United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 97-1070

___________

Gregory P. Vrban, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

District

v. * Court for the Southern District

of

* Iowa.

Deere & Company, doing business as *

John Deere Company, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: September 11, 1997

Filed: November 20, 1997

___________

Before BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Gregory P. Vrban appeals from the district court's decision granting

Deere & Company's motion to dismiss his wrongful discharge action. We

reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

For the purposes of the motion to dismiss, the district court

presumed the following facts were true. Gregory P. Vrban worked at Deere

& Company (Deere) as an at-will employee. During the course of his

employment with Deere, he sustained
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work-related injuries. Subsequently, Vrban filed a Petition for

Arbitration with the Iowa Industrial Commissioner claiming that he was

entitled to compensation for his work-related impairments. On June 26,

1991, Deere constructively discharged Vrban in retaliation for pursuing the

compensation. On June 25, 1996, Vrban commenced this suit in state court

claiming Deere wrongfully discharged him in violation of Iowa public

policy. Deere removed the action to federal court and then filed a motion

to dismiss the action as untimely.

The district court found that the two-year statute of limitations for

"injuries to the person" barred Vrban's action. Iowa Code § 614.1(2).

Vrban appeals, claiming that the five-year limitation period for "all other

actions not otherwise provided for" in section 614.1(4) applies.

II. DISCUSSION

The sole issue on appeal is whether, under Iowa law, a two-year or

five-year statute of limitations applies to a wrongful discharge action.

We hold that the five-year statute of limitations applies.

We review de novo the district court's application of Iowa Code §

614.1. See Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 1365, 1367 (8th Cir.

1995). Since the Iowa courts have not addressed this specific issue, we

must determine what the Iowa Supreme Court would decide. See Garoogian v.

Medlock, 592 F.2d 997, 1000 (8th Cir. 1979).

Deere first asserts that a two-year statute of limitations applies

to this cause of action because a wrongful discharge action is founded on

"injuries to the person." Iowa Code § 614.1(2) (two year limitation period

for actions "founded on injuries to the person or reputation, including

injuries to relative rights, whether based on contract or tort, or for a

statute penalty"). Alternatively, Deere asserts that Vrban's action is
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founded on a claim for wages, which is also subject to a two-year

limitation period. See Iowa Code § 614.1(8). Vrban contends that his

action is "not otherwise provided for," and thus, the five-year limitation

period contained in section 614.1(4) applies.

Deere contends that section 614.1(2) applies because the Iowa Supreme

Court characterizes a wrongful discharge action as a tort claim. However,

the mere fact that an action is a tort claim does not automatically trigger

the two-year statute of limitations contained in section 614.1(2). See,

e.g., Clark v. Figge, 181 N.W.2d 211, 214-16 (Iowa 1970) (five-year

limitation period applies to the tort of intentional interference with

prospective economic advantage). In ascertaining the appropriate statute

of limitations, we must apply the analysis utilized by the Iowa Supreme

Court. 

The Iowa Supreme Court has held that, "[i]n determining the

appropriate statute of limitations for a specific cause of action, the Code

requires us to look to the foundation of the action." Sandbulte v. Farm

Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 343 N.W.2d 457, 462 (Iowa 1984). Looking to the

foundation "means that the appropriate statute of limitations is to be

ascertained by characterizing the actual nature of the action." Id.

Therefore, "we must determine, as best we can, which of the types of

actions described in the statute most nearly characterizes" the action that

Vrban has brought. Scott v. Sioux City, 432 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 1988).

The Iowa Supreme Court recognized the cause of action for wrongful

discharge in Springer v. Weeks and Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 1988)

(Springer I). Springer I involved an at-will employee that alleged her

employer retaliated against her for seeking workers' compensation benefits.

Id. at 558. The court held that "a cause of action should exist for

tortious interference with the contract of hire when the discharge serves

to frustrate a well-recognized and defined public policy of the state."

Id. at 560. Because Iowa has a well-recognized policy that encourages

employees to seek workers' compensation benefits, the court permitted the

action. Id. at 561. 
The Iowa Supreme Court revisited Springer I when the employer appealed the 1

ultimate jury verdict. See Springer v. Weeks and Leo Co., 475 N.W.2d 630 (Iowa

1991) (Springer II). The employer argued that the trial court should have required

proof of a tortious interference claim. Id. at 632. The court held that prior reference

to the action as "'tortious interference with a contract for hire'" confuses the issue

because it is simply a wrongful discharge claim which does not require a showing of

tortious interference. Id. at 633 (quoting Springer I, 429 N.W.2d at 560). Nonetheless,

the Iowa Supreme Court has not modified its pronouncement in Springer I and Niblo

that a wrongful discharge action is related to the common law tort of improper

interference with an existing business relationship.

For our purposes, the distinction between an action for improper interference

2

with an existing business relationship and improper interference with a prospective

economic advantage is a distinction without difference. See Springer I, 429 N.W.2d

at 561 (referring to Clark as the case where "we recognized the tort of interference with

a business relationship"); see also Clark, 181 N.W.2d at 214 (referring to the tort as

"intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, or however the wrong

is labeled").

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In rejecting the employer's contention that only the legislature

should create this new tort, the court stated that the action is "more

nearly related to the common-law tort which has been recognized for

improper interference with existing business relationships than with any

single substantive topic with which the legislature might deal." Id. In

Niblo v. Parr Mfg., 445 N.W.2d 351, 354 (Iowa 1989), the court again

compared a wrongful discharge action with a claim for tortious interference

with a business relationship. Thus, we find that the statute of

1

limitations applicable to a tortious interference with a business

relationship claim pertains to Vrban's claim.

In Clark, the Iowa Supreme Court recognized the tort of "intentional

interference with prospective economic advantage" and determined that the

five-year statute of limitations was appropriate for the cause of action.2

Clark, 181 N.W.2d at 214-16. The court narrowly construed the two-year

statute of limitations stating, "so far as we are concerned with it here,

[section 614.1(2)] covers defamation, torts causing bodily injury or death,

and harm related to those wrongs." Id. at 215 (emphasis added). Next,
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the court stated that the tort of intentional interference with a business

relationship "does not seem to fall within those classes." Id. After

examining the proprietary nature of the action, the court held that the

five-year limitation period, section 614.1(4), applied because "if the

action is not for injuries to property, then we think it must surely be one

not otherwise provided for." Id. at 216 (quotations omitted).

In light of the Iowa Supreme Court's characterization of a wrongful

discharge action, we find no merit in Deere's argument that Vrban's action

is "founded on injuries to the person." Iowa Code § 614.1(2). The Iowa

Supreme Court limits the meaning of "injuries to the person" to bodily

injuries or death. See Brown v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 513 N.W.2d 762, 764

(Iowa 1994) (action for bad-faith failure to pay workers' compensation

benefits is not founded on an injury to the person because the plaintiff's

injuries "clearly do not stem from bodily hurts or slander"). Moreover,

the Iowa Supreme Court rejected Deere's characterization with respect to

a similar common-law tort, intentional interference with a business

relationship. See Clark, 181 N.W.2d at 215. Therefore, section 614.1(2)

does not apply to this cause of action. 

Deere alternatively argues that an action for wrongful discharge

constitutes a claim for wages and thus, Iowa Code § 614.1(8), bars the

claim. We disagree. Section 614.1(8) provides a two-year limitation

period for actions "founded on claims for wages or for a liability or

penalty for failure to pay wages." Vrban does not claim that Deere failed

to pay him wages for services rendered. Rather, Vrban merely requests

compensatory and punitive damages. The potential recovery of compensatory

damages, including lost income, does not convert the foundation of Vrban's

action to one for wages. See Sandbulte, 343 N.W.2d at 462 (stating "[i]t

is the nature of the right sued upon and not the elements of relief

requested that governs the selection of the appropriate statutory period");

Venard v. Winter, 524 N.W.2d 163, 165 (Iowa
Deere contends that Kulinski v. Medtronic Bio-Medicus, Inc., 112 F.3d 368

3

(8th Cir. 1997) demonstrates that this action constitutes an action founded on a claim

for wages. However, Kulinski involved a Minnesota statute that differs significantly

from Iowa Code § 614.1(8). Id. at 371. Therefore, we find Kulinski inapplicable to

the present case.

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1994) (the "determination turns on the nature of the right sued upon and

not on the elements of relief sought for the claim").3

Deere does not cite any and we have not found any Iowa case law that

supports its contention that the Iowa Supreme Court would characterize a

wrongful discharge action as one founded on a claim for wages.

Consequently, section 614.1(8) does not apply to this cause of action.

Deere has not asserted that any other limitation period bars Vrban's

action. Therefore, we find that the five-year limitation period contained

in section 614.1(4) applies to Vrban's action. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further

consideration consistent with this opinion.

A true copy.

 ATTEST:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.