UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

SAN ANTONIO DIVISION 

JULIE SOLIS, individually, and on 

behalf of all other similarly situated. 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

WFC LIMITED PARTNERSHIP d/b/a 

WORLD FINANCE CORPORATION, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 5:20-cv-00404-OLG 

FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 

 NOW COMES Plaintiff, JULIE SOLIS, individually and on behalf of all other similarly 

situated, through undersigned counsel, complaining of Defendant, WFC LIMITED 

PARTNERSHIP d/b/a WORLD FINANCE CORPORATION, as follows: 

NATURE OF THE ACTION 

1. This action is seeking redress for Defendant’s violation(s) the Telephone Consumer 

Protection Act (the “TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.; and the Texas Debt Collection Act (the 

“TDCA”), Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392 et seq.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

2. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

3. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 

4. Venue in this district is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). 

PARTIES 

5. JULIE SOLIS (“Plaintiff”) is a natural person, over 18-years-of-age, who at all 

times relevant resided in Boerne, Texas. 

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6. Plaintiff is a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 

7. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.001(1). 

8. WFC LIMITED PARTNERSHIP d/b/a WORLD FINANCE CORPORATION 

(“Defendant”) is a limited partnership organized and existing under the laws of the state of Texas. 

9. Defendant has its principal place of business at 108 Frederick Street, Greenville, 

South Carolina 29607. 

10. Defendant is a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 

11. Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.001(6) as 

it directly or indirectly engages in debt collection. 

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 

12. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was the sole operator, possessor, and subscriber of 

the cellular telephone number ending in 8357. 

13. At all times relevant, Plaintiff’s number ending in 8357 was assigned to a cellular 

telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 

14. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was financially responsible for his cellular telephone 

equipment and services. 

15. Six months ago, Plaintiff applied for and obtained an advance loan from Defendant. 

16. This loan is a ”consumer debt” as defined by Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.001(2). 

17. As result of unforeseen financial hardship, Plaintiff did not pay. 

18. Soon, Plaintiff started to receive collection phone calls from Defendant. 

19. On multiple occasions, Plaintiff answered these calls. 

20. Each time, Plaintiff was met by clear pause, and was forced to say “Hello, Hello, 

Hello” prior to being connected to an agent. 

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21. Each time, Defendant wanted payment. 

22. Often times, Plaintiff simply hung up. 

23. Ultimately however, having had enough, Plaintiff told Defendant “[s]top calling 

me!” 

24. Sadly, these phone calls continued. 

25. Whatismore, Plaintiff started to receive SMS messages from Defendant. 

26. Defendant’s SMS messages provided: 

“For your convenience you can make an online payment or you can contact us at 

(830) 896-8050.” 

27. All in all, Plaintiff received no less than 45 unwanted, unauthorized, unconsentedto phone calls/texts from numbers leading back to Defendant – including, (830) 896-8050. 

28. Defendant’s phone calls have caused Plaintiff actual harm, including but not limited 

to, aggravation that accompanies persistent and unwanted phone calls, anxiety, emotional distress, 

increased risk of personal injury resulting from the distraction caused by the phone calls, wear and 

tear to Plaintiff’s cellular phone, intrusion upon and occupation of Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, 

temporary loss of use of Plaintiff’s cellular phone, invasion of privacy, loss of battery charge, loss 

of concentration, mental anguish, nuisance, the per-kilowatt electricity costs required to recharge 

Plaintiff’s cellular telephone as a result of increased usage of Plaintiff’s telephone services, and 

wasting Plaintiff’s time. 

29. Concerned with having had her rights violated, Plaintiff sought counsel to ensure 

that Defendant’s unlawful collection practices stopped. 

30. Accordingly, Plaintiff is forced to expend energy and/or time consulting with 

attorneys to put an end to Defendant’s unlawful collection practices. 

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CLASS ALLEGATIONS 

31. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as 

though fully set forth herein. 

32. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) 

individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated (the “Putative Class”) defined as follows: 

All persons throughout the United States (1) to whom Defendant placed, or caused 

to be placed, a call; (2) directed to a number assigned to a cellular telephone 

service; (3) using an artificial or prerecorded voice; (4) within the four years 

preceding the date of this complaint through the date of class certification; (5) after 

he/she requested that Defendant cease calls to his/her telephone number. 

33. The following individuals are excluded from the Putative Class: (1) any Judge or 

Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, Defendant’s 

subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or their parents 

have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) 

Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from 

the Putative Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such executed 

persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated 

and/or released. 

A. Numerosity

34. Upon information and belief, the members of the Putative Class are so numerous 

that joinder of them is impracticable. 

35. The exact number of the members of the Putative Class is unknown to Plaintiff at 

this time, and can be determined only through appropriate discovery. 

36. The members of the Putative Class are ascertainable because the Class is defined 

by reference to objective criteria. 

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37. The members of the Putative Class are identifiable in that their names, addresses 

and telephone numbers can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant. 

B. Commonality and Predominance

38. There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the 

Putative Class. 

39. Those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual 

members of the Putative Class. 

C. Typicality 

40. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of members of the Putative Class because Plaintiff and 

members of the Putative Class are entitled to damages as result of Defendant’s conduct. 

D. Superiority and Manageability

41. This case is also appropriate for class certification as class proceedings are superior 

to all other available methods for the efficient and fair adjudication of this controversy. 

42. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Putative Class will likely 

be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense required for individual prosecution. 

43. By contrast, a class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies 

of scale and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 

44. Economies of effort, expense, and time will be fostered and uniformity of decisions 

ensured. 

E. Adequate Representation

45. Plaintiff will adequately and fairly represent and protect the interests of the Putative 

Class. 

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46. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Putative Class, and Defendant 

has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 

47. Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced counsel in consumer class action 

litigation. 

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 

COUNT I: 

Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. § 227 et. seq.) 

(On behalf of Plaintiff and the Members of the Putative Class) 

48. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as 

though fully set forth herein. 

49. Defendant placed or caused to be placed no less than 45 non-emergency calls, 

including but not limited to the aforementioned collection calls, to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone 

utilizing an artificial or prerecorded voice without Plaintiff’s consent in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 

227 (b)(1)(A)(iii). 

50. Although the TCPA does not define a “call,” the Federal Communcations 

Commission (FCC), the agency implementing the TCPA, has interpreted the TCPA to 

“encompass[] both voice calls and text calls to wireless numbers including, for example, short 

message service (SMS) calls,” which are generally referred to as text messages. In re Rules & 

Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 14014, 

14115 (July 3, 2003); see also Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 

2009) (holding that the FCC’s interpretation that a text message is a “call” under the TCPA is 

reasonable). 

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51. The TCPA defines an automatic telephone dialing system as equipment which has 

the capacity – (A) to store or produce numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number 

generator; and (B) to dial such numbers. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 

52. Upon information and belief, based on the “clear pause” Plaintiff experienced, 

Defendant employed an ATDS to place calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 

53. Upon information and belief, the ATDS employed by Defendant transfers the call 

to an agent once a human voice is detected, hence the clear pause. 

54. Upon information and belief, Defendant acted through its agents, employees, 

and/or representatives at all times relevant. 

55. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. §227 (b)(1)(A)(iii). Plaintiff is 

entitled to receive $500.00 in damages for each violation. 

56. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and willful violations of 47 U.S.C. §227 

(b)(1)(A)(iii), Plaintiff is entitled to receive up to $1,500.00 in treble damages for each violation. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff on behalf of himself and the members of the Putative Class, 

requests the following relief: 

A. an order granting certification of the proposed class, including the designation of 

Plaintiff as the named representative, and the appointment of the undersigned as 

Class Counsel; 

B. an order finding that Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(iii); 

C. an order enjoining Defendant from placing or causing to place further violating 

calls to consumers; 

D. an award of $500.00 in damages to Plaintiff and the members of the Putative Class 

for each such violation; 

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E. an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 to Plaintiff and the members of the 

Putative Class for each such violation; 

F. an award of costs of this action, together with reasonable attorney’s fees as 

determined by this Court; and 

G. an award of such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. 

COUNT II 

Texas Debt Collection Act (Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392 et seq.) 

(on behalf of Plaintiff individually) 

57. All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated herein as 

though fully set forth herein. 

58. Subsection 392.302(4) of the Texas Finance Code provides: 

[i]n debt collection, a debt collector may not oppress, harass, or abuse a person by: 

(4) causing a telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously, or making 

repeated or continuous telephone calls, with the intent to harass a 

person at the called number. 

Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.302(4). 

59. Defendant violated Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.302(4) by continuing to place phone 

calls to Plaintiff in spite of Plaintiff’s request(s) that they stop. 

60. Plaintiff may enforce the provisions of Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.302(4) pursuant 

to Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.403 which provides: 

(a) A person may sue for: 

(1) injunctive relief to prevent or restrain a violation of this chapter; and 

(2) actual damages sustained as a result of a violation of this chapter. 

(b) A person who successfully maintains an action under Subsection (a) is 

entitled to attorney’s fees reasonable related to the amount of work 

performed and costs. 

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the following relief: 

A. a finding that Defendant violated Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.302(4); 

B. an award of injunctive relief pursuant to Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.403(a)(1); 

C. an award of actual damages in an amount to be determined pursuant to Tex. Fin. 

Code Ann. § 392.403(a)(2); 

D. an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in an amount to be determined 

pursuant to Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.403(b); and 

E. an award of such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. 

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b), Plaintiff demands a trial by jury of any and all issues in 

this action so triable of right.

DATED: April 22, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 

 JULIE SOLIS 

 

By: /s/ Joseph S. Davidson 

 Mohammed O. Badwan 

Joseph S. Davidson 

 SULAIMAN LAW GROUP, LTD. 

 2500 South Highland Avenue 

Suite 200 

 Lombard, Illinois 60148 

 +1 630-575-8181 

mbadwan@sulaimanlaw.com 

jdavidson@sulaimanlaw.com 

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