NOT FOR PUB LIC ATION UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C U IT
AR NOLDO M OR

ALES-DEL ) No. 13-73012 VALLE, ) ) Age n c y

No. A205-403-590 Pe titione r, ) ) M EM OR

A NDUM * v. ) ) LOR ETTA E. LYNC H, Attorne y ) Ge ne ra l, ) ) R e sponde nt. ) )

On Pe tition for R e vie w of a n Orde r of the B oa rd of Im m igra tion Appe a ls Argue d a nd Subm itte d M arc h

15, 2016 Sa n Fra n c isc o , C a lifornia B e fore : FER

NANDEZ, GOULD, a

nd FR IEDLAND, C i rc u it Judge s. Arnoldo M o ra le s-De l Va lle , a c itiz e n of M e xic o, pe titions for re vie w of the B oa rd of Im m igra tion Appe a l s’ (B IA) de nia l of his a pplic a tion for a d

justm e nt of sta tus. W e de ny

the pe tition. M ora le s wa s c onvic te d of solic ita tion to posse s s m arijua

na for sa le in 

# FIL ED
APR 01 2016 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U

. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a

ppropria te for public a tion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3.Ariz ona . Se e Ariz . R e v. Stat. §§ 13-1002, 13-3405(A)(2). Proc e e dings we re the n

c om m e n c e d to re m ove him

a s a pe rson in this c ountry

ille ga lly , 1 and he sought
a djustm e nt of sta

tus a s the spouse of a

c itiz e n. 2 Tha

t wa s de nie d

be c a use M ora le s fa ile d to show by

a pre ponde ra nc e of the e v ide nc e 3 tha t he wa s not ina dm issible due to a c onvic tion tha

t gave the Attorne y Ge n e ra l “ re a son to be lie ve ” 4 tha t he “ is or ha s be e n . . . a

knowing a ide r, a

be ttor, a ssiste r, c onspira

tor, or c o llude r with othe rs in the illic it tra ffic king [of m arijua na ] . . . , or e nde a vore d

to do so.” 5 He
a sse rts tha

t his c onvic tion of the Ariz ona solic ita tion offe nse c ould not bring him within theina dm issa

bility provisions. W e disa gre e . In m a king its de c ision, theB IA wa s e n title d to re ly upon the e ntire re c ord of M ora l e s' c onvic tion, ra

t he r tha n on pa rtic ula r doc um e nts the re i n. B e c a use the B IA's de c ision did, in e ffe c t, re fe r to the re c ord a s a whole , we , too, a

re e ntitle d to
re ly upon the e n tire re c ord. Se e Ramire z-Villalpando v

. Holde r , 645 F.3d 1035, 1039–40 (9th C ir. 2010); s e e also Lope z-Molina , 368 F.3d a

t 1211. M ore ove r, the

1 Se e 8 U.S.C . § 1227(a )(1)(B ).
2 Se e id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), § 1255(a ).
3 Se e 8 C .F.R . § 1240.8(d).
4 8 U.S.C . § 1182(a )(2)(C ).
5 Id . § 1182(a )(2)(C )(i); se e also Lope z -Molina v . Ashc roft , 368 F.3d 1206, 1208–09 (9th C ir. 2004). 2unde rly ing offe nse
— posse ssion of m arijua

n a for sa l e 6

—

wa s a n illic it tra ffic king
c rim e . Se e Lope

z v . Gonzale

s , 549 U.S. 47, 53–54, 127 S. Ct. 625, 629–30, 166 L. Ed. 2d 462 (2006); Re ndon v . Muk a se y , 520 F.3d 967, 975–76 (9th C ir. 2008). To be guilty of solic ita

tion of the c om

m ission of tha

t c rim e , M ora le s ha d to (a ) inte nd to prom ote or fa c ilita

te 7 the c rim e of posse ssion of ove r four pounds of m arijua na for sa le , 8 and (b) c om

m and, e nc oura ge , re que st or solic it “ anothe r pe rson to e nga ge in spe c ific c onduc t whic h would c onstitute ” 9 that c rim e . 1 0 Of c ourse , his guilty ple a wa s proba

tive of the fa c t tha

t he did e nga g e in tha

t a c tivity
. Se e C

hav e z-Re y e s
v . Holde r , 741 F.3d 1, 3 (9th C i r. 2014). Tha t a c tivity wa s suffic ie n t to give a
re a s ona ble pe rson—

he re the Attorne y

Ge ne ra l—

re a son to be lie ve tha

t, within the
e xpa nsive re a c h

of the § 1182(a )(2)(C ), 1 1 M ora le s wa s suffic i e ntly involve d in

6 Ariz . R e v . Sta t. § 13-3405(A)(2).
7 Ariz . R e v . Sta t. § 13-1002(A).
8 Id. § 13-3405(A)(2), (B )(6); i d. § 13-1002(A), (B )(2). W e note tha t ove r four pounds is not a

sm a ll a m ount. Se e 8 U.S.C . § 1227(a )(2)(B )(i); M e dina v

. Ashc roft , 393 F.3d 1063, 1065–66 (9th C ir. 2005); c f. Monc rie

ffev . Holde r , __ U.S. __, __ & n.7, 133 S. C t. 1678, 1685–86 & n.7, 185 L. Ed. 2d 727 (2013).
9 Ariz . R e v . Sta t. § 13-1002(A).
1 0 Se e S tate v . Mille r , 316 P.3d 1219, 1229–30 (Ariz . 2013).
1 1 Se e , e .g., Rojas-Garc ia v . Ashc roft , 339 F.3d 814, 823 (9th C ir. 2003) (e nga g ing in ne gotia

tions to se ll a

la rge qua ntity of drugs ga

ve “ ‘ re a son to

(c ontinue d...) 3illic it drug tra ffic king to be ina dm issible
. 1 2

Tha t is, e v e n if the a c tivity wa s not suffic ie nt to c o nstitutea de porta ble offe nse , 1 3 it wa s quite suffic ie nt to re nde r him ina dm issible be c a

use a re a sona ble obse rve r would ha

ve re a son to be lie ve tha

t som e one who be have d in tha t m anne r 1 4
wa s involve d in illic it drug tra ffic king— a m uc h lowe r sta

nda rd. Aga in, while his
a c tions m ight not ha

v e re sulte d in a de porta

ble offe nse , the y

we re e nough to c a

use
one to be lie ve tha

t he wa s involve d in illic it drug tra ffic king a c t ivity
. 1 5 Pe tition DENIED.

1 1 (...c ontinue d ) be lie ve ’ ” tha

t tra ffic king wa s a foot); s e e also H amid v . IN

S , 538 F.2d 1389, 1391 (9th C ir. 1976) (a sking a

pe rson to bring a

la rge qua ntity of drugs into this c ountry gave “ ‘ re a son to be l ie ve ’ ” tha t tra ffic king wa s a foot); se e also C h av e z-Re y e s , 741 F.3d at 2 (c onvic tion se t

a side , but re a son to be lie ve re m a ine d); c f. U n ite d State

s v . Aguilar , 515 U.S. 593, 601–02, 115 S. C t. 2357, 2363, 132 L. Ed. 2d 520 (1995) (inte rpre ting “ e nde a vor” ).

1 2 The e vide nc e did not c om pe l a c ontra ry c onc lusion. Se e Gome z -Granillo v . Holde r , 654 F.3d 826, 831 (9th C ir. 2011); se e also IN S v . Elias-Zac arias , 502 U.S. 478, 481 & n.1, 112 S. C t. 812, 815 & n.1, 117 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1992); Alarc onSe rrano v . IN

S , 220 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th C ir. 2000).
1 3 Se e Le y v a-Lic e a v . IN

S , 187 F.3d 1147, 1149–50 (9th C ir. 1999); C oronado-Durazo v . IN

S , 123 F.3d 1322, 1324–26 (9th C ir. 1997).
1 4 Tha t be havior is fa

r m ore tha

n m e re pre se nc e on the sc e ne . C f . Altamirano v . Gonzale

s , 427 F.3d 586, 595 (9th C i r. 2004).
1 5 The Ariz ona Gra nd Jury tha t indic te d him

sure ly found proba

ble c a use to be lie ve tha

t he ha d, inde e d , e n g a ge d in tra ffic king. S e e Ariz . R e v. Stat. § 21-413. 4Morales

- Del Valle v. Lynch , 13
- 73012

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: I concur in the judgment because I believe that Hamid v. INS , 538 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) , requires us to affirm the BIA’s decision here

. I write separately to express doubt about whether Hamid was correctly decided. In Hamid , we reasoned that even if the petitioner’s conduct did not itself qualify as trafficking, it “provided a sound basis to believe that petitioner was a ‘trafficker’” Id. at 13 91. Ordinarily, however, evidence of the commission of one crime is not admissible to prove a separate later commission of the same offense, let alone a different offense. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Nor does evidence of the commission of a prior offense negate the axiomatic presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. See Taylor v. Kentucky , 436 U.S. 478, 4 83 (1978)
. Although “reason to believe” is a generous standard, it must be supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence
. ” Alar con - Serrano v. INS , 220 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). I question the fairness of holding that evidence that a petitioner committed
a non - trafficking offense qualifies as substantial evidence that a petitioner committed a trafficking offense. Even though s olicitation is not among the inchoate and accessorial crimes enumerated in the illicit drug trafficking statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(C)(i) , the BIA reasoned that Morales’s guilty plea to that crime was itself sufficient to give 

# FILED
APR 1 2016 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL Sthe Attorney Gener al reason to believe that Morales had committed a covered

offense. 1 T his decision was consistent with Hamid , but it leads me to believe Hamid should be revisited.

1 As I read the BIA’s decision, t he guilty plea to solicitation was the only evidence the BIA relied on in reaching its “reason to believe” determination, which distinguishes this case from the other cases cited in footnote 11 of the majority disposition. In both Rojas

- G arcia v. Ashcroft , 339 F.3d 814 , 823 (9th Cir. 2003), and Chavez

- Reyes v. Holder , 741 F.3d 1 , 2
- 3 (9th Cir. 2014), the agency relied on substantial evidence of conduct that itself constituted drug trafficking activity. Because the BIA neither referenced nor relied on the unproven indictment charging Morales with a trafficking offense, I would not consider in the first instance on appeal whether the indictment c ould constitute sufficient evidence. See Navas v. INS , 217 F.3d 646, 658 n.16 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]his court cannot affirm the BIA on a ground on which it did not rely.”).