MATTER OF T-- 

In EXCLUSION Proceedings 

A-102UCSlW 

Decided by Board September 2/. 1956 

Petty offense—Gmeietion In Italy of aggravated theft—Punishment not "actually imposed" when court on same date as sentencing grants pardon of oneyear prison sentence. 

Punishment has not been "actually imposed" within the meaning of section 4, 

RI,. 770, when the Italian Court which convicted applicant of aggravated 

theft of property (valued at less than $50) has on the date of imposing sentence granted applicant a "pardon" of a one-year prison term and fine, 

ATPLICAlIPN : Admission for permanent residence. 

BEFORE THE BOARD 

Discussion: The special inquiry officer upon conclusion of it 

hearing conducted at New York, New York, on June 15, 1956, for 

the purpose of determining the appellant's admissibility to the 

United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act, foundthat the appellant was not inadmissible thereto under any of the 

paragraphs of section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality 

Art. (s, IT.S.C. 1192(a)) and no in eonocquenec thereof he entered 

an order directing that the alien be admitted to the United States 

for permanent residence. The District Director of Immigration 

and Naturalization at New York, on ,Tune 22. 1956, noted an appeal 

from the aforementioned decision of the special inquiry officer. He 

specifically excepted to the conclusions of law rendered by the special inquiry officer in his decision of June 15, 1956. 

The appellant, a 62-year-old male, native and citizen of Italy, 

arrived in the United States at New York, New York, on June 9, 

1956, at which time he had in his possession and presented for inspection preference quota immigrant visa NO. 2920, issued in his 

name by the United States Vice Consul at, Naples, Italy, on May 2, 

1956. At the time of his arrival in the United States, the appellant 

was destined to a son living in New York, New York. The record 

reflects that the appellant was convicted on October 6, 1943, in Italy 

of the crime of aggravated theft of 2500 pounds of lumber in violation of article 624-625, paragraph 7, of the Penal Code of Italy. 
Thereafter, he was convicted on March 21, 1946, and sentenced to 

imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine. of 3000 lire. On the 

same date, the Tribunal of S. Maria CA'. declared the appellant 

pardoned entirely in accordance with article 5, Royal Decree of 

April 5, 1911, No. 26 of the Law. The remaining facts in this case 

have been heretofore fully covered by the special inquiry officer in 

his decision of June 15, 1956, and need no further discussion herein. 

The question for this Board to resolve is whether the appellant is 

precluded from obtaining the benefits of Public Law 770 by reason of 

his having been sentenced to imprisonment for a period of one year. 

In determining whether an offense committed in a foreign country 

shall be considered a misdemeanor classifiable as a petty offense 

under section 4 of the Act of September 3, 1954, United States 

standards are to be applied. Hence, recourse is had to the equivalent 

offense under United States law, that is, Title 18 of the United States 

Code, or, if the equivalent offense is not found therein, Title 22 

of the District of Columbia Code. After the equivalent offense under 

United States law has been identified for the purpose of determining 

whether an offense committed abroad shall be considered a misdemeanor classifiable as a petty offense under section 4 of the Act 

of September 3, 1014, the definitions in 15 U.S.C. 1 (3) are to be 

applied. The special inquiry dicer has properly concluded that 

the appellant's conviction in Italy in March 1946 is a misdemeanor 

classifiable n.s a petty offense (Title 22. section 2202, District of 

Columbia Code). 

Section 4 of the Act of September 3. 1954 (Public Law 770) 

provides that : 

Any alien who is excludable because of the conviction of a misdemeanor 

classifiable as a petty offense under the provisions of section 1(3) of Title 18, 

United States Cede, by reason of the imashm ,,,t actually imposed, or who is 

exdadabls who admits the oomwieeionof snob Teieeleeneonor, ,nay hereafter be granted a visa and admitted to the United States, if otherwise admissible: Provided, That the alien has committed only one such offense. (Emphasis 

supplied.) 

Section 1(3) of Title 18, United States Code, provides that: 

Notwithstanding any act of Congress to the contrary : * 

(3) Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment 

for a period of six months or a fine of not more than 8500, or both, is a petty 

offense. 

On examination of the record, it is our considered opinion that 

the pardon granted to the appellant at the time of his conviction 

on March 21, 1946, is not a pardon of his conviction of the crime 

of aggravated theft, but a pardon of the sentence imposed; in other 

words, he was granted a suspended sentence. The Chancellor of the 

Tribunal of S. Maria C.T. certified on August 29, 1953, that the 

appellant must no longer serve the penalty of one-year imprisonment 

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and pay the fine of 3000 lire inflicted upon him by that Tribunal by 

sentence of March 21, 1946, because a period of five years had passed, 

to which the pardon of said penalty was subordinate, and which was 

conceited him with said sentence, without having committed any 

other crime. This certification was made at S. Maria C.V. on August 

29, 1953. 

In view of the foregoing, it appears that the appellant, following 

his conviction of the crime of aggravated theft in Italy on March 21, 

1946, received a suspended sentence. The United States courts have 

consistently held that there has been no sentence to imprisonment 

if the imposition or execution of a sentence was wholly suspended or 

conditionally suspended by granting probation as an alternative 

(United States ex rel. Robinson v. Dag, 5 F.2d 1022). Accordingly, 

it must be held that the appellant was not punished even though 

sentenced to imprisonment for one year, inasmuch as the execution 

of the sentence has been wholly suspended. Section 4 of the Act 

of September 3, 1954 provides that any alien who is excludable because of a conviction of a misdemeanor classifiable as a petty offense 

under the provisions of section 1(3) of Title 18, United States Code, 

by reason of the plini:chnmm.t actually imposed * * 0 , may hereafter 

be granted a visa and admitted to the United States, * 5 5. Section 

1(3) of Title 18, United States Code, provides that notwithstanding 

any act of Congress to the contrary, any misdemeanor, the penalty 

for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months 

* *. Public Law 770 refers to punishment "actually imposed" 

and section 1(3) of Title 18, United States Code, uses the term 

"penalty." The term "sentence" is not used in either section 4 of 

Public Law 770 or in section 1(3) of Title 18, United States Code. 

A careful analysis of the record shows that the appellant was 

given what in effect must bo considered a suspended .sentence follow 

ing his conviction in March 1946. It appears that if he was not convicted of any crime within five years, he would be absolved from 

serving the sentence imposed on March 21, 1946. A "sentence" to a 

term of imprisonment is the final determination of the trial in a 

criminal cause, and it. is the order of the court made in the presence 

of the defendant and/or his counsel, pronouncing the judgment and 

ordering the same to be carried into execution in the manner prescribed by law after judgment on the verdict. "Punishment" is pain, 

suffering, loss, confinement, or other penalty inflicted on a person for 

a crime or offense by the authority to which the offender is subject; it is a penalty imposed in the enforcement or applicaiton of law. 

The words "penalty," "liability," and "forfeiture" are frequently 

treated as synonymous with the word "punishment" in connection 

with crimes of the highest grade. The word "punishment" ordinarily implies some punishment of a temporary character. It must be 

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given its ordinary meaning and implies continued jurisdiction over a 

person. In the case at bar, sentence of one year was imposed on the 

appellant following his conviction in Italy on March 21, 1916. However, no punishment was actually imposed upon the appellant, inasmuch as he received what may be considered a suspended sentence 

after the aforementioned conviction. Hence, the appellant is eligible 

for the benefits provided in Public Law 770 by reason of the fact that 

he was not penalized and no punishment was actually imposed. The 

appellant was at no time subjected to confinement for the offense 

committed by him in October 1943. 

After carefully considering all the evidence of record together 

with counsel's representations in oral argument on appeal, the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the order of the special inquiry officer are hereby approved. Accordingly, the following order 

will be entered. 

Order: It is ordered that the decision of the special inquiry 

officer dated June 15, 1956, authorizing the appellant's admission to 

the United States for permanent residence, be and the same is hereby 

approved. 

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