alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### TREVINO v. AMERICAN NAT. INS. CO.

No. 11088.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

Feb. 4, 1942.

Rebearing Denied March 4, 1942.

Guy Cater and Walter Hein, both of San Antonio, for appellant.

Maxwell Burkett, of San Antonio, for appellee.

MURRAY, Justice.

This is a suit on a life insurance policy brought by appellant, Anita Trevino, against appellee, American National Insurance Company, the insurer.

The case was tried to a jury. Three special issues was submitted to the jury, but only two answered; however, the verdict was received by the court and judgment rendered for the defendant Insurance Company.

The insurance policy was issued on March 21, 1938, upon the life of Alfonso Urrea. Urrea died on April 28, 1938. This suit was instituted on July 29, 1938, and appellee answered by general demurrer and general denial on August 15, 1938. The case was called on February 17, 1941, at which time appellant was permitted to change the alleged date of the issuance of the policy from May 3, 1938, to March 21, 1938. Until this interlineation was made the petition alleged an impossible date, as it showed the policy issued after the death of the insured. After the interlineation, appellee filed an amended motion affirmatively setting up the defense that the policy was not in effect at the date of insured’s death, because insured was not in good health at the time the policy was delivered. In other words, the general demurrer and general denial were filed within two years after the policy was issued, but the amended answer was filed after the two year period. The policy contained a provision to the effect that: “No obligation is assumed by the company prior to the date hereof, nor unless on said date the insured is alive and in sound health.” And the policy fur-*203thef provided that the policy was incontestable after two years except for nonpayment of premiums. Section 3 of Article 4732, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.Stats., contains a similar provision as to incontestability of insurance policies after two years from the date of their issuance.

The question here presented is whether or not appellee contested the policy of insurance when it filed its general demurrer and general denial. It is clear that before an insurance company can be said to have contested an insurance policy some kind of court procedure must have been instituted. American National Ins. Co. v. Welsh, Tex.Civ.App., 3 S.W.2d 946.

Appellant’s original petition alleged, in effect, that the policy was in full force and effect at the time of insured’s death, and appellee by its general denial challenged this allegation. This constituted such a contest of the policy within the two year period as to toll the limitation provided for in the policy and by Section 3 of Article 4732, supra. Scharlach v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company, 5 Cir., 9 F.2d 317; Art. 5539b, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes.

The judgment is affirmed.
**Exhibit 23.2**

 

**CONSENT OF BEARD MILLER COMPANY LLP**

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (No. 333-53295, 333-85025 and 333-87932) on Form S-8 of BCSB Bankcorp, Inc. of our report dated November 30, 2004**,** except for Note 21,Restatement, as to which the date is July 13, 2007, relating to the consolidated financial statements of BCSB Bankcorp, Inc. for the year ended September 30, 2004, which is included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of BCSB Bankcorp,Inc. for the year ended September 30, 2006.
**Exhibit 10.31****TERMINATION AGREEMENT**     **THIS TERMINATION AGREEMENT** (this “Agreement”) is dated as March 22, 2007 and executed by **TerayonCommunication Systems, Inc.**(together with its successors and assigns, “Lessee”) and General ElectricCapital Corporation (“Lessor”).     WHEREAS, Lessee has entered into an Aircraft Lease Agreement, dated as of February 8, 2002 (the“Lease”, capitalized terms used herein but not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribedthereto in the Lease) with Lessor; and     WHEREAS, Lessee has not satisfied certain obligations under the Lease in connection with the returnof the Aircraft;     WHEREAS, Lessor estimates the cost to make certain repairs, tests, inspections and corrections tothe Aircraft in fulfillment of Section 11 of the Lease (the “Return Repairs”) is $550,000.00 (the“Repair Cost”);     WHEREAS, Lessee has requested that Lessor refund the Collateral (as defined in the Security DepositPledge Agreement, dated December 31, 2003 (the “Pledge”), between Lessee and Lessor;     WHEREAS, pursuant to the Pledge, Lessor is under no obligation to refund the Collateral unless anduntil Lessee has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Lease in connection with thetermination thereof;     NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the above premises and for other good and valuableconsideration, receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, Lessee and Lessor herebyagree as follows:     Each of Lessor and Lessee hereby agree that the Lease shall be terminated on the date hereof andneither Lessee nor Lessor shall have any further obligations under the Lease (other than under suchprovisions of the Lease which by their terms survive such termination, including, without limitation,specifically Lessee’s obligations under Section 11). Upon receipt of a duly executed and deliveredoriginal countersignature of this Agreement and an FAA Lease Termination Agreement from Lessee, Lessorshall promptly refund to Lessee at an account designated in writing by Lessee the sum of theCollateral minus 120% of the Repair Cost (the “Remaining Collateral”). The Remaining Collateralshall be held in accordance with the Pledge and any excess thereof after all such Return Repairshave been duly made shall be subject to refund to Lessee in accordance with the terms of thePledge. This Agreement shall be governed and construed in accordance with the laws of the State ofNew York. Except as specifically set forth herein, none of the terms of the Lease or the Pledgeshall be amended or waived hereby and each of Lessor and Lessee ratify and confirm theirobligations under the Lease and the Pledge.[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK; EXECUTION PAGE FOLLOWS]
 

 
     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Lessor and Lessee have caused this Agreement to be executed by its dulyauthorized officer as of the day and year first written above.      LESSOR:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from The
Bombay Company, Inc. quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the three months
ended May 1, 1999 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
10-Q.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000096287
<NAME> THE BOMBAY COMPANY, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-29-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAY-01-1999
<CASH>                                           34632
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      89503
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                138517
<PP&E>                                          101411
<DEPRECIATION>                                   58189
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  194800
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            35376
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         38150
<OTHER-SE>                                      114275
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    194800
<SALES>                                          75286
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 75286
<CGS>                                            55680
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    79679
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (374)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (4019)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    (1588)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (2431)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (2431)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.07)


</TABLE>
#### Calvin D. TUTTLE et al., Appellants, v. BEARING CHAIN & SUPPLY COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 15562.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Fort Worth.

Nov. 5, 1954.

Albert B. Morris, Dallas, for appellants.

Leaehman, Matthews & Gardere, '-and Gordon H. Rowe, Jr., Dallas, for appellee.

MASSEY, Chief Justice.

From a judgment entered in behalf, .of a plaintiff in a suit for damages based upon an automobile negligence action, the defendants appealed.

Appeal dismissed.

During the course of the trial of the case the defendants made a motion for instructed verdict and, after the verdict was returned, made a motion for júdgment non obstante veredicto. Both motions were overruled. The defendants did not file any motion for new trial. ■ Therefore, by reason of the provisions of T.R.C.P. 324— Prerequisites of Appeal — -the defendants have failed in a most material respect to comply with á provision of the law necessary to be complied with in order to maintain an appeal. Whether they are right or whether they are wrong, they have failed to give the trial judge the benefit of their reasons why they believe they have been erroneously prejudiced by way of the “motion for new trial” they are in duty bound required to at least file.

Of course the Rule in question provides’ for three exceptions to its requirement that a party desiring to appeal, should file a motion for new trial as a prerequisite. Since this case was tried before a jury in the County Court all of the exceptions set out in the Rule would be possible to exist in certain instances. But in the present instance there was no peremptory instruction given the jury, there is no point raised in appellants’ brief based upon an error arising after the action of the trial court upon a motion for new trial, and there was a full five days’ time between the date the *746judgment was rendered and the date the court was adjourned for the term.

Though the opinion in Rowney v. Rauch, Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1953, 258 S.W.2d 371, error refused, was based upon an appeal from a judgment of a district court coming within the Special Practice Act, as to which the last exception mentioned in the .Rule would have no application, we believe the law in an instance such as here posed is settled as per this court’s holding in that case.

The appeal is dismissed.
##### 



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and2.
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 Date: December 7, 2006
    
    /s/ Constantine S. Liollio

Constantine S. LiollioPresident andChief Executive Officer
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of Advanta Corp. (the "Company")
on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Dennis
Alter, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

      (1)   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
            of the Company.


/s/ Dennis Alter
----------------
Dennis Alter
Chief Executive Officer
November 13, 2002
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Labor

###### Employment and Training Administration

          - [TA-W-38,013]

Pursuant to section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, an investigation was initiated on August 28, 2000 in response to a worker petition which was dated on August 3, 2000 on behalf of workers at Robert Bosch Corporation, Hendersonville, Tennessee.

An active certification covering the petitioning group of workers remains in effect (TA-W-36,523). Consequently, further investigation in this case would serve no purpose, and the investigation has been terminated.

Signed in Washington, D.C. this 6th day of October 2000.

Linda G. Poole,

Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.

[FR Doc. 00-27572 Filed 10-25-00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4510-30-M
[DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 15

- 14927

________________________ D.C. Docket No s . 4:12

- cv - 00470

- RH

- CAS ; 4:10

- cr - 00025

- RH

- CAS

- 1 ALDO RAY WILSON, Petitioner

- Appellant,

versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

- Appellee.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida

________________________ ( January 3, 2019 ) Before MARTIN , JILL PRYOR, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM : Aldo Wilson appeals the District Court’s decision denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence , after a jury convicted him of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”)

.

Case: 15-14927 Date Filed: 01/03/2019 Page: 1 of 32 In his § 2255 motion , Mr. Wilson raised one claim o f ineffective assistance of tria l counsel . Mr. Wilson later filed a supplemental § 2255 motion, challenging his ACCA sentence and relying on Descamps v. United States , 570 U.S. 254, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). Following issuance of the Supreme Court ’s decision in Johnson v. United States , 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which held that the residual clause of the ACCA was unconstitu tionally vague , Mr. Wilson also asserted a Johnson claim in his reply brief. Following the recommendation of a m agistrate j udge , the district court rejected both the Descamps claim and the Johnson claim , and we granted a certificate of appealability

. After Mr. Wilson file d his opening brief on appeal , t his
Court issued Beeman v. United States , 871 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2017) , which held that Descamps and Johnson claims were distinct for purposes of determining ti meliness and which clarified the burden of proof for establishing a Johnson claim in a § 2255 proceeding. Because the District Court did not have the benefit of our decision in
Beeman when it ruled on Mr. Wilson’s § 2255 motion, we vacate and remand . On remand, the District Court should decide the timeliness and merits of each claim. As to the timeliness question, the district court should also consider Mr. Wilson’s contention that the Government has waived its statute of limitations defense, and in

Case: 15-14927 Date Filed: 01/03/2019 Page: 2 of 33 doing so, it should consider the entire record, both th e record before the district court and th e record on appeal in this C ourt. VACATED AND REMANDED. Case: 15-14927 Date Filed: 01/03/2019 Page: 3 of 3
----

| a)   | all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and |
|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| b)   | any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting. |
|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:  | November 8, 2012 | /s/ Richard D. Sieradzki                                 |
|--------|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
|   |             | Richard D. Sieradzki                                     |
|   |             | Chief Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer |

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                7
<MULTIPLIER>                     1,000,000
<CURRENCY>                             USD

<S>                                    <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                        3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>              DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                 JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                   MAR-31-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                          1
<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>                10,567
<DEBT-CARRYING-VALUE>                    0
<DEBT-MARKET-VALUE>                      0
<EQUITIES>                              36
<MORTGAGE>                               0
<REAL-ESTATE>                            0
<TOTAL-INVEST>                      12,168
<CASH>                               1,604
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                       0
<DEFERRED-ACQUISITION>                 709
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                      19,190
<POLICY-LOSSES>                          0
<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                      0
<POLICY-OTHER>                      12,071
<POLICY-HOLDER-FUNDS>                    0
<NOTES-PAYABLE>                        562
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                    0
<PREFERRED>                             16
<COMMON>                                 1
<OTHER-SE>                           1,210
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>        19,190
<PREMIUMS>                               0
<INVESTMENT-INCOME>                    206
<INVESTMENT-GAINS>                     (4)
<OTHER-INCOME>                         121
<BENEFITS>                               0
<UNDERWRITING-AMORTIZATION>             27
<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>                   102
<INCOME-PRETAX>                         47
<INCOME-TAX>                            17
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                      0
<DISCONTINUED>                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                          0
<CHANGES>                                0
<NET-INCOME>                            30
<EPS-BASIC>                           0.62
<EPS-DILUTED>                         0.62
<RESERVE-OPEN>                           0
<PROVISION-CURRENT>                      0
<PROVISION-PRIOR>                        0
<PAYMENTS-CURRENT>                       0
<PAYMENTS-PRIOR>                         0
<RESERVE-CLOSE>                          0
<CUMULATIVE-DEFICIENCY>                  0


</TABLE>
#### BALL et al. v. HILL et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June *15,*1951.

Cleon K. Calvert, Pineville, Robert J. Watson, Middlesboro, for appellants.

Clore & Swinford, Pineville, for appel-lees.

CULLEN, Commissioner.

In actions in the Bell Circuit Court, the holding of local option elections in three precincts of the Third Magisterial District of Bell County was sought to be enjoined, because less than three years prior to the proposed elections, an, election had been held in the entire magisterial district, the result being against prohibition, or “wet.” The actions were consolidated. Demurrers to the petitions were sustained, and the actions were dismissed. The plaintiffs have appealed.

The contentions of the appellants are: (1) That to permit the “diys” to have a local option election in a precinct within less than three years after an election in *629which the magisterial district containing the precinct has voted “wet,” is unwarranted discrimination and denies equal protection of the laws, because the “wets” are not accorded a corresponding privilege when the district has voted “dry;” (2) that KRS 242.030(5) should be construed to mean that when a local option election held in a territory has resulted against prohibition, another election may not be held within three years in any political unit embraced in the territory.

This court consistently has taken a position adverse to' the appellants’ contentions. The position was reaffirmed in Fuson v. Howard, 305 Ky. 843, 205 S.W.2d 1018, and was adherred to in Stephens v. Stumbo, Ky., 239 S.W.2d 995. We continue to abide by those decisions.

The judgment is affirmed.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

ALLEGHENY INTERMEDIATE UNIT,

Respondent

v.

EAST ALLEGHENY SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 52 WAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24th day of July, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.