NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 22-2447 

__________ 

JOE THORPE, 

 Appellant 

v. 

TOWNSHIP OF SALISBURY; DEBRA J. BRITTON; DONALD B. BRITTON; 

SANDY NICOLO; MICHAEL J. POCHRON; JAMES R. SUHOCKI; 

MEGAN C. HOUCK, also known as Megan Suhocki; GREGORY M. REIHMAN; 

MICHAEL J. MILKOVITZ; JOELLE MILKOVITZ; JOHN ASHLEY; DANIEL SELL; 

DEBRA J. BRINTON; DONALD B. BRINTON 

____________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 5:21-cv-02102) 

District Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. 

____________________________________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

April 6, 2023 

Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: May 12, 2023) 

___________ 

OPINION*

___________ 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2

PER CURIAM

Joe Thorpe, an attorney proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s 

March 22, 2022 decision entered in this civil rights action that he brought against a host 

of defendants. We will dismiss this appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction, and to the 

extent that we do have jurisdiction here, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

I.

Thorpe commenced this civil rights action in the District Court in 2021. Later that 

year, he moved for a preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, some of the defendants moved 

to dismiss his amended complaint (the operative pleading), and other defendants moved 

for a more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). On March 22, 

2022, the District Court entered an order that (1) denied the motion for a preliminary

injunction, (2) dismissed some of the defendants, (3) granted, in part, the remaining 

defendants’ motion for a more definite statement, and (4) directed Thorpe to file a second 

amended complaint that included that more definite statement. Instead of filing a second 

amended complaint, Thorpe brought this appeal.1

II.

Our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is limited to reviewing “final” 

decisions of the district courts. But the District Court’s March 22, 2022 order does not 

1 Thorpe presented this appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit. But that court, after concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over this appeal,

transferred the appeal to us pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
3 

qualify as a “final” decision, for that order did not “end[] the litigation on the merits and 

leave[] nothing for the [district] court to do but execute the judgment.” Quackenbush v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996) (citation to quoted case omitted). Indeed, that 

order’s granting a more definite statement was merely an interlocutory ruling. See

Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 131 (5th Cir. 1959); 5C Arthur R. 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1378 (3d ed.).2 Although Rule 12(e) provides 

that a district court may strike a pleading or “issue any other appropriate order” if a 

plaintiff fails to file a more definite statement within the time prescribed, the District 

Court has yet to enter such an order in this case. See generally CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 290 

F.2d 736, 739-40 (9th Cir. 1961) (indicating that a district court’s order dismissing an 

action after striking a pleading under Rule 12(e) would be final and appealable). 

 Although jurisdiction under § 1291 does not lie here, we do have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) to review the part of the District Court’s order that denied 

Thorpe’s motion for a preliminary injunction. See Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 

173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017). But Thorpe has forfeited any challenge to that part of the 

District Court’s order by not meaningfully addressing it in his brief. See Geness v. Cox, 

2

 As noted above, the District Court’s order did dismiss some of the defendants from this 

case. But an order that dismisses some, but not all, claims does not qualify as a final and 

appealable order unless the District Court certifies it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(b). See Glover v. FDIC, 698 F.3d 139, 144 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012). The 

District Court made no such certification in this case. 
4 

902 F.3d 344, 355 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[I]t is well settled that a passing reference to an issue 

will not suffice to bring that issue before this court” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

 In view of the above, we will dismiss this appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction, 

and to the extent that we have jurisdiction, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.3

3

 One of the seven appellee briefs filed in this case includes a footnote asking us to 

impose sanctions against Thorpe under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c). That 

request is denied. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 406 (1990) (“On 

its face, Rule 11 does not apply to appellate proceedings.”); CFE Grp., LLC v. Firstmerit 

Bank, N.A., 809 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir. 2015) (indicating that Rule 11 does not apply in 

the appellate context); In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities, Inc., 218 F.3d 109, 118 n.4 (2d Cir. 

2000) (noting that “Rule 11 is generally employed in the district court” (emphasis 

added)).