NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AYNA AMANDA MEPPELINK, 

Plaintiff-counterdefendant-Appellant, 

 v. 

SELENE FINANCE, LP, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND 

SOCIETY, FSB, trustee for Pretium 

Mortgage Acquisition Trust, 

Defendant-counter-claimantAppellee, 

and 

HIDDEN ACRES HOMEOWNER’S 

ASSOCIATION; OCCUPANTS OF THE 

PREMISES, 

Counter-defendants.

No. 20-35667 

D.C. No. 3:19-cv-05655-RJB 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

JUN 29 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 20-35667 

Submitted June 21, 2021**

Before: SILVERMAN, WATFORD, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

Ayna Amanda Meppelink appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment 

on defendant Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB’s counter claim seeking

judicial foreclosure on Meppelink’s home. Because the district court certified its 

interlocutory order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), we have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the grant of partial 

summary judgment. White v. City of Sparks, 500 F.3d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 2007). 

We affirm.

The district court properly granted partial summary judgment on 

Wilmington’s counterclaim because under Washington law, Wilmington is the 

holder of Meppelink’s promissory note and entitled to enforce it by commencing a

judicial foreclosure. See Wash. Rev. Code § 62A.1-201 (21)(A) (defining a holder 

with respect to a negotiable instrument); Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. v. Slotke, 367 

P.3d 600, 601, 604 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (noting that “the holder of a promissory 

note secured by a deed of trust has authority to elect to commence a judicial 

foreclosure of that deed of trust[;]” provisions of the Deed of Trust Act relating to 

nonjudicial foreclosures of a deed of trust have “no bearing on a judicial 

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
3 20-35667 

foreclosure of a deed of trust because such a foreclosure, as the statutes make clear, 

is controlled by the law of mortgages”); see also Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc.,

285 P.3d 34, 38-39, 42-44 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (requirements for judicial 

foreclosure).

Contrary to Meppelink’s contention, the district court’s entry of partial 

judgment under Rule 54(b) did not create an inappropriately piecemeal litigation. 

See Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 877-79 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth 

standard of review and criteria for Rule 54(b) certification).

We lack jurisdiction to consider claims other than those certified in the 

district court’s Rule 54(b) order. See Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., 880 

F.2d 176, 179 n.1 (9th Cir. 1989) (no appellate jurisdiction exists over claims the 

district court did not include it is Rule 54(b) order).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). 

We reject as without merit Meppelink’s contentions that the district court 

ignored state court rulings, was biased against her, or showed favoritism towards 

the defendants.

AFFIRMED.