at 1030-31; NRCP 56(e). This court reviews an order granting summary 

judgment de novo. Wood, 121 Nev. at 729, 121 P.3d at 1029. 

Having reviewed the briefs and appendices on appeal, we 

conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment. The 

parties stipulate that Illinois law governs appellant's cause of action. 

Under Illinois law, a plaintiff must establish the following factors to prove 

a claim for tortious interference with a contract: 

(1) the existence of a valid, enforceable contract 

between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) 

defendant's knowledge of that contract; (3) 

defendant's intentional and unjustified 

inducement of the third party to breach the 

contract; (4) a subsequent breach by the third 

party resulting from defendant's wrongful conduct; 

and (5) damages suffered by the plaintiff as a 

result of the breach. 

Strosberg v. Brauvin Realty Servs., Inc., 691 N.E.2d 834, 845 (Ill. App. Ct. 

1998). If a plaintiff fails to establish any of the necessary elements, 

summary judgment is appropriate. In re Estate of Albergo, 656 N.E.2d 97, 

103 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 

In seeking summary judgment, respondent argued that 

appellant could not demonstrate that respondent had induced the third 

party to breach the third party's contract with appellant. "Establishing 

inducement . . . requires some active persuasion, encouragement, or 

inciting that goes beyond merely providing information in a passive way." 

Id. (internal quotation omitted). We agree with respondent's contention 

that appellant failed to set forth any issue of material fact to demonstrate 

that respondent induced a breach of contract by the third party. As a 

result, summary judgment was appropriate. Id.; see also Wood, 121 Nev. 

at 729, 731, 121 P.3d at 1029, 1030-31. We also reject appellant's 

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contention that the district court abused its discretion in denying its 

NRCP 56(f) motion for a continuance, as appellant failed to adequately 

demonstrate that additional discovery was necessary or that it would 

provide any basis for avoiding summary judgment. See Aviation Ventures, 

Inc. v. Joan Morris, Inc., 121 Nev. 113, 118, 110 P.3d 59, 62 (2005) (stating 

that this court reviews a denial of a motion for a continuance under NRCP 

56(f) for an abuse of discretion and that such a motion "is appropriate only 

when the movant expresses how further discovery will lead to the creation 

of a genuine issue of material fact"). 

Finally, appellant challenges the district court's order 

awarding attorney fees and costs. We review such an award for an abuse 

of discretion. McCarran Int'l Airport v. Sisolak, 122 Nev. 645, 673, 137 

P.3d 1110, 1129 (2006). The district court awarded attorney fees and costs 

under NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115, as appellant did not obtain a judgment 

in excess of respondent's offer of judgment to appellant. Appellant 

contends that the award was excessive for the amount of work done. 

Appellant fails, however, to provide any argument detailing what portion 

of respondent's attorney fees or costs was improper or excessive and we 

perceive no abuse of discretion in the district court's award. Accordingly, 

we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

Saitta 

3 
cc: Hon. Brent T. Adams, District Judge 

Robert G. Berry, Settlement Judge 

Fennemore Craig Jones Vargas/Reno 

Downey Brand LLP 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

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