I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3292 

To prevent the Government of Iran from gaining a nuclear weapons capability 

and to maximize the United States diplomatic influence to achieve, consistent with the national security interest of the United States and 

its allies and partners, a negotiated settlement with the Government 

of Iran regarding Iran’s nuclear weapons program. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

OCTOBER 15, 2013 

Mr. FRANKS of Arizona (for himself, Mr. CONAWAY, Mr. LAMBORN, Mr. KING

of Iowa, Mr. STOCKMAN, Mr. HULTGREN, Mr. GOHMERT, Mr. AUSTIN

SCOTT of Georgia, Mr. WEBER of Texas, Mr. PERRY, Mr. ROKITA, Mr. 

PEARCE, Mr. HARRIS, Mr. LAMALFA, Mrs. BLACKBURN, and Mr. WILLIAMS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Oversight and 

Government Reform and Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 

provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To prevent the Government of Iran from gaining a nuclear 

weapons capability and to maximize the United States 

diplomatic influence to achieve, consistent with the national security interest of the United States and its allies 

and partners, a negotiated settlement with the Government of Iran regarding Iran’s nuclear weapons program. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


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1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘United States-Iran Nu3 clear Negotiations Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

5 Congress finds the following: 

6 (1) After a 30-year formal diplomatic relations 

7 drought and decades of repeated and direct threats 

8 to the United States, Iran and the United States re9 cently exchanged communication between high-rank10 ing government officials with the stated intent to ac11 celerate negotiations and relations. 

12 (2) Since at least the late 1980s, Iran has en13 gaged in a sustained and well-documented pattern of 

14 illicit and deceptive activities to acquire a nuclear 

15 weapons capability and has provided weapons, train16 ing, funding, and direction to terrorist groups. 

17 (3) Iran already possesses the necessary 

18 amount of low- and medium-enriched uranium that, 

19 if enriched further to weapons-grade level, can 

20 produce several nuclear weapons. 

21 (4) Iran has the advanced nuclear facilities and 

22 technology to carry out weapons-grade enrichment 

23 and the infrastructure to assemble, house and 

24 launch long-range ballistic weapons. 

25 (5) Since September 2005, the International 

26 Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has found Iran to be 


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1 in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, 

2 which Iran is obligated to adhere to as a non-nu3 clear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non4 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Wash5 ington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and en6 tered into force March 5, 1970. 

7 (6) The United Nations Security Council 

8 (UNSC) has adopted multiple resolutions since 2006 

9 demanding Iran’s full and sustained suspension of 

10 all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing ac11 tivities and Iran’s full cooperation with the IAEA on 

12 all outstanding issues related to its nuclear activi13 ties, particularly those concerning the possible mili14 tary utilizations of its nuclear program. 

15 (7) On July 31, 2006, the UNSC adopted Res16 olution 1696 that calls on Tehran to suspend its en17 richment program and verify its compliance with the 

18 IAEA Board of Governors’ requirements. 

19 (8) On December 23, 2006, the UNSC adopted 

20 Resolution 1737 in response to Iran’s failure to com21 ply with Resolution 1696 and requires Iran to sus22 pend uranium enrichment and heavy-water reactor 

23 projects, and take other confidence-building meas24 ures. 


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1 (9) On March 24, 2007, the UNSC adopted 

2 Resolution 1747 as a result of Iran’s failure to com3 ply with the previous two resolutions. It calls on 

4 Iran to take measures required by the IAEA Board 

5 of Governors and outlined in Resolution 1737 to 

6 verify that its nuclear program has only peaceful 

7 purposes and to reach a long-term comprehensive 

8 agreement with the P5+1 nations (the United 

9 States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, 

10 and Germany). 

11 (10) On March 3, 2008, the UNSC adopted 

12 Resolution 1803 as a response to Iran’s decision to 

13 not abide by previous resolutions and calls for Iran 

14 to halt its enrichment program and comply with pre15 vious UNSC and IAEA resolutions. 

16 (11) On September 27, 2008, the UNSC adopt17 ed Resolution 1835 which reaffirms the four pre18 vious resolutions. 

19 (12) On June 9, 2010, the UNSC adopted Res20 olution 1929 which reiterates the UNSC’s demands 

21 from previous resolutions that Iran halt all enrich22 ment activity and to cooperate with IAEA efforts to 

23 determine that Iran does not have a nuclear weap24 ons program. 


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1 (13) On June 9, 2011, the UNSC adopted Res2 olution 1984 which recalls all previous resolutions 

3 and extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts 

4 that monitors sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program 

5 for a period of one year. 

6 (14) On June 7, 2012, the UNSC adopted Res7 olution 2049 which extends the mandate of the 

8 Panel of Experts to monitor the implementation of 

9 international sanctions against Iran and to provide 

10 several reports on compliance with international 

11 sanctions. 

12 (15) Congress has passed and the President has 

13 signed into law legislation imposing significant eco14 nomic and diplomatic sanctions to pressure Iran to 

15 abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and end its 

16 support for terrorism. 

17 (16) The Department of State has designated 

18 Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984 and 

19 for the past decade has characterized Iran as the 

20 ‘‘most active state sponsor of terrorism’’ in the 

21 world. 

22 (17) During the State of the Union Address on 

23 January 24, 2012, President Barack Obama stated, 

24 ‘‘Let there be no doubt: America is determined to 

25 prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I 


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1 will take no options off the table to achieve that 

2 goal.’’. 

3 (18) On March 4, 2012, President Obama stat4 ed, ‘‘Iran’s leaders should understand that I do not 

5 have a policy of containment; I have a policy to pre6 vent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.’’. 

7 (19) On October 22, 2012, President Obama 

8 said of Iran, ‘‘The clock is ticking . . . And we’re 

9 going to make sure that if they do not meet the de10 mands of the international community, then we are 

11 going to take all options necessary to make sure 

12 they don’t have a nuclear weapon.’’. 

13 (20) Iran Supreme Leader Khamenei’s newly 

14 elected President, Hassan Rouhani, served as a 

15 member of Iran’s Supreme National Security Coun16 cil since 1989, spent 16 years as the Supreme Na17 tional Security Council’s secretary, and was Iran’s 

18 nuclear negotiator from 2003 to 2005. 

19 (21) In a secret 2004 speech that leaked in 

20 2006, Rouhani acknowledged that he used the nego21 tiations to buy time for the advancement of Iran’s 

22 nuclear program: ‘‘While we were talking with the 

23 Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment 

24 in parts of the facility in Isfahan [the site of Iran’s 

25 uranium conversion plant], but we still had a long 


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1 way to go to complete the project. In fact, by cre2 ating a calm environment, we were able to complete 

3 the work in Isfahan.’’. 

4 (22) Since Barack Obama has become Presi5 dent, Iran has tripled the number of operating cen6 trifuges to 15,000 and has expanded the Natanz en7 richment facility and its newer, deep underground 

8 plant at Fordow where it has installed hundreds of 

9 more advanced machines (the IR–2) which are capa10 ble of tripling the production rate, drastically reduc11 ing the time it would need to break out and produce 

12 weapons-grade materials. 

13 (23) Iran has continued to construct the Arak 

14 heavy water reactor that is suitable for plutonium 

15 production. 

16 (24) Iran’s illicit pursuit and development of 

17 nuclear weapons and its foreign policy conduct and 

18 actions constitute a grave threat to regional sta19 bility, world peace, global economy and energy mar20 kets, and the national security interests of the 

21 United States and its allies and partners. 

22 (25) A nuclear weapons-capable Iran, with 

23 intercontinental ballistic capabilities, would pose a 

24 direct nuclear and high altitude electromagnetic 


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1 pulse (HEMP) threat to the United States and its 

2 allies. 

3 (26) A nuclear weapons-capable Iran would 

4 likely lead directly to the proliferation of nuclear 

5 weapons in such nearby powers as Saudi Arabia, 

6 Egypt, and Turkey, thus increasing the risk of re7 gional nuclear confrontation. 

8 SEC. 3. SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC EF9 FORTS. 

10 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of Con11 gress that it is in the national security interest of the 

12 United States and its allies and partners to ensure the 

13 following objectives with respect to Iran are achieved: 

14 (1) Iran permanently halts all uranium enrich15 ment and identifies all sites where such enrichment 

16 is occurring. 

17 (2) Iran removes, and transfers to a third party 

18 under the auspices of the International Atomic En19 ergy Agency (IAEA), all uranium enriched to a 20 

20 percent and higher threshold. 

21 (3) Iran closes the uranium enrichment facility 

22 at Fordow, near Qom, Iran. 

23 (4) Iran ceases developing reactors capable of 

24 producing plutonium and ceases the importation and 


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1 domestic manufacturing of all centrifuges for enrich2 ing uranium. 

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.— 

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress 

5 that if the objectives described in paragraphs (1) 

6 through (4) of subsection (a) are met, it shall be the 

7 policy of the United States to enter into a negotiated 

8 settlement regarding nuclear activities in Iran that 

9 includes the terms described in paragraph (2) of this 

10 subsection. 

11 (2) TERMS DESCRIBED.—The terms referred to 

12 in paragraph (1) are the following: 

13 (A) The Government of Iran reaffirms its 

14 commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Pro15 liferation of Nuclear Weapons and ratifies and 

16 implements all provisions of the Additional Pro17 tocol. 

18 (B) Iran ceases the development and test19 ing of long-range ballistic weapons. 

20 (C) Iran permits unfettered access by 

21 IAEA officials to inspect and verify its compli22 ance to IAEA safeguards and the IAEA Board 

23 of Governors’ obligations. 

24 (D) Iran ceases to provide weapons, train25 ing, funding, and direction to terrorist groups, 


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1 including Hamas, Hezbollah, Shiite militias in 

2 Iraq, and the regime of Bashar al Assad in 

3 Syria. 

4 (E) Iran demonstrates peaceful foreign 

5 policy conduct and actions and issues full rec6 ognition of its neighbors’ sovereignty, including 

7 Israel. 

8 (F) Iran ceases all threats against the 

9 United States and Israel. 

10 SEC. 4. MILITARY READINESS AND CONGRESSIONAL CON11 SENT. 

12 (a) DECLARATION OF POLICY.—Congress declares 

13 that the United States is wholly capable, willing, and 

14 ready to use military force to prevent Iran from obtaining 

15 or developing a nuclear weapons capability. 

16 (b) CONGRESSIONAL CONSENT.— 

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—To maximize the Adminis18 tration’s diplomatic leverage to achieve, consistent 

19 with the national security interests of the United 

20 States and its allies and partners, a negotiated set21 tlement with the Government of Iran regarding 

22 Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and consistent with 

23 the President’s authority under article II, section 2 

24 of the Constitution and pursuant to the War Powers 


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1 Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.), at such time 

2 when the President determines that— 

3 (A) Iran is using the cover of diplomacy to 

4 continue advancing its nuclear program to ac5 quire a nuclear weapons capability, 

6 (B) diplomatic efforts have failed to miti7 gate Iran’s nuclear enrichment program in doc8 umented, inspected, and verifiable ways, or 

9 (C) Iran poses a threat to the national se10 curity interests of the United States and its al11 lies and partners, 

12 Congress hereby acknowledges that this Act con13 stitutes current consultation with the President on 

14 Iran in order to provide for swift application of all 

15 options to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear 

16 weapons capability and provides consent to the nec17 essary and appropriate use of force against legiti18 mate targets in Iran to achieve the objectives de19 scribed in paragraph (2). 

20 (2) OBJECTIVES DESCRIBED.—The objectives 

21 referred to in paragraph (1) are the following: 

22 (A) Uphold and implement all relevant 

23 United Nations Security Council resolutions re24 garding Iran’s nuclear program. 


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1 (B) Deter Iran’s development of nuclear 

2 weapons in order to protect the national secu3 rity interests of the United States and to pro4 tect United States allies and partners against 

5 the development and transfer of such weapons 

6 to rogue regimes and non-state actors. 

7 (C) Degrade Iran’s capacity to develop 

8 such weapons in the future. 

9 SEC. 5. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 

10 IRAN. 

11 (a) AUTHORIZATION FOR IMPOSITION OF SANC12 TIONS.—If any business, firm, or entity has not termi13 nated the provision of goods, services, or technology in 

14 Iran or with any Iranian-controlled entity, the President 

15 may— 

16 (1) prohibit that business, firm, or entity from 

17 receiving any United States Government contract or 

18 accessing United States capital markets; and 

19 (2) in the case of a business, firm, or entity 

20 that is a foreign financial institution, prohibit, or 

21 impose strict conditions on, the opening or maintain22 ing in the United States of a correspondent account 

23 or payable-through account by the business, firm, or 

24 entity. 

25 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 


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1 (1) BUSINESS, FIRM, OR ENTITY.—The term 

2 ‘‘business’’, ‘‘firm’’, or ‘‘entity’’— 

3 (A) means a partnership, association, 

4 trust, joint venture, corporation, company, gov5 ernmental, quasi-governmental or non-govern6 mental body, affiliate or other organization; and 

7 (B) includes any affiliate, subsidiary, or 

8 branch thereof. 

9 (2) IRAN.—The term ‘‘Iran’’ means the Govern10 ment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the 

11 central bank or monetary authority of that Govern12 ment and any agency or instrumentality of that Gov13 ernment. 

14 (3) IRANIAN-CONTROLLED ENTITY.—The term 

15 ‘‘Iranian-controlled entity’’ means a partnership, as16 sociation, trust, joint venture, corporation, affiliate 

17 or other organization in which the Government of 

18 Iran— 

19 (A) holds more than 50 percent of the eq20 uity interest by vote or value in the entity; 

21 (B) holds a majority of seats on the board 

22 of directors of the entity; or 

23 (C) otherwise controls the actions, policies, 

24 or personnel decisions of the entity. 

Æ 


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