2014 WI 53

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2012AP2341-D 

COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Mark Alan Ruppelt, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant,

 v.

Mark Alan Ruppelt,

 Respondent.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST RUPPELT

OPINION FILED: July 8, 2014

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT:

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT: 

COUNTY:

JUDGE:

JUSTICES:

CONCURRED: 

DISSENTED: BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissent. (Opinion 

filed.) 

NOT PARTICIPATING: 

ATTORNEYS:
2014 WI 53

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2012AP2341-D

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Mark Alan Ruppelt, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant,

 v.

Mark Alan Ruppelt,

 Respondent.

FILED

JUL 8, 2014

Diane M. Fremgen

Clerk of Supreme Court

ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney publicly 

reprimanded.

¶1 PER CURIAM. We review a report and recommendation of 

Referee Richard C. Ninneman approving the Stipulation and No 

Contest Plea filed by the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and 

Attorney Mark Alan Ruppelt.1 In the stipulation, 

Attorney Ruppelt pled no contest to three counts of misconduct 

 

1 In the documents filed in this matter, the spelling of 

Attorney Ruppelt's middle name varies. We note that his name as 

listed with the State Bar of Wisconsin is "Mark Alan Ruppelt," 

and we therefore use that spelling throughout this opinion.
No. 2012AP2341-D 

2

as alleged in the complaint filed by the OLR. The OLR 

voluntarily dismissed Count Four of the complaint. The parties 

jointly recommended that the sanction imposed be a public 

reprimand. The referee approved the stipulation and recommended 

that this court publicly reprimand Attorney Ruppelt. 

Attorney Ruppelt filed a timely objection to the OLR's statement 

of costs, which sought costs of $18,443.05. The referee's 

amended recommendation as to the assessment of costs was that 

the requested fees for retained counsel be reduced by 50 

percent, which would reduce the costs assessed against Attorney 

Ruppelt to $9,990.55.

¶2 After carefully reviewing the matter, we uphold the 

referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law. We agree 

with the referee that a public reprimand is an appropriate 

sanction. We also agree with the referee that it is appropriate 

to reduce the costs of this proceeding to $9,990.55.

¶3 Attorney Ruppelt was admitted to practice law in 

Wisconsin in 1994 and practices in Milwaukee. He was previously 

a partner in the law firm of Gatzke & Ruppelt SC (the Firm), 

located in Waukesha County.

¶4 In 2007, T.W. retained the Firm to represent her in 

two legal matters. The first was a civil claim against a former 

teacher and his employer based on the teacher's alleged sexual 

assaults of T.W. when she was a student at the school.2 The 

 

2 According to the Wisconsin Court System Circuit Court 

Access web site, T.W. was born in 1980, which means she was 27 

years old when she retained the Firm to represent her in the two 

legal matters.
No. 2012AP2341-D 

3

other matter was to assist T.W. as a victim/witness in the 

criminal case pending against the teacher. Prior to undertaking 

representation of T.W., Attorney Ruppelt had not had a sexual 

relationship with her.

¶5 Attorney Ruppelt attempted without success to settle 

T.W.'s civil claims against the former teacher and the school. 

In March of 2008, Attorney Ruppelt filed a lawsuit against the 

former teacher and the school. From March 2008 through February 

2009, Attorney Ruppelt filed numerous pleadings on T.W.'s behalf 

in the civil case and appeared at hearings and scheduling 

conferences. In August of 2008, Attorney Ruppelt appeared as 

counsel of record for T.W. at the former teacher's sentencing 

hearing in the criminal case.

¶6 In April of 2009, while the civil and criminal cases 

were still pending, Attorney Ruppelt and T.W. began a sexual 

relationship. In mid-April 2009, the Firm became aware that 

Attorney Ruppelt may have been engaging in a sexual relationship 

with T.W. while representing her. Attorney Ruppelt continued to 

represent T.W. until he and the Firm determined he could no 

longer do so, given the concerns surrounding the nature of his 

relationship with T.W.

¶7 On April 19, 2009, Attorney Ruppelt met with 

Attorney James Gatzke, and Paul Bucher, another senior attorney 

at the law firm, to discuss the Firm's concerns about 

Attorney Ruppelt's relationship with T.W. At the meeting, 

Attorney Ruppelt falsely represented to Attorneys Gatzke and 

Bucher that he had not received or exchanged any texts, e-mail, 
No. 2012AP2341-D 

4

or voicemail messages of any kind with T.W. that were of a 

personal nature and unrelated to the law firm's representation 

of T.W. in her civil and criminal cases. In fact, 

Attorney Ruppelt had received an e-mail from T.W. on April 17, 

2009, that was of a personal nature. At the April 19 meeting, 

Attorney Ruppelt falsely represented that he had not engaged in 

a sexual relationship with T.W. while representing her. 

Attorney Ruppelt agreed not to have contact with T.W. following 

the April 19 meeting. On several occasions after April 19, 

2009, Attorney Ruppelt denied to Attorney Gatzke that he was 

involved in a romantic relationship with T.W.

¶8 In May or June of 2009, Attorney Ruppelt acknowledged 

to Attorney Gatzke that he was engaging in a sexual relationship 

with T.W. at that time. 

¶9 On October 15, 2009, the OLR sent Attorney Ruppelt a 

letter notifying him of its pending investigation regarding his 

relationship with T.W. while representing her. In late October 

2009, Attorney Ruppelt responded to the grievance and falsely 

indicated that his representation of T.W. was limited to 

assisting her in drafting a victim impact statement. His 

response stated that Attorney Gatzke was lead counsel in the 

civil case and that Attorney Ruppelt only filled in when needed. 

The response also falsely represented that Attorney Ruppelt had 

not engaged in sexual relations with T.W. at a time when his law 

firm was representing her in the civil case. Attorney Ruppelt 

further falsely represented that T.W.'s e-mail of April 17, 2009 

was unsolicited and not responded to by him.
No. 2012AP2341-D 

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¶10 The OLR directed Attorney Ruppelt to provide a more 

complete response. Attorney Ruppelt and an OLR investigator had 

a telephone conference on October 30, 2009. During the 

telephone conference, Attorney Ruppelt falsely represented that 

the April 17, 2009 e-mail was "all fabrication." He again 

falsely represented that his representation of T.W. was limited 

to assisting her in drafting a victim impact statement in the 

criminal case. He also falsely represented to the OLR 

investigator that Attorney Gatzke was lead counsel in the civil 

case and that Attorney Ruppelt only filled in when needed.

¶11 On November 13, 2009, Attorney Ruppelt filed a 

supplemental response to the OLR's inquiry. The supplemental 

response falsely represented that Attorney Ruppelt had not begun 

a sexual relationship with T.W. until June 27, 2009, and thus 

had not had a sexual relationship with her at any time while 

representing her on behalf of his law firm. The supplemental 

response also falsely represented that Attorney Gatzke and 

Attorney Ruppelt had decided Attorney Ruppelt's contact with 

T.W. should cease because she had sent Attorney Ruppelt an 

unsolicited e-mail alluding to inappropriate contact that he 

denied. The supplemental response also falsely represented that 

Attorney Ruppelt had told Attorney Gatzke about T.W.'s April 17, 

2009 e-mail and asserted that the decision to remove himself 

from T.W.'s legal matters was made between him and 

Attorney Gatzke, without mentioning Attorney Bucher or the 

Firm's investigation.
No. 2012AP2341-D 

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¶12 On April 20, 2009, as part of the Firm's investigation 

of Attorney Ruppelt's relationship with T.W., Attorney Bucher 

met with T.W. During the meeting, T.W. denied that she and 

Attorney Ruppelt had engaged in a sexual relationship while he 

was representing her on behalf of the Firm. T.W. subsequently 

had a telephone conference with an OLR investigator. During the 

telephone conference T.W. denied that Attorney Ruppelt had had a 

sexual relationship with her during the period of time he was 

representing her on behalf of the Firm. She also denied sending 

the April 17, 2009 e-mail.

¶13 Attorney Ruppelt and T.W. were married in June 2010. 

On October 26, 2012, the OLR filed a complaint against 

Attorney Ruppelt alleging four counts of misconduct:

[COUNT ONE] By engaging in sexual relations with 

[T.W.] while he was representing her in [civil and 

criminal cases], when they had not engaged in a 

consensual sexual relationship prior to the 

commencement of the attorney-client relationship, 

[Attorney] Ruppelt violated SCR 20:1.8(j).3

[COUNT TWO] By providing false information to his 

Firm regarding the nature and timing of his 

relationship with [T.W.], by failing to disclose 

information to his Firm regarding the nature and 

timing of his relationship with [T.W.], and by 

engaging in a course of conduct to conceal from his 

Firm the nature and timing of his relationship with 

 

3 SCR 20:1.8(j) states, "A lawyer shall not have sexual 

relations with a current client unless a consensual sexual 

relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer 

relationship commenced." 
No. 2012AP2341-D 

7

[T.W.], [Attorney] Ruppelt violated SCR 20:8.4(f)4 and 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Shea, 190 

Wis. 2d 560, [527] N.W.2d [314] (1995).5 

[COUNT THREE] By providing false information to 

OLR and failing to provide relevant information to OLR 

regarding the scope and time of his representation of 

[T.W.], and/or by providing false information to OLR 

and failing to provide relevant information to OLR 

regarding the nature and timing of his relationship 

with [T.W.], and/or by providing false information to 

OLR and failing to provide relevant information to OLR 

regarding his Firm's investigation of his relationship 

with [T.W.], [Attorney] Ruppelt violated 

 

4 SCR 20:8.4(f) states it is professional misconduct for a 

lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme court 

order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 

lawyers; . . . ."

5 The Shea court found an attorney's pattern of conduct 

"constituted a breach of his fiduciary duty to his law firm and 

his duty of honesty in his professional dealings with it." 
No. 2012AP2341-D 

8

SCR [22.03(2)]6 and SCR 22.03(6),7 enforced via 

SCR 20:8.4(h).8

[COUNT FOUR] By assisting or inducing [T.W.] to 

provide false information to OLR and to withhold 

relevant information from OLR regarding the nature and 

timing of [Attorney] Ruppelt's relationship with 

[T.W.], and/or by assisting or inducing [T.W.] to 

provide false information to OLR and to withhold 

relevant information from OLR regarding [Attorney] 

Ruppelt's Firm's investigation of the nature and 

timing of [Attorney] Ruppelt's relationship with 

[T.W.], and/or by assisting and inducing [T.W.] to 

provide false information to OLR and to withhold 

relevant information from OLR regarding [T.W.]'s 

knowledge of events relevant to OLR's investigation, 

and/or by failing to advise OLR that [T.W.] had 

provided or intended to provide false information to 

 

6 SCR 22.03(2) states as follows:

Upon commencing an investigation, the director 

shall notify the respondent of the matter being 

investigated unless in the opinion of the director the 

investigation of the matter requires otherwise. The 

respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts 

and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct 

within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a 

request for a written response. The director may 

allow additional time to respond. Following receipt 

of the response, the director may conduct further 

investigation and may compel the respondent to answer 

questions, furnish documents, and present any 

information deemed relevant to the investigation.

7 SCR 22.03(6) provides as follows: "In the course of the 

investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide 

relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 

documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure 

are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted 

in the grievance."

8 SCR 20:8.4(h) states it is professional misconduct for a 

lawyer to "fail to cooperate in the investigation of a grievance 

filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required by 

SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6), or 

SCR 22.04(1); . . . ."
No. 2012AP2341-D 

9

OLR and had withheld or intended to withhold relevant 

information from OLR, [Attorney] Ruppelt violated 

SCR 22.03(6), enforced via SCR 20:8.4(h) and 

SCR 20:8.4(a).9

¶14 The complaint sought a 60-day suspension of 

Attorney Ruppelt's license to practice law in Wisconsin. 

Attorney Ruppelt filed an answer to the complaint on 

November 13, 2012. Following the recusal of one referee and a 

motion for substitution of second referee, Referee Ninneman was 

appointed on April 16, 2013.

¶15 The matter was set for a hearing that was scheduled to 

commence on September 16, 2013. Prior to the hearing, the 

parties entered into a stipulation, which was filed on 

September 19, 2013. The parties stipulated that the OLR would 

voluntarily dismiss Count Four of its complaint. 

Attorney Ruppelt agreed to plead no contest to Counts One, Two, 

and Three of the complaint and agreed that the referee could use 

the allegations of the complaint as an adequate factual basis in 

the record for a determination of misconduct as to those counts. 

The parties jointly recommended that the sanction imposed be a 

public reprimand.

¶16 On October 9, 2013, the referee issued his report and 

recommendation. Based on the stipulation, the referee found by 

clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that 

Attorney Ruppelt violated the supreme court rules as alleged in 

 

9 SCR 20:8.4(a) states that it is professional misconduct 

for a lawyer to "violate or attempt to violate the Rules of 

Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do 

so, or do so through the acts of another; . . . ." 
No. 2012AP2341-D 

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Counts One, Two, and Three of the complaint. The referee also 

recommended that this court publicly reprimand Attorney Ruppelt 

for his disciplinary violations.

¶17 The OLR filed its statement of costs on October 29, 

2013. The OLR sought costs and disbursements of $18,443.05. 

The OLR noted that its complaint alleged four counts of 

misconduct and, as part of the stipulation, the OLR agreed to 

dismiss Count Four. The OLR also noted that while it initially 

sought a 60-day suspension of Attorney Ruppelt's license, after 

Count Four was dismissed the OLR revisited its sanction 

recommendation and the OLR director determined that a public 

reprimand was an appropriate sanction. The OLR said that 

Attorney Ruppelt was uncooperative in part with the OLR's 

investigation. The OLR also said:

Although the litigation was ultimately resolved by 

stipulation short of a hearing, this stipulation did 

not occur until after the case had been pending almost 

a year. Discovery, including depositions was 

extensive. Attorney Ruppelt's discovery requests were 

onerous and resulted in OLR's expenditure of a 

tremendous amount of time (the majority of which was 

internal staff time and not even charged herein to 

Attorney Ruppelt). Counsel costs herein are 

substantial but were paid out by OLR as reasonable and 

necessarily incurred.

¶18 Attorney Ruppelt filed an objection to the OLR's 

statement of costs on November 19, 2013. Attorney Ruppelt 

asserts that he was in fact cooperative and proposed to enter 

into a stipulation that was ultimately adopted after thousands 

of dollars in costs were incurred by the OLR, primarily through 

retained counsel's legal fees of nearly $17,000.
No. 2012AP2341-D 

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¶19 Attorney Ruppelt said that on January 14, 2013, his 

counsel sent a letter to the OLR offering to discuss the case 

before either side invested a significant amount of time and 

money. Attorney Ruppelt said:

Respondent explained in the January 14 letter that his 

lack of complete candor was an effort to protect 

[T.W.] as opposed to any desire to mislead OLR. While 

recognizing that being a gentleman and consideration 

of [T.W.'s] personal interests didn't excuse a failure 

to be candid with OLR, respondent requested that 

failure be put in proper context. . . .

This was not an attempt to save respondent or to hide 

improper conduct from others; it was motivated by a 

desire to protect a woman for whom respondent had, at 

that point, extremely strong feelings, evidenced by 

the fact that they [have] since married and have had 

children together. It was in that context that 

respondent suggested that his actions should be viewed 

as a less serious offense warranting less serious 

discipline than a failure to cooperate or respond 

candidly would under other circumstances.

¶20 Attorney Ruppelt notes that while the OLR seeks 

counsel fees and disbursements of $16,926.09, the fees charged 

by Attorney Ruppelt's counsel from the time the OLR filed its 

complaint in October of 2012 through the time the stipulation 

was entered into total only $6,150. Attorney Ruppelt suggests 

that any award of costs made should be in an amount not greater 

than the fees Attorney Ruppelt himself has been charged.

¶21 The OLR replied to Attorney Ruppelt's objection to 

costs on November 21, 2013, and said it stands by its original 

costs statement.

¶22 The referee issued his amended recommendation as to 

the assessment of reasonable costs on December 9, 2013. The 
No. 2012AP2341-D 

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referee stated that this was not a complicated case involving 

multiple client matters, nor was this a case involving extensive 

discovery. The referee said he was troubled by the fact that 

retained counsel spent 33.7 hours reviewing the OLR's 

investigative file and drafting the complaint, which was more 

than the 27.33 hours that Attorney Ruppelt's counsel spent 

defending the matter from the time of the filing to the time of 

the stipulation. 

¶23 The referee said he was also troubled that retained 

counsel billed approximately 125 hours for discovery, which 

included responding to Attorney Ruppelt's request for production 

of documents and conducting two depositions, one by telephone, 

of Attorney Ruppelt's two former law partners/employers. The 

referee said, "[M]ost importantly, this referee is very troubled 

by the fact that the OLR's retained counsel billed 241.5 hours

in this matter, resulting in $16,905 in total fees, when 

respondent's counsel was proposing some type of reprimand as 

opposed to a sixty-day suspension as early as January 14, 2013 

as reflected in retained counsel's own billing records."

¶24 The referee recommends that the requested fees for 

outside counsel be reduced by 50 percent, making the recommended 

costs in this matter $9,990.55 as opposed to the requested costs 

of $18,443.05.

¶25 This court will adopt a referee's findings of fact 

unless they are clearly erroneous. Conclusions of law are 

reviewed de novo. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 

Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. The 
No. 2012AP2341-D 

13

court may impose whatever sanction it sees fit regardless of the 

referee's recommendation. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.

¶26 We adopt the referee's findings of fact and 

conclusions of law that Attorney Ruppelt violated the supreme 

court rules as alleged in Counts One, Two, and Three of the 

OLR's complaint. We also agree with the referee that a public 

reprimand is an appropriate sanction for Attorney Ruppelt's 

misconduct.

¶27 We turn next to the issue of costs. Assessment of 

costs in OLR matters is governed by SCR 22.24. Our general 

policy is that upon a finding of misconduct it is appropriate to 

impose all costs, including the expenses of counsel for the OLR, 

upon the respondent. In some cases this court may, in the 

exercise of its discretion, reduce the amount of costs imposed 

upon a respondent. In exercising its discretion regarding the 

assessment of costs, the court will consider the statement of 

costs, any objection and reply, the recommendation of the 

referee, and all of the following factors: the number of counts 

charged, contested, and proven; the nature of the misconduct; 

the level of discipline sought by the parties and recommended by 

the referee; the respondent's cooperation with the disciplinary 

process; prior discipline, if any; and other relevant 

circumstances.

¶28 Upon consideration of the relevant factors and the 

submissions of the parties, we agree with the referee that it is 

appropriate in this case to reduce the amount of retained 
No. 2012AP2341-D 

14

counsel's fees by 50 percent. In making our determination on 

costs, we appreciate the referee's analysis. On balance, we 

find it appropriate to follow the referee's recommendation and 

reduce retained counsel's fees by 50 percent. Our determination 

is not the result of the application of a precise mathematical 

formula, but instead is based on our thorough consideration of 

the record, the manner in which this case developed, and the 

factors set forth in SCR 22.24(1m).

¶29 IT IS ORDERED that Mark Alan Ruppelt is publicly 

reprimanded for professional misconduct.

¶30 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 

of this order, Mark Alan Ruppelt shall pay to the Office of 

Lawyer Regulation the imposed costs of this proceeding, which 

are $9,990.55.

¶31 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the director of the Office 

of Lawyer Regulation shall advise the court if there has not 

been full compliance with all conditions of this decision.
No. 2012AP2341-D.awb

1

¶32 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). The discipline 

should be more than a public reprimand. Attorney Ruppelt not 

only violated SCR 20:1.8(j), but also violated SCR 20:8.4(h) and 

(f) by repeatedly misrepresenting the facts to his law firm and 

the OLR, as explicitly set forth in the opinion. Per curiam, 

¶¶7, 9, 10, 11.

¶33 In addition, I would impose full costs. SCR 22.24(1m) 

states the court's "general policy [] that upon a finding of 

misconduct, it is appropriate to impose all costs." The rule 

then sets forth the factors to consider when determining whether 

to deviate from that general policy and reduce the costs. 

¶34 Because the per curiam does not explain or evaluate 

how those factors apply in this case, there has been no showing 

that we should deviate from our general policy here. 

¶35 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 

ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.
No. 2012AP2341-D.awb

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