2020 IL App (1st) 171995-U 

FIFTH DIVISION

 July 24, 2020 

No. 1-17-1995 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

 Respondent-Appellee,

v. 

RECO WILSON, 

Petitioner-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 04 CR 11843 

Honorable Alfredo Maldonado, 

Judge Presiding.

 

JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Hoffman and Justice Rochford concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court correctly dismissed petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claims at the second stage of postconviction proceedings. We affirm.

¶ 2 Petitioner Reco Wilson appeals the second stage dismissal of his pro se and supplemental 

petitions for postconviction relief. After a simultaneous, but severed, bench trial, the circuit court 

convicted him on an accountability theory of first degree murder. He was sentenced to a term of 

40 years in prison. He argues that this case should be remanded for a third stage evidentiary 

hearing based on claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He contends that trial counsel

failed to call a trial witness who would have corroborated his defense, and to call his 
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grandmother to testify at the suppression hearing to rebut the State’s suggestion that his 

testimony was a recent fabrication. We affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of the petitions. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The facts are set forth in a previous opinion of this court. See People v. Wilson, 2013 IL 

App (1st) 112303. Therefore, we will limit our discussion only to those facts pertinent to the 

issues raised in this appeal.

¶ 5 Petitioner was charged with first degree murder, attempt first degree murder, aggravated 

discharge of a firearm and aggravated vehicular hijacking. Codefendant Marcel Milton, who is 

not a party to this appeal, fatally shot Deon Gardner during the course of an aggravated vehicular 

hijacking. Petitioner was convicted on an accountability theory for calling Milton and informing 

him of the vehicle’s location, knowing that Milton was armed with a gun. 

¶ 6 On March 17 or 18, 2004, petitioner approached Sergio Wray to ask if he could move a 

car for him. Wray agreed, and petitioner drove him to an area near 78th Street and South Shore 

Drive in Chicago. Petitioner gave Wray the keys to a Jeep Grand Cherokee that he and Milton 

had stolen earlier from a rental facility. Petitioner told Wray to follow him in the Jeep to 77th 

Street and Yates Boulevard, but after losing sight of petitioner’s vehicle, Wray decided to keep 

the Jeep.

¶ 7 During the evening of March 22, 2004, Wray was watching movies with Lamar Murphy 

and Gardner at Murphy’s apartment at 6926 South Michigan Avenue. At about 9:00 p.m., Wray 

asked Murphy to drive him and Gardner in the Jeep to Gardner’s house to retrieve more movies. 

As they pulled away from the curb, a white car travelling the wrong way approached the Jeep 

and stopped. Milton exited the passenger seat of the white car, pulled out a gun, and ordered the 

men to exit the Jeep. Milton fired two shots at Murphy and Wray as they exited through the 
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driver’s door and ran. Milton then entered the driver’s seat and ordered Gardner, who was in the 

back seat, to exit the Jeep. As Gardner exited the car, Milton shot him once in the back and then 

twice after he had fallen to the ground.

¶ 8 At trial, the State introduced petitioner’s videotaped statement, in which he stated that 

earlier that day, he saw the Jeep near East 69th Street and South Cottage Grove Avenue. He 

related that he had contacted Milton on his cell phone and told him that he was following the 

Jeep. He told Milton to bring an extra set of keys to retrieve the vehicle. Petitioner then called his 

cousin to give Milton a ride. He followed the Jeep to 69th and Michigan, where he observed the 

occupants exit the vehicle and enter a building. In the videotaped statement, petitioner 

acknowledged that he knew Milton carried a gun in such situations and admitted that he thought 

Milton would bring a gun to retrieve the Jeep. He also stated that when he later called Milton on 

his cell phone to tell him to hurry, Milton stated that he had his “blow on [him].” Petitioner 

explained that “blow” referred to a gun. He observed Milton’s arrival to retrieve the Jeep and the 

firing of the initial two shots at Murphy and Wray. As petitioner drove away, he looked in his 

rearview mirror and saw Milton shoot Gardner once as a he exited the Jeep and twice as he lay 

on the ground. 

¶ 9 Petitioner testified at trial and, contrary to his videotaped statement, claimed that he did 

not observe Milton shoot Gardner. Instead, he testified that he was with his girlfriend, Tiffany 

Taylor, and her children at a McDonald’s restaurant when he saw the Jeep drive by. He stated 

that Taylor was with him in the car when he called Milton and drove to the area of 69th and 

Michigan, and that they had left before Milton arrived. Petitioner admitted that he did not know 

where Taylor was during trial, over defense counsel’s objections. 
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¶ 10 On direct appeal, appellate counsel filed a motion for leave to withdraw pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that there were no issues of merit on appeal. 

See People v. Wilson, No. 1-08-2836, 399 Ill. App. 3d 1225 (2010) (unpublished order under 

Supreme Court Rule 23). Petitioner filed a pro se response, arguing that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to call Taylor as a witness to corroborate his defense despite his repeated 

requests for counsel to do so. Id. This court affirmed petitioner’s conviction on appeal, 

concluding that trial counsel “made a conscious decision” not to call Taylor as a witness, which 

was a matter of trial strategy, generally immune from an ineffective assistance claim. Id. 

¶ 11 Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for relief under the Post-Conviction 

Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2010)). Petitioner asserted that he was 

denied effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to: (1) assure that police had 

the proper paperwork to remove him from the county jail for questioning, (2) investigate the 

number of stolen cars and trucks in Wilson’s neighborhood to negate law enforcement’s stated 

reason for questioning him, (3) interview or call Taylor as an alibi witness, and (4) move to sever 

Wilson’s trial from Milton’s. Wilson further claimed that he was convicted of an offense not 

charged in the indictment and was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel in his direct 

appeal.

¶ 12 Petitioner attached to his petition a signed and notarized affidavit from Taylor in which 

she attested that, on March 22, 2004, she was with petitioner from 4:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m. At 

one point, petitioner, Taylor, and their children went to a McDonald’s restaurant located at East 

79th Street and South Phillips Avenue. As they pulled out of the McDonald’s drive through, 

petitioner saw the Jeep pass by and stated, “there goes Marcell’s truck.” They followed the Jeep 

until it arrived at 69th and Michigan, at which point petitioner called Milton using the cell phone 
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speaker. Taylor heard petitioner tell Milton to bring an extra set of keys to retrieve the Jeep.

Taylor attested that they left the area before Milton arrived. She also stated that she had 

contacted petitioner’s trial counsel and told him what she witnessed the night of the incident. 

Trial counsel told Taylor that he would contact her before trial, but he never did so. 

¶ 13 The circuit court dismissed the pro se petition, concluding that all the issues raised were 

barred by res judicata, having been raised and settled previously on direct appeal. The court 

determined that petitioner’s claims had no arguable basis in law and that he was not entitled to 

proceed to the second stage of the postconviction relief process with appointed counsel. 

¶ 14 On appeal, petitioner contended that he presented an arguable ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel claim in failing to present Taylor as a witness because her version of events would 

have corroborated his trial testimony. This court applied the standard of first stage postconviction 

review in People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (2009), finding “it is at least arguable that 

defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present Taylor as a witness, given the 

potential testimony set out in her affidavit.” Wilson, 2013 IL App (1st) 112303, ¶ 22. We 

reversed the circuit court’s summary dismissal of the postconviction petition and remanded for 

further proceedings. 

¶ 15 On remand for second stage postconviction proceedings, petitioner’s appointed counsel 

filed a supplemental postconviction petition and a certificate under Supreme Court Rule 651(c) 

(eff. Feb. 6, 2013). Petitioner sought a third stage evidentiary hearing based on his ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel claims. He argued that Taylor’s testimony would have supported his 

defense and disclaimed most of the videotaped statement, which he asserted was coerced. Taylor 

had been listed as a witness in trial counsel’s answer to the State’s discovery motion. On June 

10, 2008, the parties discussed scheduling for the next trial date, during which trial counsel 
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stated, “I’ve got a witness, Tiffany, I put her on my list. Her days off are on Mondays. She[’s] 

asking if it’s possible we can do it on a Monday.” Trial counsel stated that Taylor would “be a 

short witness.” 

¶ 16 Taylor provided a new affidavit in support of the petition, attesting that she was with 

petitioner, her two daughters, and petitioner’s daughter during the evening of March 22, 2004. 

She further attested:

“3. We left McDonald’s and [petitioner] drove to 69th and Michigan. We did not 

stop or park but rolled past. No shooting occurred while we were there. We went 

straight to my mother’s home and we all went inside.

4. [Petitioner’s] cell phone was not working properly and could only be used as a 

speaker phone. Therefore, I could hear what both parties said over the phone. I 

knew that he was talking to Marcel Milton and remember him telling Marcel 

either to come get his car or to bring keys.

5. I did not hear anyone say ‘blow’ or discuss a gun. I did not hear [petitioner] tell 

Marcel that people were getting in the truck, because we left 69th and Michigan 

without stopping and did not see Marcel there. 

6. I told [petitioner’s] lawyer what happened. I did not tell him that I was 

unwilling to testify. However, I never received a subpoena from [petitioner’s] 

lawyers. I did not go to [petitioner’s] trial because I did not get a subpoena and 

the lawyers did not tell me to be there.

7. I signed an affidavit in 2011, which I confirm. 
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8. If I would have received a subpoena, or if the lawyer would have called me and 

told me to come to court on July 21, 2008, I would have testified consistently with 

my affidavits, and would do so if called as a witness now.” 

¶ 17 Postconviction counsel also argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

investigate and call petitioner’s grandmother, Willie Mae Wilson, as a witness at the suppression 

hearing. He contended that Wilson would have corroborated his testimony that the police made 

falsified promises of leniency to him. Wilson submitted an affidavit attesting that in April 2004, 

Chicago police called her and told her that petitioner had been arrested for murder. A police 

officer handed the phone to petitioner, who was crying and stated that “they got him for murder 

but he didn’t do it.” Petitioner relayed to Wilson that the officers told him that if he explained

what happened, he would not be charged with murder. As a result, Wilson encouraged petitioner 

to talk to the police.

¶ 18 The State moved to dismiss the petitions, arguing that trial counsel was not ineffective for 

failing to call Taylor and Wilson as witnesses. The State contended that petitioner failed to make 

a substantial showing of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call Taylor because 

petitioner’s presence at the scene was irrelevant for purposes of establishing his guilt on an 

accountability theory. Taylor’s testimony would not have contradicted the evidence at trial that 

petitioner provided Milton with the location of the Jeep and arranged for his transportation to the 

location of the shooting. Further, trial counsel had spoken to Taylor, knew what she had 

observed, and made the strategic decision not to call her as a witness. The State also argued that 

petitioner failed to make a substantial showing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call 

Wilson to testify at petitioner’s hearing on the motion to supress. The State contended that her 

affidavit did not support petitioner’s claim that her testimony would have corroborated his claim 
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that the police made false promises of leniency because his grandmother did not hear the police 

tell petitioner that if he provided a statement, he would not be charged. 

¶ 19 The circuit court found that petitioner failed to make a substantial showing of a 

constitutional violation and granted the State’s motion to dismiss the petitions. This appeal 

followed. 

¶ 20 ANALYSIS

¶ 21 Petitioner contends that the circuit court erred in granting the State’s motion to dismiss 

his pro se and supplemental postconviction petitions at the second stage of proceedings. He

argues that he is entitled to a third-stage evidentiary hearing based on trial counsel’s failure to 

call Taylor as a witness to corroborate his defense, and Wilson as a witness during the 

suppression hearing to rebut the State’s suggestion that his testimony was a recent fabrication.

¶ 22 The Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2010)) allows a petitioner to challenge a 

conviction or sentence for violations of federal or state constitutional rights. People v. Pendleton, 

223 Ill. 2d 458, 471 (2006). An action for postconviction relief is a collateral proceeding rather 

than an appeal from the underlying judgment. People v. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55, 62 (1999). 

Principles of res judicata and waiver will limit the range of issues available to a postconviction 

petitioner “ ‘to constitutional matters which have not been, and could not have been, previously 

adjudicated.’ ” People v. Scott, 194 Ill. 2d 268, 273-74 (2000) (quoting People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 

2d 335, 346 (1992)). 

¶ 23 In a noncapital case, postconviction proceedings contain three stages. People v. Tate, 

2012 IL 112214, ¶ 9. At the first stage, the circuit court independently reviews the petition, 

taking the allegations as true, and determines whether the petition is frivolous or patently without 

merit. Id. A petition may be summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit only if 
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the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact. Id. If the court does not summarily 

dismiss the petition, it advances to the second stage, where counsel may be appointed to an 

indigent petitioner, and where the State may respond to the petition. Id. ¶ 10. At this stage, the 

court determines whether the petition and any accompanying documentation make a substantial 

showing of a constitutional violation. Id. If no such showing is made, the petition is dismissed. 

Otherwise, the petition is advanced to the third stage for an evidentiary hearing. Id. 

¶ 24 Here, the petitions were dismissed at the second stage of proceedings. During the second 

stage of proceedings, a petitioner bears the burden of making a substantial showing of a 

constitutional violation. People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35. This stage, however, only 

tests the legal sufficiency of the petition. Unless the allegations in the petition are positively 

rebutted by the record, they are taken as true, and the question to be resolved at the second stage 

is whether those allegations establish a constitutional violation. Id. “In other words, the 

‘substantial showing’ of a constitutional violation that must be made at the second stage

[citation] is a measure of the legal sufficiency of the petition’s well-pled allegations of a 

constitutional violation, which if proven at an evidentiary hearing, would entitle petitioner to 

relief.” (Emphasis in the original.) Id. We review the circuit court’s dismissal of a postconviction 

petition at the second stage de novo. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006). 

¶ 25 Petitioner contends that he made a substantial showing that his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance for failing to call Taylor and Wilson as witnesses. He argues that there is a 

reasonable probability that the outcome of the suppression hearing and trial would have been 

different had the circuit court heard the statements included in Taylor’s and Wilson’s affidavits.

¶ 26 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the familiar standard set forth 

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted by the supreme court in People v. 
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Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (1984). People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490, 496 (2010). To establish 

ineffective assistance, a petitioner must show both that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient 

and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. Id. Deficient performance is 

performance that is objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, and prejudice 

is found where there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d at 496-97; Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 690, 694. The failure to establish either prong of the Strickland test is fatal to the 

claim. People v. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d 302, 317-18 (2010) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 

¶ 27 Matters of trial strategy, however, are generally immune from claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel except where the trial strategy results in no meaningful adversarial testing. 

People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 432-33 (1999). In other words, the effective assistance of counsel 

merely refers to “competent, not perfect,” representation. People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 491-

92 (1984). Thus, mistakes in trial strategy, tactics, or judgment will not “of themselves” render a 

trial counsel’s representation constitutionally defective. Id. For these reasons, we must be highly 

deferential to trial counsel as to trial strategy, and we must evaluate counsel’s performance from 

his perspective at the time and not “through the lens of hindsight.” Id. A defendant bears the 

burden of overcoming the strong presumption that his counsel’s decision was the product of 

sound trial strategy. People v. Gacy, 125 Ill. 2d 117, 126 (1988). 

¶ 28 Generally, whether to call a particular witness is a matter of trial strategy (People v. 

Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 85-86 (1989)), and strategic choices made after thorough investigation of 

law and facts relevant to plausible options are “virtually unchallengeable” (Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 690). An exception to this rule is when counsel’s chosen strategy is so unsound that counsel 

entirely fails to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing. People v. Reid, 179 Ill. 2d 297, 310 
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(1997). Failure to call a witness will not support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where 

the circumstances show that the testimony would likely have been harmful or would have had no 

probative value to a determination of guilt or innocence. People v. Ashford, 121 Ill. 2d 55, 74-75 

(1988). Additionally, a defense attorney may choose not to call a witness who could be subject to 

severe impeachment (People v. Smado, 322 Ill. App. 3d 329, 335 (2001)), or if he reasonably 

believes that under the circumstances the individual’s testimony is unreliable or would likely 

have been harmful to the defendant (Flores, 128 Ill. 2d at 106). 

¶ 29 In this case, taking petitioner’s allegations as true, petitioner’s presence at the scene was 

never an issue at trial and Taylor’s testimony would only have corroborated that petitioner called 

Milton, told him where the Jeep was located, and told him “to come get his car or to bring keys.” 

Taylor’s testimony would have been cumulative and, therefore, petitioner was not prejudiced by 

trial counsel’s failure to call her as a witness. See People v. Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d 124, 155 

(1996) (finding that “[t]rial counsel’s performance cannot be considered deficient because of a 

failure to present cumulative evidence”). Further, trial counsel was aware of what Taylor would 

have testified to and the decision to not call her was a matter of trial strategy rather than a 

constitutional defect. Gacy, 125 Ill. 2d at 126. 

¶ 30 We find that the three cases petitioner cites in support of his argument, People v. Tate, 

305 Ill. App. 3d 607 (1999), People v. Bates, 324 Ill. App. 3d 812 (2001), and People v. Makiel, 

358 Ill. App. 3d 102 (2005), are each inapposite because here, Taylor’s proposed testimony was 

not exculpatory, and trial counsel was aware of Taylor’s version of events and chose not to call 

her as a witness. See Tate, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 612 (proposed exculpatory testimony supported 

theory of misidentification of the defendant); Bates, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 815-16 (proposed witness 

would have provided exculpatory testimony by supporting the defendant’s theory of self-
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defense); Makiel, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 108-09 (trial counsel never contacted or subpoenaed the 

proposed witness). 

¶ 31 In addition, Wilson’s affidavit did not support petitioner’s claim that the police promised 

him leniency. Wilson would have been called to corroborate the petitioner’s previous testimony 

that he was told by police he would not be charged with murder if he told them “what 

happened.” Wilson’s affidavit was not sufficient to show that the result of the suppression 

hearing would have been different had she testified. 

¶ 32 In sum, petitioner has failed to overcome the “strong presumption” that his counsel’s 

decision was the product of sound trial strategy. Gacy, 125 Ill. 2d at 126. Since petitioner has not 

made a substantial showing of both prongs of the Strickland test, his ineffective assistance claim 

necessarily fails. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d at 317-18. The circuit court therefore did not err in 

dismissing his postconviction petitions on the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

¶ 33 CONCLUSION

¶ 34 The circuit court correctly dismissed at the second stage petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County to 

dismiss petitioner’s pro se and supplemental postconviction petitions. 

¶ 35 Affirmed.