NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5997-12T2

L.C.,1

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR and LAKELAND BANK,

Respondent.

______________________________

Submitted January 21, 2015 – Decided 

Before Judges Messano, Ostrer and Hayden.

On appeal from the Board of Review, 

Department of Labor, Docket No. 423,182.

L.C., appellant pro se.

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent Board of Review 

(Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Adam Verone, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief).

Respondent Lakeland Bank has not filed a 

brief.

 

1 As this appeal addresses plaintiff's claim she was a victim of 

domestic violence, we refer to her and other parties by their 

initials, consistent with our practice in cases involving 

domestic violence complaints. 

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

March 16, 2015

APPELLATE DIVISION

March 16, 2015
2 A-5997-12T2

The opinion of the court was delivered by

OSTRER, J.A.D.

In this unemployment insurance appeal, we construe N.J.S.A.

43:21-5(j), which allows a person to receive unemployment 

insurance benefits when he or she has quit work for reasons 

related to domestic violence. L.C. claimed she quit her job at 

Lakeland Bank and moved to Utah to flee an abusive ex-spouse.

Since 1961, our unemployment insurance laws have generally 

disqualified claimants from receiving benefits if they "left 

work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work." 

L. 1961, c. 43, §3, codified at N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). Personal 

reasons for quitting unrelated to work, regardless of how 

compelling, have not warranted benefits. Self v. Bd. of Review, 

91 N.J. 453, 456-57 (1982). However, in 2000, the Legislature 

created an exception for workers who leave work because they are 

victims of domestic violence. L. 1999, c. 391, § 1 (1999 Law), 

codified at N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(j). 

L.C. argues that the Board of Review (Board) misapplied the 

1999 Law in denying her claim for benefits. The Board affirmed 

the determination of the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) that L.C.

had presented insufficient evidence that she was a victim of 

domestic violence. The Board did not consider a letter from 

L.C.'s divorce lawyer, identifying various acts of domestic 
3 A-5997-12T2

violence by her estranged husband. As we conclude the Board 

should consider a certification from L.C.'s attorney under the 

1999 Law, we reverse and remand for a new hearing.

I.

In February 2013, after almost six years on the job, L.C.

gave Lakeland Bank two weeks' notice that she was resigning as a 

loan processor. On March 17, 2013, she filed her unemployment 

claim. The deputy denied her claim as a voluntary quit without 

good cause attributable to work. L.C. appealed, claiming 

protection under the 1999 Law.

The statute includes two essential elements. First, a 

claimant must establish that he or she is a victim of domestic 

violence as defined in the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act 

(PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19. Second, the claimant must establish

that the loss of employment, by quitting or discharge, was 

causally related to being a victim. The key statutory provision 

states: "Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter 

. . . no otherwise eligible individual shall be denied benefits 

because the individual left work or was discharged due to 

circumstances resulting from the individual being a victim of 

domestic violence as defined in section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261

(C.2C:25-19)." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(j). Employers' accounts are 

unaffected. Ibid.
4 A-5997-12T2

The statute identifies six categories of evidence that 

suffice as proof of victimization. At issue in our case is the 

sixth category, which refers to "documentation or certification" 

from various professionals who have "assisted the individual in 

dealing with the domestic violence." Ibid. 

For the purposes of this subsection 

(j), the individual shall be treated as 

being a victim of domestic violence if the 

individual provides one or more of the 

following:

(1) A restraining order or other 

documentation of equitable relief issued by 

a court of competent jurisdiction;

(2) A police record documenting the 

domestic violence;

(3) Documentation that the perpetrator 

of the domestic violence has been convicted 

of one or more of the offenses enumerated in 

section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19);

(4) Medical documentation of the 

domestic violence;

(5) Certification from a certified 

Domestic Violence Specialist or the director 

of a designated domestic violence agency 

that the individual is a victim of domestic 

violence; or

(6) Other documentation or 

certification of the domestic violence 

provided by a social worker, member of the 

clergy, shelter worker or other professional 

who has assisted the individual in dealing 

with the domestic violence.

[Ibid.]
5 A-5997-12T2

The Tribunal hearing was conducted in two sessions on May 

28 and May 30, 2013. The only witnesses were L.C.; her friend, 

D.S.; and her former supervisor, M.M. They all appeared by 

telephone.

The witnesses testified without dispute that L.C.'s husband 

humiliated her, damaged her property, and physically assaulted 

her. L.C. testified that she and her husband began living 

separately in their home in late 2011 or early 2012. She often 

stayed in the homes of friends. In February or March 2012, she 

sought permission from the court to relocate with their teenage 

children. Her husband responded a few months later by filing 

for divorce. The proceedings that followed were contentious.

L.C. testified that her husband forced her to sleep in the 

basement in a sleeping bag. She was also subjected to 

demeaning, coarse, and insulting language from her husband and, 

at her husband's instigation, her children. One morning, she 

awoke to find all four of her tires flattened. She contended

she was too afraid to file a domestic violence complaint against 

her husband. But, she asserted that police had to respond to 

their home on multiple occasions because of their domestic 

disputes. 

She testified that she essentially surrendered to all her

husband's demands in the divorce action, including his request 
6 A-5997-12T2

for sole custody of their children, and sole possession of the 

marital home. The divorce was finalized on March 12, 2013, one 

day after L.C.'s last day on the job at Lakeland Bank. L.C.

moved to Utah the following week. L.C. stated, "I left with 

nothing but my clothes." 

D.S. testified that while L.C.'s divorce action was 

pending, L.C. would often sleep at her house, to flee 

mistreatment by her husband. D.S. stated that L.C. lost about 

thirty pounds, apparently related to her emotional distress. 

Further, D.S. asserted that L.C.'s husband was mentally 

unstable, and on one occasion, shoved L.C. around. As his 

condition deteriorated, D.S. testified, "I was afraid that he 

would snap and kill her." 

M.M. testified that L.C. disclosed her ongoing difficulties 

with her husband. M.M. confirmed that L.C. indicated to her 

that she was a victim of domestic violence. 

The evidence regarding the causal connection between L.C.'s 

victimization, and her resignation, was more complicated. L.C.

asserted she resigned her job to flee her husband. She 

testified she was homeless because of her divorce. L.C. also 

stated, "I was leaving because I was scared." On the other 

hand, she admitted her move out West was motivated in part by 

financial considerations, a lower cost of living, and a desire 
7 A-5997-12T2

to be near family. She initially arranged for employment in 

Nevada, but that fell through. So, she moved to Utah, where she 

resided with a boyfriend. 

The appeals examiner asked D.S. about conversations with 

L.C. regarding her plans for relocating after her divorce. D.S. 

testified that L.C. was fighting for custody of her children, 

but was frustrated by the delays in her divorce case. "I think 

she just finally decided [at] that last Court hearing whether or 

not they were divorced she had to go because like I said he did 

shove her fairly recently before that Court date." D.S. stated 

that L.C. could not afford to live on her own with her children 

in New Jersey, and could get help from family out West.

M.M. testified that L.C. told her she was resigning in 

order to relocate to Las Vegas. Her resignation letter did not 

address her reasons for leaving. However, in her exit 

interview, L.C. mentioned her dissatisfaction with her salary. 

During the hearing on May 28, 2013, the appeals examiner 

set forth his interpretation of the 1999 Law, and the proof 

required to establish she was a victim of domestic violence. He 

stated that L.C. was required to establish a "direct connection" 

between being a victim and the separation from work. 

[I]f somebody leaves their job voluntarily 

in the State of New Jersey for any personal 

reasons . . . unrelated to the working 

conditions the person is held disqualified 
8 A-5997-12T2

indefinitely because the quit is not related 

to the . . . the working conditions, 

basically. However if a person can show us 

that they were officially a member [sic] of 

domestic violence . . . those benefits could 

potentially be approved if a person is 

relocating after having shown a direct 

connection to being . . . a victim of 

domestic violence the benefits could 

potentially be approved in those matters. 

However the burden of proof still falls upon 

the claimant yourself to show us physical 

documentation that you were a legitimate 

victim of domestic violence. That can come 

about by either a domestic violence 

specialist report, which you said you don't 

have and/or police reports showing that you 

were officially . . . a member [sic] of 

domestic violence. If that happens and you

are approved for unemployment benefits the 

employer still remains relieved of 

unemployment benefit charges in those 

situations. 

[(Emphasis added).] 

In response to L.C.'s inquiry, the appeals examiner stated that 

"legitimate written documentation from a professional 

psychologist or medical doctor" would also suffice, "[a]s long 

as it is related to . . . you, being a potential member [sic] of 

domestic violence . . . ." The appeals examiner gave L.C. until 

June 4, 2013, to submit written evidence.

At the second telephonic hearing on May 30, L.C. stated

that based on conversations with police department personnel 

from her former hometown in New Jersey, she would be unable to 

obtain police reports, particularly those involving domestic 
9 A-5997-12T2

violence, within five days. L.C. said she contacted the mental 

health professional who counseled her family, but she could not 

afford the counselor's $300 fee for preparing a report. After 

completing oral testimony at the second session, the appeals 

examiner "close[d] the hearing." 

The examiner mailed his decision the same day. He found 

that L.C. left work voluntarily, without good cause attributable 

to the work, citing N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) and N.J.A.C. 12:17-

9.1(e). The examiner rejected L.C.'s claim under the 1999 Law, 

finding L.C. relocated because she "could not afford to live in 

New Jersey any longer," and she had family members near her new 

place of residence. He found that her claim she was a victim of 

domestic violence was "not . . . credible," because she failed 

to provide the requisite documentation to establish she was a 

victim of domestic violence.

On June 4, 2013 — the date by which the appeals examiner 

stated he would consider proof that L.C. was a victim of 

domestic violence — L.C.'s former divorce attorney submitted a 

letter to the Tribunal supervisor, supporting L.C.'s request for 

unemployment benefits.2 He stated that L.C.'s husband repeatedly 

"harass[ed]" and "degrade[ed]" her. "As a result, [L.C.] 

 

2 The letter was sent by certified mail and was dated June 4, 

2013. The record does not reflect the date of receipt.
10 A-5997-12T2

literally had to leave the State of New Jersey and left her 

children, home and job behind her." L.C. was so desperate to 

leave, she waived spousal support, rights to marital property, 

and accepted limited contact with her children. 

The attorney stated that local police, social service 

agencies, and the Division of Youth and Family Services were all 

involved in the family discord. He provided a detailed 

chronology of events between February 2012 and March 2013. He 

mentioned multiple acts of alleged criminal mischief, attributed 

to L.C.'s husband, including: cutting telephone and cable wires 

to the home; loosening the lug nuts on a car wheel; placing a 

screw in a tire; smashing one of her cosmetic appliances; and 

flattening all her tires. He also alleged L.C.'s husband 

falsely accused L.C. of physical threats to him, child 

molestation, and working in the pornography industry. L.C.

allegedly caught her husband stalking her on one occasion. The 

attorney also identified instances of abusive language, and 

other conduct apparently designed to annoy L.C., such as turning 

off the heat while she was sleeping, throwing her belongings 

into the basement, and rewarding the children when they insulted 

their mother. 

Contrary to L.C.'s testimony that she was too afraid to 

seek restraining orders against her husband, the attorney wrote 
11 A-5997-12T2

that L.C. twice sought domestic violence restraining orders, 

"but she was turned down both times." The attorney stated that 

L.C. sought a restraining order after her husband tampered with 

her car in May 2012. He did not identify the date of the other 

domestic violence complaint, nor did he disclose whether the 

denial of a restraining order was by a court, after a full 

evidentiary hearing.

There is no indication in the record that the Tribunal or 

the Board considered the attorney's letter. In a decision 

mailed July 2, 2013, the Board affirmed the Tribunal's decision 

"[o]n the basis of the record below," after finding that L.C.

was given a full opportunity to present evidence and there was 

"no valid ground for a further hearing."

L.C. appeals, arguing that she was entitled to benefits 

under the 1999 Law, as she left New Jersey to escape an abusive 

relationship. She asserts the appeals examiner set unreasonable 

deadlines for the submission of proof she was a victim of 

domestic violence. She also contends the letter from her 

attorney should have been considered and deemed sufficient as 

documentation from an "other professional who has assisted the 

individual in dealing with the domestic violence" under N.J.S.A.

43:21-5(j)(6).
12 A-5997-12T2

Although neither the Tribunal nor the Board expressly 

considered the attorney's letter, the Board does not argue the 

letter was appropriately rejected as untimely. Rather, the 

Board asserts an attorney is not an acceptable source of 

documentation under paragraph (6), and, in any event, the 

attorney's letter did not document acts of domestic violence. 

Absent the requisite proofs under paragraphs (1) through (6), 

the Board contends the 1999 Law did not apply, and L.C. was 

disqualified because she left work voluntarily without good 

cause attributable to work. 

II.

Addressing the principal issue on appeal, we conclude an 

attorney is an acceptable source of "documentation or [a] 

certification of the domestic violence" under N.J.S.A. 43:21-

5(j)(6). However, we also determine that written evidence of 

the domestic violence, if drafted for the purpose of supporting 

the unemployment insurance claim, should be in the form of a 

certification, consistent with Rule 1:6-6. We also address 

other issues of statutory construction raised by the appeal. 

A.

We begin with our standard of review. Although we afford 

some deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute it is 

charged with enforcing or applying, we are not bound by the 
13 A-5997-12T2

agency's interpretation. Hargrove v. Sleepy's, LLC, 220 N.J.

289, 301-02 (2015). In reviewing an agency's adjudication, 

"[a]n appellate tribunal is . . . in no way bound by the 

agency's interpretation of a statute." Mayflower Sec. Co. v. 

Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973). "Although deference is 

due the interpretation of a regulatory scheme by the agency 

charged with its enforcement, statutory interpretation is 

ultimately the task of the judiciary." Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. 

N.J. Real Estate Comm'n, 102 N.J. 176, 191 (1986).

Deference to an agency's interpretation is particularly 

compelling when the agency's interpretation is grounded in its 

technical or specialized expertise. See In re Freshwater 

Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 478, 489 (2004) (stating 

"deference is appropriate because . . . agencies have the 

specialized expertise necessary to enact regulations dealing 

with technical matters") (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted); A.Z. ex rel. B.Z. v. Higher Educ. Student Assistance 

Auth., 427 N.J. Super. 389, 394 (App. Div. 2012). Deference is 

also justified when the agency's interpretation has persisted 

for an extended period of time without legislative interference. 

That is because "the practical administrative construction of a 

statute over a period of years without interference by the 

legislature is evidence of its conformity with the legislative 
14 A-5997-12T2

intent . . . ." Body-Rite Repair Co. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 

89 N.J. 540, 545-46 (1982) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

These considerations do not apply here. The determination 

of whether a person is a victim of domestic violence does not 

fall within the technical expertise of the Division of 

Unemployment Insurance (Division). The interpretation of the 

PDVA, and the adjudication of claims of domestic violence have 

been a judicial function. Pursuant to the PDVA, judges and 

judicial staff receive specialized training in the handling of 

domestic violence cases. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-20(b). 

Although the Division has adopted regulations to implement 

the 1999 Law, the regulations essentially repeat verbatim the 

relevant statutory language, with minor renumbering changes. 

See N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.12.3 We are unaware of any prior, consistent 

administrative interpretation of the statute as it pertains to 

whether "other professional[s]" includes attorneys, and the 

Board has not identified any. In this case, neither the Board 

 

3 The regulations deviate from the statutory language only with 

respect to clarifying that non-profit and public employers 

"electing the reimbursable method pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-

7.2" are also shielded from charges to their account for 

benefits paid under the 1999 Law. N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.12(b). 
15 A-5997-12T2

nor the Tribunal expressly stated in their decisions that an

attorney was not an acceptable professional under paragraph (6).4

B.

Turning to the 1999 Law, our interpretation is guided by 

well-established principles. Our mission is to ascertain and 

implement the Legislature's intent as embodied in the statutory 

 

4 Although the regulations do not define "other professional," 

the Division recognized the 1999 Law's salutary effect in its 

social impact statement accompanying its rule-making: 

The proposed new rule will have a 

positive social impact in that it will 

prevent economic concerns from causing 

victims of domestic violence to hesitate in 

taking all appropriate actions in order to 

protect their personal safety in what may 

potentially be life-threatening situations. 

Domestic violence affects victims, their 

families, and the communities in which they 

live. Victims bear the physical and 

psychological burdens of abuse, with a 

severely decreased quality of personal and 

professional life. Many victims remain in 

abusive relationships because they do not 

have available to them sufficient 

alternatives. Among the factors which often 

finally contribute to the important decision 

of victims of domestic violence to separate 

from their abusers and begin lives of 

independence, is a sense of financial 

security. The State can assist in providing 

that financial security to these individuals 

by permitting them to collect unemployment 

benefits when they have left work or been 

discharged due to circumstances resulting 

from their having been the victims of 

domestic violence.

[32 N.J.R. 1699(a) (May 15, 2000).]
16 A-5997-12T2

language. See, e.g., In re Kollman, 210 N.J. 557, 568 (2012). 

"We ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and 

significance, and read them in context with related provisions 

so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole." DiProspero 

v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (citations omitted). "If the 

language is clear, our task is complete; if it is not, we may 

turn to extrinsic evidence." Myers v. Ocean City Zoning Bd. of 

Adjustment, 439 N.J. Super. 96, 100 (App. Div. 2015) (citing 

Kollman, supra, 210 N.J. at 568). 

We may also turn to extrinsic materials if a literal 

interpretation would lead to a result that is absurd, or "at 

odds with the overall statutory scheme." Wilson ex rel. Manzano 

v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 572 (2012). Extrinsic 

materials may include the legislative history, committee 

reports, and sponsor statements. Ibid. We are guided in our 

task "by the legislative objectives sought to be achieved by 

enacting the statute." Ibid. 

Based on its plain language, paragraph (6) includes 

attorneys as an acceptable source of a "documentation or 

certification of the domestic violence." N.J.S.A. 43:21-

5(j)(6). The paragraph refers to "a social worker, member of 

the clergy, shelter worker or other professional who has 

assisted the individual in dealing with the domestic violence." 
17 A-5997-12T2

Ibid. (emphasis added). Certainly, an attorney assists a person 

in dealing with domestic violence when counseling a client as to 

his or her rights and remedies in a case of domestic violence, 

or in representing a client in seeking relief. That is so 

whether the attorney represents a client in an action under the 

PDVA, or in a matrimonial or non-dissolution action. 

We recognize that "other professional[s]" must share some 

common attributes with the persons that the statute specifically 

identifies. "'[W]here general words follow specific words in a 

statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to 

embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects 

enumerated by the preceding specific words.'" Gallenthin Realty 

Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 191 N.J. 344, 367 (2007) 

(quoting 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction

§ 47:17 (6th ed. 2000)). 

The three specifically identified sources of documentation 

or certification in paragraph (6) are not restricted to a single 

category of professional, such as those licensed to practice in 

the mental health field. Indeed, members of the clergy and 

shelter workers are not professionals in the sense of being 

licensed by the State.5 They are professionals in the sense that 

 

5 We need not address, in this case, who would qualify as 

"clergy" under the statute. See In re Murtha, 115 N.J. Super.

(continued)
18 A-5997-12T2

they have received specialized training that may include the 

capacity to counsel or assist a victim of domestic violence.

Nor do the three identified sources necessarily provide the 

same kind of services. A social worker may provide mental 

health counseling, or may restrict his or her services to 

assisting a victim in accessing governmental services and 

support programs. It is unclear from the statute what services 

a shelter worker may provide to a victim. A "shelter worker" is 

obviously distinct from a "certified domestic violence 

specialist," who may provide a certification under paragraph (5) 

that a person is a domestic violence victim. Although "shelter 

worker" is undefined, "domestic violence specialist" is defined 

to mean "a person who has fulfilled the requirements of 

certification as a Domestic Violence Specialist established by 

the New Jersey Association of Domestic Violence Professionals." 

N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(j). Given the breadth of skills, education, 

and assistance provided by the three persons named in the 

statute, "other professional[s]" reasonably may include an 

 

(continued)

380, 384-86 (App. Div.) (holding that a nun in a teaching order 

was not "a clergyman, minister or other person or practitioner 

authorized to perform similar functions" under former Evidence 

Rule 29, governing clergy-penitent privilege) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted), certif. denied, 59 N.J.

239 (1971); see also State v. Cary, 331 N.J. Super. 236, 240-47 

(App. Div. 2000) (discussing whether a Baptist Deacon qualifies 

as a cleric or spiritual advisor under N.J.R.E. 511). 
19 A-5997-12T2

attorney providing legal services to assist a client in "dealing 

with . . . domestic violence."

Our interpretation is consistent with the legislative 

purpose of the 1999 Law, and its legislative history. The 

sponsor's expressed purpose was to "prevent economic concerns 

from causing a victim to hesitate in taking all appropriate 

actions to increase personal safety in what may potentially be a 

life-threatening situation." Sponsor's Statement to Senate Bill 

No. 869, 208th Legislature (March 19, 1998). The statute's 

legislative history does not otherwise address the specific 

question before us, that is, the breadth of the category of 

"other professional[s]" in paragraph 6.6

We are aware that many states, prompted by the federal 

incentives offered in a provision of the American Recovery and 

Reinvestment Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1103(f)(3)(B)(i)(I), 

have adopted legislation to assure unemployment insurance 

benefits to persons who quit work for a "compelling family 

reason" such as domestic violence or sexual assault. See The 

 

6 In the year prior to the 1998 introduction of the legislation 

that would become the 1999 Law, we affirmed the Board's denial 

of benefits to a claimant who quit her job and moved to 

California, to flee an abusive husband after obtaining a final 

restraining order against him. Pagan v. Bd. of Review, 296 N.J. 

Super. 539, (App. Div.), certif. denied, 150 N.J. 24 (1997). 

However, we are unaware of any evidence that the Legislature's 

purpose was to respond in some way to the Pagan decision.
20 A-5997-12T2

Women's Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, ARRA: Extending the 

Unemployment Insurance Safety Net to Victims of Domestic 

Violence, at 3 (identifying states that have adopted legislation 

pursuant to the federal law), available at http://www. 

legalmomentum.org/sites/default/files/reports/arra-extending-uidv.pdf (last visited February 25, 2015). The federal law 

requires verification "by such reasonable and confidential 

documentation as the State law may require." 42 U.S.C.A. § 

1103(f)(3)(B)(I). 

Many states expressly include attorneys as an acceptable 

source of substantiation that a victim sought assistance for 

domestic violence. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-73-108(r) 

(2014) (allowing unemployment benefits for claimants separated 

from a job due to domestic violence upon presenting 

documentation, including "from a qualified professional from 

whom the [claimant] has sought assistance for the domestic 

violence, such as a counselor, shelter worker, member of the 

clergy, attorney, or health worker") (emphasis added).7 The law 

 

7 See also Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 3314(1) (2015) (requiring 

documentation that may include "a police or court record, or 

documentation of the domestic violence from a shelter worker, 

attorney, member of the clergy or medical or other professional 

from whom the employee has sought assistance in addressing 

domestic violence and its effects"); D.C. Code § 51-132 

(LexisNexis 2015) (requiring documentation that may include a 

written report affirming the claimant sought assistance for 

(continued)
21 A-5997-12T2

of at least one state, like New Jersey, does not identify 

attorneys, but refers to documentation from other professionals, 

which is not further defined. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 96-14.8(2) 

(2014) (allowing "[d]ocumentation from a religious, medical, or 

 

(continued)

domestic violence "from the signatory," from a "(i) [s]helter 

official; (ii) [s]ocial worker; (iii) [c]ounselor; (iv) 

[t]herapist; (v) [a]ttorney; (vi) [m]edical doctor; or (vii) 

[c]leric"); 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 405/601(B)(6)(a) 

(LexisNexis 2014) (allowing "evidence of domestic violence from 

a member of the clergy, attorney, counselor, social worker, 

health worker or domestic violence shelter worker"); Kan. Stat. 

Ann. § 44-706(a)(12) (Supp. 2013) (allowing "a statement 

provided by a counselor, social worker, health care provider, 

clergy, shelter worker, legal advocate, domestic violence or 

sexual assault advocate or other professional who has assisted 

the individual in dealing with the" domestic violence and its 

effects); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 151A, § 1(g1/2) (LexisNexis 2014)

(allowing "a statement provided by a counselor, social worker, 

health worker, member of the clergy, shelter worker, legal 

advocate or other professional who has assisted the individual 

in addressing the effects of the abuse"); Minn. Stat. §

268.095(9) (2014) (allowing a "written statement" that the 

applicant "is a victim of domestic abuse, provided by a social 

worker, member of the clergy, shelter worker, attorney at law, 

or other professional who has assisted the applicant in dealing 

with the domestic abuse"); R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-44-17.1(b) (2014)

(requiring documentation that may include "but [is] not limited 

to, police or court records, or other documentation of domestic 

abuse from a shelter worker, attorney, member of the clergy, or 

medical or other professional from whom the individual has 

sought assistance"); S.C. Code Ann. § 41-35-125(A)(2) (2013) 

(allowing "documentation of domestic abuse such as police or 

court records or other documentation of abuse from a shelter 

worker, attorney, member of the clergy, or medical or other 

professional from whom the individual has sought assistance"); 

Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 21, § 1253 (2014) (allowing a sworn 

statement from the individual, court records, "or other 

documentation from an attorney or legal advisor, member of the 

clergy, or health care provider"). 
22 A-5997-12T2

other professional from whom the individual has sought 

assistance in dealing with the alleged domestic violence"). The 

treatment of this issue by other states demonstrates that 

including attorneys is a reasonable interpretation of "other 

professionals" who assist domestic violence victims.

Having concluded that an attorney is an acceptable source 

of proof under paragraph (6), we turn to address the form of 

proof required. The words "documentation" and "certification"

are both used in a paragraph (6), which refers to "[o]ther 

documentation or certification of the domestic violence" 

provided by the enumerated persons who assisted the individual. 

We conclude that the manner in which the words are used in 

paragraphs (1) through (5) imply that "documentation" consists 

of a writing that was created independently of the person's 

claim for unemployment benefits, in the course of the person's 

response to domestic violence. By contrast, a "certification" 

consists of a statement prepared for the purpose of establishing 

the claimant was a victim. 

Paragraph (1) refers to a restraining order or other 

"documentation of equitable relief" granted by a court. Police 

records that "document[] the domestic violence" can serve as 

proof under paragraph (2). The statute refers to conviction 

records of the perpetrator of domestic violence as 
23 A-5997-12T2

"[d]ocumentation." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(j)(3). Similarly, the 

statute refers to "medical documentation" of the domestic 

violence. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(j)(4). On the other hand, a 

statement of a certified domestic violence specialist or a 

domestic violence agency director that a person is a domestic 

violence victim must be provided in the form of a 

"[c]ertification." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(j)(5). Thus, "documentation

. . . of the domestic violence" provided by the professional may 

consist of contemporaneous records of the assistance provided. 

On the other hand, a statement made for the purpose of 

supporting the unemployment insurance claim should be in the 

form of a certification. 

C.

Other issues of interpretation warrant our attention. We 

conclude that one of the six forms of proof is a prerequisite to 

establishing the right to benefits under the 1999 Law, 

notwithstanding that the plain language may be read to consider 

one of the forms of proof sufficient, but not mandatory. We 

also conclude that the causation element does not require a 

direct causal connection between the domestic violence and the 

claimant's unemployment. 
24 A-5997-12T2

1.

Based on its plain language, the statute is unclear whether 

one of the six forms of proof is not only sufficient, but 

necessary to establish that a claimant is a victim of domestic 

violence. The statute provides that "the individual shall be 

treated as being a victim of domestic violence if the individual 

provides one or more of the following" forms of proofs; but it 

does not expressly exclude proof through other means. N.J.S.A.

43:21-5(j). However, we conclude, based on an accepted canon of 

statutory interpretation, as well as clear legislative history, 

that at least one of the six forms of proof is essential to 

establishing a claim under the 1999 Law.

First, one of the forms of proof is necessary if we apply 

the maxim expressio unius est exlusio alterius, that is, "the 

express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another." 

Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 11 (1957). The maxim should not be 

applied arbitrarily. Ibid. Nonetheless, generally, "[w]hen the 

Legislature creates an exhaustive list, it is assumed to intend 

to exclude what is not enumerated unless it indicates by its 

language that the list or section is not meant to be exhaustive 

or exclusive." Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA 

Local 275, 213 N.J. 190, 215 (2013).
25 A-5997-12T2

The legislative history reflects the intention that one of 

the six forms of proof shall be a prerequisite to establishing 

that a person was a domestic violence victim. "The committee 

amended the bill to require that in order for an individual to 

be treated as a victim of domestic violence under the provisions 

of the bill, the individual shall provide one or more of" the 

six categories of proof ultimately included in the statute. 

Senate Women's Issues, Children and Family Servs. Comm.

Statement to Senate Bill No. 869, 208th Legislature (May 20, 

1999) (emphasis added). See also Senate Budget and 

Appropriations Comm. Statement to Senate Bill No. 869, 208th 

Legislature (First Reprint) (November 8, 1999) ("The bill 

requires that for an individual to be treated as a victim of 

domestic violence under the provisions of the bill, the 

individual shall provide at least one of the . . . forms of 

documentation . . . ."); Assembly Labor Comm. Statement to 

Assembly Bill No. 2366, 208th Legislature (First Reprint) 

(December 6, 1999) ("Benefits are prohibited unless an 

individual provides at least one of the forms of documentation 

of domestic violence enumerated in the bill.").

Based on its plain language, the Legislature also 

determined that only one of the forms of proof was required, in 

order to "be treated as being a victim of domestic violence." 
26 A-5997-12T2

N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(j). The individual must "provide[] one or 

more" of the specified forms of proof. Ibid. Upon doing so, 

the individual "shall be treated as being a victim of domestic 

violence." Ibid. In other words, the submission of one of the 

forms of proofs is dispositive. Apparently, the Legislature did 

not want to assign to the Division the task of conducting trials 

within trials — that is, a full-blown trial on whether a person 

was a victim of domestic violence, before reaching the issues 

pertaining to separation from work. Rather, the Legislature 

identified forms of acceptable proof that would determine the 

issue.8 Consequently, so long as a claimant produces at least 

one form of proof, the failure to produce another identified 

form of proof should bear no weight in determining whether to 

treat the claimant as a victim.9

 

8 The Legislature could have provided that submission of one of 

the forms of proof was essential, but not necessarily 

sufficient. Such an approach is apparently found, for example, 

in the D.C. Code, which states, "A claimant may be eligible to 

receive benefits for separation from employment due to domestic 

violence provided that one of the following is submitted to 

support the claim of domestic violence . . . ." D.C. Code. § 

51-132. Thus, unlike N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(j), the D.C. Code does 

not expressly compel a finding of victimization upon submission 

of one of the designated forms of proof.

9 We recognize that L.C.'s attorney asserted that L.C. was twice 

turned down for domestic violence restraining orders. However, 

particularly on this record, that would not preclude L.C.'s 

claim of victimization in the context of her unemployment 

insurance claim. We have previously held that a plaintiff who 

(continued)
27 A-5997-12T2

2. 

As enacted, the 1999 Law requires an indirect, two-stage 

causation analysis. The legislation's drafters recognized that 

being a victim of domestic violence will create circumstances 

(stage one), which in turn may lead to separation from work 

(stage two). Also, the focus is not on the act of domestic 

violence as the initiating cause, but, one step removed, the 

claimant's "being a victim of domestic violence." N.J.S.A.

43:21-5(j). The claimant need prove that he or she left work, 

or was discharged, "due to circumstances" which in turn 

"result[ed] from . . . being a victim." Ibid. By its plain 

language, the causal connection may be indirect. Thus, one 

would interpret the statute too narrowly to conclude that a quit 

for financial reasons is necessarily insufficient. Financial 

reasons may arise out of being a victim of domestic violence —

 

(continued)

has prevailed in a domestic violence action may not apply the 

doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar the relitigation of the 

issues in a subsequent personal injury action against the same 

defendant. L.T. v. F.M., 438 N.J. Super. 76, 86-89 (App. Div. 

2014). In L.T., we considered, among other factors, the summary 

nature of the domestic violence proceeding, the lack of 

discovery, and lack of counsel, as weighing against application 

of the doctrine. Id. at 87-89. In this case, the record does 

not reflect whether L.C. was turned down after a hearing; 

whether the denial of the restraining order was based on an 

adverse determination on the issue of whether a predicate act 

was committed, or was based on other considerations pertaining 

to relief; or, whether L.C. alleges acts of domestic violence 

committed after the prior adverse determinations. 
28 A-5997-12T2

for example, where a domestic violence victim is compelled to 

terminate a financially supportive but abusive relationship.

We draw some support for this interpretation from the 

legislative history. As introduced in the Senate and Assembly, 

the legislation consisted of only the first two sentences of the 

statute ultimately enacted, with one significant difference 

pertaining to the causation element. The bill stated:

Notwithstanding any other provisions of this 

chapter (R.S.43:21-1 et seq.), no otherwise 

eligible individual shall be denied benefits 

because the individual left work or was 

discharged due to circumstances directly

resulting from the individual being a victim 

of domestic violence as defined in section 3 

of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19). No 

employer's account shall be charged for the 

payment of benefits to an individual who 

left work due to circumstances directly

resulting from the individual being a victim 

of domestic violence. 

[Senate Bill No. 869, 208th Legislature, 

(March 19, 1998) (emphasis added).]

See also Assembly Bill No. 2366, 208th Legislature (September 

14, 1998). As amended, the word "directly" was removed. The 

committee statement explained the amendment was intended "to 

delete the requirement for qualification under the bill that the 

circumstances 'directly' result from domestic violence . . . ." 

Senate Women's Issues, Children and Family Servs. Comm.

Statement to Senate Bill No. 869, 208th Legislature (May 20, 

1999).
29 A-5997-12T2

A person may quit a job for multiple causes, including, but 

not limited to, being a victim of domestic violence. For 

example, as a result of being a victim of domestic violence, a 

person may decide to move some distance from the abuser; but, as 

a result, the commute to work may become burdensome, leading the 

person to quit his or her job. Consistent with the remedial 

purpose of the statute, we conclude that being a victim of 

domestic violence need not be the sole factor in the quit or 

discharge. Rather, it suffices if being a victim of domestic 

violence resulted in circumstances that were a substantial 

factor in causing a claimant's decision to resign. See E.C. v. 

RCM of Wash., Inc., 92 A.3d 305, 309 (D.C. 2014) (stating that

domestic violence must be a "substantial factor" to satisfy the 

causation element of D.C. Code § 51-131(a), which authorizes 

benefits when an "individual was separated from employment by 

discharge or voluntary or involuntary resignation due to 

domestic violence against the individual").

D.

In light of the foregoing principles, we conclude L.C.'s 

attorney was qualified to provide documentation or certification 

of domestic violence, since he assisted her in dealing with 

multiple acts of domestic violence. Contrary to the Board's 

argument that counsel's letter "makes no mention of domestic 
30 A-5997-12T2

violence," counsel catalogued various incidents that satisfy the 

definition of acts of domestic violence under the PDVA, N.J.S.A.

2C:25-19. These include criminal mischief, see N.J.S.A. 2C:25-

19(a)(10), N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3, based on L.C.'s husband's damage to 

her domestic appliance, and her vehicle; and stalking, see

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(14), N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10. Counsel also 

described acts of harassment, see N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(13), 

N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, based on her husband's repeated communications 

in an "offensively coarse language . . . likely to cause 

annoyance or alarm," N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), and his repeated acts 

designed "to alarm or seriously annoy" her, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), 

such as turning off the heat, cutting telephone and cable wires, 

throwing her clothes, making false accusations, and promoting 

disrespectful behavior by their children. 

In view of our clarification of the form of proof to be 

provided under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(j)(6), L.C. should have the 

opportunity on remand to provide a "certification of the 

domestic violence" from her attorney instead of the unsworn 

letter she submitted to the Tribunal. Alternatively, she may 

submit writings provided by her attorney and created during his 

representation, if they document domestic violence.

It is also apparent that the Tribunal applied a more 

demanding standard of causation than prescribed by the 1999 Law. 
31 A-5997-12T2

The appeals examiner advised L.C. that she needed to demonstrate 

a "direct connection" between her relocation and domestic 

violence. As we have discussed, the connection between domestic 

violence and the separation from work may be indirect, so long 

as being a victim of domestic violence resulted in circumstances 

that were a substantial factor in causing a claimant's decision 

to resign. On remand, assuming L.C. provides satisfactory proof 

of victimization, the Board shall apply this standard of 

causation to determine whether L.C. "left work . . . due to 

circumstances resulting from . . . [her] being a victim of 

domestic violence . . . ." See N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(j).

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.