1998 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-22-1998

Koppers Co Inc v. Aetna Cslty & Surety

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 97-3432

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Recommended Citation

"Koppers Co Inc v. Aetna Cslty & Surety" (1998). 1998 Decisions. Paper 167.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/167
Filed July 22, 1998 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 97-3432 

KOPPERS COMPANY, INC., 

 Appellant 

v. 

THE AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY; ZURICH 

INSURANCE COMPANY; THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY 

CO.; THE AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY; 

COMMERCIAL UNION INSURANCE COMPANY; THE 

HOME INSURANCE COMPANY; UNDERWRITERS AT 

LLOYD'S OF LONDON 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. No. 85-cv-02136) 

Argued, Monday, April 27, 1998 

BEFORE: ALITO, RENDELL and GARTH, Circuit Judges 

(OPINION FILED AS A NOT-FOR-PUBLICATION 

OPINION ON JULY 22, 1998) 

 Joseph W. Montgomery, III (Argued) 

 Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue 

 500 Grant Street - 31st Floor 

 Pittsburgh, PA 15219 

 Attorneys for Appellant 
 Hershel J. Richman 

 Jennifer R. Clarke 

 Fred H. Nemeth 

 Dechert, Price & Rhoads 

 1717 Arch Street 

 4000 Bell Atlantic Tower 

 Philadelphia, PA 19103 

 Peter M. Page 

 Kathleen A. McQueeny 

 Brian D. Bossert 

 Blatt, Hammesfahr & Eaton 

 333 West Wacker Drive, Suite 1900 

 Chicago, IL 60606 

 Martin R. Baach 

 Bruce R. Grace (Argued) 

 Duane K. Thompson 

 Baach, Robinson & Lewis 

 One Thomas Circle, Suite 200 

 Washington, DC 20005-5803 

 Attorneys for Appellee, 

 Underwriters at Lloyd's of London 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

GARTH, Circuit Judge. 

The issue we must decide in this appeal is whether an 

excess insurer (here, INA) was an indispensable party 

under Rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure so 

as to cause the dismissal of certain of the Appellant's 

claims when INA was not joined in this action against 

various other excess insurers. We hold that INA was not an 

indispensable party and accordingly that the claims should 

not have been dismissed. We therefore reverse. 

I. 

Appellant Koppers Company, Inc. ("Koppers") appeals the 

district court's dismissal of its claims against Appellees, 

certain underwriters from Lloyd's of London and certain 

 2 
London market insurance companies (hereinafter, "the 

London Insurers"), pertaining to seven (7) insurance 

policies that the London Insurers issued to Koppers to 

provide coverage for various environmental property

damages that occurred from 1960-65 (hereinafter, "the 

1960-65 policies"). The district court dismissed the claims 

relating to these policies because Koppers failed to join two 

other insurers -- Indemnity Insurance of North America 

and Insurance Company of North America (collectively, 

"INA") -- as indispensable parties pursuant to Rule 19(b) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. 

As we have set forth the facts of the underlying dispute 

in an earlier opinion, see Koppers Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & 

Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1444 (3d Cir. 1996), we recite only 

the facts pertinent to the issues before us here. 

Koppers is a large manufacturing company based in 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In the 1980s, federal and state 

agencies brought claims against Koppers based on 

environmental contamination at approximately 150 plant 

and disposal sites. Although Koppers had purchased 

insurance from several insurance companies, all of the 

insurers initially denied coverage for these claims when 

Koppers sought indemnification. Accordingly, in 1985, 

Koppers sued its two (2) primary comprehensive insurers 

for breach of contract in federal court, based upon diversity 

of citizenship. 

In 1988, Koppers amended its complaint to sue other

primary insurers and several excess insurers. Excess 

insurers -- such as the London Insurers in this case -- are 

insurers who contract to provide coverage only when the 

amount of the claim is beyond that of a primary insurer. In 

amending its complaint, however, Koppers decided not to 

sue INA (an excess insurer) because INA is a Pennsylvania 

company and joining it to the instant action would have 

defeated complete diversity. Thus, instead of suing INA in a 

 3 
federal forum, Koppers initiated suit in Pennsylvania state 

court over the same insurance claims.1 

In July 1994, the London Insurers filed a Motion to

Dismiss claims pertaining to the 1960-65 policies because 

Koppers failed to join INA pursuant to Rule 19 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The London Insurers 

claimed that the relationship between the coverage that 

they provided and the coverage that INA provided 

concerning the 1960-65 policies made INA an indispensable 

party to the federal suit. 

On October 20, 1994, without comment, the district 

court granted the London Insurers' Motion to Dismiss. 

Koppers filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the district 

court denied that motion on March 24, 1995. As a result, 

Koppers brought suit against the London Insurers relating 

to the 1960-65 policies by adding them as defendants in 

the state court action against INA. 

After the initial dismissal of Koppers' claims against the 

London Insurers pertaining to the 1960-65 policies, all of 

the defendant insurers except for the London Insurers 

settled with Koppers before trial. Thus, following the 

dismissal and settlement, the only remaining claims in the 

case were those against the London Insurers for the period 

from the 1940s to 1959 and 1966 to the 1970s. See 

Koppers, 98 F.3d at 1444. 

In April-May 1995, the district court conducted a trial 

over Koppers' claims against the remaining defendants (the 

London Insurers) but the court limited the scope of that 

trial to policies that provided coverage from late 1953 until 

January 1960. The district court further limited the scope 

of the trial to only eighteen of the contaminated sites. 

Following a three week trial, the jury awarded Koppers $70 

million. See id. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

1. During the period in question, Koppers' primary insurance carrier was 

Aetna which was liable for $50,000 for each occurrence. As an excess 

carrier, INA then became liable for $1,000,000 per occurrence. The 

London Insurers thus became liable for amounts in excess of 

$1,050,000. 

 4 
On July 20, 1995, pursuant to Rule 54(b), the district 

court certified as final for interlocutory appeal the part of 

its judgment relating to the claims litigated at the jury trial, 

noted above. Although Koppers cross-appealed, it did not 

challenge the district court's decision to dismiss the 1960- 

65 policy claims against the London Insurers. 

On appeal, in reversing the district court's method of 

apportioning liability, we commented that 

 the district court would not need to determine whether 

 the non-settling pre-1971 policies were triggered 

 because the London Insurers concede -- against their 

 interests -- that all of Koppers' policies up to 1971 (the 

 date from which pollution exclusion clauses have 

 appeared in all the policies) were triggered. 

Id. at 1456. In addition, in a footnote, we suggested that 

INA was not a necessary party for a proper adjudication of 

the claims involved in this dispute: 

 We recognize that some of Koppers' insurers are not 

 part of this action because they are non-diverse with 

 the plaintiff. Under [Gould Inc. v. Continental Gas, 585 

 A.2d 16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)], however, these insurers 

 need not participate in the case in order for the district 

 court to determine their apportioned shares of liability 

 for purposes of reducing the judgment against the 

 London Insurers. See 585 A.2d at 19 (stating that 

 court need only look at policies' terms and limits). Of 

 course, any determination that these policies were 

 triggered would not be binding or preclusive against 

 the absent insurers in future litigation because they 

 are not parties here. We note also that the London 

 Insurers' interests are aligned with those of the absent 

 insurers: each would like to prove that the absent 

 insurers' policies were not triggered. For the London 

 Insurers, such a determination would increase the 

 settling insurers' shares (thereby decreasing the 

 London Insurers' liability), and the absent insurers 

 would naturally like to avoid a determination of liability 

 in the first place. 

Id. n.21. 

 5 
Prompted by our intimation that INA was not an 

indispensable party, Koppers moved to reinstate the

dismissed claims pertaining to the 1960-65 policies. 

Essentially, then, Koppers requested the district court to 

reconsider its earlier decision which had dismissed the 

claims pertaining to the 1960-65 policies on the grounds 

that INA was an indispensable party. On June 10, 1997, 

the district court denied this motion from the bench, ruling: 

 I think that's the law of the case[.] It could have been 

 appealed at the time the rest of this case went up and 

 therefore, I'm going to deny the motion to reinstate any 

 claims. I'm not going to listen to any arguments, I'm 

 just going to just deny it. 

Tr. June 10, 1997, at 2. 

Thereafter, Koppers moved for certification under Rule 

54(b). Complying with the requirements set forth in AllisChalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360 (3d 

Cir. 1975), the district court granted that motion on July 

15, 1997, and at the same time formally denied Koppers' 

Motion to Reinstate the claims that had been dismissed. 

III. 

As a threshold matter, we must address a motion by the 

London Insurers urging this Court to dismiss the instant 

appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 

The London Insurers contend that the dismissal of the 

1960-65 claims ("the dismissal order") becamefinal and 

appealable when the district court entered a final judgment 

over the litigated claims on July 20, 1995. The London 

Insurers claim that the dismissal order merged with the 

final judgment at that time. Thus, they argue that Koppers 

should have appealed the dismissal order then, and by 

failing to do so, Koppers waived its right to appeal that 

dismissal at the present time. 

Koppers counters that this Court does have appellate 

jurisdiction as there was no appealable order concerning 

the dismissal of the 1960-65 policies until the district court 

certified this issue under Rule 54(b). Koppers points out 

that the appeal of the July 20, 1995 judgment concerned 

 6 
different policies than those at issue here as the present 

appeal specifically addresses the dismissed claims.

Furthermore, Koppers argues that as there is still no final 

judgment over all of the claims in the instant case, the 

"merger rule" does not apply.2 We agree. 

Rule 54(b) provides: 

 When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 

 action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, 

 or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are 

 involved, the court may direct the entry of a final 

 judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 

 claims or parties only upon an express determination 

 that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 

 express direction for the entry of judgment. In the 

 absence of such determination and direction, any order 

 or other form of decision, however designated, which 

 adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and 

 liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not 

 terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, 

 and the order or other form of decision is subject to 

 revision at any time before the entry of judgment 

 adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities 

 of all the parties. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis added). As the Rule 54(b) 

certification pertaining to the July 20, 1995 order did not 

encompass the claims involving the 1960-65 policies, the 

Rule 54(b) certification did not -- indeed, could not -- 

implicate those claims.3 Contrary to what the London 

Insurers argue, there was no final order from which

Koppers could have appealed. Thus, Koppers did not waive 

its right to appeal this issue. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

2. Under the "merger rule," prior interlocutory orders merge with the 

final judgment in a case, and the interlocutory orders (to the extent that 

they affect the final judgment) may be reviewed on appeal from the final 

order. See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 706 (3d Cir. 

1996). 

3. The July 20, 1995 order concerned only eighteen (18) sites and 

insurance policies providing coverage from 1953-60. See Order July 20, 

1995 at 2-4. 

 7 
The London Insurers have not brought to the Court's

attention nor have we found any cases that have held that 

a district court could not enter a Rule 54(b) certification 

under delayed circumstances such as those present in this 

matter. Accordingly, we conclude that this Court has 

appellate jurisdiction over the instant matter.4 

Accordingly, we now address the merits of the dispute at 

hand -- whether, in fact, INA was an indispensable party 

under Rule 19(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 

We exercise plenary review over a district court's 

determination that a party's joinder is necessary under 

Rule 19(a). See Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard 

Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399, 404 (3d Cir. 1993). We review a 

district court's ruling that a party is indispensable under 

Rule 19(b), however, for abuse of discretion. See id. at 403. 

IV. 

The London Insurers contend that INA is a necessary

(and indispensable) party and thus that the district court 

properly dismissed the claims pertaining to the 1960-65 

policies. The London Insurers claim that they cannot be 

held liable to pay on their excess policies unless and until 

_________________________________________________________________ 

4. Along the same lines, the London Insurers also argue that because 

Koppers failed to appeal the district court's dismissal of the claims 

pertaining to the 1960-65 policies, Koppers did not preserve this issue 

and the district court's dismissal became the law of the case. This 

argument fails for the very reasons that we conclude that this Court has 

appellate jurisdiction. As the initial Rule 54(b) certification did not 

encompass the dismissal of the claims pertaining to the 1960-65 policies, 

Koppers could not have raised this issue in the prior appeal. Cf. United 

States v. U.S. Smelting Co., 339 U.S. 186, 198-99 (1950) (holding that 

the law of the case did not bar appeal despite party's failure to raise 

issue in a prior interlocutory appeal, although party could have raised 

issue in that prior appeal). Moreover, the district court's reference to 

"law 

of the case" cannot bind this Court on appeal. See Messenger v. 

Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). 

5. In response to the London Insurers' Motion to Dismiss for lack of 

appellate jurisdiction, Koppers filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and 

Costs incurred in opposing that motion in this Court. Koppers has not 

furnished us with a basis for granting its motion for fees and costs. We 

will therefore deny Koppers' motion. 

 8 
the underlying insurers -- including INA -- have paid or 

have been held liable to pay the full amount of their 

underlying policies. The London Insurers submit that their 

policies are "directly excess to [the INA policies] and 

contingent upon their liability under them," Appellee's Br. 

at 20, and that payment or liability under the underlying 

policies is a condition precedent to any obligations that the 

London Insurers might incur. In support, the London

Insurers point to the following passage quoted from the 

issued policies: 

 [L]iability shall attach to the Underwriters only after 

 the Underlying Umbrella Insurers have paid or have 

 been held liable to pay the full amount of their 

 respective ultimate net loss liability . . . . 

App. 343 (Policy No. 60/473/3 at 1). Thus, the London 

Insurers maintain that the district court could not impose 

liability upon them without INA being a party to the 

litigation at hand. The London Insurers rely upon City of 

Littleton v. Commercial Union Assurance Company, 133 

F.R.D. 159 (D. Colo. 1990) (holding that absent primary 

insurers were indispensable parties when defendant excess 

insurers' policies were dependent upon whether the 

primary insurers' policies provided coverage), in support of 

their argument that underlying insurers are indispensable 

parties in cases involving excess insurers. 

In response, Koppers asserts that the district court erred 

in determining that INA was an indispensable party under 

Rule 19(b) because INA is not, in fact, a necessary party 

under Rule 19(a). See Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. 

Shepard Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399, 405 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating 

that a court's determination that a party is necessary is a 

"necessary predicate" to its determination that a party is 

indispensable). Contrary to the London Insurers' position, 

Koppers claims that the London Insurers' policies are not 

contingent upon nor dependent upon INA's obligations 

under its insurance policies, as the London Insurers' 

policies do not incorporate the terms of INA's policies and 

do not make the London Insurers' obligations to pay

contingent upon whether INA pays its claims. Indeed, 

Koppers argues that the plain language of the policies 

establishes that the London Insurers' liability is 

 9 
independent from any liability incurred by INA. To the 

extent that the London Insurers assert otherwise, Koppers 

submits that the London Insurers improperly rely upon 

cover notes rather than provisions in actual policies.6 

Koppers also claims that INA's policy is not an 

"Underlying Umbrella Policy" and is not identified as such, 

so that the London Insurers' obligations are not dependent 

upon nor contingent upon INA's policy being paid. Rather, 

Koppers argues that the London Insurers' policies provide 

coverage only in excess of what is provided by INA's 

policies. As a result, Koppers contends that INA is not a 

necessary nor an indispensable party to the instant

dispute, as the London Insurers' obligations can be

determined fairly and properly without INA being a party. 

Indeed, Koppers points to this Court's earlier observation 

that the district court could determine the scope of the 

London Insurers' liability without INA being a party to the 

instant litigation. See Koppers, 98 F.3d at 1456 n.21. 

Accordingly, Koppers argues that complete relief can be 

granted in INA's absence, INA will not be prejudiced by the 

adjudication of the present matter, and that the London 

Insurers run no risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent 

obligations as a result of INA's absence. 

Subsection (a) of Rule 197 addresses the issue of whether 

_________________________________________________________________ 

6. Cover notes are documents that a broker issues to an insured to 

notify the insured that an insurance policy has been obtained as is in 

effect. See Decl. Michael Jackson at 3 (P 6). As the cover note is not 

issued by the insurers but rather by an insurance broker, "insurers in 

the London Market typically do not recognize a cover note as binding 

upon them." Id. 

7. Rule 19 governs the joinder of parties. It provides: 

 (a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to 

 service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of 

 jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined 

as 

 a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete 

relief 

 cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person 

 claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so 

 situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence 

 may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability 

to 

 protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already 

parties 

 10 
a party should be joined as a "necessary" party. See 

Janney, 11 F.3d at 404. Subsection (b) concerns the issue 

of whether a party is an "indispensable" party. In reviewing 

a district court's determination pursuant to Rule 19, we 

must first determine whether a party is a necessary party 

to the dispute. See id. If the party is determined to be a 

necessary party but cannot be joined because such joinder 

would defeat diversity, it must then be determined whether 

the absent party is an indispensable party. See id.

Rule 19(a) states that a party is necessary if either (1) the 

present parties will be denied complete relief in the absence 

of the party to be joined, or (2) the absent party will suffer 

some loss or be put at risk of suffering such a loss if not 

joined. As Rule 19(a) is stated in the disjunctive, if either 

subsection is satisfied, the absent party is a necessary 

party that should be joined if possible. Under Rule 19(a)(1), 

we first address whether the parties can be afforded 

complete relief in the absence of the non-joined party. We 

hold that they can. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

 subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or 

 otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed 

interest. 

 If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that 

the 

 person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff 

but 

 refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a 

 proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects 

to 

 venue and joinder of that party would render the venue of the 

action 

 improper, that party shall be dismissed from the action. 

 (b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a 

 person as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made 

 a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good 

 conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, 

or 

 should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as 

 indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: 

 first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence 

 might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; 

second, 

 the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by 

the 

 shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened 

 or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's 

 absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have 

an 
 adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 (West 1998). 

 11 
In order to determine whether the parties can be afforded 

complete relief in the absence of INA, we turn to the 

contract provisions which governed the 1960-65 policies. 

Policy No. 60/473/2 is the "Umbrella Policy" upon which all 

of the disputed policies at issue rely to define the scope and 

the terms of the London Insurers coverage and liability. See 

Decl. Michael Jackson at 4-7. Policy No. 60/473/2 

explicitly provides: 

 Nothing herein shall be construed to make this policy 

 subject to the terms, conditions, and limitations of 

 other insurance. 

App. 275 (Condition L). In addition, Policy No. 60/473/2 

states: 

 It is a condition of this policy that the policy or policies 

 referred to in the attached "Schedule of Underlying 

 Insurance" shall be maintained in full effect during the 

 currency of this policy except for any reduction of the 

 aggregate limit or limits contained therein solely by 

 payment of claims in respect of accidents and/or 

 occurrences occurring during the period of this policy. 

 Failure of the Assured to comply with the foregoing shall 

 not invalidate this policy but in the event of such failure, 

 the Underwriters shall only be liable to the same extent 

 as they would have been had the Assured complied 

 with the said condition. 

App. 276 (Condition S) (emphasis added). Moreover, the 

loss payable clause of Policy No. 60/473/2 reads, in 

pertinent part: 

 Liability under this policy with respect to any 

 occurrence shall not attach unless and until the 

 Assured, or the Assured's underlying insurer, shall 

 have paid the amount of the underlying limits on 

 account of such occurrence. 

App. 274 (Condition J) (emphasis added). 

Our reading of the Koppers' policies requires a total of 

$1,050,000 to be paid by either Koppers or its underlying 

insurance carrier -- in this case Aetna and INA-- before 

any liability of the London Insurers is triggered. Our 

understanding in this respect is that the London Insurers' 

 12 
excess policy has, in effect, a $1,050,000 deductible 

amount before any payment must be made pursuant to the 

policy's terms. We thus conclude that insofar as liability 

under the London Policies is concerned, complete relief can 

be accorded to the parties present to this litigation without 

the joinder of INA. Accordingly, we hold that INA is not a 

necessary party under Rule 19(a)(1). In addition to the fact 

that complete relief is available, INA's ability to protect its 

interests will not be impaired or impeded by the disposition 

of the action in its absence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(i). 

By the same token, under Rule 19(a)(2)(ii), the London 

Insurers face no risk of multiple or otherwise inconsistent 

obligations as a result of INA's absence from this action. 

As we noted above, the Limits of Liability section of Policy 

No. 60/473/2 provides that liability does not attach to the 

London Insurers unless a claim exceeds at least 

$1,050,000. This provision underscores the independence 

between any liability that the London Insurers have under 

their policies and any liability that may result from INA's 

own policy coverage. To the extent that the London Insurers 

rely upon the cover notes to "stand as clear evidence of the 

fundamental structure" of the insurance coverage provided 

by the respective excess insurance policies, such reliance is 

misplaced.8 Appellee's Br. at 23. By their own terms, the 

cover notes became void when the actual insurance policies 

were issued. See App. 37 ("This cover note shall be

automatically terminated and voided by delivery of policy or 

certificate of insurance to the Assured.") 

As we have concluded that INA is not a necessary party 

under Rule 19(a), INA cannot be an indispensable party 

under Rule 19(b). See Janney, 11 F.3d at 405. Accordingly, 

the district court erred in dismissing Koppers' claims 

pertaining to the 1960-65 policies for failure to join INA as 

an indispensable party.9 

_________________________________________________________________ 

8. We note that under Pennsylvania law, if the language of an insurance 

policy is ambiguous, the ambiguous language is construed against the 

drafter. See Board of Pub. Educ. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 709 A.2d 

910, 1998 WL 111558, at 2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 1998). 

9. We have considered the following issues that the London Insurers 

have raised on appeal and have found them to be without merit: the risk 

 13 
V. 

In sum, as we conclude that INA is not a necessary and 

therefore not an indispensable party to the instant action, 

we will reverse the district court's dismissal of Koppers' 

claims relating to the 1960-65 policies and remand for 

further appropriate proceedings. 

A True Copy: 

Teste: 

 Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 

 for the Third Circuit 

_________________________________________________________________ 

of duplicative litigation over identical issues in both state and federal 

fora; reinstating the 1960-65 policy claims weighs against judicial 

economy as INA policies would have to be analyzed in both state and 

federal courts; the district court cannot grant complete relief because it 

has no jurisdiction over INA; this Court should affirm under the doctrine 

of Wilton v. Seven Falls, 515 U.S. 277 (1995) (holding that a 

discretionary standard governs a district court's decision to stay a 

federal declaratory judgment action during the pendency of parallel state 

court proceedings). 

 14