alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PICTURE PATENTS, LLC,

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellant, 

and 

INTELLINET, INC., 

Counterclaim Defendant-Appellant,

v. 

AEROPOSTALE, INC., DICK’S SPORTING GOODS, 

INC., MLB ADVANCED MEDIA, L.P., 

MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PROPERTIES, INC., 

NBA MEDIA VENTURES, LLC, NBA PROPERTIES, 

INC., NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, 

and THE CHARLOTTE RUSSE, INC., 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

GSI COMMERCE SOLUTIONS, INC. and GSI 

COMMERCE, INC., 

Defendants/Counterclaimants-Appellees,

and 

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES 

CORPORATION,

Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

2011-1558 

______________________

 

 Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of New York in No. 07-CV-5567, Judge 

John G. Koeltl. 
______________________ 

JUDGMENT 

______________________ 

THOMAS J. PARKER, Alston & Bird, of New York, New 

York argued for plaintiff/counterclaim defendantappellant Picture Patents, LLC. and counterclaim 

defendant-appellant Intellinet, Inc. With him on the brief 

were MICHAEL S. CONNOR and DAVID M. ALBAN, of 

Charlotte, North Carolina. 

NATHAN K. CUMMINGS, Cooley LLP, of Reston 

Virginia, argued for defendants-appellees Aeropostale, 

Inc, et al and defendants/counterclaimants-appellees GSI 

Commerce, et al. With him on the brief were LORI 

MASON; and JANET L. CULLUM, of New York, New York 

MARK J. ABATE, Godwin Procter LLP, of New York, 

New York, argued for defendant/counterclaimant-appellee 

International Business Machines Corporation. With him 

on the brief were CALVIN E. WINGFIELD, JR.; and WILLIAM 

F. SHEEHAN, of Washington, DC. 

______________________ 

THIS CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED: 

 PER CURIAM (PROST, MAYER, and WALLACH, Circuit 

Judges). 

AFFIRMED. See Fed. Cir. R. 36. 

 ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

 April 13, 2012 /s/ Jan Horbaly

 Date Jan Horbaly 

 Clerk
ia-i5-ooaas-e>) RLED IN COURT OF APPEALS

12th Court ofAppeals District

CAUSr NO.

JUAN ENRIQUSZ, §

Plaintiff, *

1 v.

i BRAD LIVINGSTON, ET AL., i

Defendants. $

369-13*5019

IB THE DISTRICT

!!^»x

TYLER TEXAS

coflflfl ESTES, CLERK

369TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

ANDFSSOtf COUNTY, tKtM

UNSWORN nFCLARSTTOM Of INABILITY TO PAY

My name is .Ttian r:mH oik>2. T do not have the monety to oay the filing

and court costs of this case as I am imprisoned and the State does not

pay prisoners wages. I m**:e this unsworn declaration mftwf Section T32.002,

I am the Plaintiff in the above rofsrenced cause. T am over 2ly»ar3 of

age, of sound mind, and able to make this unsworn declaration, My statements

in this unsworn declaration are made on personal knowledge.

It I M not receiving any governmental entitlement funds.

2. I do not have any employment or other income.

3. I do not have access to spousal income as I am single.

4. I do not have any property.

5. I have a zero balance in my prison account.

6. I have expenses of approximately 5100 a month to pay

things the prison does not provide.

I, Juan^rig«e2, declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing

statements in my unsworn declaration are true and correct. Executed on

August 31,2015.

/, t— *--

Juan Pnrtqm*

<

-

•

Certificate of Service

I, Juan Enriguez, certify that a correct copy of the aboveuunsworn

declaration of inability to pay was served by placing same in the Unitec'

States mail, postage prepaid, on August 31,2015, addressed to Rachael

Osaze-Edi»e, Assistant Attorney General, P. 0. Box 1254ft, Capitol StftpApa,

Austin, TX 78711, and to Cledfc, Court of Appeals, 12th District of Texas,

1517 W. Front Street, Tyler, TX 75702.

Juan Fnriquez

e <-:-
Swank, Inc.
                         90 Park Avenue
                    New York, New York 10016


                                                    June 10, 1999



Mr. James E. Tulin
c/o Swank, Inc.
8800 North Gainey Center Drive
Scottedale, Arizona 85258

Dear Mr. Tulin:

    Reference is made to the Agreement dated as of March 1, 1989
between Swank, Inc. (the "Corporation") and you, as amended to
date (as so amended, the "Existing Employment Agreement"),
concerning your employment by the Corporation. This letter will
serve to confirm our agreement to amend the Existing Employment
Agreement as of the date hereof as follows:

    The term of the Existing Employment Agreement is hereby
extended for an additional period, commencing on January 1, 1999
to and including December 31, 2001(the "Extension Period").
During the Extension Period, the Corporation shall pay to you,
and you agree to accept, a base salary at the rate of $260,000,
payable in such installments as shall be mutually agreed upon by
you and the Corporation, plus such additional compensation, if
any, as the Board of Directors of the Corporation shall from time
to time determine.

    Except as modified and amended by this letter, the Existing
Employment Agreement shall remain and continue in full force and
effect on and after the date hereof.

    This letter may be executed in any number of counterparts,
each of which shall be deemed an original and all of which taken
together shall constitute one and the same agreement.

    This letter shall be governed by, and construed and enforced
in accordance with, the laws of the State of New York, without
regard to principles of conflicts or choice of law.

     If the foregoing correctly sets forth our understanding and
agreement, kindly countersign this letter in the space provided
below.

                              Very truly yours,

                              SWANK, INC.

                              By: /s/ Christopher F. Wolf
                              Name: Christopher F. Wolf
                              Title: Chief Financial Officer

ACCEPTED AND AGREED:

/s/James E. Tulin

James E. Tulin
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APRIL 6, 2011

JOHN LEY

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 ________________________

 No. 10-10623 

 ________________________

 D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-20160-JLK

ALAN KAUFMAN, 

Individually,

d.b.a. Center For Asthma & Allergy Of Bronx And Westchester,

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

SWIRE PACIFIC HOLDINGS, INC., 

a Delaware Corporation,

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee.

________________________

 Appeal from the United States District Court

 for the Southern District of Florida

 ________________________

(April 6, 2011)

Before BARKETT, HULL and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Appellant-Plaintiff Alan Kaufman (“Kaufman”) appeals: (1) the district

court’s summary judgment order, dated December 18, 2009, granting summary

judgment in favor of Appellee-Defendant Swire Pacific Holdings, Inc. (“Swire”)

on Counts I, II, and IV; (2) the district court’s order, dated October 9, 2009,

granting Swire’s motion to strike the testimony of Kaufman’s experts, Jose Perea

and Ralph Puig; and (3) the district court’s dismissal order, dated June 23, 2009,

dismissing with prejudice Kaufman’s claims in Counts III and V. With respect to

the dismissal order, Kaufman only appeals the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal with

prejudice of Count V in its entirety. 

Even without considering Kaufman’s experts, we conclude the district court

erred in granting summary judgment as to Counts I, II, and IV and dismissing

Count V in its entirety at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. As to Count V, we conclude the

complaint stated a cause of action for actual damages. As to Counts I, II, and IV,

the record presents genuine issues of material fact unsuitable for resolution at the

summary judgment stage. Because factual issues for trial are presented even

without Kaufman’s experts, we need not decide whether the district court abused

its discretion in granting Swire’s motion to strike in order to decide the summary

judgment issues as to Counts I, II, and IV. Further, we note that the district court

ruled “that Mr. Jose Perea and Mr. Ralph Puig’s testimony be excluded unless

2
timely offered for rebuttal.” Given the reversal of the summary judgment order

and the district court’s allowing Kaufman’s experts to testify anyway (albeit

limited to rebuttal), we conclude both parties on remand should now be given

adequate opportunity to depose each other’s experts before trial and each party’s

experts should be allowed to testify at trial. We vacate the above district court

orders to the extent stated above and remand this case.

VACATED AND REMANDED FOR TRIAL.

3
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Page 8 of 9
Second Amendment to Amended and Restated 1993 Stock Option Plan



 Exhibit 10.23 
  
 SECOND AMENDMENT 
 TO THE CAREMARK RX, INC. 1993 STOCK OPTION PLAN 
 (FORMERLY THE AMENDED & RESTATED MEDPARTNERS, INC. 
 1993 STOCK OPTION PLAN) 
  
 This Second Amendment to the Caremark Rx, Inc. 1993 Stock Option Plan (formerly the Amended & Restated Medpartners, Inc. 1993 Stock Option Plan)
(the “Plan”) to be effective as of January 12, 2001. 
  
 WITNESSETH: 
  
 WHEREAS, Caremark Rx, Inc. (the
“Company”) currently sponsors and maintains the Caremark Rx, Inc. 1993 Stock Option Plan (formerly the Amended & Restated Medpartners, Inc. 1993 Stock Option Plan) (the “Plan”); and 
  
 WHEREAS, Section 11 of the Plan grants the Compensation Committee of the
Board the power at any time to amend the Plan, and the Compensation Committee now wishes to amend the Plan to modify the vesting provisions for options granted under the Plan on and after January 12, 2001; 
  
 NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended as indicated below: 
  
 1. 
  
 Section 6.4 of the Plan is amended effective as of January 12, 2001, to read as follows: 
  
 6.4 Vesting of Options. Except as set forth by the Committee
in the applicable Option Agreement, Options shall vest and become exercisable as follows: 
  
 (a) 34% of the Options shall vest on the Grant Date; 
  
 (b) 33% of the Options granted shall vest on each of the first anniversary and second anniversary of the
Grant Date; provided, however, that for Options granted prior to January 12, 2001, if during 
  
 Second Amendment to the 
 Caremark Rx, Inc. 1993 Stock Option Plan 
  Page
 1
 







 the first year after the Grant Date, the stock price of the Common Stock closes at or above $12.00 (or
such other price as determined by the Committee and set forth in the applicable Option Agreement) for any twenty (20) out of thirty (30) consecutive trading days, the 33% of the Options due to vest on the first anniversary of the Grant
Date shall vest immediately at the end of such 20th day, and provided, however, that for Options granted prior to January 12, 2001, if during the second year after the Grant Date, the stock price of the Common Stock closes at or above $18.00
(or such other price as determined by the Committee and set forth in the applicable Option Agreement) for any twenty (20) out of thirty (30) consecutive trading days, the 33% of the Options due to vest on the second anniversary of the
Grant Date shall vest immediately at the end of such 20th day. 
  
 2. 
  
 The name of the Plan is changed effective as of
January 12, 2001 from the Amended & Restated Medpartners, Inc. 1993 Stock Option Plan to the Caremark Rx, Inc. 1993 Stock Option Plan. All references in any Company documents to the Amended & Restated Medpartners, Inc. 1993
Stock Option Plan shall, after January 12, 2001, be a reference to the Caremark Rx, Inc. 1993 Stock Option Plan. 
  
 3. 
  
 All other provisions of the Plan not inconsistent herewith are hereby confirmed and ratified. 
  
 Approved by the Board of Directors by resolutions on January 12, 2001.

  
 Second Amendment to the 
 Caremark Rx, Inc. 1993 Stock Option Plan 
  Page

 2
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-29-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-30-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-30-1997
<CASH>                                         418,239
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   11,992
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     83,921
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               621,258
<PP&E>                                       3,142,445
<DEPRECIATION>                                 773,896
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,742,072
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,697,897
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                      5,650
<COMMON>                                         2,644
<OTHER-SE>                                     770,157
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,742,072
<SALES>                                      1,800,093
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,800,093
<CGS>                                          544,790
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,809,309
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               694,698
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (703,914)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (703,914)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (703,914)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.27)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.27)
        

</TABLE>
#### SMITH v. STATE.

No. 24306.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 23, 1949.

No appearance for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Appellant was assessed a. fine of $109 upon his conviction by a jury in the County Court upon the charge of possessing unstamped whisky. He pleaded not guilty to the charge and testified in his own behalf to an alibi, denying that he was the person from whom the officers contended that they bought the liquor in question.

The officers testified as to the purchase-of a quart jar which they produced in court and gave as their opinion that it contained moonshine whisky on which no tax stamp, was attached.

The record is before us with one bill of exception which complains of the action of the county attorney in which he, over the objection at the time, exhibited to the jury and passed around for their inspection the quart jar with the lid removed' and invited them to smell or otherwise examine the liquid and determine for themselves whether or not it was an intoxicating liquor, as alleged. The plea of not guilty put in issue every question of fact necessary to sustain a conviction; that is, that the defendant possessed it, that the jar contained intoxicating liquor,- and that it had no tax stamp thereon. The question here presented is not a new one. It has been before this Court a great many times- and with the circumstances here presented has been the cause of reversal over a long period of time. We will not again discuss, the distinctions found in the authorities between the circumstances calling for reversal and those which do not. We refer to the recent case of Smith v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 214 S.W.2d 471, in which the very question was discussed at length. The reversal in that case was not based on the ground herein complained of, because under the circumstances of the Smith case it was not error. He admitted the contents was liquor. The Reversal was on another ground and the discussion in the opinion was in an effort to clarify the decisions of this Court on the subject, and to direct the court in a subsequent trial of the case. The opinion there does, we think, fully discuss the question herein presented and call's, for a reversal of the case now before us. The act of the county attorney made the jurors become witnesses in the case on a *852controverted issue and we are unable to say that it did not injure appellant. There was other proof that the liquid was an intoxicating liquor, but there was no admission from appellant that it was such.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded.
1 The Honorable Ross A. Walters, United States Magistrate Judge for the Southern District of Iowa, to whom th e case was referred for final disposition by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 06-1964

___________ Gabrielle F. Morris, M.D., * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Southern * District of Iowa. * McFarland Clinic, P.C.; and * [UNPUBLISHED] Terry McGeeney, M.D., * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: January 8, 2007 Filed: January 26, 2007

___________ Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BYE and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Dr. Gabrielle F. Morris appeals the district court’s 1 adverse judgment and imposition of sanctions following a bench tria l in this diversity action. Dr. Morris brought suit against the McFarland Clinic and Dr. Terry McGeeney for (1) fraudulent misrepresentation concerning Dr. Morris’ ability to obtain an Iowa medical license-2- and (2) breach of contract. In addition to entering judgment against Dr. Morris, the court granted McFarland Clin ic and Dr. McGeeney’s motion for sanctions in the amount of reasonable attorney fees and expe nses incurred in their attempt to obtain production of certain documents provided to Dr. Morris’ attorney by the California Medical Board. Having carefully reviewed the record, including the magistrate judge’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion, we fi nd no basis for reversal. See Tadlock v. Powell , 291 F.3d 541, 546 (8th Cir. 2002) (factual findings reviewed for clear error and legal conclusions reviewed de novo); Martin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 251 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 2001) (sanctions reviewed under abuse of discretion standard). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3278 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3278

To amend chapter 77 of title 5, United States Code, to clarify certain 
due process rights of Federal employees serving in sensitive positions, 
                        and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 8, 2013

  Ms. Norton introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
              Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend chapter 77 of title 5, United States Code, to clarify certain 
due process rights of Federal employees serving in sensitive positions, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AMENDMENTS.

    Section 7701 of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsection (k) as subsection (l); and
            (2) by inserting after subsection (j) the following:
    ``(k)(1) An employee or applicant for employment appealing an 
action arising from a determination of ineligibility for a sensitive 
position may not be denied Board review of the merits of such 
determination if--
            ``(A) the position is not one that requires a security 
        clearance or access to classified information; and
            ``(B) such action is otherwise appealable.
    ``(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term `sensitive 
position' means any position so designated pursuant to Executive Order 
10450 (5 U.S.C. 7311 note) or, if superseded, a successor Executive 
order.''.

SEC. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE.

    The amendments made by this Act shall apply to all appeals, without 
exception, that are pending on, or commenced on or after, the date of 
the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### VISOR v. STATE.

No. 24761.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 10, 1950.

*809None on appeal for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

The offense is unlawfully selling and delivering whisky in a dry area; the punishment, a fine of $100.

The record is before us without a statement or bills of exception.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDG MENT

N o. 04

- 14

- 00508

- CV

Rudy MENDEZ

, Appellant

v.

City of San Antonio Building

CITY OF SAN ANTONIO BUILDING STANDARDS B OARD

, Appellee

From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014

- CI

- 08659

Honorable Barbara Hanson Nellermoe, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE MARION

, JUSTICE BARNARD , AND JUSTICE MARTINEZ

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, appellant’s Motion for Rehearing is

GRANTED; we WITHDRAW our o pinion and judgment dated September 10, 2014, and issue this

opinion and judgment in their place.

This appeal is hereby REINSTATED on this court’s docket

SIGNED November 12, 2014.

_________________________________ Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
#### Ruskin, Appellee, *v.*Povzner et al., Appellants.

(No. 28152

Decided June 12, 1940.)

*Mr. Julius JR. Samuels,*for appellee.

*Messrs. Rosen & Rosen,*for appellants.

It is ordered and adjudged that said appeal as of right he, and the same hereby is, dismissed for the reason no debatable constitutional question is involved in said cause.

*Appeal dismissed.*

Weygandt, C. J., Day, Zimmerman, Williams, Matthias and Hart, JJ., concur.
---

Exhibit 13.2

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
    CFO Certification In connection with the annual report of Getty Copper Inc. (the Company) on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Donald Willoughby, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge: 1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. /s/ Donald Willoughby Name: Donald Willoughby 
    Title: Chief Financial Officer 
    February 17, 2011 A signed original of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. This certification accompanies the Form 20-F to which it relates, is not to be deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (whether made before or after the date of the Form 20-F), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.


---