IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-2056

Filed March 20, 2019

IN THE INTEREST OF D.B.,

Minor Child,

L.B., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Audubon County, Amy L. Zacharias, 

District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one child. 

AFFIRMED.

Jonathan J. Mailander of Mailander Law, Atlantic, for appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

William T. Early, Harlan, guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Doyle, P.J., Mullins, J., and Blane, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
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BLANE, Senior Judge.

A mother, Laura, appeals the termination of her parental rights to a child, 

D.B., who is now one year old, pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(b), (e), 

and (h) (2018). She contends the State did not prove the statutory grounds for 

termination; termination would be detrimental to D.B. based on their bond; and the 

department of human services (DHS) failed to make reasonable efforts toward 

reunification. Finding no merit in any of these contentions, we affirm. 

I. FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

D.B. was born in October 2017 and was immediately removed from Laura 

and placed with a foster family.1 He tested positive at birth for amphetamines, 

methamphetamine, cannabinoids, and carboxy-THC. The DHS founded a childabuse report against Laura for the presence of illegal drugs. Laura has a long 

history of substance abuse, uncontrolled mental-health impairments, and

domestic-violence incidents. When D.B. was born, Laura reportedly was not taking 

her mental-health medication and demonstrated delusional thoughts. The juvenile 

court subsequently adjudicated D.B. a child in need of assistance (CINA) pursuant 

to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(b) (physical abuse or neglect), (n) (impaired mental 

capacity or condition, imprisonment, or drug and alcohol abuse), and (o) (presence 

of an illegal drug due to acts of parent). It ordered Laura to attend counseling and 

obtain treatment for substance abuse and mental health, abstain from drugs and 

alcohol, and submit to drug testing. The court also ordered DHS to set up 

visitations. 

 

1 The court also ultimately terminated the parental rights of D.B.’s father, Daniel, but he 

did not appeal the termination. 
3

In the following months, service providers and social workers reported next 

to no improvement in Laura’s condition. In November and December 2017, Laura 

participated in six out of twenty-two offered supervised interactions. She did not 

engage in substance-abuse treatment or mental-health therapy and continued to 

exhibit delusional thinking. Toward the end of December 2017, Laura was in jail 

in Douglas County, Nebraska, under theft charges. In the CINA dispositional 

order, the court noted Laura requested to have interactions with D.B. at the jail. 

The court denied that request. 

Seven months later, in July 2018, DHS reported once again that Laura 

made no progress. She had not maintained contact with the family safety, risk, 

and permanency (FSRP) worker or DHS; completed substance-abuse or mentalhealth evaluations; progressed in any services; or submitted to any drug testing. 

She attended three visitations over a six-month period. In its permanency order, 

the court changed the case goal to termination and adoption, and the State filed 

its petition for termination in September 2018. 

The court heard the evidence in the termination petition in November 2018. 

At that time, Laura was in Douglas County Jail on felony theft charges.2 She did 

not complete ordered treatment or testing but was admitted to a drug treatment 

program through the jail and was participating in intensive outpatient treatment and 

cognitive behavior class. She was awaiting a hearing to determine whether she 

would remain in jail or be ordered into a mental-health respite program. She last 

 

2 Earlier in the year, Laura had been under arrest for theft but was released to participate 

in a mental health diversion program. Nonetheless, she was arrested again on new felony 

theft charges and had been in jail since September. 
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saw D.B. at an interaction in July for a total of ten interactions over the year-long 

CINA proceeding. When asked if it was possible to have interactions with D.B. in 

the jail, her jail caseworker said no but some jail programs would allow it. At the 

termination hearing, Laura testified she was in a work release program for mentalhealth and substance-abuse treatment, which usually lasted two years. She 

testified she was taking her medications, but the court noted her testimony 

continued to be confused, rambling, and delusional. 

The court found termination appropriate under Iowa Code section 

232.116(1)(b),

3

(e),

4 and (h).5

 Laura appeals. 

II. SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. See In re 

A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014); In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 

2010). However, “[w]e give weight to the findings of the juvenile court, particularly 

with respect to the credibility of witnesses.” In re B.N., No. 00-0220, 2001 WL 

57987, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan 24, 2001); accord D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 706. The 

statutory framework authorizing the termination of a parent-child relationship is well 

 

3

Including that the child has been “abandoned or deserted.”

4

Including that the parent has failed to maintain “significant and meaningful contact with 

the child” and has “made no reasonable efforts to resume care of the child despite begin 

given the opportunity to do so.”

5

“[A]ll the following have occurred:”

(1) The child is three years of age or younger.

(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance 

pursuant to section 232.96.

(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the 

child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the 

last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less 

than thirty days.

(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be 

returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102 

at the present time.
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established. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472–73 (Iowa 2018) (setting forth 

the statutory framework). The burden is on the State to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence (1) the statutory ground or grounds authorizing the 

termination of parental rights and (2) “termination of parental rights is in the best 

interests of the children.” See In re E.H., No. 17-0615, 2017 WL 2684420, at *1 

(Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2017); see also Iowa Code § 232.116(2).

III. ANALYSIS

We first address Laura’s claim there is insufficient evidence supporting the 

termination of her parental rights. The State was required to prove termination 

was supported on just one ground,

6 we focus on paragraph (h). 

Laura concedes the State proved three of the four prongs of this ground; 

but she insists the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that “at 

the present time” D.B. “cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as 

provided in section 232.102.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h). “At the present time” 

means at the time of the termination hearing. See A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 111. We 

have interpreted these statutory provisions to mean the State was required to 

prove the child could not be returned to the parent without creating “an appreciable 

risk of adjudicatory harm” to the child. See In re E.H., 2017 WL 2684420, at *1.

Laura says her current drug program will allow her to be placed in a mentalhealth respite program and “[t]here was no testimony offered that would dispute 

the possibility of an immediate placement in a respite program that would allow the 

 

6

“When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, 

we need only find grounds to terminate under one of the sections cited by the juvenile 

court to affirm.” In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). 
6

child to be placed with Laura.” We understand this statement to assert Laura could 

have D.B. placed with her in a drug-treatment program, but there is no support for 

this assertion in the record. The DHS worker did not receive any information from 

the jail caseworker indicating children could be placed with their parents in that 

particular program, and there is no testimony to that effect. The program Laura 

was in at the time the social worker inquired did not permit children, and going to 

the respite program was not guaranteed. Outside of her incarcerations, Laura was 

homeless and unemployed. She had not adequately resolved her substanceabuse or mental-health issues. She obtained new theft charges just weeks before 

the termination hearing. She had interacted with D.B. on only ten occasions since 

his birth, and the record does not persuade us she could advance from those 

supervised visits to parenting D.B. safely alone. The record is clear and convincing 

that D.B. could not be placed with Laura at the present time. The State proved the 

statutory ground for termination. 

We next address Laura’s claim termination was not in D.B.’s best interests. 

Under supporting legal authority, Laura cites Iowa Code section 232.116(3), so we 

assume she concedes the best-interests question under section 232.116(2) and 

look to statutory factors the court may consider to prevent termination despite proof 

of the statutory grounds. Laura asserts she has a bond with D.B. and she is getting 

the substance-abuse and mental-health help she needs. We do not believe the 

bond is so close that severing it will be detrimental to D.B. See Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(3)(c) (“The court need not terminate the relationship between the parent 

and child if the court finds . . . [t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the 

termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of 
7

the parent-child relationship.”) D.B. has lived his entire life with foster parents and 

knows Laura from only ten interactions, all of which occurred five months or more 

before the termination hearing. And Laura has made almost no effort to get her 

substance-abuse and mental-health issues under control so she can safely parent. 

D.B.’s best interests compel termination of Laura’s parental rights. 

Laura next complains, “DHS failed to provide visitation or any type of 

contact for Laura once she was incarcerated in the Douglas County Jail.” The 

DHS “has an obligation to make reasonable efforts toward reunification.” In re 

A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). “The State must show 

reasonable efforts as a part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned 

to the care of parent.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). 

Recent cases support that the reasonable-efforts obligation persists despite 

the obstacle of a parent’s incarceration. See In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839–40 

(Iowa 2017); In re R.B., No. 18-0146, 2018 WL 3057881, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 

20, 2018) (Tabor, J., concurring specially); In re S.J., 620 N.W.2d 522, 524–25 

(Iowa Ct. App. 2000). We are troubled by the DHS’s failure to ultimately ascertain 

whether interactions were possible in person, or at least over the phone or by

video, during Laura’s multiple incarcerations. 

However, we recognize that a parent has “an equal obligation to demand 

other, different, or additional services prior to a permanency or termination 

hearing.” A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d at 91. Laura does not explain how she preserved 

this issue for appeal other than she denied the allegations in the petition and filed 

a timely appeal. We note that Laura asked for visitation in the jail when she was 

arrested in December 2017. By then, Laura had already missed sixteen of the 
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twenty-two scheduled visitations. In the CINA dispositional order, the court 

determined visitation in jail would not be in D.B.’s best interests:

[D.B.] is only a little over two months old. He has no bond with Laura 

as she has missed so many available interactions. [D.B.] has had 

serious health issues which required him to be hospitalized. 

Visitation available at Douglas County Corrections where Laura is 

located is only by video and . . . physical contact would [not] be 

allowed. For these reasons, along with the record made at the 

hearing, the Court finds it is not in [D.B.’s] best interests to visit Laura 

while she is incarcerated. Should the Court learn this is a long-term 

placement, this issue shall be revisited.

The court also determined at that time DHS had made reasonable efforts toward 

reunification. Laura did not appeal this order nor did she renew her request except 

at the termination hearing nine months later. By then she had attended just ten 

interactions with D.B., the last one five months earlier in July. She had been in 

and out of jail throughout this case—consequences of her own actions. Laura had 

been offered many services to address her parenting and personal issues and had 

taken advantage of none of them. Of the visitation she was offered, she kept only 

ten over a year. The jail program did not allow in-person visitation, and phone or 

video would have been of limited value to the infant D.B. Nonetheless, our focus 

is on “the services provided by the State and the response by [the parent], not on

services [the parent] now claims the DHS failed to provide.” C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 

494. DHS made reasonable efforts under the circumstances. 

Finding no deficiencies in the termination order, we affirm. 

AFFIRMED.