testimony and evidence. He also argues that dismissal is mandated due to 

the violation of his right to a speedy trial; there was insufficient evidence 

to support the convictions for first-degree murder, burglary, and robbery; 

the district court erroneously instructed the jury on robbery and the 

presumption of innocence; and the convictions for possession of stolen 

property violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Wilcock contends that these 

errors, cumulatively, are sufficient to warrant a new trial. 

Todd House's testimony 

Wilcock asserts that the district court erred when it denied his 

motion to exclude Todd House's testimony and subsequently allowed 

House to testify at trial. According to Wilcock, the district court should 

have excluded House's testimony based on the attorney-client privilege, 

because (1) House and Wilcock had an attorney-client relationship, (2) 

Wilcock reasonably believed that he was consulting with an attorney, and 

(3) Wilcock sought and received legal services from House. 

We review de novo a lower court's decision regarding the 

proper scope of the attorney-client privilege. Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. 

Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 69, 331 P.3d 905, 910 

(2014). 

Here, both parties acknowledge that House is not an attorney 

authorized to practice law. Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege could 

only protect confidential communications between Wilcock and House if 

Wilcock held a reasonable belief that House was an attorney authorized to 

practice law. See NRS 49.065; NRS 49.095. 

Essentially, Wilcock argues that he believed that House was 

an attorney because House so informed him. However, this argument only 

shows that Wilcock believed that House was an attorney, not that such a 

belief was reasonable. See Strong v. State, 773 S.W.2d 543, 549 (Tex. 

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Crim. App. 1989) (holding that invoking the attorney-client privilege 

"requires more than a mere belief that the individual consulted is a 

licensed attorney; that belief must be 'reasonable"). 

To determine whether Wilcock's belief was reasonable, we 

would need evidence of the characteristics of an attorney-client 

relationship. None exist. Wilcock failed to support his assertion with any 

evidence that, for example, House informed Wilcock that he had attended 

a certain law school, that he was licensed in a certain jurisdiction, or that 

he practiced in a certain area of law. Wilcock's contention that House 

provided legal services is also belied by the record. House testified that he 

never reviewed any of the documents or pleadings in Wilcock's case. 

Moreover, House's description of the conversations between 

himself and Wilcock (wherein Wilcock made hypothetical statements and 

spoke in the third person) similarly demonstrate that Wilcock did not 

reasonably believe that an attorney-client relationship existed. Lastly, 

Wilcock could not have reasonably believed that House could have 

represented him because at the time of their conversations House was 

incarcerated at CCDC awaiting sentencing for felony convictions. 

We therefore conclude that Wilcock failed to prove that he 

reasonably believed that House was an attorney and, consequently, the 

attorney-client privilege does not protect Wilcock's communications with 

House. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly admitted 

House's testimony at trial. 

Wilcock additionally argues that the court erred by failing to 

conduct an evidentiary hearing before denying his motion to exclude 

House's testimony. Wilcock did not request an evidentiary hearing or 

object to the district court's denial of his motion without having conducted 

an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, we review for plain error. See 

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Ouanbengboune v. State, 125 Nev. 763, 774, 220 P.3d 1122, 1129 (2009). 

While the Eighth Judicial District Court Rules allow a criminal defendant 

to file motions in limirte, see EDCR 3.28, evidentiary hearings are not 

required as a matter of course, Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 760 

(9th Cir. 1967). At the hearing on Wilcock's motion, the district court 

determined that even if the district court accepted Wilcock's assertions as 

true, his mistaken belief was not reasonable. Therefore, because the court 

found that there was not a dispute regarding any fact underlying its 

decision, we conclude that the court was not required to conduct an 

evidentiary hearing. 

Admitted evidence 

Wilcock argues that the district court erred by admitting 

certain evidence, including words from his cellular phone's user text 

dictionary and the tables of contents from several books Wilcock owned. 

A district court's decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion. See Holmes v. State, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 59, 306 P.3d 

415, 418 (2013). The district court has considerable discretion to admit 

evidence and its determination will only be reversed if it is manifestly 

wrong. Id. 

The dynamic text dictionary from Wilcock's cellular phone 

Wilcock argues that the words from the dynamic text 

dictionary of his cellular phone, without context, were irrelevant, unfairly 

prejudicial, and invited speculation. 

Because the State claims that Wilcock entered the words into 

the phone, and thereby the phone's dictionary, it must provide 

authentication that Wilcock authored the words typed into the phone. See 

NRS 52.015. In Rodriguez v. State, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 14, 273 P.3d 845, 

849 (2012), we held that "when there has been an objection to 

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admissibility of a [cellular] text message, the proponent . . . [must] provide 

sufficient direct or circumstantial corroborating evidence of authorship in 

order to authenticate the text message as a condition precedent to its 

admission" (citations omitted). We based our conclusion on the reasoning 

that 'cellular telephones are not always exclusively used by the person to 

whom the phone number is assigned.' . . . Thus, some additional evidence, 

'which tends to corroborate the identity of the sender, is required." Id. 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1005 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011). 

In this case, the authorship of the phone's dictionary listings is 

as unclear as the authorship of the text messages in Rodriguez. The State 

did not present any evidence that Wilcock was the person who entered the 

words into his phone; it merely established that the words in the 

dictionary were at one time entered into the phone by "the user." But the 

State did not establish the user's identity for any given entry. Likewise, 

the State did not offer the circumstantial evidence suggested in Rodriguez, 

such as "the context and content of the text." Id. at 849. We therefore 

conclude that the district court abused its discretion by admitting this 

evidence without sufficient authentication. 

Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court's error was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 

1013, 1023-24, 195 P.3d 315, 322 (2008) (holding that constitutional trial 

errors occurring during the presentation of the case to the jury may be 

reviewed for harmless error). The words were used to show that Wilcock 

may have researched murder methods on his phone. This proof could just 

as easily have been established by the books found in Wilcock's home or 

the books on his computers. Therefore, the trial court's error does not 

merit reversal. See id. 1027, 195 P.3d 324 (error is harmless where "it 

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appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 

contribute to the verdict obtained" (internal quotations omitted)). 

The Anarchist Cookbook and The CIA Book of Dirty Tricks 

Wilcock argues that the court violated his rights under the 

First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments when it admitted portions of 

The Anarchist Cookbook and The CIA Book of Dirty Tricks. He contends 

that the books contain prejudicial and irrelevant material. Wilcock also 

asserts that the prosecution used the books as improper character 

evidence. 

Generally, evidence is admissible if it is relevant. NRS 

48.025. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence 

of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 

or less probable than it would be without the evidence." NRS 48.015. 

However, relevant evidence "is not admissible if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of 

the issues or of misleading the jury." NRS 48.035(1). 

We have previously held that books that are relevant are 

admissible. See Surianello v. State, 92 Nev. 492, 502, 553 P.2d 942, 948- 

49 (1976) (upholding admissibility of one book due to its relevance in 

establishing defendant's proximity to crime scene, but relevance of 

another book questionable when used to show motive or intent to commit 

certain acts). Further, other courts have held that The Anarchist 

Cookbook is admissible to show that a defendant was capable of 

committing the crime at issue. See, e.g., People v. Mertz, 842 N.E.2d 618, 

654 (Ill. 2005) ("The defendant's possession of Pipe and Fire Bomb Designs 

and The Anarchist's Cookbook is sufficiently related to defendant's act of 

arson to support admission."); State v. Adamson, 665 P.2d 972, 982 (Ariz. 

1983). And the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Ellis, 147 F.3d 1131, 

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1135-36 (9th Cir. 1998), noted that The Anarchist Cookbook may be 

relevant to show intent, specifically, intended use of a weapon. 

Here, giving due deference to the district court, the books 

appear to be relevant to whether Wilcock possessed the capability to start 

the fire in LaCella's condominium and to cover up his acts, as the books 

contain information on how to start fires without getting caught. 

Although the books contain other content that may be prejudicial, the 

books were not admitted into evidence in their entirety; only the tables of 

contents were admitted. In that sense, this case is similar to Holmes, 129 

Nev. Adv. Op. 59, 306 P.3d at 420, where this court stressed that the 

admission of only a single, relevant stanza of a song, with a proper 

limiting instruction, alleviated the prejudice that could have been caused 

by admitting the entire song. Therefore, we conclude that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by admitting portions of the books. 

Other issues 

We have reviewed Wilcock's remaining claims and conclude 

that none of them warrant reversal. 

Wilcock claims that the district court erred in denying his 

motion for dismissal due to a violation of his right to a speedy trial. We 

conclude that dismissal was not warranted because a five-month delay due 

to a congested court calendar is not presumptively prejudicial and Wilcock 

failed to demonstrate the type of prejudice that the rule is intended to 

prevent. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-32 (1972) (discussing the 

necessary considerations in a claim of violation of the right to speedy 

trial). 

Wilcock also asserts that insufficient evidence existed to 

support his convictions for first-degree murder, burglary, and robbery. 

Wilcock's argument is actually an argument against the jury's 

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interpretation of the evidence and the jury's inferences based upon the 

evidence. Because the jury may make inferences based upon the evidence, 

Wilcock's argument lacks merit. See State v. Green, 81 Nev. 173, 176, 400 

P.2d 766, 767 (1965). 

Wilcock next argues that the district court instructed the jury 

that robbery was a general intent crime when robbery should instead be a 

specific intent crime. Therefore, Wilcock argues the district court's 

instruction was erroneous. Wilcock thus urges this court to overrule 

Litteral v. State, 97 Nev. 503, 634 P.2d 1226 (1981), disapproved of on 

other grounds by Talancon v. State, 102 Nev. 294, 301, 721 P.2d 764, 768- 

69 (1986), and its progeny. Because Wilcock does not present any novel 

argument to persuade us that we should overturn Litteral, and because 

the district court properly instructed the jury, we affirm the trial court's 

instruction. 

Further, Wilcock also objected to the court's presumption of 

innocence instruction because the jury was not instructed as to which 

elements were material. We have steadfastly affirmed the instruction 

language that the district court used in the instant case for the 

presumption of innocence, see, e.g., Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. Adv, Op. 

69, 263 P.3d 235, 259-60 (2011), and we therefore conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in its instruction. 

Wilcock additionally asserts that his "rights to due process of 

law, equal protection, a fair trial and right against Double Jeopardy were 

violated by the district court's imposition of sentences for two counts of 

possession of stolen property." Because the district court convicted and 

sentenced Wilcock for robbery, he claims that he should not be convicted 

and sentenced for possessing the very same property. A conviction for 

robbery requires proof of force or the threat of force, which is not required 

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, J. 

for a conviction for possession of stolen property. See NRS 200.380; NRS 

205.275; see also Barton v. State, 117 Nev. 686, 692-94, 30 P.3d 1103, 

1107-08 (2001) (holding that this court uses the test from Blockburger v. 

United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), to determine whether separate 

offenses exist for double jeopardy purposes), overruled on other grounds by 

Rosas v. State, 122 Nev. 1258, 147 P.3d 1101 (2006). Thus, because the 

offenses of robbery and possession of stolen property constitute separate 

offenses, the charges against Wilcock did not violate double jeopardy. See 

Jackson v. State, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 55, 291 P.3d 1274, 1280 (2012) (noting 

that offenses with separate elements are considered separate offenses and 

do not invoke double jeopardy's protection from multiple punishments for 

the "same offense"). 

Lastly, Wilcock claims that he is entitled to a new trial based 

upon the cumulative effect of several trial errors. However, we conclude 

that the only error at trial was the admission of the dynamic text 

dictionary from Wilcock's cellular phone, which we found to be harmless. 

Therefore, we conclude that Wilcock is not entitled to a new trial. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

Parraguirre 424-xa—ato 

c—D--ti-<, hi 

Douglas 

J. 

J. 

(0) I907A 
cc: Hon. Douglas W. Herndon, District Judge 

Special Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth Judicial District Court Clerk 

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