In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 19-2530

GERALD PEETERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 2:18-cv-00738-WED — William E. Duffin, Magistrate Judge.

ARGUED JUNE 3, 2020 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 15, 2020

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and BAUER and ST. EVE, Circuit

Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Gerald Peeters appeals the denial of

his claim for disability insurance benefits. In 2016 and 2018,

the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined Peeters was

not disabled under the relevant regulations. Peeters sought
2 No. 19-2530

relief in the district court, which reviewed the ALJ’s opinion

and found that the decision was supported by substantial

evidence. Peeters contests the ALJ’s weight and application

of the opinions given by Dr. Sandra King and state agency

psychologists. Because we find the ALJ’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

Gerald Peeters filed for disability benefits in 2013. He

amended the onset date of his disability to 2014, which

included degenerative disc disease in the lumbar spine,

degenerative joint disease of the right shoulder, depressive

disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety

disorder, and learning disabilities. Peeters has not sustained

gainful employment since 2014. After his application was

denied, Peeters received a hearing. The ALJ denied Peeters

disability benefits in 2016. The Appeals Council denied

Peeters’ request for review. Peeters sued and the district court

approved the parties’ joint stipulation to remand for further

administrative proceedings. 

On remand, the Appeals Council instructed the ALJ to

reconsider Peeters’ maximum residual functional capacity,

obtain evidence and examples of jobs Peeters could perform

from a vocational expert, provide a new hearing, and issue a

new decision. At the second hearing in 2018, the ALJ issued a

fifteen-page decision denying Peeters disability benefits

because he failed to meet the severity requirements of 20 C.F.R.

pt. 404 and 20 C.F.R. pt. 416. Peeters filed an action with the

district court, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision. On appeal,

Peeters seeks remand for the partial or little weight given to
No. 19-2530 3

Dr. King’s assessments and the great weight given to the six

psychologists’ assessments. 

Dr. King first examined Peeters in 2014 and diagnosed him

with major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety

disorder. She gave him a global assessment functioning score

of 65, which indicates mild symptoms. In 2016, Dr. King

assessed Peeters again and increased his level of difficulty in

dealing with routine work stress, adapting to changes, and

being able to physically handle a job from moderate to severe

without an explanation. Dr. King’s diagnosis was the same in

2016 as in 2014 with only the addition of a “post-traumatic

stress disorder” diagnosis.

Six state agency psychologists evaluated Peeters. Doctors

Richard Waranch, Jack Spear, and Jan Jacobson found Peeters

would have moderate limitations completing a normal

workday and carrying out detailed instructions, but could

handle simple two to three-step instructions. They found he

could perform simple, routine, and repetitive work within

these limitations. Doctors Jayant Desai, Syd Foster, and Marie

Turner found Peeters capable of performing light work. 

II. DISCUSSION

“We review the district court’s judgment de novo” and

directly review the ALJ’s decision. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408,

413 (7th Cir. 2008). We consider whether the ALJ’s decision is

supported by “substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Beistek

v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148 (2019). The court’s role is not to

reweigh evidence, but to determine whether the ALJ built an

“accurate and logical bridge” between the evidence and the

conclusion. Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2014). 
4 No. 19-2530

The ALJ applies a five-step sequential evaluation in

determining whether the claimant is disabled. The ALJ first

considers whether the claimant had engaged in substantial

gainful activity. Then the ALJ considers whether the claimant

has a medically determinable impairment or combination of

impairments that is “severe.” A “severe” impairment significantly limits the claimant’s ability to perform basic work

activities. Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 2014).

The ALJ determined Peeters met the first two steps.

However, the ALJ found Peeters does not have impairments severe enough to meet or medically equal the severity

of one of the listed impairments for a required twelve-month

period. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d), and 416.926.

Based on the evidence presented, the ALJ concluded that

Peeters could perform light work, limited to occasional

climbing of ladders, ropes, scaffolds, ramps, or stairs; occasional stooping, crouching, kneeling, or crawling; and limited

overhead reaching. While unable to perform past relevant

work, Peeters could perform unskilled, simple, routine,

repetitive work.

While Peeters claims the ALJ erred in the weight and

application of Dr. King’s two opinions, substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ gave “great weight” to

most of Dr. King’s first opinion. However, Dr. King’s statements regarding Peeters’ ability to handle the physical demands of a job were outside of her area of expertise. Instead,

the ALJ relied on testimony from the vocational expert, who

identified jobs Peeters could perform.
No. 19-2530 5

The ALJ found Dr. King’s substantially similar second

opinion inconsistent with other evidence. In this second

opinion, she increased Peeters’ difficulty withstanding routine

work stress and adapting to change from moderate to severe

with no explanation. Doctors Waranch, Spear, and Jacobson

all found Peeters was not significantly limited in most functional areas and had only “moderately limited” mental

function regarding carrying out detailed instructions, completing a normal workday and workweek without interruptions

from psychologically based symptoms or performing at a

consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of

rest breaks, maintaining attention and concentration for

extended periods, and interacting appropriately with the

general public. No other experts found that Peeters’ disability

increased during that time frame. Dr. King’s substantially

similar second opinion, with the increased level of severity,

was inconsistent with other evidence in the record and the ALJ

properly gave her opinion partial weight. 

Peeters also claims the ALJ erred regarding the weight of

the state agency psychologists’ opinions in both a hypothetical

question and the residual functional capacity. Three state

agency psychologists, Doctors Waranch, Spear, and Jacobson,

all maintained Peeters would have moderate limitations in the

work setting, but could perform simple, routine, and repetitive

work within these limitations, such as simple two to three-step

instructions. Furthermore, Doctors Desai, Foster, and Turner

found Peeters capable of performing light work. The ALJ

included the psychologists’ stated limitations in a hypothetical

posed to the vocational expert. The vocational expert testified

that an individual with these limitations would be able to
6 No. 19-2530

perform certain jobs such as food preparation worker, mail

clerk, and laundry worker. This list further included additional

jobs for sedentary work. We find that the ALJ properly gave

the state agency psychologists’ opinions great weight because

they were supported by substantial evidence in the record.

III. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court’s decision to affirm the ALJ’s

decision to deny Peeters disability benefits.