1

The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 07-2243

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Arkansas.

Kenneth L. Knuckles, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

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Submitted: December 13, 2007

 Filed: March 21, 2008

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Before RILEY, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Kenneth Lynn Knuckles pled guilty to one count of possession of child

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The district court1

sentenced him to 37 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.

As a special condition, the district court, over objection, ordered that he spend the first

four months of supervised release in a residential reentry center. Knuckles appeals,

asserting a lack of jurisdiction and an abuse of discretion. Having jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
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This court reviews “the district court’s imposition of special conditions of

supervised release for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Smart, 472 F.3d 556,

558 (8th Cir. 2006). A sentencing court may impose a condition of supervised release

if, among other things, the condition “involves no greater deprivation of liberty than

is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C),

and (a)(2)(D).” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). These purposes are deterrence, protection

of the public, and provision of necessary training or correctional treatment. See 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); United States v. Camp, 410 F.3d 1042, 1045 (8th Cir. 2005).

Knuckles argues that the district court abused its discretion because the

condition deprives him of liberty to a greater degree than necessary, since a Bureau

of Prisons policy favors placement in residential reentry centers toward the end of

prison terms. The district court rejected this argument, stating, “I realize that

ordinarily they do that anyway, but they don’t always . . . . I just think in his case I

want to make certain it is done, and I don’t want it to be overlooked.” The court cited

the need for Knuckles to live in a stable and disciplined environment, where he could

obtain employment and counseling before fully reintegrating into society. The court

specifically noted his youth (19 years old at sentencing) and prior conviction for

sexually molesting a child. The court clearly wanted Knuckles to receive the

treatment necessary to rehabilitate and avoid committing future crimes, the purposes

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The district court did not abuse its discretion. 

Knuckles also contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction under 18

U.S.C. § 3583(d) to impose residence at a reentry center as a condition of supervised

release. To the contrary, “§ 3583(d) continues to include community-corrections

confinement as a discretionary condition of supervised release.” United States v.

Griner, 358 F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Porter, 417 F.3d

914, 919 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Community confinement is a potential condition

contemplated by the statute . . . .”). Therefore, this argument is foreclosed by

precedent. 

 The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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