### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 659 -CV

Te xa s D e par tm e nt of P ublic Safe ty , A ppe lla nt

v. Stephen Joseph Caruana , Appellee

F ROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF HAY S COUNTY NO. 12,077 -C, H ONO RAB LE HO WARD S. WARNER, II , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
The Te x as Dep artment of Public Safe ty (“the Depa

rtment”) a

ppeals fr om the trial court’ s order

reve rsing the administrative suspension of appellee Stephe n Caruana ’s driver ’s license. The Depa

rtment argues that the trial c ourt err ed in re versingthe suspension bec au s e the
ar r e s ti n g o f f ic e r ’ s u n s w o r

n in c id e n t r e p o rt s h o u ld

h a v e b e e nc o n s id e r e d

a dmi s s ib le a s e v id e n c e . We
a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
. BACK GR OUND On Dec ember

30, 2 0 0 7 , Department Troope r Eric Flore s pulled Caruana over in a routine traf

fic stop. During the stop, Flores c ame to the c onclusion that Caruana was intox icated,
and re qu e ste d a

brea th sp e c ime n f

or blo od -a lc oh ol t e sti ng . Ca ru ana c omp lie d w iththe re qu e st, providing specimens that reflec ted bl ood-alc ohol conce ntrations of 0.163 and 0.157, a bove the leg al2

limit
. See Tex. P enal Code Ann. § 49.01(2)( B) (West 2003) (def ining “intox icated” as “ha ving a n alcohol conc entration of 0.08 or more” ).

Ba sed on Carua

na’s f ailure of the bl ood-alc ohol conce ntration test, the Depa rtment suspended his l i ce nse pursua nt to transportation code section 524.012. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 524.012(b)( 1) (West Supp. 2009) (“The [D] epar tment shall s u s p end the pe rson’s drive r’s license if the [D] epar

tme n t d et er m i n es that . . . the pe rson had a n alcohol conc entration of a leve l specifie d by

Section 49.01(2)( B) , Penal Code, while ope ratinga motor vehic le in a public plac e.”)
. Caruana then re quested a

n administrative hea

ring to contest h i s l icense suspension. See id. § 5 24 .0 31 (We st 2 00 7) . A t th is h e ari ng , th e De pa rtme nt e nte re d F lor e s’ s in c ident re po rt int o
e vid e nc e ov e r C a

ru ana ’s ob

je c tio n that the re po rt

wa s uns wo rn

and the re fo re ina dmi ssi ble . F lor e s,
c a lled as a wi tn ess by

the De pa rtme nt, c on c e de d th a t no oath h a d b e e n a dmi nis te re d a nd that hi s repor t was unsworn, but testified t hat t o the best of hi s knowledg e, eve ry thing in his repor

t was true
and c or re c t. T he De pa

rtme nt e lic ite d n o a dd iti on a l te sti mony to e sta bli sh that F lor e s h a d r e a so na ble suspicion to detain Caruan a or pr obable c ause to a rre st him. Following the he aring , the administrative law judg e (A L J ) af firmed the suspe nsion of Caruana ’s license
. C ar u an a a p p e a l e d t h e A LJ ’ s d e c i s i o n t o c o u n t y c o u rt , w h e r e h e ar g u e d

t h a tt h e A LJ
err ed in a dmitti ng Flore s’s unsworn repor t into evidenc e. After a hear ing, the county court re verse d the dec ision of the AL J and orde red that Caruana ’s license be re instated. This appea l followed.
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW Administrative license- suspension case s are revie wed using a substantial-evidenc e stand ard. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 524.002(b) (West 2007), § 724.047 (West 1999);3

Te x. Gov’t C od e Ann. § 2 00 1. 17 4 ( Wes t 20 08 ); see also Texas D ep’t of Pub. Safety v . Varme , 262 S.W .3d 34, 38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“W h et h er in the tria l court or this Court, the s ubstantial evidenc e st andar d g overns review of administrative dec isions in driver’s license suspe nsion cases.” ). Under s ubstantial-evidenc e review, an administrative dec ision may not be re ve rs e d unle ss s ub sta nti a l r ig hts of

the a pp e lla nt h a ve be e n pr e

jud ic e d be c a

us e the de c isi on

is: (A) in violation of a

constitutional or statutory provision; ( B ) i ne x c e s s o f

t h e a g e n c y’ s s t a tu t o r

y a u t h o r i t y; (C) made throug h unlawful proc edure ; (D) a ffe cted by

other e rror

of law; (E) not re asonably s upported by substantial evidence consideringthe re liable and probative e vidence in the rec ord as a whole; or (F ) a rb itr ary or c a pr ic iou s o r c ha

ra c te ri zed by a buse of disc re tio n o r c le arl y unwar rante d exercise of

discretion. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.174(2).

We reviewruling s on the admission or exclusion of ev idence at the administrative level under

the abuse -of- discretion st andar d applied to trial cour ts. City of Amarill o v. Railroad Comm’n , 894 S.W .2d 491, 495 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied). Acourt a buses its discretion if it acts without refe renc e to g uiding r ules and princ iples. Downer v. Aquam arine Operators, Inc

. , 701 S.W .2d 238, 241-42 (Te x . 1985). A c ourt has no discre tion to apply the law incorre ctly
. In re Poly-Am erica, L.P. , 262 S.W .3d 337, 349 (Tex. 2008).4 DI SCU SSIO N I n its fir st issue on appea l, the Depa rtment argues that the trial c ourt err ed in re versing the a dmi nis tr a tiv e de c isi on be c a us e F lor e s’ s uns wo rn

rep o r t s h o u l d h a ve be e n c on sid e re d a dmi ssi ble
as a public rec ord. I n its second issue, the Department ar g ues in the alter native that F lores’s r eport beca me admissi b l e as a s worn report whe n he swore to the truth of it during his testimony . The Depa rtment raise s a third issue, ar g uing that there w as no basis to reve rse the administrative dec ision if the re port was properly admitted into evidenc e, but conce des t hat t his issue need not be addre ssed unless we r ever se the trial c ourt’s dec ision based on one of the first two issues.
Ad mi ssi bil ity of a n U ns wor n R e po rt L icense -suspension proc eeding s b a s e d on a per son’s failure of blood or bre ath testing for intoxi cation ar e g overne d by chapte r 524 of the tr ansportation code
. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 524.001-.051 (West 2 0 0 7 & Supp. 2009) ( chapte r entitled “A dminist rative Suspension of Driver ’s L icense for F ailure to Pass Test for I ntox ication”) . Under

section 524.011 , an ar

resting office r who obtains a br eath spe cimen indicatingthat an individual is o v er the leg al limit for intox ication must “send to the [D] epar tment not later than the fifth business day afte r the date of the
arr est . . . a swor

n repor t of information re levant to the arr est.” Id. § 524.011(b)( 4)(D) . The swor n repor t require d by

section 524.011(b)(4)(D ) must be made “ on a for m approve d by

the [D] epar

tment and in the manne r spec ified by the [D] epar

tmen t
. ” Id. § 524.011(d). In addition, the Depa rtment regulations specify

that offic er repor

ts subject to chapter

524 must “be sworn to by the ar resting office r.” 37 Te x . Admin. Code § 17.4(2) (2009) (Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safe ty , AL R Reports).SOAH updated a nd reor gan i z ed its administ rative r ules reg ardinglicense- suspension 1 proce eding s on J anuar

y 16, 2009. See 34 Tex. Reg
. 329 (2009). No substantive cha ng es we re ma de reg ardingthe admissibilit y of a swor

n repor t. See 1 T ex . Admin. Code § 159.211(c) (2) ( 2009) (State Off ice of Admin. Hear ings, H ear ings) . Be cause Caruana ’s administrative and c ounty court proce eding s were conducte d in 2008, all ref ere nces to the SOAH rules in this opinion will be to the rules as the y

exis ted at that time. 5 A t th e ti me th e a dmi n is tr a ti v e h e ar in g in th is c a s e w a s h e ld , th e State Offic e of A dmi n is tr a ti v e H e ar in g s ( SO A H ) r u l e s r e g a r d i n g l i c e n s e - s u s p e n s i o n

p r o c e e d i n g s p r o v id e d

th a t “ [a ]n office r’s swor

n repor t of rele vant information shall be a dmissibl e as a publi c record.” 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 159.23(c) (7) (2008) (State Off ice of Admin. Hear ings, H ear ing) , repeale d by 3 4 T ex . R eg. 329 (2009). T h e rule further states that if “the defe ndant timely subpoenas the of

fice r and the 1 office r does not appe ar at the schedule d hear ing, the office r’s re port shall not be admissible.” Id.

I n the pre sent ca se, F lores conc eded in h i s testimony that his report wa s not sworn
as re quired by

transportation code sec t i on 524.011(b)( 4)(D) and De partment Rule 17.4. The Depa rtment argues, howe ver, that the repor t ne ed not be sworn in or der to be admitted into evidence b e c a u s e it is a dmi s s ib le u n d e r

th e p u b li c - r e c o r d

e xc e p ti o nto th e h e ar s ay rule. See Te x. R. Ev id. 80 3( 8) (p ro vid ing fo r ad mis sib ili ty of

“ re c or ds , r e po rt s, state me nts , o r d a ta c omp ilatio ns , in any form, of public of

fice s or ag encie s set t i n g forth,” a mong othe r thing s, “matters obse rved purs ua nt t o du ty im po se d b y

law a s to wh ic h matte rs the re wa s a du ty to r e po rt ” ); see also 1 T e x. Ad min . Code § 159 .2 3( b) (2 00 8) (p ro vid ingthat r ule s o f e vid e nc e a

pp lic a ble to n on -j ur

y c ivi l tr ia ls apply to administrative license- suspension pro ce ed i ng s). The D epar tment further

argues that the term “swor

n repor t” in Rule 159.23(c) (7) is mere ly a term of a rt and doe s not in fact mea n that the repor t must be sworn in order

to be admissible as a public r ecor d.6 Of sig nificanc e to this appea l, there a r e tw o ty p e s o f a d mi n is tr a ti v e li c e n s e - s u s p e nsion proce eding s, g overne d by two separ ate statutory

scheme s. Chapter 724 of the transportation code g ov e rn s th os e pr oceed in g s th a t r e su lt f ro m an in div idu a l’ s r e fu sa l to pr ov ide a blo od or br e a th specimen f

or bl o o d -a lcohol conce ntration testing. See id. §§ 724.031-.064 (West 1999 & Supp. 2 0 0 9 )
. Ch a

p te r 5 2 4 , o n th e o th e r h an d , g o v e r n s p r o c e e d in g s li k e th e p r e s e n t c a s e , w h e r e the individual provided a b re ath or blood spec imen but subsequently failed the test. Com

pa re id. (g overningref

usal ca ses), with i d. §§ 524.001-.051 (g overningfailure case s). While both st atutory
s ch em es re qu i re an arre s t i n g o ff i ce r t o p ro v i d e th e De p ar t m en twi t h an i n ci d en tre p o rt , t h e l an gu age
us e d to de sc ri be the re qu ir e d r e po rt dif fe rs in a sig nif ic ant w ay . An off

ice r i n a re fu sa l c a se is require d to “make a wri tte n r e po rt of the re fusal to the dire ctor of the [D] epar tment,” id. § 724.032(a) (4) ( emphasis adde d), while a n office r in a fa ilu re ca s e must provide the De partment with “a swo rn re

po rt of information releva

nt to the arre st,” id. § 524.011(b)( 4)(D) (empha sis added). See also 37 Tex. Admin. C ode § 17.4 (r equiringoffice rs in r efusa l c ases to simpl y submit report, but requiringoffice rs in failure case s to submit repor t that is “sworn to by

the ar resting office r”)
. I n Te x as De pa rtm e nt o

f P ub lic Sa

fe ty v . Pru itt , 75 S.W .3d 634, 638-39 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.), the San A ntonio Court of Appeals re lied on the distinction be tw e e n th e sw or

n re po rt re qu ir e d in a fa ilure c a se and the wr itt e n re po rt re qu ir e d in a re fu sa l c a se t o d e t e r m i n e t h a ta

r e p o rti na

r e f u s a l c a s e n e e d

n o tb e s w o r

ni no r d e r t o b e a dm i s s i b l e . S p e c i f

i c a l l y, the c ourt state d, “ [I ]n a

c a se su c h as this, wh e re Pr uitt r e fu se d to su

bmi t to the takin g of

a br e a th specimen, Tr ooper Pac heco w as not require d to submit a ‘swor n’ re port but rather

only a ‘w ritten’ one.” Id. at 639. On that basis, the c ourt held that the AL J did not abuse its discretion in admitting7

the offic er’ s unsworn re port into evidence
. Id. The im plication of t his holding is that an off icer ’s repor t in a failure case , wher e t h e s t at u tory lang uag e spec ifically

require s a “swor

n repor t,” as opposed to mere ly

a wr itten one, must be proper ly sworn in orde r to be a dmissibl e. We ag ree with the rea soning of Pr uit t . Where the le g islature re quires an a rresting office r to provide a “sworn report,” and where SOAH’s rules spec ifically provide that this “sworn
re po rt ” is a dmi ssi ble a s a pu bli c re c or d, we ho ld t

hat an uns wo rn

re po rt c ann ot a lso be a dmi ssi ble as a public r ecor d. S

ee T ex . Transp. Code A nn. § 524.011(b)( 4)(D) ; 1 Tex. Admi n. Code § 1 59 .2 3( c )( 7) (2 00 8)
. To ho ld oth e rw ise wo uld re qu ir e us to i nte rp re t th e te rm “ sw or n r e po rt ” in Rule 159.23(c) (7) to me an both sw orn and unsworn repor ts, an interpre tation that is clearly contra ry to the plain lang uag e of the rule. See R odriguez v. Serv ice Lloyds Ins. Co. , 9 97 S.W .2d 248, 254 (Tex. 1999) (“U nless the rule is ambiguous, we follow the r ule’s cle ar la

ng uag e.”)
. Whil e the De partment urg es that the tra nsportation code a

nd SOA H ru l es h ave no eff ect on an unsworn repor

t’s admissibili ty as a public r ecor d under Te x as Rule of Evidenc e 803(8) , we disag ree . Texas Rule of Evidence 101(b) provides that the rules of evidenc e apply

“[e]x cept a s otherwise pr ovided by

statute.” Te x . R. Evid
. 1 0 1 (b ). Furthermore , it is a fundamental r ule of statut or y c on str uc tio n th a t whe re g e ne ra l pr ov isi on s c on fl ic t w ithsp e c if ic pr ov isi ons, the sp e c if

ic provision preva ils as an exception to the g ener al provision. Tex. Go v ’t C o d e Ann. § 311.026 (West 2005). Her e, the r equire ments of the tra nsportation code, the Depa rtment’s o wn rules, and SOAH’s rule reg arding

the admis sibili ty of sworn r eports in license -suspension proc eeding s control over the more g ener al rule of evidenc e allowingpublic rec ords to be admitted as a hear say exception. I n addition, the appli ca t i on of Texas Rule of Evidenc e 803(8) to all office r re ports in license-8

suspension proce edings u n der tra nsportation code c hapter 524 would rende r the languag e of Rule 159.23(c) (7) meaning less, as it would not be nece ssary to specify that the statutorily

require d
sworn re port is admissible as a public re cord if all repor ts, whether sworn or not, a re a dmissibl e as public rec ords under

the rules of

evidenc e. See R.K. v. Ramirez , 887 S.W .2d 836, 842 (Tex. 1994) (“We should not interpre t a rule in such a way that rende rs its lang uag e mea ningle ss.”). I n light of the statutory

require ment that an off

icer provide a sworn report i n a license

suspension proce eding based on te st failure , and the SOAH rule specific ally stating that such a swor

n repor t is admissi ble as a

public rec ord, we hold that Flore s’s unsworn re port was not admissible as a public re cord. The Depa rtment’s first issue on appe al is overr uled. Flores’s Testimony

I n its second issue on appea l, the Depa rtment argues that eve n if an unswor n repor t is not admissi ble as a

public rec ord, F lores’s unswor n repor t became a swor

n repor t when he te stified
a t th e a dmi nis tr a tiv e he ari ngthat th e c on te nts of his re po rt

we re tr ue and c or re c t. Duringthe administrative hea ring , the Depa

rtment elicited the following testimony fr om F lor e s: Q: Tr oo pe r, is e ve ry

thi ngin your r e po rt

tr ue and c or re c t? A: Yes, sir, to the be st of my knowledg e.
Flore s provided no testimony descr ibing the c ontents of the re port, his rea sonable suspicion for stopping Car

uana, or his probable c ause f

or ar rest.9 Acc ording to the Depa

rtment, the testimony

quoted above is sufficient to consider F lor e s’ s r e po rt

to b e pr op e rl y

sw or n. Ho we ve r, e ve n if

we we re to assume tha

t an o ff ic e r c ou ld “cur e” a n unsworn re port by

testify in g t o i t s t ru t h and ac cura cy on the day

of the he aringand there fore make it admissible under SOAH Rule 159.23(c) (7), the D ep artment would then be
a tte mpt ingto i ntr od

uc e ne w e vid e nc e a t the he ari ng that w a s n ot p ro du c e d in

dis c ov e ry . SO AH Rul e 159.13(1) states t h at , assuming a proper discovery

reque st was filed, “ no document, in the [D]e pa rtme nt’ s a c tua l po sse ssi on , wi ll be a dmi ssi ble un le ss i t w a s p ro vid e d to the de fe nd ant w ith in five business day s of [t he] [D]epartment’s rec eipt of the reque st f or production.” 1 Tex. Ad m i n. Code § 159.13(1) ( 2008). Ther efor e, eve n if the De partment wa s permitted to transfor m an unsworn repor t into a sworn re port in the middle of a he aring , the new sw orn re port would not be admissible. I n any event, we cannot inter

pret the statut es and rules at issue her e in a manne r that would allow the Depa rtment to circumve nt the require ment s of the tra nsportation code, the rules g overning lic e n s e - s u s p e n s io n

p r o c e e dings in SOAH, a

nd the Depa

rtment’s own rule s by

submitt ing a

n unsworn repor t and later testifying r eg ardingits truth and acc urac y at the ad m i n i s t ra t ive hea ring
. See T e x. Transp. Code A nn. § 524.011(b)( 4)(D) (re quiring office r to provide swor n repor t); 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 159.23(c) (7) ( 2008) (a llowing f or admissibilit y

o f s wo rn repor

ts); 37 Tex. Admi n. Code § 17 .4 (2 ) (s tatin g that re po rt s in fa ilure c a se s “ sh a ll be sw or n to b y the arr e sti ngof

fi c e r” ). We h old that Flore s’s testimony

was insuffic ient to rende r his repor t properly sworn as r equire d by statute. The De partment’s se cond issue on appe al is overr uled. As pr e vio us ly

dis c us se d, F lor e s’ s uns wo rn re po rt wa s n ot a dmi ssi ble . B e c a us e his te sti mony a t th e a dmi nis tr a tiv e he ari ng wa s lim ite d to the tr uth and a c c ur a c y of a do c ume nt n ot i n10

evidenc e, his testimony essentially constituted no evidenc e. As such, the Depa rtment prese nted no evidenc e that there was rea sonable suspicion to stop Car uana or probable cause to arre st him. See Te x. Tr ans p. Cod e Ann. § 524 .0 35 (p ro vid ing that “r e a so na ble su sp ic ion to sto p or p ro ba ble c a us e to arre st the person” must be proved by preponde ranc e of evide nce at administrative hear ing in or der to sustain license suspension). On that basis, we hold that the t rial court did not err in re versingthe administrative dec ision suspending Car uana’ s license. Alternative Bases for Re versal

Be cause we hold th at Flores’s re port was not admissible, we ne ed not re ach the Depa rtment’s third issue, in which it argues t hat t here was no basis for reve rsal of the administrative decision if F lores’s r eport wa s proper ly admitted into evidence
. CO NC LU SION We affir m the trial court’ s order reve rsing the admini strative dec ision and reinstating Caruana ’s driver ’s license
.

__________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Waldrop and He nson; Dissenting O pinion by Chief J ustice Jones Affir med Filed: F ebrua

ry 12, 2010