[Cite as State v. Stobbs , 2020-Ohio-92.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO Appellee

v. RONALD C. STOBBS Appellant C.A. No. 29346

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. CR-2018-10-3522
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: January 15, 2020

TEODOSIO, Presiding Judge. {¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Ronald St obbs, appeals from the judgment o f the Summit County Court of Common Pl eas. This Court reverses.
I. {¶2} Mr. Stobbs was arrested on two counts of OVI, both of which wer e later indicted as third-degree felonies due to his previously having been conv icted of a felony OVI. He was taken into custody and held at the jail before being granted su pervised release. As conditions of his supervised release, he was ordered to reside at a restricte d halfway house, to wear a Secure Continuous Remote Alcohol Monitor (“SCRAM”), to refrain from dr iving, to report to the Pretrial Supervision Program Offi ce every other week, and to ha ve phone contact with the office on his non-reporting weeks. {¶3} The parties ultimately entered into a plea agreement wherein Mr . Stobbs agreed to plead guilty to one OVI count in exchange for the State dismiss ing his remaining count and2 agreeing to a two-year prison sentence with credit for time ser ved. At his plea hearing, he asked the court to deduct, as part of his jail-time credit, the time he had spent on supervised release. The court indicated that he would not be entitled to credit for that time, but agreed that he could argue the issue at sentencing. M r. Stobbs did so at his senten cing hearing, but the court once again rejected his argument. The court orally announced that h e would receive two years in prison, with credit strictly for t he time he spent incarcerated at the jail. {¶4} Before the court issued its sentencing entry, Mr. Stobbs filed a motion for reconsideration. He asked the court to either grant his motion or hold a hearing to receive evidence on the issue of whether he was entitled to additional jail-time credit. The State did not respond to the motion for recons ideration, and the court denied it without holding a hearing. Consistent with its earlier pronouncement, the court sentenced Mr. Stobbs to two years in prison, with credit for the time he spent incarcerated at the jail. {¶5} Mr. Stobbs now appeals from the trial court’s judgment and rais es two assignments of error for our review.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO CREDIT THE DEFENDANT WITH JAIL TIME FOR TIME SERVED IN A RESTRICTIVE RESIDENTIAL PROGRAM WHICH RESTRICTED [HIM FROM] LEAVING AND WHERE HE WOULD RECEIVE AN ESCAPE CHARGE IF HE LEFT. {¶6} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Stobbs argues that the tr ial court erred when it failed to award him additional jail-time credit. For the follo wing reasons, we sustain Mr. Stobbs’ assignment of error and remand thi s matter to the trial court f or further proceedings.3
{¶7} “The record of [a] person’s convi ction shall specify the total number of days, if any, that [he] was confined for any reason arising out of the o ffense for which [he] was convicted and sentenced * * *.” R.C. 2949.08(B). The department of reha bilitation and correction then must “reduce [the person’s] sentence ‘by the total number of da ys that [he] was confined * * *.’”
State v. Keith , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 08CA009362, 2009-Ohio-76, ¶ 6, quoting R .C. 2967.191(A). R.C. 2967.191(A) provides, as exampl es of confinement, “confine ment in lieu of bail while awaiting trial, confinement for examination to determine the pr isoner’s competence to stand trial or sanity, confinement while awaiting transportation to the pla ce where the prisoner is to serve [his] prison term, * * *, and confinement in a juvenile facilit y.” “The Supreme Court of Ohio has concluded from these examples that ‘confinement’ requires s uch a restraint on the offender’s freedom of movement that he ca nnot leave official custody of hi s own volition.” State v. James , 106 Ohio App.3d 686, 690 (9th Dist.1995), citing State v. Nagle , 23 Ohio St.3d 185, 186-187 (1986). Thus, when a defendant seeks jail-time credit for time he spent at a facility other than jail, the question is whether his time at that facility was “su fficiently restrictive to constitute confinement * * *.” State v. Rinella , 9th Dist. Summit No. 28460, 2018-Ohio-1922, ¶ 19. If sufficiently restrictive, time served in a non-jail facility wi ll be awarded as jail-time credit. See State v. Napier , 93 Ohio St.3d 646 (2001), syllabus; State v. Snowder , 87 Ohio St.3d 335, 337 (1999). {¶8} The record reflects that, following his release from jail, Mr. Stobbs was ordered to reside at a restricted halfway house under the supervision of t he Summit County Pretrial Supervision Program. Both his attorney and the trial court ref erred to the restricted halfway house as “RIP” or “the RIP program,” and his attorney later def ined the program name in full as “the Residential Institutional Probation (“RIP”) restricted pro gram * * *.” At his plea hearing,4

Mr. Stobbs asked the court to cre dit him with the time he serve d in the RIP program. He represented to the court that the State had agreed that time wa s eligible for credit, and the prosecutor did not object to his representation. Even so, the court indicated that Mr. Stobbs would not be entitled to credit for that time because “RIP is n ot a secured facility.” Mr. Stobbs then asked to be able to argue t he issue at sentencing, and the court agreed that he could do so. {¶9} At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Stobbs once again asked the cour t to credit him with the time he spent in the RIP program. He represented to t he court that he spent his time there under restriction and was to ld that he would incur an esc ape charge if he attempted to leave. The State did not dispute his representation, object, o r otherwise provide an argument to the contrary. Nevertheless, the court rejected his argument an d refused to award him additional jail-time credit. In doing so, it merely stated that it would “not credit[] [Mr. Stobbs] time in the RIP program.” The court did not offer any rationale in support of its decision not to award credit. {¶10} After his sentencing hearing but before the court journalized h is sentence, Mr. Stobbs filed a motion for reconsideration. In his motion, he a sked the court to hold a hearing on the issue of confinement, so th at he might present evidence. H e represented to the court that, while in the RIP program, he resided in the “Restricted” area, he was subject to the control of the staff “regarding his personal liberties,” he was told that he w ould be charged with escape if he left, he was denied permission to visit his family for either T hanksgiving or Christmas, and he was only permitted to leave the facility for his “required AA m eetings occurring across the street and for court appearances of which he had a specific time limit for return.” He indicated that he had requested both the record of his time spent at the RIP prog ram and “the Restricted Halfway House Handbook.” Mr. Stobbs indicat ed that he would supplement the record with those5 materials upon receipt and asked the court to provide him the o pportunity to present his evidence at a hearing. The State did not respond to his motion, but the court denied it. In doing so, the court wrote in its sentencing en try and an accompanying journal entry that the request for additional jail-time credit was denied. Once again, it did not offer any rationale in support of its decision not to award credit. {¶11} As noted, time served in a non-jail facility, if sufficiently r estrictive, will constitute “confinement” for purposes of R.C. 2967.191. See Napier , 93 Ohio St.3d at 648.
Accord Snowder , 87 Ohio St.3d at 337. A reviewing court’s determination of whether time served in a [ non-jail facility] constitutes confinement * * * is [dependent] on a record that e vidences the level of restriction placed on the defe ndant during his participation at the facility. * * * When the trial court fails to provide reasoning for its denial of the motion and the record fails to indicate whether an appellant’s participation i n a [] program was confinement as defined in Napier , the trial court must reconsider the issue of crediting time served in light of the level of defendant’s part icipation at the [facility]. State v. Edwards , 9th Dist. Summit No. 20840, 2002 WL 701946, *1-2 (Apr. 24, 20 02). On reconsideration, it is the defenda nt’s burden to present eviden ce “that demonstrates his level of participation at the [facility].” Id. at *2. {¶12} Upon review, this Court cannot det ermine whether the trial cour t erred when it refused to award Mr. Stobbs the additional jail-time credit tha t he requested. That is because the record does not “evidence[] the level of restriction placed on [him] during his participation [in the RIP program]” or the trial court’s “reasoning for its denia l of [his] motion.” Edwards at *1- 2. The trial court initially rej ected Mr. Stobbs’ request for credit because “RIP is not a secured facility.” Yet, Mr. Stobbs then presented an argument to the c ontrary. He represented to the court that he had resided in t he restricted portion of the faci lity, he would have been criminally charged if he had left without permission, and he had been subj ect to the control of the staff6 “regarding his personal liberties.” See Napier at 648. The State never opposed any of his representations, and the trial c ourt, in rejecting his argument , failed to provide any reasoning for its decision. Moreover, the recor d otherwise contains scant ev idence as to the specifics of the facility where Mr. Stobbs resided or his level of participation in the program. Upon review, we cannot determine “whether [his] p articipation in the [RIP] prog ram[] was ‘confinement.’” State v. Neff , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 00CA007578, 2001 WL 111529, *2 (Feb. 7, 2001).

{¶13} Because the trial court did not provide reasoning for its denia l of Mr. Stobbs’ motion and the record does not i ndicate whether he was confined herein, “the trial court must reconsider the issue of crediting time served in light of the l evel of [his] participation at the [facility].” Edwards at *2. On remand, it will be Mr. Stobbs’ burden to present ev idence demonstrating his level of participation in the RIP program. See id. His first assignment of error is sustained on that basis.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO HOLD A HEARING ON THE DEFENDANT’S REQUEST [TO] RECEIVE CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED IN A RESTRICTIVE RESIDENTIAL PROGRAM WHICH RESTRICTED [HIM FROM] LEAVING AND WHERE HE WOULD RECEIVE AN ESCAPE CHARGE IF HE LEFT. {¶14} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Stobbs argues that the t rial court erred when it failed to hold a hearin g on his request for additional jail-time credit. B ecause this matter must be remanded for further proceedings, Mr. Stobbs’ second ar gument is premature. We, therefore, decline to address it.
III. {¶15} Mr. Stobbs’ first assignment of error is sustained. Because hi s second assignment of error is premature, this Court declines to address it. The judgment of the Summit County7

Court of Common Pleas is reverse d, and the cause is remanded fo r further proceedings in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, direc ting the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof , this document shall consti tute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file s tamped by the Clerk of the Cour t of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the pa rties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket , pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellee.

THOMAS A. TE ODOSIO FOR THE COURT

SCHAFER, J. CALLAHAN, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES: KANI HARVEY HIGHTOWER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO GUEST, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.