1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 49095

In the Interest of: JANE DOE (2021
- 38), Juvenile Under Eighteen ( 18) Years of Age.

---------------------------------------------------- ------- STATE OF IDAHO,
Petitioner
- Respondent,

v. JANE DOE (2021
- 38), Respondent
- Appellant.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Boise, February 2023 Term Opinio n filed: A pril 19, 2023 Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Id aho, Elmore County, Br ent Ferguson, Magistrate Judge , and Gerald F. Schroeder, Senior District Judge.
The decision of the distric t co urt is affirmed

. Eric D. Fredericksen, S tate Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant. Andrea Reynolds argued.
Raúl R. Labrador , Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Mark Olson argued.

________________________________

BRO DY, Justice. Jane Doe appeals the distric t court’s decision upholding the magistrate court’s judgment that Doe committed t he offense of battery

— placing Doe within the purview of the Juvenile Corrections Act . Doe argues that the magi strate court erred b y using and applying the self

defense law reflected in Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction s 1517 and 1518 , instead of Idaho Code

s ection 19

- 202A, Idaho’s “ stand your ground ” statute

. Doe contends that the statute ’ s legal standards d iffer from Instructions 1517 and 1518, and that the statutory standards should have been applied to her self

- defense claim . For the reasons set forth belo w, we disagree. The “stand2 your ground” statute codifies a spects of Idaho self

- defense law that have exist ed for over 100 years at common law , without abrogating those aspects it left uncodified. Thus, the district court did not err in upholding the magi st rate court’s use and application of the pattern instructio ns , which presumptively reflect the elements of self

- defense at common l aw . We affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In October 2020, Doe was walking to school with her girlfriend (“Girlfrien d”) when a confrontation ensued between D oe and Doe’s ex

- girlfriend (“Ex

- Girlfriend”). Do e testified that Ex

- Girlfriend first appr oached Doe aggressively and got “in h er face” but did not make physical
contact

. The magi strate court, sit t ing as the f actfind er at the later evidentiary hearin g , found that after this event , Doe then pushed Ex

- Girlfriend, punched her, pushed her again, an d then punched her again. Doe , Girlfriend, and Ex

- Girlfriend “had a troubled history prior to this incident.” Doe and Ex

- Girl friend had a history of violence d uring their prior dating relationship. In additi on, Ex

Girlfriend’s brother had been (prior to t he underlying incident) charge d with a sexual assault of Girlfriend. Ex

- Girlfriend later testified that she had “hard feelings ” against Girlfriend because of th e sexual assault allegations brought against her brother , and because Girlfriend was in a relati onship with Doe. Ex

- Girlfriend admitte d that , during a phone call between her and Doe the day before the underlying incident, Ex

- Girlfriend referred to Girlfriend usin g derogatory language

. A few weeks after the October 2020 incident, the State filed a pet ition under the Juvenile Corrections A ct, alleging Doe fell within the purview of the Act for committing a misdemeanor battery ( in violation of I.C. § 18

- 903) against Ex

- Girlfriend. Doe denied the allegation and , two

m onths later, t he magi strate court held an evidentiary hearing under the Act pursuant to the Idah o Juvenile Rules. During the hearing, Ex

- Girlfriend and Doe testifie d, and Doe claimed her use of force against Ex

- Girlfriend was in self

- defense. After closing arg uments, the magi strate court made findings, and orally ruled that the State had proven its cas e of battery and had disproven two elements of Doe’s self

- defense claim

— all beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, Doe fe ll within the purview of the Act and the magi strate court set th e matter for sent encing. In ruling on Doe’s self

- defense claim, the magi strate court referred to Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions 1517 and 1518 , the pattern jury instructions on sel f

- defense and reasonable force

. Nothing in the record shows that Doe, or the State, filed a motion for a pre
- evidentiary3 hearing to argue for, or propose , a ny particular version of Idaho’s self

- defense law fo r the magi strate court’s use and application at the evidentiary hearing. Furt hermore, at the evidentiary hearing, Doe did not contemporaneou sly, or subsequently, object to the magi strate c ourt’s reference to and ap plication of Instructions 1517 and 1518 to Doe ’ s sel f

- defense claim. Doe timely appealed to the district cou rt and argued that the magi strate court erred because the self

- defense law reflected in Instructions 1517 and 1518 was “upended” when the l egislature, two years prior to Doe ’s evidentiary hearing , pas sed a “stand your ground” statute : Idaho Code section 19

- 202A. In othe r words, Doe argued the statute rendered Instruct ion s 1517

a nd 1518 “obsolete [

. ] ” In response, the State argued, among other things, that Doe failed to p reserve her ar gument for appeal , and that there was no error by the magi strate court because the statute does not differ from common law self

- defense. Sit tin g in i ts appellate capacity, the district court upheld the magi strate court’s decision, and affirmed th e judgment

. T h e district cour t first determined that Doe did not preserve her assignment of error . From this, the district court conclude d that fundamental err or review applied , but reversal was not warranted because ther e was no “erro r” at all

. E ven if an error occurred, the court c o ncluded any error in using and applying Instructions 1517 and 1518 inst ead of the statute did not cons titute fundamental error
. Do e timely a ppealed to this Court. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“ When t his Court revi ews the decision of a district court sitting in it s appellate capacity

over a [magistrate ] court, we examine the [magistrate ] court record t o determine whether substantial and comp etent evidence sup ports the [ magi strate ] court ’ s findings of fact and whet her its conclu sions of law follow from those finding s.” Int. of Doe , 168 Idaho 389, 390, 483 P.3d 932, 933 (2020) (alterations added)

. As to findings, “ [i] f the district c ourt affirm ed the magistrate court’s decision, and the magi strate court’s findings are supported by substantia l and competen t evidence, t his Court affirms the district court as a matter of procedure.” Matter of Est. of Hirning , 167 Idaho 669, 675, 475 P.3d 1191, 1197 (2020)

. The interpretation of statutes and other questions of law are reviewed de novo. Stat e v. Burke , 166 Idaho 621, 623, 4 62 P.3d 599, 601 (2020)

. III. ANALYSIS Doe ’s central argument on appeal i s that the magi strate court erred when it used Idaho Crimin al Jury Instructio ns 1517 (self

- defense) and 1518 (reasonable force) t o analyze her claim4 of self

- defense

— instead of the “ stan d your ground” self

- defense statute, Idaho Code section 19

- 202A. Doe also c ontends that on intermediate appeal, the district court erred in applying th e preservation doctrine , and in re quiring her to pr ove this error was “fundamental” when she was not requ ired to raise it before, during, or after the magi strate court’s ruling. In r esponse, the State contends that the magi strate court did not err , but if it di d , the issue was not preser ved below; thus, relief cannot issue be cause Doe’s unobjected

- to error is not fundamental. We agree with Doe that she was not required to object below and that the district court erred by requiring her to prove the assigned erro r was fundamental. Neverthe less , Doe is not entitled to relief bec ause t he magi strate court did not er r
. We conclude that Instructions 1517 and 151 8 are consistent with t he “stand your ground” statute

. Idaho Code section 19

- 202A s imply codifie d aspects of Idaho’s self

- defense law th at have existed f or over 100 year s. B y the statute’ s plain language , it d oes not abrogate or supplan t the common law of self

- defense in Idaho. Thus, the decision of the district court upholding the magi s trate court’s judgment is affirmed. A. The preservation d octrine does not apply
. In most contexts , t he pr eservation doctrine prov i des a “ central rule ” of appellate re view :

“ To properly preserve an issue for appellate r eview, ‘ both the issue and the party ’ s po sition on the issue must be r aised before the trial court [ , ] ’ ” and “ so long as this requirement is met, the specific legal au th orities used to support the position may evolve

. ” State v. Ho skin s , 165 Idaho 217, 221

– 22, 443 P.3d 231, 235

– 36 (2019) (c itation omitted)

. However , w hen a defendant assigns legal error to a trial court’s conclusions of law after an evidentiary hearing un der the Juvenile Corrections Act (I daho Code sections 20

- 501 to

- 549) , the issue may be consid ered on appeal ev en though the defen dant did not raise it be low. In this context, and for the reasons discussed below, the preservation doctrine simply does not a pply. E videntiary hearings under the Act are the procedural analog of a criminal bench trial. See I.J.R. 15(g) (“All issues shall be tried solely before the court.”). When a defendant assigns

error to how the trial court in fact applied the law at the con clusion o f a bench trial, a defe ndant may raise that issue for the first ti me on appeal. See, e.g. , State v. C lark , 168 Idaho 503, 507, 484 P.3d 187 , 191 (2021) (reviewing de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of the term “fresh pursu it” in Idah o C ode section 19

- 705 afte r a criminal bench trial). Unlike a crimina l jury trial , an “instruction” conference on the p roposed or applicable law

— before an evidentiary hearing under the Act

— is not required. See I.J.R. 21 ( exclu d ing Idaho Criminal Rule 30 fr om t he5 procedures under the Idaho Juvenile Rules). T he magi strate court does not need to “instruct” i tself on the law

— t rial judges are presumed to know the law , and to apply it in making their decisions

. State v. Leavitt , 121 Idaho 4, 6, 822 P.2 d 523, 525 (199 1)

. In the context of criminal ju ry trials , the parties are typically required to “file written requests that the c ourt instruct the jury on the law as set forth in th e request ” before the trial

commences
. I.C.R . 30(b)(1). Thereafte r, the tr ial court “must inform counsel of it s proposed actions on the requested instructions and allow a reasonable time within which to e xamine and make objections outside the presence of the jury to the instruction s or the failure to give requested instru ctions. ” I.C.R. 30(b)(3) (emp hasis added). In this context, the parties

— who have prior notice of what law will be used and applied

— are re quired to object , with the grounds of the ir objection, before the jury retires to consider its ver dict. I.C.R. 30(b)(4)

. On a ppellate review from a criminal jury t rial, if a defendant properly objected to the law the jury was ultimately instructed on

— ther eby preserving any assignment of error

— this Court applies harmless error revie w
. State v. Adamcik , 152 Idaho 445, 47 2 , 272 P.3 d 417, 44 4 (201 2 ). One purpose of this preservation requirement is to “prevent[] the litigant from sandbagging the court, i.e., re maining silent about his objection and belatedly raising the error only if the case does not concl ude in his favor.” St ate v. Perry , 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (alter ation added) ( citation omitted). I f a defendant does not object, this Co urt will still review the jury instruction s

— but for “ fundamental er ror.” Id

. Notably, a common predicate to bot h har mless and fundamenta l error review is “whether the jury instructio n was erroneous at all.” State v. Medina , 165 Idaho 501, 507, 447 P.3d 94 9, 955 (2019). T o answer this question, we review jury instructions de novo

— not for a perfect recitation of law

— but t o “determ ine ‘whethe r, when considered as a whole, they fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law.’ ” Id

. (quot ing State v. Dunlap , 155 Idaho 345, 364, 313 P.3d 1, 20 (2013)). “W hether the instruction was erroneous will dep end

u pon how a reasonable juror would have interpreted the instruction. ” Medina , 165 Idaho at 507, 447 P.3d at 955 ( citation omitted). In sum , i n the context of a jury trial, at a minimum the parties should have prior notice of what law will be used and a ppli ed to the f acts found, even though the jury’s deliberations in applying the la w often remain “secret and not subject to outside examination[, ]” Yeager v. United States , 557 U.S. 110, 122 (2009) (alterat ion added).6 Conversely, in the context of an evide ntiary he aring und er the Juvenile Corrections Act

— essentially a bench trial

— there are no jury instructions ; thus , the parties do not necessarily have a preview of all aspects of the law the magi strate court intends to apply

. A party cou ld move for

a “ p retrial conference” pursuant to I daho J uvenile Rule 12 to “consider” what law the magi strate court should apply, or file a similar motion under I daho Juvenile Rule 21 (incorporating I.C.R. 12 and 47 for pre
- tria l motions)

. Yet, even if a party did move for such a conference , it still

ca nnot know with certainty what law will in fact be used and applied by the magi strate court until it has ruled. Moreove r, nothing r equires a defendant to move for r econsideration before the defendant can appeal to district court. See I.J.R. 24 ; I.C . § 20

- 528 ; I.J.R. 21 (incorporating , in part, the rules for appeals from mag istrate to district court under I.C.R. 54). With this re cognition of the basi c difference between a jury trial and a b ench tr i al , the preservation doctrine doe s not apply to D oe ’s appeal whe re she has alleged the magi strate court , during the procedural equ ivalent of a bench trial, used and applied the wr ong law. Thus, Do e’s appeal has no preservation problem, and the district court erred by imposing one. For these reasons, we d o not view Doe’s appeal through the lens of f undamental error review. Rather, we simply review the conclusions of law she challeng es de novo. See S tate v. Doe , 140 Idaho 271, 273, 92 P.3d 521, 523 (2004). B. The magi strate court did not err in u sing and apply ing Idaho’s self
- defense law as reflected in Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions 151 7 and 1518. The pattern j ury instructions are pre sumed to be an accurate statement of Idaho law. State

v. Bodenbach , 165 Idaho 577, 586, 448 P.3d 1005, 1 01 4 (2019)

. When a jur y is charged with the pattern instructions , which are often tailored as needed to the fac ts and charges of each case , we consider whether the ultimat e instructions “as a whole, fairly and adequately present t he issues and state the applicable law [.]” Id . ( alteration added) ( citation omitted). Thus, in a jury trial,

“ [w] hether the instruction was erroneous wi ll depend upon how a reaso nable juror would have interpreted the instruction.” Id . (quoting State v. Sk unkcap , 157 Idaho 221, 227

– 28, 335 P.3d 561, 567

– 68 (2014)). However, beca use we are reviewing the procedural equivalent of a bench trial, i t is not enou gh that the magi strate cou rt’s conclusions of law ( albeit through the pattern instructions)

— be a “fair an d adequate” representation of the applicable la w. Instead, we review the magi strate court’s use and application of the law freely, without the deference gi ven to a jury’s delibe rative process. See D oe , 140 Idaho at 273, 92 P.3d at 523 ; State v. Clay , 112 Ida ho7 261, 263, 731 P.2d 804, 806 (Ct. App. 1987 ) (“Jury verdicts occupy an e xalted place in our criminal justice system.”). At the evidentiary hearing, the magi strate court firs t ruled that the State had proven its initial c ase for battery: Doe willfully used force against Ex

- Girlfriend when she “ pushe d her twice, punched her, pushed her again, and then punched her again.” F rom this, t he only issue was whether Doe’s use of force was jus tified , i.e., whether Doe’s use of force wa s in self

- defense. On this issue, the magi strate court turned to two pattern jury instructions on self

- defense, Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions 15 17 and 1518 , an alyzed each, and concluded that the State ha d disproven two elements of self

- defense beyond a reasonab le doubt

. First, the magi strate court concluded that Doe had used un reasonab le force when she continued to strike Ex

- Girlfriend, instead of st opping at a “push” to create space when Ex

Girlfriend wa s acting aggressively by “ getting in her face

. ” Second, the magi strate court concluded that Doe used force, at least in part, for a motivation other than self

- de fense : Doe was “angry” at Ex

- Girlfriend for a p erceived slight aga inst Girlfriend

. Thus, becaus e Doe ’s use of force was unjustified , her self

- defense claim failed and Doe’s battery against E x
- Girlfriend subjected Doe to t he purview of the Act. Instruction 1517 , entitled “ Self D efense, ” contains 5 elements : 1. The defendant must have believed tha t th e defendant was in imminent danger of bodily har m. 2. In addition to th at belief, the defendant must have believed that the ac tion the de fendant took was necessary to save the defendant from t he danger presented. 3. The circumstances must have been suc h th at a reasonable person, under similar circumstan ces, would have believe d that the defendant was in imminent danger of bodily i njury and b elieved that the action taken was necessary. 4. The def endant must have acted only in response to that danger and n ot f

or some other motivation. 5. When there is no lo nger any reasonable app earance of danger, the right of self

- defense e nds. I.C. J.I. 1517 ( irrelevant language omitted) (emphasis added). Doe’s challenge on a ppeal focuses

on the two elements of self

- defense th at the State d isproved at the hearing , i.e., ele ments three and four in Instruction 1517

.8 Accordin g to Doe, elements three and four in Instruction 1517 conflict with , and are therefore supplanted by, the self

- defense law codified in the “stand your ground” statute, Idaho Code section 19

- 202A. More specifica lly, Doe argues tha t the statute differs from these elements of self

- defen se at common law in three ways: (1) “the statute provides that a person is not required to ascertain whether a dange r is apparent or real before acting ”; (2) “the statute permits

con sideration of the p erson’s knowledge , stating a person may use ‘all force and m eans which would appear to be necessary to a reasonable person in a similar situation and with similar knowledg e without the benefit of hindsight, ’ ”; and (3) “the statute does not require that a person exercising her right to defen d herself must have acte d only in response to the danger presented by another, and not with some other motivation.” ( E mphasis added

. ) For th e reasons below, Doe’s three poin ts are without me rit. The “stand your ground” statute simply codified aspects of common law self

- defen se that have existed in Idaho for over 100 years, without abrogating those portions it l eft uncodified. In 2018, the legi slature p assed the “stand your gr ound” statute, and in doing so, e xplained that the “inte nt” of the statute was to “ incorporate provisi ons of

. . . stand your ground provided in Idaho case law and jury instructions into certain section s of this chapter[.]” I.C. § 1 9

- 2 01A (emphasis add ed) . W hen the statute i s read plainly, as it must be, State v. Smalley , 164 Idaho 780, 784, 435 P.3d 1100, 1104 (2019), it does exactly that by codifying aspects of pre
- existing self

- defense law: DEFEN SE OF SELF, OTHER S AND CERTAIN PLA CES. (1) No person in this state shall be p laced in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting himself or his family by reasonable means necessary

. . . . (2) The defense of self or of another does not require a person to wait
u ntil he or she as certains whether the danger is apparent or real

. A person confronted with such danger has a clear right to act upon appearance s such as would influence the action of a reasonable person. (3 ) In the exercise of the right o f self

- defense or defense of anoth er, a person need not retreat from any plac e that person has a right to be. A person may stand his ground and defend himself o r another person by the use of all force and means which would appear to be necessary to a reaso nable person in a similar situatio n and with similar knowledge without the be nefit of hindsight

. . . . (4) In any prosecution for the unlawful use of force, i ncluding deadly force, or the attempted or threatened use of fo rce contrary to title 18, Idaho C ode, the burden i s on the prosecut ion to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that9 the use of force, attempted use of force or threat to use force was not justifiabl e. [. . . .] I.C. § 19

- 202A (e mphasis and alterations added)

. D oe’s fi rst point

— that the statute differs from the common law becau se the statute provides that a n actor is not required to ascertain whether a danger is apparent or real before

ac ting , and “ha s a clear right to a ct upon appearances such as would influence the ac tion of a reasonable person [,]”

— is meritless. T his standard, now codified nearly word for word in Section 1 9

- 202A (2) , was set out over 100 years ago in State v . McGreevy , 17 Idaho 453, 4 66

– 67, 105 P. 1047, 1051

– 52 (1909) (explaining that a per son acting in self

- defense may “stand his ground[,]” with a “ clear legal right to act upon appearanc es such as would influence the action of a reasonabl e person ” (emphasis in or iginal) ). Thus, on thi s point, the statute does not change or add anything to the common law of self

- defense, as already reflected in element three of I nstruction 1517. See also I .C.J.I. 1518 and 1519 (elaborating on this element). Doe’s second point

— that the “stand your ground ” statute differs from the common law because the statute require s imputing the actor’s subjective knowledge onto the “reasonable person”

— is also without merit . Imputing the actor’s “knowledge” to t he “reasonable person” in evaluating a claim of self

- defen se is already part of self

- defens e law under McGreevy and

re flected in Instructions 1517 and 1518. In McGreevy , this Court said th at self

- defen se allows only reasonable force, i.e., force “ a r easonable man would” use under “s imilar circumstances and

surrou ndings [,] ” so long as the necessity pe rsists and wi thout judgment “from the theoretical standpoint of the man who is resting in bo th appa rent and real safety, confronted by no danger, and m enaced by no threats or demonstrations of sudden violence and felon ious import.” 17 Idaho
at 466

– 67 , 105 P. at 1051

– 52

. This basic standard is reflected in Instruction 1517 , element three, where it likewi se provides that the “action taken” must be “necessa ry” from the standpoint of a reasonable person “under similar circu mstances[.]” I.C.J.I. 1517

. Moreover, the other in struction used and applied by the magi strate court, Instruction 1518, elaborate s on elem ent three in Instruction 1517, to explain what const itutes “reasonable force ” and plainly imputes the actor’s “knowle dge” onto the “reasonable person” in ev aluating a cl aim of self

- defense and whether the use of force was reasonable: The kind and degree o f force which a person may lawfully use in self

- defe nse are limited by what a reasonable pe rson in the same situation as such10 person, seeing what that person sees and kno wing what the person knows , then would believe to be necessary. Any use of for ce beyon d that is regarded by the law as excessive. Although a person may believe that the person i s acting, and may act, in s elf

- defense, the person is not justifie d in using a degree of force clearly in excess of that apparently and reasonably necessary under th e existing facts and circumstances. I.C.J.I. 1518 (i rrelevant language in brackets omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, th e “ reasonable force ” element in Idaho’s self

- defense law, as reflected by element three in Instruction 1517 , and elaborated on by Instruct ion 1518, already requires the actor’s subjective “ k nowledge ” to be imputed to the “reasona ble person .” Contrary to Do e’s position, this is consistent with t he “knowledge ” language in the “stand your ground” statute

. Finally, as to Doe’s third poin t

— that t he “stand your ground” statute differs from the common law because it does not reflect the exclus ive “motivation” elem ent present in Instruction 1517 (i.e., elemen t number four )

— she is correct , but her point is irrelevant. The legislature has the p ower to abrogate the common law either expressly, or by “implicati on” when it is “obvious” and “cannot be ignored.” Mickelsen v. Broadway Ford, Inc. , 153 Idaho 149, 153, 2 80 P.3d 176, 180 (2012) (citations omitted). The exclusive “motivation” element refle cted in Instruction 1517 can be traced to McGreevy , where this Cou rt explained that force against another in self

- defense
must be “for that purpose” and not , for example, done in “reve nge[,]” 17 Idaho at 466

– 67 , 105 P.
at 1051

– 52

— i.e., the actor “ must hav e ac ted only in response to that danger and not for some other mot ivation. ” I.C.J.I. 1517

. Here, the excl usive “motivation” el ement of self

- defense at common law is neithe r expressly , n or implicitly , abrogated by its absen ce in the “stand your ground” stat ute, I.C. § 19

- 202A. Although the statute does not mention the “mo tivation” element , nothing in the statut e obviously eliminat e s it , either expressly or by implication

. See I.C. § 19

- 20 2A. To the contrary, and as noted above, the legislature expressly inst ruc ted that the statute “ incorporate [s] provisions of

. . . stand y our ground” already “ provided in Idaho case law and jury in structions [.]” I.C. § 19

- 201A (emphasis and al terations add ed)

. T he “stand your ground”
statute reflects the aspects of self

- defense law in Idaho that the legislature sought to protect by
statute

— unre lated to, and without e ffect on, the exclusive “motivati on” element of self

- defense
at co mmon law

. Thu s, Doe’s argument that the “motivation” element reflected in Instructio n 1 517 was improperly considered by the magi strate court is without m erit

.11 In sum, Doe has not shown that t he magi strate court erred in re ferring to and applying the pattern jury ins tructions to her self

- defense claim instead of relying solely on the “sta n d your ground” statute , I daho Code sect i on 19

- 202A

. T he statute simply codified aspects of self

- defense law that have existed for over 100 years a nd did not abrogate those aspects it left uncodified

. B ecause Doe has not shown legal error and does not chal lenge the magi strate court’s decision as unsupported by substantial evidence, the district court did not err in upholding the magi strate

co urt’s judg ment

. VI. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the decision of the district cou rt is affirmed

.

C hief Justi ce BEVAN, and Justices ST EGNER, MOELLER, and ZAHN, CONCUR

.