# FILED
September 9, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT KNOXVILLE APRIL 1998 SESSION

) STATE OF TENN ESSEE, ) ) C.C.A. No. 03C01-9709-CR-00376 Appellee, ) ) Loudon County V. ) ) Honorable E. Eu gene Eblen, Jud ge JAMES G. SNIDER, ) ) (First Degree Murder) Appellant. ) )

FOR THE APPE LLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: A. Phillip Lomonaco John Knox Walkup Attorney at Law Attorney General & Repor ter 112 Durwoo d Drive Knoxville, TN 37922 Todd R. Kelley Assistant Attorney Gener al 425 Fifth Avenue North Nashville, TN 37243 Charles E . Hawk District Attorney General Frank Harvey Roger Delp Assistant District A

ttorneys General P.O. Box 703 Kingston, TN 37763

OPINION FILED: _______________________
AFFIRMED PAUL G. SUMM ERS, Judge-2- O P I N I O N
In January 1997, James G. Snider was convicted by a Loudon County jury of first degree murder and sentenc ed to life imprisonment for the May 1995 shooting death of Bradley Packett. The appellant’s sole issue f or our review is whether the evidence i s sufficient to support his conv iction for first degree murder. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The appellant, James Snider, w as seventeen years old at the time he killed Bradley Packet

t. Snider, whose parents were divorced, had lived at one time or another with his mother, his father, his aunt, and finally with his mate rnal grandpar ents in Le noir City, T ennesse e. His grand father h ad passe d away a few years earlier, so at the time of the shooting, he lived in the house with his grandmother.
Apparently, the appellant had an apartment of his own in the bas ement of his grandmother’s house. I t had a separate entrance wi th a door that would lock

. The appellant lived there w ith his girlfriend, H ollie Key, in the basement apartment. In the months leading up to the shooting, the appellant had attended school sporadically and had increased his use of alcoho l and marijuana. Basically, he did as he

pleased without any adul t supervision. Accor

ding to testimony adduced at trial , the appellant’s grandmother kept marijuana in her home and sold it to the appellant’ s friends.
The appellant had a party at his apartment approximately two weeks before the shooting. The victi m, Bradley Packett, and other friends of the appellant were in attendance, and alcohol and drugs were being used. Hollie Key, the appellant’s gi rlfriend, testified that at some po int, a fight ensued between Bradley Packett and another individual w ho was drunk. This indi vidual-3- had Packett on the ground w hen the appellant interceded and br oke up the fight. She also testified that the appell ant was not angry w ith Packett.
Dwayne Crass, a fri end of the appellant’s, testified that he had a conversation with the appellant approximately a month before the shooting and that the appellant had asked w hen Packett would be home by himself. Jason Mealer, another friend of the appell ant’s, testified that he stole a shotgun and sold it to the appellant for $75.00 four days before the shooting. He testified that he and the appellant had done some shooti ng of the gun in the appellant’ s yard. Mealer also testified that abo ut a week before the shooting , the appellant stated that he was going to go to the victim’s house and get the money that was due him.
On the day of the shooting, J ohnny Vincil, a friend of the appe llant’s, arrived at the appellant’ s apartment between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m. Vincil and the appellant smoked some marijuana. Vincil saw about one-fourth of a pound of marijuana that the appellant had stolen from his grandmother. The appellant’s grandmother came downstair s to the apartment and told the appell ant that she was kicking him out

of the house because he had stolen from her.The appellant then took his girlfriend,Hollie Key, to w ork, while Vincil

stayed at the apartment. The appellant took the marijuana w ith him when he took Key to work because he did not want his grandmother to find it. When the appellant returned to the apartment, he and Vincil decided to drive around, and then went to a golf ball driving range. Sometime thereafter, when they began looking for the marij uana in the car, it was not there. Vincil testified that he believed that the appellant’s grandmother had taken the marij uana out of the car when the appell ant returned from taking his girlfr

iend to work. Vincil

and the appellant went insi de the house, and the appellant confronted his grandmoth er, telling her that the marijuana in the car belonged to Vincil . His grandmother told h im that she did not care and that “he was gone” an yway.-4- Vincil and the appellant decided to fabricate a story to tell the app ellant’s grandmother that someone else had s tolen the marijuana. Bradley Packett was suggested because the appellant’s grandmother already thought that h e was a thief. The appellant went to Pack ett’s house to bring him bac k, and Vincil went to sleep. Vincil testified that he was not concerned about the appellant confronting the victim.
Susan Brackett, the roommate of the appel lant’s aunt, testified that on the day of the shooting, the appellant came over to their house and he was very upset. Brackett liv

es in the same neighborhood as the appellant and Packett. She testified that the appellant was crying uncontrollably and even vomited. He stated t hat his gra ndmoth er was going t o kick him out and t hat he di d not have anywhere to go. She further testified that the appellant’s aunt, T ina, told him that she would spe ak with his grandmot her. The appe llant got into his c ar to go to his g randmoth er’s, a nd after taking care of a

few thi ngs, Br

ackett a nd Tina l eft to go to th e grandmo ther’s ho use. Alth ough it on ly takes a m inute or s o to drive there, the appellant was not there when they arri

ved. After about two or three minutes, the appellant arriv ed. He had the shotgun in his hand, and stated that he had shot Bradley Packett.
Dr. Sandra Elkins performed a n autopsy on the victi m. She testified that the back part of the victim’s head was no longer intact, with almost the entire brain outside the head. She i dentified shotgun pellets that w ere found in the victim’s skull and stated that the entrance wound was “in the top part of the back of the roof of the mouth.” She f urther testified that the cause of death was a shotgun blast inside the mouth.On cross-examination,Dr. Elkins testified that this case was atypi cal of a suicide and a homicide, noting that there were no chipped teeth. She also questi oned whether the victi m might have voluntari ly put the gun in his mouth.-5- Dr. Diana McCoy, a clinical psychologist, testified about the appellant’s social background. She al so testified that the appellant st ated that when he was at Packett’s house, Packett w ent over to open a window. As he opened the window, the appellant shot him in the back of the head from a dis tance of about two or four feet. Accordi ng to Dr. McCoy’ s testimony, the appellant i ndicated that he did recall pumping the gun, stepping forwar d, and then starting to shake

.
The appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for first deg ree murder. At the time of the shooti ng, first degree murder was defined as an intent ional, premeditated, and deliber ate killing of another. The appellant insists that there is no evidence that he acted in a premeditated or deliberate manner. In support of his argument, the appellant notes that all the witnes ses who saw him at the time of the shooting testified that shortly before the killing, the appellant was “violently ill from emotional upheaval” to the point of vomiting. F urthermore, after the shooting,the appellant returned , threw the shotgun on the g round, and announced that he had kill ed Bradley Packett.
The appellant further asserts that even if Bradley Packett was shot through the mouth, “this fact, i f true, does not detract from the fact that James Snider was acting i n an emotionally charged state. “ The appellant maintains that the state offered no proof about how th e appellant acted on the day of the murder, and in fact, none of the state’s witnesses even saw

the appellant on the day of the shooting. Furthe rmore, he insists that thos e who saw him that day testified that he was “sev erely emotional and distr aught to the point of physical illness.” The state asserts that the evi dence is sufficient to support a c onviction for first degree murder. Fi rst, it contends that the appel lant’s prior relation ship with the victim could lead a j ury to infer a motive for murder: the victim lost a bet to the appellant and then refused to pay. The ap pellant, according to the state’s-6- theory, had been attempting to collect the money for ove r a month, but he was unable to get the money from the v ictim. Second, the state arg ues that the appellant’s actions indic ate that he was planning the killing. The appellant questioned friends of the victim about when the victim might be home alon e. He bought a shotgun four days be fore the murder and had been engagi ng in target practice in his yar

d. The appellant had been tryi ng to obtain twenty do llars from the victim for a bet that he had won. Third, the state ins ists that the nature of the killing suggest

s an intentional killing

based on a preconceived desi gn. It argues that the appellant, armed with the shotgun that he had bo ught four days earlier, went to Bradley Packe

tt’s house when the vi ctim was alone, placed the shotgun in Packett’s mouth and fired it , thereby causing the v ictim’s death. Therefore, the state insists that a jur y could have found that the appel lant acted with premeditation and deliberation.

Once a homicide has occurred,it is presumed to be second deg ree murder, and the state has the burden of proving first degr

ee murder. State v. Brown , 836 S.W.2d 530, 54 3 (Tenn. 1992). At the time of the shooting, first degree murder was defined as “[a]n intentional, premeditat ed and deliberate killing of another.” Tenn. C ode Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1) ( amended July 1, 1995). A deliberate act is one performed with a cool purpose, and a prem editated act is one done after the exercise of reflec tion and judgment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-201(b) (deleted by amendment, July 1, 1995). Premeditation indicates “a previously formed design or intent to kill.” State v. West , 844 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tenn. 1992). Great weight is acc

orded jury verdic

ts in criminal trial s. Jury verdict s accredit the state’s witnesses and resolve all evidentiary conflicts in the state’s favor. State v. Willia ms , 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983); State v. Banes , 874 S.W.2d 73, 78 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). On appeal, th e state is entitled to both the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn. 1978).-7- Moreover, guilty

verdicts remove the presumption of innocence, enjoyed by defendants at trial, and replace i t with a presumption of gui lt. State v. Grace , 493 S.W.2d 474 (Tenn. 1973). Appellants, therefore, car ry the burden of overcoming a presumption of guilt when appealing jury convictions

. Id.
When appellants challen ge the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must determine whether, after v iewing the evidenc

e in a light most favorabl e to the prosecution, any rati onal trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doub t. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); State v. Duncan , 698 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. 1985). The weight and credibil ity of a witness’ tes timony are matters entrust ed exclusively

to the jury as the trier

s of fact. State v. Sheffield , 676 S.W.2d 542 (Te nn. 1984); Byrge v. State , 575 S.W.2d 292 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1978).

From our review of the record, the appellant was reared in an environment that is largely responsible for his problems. It truly does appear as one witness testified that Snider never had a chance to have a decent l ife. We are troubled not only by the loss o

f Bradley Packett’s life but also by the loss of James Snider’s life. The record r eveals that these two y oung lives were destined for tragedy by their use of alcohol and drugs and thei r lack of adult supervis ion.
Although the circum stances of this ca se are tra gic for all concerne d, we must nevertheless follow the law. The record indi cates that the appellant bought a shotgun four days before the sho oting and proceeded to engag e in target practice. He also made stat ements to other individual s that he was determined to get the money that Packett owed him from a bet, and the appellant had inquired when Packett might be home alone. Finally, and most significantly, are the autopsy results, as testified to by Dr. Sandra Elkins, that indicate that it is physically imposs ible for the victim to hav e been shot in the back of the head as the appellant stated to his psy chologist, Dr. Dian a McCoy. Dr. Elk ins testified-8- that the cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head, with the ent rance wound inside the vic

tim’s mouth. Thus, any rati onal trier of fact could have found the evidence sufficient to conv ict the appellant of the intentional , premeditated, and deliberate killing

of Bradley Packett. The ev idence is, therefore, sufficient.
We affirm the appellant’s conviction and his sentence.-9- _______________________ PAUL G. SUMMERS, Ju dge CONCUR:

____________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, Jud ge

____________________________ CURWOOD W ITT, Judge