No. 82-394 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF 310NTA?IA 

1983 

IiJ RE TIJE MARRIAGE OF 

W. CARTER SNELL, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

-VSHARRIETTE A. SNELL, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Rosebud, 

The IIonorable Alfred B. Coate, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

11. D. Buelow, Miles City, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Brown and Huss, Miles City, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: June 2, 1953 

Decided: August 18, 1983 

.- clerk- 
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Harriette A. Snell appeals from that part of a marital 

dissolution decree of the Rosebud County District Court 

dividing property and denying her request for maintenance. 

She argues that the trial court abused its discretion in not 

including in the marital estate certain gifts of ranch stock 

to her husband from his parents. She argues that the trial 

court abused its discretion in distributing the marital 

estate. Approximately 67 percent of the value was awarded to 

the husband and 33 percent was awarded to the wife. Finally, 

she argues that the court abused its discretion in not 

ordering the husband to pay her maintenance. We affirm. 

The parties were married in 1945, and the marriage was 

dissolved in 1982. They moved to Montana in 1948 and the 

husband was employed as a ranch hand from 1948 to 1951. In 

March 1951, the husband formed a partnership with his brother 

and his father, and purchased a 9,500 acre ranch near Jordan, 

Montana. The husband' s father made the down payment on the 

ranch and the balance of the purchase price was borrowed. 

The husband and wife lived and worked on the partnership 

ranch until 1957 when they purchased a house in Miles City 

and the wife moved there with their two children. The 

husband stayed on the ranch and the wife never moved back. 

The children attended school in Miles City. The husband's 

pa-rents gifted the down payment for the house and the balance 

of the purchase price was paid for from the husband's ranch 

earnings. 

The wife has been almost continuously employed since 

leaving the ranch. She worked at Montgomery Ward in Miles 
City from 1958 through 1963; she worked at the Miles City 

Star from 1964 through 1978; and she has worked as an 

assistant and receptionist in a doctor's office from 1978 to 

the present time. Her take-home pay was $530 per month at 

the time of the hea-ring. 

The wife testified that after the children finished 

school in 1967, her husband would not allow her to return to 

the ranch. The husband testified that she chose not to 

return to the ranch, and the trial court so found. Until 

October 1981, the husband provided the wife with $325 per 

month for upkeep of the house in Miles City. 

The wife had been in Miles City for three years when the 

Snell family ranch was incorporated in 1960. The ranch was 

incorporated as a family corporation and the trial court 

found the owners at the time of the trial to be petitioner's 

mother, M. Gladys Snell, petitioner, and petitioner's 

brother, James Snell. Respondent relinquished her interest 

in the ranch real property by quitclaim deed dated January 

23, 1960. 

The husband received 118 shares at the time the ranch 

was incorporated, and during the 19701s, he received 

additional shares through a small purchase (5 shares) from 

his father's estate and through estate planning gifts from 

his father and mother. At the time of the dissolution, the 

husband owned less than half (258 of the 555 shares) of the 

ranch corporation. 

In determining the marital estate subject to 

distribution, the trial court did not include the 120 shares 

the husband had acquired beginning in 1974. Rather, the 

trial court concluded that the wife did not contribute to the 

growth of the marital estate after 1969 and, therefore, she 
had no right to share in increases in the estate since that 

date. The court did, however, hold that the wife had an 

interest in 138 shares of stock in the family corporation by 

1969 and that she had a right to share in the inflationary 

growth of the stock to the time of dissolution. 

The trial court valued the total ma.rita1 estate subject 

to distribution at $330,514.44. The wife was awarded 

approximately 33 percent of this value, and the husband was 

awarded approximately 67 percent of this value. 

To the wife, the trial court awa.rded all real and 

personal property in her possession in Miles City -- valued 

at $57,919, all stock in the public corporations -- valued at 

$8,012.44, and a cash payment of $44,000 as representing her 

interest in the family ranch stock. The husband was to pay 

her $20,000 cash within 60 days of judgment and the remaining 

$24,000 was to be paid in 60 monthly installments at the rate 

of $400 per month, the first payment starting on the day of 

judgment. The total value was $109,931.44. 

To the husband, the trial court awarded all personal 

property on the ranch and 138 shares of the family 

corporation. The personal property was valued at $1,555. 

The 138 shares of stock were valued at $263,028, but from 

this value the husband was to make the $44,000 cash payment 

to the wife for her share in the stock. The total value 

awarded to the husband was $220,583. 

The wife first contends that the trial court erred in 

not including in the marital estate the gifts of ranch stock 

to the husband from his mother and father. This Court has 

held, however, that it is not mandatory to include in the 

marital estate gifted property to one of the parties during 

the marriage. In re Marriage of Jorgenson (1979), 180 Mont. 
294, 590 P.2d 606. The question, of course, is whether there 

had been an abuse of discretion by not including the 

husband's gifted stock. We have set forth guidelines for the 

equitable division of property acquired by gift or bequest to 

one party to the marriage (In re Marriage of Herron (1980), 

Mont . , 608 P.2d 97, 37 St.Rep. 387), and we do not 

find that the trial court violated these guidelines here. 

The trial court properly exercised its discretion in not 

including certain gifted shares of stock in the marital 

estate. 

Nor do we find an abuse of discretion in the trial court 

awarding approximately 67 percent of the marital estate to 

the husband and 33 percent to the wife. The trial court's 

findings and conclusions are extensive and detailed. Under 

section 40-4-202, MCA, marital assets can be equally divided, 

but equal division is not mandated. 'In re Marriage of Kowis 

(19831, Mont . , 658 P.2d 1084, 1088, 40 St.Rep. 149; 

Martens v. Martens (1981), Mont. , 637 P.2d 523, 

526, 38 St.Rep. 2135. The trial court considered the facts 

and applied the statute, and we find no abuse of discretion. 

Finally, the wife argues that the trial court should 

have ordered the husband to pay maintenance to her. The 

statute (section 40-4-203, MCA), however, does not mandate 

maintenance in a.11 circumstances ; rather, it requires 

maintenance only where the spouse seeking maintenance does 

not have sufficient property to provide for his or her 

reasonable needs and the spouse is unable to support himself 

or herself through "appropriate employment." See section 

40-4-203 (1) (b) , MCA. Here, the wife has been employed for 

the last 25 years, she received a home, $8,000 in public 

corporation stock, and $44,000 in cash ($20,000 immediately 
and the remaining $24,000 to be paid over a five year period 

at the rate of $400 per month). Clearly, the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying maintenance. 

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 

We Concur: 

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