### NUM BER 13-06- 0058 0-CV 

## COURT OF A PP EA LS T H I R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X AS CORPUS CHRI ST I - 

## E D I N B U R G
I.E. M ILL ER FOW LE R TR UC KIN G, L LC , A pp ellan t,
v. B- C EQU IPM ENTSA LE S, IN C., A pp ellee.
On ap pe al f rom th e 3 47t h Dist rict C ou rt o f N ue ces Co un ty , T exas .



## ME MOR A N D U M OP I N I ON B efo re C h ie f Ju st ic e Va ld eza n d J u st ic es G arza a n d V el a

M em o ra n d u m Op in io n b y J u st ic e Ga rza I.E. M il ler F ow ler Truc ki ng , LLC (“ Mi ll er”) appeal s the tr ial cour t’ s j udg ment aw ardin g damag es and attor ney ’s fees to B-C Equi pment Sales , Inc. ( “B -C ”) . B- C lea sed tw o c ra nes to M il ler pursuantto the t er ms of w ri tten lea se ag re ements

. Upo n the con clu sion of the lea se per iod s, B- C dis cov ered th at t he c ra nes had been d a m ag ed. B- C ass erted t hat Mill er w as con tractu ally obligated (1) to pay the costs of repairing the da ma ges at B-C’s stan dard prices, and (2) to continu e to make payment s und er the lea se agreem ent s until the repai rs co uld be compl eted. M il ler refused to pay

and B- C sued. A jur

y aw arded damag es and attor ney ’s fees t o B-C, a n d the tr ial co urt rendered j udg ment upo n the
v erdi c t. W e affi r m.2 I. B A CKGRO UND Mill er is a Lou isiana-b ased corpo ration in the busine ss of moving and relocating oil dr il li ng r ig s. B- C is a Tex as cor porati on th at l eases cranes and ot h e r h e a vy eq uip ment
suc h as ex cav ators and w heel l oaders. On Apr il 4, 2001, Mi ll er and B- C entered i nto a n “Equipme nt Le ase” ag reem ent w here by B-C agreed to lease to Mill er a 100 -ton Lin k-Belt
craw ler crane (the “10 0- ton crane” ) for $9,500 per month. On Ma y 22, 2002, the p arti es entered i nto a se cond lea se ag re ement w hereby B- C ag re ed to l ease to M il ler an 8 0- ton Lin k- Bel t c ra w ler

crane ( the “ 80- ton c ra ne” ) for $8, 000 per month. Both l ease ag re ements cont ain ed th e fo llow ing prov is ion reg ardin g l iab il ity i n the ev ent o f the c ra nes sus tai nin g damag e dur ing the per iod of the l ease: 5. M AIN TENAN CE AN D RE PAIR

. . . . The eq uip ment s hal l be retur ned i n the sam e con dition as w hen receiv ed, ex ceptfor no rm a l we a r. IF T HE EQU IPM EN T, W HE N RE TUR NE D TO LESS OR[B -C] , IS IN NE ED OF REPAI R, OR IS I N AD AMAGED AND W ORN COND IT ION (INCLUDING DA MA GE A ND W EARTO TIR ES) N OT ATTRIBU TABLE TO N OR MA L W EA RA N D TE AR , LES SE E [M i l l er ] SH AL L BE O BL IG ATE D TO P AY TO LESSO R THE R EASONA BLE C OSTS O F THE R EPAI RS AN D, IN ADDIT ION, LES SEE SHALL BE OBL IGAT ED TO CONTINUE T HE PAY ME NT O F RE NTAL, THE RATE HE RE IN ST ATED, FORT HE PER IOD OF TI ME REASONAB LY NECESSARY TO REPAI R LES S O R’S E Q UI P ME NT AND TO REST ORE IT TO A GO OD, SAFE AND SERVI CEABL E CONDITI ON. LESS EE A GREES THAT ANY REPAIRS AN D LABORF UR NI SH ED BY B- C EQU IPM EN T SALES, IN C. , SH ALL B E CH AR GED TO AND PAID BY LESSEE AT B- C EQU IPM EN T SALES, IN C. , PRICES FOR SIMILA R REPAI RS, PART S, OR ACCESSO RIES, IN FORCE AT THE T IME SAME ARE SUPP LIE D. On Ap ril 7, 20 03, Mil ler returned t h e 1 0 0 -t o n c rane to B-C, at w hich tim e B-C condu cte d a s tandard “ chec k- in” i nspecti on of the crane. Upon per forming the ins pect ion , B- C dis cov ered th at t he 100- ton c ra ne had sus tai ned sev ere damag es. B- C est imat ed th at itw oul d c ost$98, 758.34 to repai r thos e damag es. On June 1 1, 20 03, M il ler retur ned t he 80-to n cra n e t o B -C , at w hich tim e it discovered tha t the 80-ton crane also had sev ere damag es. B- C est imat ed th at i t woul d c ost$91, 126.86 to repai r the 8 0- ton c ra ne. Af ter Mill er ref used t o pay th e $18 9,8 85. 20 dem and ed by Mill er to repa ir the cranes, B- C filed su iton Oct ober 28, 2003, all eg ing that( 1) M il ler breache d the l ease ag re ements by refusing to pay

for repai r of the c ra nes, and (2 ) Mi ll er ’s neg li g ence prox imat ely ca used3

dam ages suf

fered by B-C. B-C req uest ed d am ages in the a mo untit ex pen ded to repa ir the c ra nes, and als o al leg ed that Mi ll er w as res ponsi ble for

conti nui ng to make p ay ments dur ing “ the p er iod of ti me reason abl y nec ess ar

y to re pai r
. . . and rest ore [t he c ra nes] to a g ood, safe, and se rv ic eabl e c ondi ti on.” A tri al w as conducted before a jur y on Janua ry

17, 2005, after w hic h a v erdict w as returne d i n f a vo r of

Mil ler. Specif ically , the jury foun d tha t the lease agreem ent s w ere
v alidly ent ered into by M iller and B-C but th at Miller did n o tf a il to comp ly w ith tho se agreem ent s. B-C f iled a m otion for new trial on March 21, 200 5, con ten ding thatthe jury’ s findi ngs w ere ag ain st the o v er w hel ming w eig ht of the ev ide nce. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 329( b) (3 ) (s tati ng thata po intin a moti on for newtri al is a prereq uis it e to a c omplai nt on appe a l t h a ta j u r

y fi n d i n g i s a g a i n s tt h e o v e r w h e l mi n g w e i g h to f t h e e v i d e n c e )

. T h e tr ial
cour t g ra nted B- C’ s mot ion for n ew tr ial b y writt e n order

date d Apr il 29, 2005, sta ti ng specif ica lly th a t t h e ju ry’s n e gat ive a n swer to Qu e st io n Nu m b e r T wo—a sk in g w hether M il ler faile d to compl y

w it h the 100- ton crane lea se ag re ement— w as ag ain st the o v er

w hel ming
w eig ht of the ev ide nce. The cas e w as re tr ied before a j ur y on A pr il 3, 2006. The pr imar y i ss ue attr ial w as the amount and reason abl eness of the c harg es to repai r the tw o c ra nes. B- C ask ed th e jur y to aw ard i t the foll ow ing : $93,768 .64 for co sts to re pai r the 1 00- ton c ra ne; $ 95,389. 78 to repa ir the 80-to n crane ; add itiona l dam ages for lost prof it cause d by its inability to lea se the cran e s d u rin g the ir periods of repair; $85 ,00 0 for trial attorne y ’s fe es; $7 ,50 0 in attor ney ’s fees for

respo ndi ng to any

appeal to thi s C our

t; and $5, 000 i n att or ney ’s fees for
re spond ing to any

peti ti on for re v iew

fil ed i n the Tex as Supreme C our t. On A pr il 10, 2006, the j ur y re tur ned a v erdict findi ng thatM il ler and B- C had ent ered int o v ali d ag re ements for leasi ng the tw o cran es, and that M il ler had faile d to compl y

w it h th e a gre ements

. The ju ry aw arded damag es of $49,457. 44 for damag es to t he 100- ton
c ran e; $5 1, 48 4. 36 for da ma g es to th e 80

- to n c ran e; $8 ,0 00 for l os t profi t du e to B-C ’s ina bil ity to lea se the 80- ton crane dur ing it s p er iod of re pai r; and nothi ng for l ostprofit du eB -C as s ert s a c ros s -po i nt c ha l l en gi ng t he j ury ’ s fai l ure t o a w ard ap pe l l ate att orn ey ’ s fee s
. H ow eve r, 1 b e c a u s e B -C d i d n o t fil e a n o ti c e o f a p p e a l i n th e tri a l c o u rt, i t h a s n o t p re s e rv e d th i s i s s u e fo r a p p e a l

. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 25

. 1(c ) (“T he a pp el l ate c ou rt m ay n ot g ran t a p art y w ho d oe s n ot fi l e a n oti c e o f ap pe al m ore fa v o ra b l e re l i e f th a n d i d th e tri a l c o u rt e x c e p t fo r ju s t c a u s e .”); C H C A E. H oust on, L. P. v. H en der son , 99 S .W .3 d 6 3 0 , 6 3 5 -3 6 (T e x . A p p .– H o u s to n [1 4 th D i s t.] 2 0 0 3 , n o p e t.) (c ro s s -p o i n t a l l e g i n g e n ti tl e m e n t t o att orn ey ’ s fee s i s a req ue s t for “ m ore favo rab l e rel i ef” un de r R ul e 2 5.1(c)).

B- C cl ai m s t hat M i l l erhas wai v ed t hi s i ssue o n ap peal beca use i t di d not i ncl ude anyci t at i ons t o t he 2 r ecor d i n t he a r gum entsect i on o fi t s app el l at e br i ef

. B- C ci t es T exas Rul e of Appel l at e Pr ocedur e 38

. 1( h) whi ch st at es: “ T he [ appel l ant ’ s] br i efm ust cont ai n a cl earand conci se ar gum ent f ort he co nt ent i ons m ade, w i t h a pp rop ri ate c i t ati on s to a utho ri t i es a nd t o t he rec ord

. ” T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 3 8 .1 (h ). T h o u g h M i l l e r d i d n o t c i te t he r ecor d i n i t s ar gum ent sect i on, i t di d i ncl ude appr opr i at e ci t at i ons t o t he r ecor d i n t he “ St at em ent of Fact s” sect i on o fi t s br i ef

. T hese ci t at i ons wer e suff i ci ent t o al l ow t hi s C our t t o con duct an effe c t i v e r ev i ew oft he i s s u e s o n a p p e a l

. W e fi n d , t h e re fo re , t h a t M i l l e r d i d n o t w a i v e th i s i s s u e u n d e r ru l e 3 8 .1 (h ). See id. 4 to B-C’s inability to l e a s e t h e 1 0 0-footcrane du ring its period o f repair. Th e jury add i t i o n a l l y

a w a rd e d B

- C $ 6 4 , 0 0 0 i n t r i a l a t t o r n e y ’ s fe e s , b u ta w a rd e d n o a p p e l l ate attor ney ’s fees. The t ri al cour t re ndered a final jud g ment on the jur y ’s v erdict on Jul y

12, 1 2006. M il ler

fil ed a moti on for new tr ial on A u g ust9, 2006, w hic h w as ov er ru led by operati on of l aw
. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 329b( c)

. This appeal ens ued. II. D I S CUS S I ON Mi ll er now chal len g es the tr ial cour t’ s jud g ment on th e j ur

y v erdict, cont endi ng that : (1 ) the t ri al cour

t er re d i n dis all ow ing ev ide nce of t he w hol esal e cos t of repai r par ts; ( 2) the jury charge conta ined e rrors; an d (3) th ere w as insuf f icient evidence to supp ort the jury ’s award of dam ages for costs of

repair. A
. Ev id ence o f “Act ual C ost s” of D amag es By i ts firs t is sue, M il ler

arg ues that the t ri al cour t er re d i n di sal low ing ev ide nce of
w hol esal e c ost s—

w hat M il ler

des cr ibe s a s “ act ual cos ts” —i ncur re d by B- C in under

tak ing the repai rs of the tw o c ra nes. The ev ide nce proffered by M il ler w oul d hav e s how n the 2
am oun ts tha t B-C w as cha rg ed b y Link-Belt an d oth er supp liers fo r the pa rts that were used in re pai ri ng the cranes; M il ler then i ntended to show

the jur y that B- C mark ed up th e pr ic es, ch arg ing M il ler

more for thos e s ame par ts. F or ex ample, a char

t prepared by

M il ler inc lud ed as par

t of i ts Bi ll of Ex cept ion sh ow ed th at Li nk- Bel t had ch arg ed B-C $15, 541.21 for a tw enty -foot base s e ct io n for the 8 0- ton c ra ne, a nd B- C had i n tur n c harg ed M il ler $22,201 .72 for

thatsa me par

t. Ev ide nti ar

y r uli ng s a re co mmitt ed to the tr ial co urt’ s s ound d isc re ti o n. Bay Ar ea5

Hea lt hcar e Gr oup, Ltd. v. Mc Shane , 239 S.W .3d 231, 23 4 ( Tex . 200 7) ; City of Brow nsville
v. Al var ado , 897 S.W .2d 7 50, 7 53 (Te x
. 199 5). At rial cou rt a buse s its discret ion w hen it
ru les w it hout re g ard for any g uid ing r ule s o r pr inc ipl es. Owens-Cornin g Fibergla s Corp. v. Ma lon e , 9 7 2 S

. W

. 2 d 35 , 4 3 (T e x. 19 9 8 ) (ci ti n g City of Brow nsville , 897 S.W .2d at 753 ). Tri al cour

ts mayex cl ude rele v ant e v ide nce if i ts probati v e v alu e i s s ubst anti all y outw eig hed by the dang er

of unfair prej udi ce, confusion of the is sues , or misl eadi ng the jur y
. See T EX
. R. E V ID . 403

. W e must uphol d the tr ial cour t’ s ev ide nti ar

y ru li ng i f there i s a ny

l eg it imat e basi s fo r th e r u lin g
. Ma lon e , 972 S.W .2d at 43. Ev en if a trial court errs by

improp erly dis all ow ing ev ide nce, re v ersal is w ar ra nted onl y if the er ro r probabl y ca used the rendi ti on of an i mprop er

j udg ment or

probabl y

prev ented the appel lan t f ro m proper ly present ing the
cas e to thi s C our

t. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 4 4.1. Mi ll er arg ues that the e v ide nce re gardin g w hol esal e c ost s i ncur re d by B- C w as re lev ant a nd s houl d hav e been admitted b ecaus e i t w as probati v e as to w hether the pr ic es charg ed by

B-C w ere reas onabl e. To suppo rtthis arg ument, Mi ll er poi nts to the c lau se of the l ease ag re ements st ati ng that , i f the eq u ip m e n t is retur ned t o B- C in a damag ed cond ition, t h e lessee shall be ob lig ate d to pa y to B-C the “reason able ” cost of repairs. Mi ll er al so ci tes the Dal las Cour t of Appea ls ’ opi nio n i n Ant hon y Equip m ent

Corp. v. Irwin Ste el Erecto rs, Inc. , 115 S.W .3d 1 91 ( Tex . Ap p.–D all as 2003, pet. dis m’d) , for the prop osition thatthe “actu al,” or w hole sale, co st of rep airs is the a ppro priate st and ard to use
w hen c alc ula ti ng damag es. I n Anthony Equi pm ent , as here, the pla int iff les sor su ed th e defendant l ess ee for neg li g ence and breach of co n tr a ctto re cov er co sts of re pai rs to
cranes lea sed by

the defendant, as w ell as l ostprofits

. The cour t hel d tha t: W h e n p e rsonal proper ty has been damag ed, t he g eneral ru le is thatthe damag e i s to be measured by the differenc e i n the reason abl e mar ketv alu e immedi a te lybefore and i mmediat ely after the damag e to suc h proper ty

. If dam aged prop erty can b e repa ired ade quately an d f u ll y , the dif feren ce in v alu e before and after the damage to the ite m can be define d as the cos t of the repairs. W h e n prop erty has su staine d da ma ge that dim inishes its fair mark et v alu e, t he c ostof re pai ri ng or rest or ing the proper

ty to it s ful l mark et v alu e i s a n appropr iat e el ement of damag e. Id. at 206 (citat ions om itted ). Miller cl aim s that , und er this preced ent , the trial court shou ldIt i s a l s o n o te w o rth y th a t th e tri a l c o u rt d i d p e rm i t M i l l e r t o p re s e n t e v i d e n c e , i f a n y , t h a t t h e a m o u n ts 3 char ged by B

- C fo r t he r epai r s t o t he cr anes wer e i n excess oft he a m ount char ged by B- C t o ot hercust om er s. H o w e v e r, M i l l e r d i d n o t p ro v i d e a n y s u c h e v i d e n c e
. 6 have permi tt ed th e j ur

y to s ee ev i de nc e of th e w ho l es al e c os ts of rep ai rs be c au s e the ir tas k was to de ter mine the “ re asona ble co sts of re pai r. ” The p res en t c as e, h ow ev er , i s di s ti ng ui s ha bl e from Anthony Equi pm ent i n tha t M il ler cont ractua lly

agreed to a sp ecif ic meth od fo r calculat ing dama ges. Specif ically , the lease ag re ements prov ide d as foll ow s: “ LESSE E AG RE ES THAT AN YREPAI RS AN D LABOR FU RN ISH ED BY B- C EQU IPM EN T SALES , IN C. , SH ALL BE CH AR GED TO AN D PAID BY L ES SE E AT B- C EQUIPM EN T SALES, INC ., PR IC ES F OR SIMILAR

R EPAIRS, PAR TS, OR

AC CESSOR IES, IN

F OR CE

AT T HE T IME SA ME

AR E SUPPLIE

D ” (e mphasi s a dded)

. The tr ial co urt, g iv ing thi s p ro v is ion i ts pla in and ordin ar y meani ng , see J.M. D avi

dson, Inc . v

. W ebster , 128 S.W .3d 2 23, 2 29 ( Tex . 200 3) , found t hat M il ler w as cont ractua lly

obligated to pay B-C’s stan dard prices for repa ir parts, rather tha n w hole sale p r i c e s fo r

t h o s e p a rt s
. M o re o v e r , t o t h e e xt e n tt h a tt h i s p ro v i s i o n c o n fl i c t s w i t h t h e p r ior prov is ion stati ng that Mi ll er w oul d only

be re spons ibl e for

the “ re asona ble co sts of re pai rs ,” thi s more s peci fic p ro v is ion co ntrols

. See Ostrowski v. Ivanho e Prop . Ow ners Imp r o v e me n t A s s ’n , 38 S.W .3d 2 48, 2 54 ( Tex . Ap p.–Tex ar kana 2001, pet. deni ed) ( “The g eneral ru le is thatw hen t here i s a co nflict bet w een tw o prov is ion s, the s peci fic p ro v is ion cont rols ov er the general provision.”). Thus, the t ri al cour t reason abl y

dete rmi ned t hat a ny ev ide nce of w hol esal e pr ic es w oul d either be ir re lev ant or subs tanti all y outw eig hed by

the dang er of unfair preju dic e. See T EX
. R. E V ID . 403

.

3 Mill er asserts in reply tha t the provi sion requiring it to pay fo r repa irs at B-C’ s sta ndard pr ic es is ak in to a li q uid ated damag e s cla u se and th erefore mus t meeta re asona ble ness st andard. See Austin Hill Country Realty, In c. v. Palisades Plaza, In c. , 948 S.W .2d 293 , 298 (Tex. 1997 ) ( hold ing that a liq uida ted dam ages clause in a contract
w il l not b e enforc eabl e unles s it re present s a reason abl e es ti mate of anti ci pated damag es upo n brea ch of

the con tract). W e disagree th at th e lease provi sion atissue here is akin to s uch a c lau se. A li q uid ated damag es cl ause is des ig ned t o s ubst it ute a su m ag re edM i l l er c ha rac t eri z es i t s se c on d i s s ue on ap pe al di fferen t l y i n d i fferen t se c t i on s of i t s bri ef. I n i ts 4

“ I ssues Pr esent ed” sect i on, M i l l erdescr i bes i t s secon d i ssue as: “ W het hert he t r i al cour t er r ed when i t f ai l ed t o sub m i t a quest i on t o t he j ur y and deni ed a ne w t r i al on t he i ssue o fwhet herB- C Equi pm ent was en t i t l ed t o o nl y rec ove r und er t he co ntr ac t t he ‘ rea s on ab l e c os t s of rep airs .’ ” In th e “ A rgu m en t ” se c t i on of i t s bri ef, M i l l e r d e s c rib e s i ts s e c o n d i s s u e a s fo l l o w s : “T h e ju ry w a s i m p ro p e rlyi n s tru c te d w i th re s p e c t t o d a m a g e s .” W e fi rs t n o te th a t, to th e e x te n t t h a t M i l l e r p u rp o rts to c h a l l e n g e th e tri a l c o u rt’ s re fu s a l to g ra n t i ts m ot i on f ornew t r i al , as t he f i r st char act er i z at i on o fi t s secon d i ssue i m pl i es, M i l l erhas not m ade anyar gum ent a s to th i s i s s u e a n d s o th e re i s n o th i n g fo r u s to re v i e w
. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38. 1.

Second, we no t e t hat t hough t heyap pe ar si m i l ar , t he t wo char act er i z at i ons d i ff eri n t hat t he f i r st p u r p o r ts to c h a l le n g e th e tr ia l c o u r t’s e x c lu s io n o fa p r o p o s e d ju r y question w h i l e th e s e c o n d p u rp o rts to c h a lle n g e t h e c o u r t’s e x c lu s io n o fa p r o p o s e d ju r y instruction
. A t r i al cour t has gr eat erdi scr et i on i n sub m i t t i ng i n s tru c ti o n s a n d d e fin i ti o n s to th e ju ry t h a n i t d o e s i n s u b m i tti n g q u e s ti o n s
. W al

- M art St ores, I nc. v. Mi ddlet on , 9 8 2 S .W .2 d 4 6 8 , 4 7 0 ( T e x . A p p .– S a n A n to n i o 1 9 9 8 , p e t. d e n i e d ); see St eak & Al e of Tex. , I nc. v. Bor nem an , 6 2 S .W .3 d 8 9 8 , 9 0 4 ( T e x . A p p .– F o rt W o rth 2 0 0 1 , n o p e t.); s e e a ls o H a llm a rkv . W e tz , N o. 0 4- 04

- 00 43 0- C V, 2005 T ex. App. LEX I S 2559, at * 5 ( T ex. A pp. –San A nt oni o Apr

. 6, 200 5, no pet

. ) ( m em
. op. )

. Never t hel ess, w e n e e d n o t a d d r e s s th e d iff e r e n t s ta n d a r d s o f r e v ie w a s M ille r h a s f a ile d to p r e s e r v e e ith e r is s u e f o r a p p e a l. 7 upon by the par ti es for any act ual damag es suffered as a resul t of a breach. BFG Direct Mktg., Inc. v. Pea ke , 178 S.W .3d 7 63, 7 66 ( Tex . 200 5) ( ci ti ng 24 S AM U EL W I L L I S TO N & R I CHA RD A. L ORD , W I L L I S TON O N C ON T R ACT S § 65:1, at 229 (4 th ed . 200 2) ). M oreov er , t o be enforceabl e as liq uid ated damag es, the damag es must be uncer tai n. Id. (cit in g Phi

ll ips
v. Phi ll ips , 820 S.W .2d 7 85, 7 88 (Tex . 199 1) ). H ere, t he prov is ion at is sue ide nti fied th e a n ti cip a te d damag es w it h c ertai nty —i t c onsi ste d of the amount t hat B -C ch arg es to an y other cu sto mer “for

si mil a r re p airs, par

ts, or ac ces sor ies .” Ad dit ion all y , w e not e tha t t he lea se prov is ion a t iss ue di d notanti ci pate a breach by M il ler ; rather , i t merely se t fort h a sta ndard by

w hic h pr ic es for repai rs w oul d be set

. Mi ll er ag re ed to thi s sta ndard, and t he trial court w as justif ied i n not perm itting Mill er to cl aim at tri al tha t the stan dard did notapp ly becau se itw as unreason abl e. W e con clude thatthere is a legitimate b asis in the reco rd su ppo rting the t rial court’s ref usal to ad mi t ev i de nc e on th e w ho l es al e pr i c es of pa rts

. The refo re, th e tr i al c ou rt did notabu se its discretion in declining to perm it evidence of w hole sale costs incurred b y B-C in re pai ri ng the tw o c ra nes. See M alo ne , 972 S.W .2d a t 43. Ac cordin g ly , M il ler ’s first is sue is ov er ru led

. B. Errors in Jury

Charge 4 By it s se co n d iss u e , Mi lle r as se rt s t h a t “[ t] h e Co u rtsh o u ld ha ve u se d th e la n gua ge in the contractand the jury charge shou ld have instruct e d the jury thatPlaintif

f B-CB- C al so ar gues, as i t di d wi t h r egar d t o M i l l er ’ s f i r st i ssue, t hat M i l l erwai v ed t hi s ar gum ent byf ai l i ng 5 t o i ncl ude ci t at i ons t o t he r ecor d i n t he a r gum ent sect i on o fi t s br i ef

. As no t ed a bov e, howev er , t he “ St at em ent ofFact s” sect i on i n M i l l er ’ s br i efdoes i ncl ude appr opr i at e ci t at i ons t o t he r ecor d. W e t her ef or e f i nd t hat M i l l er h a s n o t w a i v e d i ts s e c o n d i s s u e o n th i s g ro u n d

. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38

. 1(h ). 8 Equipm entw as en titled to recover the ‘reasona ble cost s of repairs.’” Tex as Rul e of

Civ il Proc edure 277 re q uires the t ri al cour t t o s ubmiti nst ru cti ons and defini ti ons to t he j ur

y as are nec ess ar

y to enabl e the jury

to re nder

a v erdict. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 277. T h e go a l o f

t h e ch a rg e is t o su b m itt o t h e ju ry t h e is s u e s fo r d e c is io n lo gi c a ll y, si mply , c le ar ly , fair ly , c or re ctl y , and co mplet ely

. Hy undai Motor C o. v . R odr igu ez , 995 S.W .2d 6 61, 6 64 ( Tex . 199 9)

. Fai lure to submit a q uest ion i s n ot de emed g ro unds for
re v ersi ng the jud g ment unl ess i ts submi ss ion , i n s ubst anti all y co rrectw ordin g , has been
re q uest ed i n w ri ti ng by

the par ty co mplai nin g of the jud g ment. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 278. As l ong as the c harg e i s lega lly c or re ct, tr ial co urts are afforded broad di sc re ti on, s ubj ectto
re v ersal only

on a court’ s a buse of that d is creti on. Tex. D ep’ t of H um an Ser

vs . v . E. B. , 802 S.W .2d 6 47, 6 49 ( Tex . 199 0) ; Hagins v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc. , 1 2 8 S

. W

. 3 d 3 8 3 , 3 8 7 (T e x. App .–T exarkana 20 04, no pe t.). Ev en if the trial court ab used its discretion, we reverse onl y w here the er ro r in the j ur y ch arg e is show n to be har mf ul. Boa tland of Housto n, In c.
v. Bai ley, 609 S .W .2d 7 43, 7 49-5 0 (Te x
. 198 0). T hatis, a jury charge error is rev ersible onl y i f itprobabl y

caused the rend it ion of an improper

judg ment or p ro babl y

prev ented the appel lan t from proper ly present ing the cas e on appeal

. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 44. 1(a). Mi ll er cl aims that the cour t’ s fai lure to ins tr uctthe jur y thatB- C w as enti tl ed onl y to
re cov er the “reason abl e cos ts of repai r” w as re v ersi ble er ro r. B- C arg ues in re spons e tha t (1 ) M il le r fa i l e d t o p re s e r

v e t h e a rg u me n tb e c a u s e i td i d n o to bj e c tt o t h e j u r y q u e s ti ons per tai nin g to damag es, and (2 ) ev en if Mi ll er did pres er

v e the arg ument, the e x cl usi on of Mi ll er ’s propose d j ur

y q uest ion and ins tr uct ion s was not a n abus e of di sc re ti on. W e ag re e 5 tha t Mill er failed to preserve the argume nt for app eal. The record reflect s that Mi ll er submitt ed a propose d jur y ch arg e on Ma rc h 10, 2006,
a n d B-C s u b m it te d a pro p o se d ju ry cha rge on Mar ch 13 , 2 0 0 6 . Mil le r’s pro p o se d ch a rge cont ain ed a propose d Que sti on N umber One w hic h i ncl uded t he foll ow ing i nst ru cti on:9

It is y our duty to int er pret t he foll ow ing l ang uag e of the ag re ement: “The eq uip ment s hal l be retur ned i n the sa me con dit ion as w hen re cei v ed, e x ceptfor n or mal w ear
. IF THE EQU IPM EN T , W HE N RET URNED TO LE S S O R, IS IN NEED OF R EPA IR, OR IS IN A DAMAGED AND W ORN CONDIT ION (INCLUDING DAMAGE AND W EAR T O T IRES) NOT AT T RIBUT ABL E T O NORMAL W EAR AND T EAR, LE SSE E SHALL BE OBL IGAT ED TO PAY TO LES SOR T HE REASO N AB LE C OS TS OF TH E R EP AI R S AN D , IN A D D IT ION, L E SSE E SHALL BE OBL IGAT ED TO CONTINUE T HE PAYMENT OF R EN TAL. [ si c] THE RATE H ER EIN STATED, F ORTHE PER IOD OF TI ME REASONAB LY NECESSA RYT O REPAIR LE SSOR’S EQUIPMENT AND TO REST ORE IT TO AG O O D, SAFE AND SERVIC EABLE C ON DI TION .” After re v iew ing both par ti es’ propose d charg es, the t ri al cour t final iz ed i ts charg e on Apr il 9, 2006 and submi tted it to couns el for both par ti es for thei r re v iew

. Ques ti on N umber Fi v e of the cour

t’ s charg e, w hic h w as to be ans w ered by the jur y onl y i f it had found t hat Mill er had failed to comp ly w ith the 100 -ton cran e lease agreeme nt, rea d as follows: W hat s um of

money , i f any , i f paid now i n c ash, w oul d fair ly

and re a s o n a b ly c o m p e n s a t e B -C E qu ip m e n tS a le s , I n c
. fo r i t s d a m a ge s , if a n y, tha t resul t e d f rom su ch failure to co mp ly [w ith the 100 -ton cran e lease ag re ement]? Conside r the followi ng eleme nts of dam ages, if any, and non e oth er. 1) The cos t t o B- C Eq uip ment Sa les , I nc. to re tu rn t he 100- ton Lin k- Be ltcraw ler

crane t o the sa me con dit ion i t w as in w hen re cei v ed by

I. E. Mill er-F ow ler

Truc ki ng , LLC , ex ceptnor mal w ear an d tea r. 2) The lo ss of

rental profits to B- C Eq uip ment Sa les , I nc. for t he ti me rea s on ab l y

n ec es s ar

y t o ret ur n th e c ran e to the s am e condi ti on i t w as in when recei v ed by I. E. M il ler-F ow ler T rucking, LLC. The next charg e q uest ion w as ide nti cal to Ques ti on N umber F iv e ex ceptthati t per

tai ned to t he 80- ton c ra ne l ease ag re ement. On Apr il 10, 2006, pr ior to cl osi ng arg ument attr ial , t he tr ial co urt as ked couns el for bot h p a rt ie s wh e t h er they objecte d to th e cou rt’s charge. U nde r Texas Rule of Civ il Proced ure 27 4, a p a rt y object ing to a charge mustpointout distin ctly the objection able
m a tt e r a n d the g ro unds of the obj ect ion

. T EX
. R. C IV
. P

. 2 7 4

. A n y c o mp l a i n t a s to a que st io n , d e f in it io n , o r in st ru ct io n , o n ac co u n t o f an y de fe ct , o m iss io n , o r fa u ltin pl e a d in g,T o th e e x te n t t h a t M ille r n o w c h a lle n g e s ( 1 ) th e tr ia l c o u r t’s in c lu s io n o f“ th o s e In s tr u c tio n s in 6 Q uest i ons 1 , 2, 3, and 4 t hat di scuss cour se ofper f or m ance, cour se of dea l i ng a nd u sage oft r ade, ” or( 2) t he t r i al cour t ’ s excl usi on o fan i nst r uct i on st at i ng t hat “ any doubt as t o t he pr oper const r uct i on t o be gi v en t o t he equi pm ent l ease pr ov i si ons m ust be r esol v ed a gai nst ” B- C , M i l l erhas wai v ed t hose ar gum ent s beca use t hey w e re n o t ra i s e d o n a p p e a l

. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38. 1. 10 is w aiv ed unl ess sp eci fical ly i ncl uded i n the o bje cti ons. Id. Atth e Ap ril 1 0 , 2 0 0 6 he a rin g, Mi ll er ’s co unsel obj ect e d t o : (1) the inc lus ion of “t hose Ins tr uct ion s i n Que sti ons 1, 2, 3, and 4 that dis cus s c ourse of per formance, cours e of

deali ng and usag e of trade,” and (2 ) the ex cl usi on of

an ins tr uct ion st ati ng that“ any doubtas to the p ro per co nst ru cti on to be giv en to the equipm entlease pro v is io ns mu st be reso lv ed a gainst” B-C. At no time d id Mi ll er ’s tr ial counsel ex press an obj ect ion to Ques ti on N umber F iv e or Ques ti on N umber Six , the only question s in the cha rg e pe rtaining to the calculatio n of dam ages. 6 Mo re ov er , M il ler ’s propose d c harg e i nst ru cte d the j ur y to int er pret an i ncompl ete
v ersi on of the le a se p ro v is ion at is sue. Sp eci fical ly , M il ler ’s req uest ed j ur y i nst ru cti on omitted t he foll ow ing se ntenc e from i ts re cit a tion of the lea se prov is ion : “L ESSEE AGR EES THAT AN YR EPAI RS AN D LABOR FU RN ISH ED BY B- C EQU IPM EN T SALES, IN C. , SH ALL B E CH AR GED TO AN D PAID BY LESS EE AT B- C EQU IPM EN T SALES, INC., PRICES FOR SI MILAR REPAI RS, PART S, OR ACCESSO RIES, IN FORCE AT THE TIME SAM E AR E SU PPLIE D. ” W it hout thi s s entenc e, M il ler ’s req uest ed q uest ion w as not subs tanti all y

co rrect , and the tr ial court ’s refusal to inc lud e tha t q uest ion ca nnot form the basi s o f rev ersi ble er ro r. See T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 2 78. Mi ll er di d not object

to the jur

y ques ti ons and ins tr uct ion s reg ardin g the cal cul ati on of dam ages, no r did it subm it a j uryq uest ion in sub stan tially correct w ording thatw ould have app rised the trial court of t h e e rror. T here fore, th e trial court’s error, if an y , in ins tr uct ing the jur

y i n the manner that it did w it h re g ard to the c alc ula ti on of damag es has been w aiv ed. See i

d. ; T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 33.1( a) ; see a lso Knox v. T ayl or , 992 S.W .2d 40, 65 (Tex . Ap p.–H oust on [1 4th D is t.] 1999, no p et.) ( “A ppel lan ts maynot rais e a c omplai nt on app eal w hi c h do es no t c om po rt w i th i ts ob j ecti on at tr i al .” )

. M i l l er ’ s s ec on d i s s ue is
ov er ru led

.B- C cont ends t hat M i l l erwai v ed i t s t hi r d i ssue because i t s “ br i ef cont ai ns no ar gum ent supp or t ed 7 by ci t at i ons t o au t hor i t y and t he r ecor d as t o whyt he e v i dence i s l egal l y orf act ual l y i nsuff i ci ent

. ” I ndeed , M i l l er ’ s ar gum ent on i t s t hi r d i ssue consi st s m er el y of a sum m ar y of t he a ppl i cabl e st andar d of r ev i ew al ong w i th th e fo l l o w i n g s ta te m e n t:

B -C E qu i pm en t p res en t ed n o evi de nc e reg ard i ng t he ac t ua l co s t or r ea s on ab l e c os t of rep ai r. Al t er nat i v el y , t her e was f act ual l y i nsuff i ci ent ev i dence t o suppor t t he j ur y awar d r egar di ng t he c o s ts o fr e p a ir to th e s u b j e c t c r a n e s
. I n s u p p o r t o ft h is a w a r d , B

- C E q u ip m e n t o ff e r e d o n ly es t i m ates or m ark up s for t he al l eg ed co s t s to r e p ai r t he su bjec t cra ne s
. Su c h c on c l us ory s t atem en t s are n ot val i d e vi de nc e o f r ea s on ab l e c os t s of rep ai r. Al t hough t hi s ar gum ent cont ai ns no ci t at i ons t o t he r ecor d, we f i nd, as not ed a bov e, t hat t he ci t at i ons t o t he r ecor d con t ai ned i n t he“ St at em ent ofF act s” sect i on ofM i l l er ’ s br i efar e suff i ci ent t o al l ow t hi s C our t t o con duct a n e ff e c t iv e r e v ie w o fth e is s u e s . A d d itio n a lly, w e n o te th a t M ille r d id e ff e c tiv e ly s u m m a r iz e th e a p p lic a b le st andar d of

r ev i ew f orl egal and fac t ua l s uffi ci encychal l enges, ci t i ng a ppr opr i at e au t hor i t y
. M i l l erhas not w a i v e d i ts th i rd i s s u e u n d e r ru l e 3 8 .1 (h ). See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38

. 1(h ). 11 C Suf

fi cien cy o f Ev id ence t o Sup po rtA w ard o f Dam ages for

C ost s o f Rep air By i ts thi rd is sue, Mi ll er cont ends that the ev ide nce adduc ed attr ial w as leg all y and factu ally insuf f icient to supp ort the jury aw ard of

dam ages for cost of

repair. 7 A challen ge to the legal suf f iciency of

ev iden ce w ill be su staine d only if : (1) the re is a c omplet e abs ence of ev ide nce of a v it al fact; ( 2) the cour t i s b ar re d by

r ule s o f law

or of ev id e n ce f ro m g iv ing w eig ht t o the onl y ev ide nce offered to prov e a v it al fact; ( 3) the evidence o f

fered to prove a v ital fact i s no more th an a mere scintilla; or (4) the ev iden ce est abl is hes conc lus iv ely the oppos it e of a v it al fact. City of Kel ler v. Wils on , 168 S.W .3d 802 , 810 (Tex. 2005 ). M ore tha n a scintilla of ev iden ce exists, and th e evidence is legally suffici ent, if the ev ide nce furni shes so me reason abl e bas is fo r d if fer ing co ncl usi ons by
re asona ble min ds about a v it al fac t’s e x is tenc e. Lee Lewi s C onst r. C o. v . Har ri son , 70 S.W .3d 778 , 782 -83 (Te x. 2 0 0 1). In cond ucting a factu al suf f iciency rev iew , w e v iew all the e v ide nce in a neutral li g ht to determi ne w hether the cont est ed findi ng i s s o c ontrar y to the g re at w eig ht an d preponderance of the ev ide nce as to be mani festl y unj ust , s hock

the
cons ci ence, or

cl e a rly d e monstrate b ias

. Golden Ea gleAr cher y, Inc . v . Jack son , 116 S.W .3d 757, 76 1 ( Tex . 200 3) ; Villago m ez v. Rockwo od Sp ecialties, Inc. , 210 S. W .3d 7 20, 749 (Tex. App. –Corpu s Christi 200 6, pe t. de nied ). Mill er cites Me rchants

Fast Motor

Li nes, Inc . v

. St ate , 9 1 7 S

. W

. 2 d 5 1 8 , 5 2 3 (T e x. App.–W aco 1996, writ d e n ied ), for t he proposi ti on th at “ [to] recov er for c ostof re pai r, a plaint if f mustpresen t evi den ce to justif y the jury’ s f inding tha t the co sts of repair w ere12

reaso nab le and n ecessa ry .” Mill er f urthe r asse rts th at B-C’s trial evi den ce con sisted o nly of “estima tes or ma rkups for the a lleged costs,” w hich Miller cl ai m s a re “concluso ry sta tements ” and “ not v ali d ev ide nce of reas onabl e c ost s o f repai r. ” W e di sag re e. Ag ain , Me rchants

F ast Motor Li nes can be distinguishe d f rom the present case in that the p arti es there di d notente r int o any pr ior agree m e n t as to the c alc ula ti on of dam ages. Here, as w e ha v e stat ed in ou r discussion of Mil ler’s first issue, th e lease ag re ements prov ide d a s peci fic met hod for cal cul ati ng M il le r’s l iab il ity i n the ev ent o f dam age to the cranes—th at is, Mill er w ould be respo nsibl e f o r payi ng B-C’ s stand ard pr ic es “for si mil ar re pai rs , par ts, or acc ess or ies .” B- C, therefore, had no burden at tr ial to show that the costs of

rep air w ere reaso nab le and nece ssary ; it merely need ed to estab lish it s s tandard pri ces. B- C present ed s uff ic ien t ev ide nce as to i ts pr ic es in the for m of tes ti mony

by i ts employ ee J er ry Lopez , as w ell as doc umentar y ev ide nce g iv ing deta il s o f t h e p a rt s re qu ir e d t o re p a ir t h e c ra n e s a n d t h e p ri c e s c h a rg e d fo r th e m
. A c c o rd in gl y, we cann o ts a y thatthere was insuf f icient evidence supp orting the jury’ s aw ard of dam ages. Mo re ov er , the jur

y ’s findi ng is not so cont ra ry to the g re at w eig ht an d preponderance of the evidence a s to be m anifestly unju st, sho ck the con science , o r c le arly dem onst rate bia s. See Jack

son , 116 S.W .3d a t 761

. Mi ll er ’s thi rd i ss ue i s o v er ru led

. D. B-C’s Mot ion for Sanc tions B- C has mov ed for sancti ons pursuantto Rul e 45 of the Tex as Rul es of Appel lat e Procedu re , w hic h prov ide s in re lev ant par t that “[ i] f t he cour

t of ap peal s d eter mines thatan appeal i s friv olo us, it may—on moti on of an y par ty or on i ts ow n i nit iat iv e, after noti ce and
a reaso nab le opp ortun ity for respon se—award each p rev ailing party just dam ages.” T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 45. B- C cont ends that “t he br ief filed by M il ler and the record on appeal sh ow that Mi ll er

di d not preser

v e cer tai n is sues for appel lat e re v iew , di d notprov ide any ci tati ons to the record or

ci te an y rele v ant a uthor ity

to suppo rt s [ si c] other i ss ues, and did not presentany

arg ument t o s uppor

t i ts thi rd i ss ue for re v iew .” Al tho u gh Mill e r w as not
suc ces sful in it s a ppeal , we c oncl ude, after re v iew ing the re cord and the b ri efs on fil e, t hat13

the a ppeal w as not fr iv olo us. Therefore, w e dec li ne to aw ard damag es under r ule 45. III . C ONCL US I ON The ju dg ment of the tr ial co urt i s a ff ir med.

_________

_________

_________

___ DO RI C ON TRERAS G AR ZA, J u s t i c e Me moran dum Opi nio n del iv ered and filed thi s t he 5t h day

of June, 2008.