i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 7- 00 33 9- CV Rol and o Ra fa e l SAENZ , Appellant
v . M ar ia G r a c ie la Sa e n z M AR TIN EZ , Individually and as Tr ustee for the Rolando Raf

ael Tr ust, and Pedro I . Saenz J r., Appellee s Fr om the 406th J udicial District Court, Webb County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2005-CVQ-000144- D4 Honora ble O.J . Hale, Jr., J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Justi ce

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Deliver ed and F iled: November 5, 2008 AFF I RMED Mari a Gr a c ie la Sa e nz Ma

rt ine z, Ind ivi du a lly

and a s Tru ste e fo r t

he Rol and o Ra fa e l T ru st, and Pedro I
. Saenz Jr. (“a ppellees” ) soug ht to enfor ce a mediated settlement ag ree ment b y fi l i ng traditional and no e vidence motions for summary judgme nt. The trial c ourt g rante d the motions and Rol and o Ra fa e l Sa e nz ( “ Sa e nz” ) a pp e a ls. We a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.04
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1 ... T h e se ttl e m e n t ag re e m e n t wa s a ls o s ig n e d b y S a e n z ’s w ife, L e tty A lm a ra z S a e n z , as a “n o n -li tiga n t.” Cou n s e l f

or M a r t i n e z a n d Sa e n z J r . t e s t i f i e d t h e y h a d h e r s i g n t h e a g r e e me n t t o pr e v e n t a n y a dd i t i on a l po t e n t i a l c l a i ms w ith re g a rd to the m a tter s.

- 2- B ACKG ROUND Pedro I . Saenz Sr. and Maria Del Refug io M. De Saenz cre ated a n irrevoc able trust (“ Trust”) for the benef

it of t heir son, Saenz. Saenz’s sister, Maria Grac iela S aenz M artinez (“Ma rtinez”) wa s named trustee
. Approxim ately ten y ear s later, Saenz f iled suit a g ainst his brother, Pedro I . Saenz J r.,
and Mart ine z, a lle g ingmis mana g e me nt o f t he Tr us t. S a e nz’ s d a

ug hte rs , K a the ri ne Sa e nz and Amy Saenz-Smit h (“Interve nors”) filed a petition in intervention, alleg ing Sae nz breac hed his fiduciar y duty as trustee of anothe r trust c rea ted for their benef

it. The parties media

ted and on Apr il 11, 2006, signe d a “Settlement Agr ee m en t and Relea se of All Claims.” 1 Howeve r, at a schedule d status hear ing on Ma

y 4, 2006, Saenz claimed he no long er a g ree d to the settlement. The trial c ourt g rante d appellee s’ motion to enter judg ment based on the settlement ag ree ment; however , the cour t later g rante d Saenz’s motion for new tria l. Appellees then filed an
ame nd e d a

ns we r, inc lud in g a c ounte rc la im s e e kin g e nf or c e me nt o f t

he se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt. Appellee s filed traditional and no evidenc e motions for summary judgme nt seekingto enforc e the settlement a gr e e me nt. Sa e n z r e s p o n d e d, rea sserting his defense s and af firmative de fense s, excepting to the l ack of specific ity in the no evidenc e motion for summary judgme nt, and re questing a motion for c ontinuance. T he trial c ourt g rante d the motions for summary judgme nt. A N A L Y SIS No Evi de nc e M ot ion for Sum m ar y J udgm e nt– R ule 16 6( a) (i ) In h is f ir st i ssu e , Sa e nz ar g ue s the tr ia l court e rr e d in g ra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt b e c a

us e the no evidenc e motion for summary judgme nt filed by

appellee s was def

ective. While we a g ree the04
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2 ... T his was b ase d o n a p p elle e s’ e rro ne o us asse rti o n that Sa en z h ad no t p l ea d ed an y af f i rm ati ve d efen ses. Saenz ’ s s uppl ement al pet i t i on as s er t ed s eve r al def ens es , at l eas t one a f

f i r mat i ve def

ens e, an d i ncor po r at ed t he def ens es a n d a ff irm a tive d e fen se s p le a d e d in h is m o tio n fo r n e w trial.

- 3- no evidenc e motion for summary judgme nt was flaw ed, sust aining this issue does not entitle Saenz to relief. Rul e 16 6a (i ) p ro vid e s a

pa rt y may mov e fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt o n th e g ro un d th a t th e re is no evidenc e of one or more e ssential elements of a defe nse on which a

n adver se par

ty has the burde n of proof , but the motion “must state the e lements as to which ther e is no evidenc e.” T EX . R. C IV . P. 166a(i). T he comment to the rule, which is “intended to inform the construction and a pplication of the rule,” states the motion “must be specif ic in challeng ing the evidentiar y support for a

n element of a . . . defe nse” and the rule “does not a uthorize c onclusory motions or g ener al n o -evidence challeng es t o an opponent’s ca se.” T EX . R. C IV . P. 16 6a (i ) c mt. I f a no e vid e nc e mot ion

is
c on c lus or y or do e s no t sp e c if

ic a lly c ha lle ng e a pa

rt ic ula r e le me nt o f a

de fe ns e , th e mot ion

is l e g a lly insufficient. Callaghan Ranch, Ltd. v. Killam , 5 3 S. W.3 d 1 , 3 (T e x. Ap p. –Sa n A nto nio 20 00 , p e t. denied)
. Ap pe lle e s’ no e vid e nc e mot ion stated: “ In th e ins tant c a se [Sae nz] . . . w ill no t be a ble to produce any valid summary judgme nt evidence to support any defe nses.” 2 Ap pe lle e s’ mot ion fa ils to state the ele ments of Saenz’s af firmative defe nses as to which there is no e vidence , rende ringthe motion lega lly

insufficient to su p p o rt a judgment. See id. a t 3- 4. Ho we ve r, thi s d oe s n ot e nti tle Sa e nz to a

re ve rs a l be caus e app e lle e s a lso fi le d a tr a dit ion a l mo tio n f

or summa ry jud g me nt. Ap pe lle e s, a s p la int if

fs , we re no t re qu ir e d to c on c lus ive ly dis pr ov e Sa e nz’ s a ff ir mativ e de fe ns e s to preva il on their traditional motion. See B rownlee v. Brownlee , 665 S.W .2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984). Ra the r, Sa e n z , a s th e p arty r e l yi n g o na f

f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e s , w a s r e qu i r e d

t o c o m e f

o r w ar d w i th04
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- 4- summ ar y ju d g me n t e v id e n c e s u f f ic ie n t to r a is e a f

a c t is s u e o n e a c h e le me n t o f a t le ast one aff irmative def

ense to avoid summary

judgme nt. See id. ; se e als o Nic ho ls v. S mith , 507 S.W .2d 5 1 8 , 5 2 0 (T ex . 1 9 7 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Torres v. W estern Cas. & Sur. Co. , 457 S.W .2d 50, 53 (Tex. 1970) (h old ing“ [t]he re is o ne sit uat io n whe re the op po ne nt o f a summa ry jud g me nt m oti on

mus t c ome forwa rd himself to raise a fact issue by proof rather than alleg ation, the m ovant having pre sented no proof on the issue, a

nd that is to support the non-movant’s own af firmative de fense .”)) . The a bsence of a le g a lly su ff ic ie nt n o e vid e nce mo ti on for summa ry jud g me nt d oe s n ot r e lie ve Sa e nz o f t his burden be cause he bea

rs this burden under

the traditional motion for summary judgme nt. Alleged Exclusion of S aenz’s Sum m ary Judgm ent Evidence Saenz contends in his second issue that the trial cour t erre d in excluding his summary judgme nt evidence . Appellee s made numer ous objections to Saenz’s summary judgme nt evidence , but the rec ord does not contain any trial court rulings on those objections. Nor is there any indication in t he re c or d th a t th e tr ia l c ourt fa ile d to c on sid e r S a e nz’ s summa ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e or

a c tua lly
ex cl u ded any

evidenc e. Given our

mandate to c onduct a de novo revie w and to take evidenc e favor able to no n m o v an tas t ru e, we s h al l re v i ew ap p el l ee s ’ s u m m ary j u d gm en tev i d en ce t o deter mine whethe r th e y e s ta b li s h e d th e ir r igh t t o s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t a s a

matt e r o f la w an d if s o , w hether Sa e nz ’s summa

ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e is c omp e te nt a nd ra ise s a g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t to defe at summary

judgme nt. See B rowning v. Prostock, 16 5 S.W. 3d 33 6, 34 4 (T ex . 2 00 5) ; Am. Tob ac c o Co . v . G rin ne ll , 951 S.W .2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997).

Traditional Motion for Su m m ary Judgm ent – Rule 166a(c ) Ini s s u e s t h r e e t h r o u g hs i x, S a e n z c o n t e n d s th e tr i a l c o urte r r e d i ng r an t i n g app e lle e s’ traditional motion for summary judgme nt beca

use (1) appellee s’ evidenc e wa s insufficient to prove04
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3 ... I n t r i al cou r t pl ea di n g s , Sa en z r ai s ed el ev en def en s es an d af

f i r mat i v e def

en s es . O n appe al , h owe v er , he cl ai ms onl y t hat t wo def ens es an d f

i ve af f i r mat i ve def

ens es pre cl ude s ummary j udgment
. Accordi ng l y , we wi l l r evi ew t he p rop ri et y of t he t ri al co urt ’ s o rder grant i ng s um m ary judgm ent only wi t h regard t o t ho se def enses a n d af

f i rma t i ve d e fen se s ra ise d b e lo w a n d p re se n te d a s g ro u n d s fo r re v e rs a l o n a p p e a l. See San Jaci nt o R i ver A ut h. v. D uke , 783 S. W
. 2d 2 0 9 , 2 1 0 (T e x . 1 9 9 0 ) (h o ld ing a p p e llate c o u rt m a y no t re v e rs e su m m a ry j u d g m e n t ab se n t p ro p e rly a ssig n e d e rr o r)
.

- 5- as a matter of law

the exist ence of a se ttlement ag ree ment and bre ach o f s am e b y S aenz, and (2) Sae nz produced c ompetent su m m ar y j u d g ment evidenc e ra ising fa ct issues on numerous
a ff ir mativ e de fe ns e s. 3 Courts review de novo traditional motions for summary judgme nt. ValenceOperating Co.

v . D or se tt , 1 64 S.W. 3d

65 6, 66 1 ( Te x. 20 05 ). Atr a dit ion a l mo tio n f or summa ry jud g me nt i s proper ly g rante d only when the mova nt establishes there are no g enuine issues of material fa ct and it i s en t i t l ed t o judgme nt as a matter of law on the g rounds expressly set forth in the motion. Browning , 165 S.W .3d at 344. When revie wing an order g rantinga tra ditional moti on for summary jud g me nt, c ourt s ta

ke e vid e nc e fa

vo ra ble to n on mov ant a s tr

ue and ind ulg e e ve ry

rea so na ble in f e r e n c e f r o m th e e v id e n c e in f

av o r o f th e n o nmovant. Gr inn e ll , 951 S.W .2d at 425. Mere suspicion or surmise is not a rea sonable infe renc e and w ill not qualify as summary

judgme nt proof. See Ce nteq Realty, I

nc. v. Sie gler , 899 S.W .2d 195, 198 n.1 (Tex. 1995). Saenz first argues the trial court e rre d in gr anting appellee s’ traditional motion for summary judgme nt beca

use appe llees did not produce sufficie nt summar y judgme nt e vidence to establish as a matter of law the exis tence of a settlement ag ree ment or that Saenz brea ched it. Saenz contends the only evidenc e produc ed by

appellee s in support of their motion was portions of Saenz’s te sti mony fr om a he ari nghe ld b e fo re the mot ion for su mma ry jud g me nt w a s f

ile d. Sa e nz is incorre ct. In their motion for summary judgme nt, appellee s relied on not only the t estimony ref err ed to by Saenz, but also on their pleading establishing the y filed a c ounterc laim seekingto enforc e the04
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4 ... A n a ff

ir m a ti v e d e fen se a ttem p ts to e sta b lish a n ind e p e n d e n t re a so n to d e n y a p la intiff ’s re c o v e ry. H ong K on g D ev. , I

nc. v. Ng uyen , 229 S. W
. 3d 415, 457 n
. 41 ( T ex . App. –H ou s t on [ 1s t D i s t
. ] 2007, n o pe t
. )
. I t i s a de f en s e of a v o id a n c e a s o p p o se d to a d e fen se in d e n ia l. Id
. I n other wo rds, when ass ert i ng an af f i rma t i ve d ef

ense, a de f

end ant a d m its t h e va lid ity o f th e p la intiff ’s c la im , b u t c o n te n d s tha t d e sp ite its va lid ity o the r re a so n s e x ist t o d e n y the p la intiff re c o v e ry. S e e id

.

- 6- s e tt le me n t a g r e e me n t a

n d th e s e tt le me n t a g r e e me n t i ts e lf
. T h e qu e s ti o nis w h e th e r th is e v id e n ce established their r ight to judg ment as a matter of law
. Saenz next contends appellees did not establish their rig ht to judgment as a matter of la

w be c a us e he ra ise d f

a c t is su e s r e g ard ingthe se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt’ s e nf or c e a bil ity , in c lud inghis withdrawa l of consent to the agr eeme nt and an absenc e of consideration to support it – defe nses as op po se d to a ff

ir mativ e de fe ns e s. 4 Wit

hdrawa l of

Cons e nt Appellee s’ summary

judgme nt evidence establishes the e x istence of a settlement a g ree ment signe d by Saenz and all the other parties, be fore a notar

y public. Additionally , appellee s included
as sum mary

judgme nt evidence testimony from a he aringat which Sae nz admitt ed he sig ned the settlement ag ree ment but, a fter he rec eived money pursuant to the ag ree ment, chang ed his mind and soug ht to withdraw his consent. A written settlement a g ree ment may be enf orc ed ev en if one party

withdraws its consent befor e judg ment is render ed on the a greement. Mantas v. Fifth Ct. of App ., 925 S.W .2d 656, 658 (T ex . 1 9 9 6 ) (o ri g. p ro ce ed i n g) (p er cu ri am ) ( ci t i n g Padilla v. LaFrance , 907 S.W .2d 454, 461 (Tex. 1995)). Where consent is lac k i n g, a t rial cour t may not rende r an a g ree d judgme nt on the settlement ag ree ment, but the party seeking enfor ceme nt ma

y proper ly pursue a

separ ate br eac h of contra ct claim. Mantas , 925 S.W .2d at 658. This mode of enfor ceme nt is based on rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedur e, the requisites of which are nece ssary for entr y o f a n y j u d g ment04
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5 ... Sa en z’ s ow n s u mmar y j u dg men t pr oof e s t abl i s h es h i s w i t h dr aw al of c on s en t w as s u bs equ en t t o t h e ex ec u t i on of t he s et t l ement ag r eement
. At t he M ay 11, 2 00 6 hea r i ng , S aen z adm i t t ed t hat on Ap r i l 11t h, t he day t he agr eement was exe cut ed, he wan t ed t he s et t l ement an d t hat he ch ang ed hi s mi nd onl y af t er he r ece i ved t he mo ney promi s ed hi m under the a g re e m e n t.

- 7- enfor cinga settlement a g ree ment. Pa dil la , 9 0 7 S
. W
. 2 d at 4 6 0 (c i t i n g Kennedy v. Hy de , 682 S.W .2d 525, 528 (Tex. 1984)). He re , th e summa

ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e sh ow s a se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt, sig ne d by a ll p art ie s, and filed with the pape rs of the c ourt as par t of the re cord be fore enfor ceme nt was soug ht. SeeT EX . R. C IV . P. 11 ; Pa dil la , 9 07 S.W. 2d a t 46 0- 61 (h old ing se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt mus t c omp ly wi th r ule 11 to be enf

orce able and holding rule 11 filing require ment is met if settlement ag ree ment is filed befor e it is soug ht to be enf orce d). The e vidence further establishes appe llees soug ht enforc ement by filing a counter claim t o enfor ce the ag ree ment by specific perf ormanc e. See M

antas , 925 S.W .2d 658. The settlement ag ree ment is c omplete in that it contains the essential terms – pa y ment to Saenz and other s of ce rtain sums of money from the trust in exchang e for execution of m utual rele ases a nd ind e mni fi c a tio n a g re e me nts
. Se e Che rCo Pr op s. , Inc . v . La w, S na k ar d &Ga mb ill

, P .C. , 985 S.W .2d 2 6 2 , 2 6 6 ( T e x. Ap p . – F o rt W o rth 1 9 9 9 , n o p e t
. ) ( h o l d i n g th a t s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t c o n ta ine d a ll materia l terms wher e it include d terms of pay ment and statement that parties would e x ecute mutual rele ases)
. Saenz’s subsequent withdra wal of c onsent 5 to the ag ree ment, though undisputed, doe s not
ra ise a fa c t is su e ne g a tin g the e nf or c eabi li ty

of the a g re e me nt a

nd pr e c lud ingsumma

ry jud g me nt. Absence of Consideration Saenz a lso c ontends appellee s did not establish their rig ht to judgme nt a s a m at t er o f l aw beca use he r aised a fa ct i s s ue re g ardingthe abse nce of consideration. Saenz arg ues there was no consideration to support the settlement ag ree ment beca use he g ot nothing more than what Ma rtinez04
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- 8- “wa s alrea dy o b l i gat ed to give n him, i.e., distributi on of trust money for his nec essar

y living expenses.” We disag ree . Consideration is an essential element of any valid contra ct. J.M. D avidson, Inc. v . W ebster , 12 8 S. W.3 d 2 23 , 2 35 (T e x. 20 03 ); MG Bl dg . M ate ria ls, Ltd

. v . M os es Lo pe z C us tom Ho me

s, Inc. , 1 79 S.W. 3d

51 , 6 1- 62 (T e x. Ap p. –Sa n Anto nio 20 05 , p e t. deni ed) . Co ns ide ratio n is a “bar g ained- for” exchang e of promises. Roark v. Stallw orth O il & Gas, Inc. , 813 S.W .2d 492, 496 (Tex. 1991). I t can be either a benef it to the promisor or a detr iment to the promisee. Fo rt W or th In de p. Sc h. Di

st. v . Ci ty of F or t W or th , 22 S.W. 3d 83 1, 84 1 (T e x. 20 00 ). I t c an c on sis t of a ri g ht, int e re st, pr of

it, or be ne fi t that accru e s to on e pa rt y , o r s ome fo rb e ara

nc e , lo ss, or

re sp on sib ili ty undertaken or inc urre d by the other pa

rty
. Cop el a n d v. Alsobrook, 3 S. W. 3 d 5 9 8 , 6 0 6 ( T e x. Ap p. –Sa n Ant on io 199 9, pe t. de nie d)
. Ev e n a n e xch ang e of

pr omi se s is su ff

ic ie nt c on sid e ra

tio n in Texas. Id
. In the settlement agree ment, Martinez, as trustee , ag ree d to pay Saenz $34,000.00 from the Trust and disburse to him six ty perc ent of any income or reve nue rece ived by the Trust within ten day s of re ceivingsame, until a succ esso r t ru s t ee was a ppointed or she r esig ned. The se terms of dis tr ibutio n d if

fe r f ro m th e Tr

us t pr ov isi on s, wh ic h g ave the tr us te e fu ll dis c re tio n “ to a c c umu late all or par t of the net income , or, to distribute any part of the income or principal for the maintenanc e, comfort, he alth, educa

tion and welfa

re” of Saenz. The only limit ation was that the t rustee e ndeavor “insofar as possible” “ to maintain that standard of living to which [S aenz] is ac customed.” Sae nz benef itted by conver ting what had been a

discretionar

y distribution by

the trustee into a ma

ndatory distribution of income. This benefit wa s sufficient c onsideration to support the settlement ag ree ment. See Supe r-Cold Sw. Co. v. Gre en &Romans , 185 S.W .2d 749, 753 (Tex. Civ. App.–Fort04
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- 9- Worth 1945, no writ) (holding that pay ment of def

err ed ins tallments of purcha se price befor e maturity was considera

tion). I n return, Saenz a g ree d to e x ecute a rele ase an dindemnification ag ree ment disposing of his cla ims arising out of or conne cted to the Tr ust. The settlement agree ment also included Mar

tinez’s ag ree ment to resig n as t rustee. This benef itted Saenz because he no long er had to pursue r emoval proc eeding s. SeeT EX . P R OP . C ODE ANN . § 113.082 (Ve rnon 2007). Interve nors also re lease d their cla ims ag ainst Saenz, constituti ng another benef it to him . Any

one of these benef

its or f orbea ranc es wa s sufficient c onsideration to support the agree ment. See A llen v. Am. G en. Finance

, Inc. , 251 S.W .3d 676, 688 (Tex. A pp.–San Antonio 2007, pe t. filed) (holding that on e c on sid e ratio n w ill su pp or t mu lti ple pr omi se s) ; Bi rd we ll v . B ird

we ll , 819 S.W .2d 223, 228 (Tex. A pp.–For t Worth 1991, writ denied) (same)
. Appellee s met their burde n o f s howing consideration for the agree ment and Saenz did not produce any summary judgme nt proof c reating a fa ct question on the issue. Affirm ative De fenses We next deter

mine whether

Saenz produce d competent summary judgme nt evidence raising f a c ti s s u e s o nth e a f

f i r m a t i v e d e f

e n s e s o f d ur e s s , an t i c i p a t o r

y b r e a c h , f

r a u d , an d u n c o n s c i o n a

b i l i ty. As the par

ty relying on a ffirmative defe nses, it was incumbent upon Sae nz to produce summary judgme nt evidence sufficie nt to raise a f act issue on e ach e lement of at least one of his affirmative defe nses. See B rownlee , 6 65 S.W. 2d a t 11 2; Nic ho ls , 507 S.W .2d at 520. Du re ss Saenz first co ntends he ra ised a fa ct issue to defe at summary judgme nt based on the aff irmative def

ense of duress. See T EX . R. C IV . P. 94 ( stating dur ess is aff irmative def

ense) ; se e als o Ha rd in v . H ar din , 597 S.W .2d 347, 348 (Tex. 1980) (desc ribing du re s s as af firmative de fense ).04
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- 10- “Dur ess is a threat to do some act which the threatening p arty has no leg al rig ht to do.” Brown v. Aztec Rig Equip., Inc. , 921 S.W .2d 835, 845 (Tex. A pp.–Houston [14t h Dist.] 1996, writ denied)
. There can be no claim of dure ss unless (1) a pa rty makes a threat or takes a

n action without leg al justification, (2) the thre at or a ction was of suc h a cha rac ter a s to destroy

the opposing party ’s fre e will, (3) the opposingparty ’s fre e will is ove rcome and he is caused to do that whic h he would not otherwise do a

nd was not lega l ly

bound to do, (4) the thre at of a ction was imminent, and (5) the opposing pa

rty had no pre sent m ea n s o f protection from the thre at or a ction. McM ahan v. Gree nwood , 108 S.W .3d 467, 482 (Tex. Ap p . – Ho u s t on [14t h Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) . The opposing party ’s “compulsion” to assent “must be actual and imminent, and not mere ly feig ned or imag ined.” Sudan v. Sudan , 199 S.W .3d 291, 292 (Tex. 2006). Sa e nz argue s h e wa s und e r e c on omi c dure ss b e c a us e a ft e r h e fi le d suit Ma

rt ine z cut of

f h is tr us t f un ds , w hic h w e re his on ly so ur c e of inc ome . In s up po rt of

his de fe ns e , Sa e nz p ro vid e d h is
ow n a ff ida vit te sti mony , h is te sti mony

fr om t he May 11 , 2 00 6 h e ari ng , a

nd his wi fe L e tty ’s a ff

ida vit
. Th e thr us t of thi s e vid e nc e wa s:
•a ft e r S a e nz f

ile d s uit a g a ins t a pp e lle e s, Ma

rt ine z did no t dis burs e tr

us t fu nd s to him for se vera l months and then later disburse d $500.00 a month instea d of the $1,000.00 to $ 3, 00 0. 00 a

month h e re c e ive d b e fo re he fi le d s uit •without disbursement at their pre- suit leve l, Sae nz lac ked sufficie nt funds to support himself or his family , which for ced him to sig n the settlement agree ment •Saenz w as unable to w ork and support his f amily and had to “ g et loans and beg [] for he lp f ro m f ri e nd s and

c hr ist ian b ro the rs and

c hr ist ian s ist e rs ” But the a ffidavits also esta blished Saenz had bee n able to prose cute his lawsuit despite the withholding of f

unds, had employ ed an attorney to help advise him, participated in a day -long mediation with assistance of counsel, a

nd signe d the settlement agree ment only afte r consultation04
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- 11- wi th h is atto rn e y . T he re wa s a lso e vid e nc e that Sa e nz’ s atto rn e y pr e vio us ly

ha d b e e n s uc c e ssf

ul i n persua ding Ma

rtinez to resume pay

ments, though at a re d u ce d level. Ac cess to prof essional
a ssi sta nc e and a pa rt y ’s de c isi on to ne g oti a te are fa c tor s to be co ns ide re d whe n mea suri ng a c la im of dure ss. Sudan , 199 S.W .3d at 292-293. We do not find any

evidenc e of a

n imminent threat that overc ame Saenz’s fre e will and fr om which he had no prese nt means of protection. See M cMahan , 10 8 S.W. 3d

a t 48 2; see also Sudan , 199 S.W .3d at 292-293 (holdingthat ex-husband’s threats to withhol d contra ctual alimony did not
c on sti tut e imm ine nt d

ur e ss a nd a bs e nc e of me ans of pr ote c tio n be c a us e e x-w if

e ha d a de qu a te tim e to consult with accounta

nt and attorne y

and chose to neg otiate a m en d m ent t o contra ct rather than enfor ce e x isting agree ment). Saenz also cl ai m ed dure ss based on thre ats of cr iminal prosecution re lating to his alleg ed misappropriation of f

unds from his daug hters’ trust in his capa city as trustee. Gene rally , threats of crimi n al p ro s ecution may support a cla im of duress for purposes of se tting aside a contr act. See K a l ya naram v. Burc k, 2 2 5 S. W. 3 d 2 9 1 , 3 0 2 ( T e x. Ap p . – E l Pa s o 2 0 0 6 , n o p e t. )
. Su c h thr e ats or actions must be imminent. McM ahan , 108 S.W .3d at 482. There is no evidence of an imminent threat at the time Saenz enter ed into the settlement
a g re e me nt. Sa e nz’ s o wn summa ry jud g me nt e vid e nc e e sta

bli sh e s h is d a

ug hte rs ha d ta

ke n th e ir misappropriation complaints to the Webb County District Attorney befor e mediation beg an. The re is no evidence that duringthe mediation Interve nors or a ppell ee s t h reatened c ontinued pursuit of criminal cha

rg es if Saenz re fused to settle. In fac t, evidenc e from the May 11, 2006 hear ing established it was Sae nz who requested the settlement ag ree ment in c lu d e a provision that Interve nors would “insure that the criminal complaints be withdrawn.” In the abse nce of evidenc e ra ising a

fac t04
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- 12- issue about an imm inent threat or ac tion, Saenz’s claim of duress ba sed on the a lleg ed cr iminal complaint cannot be used to invalidate the se ttlement ag ree ment. See id. Anticipatory Breach Under the doctrine of re pudiation or anticipatory b re ach, a par ty ’s per formanc e under

a contra ct is e x cused if the opposing party has repudiated the contra ct. Bu rfo rd v . P ou nd e rs , 1 4 5 T e x. 46 0, 19 9 S. W .2 d 14 1, 14 4- 45 (1 94 7) ; Chapman v. Olbrich , 2 1 7 S. W. 3 d 4 8 2 , 4 9 1 ( T e x. App.–Houston [14t h Dist.] 2006, no pet.). To pr ove the a ffirmative defe nse of a nticipatory

brea ch of c on tr a c t, the no nr e pu diatin g pa rt y mus t show (1 ) wo rd s or a c tio ns by the a lle g e d r e pu diatin g pa rt y establishing a

n intent not to perf

orm the contract accordingto its t erms, (2) a lac k of excuse for the non-per for m an ce , and (3) damag e. See V aldina Farms, Inc. v. B rown Beasley &Assocs., Inc

. , 733 S.W .2d 688, 692 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1987, no writ). Saenz contended Ma

rtinez breac hed the se ttlement ag ree ment by failingto comply

with the pr ov isi on tha t r e qu ir e d h e r, a s tr

us te e , “ to d isb ur se to R ola nd o Ra fa e l Sa e nz a s B e ne fi c iary sixty perc ent (60%) of any income or reve nue rec eived by the Trust within ten (10) da y s of her rec eipt of
sa id i nc ome or

re ve nu e .” In s up po rt of his a ff ir mativ e de fe ns e , Sa e nz a g a in re lie s on his a ff ida vit , the a ff ida vit of his wi fe , and the re c or d of the Ma y 11 , 20 06 he ari ng . Sa e nz state d in his a ff ida vit that M artinez “did not pay over to me the 60 perc ent of trust income w ithin 10 day s.” In her aff idavit, Saenz’s w i fe’s was more specific , claiming Martinez did not pay Saenz six ty

perc ent of the Trust income ba sed on re nts from an a partment c omplex that the Trust had a n i n t er es t in and fa ile d to pa

y inc ome fo r o il a

nd ga s r oy a lti e s. Ho we ve r, no ne of thi s e vid e nc e sh ow s th e Tr us t actua lly rec eived a

ny income re quiring disbursem en t fr o m the time the settlement ag ree ment was signe d to Sa e nz’ s o wn atte mpt e d w ith dr awa l of c on se nt. Mo re ov e r, Sa e nz a dmi tte d und e r o a th04
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- 13- duri ngthe May 11 , 200 6 he ari ng that app e lle e s c omp lie d w iththe te rm s o f t he se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt. When asked if e ither appe ll ee “did something to invalidate this ag ree ment,” Saenz re plied that he sim ply c ha ng e d h is m ind . E ve n if

it c ou ld b e argue d that Sa e nz’ s e vid e nc e ra ise s a fa c t iss ue a s to whether Martinez intended to comply with the settlement ag ree ment, Saenz failed to produce summary judgme nt evidence establ i s hing the other two re quired e lements of anticipatory brea ch. Be cause Saenz failed to produc e evide nce to r aise a fac t issue on eac h element of his affirmative defe nse, he did not sustain his burden. Fraud Saenz claims the settlement ag ree ment should not be enfor ced be cause he produc ed evide nce
ra isi nga fa c t is su e on

the a ff ir mativ e de fe ns e of

a c tua l and

c on str uc tiv e fr a ud . His fr a

ud de fe ns e is based on his conte ntion that he was fr audulently induced to ente r the settlem en t agr eeme nt by Mart ine z’s mis re pr e se ntatio ns re g ard ing , a nd no nd isc los ur e of

, the va lue of the Tr

us t and its a sse ts. Actual f raud exis ts when one makes a f alse, mate rial re prese ntation, knowing it is false or without knowledg e of the truth, to a nother with the intent that it be relied upon and it is relied upon, resulting in damag e. In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A. , 52 S.W .3d 749, 758 (Tex. 2001). Constructive fra ud or “[f]raud by

nondisclosure is simply

a subcateg ory

of fr aud.” Schlumberge r Tech. Corp. v. Swanson , 959 S.W .2d 171 , 1 8 1 (T ex. 1997). The eleme nts of fra ud by nondisclosure ther efor e require (1) a

deliberate fa ilure to disclose mater ial fac ts, ( 2) by one who had a duty to disclose such fac ts, (3) to another

who was ig norant of the facts and did not have a n equal oppor

tunity to discover them, (4) with the intent the listener act or ref rain fr om acting , and (5 ) t h e l i s t en er relies on the nondisclosure res ulting in injury
. 7979 Airport Garage, L.L.C . v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., Inc

. , 245 S.W .3d 488, 507 n.27 (Tex. App.–Houston [14t h Dist.] 2007, pets. denied)
.04
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- 14- The only “fa ilure to disclose” r aised by the summary

judgme nt is Martinez’s alleg ed fa ilure to p ro vid e Sa e nz w ith

an a c c ounti ng . Wh ile Ma rt ine z, a s truste e , w a s c e rt a inl y un de r a duty to provide Sae nz with an accountingin acc ordanc e with the Te x as Proper ty Code, Saenz did not adduce summary judgme nt evidence he re lied on this failure in dec iding whe ther to e nter into the se ttlement ag ree ment. See T EX . P R OP . C ODE ANN . § 1 1 3
. 1 5 1 (V ernon 2007) . There is no evidence of the element of

relianc e to support Saenz’s af firmative de fense of construc tive fra ud. In support of his claim of actua l f raud, Saenz a g ain points to his a ffidavit and that of his wife. A close inspec tion o f t h es e docume nts revea ls two alleg ed misrepr esentations of material fa ct
conce rningthe alleg ed value of ce rtain Trust prope rty sold by M ar t i n ez in her ca pacity as trustee : (1 ) M art ine z tol d Sa e nz th e sa le of a ranc h was at “ the g oin g rate fo r t hat la nd ” and a t “ the fa ir marke t price or

v al ue,” a nd (2) Ma

rtinez told S aenz she g ot a fa ir price for a n apar tment complex that was sold. Saenz’s summary judgme nt proof raised an issue of fa ct on re liance only with reg ard to the s tatement about the value of t he ranch: “I f I would have known the true f air va lue of my

ranc h
acr es . . . I

would never

have sig ned the S et tlement Agree ment and Relea se of Claims.” Saenz provide d n o s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t p r o o f o f r e li an c e r e g ar d in g th e a ll e g e d mi s r e p r e s e n tati o n o f the value of the apa rtment complex. W e ther efor e need only consider whether Saenz raised f act issues on the other e lements of fr aud with re g ard to the r epre sentation about the ra nch. To sh owMart ine z’s state me nt a bo ut t he va lue of

the ra nc h w a s f a lse , Sa e nz s tat ed in

his aff idavit that the Trust was only paid $395.00 per

acr e for the ranc h when “ the amount [sic] fair pr ice sh ou ld h ave be e n at le a st $ 2, 50 0. 00 pe r a c re .” Te xas c ourt s h ave he ld that an ow ne r of re a l pr op e rt

y is qualified to testify ab o u t t h e v alue of rea l property
. Se e Po rra s v . Craig , 675 S.W .2d 503, 504 (T e x. 19 84 ); Stein v. Killough , 53 S.W .3d 36, 44 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2001, no pet.). “Eve n an04
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- 15- owner ’s testimony , howeve r, is subject to some re strictions.” Id
. For a proper ty owner to qualify
as a w itness, his testim ony “must show that it refe rs to marke t, rather than in t ri nsic or some other value of the prope rty .” Porras , 6 75 S.W. 2d a t 50 4- 05 ; Ste in , 53 S.W.3 d at 44. Th is r e qu ir e me nt i s usually met if the owne r testifies he is familiar with the m arke t value of his proper ty
. “Mar ket value” is t he pr ic e pr op e rt

y wo uld br ingif of

fe re d fo r sa le by on e wh o de sir e s, but is n ot o bli g a te d to se ll, and is boug ht by

one who is under

no obligation to buy
. Exx on Corp. v. Middleton , 613 S.W .2d 240, 246 (Tex. 1981). Saenz did not provide any summary judgme nt proof of the marke t value of the ranc h. He
never testified he wa s familiar with the market value of t he ra nch. See id. We theref

ore hold he has not produce d any

evidenc e to ra ise a fa ct issue as the fa lsity of Mar tinez’s repre sentation about the value of the ra nch. Havingfailed to raise a fac t issue on eac h element of his a ffirmative defe nses of ac tual and constructive f

raud, Sae nz failed to sustain his sum mary judgme nt burden. Un c on sc ion ab ili ty Saenz claims the trial cour t erre d in gr anting summary judgme nt beca

use h e ra ised a fa ct iss ue on the un c on sc ion a

bil ity of the a g re e me nt and its vio latio n o f p ub lic po lic y . Sa e nz b a se s h is aff irmative def

ense of unconsciona

bility on the “g reat disparity

of bar g aining power ” betwe en him se lf and Mart ine z . Th is d e fe ns e is b a se d s ole ly on Sa e nz’ s c la im that he ha d n o c ho ic e but to
e nte r i nt o t he s ett lem entagreemen t b ecaus e of M art in ez ’s c on tr ol ov er di sb urs eme nt s fr om theTr us t. Saenz’s unconsciona

bility arguments repr esent littl e more than a rec asting of his dur ess defe nse, for which he f

ailed to pre sent any

evidenc e ra ising a

n issue of fa ct. Howe ver, out of an abunda nce of04
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- 16- c a uti on and in t he int e re st of ju st ic e , w e sh a ll r e vie w this iss ue un de r t he law a pp lic a ble to unconsciona

bility
.

“ As a g e ne ra l r ule , th e te rm

‘u nc on sc ion a

bil ity ’ d e sc ri be s a

c on tr act th a t is un fa ir

be c a us e of its overa ll one-sidedness o r t h e gross one -sidedness of one of its terms.” Olshan Found. R e p a i r C o . v . A y ala , 180 S.W .3d 212, 214-215 (Te x . App.–San Antonio 2005, pet. denied) . An unconsciona

ble contract i s unenfor cea ble. Sk i R iv e r D e v ., In c . v . M

c Cal la , 167 S.W .3d 121, 135-36 (Tex. A pp.–Waco 2005, pet. denie d). Unc onscionability has two aspe cts: (1) proc edura l unconsciona

bility , which conce rns the circ umstances surrounding the barg aining proce s s , and (2 ) s ub sta nti ve un c on sc ion a

bil ity , w hic h c on c e rn s th e fa ir ne ss o f t he r e s u l t i n g

a gr e e me nt. Se e Ay ala , 180 S.W .3d at 215 n.1. Saenz had the bur den to raise fac t issues on both procedur al and substantive unconsciona

bility
. Se e Mc Cal la , 167 S.W .3d at 136. “Unc onscionability ” has no pr ecise definition beca use it is a deter

mination to be made in light of the entire atmosphere in which the agree ment was made, th e a lt e r

n a ti v e s , if an y , av a il a

b le to th e p arti e s a t th e ti me th e c o n tr a c t w a s ma d e, the
n o n b ar gai n i n g ability

of one pa

rty , whether

the contra ct was illeg al or a g ainst public policy , and whether the contra ct is oppressive or unrea sonabl e. Mc Cal la , 1 67 S.W. 3d a t 13 6; In re Big 8 Food Stores, Ltd. , 166 S.W .3d 869, 877 (Tex. A pp.–El Paso 2005, orig . proce eding ). These fac tors
are assessed a s of the time the contr act wa s entere d. Mc Cal la , 167 S.W .3d at 136. We have se arc hed Saenz’s summary judgme nt evidence to determine if he raised a fac t issue on any fac tor relating to unconsciona bility but have found none. Given that Saenz’s own evidenc e pr ov es he was rep re se nte d b y c ouns e l, w e c ann ot s ay he ha s r a ise d a

fa c t is su e on

dis pa rate barg aining positions. See H ead v. U .S. Inspec t DFW

, Inc ., 159 S.W .3d 731, 748 (Tex. App.–For t Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding no disparity in barg aining power wher e, among other things, pa rty was04
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- 17- repr esente d by

counsel). A disparity in barg aining power may also exis t when one party has no “real choice ” but to acc ept the agree ment offe red. In re Lyon Fin. Se rvs., Inc

. , 257 S.W .3d 228, 232-33 (T ex . 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Allright, Inc. v. Elledge , 5 15 S.W. 2d 26 6, 26 7 ( Te x. 19 74 )) . B ut a s w e he ld i n our discussion conce rningduress, Sae nz failed to raise a fact issue reg ardinghis inabilit y to barg ain. Nor did Saenz prese nt evidence to show the contra ct was ag ainst public policy
. A contra ct violates public policy

if it is il leg al or contrary to the best interest of the publ ic. Johnson v. Structure d Asset Se rv s. , LLC , 1 48 S.W. 3d

71 1, 72 8 ( Te x. Ap p. –D a lla s 2 00 4, no pe t.) . Sa e nz’ s ar g ume nts re late on ly to disparity

in barg aining . There are no arguments , m uch less evide nce, that the settlement ag ree ment was illeg al or somehow c ontrary to the public interest. Finally , Saenz presentedno evidenc e that would sug g est the settlement agree ment was oppressive or

unrea sonable. While he ce rtainly contends he might have been a ble to procur e a mor e fa vo ra ble se ttl e me nt if

he ha d c on tin

ue d to re c e ive his tr

us t pa y me nts or ha d b e e n p ri vy

to a fu ll
acc ounting, the f

act that a barg ain m ay be less favor able than it might have been is no evidenc e of unconsciona

bility
. See Big 8 Food Stores , 166 S.W .3d at 878 (holding that fac t that barg ain is “har d one” doe s not entitle party to be re lieved ther efr om if it was assumed fa irly and voluntarily

). We hold Saenz failed to raise a n issue o f fa ct as to either proce dural or substantive unconsciona

bility
. The trial court therefor e did not err in g ranting summary judgme nt in the fa ce of Saenz’s claim of unc onscionability
.

Denial of Motion for Continu ance to Obtain Addi tional Discovery In h is s e ve nth

iss ue , Sa e nz c onten ds the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in fa ili ngto gra

nt h is m oti on

to continue the summary

judgme nt hear ing a

nd compel appe llees to answe r ce rtain discover y befor e the he ari ng . Within

thi s is su e Sa e nz r e fe rs thi s c ourt to t he se c tio n o f h is b ri e f r e g ard in g his04
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- 18- aff irmative de fe n s e o f fr au d. Fr om this we g lean that Sae nz claims that if he had bee n g iven a continuance and discove ry had been compelled, he would have be en able to obtain and produc e additional evidenc e to support his fra ud contention. Th e tr ia l c ourt

may or de r a c on tin ua nc e of a summa ry jud g me nt h e ari ngto al lo w a pa rt y additional time to conduct discover y . J oe v . Two Thi rty Nin e J

oin t V e ntu re , 145 S.W .3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004). We review a trial c ourt’s orde r deny ing a motion for continuance for a buse of discretion. Id . A n a

bu se of dis c re tio n o c c ur s o nly

wh e n th e tr ia l c ourt rea c he s a de c isi on “ so arbitra ry and unre asonable as to amount to a cle ar a nd prejudicia l error of law.” Id . In our re view,
we m ay c o n s i d e r , am o n g o th e r

th i n g s : th e l e n g tho f

t i m e t h e c a s e h a s b e e no nf i l e , t h e m a t e r i a lit y and purpose of the discovery soug ht, and whether the party seekingthe continuanc e exerc ised due diligenc e to obtain the discove ry soug ht. Id
. In his moti on for c ontinuance, Sae nz complained that Martinez had not provided suf ficient response s to his dis cover y reque sts and attache d his requests for production, interr og atories, a nd Martinez’s response s there to. He simult aneously filed a motion to compel re sponses. When Saenz filed these motions, his suit, which inc luded alleg ations of fra ud, had been on file for more than two y ear s. Whi le Saenz explained he expected a ny compelled discove ry

response s to revea l evi d ence of fr aud, he made no showing that he exercised due diligenc e to obta in this information. There wer e no discovery

reque sts until almost eig ht months after Sae nz fir s t indicated his intent to withdraw fr om t he se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt. Th e re c or d re fl e c ts no atte mpt to c omp e l Ma rt ine z to r e sp on d unti l afte r appe llees had move d for summary judgme nt and Saenz had filed h i s amende d summary jud g me nt r e sp on se . Un de r the se c ir c ums tanc e s we c ann ot sa y the tr ia l c ou

rt ’s de nia l w a s an a

bu se of discre tion.04
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- 19- Cum ulative Error Saenz complains in the last para g raph of the substantive portion of his brief that the alleg ed tr ia l c ourt e rr or s c on sti tut e c umu lativ e e rr or re qu ir ingre ve rs a l. T his c omp la int is no t lis te d in h is statement of issues. Sae nz provides no argument nor any authority in suppor

t of this posit ion. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 3 8. 1( h) (r e qu ir ingc le ar and c on c ise argume nt f or c on te nti on

ma de wi th c itatio ns to
a uth or iti e s and

to t he re c or d) . D e sp ite the br ie fi ngde fi c ie nc y , w e re vie w this c omp la int
. Some courts have rec og nized a “c u m u l ati ve-e rror doctrine” in situations where the r ecor d sh ow s mu lti ple e rr or s th a t c on sid e re d in iso latio n w ou ld n ot e nti tle s a pa rt y to r e versa l, b ut i n combination might g ive rise to re versible e rror . Nat’l Freight, Inc. v. Sny der , 191 S.W .3d 416, 424 (Tex. App.–Eastland 2006, no pet.) . This court has rec og nized the doctrine, but we hold it does not apply in this cas e b ec au s e we have f ound no err or by

the trial cour

t with respec t to the previous issues asserte d by

Saenz. See Cortez e

x rel. Estate of Puente

s v. HCC

I- S a n Antonio, Inc ., 131 S.W .3d 113, 124 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2004), aff’d , 159 S.W .3d 87 (Tex. 2005). Acc ording ly , this contention is overruled. C ONCL US I ON We hold appellees e stablished the exis tence of a valid settlement ag ree ment as a matter of law a nd Sa e nz has fa ile d to ra ise an issu e of fa c t pre c lud ing summa ry jud g me nt. We f

ur the r h old the trial cour

t did not abuse its discretion in denying Sae nz’s motion for c ontinuance a nd to compel discovery . Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the tria l court’s summary judgme nt in favor of

appellee s.
Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice