[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 23-10195

Non-Argument Calendar

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LINCOLN MEMORIAL ACADEMY, 

EDDIE HUNDLEY, 

MELVIA SCOTT, Dr.,

KATRINA ROSS,

JAUANA PHILLIPS, et. al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF MANATEE COUNTY, 

CITY OF PALMETTO, FLORIDA, 

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 

Defendants-Appellees.

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10195

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cv-00309-CEH-AAS

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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and WILSON and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Lincoln Memorial Academy, its founder and former principal Eddie Hundley, and former employees Melvia Scott, Katrina 

Ross, Jauana Phillips, and Angella Enrisma appeal the dismissal of 

their second amended complaint against the School Board of Manatee County, the City of Palmetto, Florida, and the Florida Department of Education. The district court dismissed the complaint as a 

shotgun pleading and alternatively for failure to state a claim. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court also ruled that the claims 

against the Department and its Commissioner were barred by the 

Eleventh Amendment. We affirm in part and vacate in part with 

instructions to dismiss the complaint against the Department without prejudice.

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the second amended complaint against the School Board 

and the City as a shotgun pleading. See Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 

878 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2018). The counseled complaint was 

neither short nor plain. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Instead, it was a 

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shotgun pleading that consists of 152 paragraphs, many of which 

are replete with vague allegations and legal conclusions that would 

leave a defendant reading the complaint hard-pressed to understand “the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland v. Palm 

Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). The 

district court explained that the complaint “foreclose[d] any understanding of the entity against whom the claims are brought.” In its

first dismissal order, the district court provided examples of the 

pleading deficiencies, such as the intermingled allegations of unlawful conduct against “all Defendants,” which forced the district 

court to “speculate as to the entity against whom the claim [was] 

brought.” See id. at 1320. The district court explained that each 

count alleging that the School Board “violated Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and § 1983” left the 

district court unable to connect the allegations to the claims or determine whether the plaintiffs alleged “separate Title VII claims or 

instead merely offer purported violations of Title VII in support of 

their § 1983 claims.” The district court sua sponte granted “one—

and only one—opportunity to cure the shotgun pleading.”

Counsel failed to cure these pleading deficiencies in the second amended complaint, which continued to combine multiple 

claims within individual counts and intentionally retain vague demands for a judgment against “all Defendants” for compensatory 

and punitive damages, despite failing to allege actions or omissions 

by each defendant. Because the district court again was left to speculate about which defendants were implicated in each count, with 

its confusion compounded by numerical inconsistencies in the 

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paragraph ranges that were incorporated into multiple counts, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the second 

amended complaint with prejudice for failing repeatedly to comply

with the rules of procedure. See Jackson v. Bank of America N.A., 898 

F.3d 1348, 1357 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that a 

District Court retains authority to dismiss a shotgun pleading on 

that basis alone.”). Because we affirm on this basis, we do not address the alternative ruling that the second amended complaint 

failed to state a claim.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in not sua 

sponte granting leave to file a third amended complaint. The district 

court warned that it would permit “one—and only one—opportunity to cure the shotgun pleading deficiencies.” And, even if the 

time to amend the pleadings under the scheduling order had not 

long passed, the plaintiffs had withdrawn their earlier motion for 

leave to file a third amended complaint and failed to renew that 

request. See Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1296 (“When a litigant files a 

shotgun pleading, is represented by counsel, and fails to request 

leave to amend, a district court must sua sponte give him one

chance to replead before dismissing his case with prejudice on 

non-merits shotgun pleading grounds.” (emphasis added)).

The district court also did not err in ruling that claims 

against the Department were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 71 (1989) (“[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”). Because the Eleventh Amendment bars the 

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claims against the Department, the district court lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction over them. See Seaborn v. Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 143 

F.3d 1405, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998). Without power to render a judgment on the merits, the district court should have dismissed the 

complaint against the Department without prejudice instead of 

with prejudice. See Stalley ex rel. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 

524 F.3d 1229, 1235 (11th Cir. 2008). 

The district court also did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning counsel for failing to comply with discovery orders. A district court may impose sanctions when a party fails to “obey an order to provide or permit discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b). In reviewing discovery motions, “wide discretion is proper because a 

judge’s decision as to whether a party or lawyer’s actions merit imposition of sanctions is heavily dependent on the court’s firsthand 

knowledge, experience, and observation.” Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Brown, 69 F.4th 1321, 1329 (11th Cir. 2023). After holding a

four-hour evidentiary hearing on the School Board’s motion for 

sanctions and considering the testimony and evidence presented, 

the magistrate judge found that sanctions against counsel were 

warranted because he repeatedly failed to respond to discovery requests, even after the district court issued an order compelling production. Although counsel argues that the magistrate judge “impermissibly rejected” his evidence of mitigating circumstances and 

good faith, we discern no clear error in the magistrate judge’s finding. See id.

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We AFFIRM in part the dismissal with prejudice of the second amended complaint against the School Board and the City and 

the award of sanctions against counsel, and we VACATE and

REMAND in part with instructions to dismiss the complaint 

against the Department without prejudice.

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