United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 06-1797

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United States of America, * 

 * 

 Appellee, * 

* 

v. *

 *

David M. Nanos, * 

 * 

 Appellant. *

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Appeals from the United States

No. 06-1821 District Court for the Western

___________ District of Missouri.

United States of America, * [UNPUBLISHED] 

 * 

 Appellee, * 

* 

v. *

 *

Johnnie D. Dethrow, also known as * 

Jerry Lee Rich, *

* 

 Appellant. *

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Submitted: November 14, 2006

Filed: December 13, 2006

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1

The Honorable Dean Whipple, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Western District of Missouri.

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Before BYE, JOHN R. GIBSON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

David M. Nanos and Johnnie D. Dethrow pleaded guilty to conspiracy to

manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and

aiding and abetting each other in carrying a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c). The charges stemmed from an incident involving the purchase of

methamphetamine precursors at a Wal-Mart in Independence, Missouri. Nanos and

Dethrow conditioned their pleas on their right to challenge the district court's1

 denial

of their motions to suppress. Finding no error in the denial of their suppression

motions, we affirm.

Nanos and Dethrow contend the district court should have suppressed evidence

seized subsequent to their arrests because the arrests stemmed from an improper

investigatory detention and no probable cause existed for their arrests. "[W]e review

for clear error the facts supporting a denial of a motion to suppress and review de

novo the legal conclusions based on the facts." United States v. James, 353 F.3d 606,

612 (8th Cir. 2003). 

"Law enforcement officers may briefly detain an individual for investigative

purposes if they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity."

United States v. Davis, 457 F.3d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). The

investigating officer, Christina Nunez, had been told by a Wal-Mart loss-prevention

employee that Dethrow and a female companion had split up after shopping together

and selecting for purchase pseudoephedrine, hydrogen peroxide, and coffee

filters—three items Nunez knew to be methamphetamine precursors. Thereafter,
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Nunez observed: (1) Dethrow and his female companion leave the store separately;

(2) Dethrow and his female companion talking on cell phones as Dethrow left the

store; (3) Dethrow pacing outside the front doors of the store despite very cold

conditions; (4) Dethrow's female companion taking an extremely long time to check

out at a self-check-out register while constantly looking around; and (5) Dethrow and

his female companion reuniting at a vehicle parked outside of Wal-Mart; Dethrow was

in the driver's seat and Nanos in the backseat. Given the totality of the circumstances,

we find Nunez had an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal

activity sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. See, e.g., United States v. Ameling,

328 F.3d 443, 448 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding stop of suspect's vehicle was justified

after officer learned from reliable source or observed: two suspects who had entered

store together split the purchase of four boxes of pseudoephedrine, known to the

officer to be a methamphetamine precursor, the suspects did not leave the store

together but reunited at one of the suspect's vehicles, and the suspects went to another

store and purchased lithium batteries, also known to the officer to be a

methamphetamine precursor). 

As part of the investigatory stop, Nunez was entitled to conduct an investigation

"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in

the first place." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). We agree with the district court

that Nunez acted properly in securing the keys to the vehicle (for officer and bystander

safety), in asking Dethrow and his female companion to keep their hands in plain sight

(for officer and bystander safety), in calling the vehicle license number in to the police

dispatch center (to dispel her suspicion of criminal activity), and in removing

Dethrow's female companion from the vehicle and conducting a pat-down search after

she refused to keep her hands in plain sight during the brief investigation despite being

directed to remain still on two prior occasions (again for officer and bystander safety).

See United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1999) ("During

a Terry stop, officers can check for weapons and may take any additional steps that

are 'reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo
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during the course of the stop.'" (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235

(1985))).

Finally, we agree with the district court that the officers had probable cause to

arrest Nanos and Dethrow. Coupled with the information provided by reliable sources

(trained loss-prevention employees) and their own pre-arrest observations, Nunez and

another officer developed probable cause to arrest the occupants of the car after

smelling a heavy chemical odor—familiar to the officers as the odor of

methamphetamine manufacturing—as Dethrow's female companion exited the

vehicle. See, e.g., United States v. Clayton, 210 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir. 2000)

(finding officer "developed probable cause for a search based on his immediate

perception of an odor associated with methamphetamine production").

We therefore affirm the district court.

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