alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Berthel Growth & Income Trust I (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2005 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Thomas J. Berthel, Chief Executive Officer of Berthel Fisher & Company Planning,
Inc., the Trust Advisor of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

         (1) The Company's Report fully complies with the requirements of
         Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.


November 8, 2005                            /s/  Thomas J. Berthel
                                            -----------------------------------
                                                 Thomas J. Berthel
                                                 President and
                                                 Chief Executive Officer
                                                 Berthel Fisher &
                                                 Company Planning, Inc.
                                                 Trust Advisor
                                                 Berthel Growth & Income Trust I
Document headings vary by document type but may contain
                    the following: the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document
the number of the CFR title and the number of each part
                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly
                      related to
the agency docket number / agency internal file number
the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in
                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory
                      Actions See the
                    Document Drafting Handbook
                    for more details.
 Small Business Administration [Declaration of Disaster #3303]
 Eau Claire County and the contiguous counties of Buffalo, Chippewa, Clark, Dunn, Jackson, Pepin, and Trempealeau in the State of Wisconsin constitute a disaster area due to damages caused by severe storms and flooding that occurred on September 10-11, 2000. Applications for loans for physical damage as a result of this disaster may be filed until the close of business on December 4, 2000 and for economic injury until the close of business on July 5, 2001 at the address listed below or other locally announced locations: U.S. Small Business Administration, Disaster Area 2 Office, One Baltimore Place, Suite 300, Atlanta, GA 30308. The interest rates are: PercentFor Physical Damage:Homeowners With Credit Available Elsewhere
7.375Homeowners Without Credit Available Elsewhere
3.687Businesses With Credit Available Elsewhere
8.000Businesses and Non-Profit Organizations Without Credit Available Elsewhere
4.000Others (Including Non-Profit Organizations) With Credit Available Elsewhere
6.750For Economic Injury:( print page 64472)Businesses and Small Agricultural Cooperatives Without Credit Available Elsewhere
4.000
 The numbers assigned to this disaster are 330306 for physical damage and 9J3300 for economic injury. (Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 59002 and 59008) Dated: October 5, 2000. Charles Payne, Acting Administrator.


[FR Doc. 00-27636 Filed 10-26-00; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
#### Ex parte MATTHEWS.

No. 24716.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 11, 1950.

*844No appearance, for appellant.

George • P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

An application for writ of habeas corpus was filed before the Criminal District Court of Dallas County on September 29, 1949. The only- effort to allege grounds for it was that R. D. Matthews,, the petitioner, “ * * * is illegally confined and restrained of his liberty in Dallas County, Texas by Bill Decker, Sheriff,” and others, together with the following: “The nature of such illegal confinement and restraint being Illegal Hold for the State of Arkansas.”

There is no statement that a hearing was had and the only judgment we find in the record is in the following language: “Relator remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Dallas County, Texas, to hold for the Removal Agent of Arkansas. To which Relator excepts and gives Notice of Appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, at Austin, Texas. Bond set at $1500.00 on Appeal.”

Appellant entered into recognizance in the sum of $1500, as required of him, and requested 60 days in which to perfect his appeal. This was granted. No further action is indicated. This presents nothing for our consideration.

Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE FINANCIAL DATA SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
FROM THE CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF EQUALNET HOLDING CORP. AT DECEMBER
31, 1996 AND FOR THE SIX MONTHS THEN ENDED AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                         496,036
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               13,261,215
<ALLOWANCES>                                 1,792,903
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            15,971,862
<PP&E>                                       5,599,450
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,808,574
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              25,837,613
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       21,466,054
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        61,738
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,306,821
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                25,837,613
<SALES>                                     25,404,968
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            25,404,968
<CGS>                                       19,932,937
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               19,932,937
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             1,211,714
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             478,640
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (9,512,288)
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (802,845)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (8,709,443)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (8,709,433)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.44)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.44)

</TABLE>
CLD

- 126 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 19

- 1263

___________ IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS, Petitioner

____________________________________ On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (Related to W.D. Pa. Crim. No. 2

- 15

- cr

- 00168

- 001 )

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. March 7, 2019 Before: CHAGARES, RESTREPO, and SCIRICA, Ci rcuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 5, 2019 )

_________ OPINION *

_________ PER CURIAM
Frederick Banks is currently awaiting trial in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania on charges of interstate stalking, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2261(a)( 2), aggravated identity theft, § 1028A(a)(1), making false statements,
§ 1001(a)(3), and wire fraud, § 1343.
On January 21, 2019, Banks filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 Banks states that in December 2018, he filed a motion in the D istrict Court seeking
reimbursement for expenses incurred in the criminal action, including postage, envelopes,
paper, and pens. The District Court denied his request. Banks now asks us to order the
District Judge to “perform his clear legal duty and ent er an order granting [his] motion

for reimbursement.”
We will deny Banks’s petition. Mandamus is a drastic remedy available in only
extraordinary circumstances, and may not be used as a substitute for an appeal. In re Diet
Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig. , 418 F.3d 372, 378

- 79 (3d Cir. 2005). Because the District

Court’ s order was reviewable on appeal, mandamus relief is not appropriate. 1 See In re
Kensington Int’l Ltd. , 353 F.3d 211, 219 (3d Cir. 2003) (“If, in effect, an appeal will lie,

mandamus will not.” ).

1 We express no opinion on whether, should Banks seek appellate review, his appeal would be timely or otherwise within our jurisdiction, or whether the appeal would have merit

.
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-17-00382-CV

CCPA ENTERPRISES, INC. AND RICKEY 

CONRADT, Appellants

V.

BEDFORD HOSPITALITY INVESTMENTS,

LLC D/B/A HOLIDAY INN - BEDFORD, 

Appellee

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from the 348th District Court

of Tarrant County (348-237051-09)

October 31, 2019

Opinion by Justice Kerr

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there 

was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of the trial 

court is affirmed.

It is further ordered that Appellants CCPA Enterprises, Inc. and Rickey 

Conradt shall jointly and separately pay all of the costs of this appeal, for which let 

execution issue.
SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By _/s/ Elizabeth Kerr__________________

 Justice Elizabeth Kerr
DISMISS and Opinion Filed September 12, 2022

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05 - 22 - 00887 - CV IN RE ALEX NEAL , Relator Original Proceeding from the 296th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 296 - 82970 - 2022 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III Before the Court is Alex Neal’s September 7, 2022 “Writ of Habeas Corpu s.” We construe this filing as an original petition for writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, Neal contend s that a true bill of indictment contains numerous errors , that the indictment has been wrongfully duplicated nine times , and that he is innocent
. This Court does not have original jurisdiction to consider petitions seeking habeas relief generated in connection with criminal proceedings. See T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE A N N . § 22.221(d); T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . art. 11.05; In re Spriggs , 528 S.W.3d 234, 236 (Tex. A pp. — Amarillo 2017, orig. proceeding); In re Ayers , 515 S.W.3d 356, 356

– 57 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding) (per– 2

–

curiam); s ee also In re Dingler , Nos. 05

- 22

- 00594

- CV, 05

- 22

- 0 0 59 5

- CV, 05

- 22

- 00596

- CV, 05

- 22

- 00597

- CV, 2022 WL 2302173, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Dallas June 27, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). We dismiss relator’s original petition for writ of habeas corpus for want of jurisdiction. 220887f.p05 /Bill Pedersen, III/ / BILL PEDERSEN, III JUSTICE
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          65,600
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                6,389,351
<ALLOWANCES>                                   567,458
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             7,592,023
<PP&E>                                       5,893,654
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,711,228
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              12,667,760
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       17,824,076
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        66,828
<OTHER-SE>                                 (5,453,005)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                12,667,760
<SALES>                                     14,808,555
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            14,808,555
<CGS>                                       10,993,553
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               10,993,553
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               754,225
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             785,454
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (4,275,380)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (4,275,380)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (4,275,380)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.68)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.68)
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                       1,442,689
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                7,802,135
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             9,264,824
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              11,019,353
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,224,174
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   (115,770)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                11,019,353
<SALES>                                      1,442,091
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,442,091
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               520,626
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,039,500
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (118,035)
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (118,035)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (118,035)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (118,035)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                (118,035)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                 (118.04)
        

</TABLE>
#### The State, ex rel. Industrial Commission of Ohio et al., *v.*Municipal Court of Columbus et al.

(No. 28274

Decided October 23, 1940.)

*322
      *Mr. Thomas J. Herbert,*attorney general, *Mr. David M. Spriggs*and *Mr. Fred W. Edmonston,*for relators.

*Mr. Maurice K. Topson,*for respondents.

By the Court.

The Attorney General concedes that the writ of prohibition ordinarily will not issue in this state where there is an adequate remedy at law available by appeal or otherwise, but he urges that in the present matter the state is possessed of no other remedy which is adequate because of numerous pending cases involving the same question.

The reasoning supporting the second paragraph of the syllabus in *State, ex rel. Caley,*v. *Tax Commission,*129 Ohio St., 83, 193 N. E., 751, applies to the present litigation.

The Municipal Court of Columbus is authorized by Section 1558-51, General Code, to entertain actions to enforce the collection of its judgments, and that court is competent in the first instance to determine its own jurisdiction. A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent an anticipated erroneous judgment, and the writ is not available as a substitute for a proceeding on appeal. *State, ex rel. Norris,*v. *Hodapp, Judge,*135 Ohio St., 26, 18 N. E. (2d), 984, and cases cited therein.

The relators not desiring to plead further a writ of prohibition is denied.

*Writ denied.*

Weygandt, C. J., Day, Zimmerman, Williams, Matthias, Hart and Turner, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit 23.1**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLICACCOUNTING FIRM**

 

We consent tothe incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form S-3(No.’s. 333-131518 and 333-129028) of Metabasis Therepeutics, Inc. and in therelated Prospectus and in the Registration Statement on Form S-8 (No.’s333-125322 and 333-116545) pertaining to the Amended and Restated 2001 EquityIncentive Plan, 2004 Non-Employee Directors’ Stock Option Plan, and the 2004Employee Stock Purchase Plan of Metabasis Therapeutics, Inc. of our reportdated February 16, 2006, with respect to the financial statements of MetabasisTherapeutics, Inc. included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year endedDecember 31, 2005.

 
|   | /s/ Ernst & Young LLP |   |
|--------|---------------------------|--------|

 

San Diego, California

March 21, 2006

 

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE COMPANY'S ANNUAL
REPORT AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH CONDENSED
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                          45,126
<SECURITIES>                                   100,117
<RECEIVABLES>                                   42,835
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,523
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               198,849
<PP&E>                                          31,140
<DEPRECIATION>                                  16,612
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 224,884
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           54,251
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     170,567
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   224,884
<SALES>                                         55,494
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                95,436
<CGS>                                            2,541
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   19,170
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                19,418
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  45
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 14,061
<INCOME-TAX>                                     4,640
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     9,421
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.33
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.31


</TABLE>
#### The State, ex rel. Greenlun, Appellant, *v. Beightler,*Dir. of Highways, Appellee.

(No. 28202

Decided December 11, 1940.)

*378
      *Mr. J. L. Mason*and *Messrs. McFadyen, Swisher é Warden,*for appellant.

*Mr. Thomas J. Herbert,*attorney general, *Mr. John P. Walsh*and *Mr. Herbert K. Ames,*for appellee.

By the Court.

The sole question made by the record in this case is whether an employee of the state highway department appointed under civil service may invoke the remedy of mandamus to require the state highway director to issue a warrant for the payment, of the salary of such employee for a period of time during which he was wrongfully excluded from his position of employment.

The only respondent in this case is the director of highways. Under the law, he is not charged with the duty of issuing warrants for salaries of officers or employees in his department. There is, therefore, no proper respondent in this case against whom a writ of mandamus for the issuance of a salary warrant could be properly directed.

The disposition of the case on this issue makes it unnecessary to consider other questions made by the record.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Weygandt, C. J., Day, Zimmerman, Turner, Williams, Matthias and Hart, JJ., concur.
#### STRUNK v. STATE.

No. 25806.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 9, 1952.

E. W. Newman, and Heidingsfelder, Knight & Daniel, all of Houston, for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is aggravated assault; the punishment, a fine of $50.

The assault is alleged to have become aggravated by virtue of the infliction of serious bodily injury.

Two citizens of the Oakland community, who had recently opposed each other as candidates for Justice of the Peace, engaged in a fist fight, presumably over the location of certain gasoline pumps. The appellant, father of one of the participants, by words and gestures, encouraged his son in the affray. The sole question is whether the wounds inflicted gave rise to apprehension of danger to life, health or limb.

The doctor, in describing the black eye received by the injured party, testified on direct examination:

> At that time he had a severe bruise of the left eye around the orbit of the eye and the soft tissue was black, the eyeball was bleeding and had what was called subconjunctive hemmorage, that is a hemmorage of the outer layer of the eyeball.”

On cross-examination, we find the following :

> *“Q.*Was this injury to Mr. Mayes of a permanent nature? A. No, not in my opinion.

> “Q. Would it be such an injury that would endanger his life or his health? A. No.”

Later, we find:

> “Q. How long were you in bed? A. Oh, I layed around 2 or 3 days, I think.”

Recently, in Gonzalez v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 108, 172 S.W.2d 97, we had occasion to review our decision on the question of what constitutes serious bodily injury.

From the record before us, it does not appear that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.

Judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.