United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-2758 & 04-2802

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Adam J. Hanig, *

*

Appellee and Cross-Appellant *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States 

* District Court for the District 

Lisa Anne Lee, * of South Dakota

* 

Appellant and Cross-Appellee * 

*

and *

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City of Rapid City, *

*

Cross-Appellee. *

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Submitted: May 13, 2005

Filed: July 18, 2005

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Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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BENTON, Circuit Judge.

On October 17, 2000, sixteen-year-old Adam J. Hanig and three friends were

skateboarding in the parking lot of the civic center in Rapid City, South Dakota.

Hanig was arrested by Officer Lisa Anne Lee of the city Police Department. Taking

him into custody, Officer Lee applied handcuffs and put him in her patrol car. 
1

 The Honorable Andrew W. Bogue, United States District Court Judge for the

District of South Dakota.

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Hanig sued Lee and the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and pendent state claims.

A jury returned a verdict for Hanig finding Lee violated his Fourth Amendment rights

by using excessive force in the arrest and negligently applying the handcuffs. Lee

appeals the jury verdict awarding a total of $153,000 in damages. Hanig crossappeals the grant of attorney's fees by the district court.1

 Jurisdiction being proper

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms. 

I.

Lee argues that the district court should have directed a verdict in her favor

based on the defense of qualified immunity. This court reviews de novo denials of

motions for directed verdict. See Grogg v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 841 F.2d

210, 212 (8th Cir. 1988). All inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence must

be given to the non-moving party; the trial court's decision will only be overturned

if the appellate court, reviewing the evidence de novo, concludes that "no reasonable

juror could have returned a verdict in the non-moving party's favor." Goff v. Bise,

173 F.3d 1068, 1073 (8th 1999); Hill v. McKinley, 311 F.3d 899, 902 (8th Cir. 2002).

Qualified immunity is not just a defense to liability, it constitutes immunity

from suit. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). The threshold issue – and the

only issue in this appeal – is whether the facts show the officer's actions violated a

constitutional right. Id. at 201. The evidence was clear (from the senior officer

present at the scene) that Officer Lee improperly applied the handcuffs, causing

Hanig significant pain and severe bruising. 

Lee asserts, however, that Hanig did not sufficiently prove long-term or

permanent physical injury. An "actual injury" must be shown to support an excessive

force claim under the Fourth Amendment. Dawkins v. Graham, 50 F.3d 532, 535
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(8th Cir. 1995). For the application of handcuffs to amount to excessive force, there

must be something beyond minor injuries. Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d

1003, 1008 (8th Cir. 2003).

Lee invokes Foster v. Metropolitan Airports Commission, 914 F.2d 1076 (8th

Cir. 1990), and Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d at 1008. In Foster, "nerve

damage" from being handcuffed too tightly did not constitute actual injury without

"medical records indicating . . . any long-term injury as a result of the handcuffs."

914 F.2d at 1082. Affirming summary judgment, this court stated: "We do not

believe . . . allegations of pain as a result of being handcuffed, without some evidence

of more permanent injury, are sufficient to support his claim of excessive force." Id.

In Crumley, also affirming summary judgment, this court concluded that no

reasonable jury could have found excessive force in applying handcuffs, because the

plaintiff failed to allege or present any medical records indicating a long-term or

permanent physical injury. 324 F.3d at 1008.

Here, the jury heard testimony from (1) Hanig's treating orthopedic surgeon

that he suffered a 1.3% permanent impairment of his upper right extremity, (2) a

vocational rehabilitation expert that Hanig suffered a 13% vocational disability, and

(3) an economist that his life-time economic loss was $180,063. This distinguishes

Foster and Crumley. Although the surgeon acknowledged that his opinion was

founded on Hanig's subjective complaints and not independently supported by

objective findings, the surgeon's opinion was uncontradicted at trial, and the jury had

an opportunity to judge the credibility of Hanig’s subjective complaints at trial.

Giving Hanig the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence, the jury's

verdict was not unreasonable. The district court did not err in denying Lee's motion

for directed verdict. 
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II.

Hanig argues that the district court should have granted more than $51,692.15

in attorney's fees, of the $85,457.33 he requested. Specifically, Hanig asserts that the

district court improperly reduced the hourly rates for attorneys Kenneth R. Dewell,

Gregory A. Eiesland, and Aaron D. Eiesland. 

Attorney's fees are within the broad discretion of the district court and will not

be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See Harmon v. City of Kansas City, 197

F.3d 321, 329 (8th Cir. 1999). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), a prevailing party in a §

1983 action is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424, 429 (1983). "The starting point in determining attorney fees is the lodestar,

which is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the

reasonable hourly rates." Fisk v. St. Cloud State University, 295 F.3d 849, 851 (8th

Cir. 2002). When determining reasonable hourly rates, district courts may rely on

their own experience and knowledge of prevailing market rates. See Warnock v.

Archer, 397 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2004).

 

Here, the district court determined that recent fee awards in South Dakota range

from $150 to $185 per hour. Dewell presented affidavits that his customary fee was

$150 per hour when this litigation began, and he agreed with Hanig to use a "base

rate" of $150 in pursuing court-awarded fees (from which Dewell could seek a

"substantial multiplier" with the court). The court acknowledged that Dewell has

substantially more experience than another attorney who was awarded an hourly rate

of $185 (by a different judge), but concluded that the $150 per hour was reasonable

based on the fact that Dewell assesses this rate to his clients for similar litigation.

The court found excessive a $200 rate for Dewell. The district court did not abuse

its discretion in calculating Dewell's rate.
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The district court decided that although Greg Eiesland receives $250 per hour

for services in other types of litigation, such a rate is excessive for a civil rights case

in South Dakota. The district court concluded a rate of $200 was more reasonable.

In addition, after considering the experience of Aaron Eiesland as a former federal

law clerk with two years in private practice, the district court concluded that $125 per

hour was more reasonable than the $150 requested. The district court did not abuse

its discretion in granting attorney's fees. 

The judgment is affirmed.

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