### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A pr il 7, 200 3 S es sio n
RU THIE C UR BOW v. JAM ES D OUG LAS STU CKI
Appeal f romthe Juvenile Court for Williamson County No. 33563 Lonn ie Hoover, Judge

No. M2001- 02908-COA-R 3-JV - F iled October 28, 2003

I n this case, Ruthie Ann Curbow a ppeals fr om a custody

an d s u pport proce eding in Wi lliamson CountyJ uvenile C ourt. On t he day of t he hea ring , parties a nd counsel a ppear ed in ca mera

for apretrial confe renc e. Upon a nnounceme nt of an a ppare nt settlement in open court, Mother expressed disag ree ment with the terms of the se ttlement and a de sire to pre serve her right to appe al. The tria l
c ou rt de te rm ine d th a t no se ttl e me nt e xi st ed andtria l on the me ri ts p ro c e e de d w ith pr oo f f ro m a ll parties. The court enter ed an order awa rding joint custody with F ather as primary

custodian under the statut ory

fi tne ss c omp ari so n. Mo the r a pp e a ls. We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Juvenile Court Aff irm ed and Rem anded

W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which B EN H. C A N T RE LL , P.J ., M.S., and W I L L I AM C H A RLES LEE , S P

. J ., joined.

Thomas F. B loom, Nashville, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Ruthi e Curbow.

Jame s Ro bin Mc Ki nn e y , Jr. , N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lle e , Jam e s D ou g la s Stu c ki.

OP IN ION

Mother and Fa ther beg an dating in May of 1998. The c hild who is the subject of this custody action was born on April 3, 1999. I n Aug ust of 2000 Mother and F ather quit dating. In September of 2000 F ather beg an dating his c urre nt w ife. On the 20th of that month, Mother filed the petition in J uvenile Court for Williamson Count y reque sting c ustody

and child suppo rt

. I n that petition Mother alleg ed, int e r a lia , t h e f o l l o wi n g:
9

. T h a td u r i n g t h e t i m e s t h a tt h e m i n o r c h i l d , J A M E S W ILLIA M S T U C K I, vis its ov e rn ig ht w ith Fa the r i n h is h ome , th e min or c hil d d oe s n ot h a ve his own bedr oom. Mother fe ars that unless F ather is rest raine d he will have-2- overnig ht female g uests to whom he is not marrie d and to the detriment of the
m i n o r c h i l d , J A M E S W ILLIA M S T U C K I;

1 0

. T h a t a r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r b e i s s u e d r e s t r a i n i n g F a t h e r f r o m h a v i n g fe ma le g uests overnig ht during tim es when the minor c hild, J AMES WI LL I AM STUCKI , spends the night with F ather pending a fina l hearing in this matter;

11. That F ather

is fundam e n ta

lly opposed to immuniz ations for c hildren and doe s no t be lie ve in g ivi ng c hil dr e n pr e sc ri be d me dic ine

. Mo the r fe ars that un le ss restra ined Father will fail to immuniz e the part ies’ minor child, JAMES WI LL I AM STUCKI , or fa il to give him pr escribed medicine, if nee ded; and

12. That a r est raining order be issued re straining Fa ther fr om preve nting the parties’ minor child from bein g immuniz ed and/or from pre venting the parties’ minor child from re ceiving any and all presc ribed medications in the presc ribed dosag es, as or dere d by the child’s pediatrician, pe ndi n g a fina l hearing in this matter.

The F ather

responde d to the petition a nd filed a counte r-pe tition s eeking sole custody of the parties’ minor child. T h e counter claim went una nswere d. During the ensuing litigation seve ral alterc ations occur

red betwee n the parties reg arding visitation. Despite the disag ree ments betwee n the parties it seems that on the date a ssigne d for he aring , October 24, 2001, the parties had wor ked out a settlement in cha mbers. The transcript of th e h ea ri n g reve als six teen pa g es of discussion
co n ce rn i n g t h e t er m s o f a n ap p arent ag ree d comp ro m i s e. M o t h eri n d i ca t ed h erd i s agr ee m en tt h ro u gh
c ou ns e l.

THE COURT: Wil l go into an education trust for the child. I s all that
a g re e able ? I s th a t a g re e able wi th y ou , ma ’a m?

MS. HO OD : Well, Yo ur Ho no r, a g a in, thi s is no t w ha t sh e wa nts so she is not going to ag ree

.

TH E CO UR T: Wel l, d o y ou ob je c t to it? MS. HOOD: But we ’re not going to object that this is the order of the Cou rt a ndno t ha ve a he ari ng

. I thi nk a t the e ndof the da y if we ha ve a

he ari ng , th is is going to be the Court’s orde r.

THE COURT: I

believe it will too. M S

. HO OD : S o we ’r e n o to b j ec t i n g t o t h i s o rd ern o th av i n g a h ea ri n g. THE COURT: You know , we ’v e got this about as eve n and fa ir as it c a n b e . Y ou do n’ t ob

je c t to it, ma ’a m? MS. CUR BO W: No, sir, but c ould I add one thing if I could, please ? THE COURT: Yes, if y ou have to, g o ahea d.-3- MS. CUR BO W: There have been nume ro u s ti me s that Mr. Stucki has not allowed me to talk to my son, and I

was wonde ring i f i t woul d be okay , Your Honor, if I

can ha ve phone privilege s with myson. THE COURT: See, this is another one of t hose t hings. I ’m not g oing to g e t in to e ve ry

la st a sp e c t of

y ou r a ndhis lif

e . I me a n y ou -a ll a

re g ro wn up s. MS. CUR BO W: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And if y ou want to spend it, y ou know, hiring lawy ers every three minutes coming in a nd out of court a nd acting like children, the n y ou can do that. But I ’ve a lrea dy told y ou the thing to do is to t al kto eac h other a nd try to work these littl e simple things out betwee n y ourselves. Y ou-all just sit down and discuss it and work out some sort of ph o n e ar ra ng ements or some sort of
a g re e me nts

. I f y ou have a problem, simply

call the man. And, sir, it’s w ay in y our best interest to let her

talk her son whe n y ou have him for visitation.

S ho rt lyaft er t hi s ex chan ge coun sel forP eti ti on er m ade t he fo ll owi ng st ate men t in op e n c ou rt , wh er eu p o n the court vented its frustra tion at the understanda bly difficult task of f

acilitating what
se e ms t o h a ve be e n a

dif fi c ult e ff ort a t c omp ro mis e :
MS. HOOD: Your Honor , I do need to make clea

r to rese rve her
app e a l r ig hts that sh e ’s no t a gre e d to the or de r. Wha t w e ’r e a g re e ing is tha t th is i s the orde r of the c ourt, but its not an ag ree d order

.

TH E CO UR T: Wel l no w, if sh e ’s g oin g to a pp e a l, w e ne e d to sta

rt - - we can just start calling witnesses and let y our leg al bill run up to, y ou know, three kazilli on dollars or so, wha tever it’s going to be. I f y our client wa nts to appeal - - MS. HOOD: Ther e is probably g oi n g t o be an a

ppeal, Ye s, Your Honor. What I

was say ing is that I think at t he end of the day , Your Honor

is going to rule this way . And as such - -

THE COURT: Okay

. There ’s going to be an appea l? All those g oing to t e s t i f y , r a i s e y o u r i g h t h a n d a n d b e s w o r n

. ( W i t n e s s e s s w o r n

. ) C a l l y ou r f ir st wi tne ss: MR. McKI NNEY: Judge, I call the Rule. TH E CO UR T: I ’m

g oin g to h e ar this in abo ut te n- min ute inc re me nts
a n d t ak e ab o u t1 5

- m i n u t e b r e ak s e v e r y t e n m i n u t e s

. It ’ s b e e n a h ar d d a y.

I t does bea

r noting for the pur

pose of Appe llant’s arg ument th at p ri o r to statements of
c ou ns e l r e g ard ing pr e se rv ing the ri g ht to app e a l, the c ou rt ha d in dic a te d th a t un de r the c omp ro mis e a s a nn ou nc e d M oth e r w ou ld b e pr ima ry c us tod ia n. F oll ow ing that le ng thy dis c us sio n, the juv e nil e court c onducted a

trial on the merits, during which it hear d proof from both parties. The Petitioner testified on her own behalf

. I n addition to her own testimony , Petitioner also prese nted J oy Drury
a ndJenn y Rom ing e r, tw o o f the wo rk e rs a t th e c hil d’ s day c are in Willi a mso n Co un ty in h e r c a se in chief . Respondent pre sented his own testimony as well in his case in c hief. He also prese nted the-4-

testimonyof Allison Stucki, his daug hter fr om a pre vious marriag e, L ori S t u ck i, his wife, and Debor ah Cochra n, a m u t u al friend of the parties who introduced the m back in 1999. The Mother offe red as rebuttal proof the te stimonyof Ter ry Snow, a witness whose r elationship to the Plainti ff i s u n clea r, and Ma rg are t Hawkins, the c hild’s materna l gr andmother. A fter c onsidering all of the testimony , the juvenile court entere d its order on November 2, 2001, in which it determined tha t the Re sp on de nt F a the r w a s c omp arativ e ly mor e fi t t han th e Mothe r u nd e r the c ri te ri a se t f orth i n Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 36-6-106:

THI S CAUSE came to be heard on the 24t h day of October, 2001, upon the setting f or F inal Hea

ring of the Petition for Custody and To S et Child S upport filed by our Petitioner, Ruthie Curbow, the testimo n y o f wit nesses a nd production of exhibi ts, statements of counse l, and u p o n the entire rec ord in this cause, the Court fi nd s th a t in a c c or da nc e wi th the fa c tor s se t f orth i n T .C. A. § 3 6- 6- 10 6 a s f oll ow s: 1. The love, a ffe ction and emotional ties existi ng betwee n the pa re nts a ndc hil d a

re e qu a l be tw e e n th e pa

rt ie s; 2

. T h a tf

a t h e r i s b e t t e r ab l e t o p r o v i d e f

o r t h e c h i l d f

i n a n c i a l l y; 3. That the c ontinuity of pl ace ment of t he child has been equa l be tw e e n th e pa

re nts ; 4. Th a t f

a ther has r e marrie d a ndha s tw o o the r c hil dr e n in Wil liamson County , Tenne ssee. Mother ’s fa milylives
sever al hours fr om the Wil liamson County . There fore , the stabilityof the fa milyweig hs in favor of Father. 5. Th a t bo th p are nts app e ar e qu a lly fi t to me nta lly

an d p hy sic a lly
car e for the child. 6. T. C.A . § 36 -6 -1 06 (6 ) is no t app lic able to the c hil d d ue to h is ag e; 7. T. C.A . § 36 -6 -1 06 (7 ) i s n ot a pp lic able to the c hil d du e to h is ag e; 8. There i s n o ev idence that either pa rent ha s been a

busive towards the c hild; 9. Th e re is n o e vid e nc e that e ith e r p are nt a llo ws the c hil d to have c ontact with any

p er s o n s of immoral cha rac ter or improper be havior; and 10. That it is likelythat Mother broug ht this action for vindictive
or fi na nc ia l pu rp os e s. Th e re fo re , in lig ht o f the te sti mon y of wi tne sse s, e xhibi ts i ntr od uc e d in to evidenc e and in a ccord an ce with the above- ref ere nced f actor s, the Court finds that Father is the fit and pr oper pe rson to car e for the child. I t is he re by

OR DE RED , A DJUD GE D an d DEC REE D tha t the pa rt ie s sh a ll be aw arde d joint custodyand that Father shall be awa rded primary

phy sical custody of the m i n o r ch i l d. Mother shall be e ntitled to li bera l visit ation including e very Tu e sd a y a ndTh ur sd a y

nig ht a nde ve ry

oth e r w e e ke ndfr om Fri da y a t 6: 00 p. m. t o-5-

Sunday at 6:00 p.m. Mother shall be e n t i t l ed to four conse cutive we eks visitation d u r i n g t h e s u m m e r

w i t h t h e m i n o r

c h i l d

. S t a n d ar d h o l i d a y v i s i t a t i o n s h a l l ap p l y.
On Pe tit ion e r’ s mo tio n th is o rd e r w a s a me nd e d a s f oll ow s:

I t is, therefor e, ORDERED, AD J UDGED and DECREED that the w eekday visitation on Tuesday s and Thursda y s shall be from 6:00 p.m. unt i l 8:00 a.m. the f o l l o w i n g d a y. I t is fu rthe r O RD ERE D, AD JUDG ED a nd DE CRE ED that the Mo the r s ha ll g ive no tic e by

Ap ri l 1, 20 03 a nde a c h y e ar the re a ft e r o f w he n s he int e nd s to e xer c ise summer visitation. I t is fu rthe r OR DE RED , AD JUDG ED a nd DE CRE ED that the Mo the r s ha ll
ma int a in m a

jor m e dic a l in su ra nc e on be ha lf of the min or

c hil d. Th e pa

rt ie s sh a ll equally divide all medical e x penses not cove red by insurance

. I t is further ORDERED, A DJ UDGED and DECREED that the component of the Motion t o s p ec i fy

the time of the e x chang es for the major holiday s for the visitation shall be denied. I t is further ORDERED, A DJ UDGED and DECREED that notwithstanding the abo ve , th e Cou rt ’s pr e vio us Or de r r e ma in i n f ull fo rc e a nde ff

e c t.

F ro m th e fi nal o rd e r o f the c ou rt a wa rd ing pr ima

ry c us tod y to the F a the r, Mo the r a

pp e a ls. Mother ar g ues on appeal t hat t he court err ed in ref using to enter an A g ree d Orde r and tha t the court
err ed in finding the Father c ompara tively more fit.

I . A g re e me nt

The diff iculty with the position of Appellant is that there is no ag ree ment - - ther e wa s no ag ree ment at the time of the he aring - - a nd there never has bee n an agr ee m ent. The pa rties and counsel ha d an in-c amer a conf ere nce with the t rial court and appa rently rea ched w hat the trial c ourt thought wa s a settlement ag ree ment. When court opened, the trial court was in the proce ss of stating the te rm s o f the app are ntl y a g re e d s e ttl e me nt w he n Ap pel lant a nn ou nc e d h e r d isa g re e me nt w ith po rt ion s o f the se ttl e me nt b ut w a s c on te nt t o h a ve the tr ia l c ou rt e nte r a n a g re e d o rd e r i n c on fo rm ity wi th the po rt ion s o f the a lle g e d a g re e me nt w ith wh ic h s he a g re e d w hil e a lso pr e se rv ing he r ri g ht t o appea l as to the portions of the orde r wit h which she disag ree d. I f the trial c ourt wer e to sig n such an orde r, any

appellate court would ha ve to s et t h e order aside on the basis that there was no evidenc e in the re cord to support the tria l court finding . The trial judg e wa s n o t ab out to embark upon such an e x erc ise in futilityand very corr ectly said “c all y our first witness.”

A conse nt judgment i s en t i rely depende nt upon consent by all parties to all provisions there of. Th e g e ne ra l rule de fi nin g the po we r o f a c ou rt to e nte r a

c on se nt j ud g me nt i s se t f orth i n 4 9 C. J.S. Jud g me nts § 1 74 (b ), a s f oll ow s:-6- The powe r of the c ourt to rende r a judg ment by consent is depe ndent on the exist ence of the c onsen t o f the parties at the time the ag ree ment rec eives the sa nction of the c ourt or is re n dere d and pr omu lg a te d a s a

jud g me nt. I n making ref

ere nce to the g ener al rule in Burnaman v. He aton , 150 Tex. 333, 24 0 S. W.2 d 2 88 (1 95 1) , th e c ou rt e mph a size d th a t: A valid conse nt judgment c annot be r ender ed by a co urt when the
c on se nt of on e of the pa

rt ie s th e re to i s w a nti ng . It is no t su ff ic ie nt t o su pp ort th e jud g me nt tha t a pa rt y ’s c on se nt the re to m a y a t on e tim e have be en g iv en ; co n s ent m ust ex ist at the very moment the court
un de rt ake s to make the a g re e me nt the jud g me nt o f the c ou rt

. The re ason for

the rule is that a c ons en t j u d gment does not repr esent the
rea soned dec is i o n o f the court but is m ere ly the ag ree ment of the pa

rties, made a matter of r ecor d by

the court. Van Donselaar v. Van Donselaar , 249 I owa 504, 87 N.W.2d 311 (1958). And, until entere d by the court, the matter being the question of an a g ree ment betwee n the parties, either pa rty may re p u d i ate the ag ree ment beca use of an actua l or suppos ed defense to the agr eeme nt. This is not to say that the compromise ag ree ment may not be a binding contra ct, subject to being enfor ced a s other c o n tr a c ts , b u t o n ly th a t th e c o u r t may n o t e n te r ju d g me n t b a s e d on the compromise ag ree m en t , wh en it has notice tha t one of the pa rties is not longe r consenting to the ag ree ment for whatever rea son. Harbour v. Brown for Ulrich , 7 3 2 S

. W

. 2 d 5 9 8 , 5 9 9

- 6 0 0 ( T e n n

. 1 9 8 7) ; s ee a l s o Environmental Abateme nt v. Astrum, R.E. , 27 S.W .3d 530 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000).
Upon this Co u rt ’s re v i ew of the stateme nts of the Petitioner as re flec ted in the transc ript there can be no doubt that one of the e le me nts of

the c on tr a c t w a s la c kin g , i. e . mu tua lit y of a sse nt. Wit hout consent there can be no contra ct; without the contract t here can be no decr ee. By her ow n assertion through c ounsel, Plaintiff stated the orde r ente red by the court would not be “an ag ree d order .” As such the re is no er ror in the c ourt’s re fusing to ent er a consent decre e and pr ocee ding wi th a tr ia l on the me ri ts.

I I

. Compa

rativ e F itn e ss
The sec ond issue on appea l conce rns the court’s compar ative fitness de termination under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 36-6-106. Appellate courts affor d broad discr etion to the trial courts in their de termination of custody and visitation ar range ments. Se e Ga sk ill v . G as k ill , 936 S.W. 2d62 6 ( Te nn .Ct .A pp . 1 99 6); D. v . K. , 9 17 S.W. 2d68 2 ( Te nn .Ct .A pp . 1 99 5) ; Nichols v. Nic ho ls , 792 S.W .2d 713 (Tenn. 1990) . As has b ee n s ai d by this Court, “custody

and visitation determinations often hinge on subtle fac tors, including the pare nts’ demea nor and cre dibilit y

. . .” Ga sk ill , 936 S.W .2d, at 631. Appellate courts ar e thus understa ndably reluc tant to interfe re with the trial court’ s rea sonable e x erc ise of its broad discr eti on. Id. ; see also Bowman v. B owman , 836 S

. W

. 2 d 5 6 3 , 5 6 6 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 1 )( ci t i n g Town of Alamo v. Forc um-J

ames Co. , 205 Tenn. 478,-7-

48 3, 32 7 S. W.2 d 4 7, 49 (1 95 9) , f ind ing s o f the tr ia l c ou rt wh ic h a re de pe nd e nt u po n w itn e ss cre dibilit y

are entitled to gr eat we ight on a ppeal.) The trial c ourt was presented w ith severa l witnesses’ testim ony conce rning the l ove, affec tion and emotional ties betwee n both pare nts and the child; the dispositi on of ea ch par ent to provide life ne cessities for the child; the deg ree to which the Mother had be en the pr imary car e g iver up to the point of the custody hearing. The trial court he ard from the Mother conce rning Fa ther’s initial re luctance to e x erc ise visitation and eventual bonding with the child. L ikewise, the tria l court he ard of Mother’s ne ed to find day car e for the child in the
abs e nc e of

a ny oth e r f a mil y su pp ort. T he tr ial court

he ard te sti mon y

that su g g e ste d th a t th e c hil d would n ee d to be in day car e 10.5 hours a day should Mother be primary custodian and F ather

be
a wa rd e d s ta nd ardvis ita tio n o f e ve ry oth e r w e e ke nda nd on e nig ht p e r w e e k. Th e tr ia l c ou rt a lso hear d ample testimony

conc erning the bene ficial e ffe cts of the liber al visitation ex erc ised by the Fa ther u p to th e in it ia l h e ar in g a n d th r o u g h th e f in a l h e ar in g o f O c to b e r 2 4 , 2 0 0 1

. T h e tria l court he ardstate me nts fr om bot h partie s su g g e sti ng , a t th e ve ry le a st, pr ob le ms w ith vis itatio n w hil e Mother wa s the primary

custodian. F ather

testified that the child had a lrea dy been immunized, indeed ha d his own room and that the only fema les in the house we re the step-mother a nd the fathe r ’ s d a u g h te r s f

r o m a p r e v io u s ma

rr ia g e

. Re v ie w in g th e r e c o r d b e f o r e u s w e f

in d th a t the evidenc e pre sented to t he trial court a nd prese rved in the r ecor d does not preponde rate ag ainst the court’s f inding of fac t. See Te nn . R. App

. P. 1 3( d) . T he or de r o f the tr ia l c ou rt is a ff ir me d in a ll respe cts. The cause is r emande d to the court for further proce eding s. Costs on appe al ar e asse ssed ag ainst Appellant for

which execution may

issue.

____

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _________________ _ WI LL I AM B. CAIN, J UDGE