*

Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr., Senior U.S. District

Judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by

designation. 

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 95-4639.

Jose Abelardo Calmet COUZADO, Jean Denis Boileau, Claude

Woodhull, Salvador Moran Keydel, Leonardo Moran Auyon, Alcides

Diaz, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Donna Woodhull, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES of America, By and Through its DRUG ENFORCEMENT

ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Diverse Agents of the

Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of

Justice, currently unknown, Defendants-Crossclaim DefendantsAppellants-Cross-Appellees,

Belize Air International, Limited, a Florida Corporation, TransInternational Crew Leasing, Incorporated, a Florida Corporation,

Don Ewing, Director of Operations, Belize Air International,

Limited, in his individual capacity, Belize Air Operation, Limited

on information and belief, a Belize corporation, Defendants,

Paul Martin, Security Chief, Belize Air International, Limited,

in his individual capacity, Defendant-Cross-Claimant.

Feb. 20, 1997.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Florida. (No. 92-1135-CIV-FAM), Federico A. Moreno,

Judge.

Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, DUBINA, Circuit Judge, and COHILL*

,

Senior District Judge.

DUBINA, Circuit Judge:

Jose Abelardo Calmet Couzado ("Couzado"), Jean Denis Boileau

("Boileau"), Claude Woodhull ("Woodhull"), Salvador Moran Keydel

("Keydel"), Leonardo Moran Auyon ("Auyon"), and Alcides Diaz

("Diaz"), (hereinafter "the plaintiffs"), filed suit against the

United States ("the government") pursuant to the Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 and 2671-2680. Donna

Woodhull ("Donna"), the wife of Captain Claude Woodhull, also

brought an action for loss of consortium based upon the injuries

her husband sustained due to the government's negligence.

Following a non-jury trial, the district court found the government

liable and awarded damages to the plaintiffs. The district court

did not, however, award damages for loss of consortium to Donna.

The government appeals from the district court's judgment and Donna

cross-appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part,

reverse in part, and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 3, 1991, United States Customs ("Customs") agents

began investigating a drug trafficking scheme involving several

South American countries and the United States. Customs Group

Supervisor Peter G. Girard ("Girard") appointed Special Agent Alan

Childers ("Childers") to investigate the matter. Childers and

Girard met with a Customs special agent in the Miami office and

members of the United States Department of State. During this

meeting in Miami, the United States Embassy in Belize, by

telephone, expressed its desire to ascertain the identity of the

drug smugglers. The Belize Embassy then contacted the Belize

National Police and arranged for a controlled delivery of cocaine

from Belize to Miami using Belize Air Flight 712. The Belize

police planned to load 45 kilograms of cocaine onto the plane bound

for Miami, where Customs would apprehend the recipients of the

drugs.

That same day, Girard attempted to inform the Miami office of
the United States Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") of the

arrangement. DEA instructed Girard to contact the DEA office in

Guatemala to inform them of the plan. However, Girard was

unsuccessful in his attempts to contact the DEA in Guatemala.

Girard therefore requested country clearance from the DEA so that

Childers could go to Belize to determine the status of the

controlled shipment. In response to this request, DEA Agent Larry

Holifield ("Holifield") in Guatemala contacted Girard. During this

initial conversation, Girard disclosed Customs' plan for the

controlled delivery to Miami. Soon thereafter, Holifield's

supervisor, Robert Stia ("Stia") denied Girard's request for

country clearance on behalf of Childers. Instead, one day prior to

the controlled delivery, Stia assigned Holifield to Belize to

supervise the investigation.

That evening, a Miami Customs agent notified Girard that the

DEA had activated its own investigation and that Customs, at that

point, was out of the investigation. Girard then contacted

Childers and informed him that Customs was no longer involved in

the investigation. Although Childers knew that Customs was no

longer involved in the controlled delivery, he met with Paul Martin

("Martin"), head of security for Belize Air in Miami. At this

meeting, Martin informed Childers of Flight 712's itinerary.

Martin also informed Childers that dogs might be used to sniff for

drugs on the plane and that these dogs might not be under the

control of the Belize National Police. Childers testified that he

never discussed his conversation with Martin with anyone at the

DEA. Martin testified that Childers never told him that Customs
was out of the investigation and that DEA never contacted him

regarding the controlled delivery.

On April 5, Holifield informed Girard that the shipment of

cocaine had arrived that morning and that DEA agents would place

the cocaine on the Belize flight to Miami the following day.

Holifield also told Girard that the DEA had no agents in Miami to

handle the shipment once it arrived, so Customs would have to

handle the shipment in Miami. Girard informed Holifield that

Customs was out of the operation. Nevertheless, Customs

reluctantly rejoined the operation, and Girard instructed Childers

to coordinate with Holifield. Childers and Holifield spoke one

time that evening and discussed only the arrival time of the

shipment and the cocaine that would be on board. Holifield had no

knowledge that Martin was the head of security for Belize Air or

that he needed to contact Martin regarding the operation. In

short, vital information regarding the logistics of the operation

was not communicated between Customs and the DEA.

On April 6, the Belize National Police, with the cooperation

of the DEA, loaded the plane with 45 kilograms of cocaine. The

plane then departed to San Pedro Sula, Honduras. After Flight 712

left Belize, Childers and Holifield learned that the plane would

stop in Honduras. Nevertheless, neither agency representative

notified the Ambassador in Honduras regarding the sting operation.

No one from the DEA or Customs inquired about the flight manifest

to determine the identity of the crew and possible passengers. In

addition, neither agency informed the flight crew that their plane

was being used for a covert controlled drug delivery.
Upon the plane's arrival in Honduras, drug-sniffing dogs

alerted and that led to a search of the plane and the discovery of

the cocaine. Honduran officials arrested and incarcerated the

flight crew and the passengers of the flight. Thus began the

plaintiffs' nightmare.

Woodhull, Captain of Flight 712, testified regarding his

incarceration in the Honduran jail. R. 11-III-146-186. Woodhull

stated that the plane carried cargo from Miami to Belize. When the

plane arrived in Belize, Woodhull asked if any cargo was being

loaded and was told that cargo was being unloaded only. Woodhull

did not see any cargo placed on the airplane. When the plane

landed in Honduras, Woodhull proceeded to the crew lounge while

Couzado, the flight engineer, did the "post flight." Id. at 150.

About fifteen minutes after Woodhull entered the lounge, Couzado

ran in and told him that the authorities had found "coke" on the

plane. Id. Woodhull ran back to the plane and noticed two

cardboard boxes. One of the boxes was open and he saw "packages of

something wrapped in plastic." Id. at 151. Woodhull called Frank

Fine ("Fine"), President of Belize Air, to inform him of the

situation. Woodhull then called the station manager for Belize

Air. The Honduran authorities interrupted Woodhull's phone calls

and insisted that he leave with them.

After Woodhull rejoined his crew and the passengers, the

authorities took them all to a hangar, where they remained for four

or five hours under armed guard. The hangar had no toilet

facilities, no air conditioning, and no water. Honduran

authorities then transported the plaintiffs to the Department of
Investigation National ("DIN"), where they were fingerprinted and

"run up on the roof." Id. at 158. Woodhull explained that the

roof was an open area located on top of the building that had a tin

covered portion and some plywood rooms. Toilet facilities had

existed there at some time, but were no longer operational. There

were no beds or other furniture. Woodhull noticed rats and

numerous roaches in the area. Woodhull testified that the group

spent approximately five days on the roof.

When the plaintiffs arrived at the DIN, the guards did not

give them anything to eat or drink. Woodhull requested that the

Honduran authorities contact the United States Embassy, but his

requests were denied. The guards pushed one of the passengers,

Auyon, an elderly man, and shoved Woodhull when he tried to

intervene. In Woodhull's presence, one of the guards violently

beat an incarcerated Honduran. One night, while Woodhull was

sleeping on a board outside, a guard woke him by kicking him in the

back and chest. The guard handcuffed Woodhull, placed a hood over

his head, and marched him downstairs. The hood was filthy, reeked

of vomit, and had no holes for his eyes, nose, or mouth. Woodhull

stated that "they were forcing us down on our knees, and they kept

punching us [the plaintiffs], with what I determined later was a

rubber hose, putting it on our shoulders, around our neck, the

head." Id. Woodhull further testified that "I heard they were

playing spin the cylinder in a pistol, pulling a trigger and things

like that. Disconcerting, saying, "Gringo, you are going to die.'

" Id. While the guards were spinning the barrel of the revolver,

they kept a hood on Woodhull.
Woodhull testified that the guards taped his head and

violently interrogated him. He stated that at one point they "got

a bag of greasy hamburgers that were covered with roaches and stuff

like that." Id. at 171. Woodhull testified that the plaintiffs

did not have clean water to drink or toilet facilities they could

use. He stated that the guards used cattle prods around their ears

to intimidate them.

Several days after his incarceration, Woodhull met with a

representative from the United States Embassy at Tegucigalpa. He

told the representative what was happening to the plaintiffs, but

the Embassy was unaware that the DEA was involved in a sting

operation on Flight 712. On the Wednesday after the plaintiffs'

arrest, the guards escorted them to a local Honduran court where

Woodhull, through a translator, provided a statement to the judge.

After the court appearance, the guards took the plaintiffs to

another jail where "the toilets worked." Id. at 176. The

authorities released the plaintiffs the following Thursday and they

returned home on Friday.

Woodhull testified that as a result of the ordeal, he has lost

his sense of humor, has no tolerance for incompetence, and is

afraid that the incompetence he witnessed pervades all levels of

the United States government. He continues to fly outside the

country but realizes that the same thing could happen to him again

or to someone else.

Keydel also testified about the ordeal. R.12-IV-1-24.

Keydel, a Guatemalan citizen, was traveling to the United States

with his father to conduct banking business. Prior to being
detained in Honduras, Keydel had no knowledge of the cocaine on the

plane.

Keydel testified that the authorities took him and his father

to a hangar where armed guards watched them. Later the guards took

them to the roof of a police station, where they remained for five

days. Keydel described the building as "revolting." Id. at 6.

Around 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. on the first night of Keydel's

incarceration, the guards put a hood on him, handcuffed him, and

took him down several flights of stairs where they interrogated and

beat him. Keydel testified that the hood, or bag, "smelled of

vomit and insecticide." Id. at 7. He stated that he was beaten

with "a metal piece" and then a wooden stick and that he was

threatened with an "electrical noise that sparks." Id. Keydel

testified that the guards kicked him in the stomach and beat him

twice as much because his father was in poor health and they would

not beat him. Keydel stated that he slept on the ground with no

blanket or sheet. According to Keydel, the guards provided no

toilet facilities except for some buckets. In addition, the guards

put cardboard on his face and tape around his head on three

occasions. Keydel stated that he was not fed while in jail. When

the guards transported the plaintiffs to another jail, Keydel was

not beaten again, but he was threatened.

Couzado, the flight engineer, testified that after the guards

took his fingerprints and photographed him, they interrogated him.

R.13-V-151-162. Later that night, two guards put a hood on him,

handcuffed him, and threw him down the stairs. A guard with a bat

kept "smacking" him. Id. at 153. The guards beat him and put a
gun to his head while spinning the barrel. The guards placed his

hands in some liquid that smelled like gasoline and told him that

Woodhull had confessed. They put tape on his face so he almost

could not breathe and kicked him constantly. Couzado testified

that when the guards transported the plaintiffs to court, numerous

people were laughing at them and he felt humiliated. Couzado

stated that he felt mentally tortured and that the whole experience

was "pretty horrifying." Id. at 142.

Boileau, the first officer of Flight 712, corroborated the

other plaintiffs' testimony regarding the beatings, the blindfolds,

the kicks, and the shoves that they endured during their arrest and

incarceration in Honduras. R.13-V-163-174.

In support of her claim for loss of consortium, Donna

testified that her husband left on Saturday morning to fly to

Central America and was due to return that same evening, but did

not. R.13-V-89-112. Donna testified that when she called the

airline to inquire why her husband was not home, she was told that

his aircraft had a mechanical breakdown and that he would not be

returning until Sunday. When her husband did not return on Sunday,

she called the airline again. This time the airline scheduler told

her that Honduran authorities found drugs on her husband's plane

and that he and his crew were being detained. Donna stated that

when she received this information, she became very upset and

nervous, could not sleep, and kept wondering what would happen.

Id. at 92.

Donna called the Director of Operations at the airline, and he

assured her that the airline was taking care of the problem. Donna
testified that she went to work that day but when she returned home

she became upset because many bills were due and she was working

and handling everything. On Tuesday, she called her babysitter to

come stay with her small child while she went to the airline to get

information about her husband's situation. She spoke with Fine,

the President of Belize Air, who said that the operation on the

plane was a DEA one that had gone bad. Fine tried to contact

political representatives in Washington, D.C., as well as Florida's

governor, to obtain some assistance in the matter. Later that day,

Donna received a call from the United States Embassy in Honduras

informing her that her husband was being held in a Honduran jail

and that the Embassy was working for his release. Donna testified

that at this point, she was "hysterical." Id. at 99. She stated

that she was concerned that her husband was not coming home. Donna

was lonely and upset; her demeanor also upset her two-year-old

child.

On Wednesday, Donna contacted a business associate of

Woodhull's. The business associate arranged a telephone call

between Donna and her husband. When Donna heard her husband's

voice, she said that the first thing that struck her was that he

was alive. Id. at 102. Thereafter, Donna continued to call the

airline, friends, business associates, and Congressmen's offices in

Washington, D.C., trying to obtain additional information about her

husband's plight. During this time, her son kept asking her where

his daddy was, and the more he asked, the more she cried. Id. at

103. Donna testified that no one in Washington and no one at the

airline would call her back, so she went an entire week with no
information.

In describing what her husband looked like when he returned

home, Donna testified that it was "like seeing somebody coming home

from war." Id. at 109. He looked very tired, his eyes were red,

and he had lost weight. In short, "he looked dead." Id.

Donna testified that the incident has taken a toll on her

entire family. She stated that some of the love and humor that her

husband previously possessed are gone. Before the incident, her

husband wanted to spend time with her, but now he prefers to be

alone. He does not seem to care as much about their son; he is

very short-tempered with her; and he has threatened to walk out of

their marriage. Donna testified that her husband is a very

different person due to this incident. In addition, she worries

every time he leaves on a trip that this might happen again.

II. ISSUES

1. Whether the district court erred in holding that the

foreign country exception to the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k), did not

apply to this case.

2. Whether the district court erred in failing to award Donna

damages on her loss of consortium claim.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

 The district court's legal conclusions regarding the

non-applicability of the foreign country exception of the FTCA is

subject to de novo review. See Boca Ciega Hotel, Inc. v. Bouchard

Transp. Co. Inc., 51 F.3d 235, 237 (11th Cir.1995) (statutory

interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review).

The district court's findings of fact and apportionment of
liability under the FTCA are reviewable by this court only for

clear error. See Soto v. United States, 11 F.3d 15, 17 (1st

Cir.1993); see also Cole v. United States, 861 F.2d 1261, 1263

(11th Cir.1988) (factual determinations are governed by the clearly

erroneous standard). A finding is clearly erroneous "when although

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been committed." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,

N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518

(1985).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Foreign Country Exception

In 1946, Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28

U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680. The FTCA was designed to waive

sovereign immunity from suit for certain specified tortious acts of

federal employees. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73

S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953). "It was the offspring of a

feeling that the Government should assume the obligation to pay

damages for the misfeasance of employees in carrying out its work."

346 U.S. at 24, 73 S.Ct. at 962. Thus, under the FTCA, the

government consented, under certain circumstances, to be sued in

tort.

 The relevant provision of the FTCA provides in part:

(b) ... [T]he district courts, ..., shall have exclusive

jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United

States, for money damages, ..., for injury or loss of

property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent

or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government

while acting within the scope of his office of employment,

under circumstances where the United States, if a private

person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Thus, individuals generally are capable of

recovering from the government and its agencies for injuries

sustained as a result of the government's negligence if the state

law where the conduct or omission occurred allows such recovery.

Newmann v. United States, 938 F.2d 1258, 1261 n. 2 (11th Cir.1991).

 Congress has recognized, however, that the government's

sovereign immunity performs an important function in many instances

and has enumerated a number of exceptions to the FTCA. See 28

U.S.C. § 2680. The exception at issue in this case is the foreign

country exception which exempts "[a]ny claim arising in a foreign

country" from the waiver of sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. §

2680(k). The government contends that this exception applies here

because all of the negligent acts took place in a foreign country.

The district court properly concluded otherwise.

 First, we look to Florida state law to determine if the

government's actions at issue would support a cause of action for

the plaintiffs. The Florida Supreme Court has recognized that a

defendant owes a duty of care to persons who are foreseeably

endangered by the defendant's conduct and fall into the zone of

risk which makes the conduct unreasonably dangerous. McCain v.

Florida Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500 (Fla.1992). It is clear, under

to the facts of this case, that the plaintiffs have a cause of

action for negligence against the government. It was reasonably

foreseeable that the crew of Flight 712 could be endangered by the

failure of the government to notify the Honduran authorities

regarding the controlled delivery of cocaine.
 Next, we consider where the events at issue occurred. An

FTCA claim is decided under the law of the place in which the

negligent act or omission occurred and not the place in which the

act or omission had its operative effect. See Richards v. United

States, 369 U.S. 1, 10, 82 S.Ct. 585, 591, 7 L.Ed.2d 492, 498-99

(1962); Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 762 (D.C.Cir.1979);

Leaf v. United States, 588 F.2d 733, 735-36 (9th Cir.1978);

Donahue v. United States Dep't of Justice, 751 F.Supp. 45, 47

(S.D.N.Y.1990). These claims are characterized as "headquarters

claims."

The plaintiffs urge that a "headquarters claim" exception

exists in § 2680(k) jurisprudence under which the location of the

injury is not controlling for jurisdictional purposes. This claim

is achieved on proof that a negligent failure to warn, instruct or

train occurred in the United States.

In In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580

F.Supp. 1242, 1255 (E.D.N.Y.1984), appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 161

(2d Cir.1984), the court held that although the injuries to the

claimants resulting from the exposure to Agent Orange occurred in

Vietnam, the initial decision to use Agent Orange, the decision to

continue using it, and the decision relating to the specifications

for the herbicide, were all made in the United States. Therefore,

the negligent act or omission occurred in the United States and

liability was properly imposed upon the government. Thus, "a claim

is not barred by section 2680(k) where the tortious conduct occurs

in the United States, but the injury is sustained in a foreign

country." Donahue, 751 F.Supp. at 48.
The plaintiffs in this case have established such a proximate

nexus. The district court, in its findings of fact, described the

actions of the DEA and Customs as bilateral conduct requiring the

coordination of the two agencies and specifically found that these

actions constituted a "joint operation." The district court found

that the plaintiffs' incarceration was directly and proximately

caused by the actions of the government both within and without the

United States. Specifically, the district court determined that

the government loaded cocaine on the plane in Belize, and the

government (mainly DEA Agent Holifield) failed to notify the

authorities in Honduras of the controlled delivery. This failure

resulted in the plaintiffs' arrest and incarceration. The district

court also noted that Customs Agent Childers failed to notify Agent

Holifield regarding his investigation of the controlled delivery

and this failure also contributed to the plaintiffs' misfortune.

In sum, the district court found that the actions of the agencies

resulted in a "turf battle" which proximately caused the arrests

and incarceration of six innocent individuals.

We hold that the district court's factual findings are not

clearly erroneous and, in fact, are amply supported by the record.

Many factors occurring within the United States contributed to the

utter lack of coordination of the controlled delivery in this case.

Childers should have notified Holifield of his investigation and of

the possibility that the Honduran authorities might use

drug-sniffing dogs to search the plane when it landed. Holifield

would then have known that the plane might be subject to a search

and that he should notify the Honduran authorities about the
 1

We note the government's formal acceptance of

responsibility in this case. In a letter written by the United

States General Consul in Honduras to the Attorney General of

controlled delivery. Childers should have questioned Holifield

about Childers' growing suspicion that the controlled delivery was

not being appropriately coordinated. As DEA Agent Hidgon admitted,

the disaster would have been prevented, had the agents communicated

to the Honduran authorities about the operation.

We are persuaded that tort liability was properly imposed upon

the government in this case. The plaintiffs proved that the

government agents in Florida engaged in acts or omissions that

breached a duty under Florida law and proximately caused the

plaintiffs' injuries. In conducting the controlled delivery, the

government had a duty to secure the safety of the crew and

passengers unknowingly involved in the mission. The agents'

testimony confirms this duty. Nevertheless, neither Customs nor

the DEA ever requested the flight's manifest to determine who would

be on board the plane. At no time did the agents discuss the use

of drug-sniffing dogs at any transit stops or the itinerary of the

flight. Customs should have provided the DEA with the information

it had to assist the DEA in making informed decisions regarding the

delivery. The Customs agent's failure to divulge critical

information and to cooperate with the DEA in executing the

controlled delivery negligently compromised the safety of the

passengers and the crew and proximately caused the plaintiffs'

injuries. Thus, the district court's judgment in favor of the

plaintiffs is supported by the record and is not clearly

erroneous.1
Honduras on April 12, 1991, the United States declared that the

operation was an operation of the DEA in conjunction with the

Belize police; that the State and Government of Honduras are

exonerated of all responsibility for the detention and legal

proceedings against the plaintiffs; and the United States

Government accepts responsibility for its error in not having

coordinated this operation with the government of Honduras and

its authorities. 

 2

In the district court, the government also argued that the

discretionary function exception to the FTCA applied in this

case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The government appears to have

abandoned that argument on appeal because it fails to discuss the

issue in its briefs. Even if the government presented the issue

to us, however, we would not be persuaded that the exception

applies. Indeed, we conclude that the district court's analysis

of this issue is correct and that the exception does not apply. 

B. Applicability of 21 U.S.C. § 904

The government attempts to justify the applicability of the

foreign country exception to the FTCA by turning the court's

attention to a claims statute which authorizes the Attorney General

to pay tort claims when such claims arise in foreign countries in

connection with the operations of the DEA abroad. See 21 U.S.C. §

904. Plaintiffs counter that this argument was not raised by the

government in the district court and, accordingly, should not be

considered for the first time on appeal. See Allstate Ins. Co. v.

Swann, 27 F.3d 1539 (11th Cir.1994). We agree and decline to

consider the issue.2

C. Cross-Appeal

 Donna argues that the district court erred in failing to

award her damages for her loss of consortium claim. Under Florida

law, the spouse of a person who is injured as a proximate result of

the negligence of another has a right of action against that person

for loss of consortium. See Gates v. Foley, 247 So.2d 40

(Fla.1971). Loss of consortium means the companionship and
fellowship of husband and wife and the right of each to the

company, cooperation, and aid of the other in every conjugal

relation. Id. at 43. "Consortium means much more than mere sexual

relations and consists, also, of that affection, solace, comfort,

companionship, conjugal life, fellowship, society and assistance so

necessary to a successful marriage." Id. The wife's right of

action is a derivative right and she may recover only if her

husband has a cause of action against the defendant. Id. at 45.

 As previously stated, the government was negligent in its

handling of the controlled delivery operation. As a proximate

result of the government's negligence, Woodhull was injured. The

unrebutted testimony shows that Donna was deprived of her husband's

companionship, fellowship, and aid for the eleven days he was

incarcerated in Honduras. Additionally, the evidence shows that

after Woodhull returned to the United States, his marital

relationship with his wife changed. Donna testified that Woodhull

is more withdrawn, wants to be by himself, is not concerned about

her or their child, is very short-tempered, and has threatened to

walk out of the marriage. The evidence clearly shows a

deterioration in the conjugal relationship.

 Where the unrebutted substantive evidence shows a loss of

consortium, an award of zero damages cannot stand. Bach v. Murray,

658 So.2d 546 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995). See also Villatoro v.

Concepcion, 671 So.2d 216, 217 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996) ("A zero

verdict for loss of consortium cannot stand where liability is

conceded and there is evidence to support a verdict of nominal

damages.").
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

district court imposing liability upon the government pursuant to

the FTCA. We reverse the judgment of the district court on Donna

Woodhull's claim of loss of consortium and remand this case for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.