Conviction.

A person commits theft if he “unlawfully appropriates property with 

intent to deprive the owner of property.” Tex. Penal Code § 31.03 (a). To 

“appropriate” is defined as “to acquire or otherwise exercise control over 

property other than real property.” Tex. Penal Code § 31.01(4)(B).

In the shoplifting context, the Court of Criminal Appeals has stated 

that “it is not essential that the property be taken off the premises; it is 

instead only essential that the evidence show an ‘exercise of control over the 

property,’ coupled with an ‘intent to deprive the owner of the property.’” 

Hill v. State, 633 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). In Hill, the 

4
Court found sufficient evidence of both exercise of control and intent to 

deprive in the defendant’s act of placing an item of merchandise under his 

shirt. Id.; see also Roberson v. State, 821 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref'd) (evidence sufficient to show appropriation 

where defendant removed tags from shirt and concealed it in a bag).

In the present case, Moreno’s testimony clearly shows that Hernandez 

was assisting Esparza to obtain merchandize and place it inside her bag, 

which sufficiently shows both an exercise of control and an intent to deprive. 

Although Hernandez and Esparza might have had the right to carry the 

merchandise in question or place it in a shopping cart or basket before taking 

it to the checkout, the act of placing it inside a bag, like placing merchandise 

under a shirt in Hill, goes beyond what is reasonably expected and 

sufficiently shows both an exercise of control and an intent to deprive 

Hoddy Lobby of the merchandise in question.

As with any other question of circumstantial evidence and inference, 

the fact finder may use common sense and apply common knowledge, 

observation, and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life when 

giving affect to the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the 

evidence. Obigbo v. State, 6 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, no 

pet.); Jones v. State, 900 S.W.2d 392, 399 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, 

5
pet. ref’d); Wawrykow v. State, 866 S.W.2d 87, 88-89 (Tex. App.--

Beaumont 1993, pet ref'd) (citing United States v. Heath, 970 F.2d 1397, 

1402 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also Saenz v. State, 976 S.W.2d 314, 322 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.) (“Jurors are expected to draw upon 

their own experiences and common knowledge and apply them to the facts

at hand.”).

The reasonable inference here is that Hernandez and Esparza were 

shoplifting. Esparza’s act of leaving the store without paying for the 

merchandise in question only confirms the reliability of this inference.

In addition, the fact finder may consider a defendant's implausible and 

inconsistent statements as affirmative evidence of guilt. See Gear v. State,

340 S.W.3d 743, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Padilla v. State, 326 S.W.3d 

195, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). As the court of criminal appeals has 

noted, “the carriage, behavior, bearing, manner and appearance of a 

witness—in short, his ‘demeanor’—is a part of the evidence.” Padilla, 326 

S.W.3d at 201 (quoting Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 268–69 (2nd 

Cir. 1952)).

In the present case, assuming that the jury believed Moreno’s 

testimony that Hernandez was with Esparza in the store and actively helping 

6
her to put merchandise in her bag, Hernandez’s untruthful denials provide 

additional affirmative evidence of her guilt.

The evidence was legally sufficient to support the theft conviction and 

Hernandez’s issue on appeal should be overruled.

PRAYER

For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the 

judgment of the trial court be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Douglas K. Norman

___________________

Douglas K. Norman

State Bar No. 15078900

Assistant District Attorney

105th Judicial District of Texas

901 Leopard, Room 206

Corpus Christi, Texas 78401

(361) 888-0410

(361) 888-0399 (fax)

douglas.norman@co.nueces.tx.us

7
RULE 9.4 (i) CERTIFICATION

In compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I 

certify that the number of words in this brief, excluding those matters listed 

in Rule 9.4(i)(1), is 1,262.

/s/ Douglas K. Norman

___________________

Douglas K. Norman

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a copy of this brief was e-mailed on March 25, 

2015, to Appellant’s attorney, Mr. Eric Flores.

/s/ Douglas K. Norman

___________________

Douglas K. Norman

8