This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 34,872 4 DAVID ROSALES, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Stan Whitaker, District Judge 8
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Law Office of Monnica L. Garcia, LLC 12 Monnica L. Garcia 13 Albuquerque, NM 14 for Appellant 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 WECHSLER, Judge. 172 {1} Defendant David Rosales appeals following the denial of his motion to suppress 1 evidence on June 21, 2013, and his jury trial convictions on October 3, 2014, for 2 trafficking by distribution and trafficking by possession with intent to distribute. [DS 3 1–2; RP 79, 137] This Court issued a noti ce proposing to affirm. Defendant filed a 4 memorandum in opposition, which we have duly considered. Remaining unpersuaded, 5 we affirm. 6
{2} Defendant first argues in his memorandum in opposition that this Court erred 7 in proposing to conclude that the distri ct court did not err in denying Defendant’s 8 motion to suppress evidence based on lack of probable cause. [MIO 1] In support of 9 this argument, Defendant asserts that th e only basis for the stop and arrest of 10 Defendant was the hand signal by the confidential informant (CI) after the controlled 11 drug buy, and that this Court inferred facts not in evidence to reach its proposed 12 conclusion. [MIO 2] Defendant also argues that the hand signal could not have 13 provided probable cause for arrest because of the lack of eviden ce about the meaning 14 of the hand signal. [MIO 2–3] We disagree. 15
{3} Defendant’s memorandum characterizes this Court’s notice of proposed 16 disposition as relying heavily on the CI’s hand signal to Irwin as the basis for our 17 proposal to affirm the district court. [MIO2] However, this Court’s notice of proposed 18 disposition lists numerous facts gleaned from Defendant’s docketing statement and 193 from the district court’s order, so we need not repeat them here. [ SeeCN 4–7] We note 1 that factual recitations in the docketing statement are accepted as true unless the 2 record on appeal shows otherwise. See State v. Calanche , 1978-NMCA-007, ¶ 10, 91 3 N.M. 390, 574 P.2d 1018; see also State v. Ibarra , 1993-NMCA-040, ¶ 10, 116 N.M. 4 486, 864 P.2d 302 (stating that “[ t]he facts contained in the docketing statement are 5 accepted as the facts of the case unless theyare challenged.”). Rather than explain 6 why the facts in the district court’s order or Defendant’s own docketing statement are 7 not supported by substantial evidence or do not support the existence of probable 8 cause, Defendant’s memorandum in opposition focuses instead on the deficiency of 9 the CI’s hand signal on its own to support a determination of probable cause. [MIO 10 2–3] Because Defendant’s memorandum in opposition does not respond to the facts 11 noted in our proposed disposition and does not demonstrate how, based on all of those 12 facts, Defendant’s arrest was not supported by probable cause, we conclude the 13 officers had probable causeto arrest Defendant. See Hennessy v. Duryea , 14 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24, 124 N.M. 754, 955 P.2d 683 (“Our courts have repeatedly 15 held that, in summary calendar cases, th e burden is on the party opposing the proposed 16 disposition to clearly point out errors in fact or law.”). 17
{4} Defendant also argues that exigent circumstances did not exist, because no 18 officer testified about exigency. [MIO 3] As we noted in our proposed disposition, an 194 arrest pursuant to a situation where probable cause was developed on the scene “will 1 usually supply the requisite exigency” becau se in such situations it would not be 2 “reasonably practicable” to get a warrant. State v. Paananen , 2015-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 26- 3 27, 357 P.3d 958. Our Supreme Court has also acknowledged that most cases 4 involving vehicles will involve exigent circumstances. See State v. Gomez , 1997- 5 NMSC-006, ¶ 44, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1; see also State v. Contreras , 2003- 6 NMCA-129, ¶ 15, 134 N.M. 503, 79 P.3d 1111 (“[A] moving car on a public roadway 7 presents an exigent circumst ance[.]”). In the present case, Defendant arrived in a car, 8 remained in the car during the controlled buy, and started to l eave the scene after 9 completion of the controlled buy and the C I’s hand signal. [RP 80, 82; DS 5–6] Based 10 on these facts, we conclude Defendant’s arrest occurred under exigent circumstances. 11
{5} To the extent Defendant argues that hi s case should be assi gned to the general 12 calendar, because it would be unfair to Defendant to summarily resolve his case where 13 his co-defendant’s case was affirmed on the general calendar, we remind Defendant 14 “[o]ur courts have repeatedly held that , in summary calendar cases, the burden is on 15 the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly point out errors in fact or law.” 16 Hennessy , 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24. Because Defendant has not pointed out any errors 17 in fact or law, the facts are undisputed, and the application of legal principles is clear, 18 we decline to prolong this appeal by assigning it to the general calendar. See State v. 195 Hearne , 1991-NMCA-046, ¶ 32, 112 N.M. 208, 813 P.2d 485 (pointing out, when 1 facts are undisputed and application of legal principles is clear, a case is appropriately 2 decided on summary calendar); see also Udall v. Townsend, 1998-NMCA-162, ¶ 3, 3 126 N.M. 251, 968 P.2d 341 (“The summary calendar allows us to dispose of certain 4 cases in an expeditious manner. . . . In determining whether a case should be assigned 5 to the summary calendar, a key consider ation is whether the Court can obtain 6 sufficient information about the facts of a case from the record proper, the docketing 7 statement, and the parties’ memoranda. If webelieve that the facts contained in the 8 docketing statement are sufficient to enable us to resolve the issues raised, then the 9 case will be assigned to the summary cal endar with an appropriate disposition.” 10 (citations omitted)). Finally, the fact thatDefendant’s co-defendant’s appeal was 11 decided against him on virtually identical fact s militates in favor of resolving this case 12 on the summary calendar. See State v. Hunt , No. 33,716, mem. op. (N.M. Ct. App. 13 May 17, 2016) (non-precedential). 14
{6} Defendant next argues that his convic tions were not based on substantial 15 evidence, because he was not properly identif ied at trial. [MIO 6–7] In support of this 16 argument, Defendant asserts that Officer Higdon, whose testimony was the basis of 17 the in-court identification, could not remember whether he was the officer who took 18 Defendant into custody, and that he “believe[d]” Defendant was the person from 196 whose pocket he retrieved the controlled buy money. [MIO6–7; DS 8] As we noted 1 in our proposed disposition, “[i]n reviewing the sufficiency of th e evidence, we must 2 view the evidence in the light most favor able to the guilty verdict, indulging all 3 reasonable inferences and resolving all c onflicts in the evidence in favor of the 4 verdict.” State v. Cunningham , 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 26, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176. 5 “This court does not weigh the evidence and may not substitute its judgment for that 6 of the fact finder so long as there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict.” State 7 v. Griffin , 1993-NMSC-071, ¶ 17, 116 N.M. 689, 866 P.2d 1156 (internal quotation 8 marks and citation omitted). Because we do not re-weigh evidence, we conclude that 9 Officer Higdon’s testimony that he believed Defendant was the person from whose 10 pocket he retrieved the c ontrolled buy money was sufficient to identify Defendant. 11 Thus, Defendant’s convictions weresupported by substantial evidence. 12
{7} Finally, Defendant continues to argue th at his convictions for trafficking by 13 distribution and trafficking by possession w ith intent to distribute violate the 14 prohibition against double jeopardy. [MIO7–8] As we noted in our proposed 15 disposition, multiple convictions for trafficking do not violate double jeopardy, 16 because the various means of trafficking defined in the statute indicate legislative 17 intent to authorize prosecution for each of the various means. See State v. Borja18 Guzman , 1996-NMCA-025, ¶ 13, 121 N.M. 401, 912 P.2d 277; NMSA 1978, §30-31- 197 20 (2006) (defining trafficking as (1) manuf acture; (2) distribution, sale, barter, or 1 giving away of; or (3) possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance.) [CN 2 12–13] Defendant argues that the facts of his case are closer to those in State v. Quick , 3 2009-NMSC-015, ¶ 2, 146 N.M. 80, 206 P.3d 985, in which our Supreme Court held 4 that the defendant’s convictions for po ssession of methamphetamine and possession 5 of methamphetamine with intent to distribute violated double jeopardy. [MIO 8] 6
{8} We disagree that Quick controls. The defendant’s convictions in Quick were 7 based on containers of various quantities of methamphetamine found in the 8 defendant’s room. Id . ¶ 3. The district court in Quick reasoned the separate quantities 9 indicated that the defendant intended to distribute some of the methamphetamine and 10 to keep some for personal use. Id . ¶ 4. Unlike in Quick , where the defendant’s 11 convictions were based on the same actus reus of possession, Defendant first engaged 12 in a sale of methamphetamine to the CI and then was found in possession of additional 13 methamphetamine, apparently packed for sale , at the time he was arrested. [DS 5, 7] 14 Moreover, we note that Quick relates to a double-descrip tion type of double jeopardy 15 violation. Id . ¶ 8. Here, Defendant’s convicti ons call for a unit-of-prosecution 16 analysis, because Defendant’s convicti ons are based on the same statute. See State v. 17 Swick , 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 33, 279 P.3d 747 (applying a unit-of-prosecution analysis 18 to multiple convictions under different subsections of the same statute). Therefore, 198 because the trafficking statute allows for separate units of prosecution for trafficking 1 by distribution and trafficking by possession w ith intent to distribute, and Defendant’s 2 actions did not constitute a single course of conduct, we hold De fendant’s convictions 3 do not violate double jeopardy principles. 4
{9} Accordingly, for the reasons articulatedhere and in this Court’s notice of 5 proposed disposition, we affirm. 6
{10} IT IS SO ORDERED. 7

__________ ______________________ 8 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 9

WE CONCUR: 10

________________________________ 11 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 12

________________________________ 13 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 14