In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-24-00051-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 3

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2023-004499-3 

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell

DINA S. KASWATUKA, Appellant

V. 

STONERIDGE HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, Appellee
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellee Stoneridge Homeowners’ Association (the HOA) nonsuited its claims 

against pro se Appellant Dina S. Kaswatuka and filed a no-evidence motion for 

summary judgment on her counterclaims. The trial court granted the motion and 

entered a take-nothing judgment.

On appeal, although Kaswatuka’s brief does not identify any specific issues and 

contains no citations to the record or to applicable legal authority, cf. Tex. R. App. P. 

38.1(f)–(g), (i),1 she appears to complain (as she did in her filings in the trial court) 

that she should have been granted a no-answer default judgment because the HOA 

did not answer her counterclaims and because she had submitted sufficient evidence 

to support a no-answer default judgment in her favor.

Kaswatuka does not specifically complain that the trial court erred by granting 

the HOA’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment but rather that both the HOA 

and the trial court discriminated against her. She did not direct the trial court to any 

evidence in the record to defeat the HOA’s no-evidence motion, cf. Tex. R. Civ. P. 

1

After Kaswatuka filed her appellant’s brief, this court advised her of the brief’s 

deficiencies, referring her to Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i) and 38.1(a)–(i), (k) 

and Local Rule 1; gave her ten days to file a corrected brief; and warned her that 

failure to amend the brief to comply with these rules could result in the striking of her 

brief and dismissal of her appeal or the waiver of noncomplying points. Although 

Kaswatuka filed an amended brief, she did not remedy most of these deficiencies. 
3

166a(i),2 and she has likewise failed to do so on appeal.

3 Instead, her filings in the trial 

court and in this court focus primarily on the trial court’s failure to grant her a default 

judgment.

2

Under Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i), the trial court “must grant the [noevidence] motion unless the respondent produces summary[-]judgment evidence 

raising a genuine issue of material fact.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); B.C. v. Steak N Shake 

Operations, Inc., 598 S.W.3d 256, 259 (Tex. 2020) (explaining that a Rule 166a(i) 

nonmovant has the burden to produce summary-judgment evidence raising a genuine 

issue of material fact and that the trial court must grant the no-evidence motion if the 

nonmovant fails to carry that burden). The nonmovant’s response “need only point 

out evidence that raises a fact issue on the challenged elements.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 

166a(i) cmt.

Instead of filing a response to the HOA’s no-evidence motion with evidence to 

raise a genuine issue of material fact, cf. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i), Kaswatuka filed a 

document entitled, “MOTION For SUMMARY JUDGEMENT UNDER 

DEFAULT JUDEMENT BECAUSE plaintiff was served and did not file an answer 

by the deadline”; she attached no evidence to this document. Kaswatuka also filed an 

unverified “ORDER OF DEFENDANT OPPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF 

MOTION FOR NO EVIDENCE SUMMARY,” in which she again complained that 

the HOA had never answered her counterclaims and that she had “submitted enough 

evidence to the court to support [her] evidence.” The record reflects that Kaswatuka 

filed a variety of documents (unsupported by affidavit) before the HOA filed its noevidence motion. However, she did not attach any evidence to her “opposition” filing

or specifically refer the court to any of the unsworn documents she had previously 

filed. Cf. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(d), (f) (setting out requirements for summary-judgment 

evidence).

3

Pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must 

comply with all applicable rules. See Barcroft v. Walton, No. 02-16-00110-CV, 2017 WL 

3910911, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 7, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). While we 

must liberally construe issues presented “to obtain a just, fair, and equitable 

adjudication of the rights of the litigants,” Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587–88 

(Tex. 2008), we may not make a party’s arguments for her. See Bolling v. Farmers Branch 

ISD, 315 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (explaining that the court 

is not responsible for identifying error, searching the record for favorable facts, or 
4

Kaswatuka was not entitled to a no-answer default judgment on her 

counterclaims because by the time she filed her first motion for no-answer default 

judgment on her counterclaims, the HOA had already appeared in the lawsuit (as the 

plaintiff) and was deemed to have pleaded a general denial to her counterclaims. 

Compare Tex. R. Civ. P. 92 (stating that when a counterclaim “is served upon a party 

who has made an appearance in the action, the party so served, in the absence of a 

responsive pleading, shall be deemed to have pleaded a general denial of the 

counterclaim”), Kadyebo v. Chako, No. 2-04-306-CV, 2006 WL 133508, at *2 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth Jan. 19, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that under Rule 92, the 

plaintiff “was not required to file an answer to [the defendant’s] counterclaim, and 

[the defendant] was not entitled to a default judgment . . . on this basis”), and Tex. 

Sting, Ltd. v. R.B. Foods, Inc., 82 S.W.3d 644, 650 n.7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, 

pet. denied) (explaining that the case was a post-answer default judgment because the 

plaintiff was deemed to have pleaded a general denial to the defendant’s counterclaim 

under Rule 92), with Tex. R. Civ. P. 239 (stating general default-judgment rule based 

on failure to answer). See generally Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 372 S.W.3d 

177, 183–84 & n.8 (Tex. 2012) (explaining distinctions among no-answer, postanswer, and other types of default judgments). That is, under Rule 92, the HOA had 

conducting legal research, even for a pro se party, because doing so would require the 

court to abandon its role as arbiter and to become an advocate).
5

already effectively—if implicitly—answered Kaswatuka’s counterclaims, see Tex. R. 

Civ. P. 92, making a no-answer default unavailable to her.4

Because the trial court did not err by denying Kaswatuka a no-answer default 

judgment and because she has failed to challenge any of the HOA’s summaryjudgment grounds in the trial court or on appeal, we overrule the sole issue we have 

been able to identify, and we overrule for inadequate briefing any remaining issues 

that we have been unable to identify. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). We affirm the trial 

court’s judgment.

/s/ Wade Birdwell

Wade Birdwell

Justice

Delivered: August 8, 2024

4

The HOA also expressly addressed Kaswatuka’s counterclaims in its untimely 

Rule 91a motion, its no-evidence motion for summary judgment, and its special 

exceptions to her counterclaims. See Smith v. Lippmann, 826 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. 

1992) (quoting Santex Roofing Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Venture Steel, Inc., 737 S.W.2d 55, 56–57 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ), for the proposition that “Texas courts have 

always been reluctant to uphold a [no-answer] default judgment . . . where some 

response from the defendant is found in the record”).