Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A05-1507-CR-797 | December 15, 2015 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Derick W. Steele

Kokomo, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Tyler G. Banks

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

John Norris,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 15, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

34A05-1507-CR-797

Appeal from the Howard Superior 

Court

The Honorable William C. 

Menges, Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

34D01-1404-FB-218

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A05-1507-CR-797 | December 15, 2015 Page 2 of 7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, John Norris (Norris), appeals a condition of his 

probation.

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Norris raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial court 

abused its discretion by imposing a sex offender probation condition that 

restricts Norris from having contact with children under sixteen years of age.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] In the summer of 2012, sixteen-year-old S.M. was visiting with Norris at his 

house, located at 1323 East Murden Street, Kokomo, Indiana. While S.M. was 

asleep, Norris used his cell phone to record himself unzipping S.M.’s top, 

revealing her nipple, and using his finger to rub her exposed nipple. In that 

same video, Norris fondled S.M.’s buttocks and back. 

[5] In December 2012, fifteen-year-old A.H. was babysitting Norris’ minor 

children. On December 3, 2012, Norris set up a hidden camera and recorded 

A.H. taking a shower. Later that day, Norris set up a camera and recorded

A.H. sitting on a chair only wearing a top with her legs spread open. Norris 

also video-recorded as he inserted two vibrators in A.H.’s vagina. Again on 

December 16, 2012, Norris recorded A.H. sitting on a chair with her legs spread 

open toward the camera. Also, Norris recorded himself inserting a vibrator 
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inside A.H.’s vagina, and he made a close-up video of her genitals. In addition,

Norris recorded himself having sexual intercourse with A.H. On February 22, 

2014, S.M.’s mother found a micro SD card in her apartment. S.M.’s mother 

put the card into her cell phone to view the contents, and she saw videos of her 

daughter being molested by Norris. S.M.’s mother later turned the micro SD 

card over to the police. The micro SD card also contained the video recordings

of Norris molesting A.H. 

[6] On April 14, 2014, the State charged Norris with Count I, sexual misconduct 

with a minor, a Class C felony; Count II, child exploitation, a Class C felony; 

Counts III-IV, sexual misconduct with a minor, Class B felonies; and Count V, 

child exploitation, a Class C felony. On January 20, 2015, the State added 

Count VI, child exploitation, a Class C felony. On May 8, 2015, Norris agreed 

to plead guilty to Counts I, II, III, and VI, in exchange for the State dismissing 

the other charges. On June 3, 2015, pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial 

court sentenced Norris to eight years in the Department of Correction (DOC) 

with two years suspended to probation on Counts I and II. On Count III, 

Norris was ordered to serve an executed consecutive sentence of fourteen years 

in the DOC. Lastly, on Count VI, Norris was ordered to serve a six-year 

sentence concurrent with Count III. Norris’ aggregate sentence is twenty years. 

Additionally, Norris agreed to be subjected to the “special rules of probation for 

sex offenders.” (Appellant’s App. p. 53). As one of his conditions for

probation, Norris was ordered to have no contact with any person under the 
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age of sixteen unless he received court approval or successfully completed a 

court-approved sex offender treatment program.

[7] Norris now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[8] Norris contends that Condition 20 of his sex offender probation conditions is

unconstitutional as applied to him. Specifically, Norris argues that one of his 

daughters was nine months old at the time of the sentencing, and Condition 20 

prohibits him from having contact with his child. He further argues that he 

“cannot even ask a relative to wish his children a Merry Christmas . . . or even 

Happy Birthday.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 4). 

[9] “Probation is a criminal sanction wherein a convicted defendant specifically 

agrees to accept conditions upon his behavior in lieu of imprisonment.” Carswell 

v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Trial courts have broad 

discretion in determining the appropriate conditions of a defendant’s probation. 

Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109, 113 (Ind. 2010). “This discretion is limited 

only by the principle that the conditions imposed must be reasonably related to 

the treatment of the defendant and the protection of public safety.” Stott v. 

State, 822 N.E.2d 176, 179-80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Thus, “our 

review is essentially limited to determine whether the conditions placed on the 

defendant are reasonably related to attaining these goals.” Carswell, 721 N.E.2d 

at 1258. We will not set aside a trial court’s probation terms unless it has 
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abused its discretion. Collins v. State, 911 N.E.2d 700, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), 

trans. denied.

[10] “‘Convicted individuals do not enjoy the same constitutional protections as 

law-abiding citizens[,]’” and “probation conditions that intrude upon 

constitutionally protected rights are not necessarily invalid.” Taylor v. State, 820 

N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Johnson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 194, 

200 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), reh’g denied), trans. denied. See also Gaither v. Ind. Dep’t 

of Correction, 971 N.E.2d 690, 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that 

“probation conditions may impinge upon a probationer’s right to exercise an 

otherwise constitutionally protected right”). Where, as here, a defendant 

contends that a probation condition is unduly intrusive upon a constitutional 

right, the following three factors must be balanced: (1) the purpose sought to be 

served by probation; (2) the extent to which constitutional rights enjoyed by 

law-abiding citizens should be afforded to probationers; and (3) the legitimate 

needs of law enforcement. Smith v. State, 779 N.E.2d 111, 117 (Ind. Ct. App.

2002), trans. denied.

[11] Special Condition 20 reads: 

You shall have no contact with any person under the age of 16 

unless you receive court approval or successfully complete a 

court-approved sex offender treatment program, pursuant to 

[Indiana Code section] 35-38-2-2.4. Contact includes face-toface, telephonic, written, electronic, or any indirect contact via 

third parties.

(Appellant’s App. p. 87). 
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[12] Norris posits that the imposition of Condition 20 improperly infringes upon his 

fundamental right to family integrity because he has a child under the age of 

sixteen. As noted above, convicted individuals do not enjoy the same 

constitutional protections as law-abiding citizens. See Taylor, 820 N.E.2d at 

761. Moreover, this court has previously observed that “child molesters molest 

children to whom they have access.” Smith, 779 N.E.2d at 117 (citing Carswell, 

721 N.E.2d at 1259). As a result, “probation conditions that reduce the 

potential for access to children are reasonable.” Id. 

[13] Norris molested both S.M. and A.H. in his home where he lived with his minor 

children. Having no contact with minors helps prevent further children from 

the harm that Norris perpetrated against S.M. and A.H. Moreover, we note 

that Norris is not entirely prohibited from establishing and maintaining a 

relationship with his daughter. Rather, he is required to receive court approval 

or successfully complete a court-approved sex offender treatment program 

pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-2-2.4 before having any contact. In 

light of the foregoing, we agree with the trial court and conclude that no contact 

with anyone under sixteen is a reasonable probation condition related to the 

goal of protecting the community while rehabilitating Norris.

CONCLUSION

[14] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the challenged probation condition is

reasonably related to the goals of rehabilitation and public safety and 

accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
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[15] Affirmed. 

[16] Brown, J. and Altice, J. concur