### 140 Nev.,Advance Opinion

# g3 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

No. 85564 

# FILED

BY C 1EF DEPUTY CLERK 

### JESSE CALVIN GILBERT, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

Appeal from ajudgment ofconviction, pursuant to a no-contest plea, of ex-felon in possession of a firearm. Tenth Judicial District Court, Churchill County;ThomasL. Stockard, Judge.

Affirmed.

Evenson Law Office and Steve E. Evenson, Fallon, for Appellant. Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City;Arthur E. Mallory, District Attorney, and Chelsea D. Sanford, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Churchill County, for Respondent.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, CADISH, C.J., and PICKERING and BELL, JJ.

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### OPINION

Bythe Court, CADISH, C.J.:

The inventory search is a well-established exception to the warrant requirementofthe FourthAmendment. Generally,ifaninventory search complies with standardized procedures, it is reasonable and therefore constitutional. Wehavepreviouslyrecognizedthatevenwhen an inventorysearchdoesnotcomplywithstandardizedprocedures,it maystill be constitutionalifit isreasonable under thetotalityofthe circumstances. We are called on today to address how courts should conduct this reasonableness analysis. First, we clarify that while an inventory search cannot be a ruse for general rummaging, an investigatory motive does not necessarily invalidate an inventory search so long as the search that occurred is the same as the inventory-based search that would have happenedabsent anysuch motivation and thecircumstancesleadingtothe search were not created as a ruse to establish a basis for that search. Instead, acourt decidinga suppressionmotionmust determinethesearch's reasonablenessunderthetotalityofthecircumstancesbyevaluating(1)the extent to which law enforcement departed from the standardized procedures, (2) whether the scope ofthe search was as expected in light of the underlying justifications for inventory searches, and (3) whether the inventoryproduced servedthepurposesofaninventorysearch.

Here, a law enforcement deputy pulled over appellant Jesse CalvinGilbertbecausethecarGilbertwasdrivingdidnothaveanoperating license plate light. As Gilbert had an active warrant, the deputy arrested him. Duringthe subsequent warrantless search ofthe vehicle, the deputy made several statements that indicated the deputy hoped to locate incriminatingevidence in the vehicle. While searching, the deputyfound a

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### handgun under the driver's seat. Gilbert was charged with ex-felon in

possession of a firearm and moved to suppress the evidence on the basis thatthesearchwasnota trueinventorysearch,butratherarusetoconduct
an investigatory search. Findingthat the deputy appropriatelyimpounded the vehicle and the inventory search was reasonable, the district court denied the motion. Gilbert appeals from his subsequent conviction based
on the search and resultingunsuppressed evidence.

Perceiving no error in the district court's decision denying the motion to suppress, we affirm. The investigatory motive here does not invalidate the inventory search because the search that occurred was precisely the same as the search that would have occurred absent the impure motivation. Because the deputy properly stopped Gilbert for the nonfunctioninglicense plate light and arrested Gilbert on the outstanding warrant, the deputy wasrequired underpolice policytotow the car Gilbert
was driving. Therefore, the search that uncovered the gun would have occurred pursuant to the inventory search policy even absent the deputy's investigatory motives. Additionally, we conclude that while the inventory search here did not comply with standardized policies, it passes constitutional muster because it was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, asthe district court concluded.

FACTSANDPROCEDURAL HISTORY In the early morning hours, Deputy Nollan of the Churchill County Sheriffs Office observed two vehicles enter a parking lot, meet up, and leave the parkinglot a short time later. Deputy Nollan followed one of thevehiclesandinitiated a trafficstop because it did not have an operating license plate light. Appellant Jesse Calvin Gilbert, who was driving the vehicle, pulled over and stopped in a private residential driveway.

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### 3Deputy Nollan approached the vehicle and recognized Gilbert

from prior law enforcement contact. Gilbert indicated to Deputy NoIlan that he was driving on a suspended license. Deputy Nollan confirmed this information with dispatch and was informed that Gilbert had an active arrest warrant. Deputy Nollan arrested Gilbert, after which other officers, includingDeputy Nollan's supervisor, arrived on the scene. Deputy Nollan told his supervisor that he wanted to searchthe car andthat he intended to tow it. Before Gilbert was transported tojail, he made a phone call to
an unidentified woman. Either Gilbert or the unidentified woman asked Deputy Nollan if the woman could take the car, which Deputy Nollan refused because the vehicle wasbeingillegallyoperated on a roadway, such that the vehicle had to be towed. Shortly after, a woman approached the officers and identified herself as Lauren Sealock. She asked the officers if she could take the vehicle, stating that she was a friend ofthe residents of the house in front ofwhich the carwasparked, to which Deputy NoIlan said
no. A different officer transported Gilbert to jail, and Deputy Nollan searched Gilbert'svehicle.

Among other iterns, Deputy NoIlan found a handgun under the driver's seat approximately one minute into the search. The entire search, which was captured on Deputy Nollan's body-camera video, lasted roughly 15minutes, during which Deputy NoIlan searched the car door pockets, the floor, under the seats, and in the trunk of the car. During the search, another deputy asked Deputy NoIlan ifhe found anything, towhich Deputy Nollan responded "not yet" and then "not yet anyway." Deputy Nollan did not apply for or obtain a search warrant.

Duringthe search, the officersinteracted withtwo morepeople: another unidentified woman and the owner ofthe residence where Gilbert
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KO 1947A hadpulled over. The woman allegedly co-owned the car Gilbert was driving

and requested totake the vehicle. Deputy Nollan denied this request. The
owneroftheresidence asked the officerswhat washappeningandindicated he needed to leave. Later, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, the
owner testified that he never gave Gilbert permission to park in his driveway. After the search, Deputy Nollan completed a Churchill County Sheriffs Office Vehicle Inventory/Impound Sheet. On that sheet, Deputy Nollan listed the following items as "property, tools, or other items in the vehicle": set ofgolfclubs, two earrings white metal/white stone, black metal ring, two air rifles, and miscellaneous trash. Deputy Nollan failed to include on the inventory sheet several other items that were in the car, including a glass pipe, a substance he suspected to be methamphetamine, and the handgun.

Gilbert was formally charged by information with one count of ex-felon in possession of a firearm. Gilbert filed a motion to suppress evidence of the gun, arguing that the inventory search was a "ruse for the purposeful and general means ofdiscoveringevidence ofa crime." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Respondent State of Nevada opposed, arguing the vehicle was appropriately impounded and the inventory of the vehicle
was not unlawfully excessive.

At the hearing on the motion. Deputy Nollan testified that he statedhe wasgoingtotowthe vehiclebecause "[he]was arrestingthe driver who was also parked in a private driveway." After reviewing his bodycamera footage, he admitted that during the stop, he planned to tow the vehiclebecauseit wasbeingoperatedillegally on the roadway, i.e., dispatch confirmed that Gilbert had a suspended driver's license. On crossexamination, he stated that he noticed the license plate light was out on
5

### Gilbert's car when it left the parking lot. When asked about his comment

that he wanted to gothrough the car, Deputy Nollantestified that lilt was my vehicle stop. It was my arrest. It was my scene. I told my supervisor I wanted to—that I wanted to go through the vehicle because that's why. It
was my arrest
. . . I wanted to be responsible for it." Id at 74-75. Deputy Nollan acknowledged that he does not always conduct a vehicle inventory following an arrest, but he wanted to do so in this case because "[he] was relativelynew on the—onpatrol. [He] wanted the experience. [He] wanted tobe responsible for it."

Deputy Nollan also testified that the two vehicles meeting in theparkinglot "playedapart"inhisstoppingGilbertandtowingthevehicle because he believed the meeting was suspicious, he believed he would find drugsinthe car andthat was a substantialreason whyhe decided tosearch and tow the vehicle. He also testified that he suggested his supervisor search Gilbert'swallet because he thought it might have dope in it. Deputy Nollan acknowledged that he located a handgun, a glass pipe, and what he presumed to be methamphetamine but did not list them in his inventory. DeputyNollan, however, listedthe gun andpossible drugsinhisreport and turnedallthreeitemsovertothetaskforceofficer. DeputyNollan admitted that he "made mistakes as far as what items [he] did not list on the form" and lacked proper diligence and documentation for alltheitems in the car.

Relying on State v. Nye, 136 Nev. 421, 468 P.3d 369 (2020), the district court denied Gilbert's motion, finding that the inventory search of Gilbert's vehicle was reasonable based on the totality ofthe circumstances, including that (1) law enforcement had an unquestionable right to tow the vehicle because Gilbert was arrested, the car was inoperable due to a nonfunctioninglicenseplate light, and it was dark; (2) theinventory search did not exceed the scope ofa proper inventory; (3) the search was recorded
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### 6on a body-worn camera;and (4) Deputy NoIlanproduced a nearlycompleted

inventory sheet. The district court found, however, that Deputy Nollan's failuretoproduce a complete inventory sheetandclear motivation to search the car because he believed he would find drugs weighed against reasonableness.'

Gilbert entered a conditional no-contest plea to ex-felon in possession of a firearm, wherein he preserved his right to appeal on the basis that the district court erred in. denying his motion to suppress. The district court entered a judgment of conviction on the no-contest plea. Gilbert now appeals. DISCUSSION

"A motion to suppress presents mixed questions of law and fact." Statev. Lloyd, 129Nev. 739, 743, 312 P.3d467, 469 (2013). "Adistrict court's legal conclusion regarding the constitutionality of a challenged search receives de novo review." Id. at 743, 312 P.3d at 469. Because Gilbert does not challenge the district court's factual findings and instead challenges only its legal conclusions that the search was valid and reasonable, we apply a de novo standard ofreview. State v. Beckman, 129 Nev. 481, 486, 305 P.3d 912, 916 (2013) (reviewing de novo the issue of reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment context).

The Nevada Constitution and United States Constitution both prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Nev. Const. art. 1, § 18. "Under these cognateprovisionsofour federal and state

'The district court also found the inevitable discovery doctrine was inapplicable. We agree becausethe search conductedbyDeputyNollan was the onlyinventory searchthat wasconductedor would havebeen conducted on the vehicle. The State does not argue on appeal that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies.

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### perseunreasonable

. . . subject only

to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 

### Lloyd, 129 Nev. at 743, 312 P.3d at 469 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevada recognizes inventory searches as one such exception to the warrant requirement. 

### Weintraub v. State, 110 Nev. 287, 288, 871 P.2d 339, 340 (1994). The purpose of the inventory search exception is to protect an individual's property while it is in the custody of the police, to ensure against claims of damaged or missing property, and to guard the police against danger. 

### Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1987). In 

### Weintraub,we held that aninventory searchwillpassconstitutional muster ifit is carried out pursuant to standardized official department procedures and administered in good faith. 110 Nev. at 288, 871 P.2d at 340. Further, "the officers conducting the search must produce 'a true inventory of personal itemsfound during the search." 

### Nye, 136 Nev. at 423, 468 P.3d at 371 (quoting 

### Weintraub, 110 Nev. at 289, 871P.2d at 340). Indeed, without
an inventory, there can be no inventory search. 

### State v. Greenwald, 109 Nev. 808, 811, 858 P.2d 36, 38 (1993). However, "inventory searches need not be conducted in a totally mechanical, all or nothing fashion." 

### United States v. Smith, 715 F.3d 1110, 1117 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting 

### United States
v. Garreau, 658 F.3d 854, 858 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In 

### State v. Nye, we observed that the failure to precisely follow the department's policies does not necessarily invalidate an inventory search, as the validity of the search turns on reasonableness. 136 Nev. at 425 n.3, 468 P.3d at 372 n.3 (stating that "an inventory search need not conform to official procedure to be valid, so long as the State can otherwise prove that the search was reasonable"); 

### see id. at 426-28; 468 P.3d at 373- 74 (Cadish, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence focuses on reasonableness, and a SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10) 1947A .040 8

.osreasonableness evaluation "does not necessarily require adherence to an

official procedure"). While the search did not comply with the Churchill County Sheriff's Office Policy 3.415procedure, it was reasonable underall the circumstances

Inventory searches that comply with standardized procedures
are reasonable—and thus constitutional—because the standardized procedures "ensure[] that an inventory search is truly designed to produce
an inventory and is notjust a ruse for a general rummaging

. . . to discover incriminatingevidence." Jim v. State, 137Nev. 557, 560, 495P.3d 478, 481 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Taylor, 636 F.3d461, 464(8th Cir.2011) ("Thereasonablenessrequirementismet when
an inventory search is conducted according to standardized police procedures, which generally remove the inference that the police have used inventory searches as a purposeful and general means of discovering evidence." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Marshall, 986 F.2d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 1993))). In Nye, we acknowledged that an inventory search that does not fully comply with standardized procedures may still pass constitutional muster so long as it is reasonable. 136 Nev. at 425 n.3, 468 P.3d at 372 n.3. As reasonableness is the touchstonebywhich courtsmeasure theconstitutionalityofpolice searches,
an inquiry into an inventory search that does not comply with such procedures must focus on whether the police conduct wasreasonable under the totality ofthe circumstances. See Smith, 715 F.3d at 1117 (holding an inventory search must be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances).

Today we clarify that this reasonableness evaluation is not dependent on the motive of law enforcement under a so-called pretext theory unless the inventory search itselfwould not have occurred or would

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•"' "." •:77.;"‘"":"-"' '• • 7r$77.have been more limited absent the investigatory motive. Instead, we

announce the factors a district court must consider in determiningwhether
an inventory search is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances: (1) to what extent law enforcement departed from the standardized procedures, (2) whether the scope ofthe searchis what one would expect in light ofthe underlyingjustifications ofinventory searches, and (3) whether the inventoryproduced servedthe purpose ofaninventory search. Jim, 137 Nev. at 561, 495 P.3d at 481 (noting law enforcement's deviation from the standardized policy was slight); cf. United States v. Neugin, 958 F.3d 924, 931 (10th Cir. 2020) (noting officers are entitled to some latitude in conducting their community caretaking role, but their actions must be 

### 44 reasonably related in scope" to the underlying justification for the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement (quoting Lundstrorn v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010))); cf. United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding a search wherelawenforcementdisregardeditemswithoutevidentiaryvalue despite them being of possible monetary value suggested the search did not serve the purpose of an inventory search). These factors will properly focus the court on the search that actually took place and whether it is in reality an inventory searchjustifying an exception to the warrant requirement. The investigatory motive to search a vehicle does not alone make the search unconstitutional Gilbert argues that the district court erred in determining the search was reasonable despite Deputy Nollan's investigatory motive to search the car, which he expressed before ever searching the vehicle. Gilbert points to Nye for support that an inventory search cannot be reasonable where law enforcement does not comply with the standardized procedures for the search and the motive to conduct the search is impure.

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in a search is not impermissible pretext within the context of the Fourth Amendment. 3 Wayne R. LaFaye, Search and Seizure 926 (6th ed. 2020). Rather,impermissiblepretext within thiscontext "arisesout ofthe factthat the evidence is found in a search which would not have occurred at all but for the manipulation of circumstances and events by the police because of their desire to conduct a search that could not otherwise be lawfully made." Id. That is, an impermissible pretextual inventory searchis one where law enforcement created the circumstances warranting the search to satisfy theirinvestigatorydesire. SeeJim, 137Nev. at 560, 495P.3d at 481("While
an officer's failure to complete an inventory per department policy may foreclose the inventory warrant exception, such a failure does not per se establish that an officer's motive for beginning an inventory was a subterfuge."); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816 (1996) (observing that although adherence to procedures shows lack of pretext, deviation from procedures does not prove or serve as an operational substitute for pretext). The suppression of evidence is not required when,
even assuming a questionable motivation is dominant, "the Fourth Amendment activity undertaken is precisely the same as would have occurred had that intent or motivation been entirely absent from the case." 1Wayne R. LaFave, supra, at 177.

Other courts have concluded this "would have

... anyway" rationale applies in the context of inventory searches. United States v. Bowhay, 992 F.2d 229, 231(9th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Lillard, 929 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 1991)). In Bowhay, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appealsexplainedthat,inthecontextofinventory searches, dual motives— i.e., a motive to investigate for incriminating evidence and a motive to compile an inventory of an individual's property—do not make a search
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### pretextual and thus do not invalidate it. 992 F.2d at 231. The court

observed that unlike in pretextual cases, department inventory procedures required that the officer take an inventory of all personal property, such that the officer had no discretion in initiating a search of the defendant's satchel, in which narcotics, a gun, and cash were found. Id. at 230-31. Other courts have agreed, observing that "Nile police are not precluded frorn conductinginventorysearcheswhentheylawfullyimpoundthevehicle of an individual that they also happen to suspect is involved in illegal activity." Marshall, 986 F.2d at 1175-76; see also United States v. Lopez, 547 F.3d 364, 372 (2d Cir. 2008) (observing that the expectation and motivation to find criminal evidence does not constitute bad faith where good faith is a prerequisite of an inventory search). We agree that the would have

. . . anyway" rationale appli.es to inventory searches.

Here, we agree with the district court's conclusion that Deputy NoIlan "clearly had motives to inventory the vehicle that were unrelated to the constitutionally recognized purpose of an inventory search." See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372-73. Deputy Nollan's comments leading up to and during the search indicate that he was suspicious of the two vehicles meeting in the parking lot, and his belief that he would find drugs in the vehicle was a substantialreason why he decided to search and tow Gilbert's
car. However, Deputy Nollan was legally permitted to initiate the traffic stop because the car did not have a functioning license plate light and was thus inoperable considering it was dark outside. See NRS 484D.115(4) ("Everypassenger car, bus and truck under 80 inchesin overall width must be equipped with a lamp so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a white light the rearregistration orlicenseplate andrender it clearlylegible from a distance of 50 feet to the rear."). Further, Gilbert was lawfully arrested due to an outstandingwarrant, and officersremoved him from the
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### 12scene. 'phis left the car parked on private property without the permission

of the property owner. While two individuals approached Deputy Nollan indicating they could remove the car from the property, including the claimed co-owner of the vehicle, the car was not operable at night. NRS 484D.115(4). Under these circumstances, Deputy Nollan had an unquestionable andundisputedright totowthecar under Churchill County Sheriffs Office Policy 3.415 (governingtowing and storage ofvehicles) as a vehicle that wasillegallyparked. Further Churchill County SheriffsOffice Policy 3.410 provides vehicles will be towed when the driver is arrested. Thus, the car would have been towed and inventoried under Churchill County Sheriffs Office policies regardless of Deputy Nollan's expressed expectation or hope to find drugsin the car. Inother words, Deputy Nollan had a right and obligation to perform an inventory on the car. See Collins

v. State, 113 Nev. 1177, 1181, 946 P.2d 1055, 1058-59 (1997) (recognizing that "police have a duty to inventory the contents of an automobile" for legitimate purposes). Gilbert does not dispute the constitutionality of the stop itself, his arrest, or that Deputy Nollan's decision to tow the vehicle complied with department polices. Therefore, we conclude Deputy Nollan's investigatory motive to search Gilbert's car did not invalidate the search because the inventory search would have occurred regardless of such a motive. Deputy Nollan's deviation frorn Churchill County Sheriff's Office Policy 3.415is concerning Turning to the factors we announce today to evaluate the reasonableness of the purported inventory search under all the circumstances, we first address the extent to which Deputy Nollan strayed from the standardized procedure. First, Deputy Nollan complied with Churchill County SheriffsOfficePolicy 3.410, which providesthat a vehicle

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,: ', • ,r.P.t77-': 1will be towed in the event the driver of the vehicle is arrested. While the

policy also permits a co-owner to take the vehicle if a deputy objectively determines the co-owner is capable of safely operating the vehicle, Deputy Nollan properly determined the vehicle could not be driven safely because it was dark outside and one ofthe license plate lights was nonoperational. Because Deputy Nollan was required to have the vehicle towed under these circumstances, he was also required to conduct an inventory search of the vehicle. However, it is undisputed that Deputy Nollan failed to fully comply with Churchill County Sheriff's Office Policy 3.415 in that he failed to provide a detailed written description ofthe contents ofall the personal property that was in the car. This policy provides:

Any vehicle which is taken or removed from any location pursuant to the lawful authority of any Deputy, whether saidvehicle is onpublicor private property, will be thoroughly inventoried as to its condition and contents
. . . . Saidinventory shallbe recorded on a Vehicle Inventory Report form and will include a detailed written description of the contents and conditions of any items of personal property contained therein. Deputy Nollan did properly identify the make and license number of the vehicle and its features and listed certain items ofpersonal property on the inventory sheet. The district court's thorough order after a full evidentiary hearing noted Deputy Nollan acknowledged in his testimony that other items ofpersonal property were in the car and not listed on the inventory, including "a pipe, a Halloween mask, what appeared to be two one-dollar bills, a cell phone, a basket of golf balls, a rangefinder, and a pack of cigarettes." The court also found the body camera footage showed other omitted items whose nature was not clear. While some itemsthat were not

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Mirk.catalogued may fall under Deputy Nollan's miscellaneous trash listing on

the inventory sheet, others did not fit in that category and were ofthe type the inventory policy would cover, such as the cell phone and rangefinder. Thus, asthe district courtproperlyconcluded, DeputyNoIlan deviatedfrom the standardizedpolicybyfailingtoprovide a "detailedwritten description" of these items. Even Deputy Nollan acknowledged that he lacked proper diligence when documenting the itemsin the car. However, Deputy NoIlan did not altogether disregard his duty to document the items in the car, and it is not clear that any ofthe omitted items were ofvalue. Compare United States v. Garay, 938 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2019) (concluding an inventory search was valid despite the officer failing to list some of the property in the inventory list), with Weintraub, 110 Nev. at 289, 871 P.2d at 340 (concluding an inventory search was unconstitutional where the inventory list included only 8 items, but the vehicle contained approximately 100 items including a wallet with money and identification and $150 in cash that were not listed). We conclude that while Deputy Nollan deviated from the standardized policy, and these deviations are concerning, he made a good faith effort and prepared a nearly complete inventory list with the items that appeared to him to be ofpotential value. Thus, this factor weighs against the reasonableness of the search, but not significantly so. The searchperformed did not exceed thescopeexpectedofan inventory search The second metric in the reasonableness inquiryiswhether the search's scope was as expected in light of the underlying justifications of inventory searches,i.e., toprotecttheowner'spropertyinterestsandprotect police from liability for missing property and against danger. Here, the entire search spanned approximately 15 minutes, and Deputy Nollan and

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CO) I947A 15another deputy searched the pockets of the car doors, the floor, the seats,

under the seats, the center console, and the trunk. As the district court concluded, all ofthese locations are areas in a vehicle that were "certain to be searched during an inventory." Thus, as the district court also properly concluded, the handgun, which was found under the seat, and the drugs, which were found in the console, were also "almost certain to be found ifan inventory search were conducted," whether or not the officer inventorying the vehicle strictly adhered to the inventory search protocol. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 863-64 (6th ed. 2020) (an inventory search customarily will "extend to all parts of the car where personal property might be found, and to include an inventory ofcontainers found within the vehicle" (footnotes omitted));cf. Greenwald, 109 Nev. at 809-11, 858 P.2d at 37-38 (concluding that a search exceeded the scope of an administrative search where the law enforcement officer examined the contents ofthe gas and oil tanks and even dismantled a flashlight). We thus conclude that the search's scope was appropriate for an inventory search. The search served the underlying purpose of the inventory search exception to the warrant requirement Finally, we conclude that Deputy Nollan's search served the purposes of an inventory search. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372-73. Again, the inventory sheet prepared by Deputy Nollan did not include several items that potentially were valuable. In this way, the search fell short ofserving the purpose of protecting Gilbert's property that was impounded and protecting police from claims that said property was lost or stolen while in police custody. The inventory sheet was not the only documentation ofthe search, however. Throughouttheentire search,DeputyNollanwaswearing hisbody camera, andthe entire search wascapturedbythisrecording. The district court found the footage "provided a relatively clear audio and video

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, 111.V.'79'ex.•recording of the inventory search." While it does not satisfy Churchill

County Sheriffs Office Policy 3.415, the district court found that the recording showed Deputy Nollan handling virtually every item that was locatedinthe car, which thepartiesdo not dispute.2 Thisis distinguishable from Nye, which involved an unrecorded search when the inventory search policyrequireditbeperformedoncamera. Conversely,the inventorysearch policy here required no such recording, but the entire search was recorded
on Deputy Nollan's body camera. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that the search performed by Deputy Nollan served the underlying purpose ofthe inventory search exception to the warrant requirement ofthe Fourth Amendment.

The district court extensively analyzed these factors in determining that the search was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Based on our independent review, we agree. While the failure to list several items in the car on the inventory is concerning and reduces the efficacy of the inventory procedure, weighing all of the circumstancesunderthe factorswe haveidentifiedleadsustoconcludethat the inventory search was reasonable and the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress. CONCLUSION

Even when a warrantless inventory search does not comply with the department policies and procedures, it may be constitutional ifit is reasonable under the totality ofthe circumstances. We conclude that an investigatory motive does not necessarily invalidate an inventory search so long as the search that occurred is the same as the inventory-based search that would have happened even absent any investigatory or other intent or

2The body-camera footage ofthe search was not provided on appeal.
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### motivation. We hold instead that a court deciding a suppression motion in

these circumstancesmust determine the search'sreasonablenessunderthe totality of the circumstances by evaluating (1) the extent to which law enforcement departed frorn the standardized procedure, (2) whether the scope ofthe search was asexpected in light ofthe underlyingjustifications for inventory searches, and (3) whether the inventory produced served the purposes of an inventory search. We conclude that, after weighing these factors, the search here was reasonable, and we perceive no error in the district court's denial ofGilbert's motion to suppress. We therefore affirm thejudgment ofconviction.

, C.J.

We concur:

Bell

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