Interim Decision #2531 

MATTER OF HASSAN 

In Visa Petition Proceedings 

A4258751 

Decided by Board September 9, 1976 

(1) In order for a child to confer immediate relative status upon a parent under the 

provisions of section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the petitioning child 

must be a United States citizen at least 21 years of age, and qualify as a "child" as 

defined in section 101(b) of the Act. 

(2) Beneficiary, the natural father of a United States citizen petitioner, obtained a divorce 

in 1950 at the Royal Egyptian Consulate located in New York. Notwithstanding the fact 

that the divorce occurred in a foreign consulate in the United States, it was not a foreign 

divorce. Therefore, the principle of international comity is not involved, and the divorce 

is subject to the requirements of full faith and credit. Since this divorce was not 

obtained in accordance with applicable New York statutory provisions it was invalid in 

the State of New York, was not entitled to full faith and credit in any other jurisdiction, 

and was invalid for immigration purposes. 

(3) Since the beneficiary's divorce was invalid in the United States (notwithstanding the 

fact it was valid in Egypt). beneficiary was not free to contract a valid marriage with 

petitioner's mother in the United States so as to legitimate the petitioner and enable 

him to confer immediate relative status on his father. Under the circumstances revocation of the approval of the visa petition was proper. 

(4) Matter of 6 I. & N. Dec. 470 (BIA 1954) reaffirmed. 

ON BEHALF Or PlartiONER: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: 

Arlene Tuck Ulman, Esquire George Indelicato 

3730 Rhode Island Avenue N.W. Appellate Trial Attorney 

'Washington, D.C. 20036 

The United States citizen petitioner applied for immediate relative 

status for the beneficiary as his father under section 201(b) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act. The petition was initially approved; 

however, after due notice to the petitioner, the approval was revoked 

by' the District Director in a decision dated January 15, 1975. The 

petitioner has appealed. The appeal will be dismissed. 

The issue in this case is whether the beneficiary, the natural father of 

th e petitioner, is entitled to immediate relative status under section 

2001(b) of the Act, as the "parent" of an adult United States citizen. 

Counsel has offered two alternative arguments in support of the petition. 

In the first argument, counsel assumes that the petitioner must once 

have been the "child" of the beneficiary within the statutory definition, 

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Interim Decision #2531 

in order to confer immediate relative status, under section 201(b), upon 

the beneficiary as a "parent." See sections 101(b)(1) and (2). She contends that the petitioner, although born out of wedlock, was legitimated 

according to the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(C). Counsel's alternative argument is that even if the petitioner was not legitimated, there is 

no congressional directive that the petitioner must have qualified as the 

"child" of the beneficiary in order to confer benefits, as an adult, upon 

his parent. Moreover, counsel contends that the intent of Congress to 

unite families would be subverted if that requirement is read into 

section 201(b). We turn first to counsel's contention that the petitioner is 

the legitimated son of the beneficiary. 

The beneficiary, Mr. Hassan, is a native and citizen of Egypt. He 

entered the United States in 1948 as the servant of an official assigned to 

the Egyptian Embassy in Washington, D.C. The beneficiary's wife, 

whom he had married in 1946 in Cairo, Egypt, did not accompany him to 

the United States. 

On December 4, 1950, the beneficiary went to the. Royal Egyptian 

Consulate in New York City and obtained an irrevocable divorce from 

his Egyptian wife. One year later, he married a United States citizen in 

the State of Maryland. A petition to accord him immediate relative 

status was filed by his American wife in 1952. It was denied by the 

District Director on the ground that the beneficiary's consular divorce 

was not valid for immigration purposes and that he was not free, 

therefore, to marry in the United States. The petitioner appealed that 

decision to this Board; we affirmed the District Director's decision in 

Matter of H—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 470 (BIA 1954). 

In the present appeal, taken some 20 years after our decision in 

Matter of H—, supra, we are once again concerned with Mr. Hassan's 

consular divorce. In the present context, the petitioner's claim to 

legitimated status must be evaluated in ligh.t of our holding in Matter of 

supra. The registration of the petitioner's birth indicates that he 

was officially acknowledged by the beneficiary shortly after his birth on 

January lo, 1953. It is counsel's contention that the petitioner was 

legitimated under the laws of his residence; the District of Columbia, 

when his father, Mr. Hassan, entered into a. common-law marriage with 

his mother in the District in the mid-1950's_ Quite obviously, unless we 

now find that Mr. Hassan was free to enter into the alleged common-law 

marriage, we cannot accept counsel's theory. In short, we are urged to 

overturn Matter of H—, supra, and to extend belated recognition to the 

beneficiary's consular divorce for the following two reasons. 

First, counsel contends that the Board's characterization of the benefieiary's divorce as a "consular divorce" (a decree granted at a foreign 

For a succinct discussion of the reasons underlying the invalidity of the "consular 

divorce" in this country, see Puente, The Foreign Consul and His Juridical Status in the 

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Interim Decision #2531 

consulate within the United States) is inaccurate. According to counsel, 

although the proceeding was commenced in New York City, it was 

concluded, some three years later, in Egypt. Moreover, it was a proceeding in which both parties participated and over which the rendering 

authorities in Egypt had competent jurisdiction. Thus, it is more precisely characterized as a foreign divorce. As such, recognition of its 

validity becomes a matter of international comity. If recognized by the 

jurisdiction most concerned with the effect of the decree, namely, the 

beneficiary's residence at the time of the proceeding, it must be recognized for immigration purposes. 

Second, counsel contends that the Board erred in holding that the 

beneficiary was a resident of New York, and that, as a consequence, 

New York law governed the validity of the divorce. Counsel maintains 

that the beneficiary's residence was the District of Columbia. Therefore, 

as a corollary to the first argument, counsel contends that recognition 

of the foreign divorce must be assessed in light of the laws and policies 

of the District of Columbia. 

We observe, at the outset, that unless we find that the beneficiary's 

divorce was a foreign judgment, and not a consular divorce, as counsel 

contends, we need not discuss the choice of law issue. For if the divorce 

is, as we held in Matter of H—, supra, a consular divorce, granted in 

usurpation of New York's traditional and exclusive authority in matrimonial matters over persons within her borders, it cannot be recognized by the District of Columbia. It is axiomatic, under the principle of 

full faith and credit, that no jurisdiction can adopt, as valid, a divorce 

decree which is void in the jurisdiction where rendered. 

Therefore, the pivotal issue in counsel's first argument is whether the 

beneficiary's divorce was a "New York" divorce, obtained in a consulate 

in New York or whether New York was only coincidentally the site of 

the institution of divorce proceedings which eventually culminated in a 

filial decree of divorce issued by an Egyptian court in Egypt. 

To assist us in answering this question, we have asked the Library of 

Congress to provide us with information on the Egyptian law of divorce. 

From a memorandum submitted, we have learned that in Egypt, marriage and divorce are performed by a government official called alDia'zun. According to Article 31 of the "Ordinance for the Ma'zuns," 

(Egyptian Official Gazette, No. 25 of February 27, 1915): 

The Ma'zun must register the divorce exactly as the divorcer has pronounced it 

without any change in its wording. 

In situations which involve the marriage or divorce of Egyptian 

United States (Burdette J. Smith and Company, Publishers, 1926). For pertinent commaentary from the United States Department of State, see Whiteman, Digest of Internatiemat Law, Vol. VII, pp. 621-625. 

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Interim Decision #2531 

nationals abroad, the Egyptian consuls are empowered to perform the 

same functions which the Ma'zuns are assigned in Egypt. Under Article 

16 of the "Consular Law" (Egyptian Official Gazette, No. 78 of August 

13, 1925), the consul is authorized "to draw the pronouncements of 

divorce and attest their authenticity . . ." (subsection 3). 

The record indicates that Mr. Hassan went to the Royal Egyptian 

Consulate in New York on December 4, 1950, and pronounced himself 

irrevocably divorced from his Egyptian wife before the presiding consul. Two years later, in connection with a visa petition filed on his 

behalf, he presented as evidence of the termination of his first marriage, 

a certificate issued by the Egyptian Consulate. In this certificate, which 

was issued on November 5, 1952, the Egyptian Consul attested to the 

validity, under Egyptian law, of the divorce which had been concluded 

two years earlier. Reference to the "Consular Law," mentioned above, 

indicates that this attestation by the consul, acting in his capacity as 

Ma'zun, was clearly authorized. The substance of this certificate is set 

out below. 

This is to certify that Mr. A 0 H was married on December 5th, 1946 

at Cairo, EGYPT. to Miss E I A and was divorced from said wife on 

December 4th, 1950_ This divorce was concluded at the office of the Royal Consulate 

General of Egypt in New York, U.S.A., in conformity with stipulations of the Egyptian 

Law and entered in the Divorce Records under No. 20 {Emphasis added.) 

Despite the fact that the certificate recites December 4, 1950, as the 

date on which the divorce was "concluded" according to Egyptian la-w, 

counsel maintains that the divorce was not finalized until 1953. In 

support of this assertion, she had provided a document in Arabic with 

two English translations. This document, issued by the Shari'a court of 

Abdeen in Egypt under the seal of the Ministry of Justice, records the 

remarriage of the beneficiary's first wife by a Ma'zun on February 25, 

1953. Both translations state that the bride "was divorced from Mx. 

Ahmed Osman Hassan on December 4, 1950, in the presence of 1VIr. 

Ahmed Abdul Aziz Sherif, Consul, at the Consulate General in New 

York." 2The translations further state that this divorce was certified or 

approved by the Egyptian Ministry of Justice on February 24, 1953, the 

day before the remarriage. 

On the basis of this document, counsel argues that the divorce was not 

final and binding upon the beneficiary until it was certified in 1953. More 

importantly, she argues that when it was certified, it constituted. a 

2In commenting upon the original Arabic version of this document, the author of the 

Library of Congress memorandum noted that the divorce which was pronounced by the 

beneficiary in New York City was an irrevocable divorce (Ba'in in Arabic). Unlike the 

revocable divorce (Rail in Arabic), the marital status of the parties Lu su irrevocable 

divorce is terminated instantly. 

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Interim Decision #2531 

"foreign" decree of divorce, recognizable in United States courts under 

the doctrine of international comity. We cannot agree. 

Our materials on Egyptian law indicate that the document which 

counsel has submitted is in the nature of an administrative record. It 

registers the remarriage of the beneficiary's ex-wife; it also reflects 

compliance on the part of the Egyptian wife, upon remarriage, with 

registration requirements contained in the "Ordinance of the Ma'zuns." 

It does not refer to a certification of the divorce, in the sense of "give 

effect to"; it simply refers to the registration in the Shari'a court of a 

divorce obtained abroad. 

Specifically, the law of Egypt requires the recording or registering of 

a divorce with a Ma'zun or in a Shari'a court. Article 33 of the "Ordinance of the Ma'zuns" reads: 

If the separation [between the couple] reached the Ma'zun who performed the 

marriage and he has the register of marriage in his possession, he shall enter the divorce 

at the bottom of the marriage folio. But if this Ma'zun did not perform [originally] the 

marriage and the marriage registeris not in his possession, he must im this case notify the 

Shari'a court or the Ma'run [who performed the marriagelin order to note the divorce in 

the proper register. 

This provision is not operative if the marriage resulting in separation did not take 

place either in Egypt or in the Sudan. [Emphasis added.] 

Therefore, although the "Consular Law" empowers the consul to 

register the divorce when pronounced in a foreign country, the divorce 

must also be registered with the Ma'zun who performed the marriage or 

in the appropriate Shari'a court. Moreover, if the divorcee wishes to 

remarry, Article 28 of the "Ordinance of the Ma'zuns" requires her to 

prove to the Ma'zun who presides over the marriage ceremony that her 

divorce from a previous husband has been duly recorded. 

The Ma'zun is not allowed to perform a marriage contract of a divorcee with another 

husband unless he sees the document (folio) of her divorce, or the final judgment in it. 

But if anything of that sort has not been presented to the Ma'zun, he must refer the 

matter to the Shari'a judge and follow whatever orderhe receives. The judge may allow 

the conclusion of the marriage if, according to the investigation he effected, it has been 

proven that there were no objections to it. Then the Ma'zun should specify in the 

marriage contract, the date, number and the place where the divorce has taken place, or 

the date of the permission given [by the judge] to perform the marriage. [Article 28.] 

The document which counsel has provided indicates that the Ma'zun 

who remarried the beneficiary's first wife was satisfied that her divorce 

had been properly recorded with the Shari'a court, on the day before he 

performed the ceremony. As a consequence, there were no instructions 

from the Shari'a judge indicating that the divorce's validity had been 

questioned. As Article 28 directs, the Ma'zun noted in the marriage 

contract, the date and place of the party's divorce. The date given was 

December 4, 1950; the place, New York. 

Therefore, after reassessment, we have concluded that the reasoning 

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Interim Decision #2531 

in Matter of H— , supra, remains sound. Although the document provided by counsel removes all doubt that the divorce was recognized as 

valid in Egypt, it does not alter our conclusion that "the doctrine of 

comity would appear to have no application, since, notwithstanding the 

fact that the divorce occurred in a foreign consulate in the United 

States, it was not a foreign divorce, and insofar as its recognition by the 

State of Maryland with respect to the subsequent marriage, is subject 

only to the requirement of full faith and credit . . . ," Matter of H— , 

supra, at 472. 

Hence, while counsel has presented persuasive evidence that the 

Board erroneously assumed, in Matter of H— , supra, that Mr. Hassan 

was a resident of New York when he obtained his divorce, we cannot 

conclude that this evidence impacts on the outcome of the decision. 

Even if the beneficiary has been a resident of the District of Columbia at 

all times, the divorce must still be denied recognition. For just as the 

District must extend its recognition to a decree validly rendered in a 

sister state, under the doctrine of full faith and credit, so too must it 

deny recognition to a decree which is void under the law of the jurisdiction where it was issued. 3 

In an alternative argument, counsel contends that the petitioner need 

not qualify as a "child" within the statutory definition in order to confer 

immediate relative status upon his father under section 231(b) of the 

Act. We cannot agree_ 

Section 101(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 provided interrelated definitions of the terms "child" and "parent" which 

would govern their use in Titles I and II of the statute. In Title II of that 

Act, parents were merely accorded preference status under section 

203(a)(2). Moreover, section 203(a)(2) referred only to parents of United 

States citizens "at least twenty-one years of age," 

It was not until the term "parent" arose in another context, without 

the age restrictions, that the Board had an occasion to determine precisely the nature of the interrelationship between the two definitions—

parent and child. Matter of G—, 8 I. & N. Dee. 355 (BIA 1959), 

concerned the use of "parent" within section 7 of the Act of September 

11, 1957 (P.L. 85-316). Section 14 of the same Act directed that the 

definitional provisions contained in subsections (a) and (b) of section 101 

of the 1952 Act apply to section 7 of the 1957 law. Therefore, the Board 

had squarely before it the question of what "circumstances" within 

section 101(b)(1) lead to the creation of the status of "parent." (See 

definition of parent in section 101(b)(2).) In light of the steadily liberalizing policy of the Congress to unite and preserve the immigrant's family 

3 In light of our holding that the beneficiary's first marriage was not validly terminated, 

we need not address counsel's contention that the beneficiary's second marriage in 1951 to 

a United States citizen was void, ab initio. 

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Interim Decision #2531 

unit, the Board held that the "circumstances" referred to in section 

101(b)(2) referred only to the events in subsections (A) through (E) 

which create a child-parent relationship. Those circumstances include: a 

legitimate birth, the creation of a steprelationship, legitimation, illegitimate birth in relation to the mother, and an adoption. The term 

"circumstances" does not refer to the words "unmarried" or "under 

twenty-one years of age." Therefore, "While for immigration purposes a 

`child' ceases to be a child even if it fits into the various categories when 

it reaches the age of twenty-one or becomes married, the parent, once 

the required relationship has been established, always remains a parent." Matter of G—, supra, at 359. (Emphasis added.) 

In dicta, the Board also notcd that if the age and marital restrictions 

in the definition of child were read into the definition of parent, the 

provisions in the 1952 Act giving parents a preference would also have 

to be restricted to the parents of adult unmarried citizens since section 

203(a)(2) refers to parents of citizens over 21 but makes no mention of 

marital status. In light of Congress' clear intent to unite the families of 

immigrants, such a restriction appeared unwarranted. In keeping with 

these observations, the Board held in Matter of Schaad, 10 L & N. Dec. 

555 (BIA 1964), that a 32-year-old married petitioner could not confer 

preference status under section 203(a)(2) on her stepfather, because the 

steprelationship had not been created before the petitioner reached the 

age of 18, as section 101(b)(1)(B) requires. The petitioner's age and 

marital status were dearly not relevant to the denial. 

In 1965, Congress created the provision which the present petitioner 

invokes to confer immigration benefits upon his father. This provision, 

section 201(b),4in effect, reaffirmed the terms of section 203(a)(2) of the 

1952 Act while elevating the parents of citizens over 21 from "preferred" 

to "nonquota" status. Thus, the new amendment enables the parents of 

adult United States citizens, as well as the spouses and children, to 

enter this country as "immediate relatives," without numerical limitation. As part of Title II of the Act, the new provision's use of the terms 

"child" and "parent" is governed by the definitions set out In sections 

101(b)(1) and (2). 5Hence, in discussing the applicability of the term 

4"The 'immediate relatives' referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall mean the 

children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States: Provided, That in the case 

of parents, such citizen must be at least twenty-one years of age. The immediate relatives 

specified in this subsection who are otherwise qualified for admission as immigrants shall 

be admitted as such, without regard to the numerical limitations in this Act" 

Counsel points out that while section 14 of the 1957 Act expressly directed that the 

definitions of section 101(a) and (b) of the 1952 Act apply to section 7 (the provision at issue 

in Matter of G—, supra), there is no provision which preserves those definitions with 

reference to section 201(b), as amended. A careful look at section 14, however, indicates 

that the definitions were only applied to those sections of the new law which were not 

incorporated into Titles I and II of the 1952 Act. Congress apparently saw no reason to 

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Interim Decision #2531 

"parent" to the new provision, the Board concluded in Matter of Citino, 

12 I. & N. Dec. 427 (BIA 1967), that the decision was governed by our 

earlier decision construing the interrelationship between the terms 

"parent" and "child," e.g., Matter of supra. Applying the holding in 

Matter of G— , supra, to the issue in Citino, we held that the petitioner, 

a 33-year-old married woman, could confer 201(b) status on her stepmother since the steprelationship had been created within the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(B). The opposite result was reached in cases 

involving the same issue when the parent-child relationships were not 

created in accordance with (A) through (E) of section 101 of the statute. 

See Matter of Polidoro, 12 L & N. Dec. 353 (BIA 1967), and Matter of 

Huerta-Leon, Interim Decision 2367 (BIA 1975). 

We find no support within the statute nor in our decisions for counsel's 

contention that section 201(b) in Title II of the Act need not be read in 

conjunction with the definitions in Title I. Inasmuch as the petitioner, in 

this ease, has never qualified as a "child" for immigration purposes, he 

cannot bestow immediate relative status, as an adult, upon the beneficiary. 

Accordingly, the appeal will he dismissed . 

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 

Irving A. Appleman, Member, Concurring 

I concur in that portion of the majority decision which finds that the 

parent-child relationship under section 201(b) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act is governed by the same definition as in the case of an 

adopted child, Matter of Caramanzana, 12 I. & N. Dec. 47 (BIA 1967), 

stepchild, Matter of Schaal, 10 I. & N. Dec. 555 (BIA 1964), or son or 

daughter, Nazarene v. Attorney General of the United States, 512 F.2d 

936 (C_A_D_ C. 1975). 

I also agree that so far as this record is concerned we are confronted 

with a purely "consular divorce" in the United States, invalid under the 

law of the State of New York, and one to which full faith and credit could 

not be given by the District of Columbia.' The Board recognized in the 

reiterate the fact that the section 101 definitions were automatically applicable to the parts 

of the new Act which were incorporated into the existing framework of Titles I and II. For 

the name reason, there was no need to include en express provision ion applying the defini - 

tions of parent and child to section 201(b), as amended, in 1965, since, the definitions 

themselves are prefaced with the sentence—"As used in Titles I and II." In short, the 

absence of a preserving clause cannot be seen as an indication that Congress severed the 

existing connection between the two provisions. 

' Contrary to the contention of counsel, there is substantial evidence that Hassan Sr, 

was domiciled in New York at the apartment of his wife, although working in the District 

of Columbia at the time the divorce was obtained. However, The domicile is unimportant, 

and the divorce would gain no stature even if Hassan had been residing in the District of 

Columbia at the time. 

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Interim Decision #2531 

original Hassan decision (Matter of H—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 470) that the 

consular decree might well be recognized as valid in Egypt. Petitioner 

has submitted two widely divergent translations of an Egyptian document. The net effect of a reading of the translations is that the Egyptian 

authorities did indeed recognize as valid the divorce obtained in the 

New York consulate. There is a dirth of any evidence that the parties to 

the divorce, or their representatives, secured a foreign divorce in a 

manner which can be recognized here under principles of comity. 

That should end the inquiry so far as this Board is concerned. The 

further majority discussion of E gyptian divorce law, is both confusing, 

and unnecessary, in my opinion- Foreign law is a matter of fact, to be 

proved as evidence. Here the Board has, on its own, obtained a 

memorandum of law from the Library of Congress, which it has then 

proceeded to rely on heavily, adversely to the petitioner—and without 

showing it to the parties prior to decision. One can recognize the necessity for the Board requesting such a memorandum in some circumstances not present here 2but the practice of rendering an opinion 

based on the memorandum, without the parties seeing it and having a 

chance to comment, is most questionable. 

In addition, it will be noted that the present claim is based on an 

alleged common-law marriage between Hassan Sr. (the beneficiary) and 

one Frances Mae, beginning sometime prior to the birth of the petitioner in 1953 and allegedly continuing until 1959. Frances Mae Hendricks (the petitioner's mother according to his birth certificate) and 

Frances Robinson (referred to as the petitioner's mother by Hassan Sr.) 

presumably are one and the same person. However, the record indicates 

that Frances also had .a prior existing marriage and there is no proof 

whatsoever of the termination of that marriage. Thus, even assuming 

the impediment to a common-law marriage ceased as to Hassan Sr., it 

has not been shown to have ceased as to his claimed, common-law, 

"wife." Nor has any evidence been submitted to prove a true commonlaw marriage even assuming no impediment as to either party. 

With the record in this state, the majority discussion of esoteric 

Egyptian and Islamic divorce law is a needless exercise, and, since it is 

based on a Library of Congress memorandum received into evidence at 

the Board level, without briefing or scrutiny by the parties, it may quite 

possibly be an erroneous one as well. 

The case has appealing aspects. The petitioner is a United States 

Marine Corps veteran who enlisted at the age of 18. It is alleged that the 

beneficiary supported and raised the petitioner from infancy, and that 

Hassan, Sr. has been in the United States since 1948. The visa petition 

was filed as a preliminary to an application for adjustment of status. 

2An obvious example is for an indigent alien. 

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Interim Decision #2531 

While the file before us does not purport to examine the good moral 

character of the beneficiary, so far as known he may be able to qualify 

for suspension of deportation, and that avenue of relief may be open to 

him. For the reasons stated, I agree with the majority, that the present 

petition cannot be approved, but would deny solely because petitioner 

has failed to sustain his burden under Matter of Brantigan, 11 I. & N. 

Dec. 493 (BIA 1966). 

25