UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4407

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHRISTIAN OMAR BELTRAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Danville. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior 

District Judge. (4:12-cr-00023-JLK-1)

Submitted: December 18, 2013 Decided: December 31, 2013

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Krysia Carmel Nelson, LAW OFFICES OF KRYSIA CARMEL NELSON, PLC, 

Keswick, Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United 

States Attorney, Ashley B. Neese, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Christian Omar Beltran was convicted by a jury of 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012) (Count One), possession with 

intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) (2012) (Count Two), and possession of a firearm 

during and in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012) (Count Three). Beltran 

was sentenced to a total of 168 months of imprisonment. On 

appeal, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to 

support his § 924(c) conviction and that the district court 

erred in denying a two-level sentencing reduction for acceptance 

of responsibility under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 3E1.1 (2012). We affirm.

In February 2012, law enforcement officers conducted a 

stop of Beltran’s vehicle. Inside the vehicle officers found a 

loaded pistol and a bag containing more than forty pounds of 

marijuana. Beltran acknowledged ownership of the firearm, which 

had been previously reported as stolen, and admitted that he had 

been engaged in the transportation of marijuana for some time. 

At trial, Beltran testified that he possessed the firearm solely

for the protection of himself and his family and did not intend 

to use it “in furtherance” of his drug trafficking. The jury 

convicted Beltran on all three counts.
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At sentencing, the government objected to the 

probation officer’s recommendation that Beltran’s acceptance of 

responsibility warranted a two-level reduction in his offense 

level calculation. The sentencing court sustained the 

objection.

Beltran first argues that there was insufficient 

evidence to support his § 924(c) conviction. We review the 

sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction “by 

determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record, 

when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, to 

support the conviction.” United States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83, 

93 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. 

denied, 132 S. Ct. 2118 (2012). We will not overturn a jury 

verdict if “any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 387 (4th Cir. 2012)

(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 

133 S. Ct. 1278 (2013).

To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the 

government must prove that Beltran (1) used, carried or 

possessed a firearm (2) in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

crime or crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); 

United States v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 565 (4th Cir. 2009). 

“Furtherance” under § 924(c) means “the act of furthering, 
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advancing, or helping forward.” United States v. Lomax, 293 

F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and 

brackets omitted). Whether a firearm furthered, advanced, or 

helped forward a drug trafficking crime is a question of fact. 

Id. Numerous factors might lead a reasonable trier of fact to 

find a connection between a defendant’s possession of a weapon 

and a drug trafficking crime, including: “the type of drug 

activity that is being conducted, accessibility of the firearm, 

the type of weapon, whether the weapon is stolen, the status of 

the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun is 

loaded, proximity to drugs or drug profits, and the time and 

circumstances under which the gun is found.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

In the present case, Beltran admitted that he was 

trafficking over forty pounds of marijuana, which the evidence 

established had a wholesale value of approximately $40,000. The 

firearm was loaded and was on the passenger-side floorboard,

accessible to Beltran and in close proximity to the marijuana. 

Although Beltran had a license to carry a firearm, the pistol 

itself was stolen. We conclude that, taken together and in the 

light most favorable to the government, sufficient evidence was 

adduced at trial to sustain the conviction.

Beltran next argues that the district court erred in 

sustaining the government’s objection to an adjustment in his 
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Guidelines sentence for acceptance of responsibility. Whether 

the district court has the authority to grant such a reduction 

is a legal conclusion to be reviewed de novo, United States v. 

Hargrove, 478 F.3d 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2007), but the 

determination of whether a defendant is entitled to the 

adjustment “is clearly a factual issue and thus reviewable under 

a clearly erroneous standard.” United States v. White, 875 F.2d 

427, 431 (4th Cir. 1989).

Section 3E1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

(“USSG”) (2012) provides for a two-level reduction for a 

defendant who “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility 

for his offense.” United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 678 

(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have 

held that, “[a]lthough the reduction is not intended to apply to 

a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at 

trial[,] . . . going to trial does not automatically preclude 

the adjustment." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see

USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2. However, “[p]ursuant to the Guidelines, 

a denial of relevant conduct is inconsistent with acceptance of 

responsibility.” Elliott v. United States, 332 F.3d 753, 766

(4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). An 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction constitutes relevant conduct for the 

purposes of § 3E1.1. Hargrove, 478 F.3d at 201. “[T]he 

sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a 
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defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, and thus . . . the 

determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great 

deference on review.” Elliott, 332 F.3d at 761 (internal 

quotations omitted).

Our examination of the record convinces us that the 

district court did not misapprehend its authority to grant an 

acceptance of responsibility reduction, but simply exercised its 

discretion to decline to accept the adjustment recommended by

the probation officer. Based on the facts before the district 

court, we find no error, clear or otherwise, in the court’s 

decision. Therefore, this claim entitles Beltran to no relief.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED