UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 

2016 MSPB 38 

Docket No. DA-0752-14-0353-I-1 

William R. Campbell, 

Appellant, 

v. 

Department of the Army, 

Agency. 

November 2, 2016 

William R. Campbell, El Paso, Texas, pro se. 

Russell Wardlow, Fort Bliss, Texas, for the agency. 

BEFORE 

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman 

Mark A. Robbins, Member 

OPINION AND ORDER 

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which 

sustained his demotion for negligent performance of duty and found that he did 

not prove his affirmative defense of reprisal for whistleblowing. For the reasons 

set forth below, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly 

MODIFIED by this Opinion and Order to supplement the administrative judge’s 

analysis of the appellant’s whistleblower reprisal claim, we AFFIRM the initial 

decision. 
2

BACKGROUND 

¶2 The initial decision contains a lengthy discussion of the facts in this appeal, 

but the essential facts are that the appellant occupied a GS-15 position as Director 

of the agency’s Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization, and Security 

(DPTMS) at Fort Bliss, Texas. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 7-8. DPTMS 

is composed of several branches, including the Range Operations Branch (Range 

Branch). IAF, Tab 7 at 23. The appellant’s responsibilities included establishing 

and maintaining effective internal controls, which are the agency’s mechanisms 

and procedures for protecting agency resources. IAF, Tab 6 at 102. 

¶3 In May 2012, several employees of the Range Branch were arrested and 

charged with theft of Government property, including furniture, which had been 

acquired for use in military training villages. IAF, Tab 37 at 4-68, Tab 38 

at 4-68, Tab 19 at 50. As an outgrowth of the agency’s investigation into the 

theft, the appellant also suspected wrongdoing in the use of Government purchase 

cards (GPC) in the Range Branch. IAF, Tab 7 at 15. Following an internal 

review that led to some actions, the appellant requested an external audit. Id. 

The Garrison Commander then initiated an investigation of GPC use in the Range 

Branch pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-6. Id. at 11. The AR 15-6 

investigation found, among other things, that: management controls for the GPC 

program at the Range Branch were not in place; the appellant did not adequately 

monitor the GPC program at the Range Branch; the appellant did not clearly 

understand or communicate agency policy and priorities regarding the GPC 

program; and the absence of management controls for the Range Branch’s GPC 

program caused the misuse of the program. Id. at 18. 

¶4 Following the AR 15-6 investigation, the agency proposed the appellant’s 

removal based on a charge of negligent performance of duty. Id. at 4-6. The 

charge was supported by three specifications involving the alleged absence of 

management controls in the Range Branch GPC program and the lack of 

management controls regarding the furniture. Id. at 4. After the appellant 
3

responded to the notice of proposed removal, IAF, Tab 6 at 13-18, the deciding 

official sustained the charge but mitigated the penalty to a demotion to a GS-12 

Workforce Development Specialist position, IAF, Tab 1 at 11-13. 

¶5 The appellant filed a Board appeal of his demotion, arguing that the charge 

against him was “unfounded” and that he had instituted required policies and 

procedures and conducted required inspections. Id. at 5. He also raised an 

affirmative defense of reprisal for whistleblowing activity, alleging that the 

agency demoted him in retaliation for his having reported to his superior his 

suspicion that employees were engaging in theft of Government property and 

seeking an external investigation of the GPC program. Id.

¶6 After holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision 

that affirmed the appellant’s demotion. IAF, Tab 43, Initial Decision (ID) 

at 1, 38. The administrative judge found that: the agency proved the charge and 

each specification by preponderant evidence, ID at 5-32; the appellant did not 

prove his affirmative defense, ID at 32-35; and the penalty of demotion was 

reasonable and promoted the efficiency of the service, ID at 35-37. 

¶7 The appellant has filed a petition for review, arguing that the agency 

applied outdated GPC program operating procedures in its investigation, he took 

immediate action once he learned of control issues within the Range Branch, the 

control weaknesses in the Range Branch were not material, and other directors 

had accountability issues and were not demoted. Petition for Review (PFR) File, 

Tab 1 at 4-5. The agency has filed a response in opposition to the petition for 

review, and the appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response. PFR File, 

Tabs 7-8. 

ANALYSIS 

The administrative judge correctly found that the agency proved the charge by 

preponderant evidence. 

¶8 In the initial decision, the administrative judge thoroughly analyzed the 

hearing testimony and documentary evidence and found that the agency proved 
4

the charge. ID at 5-32. The appellant challenges this finding on review, arguing 

that the investigators improperly used an outdated regulation, AR 715-xx, in 

evaluating the GPC program. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4; see IAF, Tab 12 at 5, 9. The 

appellant asserts that, although AR 715-xx required the billing official to 

maintain original documentation for GPC purchases, an updated regulation 

governing GPC purchases did not include such a requirement. PFR File, Tab 1 

at 4. He contends that because they relied on an outdated regulation in finding 

that the management controls over the GPC program at the Range Branch were 

unsatisfactory, the investigators provided the deciding official with incorrect 

information. Id. 

¶9 We find this argument unpersuasive. The audit covered GPC transactions 

at the Range Branch from March 2011 through August 2012. IAF, Tab 7 at 32. 

As the administrative judge correctly noted, the appellant’s certifications of 2010 

and 2011 reflect that the regulation governing the GPC program at that time was 

AR 715-xx, and the updated GPC Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) was 

published on February 23, 2012. ID at 7 n.4 (citing IAF, Tab 8 at 61, 72;1

 IAF, 

Tab 18 at 56); IAF, Tab 17 at 39. Given the time period covered by the audit, we 

find that the agency investigators appropriately relied on both the agency’s GPC 

SOP dated February 23, 2012, and AR 715-xx in evaluating the GPC program at 

the Range Branch. IAF, Tab 7 at 32. 

¶10 The appellant also argues on review that once he learned of “accountability 

issues” in the DPTMS, he immediately took actions to remedy them. PFR File, 

Tab 1 at 4. As the administrative judge found, however, the appellant failed to 

implement adequate controls to prevent issues from arising in the first place and 

the weaknesses were material. ID at 15, 25-26, 30-32. In sum, we have 

considered the appellant’s arguments set forth above, and we find that he has not 

 

1

 The administrative judge inadvertently cited to page 73 instead of page 72. 
5

set forth a basis to disturb the administrative judge’s well-reasoned findings 

regarding the charge. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 

(1997) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she 

considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made 

reasoned conclusions); Broughton v. Department of Health & Human Services, 

33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same). 

The agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the 

same action in the absence of the appellant’s protected disclosure. 

¶11 In an adverse action appeal such as this, an appellant’s claim of 

whistleblower reprisal is treated as an affirmative defense. Shannon v. 

Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶ 21 (2014); Shibuya v. 

Department of Agriculture, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 19 (2013). In such instances, 

once the agency proves its adverse action case by a preponderance of the 

evidence, the appellant must show by preponderant evidence that he engaged in 

whistleblowing activity by making a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(b)(8) and that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s 

personnel action. Shannon, 121 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶ 21; Shibuya, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, 

¶ 19; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(C). 

¶12 If an appellant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the agency to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same 

action in the absence of the protected disclosure. Shannon, 121 M.S.P.R. 221, 

¶ 22; 5 C.F.R. § 1209.4(d). In determining whether the agency has met this 

burden, the Board will consider the following factors: (1) the strength of the 

agency’s evidence in support of its action; (2) the existence and strength of any 

motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials involved in the decision; and 

(3) any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against employees who are 

not whistleblowers, but who are otherwise similarly situated. Carr v. Social 

Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Board does 

not view these factors as discrete elements, each of which the agency must prove 
6

by clear and convincing evidence, but rather, the Board will weigh the factors 

together to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing as a whole. 

Phillips v. Department of Transportation, 113 M.S.P.R. 73, ¶ 11 (2010). Our 

reviewing court has added that “[e]vidence only clearly and convincingly 

supports a conclusion when it does so in the aggregate considering all the 

pertinent evidence in the record, and despite the evidence that fairly detracts from 

that conclusion.” Whitmore v. Department of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed. 

Cir. 2012); Ayers v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 11, ¶ 27 (2015). 

¶13 The administrative judge found that the appellant proved that he made a 

protected disclosure and that this disclosure was a contributing factor in the 

agency’s decision to demote him.2

 ID at 34. The administrative judge further 

found, however, that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it 

would have taken the same action in the absence of the appellant’s disclosure. 

ID at 35. 

¶14 Although the appellant does not raise this issue on review, the 

administrative judge did not explicitly address each of the Carr factors in making 

her clear and convincing assessment. ID 34-35. Instead, she focused on the 

second Carr factor, i.e., the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on 

the part of the agency officials involved in the decision. The administrative judge 

found that the proposing and deciding officials credibly testified that they had no 

motive to retaliate against the appellant based on his whistleblowing. ID at 35. 

In making this finding, the administrative judge noted that the deciding official 

stated that the misconduct that was the subject of the appellant’s disclosure 

occurred before he took command of the garrison, thus implying that he was not 

directly implicated by the appellant’s disclosures. ID at 34; see PFR File, Tab 7, 

 

2

 The agency has not filed a cross petition for review challenging these findings, and we 

discern no reason to disturb them. 
7

Hearing Transcript (HT) at 134-35 (testimony of deciding official).3

 The 

appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s assessment of the 

proposing and agency officials’ motive to retaliate, and we discern no reason to 

disturb this portion of the initial decision. However, because the administrative 

judge did not make any findings regarding the other two Carr factors in her clear 

and convincing assessment, we find it appropriate to supplement her analysis by 

addressing the other two factors. 

The agency’s evidence in support of its action is strong. 

¶15 The record evidence shows that the agency had strong reasons for 

disciplining the appellant, as there was significant evidence to support the charge 

and the consequences of the appellant’s negligence were very serious. As 

discussed above, the results of both the agency audit and the AR 15-6 

investigation showed that the appellant failed to perform his duties of ensuring 

that management controls were in place to prevent misuse of the GPC program 

and theft of Government property. The proposing official testified that the 

investigation showed that there were systemic long-term issues with internal 

controls relating to property accountability and the GPC program, HT at 21 

(testimony of the proposing official), and he stated that the appellant failed to 

ensure that Range Branch personnel were aware of the requirements governing 

property accountability and were following them, HT at 42 (testimony of the 

proposing official). 

¶16 In addition, the deciding official testified that the results of the agency 

audit were “alarming” and demonstrated a “complete failure” of management 

controls for the GPC program at the Range Branch. HT at 97 (testimony of the 

 

3

 The hearing transcript is included as part of the agency response to the petition for 

review, but our citations to the hearing transcript will be to the separately paginated 

hearing transcript and not the pagination of the entire response. 
8

deciding official). He also testified that the AR 15-6 investigation “documented a 

number of abuses, likely criminal activity, pilferage, theft, fraud, waste, and 

abuse in the [GPC program], and rampant [leadership] failures at all echelons, 

including [the appellant] as the Director of DPTMS.” HT at 98 (testimony of the 

deciding official). He further noted that both the agency audit and the AR 15-6 

investigation illustrated that the appellant had not made any efforts to rectify 

weaknesses and ensure that procedures were in place to prevent them from 

recurring. HT at 112 (testimony of the deciding official). The deciding official 

explained that he imposed the demotion because the investigation revealed that 

the problems at the Range Branch were caused, in part, by the appellant’s 

inaction and lack of oversight. HT at 124 (testimony of the deciding official). In 

sum, based on our review of the record, we find that the evidence in support of 

the appellant’s demotion is very strong. 

The record does not reveal whether there are any employees who are not 

whistleblowers, but who are otherwise similarly situated to the appellant. 

¶17 The agency did not present any evidence showing that it took similar 

actions against employees who were not whistleblowers, but who were otherwise 

similarly situated to the appellant. See generally IAF, Tabs 36-38 (agency’s 

response to the administrative judge’s affirmative defense order); HT. The 

appellant argues on review that there were property accountability issues in three 

other directorates; however, he was the only director who was removed from his 

position. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. In support of this argument, the appellant notes 

that the Logistics Management Specialist who conducted Command Supply 

Discipline Program (CSDP) evaluations at Fort Bliss testified that other 

directorates also had accountability issues but the agency did not take any action 

against their directors. PFR File, Tab 8 at 3 (citing HT at 189) (testimony of the 

Logistics Management Specialist). The appellant further notes that the proposing 
9

official, who is the Director of the agency’s Directorate of Family, Morale, 

Welfare, and Recreation (DFMWR) at Fort Bliss,4

 testified that there had been 

property accountability issues at DFMWR but no action was taken against him. 

Id. (citing HT at 67-70) (testimony of the proposing official). 

¶18 As the proposing official explained, however, once he became aware of 

property accountability issues in his directorate, he addressed them immediately, 

whereas the appellant did not. Specifically, the proposing official testified that 

when an inventory of DFMWR revealed that a number of items were missing, he 

began implementing safeguards within 30 days to ensure that property 

accountability issues would not recur. HT at 39-40, 69 (testimony of the 

proposing official). By contrast, the record evidence demonstrates that the 

appellant did not adequately address the property accountability issues in DPTMS 

once he became aware of them. For example, a May 2011 evaluation showed that 

DPTMS was unsatisfactory in 6 of 9 areas and made recommendations for 

improvement; however, a follow-up evaluation conducted in July and August of 

2011 indicated that the primary recommendation had not been implemented. IAF, 

Tab 23 at 20-23; see HT at 33-34 (testimony of the proposing official). In 

addition, as previously noted, the deciding official testified that both the agency 

audit and the AR 15-6 investigation illustrated that the appellant had not made 

any efforts to rectify weaknesses and ensure that procedures were put in place to 

prevent them from recurring. HT at 112 (testimony of the deciding official). 

Given these circumstances, we find that the proposing official is not a valid 

comparator employee for purposes of the appellant’s whistleblowing retaliation 

claim. 

 

4

 At the time of the appellant’s proposed removal, the proposing official was serving a 

detail as Deputy to the Garrison Commander. HT at 15-16 (testimony of the proposing 

official). 
10

¶19 In his petition for review, the appellant does not identify the other two 

directors (other than the proposing official), who he asserts were not disciplined 

for accountability issues, but he refers to the testimony of the Logistics 

Management Specialist, who identified the other directorates in his hearing 

testimony. PFR File, Tab 8 at 3; HT at 188-89 (testimony of the Logistics 

Management Specialist). At no point, however, does the appellant describe the 

specific circumstances surrounding the accountability issues in those other 

directorates. The agency does not do so either. Thus, it is not possible, based on 

the evidence presented, to determine whether the directors who were not 

whistleblowers engaged in similar misconduct and were not disciplined, or if they 

were not similarly situated to the appellant because their misconduct was not as 

serious. 

¶20 In Whitmore, our reviewing court determined that “Carr does not impose 

an affirmative burden on the agency to produce evidence with respect to each and 

every one of the three Carr factors to weigh them each individually in the 

agency’s favor.” Whitemore, 680 F.3d at 1374. Rather, “the absence of any 

evidence relating to Carr factor three can effectively remove that factor from the 

analysis.” Id.; see Runstrom v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 

169, ¶ 18 (2016) (finding that, due to lack of evidence that there were any 

employees similarly situated to the appellant, the third Carr factor was not 

significant for the analysis of that case). This is the situation presented in the 

instant matter. Accordingly, we find that the third Carr factor is insignificant due 

to the lack of evidence regarding similarly situated employees. 

¶21 Weighing the three Carr factors together, we find that, given the strength 

of the agency’s evidence regarding its reason for demoting the appellant and the 

absence of a motive to retaliate on the part of the proposing and deciding 

officials, the agency demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that it would 

have demoted the appellant even absent his protected disclosure. We therefore 
11

agree with the administrative judge’s determination that the appellant failed to 

prove his whistleblower reprisal claim. 

The administrative judge complied with the guidance in Whitmore regarding the 

clear and convincing evidence issue. 

¶22 In reviewing this case, we also have considered the guidance in Whitmore 

regarding how the Board should analyze the evidence in addressing a 

whistleblowing claim. As noted above, our reviewing court has stated that a 

proper analysis of the clear and convincing evidence issue requires that the Board 

evaluate all of the pertinent evidence in determining whether an agency has met 

its clear and convincing burden. Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1368. In Whitmore, the 

court found that, in analyzing whether the agency met this burden, the Board 

excluded or ignored evidence offered by the appellant that was necessary to 

adjudicate his whistleblower reprisal claim. Id. at 1368-72. In particular, the 

court found that the administrative judge in that case abused her discretion by 

excluding certain of the appellant’s requested witnesses, thereby admitting only 

testimony on the charges brought against the appellant and excluding witnesses 

offered to support his affirmative defense of whistleblower reprisal. 

Id. at 1368-70. The court held that the administrative judge “treated the hearing 

as if it only functioned to examine the proof of the charges and the 

reasonableness of the penalty—not Whitmore’s whistleblower defense.” Id.

at 1363. 

¶23 By contrast, the administrative judge in this case did not prevent the 

appellant from effectively presenting his whistleblowing defense. Not only did 

the administrative judge approve all 14 of the appellant’s requested witnesses, 

compare IAF, Tab 12 at 7-10, with IAF, Tab 33 at 2, but she also granted him an 

extension of time to submit a prehearing submission, which consisted of 20 

separate parts and thousands of pages, some of which pertained to his 

whistleblowing reprisal claim, IAF, Tabs 12-31. Most importantly, her thorough 
12

initial decision shows that she closely listened to the testimony of witnesses from 

both sides, including those who bolstered the appellant’s whistleblowing defense. 

The administrative judge correctly found that the agency established nexus and 

that demotion is a reasonable penalty. 

¶24 In addition to the requirement that the agency prove its charge against the 

appellant, the agency also must prove that there is a nexus, i.e., a clear and direct 

relationship between the articulated grounds for the adverse action and either the 

appellant’s ability to accomplish his duties satisfactorily or some other legitimate 

government interest. Ellis v. Department of Defense, 114 M.S.P.R. 407, ¶ 8 

(2010). Here, the administrative judge found that nexus was established, see ID 

at 35, and we agree. There is a presumption of a nexus where the misconduct 

occurred in part at work. Parker v. U.S. Postal Service, 819 F.2d 1113, 1116 

(Fed. Cir. 1987). The appellant has not presented any argument to the contrary, 

and thus we see no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s finding on nexus. 

¶25 The Board will review an agency imposed penalty only to determine if the 

agency considered all the relevant factors and exercised management discretion 

within tolerable limits of reasonableness. Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 

5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981). In making this determination, the Board must 

give due weight to the agency’s primary discretion in maintaining employee 

discipline and efficiency, recognizing that the Board’s function is not to displace 

management’s responsibility, but to ensure that managerial judgment has been 

properly exercised. Ellis, 114 M.S.P.R. 407, ¶ 11; Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 306. It 

is not the Board’s role to decide what penalty it would impose, but, rather, to 

determine whether the penalty selected by the agency exceeds the maximum 

reasonable penalty. Lewis v. General Services Administration, 82 M.S.P.R. 259, 

¶ 5 (1999). 

¶26 The decision letter and the deciding official’s hearing testimony show that 

he appropriately considered the relevant Douglas factors in deciding to demote 

the appellant. IAF, Tab 1 at 11-13; HT at 111-21, 126 (testimony of the deciding 
13

official). Specifically, he considered the seriousness of the appellant’s 

misconduct and found that it was “quite serious” because the situation at the 

Range Branch was longstanding and pervasive and no action was taken to address 

it. HT at 112 (testimony of the deciding official). The deciding official also 

considered that the appellant’s conduct had caused him to lose faith and 

confidence in the appellant’s ability to serve as a director. HT at 115 (testimony 

of the deciding official). In addition, he considered the appellant’s potential for 

rehabilitation and determined that the appellant could not function as a supervisor 

but could continue to serve in a nonsupervisory role. HT at 120-21 (testimony of 

the deciding official). The deciding official considered as mitigating factors the 

appellant’s lengthy service (36 years), the statements he provided, his health, and 

his emotional state, and the deciding official testified that these factors caused 

him to mitigate the proposed removal penalty to a demotion. HT at 126 

(testimony of the deciding official). 

¶27 In assessing the reasonableness of the penalty, the administrative judge 

also considered the appellant’s disparate penalty claim, noting that the appellant 

“complained that no other directors were demoted from their positions when there 

were problems within their directorates.” ID at 36. The consistency of the 

penalty with those imposed upon other employees for the same or similar offenses 

is one of the factors to be considered under Douglas in determining the 

reasonableness of an agency-imposed penalty. Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305. To 

establish disparate penalties, the appellant must show that the charges and the 

circumstances surrounding the charged behavior are substantially similar to those 

in his comparator’s case. Voss v. U.S. Postal Service, 119 M.S.P.R. 324, ¶ 6 

(2013). Here, the administrative judge properly rejected the appellant’s disparate 

penalty claim, noting that the appellant failed to identify any director whose 

directorate had similar problems. ID at 36. 

¶28 Finally, the administrative judge considered as mitigating factors the 

appellant’s length of service, his commitment to the agency and its mission, his 
14

lack of any prior discipline, and the good records of other branches in DPTMS 

under his supervision, but found that the sustained charge was serious and 

militated against mitigating the penalty. Based on her review of the record, the 

administrative judge found that the deciding official properly exercised his 

discretion in determining that demotion was an appropriate penalty in this case 

and that the agency’s selected penalty was not unreasonable. ID at 37. We see 

no reason to disturb this finding. 

ORDER 

¶29 This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this 

appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113(c) (5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.113(c)). 

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING 

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS 

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar 

days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. 

Dec. 27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court 

has held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory 

deadline and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. 

See Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 

If you want to request review of the Board’s decision concerning your 

claims of prohibited personnel practices under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), 

(b)(9)(A)(i), (b)(9)(B), (b)(9)(C), or (b)(9)(D), but you do not want to challenge 

the Board’s disposition of any other claims of prohibited personnel practices, you 

may request the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of 

appeals of competent jurisdiction to review this final decision. The court of 

appeals must receive your petition for review within 60 days after the date of this 
15

order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27, 2012). If you choose 

to file, be very careful to file on time. You may choose to request review of the 

Board’s decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any other 

court of appeals of competent jurisdiction, but not both. Once you choose to seek 

review in one court of appeals, you may be precluded from seeking review in any 

other court. 

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to 

court, you should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found in 

title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff. 

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United 

States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode/htm. 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is 

available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance 

is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained 

within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11. Additional 

information about other courts of appeals can be found at their respective 

websites, which can be accessed through 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

 
16

Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any 

attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

FOR THE BOARD: 

______________________________ 

Jennifer Everling 

Acting Clerk of the Board 

Washington, D.C.