[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-13755

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 3:11-cr-00221-MMH-JBT-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

ANTHONY LEONARDO COOPER, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(January 30, 2015)

Before HULL, MARCUS and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Anthony Cooper appeals his 14-month sentence, imposed for violating 

conditions of his supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). On appeal, 

Cooper argues that: (1) the district court procedurally erred in determining the 

guideline range for the revocation by finding his Florida state conviction for false 

imprisonment, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 787.02, was a “crime of violence” under 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2; and (2) his sentence, imposed below the guideline range, was 

substantively unreasonable. After careful review, we affirm.

We review a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release for 

reasonableness. United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106–07 (11th Cir. 

2006). When reviewing for reasonableness, we apply the abuse-of-discretion 

standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). We review de novo

whether a defendant’s prior conviction is a “crime of violence” under the 

Guidelines. United States v. Cortes-Salazar, 682 F.3d 953, 954 (11th Cir. 2012), 

cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 995 (2013). 

First, we are unpersuaded by Cooper’s claim that the district court 

procedurally erred in determining the guideline range for the revocation. If a 

defendant violates a condition of supervised release, the district court may, after 

considering the relevant factors set forth in § 3553(a), continue supervised release 

or revoke the sentence of supervised release and resentence the defendant. 18 

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U.S.C. § 3583(e).1 Among other things, the district court must consider the correct 

advisory guideline range. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)). “[The] 

recommended sentencing range is based on the classification of the conduct that 

resulted in the revocation and the criminal history category applicable at the time” 

of the defendant’s original sentencing. United States v. Campbell, 473 F.3d 1345, 

1348-49 (citing U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1, 7B1.4).

Pursuant to § 7B1.3(a)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines, upon a finding of a 

Grade A violation, the court “shall revoke” supervised release. U.S.S.G. § 

7B1.3(a)(1). A “Grade A” violation is defined as “conduct constituting (A) a 

federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one 

year that (i) is a crime of violence . . . .” Id. § 7B1.1(a)(1). 

Section 4B1.2(a) defines “crime of violence” to include any offense that 

either “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 

against the person of another,” or that “is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or 

extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a 

 1 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), when a defendant violates a condition of his supervised 

release, the district court must consider the factors outlined in “section[s] 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), 

(a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7)” in determining whether to impose a 

sentence of imprisonment. United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2014); 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). These factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and 

the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for deterrence; (3) the need to 

protect the public; (4) the need to provide the defendant with needed training, medical care, or 

other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (5) the kinds of sentences and the 

guideline range; (6) any pertinent policy statements; (7) the need to avoid unwarranted 

sentencing disparities; and (8) the need to provide restitution to any victims. 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7). 

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serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id. § 4B1.2(a)(1), (2). 

Notably, the definition of a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2(a) is “virtually 

identical” to the definition of a “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act 

(“ACCA”), and, therefore, we apply a similar analysis in deciding whether a given 

offense qualifies as a crime of violence or a violent felony. United States v. 

Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1253 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).

When analyzing a case under § 4B1.2, we generally apply a “categorical 

approach,” looking “no further than the fact of conviction and the statutory 

definition of the prior offense.” United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238, 1240 

(11th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). In doing so, we disregard the label placed 

on the state crime and instead look to whether the conduct necessary to establish a 

conviction under the state law is a natural equivalent to the offenses designated as 

crimes of violence. Id. at 1242. In United States v. Schneider, we conducted a 

categorical analysis of Florida’s false imprisonment statute to determine whether 

Florida’s false imprisonment statute is a “violent felony” for purposes of the 

ACCA. 681 F.3d 1273, 1276 (11th Cir. 2010). We found that false imprisonment 

was “comparable to [the enumerated offense of] burglary with respect to the 

degree and kind of risk produced” because the risk created by false imprisonment, 

even if accomplished by deceit, “arises from the possibility that the victim might 

try to resist or escape.” Id. at 1281. Accordingly, we held that Florida’s false 

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imprisonment crime, “even when accomplished secretly, produces a serious 

potential risk of physical injury to another for purposes of the residual clause of the 

[ACCA].” Id. at 1282 (quotation omitted).

In this case, the district court did not commit procedural error in finding that 

Cooper’s Florida false imprisonment conviction was categorically a “crime of 

violence” based on our holding and analysis of Fla. Stat. § 787.02 in Schneider. 

Although Schneider involved an inquiry as to whether Florida’s false 

imprisonment statute was categorically a “violent felony” for purposes of the 

ACCA, the definition of “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2 is “virtually identical,” 

and the analysis is similar. Alexander, 609 F.3d at 1253. In particular, Schneider

concluded that false imprisonment was “comparable” to the enumerated offense of 

burglary, which is also designated as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2. 

Schneider, 681 F.3d at 1281; Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1242; U.S.S.G. § 4B.1.1(a). 

As for Cooper’s argument that false imprisonment does not ordinarily entail 

a risk of injury, this was also foreclosed by Schneider. There, we held that the risk 

of injury in false imprisonment arose “from the possibility that the victim might try 

to resist or escape” even in situations where the victim was imprisoned “secretly.” 

Schneider, 681 F.3d at 1281. Finally, it does not matter whether false 

imprisonment constitutes “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct” because 

false imprisonment is not a crime of strict liability, negligence, or recklessness. Id.

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at 1280-82. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding 

that Cooper’s conviction constituted a Grade A felony for purposes of determining 

his advisory guideline range under § 7B1.4. 

Nor is Cooper’s sentence substantively unreasonable. To assess substantive 

reasonableness, we consider the “‘totality of the circumstances.’” United States v. 

Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). “A 

district court abuses its discretion and imposes a substantively unreasonable 

sentence when it fails to afford consideration to relevant [§ 3353(a)] factors that 

were due significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant 

factor, or commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” 

United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir.2010) (en banc) (quotation 

omitted). But “we will not second guess the weight (or lack thereof) that the 

[court] accorded to a given [§ 3553(a) ] factor ... as long as the sentence ultimately 

imposed is reasonable in light of all the circumstances presented.” United States v. 

Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir.2010) (quotation, alteration and emphasis 

omitted). We reverse only if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that 

the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) 

factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences 

dictated by the facts of the case.” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191 (quotation omitted). The 

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party challenging the sentence has the burden of establishing that the sentence was 

unreasonable. United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008).

Ordinarily, we expect a sentence within the advisory guideline range to be 

reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence 

imposed below the statutory maximum is another indicator of a reasonable 

sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). 

Here, Cooper’s sentence was substantively reasonable. As the record 

shows, the court properly weighed the factors and carefully reviewed the evidence

-- including the testimony of the victim, the proceedings in Cooper’s state court 

conviction, and Cooper’s medical records -- before imposing a sentence below the 

guideline range and the two-year statutory maximum penalty. In addition, the 

district court discussed: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense, which 

involved the solicitation of a prostitute and restraining of the victim; (2) the history 

and characteristics of the defendant, including Cooper’s health conditions; and (3) 

the applicable guidelines, including the guideline-imprisonment term for a Grade C 

violation, before stating that the 14-month sentence was “sufficient but . . . not 

greater than necessary” to satisfy the purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. §§ 

3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4)(B), 3583(e)(3). The record also reveals that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion by giving significant weight to the 

aggravating factors -- including the nature and seriousness of the offense -- nor did 

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it improperly insert the judge’s personal judgment in the decision. Finally, there is 

no evidence that the court gave undue weight, or factored in his prior convictions, 

beyond his criminal history category, in determining the sentence at hand. 

Accordingly, Cooper has not met his burden to demonstrate that his sentence is 

substantively unreasonable, nor did the court abuse its discretion in imposing a 

total 14-month sentence. 

AFFIRMED.

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