J-A32045-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION 

OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES 

CONCERNING K.M.T., A MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: T.T., FATHER No. 1915 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree entered May 22, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, Orphans’

Court, at No(s): 2011-9208

BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON, and FITZGERALD*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED MARCH 12, 2015

T.T. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered in the Bucks County 

Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Court Division: (1) granting the petition of 

private parties J.M. and A.M., husband and wife (collectively, “Petitioners”), 

to terminate his parental rights to his daughter, K.M.T. (“Child”), under 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (b); and (2) denying Father’s motion to quash 

Petitioners’ termination petition for lack of standing under 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2512(3).1 Father challenges both rulings. We affirm.

The trial court set forth a thorough summary of the testimony adduced 

at the termination hearing.2 Child’s mother, M.L. (“Mother”) and Father are 

 

* Former Justice specially assigned to Superior Court.

1

Petitioners, as well as counsel for Child, filed appellee’s briefs.

2

For ease of review, we have substituted the following appellations in the 

trial court’s opinion: “Father” for T.T. and Respondent; “Child” for K.M.T.; 

and “M.H.,” “A.M.,” and “J.M.” in lieu of their full names, and “Petitioners” 
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both of Vietnamese origin and were married in 2002. They are “the parents 

of twin developmentally-challenged sons,” born in September of 2004 and 

another son born in January of 2008. Trial Ct. Op., 7/9/14, at 1. As stated 

above, Child was born in June of 2009. Due to complications from her birth, 

Mother passed away approximately three and a half weeks later.

After the loss of his wife, Father decided that it would 

not be possible for Child to [stay with him. 3] Father 

explained [at the termination hearing:] “I could not handle 

four kids under five years old by myself especially with a 

newborn who constantly hungry and get diaper changing . 

. . I cannot help her. I surrender. [I need somebody to 

help me. I cannot do this on my own by myself.”] In light 

of this capitulation, Father placed Child with [a couple who 

were Father’s own] foster parents after he had immigrated 

to the United States as a teenager. The [couple] apprised 

Father that they could only care for Child for a month while 

he found “more suitable, more long-time care for her.”

In August of 2009, after his sister and two nannies 

declined his request for assistance, Father, through one of 

his nephews, turned to M.H. for help with Child. M.H. is a 

licensed foster care person . . . . Father and M.H. first 

became acquainted with each other through Father’s 

nephews who were M.H.’s third and fourth foster children. 

The last time Father spoke to M.H. was when his nephew 

left her care in 1985.

Id. at 1-2 (citations to transcripts omitted). “In Father’s view, unlike the 

friend of a neighbor who offered to care for Child . . . for the summer[,] M.H. 

was ‘more like a longer permanent thing.’” Id. at 2.

 

for J.M. and A.M. together. Furthermore, we have omitted the trial court’s 

citations to the notes of testimony.

3

Father testified that after Child was discharged from the hospital, he first 

took her to his home, but she did not stay overnight. N.T., 1/27/14, at 35.
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In early August 2009, Father

brought Child to M.H.’s house in Yardley, Bucks County. 

Child was approximately six weeks old at the time of the 

transfer. Father brought the clothing, formula, diapers, 

and wipes that Child would need during the first few 

months of her stay with M.H. Father, who had an annual 

income of approximately $78,000, gave M.H. the gift cards 

he had received and [$1,000,] which was the only financial 

contribution he made to M.H. Father also provided M.H. 

with “a lengthy letter from [his foster mother] detailing 

everything that she could . . . to advise [M.H.”] on how to 

serve Child’s needs and her prior medical history. Father 

did not inform M.H. about how long he was leaving Child in 

her care. According to M.H., “I don’t think either of us had 

any idea” as to how long Child would remain in her 

custody.

Father next saw Child and M.H. in September [2009. 

Father suggested that he visit M.H.’s house,] but M.H. 

thought it would be more convenient to make the 

approximately thirty-minute drive to bring Child to 

[Father’s home in Northeast Philadelphia.] During this 

hour long visit Child sat with M.H. on one couch while 

Father sat on the other. According to M.H., “[t]here wasn’t 

a lot of interaction” between Father and Child.

After this visit, M.H. continued to take Child to see 

Father at his house on a monthly basis for the next six 

months. The visits . . . generally last[ed] one hour. . . . 

Through her conversations with Father during these 

monthly visits, M.H. learned that Father “wanted to get 

married first because he felt he needed a wife and a 

mother for the children.” M.H. also “got the impression 

that Father was going to try to have Child come to his 

home permanently by the end of the year.” [Father 

testified that t]he purpose of these visits was for [him] to 

apprise M.H. of “what happened with [his] family, [his] 

situation, and for [his] three kids to get along [and] know 

Child.” Father continued, “mainly I would like [my sons] 

to get to know my daughter well, because [I already know 

that was my daughter.”]

Aside from these monthly one-hour visits, Father had 
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no other contact with Child during this period. Despite 

living a mere half-hour away from M.H., Father did not 

make a visit to [M.H.’s home] to see Child. Father 

[testified that he] declined to make an unannounced visit 

because according to his nephews, M.H. was “very strict 

about somebody knocking on her door without making 

appointment.” Father did not make separate 

appointments to see Child aside from those offered 

because he did not want to disturb M.H. or “to intervene.” 

Apparently, Father assumed that this arrangement “was 

only temporary until December [2009]” when he would 

take Child from M.H. to his house. Despite [Father’s] 

initial belief that this placement was only to be temporary, 

he conceded that this December 2009 target came and 

passed without Father remarrying or collecting Child from 

M.H.

Throughout the first seven or eight months Child was in 

M.H.’s care, M.H. acted as a parent to her, provided Child 

with everyday care and did everything a parent would 

normally do for his or her child. M.H. provided Child with 

food, nurture, and clothing, and was up with Child during 

her nighttime crying. Furthermore, M.H. selected and 

brought Child to a pediatrician. . . . M.H. used the 

medical card Father provided, but Father did not attend 

any of [Child’s] visits to the pediatrician.

During this time, M.H.’s neighbor, J.B., started assisting 

. . . with Child’s care. [J.B. is the mother of Petitioner 

A.M.] In M.H.’s view, “J.B. was a miracle.” M.H. apprised 

Father that J.B. was aiding her in caring for Child and took 

J.B. . . . to one of their visits to Father’s house in 

December of 2009. A.M. . . . also started assisting M.H. 

with Child’s care while visiting her mother.

Meanwhile, Father was focused on finding a wife and in 

November of 2009 he received a picture of the woman who 

ultimately would become his spouse. In February or March 

of 2010, Father talked to his future wife on the telephone. 

Father recounted, “I took a lot of risk on talking to my 

second wife on the phone and tried to see how she 

respond to me, see how she answer my question, try to 

find out what she want, what she like . . . that’s when I 

started to say, okay, this is a done deal.” Father thought 
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of himself as “a breadwinner . . . someone who can 

provide the necessities” for his children but he could not 

“give them the mother[‘s] love because [motherly] love is 

something that I cannot do.” Father planned to travel to 

Vietnam in May of 2010 to marry his second wife and 

complete paperwork.

Father saw Child only a few times in the months prior to 

his trip to meet his future wife in Vietnam. M.H. brought 

Child to his house for the typical hour-long visit in January 

[2010], and the scheduled February visit was cancelled 

due to weather. Father remained in contact with M.H. 

through e-mail messages and telephone calls, but had no 

communication or contact with Child that month, nor did 

he visit Child at M.H.’s house. When M.H. and Child 

arrived at [Father’s] house in March [2010], Father 

announced to M.H. that “I have prepared to get married in 

May.”

The following month included a visit by Child, M.H., 

J.B., and A.M. to Father’s home. At this April [2010] 

meeting, Father gave his permission for A.M. to take Child 

with her overnight to her home in South Philadelphia. 

Despite Father not visiting A.M.’s home, nor meeting her 

husband, J.M., Father gave his general assent to overnight 

visits to [Petitioners A.M. and J.M.], who were undergoing 

certification to be foster parents. Petitioners cared for 

Child for twenty one days in May [2010] before a regular 

schedule of overnight visits developed. A.M. testified that 

“I believe at that point Child was spending two nights with 

us, one night with my mother, and the rest of the week 

with M.H.”

In May of 2010, Father visited his prospective wife, 

[D.B.], in Vietnam. The couple married later during 

Father’s month long visit to the country. Father returned 

to the United States in June [2010] without [his wife] due 

to difficulties in obtaining a visa[.] Even though Father 

was now married, he did not bring Child to his house. 

Father [testified he] was not ready for Child because “I 

already took care of three boys. I cannot take another 

person. . . another kid like five or ten years old, that’s 

better, but not at that age.”
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After Father returned to the country in June [2010], 

M.H. brought Child to a [party for Child’s birthday] at his 

house. [M.H. testified that w]hile Father appeared pleased 

with the celebration, M.H. did not recall much contact 

between Child and Father at the birthday party. A.M., who 

was also at the birthday event, observed that the 

interaction between Father and Child was limited to Father 

sitting across from Child during a ceremony and taking a 

photograph together. Father had declined an invitation to 

a party M.H. held for Child at her house.

[A.M. testified to the following.] In August 2010, Father 

hired [her] to work as a nanny for his three sons even 

though she “had met him only twice before, once at his 

home for the meeting in April [2010] and then once at the

birthday party.[”] Specifically, Father required somebody 

to care for [his three sons] and to prepare them for 

school.[4]

Id. at 2-6. On days when A.M.’s husband, J.M., could accompany her, they 

brought Child to Father’s house as well, “so that she would be ready when 

she was [to move] into that house.” Id. at 6-7. Such visits by Child 

occurred approximately four times per month.

A.M. further testified to the following. “On one evening, Father 

returned home from work and requested that A.M. stay late one day that 

week so that Father could spend time with Child.” Id. at 7. On that agreedupon day, Father arrived home from work, cut the grass, and then let A.M., 

J.M., and Child leave. “Father did not spend any time with Child that 

evening.” Id.

 

4 A.M. testified, however, the almost-six year old twins and the three-year 

old son were not enrolled in school. N.T., 12/12/13, at 19. A.M. stated the 

twins had developmental delays, and Father had told her that one twin had 

Klinefelter’s syndrome, but the other twin was not tested. Id. at 20, 21.
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By January 2011, [Father’s wife] had acquired the 

required visa to enter the United States. Father asked that 

Petitioners take care of his three sons while he was away 

in Vietnam picking up his wife. The three boys stayed with 

Petitioners in their South Philadelphia home until [Father 

and his wife] returned to the United States later that 

month.

[Father’s wife] was unable to assist A.M. in teaching 

Father’s sons English as [she] only spoke Vietnamese. 

Child remained with Petitioners after [Father’s wife] arrived 

although A.M. brought [Child] on a regular basis to 

Father’s residence. A.M. reflected that bringing Child to 

[Father’s residence] was difficult because Child spoke 

English and [Father’s Wife] could not communicate with 

Child. Father did not have any contact with Child on the 

days A.M. brought her to his house.

Father brought [his wife] to see M.H. at the end of 

January 2011. Petitioners were also present at the visit. 

[Father’s wife] had been in the United States about two 

weeks at the time of this visit. [M.H. testified to the 

following.] At the time, M.H. believed Father was bringing 

[his wife] and his sons to her house for an introduction. 

While Father had spoken to M.H. a few months prior and 

outlined a “concept” for Child’s transition to his house as 

her permanent residence, at this visit “it seemed to be 

more that he was making a proclamation that he would be 

taking her into his house in two weeks.”

[M.H. further testified as follows. She] was not 

prepared to give Child to Father in . . . two weeks. In 

[M.H.’s] view, Father “would be taking a child who was 

going on two years old, who didn’t know him, who didn’t 

know . . . the new stepmother, who wasn’t familiar with 

their food, who wasn’t familiar with their customs and . . . 

picking her up from here and putting her down there.” 

Although M.H. never had to decide whether to transfer 

Child to Father, she was “very fearful for the child.”

In February of 2011, a series of events transpired which 

ultimately led to the termination of A.M. as caretaker and 

tutor for Father’s sons. . . . On a Friday . . . A.M. received 

a telephone call from Father in which he declared that she 
J-A32045-14

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did not help his family, specifically his sons, and that 

“everything [she] had done had hurt them.” A.M. was 

upset at Father’s allegations and responded that she 

thought that “he was a disgusting parent” and that her 

family had “only done everything to help his family.” 

According to Father, “[t]he reason A.M. was let go, she 

supposed to stay there and help my kids and my wife, but 

she did not do a good job . . . .” Additionally, Father 

testified that he had fired A.M. because she had brought 

Child back to M.H.’s house whereas Father wanted to see 

how Child would do in M.H.’s absence and because [A.M.] 

became argumentative with him.

A.M. appeared for work the following Monday while 

Father was registering his twin sons at the local 

elementary school. When Father returned to his home, he 

terminated A.M. from her duties as nanny to his sons. 

Father claimed that he contacted M.H. and requested that 

A.M. not be involved in the care of Child.

Shortly after A.M.’s termination, M.H. made a report to 

the Department of Human Services in Philadelphia 

(hereinafter “DHS”) regarding Father’s household. 

Therein, M.H. reported that “I thought that the situation 

was not a good one for a child, actually, unsafe and I told 

the person on the phone things that I had learned or 

observed myself.” Many of M.H.’s allegations were based 

upon what A.M. had observed during her time at Father’s 

house[, specifically] the prolonged use of baby bottles by 

Father’s sons and Father’s practice of putting them in 

diapers even though A.M. had toilet trained them. The 

twins were six years old at the time of the report and [the 

younger son] was nearly three years of age. DHS 

investigated the report.

Father suspected that A.M. had made the telephone call 

report to DHS. Father claimed that he felt “very . . . very 

invaded and . . . was completely in shock.” Father had 

learned that a child abuse report was filed “against me 

because I let my kids live in dirty places and let them go 

hungry.” The report pertained only to Father’s sons.

While Father had no contact with Child during this time, 

M.H. went on vacation to Costa Rica. She had made 
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arrangements with J.B.[, A.M.’s mother] in 2010 to take 

care of Child during her trip. M.H. did not discuss her plan 

with Father because she “was making those decisions.” 

J.B., however, did not take care of Child . . . because of a 

medical issue, and instead asked Petitioners A.M. and J.M. 

to take care of Child. Petitioners agreed and brought Child 

to their new home in Yardley. Once M.H. returned and 

recovered from an illness during which Petitioners had 

Child in their care for an extended period of time, 

Petitioners and M.H. shared caretaking duties. [They] “all 

shared in the responsibility of [Child’s] well-being,” and 

Petitioners made doctor and dentist appointments and took 

Child to them.

Father [testified that he] had no contact with Child from 

February through part of June in 2011 “because of the 

child abuse charge against [him].” Even though Father 

realized that the report did not concern Child, [he] did not 

visit Child during this time because he did not want 

“somebody to call me child abuser when I show up in the 

neighborhood . . . and look at me and that kind of stuff.” 

Ultimately, DHS found the report unsubstantiated and 

ended its investigation in early May of 2011.

M.H. did not share any information with Father that 

would have corrected his impression that A.M. lodged the 

DHS complaint against him. [M.H.] perceived that Child 

was better served if Father was not aware of her action. 

M.H. also believed that furnishing the [$1,000 given to her 

by Father] to Petitioners to pursue adoption of Child was 

“the best possible way to extend [her] care for this child.” 

M.H. also acknowledged that she “put him off” and 

attempted to secure delays in the transfer of Child to 

Father’s house.

Father waited until the end of June of 2011 to see Child 

because he “did not feel like it was any emergency where I 

have to see her or something.” Father did not believe 

there was “a rush or anything like that.” Father described 

himself as “really laid back” and he wanted to “take some 

time and try not to rush and stuff.” Father next saw Child 

at a lunch in celebration of [Child’s] second birthday that 

M.H. arranged at a restaurant. There was no interaction 

between Father and Child as he was occupied with helping 
J-A32045-14

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his twin sons eat.

Contemporaneously, Father informed M.H. that January 

2012 was his deadline for claiming Child in response to her 

suggestion that he give his wife time to acclimate to this 

country. Father also testified that he failed to take custody 

of Child because his wife was “homesick” and he did “not 

want to push her into caring for another kid.” Father’s 

“priority” was to get his wife accustomed to American 

culture prior to bringing Child to his house. M.H. 

suggested to Father that [his wife], who wanted to learn 

English and how to drive, and his youngest son . . . visit 

her house “a couple of times” in July [2012]. Father 

replied that [his wife] was unable to travel to [M.H.’s 

house] because she was employed; however, this job did 

not last and a few of the proposed July dates became 

available.

Moreover, Father created this new deadline despite 

seeing Child on only two occasions—once in January, and 

once in June [2011]—prior to the declaration. Father did 

not place a telephone call to M.H. until August [2011] 

because he forgot to call her to inquire about Child in July 

due to a medical issue with his wife’s uncle. Father 

arranged for a visit to see Child in September [2011], but 

this visit was cancelled because his kids were ill.

Father made his third and final visit to [M.H.’s home] in 

December of 2011. [At this time, Child was two years and 

six months old.] Father recalled that he had bought some 

gifts for his daughter and . . . a Christmas present for 

M.H.. This Christmas present was the only contribution 

Father provided to Child’s caregivers that year. Father 

maintained that, during the course of 2011, he inquired 

with M.H. as to whether Child needed diapers or milk. 

Father even offered to “baby-sit” Child and told M.H. that 

“my wife and I can come up there and watch the kid for 

you while you do Christmas decorations.” M.H. declined.

Trial Ct. Op. at 7-12 (emphases added). Finally, we note that Father and his 

current wife have a daughter who was born in August of 2012. N.T., 

1/27/14, at 5.
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On December 23, 2011, when Child was approximately two and a half years 

old, Petitioners J.M. and A.M. filed a: (1) petition to terminate Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), and (2); (2) a “Joinder 

of Adults Intending to Adopt Child;” (3) and a petition to adopt Child. On 

the same day, M.H. filed a “Report of Intermediary,” claiming herself to be 

the intermediary. On March 5, 2012, the court appointed counsel to 

represent Child.

On August 13, 2012, Father filed a response, denying that Petitioners 

had in loco parentis status, and arguing that he and M.H. merely had a child 

care agreement, he had specifically directed M.H. not to permit A.M. to have 

contact with Child, and M.H. had agreed to his request but continued to 

allow A.M. to have contact with Child. Father’s Resp., 8/13/12, at ¶ 1. On 

October 15, 2013, Father filed a motion to quash the termination petition 

and a motion for summary judgment.

On May 22, 2012, the [trial court] granted Petitioners’ 

Petition for Discovery which permitted any party . . . to 

motion for hearing upon the completion of discovery. 

Meanwhile, Father commenced a custody action in the 

Family Court Division of the Bucks County Court of 

Common Pleas. On November 2, 2012, Petitioners and 

Father appeared before [another judge] and entered into 

an agreement on the record.

Trial Ct. Op. at 12. The agreement provided: (1) the parties will participate 

in an evaluation by John Shanken-Kaye, Ph.D., to determine whether it was 

in Child’s best interests to have contact with Father or “contact should 

continue exclusively with” Petitioners; and (2) Petitioners “will not move 
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forward with the termination of parental rights hearing until this evaluation 

is concluded.” Id.

Dr. Shanken-Kaye’s evaluation and written report were 

completed on or about September 10, 2013. . . . 

Petitioners moved for a hearing on their . . . Petition [to 

terminate Father’s parental rights.] On October 15, 2013, 

Father filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to 

Quash . . . . On December 2, 2013, after a conference 

with counsel and the submission of briefs, [the court] 

denied Father’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

Id. at 12-13.

The trial court held evidentiary hearings on December 4, 5, and 12, 

2013, and January 27, 28, 2014. On May 22, 2014, the court entered the 

underlying decree, denying Father’s motion to quash the termination petition 

and granting the petition to terminate his parental rights under Subsection 

2511(a)(1).5 Father took this timely appeal,6raising three questions for our 

review, whether: (1) Petitioners had standing under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(3) to 

seek termination of his parental rights; (2) Petitioners met their burden of 

proof to terminate his parental rights under Subsection 2511(a)(1) by clear 

 

5 The court’s decree did not identify the section under which it was 

terminating Father’s parental rights. However, the court’s opinion stated 

“the present thrust of Petitioners’ case is that grounds exist under Section 

2511(a)(1),” and the court granted termination on that ground. Trial Ct. Op. 

at 17.

6

Father failed to file a statement of errors complained of on appeal along 

with his notice of appeal, in contravention of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). On 

June 19, 2014, the trial court directed Father to file immediately a concise 

statement, and Father filed one on June 30th. We decline to dismiss or 

quash this appeal due to the untimely 1925 filing. See In re K.T.E.L, 983 

A.2d 745, 747 (Pa.Super. 2009).
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and convincing evidence; and (3) the termination of his rights is in Child’s 

best interests.

Father’s first claim is that Petitioners did not stand in loco parentis to 

Child and therefore lacked standing under Section 2512(3) to seek 

termination of his parental rights. Father avers that M.H. never stood in loco 

parentis to Child, and that she admitted “she was a ‘temporary foster 

mother.’” Father’s Brief at 14. Accordingly, Father reasons, M.H. “could not 

confer in loco parentis status to” Petitioners, as they claimed. Father 

concludes the trial court was required to dismiss their petition “without 

further inquiry.” Id. at 15. We disagree. 

On this issue, our standard of review is as follows:

“[T]he question of standing is whether a litigant is 

entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute 

or of particular issues.” “When a statute creates a cause 

of action and designates who may sue, the issue of 

standing becomes interwoven with that of subject matter 

jurisdiction. Standing then becomes a jurisdictional 

prerequisite to an action.” “Issues pertaining to 

jurisdiction are pure questions of law, and an appellate 

court’s scope of review is plenary.” “Questions of law are 

subject to a de novo standard of review.”

In re B.L.J., Jr., 938 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations 

omitted). 

Section 2512(a)(3) of the Adoption Act provides:

(a) Who may file.—A petition to terminate parental 

rights with respect to a child under the age of 18 years 

may be filed by any of the following:

* * *
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(3) The individual having custody or standing in loco 

parentis to the child and who has filed a report of 

intention to adopt required by section 2531[.]

23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(a)(3).

This Court has stated: “Third parties who are not designated foster 

parents may seek adoption when they can establish that they stand in loco

parentis to the child.” B.L.J., 938 A.2d at 1072 (citation omitted).

Further, the legal status of in loco parentis refers to a 

person who puts himself or herself “in the situation of a 

lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the 

parental relationship without going through the formality 

of a legal adoption.”

There are two aspects to the concept of in loco 

parentis: assumption of parental status and 

discharge of parental duties. In order for 

assumption of parental duties to be legitimate, it

must have been accomplished through some legally 

cognizable means. Furthermore, the assumption of 

parental status must be predicated on the natural 

parent’s agreement to a permanent placement of the 

child.

“The rights and liabilities arising out of an in loco parentis 

relationship are, as the words imply, exactly the same as 

between parent and child.”

Id. at 1073 (citations omitted).

The in loco parent is basis for standing recognizes that 

the need to guard the family from intrusions by third 

parties and to protect the rights of the natural parent must 

be tempered by the paramount need to protect the child’s 

best interest. Thus, while it is presumed that a child’s best 

interest is served by maintaining the family’s privacy and 

autonomy, that presumption must give way where the 

child has established strong psychological bonds with a 

person who, although not a biological parent, has lived 
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with the child and provided care, nurture, and affection, 

assuming in the child’s eye a stature like that of a parent. 

Where such a relationship is shown, our courts recognize 

that the child’s best interest requires that the third party 

be granted standing so as to have the opportunity to 

litigate fully the issue of whether that relationship should 

be maintained even over a natural parent’s objections.

Although the requirement of in loco parentis status for 

third parties seeking child custody rights is often stated as 

though it were a rigid rule, it is important to view the 

standard in light of the purpose of standing principles 

generally: to ensure that actions are brought only by those 

with a genuine, substantial interest. When so viewed, it is 

apparent that the showing necessary to establish in loco 

parentis status must in fact be flexible and dependent 

upon the particular facts of the case. . . .

J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1319-20 (Pa. Super. 1996).

The phrase “in loco parentis” refers to a person who puts 

himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the 

obligations incident to the parental relationship without 

going through the formality of a legal adoption. The status 

of ‘in loco parentis’ embodies two ideas; first, the 

assumption of a parental status, and, second, the 

discharge of parental duties.

McDonel v. Sohn, 762 A.2d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation 

omitted).

In the instant case, the trial court found M.H., and then Petitioners, 

stood in loco parentis to Child as follows:

Father brought Child to M.H.’s home in August of 2009 

after he declined an offer of temporary care from a friend 

of his neighbor. Instead, he chose to place Child [with 

M.H.] because [her] offer appeared to him as “more like a 

longer permanent thing.” Father viewed his role as that of 

a provider but abrogated his responsibilities as a parent to 

provide care, nurture, and affection, and to develop an 

emotional bond. Instead, M.H. assumed these obligations, 
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which included selecting a pediatrician and taking Child for 

visits. In our opinion, M.H. attained in loco parentis status 

as she was Child’s parental figure until Petitioners entered 

Child’s life.

In April of 2010, Father gave his assent to Child making 

overnight visits to Petitioners’ house, then in South 

Philadelphia. The record is devoid of any evidence 

establishing that Father set any restrictions as to how 

often Child would stay at [Petitioners’ home] relative to 

her stay at M.H.’s home. Petitioners were an essential and 

valuable resource for M.H. in providing care for Child in a 

critical stage of her life and they offered nurture, care, and 

affection to Child, including housing, food, and other 

necessities.

Trial Ct. Op. at 14-15.

After the placement, Father had two and a half years to 

bring into fruition one of his multiple plans to make Child a 

part of his household.

While Father repeatedly spoke of bringing Child to his 

home after this temporary separation, his conduct belied 

these expressed intentions. Specifically, Father rejected 

an offer from his first wife’s sister, in September 2011, to 

take Child until she was an adult because she had two 

other sons, and he did not want Child to impact the 

situation whereby his former sister-in-law would then 

“throw Child back onto me.” We perceive that even if 

Father viewed that the placement was temporary, the 

indefinite placement in the present case, lasting for more 

than two years prior to the filing of the Petition, is for all 

practical purposes a permanent placement with respect to 

Child.

* * *

Accordingly, because M.H. obtained in loco parentis 

status, she was in a position to act as parent and could 

place Child with Petitioners for the purpose of adoption and 

file for the termination of parental rights. Furthermore, as 

Father initially agreed to Child’s placement with 

Petitioners, we find that, under the circumstances of this 
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case, Petitioners have standing to file for termination of 

parental rights.

Id. at 16.

We agree with the trial court that Petitioners assumed in loco parentis 

status through their roles as Child’s primary caretakers. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2512(a)(3); B.L.J., 938 A.2d at 1072. First, the record supports a finding 

that Father, despite his claims that he planned to resume custody or charge 

of Child, made no progress ever towards doing so. From the time Father 

brought Child, at six weeks old, to M.H.’s home, M.H. made all medical 

decisions for Child. She, and later Petitioners, housed, fed, clothed, 

nurtured, and cared for Child. After considering the extensive testimony 

cited by the trial court, as well as our own review of the record, we agree 

with the trial court that M.H. had established in loco parentis status and was 

then “in a position to act as parent and . . . place Child with” Petitioners. 

See Trial Ct. Op. at 16. 

Thus, in light of all the evidence set forth above, we agree that Father 

discharged his parental duties. See B.L.J., 938 A.2d at 1073. Accordingly, 

Petitioners assumed parental duties through legitimate means, and we do 

not disturb the trial court’s finding that they had standing to seek 

termination of Father’s parental rights. See id.

Next, we address Father’s challenge to the termination of his parental 

rights under Subsection 2511(a)(1). First, his appellate brief argues “one 

needs to understand [F]ather” and “imagine what it was like to be in [his] 
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shoes.” Father’s Brief at 16. The brief summarizes that he was born in 

Vietnam in 1966 “during the height of the war,” was orphaned at age three 

and raised by his sister who is twenty-five years older, “escaped Vietnam on 

a boat,” entered a refugee camp in Malaysia at age fifteen, immigrated to 

the United States at age sixteen and lived with four foster families. Id. The 

brief also states that “[i]n the Vietnamese culture, . . . the mother is the 

primary care giver, and the father the primary financial provider.” Id. The 

brief then appears to cite this belief in justifying the observations of Dr. 

Shanken-Kaye—that Father believes “all child rearing are invested in the 

woman[, which] explains [his] failure to have any meaningful relationship 

with his daughter over the years as well as his failure to make any 

meaningful plans for reunification of his family until he was able to locate 

and marry a woman.” Id. at 16-17.

Additionally, Father avers the following. He “was overwhelmed with 

the responsibility of 4 children under the age of 5 years old, when his wife . . 

. died,” “made appropriate arrangements for his children,” and “was upfront 

with his plan for reunification.” Id. at 17. “Father blindly trusted [M.H.] in 

all matters and did not question her judgment.” Id. Furthermore, 

psychological testing reported that he “does not see himself as vexed by any 

of the circumstances in his life” and “[t]his apparent insouciance does help 

explain how [he] could allow so much time to pass without making any 

serious attempt to reunite with his daughter, or indeed get to know her at 
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all.” Id. By January 2011, “Father’s situation had dramatically improved 

with the addition of his new wife.” Id. He owns a five-bedroom home, 

makes a substantial salary, had Child on his medical insurance plan since 

birth, paid her unreimbursed medical expenses, was apprised of her doctor 

appointments, milestones, and accomplishments. Additionally, in June 

2011, six months before Petitioners filed the petition, Father communicated 

with M.H. several times via email. He requested visits with Child in August, 

September, and November, but could not see her until December 3rd. 

Father concludes that “[b]ased upon the above, there is no clear and 

convincing evidence that [his] conduct for a period of at least 6 months . . . 

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to [Child] or a 

refusal or failure to perform parental duties.” Id. at 20. We find no relief is 

due.

We note the relevant standard of review:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent 

evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, 

or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has 

granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental 

rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision 

the same deference that [we] would give to a jury verdict. 

We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s 

decision is supported by competent evidence.

In the Interest of J.T., 983 A.2d 771, 775 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation 

omitted).
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In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Father’s parental 

rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to 

a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of 

the following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing of 

the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating 

the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors 

such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing 

and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(1), (b). “The burden of proof is on the party seeking 

termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of 

grounds for doing so.” J.T., 983 A.2d at 775 (citation omitted).

There is no simple or easy definition of parental 

duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation 

to the needs of a child. A child needs love, 

protection, guidance, and support. These needs, 

physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely 

passive interest in the development of the child. 

Thus, this court has held that the parental obligation 
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is a positive duty which requires affirmative 

performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a 

financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in 

the child and a genuine effort to maintain 

communication and association with the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor,

parental duty requires that a parent ‘exert himself to 

take and maintain a place of importance in the 

child’s life’.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively 

with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every 

problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship 

to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult 

circumstances. A parent must utilize all available 

resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must 

exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed 

in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. 

Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more 

suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with his or 

her physical and emotional needs. . . . .

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

Under subsection (a)(1),

[o]nce the evidence establishes a failure to perform 

parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental rights, the court must engage in three lines of 

inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her 

conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between 

parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of 

termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to 

Section 2511(b).

J.T., 983 A.2d at 777 (citation omitted).

In the instant case, the trial court first found Father’s conduct 

established a failure to perform his parental duties in the six-month period 
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preceding the filing of the termination petition:

While Father may have provided M.H. with some initial 

supplies when he dropped off Child in August 2009 and 

occasionally paid a few medical bills, the record is silent as 

to any instance where he fed Child a meal, changed her 

diaper, supervised her on his own, or even spoke to her. . 

. . Father recognized his own inability to provide Child 

with what he described as “mother love.”

Even with respect to his view of his duties as a father, 

Father failed to provide a roof over Child’s head and 

provided minimal financial support for her despite earning 

$78,000 per year. Instead, Father surrendered those 

duties to others, namely Petitioners, as he pursued his 

main objective, finding a wife to raise his children.

Even after [Father’s Wife] had been in the United States 

for about a year, Father had made no meaningful progress 

towards collecting Child from M.H. and bringing her to his 

house. Other priorities emerged for Father that precluded 

him from parenting Child. For instance, Father wished for 

his wife to get accustomed with Child prior to Child 

entering his household because he envisioned that his . . . 

wife would be Child’s primary caregiver. M.H. offered to 

host [Father’s wife] once or twice a week in order for her 

to become familiar with Child, but this gesture was 

declined.

Trial Ct. Op. at 18-19.

The court then considered Father’s reasons for his actions. See J.T., 

983 A.2d at 777. It stated:

Initially, we accept Father’s representation that he 

experienced a difficult childhood in Vietnam and overcame 

serious challenges in relocating to the United States and 

becoming a productive citizen. Furthermore, we recognize 

that Father faced significant adversity from the passing of 

his wife following Child’s birth and we do not take issue 

with Father’s decision to seek help with the care of Child 

while he cared for his three sons in the aftermath of his 

wife’s passing.
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Trial Ct. Op. at 20. However, the court further found that as time passed, 

he “lost focus” on his plan to bring Child back into his home. Id. The court 

rejected Father’s explanations that he wished his wife first to be comfortable 

living in the United States, that his son and his wife’s uncle were ill, and that 

he “feared the supposed judgment of M.H.’s neighbors” when DHS 

conducted its investigation. Id. at 21. 

The court also considered M.H.’s “admission that in 2011 she 

intentionally put [off Father] and tried to delay his plan to take custody of 

Child.” Id. The court found that nevertheless, Father knew that Child was 

under M.H.’s care “a mere thirty minutes away and made no effort to assert 

himself as a parent or to claim Child.” Id. at 21-22.

Next, the court considered “the post-abandonment contact between” 

Father and Child. See J.T., 983 A.2d at 777. “Father’s last visit with Child 

occurred in December of 2011 and he has not seen Child since the Petition 

was filed that same month.” Trial Ct. Op. at 22. Although Father 

“appear[ed] to assert that a Court Order stayed his petition to gain custody 

of Child and prevented him from contacting her,” there was no such order, 

and only an agreement placed on the record in Family Court that Petitioners 

would not proceed with their termination petition until the completion of Dr. 

Shanken-Kaye’s evaluation. Id. 

After careful review of the record, we conclude the trial court properly 

considered the factors for termination under subsection 2511(a)(1), and its 
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findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. Father’s claim on 

appeal that in January 2011 his “situation had dramatically improved” does 

not include any mention of how his conduct concerning Child changed or 

improve. See Father’s Brief at 17. Father’s payment of medical expenses 

for Child and giving $1,000 to M.H. were considered by the trial court along 

with all other evidence adduced. Finally, while we share the trial court’s 

observation that Father overcame serious challenges in childhood and 

adolescence, we reject Father’s inference on appeal that any alleged cultural 

or gender creeds justify a “belief that all child rearing responsibilities are 

invested in the women.” See Father’s Brief at 16. Instead, the court 

properly considered the factors under Subsection 2511(a)(1)—whether 

Father’s conduct refused or failed to perform parental duties, by evidencing 

more than a passive interest in Child’s development and fulfilling a financial 

obligation, and instead acting affirmatively to provide love, protection, 

guidance and support to Child. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1); B., N.M., 856 

A.2d at 855.

Father’s third issue on appeal pertains to subsection 2511(b). He 

avers that “[i]n August, 2009, [he] made sure all of [Child’s] needs would be 

met” by, as conceded by M.H., placing Child in M.H.’s care “to assure [Child] 

had . . . physical and emotional care.” Father’s Brief at 21. He concedes 

“[w]hile it is true that [F]ather has no meaningful relationship with” Child, he 

contends, without further explanation, “[t]he lack of meaningful relationship 
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is not only due to [his] personality, . . . inaction and beliefs, but also to” 

M.H. and Petitioners. Id. at 21-22. Father further asserts “his inaction 

never demonstrated a settled purpose to relinquish his parental rights,” and 

despite “the fact that [Child] does not know her biological family, according 

to Dr. Shanken-Kaye, it is possible, over time and with great professional 

help, to reunite [Child] with her biological family.” Id. We find no relief is 

due.

This Court has stated:

[U]nder Section 2511, the court must engage in a 

bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights. . . 

. Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct 

warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to 

Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare 

of the child under the standard of best interests of the 

child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond 

between parent and child, with close attention paid to the 

effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

Here, the trial court considered Dr. Shanken-Kaye’s evaluation of the 

relationship between Father and Child:

Based upon his interviews, his home visits, his testing 

and his discussions with collateral individuals, Dr. 

Shanken-Kaye reached an opinion based upon a 

reasonable degree of certainty in the field of psychology. 

Dr. Shanken-Kaye stated that his “concern for Child is that 

there is no relationship between Child and Father.” Dr. 

Shanken-Kaye testified that there has been “ample time 

and opportunity for Father to have established even a 

rudimentary relationship with Child.” By contrast, Dr. 

Shanken-Kaye recognized that Child has “an extremely 
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close and . . . emotionally satisfying and appropriate 

relationship with Petitioners, with their extended family 

and with M.H.” Dr. Shanken-Kaye further stated:

“. . . I have a significant concern that a child almost 

five years old be taken from a situation, where on all 

measures she is thriving and placed into a situation 

that . . . is not only alien, but has within its own 

structure significant challenges that have not yet 

been successfully met, and I just believe that this 

would prove to be highly traumatic and not 

something that could be overcome in any reasonable 

fashion or any reasonable length of time.”

Trial Ct. Op. at 24. The court also found:

This lack of a parent-child relationship manifested itself 

during a meeting at Dr. Shanken-Kaye’s office[.] Prior to 

this meeting[,] Child was playing in Dr. Shanken-Kaye’s 

playroom by herself. Thereafter, Father entered the room. 

Dr. Shanken-Kaye observed that Child accepted Father as 

another person in the room, but “there was also no 

recognition at all. Child did not stop what she was doing 

or turn around and say hello or smile or whatever.” Child 

terminated the play session with Father by saying “[c]an I 

play with mommy and daddy” whereupon Father went into 

Dr. Shanken-Kaye’s office and Child rejoined Petitioners. 

Dr. Shanken-Kaye also noted that Child had made a 

drawing of her family and “the family consisted of herself[ 

and] Petitioners.”

Id.

On appeal, Father concedes he “has no meaningful relationship with 

Child” and that Child “does not know her biological family.” Father’s Brief at 

21, 22. Father instead postulates that “it is possible, over time and with 

great professional help, to reunite [Child] with her biological family.” Id. at 

22. Subsection 2511(b) does not provide for the possibility of a future 

relationship, but instead requires the court to focus on the present “nature 
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and status of the emotional bond between parent and child.” See 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b); L.M., 923 A.2d at 511. Our review of the record 

indicates there was competent evidence to support the trial court’s decision 

that termination of Father’s parental rights best serves Child’s 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. Although Father 

expresses on appeal a willingness to fulfill his parental duties for Child, the 

record indicates his lack of effort towards cultivating a parental bond with 

Child, while others provided the nurture, care, and affection that Child 

needs. Moreover, the trial court found Child has bonded with Petitioners. 

In consideration of these circumstances and our careful review of the 

record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or 

commit an error of law in finding competent evidence to support the 

termination of Father’s parental rights to Child under section 2511(b).

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s decree finding that 

Petitioners had standing to petition for the involuntary termination of 

Father’s parental rights and that grounds were established for involuntarily 

terminating his parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) 

and (b).

Decree affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/12/2015