COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Elder and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

JESSE JEROME HENDREN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1961-99-2 JUDGE MARVIN F. COLE 

 AUGUST 1, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HALIFAX COUNTY 

William L. Wellons, Judge 

 Tracy L. Quackenbush, Assistant Public 

Defender, for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

 Jesse Jerome Hendren, appellant, was convicted in a bench 

trial of possession of cocaine, obstruction of justice and driving 

without an operator's license. On appeal, appellant contends the 

trial judge erred by denying his motion to suppress. We disagree 

and affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

 On September 27, 1998, appellant approached a traffic 

checking detail on Sinai Road in Halifax County. Deputy Sheriff 

Steve Moore testified that appellant "pulled up to the checking 

detail" but "wouldn't stop at first." Moore "had to instruct 
[appellant] two or three times to stop the car." When Moore asked 

for appellant's driver's license, appellant "said he did not have 

it with him at the time." Moore then "asked [appellant] to pull 

over to the side of the road, so he wouldn't block the traffic 

that was coming through." Appellant's car contained three 

passengers. Moore asked appellant to step out of the car and 

again inquired about appellant's driver's license. "When 

[appellant] got out of the car, he had his right hand closed[,] 

. . . [and h]e was trying to hide his hand from [Moore]." Moore 

asked appellant to keep his hands where Moore could see them, but 

appellant "kept moving his hand around." Moore testified as 

follows: 

He moved his hand around behind his leg, 

trying to hide it from me. Again, I told 

him to open his right hand and keep it where 

I could see it. He tried to stick his hand 

in his pocket, and when he tried to put his 

hand in his pocket, [Moore and another 

officer] grabbed him. 

 Appellant's "hand still wouldn't open." A struggle ensued, 

and the officers placed appellant on the ground. After subduing 

appellant, the officers "turned him over on his left side and 

found . . . what appeared to be crack cocaine up under him." 

 At the March 10, 1999 hearing on appellant's motion to 

suppress, appellant argued that he was unlawfully seized and 

searched based solely on a traffic stop. According to 

appellant, "there was no probable cause" or "reasonable 

suspicion to believe he had done anything criminal." He argued 

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that "having a closed hand does not indicate he had a weapon, 

and it doesn't indicate criminal activity." 

ANALYSIS 

The Law

 Once a vehicle has been lawfully stopped, an officer is 

authorized to "take necessary measures to determine whether the 

person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat 

of physical harm." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968). Such 

measures may include a pat-down search for weapons. See id. at 

27. The question is would "the facts available to the officer 

at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of 

reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was 

appropriate?" Id. at 21-22. 

The purpose of this limited [protective] 

search is not to discover evidence of crime, 

but to allow the officer to pursue his 

investigation without fear of violence 

. . . . So long as the officer is entitled 

to make a forcible stop, and has reason to 

believe that the suspect is armed and 

dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search 

limited in scope to his protective purpose. 

Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (discussing Terry). 

 In determining the reasonableness of a search, a court must 

balance "'the need to search [or seize] against the invasion 

which the search [or seizure] entails.'" Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 

(quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 

(1967)). In Terry, the Supreme Court explained: 

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[T]here is the more immediate interest of 

the police officer in taking steps to assure 

himself that the person with whom he is 

dealing is not armed with a weapon that 

could unexpectedly and fatally be used 

against him. Certainly it would be 

unreasonable to require that police officers 

take unnecessary risks in the performance of 

their duties. American criminals have a 

long tradition of armed violence, and every 

year in this country many law enforcement 

officers are killed in the line of duty, and 

thousands more are wounded. Virtually all 

of these deaths and a substantial portion of 

the injuries are inflicted with guns and 

knives. 

 In view of these facts, we cannot blind 

ourselves to the need for law enforcement 

officers to protect themselves and other 

prospective victims of violence in 

situations where they may lack probable 

cause for an arrest. When an officer is 

justified in believing that the individual 

whose suspicious behavior he is 

investigating at close range is armed and 

presently dangerous to the officer or 

others, it would appear to be clearly 

unreasonable to deny the officer the power 

to take necessary measures to determine 

whether the person is in fact carrying a 

weapon and to neutralize the threat of 

physical harm. 

Id. at 23-24. 

 A search for weapons in the absence of 

probable cause to arrest, however, must, 

like any other search, be strictly 

circumscribed by the exigencies which 

justify its initiation. Thus, it must be 

limited to that which might be used to harm 

the officer or others nearby, and may 

realistically be characterized as something 

less than a "full" search, even though it 

remains a serious intrusion. 

Id. at 25-26. 

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 "The officer need not be absolutely certain that the 

individual is armed; the [ultimate] issue is whether a 

reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted 

in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." 

Id. at 27. "The validity of a seizure '"turns on an objective 

assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and 

circumstances confronting him at the time," and not on the 

officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action 

was taken.'" Welshman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 20, 30, 502 

S.E.2d 122, 127 (1998) (en banc) (citations omitted). Moreover, 

"[a]n officer is entitled to view the circumstances confronting 

him in light of his training and experience, and he may consider 

any suspicious conduct of the suspected person." James v. 

Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 740, 745, 473 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1996). 

If, under Terry, a police officer is 

justified in conducting a protective weapons 

search based upon the officer's reasonable 

belief that a suspect may be armed and 

dangerous, such a weapons search would 

necessarily include the right to search a 

clenched fist. Common sense would not 

dictate otherwise. Weapons are normally 

held in one's hands. Hence, a search for 

weapons in a suspect's hands is reasonable 

under such circumstances. Otherwise, a 

suspect could avoid the detection of a 

weapon by simply hiding it in his hand, 

where it remains ready for use. 

State v. Williams, 544 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Neb. 1996). 

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Application

 Appellant does not contest the validity of the traffic 

checkpoint or the validity of his stop. Instead, he argues 

that: (1) the officers' actions in grabbing his hand when he 

thrust it into his pocket "[were] not proper as a search 

incident to the traffic violation"; and (2) his "behavior did 

not otherwise justify the search." 

 When appellant approached the traffic checkpoint, he 

initially refused to stop his car. It was not until the officer 

instructed appellant two or three times to stop that he did so. 

Upon further investigation, the officer learned that appellant 

did not have in his possession a driver's license. Appellant's 

reluctance to stop the car and failure to possess a driver's 

license properly aroused the officer's suspicion and supported 

Officer Moore's decision to have appellant pull over so he could 

investigate the situation. Under those circumstances, Moore did 

not know whether appellant possessed a valid license.1 

Appellant's car contained three passengers. When appellant 

exited his car, he kept his right hand closed and tried to hide 

 1

 By not having a driver's license in his possession when he 

was stopped, appellant was in violation of Code § 46.2-104, 

failure to carry a driver's license, a traffic infraction 

punishable by a fine. At the time of the incident, Moore also 

had to consider, inter alia, whether appellant had a valid 

driver's license, see Code § 46.2-300, whether he was driving on 

a suspended or revoked license, see Code § 46.2-301, or whether 

he was driving after having been declared a habitual offender, 

see Code § 46.2-357. 

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it. At this point, the police had observed three highly 

suspicious circumstances warranting further investigation. 

Appellant refused Moore's order to open his hand and attempted 

to place his hand into his pants pocket, causing the officers to 

grab his hand. 

 In light of the facts and circumstances confronting the 

officers at the time, including appellant's suspicious conduct, 

see James, 22 Va. App. at 745, 473 S.E.2d at 92, the officers 

were justified in seizing appellant's hand. We find the 

circumstances under which the police encountered appellant, 

namely, appellant's escalating suspicious behavior during a 

valid traffic stop, "'warrant[ed] a man of reasonable caution in 

the belief' that the action taken was appropriate[.]" Terry, 

392 U.S. at 21. In other words, we hold that "a reasonably 

prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the 

belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." Id. at 

27; see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985) 

(after officers validly stopped suspect pursuant to Terry, "they 

were authorized to take such steps as were reasonably necessary 

to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo 

during the course of the stop"); People v. Shackelford, 546 P.2d 

964, 967 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (during valid Terry stop, 

defendant kept his hand closed and refused to open it; officers 

forced it open and found stolen credit cards; upholding search 

"prompted by the defendant's suspicious and unusual movements in 

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response to the confrontation"); State v. Bridges, 610 So. 2d 

827, 828-29 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that officers were 

justified in forcing open defendant's clenched fist during Terry

stop); Worthey v. State, 805 S.W.2d 435, 437, 439 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1991) (upholding search of purse where, during Terry stop, 

defendant disobeyed officer's order not to move or hide her 

hands); Manry v. State, 621 S.W.2d 619, 622-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1981) (defendant's "unusual behavior" when stopped justified 

weapons search); Welshman, 28 Va. App. at 34, 502 S.E.2d at 129 

(approving frisk for weapons; holding that police officer may 

preserve the status quo by ordering detainee to place his hands 

where officer can see them). 

 Therefore, the trial judge did not err in denying 

appellant's motion to suppress the evidence. Accordingly, we 

affirm. 

Affirmed.

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