United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 99-1178

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In re: C. Dean Ferren; Sue S. Ferren, *

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Debtors, *

*

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C. Dean Ferren, *

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Appellant, *

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v. *

* Appeal from the United States

Searcy Winnelson Company; * Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

McPherson Electric Company, Inc.; * for the Eighth Circuit.

Strother-Wilbourn Land Title *

Company; North Little Rock * (PUBLISHED)

Winnelson Company; Charles Hicks, *

doing business as Budget Print; *

Searcy Physical Therapy Clinic; *

McClain Heating and Air; Ken Dick & *

Associates, Inc., *

*

Appellees. *

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 Submitted: January 6, 2000

 Filed: February 11, 2000

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Before McMILLIAN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

C. Dean Ferren initiated an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court seeking

to recover the proceeds from the foreclosure and sale of certain real estate which had

been disbursed by the Arkansas Chancery Court to satisfy judicial liens against Ferren.

He argued to the bankruptcy court, as he had to the Chancery Court, that his

bankruptcy had discharged the liens. The bankruptcy court dismissed the action, and

the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Ferren

appeals.

We agree with the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel that Rooker-Feldman bars

Ferren’s action. If the bankruptcy court were to entertain Ferren’s adversary

proceeding, it would necessarily be reviewing the lien-discharge argument already

rejected by the Arkansas Chancery Court, and in order to grant Ferren the relief he

seeks, the bankruptcy court would have to effectively void the Arkansas Chancery

Court’s decision. Under Rooker-Feldman, the bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to

do so. See Fielder v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 188 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 (8th Cir.

1999).

We note that the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit has taken the

opposite view in its decision in In Re Pavelich, 229 B.R. 777, 781-83 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.

1999) (a federal court has jurisdiction to collaterally attack an erroneous state court

construction of a bankruptcy discharge because it is void ab initio under 11 U.S.C.

§524(a)(1)), but we specifically reject its view of the applicability of the RookerFeldman doctrine. Instead, we agree with the reasoning of the Bankruptcy Appellate

Panel of the Sixth Circuit in its decision in In Re Singleton, 230 B.R. 533 (B.A.P. 6th

Cir. 1999) (state court determination that bankruptcy order staying sale of debtor's

personal property did not apply to other property of the debtor is not subject to

collateral attack by a federal court because no exception to Rooker-Feldman doctrine

applies). In our present case, the state court determined that the judicial liens had not
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been discharged during federal bankruptcy proceedings. In our view, Ferren's only

remedy at that point was to appeal within the state courts of Arkansas, because the

bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to overturn the state court judgment and we

decline to create an exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.