[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-3729.] 

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 

an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested 

to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 

65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-3729

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. BUNSTINE.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine, Slip Opinion 

No. 2015-Ohio-3729.] 

Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Existence of attorney-client relationship not 

proven by clear and convincing evidence—Attorney failed to cooperate in 

disciplinary investigation—Six-month suspension with no credit for time 

served under prior suspension. 

(No. 2014-1392—Submitted February 3, 2015—Decided September 16, 2015.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 2013-028. 

_______________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Edward Royal Bunstine of Chillicothe, Ohio, Attorney 

Registration No. 0030127, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1981. 

Since 2012, we have twice disciplined Bunstine for engaging in professional 
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2

misconduct—first imposing a stayed six-month suspension for his dishonest 

conduct in a criminal case involving acquaintances and then imposing a one-year 

suspension with six months conditionally stayed after Bunstine made a sexually 

suggestive request of a client and drove to her home to see if she would comply. 

See Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine, 131 Ohio St.3d 302, 2012-Ohio-977, 964 

N.E.2d 427; Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine (“Bunstine II”), 136 Ohio St.3d 

276, 2013-Ohio-3681, 995 N.E.2d 184. 

{¶ 2} In a May 13, 2013 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged 

Bunstine, in Count One, with a number of violations of the Rules of Professional 

Conduct arising from his alleged representation of Gary Freeland in a criminal 

matter and, in Count Two, with failing to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary 

investigation. A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 

Discipline1

 conducted a hearing on February 10, 2014. The panel overruled 

Bunstine’s motion to dismiss the complaint but unanimously dismissed the 

charges as to four of the alleged rule violations, for insufficient evidence. The 

panel found that although Bunstine denied having agreed to represent Freeland, an 

attorney-client relationship nonetheless arose by implication and that in the 

context of that attorney-client relationship, Bunstine failed to provide competent 

representation, knowingly made a false statement of fact to a tribunal, engaged in 

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, engaged in 

conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and failed to cooperate in 

relator’s investigation. For this misconduct, the panel recommended that 

Bunstine be suspended from the practice of law for two years, with 18 months 

stayed and no credit for any time served under the suspension we imposed on 

August 28, 2013, in Bunstine II. 

 

1

 Effective January 1, 2015, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has been 

renamed the Board of Professional Conduct. See Gov.Bar R. V(1)(A), 140 Ohio St.3d CII. 
January Term, 2015 

3

{¶ 3} The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and conclusions of 

law but unanimously recommended that Bunstine be indefinitely suspended from 

the practice of law with credit for time served under the Bunstine II suspension. 

Bunstine objects and argues that the record does not support the board’s findings 

of fact and misconduct and that the entire complaint should be dismissed because, 

he claims, relator failed to afford him due process. 

{¶ 4} While we agree that Bunstine failed to cooperate with relator’s 

investigation into the underlying allegations of misconduct, we find that the 

evidence offered in support of the underlying allegations is not clear and 

convincing. Therefore, we dismiss Count One of relator’s complaint; find that 

Bunstine failed to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation, as alleged in 

Count Two, in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) and former Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) 

(now Gov.Bar R. V(9)(G)); overrule Bunstine’s remaining objections; and 

suspend him from the practice of law for six months with no credit for time 

served under his prior suspension. 

Misconduct 

Count One—The Underlying Allegations of Misconduct

{¶ 5} In Count One of the complaint, relator alleged multiple rule 

violations, including that Bunstine failed to provide competent representation to a 

client, Gary Wayne Freeland, that he made a false statement to a tribunal, that he 

engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and that his conduct 

was prejudicial to the administration of justice. The threshold issue, however, is 

whether an attorney-client relationship ever existed between Bunstine and 

Freeland. 

{¶ 6} In December 2011, Freeland was arrested on a five-count indictment 

and asked his daughter, Sharon, to call Bunstine, who had previously represented 

him in divorce proceedings. It is undisputed that Bunstine visited Freeland at the 
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Ross County jail later that day and that he instructed Freeland to have the public 

defender’s office represent him at his arraignment. 

{¶ 7} After the arraignment, Bunstine met with Freeland at the jail on 

several occasions and continued to discuss the case with Sharon, who delivered 

$10,000 to him. The purpose of that $10,000 payment and Bunstine’s role in 

Freeland’s criminal defense were contested at the panel hearing. In his 

videotaped deposition, Freeland testified that once Sharon had delivered the 

money to Bunstine, he believed Bunstine was his attorney. Bunstine, in contrast, 

maintained that he never represented Freeland in his criminal matter because he 

had reserved the right to review the discovery before accepting the case and the 

public defender initially refused to release discovery to him until he entered an 

appearance in the case—which he refused to do. 

{¶ 8} At a hearing on the public defender’s motion to withdraw from 

Freeland’s case, the judge inquired about Bunstine’s involvement in the case. He 

asked Bunstine whether he had received money from Freeland, and Bunstine 

replied, “No, your honor.” On further questioning, Bunstine acknowledged that 

he had received $10,000 from Sharon. But when the judge inquired, “Why don’t 

I have an appearance from ya?” Bunstine replied, “I represent Sharon Freeland, 

your honor.” When asked to describe the nature of his representation, Bunstine 

stated, “She’s asked me to look into this matter.” 

{¶ 9} Freeland’s daughter, Sharon, served as his attorney-in-fact and 

communicated with Bunstine on his behalf. She testified at the hearing, and the 

parties submitted her deposition transcript as a stipulated exhibit. The board’s 

findings demonstrate that Sharon’s testimony was often contradictory—

sometimes supporting Freeland’s version of events and at other times supporting 

Bunstine’s position. 

{¶ 10} For example, Sharon remembered that Bunstine told her that he 

would not agree to represent her father or enter an appearance in his case until he 
January Term, 2015 

5

first had read over the discovery and decided if he could help. She recalled that 

Bunstine said that they would need to hire a private investigator and a 

psychologist and have Freeland take a polygraph test, and she understood that the 

$10,000 payment she made to Bunstine would be used to pay for those services. 

She also testified that she shared all of this information with Freeland and that he 

had agreed. 

{¶ 11} The board noted that Sharon initially denied having intended to 

retain Bunstine, stating, “I can’t say that I gave him money to be dad’s attorney.” 

Rather, she believed that the money she gave Bunstine was going to help get 

information regarding her father’s case and acknowledged that he “already had 

the State” representing him. But she later contradicted herself when relator asked 

who she thought was her dad’s attorney, replying, “I truly believed it was 

Bunstine.” 

{¶ 12} The board found that Freeland had a reasonable expectation that an 

attorney-client relationship existed once he paid Bunstine, and it therefore 

determined that an attorney-client relationship arose by implication. See, e.g., 

Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Hardiman, 100 Ohio St.3d 260, 2003-Ohio-5596, 798 

N.E.2d 369, syllabus (recognizing that an attorney-client relationship can be 

formed by implication based on “the conduct of the parties and the reasonable 

expectations of the person seeking representation”). The board also found that 

Bunstine (1) failed to provide competent representation to Freeland, (2) 

knowingly made false statements to the court about his role in Freeland’s case, (3) 

engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and 

(4) engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice. 

{¶ 13} Bunstine objects to the board’s findings of fact and misconduct. 

He argues that he reserved the right to review the discovery in Freeland’s case 

before deciding whether he would represent Freeland. Therefore, he contends 

that relator has failed to prove that an attorney-client relationship came into being 
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6

or that he engaged in any additional misconduct in the Freeland matter. For the 

reasons that follow, we agree. 

{¶ 14} In attorney-discipline matters, the relator must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence the facts necessary to establish an ethical violation. Ohio 

State Bar Assn. v. Reid, 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 708 N.E.2d 193 (1999), paragraph two 

of the syllabus. Clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate measure of 

proof that requires evidence sufficient to produce “ ‘a firm belief or conviction as 

to the facts sought to be established.’ ” Id. at 331, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 

Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶ 15} Having considered the board’s findings of fact and reviewed the 

record in this case, we acknowledge that there is some evidence tending to show 

that an attorney-client relationship arose by implication. But given (1) Sharon’s 

role as Freeland’s attorney-in-fact, (2) her knowledge of Bunstine’s intention not 

to accept Freeland’s representation until he reviewed the discovery and 

determined whether he could help, and (3) the contradictions the board noted in 

her testimony, we are not firmly convinced that Freeland had a reasonable 

expectation that Bunstine was his attorney. Nor are we convinced that Bunstine’s 

statements to the judge about his involvement in the Freeland matter were 

knowingly false. Therefore, we sustain Bunstine’s objections as to Count One of 

relator’s complaint and dismiss that count in its entirety. 

Count Two—Failure to Cooperate

{¶ 16} On March 7, 2012, relator sent Bunstine a letter of inquiry 

regarding a grievance filed by a Ross County deputy prosecuting attorney. 

Relator alleged that Bunstine had spoken to Gary Freeland about his criminal 

matter without first seeking permission of the public defender, who was at that 

time Freeland’s attorney of record, and that his conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 4.2 

(prohibiting a lawyer from communicating about the subject of the representation 

with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer unless the 
January Term, 2015 

7

lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law or a court 

order). 

{¶ 17} Bunstine responded to this initial letter of inquiry but failed to 

respond to two subsequent letters in which relator sought additional information. 

Relator deposed Bunstine pursuant to a subpoena on June 28, 2012. Bunstine 

testified that he failed to respond to relator’s second and third letters of inquiry 

because he “didn’t believe it was relevant” and “didn’t want to waste [his] time,” 

and that he had not notified relator of this position. While he was aware of the 

open disciplinary investigation and acknowledged that he had a duty to cooperate 

in the investigation, he explained, “I felt that I responded appropriately to your 

letter of inquiry initially and that was it.” 

{¶ 18} Therefore, the board found that Bunstine elected not to respond to a 

demand for information from a disciplinary authority in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 

8.1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a demand for 

information by a disciplinary authority during an investigation) and former 

Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (prohibiting a lawyer from neglecting or refusing to assist in 

a disciplinary investigation). 

{¶ 19} Bunstine objects, arguing that he was not required to respond to 

relator’s subsequent inquiries because the questions posed were not relevant to the 

alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 4.2 and the letters failed to allege any other rule 

violations. 

{¶ 20} Former Gov.Bar R. V(4)(C)(1) (now Gov.Bar R. V(9)(C)(1)) 

provides that disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee “shall review 

and may investigate any matter filed with it or that comes to its attention and may 

file a complaint pursuant to this rule in cases where it finds probable cause to 

believe that misconduct has occurred.” And Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) and former 

Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) both require attorneys to cooperate in disciplinary 

investigations. 
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8

{¶ 21} Former Gov.Bar R. V(4)(I)(2) (now Gov.Bar R. V(10)(A)) 

provides that no disciplinary investigation shall be completed without first giving 

the attorney who is the subject of the investigation notice of each allegation and 

the opportunity to respond. It does not require that relator allege specific rule 

violations in the initial stages of his investigation. Rather, it provides that such 

disclosures must be made and the respondent be given an opportunity to respond 

before the investigation is completed and the complaint is filed. Thus, relator’s 

failure to allege a specific rule violation at the earliest stages of his investigation 

does not excuse Bunstine’s failure to respond to relator’s inquiries. 

{¶ 22} Nor do we find that the charges arising from Bunstine’s admitted 

failure to respond to relator’s second and third letters of inquiry should be 

dismissed based on Bunstine’s claim that he received insufficient time to respond 

to relator’s draft complaint. There is no evidence that he requested an extension 

of time or that such a request was refused, and he did not raise this argument in 

his answer to the complaint once it was certified to the board by the probablecause panel. Therefore, we overrule Bunstine’s remaining objections and adopt 

the board’s findings of fact and misconduct with respect to Count Two of the 

complaint. 

Sanction

{¶ 23} In determining the appropriate sanction to impose for attorney 

misconduct, we consider the ethical duties the lawyer violated, the presence of 

aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B),2

 and the 

sanctions imposed for comparable misconduct. 

{¶ 24} None of the mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2) 

are present. But the following aggravating factors are relevant: Bunstine’s two 

prior disciplinary offenses, a pattern of misconduct demonstrated by the three 

 

2

 Effective January 1, 2015, the aggravating and mitigating factors previously set forth in BCGD 

Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1) and (2) are codified in Gov.Bar R. V(13), 140 Ohio St.3d CXXIV. 
January Term, 2015 

9

disciplinary proceedings initiated against Bunstine in a three-year time span, his 

failure to cooperate in the disciplinary process, and his refusal to acknowledge the 

wrongful nature of his conduct. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a), (c), (e), and 

(g). 

{¶ 25} The panel and board recommended sanctions based on their 

findings that Bunstine engaged in most of the charged misconduct, but we have 

only found violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) and former Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G). In 

Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Jaffe, 121 Ohio St.3d 260, 2009-Ohio-763, 903 

N.E.2d 628, ¶ 2-3, 7, we imposed a six-month suspension on a previously 

disciplined attorney who failed to respond to a disciplinary investigation in 

violation of former Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G). 

{¶ 26} In light of Bunstine’s misconduct and the fact that this is his third

disciplinary offense in three years, a greater sanction might be warranted. But 

given that the charges pending in this case have prevented Bunstine from seeking 

reinstatement from the one-year suspension we imposed on August 28, 2013, in 

Bunstine II, we find that a six-month suspension is appropriate. 

{¶ 27} Accordingly, Edward Royal Bunstine is suspended from the 

practice of law in Ohio for six months with no credit for the time served under the 

suspension imposed in Bunstine II. Costs are taxed to Bunstine. 

Judgment accordingly. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., 

concur. 

LANZINGER, J., dissents and would indefinitely suspend the respondent 

from the practice of law in Ohio. 

O’NEILL, J., dissents and would publically reprimand the respondent. 

_________________ 

Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Stacy Solochek Beckman and 

Michelle R. Bowman, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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Edward R. Bunstine, pro se. 

_________________