alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]



# United States Court of Appeals

**For the First Circuit**

No. 99-2086 CHRISTIAN CASTRO, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v. UNITED STATES, Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE [Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge ]
Before Torruella, Chief Judge , Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges .

Christian Castro on brief pro se. JayP. McCloskey , United States Attorney, and F. Mark Terison , Senior Litigation Counsel, on brief for appellee.

September 6, 2000-2- Per Curiam . After a thorough review of the record and of the parties’ submissions, we affirm.

Even if appellant Christian Castro (“Castro”) had adequately alleged in his § 2255 petition that his counsel fell below the standard of care – a matter we do not decide

– Castro wholly failed to establish that any alleged failure on counsel’s part caused him prejudice. Strickland
v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). “A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment under [U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1] as a matter of right.” See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, app. note 3; see also United States v. Muriel , 111 F.3d 975, 982 (1 st Cir. 1997). Rather, the court must consider a number of factors, including whether defendant “truthfullyadmit[s] the conduct comprising the offense[] of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, app. note 1(a). Castro in dicates he would only have been willing to enter into a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25 (1970), so he has failed to allege he would have “truthfully admitted” that he had conspired to distribute cocaine base.-3- Further, he has not alleged that he could have earned a section 3E1.1 reduction by pointing to any other factor listed in application note 1; and we see no indication in the record that he could have supported any such allegation. See generally United States v. Burns , 925 F.2d 18, 20-21 (1 st Cir. 1991) (defendant entered Alford plea; court properly denied section 3E1.1 reduction where evidence as a whole indicated a lack of acceptance of responsibility). Thus, Castro failed to show any reasonable probabilitythat the result at his sentencing would have been different had his attorney convinced him to plead guilty, Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694; so the lower court did not err in denying him an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See United States v. McGill , 11 F.3d 223, 225-26 (1 st Cir. 1993) (“[A] § 2255 motion may be denied without a hearing as to those allegations which, if accepted as true, entitled the movant to no relief. . . .”).

Affirmed . 1 st Cir. Loc. R. 27(c).
#### PARKER v. STATE.

No. 26672.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 9, 1953.

Wiesenthal & Stolbun, by Bernard S. Stolbun, Plouston, for appellant.

William PI. Scott; Dist. Atty., King C. Haynie, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

*950■ BELCHER, Commissioner.

The offense is driving while intoxicated as a subsequent offense under Art. 802b, Vernon’s Ann.P.C.; the punishment, a fine of $650.

Police Officer Price testified that he saw appellant about 1:30 A.M. on October 2, 1952, driving 'an automobile along the wrong side of the Gulf Freeway, a public road in Plarris County, Texas; that after. stopping him, he observed that he staggered as he walked; that he mumbled and couldn’t talk plainly; and that his eyes were about half closed and “watery.” He further testified that appellant “smelled awfully strong of some sort of intoxicating beverage”; that he “did smell alcoholic beverages on his breath”; and that appellant was intoxicated at that time.

Police Officer Bertrand testified that while he was with Police Officer Price on October 2, 1952, they saw appellant driving his automobile on the wrong side of the Gulf Freeway; that they turned on the red light, siren, and spotlight on their patrol car in an effort to stop appellant, all of which appellant ignored for some distance; that when appellant got out of his car he staggered and could not talk plainly; that he smelled alcohol on appellant’s breath and that “he (appellant) was under the influence of intoxicating alcohol.”

The alleged prior conviction was properly shown.

Appellant testified and denied that he had been drinking that night, or that he was intoxicated. He introduced four witnesses who had seen appellant at intervals from 7 P.M. on October 1, until 12:30 A.M. on October 2, and each testified that appellant had not' been drinking and was not intoxicated.

The jury resolved the issue of intoxication against appellant and we find the evidence sufficient to. sustain the conviction.

By informal Bill of Exception No. 1, appellant complains of the refusal of .the .court to permit him to question one of the state’s witnesses about his suspension from the Police Department shortly after this, offense was alleged to have occurred. There is no connection shown between the suspension and the commission of the alleged offense, thus no error is shown.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-1273

JEFFREY THOMAS FARMER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, at Chapel Hill,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, District

Judge. (CA-03-103-H)

Submitted: April 17, 2003 Decided: April 22, 2003

Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jeffrey Thomas Farmer, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Jeffrey Thomas Farmer appeals the district court’s order

dismissing his complaint alleging violations of the Americans with

Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act for failing to state a

claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2000). We have reviewed the record

and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the

reasons stated by the district court. See Farmer v. University of

North Carolina, No. CA-03-103-H (E.D.N.C. Feb. 20, 2003). We deny

Farmer’s motions to expedite the appeal and to seal forwarded

documents. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 32.2



Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



---



In
connection with the quarterly report of Pathmark Stores, Inc. (the Company)
on Form 10-Q for the period ended July 29, 2006, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Frank G. Vitrano,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the
best of my knowledge:

| | (1) |  | the
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | (2) |  | the
information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed
form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has
been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



| |                      | /s/ Frank G. Vitrano                                                   
| | -------------------- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------
| | Name:    Title:Date: | Frank G. VitranoPresident and Chief Financial Officer
September 7, 2006
# AGENCY:

 National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Commerce.

# ACTION:

 Issuance of permit.

# SUMMARY:

                         Notice is hereby given that Marsha Green, Ph.D., Psychology Department, Albright College, P.O. Box 15234, Reading, PA 19612-5234, has been issued a permit to take (                        *i*.                        *e*., harass) humpback whales (                        *Megaptera**novaeangliae*) for purposes of scientific research.                    

# ADDRESSES:

 The permit and related documents are available for review upon written request or by appointment in the following offices:

Permits Division, Office of Protected Resources, NMFS, 1315 East-West Highway, Room 13130, Silver Spring, MD 20910 (301/713-2289);

Regional Administrator, Southwest Region, NMFS, 501 West Ocean Blvd., Suite 4200, Long Beach, CA 90802-4213 (562/980-4027) and

Pacific Islands Area Office, National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA, 1601 Kapiolani Boulevard, Suite 1110, Honolulu HI 96814-4700 (808/973-2935).

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

 Jeannie Drevenak, 301/713-2289.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                     On December 21, 1998, notice was published in the                     **Federal Register**                     (63 FR 70395) that a request for a scientific research permit to take (i.e., harass) North Pacific humpback whales during the course of vessel effects studies, had been submitted by the above-named individual. The requested permit has been issued under the authority of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, as amended (16 U.S.C. 1361*et**seq*.), the Regulations Governing the Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals (50 CFR part 216), the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended (16 U.S.C. 1531*et**seq*.), and the regulations governing the taking, importing, and exporting of endangered and threatened species (50 CFR Parts 222 - 226).                

Issuance of this permit, as required by the ESA, was based on a finding that such permit (1) was applied for in good faith, (2) will not operate to the disadvantage of the endangered species which is the subject of this permit, and (3) is consistent with the purposes and policies set forth in section 2 of the ESA.

Dated: February 2, 2000.

Ann D. Terbush,

Chief, Permits and Documentation Division, Office of Protected Resources, National Marine Fisheries Service.

[FR Doc. 00-2811 Filed 2-7-00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510-22-F
#### Candido RANGEL v. STATE.

No. 25884.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 21, 1952.

' No 'attorney for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty.¡ Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is seduction; the punishment, two years’ confinement in the penitentiary. ■

Accompanying the record is an affidavit In proper form, executed, by appellant, requesting the dismissal of -the appeal.

The request is granted, and the appeal is dismissed.
<PAGE>

                                                                      Exhibit 23


                   [LETTERHEAD OF ANDERSON ASSOCIATES, LLP]




     We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements
of BCSB Bankcorp, Inc. on Form S-8 (File No. 333-53295 and File No. 333-85025)
of our report dated December 2, 1999 on our audits of the consolidated financial
statements of BCSB Bankcorp, Inc. as of September 30, 1999 and 1998, and for
each of the two years in the period ended September 30, 1999, which report has
been incorporated by reference in BCSB Bankcorp, Inc.'s Annual Report
on Form 10-KSB filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.


/s/ Anderson Associates, LLP
Anderson Associates, LLP


Baltimore, Maryland
December 27, 1999
EXHIBIT 32.01

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                               SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In  connection  with the Annual  Report of  Wherify  Wireless,  Inc.  (the
"Company")  on Form 10-KSB for the period ended June 30, 2005, as filed with the
Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof (the  "Report"),  the
undersigned  certifies,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (1) The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.

October 13, 2005

                                         /s/ Timothy Neher
                                         ---------------------------------------
                                         Timothy Neher
                                         Chief Executive Officer
OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

**** SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITING ****

The full texts of the opinions of the Supreme Court of Ohio are being transmitted electronically beginning May 27, 1992, pursuant to a pilot project implemented by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer. Please call any errors to the attention of the Reporter's Office of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Attention: Walter S. Kobalka, Reporter, or Deborah J. Barrett, Administrative Assistant. Tel.: (614) 466-4961; in Ohio 1-800-826-9010. Your comments on this pilot project are also welcome. NOTE: Corrections may be made by the Supreme Court to the full texts of the opinions after they have been released electronically to the public. The reader is therefore advised to check the bound volumes of Ohio St.3d published by West Publishing Company for the final versions of these opinions.

The advance sheets to Ohio St.3d will also contain the volume and page numbers where the opinions will be found in the bound volumes of the Ohio Official Reports.

The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Durr, Appellant. [Cite as State v. Durr (1994), Ohio St. 3d .] Appellate procedure -- Application for reopening appeal from judgment and conviction based on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel -- Application denied when

no colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is

found. (No. 94-1820 -- Submitted October 24, 1994 -- Decided December 30, 1994.) Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No.

57140. Appellant, Darryl Durr, was convicted of one count of aggravated murder with specifications that the murder was committed while the appellant was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing after committing, aggravated robbery, rape, and kidnapping, and of kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and rape, each with a violence specification. He was sentenced to death. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. State v. Durr (Dec. 7, 1989), Cuyahoga App. No. 57140, unreported. We also affirmed the convictions. State v. Durr (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 86, 568 N.E.2d 674. On June 30, 1993, appellant filed with the court of appeals an application pursuant to State v. Murnahan (1992), 63 Ohio St. 3d 60, 584 N.E. 2d 1204, for delayed reconsideration, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise thirty-five issues on direct appeal. The court of appeals examined each issue, found no colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and denied the application. Appellant now appeals that decision to this court.

Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Carmen M. Marino, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, William S. Lazarow and Randy D. Ashburn, for appellant.Per Curiam. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed for the reasons stated in its opinion. Judgment accordingly. Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney and Pfeifer, JJ., concur. Wright, J., dissents.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

T.J., a child,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D13-1282

[January 28, 2015]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Elijah H. Williams, Judge; L.T. Case Nos. 12-584DL00A 

and 12-1249DL00A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ellen Griffin, Assistant Public 

Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mark J. Hamel, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

STEVENSON, J.

In this appeal, the minor defendant challenges an order finding him 

guilty of numerous violations of probation, including the commission of 

numerous substantive criminal offenses, and the resulting revocation of 

his probation and commitment to a level 6 facility. While defendant raises 

a number of issues, we affirm the trial court’s order in its entirety, save 

the finding that defendant violated probation by committing the crime of 

criminal mischief. 

Since all the evidence purportedly establishing defendant as the culprit 

who threw a rock through the window of a Walgreens store was hearsay,

we reverse this finding. See § 806.13(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012) (defining 

offense of criminal mischief); Russell v. State, 982 So. 2d 642, 646 (Fla. 

2008) (recognizing hearsay is admissible in violation of probation 

proceedings, but hearsay alone may not form the sole basis for revocation). 

The trial court’s order is affirmed in all other respects, including the 

findings that defendant violated his probation by failing to complete 

community service hours and committing petit theft, grand theft and 
2

burglary. See McKenzie v. State, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D2379 (Fla. 3d DCA 

Nov. 13, 2013) (recognizing reversal of one of many violations does not 

require reversal of order of revocation or sentence, where, based upon the 

record, appellate court is confident the trial court would have revoked 

probation and imposed the same sentence).

Reversed in part and Affirmed in part.

CIKLIN and GERBER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**Certification**

**Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

**(Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title18, United States Code)**

 

Pursuant to Section 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350,Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officerof *SOURCECORP*, Incorporated, aDelaware corporation (the “Company”), does hereby certify that:

 

The Quarterly Report onForm 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2004 (the “Form 10-Q”)of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in theForm 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| Dated: March  23, 2005 | /s/ Ed H. Bowman, Jr.                  |
|------------------------|----------------------------------------|
|                   | Ed H.  Bowman, Jr.                     |
|                   | President  and Chief Executive Officer |

 

The foregoing certification isbeing furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 ofTitle 18, United States Code).

 

----
```

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 18 (Wednesday, January 28, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 4619-4620]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-01589]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 9016]

In the Matter of the Designation of Denis Cuspert, Also Known as 
Deso Dogg, also Known as Denis Mamadou Cuspert, Also Known as Abu 
Mamadou, Also Known as Abu Talha the German, Also Known as Abu Maleeq, 
Also Known as Abu Maliq, Also Known as Abu Malik, Also Known as Abu 
Maleeq al-Mujaheed, Also Known as Abu Talhah al Almani, as a Specially 
Designated Global Terrorist Pursuant to Section 1(b) of Executive Order 
13224, as Amended

    Acting under the authority of and in accordance with section 1(b) 
of Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, as amended by Executive 
Order 13268 of July 2, 2002, and Executive Order 13284 of January 23, 
2003, I hereby determine that the individual known as Denis Cuspert, 
also known as Denis Mamadou Cuspert, also known as Abu Mamadou, also 
known as Abu Talha the German, also known as Abu Maleeq, also known as 
Abu Maliq, also known as Abu Malik, also known as Abu Maleeq al-
Mujaheed, also known as

[[Page 4620]]

Abu Taha al Almani, committed, or poses a significant risk of 
committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. 
nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the 
United States.
    Consistent with the determination in section 10 of Executive Order 
13224 that ``prior notice to persons determined to be subject to the 
Order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States 
would render ineffectual the blocking and other measures authorized in 
the Order because of the ability to transfer funds instantaneously,'' I 
determine that no prior notice needs to be provided to any person 
subject to this determination who might have a constitutional presence 
in the United States, because to do so would render ineffectual the 
measures authorized in the Order.
    This notice shall be published in the Federal Register.

    Dated: January 9, 2015.
John F. Kerry,
Secretary of State.
[FR Doc. 2015-01589 Filed 1-27-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-AD-P
```