### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON N ove m be r 15, 200 6 S es sio n ROBE RT DYE v. W IT CO CORP. A/K/A WI TCO CORPORATI ON ET AL 

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Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. CH-02-2346- 2 Arnold B. Goldin , Chancellor

No. W2005-01796-SC- R3-CV - F iled on March 5, 2007

The trial c ourt g rante d summary judgme nt to the employ er in this workers ’ compensation case , finding that the statute of limit ations bars the e mploy ee’ s claim and that the sa vings statute pr ovides no relief to the employ ee. We hold that the e mploy ee’ s complaint fo r workers’ compe nsation be ne fi ts i s b arr e d b y

thestatut e of lim itatio ns
. We f urthe r h oldthat th e e mpl oy e e faile d to fi le his complaint within the time allowed by the saving s statute. Acc ording ly , we affirm the trial court’s g rant o f s umm ary

jud g me nt.
Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 50-6-225(e ); Judgm ent of the Trial Court Aff irm ed
J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C.J ., and C OR NE L I A A. C LARK and G AR Y R. W ADE , J J ., and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , S P .J ., joined. Stephen F. Libby , Memphis, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Robert Dy e. Kevin W. Washburn, Memphis, T ennesse e, for the appellee s, Wit co Corp. a/k/a Wit co Corporation, W i t c o C h e m i c a l C o rp
. a /k / a W i t c o C h e m i c a l C o rp o r a t i o n , O l dR e p u b l i c In s u r a n c e C o mp a n y, Wau sau Ins ur a nc e Company , andRI SKO Claims Mana g e me nt.
OP IN ION
I. F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound During his employ ment with Wi tco Corporation (“Witco”), Robert Dy e (“ Dy e”) develope d an all e r g ic c o n d itio n p r im ar il y a f f e c ti n g th e s k in o n h is h a n d s
. O n A u g u s t 7 , 1 9 9 6 , Dr. James Turner , a dermatolog ist, beg an treating Dy e for his allerg ic conditi on. Dy e informed Dr. Turner that his skin aller gy im prove d w he n h e wa s a way fr om w or

k andthat hi s c on ditionmay be re late d to c he mic a ls t o w hic h h e wa s e xpos e d at Witc o. Sub se qu e nt t e sti ng re ve a le d th a t D y e wa s a lle rg ic to potassium dichromate. On se veral occa sions, Dr. Turner recommende d to Wit co that Dy e be placedIn hi s b ri ef , D y e ass ert s t hat D r. T urner agai n o p i ned t hat D y e’ s co nd i t i o n was not caused by hi s em p l o y m ent 1 in a lette r d a te d A u g u st 1 , 1 9 9 9 . T h is e v id e n c e , ho w e v e r, is no t co n ta ine d in the re c o rd b e fo re this C o u rt. -2- i n a j o b l i m i t i n g h i s e x p o s u r e t o p o t a s s i u md i c h r o m a t e
. D r
. T u r n e r a l s o r e c o m m e n d e dth a tD ye avoid exposure to chemicals at w ork. In spite of these r ecommendations and Dr. Turne r’s ong oing treatment of Dy e, Dy e’s c ondition persisted.
Witc o in i t i a l l y

p a i dD y e ’ s m e d i c a l e xp e n s e s
. H o w e v e r , i n A u g u s t1 9 9 8 , B u s i n e s s He a lth Service s, L .L .C. conducted a job site analy sis of the Wit co plant at W i t co ’s reque st to determine wh e the r D y e ’s e xpos ur e to p otassi um di c hr omate wa s r e late d to his e mpl oyme nt. Th e job sit e analy sis consisted of observations of plant activity and saf ety proce dures, interviews with various supervisors and manag ers, and an examination of the various s i t es Mr. Dy e believe d contained c on c e ntrat ion s o f p ota ssi um d ic hr omate . T he inv e sti g a tio n r e su lte d ina fi nd ing that “ the reis nothing to support an e x cessive or prolong ed exposure to pota ssium dichr omate as a result of Mr. Dy e ’s e mpl oyme nt. ” Con se qu e ntl y , Wit c o c on c lu dedthat D y e ’s c on ditionwa s n ot c aus e d b y his e mpl oyme nt. Appar en tl y

at D r
. T u rn e r ’ s reque st, an industrial hy g iene surve y was c onducted on Nove mber 19, 1998, and De cembe r 3, 1998, by a ce rtified industrial hy g ienist. The chr omium contained in the a ir a ndon va

ri ou s su rf a c e s w a s me a su re d, a s w e ll as thea mou nt o f e xpos ur e to c hr omi um w hil e operating tank loa ding equipment. I n a letter dated January

8, 1999, Wit co’s wor

kers’ compensation casenurse f

orwa rded the results of the air quality testing to Dr. Turne r and r equeste d Dr. Turner’ s assent to t h e fo l l owing statement: “Mr. D y e is under me dical ca re f or a pe rsonal health matter. Th e re is no e vid e nc e to su pp ort that his job wa s the c aus e of thi s c on dition . Furthe rm or e , th e reis no evidenc e that his job is the d i re ct cause of any rec urre nt condition.” On J anuary 21, 1999, Dr. Turner signe d this statement and wrote in a spac e provided for comment that he saw “no clinica l or laboratory

evidenc e that [Dy e’s] condition is caused by his job.”
On Fe bruary

8, 1999, less than one month later, Dr. Turner not ed in Dy e’s medical re cords that “[f]rom the patient’s history . . . it sounds li ke [his condition] is work re lated; howeve r, we have been un ableto i de nti fy

a ny sp e c if ic a lle rg e n o r i rritant that is c aus ing his pr ob le m.” De sp itehis previous written statement to the contra ry , Dr. Turner c ontinue d t o o p i ne in his officenotes and deposition te stimonythat Dy e’s c ondition is “proba bly ” wor k-re lated. Dr. Turner c ontinued to treat

1 Dy e until J uly

22, 1999. Wit co ce ased pay ment of all bene fits to Dy e on October 22, 1999. Over tw o y e ars late r, on Ma

rc h 25, 27 , an d 29, 20 02 , Dy e re turne d to Dr. Tu rn e r fo r tr e a tme nt of thesame allerg ic condition. Although the parties disput e whether or not Wit co authorized this treatment, on Oc tob e r 9 , 2 00 2, Witc o ma de a sin g le pay me nt f

or theMa rc h 2 00 2 tr e a tme nt.
On Marc h 4, 1999, aft er W i t co conc luded that Dy e’s c ondition was not work-re lated but be fo reWitc o c e a se d ma

kin g pay me nts , D y e fi le d a c omp la int

fo r w or ke rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n b e ne fi ts. For rea sons that are not clea

r from the record, Dy e volunt arily dismiss ed his complaint on May 8,T en ne ssee C o d e A nn o t ated sec t i o n 5 0

- 6

- 2 0 3 (a) (1 9 9 9 ) p ro vid es: 2

T he ri gh t t o co m p en sati o n un d er the W o rke rs’ C o m p en sati o n L aw shall b e fo rev er b arre d , un l ess, wi t h i n on e ( 1) y ea r a f

t er t h e ac ci den t r es u l t i n g i n i n j u r y or de at h oc curred, t h e n ot i ce r equ i r ed by § 50

- 6- 20 2 i s gi ven t he emp l oy er an d a cl ai m f or c om pens at i on un der t he provi s i ons of t hi s ch apt er is fi le d w ith the trib u n a l ha v ing j u risd ic tio n to h e a r a n d d e te rm ine the m a tter ; p ro v id e d , t h a t i f with in t he one- y ear per i od vol un t ar y pay ment s of comp ens at i on ar e pai d t o t he i nj ur ed pers on or t he i nj ur ed p e rs o n ’s d e p e n d e n ts, an a c tio n to re c o v e r a n y un p a id p o rtio n o f t h e c o m p e n sa tio n , p a ya b le un d e r th is chap t er, m ay b e i nst i t ut ed wi t hi n one (1) y ear f rom t he l at er of

t he d at e o f

the l ast aut ho ri zed t reat m ent o r t he t i m e t h e empl oy er s h al l c ea s e mak i n g s u ch pa y men t s , e x ce pt i n t h os e ca s es pr ov i ded for by § 50

- 6

- 2 3 0

. W here a wo rkers ’ co m p ensat i o n s ui t i s b rought b y t he em p l o y er or t he em p l o y er’ s agent an d t h e empl oy er or a g en t f i l es n ot i ce of

n on
- s u i t of

th e ac t i on a t a n y t i me on or a f t er t h e dat e of exp i rat i o n of t he st at ut e o f l i m i t at i o ns, ei t her part y s hal l have ni net y (9 0 ) d ays f rom t he d at e o f

t he
o rder o f dis m i ss al t o i nst i t ut e an act i o n fo r r eco very of b enef i t s und er t hi s chap t er.
I n 2004, t h e G en er al As s embl y s i g n i f i ca n t l y r ev i s ed T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on 50- 6- 203. T he s t at u t e of l i m i t at i o ns fo r workers’ co m p ensat i o n cases i s no w fo und at T enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed 50

- 6

- 2 0 3 (g) (2) (20 0 5 ). -3- 20 01 . O n D e c e mbe r 1 3, 20 02 , Dy e fi le d a se c on d c omp la int fo r w or ke rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n b e ne fi ts i n theChanc e ry

Cou rt of She lby Cou nty . In h is c omp la int , D y e alleg e d th a t Witc o ma de its la st vo lun tary me dic a l pay me nt on Dy e ’s be ha lf onOc tob e r 9 , 2 00 2. Witc o f ile d a motionto d ism iss , which wa s later c onverte d into a motion for summary judgme nt, asserting that Dy e’s c omplaint was n o tf i l e dw i th i n t h e t i m e a l l o w e db y t h e s t a tu t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s o r th e s a v i n g s s t a tu t e
. S p e c i f i c a l l y, Wit co conte nded that the last voluntary medical pay ment on Dy e’s behalf was made on October 22, 1999, and that the se cond ac tion wa s n o t filed within one y ear of the voluntary

non-suit of the orig inal action. The chanc ellor granted t he mot ion in favor of W itco, and Dy e appe aled. We g rante d revie w af ter oral arg ument befor e the Spec ial Workers’ Compensation Appeals Pane l (“Pane l”) but be fo rea de c isi onwa s r e nd e re d b y thePa ne l.
II. Ana lys is Dy e conte nds that his claim was filed within t h e statute of limitations. Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-203( a) ( 1999) provides that an employ ee ha s one y ear from the date of injury to file a complaint for wor kers’ compensation benefits. When apply ing this statute, wefollow the 2 longstanding r

ule t hat the running of the statute of limit ations is suspended until “by rea sonable c are and dilige nce it i s d iscovera ble and a ppare nt that a compensa ble injury

has bee n sustained.” Hawkins v. Consol. Aluminum C orp., 742 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tenn. 1987). On appe al, Dy e ar g ues for the first time that the statut e of limitations did not begin to run until either Marc h 2002, the month in which Dy e re turned to Dr. Turner for patch testing, or Marc h 28, 2005, the date upon w hich Dr. Turner te stified that Dy e had suff ere d a permanent medicalO n D ecem b er 27 , 20 0 5 , t hi s C o urt ent ered an o rd e r p erm i t t i ng D y e t o s up p l em ent t he reco rd wit h t he 3 d e p o sitio n tra n sc rip t o f D r. T u rn e r in c lud ing e x h ib its, W itco ’s re sp o n se to D ye ’s re q u e st fo r a d m issio n s, a n d W itco ’s resp o nse t o D ye’s sec o nd req ue st fo r ad m i ssi o ns. -4- impairment. Dy e maintains that Dr. Turner ’s medica l rec ords re flec t uncertainty as to the cause of 3 Dy e’s c ondition and pr ovided him with no notice of c ausation until the patch testing conducte d by Dr. Turner in Mar ch 2002. Dy e further a rg ues that he co u l d not have discove red the permanency of his injury

until Dr. Turner

assig ned a medical impairme nt rating in his deposition on M arc h 28, 2005. These a

rg uments were not raised in opposition to Wit co’s moti on for summary judgme nt and areno t me nti on e d inthetria l c ou rt re c or d. Whil e Dy e didarg ue that th e statut e of lim itatio ns did no t be g in t o r

unun til Ma

rc h 200 2, his arg ume nt w a s b a se d u po n th e c on te nti onthat th e la st auth orize d tr e a tme nt o c c ur re d at th a t ti me
. Con se qu e ntl y , the tria l c ou rt didno t have a n o pp ortun ity to make finding s reg arding the dates on w hich Dy e discove red the compensa bilityand the permanenceof his injury . We have he ld that “issues raise d for the first time on a ppeal a re w aived.” Bla ck v. B lount, 938 S.W .2d 394, 403 (Tenn. 1996); see Norton v. McCaskill, 12 S.W .3d 789, 795 (Tenn. 2000) . Be causeDy e raises this issue for the first time on appeal, we conc lude that the issue is waived. Dy e also a

rg ues that Witco’s final voluntary payment of compe nsation occur red on O ctober 9, 20 02 , a nd that the statut e of lim itatio ns did no t be g in to ru n un til that date

. Prior to that last, isolated payment of compensation, Witco’s last voluntary payment was madeon October 22, 1999. Wit co conte nds that Dy e had until Oc tober 22, 2000, to f ile his claim and that the a dditional pay ment o f O c to b e r 9, 2002, ma d e a f te r th e s tatu teo f

li mi tati o n s e xp ir e d , d idn o t r e v iv e D y e ’ s c laim

. We ag ree
. I n worke rs’ c ompensation ca ses , we r eview the trial court’ s findings of fac t de novo acc ompanied by

a presumption of cor

rec tness unless the evidenc e pre ponderates otherwise . Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 225(e) (2) ( 2005); L ay v
. Scott Count y Sheriff’ s Dep’t, 109 S.W.3d 293, 296 (Tenn. 2003) . Howeve r, when there a re no material fa cts in dispute, we re view the tria l court’s ruling de novo with no pre sumption of corre ctness. Vinson v. United P arc el Serv., 92 S.W.3d 380, 38 4 ( Te nn . 200 2) . A c c or din g ly , w e re vie w the tria l c ou rt ’s g rant o f s umm ary jud g me nt d e no vo wi th no pr e su mptionof

c or re c tne ss. Whe n th e e mpl oy e r m ake s v olu nta ry pay me nts of

c omp e ns a tio n wi thi n the on e -y e ar s tatut e of limitations period, an employ ee may file suit within o n e y ear

of the late r of the la st authorized medical tre atment or the date an e mploy er stops making voluntary pay m en t s . Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-203( a) ( 1999). Voluntary payments of compensation and medical tre atment occ urring afte r thestatut e of

lim itatio ns ha s a lr e a dy ru n are of no e ff e c t. Se e Th re a dg ill v. L e xing tonMe ta l Pr od s. Co., 632 S.W .2d 550, 552 (Tenn. 1982) (once claim is barr ed by the passag e of time, a

new pe riod will not be set in moti on by the furnishing of medical service s); Og den v. Matrix Vis i o n of Wil liamson County , I nc., 838 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tenn. 1992) (affirming Threa dg ill).D ye a rg u e s, w itho u t cita tio n to a u tho rity, t h a t t h e sa v ing s sta tute a n d the sta tute o f l im itatio n s o p e ra te to c re a te 4

a ne w sta tute o f l im itatio n s tha t b e g ins a fter the vo lun ta ry d ism issa l o f a c la im fo r w o rk e rs ’ co m p e n sa tio n . N o thin g in t h e pl ai n l an g u ag e of

e i t h er s t at u t e s u g g es t s t h at t h e s t at u t e of l i mi t at i on s r ec ommen ce s a f t er t h e v ol u n t ar y di s mi s s al of
a c la im . T h e re fo re , w e c o n c lud e tha t t h is a rg u m e n t i s w itho u t m e rit.

T en ne ssee C o d e A nn o t ated sec t i o n 2 8

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- 1 0 5 (a) (2 0 0 0 ) p ro vid es: 5

If t he act i o n i s co m m enced wi t hi n the t i m e l i m i t ed b y a rul e o r st at ut e o f l i m i t at i o n, but t he judgm ent or de cr ee i s r en der ed ag ai n s t t h e pl ai n t i f f u pon a n y g r ou n d n ot c on cl u di n g t h e pl ai n t i f f ’ s r i g h t of
ac t i on , or w h er e t h e j u dg men t or de cr ee i s r en der ed i n f av or of t h e pl ai n t i f f , a n d i s a r r es t ed, or re v e rs e d o n a p p e a l, the p la intiff , o r t h e p la intiff ’s re p re se n ta tive s a n d p riv ie s, a s the c a se m a y b e , m a y, f rom t i m e t o ti m e , c o m m e n c e a new act i o n wi t hi n one (1) y ear af t er t he revers al or arres t

. A ct i o ns o rig ina lly c o m m e n c e d in g e n e ra l se ssio n s c o u rt a n d su b se q u e n tly re c o m m e n c e d p u r s u a n t t o this
se c tio n in c irc u it o r c h a n c e ry c o u rt sh a ll n o t b e su b je c t to the m o n e ta ry j u risd ic tio n a l l im it o rig ina lly im p o se d in the ge n e ra l se ssio n s c o u rt.

B eca us e t he s t at ut e h as not been r evi s ed s i nce i t was amended i n 1989 , we ci t e t o t he cur r ent ve r s i on of t he s t at ut e. -5- Appl y i n g this principle to the casebefor e us, we concludethat Wit co ce ased ma king payments on October 22, 1999, and that the statute ran on October 22, 2000. Wit co’s sing le payment on October 9, 2002, almost two y ear s afte r the expiration of the statute of limitations, does not revive Dy e’s c laim. Had Witco continued making reg ular pay ments without int err uption, we would be fac ed with a ve ry

differ en t ca s e. S ee T enn. C ode Ann. § 50- 6-203(a ) (1999) . I n the instant case , howeve r, therewas a g reater than one -y ear g ap betwe en voluntary

medical pay ments. During that interval, the statute of

limit ations ran. The ref

ore, D y e’s second complaint, filed on Dece mber 13, 20 02 , is ba

rr e d b y thesta tut e of lim itatio ns
. Dy e’s f inal ar gument conce rns the applica bilityof the saving s statute. Tenne ssee Code 4 A n n o tate ds e c ti o n 2 8

- 1

- 1 0 5 ( a ) ( 2 0 0 0 ) , th e “ s a v in g s s tatu te , ” a ll o w s a p lain ti f f to r e f il e a n action 5 within one y ear

of the voluntary

non-suit of the first ac t i o n
. C ro nin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 912-13 (Tenn. 1995). I n this c ase, the second complaint was not f iled until m o re t h an n i netee n months after the voluntary dismiss al of the first action. There fore , the saving s statute does not save Dy e ’s c la im.
Be causeDy e’s se cond complaint wa s not filed within the applicable statute of limitations or wi thi n th e pe ri odpr ov ide d b y thesa vin g s st a tut e , it

is b arr e d. Al tho ug h su mma ry jud g me nt i s r are ly appropriate in a c ontested worke rs’ c ompensation ca se, Berry v. Consol. Sy s., I nc., 804 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tenn. 1991) , the situation presente d by this case is one of those ra re oc casions whe n summary jud g me nt i s ju sti fi e d. Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff irm th e tria l c ou rt ’s g rant o f s umm ary jud g me nt.
III. Conclusi on We hold that Dy e’s a

rg ument conce rning the date hediscovere d the permanenc y and compensa bilityof his injury is w aived beca use it wa s not r aised befor e the trial court. We further-6-

hold that afte r t he ex piration of the statute of limit ations an isolated voluntary medical pay ment does not revive the employ ee’ s claim. Finally , we conclude that Dy e filed his second complaint more than a y ear afte r the voluntary dismiss al of his orig inal suit. W e ther efor e conc lude that Dy e’s c laim for wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n be ne fi ts is ba rr e d by the statut e of lim itatio ns a nd that the savi ngs s tatut e provides no re lief. Ac cording ly , the trial court’s g rant of summary judgme nt is affirmed. Costs of thi s a pp e a l areta xedto the app e llant, Rob e rt Dy e , an d his sur e ty , for wh ic h exec uti on may iss ue if n e c e s s ary.

___________________________________ JANI CE M . H OLDE R, JUS TI CE