SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0649-18T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SHANIKAH S. DANIELS,

a/k/a SHANIKA DANIELS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Submitted June 2, 2020 – Decided June 16, 2020

Before Judges Fisher and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 11-11-

0749.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for

appellant (Elizabeth H. Smith, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief).

Michael H. Robertson, Somerset County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Amanda Paige Frankel, 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Shanikah Daniels appeals an order denying her petition for 

post-conviction relief (PCR) following an evidentiary hearing. Because 

defendant failed to demonstrate her trial counsel's "deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense," Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984),1

we affirm. 

For her part in crimes against a seventeen-year-old girl, defendant was 

charged in a separate indictment from her two accomplices with first-degree 

robbery, second-degree kidnapping, third-degree aggravated assault, and several 

second- and fourth-degree weapons offenses. Prior to trial, the State extended 

an open plea offer to defendant, which meant the State did not make a sentencing 

recommendation but reserved the right to argue for a sentence in the seconddegree range. Defendant rejected that offer and a jury convicted her of nearly 

all charges, except robbery and one weapons offense; she was sentenced to an 

aggregate seven-year prison term, subject to the eighty-five percent parole 

disqualifier under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. 

1

In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court established a two-part test,

requiring a defendant seeking PCR on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds 

to demonstrate: (1) the particular manner in which counsel's performance was 

deficient; and (2) that the deficiency prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial. 

Ibid. Our Supreme Court adopted the Strickland test in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 

42, 58 (1987).
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One month later, the trial judge resentenced defendant solely to impose 

the registration requirements under Megan's Law. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(2) 

(requiring registration as a sex offender for certain non-sexual offenses, 

including kidnapping of a minor). We affirmed defendant's conviction and 

sentence in our prior unpublished opinion. State v. Daniels, No. A-5451-12 

(App. Div. Dec. 9, 2014).

After the Supreme Court denied certification, defendant filed a petition 

for PCR, contending her trial counsel was ineffective by failing to advise that 

her kidnapping charge triggered Megan's Law consequences. The State 

conceded defendant established counsel's deficiency and was thereby entitled 

to an evidentiary hearing. But the State further argued defendant could not 

establish prejudice under the second Strickland prong because defendant's 

ineffectiveness claim was "premised solely on the speculative success of a 

theoretical plea negotiation in a multi-defendant case." 

Defendant testified at the hearing and presented the testimony of her trial 

counsel. Defendant asserted that had she known she would have had to register 

under Megan's Law, she would have attempted "to work out a plea" that avoided 

that requirement. Trial counsel acknowledged he was unaware Megan's Law 

registration applied to defendant's kidnapping charge until after she was 
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sentenced, and said he would have attempted to negotiate a deal that avoided 

that consequence.2 

Notably, both witnesses conceded they did not know whether the State 

would have agreed to eliminate the requirement. On cross-examination, trial 

counsel recalled the State was "principally focused" on defendant's cohort, "the 

Irvington police officer." Trial counsel acknowledged that the State would not 

have "cut one loose and let the other [go] to trial alone," specifically stating: 

"It's my understanding there was no plea by one without the other."

Because defendant was unable to demonstrate the State would have 

offered her a plea agreement eliminating her exposure to Megan's Law 

registration requirements, the PCR judge, who was not the trial judge, denied 

defendant's petition. In a written decision that accompanied his order, the judge 

concluded defendant failed to establish prejudice under the second Strickland

prong. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant renews her argument in a single point for our 

consideration:

THE [PCR] COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR 

FAILING TO ADVISE [DEFENDANT] THAT A 

CONVICTION OF KIDNAPPING WOULD SUBJECT 

2

 Neither the trial judge nor the State was aware of the consequences until after 

defendant's initial sentence.
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HER TO THE REGISTRATION PROVISIONS OF 

MEGAN'S LAW.

We have carefully considered defendant's contentions in view of the applicable 

law, and conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in 

this written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), beyond the following comments. 

 Our review following an evidentiary hearing for PCR "is necessarily 

deferential to a PCR court's factual findings based on its review of live witness 

testimony." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013). Where an evidentiary 

hearing has been held, we should not disturb "the PCR court's findings that are 

supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Pierre, 223 

N.J. 560, 576 (2015) (citation omitted). We review any legal conclusions of the

court de novo. Nash, 212 N.J. at 540-41.

The testimony adduced at the hearing fell far short of establishing the 

second Strickland prong. The record is devoid of any evidence that the State 

would have offered a plea agreement eliminating Megan's Law consequences. 

Rather, the record reveals the State was unwilling to negotiate a plea agreement 

with defendant because her accomplice exercised his right to trial. The State's 

open plea offer therefore required defendant to plead guilty to all counts, only 

limiting her sentencing exposure on the first-degree robbery to the seconddegree range. Defendant simply presented no evidence to demonstrate the State 
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would have extended a plea offer, eliminating the mandatory registration 

requirement under the kidnapping charge. The record amply supports the PCR 

judge's findings.3 See Pierre, 223 N.J. at 576.

Affirmed.

3 We part company with the judge's reasoning in one respect. We discern no 

distinction between a trial attorney's obligation to advise a client about Megan's 

Law consequences in the context of "completing the plea form and/or during 

the plea colloquy" and when informing the client's "decision to go to trial." See

State v. L.G.-M., N.J. Super. , (App. Div. 2020) (slip op. at 11) 

("impos[ing] an obligation upon defense attorneys to advise their clients of the

potential immigration consequences of any criminal disposition whether that

disposition will result from a guilty plea, trial, or diversionary program"), certif. 

denied, N.J. (2020).