DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ARLENE WILLIAMS-PARIS,

Appellant,

v.

APRIL NELLE JOSEPH, PRISCILLA PARIS-AUSTIN,

THEODORE PARIS, and SAMUEL PARIS,

Appellees.

No. 4D20-1760

[September 1, 2021]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; Charles E. Burton, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2019-CP002796-XXXX-SB.

Robert J. Hauser, John J. Pankauski and Jason D. Lazarus of 

Pankauski Hauser Lazarus, PLLC, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ellen S. Morris of Elder Law Associates, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellees.

CONNER, C.J.

Arlene Williams-Paris (“the Wife”) appeals several probate court orders 

determining that she waived her right to inherit as a spouse by signing a 

prenuptial agreement. The Wife raises multiple issues on appeal. We write 

to address only two of the issues, affirming as to one issue and reversing 

as to the other. We affirm the remaining issues on appeal without 

discussion.

Background

This case involves the enforceability and scope of a prenuptial 

agreement entered into hours before the Wife and Calvin Paris (“the 

decedent”) got married. The couple lived together in the decedent’s home 

for approximately five years before the wedding and continued to do so 

afterwards.

Approximately a year before the marriage, the decedent told the Wife 

that “if we get married, I would like you to get a prenup.” Wife responded 
2

that she did not want to pay for a prenuptial agreement, and according to 

the Wife, the issue was never brought up again until their wedding day. 

In June 2015, the decedent proposed that the couple get married the 

following month when his family would be vacationing in Martha’s 

Vineyard, Massachusetts where he owned a second home. The Wife agreed 

and made the arrangements with a month’s notice. At the time the parties 

married, the decedent was 83 years old, and the Wife was 58 years old. 

Both had been married before.

On the day of the wedding, the decedent woke the Wife at 7:00 a.m. 

demanding her to find a prenuptial agreement online and sign it. When 

she expressed her dismay, the decedent refused to marry her unless she 

signed one, explaining that she was to be his fifth wife and a prenuptial 

agreement was necessary in the event of divorce. At that point, the family 

members and guests were all in Martha’s Vineyard for the wedding. 

Feeling pressured by the significant potential embarrassment of canceling 

the wedding, the Wife reluctantly followed the decedent downstairs to the 

small office in the home, where the decedent closed the door and 

instructed her to search the word “prenup” online. The Wife then selected 

a website offering legal forms online using a digital program to create an

agreement by filling in responses to prompts. Most of the information 

responding to the prompts was supplied by the decedent. The form 

agreement could not be read until all of the questions asked in the prompts 

were completed. After the prompts were completed, including ones 

providing their financial information for the exhibits to the agreement, the 

Wife printed the prenuptial agreement. The decedent then drove the Wife 

to a notary nearby where they signed the agreement in the notary’s 

presence. After the agreement was signed, the Wife rushed to get ready 

for the marriage ceremony, which occurred at 4:00 p.m. that day.

Approximately four years after the marriage, the decedent passed away 

and intestate while still married to the Wife. Thereupon, the Wife 

petitioned the probate court to: (1) invalidate the prenuptial agreement; (2) 

declare the residence described in paragraph 2 of the agreement to be the 

decedent’s homestead subject to her election to take a one-half interest; 

and (3) award her intestate share and elective share of the estate as 

spouse. The petition argued that the prenuptial agreement was invalid 

based on fraud, deceit, duress, coercion, misrepresentation, and 

overreaching since the decedent never explained that it applied in the 

event of death (“count I”), and because it contained unfair or unreasonable 

provisions (“count II”). Additionally, she petitioned for rescission of the 

agreement based on her unilateral mistake (“count III”). The petition was 

served on the appellees, the decedent’s children (“the Children”).
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Subsequently, the Wife moved the probate court for instructions and 

determination of whether Massachusetts or Florida law governed the 

enforceability of the prenuptial agreement. As discussed more fully in the 

analysis section below, the probate court determined Florida law governed 

the issue of the agreement’s validity.

The Children then moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 

prenuptial agreement had a specific provision pertaining to a spouse’s 

death and therefore discounted Wife’s argument that it was only effective 

in the event of divorce. Additionally, in response to the Wife’s contention 

that the decedent did not fully disclose his assets prior to the agreement 

being signed or in the exhibits attached to the agreement, the Children 

argued that full disclosure was not required under Florida law when the 

agreement’s validity is contested in a probate proceeding. The Children 

further argued the Wife knew what she was signing and was not coerced 

into signing, as verified by the notary’s affidavit filed in support of the 

motion stating that the notary did not indicate that anything unusual 

occurred when the prenuptial agreement was signed. The Wife filed a 

response and counter affidavit to the motion for summary judgment.

The probate court granted the Children summary judgment on the

Wife’s coercion and duress arguments. However, the probate court denied 

the Children summary judgment on the Wife’s unilateral mistake 

argument, ruling material disputed facts remained as to whether the 

decedent represented the agreement was to apply only in the event of

divorce and not death.

After a nonjury trial on the disputed issue of misrepresentation and 

unilateral mistake, the probate court denied the Wife’s petition to 

invalidate the prenuptial agreement on those issues. The Wife then gave 

notice of appeal.

Appellate Analysis

Choice of Law Issue

The Wife argues that because the prenuptial agreement was signed by 

both parties in Massachusetts, the probate court should have applied the

choice of law rule of lex loci contractus in determining the agreement’s 

validity. She further contends that the rule’s exceptions do not apply to 

the agreement. The rule “specifies that the law of the jurisdiction where 

the contract was executed should control.” Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So. 2d 

1126, 1129 (Fla. 1988). The Children argue that the public policy 
4

exception to the lex loci contractus rule precludes applying Massachusetts 

law to determine the agreement’s validity.

“The standard of review for choice-of-law questions is de novo.” Higgins 

v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 85 So. 3d 1156, 1157 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (citing 

Sosa v. Safeway Premium Fin. Co., 73 So. 3d 91, 102 (Fla. 2011)).

As our supreme court has explained, “we apply different choice of law 

rules to different areas of the law.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roach, 

945 So. 2d 1160, 1163 (Fla. 2006). “[I]n determining which state’s law 

applies to contracts, we have long adhered to the rule of lex loci contractus.” 

Id. However, the rules of comity may be departed from in certain cases 

“for the purpose of necessary protection of our own citizens, or of enforcing 

some paramount rule of public policy.” Id. at 1164 (quoting Herron v. 

Passailaigue, 110 So. 539, 542 (Fla. 1926); see also In re Estate of Nicole 

Santos (“Santos”), 648 So. 2d 277, 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (“We agree that 

Florida courts may depart from the rule of comity where necessary to 

protect its citizens or to enforce some paramount rules of public policy.”). 

Our supreme court has made clear that what has become known as the 

public policy exception to the rule of lex loci contractus “requires both a 

Florida citizen in need of protection and a paramount Florida public 

policy.” Roach, 945 So. 2d at 1165.

In this case, the probate court determined that Florida law controlled 

the issue of the agreement’s validity. The probate court acknowledged that 

Florida follows the lex loci contractus rule but noted that in Gillen v. United 

Services Auto. Ass’n, 300 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974), our supreme court 

recognized a public policy exception to the rule. There, the court applied 

Florida law to an insurance contract signed in New Hampshire because 

the insured vehicle and the insured remained in Florida. Id. at 6-7.

In deciding that the public policy exception applied in this case, the 

probate court reasoned that cases upon which the children relied – Gordon 

v. Russell, 561 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), and Gustafson v. Jensen, 

515 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) – purportedly held that Florida law 

applied in determining the prenuptial agreements’ validity because the 

parties in those cases had meager connections with the jurisdictions in 

which the agreements were executed. The Wife contended that Roach

effectively abrogated Gillen, Gustafson, and Gordon, and that the more 

recent cases of Ziegler v. Natera, 279 So. 3d 1240 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) and 

Santos, 648 So. 2d 277, reaffirmed that the lex loci contractus rule 

controlled. The probate court decided that reliance on Ziegler and Santos

was “unavailing” and that Roach did not totally abrogate Gillen, Gustafson, 

and Gordon. The probate court also felt this case’s facts were similar to 
5

Gustafson. Additionally, the probate court agreed with Judge Warner’s 

dissent in Santos that the public policy exception should apply more 

broadly to marital agreements than to insurance agreements because 

protecting parties in marital agreements is a particularly important public 

policy. The probate court then determined that the public policy exception 

to lex loci contractus applied to the agreement. In the alternative, the 

probate court departed from the lex loci contractus rule, followed the 

significant relationship test, and concluded that Florida law applied to 

determine the agreement’s validity in this case because the Wife has no 

connection to Massachusetts other than the fact that she signed the 

agreement and married the decedent there.

We agree with the probate court that Santos is “unavailing” because 

this case’s facts are significantly different from Santos’ facts. In Santos, 

the parties were Puerto Rico residents. Santos, 648 So. 2d at 278. While 

in Puerto Rico, they executed a prenuptial agreement and were married. 

Id. After the marriage, the parties continued to reside in Puerto Rico for 

over ten years before moving to Florida. Id. After returning to Puerto Rico

to reside, the decedent executed a will and once again the parties moved 

to Florida where decedent died. Id. at 278–79. Finding that the rule of lex 

loci contractus applied, the majority held that the trial court properly 

applied Puerto Rican law to the prenuptial agreement. Id. at 280–81. 

However, the majority also concluded that the public policy exception to 

the rule would apply to homestead property. Id. at 282. The majority 

remanded the case to determine whether the decedent’s Florida home was 

homestead property. Id.

In comparison, in the instant case, the parties never lived together as 

a married couple in Massachusetts and the record does not reflect any 

other marital documents were signed in Massachusetts. Except for the 

homestead property, there was a much more compelling reason to apply 

lex loci contractus in Santos than in the situation under review here.

It is debatable whether Roach abrogated Gillen, Gustafson, and Gordon. 

We understand Roach’s holdings to be: (1) “[t]he public policy exception to 

the lex loci contractus rule is narrow;” and (2) the exception “applies only 

when necessary to protect ‘our own citizens,’ not visitors or even temporary 

residents, and then only when necessary to promote a paramount public 

policy of this state.” Roach, 945 So. 2d at 1169 (citation omitted). 

However, we need not engage in the abrogation debate because we affirm 

the probate court’s application of Florida law because it reached the right 

result, even though it may have erred in its reasoning. See Dade Cnty. 

Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999) (“[I]f a 

trial court reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons, it will be 
6

upheld if there is any basis which would support the judgment in the 

record.”).

A key asset in the litigation below was the decedent’s homestead. “A 

citizen’s right to homestead protection under our constitution is 

considered a paramount rule of public policy that would justify our 

departure from the otherwise applicable rule of comity.” Santos, 648 So. 

2d at 282. Homestead protection extends not only to spouses, but also to 

heirs. Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999, 1002 (Fla. 1997) (“As a matter of 

public policy, the purpose of the homestead exemption is to promote the 

stability and welfare of the state by securing to the householder a home, 

so that the homeowner and his or her heirs may live beyond the reach of 

financial misfortune and the demands of creditors who have given credit 

under such law.” (quoting Pub. Health Tr. v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946, 948 

(Fla. 1988))). One of the key disputes below and on appeal is whether the 

Wife waived her interests in the decedent’s homestead in the prenuptial 

agreement.

In the probate proceeding below, the parties litigated the application of 

section 732.702(2), Florida Statutes (2019), a provision of Florida’s Probate 

Code, which provides:

Each spouse shall make a fair disclosure to the other of that 

spouse’s estate if the agreement, contract, or waiver is 

executed after marriage. No disclosure shall be required for 

an agreement, contract, or waiver executed before marriage.

§ 732.702(2), Fla. Stat. (2019). The Wife sought to apply Massachusetts 

law to the agreement because Massachusetts law required full financial 

disclosure for marital agreements entered into both before and after 

marriage. The Children sought to apply section 732.702(2) because no 

financial disclosure is required to validate a marital agreement executed 

before marriage.1

1 Below and on appeal, neither party argued the applicability of section 

732.702(1), Florida Statutes (2019), which provides in part:

(1) The rights of a surviving spouse to an elective share, intestate 

share, pretermitted share, homestead, exempt property, family 

allowance, and preference in appointment as personal 

representative of an intestate estate or any of those rights, may be 

waived, wholly or partly, before or after marriage, by a written 
7

Because (1) the Wife and the Children, one of whom is a Florida 

resident, both stood to benefit from the decedent’s homestead; (2) Florida 

has a strong public policy for homestead protection; and (3) Florida has 

specific statutes addressing the requirements for waiver of homestead 

protection, we affirm the probate court’s decision to apply Florida law, 

rather than Massachusetts law, to the prenuptial agreement’s validity.

Interpretation of the Agreement

The Wife argues that the prenuptial agreement unambiguously and 

specifically excludes the decedent’s homestead from its application 

pursuant to paragraph 2 of the agreement. The Children agree that the 

prenuptial agreement is unambiguous but contend that paragraph 2 

applied only during the decedent’s life, and that instead the Wife waived 

any interest in the home in paragraph 10 of the agreement.

contract, agreement, or waiver, signed by the waiving party in the 

presence of two subscribing witnesses.

§ 732.702(1), Fla. Stat. (2019) (emphases added). The application of section 

732.702(1) appears significant in this case because the prenuptial agreement was 

signed only by the two parties and a notary public. Because the applicability of 

section 732.702(1) was not argued below or in the briefs, we do not apply it to 

our analysis.

In compliance with a focus order we issued requesting that the parties be 

prepared to address the applicability of section 732.702(1) at oral argument, the 

parties made certain arguments. We disagree with the arguments presented by 

both sides at oral argument that the requirement of two subscribing witnesses 

was met in this case. See McKoy v. DeSilvio, 974 So. 2d 539, 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2008) (determining that the notary did not count as one of two subscribing 

witnesses required to transfer real property via quitclaim deed, where notary did 

not sign deed as a subscribing witness); Am. Gen. Home Equity, Inc. v. 

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 769 So. 2d 508, 509 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) 

(determining that “nothing in the notary’s affidavit . . . establishes or raises a 

question of fact that he was the second subscribing witness”); Santos v. Bogh, 

334 So. 2d 833, 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (rejecting the argument that the notary’s 

acknowledgment should be regarded as that of a second subscribing witness); 

see also Witness, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining a “subscribing 

witness” as “[s]omeone who witnesses the signatures on an instrument and signs 

at the end of the instrument to that effect”). We found no case law supporting 

the contention that one party’s signature on a contract can qualify as a 

subscribing witness to the other party’s signature.
8

“A trial court’s interpretation of a prenuptial agreement is reviewed de 

novo, as such agreements are governed by the law of contracts.” 

Hahamovitch v. Hahamovitch, 174 So. 3d 983, 986 (Fla. 2015) (citation 

omitted).

“When interpreting a contract, a court should give effect to the plain 

and ordinary meaning of its terms.” Golf Scoring Sys. Unlimited, Inc. v. 

Remedio, 877 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). “Words should be 

given their natural meaning or the meaning most commonly understood 

in relation to the subject matter and circumstances, and reasonable 

construction is preferred to one that is unreasonable.” Id. (quoting 

Thompson v. C.H.B., Inc., 454 So. 2d 55, 57 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)). 

Moreover, when certain provisions of a contract appear to conflict, “it is a 

general principle of contract interpretation that a specific provision dealing 

with a particular subject will control over a different provision dealing only 

generally with that same subject.” Idearc Media Corp. v. M.R. Friedman &

G.A. Friedman, P.A., 985 So. 2d 1159, 1161 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (quoting 

Kel Homes, LLC v. Burris, 933 So. 2d 699, 703 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)).

Paragraph 2 of the agreement states:

2. RESIDENCE. It is intention of the parties that the residence 

presently owned by [the decedent] located at 601 NW 12 Street, 

Delray Beach, Florida shall not be affected by this Agreement.

The expenses associated with the maintenance of the 

residence shall be paid as follows:

a. Mortgage payments shall be made by [the decedent].

b. Payment of all real estate taxes shall be made by [the 

decedent].

c. Insurance premiums for such residence shall be paid 

by [the decedent].

d. ______________________ [blank line in original].

(emphasis added). Pertinent to this appeal, paragraph 10 states:

10. DEATH. Each party agrees that if he or she survives the 

death of the other, such party will make no claim to any part 

of the real or personal property of the other. In consideration 

of such promise and in consideration of the contemplated 

marriage, each party knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily 

waives and relinquishes any right of . . . homestead, 

inheritance, descent, distributive share, or other statutory or 
9

legal right, now or later created, to share as surviving spouse 

in the distribution of the estate of the other party. The parties 

agree that it is their mutual intent that neither shall have or 

acquire any right, title, or claim in and to the real or personal 

property of the other by virtue of the marriage. The estate of 

each party in the property now owned by either of them, or 

acquired after the date of marriage by either of them, shall 

descend to or vest in his or her heirs at law, legatees, or 

devisees, as may be prescribed by his or her Last Will and 

Testament or by the laws of the state where the decedent was 

domiciled at the time of death, as through no marriage had 

taken place between them.

(emphasis added). Additionally, the agreement contains multiple words 

and phrases indicating “what’s mine is mine, what’s yours is yours, and 

what’s ours is ours,” as summarized by the probate court.

We agree with the Wife’s argument that paragraph 2’s language

describing a specific parcel of real property by address and stating the 

described property “shall not be affected by this Agreement” 

unambiguously exempts it from the agreement. For three reasons, we are 

not persuaded by the Children’s argument that paragraph 2’s provision for 

the payment of expenses indicates that paragraph 2 was only to be 

effective while the decedent was alive: (1) the language “shall not be 

affected by this Agreement” would be totally superfluous and without 

meaning, given the listing of the specific property in both paragraph 2 and 

the multiple instances of “what’s mine is mine, what’s yours is yours, and 

what’s ours is ours” language; (2) at least two of paragraph 2’s listed 

expenses would continue to be payable after the decedent’s death 

(assuming the decedent paid off the mortgage during his lifetime); and (3) 

paragraph 2’s listed expenses do not include maintenance expenses for

the house and yard (if the expense language’s intent was to demonstrate 

paragraph 2 only pertains to decedent’s lifetime, it makes no sense that 

key expenses would be omitted).2

“[T]he court’s task is to apply the parties’ contract as written, not 

‘rewrite’ it under the guise of judicial construction.” Fla. Inv. Grp. 100, LLC 

v. Lafont, 271 So. 3d 1, 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (alteration in original)

2 Because both sides contend on appeal that paragraph 2 is unambiguous, our 

analysis accepts that assertion. We therefore treat the reference to “homestead” 

in paragraph 10 to envision the possibility before the marriage that the decedent 

may possibly change his primary residence after the marriage.
10

(quoting City of Pompano Beach v. Beatty, 222 So. 3d 598, 600 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2017)). “In construing a contract, the legal effect of its provisions 

should be determined from the words of the entire contract.” Id. (quoting 

Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla., Inc. v. Pinnock, 735 So. 2d 530, 535 (Fla. 

4th DCA 1999)). “An interpretation of a contract which gives a reasonable, 

lawful and effective meaning to all of the terms is preferred to an 

interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful or of no effect.” 

Id. at 5 (quoting Herian v. Se. Bank, N.A., 564 So. 2d 213, 214 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 1990)).

The Children’s construction of paragraph 2 would render the words 

“shall not be affected by this Agreement” meaningless. The Wife’s 

construction does not. Therefore, we reverse the probate court’s 

determination that the Wife waived all her spousal interests in the real 

property described in paragraph 2 of the agreement. We remand the case 

to the probate court to determine the extent of the Wife’s interest in that 

asset alone. Because further proceedings as to the Wife’s interest in the 

paragraph 2 property are necessary, we also vacate the final orders 

pertaining to that property, which may or may not contain errors in the 

legal description.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

GROSS, J., concurs.

WARNER, J., concurs specially with opinion.

WARNER, J., concurring specially.

I concur with the majority opinion but would go further and simply 

recede from In re Estate of Nicole Santos, 648 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 4th DCA 

1995), as to the application of lex loci contractus to marital agreements. I 

think the significant relationship test should be used to determine which 

jurisdiction’s law should apply to the interpretation of all such agreements, 

as I argued in my dissent in Santos. The best way to avoid a conflict of 

laws issue, however, is for the parties themselves to designate in their 

agreement what jurisdiction’s law is to apply.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.