alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### FOSTER v. STATE.

No. 23129.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 16, 1945.

*576A. F. Nossaman, of Sherman, for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

The offense is rape. The punishment assessed is confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of five years.

The record is before us without a statement of the facts proven on the trial.

There is but one bill of exception in the record which was prepared by the trial court because the bill on the subject prepared by appellant was found to be incorrect by the State’s Attorney and the court. Whereupon, the court suggested to counsel for appellant that certain corrections be made, but appellant’s counsel refused to agree to the corrections as suggested by the court. Thereupon the court endorsed thereon his refusal to approve the bill and returned it to appellant’s counsel. The bill, as prepared and filed by the court, shows that at the conclusion of the State’s evidence in chief and before appellant had offered any evidence in his behalf, he filed a written motion requesting that he be granted permission to personally make a statement to the jury of the nature of his defense and the facts which he expected to prove in support thereof. The trial court declined to permit appellant to do so, but informed counsel that he might make the opening statement, which his counsel declined to do. The trial court based his action in the matter complained of on Section 5 of Article 642, C.C.P., which provides as follows: “The nature of the defenses relied upon and the facts expected to be proved in their support shall be stated by defendant’s counsel.”

Under the provisions of the article quoted, appellant had the right by and through his counsel to make such statement, and this right the court accorded him, but he declined to avail himself thereof and insisted on doing so in person. No reason is assigned why his counsel, who was conducting his defense, could not have made the statement as well as appellant might have done. No injury is shown to have resulted to appellant from the court’s ruling, and none will be presumed under the circumstances here disclosed. In support of the opinion here expressed, we refer to the following authorities: McBride v. State, 110 Tex.Cr.R. 308, 7 S.W.2d 1091 (in motion for rehearing), and White v. State, 78 Tex.Cr.R. 216, 181 S.W. 192. Having reached the conclusion that no error is reflected by the bill, the same is overruled.

From what we have said, it follows that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2809 

To delay the application of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 24, 2013 

Mrs. BLACKBURN (for herself, Mr. MEADOWS, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, 

Mr. PRICE of Georgia, Mr. YODER, and Mr. HARRIS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on Ways and Means, Education 

and the Workforce, the Judiciary, Natural Resources, Rules, House Administration, and Appropriations, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions 

as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To delay the application of the Patient Protection and 

Affordable Care Act. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. DELAY IN APPLICATION OF PATIENT PROTEC4 TION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT. 

5 (1) ONE-YEAR DELAY IN PPACA PROVISIONS

6 SCHEDULED TO TAKE EFFECT ON OR AFTER JANU7 ARY 1, 2014.—Notwithstanding any other provision 

8 of law, any provision of (including any amendment 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2809 IH

1 made by) the Patient Protection and Affordable 

2 Care Act (Public Law 111–148) or of title I or sub3 title B of title II of the Health Care and Education 

4 Reconciliation Act of 2011 (Public Law 111–152) 

5 that is otherwise scheduled to take effect on or after 

6 January 1, 2014, shall not take effect until the date 

7 that is one year after the date on which such provi8 sion would otherwise have been scheduled to take ef9 fect. 

10 (2) ONE-YEAR SUSPENSION OF CERTAIN TAX

11 INCREASES ALREADY IN EFFECT.—Notwithstanding 

12 any other provision of law, in the case of any tax 

13 which is imposed or increased by any provision of 

14 (including any amendment made by) the Patient 

15 Protection and Affordable Care Act (Public Law 

16 111–148) or of title I or subtitle B of title II of the 

17 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 

18 2011 (Public Law 111–152), if such tax or increase 

19 takes effect before January 1, 2014, such tax or in20 crease shall not apply during the 1-year period be21 ginning on such date. 

Æ 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Exhibit
32.2



CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO

18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In
connection with the Annual Report of Agritech Worldwide, Inc. (formerly Z Trim Holdings, Inc.) (the “Company”) on
Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2016, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof
(the “Report”), I, Edward B. Smith III, interim Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.



|/s/
    Edward B. Smith III         | 
|----------------------------------- | 
|Edward
    B. Smith III             | 
|Interim
    Chief Financial Officer | 
|(Principal
    Financial Officer)   | 



April
17, 2017



A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise
adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section
906, has been provided to Agritech Worldwide, Inc. (formerly Z Trim Holdings, Inc.) and will be retained by Agritech Worldwide,
Inc. (formerly Z Trim Holdings, Inc.) and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3343 Engrossed in House (EH)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3343

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To amend the District of Columbia Home Rule Act to clarify the rules 
regarding the determination of the compensation of the Chief Financial 
                  Officer of the District of Columbia.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CLARIFICATION OF DETERMINATION OF COMPENSATION OF CHIEF 
              FINANCIAL OFFICER OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

    (a) Determination of Compensation.--Section 424(b)(2)(E) of the 
District of Columbia Home Rule Act (sec. 1-204.24(b)(2)(E), D.C. 
Official Code) is amended to read as follows:
                    ``(E) Pay.--The Chief Financial Officer shall be 
                paid at a rate such that the total amount of 
                compensation paid during any calendar year does not 
                exceed an amount equal to the limit on total pay which 
                is applicable during the year under section 5307 of 
                title 5, United States Code, to an employee described 
                in section 5307(d) of such title.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to pay periods beginning on or after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.

            Passed the House of Representatives November 18, 2013.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
113th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                               H. R. 3343

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To amend the District of Columbia Home Rule Act to clarify the rules 
regarding the determination of the compensation of the Chief Financial 
                  Officer of the District of Columbia.
```
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-7950

In Re: CHARLES BROWN,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

(CR-99-154)

Submitted: April 27, 2006 Decided: May 5, 2006

Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles Brown, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Charles Brown petitions this court for a writ of

mandamus. He seeks review of the district court’s order dismissing

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) action and review of his conviction and

sentence reflected in the amended judgment entered in January 2001.

Mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has

a clear right to the relief sought. See In re First Fed. Sav. &

Loan Assn., 860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988). Further, mandamus

is a drastic remedy and should only be used in extraordinary

circumstances. See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S.

394, 402 (1976); In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir. 1987).

Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. See In re

United Steelworkers, 595 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir. 1979).

The relief sought by Brown is not available by way of

mandamus. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma

pauperis, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Ben Cannon Wherry, Appellant

No. 06-19-00032-CR v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

Appeal from the 4th District Court of Rusk 

County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. CR17-313). 

Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice 

Stevens, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice 

Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find there was partial error in the judgment 

of the court below. Therefore, we modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect that appellant was 

convicted of a state jail felony. As modified, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

We further order that the appellant, Ben Cannon Wherry, pay all costs of this appeal.

RENDERED OCTOBER 4, 2019

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-23-00119-CR

JASON SCOTT DAVIS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

§

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from the 372nd District Court

of Tarrant County (1672108D)

March 7, 2024

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there 

was no error in the trial court’s judgments. It is ordered that the judgments of the 

trial court are affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By /s/ Dana Womack

 Justice Dana Womack
EXHIBIT 32.1


Tel-Instrument Electronics Corp







CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED


PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Tel-Instrument Electronics Corp (the “Company”), on Form 10-Q for the period ending December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, each hereby certify, pursuant to and solely for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of their knowledge:





1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and





2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.











By:  /s/  Jeffrey C. O’Hara


Jeffrey C. O’Hara


CEO





/s/  Joseph P. Macaluso


Joseph P. Macaluso


Principal Accounting Officer





February 14, 2011





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Tel-Instrument Electronics Corp and will be retained by Tel-Instrument Electronics Corp and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<PAGE>
                                                                               .
                                                                               .
                                                                               .

                                                                     EXHIBIT 21.

SUBSIDIARIES OF THE COMPANY

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                   STATE OF
SUBSIDIARY                                       INCORPORATION
----------                                       -------------
<S>                                              <C>
Getty Properties Corp.                              Delaware
AOC Transport, Inc.                                 Delaware
Getty CT Leasing, Inc.                              New York
Getty Kingston Corporation                          New York
Getty NY Leasing, Inc.                              New York
Getty VA Leasing, Inc.                              New York
Getty Saugerties Corporation                        New York
Getty TM Corp.                                      Maryland
GettyMart, Inc.                                     Delaware
Leemilt's Flatbush Avenue, Inc.                     New York
Leemilt's Petroleum, Inc.                           New York
Slattery Group, Inc.                               New Jersey
Power Test Realty Company Limited Partnership*      New York
</TABLE>

----------
*    ninety-nine percent owned by the Company, representing the limited partner
     units, and one percent owned by Getty Properties Corp., representing the
     general partner interest.
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 20-2300

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jack Eugene Knight

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Nebraska - Lincoln

 ____________

 Submitted: January 18, 2021

Filed: January 22, 2021

[Unpublished]

____________

Before COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Jack Knight appeals the sentence imposed by the district court1 after he pleaded

guilty to assaulting a federal employee. His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw,

1The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, United States District Judge for the District

of Nebraska.
and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that the

sentence was unreasonable.

Upon careful review, we conclude that the district court did not impose a

substantively unreasonable sentence, as the court properly considered the factors listed

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and did not err in weighing the relevant factors. See United

States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461-62 (8th Cir. 2009) (sentences are reviewed for

substantive reasonableness under deferential abuse of discretion standard; abuse of

discretion occurs when court fails to consider relevant factor, gives significant weight

to improper or irrelevant factor, or commits clear error of judgment in weighing

appropriate factors). Further, the court imposed a sentence below the Guidelines

range. See United States v. McCauley, 715 F.3d 1119, 1127 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting

that when district court has varied below Guidelines range, it is “nearly inconceivable”

that court abused its discretion in not varying downward further).

We have also independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488

U.S. 75 (1988), and we find no non-frivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we

affirm the judgment, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

______________________________

-2-
#### Johnnie Lee BRYANT, Appellant, v. STATE, Appellee.

No. 24946.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 23, 1950.

None on appeal for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Conviction is for murder without malice and punishment assessed at two years in the penitentiary.

Appellant perfected his, appeal to this court. He now by his personal affidavit advises us that he no longer desires to prosecute his appeal, but desired to have same dismissed. At his request the appeal is ordered dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-30-1999
<CASH>                                         540,489
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                2,913,278
<ALLOWANCES>                                    72,000
<INVENTORY>                                  3,123,676
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             6,660,449
<PP&E>                                       6,100,513
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,498,926
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              10,050,814
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,495,952
<BONDS>                                      1,120,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        71,452
<OTHER-SE>                                   5,724,364
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                10,050,814
<SALES>                                      4,858,664
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,858,664
<CGS>                                        3,070,402
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                4,437,831
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              (12,457)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              71,014
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                362,276
<INCOME-TAX>                                   118,500
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            243,776
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                (2,109)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   241,667
<EPS-BASIC>                                       .087
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     .083


</TABLE>
EX-10.5



 






Exhibit 10.5




Schedule to Exhibit 10.4



Severance Agreements substantially identical to Morgan K. O’Brien’s were entered into with the
following executive officers on the following dates:




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Name	 	Current Title	 	Date	 	 
	Joseph G. Belechak

	 	Senior VP and Chief Operations Officer
	 	12/23/03
	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Maureen L. Hogel

	 	Senior VP and Chief Legal & Admin. Officer
	 	12/10/03	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Mark E. Kaplan

	 	Senior VP and Chief Financial Officer
	 	9/22/05	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Stevan R. Schott

	 	VP, Finance (previously Sr. VP and Chief

       Financial Officer)
	 	12/23/03	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	James E. Wilson

	 	VP, Corporate Development (previously
Sr. VP

       and Chief Strategic Officer)
	 	12/18/03
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               NOV-30-1996
<CASH>                                           7,114
<SECURITIES>                                     3,337
<RECEIVABLES>                                   29,112
<ALLOWANCES>                                       676
<INVENTORY>                                     11,182<F1>
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                52,336
<PP&E>                                          53,849
<DEPRECIATION>                                  33,609
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  81,548
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           22,757
<BONDS>                                         13,484
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        42,544
<OTHER-SE>                                         529
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    81,548
<SALES>                                         70,201
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                75,267
<CGS>                                           40,525
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   44,977
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                26,459
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   196
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 535
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,296
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,434
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,862
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,862
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .38
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .38
<FN>
<F1>Inventory detail at November 30, 1996 was finished goods $7445; work in process
$541; raw materials $3196.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>