T his co urt i d en t i f i es m i no r sexu al ab use victi m s b y t he i r i nit i als. 1 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 25, 200 5


### STAT E O F T EN NE SSEE v. JOSEP H V ER MEA L

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Warre n Coun ty No. F -8405 Larry B. Stanley, Jr., Judge

No. M2005- 00568-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Dece m ber 28, 2005

The a ppellant, J oseph Ve rmea l, wa s co n v i cted by a jury in the Warren County

Circuit Court of attempted ag g ravated sexual battery and wa s sentence d to four y ear s incar cer ation in the Tenne ssee De pa rt me nt o f C or

re c tio n. On app e a l, the app e lla nt c omp la ins that th e e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt t o support his conviction, the trial court err ed in r efusing to permit his ex pert witness to testify , and the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in imp os ing c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing

. Up on ou r re vie w of the re c or d a ndthe pa rt ie s’ briefs, w e af

firm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D G. H A Y ES and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Phi lli p T . Cl e mon s, Mc Min nv ill e , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Jose ph Ve rm e a l.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tt o rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; El iza be th B . M arn e y , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Da le Pot te r, Di stric t At torne y Ge ne ra l; a nd Th oma s J. Mi ne r, As sis ta nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

The a ppellant was indicte d by

the Warre n CountyGra nd J u ry o n o ne count of ag g ravated sexual battery . I n the l i gh t m o s t fa v orable to the State, the proof a dduced at trial reve aled that on Aug ust 26, 2000, Pi oneer Ba ptist C hurch spon s o re d a block pa rty in the parking lot of the nea rby Country Place Apartments. After the party ended, the victim, N.O., who was se ven y ear s old, rode 1 her bic y cle with sever al friends. The victim was dressed in blue j eans and a Tweety Bird shirt. One of the oth e r c hil dr e n to ld the vic tim that th e y c ou ld ob tai n ic e c re a m a t th e app e lla nt’ s a pa rt me nt.J. P. w as a l s o a v i ct i m of s ex u al a bu s e by t h e appe l l an t

. Se e St at e v

. J os eph V er mea l , N o. 2
M 2 0 0 4

- 0 0 0 4 6

- C C A

- R 3

- C D , 20 0 5 W L 1 0 0 0 2 3 7 , at * 1 (T enn. C ri m

. A p p

. at N ashvi l l e, A p r. 29 , 20 0 5 ).
2 The c hildren we nt to the appellant’s apartment and found that the appellant was at home, sitting on the porc h. After

rec eiving the appe llant ’s p ermission, the children w ent inside and g ot popsicles from the a

ppellant’s fr eezer . At the appe llant’s reque st, th e ch ildren ate their popsicles on the ap p el l an t’s front porc h instead of inside his apa rtment. After war d, the childre n went inside the appellant’ s apartment to watch television and jump on the a ppellant’s waterbe d.
Soon, all of the children except the victim a nd J .P., another fe male child, we nt home. The 2 victim remained in the a

ppellant’s li ving r oom for thirty minutes to an hour, watc hing c artoons on cable television, while J .P. went in the appellant’ s bedroom to jump on the bed. The appellant joined J .P. in the bedroom. Some time after the appe llant went into the bedr oom, the victim was standing by th e f r o n t d o o r lo o k in g o u ts id e w h e n s h e f e lt s o me o n e to u c h h e r r ig h t b u tt o c k

. During her testimony at trial, the victim de monstrated how she was touche d. The victim believe d that J .P. had touched he r, but when she turned a round she sa w the appe llant. The appel l an t slid hi s hand underne ath her

shirt and touched he r bre asts. S h e explained that when he touc hed her , “he . . . presse d down.” The appellant r emoved his hand, g ot a bee r fr om the k i t ch en , and re turned to the bedroom.

The victim wa s afr aid that she would g et into trouble for be ing in the a ppellant’s apa

rtment and for letting him touch her. She rema ined i n the apartment for a few minutes then went outside. S h e r o d e h e r

b i k e f o r t e n m i n u t e s b e f

o r e b e i n g s t o p p e d b y “ U n c l e E

. J

. , ” E l v i s J o s e p h K e r s e y. Ke rs e y tol d th e vic tim

that on e of

his frie nd s h a d s e e n h e r i n th e app e lla nt’ s a pa rt me nt. Th e vic tim didno t te ll K e rs e y

wh a t th e app e lla nt h a d d on e be c a us e sh e wa s e mbarr a sse d a nddidno t w a nt t o dis c us s th e inc ide nt. Ke rs e y a ndthe vic tim

we nt to f indthe vic tim ’s da d, Ho wa rdOr c utt . B oth Ke rs e y a ndOr c utt

liv e d in Cou ntry

Pla c e Ap art me nts

. Whe n th e vic tim

a ndKe rs e y

fo un d O rc utt

a t hi s a pa rt me nt, Ke rs e y

tol d O rc utt

that the vic tim ha d b e e n in the app e lla nt’ s a pa rt me nt. Or c utt

le ft , g oin g imm e diate ly

to the app e lla nt’ s a

pa rt me nt. He f ound the appe llant sitt ing on the porch of his apartment. Or cutt stepped on the a ppellant’s porc h and ask e d th e ap p e ll a n t w h y h is d a u g h te r

h a d b e e n in th e ap p e ll a n t’ s ap ar tm e n t. T h e appellant g rabbe d Orc utt’s neck a nd pushed him. A scuff le ensue d with Orcutt eme rg ing a s the victor.
Upon h is r e tu r n to h is ap ar tm e n t, O r c u tt f o u n d th e v ic ti m s itti n g o n th e p o r c h w ith her g randmother , Ba

rbar a B evilag ua. The victim was crying. B evilag ua aske d the victim if the appe llant had touche d her. Initially , the victim stated that he ha d n o t ; h o wever, shortly there afte r she acknow ledg ed that the a

ppellant had touche d her. When asked where the appellant touche d her, the vict im , w h o w a s s itti n g d o w n , g e s tu r e d b e lo w h e r w a is t. O r c u tt

w e n t b a c k

to th e ap p e ll a nt’s apar tment, i n te n d in g to k il l h im

. H o w e v e r , p o li c e h a d b e e n c a ll e d a s a r e s u lt o f th e p r e v ious strug g le. The a

ppellant was taken fr om the scene in an ambulanc e.
The victim was take n to the Depa rtment of Children’s Ser vices (D C S ) where she wa s3

interviewe d by

a ca se worke r, Melba Moone yham. The vic tim ini t i al l ytold Mooneyham that nothing ha

ppened at the appellant’ s apartment. At trial, the victim e x plained that at the time of the first statement, she ha d not wanted to discuss the incide nt because she wa s embarr assed, f rig htened,
a ndbe lie ve d s he wo uldg e t in tr ou ble fo r b e ing in a str a ng e r’ s apa rt me nt. At

a se c on d in te rv ie w w ith Mooneyh am o n October 10, the victim told Mooney ham about the de tails of the molestation. Mooneyham believe d that the victim was mor ec o mf o r ta ble with her a nd forthrig ht during the sec ond interview.

At the conc lusion of the proof, the jury acquitted the ap p ell ant of the c harg ed off ense but found h i m guilty

of the lesse r-include d offe nse of attempted ag g ravated sexual battery . The trial
c ou rt imp os e d a

se nte nc e of

fo ur y e ars

. Th e c ou rt

or de re d th a t th e se nte nc e fo r the ins ta nt o ff e ns e be ser ved conse cutively

to t he nine- y ear

sentenc e he ha d previously rec eived f

or the a g g ravated sexual battery

of J.P . On appe al, the appellant challeng es the suff iciency of the e vidence , the trial court’s e videntiary

ruling , and the imposition of consec utive sentenc ing.

II. Ana lys is

A. Sufficienc y

of the Evidenc e

I n h is f ir st i ssu e , th e app e lla nt c ha lle ng e s th e su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e supp ortin g his conviction, specific ally complaining that there was no evidenc e from which a jury could infer

that the touching was for

the purpose of

sexual arousal or g ratification. I n his second issue, the appellant contends that the tria l court er red in ove rruling his moti on for judgment of acquittal bec ause the vic tim ’s te sti mon y

c on ta ine d to o many inc on sis te nc ie s to be be lie ve d. As the se iss ue s a re c los e ly related, we w ill address them tog ether

.
I nitially , we note that the rec ord re flec ts that the appellant made a motion for a judgme nt of acquittal at the e nd of the State’s pr oof. It is well-established that a m o t i o n fo r a judg ment of
a c qu itt a l ma de a t th e c on c lus ion of the Sta te ’s pr oo f is wa ive d by a n a pp e lla nt w he n h e c ho os e s to pr e se nt e vid e nc e on his be ha lf . St a te v. Th oma s, 15 8 S. W.3 d 3 61 , 3 87 (T e nn . 2 00 5) (q uo tin g Sta te v. Ba ll, 973 S.W .2d 288, 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)) (a ppendix). Rega

rdless, “[t] he standa

rd by wh ic h th e tr ia l c ou rt

de te rm ine s a

mot ion fo r j ud g me nt o f a c qu itt a l at th e e nd of a ll the pr oo f i s, in
essenc e, the same standa

rd which a

pplies on appea l in determining the suffic iency of the e vidence afte r a c onviction.” State v. Thompson, 88 S.W .3d 611, 6 1 4-15 (Te nn. Crim. App. 2000). There fore , we will addr ess the appe llant’s complaints as a c halleng e to the suff iciency of the evidenc e. On appe al, a jury

conviction re moves the pre sumptio n o f t h e appellant’ s innocenc e and repla ces it with one of g uilt, so that the appellant car ries the burden of demonstrating to this court why the evidenc e will not support the jur y ’s fi ndings. See State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (T en n

. 1 9 8 2). The a

ppellant must establish that no reasona ble trier of

fac t could have f

ound the essential ele ments of the off ense bey ond a rea sonable doubt. See J ackson v. Virg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct . 2781, 2789 (1979); Te nn. R. App. P. 13(e).4

Acc ording ly , on appea l, the State is entitled to the stronge st leg itimate view of the e vidence and all rea sonable inferenc es which may be drawn t here from. S ee State v. Williams, 657 S .W.2d 4 0 5 , 4 1 0 (T enn. 1983). In other wor ds, questions conce rning the cr edibilityof witnesses a nd the weig ht and value to be g iven the evide nce, a s well as all fa ctual is sues ra ised by the evidenc e, ar e resolved by

the t rier of

fac t, and not the appe llate courts. See State v. Pruett, 788 S.W .2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990)

.
In t h e i n s t a n tc a s e , t h e ap p e l l a n tw a s c o n v i c t e d o f a t t e m p t e d a g g r a v a t e d s e x u a l b a t t e r y. “Ag g ravated sexual battery is unlawful sexual contact with a vic tim bythe def endant or the defe ndant by

a victim” whe n the “victim i s less than thirteen ( 13) y ear s of ag e.” T enn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504( a)( 4) (2003) . “‘Sexual contac t’ includes t he int entional t ouching of the victim’s [or] the def endant’ s . . . intim ate part s , . . . if that intentional touching can be rea sonably construed a s being for the pur

pose of se x ual arousal or gratification.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 501(6) ( 2003). I t is pe rm iss ibl e fo r a

jury to “ us e the ir

c omm on kn ow le dg e a nde xpe ri e nc e in m akin g re a so na ble infere nces f

rom evidenc e.” State v. Me eks, 876 S.W.2d 121, 131 (Tenn. Cr i m

. Ap p

. 1993). Spe c if ic a lly , a jury ma y dr a w u po n th e ir

c omm on kn ow le dg e to i nf e r that a n a c c us e d f

or c e d in tim a te contac t f or the purpose of sexual a rousal or g ratification. I d. Additionally , criminal attempt occ urs when a person a cting with the kind of culpability otherwise r equire d for the of fense : (1 ) Inte nti on a ll y engag e s in a c tio n o r c a us e s a re su lt that w ou ld constitute an off

ense if the circ umstances surr ounding the conduct
wer e as the person be lieves them to be;
(2) Ac ts with int ent to cause a re sult that is an element of the of fense , and believe s the conduc t will ca use the result without further conduct on the per son’s part; or
(3 ) A c ts w ith int e nt t o c omp le te a c ou rs e of act io n or cau se a re su lt that would constitute the offe nse, under t he cir cumstance s surrounding the conduc t as the per son believes them to be, and the conduct c onstitut es a substantial step towa rd the c ommissi o n of the offe nse. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 12-101(a )(1) -(3) (2003).

I n t h e i n s t an tca s e, t h e p ro o f i s u n co n tro v er t ed t h at t h e vi ct i m wa s u n d ert h i rt ee n y ea rs o f a ge at the time of the of

fense

. Moreove r, t he victim testified t hat t he appellant touched her breasts and her buttocks, a nd she demonstrated at trial how the touch i n g occur red. The victim ex plained that wh e n h e tou c he d h e r b re a st, he “ pr e sse d d ow n. ” We c on c lud e that th e jury , draw ing up on its common knowledg e, could have inferr ed that the appellant committed the touching of the victim’s br e a sts a ndbu tto c ks fo r the pu rpose of se xua l aro us a l or

g ratif ic a tio n. Se e Sta te v. Al ton Da rn e ll Young , No. M1999-01166-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 380103, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Na shville,5

Apr. 14, 2000). Arational jury could have determined that the appe llant performed a substantial st ep towards the c ommissi on of ag g ravated sexual battery

. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the appe llant’s conviction for attempted ag g ravated sexual battery

. As his second issue, the a

ppellant contends that the t rial court err ed in over ruling his moti on for a judgme nt of ac quittal “based upon [ the vi ctim’s] inconsistent statements t here by canc elling out her te stimony .” Specif

ically , the appe llant maintains that the victim’s version of e vents at trial wa s so inc on sis te nt w ith the ve rs ion of e ve nts sh e re la te d to Mo on e yha m, the pr oo f s ho uldbe su bje c t to
canc ellation. I n Tenne ssee, “ contra dictory statements by

a witness in conne ction with the same fa ct
canc el ea ch other.” State v. Matthews, 888 S .W.2d 446, 449 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). Howe ver, “[ t] he ru le of

c a nc e llatio n is ty

pic a lly lim ite d to c ir c ums ta nc e s in wh ic h th e wi tne ss h a s sw orn to
eac h statement.” State v. Cayle Way ne Ha rris, No. M2000-02143- CCA-R3-CD, 2 0 0 1 WL 1218582, at *2 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. a t N a s h v il le , O c t. 1 2 , 2 0 0 1 )

. N e v e r th e le s s , “ [t ]h is ru le o f c a n c e lla tion applies only when inconsistency in a witness’ testimony is une x plained and when neither ve rsion of [her] t estimony

is corrobor ated by

other e vidence .” Matthews, 888 S.W .2d at 449 (citing Tay lor v. Nashville B anner

Pub. Co., 573 S .W.2d 476, 483 (Tenn. App. 1978))

.
I n the ins ta nt c a se , the app e lla nt c omp la ins that th e ve rs ion of e ve nts wh ic h th e vic tim

tol d Mooneyham diffe rs from the ver sion of events the vic tim related at trial. As there is no indication that the state me nts to Mo on e yha m we re sw orn, the vic tim ’s te sti mon y is thu s no t su bje c t to the ru le of c a nc e llatio n. Re g ard le ss, the vic tim c le arl y e xpla ine d a ny

dis c re pa nc ie s in he r t e sti mon y a t tria l. See State v. Caldwe ll, 977 S.W .2d 110, 118 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) . Acc ording ly , the victim’s te sti mon y wa s p ro pe rl y

c on sid e re d b y

the jury a nd the tr ia l c ou rt in d e te rm ini ng the app e lla nt’ s g uil t.

B . E xpe rt

Witn e ss
As his next issue, the appe llant arg ues that the “ trial court erre d in not allowing a ppellant’s expert to testify

at this tria l a s to the questioning of children.” Gene rally , the trial court ha s broad discretion in determining the qua lifications, admissibili ty , rele vancy , and compe tency of expert testimony . S ee S t ate v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 832 (Tenn. 2002). A s such, this court will not overturn the trial court’ s ruling o n t h e ad m i ssibili ty of expert testimony

absent a n abuse of

that discretion. See State v. B allard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tenn. 1993).

The fa ctual basis for

the appe llant’s cl ai m was best recited by the trial court in its order g ranting the State’s motion t o p rohi bit Dr. Wil liam Be rnet, a prospec tive expert witness for the defe nse, fr om tes t i fy i ng at trial. The trial court re lated that the State f iled a re quest for discove ry under Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Proc edure 16(b) on June 18, 2002, and a motion to compel the appellant to re spond to the discovery reque st on Aug ust 15, 2002. On October 1, 2002, the appe llant resp o n d e d th a t h e d id n o t in te n d to c a ll a n e xp e r t to te s ti f y a t tria l. O n N o v e mb e r 2 5 , 2 0 0 2 , the appellant f

iled a “se cond re sponse,” se tting forth his int ention to call Dr. W illiam Berne t as an expert. The trial court found that the notice did not allow the State “a pr oper opportunityto prepa reT h e t r i al w as s et t o be g i n on D ec embe r 3, 2002. 3

T he p roffer was o ri gi nal l y m ad e i n t he ap p el l ant ’ s p revi o us t ri al rel at i ng t o t he aggravat ed s exual ba t t ery 4

o f J

. P.
6 fo r the wi tne ss’ s te sti mon y a nd the wi tne ss’ s te sti mon y mus t th e re fo re be e xclu de d. ” Th e c ou rt a lso 3 found that the propose d testimonydid not meet the re quirements of Te nnessee Rules of Evidence 702 “in that it will not s ubstantially assist the trier of f

act to determine a f

act in issue, but instead addre sses an issue of w itness cre dibilit y which is an issue to be de termined by the jury .”

The a ppellant i n cl uded in the re cord f or our r eview an offe r of pr oof of the pr oposed testimonyof Dr. B erne t. During the offe r of pr oof, 4

Dr. B erne t testified that he wa s a g raduate of Ha rvar d Medica l School and was board certified “in g ener al psy chiatry and in c hild and adolesc ent psy chiatry

an d in f orensic psy chiatry .” Dr . Be rnet a sserted that hi s testimo ny

wo uldre la te to thr e e iss ue s. F ir st, he wo uld
e xpla in to the jury “ the pr op e r me tho ds fo r i nte rv ie wi ng c hil dr e n in inv e sti g a tin g a lle g a tio ns of ma ltr e a tme nt. ” Se c on d, he wo ulddis c us s

“ the va ri ou s mec ha nis ms, ps y c ho log ic a l mec ha nis ms, by wh ic h f a lse statements ar e made by children.” Finally , he would testify reg arding “what has bee n studied in resea rch w ith chi ldren in these situations and to be able to e x plain or to list differ ent fac tors that are consistent wi th t rue a lle g a tio ns a nddif

fe re nt f a c tor s th a t are c on sis te nt w ith false a lleg ations of abuse .”

As an e x ample, Dr. B erne t expl ained that he would inform the jur y that asking a potential child sexual abuse victim sug g estive, leading , or re petitive questions was ill-advised. Dr. Be rn et, had “re viewed the interview” of the DCS worke r and JP and concluded that J P had been a sked questions whi ch i nfluenc ed the a nswers she g ave. D r. B erne t also noted that t h er e we re indications in J P’s previous stateme nts which sug g ested that the a lleg ations we re true, and ther e we re other i ndications which would sug g est the alleg ations
wer e fa lse. Dr. B erne t stated that his testimony would serve to aid the jury in d e te rm ini ng the c re dib ili ty of the state me nts of

the c hil d witnesses and “ help them be a war e of issues they need to be awa

re of.”

Sta te v. Jose ph Ve rm e a l, No

. M2 00 4- 00 04 6- CCA -R 3- CD , 20 05 WL 10 00 23 7, a t *5 (T e nn . Crim. App. at Na shville, Apr. 29, 2005).

O n ap p e a l , t h e ap p e l l a n tc h a l l e n g e s t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s e x c l u s i o n o f D r

. B e r n e t ’ s t e s t i m o n y,7

arg uing that the testimonywas re liable and would substantially assist the trier of f

act. Te nnessee Rul e of Ev ide nc e 70 2 p ro vid e s:

I f scie nti fi c , te c hn ic a l, o r o the r s pe c ia lize d kno wl e dg e wi ll
su bs ta nti a lly

a ssi st the t ri er of fa c t to un de rs ta ndthee vid e nc e or to determ i n e a fa ct in issue, a witness qualifie d as an e x pert by knowledg e, skill, e x perie nce, tr aining , or educ ation may testify in the form of a n opinion or otherwise.

Further, McD aniel v. CSX Transpor t at ion, I nc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tenn. 1997), sug g ests the f o l l o w i n g c r i t e r i a

a c o u r t m a y c o n s i d e r

i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e r e l i ab i l i t y o f p r o p o s e d e x p e r tt e s t i m o n y: (1 ) wh et h ers ci en t i fi c e v i d en ce h as b ee n t es t ed an d t h e m et h o d o l o gy with which it has bee n tested; (2) w h et h er t h e evidence ha s been
su bje c te d to pe e r r e vie w o r publi c a tio n; ( 3) wh e the r a po te nti a l r a te of er ror is known; (4) whether . . . the evidenc e is g ener ally acc epted in the sc ie nti fi c c ommun ity ; a nd(5 ) w he the r the e xpe rt ’s re se arc h in the field ha s been c onducted indepe ndent of litigation.

I n State v. Coley , 32 S.W .3d 831 (Tenn. 2000), our supre me court examined the strictures of Rule 702 and Mc Daniel in dete rmining the admissibili ty of expert t es t i mony

conce rning the reliability of ey ewitness testimony . The c ourt noted that the testimony proposed in Coley was “ of a g ener al nature desig ned to aff ect the juror’s decision on the credibility of witnesses.” Coley , 32 S.W. 3da t 83 5. Th e c ou rt e mph a size d tha t “th e a sse ssm e nt of wi tne ss cr e dib ili ty a ndthe ro le of fa c tfinder is a lway s left to the jury , re gar d l ess of the issue pr esent in the c ase.” I d. Finally , the court fo un d th a t expert testimonyconce rning ey ewitness identification simpl y offe rs g e ne ra lit ie s a ndis n ot sp e c if ic to thewi tne ss w ho se te sti mon y is i n question. Moreove r, we are of the opi nion that the subject of the reliabi l i t yof ey ewitness identification is wit hin the common understanding of re asonable persons.

I d. at 8 3 7. Thus, the court concluded that the trial court ha d proper ly excluded Coley ’s expert witness. I d. at 838.

Our re view of the rec ord in the instant case convinces u s t h at t h e testimonyof Dr. B erne t reg arding the interview ing te chniques of alleg ed child sexual a buse victims is akin to that proposed in C ole y . D r. B e rn e t’ s te sti mon y wa s g e are d tow ard a sse ssi ng the c re dib ili ty of the c hil d w itn e sse s. The a ssessment of witness cr edibilityrests in the province of the jury

. There fore , we c onclude that the trial court in the instant case pr o p er l y ex cl uded the testimony of the a ppellant’s prospe ctive
e xpe rt wi tne ss.8 C. Sentencing

As his fi na l issu e , the app e lla nt ar g ue s tha t the tria l cou rt e rr e d in or de ri ng the app e lla nt t o serve his instant sentence c onsecutively to the nine-y ear

sentenc e for

his pr evious ag g ravated sexual battery conviction. The pe titioner contends that the two se ntence s should have run c oncurr ently

. Appellate revie w of the leng th, r ang e or manner of service of a sentence i s d e novo. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d) (2003). I n conducting its de novo review , this court considers th e f o ll o w in g f

a c to r s : ( 1 ) th e e v id e n c e , if a n y , r e c e iv e d a t th e tria l a n d th e s e n te n c in g h e ar in g ; (2) the pr e se nte nc e re po rt ; ( 3) the princ ipl e s of se nte nc ing a nd arg ume nts a s to se nte nc ing a lte rn a tiv e s; (4) the nature a nd char acte ristics of the criminal co nduct involved; (5) e vidence and information of fe re d b y the pa rt ie s o n e nh a nc e me nt andmit ig a tin g fa c tor s; ( 6) a ny state me nt by

the app e lla nt i n his own behalf; a nd (7) the pote ntial for reha bilitation or treatment. See Tenn. Code A nn. §§ 40-35- 10 2, -1 03 , -21 0 ( 20 03 ); se e a lso Sta te v. As hb y , 8 23 S.W. 2d16 6, 16 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 1) . T he bu rd e n is on the appe llant to demonstrate the improprie ty of his sentenc e(s) . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401, S en t en cing Commiss ion Comm ents. Moreove r, if the r ecor d reve als that the trial court
a de qu a te ly

c on sid e re d s e nte nc ing princ ipl e s a nda ll r e le va nt f a c ts a ndc ir c ums ta nc e s, thi s c ou rt wi ll
acc ord the trial court’s determinations a presumption of cor

rec tness. I d. at (d); Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

We note that “[w]hether sentenc es are to be serve d concur rently or conse cutively

is a matter addre ssed to the sound discre tion of the trial court.” State v. Adams, 973 S.W .2d 224, 230-31 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1997). Ten n es s ee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c) (2) pr ovides that consec utive sentenc ing may

be ordered w hen a de fenda nt is convicted of a n offe nse and “ has additional sentenc es not y et fully

serve d” if the de fenda nt meets the criteria for mandatory or discre tionary

consec utive sentenc ing. In the instant case , t h er e is no alleg ation that the appe llant meets the criteria for mandatory

consec utive sentenc ing. There fore , we must consider w hether the appe llant qualifies for discretionary

consec utive sentenc ing.

Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d se c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 15 (b ) ( 20 03 ) c on ta ins the dis c re tio na ry c ri te ri a for imposi n g c o n s e c u ti v e s e n te n c in g

. Se e a ls o St a te v

. Wi lk e r s o n , 9 0 5 S. W. 2 d 9 3 3 , 9 3 6 ( T e n n. 1995). The trial court may impose consec utive sentenc ing upon finding the exist ence of any one of the following criteria:

(1 ) T he de fe nd a nt i s a

pr of e ssi on a l crim in a l w ho ha s k no wi ng ly devoted such defe ndant’s life to c riminal acts as a major sourc e of livelihood;
(2 ) T he de fe nd a nt i s a n of fe nd e r wh os e re c or d o f c ri min a l a c tiv ity is extensive;
(3 ) T he de fe nd ant is a

da ng e ro us me nta lly

abn orma l pe rs on so decla red by a compe tent psy chiatrist who conc ludes as a result of an9 i n v es t i gat i o n p ri o r t o s en t en ci n g t h at t h e d ef en dant’s cr

iminal conduct h a s b e e n c h ar a c te r iz e d b y a p a tt e r n o f

r e p e ti ti v e o r

c o mp u lsive be ha vio r w ith he e dle ss i nd if fe re nc e to c on se qu e nc e s; (4) The defe ndant is a dang erous offe nder whose be havior indicates littl e or no reg ard for hum an li fe, and no hesitation about committing
a crime in which the risk to human life is hig h;
(5) The defe ndant is convicted of two (2) or more statutory

offe nses involvi n g s ex ual abuse of a minor with conside ration of the ag g ravating c ircumstance s arising from the r elationship betwee n the defe ndant and victim o r v ictims, the tim e span of defe ndant’s undetec ted sexual activity , the nature and scope of the sexual acts a nd the e xten t of

the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l a ndme nta l dam a g e to the vic tim
or vic tim s; (6) The defe ndant is sentence d for a n offe nse co m mitted while on probation; or
(7 ) T he de fe nd a nt i s se nte nc e d f or c ri min a l c on te mpt

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115(b) (1)- (7) ( 2003).

I n the instant case , the trial court found that consec utive sentenc ing was proper beca use the appellant ha d been convicted of two or m ore statutory offe nses involving se x ual abuse of a minor with consideration of the ag g ravating c ircumstance s arising fr o m the relationship between the appellant a nd victim or victims, the tim e span of appellant’ s undetec ted sexual a ctivity , the nature
a ndsc op e of

the se xua l a c ts andthe e xten t of the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l a nd me nta l dam a g e to the vic tim or victims. The appellant’s previous agg ravated s exual battery conviction stemmed fr om the sexual
abu se of J.P. in his apa

rt me nt o n th e nig ht o f the ins ta nt o ff e ns e . T he app e lla nt p e ne tr a te d J.P. wi th his pe nis wh ile the vic tim in the ins ta nt ca se watc he d ca rt oo ns in the liv ing ro om. Du ri ng the sa me evening , the appe llant f

ondled the buttocks and br easts of the instant victim, resulting in a c onviction for attempted ag g ravated sexual battery . Thus, the appe llant was cle arly g uilt y o f t wo offe nses involving the se x ual abuse of a minor.

The sexual abuse of

minors, alone, is insufficient to sust ain the imposition of consecutive
se n t e n c i n g

. W e m u s ta l s o l o o k a t“ t h e a g g r a v at i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s ari s i n g f r o mt h e r e l a t i o n sh ip betwee n the appe llant and victim or v ictims, the tim e span of [t he appe llant’s] undetected sexual activity , the nature and scope of the sex ual acts and the extent of t he residual, phy sical and me ntal damag e to the victim or victims.” Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35-115( b)(5) . Th e t i m e s p an of the appel lan t’ s u n d e te c te d s e xu a l a c ti v it y is r e lati v e ly

s h o r t. M o r e o v e r , th e r e w a s n o p ar ti c u lar relationship between the a ppellant and the victims. However, the scope of the sexual acts and the extent of t h e re sidual mental damag e to the victims was g reat. At the time of the off enses, the10

appellant wa s a sing le, white, fifty -one- y ear -old male. The victims, who wer e seve n and eig ht y ear s old, came into his apartment, lured by ice c rea m. He allowe d the childre n to watch c able c artoons
a nd jump on his be d. I n the mid st o f this a c tiv ity , th e app e lla nt s e xua lly a c c os te d tw o mi no r v ic tim s. I n th e ins ta nt c a se , O rc utt , N .O .’s fathe r, te sti fi e d at th e se nte nc ing he ari ng that th e vic tim sti ll suffe rs from he r ordea l, noting that her g rade s had dropped a nd had not improved by the time of the sentenc ing he aring . He a lso testified that the victim suf fer ed fr om depre ssion and nightmar es, and she fe are d that the appe llant would jump out from behind things and kill her. A fter c onsidering the fore g oing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposi ng consec utive sentenc ing.

III. Conclusi on Finding no err or, we aff

irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE