J-S01045-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

C.Z.

Appellee

v.

Z.M. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 947 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered May 25, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County

Civil Division at No(s): 2017--6444

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MAY 25, 2018

Appellant, Z.M., appeals from the order entered in the Luzerne County 

Court of Common Pleas, which granted the petition of Appellee, C.Z., filed 

under the Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) Act.

1

 We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On 

May 18, 2017, Appellee filed a petition for a PFA order against Appellant 

claiming, inter alia, Appellant followed her and called her incessantly after 

Appellee had ended their dating relationship. The court issued a temporary 

PFA order that day and held a PFA hearing on May 25, 2017. Testimony at 

the PFA hearing established:

[Appellee] and [Appellant] began a dating relationship after 

they met in December 2015 at an Alcoholics Anonymous 

____________________________________________

1 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6122.
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(“AA”) meeting in Duryea. The relationship ended in 

December 2015 after four dates.[2] On the fourth date, 

[Appellant] asked [Appellee] how she felt about him, to 

which she responded that she “only wanted to be friends.” 

[Appellant] did not respond well to [Appellee’s] statement 

and continuously called and texted [Appellee] in an attempt 

to change her mind. The repeated contacts frightened 

[Appellee] and she noted that he acted in an “obsessive” 

[manner].

After the relationship ended, [Appellant] continuously 

followed [Appellee]. [Appellee] attested that she is eight 

and one half years sober and attended AA meetings for six 

years. She stated that her “home” AA meeting facility was 

in Avoca, Pennsylvania. After the relationship ended, 

[Appellant] stopped attending AA meetings in September 

2016 as she was “afraid to go...because [Appellant] was 

always there.”

During the week of May 8, 2017, [Appellee] parked her car 

in a back parking lot of her house. When [Appellee] left to 

go to work around 2:00 P.M., she saw [Appellant] walking 

down the alleyway, but no conversation took place. On May 

16, 2017, while [Appellee] was driving to her sister’s 

house..., [Appellant] “sped up on [Appellee’s] bumper at a 

stop light, and [Appellee] was afraid to turn, [as Appellant] 

was so close to [her].” When [Appellee] left her sister’s 

house and was again driving in her car, [Appellant] “flew up 

on [Appellee’s] bumper...beeping his horn and everything.” 

[Appellee] was frightened of [Appellant] as she stated that 

she did not “know what he’s capable of. Further, [Appellee] 

thought he was going to hit [her].”

Corroborating these events, [Appellee’s] sister...confirmed 

that she heard and saw [Appellant] honking at [Appellee] 

outside her house and then witnessed [Appellant] pass 

around [Appellee]. [Appellee] then came into [her sister’s] 

house crying, shaking, and frightened. [Appellee’s sister] 

stated that [Appellee] always contacted her after seeing 

[Appellant]. [Appellee’s sister] observed that [Appellee’s] 

____________________________________________

2 After their second date, Appellant gave Appellee a Garmin watch worth 

approximately $300.00. Appellee did not accept the gift.
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demeanor was always “scared, crying, a mess.” ... 

[Appellee] also saw [Appellant] multiple times while 

jogging/running. Based upon her ongoing fear of 

[Appellant], [Appellee] would call her sister whenever...she 

went on a run and to and from work. [Appellee’s sister] also 

received multiple texts from unknown numbers whenever 

[Appellee] went on a run, stating “[e]arly morning run again 

today?” [Appellee’s sister] always confirmed with 

[Appellee] that she saw [Appellant] while running, stating, 

“[i]t always seemed to be when [Appellee] had [seen 

Appellant,] I got the text.” Based on her fear of [Appellant] 

following her while running, [Appellee] asked her sister’s 

husband to drive her to local school running tracks and had 

him wait until she finished exercising.

[Appellant] also visited [Appellee’s] employment three

times after the relationship ended. [Appellant] twice visited 

[Appellee] at her job at GNC in 2016. [Appellant] then 

visited [Appellee] at her following job at Core Fitness and 

Rehab.

On May 18, 2017, [Appellee] filed a PFA against [Appellant] 

in the Luzerne County Courthouse. [Appellee’s] friend from 

church, [J.M.], accompanied her. On the way out of the 

courthouse, [Appellee] saw [Appellant] and gave an officer 

the PFA, who then served it on [Appellant]. While the officer 

served [Appellant], [Appellee] “collapsed,” and was 

“sobbing, crying, her knees kind of gave out. She was 

sitting on the steps.” [J.M.] stated that she had never “seen 

that side of [Appellee].”

[Appellee] was forced to change her cell phone number in 

October 2016, due to [Appellant’s] constant harassment. 

[Appellee] received “hang-up calls” two to three times per 

day, every day, from unknown numbers, one of which was 

from the Second Presbyterian Church, where [Appellee] and 

[Appellant] used to attend AA meetings. In addition to 

phone calls, [Appellee] received multiple text messages per 

day from unknown numbers saying “nasty things about 

me.”

[Appellant] also testified at the hearing stating that 

[Appellee] followed him in the past on numerous occasions. 
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[Appellant] runs every day from his Moosic house, passing 

[Appellee’s] house in Avoca, to his Dupont house, because 

he was training to take the test to obtain employment in the 

Wilkes-Barre Police Department. [Appellant] would run in 

the alleyway behind [Appellee’s] house, as he knew 

[Appellee] usually parked on Main Street in Avoca, and not 

in the parking lot behind her house. [Appellant] also stated 

that he was honking at [Appellee] on May 16, 2017, because 

she did not drive forward when the light turned green at the 

stoplight, so he pulled around her. Later on the same day, 

as [Appellant] was driving to his house in Moosic, [Appellee] 

pulled out in front of him and slammed on her brakes, 

forcing [Appellant] into the oncoming lane. In another 

instance while [Appellant] was driving, he pulled out from 

being parked on the side of the road and noticed [Appellee] 

behind him “a distance back,” which prompted him to take 

pictures of her car. [Appellant] further testified that while 

he was sitting in his parked car at the [convenience] store 

closest to [Appellee], [Appellee] “rolled up” next to 

[Appellant’s] car, and then pulled away.

(Supplemental Trial Court Opinion, filed April 25, 2018, at 5-8) (internal 

citations omitted). 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered a final PFA order 

prohibiting Appellant from contact with Appellee for three years.3 The court 

entered an amended order on June 8, 2017, to fix a scrivener’s error. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on June 9, 2017. By order entered 

June 26, 2017, with Pa.R.C.P. 236 notice issued the next day, the court 

directed Appellant to file a concise statement of errors per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 

within 30 days. On July 21, 2017, Appellant inadvertently filed his concise 

____________________________________________

3 Appellant had also filed a PFA petition against Appellee, which the court 

denied after the hearing. Appellant does not challenge the court’s denial of 

his PFA petition on appeal.
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statement in the Superior Court. The certificate of service and proofs of 

service, however, indicate Appellant served opposing counsel and the trial 

judge with the statement. Nevertheless, the trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) 

opinion, stating Appellant had failed to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, 

constituting waiver of all issues on appeal. Consequently, the trial court 

declined to address any of Appellant’s issues on the merits. 

On February 6, 2018, this Court remanded for the trial court to grant 

Appellant leave to file the same Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc 

immediately with the Luzerne County Prothonotary, and to serve opposing 

counsel and the trial judge again. Appellant complied, and the trial court 

subsequently issued a supplemental Rule 1925(a) opinion. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

WHETHER [APPELLEE] HAS STANDING SUFFICIENT TO 

BRING AN ACTION FOR PROTECTION FROM ABUSE 

AGAINST [APPELLANT]?

WHETHER THE RECORD INDICATES THAT [APPELLEE] WAS 

EITHER IN REASONABLE FEAR OF IMMINENT BODILY HARM 

OR [APPELLANT] KNOWINGLY ENGAGED IN A COURSE OF 

CONDUCT OR REPEATEDLY COMMITTED ACTS TOWARD 

[APPELLEE] WHICH PLACED [APPELLEE] IN REASONABLE 

FEAR OF BODILY INJURY?

WHETHER THE CONDUCT OF THE PRESIDING JUDGE IN 

INTERRUPTING [APPELLANT] AND COUNSEL FOR THE 

DEFENSE SHOWED BIAS AGAINST [APPELLANT] PRIOR TO 

THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4-5). 

“In the context of a PFA order, we review the trial court’s legal 
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conclusions for an error of law or abuse of discretion.” Stamus v. Dutcavich, 

938 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Pa.Super. 2007) (quoting Drew v. Drew, 870 A.2d 

377, 378 (Pa.Super. 2005)). “When interpreting statutes, we exercise plenary 

review.” Stamus, supra (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Additionally, “[t]his [C]ourt defers to the credibility determinations of the trial 

court as to witnesses who appeared before it.” Karch v. Karch, 885 A.2d 

535, 537 (Pa.Super. 2005). 

“The purpose of the PFA Act is to protect victims of domestic violence 

from those who perpetrate such abuse, with the primary goal of advance 

prevention of physical and sexual abuse.” Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 

A.2d 1260, 1262 (Pa.Super. 2008) (quoting Custer v. Cochran, 933 A.2d 

1050, 1054 (Pa.Super. 2007) (en banc)). “[T]he Protection From Abuse Act

does not seek to determine criminal culpability. A Petitioner is not required 

to establish abuse occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, but only to establish 

it by a preponderance of the evidence.” Snyder v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977, 

982 (Pa.Super. 1993). “A preponderance of the evidence is defined as the 

greater weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly is the [criterion] or 

requirement for preponderance of the evidence.” Karch, supra at 537 

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

In his first issue, Appellant argues Appellee lacked standing to bring a 

PFA action against him. Appellant asserts the PFA provides relief from abuse 

to several categories of people including current or former sexual or intimate 
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partners. Appellant concedes he briefly dated Appellee, but he contends their 

courtship did not rise to the level of a “romantic relationship” for purposes of 

the statute. Appellant highlights that he went on only four dates with Appellee 

and emphasizes Appellee’s testimony at the PFA hearing that she “barely even 

knew” Appellant. Appellant insists the record contains no evidence showing a 

sexual relationship between the parties or any type of romantic bond. 

Appellant maintains the parties merely shared a brief friendship while they 

dated. Appellant concludes Appellee lacked standing to bring a PFA action 

against him, and this Court should reverse the PFA order and dismiss the 

matter. We disagree.

To have standing to bring a PFA action, the plaintiff and defendant must 

be “family or household members, sexual or intimate partners or persons who 

share biological parenthood.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a). In other words, 

persons protected by the Act “have a connection in blood, marriage, familystanding, or a chosen romantic relationship.” Scott v. Shay, 928 A.2d 312, 

315 (Pa.Super. 2007). A dating relationship meets the relationship 

requirement of the Act. Varner v. Holley, 854 A.2d 520 (Pa.Super. 2004). 

See also Evans v. Braun, 12 A.3d 395 (Pa.Super. 2010) (holding appellee 

had standing to bring PFA action against appellant, where evidence showed 

parties mutually chose to enter dating relationship which involved romantic 

bond, albeit short-lived, as parties had been on only two dates together); 

Scott, supra (explaining persons involved in dating relationships are 
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protected by Act because they have elected some measure of personal 

interaction, which often involves emotional or private concerns). 

Instantly, the record shows the parties met around December 2015, at 

an AA meeting and decided to enter a dating relationship. After their second 

date, Appellant offered Appellee a Garmin watch worth approximately $300.00 

as a gift. Appellant knew Appellee was a marathon runner and this type of 

watch is specifically for runners. Appellee did not accept the watch because,

after only two dates, she felt she barely knew Appellant and did not feel right 

about keeping it. After their fourth date, Appellant asked Appellee how she 

felt about him; and Appellee said she just wanted to be friends. Appellant 

subsequently texted and called Appellee incessantly in an effort to change her 

mind. Under these facts, the parties “elected some measure of personal 

interaction” and chose to engage in a dating or “romantic relationship” 

sufficient for purposes of the PFA. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a); Evans, 

supra; Scott, supra; Varner, supra. Thus, Appellee had standing to bring 

a PFA action against Appellant; and Appellant’s first issue merits no relief.4 

In his second issue, Appellant argues Appellee failed to establish 

Appellant committed “abuse” as defined in the PFA Act. Appellant admits 

Appellee testified she is afraid of Appellant, but he claims Appellee also 

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4 Notably, Appellant also filed a PFA petition against Appellee, which the court 

denied after the PFA hearing. Thus, Appellant’s challenge to Appellee’s 

standing is disingenuous. 
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conceded Appellant did not ever injure her or threaten to injure her. Appellant 

emphasizes he lives near Appellee and frequently drives between his house 

and his aunt’s house. Appellant insists Appellee lives directly between 

Appellant’s house and his aunt’s house, which explains why the parties have 

seen each other since they stopped dating. Appellant claims there is no 

history of violence or physical abuse in this case. Appellant maintains there 

is no evidence he placed Appellee in reasonable fear of imminent serious 

bodily injury or engaged in a course of conduct, or repeatedly committed acts, 

which placed Appellee in reasonable fear of bodily injury. Appellant concludes 

the evidence was insufficient to warrant a PFA order in this case, and this 

Court should reverse the PFA order and dismiss the matter. We disagree.

The PFA Act defines “abuse” as follows:

§ 6102. Definitions

(a) General rule.—The following words and phrases 

when used in this chapter shall have the meanings given to 

them in this section unless the context clearly indicates 

otherwise:

“Abuse.” The occurrence of one or more of the 

following acts between family or household members, 

sexual or intimate partners or persons who share biological 

parenthood:

* * *

(2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent 

serious bodily injury.

* * *
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(5) Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or 

repeatedly committing acts toward another person, 

including following the person, without proper authority, 

under circumstances which place the person in reasonable 

fear of bodily injury. ... 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a)(2), (5). “When a claim is presented on appeal that 

the evidence is not sufficient to support an order of protection from abuse, 

the reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict winner, granting her the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” 

Mescanti v. Mescanti, 956 A.2d 1017 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted). “The reviewing court then determines whether the 

evidence was sufficient to sustain the [trial] court’s conclusions by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” Id. 

Under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a)(2): “In the context of a PFA case, the 

court’s objective is to determine whether the victim is in reasonable fear of 

imminent serious bodily injury. The intent of the alleged abuser is of no 

moment.” Buchhalter, supra at 1263. Physical contact is not a pre-requisite 

for a finding of abuse under Section 6102(a)(2) of the Act. Fonner v. Fonner, 

731 A.2d 160 (Pa.Super. 1999). As the goal of the Act is to prevent physical 

and sexual abuse, a victim does not have to wait for physical or sexual abuse 

to occur for the Act to apply. Id. See also T.K. v. A.Z., 157 A.3d 974 

(Pa.Super. 2017) (holding appellee established abuse under Section 

6102(a)(5) of Act, where appellant repeatedly followed appellee in his vehicle, 

in local grocery store, at sporting events, and in other locations; appellant also 
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kept track of appellee’s whereabouts and constantly drove past her home and 

honked car horn; appellee testified about deep concern for her safety and fear

that appellant’s behavior would eventually escalate to cause her bodily harm);

R.G. v. T.D., 672 A.2d 341 (Pa.Super. 1996) (holding appellee established 

abuse under Section 6102(a)(5) of Act, where appellant repeatedly called 

appellee and sent her unwanted, threatening e-mails; appellee testified she 

was “very scared” by appellant’s increasingly hostile messages and was afraid 

to walk around campus). 

Instantly, the trial court explained:

[T]he record in the present case supports the PFA Order 

because [Appellant’s] stalking and harassment placed 

[Appellee] in reasonable fear of bodily injury. [Appellant] 

constantly stalked [Appellee] while driving and running, 

visited her employment, appeared at her AA meetings, and 

continuously contacted [Appellee] and her family. 

[Appellee] stopped going to AA meetings, called [her sister] 

going to and from work, had [her sister’s] husband wait at 

a school track while [Appellee] exercised, and changed her 

cell phone number. [Appellee] would call her sister scared

and crying every time she saw [Appellant]....

The testimony...provided the necessary elements of abuse 

as defined by the statute. The review of the record and 

testimony clearly indicate that [Appellee] proved the 

allegations of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.

(Supplemental Trial Court Opinion at 9). We see no reason to disrupt the 

court’s analysis. See Stamus, supra. The trial court was free to reject 

Appellant’s version of events in favor of Appellee’s testimony. See Karch, 

supra. Viewed in the light most favorable to Appellee as the verdict winner, 

the record demonstrates that Appellee established Appellant’s abuse under 
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the Act.

5

 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a)(2), (5); Mescanti, supra. See also 

T.K., supra; Fonner, supra; R.G., supra. Therefore, Appellant’s second 

issue on appeal merits no relief.

In his third issue, Appellant argues the court interrupted Appellant’s 

testimony during direct and cross-examination on several occasions. 

Appellant concedes the court was trying to clarify issues in some instances,

but he insists some of the court’s questions demonstrated a bias against 

Appellant. Appellant claims some of the court’s questions improperly sought 

to test his credibility. Appellant maintains the court engaged in protracted 

and unnecessary questioning of Appellant. Appellant concludes the court 

showed bias against him, and this Court should reverse the PFA order and 

dismiss the matter. We disagree.

Allegations of bias and prejudice constitute some of the most serious 

charges which can be hurled against a court. Kenworthy v. Burghart, 361 

A.2d 335, 338 (Pa.Super. 1976), appeal dismissed, 478 Pa. 20, 385 A.2d 975 

(1978). Before reversal is warranted on these grounds, the record must 

clearly show prejudice, bias, capricious disbelief or prejudgment. Id. “When 

the trial [court] is assailed as lacking impartiality, the only way to meet this 

point is to examine the testimony [as a whole], not depending upon sentences 

plucked out here and there.” Id.

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5 The record supports the trial court’s finding of abuse under either subsection

(a)(2) or (a)(5). 
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Instantly, the trial court explained:

[Appellant’s]...alleged error is baseless and wholly without 

merit. Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 614(b), a 

judge may examine a witness in the interest of justice, 

regardless of who calls the witness. In the case at bar, the 

[t]rial [c]ourt asked questions of both parties in an attempt 

to adduce testimony to determine whether the Petition was 

meritorious. [The c]ourt only interrupted [Appellant] when 

he was talking off topic or restating his previously 

mentioned testimony. Defense counsel was free to ask 

[Appellant] any relevant questions that were pertinent [to] 

his case.

(Supplemental Trial Court Opinion at 14). We agree. The record and the PFA 

hearing transcript as a whole make clear the court remained impartial and 

treated both parties equally. See Kenworthy, supra. Therefore, Appellant’s 

third issue merits no relief. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/25/18