### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE N ove m be r 3, 200 3 S es sio n
PHI LLI P LUCAS, ET AL 

### . v. STAT E OF TENNE SSEE , MIC HAE L E. COL LINS , ET A L 

### . v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Appea l from the Te nnessee Claims C ommissi on No . 1 ,6 04 ,2 01 AN D 2 0, 10 0, 37 6 e n b anc , Co mmi ssi on e rs , Randy C. Camp, Vance W. C heek, Jr., and W.R. Bake r

No. M2002-02810-COA- R9-CV - Filed F ebrua ry 4, 2004

These c onsolidated ca ses pre s en t t wo separ ate f actua l situations i nvolving a lleg ed liability of the state under

the Tenne ssee Claims Commissi on Act, Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 9-8-301, e t seq., for dang erous c onditions ex isting on two separate highw ay s. I n both case s the State asser ted in d e fe ns e dis c re tio na

ry fu nc tio n immun ity . B e c a

us e thi s d e fe ns e is c e ntr a l to bo th c a se s, the Cla ims Commi ssion consolidated the ca ses for consideration of the applica bility of discre tionary

function immunit y

. I n an en banc order, the Commi ssion, construing T ennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 9-8- 3 0 7 ( d ) an d

c a s e s b a s e d

u p o nth a t s e c ti o n , o v e r

r u le d th e St ate ’ s mo ti o n s f

o r s u mm ar y ju d g me n t. We hold that under the pla i n an d u n am b iguous pr ovisions of Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 9-8- 307(d) the State is not entitled to asser t discretionar

y fu nction immunit y

in actions under the Tenne ssee Claims Commi ssion Act and af firm the judg ment of the Claims Commi ssion.
Tenn. R. App . P . 9 Interlocutor y Appeal; Jud gm ent of the Tennessee Claim s Com m ission Aff irm ed and Rem anded

W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., joined. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; Michael E. Moore , Solicitor G e n e r a l; D a wn Jo r dan, Rebec ca L

y ford, Ge org e Coffin, Na shville, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, State of Te nnessee

.
Mart G. F e nd le y , Cl ark sv ill e , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lle e , Ph ill ip L

uc a s. To ny R.. Da lto n, Cha d D . E me rs on , K no xvill e , T e nn e sse e , f

or the a pp e lle e , M ic ha e l E . Co lli ns

. OP IN ION

At issue in these two consolidated a ppeals a re se parate as s er t i o n s befor e the Te nnessee Claims C o m m ission of tort liabili ty of the state f

or maintaining dang erous c onditions on t he highw ay s. David L ucas, son of P hillip and Betty Lucas, died in an automobil e accident on Ma rch 2, 19 90 on

State Hi g hwa y 96 in R ob e rt so n Co un ty , T e nn e sse e . T he c omp la int a lle g e d th a t inT he St at e mo ved f or s ummary j udgment i n t hes e cas es on t he addi t i onal bas i s t hat t he cl ai mant s ha d f ai l ed 1

t o pr ovi de not i ce of dange r ous condi t i ons as r equi r ed by T enn es s ee C od e A nn ot at ed s ect i on 9- 8- 30 7(a) ( I ) ( J) , an d, t hat t he S t ate w as p ro t ec t ed b y the st atute o f rep o se (T C A 2 8

- 3

- 2 0 2 ). T he C l aim s C o m m i ssi o n gra nted t he st atute o f rep o se
m o t i o ns i nsof

ar as t he cl ai m s were p redicat ed on ac t s o r om i ss i o ns o ccurri ng m o re t han f o ur y ears b ef

o re t he res p ect i ve d ates o f t he claim s and f

urthe r he l d t ha t q ue st i o ns o f m aterial f

ac t rem aine d f

o r d eterm i na t i o n a s t o t he no t i ce claim s. T h e se two ru ling s a re no t b e fo re the C o u rt o n this inte rlo c u to ry a p p e a l.
-2- constructingand maintainingthe hi gh way , at and ne ar the vicinity of the a ccide nt, the g rade and
curvature of the highw ay was dang erous and that the State had failed to pr operly bank the c urve or war n trave lers of the dang erous condit ion of the roa d. The sing le ca r ac cident re sulted in injuries to D avid Lucas that wer e fata l. The State, with suppor ting aff idavits, f iled a Motion for Summary J u d g m e n ta s s e rt i n g “ d i s c r e t i o n ar y f u n c t i o n ” i m m u n i t y.
On No ve mbe r 2 1, 19 99 , M ic ha e l Co lli ns wa s d ri vin g his a

uto mob ile so uth

bo un d a lon g State Hi g hway 15 5 ( a lso kn ow n a s B ri le y Park wa y ) a nd c ame up on

a po rt ion of the highw ay

a lle g e d to be known a s “dea d man’s cur ve.” Passe ng ers in his vehic l e we re Deanna L . Colli ns, Bobby

E. Colli ns and Ruth Coll ins. I t was alleg ed that one Toni A. Roge rs was dr iving he r vehic le northbound
on Hi g hw ay 15 5, e nte re d “ de a d man’ s c ur ve ,” los t c on tr ol of he r ve hic le c a us ing it to b e c ome a i r b o r n e an d l an d o nt h e c l a i m an t ’ s v e h i c l e , s e r i o u s l y i n j u r i n g M i c h a e l E

. C o l l i n s an d D e an n a L. Col lin s, and

kil lin g B ob by

and Ruth Co lli ns . T he c la im w a s f ile d w ithth e Ten nesse e Cla ims Commi ssi on based upon Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 9-8-307 f or the ne g lige nt desig n and maintenanc e of the portion of State Hig hway 155 called “ dead ma

n’s cur ve.” T his claim was met by a Motion for Summ ar y J u d gm ent s upported by aff idavit on behalf of

the State claiming discretionar

y function immunity

. These two case s, along with two other case s not be fore the Court on this appeal, we re c onsolidated su a s po nte by the C laims Commi ssion for the purpose of r uling upon separ ate summary

judgme nt motions in eac h.

On Mar ch 2 , 2 00 2, Cla ims Com mis sio ne r W. R. B ake r e nte re d a n e xten siv e and

c are fu lly
rea soned orde r construingthe “immunities” provision o f T ennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 9-8- 3 0 7 (d ), d i s t i n gu i s h i n g Cox v . S tate , 844 S.W .2d 173 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992), de clining to r ecognize as controlli n g au t h ority

the unre ported de cision in W ate rs v . S

tate , 1998 WL 880911 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998) a

nd overr uling the State’ s m o tions for summary judgme nt based upon d i s c r e t i o n ar

y f u n c t i o ni m m u n i t y. 1
On April 1 , 2 0 0 2 , t h e State filed in these c ases a Motion to Alt er or

Amend or, in the alternative, for a rehe aring en banc. The motion of the State for an en banc hear ing b ef o re t he Claims C ommissi on was gra nted and, on Aug ust 5, 2002, Commi ssioners R andy C. Camp, Vance W. Che e k , Jr

. , an d

W

. R

. B ak e r

e n t e r e d ane xt e n s i v e an d

c ar e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d

o r d e r , o n c e a g a in
ca t ego ri z i n g Cox v . S

tate , 844 S.W .2d 173 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992) as being obiter dicta as to the point i n i s s u e and declining to rec og nize W ate rs v . S tate , 1 9 9 8 WL 8 8 0 9 1 1 ( T e n n

. Ct

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 8 ) as prec edential a

uthority under Tenne ssee Supreme Court Rule 4 (H)( 1) and onc e ag ain over ruling the mot ion s f or summa ry jud g me nt.-3-

Ap pli c a tio ns fo r p e rm iss ion to a pp e a l w e re fi le d p ur su ant t o T enn ess ee Ru le of Ap pe llate Procedur e 9 as to discretionar y function i mmunity challeng ing the ruling of the Claims Commi ssion. Th e a pp lic a tio ns we re g ra

nte d by the Cla ims Com mis sio n and thi s Co ur t. T he c on so lid a te d c a se is now bef ore this Court for disposition.

GOVERNMENT AL

(SOVEREI GN) I MMUNI TY

I n the ca se of Coo

pe r v . R uth e rfo rd

Cou nty , 531 S.W .2d 783 (Tenn.1975) , J ustice He n ry mounted an impassioned assa ult upon the citadel of g over n m en t al i mmunity , which met with as
muc h s uc c e ss a s d id P ic ke tt’ s Ch arg e up Ce me te ry Rid g e a t Get ty sb urg. The Justi c e op ine d in dis se nt:

Gover

nmental i m m u n ity

is a ca nkere d, corr oded and c orrupted a rea of our law. I t is the flaming sword us ed by cities and c ounties in Tennessee to [ banish] the innocent victims of their wr ong s and deny them their traditional day in court. I t has become t h e h allmark of g overnme ntal irresponsibility –the def ense by which g ov e rnme nta l e nti tie s st oo p to c on qu e r t he ir ow n c iti zen s.

. . . .
I c o n d e mn

s o v e r e ignimmu

n it y

. Ib e li e v e th a t j u s ti c e d e ma n d s , r e a son dictates, mora lit y m andate s and ele mental consider ation of consc ience decr ee a chang e in co n fi d en ce in the qua lity of justice, which a ccor ding to Da niel Webster, is ‘man ’ s g r e a te s t inte r e s t o n e arth

. ’ M an ’ s e te r n a l qu e s t f

o r ju s ti c e is of equa l d i g n i t y w i t hh i s s e ar c hf

o r c e rt a i n t y. Iwo uld c ondem n th is l e g a l mo ns tr os ity to t he ob liv ion

wh ic h it so ri c hly de se rv e s.
Coo pe r v . R uth e rfo rd

Cou nty , 531 S.W .2d 783, 785, 792 (Tenn.1975) (He nry , J ., dissenting)

.
I n the nea

rly three d eca des that have elapse d since Coo pe r v . R uth e rfo rd

Cou nty , no su c c e s s f u l c h a ll e n g e h a s b e e n mo u n te d u p o n th e f

u n d ame n ta l p r e mi s e th a t th e d o c tr ine of g overnme ntal immunit y

in Tennesse e is of common law or igin.

Co f f ma n v. City of Pulaski , 2 20 Te nn . 6 42 , 4 22 S.W. 2d 42 9 ( 19 67 ) s ur

viv e d th e a tta c k in Coo pe r v . R uth e rfo rd

Cou nty and re mains the law of T ennesse e. The rein it is said:

As to t he argume nt that we sh ou ld ab oli sh thi s d oc tr ine of immun ity

be c a us e it is wit hout warr ant in the common law a s adopted in this State by our Constitut ion, (which a dopted the common law of Eng land as in forc e in North Carolina in 1796), it is sufficient to say

that, acc epti n g the plaintiff-in-e rror ’s own ar g ument that the common law should be wr itten by judge s to me et the needs of the society expected to act ther eunder , it lay within the power of the Supreme Court of this state to adopt-4-

and promulg ate the doc trine of immunity prese ntly under assault and the absence of
anE n g l i s hp r e c e d e n ti s i m m a t e r i a l t o i t s v a l i d i t y. Coffman v. City of Pulaski , 220 Tenn. 642, 645, 422 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tenn.1967).

On c e the c omm on

law o ri g in o f g ov e rnme nta l immun ity is es ta bli sh e d, the lon g se ttl e d r

ule of strict construction conce rning statutes in de rog ation of the common law place s a h ea v y b urden
on the ba c k o f a

pla int if f s uin g a so ve re ig n in

tor t. Und e r t

his ru le :

I t is we ll se ttled that a statute will not be construed to alter the common law, further than the act expressly decla res or than is nece ssarily

implied from the fa ct that it covers the whole subject-matter. Horne v . Railroad Co. , 1 Co ld. , 7 7; State v. Miller , 11 L ea, 6 21 ; McCrea v . Galey , 1 Te nn . 2 51 ; Eaton v. Dick inson , 3 Sneed, 40 4; M o y e r s v . B ro wn , 10 Humph ., 77 ; Sh aw v . M e rc ha nts ’ N

ati on al B an k

of S t. Lou is , 101 U.S., 557, 25 L .Ed., 892.”
State v. Cooper , 1 20 Te nn . 5 49 , 553 ; 11 3 S .W . 1 04 8, 10 49 (T e nn .1 90 8) ; Olson v. Sharpe , 235 S.W. 2d 11 , 1 2 ( Te nn .1 95 0) ; see also, Lillienkamp v. Rippe toe , 133 Tenn. 57, 63, 17 9 S

. W

. 628 (1915).

We beg in there fore with the premise that at common law the state w as absolutely immune from tort liability

as we re c ities and counties within the state. The im m u n i t y of the state a nd the
se pa rate immun iti e s o f c iti e s and c ounti e s de ve lop e d a lon g dif fe re nt p a ths thr ou g h s tatut or y mod if i c a t i o n s an d

p art i a l a b r o g a t i o n s o f

i m m u n i t y.
As to the immunit y

of the state, the Supreme Court of Te nnessee has provided the following g uidance :
As bac kg round, we think it important and sig nificant to outline the rig hts of the State o f T e n n e s s e e a s a s o v e r e ign

. A c c o r d in g to A rti c le I , Se c ti o n 1 7 of the Constit ution of the State of Te nnessee , suits may be brought ag ainst the State in such
a manne r and in such c ourts as the L eg islature may by law dire ct, and i n no other
manner

. I n view of this, the L eg islature has e x pressly provided by

statute (T.C.A. § 20 -1 70 2) a s f

oll ow s: No cour t in the state shal l have a ny power , jurisdiction, or authority to enter

tain any suit ag ainst the state, or a g ainst any office r of the state ac t i n g by

authority of the state, w ith a view to re ach the state, its treasur

y , funds, or prope rty , and all such su i t s s h all be dismiss ed as to the s tate or suc h office rs, on motion, plea, or de murrer of the lawoffice r of the state, or c ounsel employ ed for the state. I n the ca se of Sta te

, e xre l. A lle n v . Co ok

, s up ra , the Court said:-5- Article 1, se ct i on 17, of the Constituti on, deleg ating to the L e g isl a tur e the po we r t o a uth or ize su its again st the state , b e ingin derog ation of the state’s inhere nt e x emption f rom suit, must itself be str ic tly c on str

ue d; h e nc e le g isl a tio n a

uth or izin g su its a g a ins t th e state must strictly

pursue the c onstitut ional require ments, and be so plain, clea r, an d u n m istakable in its provisions as to the manner a nd form in which such suits may be broug ht a s to le ave nothing to surmise or conjec ture. 171 Te nn. at 611, 106 S.W.2d at 860.
Brewington v. Brewington , 387 S.W .2d 777, 778-79 (Te nn.1965). Sovereig n immunit y

of counties in Tenne ssee developed on the basis that a c ounty was a n arm of the state and sin c e it c ou ld e xer c ise on ly the so ve re ig nty de le g a te d to it b y th e st a te leg islature, it was shielded by the sovere ign immunity

of the state.

I n W oo d v . Ti pto n Co un ty , 7 Bax ., 112, it wa s held that a county was no more liable to be sued for the neg lect of its office rs t han is the S tate for the neg lige nce of its of fi c e rs in t he dis c ha rg e of the ir pu bli c dutie s. B ut i n s uc h matte rs it c an d o o nly su ch act s as m ay be a llo we d, tha

t is , authorized by

law. Shannon , sec . 496

. I t can exer c ise that po rt ion of the so ve re ig nty of the State c ommunicated to it by the L eg islature, and no more. Grant v. Lindsay , 11 He is. , 6 51 ; Ra ilwa

yCo. v . W

ils on Cou nty , 5 Pick., 604. I ts liabili ty

to suit onl y

extends to matters of contra ct and not to t orts or the neg lige nce of

its employ ees. Henc e an action for damag es will not lie for laying of f a public road by

the County

Court, which was a fterw ards de clar ed by the cour t to be
a shun-pike and order ed to be closed. Tur np ik e Co. v . D av ids on Cou nty , 14 L ea, 74; Grant v. Lindsay , 1 1 H e is. , 6 51 ; Hawkins v. Justice s , 12 L ea, 356. The g ener al rule is that counties a re not liable f

or torts o r neg lige nce in the condition, use, and mana g ement of public institutions. Many rea sons are assig ned. 1. That there is no fund out of which satisfa ction could be ha d. 2. Th a t it

is b e tte r t

hat an in div idu a l sh ou ld s uf fe r t ha n th a t th e pu

bli c should sustain an inconvenienc e. 3. That it is a subordinate polit ical or g overnme ntal division of t he State. 4. That its function or ac tion in reg ard to such insti tutions are leg islative,
and that ne ith e r t

he State or

c ounty c ou ld b e su e d o n s uc h a c c ount. 5. That counties are instrumentalities of gover nment and par

take of the i m m u n i t i e s o f

S t a t e s w h i l e a c t i n g i na

g o v e r n m e n t a l c a

p a c i t y.
Mc An dr e ws v . H

am ilton Cou nty , 105 Tenn. 399, 403-04, 58 S.W.483 (1900).

Th e c omm on

law i mmunit

y of c iti e s is e sse nti a lly

based up on the same c on sid e ratio ns

. Cru sev . Ci ty

of C olu mb ia , 9 22 S.W. 2d

49 2 ( Te nn .1 99 6) ; H

a wk s v

. Ci ty o f W es tm o r e land , 960 S.W .2d 10 (Tenn.1997)

.T he rul e st at ed i n H al e v. J ohns t on i s exhaust i vel y anno t at ed i n 52 L.R.A. ( new seri es) 14 2 (19 1 4 ). 2

-6- We are not conce rned in this case with the separ ate statutory d ev el o p m en t of the limited abrogat ion of sovere ign immunity made a pplicable to cities a

nd counties by

the Tenne ssee Gover nmental Tort L iability Act. Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 29-20-101, e t seq. This act is not and neve r has been applicable to the State of Tenne ssee or its ag encie s and depa

rtments. TennesseeDep’ t of Mental He alth, et al. v. Hughes , 531 S.W .2d 299 (Tenn.1975)

. Prior to the eff

ective da te of e ither the Te nnessee Gover nmental Tort L iability

Act in 1973
or the Te nn e sse e Cla ims Com mis sio n Ac t in 19 84 , Te nn e sse e re c og nize d a c omm on law i mmunit

y fo r a pu bli c of fi c ia l in the pe rf or manc e of a dis c re tio na

ry a c t.

The a uthori t ies seem to be in a ccor d to the eff ect that public of

ficials, who owe the pe rfor

mance of a ministerial duty to a particula

r individual, are liable to one injured as the pr ox imate re sult of their nonfea sance o r m isfeasa nce in the perf ormanc e of such dut y

. Where the duty is absolute, cer tain, and imperative, and is simpl y minist er i al , t he off

icer is liable in damag es to any one spec ially

injured, either by his omit ting to per form the task or by perf o rm ing it neg lige ntly

or unskillfully . On the other

hand, whe re his powe rs are di scre tionary , and to be e x erte d
or withheld acc ording to his own judgme nt, he is not liable to a ny private pe rson for a neg lect to exercise those power s, nor for the conseque nces of a willful e x erc ise of them, wher e no cor

ruption or malice c an be imputed to him, and he ke eps within the scope of his authority . Some of the ca ses re fer to an o ff

i ce r p o ssessing suc h discretionar

y power s as judicial or qu as i -off icer

. But thi s rule goe s no further than to r e lie ve pu

bli c of fi c ia ls o f lia

bil ity fo r no nf

e a sa nc e and fo r the mis fe a sa

nc e of the ir
s ervants or ag ents. Moynihan v . Todd , 1 8 8 M a s s

. , 3 0 1 , 7 4 N

. E

. , 3 6 7 , 10 8 A m. S t. Re p. , 4 73 ; Smith v. Zimmer , 45 Mont., 282, 125 Pac., 420; Shearman & Redfield on Ne g . ( 3 E d. ), se c tio n 1 56 ; Doeg v . Cook , 1 26 Ca l., 21 3, 58 Pa c ., 70 7, 77 Am . St

. Re p. , 1 71 ; Tholkes v. De cock , 125 Minn., 507, 147 N.W., 648, 52 L .R.A. (N.S.), 142,
and no te s.
Hale v. J ohnston , 140 Tenn. 182, 197-98, 203 S.W. 949, 952-53 (1918). 2

At common law the sove reig n entity , be it the state, a city , or a c ounty , had no “disc retionar y act” immunit y and indee d neede d none. The sovere ign e ntity was a lrea dy

absolutely

immune under the common law doc trine of sove reig n immunit y . Be cause of sover eig n immunit y the entit y was not liable in responde at superior for the a cts or omissions of its ag ents, serva nts, or employ ees, e x cept in case s where such immunity was modified by

statute or the e ntity

was e x erc ising propr ietary functions. Mem

phis v. Kimbrough , 59 Tenn. 133 (1873)

. “Discr etionary

act” immunit y

developed t o p rotec t office rs, employ ees a nd ag ents of the g overnme n tal entity

in their individual capa city since they

otherwise w ere not protecte d by the umbrella of sove reig n immunit y . As one a uthority stated:-7- T h e l i ab i l i t y

o f p u b l i c o ff i ce rs fo r t h e n egl i gen tfa i l u re t o d i s ch ar ge minist e r ia l d

u ti e s e xp r e s s ly

im p o s e d u p o nth e m b y

la w , in c o n s e qu e n c e o f

w hich injury is suffer ed by

an ind i v i d ual member

of the c ommunity , is well settled. The g ener al rule is ter sely

stated by Mr. J ustice B unn in Ho wle yv . S c ott , 123 Minn. 159, 51 L .R.A. (N.S.) 137, 143 N.W. 257, and as there laid down is followed and a pplied b y p ra ct i ca l l y

al l t h e c o u rt s

. 2 3 Am

. & En g. E n c. L aw , 3 7 7 ; 2 S h ea rm

. & R ed f. Ne g. 30 3 e t se q. ; A n n e A r u n d

e l C o u n t yv

. D u c k e tt , 83 Am. Dec . 557, and note ( 20 Md. 468); 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. 5th ed. 483. This is true notwit hstanding the fact that the county , to w n , o r o th e r mu n ic ip a li ty w h ic h th e y ma

y r e p r e s e n t is n o t r e s p o n s ib le at the suit of a private person, either for their nonfeasanc e or misfeasanc e. The wrong of the off icer is not the wrongof the muni cipal subdi vision he may repr esent, but t hat of the off icer , and he alone is responsible therefor , except perha ps where by

law the municipality

is equally

liable. The co unty

is not responsible to private pe rsons for the tor ts o f i ts s he ri ff

, c ounty a ud ito r, or oth e r o ff

ic e r, y e t th e of

fi c e r h ims e lf

, f or his neg lige nce in r espec t to the perfor mance of his minist er i al dut ies, is liable to any person who ma

y suffe r in conseque nce of such neg lect.

Tholkes v. De cock

, 125 Minn. 507, 509, 147 N.W. 648, 52 L .R.A. (N.S.) 142, 146-47 ( 1914).

I f T h olkes v . Dec ock

a pp lie d to a ll a c ts o f p ub lic of fi c ia ls r a the r t

ha n o nly to t ho se pure ly minist eria l, the position of a public employ ee w ould indeed be prec arious. To modify this ge nera l
e xpos ur e to l ia

bil ity , b oth

the c omm on law and

statut or y e na c tme nts de ve lop e d “ dis c re tio na ry a c t” immunit y . As one a

uthority has obser ved:

Ex e c uti v e off

ic e rs an d e mp loy e es. Public employ ees of the executive bra

nch
–ever y one who is not in the l eg islative or j udicial bra nches–w ere orig inally

liable for their torts and c erta in l y fo r t hose committed in excess of their a uthority . One
so lut ion ho lds state of

fi c e rs lia ble on ly fo r gro ss n e g lig e nc e or

fo r s pe c if ie d c on du c t. I n the twentieth ce ntury , state cour ts developed immunities for off icer s and
e mpl oy e e s of pu

bli c e nti tie s. A little a

uth or ity e ve n p ro vid e s an a

bs olute immun ity to highe r le ve l state of

fi c e rs , a t le a st a s to de fa

matio n or a s to matte rs in whic h it is espec ially important for hig h level off icer s to feel unhampere d by po ssible leg al
a c tio ns . M or e g e ne ra lly , o ff ic e rs and e mpl oy e e s are sa id t o e njo y qu a lif ie d immun ity fo r d isc re tio na

ry a c ts, but not for min ist e ri a l a c ts. Th e dis c re tio na ry immun ity

is qualified or c onditional because it is usually lost if the officer is guilty of bad f aith, malice, c orruption, wanton misconduc t or the like.

Dobbs “The L aw of

Torts, Vol. 1, Ch. 15, sec. 273, 734-35 ( 2001).

The t erm “discretionar

y function” w as introduce d into the law of Te nnessee when the Tenne ssee Governmenta l Tort L iability Act was enac ted by Chapter 345 of t he P ublic Acts of 1973. Th is A c t, ap pli c a

ble to loc a l go ve rnme nt e nti tie s, pa rt ia lly a br og ate d g ov e rnme nta l im mun ity wi th Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 2 9- 20 -2 05 pro vi ding , in pa rt : “ I mmunit

y fr om s uit

of a ll-8-

g overnme ntal entities is removed for injury proxi mately cause d by a neg lige nt a ct or omission of any
e mpl oy e e wi thi n th e sc op e of his e mpl oy

ment e xce pt i f t

he inj ur y ari se s o ut o f: (1 ) T he e xer c ise or per formanc e or the failure to exercise or pe rfor m a discre tionary

function, whether or not the discretion is abused.”

This Act serve d the dual purpose (wit hin the limit s provided by the statute) of

removing i m m u n i t y o f

t h e s o v e r e i g ne n t i t y an d

s h i e l d i n g t h e e mp l o ye e , a c t i n g w i t h i nt h e s c o p e o f h i s a u t h o r i t y, from liability

to third persons. Hi ll v . Ci ty of G e rm an tow n , 31 S.W .3d 234 (Tenn.2000)

. Th e Ac t di d n ot d e fi ne “ dis c re tio na ry fu nc ti on ” leavin g Te nn e sse e c ourt s to fi ll the vo id thereb y cr ea ted by

falling back on the “discre tionary” and “ minist eria l” def initions in Hale v. Johnston . Noting that other jurisdictions had interpre ted their statutory “discre tionary

function” lang uag e, Judge F ranks, dissentingin Davis v. City of Cleve land , 709 S

. W .2d 613 (Tenn.Ct.App.1986), ur g ed adoption of a “planning -oper ational” test a s the proper standard. Da v is , 709 S.W .2d at 616. The supre me cour t responded in Bowers v. City of Chattanooga , 826 S.W .2d 427 (Tenn.1992) , a ca se pre dicated upon t h e T en nessee Gover nmental Tort L iability

Act, by ad o p t i n g a “ p l an n i n g-o p er at i o n al ” t es tan d m o d i fy i n g Ha le v . J

oh ns ton ’s s t an d ar d

a c c o r d i n g l y.
As we ha ve observe d, the Tenne ssee Gover nmental Tort L iability Act is not applicable to the
case at bar and this discussion is m ade only in response to the position of the State of T ennesse e that it is entit led, under

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 9-8-307( d), to a ssert “discre tionary function” immunit y in this case. The position of the State is not persuasive as it contradicts Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 9-8-307( d).

TH E CLAI MS CO MMI SSI ONAC T

Ke e pin g in m ind

that so ve re ig n immunit

y is the ru le , we tur

n now to t he Te nn e sse e Cla ims Com mis sio n A c t.

Central to the resolution of t he is sue bef ore us is the Claims Commi ssion’s jurisdictional authority . Article I , § 17, of t he Tennessee Constit ution provides that the s tate ma

y b e s u e d in s u c h ma

n n e r an d in s u c h c o u rts a s th e le g is lature by law dir e c ts. F ro m 17 96 un til 19 84 , th e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y wa s e xtre me ly re tic e nt i n permitting claims ag ainst the state. Moreove r, the courts’ retice nce was e vidence d by repe atedly

pointing out that suits ag ainst the state we re in de rog ation of the
c omm on law a nd that st a tut e s p ur

po rt ingto p erm it thes e su its sh ou ld b e str ic tly construed. See, e.g., State ex rel. Allen v. Cook, 171 Tenn. 605, 106 S.W.2d 858, 860 (1 93 7) ; Stokes v . University of Tenn. , 737 S.W .2d 545, 547 (Tenn.A pp.1987), c e rt. denied , 485 U.S. 935, 108 S.Ct

. 1110, 99 L .Ed.2d 271 (1988). How ever , in 1984 the leg islature ena cted a

swee ping proce dure for filing mone tary claims ag ainst the state. See Act of May 24, 1984, ch 972, 1984 Tenn. Pub. Ac ts 1026; Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 9- 8- 30 5, -3 07 (S up p. 19 84 ). Th e fo llo wi ng y e ar, the le g isl a tur e ame nd e d th e statut e by addingthe foll owing statement: “I t is the i ntent of the g ener al assembly that theA “ st at e em p l o y e e, ” as pert i nent t o t hi s case, i s d ef i ned as “any pe rs o n who i s a st at e o f f i ci al , i ncl ud i ng 3

m e m b e rs o f t h e G e n e ra l A sse m b ly an d leg islativ e o ff ic ia ls e le c te d b y t h e G e n e ra l A sse m b ly, o r a n y p e rs o n w h o is

e m p lo ye d in the se rv ic e o f an d w h o se c o m p e n sa tio n is p a ya b le b y the sta te , o r a n y p e rs o n w h o is em p lo ye d b y the sta te who se com p ensat i o n i s p ai d i n who l e o r i n pa rt f rom f ed eral f und s. ” T enn. C o d e A nn. § 8

- 4 2

- 1 0 1 (3)(A ).
-9- jurisdiction of the claims commission be liberally const ru ed to implement the
reme dial purposes of this leg isla t i o n.” Te nn.Code Ann. § 9-8- 307(a) (Supp.1985). He mb re e v . S

tate , 925 S.W .2d 513, 516 (Tenn.1996)

. Th e Te nn e s s e e C l a i m s C o mmi ssi on Ac t, s ub je c t to its mon e tary

c a p o n r e c ov e ra

ble dama g e s, a c c omp lis he d a

sw e e pin g a

br og a tio n o f s ov e re ign immun ity a s to the State of Te nn e sse e re lativ e to acts or omissions of s tate employ ees. Pursuant to the statute, sovere ign immunity is abrog ated a s 3 to: (C ) N e g lig e ntl y c re a te d o r m a int a ine d d ang e ro us c on dit ion s o n s tate controlled re al pr o p er t y . The c laimant under this subsection must establish the fo res e e a bil ity of the ri sk s and

no tic e g ive n to the pr op e r s tate of fi c ia ls at a

tim e su ff ic ie ntl y pr ior to t he inj ur y fo r t he state to h ave take n a

pp ro pr iate me a sure s;

. . . . (I ) Ne g lige nce in planningand prog ramming for, inspec tion of, desig n of, pr e p ar a t i o no f

p l an s f o r , a p p r o v a l o f

p l an s f o r , an d c o n s t r u c t i o no f , p u b l i c r o a ds , streets, highw ay s, or bridg es and similar struc tures, and ne g lige nce in maintena nce of hig hway s, and bridg es and similar structures, designated by the depa rtment of transportation as b ei ng on the state sy stem of hig hway s or the state sy stem of int e rs tate highw a

y s; (J) Dang erous c onditions on st ate maintaine d highw ay s. The claimant under this subsection must estab l i s h t h e foreseea bility of the risk a

nd notice g iven to the proper state off icials at a time suff

iciently p rior to the injury for the state to have take n a pp ro pr iate me a sure s; Tenn. Code Ann. § 9- 8-307(a )(C)( I )(J) (2003 Supp.).

Whil e the Te nnessee Gover nmental Tort L iability

A c t a p p li c a b leto lo c a l g overnme nt entities provides immunity

to the local g overnme nt entity in perfor mance by an employ ee of a “ discretionar y function,” ( Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 20-205(a )), the T ennesse e Claims Comm ission Act provide s no such immunity

for the State of

Tenne ssee. The controlling part of the Claims Commi ssion Act pr ov ide s: (c) The de termination of the state ’s liability in tort shall be based on the traditional tort conce pts of duty and the rea sonably prudent person’ s standard of car e. (d) The state wil l be li able f or ac tual damag es only . No awa rd shall be made unless the fa cts found by

the commission would e ntitle the claimant to a judg ment-10-

in an ac tion at law if the state ha d been a pri v at e i n d i v i d u al . The state w ill not be liable for punitive damag es and th e co s t s of litigation other than cour

t costs. The state will not be liable for willful, malicious, or criminal acts by state employ ees, or for a cts on the par

t of state employ ees done for pe rsonal g ain. The state may asser t any an d a ll d e f

e n s e s , in c lu d in g c o mm o n la w d e f e n s e s , w h ic h w o u ld h av e bee n available to the office r or e mploy ee in a n action ag ai n s t s u ch an individual based
u p o nt h e s am e o c c u r

r e n c e

. T h e s t a t e m ay a s s e rtan y ab so lute common law immunit ies ava ilable to the offic er or employ ee, however , g ood faith common law immunit y may not be asser

ted.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 9- 8-307(c )(d) (Supp.2003)(e mphasis added)

. Th e Sup re me Court

of Te nn e sse e ha s n oti c e d th e c la shbe tw e e n th e str ic t c on str uc tio n r ule established in State v. Cook, 1 7 1 T e n n

. 6 0 5 , 1 0 6 S. W. 2 d 8 5 8 ( T e n n

. 1 9 3 7) and B r ewington v. Brewington , 215 Tenn. 475, 387 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn.1965), a nd the l egi s l ati vely -mandated libera l construction rule establi s h ed by Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 9-8-307(a )(3) relative to the jurisdiction of the Claims Com mission. Se e Ste war t v . S tate , 3 3 S. W.3 d 7 85 , 7 91 (T e nn .2 00 0) ; Cf. Nor thl an d I ns uran c e Co. v . S

tate , 33 S.W .3d 72 7 , 730 (Tenn.2000) . Howeve r, there is room for neither strict construction nor liberal construction when the controlling statutory provision is clear and unambig uous. “When the lang uag e contained within the four corne rs of a statute is plain, clear , and unambig uous, the duty of the c ourts is simpl e and obvious, ‘to sa y sic lex scripta, and obey

it.’ ” ATS Southeast, Inc. v. Carrier Corp. , 1 8 S. W.3 d 6 26 , 6 29 -3 0 ( Te nn .2 00 0) ; se e als o Haw k s v . Ci ty of W estmoreland , 9 60 S.W. 2d

10 , 1 6 ( Te nn .1 99 7) ; Mi lle r v . Ch ild re ss , 21 Tenn. 320, 321-22 (1841).

The e ntire statutory

purpose of

the Ten n es s ee Claims Commiss ion Act is to establish the state’s liability

in tort based on the tra ditional tort concepts of duty and the r easona b ly

prudent persons’ sta

ndard of car e. SeeTe nn . Cod e Ann

. § 9-8-3 07 (c )( Sup p. 20 03 ). As re str a int on thi s purp os e , th e same statut e pr ov ide s: “ F or c a us e s o f ac tio n ar isi ng in tor t, the state sh a ll onl y

be lia ble for damag es up to th e s u m o f thr e e h u n dr e d

th o u s an d d o ll ar s ( $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 ) p e r

c la im an t a

n d o ne mil lio n d oll ars ($ 1, 00 0, 00 0) pe r o c c urr ence. ” Te nn . Co de Ann. § 9 -8 -3 07 (e ). With in t he se presc ribed moneta

ry limit s, the abrog ation of soverei g n immunit y in Tennesse e Code Annotated
se c tio n 9 -8 -3 07 (a )( C) (I )( J) is un c on dit ion a l a s to lia bil ity in t or t f or a c tua l da ma g e s.

I t is the provision of the statute rese rving to the s tate certain preexist ing defe nses on which the dec ision in t his case must be predicated. The statute pr ovides in part: “The state may asser t any and all def

enses, includingcommon law def enses, which would have been available to the of fice r or employ ee in a

n action ag ainst such an individual ba sed upon the same oc curr ence . The state ma y asser t any absolute common law immunities available to the of fice r or e mploy ee, ho we v er, g ood faith common law immunity may not be asser

ted.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 9-8- 307(d)( Supp.2003).

Cle arl y on ly “ a bs olute ” c omm on

law i mmunit ie s r e ma in a va ila ble to t he state . Absolute immunit y is a well def

i n ed doctr ine at common law. Imbler v . Pachtman , 4 24 U. S. 4 09 , 9 6 S. Ct.-11-

98 4 , 4 7 L

. E d

. 2 d 1 2 8 ( U

. S. 1 9 7 6 )

. “ Q u a li f ie d immu n it y ” is li k e w is e w e ll d e f

in e d a t c o mmon law

. Ha rlo w v . F

itz ge ra ld , 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.C t. 2727, 73 L .Ed.2d 396 (U.S.1982). The Supreme Court has consistently held that g overnme nt officia l s are entitled to some ty

pe of immunity

from suits for damag es. “[P] ublic office rs re quire this prot e c ti o nto s h ie ld

th e m f r o m u n d u e inte r f e r e n c e w it

hth e ir d u ti e s an d f rom potentially

disabling thre ats of liability .” Ha rlo w v . F itz ge ra ld , 457 U.S. 800, 806, 102 S.Ct . 2727, 2732, 73 L .Ed.2d 396 (1982). Two t y pes of immunit y

defe nses have g e ne ra lly been recog nize d: a

bs olute immun ity

and qu a lif ie d immun ity . Abs olute immun ity de fe a ts a su it a t th e outse t, p ro vid e d th a t th e of fi c ia l’ s a c tio ns are wi thi n the scope of the immunity

. Imbler v . Pachtman , 4 24 U. S. 4 09 , 4 19 n. 13 , 9 6 S. Ct. 984, 989 n. 13, 47 L .Ed.2d 128 (1976). Qualified imm unity is asser ted as a defe nse, and sh ie lds g ov e rnme nt o ff ic ia ls p e rf

or min g discret ion ary

fu nc tio ns fr om c ivi l liability if their conduc t does not

v io late cle arly

established statutory

or constitutional rig hts of which a r easona

ble per son would have known. Ha rlo w v

. Fi tzge ra ld, su pra , 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct . at 2738.

“ [O ]f f ic ia ls w h o s e s p e c ia l f

u n c ti o n s o r

c o n s ti tuti o n a l s tatus r e qu ir e [] complete protec tion f

rom suit” are acc orded a

bsolute immuni ty

. Id . at 807 , 102 S.Ct

. at 2732. Absolute immunity from suit has bee n ac co rded to judg es, Stump v. Sparkman , 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.C t. 109, 55 L .Ed.2d 331 (1978), pr osecutors, Imbler
v . P ac htm an , s up ra , leg islators, Eastland v. United States Servic eme n’s Fund , 421 U.S. 491, 95 S.C t. 1813, 44 L .Ed.2d 324 (1975), and to fede ral ag ency officia ls who perf orm adjudicator

y or prosecutorial functions. Butz v. Econom ou , 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct

. 2 8 9 4 , 5 7 L

. E d

. 2 d 8 9 5 ( 1 9 7 8 )

. T h e S u p r e m e C o urt h a s b e e n c a u t i o u s in
e xten din g the pr ote c tio n of ab so lut e immun ity , a nd ha s n ote d th a t “ fe de ra l of fi c ia ls who see k absolute exemption from persona l liabilit y for unc onstit u t i o n al conduct must bear the bur den of s h o wi ng that public policy require s an exemption of that scope.” Id. at 506, 98 S.Ct. at 2911. The Supreme Court has provided that qua lifi ed i m m unity from dama g es liability is the g ener al rule f

or executive off

icials cha rg ed with constitut i onal violations. Id. at 507, 98 S .Ct. at 2911. Qualified immunity is an attempted ba lance of the c ompeting va lues of prote c ti n g in d iv id u a ls ’ constitutional rig hts and protec ting officia ls who are require d to exercise their discretion, in order to encour ag e the vigor ous exercise of officia l authority

. Ha rlo w v . F itz ge ra ld, su pra , 457 U.S. at 813- 14 , 1 02 S.Ct . at 27 36 ; Bu tz v

. Ec on om ou , s up ra , 438 U.S. at 506, 98 S.Ct . at 2910.

Ra yv . P ic k e tt , 734 F.2d 370, 371- 2 (C.A.Mo., 1984). Qualified immunity

has bee n historically

ref err ed to as “go o d faith immunity .” See W inc he ste r v . Li ttl e , 996 S.W .2d 818, 826 (1998), perm. app. de nied J uly 6, 1999, cer

t. denied 528 U. S. 1 02 6, 12 0 S. Ct. 54 3, 14 5 L .E d. 2d 42 1 (No v. 29 ,1 99 9) ; Gomez v . Toledo , 4 4 6 U.S. 635, 64 L .E d. 2d 57 2, 10 0 S. Ct. 19 20 , ( 19 80 ); W ood v. Strickland , 4 20 U. S. 3 08 , 4 3 L .E d. 2d 21 4, 95 S.Ct

. 992 (1975). While the “g ood faith” standa rd wa s adjusted in Ha rlo w v . F itz ge ra ld , 457 U.S. 800,-12-

73 L .E d. 2d

39 6, 10 2 S. Ct. 27 27 (U .S. 19 82 ) to sh ie ld g ov e rnme nt of fi c ia ls fr om lia

bil ity wh e re “ the ir
c on du c t do e s n ot v iol a te c le arl y e sta bli sh e d statut or

y or c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts of wh ic h a re a so na ble pe rs on wo uld have kn ow n. ” 73 L .E d. 2d a t 41 0, it i s c le ar t

hat Harlow did not convert qua l i fied “g ood faith” immunity

into absolute immuni ty

since the c ase w as re manded f or re consid er at i on rathe r than simply

dismiss ed. Absolute immunity defe ats a suit at the outset and nothing rema ins to be addr essed by

an orde r of r emand. It is only qualified immunit y that would allow re mand for consideration of the fac tual basis for e ither a “ g ood faith” standa rd as pr e-e x isted Harlow v. F i t z g e r a ld , or a fa c tua l de te rm inatio n p os t Ha rlo w v . F itz ge ra ld that officia l conduct “doe s not violate clea

rly established statutory or constitutional rig hts of which a rea sonable pe rson would have known.”

I t has long be en re cog nized that absolute immuni ty envisions the ty

ranny of abuse of powe r on an in div idu a l ba sis by

pe rs on s c lot

he d w itha

uth or ity . T he just if

ica ti on fo r a bs olute immun ity is nowhere better expressed than by J udg e L ear ned Hand in Gr e

go irev . B idd

le , 177 F.2d 579, ( 2nd Cir.1949).

I t does indeed g o without sa ying that an officia l, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon othe rs, or f o r an y o t her pe rsonal motive not
c onne c te d w iththe pu

bli c g oo d, sh ou ld n ot e sc a pe lia bil ity fo r the inj ur ie s h e may so c a us e ; and , if it wer e po ssi ble in pr a c tic e to co nf ine su c h co mpl a int s to the g uil ty , it
wo uld be mon str ou s to de ny

re c ov e ry . T he jus tif

ic a tio n f or do ingso is that it

is impossibl e to know whe ther the c laim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innoce nt as well as the g uilty , to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable dang er of its outcome, would dampen the a rdor of all but the mos t r e so lut e , o r t

he most ir res pons ibl e , in the un fl inc hin g dis c ha

rg e of the ir duties. Ag ain and a g ain the public intere st calls for a ction which may turn out to be founded on a

mistake, in the face of

which an of

ficial may later f ind himself hard put to it to s atisfy

a jury of his g ood faith. Ther e m u s t i n d eed be means of punishing public office rs who have been tr uant to their duties; but that is quite another matter from exposing such a s have be en honestly mistaken to suit by

anyone who has suffe red f rom their er

rors. As is so often the case , the answe r must be fo u n d i n a balanc e betwe en the evils inevitable in either alternative. I n this inst ance it has been thought in the end be tter to leave unredr essed the wrong s done by dishonest office rs than to subject those who try t o d o their duty to the constant dre ad of r etaliation. Judg e d a s r e s n ov a , w e sh ou ld n ot he sit a te to fo llo w the path la id d ow n in the bo ok s. The de c is io n s h av e , in d e e d , a lw ay s im p o s e d a s a li mi tati o nu

p o nthe immunit y that the offic ial’s ac t must have been within the scope of his power s; and it can be argued that officia l powers, since they exis t only

for the public g ood, never
cover occa sions where the public g ood is not their aim, and hence that to e x erc ise a power dishonestly

is nece ssarily

to o v erstep its bounds. A mom ent’s re flec tion shows, howeve r, that that cannot be the mea ning of the limitation wit hout defe ating the wh ole do c tr ine . Wh a t is me ant b y sa yingthat th e of

fi c e r m us t be a c tin g wi thi n his power c annot be more than that the occ asion must be such as would have justifiedS a tter field , i n a d d iti o n to his fa lse te stim o n y, a ttem p te d to p e rs u a d e a c o -d e fen d a n t, A p p le , t o li e a n d c la im 4

t o hav e been a w i t nes s t o t he murder and f ur t her gav e A pp l e “ hu s h mo ney ” af t er t he pl ai nt i f

f s ’ t r i al s i n or der t o i nduce h is c o n tinu e d silen c e

. -13- the a c t, if he ha d be e n us ing his po we r fo r any of the purp os e s o n w ho se a c c ount i t
was ve sted in him.

Gr e go irev . B idd

le , 177 F.2d at 581.

Th e Court of Ap pe a ls f or the Sixth Cir c uit , af

fi rm ing the tr ia l court in a

rathe r c e le br a te d c ivi l rig hts case, de lineated

th e ti me-honore d distinctions between absolute immunity on the one ha

nd and qu a li f ie d immu n it y o n th e o th e r in u n mi s ta

k a b le te r ms in th e c ase of Sp ur loc k v . S atte rfi e ld , 167 F.3d 995 (6th Cir.1999). In that case Spurlock and his co-de fenda nt Marshall had be en prose cuted for murd er p re d i cate d in part upon the testimony of De puty

Sheriff D anny

Satterfield. F urther investigation, after the conviction of Spurlock, es t ab l ished that other pe rsons had c ommitt ed the
mur de r a nd the Spurl oc k- Ma

rs ha ll c on vic tio ns we re se t a sid e . In th e c ivi l r ig hts a c tio n, Sa tte rf ie ld
c la ime d in

de fe ns e that he wa s e nti tle d to a bs olute i mm un it y

fo r h is w itn e ss t e sti mony and a lso
a bs olute immun ity

fo r h is n on -t e sti mon ia l a c ts. 4

As to h is w itn e ss t e sti mony the c ourt he ld t hat he wa s ent itl e d to a

bs olute immun ity . Sa id the c ourt :
The issue he re is not simply one of providing false te stimony at trial, or e ven, for that matter, conspiring to g ive fa lse testimony . I t is well-settled that witnesses ar e g rante d absolute immunity from sui t for all testimony provided in judicial proce eding s. See B riscoe v. LaHue , 460 U.S. 3 2 5 , 330-31, 103 S.Ct. 1108. 75 L .E d. 2d 96 (1 98 3) . T hu s, it is c le ar that Sa tte rf ie ld wo uld

be ins ulate d f

ro m li a bil ity for a ny testimony

that he provided as a witness at tria l, no matter how e g reg ious or perjurious that testimony

was a lleg ed to have been. Acc ording ly , the district court
corr ectly found that Satterf

ield was ab s o l u tely

immune from suit for his testimony during Spurlock’s criminal trial, and we easily aff irm the di strict court’s c onclusion i nt h at re gar d

. M o re o v er , we n o t e a l s o t h at t h e m er e f ac tt h at p l ai n t i ff

s m ay al l ege a conspira cy

to rende r fa lse testimony , as opposed to simply alleg ing that one per son testified falsely at trial, does not waive a bsolute testimonial im munity

. See A lioto v. City of Shively, Kentuck

y , 8 35 F .2 d 1 17 3, 11 74 -7 5 ( 6th Cir .1 98 7) ; Mack

o v. By ron , 760 F.2d 95, 97 (6th Cir.1985). Thus, Satterfield is c orre ct that an alleg ed conspira cy to pr ovide false testimony does not a brog ate his r ight to a

bsolute t es t i monial i m m u n i t y. 167 F.3d 995, 1001 ( 6th Cir.1999).

As to his non-testimonial actions, the c ourt first re jected his c laim of absolute immunity and t h e na d dr e s s e d

h i s a l t e r n a t i v e c l a i mo f

qu a l i f i e d i m m u n i t y.-14- Qualified immunity , li k e absolute immunity , is also available a s an aff irmative def

ense that protects public officials not only from liability , but also from the “b u rd en s of trial and discove ry .” En gli sh , 23 F.3d at 1089. See also Noble v. Sc hm itt , 8 7 F .3 d 15 7, 16 1 (6 th Cir .1 99 6)

. Of fi c ia ls who are no t e nti tle d to a bs olute immunit y may , in cer

tain instances, “ enjoy t h e protection of qualified immunity .” Achterhof

, 88 6 F .2 d ta 82 9. I n e xami nin g a c la im f or qu a lif ie d immun ity , w e mus t ba lanc e the ne e d f

or pu bli c of fi c ia ls t o b e fr e e fr om t

he c on st ant fe ar o f l aws uit s b r o u g h t wh il e p e r f

o r mi n g th e ir

o f f ic ia l d u ti e s , w ithth e r e c o g n it io nth a t “ [i ]n sit uatio ns of

a bu se of of fi ce, an act ion

fo r d ama g e s ma

y of fe r t he on ly re a lis tic
avenue for vindication of constit utional g uara ntees.” Ha rlo w v . F

itz ge ra ld , 4 57 U. S. 800, 814, 102 S.Ct . 2727, 73 L .Ed.2d 396 (1982 ). I n Harlow , the Supreme Court
art ic ulate d th e te st f

or qu a lif ie d immun ity

a nd state d th at “gove rnme nt o ff ic ia ls pe rf or min g dis c re tio na

ry fu nc tio ns g e ne ra lly

are sh ie lde d fromlia

bil ity fo r c ivi l damag es insofa r as t heir c onduct does not violate c lear ly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a rea sonable person would have known.” Id . at 818, 102 S.Ct

. 2727 (aba

ndoning the subjective g ood faith approa ch to ad dressing qu a lif ie d immun ity

fo r t he mor e ob

je c tiv e reason a

ble ne ss t e st) ; se e als o No ble , 87 F .3 d 3 75 , 3 86 (6 th C ir .1 99 4) ; Adams v. M etiva , 31 F.3d 375, 386 ( 6th Cir.1994). 167 F.3d 995, 1005 ( 6th Cir.1999).

The c ourt there upon reje cted Satter field’s claim of qualified immunit y and aff irmed the trial
c ourt ’s jud g me nt f

or Spurl oc k o n th e ba sis of

his a lle g e d n on -t e sti mon ia l a c ts. As to the proce dural a spects of a qualified immunity

defe nse, the Six th Circuit C o u rt of Appea ls has observe d:

“ Qu a lif ie d o r ‘ g oo d f

a ith ’ i mmunit

y is a n a ff ir mativ e de fe ns e that is ava ila ble to g overnme nt officials pe rfor ming discr etionary

functions.” Ri ch v. Ci ty o

f M ayf ie ld Ht s. , 955 F.2d 1 092, 1094 (6th Cir.1992). “The ultimate burden of pr oof is on the plaintiff to show that the def endants a re not e ntitled to qua l i fied immunity .” Id . at 1095 (emph as es added). The Six th Circuit, en banc, ha s rec ently define d the components of the qua lified immunit y defe nse: Gover nment off ic ia ls p e r f o r mi n g d is c r e ti o n a

r y f u n c ti o n s g e n era lly

are shielded fr om liabilit y

for c ivil damag es insofar

as their c onduct does not violate clea

rly est abli shed [feder al] statutory or constitutional rig hts of which a r easona ble per son would have known. The proced u re for e valuatingclaims of qualifie d immunit y is tripartite: First, we deter

mine whether a constitutional violation has occur red;
se c on d, we de te rm ine wh e the r t he ri g ht t hat w a s vio lat e d w a s a clea rly established rig ht of which a rea sonable pers on would have known; finally , we de termine whe ther the plaintiff has alleg ed sufficie nt fac ts, and supported the alleg ations by sufficie nt evidence ,-15- to i nd ic a te tha

t w hat th e of

fi c ia l a lleg edl y did

wa s o bje c tiv e ly
unre a so na

ble in l ig ht o f t

he c le arl y e sta bli sh e d c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts

. W i lliams v. Mehar , 1 8 6 F

. 3 d 6 8 5 , 6 9 1 ( 6 th

Ci r

. 1 9 9 9 ) ( e nbanc) (q u o t a t i o n s o m i t t ed ; b ra ck et s ad d ed ) ( ci t i n g Ha rlo w v . F itz ge ra ld , 47 5 U .S. 80 0, 81 8, 10 2 S.Ct . 2 72 7, 73 L .E d. 2d 39 6 ( 19 82 ); Dicke rson v. Mc Clellan , 101 F.3d 1151, 1157- 58 (6th Cir.1996)). Scott v. Clay County, Tennessee , 205 F.3d 867, 873- 74, n. 9 (6th Cir.2000).

Th e Cla ims Com mis sio n, in i ts Augus t 5, 20 02 Or de r, state s “ it a pp e ars that w hat th e state
c a lls the ‘q

ua lif ie d immuni ty do ctr ine’ is i n r e a lity jus t an a da

ptatio n o f t

he dis c re tio na

ry a c ts do c tr ine to a c tio ns bro ught un de r 4 2 U .S. C., se c tio n 1 98 3. ” Whil e the re is, in t he c on te xt of

thi s c a se , b are ly

marg ina l di sti nc tio n b e tw e e n th e qu a lif ie d immun ity do c tr ine and the dis c re tio na ry a c ts doctrine, qualified immunit y is of ancie nt orig in. I n Scheue r v. Rhodes , 416 U.S. 232, 40 L .Ed.2d 90, 94 S.Ct . 1683 (U.S.1974), whil e t ra cing the orig in of qualified immunity to the statute of Westmi nster I , 3 Ewd., 1, c. 24 (1275) and obser ving that “g ood-fa ith perfor mance of a discr etionary duty has re mained, it seems as a defe nse,” and afte r refer ring to absolute i mmunity the Court g oes on to s tate : [I ]f, on the other hand, the immunit y is not absolute but r ather one that is qualified or limited, an executive off icer may or may

not be subject to liability dependingon a ll the c ir c ums tanc e s th a t ma y be re ve a le d by e vid e nc e

. Th e c on c e pt of the immun ity of g overnme nt office rs from pers o n al l iability spring s from the same root considerations that ge nerated the doctr ine of sovere ign immunit y . Whil e the latter doctrine–that the “Kingcan do no wrong ” –did not pr otect all g overnme nt office rs from per sonal liability , the common law soon re cognized the nece ssity of per mitti ng officia ls to perform their

officia l functions fre e fr om the threat of suits for persona l l i a b i l i t y.
Scheue r , 416 U.S. at 239.

Any lin g e ri ngdo ub t th a t “ dis c re tio na ry fu nc tio n” immun ity

is, in fa c t, a

qu a lif ie d immun ity
an d n o t an absolute immunity is settled by

the United States Supreme Court in A n d e r s o n v. Cre ighton , 4 8 3 U.S. 635, 97 L .Ed. 523, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (1987) where in the court obser ved the te ns ion bet ween g ov e rnme nt o ff ic ia ls a bu sin g the ir

of fi c e s o n th e on e ha

nd and be ingho ne stl y mis take n a s to the ir

c on du c t on

the oth e r. Sa id t

he c ourt :
Our c ases have ac commodated these conflic t ing c oncer ns by g ener ally providing g o v e r n m e n to f f i c i a l s p e r f o r m i n g d i s c r e t i o n ar

y f u n c t i o n s w i t h a

qu a l i f i e d i m m u n i t y, sh ie ldi ngthe m f

ro m c ivi l da

ma g e s lia bil ity a s lon g a s the ir a c tio ns c ou ld r e a so na bly have been thought consistent with the rig hts the y are alleg ed to ha ve violated. See, e.g., Malley

v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 3 3 5 , 3 4 1 , 89 L .Ed.2d 271, 106 S.Ct. 1092 (1986) (q ua lif ied i mm un it y

pro tec ts “al l b utth e pl ain ly in com pet ent or t ho se w ho kn owi nglySecti o n 1 o f C hap t er 10 5 ad d ed t he p rovis i o n t hat “ i t i s t he i nt ent of t he G eneral A sse m b l y t hat t he 5 ju risd ic tio n o f t h e C la im s C o m m issio n b e li b e ra lly c o n stru e d to im p le m e n t t h e re m e d ia l p u rp o se s o f t h is leg islatio n .”
-16- v i o l a t e t h e l aw ” ) ; id

. , at 344-345, 89 L .Ed.2d 271, 106 S.Ct. 1092 (poli ce of fice rs applying f

or wa rra nts are immune if a

rea sonable off

icer could have believed that the re wa s pr ob a

ble c a us e to su pp or t the a pp lic a tio n) ; Mi tc he ll v . F or sy th , 472 U. S. 511, 528, 86 L .Ed.2d 411, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (1985) (offic ials are immune unless “the law c le arl y pr os c ri be d the a c tio ns ” the y too k) ; Davis v. Sc herer , 468 U.S. 183, 191, 82 L .E d. 2d

13 9, 10 4 S. Ct. 30 12 (1 98 4) ; id ., at 198, 82 L .Ed.2d 139, 104 S.Ct. 3012. (B re nn an, J., c on c ur

ri ngin p art

and dis se nti ngin p art ); Ha rlo w v. F itz ge ra ld, su pra , at 819, 73 L .Ed.2d 396, 102 S.Ct. 2727. C f. , e.g ., Pr oc un ie r v . Na v ar e tte , 434 US 555, 562, 55 L .Ed.2d 24, 98 S.Ct

. 855 (1978). Somewhat more c oncre tely , whether an off icial protec t ed b y

qualified immunity

may be held pe rsonally

liable for a

n alleg edly unlawful off

icial ac tion gen era lly

turns on the “objec tive leg al
rea sonablene ss” of the a ction, Harlow , 4 57 U. S., a t 81 9, 73 L .E d. 2d 39 6, 10 2 S. Ct. 27 27 , ass e sse d in

lig ht o f t he le g a l r ule s th a t w e re “ c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d” a t th e tim e it was taken, id. , at 818, 73 L Ed 2d 396, 102 S Ct 2727.

Anderson , 483 U.S. at 638-39, 107 S.Ct. 3038, at 530 (1987).

B e fo re dis c us sin g fu

rt he r t he c on tr oll ing iss ue inv olv ing“ dis c re tio na ry fu nc tio n” immun ity it i s h e lpf ul t o c on sid e r t

he le g isl a tiv e his tor

y of the c on tr oll ing pr ov isi on s of the Te nn e sse e Cla ims Commi ssion Act. I n the orig inal Act cr eatingthe Claims Co m m i s s i on, the controlling provision simply stated: “The state may

asser t any and all defe nses, including common law defe nses, which would have be en ava ilable to t h e o ff icer or employ ee in a

n action ag ainst such individuals based upon the same occur

renc e.” 1984 Tenn. Pub. Ac ts 972, sec. 8(d). Since the case s are clea r throug hout the country that common law immunities are a ffirmative defe nses, we ma y assume, that under the o r i g i n a l A c t , b o t ha

b s o l u t e i m m u n i t i e s an d

g o o d f a i t hi m m u n i t i e s w e r e av a i l a b l e t o t h e s t a te
un de r t his pr ov isi on

of the Ac t. C ha

pte r 1 05 of

the Pub lic Ac ts of

19 85 ame nd e d th e Cla ims Com mis sio n A c t by

a dd ingto t

he a bo ve se nte nc e a pr ov isi on that “ the state may a sse rt any a bs olute common law immunities available to the off icer or employ ee, how ever , g o o d faith common law immunit y may not be asser ted.” 1985 Tenn. Pub. Acts 105, sec. 6. By this section of Chapter 105, 5 the le g isl a tur e c le arl y de te rm ine d to se pa ra te c omm on law de fe ns e s fr om c omm on law i mmunit ie s, an d t o r e s t r i c tt h e s t a t e t o t h e u s e o f o n l y a b s o l u t e c o m m o nl aw i m m u n i t y.
A t b ar th e d is c u s s io nin

b r ie f an d ar g u me n t c e n te r e d

ar o u n d w h e th e r o r n o t “ d is c r e ti o n ary function” immunity

was in fa ct “g ood faith” immunity and thu s fore closed to the state unde r the express provisions of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 9-8-307(d). T he discussion is aca demic, as under no circ umstances is any immunit y available to the state whic h could not be cha rac terized as “a bsolute immuni ty ,” such be in g t h e o nly ty pe of immunity

that survived the e nactment of the Tenne ssee Claims Commi ssion Act, as ame nded by Chapter 105 of

the Public Acts of 1985.-17-

Effor ts t o s u p e r im p o s e th e “ planning -oper ational” test of Bowers v. City of Chattanooga on to the Tenne ssee Claims Commi ssion Act are to no ava i l given the explicit langua g e used by the leg islature in limiti ng immunit ies ava ilable to the state to “ ab s o l u t e” immunities. The “pla nning operational” test of Bo we rs involves a construction of t he “discretionar y function” pr ovisions of the Tenne ssee Governmenta l Tort L iability Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205( a). Aside from the f act that su c h d isc re tio na

ry fu nc tio n immun ity

is f or e ig n to the Te nn e sse e Cla ims Commi ss ion A c t, i t f a i l s t o qu a l i f

y a s an“ a b s o l u t e ” i m m u n i t y.
The de cision h erein is at odds with certain languag e in four T ennesse e ca ses, these be ing
c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y Cox

v . S tate , 8 44 S.W. 2d

17 3 ( Te nn .Ct .App .1 99 2) ; You n gb lo o d v

. Cl epper , 856 S.W. 2d 40 5 ( Te nn .Ct .App .1 99 3) ; W ate rs v . S

tate , 03A01-9808-B C-00243, 1 9 98 WL 880911 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998) a

nd Bo lto n v . S

tate , E2 00 1- 02 96 0- CO A- R9- CV ; 20 02 WL17 98 53 8 ( Te nn .Ct

. App.2002). In Cox , an inmate on wor k rele ase attacked, r aped a nd sodomiz ed a c laimant. One section of this Court’s opinion dealt with discretionar y function immunity , but the case was de cided
on the iss ue of fo re se e a

bil ity

. Th e e nti re dis c us sio n in the c a se a s to d isc re tio na ry fu nc tio n immun ity provided:

Cla ima

nt argue s that the a c ts c omp la ine d of are no t di sc re tio na

ry fu nc tio ns

. Howeve r, the State maintains that it has neve r asse rt ed d i s cre tionary function immunit y as a de fe n s e to this claim. The Commi ssioner found that “ all actions complained of

here in deal with discr et ionary duties of State employ ees f or which such employ ees a

re immune fr om liabilit y ” and t h at “pursuant to [ T.C.A. §] 9-8- 307(d) the State ma

y asser t this common l aw immunity .” We a g ree that, under T.C.A. § 9- 8-307(d) , the State may asser t the common law immunity which has develope d in this State with reg ard to discretionary actions of State employ ees. See State ex rel. Robertson v. Farme rs’ State Bank, 162 Tenn. 49 9, 39 S.W. 2d

28 1 ( 19 31 ); Buck

ner v. Carlton , 623 S.W .2d 102 (Tenn.A pp.1981). I n the re cent c ase of Bowers ex rel. Bowers v. C ity of Chatt anooga , 826 S.W .2d 427 (Tenn.1992) , the Supreme Court a dopted the “pla n n i n g-operational test,” unde r which “decisions that rise to the level of planning or policy -makingare considere d discretionar

y acts whic h do not give ri s e to tort liabili ty , while dec isions that are
mere ly operational are not considere d discretionar y acts and, there fore , do not give rise to immunity .” Id. at 430. Be cause we a ffirm the f

indings of the Commi ssioner with r eg ard to the issue of fo reseeabi lity , h ow e ve r, we fi nd it unn e c e ssa

ry to d e te rm ine wh e the r t

he a c ts complained of

wer e discre tionary . This issue is pretermitted.

Cox v . S tate , 844 S.W .2d 173, 176 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992).

Thus , wh ile the Com mis sio ne r a pp lie d dis c re tio na

ry fu nc tio n immun ity , o ne mus t take no te of the fa ct that t h e State never asser ted discre tionary

function immunity

as a de fense in that case

. I n the dis c us sio n of T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 9 -8 -3 07 (d ) t he c ourt op ine s th a t “ the state may asser t the common law immunity which has de veloped in this state with r eg ard to discretionar yU nd er T enness ee Sup rem e C o urt rul e 4 (H )( 1 ), a n unp ub l i shed o p i ni o n i s co nt roll i ng aut ho ri t y be t ween t he 6
p a rtie s to the c a se b u t f o r a ll o the r p u rp o se s is c o n sid e re d p e rs u a siv e a u tho rity.
-18- actions of state employ ees.” Id. I n support of this stateme nt the court relies on two case s, State ex rel. Robertson v. Farme rs State Bank , 1 62 Te nn . 4 99 , 3 9 S. W.2 d 2 81 (1 93 1) ; Buck ner v. Carlton , 62 3 S. W.2 d 1 02 (T e nn .Ct .App .1 98 1) . B oth of the se c a se s p redated th e enac tme nt o f t he Cla ims Commi ssion Act in 1984. Permission to appea l in Cox v . S tate was denied by the Supreme Court on October

26, 1992.

Y oungblood v. Clepper , 856 S.W .2d 4 0 5 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993) was a suit not befor e the Claims C ommissi on but before the Circuit Court of Marion County , and not agai n s t t h e State of Tenne ssee but ag ainst a Tenne ssee Hig hway patrolman in his individual c apac ity

. The a cts in issue
occur red on Aug ust 12, 1984, which predated the ef fec tive date of section 8 of Chapter 972 of the Public Acts of 1984 (the Claims Commis sion Act ), which ef fec tive date wa s J anuar

y 1, 1985. Section 8 of t he C laims Commi ssion Act wa s codified a s Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 9-8- 307.
Thus, this Court i n Y oungblood v. Clepper specific ally held that Tenne ssee Code A nnotated section 9-8- 307 was not ap p l i ca b le to that case and the de cision applied ca se law pr edatingthe Claims C ommissi on Act. Y oungblood , 856 S.W .2d at 406.

W ate rs v . S tate , 0 3 A 0 1

- 9 8 0 8-B C-00248, 1998 WL 880911 (Tenn.Ct.App. De c.17,1998) a nd Bo lto n v . S

tate , E2001-02960-COA- R9-CV, 2002 WL 1798 5 3 8 (T enn.Ct.App. Aug .6,2002) ar e unrepor ted dec isions of the Court of Appea ls in which applications to a ppeal to the Supreme Court
wer e not filed. In W

ate rs , the c la ima

nt ap pe a le d an a dv e rs e de c isi on of the Cla ims Com mis sio n in 6

a tr a ff ic a c c ide nt on Hi g hw ay 64 in Pol k County re su lti ng in the de a th o f M r. Wat e rs . T he Cla ims Commi ssion dism issed the ac tion holding that installation of the g uardr ails was discre tionary and the State wa s th e re fo r i mmune fr om s uit . T he Com mis sio n a lso he ld t hat th e c la ima

nt fai le d to establish any

neg lige nce by

the State in its design for m aintenanc e of the highw ay , or that its actions
we re the pr oximate c a

us e of the a c c ide nt. Th e Court of Ap pe a ls s us ta ine d th e a c tio n o f t he Cla ims Commi ssion on the basis that “the Claims Commissi on proper ly deter mined that the State is immune from suit on this evidence unde r T.C.A. §§ 9-8-307( a)( 1)(I ) and ( J ).” W ate rs , 1998 WL 880911, * 3. The a ppellate c ourt then dec lined to addre ss the other ba sis on which the Claims Com mission had dis mis se d th e c la im. Th e c ourt pr e dic a te s it s o pin ion

up on its state me nt:

T. C.A . § 9- 8- 30 7 p ro vid e s th e Co mm is si on ha s e xclu siv e jur isd ic tio n to decide cer

tain monetary claims ag ainst the State. In this case, the Claimant brought claims under T.C.A. § 9-8-307( a)( 1)(I ) and T.C.A. § 9-8-307( a)( 1)(J). Under T.C.A. § 9-8-307( d), the State “ may ass er t an y and all defenses, inc luding c ommon law defe nses, wh ich would have been a vailable to the of

fice r or e mploy ee in a

n action ag ainst such an individual based upon the s ame occurr ence .” Additi onally , T.C.A. § 9-8-307( g ) p r o v id e s “ [n ]o la n g u a g e c o n ta in e d

in th is c h a p te r is inte n d e d

to be construed to a

bridg e the common law immunit ies of state of ficials and e mploy ees.”-19-

Thus , und e r T .C. A. § 9 -8 -3 07 (d ), “ the State may a sse rt the c omm on law i mmunit y wh ic h h a s d e ve lop e d in

thi s State wi th r e g ard

to d isc ret io na

ry a c tio ns of

State employ ees.” Cox

v . S tate , 844 S.W .2d 173,176 (Tenn.A pp.1992) W ate rs , 1998 WL 880911, * 1 (Tenn.Ct.App. De c.19,1998). The languag e of Te nnessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307( g ) i s limit ed to the common l aw immunit ies of state officia ls a nd employ ees. No state off icial or e mploy ee w as a de fenda nt either in W ate rs or in the ca se at ba

r. The common law im munities of st ate of ficials and e mploy ees doe s not enure to the benef

it of t he st ate ex cept to the ex tent that section 307(d) allows the state to asse rt
su c h immun iti e s, and

that a llo wa

nc e is l imi te d to a

bs olute immun iti e s.
The diff iculty with this relianc e on the provision of Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 9-8- 30 7( d) that th e State “ may a sse rt any and a ll d e fe ns e s, inc lud ing c omm on law de fe ns e s, wh ic h w ou ld have be en ava ila b l e t o the offic er or employ ee in a

n action ag ainst such an individual base d upon the same oc curr ence ,” is that the same statute makes a n express distinction between “c ommon law defe nses” and “common law immunit ies.” The W ate rs’ c ourt the n r e lie s o n th e state me nt f ro m Cox
v . S tate , 844 S.W .2d 173, 176 (Tenn.A pp.1992) that “ t h e S tate may asser t the common law immunit y which has develope d in this State with reg ard to discretionar y actions of state employ ees.” The a ctual provision of Te nnessee Cod e An n o t ated section 9-8-307(d) as to such common law immunit ies is “the State may asser t any absolute common law im munities available to the office r or employ ee, how ever , g ood faith common law immunity may not be asser

ted.”

I n Bo lto n v . S

tate , E 2 0 0 1 -02960-COA-R9-CV, 2002 WL 1798538 (Tenn.Ct.App. Aug .6, 2002) t h e S t at e appealed the a ction of the Claims Commi ssion denying its Motion for Summary J udg ment based on discr etionary function i mmunity

. J anet Bolton was inj ured in Septembe r of 1995 in an automobil e ac cident on U.S. Hig hway 11. She sued under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 9-8-307( a)( 1)(I ) and ( J ), the same provisions of the statute on which the case at bar is predicated. Wit hout elaboration the Claims C ommissi on overr uled the summary judgme nt motion of the State. Certain conc essions by

the par ties must be noted. The State, in its reply

brief, how ever , conce des it is not entitl ed to summary judgme nt
on Plaintiffs’ claim that the portion of Hig hway 11 that includes the interse ction was
ne g lig e ntl y de sig ne d or c on str uc te d but ins te a d argue s Pla int if fs did no t ra ise this
c la im at th e tr ia l le ve l. Plaintiffs contend the Claims C o m m i s s i o nco rr ec t l y d en i edt h e S tate’s Motion for Summary

J udg ment and ar g ue the State is not entitled to discretionar y function immunit y for the neg lige nt de sign and construc tion and the dang erous c ondition of the int e rs e c tio n und e r T e nn .Co de Ann. §§ 9- 8- 30 7( a )( 1) (I ) a nd (J) . Pl a int if

fs , howeve r, conc ede the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of la

w under the dis c re tio na

ry fu nc tio n immun ity

de fe ns e fo r i ts d e c isi on

wh e the r or no t to ins ta ll a traff ic control de vice at the intersec tion.

Bolton , 2002 WL 1798538 * 2.-20-

Th e c ri tic a l po rt ion

of the op ini on

of the Court

of Ap pe a ls s tate s:

Fur thermore , under Te nn.Code Ann. § 9-8- 307(d), “ ‘the State may asser t the
common law immunit y which has develope d in this State with r eg ard to discr etionary actions of State e mploy ees.’ ” W a t e r s v . Stat e , No. 03A01-9808-BC-00243, 1998 Tenn.App. L EXI S 844, at * 2-3 (Te nn.Ct.App. Dec.17,1998) , no appl. perm. app. filed , (q u o t i n g Cox

v . S tate , 8 44 S.W. 2d 17 3, 17 6 ( Te nn .Ct .App .1 99 2) ). Th e State is i mm u n e f r o m s u it f o r d is c r e ti o n ar

y a c ts u n d e r

th is d e f e n s e

. Co u rts , when de te rm ini ngwh e the r a pa rt ic ula r de c isi on of the State is d isc re tio na ry , a re to a pp ly the planning -oper ational test. Id. a t * 3 ; Cox v . S tate , 844 S.W .2d at 176. When using the planning -oper ational test, courts a re to c onsider “ ‘ (1) the de cision-making proce ss and (2) the propriety of judicial revie w of the resulting decision.’ ” W ate rs v . S tate , 1998 Tenn.App. L EXI S 844, at * 3 (quoti n g B o w er s v. Chattanooga , 826 S.W .2d 427, 431 (Tenn.1992) ).

2002 WL 1798538 * 4.

Re lia nc e is on c e a g a in p la c e d o n th e langua g e fr om Cox v . S tate , 844 S.W .2d 173, 176 (T e nn .Ct .App .1 99 2) that “ the state may a sse rt the c omm on

law i mmunit

y wh ic h h a s d e ve lop e d in this state wit h reg ard to discretionar y actions of state employ ees.” Once ag ain this lang uag e is not what the statute say s. The only other a uthority relied on in Bolton is t

he same langua g e fr om W ate rs v . S tate

. Footnote 3 in the Bolton op ini on state s:
This Court in W

ate rs v . S tate held t hat, whil e our Supre me Court in Bo we rs v. City of Chatt anooga applied the planning -oper ational test to an ac tion
a g a ins t a mun ic ipa lity

un de r t he Te nn e sse e Go ve rnme nta l T or t L ia bil ity Ac t, the test was also applicable to actions ag ainst the State wher e the State r aises the def ense of common law immunity

. W a t e r s v . Stat e , 1998 Tenn.App. L EXI S 844, at * 3.

W ate rs , 2002 WL 1798538, *4 at n. 3.

The diff iculty with this posi tion is t hat while discretionar y function immunit y

upon which Bowers v. City of Chattanooga is predic ated is specific ally applicable to counties and c ities under the Tenne ssee Gove rnmental Tor t L iability Act, it is not applicable to the State of Tenne ssee unde r the Claims Commi ssion Act, section 9-7-307( d) as only “absolute” immunit ies are available to the state . D isc re tio na

ry fu nc tio n immunit

y is a qua lif

ie d (g oo d f

a ith ) i mmunit

y rathe r t ha n a n a bs oluteT he m et am o rpho si s o f t he p o si t i o n of t he Stat e o n thi s i ss ue i s i nt erest i ng and pred i ct ab l e. I n C o x v . S ta te , 7

“ t h e s t at e mai n t ai n s t h at i t h as n ev er as s er t ed di s cr et i on ar y f u n ct i on i mmun i t y as a de f en s e t o t h i s c l ai m. ” 844 S. W

. 2d 1 7 3 , 17 6 (T enn. C t

. A p p .1 9 9 2 ). W h e n i n s p i t e o f t hi s ass ert i o n t he C l ai m s C o m m i ss i o n i n Cox ap p l i ed dis cret i o nary f unct i o n i m m uni t y and t he C o urt of A p p eal s ap p roved such act i o ns, a l t ho ugh i n a s ect i o n of t he o p i ni o n not necessar y t o a d eci si o n in t he case, the S t at e p rom p t l y a ccep t ed thi s i nvi t at i o n a nd in b o t h W a t ers an d Bol t on , s peci f i cal l y r el i ed

o n d isc re tio n a ry fun c tio n im m u n ity a s it h a s re lied o n su c h im m u n ity in th e c a se a t b a r.
-21- immunit y and by the express provisions of section 307(d) of the statute cannot be re lied upon by the State in an ac tion before the Claims Com mission. 7

Even in the a

bsence of a c lear

leg islative mandate suc h as is c ontained in Tennesse e Code Annotated se ction 9-8-307( d), the State c ould not assert di scre tionary function i mmunity as a matter of law s o a s to jus tif

y summa ry jud g me nt. Although absolute immunit y from § 1983 actions is available to gove rnment of fi c ia ls p e rf

or min g le g isl ativ e fu

nc tio ns a t th e mun ic ipa l le ve l, g e ne ra lly on ly qu a lif ie d o r “ g oo d f

a ith ” immun ity

ha s b e e n e xten de d to g ov e rnme nt o ff ic ials perf orming discretionar

y functions that ar e cha rac teristically

executive or adminis t rative. Scheue r v. Rhodes , 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.C t. 1683, 40 L .Ed.2d 90 (1 97 4) ; Harlow , s up ra ; Mi tc he ll v . F or sy th , 472 U. S

. 5 1 1 , 105 S.Ct . 2806, 86 L .Ed.2d 411 (1985). See , also, Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.C t. 3034, 97 L .E d2 d 5 23 (1 98 7) ; Se c tio n 1 98 3: Swo rd an d S hie ld , s u p ra, at 340-42; and Fe de ra l Civ il R igh ts A c ts , supra, §§ 108, 109. Conseque ntly , beca use the United States S u p reme Court has applied a “ function” te st in determining the extent of immun ity g ra nte d to g ov e rnme nt o ff

ic ia ls, and

be c a us e that C ou rt ha s st

ro ng ly sug g ested, a

nd other c ourts h ave held, that g overnme nt officials pe rfor ming at the
mun ic ipa l le ve l sh ou ld n ot b e c la ssi fi e d d if fe re ntl y fr om g ov e rnme nt o ff

ic ia ls pe rf or min g a t th e fe de ra l or

state le ve l, w e c on c lud e that immun ity

is a va ila ble to g overnme nt officials pe rfor ming discr etionary

functions at the municipal level that
are executive or a dminist rative in nature, b u t that that immunit y is lim ited to the qu a l i f i e d o r “ g o o d f a i t h ” v ar i e t y. Point Properties, Inc. v . Anderson , 584 So.2d 1332, 1338 (Ala.1991).

A c a se c los e ly

ana log ou s to the cas e a t ba r i s Sa v age v . S

tate , 127 Wash.2d 434, 899 P.2d 1 2 7 0 (1 9 9 5 ). T h e l egi s l at u re o f W as h i n gt o nh aden ac t eda s we ep i n g ab ro gat i o no f s o v er ei gn immunit y simil ar to the Te nnessee Claims C ommissi on Act. In a suit ag ainst the State for a lleg ed neg lige nt supervision of a pr isoner wh o raped the plaintiff, the f inding of the Supreme Court of W a s h i n g t o nd e n i e d

t h e e f f o rto f t h e S t a t e t o a s s e rts o v e r e i g ni m m u n i t y:

I n addition, the Court of Appea ls’ holding on the immunit y issue is based on a pre mise we c annot sustain: that the immunit y of a g overnme nt age n t will be extended to the State unless expre ssly prohibited

by th e L eg islature. Savage , 72 Was h. Ap p. a t 49 0, 86 4 P. 2d 10 09 . T hat c on c lus ion

sim ply c ann ot b e re c on c ile d w ith-22-

the le g isl a tiv e a

br og a tio n o f s ov e re ig n immun ity . T hat a br og a tio n w o u l d b e p o i nt le ss if the L eg islature we re r equire d, in order to g ive it effe ct, to reiter ate it at ever y oc c a sio n in

wh ic h it mig ht ap ply . The re is n o b a sis fo r t re a tin g RCW 4. 92 .0 90 a s a nullity , particula

rly as it is one of the broade st w aiver s of sovere ign immunity in the country

. SeeComment, Abolition of Sovere ign I mmuni t y i n W ashington , 36 Wash.L .Rev. 312, 313 (1961).

B

Th e Exte ns ion

of Qu a lif ie d Pe rs on a l Immunit

y fo r t he State The prope r startingpoint for a discussion of whether the State is immune for the qualifiedly

immune acts of its offic ers must beg in with the leg islative abrog ation
o f s o v e r e i g ni m m u n i t y. Article 2, § 26 of the Washing ton State Consti tution provides: “[t ]he leg islature shall direc t by law, in what mann er , an d i n what cour ts, suits may

be b r o u g h t aga i n s tt h e s t at e. ” In 1 9 6 1 t h e Legi s l at u re wa i v edt h e S t at e’ s s o v er ei gn im munity fr om c ivi l li a

bil ity . L aws of

19 61 , c h. 13 6, § 1 (c od if ie d a s RCW 4. 92 .0 90 ). As su

bs e qu e ntl y

ame nd e d, that se c tio n p ro vid e s: The state of Washington, whether acting in its gover nmental
or pr op ri e tary

c a pa c ity , s ha ll b e lia

ble fo r d ama g e s a

ri sin g out of i ts tortious conduct to the same ex tent as if it wer e a pr ivate per son or corpor ation. This provision operate s to make the State pre sumptively lia b lein all instances in whic h th e L e g isl a tur e ha s not indicated other

wise. (unde rscor ing a dded). Quite apa rt from the le g islative mandate abrog ating sovere ign immunity , the differ ent func tions personal and g overnme ntal immunit y are desig ned to serve
s u p p o rtm a i n t a i n i n g s t a t e l i a b i l i t y i nt h i s c o n t e x t , e v e nw h e r e t h e a g e n te n j o ys qu a lif ie d p e rs on a l im mun ity . O ne c ourt ha s e xpla ine d th e dif

fe re nc e a s f

oll ow s: [T] he funda

mental re asons for the two immunit i es diffe r; for the
o f f i c e r i ti s t o e n c o u r a g e u n r e s t r a i n e d e x e c u t i o no f

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y, wh ile fo r the so ve re ig n it is to pr e ve nt jud ic ia l sc rutiny of b asic policies formulate d by

coordinate bra

nches of g overnme nt. To insu late the Gove rnment fr om liabilit y for the ine vitable mishaps which will occur

when its employ ees pe rfor m their functions without fea r of liability

not only is unjust, but also serve s no purpose for wh ic h s ov e re ig n immun ity ne e d e xist. Downs v. United States , 382 F.Supp. 713, 750 (M.D.Tenn.1974) (in a Fe dera l Tort Claims Act case it was unnec essar y to decide whether

g overnme nt ag ents wer e immune, beca

use t he gover

nment would not be im mune even if they wer e), rev’d on other grounds , 5 2 2 F

. 2 d 9 9 0 ( 6 t hC i r .1 97 5) ; s ee also Lutheran Day Care v

. Snohomish Cy. , 119 Wash.2d 91, 108, 829 P.2d 746 (1992), cert. de nied , _

__ _ U .S. _____, 113 S.Ct . 1044, 122 L .Ed.2d 353 (1992).-23-

The Restate ment (Second) of Torts re cognizes thi s notion:

Wit h respe ct to some g overnme nt f unctions, the threat of

individual liabi l i ty would have a

devasting[si c] effe ct, while the thre at of g overnme ntal liability

would not significa

ntly impair perf

ormanc e. Restatement (Sec ond) of Tor ts § 895D cmt. j, at 420 (1979). A fac t a nd policy specific inquiry

also sug g ests the rationale under ly ing the g rant of qualified persona l immunity to pa role office rs does not a

pply wi t h equal forc e to the State. Parole o ff i ce rs s u pervisingparole es ar e ca lled upon to make difficult dec isions under difficult circ umstances. Tag ga rt v . S tate , 118 Wash.2d 195, 21 5, 82 2 P. 2d

24 3 ( 19 92 ). Gi ve n th e se c on dit ion s, the pr os pe c t of pe rs on a l li a

bil ity may rea sonably be expected to ha ve an unduly inhibiti ng eff ect on the per formanc e of the ir pr of e ssi on a l dutie s. As was the c ase in Ba bc oc k v . S tate , 116 Wash.2d 596, 616-19, 809 P.2d 143 (1991), the sa

me ca nnot be said about state liability

. On t h e contra ry , maintaining the potential of state liability , as established in RCW 4.92, can be expected to have the salutary

eff ect of providing the S tate an incentive to ensure that rea sonable c are is u se d in fa sh ion ingg uid e lin e s and pr oc e dure s f

or the su pe rv isi on of pa ro le e s.
Sa v age v . S

tate , 127 Wash.2d 434, 444, 899 P.2d 1270, 1275-76 (Wash.1995).

The Claims Commi ssion, both in Commi ssioner Baker ’s Marc h 1, 2002 order and in the en banc or der of

Aug ust 5, 2002 ex haustively construed T ennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 9-8-307 and the c ases de emed applicable to such construc tion and rea ched the conclusion that the State wa s no t e n t i t l e d t o r e l y u

p o n d i s c r e t i o n ar

y f u n c t i o n i m m u n i t y

. T h e r e a s o n i n g o f t h e C o m mis sio n is impressive but we are content to sustain the pos ition of t he C laims Comm ission on the basis that the statu te is c le ar

an d u n amb igu o u s an d

n e e d s n o c o n s tr

u c ti o n

. Wh e th e r

o n e r e f e r s to “ qualified immun ity ,” “ dis c re tio nary func tio n immun ity ,” “ dis c re tio na ry a c ts i mmunit

y ,” or “ g oo d f a ith immunit y ” is, in the context of this case, acad emi c. None of these c hara cter izations qualify as an “absolute immunity ” and only absolute immuniti es ar e ava ilable to the state under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 9-8-307( d).

The State a

rgues t hat even afte r i t is deter mined that there is a dange rous conditi on, “then the State must be able to use its discre tion in making a de cisi on whether there are funds and other
resour ces available to c orre ct the dang erous c ondition.” In such situations, the argument g oes, the state has the disc retion to decide that the correc tion is too ex pensive or that monetary considerations require delay

in corre ction until other projects are completed or even that a war ning is not feasible. “The State must have the discr etion t o m ake the se dec isions without fea r of law suits challeng ing the dec isions made.”

Th is p os iti on

is i nc on sis te nt w ithTe nn . Co de Ann. § 9 -8 -3 07 (a )( 1) (I ) a nd (J ). I t is a lso inconsistent with the Claims C ommissi on Act provision that t h e S tate’s liability in tort “shall be based on the t ra ditional concepts of duty and the r easona

bly prudent pe rson’s standa

rd of c are .”T he Savage c o u rt sid e ste p p e d this q u e stio n b y a ff irm ing the trial c o u rt ju d g m e n t o n the b a sis tha t t h e S ta te 8 had t ender ed no proof

as t o s uch cons i dera t i ons or as t o t he economi c r es our ces av ai l abl e t o t he s t at e.
-24- Tenn. Code Ann. § 9- 8-307(c ). Under g ener ally -applica

ble principles of

tort law, all per sons have
a duty to us e re a so na

ble c are un de r the c ir c ums tanc e s to re fr a in fr om c on du c t th a t w ill fo re se e a bly
cause injury

to others. Doe v . Linder Const ru. Co., Inc. , 8 4 5 S

. W

. 2 d 1 7 3 , 1 7 8 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 2 )

. In deter mining whe ther, in a pa

rticular situation, there is a duty to act re sponsibly

so as to protec t others fr om u nr e a so na ble ri sk s o f h arm , T e nn e sse e ha s a do pte d a n a pp ro a c h th a t bal anc e s th e fo re se e a ble probability

and seve rity

of har m ag ainst the burden upon the defe ndant to eng ag e i n alternative conduct that would have pr evente d the har m. Staples v. CBL & Associates, Inc

. , 13 S.W .3d 83, 89 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; Mc Clu ng

v . D e lta S q u a reL im ite d P ar tne rsh ip , 937 S.W .2d 891, 894-95 (Te nn. 1996); McCall v. W

ilder , 913 S.W .2d 150, 153 (T en n

. 1 9 9 5 ). I n deter mining whe ther a

risk is an
unrea sonable one , the cour t must consider sever al fa ctors, including

The for esee able pr obability of the ha rm or i njury occur

ring ; the pos sible mag nitude of the potential harm or injury ; the importance or social va lue of the a ctivity eng ag ed in by defe ndant; the usefulne ss of the conduc t t o d efe ndant; the fe asibility of alternative, safe r conduc t and the re lative costs an d b u rdens a ssociated with that conduct; the r elative use fulness of the sa ferconduct; and the relative safe ty of
a lte rn a tiv e c on du c t. Staples , 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d

at 8 9 , qu o t i n g Co ln v

. Ci ty o f S avannah , 9 6 6 S.W .2d 34, 39 (Tenn. 1998) ; McCall v. W

ilder , 913 S.W .2d at 153. Thus, under g ener al tort law princ iples, the fea sibili ty and costs assoc iated with cor rec ting a dang erous c ondition or taking othe r steps to avoid injury beca use of that c ondition would be fac tors rele vant to a dete rmination of duty , not a bar to rec overy by an injured pla intiff. Our Supreme Court 8 has applied tra ditional tort theories to claims under the Claims C ommissi on Act, pursua nt to Tenn. Code Ann. §9-8- 307(c)

. Se e Ste war t v . S tate , 33 S.W .3d 785, 793 (Tenn. 2000) (apply ing c ommon law princ iples of assumption of a duty where o n e i s not leg ally imposed to a claim for

neg lige nt control).

CONCL USI ON

The see d from which the problem developed i n this case wa s planted in Cox v . S tate , when afte r the State c orre ctly

conce ded that it could not rely on discretionary function i mmunity under T e n n e s s e e C o d e A n n o t a

t e d s e c t i o n9

- 8

- 3 0 7 ( d ) t h e C l a i m s C o m m i s s i o na p p l i e d t h e d o c t r i n e an yw ay. Whe n th is C ourt

in d ic ta a pp rov ed th e a c tio n o f t

he Cla ims Com mis sio n th e State c ha ng e d it s position. There afte r, in W ate rs and in Bolton and in the case at bar , the State asser ted discre tionary function immunity

based upon Cox . Continued reliance on the dicta in Coxsimply compounds the problem.-25-

Sub ject to mo net ary

c a ps and lim itatio ns to a c tua l da

ma g e s and

c ourt c os ts, the Cla ims Commi ssion Ac t w as a swee ping abrog ation of sovere ign immunit y

. He mb re e v . S tate , 925 S.W .2d 513 (Tenn.1996) . I t was the same broad w aiver of sover eig n immunit y

as wa s eff

ecte d in Savage , 899 P.2d 1270 (Wash.1995). By way of exception to this broad a brog ation, the leg islature g ave ba ck to t he state the ri g ht t o p le a d a bs olute immun ity

. Th e le g isl a tur e sp e c if ic a lly pr oh ibi te d th e state from re ly ing on “ g ood faith” immunity . The c ontrolling point is that no matter how one may define

“ dis c re tio na

ry fu nc tio n” immun ity

it c ann ot b e de fi ne d a s an a bs olute immun ity , a

nd s i n c e the statut e re str ic ts the state to t

he de fe ns e of

a bs ol ut e im munity

on ly , it ne c e ssa ri ly fo llo ws that th e State
s i mp l y c an n o tr e l y o n“ d i s c r e t i o n ar y f u n c t i o n ” i m m u n i t y.
The Cl aims Commi ssion has already held that the question of notice of dang erous c onditions
re m ai n s for tria l. I t has furthe r alre ady g rante d summary

judgme nt to the State under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 28-3-202 f or all cla ims predicate d upon acts or omission o cc u rr ing mor e than four year s befor e the r espec tive dates of c laims in these case s. As t h ese issues we re not appea led, they

are not curre ntly

befor e the Court. For esee ability rema ins a n issue of fa ct to be tried.

On the sole issue be fore this Court which is the availability of “dis cr et i o n ar y

function” immunit y to the State under the Tenne ssee Claims Commi ssion Act, we a ffirm the a ct i on of the Claims C ommissi on for r easons state d here in and re mand these ca s es fo r t rial on their r espec tive merits “base d upon the t raditional t ort conce pts of dut y and a r easona

bly prudent pe rsons’ standa

rd of ca re.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 9- 8-307(d)

. Costs of the cause are assessed to the State of Tenne ssee.

____________________________________ WI L L I AM B. CAI

N, J UDGE