Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Hamilton, 2019 IL App (1st) 170019

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

ERIC HAMILTON, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. First District, Sixth Division 

No. 1-17-0019

Filed

Rehearing denied

December 13, 2019

January 8, 2020

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 15-CR-609; the 

Hon. Kevin M. Sheehan, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed and remanded.

Counsel on

Appeal

James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Daniel H. Regenscheit, of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg 

and Brian K. Hodes, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the 

People.
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Panel JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Mikva concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Connors dissented, with opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, the defendant-appellant, Eric 

Hamilton, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 55 years’ imprisonment. On 

appeal, the defendant contends that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) he 

was unfairly prejudiced by witness testimony, and (3) the trial court did not provide proper 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012) admonishments during voir dire. For 

the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and remand 

the case for a new trial.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The State charged the defendant with first degree murder for the death of Guvonni Johnson 

on December 8, 2014. The defendant retained counsel, who claimed that the defendant shot 

Johnson in self-defense. A jury trial commenced, and the following evidence was presented.

¶ 4 On the morning of December 8, 2014, the defendant picked up his fiancée, Nikita 

Robinson, from her job and drove her home. When they arrived at the house, located at 6103 

South Wabash Avenue, Chicago, Illinois (the house), Guvonni Johnson was there. Johnson 

was Robinson’s brother, who had lived with Robinson at the house for the past several months. 

An argument ensued between Johnson and Robinson over a bus pass. The defendant joined the 

argument to support Robinson, and things became heated between him and Johnson.

¶ 5 The defendant stepped outside and called the police. Chicago police officer John Block 

arrived at the house a few minutes later. Robinson and the defendant told Officer Block that 

they wanted Johnson to leave the house. However, Officer Block declined to remove Johnson 

or make him leave. After talking with everyone for about 20 minutes, Officer Block left the 

house. 

¶ 6 The argument continued between the defendant and Johnson once Officer Block left. 

Robinson then told both men to leave the house. Once outside of the house, the defendant and 

Johnson engaged in a physical altercation. Johnson eventually entered his car, a red PT Cruiser, 

and drove away. The defendant followed in his car, a white PT Cruiser. After a few minutes, 

both men drove back to the house and parked their cars. Words were exchanged between them 

on the street. The defendant then shot and killed Johnson outside of the house. No gun was 

found on Johnson or at the crime scene.

¶ 7 The State’s Case

¶ 8 Robinson testified on behalf of the State. After she told both men to leave the house, she 

watched the physical altercation between them from inside the house. Johnson punched the 

defendant in the jaw, which knocked out the defendant’s tooth, and then Johnson spit in the 

defendant’s face. The defendant pushed Johnson away from him and swung at him but missed. 
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Robinson then went outside to try to stop the fight but was unable to do so and it continued. 

She went inside the house and called the police. She was on the telephone with the police for 

a few minutes when she heard the front gate outside of the house crash to the ground. She 

looked outside and saw that Johnson had knocked the defendant into the gate, which broke it. 

Robinson went back outside as the two men continued to fight in the street. She went up to 

them to try to physically break up the fight once again, but she was hit by one of the punches 

thrown. She went back into the house and called the police again.

¶ 9 About five minutes after Robinson went back inside the house, she heard three gunshots. 

She looked out the front window of the house and saw Johnson lying on the ground in front of 

his car. The defendant then knocked on the back door of the house. Robinson opened the door, 

and the defendant told her “I’m sorry, I love you.” Robinson told the defendant to turn himself 

in, and he left.

¶ 10 Robinson testified on direct examination that she did not see either man with a gun on that 

day. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked her: “Had you ever seen [Johnson] with a 

gun?” Robinson answered, “Yes.” The State objected and the trial court sustained the 

objection. Defense counsel requested a sidebar, and the trial court asked defense counsel why 

he should be allowed to ask Robinson if she ever saw Johnson with a gun: 

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I believe the State opened the door. They said there were 

a couple of questions. Did you ever see him on that day with a gun? Did you ever see 

him—

THE COURT: Well, that’s relevant because you had filed a defense of self defense 

for that particular day.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I just believe, Judge, I should be able to ask if she ever 

saw [Johnson] with a gun. They lived together for eight months and it shows he may 

have possessed a gun at some point and he may have had a gun—if he possessed a gun 

at some point prior, then he may have had a gun on that day.

THE COURT: That calls for sheer speculation. State[’s] response.

[THE STATE]: First of all, in the defendant’s opening statement, they indicated 

that this defendant saw [Johnson] supposedly carrying his waistband as if he had a gun. 

Thus the question[,] [‘]did you see [Johnson] on that day carrying a gun.[’] Secondly, 

even if [Johnson] had no criminal background, even if he had a criminal conviction for 

possession of a gun, case law is clear [that possession] does not go towards violence. It 

doesn’t go to Lynch material. This is nothing but to dirty up [Johnson].

THE COURT: First of all, the fact that he has ever [been] seen by anyone with a 

gun, is she prepared to tell you where and when and what date she saw him with a gun?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think she is prepared to tell me not the exact date but 

where.

THE COURT: What do you mean where? On his person, at his place?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: On his person.

THE COURT: Here is the problem. When the State asked [‘]did you see him with 

a gun on that particular day,[’] that’s a relevant question because that goes to the heart 

of pure self defense. It may go to the heart of unreasonable self defense, et cetera. In 

your opening statement you obviously indicated that your client will testify that he saw 

[Johnson] reaching towards something that he thought was a gun. The fact that did one 
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person ever carry a gun is irrelevant. Number one, we don’t know if that person had 

the right to carry a gun or carried a gun lawfully. Right?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, agree.

THE COURT: What this is doing essentially, [counsel], he carried a gun then so I 

think you can pretty much believe he carried a gun. It’s conjecture. Objection 

sustained.”

¶ 11 Shelton Young also testified on behalf of the State. Young lived across the street from 

Robinson. On December 8, 2014, Young was watching television at his home when he looked 

outside of his window. He saw Johnson park a red PT Cruiser and walk toward Robinson’s 

house. He then saw the defendant park a white PT Cruiser and walk toward Johnson. The 

defendant said something to Johnson that Young could not hear, and Johnson turned and 

walked toward the defendant. Young noticed the defendant had a gun in his hand. When the 

two men were about 10 feet apart from each other, the defendant fired the gun at Johnson and 

missed. Johnson ran between two cars to shield himself. The defendant fired again, and 

Johnson fell to the ground. The defendant then walked up to Johnson and fired his gun four 

more times. 

¶ 12 Anthony Bates testified that he is the maintenance supervisor for Robinson’s townhome 

complex. Just before 11 a.m. on December 8, 2014, Bates was walking near the house when 

he saw “two cars racing back and forth down the street,” one a burgundy PT Cruiser and the 

other a white PT Cruiser. He saw the burgundy PT Cruiser eventually stop, and then the white 

PT Cruiser stop just a few seconds later. Bates recognized the defendant as he “hopped out” of 

the white PT Cruiser. The defendant walked up to the burgundy PT Cruiser and tried to break 

several of the car’s windows with his elbow but was unsuccessful. The defendant walked back 

to his car, and Johnson exited the burgundy PT Cruiser. Johnson walked away from the 

defendant and toward the house. The defendant then fired a gun at Johnson but missed. The 

defendant chased Johnson between the parked cars and fired a second shot. Johnson fell to the 

ground. Bates moved toward the defendant and “tried to talk him out of it.” As Bates stood in 

the middle of the street, he saw the defendant walk over to Johnson, who was laying on the 

ground, and stand over Johnson and shoot him about four or five more times. The defendant 

then “[l]ooked up and took off running” with his gun. Bates never saw Johnson with a gun. 

¶ 13 Detective Dale Potter testified that when he arrived at the scene, Johnson had already been 

transported to the hospital. He spoke with Bates, who agreed to go down to the police station 

to speak with him further. At the station, Detective Potter showed Bates an array of compiled 

photographs. Bates identified the defendant’s photograph from the array. Detective Potter then 

notified the “mission team” of detectives and police officers within the area to look for the 

defendant. Detective Potter testified that he gave the mission team “personal information that 

I knew of [the] defendant based on previous arrests.” The mission team was unable to locate 

the defendant. The defendant turned himself in on December 10, 2014, and was arrested.

¶ 14 The State presented a stipulation that the assistant Cook County medical examiner, 

Dr. Ponni Arunkumar, would testify that she conducted Johnson’s autopsy. Dr. Arunkumar 

determined that Johnson sustained gunshot wounds to his head, left arm, and left hand, and 

concluded that his cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds. Dr. Arunkumar removed three 

bullets from Johnson’s body, but noted that one of them was removed from his abdomen and 

was an “old” bullet. The autopsy report did not find evidence of close-range firing.
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¶ 15 The State rested its case, and the trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a directed 

finding.

¶ 16 The Defendant’s Case 

¶ 17 The defendant testified in his own behalf. After Robinson told him and Johnson to take the 

argument outside of the house, Johnson followed and swore at the defendant for trying to have 

him arrested. Johnson then spit in the defendant’s face and punched him in the jaw, knocking 

out one of his teeth. The defendant swung back at Johnson but missed. Johnson hit the 

defendant again, knocking him into a gate and breaking it.

¶ 18 The defendant testified that Johnson then got into his car and drove away. The defendant 

walked down the street to “cool off,” but decided to follow Johnson in his car. The defendant 

planned to wait until Johnson arrived at his destination and then call the police to have them 

arrest Johnson for assault. Both men eventually drove back to the house and parked. The 

defendant parked about three cars behind Johnson. The defendant exited his vehicle and looked 

down at his cell phone to call the police, but right then he saw Johnson “coming towards” him 

with his right hand in front of his waistband. He thought Johnson was “fixing to shoot” him. 

Defense counsel questioned the defendant: 

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Why did you think he was looking to shoot you?

[THE DEFENDANT]: Because I know [Johnson] to carry a—

[THE STATE]: Objection.

THE COURT: [Counsel], that will be stricken.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, I don’t want to know about what you know about 

in the past. When I say why do you think he was going to shoot you, describe to the 

jurors why do you think he was going to shoot you, describe what you observed at that 

point with his hands?

[THE DEFENDANT]: What I observed with his hands in his waist you can see like 

a little black steel kind of like a frame you see kind of the butt so therefore I know he 

was going to shoot me.”

The defendant testified that he then grabbed his gun and fired in Johnson’s direction. He fired 

more than once, but he did not know exactly how many times. The defendant testified that he 

shot Johnson “to protect myself. I felt myself threatened. I knew he was going to shoot me.” 

The defendant denied that he went up to Johnson and fired four more shots into his body. After 

he shot Johnson, he went to Robinson’s house to talk to her. He turned himself in to the police 

a day or two later. 

¶ 19 On cross-examination, the defendant testified that while he saw the black steel butt of a 

handgun in Johnson’s waistband, Johnson never took the gun out of his waistband. 

¶ 20 Closing Arguments and Sentencing

¶ 21 In closing arguments, the State described Johnson as fleeing from the defendant and 

“defenseless” at the time he was shot. The State argued that the shooting was unjustified and 

described the defendant’s version of events as “concocted.”
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¶ 22 Defense counsel’s closing argument focused on the defendant’s self-defense claim, arguing 

that he was justified in shooting Johnson because “he believed he was going to get shot.” He 

highlighted that there was conflicting witness testimony regarding whether Johnson walked 

toward or away from the defendant just before he was shot. His closing arguments stressed that 

Johnson had just “pummeled” the defendant during the physical altercation and that the 

defendant believed Johnson had a gun in his waistband. Defense counsel suggested that Bates 

could have found the gun on Johnson and then concealed it from the police as an explanation 

for why no gun was found. Defense counsel further propounded that Johnson perhaps shot 

himself in the abdomen as he was pulling his gun out of his waistband, since there had been a 

third “old” bullet found in his abdomen. 

¶ 23 Defense counsel alternatively argued to the jury that they should find the defendant guilty 

of second degree murder on the basis that the defendant did believe that Johnson was going to 

shoot him, but his belief was unreasonable: “[Y]ou can find a mitigating factor which says that 

he did what he did out of unreasonable belief. He wasn’t reasonably doing what he said. That’s 

second degree.”1

¶ 24 The trial court instructed the jury on first degree murder, second degree murder, and the 

affirmative defense of self-defense. The jury deliberated for a little more than an hour before 

reaching a verdict. The jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder and that during 

the commission of a first degree murder he had personally discharged a firearm that caused the 

death of another person. 

¶ 25 Subsequently, the trial court heard and denied the defendant’s posttrial motion, which 

argued that the defendant was not proven guilty of first degree murder, or alternatively, that he 

should have been found guilty of second degree murder. The trial court stated to defense 

counsel: “[Y]ou did an extremely competent job seeking [sic] that the jury had an alternative 

version to consider ***. You did your job based on your theory of the case. Twelve of [the 

defendant’s] citizens did not buy into it.” 

¶ 26 At sentencing, the trial court called the fight between the defendant and Johnson “an 

argument over a silly bus pass.” The court explained that in order to deter others from turning 

to guns over “nonsense,” it was sentencing the defendant to 30 years’ imprisonment for first 

degree murder. The court also sentenced him to 25 years for personally discharging a firearm 

causing the death of another person, for a total of 55 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 27 The defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied. This appeal followed.

¶ 28 ANALYSIS

¶ 29 We note that we have jurisdiction to review the trial court’s judgment, as the defendant 

filed a timely notice of appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013); R. 606 (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 30 On appeal, the defendant presents the following issues: (1) whether he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel; (2) whether he was prejudiced by Detective Potter’s testimony; and 

(3) whether the trial court failed to provide proper Rule 431(b) admonishments during 

1

“A person commits the offense of second degree murder when *** at the time of the killing he or 

she believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing 

*** but his or her belief is unreasonable.” 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(2) (West 2014).
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voir dire. Because we find the ineffective assistance of counsel issue to be dispositive, we turn 

to it first.

¶ 31 The defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when defense 

counsel failed to properly elicit state-of-mind testimony from both the defendant and Robinson 

regarding Johnson’s past habit of carrying a gun. The defendant maintains: “Their testimony 

would have helped explain why [the defendant] reasonably believed that he saw a gun and that 

using deadly force was necessary to protect himself.” Specifically, the defendant takes issue

with defense counsel’s failure to respond at all when the State objected to his testimony about 

knowing Johnson’s habit of carrying a gun. He also challenges defense counsel’s response 

when the State objected to Robinson’s testimony about having seen Johnson carry a gun in the 

past. The defendant argues that during the sidebar regarding Robinson’s testimony, defense 

counsel improperly made a propensity argument instead of framing it as corroborative stateof-mind evidence. The defendant claims that if his and Robinson’s state-of-mind testimony had 

been admitted, “there is a reasonable probability” that the jury would have found that he acted 

in self-defense, or, in the alternative, found “that his belief was unreasonable” and convicted 

him of second degree murder instead.

¶ 32 The State counters that the defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel and 

that the defendant is merely challenging trial strategy. Primarily, the State argues that defense 

counsel’s strategy was to focus on what happened the day of the shooting, and that the 

defendant cannot “second guess” that strategy on appeal. The State also claims that the 

testimony at issue would have been excluded under People v. Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d 194 (1984), 

and so defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to elicit inadmissible testimony.

¶ 33 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed through a two-part test that was 

announced by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984), and adopted by our supreme court. People v. Burrows, 148 Ill. 2d 196, 232 (1992). To 

prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate both that 

(1) counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms 

and (2) the defendant was prejudiced thereby. People v. Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶ 30 (citing 

People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36). Prejudice is a reasonable probability of a different 

result of the proceeding absent counsel’s deficiency, and a reasonable probability is probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. A defendant must overcome the strong 

presumption that the challenged action or inaction of counsel was the product of sound trial 

strategy and not incompetence. People v. King, 316 Ill. App. 3d 901, 913 (2000). We review 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. People v. Demus, 2016 IL App (1st) 

140420, ¶ 21. 

¶ 34 We initially address the State’s claim that any testimony regarding Johnson’s reputation to 

carry a gun would not be admissible under Lynch. The State avers that Johnson’s character was 

not an essential part of the defendant’s self-defense claim and, therefore, defense counsel was 

not ineffective for failing to elicit testimony about him being known to carry a gun. See Lynch, 

104 Ill. 2d at 200; People v. Figueroa, 381 Ill. App. 3d 828, 841 (2008) (a defendant claiming 

self-defense may present evidence of the victim’s aggressive and violent character because 

such evidence is relevant to determine which person was the aggressor). However, the 

defendant’s testimony was not that Johnson had a propensity for violence; it was that he knew 

Johnson to carry a gun. Thus, Lynch is irrelevant.
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¶ 35 Instead, the testimony at issue was relevant for the limited and nuanced purpose of 

representing the defendant’s state of mind at the time he shot Johnson. Specifically, the 

defendant’s testimony that he knew Johnson to carry a gun supports his belief that Johnson was 

going to shoot him. The testimony, therefore, is relevant to his claim of self-defense—whether 

or not his belief of imminent harm was reasonable. See People v. Sims, 265 Ill. App. 3d 352, 

355 (1994) (a defendant’s belief that force was necessary is an essential element of his selfdefense claim, and thus, a defendant’s state of mind at the time of the occurrence is relevant 

and material); People v. Cruzado, 299 Ill. App. 3d 131, 136 (1998) (“When self-defense is 

raised, testimony concerning the victim’s reputation and character may be offered for two 

distinct purposes. [Citations.] ‘One purpose of the testimony may be to show the 

reasonableness of the defendant’s state of mind in acting in self-defense ***.’ ” (quoting 

People v. Buchanan, 91 Ill. App. 3d 13, 16 (1980)); see also People v. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d 218, 225 

(2004); People v. Zertuche, 5 Ill. App. 3d 303, 305 (1972).

¶ 36 The defendant’s knowledge of Johnson’s past practice of carrying a gun, coupled with 

Johnson reaching for what the defendant believed to be a gun in his waistband, was the basis 

of the defendant’s subjective belief that he was going to be shot. This is classic state-of-mind 

evidence. Whether the belief was reasonable or unreasonable was for the jury to decide, based 

on the totality of the evidence presented to them. Similarly, the testimony of Robinson, who 

lived with Johnson and knew of his habit of carrying a gun, would have corroborated the 

defendant’s testimony regarding his belief and state of mind.

¶ 37 Nonetheless, the State predictably claims that defense counsel’s failure to properly object 

was appropriate because his strategy was to focus on the events on the day of the shooting, i.e.,

that Johnson had just assaulted the defendant and that the defendant believed he saw the butt 

of a gun in Johnson’s waistband. However, the events on the day of the shooting include the 

defendant’s state of mind. If the defendant believed that he saw the butt of a gun in Johnson’s 

waistband just after Johnson had assaulted him, testimony that Johnson had a habit of carrying 

a gun would be more than relevant. 

¶ 38 While defense counsel’s opening and closing statements did focus on the defendant’s claim 

that he saw Johnson running toward him with a gun in his waistband, testimony regarding the 

defendant’s state of mind is not an “alternative theory” or a “different tactic” as the State 

alleges. That testimony is part and parcel of the defendant’s theory of defense. Indeed, stateof-mind evidence goes to the heart of self-defense. People v. Sawyer, 115 Ill. 2d 184, 193-94 

(1986) (“it is the defendant’s perception of the danger, not the actual danger, which is 

dispositive” for purposes of self-defense (emphasis added)). Certainly, the defendant’s 

knowledge that Johnson had a habit of carrying a gun, coupled with the fact that Johnson had 

just violently beat him, may very well have been the reason that the defendant believed Johnson 

was going to shoot him. Thus, defense counsel should have properly elicited the defendant’s 

testimony that he knew Johnson to carry a gun. That would certainly qualify as admissible 

state-of-mind evidence. 

¶ 39 Defense counsel was also predictably unsuccessful in his attempt to elicit Robinson’s 

testimony that she knew Johnson to carry a gun:

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I just believe, Judge, I should be able to ask if she ever 

saw [Johnson] with a gun. They lived together for eight months and it shows he may 

have possessed a gun at some point and he may have had a gun—if he possessed a gun 

at some point prior, then he may have had a gun on that day.
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THE COURT: That calls for sheer speculation. State[’s] response.

[THE STATE]: First of all, in the defendant’s opening statement, they indicated 

that this defendant saw [Johnson] supposedly carrying his waistband as if he had a gun. 

Thus the question[,] [‘]did you see [Johnson] on that day carrying a gun.[’] Secondly, 

even if [Johnson] had no criminal background, even if he had a criminal conviction for 

possession of a gun, case law is clear [that possession] does not go towards violence. It 

doesn’t go to Lynch material. This is nothing but to dirty up [Johnson].

THE COURT: First of all, the fact that he has ever [been] seen by anyone with a 

gun, is she prepared to tell you where and when and what date she saw him with a gun?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think she is prepared to tell me not the exact date but 

where.

THE COURT: What do you mean where? On his person, at his place?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: On his person.

THE COURT: Here is the problem. Here is the problem. When the State asked 

[‘]did you see him with a gun on that particular day,[’] that’s a relevant question 

because that goes to the heart of pure self defense. It may go to the heart of unreasonable 

self defense, et cetera. In your opening statement you obviously indicated that your 

client will testify that he saw [Johnson] reaching towards something that he thought 

was a gun. The fact that did one person ever carry a gun is irrelevant. Number one, we 

don’t know if that person had the right to carry a gun or carried a gun lawfully. Right?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, agree.

THE COURT: What this is doing essentially, [counsel], he carried a gun then so I 

think you can pretty much believe he carried a gun. It’s conjecture. Objection 

sustained.”

Defense counsel never argued that Robinson’s testimony was relevant to corroborate the 

defendant’s belief and state of mind. For example, when the trial court stated that the 

propensity argument “calls for sheer speculation,” defense counsel could and should have 

framed the testimony as relevant state-of-mind evidence. Instead, defense counsel only 

continued to argue with the State about propensity and debate whether the testimony would 

“dirty up” Johnson. It was an incredible error for defense counsel to fail to make the appropriate 

argument during the sidebar. 

¶ 40 The dissent misses the point of our analysis when it asserts that, “[s]tanding alone, whether 

Robinson had seen Johnson with a gun is not relevant to whether defendant believed that 

Johnson had a gun.” Infra ¶ 56. Robinson’s testimony that she knew Johnson to have a history 

of carrying a gun would have corroborated the defendant’s state-of-mind and his belief that 

Johnson had a gun on him. See People v. Evans, 104 Ill. App. 3d 598, 603 (1982) (the 

defendant’s state-of-mind testimony was corroborated by his cousin who testified that the 

victim was known to carry a gun).2

¶ 41 During oral arguments before this court, the State argued that after the trial court sustained 

the State’s objection to the evidence in question, an offer of proof for the testimony at issue 

2 We acknowledge that Robinson’s testimony would have been admissible only during the 

defendant’s case to corroborate the defendant’s state-of-mind testimony, which we hold should have 

been admitted.
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would have been too remote and uncertain. The State speculates that the trial court would have 

excluded the testimony as irrelevant. This argument is nonsensical. The defendant’s point is 

that there never was an offer of proof for the trial court to consider. When the trial court 

prevented defense counsel from eliciting the testimony at issue, counsel could and should have 

made an offer of proof for the record, which would have made it clear why he needed to elicit 

the testimony which the trial court had banned (i.e., the defendant’s belief in state of mind). 

Instead, counsel responded to the State’s propensity argument. This had nothing to do with the 

defendant’s state of mind, which should have been the focus of defense counsel’s argument. 

The trial court was never able to consider the relevance of the testimony at issue as it related 

to the defendant’s belief and state of mind. The trial court excluded the evidence based on the 

State’s propensity argument, but defense counsel had a duty to make an offer of proof based 

on the defendant’s belief, and therefore, state-of-mind relevance.

¶ 42 Defense counsel argued to the jury that they could alternatively find the defendant’s belief 

that Johnson was about to shoot him to be unreasonable and therefore find him guilty of second 

degree murder. Yet, defense counsel failed to provide the jury with any evidence by which to 

find the defendant guilty of second degree murder. Significantly, when defense counsel had 

the opportunity to elicit the testimony at issue by framing it as state-of-mind evidence which 

would be relevant to finding the defendant’s belief unreasonable and therefore supporting a 

finding of second degree murder, he failed to do so. Instead of succeeding in having the 

defendant’s belief and state-of-mind testimony admitted and using it to argue that the defendant 

unreasonably believed he was about to be shot, defense counsel made two speculative and 

incredible arguments. First, he suggested that Bates may have taken Johnson’s gun after the 

shooting and concealed it from the police. Then, he suggested that Johnson may have 

accidentally shot himself in the abdomen. Both of those arguments are beyond comprehension. 

¶ 43 The State highlights that the trial court commended defense counsel’s performance at the 

end of the trial. However, that is not dispositive of whether the defendant received effective 

assistance of counsel. The sole relevant inquiry is whether defense counsel’s performance was 

objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. And as we have discussed, 

defense counsel in this case failed to even attempt to have the trial court admit the defendant’s 

state-of-mind testimony which would support his belief, and was crucial to his defense; or to 

a finding of second degree murder under these facts. 

¶ 44 Further, the record reflects that Dr. Arunkumar’s autopsy report did not find evidence of 

close-range firing. Yet, defense counsel made no mention of this fact, even when he was 

arguing during his closing arguments that the defendant did not shoot Johnson at close range. 

Defense counsel’s failure to highlight that the autopsy report did not find evidence of closerange firing, especially under the facts of this case, underscores his deficient performance. Had 

defense counsel made the proper argument to lay the foundation for the defendant’s belief and 

state-of-mind testimony, coupled with pointing out to the jury that there was no autopsy 

evidence of close-range firing, the jury would certainly have had the entirety of the theory of 

defense upon which to make a determination. However, they were deprived of that opportunity.

¶ 45 The defendant had a right to expect defense counsel to understand, explain, and apply the 

rules of evidence to the facts of his case in support of his theory of defense, no matter how 

nuanced that interpretation may be. Defense counsel in this case clearly did not. Rather, he 

allowed the State to distract him from arguing the state-of-mind application of the relevant 

testimony; choosing instead to follow the State down the wrong path and responding to the 
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State’s propensity argument regarding the testimony. At no point in the argument regarding 

why the testimony was necessary did defense counsel ever mention the defendant’s belief and 

state of mind as the basis for the trial court to consider why the testimony was needed. That, 

after all, was the crux of the defense. 

¶ 46 Having determined that defense counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and 

unreasonable, we now parse whether the defendant was prejudiced.

¶ 47 Given the fact that no gun was found on Johnson or at the crime scene, this case turned on 

whether the jury accepted the defendant’s belief that Johnson was going to shoot him as 

reasonable. On one hand, Johnson had just knocked out one of the defendant’s teeth and hit 

the defendant with such force that the defendant’s body broke a gate to the building. And one 

witness testified that Johnson was walking toward the defendant when he was shot.3 On the 

other hand, no gun was found on Johnson, and one witness testified that Johnson was walking 

away from the defendant when he was shot. In such a close case, and in light of conflicting 

testimony, the defendant’s belief and state of mind were crucial. Testimony from the defendant 

and Robinson that they knew Johnson to have a habit of carrying a gun would have shown the 

case in a different light and could have tipped the scales with respect to the defendant’s state 

of mind, and therefore, belief (unreasonable or otherwise) that Johnson was going to shoot 

him. See People v. Morales, 2019 IL App (1st) 160225, ¶ 36 (a defendant need not prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the outcome would have been different, only that the 

favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as 

to undermine confidence in the verdict).

¶ 48 Without the relevant state-of-mind evidence, the core of the defendant’s case was not put 

before the jury, thereby denying the defendant the opportunity to effectively mount his defense. 

This was error, occasioned by defense counsel’s failure to make a clear, coherent argument to 

the trial court regarding the true use of the evidence, which the court excluded. Consequently, 

the trial court never got the opportunity to consider the testimony in that context. Specifically, 

that based on the defendant’s knowledge of Johnson’s habit of carrying a gun, the defendant 

believed Johnson was going to shoot him. The jury should have been allowed to hear why he 

had that belief. They would then be free to accept or reject it; but it was error to keep it from 

them. This deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

¶ 49 We agree with the defendant that there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have 

found him either not guilty or guilty only of second degree murder had the state-of-mind 

testimony been admitted and argued. Thus, the defendant was prejudiced by defense counsel’s 

performance. See People v. Moore, 356 Ill. App. 3d 117, 128 (2005) (“the prejudice component 

of Strickland requires the defendant show the deficient representation rendered the trial result 

unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair”). Accordingly, we find that the defendant 

received ineffective assistance of counsel. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the circuit 

court of Cook County and remand the case for a new trial.

¶ 50 In light of the preceding analysis, we need not address the defendant’s additional arguments 

that he was prejudiced by Detective Potter’s testimony and that the trial court failed to provide 

proper Rule 431(b) admonishments during voir dire.

3

Not to mention, the autopsy report found no evidence of close-range firing, which defense counsel 

should have, but did not, highlight.
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¶ 51 CONCLUSION

¶ 52 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the defendant’s conviction and sentence, and remand 

the case to the circuit court of Cook County for a new trial.

¶ 53 Reversed and remanded.

¶ 54 JUSTICE CONNORS, dissenting:

¶ 55 Because I would find that defendant did not show that his counsel was ineffective, I 

respectfully dissent. As the majority notes, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of 

counsel must show that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 

Neither prong was met here.

¶ 56 Testimony that Johnson was known to carry a gun would have been relevant to defendant’s 

self-defense theory. See People v. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d 218, 225 (2004) (in support of a self-defense 

claim, several witnesses testified that the victims were known to carry guns and were involved 

in various shootings); People v. Sims, 265 Ill. App. 3d 352, 356 (1994) (alleged fact that the 

victim carried a gun and pulled it out during a confrontation was probative of the defendant’s 

state of mind).Yet, the majority oversteps its role by finding that defense counsel should have 

argued differently when he sought to admit Robinson’s testimony about whether she had ever 

seen Johnson with a gun. Standing alone, whether Robinson had seen Johnson with a gun is 

not relevant to whether defendant believed that Johnson had a gun. The majority notes in 

passing that Robinson’s testimony would only be admitted if defendant’s state-of-mind 

testimony was already admitted. That being the case, the majority seems to fault defense 

counsel for not laying the groundwork for admitting Robinson’s testimony, later eliciting from 

defendant whether he knew that Johnson carried a gun, and then hypothetically recalling 

Robinson to offer the desired testimony that she had seen Johnson with a gun. To require that 

sequence of actions risks micromanaging an attorney’s trial strategy. And, the majority’s view 

appears to be swayed by hindsight, which we are supposed to avoid. See People v. French, 

2017 IL App (1st) 141815, ¶ 67 (“ ‘[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that 

every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight’ ”) (quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 689). The majority has applied a standard to defense counsel’s conduct that is far 

above what Strickland mandates.

¶ 57 Further, in evaluating counsel’s performance, a “court must consider the totality of 

counsel’s conduct, not isolated incidents.” People v. Wilson, 392 Ill. App. 3d 189, 198 (2009). 

Numerous times, defense counsel elicited evidence of defendant’s state of mind. Indeed, 

defendant testified about his state of mind four times, twice stating, “I thought he was fixing 

to shoot me,” and also stating that “I know he was going to shoot me” and “I felt my life was 

threatened.” Defendant also testified that Johnson had his hand in his waistband and he saw 

black steel. Defense counsel highlighted the self-defense theory in closing argument. The jury 

was presented with defendant’s state of mind throughout the trial. Based on the entire trial, 

defense counsel’s performance was not “so inadequate that counsel was not functioning as the 

‘counsel’ guaranteed by the sixth amendment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. 

Manning, 241 Ill. 2d 319, 326-27 (2011).

¶ 58 In a similar vein, I would also find that defendant failed to meet the prejudice prong of 

Strickland. Under the Strickland standard, a defendant must show that, but for counsel’s 
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deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v. Steele, 

2014 IL App (1st) 121452, ¶ 38. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not 

just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). Further, the defendant must 

show “actual prejudice” and “not simply speculation that the defendant may have been 

prejudiced.” People v. Gordon, 2016 IL App (1st) 134004, ¶ 46. Evidence of defendant’s state 

of mind—that he feared for his life and believed Johnson had a gun—was repeatedly brought 

out at trial. I am not convinced that the additional testimony would have made a sufficient 

difference. The jury was presented with defendant’s theory and rejected it. Defendant has not 

shown that counsel’s failure to admit the desired evidence “rendered the result of the trial 

unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 

Manning, 241 Ill. 2d at 327. Ultimately, a defendant is entitled to “a fair trial, not a perfect 

one” and “competent, not perfect, representation.” People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 344 

(2000). Based on the record before us, I believe defendant received all that Strickland required. 

¶ 59 For the foregoing reasons, I would not reverse and remand based on this issue, and I 

respectfully dissent in this case.