o i.'.! C -.-'i" t*f<-iw.'.i;. j i v.". 

### 20I3HOV 25 AH 9= l» 1
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

JOYCE ZAMELIS, Respondent,

v. ZINTARS ZAMELIS,Appellant. No. 68841-3-1 DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: November 25. 2013 

### Spearman, A.C.J.

- Zintars Zamelis appeals from the trial court's findings 

### of fact, conclusions of law, andjudgmententered in a partition action brought by 

### his formerwife, Joyce Zamelis. He contends the trial court erred inruling that real 

### propertypurchased during the couple's marriage should be sold and the proceeds divided equally between them. We conclude the trial court acted within itsequitable discretion given the facts in this case and affirm. FACTS 

### Zintars Zamelis and Joyce Zamelis1 were married in 1963. Zintars controlled the couple's finances. On July 20, 1971, they purchased a home and 

### land (theProperty) in Honeymoon Bay, Washington. Themortgage of$20,000

was owed to National Bank ofCommerce (hereinafter Rainier National Bank).
The parties will be referred to by their firstnames for convenience.No. 68841-3-1/2 

### Afterthey boughtthe Property, Zintars told Joyce that ifthey everdivorced, he 

### wouldmake sure she got nothing. Later that year, the parties granted a second mortgage on the Property inthe amount of$40,000 to secure paymentforthe purchase of a business, Alert Glass. That mortgage was also owed to Rainier National Bank. 

### In 1976, Zintars told Joyce he owed money to Victor Otians, his Latvian 

### fraternity brother, and that they had to quit claim the Property to Otians to satisfy the debt. The Zamelises executed a quitclaim deed. Zintars told herthe house 

### belonged to Otians, but that at some point, Otians would deed the Property back to them. The Zamelises continued to reside on the Property and to pay the mortgage, taxes, and insurance. As far as Joyce knew, they were paying rent to Otians.In 1979, a business creditor sued the Zamelises and Otians for fraudulent 

### transfer ofthe Property. The lawsuit was dismissed subject to the condition that it could be re-filed ifthe Property was ever repurchased by the Zamelises for less than fair consideration. In 1980, the Zamelises and Alert Glass filed for 

### bankruptcy, though Joyce did not know the details. Several months later, the bankruptcy court entered a discharge ofdebtors. In 1983, Rainier National Bank filed a complaint against the Zamelises and Otians for foreclosure ofthe second mortgage. Otians executed a shortform deed oftrust in the sum of $18,000 to satisfy the bank's complaint.No. 68841-3-1/3 

### In November 1983, Zintars and Joyce separated. Joyce moved out ofthe Property while Zintars stayed with their daughter. Joyce wanted to stay and for Zintars to leave, but Zintars told her that Otians would not allow it. When Joyce 

### left in 1983, the Property was in good but not excellent condition. In 1984, Joyce filed a petition for dissolution and a lis pendens against the Property. By 1986, Zintars wanted to get divorced, but Joyce first wanted an agreement regarding the Property. Zintars knew she believed title to the Property

was a sham transaction between him and Otians. He thus drafted a "Partnership Agreement" that the parties signed inAugust 1986. The agreement purported to "dispense any past, present orfuture aspirations by either partfy] in regard to their posture on [the Property]" by establishing a "limited and equal partnership for the sole purpose of purchasing, renting, and selling" the Property. Exhibit (Ex.) 31. Itstated thatZintars, the active partner, would solicit and arrange for financing ofthe Property; maintain the Property to make itrentable and expense that costto the partnership at the rate of $15 per hour; keep the premises rented 

### "but not at his peril"; and keep the mortgage current. The agreement stated that 

### Joyce would be equally responsible forthe mortgage and that Zintars and Joyce would each pay $150 per month to meet any shortages between the mortgage 

### and rent and to pay for repairs. Furthermore, "[a]ll capital improvements, change of responsibility, and any amendments to this agreement shall be in writing, 

### signed by both partners." ]d, Zintars agreed to "divulge within 10 days and share 

### equally any monies and real benefits that come to him now or in the future as aNo. 68841-3-1/4 

### result of the community property period of the marriage." Id,The agreement required Joyce to release her lispendens on the Property, which she did. On December 30, 1986, Otians conveyed the Propertyto Zintars by quitclaim deed. Joyce was not named as a grantee. Consideration was 

### "assumption ofliability only." Ex. 8. Zintars putthe deed in his safe deposit box. 

### He had no conversations withJoyce inthe following year and delivered no documents to her. 

### On March 14, 1988, the decree ofdissolution was entered. The decree, 

### prepared by Zintars, purported to give each party one-halfofpartnership real property and to give Joyce "$5,000 paid on the property/partnership." Itstated 

### that each party was liable for $11,000 owed to Otians and for "partnership liability on real property." Joyce had not paid nor received $5,000 on the Property and she did not know whatthat asset referred to. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 10. She also did not know what the debt to Otians was for; she saw no documents to evidence 

### itand never heard from Otians to collect it. Afterthe divorce, Joyce called Otians aboutthe Property and felt reassured that when legal title was recovered, the Property would be in both parties' names. 

### Zintars continued to reside on the Property afterthe divorce, though he

was injured and unable to work on the house. He paid the monthly mortgage of 

### $144.57 to Rainier National Bank untilJanuary 31, 1997, when itwas paid off. In 1993, he began dating Krisstine Muzzy. When Muzzy first saw the Property, it

was a "dump." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 238. From 1994 on, Zintars andNo. 68841-3-1/5 Muzzy made updates and improvements to the Property, most significantly the conversion ofthe garage into an accessory living unit and the construction of a detached garage. They were married in 2000, and Muzzy's mother came to live with them in 2001. Muzzy and her mother invested substantial sums into the Property. From 1988 to 2004, Joyce checked Island County real property records, which showed that the Property was in Otians' name. During this time, she rented rooms and bought a trailer. In 2005, she moved to Oregon. On January 18, 2005, after Otians passed away, Zintars recorded the 1986 quit claim deed. 

### Joyce discovered the deed when she checked county records inthe fall of2008. Joyce filed a complaint against Zintars on March 26, 2009 and an amended complaint on August 7, seeking to quiet title and partition the Property. Zintars filed an amended answer, asserting a counterclaim for adverse 

### possession and claiming Joyce owed him $486,274.29, with interest, underthe Partnership Agreement. In his amended answer and his answers to 

### interrogatories, Zintars admitted that Otians executed the quitclaim deed on December 30, 1986 and that he had an ownership interest inthe Property as of January 1, 1987. The trial court held a bench trial. Contrary to the admissions in his amended answer and answers to interrogatories, Zintars testified attrial that he did not receive the December 1986 quit claim deed until December 1991, when 

### he purportedly paid off a $22,000 promissory note to Otians. Zintars producedNo. 68841-3-1/6 two promissory notes—one for $22,000 and the otherfor $6,400—that he had executed in favor ofOtians on December 30, 1986. Zintars testified that the 

### $22,000 note represented the $18,000 deed oftrustfrom Otians to Rainier 

### National Bank. He testified thatthe second note was for repayment of a roof put on his business's property in 1976. The decree ofdissolution did not identify 

### either ofthe promissory notes as encumbering the Property. Zintars testified that he told Joyce in 1991 that he had paid offthe note to Otians and had the quit 

### claim deed to the Property, and that she owed him a certain amount ofmoney. The trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment on May 7, 2012. Itfound that Zintars' testimony was not credible. Itfound that Otians signed the quitclaim deed on December 30, 1986 and that the timing of the promissory notes afterthe separation, the date ofthe quitclaim deed, Zintars' 

### vow to make sure Joyce received nothing from the marriage and the friendship between Zintars and Otians evidenced Zintars' efforts to cut Joyce out ofthe Property. The courtfound that Zintars provided no documentary proofthat he had paid the sums due on the promissory notes to Otians and found that the notes were not for financing the Property because they were not secured. It concluded thatZintars had repudiated the Partnership Agreement and set it 

### aside.2 The courtordered that the Property be sold and the proceedsdivided equally. Zintars appeals.

2Thetrial courtalsoconcluded thatMuzzy had recourse againstZintars for monies she put into the Property.No. 68841-3-1/7 DISCUSSION 

### This case involves a partition action, which "is both a right and a flexible equitable remedy subjectto judicial discretion." Friend v. Friend. 92 Wn. App. 

### 799, 803, 964 P.2d 1219 (1998) (citing Anderson & Mitchell Lumber Co. v. Quinault Indian Nation. 130 Wn2d 862, 873, 929 P.2d 379 (1996)). Atrial court's order partitioning property is reviewed for abuse ofdiscretion. IcL at 805. We review a trial court's findings offact for substantial evidence and review de novo whether its conclusions of law flow from its findings. Dep't of Labor &Indus, v. 

### Shirley. 171 Wn. App. 870, 288 P.3d 390, 394 (2012), rev. denied. 177 Wn.2d 1006, 300 P.3d 415 (2013)). Initially,while Zintars assigns errorto fourteen findings offact and six 

### conclusions of law, he makes no argument addressing why any ofthe findings of fact ortwo ofthe conclusions of law were erroneous.3 This court will not review



### 3Zintars assigns errortothefollowing findings offactand conclusions oflaw: Finding ofFact 54: [Joyce] did not know what that asset [the "$5,000 paid on property/partnership" listed inthe decree ofdissolution as awarded to Joyce]

was. Finding of Fact 56: [Zintars] did very little to maintain the property. Finding ofFact 79: [Zintars] knew that if[Joyce] knew ofthe deed, she would sue to recoverthe property. Finding of Fact 87: It is not credible that [Otians] would wait 10 years [from 1976 to 1986], during which time the parties declared bankruptcy, to recover his debt. Finding ofFact 88: The timing of the debt is suspicious. Itwas incurred only by [Zintars] during the parties' separation and without [Joyce's] knowledge. Finding ofFact 90: If[Zintars] had told [Joyce] in 1991 that he had possession of the deed, this action would have commenced in 1991.No. 68841-3-1/8

Finding ofFact 91: [Zintars] hidthe quit claim deed in a safety deposit box. Finding of Fact 92: The Court strongly suspects that [Zintars] had possession of the deed on December 30, 1986, Mr. Otians signed the quitclaim deed on December 30, 1986, the same day that Zintar signed promissory notes. Finding of Fact 94: The timing ofthe promissory notes after separation, the date ofthe quit claim deed and [Zintars'] vow to make sure [Joyce] received nothing from the marriage combined with the deep friendship between [Zintars] and [Otians] convinced the Courtthat [Zintars] was trying to cut [Joyce] out ofthe subject property, which both parties acknowledge was a community asset. Finding of Fact 95: [Zintars] did not provide any proof, otherthan his testimony, which was riddled with inconsistencies, that he actually paid [Otians] the sums due on the notes. Finding of Fact 96: Although [Zintars] was able to find other documents more than 20 years old, he offered not one canceled check, not one bank statementto show proofof payment. Finding of Fact 99: [Zintars'] payments on the property were far below fair rental value. Finding of Fact 100: [Zintars] now claims that he is owed $150 per month from [Joyce] since 1986. Finding ofFact 103: If [Zintars] had notified [Joyce] in late 1986, when the court believes he gotthe quit claim deed, of his title to the real property, the property would have been sold or rented then. Conclusion of Law 3: The notes that [Zintars] signed to [Otians] in 1986 were not forfinancing the subject property because the notes were not secured. Conclusion of Law 4: The liability againstthe subject property referenced in the 1986 deed was the note and deed oftrust in favor of Rainier National Bank, which, in 1986, was $12,000. Conclusion of Law 5: [Zintars] repudiated the 1986 partnership agreement. Conclusion of Law 6: The partnership agreement should be set aside. Conclusion of Law 11: It is equitable that the subject property be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties. Conclusion of Law 13: Inexchange for his exclusive occupancy of the residence, [Zintars] should pay the taxes and insurance and maintenance for the property and he should pay rent to [Joyce] in the sum of$1,000 per month, commencing April 1,2012. CP at 5-15.No. 68841-3-1/9 

### assignments oferrorthat are not supported by argument and citation to authority. Raum v. Cityof Bellevue. 171 Wn. App. 124, 149, 286 P.3d 695 (2012), rev. denied. 176 Wn.2d 1024, 301 P.3d 1047 (2013)). Therefore, we do not consider 

### Zintars' challenges to any ofthe findings offact or to conclusions of law 3 and 4. On appeal, Zintars makes three main arguments as to why the trial court's 

### ordershould be reversed.4 First, he argues that the courtabused its discretion in ordering that the proceeds from the sale ofthe Property be divided equally without deducting Joyce's share ofthe purchase price, taxes, and costs of improvements from 1983 on. He contends she was required to make these contributions under principles oftenancy in common, relying on Cummings v. Anderson. 94 Wn.2d 135, 614 P.2d 1283 (1980). We disagree. In Cummings, a couple purchased a home on a real estate contract as 

### tenants in common and married within a year. jd. at 136-37. Several months after they were married, the wife leftthe property, taking most ofthe couple's personal 

### property, including the cash intheir bank account. Id. at 137. She obtained a default dissolution decree. Years later, by which time most ofthe payments had 

### been made underthe original contract, she brought suit against herformer

4AlthoughZintars claimed in his amended complaintthatJoyce owed him $486,274.29, with interest, underthe Partnership Agreement, he does not, on appeal, continue to argue that he was due this amount. Instead, he argues thatthis court should remand with instructions to order the trialcourtto amend the judgment so that Joyce is awarded one-halfof the value of the Property as of March 14, 1988 (the date of the decree of dissolution), deducting one-half of the balance owed to Rainier National Bank and $11,000 (as provided inthe decree ofdissolution) and crediting her with$5,000 paid toward the partnership liability (as stated in the decree). He contends the trial court should orderthe Property to be listed for sale, upon which Joyce should receive her proportionate share, after deducting her share of the costs ofsale.No. 68841-3-1/10 

### husband, seeking one-half of the equity value of the property and one-half of the fair rental value during the time he livedthere alone. ]d at 137-38. The 

### WashingtonSupreme Court explained that where parties own propertyas cotenants, they are presumed to own the property equallyunless they contributed unequally to the purchase price, in which case "a presumption arises that they intended to share the property proportionately to the purchase price."jd. at 140 (citing Iredell v. Iredell. 49 Wn.2d 627, 305 P.2d 805 (1957)). Itexplained that tenants incommon owe fiduciary duties to each other and thatthe husband had 

### not breached any fiduciary duties owed to the wife,jd at 143. Itconcluded, 

### Here, the trial court correctly held that the respondent, having abandoned her obligations underthe contract, could no longer be heard to say that her interestwas equal to that ofthe petitioner, 

### who alone made the payments necessary to preserve the equity existing at that time and avoid forfeiture. There appears no reason why the petitioner should have intended to donate to the 

### respondent the benefit ofone-halfofthe payments which he made aftertheir relationship terminated, nor is itcontended that he had any legal or equitable duty to do so. 

### |d The Court held thatthe wifewas entitled only to the interest she had acquired inthe property by the time she had left. ]d at 144. This case presents a very different situation. In Cummings, the wife abandoned her obligations as a tenant in common and there was no deceit on 

### the part ofthe husband. The parties did not discuss their rights inthe property or their future obligations when the wife left the property. ]d at 137. The wife made

no offerto make payments necessary for acquisition ofthe property nor did she assert a right to occupy the property or to receive rent for the husband's

10No. 68841-3-1/11 

### occupancy. Jd Here, incontrast, after the parties separated they agreed that they owned the Property as partners and agreed to jointly purchase, rent, and sell the 

### Property. ButZintars did not honorthat agreement or his fiduciary duties to Joyce. Instead, several months after entering intothe agreement, he obtained a quit claim deed giving him sole title to the Property. He then represented for over 

### 17 years thatthe Property belonged to Otians and that he was merely a tenant. Joyce did not abandon herobligation to make payments underthe Partnership Agreement or decree of dissolution; that duty was nottriggered because she did
not learn until 2008 that title had been recovered from Otians. The trial court acted within its discretion when it determined that Zintars should not receive 

### creditfor mortgage payments and taxes during the period he represented that he

was a renter, particularly when he paid significantly less than fair rental value to 

### live in the Propertywhile Joycerented rooms andlived in atrailer.5 As for Zintars' improvements to the Property, the trial court did not err in not ordering that the value ofthe improvements be deducted from Joyce's share ofthe proceeds from the sale ofthe Property. Generally, [w]hile a cotenant cannot at his own suit recoverfor improvements placed upon the common estate without the request or consent of his cotenant, yet a court ofequity, in a partition suit, will give the cotenantthe fruits of his industry and expenditures, by allotting to him the parcel so enhanced in value or so much thereofas represents his share ofthe whole tract.


### 5During thoseyears, Zintars paid $144 permonth in mortgage payments and lessthan $200 per month intaxes, when the houses Joyce soughtto rentwere being rented at $700 per month. The mortgage was paid off in 1997, and thereafterZintars paid little in real estate taxes (in 2010 he paid $788, approximately $65 per month).

11No. 68841-3-1/12 

### Cummings, 94 Wn.2d at 141. But here, we agree withJoyce that itwas equitable for the increase inthe Property's value from the improvements to be offset by rent due upon Zintars' ouster ofJoyce in January 2005. A cotenant ousts another cotenant by repudiating or disavowing cotenancy and engaging in acts or conduct signifying his intention to hold, occupy, and enjoy the premises exclusively, acts ofwhich the tenant out of possession has knowledge or sufficient information to be put on inquiry. Fritch v. Fritch. 53 Wn.2d 496, 503, 335 P.2d 43 (1959). The claimant "'must show a definite and continuous 

### assertion ofan adverse right by overt acts ofunequivocal character clearly indicating an assertion of ownership ofthe premises to the exclusion ofthe right ofthe other cotenants.'" ]d at 503-04 (quoting 1 Am. Jur., Adverse Possession, 

### 824 § 54). When an occupying cotenant ousts a non-occupying cotenant, the 

### former begins to owe rent. Yakavonis v. Tilton. 93 Wn. App. 304, 309, 968 P.2d 908(1998). 

### On January 18, 2005, Zintars recorded the quit claim deed, taking the overt, unequivocal act ofasserting a right ofownership adverse to Joyce and 

### beginning his attemptto oust her. He asserted in his pleadings, up to the date of trial, that he was the sole owner by quit claim deed and adverse possession. 

### Wherethevalue ofZintars' improvements was$27,5006 and therentsoughtby

6Themain improvementsweretheconversion ofthe garage to anaccessory living unit and the construction of a detached garage, which together added $27,500 in value.

12No. 68841-3-1/13 

### Joycewas$31,480,7 thetrial courtacted within its discretion in ordering thatthe proceeds from the sale of the Property be divided equally without awarding Zintars the value ofthe improvements. 

### Second, Zintars argues thatthe trial court retroactively modified the 

### decree ofdissolution when itfailed to findthatJoyce abandoned her obligations underthe decree, awarding her a greater interest inthe Property than she was 

### entitled to receive. He notes that a trialcourt has no authority to modifyeven its

own decree unless conditionsjustify the reopening ofthejudgment, citing Kern v. Kern. 28 Wn.2d 617, 619, 183 P.2d 811 (1947) and RCW 26.09.170(1). We reject Zintars' contention thatthe trial court retroactively modified the 

### decree ofdissolution. The decree awarded one-halfofthe real property to Joyce and ordered her to pay the "[partnership liability on real property." Ex. 10(c). Her obligation to contribute toward the mortgage would take effect when she and Zintars recovered title. But for years, Zintars concealed the fact that he had recovered title from Otians. By the time Joyce received title to the Property by 

### order ofthe trial court, the mortgage had been paid off 12 years earlier. The trial court did not err in not ordering herto pay a mortgage that no longer existed, particularly, as we have explained, because Zintars' mortgage payments were

7The evidenceattrial was that thefair rental value ofthe Propertywas $1,465 per month, $650 of which was from the accessory living unit. Thus, the fair rental value ofthe Property minus the improvements was $815 per month. At that rate, the total rent fromJanuary 2005 to January 2012 at the time of trial would amount to $68,460. Subtracting the taxes due overthat period of$5,500 left a net rental sum of$62,960, half of which would be $31,480.

13No. 68841-3-1/14 less than fair rental value and were offset by his beneficial use ofthe Property. 

### Zintars also argues Joyce should be required to pay him $11,000, representing the alleged debtto Otians stated inthe decree ofdissolution. But the trial court found that Zintars provided no proofhe paid the sums due on the promissory notes and found that the notes were not for financing the Property because they



### were not secured. Furthermore, the quitclaim deed transferring title to Zintars 

### stated thatconsideration was "assumption ofliability only."8 Ex. 8. Finally, Zintars argues thatthe trialcourt erred inconcluding that he repudiated the Partnership Agreement and insetting itaside. He cites cases and statutes, includingthe Revised Uniform Partnership Act, chapter25.05 RCW, in arguing that partners owe each other duties and obligations and thatJoyce 

### breached those duties byfailing to pay $150 per month underthe Partnership 

### Agreement.9 He contends heshould becredited with his contributions ofmoney and labor since the execution ofthe Partnership Agreement. 

### But while Zintars asserts he did not repudiate the Partnership Agreement, 

### he makes no argument as to why the evidence fails to supportthe trial court's determination that he did, and we agree with Joyce thatthe evidence supports

8Theonly liability associatedwith theProperty was themortgage in favor ofRainier Financial Services. Ex. 9. 9Specifically, Zintars citesRCW 25.05.150 in discussing a partner'srights and duties 

### regarding contributions, liabilities, and profits; and RCW25.05.330 in discussing thesettlementof accounts and contributions between partners.

14No. 68841-3-1/15 

### thecourt's determination.10Aparty's repudiation ofa contractmay be treatedby the other as a breach that will excuse the other's performance. CKP v. GRS Const. Co.. 63 Wn. App. 601, 620, 821 P.2d 63 (1991). Thus, Zintars' discussion 

### ofthe principles that apply to partnerships is unavailing. In sum, given the evidence before it,the trial court did not abuse its 

### discretion inordering the Property to be sold and the proceeds divided equally. Attorney's Fees on Appeal 

### Joyce seeks attorney's fees on appeal, citing RCW 26.09.140, Seals v. Seals. 22 Wn. App. 652, 590 P.2d 1301 (1979), and RAP 18.9(a). Under RCW 26.09.140, 

### [t]he court from time to time after considering the financial resources of both parties may order a party to pay a reasonable amountfor the cost to the other party ofmaintaining or defending 

### any proceeding underthis chapter and forreasonable attorneys' fees or otherprofessional fees inconnection therewith, including 

### sums for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior to the commencement ofthe proceeding or enforcement or modification proceedings after entry ofjudgment. 

### The statute also permits the award offees on appeal. RCW26.09.140. 

### While the statute applies to dissolution proceedings, this court inSeals 

### upheld fees awarded under the statute to awife in a post-dissolution partition

10 Intenttorepudiate acontractmay beexpressly stated orcircumstantially manifested by conduct.CKP. 63 Wn.App. at 620. The evidence shows that Zintars did notintend to abide by thePartnership Agreement. Fourmonths afterthe agreement, herecovered theProperty in his 

### name only, in contravention oftheagreement. He then concealedfrom Joycethefactthat hehad recovered the Property for17years. Moreover, he did not rent or sell the Property, as contemplated bythe Partnership Agreement. Indeed, headmitted attrial that hedid notwantto selltheProperty. Zintars' actionson thewhole werein contravention of the agreement'spurpose ofpurchasing, renting, and selling the Property.

15No. 68841-3-1/16 action and also awarded herfees on appeal. Seals. 22 Wn. App. at 656-58. There, several months after the parties divorced, the wife learned of undisclosed 

### property and brought a partition action. We explained that fees were permissible under RCW 26.09.140 for several reasons. First, we noted that a trial court has 

### the duty to dispose of all ofthe property brought to its attention in a divorce case, and that the partition action was a "continuation ofthe original dissolution action" where the wife filed the action promptly after discovering the existence of 

### undisclosed property. Seals, 22 Wn. App. at 657. Second, we explained thatfees under RCW 26.09.140 were not precluded where itwould be manifestly unjust to 

### follow the general rulethatthe court losesjurisdiction to award attorney's fees in
a dissolution proceeding after entry ofthe order ofdismissal. Id at 657-58. Finally, we noted that a trialcourt does not exceed its authority to award attorney's fees ifthe non-prevailing party acted inbad faith. Id at 658. We award fees on appeal to Joyce under RCW 26.09.140 and Seals. 

### While the Property was purportedly addressed by the decree of dissolution, her 

### partition action was nonetheless a continuation of the dissolution proceeding because at the time the trial court entered the decree, neither the court nor Joyce 

### knew the true nature ofthe title to the Property: that itwas inZintars' name only.

16No. 68841-3-1/17

Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:



# rr

17