Hinton has since be en re lease d from imprisonment. 1 UN ITED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT

F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA
KENN ETH A. HI NTON, ) ) P la in t if f, )

) v. ) Civil Action No. 08-1073 (R WR) ) JA M ES A . RUD ASI LL, ) ) Defendan t. )

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION Plaintiff Kenneth A. H inton, a prisoner pr ocee ding pr o se and in for ma paupe ris at the time, filed this pro se complaint base d on diversity jurisdiction, assertingleg al malpra ctice a nd 1 other c ommon law claims ag ainst his former de fense counsel James A. Rudasill. Rudasil l has moved to dismiss the complaint. B eca use Hinton’s cla ims are e ither bar red by the doctrine of
c oll ate ra l e sto pp e l or

do no t st ate a

c la im u po n whic h r e lie f m ay

be g ra nte d, the c omp la int

wi ll be dismissed. BA CKGROUND Rud a sil l w a s H int on ’s c ourt -a pp ointe d d e fe ns e c ouns e l in fe de ra l c ri min a l pr oc e e din g s in this court. In his verified c omplaint, Hinton allege s that betwee n approximately April 3, 2007
and May 2, 20 07 , Ru da sil l c omm itt e d le g a l ma lpr a c tic e in r e pr e se nti ngHi nto n in pr oc e e din g s to
re vo ke Hi nto n’ s su

pe rv ise d r e le a se , a

nd that Ru da sil l’ s ma lpr a c tic e c a us e d H int on

to s uf fe r l os s of income, loss of liber

ty , and loss of consor

tium. See Compl., Ex . A (De cl. of Ke nneth A.-2-

The fa ctual alleg ations in Hinton’s complaint relate only to conduct ar ising out of a n 2 atto rn e y -c lie nt r e latio ns hip . G ive n th at th e on ly duty imp lic itl y

or e xplic itl y

a lle g e d is the duty owed by an attorne y

to a client, Hinton’s asse rtions of “ne g lige nce, br eac h of ca re, br eac h of duty , b re a c h o f t

ru st, and ba d f a ith ,” Hi nto n’ s Co mpl . at 1, are a ll i nte rp re te d to be re state me nts of his claim for le g al malpra ctice. T o the extent the plaintiff may have intende d them to be claims distinguishable f

rom his leg al malpra ctice c laim, he has not alleg ed fa cts to support any oth e r d uty ow e d b y the pla int if

f, or the br e a c h o f a

ny su c h o the r d

uty . T hu s, su c h c la ims wo uld in a ny c a se fa il t o s ur

viv e sc re e nin gun de r 2 8 U .S. C. § 19 15 A b e c a us e the y do no t st ate a

c la im upon which re lief may

be g rante d. In addition, Hinton’s claim based on a “bre ach of

Six th Amendment,” due to “ineff ective a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l,” Hi nto n’ s Co mpl . at 1, is n ot c og niza ble in a c ivi l su it f

or dama g e s a g a ins t a pr ivate ind ivi du a l, b e c a

us e the Sixth A me ndme nt r e str a ins on ly g ov e rnme nts , n ot p ri vate ind ivi du a ls, and

ne ith e r p ub lic de fe nd e rs no r c ourt a pp ointe d c ri min a l de fe ns e c ouns e l are state or fe dera l actors. See P olk County v. Dodson, 45 4 U .S. 31 2, 32 5 ( 19 81 ) ( ho ldi ngthat a pu bli c defe nder is not a state actor when pe rfor

ming the tr aditional functions as de fense counsel); Anderson v. Sone nberg, 11 1 F .3 d 9 62 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 7) (u np ub lis he d ta

ble de c isi on ) ( “ [P]ubl ic defe nders a

nd other attorney s appointed to repr esent de fenda nts in feder al proc eeding s are not f e d e r a l o f f ic ia ls f o r p ur p o s e s o f [a s u it f o r mo n e y d ama g e s un d e r ] Bi v e ns [ v . S ix Un k no wn A ge nts of Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971)].”). Hinton, “Statement of Claim & F acts” (“H inton Com pl.”) at 1. In brief, the complaint alleg es 2 that Rudasill did not appea r in court a s order ed, id. ¶ 1, did not prese nt miti g atingevidenc e on behalf of def endant, id. ¶¶

2, 10 , ma de mis state me nts to t he c ourt and did no t a de qu ate ly

e xpla in things to either

Hinton or the cour

t, id. ¶¶ 3- 7, and fa iled to educate the cour t about its statutory obligations. Id. ¶¶ 9. This very same c onduct by

counsel re lating to the r evocation procee dings dur ing the period Apr il 3 through Ma y 2, 2007, was the subjec t of the appe al in Hinton’s fede ral c riminal proce eding s in which Hinton contende d that Rudasill provided ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. In his appea l, Hinton was repr esente d by counsel fr om the District of Columbia Office of the Fe dera l Publi c De fende r. The c ourt of appe als dec ided the mer its of the issue, concluding“that counsel’s be havior did not fall below a n objective standa

rd of r easona

bleness” a

nd that Hinton-3-

The c ourt of appe als’ opinion was attached to a nd ref err ed to in Rudasill’s answer. See 3 Def .’s Answe r to the Compl. & Mot. for Summ. Dismissal, ¶ 12 & Attac hment. I ts entire dis c us sio n o f t

he me ri ts o f t

he a pp e a l w a s a s f

oll ow s: Whil e appe llant was on fe dera l supervised re lease , a Mar yland cour

t convicted him of a ssault and burg lary . The United States District Court for the District of Columbia then held a he aring , revoke d appellant' s supervised r elea se, and sente nced him to 18-months' imprisonment. Appellant raises se vera l rea sons why his counsel' s perf

ormanc e wa s deficie nt under the f irst prongof Strickland v. W ashington, 46 6 U .S. 66 8, 68 7 ( 19 84 ), but no ne ha s me ri t. First, appe llant argues that counse l should have (1) soug ht a continuanc e of the re vocation hea

ringuntil after a

ppeal of his Maryland conviction, and (2) pr esente d evidenc e cha lleng ing the conviction itself as e rrone ous. But a pp e lla nt p re se nts no re mot e ly

c omp e lli nge vid e nc e that hi s c onvic tio n w a s in err or, asse rting only

that the conviction ar ose fr om a domestic dispute involving his “vindictive ex-wife” and her “fr ivolous charg es.” A

ppellant' s OpeningBr . 4. Second, appe llant argues that counse l failed (1) to inform the district court th atth e s en t en ci n g gu i d el i n es d i d n o tm an d at e r ev o ca t i o ni nap p el l an t 's c ir c ums tanc e , a

nd (2 ) t o p oint out di sc re tio na ry fa c tor s th e dis tr ic t c ourt

c ou ld have c onsidered in de cidingwhether to revoke supervised r elea se. Nothingin the rec ord, howe ver, r evea ls that the district court believe d revoc ation was re quired or re fu se d to c on sid e r t

he a pp ro pr iate dis c re tio na

ry fa c tor s. Third, appe llant argues that once the district court de cided to re voke su pe rv ise d r e le a se , c ouns e l f a ile d to inv ok e statut or

y se nte nc ingfa c tor s o r t o pr e se nt m iti g atin ge vid e nc e . B ut t he re c or d s ho ws that th e dis tr ic t c ourt did in fa c t c on sid e r a

pp ro pr iate se nte nc ingfa c tor s a nd mit ig atin ge vid e nc e , a

rr ivi ngat a mid-rang e sente nce. For the fore g oing r easons, we conclude that counsel’s be havior did not “f[a]ll below an objective standa rd of r easona

bleness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 6 8 8
. In an y e v e n t , e v e ni f i td i d , a p p e l l an tc an n o ts at i s f

y Strickland ’s sec ond prong , that the “de ficient pe rfor mance prejudice d the def ense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Appellant has f ailed to show a r easona

ble proba bility that the district court' s revoc ation decision would have been dif fer ent had c ounsel reque sted a could not show that a “ defic ient perf ormanc e pre

judiced the de fense
. United States v. Hinton, No . 0 7- 30 56 , 2 75 F e d. Ap px. 1 9, 20 (D .C. Cir . Apr . 2 3, 20 08 ) ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s, alterations and citations omitt ed). 3-4-

continuance of the he aringor pre sented e vidence on the under lying c onviction. No r h a s a pp e lla nt s ho wn that any fu rt he r m iti g atin gfa c tor s e xiste d th at w ou ld have le d to a lower

sentenc e. Hinton also asserts a

claim for intentional infliction of e motional dist ress, see Hinton’s Compl. at 1, and alleg es that Rudasill committ ed malpra ctice in a n appea l of a diff

ere nt criminal
matte r i n M ary

land state c ourt

by fa ili ngto e xpla in t

he le g a l pr oc e e din g s to him and by fa ili ngto contac t on Hinton’s behalf the cler k for that c ourt. Id. ¶¶ 4, 5. The se cla ims were not pa rt of Hinton’s fede ral a

ppeal. Rudasill filed a verif

ied answe r and motion for summar y dismiss al, af

firmatively

raising in his defense the ar g ument that the 2008 dec ision of the fede ral a ppeals c ourt prec ludes Hinton’s malprac tice cla ims in t his suit, and arguing that the complaint does not state a c laim upon which relief may be g rante d. Def

.’s Answe r to Compl. & Mot. for Summ. Dismis sal (“D ef.’ s Ans. & Mot. to Dismi ss”) ¶ 12. H inton filed an opposition. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’ s Mot. for Summ. J
. DI SCUS SI ON I
. THE MAL PRACTI CE CL AI MS AL READY L I TI GATED To c on se rv e jud ic ia l r e so ur c e s, re lie ve pa rt ie s o f t he c os t and

ve xati on of mul tip le laws uit s, pr e ve nt i nc on sis te nt l iti g atio n a nd e nc oura g e re lia

nc e on a dju dic atio n, fe de ra l c ourt s have tr aditionally

adher ed to the jurisprude ntial doctrine of c ollatera l estoppel. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). One version of c ollatera l estoppel, known as non- mutual defe nsive estoppel, bar s a par ty who has ha d a full and f

air opportunity

to liti g ate a

n issue in an
ear lier ca se and lost from r elitigating that same issue in a later case ag ainst a diffe rent de fenda nt.-5-

Id. at 94 -9 5; Ph ar

ma c e uti c al C

ar e Ma nage me nt A ss’n v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 522 F.3d 443, 446 (D.C. Cir. 2008). T h e l ega l s t an d ar d s fo r i n ef fe ct i v e a s s i s t an ce o f c o un s el i nth e r ev o ca t i o np ro ce ed i n gs ag ainst Hinton and for le g al malpra ctice in those same proc eeding s are equivalent. Se e Mc Cor d v. Bailey , 63 6 F .2 d 6 06 , 6 09 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 0) ; Bigelow v. Knight, 73 7 F . Su pp . 6 69 , 6 71 (D .D .C. 1990). In either instanc e, the pr oponent must establish both that the perfor mance was de ficient and that the de ficient pe rfor mance was the pr ox imate ca use of injury

to the counsel’s c lient. Niosi v. Aiello, 69 A.2d 57, 60 (D.C. 1949) ; Bigelow v. Knight, 737 F. Supp. at 671. Where the issue of def

ense c ounsel’s per formanc e has be en litigated and de cided, the pla intiff is estopped from re litigatingthe same pe rfor mance issues in another f orum. See M

cCord v. Bailey

, 636 F.2d at 609-10 (c ollatera l estoppel bars a leg al malpra ctice c laim in a civil suit after a court in a
c ri min a l a pp e a l ha s d e te rm ine d th at c ouns e l di d n ot g ive ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e ); Bieglow v. Knight, 7 3 7 F. S u

p p . at6 7 1 (c i t i n g McCord v. Bailey and apply

ing c ollatera l estoppel afte r de c isi on in a c ri min a l a

pp e a l ma de un de r D .C. Cod e § 2 3- 11 0) . T he re fo re , in thi s su it, Hi nto n is
c oll ate ra lly

e sto pp e d f

ro m r e lit ig atin gthe le g a l ma lpr a c tic e c la ims a g a ins t Ru da sil l be c a us e tho se claims wer e fully

litigated a

nd decide d ag ainst him in hi s fede ral c riminal appea l. The fe dera l appea ls court deter

mined that Rudasill’s perfor mance betwee n April 3, 2007 and May 2, 2007 was not def

icient and that, in any

case , Rudasill’s perfor

mance did not harm Hinton’s defe nse. Ac c or din g ly , H int on ’s le g a l ma lpr a c tic e c la ims ba se d o n h is c ouns e l’ s p e rf or manc e in h is
revoc ation proce eding s are prec luded by the doctrine of collate ral e stoppel and will be dismissed.-6-

I I
. TH E O TH ER C L AI MS On a motion to dismi ss for fa ilure to state a c laim upon which re lief may be g rante d, see Fe d. R. Civ. P . 12(b)( 6), a c ourt assumes all fa ctual alleg ations in the complaint to be true, e ven if they are doubtful. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Tw ombly, 12 7 S. Ct. 19 55 , 1 96 5 ( 20 07 ); Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F .3 d 1 27 1, 12 76 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 4) (n oti ngthat a c ourt mus t
c on str ue the c omp la int

“ lib e ra lly in t he pla int if

fs ’ f avo r” and “ g ra nt p la int if fs the be ne fi t of

a ll infere nces that can be derive d from the f acts a lleg ed”) . A cour

t need not, howe ver, “ acc ept infere nces dr awn by

plaintiffs if such infe renc es ar e unsupported by the fa cts set out in the complaint. Nor must [a] court a cce pt leg al conc lusions cast in the form of f actua l alleg ations.” Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276. I n decidinga motion to dism iss for fa ilure to state a c laim upon which
re lie f m ay

be g ra nte d, a c ourt is l imi te d to c on sid e ri ng“ the fa c ts a lle g e d in the c omp la int , documents attac hed as e x hibits or incorporate d by ref ere nce in the c omplaint, and matters about which the Court may

take judicial notice .” Gustave- Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002) ( citations omitt ed). Un de r D istri c t of

Col umb ia

law, “ [t]he tor

t of int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss consists of (1) e x treme a

nd outrag eous conduc t on the part of the defe ndant which (2) intentionally

or re cklessly

(3) c auses the pla intiff sever e emotional distress.” Kotsch v. District of Columbia, 924 A.2d 1040, 1045 (D.C. 2007) ( internal quotation marks a nd citations omi tte d) ; see also Ande rson v. Prease , 445 A.2d 612, 613 (D.C. 1982) ( stating that the tort
re qu ir e s sh ow ingan inte nti on a l a c t th at pr oximate ly c a us e d a le g a lly c og niza ble ha rm ). To state a cla im, the conduct alleg ed must be “so e x treme in de g ree , as to g o beyond all possible bounds of dec ency , and to be r eg arde d as atroc ious, and utterly intolerable in a

civiliz ed community .”-7-

Kotsch, 92 4 A .2 d at 10 45 -4 6. In a dd iti on , th e c la im r e qu ir e s a le ve l of e mot ion a l di str e ss “ so acute [i n] nature that har

mful phy sical conse quence s might not be unlikely to result.” Kotsch, 92 4 A .2 d at 10 46 (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s a nd c itatio n o mitte d) . T he fa c tua l a lle g atio ns in Hinton’s complaint alleg e neg lige nce, not r eckle ssness or ac ts intended to inflict emotional distress. See Hinton Compl . ¶¶ 1- 11 (alleg ing that Rudasill acted with “neg lige nce” or

“ ne g le c te d” to a c t) . M or e ov e r, the c omp la int do e s n ot a lle g e any

a c ts b y Rud a sil l th at w ou ld
rea ch the leve l of outrag eousness that is re quired to state a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See id. (a lle g inga fa ilure to a

pp e ar at a c ourt he ari ng , f

a ilure to c omm

un ic ate dil ig e ntl y wi th c lie nt, fa ilure to e xpla in l e g a l pr oc e dure to c lie nt, fa ilure to c on du c t a de qu ate le g a l r e se arc h, fa ilure to m ov e the c ourt fo r a c on tin ua nc e , a nd oth e r f a ilure s o f t

hat natur e ); c

f. Joyne r v. Sibley M

emorial Hospital, 826 A.2d 362, 373 (D.C. 2003) ( aff irming tria l court’s decision that the outra g eous conduc t element of the claim was not e stablished by a showe ing that a super visor intentionally

closing an off

ice door on an employ ee’ s hand to preve nt her fr om leavinga disciplinary

meeting ); Kerrigan v. Britches of George towne, Inc., 705 A.2d 624, 628 (D.C. 1997) (holdingthat alleg ing that a supervisor “ targ eted him for a sexual harassment investigation, manufac tured e vidence ag ainst him in order to establish a fa lse claim of se x ual ha ra ssm e nt, le ake d in fo rm atio n f ro m th e inv e sti g atio n to oth e r e mpl oye e s, and un jus tif ia bly demoted him” did not state a c laim of intentional infliction of emotional distress beca use the
su pe rv iso r' s c on du c t di d n ot r ise to t he ne c e ssa

ry le ve l of outr a g e ou sn e ss) ; Ho lli

s v . R os a Mex icano DC, LLC

, 582 F. Supp. 2d 22, 26 (D.D .C. 2008) (statingthat “[t] he bar for this tort . . . has bee n set very

high” and dismissing complaint alleg ing that plaintiff was de nied servic e in a
re sta ur ant b e c a

us e of inv idi ou s d isc ri min atio n) ; Haye s v. Chartered He alth Plan, 360 F. Supp.-8-

2d 84, 88 (D.D.C. 2004) ( decidingthat fra ud alone is insufficie nt to state a cla im for intentional inf lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss) ; Cooke-Se ales v. District of Columbia, 973 F. Supp. 184, 188 (D.D.C. 1997) ( decidingthat alleg ations of a pattern of discr imination and abuse of supe rvisory po we r d o n ot a

mou nt t o a lle g atio ns of

“ e xtre me and

outr a g e ou s” c on du c t a s is re qu ir e d to survive a motion to dismiss for f ailure to state a

claim). Additionally , the complaint alleg es no fac ts to show the require d extreme level of e motional dist ress on the pla intiff’s par t. See Hi nto n’ s Co mpl . ¶

¶ 1 -1 1; c f. Futrell v. Dep’ t of Labor Fede ral Credit Union, 816 A.2d 793, 808 (D.C. 2003) (stating that “ mental anguish” and “ stress” do not rise to the le vel of seve re
e mot ion a l di str e ss) ; Kotsch, 924 A.2d at 1046 (statingthat the claim re quires a le vel of e motional distress “so ac ute [in] nature that harmful phy sical conse quence s might not be unlikely to result”) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s and c itatio n o mitte d) ; Hudson v. District of Columbia, 558 F.3d 526, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (statingthat “g ener al, subjective f eeling s of worr

y and conc ern” are “not the kin d o f s e ri ou s, ve ri fi a

ble e mot ion a l in

jur y ” re qu ir e d to su

pp or t th e c la im) ; see also Langer v. GeorgeW

ashington University, 49 8 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 96 , 2 01 (D .D .C. 20 07 ) ( statin gthat no lia bil ity
atta c he s if

the e mot ion a l di str e ss i s e xag g e ra te d a nd unre a so na

ble , unle ss i t r e su lts fr om a plaintiff’s pec uliar susce ptibili ty to such distress of which the defe ndant has knowle dg e). Be fore a lawyer c an have a duty to a client, ther e must be an attorney -client re lationship. Smith v. Haden , 872 F. Supp. 1040, 1044 (D.D .C. 1994) (statingthat plaintiff must establish the exis tence of an attorney

client re lationship in order to sustain a leg al malpra ctice suit in the District of Columbia). The c omplaint does not alleg e that Rudasill entere d into an attorney -client relationship wit h Hinton in relation to the criminal appe al in Mary land state c ourt. Rudasill’s verifie d answe r ave rs that Rudasill had no attorney -client re lationship with Hint on relating to the-9-

appea l in the Maryland cr iminal procee dings. D ef.’ s Ans. & Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 5(i)-( j). Hinton has not disputed Rudasill’s sworn statement that no attorne y -client re lationship ex isted betwee n them as to that matter. Ac cording ly , Hinton’s claim for intentional infliction of e motional distress and his leg al malpra ctice c laims arising from Rudasill’s conduct r elatingto the criminal appea l in Maryland will be dismissed for fa ilure to state a c laim upon which re lief may be g rante d. CONCLUSI ON Th e ma lpr a c tic e c la im s te mmi ngfr om R ud a sil l’ s p e rf

or manc e in m atte rs re latin gto Hinton’s revoc ation proce eding s in this court are ba rre d by res judicata as they

wer e litigated and decide d by

the cour t of appe als. The c omplaint does not state a cla im for intentional infliction emotional distress beca

use the fa ctual alleg ations do not set forth either the kind of intentional and outra g eous beha

vior by the def endant or the seve rity

of emotional distress in the plaintiff that is require d to state a c laim upon which re lief may be g rante d. The c omplaint also does not state a malprac tice cla im relatingto Rudasill’s conduct in the criminal appe al in Maryland state c ourt be c a us e the re c or d d oe s n ot s ho w that Ru da sil l and Hi nto n h a d a

n atto rn e y -c lie nt r e latio ns hip with respec t to the Maryland state c riminal appea l. Accor dingly , Rudasill’s moti on for summary dismiss al will be g rante d and the c omplaint will be dism issed for f ailure to state a

claim upon wh ic h r e lie f m ay

be g ra nte d. Th is d e c isi on

c on sti tut e s a

“ str ike ” fo r p ur

po se s o f 2 8 U .S. C. § 1915(g ). A sepa rate order acc ompanies this memorandum opinion.-10-

SI GNED this 12th day

of June, 2009.
/ s /

RI CHARD W. R OB ERTS Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge