J

- A02042

- 24

NON

- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

- SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

NICHOLAS BENJAMIN ORTIZ

Appellant :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 574 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 15, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 67

- MD

- 0002911

- 2022

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: MARCH 11, 2024

Nicholas Ortiz (“Ortiz”) appeals from the judgment of sentence following

his conviction of indirect criminal contempt. 1 Ortiz’s counsel (“Counsel”) has

filed a petition to withdraw and an accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v.

California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago , 978

A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We affirm and grant C ounsel’s petition to withdraw.

At trial, the Commonwealth introduced the following evidence. In

September 2022, C.M. sought a protection from abuse order (“PFA”) against

Ortiz, her former boyfriend. See N.T., 3/15/23, at 9

- 10

. After a hearing

, at

which Ortiz appeared pro se , the court issued a three

- year PFA barring Ortiz

from any contact with C.M. See N.T

. , 3/15/23, at 10

.

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

1 See 23 Pa. C.S.A

. § 6 1 14

.J

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- 2

-

Less than two months later, on November 7, 2022, C.M. received a

series of calls and text messages from a n unfamiliar phone number. See id

.

at 15

- 16. C.M. testified she did not answer the calls for fear Ortiz was trying

to contact her. See id at 14

. She testified Ortiz previously contacted her via

WhatsApp, an anonymous texting app. 2 See id

. Between 9:45 a.m. and

10:00 a.m. th at day, C.M. received a series of texts from a phone number she

did not recognize but believed was a WhatsApp number. See N.T., 3/15/23,

at 11

. C.M. testified she received a text message that said, “I miss you.” She

then testified:

I said, “who is this?” He said, “you know who this is.” And then I

responded, “I actually don’t. Can you enlighten me?” Then he

said, :I heard you have a new boyfriend,” and I responded, “I do.”

Then [Ortiz] said, “After how long we were together it’s crazy how

you found someone new. He doesn’t compare to what we had.”

And I responded, “ Nick , do not ever contact me again.”

See id . at 12 (quotation marks added, punctuation corrected, emphasis

added). C.M. testified the conversation concluded as follows:

I added on to, “Nick, do not contact me. . . . [H]e doesn’t compare

b ecause he’s better in every way. . . .” And then he responded,

“Yeah. Right.” And with that I responded, “You made your bed,

lay in it.” Then he responded, “You’ll come back one day.”

See id . at 12

- 13. C.M. testified she believed Ortiz sent the text messages

because she had a two

- year relationship with Ortiz , her longest, and the

sender did not deny that he was “Nick” when she addressed the sender using

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

2 The record does not specify whether th at previous communication was via

phone call or text message.J

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his name. See id

. at 13, 16

- 17. C.M. reported her receipt of the texts to

Officer Andy Mallette. See id

. at 5

- 6. Officer Mallette ran a registration check

on the phone number used to text C.M. and determined it was unregistered.

See id

. at 5

- 7.

At trial, Ortiz presented his current girlfriend’s testimony that she, he,

and her two children were together on the morning of the text conversation,

and one of her children was using Ortiz’s phone continuously from 9:20 a.m.

to 10:00 a

. m. See id

. at 19

- 22, 24

- 25.

The trial court convicted Ortiz of indirect criminal contempt . It

concluded Ortiz texted C.M. and conceal ed his identity by using an anonymous

texting app he had used before. See id

. at 30

- 33. 3 The court imposed a

sentence of six months of probation. See id

. at 34. Ortiz timely appealed,

and counsel filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) statement of intent to withdraw

, in

lieu of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement

, and an Anders brief

.

When presented with an Anders brief, t his Court may not review the

merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to

withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Daniels , 999 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa. Super.

2010)

. C ounsel who believes an appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw

from representation must :

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

3 The trial court declined to credit Ortiz’s girlfriend’s testimony. See id

. at

3 3

- 34

.J

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-

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy

of the brief to the defendant; and 3) advise the defendant that he

or she has the right to retain private counsel or raise additional

arguments that the defendant deems worthy of the court's

attention.

Commonwealth v. Tejada

, 176 A.3d 355, 359 (Pa. Super. 2017). See also

Commonwealth v. Cartrette

, 83 A.3d 1030 (Pa. Super. 2013) ( en banc ).

In Santiago , our Supreme Court addressed the second requirement of

Anders

, i.e. , the contents of an Anders brief , and required that the brief :

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with

citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably

supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel ’ s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

(4) state counsel ’ s reasons for concluding that the appeal is

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

S antiago

, 978 A.2d at 361. Once counsel has satisfied the Anders

requirements, this Court then has a duty to conduct its own review of the trial

court’s proceedings and make an independent determination whether the

appeal is wholly frivolous. See Commonwealth v. Edwards

, 906 A.2d 1225,

1228 (Pa. Super. 2006)

.

Here, C ounsel avers in his petition to withdraw he reviewed the entire

record and concluded the appeal is frivolous. See Ortiz’s Brief at 8. Counsel

further avers he sen t a copy of the petition to withdraw and the Anders brief

to Ortiz, as well as information explaining Ortiz’s right to retain private counselJ

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or proceed pro se and raise any other argument Ortiz sees as meritorious

.

See Ortiz’s Brief at 8.

Counsel’s Anders brief includes a summary of the facts and procedural

history of the case, identifies the issues that could arguably support Ortiz’s

appeal, and Counsel’s analysis of why the issues lack merit, with citations to

the record and legal authority

. See id

. We conclude Counsel has complied

with the requirements of the Anders procedure. Accordingly, we will conduct

an independent review of the record to determine whether this appeal is

wholly frivolous.

Counsel raises the following issues for our review:

I. Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish [] Ortiz

committed indirect criminal contempt?

II. Whether the text messages that formed the basis of the

[indirect criminal contempt] c harge were properly

authenticated ?

See Ortiz’s Brief at 4.

Ortiz’s first issue implicate s the sufficien cy of the evidence of indirect

criminal contempt.

In considering a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, the Superior

Court reviews evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence as

follows:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence

to enable the fact

- finder to find every element of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may notJ

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weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact

finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt

may be resolved by the fact

- finder unless the evidence is so weak

and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may

be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime

beyond a reas onable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be

considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Brumbaugh

, 932 A.2d 108, 109

- 10 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(citations and quotation mark s omitted).

“[M]uch reliance is given to the discretion of the trial judge[]” when

reviewing a conviction for contempt. Commonwealth v. Boyer

, 282 A.3d

1161, 1167 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations omitted). Because of this, our review

is limited to whether the facts support the trial court’s decision. See Boyer

,

282 A.3d at 1167

. A reversal is only appropriate “where there has been a

plain abuse of discretion.” Id

.

I ndirect criminal contempt occurs when a person violates an order or

decree given by a court outside of the presence of the court. See Boyer

, 282

A.3d at 1163. To establish indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth

must prove four elements: (1) that the court’s order was sufficiently definite,

clear, and specific, and left no doubt in the contemnor’s mind as to the

prohibited conduct; (2) the contemnor had notice of the o rder ; (3) the actJ

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constituting the violation was volitional, not accidental ; and (4) the contemnor

act ed with wrongful intent. See Brumbaugh

, 932 A.2d at 1 1 0.

Here, Counsel states he “considered raising a claim there was

insufficient evidence to convict [] Ortiz of indirect criminal contempt[,]” but

concluded, “ upon review of the record, any argument to that effect would lack

arguable merit.” Anders’ Brief at 9. Counsel explained:

the [PFA o ] rder unambiguously prohibited [] Ortiz from having any

contact whatsoever with [C.M.]

. The order was clear and left no

doubt that all communications were prohibited. . . . The element

of volition was met where the [trial] court found that the

messages were indeed sent by [] Ortiz. . . . Regarding the element

of wrongful intent, [the Superior C]ourt has determined that a

clear and intentional violation of an unambiguou s PFA order can

allow the inference of wrongful intent.

Id . at 10

- 11 (record citation omitted)

The trial court agreed ; it specifically credited the testimony of C.M.,

while finding the testimony of Ortiz’s girlfriend “too convenient and self

serving.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/23, at 3 (unnumbered). The court

concluded, “the only reasonable explanation” for the events was Ortiz sent the

messages. Id

.

We find no error in the trial court’s ruling. The evidence showed Ortiz

knew about the PFA and intentionally violated it by texting C.M. See N.T.,

3/15/23, at 31

- 34

. T he trial court, sit ti ng as the finder

- of

- fact, credited the

Commonwealth’s version of the events, while disbelieving Ortiz’s version. See

Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/23, at 3. “T his Court will defer to the credibility

determinations of the trial court as to witnesses who appeared before it[, andJ

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-

it] is well

- settled that the trier[

- ]of[

- ]fact while passing upon the credibility of

witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part

or none of the evidence

. ” Commonwealth v. Juray

, 275 A.3d 1037, 1046

(Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). Therefore, w e agree Ortiz’s sufficiency

claim is wholly frivolous

.

In his second issue, Ortiz challenges the authentication of the text

messages. Before reviewing the merits of Ortiz’s claim, we must consider

when the claim is preserved for appellate review. I ssues not raised in the tr i al

court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal See

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) ; see also Commonwealth v. Ramos

, 231 A.3d 955, 957

(Pa. Super. 2020 ) (stating " [i]t is settled that an appellant ’s failure to raise a

contemporaneous objection to evidence at trial waives that claim on appeal” )

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

. Because Ortiz failed to

object to the admission of this evidence at trial, his second issue is waived.

See id

.

F inally

, our independent review of the record reveals no arguably

meritorious issues Ortiz could raise on appeal. See C ommonwealth v.

Dempster , 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) ( en banc ) . Accordingly, we

grant Counsel’s application to withdraw and affirm Ortiz’s judgment of

sentence.

Application to withdraw from representation granted. Judgment of

sentence affirmed.J

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-

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/11/2024