NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0327n.06 F iled: May 12, 2009 No. 08-5884 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT DAVI D DENN I

NG, dec ease d, by

next friend ) J OE DENN I

NG, on beha lf of OL I VI A DENN I NG, ) ) Pla int if fs -A pp e lla nts , ) ) J EANETTE WEBB , mother and guardia n of ) t h e m i n o r p l ai n t i ff

, Ol i v i a D en n i n g, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED ) STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR v. ) THE MI DDL E DI STRI CT OF ) TENNESSEE METROPOL I TAN GO VERNMENT OF ) NA SHV I L L E A

ND DA VI DSO N C OU

NT Y; ) O P I N I O N DO N D AV I DSO N, ind ivi du a lly and in h is ) o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y, ) ) De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) __________________________________________) Be for e : M ER RI TT, CO OK , a nd WH ITE, Ci r c uitJudg e s. WHITE , Circuit Judge. On the n i gh t of January 27, 2006, Offic er D on Davidson (D a vid so n) fi re d o ne g un sh ot t hr ou gh a wi nd ow

pa ne in t he c los e d d oo r o f t

he ho me of

Da vid Denning(De nning) afte r De nning a pproac hed the door

whi le c arr

y ing a handg un and did not respond to Davidson’s commands to d ro p t h e wea pon. Denningsustained a sing le g unshot wound to the

c he st a nd die d th a t ni g ht. Pla int if fs fi le d s uit

purs ua nt t o 4 2 U .S. C. § 1 98 3 a g a ins t de fe nd ants , D a vid so n ( ind ivi du a lly

and in h is o ff ic ia l c a pa c ity ) a nd the Me tr op oli tan G ov e rnme nt o f N a sh vil le and Da vid so n Co un tyPlaintiffs also filed suit a g ainst Chief of Police Ronal W. Serpa s, but subse quently ag ree d 1 to dismi ss their claims ag ainst him. Pla int if f Jeane tte Web b, mot

he r a nd g ua rd ian o f m ino r O liv ia

De nn ing , is no t an a

pp e lla nt. 2 2 (collec tively , defe ndants), alleg ing de privations of De nnin g ’ s r ig h ts u n d e r th e Se c o nd, Four

th, Fifth, 1 and F ourtee nth Amendments. After the district court dismissed cer tain claims , defe ndants filed a motion for summary

judgme nt on the rema ining one s, which t h e co urt g rante d. Certain plaintiffs appea led. On appe al, they expressly

do not contest the distri ct co urt’s conc lusion that Office r 2 Da vid so n d id n ot u se e xce ssi ve fo rc e and wa s thu s e nti tle d to qu a lif ie d immun ity , bu t in ste a d d isp ute other a spects of the district court’s ruling

. Th ou g h th e fa c ts of thi s ca se str ike us a s tra g ic and dis tur bin g , w e dis a g re e wi th a

pp e lla nts ’

argume nts on

a pp e a l and mus t A F F I RM. I Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a bly re c ounte d th e fa c ts: On the eve ning of

J anuar y 27, 2006, 15 calls we re place d in the course of an hour and a half from a cellular t elephone belong ing to Da vid Denning to a local Papa J ohn’s Piz za store. The ma n who ca lled eac h time was belliger en t, cursing at the employ ees who answe red his c alls. After a number of such calls, the pi z z a s tore manag er infor

med the ca ller that the store would not do bus iness with him that evening , and then c alled the pol i ce non-emer g ency number to lodg e a f

ormal c omp la int of ha ra ssm e nt. Ho we ve r, a

fo od or de r f ro m on e of

the pla c ed c a lls wa s a c c ide nta lly proce ssed, and a

pizz a orde r for “David” was sc heduled to be de livered at the upstairs entra nce of Denning ’s addr ess that eve ning. When the delivery woman (“ Ms. Scott”) arr ived at the back of

Denning ’s re sidence , she noticed a black dogbarkingoutside. Out of concern that the dog m ight bite her, she called the telephone number on the order ticket and a sked the man to c ome outside to g et t he piz za. Ms. Scott then heard things ba ng ing a round indoors “like he lost his balanc e or something” and sawa man come f rom the sec ond floor apa

rtment onto the landing ar ea of the stairs, we aving ba ck and fo rt

h. Up on the man’ s a ssu

ra nc e that th e do g wo uld

no t bi te , M s. Sc ott c lim be d th e sta ir s le a din g up to De nn ing ’s se c on d f loo r a pa rtme nt. She c ou ld s me ll3

alcohol on his breath. Ms. Scott asked the man if he ha d a pen to sign the cre dit card slip, but he said “no,” took the pizz a out of her hands and thanked her . She reiter ated that h e needed to sig n the cr edit car d slip, but t he man sa id, “have a g ood night,” went bac k into the apar

tment with the food, and c losed the door. Ms. Scott retrie ved an ink pen from her car a nd asce nded the stairs a

second time. As she approache d Denning ’s back door and knoc ked, she sa w the man sitting on the couc h eatingpizz a. Ms. S cott watche d the man g et up, walk to a c ounter a rea , unzip a black bag , pull a g u n o u t fr o m t h e bag , and wa lk towards her with the g un pointed in her dire ction. I mmediately , Ms. Scott turned around an d fl ed down the s t a i r s , h e ar i n g t h e b a c k d o o r o p e nb e h i n d h e r a s s h e d e s c e n d e d

. S h e h i d b r i e f l y, looking ba ck towar ds the stairs to se e if the man was c lose behind her . Seeing no one she ra n to he r car and called 911. Ms. Scott informed the 911 oper ator that the ma n pu lle d a g un on he r w he n s he re tur

ne d w itha pe n for him to sig n a c re dit c ard re c e ipt

. She pr ov ide d th e op e rator a ph y sic a l de sc ri pti on of

the man, and

sa id t hat he wa s “ so intox i cated he’s f

alling a ll over his apar

tment.” Ms. Scott was told to standby and she ag ree d to wait for the police at a ne arby intersec tion. Metropolitan Nashville Police Of fice r Da v i d s o nre s p o n d ed

t o t h e d i s p at ch er ’s call and a rrived at the sce ne some minutes later . He spoke with Ms. Scott who repe ated the de tail s of the incident to him. Offic er G regL y ons (“Of fice r Ly ons”) arr ived at the scene shor

tly there afte r, and O ffice r Davidson informed Off icer L y ons of Ms

. Scott’s encounter . Tog ether the two offic ers a

pproac hed the ba ck of the building, which was dark and had no outdoor lighting , with f lashlights on and wea pons drawn. After sear ching around the outdoor are a to be sure the man wa s not hiding, the office rs asce nded the stairs to the second floor apart m en t

. Officer Davidson turned of

f his flashlig ht and positioned his gun in the “low-r eady” position – p oin tin g a t th e g ro un d. He a pp ro a c he d th e la

nd in g at th e top of

the sta ir s w hil e Offic er Ly ons remaine d on a landing halfwa y up the stairs. Fr om the window on the top part of the a

partment door, O ffice r Davidson saw Denningsitti ng at a de sk about 20 fee t away . A bottle of liquor was on the desk. Of fi ce r Da vidson tapped on the door a f ew times w ith his flashlig ht, but did not i dentify himself as a police office r. Acc ordi n g to O f

f ic e r D a v id s o n ’ s te s ti mo n y , D e n n in g tu r n e d ar o u n d , lo o k e d

a t t he door, and walked towa

rds the door. A s Denning passed a kitchen counte r about e ight (8) or n i n e (9 ) fe et awa

y from Of fice Davidson, De nning r eac hed into a blac k bag resting on the counter

and withdre w a ha

ndg un. The pa rties disag ree as to Denning ’s actions after he rea ched f or his g un. Def e n d an ts , r e ly

in g o n an in te r

v ie w g iv e n b y O f

f ic e r D a v id s o n th e n ig h t of the incident and Of

fice r Davidson’s deposition te stimony in this case , maintain that afte r De n n i n g pulled the handgun from the ba g , he pointed the gun in an “e lbow over holster” position such t hat t he gun was pointed straig ht out at t he door and at Off icer Davidso n . Plaintiffs arg ue that the e vidence supports a diffe rent ve rsion ofFor the sake o f completene ss, a fe w points deserve elabor ation. First, Of fice r Davidson 3 acknow ledg ed re peate dly at hi s deposition that at no point did he eve r identify himself as a police office r to Denning . Second, his initial failure to identify himself as a police office r whe n he knocke d on the d o o r w a s a d e l i b e r a t e d e c i s i o n b a s e d o n t a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . T h i r d , a t n o p o i n tdid Davidson hea

r De nning sa

y any thing—De nning did not make any verba l threats, nor did he ask who was at the door. Finally , when asked if he had any indication about what De nning c ould see at any point—including who was at the door—Davidson te stified, “I don’t know what he could see .” He te sti fi e d th a t he wa s w e ari nghis ba dg e —“ sh iny stu ff ” —b ut d oe s n ot k

no w w he the r D e nn ingc ou ld 4 Denning ’s ac tions, one in which Denning held a gun, but did not point it at Office r Davidson. In support of th[at] asser tion, Pl aintiffs point to another a ccount of the evening ’s incid en t p re pare d by Offic er D avidson. I n his one-pag e “U se of F orce Report,” Of

fice r Davidson wrote, “H e wa lked towar d me. He stoppe d and pulled a handg un out of a blac k bagand continued to walk toward me. I y elled at him to drop the g u nb u t h e c o n ti n u e d to w a lk to w ar d me . ” B a s e d

o nth is s tate me n t, Pl a in ti ffs argue that [] Denning ’s g un was not pointed at Of fice r Davidson. Th e re a ft e r, the ma te ri a l f

a c ts s ur ro un din g the re ma ind e r o f that ni g ht’ s e ve nts are ag ain unconteste d. Offic er D avidson shouted to O ffice r Ly ons—whose view of the apa rtment door was obstructed from his position on the lower landing —that the man had a g un. Offic er D avidson then turned a way from the door to retre at down the stairs, but c ould not see the stairs while his ey es adjusted f rom the we ll-lit apartment to the dark outdoors. The landing on which Of fice r Davidson stood was only as wide as the do o rw ay , g iving Of fice r Davidson no room to step out of Denning ’s direc t path. As De nning c ontinued to walk t owar ds the door with the g un, Offic er Davidson shouted twice at him to drop his gu n. Denningdid not drop his gun a nd continued wa lking towa

rds the door. When D enning was about three (3) or four ( 4) fee t from the door, O ffice r Davidson f ired a single shot through the window of the do or , s tr iki ngDe nn ingin t he c he st. After he asc erta ined that Denning was on the floor and not moving, O ffice r Davidson kicke d the door ope n and kicked the wea pon awa y from De nning. O ffice r Davidson orde red D enning to ge t his hands out so that they wer e visible, but Denning replied that he could not g et his breath. Office r Davidson reac hed down a nd pulled Denning ’s hands out fr o m u n der him. Off icer L y ons advised the dispatc her that Denninghad bee n shot and ca lled for a n ambulance . Denningwas transported by ambulance to Vander

bilt University

Medica l Center where he died from the gunshot wound. Samples taken during an autopsy later reve aled that Denning ’s blood alcohol level wa s in the rang e of .12% to .13%. De nn ing v . Me tro . G ov ’t

of N as hv ill e , 564 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808-11 (M.D . Tenn. 2008) ( footnotes and citations omitted). 3see his badg e that nig ht. There was no lig ht on the porch w here Davidson wa s standing. 5 Plaintiffs filed their complaint on S ep tember 22, 2006. Count I alleg ed that the shooting vio la te d D e nn ing ’s c on sti tut ion a l right s un de r t he Se c on d, F ourt

h, F if th, and F ourt e e nth Amendments—that the shooting was a n excessive use of f

orce and Of

fice r David son’s conduc t constituted an unre asonable sear ch and se izure, a viol ation of De nning’ s rig ht not to be deprived of his life, liberty

or prope rty

without d u e p ro ce s s of law, a nd a violation of De nning’ s rig ht to bear

arm s. Count I Ia lle g e d th a t th e Me tr op oli tan G ov e rnme nt o f N a sh vil le and Da vid so n Co un ty (Metropolitan Gove rnment) “ authorized, permitted, and toler ated the c ustom and p ra cti ce of the unconstitutional and excessive use of f orce ” by Offic er D avidson by fa i l i n g to adequately train, supervise, a

nd discipline him and by “per mitti ng the policy

and custom of using unrea sonable for ce to e xist and c on tin

ue , wh e n [it] wa s o n n oti c e that su c h unr e a so na ble fo rc e wa s b e ingus e d p ri or to the wr on g fu l sh oo tin g and kil lin g of

Da vid Denni ng.” Cou

nt I I Ic on ta ine d a

n a lle g a tio n a g a ins t Chief of Police Serpa s—a count whic h was late r dismissed without prejudice. Count I V alleg ed that defe ndants’ “f

ailures a s stated represe nted conscious or reckless dis reg ard of defe ndants[’] acts or omissions and deliber ate indiffe renc e to the rig hts of others and e specia lly David De nning.” Def endants subseque ntly

filed a motion to dismis s cer tain claims. The district c ourt g rante d the mo ti o n in p art an d d e n ie d it in p art, s u c h th a t th e r e ma in in g c la im s w e r e Co u n t I ’s Second, F ourt h, and F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt c la ims a g a ins t D a vid so n in div idu a lly and Cou nt I I ’s c la im ag ainst the Metropolitan Gove rnment. On Octobe r 1, 2007, def endants filed a

motion for summary

judgme n t , contendingthat plaintiffs had no va lid Sec ond Amendment cla im; that plainti ffs did not show a c ustom, practice , or po lic y that c a us e d D e nn ing ’s de a th; and that Of fi c e r Da vid so n w a s e nti tle d to qu a lif ie d im mun ityPlaintiffs do not a ppeal the district court’s g ranting of summary judgme nt to defenda

nts on 4 the Se c on d A me ndme nt c la im. The c ourt also observe d that “the position of the g un in the suspect’s ha nd is not dispos itive 5 in determining whether

the use of f

orce was e x cessive.” Denning , 5 6 4 F

. Supp. 2d a t 815 (citi ng Bell v. Ci t

y o f E . Cleveland , No. 96-3801, 1997 WL640116, at *4 (6th Cir. Oct.14, 1997) ( per c u r i a m ) , an d

s t a t i n g t ha t Be ll “c it[ ed] with approval appe llate dec isions finding re asonable use of 6 on the F ourt h A me ndme nt c la im b e c a us e Da vid so n did no t vio la te a

c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht. Pla int if fs , opposing the motion, contended that whether Denning could discern who knocked at his door and whether Denningpoint ed his gun at Davidson wer e both in dispute. Plainti ffs fur ther a rg ued that Denninghad a va lid Second Amendment cla im. Pl aintiffs maintained that the Metropolitan Gover nment’s policy

reg arding the use of deadly forc e cause d Denning ’s death. F inally , plaintiffs claimed that Of

fice r Davidson was not entitled to qualified immunity beca use he used force that was excessive under

objective standa

rds of re asonable ness. The district cour

t gr anted de fenda

nts’ motion for summary

judgme nt and dismi s s ed all of plaintiffs’ cla ims. Denning , 564 F. Supp. 2d 805

. I n ad d ressing whether Offic er D avidson was 4 entitled to qualified immunity on p l ai n t i ff

s ’ excessive for ce c laim, the court de termined that Da vid son’s us e of dea dly

fo rc e wa s “ ob

je c tiv e ly re a so na ble ” in l ig ht o f D e nn ing ’s pic kin g up his g un, pointing it in Davidson’s direc tion, and conti n u i n g t o walk towar ds the door while ig noring commands to drop his w eapon, and that Davidson “wa s forc ed to make a split-sec ond decision that he wa s not safe a

nd t h at re t re at was not fe asible.” Id. at 814. Thus , th e c ourt c on c lud e d th a t a s a matter of la

w Davidson “ did not use excessive for ce in violation of De nning’ s Fourth Ame ndment rig hts.” Id. at 815. The c ourt fou n d t h at plaintiffs had not pre sented a materia l question of fac t

r e g ar d i n g w h e t h e r t h e g u n w a s p o i n t e d a t D a v i d s o n , a s t h e e v i d e n c e o f r e c o r d w a s n o tc o n t r a d i c t o r

y. See id. 5forc e whe re the wea pon was not pointed direc tly at the off icer ”). 7 I n dismiss ing pla intiffs’ municipa l l ia bility claims, the cour

t noted that there could be no suc h lia bil ity be c a us e pla int if

fs ha d n ot es ta

bli sh e d tha t De nn ing wa s dep ri ve d o f a c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht. Id. at 816-17. The court further stated that even assuming plaintiffs established a c o n stitut ional violation ha d occur

red, plaintiffs did not establish fac ts to support their claim that the Metropolitan Gover nment was re sponsible for t h at v i o l ation: the police depa rtment policy

at issue was not a

n illega l policy beca

use i t trac ks the l ang uag e on the us e of de adly forc e in Tennesseev. Garne r , 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985); plainti ffs did not prese nt other e vidence establishing a n illega l custom, practice , or p oli c y , n or

did the y sh owtha

t any of fi c ia l w a s awa

re of ill e g a l c on du c t or

wa s d e lib e rate ly indiffer ent; and plaintiffs did not introduce e v i d en ce s h o wi ng a fa ilure to supervise or train. Denning , 564 F. Supp. 2d at 817. II We reviewde novo a district c ourt’s g rant of summar y judgme nt. In t’ l U

nio n v . Cu mm ins , Inc. , 43 4 F

. 3 d

4 7 8 , 4 8 3 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 6 )

. Summ ar

y ju d g me n t i s a

p p r o p r iate “ if

th e p le a d in g s , the discovery and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits show that there is no ge nuine issue as
to a ny ma te ri a l f

a c t and that th e mov ant i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt as a ma tte r of law. ” F e d. R. Civ. P. 56 (c ). F a c tua l e vid e nc e is to be vie we d in the lig ht m os t f a vo ra ble to t he no n- mov ingpa

rt y a nd a ll

rea sonable i n fe re n ce s m ust be construe d in that party ’s favor. See H enderson v . W

alled Lake Consol. Sch. , 469 F.3d 479, 487 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Appellants conf

irmed at ora l argument that, consistent with the ir brief, they are not appea ling the distric t c o u

r t’ s d e cision to gr ant summary judgme nt to defenda

nts on plaintiffs’ claim that Off icer Davidson used e x ce s s i v e f o rc e. R at h er , ap p el l an t s m ai n t ai nt h at al t h o u gh t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ad dre ssed8

the ir e xce ssi ve -f

or c e c la im, it did no t add

re ss t he ir “ ill e g a l se arc h a

nd se izur e ” c la im. Ap pe lla

nts ’ B r. 8; s e e a ls o id. at 1 7 (“ P laintiffs contend that there was an unconstitut ional, forcible, physical

e ntr y o f the de cede nt’s home by virtue of the a ct of de fenda nt’s firing into the home without identifying himself. Th e Di s t ri ct Court’s Orde r addr esses the e x cessive f orce fac et of Plaintiff’s

case , but fails to deal with the illeg al sea rch f ace t.” (e mphasis in the orig inal)). I t is un c le ar t o w hat e xten t a pp e lla nts argue that the dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a dd re ss t he ir c la im that there had bee n an unconstitutional “seizure,” as opposed to a n illega l “ sear ch.” I t is settled law that “ther e can be no question that appre hension by the use of de adly

forc e is a seizure subjec t to the

rea sonablene ss require ment of t he Fourth Amendment.” Tennesseev. Garne r , 471 U.S. 1, 7 ( 1985). The district cour

t considere d the re asonable ness of this sei z u re wh en it determined that Of fice r Da vid son’s u se of

de a dly fo rc e wa s o bje c tiv e ly

re a so na ble , a s “ De nn ingpo se d a se ri ou s th re a t to Offic er [Davidson]’s safety such that Off

icer [Davi d s o n ] ’s use of de adly forc e wa s permissible.” Denning , 564 F. Supp. 2d. at 814. Plaintiffs have not explained how Davidson’s use of dea dly forc e can be d e e me d u n r e a s o n a b le u n d e r th e F o u rth A me n d me n t w h e r e p la in ti f f s d o n o t c h a ll e n g e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c on c lus ion that th e us e of de a dly fo rc e wa s n ot e xce ssi ve un de r t he c ir c ums tanc e s. To the e xten t a

pp e lla nts ma int a in t

hat th e bu lle t pi e rc ingDe nn ing’s do or and e nte ri nghis house as a result of Davidson’s firing of his gun w as an unc onstitut ional “sea rch” notwithstanding the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c on c lusi on (wh ich the y do no t a pp e a l) that th e us e of

fo rc e wa s o bje c tiv e ly

rea sonable in lig ht of the threat posed to Davidson, appellants offe r no authority for the pr oposition that in this si tuation the office r’s fir ing a bullet into the dwelling c onstitut ed an unla wful “se arc h”

un de r t he F ourt h A me ndme nt. Th e Sup re me Co urt h a s o bs e rv e d th a t “ [w]he n th e F ourt h Amendment wa s adopted, a s now, to ‘sea rch’ meant ‘[ t ] o look over or thr oug h for the pur pose ofOffic er D avidson’s subseque nt entry into the home afte r noticing Denning on the floor a nd 6 not moving wa s objectively rea sonable g iven that “[o]ne ex ige ncy ob v iating the require ment of a war rant is the nee d to assist perso n s wh o ar e seriously injured or thre atene d with such injury .” Br igh am City

v . S tua rt , 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). We rec ently

pointed out that municipal-liability case s make such a distinction. See F ord v. 7 Cou nty of G ra nd Tra v e rse , 5 3 5 F. 3 d

4 8 3 , 4 9 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( co mp ar i n g Mi lle r v . Ca lho un Cou nty , 408 F.3d 802, 813 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (“Municipa l liabilit y may attach f or policies promulg ated by the of fi c ia l ve ste d w ith

fi na l po lic y

makin g a uth or ity fo r the mun ic ipa lity .” ) w ithMem phis, Tenn. Area Loc al, Am . P os tal

W or k e rs U nio n v . Ci ty

of M e mp his , 361 F.3d 898, 902 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) (“A mun i c i p a l ‘ c u s tom ’ m ay

be e sta bli sh e d b y

pr oo f o f t he kn ow le dg e of

po lic y makin g of

fi c ia ls a nd the ir acquie scenc e in the esta

blished prac tice.”) ). 9 finding something; to explore; to examine by inspection; as, to se arc h the house for a book; to sear ch the wood for

a thief.’ ” Kyllo v. United States , 533 U.S. 27, 3 2 n .1 (2001) ( citing N . Webster, An American D ictionary of the English Language 66 (1828) ( rep rint 6th ed. 1989)). The bullet that
enter ed De nning’ s home obviously could not “look,” “explore,” or “examine,” nor

did its entry fa c ili ta te su c h c on du c t. Ap pe lla nts ’ argume nt that Da

vid so n’ s fi ri ng a bu lle t int o D e nn ing ’s ho me 6

co n s t i tu t edan u n co n s t i tu t i o n al “s ea rc h ” i s u n av ai l i n g. F ina lly , a pp e lla nts c on te nd

that th e dis tr ic t court

e rr e d w he n it

dis mis se d th e ir

c la im a g a ins t the Metropolitan Gover

nment beca

use the court employ ed the test for g overnme ntal liability for a “custom” a

nd not for a “ policy .” I t appea rs to us that the district court c onsidered both policy and 7 custom. I n any

event, be ca u s e appellants have not established that ther e wa s an unconstitutional de pr ivatio n o f D e nnin g’s con sti tut ion a l r ig hts , th e ir c la im o f m

un ic ipa l li a

bil ity ne c e ssa ri ly fa ils

. See W atkins v. City of Battle Creek , 273 F.3d 682, 687 (6th Cir. 2001) (“I f no constitutional violation by the individual defe ndants is established, the municipal def endants c annot be he ld liable under § 1 9 8 3

. ” ( ci t i n g City of L os Angeles v . Heller , 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)))

.10 III F or the re a so ns state d a

bo ve , w e AF F I RM.