alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Merrill Lynch Preferred
Capital Trust III (the "Trust") and Merrill Lynch Preferred Funding III, L.P.
for the period ended December 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Marlene Debel,
Regular Trustee of the Trust, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
    of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
    respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.





                              MERRILL LYNCH PREFERRED CAPITAL TRUST III


                              By:  /s/ MARLENE DEBEL
                                   ---------------------------------------------
                              Name:    Marlene Debel *
                              Title:   Regular Trustee









Dated: March 24, 2006
_____________________

* Marlene Debel functions as the equivalent of the Chief Executive Officer
  and Chief  Financial  Officer of the Trust for  purposes  of Section  906
  of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

 No. 06-7690 

TONY HESTER VINSON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

LAFAYETTE HALL,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr., Chief

District Judge. (1:05-cv-00701-JAB)

Submitted: February 22, 2007 Decided: March 2, 2007

Before WILLIAMS, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Tony Hester Vinson, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III,

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Tony Hester Vinson seeks to appeal the district court’s

order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order

is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any

assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is

debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by

the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have

independently reviewed the record and conclude that Vinson has not

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, although we grant

Vinson’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny his motion

for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-7950
In Re: CHARLES BROWN, Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CR-99-154) Submitted: April 27, 2006 Decided: May 5, 2006 Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Charles Brown, Petitioner Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Charles Brown petitions this court for a writ of mandamus. He seeks review of the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) action and review of his conviction and sentence reflected in the amended judgment entered in January 2001. Mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. SeeIn re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. , 860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988). Further, mandamus is a drastic remedy and should only be used in extraordinary circumstances. See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court , 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); In re Beard , 811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir. 1987). Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. See In re United Steelworkers , 595 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir. 1979). The relief sought by Brown is not available by way of mandamus. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000096988
<NAME> MARLTON TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                       5,627,644
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                7,350,522
<ALLOWANCES>                                   231,231
<INVENTORY>                                  5,702,132
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            19,663,780
<PP&E>                                       5,718,445
<DEPRECIATION>                               3,552,969
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              27,157,502
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       11,952,404
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    21,883,684
<OTHER-SE>                                   6,801,117
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                27,157,502
<SALES>                                     36,037,550
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            36,037,550
<CGS>                                       25,793,688
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               25,793,688
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              30,157
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,831,049
<INCOME-TAX>                                   724,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,107,049
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,107,049
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.19
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.19
        




</TABLE>
Amendment to Olin Senior Management Incentive Compensation Plan



 Exhibit 10(l)(1) 
 BENEFIT PLAN REVIEW COMMITTEE OF OLIN CORPORATION 
 AMENDMENT TO THE 
 OLIN SENIOR MANAGEMENT INCENTIVE COMPENSATION PLAN 
 Olin Corporation (the “Company”) currently maintains the Olin Senior Management Incentive Compensation Plan (the “Plan”). In Section 7 of the Plan, the Company reserved the right to amend the
Plan. Pursuant to the authority granted to the Benefit Plan Review Committee of Olin Corporation (“the Committee”), effective as of January 1, 2005, the Committee hereby amends the Plan in the following manner: 
 1. Section 4.1 of the Plan is amended by replacing the first sentence of the fourth paragraph with the following: 
 “Incentive Awards for a fiscal year shall be determined as soon as practicable after such fiscal year and shall be paid no later than the 15th day of
the third month following such fiscal year unless deferred as provided in Section 4.3 hereof.”
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 206 (Tuesday, October 24, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 63591-63592]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-27192]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Office of the Secretary


Notice of Interest Rate on Overdue Debts

    Section 30.13 of the Department of Health and Human Services' 
claims collection regulations (45 CFR part 30) provides that the 
Secretary shall charge an annual rate of interest as fixed by the 
Secretary of the Treasury after taking into consideration private 
consumer rates of interest prevailing on the date that HHS becomes 
entitled to recovery. The rate generally cannot be lower than the 
Department of Treasury's current value of funds rate or the applicable 
rate determined from the ``Schedule of Certified Interest Rates with 
Range of Maturities.'' This rate may be revised quarterly by the 
Secretary of the Treasury and shall be published quarterly by the 
Department of Health and Human Services in the Federal Register.
    The Secretary of the Treasury has certified a rate of 13\7/8\% for 
the quarter ended September 30, 2000. This interest rate will remain in 
effect until such time as the Secretary of the Treasury notifies HHS of 
any change.


[[Page 63592]]


    Dated: October 17, 2000.
George Strader,
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Finance.
[FR Doc. 00-27192 Filed 10-23-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4150-04-M
MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-10-00718-CR

IN RE Eddie LUNDY

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 20, 2010

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED

On October 8, 2010, relator Forest Holmes filed a petition for writ of mandamus, 

complaining of the trial court’s failure to rule on his pro se motions. However, counsel has been 

appointed to represent relator in the criminal proceeding pending in the trial court for which he is 

currently confined. A criminal defendant is not entitled to hybrid representation. See Robinson 

v. State, 240 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 498 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A trial court has no legal duty to rule on pro se motions or petitions 

filed with regard to a criminal proceeding in which the defendant is represented by counsel. See

Robinson, 240 S.W.3d at 922. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

 1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2010-CR-0566, styled State of Texas v. Eddie Lundy, pending in 

the 437th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Lori Valenzuela presiding.
04-10-00718-CR

- 2 -

declining to rule on relator’s pro se motions filed in the criminal proceeding pending in the trial 

court. Accordingly, the petition is denied. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a).

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                            9
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              SEP-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 OCT-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                         3,555
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                         0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                               0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    20,066
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         12,864
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           12,285
<LOANS>                                        176,963
<ALLOWANCE>                                    1,537
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 244,651
<DEPOSITS>                                     161,352
<SHORT-TERM>                                   3,109
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            1,490
<LONG-TERM>                                    37,500
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       15,201
<OTHER-SE>                                     24,086
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 244,651
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                12,986
<INTEREST-INVEST>                              2,127
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               1,302
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               16,414
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                             6,968
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             9,219
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                          7,195
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  30
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                             225
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                5,960
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                3,272
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                     3,272
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   2,185
<EPS-BASIC>                                    0.53
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0.53
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                 2.5
<LOANS-NON>                                    257
<LOANS-PAST>                                   0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                               0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                2,096
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               1,509
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                  3
<RECOVERIES>                                   0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              1,537
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                           1,537
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                            0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                        0


</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-7268

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee,

v. DANIEL DEMETRIUS JAMES, JR., a/k/a Dee, Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan, Chief District Judge. (5:04-cr-00262-FL-1)

Submitted: September 29, 2009 Decided: October 8, 2009

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Daniel Demetrius James, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Anne Margaret Hayes, Rudolf A. Renfer, Jr., Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Daniel Demetrius James, Jr., appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. United States v. James , No. 5:04-cr00262-FL-1 (E.D.N.C. filed June 30, 2009; entered July 1, 2009). We further deny James’ motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit
      32.2





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**


**OF
      THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**







Pursuant
      to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, the undersigned Officer of Finity Holdings, Inc.
      (the
“Company”), hereby certifies, to such officer’s knowledge, that the Company’s
      Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2005 (the “Report”)
      fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as
      applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information
      contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
      condition and results of operations of the Company.









/s/
      Philip E. Barak


Philip
      E.
      Barak


Chief
      Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer







Date:
      April 7, 2006
Exhibit
10.11


 


AMENDMENT
TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


 


                THIS AMENDMENT TO THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT is made
effective as of February 6, 2006, by and between Duratek, Inc., a Delaware
corporation (the “Company”) and
the undersigned (“Employee”).


 


Recitals:


 


A.            Employee and the
Company entered into an employment agreement effective as of June 3, 2002 (the “Employment Agreement”); and


B.            Employee and the
Company wish to amend the terms of the Employment Agreement in this Agreement.


Agreement:


NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the agreements contained herein
and of such other good and valuable consideration, the sufficiency of which
Employee acknowledges, the Company and the Employee, intending to be legally
bound, hereby agree that the Employment Agreement is hereby amended in the
following respects:


1.             A new sentence is added to the end
of section 8(e) to read as follows:


 


                                “Notwithstanding
anything in this Section 8(e) to the contrary, this Section 8(e) shall not
apply to a termination of the Employee’s employment that occurs within twelve
(12) months after a Change of Control.”


 


2.             Amendment and
Waiver.  The provisions of this
Amendment may be amended and waived only with the prior written consent of the
parties hereto.


3.             Complete Agreement.  The Employment Agreement, as amended by this
Amendment, contains the entire agreement and understanding between the Company
and Employee with respect to Employee’s employment and supersedes all
employment agreements, whether written or oral, relating to Employee’s
employment with the Company.


 


4.             Effect of the
Amendment on Employment Relationship. 
Nothing in this Amendment shall be construed as conferring upon the
Employee any right to continue in the employ of (or otherwise provide services
to) the Company, or to limit in any respect the right of the Company to
terminate the Employee’s employment or other relationship with the Company at
any time.


 


 

















 


 


IN
WITNESS WHEREOF,
the parties hereto have executed this Amendment on the date first written
above.


	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
  DURATEK, INC.

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By:

  	
   

  	
  /s/
  Robert E. Prince

  
	
   

  	
  Robert E. Prince

  
	
   

  	
  President/CEO

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Agreed
  and Accepted:

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By:
  

  	
  /s/
  C. Paul Deltete

  	
   

  
	
  NAME: C. Paul
  Deltete

  	
   

  
				



 


 


 


 


 


 


 


2
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

 that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-40704

Conference Calendar

__________________

SHANE EDWARD BISHOP,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JEFF HENSLEY, et al.,

 Defendants,

DOUG LEE, Denton County Detention Officer,

 Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:94-CV-98

- - - - - - - - - -

April 19, 1996

Before DUHÉ, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Shane Edward Bishop has appealed the district court's denial

of his motion for appointment of counsel. An interlocutory order

denying the appointment of counsel in a civil rights action may

be immediately appealed. Robbins v. Maggio, 750 F.2d 405, 413

(5th Cir. 1985). A trial court is not required to appoint

counsel for an indigent plaintiff asserting a claim under 42 
No. 95-40704

-2-

U.S.C. § 1983 unless exceptional circumstances exist. Ulmer v.

Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982). A district court

has the discretion to appoint counsel for a plaintiff proceeding

pro se if doing so would advance the proper administration of

justice. Id. at 213. 

A review of the district court's order, which reveals that

it considered the four Ulmer factors, as well as of the record on

appeal and Bishop's brief, demonstrates that the court did not

abuse its discretion by refusing to appoint counsel for Bishop in

this case. 

Bishop has also moved for the appointment of counsel in this

appeal. Because the issues presented in this appeal are limited

to the denial of Bishop's appointment-of-counsel motion in the

district court, appointment of counsel is not warranted in this

appeal. He has also filed motions to strike the appellee’s

response brief and to file a reply brief out of time. Neither

motion has any bearing on the issues before the court.

AFFIRMED.

MOTIONS DENIED.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 200 (Monday, October 16, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 61189]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-26564]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Parole Commission


Sunshine Act Meeting

Public Announcement

    Pursuant To The Government In the Sunshine Act (Public Law 94-409) 
[5 U.S.C. Section 522b].

    Agency Holding Meeting: Department of Justice, United States Parole 
Commission.
    Time and Date: 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, October 17, 2000.
    Place: 5550 Friendship Blvd., Fourth Floor, Chevy Chase, MD 20815.
    Status: Open.
    Matters to be Considered: The following matters have been placed on 
the agenda for the open Parole Commission meeting:
    1. Approval of minutes of previous Commission meeting.
    2. Reports from the Chairman, Commissioners, Legal, Chief of Staff, 
Case Operations, and Administrative Sections.
    3. Discussion of the proposed Interim Rules for District of 
Columbia Supervised Release.
    Agency Contact: Sam Robertson, Case Operations, United States 
parole Commission, (301) 492-5962.

    Dated: October 10, 2000.
Michael A. Stover,
General Counsel, U.S. Parole Commission.
[FR Doc. 00-26564 Filed 10-12-00; 11:04 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-31-M