1 Rule 10(b) (Court of Appeals). MEMO RANDUM OPINI ON. The Court, with the

concurren ce of all judges participating in t he case, may affirm, rever se or modify the actio ns of t

he tr ial court by memoran dum opinion when a formal op ini on wou ld have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memora ndum opi nion it shall be designat

ed “MEMORANDUM OP INION,” shall not be published, an d sh all not be cit

ed or relied on for any reason in a subsequent related case. 

# FILED

July 30, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr
. App ellate C ou rt Clerk IN THE COURT

OF APPEA LS OF TEN NESSEE WESTER N SECTION AT J ACKSON

______________________________________________________________________________ BRUCE ALAN WRI GHT, Henderson Chancery No. 907 9 C.A. No. 02A0

1-9608-CH-002

02 Plaintiff, Hon. Joe C. Morris, J udge v. PATRI CIA R UTH WRIGHT, Defe nda nt. RICKY L. WOOD, Parsons, At torney fo r Plaintiff. LLO YD R. TATUM , Tatum and Tatum , Hen der son , Attorn ey fo r Def

end ant. REMANDED Opinion filed:

______________________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

TOMLIN, Sr. J. In this divo

rce ca se each

of the pa rties disputes the d

ivision of marital pr

operty and marital debt by the chancellor below, as well as the a scertainment by the court of what property was marital property and what prope rty was previously owned by Husband. Bruce Al an Wrigh

t, (here after “ Husband”

or “plai ntiff”) filed suit

for divor ce in the Chancery Court of Henderson County against Patricia Ruth Wright (here after “Wife” or “defendant”) on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct on the part of Wife. Wife filed a counter-complaint aga inst Husband on the same grounds. Following a

bench tr ial, the chancell or awar

ded both p arties a

divorce and sough

t to divide the marital p roperty and marital debt. Husband’s sole issue on appeal is whether or not the trial court prope rly divided the marital property as well as the various debts incurred by the parties during the2

marriage. Because of deficienc ies in the record as to what was marital property and what was previously-owned property of Husband, as we ll as the absence of a finding of the values of the respective pieces of prope rty sought to be divided, and the appreciation of value allocated to Wife, if a ny, as well as a lack of clarity as to the value of the parties’ personal property, we remand this case to the chancellor for fur ther proceedings in this regard. The parties were married in 1988 and divorced in 1995. Shortly after marriage the parties purchased a 15.5 acre tr act of land in Morgan County for $24,000.00, where they resided in a mobile home (hereafter c alled “the Morgan County property”). It was stipulated that they subsequently sold 9 acres of the Morgan County property for $20,000.00 and used the proceeds to amortize the existing debt on the rema ining 6.5

acres. This prope

rty was titled in the

name of b oth partie s. The ch ancello r found it to be marital property and awarded it to Wife. The value of this property however was hotly contested by both parties, with one party’s valuation being almost 300% greater than the other. The chancellor made no finding as to the spec ific value of the Morgan County property in the divorce decree. Upon leaving Morgan County, the parties moved to Henderson County, where they resided in a mobile home on Husband’s 37 acre far m. Utilizing some of the facilitie s alrea

dy built the

re, Husb and bega

n operat ing a comm

ercial hog farm. While Husband and Wife dispute the efforts expended by W ife in the operation of the hog farm, Wife contends that she contributed substantially to the development of the hog operati on, althou gh at the t ime of tri al it appe ared to b e financ ially unsu ccessf ul, so much so tha

t Husband

was no lon ger enga

ged in the hog busine ss. At trial Wife contended that the “hog farm” should be c onsidered marital property. On the other hand Husband contended that inasmuch a s the property was purchased by him prior to marriage, it could not be considered mar ital property and at best Wife would be entitled only to an appreciation in the value of the prope rty during marriage and the extent, if any, to which Wife c ontributed to the appreciation in value. In the fin al decr

ee of div orce the

chance llor fail ed to make

a finding whether or not this property was considered Husband’s separ ate property or marital property, nor did he3

find any contribution as to the appreciation in value, if there was a ny, by Wife. Shortly after moving to Henderson County, the parties begin construction on their marital residence in which Wife resided a t the time of the divorce. This residence was constructed on a 1.1 acre parc el of land, owned by Husband prior to marriage and located adjacent to the 37 acre hog fa rm. The parties financed the construction of the marital re sidence by placing a mortgage on the 37 acre hog farm, the 1.1 ac re parcel of land on which they were
constructing the re sidence and a 16 a

cre tra ct of unimp

roved la nd in Hend

erson Cou

nty which was adjacent to the hog farm. This latter parc el of land was agreed by the parties to be sepa rate pr operty of Husband. The rec ord also r eflectsthat the h og farm p roperty was burdened with a preexisting loan of $33,000.00 at the time it was used by them as security for the loan to build the residence. The fina l decre e enter

ed by the c

hancell or read s as follow s:
This cause came on to be heard on the 12th and 19th days of October, 1995, before the Honorable Joe C. Morr is, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court for Henderson County, Tennessee, upon the complain t filed by t

he Plaintif

f, Husba nd, the An swer an d Counter claim of Defendant, Wife, and the Answer thereto, the testimony of the parties and other witnesse s heard in open Cour t, and the entire r ecord in this cause; a nd it appe ared to t

he Court, and the Court so fou nd that bot

h parties were residents of Henderson County, Tenne ssee, at the time of their final separation, and that the Court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the property herein involved. From all of which it appeared to the Court and the Court so found that the allegations in the Complaint and the Counter-complaint are true; that the Husband and Wife have been guilty of such inappropr iate marital conduct as renders cohabitation unsafe and imprope r. The Court further found that the parties have accumulated marital prope rty comprised of approximately 6 acres in Morgan County, Tennessee, 1.11 ac res and a house at 2995 Centerpoint Rd., and approximately 40 acres adjace nt thereto in Reagan, Henderson County, Tennessee, and the 10 and 1⁄2 acre “Roby” tract of land in Chester County, Tennessee; livestock, farm equipment, vehicles, household furnishings and other items of personal propert y; and tha t the only ma

rital deb t in this ca se is appr oximately $43,000 owed to First State Bank secured by some of the parties’ real property with the remaining debt either Husband’s separa te debt or is debt collateralized by personal property awa rded to the Husband, more particularly hereinbelow, except for de bt secured by Wife’s Chevy S-10. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 1. That the parties have been guilty of inappropriate marital conduct as renders cohabitation between the pa rties unsafe and improper, and that the bonds of matrimony subsisting between and uniting Husband4 and Wife be, and th

e same a re, her eby abso lutely, fo

rever a nd perpe tually dissolved and the parties are restored to all of the rights, privileges and status of unmarried persons, and they are here by granted and awarded an absolute divorce from each other. 2. That the approximately 6 acres in Morgan County, Tennessee, 1.11 acres and a house at 2995 Centerpoint Rd. and the contents of the aforesaid house and lot, and other personal prope rty presently possessed by Wife, including her Chevy S-10 vehicle, are divested fr om Husband and vested in Wife. Wife is further awa rded the sum of Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars to equitably adjust the division of marital property. 3. That any interest of Wife in all remaining real and pe rsonal propert y accumu lated by t he parti es is dive sted fro m Wife and vested in Husband. Both parties are to execute any and all docume nts necessary for the transfer of title or deed to said properties awa rded herein. 4. That Husband shall pay the joint debt owed to First State Bank of Henderson, Tennessee, and secur ed by the parties’ real property. 5. Wife s hall pay t

he debt ow ed for he

r Chevy S- 10 and hol d Husband harmless therefrom. Husband shall pay any re maining debts and hold Wife

harmlesstheref

rom. 6. Husband is ordered to pay as alimony in solido the sum of One Thousand ($1,000. 00) Dolla

rs to def ray Wif e’s lega l fees a nd expen ses. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Husband shall pay the costs of this cause, for all of which let execution issue, if necessary.
In the parties’ respective affidavits filed a s part of their briefs, they agree that three pa rcels of propert y were ma

rital pro perty at the time of

the divor ce-6 ac res in Morgan County, a house and 1.1 acre in Henderson County, and 10.5 ac res known as the “Roby property” in Chester County. However, they sharply dispute the values of these properties. The parties also agree that 16 acre s in Henderson County and another 1 acre parcel in Henderson County are separa te property of the Husband. While the values of these parcels are disputed, the differe nce is not so great. Lastly, Wife contends that the hog farm is marital property, while Husband contends that it is his separate proper ty. Again, we have a wide divergence of value, as stated by Husband and Wife. In reviewing this record we have deter mined that the chancellor failed to make any finding as to what should be considered marital property or sepa rate property in the case of the one disputed parcel, while at the same time failing to determine whether or not Wife was entit led to any increa se in valu e there of. As to th e parce ls of prop erty5

that wer e undisput

ed to be ma

rital pro perty, in awarding intere st in and to these properties the chancellor failed to fix a value on these respective properties in light of the substantial dispute by the parties themselves. Lastly, the trial c ourt fail ed to cle arly spe cify the value of the pers onal prop erty in dispute , and the c orrespo nding allo cation of this value

to one par

ty or the o ther. Thi s court is unable to determine if the division of property was “equitable.” Accordingly, we remand this case to the chanc ellor and direct that he revisit the issues that we have raised in this opinion, along with a reconsideration of the proof relative thereto, and to thereafter to make specific findings as to the ownership of each
respec tive piec e of prop erty as a lready d etermine d by him, its v alue, the apprec iation in value of any separately owned proper ty of Husband that would be allocated to the Wife, based upon any contribution to its value by her, and such other findings as may be

necessa ry so that the part ies can c learly a scerta

in the val ue of the assets a warded to them and s o that in the

event of a furthe r appea l

there will be ample evidence for this court to consider in attempting to resolve a ny issues presented to it. Costs in this cause on appeal are taxed one-half to Husba nd and one-half to Wife, for which execution may issue, if necessary.

________________________________________ TOMLIN, Sr. J.

________________________________________ CRAWFORD, P. J., W .S. (CONC URS)6 ________________________________________ HIGHERS, J. (CONC URS)