alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-1002

VICTORIA MINDI AMBA,

Petitioner,

versus

JOHN ASHCROFT,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals. (A95-219-544)

Submitted: July 16, 2004 Decided: August 4, 2004

Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Bokwe G. Mofor, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Petitioner. Peter D.

Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Linda S. Wernery, Douglas E.

Ginsburg, Senior Litigation Counsel, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Victoria Mindi Amba, a native and citizen of Cameroon,

petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“Board”) affirming the immigration judge’s denial of

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention

Against Torture. 

In her petition for review, Amba contends that she

established her eligibility for asylum relief. The record reveals,

however, that the Board upheld the immigration judge’s denial of

asylum relief on the ground that Amba failed to demonstrate by

clear and convincing evidence that she filed her application within

one year of the date of her arrival in the United States. See 8

U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2000). We lack jurisdiction to review this

determination pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (2000). See

Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 544 (6th Cir. 2003);

Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2003);

Tsevegmid v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2003);

Fahim v. United States Attorney Gen., 278 F.3d 1216, 1217-18 (11th

Cir. 2002); Hakeem v. INS, 273 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2001);

Ismailov v. Reno, 263 F.3d 851, 854-55 (8th Cir. 2001). Given this

jurisdictional bar, we cannot review the underlying merits of

Amba’s asylum claim.

While we do not have jurisdiction to consider the Board’s

denial of Amba’s asylum claim, we retain jurisdiction to consider
- 3 -

the denial of her request for withholding of removal, which is not

subject to the one-year time limitation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)

(2004). “To qualify for withholding of removal, a petitioner must

show that [s]he faces a clear probability of persecution because of

h[er] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular

social group, or political opinion.” Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316,

324 n.13 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430

(1984)). Based on our review of the record, we find that Amba has

failed to meet this standard.

Accordingly, we deny Amba’s petition for review. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
##### 



Exhibit 31.1
 WESTERN RESERVE BANCORP, INC.
FORM 10-KSB
Year ended December 31, 2006
 CERTIFICATIONS
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Western Reserve Bancorp, Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented
in this report;4.
    
    The small business issuers other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:
  [This paragraph intentionally left blank.]
   5.
    
    The small business issuers other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business
issuers auditors and the audit committee of the small business issuers board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):
   By: /s/ Edward J. McKeon
    

Date:   March 29, 2007Edward J. McKeon, President and CEO
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-50728 Summary Calendar

IRA “JIM” M. HOMEWOOD ET AL., Plaintiffs,

IRA “JIM” M. HOMEWOOD; RUFUS L. HUDGINS; CLETON SHANNON, JR.; DAVID T. LEVAN; KIM L. HILL; CARLOS JUAREZ; CAROLYN CURNOW, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus TEXAS EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, INC., doing business as Gary Job Corps, Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. A-96-CV-569

- - - - - - - - - - May 25, 1998 Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * The Plaintiffs appeals the summary judgment dismissal of their claims brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents , 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in determiningNo. 97-50728 -2- that Texas Educational Foundation, Inc., was not a state actor. Inasmuch as plaintiff Juarez does not challenge the district court’s decision with regard to his Title VII claims, they are waived. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner , 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). We have reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs and AFFIRM the district court’s judgment for essentially the same reasons set forth by the district court. Homewood et al. v. Texas Educational Foundation, Inc. , A 96-CA-569 SS (W.D. Tex. July 23, 1997).
AFFIRMED.
_________________________________________ 

 

_________________________________________ 

 

_________________________________________ 

_________________________________________ 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

February 2, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

132048-9(55) Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly IN RE HAILEY NICOLE SCHILL, Minor. Maura D. Corrigan 

_________________________________________ Robert P. Young, Jr. 

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES f/k/a Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY, 

Petitioner-Appellee, 

v SC: 132048 

 COA: 267501

 Macomb CC

 Family Division: 2003-5529011-NA 

RANAE DENISE HARDING, 

Respondent-Appellant, 

and 

ERIC ALLEN SCHILL,

Respondent. 

IN RE ANGELICA DIANNE HARDING, Minor. 

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES f/k/a 

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY, 

Petitioner-Appellee, 

v SC: 132049 

 COA: 267526

 Macomb CC

 Family Division: 2003-5529021-NA 

RANAE DENISE HARDING, 

Respondent-Appellant, 

and 

ERIC ALLEN SCHILL,

Respondent. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s September 

29, 2006 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order 

was entered erroneously. 

p0130 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

February 2, 2007 

Clerk
Tel-Instrument Electronics Corp
                                CEO Certification                   Exhibit 32.1

           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 8 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection  with the  Quarterly  Report of  Tel-Instrument  Electronics
Corp. (the "Company"), on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2003, as
filed with the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the
"Report"),  I, Harold K. Fletcher,  President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Company,  certify,  pursuant to and solely for the purpose of 18 U.S.C.  Section
1350,  as adopted  pursuant  to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,
that, to my knowledge and based on my review of the Report:

            1.    the Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

            2.    the information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in
                  all material respects,  the financial  condition and result of
                  operations of the Company.

                                            By: /s/ Harold K. Fletcher
                                                ----------------------
                                                /s/ Harold K. Fletcher
                                                Chairman and President

                                                  December 22, 2003

      A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906 has
been  provided  to  Tel-Instrument  Electronics  Corp  and will be  retained  by
Tel-Instrument  Electronics  Corp and furnished to the  Securities  and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.


                                      -15-
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed April 14, 2021. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D21-690 Lower Tribunal No. F11-19910

________________ Anthony Chavis, Appellant, vs. The State of Florida, Appellee. An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Ellen Sue Venzer, Judge. Anthony Chavis, in proper person. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee. Before LOGUE, SCALES, and LOBREE, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.1




CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER


AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


(SUBSECTIONS (A) AND (B) OF SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18,


UNITED STATES CODE)




Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the undersigned officers Oramed Pharmaceuticals Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), does hereby certify, to such officer’s knowledge, that the Annual Report for the fiscal year ended August 31, 2011 (the “Form 10-K”) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Dated: November 28, 2011
/s/ Nadav KidronNadav Kidron, President and Chief Executive OfficerDated: November 28, 2011
/s/ Yifat ZommerYifat Zommer, Chief Financial Officer




A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided by the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3095 Received in Senate (RDS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3095

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 27, 2013

                                Received

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
    To ensure that any new or revised requirement providing for the 
 screening, testing, or treatment of individuals operating commercial 
motor vehicles for sleep disorders is adopted pursuant to a rulemaking 
                  proceeding, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO 
              SLEEP DISORDERS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of Transportation may implement or 
enforce a requirement providing for the screening, testing, or 
treatment (including consideration of all possible treatment 
alternatives) of individuals operating commercial motor vehicles for 
sleep disorders only if the requirement is adopted pursuant to a 
rulemaking proceeding.
    (b) Applicability.--Subsection (a) shall not apply to a requirement 
that was in force before September 1, 2013.
    (c) Sleep Disorders Defined.--In this section, the term ``sleep 
disorders'' includes obstructive sleep apnea.

            Passed the House of Representatives September 26, 2013.

            Attest:

                                                 KAREN L. HAAS,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
#### GLASGOW COCA-COLA BOTTLING WORKS, Inc. v. WILSON.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Feb. 12, 1954.

Richardson & Barrickman, Glasgow, for appellant.

Wilson & Wilson, Glasgow, for appellee.

CULLEN, Commissioner.

The Glasgow Coca-Cola Bottling Works prays for an appeal from a judgment against it in favor of Earl Wilson, in the amount of $500, for personal injuries sustained as a result of drinking from a bottle of Coca-Cola which contained a dead mouse. One of the grounds of reversal relied upon 'by the company is the lack of proof of integrity of the bottle.

The facts with respect to integrity of the bottle in this case are substantially the same as those in Ashland Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Byrne, Ky., 258 S.W.2d 475, in which we held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would not be applied.

In an able brief, counsel for appellee urges that the Byrne case be overruled. However, a majority of the Court continues to adhere to the views expressed in the Byrne case.

The motion for an appeal is granted and the judgment is reversed.
Exhibit 32.1

### Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

### As Adopted Pursuant to

### Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

---

In connection with the
quarterly report of Pathmark  Stores, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the
period ended October 29, 2005,  as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the  Report), I, John T. Standley, Chief Executive Officer
of the Company, hereby  certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:



| | (1) | the
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the
information contained in the Report fairly represents, in  all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the  Company.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this
written statement required by  Section 906, or other document authenticating,
acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the  signature that appears in typed form within the
electronic version of this written  statement required by Section 906, has been provided
to the Company and will be retained  by the Company and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon  request.

| |                      | /s/ John T. Standley                                    
| | -------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------
| | Name:    Title:Date: | John T. StandleyChief Executive Officer
December 2, 2005
#### FUDGE v. STATE.

No. 24024.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 5, 1948.

No appearance for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Appellant was charged by complaint and information with the offense of driving while intoxicated. Upon his plea of guilty the court assessed his punishment at a fine of $50 and costs.

The procedure appears regular. The record is brought forward without a statement of facts or bills of exception. Nothing is presented for our consideration.

The judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 23





CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
--------------------------------------------------------

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No.
333-42859 of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Merrill Lynch Preferred Capital Trust
III, Merrill Lynch Preferred Funding III, L.P., Merrill Lynch Preferred Capital
Trust IV and Merrill Lynch Preferred Funding IV, L.P. and Registration Statement
No. 333-44173 of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Merrill Lynch Preferred Capital
Trust IV, Merrill Lynch Preferred Funding IV, L.P., Merrill Lynch Preferred
Capital Trust V and Merrill Lynch Preferred Funding V, L.P. on Forms S-3 of our
reports dated March 23, 2007, appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of
Merrill Lynch Preferred Capital Trust IV and Merrill Lynch Preferred Funding IV,
L.P. for the year ended December 29, 2006.

/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP


New York, New York
March 23, 2007
**Exhibit 32.1****Certification Pursuant To****18 U.S.C. Section 1350****As Adopted Pursuant To****Section 906 Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002**This certification is provided pursuant to § 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1350,and accompanies the Annual Report on Form 10-K/ A,Amendment No. 2, for the period ended December 31,2004 of Horizon Offshore, Inc. (the Company) as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (theReport).I, David W. Sharp, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,certify that:     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements ofsection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Act of1934; and     (2) The information contained in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Company.     /s/ David W. Sharp           David W. Sharp *President and Chief Executive Officer*August 15, 2005
#### REDDICK v. STATE.

No. 22731.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 2, 1944.

W. T. McDonald and Oak McKenzie, both of Bryan, for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

*269HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Conviction is for murder; punishment assessed at five years in the penitentiary.

The record is before us without a statement of facts or bills of exception. In such condition nothing is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAY-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JUN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               FEB-28-1999
<CASH>                                           5,710
<SECURITIES>                                     2,977
<RECEIVABLES>                                   29,297
<ALLOWANCES>                                       977
<INVENTORY>                                      9,422<F1>
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                52,154
<PP&E>                                          62,301
<DEPRECIATION>                                  42,837
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  75,751
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           22,408
<BONDS>                                          6,531
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        46,485
<OTHER-SE>                                     (3,010)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    75,751
<SALES>                                         95,445
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               117,975
<CGS>                                           55,302
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   72,788
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                43,864
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   120
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 559
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    764
<INCOME-TAX>                                       400
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                364
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       364
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .07
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .07
<FN>
<F1> Inventory detail at February 28, 1999 was finished goods $4,739; work in 
process $572; raw materials $4,111.
</FN>
        


</TABLE>
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

MICHAEL ARMAND DELORME
, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA
, Appellee

.

No. 4D 19

- 1510

[ March 4 , 2020 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.

Lucie County ; Gary L. Sweet , Judge; L.T. Case No. 562011CF000962 A

.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ian Seldin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and James J. Carney,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

ON CONFESSION OF ERROR

C ONNER
, J

.

Appellant, Michael Armand Delorme, appeals the denial of his motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) . In the motion, Appellant argued that he was sentenced on a violation of probation based on an incorr ect scoresheet. Specifically, he alleged that there were seventeen counts of third

- degree grand theft erroneously listed on the scoresheet as “additional offense(s).” The State agrees that the trial court erred. Because Appellant completed his
sentences fo r those seventeen counts of third

- degree grand theft prior to the time he violated his probation, and therefore, those counts were not

“ pending before the court for sentencing at the time of the primary offense,” we agree the scoresheet was scored improper ly

. See § 921.0021(1), Fla. Stat. (2011) (defining “[a]dditional offense” as “any offense other than the primary offense for which an offender is convicted
and which is pending before the court for sentencing at the time of the primary offense” (emphasis added)); see also Sanders v. State , 35 So. 3d 864, 866 (Fla. 2010 ) (“Offenses over which the trial court no longer has2 jurisdiction cannot be scored as additional offenses during a sentencing proceeding following a violation of probation because they do not fit the
definition of ‘ additional offense ’ set out in section 9 21.0021, Florida Statutes (1999) .”); Somps v. State

, 183 So. 3d 1090, 1092 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“An offense should not be scored as an additional offense following
the revocation of a defendant ’ s probation if the defendant completed his
sentence as to that offense before the VOP occurred.”). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for resentencing.

Reverse and remand for resentencing

.

M AY and C IKLIN
, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### H. H. HAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 23484.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 16, 1946.

W. S. Foster and Gene Maddin, both of Waco, for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Proper affidavit having been filed, the appellant’s motion to withdraw the appeal is granted and the clerk is directed to so certify.