PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JAMES J. LIGHTNER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF WILMINGTON, NORTH

CAROLINA; TANDY CARTER, Acting

Chief of Police for the

Wilmington Police Department;  No. 07-1442

BRUCE HICKMAN, Interim Chief of

Police for the Wilmington Police

Department; STERLING CHEATHAM,

City Manager for the City of

Wilmington,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern.

Louise W. Flanagan, Chief District Judge.

(7:05-cv-00101-FL)

Argued: September 24, 2008

Decided: November 3, 2008

Before WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, HAMILTON,

Senior Circuit Judge, and James C. CACHERIS,

Senior United States District Judge

for the Eastern District of Virginia,

sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the

opinion, in which Senior Judge Hamilton and Senior Judge

Cacheris joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Stephen Edward Culbreth, CULBRETH LAW

FIRM, Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellant. Bruce

Danforth Morton, HEDRICK & MORTON, L.L.P., Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Ashley C.

Council, CULBRETH LAW FIRM, Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

The plaintiff in this case claims he faced discrimination on

account of race and gender, and he appeals the district court’s

grant of summary judgment in favor of his employer. At the

same time, he charges that his employer’s action was actually

an attempt to cover up the employer’s own wrongdoing. In so

doing, plaintiff has pleaded himself right out of court. Title

VII was enacted to prohibit discrimination on the basis of

race, gender, and other legislatively enumerated grounds. It is

not a statute intended to police standards of general fairness

in the workplace, or even to protect against the firing of an

employee in order to cover up wrongdoing by an employer.

If it were interpreted in such an omnibus fashion, it would

dilute the noble purposes for which Congress enacted it. We

thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment. 

I.

James J. Lightner claims that he was suspended from the

Wilmington Police Department in violation of Title VII of the

2 LIGHTNER v. CITY OF WILMINGTON
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and 42

U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. He is a white male who, at the time

of the incident, was 53 years old and serving as a lieutenant

in the Wilmington Police Department ("WPD"), where he had

worked for over 25 years. 

In 2003, he was promoted to Acting Division Commander

of the Professional Standards Division where he was responsible for department ethics including the investigation of misconduct by WPD officers. As Acting Division Commander of

the Professional Standards Division, he began an internal

investigation into whether WPD officers were failing to report

automobile accidents in an effort to make the city look better.

Shortly after Lightner started the ethics investigation, three of

the officers who were being investigated claimed that Lightner himself had committed an ethics violation—specifically,

that he had pressured them into dismissing individuals’ traffic

tickets. Lightner concedes that on occasion he asked ticketing

officers to help certain people whom they had ticketed, but

maintains that he did not inappropriately pressure them. 

On February 5, 2004, Acting Police Chief Tandy Carter

and Acting Deputy Policy Chief Bruce Hickman informed

Lightner of the ticket fixing allegations against him and

placed him on paid administrative leave for three weeks so

that the Human Resources Department could investigate his

conduct. After the investigation, Hickman informed Lightner

by letters on February 17 and 19, 2004 that he had violated

various Department Rules by asking subordinate officers to

fix tickets. The February 19th letter also recognized that ticket

fixing was widespread in the WPD, but noted that Lightner

had approached the ticketing officers as both a superior officer and as the Acting Division Commander of the Professional Standards Division. The letter went on to say that given

his role in the Professional Standards Division, Lightner’s

conduct "should be beyond reproach for professional and ethical behavior." Accordingly, he was suspended without pay for

one week until his previously announced retirement date on

LIGHTNER v. CITY OF WILMINGTON 3
March 1, 2004. Lightner appealed the suspension to City

Manager Sterling Cheatham who upheld it. 

Lightner then filed suit in North Carolina state court against

the City of Wilmington, Acting Police Chief Carter, Acting

Deputy Police Chief Hickman, and City Manager Cheatham

alleging that they had discriminated against him in violation

of Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983. Specifically, he alleged that

by disciplining him for ticket fixing more harshly than a

younger, female African American officer, they had discriminated against him on the basis of race, gender, and age.

Defendants removed the case to United States District Court

in the Eastern District of North Carolina. 

After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants’ motion over

a contrary recommendation from the magistrate judge. The

court concluded that plaintiff had not presented evidence from

which a jury could find that any disparate treatment was the

result of race or gender discrimination. Plaintiff had established only a weak prima facie case of discrimination and,

moreover, had admitted that the real reason for his suspension

was to halt his internal investigation into WPD officers’ failure to report automobile accidents. See Lightner v. City of

Wilmington, 498 F.Supp.2d 802 (E.D.N.C. 2007). Lightner

now appeals. 

II.

Lightner claims that the district court erred in granting

summary judgment for the defendants because he presented

evidence under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973), from which a jury could find that his suspension

for ticket fixing violated Title VII.* Plaintiff argues that he

*Lightner does not appear to appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment on his age discrimination claim, and in any event that

claim lacks merit. Lightner also does not specifically address his § 1981

4 LIGHTNER v. CITY OF WILMINGTON
presented evidence sufficient to satisfy his burdens by showing (1) that his conduct was similar to that of a female African

American officer who was also disciplined for ticket fixing,

and (2) that he was disciplined more severely for his conduct

because he received an unpaid one-week suspension while she

received only a paid one-day suspension—a "Decision Making Day." 

As further evidence that there was a disparity in treatment,

he claims that the female officer’s offense was a more egregious violation of Department policy and that her record of

service, filled with discipline problems, was much worse than

his exemplary 25-year record of service in the WPD. In addition, he argues that his suspension was a disproportionate

punishment because, as Acting Deputy Police Chief Hickman

noted in his letter, ticket fixing was widespread throughout

the WPD. The plaintiff also contends that he offered sufficient

evidence that the defendants’ proffered nondiscriminatory

reasons were pretextual. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502 (1993).

A.

Plaintiff’s claim founders on its terms. By the plaintiff’s

own repeated admission, the real reason for his suspension

was to cover up department wrongdoing. This is not race or

gender discrimination and therefore is not actionable under

Title VII. 

The plaintiff admitted on multiple occasions throughout

this litigation that the reason for his suspension was to quash

his internal investigation into WPD officers’ failure to report

and § 1983 claims, but the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to discrimination claims under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983. See Love-Lane v.

Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 786 (4th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the following analysis also governs his § 1981 and § 1983 claims. 

LIGHTNER v. CITY OF WILMINGTON 5
automobile accidents. His admissions during litigation are

binding. See In re McNallen, 62 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 1995)

(collecting cases). In his brief before this court and in his

memorandum in opposition to the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, plaintiff stated his "adamant belief" that

his suspension was "in direct retaliation for [his] Internal

Affairs investigation into the failure of certain traffic officers

to appropriately report automobile accidents." See Brief of

Appellant at 8-9; Memorandum in Opposition of Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, JA 202. In his deposition, the plaintiff stated his belief that his suspension was "a

big conspiracy to hush me up, to get me out of the way, to

make the investigation stop" and that he "was not allowed to

come back to be in internal affairs in any way, shape, or form

so this traffic investigation would not continue." See JA 103,

111.

In offering this explanation as to the real reason for the

employer’s action, the plaintiff has undone his case. He has

tried to take a statute aimed at discrete forms of discrimination and turn it into a general whistleblower statute, which of

course Title VII is not. Title VII prohibits discrimination on

the basis of specifically enumerated grounds: "race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)

(2000). Its purpose to eliminate these invidious forms of discrimination is clear. It would vitiate Congress’s decision to

single out these grounds as particularly deserving of protection if Title VII were interpreted as a general employment

statute that protects employees from any wrongful discharge.

There is no other federal cause of action pled to support the

plaintiff’s claim. His claim is in the nature of a state wrongful

discharge claim, which is a matter of state employment and

tort law. See, e.g., Newberne v. Department of Crime Control

and Public Safety, 359 N.C. 782 (2005) (applying North Carolina Whistleblower Act, N.C.G.S. § 126-84 to -88); Amos v.

Oakdale Knitting Co., 331 N.C. 348 (1992) (discussing

exceptions to at-will employment doctrine). 

6 LIGHTNER v. CITY OF WILMINGTON
This case is analogous to Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers,

Inc., 85 F.3d 1328 (8th Cir. 1996), where the Eighth Circuit

upheld a grant of summary judgment for the defendant on an

ADEA claim where the plaintiff conceded that he was fired

for investigating SEC violations by his employer. He admitted

that he "was discharged because [his employer] wanted to

cover up its SEC problems and keep the millions of dollars it

illegally collected." Id. at 1337. The court held that "[t]his

acknowledgment standing alone would completely refute [the

plaintiff’s] claim of age discrimination." Id. Similarly, in this

case, Lightner’s acknowledgement that he was fired to stop

his internal investigation negates his claims of race and gender discrimination. Consequently, his suspension, however

wrongful, is not actionable under Title VII and the defendants

are entitled to summary judgment. 

B.

The application of the McDonnell Douglas framework to

plaintiff’s case reinforces the point that he was not discriminated against on the basis of race or gender. To establish a

prima facie case a plaintiff must show "(1) that plaintiff

engaged in prohibited conduct similar to that of a person of

another race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, and (2)

that disciplinary measures enforced against the plaintiff were

more severe than those enforced against the other person."

Moore v. City of Charlotte, 754 F.2d 1100, 1105-06 (4th Cir.

1985) (adapting the McDonnell Douglas framework for the

employee discipline context). Lightner seeks to establish a

prima facie case of race and gender discrimination by pointing to an African American female comparator whom he

alleges was disciplined less harshly for more egregious violations of Department Rules. This comparison does not save

plaintiff’s claims. 

First, the comparison is not sufficient because the two officers are not comparable. The plaintiff was the Acting Division

Commander of the Professional Standards Division. He was

LIGHTNER v. CITY OF WILMINGTON 7
responsible for Department compliance with ethics rules and

therefore was naturally expected to set an example by following the rules himself. In contrast, the female officer was not

a member of the Professional Standards Division or even an

Acting Division Commander at the time of her offenses. The

similarity between comparators and the seriousness of their

respective offenses must be clearly established in order to be

meaningful. See Moore, 754 F.2d at 1106-10 (holding that

fact-finding was deficient when premised on "an unprincipled

conception of ‘similarity’ and ‘comparability,’ a structural

flaw"). The difference in their positions within the WPD

makes the purported comparison in this case too loose. 

Second, the McDonnell Douglas framework does not transform all instances of disparate treatment into unlawful discrimination. The framework is a means by which plaintiffs

can use circumstantial evidence to create an inference of discrimination. In this case, any inferences as to race or gender

that could potentially be drawn from the disparate treatment

are completely undermined by the plaintiff’s admission that

he was suspended to stop his internal investigation. As the

Supreme Court stated in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), "an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively

revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the

employer’s decision." Id. at 148. Given his admission, no reasonable jury could infer that the Department disciplined the

plaintiff more harshly because of his race or sex. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is 

AFFIRMED.

8 LIGHTNER v. CITY OF WILMINGTON