IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

August 8, 2017 Session

BRADLEY COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM BY AND THROUGH THE BRADLEY 

COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL. v. THE CITY OF 

CLEVELAND, TENNESSEE

 Appeal from the Chancery Court for Bradley County

No. 2014-CV-84 Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor

No. E2016-01030-COA-R3-CV

This is one of four separate actions currently before this Court with the common issue of 

whether the version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) in effect prior to 

the July 2014 amendment of that statute required a municipality governed by its own 

liquor-by-the-drink referendum and operating its own school system to share one-half of 

its liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue with the county in which the municipality was located

when the county had not enacted a liquor-by-the-drink referendum. The county 

commenced the instant action by filing a complaint requesting declaratory judgment of its 

asserted right to a portion of liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue collected within the 

municipality. Upon subsequent competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court 

granted summary judgment in favor of the municipality, finding that the municipality was 

entitled to keep all liquor-by-the-drink tax monies distributed to it by the Tennessee 

Commissioner of Revenue (“the Commissioner”). Upon the county’s motion to alter or 

amend, the trial court reserved judgment on the issue of whether the municipality was 

entitled to the local political subdivision’s portion of the liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue 

for sales that took place at private clubs within the municipal limits of the municipality 

prior to the municipality’s 2002 passage of its referendum authorizing liquor-by-the-drink 

sales. Following consideration of a motion for summary judgment on this remaining

issue filed by the municipality and a response filed by the county, the trial court again 

granted summary judgment in favor of the municipality, dismissing the county’s 

complaint in its entirety. The county has appealed. Determining that the municipality 

was not required under the applicable version of the statute to share its liquor-by-thedrink tax revenues with the county, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

12/27/2017
2

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL 

SWINEY, C.J., and RICHARD H. DINKINS, J., joined.

James F. Logan, Jr., Cleveland, Tennessee, for the appellants, Bradley County School 

System, by and through the Bradley County Board of Education, and Bradley County, 

Tennessee.

Douglas S. Johnston, Jr., Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, the City of Cleveland, 

Tennessee. 

Kristin Ellis Berexa and Mark E. McGrady, Nashville, Tennessee, for the amicus curiae,

Tennessee Municipal League Risk Management Pool, Inc.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The facts underlying this action are essentially undisputed. Tennessee Code 

Annotated § 57-4-301(c) (2013 & Supp. 2017) provides for a tax “to include each and 

every retail” of an alcoholic beverage sold for consumption on the premises by various 

establishments delineated in section -301, such as restaurants, hotels, sports facilities, and 

private clubs. This tax is commonly referred to as a “liquor-by-the-drink tax.” See Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 57-4-306 (2013 & Supp. 2017); Copper Cellar Corp. v. Jackson, 762 

S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tenn. 1988). Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306, originally 

enacted in 1967, prescribes the manner in which proceeds from the liquor-by-the-drink 

tax are to be distributed, primarily in support of public education. At issue in this action 

is the version of section -306 in effect prior to the Tennessee General Assembly’s 2014 

amendment of that statutory section (“2014 Amendment”). See 2014 Tenn. Pub. Acts, 

Ch. 901 § 1 (H.B. 1403). Particularly at issue is statutory language added to subsection 

-306(a)(2)(A) through an amendment made by the General Assembly in 1982 (“1982 

Amendment”). See 1982 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 942, §§ 1-2 (S.B. 1817).

 

The City of Cleveland (“the City”) passed a liquor-by-the-drink referendum in 

2002. The citizens of Bradley County (“the County”) have rejected such a referendum. 

As the trial court stated in its final order:

Prior to the 2002 referendum, private clubs operated within the city 

limits of Cleveland, Tennessee and legally sold liquor-by-the-drink on the 

premises. The clubs collected liquor taxes and remitted the taxes to the 

State. In accordance with T.C.A. § 57-4-306, the State then returned onehalf of those revenues to the City, which the City in turn allocated fifty 
3

(50%) percent of the revenues received back from the State to its[] school 

system through the City’s annual appropriations. 

As the trial court noted, the City had continuously operated its own school system since 

1966, one year before the liquor-by-the-drink tax was initially enacted by the General 

Assembly. Since passage of the 2002 referendum, the City had continued to receive fifty

percent of gross receipt taxes arising from sales of liquor by the drink. The City had not 

distributed any of its liquor-by-the-drink revenue to the Bradley County School System 

or the Bradley County Education Fund. 

On April 14, 2014, the Bradley County School System (“the County School 

System”), acting by and through the Bradley County Board of Education (“the County 

Board”), filed a complaint in the Bradley County Chancery Court (“trial court”), seeking 

declaratory judgment regarding the rights and responsibilities of the parties concerning

the liquor-by-the-drink tax. The County Board requested, inter alia, an order directing 

the City to remit to the County Board “the full amount of unremitted tax revenues” plus 

prejudgment interest. On May 13, 2014, the City filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,

asserting, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), that the County Board

had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The City argued that 

because the County had not authorized liquor-by-the-drink sales, all of Title 57, Chapter 

4, including section -306, did not apply to the County. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-

103(a) (2013 & Supp. 2017) (“This chapter shall be effective in any jurisdiction which 

authorizes the sale of alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises in a 

referendum . . . .”). The County Board filed a response in opposition to the motion to 

dismiss on June 12, 2014.

Upon the County Board’s subsequent motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of 

Civil Procedure 42.01, the trial court entered an order on July 25, 2014, consolidating this 

action with similar actions filed by the McMinn County Board of Education against the 

Cities of Athens, Niota, and Etowah solely “for the purpose of consideration of the 

Motions to Dismiss presently pending.” McMinn County also had not passed a liquorby-the-drink referendum, and the Cities of Athens, Niota, and Etowah had filed motions 

to dismiss the respective complaints.1 The trial court denied the various motions to 

dismiss in an order entered September 24, 2014.

The City filed an answer to the complaint on October 16, 2014, asserting, as 

pertinent to this appeal, that (1) the County School System and County Board were not 

proper parties; (2) Title 57, Chapter 4 of the Tennessee Code was not applicable to the 

County because the County had not authorized liquor-by-the-drink sales; and (3) the City 

 

1

The McMinn County actions are not at issue in this appeal.
4

was exempted by operation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a) (2013) from 

paying any portion of the liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds received from the 

Commissioner because the City operated its own school system separate from the County

School System. The County subsequently filed a motion to intervene as a co-plaintiff 

with the County Board, which the trial court granted in an order entered February 3, 

2015. We will hereinafter refer to the plaintiffs collectively as “the County.” 

In the meantime, the General Assembly amended Tennessee Code Annotated § 

57-4-306(a)(2), effective July 1, 2014, setting forth, inter alia, a detailed process by 

which counties that were owed funds by municipalities under Tennessee Code Annotated 

§ 57-4-306 could seek those funds and negotiate settlements as applicable. See 2014 

Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 901 § 1 (H.B. 1403). The 2014 Amendment included a distinction 

between the liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds received by a local political subdivision in 

the time period spanning July 1, 2014, until June 30, 2015, and those proceeds received 

after July 1, 2015, when, according to the 2014 Amendment, the statute would revert 

back to its pre-amendment language. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-306(b)-(c) (Supp. 

2014); 2014 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 901 § 1 (H.B. 1403).2 However, the General Assembly 

has also amended Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306 each year since the 2014 

Amendment, extending the amended language in subsequent years, one year at a time. 

See 2015 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 220 §§ 1, 2 (S.B. 990); 2016 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 885 §§

1, 2 (H.B. 1691); 2017 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 346 §§ 1, 2 (S.B. 1262). 

Upon competing motions filed for summary judgment in January 2015, the trial 

court conducted a hearing on March 2, 2015. In an order entered July 30, 2015, the court 

granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. The court found that pursuant to 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-103(a), only local political subdivisions that had 

authorized liquor-by-the-drink sales had rights and responsibilities under Chapter 4 of 

Title 57. The court concluded that pursuant to the governing version of Tennessee Code 

Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2), liquor-by-the-drink funds were “to be paid to the local 

political subdivision which has passed the referendum thereby allowing the City to keep 

all funds raised by this tax.” The court also determined that the 2014 Amendment did not 

affect its interpretation of the prior version of the statute.

The County filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment on July 31, 2015, which 

the trial court partially denied in an order entered November 19, 2015. The court 

reserved judgment on the issue of whether proceeds from liquor-by-the-drink taxes 

collected prior to the City’s 2002 referendum should be divided between the City and the

County. Following consideration of a motion for summary judgment on this issue filed 

 

2

It is undisputed that due to pending litigation, an exception included in the 2014 Amendment excluded 

Bradley County, via specific population parameters, from the amended language. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 

57-4-306(i) (Supp. 2014); 2014 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 901 § 1 (H.B. 1403).
5

by the City, a response filed by the County, and supplemental briefs, the trial court 

entered a final judgment on May 2, 2016, confirming its prior judgment and finding that 

the City was entitled to retain all funds from “pre-referendum taxes collected from 

private clubs.” The court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety 

and dismissed the County’s complaint. The County timely appealed. 

During the pendency of this appeal, this Court granted a motion filed by the 

Tennessee Municipal League Risk Management Pool (“the Pool”) to file a brief in this 

matter as an amicus curiae. Upon Bradley County’s motion to consolidate this case with 

three others pending on appeal, this Court entered an order on May 26, 2017, granting the 

motion “only to the extent that these cases shall be set for oral argument on the same 

docket and on the same day.”3 

II. Issues Presented

Bradley County presents three issues on appeal, which we have restated as 

follows:

1. Whether the trial court erred by declining to find that the version of 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) in effect prior to the 

2014 Amendment required the City, as a municipality governed by 

its own liquor-by-the-drink referendum and operating its own school 

system, to share one-half of its liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue with 

the County when the County had not enacted a liquor-by-the-drink 

referendum.

2. Whether the trial court erred by declining to find that the pre-2014 

version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2) required that 

one-half of all liquor-by-the-drink sales tax revenue received by the 

City must be distributed in support of education in the same manner 

as the County property tax is distributed.

3. Whether the trial court erred by finding that the City was entitled to 

the local political subdivision’s portion of the gross receipt liquorby-the-drink taxes for sales that took place within the municipal 

limits of the City prior to the City’s 2002 passage of the referendum 

authorizing liquor-by-the-drink sales.

 

3

The other three cases currently before this Court on the same overarching issue are Sullivan Cty. v. City 

of Bristol, No. E2016-02109-COA-R3-CV; Blount Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. City of Maryville, No. E2017-

00047-COA-R3-CV; and Washington Cty. Sch. Sys. v. City of Johnson City, No. E2016-02583-COA-R9-

CV.
6

III. Standard of Review

The grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law; 

therefore, our standard of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. See Rye

v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015); Dick 

Broad. Co., Inc. of Tenn. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653, 671 (Tenn. 2013) 

(citing Kinsler v. Berkline, LLC, 320 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tenn. 2010)). As such, this Court 

must “make a fresh determination of whether the requirements of Rule 56 of the 

Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied.” Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 250. 

“Statutory construction is a question of law that is reviewable on a de novo basis without 

any presumption of correctness.” In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tenn. 

2009).

As our Supreme Court has explained concerning the requirements for a movant to

prevail on a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil 

Procedure 56:

 

We reiterate that a moving party seeking summary judgment by attacking 

the nonmoving party’s evidence must do more than make a conclusory 

assertion that summary judgment is appropriate on this basis. Rather, 

Tennessee Rule 56.03 requires the moving party to support its motion with 

“a separate concise statement of material facts as to which the moving party 

contends there is no genuine issue for trial.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. “Each 

fact is to be set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph and supported by a 

specific citation to the record.” Id. When such a motion is made, any party 

opposing summary judgment must file a response to each fact set forth by 

the movant in the manner provided in Tennessee Rule 56.03. “[W]hen a 

motion for summary judgment is made [and] . . . supported as provided in 

[Tennessee Rule 56],” to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party 

“may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading,” but 

must respond, and by affidavits or one of the other means provided in 

Tennessee Rule 56, “set forth specific facts” at the summary judgment 

stage “showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 

56.06. The nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. 

Co., 475 U.S. [574,] 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 [(1986)]. The nonmoving party 

must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record which could 

lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party. If a 

summary judgment motion is filed before adequate time for discovery has 

been provided, the nonmoving party may seek a continuance to engage in 
7

additional discovery as provided in Tennessee Rule 56.07. However, after 

adequate time for discovery has been provided, summary judgment should 

be granted if the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment 

stage is insufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material 

fact for trial. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04, 56.06. The focus is on the evidence 

the nonmoving party comes forward with at the summary judgment stage, 

not on hypothetical evidence that theoretically could be adduced, despite 

the passage of discovery deadlines, at a future trial.

Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 264-65 (emphasis in original). Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil 

Procedure 56.04, the trial court must “state the legal grounds upon which the court denies 

or grants the motion” for summary judgment, and our Supreme Court has instructed that 

the trial court must state these grounds “before it invites or requests the prevailing party 

to draft a proposed order.” See Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., 439 S.W.3d 303, 316 

(Tenn. 2014). 

IV. Distribution of Liquor-by-the-Drink Tax Revenue

The County contends that the trial court erred by finding that the version of 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) (2013) in effect prior to the 2014 

Amendment did not require the City to share one-half of its liquor-by-the-drink tax 

revenue with the County’s school system. The City asserts that the trial court properly 

interpreted the governing statute as directing that because the City operated its own 

school system, the portion of its liquor-by-the-drink revenue not paid into the state’s 

general education fund was to be split between the City’s school system and the City 

itself. Upon careful review, we determine that the governing statute was ambiguous in 

that the distribution scheme for a city operating its own school system could be 

reasonably interpreted in more than one way. Having therefore analyzed the surrounding 

statutory scheme, the legislative history, and other applicable authorities, as well as the 

record in this action, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the 

City was not required to share one-half of its liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue with the 

County’s school system.

In conducting this analysis, we adhere to the following longstanding principles of 

statutory interpretation:

When dealing with statutory interpretation, well-defined precepts apply. 

Our primary objective is to carry out legislative intent without broadening 

or restricting the statute beyond its intended scope. Houghton v. Aramark 

Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002). In construing 

legislative enactments, we presume that every word in a statute has 
8

meaning and purpose and should be given full effect if the obvious 

intention of the General Assembly is not violated by so doing. In re 

C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn. 2005). When a statute is clear, we 

apply the plain meaning without complicating the task. Eastman Chem. 

Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004). Our obligation is 

simply to enforce the written language. Abels ex rel. Hunt v. Genie Indus., 

Inc., 202 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tenn. 2006). It is only when a statute is 

ambiguous that we may reference the broader statutory scheme, the history 

of the legislation, or other sources. Parks v. Tenn. Mun. League Risk 

Mgmt. Pool, 974 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tenn. 1998). Further, the language of a 

statute cannot be considered in a vacuum, but “should be construed, if 

practicable, so that its component parts are consistent and reasonable.” 

Marsh v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 42, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196 (1968). Any 

interpretation of the statute that “would render one section of the act

repugnant to another” should be avoided. Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. City of 

Chattanooga, 172 Tenn. 505, 114 S.W.2d 441, 444 (1937). We also must 

presume that the General Assembly was aware of any prior enactments at 

the time the legislation passed. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 

(Tenn. 1995).

In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d at 613-14.

A. Ambiguity of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) (2013)

The version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306 in effect when this action 

was commenced provided in pertinent part:

(a) All gross receipt taxes collected under § 57-4-301(c) shall be 

distributed by the commissioner as follows:

(1) Fifty percent (50%) to the general fund to be earmarked for 

education purposes; and

(2) Fifty percent (50%) to the local political subdivision as 

follows:

(A) One half (1⁄2) of the proceeds shall be expended and 

distributed in the same manner as the county property 

tax for schools is expended and distributed; provided, 

however, that except in counties having a population 

of not less than twenty-seven thousand nine hundred 
9

(27,900) nor more than twenty-seven thousand nine 

hundred twenty (27,920), according to the 1980 federal 

census or any subsequent federal census, any proceeds 

expended and distributed to municipalities which do 

not operate their own school systems separate from the 

county are required to remit one half (1⁄2) of their 

proceeds of the gross receipts liquor-by-the-drink tax 

to the county school fund; and

(B) The other one half (1⁄2) shall be distributed as follows:

(i) Collections of gross receipts collected in 

unincorporated areas, to the county general 

fund; and

(ii) Collections of gross receipts in incorporated 

cities and towns, to the city or town wherein 

such tax is collected.

(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a)(2), the fifty percent (50%) of the 

gross receipt taxes allocated to local political subdivisions by 

subdivision (a)(2) and collected in a municipality which is a premier 

tourist resort shall be distributed to and expended by such 

municipality for schools in such municipality.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-306 (2013).

The applicable version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-301(c) (2013), 

referenced in subsection -306(a), provided:

(c) In addition to the privilege taxes levied in subdivision (b)(1), there is 

further levied a tax equal to the rate of fifteen percent (15%) of the 

sales price of all alcoholic beverages sold for consumption on the 

premises, the tax to be computed on the gross sales of alcoholic 

beverages for consumption on the premises for the purpose of 

remitting the tax due the state, and to include each and every retail 

thereof.4

 

4

Effective May 9, 2017, the General Assembly amended Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-301(c) to 

designate the prior version of subsection -301(c) as -301(c)(1) and add a subsection -301(c)(2). See 2017 

Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 338 § 4 (S.B. 798). 
10

Subsection -301(b)(1) (2013 & Supp. 2017) sets forth privilege taxes to be paid to the 

alcoholic beverage commission by “[e]ach applicant for an on-premises consumption 

license” during the application process and on an ongoing basis as the privilege is 

exercised, according to such criteria as the type of seller, seating capacity, and percentage 

of gross sales. Subsection -301(c), in both its prior and current versions, thus adds to the 

privilege taxes levied in -301(b)(1) the fifteen-percent, liquor-by-the-drink tax applied to 

alcoholic beverages consumed on the premises. Pursuant to subsection -306(a)(1), which 

remains unchanged since the version governing here, all of the gross receipt liquor-bythe-drink taxes are to be distributed by the Commissioner, with fifty percent allocated to 

the state’s general fund, where they are earmarked for education purposes. Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 57-4-306(a)(1) (2013 & Supp. 2017). Up to this point, the clarity of section -306 

is not in dispute.

At issue in this action is the second fifty percent of the gross receipt taxes, which, 

under the governing version of the statute, were to be distributed to the “local political 

subdivision.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-306(a)(2) (2013). Particularly at issue is the 

distribution of the twenty-five percent (half of the fifty percent returned to the local 

political subdivision by the Commissioner) as set forth in subsection -306(a)(2)(A). The 

phrase, “local political subdivision,” is not expressly defined in Title 57, Chapter 4. In 

general, a “political subdivision” may be defined as “[a] division of a state that exists 

primarily to discharge some function of local government.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

1197 (8th ed. 2004). For example, within Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act, 

a “governmental entity” is defined in part as “any political subdivision of the state of 

Tennessee including, but not limited to, any municipality, metropolitan government, 

county, utility district, school district . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-102(3)(A) (2012 & 

Supp. 2017) (emphasis added). Accordingly, both the City and the County are local 

political subdivisions of the state. However, whether the applicable version of Title 57, 

Chapter 4 applied to a local political subdivision that had not authorized liquor-by-thedrink sales is a separate question, which we will address in a subsequent portion of this 

analysis.

We note that the plain language of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-

306(a)(2)(B) (2013), which disposed of the final twenty-five percent of liquor-by-thedrink gross receipt taxes, is not in dispute. This subsection provided that twenty-five 

percent of gross receipt taxes (or fifty percent of the revenue returned to the local 

political subdivision by the Commissioner) would be distributed to a county’s general 

fund if the gross receipt taxes were collected in unincorporated areas of the county and to 

a city or town if the gross receipt taxes were collected in that city or town. Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 57-4-306(a)(2)(B) (2013). The applicable version of subsection -306(b), which 

provided for distribution of gross receipt taxes collected in a municipality that was a 

premier tourist resort, as that term was defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-
11

102(26) (2013), is also not in dispute. The question of statutory interpretation at issue is 

thus narrowed to the distribution scheme set forth for twenty-five percent of the gross 

receipt taxes from liquor-by-the-drink revenue in subsection -306(a)(2)(A) (2013). 

In the applicable version, subsections -306(a)(2)(A) and -306(a)(2)(B) were joined 

by a semi-colon and the coordinating conjunction, “and.” Subsection -306(a)(2)(A), up

to the conjunction joining it to -306(a)(2)(B), stated:

One half (1⁄2) of the proceeds shall be expended and distributed in the same 

manner as the county property tax for schools is expended and distributed; 

provided, however, that except in counties having a population of not less 

than twenty-seven thousand nine hundred (27,900) nor more than twentyseven thousand nine hundred twenty (27,920), according to the 1980 

federal census or any subsequent federal census, any proceeds expended 

and distributed to municipalities which do not operate their own school 

systems separate from the county are required to remit one half (1⁄2) of their 

proceeds of the gross receipts liquor-by-the-drink tax to the county school 

fund; . . . .

The paragraph began with an independent clause, ending with the first semi-colon, which 

provided: “One half (1⁄2) of the proceeds shall be expended and distributed in the same 

manner as the county property tax for schools is expended and distributed; . . . .” This 

statement, which stood as its own sentence prior to the 1982 Amendment, was linked in 

the applicable version to an additional clause by the semi-colon, beginning with 

“provided, however that . . . .” 

The County posits that the semi-colon preceding “provided” indicates that the 

clause added by the 1982 Amendment was a clarification of the preceding sentence. We 

note that when the 1982 Amendment was approved by the General Assembly, “provided” 

began a new sentence and that the punctuation was subsequently changed to a semicolon, apparently during codification of the 1982 Amendment. However, we find this 

distinction immaterial to analysis of the statute. The meaning of “provided,” as it was 

utilized here as a conjunction, is “[o]n the condition or understanding (that).” See

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 1261-62. Combined with “however,” “provided” 

functioned as a conjunctive adverbial phrase, with the standard function of “join[ing] two 

clauses and indicat[ing] the relationship between them.” See generally BRYAN A.

GARNER, THE REDBOOK, A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE, 207 (3d ed. 2013). 

A semi-colon, when utilized in its non-listing function, separates two independent 

but related clauses and, as the County notes, “generally signals addition or contrast.” See 

CHERYL GLENN & LORETTA GRAY, HODGES’ HARBRACE HANDBOOK 63 (16th ed. 2007). 
12

Of course, a period also separates independent clauses, but one sentence does not follow 

another in a vacuum. In this instance, the amended language began with the conjunctive

adverbial phrase, “provided, however,” which through its meaning connected the proviso 

to the clause preceding it, whether that connection was signaled by a semi-colon, as in the 

printed version of the amended statute, or simply through the neighboring proximity of 

two sentences and context of those sentences, as in the version of the 1982 Amendment 

passed by the legislature. The phrase, “provided, however,” was followed by the

nominalizer, “that,” signaling what was provided, which in this case was the entire clause 

up to the end of subsection -306(a)(2)(A). The use of “provided that” thus created a 

proviso, or “a provision that begins with the words provided that and supplies a 

condition, exception, or addition.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 1262 (emphasis in 

original).

Immediately following “provided, however that . . .” the General Assembly 

included an exception, narrowly drawn as applying “in counties having a population of 

not less than twenty-seven thousand nine hundred (27,900) nor more than twenty-seven 

thousand nine hundred twenty (27,920).” Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) (2013). 

As the parties acknowledge and the legislative history of the 1982 Amendment indicates, 

the General Assembly designed the exception to the proviso to apply solely to Bedford 

County. Given that the above population parameters do not apply to Bradley County, we 

can, for the purpose of our analysis, omit the exception, yielding the following:

One half (1⁄2) of the proceeds shall be expended and distributed in the same 

manner as the county property tax for schools is expended and distributed; 

provided, however, that . . . any proceeds expended and distributed to 

municipalities which do not operate their own school systems separate from 

the county are required to remit one half (1⁄2) of their proceeds of the gross 

receipts liquor-by-the-drink tax to the county school fund; . . . .

See id.

In other words, one-half of the proceeds were to be expended and distributed in 

the same manner as the county property tax for schools on the condition or understanding 

that “any proceeds expended and distributed to municipalities which [did] not operate 

their own school systems separate from the county [were] required to remit one half (1⁄2) 

of their proceeds of the gross receipts liquor-by-the-drink tax to the county school fund.” 

See id. (emphasis added). The underlined clause functioned as a restrictive relative 

clause, restricting the “municipalities” to which this proviso applied to those that did not 

operate their own school systems.5

 

5 Although the relative pronoun, “which,” generally would be used to indicate a nonrestrictive relative 

clause while the relative pronoun, “that,” would be used to indicate a restrictive clause, interpreting 
13

The City relies in part on this proviso as excluding it from remitting any part of its 

liquor-by-the-drink proceeds to the County’s school system, whether in the manner in 

which the county property tax for schools is distributed or into the County’s school fund, 

because the City has operated its own school system since 1966, one year prior to the 

initial enactment of the liquor-by-the-drink tax. We agree that under the plain language 

of the applicable version of subsection -306(a)(2)(A), the City was excluded from the 

proviso of remitting one-half of its proceeds into the County’s school fund because the 

City operated its own school system. However, it is not clear from the structure and plain 

language of the first part of subsection -306(a)(2)(A) whether the City’s operation of its 

own school system excluded it from the general rule that “one-half of the proceeds [were 

to] be expended and distributed in the same manner as the county property tax for schools

[was] expended and distributed[.]” See id. 

The statute established this general rule and then set forth a condition or 

understanding that applied to municipalities not operating their own schools. This 

version of the statute did not clarify whether the opposite of the proviso was true, in other 

words, whether a municipality operating its own school system could disregard the 

general rule of distribution in the manner of county property tax and instead distribute 

one-half of its proceeds to its own school system. Although the placement of the 

conjunctive adverb, “however,” following “provided” in subsection -306(a)(2)(A) would 

typically indicate that the proviso is in some manner antithetical to the general rule of 

distribution in the manner of county property tax, it is not clear from the plain language 

of subsection -306(a)(2)(A) how it would be so.

To summarize, it is possible to reasonably interpret the proviso as simply 

operating to ensure that a municipality without its own school system would remit onehalf of its liquor-by-the-drink proceeds to the county within which it was located. It is 

also possible to reasonably interpret the proviso as operating to require solely those 

municipalities not operating their own school systems to remit proceeds to the counties in 

which they were located, effectively exempting those municipalities that operated their 

own school systems. The latter interpretation utilizes the longstanding maxim of 

statutory construction maintaining that “the expression of one thing implies the exclusion 

of all things not expressly mentioned.” See Limbaugh v. Coffee Med. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73, 

84 (Tenn. 2001) (citing City of Knoxville v. Brown, 260 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Tenn. 1953)).

We do not find this maxim dispositive in this instance, however, because the statute is 

 

“which” as nonrestrictive in this instance would be nonsensical because it would mean that no 

municipalities operated their own school systems. We note also that this “which” clause is not marked by 

paired commas as a nonrestrictive relative clause normally would be. The drafters appear simply to have 

made the very common grammatical error of using “which” rather than “that” as a restrictive relative 

pronoun. See generally GARNER, THE REDBOOK, A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE at 188-90.
14

ambiguous regarding whether the general rule of distribution in the manner of the 

property tax for schools would still apply to municipalities to which the proviso does not 

apply. Because the requirement in Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) 

(2013) that municipalities without school systems must remit proceeds to counties can be 

reasonably interpreted in more than one way when municipalities that do operate their 

own school systems are at issue, we determine this requirement in the applicable version 

of the statute to be ambiguous. See Bryant v. HCA Health Servs. of N. Tenn., Inc., 15 

S.W.3d 804, 809 (Tenn. 2000) (“A statute is ambiguous if the statute is capable of 

conveying more than one meaning.”).

B. Consideration of Statutory Framework, Legislative History, and Other Sources

Having determined that Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) (2013) 

was ambiguous with regard to whether municipalities with their own school systems were 

required to remit a portion of liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds to the counties in which 

they were located, we now consider the statutory framework, legislative history, and 

other sources surrounding the version of the statute governing this action. See Arden v. 

Kozawa, 466 S.W.3d 758, 764 (Tenn. 2015) (“Where statutory language is ambiguous, 

we may decipher legislative intent in other ways, including consideration of the broader 

statutory scheme, legislative history, and other sources.”). We begin with the County’s 

assertion that the trial court erred by finding that Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-

103(a)(1) (2013) operated to render subsection -306 inapplicable to a county, such as 

Bradley County, that had not passed a liquor-by-the-drink referendum. Upon careful 

review, we conclude that because subsection -103(a)(1) set forth the effectiveness of the 

entire statutory chapter in which the applicable version of subsection -306(a) was located, 

subsection -103(a)(1) operated to classify a “local political subdivision” receiving liquorby-the-drink taxes from the Commissioner as one that had passed a liquor-by-the-drink 

referendum. We further conclude, however, that this did not necessarily exempt the City 

from the general requirement of subsection -306(a)(2)(A) of distributing one-half of its

liquor-by-the-drink revenue in the manner of county property tax distribution.

Title 57 of the Tennessee Code is entitled, “Intoxicating Liquors.” Chapter 4 of 

Title 57 is entitled, “Consumption of Alcoholic Beverages on Premises,” and it consists 

of three parts: Part 1 – “General Provisions,”; Part 2 – “Administration, Enforcement, 

Prohibited Acts”; and Part 3 – “Taxes and Fees.” This overall structure has remained 

unchanged since the present action was commenced, as has the language of Tennessee 

Code Annotated § 57-4-103(a)(1), which provides within the general provisions of Title 

57:

This chapter shall be effective in any jurisdiction which authorizes the sale 

of alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises in a referendum in 
15

the manner prescribed by § 57-3-106; provided, that, in addition to any 

other method authorized for holding an election pursuant to § 57-3-106, an 

election may be held for such sales upon adoption of a resolution by a twothirds (2

/3) vote of the legislative body of a county or municipality.

We determine this language regarding the effectiveness of Chapter 4 to be clear 

and unambiguous. Because Part 3 is within Chapter 4, Part 3 is effective in any 

jurisdiction that has authorized liquor-by-the-drink sales by referendum. See In re Estate 

of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d at 614 (“Any interpretation of the statute that ‘would render one 

section of the act repugnant to another’ should be avoided.”) (quoting Tenn. Elec. Power 

Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 114 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tenn. 1937)). Although the statutory 

scheme regarding alcoholic beverages does not provide a definition of “jurisdiction” as it 

is used in subsection §-103(a)(1), we further determine that the generally accepted 

definition of jurisdiction as it applies to governmental authority is applicable within the 

context of a jurisdiction’s authorization of alcoholic beverage sales. Black’s Law 

Dictionary defines “jurisdiction” within this context of governmental authority as a 

“government’s general power to exercise authority over all persons and things within its 

territory,” “geographic area within which political . . . authority may be exercised,” or 

“political . . . subdivision within such an area.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 867. 

Therefore, at the time this action was commenced, Part 3 of Chapter 4 was effective in 

the jurisdiction of the City, which had authorized liquor-by-the-drink sales, but was not 

effective in the jurisdiction of the County, which had not authorized such sales. 

The City argues that the ineffectiveness of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-

306(a) (2013) in the jurisdiction of the County means that the City was not required to 

remit any portion of its liquor-by-the-drink proceeds distributed by the Commissioner to 

the County. However, we do not agree that this conclusion automatically follows from 

subsection -103(a)(1) because the City, as a jurisdiction having authorized the sale of 

alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-

103(a)(1), and thereby a local political subdivision receiving liquor-by-the-drink gross 

receipt taxes from the Commissioner, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-306(a)(2), was

required to follow the requirements of Chapter 4. This analysis leads us back to the 

ambiguity previously identified in subsection -306(a)(2)(A) but does not clarify it. It is 

still possible to reasonably interpret the proviso of subsection -306(a)(2)(A) as either 

simply ensuring that a municipality without its own school system would remit one-half 

of its liquor-by-the-drink proceeds to the county within which it was located or as 

actually exempting municipalities with their own school systems, such as the City of 

Cleveland, from the general requirement of distributing one-half of their liquor-by-thedrink revenue in the manner of county property tax distribution.
16

Inasmuch as Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) (2013) provided that 

“[o]ne half (1⁄2) of the proceeds shall be expended and distributed in the same manner as 

the county property tax for schools is expended and distributed,” it is important to 

consider the statutory scheme for expenditure and distribution of the county property tax 

for schools. Tennessee Code Annotated § 49-3-315(a) (2016) provides in pertinent part:

For each LEA [local education agency] there shall be levied for current 

operation and maintenance not more than one (1) school tax for all grades 

included in the LEA. Each LEA shall place in one (1) separate school fund 

all school revenues for current school operation purposes received from the 

state, county and other political subdivisions, if any. . . . All school funds 

for current operation and maintenance purposes collected by any county . . . 

shall be apportioned by the county trustee among the LEAs in the county 

on the basis of the WFTEADA [weighted full-time equivalent average daily 

attendance] maintained by each, during the current school year. For the 

purposes of making the apportionment of local school funds as set forth in 

this subsection (a), and in defining the WFTEADA for the current school 

year, the county director of schools and the county trustee shall be guided

by the following procedure: . . . .6

The above statute goes on to delineate the procedure by which the county director 

of schools shall certify to the county trustee the weighted full-time equivalent average 

daily attendance (“WFTEADA”) during the preceding school year and, in progressive 

fashion, estimate “the WFTEADA in the schools of the LEAs in the county” for 

successive quarters of the current and upcoming years. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-3-

315(a)(1)-(5). Although the statutory procedure for determining the WFTEADAs 

involves county officials, the City, as a local political subdivision receiving liquor-bythe-drink tax revenue, would be able to remit a portion of those gross receipt taxes

received from the Commissioner to the County’s school fund, which arguably could then 

be distributed by the County according to the procedure delineated in the above statute. 

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-3-315(a) (“Each LEA shall place in one (1) separate school 

fund all school revenues for current school operation purposes received from the state, 

county and other political subdivisions . . . .”) (emphasis added). 

The question arises as to whether, if the County were successful in the present 

action, funds remitted by the City to the County’s school fund would in turn be partially 

apportioned to schools operated by the City as LEAs geographically existing within the 

County. This Court recently interpreted Tennessee Code Annotated § 49-3-315(a) in 

light of whether a county was required to apportion funds from its “educational capital 

 

6

The definitions in brackets are provided pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 49-1-103(2) (2016) 

(LEA) and 49-3-302(18) (2016) (WFTEADA).
17

projects fund” to the school boards of cities located within the county. See City of Athens 

Bd. of Educ. v. McMinn Cty., 467 S.W.3d 458, 459-60 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014), perm. app. 

denied (Tenn. May 14, 2015). This Court noted that, with one exception for 

transportation levies not relevant here, “[a]ll school funds for current operation and 

maintenance purposes collected by any county . . . shall be apportioned by the county 

trustee among the LEAs,” including those LEAs operated by the cities located in the 

county. Id. at 460 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-3-315(a)) (emphasis in City of Athens). 

Because the funds at issue in City of Athens had been collected by the county through 

levying “a special tax designated for a capital projects fund,” this Court held that the 

funds had not been collected “for current operation and maintenance purposes” and 

therefore did not fall under the purview of Tennessee Code Annotated § 49-3-315(a). 

City of Athens, 467 S.W.3d at 465-66 (affirming the trial court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of the county). 

In the current analysis, the County is requesting that this Court interpret the 

language of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) (2013) to mean that twentyfive percent (half of the amount returned to the local political subdivision by the 

Commissioner) of the gross receipt liquor-by-the-drink taxes collected within the 

incorporated limits of the City would be paid in the manner of the county property tax to 

the county school fund for distribution to all of the LEAs in the County, including those 

located within the City. Because such a distribution within the County of funds obtained 

from a “local political subdivision” such as the City is possible, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 

49-3-315(a), we do not find the statutory scheme for expenditure and distribution of the 

county property tax for schools to be dispositive of the ambiguity previously identified in 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) (2013).

7

However, we do find the legislative history surrounding the 1982 Amendment, 

which added the ambiguous language at issue to Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-

306(a), to be instructive of the General Assembly’s intent. Prior to the 1982 Amendment, 

the subject statutory section, then codified at § 57-162, provided in full:

 

7

The County also requests that this Court compare the language of the statute at issue to that utilized by 

the General Assembly when enacting the local option sales tax in 1963. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-

712(a) (2013); 1963 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 329 § 4. The County asserts that because the local sales tax 

statute demonstrated a disbursement method involving the county property tax for schools according to 

weighted average daily attendance of students, this Court should conclude that proceeds from the liquorby-the-drink gross receipts were intended to be distributed solely as in the county property tax for 

schools. Finding such a foray to be far afield from the statute at issue, we decline the County’s invitation 

to superimpose the local sales tax statutory scheme upon the proviso effected within the liquor-by-thedrink statutory scheme by the 1982 Amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A). 
18

Distribution of collections.—All gross receipt taxes collected under 

subdivision (b) of § 57-157 shall be distributed by the commissioner of 

revenue as follows:

(a) Fifty percent (50%) to the general fund to be earmarked for 

education purposes; and

(b) Fifty percent (50%) to the local political subdivision.

(1) One half (1⁄2) of the proceeds shall be expended and 

distributed in the same manner as the county property 

tax for schools is expended and distributed.

(2) The other one half (1⁄2) shall be distributed as follows:

(a) Collections of gross receipts collected in 

unincorporated areas, to the county general 

fund; and

(b) Collections of gross receipts in incorporated 

cities, towns, to the city or town wherein such 

tax is collected.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-162 (1968). 

In introducing the applicable Senate bill to the Finance, Ways and Means 

Committee in March 1982, Senator Albright explained the bill’s purpose as follows:

Right now, the law provides that one-half of one percent of the gross 

receipts by liquor by the drink tax goes to the, to, into the school system –

provide into the school system – goes to the city for the school systems. In 

many counties, the cities do not operate a school system. They have been 

turning this over to the county because the county provides that school 

system for the city. There has been some. There was a couple of ‘em. I

have a whole bunch of little cities around Chattanooga. There was a couple 

of them that did not want to return this money over. They simply asked for 

an Attorney General’s ruling that the legislative intent was that that’s where 

it would go in the school system. And they didn’t have a school system, 

they shouldn’t be getting the money. That’s an Attorney General ruling. 

Our county simply said rather than have an Attorney General’s ruling, 

which – cause they would like to put this in legislation. And this just 
19

provides, however, then if proceeds expanding or distribution to 

municipalities which do not operate their own school system separate from 

the county, are required to remit one-half of their proceedings from the 

gross receipts liquor by the drink tax to the county school fund. And that is 

where it is intended to go anyway. 

As the sponsoring legislator, Senator Albright then engaged in the following exchange 

with a committee member, Senator Crouch:

Senator Crouch: In other words, if, uh, we [are] still operating a city 

school system it doesn’t affect –

Senator Albright: It doesn’t affect you at all. It goes to the city –

Senator Crouch: They’re still getting their . . . percent?

Senator Albright: See the legislation . . . says for the school fund. 

That’s what the –

Senator Crouch: Okay.

Senator Albright thus assured Senator Crouch that if a municipality were operating its 

own school system, the provision added by the 1982 Amendment would not affect the 

municipality because the liquor-by-the-drink taxes returned by the commissioner would 

still go “to the city.” 

In introducing the bill to the committee, Senator Albright referenced a “ruling” of 

the attorney general. At this point in time, the attorney general had issued two opinions 

interpreting the distribution scheme set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306, 

the first in September 1980 (“1980 AG Opinion”), see Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. 80-457, 1980 

WL 103875 (Sept. 19, 1980), and the second in April 1981 (“1981 AG Opinion”), see 

Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. 81-270, 1981 WL 142843 (Apr. 27, 1981). We note that “although 

opinions of the Attorney General may be persuasive authority, they are not controlling.” 

Beacon4, LLC v. I & L Invs., LLC, 514 S.W.3d 153, 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016). 

However, we do afford such opinions “‘considerable deference,’” particularly because 

“‘government officials rely upon them for guidance.’” See id. (quoting State v. Black,

897 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tenn. 1995)). As to the statutory section at issue in this action, a 

series of three attorney general’s opinions, released from 1981 to 1983, are informative 

concerning the situation surrounding the 1982 Amendment. Moreover, insofar as 

legislators indicated while introducing and explaining the 1982 Amendment that they 
20

were responding to various municipalities’ reliance on the attorney general’s 1980 and 

1981 opinions, those opinions are integral to the legislative history as well. 

The question proffered in the 1980 AG Opinion focused on the situation presented 

when a municipality had passed a liquor-by-the drink referendum but the county in which 

the municipality was located had not. See Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. 80-457, 1980 WL 

103875, at *1. The attorney general opined:

It is the opinion of this office that if a municipality but not the county has 

approved by referendum the sale of alcoholic beverages for consumption on 

the premises the fifty percent (50%) distribution, under T.C.A. § 57-4-

306(2), of the gross receipts tax collected would go entirely to the local 

municipality.

Id. The attorney general further concluded:

[I]f there has been no countywide election approving the sale of alcoholic 

beverages for consumption on the premises in accord with T.C.A. § 57-4-

103, then the provisions of Chapter 4 dealing with both the imposition of 

the tax and the distribution of the tax would have no application to such 

county and it would not be entitled to a distribution of any amounts under 

T.C.A. § 57-4-306(2) which go to the local political subdivision. Such 

local political subdivision, i.e., the city or town, would then be required to 

expend one half of the amount received in the same manner as the county 

property tax for schools would be expended within the city or town.

Id. at *2 (emphasis added). Thus, according to the 1980 AG Opinion, a municipality 

acting as the local political subdivision receiving gross receipt liquor-by-the-drink taxes 

would be required to expend and distribute one-half of the monies returned by the 

commissioner solely to the schools located within the municipality. 

The 1980 AG Opinion did not address the distinction between a municipality that 

operated its own school system and one that utilized a county school system to educate its 

students. However, this question was the focus of the 1981 AG Opinion, with the 

attorney general opining: “[T]hose municipalities which do not operate their own school 

system separate from the county would be required to remit one-half of [their] proceeds 

of the gross receipts liquor-by-the-drink tax to the county school fund.” Tenn. Op. Atty. 

Gen. No. 81-270, 1981 WL 142843, at *1. Building on the prior analysis of Tennessee 

Code Annotated § 57-4-306 in the 1980 AG Opinion, the attorney general reasoned as 

follows:
21

If the local municipality does not operate a separate school system, 

the one-half of the proceeds expended and distributed in the same manner 

as the county property tax for schools as mandated by subparagraph (A) 

would naturally have to be remitted to the county school fund.

It appears clear that the purpose of the statute is to earmark a certain 

percentage of the proceeds of such taxes for the purpose of local education. 

This objective could be accomplished by the remittance of such amount to 

the county school fund where the municipality itself does not operate its 

own school system.

Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 81-270, 1981 WL 142843, at *1.

In introducing to his committee the Senate bill that became the 1982 Amendment, 

Senator Albright expressed an intent to codify the attorney general’s opinion, requiring 

municipalities not operating their own school systems “to remit one-half of their 

proceedings from the gross receipts liquor by the drink tax to the county school fund.” In 

sponsoring the bill during a March 4, 1982 session of the entire Senate, Senator Albright 

stated in pertinent part: 

This bill . . . just puts into law what’s been the practice. And it says that 

one-half of the proceeds of the gross receipt liquor by the drink to the 

county school system where the city does not provide one.

The following exchange occurred in response:

Senator Darnell: Senator Albright as I understand it this is to make sure 

that the funds actually go to, to the county for schools 

– is that the intent of the bill? Or is that just a 

peripheral sort of thing that’s involved here?

Senator Albright: This just makes sure – right some of, in my area in 

Chattanooga – we’ve had a couple of them that had to 

be told, you don’t have your own school system – the 

county permits this – the statute says – can I just read 

one brief sentence –

Senator Darnell: --they won’t turn over the money to the county?

Senator Albright: This would make it that they have to turn it over.
22

This exchange demonstrates that when he stated previously that a city would have to 

distribute gross receipt taxes to the county in which it was located “where the city does 

not provide one,” Senator Albright meant a city that does not provide a school system. 

At the close of the March 4, 1982 session, the Senate approved the bill as sponsored by 

Senator Albright. 

We determine that as presented to and adopted in the Senate, the legislative intent 

of the 1982 Amendment was to correct a situation in which some municipalities that did 

not operate their own school systems were failing to distribute the statutorily required 

portion of liquor-by-the-drink gross receipt taxes to the counties whose school systems 

they utilized. As explained by the Senate sponsor, the intent was not to require 

municipalities that operated their own school systems to distribute liquor-by-the-drink 

revenue to the corresponding counties. 

Subsequently, Representative Davis introduced the companion bill to the House 

Calendar and Rules Committee on April 7, 1982, by stating in relevant part:

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee House Bill 2277 provides 

that if, provides that in the distribution of liquor, local liquor by the drink 

taxes that it will be distributed as it is now in the same fashion that local 

property taxes is distributed for education. In the event that the 

municipality affected operates a school system, right now the, the reason 

for division in the law originally was for this percentage of the money to go 

[to] education – fifty percent to the county, fifty percent to the municipality 

involved. There are municipalities such as the one involved in my county 

that are collecting this tax but that are, that are not operating school 

systems. This simply changes the law to provide that in the event the city 

does not operate a, a, the school system, that the money will go to the 

county. 

In response to a committee member’s question regarding under what circumstances the 

proviso added by the 1982 Amendment would be “activated,” Representative Davis 

replied: 

If there’s, if a municipality is operating its own system it’ll continue to get 

its share of the liquor by the drink money. Uh, only if it’s not operating a 

school system and thereby using the county school system uh, will the 

money that has been going to the municipality for education go instead to 

the county.
23

The House approved the bill, with an amendment added to exclude Bedford 

County, in a vote taken during a full session conducted on May 5, 1982.8 In introducing 

the bill to the House as a whole during an April 8, 1982 session, Representative Davis 

presented it as a remedy to a situation in which “[a]t the present time, there is no 

provision . . . that those municipalities that do not operate school systems will permit the 

money – which is to go to education from the liquor by the drink tax – to go to the 

county.” The Senate subsequently adopted the bill as amended by the House without 

further discussion.

Upon thorough review of the language of the statute in light of the statutory 

framework, legislative history, and attorney general’s opinions referenced by the 

legislative history, we hold that the General Assembly’s intent in enacting the 1982 

Amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2)(A) was to require solely

those municipalities that did not operate their own school systems to share liquor-by-thedrink tax proceeds with the counties in which they were located. This conclusion is also 

supported by an opinion issued by the attorney general in January 1983, six months 

following enactment of the 1982 Amendment (“1983 AG Opinion”). See Tenn. Op. Atty. 

Gen. No. 83-36, 1983 WL 166853 (Jan. 18, 1983). Concluding that “the 1982 

amendment to the statute was merely a codification of our opinion dated April 27, 1981,” 

the attorney general opined in pertinent part: 

It is the opinion of this office that the proper distribution of the liquor-bythe-drink gross receipt privilege taxes under T.C.A. § 57-4-306(2)(A) 

depends upon whether a municipality maintains a separate school system, 

when the municipality but not the county has approved by referendum the 

sale of alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises.

* * *

If the municipality does operate a separate school system, it would be 

entitled to the fifty percent of the liquor-by-the-drink gross receipts

privilege tax collected under T.C.A. § 57-4-306(2)(A).

Id. at *1. Although opinions of the attorney general are but persuasive authority, see

Beacon4, 514 S.W.3d at 173, we conclude that the 1983 AG Opinion merits considerable 

deference given its issuance contemporaneously with the General Assembly’s enactment 

of the 1982 Amendment and its consistency with the 1980 and 1981 opinions referenced 

by legislators who sponsored the 1982 Amendment. See id.

 

8 During the April 7, 1982 House Calendar and Rules Committee meeting, Representative Phillips from 

Bedford County explained that his county was requesting an exception because a municipality within the 

county owned and paid expenses on buildings operated by the county’s school system.
24

C. 2014 Amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306

Having concluded that the General Assembly’s intent in enacting the 1982 

Amendment was to require solely those municipalities that did not operate their own 

school systems to share liquor-by-the-drink tax proceeds with the counties in which they 

were located, we further determine that nothing in the General Assembly’s adoption of 

the 2014 Amendment contradicts this conclusion. It is undisputed that the 2014 

Amendment was not adopted with retroactive application. As the trial court noted, when 

analyzing legislative intent, we may view a subsequent, non-retroactive amendment as 

“‘declaratory of the original legislative intent.’” See Sneed v. City of Red Bank, 459 

S.W.3d 17, 32 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting Fretwell v. Chaffin, 652 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Tenn. 

1983)). However, being mindful of the thirty-two-year time span between the 1982 and 

2014 Amendments, we agree with the City that the best indicator of legislative intent in 

this instance is the legislative history surrounding the 1982 Amendment itself.

Moreover, although the 2014 Amendment provided for a process by which 

counties that were owed funds by municipalities under Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-

4-306 could seek those funds and negotiate settlements as applicable, nothing in the 

amended statutory language provided that municipalities operating their own 

kindergarten through twelfth-grade school systems, separate from the counties in which 

the municipalities were located, owed such funds to the corresponding counties. See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-306 (Supp. 2014); 2014 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 901 § 1 (H.B. 

1403). As amended in 2014, Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306(a) provided:

(a) All gross receipt taxes collected under § 57-4-301(c) shall be 

distributed by the commissioner of revenue as follows:

(1) Fifty percent (50%) to the general fund to be earmarked for 

education purposes; and

(2) The other fifty percent (50%) to be distributed to local 

political subdivisions as follows:

(A) Collections for privileges exercised in an incorporated 

municipality shall be distributed by the commissioner 

to the city recorder; and

(B) Collections for privileges exercised in an 

unincorporated area of the county shall be distributed 

by the commissioner to the county trustee.
25

Subsection (a) was thus amended to expressly provide for more than one local political 

subdivision, with distribution of collections for privileges exercised to be sent to the city 

recorder for those collections originating from a municipality and to the county trustee 

for those collections originating from unincorporated areas of a county. See Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 57-4-306(a) (Supp. 2014). Subsections (b) through (h) then provided a 

distribution scheme for liquor-by-the-drink proceeds received from July 1, 2014, until 

June 30, 2015.9 See id. at -306(b)-(h).

10

 Although we find a detailed analysis of this 

distribution scheme unwarranted in an analysis of the prior version of the statute, we have 

examined the distribution scheme of the 2014 Amendment and determined that it 

essentially follows the ongoing intent of the General Assembly to have a portion of the 

proceeds from the liquor-by-the-drink tax benefit children who attend school within the 

jurisdiction, incorporated municipality or unincorporated county, wherein the gross 

receipts originated. See id. Insofar as the County argues that the 2014 Amendment 

demonstrates a contrary legislative intent underlying the 1982 Amendment, the County’s 

argument is unavailing. 

Finally, the County posits that public policy regarding funding education equally 

for all students supports the conclusion that a municipality must share its liquor-by-thedrink tax revenue with the county in which it is located. However, as the City notes, 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-3-106(a) (2013 & Supp. 2017) provides for a local 

option election in any county wherein the voters may decide to either permit or forbid 

“the manufacture, receipt, sale, storage, transportation, distribution and possession of 

alcoholic beverages . . . .” Even in counties, such as the County in this action, that have 

not approved a liquor-by-the-drink referendum, students benefit from the distribution of 

fifty percent of liquor-by-the-drink gross receipt taxes to the state’s general fund, 

earmarked for education. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-306(a)(1). 

Moreover, such an argument concerning perceived fairness of the tax distribution 

scheme provided by the statute would properly be directed to the General Assembly 

 

9 As Bradley County acknowledges, it was exempted from subsections (a)-(h) of the 2014 version of the 

statute, via its population parameters, because at the time of the legislature’s adoption of the 2014 

Amendment, Bradley County had commenced this lawsuit. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-306(i) (2014)

(exempting from subsections (a) through (h) counties having a population of, as specific to Bradley 

County, “not less than 98,900 and not more than 99,000,” “according to the 2010 federal census or any 

subsequent federal census” and directing that for counties with this population, language mirroring the 

prior version of the statute would apply).

10 As noted previously, the General Assembly has amended Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306 each 

year since the 2014 Amendment, extending the amended language in subsequent years, one year at a time. 

See 2015 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 220 §§ 1, 2 (S.B. 990); 2016 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 885 §§ 1, 2 (H.B. 

1691); 2017 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 346 §§ 1, 2 (S.B. 1262).
26

rather than to this Court. See, e.g., City of Athens Bd. of Educ., 467 S.W.3d at 466 

(“However compelling this argument [regarding the city’s receiving its “fair share” of 

property taxes designated for county capital improvements] may be, it is properly 

directed to others, e.g., the General Assembly, not to this Court.”). Inasmuch as we must 

apply Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306 as it was amended in 1982 and as the 

General Assembly intended the amendment, we hold that, as a matter of law, the 

applicable version of the statute did not require the City to share its liquor-by-the-drink 

proceeds with the County.11 The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in 

favor of the City on this issue.

V. Distribution Prior to the City’s 2002 Liquor-by-the-Drink Referendum

The County also contends that the trial court erred by finding that the City was 

entitled to the local political subdivision’s portion of the liquor-by-the-drink tax revenue 

for sales that took place lawfully at private clubs located within the municipal limits of 

the City prior to the City’s 2002 passage of the referendum authorizing liquor-by-thedrink sales. Ruling specifically on this issue in its May 2, 2016 order granting summary 

judgment in favor of the City, the trial court found that because the City had continuously 

operated a school system separate from the County’s school system since 1966, the fiftypercent portion of liquor-by-the-drink gross receipts from the private clubs had been 

properly returned to the City as the “local political subdivision” by the Commissioner. 

The court further found that the City had properly distributed half of that total to its own 

school system under Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306 and had not been required to 

distribute any portion to the County’s school fund. In so finding, the court noted that the 

County had failed to present any authority “stating that pre-referendum taxes collected 

from private clubs should be allocated differently” than post-referendum taxes. We agree 

with the trial court that in the absence of controlling authority specifically directing how 

the pre-referendum, liquor-by-the-drink gross receipts were to be distributed, the County

is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Prior to passage of the 2002 referendum, private clubs located within the City had 

been authorized to sell liquor by the drink pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-

101. It is undisputed that the Commissioner distributed fifty percent of the gross receipt 

taxes from these pre-referendum sales to the City, which in turn expended and distributed 

 

11 In support of its position, the City also argues that if this Court were to adopt the County’s 

interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306 (2013) and hold that a privilege tax collected in 

the City should have benefitted citizens of another jurisdiction, such a holding would render the statute in 

violation of Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. Having determined that the applicable 

version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-306 did not require the City to share its liquor-by-the-drink 

proceeds with the County, we further determine the City’s constitutional argument to be pretermitted as 

moot.
27

one-half of the amount returned to it into its own school system and kept one-half for the 

City pursuant to its interpretation of the distribution scheme set forth in Tennessee Code 

Annotated § 57-4-306(a)(2). We previously have determined that the pre-2014 versions 

of subsection -306(a)(2) did not require the City, as a local political subdivision 

authorizing liquor-by-the-drink sales and operating its own school system, to share its 

portion of liquor-by-the-drink gross receipt taxes with the County. We are therefore not 

persuaded by the County’s repetition of the same arguments urging us to interpret 

subsection -306(a)(2) as requiring that the City share pre-referendum gross receipt taxes 

with the County. 

We do note, however, that pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 57-4-

103(a)(1), Chapter 4 of Title 57 was not effective in the local political subdivision of the 

City prior to the City’s passage of its referendum authorizing liquor-by-the-drink sales. 

In this situation, the Commissioner appears to have relied on subsection -306(a) to 

expend and distribute gross receipt liquor-by-the-drink taxes to the originating location, 

in this case the incorporated municipality in which the private clubs were located. The 

County has proffered no authority, and this Court has found none, to support a conclusion 

that pre-referendum, liquor-by-the-drink gross receipt taxes should have been expended 

and distributed differently than post-referendum taxes during a time period when neither 

the City nor the County had passed a referendum authorizing liquor-by-the-drink sales. 

The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of the City on this 

issue.

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. This case is 

remanded to the trial court, pursuant to applicable law, for enforcement of the trial court’s 

judgment and collection of costs assessed below. The costs on appeal are assessed 

against the appellants, the Bradley County School System, by and through the Bradley 

County Board of Education, and Bradley County, Tennessee.

_________________________________ 

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE