COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Fitzpatrick and Annunziata 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

LINDA ANN BAUCKMAN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0160-96-4 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 OCTOBER 29, 1996 

VERNON A. BAUCKMAN 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 

LeRoy F. Millette, Jr., Judge 

 E. E. Sanders, Jr., for appellant. 

 Raymond J. Morley, Jr. (Pfitzner, Morley, 

Brickley, Borksy & Arden, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Linda Ann Bauckman (wife) appeals the equitable distribution 

decision of the circuit court. Wife contends that the trial 

court erred in classifying as marital property certain notes 

payable to wife from Vernon A. Bauckman (husband) and awarding 

her their value. Finding no error, we affirm. 

 "Fashioning an equitable distribution award lies within the 

sound discretion of the trial judge and that award will not be 

set aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it." Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396 

S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990). "Unless it appears from the record that 

the trial judge has not considered or has misapplied one of the 

statutory mandates, this Court will not reverse on appeal." 

Ellington v. Ellington, 8 Va. App. 48, 56, 378 S.E.2d 626, 630 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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(1989). 

 Wife asserts that the evidence establishes that three notes 

payable to her and purportedly signed by husband were traceable 

to funds she inherited from her family.1

 Husband denied signing 

two of the notes and testified that wife incurred no loss on the 

third note. Wife testified that she used her own funds and money 

belonging to her mother and her children to purchase certificates 

of deposit which husband used as collateral for the operation of 

his business. She lent him money to pay the business' rent and 

to purchase mirrors and other items for the restaurant. These 

items, as well as the business and the marital home, were lost 

through bankruptcy. She testified she came into the marriage 

with approximately $200,000 but that all her cash was gone. She 

admitted that husband had separate property in the form of 

furnishings and collectibles prior to the marriage and that, at 

the time of the hearings, he had no cash. 

 The trial court found that wife came into the marriage with 

assets, but that those assets were applied to the marital home 

and business which were lost in bankruptcy. The court noted that 

the parties did not agree whether the notes were executed. 

 If these notes were, in fact, executed, and I 

know they're in dispute, it's clear to me 

that that money was basically put into the 

 1Wife also argues that the court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction over wife's separate property. This argument 

confuses the court's underlying jurisdiction to decide issues of 

equitable distribution with the statutory limit on the court's 

authority to order a transfer or division of separate property. 

Compare Code § 20-107.3(A) with Code § 20-107.3(C). 
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marital, the marital pot, the idea being that 

the money was borrowed to keep Charlie 

Brown's going, that the money was borrowed so 

that they could continue the lifestyle they 

wanted to go on. So, I think that that 

should be considered, if any thought at all 

about it, some sort of a credit against the 

marital assets. And I'm going to consider it 

that way. 

The trial court then ruled that all existing marital assets would 

be awarded to wife. 

 Under Code § 20-107.3(A), the trial court is required, upon 

the request of a party, to determine the title and value of "all 

property . . . of the parties." Property which no longer is part 

of the marital estate cannot be distributed by the court. No 

cash or certificates of deposit remained to be distributed. The 

court's ruling demonstrates that it considered the separate 

property wife brought into the marriage when it awarded her the 

maximum amount of marital assets available for distribution. We 

cannot say the court's equitable distribution decision was either 

plainly wrong or an abuse of its discretion. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.