NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0434-23

KRITHIGA SADEESHKUMAR, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

SADEESHKUMAR VENUGOPAL, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________________

Argued January 29, 2024 — Decided February 9, 2024 

Before Judges Sabatino, Mawla, and Vinci. 

On appeal from an interlocutory of the Superior Court 

of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, 

Middlesex County, Docket No. FM-12-2082-22.

Derek Matthew Freed argued the cause for appellant 

(Ulrichsen Rosen & Freed, LLC, attorneys; Derek 

Matthew Freed, of counsel and on the briefs; Neethi

Vasudevan, on the briefs). 

Roy Joseph Thibodaux, III argued the cause for 

respondent (Berkowitz Lichtstein Kuritsky Giasullo & 

Gross, LLC, attorneys; Roy Joseph Thibodaux, III, of 

counsel and on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by 

MAWLA, J.A.D. 

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION 

February 9, 2024 

APPELLATE DIVISION 
A-0434-23

2 

 Defendant Sadeeshkumar Venugopal appeals from a July 6, 2023 order 

denying a motion to amend his answer to a complaint for divorce filed by 

plaintiff Krithiga Sadeeshkumar. He also challenges an August 29, 2023 order 

denying his motion for reconsideration. We reverse both orders. 

 The parties were married for over thirty years when plaintiff filed her 

complaint for divorce in May 2022. The complaint alleged irreconcilable 

differences and, in addition to dissolution of the marriage, sought an award of 

equitable distribution, open durational alimony, and counsel fees. In October 

2022, defendant filed an answer to the complaint, along with affirmative 

defenses. The answer denied "the existence of a cause of action in favor of 

[p]laintiff." It also noted there was a separate litigation in the Law Division, 

commenced by defendant, regarding a business founded during the marriage. 

Plaintiff is a third-party intervenor in the business case and the defendant is 

Selvakumar Murugan. 

In May 2023, defendant moved to amend his answer to the divorce 

complaint to include a counterclaim for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty 

and irreconcilable differences. Defendant certified he and plaintiff met 

Murugan in 2000. Murugan claimed to possess mythical and astrological 

powers given to him by a Hindu goddess. According to defendant, plaintiff 

declared Murugan as the family's Swamiji, a spiritual guru or teacher, and 
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3 

unilaterally devoted herself to him. Defendant claimed because of Murugan's 

manipulation, plaintiff and Murugan took actions in the business and divorce 

litigation that adversely affected his personal and financial wellbeing and caused 

him stress, anxiety, and emotional distress. He also learned plaintiff and 

Murugan had what he characterized as "an inappropriately intimate 

relationship," which "devastated" him and "violated all acceptable social norms 

and . . . further violated [the parties'] cultural values." Defendant urged the court 

to permit him to amend his answer in the interest of justice. 

Pursuant to the Rules of Court, defendant's answer appended a proposed 

answer and counterclaim for divorce. The counterclaim alleged the extreme 

cruelty began in 2013 and attached an eleven-paragraph schedule detailing the 

acts of extreme cruelty. 

According to the schedule, in 2017, plaintiff told defendant she wanted to 

"involve . . . Murugan in their business" and compensate him with "a 

disproportionately large renumeration," which "placed a financial strain on 

[d]efendant." Defendant claimed plaintiff "supported . . . Murugan's improper 

conduct as it relates to the parties' business," and her "actions . . . adversely 

affected [d]efendant['s] . . . reputation and finances." Moreover, "[p]laintiff 

improperly hindered [d]efendant['s] attempt to conduct a thorough inquiry" into 

the issues with the business. 
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4 

The schedule further alleged that in November 2018, defendant suffered 

from chest pain and called plaintiff, who was in India at the time. Plaintiff 

refused to speak with defendant and "forced" him to speak with Murugan. 

Shortly thereafter, defendant underwent a cardiac procedure and plaintiff did not 

return to the United States to support him. Plaintiff allegedly then pressured 

defendant into flying to India against medical advice. 

Defendant asserted that during the COVID-19 pandemic from February 

2020 to October 2020, plaintiff and Murugan were living together in India, in a 

"villa . . . improperly purchased with the funds from the parties' business." 

Because plaintiff would not communicate with defendant or family who were in 

India, he requested local police perform a welfare check on plaintiff and 

"retrieve her from the villa." When police found plaintiff, she allegedly told 

defendant that Murugan gave her "'divine water' to cure all her illnesses, but that 

the same had made her feel extremely drowsy." She told defendant she wanted 

to "maintain her distance" from Murugan. 

Defendant alleged Murugan manipulated plaintiff into leaving the United 

States and traveling to India sometime after September 2022. He reiterated that 

he learned plaintiff and Murugan "had been engaging in an inappropriately 

intimate relationship" causing him to "suffer[] . . . anxiety and severe emotional 

distress," which "endangered [his] health and safety." 
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 Plaintiff's counsel filed a letter brief in opposition to the motion to amend, 

arguing Rule 5:4-2(e) controlled and "only permits the filing of an amended 

pleading when 'a cause of action [] has arisen or become known since the filing 

of the original complaint.'" (emphasis added) (alteration in original). Therefore, 

defendant forfeited the opportunity to amend his pleadings because he knew 

about plaintiff's alleged conduct as early as 2013 but did not file a counterclaim. 

Counsel argued the court should not credit defendant's certification because it 

was based "upon information and belief" and he "fail[ed] to identify the source 

of such 'information and belief.'" 

 In reply, defendant's counsel argued his client learned about the details of 

plaintiff's conduct during the divorce. Counsel also pointed out defendant's 

frequent travels to India "reinforced" the "need for [d]efendant to have a separate 

and independent cause of action for divorce to ensure that the divorce move[d] 

forward." If plaintiff remained in India and withdrew her complaint for divorce, 

defendant would be unable to obtain a divorce and would be compelled to begin 

the process again, which would be a waste of money and judicial resources. 

Counsel reminded the court of the liberal standard to amend pleadings "without 

consideration of the ultimate merits of the amendment." 

 The motion judge denied the motion. Although his written findings noted 

plaintiff had filed a "diametrically opposing certification," as we noted, there 
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was only a letter brief submitted in opposition to defendant's motion. The judge 

found 

[d]efendant's request fails to add any substantive 

context to his counterclaim . . . and serves only to 

further exacerbate the contentious rapport between the 

parties during this litigation. The case is well over 427 

days old and both parties plead irreconcilable 

differences. Therefore, based on the discretion offered 

to the [c]ourt by R[ule] 4:9-1[,] . . . [d]efendant's 

request is denied without prejudice. 

 Defendant moved for reconsideration. He certified the judge was 

mistaken because he never pled irreconcilable differences, as his initial pleading 

was just an answer with affirmative defenses. Defendant explained he filed the 

motion to amend because when he filed his answer he was opposed to a divorce. 

He did not believe plaintiff "independently and free of duress, actually sought a 

divorce. . . . However, as discovery progressed, and based upon information 

learned in the context of [this litigation], it . . . became clear . . . that 

irreconcilable differences did exist between the parties." Defendant argued that 

at the pleadings stage, he did not have to provide the "substantive context" the 

court claimed was lacking because the court does not consider the ultimate 

merits on a motion to amend. Further, the court failed to consider defendant 

pled independent grounds for divorce and that it was important to obtain a 

divorce in the event plaintiff failed to prosecute her complaint. 
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 Plaintiff's counsel filed a letter brief in opposition to the reconsideration 

motion. Counsel argued plaintiff "vehemently denied" the reasons defendant 

asserted for amending his answer and defendant had not given a reason why he 

waited to amend. The brief reiterated an amendment was barred by operation of 

Rule 5:4-2(e). Therefore, the motion should be denied because defendant had 

not met the criteria for reconsideration and was merely dissatisfied with the 

judge's first order. 

 The motion judge denied the reconsideration motion. His written opinion 

recounted each party's argument, recited the law, and concluded that he 

"agree[d] with . . . [p]laintiff's position." We granted defendant leave to appeal 

from the July and August 2023 orders. 

I.

 On appeal, defendant repeats the standard for amending pleadings is 

liberal and he should have been permitted to amend to include a counterclaim 

because he discovered the salient facts underlying his causes of action during 

discovery. Further, the judge applied the wrong legal standard when he denied 

the motion to amend on grounds defendant failed to add any substantive context. 

Defendant asserts the judge should have granted his motion in the interest of 

justice to enable defendant to be divorced. The judge also erred when he found 

defendant had pled a cause of action for irreconcilable differences and denied 
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the motion to amend and reconsideration. Moreover, the judge applied Rule 

4:49-2 when he denied reconsideration and instead should have used Rule 4:42-

2 because his initial ruling was interlocutory. 

II. 

Rule 4:9-1 describes when a party in a civil case may amend a pleading,

including "at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading 

is one to which no responsive pleading is to be served, and the action has not 

been placed upon the trial calendar, at any time within [ninety] days after it is

served." Thereafter, a party may also amend "by written consent of the adverse 

party or by leave of court which shall be freely given in the interest of justice." 

Ibid. 

In exercising its discretion whether to grant leave to amend, the court is

guided by the fact that leave is "liberally granted and without consideration of

the ultimate merits of the amendment." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court 

Rules, cmt. 2.1 on R. 4:9-1 (2024); see also Kernan v. One Washington Park, 

154 N.J. 437, 456-57 (1998). "The broad power of amendment should be

liberally exercised at any stage of the proceedings, including on remand after 

appeal, unless undue prejudice would result . . . ." Ibid. (citing Bustamante v.

Borough of Paramus, 413 N.J. Super. 276, 298 (App. Div. 2010)). 
A-0434-23

9 

Despite the liberal standard of Rule 4:9-1, judges may deny leave to

amend when the granting of relief would be "futile," as when the new claim 

lacks merit and would ultimately be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted. Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490, 501

(2006). Even if the new claim possesses marginal merit, leave to amend may be

denied if the claim would unduly protract the litigation or cause undue prejudice. 

Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 424 N.J. Super. 448, 484 (App. 

Div. 2012); Fisher v. Yates, 270 N.J. Super. 458, 467 (App. Div. 1994). 

A.

Guided by these principles, we conclude the judge erred when he denied 

defendant's motion to amend his pleadings. At the outset, we note the judge 

made a mistaken finding of fact when he found defendant had pled a cause of 

action for irreconcilable differences. Defendant never filed a counterclaim for 

divorce. 

Moreover, the judge misapplied the law when he considered the merits of 

the allegations contained in the proposed answer and counterclaims, and then 

denied defendant's motion because the allegations lacked "substantive context." 

The Legislature has described the causes of action for extreme cruelty and 

irreconcilable differences as follows: 

c. Extreme cruelty, which is defined as including any 

physical or mental cruelty which endangers the safety 
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10

or health of the plaintiff or makes it improper or 

unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to continue to

cohabit with the defendant; provided that no complaint 

for divorce shall be filed until after [three] months from 

the date of the last act of cruelty complained of in the 

complaint, but this provision shall not be held to apply 

to any counterclaim; 

. . . . 

i. Irreconcilable differences which have caused the 

breakdown of the marriage for a period of six months 

and which make it appear that the marriage should be 

dissolved and that there is no reasonable prospect of 

reconciliation. 

[N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2(c) and (i).] 

Defendant's proposed counterclaim clearly pled sufficient grounds for 

divorce on both extreme cruelty and irreconcilable differences. The schedule 

attached to the counterclaim outlined alleged conduct by plaintiff that 

endangered defendant's health and caused the breakdown of the marriage. That 

conduct, if proven, would not make it reasonable for the parties to remain 

married. 

We do not share the motion judge's view that defendant's ability to amend 

a pleading should be denied because it would "exacerbate the contentious 

rapport between the parties during this litigation." There is no doubt Family 

Part judges handle contentious cases in every docket type. Their job, 

particularly in dissolution cases, is to cool the temperature and decide cases 
A-0434-23

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based on objective evidence to enable the parties to move on with their lives. 

However, subject to leave of court, in interest of justice, the court should permit 

the parties to timely allege why the marriage should be dissolved—unless a party 

seeks to file a futile, frivolous, or harassing pleading. To do otherwise would 

frustrate the statutory right to a divorce. 

Indeed, "the Legislature has adopted liberal grounds for citizens to end 

their marriages . . . ." Steiner v. Steiner, 470 N.J. Super. 112, 120 (App. Div. 

2021). In Steiner, the plaintiff sought a divorce on irreconcilable differences 

grounds. Id. at 116. At trial, she testified the parties had personal differences, 

the defendant physically mistreated her, and his control of the parties' finances 

during the marriage led her to seek a divorce. Id. at 120-21. 

On appeal, the defendant argued the trial judge's finding the plaintiff 

established irreconcilable differences was against the weight of the evidence. 

Id. at 124. We upheld the trial judge's decision to grant the plaintiff a divorce 

on those grounds; the point being "that divorce isn't available on mere request 

or demand. . . . Even a 'no fault' divorce requires more than the desire to divorce 

by imposing on the [party seeking the divorce] an obligation to show" they have 

met the statutory elements. Id. at 119. 

We are also unpersuaded the age of the case was a reason to prevent 

defendant from filing his counterclaim. The parties did not have a trial date, 
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discovery was still outstanding, and this was not a run-of-the-mill divorce. Not 

only were the parties engaged in a business litigation, plaintiff sought alimony, 

equitable distribution, and counsel fees. Defendant's proposed counterclaim 

sought equitable distribution and counsel fees. These issues were all 

interrelated, and if the matter proceeded to a trial, it could not be adjudicated 

with just half of the picture. 

On its surface, defendant's counterclaim suggests the case is complex 

because it involved Murugan, who defendant claimed influenced the business, 

and a potential dissipation claim impacting alimony, equitable distribution, and 

counsel fees. The dissipation of assets is a consideration in equitable 

distribution. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1(i); see also Kothari v. Kothari, 255 N.J. 

Super. 500, 506 (App. Div. 1992). Further, we have held alimony may be denied 

for an otherwise deserving spouse where that spouse engages in egregious 

conduct by secreting assets or income from the marriage affecting the parties' 

economic life. Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J. Super. 61, 76-77 (App. Div. 2012). And 

an award of counsel fees requires the court to consider the parties' good faith or 

lack thereof. R. 5:3-5(c). This consideration applies when parties seek fees for 

litigating dissipation claims. See Orlowski v. Orlowski, 459 N.J. Super. 95, 

100-01, 108 (App. Div. 2019) (affirming an award of counsel fees related to the 
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prosecution and defense of dissipation claims from the dissipating party's 

retirement funds.). 

B.

Although the judge did not rely upon Rule 5:4-2(e) to deny the motion, 

we take this opportunity to address plaintiff's interpretation of it. Plaintiff 

argued defendant was barred by Rule 5:4-2(e) from amending his answer to 

include a counterclaim because he alleged acts of extreme cruelty and 

irreconcilable differences beginning in 2013, yet failed to include a counterclaim 

when he filed his first responsive pleading. Further, at oral argument before us, 

plaintiff's counsel asserted the standard articulated under Rule 5:4-2(e) is not 

the liberal interest of justice standard of Rule 4:9-1.

Rule 5:4-2(d) reads as follows: 

Counterclaim. A counterclaim may state any family 

cause of action, and any other cause or causes of action 

which exist at the time of service of the counterclaim. 

A counterclaim not stated in an answer may be filed by 

leave of the court at any time prior to final judgment. 

Failure to file a counterclaim for divorce, dissolution of 

civil union, termination of domestic partnership, or 

nullity shall not bar such cause of action. . . .

Rule 5:4-2(e) states: 

Amended or Supplemental Complaint or Counterclaim 

in Dissolution Matters. In any action for divorce,

dissolution of civil union, termination of domestic 

partnership, nullity, or separate maintenance, a 

supplemental complaint or counterclaim may be 
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allowed to set forth a cause of action which has arisen 

or become known since the filing of the original 

complaint, and an amended complaint or counterclaim

may be allowed to change the action from the originally 

pleaded cause to any other cognizable family or family 

type action. 

Rule 5:4-2(e)'s origins can be traced to the adoption of the 1947 State 

Constitution. The proposed source Rule was Rule 3:83-5, which read as follows: 

(a) In any action for divorce, nullity, annulment or 

separate maintenance, an amendment to the complaint

or counterclaim may be allowed to set forth a cause of 

action which has arisen since the filing of the original 

complaint, or to change the action from separate 

maintenance, absolute divorce or divorce from bed and 

board to any other one of the said actions. 

(b) This [Rule] shall not permit an amendment to 

recite a cause of action for desertion which had not 

accrued at the time of the filing of the complaint. 

[N.J. Ct. R. 3:83-5 (Tentative Draft 1948).] 

The annotation to the draft Rule explained its purpose: 

 From a technical standpoint, this proposed [Rule] 

refers to what would be called now a supplemental 

petition. However, under the present law a new cause 

of action cannot be stated by supplemental pleading, 

(Szelewa v. Windeler, 110 N.J. Eq. 299, 159 [(Ch. 

1932)]). But there is no real reason why a petitioner in 

a divorce action should be required to file an 

independent suit for a cause which arose since the 

commencement of the original action. One action 

should be enough to encompass grounds for divorce 

which existed when the suit was started or which have 

come into being since that time. 
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 For example, if a divorce is sought for desertion 

and, subsequently, the defendant commits adultery, the 

[plaintiff] ought to be permitted to charge that offense, 

also, by way of amendment. The same should be true

in the case of an original suit for extreme cruelty with 

a later adultery, or in the case of an original suit for 

adultery and another act arising at a later time. 

[N.J. Ct. R., 3:83-5 cmt. (Tentative Draft 1948).] 

The final rule was adopted as Rule 3:84-4 with minimal alteration and 

read as follows: 

(a) In any action for divorce, nullity of marriage, or 

separate maintenance, an amendment to the complaint

or counterclaim may be allowed to set forth a cause of 

action which has arisen or became known since the 

filing of the original complaint, or to change the action 

from separate maintenance, absolute divorce or divorce 

from bed and board to any other one of the said actions. 

(b) This [Rule] shall not permit an amendment to 

state a cause of action for desertion which had not

accrued at the time of the filing of the complaint or 

counterclaim. 

[N.J. Ct. R. 3:84-4 (1948).] 

The source rule eventually became Rule 5:4-2(e).1 The annotation to the 

Rule recounts "[t]he significant change which the source rule had made in 

1

 Rule 3:84-4 became Rule 4:95-4 in 1958. R. 4:95-4 (1958). It changed again 

to Rule 4:77-4 in 1969. R. 4:77-4 (1969). Rule 5:4-2(e) replaced Rule 4:77-4 

and "follow[ed] its source rule . . . almost verbatim. The only change is the 

substitution of the phrase 'family actions' for the former phrase 'matrimonial 

actions.'" Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 4, R. 5:4-2 (1986). 
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previous practice was the elimination of the prohibition against the filing of an 

amended or supplemental pleading to allege a cause of action for desertion 

which had not accrued at the time of the filing of the complaint or counterclaim." 

Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, History and Analysis of Rule 

Amendments to R. 5:4-2, note 5, www.gannlaw.com (2024). The Rule was later 

amended in September 2011 to include domestic partnerships and civil unions 

and its caption was amended in September 2015 to denote its application only 

to dissolution matters. Ibid. See also 2015 Sup. Ct. Fam. Prac. Comm. Rep. 13. 

There is no precedent applying Rule 5:4-2(e) in the manner suggested by 

plaintiff. Existing precedent has interpreted the predecessor, Rule 4:77-4, and 

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2 to permit the amendment of a complaint or counterclaim where 

a cause of action arose after the filing of the original pleading. See Semely v. 

Semely, 113 N.J. Super. 411, 414-15 (App. Div. 1971); Indiero v. Indiero, 116 

N.J. Super. 193 (Ch. Div. 1971). 

Aside from the Rule 5:4-2(e)'s history, a reading of its plain language 

explains why plaintiff's argument is misplaced. The Rule governs the process 

of amending a counterclaim, not amending an answer to include a counterclaim 

as defendant sought to do here. Defendant never filed a counterclaim, which he 

later sought to amend. Rule 5:4-2(e) is inapplicable here. 
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Further, unlike Rule 4:9-2, which permits an amendment of the pleadings 

where issues not raised in the pleadings are revealed at trial; or Rule 4:9-3, which 

permits an amendment to relate back to the date of the original pleading if "the 

amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth 

or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading"; Rule 5:4-2(e) is unique to 

dissolution cases. The Rule envisions the following example: a spouse uncovers 

facts about the party or the marriage itself previously unknown to that spouse 

during the divorce proceedings, including the existence of other relationships or 

the presence or absence of assets or liabilities affecting the parties' rights in a 

divorce. The Rule permits that party to amend the counterclaim accordingly. 

"Civil family actions [are] governed by the rules in Part IV insofar as 

applicable and except as otherwise provided by the rules in Part V." R. 5:1-1. 

Therefore, Rule 5:4-2(e), being one that is applied in a court of equity such as 

the Family Part, supplements Rule 4:9. Rule 5:4-2(e) does not alter the interest 

of justice standard set forth in Rule 4:9-1, which governs all amended pleadings. 

In Family Part matters, an amendment to a responsive pleading to include a 

counterclaim is governed by Rule 5:4-2(d), which like Rule 4:9-1 requires leave 

of court, but in recognition of the Family Part's inherent equitable authority 

stipulates leave can be granted "at any time prior to final judgment." The logic 

undergirding the ability to seek leave at any time emanates from the salutary 
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procedure often employed in divorce matters, whereby parties who had initially 

filed pleadings alleging grounds other than irreconcilable differences can later 

amend their pleadings to assert irreconcilable differences as a peaceable means 

of ending the divorce. 

Plaintiff's interpretation of Rule 5:4-2(e) would impede divorce litigants' 

access to justice because they would be barred from pursuing causes of action 

revealed to them during the case. This would create, rather than remove, barriers 

to the resolution of cases, turn up the temperature of a divorce case, and work 

the opposite result of what the motion judge professed was his goal. 

For these reasons, we conclude there was an ample basis, both as a matter 

of fact and law, to grant defendant's motion to amend his pleadings in the interest 

of justice. In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that our decision is the first 

published opinion that harmonizes Rule 5:4-2(d) and (e) with Rule 4:9-1, and 

that the motion judge and counsel did not yet have the benefit of that guidance. 

The July 6, 2023 order is reversed. 

III. 

Because we have reversed the July 2023 order, the August 29, 2023 order 

requires little discussion. However, we add the following as guidance. 

"[A] trial court's reconsideration decision will be left undisturbed unless 

it represents a clear abuse of discretion." Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC 
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Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015). "[R]eversal is

required when the [trial judge's decision] . . . 'is clearly unfair or unjustly 

distorted by a misconception of law or findings of fact that are contrary to the

evidence.'" M.G. v. S.M., 457 N.J. Super. 286, 294 (2018) (quoting Wadlow v.

Wadlow, 200 N.J. Super. 372, 382 (App. Div. 1985)). We owe no deference to

a trial court on questions of law. Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. 

Div. 2019). 

An order "which adjudicates fewer than all of the claims as to all the

parties" is interlocutory and shall be subject to revision at any time before the 

entry of final judgment in the sound discretion of the court in the interest of

justice. R. 4:42-2(b). "Reconsideration under this rule offers a 'far more liberal 

approach' than Rule 4:49-2, governing reconsideration of a final order." JPC 

Merger Sub LLC v. Tricon Enters., Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 145, 160 (App. Div. 

2022) (quoting Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128, 134 (App. Div. 2021)).

 The motion judge applied the incorrect legal standard when he decided 

the reconsideration motion, because he relied on the non-interlocutory Rule 

4:49-2 standard. Pursuant to our de novo review and applying the "far more 

liberal approach" under Rule 4:42-2, we conclude the motion for reconsideration 

should have been granted. For these reasons, the August 29, 2023 order denying 

reconsideration is reversed. 
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 Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.