C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS

EL OER GONZ AL EZ TERANGO, Ap pe lla nt, V. TH E ST AT E O F TE XA S, Appellee
. § § § § § § § No . 0 8- 07 -0 00 89 -C R

Appea l from the 109th District Court of Wink le r C ounty , T e xas (TC# 4807)

O P I N I O N Eloer Gonzalez Ter ang o appea ls from a c onviction for ag g ravated sexual assault of a child. A jury

sentenc ed Mr. Te rang o to a term of 50 year s confineme nt in the I nstitut ional Division of the Texas Depar tment of Criminal J ustice and a ssessed a f ine in the amount of $10,000. In M ay of 20 05 , a nd a t th e tim e of

the inc ide nt, Ap pe lla

nt d a te d a nd liv e d w ithRos a Pineda and he r six -y ear -old twin children, De idra Ve neg as and D aniel Ve neg as. On May 27, 2005, police ar

rested Ms. Pineda f

or assa ult. After police took Ms. Pi neda, he r mother took po sse ssi on

of the tw ins . D ue to t

he ir g ra ndmot he r’ s il l- he a lth , th e tw ins we re su bs e qu e ntl y pla c e d in the c us tod

y of Ms. Ke lly

He rn and e z, th e ir

mot he r’ s a un t. Ms. Herna

ndez started to take the children ba ck to Ms. Pineda’s home, whe n Deidra started c rying, “ beca

me hy sterica l,” and told Ms. Her nandez she did not want to re turn home. At the child’s re quest, Ms. Herna ndez took the children to her own home. B ased on D eidra ’s-2-

rea ction to returninghome, Ms. Her nandez notified Captain Scott Wil liams of the Ker mit P olice Depa rtment of De idra’s outc ry in the car . Deidra

explained to Captain W illiams t hat Appellant had pene trated he r “pr ivates” w ith his finger and that “it hurt whe n he did it.” On J une 6, 2005, police que stioned Appellant in custody . Be cause Appellant did not speak Eng lish, Detective G arc ia interview ed Appe llant in Spanish. During the inter view, Appellant made an inculpator y statement. De tective Ga rcia translated a

nd transcr ibed Appellant’s state ment for him bec ause A ppellant could not write in Eng lish. The statement indicates that on May

27, 2005, Appellant “touc h[ed] Deidra ’s vag ina and then ma [de] her take a bath.” A g rand jury

indicted Appellant on De cembe r 7, 2006 on one c ount of ag g ravated sexual assault of a

child. Duringtrial, the State moved to ente r Appe llant’s inculpatory statement as
e vid e nc e . D e fe ns e c ouns e l ob je c te d o n th e g ro un d th a t App e lla nt’ s st a te me nt w a s “ no t w ri tte n in his own hand” a

nd thus “all hea

rsay .” The objection was ove rruled. T he jury found Appe llant g uilty of the c harg ed off

ense on F ebrua

ry 28, 2007. Appellant ra ises three issues on appea l: (1) that the trial c ourt err ed in over ruling Appellant’s c halleng e for cause ag ainst Venire member K line when she expressed bias or prejudice ; (2) that the tria l court er red by denying the Appellant’s motion for a new tria l based on ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel when c ounsel failed to pr eser ve er ror on the tr ial court’s de nial of Appe llant’s challeng e for cause ; and (3) that the trial court e rre d in denying A ppellant’s motion to s uppress his written c onfession whe n the conf ession was not “ma de” by the Appellant and wa s improperly

obtained. In I ssu e Thre e , App e lla

nt a rgue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d b y de nyinghis mot ion

to-3-

suppress the wr itten confe ssion when the conf ession was not “ma de” by Appellant. Appe llant further contends that the police improperly obtained his statement whe n they failed to have a “valid witness” pr esent to ver ify the translation, thus rende ringthe statement involuntary
. A ttr i a l , th e S t a t e a s k e d

D e t e c t i v e G ar c i a

t o r e a d Ap p e l l an t ’ s s t a t e m e n tt o th e j ur y. Def ense c ounsel objecte d on the g rounds that Appellant did not write the statement “in his own ha nd ” and that it wa s “ a ll h e ars ay .” De fe ns e c ouns e l phra se d th e ob je c tio n a s f

oll ow s: Your Honor , we objec t to the rea ding of the statement or e ven the e nteringof the statement as e vidence , beca use I mean it’s obviously

not a statement in his own hand bec ause he can’ t, obviously testified ca

n’t write in Eng lish. I t was written by M r. Ga rc i a a n d

th en h e, y o ukn o w, s u

p p o s ed l y tra n s l at edi tan d

th en M r. T ar an go signe d it, but it was not written in his own hand, you know, there ’s no tape, I asked, I mean I think it’s all hearsay , Your Honor and I ask that it not be admissible. The c ourt overr

uled the objec tion and allowed De tective Ga rcia to rea d the statement into the
rec ord. The tr ial court a dmitted Appellant’s statement into evidenc e as State’ s Ex hibit Number One. On

a pp e a l, A pp e lla nt c on te nd s d e fe ns e c ouns e l’ s o bje c tio n d ur ingtr ia l w a s a

mot ion to suppress the e vidence . Howeve r, the re cord doe s not indicate that Appe llant moved for suppression of the state ment, and ther efor e the a rgument is not preserve d for a ppellate r eview. In o rd e r t o p re se rv e an e rr or fo r a pp e llate re vie w, the re c or d mu st s ho w that a pa rt y prese nted a timely

reque st, objection, or motion that states the specific g rounds for the desired ruling , unless they

are appar ent from the c ontext of the re quest, objection, or motion. See T EX .R.A PP .P. 33.1(a)( 1). More over, the trial court must have either e x pressly or implicitly

ruled on the re quest, objection, or motion. See T EX .R.A PP .P. 33.1(a) (2)( A). Appellant’s c omplaint is not prese rved be cause the objection made at trial, hea rsay , does-4-

not comport with the issue raise d on appea l, a motion to suppress a conf ession on the g rounds that it was involuntary
. Se e Ba rn es v . S tate , 876 S.W .2d 316, 325 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) ( h o l d i n g th a tth e tr i a l o b

j e c t i o nd i d

n o tc o mp o rtw i thth e i s s u e r a i s e d o na p p e a l ; c o n s e qu e n t l y, there was no pre servation for re view). H oweve r, in the intere st of justice, we w ill address the
me ri ts o f A

pp e lla nt’ s argume nt o n th e qu e sti on s o f whe the r A pp e lla nt v olu nta ri ly “ ma de ” his state me nt, and

wh e the r i t w a s a dmi ssi ble a t tr ia l. We reviewa trial c ourt’s rulingon a motion to suppress for a n abuse of

discretion, g iving almost total defer ence to the trial judg e’s de cision based on the f acts. Gu zm an v . S tate , 955 S.W. 2d 85 , 8 8- 9 ( Te x.Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ); Ga rc ia v . S tate , 15 S.W .3d 533, 535 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). In revie wing the trial cour t’s decision, we must view the rec ord and r easona ble infer ence s the re fr om i n a

lig ht m os t f

avo ra ble to t he ru lin g , a

nd wi ll u ph old the de c isi on

on ly if it i s
rea sonably

supported by

the re cord. Sta tev . R os s , 32 S.W .3d 853, 855-56 (Te x .Crim.App. 20 00 ); Vi lla rre al v . S

tate , 935 S.W .2d 134, 138 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). This is the proper sta nd ard of re vie w b e c a

us e it i s r e c og nize d th a t “ tr ia l c ourt s a re us ua lly in t he be st p os iti on

to make the c all on whether cer tain evidenc e should be a dmitted or excluded.” Guzman , 955 S.W .2d 89. A re viewingcourt must take into ac count the totality of the c ircumstance s under whic h a confe ssion was made when the voluntar iness of the c onfession is at issue. Cre age r v . S tate , 952 S.W. 2d 85 2, 85 5 ( Te x.Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ). A s tate me nt i s invo luntary if the re c or d r e fl e c ts

“ of fi c ia l, c oe rc ive c on du c t of su c h a natur e that any

state me nt o bta ine d th e re by wa s unli ke ly

to have be en the pr oduct of a n essentially

fre e and unc onstrained c hoice by its maker.” Alvarado v. Sta te , 912 S.W .2d 199, 211 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). The ultimate question for the appellate court-5-

is whether A

ppellant’s will was ove rborne
. Creager , 952 S.W .2d at 856. On appe al, Appellant r elies hea vily on Cru z v . S tate . 586 S.W .2d 861 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979). In Cruz , a lawyer dr afte d a conf ession for the de fenda

nt and made him sig n the statement without readingit. Id . at 862-65. The lawy er took the sig ned stateme nt to the police station wher e the de fenda

nt was to be interr og ated. Id . at 863. When the detec tives reque sted a statement fr om the defe ndant, the lawyer of fer ed the pr epar ed stateme nt. Id . At trial, the cour t admitted the statement a s evidenc e, howe ver, the lawy er obje cted on thre e g rounds: that the defe ndant had not bee n rea d his rights prior to givingthe statement; that the de fenda nt signe d the statement without rea ding it; and that the statement was the lawy er’ s version of what happene d and not the def

endant’ s version. Id . The Court of Criminal Appea ls in Cruz , held that the statement wa s not admissibl e as e vidence beca use the stateme nt was not made by the def endant. Id
. Howeve r, in State v. Terrazas , 4 S.W. 3d 72 0 ( Te x.Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ), the Court he ld t hat it ref used “to e x tend Cruzbeyond the unique fa cts and c ircumstance s of that ca se.” I ndeed, the Court noted that the circ umstances in Cruzwer e of suc h a natur e “which it ‘trusted’ would ‘ never ag ain be pr esente d.’” Id . at 726, quoting Cruz , 586 S.W .2d at 862-65. The fac ts in thi s case are clea rly unlike the fa cts in Cruz , an d we d ec l i n e t o ex t en d

i t s re as o n i n g. In the ca se at ba

r, De tective Ga

rcia rea d Appellant his rig hts in S panish, prior to custodial int e rr og a tio n a

nd pr ior to A pp e lla nt’ s st a te me nt. Mo re ov e r, De te c tiv e Ga rc ia re a d App e lla

nt h is rig hts in the presenc e of a witness, Offic er I smael Cobos. Be cause Appellant could not spea k Eng lish, Detective G arc ia translate d and tra nscribed A

ppellant’s dictate d statement. F urther, Detec tive Gar cia r ead A

ppellant’s stateme nt back to him in both Spanish and English in the-6-

prese nce of

two witnesses, Off

icer Cobos and Ms. Ba

rbar a Sabony a, a nota

ry public. Appellant signe d h is s tate me nt a

nd ini tia le d it

se ve ra l ti me s. A r e vie w o f t

he re c or d n e ith e r i nd ic a te s th a t App e lla nt’ s w ill wa s o ve rb or

ne no r t hat hi s statement wa s a re sult of official c oerc ive conduc t rende ringit inadmissi ble under Alvarado , 912 S.W .2d at 211. The r ecor d shows Appellant wa s willing to g ive a wr itten statement as longas Offic er G arc ia wrote it out for him. Under Te x as law, “ office rs ar e cur rently permitted to reduc e defe ndants’ ora l statements into writing [and] are e ven allowe d to para phrase the statements.” He ise lbe tz v . S

tate , 906 S.W .2d 500, 512 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). Refusing to ext end Appe llant’s Cru z v . S tate analy sis, we conc lude Appellant indee d “made ” his statement and that the statement
w a s v o l un t ar

y. Fur thermore , we c onclude that the tr ial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting Appellant’s state ment. The trial judg e wa s fre e to believe that Appellant’s state ment was made willingly and fr ee f

rom offic ial coer cion. I ssue Thre e is overr uled. InI s s u e O n e, Ap p el l an tar gu es th atth e t ri al co urt erre d o v erru l i n g Ap p el l an t ’s ch al l en ge fo r c a us e a g a ins t V e nir e me mbe r K a ty Kl ine , w he n s he e xpre sse d b ia s o r p re jud ic e duri ngvo ir dire. Duringvoir dire, Ve niremembe r Katy Kline g ave notice that a fa mily member ha d been a victim of a sexual assault. Ms. Kline informed the c ourt that her young er br other ha d been a victim of sexual assault “y ear s ag o.” The court a sked Ms. Kline if she c ould “set aside that experience . . . and judg e the c ase ba sed just on what [she would] hear in the courtroom . . . .” V e n i r e m e mb e r

K l i n e i n d i c a t e d

th a ts h e w o u l d

h av e tr o u b l e d o i n g s o w h e ns h e r e p l i e d , “ a c tu a l l y, y e s, it w ill a ff

e c t me .” Th e Court

the n a sk e d, ho we ve r, wh e the r M s. Kl ine fe lt s he wo uld be a ble-7-

to f oll owthe c ourt ’s ins tr

uc tio ns in d e c idi ngthe c a se . M s. Kl ine ind ic a te d th e n th a t sh e c ou ld follow the trial cour

t’s instructions. Defe nse counse l moved to have he r struck f or ca use. The mot ion wa s d e nie d, and

Ms. Kl ine wa s se a te d a s a me mbe r o f t

he pa ne l. T o p re s erv e e rr o r f

o r ap p el l at e r ev i ew wi thre s p ec tt o a t ri al co urt ’s d en i al o f ach al l en ge for c ause, a

n appellant must: (1) a ssert a c lear and spec ific cha lleng e for cause ; (2) use a pere mptory

strike on the complaine d-of ve niremembe r; (3) e x haust his pere mptory strikes; (4) reque st additional peremptory strikes; (5) identify

an objec tionable juror; and ( 6) cla im that he would have struc k an objec tionable juror with a pe remptory strike if he ha d one to use. Allen v. Sta te , 108 S.W .3d 281, 282 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). The re cord indicates that Appellant a sserted
a c le ar a nd sp e c if ic c ha lle ng e fo r c a

us e of Ve nir e me mbe r K lin e . H ow e ve r, Ap pe lla nt f a ile d to prese rve e rror

on the trial cour

t’s denial of his cha lleng e for cause ag ainst Ms. Kline, when de fe ns e c ouns e l f

a ile d to us e a

pe re mpt or

y str ike to r e mov e he r f

ro m th e jur

y . B e c a us e Ms. Kline was not the subjec t of a pe remptory strike, I ssue One ha s not been pre serve d for our revie w. I ssue One is ove rruled. In I ssue Two, Appe llant argues that the trial c ourt err ed by denying A

ppellant’s motion fo r m istri a l on

the g ro un ds of

ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, whe n d e fe ns e c ouns e l f a ile d to prese rve e rror

on the trial cour

t’s denial of A

ppellant’s cha lleng e for

cause . In o rd e r t o p re va il o n a

c la im o f i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, a

n a pp e lla nt m us t show: (1) that trial c ounsel perf ormed de ficiently ; and (2) that defe nse counse l’s defic ient perf ormanc e ser

ved to pre judice the de fenda

nt. Strickland v. W

ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct . 2052, 2064, 80 L .Ed.2d 674 (1984). In evalua ting whe ther de fense counsel pe rfor med defic iently , a re viewingcourt “ must not second-guess leg itimate strateg ic or tac tical dec isions-8-

made by trial counsel in the midst of trial . . . .” State v. Morales , 253 S.W .3d 686, 696 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). I nstead, a revie wing court “ must indul g e a strongpresumption that counsel’s c onduct fa lls withi n the wide r ang e of r easona ble profe ssional assistance . . . .” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct . at 2065. Ther efor e, a r eviewingcourt should pre sume that the pe rf or manc e of tr ia l c ouns e l w a s c on sti tut ion a lly a de qu a te un le ss t

he re c or d is su ff

ic ie nt t o indicate other

wise. Morales , 2 53 S.W. 3d a t 69 6. Mo re ov e r, a

re vie wi ngc ourt

sh ou ld p re sume that trial counsel wa s eff

ective, “ unless the cha lleng ed conduc t was ‘so outra g eous that no competent attorney

would have e ng ag ed in it.’” Go od sp e e d v . S

tate , 187 S.W .3d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). The re cord in this case is insufficient to show that in failing to use a pere mptory

strike ag ainst Venire member K line in order to pr eser ve er ror f or appe al, trial counse l “ac ted outside the bounds of what any competent attorney

would have done .” Morales , 253 S.W .3d at 697. The re cord indicates that defe nse counse l made a motion for mistrial on the g rounds of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel at the c lose of evide nce. Prior to that motion, defe nse counse l made a motion for a dire cted ve rdict on the g rounds that there had bee n no in-court identific ation of Appe llant as the per

petrator of the of

fense . The c ourt allowed the reope ning of evidenc e solely for the pur

pose of identify

ing A ppellant. Def

ense c ounsel objecte d and wa s overr uled. I mmediately

afte r the trial c ourt reope ned evide nce, de fense counsel made the motion for mistrial. The rec ord indicate s that the motion for mistrial was a r esponse to the c ourt’s dec ision to overrule defe nse counse l and re open evide nce. T here is no indication that defense counsel
mov e d f or a mis tr ia l on

the g ro un d o f i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l du e to h is f

a ilure to pere mptorily

strike Ms. Kline and pr eser ve er ror.-9-

Assuming, a

rguendo, that Ms. Kline wa s challeng eable for c ause, w e re cog nize that the service of “a

single partial juror

will viti ate a

conviction.” De lri o v . S tate , 840 S.W .2d 443, 445 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). Howeve r, the Six th Amendment’s rig ht to an impartial jury , “is just that
- a r ight.” Morales , 253 S.W .3d at 697. The Court ha s held that this right is subject to for feiture or “w aiver

by the def endant in the inter est of over all trial strategy .” Id ., citing De lri o , 840 S.W .2d at 445. B eca

use the de fenda

nt may exercise this rig ht at will, the Six th Amendment rig ht to an impartial jury

is subject to defe nse counse l’s strateg ic and tac tical dec isions during trial. Morales , 253 S.W .3d at 697. Followingthe standar d set forth in Strickland , w e mus t pr e sume that de fe ns e c ouns e l is better situated tha

n the appe llate cour

t to judge the strateg ies employ ed in a pa rticular c ase a

nd that those strateg ic dec isions were ma de usingrea sonable prof essional judg ment. De lri o , 840 S.W .2d at 447. Indeed, in De lri o , the Court could “e nvision circumstance s under whic h it might
a pp e ar a dv anta g e ou s” to r e ta in p ro sp e c tiv e jur or s w ithan a c tua l bi a s, and he ld t hat de fe ns e counsel c ould retain such jur ors. Id . at 446. Simi larly , in this case, we cannot a ssume that defe nse counse l did not make a strate g ic or tactica l choice, a lbeit a difficult one, when he f ailed to exercise a

pere mptory

challeng e on Ms. Kline, and thus failed to pr eser ve er ror. See M

orales , 253 S.W .3d at 698. I t does not follow, ips o fa c to , that defe nse counse l’s actions we re ne cessa rily defic ient. Id . at 699. Afte r the c ourt denied de fense counsel’s c halleng e for cause , he may

very well have made a

strateg ic dec ision not to ex erc ise a pe remptory challeng e on Ms. Kline. Subsequently , I ssue Two is over ruled. Havingoverr

uled all of Appe llant’s issues, we a ffirm the tria l court’s de cision.-10-

September 30, 2009 DAVI D WEL L I NGTONCHEW, C hief Just ice B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l ur e , a n d C ar r , JJ. C arr, J
. (N o tP art i ci p at i n g) (Do Not Publish)