alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3237 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3237

 To amend the Pay Our Military Act to provide funds for the operations 
                         of the National Guard.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 2, 2013

 Mr. Stutzman introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Appropriations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Pay Our Military Act to provide funds for the operations 
                         of the National Guard.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Guard Appropriation Restoration 
During Shutdown Act'' or ``GARDS Act''.

SEC. 2. CONTINUING APPROPRIATIONS TO COVER NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL AND 
              OPERATIONAL COSTS.

    Section 2 of the Pay Our Military Act (HR 3210 of the 113th 
Congress) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)(1), by inserting before the semicolon 
        the following: ``or, in the case of members of the National 
        Guard, who perform inactive-duty training or other service 
        during such period for which the members would otherwise be 
        entitled to pay and allowances'';
            (2) in subsection (a)(2), by inserting before the semicolon 
        the following: ``or, without regard to any such determination, 
        are civilian personnel of the National Guard, including 
        military technicians (dual status)''; and
            (3) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c) and 
        inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection:
    ``(b) National Guard Operations.--There are hereby appropriated for 
fiscal year 2014, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise 
appropriated, for any period during which interim or full-year 
appropriations for fiscal year 2014 are not in effect, such sums as are 
necessary to provide for the operation and maintenance of the National 
Guard, including necessary sums to prevent any interruption or delay in 
the performance by the National Guard of domestic disaster relief and 
recovery operations.''.
                                 <all>
```
September 25, 2020

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

C.A. No. 19-3000

JAVIER HERNANDEZ-MORALES, Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

(B.I.A. No. A205-829-343)

Present: McKEE, BIBAS, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

Submitted are

(1) Respondent’s motion to publish the opinion [Dkt. No. 70]; and

(2) Petitioner’s response to Respondent’s motion to publish the opinion

[Dkt. No. 71]

in the above-captioned case.

Respectfully,

Clerk 

________________________________ORDER_________________________________

The foregoing motion is granted. 

By the Court,

s/Stephanos Bibas

Circuit Judge

Dated: October 1, 2020

CLW/cc: Alfonso Caprara, Esq.

 Vanessa M. Otero, Esq.

 Ilana J. Snyder, Esq.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Energy

###### Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

          - [Docket No. RP00-289-002]

      ( print page 63581)    
Take notice that on October 13, 2000, Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company (Tennessee), tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas Tariff, Fifth Revised Volume No. 1, Sub Sixteenth Revised Sheet No. 26, and Eleventh Revised Sheet No. 1, to with an effective date August 1, 2000.

                    Tennessee states that the attached tariff sheets are submitted in compliance with the Commission's Order issued September 28, 2000, in Docket No. RP00-289-001 (September 28th Order).                     *Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, et al.,*                     92 FERC 61,275 (2000). In the September 28th Order, the Commission directed Tennessee, within 15 days of issuance of the order, to (1) file Sub Sixteenth Revised Sheet No. 26 with the deleted footnote No. 3 from Rate Schedule NET, (2) file Eleventh Revised Sheet No. 1 showing the correct page number for Rate Schedule NET 284 on the Table of Contents.                

Any person desiring to protest said filing should file a protest with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Section 385.211 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations. All such protests must be filed in accordance with Section 154.210 of the Commission's Regulations. Protests will be considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to be taken but will not serve to make protestants parties to the proceedings. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and are available for public inspection in the Public Reference Room. This filing may be viewed on the web at http://www.ferc.fed.us/​online/​rims.htm (call 202-208-2222 for assistance).

David P. Boergers,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 00-27280 Filed 10-23-00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-31-1998
<CASH>                                      11,930,546
<SECURITIES>                                   281,117
<RECEIVABLES>                                  360,040
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            12,571,703
<PP&E>                                         249,292
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              13,444,606
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,449,256
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  4,725,766
<COMMON>                                    12,236,710
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                13,444,606
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                45,585
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                4,843,690
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              41,425
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (4,658,516)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (4,798,105)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                139,589
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (4,658,516)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (1.43)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (1.43)
        

</TABLE>
#### HUDSPETH v. STATE.

No. 23903.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 28, 1948.

No appearance for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Conviction is for possessing whiskey for the purpose of sale in a dry area, punishment assessed at a fine of $100.

No bills of exception are in the record. Our State’s Attorney calls attention to the fact that the only statement of facts present is incorporated in the transcript in violation of Art. 760, C.C.P., as amended by Acts of the 42d Legislature, p. 12, Ch. 11, Vernon’s Ann. C.C.P., Art. 760. The second paragraph of amended Art. 760 reads as follows:

> “The Statement of Facts in felony or misdemeanor cases shall not be copied in The Transcript of the Clerk, but when agreed to by the parties and approved by the Judge, shall be filed in duplicate with the Clerk, and the original sent up as a part of the record of the cause on appeal; and like procedure shall be followed if the Statement of Facts is prepared by the parties or by the Judge, on the failure of the parties to agree. * * * ”

The violation of the positive provision of the statute precludes consideration of the statement of facts.

We also observe that what purports to be a statement of facts as copied in the transcript is not signed by either counsel for the State or appellant, neither is it approved by the trial judge.

The judgment is affirmed.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-2902

_____________________________

DERRICK ALLEN,

Appellant,

v.

R.M. SCORE, Senior Clerk, T.R.

WASHINGTON, Senior Class 

Officer, J.N. BEEN, Lieutenant, 

MICHAEL BOOKER, Acting 

Warden, and RICHARD D.

COMERFORD, Superintendent,

Santa Rosa Correctional 

Institution, and JULIE L. JONES, 

Secretary, Florida Department 

of Corrections,

Appellees.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Karen Gievers, Judge.

August 1, 2018

PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges the trial court’s order dismissing his 

action against Appellees in which he alleged that he was 

wrongfully disciplined at his correctional institution. The court 

dismissed the action with prejudice for a number of reasons, 
2

including the failure to state a cause of action for damages in 

tort, the untimeliness of the filing, res judicata and collateral 

estoppel, and immunity of the individual defendants. We affirm.

We additionally conclude that this appeal is frivolous. 

Accordingly, the Clerk of this Court is directed to provide a 

certified copy of this opinion to the Department of Corrections for 

referral to the appropriate institution for disciplinary procedures. 

See § 944.279, Fla. Stat. (providing that a prisoner who is found 

by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, 

proceeding, or appeal is subject to disciplinary procedures 

pursuant to the rules of the Department of Corrections).

AFFIRMED.

RAY, KELSEY, and WINSOR, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Derrick Allen, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Kenneth S. Steely, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellees.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-19-00412-CV

Msgr. Michael Heras

v.

The Diocese of Corpus Christi and Bishop William Michael Mulvey

On Appeal from the

319th District Court of Nueces County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2019DCV-1062-G

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The Court 

orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED. Costs of the appeal are adjudged 

against appellant.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

March 10, 2022
1 NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No

. 1 21,969

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

S TATE OF K ANSAS , Appellee ,

v.

J ON A. B UCHANAN S R

. , Appellant

.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Lyon District Court; M ERLIN G. W HEELER , judge. Opinion filed July 31 , 2020

. Affirmed in part and dismissed in part

.

Submitted for summary disposition pursuant to K.S.A. 201 9 Supp. 21

- 6820 (g) and (h).

B efore M ALONE , P .J., M C A NANY , S. J., and B URGESS , S.J.

P ER C URIAM : Jon A. Buchanan Sr. appeals his presumptive sentence and jail time credit after pleading no contest to possession of methamphetamine. We granted Buchanan's motion for summary disposition under Kansas Supreme Court Rule 7.041A (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 47). The State did not respond. Finding no error, we affirm the
district court 's judgment

.

On May 1, 2019, Bucha nan pled no contest, under a plea agreement, to possession of methamphetamine in exchange for dismissal of other charges. The charge stemmed
from items Buchanan had on him when law enforcement arrested him for a "parole warrant" issued for failing to contact his parole officer.2 On June 25, 2019, the district court sentenced Buchanan to the presumptive 36 months' imprisonment with 12 months' postreleas e su pervision. At the hearing, Buchan an argued that he should receive credit against his postrelease sentence in another case for the time he was held on the present case. The district court denied that motion.

O n appeal, Buchanan claims the district court "a bused its discretion by imposing the plea based sentence and failing to find grounds to sua sponte depart from the presumptive term." But based on the crime severity level and his criminal history score, Buchanan's presumptive sentence was 32 to 36 months' imprisonment. See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21

- 6805 . Further, the State and Buchanan agreed to the aggravated presumptive sentence in the plea agreement which was accepted by the district court. This court is precluded from reviewing a sentence that is within the presumptive sentence for the crime or a sentence resulting from a plea agreement between the State and the defendant which the sentencing court approved on the record. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21

- 6820(c) . As such, this court has no jurisdiction to review Buchana n's sentence.

Buc hanan also claims the district court erred "by refusing to grant addition al jail
credit." But Bu chanan concedes that this claim is precluded by White v. Bruce , 23 Kan. App. 2d 449, Syl. ¶ 2, 932 P.2d 448 (1997) (stating " an individual on postrelease supervision for a felony cannot receive credit against an unrevoked term of such postrelease supervision for time spent incarcerated on another charge which results in a
conviction and sentence ") , and we affirm the denial of jail time credit

.

In sum, after reviewing the record, we lack jurisdiction to rev iew Buchanan's sentence on appeal and Buchanan has failed to show that he is entitled to receive additional jail credit based on his argument in his motion for summary disposition.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part

.
Summary of Non-Employee Director Compensation



 EXHIBIT 10.14 
 POZEN INC. 
 Summary of Director Compensation 
 Compensation of Non-Employee Directors 
 Set forth below is a summary description of the current compensation arrangements for the non-employee directors of POZEN Inc. (the “Company”). 
 The Company reimburses each non-employee director for out-of-pocket expenses incurred in connection with attending Board and committee meetings and otherwise in connection with service as a director and pays each
non-employee director an annual retainer fee of $10,000. The chairman of the Company’s audit committee receives an additional annual retainer of $5,000 and other committee chairmen receive an additional annual retainer of $2,500. In addition,
each non-employee director receives a fee of $1,500 for each Board meeting attended in person and $750 if attendance is by telephone, and a fee of $750 for each Committee meeting attended, whether in person or by telephone. These fees for attendance
at committee meetings and the annual retainers were approved by the Company’s Board of Directors at a meeting held on March 26, 2003. 
 Each non-employee Board member also receives annually options to purchase 20,000 shares of common stock for such director’s services as a director, granted in January of each calendar year on or before the date of the initial Board
meeting in that calendar year and vesting annually over four years, subject to the director’s continued service as a director. A new director who joins the Company’s Board receives upon his or her election to the Board an initial option
grant to purchase a pro-rated portion of 20,000 shares of common stock, based on the number of months such director serves during that initial year. This initial grant also vests annually over four years, subject to the director’s continued
service as a director. All stock options awarded pursuant to this policy are granted pursuant to the Company’s 2000 Equity Compensation Plan, as amended and restated (the “Plan”), at an exercise price equal to 100% of the fair market
value of the Company’s common stock on the date of grant and otherwise subject to the terms and conditions of the Plan. 
 Directors who
are also the Company’s employees do not receive any compensation in their capacities as directors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

FAIRWAY CONSUMER DISCOUNT 

COMPANY, 

 Respondent 

 v. 

CHARLES LASKOWSKI A/K/A CHARLES 

A. LASKOWSKI AND KAREN 

LASKOWSKI A/K/A KAREN L. 

LASKOWSKI, HUSBAND AND WIFE, 

 Petitioners 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 530 MAL 2015 

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 16th day of November, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of 

Appeal is DENIED.
#### McCRARY v. GREER.

No. 12324.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

Sept. 12, 1951.

*653C. Pearce Schaudies, Harlingen, for appellant.

Wood & Guild, Harlingen, for appellee.

NORVELL, Justice.

The plaintiff below and appellee here testified by deposition taken in accordance with a stipulation which provided that after the stenographer taking the deposition had transcribed the questions and answers from her shorthand, “the said deposition may be carefully read over by. said witness and by him subscribed and sworn to before any officer authorized to administer oaths.” The witness signed a statement saying that he had read the questions and answers contained in the deposition and that the same were true and correct. This statement was sworn to before a Notary Public on the 20th day of September, 1950. The deposition was filed in the cause on December 11, 1950. The case came on for trial on March 19, 1951, and, after announcement of ready, defendant for the first time objected to the deposition, upon the ground that the affidavit attached to the deposition was insufficient. The trial court ruled that as the instrument showed that it was “sworn to and subscribed by this man” — the witness, it sufficiently appeared that the provisions of the stipulation had been substantially complied with. The trial court’s ruling was correct and, further, the objections raised by defendant, went to matters of form, and objections based, upon such grounds should have been made before the trial commenced, as required by Rule 212, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; Page v. Hancock, Tex.Civ.App., 200 S.W.2d 421, 425.

The judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 23



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
--------------------------------------------------------

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No.
333-44173 and Registration Statement No. 333-59997 on Forms S-3 of our reports
dated March 25, 2009, relating to the financial statements of Merrill Lynch
Preferred Capital Trust V and Merrill Lynch Preferred Funding V, L.P. (which
reports express unqualified opinions and include an explanatory paragraph
regarding Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. becoming a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bank
of America Corporation on January 1, 2009) appearing in this Annual Report on
Form 10-K of Merrill Lynch Preferred Capital Trust V and Merrill Lynch
Preferred Funding V, L.P. for the year ended December 26, 2008.

/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP


New York, New York
March 25, 2009
#### STEPHENS v. COPPOCK.

No. 13934.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Dallas.

June 25, 1948.

*880D. A. Frank and D. A. Frank Jr., both of Dallas, for appellant.

Tyson, Dawson & Dawson, of Corsic-ana, for appellee.

BOND, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment sustaining defendant’s plea of privilege. The only point at issue is the sufficiency of plaintiff’s evidence to sustain a trespass, active negligence, to confer venue of the suit in Dallas County under exception (9) to the Venue Statute, Art. 1995, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. Art. 1995, which provides: “A suit based upon a * * * trespass may be brought in the county where such * * * trespass was committed * *

The allegations in plaintiff’s petition merely evidence the nature of the suit, such do not tend to prove the truth of such allegations; and, since the holding of our Supreme Court in Compton v. Elliott, 126 Tex. 232, 88 S.W.2d 91, 94, uniformly adhered to by all courts of this State, it is the settled law that, in order to 'sustain venue in a county other than the residence of a defendant under the above exception to the statute, proof of active negligence must be made by a preponderance of the evidence “in the usual way, which means that the defendant is to be permitted by his evidence to dispute and contradict plaintiff’s evidence.” Prima facie proof of such active negligence, as in all cases where prima facie rule of evidence applies, will sustain venue facts where such evidence is not disputed or contradicted. Brooks v. Bradford, Tex.Civ.App., 103 S.W.2d 862; Dallas-Celina-Sherman Bus Lines v. Counts, Tex.Civ.App., 183 S.W.2d 1017; otherwise, the quantum of proof is for the determination of the court as the trier of the facts.

In the case at bar the testimony of plaintiff is to the effect that defendant had committed acts of trespass by negligently driving his automible upon the left-hand side of the highway with reference to the direction he was going, at an unlawful rate of speed, causing the collision with plaintiff’s automobile going in the opposite direction, and that such trespass occurred in Dallas County, Texas. The testimony of the defendant, supported by another witness, contradicted the testimony of the plaintiff, to the effect that he was not driving his automobile on the left-hand side of the highway at an unlawful speed, that the collision was caused by no fault of his, but was attributable to plaintiff’s own negligence. The court found the fact issue in favor of the defendant, sustained his plea of privilege, and transferred the venue of the cause to Navarro County, Texas.

We have carefully reviewed the record, finding no error in the action of the trial court; the judgment is affirmed.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman, Chief Justice

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 March 22, 2017

p0315

Order 

Clerk

March 22, 2017

154954

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 154954

COA: 326930

Wayne CC: 14-010443-FC

JARELL ANTONIO HOUGH,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 18, 2016 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.