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[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3155 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3155

 To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within the United 
                Nations system, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 19, 2013

 Ms. Ros-Lehtinen introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                    the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within the United 
                Nations system, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``United Nations 
Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2013''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
                 TITLE I--FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Apportionment of the United Nations regular budget on a 
                            voluntary basis.
Sec. 103. Budget justification for United States contributions to the 
                            regular budget of the United Nations.
Sec. 104. Report on United Nations reform.
      TITLE II--TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES 
                  CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 201. Findings.
Sec. 202. Definitions.
Sec. 203. Oversight of United States contributions to the United 
                            Nations System.
Sec. 204. Transparency for United States contributions.
Sec. 205. Integrity for United States contributions.
Sec. 206. Refund of monies owed by the United Nations to the United 
                            States.
Sec. 207. Annual reports on United States contributions to the United 
                            Nations.
Sec. 208. Report on United Nations procurement practices.
         TITLE III--UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 301. Annual publication.
Sec. 302. Annual financial disclosure.
Sec. 303. Policy with respect to expansion of the Security Council.
Sec. 304. Access to reports and audits.
Sec. 305. Waiver of immunity.
Sec. 306. Terrorism and the United Nations.
Sec. 307. Report on United Nations personnel.
Sec. 308. United Nations treaty bodies.
Sec. 309. Equality at the United Nations.
Sec. 310. Anti-Semitism and the United Nations.
Sec. 311. Regional group inclusion of Israel.
Sec. 312. United States policy on Taiwan's participation in United 
                            Nations entities.
Sec. 313. United States policy on Tier 3 human rights violators.
     TITLE IV--STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 401. Findings.
Sec. 402. Statement of policy.
Sec. 403. Implementation.
              TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

Sec. 501. Findings.
Sec. 502. Human rights council membership and funding.
                       TITLE VI--GOLDSTONE REPORT

Sec. 601. Findings.
Sec. 602. Statement of policy.
Sec. 603. Withholding of funds; refund of United States taxpayer 
                            dollars.
                       TITLE VII--DURBAN PROCESS

Sec. 701. Findings.
Sec. 702. Sense of Congress; statement of policy.
Sec. 703. Non-participation in the durban process.
Sec. 704. Withholding of funds; refund of United States taxpayer 
                            dollars.
                           TITLE VIII--UNRWA

Sec. 801. Findings.
Sec. 802. United States contributions to UNRWA.
Sec. 803. Sense of Congress.
              TITLE IX--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Sec. 901. Technical cooperation program.
Sec. 902. United States policy at the IAEA.
Sec. 903. Sense of Congress regarding the Nuclear Security Action Plan 
                            of the IAEA.
                         TITLE X--PEACEKEEPING

Sec. 1001. Reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations.
Sec. 1002. Policy relating to reform of United Nations peacekeeping 
                            operations.
Sec. 1003. Certification.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means an individual 
        who is employed in the general services, professional staff, or 
        senior management of the United Nations, including consultants, 
        contractors, and subcontractors.
            (2) General assembly.--The term ``General Assembly'' means 
        the General Assembly of the United Nations.
            (3) Member state.--The term ``Member State'' means a Member 
        State of the United Nations. Such term is synonymous with the 
        term ``country''.
            (4) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
        of State.
            (5) Secretary general.--The term ``Secretary General'' 
        means the Secretary General of the United Nations.
            (6) Security council.--The term ``Security Council'' means 
        the Security Council of the United Nations.
            (7) UN.--The term ``UN'' means the United Nations.
            (8) United nations entity.--The term ``United Nations 
        Entity'' means any United Nations agency, commission, 
        conference, council, court, department, forum, fund, institute, 
        office, organization, partnership, program, subsidiary body, 
        tribunal, trust, university or academic body, related 
        organization or subsidiary body, wherever located, that flies 
        the United Nations flag or is authorized to use the United 
        Nations logo, including those United Nations affiliated 
        agencies and bodies identified as recipients of United States 
        contributions under section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner 
        National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public 
        Law 109-364), but not including the International Bank for 
        Reconstruction and Development, the International Centre for 
        Settlement of Investment Disputes, the International 
        Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, 
        the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the World 
        Trade Organization.
            (9) United nations system.--The term ``United Nations 
        System'' means the aggregation of all United Nations Entities, 
        as defined in paragraph (8).
            (10) United states contribution.--The term ``United States 
        Contribution'' means an assessed or voluntary contribution, 
        whether financial, in-kind, or otherwise, from the United 
        States Federal Government to a United Nations Entity, including 
        contributions passed through other entities for ultimate use by 
        a United Nations Entity. United States Contributions include 
        those contributions identified pursuant to section 
        1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization 
        Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364).
            (11) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, 
                Appropriations, and Oversight and Government Reform of 
                the House of Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committees on Foreign Relations, 
                Appropriations, and Homeland Security and Governmental 
                Affairs of the Senate.

                 TITLE I--FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States pays billions of dollars into the 
        United Nations system every year (almost $7,700,000,000 in 
        2010, according to the White House Office of Management and 
        Budget), significantly more than any other nation.
            (2) Under current rules and contribution levels, it is 
        possible to assemble the two-thirds majority needed for 
        important United Nations budget votes with a group of countries 
        that, taken together, pay less than 1 percent of the total 
        United Nations regular budget.
            (3) The disconnect between contribution levels and 
        management control creates significant perverse incentives in 
        terms of United Nations spending, transparency, and 
        accountability.
            (4) The United Nations system suffers from unacceptably 
        high levels of waste, fraud, and abuse, which seriously impair 
        its ability to fulfill the lofty ideals of its founding.
            (5) Amidst the continuing financial, corruption, and sexual 
        abuse scandals of the past several years, American public 
        disapproval of United Nations has reached all-time highs. A 
        2013 Gallup poll revealed that 50 percent of Americans believe 
        that the United Nations is doing a poor job, a negative 
        assessment shared by a majority of respondents from both 
        political parties.
            (6) Significant improvements in United Nations transparency 
        and accountability are necessary for improving public 
        perceptions of American support for United Nations operations.
            (7) Because of their need to justify future contributions 
        from donors, voluntarily funded organizations have more 
        incentive to be responsive and efficient in their operations 
        than organizations funded by compulsory contributions that are 
        not tied to performance.
            (8) Catherine Bertini, the former United Nations Under-
        Secretary General for Management and director of the World Food 
        Program (WFP), has stated that ``Voluntary funding creates an 
        entirely different atmosphere at WFP than at the UN. At WFP, 
        every staff member knows that we have to be as efficient, 
        accountable, transparent, and results-oriented as possible. If 
        we are not, donor governments can take their funding elsewhere 
        in a very competitive world among UN agencies, NGOs, and 
        bilateral governments.''.
            (9) Article XVII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
        which states that ``[t]he expenses of the Organization shall be 
        borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly'', 
        leaves to the discretion of the General Assembly the basis of 
        apportionment, which could be done on the basis of voluntary 
        pledges by Member States.
            (10) Unlike United States assessed contributions to the 
        United Nations regular budget, which are statutorily capped at 
        22 percent of the total, there is no cap on voluntary 
        contributions.
            (11) The United States, which contributes generously to 
        international organizations whose activities it recognizes as 
        credible, worthwhile, and efficient, contributes more than 22 
        percent of the budget of certain voluntarily funded United 
        Nations Specialized Agencies.
            (12) John Bolton, Former United States Permanent 
        Representative to the United Nations, has stated that ``Moving 
        to voluntary funding would end the UN practice of charging 
        member states for the expenses of the UN and its activities. 
        Member states would instead determine for themselves how much 
        to provide to the UN and, importantly, the specific tasks and 
        activities that those contributions would support. The shift 
        toward a voluntary payment system would impose a stronger 
        market incentive for UN programs and activities to meet their 
        goals and justify continued funding.''.

SEC. 102. APPORTIONMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS REGULAR BUDGET ON A 
              VOLUNTARY BASIS.

    (a) United States Policy.--
            (1) In general.--It is the policy of the United States to 
        seek to shift the funding mechanism for the regular budget of 
        the United Nations from an assessed to a voluntary basis.
            (2) Action at united nations.--The President shall direct 
        the United States Permanent Representative to the United 
        Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 
        States at the United Nations to shift the funding mechanism for 
        the regular budget of the United Nations to a voluntary basis, 
        and to make it a priority to build support for such a 
        transformational change among Member States, particularly key 
        United Nations donors.
    (b) Certification of Predominantly Voluntary UN Regular Budget 
Finding.--A certification described in this section is a certification 
by the Secretary of State to the Appropriate Congressional Committees 
that at least 80 percent of the total regular budget (not including 
extra-budgetary contributions) of the United Nations is apportioned on 
a voluntary basis. Each such certification shall be effective for a 
period of not more than 1 year, and shall be promptly revoked by the 
Secretary, with notice to the appropriate congressional committees, if 
the underlying circumstances change so as not to warrant such 
certification.
    (c) Withholding of Nonvoluntary Contributions.--
            (1) In general.--Beginning 2 years after the effective date 
        of this Act and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no 
        funds may be obligated or expended for a United States assessed 
        contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations in an 
        amount greater than 50 percent of the United States share of 
        assessed contributions for the regular budget of the United 
        Nations unless there is in effect a certification by the 
        Secretary, as described in subsection (b).
            (2) Allowance.--For a period of 1 year after appropriation, 
        funds appropriated for use as a United States contribution to 
        the regular budget of the United Nations but withheld from 
        obligation and expenditure pursuant to paragraph (1) may be 
        obligated and expended for that purpose upon the certification 
        described in subsection (b). After 1 year, in the absence of 
        such certification, those funds shall revert to the United 
        States Treasury.

SEC. 103. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE 
              REGULAR BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

    (a) Detailed Itemization.--The annual congressional budget 
justification shall include a detailed itemized request in support of 
the contribution of the United States to the regular budget of the 
United Nations.
    (b) Contents of Detailed Itemization.--The detailed itemization 
required under subsection (a) shall--
            (1) contain information relating to the amounts requested 
        in support of each of the various sections and titles of the 
        regular budget of the United Nations; and
            (2) compare the amounts requested for the current year with 
        the actual or estimated amounts contributed by the United 
        States in previous fiscal years for the same sections and 
        titles.
    (c) Adjustments and Notification.--If the United Nations proposes 
an adjustment to its regular assessed budget, the Secretary of State 
shall, at the time such adjustment is presented to the Advisory 
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), notify and 
consult with the appropriate congressional committees.

SEC. 104. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on United 
Nations reform.
    (b) Contents.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
describe--
            (1) progress toward the goal of shifting the funding for 
        the United Nations Regular Budget to a voluntary basis as 
        identified in section 102, and a detailed description of 
        efforts and activities by United States diplomats and officials 
        toward that end;
            (2) progress toward each of the policy goals identified in 
        the prior sections of this title, and a detailed, goal-specific 
        description of efforts and activities by United States 
        diplomats and officials toward those ends;
            (3) the status of the implementation of management reforms 
        within the United Nations and its specialized agencies;
            (4) the number of outputs, reports, or other mandates 
        generated by General Assembly resolutions that have been 
        eliminated;
            (5) the progress of the General Assembly to modernize and 
        streamline the committee structure and its specific 
        recommendations on oversight and committee outputs, consistent 
        with the March 2005 report of the Secretary General entitled 
        ``In larger freedom: towards development, security and human 
        rights for all'';
            (6) the status of the review by the General Assembly of all 
        mandates older than 5 years and how resources have been 
        redirected to new challenges, consistent with such March 2005 
        report of the Secretary General;
            (7) the continued utility and relevance of the Economic and 
        Financial Committee and the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural 
        Committee, in light of the duplicative agendas of those 
        committees and the Economic and Social Council; and
            (8) whether the United Nations or any of its specialized 
        agencies has contracted with any party included on the Lists of 
        Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement and Nonprocurement 
        Programs.

      TITLE II--TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES 
                  CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 201. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) As underscored by continuing revelations of waste, 
        fraud, and abuse, oversight and accountability mechanisms 
        within the United Nations system remain significantly 
        deficient, despite decades of reform attempts, including those 
        initiated by Secretaries General of the United Nations.
            (2) Notwithstanding the personal intentions of any 
        Secretary General of the United Nations to promote 
        institutional transparency and accountability within the United 
        Nations System, the Secretary General lacks the power to impose 
        far reaching management reforms without the concurrence of the 
        General Assembly.
            (3) Groupings of Member States whose voting power in the 
        General Assembly significantly outpaces their proportional 
        contributions to the United Nations system have repeatedly and 
        successfully defeated, delayed, and diluted various reform 
        proposals that would have enabled more detailed oversight and 
        scrutiny of United Nations system operations and expenditures.
            (4) To an unacceptable degree, major donor states, 
        including the United States, lack access to reasonably 
        detailed, reliable information that would allow them to 
        determine how their contributions have been spent by various 
        United Nations system entities, further contributing to the 
        lack of accountability within the United Nations system.

SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS.

    In this title:
            (1) Transparency certification.--The term ``Transparency 
        Certification'' means an annual, written affirmation by the 
        head or authorized designee of a United Nations Entity, 
        provided to the Department of State, that the Entity will 
        cooperate with the Department of State and Congress, including 
        by providing the Department of State and Congress with full, 
        complete, and unfettered access to Oversight Information as 
        defined in this title.
            (2) Oversight information.--The term ``Oversight 
        Information'' includes--
                    (A) internally and externally commissioned audits, 
                investigatory reports, program reviews, performance 
                reports, and evaluations;
                    (B) financial statements, records, and billing 
                systems;
                    (C) program budgets and program budget 
                implications, including revised estimates and reports 
                produced by or provided to the Secretary General and 
                the Secretary General's agents on budget related 
                matters;
                    (D) operational plans, budgets, and budgetary 
                analyses for peacekeeping operations;
                    (E) analyses and reports regarding the scale of 
                assessments;
                    (F) databases and other data systems containing 
                financial or programmatic information;
                    (G) documents or other records alleging or 
                involving improper use of resources, misconduct, 
                mismanagement, or other violations of rules and 
                regulations applicable to the United Nations Entity; 
                and
                    (H) other documentation relevant to the oversight 
                work of Congress with respect to United States 
                contributions to the United Nations system.
            (3) Accountability certification.--The term 
        ``Accountability Certification'' means an annual, written 
        affirmation by the head or authorized designee of a United 
        Nations Entity provided to the Secretary of State that the 
        Entity--
                    (A) provides the public with full, complete, and 
                unfettered access to all relevant documentation 
                relating to operations and activities, including budget 
                and procurement activities;
                    (B) implements and upholds policies and procedures 
                to protect whistleblowers;
                    (C) implements and upholds policies and procedures 
                to require the filing of individual annual financial 
                disclosure forms by each of its employees at the P-5 
                level and above and to require that such forms be made 
                available to the Office of Internal Oversight Services, 
                to Member States, and to the public;
                    (D) has established an effective ethics office;
                    (E) has established a fully independent, 
                autonomous, and effective internal oversight body;
                    (F) has adopted and implemented, and is in full 
                compliance with, International Public Sector Accounting 
                Standards; and
                    (G) has established a cap on its administrative 
                overhead costs.

SEC. 203. OVERSIGHT OF UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED 
              NATIONS SYSTEM.

    (a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to enhance oversight 
of United States contributions to the United Nations System and the use 
of those contributions by United Nations Entities, in an effort to 
eliminate and deter waste, fraud, and abuse in the use of those 
contributions, and thereby to contribute to the development of greater 
transparency, accountability, and internal controls throughout the 
United Nations System.
    (b) Implementation.--
            (1) In general.--The Department of State shall collect and 
        maintain current records regarding Transparency Certifications 
        and Accountability Certifications by all United Nations 
        Entities that receive United States contributions and submit 
        that information for inclusion in the report required under 
        section 207.
            (2) Notification.--The Department of State shall keep the 
        appropriate congressional committees fully and promptly 
        informed of how United Nations Entities are spending United 
        States contributions.
            (3) Referrals.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary of State shall 
                promptly report to the Attorney General and to the 
                appropriate congressional committees when the Secretary 
                of State has reasonable grounds to believe a Federal 
                criminal law has been violated by a United Nations 
                Entity or one of its employees, contractors, or 
                representatives.
                    (B) Notification.--The Secretary of State shall 
                promptly report, when appropriate, to the appropriate 
                congressional committees, and to the Secretary General 
                or to the head of the appropriate United Nations 
                Entity, cases in which the Secretary of State 
                reasonably believes that mismanagement, misfeasance, or 
                malfeasance is likely to have taken place within a 
                United Nations Entity and disciplinary proceedings are 
                likely justified.
            (4) Confirmation of transparency by united nations 
        entities.--
                    (A) Prompt notice by department of state.--Whenever 
                information or assistance requested from a United 
                Nations Entity by the Department of State pursuant to a 
                Transparency Certification is, in the opinion of the 
                Secretary of State, unreasonably refused or not 
                provided in a timely manner, the Secretary of State 
                shall notify the appropriate congressional committees, 
                the head of that particular United Nations Entity, and 
                the Secretary General of the circumstances in writing, 
                without delay.
                    (B) Notice of compliance.--If and when the 
                information or assistance being sought by the 
                Department of State in connection with a notification 
                pursuant to subparagraph (A) is provided to the 
                satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the Secretary 
                of State shall so notify in writing to the appropriate 
                congressional committees and the head of that 
                particular United Nations Entity.
                    (C) Noncompliance.--If the information or 
                assistance being sought by the Department of State in 
                connection with a notification pursuant to subparagraph 
                (A) is not provided within 90 days of that 
                notification, then the United Nations Entity that is 
                the subject of the notification is deemed to be 
                noncompliant with its Transparency Certification.
                    (D) Restoration of compliance.--After the situation 
                has been resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary 
                of State, the Secretary of State shall promptly provide 
                prompt, written notification of that fact and of the 
                restoration of compliance, along with a description of 
                the basis for the Secretary of State's decision, to the 
                appropriate congressional committees, the head of that 
                United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any 
                office or agency of the Federal Government that has 
                provided that United Nations Entity with any United 
                States contribution during the prior 2 years.
            (5) Confirmation of accountability by united nations 
        entities.--
                    (A) Prompt notice by secretary of state.--Whenever 
                a United Nations Entity that has provided an 
                Accountability Certification is, in the opinion of the 
                Secretary of State, not in full compliance with any or 
                all of the provisions of that certification, the 
                Secretary of State shall notify the appropriate 
                congressional committees, the head of that particular 
                United Nations Entity, and the Secretary General of the 
                circumstances in writing, without delay.
                    (B) Notice of compliance.--If and when the United 
                Nations Entity resumes full compliance with its 
                Accountability Certification following the provision of 
                the notification pursuant to subparagraph (A), the 
                Secretary of State shall so notify in writing the 
                appropriate congressional committees and the head of 
                that United Nations Entity.
                    (C) Noncompliance.--If the United Nations Entity 
                named in the notification in subparagraph (A) does not 
                resume full compliance with its Accountability 
                Certification to the satisfaction of the Secretary of 
                State within 90 days of that notification, then the 
                United Nations Entity that is the subject of the 
                notification is deemed to be noncompliant with its 
                Accountability Certification, and the Secretary of 
                State shall provide prompt, written notification of 
                that fact to the appropriate congressional committees, 
                the head of that United Nations Entity, the Secretary 
                General, and any office or agency of the Federal 
                Government that has provided that United Nations Entity 
                with any United States Contribution during the prior 2 
                years.
                    (D) Restoration of compliance.--After the situation 
                has been resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary 
                of State, the Secretary of State shall promptly provide 
                prompt, written notification of that fact and of the 
                restoration of compliance, along with a description of 
                the basis for the Secretary of State's decision, to the 
                appropriate congressional committees, the head of that 
                United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any 
                office or agency of the Federal Government that has 
                provided that United Nations Entity with any United 
                States contribution during the prior 2 years.
            (6) Reporting.--
                    (A) Reporting.--In the report submitted by the 
                Director of the Office of Management and Budget to 
                Congress pursuant to section 207, the Secretary of 
                State shall submit for inclusion a section that, among 
                other things, includes a list and detailed description 
                of the circumstances surrounding any notification of 
                compliance issued pursuant to paragraph (4)(C) or 
                (5)(C) during the covered timeframe, and whether and 
                when the Secretary has reversed such finding of 
                noncompliance.
                    (B) Prohibited disclosures.--Nothing in this 
                subsection shall be construed to authorize the public 
                disclosure of information that is--
                            (i) specifically prohibited from disclosure 
                        by any other provision of law;
                            (ii) specifically required by Executive 
                        order to be protected from disclosure in the 
                        interest of national defense or national 
                        security or in the conduct of foreign affairs; 
                        or
                            (iii) a part of an ongoing criminal 
                        investigation.
                    (C) Privacy protections.--The Secretary of State 
                shall exempt from public disclosure information 
                received from a United Nations Entity that the 
                Secretary of State believes--
                            (i) constitutes a trade secret or 
                        privileged and confidential personal financial 
                        information;
                            (ii) constitutes confidential personal 
                        medical information;
                            (iii) accuses a particular person of a 
                        crime;
                            (iv) would, if publicly disclosed, 
                        constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
                        personal privacy; and
                            (v) would compromise an ongoing law 
                        enforcement investigation or judicial trial in 
                        the United States.

SEC. 204. TRANSPARENCY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.

    (a) Funding Prerequisites.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, no funds made available for use as a United States Contribution to 
any United Nations Entity may be obligated or expended if--
            (1) the intended United Nations Entity recipient has not 
        provided to the Secretary of State within the preceding year a 
        Transparency Certification as defined in section 202(1);
            (2) the intended United Nations Entity recipient is 
        noncompliant with its Transparency Certification as described 
        in section 203(b)(4)(C);
            (3) the intended United Nations Entity recipient has not 
        provided to the Secretary of State within the preceding year an 
        Accountability Certification as defined in section 202(3); or
            (4) the intended United Nations Entity is noncompliant with 
        its Accountability Certification as described in section 
        203(b)(5)(C).
    (b) Treatment of Funds Withheld for Noncompliance.--At the 
conclusion of each fiscal year, any funds that had been appropriated 
for use as a United States Contribution to a United Nations Entity 
during that fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended because 
of the restrictions of subsection (a), shall be returned to the United 
States Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming for any other 
use. Any such funds returned to the Treasury shall not be considered 
arrears to be repaid to any United Nations Entity.
    (c) Presidential Waiver.--The President may waive the limitations 
of this subsection with respect to a particular United States 
Contribution to a particular United Nations Entity within a single 
fiscal year if the President determines that failure to do so would 
pose an extraordinary threat to the national security of the United 
States and provides notification and explanation of that determination 
to the appropriate congressional committees.

SEC. 205. INTEGRITY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.

    (a) Limitation.--(1) No funds made available for use under the 
heading ``Contributions to International Organizations'' may be used 
for any purpose other than an assessed United States contribution to a 
United Nations Entity or other international organization.
    (2) No funds made available for use under the heading 
``International Organizations and Programs'' may be used for any 
purpose other than a voluntary United States contribution to a United 
Nations Entity or other international organization.
    (3) No funds made available for use under the heading 
``Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities'' may be used 
for any purpose other than a United States contribution to United 
Nations peacekeeping activities, to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia, or to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda.
    (b) Treatment of Funds Withheld for Noncompliance.--At the 
conclusion of each fiscal year, any funds that had been appropriated 
for use as a United States contribution to a United Nations Entity 
during that fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended because 
of the restrictions of subsection (a), shall be returned to the United 
States Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming for any other 
use. Any such funds returned to the Treasury shall not be considered 
arrears to be repaid to any United Nations Entity.

SEC. 206. REFUND OF MONIES OWED BY THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE UNITED 
              STATES.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) United States taxpayer funds overpaid to United Nations 
        Entities and payable back to the United States sometimes remain 
        in the hands of the United Nations because the United States 
        has not requested the return of those funds.
            (2) Such funds have been paid into, among other United 
        Nations Entities, the United Nations Tax Equalization Fund 
        (TEF), which was established under the provisions of United 
        Nations General Assembly Resolution 973 (1955), and which is 
        used to reimburse United Nations staff members subject to 
        United States income taxes for the cost of those taxes.
            (3) In recent years, the TEF has taken in considerably more 
        money than it has paid out, with the United States apparently 
        overpaying into the TEF by $52,200,000 in the 2008-2009 
        timeframe alone.
            (4) According to the United Nations Financial Report and 
        Audited Financial Statements released on July 29, 2010, ``As of 
        31 December 2009, an amount of $179.0 million was payable to 
        the United States of America pending instructions as to its 
        disposition.''.
            (5) That balance was allowed to accrue notwithstanding 
        United Nations Financial Regulation 4.12, which states that any 
        such surpluses ``shall be credited against the assessed 
        contributions due from that Member State the following year.''.
            (6) Allowing the United Nations to regularly overcharge the 
        United States and to retain those overpayments, or to spend 
        them on wholly unrelated activities, is a disservice to 
        American taxpayers and a subversion of the Congressional budget 
        process.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to annually instruct the United Nations to return to 
        the United States any surplus assessed contributions or other 
        overpayments by the United States to any United Nations Entity; 
        and
            (2) to use the voice and vote of the United States to press 
        the United Nations to reform its TEF assessment procedures to 
        reduce the repeated discrepancies between TEF income and 
        expenditures.
    (c) Certification and Withholding.--For each and every fiscal year 
subsequent to the effective date of this Act, until the Secretary of 
State submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
certification that the United Nations has returned to the United States 
any surplus assessed contributions or other overpayments by the United 
States to any United Nations Entity, the Secretary of State shall 
withhold from the regular budget of the United Nations an amount equal 
to the amount of the funds that the United Nations has yet to return to 
the United States.

SEC. 207. ANNUAL REPORTS ON UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED 
              NATIONS.

    (a) Annual Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually for two years thereafter, the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit to 
Congress a report listing all assessed and voluntary contributions of 
the United States Government for the preceding fiscal year to the 
United Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and related 
bodies.
    (b) Contents.--Each report required under subsection (a) shall set 
forth, for the fiscal year covered by such report, the following:
            (1) The total amount of all assessed and voluntary 
        contributions of the United States Government to the United 
        Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and related 
        bodies.
            (2) The approximate percentage of United States Government 
        contributions to each United Nations affiliated agency or body 
        in such fiscal year when compared with all contributions to 
        such agency or body from any source in such fiscal year.
            (3) For each such contribution--
                    (A) the amount of such contribution;
                    (B) a description of such contribution (including 
                whether assessed or voluntary);
                    (C) the department or agency of the United States 
                Government responsible for such contribution;
                    (D) the purpose of such contribution; and
                    (E) the United Nations or United Nations affiliated 
                agency or related body receiving such contribution.

SEC. 208. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PROCUREMENT PRACTICES.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on United 
Nations procurement reform.
    (b) Contents.--The reports required under subsection (a) shall 
describe--
            (1) progress toward the goal of donor countries 
        establishing a threshold number for procurement purposes, of 
        which 50 percent of the procurement for donor programs over 
        $1,000,000,000 shall utilize donor vendors;
            (2) the status of the amount and percentage of procurement 
        at the United Nations through United States vendors; and
            (3) the status of examinations and investigations if 
        companies on the Excluded Parties List System are receiving 
        contracts through the United Nations, and the values of such 
        contracts.

         TITLE III--UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 301. ANNUAL PUBLICATION.

    The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure the 
United Nations publishes annually, including on a publicly searchable 
internet Web site, a list of all United Nations subsidiary bodies and 
their functions, budgets, staff, and contributions, both voluntary and 
assessed, sorted by donor.

SEC. 302. ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE.

    The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to implement a 
system for the required filing of individual annual financial 
disclosure forms by each employee of the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies, programs, and funds at the P-5 level and above, 
which shall be made available to the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services, to Member States, and to the public.

SEC. 303. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EXPANSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

    It is the policy of the United States to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to oppose any 
proposals on expansion of the Security Council if such expansion 
would--
            (1) diminish the influence of the United States on the 
        Security Council; or
            (2) include veto rights for any new members of the Security 
        Council.

SEC. 304. ACCESS TO REPORTS AND AUDITS.

    The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure that 
Member States may, upon request, have access to all reports and audits 
completed by the Board of External Auditors.

SEC. 305. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY.

    The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure that the 
Secretary General exercises the right and duty of the Secretary General 
under section 20 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the United Nations to waive the immunity of any United Nations official 
in any case in which such immunity would impede the course of justice. 
In exercising such waiver, the Secretary General is urged to interpret 
the interests of the United Nations as favoring the investigation or 
prosecution of a United Nations official who is credibly under 
investigation for having committed a serious criminal offense or who is 
credibly charged with a serious criminal offense.

SEC. 306. TERRORISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

    (a) In General.--The President shall direct the United States 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, 
and influence of the United States at the United Nations to work toward 
adoption by the General Assembly of--
            (1) a definition of terrorism that--
                    (A) builds upon the recommendations of the December 
                2004 report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
                Challenges, and Change;
                    (B) includes as an essential component of such 
                definition any action that is intended to cause death 
                or serious bodily harm to civilians with the purpose of 
                intimidating a population or compelling a government or 
                an international organization to do, or abstain from 
                doing, any act; and
                    (C) does not propose a legal or moral equivalence 
                between an action described in subparagraph (B) and 
                measures taken by a government or international 
                organization in self-defense against an action 
                described in such subparagraph; and
            (2) a comprehensive convention on terrorism that includes 
        the definition described in paragraph (1).
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) authoritarian regimes often inaccurately label 
        peaceful, pro-freedom, pro-democracy movements as terrorist 
        movements in order to undermine the legitimacy of those 
        movements; and
            (2) any United Nations definition of terrorism should not 
        be used to undermine a peaceful, pro-freedom, pro-democracy 
        movement against authoritarian rule.

SEC. 307. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report--
            (1) concerning the progress of the General Assembly to 
        modernize human resource practices, consistent with the March 
        2005 report of the Secretary General entitled ``In larger 
        freedom: towards development, security and human rights for 
        all''; and
            (2) containing the information described in subsection (b).
    (b) Contents.--The report shall include--
            (1) a comprehensive evaluation of human resources reforms 
        at the United Nations, including an evaluation of--
                    (A) tenure;
                    (B) performance reviews;
                    (C) the promotion system;
                    (D) a merit-based hiring system and enhanced 
                regulations concerning termination of employment of 
                employees; and
                    (E) the implementation of a code of conduct and 
                ethics training;
            (2) the implementation of a system of procedures for filing 
        complaints and protective measures for work-place harassment, 
        including sexual harassment;
            (3) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of 
        a rotation requirement for nonadministrative positions;
            (4) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of 
        a prohibition preventing personnel and officials assigned to 
        the mission of a member state to the United Nations from 
        transferring to a position within the United Nations 
        Secretariat that is compensated at the P-5 level and above;
            (5) policy recommendations relating to a reduction in 
        travel allowances and attendant oversight with respect to 
        accommodations and airline flights; and
            (6) an evaluation of the recommendations of the Secretary 
        General relating to greater flexibility for the Secretary 
        General in staffing decisions to accommodate changing 
        priorities.

SEC. 308. UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES.

    The United States shall withhold from United States contributions 
to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for a biennial 
period amounts that are proportional to the percentage of such budget 
that are expended with respect to a United Nations human rights treaty 
monitoring body or committee that was established by--
            (1) a convention (without any protocols) or an 
        international covenant (without any protocols) to which the 
        United States is not party; or
            (2) a convention, with a subsequent protocol, if the United 
        States is a party to neither.

SEC. 309. EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

    (a) Department of State Review and Report.--
            (1) In general.--To avoid duplicative efforts and funding 
        with respect to Palestinian interests and to ensure balance in 
        the approach to Israeli-Palestinian issues, the Secretary 
        shall, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
        of this Act--
                    (A) complete an audit of the functions of the 
                entities listed in paragraph (2); and
                    (B) submit to the appropriate congressional 
                committees a report containing audit findings and 
                conclusions, and recommendations for the elimination of 
                such duplicative entities and efforts.
            (2) Entities.--The entities referred to in paragraph (1)(A) 
        are the following:
                    (A) The United Nations Division for Palestinian 
                Rights.
                    (B) The Committee on the Exercise of the 
                Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.
                    (C) The United Nations Special Coordinator for the 
                Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative 
                to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the 
                Palestinian Authority.
                    (D) The NGO Network on the Question of Palestine.
                    (E) The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli 
                Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian 
                People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories.
                    (F) Any other entity the Secretary determines 
                results in duplicative efforts or funding or fails to 
                ensure balance in the approach to Israeli-Palestinian 
                issues.
    (b) Implementation by Permanent Representative.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall direct the United 
        States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use 
        the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 
        United Nations to seek the implementation of the 
        recommendations contained in the report required under 
        subsection (a)(1)(B).
            (2) Withholding of funds.--Until such recommendations have 
        been implemented, the United States shall withhold from United 
        States contributions to the regular assessed budget of the 
        United Nations for a biennial period amounts that are 
        proportional to the percentage of such budget that are expended 
        for such entities.

SEC. 310. ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

    The President shall direct the United States permanent 
representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to make every 
effort to--
            (1) ensure the issuance and implementation of a directive 
        by the Secretary General or the Secretariat, as appropriate, 
        that--
                    (A) requires all employees of the United Nations 
                and its specialized agencies to officially and publicly 
                condemn anti-Semitic statements made at any session of 
                the United Nations or its specialized agencies, or at 
                any other session sponsored by the United Nations;
                    (B) requires employees of the United Nations and 
                its specialized agencies, programs, and funds to be 
                subject to punitive action, including immediate 
                dismissal, for making anti-Semitic statements or 
                references;
                    (C) proposes specific recommendations to the 
                General Assembly for the establishment of mechanisms to 
                hold accountable employees and officials of the United 
                Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and 
                funds, or Member States, that make such anti-Semitic 
                statements or references in any forum of the United 
                Nations or of its specialized agencies;
                    (D) continues to develop and implements education 
                awareness programs about the Holocaust and anti-
                Semitism throughout the world, as part of an effort to 
                combat intolerance and hatred; and
                    (E) requires the Office of the United Nations High 
                Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to develop 
                programming and other measures that address anti-
                Semitism;
            (2) secure the adoption of a resolution by the General 
        Assembly that establishes the mechanisms described in paragraph 
        (1)(C); and
            (3) continue working toward further reduction of anti-
        Semitic language and anti-Israel resolutions in the United 
        Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and funds.

SEC. 311. REGIONAL GROUP INCLUSION OF ISRAEL.

    The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to expand the 
Western European and Others Group (WEOG) in the United Nations in 
Geneva to include Israel as a permanent member with full rights and 
privileges.

SEC. 312. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TAIWAN'S PARTICIPATION IN UNITED 
              NATIONS ENTITIES.

    The Secretary of State shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure 
meaningful participation for Taiwan in relevant United Nations Entities 
in which Taiwan has expressed an interest in participating.

SEC. 313. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TIER 3 HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS.

    The Secretary of State shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure that no 
representative of a country designated pursuant to section 110 of the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107) by the 
Department of State as a Tier 3 country shall preside as Chair or 
President of any United Nations Entity.

     TITLE IV--STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 401. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) In 1989, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
        launched an effort to evade direct negotiations for peace with 
        the State of Israel by instead pursuing Palestinian membership 
        in international organizations, which could imply de facto 
        recognition of a Palestinian state by the United Nations.
            (2) The Executive Branch, with significant support from 
        Members of Congress, successfully stopped the PLO's effort by 
        credibly threatening, as noted in a May 1, 1989, statement by 
        then-Secretary of State James A. Baker, ``that the United 
        States [would] make no further contributions, voluntary or 
        assessed, to any international organization which makes any 
        change in the P.L.O.'s present status as an observer 
        organization.''.
            (3) The United States success in this case demonstrates 
        that withholding contributions and placing conditions on their 
        payment can result in real reforms, stop counterproductive 
        developments, and advance United States interests at the United 
        Nations.
            (4) The Palestinian leadership has recently resumed its 
        effort to evade direct negotiations for peace with the State of 
        Israel by seeking recognition of a Palestinian state from 
        foreign governments and in international forums.
            (5) Efforts to bypass negotiations and to unilaterally 
        declare a Palestinian state, or to appeal to the United Nations 
        or other international forums or to foreign governments for 
        recognition of a Palestinian state or membership or other 
        upgraded status for the Palestinian observer mission at those 
        forums, would violate the underlying principles of the Oslo 
        Accords, the Road Map, and other relevant Middle East peace 
        process efforts.
            (6) On December 15, 2010, the House of Representatives 
        passed House Resolution 1765, in which, inter alia, the House 
        of Representatives:
                    (A) ``reaffirms its strong opposition to any 
                attempt to establish or seek recognition of a 
                Palestinian state outside of an agreement negotiated 
                between Israel and the Palestinians'';
                    (B) ``supports the Administration's opposition to a 
                unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state''; and
                    (C) ``calls upon the Administration to . . . lead a 
                diplomatic effort to persuade other nations to oppose a 
                unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state and to 
                oppose recognition of a Palestinian state by other 
                nations, within the United Nations, and in other 
                international forums prior to achievement of a final 
                agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.''.
            (7) Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo, United States Deputy 
        Permanent Representative to the United Nations, stated on July 
        26, 2011, ``Let there be no doubt: symbolic actions to isolate 
        Israel at the United Nations in September will not create an 
        independent Palestinian state . . . The United States will not 
        support unilateral campaigns at the United Nations in September 
        or any other time.''.
            (8) On September 16, 2011, the Deputy National Security 
        Advisor for Strategic Communications stated that ``We would 
        veto actions through the Security Council and oppose action 
        through the Security Council associated with a unilateral 
        declaration of [Palestinian] statehood.''.

SEC. 402. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States to oppose the recognition of 
a Palestinian state by any United Nations Entity, or any upgrade, 
including but not limited to full membership or non-member-state 
observer status, in the status of the Palestinian observer mission at 
the United Nations, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the 
Palestinian Authority, or any other Palestinian administrative 
organization or governing entity, at any United Nations Entity, prior 
to the achievement of a final peace agreement negotiated between and 
agreed to by Israel and the Palestinians.

SEC. 403. IMPLEMENTATION.

    (a) In General.--The President shall direct the United States 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, 
and influence of the United States at the United Nations to advance the 
policy stated in section 402.
    (b) Withholding of Funds.--The Secretary of State shall withhold 
United States contributions from any United Nations Entity that 
recognizes a Palestinian state or upgrades in any way, including full 
membership or non-member-state observer status, the status of the 
Palestinian observer mission at the United Nations, the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, the Palestinian Authority, or any other 
Palestinian administrative organization or governing entity, at that 
United Nations Entity, prior to the achievement of complete and final 
peace agreement negotiated between and agreed to by Israel and the 
Palestinians. Funds appropriated for use as a United States 
contribution to the United Nations but withheld from obligation and 
expenditure pursuant to this section shall immediately revert to the 
United States Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid 
to any United Nations Entity.

              TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

SEC. 501. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Since its establishment in 2006, the United Nations 
        Human Rights Council has failed to meaningfully promote the 
        protection of internationally recognized human rights, and has 
        proven to be even more problematic than the United Nations 
        Human Rights Commission that it was created to replace.
            (2) The United Nations Human Rights Council suffers from 
        fundamental and severe structural flaws present since its 
        establishment by the United Nations General Assembly, such as 
        the fact that it draws its members from the General Assembly 
        without any substantive membership criteria, with the perverse 
        result that a number of the world's worst human rights abusers 
        are members of the council.
            (3) For example, many members of the United Nations Human 
        Rights Council are rated ``Not Free'' or only ``Partly Free'' 
        by Freedom House. Only a minority of members were rated 
        ``Free''.
            (4) The structure and composition of the United Nations 
        Human Rights Council have made it subject to gross political 
        manipulation, with the result that, during its almost seven 
        years of operation, the Council has passed over 46 resolutions 
        censuring the democratic, Jewish State of Israel, as compared 
        to only a handful censuring the dictatorships in Burma, North 
        Korea, and Syria, just one addressing the severe, ongoing human 
        rights abuses in Libya, Iran, and Belarus, and none addressing 
        the severe, ongoing human rights abuses in China, Cuba, Russia, 
        Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and elsewhere.
            (5) The United Nations Human Rights Council's agenda 
        contains a permanent item for criticism of the democratic, 
        Jewish State of Israel, but no permanent items criticizing any 
        other state.
            (6) The United Nations Human Rights Council has 
        established, or preserved the existence of, a number of 
        ``Special Procedures'' mechanisms to address country-specific 
        situations or thematic issues. These mechanisms include a 
        number of ``special rapporteurs'' whose expenses and staff 
        support are paid for by contributions to the United Nations.
            (7) The United Nations Human Rights Council has also 
        established an ``Advisory Committee'' whose expenses and staff 
        support are paid for by contributions to the United Nations.
            (8) Some of these special rapporteurs and members of the 
        Advisory Committee have displayed consistent bias against the 
        United States, Israel, and the Jewish people, while providing 
        support to human rights abusers.
            (9) Richard Falk, the United Nations ``Special Rapporteur 
        on the situation of human rights in Palestinian territories 
        occupied since 1967'', has compared Israel's treatment of the 
        Palestinians to the Holocaust, questioned the veracity of the 
        events of September 11, 2001, and posted a cartoon on his blog 
        depicting Americans and Jews as bloodthirsty dogs.
            (10) Jean Ziegler, a member of the United Nations Human 
        Rights Council Advisory Committee and former United Nations 
        ``Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food'', has accused former 
        President George W. Bush and former Israeli Prime Minister 
        Ariel Sharon of committing ``state terrorism'', has called for 
        an investigation of Israel by the International Criminal Court 
        for ``war crimes'' following Israel's war against Hezbollah in 
        2006, has visited Cuba and praised the Cuban regime's provision 
        of food to the Cuban people, and has stated that Zimbabwean 
        dictator Robert Mugabe ``has history and morality with him''. 
        Ziegler was also involved in the establishment of the ``Al-
        Gaddafi International Prize for Human Rights'', a prize 
        established by, funded by, and named after Libyan dictator 
        Muammar al-Gaddafi, and awarded in the past to Fidel Castro, 
        Hugo Chavez, Louis Farrakhan, and Roger Garaudy, who has denied 
        the Holocaust, questioned the veracity of the events of 
        September 11, 2001, and supported Iranian leader Mahmoud 
        Ahmadinejad's call for Israel to be ``wiped off the map''.
            (11) Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann, a member of the United 
        Nations Human Rights Council Advisory Committee who has 
        previously served as President of the United Nations General 
        Assembly and as foreign minister for the Sandinista regime in 
        Nicaragua, has implicitly accused the United States of 
        terrorism, has called former President Ronald Reagan a 
        ``butcher'', has called for a international boycott of Israel, 
        has stated that the Palestinians were being ``crucified'' by 
        Israel, has called Israel's defensive Operation Cast Lead in 
        the Gaza Strip a ``monstrosity'' and ``genocide'', has urged 
        the United Nations to use the term apartheid in discussing 
        Israeli treatment of Palestinians, has embraced Iranian leader 
        Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after Ahmadinejad delivered an anti-
        American, anti-Israel address to the United Nations General 
        Assembly, has stated that charges of genocide against Sudanese 
        dictator Omar Hassan al Bashir are ``racist'', and has declared 
        Fidel Castro ``World Hero of Solidarity'', stating that Castro 
        ``embod[ied] virtues and values worth emulation by all of us''.
            (12) Halima Warzazi, a member of the United Nations Human 
        Rights Council Advisory Committee, has compared Israel to Nazi 
        Germany, and used her previous membership in a United Nations 
        apparatus to shield Saddam Hussein from censure for gassing 
        Iraqi Kurds in Halabja.
            (13) The ongoing five-year review of the United Nations 
        Human Rights Council concluded on June 17, 2011, and failed to 
        make any significant reforms to its fundamental and severe 
        structural flaws, including its absence of substantive 
        membership criteria, or to remove the permanent agenda item on 
        Israel.
            (14) On June 17, 2011, John F. Sammis, United States Deputy 
        Representative to the Economic and Social Council, stated that 
        ``The Geneva process [of the five-year review] failed to yield 
        even minimally positive results, forcing us to dissociate from 
        the outcome . . . the final resolution [for the five-year 
        review] also fails to address the core problems that still 
        plague the Human Rights Council . . . The United States has 
        therefore voted `no' on the resolution . . . the Council's 
        effectiveness and legitimacy will always be compromised so long 
        as one country in all the world is unfairly and uniquely 
        singled out while others, including chronic human rights 
        abusers, escape scrutiny . . . The resolution before us today 
        does nothing to address the Council's failures nor move it any 
        closer to the founding values of the UN Charter and the 
        Universal Declaration of Human Rights.''.
            (15) United States membership in the Human Rights Council 
        has not led to reform of its fundamental flaws diminished the 
        Council's virulently anti-Israel behavior. The Council has 
        passed twenty-seven resolutions criticizing Israel since the 
        United States joined in 2009.

SEC. 502. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP AND FUNDING.

    (a) In General.--For each and every fiscal year subsequent to the 
effective date of this Act, until the Secretary of State submits to 
Congress a certification that the requirements described in subsection 
(b) have been satisfied--
            (1) the Secretary of State shall withhold from a United 
        States contribution each fiscal year to a regular budget of the 
        United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of 
        such contribution that the Secretary determines would be 
        allocated by the United Nations to support the United Nations 
        Human Rights Council;
            (2) the Secretary of State shall not make a voluntary 
        contribution to the United Nations Human Rights Council; and
            (3) the United States shall not run for a seat on the 
        United Nations Human Rights Council.
    (b) Certification.--The annual certification referred to in 
subsection (a) is a certification made by the Secretary to Congress 
that--
            (1) the United Nations Human Rights Council's mandate from 
        the United Nations General Assembly explicitly and effectively 
        prohibits candidacy for Human Rights Council membership of a 
        United Nations Member State--
                    (A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council; 
                and
                    (B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation 
                for human rights abuses;
            (2) the United Nations Human Rights Council does not 
        include a United Nations Member State--
                    (A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
                    (B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation 
                for human rights abuses;
                    (C) which the Secretary of State has determined, 
                for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export 
                Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect 
                pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers 
                Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, 
                section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or 
                other provision of law, is a government that has 
                repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
                terrorism; or
                    (D) which the President has designated as a country 
                of particular concern for religious freedom under 
                section 402(b) of the International Religious Freedom 
                Act of 1998; and
            (3) the United Nations Human Rights Council's agenda or 
        programme of work does not include a permanent item with regard 
        to the State of Israel.
    (c) Special Procedures.--The Secretary of State shall withhold from 
a United States contribution each year to a regular budget of the 
United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of such 
contribution that the Secretary determines would be allocated by the 
United Nations to support the United Nations ``Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights in Palestinian territories occupied since 
1967'', and any other United Nations Human Rights Council ``Special 
Procedures'' used to display bias against the United States or the 
State of Israel or to provide support for the government of any United 
Nations Member State--
            (1) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
            (2) under a Security Council-mandated investigation for 
        human rights abuses;
            (3) which the Secretary of State has determined, for 
        purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 
        1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to the International 
        Emergency Economic Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export 
        Control Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
        1961, or other provision of law, is a government that has 
        repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
        terrorism; or
            (4) which the President has designated as a country of 
        particular concern for religious freedom under section 402(b) 
        of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.
    (d) Reversion of Funds.--Funds appropriated for use as a United 
States contribution to the United Nations but withheld from obligation 
and expenditure pursuant to this section shall immediately revert to 
the United States Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be 
repaid to any United Nations Entity.

                       TITLE VI--GOLDSTONE REPORT

SEC. 601. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) On January 12, 2009, the United Nations Human Rights 
        Council passed Resolution A/HRC/S-9/L.1, which authorized a 
        ``fact-finding mission'' regarding Israel's conduct of 
        Operation Cast Lead against violent militants in the Gaza Strip 
        between December 27, 2008, and January 18, 2009.
            (2) The resolution pre-judged the outcome of its 
        investigation by one-sidedly mandating the ``fact-finding 
        mission'' to ``investigate all violations of international 
        human rights law and International Humanitarian Law by . . . 
        Israel, against the Palestinian people . . . particularly in 
        the occupied Gaza Strip, due to the current aggression''.
            (3) The mandate of the ``fact-finding mission'' makes no 
        mention of the relentless rocket and mortar attacks, which 
        numbered in the thousands and spanned a period of eight years, 
        by Hamas and other violent militant groups in Gaza against 
        civilian targets in Israel, that necessitated Israel's 
        defensive measures.
            (4) The ``fact-finding mission'' included a member who, 
        before joining the mission, had already declared Israel guilty 
        of committing atrocities in Operation Cast Lead by signing a 
        public letter on January 11, 2009, published in the Sunday 
        Times, that called Israel's actions ``war crimes''.
            (5) The mission's flawed and biased mandate gave serious 
        concern to many United Nations Human Rights Council Member 
        States which refused to support it, including Bosnia and 
        Herzegovina, Cameroon, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
        the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
        Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
        and Northern Ireland.
            (6) The mission's flawed and biased mandate was never 
        broadened or revised by any plenary meeting of the United 
        Nations Human Rights Council, and troubled many distinguished 
        individuals who refused invitations to head the mission.
            (7) On September 15, 2009, the ``United Nations Fact 
        Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict'' released its report, 
        which is commonly referred to as the ``Goldstone Report''.
            (8) The Goldstone Report repeatedly made sweeping and 
        unsubstantiated determinations that the Israeli military had 
        deliberately attacked civilians during Operation Cast Lead.
            (9) The authors of the Goldstone Report admit that ``we did 
        not deal with the issues . . . regarding the problems of 
        conducting military operations in civilian areas and second-
        guessing decisions made by soldiers and their commanding 
        officers in the fog of war.''.
            (10) In the October 16, 2009, edition of the Jewish Daily 
        Forward, Richard Goldstone, the head of the ``United Nations 
        Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict'', is quoted as 
        saying, with respect to the mission's evidence-collection 
        methods, ``If this was a court of law, there would have been 
        nothing proven''.
            (11) The Goldstone Report, in effect, denied the State of 
        Israel the right to self-defense, and never noted the fact that 
        Israel had the right to defend its citizens from the repeated 
        violent attacks committed against civilian targets in southern 
        Israel by Hamas and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
        operating from Gaza.
            (12) The Goldstone Report largely ignored the culpability 
        of the Government of Iran and the Government of Syria, both of 
        whom sponsor Hamas and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
            (13) The Goldstone Report usually considered public 
        statements made by Israeli officials not to be credible, while 
        frequently giving uncritical credence to statements taken from 
        what it called the ``Gaza authorities'', i.e., the Gaza 
        leadership of Hamas.
            (14) Notwithstanding a great body of evidence that Hamas 
        and other violent Islamist groups committed war crimes by using 
        civilians and civilian institutions, such as mosques, schools, 
        and hospitals, as shields, the Goldstone Report repeatedly 
        downplayed or cast doubt upon that claim.
            (15) In one notable instance, the Goldstone Report stated 
        that it did not consider the admission of a Hamas official that 
        Hamas often ``created a human shield of women, children, the 
        elderly and the mujahideen, against [the Israeli military]'' 
        specifically to ``constitute evidence that Hamas forced 
        Palestinian civilians to shield military objectives against 
        attack''.
            (16) Hamas was able to significantly shape the findings of 
        the investigation mission's Goldstone Report by selecting and 
        prescreening some of the witnesses and intimidating others, as 
        the Goldstone Report acknowledges when it notes that ``those 
        interviewed in Gaza appeared reluctant to speak about the 
        presence of or conduct of hostilities by the Palestinian armed 
        groups . . . from a fear of reprisals''.
            (17) Even though Israel is a vibrant democracy with a 
        vigorous and free press, the Goldstone Report erroneously 
        asserts that ``actions of the Israeli government . . . have 
        contributed significantly to a political climate in which 
        dissent with the government and its actions . . . is not 
        tolerated''.
            (18) The Goldstone Report recommended that the United 
        Nations Human Rights Council endorse its recommendations, 
        implement them, review their implementation, and refer the 
        report to the United Nations Security Council, the Prosecutor 
        of the International Criminal Court, and the United Nations 
        General Assembly for further action.
            (19) The Goldstone Report recommended that the United 
        Nations Security Council--
                    (A) require the Government of Israel to launch 
                further investigations of its conduct during Operation 
                Cast Lead and report back to the Security Council 
                within 6 months;
                    (B) simultaneously appoint an ``independent 
                committee of experts'' to monitor and report on any 
                domestic legal or other proceedings undertaken by the 
                Government of Israel within that 6-month period; and
                    (C) refer the case to the Prosecutor of the 
                International Criminal Court after that 6-month period.
            (20) The Goldstone Report recommended that the United 
        Nations General Assembly consider further action on the report 
        and establish an escrow fund, to be funded entirely by the 
        State of Israel, to ``pay adequate compensation to Palestinians 
        who have suffered loss and damage'' during Operation Cast Lead.
            (21) The Goldstone Report ignored the issue of compensation 
        to Israelis who have been killed or wounded, or suffered other 
        loss and damage, as a result of years of past and continuing 
        rocket and mortar attacks by Hamas and other violent militant 
        groups in Gaza against civilian targets in southern Israel.
            (22) The Goldstone Report recommended ``that States Parties 
        to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 start criminal investigations 
        [of Operation Cast Lead] in national courts, using universal 
        jurisdiction'' and that ``following investigation, alleged 
        perpetrators should be arrested and prosecuted''.
            (23) The concept of ``universal jurisdiction'' has 
        frequently been used in attempts to detain, charge, and 
        prosecute Israeli and United States officials and former 
        officials in connection with unfounded allegations of war 
        crimes and has often unfairly impeded the travel of those 
        individuals.
            (24) On September 20, 2009, United Nations High 
        Commissioner for Human Rights Navanethem Pillay wrote, ``I lend 
        my full support to Justice Goldstone's report and its 
        recommendations''.
            (25) The State of Israel, like many other free democracies, 
        has an independent judicial system with a robust investigatory 
        capacity and has already launched numerous investigations, many 
        of which remain ongoing, of Operation Cast Lead and individual 
        incidents therein.
            (26) Several nations have indicated that they intend to 
        further pursue consideration of the Goldstone Report and 
        implementation of its recommendations by the United Nations 
        Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly, the 
        United Nations Human Rights Council, and other multilateral 
        fora.
            (27) On September 30, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary 
        Clinton described the underlying mandate for the Goldstone 
        Report as ``one-sided''.
            (28) On September 17, 2009, Ambassador Susan Rice, United 
        States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 
        expressed the United States ``very serious concern with the 
        mandate'' underlying the Goldstone Report and noted that the 
        United States views the mandate ``as unbalanced, one-sided and 
        basically unacceptable''.
            (29) Israeli President Shimon Peres has called the 
        Goldstone Report a ``blood libel''.
            (30) The Goldstone Report reflects the longstanding, 
        historic bias at the United Nations against the democratic, 
        Jewish State of Israel.
            (31) The Goldstone Report is being exploited by Israel's 
        enemies to excuse the actions of violent militant groups and 
        their state sponsors, and to justify isolation of and punitive 
        measures against the democratic, Jewish State of Israel.
            (32) On November 3, 2009, the House of Representatives 
        overwhelmingly adopted House Resolution 867, which stated that 
        the House of Representatives:
                    (A) ``considers the [Goldstone Report] to be 
                irredeemably biased and unworthy of further 
                consideration or legitimacy'';
                    (B) ``supports the Administration's efforts to 
                combat anti-Israel bias at the United Nations, its 
                characterization of the [Goldstone Report] as 
                `unbalanced, one-sided and basically unacceptable', and 
                its opposition to the resolution on the report'';
                    (C) ``calls on the President and the Secretary of 
                State to continue to strongly and unequivocally oppose 
                any endorsement of the [Goldstone Report] in 
                multilateral fora, including through leading opposition 
                to any United Nations General Assembly resolution and 
                through vetoing, if necessary, any United Nations 
                Security Council resolution that endorses the contents 
                of this report, seeks to act upon the recommendations 
                contained in this report, or calls on any other 
                international body to take further action regarding 
                this report'';
                    (D) ``calls on the President and the Secretary of 
                State to strongly and unequivocally oppose any further 
                consideration of the `Report of the United Nations Fact 
                Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict' and any other 
                measures stemming from this report in multilateral 
                fora''; and
                    (E) ``reaffirms its support for the democratic, 
                Jewish State of Israel, for Israel's security and right 
                to self-defense, and, specifically, for Israel's right 
                to defend its citizens from violent militant groups and 
                their state sponsors''.
            (33) On October 16, 2009, the United Nations Human Rights 
        Council voted 25-6 (with 11 Member States abstaining and 5 not 
        voting, and with the United States voting against) to adopt 
        resolution A-HRC-S-12-1, which endorsed the Goldstone Report 
        and condemned Israel, without mentioning Hamas, other such 
        violent militant groups, or their state sponsors. The United 
        States voted against the resolution.
            (34) On November 5, 2009, the United Nations General 
        Assembly voted 114-18 (with 44 Member States abstaining, and 
        with the United States voting against) to adopt resolution A/
        RES/64/10, which, among other things:
                    (A) endorsed the United Nations Human Rights 
                Council's resolution A-HRC-S-12-1, which endorsed the 
                Goldstone Report and condemned Israel, without 
                mentioning Hamas, other such violent militant groups, 
                or their state sponsors;
                    (B) requested that the Secretary General of the 
                United Nations transmit the Goldstone Report to the 
                United Nations Security Council;
                    (C) expressed its ``appreciation'' to the ``United 
                Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict'' for 
                its ``comprehensive report'';
                    (D) expressed grave concern regarding ``reports 
                regarding serious human rights violations'' during 
                Operation Cast Lead, including the findings in the 
                Goldstone Report; and
                    (E) recommended ``that the Government of 
                Switzerland, in its capacity as depositary of the 
                Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of 
                Civilian Persons in Time of War, undertake as soon as 
                possible the steps necessary to reconvene a Conference 
                of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva 
                Convention on measures to enforce the Convention'' in 
                the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and ``East Jerusalem''.
            (35) On February 26, 2010, the United Nations General 
        Assembly voted 98-7 (with 31 Member States abstaining, and with 
        the United States voting against) to adopt resolution A/RES/64/
        254, which built on the determinations of A/RES/64/10.
            (36) On March 24, 2010, the United Nations Human Rights 
        Council voted 29-6 (with 11 Member States abstaining and one 
        not voting, and with the United States voting against) to adopt 
        resolution A/HRC/13/L.30, which, among other things--
                    (A) called upon ``all concerned parties, including 
                United Nations bodies, to ensure their implementation 
                of the recommendations contained in the [Goldstone 
                Report]'';
                    (B) requested that the United Nations High 
                Commissioner for Human Rights submit a ``progress 
                report on the implementation of the present resolution 
                to the [Human Rights] Council at its fourteenth 
                session'' in May and June 2010; and
                    (C) decided to ``follow up on the implementation of 
                the present resolution at [the] fifteenth session'' of 
                the Human Rights Council in September 2010.
            (37) On March 25, 2011, the United Nations Human Rights 
        Council voted 27-3 (with 16 Member States abstaining, and with 
        the United States voting against) to adopt resolution A/HRC/16/
        L.31, which, among other things--
                    (A) called upon ``all concerned parties, including 
                United Nations bodies, to ensure the full and immediate 
                implementation of the recommendations contained in the 
                [Goldstone Report]'';
                    (B) recommended that the United Nations General 
                Assembly again consider the Goldstone Report at its 
                sixty-sixth session, and urged the General Assembly to 
                submit the report to the United Nations Security 
                Council ``for its consideration and appropriate 
                action,'' including referral to the prosecutor of the 
                International Criminal Court;
                    (C) requested that the United Nations High 
                Commissioner for Human Rights submit a ``progress 
                report on the implementation of the present resolution 
                to the Human Rights Council at its eighteenth session 
                of September 2011''; and
                    (D) decided to ``follow up on the implementation of 
                the present resolution at [the] nineteenth session [of 
                the Human Rights Council] of March 2012''.
            (38) On April 1, 2011, Richard Goldstone, the head of the 
        ``United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict'' 
        that authored the Goldstone Report, wrote an op-ed in the 
        Washington Post that renounced the Goldstone Report's claim 
        that the Israeli military deliberately attacked civilians 
        during Operation Cast Lead. Goldstone wrote that the Israeli 
        military's investigations with respect to incidents in 
        Operation Cast Lead ``indicate that civilians were not 
        intentionally targeted as a matter of policy''.
            (39) Efforts to delegitimize the democratic State of Israel 
        and deny it the right to defend its citizens and its existence 
        can be used to delegitimize other democracies and deny them the 
        same right.

SEC. 602. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States to--
            (1) consider the Goldstone Report irredeemably biased and 
        unworthy of further consideration or legitimacy;
            (2) strongly and unequivocally oppose any consideration, 
        legitimization, or endorsement of the Goldstone Report, or any 
        other measures stemming from this report, in multilateral fora;
            (3) lead a high-level diplomatic campaign in support of the 
        revocation and repudiation, by the United Nations General 
        Assembly, of the Goldstone Report and any United Nations 
        resolutions stemming from the report, including--
                    (A) United Nations General Assembly resolutions A/
                RES/64/10 and A/RES/64/254; and
                    (B) United Nations Human Rights Council resolutions 
                A-HRC-S-12-1, A/HRC/13/L.30, and A/HRC/16/L.31; and
            (4) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other 
        responsible countries not to endorse, support, or legitimize 
        the Goldstone Report or any other measures stemming from the 
        report.

SEC. 603. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS; REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER 
              DOLLARS.

    (a) Withholding of Funds.--The Secretary of State shall withhold 
from the United States contribution to the regular budget of the United 
Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of such contribution 
that the Secretary determines would be or has been expended by the 
United Nations for any part of the Goldstone Report or its preparatory 
or follow-on activities.
    (b) Refund of United States Taxpayer Dollars.--Funds appropriated 
for use as a United States contribution to the regular budget of the 
United Nations but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to 
subsection (a) shall immediately revert to the United States Treasury 
and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to any United Nations 
Entity.

                       TITLE VII--DURBAN PROCESS

SEC. 701. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States is opposed to racism, racial 
        discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance, and has 
        long been a party to the Convention on the Elimination of 
        Racial Discrimination.
            (2) Expensive and politically skewed international 
        conferences can disserve and undermine the worthy goals that 
        they are ostensibly convened to support.
            (3) The goals of the 2001 United Nations World Conference 
        Against Racism--held in Durban, South Africa, and commonly 
        referred to as ``Durban I''--were undermined by hateful, anti-
        Jewish rhetoric, and anti-Israel political agendas, prompting 
        both Israel and the United States to withdraw their delegations 
        from the Conference.
            (4) The official government declaration adopted by Durban 
        I, the ``Durban Declaration and Program of Action'', focused on 
        the ``plight of the Palestinian people under foreign 
        occupation'', and thereby singled out one regional conflict for 
        discussion and implicitly launched a false accusation against 
        Israel of intolerance towards the Palestinians.
            (5) On September 3, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell 
        explained the withdrawal of the United States delegation from 
        Durban I by stating that ``you do not combat racism by 
        conferences that produce declarations containing hateful 
        language, some of which is a throwback to the `days of Zionism' 
        equals racism; or supports the idea that we have made too much 
        of the Holocaust; or suggests that apartheid exists in Israel; 
        or that singles out only one country in the world--Israel--for 
        censure and abuse''.
            (6) The late United States Representative Tom Lantos, who 
        participated as a member of the United States delegation to the 
        Durban Conference, supported that delegation's withdrawal and 
        wrote in 2002 that the conference ``provided the world with a 
        glimpse into the abyss of international hate, discrimination 
        and, indeed, racism''.
            (7) On December 19, 2006, the United Nations General 
        Assembly approved a resolution initiating preparations for a 
        Durban Review Conference (commonly referred to as ``Durban 
        II''), which was held between April 20 and 24, 2009, in Geneva, 
        Switzerland.
            (8) The chair of the preparatory committee for Durban II 
        was Libya, and the co-chairs included Iran and Cuba.
            (9) Throughout the preparatory process for Durban II, 
        member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
        urged that the conference again focus criticism on Israel and 
        single out the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for discussion, and 
        also urged that the conference advocate global speech codes 
        that would impose restrictions contrary to fundamental freedoms 
        recognized in the provisions of the Universal Declaration of 
        Human Rights.
            (10) In testimony before the House of Representatives on 
        April 2, 2008, then-Assistant Secretary of State for 
        International Organizations Kristen Silverberg stated that the 
        United States had decided against participating in preparatory 
        activities for Durban II because ``[there is] absolutely no 
        case to be made for participating in something that is going to 
        be a repeat of Durban I. We don't have any confidence that this 
        will be any better than Durban I''.
            (11) On September 23, 2008, the House of Representatives 
        passed House Resolution 1361, which, among other things, called 
        on the President to ``urge other heads of state to condition 
        participation in the 2009 [Durban II] Conference on concrete 
        action by the United Nations and United Nations Member States 
        to ensure that it is not a forum to demonize any group, or 
        incite anti-Semitism, hatred, or violence against members of 
        any group or to call into question the existence of any state'' 
        and urged all United Nations Member States ``not to support a 
        2009 Durban Review Conference process that fails to adhere to 
        established human rights standards and to reject an agenda that 
        incites hatred against any group in the guise of criticism of a 
        particular government or that seeks to forge a global blasphemy 
        code''.
            (12) The present United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
        Rights, Dr. Navanethem Pillay, who served as Secretary General 
        of Durban II, has repeatedly sought to downplay the level of 
        hateful, anti-Jewish rhetoric and anti-Israel political agendas 
        present at Durban I, describing it as merely ``the virulent 
        anti-Semitic behavior of a few non-governmental organizations 
        on the sidelines'' and praising the biased 2001 Durban 
        Declaration and Programme of Action as ``[t]he legacy of this 
        Conference'', has repeatedly sought to downplay the level of 
        hateful, anti-Jewish rhetoric and anti-Israel political agendas 
        present at Durban II and its preparatory activities, and has 
        repeatedly praised and urged the full implementation of the 
        Durban Declaration and Programme of Action.
            (13) High Commissioner Pillay has repeatedly and publicly 
        criticized nations, including the United States, which 
        announced that they would not participate in Durban II, but has 
        almost never publicly criticized governments who succeeded in 
        using the conference and its preparatory activities to single 
        out Israel for criticism and to attempt to restrict fundamental 
        freedoms.
            (14) A United Nations press release on September 8, 2008, 
        regarding an address by High Commissioner Pillay, disturbingly 
        dismissed objections raised by non-governmental organizations 
        to Durban II as ``ferocious, and often distorted, criticism by 
        certain lobby groups focused on single issues''.
            (15) During February of 2009, the United States actively 
        participated in intergovernmental consultations on Durban II's 
        ``draft outcome document'' and engaged in high-level diplomatic 
        efforts to dramatically reverse the path of Durban II by 
        directing it towards meaningful efforts to combat intolerance 
        and bigotry and directing it away from efforts to undermine the 
        cause of fighting discrimination through singling out Israel 
        for implicit criticism and calling for restrictions on 
        fundamental freedoms.
            (16) On February 27, 2009, a State Department spokesman 
        stated that, despite United States efforts to redirect the path 
        of Durban II, ``the document being negotiated has gone from bad 
        to worse, and the current text of the draft outcome document is 
        not salvageable . . . A conference based on this text would be 
        a missed opportunity to speak clearly about the persistent 
        problem of racism'' and therefore, the United States would not 
        participate in further consultations and negotiations regarding 
        the ``draft outcome document'', and would not participate in 
        Durban II itself unless the ``draft outcome document'' was 
        radically shortened and revised to eliminate objectionable 
        material.
            (17) On April 17, 2009, the third and final session of the 
        preparatory committee for Durban II proposed a final ``draft 
        outcome document'' that contained a number of provisions 
        advocating restrictions on freedom of expression, and that also 
        implicitly singled out and criticized Israel for racism by 
        reaffirming, in its very first paragraph, the 2001 Durban 
        Declaration and Programme of Action.
            (18) On April 18, 2009, a State Department spokesman 
        announced that ``the United States will not join the [Durban 
        II] conference'', noting that ``The current document . . . 
        still contains language that reaffirms in toto the Durban 
        Declaration and Programme of Action (DDPA) from 2001, which the 
        United States has long said it is unable to support . . . The 
        United States also has serious concerns with relatively new 
        additions to the text regarding `incitement', that run counter 
        to the U.S. commitment to unfettered free speech.''.
            (19) On April 19, 2009, the President stated at a press 
        conference that ``I would love to be involved in a useful 
        conference that addressed continuing issues of racism and 
        discrimination around the globe . . . we expressed in the run-
        up to this conference our concerns that if you incorporated--if 
        you adopted all the language from 2001, that's just not 
        something we could sign up for . . . our participation would 
        have involved putting our imprimatur on something that we just 
        don't believe . . . Hopefully . . . we can partner with other 
        countries on to actually reduce discrimination around the 
        globe. But this wasn't an opportunity to do it.''.
            (20) Canada, Israel, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, 
        Poland, Australia, and New Zealand also did not participate in 
        Durban II, and the Czech Republic walked out of the Conference 
        during its proceedings, never to return.
            (21) Libya was the chair of the Main Committee of Durban 
        II, and vice presidents of Durban II included Libya, Iran, and 
        Cuba.
            (22) Speaking at Durban II on April 20, 2009, Iranian 
        leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called the democratic State of 
        Israel ``totally racist'' and ``the most cruel and repressive 
        racist regime'', and called for Israel's destruction, stating 
        that ``Efforts must be made to put an end to the abuse by 
        Zionists . . . Governments must be encouraged and supported in 
        their fights aimed at eradicating this barbaric racism''.
            (23) In his speech at Durban II, Ahmadinejad also 
        propagated anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, saying that 
        ``Those who control huge economic resources and interests in 
        the world . . . mobilize all the resources, including their 
        economic and political influence and world media, to render 
        support in vain to the Zionist regime''.
            (24) Disgusted by Ahmadinejad's biased and incendiary 
        statements, delegates from about two dozen nations walked out 
        of the assembly hall in protest, but most delegations remained, 
        and a large number of delegations and observers repeatedly 
        applauded Ahmadinejad's remarks.
            (25) On April 21, 2009, governments participating in Durban 
        II adopted by consensus an ``outcome document'' that contained 
        a number of provisions advocating restrictions on freedom of 
        expression, and that also implicitly singled out and criticized 
        Israel for racism by reaffirming, in its very first paragraph, 
        the 2001 Durban Declaration and Program of Action.
            (26) Throughout Durban II, many speakers singled out Israel 
        for criticism or called for restrictions on fundamental 
        freedoms, including representatives of Iran, Libya, Cuba, 
        Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, 
        Indonesia, Qatar, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 
        Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, Tunisia, Bangladesh, 
        Switzerland, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the 
        Arab League, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and a 
        number of other organizations and countries.
            (27) During Durban II, several speakers who sought to draw 
        attention to genuine instances of racism, racial 
        discrimination, xenophobia, related intolerance, and human 
        rights violations by the governments of Iran, Libya, and China 
        were repeatedly interrupted by the delegations from those 
        governments and instructed by the conference's chair to not 
        refer specifically to those governments.
            (28) On December 18, 2009, the United Nations General 
        Assembly approved Resolution A/RES/64/148, which urged the 
        ``full and effective implementation of the Durban Declaration 
        and Programme of Action'' and called for a ``one-day plenary 
        event to commemorate the ten-year anniversary [of Durban I] 
        during the high-level segment of the General Assembly to be 
        devoted to racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and 
        related intolerance during its sixty-fifth session, in 2011''. 
        The United States, joined by 12 other nations, voted against 
        this resolution.
            (29) On December 24, 2010, the United Nations General 
        Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/65/240, authorizing the 
        holding of a ``one-day high-level meeting of the General 
        Assembly to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption 
        of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, at the level 
        of Heads of State and Government, on the second day of the 
        general debate of the sixty-sixth session'' in September of 
        2011. The resolution also states that the meeting (commonly 
        referred to as ``Durban III'') will adopt a ``political 
        declaration aimed at mobilizing political will at the national, 
        regional, and international levels for the full and effective 
        implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of 
        Action and its follow-up processes.''. The resolution also 
        requests that the United Nations Secretary General ``establish 
        a programme of outreach, with the involvement of Member States 
        and United Nations funds and programmes as well as civil 
        society, including non-governmental organizations, to 
        appropriately commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption 
        of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action.'' The 
        resolution also requests that ``the Office of the United 
        Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Department 
        of Public Information of the Secretariat . . . launch a public 
        information campaign for the commemoration of the tenth 
        anniversary of the adoption of the Durban Declaration and 
        Programme of Action''. The United States, joined by 21 other 
        nations, voted against this resolution.
            (30) The Government of Canada announced that it would not 
        participate in the Durban III meeting. Canadian Minister of 
        Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney 
        stated that ``Our government has lost faith in the entire 
        tainted Durban process. Canada will not participate in this 
        charade any longer. We will not lend our country's good name to 
        a commemoration of what has widely been characterized as a 
        hatefest . . . Canada is clearly committed to the fight against 
        racism, but the Durban process commemorates an agenda that 
        actually promotes racism rather than combats it.''.
            (31) The Government of Israel announced that it would not 
        participate in the Durban III meeting, stating that ``Israel is 
        part of the international struggle against racism. The Jewish 
        people was itself a victim of racism throughout history. Israel 
        regrets that a resolution on an important subject--elimination 
        of racism--has been diverted and politicized by the automatic 
        majority at the UN, by linking it to the Durban Declaration and 
        Programme of Action (2001) that many states would prefer to 
        forget. The Durban Conference of 2001, with its antisemitic 
        undertones and displays of hatred for Israel and the Jewish 
        World, left us with scars that will not heal quickly . . . 
        Under the present circumstances, as long as the [Durban III] 
        meeting is defined as part of the infamous''Durban process``, 
        Israel will not participate . . .''.
            (32) On June 2, 2011, the United States publicly announced 
        that it would not participate in the Durban III meeting. The 
        Department of State's deputy spokesman stated that the ``Durban 
        process includes displays of intolerance and anti-Semitism, and 
        we don't want to see that commemorated. In our conversations 
        about this commemoration, we've not seen the kind of progress 
        that we think is indicative. We remain unconvinced that the 
        conference is moving in a new direction.''.
            (33) The Governments of Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, the 
        Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, the 
        Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, and the United Kingdom also 
        did not participate in the Durban III meeting.
            (34) On September 22, 2011, at the Durban III meeting, the 
        United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/66/3, 
        a ``political declaration'' which ``[r]eaffirm[ed] that the 
        Durban Declaration and Programme of Action . . . and the 
        outcome document of [Durban II] . . . are a comprehensive 
        United Nations framework and solid foundation for combating 
        racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related 
        intolerance'', ``[r]ecall[ed] that the aim of [Durban III] is 
        to mobilize political will at the national, regional and 
        international levels and reaffirm our political commitment to 
        the full and effective implementation of the Durban Declaration 
        and Programme of Action and the outcome document of [Durban 
        II], and their follow-up processes, at all these levels'', and 
        ``welcome[d] the continued engagement of the United Nations 
        High Commissioner for Human Rights to incorporate the 
        implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of 
        Action into the United Nations system''.
            (35) On September 22, 2011, the White House Press Secretary 
        stated that ``Since its inception . . . the Durban process has 
        included ugly displays of intolerance and anti-Semitism . . . 
        Last December, the United States voted against the resolution 
        establishing [Durban III] because we did not want to see the 
        hateful and anti-Semitic displays of the 2001 Durban Conference 
        commemorated. Over the last few months, we did not participate 
        in negotiations on [Durban III's] Political Declaration 
        document and, like many other countries, we were not present 
        when the Declaration was adopted. We are also deeply 
        disappointed that the rules established for credentialing non-
        governmental organizations to participate were used by some 
        delegations to silence voices critical of the Durban 
        process.''.
            (36) Durban I, Durban II, Durban III, and their preparatory 
        and follow-on activities, have made little or no demonstrable 
        contribution to combating racism, racial discrimination, 
        xenophobia, and related intolerance.
            (37) To date, several million dollars from the United 
        Nations regular budget has been expended on Durban I, Durban 
        II, Durban III, and their preparatory and follow-on activities.
            (38) The United States is the largest contributor to the 
        United Nations system, and is assessed for a full 22 percent of 
        the United Nations regular budget, which is funded by assessed 
        contributions from Member States.
            (39) Funding for Durban I, Durban II, Durban III, and their 
        preparatory and follow-on activities through the United Nations 
        regular budget has resulted in United States taxpayer dollars 
        being used for those purposes.
            (40) Congress, through its adoption of the Consolidated 
        Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-161) withheld from the 
        United States assessed contribution for fiscal year 2008 to the 
        United Nations regular budget an amount equivalent to the 
        United States share of the United Nations Human Rights Council 
        budget, including its share of the Council-administered 
        preparatory process for Durban II.

SEC. 702. SENSE OF CONGRESS; STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Durban I, Durban II, and Durban III conferences, 
        and their preparatory and follow-on activities, were subverted 
        by members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and 
        irredeemably distorted into a forum for anti-Israel, anti-
        Semitic, and anti-freedom activity;
            (2) by walking out of the Durban I conference, and by not 
        participating in the Durban II conference, and announcing that 
        it would not participate in the Durban III meeting, the United 
        States Government upheld and reaffirmed the fundamental 
        commitment of the United States to combating racism, racial 
        discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance;
            (3) the Governments of Canada, Israel, Italy, Germany, the 
        Netherlands, Poland, Australia, New Zealand, and the Czech 
        Republic should be commended for their decision to not 
        participate or cease participation in the Durban II conference;
            (4) the Governments of Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, 
        Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, 
        Latvia, the Netherlands, Italy, New Zealand, Poland, and the 
        United Kingdom should be commended for their decision to not 
        participate in Durban III; and
            (5) the Administration should expeditiously and 
        unequivocally announce that it will not participate in, 
        support, or legitimize any part of the Durban process.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to--
            (1) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other 
        responsible countries--
                    (A) not to participate in, support, legitimize, or 
                fund any part of the Durban process, and
                    (B) to withhold from their respective contributions 
                to the regularly assessed biennial budget of the United 
                Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of 
                such respective contributions that they determine would 
                be or has been allocated by the United Nations for any 
                part of the Durban III meeting or its preparatory or 
                follow-on activities, or for any other part of the 
                Durban process; and
            (2) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to explore 
        credible, alternative forums for combating racism, racial 
        discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance.

SEC. 703. NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE DURBAN PROCESS.

    None of the funds made available in any provision of law may be 
used for United States participation in any part of the Durban process.

SEC. 704. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS; REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER 
              DOLLARS.

    (a) Withholding of Funds for the Durban Process.--The Secretary of 
State shall withhold from the United States contribution to the regular 
budget of the United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage 
of such contribution that the Secretary determines would be or has been 
expended by the United Nations for any part of the Durban I or Durban 
II conferences, the Durban III meeting, their preparatory or follow-on 
activities, or any other part of the Durban process, including--
            (1) the ``public information campaign for the commemoration 
        of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Durban 
        Declaration and Programme of Action'' requested by United 
        Nations General Assembly Resolution A.RES/65/240;
            (2) the Intergovernmental Working Group on the Effective 
        Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of 
        Action;
            (3) the ``group of independent eminent experts on the 
        implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of 
        Action''; and
            (4) the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of 
        Complementary Standards.
    (b) Withholding of Funds for Other Biased and Compromised 
Activities.--Until the Secretary of State submits to the appropriate 
congressional committees a certification, on a case-by-case basis, that 
the requirements described in subsection (d) have been satisfied, the 
United States shall withhold from the United States contribution to the 
regular budget of the United Nations an amount that is equal to the 
percentage of such contribution that the Secretary determines has been 
allocated by the United Nations for any conference, meeting, or other 
multilateral forum, or the preparatory or follow-on activities of any 
conference, meeting, or other multilateral forum, that is organized 
under the aegis or jurisdiction of the United Nations or of any United 
Nations Entity.
    (c) Refund of United States Taxpayer Dollars.--
            (1) In general.--Funds appropriated for use as a United 
        States contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations 
        but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to 
        subsection (a) shall immediately revert to the United States 
        Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to 
        any United Nations Entity.
            (2) Allowance.--Funds appropriated for use as a United 
        States contribution to the regularly assessed biennial budget 
        of the United Nations but withheld from obligation and 
        expenditure pursuant to subsection (b) may be obligated and 
        expended for that purpose upon the certification described in 
        subsection (d). Such funds shall revert to the United States 
        Treasury if no such certification is made by the date that is 
        one year after such appropriation, and shall not be considered 
        arrears to be repaid to any United Nations Entity.
    (d) Certification.--The certification referred to in subsection (b) 
is a certification made by the Secretary of State to the appropriate 
congressional committees concerning the following:
            (1) The specified conference, meeting, or other 
        multilateral forum did not reaffirm, call for the 
        implementation of, or otherwise support the Durban Declaration 
        and Programme of Action (2001) or the outcome document of the 
        Durban II conference (2009) or the Durban III meeting (2011).
            (2) The specified conference or forum was not used to 
        single out the United States or the State of Israel for unfair 
        or unbalanced criticism.
            (3) The specified conference or forum was not used to 
        propagate racism, racial discrimination, anti-Semitism, denial 
        of the Holocaust, incitement to violence or genocide, 
        xenophobia, or related intolerance.
            (4) The specified conference or forum was not used to 
        advocate for restrictions on the freedoms of speech, 
        expression, religion, the press, assembly, or petition, or for 
        restrictions on other fundamental human rights and freedoms.
            (5) The leadership of the specified conference or forum 
        does not include a Member State, or a representative from a 
        Member State--
                    (A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
                    (B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation 
                for human rights abuses; or
                    (C) the government of which the Secretary of State 
                has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the 
                Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in 
                effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 
                Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, 
                section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or 
                other provision of law, is a government that has 
                repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
                terrorism.

                           TITLE VIII--UNRWA

SEC. 801. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302 (1949) 
        created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
        Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) with the temporary, 
        strictly humanitarian mandate to ``carry out . . . direct 
        relief and works programmes'' for Palestinian refugees.
            (2) UNRWA has acknowledged that it is the ``only UN agency 
        that reports directly to the UN General Assembly, and whose 
        beneficiary population stems from one nation-group'', and is 
        responsible solely for Palestinian refugees, while the United 
        Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible 
        for other refugees across the world.
            (3) UNHCR's definition of a refugee is, in accordance with 
        the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, any 
        person who ``owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
        for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
        particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the 
        country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such 
        fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
        country . . .''.
            (4) UNRWA's much broader definition of a ``Palestine 
        refugee'' is any person, and his descendants, whose ``normal 
        place of residence was [the former British Mandate of] 
        Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who 
        lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 
        conflict.''.
            (5) UNRWA's overly inclusive definition of a ``Palestine 
        refugee'' has resulted in an increase in UNRWA's reported 
        number of ``Palestine refugees'' from under 1,000,000 in 1950 
        to over 5,000,000 today, encompassing multiple generations of 
        descendants of the original Palestinian refugees.
            (6) Hundreds of thousands of ``Palestine refugees'' are 
        citizens of recognized states, including Jordan.
            (7) UNRWA, unlike UNHCR, does not offer refugees the option 
        of resettlement and reintegration into their country of refuge 
        or a third country. Efforts by UN officials in the 1950s to 
        offer resettlement and reintegration as an option for 
        Palestinian refugees were dropped under fierce opposition from 
        Arab governments, and have not been taken up since.
            (8) Through its overly inclusive definition of a 
        ``Palestine refugee'' and its refusal to offer refugees the 
        option of resettlement and reintegration, UNRWA contributes to 
        the perpetuation of the suffering of Palestinian refugees, who 
        have been exploited by Arab governments and Palestinian 
        militant groups for over six decades as a political tool with 
        which to assail Israel.
            (9) Almost all of UNRWA's almost 30,000 staff are 
        Palestinian refugees themselves, presenting a clear conflict of 
        interest.
            (10) UNRWA's total annual budget, including its core 
        programs, emergency activities and special projects, exceeds 
        almost $1,000,000,000.
            (11) The United States has long been the largest single 
        contributing country to UNRWA.
            (12) From 1950 to 2010, the United States has contributed 
        almost $3,900,000,000 to UNRWA, including an average of over 
        $210,000,000 per year between fiscal years 2007 and 2010.
            (13) Section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
        (22 U.S.C. 2221(c)) states that ``No contributions by the 
        United States shall be made to the United Nations Relief and 
        Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East except on 
        the condition that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
        take all possible measures to assure that no part of the United 
        States contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to any 
        refugee who is receiving military training as a member of the 
        so-called Palestine Liberation Army or any other guerrilla type 
        organization or who has engaged in any act of terrorism.''.
            (14) Then-Deputy Secretary of State Jacob J. Lew testified 
        before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 13, 2009, 
        that ``We have the highest level of scrutiny in terms of 
        UNRWA''.
            (15) However, in contravention of United States law, UNRWA 
        does not ask its personnel or aid recipients if they are 
        members of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
            (16) Even though the United States remains the largest 
        single contributing country to UNRWA, until 2010, UNRWA did not 
        make available its list of staff for screening through United 
        States watch lists, including that of the Department of the 
        Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, refused a United 
        States request to do so in 2005, and still does not do so for 
        its list of aid recipients.
            (17) UNRWA claims that it has fulfilled its obligations 
        under section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by 
        screening personnel through the United Nations Consolidated 
        List pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 
        1267, but the names on that list are largely members of Al-
        Qaeda and the Taliban, not of Palestinian Foreign Terrorist 
        Organizations such as Hamas, Fatah's al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, 
        or Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
            (18) Former UNRWA commissioner-general Peter Hansen, stated 
        in 2004 that ``I am sure that there are Hamas members on the 
        UNRWA payroll and I don't see that as a crime.''.
            (19) A number of UNRWA personnel have been discovered to be 
        affiliated with Foreign Terrorist Organizations, including, 
        inter alia--
                    (A) Issa Batran (now deceased), a commander of 
                Hamas's al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and senior rocket-
                maker who taught at an UNRWA school in Gaza;
                    (B) Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi (now 
                deceased), who reportedly carried out a homicide 
                bombing that killed seven Americans and one Jordanian 
                at Forward Operating Base Chapman in Afghanistan on 
                December 30, 2009, reportedly worked as a physician at 
                an UNRWA clinic in Amman, Jordan, and had longstanding 
                ties to violent Islamist extremism;
                    (C) Said Siam (now deceased), a longtime Hamas 
                official who eventually served as Hamas's Interior 
                Minister in Gaza, and who taught at an UNRWA school in 
                Gaza;
                    (D) Awad al-Qiq (now deceased), a rocket-builder 
                for Palestinian Islamic Jihad who served as headmaster 
                of an UNRWA school in Gaza;
                    (E) Nahd Atallah, an UNRWA staff member in Gaza, 
                who was arrested, convicted, and sentenced to 15 years' 
                imprisonment by an Israeli military court of using his 
                UN travel document to bypass Israeli checkpoints in 
                Gaza in order to transport armed Palestinian militants; 
                and
                    (F) an UNRWA teacher who reportedly praised 
                homicide bombers and permitted Hamas leader Ahmed 
                Yassin (now deceased) to speak to an assembly of 
                students at an UNRWA school. UNRWA did not terminate 
                the teacher's employment, instead only giving him a 
                letter of censure.
            (20) UNRWA staff unions, including the teachers' union, are 
        frequently controlled by members affiliated with Hamas.
            (21) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted in a 
        2009 report that--
                    (A) ``UNRWA . . . obviously does not take `all 
                possible measures' in practice'' to assure that United 
                States contributions do not provide assistance to any 
                refugee with ties to Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 
                in accordance with section 301(c) of the Foreign 
                Assistance Act of 1961;
                    (B) ``UNRWA makes no attempt to weed out 
                individuals who support extremist positions . . . UNRWA 
                has taken very few steps to detect and eliminate 
                terrorists from the ranks of its staff or its 
                beneficiaries, and no steps at all to prevent members 
                of terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, from joining 
                its staff.'';
                    (C) ``[I]t is rare for an area staff member . . . 
                to report or confirm that another staff member has 
                violated rules against political speech, let alone 
                exhibited ties to terrorism. Not surprisingly, external 
                allegations of improper speech or improper use of UNRWA 
                facilities are difficult to prove, as virtually no one 
                is willing to be a witness against gang members.''; and
                    (D) ``[T]here are no formal procedures for 
                deregistering or denying services to a properly 
                registered refugee, no matter what he or she does.''.
            (22) The late Representative Tom Lantos, in a May 13, 2002, 
        letter, expressed his concern that--
                    (A) ``UNRWA is perpetuating, rather than 
                ameliorating, the situation of Palestinian refugees'';
                    (B) ``UNRWA officials have . . . failed to prevent 
                their camps from becoming centers of terrorist 
                activity''; and
                    (C) ``for too long, UNRWA has been part of the 
                problem, rather than the solution, in the Middle East . 
                . . UNRWA camps have fostered a culture of anger and 
                dependency that undermines both regional peace and the 
                well-being of the camps'' inhabitants.
            (23) UNRWA has long held accounts at the Arab Bank and the 
        Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS), financial institutions that the 
        United States deems or believes to be complicit in money 
        laundering and terror financing.
            (24) The Arab Bank is reportedly at the center of United 
        States investigations into how tens of millions of dollars have 
        flowed to Palestinian groups that allegedly used some of those 
        funds to pay off suicide bombers and their relatives, and is 
        also reportedly being sued in Federal court by American victims 
        of attacks in Israel, with attorneys for the victims accusing 
        the bank of facilitating Acts of International Terrorism.
            (25) On May 11, 2004, the Department of the Treasury 
        designated CBS as a financial institution of ``primary money 
        laundering concern'' pursuant to section 311 of the USA Patriot 
        Act, stating that ``CBS had been used by terrorists and their 
        sympathizers and acted as a conduit for the laundering of 
        proceeds generated from the illicit sale of Iraqi oil'' and 
        that ``numerous transactions that may be indicative of 
        terrorist financing and money laundering have been transferred 
        through CBS, including two accounts at CBS that reference a 
        reputed financier for Usama bin Laden.''.
            (26) On August 10, 2011, the Department of the Treasury 
        designated CBS, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, for serving 
        as an ``agent for designated Syrian and North Korean 
        proliferators''.
            (27) CBS is controlled by the Government of Syria, a State 
        Sponsor of Terrorism.
            (28) The curriculum of UNRWA schools, which use the 
        textbooks of their respective host governments or authorities, 
        has long contained materials that are anti-Israel, anti-
        Semitic, and supportive of violent extremism.
            (29) As far back as over forty years ago, former UNRWA 
        commissioner-general Laurence Michelmore admitted that UNRWA 
        schools were supporting a ``bitterly hostile attitude to 
        Israel.''.
            (30) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted in a 
        January 2009 report that ``[T]eachers in UNRWA schools were 
        often afraid to remove posters glorifying `martyrs' (including 
        suicide bombers) for fear of retribution from armed supporters 
        of the martyrs.''.
            (31) UNRWA officials have compromised UNRWA's strictly 
        humanitarian mandate by engaging in political agitation, 
        propaganda, and advocacy agitation against Israel and in favor 
        of Hamas, as reflected by the following, inter alia:
                    (A) UNRWA officials have repeatedly called for the 
                United States and other nations to deal directly with 
                Hamas and have repeatedly called for political 
                ``reconciliation'' between Hamas and Fatah.
                    (B) UNRWA officials have repeatedly castigated 
                Israel for her actions to defend innocent civilians 
                from rocket and mortar attacks from violent extremist 
                groups in Gaza and from other Acts of International 
                Terrorism, and has repeatedly blamed Israel, not Hamas 
                and other violent extremist groups, for present 
                restrictions on access to Gaza.
                    (C) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay 
                noted in a 2009 report that: ``Although it occasionally 
                issued mild, pro forma criticisms of Palestinian 
                attacks (most of which were clearly war crimes), 
                [UNRWA] put more effort into criticizing Israeli 
                counterterrorism efforts (which were condemned using 
                language associated with war crimes, though any such 
                crimes were far from proved) . . . UNRWA never seems to 
                acknowledge that Israel, since its 2005 withdrawal from 
                Gaza, has launched strikes on the territory largely in 
                order to halt rocket attacks and other assaults.''.
                    (D) Lindsay also noted that ``UNRWA--through its 
                leaders and press spokespersons--is constantly involved 
                in political speech . . . These one-sided speeches on 
                political matters do not further the goals of a 
                humanitarian and supposedly nonpolitical agency.''.
                    (E) UNRWA Commissioner-General Filippo Grandi 
                described as a ``massacre'' Israel's May 31, 2010, 
                naval operation, and use of self-defense measures, to 
                seize the Mavi Marmara ship in order to enforce its 
                naval blockade of the Gaza Strip.
                    (F) Former UNRWA commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd 
                stated in a 2009 meeting with Congressional staff that 
                ``We [UNRWA] are not just humanitarian.''.
                    (G) In January of 2009, UNRWA spokesman Christopher 
                Gunness called for an investigation as to whether 
                Israel had committed ``a war crime''.
                    (H) On December 30, 2008, former UNRWA 
                commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd stated that only 
                Israel was responsible for the start of the most recent 
                conflict in Gaza.
                    (I) On May 25, 2008, in an interview with Press TV, 
                which is controlled by the Government of Iran, former 
                UNRWA commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd reportedly 
                claimed that Hamas was free from corruption and ``more 
                popular than ever''.
                    (J) On October 5, 2007, former UNRWA commissioner-
                general Karen AbuZayd blamed Israel for violent 
                extremist groups in Gaza launching rockets and mortars 
                against Israeli civilian targets, stating that 
                residents of Gaza ``have absorbed--and continue to 
                experience--military incursions in which civilian 
                lives, livelihoods, and property have been destroyed, 
                and to which they have responded with the continuous 
                firing of Qassam rockets into Israel.''.
                    (K) On March 8, 2007, former UNRWA commissioner-
                general Karen AbuZayd, comparing the 1948 Arab-Israeli 
                War with more recent conflicts between Israel and 
                Palestinian militant groups, stated that ``[T]here is a 
                striking historical continuity in the systematic 
                approach to use overwhelming and disproportionate force 
                in the name of security; to separate and exclude 
                Palestinians from the mainstream; to eject them from 
                their land; and to occupy Palestinian land.''.
                    (L) On January 19, 2005, former UNRWA commissioner-
                general Peter Hansen stated that ``My job [is] to 
                represent the refugees.''.
                    (M) In 2002, former UNRWA commissioner-general 
                Peter Hansen falsely accused Israel of carrying out a 
                ``massacre'' in UNRWA's Jenin refugee camp after 
                Israeli forces entered the camp, a base of operations 
                for Palestinian militant groups, to carry out defensive 
                operations to halt repeated homicide bombings in 
                Israel.
                    (N) In 1964, UNRWA allowed its staff to attend the 
                conference in Jerusalem where the Palestine Liberation 
                Organization (PLO) was established.
            (32) Despite UNRWA's contravention of United States law and 
        activities that compromise its strictly humanitarian mandate, 
        UNRWA continues to receive United States contributions, 
        including $233,300,000 in fiscal year 2012.
            (33) The bilateral ``Framework for Cooperation'' that the 
        United States concluded with UNRWA for 2012 actually 
        ``commends'' UNRWA and does not commit UNRWA to vetting its aid 
        recipients through United States watch lists.
            (34) Assistance from the United States and other 
        responsible nations allows UNRWA to claim that criticisms of 
        the agency's behavior are unfounded. UNRWA spokesman 
        Christopher Gunness has dismissed concerns by stating that ``If 
        these baseless allegations were even halfway true, do you 
        really think the U.S. and [European Commission] would give us 
        hundreds of millions of dollars per year?''.
            (35) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted in a 
        2009 report that:
                    (A) ``The United States, despite funding nearly 75 
                percent of UNRWA's national budget and remaining its 
                largest single country donor, has mostly failed to make 
                UNRWA reflect U.S. foreign policy objectives . . . 
                Recent U.S. efforts to shape UNRWA appear to have been 
                ineffective . . .'';
                    (B) ``[T]he United States is not obligated to fund 
                agencies that refuse to check its rolls for individuals 
                their donors do not wish to support.'';
                    (C) ``A number of changes in UNRWA could benefit 
                the refugees, the Middle East, and the United States, 
                but those changes will not occur unless the United 
                States, ideally with support from UNRWA's other main 
                financial supporter, the European Union, compels the 
                agency to enact reforms.''; and
                    (D) ``If the [UNRWA commissioner-general's] power 
                is used in ways that are conflict with the donors'' 
                political objectives, it is up to the donors to take 
                the necessary actions to ensure that their interests 
                are respected. When they have done so, UNRWA--given the 
                tight financial leash it has been on for most of its 
                existence--has tended to follow their dictates, even if 
                sometimes slowly.
            (36) The Government of Canada has placed restrictions on 
        its contributions to UNRWA, demonstrating consequences for 
        UNRWA's malfeasance and setting an example for the United 
        States and other donor governments.

SEC. 802. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRWA.

    Section 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by 
striking subsection (c) and inserting the following new subsection:
    ``(c)(1) Withholding.--Contributions by the United States to the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East (UNRWA), to any successor or related entity, or to the 
regular budget of the United Nations for the support of UNRWA or a 
successor entity (through staff positions provided by the United 
Nations Secretariat, or otherwise), may be provided only during a 
period for which a certification described in paragraph (2) is in 
effect.
    ``(2) Certification.--A certification described in this paragraph 
is a written determination by the Secretary of State, based on all 
information available after diligent inquiry, and transmitted to the 
appropriate congressional committees along with a detailed description 
of the factual basis therefor, that--
            ``(A) no official, employee, consultant, contractor, 
        subcontractor, representative, or affiliate of UNRWA--
                    ``(i) is a member of a Foreign Terrorist 
                Organization;
                    ``(ii) has propagated, disseminated, or incited 
                anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric or 
                propaganda; or
                    ``(iii) has used any UNRWA resources, including 
                publications or Web sites, to propagate or disseminate 
                political materials, including political rhetoric 
                regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
            ``(B) no UNRWA school, hospital, clinic, other facility, or 
        other infrastructure or resource is being used by a Foreign 
        Terrorist Organization for operations, planning, training, 
        recruitment, fundraising, indoctrination, communications, 
        sanctuary, storage of weapons or other materials, or any other 
        purposes;
            ``(C) UNRWA is subject to comprehensive financial audits by 
        an internationally recognized third party independent auditing 
        firm and has implemented an effective system of vetting and 
        oversight to prevent the use, receipt, or diversion of any 
        UNRWA resources by any foreign terrorist organization or 
        members thereof;
            ``(D) no UNRWA-funded school or educational institution 
        uses textbooks or other educational materials that propagate or 
        disseminate anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic 
        rhetoric, propaganda or incitement;
            ``(E) no recipient of UNRWA funds or loans is a member of a 
        Foreign Terrorist Organization; and
            ``(F) UNRWA holds no accounts or other affiliations with 
        financial institutions that the United States deems or believes 
        to be complicit in money laundering and terror financing.
            ``(3) Definitions.--In this section:
                    ``(A) Appropriate congressional committees.--The 
                term `appropriate congressional committees' means--
                            ``(i) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, 
                        Appropriations, and Oversight and Government 
                        Reform of the House of Representatives; and
                            ``(ii) the Committees on Foreign Relations, 
                        Appropriations, and Homeland Security and 
                        Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
                    ``(B) Foreign terrorist organization.--The term 
                `Foreign Terrorist Organization' means an organization 
                designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the 
                Secretary of State in accordance with section 219(a) of 
                the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).
            ``(4) Effective Duration of Certification.--The 
        certification described in paragraph (2) shall be effective for 
        a period of 180 days from the date of transmission to the 
        appropriate congressional committees, or until the Secretary 
        receives information rendering that certification factually 
        inaccurate, whichever is earliest. In the event that a 
        certification becomes ineffective, the Secretary shall promptly 
        transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
        description of any information that precludes the renewal or 
        continuation of the certification.
            ``(5) Limitation.--During a period for which a 
        certification described in paragraph (2) is in effect, the 
        United States may not contribute to the United Nations Relief 
        and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
        (UNRWA) or a successor entity an annual amount--
                    ``(A) greater than the highest annual contribution 
                to UNRWA made by a member country of the League of Arab 
                States;
                    ``(B) that, as a proportion of the total UNRWA 
                budget, exceeds the proportion of the total budget for 
                the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
                (UNHCR) paid by the United States; or
                    ``(C) that exceeds 22 percent of the total budget 
                of UNRWA.''.

SEC. 803. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the President and the Secretary of State should lead a 
        high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other responsible 
        nations to withhold contributions to UNRWA, to any successor or 
        related entity, or to the regular budget of the United Nations 
        for the support of UNRWA or a successor entity (through staff 
        positions provided by the United Nations Secretariat, or 
        otherwise) until UNRWA has met the conditions listed in 
        subparagraphs (A) through (F) of section 301(c)(2) of the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by section 802 of this 
        Act);
            (2) citizens of recognized states should be removed from 
        UNRWA's jurisdiction;
            (3) UNRWA's definition of a ``Palestine refugee'' should be 
        changed to that used for a refugee by the Office of the United 
        Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and
            (4) in order to alleviate the suffering of Palestinian 
        refugees, responsibility for those refugees should be fully 
        transferred to the Office of the United Nations High 
        Commissioner for Refugees.

              TITLE IX--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

SEC. 901. TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAM.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was 
        established in 1957 with the objectives of seeking to 
        ``accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to 
        peace, health and prosperity throughout the world'' and to 
        ``ensure . . . that assistance provided by it or at its request 
        or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way 
        as to further any military purpose.''.
            (2) The United States, via assessed contributions, is the 
        largest financial contributor to the regular budget of the 
        IAEA.
            (3) In 1959, the IAEA established what is now called the 
        Technical Cooperation Program, financed primarily through 
        voluntary contributions by member states to the Technical 
        Cooperation Fund, to provide nuclear technical cooperation (TC) 
        for peaceful purposes to countries worldwide.
            (4) The United States is the largest financial contributor 
        to the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Fund.
            (5) A March 2009 report by the Government Accountability 
        Office (GAO) found that ``neither [the Department of State] nor 
        IAEA seeks to systematically limit TC assistance to countries 
        the United States has designated as state sponsors of 
        terrorism--Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria--even though under U.S. 
        law these countries are subject to sanctions.''.
            (6) The GAO report also found that ``Together, [Cuba, Iran, 
        Sudan, and Syria] received more than $55 million in TC 
        assistance from 1997 through 2007.''. These four countries have 
        received continued assistance since 2007.
            (7) The GAO report also found that ``proliferation concerns 
        about the [Technical Cooperation Program] have persisted 
        because of the assistance it has provided to certain countries 
        and because nuclear equipment, technology, and expertise can be 
        dual-use--capable of serving peaceful purposes . . . but also 
        useful in contributing to nuclear weapons development.''.
            (8) The GAO report also found that ``[The State Department] 
        reported in 2007 that three TC projects in [Iran] were directly 
        related to the Iranian nuclear power plant at Bushehr.''.
            (9) The GAO report also found that ``The proliferation 
        concerns associated with the [Technical Cooperation Program] 
        are difficult for the United States to fully identify, assess, 
        and resolve . . . [because] there is no formal mechanism for 
        obtaining TC project information during the proposal 
        development phase . . . [l]imited [Department of] State 
        documentation on how proliferation concerns of TC proposals 
        were resolved . . . [and s]hortcomings in U.S. policies and 
        IAEA procedures [including monitoring proliferation risks] 
        related to TC program fellowships.''.
            (10) The GAO report noted that ``IAEA officials told us 
        that the [technical cooperation program] does not attempt to 
        exclude countries on the basis of their status as United 
        States--designated state sponsors of terrorism or other 
        political considerations'' and that, according to the Deputy 
        Director General for the Technical Cooperation Program, ``there 
        are no good countries and there are no bad countries'' with 
        respect to provision of technical cooperation by the IAEA.
            (11) The GAO report also found that ``given the limited 
        information available on TC projects and the dual-use nature of 
        some nuclear technologies and expertise, we do not believe [the 
        State Department] can assert with complete confidence that TC 
        assistance has not advanced [weapons of mass destruction] 
        programs in U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism''.
            (12) The GAO report also found that ``we do not share [the 
        State Department's confidence in IAEA's internal safeguards to 
        prevent TC projects from contributing to weapons development . 
        . .]''.
            (13) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et 
        seq.) prohibited any of the funds authorized to be appropriated 
        for ``International Organizations and Programs'' from being 
        made available for the United States proportionate share for 
        programs for Libya, Iran, Cuba, or the Palestine Liberation 
        Organization, inter alia.
            (14) The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
        Programs Appropriations Act, 1998 (Public Law 105-118) 
        prohibited any of the funds made available by such Act for the 
        IAEA from being made available for programs and projects of the 
        IAEA in Cuba.
            (15) The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 
        1998 (Public Law 105-277) required the United States to 
        withhold a proportionate share of funding to the IAEA for 
        projects in Cuba regarding the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant and 
        the Pedro Pi Nuclear Research Center.
            (16) The GAO report asked Congress ``to consider directing 
        [the State Department] to withhold a share of future annual 
        contributions to the [technical cooperation fund] that is 
        proportionate to the amount of funding provided from the fund 
        for U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism and other 
        countries of concern, noting that such a withholding is a 
        matter of fundamental principle and intended to foster a more 
        consistent United States policy toward such nations''.
            (17) The IAEA has repeatedly reported that the Government 
        of Iran continues its work on heavy water-related projects and 
        its enrichment of uranium, in violation of United Nations 
        Security Council Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 
        (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010).
            (18) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) 
        decided ``that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the 
        IAEA or under its auspices shall only be for food, 
        agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes 
        [inter alia] . . . but that no such technical cooperation shall 
        be provided that relates to . . . proliferation sensitive 
        nuclear activities . . .''.
            (19) The IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board 
        of Governors on February 25, 2011, that the Government of Iran 
        now has approximately 7,000 centrifuges for enriching uranium, 
        is running almost 5,000 of them, and has increased its 
        stockpile of low-enriched uranium to over 3,600 kilograms, 
        considered sufficient for further enrichment into enough high-
        enriched uranium for more than one atomic bomb. The Government 
        of Iran has also reportedly produced a stockpile of over 40 
        kilograms of uranium enriched up to 20 percent U-235.
            (20) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to 
        the IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of 
        February 25, 2011, about the ``outstanding issues related to 
        possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme''.
            (21) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to 
        the IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of 
        February 25, 2011, that ``the [IAEA] remains concerned about 
        the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed 
        nuclear related activities involving military-related 
        organizations, including activities related to the development 
        of a nuclear payload for a missile.''.
            (22) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to 
        the IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of 
        February 19, 2009, that ``Iran has not implemented the 
        Additional Protocol, which is a prerequisite for [the IAEA] to 
        provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared 
        nuclear material and activities. Nor has [Iran] agreed to [the 
        IAEA's] request that Iran provide, as a transparency measure, 
        access to additional locations related, inter alia, to the 
        manufacturing of centrifuges, research and development on 
        uranium enrichment, and uranium mining and milling, as also 
        required by the Security Council.''.
            (23) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to 
        the IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of 
        February 19, 2009, that ``as a result of the continued lack of 
        cooperation by Iran in connection with . . . issues which give 
        rise to concerns about possible military dimensions of Iran's 
        nuclear programme, [the IAEA] has made no substantive progress 
        on these issues.''.
            (24) Iran has refused to comply with resolutions adopted by 
        the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, November 26, 
        2003, March 15, 2004, June 18, 2004, November 29, 2004, August 
        11, 2005, September 24, 2005, February 4, 2006, and July 31, 
        2006, regarding ``Iran's many failures and breaches of its 
        obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement'' and 
        continues to block IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities, 
        in violation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement.
            (25) According to multiple news reports, Iran recently 
        denied access to its enrichment site at Natanz to IAEA 
        inspectors, and has also denied a request by the IAEA to place 
        one or more additional surveillance cameras at the enrichment 
        site at Natanz.
            (26) In April of 2008, United States Government officials 
        publicly revealed that Syria was building at the Dair Alzour 
        site, with North Korea's assistance, a secret nuclear reactor 
        that was based on a North Korean model capable of producing 
        plutonium for nuclear weapons and that was weeks away from 
        becoming operational before an Israeli air strike reportedly 
        destroyed the reactor in September 2007.
            (27) On April 28, 2008, General Michael Hayden, the former 
        Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, stated that the 
        Syrian reactor at Dair Alzour could have produced enough 
        plutonium for 1 or 2 bombs within a year of becoming 
        operational.
            (28) The IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board 
        of Governors on November 19, 2008 that the Syrian facility at 
        Dair Alzour bore features that resembled those of an undeclared 
        nuclear reactor, adding that ``Syria has not yet provided the 
        requested documentation in support of its declarations 
        concerning the nature or function of the destroyed building, 
        nor agreed to a visit to the three other locations which the 
        IAEA has requested to visit.''.
            (29) The IAEA Director General publicly stated to the IAEA 
        Board of Governors, on June 15, 2009, that ``the limited 
        information and access provided by Syria to date have not 
        enabled the Agency to determine the nature of the destroyed 
        facility'' at Dair Alzour site, that uranium particles have 
        been found in samples taken from a second site, the Miniature 
        Neutron Source Reactor facility in Damascus, and that the 
        particles found at both sites ``are of a type not included in 
        Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material.''.
            (30) Commercial satellite photos published on February 23, 
        2011, indicate efforts by the Government of Syria to conceal 
        its activities at an additional site, Marj as Sultan, which may 
        be connected to the Dair Alzour facility.
            (31) The IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board 
        of Governors on February 25, 2011, that ``Syria has not 
        cooperated with the [IAEA] since June 2008 in connection with 
        the unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and the 
        other three locations allegedly functionally related to it. As 
        a consequence, the [IAEA] has not been able to make progress 
        towards resolving the outstanding issues related to those 
        sites.''.
    (b) Prohibition.--No funds from any United States assessed or 
voluntary contribution to the IAEA may be used to support any 
assistance provided by the IAEA through its Technical Cooperation 
program to any country, including North Korea that--
            (1) is a country the government of which has been 
        determined by the Secretary of State, for purposes of section 
        6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of 
        the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms 
        Export Control Act, or other provision of law, is a government 
        that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
        terrorism;
            (2) is in breach of or noncompliance with its obligations 
        regarding--
                    (A) its safeguards agreement with the IAEA;
                    (B) the Additional Protocol;
                    (C) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
                    (D) any relevant United Nations Security Council 
                Resolution; or
                    (E) the Charter of the United Nations; or
            (3) is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance 
        with the obligations specified in paragraph (2).
    (c) Withholding of Voluntary Contributions.--Not later than 30 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall withhold from the United States voluntary contribution to the 
IAEA an amount proportional to that spent by the IAEA in the period 
from 2007 to 2008 on assistance through its Technical Cooperation 
Program to countries described in subsection (b).
    (d) Withholding of Assessed Contributions.--If, not later than 30 
days of the date of the enactment of this Act, the amount specified in 
subsection (c) has not been withheld and the IAEA has not suspended all 
assistance provided through its Technical Cooperation Program to the 
countries described in subsection (b), an amount equal to that 
specified in subsection (c) shall be withheld from the United States 
assessed contribution to the IAEA.
    (e) Waiver.--The provisions in subsections (c) and (d) may be 
waived if--
            (1) the IAEA has suspended all assistance provided through 
        its Technical Cooperation Program to the countries described in 
        subsection (b); or
            (2) the President certifies that the countries described in 
        subsection (b) no longer pose a threat to the national 
        security, interests, and allies of the United States.
    (f) United States Actions at IAEA.--The President shall direct the 
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, 
vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block the 
allocation of funds for any assistance provided by the IAEA through its 
Technical Cooperation Program to any country described in subsection 
(b).
    (g) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the implementation of this 
section.

SEC. 902. UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE IAEA.

    (a) Enforcement and Compliance.--
            (1) Office of compliance.--
                    (A) Establishment.--The President shall direct the 
                United States Permanent Representative to International 
                Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to use the voice, vote, and 
                influence of the United States at the IAEA to establish 
                an Office of Compliance in the Secretariat of the IAEA.
                    (B) Operation.--The Office of Compliance shall--
                            (i) function as an independent body 
                        composed of technical experts who shall work in 
                        consultation with IAEA inspectors to assess 
                        compliance by IAEA Member States and provide 
                        recommendations to the IAEA Board of Governors 
                        concerning penalties to be imposed on IAEA 
                        Member States that fail to fulfill their 
                        obligations under IAEA Board resolutions;
                            (ii) base its assessments and 
                        recommendations on IAEA inspection reports; and
                            (iii) take into consideration information 
                        provided by IAEA Board Members that are 1 of 
                        the 5 nuclear weapons states as recognized by 
                        the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
                        Weapons (21 U.S.T. 483) (commonly referred to 
                        as the ``Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty'' or 
                        the ``NPT'').
                    (C) Staffing.--The Office of Compliance shall be 
                staffed from existing personnel in the Department of 
                Safeguards of the IAEA or the Department of Nuclear 
                Safety and Security of the IAEA.
            (2) Committee on safeguards and verification.--The 
        President shall direct the United States Permanent 
        Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and 
        influence of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that the 
        Committee on Safeguards and Verification established in 2005 
        shall develop and seek to put into force a workplan of concrete 
        measures that will--
                    (A) improve the ability of the IAEA to monitor and 
                enforce compliance by Member States of the IAEA with 
                the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Statute of 
                the International Atomic Energy Agency; and
                    (B) enhance the ability of the IAEA, beyond the 
                verification mechanisms and authorities contained in 
                the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements 
                between the IAEA and Member States of the IAEA, to 
                detect with a high degree of confidence undeclared 
                nuclear activities by a Member State.
            (3) Penalties with respect to the iaea.--
                    (A) In general.--The President shall direct the 
                United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to 
                use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States 
                at the IAEA to ensure that a Member State of the IAEA 
                that is under investigation for a breach of or 
                noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes 
                and principles of the Charter of the United Nations has 
                its privileges suspended, including--
                            (i) limiting its ability to vote on its 
                        case;
                            (ii) being prevented from receiving any 
                        technical assistance; and
                            (iii) being prevented from hosting 
                        meetings.
                    (B) Termination of penalties.--The penalties 
                specified under subparagraph (A) shall be terminated 
                when such investigation is concluded and such Member 
                State is no longer in such breach or noncompliance.
            (4) Penalties with respect to the nuclear nonproliferation 
        treaty.--The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
        Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and 
        influence of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that a 
        Member State of the IAEA that is found to be in breach of, in 
        noncompliance with, or has withdrawn from the Nuclear 
        Nonproliferation Treaty shall return to the IAEA all nuclear 
        materials and technology received from the IAEA, any Member 
        State of the IAEA, or any Member State of the Nuclear 
        Nonproliferation Treaty.
    (b) United States Contributions.--
            (1) Voluntary contributions.--Voluntary contributions of 
        the United States to the IAEA should primarily be used to fund 
        activities relating to Nuclear Safety and Security or 
        activities relating to Nuclear Verification.
            (2) Limitation on use of funds.--The President shall direct 
        the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use 
        the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA 
        to--
                    (A) ensure that funds for safeguards inspections 
                are prioritized for countries that have newly 
                established nuclear programs or are initiating nuclear 
                programs; and
                    (B) block the allocation of funds for any other 
                IAEA development, environmental, or nuclear science 
                assistance or activity to a country--
                            (i) the government of which the Secretary 
                        of State has determined, for purposes of 
                        section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act 
                        of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance 
                        Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export 
                        Control Act, or other provision of law, is a 
                        government that has repeatedly provided support 
                        for acts of international terrorism and the 
                        government of which the Secretary has 
                        determined has not dismantled and surrendered 
                        its weapons of mass destruction programs under 
                        international verification;
                            (ii) that is under investigation for a 
                        breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA 
                        obligations or the purposes and principles of 
                        the Charter of the United Nations; or
                            (iii) that is in violation of its IAEA 
                        obligations or the purposes and principles of 
                        the Charter of the United Nations.
            (3) Detail of expenditures.--The President shall direct the 
        United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the 
        voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to 
        secure, as part of the regular budget presentation of the IAEA 
        to Member States of the IAEA, a detailed breakdown by country 
        of expenditures of the IAEA for safeguards inspections and 
        nuclear security activities.
    (c) Membership.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall direct the United 
        States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, 
        vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block 
        the membership on the Board of Governors of the IAEA for a 
        Member State of the IAEA that has not signed and ratified the 
        Additional Protocol and--
                    (A) is under investigation for a breach of or 
                noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes 
                and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; or
                    (B) that is in violation of its IAEA obligations or 
                the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
                United Nations.
            (2) Criteria.--The United States Permanent Representative 
        to the IAEA shall make every effort to modify the criteria for 
        Board membership to reflect the principles described in 
        paragraph (1).
    (d) Small Quantities Protocol.--The President shall direct the 
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, 
vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to make every 
effort to ensure that the IAEA changes the policy regarding the Small 
Quantities Protocol in order to--
            (1) rescind and eliminate the Small Quantities Protocol;
            (2) require that any IAEA Member State that has previously 
        signed a Small Quantities Protocol to sign, ratify, and 
        implement the Additional Protocol, provide immediate access for 
        IAEA inspectors to its nuclear-related facilities, and agree to 
        the strongest inspections regime of its nuclear efforts; and
            (3) require that any IAEA Member State that does not comply 
        with paragraph (2) to be ineligible to receive nuclear 
        material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA 
        Member State and subject to the penalties described in 
        subsection (a)(3).
    (e) Nuclear Program of Iran and Syria.--
            (1) United states action.--The President shall direct the 
        United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the 
        voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to 
        make every effort to ensure the adoption of a resolution by the 
        IAEA Board of Governors that, in addition to the restrictions 
        already imposed, makes Iran and Syria ineligible to receive any 
        nuclear material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any 
        IAEA Member State and ineligible for any IAEA assistance not 
        related to safeguards inspections or nuclear security until the 
        IAEA Board of Governors determines that Iran or Syria, as the 
        case may be--
                    (A) is providing full access to IAEA inspectors to 
                its nuclear-related facilities;
                    (B) has fully implemented and is in compliance with 
                the Additional Protocol; and
                    (C) has permanently ceased and dismantled all 
                activities and programs related to nuclear-enrichment 
                and reprocessing.
            (2) Penalties.--If an IAEA Member State is determined to 
        have violated the prohibition on assistance to Iran or Syria 
        described in paragraph (1) before the IAEA Board of Governors 
        determines that Iran or Syria, as the case may be, has 
        satisfied the conditions described in subparagraphs (A) through 
        (C) of such paragraph, such Member State shall be subject to 
        the penalties described in subsection (a)(3), shall be 
        ineligible to receive nuclear material, technology, equipment, 
        or assistance from any IAEA Member State, and shall be 
        ineligible to receive any IAEA assistance not related to 
        safeguards inspections or nuclear security until such time as 
        the IAEA Board of Governors makes such determination with 
        respect to Iran or Syria, as the case may be.
    (f) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually for 2 years thereafter, the 
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report on the implementation of this section.

SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTION PLAN 
              OF THE IAEA.

    It is the sense of Congress that the national security interests of 
the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear Security Action Plan of 
the IAEA and the Board of Governors should recommend, and the General 
Conference should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear 
Security Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA.

                         TITLE X--PEACEKEEPING

SEC. 1001. REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) although United Nations peacekeeping operations have 
        contributed greatly toward the promotion of peace and stability 
        for over 6 decades and the majority of peacekeeping personnel 
        who have served under the United Nations flag have done so with 
        honor and courage, the record of United Nations peacekeeping 
        has been severely tarnished by operational failures and 
        unconscionable acts of misconduct;
            (2) in response to such failures, successive Secretaries 
        General of the United Nations have launched numerous reform 
        efforts, including the high-level Panel on United Nations Peace 
        Operations, led by former Foreign Minister of Algeria Lakhdar 
        Brahimi, the 2005 report by the Special Advisor on the 
        Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, His Royal Highness 
        Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, and the 2009 New 
        Partnership Agenda, known as the ``New Horizon'' reports;
            (3) despite the fact that the United Nations has had over a 
        decade to implement many of these reforms, nearly four years to 
        implement the reforms in the Zeid Report, and the fact that 
        Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, his predecessor Kofi Annan, and 
        the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations repeatedly 
        have expressed their commitment ``to implementing fundamental, 
        systematic changes as a matter of urgency,'' a number of 
        critical reforms continue to be blocked or delayed by Members 
        States who arguably benefit from maintenance of the status quo;
            (4) further, audits of procurement practices in the 
        Department of Peacekeeping Operations, conducted by the Office 
        of Internal Oversight Services, and the now-defunct United 
        Nations Procurement Task Force have uncovered ``significant'' 
        corruption schemes and criminal acts by United Nations 
        peacekeeping personnel; and
            (5) if the reputation of and confidence in United Nations 
        peacekeeping operations is to be restored, fundamental and far-
        reaching reforms, particularly in the areas of planning, 
        management, procurement, training, conduct, and discipline, 
        must be implemented without further delay.

SEC. 1002. POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
              OPERATIONS.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue reform of 
United Nations peacekeeping operations in the following areas:
            (1) Planning and management.--
                    (A) Global audit.--As the size, cost, and number of 
                United Nations peacekeeping operations have increased 
                substantially over the past decade, independent audits 
                of each such operation should be conducted annually, 
                with a view toward ``right-sizing'' operations and 
                ensuring that all operations are efficient and cost 
                effective.
                    (B) Procurement and transparency.--The logistics 
                established within the United Nations Department of 
                Field Support should be streamlined and strengthened to 
                ensure that all peacekeeping missions are resourced 
                appropriately, transparently, and in a timely fashion 
                while individual accountability for waste, fraud and 
                abuse within United Nations peacekeeping missions is 
                uniformly enforced.
                    (C) Review of mandates and closing operations.--In 
                conjunction with the audit described in subparagraph 
                (A), the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
                Operations should conduct a comprehensive review of all 
                United Nations peacekeeping operation mandates, with a 
                view toward identifying objectives that are practical 
                and achievable, and report its findings to the Security 
                Council. In particular, the review should consider the 
                following:
                            (i) Except in extraordinary cases, 
                        including genocide, the United Nations 
                        Department of Peacekeeping Operations should 
                        not be tasked with activities that are 
                        impractical or unachievable without the 
                        cooperation of the Member State(s) hosting a 
                        United Nations peacekeeping operation, or which 
                        amount to de-facto Trusteeship outside of the 
                        procedures established for such under Chapter 
                        XII of the United Nations Charter, thereby 
                        creating unrealistic expectations and 
                        obfuscating the primary responsibility of the 
                        Member States themselves in creating and 
                        maintaining conditions for peace.
                            (ii) Long-standing operations that are 
                        static and cannot fulfill their mandate should 
                        be downsized or closed.
                            (iii) Where there is legitimate concern 
                        that the withdrawal from a country of an 
                        otherwise static United Nations peacekeeping 
                        operation would result in the resumption of 
                        major conflict, a burden-sharing arrangement 
                        that reduces the level of assessed 
                        contributions, similar to that currently 
                        supporting the United Nations Peacekeeping 
                        Force in Cyprus, should be explored and 
                        instituted.
                    (D) Leadership.--As peacekeeping operations become 
                larger and increasingly complex, the Secretariat should 
                adopt a minimum standard of qualifications for senior 
                leaders and managers, with particular emphasis on 
                specific skills and experience, and current senior 
                leaders and managers who do not meet those standards 
                should be removed.
                    (E) Pre-deployment training.--Pre-deployment 
                training on interpretation of the mandate of the 
                operation, specifically in the areas of use of force, 
                civilian protection and field conditions, the Code of 
                Conduct, HIV/AIDS, and human rights should be 
                mandatory, and all personnel, regardless of category or 
                rank, should be required to sign an oath that each has 
                received and understands such training as a condition 
                of participation in the operation.
                    (F) Gratis military personnel.--The General 
                Assembly should seek to strengthen the capacity the 
                United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
                and ease the extraordinary burden currently placed upon 
                the limited number of headquarters staff by lifting 
                restrictions on the utilization of gratis military 
                personnel by the Department so that the Department may 
                accept secondments from Member States of military 
                personnel with expertise in mission planning, 
                logistics, and other operational specialties.
            (2) Conduct and discipline.--
                    (A) Adoption of a uniform code of conduct.--A 
                single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the status of 
                a binding rule and applies equally to all personnel 
                serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, 
                regardless of category or rank, including military 
                personnel, should be adopted and incorporated into 
                legal documents governing participation in such an 
                operation, including all contracts and Memorandums of 
                Understanding, promulgated and effectively enforced.
                    (B) Understanding the code of conduct.--All 
                personnel, regardless of category or rank, should 
                receive training on the Code of Conduct prior to 
                deployment with a peacekeeping operation, in addition 
                to periodic follow-on training. In particular--
                            (i) all personnel, regardless of category 
                        or rank, should be provided with a personal 
                        copy of the Code of Conduct that has been 
                        translated into the national language of such 
                        personnel, regardless of whether such language 
                        is an official language of the United Nations;
                            (ii) all personnel, regardless of category 
                        or rank, should sign an oath that each has 
                        received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that 
                        each pledges to abide by the Code of Conduct, 
                        and that each understands the consequences of 
                        violating the Code of Conduct, including 
                        immediate termination of participation in and 
                        permanent exclusion from all current and future 
                        peacekeeping operations, as well as the 
                        assumption of personal liability and victims 
                        compensation, where appropriate, as a condition 
                        of appointment to any such operation; and
                            (iii) peacekeeping operations should 
                        continue and enhance educational outreach 
                        programs to reach local communities where 
                        peacekeeping personnel of such operations are 
                        based, including explaining prohibited acts on 
                        the part of United Nations peacekeeping 
                        personnel and identifying the individual to 
                        whom the local population may direct complaints 
                        or file allegations of exploitation, abuse, or 
                        other acts of misconduct.
                    (C) Monitoring mechanisms.--Dedicated monitoring 
                mechanisms, such as the Conduct and Discipline Teams 
                already deployed to support United Nations peacekeeping 
                operations in Haiti, Sudan, Kosovo, Liberia, Lebanon, 
                Cote d'Ivoire, Western Sahara, and the Democratic 
                Republic of Congo, should be present in each operation 
                to monitor compliance with the Code of Conduct, and 
                should report simultaneously to the Head of Mission, 
                the United Nations Department of Field Support, the 
                United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
                and the Associate Director of the Office of Internal 
                Oversight Services for Peacekeeping Operations 
                (established under section 1114(b)(9)).
                    (D) Investigations.--A permanent, professional, and 
                independent investigative body should be established 
                and introduced into United Nations peacekeeping 
                operations. In particular--
                            (i) the investigative body should include 
                        professionals with experience in investigating 
                        sex crimes and the illegal exploitation of 
                        resources, as appropriate, as well as experts 
                        who can provide guidance on standards of proof 
                        and evidentiary requirements necessary for any 
                        subsequent legal action;
                            (ii) provisions should be included in all 
                        Memorandums of Understanding, including a Model 
                        Memorandum of Understanding, that obligate 
                        Member States that contribute troops to a 
                        peacekeeping operation to designate a military 
                        prosecutor who will participate in any 
                        investigation into credible allegations of 
                        misconduct brought against an individual of 
                        such Member State, so that evidence is 
                        collected and preserved in a manner consistent 
                        with the military law of such Member State;
                            (iii) the investigative body should be 
                        regionally based to ensure rapid deployment and 
                        should be equipped with modern forensics 
                        equipment for the purpose of positively 
                        identifying perpetrators and, where necessary, 
                        for determining paternity; and
                            (iv) the investigative body should report 
                        directly to the Associate Director of the 
                        Office of Internal Oversight Services for 
                        Peacekeeping Operations, while providing copies 
                        of any reports to the Department of Field 
                        Support, the Department of Peacekeeping 
                        Operations, the Head of Mission, and the Member 
                        State concerned.
                    (E) Follow-up.--The Conduct and Discipline Unit in 
                the headquarters of the United Nations Department of 
                Field Support should be appropriately staffed, 
                resourced, and tasked with--
                            (i) promulgating measures to prevent 
                        misconduct;
                            (ii) receiving reports by field personnel 
                        and coordinating the Department's response to 
                        allegations of misconduct;
                            (iii) gathering follow-up information on 
                        completed investigations, particularly by 
                        focusing on disciplinary actions against the 
                        individual concerned taken by the United 
                        Nations or by the Member State that is 
                        contributing troops to which such individual 
                        belongs, and sharing such information with the 
                        Security Council, the Department of 
                        Peacekeeping Operations, the Head of Mission, 
                        and the community hosting the peacekeeping 
                        operation; and
                            (iv) contributing pertinent data on conduct 
                        and discipline to the database required 
                        pursuant to subparagraph (H).
                    (F) Financial liability and victims assistance.--
                Although peacekeeping operations should provide 
                immediate medical assistance to victims of sexual abuse 
                or exploitation, the responsibility for providing 
                longer-term treatment, care, or restitution lies solely 
                with the individual found guilty of the misconduct. In 
                particular:
                            (i) The United Nations should not assume 
                        responsibility for providing long-term 
                        treatment or compensation under the Sexual 
                        Exploitation and Abuse Victim Assistance 
                        Mechanism by utilizing assessed contributions 
                        to United Nations peacekeeping operations, 
                        thereby shielding individuals from personal 
                        liability and reinforcing an atmosphere of 
                        impunity.
                            (ii) If an individual responsible for 
                        misconduct has been repatriated, reassigned, 
                        redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide 
                        assistance, responsibility for providing 
                        assistance to a victim should be assigned to 
                        the Member State that contributed the 
                        contingent to which such individual belonged or 
                        to the manager concerned.
                            (iii) In the case of misconduct by a member 
                        of a military contingent, appropriate funds 
                        shall be withheld from the troop contributing 
                        country concerned.
                            (iv) In the case of misconduct by a 
                        civilian employee or contractor of the United 
                        Nations, appropriate wages shall be garnished 
                        from such individual or fines shall be imposed 
                        against such individual, consistent with 
                        existing United Nations Staff Rules, and 
                        retirement funds shall not be shielded from 
                        liability.
                    (G) Managers and commanders.--The manner in which 
                managers and commanders handle cases of misconduct by 
                those serving under them should be included in their 
                individual performance evaluations, so that managers 
                and commanders who take decisive action to deter and 
                address misconduct are rewarded, while those who create 
                a permissive environment or impede investigations are 
                penalized or relieved of duty, as appropriate.
                    (H) Database.--A centralized database, including 
                personnel photos, fingerprints, and biometric data, 
                should be created and maintained within the United 
                Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the 
                Department of Field Support, and other relevant United 
                Nations bodies without further delay to track cases of 
                misconduct, including the outcome of investigations and 
                subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel who 
                have engaged in misconduct or other criminal 
                activities, regardless of category or rank, are 
                permanently barred from participation in future 
                peacekeeping operations.
                    (I) Cooperation of member states.--If a Member 
                State routinely refuses to cooperate with the 
                directives contained herein or acts to shield its 
                nationals from personal liability, that Member State 
                should be barred from contributing troops or personnel 
                to future peacekeeping operations.
                    (J) Welfare.--Peacekeeping operations should 
                continue to seek to maintain a minimum standard of 
                welfare for mission personnel to ameliorate conditions 
                of service, while adjustments are made to the 
                discretionary welfare payments currently provided to 
                Member States that contribute troops to offset the cost 
                of operation-provided recreational facilities, as 
                necessary and appropriate.

SEC. 1003. CERTIFICATION.

    (a) New or Expanded Peacekeeping Operations Contingent Upon 
Presidential Certification of Peacekeeping Operations Reforms.--
            (1) No new or expanded peacekeeping operations.--
                    (A) Certification.--Except as provided in 
                subparagraph (B), until the Secretary of State 
                certifies that the requirements described in paragraph 
                (2) have been satisfied, the President shall direct the 
                United States Permanent Representative to the United 
                Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
                United States at the United Nations to oppose the 
                creation of new, or expansion of existing, United 
                Nations peacekeeping operations.
                    (B) Exception and notification.--The requirements 
                described under paragraph (2) may be waived with 
                respect to a particular peacekeeping operation if the 
                President determines that failure to deploy new or 
                additional peacekeepers in such situation will 
                significantly contribute to the widespread loss of 
                human life, genocide, or the endangerment of a vital 
                national security interest of the United States. If the 
                President makes such a determination, the President 
                shall, not later than 15 days before the exercise of 
                such waiver, notify the appropriate congressional 
                committees of such determination and resulting waiver.
            (2) Certification of peacekeeping operations reforms.--The 
        certification referred to in paragraph (1) is a certification 
        made by the Secretary to the appropriate congressional 
        committees that the following reforms, or an equivalent set of 
        reforms, related to peacekeeping operations have been adopted 
        by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations or 
        the General Assembly, as appropriate:
                    (A) A single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the 
                status of a binding rule and applies equally to all 
                personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping 
                operations, regardless of category or rank, has been 
                adopted by the General Assembly and duly incorporated 
                into all contracts and a Model Memorandum of 
                Understanding, and mechanisms have been established for 
                training such personnel concerning the requirements of 
                the Code and enforcement of the Code.
                    (B) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, 
                serving in a peacekeeping operation have been trained 
                concerning the requirements of the Code of Conduct and 
                each has been given a personal copy of the Code, 
                translated into the national language of such 
                personnel.
                    (C) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, 
                are required to sign an oath that each has received a 
                copy of the Code of Conduct, that each pledges to abide 
                by the Code, and that each understands the consequences 
                of violating the Code, including immediate termination 
                of participation in and permanent exclusion from all 
                current and future peacekeeping operations, as well as 
                the assumption of personal liability for victims 
                compensation as a condition of the appointment to such 
                operation.
                    (D) All peacekeeping operations have designed and 
                implemented educational outreach programs to reach 
                local communities where peacekeeping personnel of such 
                operations are based to explain prohibited acts on the 
                part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and to 
                identify the individual to whom the local population 
                may direct complaints or file allegations of 
                exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct.
                    (E) The creation of a centralized database, 
                including personnel photos, fingerprints, and biometric 
                data, has been completed and is being maintained in the 
                United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
                that tracks cases of misconduct, including the outcomes 
                of investigations and subsequent prosecutions, to 
                ensure that personnel, regardless of category or rank, 
                who have engaged in misconduct or other criminal 
                activities are permanently barred from participation in 
                future peacekeeping operations.
                    (F) A Model Memorandum of Understanding between the 
                United Nations and each Member State that contributes 
                troops to a peacekeeping operation has been adopted by 
                the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
                Operations that specifically obligates each such Member 
                State to--
                            (i) uphold the uniform Code of Conduct 
                        which shall apply equally to all personnel 
                        serving in United Nations peacekeeping 
                        operations, regardless of category or rank;
                            (ii) designate a competent legal authority, 
                        preferably a prosecutor with expertise in the 
                        area of sexual exploitation and abuse where 
                        appropriate, to participate in any 
                        investigation into an allegation of misconduct 
                        brought against an individual of such Member 
                        State;
                            (iii) refer to its competent national or 
                        military authority for possible prosecution, if 
                        warranted, any investigation of a violation of 
                        the Code of Conduct or other criminal activity 
                        by an individual of such Member State;
                            (iv) report to the Department of Field 
                        Support and the Department of Peacekeeping 
                        Operations on the outcome of any such 
                        investigation;
                            (v) undertake to conduct on-site court 
                        martial proceedings, where practical and 
                        appropriate, relating to allegations of 
                        misconduct alleged against an individual of 
                        such Member State; and
                            (vi) assume responsibility for the 
                        provision of appropriate assistance to a victim 
                        of misconduct committed by an individual of 
                        such Member State.
                    (G) A professional and independent investigative 
                and audit function has been established within the 
                United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
                and the Office of Internal Oversight Services to 
                monitor United Nations peacekeeping operations.
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