IN THE 

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA 

STATE OF ARIZONA EX REL. WILLIAM G. MONTGOMERY, MARICOPA 

COUNTY ATTORNEY, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

THE HONORABLE HARRIETT CHAVEZ, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

THE STATE OF ARIZONA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA, 

 Respondent Judge, 

ROBERT LEE GILL, 

 Real Party in Interest. 

No. CV-13-0274-PR 

Filed March 26, 2014 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

The Honorable Harriett E. Chavez, Judge 

No. CR2013-001185-001 

REMANDED 

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One 

233 Ariz. 8, 308 P.3d 1159 (App. 2013) 

VACATED 

COUNSEL: 

William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney, Keli B. Luther 

(argued), Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, for State of Arizona 

Maricopa County Public Defender, Mikel Steinfeld (argued), Deputy 

Public Defender, Christopher Manberg, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, 

for Robert Lee Gill 

David J. Euchner (argued), Tucson, for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys 

for Criminal Justice 
STATE V. CHAVEZ (GILL) 

Opinion of the Court 

2 

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE BALES authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

CHIEF JUSTICE BERCH, JUSTICE PELANDER, JUSTICE BRUTINEL, and 

JUSTICE TIMMER joined. 

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, opinion of the Court: 

¶1 We granted review to determine whether a prosecutor can 

unilaterally redact victims’ birth dates from law enforcement reports that 

must be disclosed to the defense. We hold that a prosecutor must obtain a 

court order to authorize redacting such information. 

I. 

¶2 The special actions before the court of appeals involved two 

defendants: James Dean Koontz, who was charged with one count of 

aggravated assault and a domestic violence offense, and Robert Lee Gill, 

who was charged with three counts of theft of a means of transportation. 

In both cases, the prosecutor redacted the victims’ birth dates from law 

enforcement reports disclosed to defense counsel pursuant to Rule 15.1 of 

the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defense counsel in each case 

requested the information in order to run a conflicts check, but the 

requests were denied, so defense counsel moved to compel disclosure. 

The trial courts granted the motions to compel, and the State filed 

petitions for special action. After consolidating the cases, the court of 

appeals granted relief to the State, citing the victims’ rights to privacy and 

to withhold information similar to birth dates. State ex rel. Montgomery v. 

Welty, 233 Ariz. 8, 11-12 ¶¶ 10–13, 308 P.3d 1159, 1162–63 (App. 2013). 

Koontz later pleaded guilty and did not participate in the petition for 

review to this Court. Therefore, although we vacate the court of appeals’ 

opinion, we remand only with regard to Gill. 

II. 

¶3 We review matters involving constitutional law, statutory 

construction, and rules of criminal procedure de novo. State v. Gutierrez, 

229 Ariz. 573, 576 ¶ 19, 278 P.3d 1276, 1279 (2012); State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 

193, 217 ¶ 89, 141 P.3d 368, 392 (2006). 

¶4 In criminal prosecutions, Rule 15 of the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure imposes general disclosure obligations on both the 
STATE V. CHAVEZ (GILL) 

Opinion of the Court 

3 

prosecutor and the defendant. These rule-based duties are distinct from, 

and do not depend on, discovery requests that the parties may initiate. 

Failure to make the required disclosures may result in sanctions. Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 15.7. These disclosure requirements streamline discovery in 

criminal prosecutions and help ensure that the parties receive all relevant 

information. See Rivera-Longoria v. Slayton, ex rel. County of Coconino, 228 

Ariz. 156, 157–58 ¶ 6, 264 P.3d 866, 867–68 (2011). 

¶5 Rule 15.1 addresses the scope of the prosecutor’s duty to 

disclose, including the duty to make available “[a]ll then existing original 

and supplemental reports prepared by a law enforcement agency in 

connection with the particular crime.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(b)(3). This 

directive does not allow a prosecutor to unilaterally decide whether to 

redact information from such reports. 

¶6 The rules recognize that the prosecutor’s disclosure 

obligations may be qualified by court order under Rule 15.5 or by Rule 

39(b), which concerns victims’ rights. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(a), (b). 

Under Rule 15.5(b), the court may authorize a party to excise extraneous 

information from a document that contains information subject to 

disclosure. The court, upon the motion of any party showing good cause, 

may also limit or prevent disclosure of required information if the risk of 

harm outweighs the usefulness of the disclosure and the risk cannot 

otherwise be eliminated. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.5(a); id. cmt. (noting that 

“[t]he court is given broad discretion to limit discovery required by this 

rule whenever it is shown a risk of harm resulting from a specific 

disclosure”). 

¶7 Rather than seek a court order authorizing the redaction of 

victim birth dates from law enforcement reports, the prosecutor here 

adopted a general policy of redacting such information in reports 

provided to the defense. The State argues that subsections 10 and 11 of 

Rule 39(b) authorize this practice. 

¶8 Rule 39(b) requires courts to construe the rules “to preserve 

and protect a victim’s rights to justice and due process,” and then specifies 

various rights that victims “shall have and be entitled to assert.” Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 39(b). Subsection (b)(10) gives victims the “right to require the 

prosecutor to withhold, during discovery and other proceedings, the 

home address and telephone number of the victim, the address and 
STATE V. CHAVEZ (GILL) 

Opinion of the Court 

4 

telephone number of the victim’s place of employment, and the name of 

the victim’s employer.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 39(b)(10). Subsection (b)(11) 

gives victims the “right to refuse an interview, deposition, or other 

discovery request.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 39(b)(11). 

¶9 Rule 39(b)(10) does not apply here. It provides that a victim 

can require a prosecutor to withhold specified information, but birth dates 

are not included in this list. Moreover, the record does not reflect a 

request by the victims that the prosecutor withhold any information. 

¶10 Rule 39(b)(11) is similarly inapposite because it concerns a 

victim’s right “to refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery 

request by the defendant.” This rule refers to discovery initiated by the 

defendant, such as requests to interview the victim, rather than the 

prosecutor’s mandatory disclosures under Rule 15.1, including the 

disclosure of law enforcement reports. The disclosure requirements under 

Rule 15.1 are limited by Rule 39(b), but the rules do not broadly allow 

victims to limit a prosecutor’s mandatory disclosures on the grounds that 

they are “other discovery requests” by the defendant. 

¶11 As support for the redaction of victim birth dates, the State 

also cites the Victims’ Bill of Rights in Arizona’s Constitution and related 

statutory provisions. Article II, section 2.1(a) of the Arizona Constitution 

recognizes that a victim is entitled to “refuse an interview, deposition, or 

other discovery request” by the defendant. But this provision, like the 

corresponding language in Rule 39(b)(11), refers to the right of victims to 

refuse discovery requests directed to them, not to a prosecutor’s redacting 

information in a law enforcement report subject to mandatory disclosure 

under Rule 15.1. Cf. State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court In & For County of 

Maricopa (Roper), 172 Ariz. 232, 237, 836 P.2d 445, 450 (App. 1992) 

(applying phrase “other discovery request” to request for victim’s medical 

records). 

¶12 The related statute, A.R.S. § 13-4434, addresses a victim’s 

right to privacy in other circumstances. Subsection (A) of this statute 

gives the victim a right to withhold locating information when testifying at 

a court proceeding: 

The victim has the right at any court proceeding not to 

testify regarding the victim’s addresses, telephone numbers, 
STATE V. CHAVEZ (GILL) 

Opinion of the Court 

5 

places of employment or other locating information unless 

the victim consents or the court orders disclosure on finding 

that a compelling need for the information exists. . . . 

A.R.S. § 13-4434(A). This section is inapplicable both because birth dates 

are “identifying information,” not “locating information,” and because the 

disclosure of law enforcement reports does not involve victim testimony. 

¶13 In arguing that § 13-4434(A) allows a prosecutor to redact 

victims’ birth dates from law enforcement reports, the State cites Romley v. 

Schneider, 202 Ariz. 362, 45 P.3d 685 (App. 2002). The court of appeals 

there held that the trial court had abused its discretion by ordering a 

victim to submit to fingerprinting, which defense counsel sought to 

determine if counsel had previously represented the victim and thus had a 

conflict of interest. Id. In holding that the trial court’s order violated the 

victim’s rights, the court of appeals noted that “[a]lthough [§ 13-4434(A)] 

does not specifically reference fingerprinting, DNA testing or other more 

sophisticated means of obtaining identification, it is quite clear that far less 

intrusive means of identification, such as a victim’s address and telephone 

number, are expressly protected.” Id. at 364 ¶ 10, 45 P.3d at 687. 

¶14 Without questioning the result in Schneider, we note that the 

court of appeals’ reasoning does not suggest that victims’ birth dates are 

protected from disclosure by § 13-4434(A). The issue in Schneider was 

whether a victim, at the defendant’s request, could be compelled to 

submit to fingerprinting, which the court of appeals correctly noted was a 

significant invasion of privacy. Id. at 365 ¶ 11, 45 P.3d at 688. This case, in 

contrast, does not involve a request that the victim provide information. 

And Schneider did not address whether a prosecutor can redact victim 

birth dates from reports that are subject to mandatory disclosure under 

Rule 15.1. Indeed, as noted by the court of appeals, the prosecutor in that 

case had disclosed the victim’s birth date in pleadings opposing the 

request to take the victim’s fingerprints. Id. at 364 ¶ 7, 45 P.3d at 687. 

¶15 Section 13-4434(B) is similarly inapplicable. This subsection 

concerns a “victim’s contact and identifying information that is obtained, 

compiled or reported by a law enforcement agency” and requires the 

originating agency to redact the contact and identifying information “in 

publicly accessible records,” subject to certain exceptions. A.R.S. § 13-

4434(B) (emphasis added). However, a prosecutor is neither a “law 
STATE V. CHAVEZ (GILL) 

Opinion of the Court 

6 

enforcement agency” nor “the originating agency.” Likewise, the 

disclosed law enforcement reports are not publicly accessible records. 

¶16 Rule 15.4(d) specifically provides that information furnished 

to attorneys under the disclosure rules “shall not be disclosed to the 

public.” Cf. id. cmt. (noting that Rule 15.4(d) “reminds counsel that 

discovery materials are to be considered confidential records“). Thus, 

§ 13-4434(B)’s requirement that agencies redact identifying information in 

publicly accessible records does not permit redacting such information 

from disclosures required by Rule 15.1. Furthermore, § 13-4434(C) 

explicitly states that § 13-4434(B) does not apply to “records that are 

transmitted between law enforcement and prosecution agencies or a 

court.” A.R.S. § 13-4434(C). 

¶17 The State also urges us to approve the redaction of victim 

birth dates from the reports because technology has eroded the distinction 

between locating and identifying information. The State contends that, as 

a result of the Internet, knowledge of a person’s birth date makes it 

possible to access a wide range of information, including locating 

information such as that person’s address and telephone number. Failing 

to allow redaction of birth dates in every case would, in the State’s view, 

undermine the protections for locating information now recognized in 

court rules and statutes. 

¶18 “Arizona has been a national leader in providing rights to 

crime victims,” Morehart v. Barton, 226 Ariz. 510, 512 ¶ 9, 250 P.3d 1139, 

1141 (2011), and courts should conscientiously protect those rights 

provided by law. See id. at 515–16 ¶¶ 22–23, 250 P.3d at 1144–45; cf. A.R.S. 

13-4418 (noting that statutes “shall be liberally construed to preserve and 

protect the rights to which victims are entitled”). Although Arizona’s 

Constitution broadly recognizes various rights for victims and specifically 

permits victims to refuse discovery requests from the defense, those 

provisions do not authorize a prosecutor to unilaterally redact birth dates 

from law enforcement reports. Birth dates are indeed private information, 

Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 48 of Maricopa County v. KPNX Broad. Co., 

191 Ariz. 297, 301–02 ¶¶ 16–19, 955 P.2d 534, 538–39 (1998), but the 

Victims’ Bill of Rights does not protect all private information from 

disclosure. 
STATE V. CHAVEZ (GILL) 

Opinion of the Court 

7 

¶19 Although victims have privacy interests in their birth dates, 

both prosecutors and the defense have good reasons to seek this 

information. For example, a birth date may help identify the victim of a 

crime. Likewise, a victim’s exact age may be relevant as an element of an 

offense or as a factor for determining the corresponding punishment. A 

birth date may also allow the parties to determine if the victim has a 

criminal history, which can affect the victim’s credibility, and may allow 

defense counsel to identify possible conflicts that could prevent counsel 

from representing a defendant. 

¶20 The limited disclosure of a birth date in a criminal case thus 

seeks to balance these interests, allowing both parties restricted use of the 

information while maintaining the victim’s right “to be treated with 

fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from intimidation, 

harassment, or abuse, throughout the criminal justice process.” Ariz. 

Const. art. II, § 2.1(A)(1). Disclosure of a victim’s birth date does not, in 

itself, reveal a victim’s locating or contact information. And the record 

does not establish how easily such information may be obtained from the 

combination of a birth date and information that is publicly available, e.g., 

on the Internet. 

¶21 Moreover, to the extent that disclosing a victim’s birth date 

may create a risk of harassment or other harm, we reiterate that the 

existing rules allow a prosecutor to seek a court order denying or limiting 

disclosures otherwise required by Rule 15.1. Thus, a court may authorize 

a prosecutor to redact victim birth dates from law enforcement reports 

that are disclosed to the defense if the prosecutor establishes that 

redaction is appropriate under Rule 15.5(a). See, e.g., State v. McMurtrey, 

136 Ariz. 93, 97, 664 P.2d 637, 641 (1983) (noting that the “preferred 

procedure” is for the prosecutor to obtain a court order under Rule 15.5(c) 

before redacting information, but recognizing trial courts’ power to 

approve redactions subsequently). 

¶22 Essentially, the State urges us to rewrite Rule 39(b) and § 13-

4434 to better shield certain victim-related information. That argument, 

however, should be brought through different channels. Whether the 

disclosure requirements should be revised in light of technological 

advances is better addressed through a rule change or statutory 

amendment, either of which would allow broad input and consideration 

of the policy implications. 
STATE V. CHAVEZ (GILL) 

Opinion of the Court 

8 

III. 

¶23 We vacate the court of appeals’ opinion and remand 

Defendant Gill’s case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.