United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 00-1948

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Paraquad, Inc., a Missouri *

non-profit corporation; Mental Health *

Association, of St. Louis, a Missouri *

non-profit corporation; Depressive *

and Manic Depressive Association, *

of St. Louis, a Missouri non-profit * Appeal from the United States

corporation; Beatrice E. Creason; * District Court for the Eastern 

Ariel Marquardt, * District of Missouri.

*

Appellants, *

*

v. *

*

St. Louis Housing Authority, a *

Missouri municipal corporation; *

Cheryl A. Lovell, in his official *

capacity as Executive Director of the *

St. Louis Housing Authority, *

*

Appellees. *

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Submitted: January 8, 2001

Filed: August 8, 2001

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Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, FAGG, and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.

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FAGG, Circuit Judge.
*The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

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In 1995 the St. Louis Housing Authority (SLHA) received a HOPE VI

implementation grant of $46.7 million from the United States Department of Housing

and Urban Development (HUD) for revitalization of the Darst-Webbe public housing

complex. The HOPE VI plan generally calls for demolition of more than 1200 public

housing dwelling units (less than half of which are occupied) and construction of more

than 650 new mixed income apartments and homes. The plan’s major components

include demolition of the Darst-Webbe Family building and construction of new family

housing, demolition of both the Webbe Elderly and Paul Simon buildings (which have

units reserved for the elderly and nonelderly disabled) and their replacement with a new

senior development, and selective demolition and reconfiguration of the Clinton

Peabody site. 

Two public housing tenants with disabilities, Beatrice E. Creason and Ariel

Marquardt, and three organizations that provide counseling, education, and other

services to disabled individuals, Paraquad, Inc., the Mental Health Association of

Greater St. Louis (MHA), and the Depressive and Manic Depressive Association

(DMDA), brought this lawsuit asserting the SLHA refused to provide HOPE VI

replacement housing and supportive services to disabled families and refused to provide

accessible HOPE VI replacement housing. The plaintiffs seek declaratory and

injunctive relief under the Fair Housing Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with

Disabilities Act, and the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs also assert the SLHA

is implementing the HOPE VI plan in a way that violates the requirements of the plan

and the United States Housing Act. The district court* granted summary judgment to

the SLHA, holding the plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims, their challenge is

not ripe for adjudication, and Creason’s claims are moot. Paraquad v. Saint Louis
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Housing Auth., No. 4:98CV01557 ERW (E. D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2000). The plaintiffs

appeal. Because we conclude the plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe, we affirm.

“The ripeness doctrine flows both from the Article III ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’

limitations and also from prudential considerations for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.”

Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. Midamerican Energy Co., 234 F.3d 1032, 1037 (8th Cir.

2000). The doctrine seeks “‘to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature

adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.’” Id. (quoting

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)). The ripeness inquiry requires

examination of both the “‘fitness of the issues for judicial decision’ and ‘the hardship

to the parties of withholding court consideration.’” Id. at 1038 (quoting Abbott Labs.,

387 U.S. at 149). To be ripe for decision, the harm asserted must have matured enough

to warrant judicial intervention. Johnson v. Missouri, 142 F.3d 1087, 1090 n.4 (8th Cir.

1998). The plaintiffs need not wait until the threatened injury occurs, but the injury

must be “‘certainly impending.’” Employers Ass’n v. United Steelworkers AFL-CIOCLC, 32 F.3d 1297, 1299 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers

Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)). 

The district court held any threatened injury in this case is simply not imminent.

 The court believed that for the plaintiffs claims to be ripe, the court would have to be

presented with facts that more specifically show the likelihood of injury. The district

court stated the plaintiffs had not come forward with evidence showing any disabled

individuals have been relocated to an inaccessible housing unit, denied relocation at all,

or denied public housing as a result of the HOPE VI project. Likewise, the plaintiffs

presented no evidence that the actual, finished units will not be accessible and in

compliance with applicable federal law. The plaintiffs concede the elderly-only facility

will be accessible.
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On appeal, the plaintiffs argue the district court’s conclusion fails to recognize

that the gist of their lawsuit is the unequal housing and service opportunities afforded

the disabled under the HOPE VI plan. The plaintiffs claim that because the elderly will

have units reserved specifically for them, the disabled should too. The plaintiffs

contend the injury of unequal opportunity has already occurred. The plaintiffs also

argue sufficient administrative events in furtherance of the plan have already occurred

to make the controversy ripe for decision. The plaintiffs say the specificity of the

HOPE VI plan–which explicitly excludes the nonelderly disabled from occupancy in

the new elderly-only development, sets aside no other housing specifically for the

disabled, contains a support services plan designed without considering the needs of

disabled HOPE VI residents, and includes building designs and floor plans with

accessibility problems–creates a substantial likelihood they will be denied new HOPE

VI housing and services. 

We cannot agree that the denial of HOPE VI housing and services to the

disabled is “certainly impending.” The plaintiffs cannot identify any individuals who

have been denied accessible housing under the SLHA's implementation of HOPE VI,

and plans for the design and construction of the HOPE VI dwellings are not yet

complete. The plaintiffs assert they were injured because HOPE VI fails to afford

equal housing and service opportunities to the disabled, but this argument lacks merit

because the plaintiffs cannot show that all proposed HOPE VI housing will fail to

accommodate their needs. The plaintiffs rely on the proposed elderly-only units to

support their discrimination claim, but the HOPE VI plan proposes at least 650 units

of new public housing, and the plaintiffs cannot prove the SLHA has precluded them

from residing in all of the new HOPE VI facilities, which are yet to be built.

The HOPE VI plan will be implemented in several phases, and the SLHA must

obtain HUD approval for all demolitions, architectural drawings, and new construction

plans. As for the phase involving construction of the new building for the elderly,
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demolition has not yet started, drawings are still in the preliminary phase, and no new

construction has begun. Although the plan does not propose a separate building just

for the disabled, the Darst-Webbe HOPE VI relocation plan states, “The SLHA will

provide each relocatee temporary or permanent housing at comparable cost on a nondiscriminatory basis.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. I at 100249.) In addition, the SLHA

entered into a memorandum of understanding with the resident councils of Webbe

Elderly and Paul Simon. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 100499.) The memorandum

provides that the SLHA will conduct a survey of all disabled, elderly, and near elderly

residents in order to identify their needs and expectations as related to the HOPE VI

program. Elderly, near elderly, and disabled residents will not be relocated temporarily

or permanently before completion of the survey. Current Webbe Elderly and Paul

Simon residents will be given first preference for residence within the new redeveloped

elderly building. Although only elderly residents can live there, disabled residents are

eligible to return to other HOPE VI units in other buildings at scattered sites.

The plaintiffs argue we have found ripe controversies in similar cases challenging

governmental barriers to equal treatment, citing Meadows of West Memphis v. City of

West Memphis, Ark., 800 F.2d 212 (8th Cir. 1986) and Park View Heights Corp. v.

City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972). These cases are distinguishable.

In Meadows, the complaint alleged the City blocked the plaintiff’s access to public

financing for at least a year for an unconstitutional reason. 800 F.2d at 215. The delay

itself was the injury. In Park View, we considered an attack on a zoning ordinance that

prohibited the construction of multiracial housing. We noted the architectural and

engineering plans for the building were complete, and the City could do nothing further

to exclude the plaintiffs from the community. 467 F.2d at 1215. In our case, however,

there are many unresolved uncertainties. None of the plaintiffs can show any disabled

individual has been or will be denied accessible housing in connection with the

implementation of HOPE VI. 
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Assuming without deciding that the plaintiffs have standing to bring this lawsuit,

we conclude their claims are not ripe for decision at this time. We thus affirm the

district court. We also deny the appellants’ request for leave to submit a supplemental

appendix containing two documents because the documents are not material to the

issues on appeal.

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The Court's able opinion is persuasive, but in one respect, at least, it leaves me

unconvinced.

The plaintiffs allege (and it appears to be undisputed) that under the HOPE VI

Plan certain units will not be open to younger disabled tenants. These units will be set

aside for older tenants, including both disabled and non-disabled people. No units will

be set aside for younger disabled people. This state of affairs, plaintiffs claim, violates

several federal statutes and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I believe this claim is ripe for adjudication. The aspects of the Plan challenged

by plaintiff are firmly in place. They are absolutely excluded from being considered

as tenants in the elderly-only portion of the new development. The Court appears to

feel that the claim is not ripe because the plaintiffs might be given housing in some

other units also included in the HOPE VI Plan. That is, plaintiffs are not totally

excluded from all HOPE VI facilities. This circumstance, it seems to me, may make

plaintiffs' claim less persuasive on the merits, but it has nothing to do with ripeness.

The gist of their claim is not that any of them has been excluded from housing, but that

they are prevented from applying for housing in a certain location, solely because of

their status as younger people, notwithstanding the fact that they are disabled.
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If the claim were of racial discrimination, rather than disability discrimination,

surely no one would argue that it is not ripe. Say a housing authority sets aside a

number of units for white people only. Other units, however, are equally available to

all races. The fact that a certain non-white plaintiff might get housing in these other

units would not, it seems to me, mean that his claim that he is being deprived of equal

treatment with respect to the projected all-white units is not ripe. 

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. I express no view on the merits of any

of plaintiffs' claims.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.