alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 37744

STATE OF IDAHO

,

Plaintiff-Respondent

,

v.

JOHNNY PADILLA AMAYA

,

Defendant-Appellant

. )

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

) 2011 Unpublished O pinion No. 341

Filed: February 2, 2011

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Canyon County. Hon. Bradly S. Ford , District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of ten years, with a minimum period

of confinement of three years , for felony domestic battery

, affirmed

.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, A ttorney General; Russell J. Spencer, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

______________________________________________

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge;
and GUTIERREZ, Judge

PER CURIAM

Johnny Padilla Amaya pled guilty to felony domestic battery . I.C. § 18

- 903(a), 18

-

918(2) . The district court sentenced Amaya to a unified term of ten years, with a minimum

period of confinement of three years , to run concurrent with a n unrelated sentence. Amaya

appeals.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez , 121 Idaho 1 14, 117

- 18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014

-

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez , 106 Idaho 447, 449

- 51, 680 P.2d 869, 871

- 73 (Ct. App.

1984); State v. Toohill , 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing2 the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver , 144 Idaho

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Am aya ’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
**Exhibit 31.2**

**Certification**

I, Andrew S. Prince, certify that:

 

- I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Precision AerospaceComponents, Inc. (the “Company”);

 

- Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances underwhich such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

- Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations andcash flows of the Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

 

- As the Company’s sole certifying officer, I am responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) forthe Company and have:

 

Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Company, includingits consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;
Evaluated the effectiveness of the Company’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures,as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;
Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or causedsuch internal control over financial reporting to be designed under my supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding thereliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generallyaccepted accounting principles;
 and
Disclosed in this report any change in the Company’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the Company’s most recent fiscal quarter (the Company’s fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theCompany’s internal control over financial reporting.

 

- As the Company’s sole certifying officer, I have disclosed, basedon my most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the Company’s auditors and the audit committeeof the Company’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the designor operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Company’s abilityto record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the Company’s internal control over financial reporting.

 

/s/ Andrew S. Prince

 

Andrew S. Prince

President and Chief Executive Officer

Date: August 20, 2012
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                           8,608
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   46,713
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (3,716)
<INVENTORY>                                      1,370
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                59,921
<PP&E>                                          50,761
<DEPRECIATION>                                (22,733)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 183,355
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           29,530
<BONDS>                                         25,375
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           127
<OTHER-SE>                                     127,285
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   183,355
<SALES>                                          5,470
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               172,469
<CGS>                                            4,128
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  146,050
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 (241)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   819
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 969
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 19,434
<INCOME-TAX>                                     7,772
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             11,662
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    11,662
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .93
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .91
        

</TABLE>
#### ARREDONDO v. STATE.

No. 25873.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 11, 1952.

No attorney for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

The appeal is from a conviction for assault with intent to murder, with a sentence of eight years in the penitentiary.

No notice of appeal appears in the transcript, without which this court has no jurisdiction in the matter.

The appeal is dismissed
#### McFARLAND v. State.

No. 24740.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 5, 1950.

John J. Herrera, of Houston, for appellant.

A. C. Winborn, Crim. Dist. Atty., of Houston, E. T. Branch, Asst. Crim. Dist. Atty., of Houston, George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of rape, the jury assessing the death penalty.

This is a companion case to that of Edwards v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 226 S.W.2d 865.

The facts are substantially the same, appellant being one of the three Negroes who, according to the evidence, ravished the girl on the occasion.

Appellant was identified as the Negro who struck the girl’s companion with *a.*hammer, and as the first to ravish the girl. He also is shown to be the Negro who took the girl’s watch from her wrist and buried it near his home.

After his arrest appellant made a statement to the officers admitting his participation in the robbery of the couple and the rape of the girl, and took the officers to his home and pointed out to them the place he had buried the girl’s watch.

As a result of the information obtained in the confession, the officers dug up the watch at the place indicated by appellant.

Appellant did not testify as a witness in his own behalf.

There are no bills of exception in the record and no exceptions to the-charge of the court.

The verdict of the jury is justified by the facts, and appellant’s rights were fully protected in the court’s charge to the jury.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.
#### Ex parte Jesse STEEL, Relator.

No. 24892.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 21, 1950.

For former opinion, see 230 S.W.2d 233.

Power, McDonald *&*Mell, Tyler, for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

WOODLEY, Judge.,

We remain convinced that Relator was entitled to be discharged upon the expiration of ninety' days after his commitment by the magistrate.'

Under, the provisions of Art. 1004, C.C.P., Relator may not again be arrested upon a charge of the- same offense, except- by a warrant from the Governor of this State.

The State’s motion for rehearing is overruled. •..-.■ • ■ , ■

Opinion approved by the Court
#### PHARISS v. STATE.

No. 23434.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 12, 1946.

Aubrey Davee, of Brady, and Ross Bohannon, of Dallas, for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

This is a conviction for selling 'whisky in a dry area, with punishment fixed at a fine of $400, so enhanced by reason of a prior conviction for an offense of like character under the provision of Art. 61, P. C.

To sustain the allegation of prior conviction, the State relied alone upon a certified copy of the judgment of conviction. This is not sufficient. The accused must be identified as the one and same person who was so convicted. Potter v. State, 137 Tex.Cr.R. 159, 128 S.W.2d 817; Doyle v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 417, 145 S.W.2d 876; McCann v. State, 123 Tex.Cr.R. 626, 60 S.W.2d 451.

The facts being insufficient to sustain the allegation of a prior conviction, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court. •
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 214 (Friday, November 3, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 66256]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-28219]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

[Docket No. FR-4557-N-44]


Federal Property Suitable as Facilities To Assist the Homeless

AGENCY: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Community Planning and 
Development, HUD.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This Notice identifies unutilized, underutilized, excess, and 
surplus Federal property reviewed by HUD for suitability for possible 
use to assist the homeless.

EFFECTIVE DATE: November 3, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Clifford Taffet, Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, Room 7262, 451 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, 
DC 20410; telephone (202) 708-1234; TTY number for the hearing- and 
speech-impaired (202) 708-2565, (these telephone numbers are not toll-
free), or call he toll-free Title V information line at 1-800-927-7588.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In accordance with the December 12, 1988 
court order in National Coalition for the Homeless v. Veterans 
Administration, No. 88-2503-OG (D.D.C.), HUD publishes a Notice, on a 
weekly basis, identifying unutilized, underutilized, excess and surplus 
Federal buildings and real property that HUD has reviewed for 
suitability for use to assist the homeless. Today's Notice is for the 
purpose of announcing that no additional properties have been 
determined suitable or unsuitable this week.

    Dated: October 27, 2000.
Fred Karnas, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Special Needs Assistance Programs.
[FR Doc. 00-28219 Filed 11-2-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4210-29-M
#### J. K. BUTCHER, Movant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Opposed.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 22, 1951.

Wheeler & Wheeler, Paintsville, H. R. Burke, Prestonsburg, for movant.

A. E. Funk, Atty. Gen., Wm. F. Simpson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for opposed.

PER CURIAM.

Appeal denied.

Judgment affirmed.

COMBS, J., not sitting.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                            9
<MULTIPLIER>                                     1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                  9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                           4,333
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           7,128
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 5,375
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     27,137
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          37,949
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            37,905
<LOANS>                                        212,980
<ALLOWANCE>                                      1,408
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 298,872
<DEPOSITS>                                     250,588
<SHORT-TERM>                                     5,000
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              8,115
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           532
<OTHER-SE>                                      34,638
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 298,872
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 12,510
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                3,281
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                15,791
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               8,218
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,247
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            7,545
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                       45
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   9
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  4,416
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,525
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       3,525
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,555
<EPS-BASIC>                                       1.47
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.47
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.74
<LOANS-NON>                                        127
<LOANS-PAST>                                       223
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                   108
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 1,378
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                       30
<RECOVERIES>                                        15
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                1,408
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             1,408
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0



</TABLE>
#### ASH v. STATE.

No. 23739.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 11, 1947.

No appearance for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

The offense is theft of personal property over the value of $50. The punishment assessed is confinement in the state penitentiary, for a period of two years.

The indictment contains three counts, the first of which charges appellant and Carl Thomas Ash with theft of personal property over the value of $50 from Elmo Caudle. The second count charges appellant and Carl Thomas Ash with the theft of personal property belonging to J. H. Kirby from Elmo Caudle who was holding the same for J. H. Kirby, etc. The third count charges appellant and Carl Thomas Ash with unlawfully and fraudulently receiving from James Herbert Webb the said property and fraudulently concealing the same, etc.

A 'Severance was requested by appellant and by agreement between the defendants, the appellant was placed on trial. The court submitted the case to the jury on the first count only. The jury convicted him of theft and assessed his punishment *850as above indicated from which judgment of conviction appellant attempted to appeal. The only notice of appeal as reflected by the record is a notice on the Judge’s docket. Art. 827, C.C.P., requires that such notice be given in open court and entered of record. This- is necessary to confer appellate jurisdiction upon this Court.

 It has been held many times that an entry of notice of appeal on the Judge’s docket is not in compliance with the article above mentioned. It must be entered of record upon the minutes of the court. In the absence of which, this Court does not acquire jurisdiction. See Long v. State, 3 Tex.App. 321; Tarkenton v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 292, 135 S.W.2d 716; Lucas v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 277, 135 S.W.2d 720; Bertrand v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 393, 136 S.W.2d 849; Bailey v. State, 141 Tex.Cr. R. 303, 148 S.W.2d 851; Keys v. State, 141 Tex.Cr.R. 597, 150 S.W.2d 1021; Hollis v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 36, 151 S.W.2d 597.

. Since the notice of appeal was not entered on the minutes of the court, the attempted appeal in this case is dismissed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
HLD

- 005 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 17

- 1129

___________

IN RE: ELISTON F. GEORGE,

Petitioner

____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the

District Court of the Virgin Islands (Related to D.V.I. Civ. No. 3

- 14

- cv

- 00067)

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

February 23, 2017

Before: SMITH, CHIEF JUDGE , MCKEE and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 4, 2017 )

_________

OPINION *

_________

PER CURIAM

Eliston F. George filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting that we direct

the District Court to rule on his petition for a writ of audita querela. The District Court

has since ruled on George’s petition, and George has filed a notice of appeal. In light of

the District Court’s action, the question George presented is no longer a live controversy,

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

so we will dismiss his mandamus petition as moot. See, e.g.

, Lusardi v. Xerox Corp. , 975

F.2d 964, 974 (3d Cir. 1992).
#### J. R. PHILLIPS INV. CO. v. NUECES COUNTY.

No. 11022.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

June 18, 1941.

Rehearing Denied July 9, 1941.

Kleberg, Eckhardt & Lowe, of Corpus Christi, for appellant.

Linton S. Savage and Hal F. Rachal, all of Corpus Christi, for appellee.

MURRAY, Justice.

This suit was instituted by County of Nueces against J. R. Phillips Investment Company seeking to recover the sum of $10,373.61, together with interest, as a balance due upon the purchase price of one hundred Nueces County Road Bonds, in denominations of $1,000 each.

The trial was before the court without the intervention of a jury and resulted in judgment in favor of the County and against the J. R. Phillips Investment Company in the sum of $13,400, from which judgment the Investment Company has prosecuted this appeal.

This appeal presents but the one question of limitation. The claim upon which the County sued was more than four years past due at the time the suit was filed, and if the two or four year statute of limitation articles 5526, 5527, Vernon’s Annotated Tex. Civ. Stats, ran against the County on a claim of this nature, it was barred by such statute, otherwise the judgment was properly rendered in the County’s favor.

We conclude that limitation did not run in this case against the County. This was a suit to recover money belonging to the road and bridge fund of the County. It was definitely decided by the Commission of Appeals in the case of Linz v. Eastland County, 39 S.W.2d 599, 77 A.L.R. 1466, that while limitation will defeat a recovery by the County of funds belonging to its general fund, it will not defeat a claim for money belonging to its road and bridge fund. The opinion in the Linz case was *200not adopted by the Supreme Court, but it has never been overruled by that Court and we feel constrained to follow it. National Bank of Commerce v. Williams, 125 Tex. 619, 84 S.W.2d 691.

The judgment is affirmed.