Filed 5/17/21 P. v. Darnell CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE 

OF CALIFORNIA,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

EDWARD DARNELL,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B307437

(Super. Ct. No. 20PT-00392)

(San Luis Obispo County)

Edward Darnell appeals the trial court’s order 

recommitting him for treatment as a mentally disordered 

offender (MDO; Pen. Code,

1 §§ 2970, 2972). Appellant contends, 

and the People concede, that the evidence is insufficient to 

support the finding that appellant represents a substantial 

danger of physical harm to others by reason of a severe mental 

disorder, as set forth in section 2972, subdivision (c). Although 

the People presented expert opinion testimony on this issue, the 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 

otherwise stated.
2

expert did not personally interview or observe appellant and her 

testimony was not supported by any other admissible evidence in 

the record. The People also correctly concede that the court 

prejudicially erred in allowing the expert to repeatedly convey

case-specific hearsay in violation of People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 

Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for 

further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant was first committed as an MDO in 2015. In June

2020, the People filed a petition to recommit appellant as an 

MDO pursuant to section 2970. Appellant waived his right to a 

jury trial. 

Dr. Brandi Mathews, a forensic psychologist at Atascadero 

State Hospital (ASH), testified on behalf of the People. Since 

2015, Dr. Mathews had evaluated appellant’s case annually to 

determine if he met the MDO criteria. The doctor had never 

personally interviewed appellant because he refused to 

participate. In conducting her most recent evaluation Dr. 

Mathews reviewed appellant’s probation report, his ASH chart 

documenting his daily behavior, and his prior MDO evaluations. 

The doctor also spoke with appellant’s treating psychiatrist in 

January 2020 and reviewed the psychiatrist’s evaluations of 

appellant. 

Dr. Mathews opined that appellant met the criteria for 

recommitment as an MDO. The doctor concluded that appellant 

currently suffered from a severe mental disorder, i.e., 

schizoaffective order, bipolar type. Based on her review of 

appellant’s records, Dr. Mathews testified that appellant 

exhibited symptoms of auditory hallucinations, made paranoid 

and grandiose delusional statements, and had a history of 

disorganized thinking and manic and depressive episodes. The 

doctor also opined that appellant’s severe mental disorder was 
3

not in remission and could not be kept in remission without 

treatment. She based these opinions on her review of appellant’s 

records, which indicated that he continued to display overt signs 

and symptoms of his disorder and had been subject to an 

involuntary medication order since his initial commitment. 

Dr. Mathews further opined that appellant represented a 

substantial danger of physical harm to others by reason of his 

severe mental disorder. The doctor based this opinion on her 

knowledge of appellant “over the last five years,” her “review of 

all of his records,” and “consultations with his treatment 

psychiatrist over the last few years.” 

On cross-examination, Dr. Mathews acknowledged that 

none of her opinions were based on her personal observations of 

appellant. She also acknowledged that her testimony about 

appellant’s symptoms was based entirely on her review of his 

records, none of which were offered into evidence. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, appellant asserted that 

the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of proving that 

appellant qualified for recommitment as an MDO because Dr. 

Mathew’s opinions were based entirely on multiple hearsay 

statements that were not independently proven by competent 

evidence. In concluding otherwise, the trial court reasoned that 

“Dr. Mathews was able to testify to what she reviewed in the 

records” and that her testimony “did not involve specific facts, but 

rather relying on her experts in her field, and she is certainly 

qualified as an expert in the field.” 

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends that his MDO recommitment order 

must be reversed because the evidence is insufficient to support 

the finding that he represents a substantial danger of physical 

harm to others by reason of his severe mental disorder. 

Appellant further claims that the court prejudicially erred in 
4

repeatedly allowing Dr. Mathews to testify to case-specific 

hearsay in violation of Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 665. The 

People correctly concede both points. 

“[A] prisoner adjudicated to be [an MDO] may be civilly 

committed during and after parole if certain conditions are met. 

(See §§ 2962, 2966.) The People, represented by the district 

attorney, may file a petition for the MDO’s continued involuntary 

treatment for a period of one year. (§§ 2970, 2972, subds. (a)-(c).) 

Thereafter, the district attorney may petition to extend that 

commitment in one-year increments. (§ 2972, subd. (e).)” (People 

v. Allen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 91, 94.) To obtain such an extension, 

the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the 

defendant continues to have a severe mental disorder; (2) the 

defendant’s severe mental disorder is not in remission or cannot 

be kept in remission without treatment; and (3) because of his or 

her severe mental disorder, the defendant continues to represent 

a substantial danger of physical harm to others. (§ 2972, subd. 

(c).) 

“In considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

MDO findings, an appellate court must determine whether, on 

the whole record, a rational trier of fact could have found that 

defendant is an MDO beyond a reasonable doubt, considering all 

the evidence in the light which is most favorable to the People, 

and drawing all inferences the trier could reasonably have made 

to support the finding. [Citation.]” (People v. Clark (2000) 82 

Cal.App.4th 1072, 1082.) 

A single opinion by a psychiatric expert that a person is 

currently dangerous due to a severe mental disorder can 

constitute substantial evidence to support the extension of an 

MDO commitment. (See People v. Bowers (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 

870, 879; People v. Zapisek (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1165.) 

An expert’s testimony in civil commitment cases on a person’s 
5

dangerousness or likely dangerousness may be the only evidence 

available on the issue. (People v. Ward (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th

368, 374.) However, “[e]xpert opinion testimony constitutes 

substantial evidence only if based on conclusions or assumptions 

supported by evidence in the record. Opinion testimony which is 

conjectural or speculative ‘cannot rise to the dignity of 

substantial evidence.’” (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 

Cal.App.4th 634, 651.) “‘Like a house built on sand, the expert’s 

opinion is no better than the facts on which it is based.’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 618, 

overruled on another ground in Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 

p. 686, fn. 13.) 

Moreover, an expert witness testifying at an MDO hearing

cannot “relate as true case-specific facts asserted in hearsay 

statements, unless they are independently proven by competent 

evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception.” (Sanchez, supra, 

63 Cal.4th at p. 686; see also People v. Bona (2017) 15 

Cal.App.5th 511, 520 [recognizing that Sanchez applies in MDO 

proceedings].) Accordingly, an expert “is generally not permitted 

. . . to supply case-specific facts about which he [or she] has no 

personal knowledge.” (Sanchez, at p. 676.) Case-specific facts 

are “those relating to the particular events and participants 

alleged to have been involved in the case being tried.” (Ibid.) An 

expert, however, “may still rely on hearsay in forming an opinion 

and may tell [the trier of fact] in general terms that he [or she] 

did so.” (Id. at p. 685.)

Dr. Mathew’s opinion testimony that appellant currently 

represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others by 

reason of his severe mental disorder was based entirely upon her 

review of appellant’s records and her consultation with his

treating psychiatrist six months prior to the hearing. The doctor

never observed or interviewed appellant and none of the 
6

documents supporting her opinion were offered into evidence. As 

the People concede, the opinion is thus insufficient to support the 

finding that appellant is currently dangerous as set forth in 

section 2972, subdivision (c).

We also accept the People’s concession that the trial court

erred in repeatedly allowing Dr. Mathews, over appellant’s 

objections, to testify to case-specific hearsay in violation of 

Sanchez. For example, Dr. Mathews provided detailed testimony 

regarding the symptoms of appellant’s mental disorder and 

conveyed that appellant was subject to an involuntary medication 

order. The court plainly erred in allowing this testimony, which 

was neither based on the doctor’s own observations nor supported 

by any other competent evidence in the record. (Sanchez, supra, 

63 Cal.4th at p. 686.) Because there is no other evidence to 

support Dr. Mathew’s testimony, the error is prejudicial and the 

MDO recommitment order must be reversed.

DISPOSITION

The MDO recommitment order is reversed and the matter 

is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J. TANGEMAN, J.
Dodie A. Harman, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.