NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIRNA ELIZABETH DE LEON-GARCIA; 

et al., 

Petitioners, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 21-70836

22-448

Agency Nos. A208-759-013 

A208-759-011 

A208-759-012 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 6, 2023**

Pasadena, California

Before: WALLACE and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,*** District 

Judge.

Mirna Elizabeth De Leon-Garcia (De Leon), a native and citizen of 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for 

the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUN 8 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Guatemala, and her minor children (collectively, Petitioners) petition for review of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of their appeals from the 

immigration judge’s (IJ’s) denial of their applications for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioners 

also petition for review of the BIA’s denial of their motion to reopen. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the BIA’s legal conclusions 

de novo and the BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence, and review the 

BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Plancarte Sauceda v. 

Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022); Ahwazi v. INS, 751 F.2d 1120, 1122 

(9th Cir. 1985). We deny the petitions.

Petitioners argue that the BIA erred because it should have conducted a 

meaningful analysis of the cognizability of their proposed social group—spouses 

and children of individuals living in the United States who send money back to 

Guatemala to support their family and are targeted by gang members for extortion 

in exchange for safety—before it could make a determination on whether 

Petitioners demonstrated a nexus between membership in that group and future or 

past persecution, and thereby deny their applications. Petitioners argue that, 

because they planned to challenge the IJ’s determination on the cognizability of the 

proposed social group before challenging any nexus determination, they did not 

waive any arguments challenging the nexus finding.
3 

The IJ did not err in denying Petitioners’ applications on the basis of a lack 

of a demonstrated nexus. The lack of a nexus between the harm that an applicant 

suffered and a protected ground is dispositive of asylum and withholding of 

removal applications. Riera-Riera v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2016). 

Here, the IJ considered Petitioners’ proposed social group, and determined that, 

even if it is cognizable, Petitioners had still not demonstrated a nexus between that 

group and the harm they claim. The IJ was not required to make a definitive 

decision about the social group prior to arriving at this conclusion.

Petitioners did not sufficiently raise the nexus argument before the BIA, 

which upheld the IJ’s nexus determination and denied their applications. 

Petitioners posit that they “clearly argued” their nexus issue before the BIA, but 

concede that they failed to make explicit arguments on this issue in their briefing. 

Broad arguments do not provide the BIA with notice of what specific conclusions

petitioners appeal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(b); Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 927, 930 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (“A petitioner cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement by making a 

general challenge to the IJ’s decision, but, rather, must specify which issues form 

the basis of the appeal.”). Petitioners had not properly “put the issue . . . before the 

BIA such that it had the opportunity to correct its error,” and the BIA did not err in 

concluding that they had waived objections to the nexus issue on appeal. Arsdi v.

Holder, 659 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). 
4 

Petitioners also contend that, because they were served with invalid Notices 

to Appear (NTAs) for their removal proceedings, the immigration court’s 

jurisdiction never actually vested in their cases in the first instance, and thus their 

removal proceedings should be terminated. The original NTAs served on 

Petitioners failed to specify a time and date of their removal hearings as required 

by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i), though Petitioners later received notices of hearing 

with such information and attended their proceedings. An NTA that does not 

specify the time and place of removal proceedings is insufficient to trigger the 

stop-time rule and in absentia removal proceedings. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 

S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2018); Singh v. Garland, 24 F.4th 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 2022). 

However, we have never held that a defective NTA divests the immigration court 

of jurisdiction, and Petitioners point to no authority that contradicts this 

conclusion. See United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187, 1188, 1193 

(9th Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 755 (2023) (“[T]he failure of an 

NTA to include time and date information does not deprive the immigration court 

of subject matter jurisdiction.”). Therefore, though Petitioners may have been 

served insufficient NTAs, the immigration court still had jurisdiction to conduct 

their removal proceedings.

Finally, Petitioners argue that, if their challenge to their insufficient NTAs is 

more appropriately treated as a claim-processing issue rather than a jurisdictional 
5 

issue, we should remand to the agency so that it may consider whether their claim 

was timely raised. Bastide-Hernandez held that the filing of an NTA or other 

charging document with the immigration court is a non-jurisdictional, claimprocessing issue. Id. at 1191. Though this court has not yet explicitly held when a 

claim-processing issue is timely raised, we have held that a petitioner must allege a 

claim-processing violation related to defects in an NTA in the proceedings before 

the agency in order to properly exhaust her claim. Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 

No. 19-70964, -- F.4th --, 2023 WL 3606117, at *5 (9th Cir. May 23, 2023). 

Because Petitioners never alleged before the BIA that their defective NTAs were 

claim-processing violations, they did not exhaust this claim, and therefore we deny 

this portion of the petition. See id.

The stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

PETITIONS DENIED.