SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2048-18

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JASHAWN SMITH,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Argued September 22, 2021 – Decided November 23, 2021

Before Judges Fuentes, Gooden Brown, and Gummer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 17-07-0389.

Morgan A. Birck, Deputy Public Defender, argued the 

cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, attorney; Molly O'Donnell Meng, Assistant 

Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

William P. Cooper-Daub, Deputy Attorney General,

argued the cause for respondent (Andrew J. Bruck, 

Acting Attorney General, attorney; William P. CooperDaub, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-2048-18

After the trial court denied defendant's motions to suppress his statement 

to police detectives and evidence seized in an investigatory stop, defendant 

Jashawn Smith pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree aggravated 

manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1), was sentenced to a fifteen-year term of 

imprisonment subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and 

ordered to pay restitution. Because the trial court did not err in denying the 

suppression motions or ordering restitution, we affirm. 

I.

We glean the following facts from the record of the suppression hearings. 

A.

On June 11, 2016, Trenton Police Detectives Crystal Everett and Jonathan 

Cincilla were patrolling in an unmarked white Crown Victoria sedan, wellknown in the community as a police vehicle. At approximately 3:45 p.m., they 

received a dispatch advising police units a shooting was in progress at 5 Prospect 

Village, a neighborhood on the west side of Trenton. From the dispatch, the 

detectives understood three suspects were fleeing the area of the shooting. 

Recorded transmissions did not confirm the detectives' recollection about a 

broadcast concerning three suspects fleeing from Prospect Village, but not all 
3

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transmissions are recorded. A CAD1report indicated one dispatch contained 

information that "three . . . young males [had] jumped into a four-door white car 

and fled up Prospect Street towards Oak . . . ." Neither detective recalled hearing 

that information. 

As members of the Street Crimes Unit, Everett and Cincilla were familiar 

with Trenton "hot spots," areas with high crime and recent shootings. They 

knew about an "ongoing feud between gang members of Prospect Village and 

gang members of North 25," which was a housing project located about a quarter 

mile from Prospect Village. After receiving the dispatch, Cincilla initially drove 

in the Prospect Village area, but, hearing other police units responding to 

Prospect Village, he drove towards North 25 to intercept any potential suspects 

returning to North 25 from the crime scene.

Approximately one minute after the radio dispatch, before the detectives 

reached North 25, Everett saw three men, who were later identified as defendant 

and his two co-defendants, on a sidewalk on Louise Lane running towards North 

25 in the opposite direction of the location of the shooting. According to 

1

 According to the Trenton Police Department's communications chief, the CAD 

or computer-aided dispatch system "aids the dispatcher and the call takers in 

logging in the assignments, the calls that come in, and also [in] maintaining the 

times for the officers when they respond to the assignments . . . ." Most of the 

calls and some of the dispatches are recorded.
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Everett, Louise Lane was "the quickest route between North 25 and Prospect 

Village." When Everett told Cincilla she had seen the three men, he turned the 

vehicle onto Louis Lane, driving slowly. 

When defendant and his co-defendants saw the detectives, "they all 

immediately and instantaneously began walking as if to act natural." The 

detectives noticed the three men "were all sweating" and "breathing heavily." 

Cincilla recognized co-defendant Wilson George as someone he previously had 

seen at North 25 during prior investigations. Defendant had a "hoodie" in his 

hand and George was "carrying a black hooded sweatshirt at his waist" even 

though it was a sunny, ninety-degree day. George was "manipulating [the] . . . 

sweatshirt in his hands while holding it very low and he was kind of shifting it

. . . left and right . . . as if he was attempting to discard something." Everett saw 

George drop "the sweatshirt right next to the parked car" and then walk away 

from the car without the sweatshirt. Cincilla also saw George "shaking" the 

sweatshirt against the car. 

The detectives stopped and exited their vehicle. Everett believed the three 

men were "potential suspects in the shooting" because of the known feud 

between the North 25 and Prospect Village gangs and her observations of them, 

including the direction in which they were running, that they stopped running 
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when they saw the detectives, their clothing, and George's apparent effort to 

drop something. Out of safety concerns and "to possibly detain them," Everett,

with her handgun drawn, ordered the three men to get on the ground. Codefendants complied immediately; defendant ran. Cincilla ran after him for 

thirty to forty-five seconds. During the chase, Cincilla saw defendant drop his 

sweatshirt, revealing he was holding a handgun. Cincilla told defendant to stop; 

defendant continued to run. Police officer Pedro Nieves pulled his patrol car 

alongside defendant and ordered him to stop running. 

Eventually, defendant stopped and dropped the handgun. Cincilla brought

defendant to the ground to distance him from the handgun and to gain control of 

him. While Cincilla and defendant were on the ground, they engaged in a brief 

struggle as defendant attempted to crawl away. Cincilla hit defendant "a couple 

of times to get him to stop" resisting and to prevent defendant from "get[ting] to 

the gun." Nieves took control of defendant, while Cincilla recovered the ninemillimeter, semi-automatic handgun defendant had dropped. Officer Nieves 

transported defendant to headquarters. 

B.

Mercer County Prosecutor's homicide task force detectives Ryan 

Woodhead and Patrick Holt interrogated defendant in the early morning hours 
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of the next day. Holt began the video-recorded interrogation by telling 

defendant, "[w]e're going to talk to you about a couple of things," but first they 

would "advise [him] appropriately what [his] charges [were]." Defendant was 

provided with a Mercer County Uniform Complaint Arrest Warrant Notification 

form. Holt confirmed defendant had a copy of his charges and told him, "I need 

to explain them to you verbatim and then have you sign off on this form." Holt 

advised defendant "a criminal complaint arrest warrant has been issued for you 

. . . for the following charges. . . . [C]harge one is unlawful possession of a 

weapon, handgun, obstruction of administrative [sic] law [2]. . . resisting arrest 

with eluding and . . . another resisting arrest charge." Holt asked defendant to 

sign the form if he understood "these four charges." Defendant signed the form. 

Holt said to defendant, "[o]bviously you've been charged with these four 

charges . . . I want to discuss this and some other things with you but before we 

can talk to you I've got to advise you of your Miranda rights." Holt read 

defendant his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); defendant 

acknowledged understanding his rights, stated his willingness to talk to the 

detectives, and signed the Miranda waiver form. According to Woodhead, 

2

 We infer the detective meant the obstruction of the administration of law, as 

defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a).
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defendant, who was eighteen-years old, appeared to understand his rights, 

answering in the affirmative and nodding his head; he seemed relaxed and alert,

and did not manifest any signs of being under the influence of any narcotics or 

other inebriating substances. In the course of the interrogation, Holt asked 

defendant if he knew "somebody was murdered tonight . . . a [fifteen] year old

. . . got killed in Prospect Village." When asked why that information was not 

provided to defendant earlier in the interrogation, Woodhead answered, "there 

was no secret that we were going to talk to him about a homicide that happened." 

Defendant ultimately admitted he and his co-defendants went to Prospect 

Village because they wanted "payback" for a friend who had been killed. 

Defendant stated he fired his gun three times at a crowd of people he believed 

were responsible for his friend's death. 

According to Woodhead, sometime after an interrogation of a suspect, the 

result of the interrogation is given to the assistant prosecutor assigned to the 

case. Based on the assistant prosecutor's recommendation, a determination is 

made about whether to issue additional charges. On December 6, 2016, 

defendant was charged with murder. 
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C.

A grand jury indicted defendant and his co-defendants jointly on firstdegree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(2) and 2C:2-6, and other second-degree 

weapons-related offenses and defendant individually for second-degree 

unlawful possession of handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), and fourth-degree

obstructing the administration of law or other government function, N.J.S.A. 

2C:29-1(a). 

Defendant moved to suppress "all evidence illegally obtained pursuant 

and subsequent to a warrantless seizure by Trenton Police officers on June 11, 

2016." Co-defendant Juprie E. Wadley similarly moved to suppress. Codefendant George joined in their motions. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, 

Judge Robert C. Billmeier denied the motions in a twenty-three-page written 

opinion. Finding the detectives credible, Judge Billmeier held their decision to 

stop defendant was based on "reasonable articulable suspicion," defendant's 

flight created "an individual basis for seizure of the handgun recovered from 

him," and the plain-view doctrine supported the seizure of the handgun.

Defendant moved to suppress his statement to Detectives Woodhead and 

Holt, arguing, among other things, he was "very visibly exhausted" and his 

waiver of rights was not fully informed because the detectives had not identified 
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themselves as members of a homicide unit and had not initially told him he was 

a suspect in a murder investigation. After viewing the video recording of the 

statement and hearing testimony from Woodhead, whom he found to be a 

"credible and truthful witness," Judge Billmeier denied the motion. He found 

defendant to be "an intelligent young man" who was "tired" but alert during the 

interrogation. Citing State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383 (2009), Judge Billmeier 

held the detectives properly had advised defendant of the four charges that had 

been filed against him at that time and were not required to inform defendant he 

was a murder suspect. The judge noted at the time of the interrogation "the 

police had to do a lot more investigation beyond what they found at the crime 

scene of Prospect Village," including witness interviews and obtaining videosurveillance tapes, before they could charge defendant with murder. The motion 

judge concluded defendant had made "an intelligent, voluntary waiver" of his 

Miranda rights "under the totality of the circumstances." 

On June 25, 2018, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant 

pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 

2C:11-4(a)(1). In the plea form he executed, defendant acknowledged he was 

aware he "must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has 
10 A-2048-18

suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or will be able in the future 

to pay restitution." 

Defendant and his co-defendants were sentenced pursuant to their 

respective plea agreements during a joint hearing they and their counsel attended 

on August 31, 2018. During the sentencing hearing, the State requested the 

court order defendant, jointly and severally with his co-defendants who also had 

entered into a plea agreement with the State, to pay restitution of $5,000 to the 

Victims of Crimes Compensation Office (VCCO) and $2,355 to the victim's 

mother for funeral expenses. Regarding the victim's mother's restitution, 

defense counsel asked for "documentation so [he had] something to demonstrate 

what exactly was spent and then [defendant] can concede to that." Judge 

Billmeier stated, "when I prepare the [Judgment of Conviction] . . . I'll impose 

the $5,000 [VCCO restitution] subject to the addition of $2,355" in restitution 

for the victim's mother and told defense counsel to "advise the [c]ourt whether 

[defendant] require[s] a hearing" after having had an opportunity to review the 

supporting documentation provided by the State. Defense counsel agreed to that 

procedure, responding, "exactly." 

The judge issued the initial Judgment of Conviction. On September 4, 

2018, the assistant prosecutor sent an email to court staff, defendant's counsel 
11 A-2048-18

and co-defendants' counsel, indicating the State had understood the judge would 

not issue judgments until after the parties resolved the restitution issue. The 

judge's assistant responded, "[i]f the defendants agree to the additional 

restitution the court will amend the [Judgments of Conviction] accordingly. If 

the defendants do not agree to the additional amounts, the [j]udge will conduct 

a restitution hearing." Six days later, the assistant prosecutor sent to the court, 

defendant's counsel, and co-defendants' counsel an email attaching receipts for 

the funeral and burial costs incurred by the victim's mother, totaling $2,415, and 

asking the judge to amend the judgments to include that amount in restitution to 

the victim's mother. The judge's assistant sent an email, asking "if the 

defendants agree to the additional restitution request." Defendant's and codefendants' counsel agreed to the restitution amount. Defendant's counsel 

expressly stated, "[o]n behalf of Jashawn Smith, I agree to that restitution 

amount." With all defense counsel stating their clients' agreement to the 

restitution amount and none of them requesting the restitution hearing the judge 

had offered, the judge did not conduct a restitution hearing and issued revised 

judgments including the agreed-on restitution.

In this appeal, defendant argues:

POINT I
12 A-2048-18

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 

POLICE LAWFULLY STOPPED DEFENDANT 

WHERE THERE WAS NO SUSPICION THAT HE 

WAS ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.

BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SEIZED WAS

TAINTED BY THE UNLAWFUL STOP, 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD 

HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

a. The Stop Was Unlawful Because the 

Officers Had No Reasonable Suspicion 

That Smith Was Engaged in Illegal 

Activity.

b. Smith’s Flight Did Not Provide an

Additional Justification for the Seizure of 

the Gun.

POINT II

DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF HIS MIRANDA

RIGHTS WAS NOT KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY 

BECAUSE HE WAS NOT TOLD THAT HE WAS 

BEING INTERROGATED AS THE SUSPECT IN A 

HOMICIDE.

POINT III

THE MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR A 

HEARING ON DEFENDANT’S ABILITY TO PAY 

THE RESTITUTION IMPOSED. 

II.

Our scope of review of a suppression decision is limited. State v. Ahmad, 

246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021). We uphold a trial court's factual findings made in 
13 A-2048-18

connection with a motion to suppress when "those findings are supported by 

sufficient credible evidence in the record." Ibid. (quoting State v. Elders, 192

N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). We defer to a trial court's factual findings because they 

are "informed by [the court's] first-hand assessment of the credibility of the 

witnesses . . . ." State v. Lentz, 463 N.J. Super. 54, 67 (App. Div. 2020). "[A] 

trial court's factual findings should not be overturned merely because an 

appellate court disagrees with the inferences drawn and the evidence accepted 

by the trial court," State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017), but only if the findings 

are "so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and 

correction," State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014) (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. 

at 244). We review de novo a trial court's legal conclusions. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 

at 609.

A.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution forbid law enforcement from 

conducting unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Terry, 232 N.J. 218, 

231 (2018). A warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable and 

invalid. State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 545 (2019); State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 

30, 38 (2018). For a court to find permissible a warrantless search or seizure, 
14 A-2048-18

the State must prove the search or seizure fell within one of the few recognized 

exceptions to the warrant requirement. Chisum, 236 N.J. at 545. An 

"investigatory stop of a person" is one of those exceptions. Ibid. 

A seizure occurs "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and 

restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). 

"Because an investigative detention is a temporary seizure that restricts a 

person's movement, it must be based on an officer's 'reasonable and 

particularized suspicion . . . that an individual has just engaged in, or was about 

to engage in, criminal activity.'" State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 272 (2017)

(quoting State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002)). An investigative stop is 

permissible "if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together 

with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity." State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004) (quoting State v. 

Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003)). It is not permissible if it is based on 

"arbitrary police practices, the officer's subjective good faith, or a mere hunch." 

State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 343 (2014). 

Reasonable suspicion is an objective, fact-sensitive inquiry. Pineiro, 181 

N.J. at 22; see also State v. Dunbar, 434 N.J. Super. 522, 526 (App. Div. 2014). 

A court must determine "whether at the moment of seizure, the officer had at his 
15 A-2048-18

[or her] command sufficient facts supporting a person of reasonable caution in 

the belief that seizure was appropriate." Dunbar, 434 N.J. Super. at 526. "[I]n 

evaluating whether an officer had a reasonable suspicion to conduct a brief 

investigatory stop," a court must consider "[t]he totality of the circumstances,"

including the "officer's experience and knowledge." Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 22. 

The plain-view exception is another recognized exception to the warrant 

requirement. State v. Williams, 461 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App. Div. 2019). The 

plain-view exception "authorizes a police officer to seize evidence or contraband 

that is in plain view." State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 90 (2016). Under the 

plain-view exception, the "officer must lawfully be in the area where he 

observed and seized the incriminating item or contraband, and it must be 

immediately apparent that the seized item is evidence of a crime." Id. at 101.

Defendant argues the police had "no reason" to believe he was "one of the 

shooters." We disagree. As Judge Billmeier found, based on the totality of 

circumstances, the detectives had enough information to form a "reasonable 

articulable suspicion" that defendant had been engaged in criminal activity 

justifying the investigative stop. Everett and Cincilla knew not only that 

Prospect Village and North 25 were high-crime areas but also that gangs from 

those neighborhoods were engaged in an on-going feud. Their decision to look 
16 A-2048-18

for suspects in North 25 was more than a hunch; it was based on their knowledge 

and experience.

Defendant asserts the detectives "did not have any description of the 

suspects at all." To the contrary, the detectives credibly testified they had heard 

three suspects were fleeing the scene of the shooting in Prospect Village; they 

saw defendant as one of three men running from the direction of Prospect 

Village toward North 25 on the quickest route between those neighborhoods.

The three men were sweating and "breathing heavily." Cincilla recognized codefendant George and knew from prior investigations he was from North 25.

Cincilla and Everett saw the three men "immediately and instantaneously" begin 

to walk "as if to act naturally" after seeing the detectives. They noticed 

defendant and co-defendant George carrying sweatshirts, which was suspicious 

under the circumstances on that ninety-degree, sunny day. They observed 

George shaking his sweatshirt behind a car as if he were attempting to discard

something and then leave the sweatshirt behind the car. That information 

collectively was sufficient to enable the detectives to form a reasonable and 

particularized suspicion of criminal activity.

And we know there was more. When Everett directed the three men to 

get on the ground, defendant ran. Unlike the defendant in State v. Tucker, 136 
17 A-2048-18

N.J. 158, 161 (1994), on which defendant relies, defendant wasn't just sitting on 

a curb when he started running. See also State v. Williams 192 N.J. 1, 11 (2007) 

(holding "a person has no constitutional right to flee from an investigatory stop, 

'even though a judge may later determine the stop was unsupported by 

reasonable and articulable suspicion'") (quoting State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 

458 (2006)). As he was chasing him, Cincilla saw defendant discard his 

sweatshirt, revealing he was holding in plain view a handgun, which he dropped 

when he ultimately stopped running. As Judge Billmeier found, the seizure of 

the handgun was also supported by defendant's flight and the plain-view 

exception.

Defendant urges us to make different credibility or factual determinations 

than the motion judge made. We see no basis to do so. Defendant also would 

have us focus on the facts, each of which he says lacks reason for suspicion,

individually. While we reject defendant's innocent portrayal of the individual 

facts, we recognize "[e]ven if all of the factors were susceptible of purely 

innocent explanations, a group of innocent circumstances in the aggregate can

support a finding of reasonable suspicion." Stovall, 170 N.J. at 368. Looking 

at the facts in the aggregate as we must, Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 22, the detectives' 

knowledge and observations supported a finding of reasonable suspicion of 
18 A-2048-18

criminal activity such that the investigatory stop and resulting seizure of 

evidence were lawful. We affirm Judge Billmeier's denial of defendant's motion 

to suppress evidence obtained during the investigatory stop.

B.

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and New Jersey's 

common, statutory, and evidentiary law provide a right against selfincrimination. State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 396 (2019); see also N.J.R.E 503;

N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 ("every natural person has a right to refuse to disclose in 

an action or to a police officer or other official any matter that will incriminate 

him or expose him to a penalty or a forfeiture of his estate"). In Miranda, 384 

U.S. at 467, the United States Supreme Court developed certain safeguards to 

ensure a person subject to police interrogation understands the right against selfincrimination and has a "meaningful opportunity" to exercise it. Nyhammer, 

197 N.J. at 400. Pursuant to those Miranda safeguards, an individual in custody

must be warned prior to any questioning he has the right to remain silent, 

anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, he has the right to 

the presence of an attorney, and if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be 

appointed for him prior to any questioning if he wants an attorney. Miranda, 

384 U.S. at 479.
19 A-2048-18

A person can waive those rights, ibid., but the waiver must be "knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances" and, under New 

Jersey law, the prosecutor must prove those characteristics beyond a reasonable 

doubt. State v Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000); see also State v. Tillery, 238 

N.J. 293, 315 (2019). To determine "whether the waiver of rights was the 

product of a free will or police coercion," a court considers "the totality of the 

circumstances." Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 402; see also State v. Puryear, 441 N.J. 

Super. 280, 292 (App. Div. 2015). Factors under that test include: "suspect's 

age, education and intelligence, advice concerning constitutional rights, length 

of detention, whether the questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature, and 

whether physical punishment and mental exhaustion were involved." State v. 

Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654 (1993); see also State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368, 383 

(2014).

A suspect is unable to provide a knowing and voluntary waiver of his 

rights if he is not provided the "indispensable" information that a criminal 

complaint or arrest warrant has been filed against him. State v. A.G.D., 178 N.J. 

56, 68 (2003); see also State v. Vincenty, 237 N.J. 122, 134 (2019). The 

Supreme Court in A.G.D., "impos[ed] the basic requirement [of] inform[ing] an 

interrogatee that a criminal complaint or arrest warrant has been filed or issued." 
20 A-2048-18

A.G.D., 178 N.J. at 68-69. In imposing that requirement, the Court did not 

intend to "unduly burden[] existing police practices." Id. at 69. In Nyhammer, 

the Court declined to impose a requirement that an interrogatee be informed of 

his status as a suspect. Distinguishing A.G.D., the Court described the "issuance 

of a criminal complaint and arrest warrant" as "an objectively verifiable and 

distinctive step" whereas "suspect status is not an objectively verifiable and 

discrete fact, but rather an elusive concept that will vary depending on subjective 

considerations of different police officers. A suspect to one police officer may 

be a person of interest to another officer." Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 404-05. 

Rejecting disclosure of suspect status as a bright-line test in determining 

whether a waiver of rights was knowing and voluntary, the Court in Nyhammer

re-affirmed the application of the totality-of-the-circumstances test. Id. at 405.

Like the defendant in Nyhammer, defendant asks us to impose a brightline test and suppress his confession based on the detectives' purported failure 

to disclose "what the investigation was about." Instead, following Nyhammer, 

we look at all of the circumstances surrounding his confession. Applying that 

test, we agree with Judge Billmeier that defendant confessed after he knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Detectives advised him 

of his rights and of every charge then made against him. He was not yet charged 
21 A-2048-18

with murder because, as Judge Billmeier noted, "the police had to do a lot more 

investigation beyond what they found at the crime scene of Prospect Village on 

the afternoon of June 11, 2016." Moreover, defendant confessed after Holt had 

asked him if he knew "somebody was murdered tonight . . . a [fifteen] year old 

. . . got killed in Prospect Village." As Woodhead testified, "there was no secret 

that we were going to talk to him about a homicide that happened." We affirm 

Judge Billmeier's denial of defendant's motion to suppress his statement.

C.

The purpose of restitution is to rehabilitate, not punish, the defendant and 

to compensate the victim. State v. DeAngelis, 329 N.J. Super. 178, 190 (App. 

Div. 2000); State in Interest of R.V., 280 N.J. Super. 118, 122 (App. Div. 1995). 

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b) requires a court to sentence a defendant to pay restitution 

"if: (1) [t]he victim, or in the case of a homicide, the nearest relative of the 

victim, suffered a loss; and (2) [t]he defendant is able to pay or, given a fair 

opportunity, will be able to pay restitution." In determining the amount of 

restitution, a court must "take into account the financial resources of the 

defendant and the nature of the burden that its payment will impose." N.J.S.A. 

2C:44-2(c)(1); see also State v. Williams, 467 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 2021).
22 A-2048-18

"When a sentencing court has not conducted a meaningful evaluation of a 

defendant's ability to pay, appellate courts routinely vacate restitution orders and 

remand for reconsideration." RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 234 

N.J. 459, 478 (2018). However, when there is "no dispute as to the amount 

ordered or defendant's ability to make restitution . . . [n]o restitution hearing is 

required . . . ." State v. Orji, 277 N.J. Super. 582, 589-90 (App. Div. 1994). 

Here, defendant did not dispute the amount ordered or his ability to make 

restitution. When at the sentencing hearing the State requested restitution of 

$5,000 to VCCO and $2,355 to the victim's mother, defense counsel asked for 

documentation regarding the mother's expense. The judge outlined the 

procedure they would follow: defendants would review the requested 

documentation and advise the court whether they needed a restitution hearing. 

Defense counsel on the record in defendant's presence agreed to that procedure. 

The judge's assistant confirmed in an email the judge would conduct a restitution 

hearing if defendants did not agree to the requested restitution amount. After 

defendant's counsel had an opportunity to review the State's documentation, 

instead of asking to have the restitution hearing offered by the judge, he advised 

the court in an email, "[o]n behalf of Jashawn Smith, I agree to that restitution 

amount." Having agreed to the procedure outlined by the court and to the 
23 A-2048-18

restitution requested by the State, defendant is bound by it. We see no error in 

the restitution award or the procedure followed by the court and the parties. 

Affirmed.