No. 3--02--0555

_________________________________________________________________

							IN THE

							APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

							THIRD DISTRICT

							A.D., 2003 				

In re MARRIAGE OF 				)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

DAWN K. DAVIS, n/k/a			)	of the 13th Judicial Circuit,

DAWN K. HEINRICH,				)	La Salle County, Illinois

							)

	Petitioner-Appellant,		)	

							)

	and						)	No. 99--D--472

							)	

CRAIG DAVIS,					)	Honorable

                                )	William R. Banich

	Respondent-Appellee.		)	Judge, Presiding

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	JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:

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	TThe petitioner, Dawn Heinrich, and the respondent, Craig

Davis, were divorced in 1999.  Custody of their daughter Kirsten

was set by a joint parenting agreement.  Dawn later filed a

petition to modify Kirsten’s visitation schedule and to resolve

where Kirsten should attend school.  The trial court determined

that Kirsten should attend school in Ottawa, Illinois.  The trial

judge refused to hear evidence on the motion for modification of

the visitation schedule based on his opinion that no material

change in circumstances unknown to the parties at the time of the

joint parenting agreement had occurred.  Dawn appeals, arguing that

the trial judge abused his discretion by not addressing the visitation issue.  After careful consideration, we affirm in part,

reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. 

	When Dawn and Craig divorced, Kirsten was almost three years

old.  At the time of the dissolution, Dawn resided in Ottawa,

Illinois, and Craig resided in Granville, Illinois.  The joint

parenting agreement provided that custody would be split between

the parties as follows: Kirsten was to reside with Dawn from 4 p.m.

Monday until 4 p.m. Wednesday.  From 4 p.m. Wednesday until 4 p.m.

Friday, she was to reside with Craig.  From 4 p.m. Friday until 4

p.m. Monday, Kirsten was to reside with Dawn.  The following week,

the visitation days were reversed, with Craig having custody on

Monday through Wednesday and Friday through Monday, and Dawn having

custody from Wednesday through Friday.  The effect of the custody

schedule was that Kirsten resided with each parent seven days of

every fourteen.  The agreement further provided that each parent

was the custodial parent of Kirsten during his or her time with

her.  

	Additionally, a provision in the agreement provided that if

the parties could not agree where Kirsten was to go to school by

May 1 of the year she was to begin school, then either party could

petition the court to determine where she would go to school. 

Nothing in this provision discussed a change in the custody

arrangement once the court made a determination on the school

issue.  

	Dawn filed a petition to modify the joint custody agreement on

January 9, 2002.  The petition requested that the court grant primary physical custody of Kirsten to Dawn so that when Kirsten 

began attending school in the fall she would have a primary

residence.  Craig filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that there was

no change in circumstance that was not contemplated by the parties

at the time of the divorce.  The trial court agreed and dismissed

the petition without a hearing.

	On May 20, 2002, Dawn filed a petition to have the trial court

determine which school Kirsten should attend and to modify

visitation.  In this petition Dawn stated that she was a stay-at-

home mother and that Kirsten had numerous ties both to the

community and to other children that would be attending the same

grade school in Ottawa.  Dawn also asserted that if the court

determined that Kirsten would attend school in Ottawa, the court

should modify the visitation so that Kirsten spent more time during

the week in Ottawa than the present schedule allowed.  In response,

Craig filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that this was simply

another attempt to modify custody.

	At the hearing on the petition, the trial judge repeatedly

stated that the current custody arrangement was not in Kirsten’s

best interest.  He found that attending school was a change in

circumstances.  However, based on the provision regarding court

intervention about the decision of which school to attend, the

judge found that the circumstancechange was contemplated by the parties

at the time they entered the joint parenting agreement.  As a

result, the judge determined that under the Illinois Marriage and

Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2000)), he had no authority to hold a hearing on the custody

modification.  Therefore, he granted Craig’s motion as to the

visitation modification, and the matter proceeded to a hearing on

the school determination.

	At the hearing, Dawn presented evidence that Kirsten had a

sibling and friends who would be attending school in Ottawa.  Dawn

testified that she was a stay-at-home mom, and she would take

Kirsten to school every day and be home when Kirsten arrived  from

school.

	Craig testified that he had a flexible employment schedule,

and he would be able to be home when Kirsten arrived from school if

she attended school in Granville.  Currently, Kirsten did not have

any friends who would be attending the Granville school.  He stated

that he had looked on various web sites at the "school report

cards" created by the State, and that Granville schools scored

better than Ottawa schools in several areas.  The school report

cards were not entered as evidence.

	The trial judge determined that Kirsten should attend school

in Ottawa.  The judge further ordered that on the days she was

residing with Craig, he was to bring her to school and Dawn was to

pick her up after school and return her to Craig’s custody.  During

the hearing the judge again expressed his belief that the custody

arrangement was not in Kirsten’s best interest. 

	Dawn contends that the court erred in failing hold a hearing

on the motion to modify the custody agreement.  The dismissal of a petition to modify custody is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

In re Fuesting, 228 Ill. App. 3d 339, 591 N.E.2d 960 (1992).

	The Act provides that custody may be modified only if the

court finds that a change in circumstances has occurred due to

facts that could not be ascertained that was

not contemplated by the parties at the time the parenting

agreement was entered and that modification of custody will serve

the best interests of the child.  750 ILCS 5/610(b) (West 2000). 

Additionally, there exists a strong presumption in favor of

maintaining the status quo in custody arrangements.  Nolte v. Nolte, 241 Ill. App. 3d 320, 609 N.E.2d 381 (1993).  The rationale behind this presumption is that stability is important in the lives

of children.  Nolte, 241 Ill. App. 3d 320, 609 N.E.2d 381.  However, the overarching purpose of the Act is to promote the best

interest of the children; therefore, once custody is before the

court, it has broad discretion to modify custody in the child’s

best interests.  In re Marriage of Oros, 256 Ill. App. 3d 167, 627 N.E.2d 1246 (1994).

	When determining if there has been a change in circumstances,

the trial court must look at the totality of the circumstances.  Nolte, 241 Ill. App. 3d 320, 609 N.E.2d 381.  The change in circumstances must directly affect the needs of the child.  In re Marriage of Diddens, 255 Ill. App. 3d 850, 625 N.E.2d 1033 (1993).  In some cases, the differences between the needs of a small child

and the needs of that same child as an adolescent can be sufficient

to constitute a change in circumstances.  See In re Marriage of Andersen, 236 Ill. App. 3d 679, 603 N.E.2d 70 (1992).  In other cases, the inherent instability of the custody agreement creates a

situation where modification is in the child’s best interests, even

if it is difficult to find a precise change in circumstances. 

Oros, 256 Ill. App. 3d 167, 627 N.E.2d 1246.

	Here, the judge found that there was no change in circum

stances that was not contemplated by the parties at the time of the

custody agreement.  Though he felt the agreement was no longer in Kirsten’s best interest, he believed that the statute prevented him

from holding a hearing regarding custody modification. 	

	At the time the joint parenting agreement was entered, the

parties did not know if they would agree on where Kirsten would

attend school, and, if not, which school the court would order her

to attend.  Therefore, the court’s decision that she attend school

in Ottawa was a change in circumstances not clearly contemplated by

the parties.  Once the school problem was resolved, the custody agreement created instability for the child. This instability, in

turn, created a change of circumstances permitting a hearing on

modification under section 610(b).  We believe a hearing on the

issue of custody modification would best serve the underlying

policy of the Act.  See Oros, 256 Ill. App. 3d 167, 627 N.E.2d 1246.  We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in

dismissing that portion of the petition regarding custody without

holding a hearing.  We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and remand this matter for a hearing to determine whether

a change in custody would be in Kirsten’s best interest.  We note

that if the court changes custody, the rights of both parties can be accommodated by setting an appropriate visitation schedule.  By

this opinion we make no decision regarding whether custody

modification is in Kirsten’s best interest.

	The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

	Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

	BARRY, J., CONconcurs, HOLDRIDGE, J., dissents.

	JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting:

	Subsection 610(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of

Marriage Act states:

	"The court shall not modify a prior custody judgment

unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence, upon

the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior

judgment or that were unknown to the court at the time of

entry of the prior judgment, *** that a change has

occurred in the circumstances of the child or either or

both parties having custody, and that the modification is

necessary to serve the best interest of the child."  750

ILCS 5/610(b) (West 2000).

This provision outlines two requirements that must be satisfied

before a court can modify a custody arrangement.  First, there must

be clear and convincing evidence that circumstances have changed in a way not foreseen when the arrangement was made.  Second,

modification must be necessary to serve the child's best interest.

	In the instant case, the first requirement is clearly not

satisfied.  Although the parents did not know precisely where Kirsten would attend school when they made the custody arrangement,

they obviously knew it would happen in either Ottawa or Granville. 

This knowledge renders the majority's analysis disingenuous.  The

court's order directing Kirsten to attend school in Ottawa simply

did not create an unforseen change of circumstances (by any

standard, let alone by clear and convincing evidence).  In finding

otherwise, the majority seems to be influenced by a conviction that

a custody modification would serve Kirsten's best interest.  This

type of analysis commingles two requirements that the statute keeps

distinct.  I thus respectfully dissent.