1 The crimes occur red on October 22, 2008. Appell ant was indi cted by a Fulton Co unty grand jur

y on January

30, 2009, on c harges of mal ice murder , two count s of felony murde r, aggr avate d assa ult with a de adly weapon, possess ion of a fi rearm duri ng the commission of

a f elo ny, and possess ion of a fi rearm by a convict ed felon. Trial commenced on July 5, 2011 and, on July

8, 2011, a

jury convict ed appell ant of malice murder and possessi on of a firearm by a con victed felon . He w as sen tence d on July 21, 2 011 to li f e impris onment for mali ce murder and fi ve yea rs concur rent for possessi on of

a firearm by a convict ed felon. Appellant file d a motion for

new trial on July

21, 2011 and an amend ed motion for new tri al on August 2, 2012. The motion f or new tri al was heard on October 4, 2012, and was denied by an order ent ered April 16, 201 3. Appellant file d a notic e of appeal on May 3, 2013. The appeal was docket ed to the September 2013 t erm of this Court an d submitted for a decision on the briefs. FINAL C OPY 294 Ga. 388 S13A144 1. RUSH v. THE STATE.

T HOMPSON , Chief Justice. Appella ntLaForrest Rush was convicted of malice murder

and posse ssion of a firea rm by a convict ed felo n in connection with the sho oting death of Kasey Cogburn. 1 He app eals f

rom the denial of his m otion for new trial contend ing the evidence was insuffi cient to supp ort the verdi ct and trial coun sel rendered ineff ective as sistan ce. Find ing n o erro r, we aff irm. Viewedin the light most favorable to the j ury’s ve rd ict, the evidence shows the foll owing. O n October 22, 20 08, C ogburn, a smal l time

mari juana deale r, obtained som e ma rijuana from a drug dea ler known as “Big” which he2 According to Gagne’ s test ifimony , a “t rap” is a house w here ill egal drugs are sol d. 2 arranged to sell to T ravious Ta ylor. O n his way to conduc t the de al and therea fter, C ogburn

stayedin touch w ith his gir lfriend, Olivia

Gagne, keeping her appr ised of his whereabouts and what was transpiring through phone calls and texts. Cogburn le t her know he was on his way to mee t Big, T aylor, and a person Cogburn r eferred to as Taylor’ s “cousin.” According to Gagne, “c ousin” is stree t slang fo r some one who is a very close f riend. After getting t

he ma rijuana from B ig and c omple ting the s ale w ith Taylor and Tay lor’s friend, who the jury was a uthorized to conclude was a ppellant, Cogburn calle d Gagneto inform

her he w as follow i ng the two men back to Tayl or’s “trap” 2 to ob tain fi ve pou nds o f mariju ana they had agr eed to f ront him. Upon arriving at th e trap, which was an apartment leased to app ellant, the men opened the pack age o f mar ijuana and disc overed a

problem with the drugs. They confronte d Cogbu

rn wh o attem

pted to c all Bi g. Unab le to re ach Bi g, Cogburn then placed a short ca

ll to Gagne, tell ing he r the m en wer e acc using him of setting them

up and hewas af

r aid be cause Taylor had poi nted a gun at his head. Sometime later Cogbur n called Gagne again, c rying and nearly3

hysterical, saying

“Shorty, I have t o go. I love you,”before hangingup . The evidence shows that Cogburn was shot as he atte mpte d to le ave a nd subsequently bled to death in the doorwa y of the apartm ent. That evening , appe llant’s neighbor, Juanita Willia ms, w as sitting outside

on her po rch whe n s he hea rd gunshots. She saw

a body on the porc h of appell ant’s apartment

and obse rved appe llant

and Taylor step ov er the body as they exited to flee in Taylo r’s truck. Office rs r esponding t o the sc ene found Cogburn’s body lying on the porch in the op en doorway

of appel lant’s apartment. Shortly therea fter, a

ppella nt’s landlord

and a police detective each called appell ant’s cell phone. In both instanc es, a ma

n answe red “hel lo” and then hung up as soon as the caller s aid appellant’s name. Appellan t later claimed he did not know Ta

ylor (althou gh Tay lor was listed a s an em ergenc y contact on appell ant’s lease) and that he had been in Savannah at the time of th e murder

. Cell phone re cords indi cate d, how ev er, that appellant’ s cell phone had been pinging off a tower close to his apartment at the time the murd er occurred. 1. Appellant fir st challenges the suffi cienc y of theevidenc e argui ng the State faile d to prove h e was a party to the cr

ime be yond a reasonable doubt. See4

OCGA§ 16-2-20. C ons truin g the ev idence most st rongly in support of th e verdict, we find i t was suf ficie nt for a ra

tional t rier of f act to find a ppella

nt guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for whic h he was convict ed. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 27 81, 61 LE2d 5 60) (197 9). Appella ntasserts the circumstan tial evidence pr esented by the State established nothing more than his mere presenc e at th e sce ne of the shooting a

nd

mere association with Taylor, the actual shoote r. We d isagre e. Whil e me re presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to prove tha t a defe ndant wa s a party to the crime, see Jones v. State , 292 Ga . 656, 658 ( 740 SE2d 590) ( 2013), here the evidence was suffici ent for t he jury to draw reasona

ble inference s about appell ant’s participation in the murder . Ga gne tes tified s he lea rned from Cogburn that the drug sale included

both Taylor and

Tayl or’s clos e frie nd, and that Cogburn followed these same two people back to Tayl or’s trap which was actually an apartment leased to appellant. In additi on, appe llant a nd Tay lor were close enough fri ends for T aylor t o be list ed as a n eme rgency contac t on appell ant’s lease, appe llant was pres ent at the apartment when Co gburn was shot, appell ant

f led the murder scene with Taylor, a nd appellant subsequently lied about key facts when que stioned by police , inclu ding his whe reabout s at the5

time of the m

urder. “ Presenc e, com

panionshi p, and c onduct be fore and after an offenseis committed are circumstances from which participation in the criminal act may be inferred.” Thornton v. State , 292 Ga . 87, 88 (734 SE2d 3 93) (2012) (quoting Curinton v. State , 283 Ga . 226 , 228-22 9 (657 SE2d 824 ) (2008)). Basedon th e above evidence and Gag ne’s testimony th at Cogburn told her “they” thought he set “them” up, the ju ry could rea sonably infer that “th ey” i ncluded appellant and that a ppellant was a parti cipant along with Tay lor in both the drug t

ransactio n and Cogbu

rn’s murder. A ccordin gly, w e find the evidence was suff

icient for the j ury to c oncludeappell ant wa s a part y to the crim es. 2. Appellant next contends he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of

counsel at tria

l based on trial counsel ’s failu

re to object to certa in rem arks m ade by

the prose cutor during closing argument. To prevail on his claim

of ineffective ass istance, appellant must show that tri al counsel ’s performance was defici ent and that, b ut for suc h defic iency , there is a reasonable probabilitythat the

outcom e of his t

ri al woul d have been diff erent. Strickla

nd

v. Washingt on , 466 U. S. 668 (104 S Ct 2052, 8 0 LE2d 674) ( 1984) ; White v. State , 283 G a. 566, 569 (662 SE2d 131) (2008). To show de ficie nt6

performance, appell ant “m ust overc ome th e strong

presum ption that c ounsel’s performance fel l within a wide ra nge of re asonabl e profes sional c onduct, a nd that counsel’s d ecisions were made in the exer cise of rea sonabl e professio nal judgment.” White v. State , 281 Ga . 276, 281 ( 637 SE2d 645) ( 2006) (punctua tion omitte d). In the

event a ppella nt fails to satis fyeither

the “de ficie nt performance” or “pr ejudice” prong of the Strickla ndtest, this Court

is not required to examine the other p rong. S i fuentes v. State , 293 Ga . 441, 445 ( 4) (746 SE2d 127) (2013). (a) With respect to his first claim, appella nt alleges trial c ounsel wa s ineffe ctivefor failing to object to the prosecutor’s statement that “the guilty man flees but the righteous man st ands bold a s a lion. ” Appe llant c laim s this re mark constituted an improper comment on h is failure to co me forward. “It is a brig ht

- line rul e in Ge orgia tha t the Sta te ma y not com

ment o n either a defendant’s si lenc e prior to arre st or fai lure to c ome fo rward voluntari ly.” Sanders v. State , 290 Ga. 637, 640-641 (723 SE2d 436) (20 12); Reynol ds v. State , 285 Ga . 70, 71 (6 73 SE2d 854 ) (2009) . However, evidence showingthat a

defenda ntattempted to evade arrest is adm issible as evid ence of flight and statements about flight are proper as circumstantial evidenc e of guilt.7

Id. See Evans v. State , 288 Ga . 571, 574- 575 (707 SE2d 3 53) (2011). Here, the record reveals th at the prosecuto r’s statement concerned appell ant’s inconsisten t and evasive statements to police with respect to his loc ation at thetimeof the m

urder, rather t

han his fa

ilure to come

for ward

. Although the com plaine d of statement i

n this ca se is sim

ilar to o ne found to be an imp roper co mment on a de fendant ’s right to remain s ilent in Scott v. State , 305 Ga. A pp. 710, 71 3 (700 SE2d 694) (2010), there the prosecutor’s statem ent, wh ich include d additio nal lan guage a sking why he (Scot t) faile d to give t

he police a stateme

nt if he “hadn’ t done a

nything, ” was c learly direc ted at the defenda nt’s failure

to turn himself in after hav ing been informe d the poli ce were looking for him. Id. at 713. In the ins tant ca se, the prosecutor ’s comment was directed at

appell ant’s a ctual s tatements to po lice t hat he w as in Sa

vannah a t the time of the m

urder de spite e vidence

to the c ontrary . As a prosecu tor has th e right to argue reasonableinferences from the ev idence, see Smith v. State , 279 Ga. 48, 50 (610 SE 2d 26) (2005) , the prosecutor’s statem ent, which simply highlig hted facts in evidence , was permissible and trial counsel’s failure to object did not render her performa nce deficient. (b) Appella

ntnext asserts tr ial counsel was ineffective for failing to o bject8

to state ments made

by the p rosecut orwhich a ppella nt conte nds implied his tri al counsel was not

se eking the

truth or jus tice. However, in the compl ained of statements the prosecutor suggested that appel lant, not appellant’s trial counsel,

was responsib le for th e “new lies”comin g out at t rial. While it

is “wrong f

or the prosecu ting attorney . . . to comment that opposin g counsel knows thedefenda nt to be guilty or k nows his clien t’s case is not merito rious,” Estep v . State , 129 Ga. App. 909, 916 (201 SE2d 809) (1973) (em phasis om

itted), the prose cutor’s comments in

this case did not violate this precept. “The w ide leeway given to argue all re asonabl e inferences that m ay bedrawn from the evidenc e during closing argum ent, e ncompa sses point ing out inc onsistenc ies in a defenda nt’s testimony and urg ing that, on that basis, the d efendant lied.” Appling v. State , 281 Ga. 590, 592-593 (642 SE2d 37) (2007) (citations omitted). As i n appell ant’s previous claim of error, the lack of objectio n from appellant’ s trial counsel to th ese statements did no t constitut e deficient perfor mance. Accordingly, appellant has failed to establi sh his trial counsel perfo rmed deficiently

in responding to the prosecutor’s remarks in closing argum ent, a

nd his ineffective assis tance of counsel claims lack merit. See Sifuentes , supra at 447.9

Judgme ntaffirm ed. Al l the Just ices c oncur, e xcept H

unstein, J., who

concurs in judgm ent only as to Di vision 2 (a

).

Decid ed Janua

ry 21, 201 4. Murder. Fulton Supe rior Court . Befo re JudgeAdam s. Benja min D. Goldberg , for appellant. Paul L. Howard, Jr., Distr ict Attorne y, Joshua D. Morri son, Pai ge Reese Whitaker, Assistant Distric t Att orneys , Samuel S. Olens, Attorn ey General, Patricia

B. Attaway

Burton, Deputy Attorney G eneral, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assista nt Attorne

y General , Andrew G. Sims, Assis tant Attorney General , for appellee.