[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11299

____________________

MARJORIE TAYLOR GREENE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE STATE OF GEORGIA, 

CHARLES R. BEAUDROT, 

in his official capacity as an Administrative Law Judge 

for the Office of State Administrative Hearings 

for the State of Georgia, 

JOHN DOE, I, 

GOVERNMENT ENTITY 1, 

Defendants-Appellees,

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11299

DAVID ROWAN, 

DONALD GUYATT,

ROBERT RASBURY, 

DANIEL O. COOPER,

RUTH DEMETER,

Intervenor Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-01294-AT

____________________

Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, a member of the 

U.S. House of Representatives for Georgia’s 14th Congressional 

District, appeals the district court’s denial of her Motion for 

Preliminary Injunctive Relief. In her motion, Rep. Greene asked 

the district court to enjoin the state court’s application of O.C.G.A. 

§ 21-2-5 (“Challenge Statute”) against her to prevent her from 

being disqualified as a candidate for Congress under § 3 of the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. After

oral argument and careful consideration, and because of 

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22-11299 Opinion of the Court 3

intervening circumstances, we remand this case to the district 

court with instructions to dismiss the case as moot.

This lawsuit was prompted by related state court 

proceedings. Shortly before Rep. Greene filed this lawsuit in 

federal district court, a group of voters (“Challengers”) in Rep. 

Greene’s district challenged her eligibility to be on the primary 

ballot after she filed her candidacy for the upcoming election. The 

Challengers invoked the Challenge Statute—which permits an 

eligible voter to file a pre-election challenge to the qualification of 

a candidate for state or federal office—and argued that Rep. Greene 

was disqualified from serving in the U.S. House of Representatives 

under § 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment because she engaged in 

“insurrection” in connection with the events of January 6, 2021, at 

the U.S. Capitol. 

Pursuant to Georgia law, a state administrative law judge 

(“ALJ”) heard the voters’ challenge. The ALJ held that the 

Challengers had not presented sufficient evidence to support their 

claim, finding Rep. Greene “did not ‘engage’ in the Invasion [of the 

U.S. Capitol]”—whether or not those events constituted 

“insurrection” under § 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment—and was 

therefore qualified to appear on the ballot. The Georgia Secretary

of State, Brad Raffensperger, adopted the ALJ’s conclusions. The 

Challengers petitioned for judicial review in the Superior Court of 

Fulton County, and the superior court affirmed the Secretary’s 

decision. The Challengers then filed an application for 

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11299

discretionary review of the superior court decision in the Supreme 

Court of Georgia, which was denied on September 1, 2022. 

After the state case was initiated, Rep. Greene filed this 

action against Secretary Raffensperger and the ALJ in federal 

district court, seeking a preliminary injunction barring state 

officials from adjudicating the voters’ challenge to her eligibility. 

The district court denied her motion for a preliminary injunction, 

holding that Rep. Greene failed to show a substantial likelihood of 

success on the merits, and Rep. Greene timely appealed to this 

Court. However, as discussed above, while her appeal from the 

federal proceedings have been pending in this Court, the state 

proceedings have concluded. 

“We have jurisdiction to reach the merits of a case only

where there is an active controversy.” Hand v. Desantis, 946 F.3d 

1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2020). And “[a]n action that is moot cannot 

be characterized as an active case or controversy.” BankWest, Inc. 

v. Baker, 446 F.3d 1358, 1363 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). 

“The rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must be 

extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint 

is filed.” Hand, 946 F.3d at 1275 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 

U.S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974)). “If events that occur subsequent to the 

filing of a lawsuit or an appeal deprive the court of the ability to 

give the plaintiff or appellant meaningful relief, then the case is 

moot and must be dismissed.” Id. (quotations omitted); see also 

Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Hillsborough Cnty. Aviation Auth., 162 F.3d 

627, 629 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining that when a policy change had 

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22-11299 Opinion of the Court 5

given plaintiffs the relief that they sought, “there [was] therefore 

no meaningful relief left for the court to give” because “[t]he only 

remaining issue [was] whether the [policy at issue] was

constitutional—which, at [that] stage, [was] a purely academic 

point”).

As explained, in this federal lawsuit, Rep. Greene is seeking

to enjoin the application of the Challenge Statute against her in the 

state proceedings to prevent her from being disqualified as a 

candidate for Congress under § 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

However, the state proceedings under the Challenge Statute have 

concluded, and Rep. Greene has prevailed at each stage: the ALJ 

ruled in Rep. Greene’s favor, Secretary Raffensperger adopted the 

ALJ’s conclusions, the Superior Court of Fulton County affirmed 

the Secretary’s decision, and the Supreme Court of Georgia denied 

the Challengers’ application for discretionary review. Ultimately, 

Rep. Greene was not disqualified from being a candidate for 

Congress and is presently on the ballot for the upcoming election. 

Accordingly, we no longer have the ability to accord Rep. Greene 

meaningful relief.1 We therefore hold that this case is moot.

1

Rep. Greene’s argument that this case is not moot because it falls within the 

“exception to the mootness doctrine for cases that are capable of repetition, 

yet evading review” is unavailing. Hall v. Sec’y, Alabama, 902 F.3d 1294, 1297 

(11th Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted). A dispute qualifies for this exception 

only if (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated 

before its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that 

the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again. Id. 

Rep. Greene has not established that the exception applies in this case. Indeed, 

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11299

This case is hereby REMANDED with instructions to 

DISMISS for mootness. 

at oral argument, Rep. Greene’s counsel conceded twice that it would be 

unlikely that Rep. Greene would face another challenge under § 3 of the 

Fourteenth Amendment due to the determination that she was qualified to 

appear on the ballot in the state court proceedings.

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22-11299 Branch, J., Concurring 1

BRANCH, J., Concurring:

While this case is moot, I write separately because at the 

time Rep. Greene filed her federal lawsuit, she was entitled to a 

preliminary injunction. 

I. Background 

(a) Legal Framework

Under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-5 (“Challenge Statute”), an eligible 

voter may file a pre-election challenge to the qualifications of a 

candidate for state or federal office. Once a challenge is filed with 

the Secretary of State, the Secretary then notifies the candidate and 

refers the challenge to the Office of State Administrative Hearings 

(“OSAH”) for a hearing by a state ALJ. § 21-2-5(b).

Upon referral from the Secretary of State, an ALJ must hold 

a hearing on the challenge and report his findings of fact and legal 

conclusions back to the Secretary of State. Id. After receiving the 

ALJ’s report, the Secretary of State “shall determine if the candidate 

is qualified” to hold the relevant public office. § 21-2-5(c). The 

parties to the challenge—the voters or candidate—can seek judicial 

review of the Secretary’s decision in the Superior Court of Fulton 

County. § 21-2-5(e). The superior court can affirm the decision, 

remand the case for further proceedings, or reverse or modify the 

decision. Id. The statute also provides for appellate review of the 

superior court decision “as provided by law.” Id. 

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(b) Voter Challenge to Rep. Greene’s Eligibility

Rep. Greene filed her candidacy for the upcoming election 

on March 7, 2022, and amended that filing three days later. On 

March 24, 2022, the Challengers filed an official challenge against 

Rep. Greene under the Challenge Statute. The challenge alleged

that Rep. Greene “does not meet the federal constitutional 

requirements for a Member of the U.S. House of Representatives.” 

The Challengers claimed that on the days surrounding January 6, 

2021, Rep. Greene “aided and engaged in an insurrection to 

obstruct the peaceful transfer of presidential power, disqualifying 

her from serving as a Member of Congress under Section 3 of the 

14th Amendment and rendering her ineligible under state and 

federal law to be a candidate for such office.” 

Secretary Raffensperger referred the challenge to the OSAH 

for a hearing before a state ALJ. The ALJ held a public hearing on 

April 22, 2022, during which Rep. Greene testified and was crossexamined by counsel for the Challengers. 

However, on April 1, 2022, weeks before the scheduled 

OSAH hearing, Rep. Greene sued Secretary Raffensperger and the 

ALJ (“State Defendants”), along with two unnamed defendants, in 

the underlying federal action, filing a motion for a preliminary 

injunction and a verified complaint for declaratory relief, which 

alleged that the Challenge Statute was unconstitutional under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Rep. Greene asserted claims under the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments (Counts I and II), Article I, § 5 of the 

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22-11299 Branch, J., Concurring 3

United States Constitution (Count III), and the 1872 Amnesty Act 

(Count IV). 

In Count I, Rep. Greene alleged that because the Challenge 

Statute can be triggered based only on a Challenger’s “belief” that 

a candidate is not qualified to seek and hold “the public office for 

which he or she is offering,” it violates her First Amendment right 

to run for political office. In Count II, she contended that the 

Challenge Statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 

Process Clause by placing the burden on the candidate to prove 

that she is qualified. In Count III, Rep. Greene alleged that the 

Challenge Statute violates Article I, § 5 of the U.S. Constitution 

because it permits the State to judge independently the 

qualifications of a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives, 

exceeding the State’s power to regulate election procedures and 

usurping the constitutional role of the U.S. House of 

Representatives as “the Judge of the Elections, Returns and 

Qualifications of its own Members.” Finally, in Count IV, Rep. 

Greene asserted that the state proceedings violated the 1872 

Amnesty Act, which she maintains removed the “disability” 

imposed by § 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment prospectively to all 

future members of Congress.1 

1 The 1872 Amnesty Act provides:

[A]ll political disabilities imposed by the third section of the 

fourteenth article of amendments of the Constitution of the 

United States are hereby removed from all persons 

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A few days after Rep. Greene filed her complaint against the 

State Defendants in district court, the Challengers moved to 

intervene. The district court granted their motion several days 

later. 

On April 8, 2022, the district court heard oral argument from 

Rep. Greene, the State Defendants, and the Challengerintervenors. On April 18, four days before the OSAH hearing on 

the candidacy challenge, the district court issued an order denying 

Rep. Greene’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief, finding that 

she failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits 

on any of her constitutional or statutory challenges because, in 

part, Rep. Greene failed to “cite persuasive legal authority or even 

include a developed legal argument” that Georgia lacks the 

authority to enforce “an existing constitutional provision.” The 

district court declined to address the other injunction factors. Rep. 

Greene timely appealed the district court’s ruling to this Court. 

Soon after, on April 22, the state ALJ held a hearing on the 

challenge to Rep. Greene’s candidacy qualifications. The ALJ then 

issued a decision, concluding that the “evidence in this matter is 

insufficient to establish that Rep. Greene, having ‘previously taken 

whomsoever, except Senators and Representatives of the 

thirty-sixth and thirty-seventh Congresses, officers in the 

judicial, military, and naval service of the United States, heads 

of departments, and foreign ministers of the United States.

Act of May 22, 1872, ch. 193, 17 Stat. 142 (1872).

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22-11299 Branch, J., Concurring 5

an oath as a member of Congress . . . to support the Constitution 

of the United States . . . engaged in insurrection or rebellion against 

the same, or [gave] aid or comfort to the enemies thereof’ under 

the [Fourteenth] Amendment to the Constitution” and holding 

that Rep. Greene “is qualified to be a candidate for Representative 

for Georgia’s 14th Congressional District.”

2

 Secretary 

Raffensperger subsequently adopted the ALJ’s findings of law and 

fact. 

On July 25, 2022, while this appeal was pending, the 

Superior Court of Fulton County affirmed Secretary 

Raffensperger’s decision,3 and the Supreme Court of Georgia 

denied the Challengers’ application for discretionary review of the 

superior court’s decision on September 1, 2022. 

II. Standard of Review 

This Court reviews a district court’s denial of a preliminary 

injunction for abuse of discretion and its conclusions of law de 

novo. LaCroix v. Town of Fort Myers Beach, Fla., 38 F.4th 941, 

946 (11th Cir. 2022). 

2 Although Rep. Greene raised constitutional arguments against the state 

proceeding itself, the ALJ did not address them. 

3 The Superior Court of Fulton County similarly declined to address Rep. 

Greene’s arguments about the unconstitutionality of the state proceeding. 

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III. Analysis 

I conclude that the district court erred in denying Rep. 

Greene preliminary injunctive relief. 

To obtain a preliminary injunction, Rep. Greene had to 

show: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that 

if relief is not granted, she will suffer irreparable injury; (3) that the 

threatened injury outweighs the harm the injunction would cause 

the opposing party; and (4) that the injunction is not adverse to the 

public interest. KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d 

1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006). The district court decided this case on 

the first factor—concluding that Rep. Greene could not show a 

substantial likelihood of success on the merits because, among 

other reasons, she failed to convince the district court that the State 

lacked authority to enforce an “existing disqualification within the 

text of the Constitution.” It did not reach the remaining injunctive 

relief factors. 

On appeal, Rep. Greene asserts that the district court erred 

because the Challenge Statute is unconstitutional both facially and 

as applied to her because the State is exceeding its power to 

regulate the time, place, and manner of elections and usurping the 

U.S. House’s role, as provided in Article I, § 5 of the U.S. 

Constitution, as the final arbiter of the qualifications of its 

members. The State Defendants respond that the Georgia 

challenge process is constitutional under the State’s authority to 

regulate the time, place, and manner of elections under Article I, 

§ 4 of the U.S. Constitution. And the Challengers assert that the 

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22-11299 Branch, J., Concurring 7

State is merely enforcing an existing constitutional qualification—

i.e., § 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 

I start with the first factor—whether Rep. Greene has shown 

a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Before the district 

court, she did. 

The Constitution divides authority to regulate 

congressional elections between the states and the federal 

government. Article I, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution sets forth the 

qualifications for anyone wanting to serve in the U.S. House: “[n]o 

Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the 

Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the 

United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of 

that State in which he shall be chosen.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 

Article I, § 5, in turn, specifies that Congress judges whether a 

person satisfies those qualifications: “Each House shall be the Judge 

of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.” 

U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. Meanwhile, the Constitution empowers 

the states to regulate the “Times, Places and Manner of holding 

Elections” for the U.S. House and Senate. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4 

(“Elections Clause”). But as the Supreme Court explained in U.S. 

Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the states’ power to regulate the 

“Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections” does not include 

the power to add to the existing constitutional qualifications for 

congressional office. 514 U.S. 779, 783–827 (1995). When states 

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8 Branch, J., Concurring 22-11299

add qualifications, they exceed their authority under Article I, § 4.4

Id. 

Underlying the challenge to Rep. Greene’s candidacy under 

Georgia law, § 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution—which was ratified in 1868, three years after the Civil 

War—provides:

No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 

Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, 

or hold any office, civil or military, under the United 

States, or under any State, who, having previously 

taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an 

officer of the United States, or as a member of any 

State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer 

of any State, to support the Constitution of the United 

States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion

against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 

4

The Supreme Court in Term Limits invalidated an Arkansas constitutional 

amendment barring three-term representatives from appearing on the ballot. 

514 U.S. at 828–38. The Arkansas Attorney General argued that the term limit 

amendment was not a legal bar on service in Congress because it did not 

preclude incumbents from running as write-in candidates, and was therefore 

not an additional qualification but a permissible ballot access regulation. Id. 

at 828. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Declining to provide a 

comprehensive definition of “qualifications,” the Court held that the termlimit amendment was an “indirect attempt to accomplish what the 

Constitution prohibits Arkansas from accomplishing directly” and that such 

“an amendment with the avowed purpose and obvious effect of evading the 

requirements of the Qualifications Clauses by handicapping a class of 

candidates cannot stand.” Id. at 829, 831. 

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22-11299 Branch, J., Concurring 9

enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of twothirds of each House, remove such disability.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3. 

In essence, the parties were asking the district court to 

determine whether the State of Georgia can keep a candidate for 

U.S. House off the ballot pursuant to § 3 of the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution if it determines the candidate 

“having previously taken an oath . . . to support the Constitution 

of the United States . . . engaged in insurrection or rebellion against 

the” United States. The district court determined that the State 

could do so, explaining that § 3 is “an existing provision enshrined 

in the Fourteenth Amendment” and that the Challenge Statute’s 

process enforces a “legitimate interest . . . to ensure that candidates 

meet the threshold requirements for office and will therefore not 

be subsequently disqualified, thereby causing the need for new 

elections.” The district court erred in reaching that conclusion. 

Although no case comprehensively delineates between a 

state’s permissible election regulation and an impermissible 

qualification, the Supreme Court has provided some guidance. In 

Term Limits, the Court explained that states are “entitled to adopt 

generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the 

integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself” and that it 

had upheld election regulations that “regulated election 

procedures and did not even arguably impose any substantive 

qualification rendering a class of potential candidates ineligible for 

ballot position.” 514 U.S. at 834–35 (quotations omitted); see also 

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Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 733–35, 746 n.16 (1974) (rejecting a 

challenge to a California Elections Code requirement that 

independent candidates not be affiliated with a political party one 

year before the primary, reasoning that it was “expressive of a 

general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the 

various routes to the ballot” and was no more an additional 

qualification for office than requiring a candidate to “win the 

primary to secure a place on the general election ballot or 

otherwise demonstrate substantial community support”);

Cartwright v. Barnes, 304 F.3d 1138, 1139 (11th Cir. 2002) 

(upholding Georgia’s requirement that a candidate obtain the 

signatures of 5% of registered voters as an election procedure, not 

a qualification, and explaining that states may enact rules “merely 

regulat[ing] the manner of holding elections” but they may not 

“impose[] [a] substantive qualification on a class of potential 

candidates for office”). So the states can regulate election 

procedures, but when they impose a “substantive qualification 

rendering a class of potential candidates ineligible for ballot 

position,” they exceed their authority under Article I, § 4. 

Turning to this case, in purporting to assess Rep. Greene’s 

eligibility under the rubric of § 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to 

the U.S. Constitution, Georgia imposed a substantive qualification 

on her. The State was not merely, as the district court incorrectly 

concluded, enforcing the preexisting constitutional disability in § 3. 

Instead, the State Defendants, acting under the Challenge Statute, 

forced Rep. Greene to defend her eligibility under § 3 to even 

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22-11299 Branch, J., Concurring 11

appear on the ballot pursuant to a voter challenge to her 

candidacy—thereby imposing a qualification for office that 

conflicts with the constitutional mechanism contained in § 3.5

 In 

other words, by requiring Rep. Greene to adjudicate her eligibility 

under § 3 to run for office through a state administrative process 

without a chance of congressional override, the State imposed a 

qualification in direct conflict with the procedure in § 3—which 

provides a prohibition on being a Representative and an escape 

hatch.6

In so doing, the State exceeded its authority under Article I, 

§ 4 and invaded Congress’s role to judge its members’ 

qualifications under Article I, § 5. “[T]he Framers understood the 

Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue procedural 

regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate electoral 

outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade 

important constitutional restraints.” Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 833–

5

The Court in Term Limits declined to address whether § 3 of the Fourteenth 

Amendment constituted a “qualification” for office or whether the 

qualifications enumerated in Article I, § 2 were exclusive, explaining that 

“[b]ecause those additional provisions are part of the text of the Constitution, 

they have little bearing on whether . . . the States may add qualifications to 

those that appear in the Constitution.” 514 U.S. at 787 n.2. I similarly offer no 

analysis on whether § 3 constitutes a qualification. 

6

Critically, an individual who would otherwise be barred by § 3 may still hold 

office if Congress removes § 3’s disability by a vote of two-thirds of each 

House. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3 (“But Congress may by a vote of twothirds of each House, remove such disability.”). 

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34 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has distinguished 

between impermissible substantive qualifications that could 

handicap a class of candidates and permissible procedural 

regulations that, for example, “demonstrate substantial 

community support.” Cartwright, 304 F.3d at 1143–44 (quotations 

omitted) (emphasis removed). The State’s application of the 

Challenge Statute to Rep. Greene to determine her eligibility to 

appear on the ballot—which was far from a “generally applicable 

and evenhanded” procedural determination and was untethered 

from any community support in the electoral process—falls in the 

first category. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 834–35 (explaining that 

Supreme Court decisions upholding election procedures “did not 

involve measures that exclude candidates from the ballot without 

reference to the candidates’ support in the electoral process”); see 

also Cartwright, 304 F.3d at 1144 (distinguishing between 

unconstitutional substantive qualifications and permissible 

election procedures that require candidates to show a threshold of 

community or voter support to maintain the integrity and 

regularity of the electoral process). In sum, rather than merely 

imposing an election procedure, the State’s pre-election 

adjudication under the Challenge Statute was an “effort to dress 

eligibility to stand for Congress in ballot access clothing.” Term 

Limits, 514 U.S. at 829 (quotations omitted). Accordingly, at the 

time of her hearing before the district court, Rep. Greene had 

shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. 

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Turning to the next factor, in her motion for a preliminary 

injunction, Rep. Greene argued that she would be irreparably 

harmed by the unconstitutional enforcement of the Challenge 

Statute—which would violate her constitutional rights—and, if the 

challenge succeeded, would prevent her from running for 

Congress. 

Rep. Greene satisfied this factor when she filed her federal 

complaint and motion for preliminary relief on April 1, 2022. At 

that time, the administrative hearing was still three weeks away. 

Indeed, when the district court issued its decision denying Rep. 

Greene a preliminary injunction on April 18, the hearing before the 

ALJ was still four days away. Before the hearing took place, Rep. 

Greene surely faced a risk of irreparable harm in having to defend 

herself in proceedings that carried the risk that the State 

Defendants would act outside the Constitution and strike her from 

the ballot, purportedly under § 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Given the timing of the federal litigation, the district court was 

well-positioned to obviate the risk of harm faced by Rep. Greene 

by issuing a preliminary injunction. 

Turning to the last two factors, Rep. Greene was also 

required to show that the threatened injury outweighed the harm 

that the injunction would cause the opposing party and that the 

injunction was not adverse to the public interest. KH Outdoor, 458 

F.3d at 1268. At the time of her district court proceedings, she 

satisfied both. Because the enforcement of § 3 of the Fourteenth 

Amendment through the Challenge Statute to Rep. Greene is 

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14 Branch, J., Concurring 22-11299

unconstitutional, enjoining such enforcement would not have 

been adverse to the public interest. The public “has no interest in 

enforcing an unconstitutional law.” Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d

1279, 1297 (11th Cir. 2010). And the equities did not favor 

thwarting the will of the voters through an unconstitutional 

proceeding. 

Accordingly, because Rep. Greene met her burden on all 

four factors during her district court proceedings, she was entitled 

to preliminary injunctive relief, and the district court erred by 

concluding otherwise. 

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