N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT

In re : LEAH AHN,

De btor,

______________________________ PR IYA SANGER ; M IC H AEL SANGER ,

Appe lla nts,

v. LEAH AHN,

Appe lle e . No. 18-16794 D.C . No. 4:17-c v-05182-JST

M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Sta t e s Distric t C ourt for the Northe rn Distric t of C a lifornia Jon S. Tiga

r, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d Oc tobe r 22, 2019 * * Sa n Fra n c isc o , C a lifornia B e fore : B YB EE, N.R . SM ITH, a nd C OLLINS, C irc uit Judge s. 

# FIL ED

FEB 28 2020
M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U

. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.

* * The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without ora l a

rgum e nt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a )(2).Priy a

a nd M ic ha e l Sa

nge r (c olle c tive ly , the “ Sa nge rs” ) a ppe a l the de c ision of the distric t c ourt a ffirm ing in pa rt a nd re v e rsing in pa

rt the ba nkruptc y c ourt’ s de nia l of the Sa nge rs’ m otion to dism iss a n d gra nt of Appe lle e Le a h Ahn’ s (“ Ahn” ) m otion for sum

m a ry judgm e nt. W e a ffirm

.

“ W e re vie w the distric t c ourt’ s de c ision on a ppe a l from

a ba nkruptc y c ourt de novo” a nd inde pe nde n tly re v ie w the ba

n kruptc y c o urt’ s de c ision without giving de fe re nc e to the distric t c ourt. Sax m an v . Educ . C re dit Mgmt. C

orp. (In re Sax man) , 325 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th C ir. 2003). 1. “ Abse nt e x c e ptiona l c irc um sta nc e s, we ge n e ra lly

will not c onside r

a rgum e nts ra ise d for the first tim e on a ppe a l , a lthough we ha ve disc re tion to do so.” El Paso C

ity v
. Am. W . Airline s, Inc . (In re Am. W

. Airline s, Inc .) , 217 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th C ir. 2000). The Sa nge rs a rgue for the first tim e on a ppe a l tha t Ahn la c ke d “ sta

tutory sta nding” to bring he r lie n a voida nc e c la i m (to the e x te nt it

c ha lle nge d the va lidity of Sa nge rs’ judic ia l lie n ) unde r 11 U.S.C

. § 522(f)(1)(A). 1

1 The disse nt c onte nds the Sa nge rs ra ise d this a rgum e nt “ a t e ve ry

sta ge of the s e proc e e dings” a nd points to the Sa nge rs’ a rgum e nt tha

t the ba nkruptc y c ourt la c ke d subje c t matte r jurisdic tion ove r the de c la ra t ory re lie f c l a im

. S

e e Disse nt a

t 7. Inde e d , the disse nt note s tha t the Sa nge rs a

rgue d tha t the ba nkruptc y c ourt la c ke d “ a rising unde r” jurisdic tion ove r the de c la ra tory re lie f c la im , be c a

use
“ nothing within Se c tion 522 . . . c re a te s a c a use of a c t ion to c ha l le nge a judgm e nt lie n on the grounds tha

t unde rlie [the De c la

ra tory R e lie f C la im ] .” Howe v e r, the ide n tifie d sta

te m e nt e xplic itly

c ha lle n ge d the ba

n kruptc y c o u rt’ s subje c t matte r

(c ontinue d...) 2Unlike Artic le III sta nding, whic h is jurisdic t iona l, sta t utory sta nding a rgum e nts

m a y be forfe ite d or wa i ve d if not ra ise d be fore the tria l c ourt. Se e Bily e u v . Morgan Stanle y Long Te r m Disability

Plan , 683 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th C ir. 2012). “ A
pa rty ’ s une xpla i ne d fa ilure to ra ise a n a rgum e nt tha

t wa s indisputa

bly a v a i la ble be low is pe rha

ps the le a st ‘ e xc e ptiona l’ c i rc u m sta nc e wa rra nting our e xe rc i se of

1 (...c ontinue d) jurisdic tion ove r the de c la ra tory re lie f c l a im . The Sa nge rs did not, howe ve r, a dva nc e a ny a rgum e nt tha

t A h n la c ke d sta

t utory sta nding to bring he

r lie n a voida nc e c la im unde r 11 U.S.C . § 522. M ore ove r, to the e xte nt the ide n tifie d sta te m e nt m a

y be c onstrue d a s a statutory standing c ha lle nge a nd not a

c ha lle nge to the ba nkruptc y c o urt’ s subje c t matte r jurisdic t ion , the Sa nge rs provide d no a uthority a ddre ssing the issue of sta tutory sta nding. “ The rule in this c irc uit is tha t a ppe lla te c o urts will not c o n side r a rgum e nts tha t a re not ‘ prope rly ra ise d’ in the tria l c ourts.” O’Rourk

e v . Se aboard Sur. C

o. (In re E.R. Fe

ge rt, Inc .) , 887 F.2d 955, 957 (9th C ir. 1989) (a lte ra tion a dopte d) (quoting Rothman v

. Hosp. Se rv . of S. C al. , 510 F.2d 956, 960 (9th C ir. 1975)). W h i le no bright line rule e xists to de te rm i ne whe t

h e r a litiga nt prope rly

ra i se d a n a rgum e n t be low, “ [a ] worka ble sta nda rd . . . is tha

t the a rgum e n t m

ust be ra ise d suffic ie ntly

for the tria l c ourt to rule on it.” Id. ; se e also In re Me rc ury Inte rac tiv e C

orp. Se c . Litig. , 618 F.3d 988, 992 (9th C i r. 2010). He re , the single se nte nc e ide n tifie d by the disse n t

did not suffic i e ntly

ra ise the sta

tutory sta nding a rgum e nt suc h tha

t the ba nkruptc y c ourt c ould rule on the issue . Fina lly , c ontra ry to the disse nt’ s c onte ntion tha t the ba nkruptc y c ourt a ddre sse d a

nd rule d on the sta

tutory sta nding issue , the c ourt a c tua lly c onc lude d tha

t it la c ke d “ a rising unde r” a nd “ a rising in” jurisdic t ion ove r the d e c la ra t ory judgm e nt c la im , not tha

t Ahn la c k e d sta

tutory sta nding to bring he

r lie n a voida

nc e a c tion.

3. . . disc re tion.” G & G Prods. LLC v . Rusic , 902 F.3d 940, 950 (9th C ir. 2018). Ac c ordingly , we de c line to c o n side r the Sa nge rs’ sta tutory sta nding a rgum e nt. 2 2. The ba

nkruptc y c o urt ha d subje c t

m a t te r jurisdic tion ove r Ahn’ s lie n

a voida nc e c la im a nd c ould prope rly a ddre ss the va lidity of the Sa nge rs’ purporte d judic ia l lie n

a s a pa rt of tha t c la im . W e re vie w whe the r the lowe r c o urt ha d subje c t

m a tte r jurisdic tion de novo. C oy le v . P.T. Garuda Indon. , 363 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (9th C ir. 2004).

2 The disse nt a lso sugge sts tha t, be c a use Ahn, a

pro se litiga

nt, did not ra ise wa ive r a s a

ground for opposing the Sa nge rs’ a rgum e nt, we m ust a ddre ss the m e rits of the Sa nge rs’ sta tutory sta nding a rgum e nt. Disse nt a

t 9 n.4. Howe ve r, we re gula rly ra ise a n d a p ply , sua sponte , the ge ne ra l rule tha t we will not e nte rta in a

n a rgum e nt ra ise d

for the first tim e on a

ppe a l. Se e , e
. g. , Padge tt v

. W right , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th C ir. 2009). “ This rule se rve s to e nsure tha t le ga l a rgum e nts a

re c onside re d with the be n e fit of a fully de ve l ope d fa c tua l re c ord, offe rs a ppe lla te c ourts the be ne fit of the distric t c ourt’ s prior a na ly sis, a nd pre v e nts pa

rtie s from sa ndba gging the ir oppone n ts with ne w a rgum e n ts on a

ppe a l.” Dre am Palac e v
. C ty . of Maric opa , 384 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th C ir. 2004)

. The se ra tiona le s a re a pplic a ble to the insta

nt c a se . B e c a

use the Sa nge rs ra ise d the sta tutory sta nding a rgum e nt for the first tim e on a ppe a l, we a re de prive d of the be ne fit of the ba nkruptc y a nd distric t

c ourts’ a na ly se s on the issue , a nd we a re re luc ta

nt to sa nc tion a c ourse of c onduc t tha

t e nc oura g e s litiga

nts to “ sa n dba g ” the ir oppone nts (e spe c ia lly

pro se litiga

nts) with ne w a

rgum e nts ra ise d for the first tim e on a ppe a l. R e ga rdle ss, the Supre m e C o urt ha s sta te d tha t “ [t] he m a tte r of wha t que stions m a y be ta ke n up a nd re solve d for the first tim e on a ppe a l is one le ft prim a rily to the disc re tion of the c ourts of a ppe a ls, to be e xe rc i se d on the fa c ts of individua l c a se s.” Single ton v

. W

u lff , 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976). He re , we e xe rc ise our disc re tion a nd de c line to c onside r the Sa nge rs’ sta tutory sta nding a rgum e n t, whic h the Sa n ge rs fa ile d to ra ise in both the

ba nkruptc y a nd distric t c ourts. 4“ B a nkruptc y c o u rts ha v e subje c t m a tte r jurisdic tion ove r proc e e d ings

‘ a rising unde r title 11, or a

rising in or re la te d to c a se s unde r title 11.’ ” W ilshire C ourty ard v . C

al. Franc h ise Tax

Bd. (In re

W ilshire C ourty ard) , 729 F.3d 1279, 1285 (9th C ir. 2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C . § 1334(b)). He re , the ba n kruptc y c ourt ha d subje c t m a tte r jurisdic tion ove r Ahn’ s lie n a voida nc e c la im brought pursua

nt to 11 U.S.C . § 522(f), be c a use it wa s a

c ore proc e e d ing a

rising unde r title 11. Se e 28 U.S.C . §§ 1334, 157(b)(2)(K). Furthe r, the distric t c o urt c orre c tly de te rm ine d tha

t the ba n kruptc y c ourt

c ould a ddre ss the va lidity of the Sa nge rs’ purporte d judic i a l lie n a s a pa rt of Ahn’ s lie n a voida

nc e c la i m , be c a

use a c ourt a pplie s sta te la w a s the first ste p in a

lie n

a voida nc e a c tion to de te rm ine whe the r a va lid lie n a tta c he d to the de btor’ s prope rty

. 3 Se e W

olfson v

. W

atts (In re W atts) , 298 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th C ir. 2002).

3 The disse nt a

rgue s tha t ne ithe r W

olfson nor W

ige t v . N ie lse n (In re N ie lse n) , 197 B .R . 665 (B .A.P. 9th C ir. 1996) support the vie w tha t “ the § 522(f) inquiry m ust be gin with a

n inquiry into the unde rly ing va lidity of the lie n

unde r sta te la w.” Disse nt a

t 10. Howe ve r, c ontra

ry to the disse nt’ s prote sta

tions, both W olfson a nd W

ige t c onte m pla te tha t the first ste p in a lie n a voida n c e a c tion m

ust be to de t e rm i ne whe t

he r a v alid

judic ia l lie n attac he d

to the de btor’ s prope rty

. Se e W olfson , 298 F.3d a

t 1080 (“ To de te rm ine whe the r or to wha t e x te nt [the c re d itor] ’ s judgm e nt lie n

c ould be a voide d . . . , the ba nkruptc y c ourt ha d to (1) a pply C a l ifornia

la w to de te rm ine whe the r [the c re ditor] ’ s lie n attac h e d to De btors’ re

side nc e . . . .” (e m

pha sis a dde d)); se e also W ige t , 197 B .R . a t 667–68 (To de te rm ine whe the r a lie n should be a voide d unde r § 522(f), “ [t] he first ste p is to utiliz e sta

te la w in de c iding whe the r a v alid lie n a tta c he d to the de b tor’ s (c ontinue d...) 53. The ba nkruptc y c o urt e rre d in a llowing Ahn’ s lie n a voida nc e c la im to be brought in a

n a dve rsa ry proc e e d ing, but tha

t e rror wa s ha

rm l e ss. W e re vie w the ba nkruptc y c ourt’ s inte rpre t a tion of the B a nkruptc y C ode a n d a

pplic a b le rule s of
proc e d ure de novo. Se e C

al. Franc hise

Tax Bd. v . J ac k s on (In re J ac k son) , 184 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th C ir. 1999). A lie n a voida

nc e proc e e ding unde r § 522(f) m ust be initia

te d by m otion in the b a nkruptc y c a s e a s provide d by R ule 9014 a

nd not by a dve rsa ry

proc e e ding. Se e Fe d. R . B a nkr. P. 4003(d) (“ A proc e e ding unde r § 522(f) to a void a lie n . . . unde r the [B a nkruptc y ] C ode sha ll be c om m e nc e d by

m otion in the

m a nne r provide d by

R ule 9014 . . . .” ); se e also Barrie ntos v . W e lls Fargo Bank

, N

. A. , 633 F.3d 1186, 1190–91 (9th C i r. 2011) (holding tha t c onte m pt proc e e dings a

re

3 (...c ontinue d) prope rty .” (e m

pha sis a dde d)). It m a ke s se nse tha t a c ourt m ust first e nsure tha

t a va lid lie n e xists, be c a

use , if no va lid judic i a l lie n a tta c h e d to the de btor’ s prope rty , the n the re is no lie n to a

void a nd the lie n a voida

nc e c a use of a c tion would be

m oot. In othe r words, if the re is a que stion a s to a lie n’ s va lidity , the ba

nkruptc y c ourt would e rr by

a ssum ing the va l idity

of the lie n a

nd proc e e ding to the

m e rits of the lie n a voida

nc e a c tion, be c a

use the re m a y

be no injury

in fa c t tha t the § 522(f) a c tion c ould re m e dy . The re fore , if the va lidity of a lie n is dispute d or be c om e s dispute d, the c o urt m

u s t de te rm ine , a s a

ne c e ssa ry pre dic a te to re s olving the lie n a voida nc e a c tion unde r § 522(f), whe t he r the re is a

va lid judic ia l lie n to a

void. Thus, the disse nt’ s a rgum e nt tha t the distric t c ourt c ould not a ddre s s the va lidity of the Sa nge rs’ lie n a s a

ne c e ssa ry pre dic a te to re solving Ahn’ s lie n a voida nc e c a use of a c tion (whe n the re wa s a dispute a s to the va l idity of the lie n) is not pe rsua sive

. 6c onte ste d m a tte rs, not a d ve rsa ry proc e e dings, a

nd m ust be initia

te d by m otion in the b a nkruptc y c a s e , not by a dve rsa ry

proc e e ding). R e ga rdle ss, we re v i e w a

ba nkruptc y c ourt’ s de c ision to he a r a m a tte r tha t should be brought a s a

c onte ste d m a tte r, but is brought in a n a dve rsa ry

proc e e ding, unde r the ha

rm le ss e rror sta

nda rd. C f. Auste i n v . Sc h w artz (In re Ge rw e r) , 898 F.2d 730, 734 (9th C ir. 1990) (finding the c re ditor wa s not “ h a

rm e d” by the ba n kruptc y

c ourt’ s tre a tm e nt of the issue in a c onte ste d m a tte r). He re , the Sa nge rs we re not
pre j udic e d by

the ba n kruptc y c ourt he a

ring the lie n a voida

nc e c la im in a n

a dve rsa ry proc e e ding, be c a

use the y ha d a full opportunity

to pre se nt the i r

a rgum e nts c onc e rning the va l idity of the lie n. 4. The ba

nkruptc y c o urt did not e rr in finding tha t the Sa nge rs’ re c orde d

a bstra c t of judgm e nt did not c re a te a va lid judic ia l lie n

unde r C a lifornia la

w . W e

“ re vie w the ba

nkruptc y c ourt’ s gra

nt of sum m a ry judgm e nt de novo.” Gill v . Ste rn (In re Ste rn) , 345 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th C ir. 2003) (ita lic s om itte d).

“ Sta te la w c ontrols the va lidity a nd e ffe c t of lie ns in the ba nkruptc y

c onte xt.” Tr. C

orp. of Mont. v . Patte rson (In re C oppe r K ing Inn, Inc

. ), 918 F.2d 1404, 1407 (9th C ir. 1990). C a lifornia la w provide s, in re le va

nt pa rt, tha t a n

a bstra c t of judgm e nt “ sha ll c o nta in . . . [t] h e na m e a nd a ddre ss of the judgm e nt

c re d itor.” C a l. C iv. Proc . C ode § 674(a )(4). One purpose of this sta tute is to

7provide third pa rtie s c onstruc tive notic e of a judgm e nt lie n. Stout v . Gill , 294 P. 446, 448 (C a l. C t. App. 1930). The re le va

nt inquiry , howe ve r, is “ not whe the r the re wa s notic e of the lie n , but whe the r the [Sa nge rs’ ] a bstra c t c om

plie d with sta

tutory provisions e na c te d to insure [sic ] notic e . ” K

e e le v . Re ic h , 215 C a l . R

ptr. 756, 758 (C t. App. 1985). The
te xt of se c tion 674(a )(4) is pla in a nd una m biguous a nd re quire s the judgm e n t

c re d itor’ s na

m e a nd a ddre s s a

ppe a r on the a

bstra c t of judgm e nt. Se e C a l. C i v. Proc

. C ode § 674(a )(4). The substa ntia l c om plia nc e sta nda rd ha s only

be e n a pplie d whe re “ a l l of the re quire d da ta wa s inc lude d ,” a n d “ [n] o c ourt ha s va lida te d a judgm e nt lie n whe re m a n d a te d inform a tion wa s omitte d from a n a bstra c t.” 4 K

e e le , 215 C a l. R

ptr. a t 758–59. He re , the Sa nge rs’ a ddre ss doe s not a ppe a r on the a

bstra c t of judgm e n t a

nd nothing ide ntifie s the Sa n ge rs a s the judgm e nt c re ditors. The re fore , the Sa nge rs’

a bstra c t of judgm e nt doe s not c om ply with se c t ion 674(a )(4). Se e K e e l e , 215 C a l.

4 Afte r K e e le , one sta

te a ppe lla te c ourt de te rm ine d tha

t the om ission of m a nda te d inform a tion wa s not fa ta l to a n a b stra c t of judgm e nt whe re the e rror wa s a c le ric a l e rror tha t c ould be c orre c t e d. Se e C ommonw e alth Land Title

C o. v
. K ornbluth , 220 C a l . R

p t r. 774, 781 (C t. App. 1985). Howe ve r, K ornbluth is not a pplic a ble he re , be c a

u se , e ve n if the fa ilure to ide ntify the judgm e nt c re ditors a

nd the o m ission of the

judgm e nt c re ditors’ a ddre s s we re c le ric a l e rrors, the Sa nge rs m a y not c orre c t the s e e rrors due to the ope ra tion of the disc ha rge injunc tion. Se e 11 U.S.C . § 524(a ); se e also Alc ov e Inv ., Inc . v . C onc e ic ao (In re

C onc e ic ao) , 331 B .R . 885, 892 (B .A.P. 9th C ir. 2005). 8R

ptr. a t 757, 759 (finding a

n a bstra c t of judgm e nt did not substa ntia lly c om

ply with se c tion 674(a ) whe re it om itte d the de btor’ s soc ia l se c urity num be r, whic h

wa s known to the judgm e n t c re ditor); s e e also Ellrott v . Bliss , 195 C a l. R

ptr. 446, 448 (C t. App. 1983) (holding a n a bstra c t of judgm e nt ina de qua te a nd its re c ording

a nullity whe re “ [t] he a m ount of the judgm e nt [c ould not] be a sc e rta ine d from the

a bstra c t re c orde d in th[e ] c a s e ” ); c f. Longv ie w

Int’l, Inc . v . Stirling , 247 C a l . R ptr. 3d 793, 795 (C t. App. 2019) (“ For a judgm e nt lie n to be va lid, a n a bstra c t of judgm e nt m

ust be prope rly

re c orde d a

nd c onta in a l l the inform a tion re q uire d by
sta tute .” ). The Sa nge rs a

rgue tha t the ir a bstra c t of judgm e nt substa ntia lly c om plie s with se c tion 674(a )(4), be c a use : (1) a l though the ir na

m e s do not a

ppe a r in the box

e ntitle d “ Judgm e nt C re ditor (name and addre ss) ,” the ir na

m e s do a ppe a r e lse whe re on the a b stra c t of judgm e nt; a

nd (2) the a

bstra c t of judgm e nt c onta ins the m a iling

a ddre s s of the ir a ttorne y of re c ord. The Sa n g e rs’ a rgum e nts a re not pe rsua sive

. First, the Sa nge rs a

re liste d nowhe re on the a bstra c t a s the judgm e nt

c re d itors. The Sa nge rs a

re liste d a s pla intiffs on the a bstra c t, but tha

t c a n not

c onstitute substa ntia l c om plia nc e whe re nothing on the a bstra c t inform s third
pa rtie s with a

ny c e rta inty tha t the Sa nge rs a

re the judgm e nt c re d itors. Se e Ellrott , 195 C a l. R

ptr. a t 448. Inde e d, a s the ba

n kruptc y c ourt c orre c tly

re c ogniz e d:

9“ [t] he re c ould we ll be othe r pla intiffs . . . a s the spa c e ne xt to the word ‘ Pla intiff’ is

not la rge e nough to a c c om

m o da te m ore tha

n one or two na

m e s. It would not be

unre a s ona

ble to c o nc l ude tha

t the judgm e nt c re ditor m ight be a n othe r pla intiff, whose na m e doe s not a

ppe a r on the [a ] bstra c t . . . .” 5 Se c ond, the inc lusion of the Sa nge rs’ a ttorne y ’ s a d dre ss on the a bstra c t of judgm e nt doe s not c onstitute substa ntia l c om plia n c e with se c tion 674(a )(4)’ s

re quire m e nt tha

t the a bstra c t c onta in the judgm e nt c re ditor’ s a ddre s s. Se c tion 674

re quire s tha

t a bstra c ts of judgm e nt inc lude “ [t] he . . . a ddre ss of the judgme nt

5 The disse nt a c c use s us of ba se le ssly spe c ula ting tha

t the spa c e ne xt to the word “ Pla intiff” on the EJ-001 form is not la rge e nough to a c c om

m oda te m ore tha n one or two na

m e s, but turns a

round a nd spe c ula te s tha

t the re is “ ple nty

of spa c e on the form , ne xt to a nd unde r the na m e s of the Sa nge rs, to list a dditiona l pla i ntiffs (or inc l ude ‘ e t a l .’ ).” Disse nt a t 13–14. The disse n t

m i sse s the point. Nothing on the

Sa n ge rs’ a

bstra c t of judgm e nt inform s third pa rtie s with a

ny c e rta inty tha t the Sa nge rs a

re the judgm e nt c re ditors. R a the r, the m a nne r in whic h the Sa nge rs c om

ple te d the a

bstra c t of judgm e n t

re quire s a ny

third pa rty to a ssum e tha t the individua l s liste d n e xt to “ Pla intiff” a re , in fa c t, the judgm e nt c re ditors. The disse nt a lso points to Ite m 7, whic h a

ppe a rs in the c le rk’ s portion of the form a nd provide s tha

t “ [a ] ll judgm e nt c re ditors a nd de btors a

re liste d on this a

bstra c t.” Howe ve r, re lia

nc e on the la

ngua ge in Ite m

7 forc e s third pa

rtie s to furthe r a ssum e the b ox e ntitle d “ Judgm e nt C re ditor (name and addre ss) ” wa s le ft inte ntiona lly bla n k a nd tha t the judgm e nt c re ditors’ na m e s, in fa c t, a ppe a r som e whe re e lse on the a bstra c t. Unde r the disse nt’ s vie w, a third pa rty would be forc e d

to se a rc h the a bstra c t, loc a te the Sa nge rs’ na m e s liste d a s pla intiffs, a n d a ssum e tha t the Sa nge rs we re , in fa c t, the judgm e nt c re d itors whe n nothing on the a bstra c t of judgm e nt indic a te s tha

t the Sa nge rs we re the judgm e nt c re ditors. In short, the disse nt’ s a rgum e nt is unpe rsua sive , be c a use , a s the ba

nkruptc y c ourt note d, “ [t] h e m a nne r in whic h the Sa nge rs c om

ple te d the ir Abstra c t forc e s third pa rtie s to m a ke too m a ny a ssum ptions.” 10c re d

itor. ” C a l. C iv. Proc . C ode . § 674(a )(4) (e m pha sis a dde d ). Thus, the pla in la ngua ge of se c tion 674 re quire s the addre ss o f t he judgme n t c re ditor , not the

a ddre s s of the judgm e nt c re d itor’ s a ttorne y . A c ontra ry finding would run a foul of the K e e le c ourt’ s c le a r dire c tive tha t “ the a pplic a t ion of a

libe ra l c onstruc tion [of

se c t ion 674(a )] would frustra te le g isla tive inte nt re ga

rding the spe c ific c onte nts of

a bstra c ts.” 6 K

e e le , 215 C a l. R

ptr. a t 759. Furthe r, substa

ntia l c om p lia nc e “ m e a ns ac tual

c om plia nc e in re spe c t to the substa nc e e sse ntia l to e ve ry

re a sona ble obje c tive of the sta

tute

. ” Asse mbly

v
. De uk me j ian , 639 P.2d 939, 946 (C a l. 1982) (quoting Stashe r v . Harge r -Halde man , 372 P.2d 649, 652 (C a l . 1962)). He re , if the purpose of the sta tute is to provide third pa rtie s the spe c ific inform a tion e num e ra te d in se c tion 674(a ), whic h the le gisla ture de te rm ine d

is ne c e ssa

ry to e nsure c onstruc tive notic e , third pa rtie s should not be

re quire d to se a

rc h the a bstra c t of judgm e nt to loc a te inform a tion tha t

m a y or m a y not le a d to the m a nda te d

inform a tion—

the judgm e nt c re d itor’ s na m e

6 The disse nt a

rgue s tha t we re a d se c tion 674(a )(4) a s re quiring the Sa nge rs to list only

the i r “ h om e a ddre ss a

nd not a ny othe r a ddre ss, suc h the ir a ttorne y ’ s a ddre s s.” Disse nt a

t 14. The disse nt sugge sts tha t “ nothing in the

sta tutory te xt supports tha

t na rrow re a ding.” Id. a t 15. Howe ve r, the la ngua ge of se c tion 674 is c le a r a n d una

m biguous a nd re quire s the addre

s s of the judgme nt c re ditor , not the a ddre s s of the judgm e nt c re d itor’ s a ttorne y . The re fore , be c a use the a bstra c t omits m a nda te d inform a tion (the Sa nge rs’ a ddre s s), it doe s not substa ntia lly c om ply with se c t ion 674(a ). Se e K

e e le , 215 C a l. R

ptr. a t 758–59. The

disse nt’ s a

rgum e nts to the c ontra ry a re unpe rsua sive

. 11a nd a ddre ss. An inte rpre ta t ion of se c tion 674(a ) tha t m a k e s the inc lusion of

m a nda te d inform a tion disc re tiona ry would introduc e unc e rta inty a s to wha t inform a t ion is re quire d for a va lid a bstra c t of judgm e nt a

n d would “ frustra te le gisla tive inte n t re ga rding the spe c i fic c o nte nts of a bstra c ts.” K

e e le , 215 C a l. R

ptr.

a t 759. The re fore , the Sa nge rs’ a bstra c t of judgm e nt doe s not substa ntia lly c om ply with se c tion 674(a )(4), be c a use it doe s not ide ntify

the judgm e nt c re ditors a

nd

om i ts the judgm e nt c re ditors’ a ddre ss. AFFIRM E D.

121 Sanger v. Ahn ( In re Ahn ) , No. 18

- 16794 COLLINS, Circuit Judge, dissenting : In my view, the underlying validity of the Sangers’ lien is not properly before us, but if it were, I would conclude that the Sangers’ abstract of judgment

was sufficient under California law to create a valid lien

. Because the majority concludes otherwise as to both points, I respectfully dissent. I This case comes to us in a singularly peculiar procedural posture , which is a good indication that something is seriously amiss. In the proceedings below, Ahn asserted two claims in her adversary complaint: (1) a declaratory relief claim seeking a declaration that the Sangers’ abstract of judgment did not create a valid lien under California law; and (2) a claim that, in the event the lien was valid, it should be avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) to the extent that it impai r ed her homestead exemption. T he district court reversed the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment to Ahn on her declaratory relief claim , holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subje ct matter jurisdiction over that c ause of action . As to Ahn’s lien avoidance cause of action under § 522(f), the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of that claim . Thus, the nominal result of the district court’s ruling was that Ahn lost on both of her causes of action. Nonetheless, somehow the Sangers are the appellants in this court, and Ahn is the appellee. This 

# FILED

FEB 28 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 upside

- down posture resulted from the district court’s fundamentally flawed conception of the issues properly raised by Ahn’s request to avoid the Sangers’ lien under § 522(f)

. Because Ahn has not filed a cross

- appeal from the district court’s determination that “the bankruptcy court lacked subject matte r jurisdiction over Ahn’s declaratory judgment cause of action , ” the o nly issue properly before us is the disposition of Ahn’s second cause of action for avoidance under § 522(f). See Lee v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. , 245 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2001) (party that seeks “ ‘ to change ’ ” the judgment must file a cross - appeal). The district court affirmed the dismiss al of Ahn’s § 522(f) claim based on its conclusion s that (1) such a claim necessarily required the court to address the underlying validity of the Sangers’ lien; and (2) because the Sangers’ lien was i nvalid under California law , it could not be said to impair Ahn’s homestead exemption . But the district court’s threshold premise was wrong, because a § 522(f) motion is not the proper vehicle for challenging the validity of a lien. 1 I therefore would v acate the district

1 As the majority correctly notes, a request for avoidance of a lien under § 522(f) must be brought by motion rather than by adversary proceeding. See F ED
. R. B ANKR
. P. 4003(d). It is not clear to me , however, that the expanded § 522(f) claim that the district court recognized here (which embraces the issue of the underlying validity of the lien) is within the contemplation of this rule. But given that I do not think that this expanded § 522(f) claim exists, I have no occasion to address whether, if it did exist, it would need to be raised by way of an adversar y proceeding rather than a motion.3 court’s dismissal of Ahn’s § 522(f) claim and remand

. A In requesting relief under § 522(f), Ahn sought to avoid the lien created by the abstract of judgment on the ground that it purportedly impaired her homestead exemption in light of “the amount of the consensual liens” on the property. Because the bankruptcy court granted declaratory relief hold ing that the abstract of judgment was invalid under California law, it then dismissed the § 522(f) claim as moot (which it would have been if the lien were invalid). The district court, however, reversed the grant of declaratory relief on subject matter j urisdiction grounds, thereby vitiating the bankruptcy court’s mootness ruling concerning the § 522(f) claim. But rather than vacate the dismissal of the § 522(f) claim and remand to the bankruptcy court , the district court instead held that it had authori ty
to address the underlying validity of the lien in the guise of adjudicating the § 522(f) claim. I agree with the Sangers that, in doing so, the district court erred. The district court proceeded on the premise that “the first step in deciding whether a lien should be avoided is to determine whether the lien is valid.” That is
wrong. A s the district court correctly recognized , a bankruptcy cou rt cannot grant a motion to avoid a lien under § 522(f) when that lien is wholly invalid; in such a case, the m otion must be denied as moot . But what follows from that premise is that a § 522(f) motion is not a proper vehicle for contesting the validity of the4 underlying lien. Because a movant cannot properly file a motion for the sole purpose of having it denied , a movant cannot properly use a motion under § 522(f) as a vehicle for challenging the validity of the lien

. Ahn herself seemed to recognize as much, because she filed her challenge to the lien as a freestanding claim separate and apart from her § 522(f) cause of action. B y improperly
recast ing Ahn’s § 522(f) cause of action as embracing the underlying validity of the Sangers’ lien , the district court effectively placed Ahn in the peculiar position of affirmatively asking for her § 522(f) cause of action to be dismissed on the ground that the lien was invalid. Indeed, after agreeing with Ahn that the lien was invalid, the district court then nominally ruled against Ahn by “affirm[ ing ] the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of Ahn’s second cause of action.” De spite the obvious procedural oddity, t he district court held that it had authority to address the underlying validity of the abstract of judgment because Wiget v. Nielsen ( In re Nielsen ) , 197 B.R. 665, 667

– 68 ( B.A.P. 9 th Cir. 1996), states that the “ first step ” i n the § 522(f) avoidance inquiry “ is to utilize state law in deciding whether a valid judicial lien attached to the debtor ’ s property .” But the inquiry Wiget undertook is very different from what the district court did here. I t makes sense, in deciding whether a lien impairs the debtor’s homestead exemption, to begin by first analyzing how and to what extent , under state law, the lien will attach to whatever equity might be in the relevant property, and that is the inquiry5 that Wiget undertook. Id

. at 668

– 69 ; s ee also Wolfson v. Watts ( In re Watts ) , 298 F.3d 1077 , 1080

– 8 3 (9th Cir. 2002) (undertaking a comparable inquiry). Reflecting a similar focus , Ahn’s argument in her § 522(f) claim was not that the Sangers’ lien was invalid but rather that the amount of that lien , whe n added to the
amount of the preexisting liens on the property, caused the Sangers’ lien to impair her homestead exemption

. Accordingly, n either Wiget nor Wolfson supports the view that a § 522(f) claim provides an occasion for seeking to declare liens to be completely void under state law based on underlying alleged defects in the creation or recording of the lien. As the Sangers aptly put the point, § 522(f) “was not enacted to protect the interests of a debtor who argues that a creditor’s judgment lien does not exist because it was never properly created under applicable state law.” B The majority makes two points in concluding that the district court properly addressed the validity of the lien , but neither is persuasive. 1 First, seizing o n the fact that the Sangers characterized the point as one of “statutory standing,” the majority declares that the Sangers waived any such statutory standing argume nt by supposedly failing to raise it below. See Mem. Dispo. at 2

– 4 . This holding is difficult to fathom. T he issue of “ statutory6 standing” is simply “whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim , ” Lexmark Int’l , Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. , 572 U.S. 118, 127

– 28 & n.4 (2014) , and here the majority does decide th at issue, because it expressly agrees with the district court that “the first step in a lien avoidance action must be to determin e” the validity of the lien. See Mem. Dispo. at 5 n.3 (emphasis added)

. Consequently, I am at a loss to understand what the majority thinks has been waived here. Moreover, to the extent that the parties’ arguments concerning the elements of a § 522(f) cl aim have come into sharper focus on appeal, that is attributable to Ahn and to the district court. Ahn’s complaint below never took the position that her § 522(f) cause of action for avoidance encompassed any issue concerning the validity of the lien

. R ather, Ahn ’s complaint challenged the lien only in her separate , first cause of action for declaratory relief. The bankruptcy court followed suit, addressing the validity of the lien only under the guise of Ahn’s declaratory relief claim. It was the dist rict court that, after concluding it had no jurisdiction over the declaratory relief claim, went on to hold that it could refashion Ahn’s § 522(f) cause of action so as to now include the lien

- validity issue, even though the § 522(f) claim h ad not been ple aded that way in the operative complaint

. Given that the Sangers properly responded to the claims as pleaded , they cannot be said to have waived any l egal objection to the district court’s7 reworking of Ahn’s § 522(f) claim in its final decision

. In all events, given that the majority concedes that the relevant legal issue

— i.e. , whether the validity of a lien is an element of a § 522(f) claim

— is properly before us , there is no basis for asserting that that any legal sub

- argume nt in support of that point (such as the Sangers’ “statutory standing” argument) has been waived. See Yee v. City of Escondido , 50 3 U.S. 519, 534 (1992) ( once a claim is properly preserved, “a party can make any argument in support of that claim [on appeal]; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made below”). Further , the majority is simply wrong in asserting that the Sangers are raising a ny new issue for the first time on appeal. On the contrary, t he Sangers have consistently ma intained, at every stage of these proceedings, that Ahn’s challenge to the underlying validity of the lien is not a part of her § 522(f) claim

— indeed, this contention underlay their ultimately successful challenge to the lower courts’ jurisdiction over Ahn ’s first cause of action for a declaration that the lien was invalid

. For example, i n their memorandum supporting their motion to dismiss the operative complaint, the Sangers specifically argued that , because “[n]othing within Section 522

. . . creates a cause of action to challenge a judgment lien on the grounds that underlie Count One , ” the bankruptcy court lacked “arising8 under” jurisdiction over the declaratory relief claim. 2 The majority claims that this argument was not sufficiently developed “such that the bankruptcy court could rule on the issue , ” Mem. Dispo. at 3 n.1, but that is belied by the fact that the bankruptcy court did rule on this issue and expressly agreed with the Sangers on that point : “The court agrees with Defendants as to ‘arising in’ and ‘arising under’ jurisdiction.” 3 In addition, when the bankruptcy court went on to hold that it could assert “related to” bankruptcy jurisdiction ( or , alternatively, supplemental jur isdiction ) over the declaratory relief claim, the Sangers vigorously challenged that ruling in the district court , arguing that because there was no legal overlap between the

2 As the district court summarized, bankruptcy courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). “ Proceedings ‘ arising under ’ title 11 involve causes of action created or determined by a statutory provision of that title .” Wilshire Courtyard v. Cal ifornia Franchise Tax Bd. ( In re Wilshire Courtyard ) , 729 F.3d 1279, 1285 (9th Cir. 2013). “Similarly, proceedings ‘a rising in’ title 11 ” are those not “created or determined by the bankruptcy code, but which would have no existence outside of a bankruptcy case.” Id. Finally, proceedings are “related to” title 11 if “ the outcome of the proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” Id. at 1287 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 3 It is likewise irrelevant that this issue

— whether a § 522(f) claim includes within it an inquiry into the underlying validity of the lien

— arose below in the context of the Sangers’ challenge to the lower courts’ subject matter jurisdiction over Ahn’s declaratory relief action

. See Mem. Dispo. at 2 n.1. That was the only way it could properly have arisen below given that Ahn did n ot challenge the validity of the lien in her § 522(f) cause of action.9 declaratory relief action and the § 522(f) claim , there was no basis for either form of jurisdiction even though there was “some . . . factual overlap

. ” As a result, the Sangers argued, any challenge to the validity of the lien had to be brought in state
court
. While the district court ultimately agreed with the Sangers that there was no jurisdiction over the declaratory relief action, it then rewrote Ahn’s § 522(f) claim to include within it the lien validity issue

— even though Ahn herself had not pleaded it that way

— and the Sangers have properly objected to that ruling in thi s court. There was no waiver. 4 2 Second, t he majority contends that in any event the district court correct ly conclud ed that the issue of the underlying validity of the lien is an essential part of

4 The majority’s invocation of waiver is all the more unwarranted because Ahn herself did not raise waiver as a ground for opposing the Sangers’ statutory standing argument . That alone should have been dispositive, because we have repeatedly held that “[t]his court will not address waiver if not raised by the opposing party.” United States v. Schlesinger , 49 F.3d 483, 485 (9th Cir. 199 4 ); see also United States v. Garcia

- Lopez , 309 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Doe , 53 F.3d 1081, 1082

– 83 (9th Cir. 1995). The majority nonetheless asserts that its sua sponte invocation is appropriate because Ahn, “a pro se litigant,” should not be “ ‘ sandbag[ged] ’ ” by new arguments and because this court has been “deprived of the benefit of the bankruptcy and district courts’ analyses on the issue.” Mem. Dispo. at 4 n.2. As the above discussion makes clear, neither of these assertions has any basis in the record. Indeed, we know exactly why the district court thought that the § 522(f) claim includes the lien

validity issue. And if anyone was sandbagged, it was the Sangers, who defeated the declaratory relief cause of action in the district court only to be confro nted with a transmogrified § 522(f) claim.10 Ahn’s § 522(f) claim. Mem. Dispo. at 4

– 5. The majority’s reasoning, however, does not withstand scrutiny. The majority claims that applicable precedent establishes that “the first step in a lien avoidance action must be to determine whether a valid judicia l lien attached to the debtor’s property.” Mem. Dispo. at 5 n.3 (emphasis altered). But as explained earlier, the cited cases addressed t he entirely separate question of whether and to what extent the lien attached to the property in question, and that i s an essential element of determining whether the homestead exemption in that property has been “impaired” within the meaning of § 522(f). See Wolfson , 298 F.3d at 1080

– 83 ; Wiget , 197 B.R. at 668

– 69 . The fact that Wiget (but not Wolfson ) framed the issue as being whether a “ valid lien attached , ” id. at 668, does not mean that the § 522(f) inquiry must begin with an inquiry into the underlying validity of the lien under state law. Wiget did not involve a challenge to the validity of the lien, nor did the court undertake such an inquiry. Id. at 669 (“Neither party disputes that Wiget’s lien attached to Nielsen’s property in the amount of any surplus equity after deducting all prior liens and the homestead exception.

. . . What is disputed is the existence of any surplus equity at all.”)

. Wiget thus provide s no support for the view that § 522(f) empowers a bankruptcy court to adjudicate the underlying validity of the lien. The majority is likewise wrong in contending that subsuming validity into a11 § 522(f) motion “makes sense.” Mem. Dispo. at 5 n.3. As t he upside

- down procedural posture of this case shows, it makes no sense at all. Under the majority’s view, a debtor who wants to invalidate a lien in toto

— and not merely to avoid the lien to the extent it impairs an exemption

— can simply file a § 522(f)

mo tion and then ask the court to deny her own motion on the grounds that the lien is wholly invalid. Nothing in the case law, the statute, or common sense supports such a peculiar procedure . While it is true that a determination of invalidity would
moot a § 522(f) motion, see id. , that does not mean that a motion under § 522(f) is itself the proper vehicle for making that entirely separate determination. It clearly is not. 5 As Ahn herself apparently recognized in how she originally framed her complaint, her challenge to the Sangers ’ lien “for reasons outside the ambit of § 522(f)(1) should [have been] pursued as an adversary proceeding , ” In re Ruck , 451 B.R. 128, 133 n.23 (Bankr. D . Kan. 2011) (emphasis added), rather than as part of a § 522(f) claim (which must be brought by motion). Here, however, the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over that freestanding claim. T he

5 The majority suggests that Ahn would lack Article III standing to request avoidance if the lien were invalid, see Mem. Dispo. at 5 n.3, but that cannot justify what the majority has done here. Because a plainti ff filing a claim must affirmatively allege and establish her standing to bring it, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992), a plaintiff cannot properly file a claim for the purpose of affirmatively asking that it be denied on the grou nd that the plaintiff herself contends that she lacks Article III standing to bring it.12 district court then erred in concluding , i n effect, that Ahn’s motion under § 522(f) is a proper vehicle for seeking such a declaration , thereby evading the very limits it had just recognized on its own jurisdiction. Accordingly, I would not reach the merits of the lien’s validity under California law. Instead, I would vacate the district court’s dismissal of the § 522(f) cause of action on the merits and would remand the matter to th at court with instructions to remand the case to the bankruptcy court with instructions to dismiss that c ause of action without prejudice to refiling a proper motion under § 522(f)

. II Were I to reach the merits, as the majority concludes we may do, I would hold that t he Sangers ’ abstract of judgment substantially complied with the applicable requirements of California law

. The majority concludes that the Sangers’ abstract of judgment failed to substantially comply with the statutory requirements that any such abstract must contain the “name and address of the judgment creditor.” C AL
. C ODE C IV
. P. § 674(a)( 4). I disagree. Section 674 does not require that any particular format be used to identify the names and address of the judgment creditors, so long as that information is in fact included in the abstract. It thus is not dispositive that the Sangers, in completing the abstract of judgment form, left blank item 3 (“Judgment creditor (name and address) ”). The form requires that the lawsuit in which the13 judgment was obtained be identified (and that was done here) , and it is obvious that the creditors in the judgment resolving that very lawsuit against defendant Leah Ahn (who was correctly identified as the judgment debtor ) are the plaintiffs

. And here, the plaintiffs were properly listed as “ Priya Sanger, Michael Sanger .” 6 As for the judgm ent creditors’ address, the Sangers’ attorney’s address is listed, and he is expressly identified as the attorney for the “judgment creditor.” Because “all of the required data was included ,” even though it was listed differently tha n the standard form su ggested, the Sangers ’ notice was in “ substantial compli ance” with § 674(a)(4). Keele v. Reich , 215 Cal. Rptr. 756 , 758

– 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). The majority nonetheless concludes that the abstract creates uncertainty as to who the judgment creditors are because, given that “ ‘ the space next to the word ‘Plaintiff’ [on the form] is not large enough to accommodate more than one or two
names, ’ ” there might be plaintiffs other than the Sangers who were not listed. Mem. Dispo. at 10 (quoting bank ruptcy court ruling)

. There is actually plenty of
space on the form , next to and under the names of the Sangers, to list additional plaintiffs (or to include “et al.”) , and so any speculation about supposed missing

6 The majority is therefore quite wrong in contending that “ nothing on the abstract of judgment indicates that the Sangers were the judgment creditors.” Mem. Dispo. at 10 n.5. The majority’s reasoning ultimately rests on the view that the Sangers were required to use item 3 (the “box” marked “Judgment Creditor”), see id ., but that rigid position ignores, rather than applies, California’s substantial compliance standa rd.14 additional plaintiffs is baseless. (The same speculation would equally have applied if the Sangers’ names and address had been squeezed into the relatively small space provided in item 3 for listing the names and addresses of the judgment creditors .) The majority claims that I am the one who i s speculating when I assert that that there is space to list additional plaintiffs or “et al.,” see Mem. Dispo. at 9 n.5, but that is wrong. One does not need to take my word for it

— here is the box from the Sangers’ abstract of judgment :

On top of all this , the form contains a box (item 4) that is to be checked if additional space is needed for “[i]nformation on additional judgment creditors ,” and that box was not checked. Finally, the clerk’s portion of the form contains a certification that “[a]l l judgment creditors and debtors are listed on this abstract,” and the clerk signed the form , thereby making that certification

. I n light of the actual content of th e Sangers’ abstract of judgment , i t would be entirely “ ‘ unreasonable to conclude that the j udgment creditor might be another plaintiff, whose name does not appear on the [a] bstract .’” See Mem. Dispo. at 10 (quoting bankruptcy court ruling) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). As to the address, the majority concludes that “address” means only home address and not any other address, such as an attorney’s or an agent’s address or15 even a P.O. box

. See Mem. Dispo. at 10

– 11 & n.6. But nothing i n the statutory text supports that narrow reading. See , e.g. , B LACK ’ S L AW D IC T IONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“address” simply means “[t]he place where mail or other communication is sent”). Moreover, as the majority notes, substantial compliance is judged by whether the information listed provides “ ‘ the substance essential to every

reaso nable objective of the statute , ’ ” Assembly v. D eu kmejian , 639 P.2d 939, 946 (Cal. 1982) (citation omitted), and the address provided by the Sangers meets that standard. The only conceivable objective for listing the judgment creditors’ address is to provi de a means for contacting them if necessary for any purpose related to the enforcement of the judgment

. But any “notice, order, or other paper” concerning enforcement of the judgment that is required to be served on the judgment creditor “ shall be served on the judgment creditor ’ s attorney of record rather than on the judgment creditor if the judgment creditor has an attorney of record

. ” C AL
. C ODE C IV
. P. § 684.010 (emphasis added)

. Because we construe statutes to harmonize with each othe r, listing the judgment creditors’ attorney’s address thus fully satisfies the statutory objective of § 674

. The Sangers ’ listing of their attorney ’ s address substantially complied with the statutory requirement to list their “ address. ” I respectfully dis sent.