alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Energy

###### Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

          - [Docket No. RT01-15-000]

Take notice that on October 16, 2000, the above-captioned companies (collectively Applicants) tendered a filing in compliance with Order No. 2000 and a petition for declaratory order pursuant to section 35.34(d) of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (Commission's) regulations and rule 207(a)(2) of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 CFR 35.34(d) and 207(a)(2)(2000).

Applicants request the Commission to find that if they form an independent transmission company (ITC) consistent with the ITC described in the filing, that the subject ITC would be considered independent and would be permitted to share certain functions with the regional transmission organization Applicants will seek to join.

                    Any person desiring to be heard or protest such filing should file a motion to intervene, comments, or protests with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE, Washington DC 20426, in accordance with rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). All such motions, comments and protests should be filed on or before November 20, 2000. Protests will be considered by the Commission to determine the appropriate action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the proceedings. Any person wishing to become a party must file a motion to intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and are available for public inspection. This filing may also be viewed on the Internet at http://www.ferc.fed.us/​online/​rims.htm (call 202-208-2222 for assistance). Beginning November 1, 2000, comments and protests may be filed electronically via the internet in lieu of paper.                     *See,*18 CFR 385.2001(a)(1)(iii) and the instructions on the Commission's web site at                     *http://www.ferc.fed.us/​efi/​doorbell.htm.*

Linwood A. Watson, Jr.,

Acting Secretary.

[FR Doc. 00-27549  Filed 10-25-00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
Director Compensation Arrangements



 Exhibit 10.32 
 DIRECTOR COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS 
 Radiant’s present policy is not to pay any cash compensation to its
directors, other than to the Audit Committee Chairman, who receives a $5,000 annual retainer. Each non-employee director receives an automatic grant of options to purchase 10,000 shares of Radiant’s common stock on the last business day of each
year. Each non-employee director is also reimbursed for travel and other expenses incurred in connection with the performance of his or her duties. 
 In
addition, all new non-employee directors receive a one-time grant of an option to purchase 25,000 shares of Radiant’s common stock at an exercise price equal to the fair market value of such stock on the date of grant, which options vest over a
period of three years. All such options expire, unless previously exercised or terminated, ten years from the date of grant. 
 Radiant’s non-management
directors are also eligible to receive additional stock option grants under Radiant’s Non-Management Directors’ Stock Option Plan, in the discretion of Radiant’s Board of Directors.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 208 (Thursday, October 26, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 64236]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-27534]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--Die Products Consortium (``DPC'')

    Notice is hereby given that, on September 22, 2000, pursuant to 
section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), Die Products Consortium 
(``DPC'') has filed written notifications simultaneously with the 
Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing changes in 
its membership status. The notifications were filed for the purpose of 
extending the Act's provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust 
plaintiffs to actual damages under specified circumstances. 
Specifically, Honeywell, Inc., Minneapolis, MN; and Intel Corporation, 
Santa Clara, CA have been dropped as parties to this venture. Also, 
Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation will cease to 
administer the Die Products Consortium as of October 1, 2000.
    No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned 
activity of the group research project. Membership in this group 
research project remains open, and Die Products Consortium intends to 
file additional written notification disclosing all changes in 
membership.
    On November 15, 1999, Die Products Consortium filed its original 
notification pursuant to section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of 
Justice published a notice in the Federal Register pursuant to section 
6(b) of the Act on June 26, 2000 (65 FR 39429).
    The last notification was filed with the Department on March 31, 
2000. A notice was published in the Federal Register pursuant to 
section 6(b) of the Act on June 29, 2000 (65 FR 40129).

Constance K. Robinson,
Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 00-27534 Filed 10-25-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
#### SPROUL v. JACKSON.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Jan. 25, 1952.

*616J. B. Campbell, Barbourville, C. K. Calvert, Pineville, C. B. Pope, Barbourville, for appellant.

J. J. Tye, V. A. Jordan, Barbourville, for appellee.

CLAY, Commissioner.

Two independent lawsuits, arising out of the same series of transactions, are consolidated on this appeal. The Chancellor found for appellee in one case, and the jury returned a verdict for her in the other. If the Chancellor’s decision was correct, both appeals must be affirmed.

The first suit was brought by appellee to have her title quieted to a tract of land which appellant was claiming. Appellee had in her possession a general warranty deed apparently executed by appellant on March 2, 1942. Pie contends this deed was a forgery. Appellee testified appellant delivered it to her, and the notary public whose name appears thereon testified that appellant executed it and acknowledged it in her presence. True samples of appellant’s signature appear similar to that appearing on the deed.

The reason why this deed was executed, and the consideration, was shown to be the prior agreement of appellant to reconvey the same property which appellee’s mother had conveyed to him. It is not necessary to go into the details of the transaction as we think the evidence was convincing that appellee’s version of the preceding events is much more reasonable than appellant’s.

Appellant insists he did not sign the deed. There was ample evidence to justify the Chancellor finding otherwise. Appellant next argues that an oral agreement to convey real estate cannot be enforced. The simple answer is that appellee is not attempting to enforce an oral agreement. She relies on an executed deed. It was properly adjudged valid, and therefore ap-pellee has the title she claims.

After the judgment quieting appel-lee’s title was entered, she paid off appellant’s $700 note, which he had given to a bank, together with a mortgage on this property. This mortgage became effective after the date of the deed but before ap-pellee had recorded it. It was therefore a valid lien upon the property. In the second suit to recover this $700, the jury found for appellee.

Appellant claims that in paying his note appellee acted as a volunteer. This is not true. Appellant wrongfully mortgaged appellee’s property after he had conveyed it to her. To protect it she had a perfect right to remove this encumbrance. Having taken an assignment of the note, she was substituted as the creditor instead of the bank. Appellant had no defense to the note.

The judgments in both cases are affirmed.
#### HUMPHRESS v. HUMPHRESS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 12, 1951.

H. M. Sutton, Corbin, Murry L. Brown and H. H. Owens, Barbourville, for appellant.

Thomas .F. Young, Corbin, R. L. Brown, Williamsburg, for appellee.

CLAY, Commissioner.

Appellee, the husband, was granted a dL vorce from appellant, his wife, on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. She appeals and contends that because ap-*626pellee was really the party at -fault, she should have been allowed alimony.

Appellee is 63 years of age and his former wife is twenty years younger. They were married in 1943. At that time appellee had several grown children by a former marriage, and apparently they played a part in the final breakup of the home. The evidence indicates that both husband and wife were well respected in the community where they lived. He worked hard and maintained a good home. She was a competent housekeeper when not suffering from actual or imagined illness.

The wife seems to have felt that the husband thought more of his own children than he .did of her, and she resented the fact that they and their families would visit in her home on numerous occasions. This resulted in her having spells of sickness, going to bed, and becoming angry with her husband or his children. There is testimony that from time to time she would engage in vicious quarreling, and threatened her husband with deadly weapons. The unhappy situation culminated in a big quarrel when the wife attacked her stepson with a butcher knife.

On her side, appellant .insists that ,she was a sick woman and that her husband failed to treat her as he should. She also says that he used: abusive language to her, and that she wore herself put waiting on her stepchildren.

It is unnecessary to discuss the evidence in detail, but we believe it was all carefully considered b'y the Chancellor, who wrote a fine analyticál opinion. While the husband may not have been as considérate as he could be, appellant failed to establish that she was .entitled to a divorce or that the principal fault;' resulting in a breakup of the marriage, was his.

We think that when appellant married a man who had children of his own, she should have made a greater effort to maintain domestic harmony rather than to permit her nervous' condition to constitute a threat to the family life. The Chancellor’s findings are amply supported by the evidence in the case, and since the divorce was properly granted to appellee, she is not 'entitled to -alimony. See Sullivan v. Sullivan, 307 Ky. 222, 210 S.W.2d 760; and Hartstern v. Hartstern, 311 Ky. 564, 224 S.W.2d 447.

The judgment is affirmed.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED January 10, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________ No. 06-51125

_____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee v. JESUS MIGUEL ANGEL-SALAZAR also known as, Jesus Miguel Salazar Defendant - Appellant

--------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Texas, El Paso

(06-CR-801)

--------------------- Before SMITH, WIENER and OWEN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * IT IS ORDERED that the Appellant’s unopposed motion to vacate sentence of the district court is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERE D that the Appellant’s unopposed motion to remand case for resentencing is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Appellant’s unopposed motion to issue the mandate forthwith is DENIED as unnecessary.
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3350 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3350

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           November 18, 2013

                                Received

                           December 20, 2013

 Read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, 
                              and Pensions

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
  To authorize health insurance issuers to continue to offer for sale 
  current individual health insurance coverage in satisfaction of the 
minimum essential health insurance coverage requirement, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Keep Your Health Plan Act of 2013''.

SEC. 2. IF YOU LIKE YOUR HEALTH CARE PLAN, YOU CAN KEEP IT.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any provision of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (including any amendment made by 
such Act or by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010), a health insurance issuer that has in effect health insurance 
coverage in the individual market as of January 1, 2013, may continue 
after such date to offer such coverage for sale during 2014 in such 
market outside of an Exchange established under section 1311 or 1321 of 
such Act (42 U.S.C. 18031, 18041).
    (b) Treatment as Grandfathered Health Plan in Satisfaction of 
Minimum Essential Coverage.--Health insurance coverage described in 
subsection (a) shall be treated as a grandfathered health plan 

              

for purposes of the amendment made by section 1501(b) of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act.

            Passed the House of Representatives November 15, 2013.

            Attest:

                                                 KAREN L. HAAS,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
Electronically FiledIntermediate Court of AppealsCAAP-11-000016521-OCT-201108:59 AM
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 19
- 6503

ELSON MCKANIC , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v. WARDEN LEWIS , Respondent

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Rock Hill

. Paige Jones Gossett, Magistrate Judge. ( 0:19

- cv
- 00554

- HMH )

Submitted : August 20, 2019 Decided: September 5, 2019

Before KING, WYNN, and RICHARDSON , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Elson McKanic, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Elson McKanic seeks to appeal the district court’s order d ismis sing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition without prejudice as successive . The district court referred this case to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2012). The magistrate judge
recommended dismissal without prejudice and advised M cKanic that failure to file timely objections to this recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court order based upon the recommendation. Despite this warning, McKanic did not file objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation

. The timely filing of specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when the parties have been warned of the consequences of noncompliance. Wright v. Collins , 766
F. 2d 841, 845

- 46 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140 (1985). McKanic has waived appellate review by failing to file timely objections after receiving proper
notice . Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to procee d in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN NO. 03- 08 -00 733 -CV Ci tyof A ust in , A ppe lla nt

v. Gar ry P arker , Appellee F ROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. C-1- CV-06 -00 0037 , HO NORAB LE ERIC SHEP P ERD , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant has f

iled a motion to dism iss, ex plaining that the parties have executed a settlement ag ree ment and intend to file a motion for non-suit in the trial court. We grant the motion and dis mis s th e a

pp e a l. T e x. R. A

pp . P. 42 .1 (a )( 2) . Co sts wi ll b e pa id by the pa rt y inc ur ri ngthe m.

__________________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and He nson Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion Filed: January

27, 2009
#### DEVEROUX v. STATE.

No. 24933.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 1, 1950.

No attorney for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge. '

The conviction is for the unlawful sale of wine in a dry area. The penalty was assessed at a fine of $150.

The record is before us without bills of exception or a statement of facts. All matters of procedure appear to be in regular form.

The judgment is affirmed.
Order entered April 4, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-11-01708-CV

HAL RACHAL, JR., Appellant

V.

LETKIEWICZ & FOSTER, Appellee

On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 2

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. PR-09-2413-2

ORDER

We GRANT appellee’s April 2, 2013 third motion for an extension of time to file a brief. 

We ORDER the brief tendered to this Court by appellee on April 2, 2013 filed as of the date of 

this order.

We DENY appellee’s April 2, 2013 motion to strike two documents in the appendix of 

appellant’s brief. The Court will consider only evidence that is properly before it. See Green v. 

Kaposta, 152 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).

/s/ CAROLYN WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE
#### TOLIVER v. STATE.

No. 26220.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 28, 1953.

No attorney on appeal for appellant.

Bill J. Cornelius, County Atty., Jefferson, George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is the possession of beer for the purpose of sale in a dry area; the punishment, a fine of $250.

No statement of facts or bills of exception accompany the record.

The sole question presented for review grows out of the overruling of appellant’s motion in arrest of judgment. Therein, he alleges that a fatal variance *exists*between the complaint and the information in that the complaint alleged the date of the prohibition election to be “the 29th day of May, A.D., 1942,” while the information alleges said date as “the - day of-, A.D., 1942.”

*389While it is true that the constituent elements of the offense must appear in both the complaint and the information, yet the same need not appear in the same phraseology or degree of particularity so long as there is no conflict between the two.

Branch’s Annotated Penal Code, Sec. 482, expresses this rule as follows: “When there is a substantial agreement between the information and the complaint on which it is based, a mere variance in the wording is not material.”

Attention is further directed to our holding in Rowlett v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 238 S.W.2d 781, in which we said that the allegation relative to the actual date of holding the prohibition election was an immaterial matter and need not be alleged.

We hold no variance to be shown by the above.

Finding no reversible error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Exhibit
10.43

AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO INVESTMENT MANAGER
AGREEMENT

This AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO INVESTMENT MANAGER
AGREEMENT, dated as of September  29,  2005 (this
‘‘Amendment’’), is made and entered into by
and between Renaissance Underwriting Managers Ltd., a Bermudian Company
(hereinafter called the ‘‘Company’’), and
BlackRock Financial Management, Inc., a Delaware corporation
(hereinafter called the ‘‘Manager’’).
Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the
meaning ascribed to such terms in the Investment Manager Agreement (as
defined
below).


WITNESSETH:


WHEREAS, the
Company and the Manager are parties to that certain Investment Manager
Agreement, dated as of July  1,  2005 (the
‘‘Investment Manager
Agreement’’);

WHEREAS, the parties hereto
desire to amend to the Investment Manager Agreement, as set forth
herein; and

WHEREAS, Section 16 of the Investment
Manager Agreement provides for the amendment thereof by a written
instrument signed by both of the parties thereto.

NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual terms, conditions and other
agreements set forth herein, the parties hereto hereby agree as
follows:

1. Exhibit A — Investment
Guidelines of the Investment Manager Agreement is hereby amended by
deleting the first paragraph under the caption ‘‘Duration
Guidelines’’ in its entirety and inserting the following
in lieu thereof:

‘‘The
weighted average duration of the Company’s portfolio will not
exceed three
years.’’

2.  This
Amendment shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the
laws of the State of New York applicable to contracts executed in and
to be performed in that state without regard to that state’s
conflict of laws
principles.

3.  Except as expressly
amended herein, all terms of the Investment Manager Agreement shall
remain in full force and
effect.

4.  This Amendment may be
executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed
an original but all of which together shall constitute one and the same
instrument.


[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT
BLANK]









IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have
executed this Amendment as of the date first above
written.


		RENAISSANCE UNDERWRITING
MANAGERS LTD.





		By: /s/ Laurence B.
Richardson 




			
		 	Name: Laurence B.
Richardson
 Title: Vice
President



		BLACKROCK FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT,
INC.





		By: /s/ Michael C.
Huebsch 




			
		 	Name: Michael C.
Huebsch
 Title: Managing
Director


2