J-S66003-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FKA THE 

BANK OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE FOR 

THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS CWABS, 

INC. ASSET BACKED CERTIFICATES 

SERIES 6006-19

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MICHELLE L. & WALTER T. JORDAN,

Appellants No. 680 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered March 12, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County

Civil Division at No(s): 13 CV 1323

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 12, 2014

Appellants, Michelle L. and Walter T. Jordan, appeal from the March 

12, 2014 order denying their petition to open default judgment entered 

against them and in favor of Appellee, Bank of New York Mellon, et al (“the 

Bank”). After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court provided the following brief procedural history:

The Complaint in Mortgage Foreclosure was filed in the 

instant action on March 21, 2013. On July 2, 2013, after 

[Appellants] failed to file a responsive pleading, judgment was 

entered in the amount of $305,592.02 in favor of the [Bank]. 

On July 11, 2013, [Appellants] filed a petition to open the 

judgment pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 237.3. Oral argument was 

heard on March 12, 2014, and an order denying the petition was 

filed [on] that date.
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Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 7/20/14, at 1-2. 

Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal. Herein, they present one 

question for our review: “Did the Lower Court err in failing to open the 

judgment against [] Appellants when the Petition to Open was filed within 10 

days after the entry of judgment and [] Appellants pled a meritorious 

defense?” Appellants’ Brief at 4. We review this claim under the following 

standard:

Generally, a petition to open a default judgment is addressed to 

the equitable powers of the court and is a matter of judicial 

discretion. Aquilino [v. Philadelphia Catholic Archdiocese,] 

884 A.2d [1269,] 1283 [(Pa. Super. 2005)]. “A lower court's 

ruling refusing to open a default judgment will not be reversed 

unless there has been an error of law or a clear, manifest abuse 

of discretion.” Schultz v. Erie Insurance Exchange, [] 477 

A.2d 471, 472 ([Pa.] 1984) (citation omitted).

Boatin v. Miller, 955 A.2d 424, 427 (Pa. Super. 2008).

In the present case, the trial court denied Appellants’ petition to open 

after determining that they failed to prove two of the three requisites for 

opening a default judgment. Specifically, the court stated: “It is well[-] 

settled that in Pennsylvania a default judgment may be opened if the moving 

party satisfie[s] three requirements: (1) act promptly, (2) allege a 

meritorious defense, and (3) explain the reasonable excuse for the delay 

that brought about the default judgment.” TCO at 3 (citing Seeger v. First 

Union National Bank, 836 A.2d 163, 165 (Pa. Super. 2003)). The court 

then concluded that Appellants “did respond promptly; however, they 
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neither provided a meritorious defense nor did they explain the delay that 

led to the default judgment being entered.” Id. at 4. 

In challenging the court’s ruling on appeal, Appellants first contend 

that the trial court erred by requiring them to provide an explanation for 

their delay in responding to the Bank’s complaint. Appellants rely on 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 237.3(b), which states: “If the petition 

is filed within ten days after the entry of the judgment on the docket, the 

court shall open the judgment if the proposed complaint or answer states a 

meritorious cause of action or defense.” Pa.R.C.P. 237.3(b). Appellants 

argue that because here, their petition to open was filed within 10 days of 

the entry of default judgment, under Rule 237.3(b) they were only required 

to present a meritorious defense; they were not also required to provide a 

reasonable excuse for their delay. 

We are compelled to agree that the court erred in this regard. 

[I]n Attix v. Lehman, 925 A.2d 864 (Pa. Super. 2007), we 

interpreted Rule 237.3(b) based on [the] principles of rule 

construction. We concluded that a petitioner does not need 

to satisfy the common law requirement that he provide a 

reasonable excuse for the failure that led to the judgment 

by default, if his petition to open is filed within 10 days of 

the judgment and states a meritorious defense. Id. at 866. 

In doing so, we recognized that Rule 237.3(b) presupposes that 

a petition filed within ten days of the default judgment is 

promptly filed and sets forth a reasonable explanation or 

legitimate excuse for the inactivity or delay resulting in the entry 

of the judgment. Id. Thus, we held that under Rule 

237.3(b), a trial court must open a default judgment, if 

the petitioner files a petition to open within ten days of its 

entry and states a meritorious defense. Id. at 867.
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Boatin, 955 A.2d at 427 (emphasis added). Based on our holding in Attix, 

we conclude that because Appellants filed their petition to open within 10 

days of the entry of default judgment, they were only required to assert a 

meritorious defense to warrant their petition being granted. See also 

Penn-Delco School Dist. v. Bell Atlantic-Pa, Inc., 745 A.2d 14, 19 (Pa. 

Super. 1999) (“[W]here the petitioner files a petition to open the judgment 

within ten days, ... the petitioner need demonstrate only that the verified 

pleading attached to the petition states a meritorious defense.”). Thus, the 

trial court misapplied the law in this regard.

Nevertheless, the trial court also concluded that Appellants failed to 

present a meritorious defense, and Appellants have not convinced us that 

the court’s decision was an abuse of its discretion.

The requirement of a meritorious defense is only that a defense 

must be pleaded that if proved at trial would justify relief. The 

defense does not have to prove every element of its defense[;] 

however, it must set forth the defense in precise, specific 

and clear terms.

Seeger, 836 A.2d at 166 (emphasis added) (quoting Penn-Delco School v. 

Bell Atlantic-Pa, Inc., 745 A.2d 14, 19 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citations 

omitted)). 

Here, in the Bank’s March 21, 2013 complaint in mortgage foreclosure, 

it stated that Appellants executed the at-issue mortgage in August of 2006, 

and that “[t]he mortgage is in default because monthly payments of 

principal and interest upon said mortgage due 01/01/2010 and each month 

thereafter are due and unpaid....” Complaint, 3/21/13, at 4 ¶ 5. The Bank 
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then listed the amounts of principal, interest, and certain fees owed by 

Appellants, and concluded that Appellants owed a total of $305,592.02. Id. 

at 4 ¶ 6.

In Appellants’ answer attached to their petition to open, they 

responded to the Bank’s assertion that they failed to make mortgage 

payments as follows: 

Denied. It is specifically denied that [Appellants] failed to make 

payments as indicated in the Complaint, by way of further 

response, the Complaint fails to provide any evidence that 

[Appellants] are in violation of the Mortgage Contract.

Answer, 7/11/13, at 2 ¶ 5. In response to the Bank’s statement of the total 

amount owed by Appellants, Appellants again stated:

Denied. It is specifically denied that [Appellants] failed to make 

payments of principal and interest, by way of further response, 

the Complaint fails to provide any evidence that [Appellants] are 

in violation of the Mortgage Contract.

Id. at 2 ¶ 6.

These answers are not sufficiently specific to constitute a meritorious 

defense. Despite the Bank’s alleging over 36 months of non-payment, and 

providing a specific amount owed by Appellants, Appellants failed to specify 

any month(s) in which they did, in fact, pay their mortgage, or provide the 

specific amount that they believe they currently owe. Clearly, Appellants 

had access to this type of information, yet failed to include it in their answer. 

Additionally, Appellants’ claim that “the Complaint fails to provide any 

evidence that [Appellants] are in violation of the Mortgage Contract” does 

not amount to a meritorious defense; instead, this assertion is merely a 
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claim that the Bank’s complaint was inadequate. Even more notably, 

Appellants again fail to specify what evidence the Bank was required to 

include in the complaint, or how that omission defeated the Bank’s claim 

against them.

Accordingly, we ascertain no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

decision to deny Appellants’ petition to open. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/12/2014