[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-13338

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-03858-WBH

MERITPLAN INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff - Counter Defendant - Appellee,

versus

COY LEVERETTE, III,

Defendant - Counter Claimant - Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(January 13, 2014)

Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM:

Meritplan Insurance Company filed this declaratory action seeking a ruling 

that Meritplan owed no duty to defend its insured, Coy Leverette, III, against a 

civil suit alleging bodily injury and property damage. Leverette appeals the district 

court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Meritplan. No reversible 

error has been shown; we affirm. 

This case arose out of a physical fight between Leverette and Bruno 

Arredondo. While playing golf with a group of friends, Leverette exchanged 

verbal insults with Arredondo, a member of another group of golfers. At some 

point, Leverette grabbed Arredondo’s golf club; and the club broke into two 

pieces. During the ensuing physical struggle, Leverette’s friend, Derrick Austin, 

kicked Arredondo in the head, rendering Arredondo unconscious. Leverette then 

punched Arredondo repeatedly in the face. Arredondo suffered severe and 

permanent injuries as a result of the altercation. 

Arredondo filed a civil suit against Leverette in state court, alleging claims 

for trespass to personalty, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional 

distress, and punitive damages. Leverette sought to have Meritplan defend him 

against Arredondo’s suit under Leverette’s homeowner’s insurance policy 

(“Policy”) with Meritplan. Meritplan agreed to provide the defense under a 

reservation of rights and filed this declaratory action. 

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Arredondo then amended the underlying complaint, adding a negligence 

claim against Leverette. Arredondo alleged that Leverette was negligent for 

“creating a dangerous situation whereby [Arredondo] felt that he had no choice but 

to physically tackle Defendant Leverette to the ground, thus resulting in the 

subsequent physical assault” on Arredondo by Austin and Leverette. 

The district court concluded that, because Arredondo’s injuries were not 

caused by “accident,” the altercation between Leverette and Arredondo constituted 

no “occurrence” under the terms of the Policy; and Arredondo’s injuries were not 

covered by the Policy. As a result, the district court determined that Meritplan had 

no duty to defend Leverette against Arredondo’s civil suit and was entitled to 

summary judgment. 

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Holloman 

v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2006). “Summary judgment is 

appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment 

as a matter of law in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 836-37.

“An insurer’s duty to defend is determined by comparing the allegations of 

the complaint with the provisions of the policy.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. 

City of Rome, 601 S.E.2d 810, 812 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). Under the terms of the 

Policy, Meritplan has a duty to defend Leverette “[i]f a claim is made or a suit is 

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brought against [Leverette] for damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property 

damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence’ to which this coverage applies . . . .” The term 

“occurrence” is defined in the Policy as “an accident . . . which results . . . in: . . . 

‘Bodily Injury’; or . . . ‘Property damage.’” 

The term “accident” is undefined by the Policy. But, under Georgia 

insurance law, the term “accident” means “an event which takes place without 

one’s foresight or expectation or design.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Grayes, 454 S.E.2d 

616, 618 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (citing O.C.G.A. § 1-3-3(2)). “An accident refers to 

an unexpected happening rather than one occurring through intention or design.” 

Id. Whether an event constitutes an “accident” is determined based on the 

viewpoint of the insured. Rucker v. Columbia Nat’l Ins. Cor. Am. Home Shield 

Corp., 705 S.E.2d 270, 273-74 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). 

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Leverette, demonstrates 

that the events underlying Arredondo’s complaint did not take place without 

Leverette’s foresight, expectation, or design. That Leverette intended to grab 

Arredondo’s golf club and to strike Arredondo repeatedly in the head and face is 

undisputed. Although Leverette contends that he acted in self-defense, that does 

not alter our conclusion that Leverette acted intentionally.*

 See Grayes, 454 

 * Leverette argues for the first time on appeal that, because he acted in self-defense, his conduct 

falls under a “reasonable force” exception to the Policy’s standard bodily injury exclusion. 

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S.E.2d at 618-19 (concluding that, despite the insured’s self-defense argument, no 

dispute existed that the insured shot the victims intentionally when he “intended to 

shoot the gun and hit those whom he intended to shoot.”). 

That Leverette might not have intended the specific injuries suffered by 

Arredondo is immaterial. The Policy excludes expressly from coverage losses 

resulting from “bodily injury . . . which is expected or intended by [the insured] 

even if the ‘bodily injury’ . . . [i]s of a different kind, quality or degree than 

expected or intended . . . .” In addition -- under Georgia law -- Leverette must 

show “that the loss was the unexpected result of an unforeseen or unexpected act 

which was involuntarily or unintentionally done, i.e., that the injury resulted from 

‘accidental means.’” See Winters v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 433 S.E.2d 363, 

363-64 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (interpreting policy language that provided coverage 

for “bodily injury caused by accident”); see also Provident Life & Accident Ins. 

Co. v. Hallum, 576 S.E.2d 849, 851 (Ga. 2003) (explaining that Georgia law 

distinguishes between insurance coverage for “bodily injury caused by accident” 

and “accidental bodily injuries”). Because Leverette acted intentionally and 

voluntarily when he grabbed Arredondo’s golf club and struck Arredondo, 

 

Because Leverette failed to raise this argument in the district court, the issue is not properly 

before us. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004). 

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Leverette cannot show that Arredondo’s injuries resulted from “accidental means” 

such that they would be covered under the Policy. 

The district court committed no error in determining that Meritplan owed no 

duty to defend Leverette in Arredondo’s suit and that Meritplan was entitled to 

summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.

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