alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### EDDINS v. STATE.

No. 24794.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 31, 1950.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 4, 1950.

*677Benson, Anderson & Howard and Hugh Anderson, Lubbock, for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of' Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of driving' a motor vehicle upon a public highway while intoxicated and by the jury fined the sum of $400.00.

The facts show, that a certain peace officer observed appellant’s erratic driving on a public street in Lubbock; and téstified that he saw him swing his car against another automobile; that he ran through a red light and drove on the wrong side of the street, and that he (the officer) drove mp to appellant and stopped him. His tongue was thick; his eyes were bloodshot; he had the odor of whisky on his breath; he mumbled when talked to and could not walk .without assistance. When the officers requested to see the appellant’s driver’s license, he produced a courtesy card, but did not talk to them. They. testified that they smelled liquor on his breath and that he was intoxicated. They took him into custody and to the city hall, where he was observed by others, who testified as above outlined.

It is contended that the arrest of appellant was illegal, and that under Art. 727a, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., such testimony was inadmissible. Appellant denied his drunkenness and admitted that he had only taken a small drink of whisky. He did not remember running the red light and knew nothing about a car collision, and claimed that he was sober. The jury decided this contention adversely to appellant, and we think such decision was justified by the facts.

We think that under the testimony herein the officers had a right to arrest appellant without a warrant. See Art. 803, Vernon’s Ann.P.C. If they had the right to arrest,, then they had a right to describe his condition. , Such testimony is the. basis of many objections to the officers being allowed to describe appellant’s condition at the time of. the arrest. The arrest being legal, they had the right to delineate what they then found even though it was some short time after the arrest. See King v. State, 133 Tex.Cr.R. 496, 113 S.W.2d 181.

Bill No. 2 compláins of the trial court’s charge relative to intoxication. It was riot necessary' that such term be defined iri the charge, same not being a technical term needing á 'definition, but had á commonly understood .meaning. See Randolph v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 526, 169 S.W.2d 178; Davis v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 602, 115 S.W.2d 801; Zachery v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 464, 154 S.W.2d 489; Moynahan v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 540, 146 S.W.2d 376.

Bill No. 8 is multifarious in that it complains of the testimony ■ of three separate witnesses: Again, we think the testimony was admissible because' it referred to appellant’s actions and demeanor at the time of and soon after his legal arrest.

Bill No. 13 relative to the remarks of the county attorney, is without merit.

All bills not written' upon have been considered and are thought to be without merit.

The judgment is affirmed.
Untitled Page


		

			

			

			Exhibit 10.2

			

			

			Barry Swanson

			Suite 4 - 3750 Edgemont Blvd.

			North Vancouver, BC

			Canada, V7R 2P7

			

			September 23, 2005

			

			Lodge Bay Oil & Gas Corp.

			Suite 4 - 3750 Edgemont Blvd.

			North Vancouver, BC

			Canada, V7R 2P7

			

			Re: Personal loan from Barry Swanson to Lodge Bay Oil & Gas Corp.

				

			The undersigned party acknowledges the following:

		

		In order to facilitate entry into an agreement between Lodge Bay Oil & Gas Corp. (“the Company") and Odin Capital, Barry Swanson, President and Director of the Company, has agreed to loan the Company $107,962. Under the agreement with Odin Capital, which requires the Company to initially contribute $107,962 toward test drilling costs, the Company will acquire a 2% working interest in the "Leduc formation test well".

		

		The loan will not be interest bearing, and is repayable upon demand three years from the date the agreement is entered.

			

			

			

			    /s/   Barry Swanson                    

			Barry Swanson, President and Director, Lodge Bay Oil & Gas Corp.
Exhibit 32.1

#### Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

---

In connection with the quarterly report of Pathmark
Stores, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended  April 29, 2006,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report),
I, John T.  Standley, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:



| | (1) | the
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the
information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this written statement required by
Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging,  or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written
statement  required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained
by the Company and furnished to the  Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.

| |                      | /s/ John T. Standley                                
| | -------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------
| | Name:    Title:Date: | John T. StandleyChief Executive Officer
June 2, 2006
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
ACCOMPANYING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-31-2001
<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               OCT-31-2000
<CASH>                                             322
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    6,572
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (533)
<INVENTORY>                                      9,274
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                18,345
<PP&E>                                          23,536
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (7,969)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  43,533
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            9,586
<BONDS>                                         16,633
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           303
<OTHER-SE>                                      14,436
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    43,533
<SALES>                                         12,986
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                12,986
<CGS>                                            7,848
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    7,848
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 3,621
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 701
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    815
<INCOME-TAX>                                       390
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                425
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       425
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.14
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.12


</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 208 (Thursday, October 26, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 64259]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-27569]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-38,073]


Wolverine World Wide, Inc., Rockford, MI; Notice of Termination 
of Investigation

    Pursuant to section 221 of the Trade Act of 1974, an investigation 
was initiated on September 11, 2000 in response to a worker petition 
which was filed on behalf of workers at Wolverine World Wide, 
Incorporated, Rockford, Michigan.
    The investigation revealed that an active certification covering 
the petitioning group of workers remains in effect (TA-W-35,149). That 
certification expires on January 25, 2001. Consequently, further 
investigation in this case would serve no purpose, and the 
investigation has been terminated.

    Signed at Washington, D.C. this 12th day of October 2000.
Linda G. Poole,
Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. 00-27569 Filed 10-25-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-30-M
Exhibit 10.21


 


Quarterly Bonus
Program Summary


 


Certain officers and employees in our
marketing group and business development group participate in a quarterly bonus
arrangement based on EBITDA from our commercial activities during the
quarter.  Total participants include
approximately 80 employees.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

GARY LEWIS; AND CHEYENNE 

NALDER, 

Appellants, 

vs. 

UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, 

Respondent. 

No. 83881 

FILED 

JAN 1 9 2022 

EUZASETH A. BROWN 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

ev 

CLERK 

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 

This is an appeal from a district court order on motion to retax 

costs. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Veronica Barisich, 

Judge. 

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the 

notices of appeal filed by appellants Gary Lewis and Cheyenne Nalder are 

untimely. Lewis and Nalder oppose the motion to dismiss. 

Notice of entry of the order challenged on appeal was served 

electronically on October 27, 2021. Accordingly, the last day to file the 

notice of appeal in the district court was November 29, 2021. See NRAP 

4(a)(1); NRCP 6(a)(1)(C); NRCP 6(a)(4)(A). However, Lewis did not file his 

notice of appeal in the district court until November 30, 2021. In his 

opposition to the motion to dismiss, counsel for Lewis concedes that the 

notice of appeal was untimely, but argues that a totality of circumstances, 

including issues related to staffing, the pandemic, and caseload should 

excuse the late filing. Unfortunately for Lewis, with limited exceptions not 

applicable here, this court may not extend the time to file a notice of appeal. 

NRAP 26(b)(1)(A). 

o ss 

:471:-'4• -  70- 
J. 

Hardesty 

J. J. 

Stiglich Herndon 

Nalder filed her notice of appeal in the district court on 

December 13, 2021, pursuant to NRAP 4(a)(2) ("If one party timely files a 

notice of appeal, any other party may file and serve a notice of appeal within 

14 days after the date when the first notice was served . . ."). As previously 

stated, Lewis's notice of appeal is untimely. Thus, Nalder's notice of appeal 

is untimely under both NRAP 4(a)(1) and NRAP 4(a)(2). An untimely notice 

of appeal fails to vest jurisdiction in this court. Healy v. Volkswagenwerk 

Aktiengesellschaft, 103 Nev. 329, 741 P.2d 432 (1987). Accordingly, 

respondent's motion to dismiss is granted, and this court 

ORDERS this appeal DISMISSED. 

cc: Hon. Veronica Barisich, District Judge 

Stephens Law Offices 

Christensen Law Offices, LLC 

Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP/Las Vegas 

Winner Booze & Zarcone 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

te.4115-f ,
#### FORREST v. BEYNON et al.

No. 11402.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

March 22, 1944.

S. D. Hopkins, of San Antonio, for appellant.

Saunders & Saunders and A. H. Lump-kin, all of San Antonio, for appellees.

NORVELL, Justice.

On September 7, 1943, the trial court rendered a judgment dismissing this cause.

On October 1, 1943, appellant filed a motion to set aside the order of dismissal, reinstate the cause and place the same upon the trial docket.

On October 21, 1943, appellant amended his motion.

On November 5; 1943, the trial court overruled appellant’s amended motion.

On December 4, 1943, appellant filed his appeal bond.

This case is controlled by Rule 330, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly subdivisions j, k and Z thereof. Rule 330 carries forward the provisions of Article 2092, Vernon’s Ann.Civ. Stats., now repealed, without substantial change, insofar as its provisions affect this appeal.

The trial court’s judgment of dismissal became final thirty days after September 7, 1943. The appeal bond was not filed within the time prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 356. We have no jurisdiction to consider the appeal. De Leon v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, Tex. Civ.App., 159 S.W.2d 574.

Appeal dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                           6,645
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  228,891
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     72,282
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               344,438
<PP&E>                                       1,570,649
<DEPRECIATION>                                 234,752
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,797,248
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          328,382
<BONDS>                                        868,755
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                        460
<COMMON>                                         5,142
<OTHER-SE>                                     454,813
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,797,248
<SALES>                                      1,127,322
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,127,322
<CGS>                                          982,532
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,045,603
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              29,566
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 35,093
<INCOME-TAX>                                    12,405
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             22,688
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    22,688
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.90
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.90
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.B


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period
ending March 31, 2004, of Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company (the "Company") as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Greg G. Gruber, Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer,
Treasurer and Director, certify (i) that the Report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended, and (ii) that the information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.


                                                /s/ Greg G. Gruber
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           Greg G. Gruber
                                           Senior Vice President, Chief
                                           Financial Officer, Treasurer
                                             and Director
                                           (Principal Financial
                                             and Accounting Officer)

                                           May 14, 2004



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company and will be retained by Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3191 

To amend the Small Business Act to increase the maximum loan amount 

for loans under the microloan program. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 

Mr. COHEN (for himself and Ms. NORTON) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Small Business 

A BILL 

To amend the Small Business Act to increase the maximum 

loan amount for loans under the microloan program. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Expanding Opportuni5 ties to Underserved Businesses Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. MICROLOAN AMOUNT MAXIMUM. 

7 Section 7(m) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 

8 636(m)) is amended— 

9 (1) in paragraph (1)(B)(iii), by striking 

10 ‘‘$50,000’’ and inserting ‘‘$75,000’’; 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3191 IH

1 (2) in paragraph (3)(E), by striking ‘‘$50,000’’ 

2 each place it appears and inserting ‘‘$75,000’’; and 

3 (3) in paragraph (11)(B), by striking 

4 ‘‘$50,000’’ and inserting ‘‘$75,000’’. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
(LOGO)ERNST&YOUNG LLP    Suite 1400              Phone: 512 478 9881
                         700 Lavaca              Fax:   512 473 3499
                         Austin, Texas 78701



                       REPORT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

Board of Directors
Temple-Inland Financial Services, Inc. and
     Subsidiaries (including Knutson Mortgage
     Corporation)

We have examined  management's  assertion  included in the  accompanying  report
titled REPORT OF MANAGEMENT  that  Temple-Inland  Financial  Services,  Inc. and
Subsidiaries  (including Knutson Mortgage  Corporation) (the "Company") complied
with  the  minimum  servicing  standards  set  forth  in  the  Mortgage  Bankers
Association of America's UNIFORM SINGLE ATTESTATION PROGRAM FOR MORTGAGE BANKERS
during the 15 month period ended  December 31, 1997.  Management is  responsible
for the Company's  compliance with those requirements.  Our responsibility is to
express an opinion on  management's  assertions  about the Company's  compliance
based on our examination.

Our  examination  was  made in  accordance  with  standards  established  by the
American  Institute of Certified Public Accountants and,  accordingly,  included
examining,  on a test basis,  evidence about the Company's compliance with those
requirements and performing such other procedures as we considered  necessary in
the circumstances.  We believe that our examination  provides a reasonable basis
for our opinion.  Our examination does not provide a legal  determination on the
Company's compliance with specified requirements.

In our  opinion,  management's  assertion  that the  Company  complied  with the
aforementioned  requirements during the 15 month period ended December 31, 1997,
is fairly stated, in all material respects.

                                             /s/Ernst & Young LLP

January 30, 1998



       Ernst & Young LLP is a member of Ernst & Young International, Ltd.
#### BURCHETT v. CITY OF STANTON.

No. 4951.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.

June 10, 1953.

*953Thomas, Thomas & Jones, 'Big Spring, for appellant.

R. W. Catón, Stanton, Chas. L. Klapp-roth, Midland, for appellee.

FRASER, Justice.

Appellant as Plaintiff sued the City o'f ■Stanton alleging in substance that he approached an intersection of St. Peters Street and U. S. Highway 80 in the City of Stanton from the South and stopped before entering the intersection because the traffic signal at the intersection was red facing him and that when the traffic signal changed to green facing him, he entered the intersection and while in the intersection was struck by a truck on U. S. Highway 80 proceeding in an easterly direction. He sued for personal injuries and property damages alleging that the City was negligent in the operating of and the maintenance of such traffic signal and in failing to keep same in proper repair. He alleged that while the traffic signal was supposed to be signalling red to the east and west at the time it was signalling green to the north and south that it failed to signal red to the east and west when it signalled green to the south and that failure to keep such traffic signal in proper repair was negligence on the part of the City and a proximate cause of his damages. He further alleged that the failure to keep the traffic signal in proper repair created a nuisance in that it lured him into the intersection in the path of oncoming traffic. Upon special exceptions by the Defendant, the trial court held that Plaintiff’s petition stated no cause of action because the operation of such traffic signal was within the City’s governmental capacity. The trial court entered an order dismissing Plaintiff’s suit from which the Plaintiff (has appealed. Viewed in its most favorable light the petition of the plaintiff fails to show that the defendant City had had any notice of the defect in the operation of the traffic light and had neglected to repair same. Such petition merely states that the light was out of order at the time of the collision, and that the City was negligent in failing to keep the signal in repair, and that the plaintiff was lured into the intersection by a green light while crossing traffic was not held up by a red light. It is generally accepted, and conceded here that the maintenance of traffic signals by a city is a governmental function. The petition of plaintiff does not present any allegations, which if true, would be sufficient to deprive the defendant City of its immunity from liability for damages while engaging in a governmental activity or function such as we have in the instant case. Baker v. City of Waco, Tex.Civ.App., 129 S.W.2d 499, and the many cases cited therein.

The decision of the trial court is accordingly affirmed.

McGILL, Justice

(concurring).

I concur in the foregoing views and also think that every point made by appellant was presented and decided adversely to him in Presley v. City of Odessa, 263 S.W.2d 293 in which the Supreme Court refused a writ, N. R. E.