[Cite as Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Colerain Twp., 134 Ohio St.3d 93, 2012-Ohio-3914.] 

RUMPKE SANITARY LANDFILL, INC., ET AL., APPELLEES, v. COLERAIN 

TOWNSHIP ET AL., APPELLANTS. 

[Cite as Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Colerain Twp., 

134 Ohio St.3d 93, 2012-Ohio-3914.] 

Zoning—Public utilities’ exemption from township zoning—R.C. 519.211—

Factors for determining status as public utility. 

(No. 2011-0181—Submitted February 7, 2012—Decided September 5, 2012.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-090223. 

__________________ 

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

A privately owned sanitary landfill cannot be a common-law public utility exempt 

from township zoning when there is no public regulation or oversight of 

its rates and charges, no statutory or regulatory requirement that all solid 

waste delivered to the landfill be accepted for disposal, and no right of the 

public to demand and receive its services. 

__________________ 

O’CONNOR, C.J. 

{¶ 1} In this appeal, we decide whether a private sanitary landfill is a 

public utility that is exempt from township zoning regulations pursuant to R.C. 

519.211. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that a private sanitary landfill is 

not a public utility and is therefore subject to township zoning regulations. 

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the 

cause to the trial court for trial. 

BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} Appellant Colerain Township is a governmental entity in Hamilton 

County, Ohio, with all the rights, privileges, and duties imposed upon it by R.C. 
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Title 5. Appellant Colerain Township Board of Trustees, through the elected 

trustees Bernard A. Feideldey, Keith N. Corman, and Jeff Ritter, is the legislative 

administrative body responsible for governing Colerain Township under R.C. 

Title 5. Colerain Township and the Colerain Township Board of Trustees 

(collectively, “Colerain Township”) adopted a set of zoning regulations for the 

township, which are embodied in the Colerain Township Zoning Resolution. 

{¶ 3} Appellee Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc., and its subsidiaries 

operate a sanitary landfill in Colerain Township. Rumpke, along with appellees 

Charles and John Stoeppel as trustees and Claire Stepaniak, are the owners of the 

disputed property, approximately 350 acres located between Hughes Road, 

Interstate 275, and Buell Road in Colerain Township. 

{¶ 4} The present action is not the parties’ first dispute regarding zoning 

of Rumpke’s property. Rumpke also owns adjacent property used for the disposal 

of household and commercial waste. In 1999, Rumpke and others who are not 

parties to the present litigation applied for a change in zoning of the adjacent 

property. The Colerain Township Board of Trustees rejected the recommendation 

of the Colerain Township Zoning Commission to approve the application. 

Rumpke filed a lawsuit against Colerain Township contesting the constitutionality 

of the zoning and claiming damages. The case was settled by an agreed judgment 

entry and consent decree. 

{¶ 5} In March 2006, Rumpke applied to change the existing zoning of 

the disputed property so that Rumpke could expand its landfill. The Hamilton 

County Regional Planning Commission recommended the rezoning requested by 

Rumpke, but the Colerain Township Zoning Commission recommended that the 

Colerain Township Board of Trustees deny the proposed rezoning. Following 

public hearings, Colerain Township denied Rumpke’s application. 

{¶ 6} After Colerain Township denied the application, Rumpke filed a 

complaint against Colerain Township, the Colerain Township Board of Trustees, 
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and the individual township trustees for a declaratory judgment, compensation for 

the unconstitutional taking of property, and mandamus. Rumpke later amended 

its complaint to request a declaratory judgment that it “is a public utility and 

under R.C. 519.211, the operation of * * * [its] existing landfill and its proposed 

expansion * * * are not subject to Colerain Township’s zoning authority.” 

{¶ 7} Both Colerain Township and Rumpke filed motions for summary 

judgment on the issue of whether Rumpke is a public utility exempt from zoning. 

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Rumpke, holding that 

“Rumpke Sanitary Landfill is a public utility, not subject to the zoning restrictions 

of Colerain Township, Ohio.” 

{¶ 8} On April 1, 2009, Colerain Township appealed to the First District 

Court of Appeals. Colerain Township argued on appeal that the trial court had 

improperly granted summary judgment in favor of Rumpke because a privately 

owned sanitary landfill is not a public utility under R.C. 519.211. 

{¶ 9} The First District held: 

“As a general rule, Ohio law provides that townships have 

no power under the zoning laws to regulate the location, erection, 

or construction of any buildings or structures of any public utility.” 

[Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 551, 

721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000).] R.C. 519.211 was “intended to exempt 

public utilities providers from regulation by township zoning 

boards and boards of zoning appeals.” [Campanelli v. AT&T 

Wireless Servs., Inc., 85 Ohio St.3d 103, 107, 706 N.E.2d 1267 

(1999).] The “exemption ensures that public utilities will be able 

to construct the facilities required to serve the public interest across 

the state without undue interference from township zoning 

resolutions.” [Symmes at 556.] 
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Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Colerain Twp., 1st Dist. No. C-090223, at 3. 

{¶ 10} The First District then analyzed whether Rumpke was a public 

utility. In doing so, it held, “ ‘To determine “public utility” status for purposes of 

the R.C. 519.211(A) exemption,’ a court must consider the ‘ “factors related to 

the ‘public service’ and ‘public concern’ characteristics of a public utility.” ’ ” 

Id., quoting Trustees of Washington Twp. v. Davis, 95 Ohio St.3d 274, 2002-

Ohio-2123, 767 N.E.2d 261, ¶ 16, quoting A & B Refuse Disposers, Inc. v. 

Ravenna Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 64 Ohio St.3d 385, 596 N.E.2d 423 (1992), 

syllabus. 

{¶ 11} The appellate court then set forth the factors under both the “public 

service” and “public concern” prongs. It held: 

The factors relating to the public-service requirement 

include a demonstration that the entity provides “an essential good 

or service to the general public which has a legal right to demand 

or receive this good or service.” [A & B Refuse Disposers, Inc. v. 

Ravenna Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 64 Ohio St.3d at 387, 596 N.E.2d 

423.] The entity must also demonstrate that it provides its service 

to the public “indiscriminately and reasonably.” [Id.] And the 

provider must have an obligation to provide the good or service 

that cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably withdrawn. 

Next the public utility must “conduct its operations in such 

a manner as to be a matter of public concern.” [Id. at 388.] 

Factors considered in reaching this determination include the 

nature of the services provided, competition in the local 

marketplace, and regulation by a government authority. 
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(Footnotes and citations omitted.) Id. at 3-4. 

{¶ 12} The First District then analyzed whether Rumpke is a public utility 

under both prongs and held: 

[N]o genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether (1) 

Rumpke provides virtually all residents and businesses of 

Southwest Ohio a vital and essential service—the sanitary disposal 

of solid wastes in a facility licensed under R.C. Chapter 3734; (2) 

Rumpke operates in a monopolistic position with no other costeffective alternative to its services; (3) Rumpke is legally required 

to dispose of all of the city of Cincinnati’s solid waste; (4) Rumpke 

has pledged, in sworn statements to the Hamilton County Solid 

Waste Management District and the Ohio Environmental 

Protection Agency, that it will remain open and will accept any 

qualifying solid waste so long as it has the capacity to do so; and 

(5) the disposal of solid waste is an essential public necessity. 

Id. at 4. The court of appeals agreed with the trial court and held that “Rumpke 

was entitled to the trial court’s declaration that it is a public utility for purposes of 

R.C. 519.211.” Id. 

{¶ 13} The First District also addressed Colerain Township’s argument 

that “the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment because the 

plain language of the amended public-utility statute prohibits a privately owned 

landfill like Rumpke from benefiting from the regulatory exemptions of a public 

utility.” Id. at 5. “Am.Sub.H.B. No. 562, the 2009–2010 biennial budget bill, 

* * * modified the statutory definition of ‘public utility’ to exclude ‘a person that 

owns or operates a solid waste facility or a solid waste transfer facility, other than 

a publicly owned solid waste facility or a publicly owned solid waste transfer 
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facility.’ ” Id. at 3, quoting R.C. 519.211(A). The appellate court noted that it 

had previously “declared that the Am.Sub.H.B. No. 562 modifications to R.C. 

519.211” “violated the one-subject rule of Section 15(D), Article II, Ohio 

Constitution” and therefore are “unconstitutional and not enforceable.” Id. at 3 

and 5, citing Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. State, 184 Ohio App.3d 135, 2009-

Ohio-4888, 919 N.E.2d 826, at ¶18. 

{¶ 14} (Colerain Township had appealed that decision to this court, and 

we accepted discretionary review only of the following proposition of law: “A 

township is an interested and necessary party to a constitutional challenge brought 

by a property owner within the township’s jurisdiction to a law passed by the 

General Assembly that directly affects the township’s police powers over that 

owner’s property and pending litigation.” Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. State, 

128 Ohio St.3d 41, 2010-Ohio-6037, 941 N.E.2d 1161, ¶ 9. We ultimately held 

that Colerain Township was “not a necessary party to a constitutional challenge to 

the bill premised on a violation of the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution.” 

Id. at ¶ 21. The issue before us was not whether the amendments to R.C. 519.211 

violated the one-subject rule.) 

{¶ 15} The First District affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying 

Colerain Township’s motion for summary judgment by relying heavily upon the 

fact that this court had not reversed its holding that the amendments to R.C. 

519.211 were unconstitutional and not enforceable. The court of appeals wrote, 

“Absent reversal by the Ohio Supreme Court, we will apply this decision in each 

case submitted for our review.” But again, the appellate court’s holding of 

procedural unconstitutionality based on the one-subject rule had not been 

presented to us, and we did not rule on that issue. Our decision in Rumpke 

Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. State is controlling authority on the issue of whether the 

township was a necessary party but not on the constitutional issues previously 

addressed by the First District. 
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{¶ 16} We accepted the cause as a discretionary appeal. Rumpke Sanitary 

Landfill v. Colerain Twp., 129 Ohio St.3d 1425, 2011-Ohio-3710, 951 N.E.2d 88. 

Two propositions of law are before us: 

(1) A private sanitary landfill is not exempt from township 

zoning regulations under the comprehensive statutory framework 

of solid waste disposal and township zoning. 

(2) A privately owned sanitary landfill cannot be a common 

law “public utility” exempt from township zoning when there is no 

public regulation or oversight of its rates and charges, no statutory 

or regulatory requirement that all solid waste delivered to the 

landfill be accepted for disposal, and no right of the public to 

demand and receive its services. 

ANALYSIS

The Definition of “Public Utility” Has Been Developed Through Case Law 

{¶ 17} R.C. 519.211(A), which sets forth limitations on zoning powers, 

provides: 

Except as otherwise provided in division (B) or (C) of this 

section, sections 519.02 to 519.25 of the Revised Code confer no 

power on any board of township trustees or board of zoning 

appeals in respect to the location, erection, construction, 

reconstruction, change, alteration, maintenance, removal, use, or 

enlargement of any buildings or structures of any public utility or 

railroad, whether publicly or privately owned, or the use of land by 

any public utility or railroad, for the operation of its business. As 

used in this division, “public utility” does not include a person that 
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owns or operates a solid waste facility or a solid waste transfer 

facility, other than a publicly owned solid waste facility or a 

publicly owned solid waste transfer facility, that has been issued a 

permit under Chapter 3734. of the Revised Code or a construction 

and demolition debris facility that has been issued a permit under 

Chapter 3714. of the Revised Code. 

{¶ 18} Although the General Assembly exempted public utilities from 

zoning restrictions, it did not define “public utility” insofar as it relates to R.C. 

519.211. This court’s jurisprudence, however, offers guidance as to what 

constitutes a public utility for purposes of R.C. 519.211. Marano v. Gibbs, 45 

Ohio St.3d 310, 544 N.E.2d 635 (1989); A & B Refuse Disposers, Inc. v. Ravenna 

Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 64 Ohio St.3d 385, 596 N.E.2d 423 (1992). 

{¶ 19} In Marano v. Gibbs, we held that “the determination of entities as 

public utilities is a mixed question of law and fact.” Marano v. Gibbs at 311. 

“[I]n determining public utility status” courts must examine “the character of the 

business in which the entity is engaged.” Id., citing Ohio Power Co. v. Attica, 23 

Ohio St.2d 37, 41, 261 N.E.2d 123 (1970). “ ‘To constitute a “public utility,” the 

devotion to public use must be of such character that the product and service is 

available to the public generally and indiscriminately or there must be the 

acceptance by the utility of public franchises or calling to its aid the police power 

of the state.’ ” Id., quoting S. Ohio Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 110 Ohio St. 

246, 143 N.E. 700 (1924). 

{¶ 20} We set forth two factors, i.e., public concern and public service, 

which must be taken into consideration to determine whether an entity is a public 

utility for purposes of R.C. 519.211. “[A]n entity may be characterized as a 

public utility if the nature of its operation is a matter of public concern, and 

membership is indiscriminately and reasonably made available to the general 
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public,” otherwise known as public service. Marano, 45 Ohio St.3d at 311, 544 

N.E.2d 635. 

{¶ 21} We further developed the definition of “public utility” in A & B 

Refuse Disposers, Inc. v. Ravenna Twp. Bd. of Trustees. A & B Refuse 

Disposers, Inc. operated a landfill in Ravenna Township, Portage County. A & B 

Refuse acquired a 66-acre parcel of land adjacent to the landfill intending to 

construct a truck terminal and offices. After discussing the proposed use with 

township officials, A & B Refuse was advised that the proposed use would 

probably not be approved for rezoning. A & B Refuse filed a declaratoryjudgment action against the Ravenna Township Board of Trustees, asking for a 

determination of whether its landfill operation was subject to regulation under the 

township zoning code. 

{¶ 22} We were faced with a similar issue to that before us today: 

“whether the definition of a ‘public utility,’ as expressed in case law, is applicable 

to [A & B Refuse’s] landfill operation for the purpose of exemption from 

township zoning restrictions.” A & B Refuse, 64 Ohio St.3d at 386, 596 N.E.2d 

423. To resolve this question, we turned to Marano and affirmed the definition of 

“public utility.” We also significantly expanded upon the two factors identified in 

Marano, holding that “the determination of whether a particular entity is a public 

utility for the purpose of exemption from local zoning restrictions requires a 

consideration of several factors related to the ‘public service’ and ‘public 

concern’ characteristics of a public utility.” Id. at 389. 

{¶ 23} As for the public-service factor, we held that we must look at 

whether there 

is a devotion of an essential good or service to the general public 

which has a legal right to demand or receive this good or service. 

S. Ohio Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1924), 110 Ohio St. 246, 
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252, 143 N.E. 700, 701, quoting Allen v. RR. Comm. of California

(1918), 179 Cal. 68, 175 P. 466; Freight, Inc. v. Northfield Ctr. Bd. 

of Twp. Trustees (1958), 107 Ohio App. 288, 292-293, 8 O.O.2d 

212, 215, 158 N.E.2d 537, 540; Motor Cargo v. Richfield Bd. of 

Twp. Trustees (1953), 67 Ohio Law Abs. 315, 318, 52 O.O. 257, 

258, 117 N.E.2d 224, 226. See, generally, 2 Anderson, American 

Law of Zoning (3 Ed.1986) 568, Section 12.32. * * * [T]he entity 

must * * * provide its good or service to the public 

indiscriminately and reasonably. Marano v. Gibbs, [45 Ohio 

St.3d] at 311, 544 N.E.2d at 636. * * * Further, this attribute 

requires an obligation to provide the good or service which cannot 

be arbitrarily or unreasonably withdrawn. 

A & B Refuse, 64 Ohio St.3d at 389, 596 N.E.2d 423. “The fact that a private 

business provides a good or service associated with the usual subject matter of a 

public utility does not give rise to a presumption that it is devoted to public 

service.” Id., citing S. Ohio Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 110 Ohio St. 246, 

143 N.E. 700 (1924), paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶ 24} As for the public-concern factor, we held: 

Normally, a public utility occupies a monopolistic or ogopolistic 

[sic] position in the marketplace. Greater Fremont, Inc. v. 

Fremont (N.D.Ohio 1968), 302 F.Supp. 652, 664-665. See, also, 

Mammina v. Cortlandt Zoning Bd. of Appeals (1981), 110 Misc.2d 

534, 442 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691. This position gives rise to a public 

concern for the indiscriminate treatment of that portion of the 

public which needs and pays for the vital good or service offered 

by the entity. Factors utilized in determining whether an enterprise 
January Term, 2012 

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conducts itself in such a way as to become a matter of public 

concern include the good or service provided, competition in the 

local marketplace, and regulation by governmental authority. * * * 

[N]one of these factors is controlling. Nevertheless, in a case 

where the business enterprise serves such a substantial part of the 

public that its rates, charges and methods of operation become a 

public concern, it can be characterized as a public utility. Indus. 

Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., supra, 135 Ohio St. [408] at 414, 21 

N.E.2d [166] at 168 [1939]. 

(Citations and footnotes omitted.) Id. at 388. 

{¶ 25} We further held that “the determination of public utility status 

requires a flexible rule, a rule which often intertwines the factors considered in 

relation to the concepts of ‘public service’ and ‘public concern.’ ” Id. 

Furthermore, a simple claim that a business’s services are open to the public does 

not automatically categorize the business as a public utility. Id. at 389. Such a 

holding would incorrectly encompass as public utilities “traditional private 

business enterprises which are, in various degrees, regulated by diverse public 

authorities, e.g., dry cleaners, restaurants, and grocery stores.” Id. 

{¶ 26} We also determined that the business claiming public-utility status 

bears the burden of offering sufficient evidence on these factors. Id. 

{¶ 27} Applying the principles set forth above, we held that A & B Refuse 

“failed to present sufficient evidence on those factors essential to a determination 

of whether an entity can be classified as a public utility.” Id. at 390. The only 

evidence that related to the public-utility factors was a single statement that “the 

landfill is ‘open to the residents of Ravenna Township.’ ” Id. Thus, we never 

reached the question of whether a “privately operated solid waste disposal 
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facility” could be a public utility pursuant to R.C. 519.211. Id. We now turn to 

that question. 

Rumpke, in Its Operation of a Private Sanitary Landfill, Is Not a 

Public Utility, Because There Is a Lack of Governmental 

Regulation over the Public-Service and Public-Concern Factors

{¶ 28} The interesting question of whether a private sanitary landfill can 

be a public utility answers itself, especially in light of the fact that no 

governmental body regulates private sanitary landfills on those factors that make 

an entity a public utility. 

{¶ 29} In A & B Refuse Disposers, we cautioned owners of sanitary 

landfills that although achieving public-utility status would exempt the sanitary 

landfills from local zoning restrictions, obtaining public-utility status also “invites 

even greater governmental regulation and control than is currently experienced in 

this industry.” A & B Refuse Disposers, Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d at 390, 596 N.E.2d 

423. Here, there is no such control, as there is with traditional public utilities. 

{¶ 30} As a private sanitary-landfill operator, Rumpke is subject primarily 

to the regulations of the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (“OEPA”) 

pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3734 as well as the local solid-waste regulator, the 

Hamilton County Recycling and Solid Waste District (“HCRSWD”) pursuant to 

R.C. Chapters 3734 and 343. The concerns of the OEPA are related to the 

“adverse environmental effects related to the collection and disposal of solid 

waste,” and therefore “[t]he rules and regulations promulgated and administered 

by the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency arise from this public concern and 

are imposed for the protection of the environment and for human health and 

safety.” A & B Refuse Disposers, 64 Ohio St.3d at 389, 596 N.E.2d 423, citing 

Families Against Reily/Morgan Sites v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 56 

Ohio App.3d 90, 96, 564 N.E.2d 1113 (12th Dist.1989); Hulligan v. Columbia 

Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 59 Ohio App.2d 105, 108, 392 N.E.2d 1272 (9th 
January Term, 2012 

13 

Dist.1978); N. Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 52 

Ohio App.2d 167, 170-171, 369 N.E.2d 17 (2d Dist.1976). 

{¶ 31} The HCRSWD has authority over the “[a]cquisition, construction, 

improvement, enlargement, replacement, maintenance, and operation of solid 

waste facilities within the district.” R.C. 343.011(B)(2). Like the OEPA, the 

solid-waste-management districts have a major concern for the management of 

waste. The vision statement of the HCRSWD is as follows: “The District 

provides ethical environmental leadership to equitably promote the public good 

through innovative and responsible strategies leading to the management of all 

waste as a resource that leads to a society that generates zero waste.” 

http://www.hamiltoncountyrecycles.org/index.php?page=vision-statement. 

{¶ 32} We have held that “the public concern with environmental 

regulation is separate and distinct from the public concern involved in the 

regulation of public utilities.” A & B Refuse Disposers, 64 Ohio St.3d at 389, 596 

N.E.2d 423. Therefore, the public concern of both OEPA and HCRSWD is not 

the same public concern that is relevant when determining whether an entity is a 

public utility. 

{¶ 33} Still, Rumpke argues that the regulation of its landfill is not limited 

to environmental protection, but also includes regulations to enjoin, take over, or 

terminate landfill operations. Rumpke also argues that it is regulated for nuisance 

and operates under a requirement that the landfill be fully utilized. It asserts that 

“the General Assembly has provided for regulatory oversight of landfill location, 

design, operation, permitting, closure and post-closure handling.” Although we 

do not dispute that the landfill is subject to each of the regulations mentioned by 

Rumpke, none of those are of consequence to our analysis here. Our review is 

limited to those factors set forth by this court in A & B Refuse Disposers. 

 
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Public-Service Factor 

{¶ 34} Turning to the public-service factor, the lack of governmental 

regulation means that Rumpke determines to whom it provides its service and 

how or when that service is provided. The general public has no legal right to 

demand or receive Rumpke’s services. Therefore, there is no assurance or 

guarantee that Rumpke will provide its services to the public indiscriminately and 

reasonably, nor is there anything preventing Rumpke from arbitrarily or 

unreasonably withdrawing its services. Rumpke could lawfully close its doors to 

the public. Furthermore, as a private company, Rumpke has the ability to set its 

own rates without any governmental oversight. Thus, Rumpke fails to meet the 

public-service factor of the public-utility test. 

Public-Concern Factor 

{¶ 35} As for the public-concern factor, the parties do not dispute that 

Rumpke occupies a monopolistic position in the marketplace by collecting the 

majority of the solid waste generated within Hamilton County. Rumpke also 

provides an essential service by operating its sanitary landfill and collecting and 

disposing of solid waste. However, no governmental body, including the OEPA 

and HCRSWD, regulates the rates or methods of Rumpke. That means that 

Rumpke may treat discriminately and arbitrarily the portion of the public to whom 

it provides its services. Because Rumpke dominates such a large portion of the 

market and provides an essential service but does so without any government 

oversight or regulation, it is not a public concern. 

CONCLUSION

{¶ 36} The lack of governmental control over the public-service and 

public-concern factors in A & B Refuse Disposers is critical in determining that 

Rumpke is not a public utility. Thus, we hold that a privately owned sanitary 

landfill cannot be a common-law public utility exempt from township zoning 

when there is no public regulation or oversight of its rates and charges, no 
January Term, 2012 

15 

statutory or regulatory requirement that all solid waste delivered to the landfill be 

accepted for disposal, and no right of the public to demand and receive its 

services. 

{¶ 37} For these reasons, we reverse the appellate court’s decision 

affirming the trial court’s declaration that Rumpke is a public utility for purposes 

of R.C. 519.211. Therefore, we remand the cause to the trial court. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and 

MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 

__________________ 

Keating, Muething & Klekamp, P.L.L., Joseph L. Trauth Jr., Thomas M. 

Tepe Jr., Charles M. Miller, and Barrett P. Tullis, for appellees. 

Brahm & Cunningham, L.L.C., Catherine A. Cunningham, Richard C. 

Brahm, and Aaron M. Glasgow; and James E. Reuter, Law Director, Colerain 

Township, for appellants. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 

General, and Robert C. Moormann and Nicholas J. Bryan, Assistant Attorneys 

General, urging reversal for amicus curiae state of Ohio. 

Eastman & Smith, Ltd., Dirk P. Plessner, Albin Bauer II, and Rene L. 

Rimelspach, urging reversal for amici curiae Bokescreek Township, CarrollColumbiana-Harrison Joint Solid Waste Management District, Erie County, Lake 

Township, Logan County, Lorain County, Medina County, Miami County, 

Monroe Township, New Russia Township, North Central Ohio Solid Waste 

Management District, Ottawa-Sandusky-Seneca Joint Solid Waste Management 

District, Richland Township, and Stark-Tuscarawas-Wayne Joint Solid Waste 

Management District. 
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Matthew J. DeTemple, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Township 

Association and Coalition of Large Ohio Urban Townships. 

______________________