alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
July 1, 2015

Mr. Carl France

Alaska Aerial Services

3875 Geist Road, Suite E #210

Fairbanks, AK 99709

Dear Mr. France:

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption from 

part 21 and §§ 45.23(b), 61.113(a) and (b), 91.7(a), 91.9(b)(2), 91.103, 91.109, 91.119, 

91.121, 91.151(a), 91.203(a) and (b), 91.405(a), 407(a)(1), 409(a)(2), and 417(a) and (b) of 

Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). It explains why we cannot process your 

request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Cannot Process Your Request

We entered your April 22, 2015, exemption request on behalf of Alaska Aerial Services into 

the public docket (No. FAA−2015−1202), but we are unable to process your request any 

further. The information you sent does not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy 

enclosed). For us to consider the request any further, you must send us all of the following:

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would 

benefit the public as a whole.

 The reasons why the exemption would not adversely affect safety or how the exemption 

would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which you 

seek an exemption.

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request.

What You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described 

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your 

petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption.
2

If We Do Not Hear From You

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you 

further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267-9677.

Sincerely,

Brenda Robeson

Program Analyst, Aircraft and 

 Airport Rules Division

Enclosure
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Denied and Memorandum Opinion filed May 

7, 2020.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-20-00220-CV

IN RE FILA-MAR ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

165th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2018-90836

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On March 18, 2020, relator Fila-Mar Energy Services, LLC filed a petition 

for writ of mandamus in this court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221 (Supp.); see 

also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the petition, relator asks this court to compel the 

Honorable Ursula A. Hall, presiding judge of the 165th District Court of Harris 

County, to: (1) vacate her February 10, 2020 order denying relator’s motion to 

dismiss for forum non conveniens and (2) grant such motion.
2

Because relator has not shown it is entitled to mandamus relief, we deny its

petition for writ of mandamus.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Hassan, and Poissant.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

April 25, 2011 

y0418 

Order 

 

April 25, 2011 

142299 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 142299 

 COA: 293015 

Kalkaska CC: 08-003028-FC 

SHELDON JAMES MCDONALD, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 26, 2010 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

MARCELINO CHAVEZ,

Appellant,

v.

UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER 

OF EL PASO F/K/A THOMASON 

MEDICAL CENTER,

Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-14-00190-CV

Appeal from the

41st District Court

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 2010-3010)

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes the appeal should be 

dismissed for want of prosecution. We therefore dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. We 

further order Appellant pay all costs of this appeal, and this decision be certified below for 

observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 27TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2014.

GUADALUPE RIVERA, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Rodriguez, JJ.
#### Ann FORD, Movant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Opposed.

Court *of*Appeals of Kentucky.

Oct. 5, 1951.

V. R. Bentley, Pikeville, for movant.

A. E. Funk, Atty. Gen., Wm. F. Simpson, Asst. Atty. Gen., opposed.

PER CURIAM.

Motion for an appeal from the Pike Circuit Court. Judgment of conviction for selling whiskey in local option territory and imposing sentence of $50 fin'e and 30 days in jail.

Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed.
1 In The 

### Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________ N O . 09

- 22

- 00303

- CR

__________________ AARON I. ARMSTRONG , Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

__________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the Criminal District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 21

- 37367

__________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION
On July 26 , 202 2 , the trial court sentenced Aaron Armstrong on a conviction
for possession of a controlled substance

. The trial court signed a certification in which the trial court certified that this is a plea

- bargain case and Armstrong has no right of app eal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). Nonetheless, Armstrong filed a notice of appeal. The District Clerk provided the certification to the Court of Appeals.
On September 1 4 , 2022, we notified the parties that we would dismiss the appeal unless the appellan t established the certification was incorrect. None of the2 parties responded to the Court’s notice. Since the record lacks a certification saying
that Armstrong has the right of appeal, we dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d).
APPEAL DISMISSED.
PER CURIAM

Submitted on October 11, 2022 Opinion Delivered October 12, 2022 Do Not Publish Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
#### WILLIAMSON COCA-COLA BOTTLING CO., Movant, v. Billie RUNYON, etc., Opposed. WILLIAMSON COCA-COLA BOTTLING CO., Movant, v. Mary WOLFORD, Opposed.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Feb. 27, 1953.

J. P. Hobson, Jr., Pikeville, Bias & Bias, Williamson, W. Va., Hobson & Scott, Pike-ville, for movant.

E. J. Picklesimer, Pikeville, for opposed.

PER CURIAM.

Motion for an appeal from the Pike Circuit Court. Judgment in favor of plaintiffs in each case for $300 as damages suffered *645from illness caused plaintiffs from allegedly drinking contents from a bottle of coca-cola containing a foreign substance or object. The facts, questions raised, authorities cited and applicable law have been carefully considered and we find no error in the record.

Judgment in each case affirmed.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

June 28, 2011 

h0620 

Order 

 

June 28, 2011 

141914 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 141914 

 COA: 255257 

Wayne CC: 03-013651-01 

TAVARIS MARKEITH BLANKS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 17, 2010 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
MEMORANDUM

DATE: 08/19/2014

FROM: Laura Farris/EPA Region 8

TO: Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants; Docket Id: OAR–2013-0602

SUBJECT: Center for the New Energy Economy Section Clean Power Plan Meeting - August 18, 

2014 

SUMMARY: 

EPA Region 8 staff met with representatives from the Center for the New Energy Economy on Monday, 

August 18, 2014, to discuss various aspects of the proposed rule under section 111(d) of the Clean Air 

Act. The rule was proposed on June 2, 2014.

ATTENDEES:

EPA Region 8

Joan Card

Carl Daly

Laura Farris

Callie Videtich via phone

Darcy O’Connor

Center for the New Energy Economy

Former Colorado Governor Bill Ritter

Patrick Cummins

Jeff Lyng
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-50426

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

KIOR DEJAY GOODLEY,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas, Midland Odessa

USDC No. 7:11-CR-318-1

Before JOLLY, JONES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Kior Dejay Goodley appeals his guilty plea conviction for conspiracy to

possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine. He contends that there is an

insufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea because he joined the

conspiracy when he was a juvenile and the factual basis does not sufficiently

establish a specific affirmative act that ratified his participation in the

conspiracy after he reached the age of majority. See United States v. Peters, 283

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 9, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

 Case: 12-50426 Document: 00512401962 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/09/2013
No. 12-50426

F.3d 300, 309 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[a] juvenile ‘ratifies’ his involvement

in a conspiracy by continuing to participate in an ongoing conspiracy after his

18th birthday”).

Because Goodley did not object to the sufficiency of the factual basis

underlying his plea in the district court, review is for plain error only. United

States v. Palmer, 456 F.3d 484, 489 (5th Cir. 2006). To establish plain error, an

appellant must show a forfeited error that is clear or obvious and that affects his

substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009). If the

appellant makes such a showing, this court has the discretion to correct the error

but only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings. Id.

Although the record supports Goodley’s assertions that he joined the

conspiracy when he was a juvenile, he was not a juvenile at the time he was

indicted and the indictment to which he pleaded guilty charged him only for his

participation in the conspiracy as an adult. Goodley cites no authority, and we

have found none, requiring that the factual basis for a guilty plea establish adult

ratification of participation in a conspiracy the defendant joined as a juvenile,

where the defendant is indicted as an adult and the indictment charges

participation in the conspiracy only as an adult. Accordingly, he has failed to

establish a clear or obvious error.

AFFIRMED.

2

 Case: 12-50426 Document: 00512401962 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/09/2013
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-6331

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. COURTNEY ANTHONY BAILEY, Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge. (8:05-cr-00099-AW-1; 8:07-cv-00290-AW)

Submitted: August 17, 2009 Decided: August 26, 2009

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Courtney Anthony Bailey, Appellant Pro Se. Chan Park, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.PER CURIAM: Courtney Anthony Bailey seeks to appeal the district court’s order treating his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion as a successive 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2009) motion, and dismissing it on that basis. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006); Reid v. Angelone , 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district

court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000);

Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Bailey has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. Additionally, we construe Bailey’s notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to file a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255. United States v.

Winestock , 340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2003). In order to

23 obtain authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion, a prisoner must assert claims based on either: (1) newly discovered evidence, not previously discoverable by due diligence, that would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, previously unavailable, made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral review. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255(h) (West Supp. 2009). Bailey’s claims do not satisfy either of these criteria. Therefore, we deny authorization to file a successive § 2255

motion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
##### 



Exhibit 32.2 Certification of Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, the undersigned officer of Triple Net Properties, LLC, the Manager of NNN 2002 Value Fund,
LLC (the Company) hereby certifies, to his knowledge, that: (i) the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company. /s/   Scott D. PetersScott D. PetersChief Financial Officer
Triple Net Properties, LLC,
the Manager of NNN 2002 Value Fund, LLC Date: April 27, 2005 A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the
Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. The foregoing certification is being furnished with the Companys Form 10-K for the period
ended December 31, 2004 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350. It is not being filed for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and it is not to be incorporated by
reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless
of any general information language in such filing.
# Contents

Data 1

http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngc2w.htm

U.S. Energy Information Administration

infoctr@eia.doe.gov

# Data 1

Back to Contents
#### Leonard WEBB, Movant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Opposed.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

April 24, 1953.

Rehearing Denied June 19, 1953.

Redwine & Redwine, Winchester, for movant.

J. D. Buckman, Jr., Atty. Gen., Wm. F. Simpson, Asst. Atty, Gen., opposed.

PER CURIAM.

Motion for an appeal from the Clark Circuit Court. Judgment of conviction for operating motor truck on public highway with a weight exceeding the statutory limits. $500 fine. The facts, questions presented, authorities cited and applicable law have been carefully considered.

Judgment affirmed.
STEAM ELECTRIC

C B I R E P L AC E M E NT P A G E

EPA

- HQ

- OW

- 20 09

- 0819

DCN:

________________________________________

T H E FO LL OW ING H AS BEE N R E M O V E D BE CAUSE IT
C O N T AINS C O N F ID E N T IAL B USIN E SS IN FO RMA T I O N (C B I) P E R 4 0 C F R P ART 2
, SU B P ART B

. SE0 4360A163
#### MULLINS v. STATE.

No. 23167.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 30, 1945.

No attorney for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

The State has filed a motion to abate the appeal, on the ground that the appellant has voluntarily escaped from the County Jail of Hidalgo County, where he was confined awaiting the termination of his case on appeal. The requirements of the statute are complied with and, under the rule, the • appeal is dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998             DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998             DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         195,728                 402,373
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  142,999                 411,052
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                       0
<INVENTORY>                                          0               2,389,162
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               385,426               3,331,740
<PP&E>                                         337,362                 791,776
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (82,579)               (348,879)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,308,364               9,795,014
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          228,756               3,873,101
<BONDS>                                              0               1,750,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                         5,899                   7,690
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,060,422               4,107,389
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,308,364               9,795,014
<SALES>                                              0                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,797,632               4,723,697
<CGS>                                                0                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,179,888              11,966,506
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,041                 519,031
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (399,266)             (7,761,840)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (399,266)             (7,761,840)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (399,266)             (7,761,840)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.082)                 (1.123)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.082)                 (1.123)


</TABLE>
#### GOLEMON v. STATE.

No. 24746.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 24, 1950.

Rehearing Denied June 21, 1950.

J. H. Letts, Pliny V. Myers, Brann Fuller, all of Houston, for appellant.

Thomas J. Hightower, District Attor- ' ney, of Liberty, R. A. Richardson, County Attorney, of Kountze, H. A. Coe, Special Prosecutor, of Kountze, George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was assessed the death penalty for the murder with malice of Cloyce Eloise Twitchell.

This is a companion case to our No. 24,688, Leviness v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 230 S.W.2d 814, and is suibj ect to the same objection relative to the grand jury that found the indictment in that instance. ■

The appellant was indicted on July 5, 1949, by a grand jury that had been originally drawn for a term of court superseded by the statute, as shown in House Bill No. 780 of the 51st Legislature, Regular Session, 1949, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 199, district 75, § 3, such new statute taking effect on May 12, 1949, and by its terms making this grand jury operative for the new term beginning on the first Monday in September, 1949. At the time of the finding of this indictment, the grand jury provided for the September term was sitting as the grand jury for a term called on May 14, 1949, as the grand jury for such session.

After careful consideration, we held in our No. 24,688, Leviness v. State, that this was not a valid grand jury. The holding is the same herein.

Therefore, this judgment is reversed and the' prosecution ordered dismissed.

*817On State’s Motion for Rehearing.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

For the reason stated in the companion case of Leviness v. State, No. 24,688, Tex.Cr.App., 230 S.W.2d 814, the state’s motion for rehearing is overruled.

Opinion approved by the court.
EXHIBIT 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18. U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The undersigned
executive officers of BCSB Bankcorp, Inc. (the Company) hereby certify that this Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the period covered by the Report.



By:

/s/ Gary C. LoraditchName:

Gary C. LoraditchTitle:

PresidentBy:

/s/ Bonnie M. KleinName:

Bonnie M. KleinTitle:

Vice President and Treasurer




Date: December 28, 2004