AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed August 31, 2020 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-19-00133-CV IN THE INTEREST OF M.H . AND T.H., CHILDREN On Appeal from the 256th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-16-26862 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Burn s, Pedersen, and Evans Opinion by Chief Justice Burns 1 Cristian Hinojosa appeals the trial court’s property division i n the final decree of divorce between Cristian and Sara Hinojosa. In three issues , Cristian argues he was entitled to confirmation of his separate real property and $20,000 in his Interactive Brokers Account, he was entitled to reimbursement t o his separate property for the payment of a community debt, and the trial cou rt abused its discretion in awarding a dispro portionate value of the communit y estate. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

1 The Honorable David Bridges, Jus tice, participated in the submi ssion of this case; however, he did not participate in the issuance of this opinion due to his death on July 25, 2020. Chief Justice Burns has reviewed the record and the briefs in this cause.–2– Cristian and Sara were married i n January 2013. During the mar riage, they had two children, M.H. and T.H. In December 2016, Cristian fil ed his original petition for divorce. Cristian’ s second amended petition for d ivorce, the live pleading, alleged the marriage ha d become insupportable because of discord or conflict of personalities that d estroyed the legitimate ends of the marriage relationship. Without specifying the property at issue, Cristi an stated he owned “certain separate property that is not part of the community es tate” and requested that the trial court confirm that property as separate property . Cristian also requested reimbursement of his separate e state for funds or assets expend ed by his separate estate for the benefit of the community estate. Again, Cristia n did not specify the amount of funds expended or the purpose of their expenditure. Among other things, Cristian requested he be awarded exclusive use and possession o f the residence on Southwestern Boulevard and “bank accounts held exclusively” in his name. Sara’s second amended counterpetition for divorce, filed in May 2018, alleged the marriage had become insupportable but further alleged Crist ian was “guilty of cruel treatment toward” Sara a nd had “committed adultery.” Sar a requested that she be appointed sole managing conser vator of the children and that Cristian be “required to monitor his sobriety through the use of Soberlink and ordered to submit to alcohol testing at a set time before, during, and immediatel y following his possession periods of the children and all breathalyzer tests s hould be immediately forwarded to” Sara.–3– The counterpetition anticipated that the parties would enter in to a written agreement for the division of the community property marital es tate. However, absent such an agreement, Sara r equested a disproportionate sha re of the parties’ estate for the following reasons: the fault of Cristian in the breakup of the marriage, including the cruel treatment of Sara; adultery; the benefits S ara may have derived from the continuation of the marriage; anticipation that Sara w ould be appointed the conservator with the exclusive r ight to designate the primary r esidence of the children; the tax and other busin ess consequences of the proper ty division; reimbursement; actual and constr uctive fraud committed by Crist ian; and attorney’s fees to be paid. The counterpe tition separately addressed Cris tian’s alleged fraud on the community and requested that the court reconstitute the com munity estate to its full value prior to Cristian’s “depletion of the community esta te by his fraudulent acts and divide the reconstituted community estate” including a warding Sara “an appropriate share of the commun ity estate, a money judgment, or both.” At trial in May 2018, Cristian testified that the value of his pension plan when he married Sara was $28,679. Bef ore the marriage, Cristian own ed a condominium on Holland Avenue and a house on La ke Gardens. When Sara and C ristian found a home on Moss Farms that they want ed to buy, they had money for a down payment on the home but did not have money to remodel the home until th ey sold the Lake Gardens property. Cristian testified that, when Lake Gardens s old, the money was his separate property. Cristian testified that, “At that point the equity was–4– $171,708”as shown on petitioner’s exhibit 12, a 2013 “Substitut e Form 1098” also labeled as a “Mortgage Interest Statement.” Cristian testified petitioner’s exhibit 19 showed “the net proceeds of Lake Gardens was deposited into [hi s] account.” Petitioner’s exhibit 19 is a Bank of America account summary in the name of Cristian Hinojosa and Sara Hinojo sa and covers the period March 11, 2016 to April 8, 2016. The exhibit showed a beginning balance of $7,654.83, deposits and other additions of $192,593.52, withdraw als and other subtractions of “-46,053.29,” checks of “-57,155.50,” and an ending balance of $97,037.06. C ristian testified he used some of the money to pay off a loan from his father and so me to “pay off the interest,” and he invested $55, 000 of the money in Moss Farms. Cristian also introduced an exhibit (4) listing items he asked the court to c onfirm as his separate property. On cross examination, Cristian testified he was “seeking a $131 ,000.00 reimbursement claim on the house. ” When asked what documents h e had to show the value of the house immediatel y before he started making imp rovements, Cristian testified he had “the 1098 statement from 2013 at the year of t he marriage.” Cristian testified he started making improvements on the Moss Farm resid ence “From day one” when “We purchased Moss Farm in the fall of 2015.” When a sked if he had any “documents that reflect the value of these improvements con tributed to the house, to the value of the house,” Cristian testified he had “T hree different appraisals, price the improvements gave a fair market value of the property post–5– improvement.” When asked if there was “nothing that differenti ates any value that the improvements added, if any, versus the value of simply mark et appreciation,” Cristian answered, “the appraised value was based on market and the improvements is based on the condition, desirability, and utility rating.” When asked again if he had “anything to differentiate b etween the value contributed by the improvement and the value attributable to market forces,” Cristian answered , “They’re in Sara’s possession.” Cristian testified he was asking the court to ado pt his parenting plan and his property division and c onfirm his separate property. Sara testified that, in May 2016, she was two days away from a C-section scheduled to deliver her second child when Cristian went out an d she did not hear from him by 11:30 p.m. Sara “knew he was probably out drinking .” Sara testified Cristian responded to her texts “about 2:00 in the morning, som ething like, I’m sorry my phone was off. I’ve been drinking. I’m not coming home.” Cristian “came back late the next day.” The birth of Sara’s second child was “fine ,” but afterwards in the delivery room Cristian started “picking a fight” and “verbally abusing” Sara, and he told Sara “he wanted a divorce.” After the baby came home, Cri stian “went into a several week spiral” of drinking, “becoming more and more depre ssed,” and “crying a lot.” Cristian told Sara “ove r and over again” that he had “ demons inside” him and “a devil in” him and asked her to call a priest. Sara testifie d Cristian “was afraid he was going to hurt himself and he wanted [Sara] to get the guns out of the house.”–6– Sara took Cristian to “detox” at Presbyterian Hospital where he stayed approximately four days before t elling Sara over the phone that she was “trying to lock him up.” Sara went to the hospital to visit Cristian who was there with “two of his AA friends” and “had already checked himself out of detox a gainst medical advice.” Sara did not want Cristian to come home, and she was “really worried about his state of mind.” Nevertheless, Cristian came home and “was upset that [Sara] was n’t happy for him to be home.” Sara’s sister was playing with Sara’s old est child at the neighbor’s house, and Sara was nur sing the baby when Cristian t ried to “pick a fight” and argue about the marriage. Sara went into another room and, when Cristian followed, Sara tried to go out the front door. Cristian blocke d the front door, told Sara she could not leave, and “sta rted yelling” profanities and grabbed Sara’s phone. Sara got out the back door, but “the whole time Cristian [was] right there in [Sara’s] face, yelling at [her].” Two days later, Cristian’s father dro ve him to a treatment center, La Hacienda, where Cristia n stayed for twenty-two days. In June, Sara and her sister and the children drove six hours t o La Hacienda so Cristian could see his children for Father’s Day. Cristian was “upset” Sara was not “more affectionate with him,” “mad” that Sara was thirty mi nutes late, and “upset that [Sara] didn’t bring the father’s day card.” When Sara and Cristian discussed where Cristian was going to stay when he got out of La Hacienda , Sara said she “needed some time” and Cristian could “stay at his dad’s house a couple of days and–7– then come to our house.” When Cristian got out of La Hacienda, he “came to the house and he said, I’m coming to the house. You can’t stop me. ” Cristian “ended up staying at his father’s but the next day [Sara] had to have his therapist intervene.” After Cristian spent two days at his father’s house, for the ne xt month “it was good.” Cristian was “going to meetings all the time” and “talking to h is [AA] sponsor.” However, things “started to dete riorate after a few weeks” when Cristian stopped going to meetings, meeting with h is sponsor, and seeing his cou nselor. Sara testified this series of events lasted into August, and she and Cristian separated at the end of October. In November, Cristian again went to “detox at Presby” and then to treatment at another facility. In “email discussions and phone calls,” C ristian “was begging [Sara] not to get a divorce.” Sara testified she still wanted to stay married, and she thought that the marriage could be repaired if Cristian was get ting “treatment for the alcoholism,” depression, and PTS D. Five days after getting out of treatment, Cristian filed for divorce. Cristian’s father, Santiago Hino josa, testified he was aware Cr istian “has had a problem with alcoholism.” Santiago testified that, while the Lake Gardens property was for sale and “they were doing some remodeling at t he new house on Moss Farm,” Cristian asked San tiago “if we would help them out with a bridge loan and when the Lake Gardens house sold he would pay us back.” Sa ntiago identified petitioner’s exhibit 23 as a copy of a promissory note for $55, 000 and petitioner’s–8– exhibit 19 which contained a copy of a March 2016 check Cristia n used to pay back $55,340. Cynthia Hinojosa, Cristian’s mother, testified she received a t ext from him on November 5, 2016 saying “I’m having an affair. I need a little space.” During that week, Cynthia received a call fr om a phone number she did not r ecognize, and the caller was Cristian, who said he was “in trouble” and “needed t o talk.” When Cynthia later called the number back, Kathleen Griffith answere d the phone, and Cynthia began a series of text messages and phone calls with Gr iffith asking how Cristian was doing. Cynthia becam e “more and more concerned” a bout Cristian’s condition, but she thought Cristian “was safe staying at Ms. Gr iffith’s household.” On Friday of that week, Griffith gave her address to Cynthia, a nd Cynthia went to get Cristian and take him to de tox at “Presby.” On Sunday, Cyn thia met with Griffith to tell her “to stay away from the hospital as Sara was going t o the hospital and we didn’t want to traumatize Sara f rom what was happening.” While Cristian was at a treatment facility, he gave Cynthia’s husband keys and sent Cyn thia a list of items Cristian wanted from his apartment. Cynthia used the keys to u nlock Cristian’s locked private journal, Cynthia took pictures of “things that w ere in the journal,” and Cynthia “locked it back so [Cristian] would not know [she] had violated his privacy.” Four months later, Cynthia told Sara that Cristian was having a n affair with Griffith and disclosed Cristian’s “mos t personal writings” to Sara.–9– At the conclusion of trial, the trial court found the testimony supported the relief requested and granted divorce to the parties. The trial court further stated there might be “additional rulings by vi rtue of emails or fax dependi ng on what the Court does.” On September 12, 2018, the trial court issued a memorandum ruli ng containing, among other things, the following “Property finding s”: The Court will deny reimburseme nt to the husband for $130,000 i n alleged improvements. The Cour t will find $13,823.72 to wife a s separate property for emotional distress damages. The Court do es find $38,702 in Interactive Brokers t o be Husband’s separate. On November 6, 2018, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce awarding, as relevant here, the Interactive Brokers individual trading accou nt to Cristian, after payment of $9000 to Sara as recovery on a waste claim against C ristian, and the Moss Farm property to Sara. The decree denied Cristian’s claim of $130,000 for alleged improvements to the marita l residence awarded to Sara. The decree confirmed $38,702 on deposit in t he Interactive Brokers individ ual trading account as Cristian’s separate property. Cristian filed a motion for new trial complaining of the trial court’s denial of his separate property claims of (1) $105,000 in the Interactive Brokers account “because the funds originated from Husband’s separate property house, and (2) $130,000 for the down payment on th e marital residence, the Mos s Farm property, “because the funds originated from Husband’s separate property house and a gift–10– from Husband’s father.” Attached to the motion were settlement statements from the sale of Cristian’s “SP home” and the purchase of the Moss F arm property purportedly showing “the down paym ent using the sale proceeds.” Sara filed a response to the motion for new trial in which she argued the record supported denying Cristian’s sepa rate property claim of $105,00 0 in the Interactive Brokers account because Cristian failed to meet his burden trac ing any separate property claim to the Interactive Brokers account by clear and convincing evidence. The response argued Cristian attached no proof or evidence to s upport his claim and merely made a conclusory stateme nt that it was his separate pro perty. As for Cristian’s separate property claim of $130,000, the response ar gued Cristian failed to meet his burden tracing any se parate property claim for the $130,000. The response argued the evidence Cristian attached to his motion di sproved his claim. On the settlement statement which Cristian claimed reflected th e sale of his separate property house, both Cristian and Sara were listed as sellers. The response argued further that Cristian’s claim that he made a $130,000 separate property down payment on the purchase of the Moss Farm property was directly controverted by the settlement statement associated with the sale. The respons e argued Cristian presented no evidence as to the source of any funds or tracing of funds and failed “to meet his clear and convincing evidence burden to prove his sepa rate property.” In addition, the response asserted, the settlement statement liste d both Sara and Cristian–11– as the purchasers of the Moss Farms property and reflected a do wn payment of $75,965, not $130,000. In January 2019, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court found, among other things, that Cristian is “an alcoholic who has relapsed multiple times during the parties [sic] marriage,” Cri stian “committed adultery during the marriage,” and Cristian’s “testimony was no t credible.” In finding that, as part of a just and right divisions of the part ies’ estate, Sara should be awarded a disproportionate share of the community estate, the t rial court listed the following reasons to support its finding: fault in the breakup of the marriage by Cristian Hinojosa; adul tery committed by Cristian Hinojosa; Cristian Hinojosa’s alcoholism; waste committed by Cristian Hinojosa; Sara Hinojosa having primary cu stody of the children; size of the parties’ respective separate estat es; benefits Sara Hinojosa would have receive d if the marriage continued; th e nature of the property involved ; the attorney fees and costs in volved in litigating the divorce; fraud on the community estate by Cristi an Hinojosa; tax consequences of the property division. The trial court found the value of the Moss Farms home was $156 ,845.19 and awarded the home to Sara. The trial court found the value of t he community property portion of the Interactive Broker individual trading account wa s $85,622 and awarded the entire amount to Cristian. The trial court denied Cristian’ s request for $130,000 in reim bursement for “alleged improvements” made to t he Moss Farm home and found (1) Cristian failed to prove by clear and convinci ng evidence the underlying funds were his separate–12– property; (2) Cristian failed to “prove the enhanced value attr ibutable to any alleged improvements”; and (3) assuming Cristian “had proven the above, ” the court found it would not have been equitable to award Cristian “this claim. ” The trial court found the value of the separate property portion of the Interactive B roker individual trading account was $38,702 and awarded the entire amount to Cristian. This appeal followed. In his first issue, Cristian argues he was entitled to confirm ation of his separate real property and $20,000 in his Interactive Brokers account. Specifically, Cristian argues “the trial court abused its discretion in failing to con firm [his] separate property Moss Farm home.” In hi s second issue, Cristian argues he was “entitled to reimbursement to his separate pr operty for the payment of a com munity debt.” The alleged separate pr operty referred to in Cristian’s second issu e is actually the “$20,000 in his Interactive Brokers account” referenced in his first issue. Because of the interrelated nature of th ese two issues, we address them together. Trial courts must “order a division of the parties' estate in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage.” T EX

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. C ODE A NN . § 7.001. Numerous factors are considered in making the division, including the disparity of i ncomes or earning capacities of the parties, “benef its which the party not at fau lt would have derived from continuation of the marriag e, business opportunities, educ ation, relative physical conditions, relative fina ncial condition and obligatio ns, disparity of ages,–13– size of separate estates, and the nature of the property.” Murff v. Murff , 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981). Broad discretion governs division of the community estate, and all reasonable presumptions are indulged in favor of such d iscretion. Schlueter
v. Schlueter , 975 S.W.2d 584, 589 (Tex. 1998); Murff , 615 S.W.2d at 698–99 (appellate court presumes trial c ourt properly exercised discre tion in dividing marital estate). The party complaining about the property division mus t demonstrate from the evidence that “the division was so unjust and unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” In re Marriage of C.A.S. & D.P.S. , 405 S.W.3d 373, 384 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2013, no pet.). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is some e vidence of a substantive and probative char acter to support the decision. Hinton v. Burns , 433 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex. App.—D allas 2014, no pet.) (citing Moroch v. Collins , 174 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Tex. App.—Da llas 2005, pet. denied)). In fami ly law cases, the abuse of discretion standard of review overlaps with the tradit ional sufficiency standards of review; as a result, legal and factual sufficiency are not independent grounds of reversible error, but instead constitute factors rel evant to our assessment of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Hinton , 433 S.W.3d at 193; Moroch , 174 S.W.3d at 857; see also In re A.B.P. , 291 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (discussing standard ). To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, we consider whether the trial court (1) had suffici ent evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and (2) erred in its exercise of that discretion. Hinton ,–14– 433 S.W.3d at 193–94; In re A.B.P. , 291 S.W.3d at 95. The applicable sufficiency review comes into play with regard to the first question. Hinton , 433 S.W.3d at 194;
Moroch , 174 S.W.3d at 857. We then proceed to determine whether, bas ed on the elicited evidence, the trial cour t made a reasonable decision. Hinton , 433 S.W.3d at 194; Moroch , 174 S.W.3d at 857. Further, when the burden of proof at trial is by clear and conv incing evidence, as it is for a party seeking to rebut the presumption that a sp ecified item of property is community property, we apply a higher standard of legal and factual sufficiency review. Hinton , 433 S.W.3d at 194; Moroch , 174 S.W.3d at 857. Clear and convincing evidence is defined as that “measure or degree of pr oof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” T EX

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. C ODE A NN . § 101.007 (West 2014). This intermediate standard fa lls between the preponderance stan dard of civil proceedings and the reasonable doubt standard of criminal proce edings. Hinton , 433 S.W.3d at 194; Moroch , 174 S.W.3d at 857. The proof must weigh more heavily than the greater weight of the credible evidence, but the evide nce need not be undisputed. Hinton , 433 S.W.3d at 194; Moroch , 174 S.W.3d at 857–58. In reviewing the evidence for le gal sufficiency, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine if the tr ier of fact could reasonably have formed a firm be lief or conviction that its fin ding was true. Hinton , 433 S.W.3d at 194; Moroch , 174 S.W.3d at 858. We must assume that the fact finder–15– resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable fact finder could do so.
Hinton , 433 S.W.3d at 194; Moroch , 174 S.W.3d at 858. In reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency, we must give due consideration to evid ence that the fact finder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing a nd then determine whether, based on the entire record, a fact finder could reason ably form a firm conviction or belief that the all egations in the petition were proven. Hinton , 433 S.W.3d at 194; Moroch , 174 S.W.3d at 858. All property possessed by either spouse at the time of the dis solution of the marriage is presumed to be community property. T EX

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. C ODE A NN . § 3.003(a). A party claiming property as his separate property has the burd en to rebut the presumption of community property. Pearson v. Fillingim , 332 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam). To do so, the party must trace and c learly identify the property in question as separate by clear and convincing eviden ce. Id. ; see also T EX

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. C ODE A NN . § 3.003(b). A spouse is competent to testify concerning the characterizatio n of property without producing inde pendent documentation such as bank record s. Pace v. Pace , 160 S.W.3d 706, 714 (Tex. App. —Dallas 2005, pet. denied); see Vannerson v.
Vannerson , 857 S.W.2d 659, 668 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). The testimony of a spous e seeking to overcome the com munity property presumption need not be corroborated to meet the clear and conv incing standard.
Pace , 160 S.W.3d at 714; Holloway v. Holloway , 671 S.W.2d 51, 56 (Tex. App.—–16– Dallas 1983, writ dism’d); Newland v. Newland , 529 S.W.2d 105, 107–08 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1975, no writ); but see Boyd v. Boyd , 131 S.W.3d 605, 614–17 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pe t. h.). However, a party’s un supported and contradicted testimony may not m eet the clear and convincing st andard. Pace , 160 S.W.3d at 714; see Johnson v. Johnson , 804 S.W.2d 296, 300–01 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist] 1991, no writ) . Stated another way, mere te stimony that property was purchased with separate property funds, without tracing the funds, is generally insufficient to rebut the commu nity property presumption. Sink v. Sink , 364 S.W.3d 340, 345 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.); Chavez v. Chavez , 269 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.); Boyd , 131 S.W.3d at 612. Any doubt as to the character of property should be resolved in favor of the co mmunity estate. Sink , 364 at 345; Chavez , 269 S.W.3d at 767; Moroch , 174 S.W.3d at 856. Cristian argues he proved with c lear and convincing evidence th at the Holland Avenue and Lake Gardens propertie s were his separate property. Next, Cristian argues he proved “he sold Holland in 2015 and used the proceeds to purchase Moss Farms during the marriage. In making this argument, Cristian r elies on “a HUD Settlement Statement, Bank of Ame rica statement for account end ing in 0522 in which the funds were deposited, a nd a Bank of America statement for account ending in 0522 in which th e funds were removed.” The HUD settlement statement, petitioner’s exhibit 18, does sho w the property’s location is on Holland Avenue and cash paid to selle r in the amount of–17– $75,084.14. The box on the statement that identifies “Name & A ddress of Seller” lists both Cristian and Sara at the Lake Gardens address, and t he statement is signed by both Cristian and Sara. The Bank of America statement showi ng a deposit of $75,084.14, petitioner’s exhibit 13, pertains to a joint bank a ccount in both Cristian’s and Sara’s names and lists the Lak e Gardens address. The state ment also reflects a beginning balance of $13,878.55 on August 11, 2015 and deposits in excess of $5500 from Sara’s employer. The Bank of America statement showing th e removal of a check for $74,033.93 and $1923, p etitioner’s exhibit 14, also s hows it is a joint account in the names of both Cristian and Sara and reflects dep osits from Sara’s employer in excess of $5000. Copies of the checks, petitioner’ s exhibit 15, show they are cashier’s checks that identify Cristian as “Remitter ( Purchased by” and are payable to “CAPITAL TITLE.” Th e HUD settlement statement for t he purchase of the Moss Farm property, petiti oner’s exhibit 16, shows $75,956. 93 cash from borrower and identifies borrower as Cristian and Sara. Cristia n argues that, in light of this evidence, the trial court erred in mischaracterizing th e Moss Farm property as community property. We disagree. The record is clear the Moss Farm home was purchased during Cr istian and Sara’s marriage. Cristian’s firs t amended inventory and apprai sement identified the Moss Farm home as community pro perty. Cristian’s proposed prop erty division spreadsheet, petitioner’s exhibit 4, showed the Moss Farm home going to Sara. Cristian’s testimony at trial was that he sought a “$131,000 re imbursement claim on–18– the house,” and Cristian did not argue that the Moss Farm home should be characterized as his separate property. To the extent Cristian detailed the deposit of funds from the sale of the Lake Gardens property and the purcha se of the Moss Farm home using funds from the parties’ joint checking account, the record shows that Sara was listed as seller on the documents relating to the sale of the Lake Gardens property and listed as borrower on the Moss Farm purchase docum ents. Further, Sara’s name is on the joint checking account, and the records s how her salary was direct-deposited into the account. When separate and community prope rty are commingled in a single bank account, we presume the community funds are drawn out first, be fore separate funds are withdrawn. Hinton , 433 S.W.3d at 197 (citing Zagorski v. Zagorski , 116 S.W.3d 309, 319–20 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)) . Cristian ignores the fact that the Bank of America records show, among other thi ngs, Sara’s salary direct-deposits and a $20,560 tax refund. Under these circumst ances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining Cristian failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the underlyi ng funds were his separate prop erty. See Hinton , 433 S.W.3d at 193; Moroch , 174 S.W.3d at 857; Sink , 364 at 345. Apparently in an effort to reach the total of $130,000 for the reimbursement claim raised at trial, in addition to his claim regarding the $ 75,956.93 paid for the Moss Farm home, Cristian compla ins that a $55,000 bridge loan f rom his father was paid off with Cristian’s separa te property. The $55,000 promis sory note is dated–19– January 3, 2016 and identifies the “Borrower” as “Cristian and Sara Hinojosa” and the “Lender” as “Santiago and Cecilia Hinojosa.” The note anti cipated the Lake Gardens property would be relis ted on or around January 21, 201 6, and repayment of the note would occur upon clos ing. If closing was delayed b eyond May 31, 2016, lender had the “right to call fo r repayment from borrower using sources other than equity from home sale.” Fina lly, the note provided that “Borro wer will be responsible for all costs of financing, including interest accr ued on $55,000 line of credit usage during period of credit utilization with note.” T he check used to repay the note was drawn on Cristian and Sara’s joint bank account. Thus, the bridge loan was made during the marriage in support of the purchase of the marital residence; Sara was obligated to repay the note along with Cristian, wheth er or not the Lake Gardens property sale closed; a nd the note was repaid out of Sa ra and Cristian’s joint bank account. Again, we cannot c onclude the trial court abused its discretion in determining Cristian failed to p rove by clear and convincing ev idence the underlying funds were his separate property. See Hinton , 433 S.W.3d at 193; Moroch , 174 S.W.3d at 857; Sink , 364 at 345. As to Cristian’s claim that he was entitled to confirmation of $20,000 in his Interactive Brokers account as se parate property, Cristian argu es, without more, that he “transferred from the Bank of America account containing the Lake Gardens sales proceeds into his Interactive Brokers Account in the amount of $20,000.” The bank statement Cristian relies on in making this argument, petitione r’s exhibit 19, shows–20– a $150,423.23 deposit from the sale of the Lake Gardens propert y. However, the statement also shows a $20,560 ta x refund and more than $10,000 from Sara’s employer commingled with the Lake Gardens sale money, and a clo sing balance of $192,593.52. See Hinton , 433 S.W.3d at 197. Cristian does not explain how, under these circumstances, merely withdrawing $20,000 entitled him to confirmation of that amount as his separate property. See id. Further, the trial court found the value of the separate property portion of the Interactive Broker indi vidual trading account was $38,702 and awarded the entire amount to Cristian, in addit ion to all of the community interest in the Interactive Brokers account after the $9000 payment to Sara. We overrule Cristian’ s first and second issues. In his third issue, Cristian complains the trial court abused i ts discretion in awarding a disproportionate value of the community estate to Sa ra. Cristian claims the trial court awarded Sara sixty-two percent and awarded Cris tian thirty-eight percent. The evidence in this case established, and the trial court found, that Cristian committed adultery. Adultery does not have to occur pre-separa tion for it to be a ground for granting a divorce, and the trial court’s finding of adultery can support the disproportionate division of the community property. In re Marriage of C.A.S.
& D.P.S. , 405 S.W.3d at 392. In addition, the trial court based its aw ard to Sara of a disproportionate share of the community estate on Cristian’s alcoholism, waste committed by Cristian, Sara having primary custody of the child ren, the nature of the property involved, and the attorney fees and costs involved in litigating the–21– divorce. The evidence showed the negative consequences of Cris tian’s alcoholism on the marriage and its role in the dissolution of the marriage . The court’s other findings were similarly supported by the record. Under these c ircumstances, we conclude the trial court did not a buse its discretion in awardi ng Sara a disproportionate share of the community estate. See Murff , 615 S.W.2d at 698–99. We overrule Cristian’s third issue. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

190133F.P05 /Robert D. Burns, III/ ROBERT D. BURNS, III CHIEF JUSTICE–22– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF M.H. AND T.H., CHILDREN

No. 05-19-00133-CV On Appeal from the 256th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-16-26862. Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burns. Justices Pedersen, III and Evans participating.
In accordance with this Court’ s opinion of this date, the judg ment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. It is ORDERED that appellee Sara Hinojosa rec over her costs of this appeal from appellant Cristian Hinojosa.
Judgment entered August 31, 2020.