Old File: 

18-935.pdf 

27 pages (167 KB) 

2/24/2020 8:49:11 AM 

Total Changes 

1 

2/26/2020 12:25:05 PM 

Compare Results 

versus 

Content 

0 Replacements 

0 Insertions 

0 Deletions 

New File: 

18-935_new.pdf 

27 pages (171 KB) 

2/26/2020 12:18:39 PM 

Styling and 

Annotations 

1 Styling 

0 Annotations 

Go to First Change (page 24) 

NoURLProvided.pdf[2/26/2020 12:25:05 PM] 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2019 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

MONASKY v. TAGLIERI 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

No. 18–935. Argued December 11, 2019—Decided February 25, 2020 

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Convention or Convention), implemented in the 

United States by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22

U. S. C. §9001 et seq., provides that a child wrongfully removed from 

her country of “habitual residence” ordinarily must be returned to that 

country.

Petitioner Monasky, a U. S. citizen, asserts that her Italian husband, respondent Taglieri, became abusive after the couple moved to 

Italy from the United States. Two months after the birth of the couple’s daughter, A. M. T., in Italy, Monasky fled with the infant to Ohio. 

Taglieri petitioned the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of 

Ohio for A. M. T.’s return to Italy under the Convention, pursuant to

22 U. S. C. §9003(b), on the ground that the child had been wrongfully

removed from her country of “habitual residence.” The District Court 

granted Taglieri’s petition, concluding that the parents’ shared intent

was for their daughter to live in Italy. Then two-year-old A. M. T. was 

returned to Italy. The en banc Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under its precedent, the court first noted, an infant’s habitual residence depends on 

the parents’ shared intent. It then reviewed the District Court’s 

habitual-residence determination for clear error and found none. In 

doing so, the court rejected Monasky’s argument that Italy could not 

qualify as A. M. T.’s “habitual residence” in the absence of an actual 

agreement by her parents to raise her there. 

Held: 

1. A child’s habitual residence depends on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case, not on categorical requirements such as an

actual agreement between the parents. Pp. 7–14.

(a) The inquiry begins with the Convention’s text “and the context 
 

 

 

2 MONASKY v. TAGLIERI 

Syllabus 

in which the written words are used.” Air France v. Saks, 470 U. S. 

392, 397. The Convention does not define “habitual residence,” but, as 

the Convention’s text and explanatory report indicate, a child habitually resides where she is at home. This fact-driven inquiry must be

“sensitive to the unique circumstances of the case and informed by 

common sense.” Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F. 3d 729, 744. Acclimation of older children and the intentions and circumstances of caregiving parents are relevant considerations, but no single fact is dispositive

across all cases. The treaty’s “negotiation and drafting history” corroborates that habitual residence depends on the specific circumstances of the particular case. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491, 507. 

This interpretation also aligns with habitual-residence determinations

made by other nations party to the Convention. Pp. 7–12.

(b) Monasky’s arguments in favor of an actual-agreement requirement are unpersuasive. While an infant’s “mere physical presence” is 

not a dispositive indicator of an infant’s habitual residence, a wide 

range of facts other than an actual agreement, including those indicating that the parents have made their home in a particular place, can 

enable a trier to determine whether an infant’s residence has the quality of being “habitual.” Nor is adjudicating a dispute over whether an 

agreement existed a more expeditious way of promoting returns of abducted children and deterring would-be abductors than according 

courts leeway to consider all the circumstances. Finally, imposing a 

categorical actual-agreement requirement is unlikely to be an appropriate solution to the serious problem of protecting children born into 

domestic violence, for it would leave many infants without a habitual

residence, and therefore outside the Convention’s domain. Domestic 

violence should be an issue fully explored in the custody adjudication 

upon the child’s return. The Convention also has a mechanism for 

guarding children from the harms of domestic violence: Article 13(b)

allows a court to refrain from ordering a child’s return to her habitual

residence if “there is a grave risk that [the child’s] return would expose

the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child 

in an intolerable situation.” Pp. 12–14.

2. A first-instance habitual-residence determination is subject to 

deferential appellate review for clear error. A trial court’s habitualresidence determination presents a mixed question of law and fact that 

is heavily fact laden. The determination thus presents a task for factfinding courts and should be judged on appeal by a clear-error review 

standard. See U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U. S. 

___, ___–___. There is no “historical tradition” indicating otherwise. 

Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 558. Clear-error review has a particular virtue in Hague Convention cases: By speeding up appeals, it 

serves the Convention’s emphasis on expedition. Notably, courts of 
 

 

 

 

 

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 

Syllabus 

other treaty partners also review first-instance habitual-residence determinations deferentially. Pp. 14–16. 

3. Given the circumstances of this case, it is unnecessary to disturb 

the judgment below and remand the case to give the lower courts an 

opportunity to apply the governing totality-of-the-circumstances 

standard in the first instance. Pp. 16–17. 

907 F. 3d 404, affirmed. 

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., 

joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Parts I, III, and IV. THOMAS, 

J., and ALITO, J., filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the 

judgment. 
 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 18–935 

MICHELLE MONASKY, PETITIONER v. 

DOMENICO TAGLIERI 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

[February 25, 2020]

 JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Convention or Convention), Oct. 25, 1980, T. I. A. S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 

99–11 (Treaty Doc.), a child wrongfully removed from her

country of “habitual residence” ordinarily must be returned

to that country. This case concerns the standard for determining a child’s “habitual residence” and the standard for 

reviewing that determination on appeal. The petitioner,

Michelle Monasky, is a U. S. citizen who brought her infant 

daughter, A. M. T., to the United States from Italy after her 

Italian husband, Domenico Taglieri, became abusive to 

Monasky. Taglieri successfully petitioned the District 

Court for A. M. T.’s return to Italy under the Convention, 

and the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s 

order. 

Monasky assails the District Court’s determination that 

Italy was A. M. T.’s habitual residence. First of the questions presented: Could Italy qualify as A. M. T.’s “habitual 

residence” in the absence of an actual agreement by her 

parents to raise her there? The second question: Should the 
 

 

2 MONASKY v. TAGLIERI 

Opinion of the Court 

Court of Appeals have reviewed the District Court’s habitualresidence determination independently rather than deferentially? In accord with decisions of the courts of other 

countries party to the Convention, we hold that a child’s habitual residence depends on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case. An actual agreement between

the parents is not necessary to establish an infant’s habitual residence. We further hold that a first-instance habitualresidence determination is subject to deferential appellate review for clear error. 

I 

A 

The Hague Conference on Private International Law 

adopted the Hague Convention in 1980 “[t]o address the 

problem of international child abductions during domestic 

disputes.” Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 4 (2014) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). One hundred one countries, including the United States and Italy, are Convention 

signatories. Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, Convention of 25 Oct. 1980 on the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction, Status Table, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/ 

conventions/status-table/?cid=24. The International Child 

Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 102 Stat. 437, as 

amended, 22 U. S. C. §9001 et seq., implements our Nation’s obligations under the Convention. It is the Convention’s core premise that “the interests of children . . . in matters relating to their custody” are best served when custody

decisions are made in the child’s country of “habitual residence.” Convention Preamble, Treaty Doc., at 7; see Abbott 

v. Abbott, 560 U. S. 1, 20 (2010). 

To that end, the Convention ordinarily requires the

prompt return of a child wrongfully removed or retained

away from the country in which she habitually resides. Art. 

12, Treaty Doc., at 9 (cross-referencing Art. 3, id., at 7). The 

removal or retention is wrongful if done in violation of the 
 

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

custody laws of the child’s habitual residence. Art. 3, ibid. 

The Convention recognizes certain exceptions to the return

obligation. Prime among them, a child’s return is not in

order if the return would place her at a “grave risk” of harm

or otherwise in “an intolerable situation.” Art. 13(b), id., 

at 10. 

The Convention’s return requirement is a “provisional” 

remedy that fixes the forum for custody proceedings. Silberman, Interpreting the Hague Abduction Convention: In

Search of a Global Jurisprudence, 38 U. C. D. L. Rev. 1049, 

1054 (2005). Upon the child’s return, the custody adjudication will proceed in that forum. See ibid. To avoid delaying

the custody proceeding, the Convention instructs contracting states to “use the most expeditious procedures available” to return the child to her habitual residence. Art. 2, 

Treaty Doc., at 7. See also Art. 11, id., at 9 (prescribing six

weeks as normal time for return-order decisions). 

B 

In 2011, Monasky and Taglieri were married in the

United States. Two years later, they relocated to Italy,

where they both found work. Neither then had definite 

plans to return to the United States. During their first year

in Italy, Monasky and Taglieri lived together in Milan. But 

the marriage soon deteriorated. Taglieri became physically 

abusive, Monasky asserts, and “forced himself upon [her] 

multiple times.” 907 F. 3d 404, 406 (CA6 2018) (en banc). 

About a year after their move to Italy, in May 2014, 

Monasky became pregnant. Taglieri thereafter took up new 

employment in the town of Lugo, while Monasky, who did 

not speak Italian, remained about three hours away in Milan. The long-distance separation and a difficult pregnancy 

further strained their marriage. Monasky looked into returning to the United States. She applied for jobs there,

asked about U. S. divorce lawyers, and obtained cost information from moving companies. At the same time, though, 
 

 

 

4 MONASKY v. TAGLIERI 

Opinion of the Court 

she and Taglieri made preparations to care for their expected child in Italy. They inquired about childcare options 

there, made purchases needed for their baby to live in Italy,

and found a larger apartment in a Milan suburb. 

Their daughter, A. M. T., was born in February 2015.

Shortly thereafter, Monasky told Taglieri that she wanted

to divorce him, a matter they had previously broached, and 

that she anticipated returning to the United States. Later, 

however, she agreed to join Taglieri, together with A. M. T., 

in Lugo. The parties dispute whether they reconciled while 

together in that town.

On March 31, 2015, after yet another heated argument,

Monasky fled with her daughter to the Italian police and 

sought shelter in a safe house. In a written statement to 

the police, Monasky alleged that Taglieri had abused her 

and that she feared for her life. Two weeks later, in April

2015, Monasky and two-month-old A. M. T. left Italy for 

Ohio, where they moved in with Monasky’s parents. 

Taglieri sought recourse in the courts. With Monasky absent from the proceedings, an Italian court granted Taglieri’s request to terminate Monasky’s parental rights, discrediting her statement to the Italian police. App. 183. In 

the United States, on May 15, 2015, Taglieri petitioned the

U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for the 

return of A. M. T. to Italy under the Hague Convention, 

pursuant to 22 U. S. C. §9003(b), on the ground that Italy

was her habitual residence. 

The District Court granted Taglieri’s petition after a fourday bench trial. Sixth Circuit precedent at the time, the

District Court observed, instructed courts that a child habitually resides where the child has become “acclimatiz[ed]”

to her surroundings. App. to Pet. for Cert. 85a (quoting 

Robert v. Tesson, 507 F. 3d 981, 993 (CA6 2007)). An infant, 

however, is “too young” to acclimate to her surroundings.

App. to Pet. for Cert. 87a. The District Court therefore proceeded on the assumption that “the shared intent of the 
 

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

[parents] is relevant in determining the habitual residence

of an infant,” though “particular facts and circumstances 

. . . might necessitate the consideration [of] other factors.” 

Id., at 97a. The shared intention of A. M. T.’s parents, the 

District Court found, was for their daughter to live in Italy, 

where the parents had established a marital home “with no

definitive plan to return to the United States.” Ibid. Even 

if Monasky could change A. M. T.’s habitual residence unilaterally by making plans to raise A. M. T. away from Italy,

the District Court added, the evidence on that score indicated that, until the day she fled her husband, Monasky 

had “no definitive plans” to raise A. M. T. in the United 

States. Id., at 98a. In line with its findings, the District 

Court ordered A. M. T.’s prompt return to Italy. 

The Sixth Circuit and this Court denied Monasky’s requests for a stay of the return order pending appeal. 907 

F. 3d, at 407. In December 2016, A. M. T., nearly two years

old, was returned to Italy and placed in her father’s care.1 

In the United States, Monasky’s appeal of the District 

Court’s return order proceeded. See Chafin v. Chafin, 568 

U. S. 165, 180 (2013) (the return of a child under the Hague 

Convention does not moot an appeal of the return order). A 

divided three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the

District Court’s order, and a divided en banc court adhered 

to that disposition.

The en banc majority noted first that, after the District 

Court’s decision, a precedential Sixth Circuit opinion, Ahmed v. Ahmed, 867 F. 3d 682 (2017), established that, as

the District Court had assumed, an infant’s habitual residence depends on “shared parental intent.” 907 F. 3d, at 

—————— 1Taglieri represents that “[a]n order issued by the Italian court in December 2018 awarded legal custody of A. M. T., on an interim basis, to 

the Lugo municipality . . . with placement at [Taglieri’s] residence; and 

provided that mother-daughter visits would continue under the plan prescribed in a court order issued earlier in 2018.” Brief for Respondent 56, 

n. 13. 
 

6 MONASKY v. TAGLIERI 

Opinion of the Court 

408 (quoting Ahmed, 867 F. 3d, at 690). The en banc majority then reviewed the District Court’s habitual-residence 

determination for clear error and found none. Sustaining

the District Court’s determination that A. M. T.’s habitual 

residence was Italy, the majority rejected Monasky’s argument that the District Court erred because “she and Taglieri never had a ‘meeting of the minds’ about their child’s

future home.” 907 F. 3d, at 410. 

No member of the en banc court disagreed with the majority’s rejection of Monasky’s proposed actual-agreement 

requirement. Nor did any judge maintain that Italy was 

not A. M. T.’s habitual residence. Judge Boggs wrote a concurring opinion adhering to the reasoning of his three-judge 

panel majority opinion: “[A]bsent unusual circumstances,

where a child has resided exclusively in a single country,

especially with both parents, that country is the child’s habitual residence.” Id., at 411. The dissenters urged two 

discrete objections. Some would have reviewed the District 

Court’s habitual-residence determination de novo. See id., 

at 419 (opinion of Moore, J.). All would have remanded for 

the District Court to reconsider A. M. T.’s habitual residence in light of the Sixth Circuit’s Ahmed precedent. See 

907 F. 3d, at 419–420; id., at 421–422 (opinion of Gibbons, 

J.); id., at 423 (opinion of Stranch, J.). 

We granted certiorari to clarify the standard for habitual

residence, an important question of federal and international law, in view of differences in emphasis among the

Courts of Appeals. 587 U. S. ___ (2019). Compare, e.g., 907 

F. 3d, at 407 (case below) (describing inquiry into the child’s

acclimatization as the “primary” approach), with, e.g., 

Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F. 3d 1067, 1073–1081 (CA9 2001) 

(placing greater weight on the shared intentions of the parents), with, e.g., Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F. 3d 729, 746 

(CA7 2013) (rejecting “rigid rules, formulas, or presumptions”). Certiorari was further warranted to resolve a division in Courts of Appeals over the appropriate standard of 
 

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

appellate review. Compare, e.g., 907 F. 3d, at 408–409 (case 

below) (clear error), with, e.g., Mozes, 239 F. 3d, at 1073 

(de novo). 

II 

The first question presented concerns the standard for

habitual residence: Is an actual agreement between the

parents on where to raise their child categorically necessary

to establish an infant’s habitual residence? We hold that 

the determination of habitual residence does not turn on 

the existence of an actual agreement. 

A 

We begin with “the text of the treaty and the context in 

which the written words are used.” Air France v. Saks, 470 

U. S. 392, 397 (1985). The Hague Convention does not define the term “habitual residence.” A child “resides” where 

she lives. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1176 (5th ed. 1979).

Her residence in a particular country can be deemed “habitual,” however, only when her residence there is more

than transitory. “Habitual” implies “[c]ustomary, usual, of

the nature of a habit.” Id., at 640. The Hague Convention’s 

text alone does not definitively tell us what makes a child’s 

residence sufficiently enduring to be deemed “habitual.” It 

surely does not say that habitual residence depends on an

actual agreement between a child’s parents. But the term 

“habitual” does suggest a fact-sensitive inquiry, not a categorical one.

The Convention’s explanatory report confirms what the

Convention’s text suggests. The report informs that habitual residence is a concept “well-established . . . in the 

Hague Conference.” 1980 Conférence de La Haye de droit 

international privé, Enlèvement d’enfants, E. Pérez-Vera, 
 

8 MONASKY v. TAGLIERI 

Opinion of the Court 

Explanatory Report in 3 Actes et documents de la Quatorzième session, p. 445, ¶66 (1982) (Pérez-Vera).2 The report refers to a child’s habitual residence in fact-focused 

terms: “the family and social environment in which [the 

child’s] life has developed.” Id., at 428, ¶11. What makes a 

child’s residence “habitual” is therefore “some degree of integration by the child in a social and family environment.” 

OL v. PQ, 2017 E. C. R. No. C–111/17, ¶42 (Judgt. of June

8); accord Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, [2018] 1

S. C. R. 398, 421, ¶43, 424 D. L. R. (4th) 391, 410, ¶43 

(Can.); A v. A, [2014] A. C., ¶54 (2013) (U. K.). Accordingly,

while Federal Courts of Appeals have diverged, if only in

emphasis, in the standards they use to locate a child’s habitual residence, see supra, at 6, they share a “common”

understanding: The place where a child is at home, at the 

time of removal or retention, ranks as the child’s habitual 

residence. Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 445 F. 3d 280, 291 

(CA3 2006).

Because locating a child’s home is a fact-driven inquiry,

courts must be “sensitive to the unique circumstances of the 

case and informed by common sense.” Redmond, 724 F. 3d, 

at 744. For older children capable of acclimating to their 

surroundings, courts have long recognized, facts indicating 

—————— 2According to an analysis provided by the Department of State to the

Senate during the ratification process, the “explanatory report is recognized by the [Hague] Conference as the official history and commentary 

on the Convention and is a source of background on the meaning of the

provisions of the Convention.” Hague International Child Abduction 

Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10503 (1986). The 

explanatory report notes, however, that “it has not been approved by the

Conference, and it is possible that, despite the Rapporter’s [sic] efforts to

remain objective, certain passages reflect a viewpoint which is in part 

subjective.” Pérez-Vera 427–428, ¶8. See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U. S. 1, 

19 (2010) (“We need not decide whether this Report should be given 

greater weight than a scholarly commentary.”). 
Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

acclimatization will be highly relevant.3 Because children, 

especially those too young or otherwise unable to acclimate, 

depend on their parents as caregivers, the intentions and

circumstances of caregiving parents are relevant considerations. No single fact, however, is dispositive across all 

cases. Common sense suggests that some cases will be 

straightforward: Where a child has lived in one place with 

her family indefinitely, that place is likely to be her habitual residence. But suppose, for instance, that an infant

lived in a country only because a caregiving parent had 

been coerced into remaining there. Those circumstances 

should figure in the calculus. See Karkkainen, 445 F. 3d, 

at 291 (“The inquiry into a child’s habitual residence is a

fact-intensive determination that cannot be reduced to a 

predetermined formula and necessarily varies with the circumstances of each case.”).

The treaty’s “negotiation and drafting history” corroborates that a child’s habitual residence depends on the specific circumstances of the particular case. Medellín v. 

Texas, 552 U. S. 491, 507 (2008) (noting that such history 

may aid treaty interpretation). The Convention’s explanatory report states that the Hague Conference regarded habitual residence as “a question of pure fact, differing in that

respect from domicile.” Pérez-Vera 445, ¶66. The Conference deliberately chose “habitual residence” for its factual 

character, making it the foundation for the Convention’s return remedy in lieu of formal legal concepts like domicile 

—————— 3Facts courts have considered include: “a change in geography combined with the passage of an appreciable period of time,” “age of the 

child,” “immigration status of child and parent,” “academic activities,” 

“social engagements,” “participation in sports programs and excursions,” 

“meaningful connections with the people and places in the child’s new 

country,” “language proficiency,” and “location of personal belongings.” 

Federal Judicial Center, J. Garbolino, The 1980 Hague Convention on 

the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: A Guide for Judges 

67–68 (2d ed. 2015). 
 

 

 

10 MONASKY v. TAGLIERI 

Opinion of the Court 

and nationality. See Anton, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 30 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 537,

544 (1981) (history of the Convention authored by the drafting commission’s chairman). That choice is instructive. 

The signatory nations sought to afford courts charged with

determining a child’s habitual residence “maximum flexibility” to respond to the particular circumstances of each 

case. P. Beaumont & P. McEleavy, The Hague Convention 

on International Child Abduction 89–90 (1999) (Beaumont 

& McEleavy). The aim: to ensure that custody is adjudicated in what is presumptively the most appropriate forum—the country where the child is at home. 

Our conclusion that a child’s habitual residence depends

on the particular circumstances of each case is bolstered by

the views of our treaty partners. ICARA expressly recognizes “the need for uniform international interpretation of

the Convention.” 22 U. S. C. §9001(b)(3)(B). See Lozano, 

572 U. S., at 13; Abbott, 560 U. S., at 16. The understanding that the opinions of our sister signatories to a treaty are 

due “considerable weight,” this Court has said, has “special

force” in Hague Convention cases. Ibid. (quoting El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U. S. 155, 176 

(1999), in turn quoting Air France, 470 U. S., at 404). The 

“clear trend” among our treaty partners is to treat the determination of habitual residence as a fact-driven inquiry

into the particular circumstances of the case. Balev, [2018] 

1 S. C. R., at 423, ¶50, 424 D. L. R. (4th), at 411, ¶50. 

Lady Hale wrote for the Supreme Court of the United 

Kingdom: A child’s habitual residence “depends on numerous factors . . . with the purposes and intentions of the parents being merely one of the relevant factors. . . . The essentially factual and individual nature of the inquiry should 

not be glossed with legal concepts.” A, [2014] A. C., at ¶54. 

The Court of Justice of the European Union, the Supreme 

Court of Canada, and the High Court of Australia agree. 
 

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

See OL, 2017 E. C. R. No. C–111/17, ¶42 (the habitual residence of a child “must be established . . . taking account of

all the circumstances of fact specific to each individual 

case”); Balev, [2018] 1 S. C. R., at 421, 423–430, ¶¶43, 48–

71, 424 D. L. R. (4th), at 410–417, ¶¶43, 48–71 (adopting an 

approach to habitual residence under which “[t]he judge

considers all relevant links and circumstances”); LK v. 

Director-General, Dept. of Community Servs., [2009] 237

C. L. R. 582, 596, ¶35 (Austl.) (“to seek to identify a set list

of criteria that bear upon where a child is habitually resident . . . would deny the simple observation that the question of habitual residence will fall for decision in a very wide

range of circumstances”). Intermediate appellate courts in

Hong Kong and New Zealand have similarly stated what 

“habitual residence” imports. See LCYP v. JEK, [2015] 4

H. K. L. R. D. 798, 809–810, ¶7.7 (H. K.); Punter v. Secretary for Justice, [2007] 1 N. Z. L. R. 40, 71, ¶130 (N. Z.). 

Tellingly, Monasky has not identified a single treaty partner that has adopted her actual-agreement proposal. See 

Tr. of Oral Arg. 9.4 

The bottom line: There are no categorical requirements

for establishing a child’s habitual residence—least of all an

actual-agreement requirement for infants. Monasky’s pro-

—————— 4Monasky disputes that foreign courts apply a totality-of-thecircumstances standard to infants, as opposed to older children. In this 

regard, she points out, the Court of Justice of the European Union instructs that, “where ‘the infant is in fact looked after by her mother,’ ‘it 

is necessary to assess the mother’s integration in her social and family

environment’ in the relevant country.” Reply Brief 5–6 (quoting Mercredi 

v. Chaffe, 2010 E. C. R. I–14309, I–14379, ¶55). True, a caregiving parent’s ties to the country at issue are highly relevant. But the Court of 

Justice did not hold that the caregiver’s ties are the end of the inquiry. 

Rather, the deciding court must “tak[e] account of all the circumstances 

of fact specific to each individual case.” Id., ¶56 (emphasis added) (also

considering, among other factors, the infant’s physical presence and duration of time in the country). 
 

 

12 MONASKY v. TAGLIERI 

Opinion of the Court 

posed actual-agreement requirement is not only unsupported by the Convention’s text and inconsistent with 

the leeway and international harmony the Convention

demands; her proposal would thwart the Convention’s 

“objects and purposes.” Abbott, 560 U. S., at 20. An actualagreement requirement would enable a parent, by withholding agreement, unilaterally to block any finding of habitual residence for an infant. If adopted, the requirement

would undermine the Convention’s aim to stop unilateral

decisions to remove children across international borders. 

Moreover, when parents’ relations are acrimonious, as is often the case in controversies arising under the Convention, 

agreement can hardly be expected. In short, as the Court 

of Appeals observed below, “Monasky’s approach would create a presumption of no habitual residence for infants, leaving the population most vulnerable to abduction the least

protected.” 907 F. 3d, at 410. 

B 

Monasky counters that an actual-agreement requirement 

is necessary to ensure “that an infant’s mere physical presence in a country has a sufficiently settled quality to be

deemed ‘habitual.’” Brief for Petitioner 32. An infant’s 

“mere physical presence,” we agree, is not a dispositive indicator of an infant’s habitual residence. But a wide range

of facts other than an actual agreement, including facts indicating that the parents have made their home in a particular place, can enable a trier to determine whether an infant’s residence in that place has the quality of being 

“habitual.” 

Monasky also argues that a bright-line rule like her proposed actual-agreement requirement would promote

prompt returns of abducted children and deter would-be abductors from “tak[ing] their chances” in the first place. Id., 

at 35, 38. Adjudicating a winner-takes-all evidentiary dispute over whether an agreement existed, however, is 
Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

scarcely more expeditious than providing courts with leeway to make “a quick impression gained on a panoramic 

view of the evidence.” Beaumont & McEleavy 103 (internal

quotation marks omitted). When all the circumstances are 

in play, would-be abductors should find it more, not less,

difficult to manipulate the reality on the ground, thus impeding them from forging “artificial jurisdictional links . . . 

with a view to obtaining custody of a child.” Pérez-Vera 

428, ¶11.

Finally, Monasky and amici curiae raise a troublesome 

matter: An actual-agreement requirement, they say, is necessary to protect children born into domestic violence. Brief 

for Petitioner 42–44; Brief for Sanctuary for Families et al. 

as Amici Curiae 11–20. Domestic violence poses an “intractable” problem in Hague Convention cases involving caregiving parents fleeing with their children from abuse. Hale, 

Taking Flight—Domestic Violence and Child Abduction, 70 

Current Legal Prob. 3, 11 (2017). We doubt, however, that 

imposing a categorical actual-agreement requirement is an

appropriate solution, for it would leave many infants without a habitual residence, and therefore outside the Convention’s domain. See supra, at 11–12. Settling the forum for

adjudication of a dispute over a child’s custody, of course,

does not dispose of the merits of the controversy over custody. Domestic violence should be an issue fully explored 

in the custody adjudication upon the child’s return.

The Hague Convention, we add, has a mechanism for 

guarding children from the harms of domestic violence: 

Article 13(b). See Hale, 70 Current Legal Prob., at 10–16 

(on Hague Conference working group to develop a bestpractices guide to the interpretation and application of Article 

13(b) in cases involving domestic violence). Article 13(b), as 

noted supra, at 3, allows a court to refrain from ordering a 

child’s return to her habitual residence if “there is a grave 

risk that [the child’s] return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an 
 

 

14 MONASKY v. TAGLIERI 

Opinion of the Court 

intolerable situation.” Art. 13(b), Treaty Doc., at 10.

Monasky raised below an Article 13(b) defense to Taglieri’s

return petition. In response, the District Court credited

Monasky’s “deeply troubl[ing]” allegations of her exposure 

to Taglieri’s physical abuse. App. to Pet. for Cert. 105a. But 

the District Court found “no evidence” that Taglieri ever 

abused A. M. T. or otherwise disregarded her well-being. 

Id., at 103a, 105a. That court also followed Circuit precedent disallowing consideration of psychological harm 

A. M. T. might experience due to separation from her 

mother. Id., at 102a. Monasky does not challenge those

dispositions in this Court. 

III 

Turning to the second question presented: What is the 

appropriate standard of appellate review of an initial adjudicator’s habitual-residence determination? Neither the 

Convention nor ICARA prescribes modes of appellate review, other than the directive to act “expeditiously.” Art. 

11, Treaty Doc., at 9; see Federal Judicial Center, J. Garbolino, The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 

International Child Abduction: A Guide for Judges 162 (2d 

ed. 2015) (the Convention’s “emphasis on prompt disposition applies to appellate proceedings”).5 

Absent a treaty or statutory prescription, the appropriate

level of deference to a trial court’s habitual-residence determination depends on whether that determination resolves 

a question of law, a question of fact, or a mixed question of 

law and fact. Generally, questions of law are reviewed 

—————— 5Monasky contends that only de novo review can satisfy “the need for 

uniform international interpretation of the Convention.” 22 U. S. C. 

§9001(b)(3)(B). See Brief for Petitioner 19–21. However, ICARA’s recognition of the need for harmonious international interpretation is hardly 

akin to the “clear statutory prescription” on the standard of appellate 

review that Congress has provided “[f]or some few trial court determinations.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 558 (1988). 
 

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

de novo and questions of fact, for clear error, while the appropriate standard of appellate review for a mixed question

“depends . . . on whether answering it entails primarily legal or factual work.” U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 8–9). 

A child’s habitual residence presents what U. S. law 

types a “mixed question” of law and fact—albeit barely so. 

Id., at ___ (slip op., at 7). The inquiry begins with a legal 

question: What is the appropriate standard for habitual residence? Once the trial court correctly identifies the governing totality-of-the-circumstances standard, however, what 

remains for the court to do in applying that standard, as we 

explained supra, at 7–11, is to answer a factual question:

Was the child at home in the particular country at issue? 

The habitual-residence determination thus presents a task 

for factfinding courts, not appellate courts, and should be 

judged on appeal by a clear-error review standard deferential to the factfinding court. 

In selecting standards of appellate review, the Court has

also asked whether there is “a long history of appellate 

practice” indicating the appropriate standard, for arriving 

at the standard from first principles can prove “uncommonly difficult.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 558 

(1988). Although some Federal Courts of Appeals have reviewed habitual-residence determinations de novo, there 

has been no uniform, reasoned practice in this regard, nothing resembling “a historical tradition.” Ibid. See also 

supra, at 6–7 (noting a Circuit split). Moreover, when a 

mixed question has a factual foundation as evident as the

habitual-residence inquiry here does, there is scant cause 

to default to historical practice.

Clear-error review has a particular virtue in Hague Convention cases. As a deferential standard of review, clearerror review speeds up appeals and thus serves the Convention’s premium on expedition. See Arts. 2, 11, Treaty Doc., 

at 7, 9. Notably, courts of our treaty partners review first-
 

 

16 MONASKY v. TAGLIERI 

Opinion of the Court 

instance habitual-residence determinations deferentially.

See, e.g., Balev, [2018] 1 S. C. R., at 419, ¶38, 424 D. L. R.

(4th), at 408, ¶38; Punter, [2007] 1 N. Z. L. R., at 88, ¶204; 

AR v. RN, [2015] UKSC 35, ¶18. 

IV 

Although agreeing with the manner in which the Court

has resolved the two questions presented, the United

States, as an amicus curiae supporting neither party, suggests remanding to the Court of Appeals rather than affirming that court’s judgment. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28. Ordinarily, we might take that course, 

giving the lower courts an opportunity to apply the governing totality-of-the-circumstances standard in the first 

instance. 

Under the circumstances of this case, however, we decline 

to disturb the judgment below. True, the lower courts 

viewed A. M. T.’s situation through the lens of her parents’ 

shared intentions. But, after a four-day bench trial, the

District Court had before it all the facts relevant to the dispute. Asked at oral argument to identify any additional fact 

the District Court did not digest, counsel for the United

States offered none. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. Monasky and Taglieri agree that their dispute “requires no ‘further factual 

development,’” and neither party asks for a remand. Reply 

Brief 22 (quoting Brief for Respondent 54).

Monasky does urge the Court to reverse if it rests 

A. M. T.’s habitual residence on all relevant circumstances. 

She points to her “absence of settled ties to Italy” and the 

“unsettled and unstable conditions in which A. M. T. resided in Italy.” Reply Brief 19 (internal quotation marks 

and alteration omitted). The District Court considered the 

competing facts bearing on those assertions, however, including the fraught circumstances in which the parties’ 

marriage unraveled. That court nevertheless found that 

Monasky had sufficient ties to Italy such that “[a]rguably, 
Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

[she] was a habitual resident of Italy.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 

91a. And, despite the rocky state of the marriage, the District Court found beyond question that A. M. T. was born

into “a marital home in Italy,” one that her parents established “with no definitive plan to return to the United 

States.” Id., at 97a. Nothing in the record suggests that 

the District Court would appraise the facts differently on 

remand. 

A remand would consume time when swift resolution is 

the Convention’s objective. The instant return-order proceedings began a few months after A. M. T.’s birth. She is 

now five years old. The more than four-and-a-half-year duration of this litigation dwarfs the six-week target time for

resolving a return-order petition. See Art. 11, Treaty Doc., 

at 9. Taglieri represents that custody of A. M. T. has so far 

been resolved only “on an interim basis,” Brief for Respondent 56, n. 13, and that custody proceedings, including the

matter of Monasky’s parental rights, remain pending in Italy. Tr. of Oral Arg. 60–61. Given the exhaustive record 

before the District Court, the absence of any reason to anticipate that the District Court’s judgment would change on 

a remand that neither party seeks, and the protraction of 

proceedings thus far, final judgment on A. M. T.’s return is

in order. 

* * * 

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is 

Affirmed. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 1 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 18–935 

MICHELLE MONASKY, PETITIONER v. 

DOMENICO TAGLIERI 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

[February 25, 2020]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in part and concurring in

the judgment. 

The Court correctly concludes that an actual agreement 

between parents is not necessary to establish the habitual 

residence of an infant who is too young to acclimatize.* I 

also agree with the Court’s conclusion that the habitualresidence inquiry is intensely fact driven, requiring courts 

to take account of the unique circumstances of each case. I 

write separately, however, because I would decide this case 

principally on the plain meaning of the treaty’s text. 

I 

This case requires us to interpret the Hague Convention

on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct.

25, 1980, T. I. A. S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–11, as 

implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), as amended, 22 U. S. C. §9001 et seq. Article 3 of the Convention provides that the “removal or the

retention of a child is to be considered wrongful” when “it is 

—————— 

*The Court states that we “granted certiorari to clarify the standard 

for habitual residence,” ante, at 6, and the opinion contains language that 

may be read to apply to older children, see, e.g., ante, at 8–9. But the 

relevant question presented focuses exclusively on the habitual residence 

of “an infant [who] is too young to acclimate to her surroundings.” Pet. 

for Cert. i. I would confine our analysis to that distinct question, which

is the only one briefed by the parties. 
 

 

 

 

2 MONASKY v. TAGLIERI 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person . . . under the law of the State in which the child was habitually 

resident immediately before the removal or retention” and 

“at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised.” S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–11, at 7. Under 

ICARA, a parent may petition a federal or state court to return an abducted child to the child’s country of habitual residence. §9003(b). ICARA does not define habitual residence; it merely states that the petitioning parent must

“establish by a preponderance of the evidence . . . that the 

child has been wrongfully removed or retained within the 

meaning of the Convention.” §9003(e)(1)(A). The Convention also does not define the phrase.

“‘The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of

a statute, begins with its text.’” Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U. S. 

1, 10 (2010) (quoting Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491, 506 

(2008)). The Court recognizes this fact, but it concludes 

that the text only “suggests” that habitual residence is a 

fact-driven inquiry, and ultimately relies on atextual 

sources to “confir[m] what the Convention’s text suggests.” 

Ante, at 7. In my view, the ordinary meaning of the relevant

language at the time of the treaty’s enactment provides

strong evidence that the habitual-residence inquiry is inherently fact driven. See Schindler Elevator Corp. v. 

United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U. S. 401, 407 (2011). 

In 1980, as today, “habitual” referred to something that 

was “[c]ustomary” or “usual.” Black’s Law Dictionary 640 

(5th ed. 1979); see also 6 Oxford English Dictionary 996 (2d 

ed. 1989) (“existing as a settled practice or condition; constantly repeated or continued; customary”); Webster’s 

Third New International Dictionary 1017 (1976) (similar). 

And “residence” referred to a “[p]ersonal presence at some

place of abode,” Black’s Law Dictionary, at 1176, “one’s

usual dwelling-place,” 13 Oxford English Dictionary, at

707, or “the act or fact of abiding or dwelling in a place for 

some time,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 
 

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

at 1931; see also ibid. (“a temporary or permanent dwelling 

place, abode, or habitation”). 

These definitions demonstrate that the concept of habitual residence for a child too young to acclimatize cannot be

reduced to a neat set of necessary and sufficient conditions.

Answering the question of what is customary or usual, for 

instance, requires judges to consider a host of facts, such as 

the presence or absence of bank accounts and driver’s licenses, the length and type of employment, and the

strength and duration of other community ties. Determining whether there is a residence involves the consideration 

of factors such as the presence or absence of a permanent

home, the duration in the country at issue, and, in some

cases, an actual agreement between the parents to reside in

a particular place. Accordingly, the ordinary meaning of

the phrase “habitual residence” provides strong support for 

the conclusion that an objective agreement between the

child’s parents is not required. This plain meaning should 

serve as the primary guide for our interpretation. See Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., 

at 4); Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U. S. 644, 649 (2004). 

II 

This case exemplifies the wisdom of firmly anchoring our 

discussion in the text before turning to the decisions of sister signatories—especially when those decisions are not 

contemporaneous with the treaty’s passage. Here, the 

Court finds it meaningful that foreign courts have interpreted the phrase “habitual residence” as a fact-driven inquiry. Ante, at 10–11. Though a “‘clear trend’” has certainly emerged in foreign courts, ante, at 10, this consensus 

appears to have developed only within the past decade.

Lady Hale of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 

noted as much in the 2013 decision cited by the Court. As 

she explained, for many years “the English courts [had] 
 

 

4 MONASKY v. TAGLIERI 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

been tempted to overlay the factual concept of habitual residence with legal constructs,” creating legal rules that dictated a child’s habitual residence. A v. A, [2014] A. C. ¶39 

(2013) (U. K.); see also id., ¶37. According to one commentator writing in 2001, though “academics and judges” had 

stressed “that the term should not be treated as a term of 

art and should not be complicated by technical legal requirements similar to those applicable to the concept of 

domicile,” “in some cases these statements seem[ed] to have

been pure lip-service, since many courts [were] unable to 

resist the temptation to ‘legalise’ the concept.” Schuz, Habitual Residence of Children Under the Hague Child Abduction Convention—Theory and Practice, 13 Child & Family L. Q. 1, 4 (2001). Thus, until recently, “[t]he approach of

many [foreign] courts [had] been to focus exclusively on the 

purpose of the parents in relocating,” an inquiry that 

speaks to the legal concept of domicile. Schuz, Policy Considerations in Determining the Habitual Residence of a

Child and the Relevance Of Context, 11 J. Transnat’l L. & 

Pol’y 101, 103 (2001) (footnote omitted).

It seems, then, that it took approximately 30 years from 

the time of the Convention’s enactment in 1980 for foreign

jurisdictions to coalesce around an interpretation of habitual residence. This relatively recent evolution brings into

bold relief the risk of relying too heavily on the decisions of 

foreign courts in lieu of a fulsome textual analysis. Because 

the decisions are not contemporaneous with the treaty’s

passage, they do not necessarily provide the best evidence

of the original understanding of the phrase. And reflexively

looking to foreign courts raises the question whether this

Court would have resolved this case differently had the issue been presented in 1990, 2000, or even 2010, before the 

clear trend emerged. 

The Court attempts to sidestep this difficulty by pointing 

to a statement in ICARA’s preamble that stresses “the need

for uniform international interpretation of the Convention.” 
 

 

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020) 5 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

22 U. S. C. §9001(b)(3)(B); see ante, at 10. It should go without saying that if our independent assessment of habitual

residence led to a conclusion that diverged from the emerging consensus, invocation of this prefatory language to force

agreement at the expense of plain meaning would be unfounded. By relying too heavily on the judicial decisions of 

the treaty’s other signatories, rather than on a more thorough textual analysis, we risk being persuaded to reach the 

popular answer, but perhaps not the correct one. In short, 

“we should not substitute the judgment of other courts for

our own.” Abbott, 560 U. S., at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 

see also Olympic Airways, 540 U. S., at 655, n. 9. 

To avoid these potential pitfalls, I would rely on the plain 

meaning of “habitual residence” to conclude that an actual 

agreement is not necessary. See supra, at 2–3. That conclusion is bolstered by the Convention’s explanatory report.

Interpretations from the courts of sister signatories, though

recent, also support the conclusion because they align with

the meaning of the text and our own independent judgment.

Because the Court places insufficient weight on the treaty’s

text, I cannot join Part II of its opinion. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2019) 1 

Opinion of ALITO, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 18–935 

MICHELLE MONASKY, PETITIONER v. 

DOMENICO TAGLIERI 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

[February 25, 2020]

 JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment. 

I agree with the Court on almost all the issues in this 

case. Specifically, I agree (1) that analysis of the question 

of “habitual residence” should be based on a range of factors

and should be attentive to the particular facts of each case, 

(2) that a child may have a habitual residence in a country

without a parental agreement to that effect, (3) that our interpretation of habitual residence should take into account 

the interpretations of other signatory nations, (4) that a district court’s decision on habitual residence is entitled to deference on appeal, and (5) that the judgment below should 

be affirmed. I also agree with JUSTICE THOMAS that we 

must independently interpret the meaning of “habitual

residence.” 

So what does it mean? The term “habitual” is used to 

refer to a cluster of related concepts. It can be used to refer 

to things done by habit, as well as things that are “constantly repeated or continued,” “usual,” or “accustomed.” 6 

Oxford English Dictionary 996 (2d ed. 1989); see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1017 (1976). If 

taken in isolation, each of these understandings might lead

to a different analysis in applying the concept of “habitual 

residence” under the Convention. See Hague Convention 

on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 
 

 

 

 

 

2 MONASKY v. TAGLIERI 

Opinion of ALITO, J. 

25, 1980, T. I. A. S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–11.

But I think the Court accurately captures what the term

means under the Convention when it says that a child’s habitual residence is the child’s “home.” Ante, at 8, 10, 15. 

Of course the concept of “home” is also multifaceted. It 

can be used to signify the place where a person generally 

sleeps, eats, works, and engages in social and recreational 

activities, but it can also mean the place where a person 

feels most comfortable and the place to which the person

has the strongest emotional ties. See 7 Oxford English Dictionary, at 322–323; Webster’s Third New International 

Dictionary, at 1082. As best I can determine, the concept of 

“habitual residence” under the Convention embraces all of 

these meanings to some degree. If forced to try to synthesize them, I would say it means the place where the child in 

fact has been living for an extended period—unless that 

place was never regarded as more than temporary or there 

is another place to which the child has a strong attachment.

I think this is the core of what courts have made of the concept of “habitual residence,” and it appears to represent the

best distillation of the various shades of meaning of the 

term taken in context. 

So interpreted, “habitual residence” is not a pure question of fact, at least as we understand that concept in our 

legal system. But it does involve a heavily factual inquiry.

For these reasons, I would say that the standard of review 

on appeal is abuse of discretion, not clear error. As a practical matter, the difference may be no more than minimal. 

The important point is that great deference should be afforded to the District Court’s determination.