[Cite as State v. Mundt, 2016-Ohio-4802.]

STATE OF OHIO, NOBLE COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

VS. 

FREDERICK MUNDT 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

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CASE NO. 13 NO 0406 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from Court of Common 

Pleas of Noble County, Ohio 

Case No. 204-2002 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee Attorney Kelly Riddle 

406 North Street 

Caldwell, Ohio 43724 

For Defendant-Appellant Attorney Tyson Fleming 

Assistant Public Defender 

250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400 

Columbus, Ohio 43215 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Carol Ann Robb 

 

 

 Dated: June 30, 2016 
[Cite as State v. Mundt, 2016-Ohio-4802.]

DeGENARO, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Frederick Mundt, appeals the judgment of the 

Noble County Court of Common Pleas denying his petition for post-conviction relief 

on the basis of res judicata. Mundt's assignments of error are meritless and the 

judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} Mundt's direct appeal of his convictions and death sentence were 

appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court as of right. State v. Mundt, 115 Ohio St.3d 22, 

2007-Ohio-4836, 873 N.E.2d 828 (Mundt I). The facts and procedure are as follows: 

On March 9, 2004, seven-year-old Brittany Hendrickson disappeared 

from her home in Noble County. The next day, searchers found 

Brittany's raped, battered body hidden in a nearby abandoned well. 

Appellant, Frederick A. Mundt, was convicted of the aggravated murder 

of Brittany and sentenced to death. 

The evidence at Mundt's trial revealed that Brittany's mother, Misty 

Hendrickson, became acquainted with Mundt in 1999. She and her 

daughters, Brittany and Lindsay, soon moved into Mundt's house in 

Lower Salem, Noble County. In 2004, Mundt and Hendrickson lived 

there with Brittany and Lindsay, and their infant son, Shay Mundt. 

Mundt's mother, Sarah Mundt, lived nearby with her boyfriend Tim 

Bowman and their adult daughters, Mundt's half-sisters, Timica, 

Teresa, and Mary Anne Bowman. 

During the late morning or early afternoon of March 9, 2004, Mundt 

visited the Biolife Plasma Services Plasma Center in Parkersburg, West 

Virginia to sell his blood plasma. 

March 9, 2004, was a school day for Brittany Hendrickson. The school 

bus brought her home that day around 4:10 p.m., and her bus driver 

saw her go inside the house. 
- 2 - 

Five or ten minutes later, Mundt's stepfather, Tim Bowman, arrived. 

Bowman and Sarah, along with their daughter Mary Anne and her date, 

had plans to play bingo that night in Woodsfield, Ohio. Bowman came 

to invite Hendrickson to join them. After checking with Mundt, 

Hendrickson accepted. Bowman was at Mundt's house for five to ten 

minutes; during that time, he saw Brittany and Lindsay at play. 

Hendrickson fed her daughters about 4:45 p.m. Half an hour later, 

Bowman arrived at Mundt's house to pick Hendrickson up. 

Hendrickson said goodbye and "told the kids to go upstairs with their 

dad [Mundt] when they [were] done eating." Although Bowman did not 

enter the house, he recalled hearing Hendrickson telling the girls to eat 

dinner and go upstairs. 

Around 8:00 p.m., Mundt arrived at the Bowman residence with Lindsay 

and Shay. Timica and Teresa Bowman were present. Mundt asked 

Timica if Brittany was there and said, "[S]he ain't up home, and I have 

to find her." Leaving the children with Teresa, Mundt and Timica drove 

to Woodsfield. 

They arrived at the bingo hall around 8:30 p.m. Mundt approached 

Hendrickson and asked if Brittany was with her. Hendrickson replied, 

"No, I left her there with you." She got up, grabbed her coat, and left 

with Mundt and Timica. The three then drove back to Mundt's house. At 

9:18 p.m., Hendrickson called the Monroe County Sheriff's Office to 

report Brittany missing. Officers immediately began to search for 

Brittany, a search that lasted into the next day. 

On March 10, a civilian volunteer taking part in the search noticed a 

sheet of tin covering the opening of an old well on property near 
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Mundt's house. Moving the tin revealed a chunk of concrete wedged 

into the opening of the well. The surface of the well water was visible 

around the sides of the concrete chunk. The volunteer looked into the 

well and saw a pair of green shoes floating amid some debris. The 

volunteer reported his find and led sheriff's deputies to the well. 

The deputies recovered one of the shoes and brought it to Hendrickson, 

who identified it as Brittany's. Other officers removed the chunk of 

concrete and recovered Brittany's body from the well. 

Shortly after the officers recovered her body, Agents Gary Wilgus and 

William Hatfield of the Bureau of Criminal Identification and 

Investigation ("BCI") arrived at the crime scene. Wilgus noted numerous 

abrasions and contusions on Brittany's head. Her jeans were undone, 

and the leg bottoms partly covered her feet. 

Hatfield found bloodstains and hairs on the chunk of concrete from the 

well. Hatfield later weighed and measured the chunk; it was 36 inches 

long and 14 inches wide at its widest point and weighed 254 pounds. 

According to Hendrickson, Mundt stated on the morning of March 10 

that "they will probably pin this on him * * * because he was supposed 

to be the last one to see her." 

Detective Sergeant Mark Warden and Lieutenant Seevers of the 

Washington County Sheriff's Office interviewed Mundt after Brittany's 

body was found. Mundt asked whether a condemned prisoner could 

"choose between lethal injection and the gas chamber." Warden then 

informed Mundt that Brittany's body had been found and that Warden 

"felt he was responsible for [her] death." Mundt denied it. 

Warden noted that Mundt's forearms were scratched. Mundt claimed 
- 4 - 

that the family dog had knocked him down some steps while he was 

looking for Brittany. When Warden expressed disbelief, Mundt merely 

hung his head. Biolife Plasma Services personnel later testified that 

Mundt did not have those scratches on his arm when he sold plasma on 

the morning of March 9. 

Seevers asked Mundt whether Brittany could have been sexually 

assaulted. Mundt first said no, then asked, "Well, how would I know?" 

The officers then took a DNA swab and collected other trace evidence 

from Mundt's person. As Warden was cataloguing these items, Mundt 

asked: "Do you think I should die?" Warden replied, "Well, do you think 

you should be put to death?" Mundt said, "Yes." 

Dr. P.S.S. Sreenivasa Murthy, a pathologist and deputy coroner for 

Stark and Wayne Counties, conducted an autopsy on Brittany, assisted 

by Dr. Anthony Bertin, a urologist, who examined Brittany's genitalia. 

Dr. Murthy found that Brittany had extensive blunt-force head injuries. 

These included multiple lacerations and bruises, a skull fracture, and 

hemorrhaging and contusions of the brain. She also had blunt-force 

injuries to her trunk and extremities. 

Brittany's lungs were hyperinflated and contained excess fluid, leading 

Dr. Murthy to conclude that she had drowned in the well. But because 

Brittany was 47 inches tall while the water in the well was only 30 to 36 

inches deep, Murthy concluded that Brittany's injuries had left her 

unable to stand up. Murthy also concluded that given the severity of her 

injuries, Brittany would have died within 10 to 15 minutes. Thus, Murthy 

concluded that she died both of drowning and of her multiple blunt-force 

injuries. 
- 5 - 

Dr. Bertin, the urologist, observed that Brittany's panties were soaked 

with blood. Her vaginal opening was "imploded," as if a large object had 

been forced into it. Her vaginal walls had been "ripped apart," with 

deep, full-length lacerations on both sides. In Dr. Bertin's opinion, a 

rigid object, approximately two and one-half inches in diameter, had 

been forced up Brittany's vaginal canal with "considerable force." 

Diane Larson, a BCI forensic scientist, examined numerous evidentiary 

items. Those yielding significant DNA evidence included vaginal swabs 

taken during Brittany's autopsy, fabric cut from the crotch of Brittany's 

panties, a bloodstained bedsheet found on the bed in Mundt's master 

bedroom, and a bloodstained shirt found in Mundt's bathroom and 

identified as his. 

Larson found sperm cells on the vaginal swabs and on Brittany's 

panties. She identified a mixture of two DNA profiles on the sperm 

fraction of the vaginal swabs. One of the mixed profiles was consistent 

with Mundt; the other was consistent with Brittany. The proportion of the 

population that could not be excluded as a possible contributor to that 

mixture was one in 203,800. 

On the panties, Larson identified "two clean separate DNA profiles." 

The major profile, or largest amount, came from sperm and was 

consistent with Mundt's DNA. The expected frequency of the major 

profile was one in approximately 39 quadrillion, 350 trillion persons. The 

minor profile was consistent with Brittany's DNA. 

On the bedsheet, DNA testing showed a mixture of two DNA profiles. 

The major profile was consistent with Mundt's DNA; the minor profile 

was consistent with Brittany's. The expected frequency of the minor 

profile was one in 146 million persons. 
- 6 - 

Mark Losko, another forensic scientist at BCI, testified that testing on 

Mundt's shirt revealed a mixture of two DNA profiles. The major profile 

was consistent with Brittany's DNA. The expected frequency of that 

profile was one in 4.7 quadrillion persons. The minor profile was 

consistent with Mundt's DNA. 

After Mundt's arrest, his half-brother, Johnny Mundt, visited him in jail. 

Johnny testified that he asked Mundt "if he done it." Mundt admitted 

that he had raped Brittany. Then he asked Johnny "if I can get the stuff 

out of the house." Mundt told Johnny that "the stuff" was behind the 

stereo. Johnny agreed to remove it. 

On April 24 and 25, 2004, while Mundt was incarcerated in the county 

jail, he had several telephone conversations with Johnny. In these 

conversations, Mundt repeatedly urged Johnny to remove and destroy 

certain "stuff" or "trash" located in the wall behind the stereo in Mundt's 

house. The sheriff's office recorded these conversations, and the state 

introduced them at trial. 

These recordings convey Mundt's sense of urgency and concern for 

secrecy because he continually expressed his anxiety about when 

Johnny was going to burn the "trash" and whether he had burned "all of 

it." He warned Johnny that their conversation was being taped and 

reminded him several times not to let their mother see him burning the 

"trash." 

On April 24, Mundt asked Johnny: "Hey, did you get all that stuff out of 

there where the radio is? * * * Would you be able to get that out?" 

Mundt continued: 

"You going to burn that stuff? * * * Well, make sure Mom ain't down 
- 7 - 

there when you get burning that. * * * I really—really hope you can do 

that for me." 

"You, uh, sure you can get that stuff out of there? * * * I'm really ahoping. * * * 'Cause I'm really wanting that stuff out of there. You hear? 

* * * Make sure you get it all." 

"Yeah, I hope you do that, take—take that trash out. Out—out back of 

the stereo. I really need to get that out of the house. You hear? * * * 

Back behind the stereo, yeah. Where the wall's at? * * * Down in there. 

* * * You going to burn all that? * * * That would do me a lot of good." 

On the following day, Mundt talked to Johnny three more times. In the 

first of these conversations, Mundt asked: "Did you get all that trash 

burnt?" Mundt explained that the "trash" was hidden in the wall to the 

left of the stereo "where the insulation [was] moved," approximately two 

feet away from the drywall. He instructed Johnny to "find all that trash" 

and "get rid of that for me and burn it. * * * Don't have Ma and them up 

there." He also warned Johnny that "[t]his telephone's taped." 

In their second conversation on April 25, Mundt pressed Johnny: "Did 

you get it? * * * Did you get all of it? * * * Make sure you burn all that 

trash. * * * Mom and them can't see that." 

In his third April 25 conversation with Johnny, Mundt again asked: "Did 

you make sure that other trash is burnt?" He told Johnny to "make sure 

that burns up nice and good. * * * Make sure there ain't nothing left of it. 

* * * 'Cause they be up there looking through that next." Johnny said, 

"They're done up there, they ain't gonna go back up there." Mundt 

replied, "Don't bet on it." 

According to Johnny, he eventually found "a little hole" in the corner of 
- 8 - 

a room in Mundt's house. In that hole, Johnny found a pair of boxer 

shorts, a T-shirt, a pair of girl's socks, and a pillowcase, each spattered 

with blood. Johnny put these items into a box and hid the box in another 

part of the house. The next day, he took the box home and burned it 

with the bloodstained items inside. 

On April 26, Mundt talked to Sarah Mundt from jail. The sheriff's office 

recorded this conversation. Sarah mentioned that Johnny had been 

burning things the night before, including a box. Mundt had his mother 

describe the box, then asked: "He burn it?" Mundt pressed Sarah for 

details: "Did you go up with him last night? * * * Did he pour gas on all 

that trash? * * * Did it burn?" 

On May 3, 2004, police searched Mundt's house again. In a secondfloor room, between a floor joist and the exterior wall, they found the 

space where Mundt had hidden the bloodstained items. 

Police cut out a section of the floor joist from the hiding place. The joist 

tested positive for blood. Mark Losko, the BCI forensic scientist, found a 

mixture of two DNA profiles on the joist. The major contributor's DNA 

profile was consistent with Brittany's and would be found in one of 4.7 

quadrillion persons. The minor contributor's DNA profile was consistent 

with Mundt's and would be found in one of 139 persons. 

On June 19, Mundt had yet another phone conversation with his mother 

from jail, and this too was recorded by the sheriff's office. Mundt urged 

his mother to remove his weights from his house: "You need to get 

those weights out of there. * * * They'll use that against me. * * * They'll 

try to say that I lifted those things down there. * * * Well, at least take 

some of the weights off the weight bench. * * * Did you take any weights 

off it?" 
- 9 - 

At trial, the jury found Mundt guilty of four counts of aggravated murder, 

each with four death specifications; two counts of rape, R.C. 

2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (A)(2); and one count of kidnapping. 

Before the penalty phase, the trial court merged the four aggravatedmurder counts into a single count of aggravated murder under R.C. 

2903.01(C) (murder of a child under 13) and merged the four 

specifications into two: murder to escape detection, apprehension, trial, 

or punishment for another offense, R.C. 2929.04(A)(3), and murder 

committed during a kidnapping, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). 

The jury recommended that Mundt be sentenced to death for his 

aggravated-murder conviction. The trial judge sentenced Mundt to 

death. 

Id. at ¶ 2 - ¶ 45. 

{¶3} On direct appeal Mundt presented 11 propositions of law, all of which 

were found meritless by the Ohio Supreme Court. Id. at ¶ 46. Additionally, the Court 

independently reviewed Mundt's death sentence and found that the aggravating 

circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. After 

conducting a proportionality review, the Court concluded the death sentence was 

proportionate with others they reviewed; Mundt's convictions and death sentence 

were affirmed. Id. 

{¶4} Mundt filed a post-conviction petition pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 and 

proceeded to a two day hearing. The trial court dismissed Mundt's petition, reasoning 

that his claims were barred by res judicata, either because the claims had been 

addressed on direct appeal or could have been raised in a direct appeal. The trial 

court reasoned that res judicata precluded the claims because the factual basis for 

resolving them could be found in the original trial record and not dependent upon 

evidence dehors the record. The trial court alternatively did address the merits of 
- 10 - 

Mundt's third claim relative to trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to order 

MRI/PET scans for the mitigation phase and rejected it. Finally, the trial court 

deemed two of Mundt's claims, nine and ten, appropriate for post-conviction 

consideration; the failure to call his mother and half-sister during the mitigation 

phase, which were rejected on the merits. 

Res Judicata 

{¶5} As both assignments of error address the dismissal of his postconviction petition, they will be discussed together for clarity of analysis. In his two 

assignments of error, Mundt asserts: 

 The trial court erred by applying the doctrine of res judicata to 

bar Mundt's grounds for relief. 

 The trial court erred in dismissing Mundt's post-conviction when 

he presented sufficient operative facts to merit relief. 

{¶6} On appeal Mundt asserts that his post-conviction petition was 

supported by factual allegations that could not be determined by an examination of 

the files and record of this case. R.C. 2953.21 and R.C. 2953.23 govern petitions for 

postconviction relief. Under R.C. 2953.21, relief from a judgment or sentence is 

available for a person convicted of a criminal offense who shows that "there was 

such a denial or infringement of the person's rights as to render the judgment void or 

voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States[.]" 

{¶7} "A trial court may dismiss a postconviction petition on the basis of the 

doctrine of res judicata." State v. Dillingham, 12th Dist. Nos. CA2012–02–and 

CA2012–02–042, 2012–Ohio–5841, ¶ 9. "Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final 

judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel 

from raising and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from judgment, any 

defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been 

raised by the defendant at trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on 
- 11 - 

an appeal from that judgment." State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 

(1967), syllabus. 

{¶8} An exception to the res judicata bar exists when the petitioner presents 

competent, relevant, and material evidence outside the record that was not in 

existence and available to the petitioner in time to support the direct appeal. State v. 

Bayless, 12th Dist. Nos. CA2013–10–020 and CA2013–10–021, 2014-Ohio-2475, ¶ 

10. For a defendant to avoid dismissal of the petition by operation of res judicata, the 

evidence supporting the claims in the petition must be competent, relevant, and 

material evidence outside the trial court record, and it must not be evidence that 

existed or was available for use at the time of trial. State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 

113, 443 N.E.2d 169 (1982). 

{¶9} This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 

Commrs. v. State, 112 Ohio St.3d 59, 2006–Ohio–6499, 858 N.E.2d 330, ¶ 23. 

{¶10} A review of Mundt's petition reveals that virtually all of the claims raised 

are barred by res judicata, either because they were raised and resolved in his direct 

appeal or could have been raised. We will address each res judicata argument in 

turn. 

Claims Raised and Resolved on Direct Appeal 

{¶11} As noted by the trial court, the following six claims asserted in Mundt's 

post-conviction petition were raised by Mundt in his direct appeal to the Supreme 

Court of Ohio and expressly rejected on the merits. Regarding claim one, ineffective 

assistance of counsel during the penalty phase, Mundt argued this exact point on 

direct appeal; that counsel's presentation was confusing, contradictory and 

prejudicial. Mundt I at ¶120-132. It was expressly rejected by the Court, reasoning: 

"Due to the nature of Mundt's crime, counsel could have rationally decided to offer 

the jury a variety of reasons to vote for life, hoping that at least one juror would 

accept at least one of those reasons." Id. at ¶ 143. 

{¶12} Regarding claim two, ineffective assistance of counsel to seek and 

obtain expert assistance in determining the validity of the State's DNA Evidence, 
- 12 - 

Mundt's identical claim was summarily rejected on direct appeal. "Counsel's decision 

to rely on cross-examination instead of calling an expert witness does not constitute 

ineffective assistance." Mundt I at ¶118. 

{¶13} Regarding claim four, ineffective assistance of counsel during the 

penalty phase involving the testimony of Dr. Sandra McPherson, although Mundt 

specifically argued on direct appeal that this testimony damaged his case, Mundt I at 

¶120-123, the Court was unpersuaded. "Defense counsel cannot be criticized for 

their presentation of testimony from Heiden and McPherson during the penalty phase 

of the trial and their conduct in doing so does not violate Strickland." Id. at ¶135. 

{¶14} Regarding claim six, ineffective assistance of counsel during the 

penalty phase in the testimony of Jeffrey Stevens, Mundt's argument on direct appeal 

that this proposed witness should have been called to testify was rejected by the 

Court as a strategic choice by counsel. Id. at ¶155-156. "Mundt's contention that 

being depicted as a struggling special-education student would have humanized him 

is rank speculation. Mundt's claim that the jury would have found this evidence 

compelling is equally speculative." Id. at ¶159. In a similar fashion, claim eight, 

ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase regarding the testimony of 

proposed witness, Robert Willis, was rejected. Id. at ¶155-163. 

{¶15} Lastly, regarding claim seven, ineffective assistance of counsel during 

voir dire specifically regarding juror Julie Watson and her inclination to "Automatically 

Vote for Death" Mundt asserted on direct appeal that Watson should have been 

excused given this articulated inclination. Id. at ¶49-61. The Court disagreed, finding 

no bias. "To the contrary, her responses indicated that she would be an open-minded 

juror." Id. at ¶76. 

{¶16} The Supreme Court's rejection of Mundt's claims is the law of the case 

on those respective issues. The doctrine of law of the case "provides that the 

decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal 

questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and 

reviewing levels." Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984). 
- 13 - 

Accordingly, res judicata barred Mundt from reasserting claims one, two, four, six, 

seven and eight in his petition for post-conviction relief. 

{¶17} Further, Mundt has failed to present competent, relevant and material 

evidence outside the record that was not in existence and available to him at the time 

of that direct appeal. None of the attached affidavits and documentation for any of the 

raised claims are competent evidence dehors the record. A petition for postconviction relief does not provide a petitioner with a second opportunity to litigate his 

conviction. State v. Rose, 12th Dist. No. CA2012-03-050, 2012-Ohio-5957, ¶ 15-16. 

Claims Which Could Have Been Raised on Direct Appeal 

{¶18} Mundt is also barred from raising any defense or any claimed lack of 

due process that could have been raised at trial, which resulted in a conviction, or on 

an appeal from that judgment. State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 

(1967), syllabus. The following four claims were not raised in direct appeal and were 

presented by Mundt for the first time in the petition for post-conviction relief. We will 

address these claims slightly out of order for clarity of analysis. 

{¶19} Regarding claim five—counsel ineffectively conducted voir dire to the 

extent that a change of venue was not granted—Mundt attempts to provide a 

different reasoning to achieve his desired end. He raised ineffective assistance of 

counsel during voir dire on direct appeal focusing on Juror Watson being inclined to 

automatically vote for death. Mundt now attacks how trial counsel questioned 

Watson, contending he should have conducted a "searching voir dire on her views." 

Though this is a slightly different argument than was addressed on direct appeal in 

Mundt I, it was a legal argument that was capable of being raised on direct appeal 

and nothing attached to the petition, or testified to at the evidentiary hearing is 

competent, relative and material evidence outside the record to add to what was in 

the record and reviewable during a direct appeal. 

{¶20} We turn next to claims nine and ten, that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to use his mother, Sarah Mundt, more extensively during mitigation and to call 

his half-sister, Mary Anne Patterson, at all. Both affidavits attached to the petition and 
- 14 - 

their testimony at the evidentiary hearing confirm that Sarah did testify during the 

proceedings and Mary Ann was available to testify if she had been called. These 

claims are res judicata as Sarah and Mary Anne were known to defense counsel at 

the time of trial and available to testify. The use of their testimony either at all, or in a 

limited scope, is presumed to be trial strategy. As discussed above, a post-conviction 

petition is not a second opportunity to relitigate the trial or appeal. Rose, supra. 

{¶21} Regarding claim three, that counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain 

the funds and order MRI and PET scans to use during mitigation, the trial judge found 

it to be barred by res judicata, but also denied it on the merits. 

{¶22} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant 

must show not only that counsel's performance was deficient, but also that he was 

prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 

2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 

{¶23} The trial court is correct that this claim is res judicata and also fails on 

the merits. Mundt concedes that PET scan procedures had long been accepted at 

the time of his capital trial. More importantly, where a defendant, represented by 

different counsel on direct appeal, "fails to raise [in the direct appeal] the issue of 

competent trial counsel and said issue could fairly have been determined without 

resort to evidence dehors the record, res judicata is a proper basis for dismissing 

defendant's petition for postconviction relief." State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 443 

N.E.2d 169 (1982), syllabus. Mundt had different counsel for his direct appeal and 

the McPherson report was long in existence. As such this argument was capable of 

being made on direct appeal and is res judicata. 

{¶24} We turn next to the trial court's denial of this claim on the merits. The 

basic premise of Mundt's claim is that his trial expert, Dr. McPherson had indicated in 

her report that organic brain damage needed to be ruled out, but trial counsel 

interpreted that to mean that Dr. McPherson had ruled out organic brain damage. As 

such he believes his trial counsel was ineffective for not following up on the 

McPherson recommendation. 
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{¶25} Dr. Richard Jackson was retained by Mundt's trial counsel for the 

mental retardation hearing, Marsha Heiden was hired as a mitigation specialist, and 

Dr. Sandra McPherson was retained as a clinical psychologist. These professionals 

gathered records from numerous sources and interviewed Mundt. McPherson 

administered several psychological tests on Mundt, and in her report the axis three 

diagnosis states "rule out organic damage impacting brain function." 

{¶26} McPherson was not called to testify at the post-conviction petition 

hearing. As such, it is speculation to conclude exactly what she meant by the 

statement "rule out organic damage impacting brain function". In fact, trial counsel 

testified at the hearing that Mundt's post-conviction counsel would need to ask 

McPherson what "rule out means" as he believed it meant something different to 

each of them. 

{¶27} Mundt attached to his post-conviction petition a letter from Dr. Ruben 

Gur, an independent psychologist, stating that a "quantitative MRI and FDG PET 

could be helpful in documenting likely developmental abnormalities in brain structure 

and function" as well as a 2001 article regarding quantitative PET findings. During his 

testimony at the evidentiary hearing Dr. Gur conceded that he did not personally 

examine Mundt, and admitted he did not base his conclusions on the findings of 

Jackson, Heiden or McPherson, all of which had interaction with Mundt. Dr. Gur 

offered no diagnosis and was unable to ascribe any connection between his findings 

and Mundt's criminal activity in 2002, and further acknowledged that he is not a 

medical doctor and psychologists do not receive formal training on MRI or PET scan 

results. 

{¶28} Instead, Dr. Gur reached his conclusions by applying an algorithm 

patented in 1989 and created by him, his doctor-wife, and another individual. 

However, after 1990 there were no articles published that addressed the validity of 

the algorithm. When questioned further, Dr. Gur could only name one medical 

professional who used the algorithm in a clinical setting for diagnosis and treatment 

since 1989. 
- 16 - 

{¶29} Mundt argues that Dr. Gur's testimony demonstrates what could have 

been presented to the jury in mitigation, and because this information was not 

presented, the prejudice prong of Strickland has been established. However, the 

Strickland test mandates both prongs must be proven; deficient performance by 

counsel and prejudice. Mundt has failed to make a showing of deficient performance. 

{¶30} The trial record demonstrates defense counsel retained three 

professionals to investigate Mundt's mental status and psychological state to present 

evidence for mitigation. It is entirely possible that these experts evaluated Mundt and 

decided that a neurological evaluation was unnecessary. "The defense decision to 

call or not call a mitigation witness is a matter of trial strategy." State v. Elmore, 111 

Ohio St.3d 515, 2006-Ohio-6207, 857 N.E.2d 547, ¶116. Moreover, as none of the 

trial experts were called to testify at the post-conviction hearing, any conclusions 

regarding what was or was not done, are speculative at best. It is improper to infer a 

defense failure to investigate from a silent record as the burden of demonstrating 

ineffective assistance is on Mundt. State v. Pickens, 141 Ohio St.3d 462, 2014-Ohio5445, 25 N.E.3d 1023, ¶ 221. Thus, Mundt has failed to demonstrate that counsel 

were deficient by failing to have a neuropsychologist evaluate him. This renders his 

prejudice argument moot. 

{¶31} Finally Mundt argues cumulative error as his eleventh claim. Under the 

doctrine of cumulative error, a judgment may be reversed when the cumulative effect 

of errors deprives a defendant of his or her constitutional rights, even though such 

errors are not prejudicial singularly. State v. DeMarco, 31 Ohio St.3d 191, 196–197, 

509 N.E.2d 1256 (1987). As counsel does not draw this Court's attention to multiple 

instances of harmless error, the cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable. See State 

v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 1995-Ohio-168, 656 N.E.2d 623. Accordingly, 

Mundt's eleventh claim is meritless. 

{¶32} All eleven claims contained in Mundt's postconviction petition are 

barred by res judicata. Accordingly, the judgment of the Noble County Court of 
- 17 - 

Common Pleas dismissing his petition for postconviction relief is affirmed. 

Donofrio, P. J., 

Robb, J., 

 

APPROVED: 

 

Mary DeGenaro, Judge