alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Energy

###### Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

          - [Docket No. MT01-1-000]

Take notice that on October 11, 2000, Transwestern Pipeline Company (Transwestern) tendered for filing to become part of Transwestern's FERC Gas Tariff, Second Revised Volume No. 1, the following tariff sheet to be effective October 11, 2000:

Fifteenth Revised Sheet No. 73

Transwestern states that the purpose of this filing is to remove Section 19.1 of Transwestern's General Terms and Conditions of its Tariff in accordance with Order No. 637 which required that shared personnel and shared facilities be posted on a pipeline's internet website.

Transwestern states that copies of the filing were served upon Transwestern's customers and interested State Commissions.

Any person desiring to be heard or to protest said filing should file a motion to intervene or a protest with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Sections 385.214 or 385.211 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations. All such motions or protests must be filed in accordance with Section 154.210 of the Commission's Regulations. Protests will be considered by the Commission in determining the appropriate action to be taken, but will not serve to make protestants parties to the proceedings. Any person wishing to become a party must file a motion to intervene. Copies of this filing are on file with the Commission and are available for public inspection in the Public Reference Room. This filing may be viewed on the web at http://www.ferc.us/​online/​rims.htm (call 202-208-2222 for assistance).

David P. Boergers,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 00-27088 Filed 10-20-00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
#### CHAMBLISS v. STATE.

No. 23633.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April *9,*1947.

Mays & Mays and Dave Miller, all of Fort Worth, for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

The offense is aggravated assault. The punishment assessed is confinement in the county jail for a period of six months.

It was charged in the complaint and information that appellant, an adult male person, did commit an assault upon Mrs. Dorothy White, a female person.

The facts proven on the trial as the same appear in the record are ample to sustain the conviction.

By Bill of Exception No. 1 he complains of the following remarks made by the Assistant District Attorney in his opening argument to the jury, to-wit: “Gentlemen, the reason the complaining witness is not asking for this man to be convicted is because she is afraid that if she does, he will kill her.” Appellant objected to the argument because the same was inflammatory, prejudicial, and not supported by any evidence, and was not a reasonable deduction from any evidence introduced, nor was it in response to any argument by defense counsel, and in addition thereto, requested that the jury be instructed not to consider the same for any purpose. The objection was overruled and the requested instruction was not given. The trial court, in approving the bill, certifies that the argument was made; that the same was inflammatory, prejudicial, not *1004supported by any evidence, and was not a reasonable deduction from any evidence introduced on the trial of the case. In view of the argument as set forth in the bill and the certificate by the trial court, this case will need to be reversed and remanded. If the trial court was of the opinion that the remark was not based on any evidence, was not a reasonable deduction from any evidence, and was prejudicial, he should have granted a new trial. See Clary v. State, 139 Tex.Cr.R. 333, 140 S.W.2d 456; Dykes v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 492, 121 S.W.2d 603; Rehm v. State, 128 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 78 S.W.2d 983, and cases there cited.

For the error herein pointed out, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.

HAWKINS, P. J., absent

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
#### Ex parte MARTELIANO.

No. 24989.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 1, 1950.

Oxford & Ramsour, By Royce A. Oxford, Edinburg, for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Appellant sued out a writ of habeas corpus in the 93rd District Court of Hidalgo-County alleging that he was arrested in-Tennessee and brought back to said county and incarcerated on a charge of murder.. From an order of the court refusing to reduce his bail from Three Thousand Dollars to One Thousand Dollars he has appealed.

The statement of facts in the record shows that appellant could make bond’ in the sum of One- Thousand Dollars, but. that the people who had agreed to sign that bond would not sign one for Three-Thousand Dollars. It is shown that he is-a stranger in the county and -has no other-person upon whom he may call for bond.. Neither the merits of the case nor the defense which he makes to the charge are-indicated by the record. We are aware-of no reason why we should not sustain^ the order of the trial court.

It is claimed in the pleading that-appellant has been confined in the jail fora period of approximately one year, during-which time he has continuously demánded a trial. There is no evidence to sustain-, this allegation. If appellant has been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial he should have relief, but the question is not before us in the state of the-record.

The judgment of the trial, court is affirmed.
##### 



Exhibit 23.1

The Board of Directors
Annuity and Life Re (Holdings), Ltd.

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement on
Form S-8 (File No. 333-76229) of Annuity and Life Re (Holdings), Ltd. of our
report dated February 11, 2002, except as to Notes 2 and 18, which are as of
February 28, 2003, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Annuity
and Life Re (Holdings), Ltd. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2001 and 2000,
and the related consolidated statements of operations, comprehensive (loss)
income, changes in stockholders equity and cash flows for each of the years in
the three-year period ended December 31, 2001 and the related schedule, which
report appears in the December 31, 2001 Form 10-K/A-1 of Annuity and Life Re
(Holdings), Ltd.

Our report contains an explanatory paragraph that states that the accompanying
consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule have been
prepared assuming that the Company will continue as a going concern. As
discussed in Note 18 to the consolidated financial statements, the Company has
suffered significant losses from operations and experienced liquidity demands
that raise substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern.
Managements plans with regard to these matters are also described in Note 18.
The consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule do not
include any adjustments that might result from the outcome of this uncertainty.

Our report also contains an explanatory paragraph that states that, as
discussed in Note 2 to the consolidated financial statements, the accompanying
consolidated balance sheets as of December 31, 2001 and 2000 and the related
consolidated statements of operations, comprehensive (loss) income, changes in
stockholders equity and cash flows for the years ended December 31, 2001 and
2000 have been restated.

Our report refers to a change in the method of accounting for derivative
financial instruments and hedging activities.



KPMG
Hamilton, Bermuda
March 20, 2003
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS FOR THE 9 MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FORM 10-QSB FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED
SEPTEMBER 30, 1997.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                         625,022
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                5,521,112
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  6,890,826
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            15,009,479
<PP&E>                                       3,325,304
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              18,858,716
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       11,683,128
<BONDS>                                      4,666,560
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                        100
<COMMON>                                         3,867
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,505,061
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                18,858,716
<SALES>                                     26,677,799
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            26,677,799
<CGS>                                       17,610,875
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                8,451,322
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               205,471
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             868,137
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (458,006)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (458,006)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (458,006)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.13)
        

</TABLE>
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

JOSE ANGEL ENRIQUEZ

,

Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

,

State

. §

§

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 1 5

- 00 32 5

- C R

Appeal from the

41 st District Court

of El Paso County , Texas

(TC# 20120D 05490 )

O R D E R

The Court has considered the agreed motion to consolidate, and concludes the motion

should be GRANTED. T he above styled and numbered cause shall be consolidated with cause

number ’ s 08

- 15

- 00322

- CR, 08

- 15

- 0032 3

- CR, and 08

- 15

- 0032 4

- CR , Styled Jose Angel Enr iquez

v. The State of Texas, for purposes briefing and oral argument only

IT IS SO ORDERED this 29 th day of June, 2016.

PER CURIAM

Before McClure , C.J., Rodriguez

, and Hughes, JJ.
[No. 35337.

Department Two.

September 8, 1960.]

#### Pacific Indemnity Company, *Respondent,*v. William Thompson *et al., Defendants,*Martha Margaret Harris, *Individually and as Administratrix, Appellant.**1*

*Edwin R. Johnson,*for appellant.

*Guttormsen, Scholfield, Willits & Ager (Jack P. Scholfield,*of counsel), for respondent.

1

Reported in 355 P. (2d) 12.

Foster, J.

— Respondent insurance company, by declaratory judgment procedure, sought adjudication of the extent of its liability under a family automobile liability policy in which defendant William Thompson is the named insured. The judgment declares that the insurance is limited to ten thousand dollars for injury or death of one person. Martha Harris, both in her own right and as administratrix of her husband’s estate, appeals. Her husband was killed in a collision with a car driven by the son of the insured William Thompson, which car was one of three covered by respondent’s insurance policy.

*716Because the policy limits on each of the three cars owned by the Thompsons is ten thousand dollars, appellant contends that the maximum coverage is, therefore, three times that sum. The argument, based on condition No. 4 of the policy (which provides that all of the policy’s terms shall apply separately to each described automobile), is that contributing coverage is thereby afforded. However, that provision merely assures the applicability of the policy to whichever car is involved in an accident, or to all the cars, and does no more.

The contract limits the company’s liability for bodily injury or death of one person arising out of one occurrence to a maximum of ten thousand dollars, with no contribution from one coverage to another. The language is:

> “The limit of bodily injury liability stated in the declarations as applicable to- ‘each person’ is the limit of the company’s liability for all damages, including damages for care and loss of services, arising out of bodily injury sustained by one' person as the result of any one occurrence; the limit of such liability stated in the declarations as applicable to ‘each occurrence’ is, subject to the above provision respecting each person, the total limit of the company’s liability for all such damages arising out of bodily injury sustained by two or more persons as the result of any one occurrence.”

The quoted provision is not qualified by any other policy provision.

Affirmed.2

Hill, Finley, Rosellini, and Hunter, JJ., concur.

2

The same decision was made on this identical question by the California district court of appeal, June 9, 1960, in *Sullivan v. Royal Exchange Assurance,*181 Cal. App. (2d) 644, 5 Cal. Rptr. 878.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED MAY 20, 2014

NO. 03-13-00521-CV

Wendi Mae Davidson, Appellant

v.

Judy Kay Davidson and Robert Lloyd Davidson, Appellees

APPEAL FROM 340TH DISTRICT COURT OF TOM GREEN COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE JONES, JUSTICES PEMBERTON AND ROSE

AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE PEMBERTON

This is an appeal from the order signed by the district court on August 9, 2013. Having reviewed 

the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in the 

district court’s order. Therefore, the Court affirms the district court’s order. Because appellant 

is indigent and unable to pay costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 204 (Friday, October 20, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 63091]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-26974]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management

[UT-912-01-1020-AE-24-1A]


Notice of Meeting of the Utah Resource Advisory Council

AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

ACTION: Notice of meeting of the Utah Resource Advisory Council.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Bureau of Land Management's Utah Statewide Resource 
Advisory Council (RAC) meeting will be held on November 8-9, 2000 in 
Bluff, Utah.
    On November 8, from 1-4:30, the RAC will meet at Desert Rose Hotel, 
701 West Main, Bluff, Utah. The Council will be given an overview of 
the Resource Advisory Council (RAC) in Utah, its past accomplishments 
and activities, some Utah specifics, and an overview of the BLM 
programs in general. A public comment period is scheduled on November 8 
from 4-4:30 where members of the public may address the Council.
    On November 9, from 8 a.m.-1 p.m., the RAC will be taking a field 
tour of Sand Island and the Butler Wash where they will be looking at 
cultural, recreation, wilderness, and visitation issues. The afternoon 
session (1-3:30 p.m.), at the Desert Rose Hotel, will include reports 
on Fire and Fire Rehabilitation and Off-Highway Vehicle issues, 
followed by an open discussion period. The meeting will conclude at 
3:30.
    All meetings of the BLM's Resource Advisory Council are open to the 
public; however, transportation, meals, and overnight accommodations 
are the responsibility of the participating public.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sherry Foot, Special Programs 
Coordinator, Utah State Office, Bureau of Land Management, 324 South 
State Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84111; phone (801) 539-4195.

    Dated: October 16, 2000.
Sally Wisely,
Utah BLM State Director.
[FR Doc. 00-26974 Filed 10-19-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-$$-M
# AGENCY:

Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

                        An open meeting of the Brooklyn District Citizen Advocacy                         Start Printed Page 6256                        Panel will be held in Brooklyn, New York.                    

# DATES:

The meeting will be held Friday, February 25, 2000.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Eileen Cain at 1-888-912-1227 or 718-488-3555.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Notice is hereby given pursuant to Section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. (1988) that an operational meeting of the Citizen Advocacy Panel will be held Friday, February 25, 2000, 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. at the Internal Revenue Service Brooklyn Building located at 625 Fulton Street, Brooklyn, NY 11201. For more information or to confirm attendance, notification of intent to attend the meeting must be made with Eileen Cain. Mrs. Cain can be reached at 1-888-912-1227 or 718-488-3555. The public is invited to make oral comments from 8:30 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. on Friday Feb. 25, 2000. Individual comments will be limited to 5 minutes. If you would like to have the CAP consider a written statement, please call 1-888-912-1227 or 718-488-3555, or write Eileen Cain, CAP Office, P.O. Box R, Brooklyn, NY, 11201. The Agenda will include the following: various IRS issues. Note: Last minute changes to the agenda are possible and could prevent effective advance notice.

Dated: January 29, 2000.

John J. Mannion,

Program Manager, Taxpayer Advocate Service.

[FR Doc. 00-2732 Filed 2-7-00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4830-01-P
* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________ No. 95-10311 Conference Calendar

__________________ LEROY ADAMS, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus FRANKLIN, Captain, and PATRON, Mr., Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:94-CV-172

- - - - - - - - - - August 24, 1995 Before KING, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Citing to Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974) and TDCJ-ID rules, Leroy Adams, Jr., argues that the district court's dismissal of his suit as frivolous was inappropriate because the notice of the charge of attempted escape was not adequate to allow him to prepare a defense. An in forma pauperis plaintiff's claim that has no arguable basis in law or fact may be dismissed as frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Eason v. Thaler ,No. 95-10311 -2-
14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994). Review is for abuse of discretion.
Eason , 14 F.3d at 9.
In Wolff , the Supreme Court held, inter alia , "that written notice of the charges must be given to the disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense." Wolff , 418 U.S. at 564. Adams was informed that the charge was attempted escape and that the charge arose from the incident on May 10, 1994, at 12:40 p.m. on the Panhandle Farm. Adams admitted that he knew what offense he was being charged with at the disciplinary proceeding. The notice provided Adams all of the information that he needed to prepare a defense. The dual purposes that the Supreme Court intended the notice to accomplish were accomplished. The notice, therefore, discharged the prison officials' obligation to inform Adams of the charges. Adams raised the issue of the violation of TDCJ-ID rules in the court below. When the state places substantive limitations on official discretion, it creates a protected liberty interest, the deprivation of which runs afoul of the Due Process Clause. Giovanni v. Lynn , 48 F.3d 908, 912 (5th Cir. 1995). However, "where a liberty or property interest is infringed, the process which is due under the United States Constitution is that measured by the due process clause, not that called for by state regulations." Id. Thus, we need not decide whether Adams had a protected liberty interests in a more detailed notice of the charges, because that doctrine does not give to Adams the rightNo. 95-10311 -3-
to any procedure greater than that which Wolff requires. The notice met the Wolff requirements. The dismissal is AFFIRMED.