United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 15, 2016 Decided June 9, 2017

No. 15-5145

JESSE R. REDMOND, JR.,

APPELLANT

v.

ISAAC FULWOOD, JR., FORMER CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES 

PAROLE COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:14-cv-00308)

David C. Wolff, appointed by the court, argued the cause 

as amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on the 

briefs was Kathryn L. Clune.

Peter C. Pfaffenroth, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief was R. Craig 

Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: ROGERS, BROWN and MILLETT, Circuit Judges.
2

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.

MILLETT, Circuit Judge: Jesse Redmond, Jr. was 

convicted of sexual assault under District of Columbia law. He 

was twice denied parole by the United States Parole 

Commission. Alleging that his denials of parole were infected 

by unconstitutional decisionmaking, Redmond filed suit 

against the then-Chair of the Commission, Isaac Fulwood, Jr.,

in his personal capacity. The district court dismissed the case

sua sponte, concluding that parole commissioners are entitled 

to absolute immunity from such lawsuits. We affirm, albeit on 

the ground that Fulwood is entitled to qualified immunity. We 

leave for another day the question of whether parole 

commissioners merit absolute immunity as a matter of law.

I

Jesse R. Redmond, Jr. was convicted in the District of 

Columbia in 1996 of one count of first-degree sexual assault, 

and acquitted of one count of oral sodomy and one count of 

anal sodomy. He was sentenced to serve fifteen years to life in 

prison. Fifteen years after his conviction, in 2011, Redmond 

became eligible for parole. He was denied parole both at his 

2010 pre-eligibility hearing and in a subsequent hearing held in 

2011. The 2011 denial occurred despite the Hearing 

Examiner’s finding that Redmond should be paroled under the

applicable parole guidelines. 

Dissatisfied with his parole denials and without any option 

to appeal, Redmond brought suit against the then-Chairman of 

the United States Parole Commission, Isaac Fulwood, Jr., in his 

personal capacity, pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
3

Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

1

 

The district court sua sponte dismissed Redmond’s complaint 

under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), 1915A(b)(2), holding that Fulwood is 

absolutely immune from suit for acts taken in the course of his 

duties as Chairman of the United States Parole Commission. 

Redmond appealed to this court, and we now affirm. We 

do so, however, because Fulwood is entitled to qualified 

immunity for each of the claims in Redmond’s complaint. 

Accordingly, we need not and do not reach the question of 

whether Fulwood is entitled to absolute immunity for actions 

taken during his tenure as Chairman of the United States Parole 

Commission. See Taylor v. Reilly, 685 F.3d 1110, 1113 (D.C. 

Cir. 2012) (“Because we conclude that the [Parole 

Commission] defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, we 

do not address the issue of absolute immunity.”); see also 

Radtke v. Caschetta, 822 F.3d 571, 573 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 

(“[W]e are free to affirm the lower court on alternative 

grounds.”) (citing RSM Prod. Corp. v. Freshfields Bruckhaus 

Deringer U.S. LLP, 682 F.3d 1043, 1045 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).

 1 The United States Parole Commission exercises parole jurisdiction 

not only over federal offenders, but also over individuals convicted 

of crimes under District of Columbia law. However, unlike federal 

offenders, those who were convicted of violating District law (like 

Redmond) are not entitled to appeal parole denials to the National 

Appeals Board. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S. PAROLE 

COMM’N, Frequently Asked Questions: Is it possible to appeal the 

parole decision?, https://www.justice.gov/uspc/frequently-askedquestions#q7 (last accessed May 30, 2017) (“Decisions granting or 

denying parole for prisoners sentenced under the District of 

Columbia Code may not be appealed to the Commission. D.C. 

offenders may appeal decisions revoking their parole or supervised 

release.”).
4

II

Courts are required to dismiss complaints in civil actions 

“in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity 

or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” and the 

complaint “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; see also id.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Accordingly, a prisoner’s civil complaint 

is properly dismissed sua sponte if the person the prisoner 

seeks to sue is protected by either qualified or absolute 

immunity. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Morrison, No. 16-5151, 2016 

WL 7438665, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (affirming 

dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) because defendants 

were entitled to judicial immunity); cf. Thompson v. Drug 

Enforcement Admin., 492 F.3d 428, 435 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 

(noting that qualified immunity is a basis for dismissal of 

prisoner complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). 

Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from 

suits for money damages unless a plaintiff shows both that 

(i) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and 

(ii) that right was “clearly established at the time of the 

challenged conduct.” Taylor, 685 F.3d at 1113 (quoting 

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). We can 

begin—and often end—our qualified immunity analysis with 

either prong of the test. Taylor, 685 F.3d at 1113.

Because Redmond has proceeded pro se, we construe the 

allegations of his complaint liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to be 

liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however 

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than 

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”) (citations omitted). 

However, because Redmond brought suit against Fulwood 

only in his personal capacity, Redmond’s suit must be limited 
5

to actions taken specifically by Fulwood or by the Commission 

with Fulwood’s involvement. That is to say, Fulwood cannot 

be held personally responsible for all of the Commission’s 

actions, in particular those decisions in which he did not take 

part. Accordingly, because the only decision with respect to 

Redmond that Fulwood participated in was the 2011 decision 

denying Redmond’s request for reconsideration of the adverse 

parole determination, our review is limited to that decision. 

Liberally read, Redmond’s complaint alleges five claims 

against Fulwood. The first four claims are allegations that 

Fulwood violated Redmond’s rights under the Due Process 

Clause of the Fifth Amendment by: (i) failing to consider that 

Redmond was acquitted of sodomy charges at trial; (ii) denying 

parole because Redmond had not completed certain 

rehabilitative courses, even though those courses were not 

offered at the facility in which Redmond was incarcerated; (iii) 

failing to correct errors in Redmond’s parole guideline scores; 

and (iv) exhibiting bias against Redmond due to the nature of 

his offense.2

 The fifth claim is an allegation that Fulwood 

violated Redmond’s First and Fifth Amendment rights by 

grounding the denial of parole in part on Redmond’s continued 

profession of innocence.

As a matter of law, Fulwood enjoys qualified immunity for 

each of those claims. 

First, with respect to the alleged failure to consider that 

Redmond was acquitted of the sodomy charges at trial, 

 2 Redmond frames his bias argument as a violation of his First 

Amendment rights, but allegations of bias and unfair treatment more 

accurately sound in due process. Given our obligation to construe 

Redmond’s complaint liberally, we analyze his bias argument under 

the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
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Redmond does not plausibly allege any constitutional violation 

because Fulwood expressly acknowledged that acquittal in the 

decision. See Appellee’s Br. Add. 2 n.1 (“Redmond was 

convicted of sexual assault (vaginal intercourse), but acquitted 

of oral and anal sodomy as was pointed out in a memo 

addressing counsel’s request to schedule Redmond’s rehearing 

earlier than ordered.”). 

Second, regarding the importance attached by the 

Commission to parole applicants’ participation in rehabilitative 

programs, Fulwood did not leave Redmond in the impossible 

position of having to take unavailable courses, as he alleges. 

Instead, Redmond was advised to “volunteer for the 

comprehensive residential sex offender treatment program so 

that he could be transferred to a facility that conducts the 

program” or “to participate in other comprehensive programs 

that will reduce his risk level.” Appellee’s Br. Add. 3. There 

is nothing plausibly unconstitutional about advising Redmond 

to participate in certain programs that would best prepare him 

for paroled release into society.

Third, with respect to the Commission’s improper reliance 

on an erroneous salient factor score under the parole guidelines, 

Fulwood candidly acknowledged that error in his 

reconsideration letter. See Appellee’s Br. Add. 3. (“Counsel is 

correct that the Commission should not have counted 

[Redmond’s] convictions and commitments where there was a 

period of more than 10 years between the last countable 

conviction and the commencement of the current offense 

conduct.”). That error is of no constitutional moment, 

however, because either way the District’s parole guidelines 

recommended that Redmond be granted parole. Id. The 

Commission chose to override that recommendation, making 

any errors in its calculation beside the point. See 28 C.F.R. 
7

§ 2.74(b) (Commission may depart from the guidelines 

recommendation). 

Fourth, Fulwood is entitled to qualified immunity for 

Redmond’s allegation of bias arising from the nature of his 

crime because there is no clearly established right for paroleeligible prisoners to be treated equally in the parole process 

regardless of the nature or seriousness of their crimes. Indeed, 

Parole Commissioners are expected to grant parole only when 

there is a “reasonable probability” that (i) the prisoner “will live 

and remain at liberty without violating the law,” (ii) “his or her 

release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,” and 

(iii) “he or she has served the minimum sentence imposed or 

the prescribed portion of his or her sentence[.]” D.C. CODE

§ 24-404(a). The latitude granted to the Commission in 

making that determination is broad, and some consideration of 

the nature of the underlying crime makes sense. See McRae v. 

Hyman, 667 A.2d 1356, 1357 (D.C. 1995) (“The District’s 

parole scheme confers discretion to grant or deny parole[.]”);

see also Gooding v. Marberry, 341 F. App’x. 173, 174 (7th Cir. 

2009) (“The District of Columbia’s parole regime * * * is 

entirely discretionary[.]”). 

Finally, no clearly established First or Fifth Amendment 

law prohibited Fulwood’s consideration of Redmond’s refusal 

to acknowledge culpability. Redmond cites no appellate or 

Supreme Court case holding that the Constitution forbids 

factoring a refusal to admit guilt into the length of 

incarceration. Indeed, the Third Circuit has specifically held 

that the requirement that a prisoner seeking parole first admit 

guilt does not violate the prisoner’s First Amendment rights. 

See Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 2010). 

Moreover, a plurality of the Supreme Court has explained that 

conditioning participation in certain rehabilitative programs for 

prisoners on an admission of guilt is constitutionally 
8

permissible because “[a]cceptance of responsibility is the 

beginning of rehabilitation,” and “a recognition that there are 

rewards for those who attempt to reform is a vital and necessary 

step toward completion.” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 47

(2002) (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.); cf. U.S.S.G.

§ 3E1.1(a) (“If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance 

of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 

2 levels.”). Given that precedent, it was not clearly 

unconstitutional in these circumstances for Fulwood to factor 

Redmond’s refusal to admit guilt into his decisionmaking.

Because, under even the most generous reading of the 

complaint, Fulwood is entitled to qualified immunity on each 

of the claims against him, we affirm the district court’s 

dismissal of Redmond’s complaint.

So ordered.