J-S57039-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

DEONTE SATCHELL

Appellee No. 610 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 12, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0004850-2011

BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED MARCH 09, 2015

The Commonwealth appeals from the July 12, 2013 judgment of 

sentence, imposing an aggregate term of time served, i.e. 167 days’, to two 

years less one day’s incarceration plus seven years’ probation on Appellee, 

Deonte Satchell, following his conviction by a jury for rape, involuntary 

deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI), and simple assault.1 After careful review, 

we affirm.

The trial court provided the following summary of the facts of this 

case.

[Appellee] was charged with rape and related 

offenses following an incident that occurred on June 

20, 2011. The victim and [Appellee] were/are 

boyfriend and girlfriend. This incident occurred at 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3123(a)(1), and 2701(a)(1), respectively.
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the Barkley Square Apartments, located at 1600 

Garrett Road in Upper Darby. Prior to this incident, 

[Appellee] and [the] victim had been dating for more 

than a year. The two had been living together for 

several months before this incident. During their 

relationship, the victim had become pregnant by 

[Appellee] with a set of twins, but had suffered a 

miscarriage twenty-one weeks into her pregnancy. 

This miscarriage occurred on January 26, 2011, 

approximately five (5) months before the crime. 

Both the [Appellee] and victim had a difficult time 

dealing with the miscarriage.

On the night before this incident, [Appellee] 

and victim argued and victim told [Appellee] that she 

wanted to break up with him. This was because she 

believed that [Appellee] was being unfaithful. 

[Appellee] also believed that the victim was being 

unfaithful. The two wanted to examine each other’s 

cell phones for text messages containing any 

evidence of their alleged infidelity.

On the night of June 20, 2011, [Appellee] and 

victim continued to argue and each accused the 

other of infidelity. They were also arguing about 

cooking, and [Appellee] was planning to leave the 

apartment. Before he did so, [Appellee] asked the 

victim if she would “give him some.” She did not 

realize that [Appellee] was referring to sex, and 

thought that he was referring to food. She explained 

that she wasn’t feeling too well and didn’t feel like 

cooking, so she replied “no.” [Appellee] became 

angry at her refusal, turned around, and approached 

her, saying that he “wanted it now.” In fear, she 

backed into a sliding-glass door. [Appellee] then 

grabbed her arms and began to drag her into the 

bedroom, a distance of “10 [to] 15 feet.” [Appellee] 

also smacked her wrists. The victim continued 

yelling and saying “no,” and [Appellee] repeatedly 

said that he “wanted it now.” In vain, she tried to 

pull herself away from [Appellee].

After [Appellee] got her into the bedroom, he 

forced her to perform oral sex on him. [Appellee] 
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raised his hand and yelled at her. She did not want 

to perform oral sex on [Appellee], and only did so 

because of his anger and also out of fear that he 

would hit her. [Appellee’s] penis did enter her 

mouth.

At some point, [Appellee] told the victim to get 

on the bed. During this time, she told [Appellee] to 

stop. When [Appellee] asked her to take off her

pants, she refused. [Appellee] then pulled off her 

pants. [Appellee] then vaginally penetrated her with 

his penis. She did not want to have intercourse with 

[Appellee].

[Appellee] told her that he “want[ed] to get 

[her] pregnant again.” [Appellee] continued having 

intercourse with the victim until he ejaculated. Soon 

after, [Appellee] said that “he didn’t want to do this 

anymore.” [Appellee] then left the victim alone in 

the room. Later, [Appellee] told her that he loved 

her and told her to stop crying. [Appellee] then tried 

to give her a hug. No weapons were used at any 

time by either person.

The victim called 911 from the apartment. She 

then went to Delaware County Memorial Hospital. At 

the hospital, she was examined by a Sexual Assault 

Nurse Examiner. She also gave a statement to a 

detective while at the hospital. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/14, at 1-3 (citations and footnotes omitted).

Appellee was arrested on June 21, 2011, and charged with the 

aforementioned crimes and related offenses. The trial court notes that the 

prosecution proceeded despite the contrary wishes of the victim.

[The victim] immediately began to have doubts 

about reporting what had happened. Several 

months after the incident, the victim said that she 

still cared for [Appellee]. She did not want the case 

to be prosecuted, and she did not want [Appellee] to 

go to prison. She testified that she was told that, 
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because she had called 911, the case had to be 

prosecuted. Consistent with her express wishes, she 

did not appear at the first two scheduled definite 

trials [sic] dates for [Appellee], and only appeared 

the third time because a warrant was issued for her 

arrest.

Id. at 3-4.

At the conclusion of a two-day jury trial held February 20-21, 2013, 

Appellee was convicted of rape, IDSI, and simple assault. Sentencing 

hearings were held on May 24, 2013, and July 12, 2013, at which latter date 

Appellee was sentenced to an aggregate term of 167 days’ to two years less 

one day’s incarceration plus seven years’ consecutive probation. Appellee 

was not determined to be a sexually violent predator but is required to 

register for life under the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act, 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(a)(3).

Prior to sentencing [Appellee], the victim testified on 

[Appellee’s] behalf. Before imposing its sentence, 

the [trial] court considered his psychosexual 

evaluation, presentence investigation, and Megan’s 

Law evaluation. The [trial] court considered the 

nature and seriousness of the crime, [Appellee’s] 

age, his family status, his vocation, his employment 

status, statements from the Commonwealth, 

statements from defense counsel and witnesses, 

[Appellee’s] allocution, and the sentencing 

guidelines. 

Trial Court Opinion at 4 (citations omitted). On July 16, 2013, the 

Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration and modification of 
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sentence.2 The trial court denied the Commonwealth’s motion on October 

4, 2013. Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal on 

November 4, 2013. 

On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following question for our 

review.

Did the sentencing judge abuse his discretion by 

imposing a sentence that was such an extreme 

departure below even the mitigated range of the 

Sentencing Guidelines that it was manifestly 

unreasonable not only because it was not consistent 

with the seriousness or gravity of the offenses 

committed, but also because the court’s reasons for 

going so far outside of the Guidelines did not justify 

such a radical departure[?]

Commonwealth’s Brief at 5.

The Commonwealth’s issue implicates the discretionary aspects of the 

sentence imposed by the trial court in this case. We acknowledge the 

following criteria guiding our review of this question.

The right to appellate review of the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute, 

and must be considered a petition for permission to 

appeal. An appellant must satisfy a four-part test to 

invoke this Court’s jurisdiction when challenging the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence.

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to 

determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely 

____________________________________________

2 Appellee did not file any post-sentence motion but did file a pro se notice 

of appeal on July 19, 2013. That appeal was dismissed on March 5, 2014, 

for failure to file a docketing statement in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 3517. Commonwealth v. Satchell, 3127 EDA 2013 

(Pa. Super. 2014)
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notice of appeal; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider 

and modify sentence; (3) whether appellant’s brief 

has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from 

is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265-1266 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014).

Instantly, the Commonwealth’s appeal is timely filed, and its issue is 

preserved in its motion for reconsideration and modification of sentence. 

Furthermore, the Commonwealth has included in its appellate brief a 

statement of the reasons relied on for appeal of the discretionary aspects of 

the instant sentence pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 

2119(f). We therefore proceed to determine if the Commonwealth has 

advanced a substantial question permitting review.

The determination of what constitutes a substantial 

question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 

A substantial question exists only when the appellant 

advances a colorable argument that the sentencing 

judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a 

specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) 

contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie 

the sentencing process.

Commonwealth v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted), appeal denied, 63 A.3d 774 (Pa. 

2013). “We examine an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement to determine 

whether a substantial question exists. Our inquiry must focus on the 

reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying 
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the appeal, which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.” 

Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d 869, 872 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis in original).

In its Rule 2119(f) statement, the Commonwealth “submits that the 

trial judge abused his discretion by imposing an excessively lenient sentence 

outside of the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 11. It further 

claims the “sentence was not consistent with the seriousness and gravity of 

the felony offenses,” and the trial court “inappropriately relied upon factors 

already integrated in the formulation of the Sentencing Guidelines for the 

standard range, typical case of the same offense.” Id. At 12. The 

Commonwealth also asserts the trial “court also improperly gave defendant 

consideration for factors that, if they had existed, would have placed 

defendant into a higher sentencing guideline range.” Id. These contentions 

raise a substantial question permitting our review. Commonwealth v. 

Daniel, 30 A.3d 494, 497 (Pa. Super. 2011) (holding the Commonwealth’s 

allegations, inter alia, that a sentence “was unreasonably lenient, was 

dependent upon improper factors..., [and] disregarded the serious nature of 

the offenses,” posed a substantial question for review). We therefore 

proceed to a consideration of the merits of the Commonwealth’s appeal.

When reviewing the discretionary aspects of a sentence imposed by a 

trial court, we are heedful of the following principles. “The imposition of 

sentence is vested in the discretion of the trial court, and should not be 
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disturbed on appeal for a mere error of judgment but only for an abuse of 

discretion and a showing that a sentence was manifestly unreasonable.” 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 69 A.3d 735, 740 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 83 A.3d 415 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). “The proper standard of 

review for an appellate court is to focus on the pertinent statutory provisions 

in the Sentencing Code, specifically 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c) and (d), and 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).” Id. at 741 (citation omitted). 

Section 9781 provides in pertinent part as follows.

§ 9781. Appellate review of sentence

...

(c) Determination on appeal.--The appellate court 

shall vacate the sentence and remand the case to 

the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:

...

(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the 

sentencing guidelines and the sentence is 

unreasonable. 

In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the 

sentence imposed by the sentencing court.

(d) Review of record.--In reviewing the record the 

appellate court shall have regard for:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the 

offense and the history and characteristics of 

the defendant. 

(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to 

observe the defendant, including any

presentence investigation. 
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(3) The findings upon which the sentence was 

based. 

(4) The guidelines promulgated by the 

commission.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781. “Thus, the statutory unreasonableness inquiry is a 

component of the jurisprudential standard of review for an abuse of 

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Hoch, 936 A.2d 515, 519 (Pa. Super. 

2007) (citation omitted).

Section 9721 provides in pertinent part as follows.

§ 9721. Sentencing generally

...

(b) General standards.--In selecting from the 

alternatives set forth in subsection (a), the court 

shall follow the general principle that the sentence 

imposed should call for confinement that is 

consistent with the protection of the public, the 

gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on 

the life of the victim and on the community, and the 

rehabilitative needs of the defendant. The court shall 

also consider any guidelines for sentencing and 

resentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania 

Commission on Sentencing.... ... In every case 

where the court imposes a sentence or resentence 

outside the guidelines adopted by the Pennsylvania 

Commission on Sentencing ..., the court shall provide 

a contemporaneous written statement of the reason 

or reasons for the deviation from the guidelines to 

the commission.... Failure to comply shall be 

grounds for vacating the sentence or resentence and 

resentencing the defendant.

...

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). 
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Generally, our review of a sentence [for abuse of 

discretion] is limited [] to whether the sentencing 

court explicitly or implicitly considered the section 

9721(b) factors, and we may not re-weigh the 

significance placed on each factor by the sentencing 

judge. Given such a deferential standard of review, 

our Supreme Court recognized that rejection of a 

sentencing court’s imposition of sentence on 

unreasonableness grounds would occur infrequently.

Williams, supra at 742 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) 

see also Commonwealth v. Jones, 565 A.2d 732, 734 (Pa. 1989) (holding 

that respecting the sentencing “equation, reasonable men can obviously 

differ and thus the law has seized upon the wise decision to give great 

deference to the trial judge’s decision in this area”). “[T]he appellant must 

establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or 

misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.” 

Commonwealth v. Zirkle, --- A.3d ---, 2014 WL 7212598 at *4 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) citing, Hoch, supra at 517–518.3

In fashioning a sentence, the trial court must impose 

a term of confinement consistent with the protection 

of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates 

to the impact of the victim and to the community, 

and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.... 

____________________________________________

3 With respect to its contention that the trial court abused its discretion, the 

Commonwealth acknowledges the trial court was “well-intentioned,” and 

gave “plenty of reasons” for the sentence. Commonwealth’s Brief at 9. We 

are focused, therefore, not on whether the trial court acted for reasons of 

“partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” See Zirkle, supra Rather, we are 

focused on the Commonwealth’s claim that the resulting sentence is 

manifestly unreasonable even in light of the trial court’s reasons. See Id.
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Although the trial court must consider the 

Sentencing Guidelines, the court is not obligated to 

impose a sentence deemed appropriate under the 

Sentencing Guidelines. At the same time, the trial 

court cannot justly sentence a defendant unless it 

possesses sufficient and accurate information about 

the circumstances of the offense and the character of 

the defendant to formulate its judgment. In 

imposing a defendant’s sentence, the trial court must 

state the reasons for the sentence on the record. As 

long as the trial court’s reasons demonstrate 

that it weighed the Sentencing Guidelines with 

the facts of the crime and the defendant’s 

character in a meaningful fashion, the court’s 

sentence should not be disturbed.

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 A.2d 1013, 1018-1019 (Pa. Super. 

2003) (emphasis added), quoting Commonwealth v. Begley, 780 A.2d 

605, 642-643 (Pa. 2001); see also Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 

1280, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding where “the record as a whole reflects 

that the trial court considered the facts of the crime and character of 

Appellant in making its determination, we cannot re-weigh the sentencing 

factors to achieve a different result”), appeal denied, 13 A.3d 475 (Pa. 

2010). “Even with the advent of the sentencing guidelines, the power of 

sentencing is a function to be performed by the sentencing court. Thus, 

rather than cabin the exercise of a sentencing court’s discretion, the 

guidelines merely inform the sentencing decision.” Commonwealth v. 

Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961-962 (Pa. 2007) (citations and footnote omitted).

Instantly, the Commonwealth claims the trial court’s reference to the 

particular circumstances of this case as distinguishing it from other rape 
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cases “mistakenly removed this case from the heartland (to borrow a federal 

term) of the typical domestic rape case embodying the conduct that the 

guideline range describes.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 15. The 

Commonwealth asserts that, “[a]lmost every case of domestic violence or 

domestic sexual assault involves the same dynamic.” Id. “The 

Commonwealth submits that the case at bar was typical of the domestic 

rapes that are encompassed in the Sentencing Guidelines.” Id. “Moreover, 

a number of factors relied upon by the court are neither valid nor have any 

legal efficacy to differentiate this case from the typical conduct associated 

with a domestic Rape/Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse prosecution.” 

Id. at 17-18.

It is undisputed the trial court considered the sentencing guideline 

recommendations in this case. Commonwealth’s Brief at 9. The trial court 

notes that it “is in no way diminishing the seriousness of [Appellee’s] crimes” 

by remarking on the particular circumstances of the case, especially the 

personal history between Appellee and the victim, the victim’s support for 

Appellee at sentencing, the mutual desire for potential reconciliation, and the 

insights offered by the psycho-sexual evaluation of Appellee. Trial Court 

Opinion, 3/10/14, at 14. In compliance with Section 9721, the trial court 

assessed the “gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of 

the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the 

defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) (emphasis added). 
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We disagree with the Commonwealth’s assertion that the trial court’s 

considerations of the history and relationship between Appellee and the 

victim made this a “lesser rape” than other scenarios mentioned by the trial 

court. Commonwealth’s Brief at 20. Rather, the trial court was properly 

assessing the seriousness of the offense in relation to the other statutory 

sentencing concerns. For example, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court 

admonished Appellee about the seriousness of his offense. “Rape, by 

definition, is a serious offense. You asked the [victim] for sex, and she said 

no. Then you dragged her by her arms to your bed.” N.T., 7/12/13, at 9. 

However, the trial court also noted the particular circumstances of the 

offense, e.g. that the offense was in the nature of domestic violence in the 

shadow of the personal tragedy of the victim’s earlier miscarriage. Trial 

Court Opinion, 3/10/14, at 13. This was not meant to diminish the 

seriousness of the offense as claimed by the Commonwealth, but to provide 

context for weighing the seriousness of the offense against the other 

sentencing considerations. 

Thus the trial court noted the attitude of the victim, who supported 

leniency at sentencing.

The victim testified that she does not want anything 

bad to happen to [Appellee]. She said the same 

thing prior to trial in a notarized letter to the Court. 

She wrote that she, “cares about his well being, and 

does not want to see his life ruined behind bars from 

never getting the help that was desperately needed.” 

She expressly wrote that she, “did not want 

[Appellee] to do any jail time.”
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N.T. 7/12/13, at 5. The trial court also observed the sincerity and 

intelligence of the victim, noting she was not experiencing “battered victims 

syndrome” in which some individuals persist in self-destructive choices. Id. 

at 7-8. 

The trial court also reviewed the numerous character witnesses 

attesting to Appellee’s good character. “Going to the history and character 

of [Appellee], ... by the victim’s own statements, [Appellee] is a good person 

who made a bad choice, in fact, a criminal choice. This -- his character was 

corroborated by numerous sentencing witnesses.” Id. at 10. These 

witnesses also indicated that Appellee has an extensive support network in 

the community that even the Commonwealth conceded at the sentencing 

hearing.

[BY THE ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY]

He has a whole side of the courtroom here who are 

going to help him set up a parole plan.

...

I’m confident and more than anything else in this 

case that these people will be able to provide, these 

good people will be able to provide him a place once 

he’s paroled. I don’t think that should be a concern 

for the Court at all.

Id. at 54.

The trial court, further commented on its own observations of 

Appellee.
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Now another factor, the [trial c]ourt had the 

opportunity to observe [Appellee]. And that’s a fact 

the [trial c]ourt must consider. The [trial c]ourt did 

observe [Appellee] at trial and sentencing. Though 

the Commonwealth argued at sentencing that he was 

– [Appellee] was feigning remorse, the [trial c]ourt 

feels otherwise.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/14, at 11. The Commonwealth, in its brief, now 

“accepts that there is a basis for the [trial] court’s perspective on the 

showing of remorse.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 17. 

Finally, the trial court noted the results of the psycho-sexual report of 

Appellee prepared by Dr. Surbeck. “[The trial] court has read many 

evaluations by Dr. Surbeck, and has found that she favors extensive postsentence restrictions. In the case sub judice, however, Dr. Surbeck’s 

evaluation was to a certain extent favorable to [Appellee].” Trial Court 

Opinion, 3/10/14, at 18. The trial court particularly noted “[Appellee] can 

receive counseling, as Dr. Surbeck said, on the street [], and I think -- he 

can get the counseling he needs, the counseling, the victim[] believes that 

he needs so much.” N.T., 7/12/13, at 9.

Weighing all these legitimate and statutorily required factors, the trial 

court concluded “that [Appellee] is [not] such a threat to community that 

would require a -- the prolonged incarceration asked for by the 

Commonwealth, and that otherwise could not be addressed by the jeopardy 

of a long prison sentence while he is on supervision, as a result of any future 

violations.” Id. at 10-11. 
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That the Commonwealth, or indeed that this Court, might weigh those 

considerations differently is no basis for a determination that the trial court 

abused its discretion. See Crump, supra; Walls, supra at 966 (holding 

the trial court’s generalized statements about the nature of an offense did 

not preclude a finding based on the record, as a whole, that the trial court 

imposed the required individualized sentence). 

The Commonwealth also claims the trial court relied on factors that do 

not support mitigation, as they are factors already subsumed in the 

sentencing guidelines or are collateral consequences. Commonwealth’s Brief 

at 9. “Hence, the fact that a 24 year old man has no prior convictions 

would not be a reason to go outside of the standard guidelines sentencing 

range because it has already been counted in the defendant’s favor in 

arriving at the applicable guidelines.” Id. at 17. “Clearly, the requirement 

that defendant is a lifetime registrant provides no justification for an 

extreme downward departure and imposition of a sentence outside of the 

Sentencing Guidelines.” Id. at 19. “[Appellee] should not get double 

consideration regarding his lack of prior convictions.” Id. “The 

Commonwealth recognizes and respects the trial court’s broad discretion in 

sentencing. However, this is not simply a case where the court weighed the 

appropriate sentencing factors, but chose to emphasize certain factors more 

heavily than others.” Id. at 21. We disagree.
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 We do not conclude the trial court “double counted” guideline 

considerations when it departed from the guidelines. Its mention of 

Appellee’s prior record, the fact no weapon was employed, and the SORNA 

consequences was, as noted above, to describe the particular circumstances 

of the case. The Commonwealth parses individual comments made by the 

trial court out of context to justify a reweighing of the sentencing factors 

rather than viewing the trial court’s entire analysis in light of the whole 

record.

The fallacy of the Commonwealth’s arguments is in supposing that 

each observation or consideration by the trial court was an attempt to 

distinguish and or mitigate Appellee’s crime, where most of the 

considerations concerned the rehabilitative needs of Appellee and the impact 

of the crime of the victim and the community in light of the particular 

circumstances of the offense. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/14, 10-15. In 

reviewing the reasonableness of the trial court’s sentence under the factors 

of Section 9781(d), the circumstances of the offense and character of 

Appellee, the opportunity of the trial court to observe Appellee and review all 

relevant considerations, the trial court’s findings and the sentencing 

guidelines, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court. See

Anderson, supra; Crump, supra. Neither do we conclude the sentence is 

manifestly unreasonable in light of the entire record, including the position of 

the victim, the results of the psycho-sexual evaluation by Dr. Surbeck, the 
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contrition displayed by Appellee, and the circumstances of the crime. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s July 12, 2013 judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Donohue joins the memorandum.

Judge Stabile files a dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/9/2015