Filed 6/22/15 In re Jose T. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re JOSE T., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

2d Juv. No. B259052

(Super. Ct. No. 2013001929)

(Ventura County)

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSE T.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

Jose T. appeals from a judgment sustaining a juvenile wardship petition. (Welf. & 

Inst. Code, § 602.) The petition alleged one count of possession of marijuana for sale. 

(Health & Saf. Code, § 11359.) The juvenile court committed appellant "to the care of the 

probation officer for a period of 104 days." Appellant's sole contention on appeal is that the 

court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the results of a warrantless search of his cell

phone. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1.) The search was incident to appellant's arrest. We 

affirm.

Facts

In December 2012 Officer Christopher Martin of the Simi Valley Police Department 

stopped a vehicle because it did not have a front license plate. Appellant was the driver. 

Upon contacting appellant, Martin smelled an odor of marijuana coming from inside the 
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vehicle. Appellant admitted possessing marijuana and handed Martin "a cylindrical-type 

object that contained the marijuana." Appellant said he was 17 years old and did not have a 

"prescription" for the marijuana. 

Officer Martin arrested appellant and, "incident to [the] arrest," searched his cell 

phone. Martin saw "some text messages on the cell phone that were consistent with 

[appellant] being involved in selling marijuana." Martin searched the vehicle and found a 

scale with marijuana residue on it. He searched appellant and found $500 in cash. 

Appellant said that he had been selling marijuana "to kids at his school" and had been 

"making about a thousand bucks a month." The $500 on his person "was profit from selling 

marijuana." 

Standard of Review

"In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that 

court's factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. 

[Citation.] We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts 

presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. [Citation.]" 

(People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1119.)

Discussion

Appellant contends that the search of his cell phone was unlawful pursuant to Riley v. 

California (2014) __ U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430] (Riley). There, the United 

States Supreme Court held that the search incident to arrest doctrine does not apply to 

searches of cell phones. Thus, "a warrant is generally required before such a search, even 

when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest." (Id., 134 S.Ct. at p. 2493.)

Officer Martin searched appellant's cell phone in December 2012, more than one year 

before Riley was decided. At the time of the search, the controlling authority was our 

California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Diaz (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84 (Diaz). Diaz 

"held that the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless search of cell phone data incident to 

an arrest, so long as the cell phone was immediately associated with the arrestee's person. 

[Citation.]" (Riley, supra, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2481.) 
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We presume that, when Officer Martin searched appellant's cell phone, he was 

relying on Diaz's authorization of such a search as incident to appellant's arrest. "A public 

officer is presumed to know the law, provided it is clearly established. [Citation.]" 

(Conway v. Pasadena Humane Society (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 163, 178-79.) Since Officer 

Martin was a peace officer, he was also a public officer. (In re Eddie D. (1991) 235 

Cal.App.3d 417, 422.)

In denying appellant's motion to suppress, the juvenile court concluded that Officer 

Martin had "properly relied upon the authorities [e.g., Diaz] that were in existence at the 

time that the search was conducted." The court invoked an exception to the exclusionary 

rule established by the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States (2011) 564

U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285] (Davis). Davis held that "[e]vidence obtained 

during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the 

exclusionary rule." (Id., 131 S.Ct. at p. 2429.) The Supreme Court reasoned: "[W]hen 

binding appellate precedent specifically authorizes a particular police practice, well-trained 

officers will and should use that tool to fulfill their crime-detection and public-safety 

responsibilities. An officer who conducts a search in reliance on binding appellate

precedent does no more than ' "ac[t] as a reasonable officer would and should act" ' under 

the circumstances. [Citation.] The deterrent effect of exclusion in such a case can only be 

to discourage the officer from ' "do[ing] his duty." ' [Citation.]" (Ibid.)

We agree with the juvenile court that the Davis exception to the exclusionary rule 

applies here.1 At the time of Officer Martin's search, Diaz was binding precedent from the 

California Supreme Court. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara 

 

1 A similar issue is pending before the California Supreme Court in People v. Macabeo, 

S221852, review granted November 24, 2014. According to the Supreme Court's News 

Release of November 26, 2014, one of the issues presented by Macabeo is as follows: "Did 

Riley v. California (2014) __ U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430] require the 

exclusion of evidence obtained during the warrantless search of the suspect’s cell phone 

incident to arrest, or did the search fall within the good faith exception to the exclusionary 

rule (see Davis v. United States (2011) 564 U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285]) in 

light of People v. Diaz (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84?" (See 

http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ws112414.pdf.)
4

County (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) Martin reasonably relied on the holding of Diaz that a 

search of appellant's cell phone was "valid as being incident to a lawful custodial arrest." 

(Diaz, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 88.) Because Martin "acted in strict compliance with binding 

precedent, . . . [his] behavior was not wrongful. Unless the exclusionary rule is to become a 

strict-liability regime, it can have no application in this case." (Davis, supra, 131 S.Ct. at 

pp. 2428-2429.) "About all that exclusion would deter in this case is conscientious police 

work." (Id., at p. 2429.)

We reject appellant's argument that Diaz is distinguishable because it involved the 

search of a simple "2007 flip phone," while Officer Martin searched a more sophisticated 

"smart phone" that had " 'the capacity to gather a substantial amount . . . of information that 

the owner of the phone might regard as private.' " The Diaz court made clear that its 

holding applies irrespective of the sophistication or storage capacity of the cell phone that is

being searched. (Diaz, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 96-98.) The court noted: "Adopting the 

quantitative approach of defendant and the dissent, under which the validity of a warrantless 

search would turn on the amount of personal information a particular item might contain, 

would be contrary to . . . high court precedents. [Citation.]" (Id., at p. 98.) The dissenting 

opinion in Diaz observed, "[T]he rule adopted by the majority . . . is broad enough to 

encompass all types of handheld electronic data devices, including smartphones such as 

iPhones and BlackBerry devices, as well as other types of handheld computers." (Id., at 

p. 105, dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.) 

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J.

PERREN, J.
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David Worley, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Stephen P. Lipson, Public Defender; Michael C. McMahon Chief Deputy and 

William Quest Deputy Public Defender, for Appellant. 

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jason Tran, 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss, Deputy Attorney General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.