In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-2262

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

ROBERT HERBERT KRAMER,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 98 CR 140--Sarah Evans Barker, Chief Judge.

Argued November 12, 1999--Decided September 5, 2000

 Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE and ROVNER,

Circuit Judges.

 RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Robert Herbert Kramer was

found guilty of the willful failure to pay a past

due child support obligation in violation of the

Child Support Recovery Act ("CSRA"), 18 U.S.C.

sec. 228. On appeal, Mr. Kramer claims that he

did not receive service of process in the state

action seeking the child support order and that

his federal conviction based on his noncompliance

with that state order is therefore invalid. For

the reasons set forth in the following opinion,

we reverse Mr. Kramer’s conviction and remand to

the district court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

 Mr. Kramer, while a resident of Minnesota,

worked as an over-the-road truck driver for

Mayflower Van Lines, Inc. ("Mayflower"). In

January 1980, when he first started working for

Mayflower, he attended three weeks of training

sessions in Indianapolis, Indiana. While in

Indianapolis, he had a brief sexual relationship

with Janice Jacobs, a resident of Indiana. By

January 30, at the latest, Mr. Kramer left

Indiana to return to Minnesota. On November 25,

1980, Ms. Jacobs gave birth to a son, and she

claims that Mr. Kramer is the father. When the
child was born, Mr. Kramer received a call from

his dispatcher, telling him that he was a father.

 In late 1982, Jacobs informed Mr. Kramer that

she intended to file a paternity suit against

him. She then filed a paternity action in the

Marion County Circuit Court of Indiana. Mr.

Kramer never appeared at any of the proceedings;

Mr. Kramer submits that he never received either

formal service of process or informal

notification of the paternity proceedings. The

state court file does not show that process was

served, and neither party asserts that Mr. Kramer

received service of process. In December 1982,

the Indiana court established Mr. Kramer’s

paternity by default and directed him to pay $25

per week in child support.

 Mr. Kramer insists that he first learned of the

Indiana child support order in the fall of 1990.

At that time, Mayflower informed him that an

Indiana court had ordered it to withhold $50 from

each two-week paycheck. This was required,

Mayflower told Mr. Kramer, because of an

outstanding child support order. Due to the

attachment of his wages, Mr. Kramer hired an

attorney to contest the default judgment

establishing his paternity. Mr. Kramer failed to

appear at his hearing dates, and his attorney

eventually withdrew from representing him. After

his attorney’s withdrawal from representation,

Mr. Kramer did not pursue this collateral attack

on the default judgment. Then, in January 1992,

Mr. Kramer stopped working for Mayflower. He left

Mayflower because he had failed to renew his

trucker’s license and because he was suffering

from both asthma and self-diagnosed depression.

This depression, he claims, was caused in part by

his worries over the outstanding child support

order.

 Starting in June 1993, Mr. Kramer worked for

Lenneman Transport. While at Lenneman Transport,

none of his wages were attached due to the child

support order. However, he injured his back while

at work and left Lenneman Transport in February

1994. Since that time, Mr. Kramer has not worked

at all because he does not believe that he could

pass a physical examination due to his bad back,

his asthma, and his depression. 

 Mr. Kramer moved to the State of Washington in

September 1996. Then, in July 1998, he was

visited by an FBI agent about the outstanding

child support order. Mr. Kramer informed the

agent that, although he might be able to return

to work, he did not see any reason to do so until

the support order was cleared up because he would

"just be attacked all the time." Tr.I at 41. A
federal grand jury thereafter indicted Mr. Kramer

on October 15, 1998, for the willful failure to

pay, between October 1993 and December 1995, a

past due support obligation with respect to a

child residing in Indiana.

B.

 The United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana conducted a bench

trial on the criminal charge against Mr. Kramer.

At the close of the Government’s case, Mr. Kramer

moved for a judgment of acquittal, asserting that

the Government had failed to prove that the

underlying child support order was valid. He

claimed that the order was invalid because he did

not receive service of process and that the state

court therefore did not have personal

jurisdiction over him. The district court

reserved its decision until the completion of the

trial.

 At the end of the trial, the court found Mr.

Kramer guilty of the willful failure to pay a

past due support obligation in violation of 18

U.S.C. sec. 228. The court first stated that the

Government needed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt (1) that Mr. Kramer acted willfully, (2) in

failing to pay, (3) a past due support

obligation, (4) with respect to a child who

resided in another state. The court found that,

although "Kramer may not have learned of the

lawsuit or the entry of the default judgment in

1982, it is clear that he understood by at least

1990 that such an order had been entered against

him." R.20 at 7. Next, the court found that Mr.

Kramer had failed to pay the $25 per week

mandated by the court order during the period of

the indictment. The court also found that, during

the time stated in the indictment, the child

covered by the support order resided in Indiana

and Mr. Kramer resided in Minnesota. "Therefore,"

the court concluded, "the evidence establishes

beyond a reasonable doubt that Kramer knew prior

to October 1993 that an Indiana state court had

ordered him to pay child support for a child that

resided in a different state than him and that he

failed to do so." Id. at 8.

 The court next discussed the element of

willfulness and stated: "We harbor no hesitancy

in concluding that Kramer acted willfully in not

paying the support amount due." Id. The court

noted that Mr. Kramer had challenged the support

order when it served his interest to do so. But

then, when he left Mayflower and was no longer

subject to the attachment of his wages, he no

longer believed that he owed support. "Indeed,"

the court stated, "we do not credit Kramer’s

assertion that he simply forgot that an
outstanding support order existed, as other

testimony he provided revealed that the

outstanding matter caused him such discomfort as

to contribute to his ongoing ’depression.’" Id.

at 9.

 The court also addressed Mr. Kramer’s argument

that the underlying support order was invalid

because the state court lacked personal

jurisdiction over him. The court characterized

Mr. Kramer’s defense as a collateral attack on

the state court default judgment. First, the

court held that federal courts do not need to

question the validity of support orders issued by

state courts before entering a judgment of

conviction under sec. 228. The court relied upon

United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1232 (5th

Cir. 1997), for the proposition that the language

of sec. 228 does not require a federal court to

look beyond the four corners of the state child

support order or permit a collateral attack on

the state court order in federal court. Mr.

Kramer, the court explained, should have

challenged the state court default judgment

through state channels, of which he was aware, as

evidenced by his attempted collateral attack in

1991. His failure to complete that process,

continued the court, does not invalidate the

support obligation element of sec. 228.

 Next, the court held that Mr. Kramer had been

afforded sufficient due process in his federal

prosecution. According to the court, Mr. Kramer

had argued that, because he did not receive due

process in the state default judgment, he was

denied due process in the federal conviction

because it relied on the state default judgment.

According to the court, the Supreme Court in

United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828

(1987), required the availability of meaningful

review of a decision of an administrative

proceeding as a necessary condition before a

court imposed criminal sanctions based on that

administrative decision. The court stated,

however, that Mr. Kramer possessed an opportunity

to seek review of the state default judgment

before the imposition of his criminal sanction.

Moreover, the court explained, "[a]ny putative

due process violation occurring in 1982 was cured

by the Indiana state court’s granting Kramer a

hearing to challenge that default judgment in

late 1991." R.20 at 12.

 For these reasons, the court found Mr. Kramer

guilty of the willful failure to pay a past due

child support obligation for the period between

October 1993 and December 1995. The court

sentenced Mr. Kramer to one year of probation,

with 60 days community confinement as a condition

of his probation, and it ordered him to pay
$19,750.00 in restitution.

II

DISCUSSION

A.

 Mr. Kramer submits that he cannot be found

guilty under the CSRA because the Government did

not establish that the Indiana court that issued

the support order had personal jurisdiction over

him. He contends, as he did in the district

court, that he was never served process nor

notified of the state paternity proceeding which

produced the support obligation. Without such

notice and opportunity to be heard, he submits,

the Indiana court did not have personal

jurisdiction over him, see Mullane v. Central

Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950), and the

default judgment issued by the Indiana state

court does not constitute a valid "support

obligation" under the CSRA.

 The Government has another view. It submits that

it needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt only

the existence of the support order. Mr. Kramer’s

position, it contends, is an impermissible

collateral attack on the state court child

support order. Relying on our decision in United

States v. Black, 125 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 1997),

the Government argues that a federal court cannot

revise the domestic relationship decided by a

state court. Therefore, the Government submits,

Mr. Kramer’s conviction should be upheld.

B.

1.

 We begin, as we must, with the wording of the

statute. The CSRA punishes any person who

"willfully fails to pay a support obligation with

respect to a child who resides in another State,

if such obligation has remained unpaid for a

period longer than 1 year, or is greater than

$5,000." 18 U.S.C. sec. 228(a). The term "support

obligation" is defined as "any amount determined

under a court order or an order of an

administrative process pursuant to the law of a

State . . . to be due from a person for the

support and maintenance of a child or of a child

and the parent with whom the child is living." 18

U.S.C. sec. 228(f)(3). Nothing in this definition

suggests that a defendant may defend a

prosecution under this statute by contesting the

substantive merits of the underlying support

obligation. Indeed, courts interpreting the CSRA,

including this one, have spoken with one voice on

that issue. See United States v. Brand, 163 F.3d

1268, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v.

Black, 125 F.3d 454, 463 (7th Cir. 1997); United

States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1232 (5th Cir.
1997); United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476,

481 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Sage, 92

F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 1996).

 The question remains, however, whether a

defendant in a federal CSRA prosecution may

defend on the limited ground that the underlying

state support obligation was imposed by a court

that did not have personal jurisdiction over the

defendant. The general rule for default judgments

in civil actions is that the judgment may be

attacked collaterally on the narrow ground that

the judgment was void because the rendering court

lacked the requisite nexus with the defaulting

party or gave inadequate notice of the support

action to that party. See Burnham v. Superior Ct.

of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 609-11 (1990); Kulko v.

Superior Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978); see

also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444

U.S. 286, 291 (1980). To sustain the Government’s

position therefore, we must ascertain that

Congress, in enacting the CSRA, intended to

establish an approach different from the rule

that usually applies.

2.

 In an effort to demonstrate that Congress

intended to permit a successful CSRA prosecution

without a showing that the underlying support

judgment had been issued by a court properly

exercising personal jurisdiction over the

defendant, the Government invites our attention

to Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994),

and Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980).

We shall examine each of these cases in

chronological order.

 In Lewis, the defendant was charged with being

a felon in possession of a firearm in violation

of 18 U.S.C. sec. 1202(a)(1). See 445 U.S. at 57.

In defending against the charge, he attempted to

attack collaterally the prior state conviction

that was the basis for prosecuting him as a felon

in possession of a firearm. He claimed that this

state conviction was invalid because he had not

been represented by counsel, and, therefore, the

conviction had been obtained in violation of his

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See id. at

57-58. The Supreme Court rejected his argument.

The Court stated that the statute forbidding a

felon to possess a firearm did not permit a

collateral attack on the underlying conviction on

constitutional grounds. See id. at 65 (discussing

18 U.S.C. sec. 1202(a)(1)). The Court explained

that the plain language of the statute contained

no exceptions to the definition of "prior

conviction." Id. at 60. Moreover, continued the

Court, Congress would have made such an exception

explicit because, in other sections of the same

statute, it had explicitly made exceptions to
liability for those individuals who, despite a

felony conviction, could be entrusted with a

firearm under limited circumstances. See id. at

61-62 (listing sections). Other statutes, the

Court continued, explicitly permitted a defendant

to challenge, by way of defense, the validity or

constitutionality of the predicate felony. See

id. at 62 (listing statutes). The Court further

noted that the legislative history did not

indicate any intent by Congress to permit a felon

to contest the validity of the underlying

conviction. See id. at 62-63. Indeed, the Court

noted that the legislative history made clear

that Congress intended a "sweeping prophylaxis"

against the misuse of firearms. Id. at 63.

Additionally, other sections forbade the

reception of a firearm by someone indicted for a

felony even if he was subsequently acquitted. See

id. at 64. Finally, the Court noted that the

convicted felon is not without relief; he could

have had the underlying conviction removed by a

qualifying pardon or could have challenged the

prior conviction in the state court. See id. As

the Court concluded, "Congress clearly intended

that the defendant clear his status before

obtaining a firearm." Id.

 The later Supreme Court case of Custis involved

an interpretation of the Armed Career Criminal

Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 924(e), which provides for

the enhancement of a sentence of a convicted

firearms possessor who "has three previous

convictions . . . for a violent felony or a

serious drug offense." 511 U.S. at 487.

Interpreting the statute before it, the Supreme

Court held that there was no indication that

Congress had intended to permit the defendant to

challenge the predicate convictions on the ground

that they were procured through errors of

constitutional magnitude. See id. Notably, the

Court grounded its analysis on the text and the

structure of the particular statute before it,

the Armed Career Criminal Act. See id. at 490-91.

"The statute focuses on the fact of the

conviction and nothing suggests that the prior

final conviction may be subject to collateral

attack for potential constitutional errors before

it may be counted." Id. at 490-91. Moreover,

noted the Court, the statute affirmatively

provides that no conviction "which has been . . .

set aside" may be counted and therefore "creates

a clear negative implication that courts may

count a conviction that has not been set aside."

Id. at 491. The Court also noted that Congress

had enacted other statutes that expressly permit

repeat offenders to challenge convictions that

are used for enhancement purposes. See id. at

491-92.

 Although the Court in Custis held that a
defendant could not attack collaterally the

merits of the underlying conviction, the Court

also held that a defendant could attack

collaterally a state court conviction when the

defendant had been convicted in violation of his

right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The

Court deemed such a violation akin to a

"jurisdictional defect," see id. at 496, that

raised questions about the court’s power to

render a decision at all and stated that "this

Court [has] attributed a jurisdictional

significance to the failure to appoint counsel,"

id. at 494. 

"If the accused, however, is not represented by

counsel and has not competently and intelligently

waived his constitutional right, the Sixth

Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a

valid conviction and sentence depriving him of

his life or his liberty. . . . The judgment of

conviction pronounced by a court without

jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned

thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus."

Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468

(1938)). The Court concluded that the "failure to

appoint counsel for an indigent defendant was a

unique constitutional defect," and none of the

other constitutional defects "rises to the level

of a jurisdictional defect resulting from the

failure to appoint counsel at all." Id. at 496. 

 Although these cases are somewhat helpful guides

in deciding the case before us, their value is

not the one that the Government ascribes to them.

The analysis of the Supreme Court in Lewis and in

Custis does not suggest that it is proper in

every situation involving the use of an earlier

procured judgment to refuse to allow an inquiry

into the validity of that underlying judgment. To

the contrary--and here we believe is the true

value of Lewis and Custis to our present

decision--these cases make clear that, in

determining whether we should look into the

validity of the underlying judgment, we must

focus on the particular statutory scheme at issue

and decide whether Congress expected courts to

evaluate the validity of the underlying judgment.

In Lewis and in Custis, the Court also made clear

that we must focus on the language of the statute

and the intent of Congress. See Custis, 511 U.S.

at 490-92; Lewis, 445 U.S. at 60-61. In each

case, the Court reached the issues that it did

reach because of its interpretation of the

congressional will in the particular statutory

schemes. See Custis, 511 U.S. at 493; Lewis, 445

U.S. at 64-65. Repeatedly in Lewis and in Custis,

the Supreme Court contrasted the firearms

statutes at issue with other sections of the

criminal code that permitted the sort of
collateral attack that the Court found

impermissible under the statutes in those cases.

It is also of great significance that, even when

the Court in Custis determined that the statutory

scheme did not permit the scrutiny of the merits

of the underlying conviction, the Court did

permit the examination of the jurisdictional

basis of the underlying judgment. 

3.

 As we already have noted, we have no quarrel

with those courts that have held that Congress

did not intend that a defendant could raise the

correctness of the underlying support judgment as

a defense. Indeed, as we previously have pointed

out, this court is among those circuits that have

so held. See Black, 125 F.3d at 454. In this

case, however, our focus must be on whether

Congress intended to prevent the defendant from

raising as a defense to his CSRA prosecution that

the state court rendered the support judgment

without jurisdiction. To determine whether the

general rule that allows a defendant to contest a

default judgment on jurisdictional grounds has

been abrogated by Congress in a prosecution under

the CSRA, we must focus on that particular

statute and the circumstances surrounding its

passage. 

 The issue of the enforcement of support orders

has been a focal point of legislative activity at

both the national and state levels. Support

obligations are part of the law of domestic

relations and therefore are a significant

responsibility of state government. Nevertheless,

because so many of these obligations transcend

state borders, interstate cooperation is vital,

and, in recent years, the federal government has

found it necessary to play a larger role in

improving the overall national situation. As we

noted in Black, "Congress has expressly

recognized that collecting past due child support

obligations from out-of-state deadbeat parents

has outgrown state enforcement mechanisms." 125

F.3d at 458.

 In 1988, Congress created the U.S. Commission on

Interstate Child Support ("the Commission") and

charged the Commission to "submit a report to

Congress that contains recommendations for (A)

improving the interstate establishment and

enforcement of child support awards, and (B)

revising the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of

Support Act." Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L.

No. 100-485, sec. 126, 102 Stat. 2343, 2355

(1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. sec. 666).

 The Commission submitted its report to Congress

in 1992. In its report, the Commission discussed
the inefficiencies prevalent in the current

system for the enforcement of interstate child

support orders. See Supporting Our Children: A

Blueprint for Reform, U.S. Commission on

Interstate Child Support’s Report to Congress xii

(1992) [hereinafter Blueprint for Reform]. The

Commission noted that almost $5 billion went

uncollected in child support cases in 1989. See

id. Moreover, the report explained, three out of

every ten child support cases are interstate, yet

only $1 of every $10 is collected in interstate

cases. See id. Due to the poor rate of collection

on interstate child support cases, the Commission

sought to reform the old system of collection for

a more effective one. See id.

 While the Commission was conducting its study,

the prevailing statute governing interstate

collection of past due support obligations was

the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act

("URESA"), which contained both civil and

criminal provisions. This model act was enacted

throughout the United States, although in a

variety of forms. Blueprint for Reform, at 16.

The differences in URESA among the states

contributed to delay and inefficiency. See id.

Under URESA’s civil provisions, a person seeking

support for a child had two options for obtaining

jurisdiction over a defendant. First, the

plaintiff could transmit the appropriate legal

documents to the defendant’s state. The

defendant’s state would then take action to

establish or enforce the support order against

the defendant. Oftentimes, multiple orders would

be issued. See id. at 228-31. Or, the plaintiff’s

state could exert its long-arm jurisdiction over

the defendant. The reach of long-arm jurisdiction

varied by state, increasing the difficulties in

enforcing the support orders. Although URESA

addressed the need for jurisdiction over the

defendant and for service of process, the

Commission report explained that the requirements

for jurisdiction and notice varied by state and

that oftentimes the requirements of one state

would not be effective in a different state. See

id. at 92-93.

 URESA also contained criminal provisions to

facilitate the extradition of a defendant who had

been charged with criminal nonsupport. See id. at

17. The uniform act required the governor of a

defendant’s state to surrender the defendant,

unless the defendant was complying with an

existing support order, the defendant had

prevailed on a previous support action, or the

governor believed that civil remedies would be

effective. See id. This process under URESA,

however, remained a "tedious, cumbersome and slow

method of collection." H.R. Rep. No. 102-771,

1992 WL 187429 (1992).
 When the Commission wrote its report, it

discussed extensively the importance of obtaining

jurisdiction over the parties. See Blueprint for

Reform, at 79-85. It explained that a court or

agency can establish a child support obligation

only if it has authority over the person. See id.

at 79. It also discussed the obligation that

states give full faith and credit to the support

orders of sister states. It then recommended to

Congress that it "provide for the interstate

recognition and enforcement of child support

orders, including ongoing orders, that are based

on the valid exercises of jurisdiction up to

constitutionally permissible limits." Id. at 91

(emphasis added).

 The Commission also discussed a new uniform act

for the states to follow. Rather than merely

revising URESA, the Commission advocated the

implementation of the radically different Uniform

Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA"). See id.

at 231. The basic premise behind UIFSA is that

"there should be one support order between

parties that is controlling at any given point in

time." Id. at 232. Under this proposition, only

one state controls the support obligation, and

once that state obtains jurisdiction, it then has

continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the

parties. See id. According to the Commission, to

obtain jurisdiction over the parties, UIFSA

contains a new provision for long-arm

jurisdiction as well as retaining the two-state

process introduced in URESA. See id. The

Commission recommended that, "[s]ubject to the

risk of losing federal funding, states shall

adopt verbatim the [ ] drafting committee’s final

version of UIFSA." Id. at 236. By requiring the

adoption of UIFSA verbatim, the Commission hoped

to avoid the difficulties that had been attendant

to the myriad versions of the old uniform act

that the states had enacted. See id.

 Of particular importance to Mr. Kramer’s case,

the Commission also specifically discussed the

role of service of process in interstate child

support cases. The Commission noted that a

support action begins with service of process to

the defendant in order to perfect personal

jurisdiction and to notify the defendant of the

action. See id. at 92. It also explained that

each affected party is entitled to receive notice

and that a party who is not served properly with

notice later may challenge jurisdiction. See id.

Then, the Commission recommended that each state

observe other states’ service of process laws.

See id. at 94. Also, the Commission wrote that

"States shall have and use laws that provide

that: . . . Notice required for the exercise of

jurisdiction over an individual outside the forum
state must be given in a manner reasonably

calculated to give actual notice." Id. 

 The language of UIFSA itself also focuses on the

importance of jurisdiction in child support

cases. First, to establish a support order, the

act states: "Upon finding, after notice and

opportunity to be heard, that an obligor owes a

duty of support, the tribunal shall issue a

support order directed to the obligor . . . ."

UIFSA sec. 401(c). If a support order has been

issued already in another state, then the

receiving state "shall recognize and enforce, but

may not modify, a registered order if the issuing

tribunal had jurisdiction." Id. sec. 603(c)

(emphasis added). Also, the receiving tribunal

shall notify the defendant of the registration of

the support order issued by another state. See

id. sec. 605(a). Although a defendant may not

plead lack of parentage as a defense to a support

obligation once another tribunal has established

parentage, see id. sec. 315, the defendant may

contest the validity or enforcement of the

support order on the grounds that "the issuing

tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the

contesting party," id. sec. 607(a)(1).

 Congress acted on the recommendations of the

Commission with a variety of legislative efforts.

In the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support

Orders Act, Pub. L. No. 103-383, sec. 3(a), 108

Stat. 4063, 4064 (1994) (codified at 28 U.S.C.

sec. 1738B), Congress provided that each state

"shall enforce according to its terms a child

support order made consistently with this section

by a court of another State." Id. sec. 3(a)(1).

It further provided that 

 A child support order is made consistently with

this section if--

(1) a court that makes the order, pursuant to the

laws of the State in which the court is located--

(A) has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the

matter and enter such an order; and 

(B) has personal jurisdiction over the

contestants; and 

(2) reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard

is given to the contestants. 

Id. sec. 3(c), 108 Stat. at 4065. Furthermore,

Congress has mandated that each state enact UIFSA

or lose federal funding.

 The Commission report also emphasized the

importance of state criminal nonsupport statutes

and recommended that all states enact them. See
Blueprint for Reform, at 178. It stressed that

felony penalties should be "reserved for the

especially egregious cases of nonsupport" and

that "criminal enforcement is a last resort

enforcement device." Id. "Civil enforcement

techniques should be tried before prosecuting [a

defendant] for criminal nonsupport," the

Commission warned. Id. The Commission recommended

that there should be a federal criminal

nonsupport statute to coexist with the state

criminal nonsupport statutes. See id. The

Commission explained that, although a state

court’s criminal jurisdiction over an out-ofstate defendant is not clear cut, the federal

government’s jurisdiction is nationwide. See id.

Then, the report states, "[t]he Commission

encourages Congress to pass a statute that would

make it a federal crime to willfully fail to pay

support." Id. at 179. 

 The CSRA itself started through Congress before

the Commission released its final report. The Act

was developed, however, in consultation with the

Commission and was based on a preliminary

recommendation made by the Commission. See 138

Cong. Rec. H7324-01, H7325 (daily ed. Aug. 4,

1992) (statement of then-Rep. Schumer). The House

Report revealed that, in August 1992, 42 states

already had made willful failure to pay child

support a crime, although the ability to enforce

the criminal statutes diminished significantly

once the nonpaying parent crossed state lines.

See H.R. Rep. No. 102-771. Representative Hyde,

who spearheaded the movement for the CSRA, stated

that, although URESA was necessary, it was a poor

substitute for a state’s internal enforcement

mechanism. See 138 Cong. Rec. H7324-01, H7326

(statement of Rep. Hyde). He also stressed that

the CSRA’s goal was to strengthen, not supplant,

state enforcement efforts. See id.

 During the House debates, one of the sponsors of

the bill explained that:

 The bill would create a simple and

straightforward criminal statute that would

punish any person who willfully fails to pay a

past-due support obligation to a child who

resides in another State. 

 The bill also creates a grant program under

which the Bureau of Justice Assistance may make

grants to States and local entities to develop

and implement this legislation and coordinate

criminal interstate child support enforcement

efforts.

 . . . Many of our States have done their best,

and they have made willful failure to pay child

support a crime punishable in some States by up
to 10 years in prison. But the ability of those

States to enforce such laws outside their own

boundaries is hobbled by a labyrinth of

extradition laws and snarls of red tape. As a

result, skipping out on child support is one of

the easiest crimes to get away with in America

today.

Id. at H7325 (statement of then-Rep. Schumer).

Another representative, Representative Schiff,

stated that "existing reciprocal support statutes

between States are simply bogged down and unable

to perform with the efficiency we would like to

see." Id. at H7326 (statement of Rep. Schiff). No

mention is made of jurisdiction or the validity

of the underlying state support obligation in the

legislative history of the CSRA.

4.

 When we scrutinize the entire legal landscape

surrounding the CSRA, it is clear that this

criminal provision is only a small component in a

nation-wide effort to deal with the need to

enforce support orders. In addressing this

problem, it is clear that, as Congress

legislated, it was well aware of the longstanding rule, both in federal and state

jurisprudence, that a default judgment in a civil

case is void if there is no personal jurisdiction

over the defendant and that a judgment may be

attacked collaterally on that basis.

Additionally, in addressing the problem of nonpayment of support orders, the Commission

emphasized the importance of jurisdiction and

service of process in procuring support

obligations. Although the problem of enforcement

of child support orders has been the focus of

both national and state legislative efforts for

well over a decade, there is no indication that

the Commission or Congress ever intended to

abrogate the traditional rule that a default

judgment procured without personal jurisdiction

is a nullity. More precisely, the prevailing

uniform act at the time of the CSRA’s passage,

URESA, allowed the defendant to attack

collaterally the earlier state order on

jurisdictional grounds. The new order of mutually

supportive federal and state legislation

continued the same adherence to traditional

jurisdictional standards. Notably, the new

uniform act, UIFSA, also allowed a defendant to

attack collaterally the earlier state order on

the limited ground that it was procured without

jurisdiction. The related civil statutes that

Congress enacted in the wake of the Commission’s

report accept the general rule that a defendant

may attack collaterally the underlying support

order because it was procured without

jurisdiction over his person. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. sec. 1738B.

 Subjecting Mr. Kramer to criminal penalties for

non-compliance with the state support judgment

without allowing him to challenge the state

court’s personal jurisdiction would permit the

federal criminal law to accomplish what the

states forbid in their own civil and criminal

courts and, indeed, what Congress has forbidden

in the civil remedies it has created. In a

carefully coordinated statutory scheme that

places great emphasis on federal-state

cooperation, such a result makes no sense.

Because the CSRA itself, its legislative history,

the Commission’s report, the old and new uniform

acts, and the federal statutes stemming from the

Commission’s report contain no indication that

Congress intended to alter the traditional rule

that a defendant may challenge on collateral

attack a default judgment that is entered without

personal jurisdiction, Mr. Kramer should be able

to attack the Indiana child support order that

formed the basis for his federal conviction for

the willful failure to pay a past due support

obligation. The failure of the district court to

afford him the opportunity to do so constitutes

reversible error. 

C.

 There is another reason, firmly embedded in the

statutory language, for permitting Mr. Kramer to

argue that he ought not be criminally sanctioned

without an opportunity to demonstrate that that

judgment is a nullity because it was procured

without jurisdiction. It is important to note

that the statute proscribes only the willful

disobedience of a state support order. Indeed,

the legislative history of the statute makes

clear that Congress intended that, in this

statute, the term "willfully" be given the same

meaning that it is given in the criminal tax

statutes. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-771. Therefore,

Congress, in enacting this statute, was well

aware that, by using the term "willfully," the

Government would be required to prove "an

intentional violation of a known legal duty." Id.

Indeed, quoting the Supreme Court’s decision in

United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 361

(1973), the House Report noted that the word

"willfully" under the tax felony statute "imports

a bad purpose or evil motive." See H.R. Rep. No.

102-771.

 Under traditional principles, an individual can

ignore a default judgment procured without

jurisdiction and raise that lack of jurisdiction

when the judgment creditor attempts enforcement.

Mr. Kramer was denied the right to have his

jurisdictional contention ever considered by the
district court. Certainly, the maintenance of a

meritorious jurisdictional defense would negate

the element of willfulness./1

Conclusion

 The district court erroneously held that Mr.

Kramer’s contention that the underlying judgment

was procured without jurisdiction was not a

defense to the charge. Accordingly, the judgment

of the district court is reversed and the case is

remanded for proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED

/1 Because Mr. Kramer contends that he has a

meritorious defense on jurisdictional grounds

that was never considered by the district court,

it is premature, and indeed impossible on the

record before us, to determine whether his

position on the jurisdictional issue, even if

erroneous, might have been held in good faith and

therefore negated the element of willfulness

necessary for criminal liability.