# Jurnalul Oficial C 318/2014

| | ISSN 1977-1029 |
| --- | --- |
| Jurnalul Oficial
  al Uniunii Europene | C 318 |
| | |
| Ediţia în limba română | Comunicări şi informări | Anul 5716 septembrie 2014 |

ISSN 1977-1029

Jurnalul Oficial

al Uniunii Europene

C 318

Ediţia în limba română

Comunicări şi informări

Anul 5716 septembrie 2014

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| Informarea nr. | Cuprins | Pagina |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | IV   Informări |
| | INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE |
| | Comitetul de supraveghere a OLAF |
| 2014/C 318/01 | Raport de activitate al Comitetului de supraveghere a OLAF — februarie 2013-ianuarie 2014 | 1 |

Informarea nr.

Cuprins

Pagina

IV   Informări

INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE

Comitetul de supraveghere a OLAF

2014/C 318/01

Raport de activitate al Comitetului de supraveghere a OLAF — februarie 2013-ianuarie 2014

1

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IV Informări

INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE

Comitetul de supraveghere a OLAF

| 16.9.2014 | RO EN | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 318/1 |
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16.9.2014

RO EN

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 318/1

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Raport de activitate al Comitetului de supraveghere a OLAF

februarie 2013-ianuarie 2014

(2014/C 318/01)

| Membrii Comitetului de supraveghere a OLAF | Johan DENOLF (președinte)
  Comisar șef, director al Direcției ECOFIN Infracțiuni a Poliției Federale și membru al Unității de informații financiare (UIF), Belgia |
| --- | --- |

Membrii Comitetului de supraveghere a OLAF

Johan DENOLF (președinte)

Comisar șef, director al Direcției ECOFIN Infracțiuni a Poliției Federale și membru al Unității de informații financiare (UIF), Belgia

| | Herbert BÖSCH

  Fost membru al Parlamentului European
  Fost președinte al Comisiei pentru control bugetar a Parlamentului European,
  Austria |
| --- | --- |

Herbert BÖSCH

Fost membru al Parlamentului European

Fost președinte al Comisiei pentru control bugetar a Parlamentului European,

Austria

| | Catherine PIGNON

  Procuror șef la Curtea de Apel din Angers, Franța |
| --- | --- |

Catherine PIGNON

Procuror șef la Curtea de Apel din Angers, Franța

| | Jens MADSEN

  Procuror general pentru infracțiuni economice și internaționale grave, Danemarca |
| --- | --- |

Jens MADSEN

Procuror general pentru infracțiuni economice și internaționale grave, Danemarca

| | Tuomas PÖYSTI

  Auditor general al Finlandei, președinte al Biroului național de audit, Finlanda |
| --- | --- |

Tuomas PÖYSTI

Auditor general al Finlandei, președinte al Biroului național de audit, Finlanda

CUPRINS

| DECLARAȚIE DE MISIUNE | 3 |
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| CUVÂNT-ÎNAINTE AL PREȘEDINTELUI | 4 |
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| PREZENTARE GENERALĂ | 5 |
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| 1. | MONITORIZAREA INVESTIGAȚIILOR OLAF | 5 |
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1.

| Instrucțiunile adresate personalului privind procedurile de investigație | 6 |
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| Prioritățile politicii de investigare | 6 |
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| Selecția cazurilor în cadrul OLAF | 7 |
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| Durata investigațiilor | 7 |
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| Cazurile transmise autorităților judiciare naționale | 8 |
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| Deciziile de amânare a notificării instituției, organismului, oficiului sau agenției | 9 |
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| Recomandările directorului general al OLAF | 9 |
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| Procedurile OLAF pentru soluționarea plângerilor | 10 |
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| Plângeri și solicitări adresate Comitetului de supraveghere | 10 |
| --- | --- |

| 2. | MONITORIZAREA GESTIONĂRII FUNCȚIEI DE INVESTIGARE A OLAF | 11 |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

| Proiectul preliminar de buget pentru anul 2014 | 11 |
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| Reorganizarea OLAF și sondaje privind gradul de satisfacție a personalului | 12 |
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| 3. | COOPERAREA CU OLAF | 12 |
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3.

| Acțiunile întreprinse de OLAF în urma recomandărilor Comitetului de supraveghere | 12 |
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| Acordurile de lucru cu OLAF | 12 |
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| 4. | COOPERAREA CU PĂRȚILE INTERESATE | 13 |
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4.

| Reuniunile cu instituțiile UE | 13 |
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| Schimbul de opinii cu instituțiile UE | 13 |
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| Audierea publică în cadrul Parlamentului European cu privire la garanțiile procedurale | 13 |
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| Societatea civilă | 13 |
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| 5. | GUVERNANȚA COMITETULUI DE SUPRAVEGHERE | 14 |
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5.

| Rolul Comitetului de supraveghere în temeiul Regulamentului (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 | 14 |
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| Priorități și obiective | 14 |
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| Codul de conduită | 14 |
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| Metodele de lucru | 14 |
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| 6. | SECRETARIATUL COMITETULUI DE SUPRAVEGHERE | 15 |
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6.

| ANEXE | 16 |
| --- | --- |

DECLARAȚIE DE MISIUNE

| Articolul 15 alineatul (1) din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:


  Comitetul de supraveghere monitorizează cu regularitate îndeplinirea de către oficiu a funcției sale investigative, pentru a consolida independența oficiului în exercitarea corespunzătoare a competențelor care îi sunt conferite prin prezentul regulament.


  În special, Comitetul de supraveghere monitorizează evoluțiile privind modul de aplicare a garanțiilor procedurale și durata investigațiilor, în lumina informațiilor transmise de către directorul general în conformitate cu articolul 7 alineatul (8). |
| --- |

Articolul 15 alineatul (1) din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:

Comitetul de supraveghere monitorizează cu regularitate îndeplinirea de către oficiu a funcției sale investigative, pentru a consolida independența oficiului în exercitarea corespunzătoare a competențelor care îi sunt conferite prin prezentul regulament.

În special, Comitetul de supraveghere monitorizează evoluțiile privind modul de aplicare a garanțiilor procedurale și durata investigațiilor, în lumina informațiilor transmise de către directorul general în conformitate cu articolul 7 alineatul (8).

Misiunea Comitetului de supraveghere a OLAF (CS), astfel cum este prevăzută în Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 (1), este de a consolida independența OLAF în exercitarea corespunzătoare a competențelor care îi sunt conferite (2). Pentru îndeplinirea acestei misiuni, legiuitorul UE a încredințat Comitetului de supraveghere un triplu rol:

| — | Comitetul de supraveghere este organismul de supraveghere a OLAF și un garant al independenței OLAF; acesta monitorizează cu regularitate îndeplinirea de către OLAF a funcției sale de investigare și, în special, evoluțiile privind modul de aplicare a garanțiilor procedurale și durata investigațiilor. |
| --- | --- |

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Comitetul de supraveghere este organismul de supraveghere a OLAF și un garant al independenței OLAF; acesta monitorizează cu regularitate îndeplinirea de către OLAF a funcției sale de investigare și, în special, evoluțiile privind modul de aplicare a garanțiilor procedurale și durata investigațiilor.

| — | Comitetul de supraveghere are rol consultativ în relație cu directorul general al OLAF, căruia îi acordă asistență pentru îndeplinirea responsabilităților acestuia:






  — | comunică acestuia rezultatele monitorizării efectuate de Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la îndeplinirea de către OLAF a funcției de investigare, modul de aplicare a garanțiilor procedurale și durata investigațiilor și, dacă este necesar, formulează recomandări adecvate; |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

Comitetul de supraveghere are rol consultativ în relație cu directorul general al OLAF, căruia îi acordă asistență pentru îndeplinirea responsabilităților acestuia:

—

comunică acestuia rezultatele monitorizării efectuate de Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la îndeplinirea de către OLAF a funcției de investigare, modul de aplicare a garanțiilor procedurale și durata investigațiilor și, dacă este necesar, formulează recomandări adecvate;

| — | adresează acestuia avize, inclusiv, după caz, recomandări privind, printre altele, resursele necesare pentru exercitarea de către OLAF a funcției de investigare, prioritățile de investigare și durata investigației; |
| --- | --- |

—

adresează acestuia avize, inclusiv, după caz, recomandări privind, printre altele, resursele necesare pentru exercitarea de către OLAF a funcției de investigare, prioritățile de investigare și durata investigației;

| — | transmite observațiile sale (inclusiv, după caz, recomandări) asupra orientărilor privind procedurile de investigare (și orice modificare a acestora) adoptate de către directorul general al OLAF în conformitate cu articolul 17 alineatul (8) din regulament. |
| --- | --- |

—

transmite observațiile sale (inclusiv, după caz, recomandări) asupra orientărilor privind procedurile de investigare (și orice modificare a acestora) adoptate de către directorul general al OLAF în conformitate cu articolul 17 alineatul (8) din regulament.

| — | Comitetul de supraveghere este partener de dialog al instituțiilor UE, către care raportează cu privire la activitățile sale, la cererea cărora poate emite avize și cu care face schimb de opinii la nivel politic, oferind astfel instituțiilor UE o expertiză unică bazată pe experiența sa de monitorizare. |
| --- | --- |

—

Comitetul de supraveghere este partener de dialog al instituțiilor UE, către care raportează cu privire la activitățile sale, la cererea cărora poate emite avize și cu care face schimb de opinii la nivel politic, oferind astfel instituțiilor UE o expertiză unică bazată pe experiența sa de monitorizare.

CUVÂNT-ÎNAINTE AL PREȘEDINTELUI

În calitate de președinte al Comitetului de supraveghere a Oficiului European de Luptă Antifraudă, am plăcerea de a prezenta raportul anual de activitate al comitetului nostru, în conformitate cu articolul 15 alineatul (9) din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013.

Acesta este al doilea raport de activitate al actualului Comitet de supraveghere și prezintă o imagine de ansamblu asupra principalelor activități desfășurate în cursul perioadei de raportare, de la 1 februarie 2013 până la 31 ianuarie 2014.

Capitolele 1 și 2 oferă o descriere cuprinzătoare a activităților de monitorizare ale Comitetului de supraveghere. Acestea se axează pe monitorizarea punerii în aplicare de către OLAF a funcției sale de investigare și pe gestionarea OLAF în ceea ce privește funcția sa de investigare. Capitolele 3 și 4 se referă la relațiile Comitetului de supraveghere cu OLAF, precum și cu instituțiile UE și cu alte părți interesate. Capitolele 5 și 6 oferă o prezentare generală a metodelor de lucru ale comitetului, a documentelor de politică adoptate de comitet și a considerentelor legate de secretariatul acestuia.

La sfârșitul perioadei de raportare, unul dintre membrii Comitetului de supraveghere, dl Jens Madsen, a părăsit comitetul pentru a prelua un post nou și solicitant în cadrul administrației naționale. Aș dori să profit de această ocazie pentru a-i mulțumi pentru contribuția sa valoroasă la lucrările comitetului și pentru a ura bunvenit unui nou membru, dl Dimitrios Zimianitis, începând cu 1 februarie 2014.

În cele din urmă, aș dori să mulțumesc în mod special personalului secretariatului nostru, pentru sprijinul inestimabil și activitatea sa de înaltă calitate, care a contribuit în mare măsură la eficacitatea monitorizării funcției de investigare a OLAF.

Bruxelles, 12 martie 2014

Johan DENOLF

PREZENTARE GENERALĂ

PREZENTARE GENERALĂ

Activități de monitorizare

Activități de monitorizare

Analiza și evaluarea a:

| — | 56 de cazuri care necesită transmiterea de informații către autoritățile judiciare naționale; |
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56 de cazuri care necesită transmiterea de informații către autoritățile judiciare naționale;

| — | 186 de rapoarte pe nouă luni; |
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186 de rapoarte pe nouă luni;

| — | 293 de avize privind selecția cazurilor; |
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293 de avize privind selecția cazurilor;

| — | 14 plângeri și solicitări de la persoane fizice; |
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14 plângeri și solicitări de la persoane fizice;

| — | 1 plângere formulată de o instituție UE; |
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1 plângere formulată de o instituție UE;

| — | 2 solicitări de acces public la documentele Comitetului de supraveghere; |
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2 solicitări de acces public la documentele Comitetului de supraveghere;

| — | 1 solicitare de cooperare din partea unei autorități judiciare naționale. |
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1 solicitare de cooperare din partea unei autorități judiciare naționale.

Avize și rapoarte

Avize și rapoarte

| — | 4 avize în legătură cu îndeplinirea și gestionarea funcției de investigare a OLAF:






  — | Avizul nr. 1/2013: Proiectul preliminar de buget al OLAF pentru anul 2014; |
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4 avize în legătură cu îndeplinirea și gestionarea funcției de investigare a OLAF:

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Avizul nr. 1/2013: Proiectul preliminar de buget al OLAF pentru anul 2014;

| — | Avizul nr. 2/2013: Stabilirea unei proceduri interne a OLAF pentru plângeri; |
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Avizul nr. 2/2013: Stabilirea unei proceduri interne a OLAF pentru plângeri;

| — | Avizul nr. 1/2014: Prioritățile politicii de investigare a OLAF; |
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Avizul nr. 1/2014: Prioritățile politicii de investigare a OLAF;

| — | Avizul nr. 2/2014: Selecția cazurilor în cadrul OLAF. |
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Avizul nr. 2/2014: Selecția cazurilor în cadrul OLAF.

| — | Raportul anual de activitate pe 2012. |
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Raportul anual de activitate pe 2012.

Documente de poziție și de politică

Documente de poziție și de politică

| — | Document de poziție privind „consolidarea garanțiilor procedurale în cadrul OLAF”; |
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Document de poziție privind „consolidarea garanțiilor procedurale în cadrul OLAF”;

| — | Observații privind procedurile de investigație ale OLAF; |
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Observații privind procedurile de investigație ale OLAF;

| — | Document privind misiunea și competențele Comitetului de supraveghere, având în vedere Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 și strategia pe termen mediu; |
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Document privind misiunea și competențele Comitetului de supraveghere, având în vedere Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 și strategia pe termen mediu;

| — | Orientări privind monitorizarea (în curs de elaborare); |
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Orientări privind monitorizarea (în curs de elaborare);

| — | Modificarea Regulamentului de procedură (în curs de elaborare). |
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Modificarea Regulamentului de procedură (în curs de elaborare).

Cooperare

Cooperare

| — | Noi acorduri de lucru cu OLAF. |
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Noi acorduri de lucru cu OLAF.

1.   MONITORIZAREA INVESTIGAȚIILOR OLAF

MONITORIZAREA INVESTIGAȚIILOR OLAF

| 1. | Comitetul de supraveghere a OLAF (CS) monitorizează diferite aspecte ale activităților de investigare ale OLAF pe baza informațiilor pe care directorul general al OLAF are obligația să le ofere și a informațiilor solicitate de Comitetul de supraveghere din proprie inițiativă. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Comitetul de supraveghere a OLAF (CS) monitorizează diferite aspecte ale activităților de investigare ale OLAF pe baza informațiilor pe care directorul general al OLAF are obligația să le ofere și a informațiilor solicitate de Comitetul de supraveghere din proprie inițiativă.

| Articolul 15 alineatul (1) al treilea paragraf din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:


  Comitetul de supraveghere adresează directorului general avize, inclusiv, după caz, recomandări privind, printre altele, resursele necesare pentru exercitarea funcției de investigare a oficiului, prioritățile de investigare ale oficiului și durata investigațiilor. Aceste avize pot fi emise din proprie inițiativă, la cererea directorului general sau a unei instituții, a unui organism, a unui oficiu sau a unei agenții, fără însă a interfera cu desfășurarea investigațiilor în curs. |
| --- |

Articolul 15 alineatul (1) al treilea paragraf din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:

Articolul 15 alineatul (1) al treilea paragraf din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:

Comitetul de supraveghere adresează directorului general avize, inclusiv, după caz, recomandări privind, printre altele, resursele necesare pentru exercitarea funcției de investigare a oficiului, prioritățile de investigare ale oficiului și durata investigațiilor. Aceste avize pot fi emise din proprie inițiativă, la cererea directorului general sau a unei instituții, a unui organism, a unui oficiu sau a unei agenții, fără însă a interfera cu desfășurarea investigațiilor în curs.

Comitetul de supraveghere adresează directorului general avize, inclusiv, după caz, recomandări privind, printre altele, resursele necesare pentru exercitarea funcției de investigare a oficiului, prioritățile de investigare ale oficiului și durata investigațiilor. Aceste avize pot fi emise din proprie inițiativă, la cererea directorului general sau a unei instituții, a unui organism, a unui oficiu sau a unei agenții, fără însă a interfera cu desfășurarea investigațiilor în curs.

Instrucțiunile adresate personalului privind procedurile de investigație

Instrucțiunile adresate personalului privind procedurile de investigație

| 2. | La 7 februarie 2013, directorul general al OLAF a furnizat Comitetului de supraveghere o copie a unei versiuni revizuite a Instrucțiunilor adresate personalului privind procedurile de investigație (Instructions to Staff on Investigative Procedures — ISIP). La 5 iulie 2013, acesta a furnizat Comitetului de supraveghere o a doua versiune revizuită a ISIP, destinată să armonizeze procedurile de investigație ale OLAF cu noile dispoziții prevăzute de (proiectul de) Regulament (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013. Directorul general al OLAF a informat Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la intenția sa de a adopta versiunea revizuită a ISIP la 31 iulie 2013. |
| --- | --- |

2.

La 7 februarie 2013, directorul general al OLAF a furnizat Comitetului de supraveghere o copie a unei versiuni revizuite a Instrucțiunilor adresate personalului privind procedurile de investigație (Instructions to Staff on Investigative Procedures — ISIP). La 5 iulie 2013, acesta a furnizat Comitetului de supraveghere o a doua versiune revizuită a ISIP, destinată să armonizeze procedurile de investigație ale OLAF cu noile dispoziții prevăzute de (proiectul de) Regulament (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013. Directorul general al OLAF a informat Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la intenția sa de a adopta versiunea revizuită a ISIP la 31 iulie 2013.

Instructions to Staff on Investigative Procedures

| 3. | Subliniind că nu poate efectua o analiză aprofundată a versiunii revizuite a ISIP într-un termen atât de scurt, Comitetul de supraveghere a furnizat, cu toate acestea, la 30 iulie 2013, o serie de observații și întrebări privind Instrucțiunile adresate personalului privind procedurile de investigație revizuite (3). Comitetul de supraveghere a examinat, în special, dispozițiile privind procedura de selecție și desfășurarea investigațiilor și a cazurilor de coordonare. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Subliniind că nu poate efectua o analiză aprofundată a versiunii revizuite a ISIP într-un termen atât de scurt, Comitetul de supraveghere a furnizat, cu toate acestea, la 30 iulie 2013, o serie de observații și întrebări privind Instrucțiunile adresate personalului privind procedurile de investigație revizuite (3). Comitetul de supraveghere a examinat, în special, dispozițiile privind procedura de selecție și desfășurarea investigațiilor și a cazurilor de coordonare.

3

| 4. | Comitetul de supraveghere consideră că versiunea revizuită a ISIP ar trebui, printre altele:






  — | să menționeze în mod explicit noțiunea de „suspiciune suficientă”, astfel cum se prevede în regulament, ca o condiție prealabilă pentru deschiderea unei investigații; |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Comitetul de supraveghere consideră că versiunea revizuită a ISIP ar trebui, printre altele:

—

să menționeze în mod explicit noțiunea de „suspiciune suficientă”, astfel cum se prevede în regulament, ca o condiție prealabilă pentru deschiderea unei investigații;

suspiciune suficientă

| — | să structureze în mod clar separarea selectorilor și revizorilor în Unitatea de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor; |
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să structureze în mod clar separarea selectorilor și revizorilor în Unitatea de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor;

| — | să mențină o distincție clară între investigațiile interne și cele externe, întrucât competențele de investigare ale OLAF sunt diferite; |
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să mențină o distincție clară între investigațiile interne și cele externe, întrucât competențele de investigare ale OLAF sunt diferite;

| — | să includă dispoziții pentru organizarea unui control intern mai amplu de verificare a legalității cu privire nu numai la activitățile de investigare menționate în ISIP, ci și la cele care nu sunt prevăzute în mod specific în ISIP, dar care ar putea avea drept rezultat o interferență cu drepturile persoanelor vizate. |
| --- | --- |

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să includă dispoziții pentru organizarea unui control intern mai amplu de verificare a legalității cu privire nu numai la activitățile de investigare menționate în ISIP, ci și la cele care nu sunt prevăzute în mod specific în ISIP, dar care ar putea avea drept rezultat o interferență cu drepturile persoanelor vizate.

| 5. | La 5 septembrie 2013, la solicitarea Comitetului de supraveghere, directorul general al OLAF a prezentat propriile observații și informații suplimentare cu privire la aspectele evidențiate de Comitetul de supraveghere. De asemenea, acesta a informat Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la finalizarea modificărilor aduse ISIP, care iau în considerare unele observații ale Comitetului de supraveghere, și a transmis Comitetului de supraveghere proiectul final al noilor orientări privind procedurile de investigație pentru personalul OLAF, de înlocuire a ISIP. |
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5.

La 5 septembrie 2013, la solicitarea Comitetului de supraveghere, directorul general al OLAF a prezentat propriile observații și informații suplimentare cu privire la aspectele evidențiate de Comitetul de supraveghere. De asemenea, acesta a informat Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la finalizarea modificărilor aduse ISIP, care iau în considerare unele observații ale Comitetului de supraveghere, și a transmis Comitetului de supraveghere proiectul final al noilor orientări privind procedurile de investigație pentru personalul OLAF, de înlocuire a ISIP.

Prioritățile politicii de investigare

Prioritățile politicii de investigare

| 6. | Avizul nr. 1/2014 a evaluat Prioritățile politicii de investigare (PPI) ale OLAF stabilite anual de către directorul general al OLAF și publicate în planul anual de gestionare (4). |
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6.

Avizul nr. 1/2014 a evaluat Prioritățile politicii de investigare (PPI) ale OLAF stabilite anual de către directorul general al OLAF și publicate în planul anual de gestionare (4).

4

| 7. | Comitetul de supraveghere a comparat prioritățile politicii de investigare pentru 2012 și 2013 cu proiectul de priorități ale politicii de investigare pentru 2014 și a salutat ameliorarea definirii acestora din urmă ca urmare a observațiilor exprimate de Comitetul de supraveghere în timpul reuniunilor tehnice cu directorul general al OLAF, în sensul că prioritățile politicii de investigare nu ar trebui să conțină principii generale (care trebuie întotdeauna să fie luate în considerare atunci când se decide dacă se deschide sau nu o investigație), ci doar anumite zone sau tipuri de fraudă pe care OLAF ar trebui să le abordeze în mod prioritar. |
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7.

Comitetul de supraveghere a comparat prioritățile politicii de investigare pentru 2012 și 2013 cu proiectul de priorități ale politicii de investigare pentru 2014 și a salutat ameliorarea definirii acestora din urmă ca urmare a observațiilor exprimate de Comitetul de supraveghere în timpul reuniunilor tehnice cu directorul general al OLAF, în sensul că prioritățile politicii de investigare nu ar trebui să conțină principii generale (care trebuie întotdeauna să fie luate în considerare atunci când se decide dacă se deschide sau nu o investigație), ci doar anumite zone sau tipuri de fraudă pe care OLAF ar trebui să le abordeze în mod prioritar.

| 8. | Comitetul de supraveghere a constatat că indicatorii financiari, care în anii anteriori au fost supraevaluați, au fost complet excluși din proiectul de priorități ale politicii de investigare pentru 2014. Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat că astfel de indicatori ar trebui să fie relevanți pentru evaluarea gravității riscului de fraudă implicat și ar putea fi utili ca elemente de referință și ca orientări interne referitoare la aplicarea principiului proporționalității. De asemenea, Comitetul de supraveghere a atras atenția asupra necesității de a reconsidera politica privind subsidiaritatea/valoarea adăugată și de aplicare a acesteia cu prudență, precum și asupra necesității de a efectua o evaluare periodică a priorităților politicii de investigare. |
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8.

Comitetul de supraveghere a constatat că indicatorii financiari, care în anii anteriori au fost supraevaluați, au fost complet excluși din proiectul de priorități ale politicii de investigare pentru 2014. Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat că astfel de indicatori ar trebui să fie relevanți pentru evaluarea gravității riscului de fraudă implicat și ar putea fi utili ca elemente de referință și ca orientări interne referitoare la aplicarea principiului proporționalității. De asemenea, Comitetul de supraveghere a atras atenția asupra necesității de a reconsidera politica privind subsidiaritatea/valoarea adăugată și de aplicare a acesteia cu prudență, precum și asupra necesității de a efectua o evaluare periodică a priorităților politicii de investigare.

| 9. | Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat necesitatea de a clarifica prioritățile politicii de investigare și a recomandat ca directorul general al OLAF să emită orientări privind aplicarea principiilor de selecție stabilite de Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 și să se angajeze într-un dialog constructiv cu părțile interesate cu privire la stabilirea și punerea în aplicare a priorităților politicii de investigare, în special în ceea ce privește indicatorii financiari și posibilele măsuri ulterioare luate în cazurile respinse atunci când evaluarea acestora conduce la concluzia că există suficiente suspiciuni de fraudă. În stadiul actual, este încă foarte dificil pentru Comitetul de supraveghere să evalueze performanța OLAF în domeniile acoperite de prioritățile politicii de investigare, întrucât OLAF nu a realizat o evaluare a impactului priorităților politicii de investigare. Prin urmare, Comitetul de supraveghere a solicitat ca directorul general al OLAF să prezinte o evaluare a rezultatelor punerii în aplicare a priorităților politicii de investigare pentru 2012 și 2013 în fiecare dintre domeniile prioritare, împreună cu un rezumat al informațiilor furnizate de către părțile interesate. |
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9.

Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat necesitatea de a clarifica prioritățile politicii de investigare și a recomandat ca directorul general al OLAF să emită orientări privind aplicarea principiilor de selecție stabilite de Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 și să se angajeze într-un dialog constructiv cu părțile interesate cu privire la stabilirea și punerea în aplicare a priorităților politicii de investigare, în special în ceea ce privește indicatorii financiari și posibilele măsuri ulterioare luate în cazurile respinse atunci când evaluarea acestora conduce la concluzia că există suficiente suspiciuni de fraudă. În stadiul actual, este încă foarte dificil pentru Comitetul de supraveghere să evalueze performanța OLAF în domeniile acoperite de prioritățile politicii de investigare, întrucât OLAF nu a realizat o evaluare a impactului priorităților politicii de investigare. Prin urmare, Comitetul de supraveghere a solicitat ca directorul general al OLAF să prezinte o evaluare a rezultatelor punerii în aplicare a priorităților politicii de investigare pentru 2012 și 2013 în fiecare dintre domeniile prioritare, împreună cu un rezumat al informațiilor furnizate de către părțile interesate.

Selecția cazurilor în cadrul OLAF

Selecția cazurilor în cadrul OLAF

| 10. | Avizul nr. 2/2014 privind Selecția cazurilor în cadrul OLAF (5) a evaluat eficiența, calitatea și transparența procesului de selecție a cazurilor în cadrul OLAF. Evaluarea Comitetul de supraveghere a fost efectuată pe baza, printre altele, a analizei unui eșantion de 293 de avize ale Unității de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor (Investigation Selection and Review Unit — ISRU) a OLAF recomandând fie clasarea cazurilor, fie deschiderea investigației/cazurilor de coordonare. |
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10.

Avizul nr. 2/2014 privind Selecția cazurilor în cadrul OLAF (5) a evaluat eficiența, calitatea și transparența procesului de selecție a cazurilor în cadrul OLAF. Evaluarea Comitetul de supraveghere a fost efectuată pe baza, printre altele, a analizei unui eșantion de 293 de avize ale Unității de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor (Investigation Selection and Review Unit — ISRU) a OLAF recomandând fie clasarea cazurilor, fie deschiderea investigației/cazurilor de coordonare.

5

Investigation Selection and Review Unit

| 11. | În primul rând, Comitetul de supraveghere a evaluat eficiența funcției de selecție analizând resursele puse la dispoziția Unității de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor pentru a-și îndeplini atribuțiile, precum și rezultatele concrete obținute în 2012 și 2013. Comitetul de supraveghere a constatat că expertiza tehnică, de investigare și lingvistică a fost uneori inexistentă sau insuficientă; analiza juridică nu a fost suficient demonstrată; timpul alocat selecțiilor (o perioadă obligatorie de 2 luni) nu pare a fi adecvat, în anumite cazuri; de asemenea, era necesară o procedură clară pentru abordarea situației denunțătorilor. |
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11.

În primul rând, Comitetul de supraveghere a evaluat eficiența funcției de selecție analizând resursele puse la dispoziția Unității de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor pentru a-și îndeplini atribuțiile, precum și rezultatele concrete obținute în 2012 și 2013. Comitetul de supraveghere a constatat că expertiza tehnică, de investigare și lingvistică a fost uneori inexistentă sau insuficientă; analiza juridică nu a fost suficient demonstrată; timpul alocat selecțiilor (o perioadă obligatorie de 2 luni) nu pare a fi adecvat, în anumite cazuri; de asemenea, era necesară o procedură clară pentru abordarea situației denunțătorilor.

| 12. | În continuare, Comitetul de supraveghere a evaluat calitatea avizelor având în vedere conformitatea acestora cu criteriile de selecție stabilite de către directorul general al OLAF. Comitetul de supraveghere a constatat că instrucțiunile privind punerea în aplicare a criteriilor de selecție nu au fost strict respectate: s-a acordat o atenție scăzută instrumentelor juridice relevante atunci când s-a evaluat competența OLAF de a acționa; selectorii nu au dispus de indicatori preciși pentru evaluarea caracterului suficient al informațiilor; în cazul în care au existat astfel de indicatori, aceștia nu au fost utilizați în mod constant și consecvent; frecvent, s-au utilizat în mod excesiv afirmații nefondate. |
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12.

În continuare, Comitetul de supraveghere a evaluat calitatea avizelor având în vedere conformitatea acestora cu criteriile de selecție stabilite de către directorul general al OLAF. Comitetul de supraveghere a constatat că instrucțiunile privind punerea în aplicare a criteriilor de selecție nu au fost strict respectate: s-a acordat o atenție scăzută instrumentelor juridice relevante atunci când s-a evaluat competența OLAF de a acționa; selectorii nu au dispus de indicatori preciși pentru evaluarea caracterului suficient al informațiilor; în cazul în care au existat astfel de indicatori, aceștia nu au fost utilizați în mod constant și consecvent; frecvent, s-au utilizat în mod excesiv afirmații nefondate.

| 13. | În sfârșit, s-a examinat transparența procesului de selecție prin analizarea fluxului de informații pe parcursul întregului proces de selecție, în special în ceea ce privește cooperarea dintre Unitatea de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor și unitățile de investigare. |
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13.

În sfârșit, s-a examinat transparența procesului de selecție prin analizarea fluxului de informații pe parcursul întregului proces de selecție, în special în ceea ce privește cooperarea dintre Unitatea de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor și unitățile de investigare.

| 14. | Comitetul de supraveghere a emis o serie de recomandări adresate directorului general al OLAF, care vizează îmbunătățirea funcției de selecție a Unității de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor. Ca o concluzie generală a evaluării sale, Comitetul de supraveghere a emis o recomandare finală ca OLAF să desfășoare o evaluare internă a activităților Unității de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor în vederea stabilirii, printre altele, a resurselor necesare, a punctelor tari și a punctelor slabe ale unității, precum și a „ratei de eroare” pentru cazurile evaluate. De asemenea, Comitetul de supraveghere a solicitat ca directorul general al OLAF să îl informeze cu privire la măsurile luate ca urmare a recomandărilor din aviz după un an de la adoptarea acestuia. |
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14.

Comitetul de supraveghere a emis o serie de recomandări adresate directorului general al OLAF, care vizează îmbunătățirea funcției de selecție a Unității de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor. Ca o concluzie generală a evaluării sale, Comitetul de supraveghere a emis o recomandare finală ca OLAF să desfășoare o evaluare internă a activităților Unității de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor în vederea stabilirii, printre altele, a resurselor necesare, a punctelor tari și a punctelor slabe ale unității, precum și a „ratei de eroare” pentru cazurile evaluate. De asemenea, Comitetul de supraveghere a solicitat ca directorul general al OLAF să îl informeze cu privire la măsurile luate ca urmare a recomandărilor din aviz după un an de la adoptarea acestuia.

Durata investigațiilor

Durata investigațiilor

| Articolul 11 alineatul (7) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1073/1999:


  În cazul în care o investigație este în curs de peste nouă luni, Directorul informează Comitetul de supraveghere asupra motivelor pentru care nu a fost încă posibilă încheierea investigației și asupra momentului estimat al încheierii acesteia.


  Articolul 7 alineatul (8) din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:


  În cazul în care o investigație nu poate fi încheiată în termen de 12 luni de la începerea acesteia, directorul general, la încheierea perioadei de 12 luni și ulterior la fiecare șase luni, înaintează rapoarte Comitetului de supraveghere, indicând motivele și măsurile de remediere prevăzute în vederea accelerării investigației. |
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Articolul 11 alineatul (7) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1073/1999:

Articolul 11 alineatul (7) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1073/1999:

În cazul în care o investigație este în curs de peste nouă luni, Directorul informează Comitetul de supraveghere asupra motivelor pentru care nu a fost încă posibilă încheierea investigației și asupra momentului estimat al încheierii acesteia.

În cazul în care o investigație este în curs de peste nouă luni, Directorul informează Comitetul de supraveghere asupra motivelor pentru care nu a fost încă posibilă încheierea investigației și asupra momentului estimat al încheierii acesteia.

Articolul 7 alineatul (8) din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:

Articolul 7 alineatul (8) din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:

În cazul în care o investigație nu poate fi încheiată în termen de 12 luni de la începerea acesteia, directorul general, la încheierea perioadei de 12 luni și ulterior la fiecare șase luni, înaintează rapoarte Comitetului de supraveghere, indicând motivele și măsurile de remediere prevăzute în vederea accelerării investigației.

În cazul în care o investigație nu poate fi încheiată în termen de 12 luni de la începerea acesteia, directorul general, la încheierea perioadei de 12 luni și ulterior la fiecare șase luni, înaintează rapoarte Comitetului de supraveghere, indicând motivele și măsurile de remediere prevăzute în vederea accelerării investigației.

| 15. | Comitetul de supraveghere a monitorizat durata investigațiilor OLAF utilizând, ca sursă de informații, rapoartele pe nouă luni (6) și rapoartele întocmite în cazurile transmise autorităților judiciare naționale, comunicate de OLAF în temeiul fostului Regulament (CE) nr. 1073/1999, precum și alte documente legate de caz atunci când s-a acordat acces la sistemul OLAF de gestionare a cazurilor (Case Management System — CMS). |
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15.

Comitetul de supraveghere a monitorizat durata investigațiilor OLAF utilizând, ca sursă de informații, rapoartele pe nouă luni (6) și rapoartele întocmite în cazurile transmise autorităților judiciare naționale, comunicate de OLAF în temeiul fostului Regulament (CE) nr. 1073/1999, precum și alte documente legate de caz atunci când s-a acordat acces la sistemul OLAF de gestionare a cazurilor (Case Management System — CMS).

6

Case Management System

| 16. | Comitetul de supraveghere a început analizarea motivelor prezentate de OLAF pentru explicarea duratei cazurilor care depășesc nouă luni: complexitatea chestiunii care face obiectul investigației, lipsa resurselor, prioritatea scăzută a cazului, lipsa de cooperare. Comitetul de supraveghere a remarcat o divergență între direcțiile de investigații și unitățile acestora în ceea ce privește corectitudinea explicațiilor furnizate. Analiza Comitetului de supraveghere este în curs de desfășurare. |
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16.

Comitetul de supraveghere a început analizarea motivelor prezentate de OLAF pentru explicarea duratei cazurilor care depășesc nouă luni: complexitatea chestiunii care face obiectul investigației, lipsa resurselor, prioritatea scăzută a cazului, lipsa de cooperare. Comitetul de supraveghere a remarcat o divergență între direcțiile de investigații și unitățile acestora în ceea ce privește corectitudinea explicațiilor furnizate. Analiza Comitetului de supraveghere este în curs de desfășurare.

| 17. | Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 a introdus două modificări majore menite să permită Comitetului de supraveghere să monitorizeze mai bine durata investigațiilor: rapoartele pe douăsprezece luni în locul rapoartelor pe nouă luni (care corespund mai bine realității, întrucât majoritatea investigațiilor OLAF durează mai mult de douăsprezece luni) și noua obligație a OLAF de a raporta în mod regulat la fiecare șase luni, ceea ce a permis Comitetului de supraveghere să urmărească întregul ciclu de viață al unei investigații. |
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17.

Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 a introdus două modificări majore menite să permită Comitetului de supraveghere să monitorizeze mai bine durata investigațiilor: rapoartele pe douăsprezece luni în locul rapoartelor pe nouă luni (care corespund mai bine realității, întrucât majoritatea investigațiilor OLAF durează mai mult de douăsprezece luni) și noua obligație a OLAF de a raporta în mod regulat la fiecare șase luni, ceea ce a permis Comitetului de supraveghere să urmărească întregul ciclu de viață al unei investigații.

| 18. | La 31 ianuarie 2014, Comitetul de supraveghere a primit, pentru prima dată, 83 de rapoarte pe douăsprezece luni, dintre cele 243 de cazuri având o durată de peste douăsprezece luni la data respectivă. Comitetul de supraveghere a constatat cu preocupare că, deși formularul de lucru utilizat pentru rapoarte a fost revizuit de către OLAF în conformitate cu cerințele Regulamentului (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013, rapoartele nou trimise Comitetului de supraveghere conțin informații insuficiente, în special în ceea ce privește elementele care să permită Comitetului de supraveghere să verifice posibila existență a unor întârzieri nejustificate în cadrul investigațiilor. De exemplu, 33 dintre cele 83 de rapoarte în cazurile cu o durată mai mare de douăsprezece luni prezintă motivele și măsurile de remediere prevăzute în vederea accelerării investigației fără a furniza, cu toate acestea, nicio informație concretă (de exemplu, descrierea faptelor, măsurile de investigare întreprinse de OLAF și succesiunea acestora, posibile perioade de inactivitate, tipul de fraudă, impactul financiar, alte considerații privind termenele de prescripție etc.), fără de care este imposibilă evaluarea duratei unei investigații de către Comitetul de supraveghere. În timp ce Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 a consolidat rolul Comitetului de supraveghere de a controla durata investigațiilor, OLAF nu furnizează din proprie inițiativă informații suficiente pentru îndeplinirea de către comitet a acestei misiuni. Comitetul de supraveghere a ridicat această problemă în cadrul unei reuniuni cu directorul general al OLAF și se așteaptă ca rapoartele furnizate în viitor să fie mai descriptive. |
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18.

La 31 ianuarie 2014, Comitetul de supraveghere a primit, pentru prima dată, 83 de rapoarte pe douăsprezece luni, dintre cele 243 de cazuri având o durată de peste douăsprezece luni la data respectivă. Comitetul de supraveghere a constatat cu preocupare că, deși formularul de lucru utilizat pentru rapoarte a fost revizuit de către OLAF în conformitate cu cerințele Regulamentului (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013, rapoartele nou trimise Comitetului de supraveghere conțin informații insuficiente, în special în ceea ce privește elementele care să permită Comitetului de supraveghere să verifice posibila existență a unor întârzieri nejustificate în cadrul investigațiilor. De exemplu, 33 dintre cele 83 de rapoarte în cazurile cu o durată mai mare de douăsprezece luni prezintă motivele și măsurile de remediere prevăzute în vederea accelerării investigației fără a furniza, cu toate acestea, nicio informație concretă (de exemplu, descrierea faptelor, măsurile de investigare întreprinse de OLAF și succesiunea acestora, posibile perioade de inactivitate, tipul de fraudă, impactul financiar, alte considerații privind termenele de prescripție etc.), fără de care este imposibilă evaluarea duratei unei investigații de către Comitetul de supraveghere. În timp ce Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 a consolidat rolul Comitetului de supraveghere de a controla durata investigațiilor, OLAF nu furnizează din proprie inițiativă informații suficiente pentru îndeplinirea de către comitet a acestei misiuni. Comitetul de supraveghere a ridicat această problemă în cadrul unei reuniuni cu directorul general al OLAF și se așteaptă ca rapoartele furnizate în viitor să fie mai descriptive.

| 19. | Comitetul de supraveghere a fost informat de către OLAF, în cadrul unei reuniuni tehnice, cu privire la instrumentele utilizate de OLAF pentru monitorizarea duratei cazurilor, care constau, în principal, într-un mecanism de semnalare în sistemul de gestionare a cazurilor (CMS) că se apropie termenele pentru prezentarea rapoartelor pe șase luni și pe douăsprezece luni. De asemenea, OLAF a creat o nouă structură de conducere de rang inferior în cadrul unităților de investigare, însărcinată, printre altele, cu monitorizarea duratei investigațiilor. Comitetul de supraveghere salută eforturile depuse de OLAF și disponibilitatea acestuia de a crește gradul de sensibilizare în rândul anchetatorilor în legătură cu limitele de timp. În același timp, Comitetul de supraveghere subliniază că rapoartele pe șase luni și pe douăsprezece luni prezentate Comitetului de supraveghere ar putea reprezenta un instrument util de gestionare pentru monitorizarea chiar de către OLAF a duratei investigațiilor, dar acesta devine imposibil de utilizat deoarece cele mai multe dintre rapoarte sunt lipsite de conținut substanțial. Acest lucru este deosebit de important pentru cazurile în care durata prelungită poate afecta negativ reputația și viețile profesionale ale persoanelor vizate sau poate conduce la prescrierea procedurilor juridice naționale ulterioare. |
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19.

Comitetul de supraveghere a fost informat de către OLAF, în cadrul unei reuniuni tehnice, cu privire la instrumentele utilizate de OLAF pentru monitorizarea duratei cazurilor, care constau, în principal, într-un mecanism de semnalare în sistemul de gestionare a cazurilor (CMS) că se apropie termenele pentru prezentarea rapoartelor pe șase luni și pe douăsprezece luni. De asemenea, OLAF a creat o nouă structură de conducere de rang inferior în cadrul unităților de investigare, însărcinată, printre altele, cu monitorizarea duratei investigațiilor. Comitetul de supraveghere salută eforturile depuse de OLAF și disponibilitatea acestuia de a crește gradul de sensibilizare în rândul anchetatorilor în legătură cu limitele de timp. În același timp, Comitetul de supraveghere subliniază că rapoartele pe șase luni și pe douăsprezece luni prezentate Comitetului de supraveghere ar putea reprezenta un instrument util de gestionare pentru monitorizarea chiar de către OLAF a duratei investigațiilor, dar acesta devine imposibil de utilizat deoarece cele mai multe dintre rapoarte sunt lipsite de conținut substanțial. Acest lucru este deosebit de important pentru cazurile în care durata prelungită poate afecta negativ reputația și viețile profesionale ale persoanelor vizate sau poate conduce la prescrierea procedurilor juridice naționale ulterioare.

Cazurile transmise autorităților judiciare naționale

Cazurile transmise autorităților judiciare naționale

| Articolul 11 alineatul (7) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1073/1999:


  Directorul informează comitetul în legătură cu cazurile care necesită transmiterea de informații autorităților judiciare ale unui stat membru.


  Articolul 17 alineatul (5) al treilea paragraf din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:


  Directorul general informează periodic Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la:


  (...)










  (b) | cazurile în care s-au transmis informații autorităților judiciare ale statelor membre (...). |
| --- | --- |

Articolul 11 alineatul (7) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1073/1999:

Articolul 11 alineatul (7) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1073/1999:

Directorul informează comitetul în legătură cu cazurile care necesită transmiterea de informații autorităților judiciare ale unui stat membru.

Directorul informează comitetul în legătură cu cazurile care necesită transmiterea de informații autorităților judiciare ale unui stat membru.

Articolul 17 alineatul (5) al treilea paragraf din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:

Articolul 17 alineatul (5) al treilea paragraf din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:

Directorul general informează periodic Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la:

Directorul general informează periodic Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la:

(...)

(...)

(b)

(b)

cazurile în care s-au transmis informații autorităților judiciare ale statelor membre (...).

| 20. | Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 a introdus o modificare majoră în ceea ce privește cazurile pe care OLAF intenționează să le transmită autorităților judiciare naționale: OLAF nu are obligația să informeze Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la cazurile respective înainte de transmitere [astfel cum prevedea fostul Regulament (CE) nr. 1073/1999], ci doar periodic, după transmitere. |
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20.

Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 a introdus o modificare majoră în ceea ce privește cazurile pe care OLAF intenționează să le transmită autorităților judiciare naționale: OLAF nu are obligația să informeze Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la cazurile respective înainte de transmitere [astfel cum prevedea fostul Regulament (CE) nr. 1073/1999], ci doar periodic, după transmitere.

| 21. | Între 1 februarie 2013 și 30 septembrie 2013 [până la data intrării în vigoare a Regulamentului (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013], Comitetul de supraveghere a primit 56 de cazuri (7)
  care necesită transmiterea de informații către autoritățile judiciare naționale. La cerere, s-a acordat Comitetului de supraveghere acces deplin la documentele legate de cazuri în sistemul de gestionare a cazurilor (CMS), în 18 cazuri. |
| --- | --- |

21.

Între 1 februarie 2013 și 30 septembrie 2013 [până la data intrării în vigoare a Regulamentului (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013], Comitetul de supraveghere a primit 56 de cazuri (7)
  care necesită transmiterea de informații către autoritățile judiciare naționale. La cerere, s-a acordat Comitetului de supraveghere acces deplin la documentele legate de cazuri în sistemul de gestionare a cazurilor (CMS), în 18 cazuri.

7

care necesită transmiterea de informații

| 22. | Cu toate acestea, Comitetul de supraveghere nu a reușit să examineze în detaliu cazurile respective înainte de transmiterea acestora către autoritățile judiciare naționale din cauza faptului că acesta primește acces la dosarele din sistemul de gestionare a cazurilor (CMS) numai după expirarea termenului de 5 zile prevăzut în acordurile anterioare cu OLAF. Evaluarea efectuată de Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la modul de aplicare de către OLAF a garanțiilor procedurale se bazează, în principal, pe informațiile cuprinse în avizele privind rapoartele intermediare sau finale și recomandările emise de Unitatea de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor (8) și, în cazul în care s-a acordat accesul la cazuri, privind documentele aferente cazului înregistrate în sistemul de gestionare a cazurilor (CMS). Comitetul de supraveghere a remarcat faptul că, potrivit tuturor avizelor Unității de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor, toate activitățile de investigare au fost efectuate în conformitate cu normele juridice aplicabile. Pe baza avizelor respective și a altor documente analizate, Comitetul de supraveghere a identificat doar probleme izolate referitoare la respectarea de către OLAF a garanțiilor procedurale (de exemplu, lipsa informării persoanei interesate în legătură cu încheierea anchetei într-un caz și lipsa unui mandat scris pentru a chestiona persoana vizată într-un alt caz (9)). |
| --- | --- |

22.

Cu toate acestea, Comitetul de supraveghere nu a reușit să examineze în detaliu cazurile respective înainte de transmiterea acestora către autoritățile judiciare naționale din cauza faptului că acesta primește acces la dosarele din sistemul de gestionare a cazurilor (CMS) numai după expirarea termenului de 5 zile prevăzut în acordurile anterioare cu OLAF. Evaluarea efectuată de Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la modul de aplicare de către OLAF a garanțiilor procedurale se bazează, în principal, pe informațiile cuprinse în avizele privind rapoartele intermediare sau finale și recomandările emise de Unitatea de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor (8) și, în cazul în care s-a acordat accesul la cazuri, privind documentele aferente cazului înregistrate în sistemul de gestionare a cazurilor (CMS). Comitetul de supraveghere a remarcat faptul că, potrivit tuturor avizelor Unității de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor, toate activitățile de investigare au fost efectuate în conformitate cu normele juridice aplicabile. Pe baza avizelor respective și a altor documente analizate, Comitetul de supraveghere a identificat doar probleme izolate referitoare la respectarea de către OLAF a garanțiilor procedurale (de exemplu, lipsa informării persoanei interesate în legătură cu încheierea anchetei într-un caz și lipsa unui mandat scris pentru a chestiona persoana vizată într-un alt caz (9)).

8

9

| 23. | Într-unul din cazuri, o persoană interesată a raportat Comitetului de supraveghere o presupusă încălcare gravă de către OLAF a obligației de confidențialitate. Cu toate acestea, Comitetul de supraveghere, care nu dispune de instrumente adecvate de anchetă (incidentul nu era menționat în dosarul OLAF), a putut doar să transmită plângerea către directorul general al OLAF, care a negat existența unei astfel de încălcări. |
| --- | --- |

23.

Într-unul din cazuri, o persoană interesată a raportat Comitetului de supraveghere o presupusă încălcare gravă de către OLAF a obligației de confidențialitate. Cu toate acestea, Comitetul de supraveghere, care nu dispune de instrumente adecvate de anchetă (incidentul nu era menționat în dosarul OLAF), a putut doar să transmită plângerea către directorul general al OLAF, care a negat existența unei astfel de încălcări.

| 24. | La 31 ianuarie 2014, Comitetul de supraveghere a primit informații cu privire la alte 17 cazuri în care informațiile au fost transmise autorităților judiciare ale statelor membre începând cu 1 octombrie 2013 [de la data intrării în vigoare a Regulamentului (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013]. Având în vedere faptul că informațiile au ajuns în ultima zi a perioadei acoperite de prezentul raport de activitate, Comitetul de supraveghere va solicita informații suplimentare și va examina cazurile respective ulterior în cursul anului 2014. |
| --- | --- |

24.

La 31 ianuarie 2014, Comitetul de supraveghere a primit informații cu privire la alte 17 cazuri în care informațiile au fost transmise autorităților judiciare ale statelor membre începând cu 1 octombrie 2013 [de la data intrării în vigoare a Regulamentului (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013]. Având în vedere faptul că informațiile au ajuns în ultima zi a perioadei acoperite de prezentul raport de activitate, Comitetul de supraveghere va solicita informații suplimentare și va examina cazurile respective ulterior în cursul anului 2014.

au fost transmise

Deciziile de amânare a notificării instituției, organismului, oficiului sau agenției

Deciziile de amânare a notificării instituției, organismului, oficiului sau agenției

| Articolul 4 alineatul (6) din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:


  În cazul în care investigațiile interne indică faptul că un funcționar, un alt agent, un membru al unei instituții sau organism, un conducător de oficiu sau agenție, sau un membru al personalului ar putea fi persoana vizată, instituția, organismul, oficiul sau agenția de care aparține acesta este informată cu privire la acest lucru. (...)


  În cazuri excepționale, furnizarea acestor informații poate fi amânată pe baza unei decizii motivate a directorului general, care se transmite Comitetului de supraveghere după încheierea investigației. |
| --- |

Articolul 4 alineatul (6) din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:

Articolul 4 alineatul (6) din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:

În cazul în care investigațiile interne indică faptul că un funcționar, un alt agent, un membru al unei instituții sau organism, un conducător de oficiu sau agenție, sau un membru al personalului ar putea fi persoana vizată, instituția, organismul, oficiul sau agenția de care aparține acesta este informată cu privire la acest lucru. (...)

În cazul în care investigațiile interne indică faptul că un funcționar, un alt agent, un membru al unei instituții sau organism, un conducător de oficiu sau agenție, sau un membru al personalului ar putea fi persoana vizată, instituția, organismul, oficiul sau agenția de care aparține acesta este informată cu privire la acest lucru. (...)

În cazuri excepționale, furnizarea acestor informații poate fi amânată pe baza unei decizii motivate a directorului general, care se transmite Comitetului de supraveghere după încheierea investigației.

În cazuri excepționale, furnizarea acestor informații poate fi amânată pe baza unei decizii motivate a directorului general, care se transmite Comitetului de supraveghere după încheierea investigației.

| 25. | Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 a introdus, pentru prima dată, obligația ca directorul general al OLAF să transmită Comitetului de supraveghere, după încheierea unei investigații, decizia sa motivată de amânare a notificării unei instituții, a unui organism, a unui oficiu sau a unei agenții din care face parte persoana vizată de o investigație internă. La 31 ianuarie 2014, Comitetul de supraveghere a fost informat de către OLAF că nu a avut loc nicio astfel de amânare de la intrarea în vigoare a regulamentului. |
| --- | --- |

25.

Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 a introdus, pentru prima dată, obligația ca directorul general al OLAF să transmită Comitetului de supraveghere, după încheierea unei investigații, decizia sa motivată de amânare a notificării unei instituții, a unui organism, a unui oficiu sau a unei agenții din care face parte persoana vizată de o investigație internă. La 31 ianuarie 2014, Comitetul de supraveghere a fost informat de către OLAF că nu a avut loc nicio astfel de amânare de la intrarea în vigoare a regulamentului.

Recomandările directorului general al OLAF

Recomandările directorului general al OLAF

| Articolul 11 alineatul (7) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1073/1999:


  Directorul informează comitetul în legătură cu cazurile în care instituția, organismul, oficiul sau agenția respectivă nu a acționat în urma recomandărilor transmise de către acesta.


  Articolul 17 alineatul (5) al treilea paragraf din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:


  Directorul general informează periodic Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la:










  (a) | cazurile în care recomandările directorului general nu au fost urmate (...). |
| --- | --- |

Articolul 11 alineatul (7) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1073/1999:

Articolul 11 alineatul (7) din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1073/1999:

Directorul informează comitetul în legătură cu cazurile în care instituția, organismul, oficiul sau agenția respectivă nu a acționat în urma recomandărilor transmise de către acesta.

Directorul informează comitetul în legătură cu cazurile în care instituția, organismul, oficiul sau agenția respectivă nu a acționat în urma recomandărilor transmise de către acesta.

Articolul 17 alineatul (5) al treilea paragraf din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:

Articolul 17 alineatul (5) al treilea paragraf din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:

Directorul general informează periodic Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la:

Directorul general informează periodic Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la:

(a)

(a)

cazurile în care recomandările directorului general nu au fost urmate (...).

| 26. | Pe parcursul perioadei de raportare și, de fapt, de la începutul mandatului său, Comitetul de supraveghere a primit foarte puține informații cu privire la cazurile în care recomandările directorului general al OLAF nu au fost urmate. Ancheta proprie a Comitetului de supraveghere conduce la concluzia că, la fel precum în anii precedenți, un număr semnificativ de astfel de recomandări nu au fost respectate. Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat în rapoartele de activitate precedente că OLAF nu pare să fi avut, în trecut, instrumente adecvate de monitorizare care să permită urmărirea în mod corespunzător a punerii în aplicare a recomandărilor sale de către autoritățile naționale și europene. |
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26.

Pe parcursul perioadei de raportare și, de fapt, de la începutul mandatului său, Comitetul de supraveghere a primit foarte puține informații cu privire la cazurile în care recomandările directorului general al OLAF nu au fost urmate. Ancheta proprie a Comitetului de supraveghere conduce la concluzia că, la fel precum în anii precedenți, un număr semnificativ de astfel de recomandări nu au fost respectate. Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat în rapoartele de activitate precedente că OLAF nu pare să fi avut, în trecut, instrumente adecvate de monitorizare care să permită urmărirea în mod corespunzător a punerii în aplicare a recomandărilor sale de către autoritățile naționale și europene.

| 27. | După reorganizarea OLAF în 2012, monitorizarea punerii în aplicare a recomandărilor sale a fost descentralizată către unitățile de investigare. În prezent, OLAF lucrează la elaborarea și punerea în aplicare a unor noi instrumente de monitorizare care să permită o mai bună monitorizare a rezultatelor și a impactului recomandărilor sale. Comitetul de supraveghere a remarcat faptul că OLAF a întreprins deja eforturi semnificative pentru a măsura punerea în aplicare a recomandărilor sale, în special cele judiciare și cele financiare. De exemplu, OLAF revizuiește peste 600 de cazuri închise cu recomandări judiciare. Comitetul de supraveghere a remarcat cu interes grila de evaluare utilizată pentru revizuire, conform căreia acțiunile întreprinse de autoritățile judiciare naționale în urma recomandării au fost verificate în funcție de principalele etape ale procedurilor judiciare naționale (deschiderea unei anchete penale, deciziile de punere sub acuzare sau de clasare, decizia de achitare sau de condamnare etc.). În ceea ce privește măsurile de ordin financiar, OLAF urmărește să îmbunătățească procedurile pentru a fi în măsură să stabilească sumele efectiv recuperate pentru bugetul UE. |
| --- | --- |

27.

După reorganizarea OLAF în 2012, monitorizarea punerii în aplicare a recomandărilor sale a fost descentralizată către unitățile de investigare. În prezent, OLAF lucrează la elaborarea și punerea în aplicare a unor noi instrumente de monitorizare care să permită o mai bună monitorizare a rezultatelor și a impactului recomandărilor sale. Comitetul de supraveghere a remarcat faptul că OLAF a întreprins deja eforturi semnificative pentru a măsura punerea în aplicare a recomandărilor sale, în special cele judiciare și cele financiare. De exemplu, OLAF revizuiește peste 600 de cazuri închise cu recomandări judiciare. Comitetul de supraveghere a remarcat cu interes grila de evaluare utilizată pentru revizuire, conform căreia acțiunile întreprinse de autoritățile judiciare naționale în urma recomandării au fost verificate în funcție de principalele etape ale procedurilor judiciare naționale (deschiderea unei anchete penale, deciziile de punere sub acuzare sau de clasare, decizia de achitare sau de condamnare etc.). În ceea ce privește măsurile de ordin financiar, OLAF urmărește să îmbunătățească procedurile pentru a fi în măsură să stabilească sumele efectiv recuperate pentru bugetul UE.

efectiv recuperate

| 28. | Comitetul de supraveghere recunoaște complexitatea acestui exercițiu aflat în desfășurare și salută dorința OLAF de a-și îmbunătăți instrumente de monitorizare. Cu toate acestea, în etapa actuală și în lipsa unor informații pertinente, este prematur pentru Comitetul de supraveghere să aprecieze impactul modificărilor determinate de reorganizare în ceea ce privește eficacitatea și eficiența activității de monitorizare a OLAF. Comitetul de supraveghere se așteaptă la o îmbunătățire a informațiilor primite de la OLAF în viitor, odată cu punerea în aplicare a instrumentelor de monitorizare corespunzătoare. |
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28.

Comitetul de supraveghere recunoaște complexitatea acestui exercițiu aflat în desfășurare și salută dorința OLAF de a-și îmbunătăți instrumente de monitorizare. Cu toate acestea, în etapa actuală și în lipsa unor informații pertinente, este prematur pentru Comitetul de supraveghere să aprecieze impactul modificărilor determinate de reorganizare în ceea ce privește eficacitatea și eficiența activității de monitorizare a OLAF. Comitetul de supraveghere se așteaptă la o îmbunătățire a informațiilor primite de la OLAF în viitor, odată cu punerea în aplicare a instrumentelor de monitorizare corespunzătoare.

Procedurile OLAF pentru soluționarea plângerilor

Procedurile OLAF pentru soluționarea plângerilor

| 29. | În avizul său nr. 2/2013 (Stabilirea unei proceduri interne a OLAF pentru plângeri) adoptat în decembrie 2013 (10), Comitetul de supraveghere a examinat căile de atac aflate la dispoziția persoanelor implicate în investigațiile OLAF cu privire la posibile încălcări ale drepturilor lor și ale garanțiilor procedurale. Comitetul de supraveghere a constatat că persoanele implicate nu dispun de soluții imediate și suficiente pentru remedierea încălcărilor potențiale, fie printr-un mecanism extern (o instanță națională sau a UE, Ombudsmanul European sau Autoritatea Europeană pentru Protecția Datelor), fie printr-un mecanism intern (OLAF). |
| --- | --- |

29.

În avizul său nr. 2/2013 (Stabilirea unei proceduri interne a OLAF pentru plângeri) adoptat în decembrie 2013 (10), Comitetul de supraveghere a examinat căile de atac aflate la dispoziția persoanelor implicate în investigațiile OLAF cu privire la posibile încălcări ale drepturilor lor și ale garanțiilor procedurale. Comitetul de supraveghere a constatat că persoanele implicate nu dispun de soluții imediate și suficiente pentru remedierea încălcărilor potențiale, fie printr-un mecanism extern (o instanță națională sau a UE, Ombudsmanul European sau Autoritatea Europeană pentru Protecția Datelor), fie printr-un mecanism intern (OLAF).

10

| 30. | Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat că noul Regulament (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 privind investigațiile efectuate de OLAF nu rezolvă problema, întrucât acesta nu introduce un mecanism pentru soluționarea plângerilor individuale. Comitetul de supraveghere și-a exprimat opinia potrivit căreia actuala lacună legislativă ar putea fi completată cu o procedură oficială privind plângerile în cadrul OLAF, în special în ceea ce privește presupusele încălcări ale drepturilor fundamentale și ale garanțiilor procedurale în cursul unei investigații OLAF. |
| --- | --- |

30.

Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat că noul Regulament (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 privind investigațiile efectuate de OLAF nu rezolvă problema, întrucât acesta nu introduce un mecanism pentru soluționarea plângerilor individuale. Comitetul de supraveghere și-a exprimat opinia potrivit căreia actuala lacună legislativă ar putea fi completată cu o procedură oficială privind plângerile în cadrul OLAF, în special în ceea ce privește presupusele încălcări ale drepturilor fundamentale și ale garanțiilor procedurale în cursul unei investigații OLAF.

| 31. | Prin urmare, Comitetul de supraveghere a recomandat ca directorul general al OLAF să stabilească și să publice o astfel de procedură internă în urma consultării Comitetului de supraveghere cu privire la detalii. Comitetul de supraveghere și-a exprimat dorința ca directorul general al OLAF să informeze periodic Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la plângerile primite de OLAF și la monitorizarea acestora. |
| --- | --- |

31.

Prin urmare, Comitetul de supraveghere a recomandat ca directorul general al OLAF să stabilească și să publice o astfel de procedură internă în urma consultării Comitetului de supraveghere cu privire la detalii. Comitetul de supraveghere și-a exprimat dorința ca directorul general al OLAF să informeze periodic Comitetul de supraveghere cu privire la plângerile primite de OLAF și la monitorizarea acestora.

| 32. | În luna ianuarie 2014, OLAF a publicat pe pagina sa de internet o descriere a măsurilor întreprinse în cadrul OLAF pentru soluționarea plângerilor. În urma unei cereri din partea Comitetului de supraveghere de a examina decizia scrisă privind stabilirea unei proceduri pertinente, în scrisoarea sa din 17 februarie 2014, directorul general al OLAF a confirmat că, în opinia sa, publicarea pe pagina de internet reprezintă oficializarea procedurilor existente, care nu necesită o decizie oficială în scris din partea sa. |
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32.

În luna ianuarie 2014, OLAF a publicat pe pagina sa de internet o descriere a măsurilor întreprinse în cadrul OLAF pentru soluționarea plângerilor. În urma unei cereri din partea Comitetului de supraveghere de a examina decizia scrisă privind stabilirea unei proceduri pertinente, în scrisoarea sa din 17 februarie 2014, directorul general al OLAF a confirmat că, în opinia sa, publicarea pe pagina de internet reprezintă oficializarea procedurilor existente, care nu necesită o decizie oficială în scris din partea sa.

| 33. | În consecință, Comitetul de supraveghere trebuie să concluzioneze că recomandarea sa nu a fost pusă în aplicare. Comitetul de supraveghere își exprimă preocuparea cu privire la riscul de inducere în eroare a cetățenilor care doresc să depună o plângere la OLAF. Aceștia ar putea crede că textul prezentat pe pagina de internet a OLAF le oferă un cadru juridic pentru plângere, în timp ce, de fapt, procedura relevantă (pentru plângerile referitoare la garanțiile procedurale) nu există din punct de vedere formal deoarece nu există niciun fel de act juridic care să constituie temeiul juridic pentru o astfel de procedură. |
| --- | --- |

33.

În consecință, Comitetul de supraveghere trebuie să concluzioneze că recomandarea sa nu a fost pusă în aplicare. Comitetul de supraveghere își exprimă preocuparea cu privire la riscul de inducere în eroare a cetățenilor care doresc să depună o plângere la OLAF. Aceștia ar putea crede că textul prezentat pe pagina de internet a OLAF le oferă un cadru juridic pentru plângere, în timp ce, de fapt, procedura relevantă (pentru plângerile referitoare la garanțiile procedurale) nu există din punct de vedere formal deoarece nu există niciun fel de act juridic care să constituie temeiul juridic pentru o astfel de procedură.

Plângeri și solicitări adresate Comitetului de supraveghere

Plângeri și solicitări adresate Comitetului de supraveghere

| 34. | În cursul perioadei de raportare, Comitetul de supraveghere a primit 14 plângeri și solicitări de la persoane fizice. Aceasta reprezintă o creștere cu 100 % față de anul precedent. Plângerile se referă, printre altele, la presupusa încălcare a drepturilor fundamentale și a garanțiilor procedurale, încălcarea confidențialității investigațiilor, durata excesivă a investigațiilor și presupusa închidere greșită a cazurilor fără recomandări. Plângerile au fost înaintate, în principal, de persoane vizate de investigațiile OLAF, dar și de denunțători nemulțumiți de deciziile luate de OLAF în urma raportării de către aceștia a unei presupuse fraude. |
| --- | --- |

34.

În cursul perioadei de raportare, Comitetul de supraveghere a primit 14 plângeri și solicitări de la persoane fizice. Aceasta reprezintă o creștere cu 100 % față de anul precedent. Plângerile se referă, printre altele, la presupusa încălcare a drepturilor fundamentale și a garanțiilor procedurale, încălcarea confidențialității investigațiilor, durata excesivă a investigațiilor și presupusa închidere greșită a cazurilor fără recomandări. Plângerile au fost înaintate, în principal, de persoane vizate de investigațiile OLAF, dar și de denunțători nemulțumiți de deciziile luate de OLAF în urma raportării de către aceștia a unei presupuse fraude.

14 plângeri și solicitări

| 35. | Comitetul de supraveghere a răspuns la plângeri subliniind că, în conformitate cu regulamentul actual, Comitetul de supraveghere nu este conceput ca un organism de soluționare a plângerilor. Cu toate acestea, Comitetul de supraveghere a luat în considerare plângerile în cadrul monitorizării sale sistemice a funcției de investigare a OLAF și a solicitat, acolo unde a considerat necesar, informații suplimentare și explicații din partea OLAF și/sau acces complet la dosarele cazurilor din sistemul de gestionare a cazurilor (CMS). |
| --- | --- |

35.

Comitetul de supraveghere a răspuns la plângeri subliniind că, în conformitate cu regulamentul actual, Comitetul de supraveghere nu este conceput ca un organism de soluționare a plângerilor. Cu toate acestea, Comitetul de supraveghere a luat în considerare plângerile în cadrul monitorizării sale sistemice a funcției de investigare a OLAF și a solicitat, acolo unde a considerat necesar, informații suplimentare și explicații din partea OLAF și/sau acces complet la dosarele cazurilor din sistemul de gestionare a cazurilor (CMS).

| 36. | În luna ianuarie 2014, Comitetul de supraveghere a primit o notificare oficială de la o instituție UE, care și-a exprimat preocuparea cu privire la o presupusă atingere nejustificată de către OLAF a dreptului la protecția datelor cu caracter personal al funcționarilor instituției respective. În răspunsul său, Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat că afirmația privește o investigație în curs, în care Comitetul de supraveghere nu are dreptul să intervină. De asemenea, Comitetul de supraveghere a indicat faptul că autoritatea competentă pentru soluționarea unei astfel de plângeri este Autoritatea Europeană pentru Protecția Datelor și că trebuie să se aștepte decizia acesteia. |
| --- | --- |

36.

În luna ianuarie 2014, Comitetul de supraveghere a primit o notificare oficială de la o instituție UE, care și-a exprimat preocuparea cu privire la o presupusă atingere nejustificată de către OLAF a dreptului la protecția datelor cu caracter personal al funcționarilor instituției respective. În răspunsul său, Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat că afirmația privește o investigație în curs, în care Comitetul de supraveghere nu are dreptul să intervină. De asemenea, Comitetul de supraveghere a indicat faptul că autoritatea competentă pentru soluționarea unei astfel de plângeri este Autoritatea Europeană pentru Protecția Datelor și că trebuie să se aștepte decizia acesteia.

| 37. | Comitetul de supraveghere a primit 2 cereri de acces la avizul său nr. 2/2012. Comitetul de supraveghere a considerat că documentul solicitat făcea obiectul excepțiilor prevăzute la articolul 4 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1049/2001 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului (11), în special articolul 4 alineatul (2) a doua și a treia liniuță și articolul 4 alineatul (1) litera (b) și, prin urmare, nu putea fi făcut public la momentul respectiv. Cu toate acestea, Comitetul de supraveghere și-a exprimat disponibilitatea de a furniza documentul, în cazul în care se solicită acest lucru, în cadrul procedurilor judiciare în curs. |
| --- | --- |

37.

Comitetul de supraveghere a primit 2 cereri de acces la avizul său nr. 2/2012. Comitetul de supraveghere a considerat că documentul solicitat făcea obiectul excepțiilor prevăzute la articolul 4 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1049/2001 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului (11), în special articolul 4 alineatul (2) a doua și a treia liniuță și articolul 4 alineatul (1) litera (b) și, prin urmare, nu putea fi făcut public la momentul respectiv. Cu toate acestea, Comitetul de supraveghere și-a exprimat disponibilitatea de a furniza documentul, în cazul în care se solicită acest lucru, în cadrul procedurilor judiciare în curs.

11

| 38. | În sfârșit, o autoritate judiciară națională a solicitat ridicarea inviolabilității arhivelor Comitetului de supraveghere cu privire la avizul nr. 2/2012 și a obligației de rezervă a membrilor săi, în scopul unei proceduri naționale. Comitetul de supraveghere a dat curs favorabil solicitării respective. |
| --- | --- |

38.

În sfârșit, o autoritate judiciară națională a solicitat ridicarea inviolabilității arhivelor Comitetului de supraveghere cu privire la avizul nr. 2/2012 și a obligației de rezervă a membrilor săi, în scopul unei proceduri naționale. Comitetul de supraveghere a dat curs favorabil solicitării respective.

| 39. | Statutul funcționarilor UE și Regimul aplicabil altor agenți ai UE stipulează că orice funcționar sau agent care are cunoștință de fapte care dau naștere unei prezumții cu privire la existența unei posibile activități ilegale sau a unei conduite legate de exercitarea atribuțiilor profesionale, care poate constitui o încălcare gravă a obligațiilor funcționarilor Uniunii, informează fără întârziere fie superiorul ierarhic direct sau directorul general, fie, în cazul în care consideră că este util, Secretarul General sau OLAF (12). Aceste norme se aplică, de asemenea, în cadrul OLAF, ceea ce înseamnă că membrii personalului OLAF sunt obligați să raporteze unui superior ierarhic din cadrul OLAF sau, după caz, direct Secretarului General al Comisiei orice informații faptice și dovezi privind posibile activități ilegale sau abateri profesionale grave în cadrul OLAF de care aceștia au cunoștință. Pentru a ține seama de situația specială a personalului OLAF care dorește să raporteze posibile nereguli în cadrul OLAF, s-a convenit (13) cu CS că aceste aspecte pot fi raportate președintelui Comitetului de supraveghere. |
| --- | --- |

39.

Statutul funcționarilor UE și Regimul aplicabil altor agenți ai UE stipulează că orice funcționar sau agent care are cunoștință de fapte care dau naștere unei prezumții cu privire la existența unei posibile activități ilegale sau a unei conduite legate de exercitarea atribuțiilor profesionale, care poate constitui o încălcare gravă a obligațiilor funcționarilor Uniunii, informează fără întârziere fie superiorul ierarhic direct sau directorul general, fie, în cazul în care consideră că este util, Secretarul General sau OLAF (12). Aceste norme se aplică, de asemenea, în cadrul OLAF, ceea ce înseamnă că membrii personalului OLAF sunt obligați să raporteze unui superior ierarhic din cadrul OLAF sau, după caz, direct Secretarului General al Comisiei orice informații faptice și dovezi privind posibile activități ilegale sau abateri profesionale grave în cadrul OLAF de care aceștia au cunoștință. Pentru a ține seama de situația specială a personalului OLAF care dorește să raporteze posibile nereguli în cadrul OLAF, s-a convenit (13) cu CS că aceste aspecte pot fi raportate președintelui Comitetului de supraveghere.

12

13

| 40. | Comitetul de supraveghere nu a primit niciodată un astfel de raport. Este posibil ca procedura să nu fi fost comunicată în mod adecvat personalului OLAF, dar, chiar mai important, Comitetului de supraveghere nu i s-a acordat niciun instrument pentru a monitoriza posibilele plângeri și pentru a asigura o investigație și o reparație eficientă. |
| --- | --- |

40.

Comitetul de supraveghere nu a primit niciodată un astfel de raport. Este posibil ca procedura să nu fi fost comunicată în mod adecvat personalului OLAF, dar, chiar mai important, Comitetului de supraveghere nu i s-a acordat niciun instrument pentru a monitoriza posibilele plângeri și pentru a asigura o investigație și o reparație eficientă.

2.   MONITORIZAREA GESTIONĂRII FUNCȚIEI DE INVESTIGARE A OLAF

MONITORIZAREA GESTIONĂRII FUNCȚIEI DE INVESTIGARE A OLAF

| Articolul 6 alineatul (2) din Decizia Comisiei de instituire a OLAF, astfel cum a fost modificată de Decizia 2013/478/UE a Comisiei
   (14)
  : După consultarea Comitetului de supraveghere, directorul general transmite directorului general al DG BUDG un proiect preliminar de buget, pentru a fi inclus în anexa privind oficiul la secțiunea „Comisia” din bugetul general al Uniunii Europene.


  Articolul 15 alineatul (1) al treilea paragraf din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:


  Comitetul de supraveghere adresează directorului general avize, inclusiv, după caz, recomandări privind, printre altele, resursele necesare pentru exercitarea funcției de investigare a oficiului (...). |
| --- |

Articolul 6 alineatul (2) din Decizia Comisiei de instituire a OLAF, astfel cum a fost modificată de Decizia 2013/478/UE a Comisiei
   (14)
  : După consultarea Comitetului de supraveghere, directorul general transmite directorului general al DG BUDG un proiect preliminar de buget, pentru a fi inclus în anexa privind oficiul la secțiunea „Comisia” din bugetul general al Uniunii Europene.

Articolul 6 alineatul (2) din Decizia Comisiei de instituire a OLAF, astfel cum a fost modificată de Decizia 2013/478/UE a Comisiei

14

: După consultarea Comitetului de supraveghere, directorul general transmite directorului general al DG BUDG un proiect preliminar de buget, pentru a fi inclus în anexa privind oficiul la secțiunea „Comisia” din bugetul general al Uniunii Europene.

Articolul 15 alineatul (1) al treilea paragraf din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:

Articolul 15 alineatul (1) al treilea paragraf din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013:

Comitetul de supraveghere adresează directorului general avize, inclusiv, după caz, recomandări privind, printre altele, resursele necesare pentru exercitarea funcției de investigare a oficiului (...).

Comitetul de supraveghere adresează directorului general avize, inclusiv, după caz, recomandări privind, printre altele, resursele necesare pentru exercitarea funcției de investigare a oficiului (...).

Proiectul preliminar de buget pentru anul 2014

Proiectul preliminar de buget pentru anul 2014

| 41. | Pentru a se asigura că bugetul OLAF ține seama în mod corespunzător de independența funcției de investigare a OLAF și că OLAF dispune de suficiente resurse pentru a funcționa în mod eficace și eficient în calitate de serviciu interinstituțional în procesul de intensificare a luptei împotriva fraudei, Comitetul de supraveghere a adoptat avizul nr. 1/2013 privind Proiectul preliminar de buget al OLAF pentru anul 2014
   (15). |
| --- | --- |

41.

Pentru a se asigura că bugetul OLAF ține seama în mod corespunzător de independența funcției de investigare a OLAF și că OLAF dispune de suficiente resurse pentru a funcționa în mod eficace și eficient în calitate de serviciu interinstituțional în procesul de intensificare a luptei împotriva fraudei, Comitetul de supraveghere a adoptat avizul nr. 1/2013 privind Proiectul preliminar de buget al OLAF pentru anul 2014
   (15).

avizul nr. 1/2013

Proiectul preliminar de buget al OLAF pentru anul 2014

15

| 42. | Comitetul de supraveghere a analizat alocarea de resurse pentru activitățile prioritare și strategia privind resursele umane. Recomandările Comitetului de supraveghere s-au concentrat asupra monitorizării investigațiilor și asupra elaborării unor indicatori de eficiență și de calitate a funcției de investigare, în conformitate cu politica UE de luptă antifraudă și cu strategia antifraudă a Comisiei. De asemenea, s-a recomandat ca OLAF să se concentreze pe formarea profesională, dezvoltarea carierei, planificarea succesiunii, precum și pe un echilibru corespunzător între serviciile de sprijin și anchetatori. |
| --- | --- |

42.

Comitetul de supraveghere a analizat alocarea de resurse pentru activitățile prioritare și strategia privind resursele umane. Recomandările Comitetului de supraveghere s-au concentrat asupra monitorizării investigațiilor și asupra elaborării unor indicatori de eficiență și de calitate a funcției de investigare, în conformitate cu politica UE de luptă antifraudă și cu strategia antifraudă a Comisiei. De asemenea, s-a recomandat ca OLAF să se concentreze pe formarea profesională, dezvoltarea carierei, planificarea succesiunii, precum și pe un echilibru corespunzător între serviciile de sprijin și anchetatori.

| 43. | Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat importanța consultării sale prin intermediul unui schimb real și substanțial de opinii între directorul general al OLAF și Comitetul de supraveghere înainte de trimiterea, în orice formă, a proiectului preliminar de buget către directorul general pentru buget. |
| --- | --- |

43.

Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat importanța consultării sale prin intermediul unui schimb real și substanțial de opinii între directorul general al OLAF și Comitetul de supraveghere înainte de trimiterea, în orice formă, a proiectului preliminar de buget către directorul general pentru buget.

înainte

| 44. | În sfârșit, Comitetul de supraveghere a recomandat introducerea unei rubrici bugetare separate, în bugetul OLAF, atât pentru comitet, cât și pentru secretariatul acestuia în vederea clarificării costurilor legate de funcția Comitetului de supraveghere și pentru sublinierea, în mod transparent, a caracterului interinstituțional al comitetului și al secretariatului acestuia. De asemenea, Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat importanța alocării de către directorul general a unor resurse suficiente pentru secretariatul Comitetului de supraveghere și a asigurării funcționării independente a acestuia. |
| --- | --- |

44.

În sfârșit, Comitetul de supraveghere a recomandat introducerea unei rubrici bugetare separate, în bugetul OLAF, atât pentru comitet, cât și pentru secretariatul acestuia în vederea clarificării costurilor legate de funcția Comitetului de supraveghere și pentru sublinierea, în mod transparent, a caracterului interinstituțional al comitetului și al secretariatului acestuia. De asemenea, Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat importanța alocării de către directorul general a unor resurse suficiente pentru secretariatul Comitetului de supraveghere și a asigurării funcționării independente a acestuia.

| 45. | Comitetul de supraveghere a susținut proiectul preliminar de buget pentru 2014, cu condiția ca recomandările prezentate în avizul său să fie luate în considerare. |
| --- | --- |

45.

Comitetul de supraveghere a susținut proiectul preliminar de buget pentru 2014, cu condiția ca recomandările prezentate în avizul său să fie luate în considerare.

Reorganizarea OLAF și sondaje privind gradul de satisfacție a personalului

Reorganizarea OLAF și sondaje privind gradul de satisfacție a personalului

| 46. | Sondajul efectuat în 2013 în întreaga Comisie, urmat de un sondaj intern efectuat în cadrul OLAF, a arătat un nivel scăzut de satisfacție a personalului cu privire la mediul profesional. Comitetul de supraveghere este preocupat, în mod special, de trei elemente, având în vedere impactul lor potențial asupra eficienței funcției de investigare a OLAF:






  — | potrivit personalului OLAF, reorganizarea masivă a oficiului nu a redus sarcina administrativă pentru anchetatori, nici nu a îmbunătățit transparența procedurilor interne; |
| --- | --- | --- |

46.

Sondajul efectuat în 2013 în întreaga Comisie, urmat de un sondaj intern efectuat în cadrul OLAF, a arătat un nivel scăzut de satisfacție a personalului cu privire la mediul profesional. Comitetul de supraveghere este preocupat, în mod special, de trei elemente, având în vedere impactul lor potențial asupra eficienței funcției de investigare a OLAF:

—

potrivit personalului OLAF, reorganizarea masivă a oficiului nu a redus sarcina administrativă pentru anchetatori, nici nu a îmbunătățit transparența procedurilor interne;

| — | membrii personalului consideră că personalul de conducere al OLAF nu a comunicat cu aceștia în mod suficient, nici nu a acordat atenția necesară observațiilor acestora; |
| --- | --- |

—

membrii personalului consideră că personalul de conducere al OLAF nu a comunicat cu aceștia în mod suficient, nici nu a acordat atenția necesară observațiilor acestora;

| — | ca urmare a reorganizării OLAF în 2012, toți membrii personalului de conducere și peste 75 % din membrii personalului de conducere de nivel mediu au fost numiți recent în direcțiile/unitățile lor actuale, mulți membri ai personalului au plecat și peste un sfert din restul personalului a luat în considerare părăsirea locului de muncă, ceea ce, în ansamblu, reprezintă un motiv serios de preocupare în ceea ce privește continuitatea expertizei în cadrul oficiului. |
| --- | --- |

—

ca urmare a reorganizării OLAF în 2012, toți membrii personalului de conducere și peste 75 % din membrii personalului de conducere de nivel mediu au fost numiți recent în direcțiile/unitățile lor actuale, mulți membri ai personalului au plecat și peste un sfert din restul personalului a luat în considerare părăsirea locului de muncă, ceea ce, în ansamblu, reprezintă un motiv serios de preocupare în ceea ce privește continuitatea expertizei în cadrul oficiului.

| 47. | În consecință, Comitetul de supraveghere a solicitat directorului general al OLAF să îl informeze în mod regulat cu privire la măsurile prevăzute sau puse în aplicare pentru a aborda aceste aspecte. |
| --- | --- |

47.

În consecință, Comitetul de supraveghere a solicitat directorului general al OLAF să îl informeze în mod regulat cu privire la măsurile prevăzute sau puse în aplicare pentru a aborda aceste aspecte.

3.   COOPERAREA CU OLAF

COOPERAREA CU OLAF

Acțiunile întreprinse de OLAF în urma recomandărilor Comitetului de supraveghere

Acțiunile întreprinse de OLAF în urma recomandărilor Comitetului de supraveghere

| 48. | În 2012, Comitetul de supraveghere a emis o serie de recomandări adresate directorului general al OLAF, în special în ceea ce privește protecția drepturilor fundamentale și a garanțiilor procedurale (16). Analiza inițială efectuată de Comitetul de supraveghere indică faptul că punerea în aplicare a unei mari părți a recomandărilor sale din 2012 nu a fost satisfăcătoare. În răspunsurile din partea directorului general al OLAF fie nu a existat o justificare suficientă pentru nepunerea în aplicare, fie nu au existat informații substanțiale cu privire la modul în care se presupune că au fost puse în aplicare recomandările. În consecință, Comitetul de supraveghere va analiza acest aspect într-un aviz separat care urmează să fie emis în 2014. |
| --- | --- |

48.

În 2012, Comitetul de supraveghere a emis o serie de recomandări adresate directorului general al OLAF, în special în ceea ce privește protecția drepturilor fundamentale și a garanțiilor procedurale (16). Analiza inițială efectuată de Comitetul de supraveghere indică faptul că punerea în aplicare a unei mari părți a recomandărilor sale din 2012 nu a fost satisfăcătoare. În răspunsurile din partea directorului general al OLAF fie nu a existat o justificare suficientă pentru nepunerea în aplicare, fie nu au existat informații substanțiale cu privire la modul în care se presupune că au fost puse în aplicare recomandările. În consecință, Comitetul de supraveghere va analiza acest aspect într-un aviz separat care urmează să fie emis în 2014.

16

Acordurile de lucru cu OLAF

Acordurile de lucru cu OLAF

| 49. | În cursul perioadei de raportare, Comitetul de supraveghere a organizat ample și îndelungate discuții cu directorul general al OLAF cu privire la accesul Comitetului de supraveghere la informații legate de cazuri. Rezultatul discuțiilor este reflectat în acordurile de lucru (17) semnate de directorul general al OLAF și președintele Comitetului de supraveghere la 14 ianuarie 2014. Acordurile stabilesc: (i) sfera de cuprindere a informațiilor privind activitățile de investigare ale OLAF care urmează să fie furnizate Comitetului de supraveghere; (ii) metodologia pentru furnizarea de informații; și (iii) perioada de timp. Acestea sunt menite să stabilească un echilibru just între datoria OLAF de a proteja confidențialitatea informațiilor legate de investigațiile sale și nevoile în materie de monitorizare ale Comitetului de supraveghere. |
| --- | --- |

49.

În cursul perioadei de raportare, Comitetul de supraveghere a organizat ample și îndelungate discuții cu directorul general al OLAF cu privire la accesul Comitetului de supraveghere la informații legate de cazuri. Rezultatul discuțiilor este reflectat în acordurile de lucru (17) semnate de directorul general al OLAF și președintele Comitetului de supraveghere la 14 ianuarie 2014. Acordurile stabilesc: (i) sfera de cuprindere a informațiilor privind activitățile de investigare ale OLAF care urmează să fie furnizate Comitetului de supraveghere; (ii) metodologia pentru furnizarea de informații; și (iii) perioada de timp. Acestea sunt menite să stabilească un echilibru just între datoria OLAF de a proteja confidențialitatea informațiilor legate de investigațiile sale și nevoile în materie de monitorizare ale Comitetului de supraveghere.

17

| 50. | În ceea ce privește cazurile transmise autorităților judiciare naționale, Comitetul de supraveghere și-a exprimat dorința de a primi o copie a avizelor emise de Unitatea de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor (ISRU) adresate directorului general al OLAF cu privire la raportul final și recomandări, pentru a permite Comitetului de supraveghere să monitorizeze evoluțiile privind aplicarea garanțiilor procedurale. Dat fiind faptul că un astfel de document poate conține date cu caracter personal, Comitetul de supraveghere a convenit cu OLAF să solicite mai întâi avizul Autorității Europene pentru Protecția Datelor cu privire la acest subiect. În prezent, procedura de avizare este în curs. |
| --- | --- |

50.

În ceea ce privește cazurile transmise autorităților judiciare naționale, Comitetul de supraveghere și-a exprimat dorința de a primi o copie a avizelor emise de Unitatea de selecție și de revizuire a investigațiilor (ISRU) adresate directorului general al OLAF cu privire la raportul final și recomandări, pentru a permite Comitetului de supraveghere să monitorizeze evoluțiile privind aplicarea garanțiilor procedurale. Dat fiind faptul că un astfel de document poate conține date cu caracter personal, Comitetul de supraveghere a convenit cu OLAF să solicite mai întâi avizul Autorității Europene pentru Protecția Datelor cu privire la acest subiect. În prezent, procedura de avizare este în curs.

| 51. | În cadrul acordurilor de lucru, prima transmitere a informațiilor pe care directorul general al OLAF este obligat să le trimită cu regularitate Comitetului de supraveghere a avut loc la 31 ianuarie 2014, ultima zi a perioadei de raportare pentru prezentul raport. În consecință, o evaluare mai detaliată a punerii în aplicare a acordurilor de lucru va fi prezentată în următorul raport. |
| --- | --- |

51.

În cadrul acordurilor de lucru, prima transmitere a informațiilor pe care directorul general al OLAF este obligat să le trimită cu regularitate Comitetului de supraveghere a avut loc la 31 ianuarie 2014, ultima zi a perioadei de raportare pentru prezentul raport. În consecință, o evaluare mai detaliată a punerii în aplicare a acordurilor de lucru va fi prezentată în următorul raport.

| 52. | Având în vedere faptul că acordurile de lucru reprezintă o realizare importantă, Comitetul de supraveghere insistă în prezent ca punerea în aplicare a acestora să fie îmbunătățită, în special în ceea ce privește conținutul informațiilor furnizate Comitetului de supraveghere de către OLAF. În caz contrar, Comitetul de supraveghere nu își va putea îndeplini funcțiile de monitorizare în mod eficient. |
| --- | --- |

52.

Având în vedere faptul că acordurile de lucru reprezintă o realizare importantă, Comitetul de supraveghere insistă în prezent ca punerea în aplicare a acestora să fie îmbunătățită, în special în ceea ce privește conținutul informațiilor furnizate Comitetului de supraveghere de către OLAF. În caz contrar, Comitetul de supraveghere nu își va putea îndeplini funcțiile de monitorizare în mod eficient.

4.   COOPERAREA CU PĂRȚILE INTERESATE

COOPERAREA CU PĂRȚILE INTERESATE

Reuniunile cu instituțiile UE

Reuniunile cu instituțiile UE

| 53. | În perioada mai-iulie 2013, Comitetul de supraveghere a fost invitat să prezinte concluziile din raportul său de activitate pe 2012 Parlamentului European (Comisia pentru control bugetar), Consiliului (Grupul de lucru pentru combaterea fraudei) și Curții de Conturi Europene. |
| --- | --- |

53.

În perioada mai-iulie 2013, Comitetul de supraveghere a fost invitat să prezinte concluziile din raportul său de activitate pe 2012 Parlamentului European (Comisia pentru control bugetar), Consiliului (Grupul de lucru pentru combaterea fraudei) și Curții de Conturi Europene.

| 54. | Într-o serie de alte reuniuni cu Comisia pentru control bugetar și comisarul Šemeta, Comitetul de supraveghere a prezentat un raport cu privire la rezultatele investigațiilor OLAF și respectarea drepturilor fundamentale. De asemenea, acesta și-a prezentat concluziile privind eficacitatea supravegherii OLAF, reforma Regulamentului OLAF și o nouă structură de supraveghere pentru OLAF, astfel cum a fost propusă în Comunicarea Comisiei privind Îmbunătățirea guvernanței OLAF și consolidarea garanțiilor procedurale în ceea ce privește investigațiile
   (18). |
| --- | --- |

54.

Într-o serie de alte reuniuni cu Comisia pentru control bugetar și comisarul Šemeta, Comitetul de supraveghere a prezentat un raport cu privire la rezultatele investigațiilor OLAF și respectarea drepturilor fundamentale. De asemenea, acesta și-a prezentat concluziile privind eficacitatea supravegherii OLAF, reforma Regulamentului OLAF și o nouă structură de supraveghere pentru OLAF, astfel cum a fost propusă în Comunicarea Comisiei privind Îmbunătățirea guvernanței OLAF și consolidarea garanțiilor procedurale în ceea ce privește investigațiile
   (18).

Îmbunătățirea guvernanței OLAF și consolidarea garanțiilor procedurale în ceea ce privește investigațiile

18

| 55. | În noiembrie 2013, Comitetul de supraveghere a organizat un schimb neoficial de opinii cu privire la provocările cu care se confruntă OLAF și Comitetul de supraveghere a OLAF după intrarea în vigoare a Regulamentului (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013. |
| --- | --- |

55.

În noiembrie 2013, Comitetul de supraveghere a organizat un schimb neoficial de opinii cu privire la provocările cu care se confruntă OLAF și Comitetul de supraveghere a OLAF după intrarea în vigoare a Regulamentului (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013.

Schimbul de opinii cu instituțiile UE

Schimbul de opinii cu instituțiile UE

| 56. | În august 2013, Comitetul de supraveghere a inițiat pregătirile pentru un schimb de opinii oficial privind politica referitoare la activitățile OLAF, cu participarea Comisiei, a Parlamentului European, a Consiliului și a Curții de Conturi, în conformitate cu articolul 16 din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013. Comitetul de supraveghere a propus axarea în primul rând pe cadrul de supraveghere pentru OLAF reformat. Din păcate, administrația Comisiei a organizat reuniuni pregătitoare la care au fost invitați toți ceilalți participanți, în afara Comitetului de supraveghere. Prin urmare, rămâne de văzut dacă primul schimb de opinii va îndeplini obiectivele stabilite de regulament. |
| --- | --- |

56.

În august 2013, Comitetul de supraveghere a inițiat pregătirile pentru un schimb de opinii oficial privind politica referitoare la activitățile OLAF, cu participarea Comisiei, a Parlamentului European, a Consiliului și a Curții de Conturi, în conformitate cu articolul 16 din Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013. Comitetul de supraveghere a propus axarea în primul rând pe cadrul de supraveghere pentru OLAF reformat. Din păcate, administrația Comisiei a organizat reuniuni pregătitoare la care au fost invitați toți ceilalți participanți, în afara Comitetului de supraveghere. Prin urmare, rămâne de văzut dacă primul schimb de opinii va îndeplini obiectivele stabilite de regulament.

Audierea publică în cadrul Parlamentului European cu privire la garanțiile procedurale

Audierea publică în cadrul Parlamentului European cu privire la garanțiile procedurale

| 57. | În octombrie 2013, Comitetul de supraveghere a adoptat, pe baza experienței sale de monitorizare, un document de poziție privind Consolidarea garanțiilor procedurale în cadrul OLAF
   (19). Poziția Comitetului de supraveghere privind posibilele noi modificări legislative la Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013, astfel cum au fost propuse de către Comisie în comunicarea acesteia, a fost prezentată în cadrul unei audieri publice organizate de Parlamentul European (20). |
| --- | --- |

57.

În octombrie 2013, Comitetul de supraveghere a adoptat, pe baza experienței sale de monitorizare, un document de poziție privind Consolidarea garanțiilor procedurale în cadrul OLAF
   (19). Poziția Comitetului de supraveghere privind posibilele noi modificări legislative la Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013, astfel cum au fost propuse de către Comisie în comunicarea acesteia, a fost prezentată în cadrul unei audieri publice organizate de Parlamentul European (20).

document de poziție

Consolidarea garanțiilor procedurale în cadrul OLAF

19

20

| 58. | Comitetul de supraveghere a salutat propunerea Comisiei, dar a subliniat faptul că unele soluții structurale ar trebui reexaminate, în special în ceea ce privește independența OLAF și a Comitetului de supraveghere. În particular, ar trebui evitate eventualele conflicte de competență și dublarea activității între structurile de supraveghere actuale și cele prevăzute în viitor. Comitetul de supraveghere a propus soluții alternative care ar păstra instrumentele utile propuse de Comisie, dar ar putea, în același timp, să le includă într-un mecanism de supraveghere global. |
| --- | --- |

58.

Comitetul de supraveghere a salutat propunerea Comisiei, dar a subliniat faptul că unele soluții structurale ar trebui reexaminate, în special în ceea ce privește independența OLAF și a Comitetului de supraveghere. În particular, ar trebui evitate eventualele conflicte de competență și dublarea activității între structurile de supraveghere actuale și cele prevăzute în viitor. Comitetul de supraveghere a propus soluții alternative care ar păstra instrumentele utile propuse de Comisie, dar ar putea, în același timp, să le includă într-un mecanism de supraveghere global.

Societatea civilă

Societatea civilă

| 59. | Biroul european al Transparency International (TI-UE) a decis să efectueze o evaluare a sistemului de integritate al UE (21). În ianuarie 2014, președintele Comitetului de supraveghere și membrii secretariatului Comitetului de supraveghere s-au întâlnit cu reprezentanții TI-UE și au discutat aspecte cum ar fi relația dintre OLAF și Comitetul de supraveghere, responsabilitatea și independența OLAF, precum și normele de integritate aplicabile Comitetului de supraveghere. |
| --- | --- |

59.

Biroul european al Transparency International (TI-UE) a decis să efectueze o evaluare a sistemului de integritate al UE (21). În ianuarie 2014, președintele Comitetului de supraveghere și membrii secretariatului Comitetului de supraveghere s-au întâlnit cu reprezentanții TI-UE și au discutat aspecte cum ar fi relația dintre OLAF și Comitetul de supraveghere, responsabilitatea și independența OLAF, precum și normele de integritate aplicabile Comitetului de supraveghere.

21

5.   GUVERNANȚA COMITETULUI DE SUPRAVEGHERE

GUVERNANȚA COMITETULUI DE SUPRAVEGHERE

Rolul Comitetului de supraveghere în temeiul Regulamentului (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013

Rolul Comitetului de supraveghere în temeiul Regulamentului (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013

| 60. | Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 a introdus o serie de modificări în ceea ce privește rolul Comitetului de supraveghere și instrumentele sale de monitorizare. Prin urmare, o parte semnificativă a reuniunilor comitetului a fost dedicată discuțiilor privind impactul modificărilor respective asupra activităților Comitetului de supraveghere. |
| --- | --- |

60.

Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 a introdus o serie de modificări în ceea ce privește rolul Comitetului de supraveghere și instrumentele sale de monitorizare. Prin urmare, o parte semnificativă a reuniunilor comitetului a fost dedicată discuțiilor privind impactul modificărilor respective asupra activităților Comitetului de supraveghere.

| 61. | Comitetul de supraveghere a efectuat o analiză minuțioasă a modificărilor privind misiunea și rolul său, sarcinile sale principale, instrumente sale de monitorizare și de raportare. Documentul său privind Misiunea, competențele și obiectivele Comitetului de supraveghere
   (22), având în vedere noul Regulament OLAF, explică modificările, formula de monitorizare a Comitetului de supraveghere și rolul secretariatului său, funcționarea independentă a acestuia fiind o garanție a însăși independenței Comitetului de supraveghere. |
| --- | --- |

61.

Comitetul de supraveghere a efectuat o analiză minuțioasă a modificărilor privind misiunea și rolul său, sarcinile sale principale, instrumente sale de monitorizare și de raportare. Documentul său privind Misiunea, competențele și obiectivele Comitetului de supraveghere
   (22), având în vedere noul Regulament OLAF, explică modificările, formula de monitorizare a Comitetului de supraveghere și rolul secretariatului său, funcționarea independentă a acestuia fiind o garanție a însăși independenței Comitetului de supraveghere.

Documentul

Misiunea, competențele și obiectivele Comitetului de supraveghere

22

Priorități și obiective

Priorități și obiective

| 62. | Comitetul de supraveghere și-a definit obiectivele și prioritățile strategice pentru perioada următoare a mandatului său, cu scopul de a spori eficacitatea și impactul activităților sale de bază și, prin urmare, sprijinul pentru funcția de investigare a OLAF și consolidarea independenței OLAF. Comitetul de supraveghere a definit următoarele obiective strategice: (i) dezvoltarea unor instrumente de monitorizare eficiente și pragmatice; (ii) îmbunătățirea cooperării cu OLAF și cu directorul general al acestuia; (iii) asumarea rolului de parte interesată în punerea în aplicare a politicii de combatere a fraudelor; (iv) creșterea vizibilității Comitetului de supraveghere în rândul instituțiilor UE și al statelor membre; (v) dezvoltarea metodelor de lucru ale Comitetului de supraveghere; (vi) garantarea funcționării independente a Comitetului de supraveghere și a secretariatului acestuia; (vii) contribuția la propunerea legislativă de consolidare a supravegherii OLAF. Pentru a îndeplini aceste obiective, Comitetul de supraveghere a identificat o serie de priorități, care sunt prezentate, de asemenea, în documentul privind Misiunea, competențele și obiectivele Comitetului de supraveghere, care reprezintă în același timp strategia pe termen mediu a Comitetului de supraveghere. |
| --- | --- |

62.

Comitetul de supraveghere și-a definit obiectivele și prioritățile strategice pentru perioada următoare a mandatului său, cu scopul de a spori eficacitatea și impactul activităților sale de bază și, prin urmare, sprijinul pentru funcția de investigare a OLAF și consolidarea independenței OLAF. Comitetul de supraveghere a definit următoarele obiective strategice: (i) dezvoltarea unor instrumente de monitorizare eficiente și pragmatice; (ii) îmbunătățirea cooperării cu OLAF și cu directorul general al acestuia; (iii) asumarea rolului de parte interesată în punerea în aplicare a politicii de combatere a fraudelor; (iv) creșterea vizibilității Comitetului de supraveghere în rândul instituțiilor UE și al statelor membre; (v) dezvoltarea metodelor de lucru ale Comitetului de supraveghere; (vi) garantarea funcționării independente a Comitetului de supraveghere și a secretariatului acestuia; (vii) contribuția la propunerea legislativă de consolidare a supravegherii OLAF. Pentru a îndeplini aceste obiective, Comitetul de supraveghere a identificat o serie de priorități, care sunt prezentate, de asemenea, în documentul privind Misiunea, competențele și obiectivele Comitetului de supraveghere, care reprezintă în același timp strategia pe termen mediu a Comitetului de supraveghere.

Misiunea, competențele și obiectivele Comitetului de supraveghere

strategia pe termen mediu

Codul de conduită

Codul de conduită

| 63. | La 9 octombrie 2013, Comitetul de supraveghere a adoptat un Cod de conduită împreună cu o Expunere de motive privind Garanțiile de imparțialitate și riscurile de conflict de interese care rezultă din exercitarea funcțiilor de monitorizare
   (23). Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat că, în general, membrii săi dețin funcții cheie în administrația sau sistemele judiciare ale țării lor, ceea ce le permite să acționeze ca omolog/partener al OLAF la nivel național în orice stadiu al unui caz OLAF. În același timp, aceștia monitorizează cu regularitate cazurile OLAF, în special cele care necesită transmiterea de informații către autoritățile judiciare naționale. Prin urmare, pot apărea situații în care aceștia se pot confrunta cu același caz OLAF în cadrul sarcinilor lor de la nivel național și în calitate de membri ai Comitetului de supraveghere. În consecință, este esențial să se asigure că soluționarea unui caz în această dublă capacitate nu dă naștere unui conflict de interese real sau potențial care să pună în pericol încrederea publicului în imparțialitatea și obiectivitatea activității membrilor. Comitetul de supraveghere a efectuat o analiză a sarcinilor specifice ale membrilor săi care ar putea conduce la un conflict de interese, urmată de un inventar al situațiilor concrete în care pot apărea conflicte de interese. Codul de conduită prevede o procedură clară privind modul de gestionare a situațiilor de conflict de interese. |
| --- | --- |

63.

La 9 octombrie 2013, Comitetul de supraveghere a adoptat un Cod de conduită împreună cu o Expunere de motive privind Garanțiile de imparțialitate și riscurile de conflict de interese care rezultă din exercitarea funcțiilor de monitorizare
   (23). Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat că, în general, membrii săi dețin funcții cheie în administrația sau sistemele judiciare ale țării lor, ceea ce le permite să acționeze ca omolog/partener al OLAF la nivel național în orice stadiu al unui caz OLAF. În același timp, aceștia monitorizează cu regularitate cazurile OLAF, în special cele care necesită transmiterea de informații către autoritățile judiciare naționale. Prin urmare, pot apărea situații în care aceștia se pot confrunta cu același caz OLAF în cadrul sarcinilor lor de la nivel național și în calitate de membri ai Comitetului de supraveghere. În consecință, este esențial să se asigure că soluționarea unui caz în această dublă capacitate nu dă naștere unui conflict de interese real sau potențial care să pună în pericol încrederea publicului în imparțialitatea și obiectivitatea activității membrilor. Comitetul de supraveghere a efectuat o analiză a sarcinilor specifice ale membrilor săi care ar putea conduce la un conflict de interese, urmată de un inventar al situațiilor concrete în care pot apărea conflicte de interese. Codul de conduită prevede o procedură clară privind modul de gestionare a situațiilor de conflict de interese.

Cod de conduită

Expunere de motive

Garanțiile de imparțialitate și riscurile de conflict de interese care rezultă din exercitarea funcțiilor de monitorizare

23

| 64. | Pentru a stabili această politică și codul de conduită în termeni juridici clari, Comitetul de supraveghere a considerat că este necesar să își modifice Regulamentul de procedură. Această activitate este în curs de desfășurare. |
| --- | --- |

64.

Pentru a stabili această politică și codul de conduită în termeni juridici clari, Comitetul de supraveghere a considerat că este necesar să își modifice Regulamentul de procedură. Această activitate este în curs de desfășurare.

Metodele de lucru

Metodele de lucru

| 65. | În martie 2013, Comitetul de supraveghere a salutat venirea unui nou membru, dl Tuomas PÖYSTI. În reuniunea sa din octombrie 2013, Comitetul de supraveghere l-a ales pe dl Johan DENOLF pentru a exercita funcția de președinte pentru un nou mandat de un an. |
| --- | --- |

65.

În martie 2013, Comitetul de supraveghere a salutat venirea unui nou membru, dl Tuomas PÖYSTI. În reuniunea sa din octombrie 2013, Comitetul de supraveghere l-a ales pe dl Johan DENOLF pentru a exercita funcția de președinte pentru un nou mandat de un an.

| 66. | Din februarie 2013 până în ianuarie 2014, au avut loc 11 reuniuni plenare ale Comitetului de supraveghere, la Bruxelles și Luxemburg. Președintele, raportorii și membrii secretariatului s-au reunit, de asemenea, în mod regulat pentru lucrări privind aspecte specifice, precum și pentru pregătirea și monitorizarea reuniunilor plenare. |
| --- | --- |

66.

Din februarie 2013 până în ianuarie 2014, au avut loc 11 reuniuni plenare ale Comitetului de supraveghere, la Bruxelles și Luxemburg. Președintele, raportorii și membrii secretariatului s-au reunit, de asemenea, în mod regulat pentru lucrări privind aspecte specifice, precum și pentru pregătirea și monitorizarea reuniunilor plenare.

| 67. | Pentru fiecare aspect major analizat, Comitetul de supraveghere a numit un raportor. Astfel s-a procedat, în special, în ceea ce privește bugetul OLAF, analiza procedurilor OLAF privind soluționarea plângerilor, Instrucțiunile adresate personalului privind procedurile de investigație ale directorului general al OLAF, prioritățile politicii de investigare a OLAF și analiza procesului de selecție în cadrul OLAF. Raportorii au lucrat împreună cu secretariatul pentru pregătirea proiectelor de avize sau a documentelor care urmează să fie discutate în cadrul reuniunilor plenare. |
| --- | --- |

67.

Pentru fiecare aspect major analizat, Comitetul de supraveghere a numit un raportor. Astfel s-a procedat, în special, în ceea ce privește bugetul OLAF, analiza procedurilor OLAF privind soluționarea plângerilor, Instrucțiunile adresate personalului privind procedurile de investigație ale directorului general al OLAF, prioritățile politicii de investigare a OLAF și analiza procesului de selecție în cadrul OLAF. Raportorii au lucrat împreună cu secretariatul pentru pregătirea proiectelor de avize sau a documentelor care urmează să fie discutate în cadrul reuniunilor plenare.

| 68. | În cursul sesiunii plenare din februarie 2013, secretariatul Comitetului de supraveghere a prezentat conducerii OLAF metodele de lucru ale Comitetului de supraveghere, în special cu privire la cazurile care trebuie transmise de OLAF autorităților judiciare naționale. De asemenea, s-a explicat care sunt informațiile necesare Comitetului de supraveghere în vederea îndeplinirii corespunzătoare a atribuțiilor sale. Prezentarea a servit drept bază pentru dezvoltarea de către Comitetul de supraveghere a unui set de orientări privind monitorizarea. În urma intrării în vigoare a Regulamentului (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013, Comitetul de supraveghere pregătește în prezent noi orientări privind monitorizarea. |
| --- | --- |

68.

În cursul sesiunii plenare din februarie 2013, secretariatul Comitetului de supraveghere a prezentat conducerii OLAF metodele de lucru ale Comitetului de supraveghere, în special cu privire la cazurile care trebuie transmise de OLAF autorităților judiciare naționale. De asemenea, s-a explicat care sunt informațiile necesare Comitetului de supraveghere în vederea îndeplinirii corespunzătoare a atribuțiilor sale. Prezentarea a servit drept bază pentru dezvoltarea de către Comitetul de supraveghere a unui set de orientări privind monitorizarea. În urma intrării în vigoare a Regulamentului (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013, Comitetul de supraveghere pregătește în prezent noi orientări privind monitorizarea.

orientări privind monitorizarea

6.   SECRETARIATUL COMITETULUI DE SUPRAVEGHERE

SECRETARIATUL COMITETULUI DE SUPRAVEGHERE

| 69. | Secretariatul Comitetului de supraveghere este alcătuit din avocați, anchetatori și asistenți care asigură monitorizarea zilnică a activităților de investigare ale OLAF și oferă membrilor Comitetului de supraveghere asistență pentru îndeplinirea sarcinilor acestora. Secretariatul primește toate informațiile furnizate Comitetului de supraveghere și efectuează examinarea lor inițială. De asemenea, secretariatul răspunde de pregătirea consultanței juridice pentru membrii Comitetului de supraveghere. |
| --- | --- |

69.

Secretariatul Comitetului de supraveghere este alcătuit din avocați, anchetatori și asistenți care asigură monitorizarea zilnică a activităților de investigare ale OLAF și oferă membrilor Comitetului de supraveghere asistență pentru îndeplinirea sarcinilor acestora. Secretariatul primește toate informațiile furnizate Comitetului de supraveghere și efectuează examinarea lor inițială. De asemenea, secretariatul răspunde de pregătirea consultanței juridice pentru membrii Comitetului de supraveghere.

| 70. | Comitetul de supraveghere ar dori să sublinieze că membrii secretariatului acestuia trebuie să fie capabili să ofere comitetului asistență în vederea îndeplinirii funcției sale de monitorizare în mod corect și eficient, fără a fi expuși riscului de potențiale conflicte de interese, în calitatea lor de membri ai personalului OLAF aflat în subordinea directorului general al OLAF. În ultimii ani, Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat în mod constant importanța funcționării sale independente și eficiente, care necesită un secretariat independent și cu personal adecvat care, deși aflat în structura OLAF, acționează independent și exclusiv conform instrucțiunilor Comitetului de supraveghere. Comitetul de supraveghere este mulțumit că funcționarea independentă a secretariatului acestuia este garantată în prezent de Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 (24). |
| --- | --- |

70.

Comitetul de supraveghere ar dori să sublinieze că membrii secretariatului acestuia trebuie să fie capabili să ofere comitetului asistență în vederea îndeplinirii funcției sale de monitorizare în mod corect și eficient, fără a fi expuși riscului de potențiale conflicte de interese, în calitatea lor de membri ai personalului OLAF aflat în subordinea directorului general al OLAF. În ultimii ani, Comitetul de supraveghere a subliniat în mod constant importanța funcționării sale independente și eficiente, care necesită un secretariat independent și cu personal adecvat care, deși aflat în structura OLAF, acționează independent și exclusiv conform instrucțiunilor Comitetului de supraveghere. Comitetul de supraveghere este mulțumit că funcționarea independentă a secretariatului acestuia este garantată în prezent de Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 (24).

24

| 71. | Comitetul de supraveghere a identificat patru condiții care garantează funcționarea independentă a secretariatului: (i) procesul de recrutare, evaluare și promovare a șefului secretariatului pe baza deciziilor Comitetului de supraveghere; (ii) reclasificarea șefului secretariatului ca manager de rang superior; (iii) procesul de recrutare, evaluare și promovare a personalului secretariatului de către șeful acestuia; (iv) subdelegarea executării bugetului secretariatului către șeful acestuia. Comitetul de supraveghere a demarat discuții cu directorul general al OLAF cu privire la punerea în aplicare a acestei noi cerințe de reglementare, aflate în prezent în curs de derulare. |
| --- | --- |

71.

Comitetul de supraveghere a identificat patru condiții care garantează funcționarea independentă a secretariatului: (i) procesul de recrutare, evaluare și promovare a șefului secretariatului pe baza deciziilor Comitetului de supraveghere; (ii) reclasificarea șefului secretariatului ca manager de rang superior; (iii) procesul de recrutare, evaluare și promovare a personalului secretariatului de către șeful acestuia; (iv) subdelegarea executării bugetului secretariatului către șeful acestuia. Comitetul de supraveghere a demarat discuții cu directorul general al OLAF cu privire la punerea în aplicare a acestei noi cerințe de reglementare, aflate în prezent în curs de derulare.

| 72. | De asemenea, Comitetul de supraveghere este mulțumit de faptul că directorul general al OLAF a restabilit numărul de posturi alocate secretariatului la opt, astfel cum era cazul înainte de reorganizarea OLAF în 2012. |
| --- | --- |

72.

De asemenea, Comitetul de supraveghere este mulțumit de faptul că directorul general al OLAF a restabilit numărul de posturi alocate secretariatului la opt, astfel cum era cazul înainte de reorganizarea OLAF în 2012.

Modalități de contactare a Comitetului de supraveghere

Modalități de contactare a Comitetului de supraveghere

Prin intermediul Secretariatului Comitetului de supraveghere:

Prin intermediul Secretariatului Comitetului de supraveghere:

| Prin poștă |
| --- |
| J30 13/62 — Rue Joseph II, 30 — 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| La telefon |
| + 32 22984022 |
| Prin e-mail |
| OLAF-FMB-supervisory-committee@ec.europa.eu |
| Prin fax |
| + 32 22959776 |
| Adresa paginii de internet |
| http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/about-us/supervisory-committee/index_en.htm |

Prin poștă

Prin poștă

J30 13/62 — Rue Joseph II, 30 — 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË

La telefon

La telefon

- 32 22984022

Prin e-mail

Prin e-mail

OLAF-FMB-supervisory-committee@ec.europa.eu

Prin fax

Prin fax

- 32 22959776

Adresa paginii de internet

Adresa paginii de internet

http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/about-us/supervisory-committee/index_en.htm

---

(1)  Regulamentul (UE, Euratom) nr. 883/2013 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului din 11 septembrie 2013 privind investigațiile efectuate de Oficiul European de Luptă Antifraudă (OLAF) și de abrogare a Regulamentului (CE) nr. 1073/1999 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului și a Regulamentului (Euratom) nr. 1074/1999 (JO L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1).

1

(2)  Articolul 15.

2

(3)  A se vedea anexa 5.

3

(4)  A se vedea anexa 3.

4

(5)  A se vedea anexa 4. Deși avizul a fost adoptat în martie 2014, Comitetul de supraveghere a hotărât să îl anexeze la prezentul raport de activitate deoarece aproape toate lucrările privind avizul a fost efectuate în cursul perioadei de raportare.

5

(6)  În 2013, Comitetul de supraveghere a primit 186 de rapoarte pe nouă luni.

6

(7)  În cadrul raportului anual de activitate al Comitetului de supraveghere din 2012, s-au raportat 21 de cazuri care necesită transmiterea de informații către autoritățile judiciare naționale, transmise de OLAF Comitetului de supraveghere în ianuarie 2013. Numărul total de cazuri primite în 2013 a fost de 77.

7

(8)  OLAF a transmis Comitetului de supraveghere avize cu privire la raportul intermediar/final și recomandările în 72 dintre cele 77 de cazuri transmise autorităților judiciare naționale în 2013.

8

(9)  În acest din urmă caz, audierea persoanei vizate a fost efectuată conform normelor din vechiul manual OLAF.

9

(10)  A se vedea anexa 2.

10

(11)  JO L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43.

11

(12)  Articolul 22a din Statutul funcționarilor și articolul 11 din Regimul aplicabil altor agenți ai UE.

12

(13)  După consultarea Serviciului juridic al Comisiei — a se vedea nota directorului general al OLAF din 10 noiembrie 2008 adresată membrilor personalului OLAF.

13

(14)  JO L 257, 28.9.2013, p. 19.

14

(15)  A se vedea anexa 1.

15

(16)  A se vedea un rezumat în anexa 7.

16

(17)  A se vedea anexa 10.

17

(18)  COM(2013) 533 final, 17.7.2013.

18

(19)  A se vedea anexa 6.

19

(20)  Audierea publică din 3 octombrie 2013„OLAF și drepturile persoanelor vizate”.

20

(21)  A se vedea http://www.transparencyinternational.eu/european-union-integrity-system-study/.

21

(22)  A se vedea anexa 8.

22

(23)  A se vedea anexa 9.

23

(24)  Considerentul 40.

24

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ANEXE

| 1. | Avizul nr. 1/2013: Proiectul preliminar de buget al OLAF pe anul 2014 |
| --- | --- |

1.

Avizul nr. 1/2013: Proiectul preliminar de buget al OLAF pe anul 2014

| 2. | Avizul nr. 2/2013: Stabilirea unei proceduri interne a OLAF pentru plângeri |
| --- | --- |

2.

Avizul nr. 2/2013: Stabilirea unei proceduri interne a OLAF pentru plângeri

| 3. | Avizul nr. 1/2014: Prioritățile politicii de investigare a OLAF |
| --- | --- |

3.

Avizul nr. 1/2014: Prioritățile politicii de investigare a OLAF

| 4. | Avizul nr. 2/2014: Selecția cazurilor în cadrul OLAF |
| --- | --- |

4.

Avizul nr. 2/2014: Selecția cazurilor în cadrul OLAF

| 5. | Observațiile Comitetului de supraveghere privind procedurile de investigație în cadrul OLAF |
| --- | --- |

5.

Observațiile Comitetului de supraveghere privind procedurile de investigație în cadrul OLAF

| 6. | Document privind consolidarea garanțiilor procedurale în cadrul OLAF |
| --- | --- |

6.

Document privind consolidarea garanțiilor procedurale în cadrul OLAF

| 7. | Recomandările Comitetului de supraveghere din 2012 |
| --- | --- |

7.

Recomandările Comitetului de supraveghere din 2012

| 8. | Misiunea, competențele și obiectivele Comitetului de supraveghere: strategia pe termen mediu |
| --- | --- |

8.

Misiunea, competențele și obiectivele Comitetului de supraveghere: strategia pe termen mediu

| 9. | Codul de conduită al membrilor Comitetului de supraveghere și Expunere de motive privind măsurile de salvgardare cu privire la imparțialitate și riscurile de conflict de interese în exercitarea funcțiilor de monitorizare |
| --- | --- |

9.

Codul de conduită al membrilor Comitetului de supraveghere și Expunere de motive privind măsurile de salvgardare cu privire la imparțialitate și riscurile de conflict de interese în exercitarea funcțiilor de monitorizare

| 10. | Acorduri de lucru cu OLAF |
| --- | --- |

10.

Acorduri de lucru cu OLAF

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ANEXA 1

OPINION No 1/2013

OLAF's preliminary draft budget for 2014

Brussels, 16 July 2013

INTRODUCTION

At the meetings of 27 February and 16 July, 2013, OLAF's Supervisory Committee examined OLAF's preliminary budget for 2014 and adopted the following opinion.

In accordance with the Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (1) and Article 3 of the Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom (2), the European Anti-Fraud Office (hereinafter OLAF) shall have full independence to exercise its investigative function in all institutions, bodies, offices and agencies established by or on the basis of the Treaty on the European Union, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Euratom Treaty. To do this and to ensure that OLAF is able to function in an efficient and effective manner and contribute in the best possible way to the Union's objectives of the fight against fraud defined in Article 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, a specific budget line within the Commission budget (European Commission section of the general budget of the European Union) is created for OLAF. (3)

In accordance with Article 11 of the Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 the mission of the OLAF Supervisory Committee (SC) is to reinforce the independence of OLAF in the exercise of OLAF's investigative function. In the reform of Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2013, the role of the SC has been strengthened as guardian of the independence of OLAF in its investigative function and in the supervision of the respect of fundamental rights and freedoms. In this context, and with a view to the powers conferred by the Commission on the SC (4), the SC has considered OLAF's preliminary draft budget (PDB) and the Commission draft budget for 2014 concerning OLAF and delivers the following Opinion.

The objective of the procedure in which the SC adopts an Opinion on OLAF's preliminary draft budget and draft budget is to give assurance that the draft budget duly takes into account the independence of the investigative function of OLAF and that OLAF is resourced to function effectively and efficiently as an inter-institutional service in stepping up the fight against fraud as foreseen by the Union legislator in Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999. The SC Opinion on the preliminary draft budget also creates a documented forum of the SC advice to the Director-General of OLAF and to the Budgetary Authority of the Union and other Institutions of the Union on the prerequisites for efficient allocation and use of resources to and within OLAF. In this way the SC Opinion contributes to the attainment of value for money, legal certainty and efficient anti-fraud policy in the European Union. The Opinion of the SC is not therefore limited only to commenting on the budget line on the SC of the OLAF.

I.   RESOURCES

In the draft budget presented by the Commission on 26 June 2013, the OLAF budget will be increased by approximately 1,5 % with a total expenditure of EUR 58 523 000. The increase comes principally from the transfer of an additional 6 posts from headquarters budget line ‘Expenditure related to officials and temporary staff working with the institution to OLAF’. If the impact of the EU enlargement to include Croatia is taken into account, the increase in the OLAF expenditure is 0,7 %. In the draft budget presented by the Commission the general increase in the Commission's administrative expenditure is 0,1 % and 0,8 % when taking into account the expenditure resulting from the enlargement to Croatia. The OLAF Budget has not been subject to the same strict savings measures as those within the Commission services in general. The SC notes this with satisfaction and considers that this line on resources provides the conditions necessary to continue the fight against fraud as one of the important priorities of the European Union.

The budget line concerning buildings and IT has been kept on zero growth in accordance with the general orientation of the Commission. The SC observes that a well-organised and up-to-date ICT support and infrastructure are necessary conditions for a cost-effective fraud investigation function. The SC has no objection to the general orientation in the Commission draft budget but SC would stress the need to keep both OLAF's Case Management, ICT analytics and other information systems up to date in order to enable OLAF to function efficiently.

Allocation of resources to priority activities

The SC has regularly recommended to OLAF in its previous opinions on the budget to allocate more staff to OLAF's core business — investigations — by shifting them from the support units. In addition, the SC has proposed clarification of the distinction between investigative and operational activities of OLAF. The SC notes the reorganisation of OLAF put in place on 1 February 2012 in which resources at the organisational level were increasingly concentrated on investigations. As a result of this, in the OLAF Report of 2012, the distribution of staff in the units dealing with the fight against fraud, OLAF policy strategy and coordination and administrative support is reported separately. This goes in the direction of clarification of the distinction between investigative and other operational activities of OLAF in line with the SC's earlier recommendations. However, the SC considers that clarification between investigation and investigation support functions, anti-fraud policy functions and other operational activities of OLAF should go still further.

Opening and follow up of the investigations

The SC would mention that consistent application over the years of the investigative policy priorities in line with Union's anti-fraud policy and the Commission's anti-fraud strategy is a core issue in the resources management of OLAF and in the performance of its investigative function. The SC notes that in the OLAF Management Plan the alignment with the investigative policy priorities is defined as one of the performance indicators for OLAF. (5) The SC underlines the importance of transparent and reliable follow-up of the investigative policy priorities.

The SC would refer to its earlier observations and statistics as presented by the European Court of Auditors in the Special Report No 2/2011 (6) on the low number of OLAF investigations leading to convictions by Member States judicial authorities. (7) The SC considers that the rate of OLAF reports leading to convictions is one of the key indicators of the effectiveness of OLAF's investigative function requiring close and open attention. The SC recognises that the reasons why OLAF reports do not lead to conviction may, in some instances lie outside OLAF's control, however, the impact of such external factors should be carefully analysed and transparently reported. The SC therefore encourages OLAF to continue to develop indicators and report on them in a transparent and reliable manner in order to show an example of value for money and to demonstrate the positive impact that contribution of additional resources to OLAF has in the fight against fraud in the European Union, appropriate follow-up thus ensuring that the ultimate results of investigations are achieved. Without this OLAF risks carrying out good, hard work which may ultimately not produce the required results.

HR strategy

The reorganisation of the Office resulted in significant shifts of staff and modifications in their job description or even a completely new allocation of tasks. In such circumstances the SC reiterates its earlier position that it is essential to have an appropriate human resources strategy built on the identified and real needs of the organisation and its priorities, with the aim of giving direction and maximising the use of existing resources. The SC draws particular attention to OLAF's ability to recruit and maintain high quality professionals in its investigative functions as a focal point of cost-effective anti-fraud service at the Union level.

A crucial element of the human resources strategy should continue to be the continuous training related to internal mobility and overall restructuring. It should address the optimum balance between administrators and staff members with administrative professional background performing core investigative tasks and assistants providing support services.

| Recommendations:







  — | Effective follow-up of investigations must be ensured and results of the investigations reported with timely and reliable indicators |
| --- | --- |

Recommendations:

—

Effective follow-up of investigations must be ensured and results of the investigations reported with timely and reliable indicators

| — | OLAF shall continue to develop indicators describing the efficiency and quality of its investigative function and on the alignment with the anti-fraud policy of the European Union and anti-fraud strategy of the European Commission |
| --- | --- |

—

OLAF shall continue to develop indicators describing the efficiency and quality of its investigative function and on the alignment with the anti-fraud policy of the European Union and anti-fraud strategy of the European Commission

| — | A human resources strategy based on a needs assessment of OLAF's current activities should be developed and focus given to training, career development, succession planning and appropriate balance between assistants providing support services and administrators performing core investigative tasks. |
| --- | --- |

—

A human resources strategy based on a needs assessment of OLAF's current activities should be developed and focus given to training, career development, succession planning and appropriate balance between assistants providing support services and administrators performing core investigative tasks.

II.   BUDGETARY PROCEDURE

The Commission Decision establishing OLAF is clear that the SC must be consulted on the PDB of OLAF before it is sent to the Director-General for Budgets (8). Up to now the Director-General of OLAF has transmitted the PDB to the Committee after ‘technical’ meetings/arrangements with DG Budget. In 2013 the SC was presented with the preliminary draft budget in February and informed in June with regard to the Commission Decision on the draft budget for 2014. The SC believes that to provide an effective opinion on the PDB is one of its core tasks and would remind the Director-General of OLAF to undertake a substantive consultation with the SC prior to budget negotiations with DG Budget. Furthermore, the SC would encourage the Director-General to consult the SC on the OLAF Annual Management plan in order to have independent support and feed-back based on the follow-up of the investigative function by the SC.

| Conclusion:







  — | The Director-General of OLAF shall ensure that the SC be effectively consulted regarding the next PDB by means of a real and substantive exchange of opinions between the Director-General and the Committee before the PDB is sent to the Director-General for Budget in any form. |
| --- | --- |

Conclusion:

—

The Director-General of OLAF shall ensure that the SC be effectively consulted regarding the next PDB by means of a real and substantive exchange of opinions between the Director-General and the Committee before the PDB is sent to the Director-General for Budget in any form.

III.   THE SC AND THE SECRETARIAT OF THE SC

The SC expenditure

The SC notes that the budget line of the expenditure related to the SC is not changed in 2014 draft budget.

The SC draws attention to the fact that with the extended responsibilities attributed to the SC by the Union legislator, the performance of the duties of the SC requires the devotion of a considerable amount of time by its Members who, by definition, do so on a part time bases.

The Resources of the Secretariat of the SC

In accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 the SC has a crucial role to play in the monitoring of OLAF's investigative function. Moreover, the SC has a specific inter-institutional character.

In the discharge of its duties assigned by the legislator, the SC is dependent on its Secretariat. The SC would like to point out that the role of the Secretariat is primarily not to assist in the organisation and documentation of the meeting of the SC. In practice, the SC Secretariat performs an overall, regular monitoring of the investigative function of OLAF. This results from the fact that it is the SC Secretariat which has access, in accordance with the established access arrangements, to the OLAF Case Management System. The data protection rules de facto require that access to case information by the SC is implemented via the SC secretariat. An adequately staffed Secretariat with high quality personnel is thus a vital condition for the SC in the discharge of its duties as stipulated by the legislator.

The SC considers that the 2014 draft budget creates conditions for appropriate resourcing of the SC Secretariat.

The SC would point out the general principle of sincere cooperation between Institutions and bodies of the European Union, which is a general principle of the Union law, specifically that Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 sets out further requirements on the sincere cooperation between the Director-General of OLAF and the SC. The Director-General of OLAF shall, in the spirit of sincere cooperation, consult the SC on all issues which relate to the staffing, promotion of personnel and resources of the SC Secretariat.

To be fully informative and representative of the total cost of supervision, the budget entry for the SC should incorporate the total cost of operations stemming from the duties stipulated in Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999, that is, all the SC Members' expenditure as well as that of its Secretariat which includes their salaries, training, travel etc.

OLAF has the privilege of transferring its funds freely from one line item to another. By joining up the total cost of the SC's function in a separate budget entry it is ensured that funds targeted for use by the SC are actually used for the supervisory function. However, funds remaining unused could be redeployed to other headings within the OLAF budget. Such redeployment should only be possible with prior notification to the SC and its approval.

The Head of the SC Secretariat should be sub-delegated as the authorising officer to manage the total fund allocation for the SC's operations under the control of the Committee. Having one budget line which incorporates all expenditure will facilitate the management and efficiencies of the supervisory framework whilst, at the same time, any unused funds are passed on to other OLAF budget lines by the Director-General upon the approval of the SC.

A separate budget line has the benefit of transparency and reflects also the independence of the SC in line with the Regulation. At the same time, this separate budget line will inform the three institutions appointing the SC regarding the resources specifically allocated to the supervisory function.

Secretariat Staff

The SC maintains its position, as expressed in its previous opinions on the OLAF budget, on the minimum requirement of eight Secretariat staff, which is equivalent to the current needs of the SC. This represents about 2 % of OLAF staff (9) which the SC deems the minimum number required for it to carry out its monitoring function efficiently. (10) The SC would point out that the legal duties of the SC require a small, but high quality staff in Secretariat. The SC has noted with satisfaction the intention of the OLAF Director-General to allocate additional posts to the Secretariat. The SC expects a fluid and rapid implementation of the announced intention.

Furthermore, the SC is of the opinion that, with regard to the appointment of the Head of the Secretariat and other staff for its Secretariat, including internal transfers, there should be close consultation with the Committee, as indicated in its Rules of Procedure (11) reflecting the principle of cooperation stipulated in the Regulation.

The SC acknowledges that the Commission staff rules and the appraisal and promotion system do not currently permit the SC Members to evaluate the performance of the staff of the Secretariat directly. The SC also notes that nothing in the Commission staff rules and appraisal and promotion system excludes the consultation of the SC and that some Institutions have developed consultation systems for situations in which a member of staff is effectively working for another directorate or body than the one which is legally responsible for the appraisal and promotion. Therefore the SC considers that even though the appraisal of the Head of Secretariat and his promotion are ultimately decided by the Director-General of OLAF, he should make these decisions on the basis of the opinions of the Committee under whose direct authority the Secretariat works, as it is foreseen in the SC's Rules of Procedure (12). This will ensure the continuous independence of the Secretariat in their day to day functions.

| Recommendations:







  — | Separate budget line for both the SC and Secretariat should be considered to clearly indicate the costs of the SC function and to highlight in a transparent manner the inter-institutional character of the SC and its Secretariat. |
| --- | --- |

Recommendations:

—

Separate budget line for both the SC and Secretariat should be considered to clearly indicate the costs of the SC function and to highlight in a transparent manner the inter-institutional character of the SC and its Secretariat.

| — | The Director-General of OLAF shall, in sincere and close cooperation with the SC, ensure that appropriate resources and staff members are allocated to the SC Secretariat in line with the intention expressed by the Director-General. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Director-General of OLAF shall, in sincere and close cooperation with the SC, ensure that appropriate resources and staff members are allocated to the SC Secretariat in line with the intention expressed by the Director-General.

| — | Regular monitoring of the investigative function of OLAF and SC access to information depend on a small but high quality Secretariat. The Secretariat should have eight members of staff. |
| --- | --- |

—

Regular monitoring of the investigative function of OLAF and SC access to information depend on a small but high quality Secretariat. The Secretariat should have eight members of staff.

| — | Appointments, appraisal and promotion of the SC Secretariat staff should only be made following the approval of the SC, thus ensuring full independence of the SC Secretariat in the performance of its duties. |
| --- | --- |

—

Appointments, appraisal and promotion of the SC Secretariat staff should only be made following the approval of the SC, thus ensuring full independence of the SC Secretariat in the performance of its duties.

| — | Appraisal of the Head of Secretariat and his promotion should be decided by the Director-General on the basis of the SC's opinion. |
| --- | --- |

—

Appraisal of the Head of Secretariat and his promotion should be decided by the Director-General on the basis of the SC's opinion.

IV.   CONCLUSION

The SC supports OLAF's draft budget for 2014 with the provision that the above recommendations be taken into consideration.

In accordance with Article 6(2) of the Commission Decision of 28 April 1999, the Opinion should be transmitted to the Budgetary Authority by OLAF. Furthermore, the SC invites the Director-General of OLAF to update the SC regularly on measures taken by OLAF towards implementation of the recommendations in this Opinion.

Adopted in Brussels, on 16 July 2013

For the Supervisory Committee,

Johan DENOLF

Chairman

---

(1)  Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 1).

1

(2)  Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 28 April 1999 establishing the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 20).

2

(3)  See Art. 13 of Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 (Art. 18 of the Regulation amended as of 1 October 2013).

3

(4)  Article 6 of the Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom.

4

(5)  See OLAF Annual Activity Report 2012 final, Ares (2013) 509786 — 26.3.2013: chapter 1.3, Specific objectives for ‘fight against fraud’: investigative and coordination activities, p. 5.

5

(6)  Special Report No 2/2011, ‘Follow-up of Special Report No 1/2005 concerning the management of the European Anti-Fraud Office’.

6

(7)  See the SC Opinion 1/2012 of the 2013 OLAF draft budget, reproduced as Annex 2 of the SC Annual Report of 2012.

7

(8)  Article 6(2) of the Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom cited above provides: ‘After consulting the Surveillance Committee, the Director shall send the Director-General for Budgets a preliminary draft budget to be entered in the special heading for the Office in the annual general budget’.

8

(9)  According to the OLAF report for 2011, there are 437 staff in the Office.

9

(10)  For the detailed analysis of the SC workload and consequently of the necessary SC Secretariat resources, see the note of the Head of the SC Secretariat of 21 March 2013. In view of the incoming amendments to Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 entrusting additional tasks to the SC, the resources of the SC Secretariat may require reinforcement in the year 2014.

10

(11)  Article 11(3) of the SC's Rules of Procedure provides as follows: ‘In any case, the Head of the Secretariat shall inform the SC about the candidates for membership of the Secretariat. Once the applications are known, the Committee shall discuss in the plenary session whether they meet the Committee's working needs with a view to submitting a proposal for their appointment to OLAF's Director-General’ (OJ L 308, 24.11.2011, p. 114).

11

(12)  Article 11(5) of the SC's Rules of Procedure provides as follows: ‘The Supervisory Committee shall periodically evaluate the work of the Head of the Secretariat and of the Secretariat members’.

12

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ANEXA 2

OPINION No 2/2013

on establishing an internal OLAF procedure for complaints

| The Supervisory Committee of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) examined the options for redress open to persons involved in OLAF's investigations regarding potential violations of their rights and procedural guarantees. The Committee found that such persons do not have sufficient and immediate remedies to redress potential violations either through an external (an EU or national court, the European Ombudsman or the European Data Protection Supervisor) or internal mechanism (OLAF itself). The Committee believes that the new Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 concerning investigations conducted by OLAF has not resolved the problem, since it does not introduce a mechanism for dealing with individual complaints. The Committee expressed the opinion that the current legislative gap could be closed by putting in place a transparent and efficient complaints procedure within OLAF, to deal with complaints alleging potential breaches of fundamental rights and procedural guarantees in the course of an OLAF investigation. The Committee therefore recommended that the Director-General of OLAF institute such an internal procedure and put forward concrete suggestions with regard to its implementation. |
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The Supervisory Committee of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) examined the options for redress open to persons involved in OLAF's investigations regarding potential violations of their rights and procedural guarantees. The Committee found that such persons do not have sufficient and immediate remedies to redress potential violations either through an external (an EU or national court, the European Ombudsman or the European Data Protection Supervisor) or internal mechanism (OLAF itself). The Committee believes that the new Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 concerning investigations conducted by OLAF has not resolved the problem, since it does not introduce a mechanism for dealing with individual complaints. The Committee expressed the opinion that the current legislative gap could be closed by putting in place a transparent and efficient complaints procedure within OLAF, to deal with complaints alleging potential breaches of fundamental rights and procedural guarantees in the course of an OLAF investigation. The Committee therefore recommended that the Director-General of OLAF institute such an internal procedure and put forward concrete suggestions with regard to its implementation.

INTRODUCTION

| 1. | OLAF has been given far-reaching powers of investigation in order to efficiently carry out its mission to protect the financial interests of the EU. The exercise of these powers is very likely to touch upon the fundamental rights of persons concerned by investigations (1), and therefore their respect by OLAF is essential. It contributes — as the SC has already emphasised (2) — not only to ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of OLAF's investigative activities, but also to consolidating its reputation, credibility and ultimately its independence. |
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1.

OLAF has been given far-reaching powers of investigation in order to efficiently carry out its mission to protect the financial interests of the EU. The exercise of these powers is very likely to touch upon the fundamental rights of persons concerned by investigations (1), and therefore their respect by OLAF is essential. It contributes — as the SC has already emphasised (2) — not only to ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of OLAF's investigative activities, but also to consolidating its reputation, credibility and ultimately its independence.

| 2. | OLAF is obliged to ensure the protection of fundamental rights by safeguarding the procedural guarantees as listed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (3). In addition, the EU legislator decided to enhance OLAF's accountability for its investigative activities by reforming its legal framework (4) which resulted in the adoption of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 (5) (hereinafter, the Regulation). |
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2.

OLAF is obliged to ensure the protection of fundamental rights by safeguarding the procedural guarantees as listed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (3). In addition, the EU legislator decided to enhance OLAF's accountability for its investigative activities by reforming its legal framework (4) which resulted in the adoption of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 (5) (hereinafter, the Regulation).

| 3. | The SC welcomes the changes brought by the Regulation but would like, nevertheless, to point out that the mechanisms put in place to enforce the procedural guarantees need further improvement. The Regulation provides for a legality check (6) and a monitoring mechanism (7), but does not establish a mechanism for dealing with individual complaints which would be, in the SC's view, indispensable for ensuring effective protection of fundamental rights. |
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3.

The SC welcomes the changes brought by the Regulation but would like, nevertheless, to point out that the mechanisms put in place to enforce the procedural guarantees need further improvement. The Regulation provides for a legality check (6) and a monitoring mechanism (7), but does not establish a mechanism for dealing with individual complaints which would be, in the SC's view, indispensable for ensuring effective protection of fundamental rights.

| 4. | In the SC's opinion, persons involved in OLAF investigations do not have sufficient and immediate remedies to redress potential violations of their rights and the recent reform of the legal framework has not solved that problem. Therefore, the SC takes the view that the Director-General of OLAF ((hereinafter, the DG) should swiftly establish a transparent and stable internal procedure for dealing with individual complaints. |
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4.

In the SC's opinion, persons involved in OLAF investigations do not have sufficient and immediate remedies to redress potential violations of their rights and the recent reform of the legal framework has not solved that problem. Therefore, the SC takes the view that the Director-General of OLAF ((hereinafter, the DG) should swiftly establish a transparent and stable internal procedure for dealing with individual complaints.

I.   INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EXISTING REDRESS MECHANISMS

| 5. | Persons considering that, in the course of an investigation, OLAF breached their fundamental rights and wishing to complain, have at their disposal various means of judicial and non-judicial review which, however, may be insufficient, for the reasons stated below. |
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5.

Persons considering that, in the course of an investigation, OLAF breached their fundamental rights and wishing to complain, have at their disposal various means of judicial and non-judicial review which, however, may be insufficient, for the reasons stated below.

| 6. | Firstly, they may seek the direct judicial review by an EU Court (action for annulment, action for damages and request for interim relief) or indirectjudicial review by EU and national courts (preliminary ruling procedure). (8) However, it should be noted that these actions are governed by rather strict rules on admissibility (9) and must fulfil a number of conditions to trigger a right to reparation (10). Even when an action is successful, ‘Judicial protection is obtained long after the contested investigative act and the act as such is not affected by the EU court's ruling; only compensation for the prejudice created by that act is obtained’ (11). |
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6.

Firstly, they may seek the direct judicial review by an EU Court (action for annulment, action for damages and request for interim relief) or indirectjudicial review by EU and national courts (preliminary ruling procedure). (8) However, it should be noted that these actions are governed by rather strict rules on admissibility (9) and must fulfil a number of conditions to trigger a right to reparation (10). Even when an action is successful, ‘Judicial protection is obtained long after the contested investigative act and the act as such is not affected by the EU court's ruling; only compensation for the prejudice created by that act is obtained’ (11).

| 7. | Secondly, persons wishing to complain may address themselves to the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), who is specifically entrusted (12) with the competence of hearing and investigating complaints lodged by persons whose personal data are processed by OLAF. However, the material scope of his review is limited to the protection of personal data and privacy. |
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7.

Secondly, persons wishing to complain may address themselves to the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), who is specifically entrusted (12) with the competence of hearing and investigating complaints lodged by persons whose personal data are processed by OLAF. However, the material scope of his review is limited to the protection of personal data and privacy.

| 8. | Thirdly, the European Ombudsman (EO) is competent to investigate complaints regarding maladministration (13) against OLAF, namely failure to act in accordance with the law, to respect the principles of good administration, or breaches of fundamental rights. Nevertheless, it is the EO's view — which the SC fully shares — that an institution ‘in frequent contact with people who may have reason to complain should provide for a first line complaints mechanism allowing for their problems to be addressed and solved rapidly, before, in the event that resolution is not successful, having to turn to other redress mechanisms, such as Ombudsmen and courts’ (14). The SC considers that this statement also applies to OLAF. |
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8.

Thirdly, the European Ombudsman (EO) is competent to investigate complaints regarding maladministration (13) against OLAF, namely failure to act in accordance with the law, to respect the principles of good administration, or breaches of fundamental rights. Nevertheless, it is the EO's view — which the SC fully shares — that an institution ‘in frequent contact with people who may have reason to complain should provide for a first line complaints mechanism allowing for their problems to be addressed and solved rapidly, before, in the event that resolution is not successful, having to turn to other redress mechanisms, such as Ombudsmen and courts’ (14). The SC considers that this statement also applies to OLAF.

| 9. | Fourthly, the SC itself — as the OLAF's supervisory body — is quite often the addressee of individual complaints which it takes into consideration as a valuable source of information concerning OLAF's investigations and thus triggering the SC's monitoring activity. The SC's role, as emphasised by a ruling of the EU General Court (15) and confirmed by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013, is to monitor developments concerning the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigations (16) which cannot be carried out without examination of individual cases. However, the SC was not established as a complaints body and its supervision takes place only ex post, since the SC cannot intervene in ongoing investigations. Furthermore, the SC regrets the lack of appropriate monitoring tools at its disposal and the absence of a specific reporting obligation for the DG to inform the SC of complaints addressed to him and, in particular, on the way they were dealt with. |
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9.

Fourthly, the SC itself — as the OLAF's supervisory body — is quite often the addressee of individual complaints which it takes into consideration as a valuable source of information concerning OLAF's investigations and thus triggering the SC's monitoring activity. The SC's role, as emphasised by a ruling of the EU General Court (15) and confirmed by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013, is to monitor developments concerning the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigations (16) which cannot be carried out without examination of individual cases. However, the SC was not established as a complaints body and its supervision takes place only ex post, since the SC cannot intervene in ongoing investigations. Furthermore, the SC regrets the lack of appropriate monitoring tools at its disposal and the absence of a specific reporting obligation for the DG to inform the SC of complaints addressed to him and, in particular, on the way they were dealt with.

| 10. | In addition to the external mechanisms, the SC notes that an internal mechanism for dealing with individual complaints is not completely absent from the legal framework governing OLAF's investigations. Any official or other servant of the EU who is the subject of an internal investigation has the right to submit to the DG a complaint against an act adversely affecting him in connection with investigations by OLAF (17). However, according to the existing EU case-law, OLAF's investigative acts do not constitute acts adversely affecting the persons concerned within the meaning of Article 90a of the Staff Regulations and therefore are not challengeable acts (18). |
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10.

In addition to the external mechanisms, the SC notes that an internal mechanism for dealing with individual complaints is not completely absent from the legal framework governing OLAF's investigations. Any official or other servant of the EU who is the subject of an internal investigation has the right to submit to the DG a complaint against an act adversely affecting him in connection with investigations by OLAF (17). However, according to the existing EU case-law, OLAF's investigative acts do not constitute acts adversely affecting the persons concerned within the meaning of Article 90a of the Staff Regulations and therefore are not challengeable acts (18).

| 11. | Moreover, the SC would point out that OLAF staff who are aware of possible illegal activities or serious violations of professional duties that might trigger potential breaches of fundamental rights and procedural guarantees within an investigation have the additional possibility to report wrongdoing within OLAF to the President of the SC, on the basis of Article 22a of the Staff Regulations and of the agreement between the DG and the SC (19). |
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11.

Moreover, the SC would point out that OLAF staff who are aware of possible illegal activities or serious violations of professional duties that might trigger potential breaches of fundamental rights and procedural guarantees within an investigation have the additional possibility to report wrongdoing within OLAF to the President of the SC, on the basis of Article 22a of the Staff Regulations and of the agreement between the DG and the SC (19).

II.   LACK OF A COMPLAINT PROCEDURE IN REGULATION (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013

| 12. | The SC notes that the intention of the EU legislator was to strengthen the protection of procedural guarantees applicable in OLAF's investigations (a) by inserting in the Regulation detailed provisions concerning the procedural guarantees and (b) by enforcing them by means of an enhanced review. As a result, Article 9 of the Regulation contains now explicit procedural guarantees and thus defines and clarifies the contents of those foreseen in the Charter. On the other hand, although the EU institutions involved in the legislative process all agreed on the need for a review of potential violation of fundamental rights and put forward various proposals aimed at establishing both an ex ante legality check (relating, inter alia, to the respect of procedural guarantees of persons under investigation, during all stages of the investigation) and an ex post review procedure for handling individual complaints (20), it seems that no consensus was finally reached, since the Regulation does not explicitly put in place any such procedure. |
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12.

The SC notes that the intention of the EU legislator was to strengthen the protection of procedural guarantees applicable in OLAF's investigations (a) by inserting in the Regulation detailed provisions concerning the procedural guarantees and (b) by enforcing them by means of an enhanced review. As a result, Article 9 of the Regulation contains now explicit procedural guarantees and thus defines and clarifies the contents of those foreseen in the Charter. On the other hand, although the EU institutions involved in the legislative process all agreed on the need for a review of potential violation of fundamental rights and put forward various proposals aimed at establishing both an ex ante legality check (relating, inter alia, to the respect of procedural guarantees of persons under investigation, during all stages of the investigation) and an ex post review procedure for handling individual complaints (20), it seems that no consensus was finally reached, since the Regulation does not explicitly put in place any such procedure.

| 13. | The SC would point out that in the past, via its internal rules, OLAF put in place a review procedure open to all persons concerned in internal and external investigations in which procedural guarantees were allegedly not respected in a manner possibly having an impact on the conclusions of the investigation (21). This procedure evolved under the influence of interinstitutional discussions on reforming the OLAF legal framework. Since the Commission's proposal of 17 March 2011 contained provisions on a review procedure (22), the Instructions to Staff on Investigation Procedures (ISIP) (23) adopted by the OLAF DG as of 1 February 2012 anticipated the forthcoming legislative changes with the setting up of a procedure for dealing with complaints concerning an alleged failure to respect procedural guarantees (24). However, that Commission's proposal, which was subject to negotiations during the legislative process, was ultimately not maintained. Therefore, when the ISIP were replaced by the new Guidelines on Investigation Procedures (GIP), which entered into force on the same day as the new OLAF Regulation (1 October 2013), this internal procedure disappeared. |
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13.

The SC would point out that in the past, via its internal rules, OLAF put in place a review procedure open to all persons concerned in internal and external investigations in which procedural guarantees were allegedly not respected in a manner possibly having an impact on the conclusions of the investigation (21). This procedure evolved under the influence of interinstitutional discussions on reforming the OLAF legal framework. Since the Commission's proposal of 17 March 2011 contained provisions on a review procedure (22), the Instructions to Staff on Investigation Procedures (ISIP) (23) adopted by the OLAF DG as of 1 February 2012 anticipated the forthcoming legislative changes with the setting up of a procedure for dealing with complaints concerning an alleged failure to respect procedural guarantees (24). However, that Commission's proposal, which was subject to negotiations during the legislative process, was ultimately not maintained. Therefore, when the ISIP were replaced by the new Guidelines on Investigation Procedures (GIP), which entered into force on the same day as the new OLAF Regulation (1 October 2013), this internal procedure disappeared.

| 14. | As a result, neither the Regulation nor OLAF's internal rules foresee any formal procedure for dealing with individual complaints. Therefore, the objective of improving the mechanisms for redressing potential breaches by OLAF of procedural guarantees of persons under investigation has not been achieved. The SC would point out that the recent Communication from the Commission on Improving OLAF's governance and reinforcing procedural safeguards in investigations
   (25) supports the SC's view and its repeated recommendations (26) concerning the introduction of transparent and stable procedures for an internal legality check and for an independent review of complaints. This Communication also confirms the need for further improvements to the Regulation, by establishing of the office of a ‘Controller of procedural safeguards’. |
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14.

As a result, neither the Regulation nor OLAF's internal rules foresee any formal procedure for dealing with individual complaints. Therefore, the objective of improving the mechanisms for redressing potential breaches by OLAF of procedural guarantees of persons under investigation has not been achieved. The SC would point out that the recent Communication from the Commission on Improving OLAF's governance and reinforcing procedural safeguards in investigations
   (25) supports the SC's view and its repeated recommendations (26) concerning the introduction of transparent and stable procedures for an internal legality check and for an independent review of complaints. This Communication also confirms the need for further improvements to the Regulation, by establishing of the office of a ‘Controller of procedural safeguards’.

| 15. | With its longstanding experience in monitoring OLAF's investigative function and thereby compliance by OLAF with fundamental rights and procedural guarantees, the SC is therefore concerned by the lack of a transparent procedure for dealing with individual complaints and takes the view that, at least during the transitional period, until further amendments to the Regulation are adopted, the current gap should be closed by the DG re-establishing an internal procedure for complaint in OLAF. |
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15.

With its longstanding experience in monitoring OLAF's investigative function and thereby compliance by OLAF with fundamental rights and procedural guarantees, the SC is therefore concerned by the lack of a transparent procedure for dealing with individual complaints and takes the view that, at least during the transitional period, until further amendments to the Regulation are adopted, the current gap should be closed by the DG re-establishing an internal procedure for complaint in OLAF.

III.   THE WAY FORWARD: AN INTERNAL PROCEDURE FOR COMPLAINTS

| 16. | In OLAF's view, the notion of ‘complaints’ covers (i) complaints concerning procedural guarantees in the context of investigative actions, (ii) complaints against a reply by OLAF to a request for access to personal data and (iii) complaints from whistle-blowers (concerning either OLAF's obligation to inform them on the action taken following their fraud reporting or the protection of their identity) (27). According to information provided by OLAF, in the last three years there were 25 complaints concerning OLAF's investigation activity, of which 13 were addressed to the EO (28), 8 were addressed to the EDPS (29) and 4 were requests for review addressed to OLAF (30). OLAF is also aware of other complaints, addressed to other bodies (e.g. to the SC), but it does not have any systemic overview, register or statistics related to them. |
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16.

In OLAF's view, the notion of ‘complaints’ covers (i) complaints concerning procedural guarantees in the context of investigative actions, (ii) complaints against a reply by OLAF to a request for access to personal data and (iii) complaints from whistle-blowers (concerning either OLAF's obligation to inform them on the action taken following their fraud reporting or the protection of their identity) (27). According to information provided by OLAF, in the last three years there were 25 complaints concerning OLAF's investigation activity, of which 13 were addressed to the EO (28), 8 were addressed to the EDPS (29) and 4 were requests for review addressed to OLAF (30). OLAF is also aware of other complaints, addressed to other bodies (e.g. to the SC), but it does not have any systemic overview, register or statistics related to them.

| 17. | Taking into account the number of cases opened by OLAF (718 in 2012 (31)) and the fact that complaints against OLAF are addressed, in particular, to the EDPS, the EO and the SC (32), the small number of complaints addressed to OLAF itself may lead to the conclusion that the absence of a transparent and independent procedure for handling complaints in OLAF effectively deters potential complainants from exercising their rights. |
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17.

Taking into account the number of cases opened by OLAF (718 in 2012 (31)) and the fact that complaints against OLAF are addressed, in particular, to the EDPS, the EO and the SC (32), the small number of complaints addressed to OLAF itself may lead to the conclusion that the absence of a transparent and independent procedure for handling complaints in OLAF effectively deters potential complainants from exercising their rights.

| 18. | The SC notes, from its monitoring experience, that in the previous years the handling of complaints appeared to be carried out on a case-by-case basis rather than through a stable and consistent procedure. The SC shares the EO's view that a case-by-case approach is not ‘the best way to ensure the efficient and transparent handling of complaints’ (33) and that without a proper complaint procedure ‘compliance [with fundamental rights] cannot ultimately be effective’ (34). Such a procedure is a key element of OLAF's accountability and legitimacy, because protecting fundamental rights ‘is not only to the benefit of persons under investigation but also of OLAF, whose legitimacy can only increase when fundamental rights are (seen to be) effectively protected’ (35). |
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18.

The SC notes, from its monitoring experience, that in the previous years the handling of complaints appeared to be carried out on a case-by-case basis rather than through a stable and consistent procedure. The SC shares the EO's view that a case-by-case approach is not ‘the best way to ensure the efficient and transparent handling of complaints’ (33) and that without a proper complaint procedure ‘compliance [with fundamental rights] cannot ultimately be effective’ (34). Such a procedure is a key element of OLAF's accountability and legitimacy, because protecting fundamental rights ‘is not only to the benefit of persons under investigation but also of OLAF, whose legitimacy can only increase when fundamental rights are (seen to be) effectively protected’ (35).

| 19. | The SC considers that, from the OLAF perspective, a complaint procedure would help (i) the detection by OLAF of any breach of its own legal obligations, thus allowing for a prompt reaction, (ii) monitoring by OLAF of compliance with fundamental rights and procedural guarantees by its own staff, (iii) avoiding the risk of discriminatory treatment of persons concerned, (iv) settling possible disputes before they aggravate (36). |
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19.

The SC considers that, from the OLAF perspective, a complaint procedure would help (i) the detection by OLAF of any breach of its own legal obligations, thus allowing for a prompt reaction, (ii) monitoring by OLAF of compliance with fundamental rights and procedural guarantees by its own staff, (iii) avoiding the risk of discriminatory treatment of persons concerned, (iv) settling possible disputes before they aggravate (36).

| 20. | In the SC's opinion, Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (37) (right to good administration) would offer a sufficient legal basis for establishing an internal procedure for dealing with individual complaints. Complainants are entitled to expect from OLAF that their ‘affairs’ are ‘handled’ — according to the principles defined by the Charter. |
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20.

In the SC's opinion, Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (37) (right to good administration) would offer a sufficient legal basis for establishing an internal procedure for dealing with individual complaints. Complainants are entitled to expect from OLAF that their ‘affairs’ are ‘handled’ — according to the principles defined by the Charter.

| 21. | The SC therefore believes that the DG should put in place a transparent and efficient internal procedure for dealing with all the types of complaints related to OLAF investigative activities, including not only complaints alleging potential breaches of fundamental rights in the course of an OLAF investigation, but also those concerning duration of investigations, legality of OLAF's acts, breaches of confidentiality, refusals to provide information. The following practical recommendations are without prejudice to the forthcoming legislative proposals (38) or to the SC's position as expressed in its paper on Reinforcing procedural safeguards in OLAF — in view of the monitoring experience of the Supervisory Committee
   (39) — they should be regarded as transitional measures until the current legal framework is improved. |
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21.

The SC therefore believes that the DG should put in place a transparent and efficient internal procedure for dealing with all the types of complaints related to OLAF investigative activities, including not only complaints alleging potential breaches of fundamental rights in the course of an OLAF investigation, but also those concerning duration of investigations, legality of OLAF's acts, breaches of confidentiality, refusals to provide information. The following practical recommendations are without prejudice to the forthcoming legislative proposals (38) or to the SC's position as expressed in its paper on Reinforcing procedural safeguards in OLAF — in view of the monitoring experience of the Supervisory Committee
   (39) — they should be regarded as transitional measures until the current legal framework is improved.

| 22. | The SC would firstly point out that it is for the DG to establish and define the exact scope and content of rules on handling of complaints in OLAF. In so doing, the DG should take into consideration a number of requirements triggered by the right to good administration. Recommendations by the EO and the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour should be also taken into account. Without establishing an exhaustive list, the SC would point to the following requirements:






  — | fairness and impartiality, including, inter alia, the requirement that a complaint should be treated by a person not related to the investigation or not in the direct line of hierarchy of the person(s) related to the investigation (40) and the necessity to set out a minimum level of guarantees ensuring the functional independence of the person handling a given complaint, |
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22.

The SC would firstly point out that it is for the DG to establish and define the exact scope and content of rules on handling of complaints in OLAF. In so doing, the DG should take into consideration a number of requirements triggered by the right to good administration. Recommendations by the EO and the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour should be also taken into account. Without establishing an exhaustive list, the SC would point to the following requirements:

—

fairness and impartiality, including, inter alia, the requirement that a complaint should be treated by a person not related to the investigation or not in the direct line of hierarchy of the person(s) related to the investigation (40) and the necessity to set out a minimum level of guarantees ensuring the functional independence of the person handling a given complaint,

| — | the requirement to state reasons for the decisions taken following a complaint (41); |
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—

the requirement to state reasons for the decisions taken following a complaint (41);

| — | a reasonable time-limit for handling a complaint (42), |
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—

a reasonable time-limit for handling a complaint (42),

| — | the right of access to one's file (subject to limitations explicitly foreseen in the Charter (43), |
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—

the right of access to one's file (subject to limitations explicitly foreseen in the Charter (43),

| — | the right to address OLAF in one of the EU official languages and to have an answer in the same language (44), |
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—

the right to address OLAF in one of the EU official languages and to have an answer in the same language (44),

| — | the requirement to inform the complainant of any possible alternative forms of redress (45). |
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—

the requirement to inform the complainant of any possible alternative forms of redress (45).

| 23. | Secondly, with regard to the person entrusted with the handling of complaints, he should have the appropriate competencies, qualifications and experience. Such person should have well defined tasks and benefit from access to appropriate resources. He should have access to all relevant case-related information and OLAF staff should fully cooperate with him. |
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23.

Secondly, with regard to the person entrusted with the handling of complaints, he should have the appropriate competencies, qualifications and experience. Such person should have well defined tasks and benefit from access to appropriate resources. He should have access to all relevant case-related information and OLAF staff should fully cooperate with him.

| 24. | Regarding particularly the requirement of independence, the SC would stress that any effective internal complaint procedure, which would necessarily imply the handling of a complaint by an OLAF (senior) official, requires that this person act, when carrying out his review duties, in full independence of the DG. This is a key element in ensuring external credibility and public trust. The SC acknowledges the difficulty of implementing such a requirement, since this person should report to the DG on his findings while the latter remains the appointing authority deciding on the career progress of all OLAF officials (46). |
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24.

Regarding particularly the requirement of independence, the SC would stress that any effective internal complaint procedure, which would necessarily imply the handling of a complaint by an OLAF (senior) official, requires that this person act, when carrying out his review duties, in full independence of the DG. This is a key element in ensuring external credibility and public trust. The SC acknowledges the difficulty of implementing such a requirement, since this person should report to the DG on his findings while the latter remains the appointing authority deciding on the career progress of all OLAF officials (46).

| 25. | The SC would indicate three possible solutions to that problem.






  (i) | Firstly, the SC Secretariat being the only part of OLAF with regulatory guarantees of independent functioning with regard to the DG (47), the most logical solution would be to place the (senior) official entrusted with handling complaints under the Head of the SC Secretariat, but without involving him in any regular work of the SC. |
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25.

The SC would indicate three possible solutions to that problem.

(i)

Firstly, the SC Secretariat being the only part of OLAF with regulatory guarantees of independent functioning with regard to the DG (47), the most logical solution would be to place the (senior) official entrusted with handling complaints under the Head of the SC Secretariat, but without involving him in any regular work of the SC.

| (ii) | Secondly, the official could be nominated as a ‘complaint’ advisor to the DG, but his functional independence should be safeguarded by the right to inform the SC whenever he considers that a measure taken by the Director-General puts his independence into question (48) and by the obligation to report on all his findings related to the complaints not only to the Director-General, but also to the SC (49). |
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(ii)

Secondly, the official could be nominated as a ‘complaint’ advisor to the DG, but his functional independence should be safeguarded by the right to inform the SC whenever he considers that a measure taken by the Director-General puts his independence into question (48) and by the obligation to report on all his findings related to the complaints not only to the Director-General, but also to the SC (49).

| (iii) | Thirdly, the task could be entrusted to the OLAF Legal Advice Unit, but then its Head should have equal safeguards as a ‘complaint advisor’ — in his capacity of the handler of complaints. |
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(iii)

Thirdly, the task could be entrusted to the OLAF Legal Advice Unit, but then its Head should have equal safeguards as a ‘complaint advisor’ — in his capacity of the handler of complaints.

| 26. | Finally, the SC considers that information on how to address complaints to OLAF, together with a description of the procedure for handling them, should be published on OLAF's website, for the sake of transparency and legal certainty. Moreover, the SC should be regularly informed of the complaints received by OLAF and the way they have been handled, this allowing it to properly perform its role of monitoring developments concerning the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigations. |
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26.

Finally, the SC considers that information on how to address complaints to OLAF, together with a description of the procedure for handling them, should be published on OLAF's website, for the sake of transparency and legal certainty. Moreover, the SC should be regularly informed of the complaints received by OLAF and the way they have been handled, this allowing it to properly perform its role of monitoring developments concerning the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigations.

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

In the light of the above considerations, the Supervisory Committee:

| (1) | Recommends that the Director-General set up an internal procedure for dealing with individual complaints concerning OLAF investigations; |
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(1)

Recommends that the Director-General set up an internal procedure for dealing with individual complaints concerning OLAF investigations;

| (2) | Invites the Director-General to consult the details of the procedure with the SC, before its adoption; |
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(2)

Invites the Director-General to consult the details of the procedure with the SC, before its adoption;

| (3) | Recommends that the Director-General publish the procedure on OLAF's website after its adoption; |
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(3)

Recommends that the Director-General publish the procedure on OLAF's website after its adoption;

| (4) | Expects the Director-General to report regularly to the SC on complaints received by OLAF and the way they have been handled. |
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(4)

Expects the Director-General to report regularly to the SC on complaints received by OLAF and the way they have been handled.

Adopted in Brussels, December 2013

For the Supervisory Committee

Johan DENOLF

Chairman

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(1)  Although little consideration was given to this aspect when OLAF was created, the few procedural guarantees defined in the former Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 were developed by the case-law of the EU General Court.

1

(2)  See the SC's Opinion No 5/2010 on Respect for fundamental rights and procedural guarantees in investigations by the European Anti-Fraud Office, point 3.

2

Respect for fundamental rights and procedural guarantees in investigations by the European Anti-Fraud Office

(3)  See in particular Article 41 of the Charter.

3

(4)  One of the objectives of the reform was to reinforce the protection of fundamental rights and procedural guarantees within OLAF's investigations.

4

(5)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1).

5

(6)  The legality check relates, inter alia, to the respect of procedural guarantees and fundamental rights of persons concerned (Article 17(7)).

6

(7)  Article 15(1).

7

(8)  For a thorough overview of the different kinds of judicial review of OLAF's investigative acts, see J.F.H. Inghelram, Legal and Institutional Aspects of the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) — An Analysis with a Look Forward to a European Public Prosecutor's Office, Europa Law Publishing, 2011, p. 203. See also X. Groussot, Z. Popov, What's wrong with OLAF? Accountability, due process and criminal justice in European anti-fraud policy, Common Market Law Review 47, 2010, p. 605-643.

8

Legal and Institutional Aspects of the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) — An Analysis with a Look Forward to a European Public Prosecutor's Office

What's wrong with OLAF? Accountability, due process and criminal justice in European anti-fraud policy

(9)  For example, the actions for annulment introduced against OLAF investigative acts have constantly been declared inadmissible on the grounds that none of such acts has to date been deemed to bring about a distinct change in the applicant's legal position.

9

(10)  In actions for damages, there are three conditions to be met in order to trigger a right to reparation: the infringement of a rule of law intended to confer rights on persons; a sufficiently serious breach of this rule; the existence of a direct causal link between the breach of the rule of law and the damage allegedly suffered by the complainant.

10

(11)  J.F.H. Inghelram, Judicial review of investigative acts of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF): a search for balance, Common Market Law Review 49, 2012, p. 601-628.

11

Judicial review of investigative acts of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF): a search for balance

(12)  Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1).

12

(13)  According to the definition given by the EO, ‘Maladministration occurs when a public body fails to act in accordance with a rule or principle which is binding upon it’ (see the EO's Annual Report 1997, p. 23).

13

Maladministration occurs when a public body fails to act in accordance with a rule or principle which is binding upon it

(14)  See the Special Report of the EO in own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ concerning FRONTEX, 12 November 2013, point 43.

14

(15)  Franchet and Byk v Commission (No 2),8 July 2008, Case T-48/05.

15

Franchet and Byk

Commission

(16)  Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013.

16

(17)  See Article 14 of the former Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999. Its content has been included in Article 90a of the Staff Regulations and as a consequence has been deleted from Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013.

17

(18)  See Commission v Antonello Violetti and Others and Nadine Schmit, 20 May 2010, Case T-261/09.

18

Commission

Antonello Violetti and Others and Nadine Schmit

(19)  See the note of the Director-General to OLAF staff (I/011472 of 10 November 2008) and the note JUR(2008)45321 of 1 April 2008 of the Commission's Legal Service.

19

(20)  During the legislative process, the EU institutions put forward various proposals: an independent Review Adviser with the participation of the SC, a Review Panel consisting of senior officials of OLAF and of the Commission's Legal Service, two separate procedures (legality check by legal experts of OLAF and complaints to the Review Adviser via the SC), a review procedure to be set up by the DG within the Office.

20

via

(21)  See the former OLAF Manual — Operational Procedures, version July 2011, point 5.1.6.

21

(22)  Article 7b: this procedure aimed at dealing with requests from persons concerned by an investigation, to have an independent opinion regarding the respect of the procedural guarantees provided for in the Regulation.

22

(23)  Replacing the former OLAF Manual — Operational Procedures.

23

(24)  Article 23 of the ISIP — ‘23.1 Where a natural person concerned by an investigation has requested a review of the handling of his procedural guarantees, the Director-General appoints a member of OLAF staff not connected with the investigation, to conduct such a review. 23.2 The person entrusted with the review must act independently in his review of the complaint and report his findings to the Director-General. 23.3 The Director-General may take appropriate action in respect of any failure to respect procedural guarantees and will inform the complainant’.

24

23.1 Where a natural person concerned by an investigation has requested a review of the handling of his procedural guarantees, the Director-General appoints a member of OLAF staff not connected with the investigation, to conduct such a review. 23.2 The person entrusted with the review must act independently in his review of the complaint and report his findings to the Director-General. 23.3 The Director-General may take appropriate action in respect of any failure to respect procedural guarantees and will inform the complainant

(25)  COM(2013) 533 final, 17.7.2013.

25

(26)  See the SC's Annual Activity Report 2012, specifically Section 2 of Annex III.

26

(27)  OLAF does not count as ‘complaint’ the applications for access to documents (including ‘confirmatory applications’), the requests for access to personal data, staff complaints (Art. 90 of Staff Regulations), motions to courts, complaints addressed to the Commission which do not concern directly OLAF, letters from informants/whistle-blowers unhappy with OLAF's decision to dismiss a case.

27

(28)  7 complaints in 2013, 3 complaints in 2012 and 3 complaints in 2011.

28

(29)  5 complaints in 2012 and 3 complaints in 2011.

29

(30)  1 request in 2013, 2 requests in 2012 and 1 request in 2011.

30

(31)  See the OLAF 2012 Activity Report.

31

(32)  See the Annual Activity Reports of the EDPS and the EO. The SC itself received 7 complaints in 2012 and 14 complaints in 2013, concerning, inter alia, alleged failure to respect fundamental rights and procedural guarantees, breach of confidentiality of investigations, duration of investigations.

32

(33)  See the EO's Decision closing his inquiry into complaint 3072/2009/MHZ against the Commission, 5 April 2011, point 27.

33

(34)  See the Draft recommendation of the European Ombudsman in his own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ concerning the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), 9 April 2013, point 79.

34

(35)  J.F.H. Inghelram, Judicial review of investigative acts of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF): a search for balance, quoted above, p. 627.

35

Judicial review of investigative acts of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF): a search for balance

(36)  See the Draft recommendation of the European Ombudsman in his own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ quoted above, point 47.

36

(37)  Article 41(1) of the Charter: ‘Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions and bodies of the Union’.

37

Every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions and bodies of the Union

(38)  See the Commission's proposal quoted above.

38

(39)  This paper was adopted at the SC's plenary meeting on 8 October 2013 and transmitted to the three appointing Institutions on 24 October 2013.

39

(40)  See the Decision of 26 June 2008 of the EO on complaint 1354/2007/VIK against the European Economic and Social Committee, point 2.3: ‘it is good administrative practice that complaints against a Community official should normally not be answered by this very same official, but by the superior of this official or by another appropriate official/body’.

40

it is good administrative practice that complaints against a Community official should normally not be answered by this very same official, but by the superior of this official or by another appropriate official/body

(41)  See Article 18 of the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour. See also the Draft recommendation of the EO in the inquiry into complaint 1183/2012/MMN against OLAF, 15 November 2013.

41

(42)  See Article 17(1) of the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, which elucidates the ‘reasonable time’ requirement of the Charter by establishing a two months period from the date of receipt of a request or complaint. Article 17(2) allows for an extension of this period if it is justified by the ‘complexity of the matters which it raises’. The SC notes with interest the EO's statement that extension of the time limit within which an EU institution may deal with a complaint can be justified by the complexity of the issues raised, but not by an alleged lack of sufficient human resources or internal obstacles within its own services, since ‘in accordance with the principles of good administration, the EU institutions have the duty to ensure that they provide their various services with sufficient resources to fulfil the tasks which have been entrusted to them’ and to ‘structure their various services in a such a way as not to hinder the performance of the institution's duties, including in particular, the need to treat complaints by citizens within a reasonable time’ (see EO's Decision closing his inquiry into complaint 2288/2011/MMN against the European Investment Bank, 25 September 2013, pt. 28, 30).

42

reasonable time

complexity of the matters which it raises

in accordance with the principles of good administration, the EU institutions have the duty to ensure that they provide their various services with sufficient resources to fulfil the tasks which have been entrusted to them

structure their various services in a such a way as not to hinder the performance of the institution's duties, including in particular, the need to treat complaints by citizens within a reasonable time

(43)  This right may be limited by the need to respect the legitimate interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy.

43

(44)  See also Article 13 of the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour.

44

(45)  See, in this respect, the Decision of the EO on complaint 1512/2007/JMA against the European Commission, 5 June 2008. Article 19 of the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour may also be relevant in this respect.

45

(46)  See the concerns expressed by civil society representatives with regard to the compatibility of the principle of independence with the fact that a person works in the interest of a specific entity (see the Draft recommendation of the European Ombudsman in his own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-MHZ quoted above, point 78).

46

(47)  Recital 40 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013.

47

(48)  As it was suggested by the Commission in its proposal of 17 March 2011, Article 7b.2.

48

(49)  Idem. See also Article 14 a) of the European Parliament legislative resolution of 20 November 2008 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (COM(2006) 244 — C6-0228/2006 — 2006/0084(COD)) (OJ C 16E, 22.1.2010, p. 201).

49

---

ANEXA 3

OPINION No 1/2014

OLAF Investigation Policy Priorities

| The Supervisory Committee of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) examined the Investigation Policy Priorities (IPPs) established, on a yearly basis, by the Director-General of OLAF. The Committee compared the IPPs for 2012 and 2013 with the draft IPPs for 2014. The Committee welcomed the improved definition of the IPPs for 2014. The Committee considered however that the policy on financial indicators and the implementation of the proportionality principle needs further clarification. The Committee also drew attention to the need to reconsider the subsidiarity/added value policy and to apply it with caution, as well as to the need of a regular assessment of the IPPs. |
| --- |

The Supervisory Committee of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) examined the Investigation Policy Priorities (IPPs) established, on a yearly basis, by the Director-General of OLAF. The Committee compared the IPPs for 2012 and 2013 with the draft IPPs for 2014. The Committee welcomed the improved definition of the IPPs for 2014. The Committee considered however that the policy on financial indicators and the implementation of the proportionality principle needs further clarification. The Committee also drew attention to the need to reconsider the subsidiarity/added value policy and to apply it with caution, as well as to the need of a regular assessment of the IPPs.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| INTRODUCTION | 29 |
| --- | --- |

| I. | THE IPPS ESTABLISHED BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL | 29 |
| --- | --- | --- |

I.

| I.1. | IPPs for 2012 | 29 |
| --- | --- | --- |

I.1.

| I.2. | IPPs for 2013 | 29 |
| --- | --- | --- |

I.2.

| I.3. | Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 | 30 |
| --- | --- | --- |

I.3.

| I.4. | Draft IPPs for 2014 | 30 |
| --- | --- | --- |

I.4.

| I.5. | Feedback from other Directorates-General of the European Commission | 30 |
| --- | --- | --- |

I.5.

| II. | SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE'S ASSESSMENT OF THE IPPS | 31 |
| --- | --- | --- |

II.

| II.1. | Improved definition of the IPPs | 31 |
| --- | --- | --- |

II.1.

| II.2. | Need to clarify the policy on financial indicators | 31 |
| --- | --- | --- |

II.2.

| II.3. | Need to reconsider the subsidiarity/added value policy | 32 |
| --- | --- | --- |

II.3.

| II.4. | Need to regularly assess the IPPs | 32 |
| --- | --- | --- |

II.4.

| III. | SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS | 33 |
| --- | --- | --- |

III.

INTRODUCTION

| 1. | The Investigation Policy Priorities (IPPs) were established by the European AntiFraud Office (OLAF) for the first time within the framework of the Management Plan 2012 as an element of the reorganisation of the Office, aiming at improving the selection procedure. ‘The IPPs [were] used by OLAF to decide on the opening of investigations. These priorities [came] into play after the competence of OLAF and the necessary level of suspicions [had] been established’
   (1). |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Investigation Policy Priorities (IPPs) were established by the European AntiFraud Office (OLAF) for the first time within the framework of the Management Plan 2012 as an element of the reorganisation of the Office, aiming at improving the selection procedure. ‘The IPPs [were] used by OLAF to decide on the opening of investigations. These priorities [came] into play after the competence of OLAF and the necessary level of suspicions [had] been established’
   (1).

| 2. | On 1 October 2013, Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 (2) entered into force. It obliges the Director-General of OLAF (OLAF DG) to determine the IPPs each year and also to forward them, prior to their publication, to the Supervisory Committee (SC) of OLAF (3). In the light of its role of reinforcing OLAF's independence and of its duties to assist the OLAF DG in discharging his responsibilities (4), the SC decided to thoroughly examine the IPPs for 2012, 2013 and 2014. |
| --- | --- |

2.

On 1 October 2013, Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 (2) entered into force. It obliges the Director-General of OLAF (OLAF DG) to determine the IPPs each year and also to forward them, prior to their publication, to the Supervisory Committee (SC) of OLAF (3). In the light of its role of reinforcing OLAF's independence and of its duties to assist the OLAF DG in discharging his responsibilities (4), the SC decided to thoroughly examine the IPPs for 2012, 2013 and 2014.

I.   THE IPPS ESTABLISHED BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL

I.1.   IPPs for 2012

| 3. | There were five IPPs established in 2012:






  (i) | proportionality, |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

There were five IPPs established in 2012:

(i)

proportionality,

| (ii) | efficient use of investigative resources, |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

efficient use of investigative resources,

| (iii) | subsidiarity/added value, |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

subsidiarity/added value,

| (iv) | special policy objectives, |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

special policy objectives,

| (v) | financial impact. |
| --- | --- |

(v)

financial impact.

| 4. | The special policy objectives were related to sectors and geographical areas decided by the OLAF DG on the basis of concerns and priorities expressed by the European Institutions and of OLAF's own risk analyses. For 2012 the special policy objectives included:






  a) | double funding in external aid, |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

The special policy objectives were related to sectors and geographical areas decided by the OLAF DG on the basis of concerns and priorities expressed by the European Institutions and of OLAF's own risk analyses. For 2012 the special policy objectives included:

a)

double funding in external aid,

| b) | smuggling of cigarettes and alcohol along the EU eastern border, |
| --- | --- |

b)

smuggling of cigarettes and alcohol along the EU eastern border,

| c) | cohesion funds, |
| --- | --- |

c)

cohesion funds,

| d) | pre-accession funds in current accession and candidate countries, |
| --- | --- |

d)

pre-accession funds in current accession and candidate countries,

| e) | suspected corruption or links to organised crime
   (5). |
| --- | --- |

e)

suspected corruption or links to organised crime
   (5).

| 5. | The priority related to the financial impact included financial indicators, e.g. EUR 500 000 in the European Social Fund and Cohesion Fund and € 1 million in the European Regional Development Fund (estimated misappropriation or wrongful retention of funds), over € 1 million (estimated illegal diminution of resources) in the customs sector (6). |
| --- | --- |

5.

The priority related to the financial impact included financial indicators, e.g. EUR 500 000 in the European Social Fund and Cohesion Fund and € 1 million in the European Regional Development Fund (estimated misappropriation or wrongful retention of funds), over € 1 million (estimated illegal diminution of resources) in the customs sector (6).

I.2.   IPPs for 2013

| 6. | The IPPs have been updated for 2013 and they include four criteria:






  (i) | proportionality, |
| --- | --- | --- |

6.

The IPPs have been updated for 2013 and they include four criteria:

(i)

proportionality,

| (ii) | efficient use of investigative resources, |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

efficient use of investigative resources,

| (iii) | subsidiarity/added value, |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

subsidiarity/added value,

| (iv) | special criteria for 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

special criteria for 2013.

| 7. | The special criteria for 2013 are related to sectors only and no longer to geographical areas. The adoption of those criteria is linked to documents issued by stakeholders (7). There are three prioritised sectors:






  a) | smuggling of cigarettes and alcohol into the EU, |
| --- | --- | --- |

7.

The special criteria for 2013 are related to sectors only and no longer to geographical areas. The adoption of those criteria is linked to documents issued by stakeholders (7). There are three prioritised sectors:

a)

smuggling of cigarettes and alcohol into the EU,

| b) | the EU and national public procurement in the field of regional policies, |
| --- | --- |

b)

the EU and national public procurement in the field of regional policies,

| c) | rural development
   (8). |
| --- | --- |

c)

rural development
   (8).

Finally, the special criteria include also financial indicators which are equivalent, in content, to the financial impact priority of 2012 (9).

I.3   Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013

| 8. | Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 establishes certain principles to be taken into account by the OLAF DG, alongside the IPPs, when deciding whether or not to open an investigation (10). |
| --- | --- |

8.

Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 establishes certain principles to be taken into account by the OLAF DG, alongside the IPPs, when deciding whether or not to open an investigation (10).

| 9. | Those general principles include:






  (i) | proportionality of the means employed, |
| --- | --- | --- |

9.

Those general principles include:

(i)

proportionality of the means employed,

| (ii) | efficient use of resources, |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

efficient use of resources,

| (iii) | added value of an OLAF internal investigation, taking into account the nature of an illegal activity and its financial impact. |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

added value of an OLAF internal investigation, taking into account the nature of an illegal activity and its financial impact.

I.4   Draft IPPs for 2014

| 10. | On 4 December 2013 the OLAF DG transmitted to the SC the draft IPPs for 2014 which are to be adopted by the end of January 2014. The draft priorities for investigation in 2014 include:






  (i) | smuggling of cigarettes and tobacco into the EU, in particular via maritime transport and along the EU Eastern border; |
| --- | --- | --- |

10.

On 4 December 2013 the OLAF DG transmitted to the SC the draft IPPs for 2014 which are to be adopted by the end of January 2014. The draft priorities for investigation in 2014 include:

(i)

smuggling of cigarettes and tobacco into the EU, in particular via maritime transport and along the EU Eastern border;

| (ii) | abuse of origin rules and tariff classification in both preferential and non-preferential trade regimes in order to evade payment of conventional customs duty and anti-dumping duties; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

abuse of origin rules and tariff classification in both preferential and non-preferential trade regimes in order to evade payment of conventional customs duty and anti-dumping duties;

| (iii) | cases with indications of fraud and/or corruption in relation to public procurement for infrastructure networks; |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

cases with indications of fraud and/or corruption in relation to public procurement for infrastructure networks;

| (iv) | cases of fraud concerning specific projects (co)financed by the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and Pre-accession Funds and in which action by the Member States or Candidate Countries is deemed to be insufficient. |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

cases of fraud concerning specific projects (co)financed by the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and Pre-accession Funds and in which action by the Member States or Candidate Countries is deemed to be insufficient.

| 11. | The draft priorities are related to the areas of activities of OLAF Directorate B only (not Directorate A). They are based on 9 key documents issued by stakeholders and they do not contain any reference to financial indicators. |
| --- | --- |

11.

The draft priorities are related to the areas of activities of OLAF Directorate B only (not Directorate A). They are based on 9 key documents issued by stakeholders and they do not contain any reference to financial indicators.

I.5   Feedback from other Directorates-General of the European Commission

| 12. | On 11 February 2013 the responsible unit in the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) formally alerted OLAF via a registered note (11) that the financial indicator for one of the priorities — rural development — adopted by the OLAF DG, apparently without having consulted DG AGRI and defined as over EUR 250 000, would exclude 99,83 % of cases, since only 1 036 beneficiaries, out of 563 196, received subsidies above that threshold. DG AGRI expressed the view that it might be worthwhile considering a revision of the threshold of EUR 250 000, in order to increase the impact of OLAF's activities in the rural development sector. In May 2013 the Director-General of DG AGRI complained (12) to the OLAF DG that the above mentioned note of 11 February 2013 had never been answered. OLAF DG replied in July 2013, ‘taking note’ of the proposed ‘adaptation of the financial thresholds’, stressing that they are just one of the indicators and that when cases are dismissed on the basis of the IPPs, the relevant information is ‘systematically’ transferred to the competent authorities (13). |
| --- | --- |

12.

On 11 February 2013 the responsible unit in the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) formally alerted OLAF via a registered note (11) that the financial indicator for one of the priorities — rural development — adopted by the OLAF DG, apparently without having consulted DG AGRI and defined as over EUR 250 000, would exclude 99,83 % of cases, since only 1 036 beneficiaries, out of 563 196, received subsidies above that threshold. DG AGRI expressed the view that it might be worthwhile considering a revision of the threshold of EUR 250 000, in order to increase the impact of OLAF's activities in the rural development sector. In May 2013 the Director-General of DG AGRI complained (12) to the OLAF DG that the above mentioned note of 11 February 2013 had never been answered. OLAF DG replied in July 2013, ‘taking note’ of the proposed ‘adaptation of the financial thresholds’, stressing that they are just one of the indicators and that when cases are dismissed on the basis of the IPPs, the relevant information is ‘systematically’ transferred to the competent authorities (13).

| 13. | With regard to a number of cases dismissed by OLAF and transferred to DG AGRI for appropriate action, DG AGRI continued to express its disagreement. In particular, DG AGRI pointed out that its competence lies in carrying out system audits; it therefore cannot undertake verifications regarding individual cases (e.g. possibly irregular payments to individual beneficiaries) that would amount to investigative activities for which it is not competent. As a consequence, DG AGRI decided not to follow-up such cases forwarded by OLAF. (14) In reply, DG AGRI was referred to OLAF's ‘Guidance note for treatment of dismissed cases’ (15) listing actions that can be taken in such circumstances. |
| --- | --- |

13.

With regard to a number of cases dismissed by OLAF and transferred to DG AGRI for appropriate action, DG AGRI continued to express its disagreement. In particular, DG AGRI pointed out that its competence lies in carrying out system audits; it therefore cannot undertake verifications regarding individual cases (e.g. possibly irregular payments to individual beneficiaries) that would amount to investigative activities for which it is not competent. As a consequence, DG AGRI decided not to follow-up such cases forwarded by OLAF. (14) In reply, DG AGRI was referred to OLAF's ‘Guidance note for treatment of dismissed cases’ (15) listing actions that can be taken in such circumstances.

| 14. | The SC's inquiries have shown that the problem of insufficient consultation with the stakeholders concerns also other ‘spending’ DGs. In particular the issue of criteria for establishing financial indicators and the issue of the follow-up of cases of fraud or irregularity which are dismissed by OLAF seem to be addressed unilaterally by OLAF, without taking effectively into account opinions of the stakeholders. |
| --- | --- |

14.

The SC's inquiries have shown that the problem of insufficient consultation with the stakeholders concerns also other ‘spending’ DGs. In particular the issue of criteria for establishing financial indicators and the issue of the follow-up of cases of fraud or irregularity which are dismissed by OLAF seem to be addressed unilaterally by OLAF, without taking effectively into account opinions of the stakeholders.

II.   SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE'S ASSESSMENT OF THE IPPS

II.1   Improved definition of the IPPs

| 15. | The IPPs for 2012 and 2013 contained, as priority criteria to be taken into consideration by OLAF to decide on the opening of investigations, three general principles, namely proportionality, need for efficient use of investigative resources and subsidiarity. The SC has pointed out in technical meetings with OLAF that proportionality and subsidiarity belong to the general principles of the EU law and as such must be always applied by all the EU bodies in accordance with the established EU case-law. As a result, those principles cannot constitute discretionary priorities of the Director-General of OLAF. |
| --- | --- |

15.

The IPPs for 2012 and 2013 contained, as priority criteria to be taken into consideration by OLAF to decide on the opening of investigations, three general principles, namely proportionality, need for efficient use of investigative resources and subsidiarity. The SC has pointed out in technical meetings with OLAF that proportionality and subsidiarity belong to the general principles of the EU law and as such must be always applied by all the EU bodies in accordance with the established EU case-law. As a result, those principles cannot constitute discretionary priorities of the Director-General of OLAF.

| 16. | The SC notes that Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 has established a clear distinction between the three general principles which always need to be taken into account by the Director-General and the priorities which he himself is to determine each year within the context of the annual management plan (16). The principles established in the Regulation correspond largely to the first three IPPs for 2012 and 2013. Therefore, since 1 October 2013, only the special annual criteria and the financial indicators determined by the Director-General can be considered as the IPPs for OLAF in the sense of the Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

16.

The SC notes that Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 has established a clear distinction between the three general principles which always need to be taken into account by the Director-General and the priorities which he himself is to determine each year within the context of the annual management plan (16). The principles established in the Regulation correspond largely to the first three IPPs for 2012 and 2013. Therefore, since 1 October 2013, only the special annual criteria and the financial indicators determined by the Director-General can be considered as the IPPs for OLAF in the sense of the Regulation.

| 17. | The SC welcomes the fact that, following its comments expressed during technical meetings, the Director-General included in the draft IPPs for 2014 only those elements which can be clearly considered under the Regulation as priorities (and not principles). |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Moreover, the SC would draw attention to the fact that the general principles established in the Regulation are binding on the Director-General for all his decisions on opening or not an investigation. Since these decisions are based on the opinions of the Investigation Selection and Review Unit, the SC believes that it is important to provide the responsible staff in that unit with guidelines on the application of those principles. |
| --- | --- |

18.

Moreover, the SC would draw attention to the fact that the general principles established in the Regulation are binding on the Director-General for all his decisions on opening or not an investigation. Since these decisions are based on the opinions of the Investigation Selection and Review Unit, the SC believes that it is important to provide the responsible staff in that unit with guidelines on the application of those principles.

II.2.   Need to clarify the policy on financial indicators

| 19. | The IPPs for 2012 and 2013 listed a certain number of financial indicators to be taken into account in the selection process, together with other priority criteria. Already in its 2012 Annual Activity Report, the SC indicated that some of the thresholds were excessively high. At that time, the SC expressed its concern that potential fraud or irregularities likely to have a lower, but still significant financial impact, may not be taken into consideration, despite clear evidence (17). In particular, the SC highlighted that ‘The setting by the Director-General of high financial thresholds, to be taken into consideration by OLAF prior to open an investigation in various sectors and the possibility for the Director-General not to open an investigation even if there is ‘sufficient suspicion’, without a parallel duty for the Director-General to inform the competent authorities of institutions when he decides not to open an investigation, risks resulting in areas of impunity’ (18). |
| --- | --- |

19.

The IPPs for 2012 and 2013 listed a certain number of financial indicators to be taken into account in the selection process, together with other priority criteria. Already in its 2012 Annual Activity Report, the SC indicated that some of the thresholds were excessively high. At that time, the SC expressed its concern that potential fraud or irregularities likely to have a lower, but still significant financial impact, may not be taken into consideration, despite clear evidence (17). In particular, the SC highlighted that ‘The setting by the Director-General of high financial thresholds, to be taken into consideration by OLAF prior to open an investigation in various sectors and the possibility for the Director-General not to open an investigation even if there is ‘sufficient suspicion’, without a parallel duty for the Director-General to inform the competent authorities of institutions when he decides not to open an investigation, risks resulting in areas of impunity’ (18).

| 20. | Another concern that the SC wishes to express relates to the fact that those financial indicators were established apparently without any consultation with the stakeholders. It would not be consistent with the European Commission's anti-fraud strategy, which promotes OLAF's proactive and reinforced role in assisting the Commission Services, by providing, inter alia, a methodology and guidance on the development and implementation of the sectoral anti-fraud strategies (19). The SC would point out that the departments responsible for managing and/or supervising EU funds should receive proper information concerning suspicions of fraud or irregularities detrimental to the EU financial interests. In the absence of such information, they cannot ensure adequate protection of the EU's financial interests. In addition, the SC considers that OLAF would benefit from a constructive dialogue with its stakeholders with regard to financial indicators, since they are primarily responsible for managing EU funds and, as such, hold the most reliable information on elements of expenditure potentially affected by fraud, irregularities or other illegal activities detrimental to the EU financial interests. |
| --- | --- |

20.

Another concern that the SC wishes to express relates to the fact that those financial indicators were established apparently without any consultation with the stakeholders. It would not be consistent with the European Commission's anti-fraud strategy, which promotes OLAF's proactive and reinforced role in assisting the Commission Services, by providing, inter alia, a methodology and guidance on the development and implementation of the sectoral anti-fraud strategies (19). The SC would point out that the departments responsible for managing and/or supervising EU funds should receive proper information concerning suspicions of fraud or irregularities detrimental to the EU financial interests. In the absence of such information, they cannot ensure adequate protection of the EU's financial interests. In addition, the SC considers that OLAF would benefit from a constructive dialogue with its stakeholders with regard to financial indicators, since they are primarily responsible for managing EU funds and, as such, hold the most reliable information on elements of expenditure potentially affected by fraud, irregularities or other illegal activities detrimental to the EU financial interests.

| 21. | The SC welcomes the fact that, following its comments expressed in its Activity Report for 2012, the Director-General decided to review the policy on financial indicators. The SC is, however, concerned that, as the result, the DG has completely excluded any financial indicators from the draft IPPs for 2014, leaving the unit responsible for case selection without any concrete guidance in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | The SC would point out that, despite the financial indicators for 2012 and 2013 being arbitrary and dangerously overstated, it considers that some financial impact criteria — discussed with the stakeholders — are, however, relevant for the assessment of the seriousness of the risk involved and could be useful as an element of reference and as internal guidelines on the application of the proportionality principle. The financial criteria should take into account the input from the European Commission's Directorates-General and from the EU institutions or bodies involved in the financial lifecycle and which are the best placed for holding timely information on the management of EU funds and on potential risks of fraud or irregularities detrimental to the EU financial interests. |
| --- | --- |

22.

The SC would point out that, despite the financial indicators for 2012 and 2013 being arbitrary and dangerously overstated, it considers that some financial impact criteria — discussed with the stakeholders — are, however, relevant for the assessment of the seriousness of the risk involved and could be useful as an element of reference and as internal guidelines on the application of the proportionality principle. The financial criteria should take into account the input from the European Commission's Directorates-General and from the EU institutions or bodies involved in the financial lifecycle and which are the best placed for holding timely information on the management of EU funds and on potential risks of fraud or irregularities detrimental to the EU financial interests.

II.3.   Need to reconsider the subsidiarity/added value policy

| 23. | The SC notes that the subsidiarity principle, combined with the assessment of the added value of OLAF's action, was one of the IPPs for 2012 and 2013. In Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 the added value appears as a stand-alone principle concerning internal investigations (20), while the principle of subsidiarity is referred to (in the meaning of Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union) in the context of external investigations (21). However, they continue to be applied by the Investigation Selection and Review Unit as one selection criterion, regardless of the type of case (22). Since the two principles have been reinforced by the Regulation and defined in two different contexts, the SC considers that OLAF should clarify their application in the selection process. |
| --- | --- |

23.

The SC notes that the subsidiarity principle, combined with the assessment of the added value of OLAF's action, was one of the IPPs for 2012 and 2013. In Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 the added value appears as a stand-alone principle concerning internal investigations (20), while the principle of subsidiarity is referred to (in the meaning of Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union) in the context of external investigations (21). However, they continue to be applied by the Investigation Selection and Review Unit as one selection criterion, regardless of the type of case (22). Since the two principles have been reinforced by the Regulation and defined in two different contexts, the SC considers that OLAF should clarify their application in the selection process.

| 24. | The SC also notes, from the feedback received from other Directorates-General of the Commission, as well as from its own analysis of opinions of the Investigation Selection and Review Unit, that the application of this principle by OLAF is a matter of concern and that the likelihood of a follow-up by another authority seems to be insufficiently taken into consideration. While reiterating its views with regard to OLAF's ‘de minimis’ policy, in particular the opinion that, in cases where minor wrongdoings/low impact cases can be dealt with satisfactorily by other services, OLAF may forward incoming information to other Commission services, rather than decide to open an OLAF investigation (23), the SC would point out that OLAF should be careful to verify whether or not the recipient authority has the necessary competence and powers to deal with the case, in order to be sure that appropriate follow-up is given to cases dismissed by another authority. |
| --- | --- |

24.

The SC also notes, from the feedback received from other Directorates-General of the Commission, as well as from its own analysis of opinions of the Investigation Selection and Review Unit, that the application of this principle by OLAF is a matter of concern and that the likelihood of a follow-up by another authority seems to be insufficiently taken into consideration. While reiterating its views with regard to OLAF's ‘de minimis’ policy, in particular the opinion that, in cases where minor wrongdoings/low impact cases can be dealt with satisfactorily by other services, OLAF may forward incoming information to other Commission services, rather than decide to open an OLAF investigation (23), the SC would point out that OLAF should be careful to verify whether or not the recipient authority has the necessary competence and powers to deal with the case, in order to be sure that appropriate follow-up is given to cases dismissed by another authority.

II.4   Need to regularly assess the IPPs

| 25. | The SC notes that the IPPs, which are determined within the context of OLAF's Annual Management Plan, change every year and there are significant differences between the IPPs for 2012, 2013 and 2014. In the SC's opinion, such changes should be justified by concrete needs and measurable indicators. However, the SC is not aware of any internal or external evaluation, feedback or follow-up of the IPPs for 2012 and 2013, and equally notes the absence of any action aimed at assessing the impact of the priorities prior to their adoption. |
| --- | --- |

25.

The SC notes that the IPPs, which are determined within the context of OLAF's Annual Management Plan, change every year and there are significant differences between the IPPs for 2012, 2013 and 2014. In the SC's opinion, such changes should be justified by concrete needs and measurable indicators. However, the SC is not aware of any internal or external evaluation, feedback or follow-up of the IPPs for 2012 and 2013, and equally notes the absence of any action aimed at assessing the impact of the priorities prior to their adoption.

| 26. | The SC believes that the IPPs should have as a purpose accomplishing certain objectives and therefore their implementation should be regularly assessed by OLAF, in order to establish whether or to what extent those objectives have been achieved. Moreover, the adoption of any new IPPs should be based on an impact assessment, which should include concrete and measurable indicators, lessons learnt from the implementation of previous IPPs and results of internal audits. The draft IPPs which shall be forwarded to the SC every year should be accompanied by the assessment of the implementation of former IPPs and the impact assessment of new IPPs, together with background documents. |
| --- | --- |

26.

The SC believes that the IPPs should have as a purpose accomplishing certain objectives and therefore their implementation should be regularly assessed by OLAF, in order to establish whether or to what extent those objectives have been achieved. Moreover, the adoption of any new IPPs should be based on an impact assessment, which should include concrete and measurable indicators, lessons learnt from the implementation of previous IPPs and results of internal audits. The draft IPPs which shall be forwarded to the SC every year should be accompanied by the assessment of the implementation of former IPPs and the impact assessment of new IPPs, together with background documents.

III.   SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

| 27. | In light of the above considerations, the Supervisory Committee:






  (1) | recommends that the Director General issue guidelines on application of the three selection principles established by the Regulation, including on the application of financial indicators as a proportionality criterion; |
| --- | --- | --- |

27.

In light of the above considerations, the Supervisory Committee:

(1)

recommends that the Director General issue guidelines on application of the three selection principles established by the Regulation, including on the application of financial indicators as a proportionality criterion;

| (2) | recommends that the Director General enter into a constructive dialogue with the stakeholders on the determination and implementation of IPPs, in particular with regard to financial indicators and possible follow-up of dismissed cases; |
| --- | --- |

(2)

recommends that the Director General enter into a constructive dialogue with the stakeholders on the determination and implementation of IPPs, in particular with regard to financial indicators and possible follow-up of dismissed cases;

| (3) | requests the Director General to provide the SC, by 6 March 2014, with an assessment of the results of the implementation of the IPPs for 2012 and 2013 together with a summary of the feedback provided by the stakeholders; in the following years those documents should be attached to the new draft IPPs transmitted annually to the SC. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

requests the Director General to provide the SC, by 6 March 2014, with an assessment of the results of the implementation of the IPPs for 2012 and 2013 together with a summary of the feedback provided by the stakeholders; in the following years those documents should be attached to the new draft IPPs transmitted annually to the SC.

Adopted in Brussels, on 6 February 2014

For the Supervisory Committee

Johan DENOLF

Chairman

---

(1)  OLAF Management Plan 2012, p. 20.

1

(2)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1).

2

(3)  Article 17(5) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013.

3

(4)  Article 15 and recital 37 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013.

4

(5)  OLAF Management Plan 2012, p. 21.

5

(6)  Ib., p. 22.

6

(7)  OLAF Management Plan 2013, footnotes 32, 33 and 34 on p. 44.

7

(8)  Ib., p. 44.

8

(9)  Ib., p. 45.

9

(10)  Article 5(1).

10

(11)  Note Ares(2013)175305 addressed to the Head of Unit 0.1.

11

(12)  Note Ares(2013)1118690.

12

(13)  Note Ares(2013)2587818.

13

(14)  E.g. note Ares(2013)3660752 of December 2013.

14

(15)  Ares(2013)622043 of April 2013.

15

(16)  See Article 5.

16

(17)  See the SC's 2012 Annual Activity Report, p. 23.

17

(18)  Ib., p. 42.

18

(19)  See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions and the Court of Auditors, on the Commission antifraud strategy, 24.6.2011, COM(2011) 376 final.

19

(20)  Article 5(1).

20

(21)  Recital (49).

21

(22)  The work-form ‘Opinion on opening decision’ (version amended and adopted as of 1 October 2013) lists the subsidiarity/added value amongst the IPPs to be evaluated, without any distinction between internal and external cases.

22

(23)  See the SC's Annual Activity Report, June 2008-May 2009, point II — 1.2.

23

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ANEXA 4

OPINION No 2/2014

Case selection in OLAF

CONTENTS

| INTRODUCTION | 35 |
| --- | --- |

| Scope and purpose of the SC's review | 35 |
| --- | --- |

| Methodology | 35 |
| --- | --- |

| PART I | RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS | 36 |
| --- | --- | --- |

PART I

| Need to improve the resources allocated to the ISRU | 36 |
| --- | --- |

| Need to improve the application of the selection criteria | 37 |
| --- | --- |

| Need to increase transparency of the selection process | 40 |
| --- | --- |

| Need to improve the reporting to the SC | 41 |
| --- | --- |

| Final remarks and recommendation | 41 |
| --- | --- |

| PART II | ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS | 42 |
| --- | --- | --- |

PART II

| (1) | The resources allocated to the selection function | 42 |
| --- | --- | --- |

(1)

| (1.1) | Human resources | 42 |
| --- | --- | --- |

(1.1)

| (1.2) | Time resources | 43 |
| --- | --- | --- |

(1.2)

| (1.3) | Instructions | 44 |
| --- | --- | --- |

(1.3)

| (1.4) | IT/technical resources | 45 |
| --- | --- | --- |

(1.4)

| (2) | The selection process: compliance with the selection criteria | 45 |
| --- | --- | --- |

(2)

| (2.1) | OLAF's competency to act | 45 |
| --- | --- | --- |

(2.1)

| (2.2) | Sufficiency of information | 46 |
| --- | --- | --- |

(2.2)

| (2.3) | Investigation Policy Priorities | 47 |
| --- | --- | --- |

(2.3)

| (3) | The information flow during the selection process | 50 |
| --- | --- | --- |

(3)

| (3.1) | Information provided to the competent EU or Member States' authorities | 51 |
| --- | --- | --- |

(3.1)

| (3.2) | Information provided to the investigation directorates | 51 |
| --- | --- | --- |

(3.2)

| (3.3) | Information provided to the source of information | 51 |
| --- | --- | --- |

(3.3)

| ANNEX: THE SELECTION PROCESS — A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH | 52 |
| --- | --- |

INTRODUCTION

| 1. | On 1 February 2012, OLAF's investigative procedures and internal organisation were significantly changed. New Instructions to Staff on Investigative Procedures (ISIP) were issued and a new Investigation Selection and Review Unit (ISRU) was created. This unit deals with both the selection and review of cases (1) and provides opinions on the basis of which the Director-General (DG) of OLAF takes decisions on opening or dismissing cases, on the main investigative activities, on the final report and on the recommendations. The ISRU is thus involved in the whole lifecycle of an investigation or coordination case and most of the decisions taken by the DG in the investigation area are based on its opinions. Therefore, the internal rules, the organisation, the competences, the efficiency and the quality of the work of the ISRU have a major and direct influence on the performance of the whole OLAF investigative function. The Supervisory Committee (SC) has therefore decided to pay particular attention to the execution by this unit of its role. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 1 February 2012, OLAF's investigative procedures and internal organisation were significantly changed. New Instructions to Staff on Investigative Procedures (ISIP) were issued and a new Investigation Selection and Review Unit (ISRU) was created. This unit deals with both the selection and review of cases (1) and provides opinions on the basis of which the Director-General (DG) of OLAF takes decisions on opening or dismissing cases, on the main investigative activities, on the final report and on the recommendations. The ISRU is thus involved in the whole lifecycle of an investigation or coordination case and most of the decisions taken by the DG in the investigation area are based on its opinions. Therefore, the internal rules, the organisation, the competences, the efficiency and the quality of the work of the ISRU have a major and direct influence on the performance of the whole OLAF investigative function. The Supervisory Committee (SC) has therefore decided to pay particular attention to the execution by this unit of its role.

Scope and purpose of the SC's review

| 2. | The SC's review has focused on the selection function of the ISRU — and, in particular, on the selection process (2). The SC's analysis takes into account the legal provisions and instructions to staff in force at the time when the analysed opinions were delivered, namely Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 (3) and the ISIP. However, the SC's recommendations are made in the light of the current Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 (4) and the new Guidelines on Investigative Procedures (GIP), both of which entered into force on 1 October 2013. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The SC's review has focused on the selection function of the ISRU — and, in particular, on the selection process (2). The SC's analysis takes into account the legal provisions and instructions to staff in force at the time when the analysed opinions were delivered, namely Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 (3) and the ISIP. However, the SC's recommendations are made in the light of the current Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 (4) and the new Guidelines on Investigative Procedures (GIP), both of which entered into force on 1 October 2013.

| 3. | On 1 February 2012, the assessment of the incoming information of possible investigative interest to OLAF was transferred from the investigation units to the ISRU. A centralised decision-making system was created, consisting of two levels: the decisional level, represented by the DG, and the advisory level, represented by the ISRU. Such centralisation may help to improve the efficiency and consistency of the selection of cases, provided that the ISRU carries out its function in an effective, competent and transparent manner, according to clear principles and drawing on the expertise of investigative, analytical and legal units. The SC's review has as its objective to verify whether those requirements have been satisfied. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On 1 February 2012, the assessment of the incoming information of possible investigative interest to OLAF was transferred from the investigation units to the ISRU. A centralised decision-making system was created, consisting of two levels: the decisional level, represented by the DG, and the advisory level, represented by the ISRU. Such centralisation may help to improve the efficiency and consistency of the selection of cases, provided that the ISRU carries out its function in an effective, competent and transparent manner, according to clear principles and drawing on the expertise of investigative, analytical and legal units. The SC's review has as its objective to verify whether those requirements have been satisfied.

Methodology

| 4. | The SC selected a sample of opinions on the opening or dismissal of cases: it consisted of a statistical sample of opinions from all the cases created between 1 September 2012 and 31 March 2013 plus all opinions of May 2013 and plus further 20 opinions selected by the DG. According to the criteria submitted by the SC, OLAF identified 314 opinions (5) of which 1 contained erroneous numbering and 20 were submitted in duplicate (appearing twice on OLAF's lists). Therefore the total number of opinions eligible to be examined by the SC came to 293, of which 218 opinions (74,4 %) recommended the dismissal of cases and the remaining 75 opinions (25,6 %) recommended the opening of investigation or coordination cases (figure 1). All the recommendations have been followed by the DG. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The SC selected a sample of opinions on the opening or dismissal of cases: it consisted of a statistical sample of opinions from all the cases created between 1 September 2012 and 31 March 2013 plus all opinions of May 2013 and plus further 20 opinions selected by the DG. According to the criteria submitted by the SC, OLAF identified 314 opinions (5) of which 1 contained erroneous numbering and 20 were submitted in duplicate (appearing twice on OLAF's lists). Therefore the total number of opinions eligible to be examined by the SC came to 293, of which 218 opinions (74,4 %) recommended the dismissal of cases and the remaining 75 opinions (25,6 %) recommended the opening of investigation or coordination cases (figure 1). All the recommendations have been followed by the DG.

Figure 1

Cases dismissed/opened

| 5. | The SC's review is based on:






  (a) | an analysis of the selection of the ISRU's opinions; |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

The SC's review is based on:

(a)

an analysis of the selection of the ISRU's opinions;

| (b) | an analysis of the relevant background documentation made available by OLAF — including the ISIP, the GIP, the related work forms, a ‘Starter Kit’ provided to the selectors (6), as well as statistical information provided by OLAF (7) or extracted from the OLAF Case Management System (CMS); |
| --- | --- |

(b)

an analysis of the relevant background documentation made available by OLAF — including the ISIP, the GIP, the related work forms, a ‘Starter Kit’ provided to the selectors (6), as well as statistical information provided by OLAF (7) or extracted from the OLAF Case Management System (CMS);

| (c) | interviews — according to a semi-structured model — with individual staff members of the ISRU, as well as with staff of investigation units, as immediate recipients of the work of the ISRU (where cases are not dismissed). |
| --- | --- |

(c)

interviews — according to a semi-structured model — with individual staff members of the ISRU, as well as with staff of investigation units, as immediate recipients of the work of the ISRU (where cases are not dismissed).

| 6. | The details of the analysis and of the findings are presented in Part II of this opinion. In Part I the SC presents its conclusions and recommendations made to the DG. |
| --- | --- |

6.

The details of the analysis and of the findings are presented in Part II of this opinion. In Part I the SC presents its conclusions and recommendations made to the DG.

PART I   RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Need to improve the resources allocated to the ISRU

| 7. | The SC's examination of allocation of resources to and within the ISRU revealed that, generally, there are experienced selectors in the unit, covering a wide range of specialisations. However, each selector deals with different sectors, including those where they have less expertise, which, in particular with regard to selectors who have no investigative experience, may have affected the quality of the assessment carried out. The limited number of the training courses completed by the selectors does not appear to compensate for the lack of previous experience. The SC found also that legal knowledge was not sufficiently demonstrated in many opinions and that language expertise was sometimes missing (see paragraphs 31-35 and 38). |
| --- | --- |

7.

The SC's examination of allocation of resources to and within the ISRU revealed that, generally, there are experienced selectors in the unit, covering a wide range of specialisations. However, each selector deals with different sectors, including those where they have less expertise, which, in particular with regard to selectors who have no investigative experience, may have affected the quality of the assessment carried out. The limited number of the training courses completed by the selectors does not appear to compensate for the lack of previous experience. The SC found also that legal knowledge was not sufficiently demonstrated in many opinions and that language expertise was sometimes missing (see paragraphs 31-35 and 38).

| 8. | The SC is of the opinion that the fact that selectors are required to assess information in domains with which they are not always familiar may increase the risk of losing time when having to switch between different sectors and of performing incomplete assessments of incoming information. Selectors need to be experienced and properly trained to perform selection tasks. Selectors should also concentrate their efforts on tasks and sectors in which they are most qualified. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The SC is of the opinion that the fact that selectors are required to assess information in domains with which they are not always familiar may increase the risk of losing time when having to switch between different sectors and of performing incomplete assessments of incoming information. Selectors need to be experienced and properly trained to perform selection tasks. Selectors should also concentrate their efforts on tasks and sectors in which they are most qualified.

| 9. | The SC equally noted that it was neither possible nor productive to strictly adhere to the mandatory 2-month period foreseen in the ISIP for completing the selection of cases. Therefore, the SC welcomes the fact that the new Guidelines on Investigation Procedures eliminated this overly rigid time limit, which allows for a better balance to be struck between OLAF's objective to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its investigation and coordination cases (by speeding up the period dedicated to the assessment of incoming information) and the need to avoid excessive time pressure (which might be damaging to the quality of the assessment) (see paragraphs 39-40). |
| --- | --- |

9.

The SC equally noted that it was neither possible nor productive to strictly adhere to the mandatory 2-month period foreseen in the ISIP for completing the selection of cases. Therefore, the SC welcomes the fact that the new Guidelines on Investigation Procedures eliminated this overly rigid time limit, which allows for a better balance to be struck between OLAF's objective to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its investigation and coordination cases (by speeding up the period dedicated to the assessment of incoming information) and the need to avoid excessive time pressure (which might be damaging to the quality of the assessment) (see paragraphs 39-40).

| 10. | Lastly, the SC noted that the adoption of clear instructions for dealing with whistle-blowers, as well as technical improvement of the Fraud Notification System (FNS) would also be desirable (see paragraphs 41-44). |
| --- | --- |

10.

Lastly, the SC noted that the adoption of clear instructions for dealing with whistle-blowers, as well as technical improvement of the Fraud Notification System (FNS) would also be desirable (see paragraphs 41-44).

| Recommendation 1:


  Improve the resources allocated to the ISRU


  OLAF should take appropriate measures to ensure that ISRU has at its disposal sufficient and adequate resources to carry out its selection tasks.

  In particular, OLAF should:






  (a) | Increase the number of selectors with investigative experience; |
| --- | --- |

Recommendation 1:

Improve the resources allocated to the ISRU

OLAF should take appropriate measures to ensure that ISRU has at its disposal sufficient and adequate resources to carry out its selection tasks.

In particular, OLAF should:

(a)

Increase the number of selectors with investigative experience;

| (b) | Apply the principle of specialisation of selectors more rigorously; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Apply the principle of specialisation of selectors more rigorously;

| (c) | Ensure that the selectors have the appropriate (legal, linguistic and sectorial) expertise and provide them with sufficient training; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Ensure that the selectors have the appropriate (legal, linguistic and sectorial) expertise and provide them with sufficient training;

| (d) | Improve the functioning of the FNS, in order to allow it to cope with the upload of documents of greater size; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

Improve the functioning of the FNS, in order to allow it to cope with the upload of documents of greater size;

| (e) | Adopt proper procedures for dealing with whistle-blowers. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

Adopt proper procedures for dealing with whistle-blowers.

| 11. | The SC also noted that the reviewers have been entrusted not only with review tasks, but also with the selection of cases. The SC would point out that, the tasks of the selectors being fundamentally different from those of the reviewers, combining their responsibilities is questionable. The SC is therefore of the opinion that the attribution of cases for selection to the reviewers, in order to compensate for the insufficiency of the language expertise within the unit and resulting in an increase of the reviewers' workload, should remain a temporary and exceptional solution (see paragraphs 36-37). |
| --- | --- |

11.

The SC also noted that the reviewers have been entrusted not only with review tasks, but also with the selection of cases. The SC would point out that, the tasks of the selectors being fundamentally different from those of the reviewers, combining their responsibilities is questionable. The SC is therefore of the opinion that the attribution of cases for selection to the reviewers, in order to compensate for the insufficiency of the language expertise within the unit and resulting in an increase of the reviewers' workload, should remain a temporary and exceptional solution (see paragraphs 36-37).

| Recommendation 2:


  Separate structurally the selectors from the reviewers


  OLAF should place the selectors in an organisational structure separate from the reviewers. OLAF should also reduce, as much as possible, the number of cases for selection allocated to the reviewers.

  Furthermore, OLAF could consider either decentralising the selection function to the investigative Directorates, or introducing a rotation system whereby investigators from each investigation unit are allocated, for a period of time, to the ISRU. |
| --- |

Recommendation 2:

Separate structurally the selectors from the reviewers

OLAF should place the selectors in an organisational structure separate from the reviewers. OLAF should also reduce, as much as possible, the number of cases for selection allocated to the reviewers.

Furthermore, OLAF could consider either decentralising the selection function to the investigative Directorates, or introducing a rotation system whereby investigators from each investigation unit are allocated, for a period of time, to the ISRU.

Need to improve the application of the selection criteria

| 12. | The SC found that the assessment of OLAF's competence to act was insufficiently substantiated and in general little consideration was given to the relevant legal instruments (see paragraphs 47-49). |
| --- | --- |

12.

The SC found that the assessment of OLAF's competence to act was insufficiently substantiated and in general little consideration was given to the relevant legal instruments (see paragraphs 47-49).

| Recommendation 3:


  Improve the assessment of the criterion ‘OLAF's competence to act’


  OLAF should require the selectors:








  (a) | to better explain the concrete illegal or irregular activities to which the allegations refer and the way in which they affect the financial interests of the EU; |
| --- | --- |

Recommendation 3:

Improve the assessment of the criterion ‘OLAF's competence to act’

OLAF should require the selectors:

(a)

to better explain the concrete illegal or irregular activities to which the allegations refer and the way in which they affect the financial interests of the EU;

| (b) | to make systematically reference to the relevant legal instruments. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

to make systematically reference to the relevant legal instruments.

In addition, OLAF could also consider compensating for the lack of sufficient legal expertise by the introduction of appropriate training courses and procedures for consultations with OLAF's Legal Advice Unit.

| 13. | The SC notes that there are no clear instructions with regard to the indicators to be used by the selectors to evaluate whether or not the information is sufficient to justify the opening of an investigation or coordination case. As a result, evaluation of this selection criterion was not always properly carried out, while at the same time a variety of practices and a certain degree of inconsistency was noted in the ISRU's opinions. The SC concludes that OLAF's approach to assessing this selection criterion needs to be further developed and clarified. To that nd, OLAF could take note of concrete indicators used by selectors in some of the opinions (see paragraphs 50-54). |
| --- | --- |

13.

The SC notes that there are no clear instructions with regard to the indicators to be used by the selectors to evaluate whether or not the information is sufficient to justify the opening of an investigation or coordination case. As a result, evaluation of this selection criterion was not always properly carried out, while at the same time a variety of practices and a certain degree of inconsistency was noted in the ISRU's opinions. The SC concludes that OLAF's approach to assessing this selection criterion needs to be further developed and clarified. To that nd, OLAF could take note of concrete indicators used by selectors in some of the opinions (see paragraphs 50-54).

| Recommendation 4:


  Further develop and clarify parameters for evaluating the ‘sufficiency of information’


  OLAF should establish a list of concrete and measurable indicators for assessing the reliability of the source, credibility of the allegations and sufficiency of suspicions. |
| --- |

Recommendation 4:

Further develop and clarify parameters for evaluating the ‘sufficiency of information’

OLAF should establish a list of concrete and measurable indicators for assessing the reliability of the source, credibility of the allegations and sufficiency of suspicions.

| 14. | The SC notes that the Investigation Policy Priorities (IPPs) established by the DG indicate very clearly a number of concrete and measurable indicators that shall be used in the selection process. However, the SC's review of opinions revealed that these indicators are not systematically and rigorously applied, in particular with regard to ‘proportionality’, ‘efficient use of resources’ and ‘special policy objectives/criteria’. |
| --- | --- |

14.

The SC notes that the Investigation Policy Priorities (IPPs) established by the DG indicate very clearly a number of concrete and measurable indicators that shall be used in the selection process. However, the SC's review of opinions revealed that these indicators are not systematically and rigorously applied, in particular with regard to ‘proportionality’, ‘efficient use of resources’ and ‘special policy objectives/criteria’.

| 15. | With regard to assessment of proportionality of OLAF's action, the SC found that, despite instructions in the IPPs, the opinions frequently contain unsubstantiated statements and, in many of them, the proportionality test is either absent or incomplete. Moreover, the special policy objectives/criteria are not systematically used (see paragraphs 56-57 and 64-65). |
| --- | --- |

15.

With regard to assessment of proportionality of OLAF's action, the SC found that, despite instructions in the IPPs, the opinions frequently contain unsubstantiated statements and, in many of them, the proportionality test is either absent or incomplete. Moreover, the special policy objectives/criteria are not systematically used (see paragraphs 56-57 and 64-65).

| Recommendation 5:


  Clarify the application of the proportionality principle


  OLAF should clarify the application of the proportionality principle and provide the selectors with clearer guidelines.

  In particular, OLAF should better assess the forecast of the manpower required and other foreseeable costs, weighted against the likelihood of financial recovery and/or of prosecution, and deterrent value. Financial indicators, which are relevant for the assessment of the seriousness of the risk involved, should be used as an element of reference and as internal guidelines on the application of the proportionality principle. |
| --- |

Recommendation 5:

Clarify the application of the proportionality principle

OLAF should clarify the application of the proportionality principle and provide the selectors with clearer guidelines.

In particular, OLAF should better assess the forecast of the manpower required and other foreseeable costs, weighted against the likelihood of financial recovery and/or of prosecution, and deterrent value. Financial indicators, which are relevant for the assessment of the seriousness of the risk involved, should be used as an element of reference and as internal guidelines on the application of the proportionality principle.

| 16. | The SC also found that the evaluation of the criterion ‘efficient use of resources’ was not properly carried out. The SC believes that several factors may explain that. On the one hand, the evaluation of the four indicators mentioned in the IPPs is hardly achievable without close contact with the investigation units. While the selectors may indeed check in the CMS on the workload of the investigation units (in terms of number of investigators and investigations per unit), the management of these units is better placed to appreciate whether this workload permits swift and continuous investigative activities or could slow down priority investigations. On the other hand, neither the IPPs nor other guidelines on selection (8) establish a threshold above which the ratio of cases per investigator would be considered to be excessive workload. As a consequence, in the absence of clear instructions as to the way in which the size of the workload should be evaluated and of a systemic dialogue between the ISRU and the investigation units, the evaluation of the efficient use of investigative resources would appear to depend to a great extent on a personal approach of each selector. The variety of approaches and sometimes inconsistencies noted by the SC in the opinions confirm this conclusion (see paragraphs 58-60). |
| --- | --- |

16.

The SC also found that the evaluation of the criterion ‘efficient use of resources’ was not properly carried out. The SC believes that several factors may explain that. On the one hand, the evaluation of the four indicators mentioned in the IPPs is hardly achievable without close contact with the investigation units. While the selectors may indeed check in the CMS on the workload of the investigation units (in terms of number of investigators and investigations per unit), the management of these units is better placed to appreciate whether this workload permits swift and continuous investigative activities or could slow down priority investigations. On the other hand, neither the IPPs nor other guidelines on selection (8) establish a threshold above which the ratio of cases per investigator would be considered to be excessive workload. As a consequence, in the absence of clear instructions as to the way in which the size of the workload should be evaluated and of a systemic dialogue between the ISRU and the investigation units, the evaluation of the efficient use of investigative resources would appear to depend to a great extent on a personal approach of each selector. The variety of approaches and sometimes inconsistencies noted by the SC in the opinions confirm this conclusion (see paragraphs 58-60).

| 17. | The SC's review of opinions revealed that, in the few cases where an estimate of the size of the workload of investigators was made, it was not a determining factor for the dismissal of cases. The SC would support the approach that the workload of investigation units should not in itself be sufficient justification for the dismissal of a case. The lack of sufficient resources in investigation units should be tackled by other means, especially via management tools (e.g. temporary reallocation of staff). |
| --- | --- |

17.

The SC's review of opinions revealed that, in the few cases where an estimate of the size of the workload of investigators was made, it was not a determining factor for the dismissal of cases. The SC would support the approach that the workload of investigation units should not in itself be sufficient justification for the dismissal of a case. The lack of sufficient resources in investigation units should be tackled by other means, especially via management tools (e.g. temporary reallocation of staff).

| Recommendation 6:


  Clarify the parameters for the evaluation of the criterion ‘efficient use of resources’


  OLAF should apply more rigorously and, where necessary, clarify the application of some of the indicators established in the IPPs for evaluating the ‘efficient use of resources’.

  In particular, OLAF should better assess the following indicators: size of workload of investigation units and its impact on the on-going investigations, as well as the availability of expertise. To that end, OLAF could improve the cooperation between the ISRU and the investigation units. |
| --- |

Recommendation 6:

Clarify the parameters for the evaluation of the criterion ‘efficient use of resources’

OLAF should apply more rigorously and, where necessary, clarify the application of some of the indicators established in the IPPs for evaluating the ‘efficient use of resources’.

In particular, OLAF should better assess the following indicators: size of workload of investigation units and its impact on the on-going investigations, as well as the availability of expertise. To that end, OLAF could improve the cooperation between the ISRU and the investigation units.

| 18. | The SC found that the reasons outlined as to why an OLAF action would not bring any added value to the control activities carried out by other EU or national bodies, which are better placed to act, are generally well explained. Some reasons are recurring, so it would be more efficient for OLAF to identify the main reasons and establish for the selectors a pre-determined list of possible situations where another authority is considered better placed to act (see paragraph 61). |
| --- | --- |

18.

The SC found that the reasons outlined as to why an OLAF action would not bring any added value to the control activities carried out by other EU or national bodies, which are better placed to act, are generally well explained. Some reasons are recurring, so it would be more efficient for OLAF to identify the main reasons and establish for the selectors a pre-determined list of possible situations where another authority is considered better placed to act (see paragraph 61).

| 19. | The SC noted with concern that the likelihood of a follow-up by another EU or national authority seems to be insufficiently taken into consideration by OLAF. When information on dismissed cases is forwarded to national or EU authorities, it is of the utmost importance that OLAF follows up the action taken by them, in order to be able to react in an appropriate manner when a case is not effectively dealt with by these authorities (see paragraphs 62-63). |
| --- | --- |

19.

The SC noted with concern that the likelihood of a follow-up by another EU or national authority seems to be insufficiently taken into consideration by OLAF. When information on dismissed cases is forwarded to national or EU authorities, it is of the utmost importance that OLAF follows up the action taken by them, in order to be able to react in an appropriate manner when a case is not effectively dealt with by these authorities (see paragraphs 62-63).

| 20. | The SC would point out that, while the national authorities may indeed often be better placed to act, the situation is, however, different with regard to the EU institutions. When OLAF forwards information on serious suspicions of fraud to various DirectoratesGeneral of the Commission or to other EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies for further action, OLAF must check whether they have, apart from a general competence to carry out system audits, the appropriate powers to undertake (possibly investigative) actions in individual cases. These checks are necessary especially in the EU staff sector, where OLAF has, in certain matters, sole competence, while in others it has shared competence with the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, with some of which it has concluded agreements on the de minimis policy. |
| --- | --- |

20.

The SC would point out that, while the national authorities may indeed often be better placed to act, the situation is, however, different with regard to the EU institutions. When OLAF forwards information on serious suspicions of fraud to various DirectoratesGeneral of the Commission or to other EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies for further action, OLAF must check whether they have, apart from a general competence to carry out system audits, the appropriate powers to undertake (possibly investigative) actions in individual cases. These checks are necessary especially in the EU staff sector, where OLAF has, in certain matters, sole competence, while in others it has shared competence with the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, with some of which it has concluded agreements on the de minimis policy.

| Recommendation 7:


  Apply with caution the subsidiarity principle


  OLAF should pay special attention to cases it decides to dismiss on grounds of subsidiarity/added value reasons.

  In particular, OLAF should:






  (a) | Verify that the recipient authority does have the necessary powers to take forward cases dismissed by OLAF on grounds of subsidiarity/added value; |
| --- | --- |

Recommendation 7:

Apply with caution the subsidiarity principle

OLAF should pay special attention to cases it decides to dismiss on grounds of subsidiarity/added value reasons.

In particular, OLAF should:

(a)

Verify that the recipient authority does have the necessary powers to take forward cases dismissed by OLAF on grounds of subsidiarity/added value;

| (b) | Establish an appropriate system of monitoring (prompt, systematic and clearly evidenced) of cases dismissed on grounds of subsidiarity/added value and report in a transparent manner on the results of this monitoring exercise. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Establish an appropriate system of monitoring (prompt, systematic and clearly evidenced) of cases dismissed on grounds of subsidiarity/added value and report in a transparent manner on the results of this monitoring exercise.

| 21. | The SC's overall assessment of the way in which selectors evaluated and applied the selection criteria revealed that the quality (in terms of completeness, clarity, consistency) of the motivation of opinions depends to a great extent on the individual approach and experience of selectors. To enhance the quality, OLAF should apply more rigorously the indicators it established for the assessment of these criteria and further develop and clarify some of them. |
| --- | --- |

21.

The SC's overall assessment of the way in which selectors evaluated and applied the selection criteria revealed that the quality (in terms of completeness, clarity, consistency) of the motivation of opinions depends to a great extent on the individual approach and experience of selectors. To enhance the quality, OLAF should apply more rigorously the indicators it established for the assessment of these criteria and further develop and clarify some of them.

| Recommendation 8:


  Improve the quality of the motivation of opinions


  OLAF should improve the quality, clarity and consistency of the motivation of the opinions on opening decision.

  In particular, OLAF should consider amending the work-form ‘Opinion on opening decision’, in order to include specific reference to a number of items, to be chosen by the selectors from pre-determined lists.
  These pre-determined lists could include references to:






  (a) | relevant legal instruments (to be used when assessing OLAF's competence to act); |
| --- | --- |

Recommendation 8:

Improve the quality of the motivation of opinions

OLAF should improve the quality, clarity and consistency of the motivation of the opinions on opening decision.

In particular, OLAF should consider amending the work-form ‘Opinion on opening decision’, in order to include specific reference to a number of items, to be chosen by the selectors from pre-determined lists.

These pre-determined lists could include references to:

(a)

relevant legal instruments (to be used when assessing OLAF's competence to act);

| (b) | concrete and measurable indicators for assessing the reliability of the source, credibility of the allegations and sufficiency of suspicions (to be used when evaluating the sufficiency of information); |
| --- | --- |

(b)

concrete and measurable indicators for assessing the reliability of the source, credibility of the allegations and sufficiency of suspicions (to be used when evaluating the sufficiency of information);

| (c) | concrete and measurable indicators for assessing the IPPs. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

concrete and measurable indicators for assessing the IPPs.

Need to increase transparency of the selection process

| 22. | The examination of the information flow during the selection process showed that in general OLAF is ready to provide information on dismissed cases to other EU or national authorities, while at the same time it would appear that sources of information are not systematically informed of OLAF's decisions upon completion of the selection process (see paragraphs 67-69 and 72). |
| --- | --- |

22.

The examination of the information flow during the selection process showed that in general OLAF is ready to provide information on dismissed cases to other EU or national authorities, while at the same time it would appear that sources of information are not systematically informed of OLAF's decisions upon completion of the selection process (see paragraphs 67-69 and 72).

| 23. | The SC finds it important for the persons or entities providing OLAF with initial information to be informed of the relevant action (not) taken by OLAF. Appropriate feedback encourages fraud reporting, and it is, at the same time, a strong transparency indicator. The SC shares the view of the European Ombudsman that providing the sources of information with reasons for decisions taken by OLAF as a follow-up to that information increases transparency and strengthens trust in OLAF's functioning (9). |
| --- | --- |

23.

The SC finds it important for the persons or entities providing OLAF with initial information to be informed of the relevant action (not) taken by OLAF. Appropriate feedback encourages fraud reporting, and it is, at the same time, a strong transparency indicator. The SC shares the view of the European Ombudsman that providing the sources of information with reasons for decisions taken by OLAF as a follow-up to that information increases transparency and strengthens trust in OLAF's functioning (9).

| 24. | The SC also noticed an apparently low level of cooperation between the ISRU and the investigation units (or investigation support units) which receive very little information on dismissed cases. The SC would point out that, when a case is dismissed, the information held (sometimes exclusively) by the ISRU may still be of interest for the investigation units (e.g. to detect new fraud mechanisms), and they could also sometimes provide, thanks to their expertise, useful feedback for the selection unit and thus increase the efficiency of the selection process (see paragraphs 70-71). |
| --- | --- |

24.

The SC also noticed an apparently low level of cooperation between the ISRU and the investigation units (or investigation support units) which receive very little information on dismissed cases. The SC would point out that, when a case is dismissed, the information held (sometimes exclusively) by the ISRU may still be of interest for the investigation units (e.g. to detect new fraud mechanisms), and they could also sometimes provide, thanks to their expertise, useful feedback for the selection unit and thus increase the efficiency of the selection process (see paragraphs 70-71).

| Recommendation 9:


  Increase transparency of the selection process


  OLAF should improve the transparency of the selection process.

  In particular, OLAF should:






  (a) | Give better feedback to the source of information on the action (not) taken by OLAF following the information provided by the source; |
| --- | --- |

Recommendation 9:

Increase transparency of the selection process

OLAF should improve the transparency of the selection process.

In particular, OLAF should:

(a)

Give better feedback to the source of information on the action (not) taken by OLAF following the information provided by the source;

| (b) | Reinforce internal consultation and the exchange of information between the ISRU, and the investigation (and investigation support) units. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Reinforce internal consultation and the exchange of information between the ISRU, and the investigation (and investigation support) units.

| 25. | The SC noted that the conclusions of the opinions do not always clearly mention the actions that OLAF should take at the end of the selection process. When they are not completely omitted, some of these actions can only be deduced from other sections of the opinion (see paragraphs 67-69 and 72). |
| --- | --- |

25.

The SC noted that the conclusions of the opinions do not always clearly mention the actions that OLAF should take at the end of the selection process. When they are not completely omitted, some of these actions can only be deduced from other sections of the opinion (see paragraphs 67-69 and 72).

| Recommendation 10:


  Improve the clarity of conclusions of opinions


  Further improvements are needed with regard to the conclusions drawn up at the completion of the selection process, which should clearly specify the actions that OLAF should take following a decision to dismiss or open an investigation or coordination case.

  In particular, conclusions of opinions should clearly mention the actions that OLAF intends to take upon completion of the selection process, such as:






  (a) | to inform the national or EU authorities better placed to act; |
| --- | --- |

Recommendation 10:

Improve the clarity of conclusions of opinions

Further improvements are needed with regard to the conclusions drawn up at the completion of the selection process, which should clearly specify the actions that OLAF should take following a decision to dismiss or open an investigation or coordination case.

In particular, conclusions of opinions should clearly mention the actions that OLAF intends to take upon completion of the selection process, such as:

(a)

to inform the national or EU authorities better placed to act;

| (b) | to protect (or not) the identity of the source; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

to protect (or not) the identity of the source;

| (c) | to inform (or not) the source of information of OLAF's decisions. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

to inform (or not) the source of information of OLAF's decisions.

Need to improve the reporting to the SC

| 26. | The SC found instances where it had not been informed of obstructions that OLAF had encountered during the selection process. Moreover, OLAF did not inform the SC of cases dismissed where the opinions recommended that information should be transmitted to national judicial authorities. OLAF's obligation to inform the SC of ‘cases’ requiring information to be forwarded to the judicial authorities of a Member State (10) covers both cases opened as investigations and cases dismissed. Although such examples may be quite rare, the SC would highlight that such situations fall within its mandate and OLAF should thus provide the SC with appropriate information (see paragraphs 54 and 71). |
| --- | --- |

26.

The SC found instances where it had not been informed of obstructions that OLAF had encountered during the selection process. Moreover, OLAF did not inform the SC of cases dismissed where the opinions recommended that information should be transmitted to national judicial authorities. OLAF's obligation to inform the SC of ‘cases’ requiring information to be forwarded to the judicial authorities of a Member State (10) covers both cases opened as investigations and cases dismissed. Although such examples may be quite rare, the SC would highlight that such situations fall within its mandate and OLAF should thus provide the SC with appropriate information (see paragraphs 54 and 71).

| Recommendation 11:


  Improve reporting to the SC on risks to OLAF's independence and on dismissed cases transmitted to national judicial authorities


  OLAF should improve its reporting to the SC on issues falling within the mandate of the SC.

  In particular, OLAF should:






  (a) | Inform the SC whenever actions or omissions of EU or national authorities are likely to jeopardise OLAF's investigative independence and of the measures it intends to put in place in order to improve cooperation with these authorities; |
| --- | --- |

Recommendation 11:

Improve reporting to the SC on risks to OLAF's independence and on dismissed cases transmitted to national judicial authorities

OLAF should improve its reporting to the SC on issues falling within the mandate of the SC.

In particular, OLAF should:

(a)

Inform the SC whenever actions or omissions of EU or national authorities are likely to jeopardise OLAF's investigative independence and of the measures it intends to put in place in order to improve cooperation with these authorities;

| (b) | Inform the SC of all dismissed cases in which information has been transmitted to judicial authorities of Member States, in accordance with Article 17(5) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Inform the SC of all dismissed cases in which information has been transmitted to judicial authorities of Member States, in accordance with Article 17(5) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013.

Final remarks and recommendation

| 27. | During technical meetings with OLAF in 2013, the SC presented some concerns arising from its examination of the ISRU's opinions and from the interviews conducted with OLAF staff, with regard to, inter alia, the time-frame for completing selections, the decreasing number of analysts within the ISRU and the division of tasks between selectors and reviewers. The SC notes that OLAF introduced some significant improvements during the period when this opinion was being drafted. The 2month time limit for selection was removed from the GIP. The internal structure of the ISRU was modified on 1 January 2014: the unit is now divided into 3 sectors (two sectors dedicated to the selection and one dedicated to the review), run by heads of sectors assisting the head of unit. The SC welcomes these improvements. |
| --- | --- |

27.

During technical meetings with OLAF in 2013, the SC presented some concerns arising from its examination of the ISRU's opinions and from the interviews conducted with OLAF staff, with regard to, inter alia, the time-frame for completing selections, the decreasing number of analysts within the ISRU and the division of tasks between selectors and reviewers. The SC notes that OLAF introduced some significant improvements during the period when this opinion was being drafted. The 2month time limit for selection was removed from the GIP. The internal structure of the ISRU was modified on 1 January 2014: the unit is now divided into 3 sectors (two sectors dedicated to the selection and one dedicated to the review), run by heads of sectors assisting the head of unit. The SC welcomes these improvements.

| 28. | Moreover, the SC wishes to underline that it is not its intention to substitute its own judgment on cases examined for that of OLAF, i.e. the SC is not judging whether individual cases should or should not have been opened. However, taking into consideration all of the above conclusions and recommendations and, in particular, the concerns with regard to the sufficiency of human and time resources allocated to the ISRU as well as with regard to compliance with the selection criteria, the SC believes that it would be of benefit for OLAF to carry out an internal evaluation of the activities of the ISRU, aimed at establishing, inter alia, the level of resources needed (number of staff and expertise), the strengths and weaknesses, the ‘error rate’ in evaluated cases (in particular those dismissed) and the relation between selectors and reviewers. |
| --- | --- |

28.

Moreover, the SC wishes to underline that it is not its intention to substitute its own judgment on cases examined for that of OLAF, i.e. the SC is not judging whether individual cases should or should not have been opened. However, taking into consideration all of the above conclusions and recommendations and, in particular, the concerns with regard to the sufficiency of human and time resources allocated to the ISRU as well as with regard to compliance with the selection criteria, the SC believes that it would be of benefit for OLAF to carry out an internal evaluation of the activities of the ISRU, aimed at establishing, inter alia, the level of resources needed (number of staff and expertise), the strengths and weaknesses, the ‘error rate’ in evaluated cases (in particular those dismissed) and the relation between selectors and reviewers.

| Recommendation 12:


  Carry out an internal evaluation of the activities of the ISRU


  OLAF should carry out an internal evaluation of the activities of the ISRU.

  Such evaluation could be done either by OLAF's internal auditor and/or by a special team designated by the Director-General, in close consultation with Directors A and B. |
| --- |

Recommendation 12:

Carry out an internal evaluation of the activities of the ISRU

OLAF should carry out an internal evaluation of the activities of the ISRU.

Such evaluation could be done either by OLAF's internal auditor and/or by a special team designated by the Director-General, in close consultation with Directors A and B.

The SC invites OLAF to consider the recommendations of this opinion and to report to the SC on the follow-up given to them. The SC expects to receive OLAF's report by 15 June 2014.

PART II   ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

| 29. | The SC defined a number of indicators for the evaluation it carried out. To assess the efficiency of the selection function, the SC looked into the resources made available to the ISRU to carry out its tasks and the concrete results achieved in 2012 and 2013. The quality of the opinions was evaluated in the light of their conformity with the selection criteria established by the DG (11), while the transparency of the selection process was scrutinised by looking into the information flow throughout the selection process. |
| --- | --- |

29.

The SC defined a number of indicators for the evaluation it carried out. To assess the efficiency of the selection function, the SC looked into the resources made available to the ISRU to carry out its tasks and the concrete results achieved in 2012 and 2013. The quality of the opinions was evaluated in the light of their conformity with the selection criteria established by the DG (11), while the transparency of the selection process was scrutinised by looking into the information flow throughout the selection process.

(1)   The resources allocated to the selection function

| 30. | Appropriate staff (number and expertise), sufficient time and clear instructions, appropriate technical and IT tools — those elements are critical for a successful selection process. Therefore, the SC has assessed the allocation of these resources to and within the ISRU. |
| --- | --- |

30.

Appropriate staff (number and expertise), sufficient time and clear instructions, appropriate technical and IT tools — those elements are critical for a successful selection process. Therefore, the SC has assessed the allocation of these resources to and within the ISRU.

(1.1)   Human resources

| 31. | Number of staff — The ISRU had 16 selectors in 2012 and 2013 (12), who dealt with an ever increasing amount of incoming information (13). The average number of selections per selector was 74, meaning that an average of 3 working days was spent on one selection (14). An opinion was expressed in the interviews conducted by the SC that the staffing of the ISRU may be insufficient and that the heavy workload may affect the quality of the opinions. The SC does not have the necessary means and information to compare whether the performance of the ISRU is equivalent to that of the investigators who formerly carried out the assessment of the initial information prior to the OLAF reform. The SC believes that OLAF itself could and should perform such an analysis. (15) |
| --- | --- |

31.

Number of staff — The ISRU had 16 selectors in 2012 and 2013 (12), who dealt with an ever increasing amount of incoming information (13). The average number of selections per selector was 74, meaning that an average of 3 working days was spent on one selection (14). An opinion was expressed in the interviews conducted by the SC that the staffing of the ISRU may be insufficient and that the heavy workload may affect the quality of the opinions. The SC does not have the necessary means and information to compare whether the performance of the ISRU is equivalent to that of the investigators who formerly carried out the assessment of the initial information prior to the OLAF reform. The SC believes that OLAF itself could and should perform such an analysis. (15)

| 32. | Technical and investigative expertise — In order to accomplish its mission, the ISRU needs to work within all the areas of OLAF's investigative competence. A wide range of expertise is covered by the staff within the unit, both through their education (economy, law, accounting/finances, biology, political sciences) and their professional experience (public finances inspectors, repression of corruption/fraud specialists, lawyers and magistrates, lecturers, auditors, customs officers, national police force, administrative assistants and secretaries). However, it appears from information provided by OLAF that some of the selectors do not have any investigative experience. |
| --- | --- |

32.

Technical and investigative expertise — In order to accomplish its mission, the ISRU needs to work within all the areas of OLAF's investigative competence. A wide range of expertise is covered by the staff within the unit, both through their education (economy, law, accounting/finances, biology, political sciences) and their professional experience (public finances inspectors, repression of corruption/fraud specialists, lawyers and magistrates, lecturers, auditors, customs officers, national police force, administrative assistants and secretaries). However, it appears from information provided by OLAF that some of the selectors do not have any investigative experience.

| 33. | The SC noted, from the examination of the opinions of the ISRU, that cases appear to be attributed to the selectors on the basis of their personal skills (competencies, language etc.). However, the distribution of cases per sector and per selector indicates that each selector provides opinions not only within their sectors of expertise. Statistical information extracted from the CMS showed that selectors without investigative experience dealt with a high number of cases — mostly dismissed — in very different sectors. Some of the opinions examined clearly reflected the lack of specific or investigative expertise of the selectors, who themselves sometimes acknowledged that they ‘are not specialist [in the matter analysed]’ (16). |
| --- | --- |

33.

The SC noted, from the examination of the opinions of the ISRU, that cases appear to be attributed to the selectors on the basis of their personal skills (competencies, language etc.). However, the distribution of cases per sector and per selector indicates that each selector provides opinions not only within their sectors of expertise. Statistical information extracted from the CMS showed that selectors without investigative experience dealt with a high number of cases — mostly dismissed — in very different sectors. Some of the opinions examined clearly reflected the lack of specific or investigative expertise of the selectors, who themselves sometimes acknowledged that they ‘are not specialist [in the matter analysed]’ (16).

| 34. | Legal expertise — In the opinions analysed, the SC notes the limited use of references to the relevant legal instruments (17). This is a clear indicator that the appropriate legal knowledge is either missing or not being sufficiently applied within the unit. |
| --- | --- |

34.

Legal expertise — In the opinions analysed, the SC notes the limited use of references to the relevant legal instruments (17). This is a clear indicator that the appropriate legal knowledge is either missing or not being sufficiently applied within the unit.

| 35. | Language expertise — The ISRU must be able to handle incoming information potentially drafted in all the 24 EU official languages, which is clearly impossible given the current number of selectors (18). As a result, the lack of language expertise has sometimes prevented the selectors from properly assessing the incoming information (19). |
| --- | --- |

35.

Language expertise — The ISRU must be able to handle incoming information potentially drafted in all the 24 EU official languages, which is clearly impossible given the current number of selectors (18). As a result, the lack of language expertise has sometimes prevented the selectors from properly assessing the incoming information (19).

| 36. | The lack of appropriate language expertise has been supplanted by the attribution of cases for selection to the reviewers (20), based mainly on their language skills (21), leading to an increase in their workload, while they were already in charge of providing opinions to the DG on the legality of OLAF's key investigative activities (22), on the requests to extend the scope of cases (23) and on case closures (24). |
| --- | --- |

36.

The lack of appropriate language expertise has been supplanted by the attribution of cases for selection to the reviewers (20), based mainly on their language skills (21), leading to an increase in their workload, while they were already in charge of providing opinions to the DG on the legality of OLAF's key investigative activities (22), on the requests to extend the scope of cases (23) and on case closures (24).

| 37. | The SC believes that this may represent only a temporary solution of an exceptional nature, more especially considering that the workload of reviewers will likely continue to increase in the future given that the new GIP foresee that, in addition to the opinions provided under the ISIP, they will also need to advise the DG on interviews with witnesses (25) as well as to provide opinions on the requests to split and merge cases (26). |
| --- | --- |

37.

The SC believes that this may represent only a temporary solution of an exceptional nature, more especially considering that the workload of reviewers will likely continue to increase in the future given that the new GIP foresee that, in addition to the opinions provided under the ISIP, they will also need to advise the DG on interviews with witnesses (25) as well as to provide opinions on the requests to split and merge cases (26).

| 38. | Trainings — The SC would like to stress that the lack of previous experience or knowledge need not be an impediment to performing a good selection process, at least for ‘simple’ cases (e.g. cases clearly outside OLAF's competence, the so-called ‘prima facie’ non-cases or where allegations are not substantiated), as long as appropriate training has been provided. The SC was surprised to note that, on the one hand, the training courses followed by the selectors did not cover all the different sectors of OLAF's field of work while, on the other hand, the specialised courses were followed by only a very limited number of selectors (27). |
| --- | --- |

38.

Trainings — The SC would like to stress that the lack of previous experience or knowledge need not be an impediment to performing a good selection process, at least for ‘simple’ cases (e.g. cases clearly outside OLAF's competence, the so-called ‘prima facie’ non-cases or where allegations are not substantiated), as long as appropriate training has been provided. The SC was surprised to note that, on the one hand, the training courses followed by the selectors did not cover all the different sectors of OLAF's field of work while, on the other hand, the specialised courses were followed by only a very limited number of selectors (27).

(1.2)   Time resources

| 39. | The percentage of selections which the selectors completed within the 2-month period foreseen in the ISIP (28) was 76 % (29). Some cases were dismissed (mainly on the grounds of the insufficiency of information), because it was not possible to acquire the necessary information within the fixed time limit imposed (30). At the same time, it appears that some cases which were previously dismissed have been opened later, on the basis of the information provided by the source after the fixed period (31). Moreover, it was ascertained during the interviews conducted by the SC that the assessment of the incoming information was affected by time pressure. These examples show that it was not only impossible, but sometimes also counterproductive to adhere strictly to the 2-month time limit, in the absence of a procedure, in the ISIP, allowing extending this period, in duly justified situations. The SC believes that a flexible approach is recommendable taking into account that sometimes the necessary supplementary information may emerge after the 2-month period or the source of information may take some time to reply to supplementary questions. |
| --- | --- |

39.

The percentage of selections which the selectors completed within the 2-month period foreseen in the ISIP (28) was 76 % (29). Some cases were dismissed (mainly on the grounds of the insufficiency of information), because it was not possible to acquire the necessary information within the fixed time limit imposed (30). At the same time, it appears that some cases which were previously dismissed have been opened later, on the basis of the information provided by the source after the fixed period (31). Moreover, it was ascertained during the interviews conducted by the SC that the assessment of the incoming information was affected by time pressure. These examples show that it was not only impossible, but sometimes also counterproductive to adhere strictly to the 2-month time limit, in the absence of a procedure, in the ISIP, allowing extending this period, in duly justified situations. The SC believes that a flexible approach is recommendable taking into account that sometimes the necessary supplementary information may emerge after the 2-month period or the source of information may take some time to reply to supplementary questions.

| 40. | The SC notes that Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 does not impose a mandatory selection period, except for cases where a Member State concerned or an EU institution, body, office or agency requests that OLAF open an investigation and where a decision whether or not to open an investigation shall be taken within two months of receipt by OLAF of the request, otherwise OLAF shall be deemed to have decided not to open an investigation (32). The new GIP eliminated the overly rigid 2-month time limit, while at the same time maintaining strict deadlines for the Registry to register the incoming information and transmit it to the ISRU (33). |
| --- | --- |

40.

The SC notes that Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 does not impose a mandatory selection period, except for cases where a Member State concerned or an EU institution, body, office or agency requests that OLAF open an investigation and where a decision whether or not to open an investigation shall be taken within two months of receipt by OLAF of the request, otherwise OLAF shall be deemed to have decided not to open an investigation (32). The new GIP eliminated the overly rigid 2-month time limit, while at the same time maintaining strict deadlines for the Registry to register the incoming information and transmit it to the ISRU (33).

(1.3)   Instructions

| 41. | Selectors carry out their tasks on the basis of instructions given by the DG, namely the ISIP (and, since 1 October 2013, the GIP) and of standardised work-forms (34). The SC has analysed these instructions and already provided the DG with a number of comments (35). The SC also makes some recommendations with regard to the work-form ‘Opinion on opening decision’ used by the selectors in Part I of this opinion. |
| --- | --- |

41.

Selectors carry out their tasks on the basis of instructions given by the DG, namely the ISIP (and, since 1 October 2013, the GIP) and of standardised work-forms (34). The SC has analysed these instructions and already provided the DG with a number of comments (35). The SC also makes some recommendations with regard to the work-form ‘Opinion on opening decision’ used by the selectors in Part I of this opinion.

| 42. | During the interviews carried out with OLAF staff it was stated, inter alia, that in all probability many cases are not reported to OLAF due to the lack of a clear procedure for dealing with whistle-blowers. The SC notes that the selectors are instructed to comply with general rules (36), but do not have specific instructions or any formal procedure for dealing with whistle-blowers (e.g. formal contact points, work forms, process for the selectors to contact the OLAF's Legal Advice Unit). As a result, different approaches have sometimes been noted amongst the selectors (37). While taking note of the increase over the past few years, of the number of cases where the source of information was a whistle-blower (figure 2), the SC believes that the adoption of clear and detailed guidelines on how to deal with them would be helpful for the selectors. |
| --- | --- |

42.

During the interviews carried out with OLAF staff it was stated, inter alia, that in all probability many cases are not reported to OLAF due to the lack of a clear procedure for dealing with whistle-blowers. The SC notes that the selectors are instructed to comply with general rules (36), but do not have specific instructions or any formal procedure for dealing with whistle-blowers (e.g. formal contact points, work forms, process for the selectors to contact the OLAF's Legal Advice Unit). As a result, different approaches have sometimes been noted amongst the selectors (37). While taking note of the increase over the past few years, of the number of cases where the source of information was a whistle-blower (figure 2), the SC believes that the adoption of clear and detailed guidelines on how to deal with them would be helpful for the selectors.

Figure 2

(1.4)   IT/technical resources

| 43. | Successful assessment of incoming information depends to a great extent on IT/technical tools available to the ISRU which is able to access various internal and external databases. The SC noted that, for the most part, the opinions make clear mention of the consultation of databases and of the results of the research carried out by the selectors. |
| --- | --- |

43.

Successful assessment of incoming information depends to a great extent on IT/technical tools available to the ISRU which is able to access various internal and external databases. The SC noted that, for the most part, the opinions make clear mention of the consultation of databases and of the results of the research carried out by the selectors.

| 44. | The IT tools made available to the public to report fraud are also important. One of them is the OLAF Fraud Notification System (FNS), a web-based information system that may be used to submit information to OLAF, and through which the selectors may communicate with the source of information (38). On several occasions, the opinions of the ISRU mention that the informants have tried to send documents through the FNS, but these documents have not been received because of the restrictions imposed by the FNS, which blocks the upload of overly large files or limits the number of characters that can be used, without, however, informing the sender. |
| --- | --- |

44.

The IT tools made available to the public to report fraud are also important. One of them is the OLAF Fraud Notification System (FNS), a web-based information system that may be used to submit information to OLAF, and through which the selectors may communicate with the source of information (38). On several occasions, the opinions of the ISRU mention that the informants have tried to send documents through the FNS, but these documents have not been received because of the restrictions imposed by the FNS, which blocks the upload of overly large files or limits the number of characters that can be used, without, however, informing the sender.

(2)   The selection process: compliance with the selection criteria

| 45. | The selection process consists of a step-by-step application of three selection criteria: OLAF's competency to act, the sufficiency of information to open an investigation or coordination case and the Investigative Policy Priorities (IPPs) established by the DG (39). If the first selection criterion (or the first and second selection criteria) is not fulfilled, the case is dismissed and the information assessed no further (40). Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of cases dismissed and opened by sector. |
| --- | --- |

45.

The selection process consists of a step-by-step application of three selection criteria: OLAF's competency to act, the sufficiency of information to open an investigation or coordination case and the Investigative Policy Priorities (IPPs) established by the DG (39). If the first selection criterion (or the first and second selection criteria) is not fulfilled, the case is dismissed and the information assessed no further (40). Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of cases dismissed and opened by sector.

Figure 3

Distribution of cases dismissed by sector

Figure 4

Distribution of cases opened by sector

| 46. | The ISIP and the IPPs contain instructions on how to apply each of the selection criteria. The SC's review of the opinions was thus aimed at assessing their conformity with these instructions. |
| --- | --- |

46.

The ISIP and the IPPs contain instructions on how to apply each of the selection criteria. The SC's review of the opinions was thus aimed at assessing their conformity with these instructions.

(2.1)   OLAF's competency to act

| ISIP, Art. 5.4: In assessing whether OLAF is competent to act, consideration must be given to relevant EU Regulations, Decisions, Interinstitutional Agreements and other legal instruments relating to the protection of the financial and other interests of the EU
   (41). |
| --- |

ISIP, Art. 5.4: In assessing whether OLAF is competent to act, consideration must be given to relevant EU Regulations, Decisions, Interinstitutional Agreements and other legal instruments relating to the protection of the financial and other interests of the EU
   (41).

| 47. | The SC notes that the lack of OLAF's competence to act, being the reason given for the dismissal of 15 % of the cases (figure 5), was in general well explained (42). On the other hand, little consideration was given to the relevant legal instruments in those cases where OLAF was considered to be competent to act (43). Moreover, the assessment of OLAF's competency to act is not sufficiently substantiated: in many opinions there is a general and unsubstantiated reference to a potential impact on the EU financial interests or to the fact that EU funds were involved (44); in some opinions it is just stated ‘yes’ in the parts referring to the potential impact on the EU financial interests/potentially serious matter relating to the discharge of professional duties (45); other, very few, opinions only mention that ‘OLAF is competent’ without giving any further explanation (46). |
| --- | --- |

47.

The SC notes that the lack of OLAF's competence to act, being the reason given for the dismissal of 15 % of the cases (figure 5), was in general well explained (42). On the other hand, little consideration was given to the relevant legal instruments in those cases where OLAF was considered to be competent to act (43). Moreover, the assessment of OLAF's competency to act is not sufficiently substantiated: in many opinions there is a general and unsubstantiated reference to a potential impact on the EU financial interests or to the fact that EU funds were involved (44); in some opinions it is just stated ‘yes’ in the parts referring to the potential impact on the EU financial interests/potentially serious matter relating to the discharge of professional duties (45); other, very few, opinions only mention that ‘OLAF is competent’ without giving any further explanation (46).

| 48. | In general, the SC notes that the quality of the assessments varies according to selectors and their experience in specific sectors: opinions concerning customs, cigarettes and EU staff are comprehensive and generally contain a clear explanation as to the irregularity arising from the allegations, the way it impacts the EU budget and the amount at stake (when determined). |
| --- | --- |

48.

In general, the SC notes that the quality of the assessments varies according to selectors and their experience in specific sectors: opinions concerning customs, cigarettes and EU staff are comprehensive and generally contain a clear explanation as to the irregularity arising from the allegations, the way it impacts the EU budget and the amount at stake (when determined).

| 49. | The SC also notes that the work-form ‘Opinion on opening decision’ used by the selectors includes two different options for referring to the potential impact on the EU financial interests and to possibly serious matters relating to the discharge of professional duties: one in the ‘summary’ part of the work-form, where the selectors need to tick the relevant boxes, and one in the body of the opinion (part 3 of the work-form), where the selectors need to assess in concreto OLAF's competency to act. This double option might have created some confusion amongst the selectors, since some of them seem to assume that ticking the boxes in the ‘summary’ part exempts them from carrying out a concrete analysis of OLAF's competency to act in Part 3 of the opinion, which should not be the case. |
| --- | --- |

49.

The SC also notes that the work-form ‘Opinion on opening decision’ used by the selectors includes two different options for referring to the potential impact on the EU financial interests and to possibly serious matters relating to the discharge of professional duties: one in the ‘summary’ part of the work-form, where the selectors need to tick the relevant boxes, and one in the body of the opinion (part 3 of the work-form), where the selectors need to assess in concreto OLAF's competency to act. This double option might have created some confusion amongst the selectors, since some of them seem to assume that ticking the boxes in the ‘summary’ part exempts them from carrying out a concrete analysis of OLAF's competency to act in Part 3 of the opinion, which should not be the case.

(2.2)   Sufficiency of information

| ISIP, Art. 5.4: In evaluating whether the information is sufficient to open an investigation or coordination case, consideration must be given to the reliability of the source and the credibility of the allegations. In addition, all information collected during the selection process must be taken into account when justifying the opening of an investigation or coordination case
   (47). |
| --- |

ISIP, Art. 5.4: In evaluating whether the information is sufficient to open an investigation or coordination case, consideration must be given to the reliability of the source and the credibility of the allegations. In addition, all information collected during the selection process must be taken into account when justifying the opening of an investigation or coordination case
   (47).

| 50. | The insufficiency of information was the main reason for dismissing cases (figure 5). The SC therefore paid particular attention to the grounds on which the selectors based their conclusions. |
| --- | --- |

50.

The insufficiency of information was the main reason for dismissing cases (figure 5). The SC therefore paid particular attention to the grounds on which the selectors based their conclusions.

Figure 5

Reasons for dismissing cases

| 51. | The SC identified opinions where the assessment of the sufficiency of the information (reliability of the source and credibility of the allegations) is unsubstantiated (48), incomplete (49) or inconsistent (50). Equally, little consideration was given to a third parameter emerging from the EU case-law (sufficiency of suspicions), which was rather rarely used, mainly because it was not mentioned in the ISIP or in the workform used by the selectors (51). Moreover, it seems to have various meanings for the selectors: most of the time it was considered that the information was insufficient due to lack of ‘clear indications of fraud’ or ‘absence of fraud elements’ or because there was ‘no concrete information as regards possible irregularities or fraud’ (52); in other cases the (in)sufficiency of suspicions was determined by the quality of the information at OLAF's disposal (53), sometimes the ‘seriousness of the allegations’ was also an element taken into consideration (54). Bearing in mind the existing difference between the ‘seriousness of the allegations’ and the ‘seriousness of suspicions’, the SC would point out that this latter parameter should not have been considered as optional, since the EU case-law has established the ‘sufficiently serious suspicion’ as a precondition for the opening of an investigation (55). The new Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 has now explicitly incorporated this requirement (56) and this change is reflected in an amended work-form accompanying the new GIP. The SC welcomes this improvement. |
| --- | --- |

51.

The SC identified opinions where the assessment of the sufficiency of the information (reliability of the source and credibility of the allegations) is unsubstantiated (48), incomplete (49) or inconsistent (50). Equally, little consideration was given to a third parameter emerging from the EU case-law (sufficiency of suspicions), which was rather rarely used, mainly because it was not mentioned in the ISIP or in the workform used by the selectors (51). Moreover, it seems to have various meanings for the selectors: most of the time it was considered that the information was insufficient due to lack of ‘clear indications of fraud’ or ‘absence of fraud elements’ or because there was ‘no concrete information as regards possible irregularities or fraud’ (52); in other cases the (in)sufficiency of suspicions was determined by the quality of the information at OLAF's disposal (53), sometimes the ‘seriousness of the allegations’ was also an element taken into consideration (54). Bearing in mind the existing difference between the ‘seriousness of the allegations’ and the ‘seriousness of suspicions’, the SC would point out that this latter parameter should not have been considered as optional, since the EU case-law has established the ‘sufficiently serious suspicion’ as a precondition for the opening of an investigation (55). The new Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 has now explicitly incorporated this requirement (56) and this change is reflected in an amended work-form accompanying the new GIP. The SC welcomes this improvement.

| 52. | The SC believes that the deficiencies noted above could be explained, at least partially, by the fact that neither the ISIP nor any other internal document (57) provides the selectors with precise indicators for implementing this criterion, namely concrete situations when a source of information can be considered reliable (or not), when the allegations put forward are credible (or not) or when there are sufficient suspicions of fraud or irregularities (or not). Appreciation of these elements depends, therefore, very much on the personal approach of each selector, based on their investigative experience and specialised knowledge. |
| --- | --- |

52.

The SC believes that the deficiencies noted above could be explained, at least partially, by the fact that neither the ISIP nor any other internal document (57) provides the selectors with precise indicators for implementing this criterion, namely concrete situations when a source of information can be considered reliable (or not), when the allegations put forward are credible (or not) or when there are sufficient suspicions of fraud or irregularities (or not). Appreciation of these elements depends, therefore, very much on the personal approach of each selector, based on their investigative experience and specialised knowledge.

| 53. | The SC was, however, able to identify a number of concrete indicators used in some of the opinions. The reliability of the source was evaluated by using indicators such as (i) the verifiability of the source (anonymous or not), (ii) the type of the source (natural person; EU institution, body, office, agency or a Member State or third country authority; OLAF itself), (iii) the (in)direct knowledge of or connection with the matter reported to OLAF, (iv) the possibility for OLAF to contact the source to request further information (v) the degree of cooperation between the source and OLAF, (vi) the trustworthiness of the source, (vii) the motivation of the source and potential degree of subjectivism. As to the assessment of the credibility of the allegations, their appreciation was based on indicators such as (i) the quality of the initial information provided to OLAF (58), (ii) its verifiability (59), (iii) the context. |
| --- | --- |

53.

The SC was, however, able to identify a number of concrete indicators used in some of the opinions. The reliability of the source was evaluated by using indicators such as (i) the verifiability of the source (anonymous or not), (ii) the type of the source (natural person; EU institution, body, office, agency or a Member State or third country authority; OLAF itself), (iii) the (in)direct knowledge of or connection with the matter reported to OLAF, (iv) the possibility for OLAF to contact the source to request further information (v) the degree of cooperation between the source and OLAF, (vi) the trustworthiness of the source, (vii) the motivation of the source and potential degree of subjectivism. As to the assessment of the credibility of the allegations, their appreciation was based on indicators such as (i) the quality of the initial information provided to OLAF (58), (ii) its verifiability (59), (iii) the context.

| 54. | On the other hand, the SC identified a number of objective reasons explaining the insufficiency of information gathered during the selection process, such as (i) the imprecision of the initial information, which did not allow further research; (ii) technical problems with the FNS preventing the reception of documents; (iii) time pressure of the 2-month period for selection, which did not allow in-depth searches for additional information; (iv) lack of response from stakeholders (EU, national or third countries authorities, sources of information) or even obstruction on their part (60). The SC regrets that, in the latter case, such obstruction was not reported to it. |
| --- | --- |

54.

On the other hand, the SC identified a number of objective reasons explaining the insufficiency of information gathered during the selection process, such as (i) the imprecision of the initial information, which did not allow further research; (ii) technical problems with the FNS preventing the reception of documents; (iii) time pressure of the 2-month period for selection, which did not allow in-depth searches for additional information; (iv) lack of response from stakeholders (EU, national or third countries authorities, sources of information) or even obstruction on their part (60). The SC regrets that, in the latter case, such obstruction was not reported to it.

(2.3)   Investigation Policy Priorities

| ISIP, Art. 5.4: The IPP set out the criteria to be applied in determining whether information falls within an established investigative priority
   (61). |
| --- |

ISIP, Art. 5.4: The IPP set out the criteria to be applied in determining whether information falls within an established investigative priority
   (61).

| 55. | Each of the investigation policy priorities established by the DG — proportionality, efficient use of investigative resources, subsidiarity/added value and special policy objectives/criteria for 2012/2013 — can be assessed on the basis of the concrete and measurable indicators which are clearly indicated in the IPPs. The SC's review is aimed at assessing the way in which the selectors applied those indicators. (62) |
| --- | --- |

55.

Each of the investigation policy priorities established by the DG — proportionality, efficient use of investigative resources, subsidiarity/added value and special policy objectives/criteria for 2012/2013 — can be assessed on the basis of the concrete and measurable indicators which are clearly indicated in the IPPs. The SC's review is aimed at assessing the way in which the selectors applied those indicators. (62)

(2.3.1)   Proportionality

| IPPs: OLAF should focus on cases where it can expect a fair return for its efforts. The expected results need to be balanced against the human and material resources that will be needed to bring a case to a successful conclusion.


  This entails formulating a reasonable forecast of the manpower required and other foreseeable costs (e.g. due to missions) in connection with the investigation while also taking into account:







  — | Likelihood of financial recovery |
| --- | --- |

IPPs: OLAF should focus on cases where it can expect a fair return for its efforts. The expected results need to be balanced against the human and material resources that will be needed to bring a case to a successful conclusion.

This entails formulating a reasonable forecast of the manpower required and other foreseeable costs (e.g. due to missions) in connection with the investigation while also taking into account:

—

Likelihood of financial recovery

| — | Likelihood of prosecution — for example, whether there is sufficient time to investigate before time-barring and whether there are reasons prima facie to suspect a criminal intent |
| --- | --- |

—

Likelihood of prosecution — for example, whether there is sufficient time to investigate before time-barring and whether there are reasons prima facie to suspect a criminal intent

| — | Possible high deterrent value: for example action is taken in a high value area where little action has been taken before |
| --- | --- |

—

Possible high deterrent value: for example action is taken in a high value area where little action has been taken before

| 56. | In general terms, the proportionality principle requires that there be a reasonable relationship between an objective to be achieved and the means used to achieve it. Applied to OLAF's decisions, these require an appropriate equilibrium between, on the one hand, the investigative means to be deployed by OLAF if a decision to open an investigation or coordination case is taken and, on the other, the results that are expected. This approach is well reflected in the IPPs, which provide the selectors with clear indications as to the elements that need to be weighed against each other, resulting in a ‘fair return for [OLAF's] efforts’. |
| --- | --- |

56.

In general terms, the proportionality principle requires that there be a reasonable relationship between an objective to be achieved and the means used to achieve it. Applied to OLAF's decisions, these require an appropriate equilibrium between, on the one hand, the investigative means to be deployed by OLAF if a decision to open an investigation or coordination case is taken and, on the other, the results that are expected. This approach is well reflected in the IPPs, which provide the selectors with clear indications as to the elements that need to be weighed against each other, resulting in a ‘fair return for [OLAF's] efforts’.

| 57. | The SC notes however that there are a limited number of cases where the indicators for proportionality, as mentioned in the IPPs (likelihood of recovery and of prosecution, possible deterrent value) are clearly indicated and where a balance is struck between the number and type/complexity of the investigative activities needed to be carried out and the expected amount to be recovered/the likelihood of action to be taken by a competent authority, or between the relatively low financial impact of the alleged irregularities and the workload of the investigative unit (63). However, the indicators contained in the IPPs were not rigorously applied in some cases: investigations were opened on the basis of only the two first selection criteria (64); the proportionality test consisted of unsubstantiated statements (65) or in remarks with regard to a different policy criteria (66); reference to a financial cost/benefit ratio of an investigation to be carried out was incomplete (67). |
| --- | --- |

57.

The SC notes however that there are a limited number of cases where the indicators for proportionality, as mentioned in the IPPs (likelihood of recovery and of prosecution, possible deterrent value) are clearly indicated and where a balance is struck between the number and type/complexity of the investigative activities needed to be carried out and the expected amount to be recovered/the likelihood of action to be taken by a competent authority, or between the relatively low financial impact of the alleged irregularities and the workload of the investigative unit (63). However, the indicators contained in the IPPs were not rigorously applied in some cases: investigations were opened on the basis of only the two first selection criteria (64); the proportionality test consisted of unsubstantiated statements (65) or in remarks with regard to a different policy criteria (66); reference to a financial cost/benefit ratio of an investigation to be carried out was incomplete (67).

(2.3.2)   Efficient use of investigative resources

| IPPs: An efficient use of resources means inter alia that once opened, investigations should be dealt expeditiously.


  This will entail checking whether:







  — | The workload of the relevant Unit will permit to begin investigative activities soon after the case has been opened |
| --- | --- |

IPPs: An efficient use of resources means inter alia that once opened, investigations should be dealt expeditiously.

This will entail checking whether:

—

The workload of the relevant Unit will permit to begin investigative activities soon after the case has been opened

| — | The workload of the relevant unit will permit to carry out work continuously as required by Regulation (EC) No 1073/99 |
| --- | --- |

—

The workload of the relevant unit will permit to carry out work continuously as required by Regulation (EC) No 1073/99

| — | Investigations underway and whose priority is higher are not slowed down |
| --- | --- |

—

Investigations underway and whose priority is higher are not slowed down

| — | Expertise required in order to carry out the investigation is available (language/sectoral/technical/legal knowledge) |
| --- | --- |

—

Expertise required in order to carry out the investigation is available (language/sectoral/technical/legal knowledge)

| 58. | The SC notes that the evaluation of the workload of the investigation units is often missing (68), unsubstantiated (69), inconsistent (70), or makes reference to indicators such as proportionality or the added value of OLAF's action (71). When verification in concreto of the workload of the investigation unit is carried out, the selectors mention the number of cases per unit and the number of investigators per unit, without making any estimate as to the size of the workload of the investigation unit (72). In the few cases where such an estimate was made, the heavy workload of the investigators was a reason for dismissing them, but always used in conjunction with subsidiarity reasons (73). |
| --- | --- |

58.

The SC notes that the evaluation of the workload of the investigation units is often missing (68), unsubstantiated (69), inconsistent (70), or makes reference to indicators such as proportionality or the added value of OLAF's action (71). When verification in concreto of the workload of the investigation unit is carried out, the selectors mention the number of cases per unit and the number of investigators per unit, without making any estimate as to the size of the workload of the investigation unit (72). In the few cases where such an estimate was made, the heavy workload of the investigators was a reason for dismissing them, but always used in conjunction with subsidiarity reasons (73).

| 59. | The number of opinions making reference to the possibility to carry out activities continuously and without slowing-down on-going or priority investigations is also very limited (74), while the availability of expertise within a specific unit seems to be better evaluated (75). |
| --- | --- |

59.

The number of opinions making reference to the possibility to carry out activities continuously and without slowing-down on-going or priority investigations is also very limited (74), while the availability of expertise within a specific unit seems to be better evaluated (75).

| 60. | Few opinions make explicit reference to an internal consultation as to the availability of the human resources and/or expertise within the investigation units (76). From the interviews conducted by the SC it is also clear that the investigation units are only rarely consulted regarding the resources situation. |
| --- | --- |

60.

Few opinions make explicit reference to an internal consultation as to the availability of the human resources and/or expertise within the investigation units (76). From the interviews conducted by the SC it is also clear that the investigation units are only rarely consulted regarding the resources situation.

(2.3.3)   Subsidiarity/added value

| IPPs: OLAF will prioritise cases where it is the only authority with competence in a specific situation or when it can clearly add value to the actions of others.


  This will entail checking whether:







  — | OLAF has sole competence (in certain matters in relation to EU staff) or whether there is an identifiable authority that can act |
| --- | --- |

IPPs: OLAF will prioritise cases where it is the only authority with competence in a specific situation or when it can clearly add value to the actions of others.

This will entail checking whether:

—

OLAF has sole competence (in certain matters in relation to EU staff) or whether there is an identifiable authority that can act

| — | One or several authorities have requested the assistance of OLAF in a complex case and OLAF is therefore in a position to add value |
| --- | --- |

—

One or several authorities have requested the assistance of OLAF in a complex case and OLAF is therefore in a position to add value

| — | An OLAF investigation could add value in terms of recovery, prosecution or deterrence to the control activities already carried out by other EU or national bodies |
| --- | --- |

—

An OLAF investigation could add value in terms of recovery, prosecution or deterrence to the control activities already carried out by other EU or national bodies

| 61. | The SC notes that the criterion of subsidiarity/added value represents the main reason used for advising the dismissal of a case on the grounds outlined in the IPPs, taken alone or combined with other reasons (77). Apart from a small number of opinions giving it no consideration (78) or unsubstantiated (79), the reasons outlined as to why an OLAF action would not bring any added value in terms of recovery, prosecution or deterrence to the control activities carried out by other EU or national bodies, which are better placed to act, are generally well explained (80). |
| --- | --- |

61.

The SC notes that the criterion of subsidiarity/added value represents the main reason used for advising the dismissal of a case on the grounds outlined in the IPPs, taken alone or combined with other reasons (77). Apart from a small number of opinions giving it no consideration (78) or unsubstantiated (79), the reasons outlined as to why an OLAF action would not bring any added value in terms of recovery, prosecution or deterrence to the control activities carried out by other EU or national bodies, which are better placed to act, are generally well explained (80).

| 62. | The SC received information, from other Directorates-General of the Commission, pointing out that OLAF is dismissing cases, while at the same time forwarding them for action to those Directorates without, however, checking whether they had the necessary competence and powers to act. The SC notes with concern that the Directorates-General of the Commission, which have been considered by OLAF to be better placed to act and thus receive from OLAF information on dismissed cases, are not required to report back to OLAF on actions taken (81). |
| --- | --- |

62.

The SC received information, from other Directorates-General of the Commission, pointing out that OLAF is dismissing cases, while at the same time forwarding them for action to those Directorates without, however, checking whether they had the necessary competence and powers to act. The SC notes with concern that the Directorates-General of the Commission, which have been considered by OLAF to be better placed to act and thus receive from OLAF information on dismissed cases, are not required to report back to OLAF on actions taken (81).

| 63. | Moreover, the SC notes that cases concerning Members of the European Parliament (EP), where OLAF has clearly competence to act (82) were dismissed on the grounds of subsidiarity, although it was stated that in similar cases the EP did not report back to OLAF, despite an explicit request, on the action taken with regard to the information sent by OLAF (83). The SC would draw attention to the Practical Arrangements recently agreed between the EP and OLAF (84) which do not include such situations on the list of activities which usually/probably do not lead to serious situations requiring OLAF investigations and where OLAF is presumed not to intend to open an investigation or where there is a high probability that OLAF will not open an investigation (85). |
| --- | --- |

63.

Moreover, the SC notes that cases concerning Members of the European Parliament (EP), where OLAF has clearly competence to act (82) were dismissed on the grounds of subsidiarity, although it was stated that in similar cases the EP did not report back to OLAF, despite an explicit request, on the action taken with regard to the information sent by OLAF (83). The SC would draw attention to the Practical Arrangements recently agreed between the EP and OLAF (84) which do not include such situations on the list of activities which usually/probably do not lead to serious situations requiring OLAF investigations and where OLAF is presumed not to intend to open an investigation or where there is a high probability that OLAF will not open an investigation (85).

(2.3.4)   Special policy objectives/criteria

| 64. | According to the IPPs, OLAF will focus its investigative activity on sectors considered to be a priority and also on those cases where financial indicators determine the seriousness of fraud (86). When it comes to the prioritised sectors, the SC noted that the reference to them was quite rare (87). Similarly, the financial indicators were not always used: in some cases there is no reference at all, even when the financial impact is known (88). When they are referred to, mainly in sectors such as EU staff or structural funds, they are used either to dismiss cases on the grounds that the financial impact was non-existent or too low, taken alone or in conjunction with other IPPs, or to recommend the opening of an investigation or coordination case. The SC noted that the financial indicators were not always a determining factor when proposing to dismiss or open a case: when the financial indicators correspond to the IPPs, the case may, however, be dismissed on subsidiarity/added value grounds (89) or, conversely, when a case does not fall within the special policy objectives it may however be opened as an investigation if the other selection criteria are fulfilled (90). |
| --- | --- |

64.

According to the IPPs, OLAF will focus its investigative activity on sectors considered to be a priority and also on those cases where financial indicators determine the seriousness of fraud (86). When it comes to the prioritised sectors, the SC noted that the reference to them was quite rare (87). Similarly, the financial indicators were not always used: in some cases there is no reference at all, even when the financial impact is known (88). When they are referred to, mainly in sectors such as EU staff or structural funds, they are used either to dismiss cases on the grounds that the financial impact was non-existent or too low, taken alone or in conjunction with other IPPs, or to recommend the opening of an investigation or coordination case. The SC noted that the financial indicators were not always a determining factor when proposing to dismiss or open a case: when the financial indicators correspond to the IPPs, the case may, however, be dismissed on subsidiarity/added value grounds (89) or, conversely, when a case does not fall within the special policy objectives it may however be opened as an investigation if the other selection criteria are fulfilled (90).

| 65. | As a general remark, the SC would point out that the financial indicators should not be used as thresholds for justifying the dismissal or opening of cases, but rather as an indicator for estimating or measuring the seriousness of the fraud risk involved (proportionality test) (91). |
| --- | --- |

65.

As a general remark, the SC would point out that the financial indicators should not be used as thresholds for justifying the dismissal or opening of cases, but rather as an indicator for estimating or measuring the seriousness of the fraud risk involved (proportionality test) (91).

(3)   The information flow during the selection process

| 66. | A centralised system where the number of OLAF staff aware of specific incoming information is very limited (92) may lead, in the SC's opinion, to a lack of transparency and of accountability in the decision-making process, especially with regard to the cases dismissed. It should be balanced by a procedure for providing the appropriate information to the relevant EU or national authorities with which OLAF shares competence in the antifraud fight, to the investigation directorates and also to the sources providing OLAF with the initial information. The SC therefore examined the transparency of the selection process in the light of these three information-sharing requirements. |
| --- | --- |

66.

A centralised system where the number of OLAF staff aware of specific incoming information is very limited (92) may lead, in the SC's opinion, to a lack of transparency and of accountability in the decision-making process, especially with regard to the cases dismissed. It should be balanced by a procedure for providing the appropriate information to the relevant EU or national authorities with which OLAF shares competence in the antifraud fight, to the investigation directorates and also to the sources providing OLAF with the initial information. The SC therefore examined the transparency of the selection process in the light of these three information-sharing requirements.

(3.1)   Information provided to the competent EU or Member States' authorities

| 67. | Whenever an EU or national authority is better placed to deal with a case, OLAF should transfer it there. Such follow-up is necessary for every case where a sufficient suspicion of fraud has been established, but where OLAF decides not to open an investigation. Otherwise, not only would areas of impunity be created, but the transparency and coherence of the selection process would also be compromised. |
| --- | --- |

67.

Whenever an EU or national authority is better placed to deal with a case, OLAF should transfer it there. Such follow-up is necessary for every case where a sufficient suspicion of fraud has been established, but where OLAF decides not to open an investigation. Otherwise, not only would areas of impunity be created, but the transparency and coherence of the selection process would also be compromised.

| 68. | Opinions advising dismissal of a case on the grounds of subsidiarity/added value usually indicate that information should be forwarded to the authority considered better placed to act (93). However, it is not always clearly stated in the ‘conclusions’ part of the opinion, but can sometimes only be deduced from other sections. |
| --- | --- |

68.

Opinions advising dismissal of a case on the grounds of subsidiarity/added value usually indicate that information should be forwarded to the authority considered better placed to act (93). However, it is not always clearly stated in the ‘conclusions’ part of the opinion, but can sometimes only be deduced from other sections.

| 69. | Another important aspect that OLAF needs to take into account when transferring information to a competent authority is the necessity to protect the identity of the source, in particular of whistle-blowers. The SC notes the very limited number of opinions recommending non-disclosure of the identity of the source to those authorities, sometimes upon request by the source itself (94). |
| --- | --- |

69.

Another important aspect that OLAF needs to take into account when transferring information to a competent authority is the necessity to protect the identity of the source, in particular of whistle-blowers. The SC notes the very limited number of opinions recommending non-disclosure of the identity of the source to those authorities, sometimes upon request by the source itself (94).

(3.2)   Information provided to the investigation directorates

| 70. | During the interviews with OLAF staff, the lack of transfer of information on dismissed cases to the investigation units was described as inhibiting the exchange of knowledge and experience. On the other hand, the SC was informed by OLAF notes (95) that there was a regular contact between the ISRU and the investigation units during the selection phase, principally in order to check the availability of investigative resources in a specific unit, or connections between new incoming information and already existing cases. |
| --- | --- |

70.

During the interviews with OLAF staff, the lack of transfer of information on dismissed cases to the investigation units was described as inhibiting the exchange of knowledge and experience. On the other hand, the SC was informed by OLAF notes (95) that there was a regular contact between the ISRU and the investigation units during the selection phase, principally in order to check the availability of investigative resources in a specific unit, or connections between new incoming information and already existing cases.

| 71. | However, the opinions reviewed by the SC do not reflect regular contacts. Few opinions make explicit reference to an internal consultation (96) or to the forwarding of information on a dismissed case of possible interest for an on-going investigation to the investigator in charge (97). This lack of consultation is even more evident in a few other cases where the selectors faced difficulties in carrying out searches or assessing information drafted in a language with which they were not familiar and where the investigation units (possessing the relevant language expertise) were never consulted (98), as well as in instances where investigation/coordination cases similar to or connected with the information being assessed were identified (99). That situation could raise problems in cases where it is recommended to send the information under assessment to a competent national judicial authority but not to the investigation unit dealing with the connected case, or to the SC (100). |
| --- | --- |

71.

However, the opinions reviewed by the SC do not reflect regular contacts. Few opinions make explicit reference to an internal consultation (96) or to the forwarding of information on a dismissed case of possible interest for an on-going investigation to the investigator in charge (97). This lack of consultation is even more evident in a few other cases where the selectors faced difficulties in carrying out searches or assessing information drafted in a language with which they were not familiar and where the investigation units (possessing the relevant language expertise) were never consulted (98), as well as in instances where investigation/coordination cases similar to or connected with the information being assessed were identified (99). That situation could raise problems in cases where it is recommended to send the information under assessment to a competent national judicial authority but not to the investigation unit dealing with the connected case, or to the SC (100).

(3.3)   Information provided to the source of information

| 72. | The SC notes that the opinions of the ISRU do not systematically propose informing the source of information of OLAF's decisions (101). While this is understandable with regard to decisions to open investigation/coordination cases (for confidentiality reasons) (102), it may be questionable with regard to dismissed cases. |
| --- | --- |

72.

The SC notes that the opinions of the ISRU do not systematically propose informing the source of information of OLAF's decisions (101). While this is understandable with regard to decisions to open investigation/coordination cases (for confidentiality reasons) (102), it may be questionable with regard to dismissed cases.

Adopted in Brussels, on 12 March 2014

For the Supervisory Committee

Johan DENOLF

Chairman

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(1)  During the selection stage, the ISRU is in charge of processing the incoming information and provides the DG with opinions on the opening or dismissal of cases; during the investigation stage, it provides opinions on the necessity and legality of the main investigative activities requiring prior authorisation by the DG; before the closure of an investigation or coordination case, the ISRU reviews the final report and recommendations.

1

(2)  Article 5 of the ISIP.

2

(3)  Valid until 30 September 2013.

3

(4)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1).

4

(5)  Selecting one in three cases created between 1.9.2012 and 31.3.2013 came to a total of 237 cases of which 11 were found by OLAF to be duplicates of pre-existing cases = 226 opinions; all opinions delivered for the month of May 2013 = 68 opinions.

5

(6)  It contains, inter alia, general guidelines for selection and review.

6

(7)  Covering two periods of reference: February 2012 to December 2012 and January 2013 to November 2013.

7

(8)  The ‘Starter Kit’.

8

(9)  See the Draft recommendation of the European Ombudsman in her inquiry into complaint 1183/2012/MMN against OLAF, 15 November 2013, paragraph 28.

9

(10)  See Article 11(7) of the former Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 and Article 17(5) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013.

10

(11)  The three selection criteria are: OLAF's competency to act, the sufficiency of information to open an investigation or coordination case and the Investigative Policy Priorities.

11

(12)  Ares(2013)3357296.

12

(13)  The information of possible investigative interest received by OLAF was defined by the ISIP as ‘all information received by OLAF or information gathered on OLAF's own initiative, that could be considered for the opening of an investigation or coordination case and which must be submitted to the selection procedure for analysis’. In 2012, OLAF received 1,264 incoming information items which represented an increase of 21 % compared to 2011 (Source: OLAF 2012 Activity Report, page 13). The number of incoming information items also slightly increased in 2013 compared to 2012: OLAF received 1 156 incoming information items from February 2012 to December 2012, and 1 222 items from January 2013 to December 2013. Source: Ares(2013)3357296.

13

all information received by OLAF or information gathered on OLAF's own initiative, that could be considered for the opening of an investigation or coordination case and which must be submitted to the selection procedure for analysis

(14)  According to statistics provided by OLAF, a selector dealt with, on average, 72 cases from February 2012 to December 2012 (221 working days) and 76 from January 2013 to December 2013. Source: Ares(2013)3357296.

14

(15)  Prior to the reform of OLAF, incoming information was assessed by the investigators allocated to the 8 investigation units. In 2010, the investigation units counted 152 staff members (including Heads of Unit and secretaries). Source: Special Report No 2/2011 of the European Court of Auditors, Annex II.

15

(16)  1 opinion.

16

(17)  See Part II.2 of this opinion.

17

(18)  According to the 2012 Activity Report of the ISRU, this unit was comprised of 11 different nationalities and was able to deal with information in 16 languages.

18

(19)  At least in 2 opinions.

19

(20)  The unit had 7 reviewers. A statistical search in the CMS showed an average of 60 cases dismissed per reviewer (2012 and 2013 cases).

20

(21)  71 out of 293 opinions analysed were drafted by the reviewers.

21

(22)  Article 12.2 of the ISIP. In 2012 OLAF performed 97 on-the-spot checks and inspections, 66 interviews with persons concerned, 38 investigative missions to third countries, 11 inspections of EU premises, 10 digital forensic examinations (Source: OLAF 2012 Activity Report, page 21). These activities were authorised by the DG, on the basis of opinions provided by the reviewers of the ISRU.

22

(23)  Article 12.3 of the ISIP. The SC has no statistical information as to the number of opinions provided by the ISRU in this respect.

23

(24)  465 investigation and coordination cases were closed by OLAF in 2012 (Source: OLAF 2012 Activity Report, page 18).

24

(25)  Article 11.2, a) combined with Article 12.2 of the GIP. In 2012, OLAF carried out 108 interviews with witnesses (Source: OLAF 2012 Activity Report, page 21).

25

(26)  Article 12.4 of the GIP.

26

(27)  In January 2012, training for selectors was provided comprising several modules. Module 1 was followed by three participants; module 2 was followed by twelve participants; modules 3 and 5 were followed by seven participants; module 4 was also followed by seven participants. Specialised training courses were also provided later, e.g. in the area of Agricultural funds — Investigations by OLAF (one participant); New financial Regulation (three participants); EIB training on internal procedures (three participants); DEVCO — Budget support (one participant); SPS/SPAS training (four participants); Computer forensics in support of OLAF's investigations (one participant); Operational analysis in support of OLAF's investigations (one participant). Source: OLAF.

27

(28)  Article 5.5 of the ISIP.

28

(29)  Ares (2013) 3357296.

29

(30)  The source of information did not reply to OLAF's requests in 24 out of 125 cases dismissed on the grounds of insufficiency of information (19 %).

30

(31)  1 case dismissed on the grounds that the information fell outside the IPPs was reopened later on as an investigation.

31

(32)  Article 5(2) and 5(4) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013.

32

(33)  Selection period of no longer than 2 months nevertheless remained a target in OLAF 2013 Management Plan.

33

(34)  General guidelines on the selection appear also in the ‘Starter Kit’.

34

(35)  On 5 July 2013 the DG provided the SC with a copy of an amended version of the ISIP, which the DG envisaged adopting at the date of the entry into force of the new OLAF Regulation. The SC provided its first comments by letter of 30 July 2013.

35

(36)  Articles 22a and 22b of Staff Regulations and Commission Guidelines on Whistleblowing (SEC(2012)679 final).

36

(37)  In one opinion the identity of the whistle-blower is clearly mentioned, while in another opinion it is anonymised. Both opinions recommended the opening of an investigation.

37

(38)  Through the FNS, OLAF collects information supplied by users of the system in a questionnaire, including a free text field. Messages are recorded and analyzed by OLAF staff. If the user chooses to register for ongoing communications, OLAF collects the information subsequently transmitted in all following communications between OLAF and the user. This information is recorded on a dedicated server, and used as a source of intelligence/evidence.

38

(39)  Article 5.3 of the ISIP, which corresponds to Article 5.3 of the GIP. The latter was not significantly changed.

39

(40)  See the Annex which illustrates this approach.

40

(41)  This provision was slightly changed in the GIP: ‘In assessing whether OLAF is competent to act, consideration shall be given to relevant EU Regulations, Decisions, Interinstitutional Agreements and other legal instruments relating to the protection of the financial interests of the EU, and any other interest of the EU the protection of which falls under OLAF's mandate.’

41

(42)  34 cases, concerning mainly civil/private disputes between individuals/companies where EU funds were not concerned, questions of interpretation of the EU legislation, matters falling within the exclusive competence of the Member States such as criminal offences (e.g. kidnapping).

42

(43)  Reference to legal instruments was made in 25 out of 259 opinions where OLAF was considered to be competent to act (9,6 %).

43

(44)  55 out of 259 opinions where OLAF was considered to be competent to act (21 %).

44

(45)  6 out of 259 opinions where OLAF was considered to be competent to act (2,31 %).

45

(46)  3 out of 259 opinions where OLAF was considered to be competent to act (1,15 %).

46

(47)  This provision was not significantly changed in the GIP.

47

(48)  In 64 out of 259 opinions (24,71 %) where OLAF was considered to be competent to act and the (in)sufficiency of information was evaluated, the SC noted the use of unsubstantiated statements — usually one sentence such as ‘the information is/would/should (not) be sufficient/enough to open an investigation’ (58 opinions), ‘all the elements needed to further investigate have clearly been identified’ (1 opinion), ‘the information is sufficient and the sources are reliable’ (3 opinions), or even a simple ‘yes’ (2 opinions).

48

(49)  No consideration was given either to the reliability of the source or to the credibility of the allegations in 22 out of 259 opinions (8,5 %) where OLAF was considered to be competent to act and the (in)sufficiency of information was evaluated.

49

(50)  In some cases where the source was anonymous, the selectors considered either that its reliability cannot be proved or assessed (5 opinions) or considered it to be unreliable (2 opinions).

50

(51)  The sufficiency of suspicions was clearly assessed in 69 out of 259 opinions (26,64 %) where OLAF was considered to be competent to act and the (in)sufficiency of information was evaluated.

51

(52)  58 opinions.

52

(53)  8 opinions.

53

(54)  3 opinions.

54

(55)  Cases C-15/00 Commission v EIB and C-11/00 Commission v ECB.

55

Commission

EIB

Commission

ECB

(56)  Article 5(1).

56

(57)  In particular the ‘Starter kit’.

57

(58)  Clarity, preciseness, completeness: information has been considered to be detailed and substantiated/documented when it provided the names of persons/entities involved, dates, location, and fraud mechanism.

58

(59)  Information has been considered to be verifiable and accurate when confirmed after being cross checked with information otherwise provided to or gathered by OLAF.

59

(60)  Lack of cooperation from a Member State was reported in one opinion. Obstructions from an EU Delegation were also reported in one opinion (disclosure of the existence of OLAF's case to the person concerned and lack of cooperation with OLAF, mainly by not providing the information requested by the latter).

60

(61)  This provision was removed from the GIP. However, the reference to the IPPs as a selection criterion was kept in Article 5.3 of the GIP.

61

(62)  The SC's comments on the IPPs themselves can be found in the SC's Opinion No 1/2014.

62

(63)  37 out of 134 opinions (27,61 %) where the IPPs were assessed (59 opinions recommending dismissing a case on the grounds outlined in the IPPs and 75 opinions recommending the opening of investigation/coordination cases).

63

(64)  2 cases.

64

(65)  In 24 out of 134 opinions (18 %) where the IPPs were assessed it was only stated that ‘it is/it would be proportionate/disproportionate’ or ‘it would be/not be proportional’ to open an investigation or coordination case or OLAF ‘can/cannot expect a fair return from its investigative efforts’.

65

(66)  E.g. when carrying out the proportionality test, reference was made to the subsidiarity/added value of OLAF's action (the assumption that an OLAF action would not be proportionate because action was already taken at national level and OLAF cannot bring any added value was found in 15 out of 59 opinions (25,42 %) recommending dismissing a case on the grounds outlined in the IPPs).

66

(67)  Where the potential financial impact of the irregular activity affecting the EU budget was estimated or the likelihood of prosecution in the Member State or of disciplinary action by the EU institution concerned was anticipated, there is no reference to the forecast of the human and material resources needed to investigate: 8 out of 59 opinions (13,55 %) recommending dismissing a case on the grounds outlined in the IPPs.

67

(68)  The evaluation of the workload is missing in 50 out of 134 opinions (37,31 %) where the IPPs were assessed: some opinions mention that no investigative resources should be used (22 opinions), while others make no reference to the investigative resources (28 opinions).

68

(69)  In the sense that it is stated that OLAF would be able to carry out an investigation or that a specific unit would be competent to investigate or would have the necessary resources available, but without any further explanation (30 out of 134 opinions (22,38 %) where the IPPs were assessed).

69

(70)  One opinion mentions that the workload of a specific investigation unit would not allow investigative activities to begin soon after the case has been opened and consequently recommended the dismissal of the case, while another opinion issued in the same period by a different selector indicates the contrary with regard to the same investigation unit, and as a consequence recommends the opening of an investigation case.

70

(71)  7 out of 134 opinions (5,22 %) where the IPPs were assessed.

71

(72)  40 out of 134 opinions (29,85 %) where the IPPs were assessed.

72

(73)  In 5 out of 59 opinions (8,47 %) recommending dismissing a case on the grounds outlined in the IPPs.

73

(74)  Such reference was made in 5 out of 134 opinions (1,49 %) where the IPPs were assessed.

74

(75)  42 out of 134 opinions (31,34 %) where the IPPs were assessed.

75

(76)  3 out of 59 opinions (5 %) recommending dismissing a case on the grounds outlined in the IPPs.

76

(77)  It was found that OLAF's action could have an added value only in 1 out of 59 cases dismissed on the grounds outlined in the IPPs. The case was however dismissed because it was considered that an OLAF action would not have been proportionate (financial ratio cost/benefit too high).

77

ratio

(78)  1 opinion, advising dismissal of a case exclusively on the grounds that the financial impact was too low.

78

(79)  2 opinions out of 59 opinions (3,38 %) recommending dismissing a case on the grounds outlined in the IPPs.

79

(80)  E.g. the EU/national authorities were aware or already dealing with the matters submitted to OLAF or with similar matters; due to the nature of the denounced acts they were better placed to conduct a national enquiry or they had more powerful means to investigate than OLAF; there would be duplication of work if OLAF was involved and consequent risk of jeopardising a national investigation; it was considered that, in accordance with principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the Member State had the primary responsibility for the management and control of the EU funded projects). Those explanations were found in 56 out of 59 opinions (95 %) recommending dismissal of a case on the grounds outlined in the IPPs.

80

(81)  According to the replies by the EC to the EP's written questions to Commissioner Šemeta, in the framework of the 2012 discharge to the Commission (questions 6d and 6e).

81

(82)  2 cases regarding allegations of possible irregular cost declarations or possible irregular defrayal of parliamentary assistance expenses, with direct impact on the EU financial interests and representing a potentially serious matter relating to the discharge of professional duties of Members of the European Parliament.

82

(83)  The 2 cases referred to in the previous footnote were dismissed on subsidiarity grounds five and, respectively, seven months after another similar case was dismissed and referred to the EP. It was proposed to refer the two cases to the EP, despite the fact that, at the time of the drafting of the opinions, OLAF had not received any feedback from the EP.

83

(84)  19 July 2013. The cases referred to above were however dismissed several months before the signature of the Practical arrangements.

84

(85)  See Annex II to the Practical arrangements with the EP.

85

(86)  See the IPPs for 2012 and 2013 and the SC's Opinion No 1/2014 on the IPPs.

86

(87)  17 out of 134 opinions (12,68 %) where the IPPs were assessed.

87

(88)  The financial impact was known in 80 (out of 134) cases where the IPPs were assessed. In 13 of them (16,25 %) the opinions did not make explicit reference to the financial indicators.

88

(89)  The financial impact was known in 34 (out of 59) cases dismissed on the grounds outlined in the IPPs. In 7 of them the financial impact corresponded to the IPPs, but they were dismissed on subsidiarity/added value grounds.

89

(90)  The financial impact was known in 46 (out of 75) cases opened (investigation or coordination cases). In 6 of them the financial impact was below the financial indicators as mentioned in the IPPs.

90

(91)  See the SC's Opinion No 1/2014 on the IPPs.

91

(92)  With regard to dismissed cases, the information flow includes staff of the Registry (the person registering the incoming information), of the ISRU (the selector in charge and/or the Head of Unit) and the DG, who takes the ultimate decision to dismiss the case. The circulation chain may thus include from two persons (the Director-General and the Head of the ISRU, when the latter is acting as selector — this was the case in two of the opinions analysed) — when the incoming information is transmitted exclusively and directly to one of them) up to a maximum of four persons (the Director-General, the Head of the ISRU, the selector and the Registry staff).

92

(93)  47 out of 59 opinions (79,66 %) recommending dismissing a case on the grounds outlined in the IPPs.

93

(94)  In cases dismissed where it was proposed to forward relevant information to the competent authority, recommendations of non-disclosure of the identity of the source was found in 7 opinions (out of 42 cases where the identity of the source is known by OLAF).

94

(95)  Ares (2013)1903286 and (2013)3417726.

95

(96)  29 out of 134 opinions (21,64 %) where the IPPs were assessed make reference to an internal consultation, with regard to the availability of the human resources and/or expertise (3 opinions), verification of connection of the information being assessed to existing investigations (3 opinions), or discussions on the proposal to dismiss a case or to open an investigation/coordination case (23 opinions — mainly in those cases where the initial information was forwarded for assessment to the ISRU by the investigation units themselves).

96

(97)  1 out of 59 opinions (1,69 %) recommending dismissing a case on the grounds outlined in the IPPs.

97

(98)  2 out of 59 opinions recommending dismissing a case on the grounds outlined in the IPPs.

98

(99)  3 out of 59 opinions recommending dismissing a case on the grounds outlined in the IPPs.

99

(100)  1 out of the 3 cases mentioned in the previous footnote.

100

(101)  The identity of the source was known by OLAF and/or OLAF can communicate with the source in 132 out of 218 cases dismissed. It was proposed to inform the source of information of OLAF's decisions to dismiss cases in 22 out of these 132 opinions (16,66 %).

101

(102)  1 out of 75 opinions recommending the opening of investigation/coordination cases proposed that the source of information be informed of OLAF's decision.

102

ANNEX

The selection process — a step-by-step approach

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ANEXA 5

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE'S OBSERVATIONS ON THE AMENDED ISIP

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

In general, the Committee considers that by their content, the Instructions to Staff on Investigation Procedures (ISIP), which as of February 2012 replaced the OLAF Manual, constitute the governing principles of OLAF investigative procedures. They merit completion by the institution of operational guidelines (practical guidance according to Recital 18 of the amended Regulation) aimed at a concrete definition of the implementation of these guidelines in order to ensure a transparent, coherent implementation, to ensure respect for the equal treatment of all persons. Such guidelines would be useful when confronting those obstacles or difficulties faced by investigators, which are not mentioned in the ISIP.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS

1.   The selection procedure (chapter 1)

Decision on the opening of a case

Regarding the conditions governing the opening of cases, the ISIP refer, in Article 5.3, to the existence of information sufficient to open an investigation or coordination case. However, they do not refer to the sufficient suspicion, as provided in the amended Regulation. The existing European jurisprudence has established ‘sufficiently serious suspicion’ as a precondition for the opening of the investigation. Given the importance of that condition for the sake of the guarantee of fundamental rights, the SC considers this notion should be explicitly mentioned.

The measures the ISRU is entitled to take prior to the decision whether to open a case

The ISIP provide the possibility, inter alia, to take a statement from any person able to provide relevant information. The glossary defines a statement as a written record of evidence relevant to an investigation provided by a person within the framework of an OLAF case, which could be applied to a witness. The SC questions to what extent and what type of measures the ISRU is entitled to take prior to the opening of a case taking into consideration the procedural guarantees as outlined in the ISIP following the opening of the case. Clarification on this point would appear useful.

The internal competencies within the ISRU

Whilst enjoying the power of assessment and proposal to open an investigation, the ISRU has, in addition, the responsibility for reviewing the legality of a certain number of investigative measures as foreseen by the investigation units. In order to clearly set out the principle of an independent legality control within OLAF, it would be appropriate to clearly define in the ISIP the separation of selectors and reviewers in this unit.

Dismissed cases where there are grounds for sufficient suspicion

As pointed out by the SC in its annual report, the text of the Reform strengthens the primacy of the principal of opportunity in the opening or investigations without establishing a subsequent duty for the Director-General to inform the competent authorities of the Member State or the institution concerned when he decides not to open an investigation.

As further mentioned by the SC in its annual report, the ISIP does not make any provision for those cases where there may be sufficient grounds for suspicion but which may not necessarily lead to a decision to open an investigation.

2.   The provisions regarding the investigations and coordination cases (chapter II)

The nature of the investigations

The SC notes that any reference to the administrative nature of the investigative measures OLAF is entitled to conduct has been deleted. There could therefore be a risk of confusion for persons and the public at large as to the extent of its powers.

The SC notes that the distinction between internal and external investigations has also been removed also and endeavours to understand the reasons supporting this change given that this categorisation is provided for in the text of the amended Reform, as well as in the previous ISIP. The SC would suggest it to be of a particular importance to maintain this distinction, since the powers and the investigative measures OLAF is entitled to carry out do not appear to be similar, according the scope of the investigation.

The scope of the legality check during an investigation

The ISIP establishes a prior legality check of specific and limited investigative measures.

As the SC has pointed out in its annual activity report, some others investigative measures may have a significant impact on procedural guarantees and fundamental rights, for example measures that could be seen as ‘interference by a public authority’ with the exercise of the right to respect for private life could result in an interference with fundamental rights.

The text of the Reform has specifically foreseen that the Director-General shall put in place an internal advisory and control procedure including a legality check relating, inter alia, to respect (...) of the national law of the Member States concerned.

It appears therefore that the ISIP should include provisions for organising a wider internal control covering, in particular, verification of the consistency of the gathering of elements for investigations when requested from Member States.

3.   Cooperation with others agencies (Europol, Eurojust)

The ISIP do not contain provisions relating to the rules applicable for the implementation of cooperation, in particular the content and procedures for the exchange of information with other agencies liable to carry out investigations or to coordinate action by Member States in the areas of competence shared with OLAF.

In this regard the SC shares the Recommendations 3 and 4 as issued by the European Court of Auditors in its follow-up report 2011 to its Special Report No 1/2005 on the management of OLAF.

4.   Decisions of the Director-General

In order to ensure transparency and impartiality where the Director-General decides not to follow the opinion of the ISRU at important stages (inter alia, the opening or dismissal of cases, closure decisions, extension of the scope of an investigation), the ISIP should provide a reasoned decision from the Director-General.

In several sections of the ISIP (Articles 5.4, 8.1), reference is made to ‘the financial and other interests of the EU
  ’. This wording should be clarified, in light of recital 6 of the amended Regulation.

Article 13.4 — In the view of the Supervisory Committee, the ISIP should specify the principle according to which inspections of EU premises are conducted in the presence of the Member or official concerned, prior to providing provisions for inspection in the case of absence of the person concerned from the office.

5.   Specific changes

The SC would like, in particular, to know the reasons for the modifications to the following Articles:

| | 14.6: on-the spot checks, |
| --- | --- |

14.6: on-the spot checks,

| | 15.2: digital forensic operations within inspections or on-the-spot checks, |
| --- | --- |

15.2: digital forensic operations within inspections or on-the-spot checks,

| | 16.2 and 16.5: interviews, |
| --- | --- |

16.2 and 16.5: interviews,

| | 18.1 and 18.2: the opportunity to provide comments, |
| --- | --- |

18.1 and 18.2: the opportunity to provide comments,

| | 19.10: the final report and proposed recommendations. |
| --- | --- |

19.10: the final report and proposed recommendations.

---

ANEXA 6

Reinforcing procedural safeguards in OLAF in view of the monitoring experience of the OLAF Supervisory Committee

Present supervision structure

| 1. | The European Antifraud Office (OLAF) and its Supervisory Committee (SC) have been established by Commission Decision of 28 April 1999 (1). The scope of supervision has been reinforced and specified by Regulation No 883/2013 (2) of 11 September 2013. The SC is the guarantor of OLAF's independence and it supervises the investigatory function of OLAF through regular monitoring aimed at ensuring the proper conduct of investigations. The SC focuses in particular on examining whether fundamental rights and procedural guarantees are respected in OLAF's investigations and whether the cases are dealt with efficiently, effectively, in due time and according to the relevant rules and legal provisions. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The European Antifraud Office (OLAF) and its Supervisory Committee (SC) have been established by Commission Decision of 28 April 1999 (1). The scope of supervision has been reinforced and specified by Regulation No 883/2013 (2) of 11 September 2013. The SC is the guarantor of OLAF's independence and it supervises the investigatory function of OLAF through regular monitoring aimed at ensuring the proper conduct of investigations. The SC focuses in particular on examining whether fundamental rights and procedural guarantees are respected in OLAF's investigations and whether the cases are dealt with efficiently, effectively, in due time and according to the relevant rules and legal provisions.

SC recommendations and Commission proposals

| 2. | In its Annual Activity Report 2012 (in particular in Section 2 of Annex III), the SC recommended, on the basis of its monitoring experience and in view of the identified shortcomings, a number of actions aiming at reinforcing procedural safeguards in OLAF's investigations. The SC recommended in particular introduction of transparent and stable procedures for the internal legality check and for independent review of complaints. The SC recommended also clarification of OLAF's powers in different types of administrative investigations and insisted on providing the SC with effective tools for monitoring the respect of procedural guarantees and fundamental rights by OLAF. |
| --- | --- |

2.

In its Annual Activity Report 2012 (in particular in Section 2 of Annex III), the SC recommended, on the basis of its monitoring experience and in view of the identified shortcomings, a number of actions aiming at reinforcing procedural safeguards in OLAF's investigations. The SC recommended in particular introduction of transparent and stable procedures for the internal legality check and for independent review of complaints. The SC recommended also clarification of OLAF's powers in different types of administrative investigations and insisted on providing the SC with effective tools for monitoring the respect of procedural guarantees and fundamental rights by OLAF.

| 3. | That need to strengthen the procedural safeguards and legality checks seems to be a common conclusion of the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Auditors and the SC as expressed in their exchanges of opinions on OLAF investigative activities. |
| --- | --- |

3.

That need to strengthen the procedural safeguards and legality checks seems to be a common conclusion of the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Auditors and the SC as expressed in their exchanges of opinions on OLAF investigative activities.

| 4. | Such strengthening should be considered in view of the Commission's proposal for the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO). Creation of the EPPO would be a change of paradigm by transferring cases of possible criminal fraud from administrative investigations in OLAF to criminal investigations conducted by European prosecutors. Such change is to result in a substantial reinforcement of the procedural guarantees for persons concerned by investigations. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Such strengthening should be considered in view of the Commission's proposal for the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO). Creation of the EPPO would be a change of paradigm by transferring cases of possible criminal fraud from administrative investigations in OLAF to criminal investigations conducted by European prosecutors. Such change is to result in a substantial reinforcement of the procedural guarantees for persons concerned by investigations.

| 5. | Even with the establishment of the EPPO, OLAF would still have a significant role to play in the protection of the EU against offences and irregularities affecting its financial interests. There is a high degree of uncertainty when it comes to the geographical coverage of the EPPO which most probably will be established by enhanced cooperation of some Member States — their number remains unknown, but almost surely not all of them are going to participate. Therefore investigations of similar nature might be in future conducted in parallel by the EPPO and OLAF, depending on a Member State, which would require strengthening the procedural safeguards in OLAF's investigations, so that they could match the foreseen EPPO standards. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Even with the establishment of the EPPO, OLAF would still have a significant role to play in the protection of the EU against offences and irregularities affecting its financial interests. There is a high degree of uncertainty when it comes to the geographical coverage of the EPPO which most probably will be established by enhanced cooperation of some Member States — their number remains unknown, but almost surely not all of them are going to participate. Therefore investigations of similar nature might be in future conducted in parallel by the EPPO and OLAF, depending on a Member State, which would require strengthening the procedural safeguards in OLAF's investigations, so that they could match the foreseen EPPO standards.

| 6. | Therefore, the SC welcomes with satisfaction the Commission's Communication on Improving OLAF's governance and reinforcing procedural safeguards in investigations
   (3). The SC is currently analysing possible consequences of particular solutions proposed there and is looking forward to discussing them with the Institutions and with OLAF. As the first reflection, the SC considers the substance of the proposals as positive, providing for instruments potentially enabling to improve the current level of safeguards. At the same time, some structural solutions, as proposed in the Communication, should be reconsidered with particular regard to the independence of OLAF and of the SC, to ensure avoiding conflicts of competences with respect to the supervision of OLAF as well as duplication of work and inefficient allocation of resources. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Therefore, the SC welcomes with satisfaction the Commission's Communication on Improving OLAF's governance and reinforcing procedural safeguards in investigations
   (3). The SC is currently analysing possible consequences of particular solutions proposed there and is looking forward to discussing them with the Institutions and with OLAF. As the first reflection, the SC considers the substance of the proposals as positive, providing for instruments potentially enabling to improve the current level of safeguards. At the same time, some structural solutions, as proposed in the Communication, should be reconsidered with particular regard to the independence of OLAF and of the SC, to ensure avoiding conflicts of competences with respect to the supervision of OLAF as well as duplication of work and inefficient allocation of resources.

New bodies and their competences

| 7. | At this stage, the SC is considering specifically the issues of the institutional framework for two new offices proposed by the Commission and the scope of their competences. |
| --- | --- |

7.

At this stage, the SC is considering specifically the issues of the institutional framework for two new offices proposed by the Commission and the scope of their competences.

| 8. | The Communication advocates establishment of a new office of a ‘Controller of procedural safeguard’ who would ‘monitor compliance with the procedural guarantees applicable to OLAF investigations and of prompt handling of investigations to avoid undue delay’. It is very hard to see how the Controller could avoid having his work overlapping with the work of the SC which would ‘monitor systemic developments regarding respect of procedural rights and reasonable deadlines for handling cases’. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The Communication advocates establishment of a new office of a ‘Controller of procedural safeguard’ who would ‘monitor compliance with the procedural guarantees applicable to OLAF investigations and of prompt handling of investigations to avoid undue delay’. It is very hard to see how the Controller could avoid having his work overlapping with the work of the SC which would ‘monitor systemic developments regarding respect of procedural rights and reasonable deadlines for handling cases’.

| 9. | Even if the differentiation between the tasks of the Controller and of the SC could be possible argued on a theoretical level, the practical experience of the SC shows that review of individual cases is an indispensable element of systemic monitoring of OLAF. Therefore, the daily work — in the separate secretariats of both bodies — would be very similar and consist in examination of individual case files in view of respect of procedural rights and duration of investigation. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Even if the differentiation between the tasks of the Controller and of the SC could be possible argued on a theoretical level, the practical experience of the SC shows that review of individual cases is an indispensable element of systemic monitoring of OLAF. Therefore, the daily work — in the separate secretariats of both bodies — would be very similar and consist in examination of individual case files in view of respect of procedural rights and duration of investigation.

| 10. | In its systemic analyses based on samples of individual cases, the SC could be examining, coincidently and even unknowingly, the same case as would be examined by the Controller in the framework of his individual review. It could lead not only to redundant duplication of work, but also to issuing diverging or even conflicting recommendations to the Director-General of OLAF. |
| --- | --- |

10.

In its systemic analyses based on samples of individual cases, the SC could be examining, coincidently and even unknowingly, the same case as would be examined by the Controller in the framework of his individual review. It could lead not only to redundant duplication of work, but also to issuing diverging or even conflicting recommendations to the Director-General of OLAF.

| 11. | Furthermore, the Commission proposes to establish an office of a judicial reviewer who would authorise OLAF's intrusive investigative measures concerning Members of EU Institutions. As a result, also his work (as the SC's and Controller's work) would concern examination of the respect of procedural/fundamental rights (although ex ante and not ex post). |
| --- | --- |

11.

Furthermore, the Commission proposes to establish an office of a judicial reviewer who would authorise OLAF's intrusive investigative measures concerning Members of EU Institutions. As a result, also his work (as the SC's and Controller's work) would concern examination of the respect of procedural/fundamental rights (although ex ante and not ex post).

| 12. | The reviewer's competences, his punctual interventions and his placement within or next to the Commission could raise serious concerns as regards OLAF's independence. In view of his placement, his competence to advise on investigative measures against Members of the Commission but also of other Institutions could affect the interinstitutional balance. |
| --- | --- |

12.

The reviewer's competences, his punctual interventions and his placement within or next to the Commission could raise serious concerns as regards OLAF's independence. In view of his placement, his competence to advise on investigative measures against Members of the Commission but also of other Institutions could affect the interinstitutional balance.

| 13. | Also as regards the Controller, who would be similarly placed and separated from the SC, there could be concerns with regard to his independence and to the cost effectiveness of him having a separate secretariat doing the job currently done by the SC's Secretariat. |
| --- | --- |

13.

Also as regards the Controller, who would be similarly placed and separated from the SC, there could be concerns with regard to his independence and to the cost effectiveness of him having a separate secretariat doing the job currently done by the SC's Secretariat.

| 14. | Creation of two additional offices controlling OLAF but separate from the Supervisory Committee of OLAF would lead to multiplication of independent supervising structures, probably resulting in confusion or conflict of competences and duplication of work. That could ultimately decrease the efficiency of the supervision of OLAF. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Creation of two additional offices controlling OLAF but separate from the Supervisory Committee of OLAF would lead to multiplication of independent supervising structures, probably resulting in confusion or conflict of competences and duplication of work. That could ultimately decrease the efficiency of the supervision of OLAF.

Alternative solutions

| 15. | The SC is considering other options which would retain the useful instruments proposed by the Commission, but which would at the same time incorporate them into a comprehensive and effective supervision structure. |
| --- | --- |

15.

The SC is considering other options which would retain the useful instruments proposed by the Commission, but which would at the same time incorporate them into a comprehensive and effective supervision structure.

| 16. | To achieve the important aim of reinforcing the procedural safeguards in OLAF set forth by the Communication, the Controller should form a part of a wider supervisory committee. His independence would be strengthened and he could benefit from the expertise of the SC and its Secretariat having a long experience in examining the respect of procedural guarantees in OLAF. The whole joint structure would be stronger, more efficient and would produce an effect of synergy. A common secretariat would ensure consistency, economy of scale and allow avoiding duplication of work. |
| --- | --- |

16.

To achieve the important aim of reinforcing the procedural safeguards in OLAF set forth by the Communication, the Controller should form a part of a wider supervisory committee. His independence would be strengthened and he could benefit from the expertise of the SC and its Secretariat having a long experience in examining the respect of procedural guarantees in OLAF. The whole joint structure would be stronger, more efficient and would produce an effect of synergy. A common secretariat would ensure consistency, economy of scale and allow avoiding duplication of work.

| 17. | As regards the judicial reviewer, he could be, theoretically, also attached to a wider supervisory committee to benefit from the knowledge and independent resources of the already established structure. On the other hand, the judicial reviewer being attached to the SC (or to the Commission) would implicate the SC (or the Commission, respectively) in the decision-making process in OLAF which could jeopardise OLAF's independence. |
| --- | --- |

17.

As regards the judicial reviewer, he could be, theoretically, also attached to a wider supervisory committee to benefit from the knowledge and independent resources of the already established structure. On the other hand, the judicial reviewer being attached to the SC (or to the Commission) would implicate the SC (or the Commission, respectively) in the decision-making process in OLAF which could jeopardise OLAF's independence.

| 18. | Therefore, it seems more logical to place the judicial review back in a dedicated judicial unit within OLAF which would consist, as it used to be the case, of national magistrates. They could, without putting OLAF's independence in danger (as it could be the case with an external body), provide the Director-General, rather expeditiously thanks to their presence within OLAF, with independent and formal legal advice, ex ante, on all intrusive investigative measures and other actions requiring compliance with specific national provisions. The SC would continue to monitor, ex post, the judicial recommendations to the Director-General and his ensuing decisions, with a view of ensuring OLAF's independence, on the one hand, and the procedural rights of persons concerned, on the other. |
| --- | --- |

18.

Therefore, it seems more logical to place the judicial review back in a dedicated judicial unit within OLAF which would consist, as it used to be the case, of national magistrates. They could, without putting OLAF's independence in danger (as it could be the case with an external body), provide the Director-General, rather expeditiously thanks to their presence within OLAF, with independent and formal legal advice, ex ante, on all intrusive investigative measures and other actions requiring compliance with specific national provisions. The SC would continue to monitor, ex post, the judicial recommendations to the Director-General and his ensuing decisions, with a view of ensuring OLAF's independence, on the one hand, and the procedural rights of persons concerned, on the other.

| 19. | In the light of its monitoring experience, the SC supports the Commission's proposal to reinforce the procedural safeguards in OLAF investigations. It is particularly recommendable having regard to the abolition in the reformed OLAF of the SC's prior examination of the respect of fundamental right and procedural guarantees before an OLAF case is sent to national judicial authorities — which was considered by the Court of Justice as a crucial safeguard for persons concerned. The improved supervisory structure must be functional and efficient. The SC is looking forward to the forthcoming exchange of opinions between the Institutions under the new OLAF Regulation which could focus on working out optimal and broadly supported legislative solutions. |
| --- | --- |

19.

In the light of its monitoring experience, the SC supports the Commission's proposal to reinforce the procedural safeguards in OLAF investigations. It is particularly recommendable having regard to the abolition in the reformed OLAF of the SC's prior examination of the respect of fundamental right and procedural guarantees before an OLAF case is sent to national judicial authorities — which was considered by the Court of Justice as a crucial safeguard for persons concerned. The improved supervisory structure must be functional and efficient. The SC is looking forward to the forthcoming exchange of opinions between the Institutions under the new OLAF Regulation which could focus on working out optimal and broadly supported legislative solutions.

---

(1)  Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 28 April 1999 establishing the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF), (OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 20) as recently amended by Commission Decision 2013/478/EU of 27 September 2013 (OJ L 257, 28.9.2013, p. 19).

(2)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1).

(3)  COM(2013)533 final, 17.7.2013.

---

ANEXA 7

SC Recommendations to OLAF DG (2012)

| Subject | Document Reference | SC Recommendations to OLAF DG (2012) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Right to private life | Opinion 2/2012
  (p. 17) | 1) | OLAF to indicate the legal basis prior to applying any measure potentially interfering in the fundamental rights to «private life» and «communications» of persons involved in an investigation. |

Subject

Document Reference

SC Recommendations to OLAF DG (2012)

Right to private life

Opinion 2/2012

(p. 17)

1)

OLAF to indicate the legal basis prior to applying any measure potentially interfering in the fundamental rights to «private life» and «communications» of persons involved in an investigation.

Opinion 2/2012

(p. 17)

| 2) | OLAF did not analyse its competence to gather evidence by way of recording private telephone conversations which seems contrary to Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. OLAF to make necessarily such a legal analysis. |
| --- | --- |

2)

OLAF did not analyse its competence to gather evidence by way of recording private telephone conversations which seems contrary to Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. OLAF to make necessarily such a legal analysis.

Data protection

Opinion 2/2012

(p. 18)

| 3) | OLAF did not inform persons unrelated to the investigation that their personal data and telephone listings appear in the case file which seems contrary to requirements of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001. OLAF to fulfil this legal obligation without delay. |
| --- | --- |

3)

OLAF did not inform persons unrelated to the investigation that their personal data and telephone listings appear in the case file which seems contrary to requirements of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001. OLAF to fulfil this legal obligation without delay.

Right to express views on all facts

Opinion 2/2012

(p. 23)

| 4) | OLAF to ensure that persons concerned are informed of each fact concerning them in a clear and accurate manner, with an expressly separate question asked for each particular allegation, so that they can express views on all the facts concerning them. |
| --- | --- |

4)

OLAF to ensure that persons concerned are informed of each fact concerning them in a clear and accurate manner, with an expressly separate question asked for each particular allegation, so that they can express views on all the facts concerning them.

Complaints

Activity Report 2012 (1)

(p. 26)

Opinion 3/2010

| 5) | OLAF to inform the SC of all complaints related to fundamental rights and procedural guarantees to allow the SC to fulfil properly its monitoring remit. |
| --- | --- |

5)

OLAF to inform the SC of all complaints related to fundamental rights and procedural guarantees to allow the SC to fulfil properly its monitoring remit.

Whistle-blowers

Activity Report 2012

(p. 11)

Opinion 5/2011

| 6) | OLAF to ensure protection of whistle-blowers and informants as recommended in the SC Opinion No 5/2011 which seems not to have been fully implemented yet. |
| --- | --- |

6)

OLAF to ensure protection of whistle-blowers and informants as recommended in the SC Opinion No 5/2011 which seems not to have been fully implemented yet.

Checks of economic operators

Opinion 2/2012

(p. 13)

| 7) | OLAF to ensure a scrupulous legality check before applying Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96  (2)(on-the-spot checks of economic operators) requiring justification in terms of the scale of fraud or of the seriousness of the damage done to the EU financial interests («very limited evidence» is not a valid justification). |
| --- | --- |

7)

OLAF to ensure a scrupulous legality check before applying Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96  (2)(on-the-spot checks of economic operators) requiring justification in terms of the scale of fraud or of the seriousness of the damage done to the EU financial interests («very limited evidence» is not a valid justification).

Extension of the scope of investigation

Opinion 2/2012

(p. 13)

| 8) | OLAF to ensure a legality check of extension of the scope of an investigation, to respect in particular the requirement of «sufficiently serious suspicion» with regard to the new aspects. |
| --- | --- |

8)

OLAF to ensure a legality check of extension of the scope of an investigation, to respect in particular the requirement of «sufficiently serious suspicion» with regard to the new aspects.

External vs. internal investigations

Opinion 2/2012

(p. 13)

| 9) | OLAF to differentiate clearly, where it is relevant, between its powers and legal basis applicable to external vs. internal investigations. |
| --- | --- |

9)

OLAF to differentiate clearly, where it is relevant, between its powers and legal basis applicable to external vs. internal investigations.

Legality check incl. national provisions

Activity Report 2012

(p. 24)

| 10) | OLAF to ensure compliance with national rules for collection of evidence (within the framework of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) by establishing a procedure for legality check including the relevant national legal provisions. |
| --- | --- |

10)

OLAF to ensure compliance with national rules for collection of evidence (within the framework of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) by establishing a procedure for legality check including the relevant national legal provisions.

Sufficient suspicion

Opinion 2/2012

(p. 7, 15)

Activity Report 2012

(p. 25)

| 11) | Selectors of cases must have enough time, information and competence to assess the seriousness of suspicions (not only the «seriousness of allegations») and to ensure that the decision to open or to dismiss a case is taken with respect for OLAF independence. |
| --- | --- |

11)

Selectors of cases must have enough time, information and competence to assess the seriousness of suspicions (not only the «seriousness of allegations») and to ensure that the decision to open or to dismiss a case is taken with respect for OLAF independence.

IPPs

| 12) | OLAF to reconsider high financial thresholds for opening investigations and to introduce a follow-up procedure for cases dismissed on that basis, to avoid the risk of creating areas of impunity. |
| --- | --- |

12)

OLAF to reconsider high financial thresholds for opening investigations and to introduce a follow-up procedure for cases dismissed on that basis, to avoid the risk of creating areas of impunity.

DG's direct participation

Opinion 2/2012

(p. 11)

| 13) | DG not to participate personally in investigative activities (interviews, on-the-spot checks, etc.) to avoid situations of a potential conflict of interest, especially in review of OLAF actions. |
| --- | --- |

13)

DG not to participate personally in investigative activities (interviews, on-the-spot checks, etc.) to avoid situations of a potential conflict of interest, especially in review of OLAF actions.

Notification to institutions

Opinion 2/2012

(p. 8-9)

| 14) | OLAF to follow rigorous the legal requirements on notifications to the institutions concerned by the opening of an investigation. OLAF, in particular, to notify the President when a Member of an institution or body (incl. the SC) is involved in an investigation. |
| --- | --- |

14)

OLAF to follow rigorous the legal requirements on notifications to the institutions concerned by the opening of an investigation. OLAF, in particular, to notify the President when a Member of an institution or body (incl. the SC) is involved in an investigation.

Follow-up of investigations

Opinion 1/2012

(p. 4)

| 15) | An effective follow-up of investigations must be ensured (incl. feedback on OLAF recommendations). |
| --- | --- |

15)

An effective follow-up of investigations must be ensured (incl. feedback on OLAF recommendations).

Budget

Opinion 1/2012

(p. 4)

| 16) | OLAF to consult its draft budget effectively with the SC before it is communicated outside. |
| --- | --- |

16)

OLAF to consult its draft budget effectively with the SC before it is communicated outside.

HR strategy

| 17) | OLAF to develop a human resources strategy based on a needs assessment, with focus on training, career development (also for temporary agents), succession planning and justified division of tasks among administrators and assistants. |
| --- | --- |

17)

OLAF to develop a human resources strategy based on a needs assessment, with focus on training, career development (also for temporary agents), succession planning and justified division of tasks among administrators and assistants.

SC's access to data

Activity Report 2012

(p. 9-10)

| 18) | OLAF to provide the SC with all the necessary information, in particular: (i) sufficient information to assess the respect of fundamental rights and procedural guarantees in cases forwarded to national judicial authorities; (ii) information on duration of cases, sufficient to assess it in the context of legal requirements, including national time-barring provisions; (iii) if necessary, full access to individual case files. |
| --- | --- |

18)

OLAF to provide the SC with all the necessary information, in particular: (i) sufficient information to assess the respect of fundamental rights and procedural guarantees in cases forwarded to national judicial authorities; (ii) information on duration of cases, sufficient to assess it in the context of legal requirements, including national time-barring provisions; (iii) if necessary, full access to individual case files.

| 19) | OLAF must ensure that information provided to the SC is reliable, accurate and reflects exactly the content of the case file. |
| --- | --- |

19)

OLAF must ensure that information provided to the SC is reliable, accurate and reflects exactly the content of the case file.

SC Secretariat

Opinion 1/2012

(p. 6)

| 20) | OLAF to ensure adequate staffing of the SC Secretariat (8 posts). |
| --- | --- |

20)

OLAF to ensure adequate staffing of the SC Secretariat (8 posts).

| 21) | OLAF to indicate global SC Secretariat's expenses separately from other positions. |
| --- | --- |

21)

OLAF to indicate global SC Secretariat's expenses separately from other positions.

| 22) | OLAF to ensure independent functioning of the SC Secretariat as a precondition of the independence and effective functioning of the SC itself, in particular: staff to be appointed, evaluated and promoted on the basis of SC opinions. |
| --- | --- |

22)

OLAF to ensure independent functioning of the SC Secretariat as a precondition of the independence and effective functioning of the SC itself, in particular: staff to be appointed, evaluated and promoted on the basis of SC opinions.

---

(1)  OJ C 374, 20.12.2013, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2.

---

ANEXA 8

MISSION, COMPETENCES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE EUROPEAN ANTI-FRAUD OFFICE

Mid-term strategy (2012–2015)

(Updated in February 2014)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| INTRODUCTION | 61 |
| --- | --- |

| 1. | LEGAL FRAMEWORK | 61 |
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1.

| 1.1. | Mission and role of the Supervisory Committee | 61 |
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1.1.

| 1.2. | Core tasks of the Supervisory Committee | 61 |
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1.2.

| 1.3. | Reporting | 61 |
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1.3.

| 1.4. | Access to information | 62 |
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1.4.

| 2. | MONITORING FORMULA | 62 |
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2.

| 3. | SECRETARIAT OF THE SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE | 62 |
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3.

| 3.1. | Role of the Secretariat | 62 |
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3.1.

| 3.2. | Independent functioning of the Secretariat | 63 |
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3.2.

| 4. | STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES | 63 |
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4.

INTRODUCTION

| 1. | In the light of the mission and tasks entrusted to it by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 (1), the Supervisory Committee (SC) of the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) hereby defines its strategic objectives and priorities for the first half of its five years mandate (as of 23 January 2012). |
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1.

In the light of the mission and tasks entrusted to it by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 (1), the Supervisory Committee (SC) of the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) hereby defines its strategic objectives and priorities for the first half of its five years mandate (as of 23 January 2012).

1.   LEGAL FRAMEWORK

1.1.   Mission and role of the Supervisory Committee

| 2. | The mission of the SC, as outlined by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013, is to reinforce OLAF's independence in the proper exercise of the competences conferred upon it (2). To accomplish this mission, the SC was entrusted with a threefold role:






  — | The SC is the supervisory body of OLAF and a guardian of OLAF's independence. |
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2.

The mission of the SC, as outlined by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013, is to reinforce OLAF's independence in the proper exercise of the competences conferred upon it (2). To accomplish this mission, the SC was entrusted with a threefold role:

—

The SC is the supervisory body of OLAF and a guardian of OLAF's independence.

| — | The SC plays an advisory role towards the Director-General of OLAF (DG). |
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The SC plays an advisory role towards the Director-General of OLAF (DG).

| — | The SC is a dialogue partner of the EU institutions. |
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The SC is a dialogue partner of the EU institutions.

1.2.   Core tasks of the Supervisory Committee

| 3. | The core tasks of the SC are also defined by the Regulation from this triple perspective.






  — | As a supervisory body, the SC shall regularly monitor the implementation by OLAF of its investigative function and, in particular, developments concerning the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigations (3). |
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3.

The core tasks of the SC are also defined by the Regulation from this triple perspective.

—

As a supervisory body, the SC shall regularly monitor the implementation by OLAF of its investigative function and, in particular, developments concerning the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigations (3).

| — | In the framework of its advisory role, the SC provides consultation to the DG:






  — | by communicating to him the results of the SC's monitoring of the implementation of the OLAF investigative function, the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigations and making, where necessary, appropriate recommendations; |
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In the framework of its advisory role, the SC provides consultation to the DG:

—

by communicating to him the results of the SC's monitoring of the implementation of the OLAF investigative function, the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigations and making, where necessary, appropriate recommendations;

| — | by addressing to him opinions including, where appropriate, recommendations on, inter alia, the resources needed to carry out OLAF's investigative function, on the investigative priorities and on the duration of the investigation (4); |
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—

by addressing to him opinions including, where appropriate, recommendations on, inter alia, the resources needed to carry out OLAF's investigative function, on the investigative priorities and on the duration of the investigation (4);

| — | by submitting its observations (including, where appropriate, recommendations) on the guidelines on investigation procedures (and any modification thereto) adopted by the DG in accordance with Article 17(8) of the Regulation. |
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by submitting its observations (including, where appropriate, recommendations) on the guidelines on investigation procedures (and any modification thereto) adopted by the DG in accordance with Article 17(8) of the Regulation.

| — | As a dialogue partner of the EU institutions, the SC reports to them on its activities (5) and exchanges views at a political level (6), thus providing the EU institutions with expertise based on its monitoring experience. |
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As a dialogue partner of the EU institutions, the SC reports to them on its activities (5) and exchanges views at a political level (6), thus providing the EU institutions with expertise based on its monitoring experience.

1.3.   Reporting

| 4. | The SC reports to the European Parliament, the Commission, the Council and the European Court of Auditors on its findings and activities via:






  — | activity reports, which remain the primary medium to report to the EU institutions on the SC's findings and assessment of OLAF's independence, the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigation (7); |
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4.

The SC reports to the European Parliament, the Commission, the Council and the European Court of Auditors on its findings and activities via:

—

activity reports, which remain the primary medium to report to the EU institutions on the SC's findings and assessment of OLAF's independence, the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigation (7);

| — | reports on the results of OLAF's investigations and the action taken on the basis of those results (8); |
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—

reports on the results of OLAF's investigations and the action taken on the basis of those results (8);

| — | opinions, including, where appropriate, recommendations adopted on the SC's own initiative or at the request of the DG or of an institution, body, office or agency (9). |
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opinions, including, where appropriate, recommendations adopted on the SC's own initiative or at the request of the DG or of an institution, body, office or agency (9).

| 5. | The SC underlines that opinions issued at the request of the DG or by an institution, body, office or agency should relate to the core activities of the SC and should not interfere with the conduct of investigations in progress, or put the independence and the objectivity of the SC at risk. |
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5.

The SC underlines that opinions issued at the request of the DG or by an institution, body, office or agency should relate to the core activities of the SC and should not interfere with the conduct of investigations in progress, or put the independence and the objectivity of the SC at risk.

1.4.   Access to information

| 6. | The SC's monitoring is based on information that the DG is obliged to provide:






  — | The investigation policy priorities determined in the context of the annual management plan (10); |
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6.

The SC's monitoring is based on information that the DG is obliged to provide:

—

The investigation policy priorities determined in the context of the annual management plan (10);

| — | Periodic information on OLAF's activities, on the implementation of its investigative function and the action taken by way of follow-up to investigations (11); |
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—

Periodic information on OLAF's activities, on the implementation of its investigative function and the action taken by way of follow-up to investigations (11);

| — | Periodic information on cases in which the recommendations made by the DG have not been followed, on cases in which information has been transmitted to judicial authorities of the Member States and on the duration of investigations (12); |
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Periodic information on cases in which the recommendations made by the DG have not been followed, on cases in which information has been transmitted to judicial authorities of the Member States and on the duration of investigations (12);

| — | Decisions to defer informing an institution, body, office or agency that its member, official or other servant may be a person concerned in an internal investigation (13); |
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Decisions to defer informing an institution, body, office or agency that its member, official or other servant may be a person concerned in an internal investigation (13);

| — | The OLAF preliminary draft budget (14). |
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—

The OLAF preliminary draft budget (14).

| 7. | In addition, the SC may ask the Office for additional information on investigations, including reports and recommendations on closed investigations, without however interfering with the conduct of investigations in progress (15). |
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7.

In addition, the SC may ask the Office for additional information on investigations, including reports and recommendations on closed investigations, without however interfering with the conduct of investigations in progress (15).

2.   MONITORING FORMULA

| 8. | The SC provides OLAF and the EU institutions with a first-hand practitioners' view based on their expertise as high-level external professionals and on the regular monitoring of OLAF's investigative function. |
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8.

The SC provides OLAF and the EU institutions with a first-hand practitioners' view based on their expertise as high-level external professionals and on the regular monitoring of OLAF's investigative function.

| 9. | The SC's monitoring is carried out both on a systemic level and on a case-by-case basis, using a matrix review of OLAF investigative activities: the SC collects and examines information concerning OLAF's cases horizontally and on sampling bases for the purpose of systemic and structural analyses; in addition it examines individual files or their components in order to obtain a more profound and concrete understanding of sensitive areas. |
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9.

The SC's monitoring is carried out both on a systemic level and on a case-by-case basis, using a matrix review of OLAF investigative activities: the SC collects and examines information concerning OLAF's cases horizontally and on sampling bases for the purpose of systemic and structural analyses; in addition it examines individual files or their components in order to obtain a more profound and concrete understanding of sensitive areas.

| 10. | The SC's monitoring experience, based on examination of individual case files (or their representative samples), on information regularly forwarded by the DG as well as on the SC Members' specific knowledge (savoir-faire) of investigations, allows the SC to provide particular added value to the implementation by OLAF of its investigative function. The SC thus effectively contributes to ensuring, within OLAF, good administration, good governance and respect for fundamental rights and procedural guarantees as set out in EU law. |
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10.

The SC's monitoring experience, based on examination of individual case files (or their representative samples), on information regularly forwarded by the DG as well as on the SC Members' specific knowledge (savoir-faire) of investigations, allows the SC to provide particular added value to the implementation by OLAF of its investigative function. The SC thus effectively contributes to ensuring, within OLAF, good administration, good governance and respect for fundamental rights and procedural guarantees as set out in EU law.

3.   SECRETARIAT OF THE SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE

3.1.   Role of the Secretariat

| 11. | The role of the Secretariat of the SC (SCS) is to assist the SC Members in the discharge of their functions. The SCS staff members, legal and operational experts, prepare and carry out the initial examination of those matters subject to the SC monitoring and present the results for the SC Members' consideration. |
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11.

The role of the Secretariat of the SC (SCS) is to assist the SC Members in the discharge of their functions. The SCS staff members, legal and operational experts, prepare and carry out the initial examination of those matters subject to the SC monitoring and present the results for the SC Members' consideration.

| 12. | The Regulation obliges OLAF to allocate staff to the SCS ‘in close consultation with the SC’ (16) and to guarantee the independent functioning of the SCS in order to ensure that the SC can carry out its mission efficiently
   (17) — as already recommended by the European Court of Auditors (18) and by the SC (19) in 2011. |
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12.

The Regulation obliges OLAF to allocate staff to the SCS ‘in close consultation with the SC’ (16) and to guarantee the independent functioning of the SCS in order to ensure that the SC can carry out its mission efficiently
   (17) — as already recommended by the European Court of Auditors (18) and by the SC (19) in 2011.

3.2.   Independent functioning of the Secretariat

| 13. | It is crucial that the SCS be able to assist the SC in the implementation of its monitoring functions in a loyal and efficient manner without being exposed to the risks of potential conflicts of interest as OLAF staff subordinate to the DG. |
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13.

It is crucial that the SCS be able to assist the SC in the implementation of its monitoring functions in a loyal and efficient manner without being exposed to the risks of potential conflicts of interest as OLAF staff subordinate to the DG.

| 14. | Therefore, the SC has recommended to the DG four conditions to ensure the independent functioning of the SCS (20): |
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14.

Therefore, the SC has recommended to the DG four conditions to ensure the independent functioning of the SCS (20):

—   Reclassification of the Head of the SCS as a senior manager

| 15. | The Head of the SCS, also having the function of the SC Secretary, represents the SC in the daily monitoring of OLAF's investigative activities. Since, as an OLAF official, he is hierarchically subordinate directly to the DG, it is essential for the integrity of the SC's monitoring to put in place safeguards of independence for the Head of the SCS. Therefore, when the SCS was originally established, its Head was nominated at Director level (21) (in OLAF only the senior management enjoys certain, although very limited, independence with regard to the DG, who is not alone to decide on their appointments, internal transfers or leave) (22). |
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15.

The Head of the SCS, also having the function of the SC Secretary, represents the SC in the daily monitoring of OLAF's investigative activities. Since, as an OLAF official, he is hierarchically subordinate directly to the DG, it is essential for the integrity of the SC's monitoring to put in place safeguards of independence for the Head of the SCS. Therefore, when the SCS was originally established, its Head was nominated at Director level (21) (in OLAF only the senior management enjoys certain, although very limited, independence with regard to the DG, who is not alone to decide on their appointments, internal transfers or leave) (22).

—   Recruitment, appraisal and promotion of the Head of the SCS on the basis of SC decisions

| 16. | The recruitment of the Head of the SCS should be done through an open competition to reinforce the independent nature of the SC. His appraisal and promotion should be decided on the basis of input from the SC Chairman. |
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16.

The recruitment of the Head of the SCS should be done through an open competition to reinforce the independent nature of the SC. His appraisal and promotion should be decided on the basis of input from the SC Chairman.

—   Recruitment, appraisal and promotion of the SCS's staff by its Head

| 17. | The recruitment, appraisal and promotion of the SCS's staff should be delegated, as far as possible, to the Head of the SCS (23). |
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17.

The recruitment, appraisal and promotion of the SCS's staff should be delegated, as far as possible, to the Head of the SCS (23).

—   Sub-delegation of the SCS's budget implementation to its Head

| 18. | Powers of the authorising officer with regard to the SCS's budget should be delegated to the Head of the SCS as is already the case for the SC's budget. This would mean, for example, that authorisation of missions for the SCS staff and their participation at public events on behalf of the SC be sub-delegated to the Head of the SCS and thus reinforce the ability of the SC Members to carry out their duties efficiently and to work with their Secretariat in a flexible manner. |
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18.

Powers of the authorising officer with regard to the SCS's budget should be delegated to the Head of the SCS as is already the case for the SC's budget. This would mean, for example, that authorisation of missions for the SCS staff and their participation at public events on behalf of the SC be sub-delegated to the Head of the SCS and thus reinforce the ability of the SC Members to carry out their duties efficiently and to work with their Secretariat in a flexible manner.

| 19. | Such sub-delegation would also be in line with the new wording of the provisions on the financing of OLAF (which introduce independently fixed resources for the SCS (24)) as well as with the European Parliament's position (25). |
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19.

Such sub-delegation would also be in line with the new wording of the provisions on the financing of OLAF (which introduce independently fixed resources for the SCS (24)) as well as with the European Parliament's position (25).

4.   STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES

| 20. | In the light of the mission and tasks entrusted to it by the Regulation, the SC hereby defines its strategic objectives for the forthcoming period of its mandate, aiming at increasing the effectiveness and impact of its core activities and thus at supporting OLAF's investigative function and reinforcing OLAF's investigative independence. To meet these objectives, the SC has identified the following priorities. |
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20.

In the light of the mission and tasks entrusted to it by the Regulation, the SC hereby defines its strategic objectives for the forthcoming period of its mandate, aiming at increasing the effectiveness and impact of its core activities and thus at supporting OLAF's investigative function and reinforcing OLAF's investigative independence. To meet these objectives, the SC has identified the following priorities.

Objective 1: Develop effective (and pragmatic) monitoring tools

1.   Adopt evaluation grids

| — | Propose new (and/or update the existing) evaluation grids concerning the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigations, to be filled in and regularly provided by OLAF. |
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Propose new (and/or update the existing) evaluation grids concerning the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigations, to be filled in and regularly provided by OLAF.

2.   Define and use criteria for the sampling of OLAF cases

| — | Define and use random, statistical and risk-based criteria for the selection of representative samples of OLAF cases. |
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—

Define and use random, statistical and risk-based criteria for the selection of representative samples of OLAF cases.

3.   Rely on the experience of experts from Member States

| — | Rely on the experience of experts from judicial and administrative authorities of Member States, working with OLAF and/or on the follow-up to OLAF cases. |
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—

Rely on the experience of experts from judicial and administrative authorities of Member States, working with OLAF and/or on the follow-up to OLAF cases.

| — | Return to the practice of hearing these experts for the purpose of the preparation of the SC activity reports and opinions. |
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—

Return to the practice of hearing these experts for the purpose of the preparation of the SC activity reports and opinions.

| — | Organise such hearings by an SC rapporteur together with a member of the SCS working on a specific topic, and/or, exceptionally, in the context of the SC plenary meetings. |
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Organise such hearings by an SC rapporteur together with a member of the SCS working on a specific topic, and/or, exceptionally, in the context of the SC plenary meetings.

| — | Consider the possibility to occasionally organise the SC's plenary meetings in (some of) the Member States, in order to gather — from national experts — information and evidence on subjects precisely defined in advance. |
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—

Consider the possibility to occasionally organise the SC's plenary meetings in (some of) the Member States, in order to gather — from national experts — information and evidence on subjects precisely defined in advance.

Objective 2: Improve cooperation with OLAF and its Director-General

1.   Agree on new working arrangements with OLAF

| — | Propose to OLAF and agree on new working arrangements. |
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—

Propose to OLAF and agree on new working arrangements.

2.   Organise regular exchanges of views with the Director-General

| — | Establish a direct reporting and consultation line with the DG and regularly invite him to the SC's plenary meetings. |
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—

Establish a direct reporting and consultation line with the DG and regularly invite him to the SC's plenary meetings.

| — | Exchange views and information with the DG on specific topics relating to OLAF's investigative activity. |
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—

Exchange views and information with the DG on specific topics relating to OLAF's investigative activity.

3.   Raise awareness of the SC's role and work within OLAF

| — | Organise/participate in workshops/meetings/lunch debates with OLAF staff. |
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—

Organise/participate in workshops/meetings/lunch debates with OLAF staff.

Objective 3: Act as an important player in the fight against fraud

1.   Participate in the exchange of views with the institutions

| — | Actively participate in the exchange of views with the EU institutions and the DG. |
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—

Actively participate in the exchange of views with the EU institutions and the DG.

| — | Use this new inter-institutional forum as a platform for discussing the results of its monitoring as presented in the SC's opinions, reports and activity reports. |
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—

Use this new inter-institutional forum as a platform for discussing the results of its monitoring as presented in the SC's opinions, reports and activity reports.

| — | Ensure that the exchange of views represents a positive arena for discussion and for assessment of the effectiveness of OLAF's work and thus becomes an asset in the fight against fraud. |
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—

Ensure that the exchange of views represents a positive arena for discussion and for assessment of the effectiveness of OLAF's work and thus becomes an asset in the fight against fraud.

| — | Ensure that the exchange of views does not entail the politicising of OLAF. |
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—

Ensure that the exchange of views does not entail the politicising of OLAF.

2.   Hold bilateral meetings

| — | Hold regular (yearly) meetings with the three appointing EU institutions and with the European Court of Auditors (at least every two years). |
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Hold regular (yearly) meetings with the three appointing EU institutions and with the European Court of Auditors (at least every two years).

| — | Hold bilateral meetings with the Commissioner responsible for the fight against fraud (at least once a year). |
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—

Hold bilateral meetings with the Commissioner responsible for the fight against fraud (at least once a year).

3.   Take a proactive role in the legislative process concerning the revision of the EU antifraud legislation

| — | Take a proactive role in the on-going/forthcoming revision of the EU antifraud legislation, without however interfering in the EU legislative process. |
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—

Take a proactive role in the on-going/forthcoming revision of the EU antifraud legislation, without however interfering in the EU legislative process.

| — | Assess the application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013. |
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—

Assess the application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013.

| — | Make appropriate recommendations on the instructions/guidelines to staff on investigative procedures as a way to address some of the remaining weaknesses of the OLAF Regulation, in particular, regarding fundamental rights and procedural guarantees. |
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—

Make appropriate recommendations on the instructions/guidelines to staff on investigative procedures as a way to address some of the remaining weaknesses of the OLAF Regulation, in particular, regarding fundamental rights and procedural guarantees.

| — | Contribute to the development of the Commission's legislative proposal on Improving OLAF's governance and reinforcing procedural safeguards in investigations
   (26), in order to:






  — | reinforce procedural guarantees applicable in OLAF's investigations; |
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—

Contribute to the development of the Commission's legislative proposal on Improving OLAF's governance and reinforcing procedural safeguards in investigations
   (26), in order to:

—

reinforce procedural guarantees applicable in OLAF's investigations;

| — | reinforce OLAF's supervision while at the same time safeguarding its investigative independence. |
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—

reinforce OLAF's supervision while at the same time safeguarding its investigative independence.

Objective 4: Increase the SC's visibility among EU institutions and Member States

1.   Develop an effective communication strategy

2.   Improve reporting tools

| — | Inform the appointing institutions of the decisions/action points decided on by the SC during its plenary meetings, in full respect of the principle of confidentiality of investigations. |
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—

Inform the appointing institutions of the decisions/action points decided on by the SC during its plenary meetings, in full respect of the principle of confidentiality of investigations.

| — | Change the format of the activity report, in order to better reflect the reinforced role and the core activities of the SC. |
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—

Change the format of the activity report, in order to better reflect the reinforced role and the core activities of the SC.

3.   Increase interaction with stakeholders on a broader range of issues

| — | Organise and/or participate in events promoting the SC's work (workshops, presentations, conferences, cocktails etc.). |
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—

Organise and/or participate in events promoting the SC's work (workshops, presentations, conferences, cocktails etc.).

Objective 5: Develop the SC's working methods

1.   Ensure a consistent approach in monitoring OLAF cases

| — | Adopt monitoring guidelines. |
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—

Adopt monitoring guidelines.

| — | Adopt a workflow system to monitor the follow-up by OLAF of the SC's recommendations. |
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—

Adopt a workflow system to monitor the follow-up by OLAF of the SC's recommendations.

2.   Update the SC's Rules of procedure

| — | Update the SC's Rules of procedure, in order to reflect the changes brought about by the new Regulation. |
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—

Update the SC's Rules of procedure, in order to reflect the changes brought about by the new Regulation.

3.   Develop an ethical code of conduct

| — | Develop an ethical code of conduct for the use of the SC Members. |
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—

Develop an ethical code of conduct for the use of the SC Members.

Objective 6: Safeguard the independent functioning of the SC and its Secretariat

| — | Advocate the modernisation of the remuneration and financial arrangements for the SC's Members. |
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—

Advocate the modernisation of the remuneration and financial arrangements for the SC's Members.

| — | Advocate a separate budget line for the SC and its Secretariat. |
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—

Advocate a separate budget line for the SC and its Secretariat.

| — | Recommend to the DG appropriate measures for ensuring the independent functioning of the SCS: (1) reclassification of the Head of the SCS as a senior manager; (2) recruitment, appraisal and promotion of the Head of the SCS on the basis of SC's decisions; (3) recruitment, appraisal and promotion of the SCS's staff by its Head; (4) sub-delegation of the SCS's budget implementation to its Head. |
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—

Recommend to the DG appropriate measures for ensuring the independent functioning of the SCS: (1) reclassification of the Head of the SCS as a senior manager; (2) recruitment, appraisal and promotion of the Head of the SCS on the basis of SC's decisions; (3) recruitment, appraisal and promotion of the SCS's staff by its Head; (4) sub-delegation of the SCS's budget implementation to its Head.

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(1)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1).

(2)  Article 15(1) first paragraph.

(3)  Article 15(1) first and second paragraphs.

(4)  Article 15(1) third paragraph.

(5)  Article 15(9).

(6)  Article 16.

(7)  Article 15(9) first paragraph.

(8)  Article 15(9) second paragraph.

(9)  Article 15(1) third paragraph.

(10)  Article 17(5) first paragraph.

(11)  Article 17(5) second paragraph.

(12)  Article 17(5) third paragraph.

(13)  Article 4(6).

(14)  Article 6(2) of the Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 28 April 1999 establishing OLAF (OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 20) as amended by Commission Decision 2013/478/EU of 27 September 2013 (OJ L 257, 28.9.2013, p. 19).

(15)  Article 15(1) fifth paragraph.

(16)  Article 15(8) sixth sentence.

(17)  Recital (40).

(18)  Point 44 of the European Court of Auditor's Opinion No 6/2011: In order to reinforce the independent role of the Supervisory Committee, the Court recommends that the proposed Article 11(6) should provide that the Committee's secretariat must act solely in accordance with the Committee's instructions and independently of OLAF, and may not be appointed by or subject to the authority of the Director-General.

(19)  Point 41 of the SC's Opinion no 4/2011: Although provided by OLAF, the secretariat shall work in complete independence under the chair of the SC and its members. (...) members of the secretariat shall be appointed by an Appointing Authority different from OLAF DG, at the suggestion of the SC; they shall be periodically evaluated solely by the SC; they shall act with loyalty and in full respect of the instructions received exclusively from the SC. (...) the independence of its secretariat — and consequently of the SC — is illusory if the staff of the secretariat is appointed, administered and promoted by the service which it is in charge of monitoring.

(20)  Cf. SC's Opinion No 1/2013 on OLAF's Preliminary Draft Budget for 2014 and the previous SC's opinions on OLAF's Preliminary Draft Budget.

(21)  His successor was a senior Head of Unit, but the then DG ensured the then SC Chairman on 13.2.2007 that: ‘The status of your Secretariat is indicated by the fact that your present Secretary is one of only three OLAF Heads of Unit to hold the rank of AD14’.

(22)  If, under the general rules of the Commission, it were undesirable to classify a Head of a relatively small team as a director, then the model of the Legal Service could be followed with the Head of the SCS classified as a principal (legal) advisor with management functions over a team of legal officers and secretarial staff (e.g. the M team in the Legal Service consists of a principal legal advisor, 7 lawyers and 5 assistants). The tasks of the SCS Head consist mainly in providing legal advice to the SC Members. Alternatively, the arrangements concerning principal advisors in the European Commission's Bureau of European Policy Advisers could be applied.

(23)  In accordance with Article 6(1) of Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom establishing OLAF (as amended by Commission Decision 2013/478/EU: The DirectorGeneral of the Office shall exercise, with regard to the staff of the Office, the powers of the appointing authority and of the authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment delegated to him. He shall be permitted to sub-delegate those powers (...).

(24)  Article 18 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013:

| | The total appropriations for the Office, including for the Supervisory Committee and its secretariat, shall be entered under a specific budget line within the section of the general budget of the European Union relating to the Commission and shall be set out in detail in an Annex to that section. |
| --- | --- |

The total appropriations for the Office, including for the Supervisory Committee and its secretariat, shall be entered under a specific budget line within the section of the general budget of the European Union relating to the Commission and shall be set out in detail in an Annex to that section.

| | The establishment plan of the Office, including the secretariat of the Supervisory Committee, shall be annexed to the establishment plan of the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

The establishment plan of the Office, including the secretariat of the Supervisory Committee, shall be annexed to the establishment plan of the Commission.

(25)  On 23 October 2013 the Parliament recommended to ‘split the line for OLAF expenditure related to officials and temporary staff, to reflect the widened mandate and strengthened independence of the Secretariat of the OLAF Supervisory Committee provided for in the new OLAF Regulation’.

(26)  COM(2013)533 final, 17.7.2013.

---

ANEXA 9

Code of Conduct of the Members of the OLAF Supervisory Committee

| 1. | Members of the Supervisory Committee of OLAF (SC) shall act in a manner respecting the dignity and public trust of their office. They shall refrain from any activities which may jeopardise or may appear to jeopardise the independence and impartiality of the SC. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Members of the Supervisory Committee of OLAF (SC) shall act in a manner respecting the dignity and public trust of their office. They shall refrain from any activities which may jeopardise or may appear to jeopardise the independence and impartiality of the SC.

| 2. | Members of the SC shall not deal with a matter in which, directly or indirectly, they have any personal interest, in particular, any family or financial interests such as to impair their independence. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Members of the SC shall not deal with a matter in which, directly or indirectly, they have any personal interest, in particular, any family or financial interests such as to impair their independence.

| 3. | Members of the SC shall avoid participation in the examination of individual cases concurrently as the responsible officials of a competent national authority and as SC Members. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Members of the SC shall avoid participation in the examination of individual cases concurrently as the responsible officials of a competent national authority and as SC Members.

| 4. | An SC Member shall withdraw from participation in the SC proceedings on an individual OLAF case if he or the services which he directs or over which he exercises effective control or influence are conducting or assist OLAF in conducting an investigation related to that case. |
| --- | --- |

4.

An SC Member shall withdraw from participation in the SC proceedings on an individual OLAF case if he or the services which he directs or over which he exercises effective control or influence are conducting or assist OLAF in conducting an investigation related to that case.

| 5. | An SC Member shall withdraw from participation in the SC proceedings on an individual OLAF case if he directs or exercises effective control or influence over national judicial or administrative proceedings related to that case. |
| --- | --- |

5.

An SC Member shall withdraw from participation in the SC proceedings on an individual OLAF case if he directs or exercises effective control or influence over national judicial or administrative proceedings related to that case.

| 6. | An SC Member in a judicial or administrative position may withdraw, in accordance with national provisions on impartiality, from national proceedings related to an individual case if he participated as SC Member in the SC proceedings related to that case. |
| --- | --- |

6.

An SC Member in a judicial or administrative position may withdraw, in accordance with national provisions on impartiality, from national proceedings related to an individual case if he participated as SC Member in the SC proceedings related to that case.

| 7. | SC Members shall inform the Chairman and the Secretary without delay of the situations referred to in paragraphs 2-6. |
| --- | --- |

7.

SC Members shall inform the Chairman and the Secretary without delay of the situations referred to in paragraphs 2-6.

| 8. | Documents drawn up following SC proceedings on an individual case shall clearly indicate if any SC Member withdrew from the proceedings or if any of them participated in his capacity as a national judicial or administrative official. |
| --- | --- |

8.

Documents drawn up following SC proceedings on an individual case shall clearly indicate if any SC Member withdrew from the proceedings or if any of them participated in his capacity as a national judicial or administrative official.

| 9. | Prior to sending to an SC Member any information related to a case (to be) transmitted to his national authorities, the Secretariat of the SC shall provide such Member with an opportunity to withdraw from the SC proceedings on that case. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Prior to sending to an SC Member any information related to a case (to be) transmitted to his national authorities, the Secretariat of the SC shall provide such Member with an opportunity to withdraw from the SC proceedings on that case.

Brussels, 9 October 2013

For the Supervisory Committee,

Chairman

Explanatory memorandum on the Code of Conduct of the Members of the Supervisory Committee: safeguards of impartiality and risks of conflict of interest in the exercise of the monitoring functions

Explanatory memorandum on the Code of Conduct of the Members of the Supervisory Committee: safeguards of impartiality and risks of conflict of interest in the exercise of the monitoring functions

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

| 1. | The Supervisory Committee (SC) of OLAF, whose mission is to reinforce OLAF's independence by the regular monitoring of its investigative function, is composed of five independent members having experience in senior judicial, investigative or comparable functions relating to the areas of OLAF's activities (1). The membership of the SC is a parttime function. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The Supervisory Committee (SC) of OLAF, whose mission is to reinforce OLAF's independence by the regular monitoring of its investigative function, is composed of five independent members having experience in senior judicial, investigative or comparable functions relating to the areas of OLAF's activities (1). The membership of the SC is a parttime function.

1

| 2. | As such, the Members of the SC generally hold key functions in their national judicial system or administration, allowing them to act as a counterpart/partner of OLAF at a national level at any stage of an OLAF case. At the same time, they regularly monitor OLAF's cases, in particular those where information has been transmitted to national judicial authorities. Situations may thus occur when they are to deal with the same OLAF case both in the framework of their national duties and as the SC Members. |
| --- | --- |

2.

As such, the Members of the SC generally hold key functions in their national judicial system or administration, allowing them to act as a counterpart/partner of OLAF at a national level at any stage of an OLAF case. At the same time, they regularly monitor OLAF's cases, in particular those where information has been transmitted to national judicial authorities. Situations may thus occur when they are to deal with the same OLAF case both in the framework of their national duties and as the SC Members.

| 3. | It is essential to make sure that dealing with a case in this dual capacity does not give rise to actual or potential conflicts of interest and then endanger impartiality and objectivity as well as the public trust in the impartiality and objectivity in the exercise of the national functions of the SC Members or in the discharge of their duties in the SC. Actual or potential conflicts of interests could have a negative impact on the impartiality of the decisions taken and on the quality of their work, could damage their reputation and undermine both the EU institutions' and the public's trust in the SC. Given the potential risks involved, it is important therefore to identify the risk areas for conflict of interest situations in order to prevent them. |
| --- | --- |

3.

It is essential to make sure that dealing with a case in this dual capacity does not give rise to actual or potential conflicts of interest and then endanger impartiality and objectivity as well as the public trust in the impartiality and objectivity in the exercise of the national functions of the SC Members or in the discharge of their duties in the SC. Actual or potential conflicts of interests could have a negative impact on the impartiality of the decisions taken and on the quality of their work, could damage their reputation and undermine both the EU institutions' and the public's trust in the SC. Given the potential risks involved, it is important therefore to identify the risk areas for conflict of interest situations in order to prevent them.

| 4. | To do so, after defining the conflict of interest (part 1), it is necessary to make an overview of the specific tasks of the SC Members which may possibly lead to conflict of interest situations (part 2), followed by an inventory of concrete situations when conflicts of interest may occur (part 3). Finally, a clear procedure on how to manage conflict of interest situations is also necessary (part 4). |
| --- | --- |

4.

To do so, after defining the conflict of interest (part 1), it is necessary to make an overview of the specific tasks of the SC Members which may possibly lead to conflict of interest situations (part 2), followed by an inventory of concrete situations when conflicts of interest may occur (part 3). Finally, a clear procedure on how to manage conflict of interest situations is also necessary (part 4).

part 1

part 2

part 3

part 4

1.   DEFINITION OF THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST

DEFINITION OF THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST

| 5. | Apart from their obligation to act independently, without seeking nor taking instructions from any government or any institution, body, office or agency (2), the Members of the SC are required to act in full objectivity and impartiality. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Apart from their obligation to act independently, without seeking nor taking instructions from any government or any institution, body, office or agency (2), the Members of the SC are required to act in full objectivity and impartiality.

2

| 6. | In general terms, the requirement of impartiality is enshrined in the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, which foresees that ‘every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union’ (3). |
| --- | --- |

6.

In general terms, the requirement of impartiality is enshrined in the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, which foresees that ‘every person has the right to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union’ (3).

3

| 7. | According to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (standing as a source of general principles of the Union law in accordance with the Article 6(3) of the Treaty on the European Union), ‘as a rule, impartiality denotes the absence of prejudice or bias’ and ‘even appearances may be of a certain importance’ or, in other words, ‘justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be done’
   (4). |
| --- | --- |

7.

According to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (standing as a source of general principles of the Union law in accordance with the Article 6(3) of the Treaty on the European Union), ‘as a rule, impartiality denotes the absence of prejudice or bias’ and ‘even appearances may be of a certain importance’ or, in other words, ‘justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be done’
   (4).

‘as a rule, impartiality denotes the absence of prejudice or bias’ and ‘even appearances may be of a certain importance’ or, in other words, ‘justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be done’

4

| 8. | The requirement of impartiality and objectivity and the obligation to avoid situations in which appearance may give rise to doubts with regard to objectivity and impartiality is also reflected in Article 298 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which stipulates that, in carrying out their missions, the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union shall have the support of an open, efficient and independent European administration. Independence here refers generally to objectivity and impartiality. Even though this provision concerns directly only the SC Secretariat (composed of EU officials), it expresses a general principle of Union law guiding also the activities of the SC itself. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The requirement of impartiality and objectivity and the obligation to avoid situations in which appearance may give rise to doubts with regard to objectivity and impartiality is also reflected in Article 298 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which stipulates that, in carrying out their missions, the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union shall have the support of an open, efficient and independent European administration. Independence here refers generally to objectivity and impartiality. Even though this provision concerns directly only the SC Secretariat (composed of EU officials), it expresses a general principle of Union law guiding also the activities of the SC itself.

| 9. | The requirement of impartiality, applied to the execution by the SC Members of their tasks, includes an obligation to avoid conflicts of interest, as established in the Decision on their appointment and their Rules of Procedurewhich stipulate that the SC Members ‘shall not deal with a matter in which, directly or indirectly, they have any personal interest, in particular, any family or financial interests such as to impair their independence’
   (5). |
| --- | --- |

9.

The requirement of impartiality, applied to the execution by the SC Members of their tasks, includes an obligation to avoid conflicts of interest, as established in the Decision on their appointment and their Rules of Procedurewhich stipulate that the SC Members ‘shall not deal with a matter in which, directly or indirectly, they have any personal interest, in particular, any family or financial interests such as to impair their independence’
   (5).

‘shall not deal with a matter in which, directly or indirectly, they have any personal interest, in particular, any family or financial interests such as to impair their independence’

5

| 10. | The above mentioned acts do not define the concept of conflict of interest. A comprehensive definition can be found in the Guidelines of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (6), which indicates also three types of conflict of interest:
  —   
  Conflict of interest (actual)
  : ‘a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private-capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities’.
  —   
  Conflict of interest (apparent)
  : ‘an apparent conflict of interest can be said to exist where it appears that a public official's private interests could improperly influence the performance of their duties but this is not in fact the case’.
  —   
  Conflict of interest (potential)
  : ‘a potential conflict arises where a public official has private interests which are such that a conflict of interest would arise if the official were to become involved in relevant (i.e. conflicting) official responsibilities in the future’. |
| --- | --- |

10.

The above mentioned acts do not define the concept of conflict of interest. A comprehensive definition can be found in the Guidelines of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (6), which indicates also three types of conflict of interest:

6

—   
  Conflict of interest (actual)
  : ‘a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private-capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities’.

Conflict of interest (actual)

‘a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official has private-capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities’

—   
  Conflict of interest (apparent)
  : ‘an apparent conflict of interest can be said to exist where it appears that a public official's private interests could improperly influence the performance of their duties but this is not in fact the case’.

Conflict of interest (apparent)

but this is not in fact the case

—   
  Conflict of interest (potential)
  : ‘a potential conflict arises where a public official has private interests which are such that a conflict of interest would arise if the official were to become involved in relevant (i.e. conflicting) official responsibilities in the future’.

Conflict of interest (potential)

potential

| 11. | It is also worth noting the Article 13 of Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. 2000 (10):

  ‘1.   Conflict of interest arises from a situation in which the public official has a private interest which is such as to influence, or appear to influence, the impartial and objective performance of his or her official duties.


  2.   The public official's private interest includes any advantage to himself or herself, to his or her family, close relatives, friends and persons or organisations with whom he or she has or has had business or political relations. It includes also any liability, whether financial or civil, relating thereto’. |
| --- | --- |

11.

It is also worth noting the Article 13 of Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. 2000 (10):

‘1.   Conflict of interest arises from a situation in which the public official has a private interest which is such as to influence, or appear to influence, the impartial and objective performance of his or her official duties.

‘1.

Conflict of interest arises from a situation in which the public official has a private interest which is such as to influence, or appear to influence, the impartial and objective performance of his or her official duties.

2.   The public official's private interest includes any advantage to himself or herself, to his or her family, close relatives, friends and persons or organisations with whom he or she has or has had business or political relations. It includes also any liability, whether financial or civil, relating thereto’.

2.

The public official's private interest includes any advantage to himself or herself, to his or her family, close relatives, friends and persons or organisations with whom he or she has or has had business or political relations. It includes also any liability, whether financial or civil, relating thereto’.

| 12. | This definition of conflict of interest has three dimensions: (i) the existence of a private or personal interest of a public official, which (ii) comes into conflict with his official duty, and thus (iii) leads to a conflict of interest interfering with professional principles. Essentially, in a conflict of interest situation, the private interest of the public official can or could influence the objective and impartial performance of his official duties (7). |
| --- | --- |

12.

This definition of conflict of interest has three dimensions: (i) the existence of a private or personal interest of a public official, which (ii) comes into conflict with his official duty, and thus (iii) leads to a conflict of interest interfering with professional principles. Essentially, in a conflict of interest situation, the private interest of the public official can or could influence the objective and impartial performance of his official duties (7).

7

| 13. | Conflict of interest was also defined in the EU case-law. The EU judiciary assessed the scope of the conflict of interest under the Staff Regulations, and gave it a broad definition (8). Although the Members of the SC are not bound by the Staff Regulations, the interpretation of the Court is relevant on the matter since the wording of the legal provisions concerning conflict of interest — in the Staff Regulations and in the Decision on their appointment — is quite similar. They are an expression of the same underlying general principles of EU law enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. |
| --- | --- |

13.

Conflict of interest was also defined in the EU case-law. The EU judiciary assessed the scope of the conflict of interest under the Staff Regulations, and gave it a broad definition (8). Although the Members of the SC are not bound by the Staff Regulations, the interpretation of the Court is relevant on the matter since the wording of the legal provisions concerning conflict of interest — in the Staff Regulations and in the Decision on their appointment — is quite similar. They are an expression of the same underlying general principles of EU law enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

8

| 14. | The term conflict of interest as defined above does not, however, take into account expressly all the situations in which the impartiality and independence (as well as the appearance of impartiality and independence) of the SC Members may actually or potentially be endangered. Classic conflict of interest concerns situations in which a public official may have a private interest in conflict with his or her public duties. In the case of the SC Members, the independence and impartiality could be jeopardised also due to their dual roles as high national judicial or administrative officials and SC Members at the same time. |
| --- | --- |

14.

The term conflict of interest as defined above does not, however, take into account expressly all the situations in which the impartiality and independence (as well as the appearance of impartiality and independence) of the SC Members may actually or potentially be endangered. Classic conflict of interest concerns situations in which a public official may have a private interest in conflict with his or her public duties. In the case of the SC Members, the independence and impartiality could be jeopardised also due to their dual roles as high national judicial or administrative officials and SC Members at the same time.

conflict of interest

| 15. | Generally, the national in-depth expertise is of great benefit for the discharge of the duties of the SC. Yet, in some situations, an SC Member might have a dual role related to a particular OLAF investigation. This may raise the issue as to whether the judgment of the SC is, or appears to be independent of the judgment and proceedings of national authorities, or whether the data protection and confidentiality requirements either by national law or by Union law are fully observed. In addition, it is important for the independence and impartiality of the SC Members that the third parties understand in all communications in which capacity the SC Members are acting. The analyses of and the measures related to the conflict of interest situations shall cover, in particular, the situation of concurrent duties as national officials and SC Members. |
| --- | --- |

15.

Generally, the national in-depth expertise is of great benefit for the discharge of the duties of the SC. Yet, in some situations, an SC Member might have a dual role related to a particular OLAF investigation. This may raise the issue as to whether the judgment of the SC is, or appears to be independent of the judgment and proceedings of national authorities, or whether the data protection and confidentiality requirements either by national law or by Union law are fully observed. In addition, it is important for the independence and impartiality of the SC Members that the third parties understand in all communications in which capacity the SC Members are acting. The analyses of and the measures related to the conflict of interest situations shall cover, in particular, the situation of concurrent duties as national officials and SC Members.

2.   SC MEMBERS' TASKS WHICH MAY LEAD TO CONFLICT OF INTEREST SITUATIONS

SC MEMBERS' TASKS WHICH MAY LEAD TO CONFLICT OF INTEREST SITUATIONS

| 16. | The particular situation of the SC Members arises from the principle that they have their national duties as their primary public obligations. Article 15(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 requires the SC Members to have experience in the senior judicial or investigative functions in the Member States and the appointing Decision specifies that the membership of the SC is a part-time function. As a result the SC Members usually exercise simultaneously their dual roles: national officials and SC Members. |
| --- | --- |

16.

The particular situation of the SC Members arises from the principle that they have their national duties as their primary public obligations. Article 15(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 requires the SC Members to have experience in the senior judicial or investigative functions in the Member States and the appointing Decision specifies that the membership of the SC is a part-time function. As a result the SC Members usually exercise simultaneously their dual roles: national officials and SC Members.

| 17. | When exercising their national duties, the SC Members (or a national office or service which is directed by an SC Member or over which an SC Member exercises effective control or influence) (9) may be involved in an OLAF case at different stages:






  — | they may provide information or assist OLAF in an investigation (e.g. during an onthe-spot check) (10); |
| --- | --- | --- |

17.

When exercising their national duties, the SC Members (or a national office or service which is directed by an SC Member or over which an SC Member exercises effective control or influence) (9) may be involved in an OLAF case at different stages:

9

—

they may provide information or assist OLAF in an investigation (e.g. during an onthe-spot check) (10);

10

| — | they may conduct a national investigation which may be coordinated by OLAF (coordination case) or requiring assistance from OLAF; |
| --- | --- |

—

they may conduct a national investigation which may be coordinated by OLAF (coordination case) or requiring assistance from OLAF;

| — | they may be the addressees of OLAF's reports drawn up following an investigation and of subsequent recommendations (of judicial/financial nature) based on the findings of the OLAF investigation (11). |
| --- | --- |

—

they may be the addressees of OLAF's reports drawn up following an investigation and of subsequent recommendations (of judicial/financial nature) based on the findings of the OLAF investigation (11).

11

| 18. | In their capacity as SC Members, they carry out the tasks laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 and in Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom establishing OLAF (12). The duties of the SC include, inter alia, the regular monitoring of the implementation by OLAF of its investigative function, in order to reinforce the Office's independence in the proper exercise of its competences and, in particular, the monitoring of developments concerning the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigations in the light of the information supplied by the Director-General of OLAF. In duly justified situations, the SC may ask OLAF for additional information on investigations, including reports and recommendations on closed investigations, without however interfering with the conduct of investigations in progress. |
| --- | --- |

18.

In their capacity as SC Members, they carry out the tasks laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 and in Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom establishing OLAF (12). The duties of the SC include, inter alia, the regular monitoring of the implementation by OLAF of its investigative function, in order to reinforce the Office's independence in the proper exercise of its competences and, in particular, the monitoring of developments concerning the application of procedural guarantees and the duration of investigations in the light of the information supplied by the Director-General of OLAF. In duly justified situations, the SC may ask OLAF for additional information on investigations, including reports and recommendations on closed investigations, without however interfering with the conduct of investigations in progress.

12

3.   POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST SITUATIONS

POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST SITUATIONS

| 19. | Taken separately, both capacities in which the SC Members may act are official/public qualities. They are generally national officials, and as SC Members they are appointed by three EU institutions and exercise a mission of public interest. However, from the perspective of the definition of the conflict of interest, each of these two capacities could be regarded as a private interest when set against the other: when they act as national officials, their membership of the SC may be seen as a ‘private interest’; conversely, when they act as SC Members, their national duty could also be regarded as being a ‘private interest’ in the widest sense of the term (personal interest). |
| --- | --- |

19.

Taken separately, both capacities in which the SC Members may act are official/public qualities. They are generally national officials, and as SC Members they are appointed by three EU institutions and exercise a mission of public interest. However, from the perspective of the definition of the conflict of interest, each of these two capacities could be regarded as a private interest when set against the other: when they act as national officials, their membership of the SC may be seen as a ‘private interest’; conversely, when they act as SC Members, their national duty could also be regarded as being a ‘private interest’ in the widest sense of the term (personal interest).

| 20. | The conflict of interest would then occur when the activity as SC Members would improperly influence the performance of their official national responsibilities and vice versa, when their activity as national officials would improperly influence the performance of their responsibilities as SC Members. |
| --- | --- |

20.

The conflict of interest would then occur when the activity as SC Members would improperly influence the performance of their official national responsibilities and vice versa, when their activity as national officials would improperly influence the performance of their responsibilities as SC Members.

vice versa

(a)   Situations when the national duties (as ‘private interest’) could affect the performance of the SC duties (as ‘official duties’)

Situations when the national duties (as ‘private interest’) could affect the performance of the SC duties (as ‘official duties’)

| 21. | Example 1:
  —   
  Assumption
  : after being involved in an OLAF investigation in his national capacity, an SC Member becomes an addressee of an OLAF report to the SC on that investigation.
  —   
  Possible conflict of interest
  : participation in a dual role in the same process (as an SC Member evaluating the proper conduct of an investigation in which he was involved at the national level as a national official). |
| --- | --- |

21.

Example 1:

—   
  Assumption
  : after being involved in an OLAF investigation in his national capacity, an SC Member becomes an addressee of an OLAF report to the SC on that investigation.

Assumption

—   
  Possible conflict of interest
  : participation in a dual role in the same process (as an SC Member evaluating the proper conduct of an investigation in which he was involved at the national level as a national official).

Possible conflict of interest

| 22. | Example 2:
  —   
  Assumption
  : after having received as a national judicial official an OLAF report on an investigation, possibly with recommendations to initiate judicial proceedings, an SC Member would have to evaluate compliance by OLAF in that investigation with fundamental rights and with procedural requirements as laid down by the national law.
  —   
  Possible conflict of interest
  : a dual role in the same process; use of inside (confidential) information (13); lack of impartiality or lack of independence when acting under the authority of the national office. |
| --- | --- |

22.

Example 2:

—   
  Assumption
  : after having received as a national judicial official an OLAF report on an investigation, possibly with recommendations to initiate judicial proceedings, an SC Member would have to evaluate compliance by OLAF in that investigation with fundamental rights and with procedural requirements as laid down by the national law.

Assumption

—   
  Possible conflict of interest
  : a dual role in the same process; use of inside (confidential) information (13); lack of impartiality or lack of independence when acting under the authority of the national office.

Possible conflict of interest

13

| 23. | Example 3:
  —   
  Assumption
  : after having received as a national judicial official an OLAF report on an investigation, with recommendations to initiate judicial proceedings, an SC Member would have to monitor the follow-up by his national judicial authorities of the recommendations made by OLAF.
  —   
  Possible conflict of interest
  : a dual role in the same process; use of inside information; lack of impartiality or lack of independence when acting under the authority of the national office. |
| --- | --- |

23.

Example 3:

—   
  Assumption
  : after having received as a national judicial official an OLAF report on an investigation, with recommendations to initiate judicial proceedings, an SC Member would have to monitor the follow-up by his national judicial authorities of the recommendations made by OLAF.

Assumption

—   
  Possible conflict of interest
  : a dual role in the same process; use of inside information; lack of impartiality or lack of independence when acting under the authority of the national office.

Possible conflict of interest

(b)   Situations when the SC duties (as ‘private interest’) could affect the performance of the national duties (as ‘official duties’)

Situations when the SC duties (as ‘private interest’) could affect the performance of the national duties (as ‘official duties’)

| 24. | Example 4:
  —   
  Assumption
  : after having evaluated an OLAF investigation as an SC Member (in particular with regard to the respect of the fundamental rights and of procedural requirements laid down in the national law), he could receive the case in his national capacity (as a judicial official to whom OLAF report and recommendations or a complaint related to them are addressed).
  —   
  Possible conflict of interest
  : a dual role in the same process; use of inside information; lack of impartiality (when acting in his national capacity, he would already have issued/expressed an opinion on the case in his capacity as an SC Member). |
| --- | --- |

24.

Example 4:

—   
  Assumption
  : after having evaluated an OLAF investigation as an SC Member (in particular with regard to the respect of the fundamental rights and of procedural requirements laid down in the national law), he could receive the case in his national capacity (as a judicial official to whom OLAF report and recommendations or a complaint related to them are addressed).

Assumption

—   
  Possible conflict of interest
  : a dual role in the same process; use of inside information; lack of impartiality (when acting in his national capacity, he would already have issued/expressed an opinion on the case in his capacity as an SC Member).

Possible conflict of interest

| 25. | There may be potentially other situations where the risk of a conflict of interest is not that obvious. They should be assessed on a case by case basis in order to establish in concreto whether there are real risks of lack of independence or impartiality, liable to affect the capability to evaluate cases in an impartial and independent manner. The case-law suggests here a pragmatic approach based on the assumption that a purely abstract risk of a conflict of interest (between the dual national and EU role) is not sufficient to establish an infringement of the obligations of impartiality and integrity — it is necessary to identify a concrete factual element supporting the conclusion that there exists a conflict of interest (14). |
| --- | --- |

25.

There may be potentially other situations where the risk of a conflict of interest is not that obvious. They should be assessed on a case by case basis in order to establish in concreto whether there are real risks of lack of independence or impartiality, liable to affect the capability to evaluate cases in an impartial and independent manner. The case-law suggests here a pragmatic approach based on the assumption that a purely abstract risk of a conflict of interest (between the dual national and EU role) is not sufficient to establish an infringement of the obligations of impartiality and integrity — it is necessary to identify a concrete factual element supporting the conclusion that there exists a conflict of interest (14).

in concreto

14

4.   PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH CONFLICT OF INTEREST SITUATIONS

PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH CONFLICT OF INTEREST SITUATIONS

| 26. | The procedural steps for dealing with conflict of interest situations are currently set out in Article 4(3) of the SC Rules of Procedure: ‘The members of the Supervisory Committee shall inform it of any situation liable to compromise any of the principles governing its activity as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 so that the Committee may take appropriate measures’. |
| --- | --- |

26.

The procedural steps for dealing with conflict of interest situations are currently set out in Article 4(3) of the SC Rules of Procedure: ‘The members of the Supervisory Committee shall inform it of any situation liable to compromise any of the principles governing its activity as referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 so that the Committee may take appropriate measures’.

| 27. | The SC considers that in order to maintain the high integrity of the SC and to ensure a high level of public trust in the proper supervision of the investigative activities of OLAF and in the independence and impartiality of the SC, it will benefit from the establishment of more comprehensive guidance on the matter and more detailed procedures to be followed. |
| --- | --- |

27.

The SC considers that in order to maintain the high integrity of the SC and to ensure a high level of public trust in the proper supervision of the investigative activities of OLAF and in the independence and impartiality of the SC, it will benefit from the establishment of more comprehensive guidance on the matter and more detailed procedures to be followed.

| 28. | Therefore, the SC adopts hereby its Code of Conduct supplemented by this explanatory memorandum. |
| --- | --- |

28.

Therefore, the SC adopts hereby its Code of Conduct supplemented by this explanatory memorandum.

| 29. | This Code of Conduct will be incorporated in the SC Rules of Procedure which require further amendment following the entry into force of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013. |
| --- | --- |

29.

This Code of Conduct will be incorporated in the SC Rules of Procedure which require further amendment following the entry into force of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013.

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(1)  Article 18(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013).

1

(2)  Article 15(7) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013.

2

(3)  Article 41 of the Charter — right to good administration.

3

(4)  ECtHR, judgment of 9 January 2013, Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, application no 21722/11, §§ 104-106.

4

Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine,

(5)  Article 2 of Decision 2012/45/EU, Euratom of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 23 January 2012 appointing the members of the Supervisory Committee (OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p. 30); Article 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Supervisory Committee (OJ L 308, 24.11.2011, p. 114).

5

(6)  Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service: OECD Guidelines and country experiences, OECD, Paris, 2003, p. 28. Source of information: the European Court of Auditors' Special Report No 15/2012 ‘Management of conflict of interest in selected EU Agencies’, http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/18686746.PDF.

6

Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service: OECD Guidelines and country experiences

(7)  See the Academic research report — Conflict of interest, drafted by Prof. Dr. Ömer Faruk GENÇKAYA, page 5 (this report can be found at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/projects/tyec/1062-TYEC%20Research%20-%20Conflict%20of%20Interest.pdf).

7

(8)  Case T-89/01 Willeme v Commission, where theCourt of First Instance analysed the scope of the concept of conflict of interest under former Article 14 of the Staff Regulations (currently, Article 11a).

8

Willeme v Commission,

(9)  Judicial and administrative structures of the Member States differ substantially, which must be taken into account when establishing rules on potential conflict of interest. The expression ‘directs or exercises effective control over’ comes from Article 25 of the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court which stands as a generally accepted legal definition of de jure or de facto direction or command. The expression ‘exercises effective influence’ is an extension to cover situations in which an SC Member is not formally in the chain of command and thereby not necessarily exercises effective control over a case, but in which he can substantively influence the handling of a case by being, for example, an authority to be heard, actually or potentially, or by being in a position to comment or influence the handling of a case (for example, if an SC Member were a Deputy Prosecutor General and the officer working on an OLAF case reports to the Prosecutor General).

9

de jure

de facto

(10)  For example, in accordance with Article 3(3) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013, especially as the anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS) of the Member State concerned pursuant to Article 3(4).

10

(11)  Article 11(3) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013.

11

(12)  As amended by Commission Decision 2013/478/EU of 27 September 2013 (OJ L 257, 28.9.2013, p. 19).

12

(13)  ‘Using confidential information means that a public official disclose to others, or use to further their personal interest, confidential information acquired by them in the course of their official duties. A specific example of this is ‘insider information’ which means the use of information that is gained in the execution of a public official's office and is not available to the general public to further or seek to further the member's private interest’ (see page 7 of the Academic Report quoted in footnote 7).

13

(14)  This pragmatic approach is taken, for example, by the EU judiciary in cases concerning the statutory obligations of the EU officials: see case T-157/04 De Bry v Commission, paragraphs 36 to 38. See also the Opinion of the Advocate General Mazak delivered on 27 March 2012 in joined cases European Commission (C-553/10 P) and Lagardère SCA (C-554/10 P) v Éditions Odile Jacob SAS, paragraphs 35-36.

14

De Bry

Commission,

European Commission (C-553/10 P) and Lagardère SCA (C-554/10 P) v Éditions Odile Jacob SAS

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ANEXA 10

WORKING ARRANGEMENTS

between OLAF and the Supervisory Committee

In order to properly carry out its monitoring tasks with regard to the implementation by OLAF of its investigative function, the Supervisory Committee (SC) needs comprehensive, adequate and timely information with regard to OLAF's investigative activity and the necessary general information, while, at the same time, it fully respects OLAF's independence and the confidentiality of its investigations.

Therefore, the SC and the Director-General of OLAF (DG) hereby agree to the following practical working arrangements in order to implement the provisions of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013
   (1)
  and Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom
   (2).

CHAPTER I

INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED BY OLAF ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE

SECTION 1

General information on OLAF's activity

Article 1

Investigative policy priorities

(Art. 17(5), first sentence, Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013)

1.   The DG will forward to the SC the draft investigative policy priorities, prior to their publication and within a period of time sufficient for the SC to provide its comments.

2.   The draft will be accompanied by documents and background information on the basis of which the investigative policy priorities have been formulated.

3.   This information will be provided annually.

Article 2

Implementation of investigative function and follow-up

(Art. 17(5), second sentence, Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013)

1.   The DG will forward to the SC:

| (a) | the Annual Management Plan, |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the Annual Management Plan,

| (b) | the Annual Activity Report, |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the Annual Activity Report,

| (c) | a mid-term report and an end-of-year report on the implementation of the investigative function, reflecting the objectives set out in the annual management plan. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

a mid-term report and an end-of-year report on the implementation of the investigative function, reflecting the objectives set out in the annual management plan.

2.   The DG will also provide continuous access for the SC Secretariat to general and specific case-related data held in OLAF's case management database, as set out in Chapter II.

Article 3

Budget

(Art. 6(2), Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom)

1.   The DG will forward to the SC the preliminary draft budget, prior to its sending to the Director-General for Budgets and within a period of time sufficient for the SC to provide its comments.

2.   The draft will be accompanied by explanations of changes introduced to the draft as compared to the previous budget.

3.   This information will be provided annually.

Article 4

Independence

(Art. 15(1), first paragraph, and Art. 17(3), Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013)

The DG will provide the SC, with timely information on any situation where the investigative independence of OLAF or its DG is or may be jeopardised.

Article 5

Guidelines on investigation procedures

(Art. 17(8), Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013)

1.   The DG will forward to the SC the draft guidelines on investigation procedures or any modifications thereto, prior to their adoption and within a period of time sufficient for the SC to provide its comments.

2.   The draft modifications will be accompanied by explanation of reasons for their introduction.

SECTION 2

Specific information on OLAF's cases

Article 6

Recommendations

(Art. 17(5)(a), Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013)

1.   The DG will provide the SC with a list of cases in which he has issued recommendations, specifying the recipient and the type of recommendation.

2.   The DG will report annually to the SC on cases in which recommendations have not been followed.

3.   In addition, the DG will send to the SC an annual summary report on the implementation of his recommendations.

4.   The SC Secretariat will have continuous access to information referred to in this Article, as set out in Chapter II.

Article 7

Cases transmitted to national judicial authorities

(Art. 17(5)(b), recital 45 and Article 15(1), second paragraph, Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013)

The DG will forward to the SC a list of cases in which information has been transmitted to national judicial authorities, together with a copy of the transmission letter.

Article 8

Cases lasting more than 12 months

(Art. 7(8) and 17(5)(c), Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013)

1.   The DG will report to the SC on investigations which have not been closed within 12 months, indicating the reasons for which it was not possible to complete the investigation and the remedial measures, envisaged with a view to speeding up the investigation.

2.   The reports will be drawn at the expiry of the 12-month period and every six months thereafter.

Article 9

Deferrals

(Art. 4(6), Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013)

1.   The DG will forward to the SC, after the closure of the investigation, the reasoned decision to defer the information to the institution, body, office or agency to which a person concerned by an internal investigation belongs.

2.   The DG will also inform the SC of the date when the institution, body, office or agency was provided with the deferred information.

CHAPTER II

INFORMATION MADE CONTINUOUSLY AVAILABLE BY OLAF
   (3)

Article 10

Access to general case-related data

The staff members of the SC Secretariat shall have access to metadata of cases by means of automated searches in OLAF's case management database, including:

| (a) | list of cases in selection or dismissed, |
| --- | --- |

(a)

list of cases in selection or dismissed,

| (b) | list of investigation and coordination cases by Unit and Directorate, as well as by sector of activity, |
| --- | --- |

(b)

list of investigation and coordination cases by Unit and Directorate, as well as by sector of activity,

| (c) | list of all cases in the monitoring stage by Unit and Directorate, |
| --- | --- |

(c)

list of all cases in the monitoring stage by Unit and Directorate,

| (d) | list of cases lasting more than 12 months. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

list of cases lasting more than 12 months.

Article 11

Access to specific case-related data

1.   The Head of the SC Secretariat and the staff members authorised by him will have special access to limited data in the OLAF case management database on the basis of self-validation which confirms that this level of access is justified.

2.   These data will include the following:

| (a) | general information (the case number, a general description, the category of source, the relevant EU Institution, office, body or agency in staff cases); |
| --- | --- |

(a)

general information (the case number, a general description, the category of source, the relevant EU Institution, office, body or agency in staff cases);

| (b) | sector (responsible Unit and sector of activity); |
| --- | --- |

(b)

sector (responsible Unit and sector of activity);

| (c) | stage (selection, investigation/coordination case, monitoring); |
| --- | --- |

(c)

stage (selection, investigation/coordination case, monitoring);

| (d) | case type (investigation or coordination case, legal basis for the opening decision, date of the opening decision, offence category, type of fraud, whether there is an impact on EU financial interests and if so, the estimated amount); |
| --- | --- |

(d)

case type (investigation or coordination case, legal basis for the opening decision, date of the opening decision, offence category, type of fraud, whether there is an impact on EU financial interests and if so, the estimated amount);

| (e) | recommendations (recipient of recommendations, type of recommended action, status of recommended action (pending, implemented or not implemented)). |
| --- | --- |

(e)

recommendations (recipient of recommendations, type of recommended action, status of recommended action (pending, implemented or not implemented)).

3.   Insofar as the special access for the SC Secretariat to the OLAF case management database is technically not available, the DG will, whenever requested, provide the information described above to the staff members of the SC Secretariat indicated by the Head of SC Secretariat.

CHAPTER III

INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED BY OLAF AT THE SC'S REQUEST

Article 12

Due justification and procedure for requests of additional information

(Article 15(1) paragraph five,Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013)

1.   Requests for additional information on investigations, pursuant to Article 15 (1) fifth paragraph of the Regulation, including access to a case file, also by sampling, shall be made by the SC to the DG in writing, with due justification. The request shall be signed by the SC Chairman or the SC Member appointed by the SC to act as a rapporteur responsible for a given monitoring activity.

2.   When the request concerns also access to personal data, the SC shall justify why it is necessary.

3.   The SC determines the purpose and scope of its monitoring activities, within the framework set by the relevant legislation. On that basis the SC provides the due justification for individual requests.

4.   The DG shall reply to SC requests for additional information within 15 working days.

5.   When the reply is negative, it shall be justified.

6.   When the DG considers it impossible to provide the requested additional information within the 15 working days, it shall, within this time limit, explain the reasons and propose a new date for transmission of the requested information.

Article 13

Additional case-related information

(Article 15(1) paragraph five,Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013)

When the SC considers it necessary for monitoring of the implementation of OLAF's investigative function, it may request additional information, including, inter alia:

| (a) | reports and recommendations in the cases where OLAF recommendations were not followed; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

reports and recommendations in the cases where OLAF recommendations were not followed;

| (b) | reports, recommendation and opinions of the review unit, including the prior legality check and the final quality and legal review assessing, among others, compliance with the rights and procedural guarantees of persons concerned; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

reports, recommendation and opinions of the review unit, including the prior legality check and the final quality and legal review assessing, among others, compliance with the rights and procedural guarantees of persons concerned;

| (c) | reports and recommendation in the cases of deferral of the information to the institution, body, office or agency to which a person concerned by an internal investigation belongs; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

reports and recommendation in the cases of deferral of the information to the institution, body, office or agency to which a person concerned by an internal investigation belongs;

| (d) | other reports, recommendations, work forms, notes and information on countries concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

other reports, recommendations, work forms, notes and information on countries concerned.

Article 14

Access to an OLAF case file

(Article 15(1) paragraph five,Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013)

1.   When the SC considers that it is necessary for monitoring of the implementation of OLAF's investigative function and that the otherwise accessible information is not sufficient in a given case, the SC may request partial or full access to an OLAF case file.

2.   Access to the case file will be granted to specified staff members of the SC Secretariat for a specified duration which may be extended upon written request.

Article 15

Sampling

(Article 15(1) paragraph five,Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013)

1.   Where the SC decides to monitor a systemic issue on the basis of sampling of cases which requires additional information or access to OLAF case files, the SC will inform the DG of the criteria for the selection and will request the necessary information or access

2.   The SC, in close consultation with the DG, will select a representative sample of cases, following statistical or risk-based sampling.

Article 16

Additional non case-related information

The SC can also ask the DG for additional information relating to OLAF's investigation activity which does not constitute a part of a case file. Such a request shall be signed by the Head of the SC Secretariat, the SC Chairman or the relevant SC Member — rapporteur.

CHAPTER IV

FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 17

Timetable for providing information

Unless otherwise indicated in these Working Arrangements, the information to be provided by the DG on its own initiative will be transmitted to the SC four times a year, by the following dates: (i) 31 January, (ii) 30 April, (iii) 31 July, (iv) 31 October.

Article 18

Delegation

The DG may delegate in writing the exercise of his functions under these Working Arrangements to one or more members of the staff of the Office.

Article 19

Entry into force

These Working Arrangements will take effect from the date of their signature.

Article 20

Review

After one year from the date of the signature of these arrangements, the SC and the DG will evaluate their implementation and may propose, if appropriate, any necessary amendments.

Done in Brussels, on 14 January 2014

Giovanni KESSLER

Director-General of OLAF

Johan DENOLF

Chairman of the Supervisory Committee of OLAF

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(1)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1).

1

(2)  Commission Decision of 28 April 1999 establishing the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF), 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom (OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 20) as amended by Commission Decision of 27 September 2013, 2013/478/EU (OJ L 257, 28.9.2013, p. 19).

2

(3)  The SC may access case-related information following the ‘three-step approach’ as outlined in the European Data Protection Supervisor's Opinion on a notification for prior checking received from the Data Protection Officer of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) on Regular monitoring of the implementation of the investigative function, 19 July 2007 (Case 2007-73). Step 1 is covered by Article 10, step 2 – by Article 11 and step 3 – by Articles 12-15. Whenever personal data are transferred to SC, the SC takes adequate measures to ensure confidentiality and proper handling of such data according to the EU law on personal data protection.

3

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