# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 7, 2019 *

Decided January 8, 2019

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 17-3328

NOAH SCHROEDER, Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v

.

TERRY SAWALL, et al., Defendants-Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 15-CV-1158

Lynn Adelman, J udge

.

O R D E R

Noah Schroeder, a Wisconsin inmate, sued prison officials for deliberate indifference in failing to protect him from an attack by another inmate. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for su mmary judgment because Schroeder did not demonstrate that any defendant knew of a subs tantial risk of serious harm. We affirm.

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts an d legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited onl y in accordance with Fed. R. A pp . P. 32.1No. 17-3328 Page 2

Schroeder was accused by fellow inmate Kevin Stuckey of being a “snitch.” According to a conduct report that charged Stuckey with making unauthorized phone calls, Schroeder had told the investigating officer that Stuckey had helped him make calls in exchange for food. Schroeder, concer ned about the ramification of being labeled a snitch, sent a letter to the prison’s security director stating that he feared for his safety and that the officer had fabricated the re port. He also filed an inmate complaint accusing the officer of misconduct for f iling a false conduct report. The complaintexaminer dismissed the complaint, explaining that Schroeder’s only legitimate safety concern would relate to Stuckey, with whom Schroeder continued to associate peacefully even after the conduct report ha d been issued. In any event, the complaintexaminer added, Stuckey and Schroeder already were housed in different units.

About three months later, Schroeder was attacked by another inmate who had gained improper access to the recreation fi eld during Schroeder’s scheduled recreation time. That inmate “choked out” Schroeder, repeatedly stabbed him with a sharpened paint brush, and called him a snitch. The attack lasted until officers who were supervising the recreation field intervened.

Schroeder sued prison officials un der the Eighth Amendment for being deliberately indifferent to the ri sk that an attack would occur. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court ultimately entered summary ju dgment for the defendants, explaining that Schroeder had not produced sufficient evid ence for a jury to conclude that the defendants subjectively knew about the risk and did not take reasonable measures to abate it. See Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 846–47 (1994); Giles v. Tobeck , 895 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2018).

On appeal Schroeder generally challenges the district court’s conclusion that he did not establish the defendants’ culpable st ate of mind, and stresses that officers knew of the ramifications of being named in Stuc key’s conduct report. But “[j]ust because a correctional officer knows an inmate ha s been branded a snitch—and it’s common knowledge that snitches face unique risks in prison—doe s not mean that an officer violates the Constitution if the inmate gets attacked.” Dale , 548 F.3d at 570. An officer does not violate the Eighth Amendment “unle ss the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer , 511 U.S. at 837. And Schroeder has presented no evidence that any defendant kn ew of such a risk. The most any defendant knew was that, three months before the a ttack, Schroeder was named in Stuckey’s conduct report, but there is no indication that any defendant would have known thatNo. 17-3328 Page 3

any threat was posed by the inmate who ultimately attacked Schroeder—an inmate who was uninvolved in the incidents giving rise to Stuckey’s conduct report.

Schroeder insists that the attack was no netheless foreseeable, but his arguments are unpersuasive. To the extent he speculates that his name in the conduct report may have led the assaulting inmate to suspec t him of being a confidential informant elsewhere, his theory does not impute know ledge of a serious risk of harm to any defendant. See Klebanowski v. Sheahan , 540 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 2008). Schroeder also asserts that his assailant told an officer—o ne not named as a defendant—about plans to attack him, but points to no factual basis fo r knowing that such a conversation occurred, and ideas based on hunches or rumors are insufficient to avert summary judgment. See
F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 56(c); Springer v. Durflinger , 518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008). In any case, what was told to a non-defendant officer in no way establishes what any individual defendant here knew.

Schroeder also asserts that lying on a co nduct report violates prison policy and amounts to deliberate indifference per se. But violation of a prison policy alone does not violate the Constitution or suggest deliberate indifference. See Lewis v. Richards , 107 F.3d 549, 553 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1997); Langston v. Peters , 100 F.3d 1235, 1238 (7th Cir. 1996).

AFFIRMED