I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3155 

To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within the United 

Nations system, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 19, 2013 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within 

the United Nations system, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

5 ‘‘United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Re6 form Act of 2013’’. 

7 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents is 

8 as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Definitions. 

TITLE I—FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS 


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Sec. 101. Findings. 

Sec. 102. Apportionment of the United Nations regular budget on a voluntary 

basis. 

Sec. 103. Budget justification for United States contributions to the regular 

budget of the United Nations. 

Sec. 104. Report on United Nations reform. 

TITLE II—TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED 

STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS 

Sec. 201. Findings. 

Sec. 202. Definitions. 

Sec. 203. Oversight of United States contributions to the United Nations System. 

Sec. 204. Transparency for United States contributions. 

Sec. 205. Integrity for United States contributions. 

Sec. 206. Refund of monies owed by the United Nations to the United States. 

Sec. 207. Annual reports on United States contributions to the United Nations. 

Sec. 208. Report on United Nations procurement practices. 

TITLE III—UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS 

Sec. 301. Annual publication. 

Sec. 302. Annual financial disclosure. 

Sec. 303. Policy with respect to expansion of the Security Council. 

Sec. 304. Access to reports and audits. 

Sec. 305. Waiver of immunity. 

Sec. 306. Terrorism and the United Nations. 

Sec. 307. Report on United Nations personnel. 

Sec. 308. United Nations treaty bodies. 

Sec. 309. Equality at the United Nations. 

Sec. 310. Anti-Semitism and the United Nations. 

Sec. 311. Regional group inclusion of Israel. 

Sec. 312. United States policy on Taiwan’s participation in United Nations entities. 

Sec. 313. United States policy on Tier 3 human rights violators. 

TITLE IV—STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES AT THE UNITED 

NATIONS 

Sec. 401. Findings. 

Sec. 402. Statement of policy. 

Sec. 403. Implementation. 

TITLE V—UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 

Sec. 501. Findings. 

Sec. 502. Human rights council membership and funding. 

TITLE VI—GOLDSTONE REPORT 

Sec. 601. Findings. 

Sec. 602. Statement of policy. 

Sec. 603. Withholding of funds; refund of United States taxpayer dollars. 

TITLE VII—DURBAN PROCESS 

Sec. 701. Findings. 


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Sec. 702. Sense of Congress; statement of policy. 

Sec. 703. Non-participation in the durban process. 

Sec. 704. Withholding of funds; refund of United States taxpayer dollars. 

TITLE VIII—UNRWA 

Sec. 801. Findings. 

Sec. 802. United States contributions to UNRWA. 

Sec. 803. Sense of Congress. 

TITLE IX—INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

Sec. 901. Technical cooperation program. 

Sec. 902. United States policy at the IAEA. 

Sec. 903. Sense of Congress regarding the Nuclear Security Action Plan of the 

IAEA. 

TITLE X—PEACEKEEPING 

Sec. 1001. Reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations. 

Sec. 1002. Policy relating to reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations. 

Sec. 1003. Certification. 

1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

2 In this Act: 

3 (1) EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘‘employee’’ means 

4 an individual who is employed in the general serv5 ices, professional staff, or senior management of the 

6 United Nations, including consultants, contractors, 

7 and subcontractors. 

8 (2) GENERAL ASSEMBLY.—The term ‘‘General 

9 Assembly’’ means the General Assembly of the 

10 United Nations. 

11 (3) MEMBER STATE.—The term ‘‘Member 

12 State’’ means a Member State of the United Na13 tions. Such term is synonymous with the term 

14 ‘‘country’’. 

15 (4) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 

16 the Secretary of State. 


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1 (5) SECRETARY GENERAL.—The term ‘‘Sec2 retary General’’ means the Secretary General of the 

3 United Nations. 

4 (6) SECURITY COUNCIL.—The term ‘‘Security 

5 Council’’ means the Security Council of the United 

6 Nations. 

7 (7) UN.—The term ‘‘UN’’ means the United 

8 Nations. 

9 (8) UNITED NATIONS ENTITY.—The term 

10 ‘‘United Nations Entity’’ means any United Nations 

11 agency, commission, conference, council, court, de12 partment, forum, fund, institute, office, organiza13 tion, partnership, program, subsidiary body, tri14 bunal, trust, university or academic body, related or15 ganization or subsidiary body, wherever located, that 

16 flies the United Nations flag or is authorized to use 

17 the United Nations logo, including those United Na18 tions affiliated agencies and bodies identified as re19 cipients of United States contributions under section 

20 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense 

21 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 

22 109–364), but not including the International Bank 

23 for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter24 national Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis25 putes, the International Development Association, 


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1 the International Finance Corporation, the Multilat2 eral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the World 

3 Trade Organization. 

4 (9) UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.—The term 

5 ‘‘United Nations System’’ means the aggregation of 

6 all United Nations Entities, as defined in paragraph 

7 (8). 

8 (10) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTION.—The 

9 term ‘‘United States Contribution’’ means an as10 sessed or voluntary contribution, whether financial, 

11 in-kind, or otherwise, from the United States Fed12 eral Government to a United Nations Entity, includ13 ing contributions passed through other entities for 

14 ultimate use by a United Nations Entity. United 

15 States Contributions include those contributions 

16 identified pursuant to section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the 

17 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act 

18 for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364). 

19 (11) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT20 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com21 mittees’’ means— 

22 (A) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, 

23 Appropriations, and Oversight and Government 

24 Reform of the House of Representatives; and 


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1 (B) the Committees on Foreign Relations, 

2 Appropriations, and Homeland Security and 

3 Governmental Affairs of the Senate. 

4 TITLE I—FUNDING OF THE 

5 UNITED NATIONS 

6 SEC. 101. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 

8 (1) The United States pays billions of dollars 

9 into the United Nations system every year (almost 

10 $7,700,000,000 in 2010, according to the White 

11 House Office of Management and Budget), signifi12 cantly more than any other nation. 

13 (2) Under current rules and contribution levels, 

14 it is possible to assemble the two-thirds majority 

15 needed for important United Nations budget votes 

16 with a group of countries that, taken together, pay 

17 less than 1 percent of the total United Nations reg18 ular budget. 

19 (3) The disconnect between contribution levels 

20 and management control creates significant perverse 

21 incentives in terms of United Nations spending, 

22 transparency, and accountability. 

23 (4) The United Nations system suffers from 

24 unacceptably high levels of waste, fraud, and abuse, 


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1 which seriously impair its ability to fulfill the lofty 

2 ideals of its founding. 

3 (5) Amidst the continuing financial, corruption, 

4 and sexual abuse scandals of the past several years, 

5 American public disapproval of United Nations has 

6 reached all-time highs. A 2013 Gallup poll revealed 

7 that 50 percent of Americans believe that the United 

8 Nations is doing a poor job, a negative assessment 

9 shared by a majority of respondents from both polit10 ical parties. 

11 (6) Significant improvements in United Nations 

12 transparency and accountability are necessary for 

13 improving public perceptions of American support 

14 for United Nations operations. 

15 (7) Because of their need to justify future con16 tributions from donors, voluntarily funded organiza17 tions have more incentive to be responsive and effi18 cient in their operations than organizations funded 

19 by compulsory contributions that are not tied to per20 formance. 

21 (8) Catherine Bertini, the former United Na22 tions Under-Secretary General for Management and 

23 director of the World Food Program (WFP), has 

24 stated that ‘‘Voluntary funding creates an entirely 

25 different atmosphere at WFP than at the UN. At 


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1 WFP, every staff member knows that we have to be 

2 as efficient, accountable, transparent, and results3 oriented as possible. If we are not, donor govern4 ments can take their funding elsewhere in a very 

5 competitive world among UN agencies, NGOs, and 

6 bilateral governments.’’. 

7 (9) Article XVII of the Charter of the United 

8 Nations, which states that ‘‘[t]he expenses of the 

9 Organization shall be borne by the Members as ap10 portioned by the General Assembly’’, leaves to the 

11 discretion of the General Assembly the basis of ap12 portionment, which could be done on the basis of 

13 voluntary pledges by Member States. 

14 (10) Unlike United States assessed contribu15 tions to the United Nations regular budget, which 

16 are statutorily capped at 22 percent of the total, 

17 there is no cap on voluntary contributions. 

18 (11) The United States, which contributes gen19 erously to international organizations whose activi20 ties it recognizes as credible, worthwhile, and effi21 cient, contributes more than 22 percent of the budg22 et of certain voluntarily funded United Nations Spe23 cialized Agencies. 

24 (12) John Bolton, Former United States Per25 manent Representative to the United Nations, has 


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1 stated that ‘‘Moving to voluntary funding would end 

2 the UN practice of charging member states for the 

3 expenses of the UN and its activities. Member states 

4 would instead determine for themselves how much to 

5 provide to the UN and, importantly, the specific 

6 tasks and activities that those contributions would 

7 support. The shift toward a voluntary payment sys8 tem would impose a stronger market incentive for 

9 UN programs and activities to meet their goals and 

10 justify continued funding.’’. 

11 SEC. 102. APPORTIONMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS REG12 ULAR BUDGET ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS. 

13 (a) UNITED STATES POLICY.— 

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United 

15 States to seek to shift the funding mechanism for 

16 the regular budget of the United Nations from an 

17 assessed to a voluntary basis. 

18 (2) ACTION AT UNITED NATIONS.—The Presi19 dent shall direct the United States Permanent Rep20 resentative to the United Nations to use the voice, 

21 vote, and influence of the United States at the 

22 United Nations to shift the funding mechanism for 

23 the regular budget of the United Nations to a vol24 untary basis, and to make it a priority to build sup25 port for such a transformational change among 


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1 Member States, particularly key United Nations do2 nors. 

3 (b) CERTIFICATION OF PREDOMINANTLY VOL4 UNTARY UN REGULAR BUDGET FINDING.—A certifi5 cation described in this section is a certification by the 

6 Secretary of State to the Appropriate Congressional Com7 mittees that at least 80 percent of the total regular budget 

8 (not including extra-budgetary contributions) of the 

9 United Nations is apportioned on a voluntary basis. Each 

10 such certification shall be effective for a period of not more 

11 than 1 year, and shall be promptly revoked by the Sec12 retary, with notice to the appropriate congressional com13 mittees, if the underlying circumstances change so as not 

14 to warrant such certification. 

15 (c) WITHHOLDING OF NONVOLUNTARY CONTRIBU16 TIONS.— 

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—Beginning 2 years after the 

18 effective date of this Act and notwithstanding any 

19 other provision of law, no funds may be obligated or 

20 expended for a United States assessed contribution 

21 to the regular budget of the United Nations in an 

22 amount greater than 50 percent of the United 

23 States share of assessed contributions for the reg24 ular budget of the United Nations unless there is in 


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1 effect a certification by the Secretary, as described 

2 in subsection (b). 

3 (2) ALLOWANCE.—For a period of 1 year after 

4 appropriation, funds appropriated for use as a 

5 United States contribution to the regular budget of 

6 the United Nations but withheld from obligation and 

7 expenditure pursuant to paragraph (1) may be obli8 gated and expended for that purpose upon the cer9 tification described in subsection (b). After 1 year, 

10 in the absence of such certification, those funds shall 

11 revert to the United States Treasury. 

12 SEC. 103. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR UNITED STATES 

13 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE REGULAR BUDGET 

14 OF THE UNITED NATIONS. 

15 (a) DETAILED ITEMIZATION.—The annual congres16 sional budget justification shall include a detailed itemized 

17 request in support of the contribution of the United States 

18 to the regular budget of the United Nations. 

19 (b) CONTENTS OF DETAILED ITEMIZATION.—The 

20 detailed itemization required under subsection (a) shall— 

21 (1) contain information relating to the amounts 

22 requested in support of each of the various sections 

23 and titles of the regular budget of the United Na24 tions; and 


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1 (2) compare the amounts requested for the cur2 rent year with the actual or estimated amounts con3 tributed by the United States in previous fiscal years 

4 for the same sections and titles. 

5 (c) ADJUSTMENTS AND NOTIFICATION.—If the 

6 United Nations proposes an adjustment to its regular as7 sessed budget, the Secretary of State shall, at the time 

8 such adjustment is presented to the Advisory Committee 

9 on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), 

10 notify and consult with the appropriate congressional com11 mittees. 

12 SEC. 104. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM. 

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

14 date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, 

15 the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congres16 sional committees a report on United Nations reform. 

17 (b) CONTENTS.—The report required under sub18 section (a) shall describe— 

19 (1) progress toward the goal of shifting the 

20 funding for the United Nations Regular Budget to 

21 a voluntary basis as identified in section 102, and a 

22 detailed description of efforts and activities by 

23 United States diplomats and officials toward that 

24 end; 


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1 (2) progress toward each of the policy goals 

2 identified in the prior sections of this title, and a de3 tailed, goal-specific description of efforts and activi4 ties by United States diplomats and officials toward 

5 those ends; 

6 (3) the status of the implementation of manage7 ment reforms within the United Nations and its spe8 cialized agencies; 

9 (4) the number of outputs, reports, or other 

10 mandates generated by General Assembly resolutions 

11 that have been eliminated; 

12 (5) the progress of the General Assembly to 

13 modernize and streamline the committee structure 

14 and its specific recommendations on oversight and 

15 committee outputs, consistent with the March 2005 

16 report of the Secretary General entitled ‘‘In larger 

17 freedom: towards development, security and human 

18 rights for all’’; 

19 (6) the status of the review by the General As20 sembly of all mandates older than 5 years and how 

21 resources have been redirected to new challenges, 

22 consistent with such March 2005 report of the Sec23 retary General; 

24 (7) the continued utility and relevance of the 

25 Economic and Financial Committee and the Social, 


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1 Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee, in light of 

2 the duplicative agendas of those committees and the 

3 Economic and Social Council; and 

4 (8) whether the United Nations or any of its 

5 specialized agencies has contracted with any party 

6 included on the Lists of Parties Excluded from Fed7 eral Procurement and Nonprocurement Programs. 

8 TITLE II—TRANSPARENCY AND 

9 ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 

10 UNITED STATES CONTRIBU11 TIONS TO THE UNITED NA12 TIONS 

13 SEC. 201. FINDINGS. 

14 Congress makes the following findings: 

15 (1) As underscored by continuing revelations of 

16 waste, fraud, and abuse, oversight and account17 ability mechanisms within the United Nations sys18 tem remain significantly deficient, despite decades of 

19 reform attempts, including those initiated by Secre20 taries General of the United Nations. 

21 (2) Notwithstanding the personal intentions of 

22 any Secretary General of the United Nations to pro23 mote institutional transparency and accountability 

24 within the United Nations System, the Secretary 

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1 agement reforms without the concurrence of the 

2 General Assembly. 

3 (3) Groupings of Member States whose voting 

4 power in the General Assembly significantly out5 paces their proportional contributions to the United 

6 Nations system have repeatedly and successfully de7 feated, delayed, and diluted various reform proposals 

8 that would have enabled more detailed oversight and 

9 scrutiny of United Nations system operations and 

10 expenditures. 

11 (4) To an unacceptable degree, major donor 

12 states, including the United States, lack access to 

13 reasonably detailed, reliable information that would 

14 allow them to determine how their contributions 

15 have been spent by various United Nations system 

16 entities, further contributing to the lack of account17 ability within the United Nations system. 

18 SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS. 

19 In this title: 

20 (1) TRANSPARENCY CERTIFICATION.—The term 

21 ‘‘Transparency Certification’’ means an annual, 

22 written affirmation by the head or authorized des23 ignee of a United Nations Entity, provided to the 

24 Department of State, that the Entity will cooperate 

25 with the Department of State and Congress, includVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:31 Sep 28, 2013 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3155.IH H3155

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1 ing by providing the Department of State and Con2 gress with full, complete, and unfettered access to 

3 Oversight Information as defined in this title. 

4 (2) OVERSIGHT INFORMATION.—The term 

5 ‘‘Oversight Information’’ includes— 

6 (A) internally and externally commissioned 

7 audits, investigatory reports, program reviews, 

8 performance reports, and evaluations; 

9 (B) financial statements, records, and bill10 ing systems; 

11 (C) program budgets and program budget 

12 implications, including revised estimates and re13 ports produced by or provided to the Secretary 

14 General and the Secretary General’s agents on 

15 budget related matters; 

16 (D) operational plans, budgets, and budg17 etary analyses for peacekeeping operations; 

18 (E) analyses and reports regarding the 

19 scale of assessments; 

20 (F) databases and other data systems con21 taining financial or programmatic information; 

22 (G) documents or other records alleging or 

23 involving improper use of resources, mis24 conduct, mismanagement, or other violations of 


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1 rules and regulations applicable to the United 

2 Nations Entity; and 

3 (H) other documentation relevant to the 

4 oversight work of Congress with respect to 

5 United States contributions to the United Na6 tions system. 

7 (3) ACCOUNTABILITY CERTIFICATION.—The 

8 term ‘‘Accountability Certification’’ means an an9 nual, written affirmation by the head or authorized 

10 designee of a United Nations Entity provided to the 

11 Secretary of State that the Entity— 

12 (A) provides the public with full, complete, 

13 and unfettered access to all relevant docu14 mentation relating to operations and activities, 

15 including budget and procurement activities; 

16 (B) implements and upholds policies and 

17 procedures to protect whistleblowers; 

18 (C) implements and upholds policies and 

19 procedures to require the filing of individual an20 nual financial disclosure forms by each of its 

21 employees at the P–5 level and above and to re22 quire that such forms be made available to the 

23 Office of Internal Oversight Services, to Mem24 ber States, and to the public; 


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1 (D) has established an effective ethics of2 fice; 

3 (E) has established a fully independent, 

4 autonomous, and effective internal oversight 

5 body; 

6 (F) has adopted and implemented, and is 

7 in full compliance with, International Public 

8 Sector Accounting Standards; and 

9 (G) has established a cap on its adminis10 trative overhead costs. 

11 SEC. 203. OVERSIGHT OF UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS 

12 TO THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM. 

13 (a) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to en14 hance oversight of United States contributions to the 

15 United Nations System and the use of those contributions 

16 by United Nations Entities, in an effort to eliminate and 

17 deter waste, fraud, and abuse in the use of those contribu18 tions, and thereby to contribute to the development of 

19 greater transparency, accountability, and internal controls 

20 throughout the United Nations System. 

21 (b) IMPLEMENTATION.— 

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Department of State 

23 shall collect and maintain current records regarding 

24 Transparency Certifications and Accountability Cer25 tifications by all United Nations Entities that reVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:31 Sep 28, 2013 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3155.IH H3155

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1 ceive United States contributions and submit that 

2 information for inclusion in the report required 

3 under section 207. 

4 (2) NOTIFICATION.—The Department of State 

5 shall keep the appropriate congressional committees 

6 fully and promptly informed of how United Nations 

7 Entities are spending United States contributions. 

8 (3) REFERRALS.— 

9 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State 

10 shall promptly report to the Attorney General 

11 and to the appropriate congressional commit12 tees when the Secretary of State has reasonable 

13 grounds to believe a Federal criminal law has 

14 been violated by a United Nations Entity or one 

15 of its employees, contractors, or representatives. 

16 (B) NOTIFICATION.—The Secretary of 

17 State shall promptly report, when appropriate, 

18 to the appropriate congressional committees, 

19 and to the Secretary General or to the head of 

20 the appropriate United Nations Entity, cases in 

21 which the Secretary of State reasonably believes 

22 that mismanagement, misfeasance, or malfea23 sance is likely to have taken place within a 

24 United Nations Entity and disciplinary pro25 ceedings are likely justified. 


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1 (4) CONFIRMATION OF TRANSPARENCY BY

2 UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES.— 

3 (A) PROMPT NOTICE BY DEPARTMENT OF

4 STATE.—Whenever information or assistance 

5 requested from a United Nations Entity by the 

6 Department of State pursuant to a Trans7 parency Certification is, in the opinion of the 

8 Secretary of State, unreasonably refused or not 

9 provided in a timely manner, the Secretary of 

10 State shall notify the appropriate congressional 

11 committees, the head of that particular United 

12 Nations Entity, and the Secretary General of 

13 the circumstances in writing, without delay. 

14 (B) NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE.—If and 

15 when the information or assistance being 

16 sought by the Department of State in connec17 tion with a notification pursuant to subpara18 graph (A) is provided to the satisfaction of the 

19 Secretary of State, the Secretary of State shall 

20 so notify in writing to the appropriate congres21 sional committees and the head of that par22 ticular United Nations Entity. 

23 (C) NONCOMPLIANCE.—If the information 

24 or assistance being sought by the Department 

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1 ant to subparagraph (A) is not provided within 

2 90 days of that notification, then the United 

3 Nations Entity that is the subject of the notifi4 cation is deemed to be noncompliant with its 

5 Transparency Certification. 

6 (D) RESTORATION OF COMPLIANCE.— 

7 After the situation has been resolved to the sat8 isfaction of the Secretary of State, the Sec9 retary of State shall promptly provide prompt, 

10 written notification of that fact and of the res11 toration of compliance, along with a description 

12 of the basis for the Secretary of State’s deci13 sion, to the appropriate congressional commit14 tees, the head of that United Nations Entity, 

15 the Secretary General, and any office or agency 

16 of the Federal Government that has provided 

17 that United Nations Entity with any United 

18 States contribution during the prior 2 years. 

19 (5) CONFIRMATION OF ACCOUNTABILITY BY

20 UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES.— 

21 (A) PROMPT NOTICE BY SECRETARY OF

22 STATE.—Whenever a United Nations Entity 

23 that has provided an Accountability Certifi24 cation is, in the opinion of the Secretary of 

25 State, not in full compliance with any or all of 


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1 the provisions of that certification, the Sec2 retary of State shall notify the appropriate con3 gressional committees, the head of that par4 ticular United Nations Entity, and the Sec5 retary General of the circumstances in writing, 

6 without delay. 

7 (B) NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE.—If and 

8 when the United Nations Entity resumes full 

9 compliance with its Accountability Certification 

10 following the provision of the notification pursu11 ant to subparagraph (A), the Secretary of State 

12 shall so notify in writing the appropriate con13 gressional committees and the head of that 

14 United Nations Entity. 

15 (C) NONCOMPLIANCE.—If the United Na16 tions Entity named in the notification in sub17 paragraph (A) does not resume full compliance 

18 with its Accountability Certification to the sat19 isfaction of the Secretary of State within 90 

20 days of that notification, then the United Na21 tions Entity that is the subject of the notifica22 tion is deemed to be noncompliant with its Ac23 countability Certification, and the Secretary of 

24 State shall provide prompt, written notification 

25 of that fact to the appropriate congressional 


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1 committees, the head of that United Nations 

2 Entity, the Secretary General, and any office or 

3 agency of the Federal Government that has 

4 provided that United Nations Entity with any 

5 United States Contribution during the prior 2 

6 years. 

7 (D) RESTORATION OF COMPLIANCE.— 

8 After the situation has been resolved to the sat9 isfaction of the Secretary of State, the Sec10 retary of State shall promptly provide prompt, 

11 written notification of that fact and of the res12 toration of compliance, along with a description 

13 of the basis for the Secretary of State’s deci14 sion, to the appropriate congressional commit15 tees, the head of that United Nations Entity, 

16 the Secretary General, and any office or agency 

17 of the Federal Government that has provided 

18 that United Nations Entity with any United 

19 States contribution during the prior 2 years. 

20 (6) REPORTING.— 

21 (A) REPORTING.—In the report submitted 

22 by the Director of the Office of Management 

23 and Budget to Congress pursuant to section 

24 207, the Secretary of State shall submit for in25 clusion a section that, among other things, inVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:31 Sep 28, 2013 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3155.IH H3155

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1 cludes a list and detailed description of the cir2 cumstances surrounding any notification of 

3 compliance issued pursuant to paragraph (4)(C) 

4 or (5)(C) during the covered timeframe, and 

5 whether and when the Secretary has reversed 

6 such finding of noncompliance. 

7 (B) PROHIBITED DISCLOSURES.—Nothing 

8 in this subsection shall be construed to author9 ize the public disclosure of information that 

10 is— 

11 (i) specifically prohibited from disclo12 sure by any other provision of law; 

13 (ii) specifically required by Executive 

14 order to be protected from disclosure in 

15 the interest of national defense or national 

16 security or in the conduct of foreign af17 fairs; or 

18 (iii) a part of an ongoing criminal in19 vestigation. 

20 (C) PRIVACY PROTECTIONS.—The Sec21 retary of State shall exempt from public disclo22 sure information received from a United Na23 tions Entity that the Secretary of State be24 lieves— 


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1 (i) constitutes a trade secret or privi2 leged and confidential personal financial 

3 information; 

4 (ii) constitutes confidential personal 

5 medical information; 

6 (iii) accuses a particular person of a 

7 crime; 

8 (iv) would, if publicly disclosed, con9 stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 

10 personal privacy; and 

11 (v) would compromise an ongoing law 

12 enforcement investigation or judicial trial 

13 in the United States. 

14 SEC. 204. TRANSPARENCY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBU15 TIONS. 

16 (a) FUNDING PREREQUISITES.—Notwithstanding 

17 any other provision of law, no funds made available for 

18 use as a United States Contribution to any United Na19 tions Entity may be obligated or expended if— 

20 (1) the intended United Nations Entity recipi21 ent has not provided to the Secretary of State within 

22 the preceding year a Transparency Certification as 

23 defined in section 202(1); 


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1 (2) the intended United Nations Entity recipi2 ent is noncompliant with its Transparency Certifi3 cation as described in section 203(b)(4)(C); 

4 (3) the intended United Nations Entity recipi5 ent has not provided to the Secretary of State within 

6 the preceding year an Accountability Certification as 

7 defined in section 202(3); or 

8 (4) the intended United Nations Entity is non9 compliant with its Accountability Certification as de10 scribed in section 203(b)(5)(C). 

11 (b) TREATMENT OF FUNDS WITHHELD FOR NON12 COMPLIANCE.—At the conclusion of each fiscal year, any 

13 funds that had been appropriated for use as a United 

14 States Contribution to a United Nations Entity during 

15 that fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended 

16 because of the restrictions of subsection (a), shall be re17 turned to the United States Treasury, and are not subject 

18 to reprogramming for any other use. Any such funds re19 turned to the Treasury shall not be considered arrears to 

20 be repaid to any United Nations Entity. 

21 (c) PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER.—The President may 

22 waive the limitations of this subsection with respect to a 

23 particular United States Contribution to a particular 

24 United Nations Entity within a single fiscal year if the 

25 President determines that failure to do so would pose an 


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1 extraordinary threat to the national security of the United 

2 States and provides notification and explanation of that 

3 determination to the appropriate congressional commit4 tees. 

5 SEC. 205. INTEGRITY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBU6 TIONS. 

7 (a) LIMITATION.—(1) No funds made available for 

8 use under the heading ‘‘Contributions to International Or9 ganizations’’ may be used for any purpose other than an 

10 assessed United States contribution to a United Nations 

11 Entity or other international organization. 

12 (2) No funds made available for use under the head13 ing ‘‘International Organizations and Programs’’ may be 

14 used for any purpose other than a voluntary United States 

15 contribution to a United Nations Entity or other inter16 national organization. 

17 (3) No funds made available for use under the head18 ing ‘‘Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activi19 ties’’ may be used for any purpose other than a United 

20 States contribution to United Nations peacekeeping activi21 ties, to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 

22 Yugoslavia, or to the International Criminal Tribunal for 

23 Rwanda. 

24 (b) TREATMENT OF FUNDS WITHHELD FOR NON25 COMPLIANCE.—At the conclusion of each fiscal year, any 


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1 funds that had been appropriated for use as a United 

2 States contribution to a United Nations Entity during 

3 that fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended 

4 because of the restrictions of subsection (a), shall be re5 turned to the United States Treasury, and are not subject 

6 to reprogramming for any other use. Any such funds re7 turned to the Treasury shall not be considered arrears to 

8 be repaid to any United Nations Entity. 

9 SEC. 206. REFUND OF MONIES OWED BY THE UNITED NA10 TIONS TO THE UNITED STATES. 

11 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find12 ings: 

13 (1) United States taxpayer funds overpaid to 

14 United Nations Entities and payable back to the 

15 United States sometimes remain in the hands of the 

16 United Nations because the United States has not 

17 requested the return of those funds. 

18 (2) Such funds have been paid into, among 

19 other United Nations Entities, the United Nations 

20 Tax Equalization Fund (TEF), which was estab21 lished under the provisions of United Nations Gen22 eral Assembly Resolution 973 (1955), and which is 

23 used to reimburse United Nations staff members 

24 subject to United States income taxes for the cost 

25 of those taxes. 


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1 (3) In recent years, the TEF has taken in con2 siderably more money than it has paid out, with the 

3 United States apparently overpaying into the TEF 

4 by $52,200,000 in the 2008–2009 timeframe alone. 

5 (4) According to the United Nations Financial 

6 Report and Audited Financial Statements released 

7 on July 29, 2010, ‘‘As of 31 December 2009, an 

8 amount of $179.0 million was payable to the United 

9 States of America pending instructions as to its dis10 position.’’. 

11 (5) That balance was allowed to accrue notwith12 standing United Nations Financial Regulation 4.12, 

13 which states that any such surpluses ‘‘shall be cred14 ited against the assessed contributions due from that 

15 Member State the following year.’’. 

16 (6) Allowing the United Nations to regularly 

17 overcharge the United States and to retain those 

18 overpayments, or to spend them on wholly unrelated 

19 activities, is a disservice to American taxpayers and 

20 a subversion of the Congressional budget process. 

21 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

22 United States— 

23 (1) to annually instruct the United Nations to 

24 return to the United States any surplus assessed 


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1 contributions or other overpayments by the United 

2 States to any United Nations Entity; and 

3 (2) to use the voice and vote of the United 

4 States to press the United Nations to reform its 

5 TEF assessment procedures to reduce the repeated 

6 discrepancies between TEF income and expendi7 tures. 

8 (c) CERTIFICATION AND WITHHOLDING.—For each 

9 and every fiscal year subsequent to the effective date of 

10 this Act, until the Secretary of State submits to the appro11 priate congressional committees a certification that the 

12 United Nations has returned to the United States any sur13 plus assessed contributions or other overpayments by the 

14 United States to any United Nations Entity, the Secretary 

15 of State shall withhold from the regular budget of the 

16 United Nations an amount equal to the amount of the 

17 funds that the United Nations has yet to return to the 

18 United States. 

19 SEC. 207. ANNUAL REPORTS ON UNITED STATES CON20 TRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS. 

21 (a) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after 

22 the date of the enactment of this Act and annually for 

23 two years thereafter, the Director of the Office of Manage24 ment and Budget shall submit to Congress a report listing 

25 all assessed and voluntary contributions of the United 


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1 States Government for the preceding fiscal year to the 

2 United Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies 

3 and related bodies. 

4 (b) CONTENTS.—Each report required under sub5 section (a) shall set forth, for the fiscal year covered by 

6 such report, the following: 

7 (1) The total amount of all assessed and vol8 untary contributions of the United States Govern9 ment to the United Nations and United Nations af10 filiated agencies and related bodies. 

11 (2) The approximate percentage of United 

12 States Government contributions to each United Na13 tions affiliated agency or body in such fiscal year 

14 when compared with all contributions to such agency 

15 or body from any source in such fiscal year. 

16 (3) For each such contribution— 

17 (A) the amount of such contribution; 

18 (B) a description of such contribution (in19 cluding whether assessed or voluntary); 

20 (C) the department or agency of the 

21 United States Government responsible for such 

22 contribution; 

23 (D) the purpose of such contribution; and 


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1 (E) the United Nations or United Nations 

2 affiliated agency or related body receiving such 

3 contribution. 

4 SEC. 208. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PROCUREMENT 

5 PRACTICES. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

7 date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, 

8 the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congres9 sional committees a report on United Nations procure10 ment reform. 

11 (b) CONTENTS.—The reports required under sub12 section (a) shall describe— 

13 (1) progress toward the goal of donor countries 

14 establishing a threshold number for procurement 

15 purposes, of which 50 percent of the procurement 

16 for donor programs over $1,000,000,000 shall utilize 

17 donor vendors; 

18 (2) the status of the amount and percentage of 

19 procurement at the United Nations through United 

20 States vendors; and 

21 (3) the status of examinations and investiga22 tions if companies on the Excluded Parties List Sys23 tem are receiving contracts through the United Na24 tions, and the values of such contracts. 


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1 TITLE III—UNITED STATES POL2 ICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS 

3 SEC. 301. ANNUAL PUBLICATION. 

4 The President shall direct the United States Perma5 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the 

6 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

7 United Nations to ensure the United Nations publishes 

8 annually, including on a publicly searchable internet Web 

9 site, a list of all United Nations subsidiary bodies and 

10 their functions, budgets, staff, and contributions, both vol11 untary and assessed, sorted by donor. 

12 SEC. 302. ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE. 

13 The President shall direct the United States Perma14 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the 

15 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

16 United Nations to implement a system for the required 

17 filing of individual annual financial disclosure forms by 

18 each employee of the United Nations and its specialized 

19 agencies, programs, and funds at the P–5 level and above, 

20 which shall be made available to the Office of Internal 

21 Oversight Services, to Member States, and to the public. 

22 SEC. 303. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EXPANSION OF THE 

23 SECURITY COUNCIL. 

24 It is the policy of the United States to use the voice, 

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1 tions to oppose any proposals on expansion of the Security 

2 Council if such expansion would— 

3 (1) diminish the influence of the United States 

4 on the Security Council; or 

5 (2) include veto rights for any new members of 

6 the Security Council. 

7 SEC. 304. ACCESS TO REPORTS AND AUDITS. 

8 The President shall direct the United States Perma9 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the 

10 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

11 United Nations to ensure that Member States may, upon 

12 request, have access to all reports and audits completed 

13 by the Board of External Auditors. 

14 SEC. 305. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY. 

15 The President shall direct the United States Perma16 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the 

17 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

18 United Nations to ensure that the Secretary General exer19 cises the right and duty of the Secretary General under 

20 section 20 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immu21 nities of the United Nations to waive the immunity of any 

22 United Nations official in any case in which such immu23 nity would impede the course of justice. In exercising such 

24 waiver, the Secretary General is urged to interpret the in25 terests of the United Nations as favoring the investigation 


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1 or prosecution of a United Nations official who is credibly 

2 under investigation for having committed a serious crimi3 nal offense or who is credibly charged with a serious crimi4 nal offense. 

5 SEC. 306. TERRORISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the 

7 United States Permanent Representative to the United 

8 Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 

9 States at the United Nations to work toward adoption by 

10 the General Assembly of— 

11 (1) a definition of terrorism that— 

12 (A) builds upon the recommendations of 

13 the December 2004 report of the High-Level 

14 Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change; 

15 (B) includes as an essential component of 

16 such definition any action that is intended to 

17 cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians 

18 with the purpose of intimidating a population 

19 or compelling a government or an international 

20 organization to do, or abstain from doing, any 

21 act; and 

22 (C) does not propose a legal or moral 

23 equivalence between an action described in sub24 paragraph (B) and measures taken by a gov25 ernment or international organization in self-deVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:31 Sep 28, 2013 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3155.IH H3155

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1 fense against an action described in such sub2 paragraph; and 

3 (2) a comprehensive convention on terrorism 

4 that includes the definition described in paragraph 

5 (1). 

6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con7 gress that— 

8 (1) authoritarian regimes often inaccurately 

9 label peaceful, pro-freedom, pro-democracy move10 ments as terrorist movements in order to undermine 

11 the legitimacy of those movements; and 

12 (2) any United Nations definition of terrorism 

13 should not be used to undermine a peaceful, pro14 freedom, pro-democracy movement against authori15 tarian rule. 

16 SEC. 307. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL. 

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the 

18 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 

19 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 

20 a report— 

21 (1) concerning the progress of the General As22 sembly to modernize human resource practices, con23 sistent with the March 2005 report of the Secretary 

24 General entitled ‘‘In larger freedom: towards devel25 opment, security and human rights for all’’; and 


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1 (2) containing the information described in sub2 section (b). 

3 (b) CONTENTS.—The report shall include— 

4 (1) a comprehensive evaluation of human re5 sources reforms at the United Nations, including an 

6 evaluation of— 

7 (A) tenure; 

8 (B) performance reviews; 

9 (C) the promotion system; 

10 (D) a merit-based hiring system and en11 hanced regulations concerning termination of 

12 employment of employees; and 

13 (E) the implementation of a code of con14 duct and ethics training; 

15 (2) the implementation of a system of proce16 dures for filing complaints and protective measures 

17 for work-place harassment, including sexual harass18 ment; 

19 (3) policy recommendations relating to the es20 tablishment of a rotation requirement for non21 administrative positions; 

22 (4) policy recommendations relating to the es23 tablishment of a prohibition preventing personnel 

24 and officials assigned to the mission of a member 

25 state to the United Nations from transferring to a 


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1 position within the United Nations Secretariat that 

2 is compensated at the P–5 level and above; 

3 (5) policy recommendations relating to a reduc4 tion in travel allowances and attendant oversight 

5 with respect to accommodations and airline flights; 

6 and 

7 (6) an evaluation of the recommendations of the 

8 Secretary General relating to greater flexibility for 

9 the Secretary General in staffing decisions to accom10 modate changing priorities. 

11 SEC. 308. UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES. 

12 The United States shall withhold from United States 

13 contributions to the regular assessed budget of the United 

14 Nations for a biennial period amounts that are propor15 tional to the percentage of such budget that are expended 

16 with respect to a United Nations human rights treaty 

17 monitoring body or committee that was established by— 

18 (1) a convention (without any protocols) or an 

19 international covenant (without any protocols) to 

20 which the United States is not party; or 

21 (2) a convention, with a subsequent protocol, if 

22 the United States is a party to neither. 

23 SEC. 309. EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS. 

24 (a) DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AND RE25 PORT.— 


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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—To avoid duplicative efforts 

2 and funding with respect to Palestinian interests 

3 and to ensure balance in the approach to Israeli-Pal4 estinian issues, the Secretary shall, not later than 

5 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 

6 Act— 

7 (A) complete an audit of the functions of 

8 the entities listed in paragraph (2); and 

9 (B) submit to the appropriate congres10 sional committees a report containing audit 

11 findings and conclusions, and recommendations 

12 for the elimination of such duplicative entities 

13 and efforts. 

14 (2) ENTITIES.—The entities referred to in 

15 paragraph (1)(A) are the following: 

16 (A) The United Nations Division for Pales17 tinian Rights. 

18 (B) The Committee on the Exercise of the 

19 Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. 

20 (C) The United Nations Special Coordi21 nator for the Middle East Peace Process and 

22 Personal Representative to the Palestine Lib23 eration Organization and the Palestinian Au24 thority. 


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1 (D) The NGO Network on the Question of 

2 Palestine. 

3 (E) The Special Committee to Investigate 

4 Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 

5 the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the 

6 Occupied Territories. 

7 (F) Any other entity the Secretary deter8 mines results in duplicative efforts or funding 

9 or fails to ensure balance in the approach to 

10 Israeli-Palestinian issues. 

11 (b) IMPLEMENTATION BY PERMANENT REPRESENTA12 TIVE.— 

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct 

14 the United States Permanent Representative to the 

15 United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence 

16 of the United States at the United Nations to seek 

17 the implementation of the recommendations con18 tained in the report required under subsection 

19 (a)(1)(B). 

20 (2) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.—Until such rec21 ommendations have been implemented, the United 

22 States shall withhold from United States contribu23 tions to the regular assessed budget of the United 

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1 portional to the percentage of such budget that are 

2 expended for such entities. 

3 SEC. 310. ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS. 

4 The President shall direct the United States perma5 nent representative to the United Nations to use the voice, 

6 vote, and influence of the United States at the United Na7 tions to make every effort to— 

8 (1) ensure the issuance and implementation of 

9 a directive by the Secretary General or the Secre10 tariat, as appropriate, that— 

11 (A) requires all employees of the United 

12 Nations and its specialized agencies to officially 

13 and publicly condemn anti-Semitic statements 

14 made at any session of the United Nations or 

15 its specialized agencies, or at any other session 

16 sponsored by the United Nations; 

17 (B) requires employees of the United Na18 tions and its specialized agencies, programs, 

19 and funds to be subject to punitive action, in20 cluding immediate dismissal, for making anti21 Semitic statements or references; 

22 (C) proposes specific recommendations to 

23 the General Assembly for the establishment of 

24 mechanisms to hold accountable employees and 

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1 ized agencies, programs, and funds, or Member 

2 States, that make such anti-Semitic statements 

3 or references in any forum of the United Na4 tions or of its specialized agencies; 

5 (D) continues to develop and implements 

6 education awareness programs about the Holo7 caust and anti-Semitism throughout the world, 

8 as part of an effort to combat intolerance and 

9 hatred; and 

10 (E) requires the Office of the United Na11 tions High Commissioner for Human Rights 

12 (OHCHR) to develop programming and other 

13 measures that address anti-Semitism; 

14 (2) secure the adoption of a resolution by the 

15 General Assembly that establishes the mechanisms 

16 described in paragraph (1)(C); and 

17 (3) continue working toward further reduction 

18 of anti-Semitic language and anti-Israel resolutions 

19 in the United Nations and its specialized agencies, 

20 programs, and funds. 

21 SEC. 311. REGIONAL GROUP INCLUSION OF ISRAEL. 

22 The President shall direct the United States Perma23 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the 

24 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

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1 ers Group (WEOG) in the United Nations in Geneva to 

2 include Israel as a permanent member with full rights and 

3 privileges. 

4 SEC. 312. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TAIWAN’S PARTICIPA5 TION IN UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES. 

6 The Secretary of State shall direct the United States 

7 Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use 

8 the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

9 United Nations to ensure meaningful participation for 

10 Taiwan in relevant United Nations Entities in which Tai11 wan has expressed an interest in participating. 

12 SEC. 313. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TIER 3 HUMAN 

13 RIGHTS VIOLATORS. 

14 The Secretary of State shall direct the United States 

15 Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use 

16 the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

17 United Nations to ensure that no representative of a coun18 try designated pursuant to section 110 of the Trafficking 

19 Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107) by the 

20 Department of State as a Tier 3 country shall preside as 

21 Chair or President of any United Nations Entity. 


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1 TITLE IV—STATUS OF PALES2 TINIAN ENTITIES AT THE 

3 UNITED NATIONS 

4 SEC. 401. FINDINGS. 

5 Congress makes the following findings: 

6 (1) In 1989, the Palestine Liberation Organiza7 tion (PLO) launched an effort to evade direct nego8 tiations for peace with the State of Israel by instead 

9 pursuing Palestinian membership in international 

10 organizations, which could imply de facto recognition 

11 of a Palestinian state by the United Nations. 

12 (2) The Executive Branch, with significant sup13 port from Members of Congress, successfully 

14 stopped the PLO’s effort by credibly threatening, as 

15 noted in a May 1, 1989, statement by then-Sec16 retary of State James A. Baker, ‘‘that the United 

17 States [would] make no further contributions, vol18 untary or assessed, to any international organization 

19 which makes any change in the P.L.O.’s present sta20 tus as an observer organization.’’. 

21 (3) The United States success in this case dem22 onstrates that withholding contributions and placing 

23 conditions on their payment can result in real re24 forms, stop counterproductive developments, and ad25 vance United States interests at the United Nations. 


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1 (4) The Palestinian leadership has recently re2 sumed its effort to evade direct negotiations for 

3 peace with the State of Israel by seeking recognition 

4 of a Palestinian state from foreign governments and 

5 in international forums. 

6 (5) Efforts to bypass negotiations and to unilat7 erally declare a Palestinian state, or to appeal to the 

8 United Nations or other international forums or to 

9 foreign governments for recognition of a Palestinian 

10 state or membership or other upgraded status for 

11 the Palestinian observer mission at those forums, 

12 would violate the underlying principles of the Oslo 

13 Accords, the Road Map, and other relevant Middle 

14 East peace process efforts. 

15 (6) On December 15, 2010, the House of Rep16 resentatives passed House Resolution 1765, in 

17 which, inter alia, the House of Representatives: 

18 (A) ‘‘reaffirms its strong opposition to any 

19 attempt to establish or seek recognition of a 

20 Palestinian state outside of an agreement nego21 tiated between Israel and the Palestinians’’; 

22 (B) ‘‘supports the Administration’s opposi23 tion to a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian 

24 state’’; and 


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1 (C) ‘‘calls upon the Administration to . . . 

2 lead a diplomatic effort to persuade other na3 tions to oppose a unilateral declaration of a 

4 Palestinian state and to oppose recognition of a 

5 Palestinian state by other nations, within the 

6 United Nations, and in other international fo7 rums prior to achievement of a final agreement 

8 between Israel and the Palestinians.’’. 

9 (7) Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo, United 

10 States Deputy Permanent Representative to the 

11 United Nations, stated on July 26, 2011, ‘‘Let there 

12 be no doubt: symbolic actions to isolate Israel at the 

13 United Nations in September will not create an 

14 independent Palestinian state . . . The United 

15 States will not support unilateral campaigns at the 

16 United Nations in September or any other time.’’. 

17 (8) On September 16, 2011, the Deputy Na18 tional Security Advisor for Strategic Communica19 tions stated that ‘‘We would veto actions through 

20 the Security Council and oppose action through the 

21 Security Council associated with a unilateral dec22 laration of [Palestinian] statehood.’’. 

23 SEC. 402. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

24 It is the policy of the United States to oppose the 

25 recognition of a Palestinian state by any United Nations 


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1 Entity, or any upgrade, including but not limited to full 

2 membership or non-member-state observer status, in the 

3 status of the Palestinian observer mission at the United 

4 Nations, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Pales5 tinian Authority, or any other Palestinian administrative 

6 organization or governing entity, at any United Nations 

7 Entity, prior to the achievement of a final peace agree8 ment negotiated between and agreed to by Israel and the 

9 Palestinians. 

10 SEC. 403. IMPLEMENTATION. 

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the 

12 United States Permanent Representative to the United 

13 Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 

14 States at the United Nations to advance the policy stated 

15 in section 402. 

16 (b) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.—The Secretary of 

17 State shall withhold United States contributions from any 

18 United Nations Entity that recognizes a Palestinian state 

19 or upgrades in any way, including full membership or non20 member-state observer status, the status of the Pales21 tinian observer mission at the United Nations, the Pal22 estine Liberation Organization, the Palestinian Authority, 

23 or any other Palestinian administrative organization or 

24 governing entity, at that United Nations Entity, prior to 

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1 gotiated between and agreed to by Israel and the Palestin2 ians. Funds appropriated for use as a United States con3 tribution to the United Nations but withheld from obliga4 tion and expenditure pursuant to this section shall imme5 diately revert to the United States Treasury and shall not 

6 be considered arrears to be repaid to any United Nations 

7 Entity. 

8 TITLE V—UNITED NATIONS 

9 HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 

10 SEC. 501. FINDINGS. 

11 Congress makes the following findings: 

12 (1) Since its establishment in 2006, the United 

13 Nations Human Rights Council has failed to mean14 ingfully promote the protection of internationally 

15 recognized human rights, and has proven to be even 

16 more problematic than the United Nations Human 

17 Rights Commission that it was created to replace. 

18 (2) The United Nations Human Rights Council 

19 suffers from fundamental and severe structural 

20 flaws present since its establishment by the United 

21 Nations General Assembly, such as the fact that it 

22 draws its members from the General Assembly with23 out any substantive membership criteria, with the 

24 perverse result that a number of the world’s worst 

25 human rights abusers are members of the council. 


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1 (3) For example, many members of the United 

2 Nations Human Rights Council are rated ‘‘Not 

3 Free’’ or only ‘‘Partly Free’’ by Freedom House. 

4 Only a minority of members were rated ‘‘Free’’. 

5 (4) The structure and composition of the 

6 United Nations Human Rights Council have made it 

7 subject to gross political manipulation, with the re8 sult that, during its almost seven years of operation, 

9 the Council has passed over 46 resolutions censuring 

10 the democratic, Jewish State of Israel, as compared 

11 to only a handful censuring the dictatorships in 

12 Burma, North Korea, and Syria, just one addressing 

13 the severe, ongoing human rights abuses in Libya, 

14 Iran, and Belarus, and none addressing the severe, 

15 ongoing human rights abuses in China, Cuba, Rus16 sia, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and elsewhere. 

17 (5) The United Nations Human Rights Coun18 cil’s agenda contains a permanent item for criticism 

19 of the democratic, Jewish State of Israel, but no 

20 permanent items criticizing any other state. 

21 (6) The United Nations Human Rights Council 

22 has established, or preserved the existence of, a 

23 number of ‘‘Special Procedures’’ mechanisms to ad24 dress country-specific situations or thematic issues. 

25 These mechanisms include a number of ‘‘special 


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1 rapporteurs’’ whose expenses and staff support are 

2 paid for by contributions to the United Nations. 

3 (7) The United Nations Human Rights Council 

4 has also established an ‘‘Advisory Committee’’ whose 

5 expenses and staff support are paid for by contribu6 tions to the United Nations. 

7 (8) Some of these special rapporteurs and mem8 bers of the Advisory Committee have displayed con9 sistent bias against the United States, Israel, and 

10 the Jewish people, while providing support to human 

11 rights abusers. 

12 (9) Richard Falk, the United Nations ‘‘Special 

13 Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Pal14 estinian territories occupied since 1967’’, has com15 pared Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians to the 

16 Holocaust, questioned the veracity of the events of 

17 September 11, 2001, and posted a cartoon on his 

18 blog depicting Americans and Jews as bloodthirsty 

19 dogs. 

20 (10) Jean Ziegler, a member of the United Na21 tions Human Rights Council Advisory Committee 

22 and former United Nations ‘‘Special Rapporteur on 

23 the Right to Food’’, has accused former President 

24 George W. Bush and former Israeli Prime Minister 

25 Ariel Sharon of committing ‘‘state terrorism’’, has 


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1 called for an investigation of Israel by the Inter2 national Criminal Court for ‘‘war crimes’’ following 

3 Israel’s war against Hezbollah in 2006, has visited 

4 Cuba and praised the Cuban regime’s provision of 

5 food to the Cuban people, and has stated that 

6 Zimbabwean dictator Robert Mugabe ‘‘has history 

7 and morality with him’’. Ziegler was also involved in 

8 the establishment of the ‘‘Al-Gaddafi International 

9 Prize for Human Rights’’, a prize established by, 

10 funded by, and named after Libyan dictator Muam11 mar al-Gaddafi, and awarded in the past to Fidel 

12 Castro, Hugo Chavez, Louis Farrakhan, and Roger 

13 Garaudy, who has denied the Holocaust, questioned 

14 the veracity of the events of September 11, 2001, 

15 and supported Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadine16 jad’s call for Israel to be ‘‘wiped off the map’’. 

17 (11) Miguel D’Escoto Brockmann, a member of 

18 the United Nations Human Rights Council Advisory 

19 Committee who has previously served as President of 

20 the United Nations General Assembly and as foreign 

21 minister for the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, has 

22 implicitly accused the United States of terrorism, 

23 has called former President Ronald Reagan a 

24 ‘‘butcher’’, has called for a international boycott of 

25 Israel, has stated that the Palestinians were being 


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1 ‘‘crucified’’ by Israel, has called Israel’s defensive 

2 Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip a ‘‘mon3 strosity’’ and ‘‘genocide’’, has urged the United Na4 tions to use the term apartheid in discussing Israeli 

5 treatment of Palestinians, has embraced Iranian 

6 leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after Ahmadinejad 

7 delivered an anti-American, anti-Israel address to 

8 the United Nations General Assembly, has stated 

9 that charges of genocide against Sudanese dictator 

10 Omar Hassan al Bashir are ‘‘racist’’, and has de11 clared Fidel Castro ‘‘World Hero of Solidarity’’, 

12 stating that Castro ‘‘embod[ied] virtues and values 

13 worth emulation by all of us’’. 

14 (12) Halima Warzazi, a member of the United 

15 Nations Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, 

16 has compared Israel to Nazi Germany, and used her 

17 previous membership in a United Nations apparatus 

18 to shield Saddam Hussein from censure for gassing 

19 Iraqi Kurds in Halabja. 

20 (13) The ongoing five-year review of the United 

21 Nations Human Rights Council concluded on June 

22 17, 2011, and failed to make any significant reforms 

23 to its fundamental and severe structural flaws, in24 cluding its absence of substantive membership criVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:31 Sep 28, 2013 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3155.IH H3155

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1 teria, or to remove the permanent agenda item on 

2 Israel. 

3 (14) On June 17, 2011, John F. Sammis, 

4 United States Deputy Representative to the Eco5 nomic and Social Council, stated that ‘‘The Geneva 

6 process [of the five-year review] failed to yield even 

7 minimally positive results, forcing us to dissociate 

8 from the outcome . . . the final resolution [for the 

9 five-year review] also fails to address the core prob10 lems that still plague the Human Rights Council 

11 . . . The United States has therefore voted ‘no’ on 

12 the resolution . . . the Council’s effectiveness and 

13 legitimacy will always be compromised so long as 

14 one country in all the world is unfairly and uniquely 

15 singled out while others, including chronic human 

16 rights abusers, escape scrutiny . . . The resolution 

17 before us today does nothing to address the Coun18 cil’s failures nor move it any closer to the founding 

19 values of the UN Charter and the Universal Dec20 laration of Human Rights.’’. 

21 (15) United States membership in the Human 

22 Rights Council has not led to reform of its funda23 mental flaws diminished the Council’s virulently 

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1 seven resolutions criticizing Israel since the United 

2 States joined in 2009. 

3 SEC. 502. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP AND 

4 FUNDING. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—For each and every fiscal year 

6 subsequent to the effective date of this Act, until the Sec7 retary of State submits to Congress a certification that 

8 the requirements described in subsection (b) have been 

9 satisfied— 

10 (1) the Secretary of State shall withhold from 

11 a United States contribution each fiscal year to a 

12 regular budget of the United Nations an amount 

13 that is equal to the percentage of such contribution 

14 that the Secretary determines would be allocated by 

15 the United Nations to support the United Nations 

16 Human Rights Council; 

17 (2) the Secretary of State shall not make a vol18 untary contribution to the United Nations Human 

19 Rights Council; and 

20 (3) the United States shall not run for a seat 

21 on the United Nations Human Rights Council. 

22 (b) CERTIFICATION.—The annual certification re23 ferred to in subsection (a) is a certification made by the 

24 Secretary to Congress that— 


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1 (1) the United Nations Human Rights Coun2 cil’s mandate from the United Nations General As3 sembly explicitly and effectively prohibits candidacy 

4 for Human Rights Council membership of a United 

5 Nations Member State— 

6 (A) subject to sanctions by the Security 

7 Council; and 

8 (B) under a Security Council-mandated in9 vestigation for human rights abuses; 

10 (2) the United Nations Human Rights Council 

11 does not include a United Nations Member State— 

12 (A) subject to sanctions by the Security 

13 Council; 

14 (B) under a Security Council-mandated in15 vestigation for human rights abuses; 

16 (C) which the Secretary of State has deter17 mined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Ex18 port Administration Act of 1979 (as continued 

19 in effect pursuant to the International Emer20 gency Economic Powers Act), section 40 of the 

21 Arms Export Control Act, section 620A of the 

22 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or other provi23 sion of law, is a government that has repeatedly 

24 provided support for acts of international ter25 rorism; or 


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1 (D) which the President has designated as 

2 a country of particular concern for religious 

3 freedom under section 402(b) of the Inter4 national Religious Freedom Act of 1998; and 

5 (3) the United Nations Human Rights Coun6 cil’s agenda or programme of work does not include 

7 a permanent item with regard to the State of Israel. 

8 (c) SPECIAL PROCEDURES.—The Secretary of State 

9 shall withhold from a United States contribution each year 

10 to a regular budget of the United Nations an amount that 

11 is equal to the percentage of such contribution that the 

12 Secretary determines would be allocated by the United 

13 Nations to support the United Nations ‘‘Special 

14 Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Pales15 tinian territories occupied since 1967’’, and any other 

16 United Nations Human Rights Council ‘‘Special Proce17 dures’’ used to display bias against the United States or 

18 the State of Israel or to provide support for the govern19 ment of any United Nations Member State— 

20 (1) subject to sanctions by the Security Council; 

21 (2) under a Security Council-mandated inves22 tigation for human rights abuses; 

23 (3) which the Secretary of State has deter24 mined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Ad25 ministration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect purVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:31 Sep 28, 2013 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3155.IH H3155

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1 suant to the International Emergency Economic 

2 Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control 

3 Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 

4 1961, or other provision of law, is a government that 

5 has repeatedly provided support for acts of inter6 national terrorism; or 

7 (4) which the President has designated as a 

8 country of particular concern for religious freedom 

9 under section 402(b) of the International Religious 

10 Freedom Act of 1998. 

11 (d) REVERSION OF FUNDS.—Funds appropriated for 

12 use as a United States contribution to the United Nations 

13 but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to 

14 this section shall immediately revert to the United States 

15 Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid 

16 to any United Nations Entity. 

17 TITLE VI—GOLDSTONE REPORT 

18 SEC. 601. FINDINGS. 

19 Congress finds the following: 

20 (1) On January 12, 2009, the United Nations 

21 Human Rights Council passed Resolution A/HRC/S– 

22 9/L.1, which authorized a ‘‘fact-finding mission’’ re23 garding Israel’s conduct of Operation Cast Lead 

24 against violent militants in the Gaza Strip between 

25 December 27, 2008, and January 18, 2009. 


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1 (2) The resolution pre-judged the outcome of its 

2 investigation by one-sidedly mandating the ‘‘fact3 finding mission’’ to ‘‘investigate all violations of 

4 international human rights law and International 

5 Humanitarian Law by . . . Israel, against the Pal6 estinian people . . . particularly in the occupied 

7 Gaza Strip, due to the current aggression’’. 

8 (3) The mandate of the ‘‘fact-finding mission’’ 

9 makes no mention of the relentless rocket and mor10 tar attacks, which numbered in the thousands and 

11 spanned a period of eight years, by Hamas and 

12 other violent militant groups in Gaza against civilian 

13 targets in Israel, that necessitated Israel’s defensive 

14 measures. 

15 (4) The ‘‘fact-finding mission’’ included a mem16 ber who, before joining the mission, had already de17 clared Israel guilty of committing atrocities in Oper18 ation Cast Lead by signing a public letter on Janu19 ary 11, 2009, published in the Sunday Times, that 

20 called Israel’s actions ‘‘war crimes’’. 

21 (5) The mission’s flawed and biased mandate 

22 gave serious concern to many United Nations 

23 Human Rights Council Member States which re24 fused to support it, including Bosnia and 

25 Herzegovina, Cameroon, Canada, France, Germany, 


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1 Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the Republic of 

2 Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Ukraine, and 

3 the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 

4 Ireland. 

5 (6) The mission’s flawed and biased mandate 

6 was never broadened or revised by any plenary meet7 ing of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 

8 and troubled many distinguished individuals who re9 fused invitations to head the mission. 

10 (7) On September 15, 2009, the ‘‘United Na11 tions Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’’ 

12 released its report, which is commonly referred to as 

13 the ‘‘Goldstone Report’’. 

14 (8) The Goldstone Report repeatedly made 

15 sweeping and unsubstantiated determinations that 

16 the Israeli military had deliberately attacked civil17 ians during Operation Cast Lead. 

18 (9) The authors of the Goldstone Report admit 

19 that ‘‘we did not deal with the issues . . . regarding 

20 the problems of conducting military operations in ci21 vilian areas and second-guessing decisions made by 

22 soldiers and their commanding officers in the fog of 

23 war.’’. 

24 (10) In the October 16, 2009, edition of the 

25 Jewish Daily Forward, Richard Goldstone, the head 


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1 of the ‘‘United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the 

2 Gaza Conflict’’, is quoted as saying, with respect to 

3 the mission’s evidence-collection methods, ‘‘If this 

4 was a court of law, there would have been nothing 

5 proven’’. 

6 (11) The Goldstone Report, in effect, denied the 

7 State of Israel the right to self-defense, and never 

8 noted the fact that Israel had the right to defend its 

9 citizens from the repeated violent attacks committed 

10 against civilian targets in southern Israel by Hamas 

11 and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations operating 

12 from Gaza. 

13 (12) The Goldstone Report largely ignored the 

14 culpability of the Government of Iran and the Gov15 ernment of Syria, both of whom sponsor Hamas and 

16 other Foreign Terrorist Organizations. 

17 (13) The Goldstone Report usually considered 

18 public statements made by Israeli officials not to be 

19 credible, while frequently giving uncritical credence 

20 to statements taken from what it called the ‘‘Gaza 

21 authorities’’, i.e., the Gaza leadership of Hamas. 

22 (14) Notwithstanding a great body of evidence 

23 that Hamas and other violent Islamist groups com24 mitted war crimes by using civilians and civilian in25 stitutions, such as mosques, schools, and hospitals, 


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1 as shields, the Goldstone Report repeatedly down2 played or cast doubt upon that claim. 

3 (15) In one notable instance, the Goldstone Re4 port stated that it did not consider the admission of 

5 a Hamas official that Hamas often ‘‘created a 

6 human shield of women, children, the elderly and the 

7 mujahideen, against [the Israeli military]’’ specifi8 cally to ‘‘constitute evidence that Hamas forced Pal9 estinian civilians to shield military objectives against 

10 attack’’. 

11 (16) Hamas was able to significantly shape the 

12 findings of the investigation mission’s Goldstone Re13 port by selecting and prescreening some of the wit14 nesses and intimidating others, as the Goldstone Re15 port acknowledges when it notes that ‘‘those inter16 viewed in Gaza appeared reluctant to speak about 

17 the presence of or conduct of hostilities by the Pales18 tinian armed groups . . . from a fear of reprisals’’. 

19 (17) Even though Israel is a vibrant democracy 

20 with a vigorous and free press, the Goldstone Report 

21 erroneously asserts that ‘‘actions of the Israeli gov22 ernment . . . have contributed significantly to a po23 litical climate in which dissent with the government 

24 and its actions . . . is not tolerated’’. 


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1 (18) The Goldstone Report recommended that 

2 the United Nations Human Rights Council endorse 

3 its recommendations, implement them, review their 

4 implementation, and refer the report to the United 

5 Nations Security Council, the Prosecutor of the 

6 International Criminal Court, and the United Na7 tions General Assembly for further action. 

8 (19) The Goldstone Report recommended that 

9 the United Nations Security Council— 

10 (A) require the Government of Israel to 

11 launch further investigations of its conduct dur12 ing Operation Cast Lead and report back to the 

13 Security Council within 6 months; 

14 (B) simultaneously appoint an ‘‘inde15 pendent committee of experts’’ to monitor and 

16 report on any domestic legal or other pro17 ceedings undertaken by the Government of 

18 Israel within that 6-month period; and 

19 (C) refer the case to the Prosecutor of the 

20 International Criminal Court after that 6- 

21 month period. 

22 (20) The Goldstone Report recommended that 

23 the United Nations General Assembly consider fur24 ther action on the report and establish an escrow 

25 fund, to be funded entirely by the State of Israel, to 


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1 ‘‘pay adequate compensation to Palestinians who 

2 have suffered loss and damage’’ during Operation 

3 Cast Lead. 

4 (21) The Goldstone Report ignored the issue of 

5 compensation to Israelis who have been killed or 

6 wounded, or suffered other loss and damage, as a re7 sult of years of past and continuing rocket and mor8 tar attacks by Hamas and other violent militant 

9 groups in Gaza against civilian targets in southern 

10 Israel. 

11 (22) The Goldstone Report recommended ‘‘that 

12 States Parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 

13 start criminal investigations [of Operation Cast 

14 Lead] in national courts, using universal jurisdic15 tion’’ and that ‘‘following investigation, alleged per16 petrators should be arrested and prosecuted’’. 

17 (23) The concept of ‘‘universal jurisdiction’’ has 

18 frequently been used in attempts to detain, charge, 

19 and prosecute Israeli and United States officials and 

20 former officials in connection with unfounded allega21 tions of war crimes and has often unfairly impeded 

22 the travel of those individuals. 

23 (24) On September 20, 2009, United Nations 

24 High Commissioner for Human Rights Navanethem 


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1 Pillay wrote, ‘‘I lend my full support to Justice 

2 Goldstone’s report and its recommendations’’. 

3 (25) The State of Israel, like many other free 

4 democracies, has an independent judicial system 

5 with a robust investigatory capacity and has already 

6 launched numerous investigations, many of which re7 main ongoing, of Operation Cast Lead and indi8 vidual incidents therein. 

9 (26) Several nations have indicated that they 

10 intend to further pursue consideration of the 

11 Goldstone Report and implementation of its rec12 ommendations by the United Nations Security Coun13 cil, the United Nations General Assembly, the 

14 United Nations Human Rights Council, and other 

15 multilateral fora. 

16 (27) On September 30, 2009, Secretary of 

17 State Hillary Clinton described the underlying man18 date for the Goldstone Report as ‘‘one-sided’’. 

19 (28) On September 17, 2009, Ambassador 

20 Susan Rice, United States Permanent Representa21 tive to the United Nations, expressed the United 

22 States ‘‘very serious concern with the mandate’’ un23 derlying the Goldstone Report and noted that the 

24 United States views the mandate ‘‘as unbalanced, 

25 one-sided and basically unacceptable’’. 


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1 (29) Israeli President Shimon Peres has called 

2 the Goldstone Report a ‘‘blood libel’’. 

3 (30) The Goldstone Report reflects the long4 standing, historic bias at the United Nations against 

5 the democratic, Jewish State of Israel. 

6 (31) The Goldstone Report is being exploited by 

7 Israel’s enemies to excuse the actions of violent mili8 tant groups and their state sponsors, and to justify 

9 isolation of and punitive measures against the demo10 cratic, Jewish State of Israel. 

11 (32) On November 3, 2009, the House of Rep12 resentatives overwhelmingly adopted House Resolu13 tion 867, which stated that the House of Represent14 atives: 

15 (A) ‘‘considers the [Goldstone Report] to 

16 be irredeemably biased and unworthy of further 

17 consideration or legitimacy’’; 

18 (B) ‘‘supports the Administration’s efforts 

19 to combat anti-Israel bias at the United Na20 tions, its characterization of the [Goldstone Re21 port] as ‘unbalanced, one-sided and basically 

22 unacceptable’, and its opposition to the resolu23 tion on the report’’; 

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1 equivocally oppose any endorsement of the 

2 [Goldstone Report] in multilateral fora, includ3 ing through leading opposition to any United 

4 Nations General Assembly resolution and 

5 through vetoing, if necessary, any United Na6 tions Security Council resolution that endorses 

7 the contents of this report, seeks to act upon 

8 the recommendations contained in this report, 

9 or calls on any other international body to take 

10 further action regarding this report’’; 

11 (D) ‘‘calls on the President and the Sec12 retary of State to strongly and unequivocally 

13 oppose any further consideration of the ‘Report 

14 of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on 

15 the Gaza Conflict’ and any other measures 

16 stemming from this report in multilateral fora’’; 

17 and 

18 (E) ‘‘reaffirms its support for the demo19 cratic, Jewish State of Israel, for Israel’s secu20 rity and right to self-defense, and, specifically, 

21 for Israel’s right to defend its citizens from vio22 lent militant groups and their state sponsors’’. 

23 (33) On October 16, 2009, the United Nations 

24 Human Rights Council voted 25–6 (with 11 Member 

25 States abstaining and 5 not voting, and with the 


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1 United States voting against) to adopt resolution A– 

2 HRC–S–12–1, which endorsed the Goldstone Report 

3 and condemned Israel, without mentioning Hamas, 

4 other such violent militant groups, or their state 

5 sponsors. The United States voted against the reso6 lution. 

7 (34) On November 5, 2009, the United Nations 

8 General Assembly voted 114–18 (with 44 Member 

9 States abstaining, and with the United States voting 

10 against) to adopt resolution A/RES/64/10, which, 

11 among other things: 

12 (A) endorsed the United Nations Human 

13 Rights Council’s resolution A–HRC–S–12–1, 

14 which endorsed the Goldstone Report and con15 demned Israel, without mentioning Hamas, 

16 other such violent militant groups, or their 

17 state sponsors; 

18 (B) requested that the Secretary General 

19 of the United Nations transmit the Goldstone 

20 Report to the United Nations Security Council; 

21 (C) expressed its ‘‘appreciation’’ to the 

22 ‘‘United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the 

23 Gaza Conflict’’ for its ‘‘comprehensive report’’; 

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1 tions’’ during Operation Cast Lead, including 

2 the findings in the Goldstone Report; and 

3 (E) recommended ‘‘that the Government of 

4 Switzerland, in its capacity as depositary of the 

5 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of 

6 Civilian Persons in Time of War, undertake as 

7 soon as possible the steps necessary to recon8 vene a Conference of High Contracting Parties 

9 to the Fourth Geneva Convention on measures 

10 to enforce the Convention’’ in the West Bank, 

11 the Gaza Strip, and ‘‘East Jerusalem’’. 

12 (35) On February 26, 2010, the United Na13 tions General Assembly voted 98–7 (with 31 Mem14 ber States abstaining, and with the United States 

15 voting against) to adopt resolution A/RES/64/254, 

16 which built on the determinations of A/RES/64/10. 

17 (36) On March 24, 2010, the United Nations 

18 Human Rights Council voted 29–6 (with 11 Member 

19 States abstaining and one not voting, and with the 

20 United States voting against) to adopt resolution A/ 

21 HRC/13/L.30, which, among other things— 

22 (A) called upon ‘‘all concerned parties, in23 cluding United Nations bodies, to ensure their 

24 implementation of the recommendations con25 tained in the [Goldstone Report]’’; 


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1 (B) requested that the United Nations 

2 High Commissioner for Human Rights submit 

3 a ‘‘progress report on the implementation of the 

4 present resolution to the [Human Rights] 

5 Council at its fourteenth session’’ in May and 

6 June 2010; and 

7 (C) decided to ‘‘follow up on the implemen8 tation of the present resolution at [the] fif9 teenth session’’ of the Human Rights Council in 

10 September 2010. 

11 (37) On March 25, 2011, the United Nations 

12 Human Rights Council voted 27–3 (with 16 Member 

13 States abstaining, and with the United States voting 

14 against) to adopt resolution A/HRC/16/L.31, which, 

15 among other things— 

16 (A) called upon ‘‘all concerned parties, in17 cluding United Nations bodies, to ensure the 

18 full and immediate implementation of the rec19 ommendations contained in the [Goldstone Re20 port]’’; 

21 (B) recommended that the United Nations 

22 General Assembly again consider the Goldstone 

23 Report at its sixty-sixth session, and urged the 

24 General Assembly to submit the report to the 

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1 sideration and appropriate action,’’ including 

2 referral to the prosecutor of the International 

3 Criminal Court; 

4 (C) requested that the United Nations 

5 High Commissioner for Human Rights submit 

6 a ‘‘progress report on the implementation of the 

7 present resolution to the Human Rights Council 

8 at its eighteenth session of September 2011’’; 

9 and 

10 (D) decided to ‘‘follow up on the imple11 mentation of the present resolution at [the] 

12 nineteenth session [of the Human Rights Coun13 cil] of March 2012’’. 

14 (38) On April 1, 2011, Richard Goldstone, the 

15 head of the ‘‘United Nations Fact Finding Mission 

16 on the Gaza Conflict’’ that authored the Goldstone 

17 Report, wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post that 

18 renounced the Goldstone Report’s claim that the 

19 Israeli military deliberately attacked civilians during 

20 Operation Cast Lead. Goldstone wrote that the 

21 Israeli military’s investigations with respect to inci22 dents in Operation Cast Lead ‘‘indicate that civilians 

23 were not intentionally targeted as a matter of pol24 icy’’. 


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1 (39) Efforts to delegitimize the democratic 

2 State of Israel and deny it the right to defend its 

3 citizens and its existence can be used to delegitimize 

4 other democracies and deny them the same right. 

5 SEC. 602. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

6 It is the policy of the United States to— 

7 (1) consider the Goldstone Report irredeemably 

8 biased and unworthy of further consideration or le9 gitimacy; 

10 (2) strongly and unequivocally oppose any con11 sideration, legitimization, or endorsement of the 

12 Goldstone Report, or any other measures stemming 

13 from this report, in multilateral fora; 

14 (3) lead a high-level diplomatic campaign in 

15 support of the revocation and repudiation, by the 

16 United Nations General Assembly, of the Goldstone 

17 Report and any United Nations resolutions stem18 ming from the report, including— 

19 (A) United Nations General Assembly res20 olutions A/RES/64/10 and A/RES/64/254; and 

21 (B) United Nations Human Rights Council 

22 resolutions A–HRC–S–12–1, A/HRC/13/L.30, 

23 and A/HRC/16/L.31; and 

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1 port, or legitimize the Goldstone Report or any other 

2 measures stemming from the report. 

3 SEC. 603. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS; REFUND OF UNITED 

4 STATES TAXPAYER DOLLARS. 

5 (a) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.—The Secretary of 

6 State shall withhold from the United States contribution 

7 to the regular budget of the United Nations an amount 

8 that is equal to the percentage of such contribution that 

9 the Secretary determines would be or has been expended 

10 by the United Nations for any part of the Goldstone Re11 port or its preparatory or follow-on activities. 

12 (b) REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER DOL13 LARS.—Funds appropriated for use as a United States 

14 contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations 

15 but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to 

16 subsection (a) shall immediately revert to the United 

17 States Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be 

18 repaid to any United Nations Entity. 

19 TITLE VII—DURBAN PROCESS 

20 SEC. 701. FINDINGS. 

21 Congress makes the following findings: 

22 (1) The United States is opposed to racism, ra23 cial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intoler24 ance, and has long been a party to the Convention 

25 on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 


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1 (2) Expensive and politically skewed inter2 national conferences can disserve and undermine the 

3 worthy goals that they are ostensibly convened to 

4 support. 

5 (3) The goals of the 2001 United Nations 

6 World Conference Against Racism—held in Durban, 

7 South Africa, and commonly referred to as ‘‘Durban 

8 I’’—were undermined by hateful, anti-Jewish rhet9 oric, and anti-Israel political agendas, prompting 

10 both Israel and the United States to withdraw their 

11 delegations from the Conference. 

12 (4) The official government declaration adopted 

13 by Durban I, the ‘‘Durban Declaration and Program 

14 of Action’’, focused on the ‘‘plight of the Palestinian 

15 people under foreign occupation’’, and thereby sin16 gled out one regional conflict for discussion and im17 plicitly launched a false accusation against Israel of 

18 intolerance towards the Palestinians. 

19 (5) On September 3, 2001, Secretary of State 

20 Colin Powell explained the withdrawal of the United 

21 States delegation from Durban I by stating that 

22 ‘‘you do not combat racism by conferences that 

23 produce declarations containing hateful language, 

24 some of which is a throwback to the ‘days of Zion25 ism’ equals racism; or supports the idea that we 


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1 have made too much of the Holocaust; or suggests 

2 that apartheid exists in Israel; or that singles out 

3 only one country in the world—Israel—for censure 

4 and abuse’’. 

5 (6) The late United States Representative Tom 

6 Lantos, who participated as a member of the United 

7 States delegation to the Durban Conference, sup8 ported that delegation’s withdrawal and wrote in 

9 2002 that the conference ‘‘provided the world with 

10 a glimpse into the abyss of international hate, dis11 crimination and, indeed, racism’’. 

12 (7) On December 19, 2006, the United Nations 

13 General Assembly approved a resolution initiating 

14 preparations for a Durban Review Conference (com15 monly referred to as ‘‘Durban II’’), which was held 

16 between April 20 and 24, 2009, in Geneva, Switzer17 land. 

18 (8) The chair of the preparatory committee for 

19 Durban II was Libya, and the co-chairs included 

20 Iran and Cuba. 

21 (9) Throughout the preparatory process for 

22 Durban II, member states of the Organization of the 

23 Islamic Conference urged that the conference again 

24 focus criticism on Israel and single out the Israeli25 Palestinian conflict for discussion, and also urged 


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1 that the conference advocate global speech codes 

2 that would impose restrictions contrary to funda3 mental freedoms recognized in the provisions of the 

4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 

5 (10) In testimony before the House of Rep6 resentatives on April 2, 2008, then-Assistant Sec7 retary of State for International Organizations 

8 Kristen Silverberg stated that the United States had 

9 decided against participating in preparatory activi10 ties for Durban II because ‘‘[there is] absolutely no 

11 case to be made for participating in something that 

12 is going to be a repeat of Durban I. We don’t have 

13 any confidence that this will be any better than Dur14 ban I’’. 

15 (11) On September 23, 2008, the House of 

16 Representatives passed House Resolution 1361, 

17 which, among other things, called on the President 

18 to ‘‘urge other heads of state to condition participa19 tion in the 2009 [Durban II] Conference on concrete 

20 action by the United Nations and United Nations 

21 Member States to ensure that it is not a forum to 

22 demonize any group, or incite anti-Semitism, hatred, 

23 or violence against members of any group or to call 

24 into question the existence of any state’’ and urged 

25 all United Nations Member States ‘‘not to support 


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1 a 2009 Durban Review Conference process that fails 

2 to adhere to established human rights standards and 

3 to reject an agenda that incites hatred against any 

4 group in the guise of criticism of a particular gov5 ernment or that seeks to forge a global blasphemy 

6 code’’. 

7 (12) The present United Nations High Com8 missioner for Human Rights, Dr. Navanethem 

9 Pillay, who served as Secretary General of Durban 

10 II, has repeatedly sought to downplay the level of 

11 hateful, anti-Jewish rhetoric and anti-Israel political 

12 agendas present at Durban I, describing it as merely 

13 ‘‘the virulent anti-Semitic behavior of a few non-gov14 ernmental organizations on the sidelines’’ and prais15 ing the biased 2001 Durban Declaration and Pro16 gramme of Action as ‘‘[t]he legacy of this Con17 ference’’, has repeatedly sought to downplay the level 

18 of hateful, anti-Jewish rhetoric and anti-Israel polit19 ical agendas present at Durban II and its pre20 paratory activities, and has repeatedly praised and 

21 urged the full implementation of the Durban Dec22 laration and Programme of Action. 

23 (13) High Commissioner Pillay has repeatedly 

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1 pate in Durban II, but has almost never publicly 

2 criticized governments who succeeded in using the 

3 conference and its preparatory activities to single 

4 out Israel for criticism and to attempt to restrict 

5 fundamental freedoms. 

6 (14) A United Nations press release on Sep7 tember 8, 2008, regarding an address by High Com8 missioner Pillay, disturbingly dismissed objections 

9 raised by non-governmental organizations to Durban 

10 II as ‘‘ferocious, and often distorted, criticism by 

11 certain lobby groups focused on single issues’’. 

12 (15) During February of 2009, the United 

13 States actively participated in intergovernmental 

14 consultations on Durban II’s ‘‘draft outcome docu15 ment’’ and engaged in high-level diplomatic efforts 

16 to dramatically reverse the path of Durban II by di17 recting it towards meaningful efforts to combat in18 tolerance and bigotry and directing it away from ef19 forts to undermine the cause of fighting discrimina20 tion through singling out Israel for implicit criticism 

21 and calling for restrictions on fundamental free22 doms. 

23 (16) On February 27, 2009, a State Depart24 ment spokesman stated that, despite United States 

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1 ment being negotiated has gone from bad to worse, 

2 and the current text of the draft outcome document 

3 is not salvageable . . . A conference based on this 

4 text would be a missed opportunity to speak clearly 

5 about the persistent problem of racism’’ and there6 fore, the United States would not participate in fur7 ther consultations and negotiations regarding the 

8 ‘‘draft outcome document’’, and would not partici9 pate in Durban II itself unless the ‘‘draft outcome 

10 document’’ was radically shortened and revised to 

11 eliminate objectionable material. 

12 (17) On April 17, 2009, the third and final ses13 sion of the preparatory committee for Durban II 

14 proposed a final ‘‘draft outcome document’’ that 

15 contained a number of provisions advocating restric16 tions on freedom of expression, and that also implic17 itly singled out and criticized Israel for racism by re18 affirming, in its very first paragraph, the 2001 Dur19 ban Declaration and Programme of Action. 

20 (18) On April 18, 2009, a State Department 

21 spokesman announced that ‘‘the United States will 

22 not join the [Durban II] conference’’, noting that 

23 ‘‘The current document . . . still contains language 

24 that reaffirms in toto the Durban Declaration and 

25 Programme of Action (DDPA) from 2001, which the 


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1 United States has long said it is unable to support 

2 . . . The United States also has serious concerns 

3 with relatively new additions to the text regarding 

4 ‘incitement’, that run counter to the U.S. commit5 ment to unfettered free speech.’’. 

6 (19) On April 19, 2009, the President stated at 

7 a press conference that ‘‘I would love to be involved 

8 in a useful conference that addressed continuing 

9 issues of racism and discrimination around the globe 

10 . . . we expressed in the run-up to this conference 

11 our concerns that if you incorporated—if you adopt12 ed all the language from 2001, that’s just not some13 thing we could sign up for . . . our participation 

14 would have involved putting our imprimatur on 

15 something that we just don’t believe . . . Hopefully 

16 . . . we can partner with other countries on to actu17 ally reduce discrimination around the globe. But this 

18 wasn’t an opportunity to do it.’’. 

19 (20) Canada, Israel, Italy, Germany, the Neth20 erlands, Poland, Australia, and New Zealand also 

21 did not participate in Durban II, and the Czech Re22 public walked out of the Conference during its pro23 ceedings, never to return. 


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1 (21) Libya was the chair of the Main Com2 mittee of Durban II, and vice presidents of Durban 

3 II included Libya, Iran, and Cuba. 

4 (22) Speaking at Durban II on April 20, 2009, 

5 Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called the 

6 democratic State of Israel ‘‘totally racist’’ and ‘‘the 

7 most cruel and repressive racist regime’’, and called 

8 for Israel’s destruction, stating that ‘‘Efforts must 

9 be made to put an end to the abuse by Zionists . . . 

10 Governments must be encouraged and supported in 

11 their fights aimed at eradicating this barbaric rac12 ism’’. 

13 (23) In his speech at Durban II, Ahmadinejad 

14 also propagated anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, 

15 saying that ‘‘Those who control huge economic re16 sources and interests in the world . . . mobilize all 

17 the resources, including their economic and political 

18 influence and world media, to render support in vain 

19 to the Zionist regime’’. 

20 (24) Disgusted by Ahmadinejad’s biased and 

21 incendiary statements, delegates from about two 

22 dozen nations walked out of the assembly hall in 

23 protest, but most delegations remained, and a large 

24 number of delegations and observers repeatedly ap25 plauded Ahmadinejad’s remarks. 


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1 (25) On April 21, 2009, governments partici2 pating in Durban II adopted by consensus an ‘‘out3 come document’’ that contained a number of provi4 sions advocating restrictions on freedom of expres5 sion, and that also implicitly singled out and criti6 cized Israel for racism by reaffirming, in its very 

7 first paragraph, the 2001 Durban Declaration and 

8 Program of Action. 

9 (26) Throughout Durban II, many speakers 

10 singled out Israel for criticism or called for restric11 tions on fundamental freedoms, including represent12 atives of Iran, Libya, Cuba, Sudan, Syria, Ven13 ezuela, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, 

14 Qatar, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 

15 Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, Tunisia, Ban16 gladesh, Switzerland, the Organization of the Islamic 

17 Conference, the Arab League, the Palestine Libera18 tion Organization, and a number of other organiza19 tions and countries. 

20 (27) During Durban II, several speakers who 

21 sought to draw attention to genuine instances of rac22 ism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, related intol23 erance, and human rights violations by the govern24 ments of Iran, Libya, and China were repeatedly in25 terrupted by the delegations from those governments 


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1 and instructed by the conference’s chair to not refer 

2 specifically to those governments. 

3 (28) On December 18, 2009, the United Na4 tions General Assembly approved Resolution A/RES/ 

5 64/148, which urged the ‘‘full and effective imple6 mentation of the Durban Declaration and Pro7 gramme of Action’’ and called for a ‘‘one-day ple8 nary event to commemorate the ten-year anniversary 

9 [of Durban I] during the high-level segment of the 

10 General Assembly to be devoted to racism, racial dis11 crimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance dur12 ing its sixty-fifth session, in 2011’’. The United 

13 States, joined by 12 other nations, voted against this 

14 resolution. 

15 (29) On December 24, 2010, the United Na16 tions General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/ 

17 65/240, authorizing the holding of a ‘‘one-day high18 level meeting of the General Assembly to commemo19 rate the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the 

20 Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, at 

21 the level of Heads of State and Government, on the 

22 second day of the general debate of the sixty-sixth 

23 session’’ in September of 2011. The resolution also 

24 states that the meeting (commonly referred to as 

25 ‘‘Durban III’’) will adopt a ‘‘political declaration 


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1 aimed at mobilizing political will at the national, re2 gional, and international levels for the full and effec3 tive implementation of the Durban Declaration and 

4 Programme of Action and its follow-up processes.’’. 

5 The resolution also requests that the United Nations 

6 Secretary General ‘‘establish a programme of out7 reach, with the involvement of Member States and 

8 United Nations funds and programmes as well as 

9 civil society, including non-governmental organiza10 tions, to appropriately commemorate the tenth anni11 versary of the adoption of the Durban Declaration 

12 and Programme of Action.’’ The resolution also re13 quests that ‘‘the Office of the United Nations High 

14 Commissioner for Human Rights and the Depart15 ment of Public Information of the Secretariat . . . 

16 launch a public information campaign for the com17 memoration of the tenth anniversary of the adoption 

18 of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Ac19 tion’’. The United States, joined by 21 other na20 tions, voted against this resolution. 

21 (30) The Government of Canada announced 

22 that it would not participate in the Durban III 

23 meeting. Canadian Minister of Citizenship, Immigra24 tion, and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney stated that 

25 ‘‘Our government has lost faith in the entire tainted 


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1 Durban process. Canada will not participate in this 

2 charade any longer. We will not lend our country’s 

3 good name to a commemoration of what has widely 

4 been characterized as a hatefest . . . Canada is 

5 clearly committed to the fight against racism, but 

6 the Durban process commemorates an agenda that 

7 actually promotes racism rather than combats it.’’. 

8 (31) The Government of Israel announced that 

9 it would not participate in the Durban III meeting, 

10 stating that ‘‘Israel is part of the international 

11 struggle against racism. The Jewish people was 

12 itself a victim of racism throughout history. Israel 

13 regrets that a resolution on an important subject— 

14 elimination of racism—has been diverted and politi15 cized by the automatic majority at the UN, by link16 ing it to the Durban Declaration and Programme of 

17 Action (2001) that many states would prefer to for18 get. The Durban Conference of 2001, with its 

19 antisemitic undertones and displays of hatred for 

20 Israel and the Jewish World, left us with scars that 

21 will not heal quickly . . . Under the present cir22 cumstances, as long as the [Durban III] meeting is 

23 defined as part of the infamous’’Durban process‘‘, 

24 Israel will not participate . . .’’. 


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1 (32) On June 2, 2011, the United States pub2 licly announced that it would not participate in the 

3 Durban III meeting. The Department of State’s 

4 deputy spokesman stated that the ‘‘Durban process 

5 includes displays of intolerance and anti-Semitism, 

6 and we don’t want to see that commemorated. In 

7 our conversations about this commemoration, we’ve 

8 not seen the kind of progress that we think is indic9 ative. We remain unconvinced that the conference is 

10 moving in a new direction.’’. 

11 (33) The Governments of Australia, Austria, 

12 Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, 

13 Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Po14 land, and the United Kingdom also did not partici15 pate in the Durban III meeting. 

16 (34) On September 22, 2011, at the Durban 

17 III meeting, the United Nations General Assembly 

18 adopted Resolution A/RES/66/3, a ‘‘political declara19 tion’’ which ‘‘[r]eaffirm[ed] that the Durban Dec20 laration and Programme of Action . . . and the out21 come document of [Durban II] . . . are a com22 prehensive United Nations framework and solid 

23 foundation for combating racism, racial discrimina24 tion, xenophobia, and related intolerance’’, 

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1 bilize political will at the national, regional and 

2 international levels and reaffirm our political com3 mitment to the full and effective implementation of 

4 the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action 

5 and the outcome document of [Durban II], and their 

6 follow-up processes, at all these levels’’, and 

7 ‘‘welcome[d] the continued engagement of the 

8 United Nations High Commissioner for Human 

9 Rights to incorporate the implementation of the 

10 Durban Declaration and Programme of Action into 

11 the United Nations system’’. 

12 (35) On September 22, 2011, the White House 

13 Press Secretary stated that ‘‘Since its inception . . . 

14 the Durban process has included ugly displays of in15 tolerance and anti-Semitism . . . Last December, 

16 the United States voted against the resolution estab17 lishing [Durban III] because we did not want to see 

18 the hateful and anti-Semitic displays of the 2001 

19 Durban Conference commemorated. Over the last 

20 few months, we did not participate in negotiations 

21 on [Durban III’s] Political Declaration document 

22 and, like many other countries, we were not present 

23 when the Declaration was adopted. We are also 

24 deeply disappointed that the rules established for 

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1 ticipate were used by some delegations to silence 

2 voices critical of the Durban process.’’. 

3 (36) Durban I, Durban II, Durban III, and 

4 their preparatory and follow-on activities, have made 

5 little or no demonstrable contribution to combating 

6 racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and re7 lated intolerance. 

8 (37) To date, several million dollars from the 

9 United Nations regular budget has been expended 

10 on Durban I, Durban II, Durban III, and their pre11 paratory and follow-on activities. 

12 (38) The United States is the largest contrib13 utor to the United Nations system, and is assessed 

14 for a full 22 percent of the United Nations regular 

15 budget, which is funded by assessed contributions 

16 from Member States. 

17 (39) Funding for Durban I, Durban II, Durban 

18 III, and their preparatory and follow-on activities 

19 through the United Nations regular budget has re20 sulted in United States taxpayer dollars being used 

21 for those purposes. 

22 (40) Congress, through its adoption of the Con23 solidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 

24 110–161) withheld from the United States assessed 

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1 tions regular budget an amount equivalent to the 

2 United States share of the United Nations Human 

3 Rights Council budget, including its share of the 

4 Council-administered preparatory process for Dur5 ban II. 

6 SEC. 702. SENSE OF CONGRESS; STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

7 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con8 gress that— 

9 (1) the Durban I, Durban II, and Durban III 

10 conferences, and their preparatory and follow-on ac11 tivities, were subverted by members of the Organiza12 tion of the Islamic Conference and irredeemably dis13 torted into a forum for anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, and 

14 anti-freedom activity; 

15 (2) by walking out of the Durban I conference, 

16 and by not participating in the Durban II con17 ference, and announcing that it would not partici18 pate in the Durban III meeting, the United States 

19 Government upheld and reaffirmed the fundamental 

20 commitment of the United States to combating rac21 ism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related 

22 intolerance; 

23 (3) the Governments of Canada, Israel, Italy, 

24 Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Australia, New 

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1 mended for their decision to not participate or cease 

2 participation in the Durban II conference; 

3 (4) the Governments of Australia, Austria, Bul4 garia, Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Ger5 many, Israel, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Italy, 

6 New Zealand, Poland, and the United Kingdom 

7 should be commended for their decision to not par8 ticipate in Durban III; and 

9 (5) the Administration should expeditiously and 

10 unequivocally announce that it will not participate 

11 in, support, or legitimize any part of the Durban 

12 process. 

13 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 

14 of the United States to— 

15 (1) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encour16 age other responsible countries— 

17 (A) not to participate in, support, legiti18 mize, or fund any part of the Durban process, 

19 and 

20 (B) to withhold from their respective con21 tributions to the regularly assessed biennial 

22 budget of the United Nations an amount that 

23 is equal to the percentage of such respective 

24 contributions that they determine would be or 

25 has been allocated by the United Nations for 


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1 any part of the Durban III meeting or its pre2 paratory or follow-on activities, or for any other 

3 part of the Durban process; and 

4 (2) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to explore 

5 credible, alternative forums for combating racism, 

6 racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intol7 erance. 

8 SEC. 703. NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE DURBAN PROCESS. 

9 None of the funds made available in any provision 

10 of law may be used for United States participation in any 

11 part of the Durban process. 

12 SEC. 704. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS; REFUND OF UNITED 

13 STATES TAXPAYER DOLLARS. 

14 (a) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS FOR THE DURBAN

15 PROCESS.—The Secretary of State shall withhold from the 

16 United States contribution to the regular budget of the 

17 United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage 

18 of such contribution that the Secretary determines would 

19 be or has been expended by the United Nations for any 

20 part of the Durban I or Durban II conferences, the Dur21 ban III meeting, their preparatory or follow-on activities, 

22 or any other part of the Durban process, including— 

23 (1) the ‘‘public information campaign for the 

24 commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the 

25 adoption of the Durban Declaration and Programme 


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1 of Action’’ requested by United Nations General As2 sembly Resolution A.RES/65/240; 

3 (2) the Intergovernmental Working Group on 

4 the Effective Implementation of the Durban Dec5 laration and Programme of Action; 

6 (3) the ‘‘group of independent eminent experts 

7 on the implementation of the Durban Declaration 

8 and Programme of Action’’; and 

9 (4) the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration 

10 of Complementary Standards. 

11 (b) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS FOR OTHER BIASED

12 AND COMPROMISED ACTIVITIES.—Until the Secretary of 

13 State submits to the appropriate congressional committees 

14 a certification, on a case-by-case basis, that the require15 ments described in subsection (d) have been satisfied, the 

16 United States shall withhold from the United States con17 tribution to the regular budget of the United Nations an 

18 amount that is equal to the percentage of such contribu19 tion that the Secretary determines has been allocated by 

20 the United Nations for any conference, meeting, or other 

21 multilateral forum, or the preparatory or follow-on activi22 ties of any conference, meeting, or other multilateral 

23 forum, that is organized under the aegis or jurisdiction 

24 of the United Nations or of any United Nations Entity. 


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1 (c) REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER DOL2 LARS.— 

3 (1) IN GENERAL.—Funds appropriated for use 

4 as a United States contribution to the regular budg5 et of the United Nations but withheld from obliga6 tion and expenditure pursuant to subsection (a) 

7 shall immediately revert to the United States Treas8 ury and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid 

9 to any United Nations Entity. 

10 (2) ALLOWANCE.—Funds appropriated for use 

11 as a United States contribution to the regularly as12 sessed biennial budget of the United Nations but 

13 withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant 

14 to subsection (b) may be obligated and expended for 

15 that purpose upon the certification described in sub16 section (d). Such funds shall revert to the United 

17 States Treasury if no such certification is made by 

18 the date that is one year after such appropriation, 

19 and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to 

20 any United Nations Entity. 

21 (d) CERTIFICATION.—The certification referred to in 

22 subsection (b) is a certification made by the Secretary of 

23 State to the appropriate congressional committees con24 cerning the following: 


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1 (1) The specified conference, meeting, or other 

2 multilateral forum did not reaffirm, call for the im3 plementation of, or otherwise support the Durban 

4 Declaration and Programme of Action (2001) or the 

5 outcome document of the Durban II conference 

6 (2009) or the Durban III meeting (2011). 

7 (2) The specified conference or forum was not 

8 used to single out the United States or the State of 

9 Israel for unfair or unbalanced criticism. 

10 (3) The specified conference or forum was not 

11 used to propagate racism, racial discrimination, anti12 Semitism, denial of the Holocaust, incitement to vio13 lence or genocide, xenophobia, or related intolerance. 

14 (4) The specified conference or forum was not 

15 used to advocate for restrictions on the freedoms of 

16 speech, expression, religion, the press, assembly, or 

17 petition, or for restrictions on other fundamental 

18 human rights and freedoms. 

19 (5) The leadership of the specified conference 

20 or forum does not include a Member State, or a rep21 resentative from a Member State— 

22 (A) subject to sanctions by the Security 

23 Council; 

24 (B) under a Security Council-mandated in25 vestigation for human rights abuses; or 


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1 (C) the government of which the Secretary 

2 of State has determined, for purposes of section 

3 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 

4 (as continued in effect pursuant to the Inter5 national Emergency Economic Powers Act), 

6 section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, sec7 tion 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 

8 1961, or other provision of law, is a government 

9 that has repeatedly provided support for acts of 

10 international terrorism. 

11 TITLE VIII—UNRWA 

12 SEC. 801. FINDINGS. 

13 Congress makes the following findings: 

14 (1) United Nations General Assembly Resolu15 tion 302 (1949) created the United Nations Relief 

16 and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 

17 Near East (UNRWA) with the temporary, strictly 

18 humanitarian mandate to ‘‘carry out . . . direct re19 lief and works programmes’’ for Palestinian refu20 gees. 

21 (2) UNRWA has acknowledged that it is the 

22 ‘‘only UN agency that reports directly to the UN 

23 General Assembly, and whose beneficiary population 

24 stems from one nation-group’’, and is responsible 

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1 tions High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is 

2 responsible for other refugees across the world. 

3 (3) UNHCR’s definition of a refugee is, in ac4 cordance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the 

5 Status of Refugees, any person who ‘‘owing to a 

6 well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 

7 race, religion, nationality, membership of a par8 ticular social group, or political opinion, is outside 

9 the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, 

10 owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 

11 the protection of that country . . .’’. 

12 (4) UNRWA’s much broader definition of a 

13 ‘‘Palestine refugee’’ is any person, and his descend14 ants, whose ‘‘normal place of residence was [the 

15 former British Mandate of] Palestine during the pe16 riod 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both 

17 home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 

18 conflict.’’. 

19 (5) UNRWA’s overly inclusive definition of a 

20 ‘‘Palestine refugee’’ has resulted in an increase in 

21 UNRWA’s reported number of ‘‘Palestine refugees’’ 

22 from under 1,000,000 in 1950 to over 5,000,000 

23 today, encompassing multiple generations of de24 scendants of the original Palestinian refugees. 


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1 (6) Hundreds of thousands of ‘‘Palestine refu2 gees’’ are citizens of recognized states, including 

3 Jordan. 

4 (7) UNRWA, unlike UNHCR, does not offer 

5 refugees the option of resettlement and reintegration 

6 into their country of refuge or a third country. Ef7 forts by UN officials in the 1950s to offer resettle8 ment and reintegration as an option for Palestinian 

9 refugees were dropped under fierce opposition from 

10 Arab governments, and have not been taken up 

11 since. 

12 (8) Through its overly inclusive definition of a 

13 ‘‘Palestine refugee’’ and its refusal to offer refugees 

14 the option of resettlement and reintegration, 

15 UNRWA contributes to the perpetuation of the suf16 fering of Palestinian refugees, who have been ex17 ploited by Arab governments and Palestinian mili18 tant groups for over six decades as a political tool 

19 with which to assail Israel. 

20 (9) Almost all of UNRWA’s almost 30,000 staff 

21 are Palestinian refugees themselves, presenting a 

22 clear conflict of interest. 

23 (10) UNRWA’s total annual budget, including 

24 its core programs, emergency activities and special 

25 projects, exceeds almost $1,000,000,000. 


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1 (11) The United States has long been the larg2 est single contributing country to UNRWA. 

3 (12) From 1950 to 2010, the United States has 

4 contributed almost $3,900,000,000 to UNRWA, in5 cluding an average of over $210,000,000 per year 

6 between fiscal years 2007 and 2010. 

7 (13) Section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance 

8 Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2221(c)) states that ‘‘No 

9 contributions by the United States shall be made to 

10 the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 

11 Palestine Refugees in the Near East except on the 

12 condition that the United Nations Relief and Works 

13 Agency take all possible measures to assure that no 

14 part of the United States contribution shall be used 

15 to furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving 

16 military training as a member of the so-called Pal17 estine Liberation Army or any other guerrilla type 

18 organization or who has engaged in any act of ter19 rorism.’’. 

20 (14) Then-Deputy Secretary of State Jacob J. 

21 Lew testified before the House Committee on For22 eign Affairs on May 13, 2009, that ‘‘We have the 

23 highest level of scrutiny in terms of UNRWA’’. 

24 (15) However, in contravention of United 

25 States law, UNRWA does not ask its personnel or 


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1 aid recipients if they are members of Foreign Ter2 rorist Organizations. 

3 (16) Even though the United States remains 

4 the largest single contributing country to UNRWA, 

5 until 2010, UNRWA did not make available its list 

6 of staff for screening through United States watch 

7 lists, including that of the Department of the Treas8 ury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, refused a 

9 United States request to do so in 2005, and still 

10 does not do so for its list of aid recipients. 

11 (17) UNRWA claims that it has fulfilled its ob12 ligations under section 301(c) of the Foreign Assist13 ance Act of 1961 by screening personnel through the 

14 United Nations Consolidated List pursuant to 

15 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, 

16 but the names on that list are largely members of 

17 Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, not of Palestinian For18 eign Terrorist Organizations such as Hamas, 

19 Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, or Palestinian 

20 Islamic Jihad. 

21 (18) Former UNRWA commissioner-general 

22 Peter Hansen, stated in 2004 that ‘‘I am sure that 

23 there are Hamas members on the UNRWA payroll 

24 and I don’t see that as a crime.’’. 


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1 (19) A number of UNRWA personnel have been 

2 discovered to be affiliated with Foreign Terrorist Or3 ganizations, including, inter alia— 

4 (A) Issa Batran (now deceased), a com5 mander of Hamas’s al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades 

6 and senior rocket-maker who taught at an 

7 UNRWA school in Gaza; 

8 (B) Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi 

9 (now deceased), who reportedly carried out a 

10 homicide bombing that killed seven Americans 

11 and one Jordanian at Forward Operating Base 

12 Chapman in Afghanistan on December 30, 

13 2009, reportedly worked as a physician at an 

14 UNRWA clinic in Amman, Jordan, and had 

15 longstanding ties to violent Islamist extremism; 

16 (C) Said Siam (now deceased), a longtime 

17 Hamas official who eventually served as 

18 Hamas’s Interior Minister in Gaza, and who 

19 taught at an UNRWA school in Gaza; 

20 (D) Awad al-Qiq (now deceased), a rocket21 builder for Palestinian Islamic Jihad who 

22 served as headmaster of an UNRWA school in 

23 Gaza; 

24 (E) Nahd Atallah, an UNRWA staff mem25 ber in Gaza, who was arrested, convicted, and 


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1 sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment by an 

2 Israeli military court of using his UN travel 

3 document to bypass Israeli checkpoints in Gaza 

4 in order to transport armed Palestinian mili5 tants; and 

6 (F) an UNRWA teacher who reportedly 

7 praised homicide bombers and permitted 

8 Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin (now deceased) to 

9 speak to an assembly of students at an 

10 UNRWA school. UNRWA did not terminate 

11 the teacher’s employment, instead only giving 

12 him a letter of censure. 

13 (20) UNRWA staff unions, including the teach14 ers’ union, are frequently controlled by members af15 filiated with Hamas. 

16 (21) Former UNRWA general counsel James 

17 Lindsay noted in a 2009 report that— 

18 (A) ‘‘UNRWA . . . obviously does not take 

19 ‘all possible measures’ in practice’’ to assure 

20 that United States contributions do not provide 

21 assistance to any refugee with ties to Foreign 

22 Terrorist Organizations, in accordance with sec23 tion 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 

24 1961; 


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1 (B) ‘‘UNRWA makes no attempt to weed 

2 out individuals who support extremist positions 

3 . . . UNRWA has taken very few steps to de4 tect and eliminate terrorists from the ranks of 

5 its staff or its beneficiaries, and no steps at all 

6 to prevent members of terrorist organizations, 

7 such as Hamas, from joining its staff.’’; 

8 (C) ‘‘[I]t is rare for an area staff member 

9 . . . to report or confirm that another staff 

10 member has violated rules against political 

11 speech, let alone exhibited ties to terrorism. Not 

12 surprisingly, external allegations of improper 

13 speech or improper use of UNRWA facilities 

14 are difficult to prove, as virtually no one is will15 ing to be a witness against gang members.’’; 

16 and 

17 (D) ‘‘[T]here are no formal procedures for 

18 deregistering or denying services to a properly 

19 registered refugee, no matter what he or she 

20 does.’’. 

21 (22) The late Representative Tom Lantos, in a 

22 May 13, 2002, letter, expressed his concern that— 

23 (A) ‘‘UNRWA is perpetuating, rather than 

24 ameliorating, the situation of Palestinian refu25 gees’’; 


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1 (B) ‘‘UNRWA officials have . . . failed to 

2 prevent their camps from becoming centers of 

3 terrorist activity’’; and 

4 (C) ‘‘for too long, UNRWA has been part 

5 of the problem, rather than the solution, in the 

6 Middle East . . . UNRWA camps have fostered 

7 a culture of anger and dependency that under8 mines both regional peace and the well-being of 

9 the camps’’ inhabitants. 

10 (23) UNRWA has long held accounts at the 

11 Arab Bank and the Commercial Bank of Syria 

12 (CBS), financial institutions that the United States 

13 deems or believes to be complicit in money laun14 dering and terror financing. 

15 (24) The Arab Bank is reportedly at the center 

16 of United States investigations into how tens of mil17 lions of dollars have flowed to Palestinian groups 

18 that allegedly used some of those funds to pay off 

19 suicide bombers and their relatives, and is also re20 portedly being sued in Federal court by American 

21 victims of attacks in Israel, with attorneys for the 

22 victims accusing the bank of facilitating Acts of 

23 International Terrorism. 

24 (25) On May 11, 2004, the Department of the 

25 Treasury designated CBS as a financial institution 


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1 of ‘‘primary money laundering concern’’ pursuant to 

2 section 311 of the USA Patriot Act, stating that 

3 ‘‘CBS had been used by terrorists and their sympa4 thizers and acted as a conduit for the laundering of 

5 proceeds generated from the illicit sale of Iraqi oil’’ 

6 and that ‘‘numerous transactions that may be indic7 ative of terrorist financing and money laundering 

8 have been transferred through CBS, including two 

9 accounts at CBS that reference a reputed financier 

10 for Usama bin Laden.’’. 

11 (26) On August 10, 2011, the Department of 

12 the Treasury designated CBS, pursuant to Executive 

13 Order 13382, for serving as an ‘‘agent for des14 ignated Syrian and North Korean proliferators’’. 

15 (27) CBS is controlled by the Government of 

16 Syria, a State Sponsor of Terrorism. 

17 (28) The curriculum of UNRWA schools, which 

18 use the textbooks of their respective host govern19 ments or authorities, has long contained materials 

20 that are anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, and supportive of 

21 violent extremism. 

22 (29) As far back as over forty years ago, former 

23 UNRWA commissioner-general Laurence Michel24 more admitted that UNRWA schools were sup25 porting a ‘‘bitterly hostile attitude to Israel.’’. 


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1 (30) Former UNRWA general counsel James 

2 Lindsay noted in a January 2009 report that 

3 ‘‘[T]eachers in UNRWA schools were often afraid to 

4 remove posters glorifying ‘martyrs’ (including sui5 cide bombers) for fear of retribution from armed 

6 supporters of the martyrs.’’. 

7 (31) UNRWA officials have compromised 

8 UNRWA’s strictly humanitarian mandate by engag9 ing in political agitation, propaganda, and advocacy 

10 agitation against Israel and in favor of Hamas, as 

11 reflected by the following, inter alia: 

12 (A) UNRWA officials have repeatedly 

13 called for the United States and other nations 

14 to deal directly with Hamas and have repeat15 edly called for political ‘‘reconciliation’’ between 

16 Hamas and Fatah. 

17 (B) UNRWA officials have repeatedly cas18 tigated Israel for her actions to defend innocent 

19 civilians from rocket and mortar attacks from 

20 violent extremist groups in Gaza and from 

21 other Acts of International Terrorism, and has 

22 repeatedly blamed Israel, not Hamas and other 

23 violent extremist groups, for present restrictions 

24 on access to Gaza. 


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1 (C) Former UNRWA general counsel 

2 James Lindsay noted in a 2009 report that: 

3 ‘‘Although it occasionally issued mild, pro 

4 forma criticisms of Palestinian attacks (most of 

5 which were clearly war crimes), [UNRWA] put 

6 more effort into criticizing Israeli counterterror7 ism efforts (which were condemned using lan8 guage associated with war crimes, though any 

9 such crimes were far from proved) . . . 

10 UNRWA never seems to acknowledge that 

11 Israel, since its 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, 

12 has launched strikes on the territory largely in 

13 order to halt rocket attacks and other as14 saults.’’. 

15 (D) Lindsay also noted that ‘‘UNRWA— 

16 through its leaders and press spokespersons—is 

17 constantly involved in political speech . . . These 

18 one-sided speeches on political matters do not 

19 further the goals of a humanitarian and sup20 posedly nonpolitical agency.’’. 

21 (E) UNRWA Commissioner-General 

22 Filippo Grandi described as a ‘‘massacre’’ 

23 Israel’s May 31, 2010, naval operation, and use 

24 of self-defense measures, to seize the Mavi 


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1 Marmara ship in order to enforce its naval 

2 blockade of the Gaza Strip. 

3 (F) Former UNRWA commissioner-gen4 eral Karen AbuZayd stated in a 2009 meeting 

5 with Congressional staff that ‘‘We [UNRWA] 

6 are not just humanitarian.’’. 

7 (G) In January of 2009, UNRWA spokes8 man Christopher Gunness called for an inves9 tigation as to whether Israel had committed ‘‘a 

10 war crime’’. 

11 (H) On December 30, 2008, former 

12 UNRWA commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd 

13 stated that only Israel was responsible for the 

14 start of the most recent conflict in Gaza. 

15 (I) On May 25, 2008, in an interview with 

16 Press TV, which is controlled by the Govern17 ment of Iran, former UNRWA commissioner18 general Karen AbuZayd reportedly claimed that 

19 Hamas was free from corruption and ‘‘more 

20 popular than ever’’. 

21 (J) On October 5, 2007, former UNRWA 

22 commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd blamed 

23 Israel for violent extremist groups in Gaza 

24 launching rockets and mortars against Israeli 

25 civilian targets, stating that residents of Gaza 


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1 ‘‘have absorbed—and continue to experience— 

2 military incursions in which civilian lives, liveli3 hoods, and property have been destroyed, and 

4 to which they have responded with the contin5 uous firing of Qassam rockets into Israel.’’. 

6 (K) On March 8, 2007, former UNRWA 

7 commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd, com8 paring the 1948 Arab-Israeli War with more re9 cent conflicts between Israel and Palestinian 

10 militant groups, stated that ‘‘[T]here is a strik11 ing historical continuity in the systematic ap12 proach to use overwhelming and dispropor13 tionate force in the name of security; to sepa14 rate and exclude Palestinians from the main15 stream; to eject them from their land; and to 

16 occupy Palestinian land.’’. 

17 (L) On January 19, 2005, former 

18 UNRWA commissioner-general Peter Hansen 

19 stated that ‘‘My job [is] to represent the refu20 gees.’’. 

21 (M) In 2002, former UNRWA commis22 sioner-general Peter Hansen falsely accused 

23 Israel of carrying out a ‘‘massacre’’ in 

24 UNRWA’s Jenin refugee camp after Israeli 

25 forces entered the camp, a base of operations 


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1 for Palestinian militant groups, to carry out de2 fensive operations to halt repeated homicide 

3 bombings in Israel. 

4 (N) In 1964, UNRWA allowed its staff to 

5 attend the conference in Jerusalem where the 

6 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was 

7 established. 

8 (32) Despite UNRWA’s contravention of 

9 United States law and activities that compromise its 

10 strictly humanitarian mandate, UNRWA continues 

11 to receive United States contributions, including 

12 $233,300,000 in fiscal year 2012. 

13 (33) The bilateral ‘‘Framework for Coopera14 tion’’ that the United States concluded with 

15 UNRWA for 2012 actually ‘‘commends’’ UNRWA 

16 and does not commit UNRWA to vetting its aid re17 cipients through United States watch lists. 

18 (34) Assistance from the United States and 

19 other responsible nations allows UNRWA to claim 

20 that criticisms of the agency’s behavior are un21 founded. UNRWA spokesman Christopher Gunness 

22 has dismissed concerns by stating that ‘‘If these 

23 baseless allegations were even halfway true, do you 

24 really think the U.S. and [European Commission] 


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1 would give us hundreds of millions of dollars per 

2 year?’’. 

3 (35) Former UNRWA general counsel James 

4 Lindsay noted in a 2009 report that: 

5 (A) ‘‘The United States, despite funding 

6 nearly 75 percent of UNRWA’s national budget 

7 and remaining its largest single country donor, 

8 has mostly failed to make UNRWA reflect U.S. 

9 foreign policy objectives . . . Recent U.S. ef10 forts to shape UNRWA appear to have been in11 effective . . .’’; 

12 (B) ‘‘[T]he United States is not obligated 

13 to fund agencies that refuse to check its rolls 

14 for individuals their donors do not wish to sup15 port.’’; 

16 (C) ‘‘A number of changes in UNRWA 

17 could benefit the refugees, the Middle East, and 

18 the United States, but those changes will not 

19 occur unless the United States, ideally with 

20 support from UNRWA’s other main financial 

21 supporter, the European Union, compels the 

22 agency to enact reforms.’’; and 

23 (D) ‘‘If the [UNRWA commissioner-gen24 eral’s] power is used in ways that are conflict 

25 with the donors’’ political objectives, it is up to 


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1 the donors to take the necessary actions to en2 sure that their interests are respected. When 

3 they have done so, UNRWA—given the tight fi4 nancial leash it has been on for most of its ex5 istence—has tended to follow their dictates, 

6 even if sometimes slowly. 

7 (36) The Government of Canada has placed re8 strictions on its contributions to UNRWA, dem9 onstrating consequences for UNRWA’s malfeasance 

10 and setting an example for the United States and 

11 other donor governments. 

12 SEC. 802. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRWA. 

13 Section 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

14 is amended by striking subsection (c) and inserting the 

15 following new subsection: 

16 ‘‘(c)(1) WITHHOLDING.—Contributions by the 

17 United States to the United Nations Relief and Works 

18 Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 

19 (UNRWA), to any successor or related entity, or to the 

20 regular budget of the United Nations for the support of 

21 UNRWA or a successor entity (through staff positions 

22 provided by the United Nations Secretariat, or otherwise), 

23 may be provided only during a period for which a certifi24 cation described in paragraph (2) is in effect. 


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1 ‘‘(2) CERTIFICATION.—A certification described in 

2 this paragraph is a written determination by the Secretary 

3 of State, based on all information available after diligent 

4 inquiry, and transmitted to the appropriate congressional 

5 committees along with a detailed description of the factual 

6 basis therefor, that— 

7 ‘‘(A) no official, employee, consultant, con8 tractor, subcontractor, representative, or affiliate of 

9 UNRWA— 

10 ‘‘(i) is a member of a Foreign Terrorist 

11 Organization; 

12 ‘‘(ii) has propagated, disseminated, or in13 cited anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic 

14 rhetoric or propaganda; or 

15 ‘‘(iii) has used any UNRWA resources, in16 cluding publications or Web sites, to propagate 

17 or disseminate political materials, including po18 litical rhetoric regarding the Israeli-Palestinian 

19 conflict; 

20 ‘‘(B) no UNRWA school, hospital, clinic, other 

21 facility, or other infrastructure or resource is being 

22 used by a Foreign Terrorist Organization for oper23 ations, planning, training, recruitment, fundraising, 

24 indoctrination, communications, sanctuary, storage 


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1 of weapons or other materials, or any other pur2 poses; 

3 ‘‘(C) UNRWA is subject to comprehensive fi4 nancial audits by an internationally recognized third 

5 party independent auditing firm and has imple6 mented an effective system of vetting and oversight 

7 to prevent the use, receipt, or diversion of any 

8 UNRWA resources by any foreign terrorist organiza9 tion or members thereof; 

10 ‘‘(D) no UNRWA-funded school or educational 

11 institution uses textbooks or other educational mate12 rials that propagate or disseminate anti-American, 

13 anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric, propaganda or 

14 incitement; 

15 ‘‘(E) no recipient of UNRWA funds or loans is 

16 a member of a Foreign Terrorist Organization; and 

17 ‘‘(F) UNRWA holds no accounts or other affili18 ations with financial institutions that the United 

19 States deems or believes to be complicit in money 

20 laundering and terror financing. 

21 ‘‘(3) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

22 ‘‘(A) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COM23 MITTEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional 

24 committees’ means— 


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1 ‘‘(i) the Committees on Foreign Af2 fairs, Appropriations, and Oversight and 

3 Government Reform of the House of Rep4 resentatives; and 

5 ‘‘(ii) the Committees on Foreign Rela6 tions, Appropriations, and Homeland Secu7 rity and Governmental Affairs of the Sen8 ate. 

9 ‘‘(B) FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZA10 TION.—The term ‘Foreign Terrorist Organiza11 tion’ means an organization designated as a 

12 Foreign Terrorist Organization by the Sec13 retary of State in accordance with section 

14 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 

15 (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)). 

16 ‘‘(4) EFFECTIVE DURATION OF CERTIFI17 CATION.—The certification described in paragraph 

18 (2) shall be effective for a period of 180 days from 

19 the date of transmission to the appropriate congres20 sional committees, or until the Secretary receives in21 formation rendering that certification factually inac22 curate, whichever is earliest. In the event that a cer23 tification becomes ineffective, the Secretary shall 

24 promptly transmit to the appropriate congressional 

25 committees a description of any information that 


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1 precludes the renewal or continuation of the certifi2 cation. 

3 ‘‘(5) LIMITATION.—During a period for which a 

4 certification described in paragraph (2) is in effect, 

5 the United States may not contribute to the United 

6 Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Ref7 ugees in the Near East (UNRWA) or a successor 

8 entity an annual amount— 

9 ‘‘(A) greater than the highest annual con10 tribution to UNRWA made by a member coun11 try of the League of Arab States; 

12 ‘‘(B) that, as a proportion of the total 

13 UNRWA budget, exceeds the proportion of the 

14 total budget for the United Nations High Com15 missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) paid by the 

16 United States; or 

17 ‘‘(C) that exceeds 22 percent of the total 

18 budget of UNRWA.’’. 

19 SEC. 803. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

20 It is the sense of Congress that— 

21 (1) the President and the Secretary of State 

22 should lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encour23 age other responsible nations to withhold contribu24 tions to UNRWA, to any successor or related entity, 

25 or to the regular budget of the United Nations for 


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1 the support of UNRWA or a successor entity 

2 (through staff positions provided by the United Na3 tions Secretariat, or otherwise) until UNRWA has 

4 met the conditions listed in subparagraphs (A) 

5 through (F) of section 301(c)(2) of the Foreign As6 sistance Act of 1961 (as added by section 802 of 

7 this Act); 

8 (2) citizens of recognized states should be re9 moved from UNRWA’s jurisdiction; 

10 (3) UNRWA’s definition of a ‘‘Palestine ref11 ugee’’ should be changed to that used for a refugee 

12 by the Office of the United Nations High Commis13 sioner for Refugees; and 

14 (4) in order to alleviate the suffering of Pales15 tinian refugees, responsibility for those refugees 

16 should be fully transferred to the Office of the 

17 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 

18 TITLE IX—INTERNATIONAL 

19 ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

20 SEC. 901. TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAM. 

21 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find22 ings: 

23 (1) The International Atomic Energy Agency 

24 (IAEA) was established in 1957 with the objectives 

25 of seeking to ‘‘accelerate and enlarge the contribuVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:31 Sep 28, 2013 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00115 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3155.IH H3155

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1 tion of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity 

2 throughout the world’’ and to ‘‘ensure . . . that as3 sistance provided by it or at its request or under its 

4 supervision or control is not used in such a way as 

5 to further any military purpose.’’. 

6 (2) The United States, via assessed contribu7 tions, is the largest financial contributor to the reg8 ular budget of the IAEA. 

9 (3) In 1959, the IAEA established what is now 

10 called the Technical Cooperation Program, financed 

11 primarily through voluntary contributions by mem12 ber states to the Technical Cooperation Fund, to 

13 provide nuclear technical cooperation (TC) for 

14 peaceful purposes to countries worldwide. 

15 (4) The United States is the largest financial 

16 contributor to the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation 

17 Fund. 

18 (5) A March 2009 report by the Government 

19 Accountability Office (GAO) found that ‘‘neither 

20 [the Department of State] nor IAEA seeks to sys21 tematically limit TC assistance to countries the 

22 United States has designated as state sponsors of 

23 terrorism—Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria—even 

24 though under U.S. law these countries are subject to 

25 sanctions.’’. 


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1 (6) The GAO report also found that ‘‘Together, 

2 [Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria] received more than 

3 $55 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 

4 2007.’’. These four countries have received contin5 ued assistance since 2007. 

6 (7) The GAO report also found that ‘‘prolifera7 tion concerns about the [Technical Cooperation Pro8 gram] have persisted because of the assistance it has 

9 provided to certain countries and because nuclear 

10 equipment, technology, and expertise can be dual11 use—capable of serving peaceful purposes . . . but 

12 also useful in contributing to nuclear weapons devel13 opment.’’. 

14 (8) The GAO report also found that ‘‘[The 

15 State Department] reported in 2007 that three TC 

16 projects in [Iran] were directly related to the Iranian 

17 nuclear power plant at Bushehr.’’. 

18 (9) The GAO report also found that ‘‘The pro19 liferation concerns associated with the [Technical 

20 Cooperation Program] are difficult for the United 

21 States to fully identify, assess, and resolve . . . [be22 cause] there is no formal mechanism for obtaining 

23 TC project information during the proposal develop24 ment phase . . . [l]imited [Department of] State 

25 documentation on how proliferation concerns of TC 


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1 proposals were resolved . . . [and s]hortcomings in 

2 U.S. policies and IAEA procedures [including moni3 toring proliferation risks] related to TC program fel4 lowships.’’. 

5 (10) The GAO report noted that ‘‘IAEA offi6 cials told us that the [technical cooperation pro7 gram] does not attempt to exclude countries on the 

8 basis of their status as United States—designated 

9 state sponsors of terrorism or other political consid10 erations’’ and that, according to the Deputy Director 

11 General for the Technical Cooperation Program, 

12 ‘‘there are no good countries and there are no bad 

13 countries’’ with respect to provision of technical co14 operation by the IAEA. 

15 (11) The GAO report also found that ‘‘given 

16 the limited information available on TC projects and 

17 the dual-use nature of some nuclear technologies and 

18 expertise, we do not believe [the State Department] 

19 can assert with complete confidence that TC assist20 ance has not advanced [weapons of mass destruc21 tion] programs in U.S.-designated state sponsors of 

22 terrorism’’. 

23 (12) The GAO report also found that ‘‘we do 

24 not share [the State Department’s confidence in 


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1 IAEA’s internal safeguards to prevent TC projects 

2 from contributing to weapons development . . .]’’. 

3 (13) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 

4 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) prohibited any of the funds au5 thorized to be appropriated for ‘‘International Orga6 nizations and Programs’’ from being made available 

7 for the United States proportionate share for pro8 grams for Libya, Iran, Cuba, or the Palestine Lib9 eration Organization, inter alia. 

10 (14) The Foreign Operations, Export Financ11 ing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 

12 1998 (Public Law 105–118) prohibited any of the 

13 funds made available by such Act for the IAEA from 

14 being made available for programs and projects of 

15 the IAEA in Cuba. 

16 (15) The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restruc17 turing Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–277) required 

18 the United States to withhold a proportionate share 

19 of funding to the IAEA for projects in Cuba regard20 ing the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant and the Pedro 

21 Pi Nuclear Research Center. 

22 (16) The GAO report asked Congress ‘‘to con23 sider directing [the State Department] to withhold a 

24 share of future annual contributions to the [tech25 nical cooperation fund] that is proportionate to the 


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1 amount of funding provided from the fund for U.S.- 

2 designated state sponsors of terrorism and other 

3 countries of concern, noting that such a withholding 

4 is a matter of fundamental principle and intended to 

5 foster a more consistent United States policy toward 

6 such nations’’. 

7 (17) The IAEA has repeatedly reported that 

8 the Government of Iran continues its work on heavy 

9 water-related projects and its enrichment of ura10 nium, in violation of United Nations Security Coun11 cil Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 

12 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 

13 (2010). 

14 (18) United Nations Security Council Resolu15 tion 1737 (2006) decided ‘‘that technical cooperation 

16 provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices 

17 shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or 

18 other humanitarian purposes [inter alia] . . . but 

19 that no such technical cooperation shall be provided 

20 that relates to . . . proliferation sensitive nuclear 

21 activities . . .’’. 

22 (19) The IAEA Director General reported to 

23 the IAEA Board of Governors on February 25, 

24 2011, that the Government of Iran now has approxi25 mately 7,000 centrifuges for enriching uranium, is 


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1 running almost 5,000 of them, and has increased its 

2 stockpile of low-enriched uranium to over 3,600 kilo3 grams, considered sufficient for further enrichment 

4 into enough high-enriched uranium for more than 

5 one atomic bomb. The Government of Iran has also 

6 reportedly produced a stockpile of over 40 kilograms 

7 of uranium enriched up to 20 percent U–235. 

8 (20) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 

9 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 

10 in his report of February 25, 2011, about the ‘‘out11 standing issues related to possible military dimen12 sions to Iran’s nuclear programme’’. 

13 (21) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 

14 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 

15 in his report of February 25, 2011, that ‘‘the 

16 [IAEA] remains concerned about the possible exist17 ence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear 

18 related activities involving military-related organiza19 tions, including activities related to the development 

20 of a nuclear payload for a missile.’’. 

21 (22) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 

22 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 

23 in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘Iran has 

24 not implemented the Additional Protocol, which is a 

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1 surance about the absence of undeclared nuclear ma2 terial and activities. Nor has [Iran] agreed to [the 

3 IAEA’s] request that Iran provide, as a trans4 parency measure, access to additional locations re5 lated, inter alia, to the manufacturing of centrifuges, 

6 research and development on uranium enrichment, 

7 and uranium mining and milling, as also required by 

8 the Security Council.’’. 

9 (23) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 

10 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 

11 in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘as a result 

12 of the continued lack of cooperation by Iran in con13 nection with . . . issues which give rise to concerns 

14 about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear 

15 programme, [the IAEA] has made no substantive 

16 progress on these issues.’’. 

17 (24) Iran has refused to comply with resolu18 tions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 

19 September 12, 2003, November 26, 2003, March 15, 

20 2004, June 18, 2004, November 29, 2004, August 

21 11, 2005, September 24, 2005, February 4, 2006, 

22 and July 31, 2006, regarding ‘‘Iran’s many failures 

23 and breaches of its obligations to comply with its 

24 NPT Safeguards Agreement’’ and continues to block 


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1 IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities, in violation 

2 of its NPT Safeguards Agreement. 

3 (25) According to multiple news reports, Iran 

4 recently denied access to its enrichment site at 

5 Natanz to IAEA inspectors, and has also denied a 

6 request by the IAEA to place one or more additional 

7 surveillance cameras at the enrichment site at 

8 Natanz. 

9 (26) In April of 2008, United States Govern10 ment officials publicly revealed that Syria was build11 ing at the Dair Alzour site, with North Korea’s as12 sistance, a secret nuclear reactor that was based on 

13 a North Korean model capable of producing pluto14 nium for nuclear weapons and that was weeks away 

15 from becoming operational before an Israeli air 

16 strike reportedly destroyed the reactor in September 

17 2007. 

18 (27) On April 28, 2008, General Michael Hay19 den, the former Director of the Central Intelligence 

20 Agency, stated that the Syrian reactor at Dair 

21 Alzour could have produced enough plutonium for 1 

22 or 2 bombs within a year of becoming operational. 

23 (28) The IAEA Director General reported to 

24 the IAEA Board of Governors on November 19, 

25 2008 that the Syrian facility at Dair Alzour bore 


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1 features that resembled those of an undeclared nu2 clear reactor, adding that ‘‘Syria has not yet pro3 vided the requested documentation in support of its 

4 declarations concerning the nature or function of the 

5 destroyed building, nor agreed to a visit to the three 

6 other locations which the IAEA has requested to 

7 visit.’’. 

8 (29) The IAEA Director General publicly stated 

9 to the IAEA Board of Governors, on June 15, 2009, 

10 that ‘‘the limited information and access provided by 

11 Syria to date have not enabled the Agency to deter12 mine the nature of the destroyed facility’’ at Dair 

13 Alzour site, that uranium particles have been found 

14 in samples taken from a second site, the Miniature 

15 Neutron Source Reactor facility in Damascus, and 

16 that the particles found at both sites ‘‘are of a type 

17 not included in Syria’s declared inventory of nuclear 

18 material.’’. 

19 (30) Commercial satellite photos published on 

20 February 23, 2011, indicate efforts by the Govern21 ment of Syria to conceal its activities at an addi22 tional site, Marj as Sultan, which may be connected 

23 to the Dair Alzour facility. 

24 (31) The IAEA Director General reported to 

25 the IAEA Board of Governors on February 25, 


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1 2011, that ‘‘Syria has not cooperated with the 

2 [IAEA] since June 2008 in connection with the un3 resolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and 

4 the other three locations allegedly functionally re5 lated to it. As a consequence, the [IAEA] has not 

6 been able to make progress towards resolving the 

7 outstanding issues related to those sites.’’. 

8 (b) PROHIBITION.—No funds from any United States 

9 assessed or voluntary contribution to the IAEA may be 

10 used to support any assistance provided by the IAEA 

11 through its Technical Cooperation program to any coun12 try, including North Korea that— 

13 (1) is a country the government of which has 

14 been determined by the Secretary of State, for pur15 poses of section 6(j) of the Export Administration 

16 Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance 

17 Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control 

18 Act, or other provision of law, is a government that 

19 has repeatedly provided support for acts of inter20 national terrorism; 

21 (2) is in breach of or noncompliance with its 

22 obligations regarding— 

23 (A) its safeguards agreement with the 

24 IAEA; 

25 (B) the Additional Protocol; 


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1 (C) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; 

2 (D) any relevant United Nations Security 

3 Council Resolution; or 

4 (E) the Charter of the United Nations; or 

5 (3) is under investigation for a breach of or 

6 noncompliance with the obligations specified in para7 graph (2). 

8 (c) WITHHOLDING OF VOLUNTARY CONTRIBU9 TIONS.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the en10 actment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall withhold 

11 from the United States voluntary contribution to the 

12 IAEA an amount proportional to that spent by the IAEA 

13 in the period from 2007 to 2008 on assistance through 

14 its Technical Cooperation Program to countries described 

15 in subsection (b). 

16 (d) WITHHOLDING OF ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS.— 

17 If, not later than 30 days of the date of the enactment 

18 of this Act, the amount specified in subsection (c) has not 

19 been withheld and the IAEA has not suspended all assist20 ance provided through its Technical Cooperation Program 

21 to the countries described in subsection (b), an amount 

22 equal to that specified in subsection (c) shall be withheld 

23 from the United States assessed contribution to the IAEA. 

24 (e) WAIVER.—The provisions in subsections (c) and 

25 (d) may be waived if— 


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1 (1) the IAEA has suspended all assistance pro2 vided through its Technical Cooperation Program to 

3 the countries described in subsection (b); or 

4 (2) the President certifies that the countries de5 scribed in subsection (b) no longer pose a threat to 

6 the national security, interests, and allies of the 

7 United States. 

8 (f) UNITED STATES ACTIONS AT IAEA.—The Presi9 dent shall direct the United States Permanent Represent10 ative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence 

11 of the United States at the IAEA to block the allocation 

12 of funds for any assistance provided by the IAEA through 

13 its Technical Cooperation Program to any country de14 scribed in subsection (b). 

15 (g) REPORT.—Not later than 6 months after the date 

16 of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit 

17 to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 

18 the implementation of this section. 

19 SEC. 902. UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE IAEA. 

20 (a) ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE.— 

21 (1) OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE.— 

22 (A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President 

23 shall direct the United States Permanent Rep24 resentative to International Atomic Energy 

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1 ence of the United States at the IAEA to estab2 lish an Office of Compliance in the Secretariat 

3 of the IAEA. 

4 (B) OPERATION.—The Office of Compli5 ance shall— 

6 (i) function as an independent body 

7 composed of technical experts who shall 

8 work in consultation with IAEA inspectors 

9 to assess compliance by IAEA Member 

10 States and provide recommendations to the 

11 IAEA Board of Governors concerning pen12 alties to be imposed on IAEA Member 

13 States that fail to fulfill their obligations 

14 under IAEA Board resolutions; 

15 (ii) base its assessments and rec16 ommendations on IAEA inspection reports; 

17 and 

18 (iii) take into consideration informa19 tion provided by IAEA Board Members 

20 that are 1 of the 5 nuclear weapons states 

21 as recognized by the Treaty on the Non22 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 

23 U.S.T. 483) (commonly referred to as the 

24 ‘‘Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’’ or the 

25 ‘‘NPT’’). 


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1 (C) STAFFING.—The Office of Compliance 

2 shall be staffed from existing personnel in the 

3 Department of Safeguards of the IAEA or the 

4 Department of Nuclear Safety and Security of 

5 the IAEA. 

6 (2) COMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS AND

7 VERIFICATION.—The President shall direct the 

8 United States Permanent Representative to the 

9 IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 

10 United States at the IAEA to ensure that the Com11 mittee on Safeguards and Verification established in 

12 2005 shall develop and seek to put into force a 

13 workplan of concrete measures that will— 

14 (A) improve the ability of the IAEA to 

15 monitor and enforce compliance by Member 

16 States of the IAEA with the Nuclear Non17 proliferation Treaty and the Statute of the 

18 International Atomic Energy Agency; and 

19 (B) enhance the ability of the IAEA, be20 yond the verification mechanisms and authori21 ties contained in the Additional Protocol to the 

22 Safeguards Agreements between the IAEA and 

23 Member States of the IAEA, to detect with a 

24 high degree of confidence undeclared nuclear 

25 activities by a Member State. 


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1 (3) PENALTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE IAEA.— 

2 (A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall di3 rect the United States Permanent Representa4 tive to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and in5 fluence of the United States at the IAEA to en6 sure that a Member State of the IAEA that is 

7 under investigation for a breach of or non8 compliance with its IAEA obligations or the 

9 purposes and principles of the Charter of the 

10 United Nations has its privileges suspended, in11 cluding— 

12 (i) limiting its ability to vote on its 

13 case; 

14 (ii) being prevented from receiving 

15 any technical assistance; and 

16 (iii) being prevented from hosting 

17 meetings. 

18 (B) TERMINATION OF PENALTIES.—The 

19 penalties specified under subparagraph (A) 

20 shall be terminated when such investigation is 

21 concluded and such Member State is no longer 

22 in such breach or noncompliance. 

23 (4) PENALTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE NU24 CLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.—The Presi25 dent shall direct the United States Permanent RepVerDate Mar 15 2010 22:31 Sep 28, 2013 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00130 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3155.IH H3155

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1 resentative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and 

2 influence of the United States at the IAEA to en3 sure that a Member State of the IAEA that is found 

4 to be in breach of, in noncompliance with, or has 

5 withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 

6 shall return to the IAEA all nuclear materials and 

7 technology received from the IAEA, any Member 

8 State of the IAEA, or any Member State of the Nu9 clear Nonproliferation Treaty. 

10 (b) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.— 

11 (1) VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS.—Voluntary 

12 contributions of the United States to the IAEA 

13 should primarily be used to fund activities relating 

14 to Nuclear Safety and Security or activities relating 

15 to Nuclear Verification. 

16 (2) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The 

17 President shall direct the United States Permanent 

18 Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, 

19 and influence of the United States at the IAEA to— 

20 (A) ensure that funds for safeguards in21 spections are prioritized for countries that have 

22 newly established nuclear programs or are initi23 ating nuclear programs; and 

24 (B) block the allocation of funds for any 

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1 clear science assistance or activity to a coun2 try— 

3 (i) the government of which the Sec4 retary of State has determined, for pur5 poses of section 6(j) of the Export Admin6 istration Act of 1979, section 620A of the 

7 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 

8 of the Arms Export Control Act, or other 

9 provision of law, is a government that has 

10 repeatedly provided support for acts of 

11 international terrorism and the government 

12 of which the Secretary has determined has 

13 not dismantled and surrendered its weap14 ons of mass destruction programs under 

15 international verification; 

16 (ii) that is under investigation for a 

17 breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA 

18 obligations or the purposes and principles 

19 of the Charter of the United Nations; or 

20 (iii) that is in violation of its IAEA 

21 obligations or the purposes and principles 

22 of the Charter of the United Nations. 

23 (3) DETAIL OF EXPENDITURES.—The Presi24 dent shall direct the United States Permanent Rep25 resentative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and 


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1 influence of the United States at the IAEA to se2 cure, as part of the regular budget presentation of 

3 the IAEA to Member States of the IAEA, a detailed 

4 breakdown by country of expenditures of the IAEA 

5 for safeguards inspections and nuclear security ac6 tivities. 

7 (c) MEMBERSHIP.— 

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct 

9 the United States Permanent Representative to the 

10 IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 

11 United States at the IAEA to block the membership 

12 on the Board of Governors of the IAEA for a Mem13 ber State of the IAEA that has not signed and rati14 fied the Additional Protocol and— 

15 (A) is under investigation for a breach of 

16 or noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or 

17 the purposes and principles of the Charter of 

18 the United Nations; or 

19 (B) that is in violation of its IAEA obliga20 tions or the purposes and principles of the 

21 Charter of the United Nations. 

22 (2) CRITERIA.—The United States Permanent 

23 Representative to the IAEA shall make every effort 

24 to modify the criteria for Board membership to re25 flect the principles described in paragraph (1). 


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1 (d) SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOL.—The President 

2 shall direct the United States Permanent Representative 

3 to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 

4 United States at the IAEA to make every effort to ensure 

5 that the IAEA changes the policy regarding the Small 

6 Quantities Protocol in order to— 

7 (1) rescind and eliminate the Small Quantities 

8 Protocol; 

9 (2) require that any IAEA Member State that 

10 has previously signed a Small Quantities Protocol to 

11 sign, ratify, and implement the Additional Protocol, 

12 provide immediate access for IAEA inspectors to its 

13 nuclear-related facilities, and agree to the strongest 

14 inspections regime of its nuclear efforts; and 

15 (3) require that any IAEA Member State that 

16 does not comply with paragraph (2) to be ineligible 

17 to receive nuclear material, technology, equipment, 

18 or assistance from any IAEA Member State and 

19 subject to the penalties described in subsection 

20 (a)(3). 

21 (e) NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF IRAN AND SYRIA.— 

22 (1) UNITED STATES ACTION.—The President 

23 shall direct the United States Permanent Represent24 ative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influ25 ence of the United States at the IAEA to make 


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1 every effort to ensure the adoption of a resolution by 

2 the IAEA Board of Governors that, in addition to 

3 the restrictions already imposed, makes Iran and 

4 Syria ineligible to receive any nuclear material, tech5 nology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA 

6 Member State and ineligible for any IAEA assist7 ance not related to safeguards inspections or nuclear 

8 security until the IAEA Board of Governors deter9 mines that Iran or Syria, as the case may be— 

10 (A) is providing full access to IAEA in11 spectors to its nuclear-related facilities; 

12 (B) has fully implemented and is in com13 pliance with the Additional Protocol; and 

14 (C) has permanently ceased and disman15 tled all activities and programs related to nu16 clear-enrichment and reprocessing. 

17 (2) PENALTIES.—If an IAEA Member State is 

18 determined to have violated the prohibition on as19 sistance to Iran or Syria described in paragraph (1) 

20 before the IAEA Board of Governors determines 

21 that Iran or Syria, as the case may be, has satisfied 

22 the conditions described in subparagraphs (A) 

23 through (C) of such paragraph, such Member State 

24 shall be subject to the penalties described in sub25 section (a)(3), shall be ineligible to receive nuclear 


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1 material, technology, equipment, or assistance from 

2 any IAEA Member State, and shall be ineligible to 

3 receive any IAEA assistance not related to safe4 guards inspections or nuclear security until such 

5 time as the IAEA Board of Governors makes such 

6 determination with respect to Iran or Syria, as the 

7 case may be. 

8 (f) REPORT.—Not later than 6 months after the date 

9 of the enactment of this Act and annually for 2 years 

10 thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate 

11 congressional committees a report on the implementation 

12 of this section. 

13 SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR 

14 SECURITY ACTION PLAN OF THE IAEA. 

15 It is the sense of Congress that the national security 

16 interests of the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear 

17 Security Action Plan of the IAEA and the Board of Gov18 ernors should recommend, and the General Conference 

19 should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear Secu20 rity Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA. 

21 TITLE X—PEACEKEEPING 

22 SEC. 1001. REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 

23 OPERATIONS. 

24 It is the sense of Congress that— 


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1 (1) although United Nations peacekeeping oper2 ations have contributed greatly toward the pro3 motion of peace and stability for over 6 decades and 

4 the majority of peacekeeping personnel who have 

5 served under the United Nations flag have done so 

6 with honor and courage, the record of United Na7 tions peacekeeping has been severely tarnished by 

8 operational failures and unconscionable acts of mis9 conduct; 

10 (2) in response to such failures, successive Sec11 retaries General of the United Nations have 

12 launched numerous reform efforts, including the 

13 high-level Panel on United Nations Peace Oper14 ations, led by former Foreign Minister of Algeria 

15 Lakhdar Brahimi, the 2005 report by the Special 

16 Advisor on the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation 

17 and Abuse, His Royal Highness Prince Zeid Ra’ad 

18 Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, and the 2009 New Part19 nership Agenda, known as the ‘‘New Horizon’’ re20 ports; 

21 (3) despite the fact that the United Nations has 

22 had over a decade to implement many of these re23 forms, nearly four years to implement the reforms in 

24 the Zeid Report, and the fact that Secretary General 

25 Ban Ki-Moon, his predecessor Kofi Annan, and the 


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1 Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations re2 peatedly have expressed their commitment ‘‘to imple3 menting fundamental, systematic changes as a mat4 ter of urgency,’’ a number of critical reforms con5 tinue to be blocked or delayed by Members States 

6 who arguably benefit from maintenance of the status 

7 quo; 

8 (4) further, audits of procurement practices in 

9 the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, con10 ducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, 

11 and the now-defunct United Nations Procurement 

12 Task Force have uncovered ‘‘significant’’ corruption 

13 schemes and criminal acts by United Nations peace14 keeping personnel; and 

15 (5) if the reputation of and confidence in 

16 United Nations peacekeeping operations is to be re17 stored, fundamental and far-reaching reforms, par18 ticularly in the areas of planning, management, pro19 curement, training, conduct, and discipline, must be 

20 implemented without further delay. 

21 SEC. 1002. POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NA22 TIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. 

23 It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue 

24 reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the 

25 following areas: 


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1 (1) PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT.— 

2 (A) GLOBAL AUDIT.—As the size, cost, 

3 and number of United Nations peacekeeping 

4 operations have increased substantially over the 

5 past decade, independent audits of each such 

6 operation should be conducted annually, with a 

7 view toward ‘‘right-sizing’’ operations and en8 suring that all operations are efficient and cost 

9 effective. 

10 (B) PROCUREMENT AND TRANS11 PARENCY.—The logistics established within the 

12 United Nations Department of Field Support 

13 should be streamlined and strengthened to en14 sure that all peacekeeping missions are 

15 resourced appropriately, transparently, and in a 

16 timely fashion while individual accountability 

17 for waste, fraud and abuse within United Na18 tions peacekeeping missions is uniformly en19 forced. 

20 (C) REVIEW OF MANDATES AND CLOSING

21 OPERATIONS.—In conjunction with the audit 

22 described in subparagraph (A), the United Na23 tions Department of Peacekeeping Operations 

24 should conduct a comprehensive review of all 

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1 dates, with a view toward identifying objectives 

2 that are practical and achievable, and report its 

3 findings to the Security Council. In particular, 

4 the review should consider the following: 

5 (i) Except in extraordinary cases, in6 cluding genocide, the United Nations De7 partment of Peacekeeping Operations 

8 should not be tasked with activities that 

9 are impractical or unachievable without the 

10 cooperation of the Member State(s) 

11 hosting a United Nations peacekeeping op12 eration, or which amount to de-facto 

13 Trusteeship outside of the procedures es14 tablished for such under Chapter XII of 

15 the United Nations Charter, thereby cre16 ating unrealistic expectations and obfus17 cating the primary responsibility of the 

18 Member States themselves in creating and 

19 maintaining conditions for peace. 

20 (ii) Long-standing operations that are 

21 static and cannot fulfill their mandate 

22 should be downsized or closed. 

23 (iii) Where there is legitimate concern 

24 that the withdrawal from a country of an 

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1 keeping operation would result in the re2 sumption of major conflict, a burden-shar3 ing arrangement that reduces the level of 

4 assessed contributions, similar to that cur5 rently supporting the United Nations 

6 Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, should be 

7 explored and instituted. 

8 (D) LEADERSHIP.—As peacekeeping oper9 ations become larger and increasingly complex, 

10 the Secretariat should adopt a minimum stand11 ard of qualifications for senior leaders and 

12 managers, with particular emphasis on specific 

13 skills and experience, and current senior leaders 

14 and managers who do not meet those standards 

15 should be removed. 

16 (E) PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING.—Pre-de17 ployment training on interpretation of the man18 date of the operation, specifically in the areas 

19 of use of force, civilian protection and field con20 ditions, the Code of Conduct, HIV/AIDS, and 

21 human rights should be mandatory, and all per22 sonnel, regardless of category or rank, should 

23 be required to sign an oath that each has re24 ceived and understands such training as a con25 dition of participation in the operation. 


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1 (F) GRATIS MILITARY PERSONNEL.—The 

2 General Assembly should seek to strengthen the 

3 capacity the United Nations Department of 

4 Peacekeeping Operations and ease the extraor5 dinary burden currently placed upon the limited 

6 number of headquarters staff by lifting restric7 tions on the utilization of gratis military per8 sonnel by the Department so that the Depart9 ment may accept secondments from Member 

10 States of military personnel with expertise in 

11 mission planning, logistics, and other oper12 ational specialties. 

13 (2) CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE.— 

14 (A) ADOPTION OF A UNIFORM CODE OF

15 CONDUCT.—A single, uniform Code of Conduct 

16 that has the status of a binding rule and ap17 plies equally to all personnel serving in United 

18 Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of 

19 category or rank, including military personnel, 

20 should be adopted and incorporated into legal 

21 documents governing participation in such an 

22 operation, including all contracts and Memoran23 dums of Understanding, promulgated and effec24 tively enforced. 


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1 (B) UNDERSTANDING THE CODE OF CON2 DUCT.—All personnel, regardless of category or 

3 rank, should receive training on the Code of 

4 Conduct prior to deployment with a peace5 keeping operation, in addition to periodic fol6 low-on training. In particular— 

7 (i) all personnel, regardless of cat8 egory or rank, should be provided with a 

9 personal copy of the Code of Conduct that 

10 has been translated into the national lan11 guage of such personnel, regardless of 

12 whether such language is an official lan13 guage of the United Nations; 

14 (ii) all personnel, regardless of cat15 egory or rank, should sign an oath that 

16 each has received a copy of the Code of 

17 Conduct, that each pledges to abide by the 

18 Code of Conduct, and that each under19 stands the consequences of violating the 

20 Code of Conduct, including immediate ter21 mination of participation in and permanent 

22 exclusion from all current and future 

23 peacekeeping operations, as well as the as24 sumption of personal liability and victims 

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1 dition of appointment to any such oper2 ation; and 

3 (iii) peacekeeping operations should 

4 continue and enhance educational outreach 

5 programs to reach local communities where 

6 peacekeeping personnel of such operations 

7 are based, including explaining prohibited 

8 acts on the part of United Nations peace9 keeping personnel and identifying the indi10 vidual to whom the local population may 

11 direct complaints or file allegations of ex12 ploitation, abuse, or other acts of mis13 conduct. 

14 (C) MONITORING MECHANISMS.—Dedi15 cated monitoring mechanisms, such as the Con16 duct and Discipline Teams already deployed to 

17 support United Nations peacekeeping oper18 ations in Haiti, Sudan, Kosovo, Liberia, Leb19 anon, Cote d’Ivoire, Western Sahara, and the 

20 Democratic Republic of Congo, should be 

21 present in each operation to monitor compliance 

22 with the Code of Conduct, and should report si23 multaneously to the Head of Mission, the 

24 United Nations Department of Field Support, 

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1 keeping Operations, and the Associate Director 

2 of the Office of Internal Oversight Services for 

3 Peacekeeping Operations (established under 

4 section 1114(b)(9)). 

5 (D) INVESTIGATIONS.—A permanent, pro6 fessional, and independent investigative body 

7 should be established and introduced into 

8 United Nations peacekeeping operations. In 

9 particular— 

10 (i) the investigative body should in11 clude professionals with experience in in12 vestigating sex crimes and the illegal ex13 ploitation of resources, as appropriate, as 

14 well as experts who can provide guidance 

15 on standards of proof and evidentiary re16 quirements necessary for any subsequent 

17 legal action; 

18 (ii) provisions should be included in 

19 all Memorandums of Understanding, in20 cluding a Model Memorandum of Under21 standing, that obligate Member States that 

22 contribute troops to a peacekeeping oper23 ation to designate a military prosecutor 

24 who will participate in any investigation 

25 into credible allegations of misconduct 


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1 brought against an individual of such 

2 Member State, so that evidence is collected 

3 and preserved in a manner consistent with 

4 the military law of such Member State; 

5 (iii) the investigative body should be 

6 regionally based to ensure rapid deploy7 ment and should be equipped with modern 

8 forensics equipment for the purpose of 

9 positively identifying perpetrators and, 

10 where necessary, for determining paternity; 

11 and 

12 (iv) the investigative body should re13 port directly to the Associate Director of 

14 the Office of Internal Oversight Services 

15 for Peacekeeping Operations, while pro16 viding copies of any reports to the Depart17 ment of Field Support, the Department of 

18 Peacekeeping Operations, the Head of Mis19 sion, and the Member State concerned. 

20 (E) FOLLOW-UP.—The Conduct and Dis21 cipline Unit in the headquarters of the United 

22 Nations Department of Field Support should be 

23 appropriately staffed, resourced, and tasked 

24 with— 


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1 (i) promulgating measures to prevent 

2 misconduct; 

3 (ii) receiving reports by field per4 sonnel and coordinating the Department’s 

5 response to allegations of misconduct; 

6 (iii) gathering follow-up information 

7 on completed investigations, particularly by 

8 focusing on disciplinary actions against the 

9 individual concerned taken by the United 

10 Nations or by the Member State that is 

11 contributing troops to which such indi12 vidual belongs, and sharing such informa13 tion with the Security Council, the Depart14 ment of Peacekeeping Operations, the 

15 Head of Mission, and the community 

16 hosting the peacekeeping operation; and 

17 (iv) contributing pertinent data on 

18 conduct and discipline to the database re19 quired pursuant to subparagraph (H). 

20 (F) FINANCIAL LIABILITY AND VICTIMS

21 ASSISTANCE.—Although peacekeeping oper22 ations should provide immediate medical assist23 ance to victims of sexual abuse or exploitation, 

24 the responsibility for providing longer-term 

25 treatment, care, or restitution lies solely with 


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1 the individual found guilty of the misconduct. 

2 In particular: 

3 (i) The United Nations should not as4 sume responsibility for providing long-term 

5 treatment or compensation under the Sex6 ual Exploitation and Abuse Victim Assist7 ance Mechanism by utilizing assessed con8 tributions to United Nations peacekeeping 

9 operations, thereby shielding individuals 

10 from personal liability and reinforcing an 

11 atmosphere of impunity. 

12 (ii) If an individual responsible for 

13 misconduct has been repatriated, reas14 signed, redeployed, or is otherwise unable 

15 to provide assistance, responsibility for 

16 providing assistance to a victim should be 

17 assigned to the Member State that contrib18 uted the contingent to which such indi19 vidual belonged or to the manager con20 cerned. 

21 (iii) In the case of misconduct by a 

22 member of a military contingent, appro23 priate funds shall be withheld from the 

24 troop contributing country concerned. 


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1 (iv) In the case of misconduct by a ci2 vilian employee or contractor of the United 

3 Nations, appropriate wages shall be gar4 nished from such individual or fines shall 

5 be imposed against such individual, con6 sistent with existing United Nations Staff 

7 Rules, and retirement funds shall not be 

8 shielded from liability. 

9 (G) MANAGERS AND COMMANDERS.—The 

10 manner in which managers and commanders 

11 handle cases of misconduct by those serving 

12 under them should be included in their indi13 vidual performance evaluations, so that man14 agers and commanders who take decisive action 

15 to deter and address misconduct are rewarded, 

16 while those who create a permissive environ17 ment or impede investigations are penalized or 

18 relieved of duty, as appropriate. 

19 (H) DATABASE.—A centralized database, 

20 including personnel photos, fingerprints, and bi21 ometric data, should be created and maintained 

22 within the United Nations Department of 

23 Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of 

24 Field Support, and other relevant United Na25 tions bodies without further delay to track cases 


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1 of misconduct, including the outcome of inves2 tigations and subsequent prosecutions, to en3 sure that personnel who have engaged in mis4 conduct or other criminal activities, regardless 

5 of category or rank, are permanently barred 

6 from participation in future peacekeeping oper7 ations. 

8 (I) COOPERATION OF MEMBER STATES.— 

9 If a Member State routinely refuses to cooper10 ate with the directives contained herein or acts 

11 to shield its nationals from personal liability, 

12 that Member State should be barred from con13 tributing troops or personnel to future peace14 keeping operations. 

15 (J) WELFARE.—Peacekeeping operations 

16 should continue to seek to maintain a minimum 

17 standard of welfare for mission personnel to 

18 ameliorate conditions of service, while adjust19 ments are made to the discretionary welfare 

20 payments currently provided to Member States 

21 that contribute troops to offset the cost of oper22 ation-provided recreational facilities, as nec23 essary and appropriate. 


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1 SEC. 1003. CERTIFICATION. 

2 (a) NEW OR EXPANDED PEACEKEEPING OPER3 ATIONS CONTINGENT UPON PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFI4 CATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS REFORMS.— 

5 (1) NO NEW OR EXPANDED PEACEKEEPING OP6 ERATIONS.— 

7 (A) CERTIFICATION.—Except as provided 

8 in subparagraph (B), until the Secretary of 

9 State certifies that the requirements described 

10 in paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the Presi11 dent shall direct the United States Permanent 

12 Representative to the United Nations to use the 

13 voice, vote, and influence of the United States 

14 at the United Nations to oppose the creation of 

15 new, or expansion of existing, United Nations 

16 peacekeeping operations. 

17 (B) EXCEPTION AND NOTIFICATION.—The 

18 requirements described under paragraph (2) 

19 may be waived with respect to a particular 

20 peacekeeping operation if the President deter21 mines that failure to deploy new or additional 

22 peacekeepers in such situation will significantly 

23 contribute to the widespread loss of human life, 

24 genocide, or the endangerment of a vital na25 tional security interest of the United States. If 

26 the President makes such a determination, the 


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1 President shall, not later than 15 days before 

2 the exercise of such waiver, notify the appro3 priate congressional committees of such deter4 mination and resulting waiver. 

5 (2) CERTIFICATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPER6 ATIONS REFORMS.—The certification referred to in 

7 paragraph (1) is a certification made by the Sec8 retary to the appropriate congressional committees 

9 that the following reforms, or an equivalent set of 

10 reforms, related to peacekeeping operations have 

11 been adopted by the United Nations Department of 

12 Peacekeeping Operations or the General Assembly, 

13 as appropriate: 

14 (A) A single, uniform Code of Conduct 

15 that has the status of a binding rule and ap16 plies equally to all personnel serving in United 

17 Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of 

18 category or rank, has been adopted by the Gen19 eral Assembly and duly incorporated into all 

20 contracts and a Model Memorandum of Under21 standing, and mechanisms have been estab22 lished for training such personnel concerning 

23 the requirements of the Code and enforcement 

24 of the Code. 


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1 (B) All personnel, regardless of category or 

2 rank, serving in a peacekeeping operation have 

3 been trained concerning the requirements of the 

4 Code of Conduct and each has been given a per5 sonal copy of the Code, translated into the na6 tional language of such personnel. 

7 (C) All personnel, regardless of category or 

8 rank, are required to sign an oath that each has 

9 received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that 

10 each pledges to abide by the Code, and that 

11 each understands the consequences of violating 

12 the Code, including immediate termination of 

13 participation in and permanent exclusion from 

14 all current and future peacekeeping operations, 

15 as well as the assumption of personal liability 

16 for victims compensation as a condition of the 

17 appointment to such operation. 

18 (D) All peacekeeping operations have de19 signed and implemented educational outreach 

20 programs to reach local communities where 

21 peacekeeping personnel of such operations are 

22 based to explain prohibited acts on the part of 

23 United Nations peacekeeping personnel and to 

24 identify the individual to whom the local popu25 lation may direct complaints or file allegations 


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1 of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of mis2 conduct. 

3 (E) The creation of a centralized database, 

4 including personnel photos, fingerprints, and bi5 ometric data, has been completed and is being 

6 maintained in the United Nations Department 

7 of Peacekeeping Operations that tracks cases of 

8 misconduct, including the outcomes of inves9 tigations and subsequent prosecutions, to en10 sure that personnel, regardless of category or 

11 rank, who have engaged in misconduct or other 

12 criminal activities are permanently barred from 

13 participation in future peacekeeping operations. 

14 (F) A Model Memorandum of Under15 standing between the United Nations and each 

16 Member State that contributes troops to a 

17 peacekeeping operation has been adopted by the 

18 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 

19 Operations that specifically obligates each such 

20 Member State to— 

21 (i) uphold the uniform Code of Con22 duct which shall apply equally to all per23 sonnel serving in United Nations peace24 keeping operations, regardless of category 

25 or rank; 


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1 (ii) designate a competent legal au2 thority, preferably a prosecutor with exper3 tise in the area of sexual exploitation and 

4 abuse where appropriate, to participate in 

5 any investigation into an allegation of mis6 conduct brought against an individual of 

7 such Member State; 

8 (iii) refer to its competent national or 

9 military authority for possible prosecution, 

10 if warranted, any investigation of a viola11 tion of the Code of Conduct or other crimi12 nal activity by an individual of such Mem13 ber State; 

14 (iv) report to the Department of Field 

15 Support and the Department of Peace16 keeping Operations on the outcome of any 

17 such investigation; 

18 (v) undertake to conduct on-site court 

19 martial proceedings, where practical and 

20 appropriate, relating to allegations of mis21 conduct alleged against an individual of 

22 such Member State; and 

23 (vi) assume responsibility for the pro24 vision of appropriate assistance to a victim 


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1 of misconduct committed by an individual 

2 of such Member State. 

3 (G) A professional and independent inves4 tigative and audit function has been established 

5 within the United Nations Department of 

6 Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of In7 ternal Oversight Services to monitor United 

8 Nations peacekeeping operations. 

Æ 


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