* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 96-31026

__________________

CAROL MARIE MCCOY BOOTH,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BILLY R. HARGISS and ANGELYN RIZZO HARGISS,

Co-Adminstrators of the Succession of Attorney

William A. Hargiss, Deceased,

Plaintiffs-AppelleesIntervenors,

SAMUEL TIMOTHY MCGRAW, also known as Tim McGraw,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Louisiana

(93-CV-741)

______________________________________________

November 13, 1997

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, BENAVIDES and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

This appeal arises out of a dispute between country singer

Samuel Timothy McGraw (“McGraw”) and his erstwhile personal manager

Carol Marie McCoy Booth (“Booth”). Booth brought suit against2

McGraw in Louisiana state court in March 1993, alleging that McGraw

had breached his “personal manager contract” with her. McGraw

timely remov ed the case to federal district court in Louisiana.

Eventually, the district court ordered the parties to a rbitrate

their dispute in Louisiana. McGraw complains on appeal that this

order was contrary to his contract with Booth, which provides that

any dispute between them would be “submitted to arbitration to the

American Arbitration Association in New York City . . . .”

On removal, McGraw filed a motion to stay the proceedings

under Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §

1 et seq.

, and sought an order that the matter be arbitrated in New

York City in accordance with the parties’ agreement. Based on the

recommendation of a magistrate judge, t he district court granted

the requested stay and ordered the parties to arbitrate the matter

“in the manner provided for in the arbitration agreement be tween

the parties.”

In the wake of that order, neither party initiated arbitration

in New York. Instead, the matter languished on the district

court’s docket for almost fourteen months. The case was reassigned

to another district judge, who held a status conference in November

1994. Initially, the district court ordered Booth, the plaintiff,

to initiate arbitration proceedings in Louisiana. In the same

order, however, the district court directed McGraw to provide2 McGraw argues that Booth’s attempts to settle the case along

with a change in counsel before the November 1994 order to

arbit rate in Louisiana insulate him against a finding of waiver.

Under diff erent circumstances, we might agree, but under the

circumstances presented here, we reject his contention.

3 “authorit y . . . for the proposition that the plaintiff has the

obligation of initiating arbitration.” A minute entry several days

later reflects that the district court found that the authority

McGraw provided was inadequate and accordingly ordered M cGraw to

initiate arbitration.

McGraw complied with the district court’s order to arbitrate

without any objection to the location specified in the order, and

the matter proceeded to arbitration in Monroe , Louisiana. An

arbitration panel awarded Booth approximately $321,000 in damages,

$12 5,000 in attorneys’ fees, and $15,000 for the costs of

arbitration.

Booth made a motion in the district court for confirmation of

the arbitration award. S ee 9 U.S.C. § 9. Although McGraw opposed

the confirmation, he did not object based on impr oper venue.

McGraw also moved to vacate the arbitration award. S ee 9 U.S.C. §

10. A gain, he failed to raise improper venue as a basis for

vacating the arbitration award. The district court entered

judgment on the arbitration award. McGraw timely appealed.

In these circumstances, McGraw, by his inaction, forfeited the

right to complain of the district court’s order that the matter be

arbitrated in Louisiana. 2 After obtaining a stay of the4

proceedings, McGraw failed to initiate arbitration in New York for

fourteen months. Under the holding of the district court at the

end of those fourteen months, the burden of initiating arbitration

was on McGraw. McGraw does not challenge this holding on appeal.

Moreover, when the district court finally took action to move the

case in November 1994, McGraw made no objection to arbitration in

Louisiana.

We recognize that McGraw had no obligation to seek

interlocutory review of this order; under the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §

16(b), an interloc utory appeal normally cannot be taken from an

order referring a matter to arbitration. McGraw, however, raised

no objection whatsoever to venue at the time the district court

ordered the arbitration to proceed in Louisiana; nor did he raise

the venue issue in opposition to Booth’s motion to confirm the

arbitration award or in his motion to vacate it. Under these

circumstances, McGraw will not be heard to complain about the venue

for the arbitration and is bound by the arbitration award.

AFFIRMED.