alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.2 CERTIFICATIONS I, Dean D. Durbin,
certify that: 1. I have reviewed this
annual report on Form 10-K of Vertis, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain
any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements,
and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows
of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures
(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant
and have: (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures,
or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared; (b) [Omitted in accordance with the guidance of SEC
Release No. 33-8238] (c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions
about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the
end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and (d) Disclosed in this report any change in the
registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the
registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter
in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected or is reasonably
likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial
reporting; 5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I
have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of
registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
function): (a) All significant deficiencies and material
weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants
ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants
internal control over financial reporting.  /s/ DEAN D. DURBINName: Dean D. DurbinTitle: President and Chief Financial Officer Date:
February 25, 2005
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### African Development Foundation

      ( print page 60610)    

# TIME:

9 a.m. to 1 p.m. 

# PLACE:

ADF Headquarters.

# DATE:

Friday, October 13, 2000.

# STATUS:

Open.

## Agenda

9:00 a.m.—Chairman's Report 

9:30 a.m.—President's Report 

10:30 a.m.—New Business 

11:00 a.m.—Executive Session (Closed) 

1:00 p.m.—Adjournment

If you have any questions or comments, please direct them to Dick Day, Coordinator, Office of Policy, Planning and Outreach, who can be reached at (202) 673-3916. 

Nathaniel Fields, 

President. 

[FR Doc. 00-26351 Filed 10-10-00; 1:17 pm] 

BILLING CODE 6116-01-U
<page>

EXHIBIT 32.1

                             CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO
                             -----------------------
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             -----------------------
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                             ----------------------
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                  ---------------------------------------------

      In connection with the Report of Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K/A for the period from April 1, 2007 to March 31, 2008,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), each of the
undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates indicated below, hereby
certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      1)    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2)    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
            of the Company at the dates and for the period indicated. This
            Certificate has not been, and shall not be deemed, "filed" with the
            Securities and Exchange Commission.


Dated: August 22, 2008                         /s/ Bruce Mogel
                                               ---------------------------------
                                               Bruce Mogel
                                               Chief Executive Officer
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular

cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes

needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal

profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined

that this opinion should not be published. 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-10311

Conference Calendar 

__________________

LEROY ADAMS, JR.,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

FRANKLIN, Captain, and

PATRON, Mr.,

 Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:94-CV-172

- - - - - - - - - -

August 24, 1995

Before KING, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Citing to Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974)

and TDCJ-ID rules, Leroy Adams, Jr., argues that the district

court's dismissal of his suit as frivolous was inappropriate

because the notice of the charge of attempted escape was not

adequate to allow him to prepare a defense. An in forma pauperis

plaintiff's claim that has no arguable basis in law or fact may

be dismissed as frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Eason v. Thaler,
No. 95-10311

-2-

14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994). Review is for abuse of discretion. 

Eason, 14 F.3d at 9.

In Wolff, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, "that written

notice of the charges must be given to the disciplinary-action

defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable him

to marshal the facts and prepare a defense." Wolff, 418 U.S. at

564.

Adams was informed that the charge was attempted escape and

that the charge arose from the incident on May 10, 1994, at 12:40

p.m. on the Panhandle Farm. Adams admitted that he knew what

offense he was being charged with at the disciplinary proceeding. 

The notice provided Adams all of the information that he needed

to prepare a defense. The dual purposes that the Supreme Court

intended the notice to accomplish were accomplished. The notice,

therefore, discharged the prison officials' obligation to inform

Adams of the charges. 

Adams raised the issue of the violation of TDCJ-ID rules in

the court below. When the state places substantive limitations

on official discretion, it creates a protected liberty interest,

the deprivation of which runs afoul of the Due Process Clause. 

Giovanni v. Lynn, 48 F.3d 908, 912 (5th Cir. 1995). However,

"where a liberty or property interest is infringed, the process

which is due under the United States Constitution is that

measured by the due process clause, not that called for by state

regulations." Id. Thus, we need not decide whether Adams had a

protected liberty interests in a more detailed notice of the

charges, because that doctrine does not give to Adams the right
No. 95-10311

-3-

to any procedure greater than that which Wolff requires. The

notice met the Wolff requirements. The dismissal is AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1
                                                                                

                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS



We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form
S-8 No. 333-60207) pertaining to the UDLP Amended and Restated Supplemental
Retirement and Savings Plan, the United Defense Stock Option Plan, and the
United Defense Industries, Inc. Employee Equity Purchase Plan of our report
dated January 29, 1999, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of
United Defense Industries, Inc. included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for
the year ended December 31, 1998.



                             /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

Washington D.C.
March 24, 1999
#### DAVENPORT v. STATE.

No. 21858.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 21, 1942.

No attorney for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Appellant was charged with knowingly passing a forged instrument, and it was also averred in the indictment that he had been previously convicted of two former felonies.

Upon conviction of the present offense and a finding by the jury of the former convictions the trial court fixed the punishment at life imprisonment *in the*penitentiary under the habitual criminal provision of Art. 63, P.C.

The record is brought to this court without statement of facts or bills of exception.

The judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.1



STATEMENT FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18

U.S.C. SECTION 1350



The undersigned, Dwayne Powell, is the President and Chief Executive Officer of Pocahontas Bancorp, Inc. (the Company).



This statement is being furnished in connection with the filing by the
Company of the Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended September 30, 2003 (the Report).



By execution of this statement, I certify that:



| | A) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | B) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the
periods covered by the Report.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



This statement is
authorized to be attached as an exhibit to the Report so that this statement will accompany the Report at such time as the Report is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18
U.S.C. Section 1350. It is not intended that this statement be deemed to be filed for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.



|December 22, 2003 |  | /s/ Dwayne Powell
|----------------- |  | -----------------
|Dated             |  | Dwayne Powell    



78
EX-10.13.B:



 






Exhibit 10.13(b)




FIRST AMENDMENT TO

CENDANT CORPORATION DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN




      



               Cendant Corporation (the “Corporation”) hereby adopts this First Amendment (the “Amendment”) to the
Cendant Corporation Deferred Compensation Plan (the “Plan”). Capitalized terms not defined in this
Amendment shall have the meaning set forth in the Plan. This Amendment is effective as of November
18, 2005. Except as amended hereunder, all other terms and conditions of the Plan shall remain in
full force and effect.



      


1. Section 4.1 of the Plan is hereby amended by adding the following new sentence at the
end of the second paragraph thereof, to read as follows:





Notwithstanding anything in the Plan to the contrary, pursuant to the
transition relief provided under Q&A 19(c) of IRS Notice 2005-1, an Eligible
Employee may make a new election to change the deferral period applicable to
previously deferred amounts, provided that such election is made on or before
before December 31, 2005.



      


2. Section 7.3 of the Plan is hereby by amended by adding the following new sentence at
the end thereof, to read as follows:





Notwithstanding anything in the Plan to the contrary (a) if elected by a
Participant with respect to amounts deferred prior to calendar year 2006, as
contemplated by Section 4.1, and (b) with respect to amounts deferred for
calendar year 2006 and thereafter, in each case, if and to the extent a
Participant has elected to commence to receive a distribution of all or a
portion of his or her Account in connection with a termination of employment
from Employer, then such Participant’s Account will commence to be distributed
to him or her seven months following the date on which the Participant’s
employment terminates with the Employer, except that if such Participant
continues employment with one of the entities resulting from the proposed
transaction pursuant to which Cendant Corporation will separate into four
independent publicly-traded companies (the separated entity with whom the
Participant continues employment being referred to as “Newco”), such
Participant’s Account will instead commence to be distributed to him or her
seven months following the date on which the Participant’s employment
terminates with Newco.



      



               IN WITNESS WHEREOF, and as evidence of the adoption of this First Amendment, the Corporation has
caused the same to be executed by its duly authorized officer this 9th day of December,
2005.



	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	ATTEST:

	 	 	 	 	 	CENDANT CORPORATION	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	By	 	/s/  Terry Conley	 	 
	 


	 	 	 	 	 	 

Terry Conley, Executive Vice President
#### BRUNSON v. STATE.

No. 24073.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 2, 1948.

C. O. McMillan, of Stephenville, for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

This is a conviction for driving an automobile while intoxicated; the punishment, a fine of $100 and ten days in jail.

The information alleged that appellant, while intoxicated, did “drive a motor vehicle, to-wit: 1938 Model Chevrolet Pickup, upon a public highway within said county, towit; East Washington Street in the City of Stephenville, Texas.”

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction in two particulars: (a) There is no testimony sustaining the allegation that the motor vehicle alleged to have been driven was a “1938 Model Chevrolet Pickup,” and (b) there is no testimony sustaining the allegation that the motor vehicle was driven upon “East Washington Street in the City of Stephen-ville, Texas.”

An examination of the statement of facts sustains appellant’s contention. There is testimony that appellant was driving a “pickup” on East Washington Street in Erath County. This is as far as the testimony goes towards establishing the descriptive averments as to the year, model, and name of the motor vehicle so driven. There is no testimony that East Washington Street, where the witness saw appellant driving the “pickup,” was in the City of Stephenville, Texas, as alleged.

There is perhaps no rule of law more firmly established in this State than that which requires the State to establish the descriptive averments contained in the State’s pleading.

Here, it would have been sufficient to have alleged merely that appellant, while intoxicated, drove and operated a motor vehicle upon a public highway in Erath County. This the State did not do but described, with unnecessary particularity, the motor vehicle, as also the place where same was alleged to have been driven, thereby assuming the burden of establishing, by proof, such descriptive aver-ments. Not having sustained these descriptive averments by the testimony, the evidence fails to sustain the conviction.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.
----

----

----

----

----

----

----

----

----

|   |   | Teltronics,      Inc.           |
|--------|--------|---------------------------------|
|   |   |                            |
|   |   |                            |
|   | By:    | /s/      Ewen R. Cameron        |
|   |   | Ewen      R. Cameron, President |
|   |   |                            |
|   |   |                            |
|   | By:    | /s/      Duncan Anderson        |
|   |   | Duncan      Anderson,Employee   |

----
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY,

Appellant, 

v.

ROYAL PALM BEACH REHAB CORPORATION a/a/o NICOLE HALEY,

Appellee.

No. 4D21-201

[June 30, 2021]

Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; John D. Fry, Judge; L.T. Case Nos. CONO17-008112 and 

CACE19-022901.

Michael A. Rosenberg, Peter D. Weinstein and Thomas L. Hunker of 

Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Plantation, for appellant.

Chad A. Barr and Dalton L. Gray of the Law Office of Chad A. Barr, 

P.A., Altamonte Springs, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Geico Indem. Co. v. Muransky Chiropractic, P.A., 46 Fla. L. 

Weekly D1513a, 2021 WL 2584107 (Fla. 4th DCA June 24, 2021).

CIKLIN, GERBER and CONNER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### PERKINS v. STATE.

No. 23419.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 23, 1946.

Nolen L. Sewell, of Decatur, for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

The offense is the unlawful transportation of whisky in a dry area. The punishment assessed is a fine of $100.

The State’s evidence shows that appellant was transporting six pints of whisky in Wise County, a dry area; that when the sheriff pursued him, he threw the whisky out of his automobile. Appellant testified that he had the whisky; that "he purchased it in a wet area and was transporting it to his home to give it to his father-in-law, who was suffering from low blood pressure; that his physician had advised his father-in-law to drink whisky. The father-in-law testified to substantially the same fact.

Appellant in due time filed a number of objections to the court’s charge and requested a number of special charges, which the court declined to give, and these complaints are brought forward by proper bills of exception.

His chief objections to the court’s charge were: First, because the court in his charge failed to instruct the jury that the defendant had a legal right to possess one quart of whisky; that the possession of more than one quart of whisky is merely prima facie evidence of his guilt which may be rebutted by evidence. Second, because the court in his charge informed the jury that the transportation of whisky in a dry area of itself precludes the possibility of its being transported legally and authorizes the jury to find him guilty whether his possession thereof was for a legal or illegal purpose.

Appellant in due time requested a special charge to the effect that the transportation of whisky from a wet area to a dry area *935for one’s personal use is not unlawful, and if the jury so found to acquit him. The court declined to give this charge or incorporate one of like import in his main charge. It is our opinion that under the evidence of himself and that of his father-in-law, he was entitled to such an instruction. If appellant had in fact purchased the whisky in question in a wet area and at the time of his arrest he was transporting it to his home for his own consumption or for use by his father-in-law, who was ill, he would not be guilty of unlawfully transporting whisky. Art. 666 — 23a, Vernon’s Ann.Tex.P.C., reads as follows: “(1) It is provided that any person who purchases alcoholic beverages for his own consumption may transport same from a place where the sale thereof is legal to a place where the possession thereof is legal.”

The question here involved was decided by this court in the following cases: Walton v. State, 144 Tex.Cr.R. 335, 163 S.W.2d 203; Hess v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 343, 168 S.W.2d 250.

Having reached the conclusion that the trial court erred in declining to submit appellant’s requested charge, the case should be reversed and the cause remanded, and it is so ordered.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of' Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
# AGENCY:

 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

# ACTION:

 Notice.

# SUMMARY:

 This notice amends the notice of a major disaster for the Commonwealth of Kentucky, (FEMA-1310-DR), dated January 10, 2000, and related determinations.

# EFFECTIVE DATE:

 January 24, 2000.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

 Madge Dale, Response and Recovery Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-3772.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

 The notice of a major disaster for the Commonwealth of Kentucky is hereby amended to include the following areas among those areas determined to have been adversely affected by the catastrophe declared a major disaster by the President in his declaration of January 10, 2000:

Hancock and Henderson Counties for Individual Assistance.

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 83.537, Community Disaster Loans; 83.538, Cora Brown Fund Program; 83.539, Crisis Counseling; 83.540, Disaster Legal Services Program; 83.541, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 83.542, Fire Suppression Assistance; 83.543, Individual and Family Grant (IFG) Program; 83.544, Public Assistance Grants; 83.545, Disaster Housing Program; 83.548, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program)

Lacy E. Suiter,

Executive Associate Director, Response and Recovery Directorate.

[FR Doc. 00-2668 Filed 2-4-00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6718-02-P