BLD

- 192 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 13

- 1306

___________ In re: CHERYL LUCRETIA SPRINGS, Debtor CHERYL LUCRETIA SPRINGS, Appellant

___________________________________ _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (D.C. Civil No. 13

- cv - 00156) District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson

____________________________________ Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L AR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 April 11, 2013 Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR. , Circuit Judges (Opinion filed : May 1, 2013 )

_________ OPINION

_________ PER CURIAM In June 2012, the Appellant, Cheryl Lucretia Springs, filed for protection under
C hapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. During the course of the bankruptcy2 proceedings, Springs’s landlord requested relief from the automatic stay in order to commence eviction proceedings against her in state court. The Bankruptcy Court gran ted the landlord’s motion. In December 2012, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed Springs’s Chapter 7 case. She did not appeal from the order. Approximately two weeks later, in January 2013, Springs filed a second Chapter 7 case. Following a hearing, the Ban kruptcy Court dismissed this second case on the ground that, inter alia , “the sole purpose behind commencing this case was to hinder and frustrate the exercise of the Landlord’s legal remedies.” Springs appealed this order to the United States District Co urt for the District of Delaware. While the appeal was pending in the District Court, Springs filed an emergency motion to stay the eviction proceedings, arguing that she and her family had nowhere else to live. The District Court denied Springs’s moti on on the grounds that she had not provided any information about the status of the eviction proceedings, and had not demonstrated that she would prevail on the merits of her appeal. Springs now appeals from the District Court’s order. 1

1 We have jurisdic tion over this appeal pur suant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(a)(1) and 158(d)(1).3 The District Co urt considered the following factors to determine whether to issue a stay in this case: (1) whether Springs made a strong showing that she wa s likely to succeed on the merits of her appeal ; (2) whether she would be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) wh ether issuance of the stay w ould substantially injure the other parties ; and (4) where the public interest lies. See Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. , 949 F.2d 653, 658 (3d Cir. 1991)

. We agree with the District Court that these factor s weighed against granting a stay. While Springs stated in her motion that the Bankruptcy Court’s underlying decision to dismiss her second Chapter 7 case was “harsh,” she did not point to any specific error in that decision. In fact, she did not challen ge any of the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law. Furthermore, she did not provide the District Court with any information about the status of the state court eviction proceedings, or indicate whether any legal remedies were availab le to her there. Under these circumstances, the District Court did not err in denying her request for a stay. In the document that Springs filed in support of her appeal, she asks this Court to “reopen” and “discharge” her bankruptcy case. We note, h owever, that her appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling is still pending in the District Court, and the only matter presently before us is the District Court’s order denying her motion to stay the eviction proceedings. Therefore, we will not consider h er request.4 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there is no substantial question presented by this appeal

. Accordingly, we will summarily affi rm the District Court’s order

. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.