## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## R E P O R T S Appellate Court

State Farm Fire & Casu alty Co. v. You ng , 2012 IL App (1st) 103736

Appellate Court Caption STATE FARM FI RE AND CASUAL TY COMPANY, PlaintiffAppellee , v. THOMAS YOUN G, Def endant- Appellant.

District & N o. First District, Six th Division Docke t No. 1-10-3736

Filed April 20, 2012

Held ( Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) J udg ment on the pleading s was proper ly enter ed for plaintiff insurer in its action seeking a decla

ratory judgme nt that the insurer had no obligation
to defe nd its in s u re d in an underly ing action for assault and battery and claims of neg lige nce, since the policies at issue cove red only acc idental injuries, but the underly ing action allege d defe ndant provided heroin to
a woman, that he beat her when she overdos ed and became i ll, and that she died afte r he failed to seek medical car e for her, and those alleg ations

acc used def

endant of intentional conduct that could not be c onstrued as

assertions that an acc ident occur red; there fore
, the policies’ exclusions of

cover ag e for bodily injury or damag e expected or intended by the insured applied.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 10-CH-00998; the Hon. Michae l B. Hyman, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affirmed.Counsel on

Appea l Robert G. Riffner, of Riffner Ba rber L L C, of Schaumburg
, for appellant.

Michae l Resis, Glen E. Amundsen, and Rache l Wint hrop, all of Smit h Amundsen LL C, of Chicag o, for a ppellee.

Panel J USTI CE GARCI A deliver ed the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion.
J ustices L ampkin and Palmer c oncurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 The circ uit cour t gra n t ed j u d gm en t o n the pleading s to plaintiff State Fa rm in a decla ratory judgme nt action seeking a dete rmination that it was not obligate d to defe nd its insured in a civil suit for assault and battery and for claims of neg lige nce. The sui t alleg ed that the defe ndant provided heroin to a y oung woman an d
, when she became seriously ill fr o m an overdose
, he beat her sever ely and failed to seek medical help for the vict i m , resulting in her death. State Fa rm’s motion arg ued that it was entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law beca

use the insurance policies at issue cover ed only acc idental injuries. On de novo revie w, we ag ree with the circ uit co u rt t h at n o materia l question of fac t exis ted under the fac ts alleg ed in the underlying complaint and that only one conclusion rea sonably followed from the alleg ations in the underlying civil suit: the injuries wer e intentionally cause d by the insured. It follows that State Farm owed no duty to defe nd the def

endant. We af

firm.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 On J une 29, 2008, the defe ndant, Thomas Young
, was 21 y ear s old and was living in his
pare nts’ home in Prospect Heig hts, I llinois

. The defen d an t i n vited the victim, Gina Dominick, to h i s home. He told her he had purcha sed some heroin and offe red to share it with her. Sometime in the early morning h o u rs , Gina died from the combination of an overdose and injuries from a beating

. Her body was found the next morning at 10:45 a.m. in her c ar pa rked in the pa

rking lot of the Prospect He ights public library

. ¶ 4 Gina’s fathe r, Michae l Dominick, as administrator of her estate, filed a civil suit a g ainst the defendant and his pare nts, Chester and Tere sa Young. Only t h e al l egations against the defe ndant in the underlying complaint are rele vant to this appea l. The complaint alleg ed the following fac ts. The defe ndant boug ht he roin and provided it to Gina at his pa rents’ home. After taking the drugs, Gina suffe red an overdose and became v i olently ill. The defenda nt beg an sever ely beating Gina without provoca t i on or justification. Despite knowing that Gina’s condition was critical, the defe ndant failed to call 911, take her to a hospital, or seek medical attention. Gina died as a result of her injuries and h er drug g ed condition at the

-2-defe ndant’s home. The defe ndant then car ried her body to her car , drove the car to the library parking lot, abandoned the car , and walked hom e. Once at home, he attempted to clean up “massive a mounts of Gina Dominick’s blood.” ¶ 5 The estate’ s complaint soug ht damag es for wrong ful death, pain and suffe ring
, and burial
expenses. The complaint alleg ed that the defe ndant was liable for battery in beating Gina and
t h at h e was liable for neg lige ntly failing to procur e medical assistance for Gina. I n conjunction with the neg lige nce claims, the complaint specific ally alleg ed that the defe ndant “ca rele ssly and neg lige ntly failed to take [Gina] to a hospital.” The defe ndant, as a resident of his pare n t s ’ home, soug ht cover ag e from State Fa rm for his defe nse of the estate’ s complaint and for

indemnification in the eve nt of a judg ment. ¶ 6 The defe ndant’s pare nts wer e the listed insureds in a homeowner s insurance policy and

a p ersona l liability umbrella policy from State Fa rm. The homeowner s policy provided

cover ag e for “a suit *** ag ainst an insured for damag es beca use of bodily injury or property damag e *** cause d by an occur renc e.” For a cover ed “occ urre nce,” State Fa rm would provide a defe nse and pay damag es. The policy define d “occu rr ence” as “an acc ident, including e x posure to conditions which re sults in *** bodi ly injury .” The policy

expressly excluded cover ag e for

“[b] odily injury or prope rty damag e: (1) which is e ither expected or intended by the insured; or (2) which is t h e re s u lt of willful and malicious acts of the insured.” Under the umbrella poli cy , State Fa rm would pay damag es an d d ef en d against a claim resulting from a “loss.” I t define d a “loss” as “an ac cident, including injurious
exposure to conditions, which results in b o d i l y injury or proper ty damag e.” The umbrella policy excluded cover ag e arising from “bodily injury or property damag e: a. which is either expected or intended by y ou [t he insured]; or b. to any person or proper ty which is the result of y our willful and malicious ac t, no matter at whom the a ct was dire cted.” ¶ 7 Citi ng these provisions, State Fa rm filed a decla

ratory judgme nt complaint, contending the injuries sustained by Gina wer e not acc idental; rathe r, the i n j u ri es wer e cause d by the defe ndant’s inte n t i o n al acts, which prec luded a duty to defe nd on the part of State Fa rm. After the defe ndant filed his answe r, State Fa rm moved for judgme nt on the pleading s. State Fa rm arg ued that the undisputed fac ts in the underlying complaint by the estate fell outside the cover ag e provided by the policies and, in fac t, fell within the exclusion provisions of both policies. State Fa

rm also contende d that to find cover ag e for the injuries involved in this case would violate public policy
, which seeks to deter individuals from providing drug s to others. ¶ 8 The circuit court ruled State Fa rm h ad n o duty to defe nd the defendant and g rante d its motion for judgme nt on the pleading s. I n its oral announce ment, t h e court stated that the allegat i ons ag ainst the defe ndant “did not constitute an acc ident.” The court cited Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Freye r , 89 I ll

. Ap p

. 3 d 6 1 7 (1980), for the proposition that

cons eq u en ce s desired or rea sonably anticipated by an actor are not acc idental injuries
compensa ble by insurance

. The court noted that the defe ndant had pleade d g uilty to criminal battery ; it found the defe ndant’s acts of providing Gina with heroin and of beating her wer e willful and malicious. Acc ording ly
, neither the homeowner s policy nor the umbrella policy

cover ed the “occ urre nce” or “loss.” The court did not addre ss State Fa rm’s public policy
arg ument. The de fenda nt appea ls.

-3-¶ 9 ANAL YSI S

¶ 10 The defe ndant raises three issues: (1) whether questions of materia l fac t exis t to pr eclude judgme nt on the pleading s; (2) whether the underlying pleading s “can be construed to alleg e” injuries that constituted an “occ urre nce” or a “loss” as define d by the insurance policies; and (3) whether it is “not clea r and fre e from doubt” that the exclusion prov i sions of the two policies apply beca

use the circ uit court improperly invoked collater al estoppel arising from his battery

conviction. ¶ 11 A motion for judgme nt on the pleading s asserts the alleg ations in the pleading s and the exhibi ts to the pleading s, which are considere d part of the p l ea d i n gs , permit only one dispositi on as a matter of law. Employe rs Insurance of W ausau v. Ehlco Liquidat ing Trust
, 186 I ll. 2d 127, 138-39 (1999). J udg ment on the pleading s is proper only if no g enuine issue of materia l fac t exis ts and the moving party is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law. Gillen

v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
, 215 I ll. 2d 381, 385 (2005). We revie w the circ uit court’s g rant of judg ment on the pleading s de novo

. Id. ¶ 12 When an insurance company conclude s the claims in a lawsuit ag ainst its insured do not fall within the cover ag e provided by the policy
, th e i n s u ra n ce company must either (1) defe nd the l awsuit under a rese rvation of rig hts or (2) s ee k a d ec laratory judgme nt that no

cover ag e exis ts. Ehlco Liquidat ing Trust
, 186 I ll. 2d at 150-51; 735 I L C S 5/2-701 (West 2010). I f the fac ts alleg ed in the underlying complaint potent ially fall within the policy

co v er age, the insurer is obligated to provide a defe nse. Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Olsak
, 391 I ll. App. 3d 295, 30 2 (2 009). I ndemnification is a separ ate question from the much broade r duty to defe nd. “[T] he question of whether the insurer has a duty to indemnify the insured f

or a pa rticular liability

is only ripe for consideration if the i nsured has alrea dy incurre d liability in the underly i n g cl ai m ag ainst it.” Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. , 154 I ll. 2d 90, 127 (1992). ¶ 13 A court answe rs the question of whether a duty to defe nd exis ts by comparing the fa cts alleg ed in the underly ing c omplaint to the langua g e of the insurance policy

. Olsak
, 391 I ll. App. 3d at 302. No dut y to defe nd arises when “it is clear from th e fa ce o f t he underly ing complaint[ ] that the alleg ations fail to state fac ts which bring the case within, or potentially within, the policy ’s coverag e.” (Emphasis in orig inal.) (I nterna l quotation marks omitted.) Ehlco Liquidati ng Trust , 186 I ll. 2d at 153.

¶ 14 Materia l Question of Fa ct ¶ 15 The defe ndant initially arg ues that questions of materia l fac t exis t to prec lude judgme nt

on the pleading s. He contends the circ uit court err oneously premis ed i t s ruling on the alleg ations in the underlying complaint being true when the defe ndant expressly denied some of the alleg ations: he denied purcha sing heroin, striking Gina, or knowing that Gina neede d medical he lp. He conte nds these denia ls giverise to material questions of fac t. ¶ 16 State Fa

rm counter s that the circuit court did not assume the truth of t he al l ega tions in
t he underlying complaint. Rather, the circ uit court considere d whether the well-plea ded fa ct u al alleg ations in the underlying complaint, if true, would potentially fall within the

-4-cover ag e clause s of the policies. The court ruled that the alleg ations of fac ts in the complaint

permitted only one conclusion: the defe n d a n t a c te d in te ntionally

. The defe ndant’s intentional
acts could not be construed to support a cover ed claim for an “occ urre nce” or a “loss” under either of the policies. ¶ 17 “[A] motion for judgme nt on the pleading s is like a motion for summary judgme nt ***.” (Int er n al q uotation marks omi tted.) Id. at 138. As the defendant arg ues, fact findi ng is not permitted in considering a motion for judgme nt on the pleading s. Howeve r, the court looks
to the fac tual alleg ations of the underlying complain t , ra t h er than the insured’s answe r, to determine whether a duty to defe nd exis ts. See National Fire Insurance of Hartford v. W alsh Construction Co.
, 392 I ll. App. 3d 312 (2009) (circ uit court did not er r i n re fusing to consider third-party complaint of additional insured in deciding whether insurer had a duty
to defe nd). The court must consider “only those fac ts appar ent from the fac e of the pleading s, matters subject to judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the rec ord.” Gillen
, 215 I ll. 2d at 385. “All we ll-pleade d fac ts and rea sonable infe renc es there from ar e take n as true.” Id. ¶ 18 The defe ndant insists that his denials of the well-plea ded fac ts on the fac e of the estate’ s complaint raise questions of fac t that prec lude judgme nt on the pleading s. The only arg ument

we can discern from the defe ndant’s main brief to support this claim is that the circ uit court

er re d b y v iewing the alleg ations in an “ag g reg ated fashion” rathe r than individually

. Th e defe ndant’s point underlying this arg ument esca pes us. Taking at fac e value the defe ndant’s contention that a differ ence exis ts betwee n viewing the alleg ations in “ag g reg ated fashion” and individually
, the defe ndant fails to pr ovide us with w hat that differ ence is; nor does he tell us why that differ ence , as s u m i n g there is one, g ives rise to materia l questions of fac t. This contention is forf

eited. Express Valet, Inc. v. City of Chicago
, 373 I ll. App. 3d 838, 855 (2007) ( ill-defined a nd insufficiently prese nted issues are forf

eited). ¶ 19 We also note the absenc e of any fac tual support fo r t h e d ef en d an t ’s denials of the alleg ations in the underlying complaint by the estate of Gina Dominick, which rende rs them

no more than bald assertions. See Practical Offset, Inc. v. Davis
, 83 I ll. App. 3d 566, 573-74 (1980) (def

endan t ’s bald assertion in his deposition was littl e better than his denial in the

answe r to the complaint, neither of which was sufficie nt to g ive rise to a question of fac t to prec lude summary judgme nt). The defe ndant’s denials in his answe r to the estate’ s c o mp la int
g rounded in assault and battery and neg lige nce wer e clea rly meant to avoid the implications of the complaint’s well-plea ded fac ts. Wit hout fac tual bases, the defe ndant’s denials do not merit consideration on the ultimate issue of whether the incident was potentially within the

cover ag e provided by the State Fa rm policies. The well-plea ded fac ts alleg e that Gina Dominick died of a combination of an overdose of heroin, which the defe ndant provided, and

a brutal beating
, which the defe ndant inflicted. The d ef en d an t ’s abjec t denials that he purcha sed heroin, s t ru ck Gina, or knew that Gina neede d medical help are insufficient to

override the we ll-pleade d fac ts in the estate’s c omplaint. ¶ 20 No m at er i al questions of fac t arise solely from the defe ndant’s denials to p re cl u d e judgme nt on the pleading s.

-5-¶ 21 Coverag e Unde r the Policies

¶ 22 Next, we examine the homeowner s policy and the umbrella policy to determine whether the alleg ations in the underlying complaint state fac ts that bring the case at least potentially within the cover age o f ei t her policy

. The defe ndant only arg ues that the fac ts in the underlying complaint may be “construe d” as alleg in g an ac ci dent, which would bring it within the cover ag e provisions of the policies. The homeowner s policy st at es i t co vers an “occ urre nce,” which it de fines as an acc ident. The umbrella policy provides cover ag e for a “loss,” which it likewise define s as an acc ident. Be cause the policies contain simil ar lang uag e providing for c overa g e of an “ac cident,” w e ana ly ze the policies conc urre ntly

. ¶ 23 The t h ru s t o f t h e d ef en d an t’s arg ument is that the underlying complaint “can be construed” to alleg e an acc ident beca use the complaint included claims based on neg lige nce. State Fa rm arg ues that the claims of n egl i gence based on the defe ndant’s failure to seek medical assistance for Gina notwithstanding, no acc ident was alleg ed beca use Gina’s death was not unexpected; it was a natura l and proba ble conse quence of the de fendant’s actions. ¶ 24 The issue for the circ uit court in this case was whether the comparison of the alleg ations in the estate’ s complaint to th e p rovi sions in the insurance policies g ave rise to a duty to defe nd. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Hatherley
, 250 I ll. App. 3d 333, 336 ( 1993). I n other words, did the alleg ations in the estate’ s complaint, taken as true, state fac ts that “bring the case within, or potentially within, the policy ’s cover ag e? ” (I nterna l quotation marks omitted.) Ehlco Liquidat ing Trust
, 186 I ll. 2d at 153. I f so, State Fa rm had the duty to defe nd the def endant; if not, State F arm ha d no duty to defe nd. ¶ 25 The policies do not expressly define the term “ac cident.” The defe ndant, howeve r, does
not contend the term is ambig uous. I n fac t, our case law has established clea r contours of the
term “ac cident.” Freye r , 89 I ll. App. 3d at 619; Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Carr
, 372 I ll. App. 3d 335, 340 (2007). ¶ 26 I n Freye r , the court noted, “An acc ident has been define d as an u n fo rs ee n occur renc e, usually *** an undesig ned sudden or unexpected event of an inflictive or unfo rt u n ate char acte r.” Freye r , 89 I ll. App. 3d at 619. The Freye r court also explained what the term excludes: “ The natura l and ordinary conseque nces of an act do not constitute an acc ident.” Id. To determine whether the alleg ed conduct of an insured involves a cover ed event, a court may also inquire “whether the per s on perf orming the acts leading to the result intended or expected the result.” Carr
, 372 I ll. App. 3d at 341. I f the ac t o r intended or expected the result, the eve nt was no ac cident. Id. ¶ 27 The underlying complaint soug ht rec overy on sever al bases. Counts I throug h I I I alleg ed assault and battery based on the defe ndant’s intentional conduct when he o v erdose d and battere d Gina, which the defe ndant does not contend fall potentially within the State Farm policies. The defe ndant makes this claim only as to counts I V through VI, which alleg ed “neg lige nce” based on the defe ndant’s failure to call 911 when the victim was in clea r peril. ¶ 28 The defe ndant contends a rea sonable rea ding of cou n t s I V throug h VI
, which alleg ed
neg lige nce b as ed o n t h e defe ndant’s failure to seek help for Gina afte r she became ill, supports the conclusion that an “ac cident” was involved b ec ause neg lige nt conduct is not intentional conduct. Ba sed on the claim of neg lige nce, the defe ndant arg ues this alone bring s

-6-counts IV throug h VI within Freye r ’s definition of an acc ident. We disag ree

. To determine

whether the complaint alleg ed an acc ident, we look not to the leg al theory asserted, but to the fac tual alleg ations. Travelers Insurance Cos. v

. P.C. Q uote, Inc
., 211 I ll. App. 3d 719, 729 (1991). ¶ 29 Counts I V throug h VI alleg ed that the defe ndant failed to call 911 when the victim was in clea r peril. Although these counts wer e listed as falli n g under the leg al theory of “neg lige nce,” the alleg ations support only one conclusion, that the defe ndant chose not to seek help for Gina. Rather than call 911, the defe ndant allowed Gina to die in his home and then moved her body in an eff ort to distance himself from her injuries and death. None of the d efendant’s actions can rea sonably be called acc idental; even though the acts o f t h e defe ndant ar e otherwise charac terized as “neg lige nt” i n the complaint, Gina’s injuries and her e ventual dea

th were a “natural and ordinary conseque nce[ ]” of the def endant’ s failure
to g et help. Freye r , 89 I ll. App. 3d at 619. Calling what occur red to Gina an “ac cident” is a tortured inter

pretation of the word. ¶ 30 Counts I throug h I I I also add backg round to the alleg ations in counts I V throug h VI

. The alleg ations of assault and batt er y committed by the defe ndant’s own fist can in no way be construed to support a claim of acc ident. The defe ndant’s alleg ed failure to procur e medical
treatment for Gina afte r he alleg edly place d her in pe ril was no less “the result intended or expected.” Carr
, 372 I ll. App. 3d at 341. The complaint alleg ed that afte r Gina was g iven heroin and sever ely battere d by the defe ndant, the defe ndant acte d neg lige ntly when he did
not call 911 or take Gina to the hospital. “An i n j u ry ca u s ed by an assault and battery normally is not considered t o b e ac cidental [citation]
, even if the specific injury was not intended.” Freye r , 89 I ll. App. 3d at 6 1 9

. W e q u estion how delibera te conduct by the defe ndant is transformed into mere “neg lige nce” based on his failure to seek medical aid for Gina. ¶ 31 As we noted, we do not look to the asserted leg al theory
, seeking to impose liabilityupon the defe ndant for his actions, to determine whether an acc ident occur red; rathe r, we look to the intended or expected results arising from the defe ndant’s actions or, in this case , omissions

. See Travelers Insurance C os. , 211 I ll. App. 3d at 729. Although the complaint does not expli citly alleg e that the defendant ex pecte d Gina to die fr om the lack of medical attention, that was the only rea sonable expectation g iven her condition as alleg ed by the wellpleade d fac ts of the underlying complaint. The injuries alleg ed in this case wer e not the result of an a ccide nt under a ny

definition for that term rec og nized in our jurisprudence

. ¶ 32 The underlying complaint, irrespe ctive of the neg lige nce claims in counts I V throug h VI
, did not alleg e fac ts that might potentially place the suit within the cover ag e of either of the State Fa rm policies. State Fa

rm did not have a dut y to defen d t h e d ef endant in the l awsuit filed by Gina’s estate. S ee Freye r , 89 I ll. App. 3 d at 6 2 1 (“ [ A]n insurer only has a duty to defe nd when the complaint alleg es fac ts which bring the case within or potentially within the policy cover ag e ***.”)

. ¶ 33 The respe ctive briefs of the parties also addre ss whether the exclusion provisions of the
two policies apply to the incident as alleg ed in the under l y i n g s u i t. We addre ss that contention as well to make clea r that ev en i f co u nts I V throug h VI
, alleg ing neg lige nce,

-7-might plausibly fit within the “ac cident” provisions of the policies, the exclusion provisions

apply to bar a ny

duty by State Fa rm to provide a de fense to the estate’ s complaint.

¶ 34 Ex clusions Under the Policies ¶ 35 As this court noted in Freye r , “insuranc e companies, in order to make this limit ation of

co vera g e [t o only acc idents] absolutely clea r and inesca

pable, include an exclus i o n fo r ‘intentional injuries’ cause d by the insured.” Id. at 619. Henc e, an inte n t i o n al act is “not

cover ed both beca

use it is not acc idental and beca use it falls under the policy exclusion.” Id.
at 621. I n other words, the co v er age clause and the exclusion clause overla p reg arding intentional conduct, making such conduct b o t h not compensa ble and expressly excluded under the insurance policy

. ¶ 36 Recog nizi ng this redundancy , the defe ndant raises a point of law. He contends the circ uit
court improperly relied upon his battery conviction to conclude he acte d intent i o n al l y to apply the exclusion clause s. The defe ndant cites Cowan v. Insurance Co. of North America
, 22 I ll. App. 3d 883 (1974), and Allstate Insurance Co. v. Kovar
, 363 I ll. App. 3d 493 (2006), as authority

that the conviction of t he ins ured of a criminal offense or a f inding of liability for tortious conduct underlying the civil claim does not automatica lly bar theinsured fr om contending that his conduct wa s not intentional for purposes of an exclusion clause. ¶ 37 I n Cowan
, the insured g ot into a car acc ident, and i n t h e co u rse of an arg ument that followed the a ccide nt, the insured pushed the other driver, causing him to fall and f rac ture his leg

. Cowan
, 22 I ll. App. 3d at 886-87. The driver sued the insured for assault and battery

. Id. T h e case proce eded to trial with the insurer providing a defe nse under a rese rvation of rig hts. Id. At trial, the insured testified he pushed the driver in self-de fense and claimed the injury the driver sustained was “unintentional and bizarre in r elation to the incident.” Id. at 888. The jury found t he ins ured liable and the insurer refuse d to pay the $8,000 judgme nt. Id. at 887. I n a declara

tory action contending it owed no duty t o indemnify its insured, the i n s u re r invoked estoppel, pointing to the tort judgme nt as proof that the insured ac t ed int en t i o n al l y

. The circ uit court viewed the issue as one of law and found in favor of the i n s u red. Id. I n the course of addre ssing whether summary judgme nt was proper, thi s court found estoppel based on the finding of tort liability inapplicable. We noted that the jury could have based its ve rdict on the lack of consent by the victim, r ather than on a finding that the insured acted i ntentionally in causing the fra cture to the driver’ s leg

. Id. at 890. The court noted that no specia l interrog atory to the jury was submitt ed. Id. at 888 n.1. The dispositi ve inquiry was whethe r t h e i n sured intended the harm to result, not whether he acte d intentionally when he pushed the driver. Id. at 892-93. Ultimately
, this court conclude d that whether the insured intended to harm the other driver rema ined a disputed question of fac t, which pre cluded summary judgme nt for the insure d. Id. at 895-96. ¶ 38 I n Kovar
, the victim and the insured, with other men on the i n s u re d ’s s i d e, g ot into a phy sical alterc ation. Kovar
, 363 I ll. App. 3d at 495. One of the men wave d a sharp object in the air, and the vi ct i m wa s either intentionally stabbed or pushed into the object in the scuff le. Id. Afte r the insured pled g uilty to battery
, the victim sued him under a theory of
neg l i gen ce

. Id. at 495-96. I n a decla ratory action, the insurer claimed it was entitled to

-8-summary judgme nt beca use the insured was estopped from denying he committed an intentional act g iven his plea of g uilty to battery

. Id. The circ uit court acc epted the arg ument; the Second District reve rsed. T h e court narr owly construed the question befor e it: “[T] his

case is about only whether [t he insured’s] conviction, in and of itself, is sufficie nt to answe r [t he] question” of whether “[the victim’s] injuries wer e cause d by an intentional or criminal act.” Id. at 500. The court answe red the question in the neg ative beca use the three “thre shold require ment[s] ” for the application of estoppel arising from a c onviction did not apply

. Id. at 502. The c ourt noted t hat even if all three require ments wer e present, it would be unfa ir to apply estoppel whe re the insured had an incentive to plea d g uilty to battery to retain the
prospec t of having his conviction expunged. Id. at 503-04. ¶ 39 Thus, while we ag ree with the defe ndant that Cowan and Kovar may prec lude the use of

a g uilty plea or a finding of tort liability to determine whether an incident was intentional for
purposes of insurance cover ag e, our ag ree ment with the defe ndant ends there

. We disag ree that the circ uit court here applied estoppel in this case ; nor does our decision rest upon that doctrine. ¶ 40 Our holding supra that the defe ndant’s intentional co n d u ct fe l l outside the cove rag e clause s beca

use the conduct did not constitute an acc ident also makes it fre e and clea r from d o u b t that the defe ndant’s intentional conduct fell within the exclusion clause s o f t h e policies. See Freye r , 89 I ll

. Ap p. 3d at 619 (“insurance companies, in order to make this limit ation of cover ag e [t o only acc idents] absolutely cle ar and inesca pable, include an exclusion for ‘intentional injuries’ caused by the insured” ). ¶ 41 We add the following to our observations in the cover ag e section. The exclusion clauses in the State Fa

rm ins u ra n ce policies apply when the insured intends to cause the
conseque nces of his conduct or the conseque nces are rea sonably expected to result from that conduct. Freye r , 89 I ll. App. 3d at 620. The terms “ ‘intended’ ” and “ ‘expected’ ” are not sy nony mous. Id. Even if the injuries wer e not planned or intended by the insured, “they may be of such a nature that they shoul d have been rea sonably anticipated (expected) by the insured.” Id. L ooking only to the alleg ations of fac t in the estate’ s underlying complaint, only intentional conduct by the defe ndant was alleg ed. Whil e the alleg ati o n s concerning the defe ndant’s failure to call 911 are labeled “neg lige nce,” it was fre e from doubt that his failure
to act was intenti o n al an d the result from his failure to act was expected. The defe ndant’s omissions wer e subjec t to the exclusi on provisions of the two State Fa rm policies. ¶ 42 Be ca u s e t h e lang uag e of the exclusion clause s and the cover ag e clause s of the two policies expressly exclude and provide no cover ag e for int en t i o n al conduct, we do not consider State F arm’s public policy arg ument.

¶ 43 CONCL USI ON ¶ 44 Neither the homeowner s policy nor the u mb r e ll a p o li c y p r ovided cover ag e for the injuries sustained by the victim beca use the well-plea ded all egations of fac t in the underlying complaint acc used t he defenda nt of i ntentional conduct; the alleg ations do not support the defe ndant’s claim that the alleg ations can be construed as asserting that an acc ident occur red. I t is also clea

r and fre e from doubt that the exclusion provisions of eac h policy applied to the

-9-defe ndant’s intentional acts wher e the injuries sustained by the victim wer e either intended

or expected to result. Under the clea r fac tual alleg ations of the underlying complaint in this

case , State Fa

rm had no duty to defe nd the defe ndant. We aff irm the circ uit court’s g rant of judgme nt on the pleading s to St ate F arm.

¶ 45 Affirmed.

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