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*********************************************** 
GOSHEN MORTGAGE, LLC v. ANDREAS D.

ANDROULIDAKIS ET AL.

(AC 43002)

Elgo, Alexander and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff G Co. sought to foreclosure a mortgage on certain real property

owned by the defendant J. The defendant A, J’s now former husband,

had executed a note for a loan that was used to purchase the property

that secured the mortgage, and that loan was now in default. Prior to

the commencement of the foreclosure action, A quitclaimed his interest

in the property to J as part of a separation agreement. G Co. alleged in

its complaint that it was the holder of the note and mortgage. G Co.

thereafter filed a motion to substitute T Co. as the plaintiff, explaining

that, since the commencement of the action, it had assigned the note

and mortgage to T Co. Four days prior to commencing the foreclosure

action, however, G Co. assigned the mortgage to T Co. J objected to

the motion, claiming that G Co. lacked standing to litigate the action

because it had not proven that it was the holder of the note at the time

it commenced the action. The trial court granted the motion to substitute.

Thereafter, J filed two motions to dismiss arguing that G Co. lacked

standing to initiate the foreclosure because the note and mortgage had

been assigned before the commencement of the action, which the court

denied. Subsequently, T Co. filed a motion for summary judgment as to

liability only, which the court granted, and, thereafter, the court rendered

a judgment of strict foreclosure. J filed a motion to open the judgment,

which the court denied, and J appealed to this court. Held:

1. This court found unavailing J’s claim that G Co. lacked standing to initiate

the foreclosure action: G Co. was in possession of the note, endorsed

in blank, when it commenced the action and, therefore, had standing

to do so; the trial court correctly determined that the note was endorsed

in blank, and G Co. alleged in its complaint that it was the holder of

the note and, although the mortgage was assigned prior to the commencement of the action, there is no indication in the record that the

note itself changed hands, as the only evidence before the court indicated

that G Co. was in possession of the note when the action was commenced, and it was of no consequence that the mortgage was assigned

before the action commenced.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to

substitute T Co. as the plaintiff: although the court mischaracterized

the nature of the assignment in granting the motion to substitute when

it stated that G Co. assigned both the note and mortgage after the

commencement of the action, the substitution had no substantive effect

on the proceedings because the note, endorsed in blank, remained in

possession of G Co., and, thus, the cause of action itself was not assigned

to a legally distinct party, the substitution only having served to clarify

that G Co. was bringing the foreclosure action in its capacity as trustee

for T Co., and in no way prejudiced J’s ability to make payments or

defend against the claims brought; moreover, the court correctly determined that, contrary to J’s claim, the rule of practice (§ 9-20) that allows

for the substitution of a plaintiff when an action has been commenced

in the name of the wrong plaintiff to cure the lack of standing of the

original plaintiff, was inapplicable because G Co. had standing as holder

of the note, and it was not the wrong plaintiff.

3. The trial court properly denied J’s motions to dismiss; the court made

an express factual finding that G Co. held the note endorsed in blank

at the time the action commenced and J failed to submit any evidence

in support of her motions to dismiss that called into question G Co.’s

status as holder of the note.

4. The trial court properly granted T Co.’s motion for summary judgment:

a. T Co. established a prima facie case for foreclosure; the supporting

documentation submitted by T Co. in support of its motion for summary

judgment established that it was the holder of the note and assignee of

the mortgage as well as the terms of the note and mortgage, that A and
J were in default, and that T Co. or its predecessor were in compliance

with the condition precedent to the institution of the action and, J failed

to provide an affidavit or exhibit that raised a genuine issue of material

fact to counter T Co.’s documentation.

b. J’s alleged special defenses were without merit and did not rebut T

Co.’s prima facie case; contrary to J’s claim, this court has rejected

arguments that trust documents or pooling and servicing agreements

are relevant to the issue of standing, and, although it may not have been

entirely accurate for G Co. to state that it had assigned the mortgage

since the commencement of the action, the assignment had no substantive effect on the litigation, and it was not an abuse of the trial court’s

discretion to decline to characterize this statement as wilful misconduct,

the court properly concluded that no statute of limitations applied to

the action, and the court properly concluded that a divorce decree

between A and J, which stated that J was not assuming any liability on

the mortgage, had no effect on the mortgage, which J signed, and was

a contract between J and G Co.

5. J’s claim that the trial court improperly rendered a judgment of strict

foreclosure because it never resolved the issue of standing and should

have held an evidentiary hearing to determine when G Co. acquired the

note was unavailing, this court having previously determined that G

Co. was the holder of the note at the time the foreclosure action was

commenced and had standing.

6. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying J’s motion to open

the judgment as the grounds put forth in the motion have been resolved

in favor of T Co.

Argued January 20—officially released June 1, 2021

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant Jameela Androulidakis,

and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the

named defendant was defaulted for failure to appear;

thereafter, Goshen Mortgage, LLC, as Separate Trustee

for GDBT I Trust 2011-1, was substituted as the plaintiff;

subsequently, the court, Genuario, J., granted the substitute plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to

liability; thereafter, the court, Genuario, J., rendered

judgment of strict foreclosure; subsequently, the court

denied the motion to open filed by the defendant

Jameela Androulidakis, and the defendant Jameela

Androulidakis appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Jameela Androulidakis, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

Christopher J. Picard, for the appellee (substitute

plaintiff).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, J. The self-represented defendant,

Jameela Androulidakis,1 appeals from the judgment of

strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court in favor

of the substitute plaintiff, Goshen Mortgage, LLC, as

Separate Trustee for GDBT I Trust 2011-1. On appeal,

the defendant claims that the court improperly (1)

determined that the plaintiff, Goshen Mortgage, LLC,2

had standing to bring the foreclosure action, and thus

erred by granting the plaintiff’s motion to substitute

and denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, (2)

granted the substitute plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment, (3) rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure

for the substitute plaintiff, and (4) failed to grant the

defendant’s motion to open the judgment.3 We affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s appeal. In July,

2007, Andreas D. Androulidakis (Andreas) executed and

delivered to Chase Bank USA, N.A. (Chase Bank), a

note for a loan in the original principal amount of

$649,999. The loan was used to purchase property

located at 73 Devils Garden Road in Norwalk (property). Only Andreas signed the note for the loan. On

the same date, Andreas and the defendant executed

and delivered to Chase Bank a mortgage on the property. The mortgage subsequently was recorded on the

land records of the town of Norwalk. On October 9,

2009, ownership of the property was transferred to the

defendant from Andreas by quitclaim deed as part of

a separation agreement. The terms of that agreement

stated that ‘‘transfer of the property to the [defendant]

shall not result in her assumption of any liability of the

mortgage securing the property.’’ Andreas thereafter

failed to make payments on the mortgage and eventually

declared bankruptcy.

Chase Bank assigned the mortgage to JP Morgan

Chase Bank, N.A. (JP Morgan), on September 3, 2009,

and assigned the note to JP Morgan by way of an allonge

affixed to the note dated November 4, 2009.4

JP Morgan

subsequently endorsed the note in blank. The note and

mortgage were then transferred multiple times between

2009 and 2016, before ultimately being transferred to

the plaintiff on June 29, 2016.5

On October 28, 2016, the plaintiff commenced this

foreclosure action, naming both the defendant and

Andreas, and alleged that the defendant was the owner

of the property. In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged,

inter alia, that it was the holder of the note and mortgage, that the note was in default, and that it was electing to accelerate the balance due on the note and to

foreclose on the mortgage securing the note. Further,

the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had been pro-
vided written notice of the default and had failed to

cure the default.

Four days before this foreclosure action was commenced, however, the plaintiff assigned the mortgage to

the substitute plaintiff and the assignment subsequently

was recorded on March 27, 2017. The plaintiff then filed

a motion to substitute the plaintiff on October 13, 2017,

explaining that ‘‘since the commencement of the above

entitled action, it has assigned the subject mortgage

deed and note, and the cause of action, to Goshen

Mortgage, LLC, as Separate Trustee for GDBT I Trust

2011-1 by written instrument . . . .’’ The plaintiff

attached as an exhibit to the motion the notarized

assignment of mortgage, bearing a seal indicating that

the document had been recorded with the town clerk

of Norwalk. The defendant objected to the substitution,

arguing that the plaintiff had not proven adequately that

it was the holder of the note at the time of commencement of the action and, thus, did not have standing to

litigate the action. The court granted the motion to

substitute.6

The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss on

December 4, 2017, arguing again that the plaintiff lacked

standing to initiate the foreclosure action because the

note and mortgage had been assigned before the commencement of the action. The court denied the motion.

The defendant filed a second motion to dismiss on

April 24, 2018, arguing, again, that the plaintiff lacked

standing to pursue the action, and specifically claiming

that the plaintiff was not the owner of the note. The

court denied the second motion to dismiss.

On July 31, 2018, the substitute plaintiff filed a motion

for summary judgment as to liability under the note

and mortgage, attaching as exhibits the note endorsed

in blank and each of the prior assignments of the mortgage. In response, the defendant argued, inter alia, that

(1) the plaintiff was not registered with the Securities

and Exchange Commission (SEC), (2) a statute of limitations prevented the plaintiff from initiating the action,

(3) the plaintiff was not in possession of the note ‘‘at the

time it brought this current suit’’ and thus the substitute

plaintiff lacked standing to pursue the suit brought by

the plaintiff, (4) the foreclosure suit should be pursued

against ‘‘the nonappearing defendant, Andreas’’ and (4)

her due process rights had been violated. The court

granted the motion for summary judgment on October

3, 2018, concluding that ‘‘the affidavit and attachments

in support of the motion establish that the [substitute]

plaintiff is the holder of the note and the assignee of

the mortgage, as well as the terms of the note and

mortgage.’’ The court subsequently rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, setting a law day of July

9, 2019.

On March 21, 2019, the defendant filed a motion to

open the judgment, which she amended on April 24,
2019, arguing, again, that the statute of limitations

barred the plaintiff’s action and that the plaintiff did

not have possession of the mortgage and note at the

time that it brought this action. The substitute plaintiff

filed an objection to the motion to open the judgment,

which the court sustained. The court thus denied the

motion to open the judgment. This appeal followed.

Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

We first address the defendant’s claims regarding

standing. Specifically, the defendant claims that the

court erred in finding that the plaintiff had standing to

bring this foreclosure action against her and, thus, that

it had subject matter jurisdiction over the action.7 She

further contends, as a result of that alleged lack of

standing, that the court improperly granted the plaintiff’s motion to substitute and improperly denied her

first and second motions to dismiss. We reject the defendant’s arguments.

The following undisputed facts are relevant to these

claims. The note in question was endorsed in blank by

JP Morgan. The plaintiff alleged in its complaint, dated

October 24, 2016, that it had been assigned the mortgage

on June 29, 2016, and that it ‘‘is the holder of said note.’’

That same day, the plaintiff assigned the mortgage to

the substitute plaintiff. Service was then effectuated on

October 28, 2016, thus commencing the action.8 Almost

one year later, the plaintiff represented in its motion

to substitute, dated October 13, 2017, that ‘‘since the

commencement of the above entitled action, it has

assigned the subject mortgage deed and note, and the

cause of action, to [the substitute plaintiff] by written

instrument, a copy of which is attached hereunto as

Exhibit A.’’

A

We first address whether the plaintiff had standing

to initiate the foreclosure action, as many of the defendant’s claims on appeal revolve around the argument

that the plaintiff lacked standing to do so. The defendant

argues that because the mortgage was assigned prior

to October 28, 2016, the date this action was commenced, the plaintiff lacked standing to commence the

action. We are not persuaded.

We begin by setting forth the law of standing in the

context of foreclosure actions. ‘‘Standing is the legal

right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot

rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he

[or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity,

some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or

equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of

the controversy. . . . Where a party is found to lack

standing, the court is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause. . . . Our

review of this question of law is plenary.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) J.E. Robert

Co. v. Signature Properties, LLC, 309 Conn. 307, 318,

71 A.3d 492 (2013).

‘‘Generally, in order to have standing to bring a foreclosure action the plaintiff must, at the time the action

is commenced, be entitled to enforce the promissory

note that is secured by the property. . . . The plaintiff’s

possession of a note endorsed in blank is prima facie

evidence that it is a holder and is entitled to enforce

the note, thereby conferring standing to commence a

foreclosure action. . . . After the plaintiff has presented this prima facie evidence, the burden is on the

defendant to impeach the validity of [the] evidence that

[the plaintiff] possessed the note at the time that it

commenced the . . . action or to rebut the presumption that [the plaintiff] owns the underlying debt.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bank of America,

N.A. v. Kydes, 183 Conn. App. 479, 487, 193 A.3d 110,

cert. denied, 330 Conn. 925, 194 A.3d 291 (2018).

‘‘The rules for standing in foreclosure actions when

the issue of standing is raised may be succinctly summarized as follows. When a holder seeks to enforce a note

through foreclosure, the holder must produce the note.

The note must be sufficiently endorsed so as to demonstrate that the foreclosing party is a holder, either by

a specific endorsement to that party or by means of a

blank endorsement to bearer. If the foreclosing party

shows that it is a valid holder of the note and can

produce the note, it is presumed that the foreclosing

party is the rightful owner of the debt. That presumption

may be rebutted by the defending party, but the burden

is on the defending party to provide sufficient proof

that the holder of the note is not the owner of the debt,

for example, by showing that ownership of the debt

had passed to another party. It is not sufficient to provide that proof, however, merely by pointing to some

documentary lacuna in the chain of title that might give

rise to the possibility that some other party owns the

debt. In order to rebut the presumption, the defendant

must prove that someone else is the owner of the note

and debt. Absent that proof, the plaintiff may rest its

standing to foreclose on its status as the holder of the

note.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) U.S.

Bank, National Assn. v. Schaeffer, 160 Conn. App. 138,

150, 125 A.3d 262 (2015).

In the present case, the court determined that the

note was endorsed in blank. The evidence in the record

before us supports this finding. The defendant repeatedly claims that JP Morgan is the party entitled to

enforce the note because the allonge is on the last page

of the note: ‘‘this alleged blank endorsement is not the

current endorsement because there is a subsequent special endorsement made specially to JP Morgan by Chase

Bank . . . by way of an allonge permanently affixed

to the end of the note.’’ This argument is unavailing.
The document clearly demonstrates that the note was

specially endorsed to JP Morgan then subsequently

endorsed in blank from JP Morgan. The court correctly

determined that the note was endorsed in blank.9

Accordingly, whether or not the plaintiff had standing

to initiate the action depends on whether it had physical

possession of the note on October 28, 2016. ‘‘When an

instrument is endorsed in blank, it becomes payable to

bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession

alone. . . . General Statutes § 42a-3-205 (b).’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Chase Home Finance, LLC

v. Fequiere, 119 Conn. App. 570, 577, 989 A.2d 606, cert.

denied, 295 Conn. 922, 991 A.2d 564 (2010). Regardless

of the timing of the assignment of the mortgage, the

undisputed facts demonstrate that the plaintiff possessed the note at the time of the commencement of

this action.

Prior to the commencement of the action, the plaintiff

assigned the mortgage to the substitute plaintiff, and

this assignment was not recorded until March 27, 2017,

but the note itself never changed hands. Because the

plaintiff transferred the note to itself as trustee,10 the

physical possession of the note never changed.

It is well established that the holder of a note has

standing to enforce a mortgage even if the mortgage is

not assigned to that party. ‘‘General Statutes § 49-17

permits the holder of a negotiable instrument that is

secured by a mortgage to foreclose on the mortgage

even when the mortgage has not yet been assigned to

him. . . . The statute codifies the common-law principle of [long-standing] that the mortgage follows the

note, pursuant to which only the rightful owner of the

note has the right to enforce the mortgage. . . . Our

legislature, by adopting § 49-17, has provide[d] an avenue for the holder of the note to foreclose on the property when the mortgage has not been assigned to him.’’

(Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Fequiere,

supra, 119 Conn. App. 576–77. ‘‘This principle is

intended to address the situation in which ownership of

the note and ownership of the mortgage rest in different

hands at the time the foreclosure action commenced.’’

J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Properties, LLC, supra,

309 Conn. 323.

The plaintiff alleged in its complaint that it was the

holder of the note and in possession of the mortgage.

Before the action actually was commenced, the mortgage was assigned to the substitute plaintiff, but there

is no indication that possession of the note changed.

A plaintiff that ‘‘alleged that it possessed the note at

the time it commenced [the] action, [is] entitled to rely

upon that allegation unless the defendant present[s]

facts to the contrary . . . .’’ Bank of America, N.A. v.

Kydes, supra, 183 Conn. App. 489. The only evidence

before the court indicated that the plaintiff was in pos-
session of the note when the present action was commenced. The defendant has not pointed us to any evidence that disputes the court’s conclusion that the

plaintiff was the holder of the note at the time the

foreclosure action was commenced, other than the fact

that the mortgage had been assigned prior to the commencement, which has no bearing on possession of the

note. See HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Navin, 129 Conn.

App. 707, 711–12, 22 A.3d 647 (plaintiff had standing to

commence foreclosure action where defendant offered

no evidence contesting plaintiff’s affidavit asserting that

note endorsed in blank was delivered to plaintiff prior

to commencement of action), cert. denied, 302 Conn.

948, 31 A.3d 384 (2011). Additionally, we note that counsel for both the plaintiff and the substitute plaintiff,

which remained the same throughout the proceedings,

repeatedly represented to the court, both before and

after the motion to substitute had been granted, that it

had possession of the note at all relevant times. See

Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 310 Conn. 119, 132–33, 74

A.3d 1225 (2013) (explaining that ‘‘it [is] proper for [a]

court . . . to rely on the representation of the plaintiff’s counsel that the note he produced . . . was the

note that the plaintiff held at the time of the commencement of the action . . . [and that] [i]n the absence of

any fact based challenge to counsel’s representation,

such reliance was proper . . . because the plaintiff’s

counsel is an officer of the court’’).

The defendant’s principal argument is that the mortgage had been assigned before commencement of the

action, and that the substitution of the plaintiff did not

occur until October, 2017. Because the plaintiff was the

holder of the note when the action began, it is of no

consequence to an analysis of standing that the mortgage was assigned before the proceeding commenced.11

‘‘It is well settled that the holder of a note secured by

a mortgage has standing to commence a foreclosure

action, regardless of whether it also holds the mortgage.’’ GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Ford, 144 Conn. App.

165, 174, 73 A.3d 742 (2013). ‘‘The plaintiff’s possession

of a note endorsed in blank is prima facie evidence that

it is a holder and is entitled to enforce the note, thereby

conferring standing to commence a foreclosure action.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bank of America,

N.A. v. Kydes, supra, 183 Conn. App. 487. Put another

way, that the named plaintiff on the complaint does not

match the name on the assignment of mortgage at the

time of commencement does not affect whether the

plaintiff is entitled to foreclose on the mortgage. The

plaintiff was in possession of the note, endorsed in

blank, when it commenced the present foreclosure

action and therefore it had standing to do so. Accordingly, the court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the action, and the defendant’s claim fails.

B
Having resolved the plaintiff’s standing to initiate the

action, we next address whether the court erred in

granting the plaintiff’s motion to substitute. The defendant argues that the court made erroneous findings of

fact and relied on an incorrect rule of practice in granting the motion. We are not persuaded.

On October 13, 2017, pursuant to Practice Book § 9-

16,12 the plaintiff filed a motion to substitute the plaintiff.

The defendant objected, arguing that Practice Book § 9-

2013 was the applicable rule of practice because the

mortgage had been assigned prior to commencement

of the action and hence the plaintiff lacked standing

to initiate the action. The court granted the motion,

explaining that the plaintiff ‘‘assigned the mortgage

deed and note . . . after commencement of the foreclosure action. . . . [The] [d]efendant claims that Practice Book [§] 9-20 applies. That section provides that

the court may allow a substitute plaintiff only if the

‘wrong plaintiff’ was named in the first instance. The

original plaintiff is not the ‘wrong plaintiff.’ [Practice

Book §] 9-16 rather than [§] 9-20 applies. Additionally,

the defendant alleges no facts inviting prejudice to [her]

defense.’’

We first set forth the applicable standard of review.

‘‘Practice Book § 9-16 confers authority on a trial court

judge to substitute a new plaintiff as the sole plaintiff

in a pending action as long as the substitution does

not prejudice the defense of the action. The decision

whether to grant a motion for the [substitution] of a

party to pending legal proceedings rests generally in

the sound discretion of the trial court. . . . Our review

is limited to a determination of possible abuse of discretion.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Trevek Enterprises, Inc. v. Victory Contracting

Corp., 107 Conn. App. 574, 578–79, 945 A.2d 1056 (2008).

‘‘In reviewing the trial court’s exercise of that discretion, every reasonable presumption should be indulged

in favor of its correctness . . . and only if its action

discloses a clear abuse of discretion is our interference

warranted.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Joblin

v. LaBow, 33 Conn. App. 365, 367, 635 A.2d 874 (1993),

cert. denied, 229 Conn. 912, 642 A.2d 1207 (1994).

‘‘Our rules of practice . . . permit the substitution

of parties as the interests of justice require.’’ Federal

Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Retirement Management Group,

Inc., 31 Conn. App. 80, 84, 623 A.2d 517, cert. denied,

226 Conn. 908, 625 A.2d 1378 (1993). ‘‘As long as [the]

defendant is fully apprised of a claim arising from specified conduct and has prepared to defend the action,

his ability to protect himself will not be prejudicially

affected if a new plaintiff is added.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Rana v. Terdjanian, 136 Conn. App.

99, 110, 46 A.3d 175, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 926, 47

A.3d 886 (2012).
In the present case, the court stated that ‘‘[the plaintiff] assigned the mortgage deed and note in the captioned matter to [the substitute plaintiff] after commencement of the foreclosure action.’’ The defendant

argues that the assignment of mortgage is dated before

the commencement of the action, so the court’s factual

findings are clearly erroneous and Practice Book § 9-

16 was inapplicable to the facts of the case. Although

the court may have mischaracterized the nature of the

assignment, we conclude that the court did not abuse

its discretion in granting the motion to substitute.

Practice Book § 9-16 ‘‘provides for the substitution

of a plaintiff when the cause of action itself is assigned

to a different party.’’ (Emphasis added.) Hudson City

Savings Bank v. Hellman, 196 Conn. App. 836, 847,

231 A.3d 182 (2020). In that case, the original plaintiff

merged into the substitute plaintiff approximately two

years after a foreclosure action had been initiated. Id.,

841. The original plaintiff, Hudson City Savings Bank

(HCSB), commenced the foreclosure action on December 4, 2013. Id., 839. HCSB then moved for summary

judgment as to liability on August 4, 2017, which the

court subsequently granted. Id., 839–41. Then, on

November 28, 2017, HCSB filed a motion to substitute

Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company (M&T) as

the plaintiff, revealing that HCSB had merged into M&

T as of November 1, 2015, twenty-one months before

HCSB had filed the motion for summary judgment. Id.,

841. The motion to substitute was predicated, in part,

on Practice Book § 9-16. Id., 847. This court, however,

found that no assignment of the underlying cause of

action had actually occurred, because no assignment

was necessary, as HSBC’s assets, including the note

and the cause of action, automatically had vested in

M&T by operation of law as a result of the merger. Id.

This court concluded that even though no assignment

of the cause of action had occurred, the substitution

‘‘had no substantive effect’’ because, irrespective of the

substitution, the surviving entity subsumes all claims

and assets of the other party to the merger. Id., 845–47.

This court thus concluded that § 9-16 was an appropriate vehicle to allow substitution. Id., 842–47. Similarly, in the present case, because the note, which was

endorsed in blank, remained in the possession of the

plaintiff, the cause of action itself was not assigned to

a legally distinct party. See part I A of this opinion. The

substitution here, much like the one in Hudson City

Savings Bank, ‘‘had no substantive effect’’ on the proceedings. Hudson City Savings Bank v. Hellman,

supra, 846.

Additionally, the defendant claimed in her objection

to the motion that Practice Book § 9-20 should have

applied to the motion to substitute. Section 9-20 is

intended to ‘‘[cure] the lack of standing of the original

plaintiff’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Fairfield
Merritview Ltd. Partnership v. Norwalk, 320 Conn. 535,

553, 133 A.3d 140 (2016); and ‘‘allow[s] a substituted

plaintiff to enter a case [w]hen any action has been

commenced in the name of the wrong person as [the]

plaintiff.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 552. Because the plaintiff had standing,

as holder of a note endorsed in blank, it was not the

wrong plaintiff. The court correctly determined that

§ 9-20 was inapplicable to the facts of the case.

Finally, Practice Book § 9-16 provides that substitution should not be granted if it would ‘‘prejudice the

defense of the action as it stood before such change

of parties.’’ The court correctly stated that that the

defendant failed to allege any facts that would prejudice

her defense. The defendant maintains on appeal that

‘‘because [§ 9-16] is inapplicable [the defendant] did not

need to allege prejudice.’’ Even if the defendant was

not required to allege prejudice, we agree with the court

that the defendant did not suffer any prejudice from

the substitution. The substitution only served to clarify

that the plaintiff was bringing the foreclosure action in

its capacity as trustee for GDBT I Trust 2011-1. This,

in no way, prejudiced the defendant’s ability to make

payments on the mortgage or to defend against the

claims brought. See Hudson City Savings Bank v. Hellman, supra, 196 Conn. App. 846–48 (granting substitution under § 9-16 after merger involving plaintiff as

merger would have no substantive effect on proceedings).

We iterate that granting a motion to substitute should

be found improper only if there is a clear abuse of

discretion and that ‘‘every reasonable presumption

should be indulged in favor of its correctness . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Joblin v. LaBow,

supra, 33 Conn. App. 367. It was not a clear abuse of

discretion for the court to allow the substitution.14

C

We next address the defendant’s two motions to dismiss. The defendant maintains that the court improperly denied her motions to dismiss because the plaintiff

lacked standing to initiate the foreclosure action, the

substitute plaintiff improperly was allowed to maintain

the action, the court failed to inspect the note, and the

court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing to

determine when the plaintiff obtained possession of the

note. We are not persuaded.

We first set forth the standard of review for a motion

to dismiss. ‘‘In ruling [on] whether a complaint survives

a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be

those alleged in the complaint, including those facts

necessarily implied from the allegations, construing

them in a manner most favorable to the pleader. . . .

If . . . the plaintiff’s standing does not adequately

appear from all materials of record, the complaint must
be dismissed.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542, 550, 23 A.3d 1176 (2011).

Because the lack of standing implicates the trial

court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it properly is raised

by way of a motion to dismiss. See May v. Coffey, 291

Conn. 106, 113, 967 A.2d 495 (2009). ‘‘Our standard of

review of a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions

of law in connection with a motion to dismiss is well

settled. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it

is clearly erroneous. . . . [If] the legal conclusions of

the court are challenged, we must determine whether

they are legally and logically correct and whether they

find support in the facts. . . . Thus, our review of the

trial court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting

[denial] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) JP Morgan Chase Bank,

N.A. v. Simoulidis, 161 Conn. App. 133, 135–36, 126

A.3d 1098 (2015), cert. denied, 320 Conn. 913, 130 A.3d

266 (2016).

After the court granted the motion to substitute, the

defendant filed a revised motion to dismiss on December 4, 2017, arguing that the plaintiff lacked standing

to initiate the action. The substitute plaintiff objected

to the motion, stating that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff attests that it

and/or its agents have been in possession of the original

note, dated July 23, 2007, and have been since before

the inception of this action. The note is endorsed in

blank.’’ The substitute plaintiff included a copy of the

note with the objection. The court denied the motion,

concluding that ‘‘[t]he defendant is unable to show that

the plaintiff did not have standing. . . . At the time the

action commenced on October 28, 2016, the plaintiff

held the note endorsed in blank. The defendant is

unable to rebut the presumption that the holder of the

note is also the owner of the debt and entitled to enforce

the note.’’ The defendant filed a second motion to dismiss on April 24, 2018, arguing, again, that the plaintiff

lacked standing to initiate the action and that the substitute plaintiff lacked standing to maintain the action.15

The court denied the second motion to dismiss.

We have determined previously that the plaintiff, as

possessor of a note endorsed in blank, had standing to

initiate the action and that it was proper for the court

to allow substitution. The defendant, again, contends

that there is no evidence that the court ever examined

the note to determine if it was endorsed in blank. The

note, however, was provided with the substitute plaintiff’s objection to the motion to dismiss and the court

appropriately concluded that the note was endorsed in

blank. We will not presume that the court came to this

conclusion without examining the note. See State v.

Mills, 80 Conn. App. 662, 670, 837 A.2d 808 (2003), cert.

denied, 268 Conn. 914, 847 A.2d 311 (2004).

The defendant also claims that the court should have
conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine when

the plaintiff obtained possession of the note, pursuant

to LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Bialobrzeski, 123 Conn. App.

781, 783, 3 A.3d 176 (2010), in which this court held

that it could not rule on the issue of standing without

a finding from the trial court as to when the plaintiff

acquired the note. This court remanded the case for a

hearing to determine whether the plaintiff held the note

when the action was commenced, explaining that ‘‘[w]e

cannot review this claim because the court made no

factual finding as to when the plaintiff acquired the

note. Without that factual determination, we are unable

to say whether the court improperly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.’’ Id., 788. Unlike LaSalle Bank,

N.A., in the present case the court made an express

factual finding that the plaintiff held the note endorsed

in blank at the time the action commenced. The defendant can point to no facts or evidence that rebut this

finding, other than her repeated contention that the note

was assigned prior to commencement. As we explained,

the record contains no evidence of such an assignment.

Our review of the record confirms that the defendant

failed to submit any evidence in support of her motions

to dismiss that called into question the plaintiff’s status

as the holder of the note. We conclude, therefore, that

the court properly denied the defendant’s motions to

dismiss.

II

Next, we address the defendant’s claim that the court

improperly granted the substitute plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment. The substitute plaintiff responds

that the documents provided with its motion for summary judgment appropriately demonstrated the

absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that

the defendant failed to present any evidence that adequately rebutted the substitute plaintiff’s prima facie

case. We agree with the substitute plaintiff and, accordingly, reject the defendant’s claim.

We first set forth the standard of review for summary

judgment in a foreclosure action. ‘‘Our review of the

trial court’s decision to grant [a] motion for summary

judgment is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Ford, supra, 144 Conn.

App. 175. ‘‘[I]n seeking summary judgment, it is the

movant who has the burden of showing . . . the

absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts

[that], under applicable principles of substantive law,

entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id.

‘‘In order to establish a prima facie case in a mortgage

foreclosure action, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is the owner of the

note and mortgage, that the defendant mortgagor has

defaulted on the note and that any conditions precedent
to foreclosure, as established by the note and mortgage,

have been satisfied. . . . Thus, a court may properly

grant summary judgment as to liability in a foreclosure

action if the complaint and supporting affidavits establish an undisputed prima facie case and the defendant

fails to assert any legally sufficient special defense.’’

(Citations omitted.) Id., 176.

A party opposing summary judgment ‘‘must provide

an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence

of a genuine issue of material fact. . . . A party may

not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true

nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary

judgment.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Little v. Yale University, 92 Conn. App.

232, 234, 884 A.2d 427 (2005), cert. denied, 276 Conn.

936, 891 A.2d 1 (2006). In other words, ‘‘[d]emonstrating

a genuine issue [of material fact] requires a showing of

evidentiary facts or substantial evidence outside the

pleadings from which material facts alleged in the pleadings can be warrantably inferred. . . . A material fact

is one that will make a difference in the result of the

case. . . . To establish the existence of a [dispute as

to a] material fact, it is not enough for the party opposing

summary judgment merely to assert the existence of a

disputed issue. Such assertions are insufficient regardless of whether they are contained in a complaint or a

brief. . . . Further, unadmitted allegations in the

pleadings do not constitute proof of the existence of a

genuine issue as to any material fact . . . . The issue

must be one which the party opposing the motion is

entitled to litigate under [its] pleadings and the mere

existence of a factual dispute apart from the pleadings is

not enough to preclude summary judgment.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New Milford Savings Bank v. Roina, 38 Conn. App. 240, 244–45,

659 A.2d 1226, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 915, 665 A.2d

609 (1995).

A

We first address the defendant’s claim that the substitute plaintiff failed to establish an undisputed prima

facie case. Specifically, the defendant argues that JP

Morgan is the party entitled to enforce the note, based

on the allonge attached to the last page of the note,

and, again, that the plaintiff lacked standing at the commencement of the action. As discussed previously in

this opinion, these arguments are meritless. The note

was endorsed in blank and possessed by the original

plaintiff at the time of commencement and then by the

substitute plaintiff after the motion to substitute was

granted. See part I A of this opinion. The substitute

plaintiff attached an affidavit from its loan servicing

agent to its motion for summary judgment that set forth

the status of the note and the various transfers of the

mortgage. The court appropriately relied on this document and concluded that there was no genuine issue
of material fact, stating: ‘‘In the instant action the affidavit and attachments in support of the motion establish

that the [substitute] plaintiff is the holder of the note

and the assignee of the mortgage, as well as the terms

of the note and mortgage. They also establish the defendants’ default and the [substitute] plaintiff’s (or its predecessor’s) compliance with the condition precedent

to the institution of this action. The defendant, while

filing a memorandum, has provided nothing to counteract the import of the [substitute] plaintiff’s affidavit and

exhibits. The defendant does not provide an affidavit

or exhibit which raises a genuine issue of material fact.’’

The substitute plaintiff’s supporting documentation,

which was not countered by the defendant, was sufficient to establish its undisputed prima facie case.

B

We next address the defendant’s argument that the

court improperly concluded that her special defenses

did not apply. Specifically, the defendant claimed that

the plaintiff was not registered with the SEC, and thus

lacked standing, that the doctrine of unclean hands

should have barred summary judgment, that a statute

of limitations barred the plaintiff’s action, and that the

defendant could not be liable for the debt pursuant to

a divorce decree.16 The court did not explicitly address

any of the special defenses, but explained that ‘‘[the

defendant] [did not] file any affidavit or exhibits supporting the allegations that she set forth in her special

defenses’’ and declined to explicitly discuss the special

defenses. We agree with the court that all of the alleged

special defenses are without merit.

1

The defendant first argues that the court erred in

failing to consider her argument that the plaintiff ‘‘is

not registered as a trustee with the [SEC] . . . .’’ In

support of this claim the defendant attached attestations from the SEC that the plaintiff did not appear

in a search of their records. This court has rejected

arguments from defendants that trust documents or

pooling and servicing agreements are relevant to the

issue of standing.17

As this court has explained, a foreclosure plaintiff is

not required ‘‘to produce evidence of ownership deriving from a pooling and servicing agreement in making its

prima facie case . . . . The relevance of securitization

documents [to] a lender’s standing to foreclose a mortgage is questionable. Simply put, a borrower has a contract—the note and mortgage—with the owner or

holder of the loan documents. The borrower, however,

is not a party to the pooling and servicing agreement,

commonly referred to as a trust document. . . . It is

a basic tenet of contract law that only parties to an

agreement may challenge its enforcement. . . . [C]lose

scrutiny of trust documents and challenges to their
veracity appear to offer little benefit to the court in

determining the owner or holder of a note in a particular

case. If admissible evidence of holder status has been

presented, a borrower must then challenge those facts

by competent evidence addressed to the delivery of

the loan documents. In most instances, a borrower’s

challenge to the content of trust documents or other

borrower claims appear to have little relevance to the

issue of standing.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Bank of New York Mellon v. Horsey,

182 Conn. App. 417, 443, 190 A.3d 105, cert. denied,

330 Conn. 928, 194 A.3d 1195 (2018). ‘‘A fundamental

problem with the examination of standing is the confusion resulting from a failure to distinguish the loan

documents being enforced from the securitization documents that are not directly involved in the foreclosure.

To have standing in a mortgage foreclosure, the plaintiff

must have some interest in the note secured by the

mortgage. Possession of the original note . . . can provide a basis to confer standing.’’ (Footnote omitted.)

D. Caron & G. Milne, Connecticut Foreclosures (9th

Ed. 2019) § 30-3, pp. 467–68. Accordingly, the court did

not err in declining to address the defendant’s arguments concerning the plaintiff’s status with the SEC.

2

The defendant next claims that the doctrine of

unclean hands should have barred summary judgment

because the plaintiff was misleading when it stated that

the mortgage had been assigned since commencement

of the action. ‘‘Our Supreme Court has recognized that

the [a]pplication of the doctrine of unclean hands rests

within the sound discretion of the trial court. . . . The

exercise of [such] equitable authority . . . is subject

only to limited review on appeal. . . . The only issue on

appeal is whether the trial court has acted unreasonably

and in clear abuse of its discretion. . . . In determining

whether the trial court abused its discretion, this court

must make every reasonable presumption in favor of

[the trial court’s] action. . . . Whether the trial court

properly interpreted the doctrine of unclean hands,

however, is a legal question distinct from the trial

court’s discretionary decision whether to apply it.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A. v. Lorson, 183 Conn. App. 200, 221, 192 A.3d 439,

cert. granted on other grounds, 330 Conn. 920, 193 A.3d

1214 (2018). ‘‘The party seeking to invoke the clean

hands doctrine to bar equitable relief must show that

his opponent engaged in wilful misconduct with regard

to the matter in litigation. . . . The trial court enjoys

broad discretion in determining whether the promotion

of public policy and the preservation of the courts’

integrity dictate that the clean hands doctrine be

invoked.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 222–

23.

The defendant devoted one sentence in her objection
to the motion for summary judgment to her argument

that unclean hands should bar summary judgment and

offered no evidence or exhibits demonstrating wilful

misconduct on the part of the plaintiff other than the

claim that ‘‘[the plaintiff] explicitly stated an untruth,

i.e., that the assignment of mortgage had occurred

‘since’ its suit had ‘commenced,’ when in fact it had

occurred prior to it.’’ As discussed previously, it may

not have been entirely accurate for the plaintiff to state

that it had assigned the mortgage since commencement

of the action, but it was not an abuse of the court’s broad

discretion to decline to characterize this statement as

wilful misconduct, particularly because the assignment

had no substantive effect on the litigation and resulted

in no prejudice to the defendant.

3

The defendant next argues that the statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 42a-3-118 should

have barred enforcement of the mortgage. This court

previously has rejected the argument that § 42a-3-118

applies to a mortgage foreclosure. See Federal Deposit

Ins. Corp. v. Owen, 88 Conn. App. 806, 814–15, 873 A.2d

1003, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 902, 882 A.2d 670 (2005);

see also D. Caron & G. Milne, supra, § 32-3:14, p. 622

(‘‘[s]ince a foreclosure is an action sounding in equity,

there is no statute of limitations defense to a mortgage

foreclosure’’). Accordingly, the court correctly concluded that no statute of limitations applied to the

action.

4

Lastly, the defendant argues that the plaintiff could

not bring a foreclosure action against her because she

was not personally liable for the debt secured by the

mortgage pursuant to a divorce decree. The divorce

decree, a copy of which the defendant included in her

objection to the motion for summary judgment, states

in relevant part: ‘‘As part of the division of property,

the [h]usband shall execute a [quitclaim] deed to [the

defendant] of [the property] within ten days of the date

hereof. . . . The transfer of the property to [the defendant] shall not result in her assumption of any liability

of the mortgage securing the property.’’

Although the defendant did not sign the note, her

argument fails because she is the record owner of the

property and she signed the mortgage above the line

marked ‘‘borrower.’’ The first page of the document

states that ‘‘ ‘[b]orrower is Andreas D. Androulidakis

and [the defendant]. . . . Borrower is the mortgagor

. . . .’’ The mortgage states on the signature page: ‘‘By

signing below, [b]orrower accepts and agrees to the

terms and covenants contained in this [s]ecurity

[i]nstrument . . . .’’ ‘‘A mortgage is a contract of sale

executed, with power to redeem. . . . The condition

of a mortgage may be the payment of a debt, the indem-
nity of a surety, or the doing or not doing [of] any other

act. . . . Black’s Law Dictionary defines mortgagor as

‘[o]ne who, having all or some part of the title to property, by written instrument pledges that property for

some particular purpose such as security for a debt.

That party to a mortgage who gives legal title or a lien

to the mortgagee to secure the mortgage loan.’ Black’s

Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979). Also ‘[o]ne who mortgages property; the mortgage-debtor, or borrower.’

. . .

‘‘It has long been established at common law that

[t]he mortgage is an incident only to the debt, which

is the principal; it cannot be detached from [the debt];

distinct from the debt, it has no determinate value; and

the assignee must hold it, at the will and disposal of

the creditor, who has the note or bond, for which it is

a collateral security.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Citibank, N.A. v. Stein, 186 Conn.

App. 224, 249, 199 A.3d 57 (2018), cert. denied, 331

Conn. 903, 202 A.3d 373 (2019). The defendant may not

be personally liable for the note, but her status as a

mortgagor of the property entitles the plaintiff to bring a

foreclosure proceeding against her. The court correctly

concluded that the divorce decree, which incorporated

a contract between the defendant and Andreas, has no

effect on the mortgage, which is a contract between

the plaintiff and the defendant. See id., 249–50.

III

The defendant next claims that the court improperly

rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of

the substitute plaintiff. We do not agree.

‘‘We review a judgment of strict foreclosure to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. . . .

In determining whether the trial court has abused its

discretion, we must make every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. . . . Our

review of a trial court’s exercise of the legal discretion

vested in it is limited to the questions of whether the

trial court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have reached the conclusion that it did.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.

Tarzia, 150 Conn. App. 660, 664, 92 A.3d 983, cert.

denied, 314 Conn. 905, 99 A.3d 635 (2014).

The defendant’s grounds for this claim are that the

issue of the substitute plaintiff’s standing was never

resolved by the court and that the court should have

conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine when

the plaintiff acquired the note. Because we have

resolved these issues in favor of the substitute plaintiff,

we conclude that the court properly rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure.

IV

Lastly, the defendant claims that the court improperly

denied her motion to open the judgment of strict fore-
closure because she was not a party to the note.18 Specifically, the defendant claimed that the foreclosure proceedings violated her due process rights because ‘‘as a

non-obligor on the note’’ she could not properly challenge the standing of the plaintiff. The defendant’s

actions at the trial court and on appeal belie her argument. The defendant raised multiple challenges to the

plaintiff’s standing and each challenge was addressed

by the court.

Further, because a motion to open a judgment is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion, we only consider

the arguments that were placed before the court. ‘‘A

motion to open a judgment of strict foreclosure is

addressed to the discretion of the trial court . . . and

unless that discretion was abused or was based upon

some error in law, the denial of the motion must stand.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Countrywide

Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Peterson, 171 Conn.

App. 842, 848–49, 158 A.3d 405 (2017). The defendant

advanced two grounds in her motion to open the judgment, claiming that ‘‘the original plaintiff filed this foreclosure suit . . . after the expiration of the statute of

limitations . . . [and] the original plaintiff did not have

possession of the mortgage and note at the time that

it brought the suit.’’ We have resolved these issues in

favor of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the court did not

abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion

to open the judgment.

The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded

for the purpose of setting new law days.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The complaint named as defendants Jameela Androulidakis and her

erstwhile husband Andreas D. Androulidakis (Andreas). Jameela Androulidakis received title to the property in question as part of a divorce decree

in 2009. Andreas never appeared and the court granted a motion for default

for failure to appear as to Andreas on June 2, 2017. He is not involved in

this appeal. As subsequent encumbrancers of the property, Hop Energy,

LLC and Petro, Inc., also were named as defendants but are not involved

in this appeal. Therefore, we refer to Jameela Androulidakis as the defendant

throughout this opinion.

2 This action was commenced by the plaintiff, Goshen Mortgage, LLC. On

October 13, 2017, Goshen Mortgage, LLC, filed a motion to substitute, claiming that it had assigned the mortgage and note to Goshen Mortgage, LLC,

as Separate Trustee for GDBT I Trust 2011-1. The court granted the motion

to substitute. In this opinion, we refer to Goshen Mortgage, LLC, as the

plaintiff, and to Goshen Mortgage, LLC, as Separate Trustee for GDBT I

Trust 2011-1, as the substitute plaintiff.

3 At oral argument before this court, the defendant also argued that service

of process was insufficient. This issue was not raised before the trial court

nor was it briefed on appeal. We therefore decline to review it. ‘‘We generally

do not consider claims raised for the first time at oral argument.’’ Zenon v.

Mossy, 114 Conn. App. 734, 736 n.2, 970 A.2d 814 (2009); see also Alexander

v. Tyson, 122 Conn. App. 493, 494 n.1, 999 A.2d 830 (declining to review

issues ‘‘that were not considered or decided by the trial court’’), cert. denied,

298 Conn. 928, 5 A.3d 488 (2010). Further, any claim of lack of jurisdiction

over the person or insufficiency of service of process is waived if not raised

by a motion to dismiss filed within thirty days of filing an appearance. See

Practice Book § 10-32.

4 An allonge is defined as ‘‘[a] slip of paper sometimes attached to a

negotiable instrument for the purpose of receiving further indorsements

when the original paper is filled with indorsements.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th Ed. 2019), p. 95.

5 The plaintiff provided the complete chain of title in its complaint; the

substitute plaintiff also provided the complete chain of title in an affidavit

provided with its motion for summary judgment, and in exhibits provided

with the motion for summary judgment.

6 The court initially granted this motion and several others without explanation. On July 1, 2019, after filing her appeal, the defendant filed several

notices pursuant to Practice Book § 64-1 requesting a memorandum of decision for several of the court’s rulings. In response to the defendant’s § 64-

1 notices, the court subsequently issued memoranda of decision as to the

order granting the motion to substitute the plaintiff, the order denying the

defendant’s first motion to dismiss, the order granting the substitute plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability, and the order granting

the substitute plaintiff’s motion for judgment of strict foreclosure. We refer

to these articulated orders when reviewing the court’s rulings throughout

this opinion.

The defendant’s notices filed pursuant to Practice Book § 64-1 also sought

a memorandum of decision regarding her second motion to dismiss. The

court issued an order stating that the denial of the defendant’s second

motion to dismiss was not within the scope of § 64-1. On August 9, 2019,

the defendant filed a motion for review, in which she requested that this

court order the trial court to issue a memorandum of decision as to the

order denying her second motion to dismiss. This court granted the defendant’s motion for review, but denied the relief requested therein, agreeing

with the trial court that the denial of the motion to dismiss was not within

the scope of § 64-1, as it did not represent a final judgment. See Sasso v.

Aleshin, 197 Conn. 87, 90, 495 A.2d 1066 (1985). Regardless, given that the

defendant made identical arguments in her first and second motions to

dismiss and the court has issued a memorandum of decision as to the order

denying the first motion to dismiss, our ability to properly review these

rulings is not impeded. See part I C of this opinion.

7

In its brief, the substitute plaintiff construed the defendant’s claim as

an attack on this court’s jurisdiction over the appeal. While neither party

explicitly argues that this court lacks jurisdiction, we note that the trial

court’s judgment of strict foreclosure is an appealable final judgment and

the defendant is aggrieved by that judgment. Consequently, this court has

jurisdiction over the defendant’s appeal under General Statutes § 52-263.

Further, an appellate court has jurisdiction to determine whether the trial

court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, and a determination

that the trial court lacked jurisdiction does not deprive an appellate court

of its jurisdiction over an appeal. See State v. Martin M., 143 Conn. App.

140, 143–44 n.1, 70 A.3d 135, cert. denied, 309 Conn. 919, 70 A.3d 41 (2013);

Gemmell v. Lee, 42 Conn. App. 682, 684 n.3, 680 A.2d 346 (1996); Augeri v.

Planning & Zoning Commission, 18 Conn. App. 722, 728 n.6, 560 A.2d

985 (1989).

8

‘‘It has long been the law in this state that an action is deemed to be

commenced on the date service is made on the defendant.’’ Stingone v.

Elephant’s Trunk Flea Market, 53 Conn. App. 725, 729, 732 A.2d 200 (1999).

9 The defendant also argues that the court never actually inspected the

note to determine whether it was endorsed in blank. While the court did

not explicitly state that it had examined the note in the memorandum

granting the motion to substitute, the court later stated during a hearing on

the motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure that ‘‘[t]he court has reviewed

the original note as well as its endorsements and allonges, finds that the

plaintiff is the holder of the note. The court has also reviewed certified

copies of the mortgage and six assignments and finds that the plaintiff is

the assignee of the mortgage.’’

10 Because the defendant’s arguments on appeal are largely based on the

plaintiff’s status as a trustee for a loan pool, we provide a summary of loan

pools and the role of trustees. ‘‘Typically, mortgage loans are placed into

asset pools or ‘securities’ based upon various criteria. Loan pools are formed

based upon certain factors, including credit ratings, loan-to-value ratios,

conforming and non-conforming loans, and other indicia of volatility. One

major advantage of placing mortgage loans into pools sold as mortgagebacked securities is that these securities are designed to reduce or reallocate

certain risks inherent in the assets, thereby making them less volatile and

more appealing to investors. . . . A servicing agent, either a bank or a

mortgage company, operates to collect loan payments, escrows for taxes

and insurance, and to communicate with the borrower. The servicers and

trustees of the pools are then rated on the quality of servicing and the
application of various credit enhancements to guard against risk and to

maintain stability within the pool. [The] levels and layers of entities can

involve multiple parties, including the trustee of the pooling and servicing

agreement, a servicer of the pooling agreement, and sometimes a sub-servicing entity . . . .’’ (Footnote omitted.) D. Caron & G. Milne, Connecticut

Foreclosures (9th Ed. 2019) § 30-2, pp. 458–59. ‘‘The borrower, however, is

not a party to the pooling and servicing agreement, commonly referred to

as a ‘trust’ document. The parties to a pooling and servicing agreement are

usually: (1) the trustee, who acts on behalf of the bondholders, (2) a master

servicer, who collects payments for the trust, and (3) the initial depositor

that establishes the trust.’’ Id., p. 470.

11 Additionally, we note that it would have been legally permissible for

the plaintiff to bring the action in the name of Goshen Mortgage, LLC,

notwithstanding the assignment of the mortgage, as General Statutes § 52-

106 allows a trustee plaintiff to sue or be sued without joining the persons

represented by him and beneficially interested in the action. See Chase

Home Finance, LLC v. Fequiere, supra, 119 Conn. App. 579 (explaining that

trustee has statutory right to bring action in its own capacity where trustee

has legal title to trust res).

12 Practice Book § 9-16 provides: ‘‘If, pending the action, the plaintiff

assigns the cause of action, the assignee, upon written motion, may either

be joined as a coplaintiff or be substituted as a sole plaintiff, as the judicial

authority may order; provided that it shall in no manner prejudice the defense

of the action as it stood before such change of parties.’’

13 Practice Book § 9-20 provides: ‘‘When any action has been commenced

in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff, the judicial authority may, if

satisfied that it was so commenced through mistake and that it is necessary

for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, allow any other

person to be substituted or added as plaintiff.’’

14 ‘‘Even assuming that Practice Book § 9-16 was not the appropriate basis

to bring about the substitution, we underline the wide discretion afforded

to courts for the substitution of parties given our state’s policy of ensuring

that a real party of interest is added as a party to the underlying action.’’

Hudson City Savings Bank v. Hellman, supra, 196 Conn. App. 847 n.8.

To support her argument that Practice Book § 9-16 was not an appropriate

vehicle to allow substitution, the defendant repeatedly cites Ion Bank v.

J.C.C. Custom Homes, LLC, 189 Conn. App. 30, 35 n.3, 206 A.3d 208 (2019),

in which this court stated that ‘‘[b]ecause the plaintiff assigned the note to

[the substitute plaintiff] prior to the commencement of the action, rather

than during its pendency as contemplated by Practice Book § 9-16, this rule

is inapplicable.’’ In Ion Bank, this court held that the trial court appropriately

denied the plaintiff’s efforts to substitute the assignee as plaintiff. Id., 41–42.

Because the efforts to substitute the plaintiff were ineffectual, this court

agreed with the trial court’s ultimate determination ‘‘that the plaintiff lacked

standing to bring the action because, prior to commencing it, the plaintiff

had assigned its interest in the underlying promissory note to [the substitute

plaintiff].’’ (Emphasis added). Id., 33. The note in Ion Bank, however, was

not endorsed in blank, and thus had to be expressly assigned to the substitute

plaintiff. Id., 34. The plaintiff assigned the note one day before the action

was commenced. Id. As such, there was a clear assignment of the cause of

action occurring before commencement—the exact opposite of the situation

contemplated by § 9-16. In the present case, the note was endorsed in blank

and payable to the possessor, and the note never changed hands.

15 The defendant included several other arguments in both motions to

dismiss, including that the plaintiff was not registered to do business in the

state, the statute of limitations should have barred the action, and the

plaintiff had committed numerous violations of the federal Truth in Lending

Act. These arguments have not been advanced on appeal and are deemed

abandoned.

16 The defendant also argued in her objection to the substitute plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment, that the plaintiff was not registered to do

business in the state of Connecticut and that her due process rights had

been violated by the plaintiff not complying with ‘‘federal and state laws

regarding notification of assignments . . . and service of process.’’ These

arguments have not been advanced on appeal and are deemed abandoned.

17 ‘‘A pooling and servicing agreement establishes two entities that maintain the trust: a trustee, who manages the loan assets, and a servicer, who

communicates with and collects monthly payments from the mortgagors.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Properties,

LLC, supra, 309 Conn. 313 n.4; see footnote 10 of this opinion.
18 The defendant, again, claims that the court should have granted her

motion because the issue of the plaintiff’s standing was never resolved.

Additionally, the defendant repeats her argument that she was not the proper

party for the foreclosure action due to the divorce decree and the fact that

only Andreas signed the note. We decline to address these issues again.