The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge for th e District 1 of South Dakota. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 96-1963

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of South Dakota. Josh M. Kocourek, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: May 22, 1997 Filed: June 10, 1997

___________ Before McMILLIAN, FAGG, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Josh Kocourek pleaded guilty to possessing a stolen firearm and knowingl y selling a firearm to a juvenile, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) and § 922(x)(1)(A). The distri ct court sentenced Kocourek to 30 months imprisonment and three year s 1
s u pervised release, and he appeals. Counsel filed a brief under Anders v. California , 386 U .S. 738 (1967) and was granted leave to withdraw. Kocourek has filed a supplemental brief with our permission. We affirm.-2-

Citing United States v. Lopez , 514 U. S. 549 (1995), Kocourek first argues that the statutes defining the crimes to which he pleaded guilty are unconstitutiona l exercises o f jurisdiction. We review de novo the constitutionality of a statute. Se e United States v. McMurray , 34 F.3d 1405, 1413 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 1164 (1995).
Section 922(j) states in relevant part that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to receive, possess, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any stolen firearm . .

. which has been shipped or transported in, interstate or foreign commerce, either before or after it was stolen, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the firearm

. . . was stolen." Section 922(x)(1)(A) makes it unlawful for a person to sell o r oth erwise transfer a handgun to a person who the transferor knows or has reason t o believe is a juvenile. We reject Kocourek's challenge to section 922(j) for the same reason we rejected a similar challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). See United States v. Shelton , 66 F.3d 991, 992 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (concluding that § 922(g) contain s interstate-commerce requirement that ensures, through case-by-case inquiry, that firearm in question affects interstate commerce), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 1364 (1996). Section 9 22(j) contains plain language, virtually identical to that of section 922(g) , estab lishing an interstate-commerce requirement: the firearm in question must hav e been shipped or transported "in" interstate commerce. Accordingly, section 922(j) also ensures that the firearm in question affects interstate commerce. Section 922(x)(1)(A) does not contain an inters tate-commerce requirement. We conclude, however, that it may be susta ined as a valid exercise of Congress's power to regulate ac tivities that have a substantial relation to interstate commerce. See Lopez , 514 U.S. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30; United States v. Mic hael R. , 90 F.3d 340, 343- 44 (9th Cir. 1996) (§ 922(x) regulates interstate commerce by attacking both suppl y and demand for firearms with respect to juveniles); cf. United States v. Monteleone ,-3-

77 F.3d 1086, 1092 (8th Cir. 1996) (1 8 U.S.C. § 922(d) represents legitimate exercise of Congress's commerce power becaus e disposal of firearm--even when consummated in com pletely intrastate transaction--is commercial activity "'that might, throug h repetition elsewhere, substantially affect . . . interstate co mmerce'" (quoting Lopez , 514 U.S. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at 1634)). Kocourek also argues that the district co urt erred in denying him an acceptanceof-responsibility adjustment under U.S. Sentencing Guide lines Manual § 3E1.1 (1995). We conclude there was no cl ear error, given that Kocourek falsely denied his relevant conduct until the day of sentenc ing. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1 (a),(h)) (1995) (factors to consider); United Sta tes v. Janis , 71 F.3d 308, 310-11 (8th Cir. 1995) (standard of review); cf. United States v. Haversa t , 22 F.3d 790, 799 (8 th Cir. 1994) (district court did not clearly err in denying reduction wher e def endants continued to minimize their role in conspiracy throughout proceedings) , cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 671 (1995). Having reviewed

the record, we find no other nonfrivolous issues. See Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). Accordingly, we affirm. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.