alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### HAYTER v. STATE.

No. 25576.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 19, 1951.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 9, 1952.

No attorney on appeal for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Presiding Judge.

The conviction is for operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; the punishment assessed is a fine of $100.00.

*515All matters of procedure appear regular. The record is before us without a statement of facts and bills of exception in the absence of which no question is brought forward for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 207 (Wednesday, October 25, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 63888]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-27502]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Reclamation Fish and Wildlife Service


Rescission of Notice of Availability of Final Environmental 
Impact Statement/Environmental Impact Report

AGENCIES: Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation, Interior.

ACTION: Rescission of notice of availability.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice announces the rescission of the notice of 
availability of the joint Final Environmental Impact Statement/
Environmental Impact Report (FEIS/EIR) for the Trinity River Mainstem 
Fishery Restoration published in the Federal Register on October 20, 
2000 (65 FR 63087). The Notice of Availability of the Final 
Environmental Impact Statement for the proposed Trinity River Mainstem 
Restoration in the Federal Register on October 20, 2000, was issued in 
error. The FEIS/EIR will be issued shortly. A revised notice of 
availability will be issued in the Federal Register at that time.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. MaryEllen Mueller, U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, 2800 Cottage Way, Suite W-2606, Sacramento, CA 95825 
(916) 414-6464.

    Authority:  NEPA, the National Environmental Quality Improvement 
Act of 1970, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4371 et seq.); E.O. 11514, March 
5, 1970, as amended by E.O. 11991, May 24, 1977; and CEQ Regulations 
40 CFR 1503.1).

Willie R. Taylor,
Director, Office of Environmental Policy and Compliance.
[FR Doc. 00-27502 Filed 10-24-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-55-P
[Cite as State v. Rebholz , 2014-Ohio-2429.]



### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. ANDREW REBHOLZ, Defendant-Appellant. :

:

:

:

: APPEAL NO. C-130636

TRIAL NO. C-12CRB-34335

O P I N I O N.

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed, Conviction Vacated, and Appellant Discharged Date of Judgment Entry on A ppeal: June 6, 2014

Joseph T. Deters , Hamilton County Pros ecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams
, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, T. Martin Jennings , for Defendant-Appellant.

Please note: we have removed this case from the accelerated calendar.OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2 D INKELACKER , Judge

. 

### {¶1} Defendant-appellant Andrew Rebholz was charged with criminal child enticement under R.C. 2905.05(A). He su bsequently filed a motion to dismiss the charge in which he argued that R.C. 2905.05 was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him. The trial court denied the motion. Following a bench trial, the trial court found him guilty and sentence d him. This appeal followed. 

### {¶2} In his sole assignment of error, Re bholz contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. He argues that R.C. 2505.05 is overbroad
and unconstitutional on its face. This assignment of error is well taken. 

### {¶3} After this appeal was filed, th e Ohio Supreme Court held in State v. Romage, 138 Ohio St.3d 390, 2014-Ohio-783, 7 N.E.3d 1156, that “Ohio’s childenticement statute, R.C. 2505.05(A) is unconstitutionally overbroad because it sweeps within its prohibitio n a significant amount of constitutionally protected activity.” Id. at syllabus. 

### {¶4} Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we are bound by the Supreme
Court’s decision. State v. Bethel , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-810, 2008-Ohio2697, ¶ 25-28; Cincinnati ex rel. Crotty v. Cincinnati, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C76179, 1976 Ohio App. LEXI S 8553, *10 (May 19, 1976), overruled on other grounds
, 50 Ohio St.2d 27, 361 N.E.2d 1340 (1977). Consequently, we sustain Rebholz’s assignment of error. We reverse the tria l court’s judgment denying Rebholz’s motion to dismiss the charge, vacate Rebholz’s co nviction, and order hi m discharged from further prosecution for th is offense. Judgment reversed, conviction va cated, and appellant discharged.

H ENDON , P.J., and D EWINE , J., concur.

Please note: The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**936 CA 13-00119** 
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, LINDLEY, AND WHALEN, JJ.

THOMAS BURKE, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COUNTY OF ERIE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

HODGSON RUSS LLP, BUFFALO (RYAN J. LUCINSKI OF COUNSEL), FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

CANTOR, DOLCE & PANEPINTO, P.C., BUFFALO (JONATHAN M. GORSKI OF COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.

Appeal, by permission of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Tracey A. Bannister, J.), entered October 12, 2012. The order, among other things, denied the motion of defendant to compel and for a protective order.

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by granting that part of the motion to compel a second deposition of the nonparty witness and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: In this Labor Law action, plaintiff’s counsel served a nonparty witness subpoena on the only eyewitness to the accident demanding that he appear for a deposition. The nonparty witness had commenced a separate Labor Law action arising from a different construction site accident and retained plaintiff’s counsel to represent him in that lawsuit. Plaintiff’s counsel asked the nonparty witness various questions about plaintiff’s accident, and then defendant’s counsel asked the nonparty witness questions that established that plaintiff and the nonparty witness were both carpenters in the same union, they both had pending lawsuits involving the same employer, and they both retained the same attorneys. When defendant’s counsel asked if plaintiff was going to be a witness in the nonparty witness’s case, plaintiff’s counsel objected and directed the nonparty witness not to answer. Plaintiff’s counsel further objected and directed the nonparty witness not to answer when defendant’s counsel asked the nonparty witness whether plaintiff’s counsel was representing him in connection with the deposition. Thereafter, the deposition was discontinued.

Defendant moved, inter alia, for an order compelling a second deposition of the nonparty witness and prohibiting plaintiff’s counsel**-2- 936 CA 13-00119** 

from interfering with that deposition. Supreme Court denied the motion, and we now modify the order by granting that part of the motion seeking to compel a second deposition of the nonparty witness. The questions asked by defendant’s counsel were relevant with respect to the nonparty witness’s bias or motive ( see generally CPLR 3101 [a]; Salm v Moses, 13 NY3d 816, 818). Thus, the questions should have been “ ‘freely permitted and answered’ ” ( Roggow v Walker, 303 AD2d 1003, 1004). In any event, we agree with defendant that it is entitled to a second deposition of the nonparty witness in order to cross-examine the witness regarding the circumstances of the accident.

Entered: October 4, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-10-00322-CV

Rafael Pinedo, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 200TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-GV-09-000472, HONORABLE LORA J. LIVINGSTON, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

By letter dated July 20, 2010, this Court’s clerk informed appellant Rafael Pinedo

that he had failed to pay or make arrangements to pay for the clerk’s record, and that his failure to

do so could result in dismissal of his appeal. He has not filed a response in this Court, nor have we

received notice that he has paid or made arrangements to pay for the clerk’s record. We dismiss this

appeal for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(b).

 

G. Alan Waldrop, Justice

Before Justices Patterson, Waldrop and Henson

Dismissed for Want of Prosecution

Filed: September 10, 2010
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-2403

In re: DANIEL ANTHONY WEYMOUTH,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 

(2:03-cr-00082-JBF-FBS-1)

Submitted: March 29, 2012 Decided: April 2, 2012

Before WILKINSON, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Daniel Anthony Weymouth, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Daniel Anthony Weymouth petitions for a writ of 

mandamus, alleging the district court has unduly delayed acting 

on his petition for transfer of supervised release. Weymouth 

filed a petition for transfer of his supervised release on July 

5, 2011. The next day, the district court filed an order 

informing Weymouth that his petition was deficient and that he 

had thirty days to cure the deficiency or his petition would be 

struck from the record. Weymouth filed another petition on July 

20, 2011, but there has been no further action by the district 

court. Weymouth seeks an order from this court directing the 

district court to act. Although we find that mandamus relief is 

not warranted because the delay is not unreasonable, we deny the 

mandamus petition without prejudice to the filing of another 

mandamus petition if the district court does not act 

expeditiously. We grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

PETITION DENIED
#### DONNELLY v. DONNELLY.

No. 15284.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Fort Worth.

July 13, 1951.

Lester Boone, of Odessa, and Ted E. Frossard, of Dallas, for appellant.

Joe F. Orr and Lloyd E. Price, both of Fort Worth, for appellee.

RENFRO, Justice.

This case is before us. on motion of the appellee to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the judgment of the trial court became final before the appellant completed the appeal and that this court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The final judgment in the case was rendered by the trial court on February 14, 1951, and on February 23, 1951, a motion for new trial was filed by the appellant. The trial court entered an order overruling appellant’s motion for a new trial on April 19, 1951, or more than forty-five days after the motion for a new trial was filed. No written agreement of the parties was executed or filed under which the determination of the motion could be postponed to a later date. No such agreement having been presented to the court, the motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law at the expiration of forty-five days after February 23, 1951. It does not appear when the motion for a new trial was presented to the trial court but the order overruling same recites that it was overruled after “having heretofore been presented to the court in due time, manner and form and with due notice.” Assuming that the motion was presented within the thirty day period required by the Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 330,. the motion was nevertheless overruled by operation of law on April 9, 1951.

The record shows that the transcript was not received in this court until June 15, 1951, or sixty-seven days after the motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law. Rule 386 provides that the appellant shall file a transcript and statement of facts with the clerk of the *755Court of Civil Appeals within sixty days of the rendition of the final judgment or order overruling the motion for new' trial. Appellant filed no motion under the above rule showing good cause why his record could not have been timely filed. Compliance with Rule 386 is necessary to invoke the exercise of the appellate court’s jurisdiction.

We conclude that appellant’s motion to dismiss the appeal is well taken and should be sustained. Peurifoy v. Wiebusch, 125 Tex. 207, 82 S.W.2d 624, Comm, of App., opinion adopted by the Supreme Court. Highland Farms Corporation v. Fidelity Trust Company of Houston, 125 Tex. 474, 82 S.W.2d 627, Comm. ofApp., opinion adopted by the Supreme Court; Jones v. Campbell, Tex.Civ.App. 188 S.W.2d 679, error refused; Horwitz v. Finkelstein, Tex.Civ.App., 182 S.W.2d 751, error refused; National Life & Accident Ins. Co., v. Collins, Tex.Civ.App., 224 S.W.2d 285, error refused.

The appeal is hereby dismissed at appellant’s cost.
Amendment to the Corporate Directors' Deferred Compensation Plan



 
Exhibit 10(f) 
  
  
 AMENDMENT OF 
 A. O. SMITH CORPORATION 
 CORPORATE DIRECTORS’ DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN

 The A. O. Smith Corporation Corporate Directors’ Deferred Compensation Plan is amended effective as of

 January 1, 2005, to add the following paragraph to Section III of the Plan: 
 “Pursuant to Internal Revenue Service Notice 2005-1, any Director participating in the Plan may elect to terminate participation in
the Plan during 2005 by filing such election by December 31, 2005. Upon the filing of such election to terminate participation, the Director’s entire account balance shall be distributed to him or her as soon as practicable after the date
the notice of termination has been received. The amount distributed upon termination of participation shall be reported as includible in the income of the Director for calendar year 2005.”
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Advanta Corp. (the
"Company") for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Dennis
Alter, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

     (1)  the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

/s/ Dennis Alter
-----------------------
Dennis Alter
Chief Executive Officer
August 6, 2004
EXHIBIT 32
                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18. U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



     The undersigned  executive  officers of the Registrant  hereby certify that
this  Annual  Report on Form 10-K for the year  ended  September  30,  2003 (the
"Report") fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities  Exchange Act of 1934,  and the  information  contained in the Report
fairly presents,  in all material respects,  the financial condition and results
of operations of the Registrant.



                                  By:/s/ Gary C. Loraditch
                                     -------------------------------------------
                                     Name:    Gary C. Loraditch
                                     Title:   President



                                  By:/s/ Bonnie M. Klein
                                     -------------------------------------------
                                     Name:    Bonnie M. Klein
                                     Title:   Vice President and Tresurer

Date: December 29, 2003
Exhibit 23.1


                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS



The Board of Directors
Axeda Systems Inc.

We consent to the  incorporation  by  reference in the  registration  statements
(Nos.  333-103826,  333-82510 and  333-94417) on Form S-8 and (Nos.  333-109386,
333-70234 and  333-60538) on Form S-3 of Axeda Systems Inc. of our reports dated
February 2, 2004,  relating to the consolidated  balance sheets of Axeda Systems
Inc.  and  subsidiaries  as of  December  31,  2003 and  2002,  and the  related
consolidated statements of operations, changes in stockholders' equity, and cash
flows and the related consolidated  financial statement schedule for each of the
years in the three-year  period ended December 31, 2003, which reports appear in
the December 31, 2003 annual report on Form 10-K of Axeda Systems Inc.

Our reports refer to a change in the method of accounting for goodwill and other
intangible assets.


/s/ KPMG LLP

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
March 22, 2004
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _

Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A1 8 D0 00 7 . W ASEEM DAKER v

. QUI NTON RUSH, SHERI FF et a l

.

On M ay 1 0

, 2 0 1 7

, t h e t ri al co u rt en t ered an ord er d en y i n g t h e fi l i n g o f W as eem

Dak er’ s p ro s e ci v i l co m

p l ai n t an d h i s req u es t t o p ro ceed i n f o r ma p a u p er i s

. Dak er

fi led a m o t i o n i n t hi s Co u rt req u es t in g an ex t en s i o n o f t i m e t o fi l e a d i s c ret i o n ary

a p p l i cat i o n

. 1 W e g ran t ed t h e m o t i o n

, g iv i ng Dak er a 30 -d ay ex t en s io n t o fi l e a n

ap p li cat io n

. See Cas e N o

. A1 7 E0 0 5 6

, d e c i d ed M ay 3 1, 2 0 1 7

. Dak er fi l ed t h i s

ap p li cat io n o n J ul y

1 3, 2 0 1 7 . W e l ack ju ri s d ict i o n

.

OCGA § 5 -6 -3 9 (a) (5 ) p erm i t s t h i s Co u rt t o g r a n t a n ex t en si o n o f t i m e fo r

fi li n g an ap p l i cat io n fo r d i s cret i o n ary ap p eal wh ere, as i n t h i s cas e, t h e req u es t i s

m ad e “ b efo re ex pi rat i o n o f th e p eri o d fo r fi l i n g as o ri g in a l l y p r es cri bed o r as

e x t e n d e d b y a p erm i s s i b l e p rev i o u s o rd er.” OCGA § 5 -6 -3 9 (d ); s ee al s o Ga b l e v.

S t a t e

, 2 9 0 Ga. 8 1

, 8 4 -8 5 (2 ) (a) (7 2 0 SE2 d 1 7 0 ) (2 0 11 ). In o u r o rd er g ran t i n g Dak er

an ex t en s i o n

, t h i s Co u rt req u i red h i m t o fi le h i s ap p l i cat i o n b y J u ly 1 0

, 2 01 7

, wh i ch

h e d i d n o t d o . Fi l i n g d ead l in es are ju ri s d i ct i on al

, an d t h i s Co u rt i s un ab le to accep t

a n u n t i m el y ap p li cat i o n. See Cr o s s o n v. Co n wa y

, 29 1 Ga. 22 0 (1 ) (7 2 8 SE2 d 6 1 7 )

(2 0 1 2). Becau s e Dak er fai l ed to fi l e h i s ap p l i cat i o n wi th i n t h e t i m e li m i t s et fo rt h in

1 OCGA § 9 -1 5 -2 (d ) p ro v i d es t h at an o rd er d en y i ng fi l i n g s h al l b e ap p eal ab l e

i n t h e s am e m an ner as an o rd er d i s m i s s i ng a ci v i l act i o n

. Ho wev er, b ecau s e Dak er

i s i n carcerat ed

, h i s ap p eal i s co n t ro l led b y t h e Pri s o n Li ti g at i o n Refo rm Act o f 1 9 9 6,

wh i ch req u i res t h at h e p ro ceed b y d i s cret i o n ary ap p l i cat i o n. See OCGA § 4 2 -1 2 -8

. August 04, 2017o u r o rd er g ran t i n g h i s req u es t fo r a n e x t en s i o n

, w e l ack ju ri s d i ct io n t o co n s i d er h i s

ap p li cat io n , an d i t i s h ereb y DISM ISSED.

C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia

C le r k ’ s O f f i c e

, A t la n t a

,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r ti fy t h a t t h e a b o v e i s a t r u e e x t r a c t f r o m

t h e m i n u t e s o

f t h e C o u r t o

f A p p e a l s o f G e o r g i a

.

W i tn e s s m y s i g n a t u r e a n d th e s e a l o

f s a i d c o u r t

h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. 08/04/2017
(LOGO)ERNST& YOUNG LLP   1300 Huntington Building
                         925 Euclid Avenue
                         Cleveland, Ohio 44115-1405     Phone: 216 861 5000





                 Report on Management's Assertion on Compliance
               with Minimum Servicing Standards Set Forth in the
            UNIFORM SINGLE ATTESTATION PROGRAM FOR MORTGAGE BANKERS

                        Report of Independent Accountants

Board of Directors
National City Mortagage Co.

We have examined  management's  assertion,  included in the accompanying  report
titled REPORT OF MANAGEMENT, that National City Mortgage Co. (NCM) complied with
the minimum servicing standards set forth in the Mortgage Bankers Association of
America's UNIFORM SINGLE ATTESTATION PROGRAM FOR MORTGAGE BANKERS (USAP) during
the year ended December 31, 1997. Management is responsible for NCM's compliance
with  those  requirements.  Our  responsibility  is to  express  an  opinion  on
management's assertions about NCM's compliance based on our examination.

Our  examination  was  made in  accordance  with  standards  established  by the
American  Institute of Certified Public Accountants and,  accordingly,  included
examining,  on  a  test  basis,  evidence  about  NCM's  compliance  with  those
requirements and performing such other procedures as we considered  necessary in
the circumstances.  We believe that our examination  provides a reasonable basis
for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal determination on NCM's
compliance with specified requirements.

In  our  opinion,   management's   assertion,   that  NCM   complied   with  the
aforementioned  requirements  during the year ended December 31, 1997, is fairly
stated, in all material respects.

                                             Ernst & Young LLP
                                             /s/Ernst & Young LLP




January 28, 1998

       Ernst & Young LLP is a member of Ernst & Young International, Ltd.
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y A lton Thomas Davis, J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk September 21, 2010 

# Order

September 21, 2010

140842 (56)

_____________ _______________ _____________ In re LENA ANNE BECK and AVERY JOEL BECK, Minors.

_____________ _______________ _____________ DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Appellee,
SC: 140842
v COA: 293138
Oakland CC Fam Div: LAWRENCE MICHAEL BECK, 07-733751-NA Respondent-Appellant.

_____________ _______________ _____________

On order of Chief Justice, the motion by appellee for extension to September 3, 2010 of the time for filing its brief is considered an d it is GRANTED.
#### O. P. McKNIGHT, et al., d/b/a Cardinal Nursery & Orchard Co., appellants, v. A. W. ROSS, et al., d/b/a Ross Brothers, appellees.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Feb. 12, 1954.

Wilson & Wilson, Beverly M. Clark, Glasgow, for appellant.'

George J. Ellis, Jr., Glasgow, for appel-lee.

PER CURIAM.

This case is before us on motion for appeal under KRS 21.080. The amount involved is less than $2,500, and there is no •error apparent in the record.

The motion for an appeal is overruled .and the judgment is affirmed.