1

Filed 6/13/24 In re A.O. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re A.O. et al., Persons Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

K.O. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

E082737 

(Super.Ct.Nos. J288711, J288712)

OPINION

 E082434

(Super.Ct.Nos. J288711, J288712)

In re A.O. et al., Persons Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

K.O.,

Defendant and Appellant.
2

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Lynn Poncin, 

Judge. Affirmed.

Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant, K.O.

Amy Z. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant, K.R.

Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and David Guardado, Deputy County Counsel, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

K.O. (Mother) is the mother of D.O., G.R., and A.O. K.R. (Father) is the 

presumed father of G.R. In April 2021, San Bernardino County Children and Family 

Services (CFS) filed petitions on behalf of all three children pursuant to Welfare and 

Institutions Code1section 300 et seq., alleging that Father’s whereabouts were unknown 

and that Mother was unable to supervise, protect, or provide for the children as the result 

of her history of domestic violence, mental illness, and unresolved substance abuse.

In June 2022, the juvenile court held a 12-month review hearing, terminated 

Mother and Father’s reunification services, and set the matter for a selection and 

implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26. In February 2023, the trial court held 

a section 366.26 hearing as to D.O.; found that termination of parental rights would be 

detrimental to D.O.; and selected an alternative planned permanent living arrangement 

1

 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
3

for D.O. However, the selection and implementation hearings for G.R. and A.O. were 

continued to permit CFS to address unresolved issues related to the Indian Child Welfare 

Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).

In June 2023, Mother filed petitions pursuant to section 388, requesting the court 

reinstate reunification services and increase visitation with respect to all three children. 

The juvenile court summarily denied Mother’s petitions without conducting an 

evidentiary hearing, and we affirmed the juvenile court’s orders on appeal. (In re A.O.

(Apr. 16, 2024) E081665.)

In September 2023, Mother filed another petition pursuant to section 388, again

requesting the court reinstate reunification services for six months as to all three children

or, alternatively, return the children to her custody. The juvenile court held a hearing 

pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 5.570(f)(2) to permit the parties to argue 

whether a full evidentiary hearing was warranted and granted the request for 

reinstatement of reunification services as to D.O., but it denied the request as to G.R. and 

A.O. without a full evidentiary hearing. In November 2023, the juvenile court held a 

contested hearing pursuant to section 366.26 and terminated Mother’s and Father’s 

parental rights as to G.R. and A.O.

Mother appeals from the order denying her second section 388 petition and the 

order terminating her parental rights as to G.R. and A.O. Specifically, Mother argues that 

(1) the trial court erred in denying her section 388 petition because it considered facts set 

forth in interim reports submitted by CFS; (2) the trial court erred in denying her section 

388 petition without a full evidentiary hearing; and (3) to the extent the trial court erred in 
4

denying her section 388 petition, the order terminating parental rights must also be 

reversed. Father appeals from the order terminating his parental rights as to G.R., 

arguing only that the order must be reversed as to both parents if Mother establishes her 

right to reversal on appeal. We affirm the order denying Mother’s section 388 petition as 

well as the order terminating parental rights.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

A. Detention, Jurisdiction, and Disposition

In March 2021, CFS received a referral alleging that Mother had given birth 

prematurely to A.O. and that both Mother and A.O. had tested positive for amphetamines. 

After conducting an initial investigation, CFS detained Mother’s three children, D.O., 

G.R., and A.O., and filed petitions pursuant to section 300 et seq. on their behalf. 

Specifically, CFS alleged that Father’s whereabouts were unknown and that Mother was 

unable to supervise, protect, or provide for her children as the result of her history of 

domestic violence, mental illness, and unresolved substance abuse.

According to the detention report, a social worker confirmed with the hospital that 

A.O. had tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines at birth and required 

medical care in the neonatal intensive care unit. Mother was interviewed and admitted 

the following: (1) she was currently using illicit drugs; (2) she started using illicit drugs 

beginning at 12 years of age; and (3) she had a complicated history of addiction involving 

2

 Because Father makes no independent claim of error with respect to the 

termination of his parental rights, we summarize only the facts relevant to Mother’s 

claims of error.
5

multiple periods of sobriety followed by relapses. Mother stated that her longest period 

of sobriety was three years, but she relapsed after the birth of her second child. 

Additionally, Mother admitted that D.O. had previously been removed from her care for a 

period of time as the result of domestic violence. Finally, Mother acknowledged that she 

required medication to address multiple diagnosed mental health issues,

3 but she was not 

concerned with simultaneously using medication and illicit drugs. After the children 

were detained, the juvenile court was also informed that Father was incarcerated in state 

prison in Colorado.

In August 2021, the juvenile court held a jurisdictional and dispositional hearing; 

found Father to be the presumed father of G.R.; sustained allegations that Father had a 

history of domestic violence, unresolved substance abuse issues, and lacked the ability to 

care for G.R.; sustained allegations that Mother had a history of domestic violence, 

unresolved substance abuse issues, and mental health issues requiring treatment; and 

ordered the children formally removed from Mother’s and Father’s custody.

B. Circumstances Leading to Termination of Reunification Services

CFS filed a six-month review report in February 2022. At the time, Mother did 

not have stable housing or employment. Mother had been ordered to participate in 

individual counseling, parenting education, a domestic violence program, an outpatient 

substance abuse program, and periodic alcohol/drug testing. While Mother had made 

significant progress in individual counseling, completing seven out of eight sessions, she 

3

 Mother reported that she suffered from anxiety, post-partum depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and depression.
6

missed her last session and had yet to complete it. Additionally, Mother completed only 

three of 12 assigned domestic violence classes, failed to undergo substance abuse 

treatment, tested positive for illicit substances on four different occasions during random 

drug tests, and failed to submit to drug testing on 14 other occasions. Mother did not 

appear at the six-month review hearing, and the juvenile court ordered that the children 

continue as dependent children of the court.

CFS filed a 12-month review report in May 2022. CFS noted that all three 

children had initially been placed together in May 2021, but D.O. had been living in a 

separate placement from G.R. and A.O. since September 2021. Mother remained without 

stable housing or employment and confirmed she had not participated in any additional 

counseling or domestic violence classes since the six-month review report. Mother also 

confirmed that she had not started her outpatient substance abuse treatment program. 

Instead, Mother stated she had been attending narcotics anonymous meetings and 

expressed the belief that these meetings should be considered a suitable substitute for her 

court-ordered treatment. CFS reported that Mother failed to appear for random substance 

abuse testing on an additional four occasions since the last report. Mother did not appear 

at the 12-month review hearing, and the juvenile court ordered that reunification services 

with Mother and Father be terminated.

In October 2022, the juvenile court held a hearing pursuant to section 366.26. 

CFS recommended that the juvenile court terminate parental rights and select a 

permanent plan of adoption for G.R. and A.O., and further recommended that the juvenile 
7

court select an alternative permanent plan for D.O.4 In a continued hearing, the juvenile 

court determined that termination of parental rights as to D.O. would be detrimental and 

selected an alternative permanent plan for D.O. However, the section 366.26 hearing was 

continued as to G.R. and A.O. to permit CFS to address unresolved ICWA issues.

In April 2023, CFS filed an additional information report, notifying the juvenile 

court that Mother reported she had relocated out of state, given birth to another child, and 

was now living with family out of state.

C. Mother’s First Section 388 Petition

On June 2, 2023, Mother filed three petitions pursuant to section 388 (one for each 

child) requesting that the juvenile court reinstate reunification services and increase the 

frequency of visitation with each of her children. In support of her petition, Mother 

attested that she had begun individual counseling, parenting education classes, a domestic 

violence program, and a substance abuse treatment program. She attached a report 

indicating that she had tested clean for illicit substances on one occasion in April 2023. 

The juvenile court summarily denied the petitions without an evidentiary hearing. 

Mother appealed from the summary denial of her section 388 petitions, and this court 

affirmed the juvenile court’s orders on appeal. (In re A.O., supra, E081665.)

D. Mother’s Second Section 388 Petition

In September 2023, Mother filed another section 388 petition requesting that the 

juvenile court return the children to her custody or reinstate reunification services. In 

4

 D.O. was already a teenager at the time and objected to termination of parental 

rights.
8

support of her petition, Mother attested that she continued to be engaged in individual 

counseling, as well as numerous parenting education and domestic violence classes.

5

 

Mother stated she had successfully completed an educational program involving trauma 

awareness as well as health equity training. Finally, Mother attested that she had 

obtained a one-year chip of sobriety after testing negative for controlled substances and 

attached drug screening test results for the months of February, March, and April of 

2023. According to Mother, the requested changes were in the best interest of her 

children because she was “closely bonded” with them, visited with the children as often 

as possible, and was fully engaged during her visits. Mother also expressed the belief 

that she was soon to obtain her own housing through a public assistance program in 

Colorado; that it would be good for her children to develop a sibling bond with their new 

half sibling; and that maternal grandmother could act as a support system for the children.

In response to Mother’s petition, the juvenile court issued an order directing CFS 

to prepare a response and setting the matter for a hearing to determine if an evidentiary 

hearing was warranted. To comply with the juvenile court’s order, CFS prepared an 

interim review report. CFS reported that it conducted an interview with Mother on 

October 5, 2023, after Mother had an opportunity to consult with counsel to decide 

whether to voluntarily submit to the interview. In the interview, Mother acknowledged 

5

 Specifically, Mother stated, “I participate in Celebrate Recovery’s Christian 

Recovery Program . . . ; I serve as a Recovery Coach at Foundations for Life . . . ; I work 

with a therapist in individual therapy . . . ; Parenting Education at Hilltop Family 

Resource Center . . . ; Adult Mental Health First Aid through National Council for Mental 

Wellbeing; and in-home parenting education . . . .”
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that (1) her relapses and addiction issues previously hindered her ability to complete 

reunification services; (2) she had not been sober for the length of time claimed in her 

petition with respect to some illicit substances;

6

(3) she was not currently submitting to 

drug testing because it was no longer court-ordered; and (4) she had not completed any 

substance abuse programs. Additionally, Mother reported that she had stopped taking her 

prescribed psychotropic medication and had not seen a psychiatric care provider since 

2018. Based upon this interview, the social worker concluded that Mother was not 

currently compliant with her psychiatric medication and had never fully addressed her 

substance abuse issues.

On October 11, 2023, the juvenile court held a hearing to determine whether to set 

a formal evidentiary hearing on Mother’s section 388 petition. At the outset of the 

hearing, CFS noted that it was not contesting Mother’s request for reinstatement of 

reunification services as to D.O. As a result, the juvenile court granted the petition as to 

D.O. without objection from any parties.

With respect to G.R. and A.O., CFS requested the juvenile court accept its interim 

report into evidence.

7

 The juvenile court inquired whether any party had objection to this 

request, and Mother’s counsel expressly stated there was no objection. The juvenile 

court then permitted the parties to argue the issue of whether it should grant a formal

6

 Specifically, Mother reported to the social worker that she had not used 

methamphetamines for a year, but she had only ceased marijuana use for eight months.

7

 CFS also requested the juvenile court accept into evidence its regular additional 

information reports filed with the juvenile court pertaining to ICWA compliance and 

visitation.
10

evidentiary hearing on the petition. During argument, Mother did not contradict any of 

the representations in the interim report and, instead, expressly referenced portions of the

interim report as evidence in support of her claim that changed circumstances warranted a 

modification of the juvenile court’s prior orders. Mother did not request to testify or to 

cross-examine the social worker who prepared the report. The juvenile court found that 

Mother had not met her burden to show a prima facie case of changed circumstances or 

that her requested changes would be in the best interest of the children and denied 

Mother’s petition.

E. Termination of Parental Rights and Appeal

In November 2023, the juvenile court held a contested section 366.26 hearing as to 

G.R. and A.O. The juvenile court found that both children were adoptable, that parents 

had not met their burden to show any applicable exceptions to termination of their 

parental rights, terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, and selected a 

permanent plan of adoption for G.R. and A.O. Mother appeals from the order denying 

her second section 388 petition, and both Mother and Father appeal from the order 

terminating their parental rights. We ordered the appeals consolidated.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Issue Presented, General Legal Principles, and Standard of Review

While both Mother and Father have appealed from the order terminating parental 

rights, neither has asserted any independent error with respect to this order on appeal. 

Instead, Mother has appealed the order terminating her parental rights to maintain her 

appeal of the order denying her section 388 petition, arguing only that the erroneous 
11

denial of her section 388 petition “infects the outcome” of the subsequent selection and 

implementation hearing such that reversal of the order terminating her parental rights is 

necessary to permit a new hearing. Likewise, Father asserts no independent error in the 

order terminating his parental rights, claiming only that reversal of the order as to him 

would be appropriate if we find error warranting reversal of the order as to Mother. 

Thus, the issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying 

Mother’s second section 388 petition.

“Section 388 allows a parent to petition to change, modify, or set aside any 

previous juvenile court order. [Citation.] ‘The petitioner has the burden of showing by a 

preponderance of the evidence (1) that there is new evidence or a change of 

circumstances and (2) that the proposed modification would be in the best interests of the 

child.’ ” (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 845; § 388, subd. (a).) The juvenile 

court has “four options when presented with a section 388 request to change a prior court 

order: (1) grant the request because all parties and attorneys agree to the request; 

(2) summarily deny the request on various grounds, including that the request does not 

state new evidence or a change of circumstances, or that the proposed change of order 

does not promote the best interests of the child; (3) grant a hearing on whether the court 

should grant or deny an evidentiary hearing on the request; and (4) order a hearing 

because the best interests of the child may be promoted by the request.” (In re Alayah J.

(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 469, 480.)

On appeal, both parties invoke the legal principles and standard of review 

applicable to the summary denial of a section 388 petition. However, we observe that in 
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this case, the juvenile court did not summarily deny Mother’s petition. Instead, it ordered 

CFS to prepare a response and set a hearing on whether the court should grant or deny an 

evidentiary hearing on the petition. While we have found no published decisions setting 

forth the standard of review applicable to the trial court’s denial of a petition after 

conducting such a hearing, logic dictates that such a decision should be governed by the 

same standard of review applicable to a summary denial. After all, the hearing 

contemplated by Rules of Court, rule 5.570(f)(2) is “for the parties to argue whether an 

evidentiary hearing on the petition should be granted or denied.” (Id., emphasis added.) 

Thus, the central issue at the time of such a hearing remains whether the allegations of 

the petition state a prima facie case for relief and should be subject to the same standard 

of review applicable when a juvenile court makes the determination ex parte.

“We review the juvenile court’s summary denial of a section 388 petition for 

abuse of discretion.” (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250; In re C.J.W.

(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1079; In re Samuel A. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1, 7.)

8

 

Nevertheless, “[t]he abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it 

calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial 

court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are 

reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary 

and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712, 

8

 We further observe that, even in cases where the juvenile court proceeds to a 

full evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition, an order denying a section 388 petition 

after such a hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 

7 Cal.4th 295, 316-317.)
13

footnotes omitted; In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 123.) We proceed to analyze 

each aspect of the juvenile court’s order challenged on appeal, but we find no abuse of 

discretion warranting reversal.

B. Consideration of Interim Reports

Mother first contends that the juvenile court erred when it considered CFS’s 

interim report as well as additional information reports because doing so constituted a 

denial of her right to due process. We deem the issue forfeited on appeal and, even in the 

absence of forfeiture, would find no error warranting reversal.

1. Forfeiture

“[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an 

objection could have been but was not made in the trial court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 

32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) “A party forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal 

on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court. . . . Forfeiture . . .

applies in juvenile dependency litigation and is intended to prevent a party from standing 

by silently until the conclusion of the proceedings.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 

132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222; In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 724 [“[A]s a 

general rule, failure to object in the juvenile court forfeits a parent’s right to pursue an 

issue on appeal.”].) In this case, the juvenile court directly asked the parties whether 

there was any objection to consideration of the reports at issue at the time of the hearing 

and all parties expressly stated they did not object. Given this record, we conclude that 

Mother has forfeited any claim of error premised upon the trial court’s consideration of 

these reports.
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Mother argues that we should deem her counsel’s failure to object as ineffective 

assistance of counsel. However, “[a] parent seeking to establish ineffective assistance of 

counsel must show both that counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of a 

reasonably competent attorney practicing in the field of juvenile dependency law, and 

that it is ‘ “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would 

have been reached in the absence of the error.” ’ . . . When a parent seeks to assert 

ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal . . . , appellate courts further limit their 

review to consider only those claims ‘ “where ‘there simply could be no satisfactory 

explanation’ for trial counsel’s action or inaction.” ’ ” (In re M.F. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 

86, 108-109.) In our view, the record clearly discloses at least one satisfactory 

explanation for trial counsel’s decision not to object. During the hearing, Mother’s 

counsel expressly invoked portions of the interim report that counsel believed to be 

favorable to Mother in arguing that Mother’s petition should be granted.

9

 The decision to 

rely on evidence that can be both beneficial and harmful to a client’s case is a reasonable 

trial tactic within the discretion of trial counsel. (In re Ana C. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 

1317, 1330 [decision to call an adverse witness in order to elicit testimony used to 

challenge statements set in prior reports was reasonable trial tactic]; People v. Riel (2000) 

22 Cal.4th 1153, 1186 [decision not to object to evidence was reasonable where “counsel 

could reasonably believe [the evidence] was helpful”].) Thus, at least on this record, 

9

 Specifically, counsel stated: “There has been a change of circumstances in this 

case. That’s, I think, noted by the special interim report . . . , which acknowledges Mom 

has addressed or begun to, at least, address the concerns that brought the case before the 

Court.”
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Mother has not shown her counsel was ineffective by failing to object to consideration of 

the interim reports.

2. No Error Even in the Absence of Forfeiture

Even in the absence of forfeiture, we would find no denial of due process in the 

juvenile court’s decision to consider the interim review report and the additional 

information report. “In the context of dependency proceedings, . . . ‘due process is not 

synonymous with full-fledged cross-examination rights. [Citation.] Due process is a 

flexible concept which depends upon the circumstances and a balancing of various 

factors. [Citation.]’ ‘The essential characteristic of due process in the statutory 

dependency scheme is fairness in the procedure . . . .’ ” (In re A.B. (2022) 

79 Cal.App.5th 906, 930; In re E.S. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1340.) “ ‘In juvenile 

dependency litigation, due process focuses on the right to notice and the right to be 

heard.’ ” (J.H. v. Superior Court (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 530, 536-537; In re R.F. (2021) 

71 Cal.App.5th 459, 470 [“ ‘Due process requirements in the context of child dependency 

litigation have . . . focused principally on the right to a hearing and the right to notice.’ 

”].)10 Whether a particular procedure meets the constitutional requirements of due 

process is an issue of law we review de novo. (A.B., supra, at p. 925.)

10 We also observe that even in the context of a criminal proceeding, “ ‘[t]he 

admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process 

violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair’ ” (People v. Tran (2022) 

13 Cal.5th 1169, 1209), and the “ ‘failure to comply with the state’s rule of evidence is 

neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis’ for granting relief on federal due process 

grounds” (People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 229).
16

Generally, we see no fundamental unfairness in the juvenile court’s request for a 

response and CFS’s preparation of an interim report. Given the unique and ongoing 

nature of a juvenile dependency case, the juvenile court has express statutory authority to

“require the social worker or any other agency to render any periodic reports concerning 

[dependent children] that the court deems necessary or desirable” (§ 365); and, it is well 

accepted that in resolving a section 388 petition, “ ‘the [juvenile] court may consider the 

entire factual and procedural history of the case’ ” (In re N.F. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 112, 

120; In re R.A. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 826, 837).

More importantly, the specific record in this case does not suggest that Mother 

was denied fair notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard regarding the interim 

report or additional information reports she now complains of on appeal. The preparation 

of a response was specifically requested by the juvenile court in a written order served on 

all parties weeks prior to the hearing. The only new information furnished in the interim 

report was a summary of an interview with Mother; the social worker expressly advised 

Mother that the interview was being conducted for the purpose of preparing a response to 

Mother’s section 388 petition; and Mother expressly stated she would confer with her 

counsel prior to agreeing to participate in the interview. Thus, the specific circumstances 

of this case do not suggest that Mother was denied fair notice of the existence, contents,

or purpose of the interim report in relation to her section 388 hearing.

Additionally, Mother was present at the hearing on her section 388 petition, did 

not dispute any representations made in the interim report or additional information 

reports, made no request to testify in order to clarify any representation in any reports, 
17

and made no request to cross-examine the social worker or any other witness with respect 

to the reports. As such, nothing in the record suggests Mother was denied a meaningful 

opportunity to address the information provided by CFS in its interim report. Under such 

circumstances, even if Mother had objected to consideration of the report to preserve the 

issue on appeal, we would conclude that consideration of the report did not violate due 

process.

C. Mother’s Petition Failed to Make the Necessary Prima Facie Showing

We also conclude that Mother’s petition did not make a sufficient prima facie 

showing requiring the juvenile court to hold a full evidentiary hearing. When a section 

388 petition is denied without an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court does not abuse its 

discretion “if even a liberal interpretation of the proffered evidence of changed 

circumstances might not justify modifying the order terminating reunification.” (In re 

Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1414.) As we explain, even if we were to 

disregard the information contained in the interim reports submitted by CFS, the 

allegations and evidence submitted with Mother’s petition were not sufficient to make a 

prima facie showing that changed circumstances or the best interests of the children 

warranted modification of the prior order terminating reunification services.

With respect to changed circumstances, Mother’s petition alleged she was now 

participating in a recovery group, working as a recovery coach, participating in individual 

therapy, and participating in various mental health and parenting education courses. 

However, the record in this case shows that Mother had previously enrolled and 

participated to some degree in numerous services prior to termination of reunification 
18

services. It was not Mother’s unwillingness to participate in services but her inability to 

commit to and successfully complete services that resulted in the orders terminating 

reunification services. On this point, Mother’s declaration identified only two 

successfully completed programs. Further, the successfully completed programs were 

related to trauma awareness and health equity training, and not substance abuse, which 

was the primary reason for the dependency. Thus, the fact that Mother was actively 

participating in counseling, classes, and treatment, but only able to successfully complete 

two courses at the time of her petition, did not show a material change in the 

circumstances that already existed at the time the juvenile court terminated reunification 

services.

On appeal, Mother emphasizes that evidence attached to her petition showed that 

(1) she had transitioned to a sober living home as of May 2023; (2) she had been engaged 

in individual therapy since May; (3) she began working as a recovery coach in July; 

(4) she has been working with an in-home parenting provider since April; and (5) she had

been regularly participating in group therapy. However, almost all of the evidence 

involved a period of approximately five months prior to the filing of her section 388 

petition. Likewise, Mother attached only three drug screening tests covering a limited, 

three-month period in support of her assertion that she was now sober from all controlled

substances, the last of which was also done approximately five months prior to the filing 

of the petition.

In the context of Mother’s long history of substance abuse with repeated periods 

of sobriety and relapse, the period addressed by the allegations of her petition was 
19

relatively brief. While such evidence certainly supports an inference of changing 

circumstances, courts faced with similar facts have concluded that such a showing is not 

enough to show that circumstances have changed sufficiently to compel the juvenile court 

to hold an evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition. (In re Ernesto R. (2014) 

230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223 [Where a parent “has a history of drug relapses, is in the early 

stages of recovery, and is still addressing a chronic substance abuse problem,” the 

parent’s “recent sobriety reflects ‘changing,’ not changed circumstances” and “is not a 

substantial change in circumstances.”]; In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1081 

[Parents did not demonstrate changed circumstances where “both have extensive histories 

of drug use,” and “[t]heir recent efforts at rehabilitation were only three months old

. . . .”].) Thus, even setting aside CFS’s interim review report,

11 the allegations and 

evidence submitted with Mother’s petition did not show changed circumstances requiring 

the juvenile court to order an evidentiary hearing.

With respect to the best interests of the children, Mother’s petition made a single, 

conclusory statement that she was “closely bonded” with the children, evidenced by the 

11

 According to CFS’s interim review report, Mother subsequently admitted that 

she had not actually completed any substance abuse programs; was no longer submitting 

to drug testing; did not intend to submit to any drug testing unless required for 

reunification; was no longer compliant with her psychotropic medication regimen; and 

had not actually been sober from all controlled substances for the period claimed in her 

petition, admitting that she had engaged in marijuana use within the year she claimed to 

have been sober.
20

fact that the children enjoyed visits with Mother.

12

 However, “[a]s to the best interests 

element, after the court has bypassed or terminated reunification services and set the 

matter for a section 366.26. hearing, the focus of the case shifts from the parents’ interest 

in the care, custody, and companionship of the child to the needs of the child for 

permanency and stability. [Citations.] A court entertaining a section 388 petition at this 

stage in the proceedings ‘must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate 

question before it, that is, the best interest of the child.’ ” (In re N.F., supra, 

68 Cal.App.5th at p. 121; In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 526-527.) After 

termination of reunification services, preservation of the biological parent-child 

relationship is no longer in the best interest of the child where it conflicts with a child’s 

interest in permanency and stability. (In re J.C., at pp. 526-527.) Thus, Mother’s 

assertion of a close bond with the children, without any suggestion of how preservation 

of the bond would advance the children’s ultimate interest in permanency and stability, 

did not show that reinstatement of reunification services would be in the children’s best 

interest.

On appeal, Mother suggests that because the juvenile court reinstated Mother’s 

reunification services as to D.O., it was also in G.R. and A.O.’s best interest to reinstate 

Mother’s reunification services as to them because doing so would preserve sibling 

bonds. However, by the time of the hearing on Mother’s section 388 petition, G.R and 

12

 Mother also alluded to future, hypothetical circumstances, which had yet to 

materialize, such as her expectation of being offered subsidized housing in the near future 

and her belief that the children could form a beneficial relationship with their one-yearold half sibling. 
21

A.O had been placed separately from D.O. for more than two years. The last time they 

lived with D.O., G.R. and A.O. were three years old and six months old, respectively. 

Thus, the circumstances of this case do not suggest that the nature of any relationship 

G.R. and A.O. had with D.O. was the type that would outweigh G.R. and A.O.’s interest 

in permanency and stability. (See In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 61 [Where 

dependent children were “three years old . . . and less than two years old” when placed

separately from their older sibling and “had been living separately from [the older 

sibling] for a year and a half,” “the conclusion was virtually compelled” that any sibling 

bonds “should not prevent them from gaining a permanent home through adoption.”].)

Because the evidence proffered in support of Mother’s section 388 petition would 

not support modification of a prior order even if accepted as true, such evidence does not 

show a prima facie case for relief, and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying the petition without proceeding to a full evidentiary hearing. Thus, Mother has 

not met her burden on appeal to show an abuse of discretion warranting reversal of the 

juvenile court’s order denying her section 388 petition. Further, because Mother and 

Father have not asserted any independent claim of error with respect to the order 

terminating parental rights, we also affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating parental 

rights. 
22

IV. DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS

J.

We concur:

MILLER

Acting P. J.

MENETREZ

J.