SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0040-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DENNIS THIGPEN, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted November 1, 2021 – Decided December 14, 2021

Before Judges Accurso and Enright. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 10-07-1359.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (James D. O'Kelly, Designated Counsel, on 

the briefs).

Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Samuel Marzarella, Chief 

Appellate Attorney, of counsel; Shiraz Deen, Assistant 

Prosecutor, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-0040-19

Defendant Dennis Thigpen, Jr. appeals from the August 1, 2019 order 

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary 

hearing. We affirm.

I.

A jury convicted defendant of first-degree conspiracy to commit murder, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, and second-degree unlawful 

possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). The jury was hung on the 

remaining charges of murder and possession of a gun for an unlawful purpose, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). Defendant was tried twice more and each time the jury 

deadlocked. The trial court dismissed the two outstanding charges at the State's 

request. 

The State theorized that eighteen-year-old Anthony Skyers was murdered

because the Bloods street gang believed he "snitched" on their second-highest 

ranking member, Dyshon Ragland,

1

and told the police Ragland committed an 

armed robbery at a restaurant in Tom River. The State produced multiple 

witnesses at trial to support its theory, including Ragland's girlfriend, Z.J. 

During defendant's first trial in 2010, Z.J. testified that on the evening of June 

1

 Ragland was tried separately, convicted of Skyers's murder and related 

offenses, and sentenced to a forty-five-year prison term.
3

A-0040-19

5, 2008, she and Ragland were at her apartment in High Point when Ragland 

received "between five to seven phone calls." Ragland appeared upset by the 

calls and told Z.J., referring to Skyers, "I hope he didn't do what I think he did, 

because if he did, I'm going to have to shut him up." Z.J. also stated a fellow 

Bloods member, C.B., arrived at the apartment that night, the two men left the 

apartment together, and Ragland returned alone to the apartment around 1:00 in 

the morning. 

According to Z.J., five minutes after Ragland came home, defendant 

arrived at the apartment and his "eyes were big like in shock" and he was "very 

sweaty." Z.J. stated defendant looked "[k]ind of upset" but more "frightened." 

When she asked defendant why he "look[ed] like he killed someone," defendant 

did not answer. He and Ragland went into the bathroom together, shut the door 

and talked with the water running, but Z.J. could not hear what was said. Later 

that morning, Skyers was found dead in the woods behind the High Point 

apartment complex. He had two gunshot wounds in the back of his head. 

The State also called defendant's former roommate, J.V., to testify. J.V. 

stated that defendant told her

he lured [Skyers] to the woods and told [Skyers] to walk 

up ahead of him and he shot [Skyers]. The first time 

the safety was on the gun, it didn't go off and [Skyers] 

turned around and said what are you doing? 
4

A-0040-19

[Defendant] said, I'm just kidding, go ahead. And then 

[Skyers] turned around and [defendant] shot him again.

According to J.V., defendant said that before the murder, Bloods members 

were discussing who would kill Skyers and defendant "was the only one that had 

the balls to do it." She also stated that defendant bragged: "I killed the kid, I 

could do it again, it's nothing to kill somebody." 

More than a year after the murder, C.B. and his cousin, B.N., also a Bloods 

member, were arrested for multiple counts of unrelated armed robberies. 

Detective Gregory Staffordsmith interviewed both men on July 6, 2009, and

each implicated defendant in Skyers's murder. The following day, defendant 

was arrested based on Staffordsmith's probable cause affidavit. 

The detective's affidavit included statements attributable to C.B. and B.N. 

For example, it referred to C.B.'s statements that: Ragland invited him to his 

apartment shortly after the murder; Ragland told him he murdered Skyers and

that defendant was present; and C.B. subsequently spoke with defendant, who 

told him that "Ragland had ordered Skyers['s] murder because Skyers had 

'snitched' to the police about Ragland's involvement in the [r]obbery of the 

Subway in Toms River . . . on February 27, 2008[.]" 

Additionally, the affidavit referenced B.N.'s statements that: C.B. 

contacted him early on June 6, 2008 to advise that Ragland and another unknown 
5

A-0040-19

male took C.B. to a wooded area behind Ragland's apartment complex to show 

him the dead body of Anthony Skyers; and during that meeting, Ragland told 

C.B. he murdered Skyers. 

Pertinent to this appeal, the State admits Staffordsmith's affidavit also 

contained three statements which were partially incorrect. The phrases

comprising the admitted misstatements are underscored: (1) "Mr. Ragland and 

[defendant] then took [C.B.] in [the] wooded area behind the High Point 

Apartments and showed [C.B.] the dead body of Anthony Skyers"; (2) 

"[defendant] . . . told [B.N.] that he had murdered Anthony Skyers on the orders 

of Dyshon Ragland"; and (3) "[defendant] advised [C.B.] that he had murdered 

Skyers on the orders of Dyshon Ragland." (Emphasis added). 

The State called C.B. and B.N. to testify during defendant's first trial and 

their testimony was consistent with the unchallenged portions of Staffordsmith's 

probable cause affidavit. For example, C.B. stated that Ragland ordered him to 

go to Ragland's apartment after the murder, and that Ragland took him to the 

woods behind the apartment complex to show him Skyers's corpse. C.B. also 

testified that Ragland told him he "killed [Skyers]," that "[Skyers] had to go," 

and "this is what happens when somebody snitches."
6

A-0040-19

Additionally, C.B. stated that before the murder, defendant was trying to 

join the Bloods, and by the fall of 2008, he was a new member of the gang. 

Defendant immediately held a high-ranking position, which was unusual 

because new members usually start at a low-level position and work their way 

up by committing crimes. Defendant told some Bloods members that he gained 

his high rank because he killed Skyers. C.B. stated that defendant also talked 

about the murder a second time while he, defendant and other Bloods members 

were riding in a car on their way to Newark. 

B.N. testified that approximately a year after the murder, defendant told 

him, "the way [defendant] was raised, when people snitch on you, you got to 

handle that." B.N. asked defendant if he was talking about Skyers and defendant 

responded, "yeah." Defendant also told B.N. that defendant achieved his rank 

in the Bloods because of "the whole thing with [Skyers]."
7

A-0040-19

In anticipation of a retrial, defendant moved to suppress evidence resulting 

from Staffordsmith's probable cause affidavit, pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 

438 U.S. 154 (1978).2 The motion was denied in June 2011.

3

Because defense counsel was disbarred after the first trial, successor 

counsel assumed defendant's representation. Defendant's new attorney moved 

to suppress the statements B.N. and C.B. gave to Staffordsmith during their 2009 

interviews. He submitted a certification with the motion in January 2012, stating

"the representations made by Det. Gregory Staffordsmith . . . . were misleading 

and incomplete." But counsel's certification did not specify which 

representations in the probable cause affidavit were "misleading and 

incomplete." The suppression motion was denied on June 14, 2012.

4

2

 A Franks hearing is required only "where the defendant makes a substantial 

preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with 

reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant 

affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of 

probable cause." Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.

3

 Defendant did not provide a transcript from the motion hearing or other 

documentation from this motion to the PCR judge. Also, although neither party 

was able to find the trial court's 2011 decision, the State provided the PCR judge 

with a Promis/Gavel print out to establish the motion was denied. 

4

 Again, no transcript of the 2012 hearing was supplied to the PCR judge or to 

us. 
8

A-0040-19

Less than two weeks later, Staffordsmith was called by the defense to 

testify at the second trial.

5

 During defense counsel's examination, Staffordsmith 

admitted his probable cause affidavit contained an error. Specifically, he 

acknowledged the words, "and [defendant]" should not have been included in 

the following statement attributed to C.B.: "Mr. Ragland and [defendant] then 

took [C.B.] in [a] wooded area behind the High Point Apartments and showed 

[C.B.] the dead body of Anthony Skyers." While on the stand, Staffordsmith 

also denied he "put something in [the affidavit] knowing[] that it was wrong[,]" 

explaining he "wasn't aware there was a mistake at the time[.]" Further, the 

detective stated he did not alert the assistant prosecutor who handled the case to 

the error. According to Staffordsmith's testimony, the mistake was "later 

corrected[.]" The record does not reveal when or how the correction occurred.

Based on the limited record before us, it appears that only when defendant 

stood trial for a third time in 2013 did Staffordsmith admit to the two remaining 

misstatements in his probable cause affidavit, i.e., that defendant "advised 

[C.B.] that he had murdered Skyers on the orders of Dyshon Ragland" and that 

defendant "told [B.N.] that he had murdered Anthony Skyers on the orders of 

Dyson Ragland." (Emphasis added). An excerpt of the trial transcript reveals 

5

 Staffordsmith was not called by either party to testify at defendant's first trial. 
9

A-0040-19

that when defense counsel asked Staffordsmith about these misstatements, 

Staffordsmith asked for clarification. Specifically, the detective inquired, "is 

your question whether or not your client shot [Skyers] or was he ordered to shoot 

him?" Defense counsel responded, "[o]rdered to shoot him." Staffordsmith

replied that there was "nothing specific about an order to shoot [Skyers]" and 

that it was a mistake for the affidavit to read that either C.B. or B.N. told him 

defendant "was ordered to [shoot Skyers] by . . . Ragland." Critically, however, 

Staffordsmith did not testify he made a mistake by swearing C.B. and B.N. told 

him defendant "had murdered Anthony Skyers." 

Following defendant's third trial, the court sentenced defendant to an 

aggregate prison term of seventeen years with an eighty-five percent parole 

disqualifier pursuant to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. We 

affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct appeal.

6

 State v. Thigpen, No. 

A-2490-14T2 (App. Div. Aug. 11, 2017). In 2018, the Supreme Court denied 

certification. State v. Thigpen, 232 N.J. 146 (2018). 

6

 We also remanded for the limited purpose of correcting a typographical error 

in the judgment of conviction. 
10 A-0040-19

II.

In February 2018, defendant filed a timely pro se PCR petition. He argued 

his first trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel, and that he was 

convicted based on police and prosecutorial misconduct, as well as various 

Fourteenth Amendment violations. After PCR counsel was appointed, he 

supplemented defendant's petition, arguing that defendant's first trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to: "seek to dismiss the [i]ndictment[,]" given 

Staffordsmith's flawed affidavit; request a hearing to address Staffordsmith's 

misstatements; "conduct a proper investigation," which "at a bare minimum," 

would have included "interviewing potential witnesses"; call Staffordsmith to 

testify; and uncover the two misstatements successor counsel later discovered. 

Moreover, PCR counsel contended that even if each of his first attorney's errors 

individually did not deprive him of the effective assistance of counsel, 

cumulatively, they did. Lastly, PCR counsel argued appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to "properly raise [the] issues asserted herein that could 

have been raised on appeal." 

The PCR judge heard argument on defendant's PCR petition in July 2019, 

at which time defendant briefly addressed the court. Thereafter, defendant 

submitted a handwritten letter to the judge, which was considered without 
11 A-0040-19

objection from either party. On August 1, 2019, the judge denied the petition 

without an evidentiary hearing. 

The PCR judge concluded that defendant's claims about Staffordsmith's 

affidavit were procedurally barred under Rules 3:22-4 and -5. He reasoned that 

defendant had twice moved to suppress evidence based on the misstatements in 

Staffordsmith's affidavit, and then failed to challenge the denial of the motions

on direct appeal. 

The judge also found defendant "failed to show a prima facie case of 

ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel." He specifically rejected the 

notion that the post-trial disbarment of defendant's first attorney, without more, 

demonstrated defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. Indeed, the 

judge found defendant failed to show "how his counsel's disbarment post-trial 

had any effect on the proceedings." Moreover, the judge stated that his review 

of the trial transcript showed defendant's first attorney was "engaged, zealous 

and motivated[,]" and that the transcript "belie[d] any claim that trial counsel 

was inattentive, unprepared or ineffective." Additionally, the judge concluded 

defendant was properly counseled about his right to testify during the first trial. 

The judge noted that at his first trial, defendant was asked if he had a "full and 

fair opportunity to make [the] decision" about testifying and "underst[ood] all 
12 A-0040-19

[his] options," and defendant "answered, 'Yes, sir' to both questions." 

Accordingly, the judge found defendant was "informed thoroughly on the 

advantages and disadvantages of testifying in court" and "intelligently exercised 

his constitutional right to remain silent."

Further, the judge declined to find defendant's first attorney was 

ineffective for failing to call Staffordsmith as a witness, concluding counsel's 

decision not to call the detective demonstrated "sound strategy" because "calling 

a hostile witness" to highlight an incorrect statement in an affidavit would have 

allowed the State to cross-examine the detective, and "elicit testimony harmful 

to [defendant]." Additionally, the judge found there was no merit to defendant's 

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the 

indictment, particularly given that successor counsel was unsuccessful when he 

moved to dismiss the indictment.

Similarly, the judge rejected defendant's argument that the State 

committed prosecutorial misconduct by relying heavily on hearsay testimony 

during grand jury proceedings. The judge noted that defendant "relie[d] upon 

outdated case law" to challenge the propriety of the grand jury proceedings.

Regarding defendant's contention that his appellate counsel was 

ineffective, again, the judge was not persuaded. The judge found that although
13 A-0040-19

defendant argued "[a]ppellate counsel failed to properly raise those issues 

asserted herein that could have been raised on direct appeal," PCR counsel 

neglected "to . . . address what issues appellate counsel allegedly failed to raise."

III.

On appeal, defendant presents the following arguments: 

POINT I

THE PCR COURT'S LEGAL AND FACTUAL 

CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE PCR CLAIMS 

[DEFENDANT] MADE ABOUT THE 

STAFFORDSMITH AFFIDAVIT WERE PATENTLY 

ERRONEOUS AND BASED ON AN INADEQUATE 

PCR RECORD AND SPECULATIVE ARGUMENTS 

MADE BY THE STATE.

A. [Defendant's] Claims Concerning The Staffordsmith

Affidavit Were Not Procedurally Barred Pursuant to 

[Rule] 3:22-5 Because No Court Has Ever Adjudicated 

The Issue Of Whether Suppression Was Required Due 

To All Of The Misrepresentations In The Affidavit.

B. The PCR Court Erred In Concluding That 

[Defendant's] Claims Concerning The Erroneous 

Statements In The Staffordsmith Affidavit Were 

Procedurally Barred Because A Second Motion To 

Suppress Had Been Filed Prior To [Defendant's] Third 

Trial.

C. The Trial Court Erred In Concluding That 

[Defendant] Was Not Entitled To [PCR] Because The 

Issue Of The Numerous Misstatements In The 

Staffordsmith Affidavit Should Have Been Raised On 

Direct Appeal.
14 A-0040-19

POINT II

THE PCR COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER AND 

RESOLVE [DEFENDANT'S] PRO SE CLAIMS FOR 

[PCR]. (Not Raised Below).

POINT III

THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED 

BECAUSE PCR COUNSEL'S LEGAL 

REPRESENTATION FELL BELOW THE 

PROFESSIONAL STANDARD REQUIRED BY 

[RULE] 3: 22-6 (d). (Not Raised Below).

In his reply brief, defendant raises the following additional argument:

AT THE PCR LEVEL, THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

MADE AN ERRONEOUS REPRESENTATION 

THAT WAS ULTIMATELY RELIED ON BY THE 

PCR COURT TO DENY [DEFENDANT PCR]. 

INSTEAD OF ACKNOWLEDGING THIS 

ESTABLISHED FACT, THE STATE NOW OFFERS 

SPECULATIVE ARGUMENTS IN AN ATTEMPT TO 

SHIELD THE STAFFORDSMITH AFFIDAVIT 

FROM ADDITIONAL JUDICIAL SCRUTINY.

We review a PCR court's legal conclusions de novo, but generally defer 

to its fact-findings when those findings are "supported by adequate, substantial 

and credible evidence." State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415 (2004) (quoting Toll 

Bros. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 549 (2002)). If a PCR court does 

not hold an evidentiary hearing, we "may exercise de novo review over the 
15 A-0040-19

factual inferences drawn from the documentary record." Id. at 421 (emphasis in 

original). 

"A PCR petition is not a substitute for raising a claim on direct 

appeal." State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 145 (2011); see also R. 3:22-3. Unless 

one of "the prescribed exceptions" apply, claims that could have been, but were 

not, raised in prior proceedings cannot be asserted on PCR. State v. Preciose, 

129 N.J. 451, 476 (1992). But defendants "are rarely barred from raising 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on [PCR]." Id. at 459-60. These claims 

are generally best suited for PCR petitions and "often cannot reasonably be 

raised in a prior proceeding" given that they "involve allegations and evidence 

. . . outside the trial record." Id. at 460. However, under Rule 3:22-5, "[a] prior 

adjudication upon the merits of any ground for relief is conclusive whether made 

in the proceedings resulting in the conviction or in any post-conviction 

proceeding brought pursuant to this rule or prior to the adoption thereof, or in 

any appeal taken from such proceedings." 

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must 

establish, first, that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness" and, second, that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
16 A-0040-19

different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). A 

defendant must do more than demonstrate that an alleged error might have "had 

some conceivable effect on the outcome of the trial." State v. Sheika, 337 N.J. 

Super. 228, 242 (App. Div. 2001). A defendant must prove the error is so serious 

as to undermine the court's confidence that the "defendant's trial was fair, and 

that the jury properly convicted him." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 588 (2015). 

There is no question but that a defendant's "right to effective assistance 

includes the right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel on direct 

appeal." State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 610-11 (2014). But appellate counsel 

need not advance every argument a defendant urges, even if non-frivolous. 

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 750-54 (1983). 

Further, the right to the effective assistance of counsel extends 

to PCR counsel. See State v. Rue, 175 N.J. 1, 18-19 (2002). PCR counsel must 

"advance all of the legitimate arguments requested by the defendant that the 

record will support, "Rule 3:22-6(d), and "make the best available arguments in 

support of them," Rue, 175 N.J. at 19. Even if PCR counsel deems the claims 

to be meritless, counsel must "list such claims in the petition or amended petition 

or incorporate them by reference." R. 3:22-6(d); see also State v. Webster, 187 

N.J. 254, 257-58 (2006). Like ineffective assistance of counsel claims against 
17 A-0040-19

trial counsel, the resolution of claims against PCR counsel routinely involves

matters outside the record. Thus, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

against PCR counsel is typically raised in a second or subsequent PCR petition. 

See State v. Armour, 446 N.J. Super. 295, 317 (App. Div. 2016); see 

also R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(C). 

Mindful of these principles, we first address defendant's Point I 

arguments, which collectively challenge the PCR judge's finding that 

defendant's ineffective assistance claims about the misstatements in 

Staffordsmith's affidavit were barred under Rules 3:22-4 and -5. We disagree 

with the PCR judge that defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

were procedurally barred. Because the ineffective assistance claims raised in 

defendant's PCR petition involved alleged legal errors not contained completely 

within the trial record, they were not ripe for appellate review. See Preciose, 

129 N.J. at 460. In fact, defendant's claims were better suited for 

a PCR proceeding because, as the PCR judge recognized, at least some of the

issues defendant raised concerned trial strategy decisions. See State v. 

McDonald, 211 N.J. 4, 30 (2012). Additionally, given the partial record before 

us, as well as defendant's assertions about when Staffordsmith's misstatements

were discovered, we are not convinced defendant's contentions regarding the 
18 A-0040-19

probable cause affidavit were barred under Rule 3:22-5.

7

 Nonetheless, we are 

persuaded defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims lack merit and 

that the judge properly denied his petition without an evidentiary hearing. 

The mere raising of an ineffective assistance claim on PCR does not entitle

a defendant to an evidentiary hearing. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 

170 (App. Div. 1999). Trial courts should grant evidentiary hearings and make 

a determination on the merits only if the defendant has presented a prima facie 

claim of ineffective assistance, material issues of disputed facts lie outside the 

record, and resolution of the issues necessitates a hearing. R. 3:22-10(b); State 

v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013). 

Here, we are satisfied defendant did not establish a prima facie claim of 

ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel because he did not satisfy the 

prejudice prong under Strickland. Stated differently, defendant failed to 

establish "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687-88, particularly given that the State produced strong evidence of 

7

 To the extent defendant attempted to raise substantive contentions relating to 

the Staffordmith affidavit in his PCR petition, such as prosecutorial misconduct, 

we would agree such claims are barred under Rule 3:22-4, because they could 

have been brought on direct appeal. See State v. Quezada, 402 N.J. Super. 277, 

280 (App. Div. 2008).
19 A-0040-19

defendant's guilt through testimonial evidence. Accordingly, we need not 

address whether counsel's performance was deficient. See State v. Gaitan, 209 

N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citations omitted) ("Although a demonstration of prejudice 

constitutes the second part of the Strickland analysis, courts are permitted 

leeway to choose to examine first whether a defendant has been prejudiced, and 

if not, to dismiss the claim without determining whether counsel's performance 

was constitutionally deficient."). 

We reach this conclusion because although defendant seeks relief based 

on Staffordsmith's affidavit, the record demonstrates that even if the three 

misstatements we have discussed were excised from the affidavit, the police still 

had probable cause to arrest him. See State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 568 (1979). 

In fact, the balance of the affidavit included statements from C.B. and B.N. that: 

defendant confessed to murdering Skyers (albeit without saying he was ordered 

by Ragland to do so); C.B. was told by Ragland that defendant "was present" for 

the murder; and defendant told C.B. that Ragland ordered Skyers's murder 

because Skyers had "snitched" to the police about Ragland's involvement in a

robbery. 
20 A-0040-19

Similarly, defendant failed to show how he was prejudiced by appellate 

counsel's purported errors. As the PCR judge aptly noted, PCR counsel 

neglected "to . . . address what issues appellate counsel allegedly failed to raise." 

Regarding Point II, defendant newly argues the PCR judge failed to 

address each claim he raised in his pro se petition, despite that "PCR counsel 

properly incorporated [defendant's] pro se claims in his petition brief." Again, 

we are not convinced. Instead, our review of the certification accompanying 

defendant's pro se petition persuades us the judge addressed each of the claims 

raised in defendant's certification.

We also note defendant provided the following response in his pro se 

petition where he was directed to "state with specificity the facts upon which the 

[PCR] claim for relief is based, legal arguments and all claims": "Newly 

Discovered Evidence, Evidence hearing, Prosecutorial misconduct, and violated 

my [Fourteenth] [A]mendment[] right, and Frank [v.] Delaware hearing, and 

[p]olice misconduct, Ineffective Counsel on [my first trial attorney]." From this 

abbreviated list of claims, defendant contends that "[l]eft unaddressed in the 

PCR court's written opinion were [defendant's] claims of newly discovered 

evidence, 'evidence hearing,' [Fourteenth] Amendment violation and police 

misconduct." But defendant does not explain how his vaguely worded 
21 A-0040-19

arguments were tethered to the facts of his case. Under these circumstances, it

was not the role of the PCR judge, nor is it the role of this court, to weave 

together the fabric of an argument on defendant's behalf. 

Finally, we decline to address the arguments raised in Point III because

we are convinced the remedy for PCR counsel's purported failures to provide 

effective assistance of counsel is a new PCR proceeding. See R. 3:22-4(b)(2)(C) 

(a timely second PCR application will not be dismissed so long as it "alleges a 

prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel that represented the 

defendant on the first or subsequent application for [PCR]"). We reach this 

conclusion because proof of any alleged errors of PCR counsel currently lies

outside this record. See Preciose, 129 N.J. at 460. 

To the extent not addressed, defendant's remaining arguments lack 

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in our written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.