UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

In re: GARY WOODROW 

FLANDERS, individually and as 

officer, director, shareholder 

Canyon Quarry Co., Farmer & 

Merchants Bank, Great Northern 

Land Co., MetroBank, N.A., 

 Debtor. 

------------------------------ 

GARY WOODROW FLANDERS, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

EVELYN JANE LAWRENCE; 

DANIEL A. WEST; MOYE WHITE 

LLP; JAMES T. BURGHARDT, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 15-1327 

(BAP No. 14-055-CO) 

(Bankruptcy Appellate Panel) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

 

* The parties have not asked for oral argument, and we conclude that 

oral argument would not materially aid our consideration of the appeal. See

Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Thus, we have decided the 

appeal based on the briefs. 

Our order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent, except 

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 

It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 

32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

August 5, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

Before BRISCOE, BACHARACH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

This case grew out of two other cases. One was in state court, where 

Mr. Gary Flanders and his wife, Ms. Evelyn Lawrence, divorced. The other 

case was in bankruptcy court, where Mr. Flanders was discharged from his 

pre-petition debts. In the present action, Mr. Flanders sues Ms. Lawrence 

and her attorneys, alleging that the state court erroneously divided marital 

assets. 

The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to Ms. Lawrence

and her attorneys, concluding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded 

jurisdiction over some of the claims, that other claims were subject to issue 

preclusion, and that Mr. Flanders either lacked standing to pursue, or 

simply lost on, the rest of his claims. The Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy 

Appellate Panel affirmed, and Mr. Flanders appeals. We conclude that each 

claim fails based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, issue preclusion, or lack 

of standing.1

I. The Bankruptcy and Divorce Proceedings 

Mr. Flanders filed for bankruptcy in 1998. Two years later, divorce 

proceedings began in Colorado state court. The bankruptcy trustee then 

 

1

 The defendants also asserted laches as a defense. Given our 

disposition, however, we decline to reach that issue. 
3 

filed an adversary proceeding to assert fraudulent-transfer claims against 

Mr. Flanders, Ms. Lawrence, and a number of entities that Ms. Lawrence 

owned or controlled, including the Great Northern Transportation 

Company. In 2001, the trustee entered into a settlement agreement with 

Ms. Lawrence and her entities, releasing the bankruptcy estates “from any 

and all claims and causes of action that have been made or could have been 

made in the Adversary Proceeding, whether known or unknown, from the 

beginning of the world, to the date of [the] Release.” R. at 341. 

Mr. Flanders received a Chapter 7 discharge in 2002. This discharge 

(1) “void[ed] any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such 

judgment [was] a determination of the personal liability of [Mr. Flanders] 

with respect to any debt discharged,” and (2) “operate[d] as an injunction 

against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of 

process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal 

liability of [Mr. Flanders].” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1)–(2). 

In 2007, it became apparent that Mr. Flanders’s bankruptcy estate 

would enjoy a surplus of roughly $231,000. The expectation of a surplus 

led the federal district court to ask the state court to determine how much 

of the bankruptcy surplus would have been considered marital property. 

Mr. Flanders argued in state court that the settlement agreement and 

bankruptcy discharge had precluded any award to Ms. Lawrence from the 
4 

bankruptcy surplus. The state court disagreed, finding that the surplus 

constituted marital property. The state court ultimately awarded judgment 

to Ms. Lawrence for $563,822. 

 

Mr. Flanders appealed. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed on 

most grounds but vacated and remanded for further findings on one issue 

not relevant to the matters now before this court. The Colorado Supreme 

Court denied Mr. Flanders’s petition for a writ of certiorari. 

Mr. Flanders then filed an adversary proceeding in his bankruptcy 

case. There he asserted eleven claims against Ms. Lawrence, her divorce 

attorney (Daniel West), her bankruptcy attorney (James Burghardt), and 

her bankruptcy attorney’s law firm (Moye White LLP). In these claims, Mr. 

Flanders alleged that (1) the state court’s orders had been void ab initio,

(2) the state court had made erroneous factual findings and legal 

conclusions, and (3) the defendants had acted in contempt of the discharge 

injunction and in breach of the settlement and release agreements by 

asserting pre-petition claims in state court. In the background section of 
5 

the second amended complaint, Mr. Flanders also alleged violation of the 

bankruptcy court’s automatic stay. 

The bankruptcy court ruled that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

prevented rejection of the state court’s factual findings, but not 

Mr. Flanders’s request for a finding of contempt or sanctions for willfully 

violating the discharge injunction. Ultimately, however, the bankruptcy 

court determined that those claims were subject to issue preclusion because 

they required the parties to relitigate the effect of the discharge. 

In addition, the bankruptcy court addressed Mr. Flanders’s arguments 

that the state court’s findings had been void ab initio. In part, Mr. Flanders 

argued that the state court had violated the automatic stay and the 

discharge injunction. According to the bankruptcy court, both of these 

arguments were invalid, but for different reasons. Reliance on the 

discharge injunction was impermissible because of issue preclusion; 

reliance on the automatic stay was impermissible because Mr. Flanders 

lacked standing to assert the claim. 

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. It concluded that the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because none of Mr. Flanders’s 

claims asked the bankruptcy court to review the state-court judgments. The 

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel then affirmed based on issue preclusion and 

lack of standing. 
6 

II. Standard of Review

 We review the bankruptcy court’s decision rather than the 

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s. Alderete v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re 

Alderete), 412 F.3d 1200, 1204 (10th Cir. 2005). In reviewing the 

bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment, we apply the de novo 

standard. Spears v. St. Paul Ins. Co. (In re Ben Kennedy & Assocs.), 

40 F.3d 318, 319 (10th Cir. 1994). Under this standard, we view the 

evidence favorably to Mr. Flanders. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Manager 

of Revenue & Exofficio Treasurer (In re W. Pac. Airlines, Inc.), 273 F.3d 

1288, 1291 (10th Cir. 2001).2

III. Mr. Flanders has forfeited his argument that the bankruptcy 

court used the wrong version of the bankruptcy code.

 According to Mr. Flanders, the bankruptcy court erred by using the 

current version of 11 U.S.C. § 523 rather than the version that had been in 

effect when his bankruptcy petition was filed. Mr. Flanders claims that if 

the earlier statutory version had been used, the bankruptcy court would 

have concluded that his debt to Great Northern Transportation Co. had 

been discharged and that the bankruptcy court had enjoyed exclusive 

jurisdiction over dischargeability. 

 

2

 Because Mr. Flanders proceeds pro se, we liberally construe his 

filings but do not act as his advocate. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 

927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). 
7 

Prior to this appeal, Mr. Flanders had not questioned the bankruptcy 

court’s or the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s reliance on the current 

statutory version. Thus, we consider this argument forfeited. See Foster v. 

Hill (In re Foster), 188 F.3d 1259, 1264 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that 

an appeal point was forfeited because the litigant failed to make the same 

argument when appealing from the bankruptcy court to the district court). 

Mr. Flanders points out that 

 he raised other challenges to the state court’s jurisdiction and 

 in his adversary complaint, he mentioned one of the relevant 

statutes, referred to Ms. Lawrence’s obligation to file a § 523 

complaint, and asked the bankruptcy court to resolve his claims 

using applicable bankruptcy law. 

But these steps were insufficient to avoid forfeiture, for they did not alert 

the bankruptcy court to the need to consider the prior version of the 

statute.3

Mr. Flanders contends that the issue is jurisdictional, requiring 

consideration notwithstanding a forfeiture. See, e.g., Daigle v. Shell Oil 

Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1539 (10th Cir. 1992). We reject this contention. In 

 

3

 Ordinarily we can consider forfeited arguments under the plain-error 

standard. Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir. 

2011). But Mr. Flanders has not argued plain error. As a result, we decline 

to consider whether use of the current statutory version would constitute 

plain error. See id. at 1130-31 (stating that the failure to argue for plain 

error “surely marks the end of the road” for an argument that had been 

forfeited). 
8 

our view, the jurisdictional nature of the underlying argument does not 

insulate the issue from forfeiture, for this exception is confined to 

forfeited jurisdictional arguments made during the pendency of the action 

in which jurisdiction is at issue. Here, Mr. Flanders brings a collateral 

attack on the jurisdiction of a different court. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. 

Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982) (“A 

party that has had an opportunity to litigate the question of subject-matter 

jurisdiction may not . . . reopen that question in a collateral attack upon an 

adverse judgment.”). Thus, the jurisdictional nature of the issue does not 

preclude a forfeiture. 

IV. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Mr. Flanders’s claims that 

allege injury caused by the state court’s rulings.

 The defendants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes 

consideration of Mr. Flanders’s claims. We agree with respect to the 

claims that seek invalidation of the state court’s rulings.

A. Mr. Flanders did not waive his arguments on the RookerFeldman doctrine. 

In their dispositive motion, the defendants argued that relief is 

precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Bankruptcy Appellate 

Panel did not agree, and Mr. Flanders did not discuss the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine in his opening brief. In responding to that brief, however, the 

defendants argued that 
9 

 the Rooker-Feldman doctrine presents an alternative ground for 

dismissal and 

 Mr. Flanders waived the issue by declining to address the 

Rooker-Feldman issue in his opening brief. 

 We do not regard the issue as waived. “When an appellee raises in its 

answer brief an alternative ground for affirmance, the appellant is entitled 

to respond in its reply brief.” United States v. Brown, 348 F.3d 1200, 1213 

(10th Cir. 2003). But even if the issue had been waived, we could address 

it sua sponte. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine involves subject-matter 

jurisdiction, which the court can raise on its own. See PJ ex rel. Jensen v. 

Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1193 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that the RookerFeldman doctrine involves subject-matter jurisdiction); Gonzales v. Thaler, 

__ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) (sua sponte consideration of 

requirements that involve subject-matter jurisdiction). 

B. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes jurisdiction of Mr. 

Flanders’s claims that seek invalidation of the state court’s 

rulings. 

 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, one cannot complain in federal 

court of an injury caused by a judgment rendered in state court. Exxon 
10 

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 4

 Some 

of Mr. Flanders’s claims involve this sort of complaint. 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar an independent claim 

even if the claim had already been rejected in state court. Id. at 293. In 

that situation, the outcome is governed by state-law preclusion principles 

rather than the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id.

In the second amended complaint, Mr. Flanders identified eleven 

claims. But as Mr. Flanders stated in the introduction to the complaint, all 

involved “a collateral attack on a state court judgment.” R. at 801 (“This 

adversary proceeding constitutes a collateral attack on two State Court 

judgments that are void by law ab initio.” (footnote omitted)). 

Ordinarily, collateral attacks on a state-court judgment are barred by 

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Erlandson v. Northglenn Mun. Ct., 528 F.3d 

 

4

 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only if the state-court 

proceedings became final before the federal proceedings began. Exxon 

Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. The bankruptcy court concluded that because 

the Colorado Supreme Court had denied review on the issues relevant to 

Mr. Flanders’s adversary case, the state-court proceedings had become 

final for Rooker-Feldman purposes even though the action was remanded 

on an unrelated matter of state law. Mr. Flanders does not question the 

finality of the state-court proceedings, and we agree with the bankruptcy 

court’s conclusion that there was sufficient finality for RookerFeldman purposes. See Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 n.2 

(10th Cir. 2006) (defining finality to include when the state courts have 

finally resolved all federal questions and only state-law or factual 

questions remain). 
11 

785, 789 (10th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, we independently consider each 

claim against the backdrop of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.5

Though Mr. Flanders has identified eleven discrete claims, they 

overlap in substance. Eight of the claims (1-4, 6-7, and 10-11) are based on 

alleged violations of the bankruptcy discharge. And two of the claims (8-9) 

involve contempt and sanctions. Two other claims (1 and 4) are based, at 

least in part, on alleged breaches of the settlement agreement. 

1. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes consideration of the 

claims to invalidate the state-court rulings by invoking the 

bankruptcy discharge, but does not preclude consideration 

of other claims. 

 

In eight of the claims, Mr. Flanders alleges that the state court 

deprived him of the value of his bankruptcy discharge. This contention 

 

5

 Some courts have found an exception to Rooker-Feldman when a 

state court wrongly construes a bankruptcy court’s discharge order. See, 

e.g., Hamilton v. Herr (In re Hamilton), 540 F.3d 367, 373-75 (6th Cir. 

2008) (holding that “a state court judgment that modifies a discharge in 

bankruptcy is void ab initio and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not 

bar federal court jurisdiction”); Pavelich v. McCormick, Barstow, 

Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth LLP (In re Pavelich), 229 B.R. 777, 783-84 

(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (substantially the same); cf. Ellis v. Consol. Diesel 

Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371, 372 (10th Cir. 1990) (recognizing “that any 

action taken in violation of the [automatic bankruptcy] stay is void and 

without effect”). Other courts, however, have declined to recognize such 

an exception. See, e.g., Ferren v. Searcy Winnelson Co. (In re Ferren), 

203 F.3d 559, 559-60 (8th Cir. 2000); In re Candidus, 327 B.R. 112, 119 

(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Toussaint, 259 B.R. 96, 102-03 (Bankr. 

E.D.N.C. 2000). We follow our precedents, which have not recognized 

such an exception. 
12 

grows out of the state court’s characterization of Great Northern 

Transportation Co. as a marital asset to be awarded to Ms. Lawrence. 

Before the divorce or the beginning of bankruptcy proceedings, Mr. 

Flanders and Ms. Lawrence signed promissory notes to Great Northern in 

exchange for roughly $2 million. 

But the bankruptcy court discharged Mr. Flanders’s debt under his 

promissory note. 
13 

 The state court did not question the discharge.6

 But in valuing Great 

Northern as a marital asset, the state court considered Mr. Flanders’s 

failure to pay on his promissory note to Great Northern. 

 According to Mr. Flanders, the state court’s valuation of Great 

Northern effectively nullified any benefit from the bankruptcy discharge. 

 

6

 The state court characterized the Great Northern debt as “an account 

receivable from Ms. Lawrence.” R. at 361. This statement reflects 

recognition of Mr. Flanders’s discharge as encompassing his personal 

liability on the Great Northern note. Thus, the state court implicitly 

concluded that Mr. Flanders’s liability on the Great Northern note had been 

discharged in bankruptcy. 
14 

The state court assessed ownership of Great Northern as a liability, in part 

because Mr. Flanders had not paid on his promissory note. Based on this 

valuation of Great Northern, the state court allegedly required Mr. 

Flanders to pay his ex-wife more than he would otherwise have had to pay. 

 To determine the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we 

focus on the relief sought by Mr. Flanders. See PJ ex rel. Jensen v. 

Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1193 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[O]ur recent RookerFeldman jurisprudence has emphasized the relief sought by federal-court 

plaintiffs.”). In the second amended complaint, Mr. Flanders asked the 

bankruptcy court to grant declaratory relief nullifying the state court’s 

orders. For example, Mr. Flanders’s eleventh claim for relief requested an 

order declaring that 

 “the State Court’s Orders recorded February 10, 2009 and June 

22, 2009, offsetting the $2 Million Commercial Promissory 

Note owed by Lawrence to [Great Northern Transportation Co.] 

against the value of [Great Northern], and correspondingly, 

against the valuation of the Marital Estate, constitutes an 

attempt to collect and recover one half of that amount ($1 

Million) from Flanders, and is a violation of the Discharge 

Order of September 4, 2002, and the State Court orders to the 

contrary are void ab initio in these regards”; 

 “the State Court’s decision to delete or omit $3,148,843.84 of 

accrued interest, owed by Lawrence to [Great Northern], from 

the valuation of [Great Northern], and correspondingly, from 

the valuation of the Marital Estate, constitutes an attempt to 

collect and recover by offset a discharged pre-petition debt of 

Flanders, and the State Court’s orders to the contrary are void 

ab initio in these regards”; 
15 

 “the State Courts [sic] Order of February 7, 2007, is void ab 

initio, as Lawrence’s pre-petition claim to those funds was lost 

by her failure to assert such a claim in the bankruptcy, and thus 

any such claim was discharged by this Court’s Discharge Order 

of September 4, 2002”; and 

 “the State Court’s Orders recorded February 10, 2009 and June 

22, 2009, claiming the Net Equity assets remaining at the end 

of the bankruptcy case, specifically the [Great Northern Land 

Co.] stock, [Canyon Quarry Co.] stock, and 6 burial lots, 

constitute a pre-petition claim, and are void ab initio in these 

regards, as those assets are not marital property, but rather, are 

Flanders’ post-petition, after-acquired assets acquired from the 

Net Equity of the Bankruptcy Estate.” 

R. at 824-25 (footnote & boldface omitted). 

 These requests trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, for they depend 

on a finding that the state court erred and entail relief from the erroneous 

orders. See Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007) 

(holding that a claim for a declaratory judgment, which sought 

nullification of a probate court’s orders, is “precisely the type[] of claim[] 

encompassed by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine”); Ebel v. Ebel (In re Ebel), 

139 F. App’x 26 (10th Cir. 2005).7

 

7

 Though our opinion in In re Ebel is not precedential, it is instructive. 

There a couple divorced and the husband filed bankruptcy. 139 F. App’x at 

27-28. While the bankruptcy proceedings remained pending, the state court 

divided the marital property. Id. at 28. The divorcing husband objected and 

asked the federal court to vacate the state court’s division of property, 

contending that it had been based on a void stipulation and had involved a 

denial of due process. Id. at 28. We held that this contention was 

(continued) 
16 

 Other requests do not facially require relief from the state court’s 

orders. For example, Mr. Flanders sought 

 restitution from Ms. Lawrence for benefits she had obtained in 

state court by asserting claims that had been discharged in 

bankruptcy court, 

 issuance of contempt and sanctions for pursuing claims 

discharged in bankruptcy court, and 

 injunctions against further collection efforts based on claims 

discharged in bankruptcy court. 

Id. at 821-25. These requests are inconsistent with the state court’s orders, 

as discussed below. But that inconsistency does not trigger the RookerFeldman doctrine. See Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1283 

(10th Cir. 2012) (stating that a federal claim is not precluded by the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine solely because the claim requests relief 

inconsistent with a state-court judgment). 

 We gave a similar example in Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 

1129 (10th Cir. 2006): 

To illustrate, say a father was deprived of custody of his child 

by a state-court judgment. If he files suit in federal court, 

seeking to invalidate the state-court judgment on the ground 

that the state-court proceedings deprived him of due process or 

that the judgment was otherwise contrary to federal law, his 

suit would be barred by Rooker-Feldman; the suit usurps the 

Supreme Court’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction because it 

 

unreviewable because the husband’s challenge to the state court’s division 

of property fell under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 29. 
17 

seeks to set aside the judgment based on a review of the prior 

proceedings. If, however, the father simply brought suit in 

federal court seeking custody of his child, without raising any 

complaint about the state-court proceedings, Rooker-Feldman

cannot be invoked; his federal claim would have been the same 

even in the absence of the state-court judgment. A myriad of 

doctrines, including res judicata, would almost certainly bar the 

suit. But because he is not seeking to overturn a state-court 

judgment, Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable, regardless of 

whether a favorable judgment in federal court would be 

inconsistent with that judgment and would “deny a legal 

conclusion that the state court has reached.” 

441 F.3d at 1145 (brackets omitted) (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. 

at 293). 

 Our case involves a state court’s division of property in a divorce 

rather than an award of child custody. But the principle is equally 

applicable. While some of Mr. Flanders’s claims are for relief from the 

state court’s orders themselves, other claims could theoretically proceed 

independently of the state court’s orders. All of these claims are 

inconsistent with the divorce court’s orders, but the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine bars only those claims seeking relief from those orders, like the 

claims seeking relief from the child-custody orders in the Bolden

illustration. See Loubser v. Thacker, 440 F.3d 439, 441-42 (7th Cir. 2006) 

(holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not preclude a claim for 

damages based on wrongdoing that had led to an erroneous judgment in a 

divorce proceeding). 
18 

2. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes consideration of the 

claims that seek to invalidate the state-court rulings based 

on a breach of the settlement agreement. 

Similarly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes consideration of 

some, but not all, of the claims involving alleged breaches of the 

settlement agreement. In the bankruptcy proceedings, Ms. Lawrence settled 

litigation against the trustee. In the present suit, Mr. Flanders claims that 

the defendants breached the settlement agreement and that the state court 

allowed the breaches to take place. As a result, Mr. Flanders seeks 

remedies directed at both the defendants and the state court. 

Some of these remedies were targeted to Ms. Lawrence based on her 

alleged breach of the settlement agreement, such as a declaratory judgment 

stating that 

 “Lawrence’s claim to $231,789.70 of surplus cash, part of the 

Net Equity in the Bankruptcy Estate, and or against Flanders, 

was a pre-petition claim that had been released by the 

Settlement Agreement and the Mutual Release”; 

 “Lawrence’s $1 Million pre-petition contribution claim against 

Flanders toward her $2 Million Promissory Note obligation to 

[Great Northern Transportation Co.], which was accomplished 

by an offset against Flanders’ share of the Marital Estate, is a 

claim that had been released under both the Settlement 

Agreement and the Mutual Release”; 

 “Lawrence’s $1,574,421.91 pre-petition contribution claim 

against Flanders for half of the accrued interest on the Note 

through June 22, 2009, which was accomplished by deleting the 

accrued interest on the Note from the valuation of [Great 

Northern Transportation Co.], functioned as an offset against 
19 

Flanders’ share of the Marital Estate, and is a pre-petition 

claim that had been released under . . . the Settlement 

Agreement and the Mutual Release”; and 

 “Lawrence’s claim to 1000 shares of Great Northern Land 

Company stock, 1000 shares of Canyon Quarry Company stock, 

and 6 of 8 burial plots at the Evergreen Cemetery as marital 

assets are pre-petition claims that had been released under both 

the Settlement Agreement and the Mutual Release.” 

R. at 165-66 (footnote & boldface omitted). 

Though relief to Mr. Flanders would conflict with the state court’s 

rulings, this conflict is not enough to trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

See p. 16, above. These claims are akin to a claimant’s federal action for 

child custody after being rebuffed in state court. In Bolden, we explained 

that these claims would fall outside of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See 

pp. 16-17, above. The same is true of Mr. Flanders’s claims involving 

breach of the settlement agreement after being rebuffed in state court. 

But these are not all of Mr. Flanders’s claims. In others, Mr. 

Flanders asks the bankruptcy court to overturn the state court’s rulings. 

For example, Mr. Flanders asks for a declaratory judgment providing that 

 the state court lacked “jurisdiction to make any determination 

as to ‘the performance or interpretation of the Settlement 

Agreement’” and 

 “the State Court’s orders recorded February 10, 2009 and June 

22, 2009, claiming the Net Equity assets remaining at the end 

of the bankruptcy case, specifically the [Great Northern Land 

Co.] and [Canyon Quarry Co.] stock, and 6 burial lots, 

constitute a pre-petition claim and are void ab initio in those 
20 

regards, as those assets are not marital property, but rather, are 

Flanders’ post-petition, after-acquired assets acquired from the 

Net Equity of the Bankruptcy Estate.” 

R. at 825. 

Through these claims, Mr. Flanders seeks invalidation of the state 

court’s orders. These claims are akin to a request for a federal court to 

invalidate a child-custody order, which we said in Bolden would trigger the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See pp. 16-17, above. Under this doctrine, we 

cannot entertain Mr. Flanders’s request for invalidation of the state court’s 

orders. 

* * * 

 These conclusions leave some claims for violation of the automatic 

stay and discharge order, breach of the settlement agreement, contempt, 

and sanctions. 

V. Issue preclusion forecloses relief on Mr. Flanders’s remaining 

claims, which involve violation of the discharge order, breach of 

the settlement agreement, contempt, and sanctions.

Mr. Flanders claims that the defendants violated the discharge order, 

breached the settlement agreement, and acted in a way that was 

contemptuous and sanctionable. We conclude that these claims are barred 

by issue preclusion because their success would require the parties to 

relitigate issues that the state court already decided. 
21 

To determine the preclusive effect of a state-court judgment in a later 

federal action, we look to the preclusion law of the forum state. Marrese v. 

Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985). Colorado is 

the forum state; and under Colorado law, 

[i]ssue preclusion bars relitigation of an issue if: (1) the issue 

sought to be precluded is identical to an issue actually 

determined in the prior proceeding; (2) the party against whom 

estoppel is asserted has been a party to or is in privity with a 

party to the prior proceeding; (3) there is a final judgment on 

the merits in the prior proceeding; and (4) the party against 

whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to 

litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. 

Sunny Acres Villa, Inc. v. Cooper, 25 P.3d 44, 47 (Colo. 2001). 

The bankruptcy court correctly concluded that these requirements 

were met with respect to two key issues: 

1. whether the settlement agreement released Ms. Lawrence’s 

claims to the property remaining after the conclusion of 

Mr. Flanders’s bankruptcy case and 

2. whether Mr. Flanders’s discharge prevented the state court 

from considering his promissory note when valuing and 

dividing the marital property. 

See R. at 900-02. 

 In the state-court proceedings, Mr. Flanders contended that the 

settlement agreement precluded award of the bankruptcy surplus to Ms. 

Lawrence. See id. at 348. The state court expressly rejected this 

contention: 
22 

Mr. Frank [Mr. Flanders’s attorney in state court] argues that 

the Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release between Ms. 

Flanders and the Bankruptcy Trustee in 2001 operated to 

release any claim she might have to the surplus. The Court has 

carefully read and reviewed those documents and concludes 

that they did not release any claim Ms. [Flanders] might have 

to the surplus. Bankruptcy surpluses are returned to the debtor, 

in this case Mr. Flanders. At the time the bankruptcy was filed 

the parties were married thus the assets that went into the 

Bankruptcy estate were marital property and any surplus 

coming out is marital property. The Release specifically related 

only to claims that could have been raised in the adversary 

proceeding that had been filed against Ms. Flanders by the 

Trustee. The adversary proceeding claims related to fourteen 

different claims for relief including fraudulent conveyance 

claims against both Mr. Flanders and Ms. Flanders. The Court 

further concludes that a bankruptcy surplus does not exist with 

certainty until the bankruptcy is completed and all creditors 

and interest paid. 

Id. The court repeated this holding in a subsequent order: 

In addition [Mr. Flanders] argues that the Settlement 

Agreement of March 23, 2001 and Mutual Release of April 30, 

2001 that settled the bankruptcy adversary proceeding that 

alleged fraudulent transfer claims against Mr. Flanders, Ms. 

[Flanders] and their companies acted to discharge any 

responsibility he might have for any debts. This Court 

disagrees. The Bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction over 

the entire marital estate. Further it appears that most of the 

remaining debt occurred after Mr. Flanders’ [sic] filed 

bankruptcy in October 1998. 

Id. at 357. 

 Mr. Flanders has repackaged the same contention through four 

allegations in his second amended complaint: 
23 

1. The state court’s order “constituted a breach of the Settlement 

Agreement and Mutual Release, for lack of Divorce Court 

jurisdiction in this matter.” 

2. The state court’s order was “void ab initio” because “the 

Settlement Agreement of March 23, 2001 reserved jurisdiction 

to the Federal Bankruptcy Court regarding matters of ‘the 

performance or interpretation of the Settlement Agreement.’” 

3. The assets awarded to Ms. Lawrence could not constitute 

marital property because “the [bankruptcy court] approved both 

the Settlement Agreement and the Mutual Release, releasing all 

claims against the Bankruptcy Estate . . . .” 

4. “The State Court, acting upon Lawrence’s claims, allegations, 

and arguments, granted all 4 of Lawrence’s invalid claims, in 

complete disregard of the Discharge Injunction, Settlement 

Agreement and the Mutual Release, despite the fact that the 

State Court approved each of these agreements, the result of 

which produced State Court orders that were a nullity and void 

ab initio.” 

Id. at 810, 818, 820 (citation & emphasis omitted). 

 The same is true of Mr. Flanders’s claims involving the discharge 

order. Here, too, Mr. Flanders argued in state court that Ms. Lawrence’s 

claims would require violation of the bankruptcy court’s discharge order. 

Id. at 357 (“Mr. Flanders has also argued that since all his debts were 

discharged by the Bankruptcy Court, he is not responsible for any of the 

remaining debt in the marriage.”).8 The state court disagreed, reasoning 

 

8

 The record on appeal does not contain the parties’ filings in the state 

district court. As a result, we must depend on the state district court’s 

orders to ascertain what the parties argued. 
24 

that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over the entire marital estate. 

Id.

Mr. Flanders renews the claim here, arguing that the state court’s 

division of property “was . . . a violation of [the bankruptcy court’s] 

Discharge Injunction.” Id. at 150; see also id. at 160 (alleging that the 

state court’s division of property was “clearly an attempt to collect on a 

discharged debt”). The issue here is identical to the one decided in state 

court, triggering issue preclusion.9

Mr. Flanders argues that issue preclusion does not apply because the 

bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction on the issue of 

dischargeability. This argument is based on a misunderstanding of Mr. 

Flanders’s claims and the state court’s orders. The state court did not 

purport to decide whether any debts were dischargeable, for 

dischargeability had already been determined in the bankruptcy 

proceedings. The state court was called upon to interpret the effect of the 

discharge on the marital division of property. Mr. Flanders does not 

suggest that the bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction to interpret the 

effect of a discharge order. See State Fin. Co. v. Morrow, 216 F.2d 676, 

679 (10th Cir. 1954) (“[T]he right to a discharge and the effect of a 

 

9

 Although identity of issues is only one of the four elements of issue 

preclusion, there is no doubt that the other three elements are met here. 
25 

discharge are entirely distinct propositions.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)).10

 When the state court set out to divide assets, Mr. Flanders argued 

that the discharge order prevented any award to Ms. Lawrence. In 

addressing Mr. Flanders’s argument, the state court had to interpret the 

effect of the bankruptcy court’s discharge order. That interpretation is 

entitled to issue-preclusive effect here even if the antecedent determination 

of dischargeability had fallen within the bankruptcy court’s exclusive 

jurisdiction. Thus, Mr. Flanders cannot relitigate the same argument here. 

See Rally Hill Prods., Inc. v. Bursack (In re Bursack), 65 F.3d 51, 53 (6th 

Cir. 1995) (stating that the bankruptcy court’s exclusive jurisdiction does 

not alter the rule requiring preclusive effect to state-court judgments). 

 

10 In his second amended complaint and his appellate briefs, Mr. 

Flanders characterizes the state court’s orders as “void ab initio” because 

they violated the discharge order. This characterization is incorrect. The 

state court clearly had jurisdiction over the division of property between 

Mr. Flanders and Ms. Lawrence. If Mr. Flanders is correct on his 

underlying claims, the state court’s division of property might have been 

erroneous, but that error would not render the orders void. See Union Joint 

Stock Land Bank of Detroit v. Byerly, 310 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1940) (stating that 

the district court’s erroneous application of a statute, which governed 

administration of a bankruptcy estate, rendered the order voidable (rather 

than void) and could not be attacked collaterally in a subsequent statecourt action); see also FDIC v. Shearson-American Express, Inc., 996 F.2d 

493, 498 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that even if a court had erred in finding 

no violation of a bankruptcy court’s automatic stay, the finding would be 

“entitled to respect” and invulnerable to collateral attack). 
26 

VI. Mr. Flanders forfeited his argument that the bankruptcy court 

had erred in determining that he lacked standing to allege 

violation of the automatic stay. 

Mr. Flanders argues that the bankruptcy court erred in determining 

that he lacked standing to assert that the state-court orders violated the 

automatic stay. But he admits that he did not raise this issue before the 

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. As a result, this issue was not preserved. See 

pp. 6-8, above.11

VII. Disposition 

 The bankruptcy court and Bankruptcy Appellate Panel concluded that 

the defendants were entitled to summary judgment. We too conclude that 

Mr. Flanders’s claims fail as a matter of law, but summary judgment is not 

the correct disposition for the claims invalidated based on the RookerFeldman doctrine or lack of standing. These are defects precluding subjectmatter jurisdiction. See PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1193 

(10th Cir. 2010) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Cornhusker Cas. Co. v. Skaj, 

786 F.3d 842, 851 (10th Cir. 2015) (standing). For such jurisdictional 

defects, summary judgment is ordinarily improper. See 10A Charles Alan 

 

11 Unlike the general exception to forfeiture for belated arguments that 

a district court or this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, we generally 

do not consider unpreserved arguments in favor of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 

90 F.3d 1514, 1518 n.2 (10th Cir. 1996). 
27 

Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Fed. Practice and Procedure, 

§ 2713, at 235 (3d ed. 1998) (“In general, courts have ruled that summary 

judgment is an inappropriate vehicle for raising a question concerning the 

courts[’] subject-matter jurisdiction . . . .”), quoted with approval in 

Shikles v. Sprint/United Mgt. Co., 426 F.3d 1304, 1317-18 (10th Cir. 

2005). Instead, these claims should have been dismissed without prejudice. 

See Garman v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 630 F.3d 977, 985 (10th 

Cir. 2010) (“[A] dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is without 

prejudice and does not have a preclusive effect.”). Thus, we remand with 

instructions to dismiss these claims without prejudice. See Shikles, 426 

F.3d at 1318 (“When a district court correctly determines that it lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction over a case, but incorrectly determines that the 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction justifies the entry of summary judgment, 

we have vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court 

for entry of an order dismissing the case.”). In all other respects, we 

affirm. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Robert E. Bacharach 

 Circuit Judge