IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION TWO

CECELIA M. LEWIS AND RANDALL LEWIS,

A MARRIED COUPLE,

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

RAY C. DEBORD AND ANNE NELSON-DEBORD,

HUSBAND AND WIFE,

Defendants/Appellees.

No. 2 CA-CV 2014-0004

Filed October 6, 2014

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County

No. C20125400

The Honorable Gus Aragón, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Slutes, Sakrison & Rogers, P.C., Tucson

By James M. Sakrison and Diana L. Kanon-Ustariz

and

Decker Holland, Snowflake

By Joseph E. Holland

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Gust Rosenfeld P.L.C., Phoenix

By Scott A. Malm and Justin M. Scorza

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
LEWIS v. DEBORD

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Judge Vásquez authored the opinion of the Court, in which Judge 

Howard and Judge Miller concurred.

V Á S Q U E Z, Judge:

¶1 In this appeal, Cecelia and Randall Lewis challenge the 

trial court’s summary judgment in favor of appellees Ray Debord 

and Anne Nelson-Debord in the Lewises’ action to foreclose a 

judgment lien against the Debords’ property.

1 The court found that, 

because the Lewises failed to comply with A.R.S. § 33-967(A), they 

did not have a valid judgment lien against the property. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 In reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, 

we view the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing 

entry of the judgment. Gorman v. Pima County, 230 Ariz. 506, ¶ 2, 

287 P.3d 800, 801 (App. 2012). The relevant facts are undisputed. In 

June 2003, the Lewises obtained a default money judgment against 

Karen MacKean and Fred Foust. Intending to create a lien against 

real property, the Lewises recorded the judgment in January 2006 in 

Pima County. They renewed the judgment lien in June 2008. 

Neither the judgment recorded in 2006 nor the renewal recorded in 

2008 was accompanied by a separate information statement as 

required by § 33-967(A).

2

¶3 In March 2008, MacKean purchased real property in 

Pima County. She then transferred the property to Sonomex, LLC, 

for which Foust is the statutory agent. In July 2012, the Debords 

purchased the property from Sonomex.

 

1Randall passed away during the pendency of this appeal.

2The Lewises did not record an information statement until 

August 2013.
LEWIS v. DEBORD

Opinion of the Court

3

¶4 In August 2012, the Lewises sought judicial foreclosure 

of the lien or execution of the judgment, naming MacKean, 

Sonomex, and the Debords as defendants. The Debords moved for 

summary judgment, arguing that the Lewises’ “failure to record a 

separate information statement with the Judgment and the Renewal 

. . . render[ed] their alleged judgment lien invalid and unenforceable 

against the Property.” In response, the Lewises maintained that “the 

failure to record an information sheet of this kind does not affect the 

validity of the judgment lien, only the priority afforded to the 

judgment lien.” After hearing argument, the trial court entered 

summary judgment in favor of the Debords.3 This appeal followed. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 

12-2101(A)(1).4

 

3After the trial court entered the final judgment, it issued an 

in-chambers ruling suggesting it had done so “prematurely” and 

setting a status conference on the matter. However, the Lewises 

filed their notice of appeal before the status conference. We 

therefore suspended the appeal pursuant to Rule 9.1, Ariz. R. Civ. 

App. P., to allow the court to consider whether the judgment was 

indeed final. The court ordered that its prior judgment “shall 

remain in full force and effect,” and we reinstated the appeal.

4Generally, our jurisdiction “is limited to final judgments 

which dispose of all claims and all parties.” Musa v. Adrian, 130 

Ariz. 311, 312, 636 P.2d 89, 90 (1981). However, Rule 54(b), Ariz. R. 

Civ. P., “allows a trial court to certify finality to a judgment which 

disposes of one or more, but not all, of the multiple claims, if the 

court determines that there is no just reason for delay and directs the 

entry of judgment.” Davis v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 168 Ariz. 301, 304, 

812 P.2d 1119, 1122 (App. 1991). Here, although the judgment 

resolves only the Lewises’ claim against the Debords, and the 

Debords’ request for attorney fees is still pending, it nevertheless 

contains language pursuant to Rule 54(b). We therefore review the 

entry of summary judgment in favor of the Debords.
LEWIS v. DEBORD

Opinion of the Court

4

Discussion

¶5 The Lewises argue “[t]he trial court erred in finding that 

the lack of a timely information statement voided an otherwise valid 

money judgment lien” and consequently its entry of summary 

judgment in favor of the Debords was improper. We review a grant 

of summary judgment de novo, determining whether any genuine 

issues of material fact exist and whether the trial court properly 

applied the law. Ochser v. Funk, 228 Ariz. 365, ¶ 11, 266 P.3d 1061, 

1065 (2011). We will affirm a grant of summary judgment if it is 

correct for any legal reason. Pi’Ikea, LLC v. Williamson, 234 Ariz. 284, 

n.7, 321 P.3d 449, 454 n.7 (App. 2014). We also review de novo 

issues of statutory interpretation. Miller v. Hehlen, 209 Ariz. 462, ¶ 5, 

104 P.3d 193, 196 (App. 2005).

¶6 “Our primary task in interpreting statutes is to give 

effect to the intent of the legislature.” In re Estate of Winn, 214 Ariz. 

149, ¶ 8, 150 P.3d 236, 238 (2007). We look first to the plain language 

of the statute as the best indicator of that intent and give effect to the 

terms according to their commonly accepted meanings. Sierra 

Tucson, Inc. v. Pima County, 178 Ariz. 215, 220, 871 P.2d 762, 767 

(App. 1994). When the language is clear and unambiguous, we look 

no further and apply it as written. City of Tucson v. Clear Channel 

Outdoor, Inc., 218 Ariz. 172, ¶ 6, 181 P.3d 219, 225 (App. 2008). But if 

the language is unclear or ambiguous, we resort to other methods of 

statutory interpretation, including: the statute’s context; spirit and 

purpose; subject matter and historical background; and effects and 

consequences. Stein v. Sonus USA, Inc., 214 Ariz. 200, ¶ 3, 150 P.3d 

773, 774 (App. 2007).

¶7 Judgment liens are creations of statute, Rowe v. Schultz, 

131 Ariz. 536, 538, 642 P.2d 881, 883 (App. 1982), and thus require 

strict statutory compliance, Sysco Ariz., Inc. v. Hoskins, 235 Ariz. 164, 

¶ 8, 330 P.3d 354, 355-56 (App. 2014). We therefore begin our 

analysis with A.R.S. § 33-961(A), which sets forth the process for 

creating a judgment lien:

A copy of the judgment of a court, 

certified by the clerk, shall be filed and 

recorded in the office of the county 
LEWIS v. DEBORD

Opinion of the Court

5

recorder in each county where the 

judgment creditor desires the judgment to 

become a lien upon the real property of the 

judgment debtor before the judgment shall 

become a lien upon or in any manner affect 

or encumber the real property of the 

judgment debtor, or any part of the real 

property of the judgment debtor.

The certified copy of the judgment must identify: the court, the 

action, and the cause number; the date the judgment and the docket 

record were entered; the names of the judgment debtor and 

judgment creditor; the amount of the judgment; and the name of the 

judgment creditor’s attorney. § 33-961(A)(1)-(5).

¶8 Once a judgment has been recorded pursuant to 

§ 33-961(A), “the judgment creditor may satisfy the judgment by 

executing on any real property” that is then owned or later acquired 

by the judgment debtor. Byers v. Wik, 169 Ariz. 215, 218-19, 818 P.2d 

200, 203-04 (App. 1991); Sysco Ariz., 235 Ariz. 164, ¶ 6, 330 P.3d at 

355; see also A.R.S. § 33-964(A). “The general rule is that once a 

judgment lien has attached to the land, it remains until legally 

removed.” Freeman v. Wintroath Pumps-Div. of Worthington Corp., 

13 Ariz. App. 182, 184, 475 P.2d 274, 276 (1970).

¶9 Despite the existence of a judgment lien, the judgment 

debtor retains “full power to sell . . . or otherwise dispose of” his or 

her real property. Id. However, any subsequent purchaser who has 

notice of the judgment lien takes the property subject to it. Sysco 

Ariz., 235 Ariz. 164, ¶ 6, 330 P.3d at 355; Warren v. Whitehall Income 

Fund 86, 170 Ariz. 241, 243-44, 823 P.2d 689, 691-92 (App. 1991); see 

also Delo v. GMAC Mortg., L.L.C., 232 Ariz. 133, ¶ 18, 302 P.3d 658, 

663 (App. 2013) (purchaser has constructive notice of recorded 

documents). Thus, the purpose of § 33-961(A) is to give notice of the 

judgment lien to subsequent purchasers and others who may deal 

with the judgment debtor’s real property. Freeman, 13 Ariz. App. at

184, 475 P.2d at 276.

¶10 In 1996, our legislature amended the judgment-lien 

statutes to require a judgment creditor to attach an information
LEWIS v. DEBORD

Opinion of the Court

6

statement to the recorded judgment. See 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws, 

ch. 289, §§ 5, 7. Section 33-961(C) now provides that “[a] judgment 

or decree or any renewal that requires payment of money shall also 

be accompanied by an information statement as prescribed by 

§ 33-967.” And, § 33-967(A) states:

In addition to the requirements 

prescribed by § 33-961, any judgment or 

decree or any renewal that requires the 

payment of money and that is recorded on 

or after January 1, 1997, shall be attached to 

a separate information statement of the 

judgment creditor that contains all of the 

following information:

1. The correct name and last known 

address of each judgment debtor and the 

address at which each judgment debtor 

received the summons by personal service 

or by mail.

2. The name and address of the 

judgment creditor.

3. The amount of the judgment or 

decree as entered or as most recently 

renewed.

4. If the judgment debtor is a natural 

person, the judgment debtor’s social 

security number, date of birth and driver 

license number.

5. Whether a stay of enforcement 

has been ordered by the court and the date 

the stay expires.

Section 33-967(D) further explains that “[a] judgment or decree or 

any renewal that requires the payment of money recorded on or 

after January 1, 1997, has as its priority the date of compliance with 

subsection A of this section.”
LEWIS v. DEBORD

Opinion of the Court

7

¶11 The parties agree that the legislature’s purpose in 

creating the information-statement requirement was “to help 

identify true judgment debtors and protect those who have been 

erroneously identified as so.” Senate Fact Sheet, S.B. 1300, 42d Leg., 

2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1996). Presumably, the legislature sought to 

accomplish this by requiring judgment creditors to provide 

additional information about judgment debtors.

¶12 The Lewises maintain that their failure to attach an

information statement to their recorded judgment and renewal did 

not invalidate their judgment lien but merely caused them to lose 

their priority.5 They further reason that the term “priority” as used 

in § 33-967(D) applies to only competing lienholders and not to 

subsequent purchasers. The Lewises also maintain that subsequent 

purchasers like the Debords “st[an]d in the shoes of the original 

judgment debtors with regard to the judgment lien.” Accordingly, 

the Lewises conclude they have a valid judgment lien against the 

Debords’ property.

 

5The Lewises contend “[t]he trial court was bound to follow 

valid precedent” contained in Sourcecorp, Inc. v. Norcutt

(Sourcecorp II), 227 Ariz. 463, 258 P.3d 281 (App. 2011). But 

Sourcecorp II did not involve the issue presented in this case. In the 

factual and procedural history of that opinion, this court referred to 

an earlier appeal in which we determined that the plaintiff’s “failure 

to attach the money judgment information statement [pursuant to 

§§ 33-961(C) and 33-967(A)] did not invalidate its lien.” 

Sourcecorp II, 227 Ariz. 463, ¶ 6, 258 P.3d at 283, citing Sourcecorp, Inc. 

v. Shill (Sourcecorp I), No. 1 CA-CV 05-0425 (memorandum decision 

filed Sept. 26, 2006). Generally, “[m]emorandum decisions shall not 

be regarded as precedent nor cited in any court.” Ariz. R. Civ. 

App. P. 28(c); see also Calpine Constr. Fin. Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 

221 Ariz. 244, ¶ 24, 211 P.3d 1228, 1233 (App. 2009). Courts similarly 

do not treat passing references to previous memorandum decisions 

in published opinions as precedent. See Creach v. Angulo, 186 Ariz. 

548, 552, 925 P.2d 689, 693 (App. 1996) (court’s statement on 

question not involved in case before it is dictum and not binding 

precedent).
LEWIS v. DEBORD

Opinion of the Court

8

¶13 To address this issue, we first must determine what is 

necessary to create a valid judgment lien. Based on the plain 

language of § 33-961, the recording of a judgment pursuant to 

subsection (A), regardless of whether an information statement is 

attached thereto, creates a valid judgment lien as to the judgment 

debtor’s then-existing or later-acquired real property. See City of 

Tucson, 218 Ariz. 172, ¶ 6, 181 P.3d at 225. Section 33-961(A) states 

that a certified copy of the judgment must be filed and recorded in 

the appropriate county “before the judgment shall become a lien.”

Despite listing the specific requirements for the certified copy of the 

judgment, § 33-961(A) does not require that an information 

statement also be attached “before the judgment shall become a 

lien.” Likewise, although § 33-961(C) expressly states that the 

judgment or renewal “shall also be accompanied by an information 

statement,” it does not condition the validity of the judgment lien on 

the attachment of the information statement. If the legislature had 

intended such a requirement, it easily could have said so. See 

Democratic Party of Pima Cnty. v. Ford, 228 Ariz. 545, ¶ 17, 269 P.3d 

721, 726 (App. 2012).

¶14 This conclusion is further supported by the plain 

language of § 33-964(A), which provides that, “from and after the 

time of recording as provided in § 33-961, a judgment shall become a 

lien for a period of five years from the date it is given, on all real 

property of the judgment debtor . . . in the county in which the 

judgment is recorded.” See Bonito Partners, LLC v. City of Flagstaff, 

229 Ariz. 75, ¶ 30, 270 P.3d 902, 910 (App. 2012) (statutes relating to 

same subject construed together). Similar to § 33-961(A), this statute 

focuses on the recording of the judgment as the basis for creating a 

judgment lien and does not condition the lien’s validity on the 

attachment of an information statement. Thus, even after the 1996 

amendment, the principles supporting a judgment creditor’s ability 

to satisfy a judgment by executing on a judgment debtor’s real 

property and the judgment debtor’s ability to dispose of his or her 

property generally still stand. See Byers, 169 Ariz. at 218-19, 818 P.2d 

at 203-04; Freeman, 13 Ariz. App. at 184, 475 P.2d at 276.

¶15 We next must determine the consequence for failing to 

attach an information statement to a recorded judgment or renewal. 
LEWIS v. DEBORD

Opinion of the Court

9

Based on the plain language of § 33-967(D), we agree with the 

Lewises that a judgment creditor’s failure to attach an information 

statement affects the priority of the judgment lien.

6 See City of 

Tucson, 218 Ariz. 172, ¶ 6, 181 P.3d at 225. Section 33-967(D) clearly 

specifies that a judgment lien has priority once the information

statement is attached to the judgment. Priority commonly means 

“[t]he status of being earlier in time or higher in degree or rank; 

 

6Relying on Department of Revenue v. Southern Union Gas Co., 

119 Ariz. 512, 582 P.2d 158 (1978), the Lewises argue that the 

requirement to attach an information statement is directory, rather 

than mandatory, notwithstanding the use of the term “shall” in

§§ 33-961(C) and 33-967(A). In Southern Union Gas, our supreme 

court addressed “the legal consequence for noncompliance” with a 

statute providing that the trial court “shall” hear a case within 

ninety days of docketing. 119 Ariz. at 513, 582 P.2d at 159. The 

court started with the “general proposition” that “statutes may be 

classified as either mandatory or directory.” Id. It recognized that, 

when a mandatory statute is not followed, the proceedings to which 

it relates are void, while the failure to follow a directory statute has 

“no invalidating consequence.” Id. at 513-14, 582 P.2d at 159-60. The 

court concluded that the statute, “while couched in obligatory 

language,” was directory based on its “effect and consequences” and 

that the failure to comply did not require dismissal. Id. at 514, 582 

P.2d at 160. The Lewises similarly reason that §§ 33-961(C) and 33-

967(A) are directory and that their failure to attach a timely 

information statement did not invalidate their judgment lien.

Although we disagree that the language in the statutes is 

directory, we agree with the Lewises’ argument that the failure to 

attach an information statement affects a judgment lien’s priority 

and not its validity. Unlike the statute at issue in Southern Union 

Gas, § 33-967(D) plainly provides the legal consequence for failing to 

file a timely information statement—the judgment lien loses its 

priority. See City of Tucson, 218 Ariz. 172, ¶ 6, 181 P.3d at 225. Thus, 

even though the language in §§ 33-961(C) and 33-967(A) is 

mandatory, it is mandatory for the purpose of establishing the 

priority, not the validity, of the judgment lien.
LEWIS v. DEBORD

Opinion of the Court

10

precedence.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1386 (10th ed. 2014); see also 

Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1804 (1971) (defining priority as 

“superiority in rank, position, or privilege”). Thus, by introducing 

the concept of priority here, the legislature necessarily placed 

conditions on the judgment creditor’s ability to reach the judgment 

debtor’s real property in which third parties have acquired a 

superior interest. Cf. Rowe, 131 Ariz. at 538, 642 P.2d at 883 

(“[S]tatutes may expressly or by implication require recording of . . . 

conveyances if their priority is to be maintained.”).

¶16 Our conclusion that the failure to attach an information 

statement affects a judgment lien’s priority, not validity, is bolstered

by the other provisions of § 33-967. See Bonito Partners, 229 Ariz. 75, 

¶ 30, 270 P.3d at 910. Subsection (B) makes clear that the 

information statement must include the data prescribed by 

subsection (A) only if it is known by or available to the judgment 

creditor; if the data is not known, the judgment creditor must 

indicate as much in the information statement. And, subsection (C) 

provides that, if the judgment creditor fails to include an 

information statement with the judgment or any renewal, it may be 

amended to include one.7 The facts that all the data need not be 

included and that the judgment or renewal may be amended 

undercut the argument that the lien is invalid if the information 

statement is not attached. See Princess Plaza Partners v. State, 187 

Ariz. 214, 222 n.5, 928 P.2d 638, 646 n.5 (App. 1995) (“A ‘voidable’ 

agreement would be one subject to rescission or ratification whereas 

a ‘void’ agreement would be incapable of ratification or 

disaffirmance.”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1805 (defining voidable as 

“[v]alid until annulled”); cf. State ex rel. Herman v. Mestas, 12 Ariz. 

App. 289, 295, 469 P.2d 855, 861 (1970) (contract based on mutual 

mistake voidable).

¶17 Nevertheless, we disagree with the Lewises that the 

failure to attach an information statement affects the priority of a

judgment lien in relation to only competing lienholders and not 

subsequent purchasers. If the legislature wanted to limit the concept 

 

7“Recording an amendment . . . does not affect the 

computation of time prescribed by § 33-964.” § 33-967(E).
LEWIS v. DEBORD

Opinion of the Court

11

of priority in § 33-967(D) to the interests of competing lienholders, 

see Black’s Law Dictionary 1386 (also defining priority as “a creditor’s 

right to have a claim paid before other creditors of the same debtor 

receive payment”), it could have said so, see Democratic Party of Pima 

Cnty., 228 Ariz. 545, ¶ 17, 269 P.3d at 726. And, we will not read 

such a limitation into the statute. See Haag v. Steinle, 227 Ariz. 212, 

¶ 13, 255 P.3d 1016, 1019 (App. 2011) (“Courts will not read into a 

statute something that is not within the manifest intent of the 

legislature as indicated by the statute itself, nor will the courts 

inflate, expand, stretch, or extend a statute to matters not falling 

within its express provisions.”). Furthermore, our judgment-lien 

statutes require strict compliance. Sysco Ariz., 235 Ariz. 164, ¶ 8, 330 

P.3d at 355-56.

¶18 Thus, where a subsequent purchaser acquires an 

interest in a judgment debtor’s real property after a judgment 

creditor records a judgment but before attaching an information 

statement, the resulting judgment lien loses its priority and the 

judgment creditor cannot satisfy his or her judgment by executing 

on that property. By adding the information-statement requirement

in 1996, our legislature carved out a narrow exception to the general 

principle that a subsequent purchaser who has notice of a judgment 

lien takes the property subject to it. See Sysco Ariz., 235 Ariz. 164, 

¶ 6, 330 P.3d at 355; Warren, 170 Ariz. at 243-44, 823 P.2d at 691-92.

¶19 Here, the Debords acquired their interest in the 

property in July 2012. But the Lewises did not attach an information 

statement to their recorded judgment until August 2013. Because 

the Debords acquired their interest in the property before the 

Lewises complied with § 33-967(A), the Debords’ interest in the 

property has priority over the Lewises’ judgment lien. Accordingly, 

the Lewises cannot satisfy their judgment by executing on the 

Debords’ property. The trial court therefore did not err in granting 

summary judgment in favor of the Debords. See Ochser, 228 Ariz. 

365, ¶ 11, 266 P.3d at 1065; Pi’Ikea, 234 Ariz. 284, n.7, 321 P.3d at 454 

n.7.
LEWIS v. DEBORD

Opinion of the Court

12

Attorney Fees and Costs

¶20 Both parties have requested an award of attorney fees 

on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01. We deny the Lewises’

request because they are not the prevailing party. And, in our 

discretion, because the trial court has not yet resolved the Debords’ 

request for attorney fees incurred before it, we defer resolution of 

their request on appeal to the trial court as part of those proceedings. 

However, we grant the Debords their costs on appeal, pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 12-341, contingent upon their compliance with Rule 21, 

Ariz. R. Civ. App. P.

Disposition

¶21 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s 

grant of summary judgment in favor of the Debords.