1 The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 07-2243

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Eastern * District of Arkansas. Kenneth L. Knuckles, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: December 13, 2007 Filed: March 21, 2008

___________ Before RILEY, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Kenneth Lynn Knuckles pled guilty to one count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The district court 1 sentenced him to 37 months of imprisonmen t and three years of supervised release. As a special condition, the district court, over objection, ordered that he spend the first four months of supervised release in a re sidential reentry center. Knuckles appeals, asserting a lack of jurisdiction and an abuse of discretion. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.-2- This court reviews “the district court’s imposition of special conditions of supervised release for anabuse of discretion.” United States v. Smart , 472 F.3d 556, 558 (8th Cir. 2006)

. A sentencing court may impose a condition of supervised release if, among other things, the condition “involve s no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes se t forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D).” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). Th ese purposes are deterrence, protection of the public, and provision of necessary training or correctional treatment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); United States v. Camp , 410 F.3d 1042, 1045 (8th Cir. 2005).
Knuckles argues that the district c ourt abused its discretion because the condition deprives him of liberty to a gr eater degree than nece ssary, since a Bureau of Prisons policy favors placement in reside ntial reentry centers toward the end of prison terms. The district court rejectedthis argument, stating, “I realize that ordinarily they do that anyway, but they don’ t always . . . . I just think in his case I want to make certain it is done, and I don’t want it to be overlooke d.” The court cited the need for Knuckles to live in a stable and disciplined environment, where he could obtain employment and counseling before fully reintegrating into society. The court specifically noted his youth (19 years old at sentencing) and prior conviction for sexually molesting a child. The court cl early wanted Knuckles to receive the treatment necessary to rehabilitate and avoid committing future crimes, the purposes in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The district court did not abuse its discretion.
Knuckles also contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) to impose residence at a r eentry center as a condition of supervised release. To the contrary, “§ 3583(d) c ontinues to include community-corrections confinement as a discretionary c ondition of supervised release.” United States v. Griner , 358 F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Porter , 417 F.3d 914, 919 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Community confinement is a potential condition contemplated by the statute . . . .”). Th erefore, this argument is foreclosed by precedent.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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