IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

LESLIE T. WILDE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CITY OF DUNSMUIR et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

S252915

Third Appellate District

C082664

Siskiyou County Superior Court

SCCVPT16549

August 3, 2020

Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 

Cuéllar, and Groban concurred.
1

WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

S252915

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

The California Constitution grants voters the power of 

referendum, which allows them to approve or reject laws 

enacted by their elected representatives before the laws take 

effect. But to prevent the referendum process from disrupting 

essential governmental operations, the Constitution exempts

certain categories of legislation, including “statutes providing 

for tax levies or appropriations for usual current expenses” of 

the government. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 9, subd. (a).) The 

question in this case is whether this exemption applies to 

measures setting municipal water rates. We conclude the 

answer is yes. Municipal water rates and other local utility 

charges may be challenged by other means, but they are not 

subject to referendum.

I.

A.

Under the California Constitution, “[t]he legislative power 

of this State is vested in the California Legislature . . . but the 

people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and 

referendum.” (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.) The powers of initiative 

and referendum were enacted as part of the Constitution in 1911 

as companion reforms. The initiative power allows voters to 

propose new measures and place them on the ballot for a popular 

vote. If the measure is approved by popular vote, it becomes 

law. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8; id., § 10, subd. (a).) The 
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

2

referendum power, by contrast, allows voters to weigh in on laws 

that have already been passed by their elected representatives. 

Any voter or group of voters that gathers enough signatures can

place a legislative enactment on the ballot for an up or down 

vote. A referendum suspends operation of the law until it is

approved by a majority of voters. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 9, subd. 

(a); id., § 10, subd. (a); see City of Morgan Hill v. Bushey (2018) 

5 Cal.5th 1068, 1078 (City of Morgan Hill).) Like the initiative 

power, the referendum power applies to both state statutes and 

local enactments. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 11, subd. (a) [“Initiative 

and referendum powers may be exercised by the electors of each 

city or county under procedures that the Legislature shall 

provide”]; City of Morgan Hill, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1078; cf. 

Elec. Code, §§ 9141 et seq. [extending referendum to county 

electors], 9235 et seq. [extending referendum to electors of 

general law cities].) 

The referendum power is, however, subject to certain 

exceptions. These exceptions are spelled out in article II, section 

9, which provides, in relevant part: “The referendum is the 

power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of 

statutes except urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and 

statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations for usual 

current expenses of the State.” (Cal. Const., art. II, § 9, subd. (a), 

italics added.) Although this section is, by its terms, addressed 

to state statutes, the same exceptions apply to local legislation. 

(Rossi v. Brown (1995) 9 Cal.4th 688, 698 & fn. 4 (Rossi); Geiger 

v. Board of Supervisors (1957) 48 Cal.2d 832, 836–837 (Geiger); 
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

3

Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 

18 Cal.3d 582, 591–592, fn. 7.)1

B.

Several decades after the powers of initiative and 

referendum were established in the Constitution, voters enacted 

a series of reforms aimed at increasing voter control over 

revenue-raising measures. These provisions are of limited 

relevance to our decision in this case, for reasons we explain 

below, but help to explain the history of this litigation and the 

nature of the parties’ arguments in this court.

The series of reforms began with Proposition 13, a ballot 

initiative passed in 1978 to cap increases in property taxes and 

assessments, as well as other state and local taxes. Then, in 

1996, voters passed Proposition 218, which further curbed state 

and local government authority to generate revenue through 

taxes and other exactions. Finally, in 2010, voters approved 

Proposition 26, which expanded the reach of these limitations 

by broadening the definition of “tax” to cover “any levy, charge, 

or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government,” subject 

to several specified exceptions. (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 1, 

subd. (e); see generally City of San Buenaventura v. United 

Water Conservation Dist. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1191, 1199–1200.) 

The provisions most relevant here are articles XIII C and 

XIII D of the California Constitution (hereafter articles XIII C 

and XIII D), which were added by Proposition 218. These 

 

1 Charter cities have more leeway and “may reserve a 

broader referendum power to the voters” than is reserved in the 

Constitution. (Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 698; see also, e.g., 

Rubalcava v. Martinez (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 563, 571.) The 

City of Dunsmuir is, however, a general law city. 
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

4

articles set out detailed procedural and substantive 

requirements for imposing or increasing various types of 

government exactions. Article XIII C requires the approval of 

either a majority or two-thirds of voters before new or increased 

local taxes take effect, depending on the type of tax. (Art. XIII 

C, § 2.) Article XIII C also affirms voters’ power to reduce or 

repeal local taxes, assessments, fees, and charges through the 

initiative process. (Id., § 3.) Article XIII C does not address the 

availability of the referendum. 

Article XIII D circumscribes state and local government 

authority to impose or increase property-related taxes, 

assessments, fees, and charges. Under this article, a fee or 

charge is defined as “any levy other than an ad valorem tax, a 

special tax, or an assessment, imposed by an agency upon a 

parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership, 

including a user fee or charge for a property-related service.” 

(Art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (e).) These are commonly referred to as 

property-related fees and charges — a category that includes 

water service fees. Before levying new or increased fees or 

charges, article XIII D requires the relevant government 

authority to conduct a public hearing and allow property owners 

who are affected by the exaction to submit written protests. If 

a majority of affected owners file protests, the exaction cannot 

be imposed. (Art. XIII D, § 6; see Plantier v. Ramona Municipal 

Water Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 372, 381–382.) In general, 

property-related fees and charges must also be approved by 

either a majority of affected property owners or two-thirds of 

voters. Fees for sewer, water, and refuse collection services are, 

however, exempt from this voter approval requirement. (Art. 

XIII D, § 6, subd. (c).)
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

5

With this backdrop in mind, we turn to the facts of the case 

before us.

C.

The City of Dunsmuir is known for its water. Located on 

the Upper Sacramento River, just south of Mount Shasta, the 

City draws its water from natural mountain springs and dubs it 

the “Best Water on Earth.” The City pumps, stores, and 

distributes this water to its residents using a water system that 

the City owns and operates. The City pays for this system using 

proceeds from monthly water rates paid by the City’s residents.

Like any public utility, the water system requires regular 

repair and periodic improvements. In 2014, the City conducted 

an assessment of the improvements needed to meet the City’s 

projected water needs. This assessment concluded that a 

significant number of the system’s aging water main sections 

required replacement and that the water storage tank, which is 

more than 105 years old, would need to be upgraded “to insure 

water pressure and fire protection in major sections of the City.” 

As the City explained in a public notice, 50,000 feet of old water 

pipes had remained in the ground well past their lifespan, and 

an “extremely large number of leaks” pervaded the water 

system, leading to regular loss of water and a “continuous need 

to decontaminate large sections of water mains adjacent to the 

break in the pipe.” The City’s aging water tank likewise suffered 

from leaks. The City also commissioned a study to evaluate its

water rates, which were at the time based on a 20-year-old water 

plan. The study proposed new water rates that would raise the 

funds necessary for the infrastructure improvements.

In early 2015, the City appointed a committee of city 

council members and community members to evaluate the 
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

6

proposed water rates. (Wilde v. City of Dunsmuir (2018) 29 

Cal.App.5th 158, 164 (Wilde).) The committee recommended 

new rates to support the replacement of the water storage tank 

and water mains. (Ibid.) Plaintiff Leslie T. Wilde, a Dunsmuir 

resident, opposed the proposed rates. She has attempted to 

block them by various means.

Wilde’s first attempt came in March 2016, when the city 

council held a public hearing on the proposed water rates. 

(Wilde, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 164, 165.) Consistent with the 

requirements of Proposition 218, the City issued public notice of 

the hearing and provided an opportunity for residents to submit 

objections via protest ballots. Wilde organized the protest effort, 

but it yielded only 40 protest ballots — far short of the 

approximately 800 that would have been needed to halt the rate 

increase. (Wilde, at p. 165.)

The city council thereafter passed Resolution 2016-02

(Resolution), establishing a five-year plan for a $15 million 

upgrade to the City’s water storage and delivery infrastructure. 

(Wilde, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) The Resolution set new 

water rates that vary based on the amount of water used, the 

type of residential unit served, and the diameter of the water 

supply pipe in place. (Ibid.) 

Having led the failed Proposition 218 preadoption protest, 

Wilde next attempted to undo the Resolution in two ways. First, 

almost immediately after the city council passed the Resolution, 

Wilde submitted a petition for a referendum seeking to overturn 

it. (Wilde, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) Second, Wilde 

gathered signatures for an initiative that would implement a 

different water rate schedule. The initiative appeared on the 

November 8, 2016, ballot but was rejected by voters. (Ibid.) 
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

7

Wilde’s proposed referendum, by contrast, was never 

submitted to voters. The City declined to place the referendum 

on the ballot, telling Wilde, “The setting of Prop. 218 rates is an 

administrative act not subject to the referendum process. Also, 

Proposition 218 provides for initiatives (Art. XIIIC, sec. 3), but 

not referenda.” In response, Wilde filed a petition for a writ of 

mandate seeking to compel the City to place the referendum on 

the ballot. (Wilde, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) The trial 

court denied Wilde’s writ petition, agreeing with the City that 

Proposition 218 allows voters to challenge property-related fees 

by means of initiative but not referendum.2

 

The Court of Appeal reversed. (Wilde, supra, 29 

Cal.App.5th at p. 179.) Like the trial court, the Court of Appeal

focused its attention primarily on Proposition 218. The court 

noted that article II, section 9 of the California Constitution 

(hereafter article II, section 9) exempts tax measures from 

 

2 The trial court also concluded the City’s water-rate setting 

was an administrative act, not a legislative one, and therefore 

not subject to referendum. (See Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 

561, 569–570 [explaining that the initiative and referendum are 

available only to challenge “legislative acts by a local governing 

body” and not administrative acts].) The Court of Appeal 

disagreed, concluding that the Resolution is, in fact, a legislative 

act. (Wilde, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at pp. 172–175.) The City 

has not sought review of this aspect of the Court of Appeal’s 

decision.

The City also argued below that the issues in this case 

were moot since voters had already rejected Wilde’s proposed 

initiative. The Court of Appeal rejected the claim (Wilde, supra, 

29 Cal.App.5th at p. 164), and the City has not raised the 

challenge again here. In any event, we agree that the failure of 

Wilde’s initiative does not moot her request to place a 

referendum on the ballot.
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

8

referendum, but reasoned the exemption does not apply here 

because both parties agreed that the water charges are a 

“property-related fee” and not a “tax” under Proposition 218. 

(Wilde, at p. 172, fn. 3.) The court rejected the City’s argument 

that the water rates must be exempt from referendum because 

a referendum would suspend implementation of the rates and 

disrupt the City’s ability to provide an essential government 

service, explaining that the City could always revert to its old 

rates or craft a new water plan. (Id. at pp. 175–179.) The court

remanded the case with directions to the trial court to issue a 

peremptory writ of mandate ordering the City to place the 

referendum on the ballot in the next municipal election. (Id. at 

p. 179.)

In view of the importance of the issue presented to local 

governments and ratepayers across the state, we granted 

review. Shortly thereafter, a different panel of the Court of 

Appeal addressed a similar issue and arrived at a different 

conclusion in Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Amador Water 

Agency (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 279. The court there held that a 

local water agency’s resolution adopting new water service rates 

for its customers is exempt from referendum as a tax measure 

under article II, section 9 and that the scope of this exemption 

was not altered by Proposition 218. (Amador, at pp. 283–286, 

304.) 
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

9

We reach the same conclusion as the Amador court and 

reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeal in this 

case.3

II.

A.

Article II, section 9, subdivision (a) provides, as relevant 

here: “The referendum is the power of the electors to approve or 

reject statutes or parts of statutes except urgency statutes, 

statutes calling elections, and statutes providing for tax levies 

or appropriations for usual current expenses of the State.” The 

question before us is whether a measure instituting new 

municipal water rates qualifies as a tax measure exempt from 

referendum.

Article II, section 9 does not define the term “tax.” Wilde 

contends that to understand its meaning, we should begin by 

looking to articles XIII C and XIII D, both added by Proposition 

218. The parties do not dispute that for purposes of the

substantive and procedural requirements established by these 

 

3 For purposes of addressing the merits of Wilde’s claim, the 

City asks us to take judicial notice of two documents: (i) the 

Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association’s “annotation” of 

Proposition 218, dated September 5, 1996, as it was reprinted in 

the League of California Cities Propositions 26 and 218 

Implementation Guide dated May 2017, and made available on 

the League’s website; and (ii) the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers 

Association’s Proposition 218 “Statement of Drafters’ Intent.” 

The request is denied. Neither the existence nor the content of 

these documents is relevant to our resolution of the case. (See 

Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1141, 1147, fn. 5; see also 

Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 904; Mission 

Springs Water Dist. v. Verjil (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 892, 921, 

fn. 6.)
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

10

provisions, the new water rates are categorized as “fees” —

specifically, “property-related fees” — rather than “taxes.” (Art. 

XIII D, § 2, subd. (e); id., art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (e) [defining “tax” 

for the purpose of article XIII C]; see Richmond v. Shasta 

Community Services Dist. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 409, 426–427.) 

Wilde contends — and the Court of Appeal in this case agreed

— that the same should be true under article II, section 9.

We see no reason why that should be so. We have long 

recognized that “ ‘tax’ has no fixed meaning, and that the 

distinction between taxes and fees is frequently ‘blurred,’ taking 

on different meanings in different contexts.” (Sinclair Paint Co. 

v. State Bd. of Equalization (1997) 15 Cal.4th 866, 874 (Sinclair 

Paint); accord, e.g., Mills v. County of Trinity (1980) 108 

Cal.App.3d 656, 660 [“ ‘Tax’ is a term without fixed definition. 

The word may be construed narrowly or broadly depending on 

its particular context and the purpose for which the definition is 

to be used”].) There is no reason why an exaction cannot be both 

a “fee” under article XIII C or XIII D and a “tax” within the 

meaning of article II, section 9 (or any other constitutional 

provision, for that matter).

The definitional provisions of both articles XIII C and 

XIII D begin with the phrase “As used in this article” and do not 

purport to apply to other provisions of law. (Art. XIII C, § 1; art. 

XIII D, § 2; see Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil

(2006) 39 Cal.4th 205, 213–216 [discussing article XIII D, § 2].) 

Nor do the articles contain any other indication of intent to alter 

or amend the meaning of “tax” as used in any other 

constitutional provision — including the referendum provision, 

which predates articles XIII C and XIII D by several decades. 

In the absence of such an indication, we presume no alteration 

or amendment was intended. (See, e.g., City and County of San 
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

11

Francisco v. County of San Mateo (1995) 10 Cal.4th 554, 563; see 

also, e.g., Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek

(1990) 52 Cal.3d 531, 540–541 [“Implied amendments or repeals 

by implication are disfavored”].)

Wilde asserts we must impose a common definition of “tax” 

to harmonize articles XIII C and XIII D with the referendum 

provision. But while we have a duty to harmonize constitutional 

provisions where possible, this duty does not compel us to graft 

the tax terminology of articles XIII C and XIII D onto the 

referendum provision when the voters have not chosen to do so. 

Wilde points out that, broadly speaking, the referendum 

provision’s taxation exception and articles XIII C and XIII D all 

concern voter control over government finances. But this is not 

reason enough to impose the definition of “tax” from articles 

XIII C or XIII D on the referendum provision. The two more 

recently enacted articles do not constitute a comprehensive 

“revision of the entire subject” of voter involvement in revenue 

measures. (City and County of San Francisco v. County of San 

Mateo, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 563.) Nor does the operation of 

articles XIII C and XIII D depend in any way on whether the 

taxation exception covers exactions that are considered “fees” for 

purposes of these articles. Even as articles XIII C and XIII D

detail various methods for challenging government exactions —

including voter initiative — neither so much as mentions the 

referendum. In the absence of any clear connection between 

these two parts of the Constitution, let alone a conflict, there is 

no reason to “harmonize” articles XIII C and XIII D with the 

referendum provision in the manner Wilde proposes. In short, 

the constitutional provisions added by Proposition 218 do not 

control whether the water rates at issue are subject to challenge 

by referendum.
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

12

B.

We return, then, to the question before us: Is a measure 

adopting water rates exempt under the referendum provision as 

a “statute[] providing for tax levies?” (Art. II, § 9, subd. (a).) 

Again, the word “tax,” on its own, has no single “fixed meaning.” 

(Sinclair Paint, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 874.) This was as true 

in 1911, when the referendum provision was adopted, as it is 

today. Dictionary definitions for “tax” from the turn of the 

century reference a wide range of exactions paid to a 

government authority for public purposes, including: “a ratable 

portion of the produce of the property and labor of the individual 

citizens, taken . . . for the support of government, for the 

administration of the laws, and as the means for continuing in 

operation the various legitimate functions of the state”; “the 

enforced proportional contribution . . . levied by the authority of 

the state for the support of the government, and for all public 

needs”; and “any contribution imposed by government upon 

individuals, for the use and service of the state, whether under 

the name of toll, tribute, tallage . . . or other name.” (Black’s 

Law Dict. (2d ed. 1910) pp. 1136–1137; see also id. at pp. 1138–

1139 [defining “taxation”].) The City’s water rates fit 

comfortably with the scope of several of these definitions of 

“tax,” if not all of them: Municipal water rates are contributions 

imposed by the municipal government upon individuals for a 

service provided by the municipality — namely, the delivery of 

water.4

 

4 The use of the word “levy” adds nothing of substance to the 

analysis. In its verb form, the term meant to “lay or impose a 

tax,” and sometimes, to collect taxes. (Black’s Law Dict., supra, 
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

13

Judicial decisions from the time of article II, section 9’s 

passage likewise make clear that the term “tax” was understood 

to be capacious enough to cover charges for municipal utility

services. In City of Madera v. Black (1919) 181 Cal. 306 (City of 

Madera), for example, this court explained that rates charged to 

fund the construction of a municipal sewer system qualified as 

a “tax” within the meaning of a constitutional provision that 

conferred jurisdiction over tax cases to the superior courts. “A 

tax, in the general sense of the word, includes every charge upon 

persons or property, imposed by or under the authority of the 

legislature, for public purposes.” (Id. at p. 310, citing Perry v. 

Washburn (1862) 20 Cal. 318, 350, People v. McCreery (1868) 34 

Cal. 432, 454.) The sewer charge, we said, “was a charge upon 

persons; it was imposed by the legislative authority of the city 

of Madera for public purposes, and under these definitions it 

was a tax . . . .” (City of Madera, at p. 310.)5

 

at p. 714, cols. 1–2; see City of San Luis Obispo v. Pettit (1891) 

87 Cal. 499, 503 [the words “ ‘assessing and collecting’ . . . 

include[d] the operation called levying the tax,” in what was 

then Cal. Const., art. XI, § 12].) Wilde notes the term “levy” was 

also sometimes used to refer to the seizure of property to satisfy 

a judgment or debt, but this is plainly not the sense in which the 

term is used in article II, section 9. (See, e.g., Geiger, supra, 48 

Cal.2d at pp. 839–840 [exemption for “statutes providing for tax 

levies” in art. II, § 9 applies to sales tax measures].)

5 Having assured itself of the lower court’s jurisdiction, we 

went on to invalidate the sewer charges because they were being 

used to generate general revenue without legislative 

authorization to do so. (City of Madera, supra, 181 Cal. at 

pp. 311, 313–314.) Wilde argues that the fact the revenue was 

being used for general purposes was critical to our 

determination that the charges qualified as taxes. But our 
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

14

Municipal water rates fall well within this broad 

understanding of the term “tax.” Article XIV, section 1, of the 

1879 Constitution stated that “[t]he use of all water” was a 

“public use” and that water rates were to be set by local 

government authorities. (See People v. Stephens (1882) 62 Cal. 

209, 233–234.) And in October 1911, in the same election in 

which voters approved the right to referendum, voters amended 

the Constitution to empower municipalities to establish “public 

works” to provide “public utilities,” including water. (Cal. 

Const., former art. XI, § 19; see Clark v. Los Angeles (1911) 160 

Cal. 30, 47; see also German Sav. etc. Soc. v. Ramish (1902) 138 

Cal. 120, 124 [referring to charges imposed to pay for public 

works as tax levies].) The provision of water was understood to 

be a public purpose, so water rates would have been classified 

as “taxes” as City of Madera interpreted the term. 

City of Madera does not stand alone. Several cases from 

around the same time reflect a similarly broad understanding of 

the term “tax” as used in various provisions of California law. 

(See, e.g., Yosemite L. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1922) 187 Cal. 

774, 783 [reiterating the public purpose definition of “tax” from 

City of Madera and concluding that a mandatory workers’

compensation payment to the state was a tax]; cf. German Sav. 

etc. Soc. v. Ramish, supra, 138 Cal. at p. 124 [“The power to levy 

a tax for general purposes, which shall be a lien superior to all 

other liens, prior or otherwise, is not doubted, and it is not 

because it is called a tax, but because of its object and the 

necessity for raising revenue in order to execute the functions of 

 

opinion says nothing of the sort; it says only that the charges 

qualified as taxes because they were imposed for “public 

purposes.” (Id. at p. 310.)
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

15

government”]; Wood v. Brady (1885) 68 Cal. 78, 80 [defining a 

tax as “a public imposition, levied by authority of the 

government, upon the property of the citizen generally, for the 

purpose of carrying on the government”]; People v. Parks (1881) 

58 Cal. 624, 639 [characterizing drainage and irrigation as a 

“public purpose in which the public may be interested” and 

explaining that “promot[ing] a public purpose by a tax levy upon 

the property in the State . . . is within the power of the 

Legislature”]; Engineering etc. Co. v. East Bay M. U. Dist. (1932) 

126 Cal.App. 349, 365–366 [“the power of taxation is regarded 

as a most important and essential attribute of a public 

corporation or utility in order that there may be the ability to 

function generally and freely under exigencies and situations 

that may present themselves”].) 

Based in large measure on this body of precedent, the 

Court of Appeal would later opine that other municipal utility 

charges, not unlike the water rates at issue here, were subject 

to the taxation exception to the referendum in article II, section 

9. (See Dare v. Lakeport City Council (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 864, 

868 (Dare) [concluding sewer rates are subject to the exception]; 

cf. Fenton v. City of Delano (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 400, 403–407 

[discussing Dare and holding that a city fee on users of gas, 

electricity, phone, and cable television utilities was a tax 

measure exempt from referendum].)6

 Although we are not 

 

6 In Dare, the Court of Appeal concluded that because sewer 

rates are taxes under City of Madera and therefore exempt from 

referendum under the referendum provision in the Constitution, 

voters were barred from challenging new sewer rates by 

initiative as well. (Dare, supra, 12 Cal.App.3d at pp. 868–869.) 

This court later overruled this holding, explaining that an 
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

16

bound by these characterizations, they lend further credence to 

the conclusion that the water rates at issue here fall within the 

range of possible meanings of the term “tax” in the referendum 

provision, even if they do not reflect the only plausible 

interpretation of the term.

Wilde disagrees. According to Wilde, by the time the 

referendum provision was added to the Constitution in 1911, the 

law already distinguished between “taxes” and “fees” in much 

the same way articles XIII C and XIII D do now, following 

passage of Proposition 218. The term “tax,” Wilde argues, was 

narrowly understood to refer to a compulsory exaction designed 

to raise revenue for general government expenses. A charge in 

exchange for a particular benefit or service, like the water rates 

in this case, instead would have been denominated a “fee” —

unless, of course, it was excessive relative to the reasonable 

costs of providing a service, in which case it would have been 

 

initiative that repeals a tax prospectively is “not the ‘functional 

equivalent’ of a referendum.” (Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 711, 

italics added.)

Wilde asserts that Dare is no longer good authority after 

Rossi, even for the limited proposition that sewer rates are taxes 

exempt from referendum. Wilde highlights language in Rossi

stating, in passing, that Dare did not involve the “repeal of a 

tax.” (Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 708.) This was true insofar 

as the initiative measure at issue in Dare would have amended 

the rates at issue, not “repealed” them. But Rossi did not 

address whether the sewer rates were taxes for any purpose. We 

thus disagree with Wilde’s suggestion that Rossi rejected Dare’s 

characterization of the sewer rates as a tax or casually overruled 

the authorities on which Dare relies for that conclusion, 

including City of Madera. Rossi simply did not address the 

issue.
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

17

deemed a “tax” in disguise. In support of her argument, Wilde 

cites various cases that use the term “tax” in a range of 

unrelated contexts. (See, e.g., County of Plumas v. Wheeler

(1906) 149 Cal. 758, 761–765 [explaining that a regulatory 

business license fee was a permissible exercise of the county’s 

police power, not a statutorily prohibited tax for revenue-raising 

purposes, as long as the amount of the fee was reasonable given 

its purpose]; Fatjo v. Pfister (1897) 117 Cal. 83, 84–85 

[invalidating legislation increasing filing fees for county clerk 

inventory and appraisal of high-value estates as an 

unauthorized property tax]; The People v. Naglee (1850) 1 Cal. 

232, 252–254 [charge on foreigners operating gold mines was not 

a “tax” within the meaning of constitutional provision 

mandating that taxation be uniform throughout the state]; 

Oakland v. E. K. Wood Lumber Co. (1930) 211 Cal. 16, 25–26

[fee imposed in city’s proprietary capacity for service of 

providing wharves for use of vessels was not an unconstitutional 

duty on tonnage]; Arcade County Water Dist. v. Arcade Fire Dist.

(1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 232, 240 [allowing water district to impose

water rates on fire district as a “charge for services rendered,” 

and rejecting argument that the charge was disallowed as a 

“tax” by one governmental entity upon another]; cf. Western 

Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury (1915) 170 Cal. 686, 700 [comparing 

a mandatory workers’ compensation payment requirement for 

employers that had “some of the characteristics of a tax” with a 

requirement that an employer pay for an insurance-like 

workers’ compensation scheme].)

The law certainly drew such distinctions for some 

purposes. But did it draw the same distinction for every 

purpose, including for purposes of referendum? None of the 

cases says so. Nor do the other authorities on which Wilde 
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

18

relies, most of which refer in passing to both “water rates” and 

“taxes” without ever suggesting that water rates and taxes were 

uniformly considered to be mutually exclusive categories. (See 

Henderson v. Oroville-Wyandotte Irr. Dist. (1931) 213 Cal. 514, 

532 [noting that the cost of water in a water district included 

both “the acre-foot rate charged all water users” and other “taxes 

and assessments” without referencing the referendum power]; 

Shelton v. City of Los Angeles (1929) 206 Cal. 544, 551 [noting, 

in the context of a different constitutional provision and a 

dispute about municipal authority to incur debt, that even 

though a city’s water rates would be used to repay debt issued 

to fund the city’s water system, the debt was not being paid 

using “moneys derived from taxation”]; South Pasadena v. 

Pasadena Land etc. Co. (1908) 152 Cal. 579, 593 [describing a 

city’s administration of a public utility as a “proprietary and 

only quasi-public” activity in a different context, without 

discussion of taxes or fees]; Stats. 1911, ch. 671, §§ 22–24, 

pp. 1300–1301 [addressing, in a distinct statutory context,

municipal water districts’ authority to set “rate[s]” to pay 

operating expenses and levy “tax[es]” to cover outstanding bond 

payments].)7

 

7 Similarly, the 1948 Legislative Counsel’s interpretation of 

the term “revenue acts” in a separate provision of the 

Constitution as covering “every kind of tax, fee, or charge 

imposed and collected for the support of the State Government” 

does not establish that, for purposes of the referendum 

provision, the word “tax” could not encompass what Wilde would 

categorize as a “fee.” (Ops. Cal. Legis. Counsel, No. 197 (Mar. 

15, 1948) Consideration of Revenue Acts at Budget Sessions, 1 

Assem. J. (1948 Reg. Sess.) p. 388.)
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

19

C.

Given the wide range of uses of the term “tax,” it is 

plausible that the water rates at issue here qualify as taxes for 

some constitutional purposes. Whether they qualify as taxes for 

the particular purpose in question here requires a closer 

examination of article II, section 9. In City of Madera, we 

adopted a broad definition of “tax” in light of the purpose of the 

jurisdictional provision at issue: “to give to the sovereign power 

of the state, whether exercised generally or locally, the 

protection of having the legality of any exaction of money for 

public uses or needs cognizable in the first instance in the 

superior courts alone.” (City of Madera, supra, 181 Cal. at 

p. 311.) “In view of this purpose,” we said, “it is apparent that 

the words used should be applied in their broadest sense with 

respect to moneys raised for public purposes or needs.” (Ibid.) 

Likewise here, the proper understanding of the scope of the 

taxation exception to referendum requires close attention to the 

purpose of the exception.

We have previously explained that “[o]ne of the reasons, if 

not the chief reason, why the Constitution excepts from the 

referendum power acts of the Legislature providing for tax 

levies or appropriations for the usual current expenses of the 

state is to prevent disruption of its operations by interference 

with the administration of its fiscal powers and policies.” 

(Geiger, supra, 48 Cal.2d at pp. 839–840.) Referendum, we have 

explained, poses a distinct potential for disruption that sets it 

apart from the ordinary legislative process. To give voters an 

opportunity to propose referendum measures, all legislative 

enactments subject to referendum must wait some period of 

time before they take effect. At the state level, all nonexempt 

measures must wait 90 days; the Constitution imposes 
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

20

additional restrictions on when nonexempt measures may be 

passed by the Legislature. (See Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. 

(c)(1); id., art. II, § 9, subd. (b) [referendum measure may be 

proposed within 90 days after the enactment date of the 

statute]; id., art. IV, § 10, subd. (c) [“No bill may be passed by 

either house on or after September 1 of an even-numbered year 

except statutes calling elections, statutes providing for tax 

levies or appropriations for the usual current expenses of the 

State, and urgency statutes, and bills passed after being vetoed 

by the Governor”].)

8

 Similar rules apply to referenda at the city 

and county levels. (Elec. Code, § 9141 [county ordinances other 

than those subject to certain exceptions become effective 30 days 

after passage]; id., § 9235 [same for municipal ordinances].) By 

contrast, measures that are exempt from referendum may be 

enacted at any time and take effect immediately. (Cal. Const., 

art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)(3); see Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 703.) 

Article II, section 9’s exemptions from referendum reflect 

a recognition that in certain areas, legislators must be permitted 

to act expediently, without the delays and uncertainty that 

accompany the referendum process. All of the exemptions — for 

urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, and statutes 

providing for tax levies or appropriations for usual current 

 

8 The same was true under article II, section 9 as it was 

originally enacted. (Cal. Const., former art. IV, § 1 [“No act 

passed by the legislature shall go into effect until ninety days 

after the final adjournment of the session of the legislature 

which passed such act, except acts calling elections, acts 

providing for tax levies or appropriations for the usual current 

expenses of the state, and urgency measures necessary for the 

immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, 

passed by a two-thirds vote of all the members elected to each 

house”].)
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

21

expenses of the state — are for “measures having special 

urgency, a delay in the implementation of which could disrupt 

essential governmental operations.” (Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at 

p. 703.) For this reason, “ ‘[i]f essential governmental functions 

would be seriously impaired by the referendum process, the 

courts, in construing the applicable constitutional and statutory 

provisions, will assume that no such result was intended.’ ” 

(Ibid., quoting Geiger, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 839; see also 

McClure v. Nye (1913) 22 Cal.App. 248, 251 (McClure) 

[describing the exceptions to the referendum as “ample enough 

to prevent any menace to the public welfare by reason of such 

delay incidental to a submission to popular vote”].)

In Geiger, we elaborated on these principles as applied to 

tax measures. We held that a statute providing for a system of 

local sales and use taxes was exempt from referendum, 

explaining that allowing a referendum on these taxes would 

hamstring the ability of counties to budget and manage their

fiscal affairs. (Geiger, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 840; accord, Hunt 

v. Mayor & Council of Riverside (1948) 31 Cal.2d 619, 628–630

[sales tax exempt from referendum].) We later summarized the 

principles as follows: “[I]f a tax measure were subject to 

referendum, the county’s ability to adopt a balanced budget and

raise funds for current operating expenses through taxation 

would be delayed and might be impossible. As a result, the 

county would be unable to comply with the law or to provide 

essential services to residents of the county.” (Rossi, supra, 9 

Cal.4th at p. 703.) An initiative, by contrast, would have no such 

effect: Because an initiative does not delay or suspend the 

operation of statutes or ordinances, “[p]assage of an initiative 

which repeals an existing tax will rarely affect the current 

budgetary process of a local government.” (Ibid.)
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

22

These cases explain why article II, section 9 exempts the 

sorts of exactions that fall within Wilde’s narrow conception of 

taxes — that is, compulsory general-purpose exactions such as

sales taxes and income taxes. Each represents a source of 

revenue on which government depends for its essential 

operations. But the rationale underlying these cases is not 

limited to such exactions. Local governments also depend on 

other types of exactions to perform their essential functions, and 

subjecting such exactions to referendum would be no less 

disruptive to their operations. Here, the City depends on water 

charges to provide water to residents and to maintain the 

infrastructure necessary to do so. Even the temporary 

suspension of a rate-setting resolution would run the risk of 

undermining the City’s ability to finance its water utility and 

manage its fiscal affairs. The result would be to impair the 

City’s ability to carry out one of its most basic and essential

functions. The potential for disruption from subjecting water 

rates to referendum is at least as significant as the disruption 

that results from temporarily suspending an increase in the 

sales tax. (See Geiger, supra, 48 Cal.2d at pp. 839–840.) It 

follows from our cases that charges used to fund a city’s 

provision of water, like other utility fees used to fund essential 

government services, are exempt from referendum.

9

 

9 The rule we apply here is related to, but distinct from, the 

rule we articulated and applied in Simpson v. Hite (1950) 36 

Cal.2d 125. In Simpson, we granted a request for a writ of 

mandate that sought the removal of a proposed initiative from 

the ballot. The initiative would have repealed and replaced a

county board of supervisors’ selection of a site for local 

courthouses. (Id. at pp. 127, 135.) As we explained, the 
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

23

It may be the case, as the Court of Appeal below observed, 

that the City would not be entirely without recourse should 

Wilde’s referendum succeed. Perhaps the City could simply 

default to its prior rates while it restarts the process of 

“study[ing], plan[ning], and implement[ing] a new water rate 

master plan.” (Wilde, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 179.) But the 

exceptions to referendum do not exist solely to shield 

governments from certain and immediate disaster. From the 

standpoint of the Constitution’s referendum provision, the 

gradual disrepair of a fundamental government service is as 

much a cause for concern as a wholesale shutdown. Leaking 

 

Legislature had required, by state statute, that the county board 

of supervisors “provide suitable quarters for the municipal and 

superior courts,” and voters could not “nullify th[is] legislative 

policy” by way of an initiative. (Id. at pp. 129, 133.) To allow 

otherwise would be to permit the use of the initiative or 

referendum to “ ‘impair or wholly destroy the efficacy of some 

other governmental power.’ ” (Id. at p. 134, quoting Chase v. 

Kalber (1915) 28 Cal.App. 561, 569–570.)

The City relies on Simpson for the broad proposition that 

the powers of direct democracy are not to be interpreted to 

defeat essential government functions. But in Simpson, we 

invoked the essential government services reasoning not to 

effectuate the express exceptions in the referendum provision of 

the Constitution, but to foreclose the operation of the initiative 

or referendum where it would conflict with the Legislature’s 

express delegation of authority to a local government. (See 

DeVita v. County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 776 [describing 

Simpson as concluding that “the initiative and referendum 

power could not be used in areas in which the local legislative 

body’s discretion was largely preempted by statutory 

mandate”].) No similar exclusive delegation argument has been 

raised here. Nonetheless, for reasons given above, whether 

allowing referendum would impair essential government 

functions is a critical consideration in interpreting the scope of 

article II, section 9’s taxation exemption.
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

24

water pipes and aging water tanks only last for so long. The 

City will inevitably need to raise the funds required for the 

operation, repair, and upkeep of its utilities, just as it would for 

any other essential government service. Waiting to institute 

new water rates until a successful referendum runs the risk of 

forcing the City to wait too long. The purpose of the taxation 

exception in article II, section 9 is to alleviate that risk.

Wilde makes various additional arguments as to why the 

water rates should not be counted as taxes for purposes of the 

exemption in article II, section 9, but none is persuasive. First, 

Wilde argues that the water rates are disqualified because the 

proceeds from the water charges are not deposited in the City’s 

general fund and used for the general operation of the City. But 

into what specific accounts the money goes, and whether it funds 

general operations, are not article II, section 9’s concern. It 

suffices that the money goes to the City to fund an essential 

governmental function — namely, the provision of water. Nor 

does it matter, for purposes of our analysis, that water is 

sometimes provided by private companies rather than local 

governments; when a local government undertakes to provide 

water, the rates it sets are exempt from referendum in the same 

manner as other taxation measures.

Wilde also asserts that “taxes are no longer protected from 

the delay that a referendum election would entail” because they 

are subject to preapproval under article XIII C, which requires 

any new tax under that article to be approved by either a 

majority or two-thirds of voters before taking effect (art. XIII C, 

§ 2). The same is true for most fees and charges under article 

XIII D. (Art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (c).) Because so many exactions

are already subject to what Wilde calls a “ ‘referendum’ of 
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

25

sorts,”10 Wilde argues that there is no reason they should be 

insulated from an actual referendum under article II, section 9. 

But a preenactment vote does not suspend the operation of new 

rates in the same way as a postenactment challenge. Nor, in 

any event, is every exaction subject to a preapproval vote; the 

water rates at issue here, for example, are not. (Art. XIII D, § 6, 

subd. (c).) And at any rate, these preapproval requirements do 

not affect our interpretation of the referendum provision that 

long predated passage of Proposition 218.

It is true, as Wilde emphasizes, that it is “ ‘the duty of the 

courts to jealously guard this right of the people’ ” to the 

initiative and referendum, such that ordinarily “ ‘[i]f doubts can 

reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power, 

courts will preserve it.’ ” (Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. 

City of Livermore, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591.) But “when taxes 

levied to support essential governmental services arguably are 

involved in a referendum, the general rule requiring that 

referendum provisions be liberally construed to uphold the 

power is inapplicable.” (Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 703; see 

also Geiger, supra, 48 Cal.2d 832, 839–840.) That is the case 

here.

Finally, Wilde points to a handful of fees that have been 

the subject of referenda at various points in time, ranging from 

an “oleomargarine fee” on the ballot in 1926 (which sought to 

“regulate[] the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine” and

 

10 “[O]f sorts,” but not in fact. (See Consolidated Fire 

Protection Dist. v. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers’ Assn. (1998) 63 

Cal.App.4th 211, 225–226; see generally Santa Clara County 

Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 

220, 247–254.)
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

26

required oleomargarine dealers to pay a fee (Ballot Pamp., Gen. 

Elec. (Nov. 2, 1926) summary of measure, p. 6)) to a “plastic bag 

fee” put to the voters in 2016 (which would bar single-use plastic 

bags and impose a charge on the use of certain bags in stores 

(Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) analysis of 

Prop. 67 by Legis. Analyst, pp. 110–113)). But Wilde points to 

no historical practice of subjecting exactions like the water 

charges at issue here to referendum. Whether other exactions 

were similarly levied to fund essential government functions —

a question we need not answer here — the water charges at 

issue are.11 The resolution imposing the charges therefore 

qualifies as a tax measure within the meaning of the exception 

to the referendum power in article II, section 9.

12

D.

Whether this is the end of the inquiry, however, turns on 

another question of constitutional interpretation. Recall that

the taxation exception to the referendum is framed as follows: 

“The referendum is the power of the electors to approve or reject 

statutes or parts of statutes except . . . statutes providing for tax 

levies or appropriations for usual current expenses of the State.” 

(Art. II, § 9, subd. (a), italics added.) Even if the water rates at 

issue here qualify as taxes, Wilde says, they must be taxes “for 

 

11 We do not hold that every government revenue-raising 

measure is necessarily exempt from referendum; our holding is 

limited to utility fees on which local governments depend to 

provide essential services to their residents.

12 We disapprove of Bock v. City Council (1980) 109 

Cal.App.3d 52 to the extent it conflicts with our reasoning here.
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

27

usual current expenses” to be exempt from referendum, and 

these rates are not.

13

We identified this very issue without resolving it in Geiger. 

We noted there that while several cases had “assumed without 

discussion” that “tax levies must be for usual current expenses 

in order to be exempt from referendum,” there were arguments 

to the contrary. (Geiger, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 836, fn. *.) We 

pointed in particular to a Legislative Counsel opinion dated 

June 27, 1947, that had concluded that the phrase “ ‘for the 

usual current expenses’ ” did not modify “ ‘tax levies,’ ” based “on 

the ballot argument, on contemporaneous construction at the 

1913 session of the Legislature, and on the continuous practice 

of making state taxes effective immediately regardless of use of 

the proceeds therefrom for capital outlay as well as usual 

current expenses.” (Geiger, at p. 836, fn. *.) But we left the 

question open, explaining that the revenue from the tax 

ordinance at issue in Geiger was undisputedly to be used for 

current expenses. (Id. at p. 836 & fn. *.) We have not revisited 

the issue since. (See Rossi, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 730 (dis. opn. 

of Mosk, J.).)

Again confronted with the issue in this case, we now 

conclude the taxation exception from referendum is not limited 

to tax measures “for usual current expenses.” As a very general 

rule, we understand a qualifying phrase to apply only to the 

word or phrase that immediately precedes it and not to other 

words or phrases that appear earlier in a list or series. (White 

v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680; accord,

 

13 Although Wilde did not raise this question in her initial 

briefing, we sought supplemental briefing in order to provide a 

full response to the issue presented. 
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

28

Lockhart v. United States (2016) ___ U.S. ___, ___–___ [136 S.Ct. 

958, 963–964].) Under this “last antecedent rule,” we would 

understand the qualifying phrase “for usual current expenses” 

to modify its immediate antecedent — “appropriations” — and 

not the earlier-appearing phrase “tax levies.”

Of course like all such interpretive rules, the last 

antecedent rule has its exceptions, such as when the qualifying 

language applies just as naturally to the earlier items in a list 

as the later items. (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 

735, 743.) But that is not the situation at hand. Here it is far 

more natural — and makes far more practical sense — to read 

“for usual current expenses” as applying only to 

“appropriations” than it does to read it as applying to both 

“appropriations” and “tax levies.” Taxpayers typically pay 

certain sums to the government on the basis of income, property, 

purchases, or services used; quite often, taxpayers have no 

guarantee as to how those funds will be deployed, whether for 

usual or unusual matters. Even if some exactions may be levied 

for a specific purpose identified in advance, that is hardly the 

case for all exactions. Governments routinely raise tax revenue 

first and allocate it to various ends afterward. Indeed, in the 

early twentieth century, some of the largest pools of tax revenue, 

often from sources such as property taxes, were not tethered to 

specific expenditures. (See Cal. Tax Com., Final Rep. (Mar. 5, 

1929) table I-2, pp. 16–17 [listing the major categories of state 

tax revenue in 1911]; see also id. at pp. 14–16.) In those cases, 

classifying taxes based on whether they are “for usual current 

expenses” would have been an unwieldy, if not impossible, task.

The same is not true of appropriations. Legislative bodies 

cannot spend money without first designating the purpose of the 

expenditure. (58 Cal.Jur.3d (2012) State of California, § 80, 
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

29

p. 257 [“In the context of the appropriation requirement of the 

state constitution, an ‘appropriation’ is a legislative act setting 

aside a certain sum of money for a specified object in such 

manner that the executive officers are authorized to use that 

money and no more for such specified purpose”]; The Cal. 

Municipal Law Handbook (Cont.Ed.Bar 2019) § 5.276 [“A 

specific appropriation is an act by which a named sum of money 

is set apart in the treasury and made available for the payment 

of particular claims or demands. The city may accomplish this 

by adopting a budget or passing an appropriations ordinance or 

resolution”].) Against this backdrop, the enactors of the 

referendum provision would have understood the qualifying 

“usual current expenses” language to apply in a straightforward 

manner to appropriations measures, which could be 

distinguished on such a basis, but would have had no similar 

understanding about tax bills. 

What evidence exists of contemporaneous understandings

of the referendum provision reinforces the conclusion that the 

taxation exception is not limited to taxes for usual current 

expenses.14 Most pertinently, in 1913, the chair of the Senate 

Committee on the Judiciary submitted a report to the Senate on 

the interpretation of the referendum provision. (1 Sen. J. (1913 

Reg. Sess.) p. 226.) The chair at the time, Senator Lee Gates, 

had helmed the committee that had drafted the referendum 

 

14 Despite best efforts, we have been unable to locate a copy 

of the 1947 Legislative Counsel opinion cited in Geiger, which 

evidently reviewed various contemporary sources to conclude 

that the taxation exception is not limited to taxes for usual 

current expenses. (See Geiger, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 836, fn. *.) 

Our own review of contemporary sources, however, leads us to

the same conclusion.
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

30

provision. Senator Gates’s report described the four categories 

of legislation that could take effect immediately upon a twothirds vote of each house, without being subject to referendum:

“Acts calling elections. Acts providing for tax levies. Acts 

providing for appropriations for the usual current expenses of 

the State. [A]nd urgency measures necessary for the immediate 

preservation of the public peace, health or safety.” (Ibid.) The 

report stated that “any Act of the first three classes, to wit, an 

Act calling an election, or an Act providing for a tax levy, or an 

Act providing an appropriation for the usual current expenses 

of the State, have in such Act a section substantially in words 

and figures as follows: ‘This Act, inasmuch as it * * * shall under 

the provisions of [the referendum provision] take effect 

immediately.’ ” (Ibid.) In enumerating the exceptions to the 

referendum this way, the report made clear that “for usual 

current expenses” modifies “appropriations” and not “tax 

levies.”15 (See also, e.g., Ops. Cal. Legis. Counsel, No. 341 (Dec. 

 

15 The occasional legislative assertion that a tax bill is 

exempt from referendum “inasmuch as it provides for a tax levy 

for the usual current expenses of the state” does not alter our 

analysis (e.g., Stats. 1913, ch. 596, § 5, p. 1086), since there is no 

evidence that these legislative pronouncements constitute 

considered constitutional analysis (McClure, supra, 22 Cal.App.

at pp. 251–252).

For the same reason, the language of Government Code 

section 36937 does not resolve the inquiry. This provision, 

enacted in 1949, lists the types of city ordinances that can take 

immediate effect (instead of 30 days after final passage) and 

includes ordinances “[r]elating to taxes for the usual and current 

expenses of the city.” (Gov. Code, § 36937, subd. (d).) This 

language does not affect our analysis. Not only does the 

Legislature not have the power to limit the application of the 
WILDE v. CITY OF DUNSMUIR

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

31

13, 1949) Enactment of Bills to Take Effect Immediately, 

2 Assem. J. (1949 1st Ex. Sess.) pp. 156–157 [listing the four 

categories of legislation exempt from referendum in similar 

fashion].)

III.

The California Constitution reserves the power of 

referendum to voters with specific exemptions for certain kinds

of legislative enactments. The City’s water rates, adopted in the 

Resolution at issue here, fall within the exemption for “tax 

levies” and therefore are not subject to referendum. We reverse 

the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 KRUGER, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CHIN, J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

GROBAN, J.

 

constitutional exemptions to the referendum (Geiger, supra, 48 

Cal.2d at pp. 836–837), but a statute enacted nearly 40 years 

after the referendum provision is also of limited value in 

understanding the contemporaneous meaning of the 

constitutional provision. Notably, the statute that preceded 

Government Code section 36937, and on which it was based, 

contained an exception from the usual rule that ordinances take 

immediate effect for measures “fixing the amount of money to 

be raised by taxation, or fixing the rate or rates of taxes to be 

levied,” with no additional limiting language. (Stats. 1947, 

ch. 747, § 2, subd. (d), p. 1801.)
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Wilde v. City of Dunsmuir

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XX 29 Cal.App.5th 158

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S252915

Date Filed: August 3, 2020

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Siskiyou

Judge: Anne Bouliane

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Foundation, Jonathan M. Coupal, Trevor A. Grimm, Timothy A. Bittle, Laura E. 

Dougherty; and Leslie T. Wilde, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Jack Cohen as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Kenny, Snowden & Norine, Kenny & Norine, John Sullivan Kenny, Linda R. Schaap and Rob J. Taylor for 

Defendants and Respondents.

Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, Michael G. Colantuono and Conor W. Harkins for Association of 

California Water Agencies, California Association of Sanitation Agencies, California State Association of 

Counties, California Special Districts Association and League of California Cities as Amici Curiae.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Timothy A. Bittle

Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Foundation

921 Eleventh St., Suite 1201

Sacramento, CA 95814

(916) 444-9950

John Sullivan Kenny

Kenny & Norine

1923 Court St.

Redding, CA 96001

(530) 244-7777

Michael G. Colantuono

Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, PC

420 Sierra College Dr., Suite 140

Grass Valley, CA 95945-5091

(530) 432-7357