COURT OF CHANCERY

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

 JOHN W. NOBLE 417 SOUTH STATE STREET

VICE CHANCELLOR DOVER, DELAWARE 19901

 TELEPHONE: (302) 739-4397

 FACSIMILE: (302) 739-6179

June 30, 2015

Joel Friedlander, Esquire Brian C. Ralston, Esquire

Christopher M. Foulds, Esquire Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP

Friedlander & Gorris, P.A. 1313 North Market Street, 6th Floor

222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1400 Wilmington, DE 19801

Wilmington, DE 19801

Raymond J. DiCamillo, Esquire

Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A.

920 North King Street

Wilmington, DE 19801

Re: Friedman v. Dolan

C.A. No. 9425-VCN

Date Submitted: January 23, 2015

Dear Counsel:

It is hard to look at the facts of this case without going away troubled. 

A compensation committee with various ties to the controlling shareholder family

awarded considerable executive compensation and benefits to the patriarch of that 

family and his son. Additionally, a board dominated by members of the 

controlling family approved non-executive director compensation, which accrued 

EFiled: Jun 30 2015 04:05PM EDT 

Transaction ID 57479773

Case No. 9425-VCN
Friedman v. Dolan

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to three family-member directors with qualifications and attendance records that 

have been called into question. Nonetheless, compensation decisions are not the 

expertise of trial judges, and the Court should not second-guess an independent 

compensation committee’s business decisions that are not irrational. The Court 

also lacks a principled way to evaluate a director’s decision to accept a position

and her performance as a director. Although the amount of compensation and 

board composition raise some concern, that concern does not justify judicial 

intervention into that thicket here.

* * * * *

Plaintiff Julie Friedman (“Friedman” or the “Plaintiff”) is and has been a 

shareholder of Nominal Defendant Cablevision Systems Corporation 

(“Cablevision” or the “Company”) at all times relevant to this litigation.1 

Cablevision, “a telecommunications and media company . . . . [serving] millions of 

 

1 Mot. for Intervention Pursuant to Del. Ct. Chancery Rule 24 ¶ 1. The Court 

granted Friedman’s motion to intervene on February 10, 2015. Unless otherwise 

noted, the facts are drawn from the Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint 

(“Compl.”) and, for limited purposes, the public filings it incorporates. See, e.g., 

In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., 897 A.2d 162, 169 (Del. 2006).
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C.A. No. 9425-VCN

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Page 3

households and businesses in the New York metropolitan area,”2 was founded by 

Defendant Charles F. Dolan (“Charles”). Charles has been Executive Chairman of 

Cablevision since 1985 and “is focused on ‘setting the strategic direction of the 

Company.’”3 He is also Executive Chairman of AMC Networks, Inc., a publicly 

traded company controlled by the Dolan family. His son, Defendant James L. 

Dolan (“James”), has been Cablevision’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) since 

1995 and a director since 1991. As CEO, James “is responsible for the day-to-day 

management of the Company.”

4

 He also serves as Executive Chairman of The 

Madison Square Garden Company (“MSG”)—another company under the Dolan 

family’s control—and sings in a band that “travels extensively” for performances.

5

Charles’s daughters, Defendants Kathleen M. Dolan (“Kathleen”), Deborah 

Dolan-Sweeney (“Deborah”), and Marianne Dolan Weber (“Maryanne,” and 

collectively, the “Dolan Daughters” and, with their father and brother, the “Dolan 

 

2 Compl. ¶ 11. Cablevision is a Delaware corporation.

3 Compl. ¶ 71 (quoting Aff. of Susan M. Hannigan, Esq. in Supp. of Compensation 

Committee Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Hannigan Aff.”) Ex. 2 (“2013 Proxy”), at 25). 

First names are used for convenience and to limit confusion. No disrespect is 

intended.

4 Compl. ¶ 71.

5 Compl. ¶ 69.
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Defendants”), serve on Cablevision’s board as non-employee directors. In 

Cablevision’s 2013 annual proxy statement, the Dolan Daughters were said to be 

qualified as directors based on work at Dolan-family charitable foundations and a 

community center, as well as “‘experience as . . . member[s] of Cablevision’s 

founding family.’”

6

Defendants Thomas V. Reifenheiser (“Reifenheiser”), John R. Ryan 

(“Ryan”), and Vincent Tese (“Tese,” and collectively, the “Compensation 

Committee Defendants”) comprise Cablevision’s compensation committee. 

Committee chair Tese, seventy years old at the time of the complaint, has been a 

Cablevision director since 1996 and has been on the compensation committee since 

2004.

7

 He also serves as a director for MSG (where his brother works), but is 

retired and does not maintain full-time employment. Reifenheiser, seventy-seven 

 

6 Compl. ¶ 42 (quoting, as an example, 2013 Proxy 7).

7

The Compensation Committee Defendants rely on the 2013 Proxy to provide a 

fuller picture of their current service and qualifications. See Compensation 

Committee Defs.’ Opening Br. in Supp. of Their Mot. to Dismiss Compl. (“CCD 

OB”) 7-9 (citing 2013 Proxy 4-5, 12). Plaintiff complains that “Defendants . . . 

repeatedly rely on facts outside the pleadings.” Pl.’s Corrected Answering Br. in 

Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss Compl. (“PAB”) 24. Any additional information

in the public filings noted by the Court is included for completeness and does not 

change the Court’s conclusions.
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years old at the time of filing, has been a member of the board since 2002 and the 

compensation committee since 2007. He, too, is retired and does not maintain fulltime employment. Finally, Ryan has been a director since 2002 and a 

compensation committee member since 2009. The compensation committee has 

been the subject of criticism over the years, from advisory firms and shareholders 

alike. A majority of Class A votes cast in 2010 and 2012 elections withheld 

support for the Compensation Committee Defendants.

8

 In 2013, a majority of 

Class A votes opposed Tese’s election, 38.9% opposed Ryan’s, and 49.4% 

opposed Reifenheiser’s.

Members of the Dolan family hold 100% of Cablevision’s Class B stock and 

approximately 73% of Cablevision’s voting power. Class B holders have ten votes 

per share on matters put to common vote and can elect 75% of Cablevision’s 

 

8

The Dolans hold around four percent of the Class A stock. For context, the Court 

notes Defendants’ argument that the 2010 vote preceded the contested 

compensation awards and that the complaint fails to mention that all of the 

Compensation Committee Defendants received a majority of “for” votes in 2011. 

Compensation Committee Defs.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Their Mot. to Dismiss 

Compl. 24 n.11 (citing Hannigan Aff. Ex. 5, at 2).

 Defendants also offer public filings to show that a majority of the Class A stock 

not held by the Dolan family approved Cablevision’s executive compensation in 

2011 and 2014 advisory votes. CCD OB 16-17 (citing Hannigan Aff. Exs. 4-7).
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directors as a class (as opposed to one vote per share and 25% of directors for 

Class A holders).9They are also party to an agreement “that had the effect of 

causing the voting power of the Class B stockholders to be cast as a bloc[]” on 

matters subject to their class vote.10 “Cablevision has identified itself as a

‘controlled company’ under [New York Stock Exchange] rules” since adopting this

agreement.

11

 As such, Cablevision does not have (or need) a nominating 

committee, and the incumbent directors serve that function under Cablevision’s 

Corporate Governance Guidelines. Despite receiving substantial withhold votes 

(including a majority of votes cast in 2010 and 2012), the Compensation 

Committee Defendants have continued to nominate themselves, and the full board 

has continued to approve those nominations.

The pending litigation asserts claims related to compensation awarded to the 

Dolan Defendants. From fiscal years 2010 through 2012, Cablevision paid James 

 

9

Ten members of the sixteen-member board (as of the time of the complaint), 

including the Dolan Defendants, are part of the Dolan family. The Compensation 

Committee Defendants are Class A directors. 

10 Compl. ¶ 23.

11 Compl. ¶ 26.
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and Charles compensation worth $41.18 million and $40.27 million, respectively.

12

 

The executive compensation packages for James and Charles included “a base 

salary, perquisites, annual cash bonuses, and long-term incentive awards.”13 The 

perquisites, including a company car and driver and a security program, were 

valued at $476,000 and $792,000. Also included was a March 2012 “‘special’

one-time grant of stock options,” awarding James and Charles options valued at 

$6.85 and $7.09 million.

14 These awards were purportedly needed to “incentivize 

and retain” officers and employees because a failure to meet certain targets was 

expected to affect performance awards.15 Furthermore, on February 27, 2013, 

James signed a letter agreement that renewed certain terms of his employment and 

increased his compensation. The employment agreement retained a modified 

single-trigger provision. In other words, Cablevision “will pay James severance if 

 

12 These figures do not include compensation for service at other companies 

controlled by the Dolan family but do include the value of the 2012 stock option 

awards. See 2013 Proxy 39; CCD OB 11 n.4. The numbers in the 2013 Proxy are 

slightly, but not materially, different from those in the complaint.

13 Compl. ¶ 53.

14 Compl. ¶ 73.

15 Compl. ¶ 74 (internal quotation marks omitted). Public filings offer greater 

detail on the reasons for the options. See CCD OB 13-15 (citing, for example, 

2013 Proxy 31, 39).
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he chooses to terminate his employment for any reason within a certain period of 

time after a change in control.”16

The Compensation Committee Defendants set James’s compensation in a 

process that “allowed James to ‘assist the Compensation Committee and its 

compensation consultant in determining the Company’s core peer group and the 

peer group comparisons.’”

17

 The Compensation Committee Defendants

considered James’s suggestions and purportedly “selected fourteen publicly traded 

companies in the same general industry or industries as the Company as well as 

companies of similar size and business mix.”18 An additional selection of peer 

companies by Institutional Shareholder Service, Inc. (“ISS”) yields a pool of 

twenty-six companies for comparison.19 Of these “peer group” companies, 

 

16 Compl. ¶ 82 (emphasis omitted). Plaintiff also expresses concern that any 

change in control will depend on the Dolan family’s votes.

17 Compl. ¶ 95 (quoting, for example, 2013 Proxy 22). Class A shareholders had 

no real say in limiting James’s and Charles’s compensation. For one, 

“[s]tockholder-approved equity compensation plan[s]” have been approved 

through Dolan family votes. Compl. ¶ 97. Proxy statements provide more detail 

on the compensation committee’s process. See CCD OB 11-13 (citing, for 

example, 2013 Proxy 21-22).

18 Compl. ¶ 56 (internal quotation marks omitted).

19 The complaint does not state that the compensation committee relied upon the 

ISS sample group. Plaintiff provides the extra data for this litigation. See CCD 
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eighteen had market capitalizations of over $10 billion (as of January 2014), and 

the group’s average total revenue (over fiscal years 2010 through 2012) was 

$30.87 billion. By comparison, Cablevision had a market capitalization of $4.39 

billion and $19.58 billion in revenue. Its stockholder returns were also 

comparatively low. Of the seventeen peer companies with less than $30 billion in 

market capitalization, only two paid their CEOs more than Cablevision did.

To set Charles’s compensation, the Compensation Committee Defendants

decided “that as a result of [Charles’s] important role . . . , an appropriate general 

guideline for [Charles’s] target total direct compensation . . . was slightly below 

the target total direct compensation of the Chief Executive Officer of the 

Company.”20 Even Charles earned more than fourteen (of seventeen) CEOs at the

peer companies with a market capitalization below $30 billion.

In contrast, the entire board set the compensation for Cablevision’s nonemployee directors (including the Dolan Daughters). Total compensation for fiscal 

years 2011 and 2012 consisted of a base fee, restricted stock, sums for attendance 

 

OB 29-30. For additional comparisons of the peer companies, see paragraphs 60 

through 67 of the complaint.

20 Compl. ¶ 96 (quoting, for example, 2013 Proxy 25).
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(whether in-person or by telephone) at meetings, and perquisites. The Company’s 

Corporate Governance Guidelines encourage directors to “make every effort to 

attend meetings” and include commitment to board matters as a nomination

criterion.21 However, Kathleen received compensation valued at $340,544 over 

those two years, corresponding to participation in three (of six) meetings, by 

telephone, in fiscal year 2012.22 Deborah received $367,863 and Marianne 

received $374,455 over the same time—each attended three meetings in person 

and one meeting telephonically in fiscal year 2012. Kathleen and Deborah did not 

attend the 2012 Annual Meeting of Stockholders.

Plaintiff filed this action to remedy the alleged harms primarily through 

damages and disgorgement;

23 Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Court of 

Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff opposes the motions to dismiss and alternatively 

asks for leave to amend her complaint.

 

21 Compl. ¶ 38 (internal quotation marks omitted).

22 Plaintiff sets forth corrected observations about fiscal year 2011 attendance in 

her answering brief. PAB 7 n.3.

23 Friedman intervened in this action after the original complainant lost standing to 

assert the claims.
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* * * * *

In her derivative complaint,24 Plaintiff first asserts breach of fiduciary duty 

claims against James and Charles as officers and controllers. They are alleged to 

have breached the duties of loyalty and good faith by causing Cablevision to award 

and for personally accepting—through substantively and procedurally lacking 

transactions—compensation, stock options, and perquisites. James is further 

faulted for negotiating his amended employment agreement. In her second count, 

Plaintiff alleges that the Dolan Daughters breached duties of loyalty and good faith

as directors and controllers. They purportedly are responsible for causing 

Cablevision to award and personally accepting high compensation “despite . . . 

virtually non-existent participation as . . . Board member[s].”

25

 Count III advances

breach of fiduciary duty claims against the Compensation Committee Defendants 

for, in bad faith, (a) awarding James and Charles compensation in a manner not 

entirely fair to the corporation, (b) granting stock options to James and Charles, 

and (c) accepting the February 2013 letter agreement. Finally, Count IV asserts

 

24 Defendants have not challenged Plaintiff’s demand futility contentions.

25 Compl. ¶¶ 118-20.
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waste by the Compensation Committee Defendants in awarding, and by James and 

Charles in causing and accepting, the March 2012 stock options.

Moving to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Court of Chancery 

Rule 12(b)(6), Defendants26 emphasize that the compensation committee was 

independent and acted in good faith, thus receiving the protection of the business 

judgment rule. More precisely, they argue that Plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint 

has not rebutted the presumption of the business judgment rule and that the awards, 

including the stock options, were reasonable. As such, James and Charles cannot 

have breached fiduciary duties by accepting compensation awarded through a

process that was within the compensation committee’s business judgment. They 

add that the Dolan Daughters could not violate fiduciary duties by receiving 

standard non-employee director compensation, missing a number of meetings, or 

accepting positions for which they are allegedly unqualified absent a general 

failure to perform their duties or sufficient pleadings about what they personally 

did wrong. With respect to the waste claims, Defendants emphasize the stringent 

 

26 The Dolan Defendants submitted their own briefs but incorporated relevant 

arguments made by the Compensation Committee Defendants. The Court 

generally will not distinguish between the arguments made by the two sets of 

defendants.
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standards by which such claims are evaluated and the “built-in incentive for the 

recipients of options”

27 as consideration.

Plaintiff, in opposition, rejects application of the business judgment rule. 

Her rationale for entire fairness review is based on the premise that “[t]ransactions 

between controllers and a controlled company are reviewed under entire fairness, 

regardless of whether the challenged transaction is approved by a committee or 

whether the challenged transaction is a merger or non-merger.”28 Given the entire 

fairness standard, Plaintiff claims to have met the minimal burden of suggesting 

unfairness. She also asserts that the business judgment rule does not apply because 

of the composition of the compensation committee and the full board. Plaintiff 

places the burden of establishing independence and effectiveness on Defendants

and asks the Court to look at all of the allegations together. Finally, her waste 

claims relate to granting (and causing and accepting) special option awards when 

James and Charles had failed to meet goals and would not need any incentive to 

remain with Cablevision.

 

27 Opening Br. in Supp. of Dolan Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Compl. Pursuant to Ct. of 

Chancery Rule 12(b)(6).

28 PAB 27.
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In reply, Defendants reiterate that the business judgment rule applies,

distinguishing between mergers and compensation contexts, as well as between 

controlling and merely participating in decision-making. They caution that 

applying entire fairness here would eliminate incentives to employ special 

committees and interfere with corporate affairs. Pressing ahead with the business 

judgment rule, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not met her burden to plead a 

lack of independence, or bad faith, of the Compensation Committee Defendants. It 

would follow that James and Charles, accepting their compensation, did not breach 

fiduciary duties. Nor, they add, does the law support a breach of fiduciary duty in

accepting positions and compensation as narrowly pled by Plaintiff.

29

 Finally, 

given the compensation committee’s reasonable decision to encourage and retain 

employees (and no guarantee that James and Charles would continue to work as

executives), Defendants submit that there has not been waste.

 

29 As the Dolan Defendants note, the complaint does not challenge the level of the 

non-employee director compensation generally. Plaintiff also does not assert that 

the Dolan Daughters violated any duties as board members approving the general 

package.
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* * * * *

A. The Motion to Dismiss Standard

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), the 

Court takes the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true, draws reasonable 

inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and denies the motion “unless the 

plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any reasonably conceivable set of 

circumstances susceptible of proof.”

30

 The standard is plaintiff-friendly, but the 

Court need not accept “conclusory allegations without specific supporting factual 

allegations” or “every strained interpretation of the allegations proposed.”31

B. The Fiduciary Duty Claims

1. The Compensation Committee Defendants

The Court begins its analysis with the fiduciary duty claims against the 

Compensation Committee Defendants because they have broader implications for 

the fiduciary duty claims against James and Charles.

32

 A board’s decision to award 

 

30 Gen. Motors, 897 A.2d at 168 (internal quotation marks omitted).

31 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

32 Perhaps allegations about excessive compensation fit better under the waste 

framework, or waste simply “is a subset of good faith under the umbrella of the 

duty of loyalty.” See Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Abbvie Inc., 2015 WL 1753033, at 
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executive compensation to others is initially protected by the presumptions of the 

business judgment rule.33 To survive a motion to dismiss,

[a] plaintiff[] must show either that the board or committee that 

approved the compensation lacked independence (in which case the 

burden shifts to the defendant director to show that the compensation 

was objectively reasonable), or to plead facts sufficient to show that 

the board or committee lacked good faith in making the award. 

Assuming that this standard is met, plaintiffs need only allege some 

specific facts suggesting unfairness in the transaction in order to shift 

the burden of proof to defendants to show that the transaction was 

entirely fair.34

 

*14 n.114 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 2015) (noting the overlap with some degree of 

caution); see also White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 553-54 & n.36 (Del. 2001) 

(observing the “similar” standards and adopting a waste analysis where the claims 

were “unclear”). Nonetheless, the Court keeps with the order of Plaintiff’s 

complaint and addresses her fiduciary duty claims, followed by her waste claims 

relating to the option awards.

33 Plaintiff does not suggest that the Compensation Committee Defendants are 

interested in the compensation paid to James or Charles. This discussion about 

compensation broadly includes options, perquisites, and James’s employment 

agreement.

34 In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 589 (Del. Ch. 

2007) (footnote omitted). In Tyson, “the Tyson family ha[d] at all times kept the 

company under its power and direction.” Id. at 571. The Court elaborated the 

above standard in the process of denying the motion to dismiss certain fiduciary 

duty claims against directors, and it also applied the business judgment rule to 

dismiss a claim about a consulting contract with a member of the controlling 

family. Id. at 587-90.
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Delaware courts are hesitant to scrutinize executive compensation decisions, 

recognizing that “[i]t is the essence of business judgment for a board to determine 

if a particular individual warrant[s] large amounts of money.”

35

 Entire fairness is 

not the default standard for compensation awarded by an independent board or 

committee, even when a controller is at the helm of the company.

36

 The 

significance of an independent committee is well-recognized by our case law.37

Plaintiff suggests that entire fairness review must apply because a controller 

(namely the Dolan family) was on both sides of the transactions. She relies on 

cases applying entire fairness review to transactions involving a controlling 

shareholder, particularly non-merger cases.

38

 Nonetheless, Defendants 

convincingly distinguish an independent committee’s compensation decisions from 

 

35 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (second alteration in original) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

36 See supra note 34. Defendants do not rely on the effects of a shareholder vote.

37 See, e.g., Ravenswood Inv. Co., L.P. v. Winmill, 2011 WL 2176478, at *4 (Del. 

Ch. May 31, 2011) (“[T]he board bears the burden of proving that the salary and 

bonuses they pay themselves as officers are entirely fair to the company unless the 

board employs an independent compensation committee or submits the 

compensation plan to shareholders for approval.”).

38 See, e.g., Monroe Cnty. Empls.’ Ret. Sys. v. Carlson, 2010 WL 2376890, at *1 

(Del. Ch. June 7, 2010); T. Rowe Price Recovery Fund, L.P. v. Rubin, 770 A.2d 

536, 552 (Del. Ch. 2000).
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other matters warranting default entire fairness review. For example, major 

concerns in applying entire fairness review are informational advantages and

coercion.

39

 The complaint does not support its allegations of leveraging control

over the compensation committee with a factual basis to make that inference, and it 

is hard to imagine a material informational advantage James and Charles held 

about the value of their services. Additionally, the Court hesitates to endorse the 

principle that every controlled company, regardless of use of an independent 

committee, must demonstrate the entire fairness of its executive compensation in 

court whenever questioned by a shareholder. It is especially undesirable to make 

such a pronouncement here, where annual compensation is not a “transformative” 

or major decision.40 In light of Tyson and the nature of executive compensation 

decisions, the Court will apply the business judgment rule initially.

 

39 See In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 441-43 (Del. Ch. 2002).

40 At oral argument, Plaintiff contended that recurring decisions (such as annual 

compensation) should receive more scrutiny than discrete transactions (such as a 

merger). Oral Arg. Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss Tr. (“Oral Arg. Tr.”) 58. Plaintiff also 

cites legal scholarship to caution that controllers can abuse power through 

compensation and employment decisions. PAB 33 n.6. Although there might be 

concerns about the extent to which negotiations are truly at arm’s-length, our 

law—Tyson is a persuasive example—respects the judgment of independent 

directors. Moreover, reflexively reviewing decisions of independent directors who 
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Directors are presumed to be independent, and it is ultimately Plaintiff’s 

burden to “demonstrate that the director is beholden to the controlling party or so 

under [the controller’s] influence that [the director’s] discretion would be 

sterilized.”41 To overcome the presumption, it is not enough to observe that a 

director has some relation to a party benefiting from the decision. At this stage, a 

plaintiff must make provable allegations that, at a minimum, permit a reasonable 

inference that a relationship or tie is material to the particular defendant whose 

independence she is challenging.42 This is not a novel concept. The fact of 

 

serve in the often difficult environment of controlled corporations would offer little 

benefit to those corporations or their shareholders.

41 In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 509 (Del. Ch. 2013) (alterations in 

original) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d sub nom. Kahn v. M & F 

Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).

42 See id. at 509-10 (explaining, although on a motion for summary judgment, that 

“a plaintiff seeking to show that a director was not independent must meet a 

materiality standard”). 

 It is suggested that Defendants cannot rely on authority grappling with Rule 23.1 

demand futility here, where there is no dispute that demand is excused. PAB 23.

While the Court is conscious of this distinction, the question is still whether the 

Compensation Committee Defendants were independent. The difference is in the 

particularity with which the claims must be pleaded. See, e.g., Tyson, 919 A.2d 

at 582.
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compensation, even from both a parent and a subsidiary company, is not enough.43 

Neither long-term board service44nor the mere fact that one was appointed by a 

controller suffices.

45

 Similarly, being retired or having attained a certain age does 

not cast a reasonable doubt on independence.

46

 Close familial ties, such as those 

 

43 In re The Limited, Inc., 2002 WL 537692, at *5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002); In re 

Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig. (“Disney I”), 731 A.2d 342, 357, 360 (Del. Ch. 

1998), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 

(Del. 2000).

44 In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2013 WL 396202, at *6 n.63 

(Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2013) (explaining that allegations of “nearly twenty years of 

Board service alongside [one director] and a long-term relationship with [another 

director] . . . . do[] not raise a reasonable doubt as to the independence of a director 

under Delaware law” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

 Assessment of a director’s independence is, of course, contextual. Extended 

years of service on the board of a controlled corporation warrant careful attention. 

There is something of a concern that by 2010, Tese had served on the board with 

James and Charles for nearly fifteen years. Regardless, Tese was only one of three 

approving directors. Plaintiff has the burden to make pleadings that raise a 

reasonably conceivable challenge to the independence of a majority of the 

Compensation Committee Defendants. She has not met that burden, but 

Defendants may be testing the limits of our law.

45 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984) (“[I]t is not enough to charge 

that a director was nominated by or elected at the behest of those controlling the 

outcome of a corporate election. That is the usual way a person becomes a 

corporate director.”), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 

244 (Del. 2000).

46 See, e.g., Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 512 (Del. Ch. 1984) (noting no 

challenge to the independence of a special litigation committee member who was a 

retired lawyer and certified public accountant), aff’d, 499 A.2d 1184 (Del. 1985); 
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between parent and child, can prevent a director from acting independently.

47

 

Again, the test for independence generally asks whether, based on the alleged 

conflict, “the director is unable to base his or her decisions on the corporate merits 

of the issue before the board.”

48

In the absence of a challenge to independence, Plaintiff can state a claim by 

raising a reasonable inference that the directors acted in bad faith. To succeed, she 

must essentially rebut the business judgment rule with fact-based allegations that 

“no person could possibly authorize such a transaction if he or she were attempting 

 

cf. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 817-18 (disagreeing with the court below that the plaintiff 

had adequately pleaded demand futility based on waste arising from a consulting 

agreement with a seventy-five-year-old stockholder and director, distinguishing a 

case that found waste for a consulting arrangement where, among other factors, 

“the former president/director was a 70 year old stroke victim . . . and the contract 

was silent as to continued employment in the event that the retired

president/director again became incapacitated and unable to perform his duties”). 

This Court also has rejected the allegation that an individual who otherwise earns a 

low salary in comparison to her compensation as a director loses independence by 

that fact alone. Disney I, 731 A.2d at 359-60.

47 In re China Agritech, Inc. S’holder Deriv. Litig., 2013 WL 2181514, at *20 (Del. 

Ch. May 21, 2013). But see In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S’holder Litig., 906 

A.2d 808, 823 (Del. Ch. 2005) (drawing upon the New York Stock Exchange 

Corporate Governance rules and finding no disabling conflict as the director’s son 

was not alleged to be an executive officer or to live in the same household), aff’d, 

906 A.2d 766 (Del. 2006).

48 China Agritech, 2013 WL 2181514, at *20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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in good faith to meet their duty.”49 Allegations that another course of conduct was 

reasonable or better do not state a claim.50 Bad faith requires some level of 

culpability. 

The fact-based allegations challenging the Compensation Committee 

Defendants’ independence are long-term board service, service at other Dolancontrolled entities, age, retirement status, a sibling’s employment, continued selfnomination with board approval, and the fact of the challenged awards. 

Unfortunately for Plaintiff, long-term service or relationships, compensation itself, 

and appointment by a controller do not necessarily rebut the business judgment 

rule.

51

 Plaintiff must provide a basis to find that these alleged conflicts are 

material such that they would prevail over the directors’ business judgment. That 

the Compensation Committee Defendants did not acquiesce to majority withhold 

votes does not indicate a conflict, and shareholders fairly knew that Cablevision is 

 

49 Tyson, 919 A.2d at 592 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Leung v. 

Schuler, 2000 WL 1478538, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2000), aff’d, 783 A.2d 124 

(Del. 2001) (TABLE).

50 See, e.g., Seinfeld v. Slager, 2012 WL 2501105, at *14 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012) 

(“[T]he Plaintiff mainly disagrees with a business decision by the Board; this 

disagreement does not state a cognizable claim.”).

51 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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a controlled company with certain election processes.

52

 It is not reasonable to infer 

that age and retirement defeated independence—Plaintiff has not made fact-based 

allegations suggesting that the Compensation Committee Defendants had 

infirmities or were dependent on their compensation.

53

 Additionally, there are no 

allegations of how Tese’s decisions were tied to his brother’s general employment 

that would lead the Court to deem his discretion sterilized. Concluding that the 

Compensation Committee Defendants lacked independence just because they 

approved the contested awards would be “circular.”54 This is not a context where 

Defendants must prove the efficacy of a special committee, and the totality of the 

well-pleaded complaint does not make a reasonably conceivable case that the 

directors wanted to remain on the board so much that they sacrificed their 

 

52 The Dolan Defendants add that plurality votes are generally sufficient to elect 

directors under Delaware law and that Plaintiff has not made allegations of 

wrongdoing in the election process. See Reply Br. in Supp. of Dolan Defs.’ Mot. 

to Dismiss Compl. Pursuant to Ct. of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) (“DD RB”) 6 (citing 

8 Del. C. § 216(3)). 

53 It is conclusory to argue that the Compensation Committee Defendants were 

dependent on their director compensation because they had retired from full-time 

employment (or worked in the non-profit sector). The Court need not even reach 

the statements the Compensation Committee Defendants offer about their 

employment histories. There is insufficient basis for concern about the directors’ 

livelihoods.

54 See Tyson, 919 A.2d at 588.
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professional integrity. Plaintiff’s allegations that the compensation committee 

could not “say no”55 are conclusory.

Thus, the remaining challenge would be bad faith. There was no violation of 

positive law, and there are no allegations of utter failure to fulfill responsibilities. 

The Compensation Committee Defendants had no obligation to step down when a 

majority of Class A shareholders did not vote in their favor (or to seek approval for 

every compensation and governance decision). Given the above discussion of 

independence, there is no substance to the contention that the Compensation 

Committee Defendants were acting out of an improper motive to benefit James and 

Charles. No other theory of improper motive has been developed. The ISS sample 

and Cablevision’s sample of peer companies are not exactly the same, but 

significant overlap prevents a finding that the compensation committee’s reliance 

on its sample was inexplicable.56 A board is not forbidden from seeking 

 

55 Oral Arg. Tr. 52-54.

56 The market capitalization range of Cablevision’s sample is from $274.59 billion 

to $4.72 billion (using data from 2014); the range of ISS’s sample is from $103 

billion to $2.96 billion. See Compl. ¶ 60. If one takes out the highest and lowest 

numbers for each sample, the overlap is clearer: the new ranges would be from

$85.45 billion to $4.84 billion for the Cablevision sample and from $85.45 billion 

to $4.1 billion for the ISS sample.
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management’s input in compensation decisions,

57 and the Compensation 

Committee Defendants retained a compensation consultant.

58

 The Court has no 

reason to believe, from the complaint, that the compensation decisions were

uninformed, hastily made, or manipulated by James and Charles. 

Regarding the amount of compensation, the Court is poorly equipped to

determine how much the services of an executive are worth. Though undeniably 

high, James’s compensation was within the range of compensation paid to CEOs 

by arguably comparable companies.59 Charles is not a CEO, but he founded 

Cablevision, and the complaint reflects a successful career. The Court also is not 

 

57 See In re Goldman Sachs Gp., Inc. S’holder Litig., 2011 WL 4826104, at *3, *15 

(Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (dismissing claims for failure to allege demand futility 

and noting that the “pleadings indicate[d] that the board adequately informed itself 

before making a decision on compensation”); Tyson, 919 A.2d at 591-92 (“That 

the Committee was required to consult with other corporate officers is irrelevant: 

the committee admittedly retained independent authority and discretion to approve 

or modify whatever it received as a recommendation.”). 

58 Plaintiff submits that the Court cannot accept Defendants’ statements that the 

compensation consultant (in each of the relevant years) was an outside, 

independent advisor. PAB 41-45. She adds assertions that Defendants relied on 

consultants who worked for other Dolan entities. The motion to dismiss standard 

may be plaintiff-friendly, but it is Plaintiff’s burden to set forth allegations to 

warrant scrutiny of the Compensation Committee Defendants’ decision to rely on 

an advisor.

59 See Compl. ¶ 64 (showing higher compensation at one company chosen by 

Cablevision and one company chosen by ISS).
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aware of authority that suspects bad faith in not discounting compensation when 

executives have other obligations. Reasonable minds could differ, but that is not a 

reason to find bad faith. That James was given various severance benefits and kept

a modified single-trigger provision, too, is not inexplicable. Severance agreements 

can be used to ensure cooperation from executives or to secure other benefits.

60

 

Thus, Plaintiff has failed to rebut the business judgment rule. The fiduciary duty 

claims against the Compensation Committee Defendants are dismissed. Plaintiff 

cannot recover against the Compensation Committee Defendants unless her 

remaining waste contentions survive the motion to dismiss.

61

 

60 See Zucker v. Andreessen, 2012 WL 2366448, at *8-9 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2012) 

(discussing consideration for a severance agreement).

61 See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig. (“Disney II”), 906 A.2d 27, 73-74 (Del. 

2006). Furthermore, Cablevision’s charter contains a Section 102(b)(7) provision. 

Hannigan Aff. Ex. 9, at 28. “[P]laintiffs must plead a non-exculpated claim for 

breach of fiduciary duty against an independent director protected by an 

exculpatory charter provision, or that director will be entitled to be dismissed from 

the suit.” In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc, S’holder Litig., -- A.3d --, 2015 WL 

2394045, at *5 (Del. May 14, 2015). Plaintiff argues that “Cornerstone did 

nothing to alter” its (and Defendants’) cases about the applicability of entire 

fairness. Letter from Joel Friedlander, Esq. 1-2, May 20, 2015. In fact, the Court’s 

thinking has not changed since Cornerstone was issued. The Court still is not 

convinced that compensation approved by an independent committee receives 

entire fairness review by default (or that the business judgment rule has been 

rebutted with respect to the Compensation Committee Defendants). It is notable 
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2. James and Charles

Plaintiff next argues that James and Charles violated their fiduciary duties of 

loyalty and good faith by causing and accepting various compensation awards that 

were unfair to Cablevision.62 Defendants emphasize that accepting an award from

an independent committee acting within its business judgment does not breach 

fiduciary duties. To survive the motion(s) to dismiss, Plaintiff must make 

sufficient allegations that a fiduciary “preferr[ed] the adverse self-interest of the 

fiduciary or of a related person to the interest of the corporation” or engaged in 

conduct “qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence.”63 Prominent 

examples of the latter include “intentionally act[ing] with a purpose other than that 

of advancing the best interests of the corporation”64 and, in the case of a failure to 

act, “knowingly and completely fail[ing] to undertake . . . responsibilities.”65 

Some plaintiffs have succeeded at the motion to dismiss stage by “demonstrat[ing] 

 

that the basic non-employee compensation package was not challenged in the 

complaint. Again, the Court does not decide whether waste necessarily implicates 

the duty of loyalty.

62 This discussion also uses the term “compensation” broadly.

63 Disney II, 906 A.2d at 66.

64 Id. at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted).

65 Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243-44 (Del. 2009).
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that the fiduciary’s actions were so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment 

that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.”66

In the executive compensation context, the Court typically defers to the 

business judgment of independent directors making compensation decisions. The 

Court has declined to scrutinize mere acceptance of compensation determined by 

an independent board or committee.67 An officer or a director can breach fiduciary 

 

66 In re Novell, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2013 WL 322560, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 

2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

67 See, e.g., Wayne Cnty. Empls.’ Ret. Sys. v. Corti, 2009 WL 2219260, at *12 

(Del. Ch. July 24, 2009) (dismissing duty of loyalty claims against insider directors 

for securing employment benefits in a merger they largely negotiated because the 

“plaintiff ha[d] not alleged facts that rebut[ted] the presumption that the members 

of [the company’s] compensation committee and the [nominating and corporate 

governance committee] exercised their independent and disinterested business 

judgment in approving the employment agreements”), aff’d, 996 A.2d 795 (Del. 

2010) (TABLE); In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 758 (Del. Ch. 

2005) (“Ovitz did possess fiduciary duties as a director and officer while these 

decisions were made, but by not improperly interjecting himself into the 

corporation’s decisionmaking process nor manipulating that process, he did not 

breach the fiduciary duties he possessed in that unique circumstance.”), aff’d, 906 

A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
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duties, however, by accepting compensation that is clearly improper68 or by 

wrongfully influencing compensation decisions.69

The acts supporting Plaintiff’s theory appear to be causing outcomes by the 

reality of control, James’s involvement in selecting a group of peer companies, 

James’s negotiating his employment renewal contract, and James and Charles’s 

acceptance of the compensation committee’s awards. Again, the existence of a 

controller does not defeat the presumption that directors act in an independent, 

disinterested manner, and the fiduciary duty claims against the Compensation 

Committee Defendants have failed for the reasons above. James or Charles did not 

award themselves compensation, and there is no basis in the complaint to infer that

either of the two engaged in behavior that coerced or influenced the Compensation 

Committee Defendants to act inconsistently with their responsibilities as directors. 

Negotiating with and providing opinions to an independent committee are not 

inherently wrongful acts, and they do not support a reasonable inference of 

 

68 See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. Leedle, 2013 WL 5988416, at *10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 2013) 

(“As to the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the Complaint supports a reasonable 

inference that Leedle knew or should have known that his receipt of more than 

150,000 Stock Options in a year violated the [company’s stock incentive plan].”).

69 See supra note 67. 
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wrongdoing in the current context.

70

 Additionally, it is not wrongful to have other 

professional commitments. These facts may exist in a context where other facts 

color and inform a finding of wrongdoing. For example, providing opinions to an 

independent committee could be wrongful if the analysis were supported by other 

facts warranting an inference of improper influence. That is not the case here. 

Thus, Plaintiff has not stated a claim that James and Charles breached any 

fiduciary duties regarding their compensation awards.

3. The Dolan Daughters

Next, Plaintiff challenges the Dolan Daughters for causing and for accepting 

their compensation despite minimal participation and lack of qualifications.

71

 

Although Plaintiff’s briefing claims that Defendants must establish the entire 

fairness of the Dolan Daughters’ service and pay, the well-pleaded complaint 

essentially asks the Court to adjudicate fiduciary duty claims based on the Dolan 

 

70 Independent committees are formed to deal with conflicts. See Cornerstone, 

2015 WL 2394045, at *8 (“For more than a generation, our law has recognized that 

the negotiating efforts of independent directors can help to secure transactions with 

controlling stockholders that are favorable to the minority.”).

71

 The complaint may contain references to other aspects of the Dolan Daughters’ 

appointment, but the focus is on whether the Dolan Daughters should disgorge 

their compensation (or, presumably, be removed from the board). See Compl. 

¶¶ 118-21 & 45.
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Daughters’ degree of effort and competence of service. It bears repeating that the

complaint does not challenge the basic non-employee director compensation 

package.72 Neither does it assert claims against the overall board in connection 

with those awards and any appointments. There is no allegation that the Dolan 

Daughters received compensation for any meetings that they did not attend. 

Finally, the complaint does not say that the Dolan Daughters wholly failed to fulfill 

their responsibilities.

Plaintiff offers no authority regarding whether a failure to attend a certain 

number of meetings is culpable and how the Court is to evaluate a director’s 

qualifications. However, the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”) 

allows directors to participate in meetings via telephone.73 The DGCL does not 

 

72 See DD RB 11-12 (highlighting the narrowness of the claims). Defendants 

persuasively explain that “because [the Dolan Daughters] are paid the same as 

everyone else, the plaintiffs aren’t challenging the level of board comp. per se” but 

rather meeting attendance and qualifications to serve. Oral Arg. Tr. 30. As such, 

authority requiring directors to prove the fairness of their compensation does not 

apply. See, e.g., Calma ex rel. Citrix Sys., Inc. v. Templeton, -- A.3d --, 2015 WL 

2265535, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015); Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Bosnjak, 2014 

WL 2930869, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2014).

73 Section 141(i) expressly provides that, unless otherwise prohibited, a director 

may participate in meetings by phone and “participation . . . pursuant to this 

subsection shall constitute presence in person at the meeting.” 8 Del. C. § 141(i). 
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discuss minimum levels of attendance, committee service, or professional 

experience. Rather, it provides the board with broad discretion to manage 

corporate affairs (though limited by the law generally, the certificate of 

incorporation, and the bylaws).74 Section 225 allows the Court to remove a 

director after there has been a finding of a breach of the duty of loyalty,75 but the 

Court has demonstrated reluctance to remove directors absent clear authority to do 

so.

76

 This provides some guidance on the Court’s ability to weigh a director’s

fitness to serve. Also applicable to the claims against the Dolan Daughters are the 

general duty of loyalty and good faith standards elaborated supra.

The Dolan Daughters are non-employee directors and were paid according 

to the standard compensation package. As there is no count outlining a breach of 

fiduciary duties for the non-employee director compensation awarded generally, 

the Court views Plaintiff’s challenge as limited to the Dolan Daughters’ level of 

director participation and credentials. First, regarding participation, directors have 

various responsibilities, not all of which are performed at meetings. The Dolan 

 

74 See 8 Del. C. § 141.

75 8 Del. C. § 225(c).

76 See Shocking Techs., Inc. v. Michael, 2012 WL 1352431, at *1 & n.5 (Del. Ch. 

Apr. 10, 2012).
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Daughters did not attend at most half of the board’s meetings in a given year. 

Although Cablevision encourages director participation (and the Court will not 

deny its importance), missing at most half of the board’s meetings does not show 

self-dealing, an improper motive, or a complete failure to fulfill one’s 

responsibilities as a director. The Court does not have a bright line rule, but the 

complaint does not offer a reasonably conceivable set of facts to support disloyalty 

or bad faith through non-participation.

Secondly, judges are not equipped to evaluate whether an individual is 

qualified to serve on a given board. Plaintiff has not made pleadings that could 

establish incompetence, an improper motive, or a complete disregard of duty. 

There is no obligation to draw the conclusion that family ties and experience at 

non-profits are inadequate qualifications to serve as a director of a public company

and, thus, to decline an appointment.

77

 There is also no reasonably conceivable 

breach of the duty of loyalty by the Dolan Daughters stated in the complaint. Even 

if the Court were to consider a belated suggestion that the Dolan Daughters 

 

77 Cf. Disney I, 731 A.2d at 359-60 (taking no issue with the independence of a 

school principal serving on the board of the Walt Disney Company). The Court is 

reluctant to create a standard whereby any director related to a controller must 

prove her worth and qualifications in court.
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improperly influenced the level of non-employee compensation, the allegations are 

not rooted in fact and reason. It is not conceivable that only the Dolan Daughters 

culpably breached duties (as opposed to the entire board) in setting the nonemployee director compensation, accepting positions, attending at least half of all 

board meetings in a method recognized by the DGCL, and receiving compensation 

scaled to their participation. The choices of Cablevision’s board and the Dolan 

Daughters, as pled in the complaint, may have been less than ideal. Yet

Cablevision’s governance system is public knowledge, and questionable decisions

do not warrant creating a new policing function for the Court.

C. The Waste Claims

Plaintiff’s final count alleges waste for the Compensation Committee 

Defendants’ granting (and James and Charles’s causing and accepting) awards of 

stock options that obtained nothing of value for the Company.

78

 To state a claim 

for waste, a plaintiff must sufficiently plead that the directors “authorize[d] an 

exchange that is so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment 

 

78 Plaintiff draws on authority regarding waste committed by directors. See DD 

RB 8 (“Plaintiff has not identified a single case in which an executive who was 

awarded a special options grant by an independent compensation committee was 

found to be liable for waste by virtue of having accepted the options.”). 
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could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.”79 This is 

a difficult standard based on policy that encourages rational risk-taking by 

directors. Retaining the service of an important employee has been recognized as 

consideration,

80 particularly in the case of stock options.81

 “Courts are ill-fitted to 

attempt to weigh the adequacy of consideration under the waste standard or, expost, to judge appropriate degrees of business risk.”

82

 Furthermore, the DGCL 

mandates deference to directors’ decisions on the value of options “[i]n the 

absence of actual fraud in the transaction.”83

Although granted by the compensation committee at a time when other 

performance awards had failed to vest, the contested options had no value to the 

 

79 Leung, 2000 WL 1478538, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted). Conclusory 

allegations do not fulfill this burden. In California Public Employees’ Retirement 

System v. Coulter, 2002 WL 31888343, at *11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002), the Court 

observed “insufficient factual allegations to support” the claim that the company’s 

stated reason for repricing employees’ options must have been “false because there 

was no risk that [certain executives] might leave.” That conclusion was part of a 

demand futility analysis, but the reasoning is informative.

80 E.g., Official Comm. of Unsec. Creds. of Integrated Health Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, 

2004 WL 1949290, at *18 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004).

81 See Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 387-88 (Del. Ch. 1997) 

(“[C]onsideration for stock options is often the reasonable prospect of obtaining 

the employee’s valued future services.”).

82 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263 (internal quotation marks omitted).

83 8 Del. C. § 157(b).
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recipients unless Cablevision’s performance improved and the awardees remained 

employees. James and Charles were not the only recipients. Additionally, the 

speculation that James and Charles “were not going anywhere”84 because the 

Dolan family wanted to take the company private and have financial interests in 

the Company does not support an inference that James or Charles will always want 

to serve as executives.85 The Court declines to suggest that, as Defendants caution,

executives with a large stake in a company cannot be awarded incentive-based 

compensation because it is obvious that they will never leave. 

Ultimately, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled that the compensation 

committee’s option awards were irrational or otherwise impermissible. This is not 

a case where James and Charles have no work to do for Cablevision, the amounts 

are shockingly high in comparison to Cablevision’s value, or the pricing has been 

manipulated. The complaint does not support allegations of wrongful interference

by James and Charles or reason to know that the awards were improper. Because 

the Compensation Committee Defendants’ option awards did not constitute waste, 

 

84 Compl. ¶ 76.

85 Plaintiff may challenge the compensation committee’s stated purpose for the 

option awards, but she must support this challenge with non-conclusory 

allegations.
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James and Charles did not cause or accept any wasteful award. Plaintiff’s claims 

for waste against the Compensation Committee Defendants, James, and Charles

therefore fail.

* * * * *

For the reasons above, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted.

86

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

/s/ John W. Noble

JWN/cap

cc: Register in Chancery-K

 

86 The request for leave to amend the complaint is denied pursuant to Court of 

Chancery Rule 15(aaa). Plaintiff has not developed a theory of good cause that 

justifies amendment at this late stage.