UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ELLIOTT ROY BROWN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE;

No. 98-2832

WILNET ASHLEY BROWN,

Defendants-Appellees.

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA APPELLATE

LITIGATION CLINIC,

Amicus Curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

Robert E. Payne, District Judge.

(CA-97-657-3)

Argued: May 5, 2000

Decided: June 23, 2000

Before WIDENER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and

Irene M. KEELEY, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Neal Lawrence Walters, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

SCHOOL OF LAW APPELLATE LITIGATION CLINIC, Char-
lottesville, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae. Debra Jean Prillaman, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. ON

BRIEF: Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Elliott Roy Brown appeals the district court's order dismissing his

action alleging violations of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses

Protection Act [the "USFSPA"], 10 U.S.C.A.§ 1408 (West 1998).

We find that the district court did not err either in its interpretation

of the statute or in its decision to decline jurisdiction over Brown's

state law claims.

A.

Congress enacted the USFSPA in an attempt to strike an appropriate balance between preserving a military retiree's right to retirement

pay and protecting the rights of a former spouse and the children of

that retiree to appropriate support and maintenance. Subsection (d)(1)

of § 1408 of the USFSPA sets forth the parameters of what the Secretary of the Air Force must do upon effective service of a court order

providing for the payment of alimony, if that order specifically provides for the payment of an amount of the disposable retired pay from

a member to the spouse or a former spouse of the member. The Secretary's authority and duties under subsection (d)(1) are plainly limited

by some subsections not at issue in this appeal; however, in the event

that the Secretary acts in accordance with § 1408 and its regulations

in making payment, the Secretary has sovereign immunity under subsection (f)(1).

 2
Appellant contends that the Secretary exceeded his authority under

subsection (d)(1), by making payments of a portion of appellant's

retirement pay to his ex-wife, Wilmet Brown, in direct contravention

of the plain, unambiguous language of the Effective Date provision

for that section of the statute. This Effective Date provision, set forth

in the Historical Notes for § 1006 of Pub. Law 97-252, states:

However, in the case of a court order that became final

before June 26, 1981, payments under such subsection

[(d)(1)] may only be made in accordance with such order as

in effect on such date and without regard to any subsequent

modifications.

Mr. Brown alleges that, because the court order regarding his divorce

became final prior to June 26, 1981, the district court erred in effecting a subsequent modification, which increased the payments to Wilmet Brown from $200 per month to $1500 per month.

In rendering its decision upholding the Secretary's actions, the district court looked beyond the plain language of the Effective Date

provision and reviewed the legislative history. From this analysis, the

Court concluded that the Effective Date provision concerns only court

orders relating to the division of property, rather than to maintenance

awards. Mr. Brown claims this analysis was improper. See Razlaf v.

United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994) (holding that a court

should not resort to legislative history when a statute is unambiguous

on its face).

Mr. Brown is correct that, under the most basic tenets of statutory

construction, "unless there is some ambiguity in the language of the

statute, a court's analysis must also end with the language of the statute." See Selgeka v. Carroll, 184 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th Cir. 1999);

and Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1996),

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1077 (1997). Nevertheless, there exists a narrow exception to this cardinal rule. See United States v. Morison, 844

F.2d 1057, 1063 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).

According to Morison,

This rule is departed from only in those rare and"exceptional circumstances," Burlington Northern R. Co. v.

 3
B.M.W.E., 481 U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1860 (1987),

where "a literal reading of [the] statute[will] produce a

result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its

drafters," United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93 (1985), or

"where acceptance of that meaning would lead to absurd

results . . . or would thwart the purpose of the statute," Trans

Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643 (1978) (citing Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965)), or

where "an absolutely literal reading of a statutory provision

is irreconcilably at war with the clear congressional purpose,

[in which case] a less literal construction . . . may be considered." United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 298

(1971).

A literal reading of § 1408(d)(1) produces an absurd result, thwarting the true purpose of the USFSPA to protect a former spouse's right

to support. In that case, the Secretary would be liable for deducting

from appellant Brown's retirement pay an amount for support and

maintenance of his former spouse, even though (1) the Secretary

acted in reliance upon a valid court order; (2) the court issuing that

order specifically retained jurisdiction over later modification of the

amount of support and maintenance; and (3) the statute only limited

the modification of divorce decrees in cases in which the military

retired pay originally was treated as marital property to be divided.

Mrs. Brown thus would not receive her rightful entitlement to adequate support and maintenance, a result irreconcilably at odds with

the purpose of the statute as stated in its title. Morison permitted the

district court to look to the legislative history of§ 1408(d)(1) to avoid

this circumstance.

Applying Morison, a review of the legislative history of the statute

demonstrates why the Secretary's actions were appropriate. It also

reveals the significance of the date restriction in§ 1408(d)(1): June

25, 1981 is the day before the United States Supreme Court's decision

in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). The Supreme Court

ruled in McCarty that, upon dissolution of a marriage, federal law

precluded a state court from dividing military non-disability retired

pay pursuant to state community property laws. Importantly, McCarty

did nothing to abrogate a state's right to garnish military retired pay

for the purpose of enforcing a support order. Id. at 235-36.

 4
Congress then enacted § 1408(d)(1) in direct response to McCarty.

See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989). Congress wanted to

make clear that, in spite of McCarty, states could garnish retirement

pay for purposes of enforcing their community property laws. Even

so, Congress imposed the date restriction in § 1006(b) in order to prevent state courts from reopening pre-McCarty decisions to retroactively provide for the division of retired military pay as a marital

asset.

Here, the court issuing the Brown's divorce decree did not treat

Mr. Brown's military retired pay as marital property as happened in

McCarty; rather, it simply awarded Mrs. Brown an amount for her

monthly support and maintenance. Having retained jurisdiction to

modify this support and maintenance award, the court was free to

adjust the amount. Section 1408 of the USFSPA mandated the Secretary to pay Mrs. Brown in accordance with any such modification;

thus, the district court's decision correctly affirmed the propriety of

the Secretary's actions.

B.

Having found that the Secretary's actions were authorized under

the USFSPA, the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over

Mr. Brown's state law claims, finding them barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine, which provides that federal courts lack jurisdiction

to hear claims adjudicated by state courts. See Rooker v. Fidelity

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Suarez Corp. Indus. v.

McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 228 (4th Cir. 1997). The district court also

noted that it would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1367 in any event, because Mr. Brown's state law claims

involved substantially different facts from his claims asserted under

the USFSPA. The district court properly exercised its discretion in

this regard. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers of

America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).

For these reasons, we affirm the district court.

AFFIRMED

 5