alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 15

May 8, 2003

Board of DirectorsSuperiorUniform Group, Inc.Seminole, Florida

We have made a review, in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, of the unaudited interimfinancial information of Superior Uniform Group, Inc. for the periods ended March 31, 2003 and 2002, as indicated in our report dated April 24, 2003; because we did not perform an audit, we expressed no opinion on thatinformation.

We are aware that our report referred to above, which is included in your Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2003, is incorporated by reference inRegistration Statement No. 2-85796 on Form S-8.

We also are aware that the aforementioned report, pursuant to Rule 436(c) under the Securities Act of 1933, is not considered a partof the Registration Statement prepared or certified by an accountant or a report prepared or certified by an accountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of that Act.

| /s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP |   |
|-------------------------------|--------|
|                               |   |
| **Tampa, Florida**            |   |
Pursuant to 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not * be publishe d and is not precedent except under the limited circu mstance s set forth in 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5 .4. 

### INTHE UNI TED S TATESCOU RT OFAPPEALS

FORTHE FIFTH CIRCU IT

N o. 08- 60483 Su m m ar y Cal endar
C LA U D IAS IF U E N TE S- A ST U R IA S; C E S A RA S T U R IA S -SIF U E N T E S ; E D W IN JOV AN Y A STU RI AS- SI FU EN TE S; C L A U D IA L A LI LA ASTU RI ASSI FU EN TE S; K EV I N J EO RD AO ASTU RI AS- SI FU EN TE S, P et i t i on ers
v. ERI C H HOLDER, J R, U S AT TORNEY GENERAL Res po nde nt
Pet i t i o n f

o rRev i e w o f

a n Ord e ro f

t he B o a r do f Im m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls B IAN o. A 75 575 102 B IAN o. A 75 575 103 B IAN o. A 75 575 104 B IAN o. A 75 575 105 B IAN o. A 75 575 106
B ef ore K IN G , D E N N IS, an d O W E N , C i rcui tJu dg es. P E R C U R IA M: * T h e P et i t i on ers, C l au di a S i f u en t es- A st u ri as, C esar A st u ri as- S i f u en t es, E d w in J o v a n yA s tu r ia s -S ifu e n te s , C la u d ia L a lila A s tu r i a s-S ifu e n te s , a n dK e v in Jeorda o A st u ri as- S i f u en t es, cit i zens of

G u atem al a, petit i ont h i s c ou rtf or r evi ew United States Court of App eals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D May 7, 2009 Cha rl es R. F ulb ru g e II I ClerkN o. 08- 60483

2 of t h e B oa rdof Im m i gr a ti on A p p ea l s ( B IA) d ecisi on d e n yin g th eir m oti on to reo p en rem ov a lpr oce ed i n gs . T h e B IAd eterm i n ed , in ter a l i a , th a t t h e m oti on to r e o pe n w as f

i l e d al m o s tsix ye ar s af t e rt he B IA’ s di s m i s s alof t he i rappe ala nd th e m o tio n w a s t h e r e fo r e u n tim e ly
. T h e P e tit io n e r s a r g u e th a t t h e d e la yin f i l i ng t he i rm o t i o n was at t r ibut ab l e t o i ne f f e c t ive as s i s t anc e of

co uns e la nd t he t i m e l i m i tf

o rf i l i ng s uc h am o t i o n s ho ul d t he r e f o r e b e e quit ab ly t o l l e d. S u bj ectt o cer t ai n excepti on s t h at are i n ap plic ab l ehere, a m ot i on t o reopen rem oval proceedi n gs “ m u stbe f i l ed n o l atertha n 9 0 da ys af t er t h e date on w h i ch t he f i naladm i n i st r at ive dec i si on w as r ender ed i n t he pr oc ee di ng s oughtt o b e r e o pe ne d. ” 8 C. F. R. § 1 00 3. 2(c ) ( 2)
. The o nl y aut ho r i t y f o rr e o pe ni ng t he Pet i t i o ne r s ’r e m o va lpr o c e e di ng w as t he BI A’ s s ua s po nt ea u th o r ityt or e o pe n t he c a s e p u r s u a n t t o § 1 0 0 3 .2 (a ). S ee R am os- B on i l la v. Mu ka sey , 543 F. 3d 216, 219- 20 ( 5t h Ci r . 2 00 8)
. U nde r§ 1 00 3. 2( a) , t he BI A has c o m pl e t e di s c r e t i o n t o de ny u n tim e lym o tio n s to re o p e n . S e e id
. T h i s cou rtlacks j u ri sdi ct i on t o revi ew such de c i s i o ns a nd t he r e f o r e l ac ks j ur i s di c t i o n t o r e vi ew t he BI A’ s de c i s i o n i n t he in s ta n t p r o c e e d in g . S e eid
. a t 2 2 0 ; E n r iq u ez -A lv a r a d o v . A s h c r oft, 371 F. 3d 246, 2 4 8 -5 0 (5t h C ir. 2 0 0 4 ). P ET I T I ON D I S M I S S ED
.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 99-6997
ROBERT MILLS, Petitioner - Appellant, versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; BLEDSOE, Warden, Respondents - Appellees.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, District Judge. (CA-99-93-1) Submitted: September 30, 1999 Decided: October 8, 1999 Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Robert Mills, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Robert Mills appeals the district court’s order denying reliefon his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) petition. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss on the reasoning of the district court. See Mills v. United States , No. CA-99-93-1 (N.D.W. Va. July 7, 1999). The motion to expedite is denied. We dispense with oral argument because thefacts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
SEABOARD CORPORATION

                EXECUTIVE OFFICERS' BONUS POLICY


PURPOSE:   The purpose of this policy is to establish  guidelines
for  the  payment  of incentive compensation to  named  executive
officers of Seaboard Corporation.

AFFECTS:   The  Chief  Executive  Officer  and  the  other  named
executive  officers  of  Seaboard  Corporation,  as  defined   in
Item 402 of Regulation S-K.

POLICY:

1.   Incentive  Compensation Philosophy:  The  Company  maintains
     the philosophy that determination of incentive compensation for
     its executive officers is based upon a recognition that these
     officers are responsible for implementing the Company's long-term
     strategic objectives.  All executive compensation, including the
     incentive  portion, is designed to attract  and  retain  top
     executive employees.

2.   Basis for Determination of Incentive Compensation:

          The Board of Directors shall determine annual bonus amounts
          for the named executive officers, including the Chief Executive
          Officer.  This determination will be based on a subjective review
          of the Company's financial performance, an assessment of each
          officer's individual contribution to that performance and other
          discretionary factors.

          The amount assigned to each officer is discretionary.

3.   Method  and  Timing of Payments:  Payments will be  made  in
     cash after year-end financials are available.  This will normally
     occur about February 1 following the end of the previous fiscal
     year.

EFFECTIVE  DATE:   As  of  the  2005 bonus,  and  supersedes  all
Executive Bonus Policies in effect prior thereto with respect  to
the named executive officers.

<PAGE>
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 21

                EXTENDICARE HEALTH SERVICES, INC. & SUBSIDIARIES

Adult Services Unlimited, Inc
Alpine Health & Rehabilitation Center, LLC
Arbors At Bayonet Point, LLC
Arbors At Fairlawn Care, LLC
Arbors At Fairlawn Realty OH, LLC

Arbors At Sylvania Care, LLC
Arbors At Sylvania Realty Oh, LLC
Arbors At Tampa, LLC
Arbors At Toledo, Inc
Arbors East, Inc

Arbors West Care, LLC
Arbors West Realty Oh, LLC
Blanchester Care, LLC
Canton Care, LLC
Colonial Care, LLC

Columbus Rehabilitation Realty Oh, LLC
Columbus Rehabilitation Care, LLC
Concordia Manor, LLC
Dayton Care, LLC
Delaware Care, LLC

Extendicare Great Trail, Inc
Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc
Extendicare Health Facility Holdings, Inc
Extendicare Health Network, Inc
Extendicare Health Services, Inc

Extendicare Homes, Inc.
Extendicare Of Indiana, Inc.
Fir Lane Terrace Convalescent Center, Inc
First Coast Health & Rehab Center, LLC
Fiscal Services Group, LLC

Gallipolis Care, LLC
Great Trail Care, LLC
Greenbriar Care, LLC
Greenbrook Care, LLC
Health Poconos, Inc

Heritage Care, LLC
Hilliard Care, LLC
Indiana Health & Rehab. Centers Partnership
Jackson Heights Rehab Center, LLC
Jacksonville Care, LLC

Kaufman Street, WV, LLC
Kissimmee Care, LLC
Lady Lake Care, LLC
London Care, LLC
Marietta Care, LLC
<PAGE>

Marshall Properties, Inc
Milford Care, LLC
New Castle Care, LLC
New Horizon Care, LLC
North Rehabilitation Care, LLC

Northern Health Facilities, Inc.
Orange Park Care, LLC
Oregon Care, LLC
Palm Court Care, LLC
Partners Health Group -- Florida, LLC

Partners Health Group -- Louisiana, LLC
Partners Health Group -- Texas, LLC
Partners Health Group, LLC
Port Charlotte Care, LLC
Richey Manor, LLC

Rockledge Care, LLC
Rockmill Care, LLC
Rocksprings Care, LLC
Safety Harbor Care, LLC
Sarasota Care, LLC

Seminole Care, LLC
South Heritage Health & Rehabilitation Center, LLC
Star Purchasing Services, LLC
The Oaks Residential & Rehabilitation Center, LLC
The Progressive Step Corporation
Treasure Isle Care Center, LLC

Waterville Care, LLC
Winter Haven Care, LLC
Winter Haven Health & Rehabilitation Center, LLC
Woodsfield Care, LLC
#### DUNN v. STATE.

No. 23121.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 9, 1945.

Nat Gentry and Alex P. Pope, both of Tyler, for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Under his plea of-guilty before the court for the unlawful sale of whisky in a dry area, appellant was assessed a fine of $100.

The record before us is without statement of facts or bills of exceptions. Nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

S))))))))))))))Q

No. 95-30379

USDC No. CA-95-226-A-M2

S))))))))))))))Q

MICHAEL E. MEADER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

RICHARD L. STALDER, Warden,

Defendant-Appellee.

S))))))))))))))))))))))))Q

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Louisiana

S))))))))))))))))))))))))Q

(June 22, 1995)

Before GARWOOD, HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

Michael E. Meader's timely notice of appeal is construed as a

request for a certificate of probable cause (CPC). Meader's

motions for a certificate of probable cause (CPC) and to proceed in

forma pauperis on appeal are GRANTED.

The Supreme Court recently held, in a case where consecutive

prison sentences were imposed at the same time on separate counts

in a single indictment, that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a state

prisoner is "in custody" for any consecutive sentence until all of

the consecutive sentences are served. Garlotte v. Fordice, No. 94-

6790, 1995 WL 318633, at *2, *5 (U.S. May 30, 1995).
O R D E R

No. 95-30379

-2-

2

Although the record is not clear, the report of the magistrate

judge, which was adopted by the district court and on the basis of

which it dismissed the habeas claims for want of jurisdiction,

reflects that when Meader was sentenced October 22, 1990, to the

terms of imprisonment he is now still serving, he still had 41 days

remaining time to serve on his 1987 conviction and sentence; the

1990 sentence was "consecutive to any time the petitioner had to

serve as a result of the revocation of the mandatory parole

supervision for his 1987 conviction." The habeas petition was

filed in February 1995, and attacks the 1987 sentence, and the

magistrate judge concluded there was no jurisdiction as plaintiff

was not "in custody" under the 1987 sentence: "the plaintiff is

presently attacking a sentence for which he is not correctly

incarcerated as the sentence for the 1987 conviction expired on or

about December 2, 1990." The district court and magistrate judge

did not have the benefit of Garlotte, which reversed a decision of

this Court. Accordingly, the district court's judgment dismissing

the habeas claim is vacated and that aspect of the cause is

remanded for reconsideration in light of Garlotte. Meader does not

challenge the district court's dismissal on limitations grounds of

his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and accordingly that portion of

the judgment below is affirmed.

AFFIRMED in part; VACATED and REMANDED in part
#### HALL v. STATE.

No. 24909.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 8, 1950.

Roscoe Runge, Mason, Robert I. Wilson, Kerrville, 'for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of the offense of arson, and his penalty was assessed at *583confinement in the state penitentiary for two years.

The State’s Attorney before this court has filed a brief herein which seems to have advised a proper disposal of this case, and we adopt the same as follows:

> “Appellant appeared to be in love with a woman named Alice Underwood, and while he was a married man, was attempting to get this lady to live with him. He was jealous of another man whom she subsequently married. Alice Underwood lived in a small house which belonged to her. Her daughter, a young woman about sixteen years of age, and a younger son lived with her.

> “Appellant had been threatening to burn Mrs. Underwood’s house, and perhaps to kill her. He was at her house and drunk and raising a disturbance the afternoon or evening before the fire. On this occasion she got two knives away from him, which he was threatening to use on.her, and being frightened by him, she decided to take her children and spend the night with her daughter’s fiance.

> “That night, shortly before the fire, appellant was seen in the vicinity of the Underwood house. A very short space of time, less than half an hour, after he was seen in the vicinity of the Underwood house, it burst out in flames and was burned.

> “There are a number of bills of exception in the record, but' appellee is of the opinion that the corpus delicti of arson is not established by the testimony and that the case will have to be reversed for insufficiency of the evidence.”

It appears from a study of the record that no one saw appellant set the house afire; neither did anyone testify that such house was set afire; but circumstances alone are relied upon. There seems a strong possibility that same could have caught afire from a heater or pilot light therein.

While we have motive and the declaration of an intent, such being useful, still such is not conclusive of guilt. See Massey v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 226 S.W.2d 856; Duncan v. State, 109 Tex.Cr.R. 668, 7 S.W.2d 79; Zepeda v. State, 139 Tex.Cr. R. 258, 139 S.W.2d 820; Burris v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 227 S.W.2d 538.

In the motion for a new trial appellant charged the jury with misconduct in that it was shown that .some of the jurors failed to understand or remember the testimony correctly; that if they had correctly remembered such testimony, some of them testified that they would not have voted for a verdict of guilt. A juror cannot thus be allowed to impeach his verdict. See Hill v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 217 S.W.2d 1009, and cases there cited;

For the lack of proof that the fire which destroyed this house was of incendiary origin, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.
Honorable B. T. Walters County Auditor Smith County Tyler, Texas Opinion No. O-491 9 Re: Does the Commissioners* Court ofSmith County have the authoritytoappropriate county funds to pay election judges incommon

Dear Sir: school districts and independent school dfstrtcta under the facts stated ?
Your letter ofOctober 14, 1942, requesting the opinion of this department onthe above stated question reads in part as follows:

“After having been presqnted with a proper petition by the req,uired voters ofthe two districts, the Cornmissioners’ **Court** o,fSmith County ordered an election tobe held in the Independent School Districts ofOmen and Troup. Said election todetermine whether or not the Omen District would be consolidated with the Troup district. The election Judge ofthe Omen district has presented abill toSmith County for his services and the services ofhis two assistants. The consolidation move failed tocarry and it appears the school authorities ofthe Omen district refused topay the election expense. *
“Please advise relative tothe authority ofthe Commissioners’ Court ofSmith County toappropriate County funds to pay Election judges in common school districts and in independent school districts.

” ”

. . . . Article 2806, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes authorizes the holding ofelections for the purpose ofconsolidating contiguous common school districts, contiguous independent school districts and further provides that common school districts may inlike manner **be** consolidated with contiguous independent school dis~trtcts.

Articles 2746, 2746a and 2746b, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Stat-Honorable B. T. Walters, page 2 (o-4919)

utes regarding school district elections and expenses incurred in connection therewith provide in effect that all expenses incurred in connection with or incidental toany school district election in connection with a public school within such school district shall be paid out ofthe available maintenance fund belonging to such district or certain expenses enumerated inArticle 2746, supra, shall be paid out ofthe local funds of the school district where the election was held.

Therefore, all election expenses incurred by school districts must be paid out ofthe available maintenance fund belonging tothe school district or districts or the local funds ofthe school district or districts where the election was held as authorized by said statutes

Specifically answering your question you are advised that it is the opinion ofthis department that the Commissioners’ Court ofSmith County has no authority toappropriate County funds topay election judges in common school districts or independent school districts for any election held in such district or districts.

Trusting that the foregoing fully answers your inquiry, we are Yours very truly
ATTORNEYGENERALOFTEXA

BY /s/ Ardell Williams Ardell Williams Assistant AW :mp:da
APPROVED OCT 20, 1942
/s/ Gerald C. Mann
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS APPROVED OPINION COMMITTEE BY BWB CHAIRMAN
## F I FTH 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________

Case No. 5 D 2 2

- 2643
LT Case No. 2021

- CF

- 000099

- A

_____________________________

R OBERT A. S CHWEICKERT

, J R

. ,

Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA

,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Citrus County

. Richard A. Howard , Judge

.

Robert A. Schweickert, Jr., Raiford, pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

April 12, 2024

H ARRIS

, J

.

Appellant, Robert A. Schweickert, Jr., appeals the trial court’s restitution order, arguing the court did not have jurisdiction to hold a restitution hearing and order restituti on while his appeal was pending. We agree, strike the restitution order and remand for the trial court to conduct another hearing.2 The State charged Appellant with four counts of aggravated animal cruelty and twenty

- three counts of cruelty to animals. Appellant rejected the State’s plea offer but accepted the trial court’s disposition of a four

- year cap on incarceration in exchange for a no contest plea. The State noted at the plea hearing it would be seeking $128,090.54 in restitution. Appella nt requested a hearing on the restitution amount. On July 12, 2022, the court sentenced Appellant to four years in the Department of Corrections on the four counts of aggravated animal cruelty and
reserved on the restitution amount.

Appellant appealed his judgment and sentence, and on October 4, 2022, while his appeal was pending, the court conducted a restitution hearing, during which Appellant stipulated to the original judgment amount from his civil case ($128,090.54) as the
amount of restitution in his criminal case.

On appeal, Appellant argues the restitution order should be vacated because the trial court was without jurisdiction to conduct the hearing and enter the order. Once a notice of appeal has been filed, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to h old a restitution hearing or enter an order of restitution, even if it reserves jurisdiction only as

to the amount. See Kleintank v. State , 178 So. 3d 15 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015); Pearson v. State , 686 So. 2d 721, 721 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The State properly conc edes that the court lacked jurisdiction at the time it held the hearing and entered the restitution order.

Accordingly, we strike the restitution order and remand for the trial court to conduct another restitution hearing and again impose restitution. Se e Kleintank , 178 So. 3d at 15; Smith v. State

, 39 So. 3d 471, 472 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Restitution Order S TRICKEN and R EMANDED

.

J AY and P RATT

, JJ., concur

.3 _____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331

.

_____________________________
<PAGE>


                                                                    Exhibit 23.1


CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements of
Extended Systems Incorporated on Forms S-8 (File Nos. 333-52865 and 333-49589)
of our report dated July 27, 1998 except as to the Contingencies Note, the date
of which is September 2, 1998, on our audits of the consolidated financial
statements of Extended Systems Incorporated, and its subsidiaries as of  June
30, 1998, and 1997, and for the three years in the period ended June 30, 1998,
which report is included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.



                                                  /s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP


Boise, Idaho
September 28, 1998
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DAVID COURTNEY,

1

Petitioner Below,

Appellant,

v.

CHRISTINE ACOSTA,

Respondent Below,

Appellee.

§

§ 

§ No. 66, 2022

§

§ Court Below: Family Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§ 

§ File No. CN15-01320

§ Petition No. 21-15330 

§ 

§ 

Submitted: June 14, 2022

Decided: June 27, 2022

ORDER

(1) On April 20, 2022, the Senior Court Clerk sent a letter directing the 

appellant to pay the Family Court filing fee and transcript cost on or before May 5, 

2022, or this Court would issue a notice to show cause why the appeal should not be 

dismissed. On May 6, 2022, the Senior Court Clerk issued a notice, sent by certified 

mail, directing the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed 

for the appellant’s failure to pay the Family Court filing fee and transcript cost. On 

May 26, 2022, the Senior Court Clerk issued a second notice, sent by certified mail, 

directing the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for 

the appellant’s failure to pay the Family Court filing fee and transcript cost. 

1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
2

(2) On June 3, 2022, the Court received the certified mail receipt indicating 

that the notice to show cause had been delivered on June 1, 2022. A timely response 

to the notice to show cause was due on or before June 13, 2022. The appellant 

having failed to respond to the notice to show cause within the required ten-day 

period, dismissal of this action is deemed to be unopposed. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, under Supreme Court Rules 3(b) 

and 29(b), that the appeal is DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr.

Justice