alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 12
 ADVANTA CORP. AND SUBSIDIARIES
COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
 Three Months Ended
    
    Nine Months Ended($ in thousands)
    
    September 30,
    
    September 30,2009
    
    2008
    
    2009
    
    2008Net income (loss)
    
    $
    (76,485
    )
    
    $
    (19,258
    )
    
    $
    (482,459
    )
    
    $
    3,119Income tax expense (benefit)
    
    
    (2,888
    )
    
    
    (16,369
    )
    
    
    34,800
    
    
    
    (1,580
    )Earnings (loss) before income taxes
    
    
    (79,373
    )
    
    
    (35,627
    )
    
    
    (447,659
    )
    
    
    1,539Fixed charges:Interest on debt, deposits and other
borrowings
    
    
    23,711
    
    
    
    26,424
    
    
    
    78,240
    
    
    
    79,971Interest on subordinated debt payable
to preferred securities trust
    
    
    2,181
    
    
    
    2,317
    
    
    
    6,780
    
    
    
    6,951One-third of all rentals
    
    
    448
    
    
    
    451
    
    
    
    1,366
    
    
    
    1,387Total fixed charges
    
    
    26,340
    
    
    
    29,192
    
    
    
    86,386
    
    
    
    88,309Earnings (loss) before income taxes and
fixed charges
    
    $
    (53,033
    )
    
    $
    (6,435
    )
    
    $
    (361,273
    )
    
    $
    89,848Ratio of earnings to fixed charges(1)
    
    
    (2.01
    )x(2)
    
    
    (0.22
    )x(2)
    
    
    (4.18
    )x(2)
    
    
    1.02
    x
 
 (1)
    
    For purposes of computing these ratios, earnings represent income before income
taxes plus fixed charges. Fixed charges consist of interest expense and one-third
(the portion deemed representative of the interest factor) of rental expense on
operating leases. Fixed charges do not include interest expense related to
unrecognized tax benefits, which we classify as income tax expense.(2)
    
    The ratios calculated for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2009 and the
three months ended September 30, 2008 are less than 1.00. In order to achieve a ratio
of 1.00, earnings before income taxes and fixed charges would need to increase by $79
million for the three months ended September 30, 2009, $36 million for the three months
ended September 30, 2008 and $448 million for the nine months ended September 30, 2009.
#### TENNESSEE GAS TRANSMISSION COMPANY, Movant, v. R. A. J. HULS et al., opposed.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Jan. 15, 1954.

D". L. Pendleton, Winchester, for appellant." .i

Harvey T. Lisle, Redwine & Redwine, Winchester, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.. .

"Motion for an appeal from á judgment óf the Clark Circuit Court awarding opposed $1,750 in an action wherein movant condemned a right of way " for a gas line.

Although there is a patent error- in "the verdict.of the jury in itemizing the .damages awarded, the total amount of the award is fully supported by the evidence.

Motion for appeal denied.

Judgment affirmed. .
#### REICHE v. WILLIAMS.

No. A-417.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Jan. 31, 1945.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 28, 1945.

John Dawson, of Sinton, for plaintiff in error.

J. L. McNees, of Dallas, and J. C. Russell, of Sinton, for defendant in error.

ALEXANDER, Chief Justice.

We are not in accord with the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals that the evidence did not raise the issue of the mental incapacity of the testatrix to make the will. However, that issue was submitted to the jury and determined adversely to the contestant, and judgment was entered probating the will. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed that judgment. 183 S.W.2d 587. We have carefully examined the record, including appellant’s brief in the Court of Civil Appeals, and find no procedural error in the trial of the case. Therefore the Court of Civil Appeals properly affirmed the judgment of the trial court, even though it gave an erroneous reason therefor. The application for a writ of error is therefore “Refused for Want of Merit.”
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

October 27, 2021

No. 04

- 21

- 00200

- CV

Robert C. SINGER , III, Appellant

v.

April Marie SINGER , Individually and as Trustee o f the Singer Financial Management Trust, Appellee

From the 438th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019

- CI

- 03145 Honorable Cynthia Marie Chapa , Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice

This is an accelerated appeal. On September 29, 2021, we issued an opinion and judgment in this case. On October 26, 2021, appellant filed a motion to expedite the issuance of the mandate. The motion states that appellant has conferred with appellee’s counsel and app ellee is not opposed to this relief.

Appellant’s motion to expedite the issuance of the mandate is GRANTED . The clerk of this court is instructed to issue the mandate immediately. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 18.6 (allowing the appellate court to exped ite the issuance of the mandate in an accelerated appeal).

_________________________________ Beth Watkins , JusticeIN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 27th day of October, 2021

.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ

, Clerk of Court
March 18, 2015 Mr. Kevin Schlemmer Office of Aviation Analysis U.S. Department
of Transportation 1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20590 RE: Essential Air Services Proposal, Docket DOT-OST-2000-8556 Dear Mr. Schlemmer: As the regulated electric utility in Adak, TDX Adak Generating, LLC (TAG) kindly requests strong consideration
be given to the proposal by Alaska Airlines to provide continued jet service to Adak Island. As the electric utility, we are the only source of electric power in Adak,

a critical service in this remote location. Given the harsh environment and severe weather, the reliability of Alaska Air's jet service is paramount
in ensuring we are able to move people and material to respond to the many critical situations that occur frequently
in Adak. Jet service also provides the timeliest travel option, as well as the most reliable as the ability to land in Adak is often hampered by unruly weather conditions. At other TDX utilities around the state, we have consistently experienced delays in travel and cargo movement
as the smaller aircraft that service these locations are unable to land due to weather restrictions. When these flights are delayed or rescheduled, the ability to get people and material on subsequent flights is limited. These delays cost local business considerable expense, and unlike Adak, most other locations are serviced by regular barge service. We fully support the City of Adak's position, and that of the other local businesses
in Adak in their support continuing Alaska Airline's jet service to Adak. We urge the Department
of Transportation

to award the Essential Air Service contract for Adak for another two years beginning October

1, 2015. Sincerely, 

# a

.. A./.1J\k·.·

1 • Genera·t· 

# ~~c; 

# J- (/

J **/Jo:r~yo~** 

# fit.-/ General Manager
E.

18
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

WACO DIVISION 

WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC 

 

v. Case No.: 6:20-cv-00497-ADA 

 

ZTE CORPORATION ET AL 

ORDER 

BE IT REMEMBERED on this day, there was presented to the Court the Motion for Admission 

Pro Hac Vice filed by Hershy Stern (“Applicant”), counsel for WSOU Investments LLC, and the 

Court, having reviewed the motion, enters the following order: 

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice is GRANTED, and Applicant 

may appear on behalf of WSOU Investments LLC in the above case. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Applicant, if he/she has not already done so, shall immediately 

tender the amount of $100.00, made payable to: Clerk, U.S. District Court, in compliance with Local 

Court Rule AT-1(f)(2). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the corresponding Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice was 

e-filed, the attorney who filed the Motion on behalf of the Applicant is directed to notify the Applicant 

of this order. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Applicant, pursuant to the Administrative Policies and 

Procedures for Electronic Filing in Civil and Criminal cases in the Western District of Texas, shall 

register as a filing user within 10 days of the date of this Order, if he/she has not previously done so on 

a prior case in this District. 

SIGNED this the 4th day of January, 2022. 

ALAN D ALBRIGHT 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 6:20-cv-00497-ADA Document 150 Filed 01/04/22 Page 1 of 1
#### LAUGHERTY v. STATE.

No. 25091.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 17, 1951.

,No attorney . on appeal for appellant.

- George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State. . .

BEAUCPIAMP, Judge.'

Appellant was charged by complaint and information with the offense of driving while intoxicated. .He was; found guilty by the court, having waived a jury, and was assessed a fine, of $50.00.

The record is brought forward without a statement of facts, or bill of exception. Nothing 1⁄8 presented; for our consideration.

•The judgment:is affirmeda
|Exhibit 32


Written
Statement of the Chief Executive Officerand Chief Financial Officer


Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§1350


Solely
for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, we, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Financial Officer of Teltronics, Inc. (the Company), hereby certify,
based on our knowledge, that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the
quarter ended March 31, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
and results of operations of the Company.
/s/ Ewen R. Cameron
Ewen R. CameronChief Executive
Officer
/s/ Patrick G. Min
Patrick G. MinChief Financial
Officer
Date:   May 17, 2004
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#### BLUE DIAMOND COAL CO. v. CAMPBELL.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Oct. 31, 1952.

Craft & -Stanfill, Hazard, for appellant.

Courtney C. Wells, D. G. Boleyn, Hazard, for appellee.

WADDILL, Commissioner.

The judgment of the Perry Circuit Court from which this appeal is prosecuted, awarded appellee, Jim Campbell, $2,000 in damages against appellant, Blue Diamond -Coal Company, for alleged false arrest and imprisonment averred to have been brought about by the agent and servant of appellant while acting for and on behalf óf the company. A reversal is sought, tipon the grounds of prejudicial error, (1) in failing to sustain appellant’s motion for a peremptory instruction, and (2). excessive damages.

The evidence disclosed that appellee was arrested on the charge of. drunkenness on *422appellant’s property by an industrial ¡policeman employed by the company. Following the arrest, appellant was delivered to the jailor o-f Perry County, Kentucky, where he was incarcerated for a period of several hours. The charge was not pressed against appellee.

The officer making the arrest testified that appellee was drunk. Other witnesses introduced by appellant also stated that appellee was intoxicated. However, appellee and several witnesses who were present on the occasion of the arrest testified that he was sober. The contrariety of the testimony made an issue for the jury’s determination. Sizemore v. Hoskins, 314 Ky. 436, 235 S.W.2d 1011. We find no merit in appellant’s first contention.

Appellant’s second ground urged for reversal i-s well taken. According to appel-lee’s statement he was imprisoned for *“2*■or 3 -hours.” The averment contained in the petition concerning damages states that “this plaintiff was greatly exposed, chagrined, and humiliated and injured to his credit and circumstances.”

We find that under the pleadings and proof the damages awarded appellee were excessive even though it be conceded that appellee was not drunk and that his .arrest and imprisonment were caused by the wrongful acts of appellant’s employee. Proof of these facts would only entitle him to compensatory damages for the humiliation he suffered. Nothing is shown in the way o-f excessive force, brutal treatment or physical injury. Appellant offered no proof concerning damage to his reputation.

The cases referred to below are somewhat similar to the instant one and in each case the damages were held to be excessive. In Sizemore v. Hoskins, 314 Ky. 436, 235 S.W.2d 1011, $5,000; Couch v. Vanhoose, 314 Ky. 36, 234 S.W.2d 169, $1,000; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Carson, 145 Ky. 81, 140 S.W. 71, $400; Southern Ry. in Kentucky v. Hawkins, 121 Ky. 415, 89 S.W. 258, 28 Ky.Law Rep. 364, $1,000; Lexington & E. Ry. Co. v. Lyons, 104 Ky. 23, 46 S.W. 209, 20 Ky.Law Rep. 516, $260; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Breckinridge, 99 Ky. 1, 34 S.W. 702, $500; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Fish, Ky., 127 S.W. 519, 43 L.R.A.,N.S., 584, $500; and in Camden Interstate, R. Co. v. Frazier, 97 S.W. 776, 30 Ky.Law Rep. 186, $500.

Judgment reversed.
Exhibit 99.1

CERTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 906  OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, each of the undersigned certifies that this periodic report fully complies with the requirements
of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in this periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of Versicor Inc.

|Date: March 3, 2003 |  | /s/GEORGE F. HORNER IIIGeorge F. Horner IIIPresident and Chief
Executive Officer                  
|------------------- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: March 3, 2003 |  | /s/DOV A. GOLDSTEIN, M.D.Dov A. Goldstein, M.D.Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial
Officer

This
certification accompanies this periodic report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by for purposes of Section 18 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

---

QuickLinks
MARK A. EDWARDS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IS FILED

CASE NO. 1D16-4623

_____________________________/

Opinion filed May 17, 2017.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.

James B. Fensom, Judge.

Mark A. Edwards, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

WOLF, RAY, and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from Financial
Statements for the Quarter Ended March 31, 2000 and is qualified in its entirety
by reference to such Form 10-Q for Quarter Ended march 31, 2000.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                         616,691
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                4,656,608
<ALLOWANCES>                                   138,992
<INVENTORY>                                  5,659,805
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            11,013,259
<PP&E>                                       9,535,390
<DEPRECIATION>                               5,880,018
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              15,290,507
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       10,851,390
<BONDS>                                      1,429,948
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                        113
<COMMON>                                         4,062
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,004,994
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                15,290,507
<SALES>                                      7,584,389
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,584,389
<CGS>                                        4,501,137
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                3,592,900
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                59,778
<LOSS-PROVISION>                              (71,008)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             290,017
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (788,435)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (788,435)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (788,435)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.20)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.20)


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3265 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3265

   Eliminating the debt ceiling for a period defined, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 5, 2013

 Mr. Grayson introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   Eliminating the debt ceiling for a period defined, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Fiscal Sanity Act for the National 
Debt''.

SEC. 2. NONAPPLICABILITY OF DEBT CEILING.

    Section 3101(b) of title 31, United States Code, shall not apply 
for the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and 
ending 210 days thereafter.
                                 <all>
```
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALEJANDRO ACEVEDO

- PEREZ, AKA Antonio Aguilar

- Garcia, AKA Riche Garcia

- Mendez, AKA Alberto Perez,

Petitioner ,

v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 14

- 70744 Agency No. A0 88

- 747

- 035

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted January 18, 2017 **

Before: TROTT, TASHIMA , and CALLAHAN , Circuit Judges.
Alejandro Acevedo

- Perez , a native and citizen of Mexico, petition s pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing h is
appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JAN 24 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF A PPEALS2 14

- 7 0744

cancellation of removal

. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review

for substantial evidence the agency ’ s continuous physical presence determination

. Gutierrez v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2008)

. We review de novo
questions of law, Mohammed v. Gonzales , 400 F.3d 785, 791

- 92 (9th Cir. 2005),

and review for abuse of discretion t he denial of a motion to remand, Movsisian v.
Ashcroft , 395 F.3d 1095, 1097

- 98 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for

review.
Substantial evidence supp orts t he agency’s determination that Acevedo

Perez failed to establish the requisite continuous physical presence for cancellation

of removal , where he presented inconsistent testimony with no corroboration
regarding his presence in the U nited States between 1999 and 2002

. S ee 8 U.S.C.
§ § 1229a(c)(4)(B)

- (C) , 1229b( b )(1)(A)

.
The BIA did not err in its decision not to consider Acevedo

- Perez’s

additional evidence filed for the first time in conjunction with the appeal. Zumel v.
Lynch , 8 03 F.3d 463, 475 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Under the regulations, the BIA may not
make its own findings or rely on its own interpretation of the facts.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) )

.
To the extent Acevedo

- Perez is challenging the BIA’s denial of his motion3 14

- 7 0744

to remand, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, where
petitioner did not show that the evidence he submitted was previously un available.

See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) ( “ A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted
unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and
was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former
hearing .” ); s ee also Romero

- Ruiz v. Mukasey , 538 F. 3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“T he formal req uirements for a motion to reopen and a motion to remand are the

same .” ).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.