# Jornal Oficial C 334/2014

| | ISSN 1977-1010 |
| --- | --- |
| Jornal Oficial
  da União Europeia | C 334 |
| | |
| Edição em língua portuguesa | Comunicações e Informações | 57.° ano25 de setembro de 2014 |

ISSN 1977-1010

Jornal Oficial

da União Europeia

C 334

Edição em língua portuguesa

Comunicações e Informações

57.° ano25 de setembro de 2014

---

| Número de informação | Índice | Página |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Comunicações |
| | COMUNICAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA |
| | Comissão Europeia |
| 2014/C 334/01 | Não oposição a uma concentração notificada (Processo M.7361 — Kaindl/DB ML/CTE) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2014/C 334/02 | Não oposição a uma concentração notificada (Processo M.7386 — KKR/Riverstone/Trinity) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Número de informação

Índice

Página

II   Comunicações

COMUNICAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA

Comissão Europeia

2014/C 334/01

Não oposição a uma concentração notificada (Processo M.7361 — Kaindl/DB ML/CTE) (
  1
  )

1

1

2014/C 334/02

Não oposição a uma concentração notificada (Processo M.7386 — KKR/Riverstone/Trinity) (
  1
  )

1

1

---

| | IV   Informações |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA |
| | Comissão Europeia |
| 2014/C 334/03 | Taxas de câmbio do euro | 2 |
| 2014/C 334/04 | Parecer do Comité Consultivo em matéria de acordos, decisões e práticas concertadas e de posições dominantes Emitido na sua reunião, de 3 de março de 2014, Relativo a um projeto de decisão respeitante ao Processo AT.39952 Bolsas de Eletricidade — Relator: Países Baixos | 3 |
| 2014/C 334/05 | Relatório final do Auditor — Bolsas de eletricidade (AT.39952) | 4 |
| 2014/C 334/06 | Resumo da Decisão da Comissão, de 5 de março de 2014, relativa a um processo nos termos do artigo 101.o do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia e do artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE — Processo AT.39952 — Bolsas de eletricidade [notificada com o número C(2014) 1204 final] | 5 |
| | Tribunal de Contas Europeu |
| 2014/C 334/07 | Relatório Especial n.o 13/2014 — Apoio da UE à reabilitação na sequência do sismo no Haiti | 7 |
| | INFORMAÇÕES RELATIVAS AO ESPAÇO ECONÓMICO EUROPEU |
| | Comissão Europeia |
| 2014/C 334/08 | Convite para apresentação de observações, nos termos da Parte I, artigo 1.o, n.o 2, do Protocolo n.o 3 do Acordo entre os Estados da EFTA relativo à criação de um Órgão de Fiscalização e de um Tribunal de Justiça relativamente a um alegado auxílio concedido à empresa Innovasjon Norge AS no âmbito das suas atividades no mercado de infraestruturas web e de serviços conexos, bem como ao eventual auxílio a favor dos SRT e dos OGT | 8 |
| 2014/C 334/09 | Parecer dos representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA apresentado na reunião do Comité Consultivo em matéria de decisões, acordos, práticas concertadas e de posições dominantes de 3 de março de 2014 relativo a um anteprojeto de decisão da Comissão no Processo AT.39952 Bolsas de eletricidade — Relator: Países Baixos | 28 |

IV   Informações

INFORMAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA

Comissão Europeia

2014/C 334/03

Taxas de câmbio do euro

2

2014/C 334/04

Parecer do Comité Consultivo em matéria de acordos, decisões e práticas concertadas e de posições dominantes Emitido na sua reunião, de 3 de março de 2014, Relativo a um projeto de decisão respeitante ao Processo AT.39952 Bolsas de Eletricidade — Relator: Países Baixos

3

2014/C 334/05

Relatório final do Auditor — Bolsas de eletricidade (AT.39952)

4

2014/C 334/06

Resumo da Decisão da Comissão, de 5 de março de 2014, relativa a um processo nos termos do artigo 101.o do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia e do artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE — Processo AT.39952 — Bolsas de eletricidade [notificada com o número C(2014) 1204 final]

o

o

[notificada com o número C(2014) 1204 final]

5

Tribunal de Contas Europeu

2014/C 334/07

Relatório Especial n.o 13/2014 — Apoio da UE à reabilitação na sequência do sismo no Haiti

o

7

INFORMAÇÕES RELATIVAS AO ESPAÇO ECONÓMICO EUROPEU

Comissão Europeia

2014/C 334/08

Convite para apresentação de observações, nos termos da Parte I, artigo 1.o, n.o 2, do Protocolo n.o 3 do Acordo entre os Estados da EFTA relativo à criação de um Órgão de Fiscalização e de um Tribunal de Justiça relativamente a um alegado auxílio concedido à empresa Innovasjon Norge AS no âmbito das suas atividades no mercado de infraestruturas web e de serviços conexos, bem como ao eventual auxílio a favor dos SRT e dos OGT

o

o

o

web

8

2014/C 334/09

Parecer dos representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA apresentado na reunião do Comité Consultivo em matéria de decisões, acordos, práticas concertadas e de posições dominantes de 3 de março de 2014 relativo a um anteprojeto de decisão da Comissão no Processo AT.39952 Bolsas de eletricidade — Relator: Países Baixos

28

---

| | V   Avisos |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDIMENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS |
| | Comissão Europeia |
| 2014/C 334/10 | Anúncio de concurso geral | 29 |
| | PROCEDIMENTOS JURISDICIONAIS |
| | Comissão Europeia |
| 2014/C 334/11 | Ação intentada em 17 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra a Islândia (Processo E-12/14) | 30 |
| 2014/C 334/12 | Ação intentada em 17 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra a Islândia (Processo E-11/14) | 31 |
| 2014/C 334/13 | Ação intentada em 17 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra a Islândia (Processo E-13/14) | 32 |
| 2014/C 334/14 | Ação intentada em 17 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra a Islândia (Processo E-14/14) | 33 |
| 2014/C 334/15 | Ação intentada em 18 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra a Islândia (Processo E-15/14) | 34 |
| 2014/C 334/16 | Ação intentada em 25 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra o Principado do Listenstaine (Processo E-17/14) | 35 |
| | PROCEDIMENTOS RELATIVOS À EXECUÇÃO DA POLÍTICA DE CONCORRÊNCIA |
| | Comissão Europeia |
| 2014/C 334/17 | Notificação prévia de uma concentração (Processo M.7372 — AXA/Hammerson/The real estate portfolio) — Processo suscetível de beneficiar do procedimento simplificado (
  1
  ) | 36 |

V   Avisos

PROCEDIMENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Comissão Europeia

2014/C 334/10

Anúncio de concurso geral

29

PROCEDIMENTOS JURISDICIONAIS

Comissão Europeia

2014/C 334/11

Ação intentada em 17 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra a Islândia (Processo E-12/14)

30

2014/C 334/12

Ação intentada em 17 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra a Islândia (Processo E-11/14)

31

2014/C 334/13

Ação intentada em 17 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra a Islândia (Processo E-13/14)

32

2014/C 334/14

Ação intentada em 17 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra a Islândia (Processo E-14/14)

33

2014/C 334/15

Ação intentada em 18 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra a Islândia (Processo E-15/14)

34

2014/C 334/16

Ação intentada em 25 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra o Principado do Listenstaine (Processo E-17/14)

35

PROCEDIMENTOS RELATIVOS À EXECUÇÃO DA POLÍTICA DE CONCORRÊNCIA

Comissão Europeia

2014/C 334/17

Notificação prévia de uma concentração (Processo M.7372 — AXA/Hammerson/The real estate portfolio) — Processo suscetível de beneficiar do procedimento simplificado (
  1
  )

1

36

---

| | Rectificações |
| --- | --- |
| 2014/C 334/18 | Retificação para atualização da lista de pontos de passagem de fronteira referidos no artigo 2.o, n.o 8, do Regulamento (CE) n.o 562/2006 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece o código comunitário relativo ao regime de passagem de pessoas nas fronteiras (Código das Fronteiras Schengen) ( JO C 316 de 28.12.2007, p. 1 ; JO C 134 de 31.5.2008, p. 16 ; JO C 177 de 12.7.2008, p. 9 ; JO C 200 de 6.8.2008, p. 10 ; JO C 331 de 31.12.2008, p. 13 ; JO C 3 de 8.1.2009, p. 10 ; JO C 37 de 14.2.2009, p. 10 ; JO C 64 de 19.3.2009, p. 20 ; JO C 99 de 30.4.2009, p. 7 ; JO C 229 de 23.9.2009, p. 28 ; JO C 263 de 5.11.2009, p. 22 ; JO C 298 de 8.12.2009, p. 17 ; JO C 74 de 24.3.2010, p. 13 ; JO C 326 de 3.12.2010, p. 17 ; JO C 355 de 29.12.2010, p. 34 ; JO C 22 de 22.1.2011, p. 22 ; JO C 37 de 5.2.2011, p. 12 ; JO C 149 de 20.5.2011, p. 8 ; JO C 190 de 30.6.2011, p. 17 ; JO C 203 de 9.7.2011, p. 14 ; JO C 210 de 16.7.2011, p. 30 ; JO C 271 de 14.9.2011, p. 18 ; JO C 356 de 6.12.2011, p. 12 ; JO C 111 de 18.4.2012, p. 3 ; JO C 183 de 23.6.2012, p. 7 ; JO C 313 de 17.10.2012, p. 11 ; JO C 394 de 20.12.2012, p. 22 ; JO C 51 de 22.2.2013, p. 9 ; JO C 167 de 13.6.2013, p. 9 ; JO C 242 de 23.8.2013, p. 2 ; JO C 275 de 24.9.2013, p. 7 ; JO C 314 de 29.10.2013, p. 5 ; JO C 324 de 9.11.2013, p. 6 ; JO C 57 de 28.2.2014, p. 4 ; JO C 167 de 4.6.2014, p. 9 ) ( JO C 244 de 26.7.2014 ) | 37 |

Rectificações

2014/C 334/18

Retificação para atualização da lista de pontos de passagem de fronteira referidos no artigo 2.o, n.o 8, do Regulamento (CE) n.o 562/2006 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece o código comunitário relativo ao regime de passagem de pessoas nas fronteiras (Código das Fronteiras Schengen) ( JO C 316 de 28.12.2007, p. 1 ; JO C 134 de 31.5.2008, p. 16 ; JO C 177 de 12.7.2008, p. 9 ; JO C 200 de 6.8.2008, p. 10 ; JO C 331 de 31.12.2008, p. 13 ; JO C 3 de 8.1.2009, p. 10 ; JO C 37 de 14.2.2009, p. 10 ; JO C 64 de 19.3.2009, p. 20 ; JO C 99 de 30.4.2009, p. 7 ; JO C 229 de 23.9.2009, p. 28 ; JO C 263 de 5.11.2009, p. 22 ; JO C 298 de 8.12.2009, p. 17 ; JO C 74 de 24.3.2010, p. 13 ; JO C 326 de 3.12.2010, p. 17 ; JO C 355 de 29.12.2010, p. 34 ; JO C 22 de 22.1.2011, p. 22 ; JO C 37 de 5.2.2011, p. 12 ; JO C 149 de 20.5.2011, p. 8 ; JO C 190 de 30.6.2011, p. 17 ; JO C 203 de 9.7.2011, p. 14 ; JO C 210 de 16.7.2011, p. 30 ; JO C 271 de 14.9.2011, p. 18 ; JO C 356 de 6.12.2011, p. 12 ; JO C 111 de 18.4.2012, p. 3 ; JO C 183 de 23.6.2012, p. 7 ; JO C 313 de 17.10.2012, p. 11 ; JO C 394 de 20.12.2012, p. 22 ; JO C 51 de 22.2.2013, p. 9 ; JO C 167 de 13.6.2013, p. 9 ; JO C 242 de 23.8.2013, p. 2 ; JO C 275 de 24.9.2013, p. 7 ; JO C 314 de 29.10.2013, p. 5 ; JO C 324 de 9.11.2013, p. 6 ; JO C 57 de 28.2.2014, p. 4 ; JO C 167 de 4.6.2014, p. 9 ) ( JO C 244 de 26.7.2014 )

o

o

o

37

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| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE |

---

(1)   Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE

1

| PT | |
| --- | --- |

PT

---

II Comunicações

COMUNICAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA

Comissão Europeia

| 25.9.2014 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 334/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 334/1

---

Não oposição a uma concentração notificada

(Processo M.7361 — Kaindl/DB ML/CTE)

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

(2014/C 334/01)

Em 11 de setembro de 2014, a Comissão decidiu não se opor à concentração notificada e declará-la compatível com o mercado interno. Esta decisão baseia-se no artigo 6.o, n.o 1, alínea b), do Regulamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 do Conselho (1). O texto integral da decisão apenas está disponível na língua alemã e será tornado público após terem sido suprimidos quaisquer segredos comerciais que possa conter. Poderá ser consultado:

| — | no sítio web Concorrência da Comissão, na secção consagrada à política da concorrência (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sítio permite aceder às decisões respeitantes às operações de concentração a partir da denominação da empresa, do número do processo, da data e do setor de atividade, |
| --- | --- |

—

no sítio web Concorrência da Comissão, na secção consagrada à política da concorrência (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sítio permite aceder às decisões respeitantes às operações de concentração a partir da denominação da empresa, do número do processo, da data e do setor de atividade,

| — | em formato eletrónico, no sítio EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=pt), que proporciona o acesso em linha ao direito comunitário, através do número do documento 32014M7361. |
| --- | --- |

—

em formato eletrónico, no sítio EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=pt), que proporciona o acesso em linha ao direito comunitário, através do número do documento 32014M7361.

---

(1)  JO L 24 de 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

| 25.9.2014 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 334/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 334/1

---

Não oposição a uma concentração notificada

(Processo M.7386 — KKR/Riverstone/Trinity)

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

(2014/C 334/02)

Em 19 de setembro de 2014, a Comissão decidiu não se opor à concentração notificada e declará-la compatível com o mercado interno. Esta decisão baseia-se no artigo 6.o, n.o 1, alínea b), do Regulamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 do Conselho (1). O texto integral da decisão apenas está disponível na língua inglesa e será tornado público após terem sido suprimidos quaisquer segredos comerciais que possa conter. Poderá ser consultado:

| — | no sítio web Concorrência da Comissão, na secção consagrada à política da concorrência (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sítio permite aceder às decisões respeitantes às operações de concentração a partir da denominação da empresa, do número do processo, da data e do setor de atividade, |
| --- | --- |

—

no sítio web Concorrência da Comissão, na secção consagrada à política da concorrência (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sítio permite aceder às decisões respeitantes às operações de concentração a partir da denominação da empresa, do número do processo, da data e do setor de atividade,

| — | em formato eletrónico, no sítio EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=pt), que proporciona o acesso em linha ao direito comunitário, através do número do documento 32014M7386. |
| --- | --- |

—

em formato eletrónico, no sítio EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=pt), que proporciona o acesso em linha ao direito comunitário, através do número do documento 32014M7386.

---

(1)  JO L 24 de 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

IV Informações

INFORMAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA

Comissão Europeia

| 25.9.2014 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 334/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 334/2

---

Taxas de câmbio do euro (1)

24 de setembro de 2014

(2014/C 334/03)

1 euro =

| | Moeda | Taxas de câmbio |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dólar dos Estados Unidos | 1,2826 |
| JPY | iene | 139,50 |
| DKK | coroa dinamarquesa | 7,4436 |
| GBP | libra esterlina | 0,78230 |
| SEK | coroa sueca | 9,1825 |
| CHF | franco suíço | 1,2077 |
| ISK | coroa islandesa | |
| NOK | coroa norueguesa | 8,1790 |
| BGN | lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | coroa checa | 27,497 |
| HUF | forint | 310,22 |
| LTL | litas | 3,4528 |
| PLN | zlóti | 4,1695 |
| RON | leu romeno | 4,4022 |
| TRY | lira turca | 2,8672 |
| AUD | dólar australiano | 1,4460 |
| CAD | dólar canadiano | 1,4207 |
| HKD | dólar de Hong Kong | 9,9425 |
| NZD | dólar neozelandês | 1,5908 |
| SGD | dólar singapurense | 1,6239 |
| KRW | won sul-coreano | 1 332,05 |
| ZAR | rand | 14,2735 |
| CNY | iuane | 7,8716 |
| HRK | kuna | 7,6248 |
| IDR | rupia indonésia | 15 339,21 |
| MYR | ringgit | 4,1560 |
| PHP | peso filipino | 56,995 |
| RUB | rublo | 48,9600 |
| THB | baht | 41,337 |
| BRL | real | 3,0850 |
| MXN | peso mexicano | 17,0409 |
| INR | rupia indiana | 78,2386 |

Moeda

Taxas de câmbio

USD

dólar dos Estados Unidos

1,2826

JPY

iene

139,50

DKK

coroa dinamarquesa

7,4436

GBP

libra esterlina

0,78230

SEK

coroa sueca

9,1825

CHF

franco suíço

1,2077

ISK

coroa islandesa

NOK

coroa norueguesa

8,1790

BGN

lev

1,9558

CZK

coroa checa

27,497

HUF

forint

310,22

LTL

litas

3,4528

PLN

zlóti

4,1695

RON

leu romeno

4,4022

TRY

lira turca

2,8672

AUD

dólar australiano

1,4460

CAD

dólar canadiano

1,4207

HKD

dólar de Hong Kong

9,9425

NZD

dólar neozelandês

1,5908

SGD

dólar singapurense

1,6239

KRW

won sul-coreano

1 332,05

ZAR

rand

14,2735

CNY

iuane

7,8716

HRK

kuna

7,6248

IDR

rupia indonésia

15 339,21

MYR

ringgit

4,1560

PHP

peso filipino

56,995

RUB

rublo

48,9600

THB

baht

41,337

BRL

real

3,0850

MXN

peso mexicano

17,0409

INR

rupia indiana

78,2386

---

(1)  Fonte: Taxas de câmbio de referência publicadas pelo Banco Central Europeu.

---

| 25.9.2014 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 334/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 334/3

---

Parecer do Comité Consultivo em matéria de acordos, decisões e práticas concertadas e de posições dominantes Emitido na sua reunião de 3 de março de 2014 Relativo a um projeto de decisão respeitante ao Processo AT.39952 Bolsas de Eletricidade

Relator: Países Baixos

(2014/C 334/04)

| 1. | O Comité Consultivo partilha as preocupações da Comissão expressas no seu projeto de decisão transmitido ao Comité Consultivo. |
| --- | --- |

1.

O Comité Consultivo partilha as preocupações da Comissão expressas no seu projeto de decisão transmitido ao Comité Consultivo.

| 2. | O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto ao facto de o comportamento anticoncorrencial a que diz respeito o projeto de decisão constituir um acordo e/ou prática concertada entre empresas na aceção do artigo 101.o do TFUE e do artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

2.

O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto ao facto de o comportamento anticoncorrencial a que diz respeito o projeto de decisão constituir um acordo e/ou prática concertada entre empresas na aceção do artigo 101.o do TFUE e do artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE.

| 3. | O Comité Consultivo concorda com a apreciação da Comissão relativamente ao âmbito do acordo e/ou prática concertada previsto no projeto de decisão, em termos de produto e área geográfica. |
| --- | --- |

3.

O Comité Consultivo concorda com a apreciação da Comissão relativamente ao âmbito do acordo e/ou prática concertada previsto no projeto de decisão, em termos de produto e área geográfica.

| 4. | O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto ao facto de as empresas abrangidas pelo projeto de decisão terem participado numa infração única e continuada ao artigo 101.o do TFUE e ao artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

4.

O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto ao facto de as empresas abrangidas pelo projeto de decisão terem participado numa infração única e continuada ao artigo 101.o do TFUE e ao artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE.

| 5. | O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto ao facto de o objeto do acordo e/ou prática concertada consistir em restringir a concorrência na aceção do artigo 101.o do TFUE e do artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

5.

O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto ao facto de o objeto do acordo e/ou prática concertada consistir em restringir a concorrência na aceção do artigo 101.o do TFUE e do artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE.

| 6. | O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto ao facto de o acordo e/ou prática concertada ter podido afetar de forma significativa as trocas comerciais entre os Estados-Membros da UE. |
| --- | --- |

6.

O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto ao facto de o acordo e/ou prática concertada ter podido afetar de forma significativa as trocas comerciais entre os Estados-Membros da UE.

| 7. | O Comité Consultivo concorda com a apreciação da Comissão quanto à duração da infração. |
| --- | --- |

7.

O Comité Consultivo concorda com a apreciação da Comissão quanto à duração da infração.

| 8. | O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto ao facto de dever ser aplicada uma coima aos destinatários do projeto de decisão. |
| --- | --- |

8.

O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto ao facto de dever ser aplicada uma coima aos destinatários do projeto de decisão.

| 9. | O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto ao valor das vendas. |
| --- | --- |

9.

O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto ao valor das vendas.

| 10. | O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto aos montantes de base das coimas. |
| --- | --- |

10.

O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto aos montantes de base das coimas.

| 11. | O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto à inexistência de circunstâncias agravantes ou atenuantes aplicáveis no presente caso. |
| --- | --- |

11.

O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto à inexistência de circunstâncias agravantes ou atenuantes aplicáveis no presente caso.

| 12. | O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto ao facto que não ser aplicável qualquer aumento das coimas para efeitos de dissuasão no presente caso. |
| --- | --- |

12.

O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto ao facto que não ser aplicável qualquer aumento das coimas para efeitos de dissuasão no presente caso.

| 13. | O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto à redução das coimas com base na Comunicação de 2008 relativa aos procedimentos de transação. |
| --- | --- |

13.

O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto à redução das coimas com base na Comunicação de 2008 relativa aos procedimentos de transação.

| 14. | O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto aos montantes finais das coimas. |
| --- | --- |

14.

O Comité Consultivo concorda com a Comissão quanto aos montantes finais das coimas.

| 15. | O Comité Consultivo recomenda a publicação do seu parecer no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia. |
| --- | --- |

15.

O Comité Consultivo recomenda a publicação do seu parecer no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia.

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Relatório final do Auditor (1)

Bolsas de eletricidade

(AT.39952)

(2014/C 334/05)

Em 22 de março de 2013, a Comissão deu início a um processo nos termos do artigo 11.o, n.o 6, do Regulamento (CE) n.o 1/2003 (2) contra as bolsas de eletricidade à vista EPEX Spot («EPEX») e Nord Pool Spot AS («NPS») (em conjunto, «partes»).

Após as conversações de transação e as propostas de transação apresentadas em conformidade com o artigo 10.o-A, n.o 2, do Regulamento (CE) n.o 773/2004 (3), a Comissão adotou em 11 de dezembro de 2013 uma comunicação de objeções («CO») dirigida às empresas EPEX e NPS, declarando que estas últimas tinham participado numa infração única e continuada ao artigo 101.o do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia e ao artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE. A CO alegou que as partes tinham participado num acordo de não concorrência que incluía uma repartição de territórios, com o objetivo de restringir a concorrência entre elas, no âmbito dos seus serviços de comercialização de eletricidade à vista.

Nas suas respostas à CO, tanto a EPEX como a NPS confirmaram que a CO refletia o teor das suas propostas de transação.

Nos termos do artigo 16.o da Decisão 2011/695/UE, examinei se o projeto de decisão dirigido à EPEX e NPS diz apenas respeito a objeções relativamente às quais as partes tiveram a possibilidade de se pronunciar, tendo chegado a uma conclusão positiva.

Por conseguinte, considero que o exercício efetivo dos direitos procedimentais de todas as partes neste caso foi respeitado.

Bruxelas, 3 de março de 2014.

Wouter WILS

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(1)  Nos termos dos artigos 16.o e 17.o da Decisão 2011/695/UE do Presidente da Comissão Europeia, de 13 de outubro de 2011, relativa às funções e ao mandato do Auditor em determinados procedimentos de concorrência (JO L 275 de 20.10.2011, p. 29) (Decisão 2011/695/UE).

1

o

o

(2)  Regulamento (CE) n.o 1/2003 do Conselho, de 16 de dezembro de 2002, relativo à execução das regras de concorrência estabelecidas nos artigos 81.o e 82.o do Tratado (JO L 1 de 4.1.2003, p. 1).

2

o

o

o

(3)  Regulamento (CE) n.o 773/2004 da Comissão, de 7 de abril de 2004, relativo à instrução de processos pela Comissão para efeitos dos artigos 81.o e 82.o do Tratado CE (JO L 123 de 27.4.2004, p. 18).

3

o

o

o

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RESUMO DA DECISÃO DA COMISSÃO

de 5 de março de 2014

relativa a um processo nos termos do artigo 101.o do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia e do artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE

Processo AT.39952 — Bolsas de eletricidade

[notificada com o número C(2014) 1204 final]

(Apenas faz fé o texto na língua inglesa)

(2014/C 334/06)

Em 5 de março de 2014, a Comissão adotou uma decisão relativa a um processo nos termos do artigo 101.o do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia e do artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE. Em conformidade com o disposto no artigo 30.o do Regulamento (CE) n.o 1/2003 do Conselho
   (1)
  , a Comissão publica os nomes das partes e o conteúdo essencial da decisão, incluindo as sanções impostas, acautelando o interesse legítimo das empresas na proteção dos seus segredos comerciais.

1.   INTRODUÇÃO

| (1) | A decisão refere-se a uma infração única e continuada ao artigo 101.o do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia (TFUE) e ao artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE relacionada com serviços de comércio de eletricidade à vista. Os serviços de comércio de eletricidade à vista são prestados por bolsas de energia para facilitar o comércio de produtos de eletricidade à vista. Incluem serviços para facilitar o comércio propriamente dito (ou seja, gerir uma bolsa de eletricidade), a gestão da atribuição implícita de capacidades de interconexão transfronteiras através do acoplamento de mercados, e os serviços a terceiros para o desenvolvimento e funcionamento do comércio de eletricidade à vista. A destinatária da presente decisão é a EPEX Spot («EPEX») e a Nord Pool Spot AS («NPS»). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

A decisão refere-se a uma infração única e continuada ao artigo 101.o do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia (TFUE) e ao artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE relacionada com serviços de comércio de eletricidade à vista. Os serviços de comércio de eletricidade à vista são prestados por bolsas de energia para facilitar o comércio de produtos de eletricidade à vista. Incluem serviços para facilitar o comércio propriamente dito (ou seja, gerir uma bolsa de eletricidade), a gestão da atribuição implícita de capacidades de interconexão transfronteiras através do acoplamento de mercados, e os serviços a terceiros para o desenvolvimento e funcionamento do comércio de eletricidade à vista. A destinatária da presente decisão é a EPEX Spot («EPEX») e a Nord Pool Spot AS («NPS»).

2.   DESCRIÇÃO DO PROCESSO

2.1.   Procedimento

| (2) | Em fevereiro de 2012, a Comissão realizou inspeções não anunciadas nas instalações da EPEX (em França) e da NPS (na Finlândia, na Noruega e na Suécia). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Em fevereiro de 2012, a Comissão realizou inspeções não anunciadas nas instalações da EPEX (em França) e da NPS (na Finlândia, na Noruega e na Suécia).

| (3) | A Comissão deu início a um procedimento relativo ao presente caso em 22 de março de 2013. As conversações com vista a uma eventual transação realizaram-se entre 3 de junho de 2013 e 14 de novembro de 2013. Posteriormente, a EPEX e a NPS (em conjunto designadas «partes») apresentaram à Comissão o seu pedido formal de transação nos termos do artigo 10.o-A, n.o 2, do Regulamento (CE) n.o 773/2004. Em 11 de dezembro de 2013, a Comissão adotou uma comunicação de objeções e ambas as partes confirmaram que o seu conteúdo refletia as suas observações e que continuavam empenhadas em prosseguir o procedimento de transação. O Comité Consultivo em matéria de acordos, decisões, práticas concertadas e de posições dominantes emitiu um parecer favorável em 20 de fevereiro de 2014 e a Comissão adotou a decisão em 5 de março de 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

A Comissão deu início a um procedimento relativo ao presente caso em 22 de março de 2013. As conversações com vista a uma eventual transação realizaram-se entre 3 de junho de 2013 e 14 de novembro de 2013. Posteriormente, a EPEX e a NPS (em conjunto designadas «partes») apresentaram à Comissão o seu pedido formal de transação nos termos do artigo 10.o-A, n.o 2, do Regulamento (CE) n.o 773/2004. Em 11 de dezembro de 2013, a Comissão adotou uma comunicação de objeções e ambas as partes confirmaram que o seu conteúdo refletia as suas observações e que continuavam empenhadas em prosseguir o procedimento de transação. O Comité Consultivo em matéria de acordos, decisões, práticas concertadas e de posições dominantes emitiu um parecer favorável em 20 de fevereiro de 2014 e a Comissão adotou a decisão em 5 de março de 2014.

2.2.   Destinatários e duração da infração

| (4) | As seguintes empresas cometeram uma infração ao artigo 101.o do Tratado e ao artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE ao participarem, nos períodos a seguir indicados, em atividades anticoncorrenciais no que respeita aos serviços de comércio de eletricidade à vista:






  a) | EPEX, de 21 de junho de 2011 a 7 de fevereiro de 2012; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(4)

As seguintes empresas cometeram uma infração ao artigo 101.o do Tratado e ao artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE ao participarem, nos períodos a seguir indicados, em atividades anticoncorrenciais no que respeita aos serviços de comércio de eletricidade à vista:

a)

EPEX, de 21 de junho de 2011 a 7 de fevereiro de 2012;

| b) | NPS, de 21 de junho de 2011 a 7 de fevereiro de 2012. |
| --- | --- |

b)

NPS, de 21 de junho de 2011 a 7 de fevereiro de 2012.

2.3.   Resumo da infração

| (5) | A EPEX e a NPS participaram num acordo de não concorrência que abrangia todos os seus serviços de comércio de eletricidade à vista no EEE e fora dele. O objetivo era restringir a concorrência entre si, de forma a proteger os seus baluartes tradicionais e chegar a acordo quanto à expansão em novos países, mantendo o equilíbrio de poder entre si. Em geral, as partes acordaram em não competir entre si. O acordo incluía, nomeadamente, uma repartição de territórios. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

A EPEX e a NPS participaram num acordo de não concorrência que abrangia todos os seus serviços de comércio de eletricidade à vista no EEE e fora dele. O objetivo era restringir a concorrência entre si, de forma a proteger os seus baluartes tradicionais e chegar a acordo quanto à expansão em novos países, mantendo o equilíbrio de poder entre si. Em geral, as partes acordaram em não competir entre si. O acordo incluía, nomeadamente, uma repartição de territórios.

| (6) | Considera-se que uma série continuada de contactos anticoncorrenciais envolvendo as partes foi iniciada o mais tardar em 21 de junho de 2011 e terminou em 7 de fevereiro de 2012. Os contactos entre as partes assumiram a forma de reuniões presenciais, chamadas telefónicas e videochamadas, e de mensagens por correio eletrónico, tendo envolvido quadros superiores de ambas as partes. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Considera-se que uma série continuada de contactos anticoncorrenciais envolvendo as partes foi iniciada o mais tardar em 21 de junho de 2011 e terminou em 7 de fevereiro de 2012. Os contactos entre as partes assumiram a forma de reuniões presenciais, chamadas telefónicas e videochamadas, e de mensagens por correio eletrónico, tendo envolvido quadros superiores de ambas as partes.

2.4.   Medidas corretivas

| (7) | A coima foi calculada em conformidade com as Orientações de 2006 para o cálculo das coimas (2). A decisão impõe coimas tanto à EPEX como à NPS. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

A coima foi calculada em conformidade com as Orientações de 2006 para o cálculo das coimas (2). A decisão impõe coimas tanto à EPEX como à NPS.

2.4.1.   Montante de base da coima

| (8) | O montante de base da coima é fixado em 16 % das vendas de serviços de comércio de eletricidade à vista de cada empresa no EEE. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

O montante de base da coima é fixado em 16 % das vendas de serviços de comércio de eletricidade à vista de cada empresa no EEE.

| (9) | O montante de base é multiplicado pelo número de anos de participação na infração, a fim de ter plenamente em conta a duração da participação de cada empresa na infração. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

O montante de base é multiplicado pelo número de anos de participação na infração, a fim de ter plenamente em conta a duração da participação de cada empresa na infração.

2.4.2.   Ajustamentos do montante de base

2.4.2.1.   Circunstâncias agravantes e atenuantes

| (10) | Não existem quaisquer circunstâncias agravantes nem atenuantes no presente caso. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Não existem quaisquer circunstâncias agravantes nem atenuantes no presente caso.

2.4.2.2.   Aumento específico de caráter dissuasivo

| (11) | No presente caso, não há necessidade de aumentar a coima para alcançar um efeito suficientemente dissuasivo. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

No presente caso, não há necessidade de aumentar a coima para alcançar um efeito suficientemente dissuasivo.

2.4.3.   Aplicação do limite de 10 % do volume de negócios

| (12) | No caso em apreço (com base nos últimos números disponíveis em matéria de volume de negócios), as coimas aplicáveis a ambas as partes excedem 10 % do seu volume de negócios total em 2012. Por conseguinte, as coimas para ambas as partes são limitadas a 10 % do respetivo volume de negócios total. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

No caso em apreço (com base nos últimos números disponíveis em matéria de volume de negócios), as coimas aplicáveis a ambas as partes excedem 10 % do seu volume de negócios total em 2012. Por conseguinte, as coimas para ambas as partes são limitadas a 10 % do respetivo volume de negócios total.

2.4.4.   Transação

| (13) | Como resultado da aplicação da Comunicação relativa aos procedimentos de transação (3), o montante da coima a aplicar à EPEX e à NPS é reduzido em 10 %. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Como resultado da aplicação da Comunicação relativa aos procedimentos de transação (3), o montante da coima a aplicar à EPEX e à NPS é reduzido em 10 %.

3.   COIMAS APLICADAS PELA DECISÃO

| (14) | No que diz respeito às infrações referidas supra, foram aplicadas as seguintes coimas:






  a) | EPEX Spot: 3 651 000 EUR; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(14)

No que diz respeito às infrações referidas supra, foram aplicadas as seguintes coimas:

a)

EPEX Spot: 3 651 000 EUR;

| b) | Nord Pool Spot AS: 2 328 000 EUR. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Nord Pool Spot AS: 2 328 000 EUR.

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(1)  JO L 1 de 4.1.2003, p. 1.

(2)  JO C 210 de 1.9.2006, p. 2.

(3)  JO C 167 de 2.7.2008, p. 1.

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Tribunal de Contas Europeu

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Relatório Especial n.o 13/2014 — «Apoio da UE à reabilitação na sequência do sismo no Haiti»

(2014/C 334/07)

O Tribunal de Contas Europeu informa que acaba de ser publicado o seu Relatório Especial n.o 13/2014, «Apoio da UE à reabilitação na sequência do sismo no Haiti».

O relatório está acessível para consulta ou download no sítio Internet do Tribunal de Contas Europeu: http://eca.europa.eu

Pode também obter-se gratuitamente, em versão papel, mediante pedido ao Tribunal de Contas Europeu:

| European Court of Auditors |
| --- |
| Publications (PUB) |
| 12 rue Alcide De Gasperi |
| 1615 Luxembourg |
| LUXEMBOURG |
| Tel. +352 4398-1 |
| Endereço eletrónico: eca-info@eca.europa.eu |

European Court of Auditors

Publications (PUB)

12 rue Alcide De Gasperi

1615 Luxembourg

LUXEMBOURG

Tel. +352 4398-1

Endereço eletrónico: eca-info@eca.europa.eu

Ou preenchendo uma nota de encomenda eletrónica na EU-Bookshop.

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INFORMAÇÕES RELATIVAS AO ESPAÇO ECONÓMICO EUROPEU

Comissão Europeia

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Convite para apresentação de observações, nos termos da Parte I, artigo 1.o, n.o 2, do Protocolo n.o 3 do Acordo entre os Estados da EFTA relativo à criação de um Órgão de Fiscalização e de um Tribunal de Justiça relativamente a um alegado auxílio concedido à empresa Innovasjon Norge AS no âmbito das suas atividades no mercado de infraestruturas web e de serviços conexos, bem como ao eventual auxílio a favor dos SRT e dos OGT

(2014/C 334/08)

Pela Decisão n.o 300/14/COL, de 16 de julho de 2014, publicada na língua que faz fé a seguir ao presente resumo, o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA deu início a um procedimento nos termos da Parte I, artigo 1.o, n.o 2, do Protocolo n.o 3 do Acordo entre os Estados da EFTA relativo à criação de um Órgão de Fiscalização e de um Tribunal de Justiça («Protocolo n.o 3»). As autoridades norueguesas foram informadas mediante cópia da decisão.

O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA («Órgão de Fiscalização») convida os Estados da EFTA, os Estados-Membros da UE e as partes interessadas a apresentarem as suas observações sobre a medida em causa no prazo de um mês a contar da data de publicação da presente comunicação, enviando-as para o seguinte endereço:

| Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA |
| --- |
| Registo |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA

Registo

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

As observações enviadas serão comunicadas às autoridades norueguesas. Qualquer interessado que apresente observações pode solicitar por escrito o tratamento confidencial da sua identidade, devendo justificar o pedido.

RESUMO

Processo

Por carta de 5 de julho de 2013, TellUs IT AS, que entretanto se uniu à New Mind («New Mind | tellUs», também designada «autor da denúncia»), apresentou uma denúncia ao Órgão de Fiscalização relativa à Innovasjon Norge AS («IN»), em que alegava que a IN beneficiava de um auxílio estatal para as suas atividades comerciais no mercado das infraestruturas web e de serviços conexos no setor do turismo.

O Órgão de Fiscalização trocou correspondência com as autoridades norueguesas e o autor da denúncia e reuniu-se com as duas partes.

Factos na origem do litígio

A IN é uma empresa pública de responsabilidade limitada criada em 2003 pelo Governo norueguês mediante a Lei sobre Innovasjon Norge AS («Lov om Innovasjon Norge» (1)). A empresa foi criada com o objetivo de contribuir para a inovação de empresas, o desenvolvimento em zonas rurais e uma maior competitividade das empresas norueguesas. A promoção da Noruega como destino turístico é também uma das funções da IN.

A IN destina-se a promover um aumento da rentabilidade nos vários segmentos do setor do turismo a nível nacional, sendo os serviços regionais de turismo («SRT») e os organismos de gestão de destinos («OGD») os principais intervenientes a nível local e regional. Os SRT e os OGD são empresas cujas ações são detidas conjuntamente pelas autoridades regionais ou locais e pelas empresas do setor privado do turismo ativas nas suas áreas geográficas respetivas.

As autoridades norueguesas decidiram recentemente adotar uma nova estratégia de turismo para tornar o apoio público ao setor mais eficiente, reduzir o número de atores e reforçar a coordenação entre eles. Com estes objetivos em mente, as autoridades norueguesas propuseram criar uma nova estrutura que se destina, nomeadamente, a reduzir o número de SRT e de OGD e consolidar os esforços da Noruega na promoção do turismo através da sua página web
  visitnorway.com.

Na nota destinada à IN relativa ao orçamento de 2013 (2), as missões da IN no setor do turismo são referidas do seguinte modo: «A Innovasjon Norge AS deve assegurar a difusão de experiências de viagem na Noruega através de visitnorway.com e ajudar os agentes do setor do turismo a integrar os seus produtos no sistema nacional de reservas ligado ao sítio visitnorway.com». A nota relativa ao orçamento de 2013 esclarece que: «A Innovasjon Norge AS não deve oferecer aos utilizadores serviços pagos em concorrência direta ou indireta com o setor privado. Na medida em que a Innovasjon Norge AS propõe serviços que podiam ter sido efetuados por prestadores privados, o preço solicitado pela Innovasjon Norge AS deve refletir os custos reais constatados, incluindo o que é abrangido pelos custos de base».

Em consequência, na presente fase do procedimento, o Órgão de Fiscalização entende que as autoridades norueguesas confiaram, desde 2013, um mandato à IN para promover ativamente o turismo através do sítio web, visitnorway.com, tornando esta plataforma um dos principais atores do setor do turismo. Além disso, a IN é autorizada, pela primeira vez, a exercer atividades económicas no setor do turismo.

O mercado a montante da atividade de promoção do turismo consiste no fornecimento de infraestruturas web e de serviços conexos. Estes serviços permitem que os clientes possam apresentar e atualizar regularmente informações sobre (por exemplo) zonas turísticas, hotéis, restaurantes e eventos em simultâneo na sua página web e através de outros canais externos tais como visitnorway.com, Google Maps, serviços de informação turística, portais móveis, bem como na imprensa escrita.

Anteriormente, a IN tinha um contrato com a New Mind | tellUs para os serviços informáticos necessários ao correto funcionamento de visitnorway.com. Entretanto, a IN desenvolveu as suas próprias funcionalidades. Para além disso, oferece esses serviços web (ou seja, infraestruturas e serviços conexos) aos SRT e aos OGD como parte dos serviços prestados no âmbito do sítio visitnorway.com. A infraestrutura web e os serviços conexos da IN não são oferecidos a um mercado geral, mas apenas aos SRT e aos OGD, por intermédio do sítio visitnorway.com.

Os SRT e os OGD que recorrem ao sítio visitnorway.com encerram os seus próprios sítios web e, consequentemente, cessam os seus anteriores contratos de serviços com os operadores privados (como o autor da denúncia). De acordo com este, o encerramento desses sítios web e a rescisão desses contratos constitui uma condição imposta aos SRT e aos OGD pela Innovasjon Norge AS. O autor da denúncia define esta alegada obrigação como uma cláusula de venda associada em violação da legislação de concorrência.

As alegadas medidas de auxílio estatal

As medidas apreciadas na presente decisão são as seguintes: i) a alegada subvenção cruzada da infraestrutura web e dos serviços conexos da IN mediante fundos destinados a atividades não comerciais; ii) a alegada perda de ganhos não realizados devido à orientação sem fins lucrativos das atividades da IN, incluindo a sua infraestrutura web e os serviços conexos; e iii) o alegado auxílio concedido pela IN aos SRT e aos OGD sob a forma de preços abaixo do preço de mercado.

Apreciação da medida

Existência de auxílio estatal

O artigo 61.o, n.o 1, do Acordo EEE estipula o seguinte: «Salvo disposição em contrário nele prevista, são incompatíveis com o funcionamento do presente Acordo, na medida em que afetem as trocas comerciais entre as Partes Contratantes, os auxílios concedidos pelos Estados-Membros das Comunidades Europeias, pelos Estados da EFTA ou provenientes de recursos estatais, independentemente da forma que assumam, que falseiem ou ameacem falsear a concorrência, favorecendo certas empresas ou certas produções».

O Órgão de Fiscalização considera, a título preliminar, que, com base na nota relativa ao orçamento de 2013, a IN entrou num novo mercado, em concorrência com operadores privados, propondo serviços contra uma remuneração. Estes serviços não são abrangidos pelo mandato para promover as empresas na Noruega. O Órgão de Fiscalização considera igualmente, a título preliminar, que o fornecimento de infraestruturas web e de serviços conexos implica a oferta de serviços económicos no mercado. Consequentemente, afigura-se que a IN deve ser considerada uma empresa para efeitos das regras em matéria de auxílios estatais no tocante aos serviços específicos considerados.

As informações disponíveis na presente fase não permitem que o Órgão de Fiscalização chegue a uma conclusão sobre a questão de saber se as medidas em questão implicam um auxílio estatal.

Na atual fase do procedimento, o Órgão de Fiscalização tem dúvidas quanto ao facto de a atual separação contabilística atual a nível da IN permitir distinguir entre as despesas e as receitas relativas a atividades económicas e não económicas, para cada um dos seus projetos, em especial no âmbito do projeto visitnorway.com. O Órgão de Fiscalização recorda que, quando uma entidade exerce simultaneamente atividades comerciais e não comerciais, deve implementar um sistema de contabilidade de custos, para assegurar que as atividades comerciais não são subsidiadas através de recursos estatais atribuídos às atividades não comerciais.

Além disso, o Órgão de Fiscalização observa que qualquer empresário ou investidor exige normalmente um retorno sobre o seu investimento numa empresa comercial. No entanto, não é claro, com base nas informações disponíveis, se a IN obtém lucros dos serviços económicos que presta fornecendo infraestruturas web e serviços conexos.

Se a política de preços da IN não assegura um rendimento do capital suficiente, tendo em conta todos os seus custos diretos e indiretos, os SRT e os OGD também podem eventualmente beneficiar de um auxílio estatal uma vez que são eles os beneficiários de serviços por um montante inferior ao seu custo real.

Novo auxílio

As autoridades norueguesas argumentam que, caso as medidas em apreço sejam consideradas auxílios estatais, tratar-se-ia de um auxílio existente nos termos do artigo 1.o, alínea b), subalínea i), ou do artigo 1.o, alínea b), subalínea v), da parte II do Protocolo n.o 3 do Acordo relativo ao Órgão de Fiscalização e ao Tribunal de Justiça. Nesta fase do procedimento, o Órgão de Fiscalização considera, a título preliminar, que, caso se considere que as medidas constituem auxílios estatais, devem também ser qualificadas como um novo auxílio ilegal.

No que respeita à aplicação do artigo 1.o, alínea b), subalínea i), da parte II do Protocolo n.o 3, o Órgão de Fiscalização considera, a título preliminar, que a entrada da IN num novo mercado (ou seja, o das infraestruturas web e serviços conexos), em que já estão presentes operadores privados, se encontra fora do mandato recebido do Governo norueguês. O seu sistema de financiamento também parece ser diferente. As atividades de promoção da IN são financiadas por recursos públicos, mas a nota relativa ao orçamento de 2013 esclarece que a prestação de serviços económicos deve ser financiada pelos destinatários dos serviços, mediante uma remuneração. Em consequência, o Órgão de Fiscalização considera a título preliminar, que qualquer auxílio concedido à IN no âmbito da prestação desses serviços deve ser qualificada como um novo auxílio.

Por último, o Órgão de Fiscalização não considera, na presente fase, que a medida possa ser considerada um auxílio existente, na aceção do artigo 1.o, alínea b), subalínea v), da parte II, do Protocolo n.o 3.

Compatibilidade

As autoridades norueguesas argumentaram também que se as medidas em questão fossem consideradas um novo auxílio de Estado, seriam compatíveis nos termos do artigo 61.o, n.o 3, alínea c), do Acordo EEE, enquanto auxilio ao setor do turismo. Contudo, as autoridades norueguesas não forneceram informações suficientes para demonstrar o seu ponto de vista.

Em qualquer caso, o Órgão de Fiscalização tem dúvidas quanto ao facto de as medidas de auxílio corresponderem a uma verdadeira deficiência do mercado e serem proporcionadas.

No que se refere à alegada cláusula de venda associada antes referida, o Órgão de Fiscalização considera, a título preliminar, que, se existir, e se for imposta pela IN, poderia ser contrária aos artigos 53.o e 54.o do Acordo EEE e, por conseguinte, as medidas não podem ser consideradas auxílios compatíveis com o mercado interno em aplicação da jurisprudência Matra
   (3).

Conclusão

Tendo em conta o que precede, o Órgão de Fiscalização tem dúvidas quanto a saber se se pode excluir que as medidas acima referidas constitui um auxílio estatal na aceção do artigo 61.o, n.o 1, do Acordo EEE. O Órgão de Fiscalização considera, nesta fase do procedimento, que se as medidas fossem definidas como auxílios estatais, tratar-se-ia de um novo auxílio. Por último, o Órgão de Fiscalização também tem dúvidas quanto à compatibilidade dessas medidas com o artigo 61.o, n.o 3, do Acordo EEE.

A luz das considerações que precedem, o Órgão de Fiscalização decidiu iniciar o procedimento formal de investigação em conformidade com o artigo 1.o, n.o 2, da Parte I, do Protocolo n.o 3, no que diz respeito ao alegado auxílio concedido à IN no âmbito das suas atividades no mercado de infraestruturas web e serviços conexos, bem como ao eventual auxílio a favor dos SRT e dos OGD.

Convidam-se as partes interessadas a apresentarem as suas observações no prazo de um mês a contar da data de publicação da presente comunicação no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia.

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(1)  LOV-2003-12-19-130. Acessível em: http://www.innovasjonnorge.no/no/om-oss/lov-om-innovasjon-norge/

(2)  O documento está disponível em:

http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/NHD/Vedlegg/Brev/2013_oppdragsbrev_innovasjonnorge.pdf#search=OPPDRAGSBREV®j_oss=1

(3)  Processo C-225/91 Itália/Comissão, Coletânea 1993, p. I-3203, n.o 41. De acordo com esta jurisprudência, os auxílios estatais com cláusulas que violem outras disposições do Acordo EEE não podem ser aprovados como auxílios compatíveis.

---

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 300/14/COL

of 16 July 2014

to initiate the formal investigation into the alleged aid granted to Innovation Norway for its activities within the market of web infrastructure and related services, as well as possible aid in favour of the Regional Tourist Boards and the Destination Management Organisations

(Norway)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 61 thereof,

HAVING REGARD to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

HAVING REGARD to Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(3) of Part I and Articles 4(4) and 6 of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | By letter dated 5 July 2013 (Event No 678002 and Annexes at Events No 678003-678007, 678010-678013 and 678017), TellUs IT AS (now merged with New Mind (1), and henceforth referred to as ‘New Mind | tellUs’ or ‘the Complainant’), made a complaint to the Authority in which it alleged that Innovasjon Norge AS (‘Innovation Norway’ or ‘IN’) receives state aid for its commercial activities in the web infrastructure and related services market, within the tourism sector. The complaint was received and registered by the Authority on 8 July 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

By letter dated 5 July 2013 (Event No 678002 and Annexes at Events No 678003-678007, 678010-678013 and 678017), TellUs IT AS (now merged with New Mind (1), and henceforth referred to as ‘New Mind | tellUs’ or ‘the Complainant’), made a complaint to the Authority in which it alleged that Innovasjon Norge AS (‘Innovation Norway’ or ‘IN’) receives state aid for its commercial activities in the web infrastructure and related services market, within the tourism sector. The complaint was received and registered by the Authority on 8 July 2013.

| (2) | By a letter dated 27 August 2013 (Event No 679974), the Authority requested the Norwegian authorities to provide their comments on the alleged state aid. On 24 and 25 September 2013, the Authority attended two meetings in Oslo. On 24 September 2013, the Authority received a presentation from New Mind | tellUs (Event No 684995). On 25 September 2013, the Authority discussed the complaint with the Norwegian authorities. At this meeting, IN (on behalf of the Norwegian authorities) provided the Authority with a presentation on the case (Event No 684996). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By a letter dated 27 August 2013 (Event No 679974), the Authority requested the Norwegian authorities to provide their comments on the alleged state aid. On 24 and 25 September 2013, the Authority attended two meetings in Oslo. On 24 September 2013, the Authority received a presentation from New Mind | tellUs (Event No 684995). On 25 September 2013, the Authority discussed the complaint with the Norwegian authorities. At this meeting, IN (on behalf of the Norwegian authorities) provided the Authority with a presentation on the case (Event No 684996).

| (3) | By a letter dated 4 October 2013 (Event No 685187), the Authority sent an information request to the Norwegian authorities. The Norwegian authorities replied to this request by forwarding two letters from IN, dated 28 October 2013 (Events No 688213 and 688215, together with Annexes at Events No 688214 and 688216-25). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

By a letter dated 4 October 2013 (Event No 685187), the Authority sent an information request to the Norwegian authorities. The Norwegian authorities replied to this request by forwarding two letters from IN, dated 28 October 2013 (Events No 688213 and 688215, together with Annexes at Events No 688214 and 688216-25).

| (4) | By an e-mail dated 15 November 2013 (Event No 690346), the Complainant commented on the Norwegian authorities' replies. IN submitted its observations on the Complainant's comments by way of a letter dated 20 December 2012, which was forwarded by the Norwegian authorities (Event No 694258). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

By an e-mail dated 15 November 2013 (Event No 690346), the Complainant commented on the Norwegian authorities' replies. IN submitted its observations on the Complainant's comments by way of a letter dated 20 December 2012, which was forwarded by the Norwegian authorities (Event No 694258).

| (5) | By an e-mail dated 10 January 2014 (Event No 695364), the Norwegian authorities provided the Authority with additional information. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

By an e-mail dated 10 January 2014 (Event No 695364), the Norwegian authorities provided the Authority with additional information.

| (6) | By emails dated 17 January 2013 and 3 March 2013 (Events No 696111 and 702175), New Mind | tellUs provided the Authority with additional information. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

By emails dated 17 January 2013 and 3 March 2013 (Events No 696111 and 702175), New Mind | tellUs provided the Authority with additional information.

2.   Background

2.1.   The Complainant

| (7) | The Complainant is an IT company which delivers online distribution solutions for the tourism industry. The company is active in several EEA countries and has a large portfolio of clients including several destination organisations (2) and travel agencies. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The Complainant is an IT company which delivers online distribution solutions for the tourism industry. The company is active in several EEA countries and has a large portfolio of clients including several destination organisations (2) and travel agencies.

2.2.   Innovation Norway (IN)

| (8) | IN is a limited liability state-owned company, which was established in 2003 by the Norwegian Government through the Act on Innovation Norway (‘Lov om Innovasjon Norge’ (3), hereafter ‘Act on IN’). The Norwegian Ministry of Industry and Trade owns 51 % of IN's shares, and the Norwegian counties own the remaining 49 % (4). IN enjoys a general exemption from Norwegian corporate income tax, pursuant to Section 2-30(1)(e)(5) of the Norwegian Tax Act of 1999 (5). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

IN is a limited liability state-owned company, which was established in 2003 by the Norwegian Government through the Act on Innovation Norway (‘Lov om Innovasjon Norge’ (3), hereafter ‘Act on IN’). The Norwegian Ministry of Industry and Trade owns 51 % of IN's shares, and the Norwegian counties own the remaining 49 % (4). IN enjoys a general exemption from Norwegian corporate income tax, pursuant to Section 2-30(1)(e)(5) of the Norwegian Tax Act of 1999 (5).

| (9) | The company was established with the purpose of contributing to business innovation, the development of rural areas and increasing the competitiveness of Norwegian companies. Section 1 of the Act on IN explicitly entrusts IN with the task ‘to promote corporate and social-economic development throughout the country, and trigger different regions industrial opportunities to contribute to innovation, internationalisation and promotion’ (6). IN manages and implements several Norwegian state aid schemes. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The company was established with the purpose of contributing to business innovation, the development of rural areas and increasing the competitiveness of Norwegian companies. Section 1 of the Act on IN explicitly entrusts IN with the task ‘to promote corporate and social-economic development throughout the country, and trigger different regions industrial opportunities to contribute to innovation, internationalisation and promotion’ (6). IN manages and implements several Norwegian state aid schemes.

| (10) | The tasks currently carried out by IN were previously accomplished by its four predecessor organisations: the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (‘SND’), the Government Consultative Office for Inventors (‘SVO’), the Norwegian Tourist Council (‘NTC’) and the Norwegian Export Council (‘NEC’) (7). In 2004, those four entities were discontinued and merged into IN. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The tasks currently carried out by IN were previously accomplished by its four predecessor organisations: the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund (‘SND’), the Government Consultative Office for Inventors (‘SVO’), the Norwegian Tourist Council (‘NTC’) and the Norwegian Export Council (‘NEC’) (7). In 2004, those four entities were discontinued and merged into IN.

2.3.   The Norwegian tourism structure and the new tourism strategy

| (11) | Several different entities are involved in the promotion of Norway as a tourism destination at national, regional and local level (8). |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Several different entities are involved in the promotion of Norway as a tourism destination at national, regional and local level (8).

| (12) | IN is intended to promote increased profitability within various segments of the tourism industry at a national level, continuing the tasks of its predecessors (9). The Norwegian Government has been an active stakeholder within the tourism sector since 1903 (10). |
| --- | --- |

(12)

IN is intended to promote increased profitability within various segments of the tourism industry at a national level, continuing the tasks of its predecessors (9). The Norwegian Government has been an active stakeholder within the tourism sector since 1903 (10).

| (13) | At the regional and local levels, the tourism promotion is ensured by the Regional Tourist Boards (in Norwegian ‘Regionalt selskap’, here referred to as ‘RTBs’) and the Destination Management Organisations (in Norwegian ‘Destinasjonsselskap’, here referred to as ‘DMOs’) (11). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

At the regional and local levels, the tourism promotion is ensured by the Regional Tourist Boards (in Norwegian ‘Regionalt selskap’, here referred to as ‘RTBs’) and the Destination Management Organisations (in Norwegian ‘Destinasjonsselskap’, here referred to as ‘DMOs’) (11).

| (14) | The RTBs are companies that serve the tourist industry in a regionally-defined geographical area (12). Those entities normally have public and private shareholders. According to information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the RTBs' tasks are international marketing; tourist information; regional marketing activities and knowledge; regional coordination of activities, and regional public relations activities. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The RTBs are companies that serve the tourist industry in a regionally-defined geographical area (12). Those entities normally have public and private shareholders. According to information provided by the Norwegian authorities, the RTBs' tasks are international marketing; tourist information; regional marketing activities and knowledge; regional coordination of activities, and regional public relations activities.

| (15) | The DMOs are companies that serve a defined number of destinations, products, attractions and tourist industry within a geographic region served by an RTB (13). DMOs are normally local and their structure varies. Their shareholders are normally public bodies and private companies. Their tasks under the national tourism strategy are product development; booking and sales; tourist information; destination development; competence development; destination market knowledge, and destination public relations activities. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The DMOs are companies that serve a defined number of destinations, products, attractions and tourist industry within a geographic region served by an RTB (13). DMOs are normally local and their structure varies. Their shareholders are normally public bodies and private companies. Their tasks under the national tourism strategy are product development; booking and sales; tourist information; destination development; competence development; destination market knowledge, and destination public relations activities.

| (16) | However, at the beginning of the 2010s, the Norwegian Government decided to adopt a new tourism strategy aimed at improving its national tourism structure. The objectives of the new strategy are to render the public support to the sector more efficient, reduce the number of actors and ensure more coordination among them (14). Moreover, the Norwegian authorities have stated that they aim to avoid a diversification of websites dealing with tourism in Norway, with different layouts, booking engines, languages and so on, which are funded by various Government bodies, counties or municipalities. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

However, at the beginning of the 2010s, the Norwegian Government decided to adopt a new tourism strategy aimed at improving its national tourism structure. The objectives of the new strategy are to render the public support to the sector more efficient, reduce the number of actors and ensure more coordination among them (14). Moreover, the Norwegian authorities have stated that they aim to avoid a diversification of websites dealing with tourism in Norway, with different layouts, booking engines, languages and so on, which are funded by various Government bodies, counties or municipalities.

| (17) | With these objectives in mind, the Norwegian authorities proposed a new tourism structure aiming, inter alia, to reduce the number of RTBs and DMOs and to consolidate Norway's tourism promotion efforts around IN and its webpage visitnorway.com. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

With these objectives in mind, the Norwegian authorities proposed a new tourism structure aiming, inter alia, to reduce the number of RTBs and DMOs and to consolidate Norway's tourism promotion efforts around IN and its webpage visitnorway.com.

| (18) | The Authority understands that the Norwegian authorities intend to change the existing structure of the tourism industry, by proposing a new one based, inter alia, on the promotion and development of the platform visitnorway.com, which is currently managed by IN. This implies changes in the way IN acts in the market and changes in the structure of visitnorway.com
   (15). |
| --- | --- |

(18)

The Authority understands that the Norwegian authorities intend to change the existing structure of the tourism industry, by proposing a new one based, inter alia, on the promotion and development of the platform visitnorway.com, which is currently managed by IN. This implies changes in the way IN acts in the market and changes in the structure of visitnorway.com
   (15).

| (19) | As part of the Norwegian authorities' new tourism strategy, on 1 February 2013, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries issued its 2013 State Budget for IN (hereafter ‘the 2013 Budget letter’) (16). The 2013 Budget letter entrusted IN with the mandate of ‘ensuring a good distribution of Norwegian travel experiences through visitnorway.com, and help to make the players in the tourist industry competent to enter their products into the national booking solution –linked to visitnorway.com
  ’ (17). |
| --- | --- |

(19)

As part of the Norwegian authorities' new tourism strategy, on 1 February 2013, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries issued its 2013 State Budget for IN (hereafter ‘the 2013 Budget letter’) (16). The 2013 Budget letter entrusted IN with the mandate of ‘ensuring a good distribution of Norwegian travel experiences through visitnorway.com, and help to make the players in the tourist industry competent to enter their products into the national booking solution –linked to visitnorway.com
  ’ (17).

| (20) | The 2013 Budget letter also stated that: ‘Innovation Norway shall not offer user-paid services that are in direct or indirect competition with private actors. To the extent that Innovation Norway offers services that could have been carried out by a private provider, the price that Innovation Norway asks must reflect the real accrued cost, including what is covered by the basic costs’
   (18). |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The 2013 Budget letter also stated that: ‘Innovation Norway shall not offer user-paid services that are in direct or indirect competition with private actors. To the extent that Innovation Norway offers services that could have been carried out by a private provider, the price that Innovation Norway asks must reflect the real accrued cost, including what is covered by the basic costs’
   (18).

2.4.   The market for web infrastructure and related services

| (21) | The present case relates to IN's activities in the market for web infrastructure and related services. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

The present case relates to IN's activities in the market for web infrastructure and related services.

| (22) | Web infrastructure and related services in the tourism sector are provided through ‘Destination Management Systems’ (‘DMS’), which are defined as ‘[s]ystems that consolidate and distribute a comprehensive range of tourism products through a variety of channels and platforms, generally catering for a specific region, and supporting the activities of a destination management organisation within that region. DMS attempt to utilise a customer centric approach in order to manage and market the destination as a holistic entity, typically providing strong destination related information, real-time reservations, destination management tools and paying particular attention to supporting small and independent tourism suppliers’
   (19). |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Web infrastructure and related services in the tourism sector are provided through ‘Destination Management Systems’ (‘DMS’), which are defined as ‘[s]ystems that consolidate and distribute a comprehensive range of tourism products through a variety of channels and platforms, generally catering for a specific region, and supporting the activities of a destination management organisation within that region. DMS attempt to utilise a customer centric approach in order to manage and market the destination as a holistic entity, typically providing strong destination related information, real-time reservations, destination management tools and paying particular attention to supporting small and independent tourism suppliers’
   (19).

| (23) | Through its DMS, an IT company such as the Complainant will offer a database service where its clients (destination companies) can submit and regularly update information about tourist sites, hotels, restaurants, events and similar simultaneously on their own webpage and on other external channels such as visitnorway.com, Google Maps, tourist information kiosks, mobile portals, and in printed newspapers. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Through its DMS, an IT company such as the Complainant will offer a database service where its clients (destination companies) can submit and regularly update information about tourist sites, hotels, restaurants, events and similar simultaneously on their own webpage and on other external channels such as visitnorway.com, Google Maps, tourist information kiosks, mobile portals, and in printed newspapers.

| (24) | These services allow clients to insert input data into the database and this information is then automatically disseminated on a number of different websites (including visitnorway.com). The information is then used by visitors for booking or informational purposes. These services are defined as web infrastructure and related services. They include different functionalities: (i) the ‘destinator’ functionality (the creation of points of interest or information flash to be published on the website); (ii) the ‘distribution’ functionality (the information stored in a database is distributed to many different channels and platforms) or (iii) the ‘search’ functionality (used on every website to search and present tourism products). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

These services allow clients to insert input data into the database and this information is then automatically disseminated on a number of different websites (including visitnorway.com). The information is then used by visitors for booking or informational purposes. These services are defined as web infrastructure and related services. They include different functionalities: (i) the ‘destinator’ functionality (the creation of points of interest or information flash to be published on the website); (ii) the ‘distribution’ functionality (the information stored in a database is distributed to many different channels and platforms) or (iii) the ‘search’ functionality (used on every website to search and present tourism products).

| (25) | According to the Norwegian authorities (20), the Complainant was alone on the Norwegian market offering those services for the last 17 years. However, in 2012-2013, a new international competitor, Citybreak, entered the Norwegian market offering the ‘destinator’ functionality, i.e. allowing tourism providers to create their points of interest. A graphic illustration of the functioning of these services is included in paragraph (31) below. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

According to the Norwegian authorities (20), the Complainant was alone on the Norwegian market offering those services for the last 17 years. However, in 2012-2013, a new international competitor, Citybreak, entered the Norwegian market offering the ‘destinator’ functionality, i.e. allowing tourism providers to create their points of interest. A graphic illustration of the functioning of these services is included in paragraph (31) below.

2.5.   IN's entrance into the market for web infrastructure services and related services

| (26) | The promotion of Norway as a tourism destination is one of IN's tasks. IN has developed and managed the platform visitnorway.com in order to fulfil its promotion task. Before 2013, IN only offered online marketing and promotion services on its visitnorway.com website. These services included web-advertising to the RTBs and the DMOs for an annual subscription fee, which represented a certain percentage of their turnover. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

The promotion of Norway as a tourism destination is one of IN's tasks. IN has developed and managed the platform visitnorway.com in order to fulfil its promotion task. Before 2013, IN only offered online marketing and promotion services on its visitnorway.com website. These services included web-advertising to the RTBs and the DMOs for an annual subscription fee, which represented a certain percentage of their turnover.

| (27) | However, IN has developed its own system and functionalities (21) and it is offering them to the RTBs and the DMOs which have migrated their websites to visitnorway.com. These RTBs and DMOs were previously clients of the Complainant. The Authority understands, at this stage of the procedure, that the strategy of offering these services to the RTBs and DMOs is closely linked to the decision of the Norwegian authorities to promote visitnorway.com by making it the main internet platform for tourism promotion in the country (see paragraphs (16) to (18), above). |
| --- | --- |

(27)

However, IN has developed its own system and functionalities (21) and it is offering them to the RTBs and the DMOs which have migrated their websites to visitnorway.com. These RTBs and DMOs were previously clients of the Complainant. The Authority understands, at this stage of the procedure, that the strategy of offering these services to the RTBs and DMOs is closely linked to the decision of the Norwegian authorities to promote visitnorway.com by making it the main internet platform for tourism promotion in the country (see paragraphs (16) to (18), above).

| (28) | In order to enter this new market, IN launched ‘Pilot ALFA’ between 2012-2013 – running two pilot projects called VisitSørlandet and VisitTrondheim. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In order to enter this new market, IN launched ‘Pilot ALFA’ between 2012-2013 – running two pilot projects called VisitSørlandet and VisitTrondheim.

| (29) | Once Visit Sørlandet AS (an RTB), and Visit Trondheim AS (a DMO) were selected to participate in Pilot ALFA, they signed a partnership agreement with IN, in order to use visitnorway.com templates, functionalities and content. As a consequence of the agreement, both companies redirected their URL (22) to visitnorway.com and discontinued their own homepages. The information available on those pages was migrated to visitnorway.com. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Once Visit Sørlandet AS (an RTB), and Visit Trondheim AS (a DMO) were selected to participate in Pilot ALFA, they signed a partnership agreement with IN, in order to use visitnorway.com templates, functionalities and content. As a consequence of the agreement, both companies redirected their URL (22) to visitnorway.com and discontinued their own homepages. The information available on those pages was migrated to visitnorway.com.

| (30) | When these two companies had their own website, they were clients of the Complainant. Accordingly, they used ‘tellUs destinator’ and ‘tellUs search’ functionalities, and paid a licence fee to the Complainant for this use. However, upon redirecting their URL to visitnorway.com and terminating their own website, these companies put to an end the contract for the search functionality, since within visitnorway.com only IN's search functionality can be used. They still have to contract with the Complainant or CityBreak for the ‘destinator’ functionality. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

When these two companies had their own website, they were clients of the Complainant. Accordingly, they used ‘tellUs destinator’ and ‘tellUs search’ functionalities, and paid a licence fee to the Complainant for this use. However, upon redirecting their URL to visitnorway.com and terminating their own website, these companies put to an end the contract for the search functionality, since within visitnorway.com only IN's search functionality can be used. They still have to contract with the Complainant or CityBreak for the ‘destinator’ functionality.

| (31) | The uses of the different functionalities, before and after Pilot ALFA, are represented in the following graphic: |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The uses of the different functionalities, before and after Pilot ALFA, are represented in the following graphic:

Image

| (32) | The services that IN was previously offering to these two types of companies (online marketing and promotion services on the visitnorway.com website), were offered for a fee calculated on the basis of their annual turnover. This pricing system was also applied during Pilot ALFA, with no additional charge made for the additional services provided by IN (i.e. web infrastructure and related services). |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The services that IN was previously offering to these two types of companies (online marketing and promotion services on the visitnorway.com website), were offered for a fee calculated on the basis of their annual turnover. This pricing system was also applied during Pilot ALFA, with no additional charge made for the additional services provided by IN (i.e. web infrastructure and related services).

| (33) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that the reason behind not charging extra for these additional services relates to the fact that the new services were under development, and the two companies involved in the pilot project invested time and effort in giving feedback to finalise the development of IN's functionalities; thereby ‘reimbursing’ the (unfinished) new services with their inputs. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that the reason behind not charging extra for these additional services relates to the fact that the new services were under development, and the two companies involved in the pilot project invested time and effort in giving feedback to finalise the development of IN's functionalities; thereby ‘reimbursing’ the (unfinished) new services with their inputs.

| (34) | From July 2013 to November 2013, IN undertook a project called ‘Pilot Beta’. During this pilot project, IN studied new alternatives, new business models, and the possibility of promoting new partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs. The Authority understands that during the Pilot Beta phase no new partnership agreements were signed. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

From July 2013 to November 2013, IN undertook a project called ‘Pilot Beta’. During this pilot project, IN studied new alternatives, new business models, and the possibility of promoting new partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs. The Authority understands that during the Pilot Beta phase no new partnership agreements were signed.

| (35) | As from 1 January 2014, IN has offered partnership agreements (see paragraph (5)) to all interested DMOs and RTBs on a non-discriminatory basis. IN offers its services exclusively to the RTBs and the DMOs as part of the Norwegian tourism structure, but not to other interested private companies (e.g. individual hotels, shops, or museums). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

As from 1 January 2014, IN has offered partnership agreements (see paragraph (5)) to all interested DMOs and RTBs on a non-discriminatory basis. IN offers its services exclusively to the RTBs and the DMOs as part of the Norwegian tourism structure, but not to other interested private companies (e.g. individual hotels, shops, or museums).

| (36) | The Authority understands that as from 1 January 2014, IN introduced a new pricing model for the new services it is providing, where the price charged is intended to reflect the costs of the services provided by IN, plus a reasonable profit margin of between 5 to 10 % per year. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The Authority understands that as from 1 January 2014, IN introduced a new pricing model for the new services it is providing, where the price charged is intended to reflect the costs of the services provided by IN, plus a reasonable profit margin of between 5 to 10 % per year.

3.   The complaint

| (37) | The complaint submitted by New Mind | tellUs separates IN's business promotion activities (including tourism promotion) from its activity related to the provision of web infrastructure and related services. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The complaint submitted by New Mind | tellUs separates IN's business promotion activities (including tourism promotion) from its activity related to the provision of web infrastructure and related services.

| (38) | The Complainant considers that IN's promotion activities and its tasks in relation to visitnorway.com, as a national tourism portal, can be considered to be a service of general economic interest (‘SGEI’) in line with the EEA state aid rules. However, since 2013, IN is entering a new market (23), offering economic services. Those new services are not part of the mandate received by IN and are not provided in line with the Altmark
   (24) case-law. As a consequence, IN's behaviour in the market should be in line with the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The Complainant considers that IN's promotion activities and its tasks in relation to visitnorway.com, as a national tourism portal, can be considered to be a service of general economic interest (‘SGEI’) in line with the EEA state aid rules. However, since 2013, IN is entering a new market (23), offering economic services. Those new services are not part of the mandate received by IN and are not provided in line with the Altmark
   (24) case-law. As a consequence, IN's behaviour in the market should be in line with the state aid rules.

| (39) | The Complainant refers to three different forms of alleged state aid:






  a. | the non-implementation of a separation of accounts for commercial activities within IN; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(39)

The Complainant refers to three different forms of alleged state aid:

a.

the non-implementation of a separation of accounts for commercial activities within IN;

| b. | the profits foregone through the non-profit orientation of economic activity referred to above, and |
| --- | --- |

b.

the profits foregone through the non-profit orientation of economic activity referred to above, and

| c. | the general exemption from the income tax granted to IN, also applicable to IN's economic activities. |
| --- | --- |

c.

the general exemption from the income tax granted to IN, also applicable to IN's economic activities.

| (40) | According to the Complainant, IN is not required to generate any profit and the company does not maintain separate accounts for its economic and non-economic activities. This implies spill-over effects, allowing IN to finance its economic activities with the funds that should be devoted to non-economic activities. Therefore, the measures entail state aid pursuant to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

According to the Complainant, IN is not required to generate any profit and the company does not maintain separate accounts for its economic and non-economic activities. This implies spill-over effects, allowing IN to finance its economic activities with the funds that should be devoted to non-economic activities. Therefore, the measures entail state aid pursuant to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (41) | New Mind | tellUs also alleges that IN requests its clients to terminate their previous contracts with New Mind | tellUs. The Complainant takes the view that this is a tie-in condition in breach of antitrust law (25). |
| --- | --- |

(41)

New Mind | tellUs also alleges that IN requests its clients to terminate their previous contracts with New Mind | tellUs. The Complainant takes the view that this is a tie-in condition in breach of antitrust law (25).

| (42) | In New Mind | tellUs' view, the aid measures have to be considered as new state aid since the entrance into a new market (i.e. offering web infrastructure and related services to the RTBs and the DMOs) falls outside the mandate received by IN and its predecessors. The Complainant considers that IN's mandate was limited to a general promotion of the country. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

In New Mind | tellUs' view, the aid measures have to be considered as new state aid since the entrance into a new market (i.e. offering web infrastructure and related services to the RTBs and the DMOs) falls outside the mandate received by IN and its predecessors. The Complainant considers that IN's mandate was limited to a general promotion of the country.

| (43) | New Mind | tellUs also states that the general tax exemption granted to IN should be considered to be state aid when it relates to income obtained by the performance of economic activities. This exemption would also be considered to be new state aid because it is related to the recent entrance of IN into economic activities. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

New Mind | tellUs also states that the general tax exemption granted to IN should be considered to be state aid when it relates to income obtained by the performance of economic activities. This exemption would also be considered to be new state aid because it is related to the recent entrance of IN into economic activities.

| (44) | Finally, the Complainant considers that as IN is not charging market prices for the services that it is providing to the RTBs and the DMOs, those companies are also beneficiaries of unlawful state aid (26). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

Finally, the Complainant considers that as IN is not charging market prices for the services that it is providing to the RTBs and the DMOs, those companies are also beneficiaries of unlawful state aid (26).

4.   Comments by the Norwegian authorities

| (45) | The Norwegian authorities disagree with New Mind | tellUs' legal assessment (27). |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The Norwegian authorities disagree with New Mind | tellUs' legal assessment (27).

| (46) | Firstly, the Norwegian authorities state that IN's purpose is to help to create profitable business in all parts of Norway, inter alia, by promoting the country as a holiday destination. IN's core activity is to promote business in Norway and not to operate any business itself. In functional terms, IN is merely a tool for the Norwegian authorities to grant aid, but it does not offer goods or services in the market. As a consequence, IN cannot be regarded as an undertaking being a recipient of state aid. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Firstly, the Norwegian authorities state that IN's purpose is to help to create profitable business in all parts of Norway, inter alia, by promoting the country as a holiday destination. IN's core activity is to promote business in Norway and not to operate any business itself. In functional terms, IN is merely a tool for the Norwegian authorities to grant aid, but it does not offer goods or services in the market. As a consequence, IN cannot be regarded as an undertaking being a recipient of state aid.

| (47) | In its view, since the core activities of IN are of a non-economic nature, the potential classification of secondary activities undertaken by IN as economic activities would not alter the fact that IN cannot be considered to constitute an undertaking (28). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

In its view, since the core activities of IN are of a non-economic nature, the potential classification of secondary activities undertaken by IN as economic activities would not alter the fact that IN cannot be considered to constitute an undertaking (28).

| (48) | The Norwegian authorities accept that IN carries out some activities of a particular nature. In particular, IN is involved in market loans, seed capital and investment funds. However, in these areas, certain ‘mechanisms’ have already been established to avoid any possible distortion of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The Norwegian authorities accept that IN carries out some activities of a particular nature. In particular, IN is involved in market loans, seed capital and investment funds. However, in these areas, certain ‘mechanisms’ have already been established to avoid any possible distortion of competition.

| (49) | Regarding the web infrastructure and related services, the Norwegian authorities emphasise that IN does not provide services to the general tourism market as such, but only to the RTBs and the DMOs (see also paragraph (35)). |
| --- | --- |

(49)

Regarding the web infrastructure and related services, the Norwegian authorities emphasise that IN does not provide services to the general tourism market as such, but only to the RTBs and the DMOs (see also paragraph (35)).

| (50) | The Norwegian authorities point out that the 2013 Budget letter states that: ‘Innovation Norway is to ensure a good distribution of Norwegian travel experiences through visitnorway.com, and help to make the players in the tourist industry competent to enter their products into the national booking solution – linked to visitnorway.com.’ Therefore, the web infrastructure and related services are part of this mandate to promote Norway as a tourism destination and support the tourism industry. In the opinion of the Norwegian authorities, visitnorway.com is a modern marketing and information tool and in order to make it operative, an IT platform infrastructure service is required. In other words, IN offers to the RTBs and the DMOs full web editorial services, through visitnorway.com, and not a stand-alone service, as offered by the Complainant. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Norwegian authorities point out that the 2013 Budget letter states that: ‘Innovation Norway is to ensure a good distribution of Norwegian travel experiences through visitnorway.com, and help to make the players in the tourist industry competent to enter their products into the national booking solution – linked to visitnorway.com.’ Therefore, the web infrastructure and related services are part of this mandate to promote Norway as a tourism destination and support the tourism industry. In the opinion of the Norwegian authorities, visitnorway.com is a modern marketing and information tool and in order to make it operative, an IT platform infrastructure service is required. In other words, IN offers to the RTBs and the DMOs full web editorial services, through visitnorway.com, and not a stand-alone service, as offered by the Complainant.

| (51) | The Norwegian authorities have also argued that those services are being offered to the RTBs and the DMOs as part of Norway's destination management tourism structure. All the entities involved in the tourism structure work closely together; they are all dependent on public funding, and they are closely integrated in the public sector. As a consequence, the Norwegian authorities take the view that IN is not acting on the market as such when providing internal services and coordinating the different levels of organisation within the national tourism structure. It is, rather, fulfilling its task as part of the body responsible for organising regional and local bodies within the management of Norwegian tourism. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

The Norwegian authorities have also argued that those services are being offered to the RTBs and the DMOs as part of Norway's destination management tourism structure. All the entities involved in the tourism structure work closely together; they are all dependent on public funding, and they are closely integrated in the public sector. As a consequence, the Norwegian authorities take the view that IN is not acting on the market as such when providing internal services and coordinating the different levels of organisation within the national tourism structure. It is, rather, fulfilling its task as part of the body responsible for organising regional and local bodies within the management of Norwegian tourism.

| (52) | The Norwegian authorities have, moreover, stated that IN does not impose a condition on the RTBs and DMOs to terminate its previous contract with the Complainant as alleged by the latter (see paragraph (41), above). |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The Norwegian authorities have, moreover, stated that IN does not impose a condition on the RTBs and DMOs to terminate its previous contract with the Complainant as alleged by the latter (see paragraph (41), above).

| (53) | Moreover, if the web infrastructure and related services could be considered to be economic activities, the Norwegian authorities consider that the alleged measures would be granted on the basis of an existing aid scheme (29), because the IN's financial system existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway. In the alternative, the Norwegian authorities have suggested that at the time the measure was put into effect, it did not constitute aid, and subsequently became aid as a consequence of the evolution of the European Economic Area without having been altered by the EFTA State (30). |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Moreover, if the web infrastructure and related services could be considered to be economic activities, the Norwegian authorities consider that the alleged measures would be granted on the basis of an existing aid scheme (29), because the IN's financial system existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in Norway. In the alternative, the Norwegian authorities have suggested that at the time the measure was put into effect, it did not constitute aid, and subsequently became aid as a consequence of the evolution of the European Economic Area without having been altered by the EFTA State (30).

| (54) | Concerning the alleged aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs, the Norwegian authorities recall that as of 2014, IN intends to promote partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs. They nevertheless underline that, in the framework of these partnership agreements, the services provided by IN (i.e. the web infrastructure and related services) will be provided for an annual fee. The Norwegian authorities state that their intention is to adopt a fully transparent pricing policy and apply a price close to the market price. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Concerning the alleged aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs, the Norwegian authorities recall that as of 2014, IN intends to promote partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs. They nevertheless underline that, in the framework of these partnership agreements, the services provided by IN (i.e. the web infrastructure and related services) will be provided for an annual fee. The Norwegian authorities state that their intention is to adopt a fully transparent pricing policy and apply a price close to the market price.

| (55) | Finally, the Norwegian authorities have stated that, in the event that the Authority finds any of the measures to constitute state aid, those should be considered compatible aid pursuant to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Finally, the Norwegian authorities have stated that, in the event that the Authority finds any of the measures to constitute state aid, those should be considered compatible aid pursuant to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

5.   Material scope of the investigation

| (56) | Based on the facts described above, the Authority considers it necessary to clarify the material scope of the investigation, as defined in the present opening Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Based on the facts described above, the Authority considers it necessary to clarify the material scope of the investigation, as defined in the present opening Decision.

| (57) | First, the present Decision refers to the activities of IN within the market of web infrastructure and related services. The Decision neither concerns the activities of IN regarding the general promotion of Norway as a tourist destination, nor the development of visitnorway.com. Nor does it refer to the role of IN as a vehicle of the Norwegian State to support business in Norway. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

First, the present Decision refers to the activities of IN within the market of web infrastructure and related services. The Decision neither concerns the activities of IN regarding the general promotion of Norway as a tourist destination, nor the development of visitnorway.com. Nor does it refer to the role of IN as a vehicle of the Norwegian State to support business in Norway.

| (58) | The present Decision only refers to the alleged state aid in favour of IN and/or the RTBs and the DMOs in the market of web infrastructure and related services. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

The present Decision only refers to the alleged state aid in favour of IN and/or the RTBs and the DMOs in the market of web infrastructure and related services.

| (59) | Second, the potential aid measures are the following:






  (i) | the alleged cross-subsidisation of IN's web infrastructure and related services with funds meant for non-commercial activities; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(59)

Second, the potential aid measures are the following:

(i)

the alleged cross-subsidisation of IN's web infrastructure and related services with funds meant for non-commercial activities;

| (ii) | the alleged foregoing of profits through the non-profit orientation of IN's economic activities, including the web infrastructure and related services; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the alleged foregoing of profits through the non-profit orientation of IN's economic activities, including the web infrastructure and related services;

| (iii) | the alleged aid granted by IN to the RTBs and the DMOs in the form of prices not sufficient to obtain a reasonable return on the investments; |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the alleged aid granted by IN to the RTBs and the DMOs in the form of prices not sufficient to obtain a reasonable return on the investments;

| (iv) | the general exemption from income tax granted to IN. |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

the general exemption from income tax granted to IN.

| (60) | The first three measures are linked to IN's entrance in the market of web infrastructure and related services. The legal assessment of those measures as possible state aid depends on the nature of such services, including whether they can be considered to be economic services. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

The first three measures are linked to IN's entrance in the market of web infrastructure and related services. The legal assessment of those measures as possible state aid depends on the nature of such services, including whether they can be considered to be economic services.

| (61) | Furthermore, the qualification of IN's activities as constituting possible new aid depends on the terms of the mandate received by IN and on the new activities allowed by the 2013 Budget letter. Taking into account that the legal assessment of those three measures depends on the result of a common analysis, the Authority considers that they can be assessed together within the scope of the present Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

Furthermore, the qualification of IN's activities as constituting possible new aid depends on the terms of the mandate received by IN and on the new activities allowed by the 2013 Budget letter. Taking into account that the legal assessment of those three measures depends on the result of a common analysis, the Authority considers that they can be assessed together within the scope of the present Decision.

| (62) | On the contrary, the last measure (iv) relates to a general income tax exemption and is not tied to IN's activities within the market of web infrastructure and related services (31). A legal assessment of this measure does not necessarily involve an analysis of IN's activities with regard to the tourism sector, or its tasks as manager of visitnorway.com. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

On the contrary, the last measure (iv) relates to a general income tax exemption and is not tied to IN's activities within the market of web infrastructure and related services (31). A legal assessment of this measure does not necessarily involve an analysis of IN's activities with regard to the tourism sector, or its tasks as manager of visitnorway.com.

| (63) | Because of these differences, the Authority will not assess whether the income tax provisions related to IN constitute state aid in the present decision. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Because of these differences, the Authority will not assess whether the income tax provisions related to IN constitute state aid in the present decision.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (64) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows: ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement’. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows: ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement’.

| (65) | A measure constitutes state aid pursuant to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if it fulfils four conditions. First, the measure must be funded by the State or through state resources and imputable to the State. Second, the measure must confer an advantage. Third, the measure must favour selected undertakings or economic activities. Fourth, the measure must be liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and liable to distort competition in the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

A measure constitutes state aid pursuant to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if it fulfils four conditions. First, the measure must be funded by the State or through state resources and imputable to the State. Second, the measure must confer an advantage. Third, the measure must favour selected undertakings or economic activities. Fourth, the measure must be liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and liable to distort competition in the EEA.

| (66) | The alleged foregoing of profits and the cross-subsidisation measures in favour of IN (measures (ii) and (i)) are assessed separately from the possible aid to the RTBs and the DMOs (measure (iii)), see paragraph (59) above. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The alleged foregoing of profits and the cross-subsidisation measures in favour of IN (measures (ii) and (i)) are assessed separately from the possible aid to the RTBs and the DMOs (measure (iii)), see paragraph (59) above.

1.1.   Possible aid measures in favour of IN

| (67) | It follows from Article 61(1) EEA that state aid rules only apply to advantages granted to undertakings. Prior to examining whether the conditions for state aid are met in this case, it is necessary first to examine whether IN qualifies as an undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

It follows from Article 61(1) EEA that state aid rules only apply to advantages granted to undertakings. Prior to examining whether the conditions for state aid are met in this case, it is necessary first to examine whether IN qualifies as an undertaking.

1.1.1.   Whether IN can be considered to be an ‘undertaking’

| (68) | It is settled case-law that undertakings are entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (32). Economic activities are those consisting of offering goods or services on a market (33). Offering goods and services on a market without making a profit can also constitute an economic activity (34). All entities that are legally distinct from the State and which engage in economic activities are considered to be ‘undertakings’, irrespective of whether these are public or private undertakings (35). |
| --- | --- |

(68)

It is settled case-law that undertakings are entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (32). Economic activities are those consisting of offering goods or services on a market (33). Offering goods and services on a market without making a profit can also constitute an economic activity (34). All entities that are legally distinct from the State and which engage in economic activities are considered to be ‘undertakings’, irrespective of whether these are public or private undertakings (35).

| (69) | If an entity is providing economic activities, it is to be considered as an undertaking in relation to those specific services alone, without reference to the way in which its other activities should be classified (36). |
| --- | --- |

(69)

If an entity is providing economic activities, it is to be considered as an undertaking in relation to those specific services alone, without reference to the way in which its other activities should be classified (36).

| (70) | As a consequence, the first step of the Authority's legal assessment requires an analysis of whether IN can be defined as an undertaking for the purposes of state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

As a consequence, the first step of the Authority's legal assessment requires an analysis of whether IN can be defined as an undertaking for the purposes of state aid rules.

| (71) | The Norwegian authorities have argued that IN is not an undertaking, but a mere vehicle used by the State to grant aid (see paragraph (46), above). They contend that IN is acting as an instrument of the State, and that it does not offer goods or services on a market. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The Norwegian authorities have argued that IN is not an undertaking, but a mere vehicle used by the State to grant aid (see paragraph (46), above). They contend that IN is acting as an instrument of the State, and that it does not offer goods or services on a market.

| (72) | Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities have argued that, within the scope of its task to promote businesses in Norway, IN is also entrusted with the mandate of promoting Norway as a tourist destination, which is the final goal of the platform visitnorway.com. As a consequence, since tourism promotion is a non-economic activity, IN is not offering web infrastructure and related services on the market. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Furthermore, the Norwegian authorities have argued that, within the scope of its task to promote businesses in Norway, IN is also entrusted with the mandate of promoting Norway as a tourist destination, which is the final goal of the platform visitnorway.com. As a consequence, since tourism promotion is a non-economic activity, IN is not offering web infrastructure and related services on the market.

| (73) | The Complainant, on the contrary, defines IN's task of promoting businesses in Norway as an SGEI, but an SGEI which is limited mere promotion activities, including tourism activities (37) (see paragraph (38), above). |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The Complainant, on the contrary, defines IN's task of promoting businesses in Norway as an SGEI, but an SGEI which is limited mere promotion activities, including tourism activities (37) (see paragraph (38), above).

| (74) | The Authority's preliminary view, at this stage, is that IN's main purpose appears to be to provide support to Norwegian businesses on behalf of the State. The Authority agrees that when IN is acting as a mere instrument of the State, IN does not provide services or goods on the market and its activities fall outside the scope of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Authority's preliminary view, at this stage, is that IN's main purpose appears to be to provide support to Norwegian businesses on behalf of the State. The Authority agrees that when IN is acting as a mere instrument of the State, IN does not provide services or goods on the market and its activities fall outside the scope of the state aid rules.

| (75) | The 2013 Budget letter establishes that IN should promote Norway as a tourism destination. In order to do so, the letter clarifies that IN should not provide services in competition with private operator and if it does, IN must apply market prices. The Authority understands that by the 2013 Budget letter the Norwegian authorities have allowed IN to provide economic services in competition with private operators, on condition that for those services IN must require an adequate remuneration. Thus, it is the Authority's preliminary understanding that such activities fall outside the scope of the mandate for IN regarding the use of public funds for the promotion of businesses in Norway. They are services which are economic in nature: neither an SGEI nor a non-economic activity (38). |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The 2013 Budget letter establishes that IN should promote Norway as a tourism destination. In order to do so, the letter clarifies that IN should not provide services in competition with private operator and if it does, IN must apply market prices. The Authority understands that by the 2013 Budget letter the Norwegian authorities have allowed IN to provide economic services in competition with private operators, on condition that for those services IN must require an adequate remuneration. Thus, it is the Authority's preliminary understanding that such activities fall outside the scope of the mandate for IN regarding the use of public funds for the promotion of businesses in Norway. They are services which are economic in nature: neither an SGEI nor a non-economic activity (38).

| (76) | Furthermore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that since those services (outside IN's mandate) seem to qualify as economic services, IN might also be defined as an undertaking regarding the provision of those services. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Furthermore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that since those services (outside IN's mandate) seem to qualify as economic services, IN might also be defined as an undertaking regarding the provision of those services.

| (77) | The Authority notes that IN enjoys, pursuant to the text of the 2013 Budget letter, a certain discretion in determining its course of action when providing economic services and it therefore is not acting under a specific mandate. IN is not forced to provide economic services on the market: the 2013 Budget letter only allows it to do so. These discretionarily elements have been seen by the General Court as relevant in differentiating between economic and non-economic activities provided by a single entity (39). |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The Authority notes that IN enjoys, pursuant to the text of the 2013 Budget letter, a certain discretion in determining its course of action when providing economic services and it therefore is not acting under a specific mandate. IN is not forced to provide economic services on the market: the 2013 Budget letter only allows it to do so. These discretionarily elements have been seen by the General Court as relevant in differentiating between economic and non-economic activities provided by a single entity (39).

| (78) | The Authority also underlines that IN's promotional activities are financed by the State (see paragraph (83), below) and that IN as such is not required to generate a return on capital (40). However, the 2013 Budget letter underlines that for the provision of those services, IN must cover the actual costs it has incurred, so that those services are not financed by public funds. The different methods of financing IN's activities illustrates the different natures of those activities: non economic activities or SGEIs, versus economic services. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

The Authority also underlines that IN's promotional activities are financed by the State (see paragraph (83), below) and that IN as such is not required to generate a return on capital (40). However, the 2013 Budget letter underlines that for the provision of those services, IN must cover the actual costs it has incurred, so that those services are not financed by public funds. The different methods of financing IN's activities illustrates the different natures of those activities: non economic activities or SGEIs, versus economic services.

| (79) | The Authority notes that the conclusion as to whether IN carries out an economic activity when providing web infrastructure and related services cannot be based on IN's objectives or on its general non-profitmaking orientation, but must be exclusively founded on an analysis of the services themselves (41). The Authority further notes that whatever IN's objectives are while providing these services, IN requests a remuneration for those services. Accordingly, it seems to the Authority that the objective of promoting tourism coexists with an economic objective (42). The Authority recalls in this respect that the definition of an entity as an undertaking depends on the nature of the specific activity under scrutiny. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority notes that the conclusion as to whether IN carries out an economic activity when providing web infrastructure and related services cannot be based on IN's objectives or on its general non-profitmaking orientation, but must be exclusively founded on an analysis of the services themselves (41). The Authority further notes that whatever IN's objectives are while providing these services, IN requests a remuneration for those services. Accordingly, it seems to the Authority that the objective of promoting tourism coexists with an economic objective (42). The Authority recalls in this respect that the definition of an entity as an undertaking depends on the nature of the specific activity under scrutiny.

| (80) | It is established case-law that in defining a service as economic, a significant factor is whether some kind of competition exists (i.e. if there are other entities offering the same or substitutable goods and services) (43). The Authority takes the preliminary view that this condition is met in the present case, since the services at hand are also provided by private operators, such as the Complainant. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

It is established case-law that in defining a service as economic, a significant factor is whether some kind of competition exists (i.e. if there are other entities offering the same or substitutable goods and services) (43). The Authority takes the preliminary view that this condition is met in the present case, since the services at hand are also provided by private operators, such as the Complainant.

| (81) | Furthermore, the Court of Justice has also underlined that the economic activities are normally offered against remuneration (44). The Authority notes that both the Complaint and IN provide for remuneration the services at issue in this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Furthermore, the Court of Justice has also underlined that the economic activities are normally offered against remuneration (44). The Authority notes that both the Complaint and IN provide for remuneration the services at issue in this Decision.

| (82) | Consequently, insofar as web infrastructure and related services are concerned, the Authority draws the preliminary conclusion that it cannot be excluded that IN is an undertaking within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement with regard to those services in question. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

Consequently, insofar as web infrastructure and related services are concerned, the Authority draws the preliminary conclusion that it cannot be excluded that IN is an undertaking within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement with regard to those services in question.

1.1.2.   Presence of state resources and imputability

| (83) | It is well-established case-law that public resources at the disposal of public undertakings owned or controlled by the State are considered to be state resources (45). IN is mainly financed by public funds (46). |
| --- | --- |

(83)

It is well-established case-law that public resources at the disposal of public undertakings owned or controlled by the State are considered to be state resources (45). IN is mainly financed by public funds (46).

| (84) | Foregoing profits is equivalent to granting a financial advantage. This kind of measure is mentioned in the Authority's Guidelines on State aid provisions to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector, which require transparency where the State foregoes profits (47). By foregoing profits, state resources are consumed. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Foregoing profits is equivalent to granting a financial advantage. This kind of measure is mentioned in the Authority's Guidelines on State aid provisions to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector, which require transparency where the State foregoes profits (47). By foregoing profits, state resources are consumed.

| (85) | Cross-subsidisation also consumes public resources, since the State is not only compensating for the cost of the non-economic activities with which an entity has been entrusted but also for some of the costs linked to the commercial activities of the same entity. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

Cross-subsidisation also consumes public resources, since the State is not only compensating for the cost of the non-economic activities with which an entity has been entrusted but also for some of the costs linked to the commercial activities of the same entity.

| (86) | The measures are imputable to the State, since IN is mainly financed through the public budget (see paragraph (83)). |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The measures are imputable to the State, since IN is mainly financed through the public budget (see paragraph (83)).

1.1.3.   The measure contains a potential advantage

1.1.3.1.   Cross-subsidisation of the web infrastructure and related services

| (87) | When an entity carries out both commercial and non-commercial activities, a cost-accounting system should be put in place to ensure that the commercial activities are not subsidised through state resources allocated to the non-commercial activities of that entity (48). Objective and transparent cost allocation mechanisms should be in place to ensure that the economic activities cover all the costs related to these operations (including all the costs related to that activity plus an appropriate share of the common costs). Without such mechanisms in place the commercial activities may gain advantages from the public funds granted to the non-commercial activities. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

When an entity carries out both commercial and non-commercial activities, a cost-accounting system should be put in place to ensure that the commercial activities are not subsidised through state resources allocated to the non-commercial activities of that entity (48). Objective and transparent cost allocation mechanisms should be in place to ensure that the economic activities cover all the costs related to these operations (including all the costs related to that activity plus an appropriate share of the common costs). Without such mechanisms in place the commercial activities may gain advantages from the public funds granted to the non-commercial activities.

| (88) | This rule is in line with the principles set out in the Transparency Directive (49) which requires financial transparency for public undertakings and separate accounts for companies enjoying special or exclusive rights granted by the State or entrusted with a service of general economic interest. The objective of those provisions is precisely to avoid advantages for public companies which are liable to distort free competition by means of state aid (50). |
| --- | --- |

(88)

This rule is in line with the principles set out in the Transparency Directive (49) which requires financial transparency for public undertakings and separate accounts for companies enjoying special or exclusive rights granted by the State or entrusted with a service of general economic interest. The objective of those provisions is precisely to avoid advantages for public companies which are liable to distort free competition by means of state aid (50).

| (89) | The Norwegian authorities have informed the Authority about the separation of accounts within IN. IN's annual accounts contain a total account for the company. This consolidated account is further separated into eight accounts, one for each type of activities/schemes (for example loans and funding projects). As a consequence, there is also a separate account for visitnorway.com. However, following a preliminary analysis, it seems to the Authority that neither the visitnorway.com account nor other account of IN differentiate the figures related to the provision of web infrastructure and related services. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Norwegian authorities have informed the Authority about the separation of accounts within IN. IN's annual accounts contain a total account for the company. This consolidated account is further separated into eight accounts, one for each type of activities/schemes (for example loans and funding projects). As a consequence, there is also a separate account for visitnorway.com. However, following a preliminary analysis, it seems to the Authority that neither the visitnorway.com account nor other account of IN differentiate the figures related to the provision of web infrastructure and related services.

| (90) | On the basis of the above, the Authority notes that the Norwegian authorities have not, at this stage of the procedure, provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that IN implements separate accounts for its economic activities, thereby avoiding possible cross-subsidisation. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

On the basis of the above, the Authority notes that the Norwegian authorities have not, at this stage of the procedure, provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that IN implements separate accounts for its economic activities, thereby avoiding possible cross-subsidisation.

1.1.3.2.   Profits foregone through the non-profit orientation of IN

| (91) | Any business owner or investor will normally require a return on its investment in a commercial undertaking. Such a requirement represents a normal and expected business cost for the undertaking. The Authority has already stated in its Manufacturing Guidelines that: ‘[i]f a public enterprise has an inadequate rate of return, the EFTA Surveillance Authority could consider that this situation contains elements of aid, which should be analysed with respect to Article 61. In these circumstances, the public enterprise is effectively getting its capital cheaper than the market rate, i.e. equivalent to a subsidy’
   (51). No state resources are involved only where a full-cost prices policy is adopted, so as to cover the total costs (variable and fixed costs) plus a mark-up to remunerate equity capital (52). |
| --- | --- |

(91)

Any business owner or investor will normally require a return on its investment in a commercial undertaking. Such a requirement represents a normal and expected business cost for the undertaking. The Authority has already stated in its Manufacturing Guidelines that: ‘[i]f a public enterprise has an inadequate rate of return, the EFTA Surveillance Authority could consider that this situation contains elements of aid, which should be analysed with respect to Article 61. In these circumstances, the public enterprise is effectively getting its capital cheaper than the market rate, i.e. equivalent to a subsidy’
   (51). No state resources are involved only where a full-cost prices policy is adopted, so as to cover the total costs (variable and fixed costs) plus a mark-up to remunerate equity capital (52).

| (92) | In the case at hand, the Authority currently has doubts as to whether IN obtains profits — sufficient to generate a reasonable return on the investment — from its services to the RTBs and the DMOs. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

In the case at hand, the Authority currently has doubts as to whether IN obtains profits — sufficient to generate a reasonable return on the investment — from its services to the RTBs and the DMOs.

| (93) | The 2013 Budget letter states that if IN provides commercial services, it should act in line with the market conditions. This would imply, inter alia, requiring a reasonable profit margin. In the same line, according to the information provided to the Authority, in the framework of the partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs, IN foresees obtaining a profit of between 5 and 7 %. However, at the time being it is not clear to the Authority if IN is taking into account all relevant costs (including all the investment costs — not only operating costs — plus an appropriate share of the common costs) in calculating these margins. The Authority also has been given no information as to what is the average profit margin that a private operator would request for this type of investments. This is necessary for the purposes of determining whether a profit between 5 and 7 % is enough. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The 2013 Budget letter states that if IN provides commercial services, it should act in line with the market conditions. This would imply, inter alia, requiring a reasonable profit margin. In the same line, according to the information provided to the Authority, in the framework of the partnership agreements with the RTBs and the DMOs, IN foresees obtaining a profit of between 5 and 7 %. However, at the time being it is not clear to the Authority if IN is taking into account all relevant costs (including all the investment costs — not only operating costs — plus an appropriate share of the common costs) in calculating these margins. The Authority also has been given no information as to what is the average profit margin that a private operator would request for this type of investments. This is necessary for the purposes of determining whether a profit between 5 and 7 % is enough.

| (94) | The Authority therefore has doubts, at this stage of the investigation, as to whether it can be excluded that IN is benefiting from an advantage in the form of the general non-profit orientation of its commercial activities. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

The Authority therefore has doubts, at this stage of the investigation, as to whether it can be excluded that IN is benefiting from an advantage in the form of the general non-profit orientation of its commercial activities.

1.1.4.   Selectivity

| (95) | Only IN could benefit from the alleged advantages described above. Private operators competing with IN do not receive comparable possible advantages. Accordingly, the alleged advantages under assessment in this section of the Decision represent selective measures, as they only concern one particular undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

Only IN could benefit from the alleged advantages described above. Private operators competing with IN do not receive comparable possible advantages. Accordingly, the alleged advantages under assessment in this section of the Decision represent selective measures, as they only concern one particular undertaking.

1.1.5.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (96) | According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, in order to assess whether a measure is liable to distort competition and liable to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement, a party in the position of the Authority ‘[i]s required, not to establish that such aid has a real effect on trade between Member States and that competition is actually being distorted, but only to examine whether that aid is liable to affect such trade and distort competition’
   (53). The mere fact that aid strengthens an undertaking's position compared to that of other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade is enough to conclude that the measure is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement (54). |
| --- | --- |

(96)

According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, in order to assess whether a measure is liable to distort competition and liable to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement, a party in the position of the Authority ‘[i]s required, not to establish that such aid has a real effect on trade between Member States and that competition is actually being distorted, but only to examine whether that aid is liable to affect such trade and distort competition’
   (53). The mere fact that aid strengthens an undertaking's position compared to that of other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade is enough to conclude that the measure is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement (54).

| (97) | The Authority considers that IN's shareholders should require it to generate a profit from its economic activities. Therefore, if the web infrastructure and related services were to be defined as economic activities, by not requiring a reasonable profit, IN would be obtaining certain advantages as compared to private operators active in the same market (such as the Complainant). The same can be said regarding the risk of cross-subsidisation, since IN could be funding its commercial activities with the funds intended for its non-economic activities. |
| --- | --- |

(97)

The Authority considers that IN's shareholders should require it to generate a profit from its economic activities. Therefore, if the web infrastructure and related services were to be defined as economic activities, by not requiring a reasonable profit, IN would be obtaining certain advantages as compared to private operators active in the same market (such as the Complainant). The same can be said regarding the risk of cross-subsidisation, since IN could be funding its commercial activities with the funds intended for its non-economic activities.

| (98) | The Authority also notes that the measures concerned, and the consequent advantage for IN, could create an obstacle for companies from the EEA wishing to offer their services in Norway and therefore trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement is liable to be affected (55). |
| --- | --- |

(98)

The Authority also notes that the measures concerned, and the consequent advantage for IN, could create an obstacle for companies from the EEA wishing to offer their services in Norway and therefore trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement is liable to be affected (55).

| (99) | Finally, the Authority underlines that the clients of the private operators competing with IN are private tourism entities as well as the RTBs and the DMOs. If the measures at issue in the present Decision allow IN to provide cheaper services to the RTBs and the DMOs and, as a consequence, they move to visitnorway.com, it seems to the Authority that an important part of the market could be excluded from fair competition. Accordingly the measures are liable to distort competition and affect trade. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

Finally, the Authority underlines that the clients of the private operators competing with IN are private tourism entities as well as the RTBs and the DMOs. If the measures at issue in the present Decision allow IN to provide cheaper services to the RTBs and the DMOs and, as a consequence, they move to visitnorway.com, it seems to the Authority that an important part of the market could be excluded from fair competition. Accordingly the measures are liable to distort competition and affect trade.

| (100) | The Authority therefore concludes at the current stage of the procedure that the measures at issue are liable to affect trade and distort competition between undertakings within the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

The Authority therefore concludes at the current stage of the procedure that the measures at issue are liable to affect trade and distort competition between undertakings within the EEA.

1.2.   Preliminary conclusion

| (101) | For the reasons set out above, and on the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether it can be excluded that the measures at issue in the present section constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

For the reasons set out above, and on the basis of the information available, the Authority has doubts as to whether it can be excluded that the measures at issue in the present section constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.3.   Possible state aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs

| (102) | The existence of possible state aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs will depend on the conclusions reached by the Authority regarding the alleged state aid measures in favour of IN. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

The existence of possible state aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs will depend on the conclusions reached by the Authority regarding the alleged state aid measures in favour of IN.

| (103) | The Authority's assessment in this respect will depend on the conclusion which it reaches on the alleged foregoing of profits by IN (see paragraphs (91) to (94), above). If IN were to charge, for the services provided to its clients (exclusively the RTBs and the DMOs), a price sufficient to generate adequate profits, the existence of aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs would be excluded. On the contrary, if the prices are not sufficient to cover the costs, the Authority considers that, in this specific case, those companies might in turn be beneficiaries of state aid. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

The Authority's assessment in this respect will depend on the conclusion which it reaches on the alleged foregoing of profits by IN (see paragraphs (91) to (94), above). If IN were to charge, for the services provided to its clients (exclusively the RTBs and the DMOs), a price sufficient to generate adequate profits, the existence of aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs would be excluded. On the contrary, if the prices are not sufficient to cover the costs, the Authority considers that, in this specific case, those companies might in turn be beneficiaries of state aid.

| (104) | Taking into account that, at this stage of the procedure, the Authority has doubts as to whether the existence of a state aid measure by means of profit foregoing can be excluded, the Authority will therefore also assess, on a preliminary basis, the question of possible aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

Taking into account that, at this stage of the procedure, the Authority has doubts as to whether the existence of a state aid measure by means of profit foregoing can be excluded, the Authority will therefore also assess, on a preliminary basis, the question of possible aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs.

1.3.1.   Presence of state resources and imputability

| (105) | It is established case-law that a measure is financed through state resources if it results in a burden on the budget of a public undertaking, provided that the measure is imputable to the state (56). The concept of state aid covers all the financial means by which the public authorities may actually support undertakings (57). |
| --- | --- |

(105)

It is established case-law that a measure is financed through state resources if it results in a burden on the budget of a public undertaking, provided that the measure is imputable to the state (56). The concept of state aid covers all the financial means by which the public authorities may actually support undertakings (57).

| (106) | On this basis, the Authority considers that offering services at prices lower than the price prevailing on the market, without recovering their total costs, implies a loss of revenue equivalent to a consumption of state resources. The Authority has doubts whether all costs (operating and investments costs) are taken into account while setting the final price for RTBs and DMOs. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

On this basis, the Authority considers that offering services at prices lower than the price prevailing on the market, without recovering their total costs, implies a loss of revenue equivalent to a consumption of state resources. The Authority has doubts whether all costs (operating and investments costs) are taken into account while setting the final price for RTBs and DMOs.

| (107) | Furthermore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the measure is imputable to the Norwegian authorities (58). The Authority notes that there is a close relationship between the State and IN. IN is normally used as an instrument to grant aid measures. Furthermore, IN is fully owned by public bodies, controlled by them and instructed by the Norwegian authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(107)

Furthermore, the Authority takes the preliminary view that the measure is imputable to the Norwegian authorities (58). The Authority notes that there is a close relationship between the State and IN. IN is normally used as an instrument to grant aid measures. Furthermore, IN is fully owned by public bodies, controlled by them and instructed by the Norwegian authorities.

1.3.2.   The measure contains an ‘advantage’

| (108) | It is established case-law that a state intervention favours an undertaking if it provides the undertaking with an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions (59). This will be the case if the RTBs and the DMOs are being offered services below their real cost, without IN obtaining a sufficient return on its investment costs. |
| --- | --- |

(108)

It is established case-law that a state intervention favours an undertaking if it provides the undertaking with an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions (59). This will be the case if the RTBs and the DMOs are being offered services below their real cost, without IN obtaining a sufficient return on its investment costs.

| (109) | The fact that the RTBs and the DMOs are part of the national tourism structure (see paragraph (11), above) does not alter this conclusion. The Authority notes in particular that the shareholders of the RTBs and DMOs are not only public entities, but also private companies. Accordingly, it does not seem possible to qualify the measure as a mere cooperation amongst public entities. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

The fact that the RTBs and the DMOs are part of the national tourism structure (see paragraph (11), above) does not alter this conclusion. The Authority notes in particular that the shareholders of the RTBs and DMOs are not only public entities, but also private companies. Accordingly, it does not seem possible to qualify the measure as a mere cooperation amongst public entities.

1.3.3.   Selectivity

| (110) | According to the available information, IN only provides web infrastructure and related services to the RTBs and the DMOs (see paragraph (49), above). The Authority therefore takes the view that the measure is at least selective de facto. |
| --- | --- |

(110)

According to the available information, IN only provides web infrastructure and related services to the RTBs and the DMOs (see paragraph (49), above). The Authority therefore takes the view that the measure is at least selective de facto.

1.3.4.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Contracting Parties

| (111) | It is established case-law that a measure distorts or threatens to distort competition in a way that affects trade between Contracting Parties if it strengthens the position of the recipient compared to other companies (60) and if the recipient is active in a sector in which trade between Contracting Parties takes place (61). |
| --- | --- |

(111)

It is established case-law that a measure distorts or threatens to distort competition in a way that affects trade between Contracting Parties if it strengthens the position of the recipient compared to other companies (60) and if the recipient is active in a sector in which trade between Contracting Parties takes place (61).

| (112) | According to the available information, the Authority considers, on a preliminary basis, that the RTBs and the DMOs are carrying out some economic activities, since they are marketing, booking and selling tourism products in competition with private companies from other parts of the EEA, inter alia, tour-operators (see also paragraphs (14) and (15), above). As a consequence, if they are obtaining services at prices below the real value of the services, this will strengthen their position in the market to the detriment of their competitors (i.e. other destination and travel agencies). |
| --- | --- |

(112)

According to the available information, the Authority considers, on a preliminary basis, that the RTBs and the DMOs are carrying out some economic activities, since they are marketing, booking and selling tourism products in competition with private companies from other parts of the EEA, inter alia, tour-operators (see also paragraphs (14) and (15), above). As a consequence, if they are obtaining services at prices below the real value of the services, this will strengthen their position in the market to the detriment of their competitors (i.e. other destination and travel agencies).

| (113) | The Authority takes the view that the fact that the RTBs and the DMOs are mainly regional or local operators is not decisive, and does not exclude the conclusion that the measure would be liable to affect trade between the contracting parties. According to settled case-law, intra-state trade is liable to be affected when undertakings established in a Contracting Party have less chance of providing their services in another Contracting Party (in the case at hand, in Norway) (62). |
| --- | --- |

(113)

The Authority takes the view that the fact that the RTBs and the DMOs are mainly regional or local operators is not decisive, and does not exclude the conclusion that the measure would be liable to affect trade between the contracting parties. According to settled case-law, intra-state trade is liable to be affected when undertakings established in a Contracting Party have less chance of providing their services in another Contracting Party (in the case at hand, in Norway) (62).

1.4.   Preliminary conclusion

| (114) | Based on the foregoing, the Authority has doubts as to whether it can be excluded that the measure at stake constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(114)

Based on the foregoing, the Authority has doubts as to whether it can be excluded that the measure at stake constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

2.   Existing aid or new aid

| (115) | The Norwegian authorities have submitted that in the event that the measures at issue in the present Decision were to be classified as state aid, they should be defined as existing aid. Following a preliminary analysis, and for the reasons set out below, the Authority considers at this stage of the procedure that if the measures at issue were to be classified as state aid, they would also be defined as new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(115)

The Norwegian authorities have submitted that in the event that the measures at issue in the present Decision were to be classified as state aid, they should be defined as existing aid. Following a preliminary analysis, and for the reasons set out below, the Authority considers at this stage of the procedure that if the measures at issue were to be classified as state aid, they would also be defined as new aid.

| (116) | Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘existing aid’ is to mean: ‘all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement’. |
| --- | --- |

(116)

Article 1(b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3 provides that ‘existing aid’ is to mean: ‘all aid which existed prior to the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in the respective EFTA States, that is to say, aid schemes and individual aid which were put into effect before, and are still applicable after, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement’.

| (117) | In its judgment in Case E-14/10 (63), the EFTA Court stated that:

  ‘Whether the aid granted [...] constitutes existing aid’[...] depends upon the interpretation of the provisions of Protocol 3 SCA [...]


  [...] to qualify as an ‘existing aid measure’ under the EEA State aid rules, it must be part of an aid scheme that was put into effect before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement' |
| --- | --- |

(117)

In its judgment in Case E-14/10 (63), the EFTA Court stated that:

‘Whether the aid granted [...] constitutes existing aid’[...] depends upon the interpretation of the provisions of Protocol 3 SCA [...]

[...] to qualify as an ‘existing aid measure’ under the EEA State aid rules, it must be part of an aid scheme that was put into effect before the entry into force of the EEA Agreement'

| (118) | It follows that the definition of public measures as existing aid requires the existence of a previous aid scheme covering the activities of the public body under evaluation. |
| --- | --- |

(118)

It follows that the definition of public measures as existing aid requires the existence of a previous aid scheme covering the activities of the public body under evaluation.

| (119) | The Authority considers, at this point in time, that the measure at hand is not related to any of the schemes in force used by IN to grant state aid (see paragraph (9), above). The present Decision does not assess whether one of the schemes used by IN has been modified in substance, as required by the case-law to identify a new aid (64). Rather, the Authority takes the view that the case at hand relates to the entrance of IN on the market of web infrastructure and related services – which the Authority considers, at this stage of the procedure, to fall outside the mandate received by IN to promote business or to promote Norway as a tourism destination. The objective of this Decision is to assess IN's behaviour when it acts as an undertaking in the relevant market, if this qualification is confirmed during the formal procedure (see paragraphs (74) to (82), above). |
| --- | --- |

(119)

The Authority considers, at this point in time, that the measure at hand is not related to any of the schemes in force used by IN to grant state aid (see paragraph (9), above). The present Decision does not assess whether one of the schemes used by IN has been modified in substance, as required by the case-law to identify a new aid (64). Rather, the Authority takes the view that the case at hand relates to the entrance of IN on the market of web infrastructure and related services – which the Authority considers, at this stage of the procedure, to fall outside the mandate received by IN to promote business or to promote Norway as a tourism destination. The objective of this Decision is to assess IN's behaviour when it acts as an undertaking in the relevant market, if this qualification is confirmed during the formal procedure (see paragraphs (74) to (82), above).

| (120) | The Authority understanding at this point in time is that the legal basis for IN's entrance into a new market, offering economic services, is the 2013 Budget letter. The 2013 Budget letter allows IN, for the first time (65), to provide services in the tourism market in competition with private operators. Moreover, it allows IN to enter into economic activities, outside its general mandate to promote businesses in Norway, irrespective of whether this qualifies as a non-economic activity or a SGEI. |
| --- | --- |

(120)

The Authority understanding at this point in time is that the legal basis for IN's entrance into a new market, offering economic services, is the 2013 Budget letter. The 2013 Budget letter allows IN, for the first time (65), to provide services in the tourism market in competition with private operators. Moreover, it allows IN to enter into economic activities, outside its general mandate to promote businesses in Norway, irrespective of whether this qualifies as a non-economic activity or a SGEI.

| (121) | The Norwegian authorities have argued that IN's system of financing has not been substantially modified after the entrance into force of the EEA Agreement in the country. They take the view that if IN is obtaining state aid, the measure qualifies as existing aid (66). |
| --- | --- |

(121)

The Norwegian authorities have argued that IN's system of financing has not been substantially modified after the entrance into force of the EEA Agreement in the country. They take the view that if IN is obtaining state aid, the measure qualifies as existing aid (66).

| (122) | However, the Authority recalls that the financing system in force before 1994 relates to IN's core activities, and not to the provision of economic activities. In particular, the Act on IN establishes that: ‘The company's resources may be used for: 1. Financing, hereunder subsidies, loans, guarantees and equity capital arrangements, 2. Advising and competence enhancing measures, 3. Network and infrastructure, and 4. Marketing of Norwegian industry abroad’. No reference is made to the possible financing of economic activities. The 2013 Budget letter departs from this system in stating that if IN provides services in competition with private operators it must apply market prices. |
| --- | --- |

(122)

However, the Authority recalls that the financing system in force before 1994 relates to IN's core activities, and not to the provision of economic activities. In particular, the Act on IN establishes that: ‘The company's resources may be used for: 1. Financing, hereunder subsidies, loans, guarantees and equity capital arrangements, 2. Advising and competence enhancing measures, 3. Network and infrastructure, and 4. Marketing of Norwegian industry abroad’. No reference is made to the possible financing of economic activities. The 2013 Budget letter departs from this system in stating that if IN provides services in competition with private operators it must apply market prices.

| (123) | As a consequence, the Authority takes the preliminary view that if the alleged state aid measures (i.e. the absence of separate accounts between economic and non-economic activities and the forgoing of profit) are demonstrated, the measures should be defined as new state aid measures. |
| --- | --- |

(123)

As a consequence, the Authority takes the preliminary view that if the alleged state aid measures (i.e. the absence of separate accounts between economic and non-economic activities and the forgoing of profit) are demonstrated, the measures should be defined as new state aid measures.

| (124) | Concerning the alleged aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs, the Authority takes the preliminary view that if it is demonstrated during the formal state aid procedure that they are receiving services at a price below their real cost, the measure should likewise be considered to be new aid. The provision of these new services also finds its origin in the 2013 Budget letter – which, as described above, allows IN, for the first time, to provide services in competition with private operators, and to depart from the scope of its general task of businesses promotion. |
| --- | --- |

(124)

Concerning the alleged aid in favour of the RTBs and the DMOs, the Authority takes the preliminary view that if it is demonstrated during the formal state aid procedure that they are receiving services at a price below their real cost, the measure should likewise be considered to be new aid. The provision of these new services also finds its origin in the 2013 Budget letter – which, as described above, allows IN, for the first time, to provide services in competition with private operators, and to depart from the scope of its general task of businesses promotion.

| (125) | Finally, at the time the measures at issue in the present Decision were put into effect, the market for web infrastructure and related services was open to competition. As a consequence, Article 1(b)(v) of Part II of Protocol 3 is not applicable (67). |
| --- | --- |

(125)

Finally, at the time the measures at issue in the present Decision were put into effect, the market for web infrastructure and related services was open to competition. As a consequence, Article 1(b)(v) of Part II of Protocol 3 is not applicable (67).

| (126) | In conclusion, the Authority considers, on a preliminary basis, that in the event that the measures under the scope of this Decision are finally classified as aid, they should be classified as new aid. |
| --- | --- |

(126)

In conclusion, the Authority considers, on a preliminary basis, that in the event that the measures under the scope of this Decision are finally classified as aid, they should be classified as new aid.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (127) | Insofar as the measures at issue in the present Decision may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement, and that these measures constitute ‘new aid’ within the meaning of Article 1(c) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Norwegian authorities should have notified the aid before putting it into effect, pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(127)

Insofar as the measures at issue in the present Decision may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement, and that these measures constitute ‘new aid’ within the meaning of Article 1(c) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Norwegian authorities should have notified the aid before putting it into effect, pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3.

| (128) | It should be recalled that any new aid which is unlawfully implemented and which is finally not declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement is subject to recovery in accordance with Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(128)

It should be recalled that any new aid which is unlawfully implemented and which is finally not declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement is subject to recovery in accordance with Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

| (129) | In principle, state aid as defined by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is prohibited. However, Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement provides that certain types of aid can be declared compatible. |
| --- | --- |

(129)

In principle, state aid as defined by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is prohibited. However, Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement provides that certain types of aid can be declared compatible.

| (130) | The Norwegian authorities have submitted that if the measures at issue in the present Decision were to be considered to be state aid, they would be compatible with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, as aid to promote tourism activities. However, at this point in time the Norwegian authorities have not provided sufficient evidence to support this statement. |
| --- | --- |

(130)

The Norwegian authorities have submitted that if the measures at issue in the present Decision were to be considered to be state aid, they would be compatible with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, as aid to promote tourism activities. However, at this point in time the Norwegian authorities have not provided sufficient evidence to support this statement.

| (131) | Since at the present time there are no Guidelines on state aid to promote the tourism sector, the compatibility assessment will be carried out by way of direct reference to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(131)

Since at the present time there are no Guidelines on state aid to promote the tourism sector, the compatibility assessment will be carried out by way of direct reference to Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

| (132) | In assessing whether an aid measure can be said to be compatible with the EEA Agreement, the Authority balances the positive impact of the aid measure in reaching an objective of common interest against its potentially negative side effects by distortion of trade and competition. The assessment is based on the following steps:






  — | Is the aid measure aimed at a well-defined objective of common interest (e.g. growth, employment, cohesion, environment, etc.)? |
| --- | --- | --- |

(132)

In assessing whether an aid measure can be said to be compatible with the EEA Agreement, the Authority balances the positive impact of the aid measure in reaching an objective of common interest against its potentially negative side effects by distortion of trade and competition. The assessment is based on the following steps:

—

Is the aid measure aimed at a well-defined objective of common interest (e.g. growth, employment, cohesion, environment, etc.)?

| — | Is the aid well designed to deliver the objectives of common interest, i.e. does the proposed aid address the market failure or another objective? |
| --- | --- |

—

Is the aid well designed to deliver the objectives of common interest, i.e. does the proposed aid address the market failure or another objective?

| — | Is state aid an appropriate instrument? |
| --- | --- |

—

Is state aid an appropriate instrument?

| — | Is there an incentive effect, i.e. does the aid change the behaviour of the firms? |
| --- | --- |

—

Is there an incentive effect, i.e. does the aid change the behaviour of the firms?

| — | Is the aid measure proportional, i.e. could the same change in behaviour be obtained with less aid? |
| --- | --- |

—

Is the aid measure proportional, i.e. could the same change in behaviour be obtained with less aid?

| — | Are the distortions of competition and effect on trade limited, so that the overall balance is positive? |
| --- | --- |

—

Are the distortions of competition and effect on trade limited, so that the overall balance is positive?

| (133) | The information provided by the Norwegian authorities to the Authority during its preliminary examination of the measures at issue does not enable the Authority to make a definitive assessment of this question. The Norwegian authorities are accordingly invited to provide additional information on this matter. The Authority recalls that according to established case-law the burden of proof of the compatibility of state aid measures rests on the State concerned, which must show that the conditions for the derogation from Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are satisfied (68). |
| --- | --- |

(133)

The information provided by the Norwegian authorities to the Authority during its preliminary examination of the measures at issue does not enable the Authority to make a definitive assessment of this question. The Norwegian authorities are accordingly invited to provide additional information on this matter. The Authority recalls that according to established case-law the burden of proof of the compatibility of state aid measures rests on the State concerned, which must show that the conditions for the derogation from Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are satisfied (68).

| (134) | However, on a preliminary basis, the Authority notes that in order for the measure to be declared compatible a market failure regarding the web infrastructure and related services must be demonstrated. The mere fact that there are private operators providing these services suggests that there is no market failure and therefore no need for aid. |
| --- | --- |

(134)

However, on a preliminary basis, the Authority notes that in order for the measure to be declared compatible a market failure regarding the web infrastructure and related services must be demonstrated. The mere fact that there are private operators providing these services suggests that there is no market failure and therefore no need for aid.

| (135) | Furthermore, the balancing test for a measure of state aid, as described above, also requires the aid to be proportional and limited to the smallest possible amount. However, taking into account the nature of the measures, which cannot be described as transparent aid (69), it will be difficult to calculate the intensity of aid granted. |
| --- | --- |

(135)

Furthermore, the balancing test for a measure of state aid, as described above, also requires the aid to be proportional and limited to the smallest possible amount. However, taking into account the nature of the measures, which cannot be described as transparent aid (69), it will be difficult to calculate the intensity of aid granted.

| (136) | The Authority finally recalls that, by analogy with settled case-law (70), state aid incorporating conditions which contravene other provisions of the EEA Agreement cannot be approved as compatible. On this issue the Authority notes that if the tie-in clauses referred to in paragraph (41), above, exist and are imposed by IN, they might be contrary to Articles 53 or 54 of the EEA Agreement. In this event, the measures could not be declared compatible aid. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

The Authority finally recalls that, by analogy with settled case-law (70), state aid incorporating conditions which contravene other provisions of the EEA Agreement cannot be approved as compatible. On this issue the Authority notes that if the tie-in clauses referred to in paragraph (41), above, exist and are imposed by IN, they might be contrary to Articles 53 or 54 of the EEA Agreement. In this event, the measures could not be declared compatible aid.

| (137) | In conclusion, the Authority considers, at this stage of the procedure, that it cannot be excluded that the measure at issue in the present Decision may not comply with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, and may have to be considered to be incompatible aid. |
| --- | --- |

(137)

In conclusion, the Authority considers, at this stage of the procedure, that it cannot be excluded that the measure at issue in the present Decision may not comply with Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, and may have to be considered to be incompatible aid.

5.   Conclusion

| (138) | Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, at this stage of the procedure the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the measures at hand in this Decision constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(138)

Based on the information submitted by the Norwegian authorities, at this stage of the procedure the Authority cannot exclude the possibility that the measures at hand in this Decision constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (139) | The Authority currently takes the view that if those measures entail state aid, they would constitute ‘new aid’, which pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 should have been notified to the Authority prior to its implementation. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

The Authority currently takes the view that if those measures entail state aid, they would constitute ‘new aid’, which pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 should have been notified to the Authority prior to its implementation.

| (140) | The Authority has also doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority, therefore, has doubts as to whether that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

The Authority has also doubts as to whether these measures comply with Article 61(3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority, therefore, has doubts as to whether that the above measures are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (141) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open proceedings is without prejudice to the final Decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question do not constitute state aid, are to be classified as existing aid or are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open proceedings is without prejudice to the final Decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question do not constitute state aid, are to be classified as existing aid or are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (142) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(142)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision.

| (143) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to provide within one month of receipt of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the nature and compatibility of the measure covered by this decision. |
| --- | --- |

(143)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to provide within one month of receipt of this Decision all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the nature and compatibility of the measure covered by this decision.

| (144) | The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential aid recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(144)

The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential aid recipients of the aid immediately.

| (145) | The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law, |
| --- | --- |

(145)

The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principal of EEA law,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the possible aid measures implemented by the Norwegian authorities.

The possible aid measures are:

| (i) | the alleged foregoing of profit in favour of IN, |
| --- | --- |

(i)

the alleged foregoing of profit in favour of IN,

| (ii) | the alleged lack of accounting separation among and a clear cost allocation methodology regarding IN's economic and non economic activities and |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

the alleged lack of accounting separation among and a clear cost allocation methodology regarding IN's economic and non economic activities and

| (iii) | the alleged aid granted through IN to the RTBs and the DMOs in form of prices not sufficient to obtain a reasonable return on the investments. |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

the alleged aid granted through IN to the RTBs and the DMOs in form of prices not sufficient to obtain a reasonable return on the investments.

The measures falling within the scope of this Decision relate to IN's activities in the market of web infrastructure and related services within the tourism sector.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 18 August 2014.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide by 18 August 2014, all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done in Brussels, 16 July 2014.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Helga JÓNSDÓTTIR

College Member

---

(1)  In October 2013, the original complainant tellUs IT AS merged with the company New Mind forming New Mind | tellUs. See www.newmind.co.uk

1

(2)  In the tourism sector, the term ‘destination organisation’ or ‘destination company’ generally means a local company that handles arrangements for tours, meetings, transportation, etc. for groups originating elsewhere. See http://wsdmo.org/index.php/Educate/TourismAcronyms/

2

(3)  LOV-2003-12-19-130 (in Norwegian ‘Lov om Innovasjon Norge’), available at:

3

http://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2003-12-19-130?q=lov+om+innovasjon+norge

(4)  Section 2 of the Act on IN.

4

(5)  LOV-1999-03-26-14, (in Norwegian ‘Skatteloven’).

5

Skatteloven

(6)  Translation by the Authority.

6

(7)  In Norwegian: ‘Statens nærings- og distriktsutviklingsfond’, ‘Statens Veiledningskontor for Oppfinnere’, ‘Norges Turistråd’ and ‘Norges Eksportråd’.

7

Statens nærings- og distriktsutviklingsfond

Statens Veiledningskontor for Oppfinnere

Norges Turistråd

Norges Eksportråd

(8)  Report entitled ‘The Government's tourism strategy. Destination Norway. National strategy for the tourism industry’, dated April 2012 and sent to the Authority as Annex 4 to IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213). Available at:

8

‘The Government's tourism strategy. Destination Norway. National strategy for the tourism industry’,

http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/37646196/Lenke_til_strategien-engelsk.pdf

(9)  A description of IN's task in the tourism sector can be found in the report quoted in footnote 8.

9

(10)  IN's letter dated 20 December 2013 (Event No 694258). The National Association of Tourism, which was the joint body for the State, municipal and private stakeholders in the tourism industry, was established in 1903 and continued until 1984. From that point, marketing efforts of the National Association of Tourism were continued by the foundation NORTRA, which in 1999 changed its name to the NTC. Since 2004, the NTC's tasks have been carried out by IN, following the merger of these two entities.

10

Further information on the entities that have traditionally been entrusted with the mandate to promote Norway as a holiday destination was also provided in IN's letter dated 20 December 2013 (Event No 694258).

(11)  For further information, see the project plan for a new national tourism structure by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries (Version 1.2 dated 20.06.2013):

11

http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/NHD/Temasider/Reiseliv/Riktigprosjektplan.pdf

(12)  In Norwegian: ‘Regionalt selskap: Selskap som betjener reiselivsnæringen i et definert geografisk område’.

12

Regionalt selskap: Selskap som betjener reiselivsnæringen i et definert geografisk område

(13)  In Norwegian: ‘Destinasjonsselskap: Selskap som skal betjene et definert antall reisemål, produkter, attraksjoner og reiselivs-næring innen et geografisk område innenfor det regionale selskapet’.

13

Destinasjonsselskap: Selskap som skal betjene et definert antall reisemål, produkter, attraksjoner og reiselivs-næring innen et geografisk område innenfor det regionale selskapet

(14)  See report quoted in footnote 8.

14

(15)  According to p. 8 of IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213), the ‘[o]bjective of IN's New Structure project is to streamline visitnorway.com so that the tourist has one place to search and find information about all the destinations in Norway, in order for the tourist to choose Norway as a holiday destination’.

15

‘[o]bjective of IN's New Structure project is to streamline visitnorway.com so that the tourist has one place to search and find information about all the destinations in Norway, in order for the tourist to choose Norway as a holiday destination’

(16)  In Norwegian: ‘Statsbudsjett 2013 – oppdragsbrev Innovasjon Norge’ of 1 February 2013 (Event No 688224). Available at:

16

http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/NHD/Vedlegg/Brev/2013_oppdragsbrev_innovasjonnorge.pdf#search=OPPDRAGSBREV®j_oss=1

(17)  Translation by the Authority.

17

(18)  Translation by the Authority.

18

(19)  Definition of ‘DMS’ available at http://www.newmind.co.uk/technology-platform/destination-management-system

19

(20)  IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213).

20

(21)  Until that moment, New Mind | tellUs provided the web infrastructure and related services for IN's tourism website: visitnorway.com. See Event No 678005. Annex 3 to the complaint.

21

visitnorway.com

(22)  URL stands for Uniform Resource Locator. A URL is a formatted text string used by web-browsers, e-mail clients and other software to identify a network resource on the internet.

22

(23)  According to the Complainant: ‘to date, the offering of IT platform infrastructure services to the tourism industry has not been part of IN's activities’. Complaint (Event No 678002), p. 8.

23

‘to date, the offering of IT platform infrastructure services to the tourism industry has not been part of IN's activities’.

(24)  According to Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg [2003] ECR I-7747, the compensation of services fulfilling the four criteria established in paras. 89-93 of the judgment does not entail state aid.

24

Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

(25)  E-mail dated 15 November 2013 (Event No 690346).

25

(26)  E-mail dated 3 March 2014 (Event No 702175).

26

(27)  IN's letters dated 28 October 2013 (Events No 688213 and 688215).

27

(28)  IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213), p. 25.

28

(29)  According to Article 1 (b)(i) of Part II of Protocol 3.

29

(30)  See the definition of existing aid provided in Article 1(b)(v) of Part II of Protocol 3.

30

(31)  Corporate entities in Norway are subject to corporate income tax according to Section 2-2 of the Tax Act. Taxable income is subject to corporate income tax at the general rate of 27 %. Accordingly, limited liability companies (‘AS’ or ‘ASA’), savings banks and financial institutions, mutual insurance companies, cooperatives, state-owned enterprises, inter-municipal companies, foundations etc. are subject to corporate tax under the general regime, i.e. Section 2-2. However, State institutions, public authorities such as counties and municipalities, and a number of other entities listed exhaustively in Section 2-30(1) of the Tax Act, including IN, benefit from a corporate tax exemption.

31

(32)  Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v Macroton [1991] ECR I-1979, paras. 21-23; Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavlov and Others [2000] ECR I-6451 and Case E-5/07 Private Barnehagers Landsforbund v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2008] EFTA Ct. Rep. p. 61, para.78.

32

Höfner and Elser

Macroton

Pavlov and Others

Private Barnehagers Landsforbund

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(33)  Case C-222/04 Ministero dell'Economica e delle Finanze v Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA [2006] ECR I-289, para. 108.

33

Ministero dell'Economica e delle Finanze

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA

(34)  Joined Cases 209/78 to 215/78 and 218/78 Van Landewyck [1978] ECR 2111, paras. 18-21 and Case C-244/94 FFSA and others [1995] ECR I-4013, para. 21.

34

Van Landewyck

FFSA and others

(35)  Joined Cases T-443/08 Freissart Sachen and Land Sachsen-Anhalt and T-455/08, Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzing-Halle [2011] ECR II-1311, para. 128 et seq.

35

Freissart Sachen and Land Sachsen-Anhalt

Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzing-Halle

(36)  Economic and non-economic activities can co-exist within the same sector and sometimes be provided by the same organisation. In this scenario, the entity is to be regarded as an undertaking only with regard to its economic activities. See, for example, European Commission Decision in State Aid C-22/2003 (Italy) Reform of the training institutions (OJ L 81, 18.3.2006, p. 25), para. 43.

36

Reform of the training institutions

(37)  Para. 45 of the complaint.

37

(38)  See Case T-347/09, Germany v Commission, not yet published, p. 34 et seq., on how to differentiate between the nature of different activities provided by one single entity.

38

Germany

Commission

(39)  Case T-347/09, Germany v Commission, not yet published.

39

Germany

Commission

(40)  IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213), p. 34.

40

(41)  Commission Decision: State aid NN 8/2009. Germany. Nature conservation areas. OJ C 230, 24.9.2009, p. 1, para. 36.

41

Nature conservation areas

(42)  The Commission reached a similar conclusion in its decision in footnote 41, above (para. 40).

42

(43)  AG Opinion in Case C-205/03 Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN) v Commission, [2006] ECR I-6295, para. 31.

43

Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN)

Commission

(44)  Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, Pavel Pavlov and Others, [2000] ECR I-6451, para. 76; C-475/99, Ambulanz Glockner, [2001] ECR 9089, para. 20.

44

Pavel Pavlov and Others

Ambulanz Glockner

(45)  See, for instance, Article 2 of the Transparency Directive. (Referred to at point 1a of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement, OJ L 266 11.10.2007 p. 15 and EEA Supplement No 48 11.10.2007 p. 12, as Commission Directive 2006/111/EC of 16 November 2006 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings as well as on financial transparency within certain undertakings. Consolidated version: OJ L 318, 17.11.2006, p. 17–25). Implemented in Norwegian law by Regulation FOR-2006-09-07-1062, Section 9-1-1.

45

(46)  According to Chapter 2, Articles 7-9 of the IN Act, IN is financed by capital provided by its owners (i.e. the Norwegian Government and the Counties (ref. Article 7, ref. Article 2) and grants and loans from the Government and the Counties. IN can also obtain funding from other sources (Article 8), and Government and Counties guarantee for all obligations (Article 9).

46

(47)  See the Authority's Guidelines on application of State aid provisions to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector, paragraph 2 (OJ L 231, 3.9.1994, p. 1 and EEA Supplement No 32, 3.9.1994, p. 1) (the ‘Manufacturing Guidelines’). Section 1(3) of the Manufacturing Guidelines provides that ‘[t]his Chapter does not deal with the question of compatibility under one of the derogations provided for in the EEA Agreement and it is limited to the manufacturing sector. This does not, however, preclude the EFTA Surveillance Authority from using the approach in these rules in individual cases or sectors outside manufacturing to the extent these principles apply in these excluded sectors and where it feels that it is essential to determine if state aid is involved.’ The Manufacturing Guidelines can be found at: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=16995&1=1

47

Guidelines on application of State aid provisions to public enterprises in the manufacturing sector

t]his Chapter does not deal with the question of compatibility under one of the derogations provided for in the EEA Agreement and it is limited to the manufacturing sector. This does not, however, preclude the EFTA Surveillance Authority from using the approach in these rules in individual cases or sectors outside manufacturing to the extent these principles apply in these excluded sectors and where it feels that it is essential to determine if state aid is involved

(48)  See, for example, the Authority's Decision No 142/03/COL Regarding Reorganisation and Transfer of Public Funds to the Work Research Institute (OJ C 248, 16.10.2003, p. 6); Decision No 343/09/COL on the property transactions engaged in by the Municipality of Time concerning property numbers 1/152, 1/301, 1/630, 4/165, 2/70, 2/32 (OJ L 123, 12.5.2011, p. 72), and Decision No 174/13/COL Concerning the financing of municipal waste collectors (OJ C 263, 12.9.2013, p. 5).

48

Regarding Reorganisation and Transfer of Public Funds to the Work Research Institute

on the property transactions engaged in by the Municipality of Time concerning property numbers 1/152, 1/301, 1/630, 4/165, 2/70, 2/32

Concerning the financing of municipal waste collectors

(49)  See footnote 45.

49

(50)  AG Opinion, Case C-295/05, Asemfo [2007] ECR I-2999, para. 116.

50

Asemfo

(51)  Section 7.4(2) of the Manufacturing Guidelines. Also see Section 1(2) of the Manufacturing Guidelines, which provides that ‘[t]his Chapter firstly focuses on, the one hand, on the act referred to in point 1 of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the Transparency Directive and, on the other hand, it develops the principle that where the State provides finances to a company in circumstances that would not be applicable to an investor operating under normal market economy conditions, it does this in contradiction to the market economy investor principle, and state aid is involved’. See the reference to the Manufacturing Guidelines in footnote 47.

51

his Chapter firstly focuses on, the one hand, on the act referred to in point 1 of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the Transparency Directive and, on the other hand, it develops the principle that where the State provides finances to a company in circumstances that would not be applicable to an investor operating under normal market economy conditions, it does this in contradiction to the market economy investor principle, and state aid is involved’

(52)  Joined Cases C-83/01 P and C-94/01P Chronopost SA v Commission [2003] ECR I-6993.

52

Chronopost SA

Commission

(53)  Case C-372/97 Italy v Commission [2004] ECR I-3679, para. 44.

53

Italy

Commission

(54)  Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission [1980] ECR 2671, paras. 11-12 and Joined Cases E-5/04, E-6/04, E-7/04 Fesil ASA and Finnfjord Smelteverk AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2005] EFTA Ct. Rep. 117, para. 94.

54

Philip Morris Holland BV

Commission

Fesil ASA and Finnfjord Smelteverk AS

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(55)  Case T-301/02 AEM v Commission [2009] ECR II-01757, paras. 104 and 105.

55

AEM

Commission

(56)  Case C-482/99 France v Commission (Stardust) [2002] ECR I-4397, para. 52.

56

France

Commission (Stardust)

(57)  Case C-677/11 Doux Elevage, not yet published, para. 34, Case T-139/09 France v Commission, not yet published, para. 36.

57

Doux Elevage,

France

Commission

(58)  For listing of the relevant indicators of imputability, the Authority refers to Case C-482/99 France v Commission (Stardust Marine) [2002] ECR I-4397, paras. 55-56.

58

France

Commission (Stardust Marine)

(59)  Case E- 17/10 and E-6/11 Liechtenstein and VTM Fundmanagement v EFTA Surveillance Authority, para. 50, and the case-law cited therein; Case C-301/87 France v Commission [1990] ECR I-307, para. 41; Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community [1961] ECR 50, para. 19; Case C-241/94 France v Commission (Kimberly Clark) [1996] ECR I-4551, para. 34; and Case T-109/01 Fleuren Compost [2004] ECR II-132, para. 53.

59

Liechtenstein and VTM Fundmanagement

EFTA Surveillance Authority,

France

Commission

De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen

High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community

France

Commission (Kimberly Clark)

Fleuren Compost

(60)  Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission [1980] ECR, 2671, para. 11.

60

Philip Morris Holland BV

Commission

(61)  Case 102/87 France v Commission (SEB) [1988] ECR 4067; Case C-310/99 Italian Republic v Commission [2002] ECR I-289, para. 85; Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark) [2003] ECR I-7747, para. 77; and Case T-55/99, Confederación Española de Transporte de Mercancías (CETM) v Commission [2000] ECR II-3207, para. 86.

61

France

Commission

Italian Republic

Commission

Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark)

Confederación Española de Transporte de Mercancías (CETM)

Commission

(62)  Case T-301/02 AEM v Commission, [2009] ECR II-01757, para. 103.

62

AEM

Commission

(63)  E-14/10 – Konkurrenten.no AS v EFTA Surveillance Authority, EFTA Ct. Rep [2011] p. 266.

63

Konkurrenten.no AS

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(64)  It follows from Article 1(c) to the same Protocol that alterations to existing aid schemes constitute new aid. The case-law has also confirmed that measures to alter aid must be regarded as new aid. See Case 91/83 and 127/83 Heineken Brouwerijen [1984] ECR 3435, paras. 17 and 18, and Case C-44/93 Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office Nationale du Ducroire [1994] ECR I-3829, para. 13.

64

Heineken Brouwerijen

Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA

Office Nationale du Ducroire

(65)  The Authority notes that in White Paper no. 14 of 2003-2004 on the IN Act it is clearly stated that IN should ‘not offer products in competition with the private market’ (In Norwegian: ‘Ot.prp. nr. 14 (2003-2004) om Lov om Innovasjon Norge’). Therefore, the Authority's current understanding is that, before 2013 and the adoption of the 2013 Budget letter, IN was not authorised to provide economic services in the tourism sector. In that regard, reference is made to Proposition No 51 to the Norwegian Parliament, entitled ‘measures for an innovative and business development’ (St.prp.no. 51 (2002-2003, in Norwegian: ‘Virkemidler for et innovativt og nyskapende næringsliv’), which states (in relation to the former entity NTC) that ‘services paid by the user should, however, not be offered in areas where there is a well-developed offer from private consultants or where these services come into conflict with the priority areas of this new unit (i.e. IN)’. The original text reads: ‘Brukerbetalte tjenester ikke bør tilbys på områder hvor det eksisterer et godt utviklet tilbud fra private aktører’. St.prp. no. 51 (2002-2003), p. 37, first column.

65

not offer products in competition with the private market

Ot.prp. nr. 14 (2003-2004) om Lov om Innovasjon Norge

measures for an innovative and business development

Virkemidler for et innovativt og nyskapende næringsliv

services paid by the user should, however, not be offered in areas where there is a well-developed offer from private consultants or where these services come into conflict with the priority areas of this new unit

Brukerbetalte tjenester ikke bør tilbys på områder hvor det eksisterer et godt utviklet tilbud fra private aktører

(66)  The Norwegian authorities underline that ‘[t]he system of financing IN and its predecessors has been more or less the same since the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in 1994. The changes made are not of a nature turning the existing financing system into new aid’. IN's letter dated 28 October 2013 (Event No 688213), p. 39.

66

‘[t]he system of financing IN and its predecessors has been more or less the same since the entry into force of the EEA Agreement in 1994. The changes made are not of a nature turning the existing financing system into new aid’

(67)  Article 1(b)(v) of Part II of Protocol 3 reads as follows: Existing aid shall mean: ‘[a]id which is deemed to be an existing aid because it can be established that at the time it was put into effect it did not constitute an aid, and subsequently became an aid due to the evolution of the European Economic Area and without having been altered by the EFTA State. Where certain measures become aid following the liberalisation of an activity by EEA law, such measures shall not be considered as existing aid after the date fixed for liberalisation’.

67

‘[a]id which is deemed to be an existing aid because it can be established that at the time it was put into effect it did not constitute an aid, and subsequently became an aid due to the evolution of the European Economic Area and without having been altered by the EFTA State. Where certain measures become aid following the liberalisation of an activity by EEA law, such measures shall not be considered as existing aid after the date fixed for liberalisation’

(68)  Case T-68/03 Olympiaki Aeroporia Ypiresies AE v Commission [2007] ECR II-2911, para. 34.

68

Olympiaki Aeroporia Ypiresies AE

Commission

(69)  Transparent aid is defined in Article 5.1 of Regulation (EC) No 651/2014, General Block Exemption Regulation, of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1, incorporated as point 1j into Annex XV of the EEA Agreement by Decision No 152/2014 of 27 June 2014) as ‘aid in respect of which it is possible to calculate precisely the gross grant equivalent of the aid ex ante without any need to undertake a risk assessment’.

69

aid in respect of which it is possible to calculate precisely the gross grant equivalent of the aid ex ante without any need to undertake a risk assessment

(70)  Case C-225/91 Matra v Commission [1993] ECR I-3203, para. 41, and Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] I-6857, para. 78 and case-law cited.

70

Matra

Commission

Germany

Commission

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Parecer dos representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA apresentado na reunião do Comité Consultivo em matéria de decisões, acordos, práticas concertadas e de posições dominantes de 3 de março de 2014 relativo a um anteprojeto de decisão da Comissão no Processo AT.39952 Bolsas de eletricidade

Relator: Países Baixos

(2014/C 334/09)

| 1. | Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA partilham as preocupações da Comissão expressas no seu projeto de decisão transmitido ao Comité Consultivo. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA partilham as preocupações da Comissão expressas no seu projeto de decisão transmitido ao Comité Consultivo.

| 2. | Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto ao facto de o comportamento anticoncorrencial a que diz respeito o projeto de decisão constituir um acordo e/ou práticas concertadas entre empresas na aceção do artigo 101.o do TFUE e do artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto ao facto de o comportamento anticoncorrencial a que diz respeito o projeto de decisão constituir um acordo e/ou práticas concertadas entre empresas na aceção do artigo 101.o do TFUE e do artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE.

| 3. | Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a apreciação da Comissão relativamente ao âmbito, em termos de produto e área geográfica, do acordo e/ou prática concertada previsto no projeto de decisão. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a apreciação da Comissão relativamente ao âmbito, em termos de produto e área geográfica, do acordo e/ou prática concertada previsto no projeto de decisão.

| 4. | Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto ao facto de as empresas abrangidas pelo projeto de decisão terem participado numa infração única e continuada ao artigo 101.o do TFUE e ao artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto ao facto de as empresas abrangidas pelo projeto de decisão terem participado numa infração única e continuada ao artigo 101.o do TFUE e ao artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE.

| 5. | Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto ao facto de o objeto do acordo e/ou práticas concertadas consistir em restringir a concorrência na aceção do artigo 101.o do TFUE e do artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto ao facto de o objeto do acordo e/ou práticas concertadas consistir em restringir a concorrência na aceção do artigo 101.o do TFUE e do artigo 53.o do Acordo EEE.

| 6. | Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto ao facto de o acordo e/ou prática concertada ter podido afetar de forma significativa as trocas comerciais entre os Estados-Membros da União Europeia. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto ao facto de o acordo e/ou prática concertada ter podido afetar de forma significativa as trocas comerciais entre os Estados-Membros da União Europeia.

| 7. | Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a apreciação da Comissão quanto à duração da infração. |
| --- | --- |

7.

Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a apreciação da Comissão quanto à duração da infração.

| 8. | Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto ao facto de dever ser aplicada uma coima aos destinatários do projeto de decisão. |
| --- | --- |

8.

Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto ao facto de dever ser aplicada uma coima aos destinatários do projeto de decisão.

| 9. | Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto ao valor das vendas. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto ao valor das vendas.

| 10. | Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto aos montantes de base das coimas. |
| --- | --- |

10.

Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto aos montantes de base das coimas.

| 11. | Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto à inexistência de circunstâncias agravantes ou atenuantes aplicáveis no presente caso. |
| --- | --- |

11.

Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto à inexistência de circunstâncias agravantes ou atenuantes aplicáveis no presente caso.

| 12. | Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto ao facto d não ser aplicável qualquer aumento das coimas para efeitos de dissuasão no presente caso. |
| --- | --- |

12.

Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto ao facto d não ser aplicável qualquer aumento das coimas para efeitos de dissuasão no presente caso.

| 13. | Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto à redução das coimas com base na Comunicação de 2008 relativa aos procedimentos de transação. |
| --- | --- |

13.

Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto à redução das coimas com base na Comunicação de 2008 relativa aos procedimentos de transação.

| 14. | Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto aos montantes finais das coimas. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA concordam com a Comissão quanto aos montantes finais das coimas.

| 15. | Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA recomendam a publicação do seu parecer no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia. |
| --- | --- |

15.

Os representantes dos Estados da EFTA e do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA recomendam a publicação do seu parecer no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia.

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V Avisos

PROCEDIMENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Comissão Europeia

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ANÚNCIO DE CONCURSO GERAL

(2014/C 334/10)

O Serviço Europeu de Seleção do Pessoal (EPSO) organiza o concurso geral seguinte:

EPSO/AST-SC/02/14 — Agentes de segurança interna (SC 1)

O anúncio de concurso é publicado em 24 línguas no Jornal Oficial C 334 A de 25 de setembro de 2014.

Para informações complementares, consultar o sítio Web do EPSO: http://blogs.ec.europa.eu/eu-careers.info/

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PROCEDIMENTOS JURISDICIONAIS

Comissão Europeia

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C 334/30

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Ação intentada em 17 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra a Islândia

(Processo E-12/14)

(2014/C 334/11)

Em 17 de julho de 2014 deu entrada no Tribunal da EFTA uma ação contra a Islândia intentada pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA, domiciliado na rue Belliard 35, 1040 Bruxelas, Bélgica, e representado por Markus Schneider e Catherine Howdle, na qualidade de agentes.

O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA pede ao Tribunal da EFTA que:

| 1. | Declare que, ao não adotar e/ou não notificar imediatamente ao Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA todas as medidas necessárias para a aplicação do Ato a que se refere o anexo II, capítulo IV, ponto 6, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu (Diretiva 2009/125/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 21 de outubro de 2009, relativa à criação de um quadro para definir os requisitos de conceção ecológica dos produtos relacionados com o consumo de energia), adaptado ao Acordo EEE pelo seu Protocolo n.o 1, a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem por força do Ato e do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declare que, ao não adotar e/ou não notificar imediatamente ao Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA todas as medidas necessárias para a aplicação do Ato a que se refere o anexo II, capítulo IV, ponto 6, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu (Diretiva 2009/125/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 21 de outubro de 2009, relativa à criação de um quadro para definir os requisitos de conceção ecológica dos produtos relacionados com o consumo de energia), adaptado ao Acordo EEE pelo seu Protocolo n.o 1, a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem por força do Ato e do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE.

| 2. | Condene a Islândia no pagamento das despesas do processo. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Condene a Islândia no pagamento das despesas do processo.

Matéria de facto e de direito e fundamentos invocados:

| — | O pedido do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA refere-se ao incumprimento pela Islândia, até 3 de setembro de 2013, de um parecer fundamentado do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA, emitido em 3 de julho de 2013, sobre a não transposição para a sua ordem jurídica da Diretiva 2009/125/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 21 de outubro de 2009, relativa à criação de um quadro para definir os requisitos de conceção ecológica dos produtos relacionados com o consumo de energia («o Ato»), nos termos do anexo II, Capítulo IV, ponto 6, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu, tal como adaptada pelo Protocolo n.o 1 desse Acordo. |
| --- | --- |

—

O pedido do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA refere-se ao incumprimento pela Islândia, até 3 de setembro de 2013, de um parecer fundamentado do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA, emitido em 3 de julho de 2013, sobre a não transposição para a sua ordem jurídica da Diretiva 2009/125/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 21 de outubro de 2009, relativa à criação de um quadro para definir os requisitos de conceção ecológica dos produtos relacionados com o consumo de energia («o Ato»), nos termos do anexo II, Capítulo IV, ponto 6, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu, tal como adaptada pelo Protocolo n.o 1 desse Acordo.

| — | O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA alega que a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem por força do artigo 23.o da Diretiva e do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE pelo facto de não ter adotado as medidas necessárias para transpor o Ato no prazo previsto e/ou não lhe ter notificado essas medidas. |
| --- | --- |

—

O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA alega que a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem por força do artigo 23.o da Diretiva e do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE pelo facto de não ter adotado as medidas necessárias para transpor o Ato no prazo previsto e/ou não lhe ter notificado essas medidas.

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Ação intentada em 17 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra a Islândia

(Processo E-11/14)

(2014/C 334/12)

Em 17 de julho de 2014 deu entrada no Tribunal da EFTA uma ação contra a Islândia intentada pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA, domiciliado na rue Belliard 35, 1040 Bruxelas, Bélgica, e representado por Markus Schneider e Janne Tysnes Kaasin, na qualidade de agentes.

O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA pede ao Tribunal da EFTA que:

| 1. | Declare que, ao não adotar e/ou não notificar ao Órgão de Fiscalização as medidas necessárias para aplicar o Ato a que se refere o anexo XII, ponto 2, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu (Diretiva 2011/7/UE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 16 de fevereiro de 2011, que estabelece medidas de luta contra os atrasos de pagamento nas transações comerciais), adaptado ao Acordo EEE pelo Protocolo n.o 1, a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem por força do artigo 12.o desse Ato e do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declare que, ao não adotar e/ou não notificar ao Órgão de Fiscalização as medidas necessárias para aplicar o Ato a que se refere o anexo XII, ponto 2, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu (Diretiva 2011/7/UE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 16 de fevereiro de 2011, que estabelece medidas de luta contra os atrasos de pagamento nas transações comerciais), adaptado ao Acordo EEE pelo Protocolo n.o 1, a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem por força do artigo 12.o desse Ato e do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE.

| 2. | Condene a Islândia no pagamento das despesas do processo. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Condene a Islândia no pagamento das despesas do processo.

Matéria de facto e de direito e fundamentos invocados:

| — | O pedido do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA refere-se ao incumprimento pela Islândia, até 18 de fevereiro de 2014, de um parecer fundamentado do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA, emitido em 18 de dezembro de 2013, sobre a não transposição para a sua ordem jurídica da Diretiva 2011/7/UE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 16 de fevereiro de 2011, que estabelece medidas de luta contra os atrasos de pagamento nas transações comerciais («o Ato»), nos termos do anexo XII, ponto 2, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu, tal como adaptada pelo Protocolo n.o 1 desse Acordo. |
| --- | --- |

—

O pedido do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA refere-se ao incumprimento pela Islândia, até 18 de fevereiro de 2014, de um parecer fundamentado do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA, emitido em 18 de dezembro de 2013, sobre a não transposição para a sua ordem jurídica da Diretiva 2011/7/UE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 16 de fevereiro de 2011, que estabelece medidas de luta contra os atrasos de pagamento nas transações comerciais («o Ato»), nos termos do anexo XII, ponto 2, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu, tal como adaptada pelo Protocolo n.o 1 desse Acordo.

| — | O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA alega que a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem por força do artigo 12.o da Diretiva e do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE pelo facto de não ter adotado as medidas necessárias para transpor o Ato no prazo previsto e/ou de não lhe ter notificado essas medidas. |
| --- | --- |

—

O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA alega que a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem por força do artigo 12.o da Diretiva e do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE pelo facto de não ter adotado as medidas necessárias para transpor o Ato no prazo previsto e/ou de não lhe ter notificado essas medidas.

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Ação intentada em 17 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra a Islândia

(Processo E-13/14)

(2014/C 334/13)

Em 17 de julho de 2014 deu entrada no Tribunal da EFTA uma ação contra a Islândia, intentada pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA, domiciliado na rue Belliard 35, 1040 Bruxelles, Bélgica, e representado por Markus Schneider e Maria Moustakali, na qualidade de agentes.

O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA pede ao Tribunal da EFTA que:

| 1. | Declare que, ao não adotar e/ou ao não notificar imediatamente ao Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA todas as medidas necessárias para a aplicação do Ato a que se refere o anexo XVIII, ponto 21c, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu (Diretiva 2004/113/CE do Conselho, de 13 de dezembro de 2004, que aplica o princípio de igualdade de tratamento entre homens e mulheres no acesso a bens e serviços e seu fornecimento), adaptado ao Acordo EEE pelo seu Protocolo n.o 1 e pela Decisão do Comité Misto n.o 147/2009, a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem por força do referido Ato e do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declare que, ao não adotar e/ou ao não notificar imediatamente ao Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA todas as medidas necessárias para a aplicação do Ato a que se refere o anexo XVIII, ponto 21c, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu (Diretiva 2004/113/CE do Conselho, de 13 de dezembro de 2004, que aplica o princípio de igualdade de tratamento entre homens e mulheres no acesso a bens e serviços e seu fornecimento), adaptado ao Acordo EEE pelo seu Protocolo n.o 1 e pela Decisão do Comité Misto n.o 147/2009, a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem por força do referido Ato e do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE.

| 2. | Condene a Islândia no pagamento das despesas do processo. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Condene a Islândia no pagamento das despesas do processo.

Matéria de facto e de direito e fundamentos invocados:

| — | o pedido do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA refere-se ao incumprimento pela Islândia, até 26 de agosto de 2013, de um parecer fundamentado do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA, emitido em 26 de junho de 2013, sobre a não transposição para a sua ordem jurídica da Diretiva 2004/113/CE do Conselho, de 13 de dezembro de 2004, que aplica o princípio de igualdade de tratamento entre homens e mulheres no acesso a bens e serviços e seu fornecimento («o Ato»), nos termos do anexo XVIII, ponto 21c, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu, tal como adaptada pelo Protocolo n.o 1 desse Acordo; |
| --- | --- |

—

o pedido do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA refere-se ao incumprimento pela Islândia, até 26 de agosto de 2013, de um parecer fundamentado do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA, emitido em 26 de junho de 2013, sobre a não transposição para a sua ordem jurídica da Diretiva 2004/113/CE do Conselho, de 13 de dezembro de 2004, que aplica o princípio de igualdade de tratamento entre homens e mulheres no acesso a bens e serviços e seu fornecimento («o Ato»), nos termos do anexo XVIII, ponto 21c, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu, tal como adaptada pelo Protocolo n.o 1 desse Acordo;

| — | o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA alega que a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem por força do artigo 17.o do Ato e do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE pelo facto de não ter adotado todas as medidas necessárias para transpor o referido Ato no prazo previsto e/ou não lhe ter notificado essas medidas. |
| --- | --- |

—

o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA alega que a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem por força do artigo 17.o do Ato e do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE pelo facto de não ter adotado todas as medidas necessárias para transpor o referido Ato no prazo previsto e/ou não lhe ter notificado essas medidas.

---

| 25.9.2014 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 334/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 334/33

---

Ação intentada em 17 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra a Islândia

(Processo E-14/14)

(2014/C 334/14)

Em 17 de julho de 2014, deu entrada no Tribunal da EFTA uma ação contra a Islândia intentada pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA, domiciliado na rue Belliard 35, 1040 Bruxelas, Bélgica, e representado por Markus Schneider e Janne Tysnes Kaasin, na qualidade de agentes.

O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA pede ao Tribunal da EFTA que:

| 1. | Declare que, ao não adotar ou não notificar no prazo estabelecido ao Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA as medidas necessárias para a aplicação do Ato a que se refere o anexo II, capítulo XXIII, ponto 1a, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu (Diretiva 2009/48/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 18 de junho de 2009, relativa à segurança dos brinquedos), adaptado ao Acordo EEE pelo Protocolo n.o 1 e pela Decisão n.o 127/2012 do Comité Misto, a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem por força do citado Ato e do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declare que, ao não adotar ou não notificar no prazo estabelecido ao Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA as medidas necessárias para a aplicação do Ato a que se refere o anexo II, capítulo XXIII, ponto 1a, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu (Diretiva 2009/48/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 18 de junho de 2009, relativa à segurança dos brinquedos), adaptado ao Acordo EEE pelo Protocolo n.o 1 e pela Decisão n.o 127/2012 do Comité Misto, a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem por força do citado Ato e do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE.

| 2. | Condene a Islândia no pagamento das despesas do processo. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Condene a Islândia no pagamento das despesas do processo.

Matéria de facto e de direito e fundamentos invocados:

| — | O pedido do Órgão de Fiscalização refere-se ao incumprimento pela Islândia, até 5 de maio de 2014, de um parecer fundamentado do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA, emitido em 5 de março de 2014, sobre a não transposição para a sua ordem jurídica da Diretiva 2009/48/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 18 de junho de 2009, relativa à segurança dos brinquedos («o Ato»), nos termos do anexo II, capítulo XXIII, ponto 1a, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu, tal como adaptada pelo Protocolo n.o 1 desse Acordo. |
| --- | --- |

—

O pedido do Órgão de Fiscalização refere-se ao incumprimento pela Islândia, até 5 de maio de 2014, de um parecer fundamentado do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA, emitido em 5 de março de 2014, sobre a não transposição para a sua ordem jurídica da Diretiva 2009/48/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 18 de junho de 2009, relativa à segurança dos brinquedos («o Ato»), nos termos do anexo II, capítulo XXIII, ponto 1a, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu, tal como adaptada pelo Protocolo n.o 1 desse Acordo.

| — | O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA alega que a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem nos termos do artigo 54.o do Ato e nos termos do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE pelo facto de não ter adotado todas as medidas necessárias para transpor o Ato no prazo previsto e/ou de não lhe ter notificado essas medidas. |
| --- | --- |

—

O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA alega que a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem nos termos do artigo 54.o do Ato e nos termos do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE pelo facto de não ter adotado todas as medidas necessárias para transpor o Ato no prazo previsto e/ou de não lhe ter notificado essas medidas.

---

| 25.9.2014 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 334/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 334/34

---

Ação intentada em 18 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra a Islândia

(Processo E-15/14)

(2014/C 334/15)

Em 18 de julho de 2014, deu entrada no Tribunal da EFTA uma ação contra a Islândia intentada pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA, domiciliado na rue Belliard 35, 1040 Bruxelas, Bélgica, e representado por Markus Schneider e Janne Tysnes Kaasin, na qualidade de agentes.

O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA pede ao Tribunal da EFTA que:

| 1. | Declare que a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem nos termos do artigo 7.o do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu pelo facto de não ter adotado todas as medidas necessárias para transpor o Ato a que se refere o anexo II, capítulo XI, ponto 4d, desse Acordo,
  Regulamento (UE) n.o 1007/2011 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 27 de Setembro de 2011, relativo às denominações das fibras têxteis e à correspondente etiquetagem e marcação da composição em fibras dos produtos têxteis e que revoga a Diretiva 73/44/CEE do Conselho e as Diretivas 96/73/CE e 2008/121/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho,
  com a redação que lhe foi dada pelo:
  Regulamento Delegado (UE) n.o 286/2012 da Comissão, de 27 de janeiro de 2012, que altera, a fim de incluir uma nova denominação de fibra têxtil, o anexo I, e, para efeitos da sua adaptação ao progresso técnico, os anexos VIII e IX do Regulamento (UE) n.o 1007/2011 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho relativo às denominações têxteis e à correspondente etiquetagem e marcação da composição em fibras dos produtos têxteis,
  tal como adaptados ao Acordo EEE pelo seu Protocolo n.o 1, |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declare que a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem nos termos do artigo 7.o do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu pelo facto de não ter adotado todas as medidas necessárias para transpor o Ato a que se refere o anexo II, capítulo XI, ponto 4d, desse Acordo,

Regulamento (UE) n.o 1007/2011 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 27 de Setembro de 2011, relativo às denominações das fibras têxteis e à correspondente etiquetagem e marcação da composição em fibras dos produtos têxteis e que revoga a Diretiva 73/44/CEE do Conselho e as Diretivas 96/73/CE e 2008/121/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho,

com a redação que lhe foi dada pelo:

Regulamento Delegado (UE) n.o 286/2012 da Comissão, de 27 de janeiro de 2012, que altera, a fim de incluir uma nova denominação de fibra têxtil, o anexo I, e, para efeitos da sua adaptação ao progresso técnico, os anexos VIII e IX do Regulamento (UE) n.o 1007/2011 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho relativo às denominações têxteis e à correspondente etiquetagem e marcação da composição em fibras dos produtos têxteis,

tal como adaptados ao Acordo EEE pelo seu Protocolo n.o 1,

| 2. | Condene a Islândia no pagamento das despesas do processo. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Condene a Islândia no pagamento das despesas do processo.

Matéria de facto e de direito e fundamentos invocados:

| — | O pedido do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA refere-se ao incumprimento pela Islândia, no prazo prescrito, de dois pareceres fundamentados do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA sobre a não transposição para a sua ordem jurídica do Regulamento (UE) n.o 1007/2011 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 27 de Setembro de 2011, relativo às denominações das fibras têxteis e à correspondente etiquetagem e marcação da composição em fibras dos produtos têxteis e que revoga a Diretiva 73/44/CEE do Conselho e as Diretivas 96/73/CE e 2008/121/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, bem como ao incumprimento pela Islândia da transposição para a sua legislação nacional do Regulamento Delegado (UE) n.o 286/2012 da Comissão, de 27 de janeiro de 2012, que altera, a fim de incluir uma nova denominação de fibra têxtil, o anexo I, e, para efeitos da sua adaptação ao progresso técnico, os anexos VIII e IX do Regulamento (UE) n.o 1007/2011 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho relativo às denominações têxteis e à correspondente etiquetagem e marcação da composição em fibras dos produtos têxteis («os Atos»), nos termos do anexo II, capítulo XI, ponto 4d, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu, tal como adaptados pelo Protocolo n.o 1 desse Acordo. |
| --- | --- |

—

O pedido do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA refere-se ao incumprimento pela Islândia, no prazo prescrito, de dois pareceres fundamentados do Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA sobre a não transposição para a sua ordem jurídica do Regulamento (UE) n.o 1007/2011 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 27 de Setembro de 2011, relativo às denominações das fibras têxteis e à correspondente etiquetagem e marcação da composição em fibras dos produtos têxteis e que revoga a Diretiva 73/44/CEE do Conselho e as Diretivas 96/73/CE e 2008/121/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, bem como ao incumprimento pela Islândia da transposição para a sua legislação nacional do Regulamento Delegado (UE) n.o 286/2012 da Comissão, de 27 de janeiro de 2012, que altera, a fim de incluir uma nova denominação de fibra têxtil, o anexo I, e, para efeitos da sua adaptação ao progresso técnico, os anexos VIII e IX do Regulamento (UE) n.o 1007/2011 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho relativo às denominações têxteis e à correspondente etiquetagem e marcação da composição em fibras dos produtos têxteis («os Atos»), nos termos do anexo II, capítulo XI, ponto 4d, do Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu, tal como adaptados pelo Protocolo n.o 1 desse Acordo.

| — | O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA alega que ao não ter adotado as medidas necessárias para transpor os Atos para a sua legislação nacional no prazo previsto a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem nos termos do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

—

O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA alega que ao não ter adotado as medidas necessárias para transpor os Atos para a sua legislação nacional no prazo previsto a Islândia não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem nos termos do artigo 7.o do Acordo EEE.

---

| 25.9.2014 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 334/35 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 334/35

---

Ação intentada em 25 de julho de 2014 pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA contra o Principado do Listenstaine

(Processo E-17/14)

(2014/C 334/16)

Em 25 de julho de 2014, deu entrada no Tribunal da EFTA uma ação contra o Listenstaine intentada pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA, domiciliado na rue Belliard 35, 1040 Bruxelas, e representado por Xavier Lewis e Janne Tysnes Kaasin, na qualidade de agentes.

O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA pede ao Tribunal da EFTA que:

| 1. | Declare que, ao manter em vigor disposições nacionais como o artigo 63.o da Lei da Saúde e a disposição transitória prevista na Lei relativa à revogação da Lei da Saúde, incluindo a aplicabilidade do artigo 63.o, n.o 2, da Lei da Saúde, que exige que um «Dentista» autorizado deve exercer a sua profissão como assalariado, sob a supervisão, instrução e responsabilidade direta de um dentista qualificado, o Principado do Listenstaine não cumpriu as suas obrigações que lhe incumbem nos termos do artigo 31.o do Acordo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declare que, ao manter em vigor disposições nacionais como o artigo 63.o da Lei da Saúde e a disposição transitória prevista na Lei relativa à revogação da Lei da Saúde, incluindo a aplicabilidade do artigo 63.o, n.o 2, da Lei da Saúde, que exige que um «Dentista» autorizado deve exercer a sua profissão como assalariado, sob a supervisão, instrução e responsabilidade direta de um dentista qualificado, o Principado do Listenstaine não cumpriu as suas obrigações que lhe incumbem nos termos do artigo 31.o do Acordo EEE.

| 2. | Condene o Principado do Listenstaine no pagamento das despesas. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Condene o Principado do Listenstaine no pagamento das despesas.

Matéria de facto e de direito e fundamentos invocados:

| — | O artigo 63.o da Lei da Saúde do Listenstaine dispõe que um «Dentista» só pode trabalhar sob a supervisão, instrução e responsabilidade direta de um dentista qualificado (Zahnarzt). |
| --- | --- |

—

O artigo 63.o da Lei da Saúde do Listenstaine dispõe que um «Dentista» só pode trabalhar sob a supervisão, instrução e responsabilidade direta de um dentista qualificado (Zahnarzt).

| — | A liberdade de estabelecimento garantida pelo artigo 31.o do Acordo EEE exige que não se restrinja a liberdade de estabelecimento, incluindo o direito ao acesso e ao exercício de atividades por trabalhadores independentes. |
| --- | --- |

—

A liberdade de estabelecimento garantida pelo artigo 31.o do Acordo EEE exige que não se restrinja a liberdade de estabelecimento, incluindo o direito ao acesso e ao exercício de atividades por trabalhadores independentes.

| — | O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA alega que o Listenstaine não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem nos termos do artigo 31.o do Acordo EEE. Em seu entender, o artigo 63.o da Lei da Saúde e a disposição transitória prevista na Lei relativa à revogação da Lei da Saúde, incluindo a aplicabilidade do artigo 63.o, n.o 2, da Lei da Saúde, constitui uma restrição nos termos do artigo 31.o do Acordo EEE. |
| --- | --- |

—

O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA alega que o Listenstaine não cumpriu as obrigações que lhe incumbem nos termos do artigo 31.o do Acordo EEE. Em seu entender, o artigo 63.o da Lei da Saúde e a disposição transitória prevista na Lei relativa à revogação da Lei da Saúde, incluindo a aplicabilidade do artigo 63.o, n.o 2, da Lei da Saúde, constitui uma restrição nos termos do artigo 31.o do Acordo EEE.

| — | O Governo do Listenstaine alega que o objetivo do artigo 63.o da Lei da Saúde é garantir a proteção da saúde pública. |
| --- | --- |

—

O Governo do Listenstaine alega que o objetivo do artigo 63.o da Lei da Saúde é garantir a proteção da saúde pública.

| — | O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA considera que o facto de um «Dentista» devidamente formado e qualificado, que pretenda exercer a sua atividade profissional em conformidade com o seu diploma obtido, dever ser empregado por um dentista no Listenstaine vai além do que é necessário para a proteção da saúde pública. |
| --- | --- |

—

O Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA considera que o facto de um «Dentista» devidamente formado e qualificado, que pretenda exercer a sua atividade profissional em conformidade com o seu diploma obtido, dever ser empregado por um dentista no Listenstaine vai além do que é necessário para a proteção da saúde pública.

---

PROCEDIMENTOS RELATIVOS À EXECUÇÃO DA POLÍTICA DE CONCORRÊNCIA

Comissão Europeia

| 25.9.2014 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 334/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 334/36

---

Notificação prévia de uma concentração

(Processo M.7372 — AXA/Hammerson/The real estate portfolio)

Processo suscetível de beneficiar do procedimento simplificado

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

(2014/C 334/17)

| 1. | Em 18 de setembro de 2014, a Comissão Europeia recebeu a notificação de um projeto de concentração, nos termos do artigo 4.o do Regulamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 do Conselho (1), pelo qual as empresas SCI Vendome Commerces (França) e Hammerson plc («Hammerson», Reino Unido) adquirem, na aceção do artigo 3.o, n.o 1, alínea b), do Regulamento das Concentrações, o controlo conjunto de uma carteira imobiliária, mediante aquisição de ações. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Em 18 de setembro de 2014, a Comissão Europeia recebeu a notificação de um projeto de concentração, nos termos do artigo 4.o do Regulamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 do Conselho (1), pelo qual as empresas SCI Vendome Commerces (França) e Hammerson plc («Hammerson», Reino Unido) adquirem, na aceção do artigo 3.o, n.o 1, alínea b), do Regulamento das Concentrações, o controlo conjunto de uma carteira imobiliária, mediante aquisição de ações.

| 2. | As atividades das empresas em causa são as seguintes:
  —   SCI Vendome Commerces: filial a 100 % das empresas de seguros AXA France. A AXA é um grupo segurador de nível mundial, ativo em seguros dos ramos vida e saúde, noutros tipos de seguros e na gestão de investimentos,
  —   Hammerson: ativa na promoção imobiliária comercial e no arrendamento e exploração dos seus próprios bens imobiliários comerciais. A Hammerson é um promotor e proprietário-gestor de centros comerciais e zonas comerciais de venda a retalho, principalmente no Reino Unido, mas também em França.
  —   Carteira imobiliária: constituída por um centro comercial e uma unidade residencial, por propriedades circundantes situadas em Bristol (Reino Unido) e por um silo automóvel e terreno circundante no centro da cidade de Bristol. |
| --- | --- |

2.

As atividades das empresas em causa são as seguintes:

—   SCI Vendome Commerces: filial a 100 % das empresas de seguros AXA France. A AXA é um grupo segurador de nível mundial, ativo em seguros dos ramos vida e saúde, noutros tipos de seguros e na gestão de investimentos,

—   Hammerson: ativa na promoção imobiliária comercial e no arrendamento e exploração dos seus próprios bens imobiliários comerciais. A Hammerson é um promotor e proprietário-gestor de centros comerciais e zonas comerciais de venda a retalho, principalmente no Reino Unido, mas também em França.

—   Carteira imobiliária: constituída por um centro comercial e uma unidade residencial, por propriedades circundantes situadas em Bristol (Reino Unido) e por um silo automóvel e terreno circundante no centro da cidade de Bristol.

| 3. | Após uma análise preliminar, a Comissão considera que a operação notificada pode estar abrangida pelo Regulamento das Concentrações. Reserva-se, contudo, o direito de tomar uma decisão final sobre este ponto. De acordo com a Comunicação da Comissão relativa a um procedimento simplificado para o tratamento de certas concentrações nos termos do Regulamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 do Conselho (2), o referido processo é suscetível de beneficiar do procedimento previsto na comunicação. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Após uma análise preliminar, a Comissão considera que a operação notificada pode estar abrangida pelo Regulamento das Concentrações. Reserva-se, contudo, o direito de tomar uma decisão final sobre este ponto. De acordo com a Comunicação da Comissão relativa a um procedimento simplificado para o tratamento de certas concentrações nos termos do Regulamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 do Conselho (2), o referido processo é suscetível de beneficiar do procedimento previsto na comunicação.

| 4. | A Comissão solicita aos terceiros interessados que lhe apresentem as suas eventuais observações sobre o projeto de concentração.
  As observações devem ser recebidas pela Comissão no prazo de 10 dias após a data da presente publicação. Podem ser enviadas por fax (+32 22964301), por correio eletrónico para COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu ou por via postal, com a referência M.7372 — AXA/Hammerson/The real estate portfolio, para o seguinte endereço:





  Comissão Europeia |
| --- | --- |
| Direção-Geral da Concorrência |
| Registo das Concentrações |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

A Comissão solicita aos terceiros interessados que lhe apresentem as suas eventuais observações sobre o projeto de concentração.

As observações devem ser recebidas pela Comissão no prazo de 10 dias após a data da presente publicação. Podem ser enviadas por fax (+32 22964301), por correio eletrónico para COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu ou por via postal, com a referência M.7372 — AXA/Hammerson/The real estate portfolio, para o seguinte endereço:

Comissão Europeia

Direção-Geral da Concorrência

Registo das Concentrações

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  JO L 24 de 29.1.2004, p. 1 («Regulamento das Concentrações»).

(2)  JO C 366 de 14.12.2013, p. 5.

---

Rectificações

| 25.9.2014 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 334/37 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.9.2014

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 334/37

---

Retificação para atualização da lista de pontos de passagem de fronteira referidos no artigo 2.o, n.o 8, do Regulamento (CE) n.o 562/2006 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece o código comunitário relativo ao regime de passagem de pessoas nas fronteiras (Código das Fronteiras Schengen) (
  JO C 316 de 28.12.2007, p. 1
  ;
  JO C 134 de 31.5.2008, p. 16
  ;
  JO C 177 de 12.7.2008, p. 9
  ;
  JO C 200 de 6.8.2008, p. 10
  ;
  JO C 331 de 31.12.2008, p. 13
  ;
  JO C 3 de 8.1.2009, p. 10
  ;
  JO C 37 de 14.2.2009, p. 10
  ;
  JO C 64 de 19.3.2009, p. 20
  ;
  JO C 99 de 30.4.2009, p. 7
  ;
  JO C 229 de 23.9.2009, p. 28
  ;
  JO C 263 de 5.11.2009, p. 22
  ;
  JO C 298 de 8.12.2009, p. 17
  ;
  JO C 74 de 24.3.2010, p. 13
  ;
  JO C 326 de 3.12.2010, p. 17
  ;
  JO C 355 de 29.12.2010, p. 34
  ;
  JO C 22 de 22.1.2011, p. 22
  ;
  JO C 37 de 5.2.2011, p. 12
  ;
  JO C 149 de 20.5.2011, p. 8
  ;
  JO C 190 de 30.6.2011, p. 17
  ;
  JO C 203 de 9.7.2011, p. 14
  ;
  JO C 210 de 16.7.2011, p. 30
  ;
  JO C 271 de 14.9.2011, p. 18
  ;
  JO C 356 de 6.12.2011, p. 12
  ;
  JO C 111 de 18.4.2012, p. 3
  ;
  JO C 183 de 23.6.2012, p. 7
  ;
  JO C 313 de 17.10.2012, p. 11
  ;
  JO C 394 de 20.12.2012, p. 22
  ;
  JO C 51 de 22.2.2013, p. 9
  ;
  JO C 167 de 13.6.2013, p. 9
  ;
  JO C 242 de 23.8.2013, p. 2
  ;
  JO C 275 de 24.9.2013, p. 7
  ;
  JO C 314 de 29.10.2013, p. 5
  ;
  JO C 324 de 9.11.2013, p. 6
  ;
  JO C 57 de 28.2.2014, p. 4
  ;
  JO C 167 de 4.6.2014, p. 9
  )

(
  «Jornal Oficial da União Europeia» C 244 de 26 de julho de 2014
  )

(2014/C 334/18)

Na página 22, no ponto 2):

onde se lê:

«Fronteira búlgaro-macedónia»,

deve ler-se:

deve ler-se:

«Fronteira entre a Bulgária e a antiga República jugoslava da Macedónia».

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