alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RY. CO. et al. v. AMBURGEY.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 12, 1951.

Browning & Gray, Ashland, Combs & Combs, Prestonsburg, for appellants.

J. D. Harkins, Jr., Prestonsburg, for ap-pellee.

CLAY, Commissioner.

Plaintiff recovered a $400 judgment for personal injuries sustained when struck by one of defendant’s engines in the town of Martin. Defendant has filed a motion for an appeal on the ground it was entitled to a directed verdict.

Plaintiff was walking east on a cinder path paralleling a switch track. A freight train came up from behind her and as it passed some part of the engine struck and knocked her down. As plaintiff approach*628ed the scene of the accident, she had seen the train but thought it was standing on another track.

The fireman on the engine saw her when she neared the track and when she was walking along beside it. In substance his testimony is that plaintiff was in a place of safety, and just as the engine was passing she stepped over against it.

It is immaterial whether plaintiff was a trespasser or licensee or whether or not signals were given by defendant’s employees, since she had seen the train and the fireman had seen her. Where one is walking alongside a railroad track in a place of relative safety, the train operatives have a right to assume that the traveler will not change his course so. as to place himself in a position of peril. Young v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, 228 Ky. 771, 15 S.W.2d 1001. See Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company et al. v. Justice’s Administrator, 253 Ky. 600, 69 S.W.2d 1024.

This accident was caused solely by the carelessness of plaintiff, and was not attributable to negligence upon the part of defendant’s employees. Therefore, a directed verdict should have been given for the latter.

The motion for appeal is sustained, and the judgment is reversed.
#### JACKSON v. STATE.

No. 25803.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 9, 1952.

Rehearing Denied May 14, 1952.

Louis C. Davis, Houston, E. Ray Kirkpatrick, Trenton, on appeal only, for appellant.

Sam W. Davis, Criminal Dist. Atty., King C. Haynie, Asst. Crim. Dist. Atty., Houston, George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

.MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is driving while intoxicated; the punishment, 15 months confinement in jail.

The sole question presented for review is the refusal of the trial court to grant appellant’s amended motion for new trial based upon jury misconduct. Under Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. Article 760e, Acts 52nd Leg., 1951, c. 463, no bills are necessary to preserve the question here raised.

The trial court overruled the amended motion for new trial and declined to permit further amendment thereof or to hear testimony tendered by appellant in support of the allegations of misconduct of the jury.'

The motion for new trial was not sworn to, but attached thereto we find the affidavit of juror Billings, in which he swears that, during their deliberations as jurors, among other alleged misconduct which we do not think reflects error, the following occurred:

> “ * * * several jurors stated as a fact that the defendant would have to serve only a part of whatever sentence we fixed as his punishment. As a result of this statement, I was led to believe- that only a part of the sentence we fixed as punishment would have to be served by the defendant.”

The affidavit was sufficient to support the allegations of jury misconduct, and the trial court was not warranted in declining to hear testimony thereon. See Boone v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 242 S.W.2d 380, and Yarborough v. State, 130 Tex. Cr.R. 315, 94 S.W.2d 179.

*749While it is true that we said, in Walker v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 201 SW.2d 823, 828, in a felony case, that “It is a matter of common knowledge that prisoners are credited with extra time for good behavior” and that a discussion of such fact by the jury during its deliberations was not error, we are confronted here with the fact that the law does not provide for .a diminution of such term of imprisonment in jail except by executive clemency. In Price v. State, ISO Tex.Cr.R. 161, 199 S. W.2d 168; we reversed a conviction where one juror gave an incorrect version of the indeterminate sentence law to his colleagues.

Judgment is reversed and the cause re•manded.
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#### Draime, Appellee, *v.*Myers et al., Appellants, et al.

(No. 28425

Decided January 22, 1941.)

*Mr. Raymond J. Finley*and *Messrs. Sheck, Marsteller S Wendelken,*for appellee.

*Messrs.*Myers, *Dmsmore $ Whittemore,*for appellants.

It is ordered and adjudged, *sua sponte,*that said appeal as of right be, and the same hereby is, dismissed for the reason no debatable constitutional question is involved in said cause.

*Appeal dismissed.*

Weygandt, C. J., Turner, Williams, Matthias, Hart, Zimmerman and Bettman, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 31.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Richard H. Wills, certify that:

        (1)     I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Tektronix,
Inc., for the fiscal quarter ending August 28, 2004;

        (2)     Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

        (3)     Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

        (4)     The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures
(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant
and have:

                (a)     Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or
caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;

                (b)     Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions
about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

                (c)     Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's
most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case
of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

        (5)     The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the
registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

                (a)     All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in
the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

                (b)     Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting.

Dated:  October 6, 2004


/s/ RICHARD H. WILLS
-------------------------------------
Richard H. Wills
President and Chief Executive Officer
<PAGE>   1
      EX-21
      SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT


                                                                    EXHIBIT 21.1


                     SUBSIDIARIES OF THE HOLMES GROUP, INC.

(1)      Holmes Manufacturing Corp. (Massachusetts corporation)

(2)      Holmes Air (Taiwan) Corp. (Massachusetts corporation)

(3)      Holmes Products (Far East) Limited (Bahamian corporation)

         (a)      Esteem Industries Limited (Hong Kong corporation)

                  (i)      Dongguan Huixun Electrical Products Co., Ltd.
                           (Chinese corporation)

         (b)      Raider Motor Corporation (Bahamian corporation)

                  (i)      Dongguan Raider Motor Corporation Ltd. (Chinese
                           corporation)

         (c)      Holmes Products (Europe) Limited (UK corporation)

         (d)      Dongguan Holmes Products Ltd. (Chinese corporation)

(4)      Holmes Motor Corp. (Delaware corporation)

(5)      The Rival Company (Delaware corporation)

         (a)      Rival Consumer Sales Corporation (Missouri corporation)

         (b)      Patton Electric Hong Kong, Limited (Hong Kong
                           corporation)

         (c)      Waverly Products Company, Ltd. (Jamaican corporation)

         (d)      The Holmes Group Canada, LTD (Canadian corporation)

         (e)      Bionaire International, B.V. (Netherlands corporation)

         (f)      Rival De Mexico S.A. de C.V. (Mexican corporation)(A)



 ------------------


    (A) Rival De Mexico S.A. de C.V. is owned 99.9% by The Rival Company
directly and 0.1% held in trust for The Rival Company.








                                       59
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</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 210 (Monday, October 30, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 64723]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-27747]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD


Realignment of Regional Office Geographic Boundaries

October 25, 2000.
AGENCY: National Labor Relations Board.

ACTION: Notice of geographical realignment of Philadelphia (Region 4), 
Pittsburgh (Region 6) and Baltimore (Region 5) Regional Offices.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The National Labor Relations Board gives notice of its intent 
to realign the geographic boundaries of its Philadelphia, Pittsburgh 
and Baltimore Regional Offices. This realignment is being effectuated 
in order to meet the objective of reducing the backlog of unfair labor 
practice and representation cases, reducing governmental costs and 
improving administrative efficiency within the Agency. This constitutes 
a permanent realignment of counties that have already been the subject 
of temporary geographic realignment for periods of time ranging from 
one year to several years.

EFFECTIVE DATE: December 1, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John T. Toner, Executive Secretary, 
1099 14th Street, NW., Room 1600, Washington, DC 20570. Telephone: 
(202) 273-1944.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Beginning December 1, 2000, parties wishing 
to file unfair labor practice charges and representation petitions 
arising in 15 counties formerly within the geographic jurisdiction of 
the Philadelphia office will file in either the Pittsburgh or the 
Baltimore office according to the following design.
    1. Cases originating in New Castle County, Delaware will be filed 
in the Baltimore office in Region 5 rather than in the Philadelphia 
office in Region 4. Cases originating in these counties have been 
handled by the Baltimore Regional Office on a temporary basis for a 
period of approximately one year.
    2. Cases arising in the counties of Lycoming, Sullivan, Union, 
Montour, Snyder, Juniata, Dauphin, Northumberland, Lebanon, Schuylkill, 
Columbia and Perry will be filed in our Pittsburgh office in Region 6 
rather than in our Philadelphia office in Region 4. Cases originating 
in these counties have been handled on a temporary basis for periods 
ranging from one to three years.
    3. Cases originating in Bradford and Tioga Counties will be filed 
with our Pittsburgh office in Region 6 rather than with our 
Philadelphia office in Region 4. Cases originating in these counties 
have been handled on a temporary basis for a period of three years by 
our Albany, New York office in Region 3.

    Dated: Washington, DC, October 25, 2000.

    By Direction of the Board: National Labor Relations Board.
John T. Toner,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 00-27747 Filed 10-27-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7545-01-M
KFS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 23-0048

LAURENCE DEAN JACKSON, JR.,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

STATE OF MONTANA,

Respondent and Appellee.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for a 30-day extension of time, 

and good cause appearing therefore, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellee is granted an extension of time 

to and including November 3, 2024, within which to prepare, file, and serve its 

response brief. 

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 25 2024

09/25/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0048
1990

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HESI303124
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 00-1280

JOHN SHEWCHUN, PHD,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]

[Hon. David L. Martin, U.S. Magistrate Judge]

Before

 Torruella, Chief Judge,

Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.

John Shewchun on brief pro se.

Sheldon Whitehouse, Attorney General, and Neil F.X. Kelly,

Special Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellees.

January 24, 2001
Per Curiam. The district court held that

plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were barred by

the forum State's statute of limitations. Plaintiff repeats

here some of the arguments which he presented below and adds

others. The added arguments were waived by the failure to

urge them below and there is no plain error. 

Reviewing the preserved issues de novo in light of

the briefs and the record on appeal, we agree with the

district court that the suit was filed almost eight years

too late. Specifically, plaintiff has not substantiated his

claim that a lawsuit which he commenced during the

limitations period had remained pending for any significant

portion of the intervening years. He also offers no

convincing argument for use of the equitable exception to

the limitations period for "continuing violations."

Construed in light of what he pleaded and could prove, the

complaint alleged several communications of mistaken

information emanating from a single wrongful act (the

alleged entry into the state court records of wrong

information about the terms of the plaintiff's probationary

sentence in breach of a plea agreement). No systemic policy

nor practice was alleged. The pendent claim, too, properly

was dismissed.
-3-

We need not reach the ineffective assistance claim

since there is no right to counsel in a civil case. The

alleged impropriety by plaintiff's private counsel did not

affect the result in this case. 

Affirmed.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-11-00307-CV

In re Mark David Simmons

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM HAYS COUNTY

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The petition for writ of mandamus is denied. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).

___________________________________________

Diane M. Henson, Justice

Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Henson and Goodwin

Filed: May 24, 2011
UN PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10

- 1978

EVELYN L. MIDDLETON ,

P laintiff

- Appellant ,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY ,

Defendants

- Appellee s

.

Appeal from the United States Dist rict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Newport News

. Jerome B. Friedman , District Judge. ( 4 :10

- cv
- 00 088

- JBF

- FBS )

Submitted : January 18, 2011 Decided: January 25, 2011

Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and AGEE , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed b y un published per curiam opinion

.

Evelyn L. Middleton , Appellant Pro Se. Susan Lynn Watt, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2

PER CURIAM:

Evelyn Middl eton appeals the district court’s order

dismissing her 28 U.S.C. § 2042 (2006) action for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We have

reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly,

we affirm for the reasons stated b y the district court. See

Middleton v. United States , No. 4:10

- cv
- 00088

- JBF

- FBS (E.D. Va.

Aug. 19, 2010). We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED