J-S83032-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

GERALD RUSSELL SCHNEIDER, 

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 867 WDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order May 30, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-61-CR-0000103-2011

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MARCH 12, 2019

Gerald Russell Schneider (“Schneider”) appeals from the Order denying 

his first Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act.1 We 

affirm.

On January 31, 2012, Schneider pled guilty to three counts of corruption 

of minors, and one count each of aggravated indecent assault of a person less 

than 13 years of age, statutory sexual assault, indecent assault of a person 

less than 16 years of age, and endangering the welfare of children.2 On the 

same date, the trial court sentenced Schneider to an aggregate term of 57 

months to 22 years in prison. Schneider was also found to be a sexually 

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1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301(a)(1), 3125(a)(7), 3122.1, 3126(a)(8), 4304(a).
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violent predator (“SVP”), and, notably to this appeal, was subject to a period 

of lifetime registration and reporting, pursuant to Megan’s Law II. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.1(b)(2) (expired).

3 Schneider did not appeal his judgment 

of sentence. 

On September 14, 2017, Schneider filed a pro se PCRA Petition. 

Therein, he asserted that pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 

decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), retroactive 

application of SORNA’s registration requirements to Schneider’s convictions 

rendered this component of his sentence unlawful.4 The PCRA court thereafter 

appointed Schneider counsel, who filed an Amended PCRA Petition, requesting 

a PCRA hearing on Schneider’s claim. 

After a hearing, by an Order entered on May 30, 2018, the PCRA court 

denied Schneider’s PCRA Petition. Schneider subsequently filed a timely 

Notice of Appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise 

Statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Schneider now presents the following issues for our review:

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3 Effective December 20, 2012, approximately one year after Schneider’s SVP 

classification, Megan’s Law was replaced by the Sex Offenders Registration 

and Notification Act (“SORNA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41

(subsequently amended Feb. 21, 2018).

4

In Muniz, our Supreme Court held that SORNA’s registration requirements 

constitute criminal punishment, and therefore, their retroactive application to 

increase a sexual offender’s term of registration violates the ex post facto

clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Muniz, 164 A.3d 

at 1193, 1223. 
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1. Whether the PCRA court erred as a matter of law or abused its 

discretion when the PCRA court denied the PCRA [P]etition 

raising the whether [sic] [Schneider] had to register under 

SORNA, now Act 10, when it violated his constitutional rights[,]

under the Pennsylvania Constitution and the United States 

Constitution[,] to due process to a right to hearing[,] and a 

right to a jury determination before having to register to a 

higher Punishment[,] when he was sentenced under Megan’s 

Law[,] which has expired[?]

2. Whether the PCRA court erred as a matter of law or abused its 

discretion when the PCRA court denied the PCRA [P]etition 

raising the whether [sic] [Schneider] had to register under 

SORNA, now Act 10, when it violated his constitutional rights 

under the Pennsylvania Constitution and the United States 

Constitution[,] since violating the ex po[st] facto provisions[?]

3. Whether the PCRA court erred as a matter of law or abused its 

discretion when the PCRA court denied the PCRA [P]etition 

raising the whether [sic] [Schneider] had to register under 

SORNA, now Act 10, when it violated his constitutional rights 

under the Pennsylvania Constitution[,] violating his protected 

right to reputation[?]

4. Whether the PCRA court erred as a matter of law or abused its 

discretion when the PCRA court denied the PCRA [P]etition 

raising the whether [sic] [Schneider] had to register under 

SORNA, now Act 10, when it violated his constitutional rights 

under the Pennsylvania Constitution and the United States 

Constitution[,] and in violation of [Commonwealth v.] 

Butler, [173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017),5] when the court 

failed to vacate the finding that [Schneider] is a sexually violent 

predator[?]

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5

In Butler, this Court concluded that, in light of the decision in Muniz, 

“section 9799.24(e)(3) of SORNA [(which concerns SVP designation)] violates 

the federal and state constitutions because it increases the criminal penalty 

to which a defendant is exposed without the chosen fact-finder making the 

necessary factual findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” Butler, 173 A.3d at 

1218 (emphasis added); see also Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 

103 (2013) (holding that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a 

crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a 

reasonable doubt.”). 
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Brief for Appellant at 5-6 (footnote added).

In reviewing an order denying PCRA relief, “we examine whether the 

PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 114 A.3d 401, 409 (Pa. 2015) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

Before addressing Schneider’s claims, we first must ascertain whether 

he timely filed his PCRA Petition, as any PCRA petition must be filed within one 

year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The one-year time limitation is jurisdictional, and a 

PCRA court has no power to address the substantive merits of an untimely 

petition. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 833 A.2d 719, 723-24 (Pa. 2003). 

The three exceptions to the one-year filing requirement are for afterdiscovered facts, interference by a government official, and a newlyrecognized constitutional right. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petition 

asserting one of these exceptions must also establish that the exception was 

raised within sixty days of the date the claim could have been first presented. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). 

Here, because Schneider filed no direct appeal of his January 31, 2012 

judgment of sentence, and he did not file the instant PCRA Petition until 

September 14, 2017, it is facially untimely. However, Schneider asserts the 
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exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement for a newly-recognized 

constitutional right, invoking Muniz and Butler.

6

In Schneider’s first three issues, which we address simultaneously due 

to their relatedness, he argues that the portion of his sentence imposing 

sexual offender registration requirements is illegal under Muniz, and must be 

vacated. See Brief for Appellant at 10-15. 

In its Opinion, the PCRA court addressed Schneider’s claims as follows:

As to [Schneider’s] issues ... pertaining to the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court’s holding in [] Muniz, we specifically find that his 

issues are meritless given the General Assembly’s enactment of 

Act 2018, Feb, 21, P.L. 27, No, 10, § 19 [(hereinafter “Act 10”)], 

which was effective on February 21, 2018. This Act created the 

Continued Registration of Sexual Offenders portions of SORNA, 

effectively solving the issue of applying the requirements of 

SORNA retroactively to those who committed sexually violent 

crimes before December 20, 2012. Created by [] Act [10], 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.52[] provides the following:

This subchapter shall apply to individuals who were: (1) 

convicted of a sexually violent offense committed on or 

after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012, whose 

period of registration with the Pennsylvania State Police, 

as described in section 9799.55 (relating to registration), 

has not expired; or (2) required to register with the 

Pennsylvania State Police under a former sexual offender 

registration law of this Commonwealth on or after April 22, 

1996, but before December 20, 2012, whose period of 

registration has not expired.

Id. Here, [Schneider] was convicted of a sexually violent crime, 

specifically[,] aggravated indecent assault[,] in violation of 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a)(7). The alleged conduct relating to his 

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6 We note that Schneider filed his PCRA Petition within 60 days of the Muniz

and Butler decisions, in compliance with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). 
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conviction occurred between 2003 and 2006, effectively 

committing the offense after April 22, 1996, but before December 

20, 2012. As the [O]rder paroling [Schneider] was docketed on 

April 16, 2018, his period of registration has not expired. 

Therefore, the newly-enacted Continued Registration of Sexual 

Offenders statutes are directly applicable to him.

As [Schneider] was convicted of violating 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3125 on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012, 

he is therefore required by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.55(b)(2)(i)(A) to 

register with the Pennsylvania State Police for life.[FN]

[FN] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.55(b)(2)(i)(A) reads as follows: 

“(b) Lifetime registration.— The following individuals shall 

be subject to lifetime registration: ... (2) Individuals 

convicted: (i)(A) in this Commonwealth of the following 

offenses, if committed on or after April 22, 1996, but 

before December 20, 2012: ... 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125 (relating 

to aggravated indecent assault)[.]”

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/30/18, at 3-4 (footnote in original). We agree with the 

PCRA court’s rationale and determination, which is supported by the law and 

the record. There is no merit to Schneider’s challenge to the legality of the 

sexual offender registration component of his sentence, since he is currently

subject to the same registration requirements (i.e., lifetime registration) 

under Act 10 as he originally was when he was sentenced under Megan’s Law 

II.7 Accordingly, Schneider’s first three issues entitle him to no relief.

In his fourth and final issue, Schneider argues that his classification as 

an SVP was rendered illegal by Butler, supra, “since the determination of 

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7 To the extent Schneider contends that he was originally required to register 

for only a “limited time” (as opposed to his lifetime), when his sentence was 

imposed, Brief for Appellant at 15, this claim is belied by the record. See

Notice of Sexually Violent Predator Requirements, 2/14/12, at ¶ 1.
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sexually violent predator raises the penalty and is outside of the determination 

of the jury ....” Brief for Appellant at 17. Schneider urges that the Butler

“holding should not be limited to SORNA or Act 10[,] but also [be] applied to 

Megan’s Law[,] ... since the statutory language for both statutes is the same.” 

Id. at 18. 

In its Opinion, the PCRA court concisely and appropriately rejected this 

claim as follows:

[The sentencing c]ourt held a sexually violent predator hearing on 

January 31, 2012, and found [Schneider] to be a sexually violent 

predator[,] using the clear and convincing standard. In light of 

Butler, [Schneider] avers that his sexually violent predator status

constitutes an illegal sentence. However, [Schneider] was not 

found a sexually violent predator under SORNA, which [] Butler

directly pertains to. But rather, as he was found a sexually violent 

predator on January 31, 2012, the determination was made when

Megan’s Law was still effective. Therefore, [Schneider’s] 

argument that [] Butler requires this [c]ourt to vacate his 

sexually violent predator finding is unfounded, as our Supreme

Court has held that a sexually violent predator finding under 

Megan’s Law is not punishment. [See] Commonwealth v. Lee, 

935 A.2d 865, 886 (Pa. 2007) (holding that the lifetime 

registration, notification, and counseling obligations of sexually 

violent predators, as mandated by Megan’s Law, were not 

punitive, and therefore did not violate due process, the double 

jeopardy clause, or the prohibition against ex post facto laws).

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/30/18, at 5-6 (footnote omitted). We agree with the 

PCRA court’s rationale. The holding in Butler does not apply to SVP findings 
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made pursuant to Megan’s Law, nor have our appellate courts held that Butler

may be applied retroactively to pre-SORNA SVP designations.8 

Accordingly, as none of Schneider’s issues entitle him to relief and we 

discern no legal error by the PCRA court, we affirm the Order denying his first

PCRA Petition.

Order affirmed.

Judge Panella joins the memorandum.

Judge Shogan concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/12/2019

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8 On July 31, 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of 

appeal in Butler. If the Supreme Court issues a decision holding that Butler

applies retroactively, Schneider may file another PCRA petition within one year 

of that decision, attempting to invoke a time-bar exception in 

subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii). See Act 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No. 146, §§ 2 

and 3 (recent amendment to the PCRA Act); see also Commonwealth v.

Murphy, 180 A.3d 402, 406 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2018).