2023 IL App (4th) 220414-U 

NO. 4-22-0414 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

LAMARCUS BASSETT, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the 

Circuit Court of

Winnebago County 

No. 14CF1519 

Honorable 

Brendan A. Maher, 

Judge Presiding.

 JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices Zenoff and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: (1) The claim at issue in the amended petition for postconviction relief fails to make 

a substantial showing that defendant was deprived of a constitutional right.

(2) The record does not affirmatively refute the representation, in postconviction 

counsel’s certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615 (eff. July 1, 2017), 

that he made amendments to the petition filed pro se that were necessary for an 

adequate presentation of defendant’s contentions. 

¶ 2 Defendant, Lamarcus Bassett, is serving a sentence of imprisonment for armed 

robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2014)). He petitioned, pro se, for postconviction relief. The 

circuit court of Winnebago County appointed postconviction counsel, who amended the petition. 

The State moved for dismissal of the amended petition on the ground of legal insufficiency. The 

court granted the motion, concluding that the amended petition failed to make a substantial 

showing that defendant had been deprived of a constitutional right.

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

March 30, 2023

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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¶ 3 Defendant appeals, contesting the dismissal of ground three of his amended 

petition, a claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to impeach the victim 

regarding his bias against defendant. Because the record shows that trial counsel subjected the 

State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, we conclude that his decision not to attempt an 

impeachment of the victim in this regard falls into the category of trial strategy and, hence, is 

immune to a claim of ineffective assistance. Also, apart from such immunity, the decision was 

objectively reasonable.

¶ 4 Alternatively, defendant claims that postconviction counsel failed to shape ground 

three of his amended petition into proper legal form. Postconviction counsel filed a certificate 

representing that he had “made any amendments to the petition filed pro se that [were] necessary 

for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions.” Because the record does not affirmatively 

refute that representation, we find that postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance.

¶ 5 Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

¶ 6 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 7 An indictment charged defendant with two counts of armed robbery (id.

§ 18-2(a)(1), (2)) and one count of aggravated robbery (id. § 18-1(b)(1)). All three counts were 

based on an incident in which, on June 17, 2014, defendant allegedly robbed Deonterryo 

Thompson at gunpoint.

¶ 8 Before the trial, defense counsel filed 10 motions in limine, in which he sought to 

bar the prosecution from mentioning a variety of prior bad acts by defendant, including “having 

multiple warrants for his arrest and being a suspect in numerous shootings and robberies or other 

potential offenses.” In one of the motions in limine, defense counsel sought to bar any mention of 

the fact that, at the time of the alleged armed robbery, defendant was wearing an ankle bracelet 
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because he was on mandatory supervised release for second degree murder. Another motion 

in limine expected Thompson to testify “that the Defendant ‘kills people and robs them.’ ” This

motion sought to bar such testimony as irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.

¶ 9 On January 12, 2015, the day of the jury trial, the circuit court granted a motion by 

the State to dismiss count II, a count alleging armed robbery with a bludgeon (id. § 18-2(a)(1)). 

The court also granted some of the motions in limine filed by the defense, including the motions 

to bar evidence that defendant was on mandatory supervised release for second degree murder and 

to bar character testimony from Thompson “that the Defendant ‘kills people and robs them.’ ” 

¶ 10 In the jury trial, Thompson testified substantially as follows. On June 17, 2014, he 

was in front of the apartment building in which he resided, in Rockford, Illinois, barbecuing on a 

grill. Seven or eight people were outside with him. Delano Foreman, accompanied by two other 

men, came up to Thompson. At the time of the incident, Thompson knew one of Foreman’s two 

companions only by his nickname of Koolaid. Thompson identified Koolaid, in court, as 

defendant. Thompson did not know the name of the other man who was with Foreman. “[T]hey,” 

the three men, asked Thompson where his friend Tuvia (last name unspecified) was. Thompson 

answered that Tuvia had left. Defendant and the man whom Thompson did not know then went 

into the apartment building. “[A]fraid that Koolaid was going to do something to [him],” 

Thompson went into the apartment building a couple of minutes later, intending to take refuge in 

his apartment. While climbing the stairs to his apartment, Thompson heard footsteps behind him. 

He turned, and defendant and the man whose name Thompson did not know were on the staircase. 

These two men pulled out pistols. Pointing a pistol in Thompson’s face, defendant commanded 

him to empty his pockets. After failing to persuade defendant that he had no money, Thompson 

handed him $150 in cash. Defendant and the other man then ran down the stairs and out of the 
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apartment building, got into a black Nissan vehicle, and drove away. Thompson did not 

immediately telephone the police. Instead, he contemplated retaliation. His mother persuaded him, 

however, that reporting the robbery to the police would be the better course of action. He did so 

the day after the robbery. In the police station, he was shown a photographic array, in which he 

identified defendant as one of the robbers. He identified the second robber, Dezha Manning, in 

another photographic array.

¶ 11 In his cross-examination of Thompson, defense counsel raised seven points that 

were calculated to impeach Thompson or to reduce confidence in his testimony. First, Thompson 

could not remember whether he was robbed on June 17, 2014, or the day before, although, as 

Thompson admitted, most people would have found being robbed at gunpoint to be “somewhat 

traumatic.” Second, Thompson admitted entering the apartment building right after defendant, 

although, according to Thompson’s testimony on direct examination, he had been afraid that 

defendant would do something to him. Third, Thompson testified that defendant’s accomplice was

armed with a black 9-millimeter pistol. On June 18, 2014, however, in his written statement to the 

police, Thompson represented that this man was armed with a .40- or .45-caliber pistol. Thompson 

explained on cross-examination, “They all look alike to me, 45, 49.” Fourth, Thompson testified

he handed $150 to defendant. In his statement to the police, however, Thompson represented that 

the amount he handed to defendant was only $50. Fifth, as far as Thompson could remember, he 

gave the police no physical description of defendant other than that he had braided hair and a logo 

on his shirt or jacket. By contrast, Thompson gave the police a detailed physical description of the 

other robber. Sixth, Thompson’s friend Nuky (last name unspecified) was in the hallway of the 

apartment building during the armed robbery, and he saw the armed robbery take place.

(Nevertheless, Nuky was not called to testify.) Seventh, in addition to being previously adjudicated 
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to be a delinquent minor, Thompson had a criminal case pending against him in Winnebago 

County. He faced a potential punishment of up to one year in the county jail, a fine of as much as 

$2500, and two years of probation. Nevertheless, Thompson denied hoping for leniency as a result 

of his testimony in the present case.

¶ 12 In addition to calling Thompson, the State called Rockford Detective Dwayne 

Beets, who testified substantially as follows. When he interviewed Thompson on June 18, 2014, 

about the robbery that happened the day before, Thompson did not provide much of a physical 

description of defendant—only a reference to braids or locs and an article of clothing. The reason 

for this paucity of information, Beets explained, was that Thompson knew defendant and referred 

to him by name as Koolaid. After interviewing Thompson, Beets assembled a photographic lineup 

of six photographs. Then he gave Thompson a photographic lineup spread notice, which informed 

Thompson that (1) the suspect might or might not be in the lineup, (2) Thompson did not have to 

make an identification, and (3) the person administering the lineup did not necessarily know which 

person was the suspect. Beets watched Thompson as he read and signed the notice. Then Beets 

gave Thompson the photographic lineup (People’s exhibit No. 2). Without hesitation, Thompson 

selected defendant’s photograph, circling and initialing it. Beets assembled a second photographic

lineup (People’s exhibit No. 4), using Thompson’s more detailed physical description of the 

second robber, whose face Thompson knew but whose name Thompson did not know. On June 

25, 2014, after having been given the same notice as before, Thompson selected Manning’s 

photograph in the second lineup. 

¶ 13 In his closing argument to the jury, defense counsel reasoned that if, as Thompson 

testified, all pistols looked alike to him, it was unproven that the robbers even used firearms. If, as 

Thompson testified, all pistols looked the same to him, then (defense counsel argued) Thompson 
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was unable to tell the difference between a BB pistol and a pistol that was a firearm. See 720 ILCS 

5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2014) (providing that a person commits armed robbery when he or she commits 

robbery and is armed with a “firearm”); id. § 2-7.5 (providing that “firearm” has the meaning 

ascribed to it in section 1.1 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/1.1 (West 

2014)); 430 ILCS 65/1.1 (West 2014) (excluding a BB gun or pneumatic gun from the definition 

of a “firearm”). Also, defense counsel maintained that, for seven reasons, Thompson was an 

unreliable witness. First, not only had he been adjudicated a delinquent minor, but—implausibly—

he denied having any hope that his testimony would bring him leniency in the criminal case 

pending against him. Second, Thompson could not even figure out what day it was when he was 

robbed. Third, Thompson had tripled the amount stolen from him, telling the police it was only 

$50 but testifying it was $150. Fourth, Thompson’s story made no sense. He followed two men 

into the apartment building even though he supposedly feared that the two men were going to do 

something to him. Fifth, Thompson waited 18 hours to report the incident to the police. Sixth, 

Thompson gave the police hardly any description of what defendant looked like. He told the police 

that defendant had braids. In the photograph in the lineup, however, defendant had no braids. 

Thompson never mentioned to the police the tattoo under defendant’s left eye, which could be 

plainly seen by the jury. Seventh, defense counsel noted the State’s failure to call Nuky or any of 

the six or seven other people who were at the barbecue.

¶ 14 After deliberating for three hours, the jury sent out a note that it was hung. The 

circuit court responded with a note to continue deliberating. Ultimately, the jury found defendant 

guilty of armed robbery and aggravated robbery.
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¶ 15 On February 19, 2015, the circuit court imposed a sentence of 32 years’ 

imprisonment on count I, armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2014)). The court found

that count III, aggravated robbery, merged into count I.

¶ 16 Defendant took a direct appeal, in which he raised a single issue. He argued the 

circuit court had committed plain error by failing to ensure that one of the seated jurors, Michael 

Messink, understood and accepted the State’s obligation to prove defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012)). People v. Bassett, 2016 IL App (2d) 

150213-U, ¶ 14. In his direct appeal, defendant invoked both of the alternative theories of the plain 

error doctrine: he argued that (1) the violation of Rule 431(b) was inherently serious and (2) the 

evidence in the trial was closely balanced. Id. Disagreeing with both theories (id. ¶¶ 26-27), the 

appellate court affirmed the judgment (id. ¶ 30). The appellate court “conclude[d] that, even if a 

technical violation of Rule 431(b) occurred, the conviction should be affirmed because the 

plain-error doctrine [did] not excuse defendant’s procedural default in failing to object at trial or 

raise the issue in his posttrial motion.” Id. ¶ 2. 

¶ 17 On April 4, 2018, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. In his 

petition, defendant made four claims, which he labeled as arguments A, B, C, and D.

¶ 18 Argument A was that “trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating and 

presenting [an] alibi witness.” In exhibits to his petition, defendant presented affidavits by two 

alibi witnesses: his sister, Malikah Muhammed, who averred that defendant was home at the time 

of the armed robbery, and the codefendant, Dezha Manning, who averred that defendant “did not 

have anything to do with this armed robbery.” According to argument A, Thompson’s testimony 

already was weak and inconsistent for three reasons. First, Thompson had “failed to identify 

[defendant] as one of the perpetrators but instead [had] described an individual” with “braids” who 
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was “wearing a black shirt with a red logo on it.” Second, defendant and Thompson had gotten 

into “an earlier altercation where [Thompson] had an unfounded grudge against defendant for the 

death of one of [Thompson’s] friend[s].” Third, “suggestive police tactics” had caused Thompson 

to “inculpate” defendant. In sum, defendant claimed that trial counsel’s “failure to investigate[,] 

subpoena[,] and call [defendant’s] alibi witness[es] amounted to ineffective assistance” for the 

following reasons:

“[Defendant’s] alibi witness would have testified that [defendant] was with her at 

home when [the] offense occurred [and] this testimony not only could have 

established and corroborated [defendant’s] whereabouts at the time of the offense 

but also been used to impeach [***] already weak [and] inconsi[s]tent testimony 

from the victim.” 

¶ 19 Argument B of the pro se petition was twofold: (1) trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance by failing to object when the circuit court neglected to ask Juror Messink if 

he understood and accepted the State’s burden to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt, and (2) appellate counsel on direct appeal rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise 

this issue.

¶ 20 Argument C was that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by “failing to put 

the plea agreement in writing and [failing to] give defendant good legal advice to accept [the] plea 

the day it was offer[ed] and inform [defendant] of the possible sentence if he did not accept the 

plea offer and go to trial.”

¶ 21 Argument D was a claim of actual innocence premised on the affidavits of the alibi 

witnesses, Muhammed and Manning.
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¶ 22 On July 9, 2018, the circuit court entered an order stating that the court had lacked 

“sufficient time to review all of [defendant’s] claims or to adequately ‘*** examine the court file 

of the proceedings in which [defendant] was convicted, any action taken by an appellate court in 

such proceeding[,] and any transcripts of such proceeding’ within the ninety (90) day time limit 

imposed by” section 122-2.1(a) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a) (West 

2018)). Therefore, for that reason alone (the court emphasized), the court appointed postconviction 

counsel and ordered that the pro se petition be “ ‘docketed for further consideration and hearing’ 

pursuant to” section 122-2.1(b) (id. § 122-2.1(b)). The court said that it thereby made no finding 

as to whether the petition stated the gist of a constitutional claim.

¶ 23 On August 17, 2020, postconviction counsel filed an amended petition for 

postconviction relief. The amended petition sought relief on four grounds, which were labeled as 

grounds one, two, three, and four. 

¶ 24 Ground one was that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 

object when Messink gave no response to the circuit court’s question of whether he understood 

and accepted the State’s obligation to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 25 Ground two was that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (1) “fail[ing] 

to properly advise the Defendant of a 12 year plea offer,” (2) “fail[ing] to advise the Defendant of 

his possible sentencing exposure if found guilty of armed robbery,” and (3) “allow[ing] the offer 

to be revoked before the Defendant could accept it.”

¶ 26 Ground three was that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by “fail[ing] to 

meet with the Defendant sufficiently in order to adequately prepare a defense for trial.” The 

amended petition continued:
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 “30. Prior to trial, the Defendant made his attorney aware that the victim, 

Thompson, knew him well and that Thompson had a grudge against him. He also 

told his attorney that he did not rob Thompson and that Thompson had fabricated 

the story to get even with him.

 31. Trial counsel did not put on any evidence, choosing to rely solely on 

cross examination of Thompson as to some inconsistencies in his testimony and 

prior police statements. Counsel essentially conceded the Defendant’s guilt as to 

one or both charges.

 32. Trial counsel’s failure to review evidence and strategy with the 

Defendant arises to a level of ineffective assistance. *** [T]here appears to be no 

strategy whatsoever. Given that counsel failed to meet with the Defendant 

sufficiently to develop a defense strategy and then failed to give competent advise 

[sic] on the issue of possible sentencing exposure as discussed in Ground Two, the 

cumulative effect arises to the level of ineffective assistance.”

In an accompanying affidavit, defendant averred:

“6. Prior to our meeting on [January 8, 2015], my attorney spent little time 

with me to review the evidence or what our trial strategy would be.

 7. I told my attorney that Deonterryo Thompson had a grudge against me 

and fabricated the story about being robbed. My attorney led me to believe that I 

could not be found guilty based on the testimony of Thompson. My attorney never 

made it clear to me or sought my input into what our trial strategy would be. I 

wanted to testify but my attorney convinced me otherwise.”
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¶ 27 Ground four was that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance on direct 

appeal by failing to argue the preceding three grounds.

¶ 28 On October 20, 2020, postconviction counsel filed an amended certificate pursuant 

to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). One of his representations in the 

certificate was that he had “made any amendments to the petition filed pro se that [were] necessary 

for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions.” 

¶ 29 On May 3, 2022, the circuit court granted a motion by the State to dismiss the 

amended postconviction petition.

¶ 30 On May 16, 2022, defendant filed his notice of appeal, designating the order of 

May 3, 2022, as the judgment from which he appealed.

¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 32 A. The Legal Sufficiency of Ground Three

¶ 33 1. Failing to Impeach Thompson Regarding His Grudge Against Defendant

¶ 34 Defendant contends the circuit court erred by dismissing, as legally insufficient, 

ground three of the amended petition, the claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 

by failing to impeach Thompson with evidence of his bias, his grudge, against defendant. To 

survive the State’s motion for dismissal, the amended petition had to “make a substantial showing 

of a deprivation of rights under either the United States or Illinois Constitution[ ] or both.” People 

v. Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 28. We decide de novo whether ground three makes such a showing. 

See People v. Young, 2022 IL App (1st) 210534, ¶ 41. 

¶ 35 In ground three of his amended petition, defendant invokes a well-recognized 

constitutional guarantee. Under the United States and Illinois Constitutions, a defendant has the 

right to effective assistance from trial counsel. People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 79 (citing 
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U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8). To establish that trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance, the defendant must show that both of the following propositions hold true: 

(1) counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) there is a 

“reasonable probability *** that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different” (which is to say, more favorable to the defendant). Id. In short, the defendant must 

show deficiency of performance and resulting prejudice. Id. 

¶ 36 Establishing deficiency of performance in the impeachment of a witness tends to 

be a daunting task. What makes this type of claim so troublesome is that (1) impeachment is a 

matter of trial strategy (People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 326 (1997); People v. Phillips, 2017 

IL App (4th) 160557, ¶ 58) and (2) the supreme court has said this about trial strategy:

“[M]atters of trial strategy [citation] *** are generally immune from claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. [Citation.] *** The only exception to this rule is 

when counsel’s chosen trial strategy is so unsound that counsel entirely fails to 

conduct any meaningful adversarial testing. [Citation.]” (Emphases added and 

internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 432-33 (1999).

Recently, the supreme court reiterated this rule from West, holding again that “[e]rrors in trial 

strategy do not constitute ineffective assistance unless counsel entirely fails to conduct any

meaningful adversarial testing.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Custer, 2019 IL 

123339, ¶ 39; see also Phillips, 2017 IL App (4th) 160557, ¶ 58; People v. Leslie, 2022 IL App 

(4th) 200528-U, ¶ 19. Thus, even if the defendant can identify an additional subject on which trial 

counsel might have impeached a witness, the defendant has no valid claim of ineffective assistance 

if trial counsel subjected the State’s case to some significant adversarial testing. 
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¶ 37 Phillips illustrates this principle. In Phillips, the postconviction petition faulted trial 

counsel for failing to prove that the victim had been promised something in return for testifying 

against the defendant. Phillips, 2017 IL App (4th) 160557, ¶ 1. The prosecutor had told the victim 

that, in return for his testimony, the state’s attorney’s office would not refer him for federal 

prosecution for drug offenses. Id. ¶ 42. On cross-examination, the victim denied that any such 

promise had been made to him. Id. ¶ 14. In his postconviction petition, the defendant criticized 

trial counsel for not proving this promise by other means. Id. ¶ 34. Because the defendant, 

however, had “failed to show his counsel’s trial strategy amounted to a complete failure to conduct 

any meaningful adversarial testing,” the appellate court affirmed the decision against the defendant 

on this claim of ineffective assistance. Id. ¶ 59. The appellate court noted, “[C]ounsel attacked [the 

victim’s] credibility with his prior felony conviction as well as his possible felony drug conviction 

and the fact he did not know if he had any other felony convictions.” Id. In other words, even 

though trial counsel did not succeed in impeaching the victim on one ground, he impeached the 

witness on other grounds, and thus, some meaningful adversarial testing had taken place. 

Therefore, the defendant had no legitimate claim of ineffective assistance.

¶ 38 Similarly, in the present case, even though trial counsel did not impeach Thompson 

on his supposed grudge against defendant, he impeached Thompson in other ways. It could not be 

reasonably contended that trial counsel completely failed to conduct any meaningful adversarial 

testing. He filed 10 motions in limine, and they were largely successful. In his cross-examination 

of Thompson and in his closing argument, he exposed serious vulnerabilities in the State’s case.

The record leads us to disagree with postconviction counsel’s assertion that “[c]ounsel essentially 

conceded the Defendant’s guilt as to one or both charges.” On the contrary, there was meaningful 

adversarial testing. Defense counsel’s cross-examination of Thompson and his closing argument 
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were hard-hitting. Therefore, trial counsel’s decision not to try to impeach Thompson regarding 

his grudge against defendant is “immune from [a] claim[ ] of ineffective assistance of counsel.” 

West, 187 Ill. 2d at 432.

¶ 39 To be clear, the rule in West, in and of itself, makes ground three of defendant’s

amended petition legally insufficient. Apart from that fatal flaw, we would point out that defense 

counsel’s decision not to question Thompson about his alleged bias against defendant was 

objectively reasonable. See People v. Mays, 2023 IL App (4th) 210612, ¶ 117. If, on crossexamination, defense counsel had elicited an admission from Thompson that he had an earlier 

altercation with defendant, defense counsel might have thereby opened the door to what the 

altercation possibly was about: defendant’s allegedly having caused the death of one of

Thompson’s friends. Defense counsel might have ended up sabotaging his wise strategy of 

excluding defendant’s prior bad acts.

¶ 40 2. “Fail[ing] to Meet with the Defendant Sufficiently” 

¶ 41 In ground three of the amended petition, defendant claimed that “[t]rial counsel 

failed to meet with the Defendant sufficiently in order to adequately prepare a defense for trial.” 

This claim is conclusory and, therefore, is not taken as true. See People v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403, 

412 (2003). In deciding whether a petition makes a substantial showing of a deprivation of 

constitutional rights, we assume the truth of “all well-pleaded facts in the petition and affidavits” 

(id.) to the extent that those well-pleaded factual allegations are not “affirmatively refuted by the 

record” (People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35). By contrast, we do not assume the truth of 

“nonfactual and nonspecific assertions [that] merely amount to conclusions.” Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 

at 412. Whether a meeting is “sufficient[ ]” and whether preparation is “adequate[ ]” are matters 

of evaluative judgment—they are conclusions instead of well-pleaded facts. The conclusory 
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assertion that “[t]rial counsel failed to meet with the Defendant sufficiently in order to adequately 

prepare a defense for trial” did not merit an evidentiary hearing. See id.

¶ 42 In sum, in our de novo review (see Young, 2022 IL App (1st) 210534, ¶ 41), we 

find ground three of the amended petition, the claim at issue in this appeal, to be legally 

insufficient. Taking the well-pleaded facts in the claim to be true and disregarding its bare 

conclusions (see Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d at 412), we find that the claim fails to “make a substantial 

showing of a deprivation of rights under either the United States or Illinois Constitution[ ].” 

Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 28. 

¶ 43 B. The Alternative Claim That Postconviction Counsel Failed to Provide 

Reasonable Assistance in Shaping Defendant’s Claims Into Proper Legal Form

¶ 44 Alternatively, defendant argues that postconviction counsel failed to fulfill his duty 

of “investigat[ing] the defendant’s claims and mak[ing] any amendments necessary for an 

adequate presentation of the defendant’s contentions.” People v. Austin, 2022 IL App (4th) 

200630-U, ¶ 36 (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013)). Defendant complains that, in the 

amended petition, “[t]here was no discussion of what counsel should have done differently (e.g., 

investigate Thompson’s bias and present evidence on it).” Because the amended petition contained 

no mention or proof of the earlier altercation between Thompson and defendant, the allegation, in 

ground three of the amended petition, that “Thompson had a grudge against [defendant]” was a 

bare conclusion. Second, defendant criticizes the amended petition for failing to “specify what 

‘evidence’ and ‘strategy’ trial counsel failed to review.” We agree with these criticisms. Defendant 

has identified some pleading deficiencies and evidentiary omissions in ground three.

¶ 45 The trouble is, even if ground three had suggested (and substantiated) a reason why 

a grudge or bias of Thompson against defendant might have been inferred—namely, because of 
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their earlier altercation over the death of Thompson’s friend—its claim of ineffective assistance 

would remain frivolous. As we have explained, it is not arguable that trial counsel completely 

failed to subject the State’s case to any meaningful adversarial testing. Therefore, under binding 

precedent, the strategic decision not to try to impeach Thompson regarding his alleged grudge 

against defendant is immune to a claim of ineffective assistance. See West, 187 Ill. 2d at 432. 

¶ 46 Defendant maintains, however, that the potential merit of the claim of ineffective 

assistance in ground three is irrelevant to the question of compliance with Rule 651(c). Quoting 

from People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 47 (2007), he argues, “[i]f it is shown that counsel failed to 

fulfill any one of [the requirements in Rule 651(c)], ‘remand is required *** regardless of whether 

the claims raised in the petition her merit.’ ” The facts in Suarez, however, are significantly 

different from those in the present case. In Suarez, the postconviction counsel never filed a 

certificate pursuant to Rule 651(c). Id. at 40. In such a certificate, the postconviction counsel would 

have certified that he had “ ‘consulted with petitioner *** to ascertain his contentions of 

deprivation of constitutional right.’ ” Id. at 42 (quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. Dec. 1, 1984). 

Absent a certificate pursuant to Rule 651(c), the record in Suarez failed to show that such a 

consultation had taken place. See id. at 44. The supreme court was unwilling to excuse as harmless 

error the lack of such a showing by the record. Id. at 52. In the present case, by contrast, 

postconviction counsel filed a certificate pursuant to Rule 651(c). Consequently, the analysis in 

this case is different from that in Suarez. 

¶ 47 “The filing of a Rule 651(c) certificate by postconviction counsel averring that 

counsel has complied with the three requirements of Rule 651(c) creates a presumption of 

compliance with the rule.” People v. Gallano, 2019 IL App (1st) 160570, ¶ 26. We will credit the 

representations in the certificate unless we find, in our de novo review (see id.), that “the record 
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positively rebuts” the representations. People v. Wallace, 2016 IL App (1st) 142758, ¶ 28; see also 

People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 52 (2007); People v. Morgan, 2015 IL App (1st) 131938, ¶ 100. 

¶ 48 According to defendant, the record contradicts postconviction counsel’s 

representation, in his amended certificate, that he “made any amendments to the petition filed 

pro se that [were] necessary for an adequate presentation of [defendant’s] contentions.” Ground 

three of the amended petition, defendant argues (alternatively), was conclusory and, therefore, was 

legally insufficient on its face. If a contention is presented in a conclusory way, the contention is 

not adequately presented. See Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d at 412. Defendant contends that, by recasting a 

pro se claim as a naked conclusion, a postconviction counsel fails to “shape” the pro se claim “into 

proper legal form.” See Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d at 43-44. Defendant complains that his postconviction 

counsel at least could have included, in the amended petition, an explanation of why defendant 

thought that Thompson had a grudge against him: they had gotten into an altercation earlier.

¶ 49 Rule 651(c) required postconviction counsel to “ma[k]e any amendments to the 

petitions filed pro se that [were] necessary for an adequate presentation of [defendant’s] 

contentions.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). The supreme court has held, “If amendments 

to a pro se postconviction petition would only further a frivolous or patently unmeritorious claim, 

they are not ‘necessary’ within the meaning of [Rule 651(c)].” People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, 

205 (2004). By that standard, ground three of the amended petition—though pleaded by 

postconviction counsel—was unnecessary. It follows that any further amendment of the pro se 

petition by further elaboration of ground three was unnecessary. Defendant cites People v. Dixon, 

2018 IL App (3d) 150630, ¶ 22, in which the appellate court remarked, “Here, postconviction 

counsel chose to file an amended petition, so we assume that counsel found that the allegations in 

the pro se petition were not frivolous.” Dixon is distinguishable, however, because (regardless of 
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what the postconviction counsel in this case might have thought) the trial transcript shows ground 

three of the amended petition to be frivolous. Reasonable assistance did not require the elaboration 

of a claim of ineffective assistance that was, under West, obviously and incurably unmeritorious. 

See Greer, 212 Ill. 2d at 205.

¶ 50 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 51 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 52 Affirmed.