United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted January 7, 2019*

Decided January 8, 2019 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge 

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 17-3328 

NOAH SCHROEDER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

TERRY SAWALL, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District 

of Wisconsin. 

No. 15-CV-1158 

Lynn Adelman, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

 Noah Schroeder, a Wisconsin inmate, sued prison officials for deliberate 

indifference in failing to protect him from an attack by another inmate. The district 

court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment because Schroeder did not 

demonstrate that any defendant knew of a substantial risk of serious harm. We affirm. 

 

 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 17-3328 Page 2 

Schroeder was accused by fellow inmate Kevin Stuckey of being a “snitch.” 

According to a conduct report that charged Stuckey with making unauthorized phone 

calls, Schroeder had told the investigating officer that Stuckey had helped him make 

calls in exchange for food. Schroeder, concerned about the ramification of being labeled 

a snitch, sent a letter to the prison’s security director stating that he feared for his safety 

and that the officer had fabricated the report. He also filed an inmate complaint 

accusing the officer of misconduct for filing a false conduct report. The complaintexaminer dismissed the complaint, explaining that Schroeder’s only legitimate safety 

concern would relate to Stuckey, with whom Schroeder continued to associate 

peacefully even after the conduct report had been issued. In any event, the complaintexaminer added, Stuckey and Schroeder already were housed in different units. 

 

About three months later, Schroeder was attacked by another inmate who had 

gained improper access to the recreation field during Schroeder’s scheduled recreation 

time. That inmate “choked out” Schroeder, repeatedly stabbed him with a sharpened 

paint brush, and called him a snitch. The attack lasted until officers who were 

supervising the recreation field intervened. 

Schroeder sued prison officials under the Eighth Amendment for being 

deliberately indifferent to the risk that an attack would occur. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 

district court ultimately entered summary judgment for the defendants, explaining that 

Schroeder had not produced sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the 

defendants subjectively knew about the risk and did not take reasonable measures to 

abate it. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846–47 (1994); Giles v. Tobeck, 895 F.3d 510, 

513 (7th Cir. 2018). 

On appeal Schroeder generally challenges the district court’s conclusion that he 

did not establish the defendants’ culpable state of mind, and stresses that officers knew 

of the ramifications of being named in Stuckey’s conduct report. But “[j]ust because a 

correctional officer knows an inmate has been branded a snitch—and it’s common 

knowledge that snitches face unique risks in prison—does not mean that an officer 

violates the Constitution if the inmate gets attacked.” Dale, 548 F.3d at 570. An officer 

does not violate the Eighth Amendment “unless the official knows of and disregards an 

excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. And Schroeder has 

presented no evidence that any defendant knew of such a risk. The most any defendant 

knew was that, three months before the attack, Schroeder was named in Stuckey’s 

conduct report, but there is no indication that any defendant would have known that 
No. 17-3328 Page 3 

any threat was posed by the inmate who ultimately attacked Schroeder—an inmate 

who was uninvolved in the incidents giving rise to Stuckey’s conduct report. 

Schroeder insists that the attack was nonetheless foreseeable, but his arguments 

are unpersuasive. To the extent he speculates that his name in the conduct report may 

have led the assaulting inmate to suspect him of being a confidential informant 

elsewhere, his theory does not impute knowledge of a serious risk of harm to any 

defendant. See Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 2008). Schroeder also 

asserts that his assailant told an officer—one not named as a defendant—about plans to 

attack him, but points to no factual basis for knowing that such a conversation occurred, 

and ideas based on hunches or rumors are insufficient to avert summary judgment. See 

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008). In any case, 

what was told to a non-defendant officer in no way establishes what any individual 

defendant here knew. 

Schroeder also asserts that lying on a conduct report violates prison policy and 

amounts to deliberate indifference per se. But violation of a prison policy alone does not 

violate the Constitution or suggest deliberate indifference. See Lewis v. Richards, 107 F.3d 

549, 553 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1997); Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1238 (7th Cir. 1996). 

AFFIRMED