Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice

David F. Viviano,

Chief Justice Pro Tem

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh,

Justices

Order 

December 20, 2019

159004

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 159004

COA: 336405

Oakland CC: 2015-255034-FH

RAYMOND CHARLES COLVILLE,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 29, 2018 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in 

lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE Part II of the Court of Appeals judgment 

addressing the defendant’s motion to suppress, and we REMAND this case to the 

Oakland Circuit Court for further proceedings. The circuit court shall conduct an 

evidentiary hearing to determine: (1) whether, at the time that Officer Proulx initially 

searched the property at 695 Livernois, he had been advised that he had consent to search 

the property; (2) if so, whether Treasury employee Jill Robinson had actual authority to 

consent to that search; and (3) if not, whether Officer Proulx reasonably relied on 

apparent authority for consent to search, i.e., whether it was reasonable for him to rely on 

the apparent consent without making any effort to verify the authority to consent, in light 

of the citation posted on the front door. The circuit court shall then decide whether to 

grant the defendant a new trial. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because 

we are not persuaded that the remaining question presented should be reviewed by this 

Court.

We do not retain jurisdiction.

ZAHRA, J. (dissenting). 

I respectfully dissent from the order remanding this case to the trial court for an 

evidentiary hearing to determine whether, at the time that Officer Proulx initially 

searched the property at 695 Livernois, he had been advised that he had consent to search 

the property; whether Department of Treasury employee Jill Robinson had actual 

authority to consent to that search; or whether Officer Proulx reasonably relied on 

Robinson’s apparent authority for consent to search. Defendant did not preserve these 

issues below and has not properly presented these issues to this Court. Instead, defendant 

raises only two issues in this Court: whether the Court of Appeals misapplied the 

doctrine of “inevitable discovery” in rejecting defendant’s argument that the search of his 

house violated the Fourth Amendment; and whether defendant was denied his right to an 

impartial jury, or to the effective assistance of counsel, when a juror attempted to engage 
2

a court clerk in a conversation about the case, but no further inquiry was made into 

(a) what was said, (b) whether the juror was biased, or (c) whether there was further 

communication with the jury at large. Because the questions presented on remand were 

not preserved and were wholly abandoned by defendant, I would deny the application for 

leave to appeal and offer defendant no avenue for relief.

In the trial court, defendant moved to suppress incriminating evidence recovered 

from the warrantless entry into the Livernois home under the Fourth Amendment. His 

motion, however, focused on the validity of the search warrant and the veracity of the 

assertions within Detective Matthew Goebel’s affidavit supporting the warrant rather than 

Officer Proulx’s initial warrantless entry. Defendant alerted the trial court that the county 

did not own the Livernois home and alleged that “Ms. Robinson did not have authority to 

grant officers or county employees permission to enter the premises/home.” But he made 

this assertion in the context of requesting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks v 

Delaware,

1 arguing that the allegations in Detective Goebel’s affidavit were materially 

false. Defendant did not ask for a hearing on whether Officer Proulx or Detective Goebel 

had valid consent to search, nor did he present any argument on the doctrine of consent. 

In the Court of Appeals, defendant again stated that Robinson had no authority to consent 

to the search, but just as he failed to do before this Court, he did not argue the relevant 

body of law on the validity of Robinson’s consent.

This Court has recognized that

[i]t is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position 

or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and 

rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his 

arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his 

position.[2]

 1 Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154 (1978).

2 Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203 (1959).
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 December 20, 2019 

t1217

3

Clerk

As the appellant, defendant was required to preserve his issues adequately and make at 

least a threshold showing of error entitling him to relief.3

 His failure to do so constitutes 

abandonment of those issues on appeal.4

 This Court correctly denies defendant relief on 

the issues he raises, but on its own initiative also grants defendant relief that he has not 

requested. Because defendant has failed to properly raise and present the dispositive 

arguments adopted by the majority or any other jurisprudentially significant issues ripe 

for resolution, I would deny him the relief the majority gives him today.

 3 See id. (“The appellant himself must first adequately prime the pump; only then does 

the appellate well begin to flow.”).

4 People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120, 131 n 36 (“Failure to brief an issue on appeal 

constitutes abandonment.”).