alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-7826

GLENN CALVIN LAWHORN, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant,
versusRUFUS R. FLEMING, Warden; NOTTOWAY CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior District Judge. (CA-95-691) Submitted: March 27, 1997 Decided: April 4, 1997 Before RUSSELL, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Glenn Calvin Lawhorn, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Pamela Anne Sargent, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Appellant's notice of appeal specifically states that he is appealing the September 27, 1996, order. However, to the extent Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's November 15, 1996, order denying relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
2 PER CURIAM: Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The time periods for filing notices of appeal are governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4. These periods are "mandatory and jurisdictional." Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). Parties to civil actions have thirty days withinwhich to file in the district court notices of appeal from judgments or final orders. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The only exceptions to the appeal period are when the district court extends the time to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). The district court entered its order on September 27, 1996; Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on November 27, 1996. * Appellant's failure to note a timely appeal or obtain an extension of the appeal period leaves this court without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant's appeal. We therefore dismiss theappeal. Additionally, we deny Appellant's motion to appoint counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.2

Certification Pursuant to Section 906

of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of SUPERVALU INC. (the
Company) certifies that the quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended June 14, 2008, fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information
contained in that Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company for the period and as of the dates covered thereby.



|                     |  |  |  |                                                                                                                  
|-------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Dated: July 23, 2008 |  |  |  | /s/ PAMELA K. KNOUS                                                                                              
|                     |  |  |  | Pamela K. Knous Executive Vice President and Chief
Financial Officer (principal financial and accounting officer)
Exhibit 10(ii)

**TAYLOR DEVICES,INC.**

FIRST AMENDMENT TOEMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

            ThisFIRST AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT is made effective as of the 22nd day ofDecember, 2006 by and between TAYLOR DEVICES, INC. (the "*Company*"), a NewYork corporation having an office located at 90 Taylor Drive, North Tonawanda,New York 14120‐0748 and****DOUGLAS P. TAYLOR, an individual residing at 375Belmont Court, East, North Tonawanda, New York 14120 (the"*Executive*").

                   WHEREAS, the Company and the Executive have each agreed that it is in their bestinterests to amend the Employment Agreement by and between the Company and theExecutive entered into as of December 1, 2000 (the "*Agreement*") for thepurpose of establishing a definite expiration date of the Agreement;and

                   WHEREAS, to accomplish the foregoing, the Company and the Executive have agreedto enter into this First Amendment to Employment Agreement (the"*Amendment*"), as hereinafter set forth.

            NOW,THEREFORE**,** in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein andin the Agreement, the parties hereby agree as follows:
> 
1.              Paragraph 2(a) of the Agreement is hereby deleted in its entirety, and the  following is substituted fully in its place and stead:

2. **TERM;****TERMS AND DUTIES.**

            (a) Unless earlier terminated, as provided in this Agreement, the term of thisAgreement shall commence on its effective date and shall expire on December 31,2009 (the "*Expiration Date*"); *provided however*, that, upon writtennotice given by either party to the other at least 30 days prior to theExpiration Date, this Agreement may be renewed by mutual agreement of theparties.  Prior to any renewal of this Agreement by the Company, the Boardof Directors of the Company (the "*Board*"), acting by a majority of itsdisinterested members, shall conduct a comprehensive evaluation and review ofthe performance of the Executive for purposes of determining whether to renewthe Agreement and the results thereof shall be included in the minutes ofmeeting for the Board.  Henceforward, *"Term"* shall include any andall extensions or renewals of this Agreement.
> 
2.             Except as expressly amended by this Amendment, all other terms of the  Agreement shall remain in full force and effect, without modification, change  or amendment of any kind.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, theCompany has caused this Amendment to be executed and its seal to be affixedhereunto by its duly authorized officer; and Executive has signed thisAmendment, as of the date and year first above written.

                                                                              **                                      **                                       

(CORPORATE SEAL)
EXHIBIT 15



October 29, 2003



Board of Directors

Superior Uniform Group,
Inc.

Seminole, Florida



We have made a review, in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, of the unaudited interim financial information
of Superior Uniform Group, Inc. and subsidiary for the periods ended September 30, 2003 and 2002, as indicated in our report dated October 16, 2003; because we did not perform an audit, we expressed no opinion on that information.



We are aware that our report referred to above, which is included in your Quarterly Report on
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2003, is incorporated by reference in Registration Statement No. 2-85796 and No. 333-105906 on Forms S-8.



We also are aware that the aforementioned report, pursuant to Rule 436(c) under the Securities Act of 1933, is not considered a part of the Registration Statement
prepared or certified by an accountant or a report prepared or certified by an accountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of that Act.



|                                           
|-------------------------------------------
|/s/  Deloitte & Touche, LLP                
|                                           
|Certified Public Accountants Tampa, Florida
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5526 

To suspend temporarily the duty on plain shaft sputter bearings without 

housing (other than spherical bearings), each weighing 260 grams or more. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 7, 2012 

Mr. WILSON of South Carolina introduced the following bill; which was 

referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To suspend temporarily the duty on plain shaft sputter bearings without housing (other than spherical bearings), 

each weighing 260 grams or more. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PLAIN SHAFT SPUTTER BEARINGS WITHOUT 

4 HOUSING (OTHER THAN SPHERICAL BEAR5 INGS), EACH WEIGHING 260 GRAMS OR MORE. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter II of chapter 99 of 

7 the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

8 amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following 

9 new heading: 


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•HR 5526 IH

‘‘ 9902.01.00 Plain shaft sputter bearings without housing 

(other than spherical bearings), each weighing 260 g 

or more, with journal size 

measuring 117 mm or 

more (provided for in subheading 8483.30.80) ......... Free No change No change On or before 

12/31/2015 ’’. 

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

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#### HUGGINS v. STATE.

No. 22735.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 2, 1944.

McIntosh & Duncan, of Gilmer, for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

This is an appeal from a conviction for possessing whiskey for the purpose of sale in Upshur County, a dry area, with punishment assessed at a fine of $200.

An agent of the Texas Liquor Control Board saw appellant leave a liquor store in Gregg County, with a package in his hand, and saw him get in a car and drive away. He followed the car until it passed into-Upshur County, when he stopped it. Harvey Clark was driving the car, and appellant was a passenger therein. A search of the car was made, but no whiskey was found therein. Appellant was asked, “What did you do with the whiskey?” and he said, “I didn’t have any.” The car had been stopped near an embankment by the side of the road. The agent testified further: “I looked down the embankment which was three and a half or four feet high, and there lay a bunch of whiskey just scattered on the ground.” This whiskey, consisting of twelve half-pint bottles, was recovered and offered in evidence. The agent asked Clark, in appellant’s presence, “who the whiskey belonged to and he said to Morris Huggins” (appellant). To this statement appellant made no reply, nor did he deny same.- The twelve half-pint bottles of whiskey, when found, were in a paper sack. The agent testified that, as he drove around the car, after it had stopped, he saw appellant with this paper sack in his hand.

The appellant did not testify as a witness in the case.

It is insisted that, under the facts stated, appellant was entitled to have the jury instructed upon the law of circumstantial evidence. The testimony showing appellant in possession of the sack containing the whiskey, together with Clark’s res ges-tae statement that the whiskey so found belonged to appellant, made the State’s case one of direct evidence rather than that of circumstantial.

Appellant complains because the trial court, notwithstanding appellant’s request, refused to charge the jury to the effect that, before a conviction would be authorized, the jury had to find and believe, from the evidence, not only that appellant owned the whiskey, but that it was in his exclusive control and management. *270Such is not the law. In cases of this character, the possession contemplated is the care, control, and management of the property at the time. Ownership is unnecessary to constitute such possession; nor is the possession required to be exclusive.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
March 29, 2011

Mr. Gregg George Chief Pilot and Senior Principal Systems Engineer Raytheon

P.O. Box 11337

Tucson, AZ 85734-1337

Dear Mr. George:

We have received your March 29, 2011, correspondence withdrawing your February 9, 2011, petition on behalf of Raytheon for an exemption from § 91.215(a) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

Your letter has been placed in the public docket (No. FAA-2011-0144). No further action will be taken on your petition.

Sincerely,

/s/ Ida M. Klepper Manager, Airmen and Airspace Rules Division
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 195 (Friday, October 6, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 59874]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-25724]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993; Inter Company Collaboration for AIDS Drug 
Development

    Notice is hereby given that, on August 30, 2000, pursuant to 
section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), Inter Company Collaboration 
for AIDS Drug Development has filed written notifications 
simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade 
Commission disclosing changes in its membership status. The 
notifications were filed for the purpose of extending the Act's 
provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual 
damages under specified circumstances. Specifically, Collaboration 
member Pfizer Inc., New York, NY, has acquired Warner-Lambert Co., 
Morris Plains, NJ by way of a merger. The combined company is called 
Pfizer Inc.
    No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned 
activity of the group research project. Membership in this group 
research project remains open, and Inter Company Collaboration for AIDS 
Drug Development intends to file additional written notification 
disclosing all changes in membership.
    On May 27, 1993, Inter Company Collaboration for AIDS Drug 
Development filed its original notification pursuant to section 6(a) of 
the Act. The Department of Justice published a notice in the Federal 
Register pursuant to section 6(b) of the Act on July 6, 1993 (58 FR 
36223).
    The last notification was filed with the Department on May 26, 
2000. A notice was published in the Federal Register pursuant to 
section 6(b) of the Act on September 13, 2000 (65 FR 55283).

Constance K. Robinson,
Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 00-25724 Filed 10-5-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
#### BLOCKER v. LAWRENCE.

No. 15162.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Fort Worth.

Oct. 6, 1950.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 10, 1950.

Donald & Donald, of Bowie, for appellant.

H. G. Woodruff, of Decatur, for appellee.

HALL, Justice.

On November 17, 1948, appellant W. O. Blocker filed this suit in the district court of Wise County, Texas, against appellee' C. A. Lawrence, to restrain appellee from locking a gate and closing a passageway which appellant alleges he was using for travel to and from his lands situated on either side of appellee’s lands; on said date, the trial court in chambers entered its fiat restraining appellee Lawrence from locking said gates in question, and setting a hearing on said temporary restraining order for November 22, 1948 at 1:30 P. M.

Appellee filed his lengthy answer op November 22, 1948.

Nothing appears in the transcript other than said answer filed until May 15, 1950, when the court, after a hearing, entered an order denying plaintiff injunctive relief and dissolving the temporary restraining order theretofore entered. It is from this order appellant appeals, complaining in the main that the judgment, though confusing in its terms, is in the form of a final judgment and therefore he is prevented from trial by a jury upon the merits.

We have carefully examined the judgment dated May 15, 1950, and find some of its phraseology indicating that the court may have tried the case on its merits, but as a whole we construe said judgment to be an interlocutory order, denying appellant in-junctive relief upon the temporary hearing.

Since both parties in their brief and in their oral argument before this court admit that said hearing was upon the temporary restraining order to determine whether or not same should continue until a hearing upon its merits, and since we have construed the terminology of said judgment to be interlocutory in character, the only question before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion in entering the order appealed from.

 The appellate court will not disturb the trial court’s order granting or refusing a writ of injunction unless it is *458-clearly shown that the trial court has abused its discretion in the matter. We have read •most of the testimony in this case and find the evidence to be conflicting- and under such conditions it has been held many times that the appellate courts will not disturb the trial court’s order. See 24 T. J., p. 313, sec. 253; Rudd v. Wallace, Tex.Civ.App., 232 S.W.2d 121.

 Since the question has been raised whether the order appealed from was a final judgment on the merits, or merely an interlocutory order refusing a temporary injunction, we expressly construe the order as an interlocutory one, and not as a final judgment on the merits. We affirm it as we construe it, which is also to say that the case shall stand for trial on t'he merits. We do *not*pass on the merits but hold only that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the temporary injunction.

The order appealed from, as we have construed it, is affirmed.
[No. 35348.

Department One.

September 8, 1960.]

#### Darwin A. Ellington, *Appellant,*v. Michael A. Freigang *et al., Respondents.*
      *1*

*719
      *Sterbick, Manza, Moceri, Sterbick & Stubbs (George*W. *Christnacht,*of counsel), for appellant.

*Geer, Rickabaugh*& *Billett,*for respondents.

Reported in 355 P. (2d) 19.

Mallery, J.

— This is a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident occurring at approximately 7:30 a. m., on December 9, 1957.

Just previous to the accident, the plaintiff had been towing a stalled vehicle north on Bridgeport Way, a north-south thoroughfare in Pierce county just outside the city of Tacoma. The motor of the towed vehicle started as they approached the intersection of south 44th street and Bridgeport Way. The two drivers drove the cars to the edge of the road and parked where the shoulder was so narrow that only about one half of the width of the cars was off the paved or main-traveled portion of the roadway. The plaintiff got out of his car and stepped between the two cars to unfasten the tow chain. It was then that the driver of the towed vehicle, who was still behind the wheel, saw the defendant Michael A. Freigang approaching from the rear and began to pump his brake lights in order to warn him of the presence of the parked cars. The defendant Michael A. Freigang either did not see or did not heed the warning because he crashed into the towed vehicle, driving it forward into the plaintiff’s car, thus pinning the plaintiff between them.

At the close of the plaintiff’s opening statement at the trial, the defendants moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the statement contained an admission of a violation of RCW 46.48.290. This section provides that a person may not park any vehicle on the main-traveled portion of a public highway unless “a clear view of such stopped vehicle shall be available for a distance of three hundred feet in each direction on the highway.” The defendants urged that *720this violation made the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action upon that theory. The plaintiff appeals.

The trial court erred in dismissing the action notwithstanding the appellant’s admitted contributory negligence, because the admission did not preclude the appellant from going forward with proof of the respondent Michael A. Freigang’s last clear chance to avoid the accident. Contributory negligence is not a defense to an action predicated on the doctrine of last clear chance.

In order for admissions in an opening statement to constitute grounds for dismissal, they must be distinct, formal, unequivocal, and deliberately made. *Charada Investment Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co.,*188 Wash. 325, 62 P. (2d) 722. Moreover, the admissions must be conclusive upon every theory of liability presented by the pleadings, which, in this case, included last clear chance.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

Weaver, C. J., Hill, Foster, and Hunter, JJ., concur.

October 13, 1960. Petition for rehearing denied.
Exhibit 32.1
 
 Statement of Chief Executive Officer Furnished
 Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 
 The undersigned, Kim S. Price, is the President and Chief Executive Officer of Citizens South Banking Corporation (the “Company”).
 
 This statement is being furnished in connection with the filing by the Company of the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010 (the “Report”).
 
 By execution of this statement, I certify that:
 
 A)
the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and
 
 B)
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods covered by the Report.
 
 
 
 
 March 14, 2011                                                                          /s/ Kim S. Price
 Dated                                                                          Kim S. Price
 President and Chief Executive Officer
 
 This statement is authorized to be attached as an exhibit to the Report so that this statement will accompany the Report at such time as the Report is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350.  It is not intended that this statement be deemed to be filed for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2790 

To authorize private nonprofit organizations to administer permanent housing 

rental assistance provided through the Continuum of Care Program 

under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 23, 2013 

Mr. PETERS of California (for himself and Mr. MCNERNEY) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To authorize private nonprofit organizations to administer 

permanent housing rental assistance provided through 

the Continuum of Care Program under the McKinneyVento Homeless Assistance Act, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Housing Assistance 

5 Efficiency Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. AUTHORITY TO ADMINISTER RENTAL ASSISTANCE. 

7 Subsection (g) of section 423 of the McKinney-Vento 

8 Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 11383(g)) is amendVerDate Mar 15 2010 18:28 Jul 26, 2013 Jkt 029200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2790.IH H2790

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2 

•HR 2790 IH

1 ed by inserting ‘‘private nonprofit organization,’’ after 

2 ‘‘unit of general local government,’’. 

3 SEC. 3. REALLOCATION OF FUNDS. 

4 Paragraph (1) of section 414(d) of the McKinney5 Vento Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 11373(d)(1)) 

6 is amended by striking ‘‘twice’’ and inserting ‘‘once’’. 

Æ 


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