(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

KSR INTERNATIONAL CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 

No. 04–1350. Argued November 28, 2006—Decided April 30, 2007 

To control a conventional automobile’s speed, the driver depresses or

releases the gas pedal, which interacts with the throttle via a cable or 

other mechanical link. Because the pedal’s position in the footwell 

normally cannot be adjusted, a driver wishing to be closer or farther 

from it must either reposition himself in the seat or move the seat, 

both of which can be imperfect solutions for smaller drivers in cars

with deep footwells. This prompted inventors to design and patent

pedals that could be adjusted to change their locations. The Asano 

patent reveals a support structure whereby, when the pedal location

is adjusted, one of the pedal’s pivot points stays fixed. Asano is also 

designed so that the force necessary to depress the pedal is the same

regardless of location adjustments. The Redding patent reveals a different, sliding mechanism where both the pedal and the pivot point

are adjusted. 

In newer cars, computer-controlled throttles do not operate through

force transferred from the pedal by a mechanical link, but open and

close valves in response to electronic signals. For the computer to 

know what is happening with the pedal, an electronic sensor must

translate the mechanical operation into digital data. Inventors had 

obtained a number of patents for such sensors. The so-called ’936 

patent taught that it was preferable to detect the pedal’s position in 

the pedal mechanism, not in the engine, so the patent disclosed a

pedal with an electronic sensor on a pivot point in the pedal assembly. The Smith patent taught that to prevent the wires connecting

the sensor to the computer from chafing and wearing out, the sensor

should be put on a fixed part of the pedal assembly rather than in or 

on the pedal’s footpad. Inventors had also patented self-contained 

modular sensors, which can be taken off the shelf and attached to any 
2 KSR INT’L CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. 

Syllabus 

mechanical pedal to allow it to function with a computer-controlled 

throttle. The ’068 patent disclosed one such sensor. Chevrolet also 

manufactured trucks using modular sensors attached to the pedal 

support bracket, adjacent to the pedal and engaged with the pivot

shaft about which the pedal rotates. Other patents disclose electronic sensors attached to adjustable pedal assemblies. For example,

the Rixon patent locates the sensor in the pedal footpad, but is known 

for wire chafing. 

After petitioner KSR developed an adjustable pedal system for cars

with cable-actuated throttles and obtained its ’976 patent for the design, General Motors Corporation (GMC) chose KSR to supply adjustable pedal systems for trucks using computer-controlled throttles.

To make the ’976 pedal compatible with the trucks, KSR added a 

modular sensor to its design. Respondents (Teleflex) hold the exclusive license for the Engelgau patent, claim 4 of which discloses a position-adjustable pedal assembly with an electronic pedal position sensor attached a fixed pivot point. Despite having denied a similar, 

broader claim, the U. S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) had allowed claim 4 because it included the limitation of a fixed pivot position, which distinguished the design from Redding’s. Asano was neither included among the Engelgau patent’s prior art references nor

mentioned in the patent’s prosecution, and the PTO did not have before it an adjustable pedal with a fixed pivot point. After learning of 

KSR’s design for GMC, Teleflex sued for infringement, asserting that

KSR’s pedal system infringed the Engelgau patent’s claim 4. KSR 

countered that claim 4 was invalid under §103 of the Patent Act,

which forbids issuance of a patent when “the differences between the

subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that 

the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time

the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” 

Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U. S. 1, 17–18, set 

out an objective analysis for applying §103: “[T]he scope and content 

of the prior art are . . . determined; differences between the prior art 

and the claims at issue are . . . ascertained; and the level of ordinary

skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such 

secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to

the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter 

sought to be patented.” While the sequence of these questions might

be reordered in any particular case, the factors define the controlling 

inquiry. However, seeking to resolve the obviousness question with

more uniformity and consistency, the Federal Circuit has employed a 

“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” (TSM) test, under which a pat-
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3 

Syllabus 

ent claim is only proved obvious if the prior art, the problem’s nature, 

or the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art reveals

some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings. 

The District Court granted KSR summary judgment. After reviewing pedal design history, the Engelgau patent’s scope, and the relevant prior art, the court considered claim 4’s validity, applying Graham’s framework to determine whether under summary-judgment

standards KSR had demonstrated that claim 4 was obvious. The 

court found “little difference” between the prior art’s teachings and

claim 4: Asano taught everything contained in the claim except using

a sensor to detect the pedal’s position and transmit it to a computer

controlling the throttle. That additional aspect was revealed in, e.g., 

the ’068 patent and Chevrolet’s sensors. The court then held that 

KSR satisfied the TSM test, reasoning (1) the state of the industry

would lead inevitably to combinations of electronic sensors and adjustable pedals, (2) Rixon provided the basis for these developments,

and (3) Smith taught a solution to Rixon’s chafing problems by positioning the sensor on the pedal’s fixed structure, which could lead to

the combination of a pedal like Asano with a pedal position sensor. 

Reversing, the Federal Circuit ruled the District Court had not

applied the TSM test strictly enough, having failed to make findings

as to the specific understanding or principle within a skilled artisan’s 

knowledge that would have motivated one with no knowledge of the

invention to attach an electronic control to the Asano assembly’s support bracket. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court’s recourse to the nature of the problem to be solved was insufficient because, unless the prior art references addressed the precise problem 

that the patentee was trying to solve, the problem would not motivate

an inventor to look at those references. The appeals court found that

the Asano pedal was designed to ensure that the force required to depress the pedal is the same no matter how the pedal is adjusted,

whereas Engelgau sought to provide a simpler, smaller, cheaper adjustable electronic pedal. The Rixon pedal, said the court, suffered

from chafing but was not designed to solve that problem and taught

nothing helpful to Engelgau’s purpose. Smith, in turn, did not relate 

to adjustable pedals and did not necessarily go to the issue of motivation to attach the electronic control on the pedal assembly’s support

bracket. So interpreted, the court held, the patents would not have 

led a person of ordinary skill to put a sensor on an Asano-like pedal.

That it might have been obvious to try that combination was likewise

irrelevant. Finally, the court held that genuine issues of material

fact precluded summary judgment. 

Held: The Federal Circuit addressed the obviousness question in a narrow, rigid manner that is inconsistent with §103 and this Court’s 
4 KSR INT’L CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. 

Syllabus 

precedents. KSR provided convincing evidence that mounting an

available sensor on a fixed pivot point of the Asano pedal was a design step well within the grasp of a person of ordinary skill in the

relevant art and that the benefit of doing so would be obvious. Its arguments, and the record, demonstrate that the Engelgau patent’s 

claim 4 is obvious. Pp. 11–24.

1. Graham provided an expansive and flexible approach to the obviousness question that is inconsistent with the way the Federal Circuit applied its TSM test here. Neither §103’s enactment nor Graham’s analysis disturbed the Court’s earlier instructions concerning

the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of

elements found in the prior art. See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 

v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U. S. 147, 152. Such a combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to

be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results. See, 

e.g., United States v. Adams, 383 U. S. 39, 50–52. When a work is 

available in one field, design incentives and other market forces can

prompt variations of it, either in the same field or in another. If a 

person of ordinary skill in the art can implement a predictable variation, and would see the benefit of doing so, §103 likely bars its patentability. Moreover, if a technique has been used to improve one 

device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that 

it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond that person’s 

skill. A court must ask whether the improvement is more than the

predictable use of prior-art elements according to their established

functions. Following these principles may be difficult if the claimed 

subject matter involves more than the simple substitution of one 

known element for another or the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art ready for the improvement. To determine 

whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the way a patent claims, it will often be necessary to look to 

interrelated teachings of multiple patents; to the effects of demands 

known to the design community or present in the marketplace; and to

the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary

skill in the art. To facilitate review, this analysis should be made explicit. But it need not seek out precise teachings directed to the challenged claim’s specific subject matter, for a court can consider the inferences and creative steps a person of ordinary skill in the art would

employ. Pp. 11–14. 

(b) The TSM test captures a helpful insight: A patent composed of 

several elements is not proved obvious merely by demonstrating that

each element was, independently, known in the prior art. Although

common sense directs caution as to a patent application claiming as 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5 

Syllabus 

innovation the combination of two known devices according to their 

established functions, it can be important to identify a reason that

would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine 

the elements as the new invention does. Inventions usually rely 

upon building blocks long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries

almost necessarily will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already known. Helpful insights, however, need not become rigid and 

mandatory formulas. If it is so applied, the TSM test is incompatible

with this Court’s precedents. The diversity of inventive pursuits and 

of modern technology counsels against confining the obviousness 

analysis by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasizing the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents. In many 

fields there may be little discussion of obvious techniques or combinations, and market demand, rather than scientific literature, may often drive design trends. Granting patent protection to advances that

would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation retards

progress and may, for patents combining previously known elements,

deprive prior inventions of their value or utility. Since the TSM test 

was devised, the Federal Circuit doubtless has applied it in accord 

with these principles in many cases. There is no necessary inconsistency between the test and the Graham analysis. But a court errs 

where, as here, it transforms general principle into a rigid rule limiting the obviousness inquiry. Pp. 14–15.

(c) The flaws in the Federal Circuit’s analysis relate mostly to its 

narrow conception of the obviousness inquiry consequent in its application of the TSM test. The Circuit first erred in holding that courts 

and patent examiners should look only to the problem the patentee

was trying to solve. Under the correct analysis, any need or problem 

known in the field and addressed by the patent can provide a reason

for combining the elements in the manner claimed. Second, the appeals court erred in assuming that a person of ordinary skill in the

art attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those prior art

elements designed to solve the same problem. The court wrongly

concluded that because Asano’s primary purpose was solving the constant ratio problem, an inventor considering how to put a sensor on 

an adjustable pedal would have no reason to consider putting it on 

the Asano pedal. It is common sense that familiar items may have 

obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and a person of ordinary

skill often will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle. Regardless of Asano’s primary purpose, it provided an obvious example of an adjustable pedal with a

fixed pivot point, and the prior art was replete with patents indicating that such a point was an ideal mount for a sensor. Third, the 
6 KSR INT’L CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. 

Syllabus 

court erred in concluding that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was obvious 

to try. When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a 

problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill in the art has good reason to pursue 

the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to 

the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but 

of ordinary skill and common sense. Finally, the court drew the

wrong conclusion from the risk of courts and patent examiners falling 

prey to hindsight bias. Rigid preventative rules that deny recourse to 

common sense are neither necessary under, nor consistent with, this 

Court’s case law. Pp. 15–18.

2. Application of the foregoing standards demonstrates that claim 4

is obvious. Pp. 18–23.

(a) The Court rejects Teleflex’s argument that the Asano pivot 

mechanism’s design prevents its combination with a sensor in the 

manner claim 4 describes. This argument was not raised before the 

District Court, and it is unclear whether it was raised before the 

Federal Circuit. Given the significance of the District Court’s finding 

that combining Asano with a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor fell

within claim 4’s scope, it is apparent that Teleflex would have made 

clearer challenges if it intended to preserve this claim. Its failure to 

clearly raise the argument, and the appeals court’s silence on the issue, lead this Court to accept the District Court’s conclusion. Pp. 18– 

20. 

(b) The District Court correctly concluded that when Engelgau

designed the claim 4 subject matter, it was obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine Asano with a pivot-mounted pedal

position sensor. There then was a marketplace creating a strong incentive to convert mechanical pedals to electronic pedals, and the

prior art taught a number of methods for doing so. The Federal Circuit considered the issue too narrowly by, in effect, asking whether a 

pedal designer writing on a blank slate would have chosen both

Asano and a modular sensor similar to the ones used in the Chevrolet 

trucks and disclosed in the ’068 patent. The proper question was

whether a pedal designer of ordinary skill in the art, facing the wide 

range of needs created by developments in the field, would have seen 

an obvious benefit to upgrading Asano with a sensor. For such a designer starting with Asano, the question was where to attach the 

sensor. The ’936 patent taught the utility of putting the sensor on 

the pedal device. Smith, in turn, explained not to put the sensor on

the pedal footpad, but instead on the structure. And from Rixon’s 

known wire-chafing problems, and Smith’s teaching that the pedal 

assemblies must not precipitate any motion in the connecting wires, 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 7 

Syllabus 

the designer would know to place the sensor on a nonmoving part of 

the pedal structure. The most obvious such point is a pivot point.

The designer, accordingly, would follow Smith in mounting the sensor 

there. Just as it was possible to begin with the objective to upgrade

Asano to work with a computer-controlled throttle, so too was it possible to take an adjustable electronic pedal like Rixon and seek an

improvement that would avoid the wire-chafing problem. Teleflex 

has not shown anything in the prior art that taught away from the 

use of Asano, nor any secondary factors to dislodge the determination

that claim 4 is obvious. Pp. 20–23. 

3. The Court disagrees with the Federal Circuit’s holding that

genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. The 

ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination. Graham, 

383 U. S., at 17. Where, as here, the prior art’s content, the patent

claim’s scope, and the level of ordinary skill in the art are not in material dispute and the claim’s obviousness is apparent, summary

judgment is appropriate. P. 23. 

119 Fed. Appx. 282, reversed and remanded. 

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 04–1350 

KSR INTERNATIONAL CO., PETITIONER v. 

TELEFLEX INC. ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[April 30, 2007] 

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Teleflex Incorporated and its subsidiary Technology 

Holding Company—both referred to here as Teleflex—

sued KSR International Company for patent infringement.

The patent at issue, United States Patent No. 6,237,565

B1, is entitled “Adjustable Pedal Assembly With Electronic Throttle Control.” Supplemental App. 1. The patentee is Steven J. Engelgau, and the patent is referred to

as “the Engelgau patent.” Teleflex holds the exclusive 

license to the patent. 

Claim 4 of the Engelgau patent describes a mechanism

for combining an electronic sensor with an adjustable 

automobile pedal so the pedal’s position can be transmitted to a computer that controls the throttle in the vehicle’s 

engine. When Teleflex accused KSR of infringing the

Engelgau patent by adding an electronic sensor to one of 

KSR’s previously designed pedals, KSR countered that 

claim 4 was invalid under the Patent Act, 35 U. S. C. §103, 

because its subject matter was obvious. 

Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when “the

differences between the subject matter sought to be pat-
2 KSR INT’L CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

ented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as

a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention 

was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to

which said subject matter pertains.” 

In Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U. S. 1 

(1966), the Court set out a framework for applying the 

statutory language of §103, language itself based on the 

logic of the earlier decision in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 

How. 248 (1851), and its progeny. See 383 U. S., at 15–17. 

The analysis is objective: 

“Under §103, the scope and content of the prior art are

to be determined; differences between the prior art 

and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the 

level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. 

Against this background the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such 

secondary considerations as commercial success, long

felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might

be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be 

patented.” Id., at 17–18. 

While the sequence of these questions might be reordered 

in any particular case, the factors continue to define the 

inquiry that controls. If a court, or patent examiner,

conducts this analysis and concludes the claimed subject 

matter was obvious, the claim is invalid under §103. 

Seeking to resolve the question of obviousness with 

more uniformity and consistency, the Court of Appeals for 

the Federal Circuit has employed an approach referred to

by the parties as the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation”

test (TSM test), under which a patent claim is only proved 

obvious if “some motivation or suggestion to combine the

prior art teachings” can be found in the prior art, the 

nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art. See, e.g., Al-Site Corp. v. VSI 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

Int’l, Inc., 174 F. 3d 1308, 1323–1324 (CA Fed. 1999). 

KSR challenges that test, or at least its application in this 

case. See 119 Fed. Appx. 282, 286–290 (CA Fed. 2005). 

Because the Court of Appeals addressed the question of

obviousness in a manner contrary to §103 and our precedents, we granted certiorari, 547 U. S ___ (2006). We now 

reverse. 

I 

A 

In car engines without computer-controlled throttles,

the accelerator pedal interacts with the throttle via cable 

or other mechanical link. The pedal arm acts as a lever 

rotating around a pivot point. In a cable-actuated throttle 

control the rotation caused by pushing down the pedal 

pulls a cable, which in turn pulls open valves in the carburetor or fuel injection unit. The wider the valves open, the 

more fuel and air are released, causing combustion to 

increase and the car to accelerate. When the driver takes 

his foot off the pedal, the opposite occurs as the cable is 

released and the valves slide closed. 

In the 1990’s it became more common to install computers in cars to control engine operation. Computercontrolled throttles open and close valves in response to

electronic signals, not through force transferred from the

pedal by a mechanical link. Constant, delicate adjustments of air and fuel mixture are possible. The computer’s

rapid processing of factors beyond the pedal’s position 

improves fuel efficiency and engine performance. 

For a computer-controlled throttle to respond to a 

driver’s operation of the car, the computer must know

what is happening with the pedal. A cable or mechanical 

link does not suffice for this purpose; at some point, an

electronic sensor is necessary to translate the mechanical

operation into digital data the computer can understand. 

Before discussing sensors further we turn to the me-
4 KSR INT’L CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

chanical design of the pedal itself. In the traditional 

design a pedal can be pushed down or released but cannot 

have its position in the footwell adjusted by sliding the 

pedal forward or back. As a result, a driver who wishes to

be closer or farther from the pedal must either reposition

himself in the driver’s seat or move the seat in some way. 

In cars with deep footwells these are imperfect solutions

for drivers of smaller stature. To solve the problem, inventors, beginning in the 1970’s, designed pedals that

could be adjusted to change their location in the footwell. 

Important for this case are two adjustable pedals disclosed 

in U. S. Patent Nos. 5,010,782 (filed July 28, 1989) (Asano) 

and 5,460,061 (filed Sept. 17, 1993) (Redding). The Asano 

patent reveals a support structure that houses the pedal

so that even when the pedal location is adjusted relative to

the driver, one of the pedal’s pivot points stays fixed. The 

pedal is also designed so that the force necessary to push

the pedal down is the same regardless of adjustments to 

its location. The Redding patent reveals a different, sliding mechanism where both the pedal and the pivot point

are adjusted.

We return to sensors. Well before Engelgau applied for 

his challenged patent, some inventors had obtained patents involving electronic pedal sensors for computercontrolled throttles. These inventions, such as the device 

disclosed in U. S. Patent No. 5,241,936 (filed Sept. 9, 1991) 

(’936), taught that it was preferable to detect the pedal’s

position in the pedal assembly, not in the engine. The ’936 

patent disclosed a pedal with an electronic sensor on a

pivot point in the pedal assembly. U. S. Patent No. 

5,063,811 (filed July 9, 1990) (Smith) taught that to prevent the wires connecting the sensor to the computer from

chafing and wearing out, and to avoid grime and damage

from the driver’s foot, the sensor should be put on a fixed 

part of the pedal assembly rather than in or on the pedal’s

footpad. 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

In addition to patents for pedals with integrated sensors 

inventors obtained patents for self-contained modular 

sensors. A modular sensor is designed independently of a

given pedal so that it can be taken off the shelf and attached to mechanical pedals of various sorts, enabling the 

pedals to be used in automobiles with computer-controlled 

throttles. One such sensor was disclosed in U. S. Patent 

No. 5,385,068 (filed Dec. 18, 1992) (’068). In 1994, Chevrolet manufactured a line of trucks using modular sensors

“attached to the pedal support bracket, adjacent to the 

pedal and engaged with the pivot shaft about which the 

pedal rotates in operation.” 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 589 (ED 

Mich. 2003).

The prior art contained patents involving the placement

of sensors on adjustable pedals as well. For example, U. S. 

Patent No. 5,819,593 (filed Aug. 17, 1995) (Rixon) discloses an adjustable pedal assembly with an electronic

sensor for detecting the pedal’s position. In the Rixon 

pedal the sensor is located in the pedal footpad. The Rixon 

pedal was known to suffer from wire chafing when the

pedal was depressed and released.

This short account of pedal and sensor technology leads

to the instant case. 

B 

KSR, a Canadian company, manufactures and supplies 

auto parts, including pedal systems. Ford Motor Company

hired KSR in 1998 to supply an adjustable pedal system

for various lines of automobiles with cable-actuated throttle controls. KSR developed an adjustable mechanical

pedal for Ford and obtained U. S. Patent No. 6,151,976

(filed July 16, 1999) (’976) for the design. In 2000, KSR 

was chosen by General Motors Corporation (GMC or GM)

to supply adjustable pedal systems for Chevrolet and GMC 

light trucks that used engines with computer-controlled 

throttles. To make the ’976 pedal compatible with the 
6 KSR INT’L CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

trucks, KSR merely took that design and added a modular 

sensor. 

Teleflex is a rival to KSR in the design and manufacture

of adjustable pedals. As noted, it is the exclusive licensee 

of the Engelgau patent. Engelgau filed the patent application on August 22, 2000 as a continuation of a previous

application for U. S. Patent No. 6,109,241, which was filed 

on January 26, 1999. He has sworn he invented the patent’s subject matter on February 14, 1998. The Engelgau

patent discloses an adjustable electronic pedal described

in the specification as a “simplified vehicle control pedal

assembly that is less expensive, and which uses fewer 

parts and is easier to package within the vehicle.” Engelgau, col. 2, lines 2–5, Supplemental App. 6. Claim 4 of the 

patent, at issue here, describes: 

“A vehicle control pedal apparatus comprising: 

a support adapted to be mounted to a vehicle structure; 

an adjustable pedal assembly having a pedal arm

moveable in for[e] and aft directions with respect to

said support; 

a pivot for pivotally supporting said adjustable pedal 

assembly with respect to said support and defining a 

pivot axis; and 

an electronic control attached to said support for controlling a vehicle system; 

said apparatus characterized by said electronic control 

being responsive to said pivot for providing a signal 

that corresponds to pedal arm position as said pedal 

arm pivots about said pivot axis between rest and applied positions wherein the position of said pivot remains constant while said pedal arm moves in fore 

and aft directions with respect to said pivot.” Id., col. 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

6, lines 17–36, Supplemental App. 8 (diagram numbers omitted). 

We agree with the District Court that the claim discloses 

“a position-adjustable pedal assembly with an electronic 

pedal position sensor attached to the support member of 

the pedal assembly. Attaching the sensor to the support

member allows the sensor to remain in a fixed position

while the driver adjusts the pedal.” 298 F. Supp. 2d, at 

586–587. 

Before issuing the Engelgau patent the U. S. Patent and

Trademark Office (PTO) rejected one of the patent claims 

that was similar to, but broader than, the present claim 4. 

The claim did not include the requirement that the sensor

be placed on a fixed pivot point. The PTO concluded the 

claim was an obvious combination of the prior art disclosed in Redding and Smith, explaining: 

“‘Since the prior ar[t] references are from the field of

endeavor, the purpose disclosed . . . would have been

recognized in the pertinent art of Redding. Therefore 

it would have been obvious . . . to provide the device of 

Redding with the . . . means attached to a support

member as taught by Smith.’” Id., at 595. 

In other words Redding provided an example of an adjustable pedal and Smith explained how to mount a sensor on

a pedal’s support structure, and the rejected patent claim 

merely put these two teachings together. 

Although the broader claim was rejected, claim 4 was 

later allowed because it included the limitation of a fixed 

pivot point, which distinguished the design from Redding’s. Ibid. Engelgau had not included Asano among the

prior art references, and Asano was not mentioned in the 

patent’s prosecution. Thus, the PTO did not have before it 

an adjustable pedal with a fixed pivot point. The patent

issued on May 29, 2001 and was assigned to Teleflex.

Upon learning of KSR’s design for GM, Teleflex sent a 
8 KSR INT’L CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

warning letter informing KSR that its proposal would

violate the Engelgau patent. “‘Teleflex believes that any 

supplier of a product that combines an adjustable pedal

with an electronic throttle control necessarily employs

technology covered by one or more’” of Teleflex’s patents. 

Id., at 585. KSR refused to enter a royalty arrangement 

with Teleflex; so Teleflex sued for infringement, asserting

KSR’s pedal infringed the Engelgau patent and two other 

patents. Ibid. Teleflex later abandoned its claims regarding the other patents and dedicated the patents to the

public. The remaining contention was that KSR’s pedal

system for GM infringed claim 4 of the Engelgau patent.

Teleflex has not argued that the other three claims of the 

patent are infringed by KSR’s pedal, nor has Teleflex 

argued that the mechanical adjustable pedal designed by 

KSR for Ford infringed any of its patents. 

C 

The District Court granted summary judgment in KSR’s 

favor. After reviewing the pertinent history of pedal 

design, the scope of the Engelgau patent, and the relevant 

prior art, the court considered the validity of the contested 

claim. By direction of 35 U. S. C. §282, an issued patent is 

presumed valid. The District Court applied Graham’s 

framework to determine whether under summaryjudgment standards KSR had overcome the presumption

and demonstrated that claim 4 was obvious in light of the 

prior art in existence when the claimed subject matter was 

invented. See §102(a).

The District Court determined, in light of the expert

testimony and the parties’ stipulations, that the level of 

ordinary skill in pedal design was “‘an undergraduate

degree in mechanical engineering (or an equivalent 

amount of industry experience) [and] familiarity with

pedal control systems for vehicles.’” 298 F. Supp. 2d, at 

590. The court then set forth the relevant prior art, in-
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

cluding the patents and pedal designs described above. 

Following Graham’s direction, the court compared the

teachings of the prior art to the claims of Engelgau. It 

found “little difference.” 298 F. Supp. 2d, at 590. Asano 

taught everything contained in claim 4 except the use of a

sensor to detect the pedal’s position and transmit it to the

computer controlling the throttle. That additional aspect 

was revealed in sources such as the ’068 patent and the

sensors used by Chevrolet. 

Under the controlling cases from the Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit, however, the District Court was 

not permitted to stop there. The court was required also 

to apply the TSM test. The District Court held KSR had 

satisfied the test. It reasoned (1) the state of the industry

would lead inevitably to combinations of electronic sensors

and adjustable pedals, (2) Rixon provided the basis for 

these developments, and (3) Smith taught a solution to the 

wire chafing problems in Rixon, namely locating the sensor on the fixed structure of the pedal. This could lead to 

the combination of Asano, or a pedal like it, with a pedal

position sensor. 

The conclusion that the Engelgau design was obvious

was supported, in the District Court’s view, by the PTO’s 

rejection of the broader version of claim 4. Had Engelgau

included Asano in his patent application, it reasoned, the 

PTO would have found claim 4 to be an obvious combination of Asano and Smith, as it had found the broader 

version an obvious combination of Redding and Smith. As

a final matter, the District Court held that the secondary

factor of Teleflex’s commercial success with pedals based 

on Engelgau’s design did not alter its conclusion. The 

District Court granted summary judgment for KSR. 

With principal reliance on the TSM test, the Court of

Appeals reversed. It ruled the District Court had not been 

strict enough in applying the test, having failed to make

“‘finding[s] as to the specific understanding or principle 
10 KSR INT’L CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

within the knowledge of a skilled artisan that would have

motivated one with no knowledge of [the] invention’ . . . to

attach an electronic control to the support bracket of the

Asano assembly.” 119 Fed. Appx., at 288 (brackets in 

original) (quoting In re Kotzab, 217 F. 3d 1365, 1371 (CA 

Fed. 2000)). The Court of Appeals held that the District 

Court was incorrect that the nature of the problem to be 

solved satisfied this requirement because unless the “prior

art references address[ed] the precise problem that the 

patentee was trying to solve,” the problem would not

motivate an inventor to look at those references. 119 Fed. 

Appx., at 288. 

Here, the Court of Appeals found, the Asano pedal was

designed to solve the “‘constant ratio problem’”—that is, 

to ensure that the force required to depress the pedal is 

the same no matter how the pedal is adjusted—whereas 

Engelgau sought to provide a simpler, smaller, cheaper

adjustable electronic pedal. Ibid. As for Rixon, the court 

explained, that pedal suffered from the problem of wire 

chafing but was not designed to solve it. In the court’s 

view Rixon did not teach anything helpful to Engelgau’s 

purpose. Smith, in turn, did not relate to adjustable pedals and did not “necessarily go to the issue of motivation to

attach the electronic control on the support bracket of the 

pedal assembly.” Ibid. When the patents were interpreted in this way, the Court of Appeals held, they would 

not have led a person of ordinary skill to put a sensor on 

the sort of pedal described in Asano.

That it might have been obvious to try the combination 

of Asano and a sensor was likewise irrelevant, in the 

court’s view, because “‘“[o]bvious to try” has long been 

held not to constitute obviousness.’” Id., at 289 (quoting 

In re Deuel, 51 F. 3d 1552, 1559 (CA Fed. 1995)).

The Court of Appeals also faulted the District Court’s 

consideration of the PTO’s rejection of the broader version 

of claim 4. The District Court’s role, the Court of Appeals 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

explained, was not to speculate regarding what the PTO 

might have done had the Engelgau patent mentioned 

Asano. Rather, the court held, the District Court was 

obliged first to presume that the issued patent was valid

and then to render its own independent judgment of obviousness based on a review of the prior art. The fact that 

the PTO had rejected the broader version of claim 4, the

Court of Appeals said, had no place in that analysis. 

The Court of Appeals further held that genuine issues of 

material fact precluded summary judgment. Teleflex had 

proffered statements from one expert that claim 4 “‘was a 

simple, elegant, and novel combination of features,’” 119 

Fed. Appx., at 290, compared to Rixon, and from another 

expert that claim 4 was nonobvious because, unlike in

Rixon, the sensor was mounted on the support bracket 

rather than the pedal itself. This evidence, the court 

concluded, sufficed to require a trial. 

II 

A 

We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of

Appeals. Throughout this Court’s engagement with the 

question of obviousness, our cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the way 

the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here. To be 

sure, Graham recognized the need for “uniformity and

definiteness.” 383 U. S., at 18. Yet the principles laid 

down in Graham reaffirmed the “functional approach” of 

Hotchkiss, 11 How. 248. See 383 U. S., at 12. To this end, 

Graham set forth a broad inquiry and invited courts, 

where appropriate, to look at any secondary considerations that would prove instructive. Id., at 17. 

Neither the enactment of §103 nor the analysis in Graham disturbed this Court’s earlier instructions concerning

the need for caution in granting a patent based on the

combination of elements found in the prior art. For over a 
12 KSR INT’L CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

half century, the Court has held that a “patent for a combination which only unites old elements with no change in

their respective functions . . . obviously withdraws what is

already known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful men.” Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 

340 U. S. 147, 152 (1950). This is a principal reason for 

declining to allow patents for what is obvious. The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is 

likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results. Three cases decided after Graham illustrate the application of this doctrine. 

In United States v. Adams, 383 U. S. 39, 40 (1966), a 

companion case to Graham, the Court considered the 

obviousness of a “wet battery” that varied from prior 

designs in two ways: It contained water, rather than the 

acids conventionally employed in storage batteries; and its

electrodes were magnesium and cuprous chloride, rather

than zinc and silver chloride. The Court recognized that 

when a patent claims a structure already known in the 

prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one

element for another known in the field, the combination 

must do more than yield a predictable result. 383 U. S., at 

50–51. It nevertheless rejected the Government’s claim

that Adams’s battery was obvious. The Court relied upon 

the corollary principle that when the prior art teaches

away from combining certain known elements, discovery 

of a successful means of combining them is more likely to

be nonobvious. Id., at 51–52. When Adams designed his

battery, the prior art warned that risks were involved in 

using the types of electrodes he employed. The fact that 

the elements worked together in an unexpected and fruitful manner supported the conclusion that Adams’s design 

was not obvious to those skilled in the art. 

In Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 

396 U. S. 57 (1969), the Court elaborated on this approach. 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

The subject matter of the patent before the Court was a 

device combining two pre-existing elements: a radiantheat burner and a paving machine. The device, the Court 

concluded, did not create some new synergy: The radiantheat burner functioned just as a burner was expected to

function; and the paving machine did the same. The two 

in combination did no more than they would in separate,

sequential operation. Id., at 60–62. In those circumstances, “while the combination of old elements performed 

a useful function, it added nothing to the nature and 

quality of the radiant-heat burner already patented,” and

the patent failed under §103. Id., at 62 (footnote omitted). 

 Finally, in Sakraida v. AG Pro, Inc., 425 U. S. 273 

(1976), the Court derived from the precedents the conclusion that when a patent “simply arranges old elements 

with each performing the same function it had been 

known to perform” and yields no more than one would 

expect from such an arrangement, the combination is 

obvious. Id., at 282. 

The principles underlying these cases are instructive

when the question is whether a patent claiming the combination of elements of prior art is obvious. When a work 

is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and 

other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in

the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary 

skill can implement a predictable variation, §103 likely 

bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique 

has been used to improve one device, and a person of

ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would 

improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his

or her skill. Sakraida and Anderson’s-Black Rock are 

illustrative—a court must ask whether the improvement 

is more than the predictable use of prior art elements 

according to their established functions. 

Following these principles may be more difficult in other 
14 KSR INT’L CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

cases than it is here because the claimed subject matter 

may involve more than the simple substitution of one 

known element for another or the mere application of a 

known technique to a piece of prior art ready for the improvement. Often, it will be necessary for a court to look

to interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the effects of

demands known to the design community or present in the

marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by

a person having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to 

determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion claimed by the

patent at issue. To facilitate review, this analysis should

be made explicit. See In re Kahn, 441 F. 3d 977, 988 (CA 

Fed. 2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be 

sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there 

must be some articulated reasoning with some rational 

underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”). As our precedents make clear, however, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the 

specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court

can take account of the inferences and creative steps that

a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ. 

B 

When it first established the requirement of demonstrating a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine

known elements in order to show that the combination is 

obvious, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals captured a helpful insight. See Application of Bergel, 292 

F. 2d 955, 956–957 (1961). As is clear from cases such as 

Adams, a patent composed of several elements is not 

proved obvious merely by demonstrating that each of its 

elements was, independently, known in the prior art. 

Although common sense directs one to look with care at a 

patent application that claims as innovation the combination of two known devices according to their established 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

functions, it can be important to identify a reason that 

would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the 

relevant field to combine the elements in the way the 

claimed new invention does. This is so because inventions 

in most, if not all, instances rely upon building blocks long

since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost of necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already 

known. 

Helpful insights, however, need not become rigid and 

mandatory formulas; and when it is so applied, the TSM

test is incompatible with our precedents. The obviousness 

analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of

the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by 

overemphasis on the importance of published articles and 

the explicit content of issued patents. The diversity of 

inventive pursuits and of modern technology counsels

against limiting the analysis in this way. In many fields it 

may be that there is little discussion of obvious techniques

or combinations, and it often may be the case that market

demand, rather than scientific literature, will drive design

trends. Granting patent protection to advances that

would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation

retards progress and may, in the case of patents combining previously known elements, deprive prior inventions of 

their value or utility.

In the years since the Court of Customs and Patent 

Appeals set forth the essence of the TSM test, the Court of

Appeals no doubt has applied the test in accord with these

principles in many cases. There is no necessary inconsistency between the idea underlying the TSM test and the 

Graham analysis. But when a court transforms the general principle into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness

inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs. 

C 

The flaws in the analysis of the Court of Appeals relate 
16 KSR INT’L CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

for the most part to the court’s narrow conception of the 

obviousness inquiry reflected in its application of the TSM 

test. In determining whether the subject matter of a 

patent claim is obvious, neither the particular motivation 

nor the avowed purpose of the patentee controls. What 

matters is the objective reach of the claim. If the claim 

extends to what is obvious, it is invalid under §103. One 

of the ways in which a patent’s subject matter can be

proved obvious is by noting that there existed at the time

of invention a known problem for which there was an

obvious solution encompassed by the patent’s claims. 

The first error of the Court of Appeals in this case was

to foreclose this reasoning by holding that courts and 

patent examiners should look only to the problem the 

patentee was trying to solve. 119 Fed. Appx., at 288. The 

Court of Appeals failed to recognize that the problem

motivating the patentee may be only one of many addressed by the patent’s subject matter. The question is

not whether the combination was obvious to the patentee 

but whether the combination was obvious to a person with

ordinary skill in the art. Under the correct analysis, any

need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time 

of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a

reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed. 

The second error of the Court of Appeals lay in its assumption that a person of ordinary skill attempting to

solve a problem will be led only to those elements of prior 

art designed to solve the same problem. Ibid. The primary purpose of Asano was solving the constant ratio

problem; so, the court concluded, an inventor considering 

how to put a sensor on an adjustable pedal would have no

reason to consider putting it on the Asano pedal. Ibid. 

Common sense teaches, however, that familiar items may 

have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in 

many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the

teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

puzzle. Regardless of Asano’s primary purpose, the design 

provided an obvious example of an adjustable pedal with a 

fixed pivot point; and the prior art was replete with patents indicating that a fixed pivot point was an ideal mount

for a sensor. The idea that a designer hoping to make an

adjustable electronic pedal would ignore Asano because 

Asano was designed to solve the constant ratio problem

makes little sense. A person of ordinary skill is also a 

person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton. 

The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals 

to conclude, in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved

obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was “obvious to try.” Id., at 289 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). When there is a design need or market 

pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number 

of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary 

skill has good reason to pursue the known options within

his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated 

success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of 

ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact 

that a combination was obvious to try might show that it

was obvious under §103.

The Court of Appeals, finally, drew the wrong conclusion

from the risk of courts and patent examiners falling prey

to hindsight bias. A factfinder should be aware, of course, 

of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be

cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning. See 

Graham, 383 U. S., at 36 (warning against a “temptation

to read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in 

issue” and instructing courts to “‘guard against slipping

into the use of hindsight’” (quoting Monroe Auto Equipment Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F. 2d 406, 

412 (CA6 1964))). Rigid preventative rules that deny 

factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it. 

We note the Court of Appeals has since elaborated a 
18 KSR INT’L CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

broader conception of the TSM test than was applied in 

the instant matter. See, e.g., DyStar Textilfarben GmbH 

& Co. Deutschland KG v. C. H. Patrick Co., 464 F. 3d 

1356, 1367 (2006) (“Our suggestion test is in actuality 

quite flexible and not only permits, but requires, consideration of common knowledge and common sense”); Alza 

Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F. 3d 1286, 1291 (2006) 

(“There is flexibility in our obviousness jurisprudence 

because a motivation may be found implicitly in the prior 

art. We do not have a rigid test that requires an actual

teaching to combine . . .”). Those decisions, of course, are 

not now before us and do not correct the errors of law 

made by the Court of Appeals in this case. The extent to 

which they may describe an analysis more consistent with

our earlier precedents and our decision here is a matter

for the Court of Appeals to consider in its future cases.

What we hold is that the fundamental misunderstandings

identified above led the Court of Appeals in this case to 

apply a test inconsistent with our patent law decisions. 

III 

When we apply the standards we have explained to the

instant facts, claim 4 must be found obvious. We agree

with and adopt the District Court’s recitation of the relevant prior art and its determination of the level of ordinary skill in the field. As did the District Court, we see 

little difference between the teachings of Asano and Smith 

and the adjustable electronic pedal disclosed in claim 4 of 

the Engelgau patent. A person having ordinary skill in

the art could have combined Asano with a pedal position

sensor in a fashion encompassed by claim 4, and would

have seen the benefits of doing so. 

A 

Teleflex argues in passing that the Asano pedal cannot 

be combined with a sensor in the manner described by 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 19 

Opinion of the Court 

claim 4 because of the design of Asano’s pivot mechanisms. 

See Brief for Respondents 48–49, and n. 17. Therefore, 

Teleflex reasons, even if adding a sensor to Asano was

obvious, that does not establish that claim 4 encompasses 

obvious subject matter. This argument was not, however,

raised before the District Court. There Teleflex was content to assert only that the problem motivating the invention claimed by the Engelgau patent would not lead to the

solution of combining of Asano with a sensor. See Teleflex’s Response to KSR’s Motion for Summary Judgment of

Invalidity in No. 02–74586 (ED Mich.), pp. 18–20, App. 

144a–146a. It is also unclear whether the current argument was raised before the Court of Appeals, where Teleflex advanced the nonspecific, conclusory contention that

combining Asano with a sensor would not satisfy the 

limitations of claim 4. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants

in No. 04–1152 (CA Fed.), pp. 42–44. Teleflex’s own expert declarations, moreover, do not support the point 

Teleflex now raises. See Declaration of Clark J. Radcliffe, 

Ph.D., Supplemental App. 204–207; Declaration of Timothy L. Andresen, id., at 208–210. The only statement in

either declaration that might bear on the argument is

found in the Radcliffe declaration: 

“Asano . . . and Rixon . . . are complex mechanical

linkage-based devices that are expensive to produce

and assemble and difficult to package. It is exactly 

these difficulties with prior art designs that [Engelgau] resolves. The use of an adjustable pedal with a 

single pivot reflecting pedal position combined with an 

electronic control mounted between the support and

the adjustment assembly at that pivot was a simple,

elegant, and novel combination of features in the 

Engelgau ’565 patent.” Id., at 206, ¶16. 

Read in the context of the declaration as a whole this is 

best interpreted to mean that Asano could not be used to 
20 KSR INT’L CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

solve “[t]he problem addressed by Engelgau ’565[:] to

provide a less expensive, more quickly assembled, and 

smaller package adjustable pedal assembly with electronic

control.” Id., at 205, ¶10.

The District Court found that combining Asano with a

pivot-mounted pedal position sensor fell within the scope

of claim 4. 298 F. Supp. 2d, at 592–593. Given the sigificance of that finding to the District Court’s judgment, it is 

apparent that Teleflex would have made clearer challenges to it if it intended to preserve this claim. In light of

Teleflex’s failure to raise the argument in a clear fashion,

and the silence of the Court of Appeals on the issue, we 

take the District Court’s conclusion on the point to be 

correct. 

B 

The District Court was correct to conclude that, as of the 

time Engelgau designed the subject matter in claim 4, it

was obvious to a person of ordinary skill to combine Asano

with a pivot-mounted pedal position sensor. There then 

existed a marketplace that created a strong incentive to

convert mechanical pedals to electronic pedals, and the 

prior art taught a number of methods for achieving this 

advance. The Court of Appeals considered the issue too

narrowly by, in effect, asking whether a pedal designer 

writing on a blank slate would have chosen both Asano

and a modular sensor similar to the ones used in the 

Chevrolet truckline and disclosed in the ’068 patent. The 

District Court employed this narrow inquiry as well,

though it reached the correct result nevertheless. The 

proper question to have asked was whether a pedal designer of ordinary skill, facing the wide range of needs

created by developments in the field of endeavor, would

have seen a benefit to upgrading Asano with a sensor. 

In automotive design, as in many other fields, the interaction of multiple components means that changing one 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 21 

Opinion of the Court 

component often requires the others to be modified as

well. Technological developments made it clear that 

engines using computer-controlled throttles would become

standard. As a result, designers might have decided to

design new pedals from scratch; but they also would have

had reason to make pre-existing pedals work with the new

engines. Indeed, upgrading its own pre-existing model led 

KSR to design the pedal now accused of infringing the 

Engelgau patent.

For a designer starting with Asano, the question was

where to attach the sensor. The consequent legal question, then, is whether a pedal designer of ordinary skill 

starting with Asano would have found it obvious to put the

sensor on a fixed pivot point. The prior art discussed

above leads us to the conclusion that attaching the sensor 

where both KSR and Engelgau put it would have been

obvious to a person of ordinary skill. 

The ’936 patent taught the utility of putting the sensor 

on the pedal device, not in the engine. Smith, in turn, 

explained to put the sensor not on the pedal’s footpad but 

instead on its support structure. And from the known 

wire-chafing problems of Rixon, and Smith’s teaching that 

“the pedal assemblies must not precipitate any motion in 

the connecting wires,” Smith, col. 1, lines 35–37, Supplemental App. 274, the designer would know to place the 

sensor on a nonmoving part of the pedal structure. The 

most obvious nonmoving point on the structure from

which a sensor can easily detect the pedal’s position is a

pivot point. The designer, accordingly, would follow Smith 

in mounting the sensor on a pivot, thereby designing an 

adjustable electronic pedal covered by claim 4.

Just as it was possible to begin with the objective to

upgrade Asano to work with a computer-controlled throttle, so too was it possible to take an adjustable electronic

pedal like Rixon and seek an improvement that would 

avoid the wire-chafing problem. Following similar steps to 
22 KSR INT’L CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

those just explained, a designer would learn from Smith to

avoid sensor movement and would come, thereby, to Asano

because Asano disclosed an adjustable pedal with a fixed 

pivot.

Teleflex indirectly argues that the prior art taught away

from attaching a sensor to Asano because Asano in its 

view is bulky, complex, and expensive. The only evidence

Teleflex marshals in support of this argument, however, is 

the Radcliffe declaration, which merely indicates that

Asano would not have solved Engelgau’s goal of making a 

small, simple, and inexpensive pedal. What the declaration does not indicate is that Asano was somehow so 

flawed that there was no reason to upgrade it, or pedals 

like it, to be compatible with modern engines. Indeed, 

Teleflex’s own declarations refute this conclusion. Dr. 

Radcliffe states that Rixon suffered from the same bulk 

and complexity as did Asano. See id., at 206. Teleflex’s 

other expert, however, explained that Rixon was itself 

designed by adding a sensor to a pre-existing mechanical 

pedal. See id., at 209. If Rixon’s base pedal was not too

flawed to upgrade, then Dr. Radcliffe’s declaration does 

not show Asano was either. Teleflex may have made a 

plausible argument that Asano is inefficient as compared 

to Engelgau’s preferred embodiment, but to judge Asano

against Engelgau would be to engage in the very hindsight 

bias Teleflex rightly urges must be avoided. Accordingly,

Teleflex has not shown anything in the prior art that

taught away from the use of Asano. 

Like the District Court, finally, we conclude Teleflex has 

shown no secondary factors to dislodge the determination 

that claim 4 is obvious. Proper application of Graham and 

our other precedents to these facts therefore leads to the 

conclusion that claim 4 encompassed obvious subject 

matter. As a result, the claim fails to meet the requirement of §103. 

We need not reach the question whether the failure to 
Cite as: 550 U. S. ____ (2007) 23 

Opinion of the Court 

disclose Asano during the prosecution of Engelgau voids

the presumption of validity given to issued patents, for 

claim 4 is obvious despite the presumption. We nevertheless think it appropriate to note that the rationale underlying the presumption—that the PTO, in its expertise, has

approved the claim—seems much diminished here. 

IV 

A separate ground the Court of Appeals gave for reversing the order for summary judgment was the existence of a

dispute over an issue of material fact. We disagree with

the Court of Appeals on this point as well. To the extent 

the court understood the Graham approach to exclude the 

possibility of summary judgment when an expert provides

a conclusory affidavit addressing the question of obviousness, it misunderstood the role expert testimony plays in

the analysis. In considering summary judgment on that 

question the district court can and should take into account expert testimony, which may resolve or keep open

certain questions of fact. That is not the end of the issue, 

however. The ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal

determination. Graham, 383 U. S., at 17. Where, as here, 

the content of the prior art, the scope of the patent claim,

and the level of ordinary skill in the art are not in material dispute, and the obviousness of the claim is apparent 

in light of these factors, summary judgment is appropriate. Nothing in the declarations proffered by Teleflex 

prevented the District Court from reaching the careful 

conclusions underlying its order for summary judgment in

this case. 

* * * 

We build and create by bringing to the tangible and 

palpable reality around us new works based on instinct, 

simple logic, ordinary inferences, extraordinary ideas, and 

sometimes even genius. These advances, once part of our 
24 KSR INT’L CO. v. TELEFLEX INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

shared knowledge, define a new threshold from which 

innovation starts once more. And as progress beginning 

from higher levels of achievement is expected in the normal course, the results of ordinary innovation are not the

subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws. Were it 

otherwise patents might stifle, rather than promote, the 

progress of useful arts. See U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8.

These premises led to the bar on patents claiming obvious 

subject matter established in Hotchkiss and codified in 

§103. Application of the bar must not be confined within a

test or formulation too constrained to serve its purpose. 

KSR provided convincing evidence that mounting a 

modular sensor on a fixed pivot point of the Asano pedal 

was a design step well within the grasp of a person of 

ordinary skill in the relevant art. Its arguments, and the

record, demonstrate that claim 4 of the Engelgau patent is

obvious. In rejecting the District Court’s rulings, the

Court of Appeals analyzed the issue in a narrow, rigid 

manner inconsistent with §103 and our precedents. The 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

It is so ordered.