62812 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 401, 417, and 420

[Docket No. FAA–1999–5833; Amendment

No. 401–2, 417–1 and 420–1]

RIN 2120–AG15

Licensing and Safety Requirements for

Operation of a Launch Site

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments

on handling of solid propellants and

cooperation with the National

Transportation Safety Board.

SUMMARY: The Department of

Transportation’s (DOT or the

Department) Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) amends its

commercial space transportation

licensing regulations to add licensing

and safety requirements for the

operation of a launch site. To date,

commercial launches have occurred

principally at federal launch ranges

under safety procedures developed by

federal launch range operators. To

enable the development and use of

launch sites that are not operated by a

federal launch range, rules are needed to

establish specific licensing and safety

requirements for operating a launch site,

whether that site is located on or off of

a federal launch range. These rules will

provide licensed launch site operators

with licensing and safety requirements

to protect the public from the risks

associated with activities at a launch

site.

DATES: Effective Date: December 18,

2000. An application pending at the

time of the effective date must conform

to any new requirements of this

rulemaking as of the effective date. All

license terms and conditions, and all

safety requirements of this rulemaking

also apply as of the effective date.

Comment Date: Comments on

handling of solid propellants and

cooperation with the National

Transportation Safety Board must be

submitted on or before December 18,

2000.

ADDRESSES: Address your comments to

the Docket Management System, U.S.

Department of Transportation, Room

Plaza 401, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,

Washington, DC 20590–0001. You must

identify the docket number FAA–1999–

5833 at the beginning of your

comments, and you should submit two

copies of your comments. If you wish to

receive confirmation that FAA received

your comments, include a selfaddressed, stamped postcard.

You may also submit comments

through the Internet to http://

dms.dot.gov. You may review the public

docket containing comments to these

regulations in person in the Dockets

Office between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.,

Monday through Friday, except Federal

holidays. The Dockets Office is on the

plaza level of the NASSIF Building at

the Department of Transportation at the

above address. Also, you may review

public dockets on the Internet at http:/

/dms.dot.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: J.

Randall Repcheck, Licensing and Safety

Division (AST–200), Commercial Space

Transportation, Federal Aviation

Administration, 800 Independence

Avenue, Washington, DC 20591;

telephone (202) 267–8602; or Laura

Montgomery, Office of the Chief

Counsel (AGC–250), FAA, 800

Independence Avenue, Washington, DC

20591; telephone (202) 267–3150.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed

explosive siting requirements for

facilities on a launch site that would

handle solid and liquid propellants and

other explosives. The FAA did not

propose rules for solid explosives other

than ‘‘division 1.3,’’ as described below.

As noted in the NPRM, the FAA is

adopting the United Nations

Organization (UNO) classification

system for the transport of dangerous

goods. The hazard classification system

consists of nine classes for dangerous

goods, of which explosives are included

as UNO ‘‘Class 1, Explosives.’’ Class 1

explosives are further subdivided into

six ‘‘divisions’’ based on the character

and predominance of the associated

hazards and on the potential for causing

casualties or property damage. Two

explosive divisions that are likely to be

present on a launch site are division 1

and division 3, referred to as division

1.1 and 1.3, respectively. Division 1.1

consists of explosives that have a mass

explosion hazard, and division 1.3

consists of explosives that have a fire

hazard and either a minor blast hazard

or a minor projection hazard or both,

but not a mass explosion hazard.

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed

criteria only for division 1.3 because the

FAA believed that the only solid

explosives for commercial launches that

would likely affect separation distances

on a launch site were division 1.3

propellants. The FAA noted that

although launch vehicles frequently

have components incorporating division

1.1 explosives, such as those used to

initiate flight termination systems, the

quantity is small. The FAA also noted

that division 1.1 explosives would not

likely be present in sufficient quantities

to affect the application of Q–D criteria.

The only division 1.1 solid rocket

motors existing today are from old

military missiles, which are not likely to

be used at a commercial launch site.

One government commenter, the 45th

Space Wing Range Safety Engineering

Support (45SW/SESE), pointed out that

this was not a correct assumption, and

the FAA agrees. As noted by the 45SW/

SESE, experience with explosive siting

at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station

shows that division 1.1 explosives are

often significant enough to influence

explosive site plans.

Accordingly, section 420.65, Handling

of Solid Propellants, now includes

requirements for division 1.1

explosives. Because this change is being

adopted without prior notice and public

comment, interested persons are also

invited to submit written comments on

section 420.65.

The FAA also includes a new

requirement in this rulemaking

explicitly requiring a launch site

operator licensee to cooperate with the

National Transportation Safety Board in

section 420.59 for launch accidents as

well as for launch site accidents. The

FAA will implement this change

without prior notice and comment and

therefore invites interested persons to

submit written comments on section

420.59. Pending the evaluation of the

public comments, the FAA has decided

to proceed with due diligence to

implement its requirements.

The FAA will consider and respond

to comments on the new provisions.

The FAA will consider all comments

received, and will publish in the

Federal Register a summary of the

disposition of those comments and, if

appropriate, changes to the rule that

may result from consideration of those

comments.

Comments must include the

regulatory docket or amendment

number and must be submitted in

triplicate to the address above. The FAA

will review all comments received and

will file all comments in the public

docket. The docket is available for

public inspection before and after the

comment closing date.

Commenters who want the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this final rule

must include a preaddressed, stamped

postcard with those comments on which

the following statement is made:

‘‘Comments to Docket No. FAA–1999–

5833.’’ The postcard will be dateVerDate 11<MAY>2000 20:41 Oct 18, 2000 Jkt 194001 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\19OCR2.SGM pfrm01 PsN: 19OCR2
Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62813

stamped by the FAA and mailed to the

commenter.

Availability of Final Rules

You can get an electronic copy using

the Internet by taking the following

steps:

(1) Go to the search function of the

Department of Transportation’s

electronic Docket Management System

(DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/

search).

(2) On the search page type in the last

four digits of the Docket number shown

at the beginning of this rulemaking

document. Click on ‘‘search.’’

(3) On the next page, which contains

the Docket summary information for the

Docket you selected, click on the final

rule.

You can also get an electronic copy

using the Internet through FAA’s web

page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/

nprm/nprm.htm or the Federal

Register’s web page at http://

www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/

aces140.html.

You can also get a copy by submitting

a request to the Federal Aviation

Administration, Office of Rulemaking,

ARM–1, 800 Independence Avenue

SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by

calling (202) 267–9680. Make sure to

identify the amendment number or

docket number of this final rule.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement

Fairness Act

The Small Business Regulatory

Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of

1996 requires the FAA to comply with

small entity requests for information or

advice about compliance with statutes

and regulations within its jurisdiction.

Therefore, any small entity that has a

question regarding this document may

contact its local FAA official, or the

person listed under FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT. You can find out

more about SBREFA on the Internet at

our site, http://www.gov/avr/arm/

sbrefa.htm. For more information on

SBREFA, e-mail us 9–AWA–

SBREFA@faa.gov.

Outline of Final Rule

I . Background

A. The FAA’s Commercial Space

Transportation Licensing Role

B. Growth and Current Status of Launch

Site Industry

C. Current Practices

II. Summary of the Regulations and

Discussion of Comments

A. Overview

B. Environment

C. Policy

D. Explosive Site Plan Review

E. Explosive Mishap Prevention Measures

F. Launch Site Location Review

G. License Conditions

H. Operational Responsibilities

III. Part Analysis

IV. Required Analyses

I. Background

The Commercial Space Launch Act of

1984, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Subtitle

IX—Commercial Space Transportation,

ch. 701—Commercial Space Launch

Activities, 49 U.S.C. 70101–70121 (the

Act), authorizes the Secretary of

Transportation to license a launch or the

operation of a launch site carried out by

a U.S. citizen or within the United

States. 49 U.S.C. 70104, 70105. The Act

directs the Secretary to exercise this

responsibility consistent with public

health and safety, safety of property,

and the national security and foreign

policy interests of the United States. 49

U.S.C. 70105. On August 4, 1994, a

National Space Transportation Policy

reaffirmed the government’s

commitment to the commercial space

transportation industry and the critical

role of the Department of Transportation

(DOT) in encouraging and facilitating

private sector launch activities. A

National Space Policy released on

September 19, 1996, notes and reaffirms

that DOT is responsible as the lead

agency for regulatory guidance

pertaining to commercial space

transportation activities.

A. The FAA’s Commercial Space

Transportation Licensing Role

On November 15, 1995, the Secretary

of Transportation delegated commercial

space licensing authority to the Federal

Aviation Administration. The FAA

licenses commercial launches and the

operation of launch sites pursuant to the

Act and implementing regulations at 14

CFR Ch. III. The first commercial launch

licensing regulations were issued in

April 1988, 53 FR 11004, when no

commercial launches had yet taken

place. Accordingly, DOT established a

flexible licensing process intended to be

responsive to an emerging industry

while ensuring public safety. The

Department noted that it would

‘‘continue to evaluate and, when

necessary, reshape its program in

response to growth, innovation, and

diversity in this critically important

industry.’’ 53 FR 11006.

Under the 1988 regulations, DOT

implemented a case-by-case approach to

evaluating launch and launch site

operator license applications. At the

time, it was envisioned that most

commercial launches would take place

from federal launch ranges, which

imposed extensive ground and flight

safety requirements on launch

operators, pending the development of

commercial launch sites. The federal

launch ranges provided commercial

launch operators with facilities and

launch support, including flight safety

services.

Since 1988, DOT and now the FAA

have taken steps designed to simplify

further the licensing process for launch

operators. The regulatory and licensing

emphasis during the past decade has

been on launch operators. The

emergence of a commercial launch site

sector has only become a reality during

the past few years.

B. Growth and Current Status of Launch

Site Industry

The United States government has,

since the 1950s, built, operated, and

maintained a space launch

infrastructure for launching satellites

into space. Much of the demand for and

use of these launch sites has

traditionally come from U.S. military

and civil government agencies.

Beginning in the early 1980s, a number

of the government-operated launch sites

began providing support for commercial

launch activities as well, with the

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) acting as the

primary intermediary for providing

launch services to satellite operators.

Following the Challenger accident, a

White House decision in August 1986

allowed launch customers to solicit bids

directly from the launch vehicle

builders who would, in turn, lease

launch facilities from NASA or the

United States Air Force (USAF). This

decision, coupled with the 1984 U.S.

Commercial Space Launch Act and its

1988 amendments, did much to foster

commercial launch business, which

continues to grow to this day.

The number of commercial space

launches has steadily grown over the

years since the first licensed commercial

launch in 1989. From March 29, 1989 to

July 28, 2000, 130 licensed launches

have taken place. Launch vehicles have

included traditional orbital launch

vehicles such as the Atlas, Titan and

Delta, as well as suborbital vehicles

such as the Starfire. New vehicles using

traditional launch techniques include

Lockheed Martin Corporation’s

(Lockheed Martin) Atlas III and Athena,

EER’s Conestoga, Orbital Sciences

Corporation’s (Orbital) Taurus, and The

Boeing Company’s (Boeing) Delta III.

Unique vehicles such as Orbital’s

Pegasus and the Zenit 3–SL of Sea

Launch Limited Partnership (Sea

Launch), launched from a modified oil

rig located in the Pacific Ocean, are

included in this count. New launch

vehicles are proposed every year. On the

horizon are Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V

62814 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

1EWR 127–1 is updated on an ongoing basis. The

latest version of these requirements may be found

at http://www.pafb.af.mil/450SW/.

and Boeing’s Delta IV. A number of

companies are proposing partially and

fully reusable launch vehicles. In

addition, some companies are

participating in partnership with NASA

to develop X–33 and X–34 launch

vehicles incorporating reusable and

single-stage-to-orbit technology, a

partnership which could result in

vehicles for commercial use.

The launch site industry, the focus of

this final rule, has also made progress.

Commercial launch site operations are

coming on line with the stated goal of

providing flexible and cost-effective

facilities both for existing launch

vehicles and for new vehicles. When the

commercial launch industry began,

commercial launch companies based

their launch operations chiefly at

federal launch ranges operated by the

Department of Defense (DOD) and the

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA). Federal launch

ranges that have supported licensed

launches include the Eastern Range,

located at Cape Canaveral Air Force

Base in Florida (CCAFB), and the

Western Range located at Vandenberg

Air Force Base (VAFB), in California,

both operated by the U.S. Air Force;

Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia,

operated by NASA; White Sands Missile

Range (WSMR) in New Mexico,

operated by the U.S. Army; and the

Kauai Test Facility in Hawaii, operated

by the U.S. Navy. Federal launch ranges

provide the advantage of existing launch

infrastructure and range safety services.

Launch companies are able to obtain a

number of services from a federal

launch range, including radar, tracking

and telemetry, flight termination and

other launch services.

Today, most commercial launches

still take place from federal launch

ranges; however, this pattern may

change as other launch sites become

more prevalent. On September 19, 1996,

the FAA granted the first license to

operate a launch site to Spaceport

Systems International to operate

California Spaceport. That launch site is

located within VAFB. Three other

launch site operators have received

licenses. Spaceport Florida Authority

(SFA) received an FAA license to

operate Launch Complex 46 at CCAS as

a launch site. Virginia Commercial

Space Flight Authority (VCSFA)

received a license to operate Virginia

Spaceflight Center (VSC) within NASA’s

Wallops Flight Facility. Most recently,

Alaska Aerospace Development

Corporation (AADC) received a license

to operate Kodiak Launch Complex

(KLC) as a launch site on Kodiak Island,

Alaska. It is evident from this list that

federal launch ranges still play a role in

the licensed operation of a number of

launch sites. California Spaceport,

Spaceport Florida and VSC are located

on federal launch range property. Two

launches each have taken place from

California Spaceport, KLC, and SFA.

Other commercial launch sites are

being considered in other states. The

New Mexico Office of Space

Commercialization proposes to operate

Southwest Regional Spaceport adjacent

to the White Sands Missile Range as a

site for reusable launch vehicles. The

State of Montana is proposing to fly

reusable launch vehicles from a site

near Great Falls, Montana and

Malmstrom Air Force Base. The state of

Nevada is supporting the development

of a launch site at the Nevada Test Site,

Nye County, Nevada. The State of New

Mexico proposes to construct and

operate the Southwest Regional

Spaceport (SRS) located in south central

New Mexico for use by private

companies conducting commercial

space activities and operations. The

State of Texas has enabled the

development of a commercial Spaceport

for reusable launch vehicles. Lastly, in

Utah, the Wah Wah Valley Interlocal

Cooperation Entity, proposes to

construct and operate a commercial

launch site utilizing approximately

70,000 acres of Utah State Trust lands

located 30 miles southwest of Milford,

Utah.

Whether launching from a federal

launch range, a launch site located on

a federal launch range, or a non-federal

launch site, a launch operator is

responsible for ground and flight safety

under its FAA license. At a federal

launch range a launch operator must

comply with the rules and procedures of

the federal launch range. The safety

rules, procedures and practice, in

concert with the safety functions of the

federal launch ranges, have been

assessed by the FAA, and found to

satisfy the majority of the FAA’s safety

concerns. In contrast, when launching

from a non-federal launch site, a launch

operator’s responsibility for ground and

flight safety takes on added importance.

In the absence of federal launch range

oversight, it will be incumbent upon

each launch operator to demonstrate the

adequacy of its ground and flight safety

to the FAA.

C. Current Practices

Because of the time and investment

involved in bringing a commercial

launch facility into being, several

entities that have been planning to

establish these facilities asked the DOT

for guidance concerning the information

that might be requested as part of an

application for a license to operate a

launch site. In response to these

requests, DOT’s then Office of

Commercial Space Transportation

(Office) published ‘‘Site Operators

License, Guidelines for Applicants,’’ on

August 8, 1995, as guidance for

potential launch site operators. The

guidelines described the information

that DOT, and then the FAA, expected

from an applicant for a license to

operate a commercial launch site. This

information included launch site

location information, a hazard analysis,

and a launch site safety operations

document that governed how the facility

would be operated to ensure public

safety and the safety of property. The

Office intended that the guidelines

would assist an applicant with the parts

of the application that are critical to

assessing the suitability of the launch

site location, the applicant’s

organization, and the facility for

providing safe operations.

The Office issued the guidelines as an

interim measure for potential

developers of launch sites pending this

rulemaking, and the guidelines describe

the information that the FAA requests of

an applicant as part of its application for

a license to operate a launch site. The

pace of development of the launch site

industry has resulted in the FAA

describing the process and requirements

for applications for launch site operator

licenses under the guidelines. As noted

above, the FAA issued its first license to

operate a launch site to Spaceport

Systems International for the operation

of California Spaceport. The FAA issued

this license under its general authority

under 49 U.S.C. 70104 and 70105 and

14 CFR Ch. III to license the operation

of a launch site. Because the operation

of California Spaceport as a launch site

occurs at a federal launch range, the

U.S. Air Force plays a significant role in

California Spaceport’s safety process. In

fact, the FAA was able to review the

Spaceport Systems International

application expeditiously because the

applicant certified its intention to

observe the safety requirements

currently applied by the Western Range

and contained in ‘‘Eastern and Western

Range 127–1, Range Safety

Requirements (EWR 127–1),’’ (Mar.

1995).1 The FAA determined that

applicant compliance with EWR 127–1,

together with Air Force approval of

other important elements of the

operation of a launch site protected

public health and safety and the safety

of property. In general, the FAA deems

the compliance by a licensed launch site

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62815

operator with these requirements in

combination with other safety practices

imposed by a federal launch range as

acceptable for purposes of protecting the

public and property from hazards

associated with launch site activities at

a licensed launch site operator’s

facilities. In 1997, the FAA entered into

a Memorandum of Agreement with

Department of Defense and National

Aeronautics and Space Administration

regarding safety oversight of licensed

launch site operators located on federal

launch ranges.

On June 25, 1999, the FAA released

a notice of proposed rulemaking,

Licensing and Safety Requirements for

Operation of a Launch Site, 64 FR 34316

(Jun. 25, 1999). This will be referred to

throughout this document as the Launch

Site NPRM.

Comparison of the Guidelines and the

Final Rule

The existing guidelines will no longer

be in effect as of the effective date of this

final rule. A comparison of some of the

similarities and differences may

therefore prove of assistance. The one

aspect of the licensing process that will

not change is that the FAA will issue a

license to operate a launch site only if

the operation of the launch site will not

jeopardize the public health and safety,

the safety of property, or national

security or foreign policy interests of the

United States. The guidelines were

flexible and were intended to identify

the major elements of an application

and lead the applicant through the

application process with the FAA. The

final rule codifies the requirements that

must be met before a license will be

issued.

The guidelines and the final rule

share some common elements, namely,

the need for the applicant to supply

information to support the FAA’s

environmental determination under the

National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA) and the FAA’s policy review

that addresses national security and

foreign policy issues. These

requirements are discussed in detail

below, in the description of the final

regulations. Under the final regulations,

the information requirements for these

reviews remain for the most part

unchanged from the guidelines.

A review of the suitability of the

proposed location of the launch site is

an important component of both the

guidelines and the final regulations.

Although both approaches call for a site

location review, the reviews differ in

breadth and specificity. The guidelines

request an applicant to provide

information regarding geographic

characteristics, flight paths and impact

areas and the meteorological

environment. To describe a launch site’s

geographic characteristics, an applicant

is requested to provide information

regarding the launch site location, size,

and shape, its topographic and

geological characteristics, its proximity

to populated areas, and any local

commercial and recreational activities

that may be affected by launches such

as air traffic, shipping, hunting, and

offshore fishing. An applicant also

provides planned possible flight paths

and general impact areas designated for

launch. If planned flight corridors

overfly land, the guidelines request that

an applicant provide flight safety

analyses for generic sets of launch

vehicles and describe, where applicable,

any arrangements made to clear the land

of people prior to launch vehicle flight.

With respect to the meteorological

environment, the guidelines request an

applicant to provide data regarding

temperature, surface and upper wind

direction and velocity, temperature

inversions, and extreme conditions that

may affect the safety of launch site

operations. Under the guidelines, an

application includes the frequency

(average number of days for each

month) of extremes in wind or

temperature inversion that could have

an impact on launch.

In contrast to the guidelines, the final

rules require an applicant to use

specified methods to demonstrate the

suitability of the launch site location for

launching at least one type of launch

vehicle, including orbital, guided suborbital, or unguided sub-orbital

expendable launch vehicles, and

reusable launch vehicles. Each proposed

launch point on the launch site must be

evaluated for each type of launch

vehicle that the applicant wishes to

have launched from the launch point.

An applicant is provided with a choice

of methods to develop a flight corridor

for a representative launch of an orbital

or guided sub-orbital expendable launch

vehicle, or to develop a set of impact

dispersion areas for a representative

launch of an unguided sub-orbital

expendable launch vehicle. If a flight

corridor or set of impact dispersion

areas exists that does not encompass

populated areas, no additional analysis

is required. Otherwise, an applicant is

required to conduct a risk analysis to

demonstrate that the risk to the public

from a representative launch does not

exceed a casualty expectation (Ec) of 30

× 10¥6. The FAA will review the

applicant’s analyses to ensure the

applicant’s process was correct, and will

approve the launch site location if the

Ec risk criteria were met.

Under either the guidelines or the

final regulations, little or no launch site

location review is needed if the

applicant proposes to locate a launch

site at a federal launch range. The

fundamental purpose of the FAA’s

proposed launch site location review—

to determine whether a launch may

potentially take place safely from the

proposed launch site— has been amply

demonstrated at each of the ranges.

Exceptions may occur if a prospective

launch site operator plans to use a

launch site at a federal launch range for

launches markedly different from past

federal launch range launches, or if an

applicant proposes a new launch point

from which no launch has taken place.

The guidelines and final regulations

differ markedly in their approach to

ground and flight safety. For ground

safety under the guidelines, applicants

perform a hazard analysis and develop

a comprehensive ground safety plan and

a safety organization. Explosive safety is

part of the analysis and safety plan. In

contrast, the final regulations require

the submission of an explosive site plan,

but impose fewer operational ground

safety responsibilities on a launch site

operator. For flight safety, under the

guidelines and final rules, a launch site

operator license contains minimal flight

safety responsibilities. The FAA assigns

almost all responsibility for flight safety

and significant ground safety

responsibility to a licensed launch

operator. Extensive ground and flight

safety requirements will accompany a

launch license. This does not mean a

launch site operator cannot offer flight

safety services or equipment to its

customers. However, the adequacy of

such services and equipment typically

will be assessed in the FAA’s review of

a launch license application.

II. Summary of the Regulations and

Discussion of Comments

With this rulemaking, the FAA creates

in 14 CFR Chapter III a new part 420 to

contain the requirements for obtaining

and possessing a license to operate a

launch site. If a prospective launch site

operator proposes to offer its launch site

to others, that person must obtain a

license to operate a launch site.

Part 420 does not apply in two

notable situations. A launch operator

operating a private site for its own

launches does not need a license to

operate a launch site because its launch

license would cover the safety issues

associated with the launch site. A

person wishing to operate a site to

support amateur rocket activities, as

defined in 14 CFR 401.5, also does not

need a license to operate a launch site

because the launches taking place from

62816 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

2ACTA, Inc. divided its comments into those

from ACTA itself and those from ACTA staff.

3The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA) and the U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) play a role in regulating

ground activities at a launch site. OSHA regulations

cover worker safety issues, and may, as a byproduct, help protect public safety as well. One

provision of particular note is 29 CFR 1910.119,

process safety management of highly hazardous

chemicals (PSM). The requirements of the PSM

standard are intended to eliminate or mitigate the

consequences of releases of highly hazardous

chemicals that may be toxic, reactive, flammable, or

explosive. Management controls are emphasized to

address the risks associated with handling or

working near hazardous chemicals. These

requirements may apply to some launch site and

launch operators. EPA regulations are designed to

protect the public health and safety from releases

of chemicals. One regulation of note is 40 CFR part

68, Accidental release prevention provisions. It

applies to an owner or operator of a stationary

source that has more than a threshold quantity of

a regulated substance in a process, and requires the

owner or operator to develop and implement a risk

management program to prevent accidents and limit

the severity of any accidents that occur. The EPA

rule further requires sources to conduct an offsite

consequence analysis to define the potential

impacts of worst-case releases and other release

scenarios. For any process whose worst-case release

would reach the public, the source must develop

and implement a prevention program and an

emergency response program. Both the EPA and

OSHA prevention rules require regulated entities to

conduct formal analyses of the risks involved in the

use and storage of covered substances and consider

all possible ways in which existing systems could

fail and result in accidental releases.

the site are exempt from AST’s

regulations.

By means of operational, explosive

safety, and site location requirements,

the FAA’s regulations will address

public safety issues associated with

launches that take place from a launch

site whose operation the FAA has

licensed. Additionally, the FAA will

address environmental issues, and will

have international obligations and

national security interests reviewed by

the appropriate agencies, in the course

of a license review. Environmental

review may precede or take place

concurrently with the licensing process.

The grant of a license to operate a

launch site does not guarantee that a

launch license will be granted for any

particular launch proposed for the site.

All launches will be subject to separate

FAA review and licensing.

AST received comments from 11

members of the public and one

government organization. The one

government commenter was the 45th

Space Wing Range Safety Engineering

Support (45SW/SESE). The public

commenters were:

—ACTA, Inc. 2

—New Mexico Office for Space

Commercialization

—Kistler Aerospace Corporation

—Lockheed Martin Corporation

—National Fire Protection Association

—Don A. Nelson

—Nelson Engineering Co.

—Oklahoma Aeronautics and Space

Commission

—Christopher Shove, Ph.D.

—Space Access, LLC

—Texas Aerospace Commission

A. Overview

The FAA’s approach to licensing the

operation of a launch site focuses on

five areas of concern critical to ensuring

that operation of a launch site will not

jeopardize public health and safety, the

safety of property, U.S. national security

or foreign policy interests or

international obligations of U.S.

interests. These reviews encompass the

environment, policy considerations, the

siting of explosives and other explosive

safety measures, the safety of a launch

site location, and operational

responsibilities.

Part 420 is divided into four subparts.

Subpart A includes the scope and

applicability of the part, and definitions

applicable to the part. Subpart B

includes the criteria and information

requirements for obtaining a license.

Subpart C lists the terms and conditions

of a license to operate a launch site.

Subpart D lists the other responsibilities

of a licensee.

Part 420 separates the requirements to

obtain a license from the responsibilities

of a licensee. Much of the information

required by subpart B pertains to how

the applicant will meet its

responsibilities in accordance with

subpart D.

Under the regulations, an applicant is

required to provide the FAA with

information sufficient to conduct

environmental and policy reviews and

determinations. An applicant is also

required to submit an explosive site

plan that shows the location of all

explosive hazard facilities and distances

between them, and the distances to

public areas.

The regulations provide an applicant

options for proving to the FAA that a

launch could be conducted from the site

without jeopardizing public health and

safety. The requirement for a launch site

location approval would not normally

apply to an applicant who proposes to

operate an existing launch point at a

federal launch range, unless the

applicant plans to use a launch point

different than used previously by the

federal launch range, or to use an

existing launch point for a different type

or larger launch vehicle than used in the

past. The fact that launches have taken

place safely from any particular launch

point at a federal launch range may

provide the same demonstration that is

accomplished by the FAA’s launch site

location review: namely, a showing that

launch may occur safely from the site.

The FAA is imposing specific

operational ground safety

responsibilities on a licensed launch

site operator, and requires that a license

applicant demonstrate how those

requirements will be met. A launch site

operator licensee’s responsibilities

include: preventing unauthorized public

access to the site; properly preparing the

public and customers to visit the site;

informing customers of limitations on

use of the site; scheduling and

coordinating hazardous activities

conducted by customers; maintaining

agreements with the U.S. Coast Guard

and with the FAA regional office having

jurisdiction over the airspace through

which launches will take place and

among other measures, the issuance of

a Notice to Mariners and Notice to

Airmen, respectively, prior to a launch

from the launch site; and notifying

adjacent property owners and local

jurisdictions of the pending flight of a

launch vehicle. Part 420 also contains

launch site operator responsibilities

with regard to record keeping, license

transfer, compliance monitoring,

accident investigation and explosives.

Other federal government agencies have

jurisdiction over a number of ground

safety issues, and the FAA does not

intend to duplicate their efforts.3

Discussion of Comments Regarding

Overview

A few commentors provided

comments that focussed on the FAA’s

regulatory approach.

Space Access believed that instead of

focussing on the launch site location,

the rule should put primary interest on

the activity occurring on a site,

including preparation for a launch,

launch, and any activity or process

conducted on or near the site that might

endanger the public health and safety.

Space Access at 1. The FAA agrees, but

believes that a launch site location

analysis is necessary in order to

determine whether a launch could

safely take place from the location

selected. As noted in the NPRM, the

FAA does not plan to license the

operation of a launch site from which

even a hypothetical launch could not

take place and has devised the location

review to avoid such an eventuality.

The other requirements in part 420, in

conjunction with the ground and flight

safety requirements of a launch license,

should address the activity occurring on

a site.

Space Access also notes that the rule

must achieve minimum safety standards

but not require excessive agency

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62817

oversight or business duplication of

effort. Space Access at 2. The desire to

avoid duplication of effort was also

expressed by Kistler Aerospace

Corporation and Christopher Shove,

Ph.D., a Senior Consultant for Space

Data Systems, Inc. Although Kistler

commends the FAA for striving to keep

the regulatory environment free from

redundant requirements levied by

multiple agencies, Kistler Aerospace

Corporation at 2; Christopher Shove at

1. Kistler also states that this goal

should be expanded to include launch

site operators operating out of localities

that already address similar concerns

through local rules or ordinances.

The FAA agrees that it should not

impose requirements that duplicate

other federal regulations. That is why

there are relatively few operational

responsibilities of a launch site licensee

in part 420. For example, OSHA and the

EPA have many regulations that apply

to launch site operators, which the FAA

does not duplicate. If an applicant is

required to fulfill other safety

requirements because of state or local

regulations, or rules of property owners,

the FAA will work with the applicant to

avoid duplication of paper work.

However, applicants must meet FAA

and other federal standards.

The New Mexico Office for Space

Commercialization (NMOSC) thought

that the proposed regulations should not

relate only to launch operations.

NMOSC suggested that the proposed

regulations be expanded to include

recovery operations. New Mexico Office

for Space Commercialization at 1. The

FAA agrees that recovery operations are

important. However, recovery

operations are covered in another

rulemaking. Commercial Space

Transportation Reusable Launch

Vehicle and Reentry Licensing, 65 FR

56617 (Sept. 19, 2000).

Because the FAA stated in the NPRM

that when launching from a non-federal

launch site, a launch operator’s

responsibility for ground and flight

safety takes on added importance,

NMOSC suggested that the FAA is

willing to accept a double standard on

safety. NMOSC believes that New

Mexico will be treated differently from

Florida and California because their

launch sites are federal, and New

Mexico’s is not. NMOSC at 2. This is not

true. The FAA did not mean to imply

that a launch operator has more

responsibility for flight safety from a

commercial launch site than from a

federal launch site. In both cases, the

launch operator is responsible for the

safety of its flight. The FAA was only

pointing out that a launch operator at a

non-federal launch site will not be able

to depend on an established flight safety

infrastructure that currently exists at

federal launch ranges.

Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMC)

recommended, in the interest of

standardization and interoperability,

that a launch site operator be required

to establish and maintain at its facility

a range safety/tracking system that

functions at an industry-wide standard

and demonstrate that it meets the

standard. LMC at 4. A launch operator

should be required to demonstrate to the

FAA that its launch vehicle interfaces

with this standardized range safety/

tracking system. The FAA agrees on the

importance of range safety and tracking

for most launch operations. Because

launch safety is the responsibility of the

launch operator, because

interoperability and standardization are

business issues about which a launch

site operator may wish to make its own

decisions, the FAA notes with interest

but declines to pursue this suggestion.

Although the federal launch ranges offer

a standardized form of range safety and

tracking, the FAA is reluctant to

enshrine particular standards through

regulation, especially when the ranges

themselves are re-visiting how to

provide tracking, transmission and other

launch safety services. Nothing

precludes a launch site operator from

providing such services as well; a

launch operator will continue, of

course, to remain responsible under its

launch license for the safety of the flight

of its vehicle, regardless of with whom

it contracts for supporting services.

B. Environmental

Licensing the operation of a launch

site is a major federal action for

purposes of the National Environmental

Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. As a

result, the FAA is required to assess the

environmental impacts of constructing

and operating a proposed launch site to

determine whether these activities will

significantly affect the quality of the

environment. Because the FAA is

responsible under NEPA regulations for

preparing an environmental assessment

or environmental impact statement

(EIS), part 420 requires a license

applicant to provide the FAA with

sufficient information to conduct an

analysis in accordance with the

requirements of the Council on

Environmental Quality (CEQ)

Regulations Implementing the

Procedural Provisions of NEPA, 40 CFR

parts 1500–1508, and the FAA’s

Procedures for Considering

Environmental Impacts, FAA Order

1050.1D. An applicant will typically

engage a contractor with specialized

experience in the NEPA process to

conduct the study underpinning the

FAA’s environmental analysis.

The FAA encourages an applicant to

begin the environmental review,

including the gathering of pertinent

information to perform the assessment,

early in the planning process, but after

the applicant has defined its proposed

action and considered feasible

alternatives. The FAA will determine

whether a finding of no significant

impact (FONSI) may be issued after an

environmental assessment, or whether

an environmental impact statement

followed by a record of decision is

necessary. An applicant may be subject

to restrictions on activities at a proposed

launch site. An applicant may acquire

property for future use as a launch site;

however, absent a FONSI, the FAA must

prepare an environmental review that

includes consideration of reasonable

alternatives to the site. According to the

CEQ regulations as interpreted by the

courts, an applicant may not use the

purchase of a site or construction at the

site to limit the array of reasonable

alternatives. As a result, an applicant

must complete the environmental

process before construction or

improvement of the site. The FAA will

not issue a license if the FAA has not

concluded an environmental review in

accordance with all applicable

regulations and guidelines.

Discussion of Comments Regarding the

Environmental Review

Nelson Engineering Co. stated that the

X–33 EIS process included overflight

and safety issues. Nelson Engineering

felt that including overflight and safety

issues for licensed activities was a

duplication of effort since these safety

issues are covered in the license process

as well. It noted that the public has the

right to know and comment on

overflight and safety issues, but it would

be best to handle it separate from the

EIS process. Nelson Engineering at 2.

The FAA agrees. Safety issues are better

addressed in the licensing process

where safety standards exist. When the

question of safety comes up during the

FAA’s environmental review process,

the FAA notes in the environmental

documentation that safety issues are

addressed in the licensing process.

NMOSC commented on the FAA’s

statement that an applicant may acquire

property for future use as a launch site.

NMOSC states that according to the CEQ

regulations as interpreted by the courts,

an applicant may not use the purchase

of a site or construction at the site to

limit the array of reasonable

alternatives. NMOSC at 2. The FAA

partially agrees with NMOSC in that

purchasing a site with the intent to

62818 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

4A launch license encompasses ground activities

involved in the preparation of a launch vehicle for

flight at a launch site in the United States. This may

include the storage and handling of explosives

involved with the handling and assembly of launch

vehicles at a launch site.

build a launch facility, without looking

at other possible locations, limits the

launch site selection and evaluation of

alternatives and is contrary to the

requirements of the National

Environmental Protection Act (NEPA).

NEPA requires an applicant to show

that it looked at several feasible sites

based on certain criteria and that it

chose one of those sites as the preferred

or selected alternative. However, an

applicant can in fact purchase property

for future use as a launch site if the

applicant can show that it looked at

several sites and picked a particular site

based on certain parameters. It must

also document the evaluation of those

alternative sites.

C. Policy

The FAA conducts a policy review of

an application for a license to operate a

launch site to determine whether

operation of the proposed launch site

would jeopardize national security,

foreign policy interests, or international

obligations of the United States. The

FAA conducts the policy review in

coordination with other federal agencies

that have responsibility for national and

international interests. The Department

of Defense is consulted to determine

whether a license application presents

any issues affecting national security.

The Department of State reviews an

application for issues affecting foreign

policy or international obligations.

Other agencies, such as NASA, are

consulted as appropriate. By this

rulemaking, the regulations require an

applicant to supply information relevant

to the FAA’s policy approval, including,

for example, identification of foreign

ownership of the applicant. The FAA

will obtain other information required

for a policy review from information

submitted by an applicant in other parts

of the application. During a policy

review, the FAA will consult with an

applicant regarding any questions or

issues before making a final

determination. An applicant would

have the opportunity to address any

questions before completion of the

review.

No comments regarding policy review

were received and no changes have been

made to part 420 from the Launch Site

NPRM.

D. Explosive Site Plan Review

The final rules establish criteria and

procedures for the siting of facilities at

a launch site where solid propellants,

liquid propellants, and other explosives

are located to prepare launch vehicles

and payloads for flight. These criteria

and procedures are commonly referred

to as quantity-distance (Q–D)

requirements because they provide

minimum separation distances between

explosive hazard facilities, surrounding

facilities and locations where the public

may be present on the basis of the type

and quantity of explosive material

located within the area. Minimum

prescribed separation distances are

necessary to protect the public from

explosive hazards on a launch site so

that the effects of an explosion do not

reach the public.

An applicant must provide the FAA

with an explosive site plan that

demonstrates compliance with the Q–D

requirements. Because the FAA must

approve this plan, applicants are

cautioned not to begin construction of

facilities requiring an explosive site

plan until obtaining FAA approval. Note

also that the Q–D requirements do not

address any toxic hazards. Toxic

hazards may be mitigated through

procedural means, and the FAA

addresses toxic hazards in a separate

rulemaking on licensing and safety

requirements for launch. If a toxic

hazard is a controlling factor in siting,

a prudent launch site operator will

address the issue when preparing its site

plan.

The quantity-distance criteria are a

critical mitigation measure required in a

launch site operator application to

provide the public protection from

ground operations at a launch site. The

final rules have other mitigation

measures, including launch site

operator responsibilities that address

accident prevention measures, and

procedural requirements to protect other

launch site customers and visitors on

the launch site. Any other procedural

requirements necessary to protect the

public from explosive hazards will be

the responsibility of a launch operator

under a launch license.4

The FAA has made certain changes in

response to comments to part 420, from

what was proposed in the Launch Site

NPRM regarding the explosive site plan

requirements. A brief summary of these

changes is discussed below and is

discussed in further detail in the Part

analysis.

• The NPRM did not require an

applicant proposing to locate a launch

site at a federal launch range to submit

an explosive site plan. In the final rule,

the applicant must submit an explosive

site plan to the federal launch range

operator.

• Q–D requirements for hazard class

1.1 were added, including a provision

for public traffic route distance.

• The assumption that solid and

liquid stages on a launch vehicle would

not explode simultaneously has been

removed from the Q–D requirements for

locating solid and liquid propellants

together.

• The explosive site plan

requirements were moved from subpart

B, Application Requirements, to subpart

D, Licensee Responsibility. Although an

applicant must complete an explosive

site plan to obtain a license, this section

was moved because the explosive site

plan is a document with which a

licensee must comply and keep up to

date at all times.

• A provision was added to clarify

that explosive siting issues outside the

scope of the part 420 requirements will

be evaluated by the FAA on an

individual basis consistent with

industry safety standards.

A discussion of launch site explosive

hazards, the reason the FAA is adopting

explosive siting criteria, current Q–D

standards, the FAA’s use of NASA and

DOD Q–D standards, other approaches

to explosive safety, and the application

of ATF, DOD or NASA standards are

covered in the Launch Site NPRM. 64

FR at 34320—34322. Solid explosive

divisions, future changes in liquid

propellant requirements, and solid and

liquid bi-propellants at launch pads are

discussed below.

Solid Explosive Divisions

The Launch Site NPRM proposed

requirements for division 1.3 solid

explosives. As noted in the Launch Site

NPRM, the FAA is adopting the United

Nations Organization (UNO)

classification system, a system that

governs transport of dangerous goods.

The Department of Transportation’s

Research and Special Programs

Administration assigns dangerous goods

to the appropriate class in accordance

with 49 CFR part 173. The hazard

classification system consists of nine

classes for dangerous goods, of which

ammunition and explosives are

included as the UNO ‘‘Class 1,

Explosives.’’ Class 1 explosives are

further subdivided into ‘‘divisions’’

based on the character and

predominance of the associated hazards

and on the potential for causing

casualties or property damage. As

defined in 49 CFR 173.50:

• Division 1.1—consists of explosives

that have a mass explosion hazard. A

mass explosion is one which affects

almost the entire load instantaneously.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62819

5Memorandum from USAF Colonel Daniel T.

Tompkins to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and

Marine Corps board members (Dec. 9, 1999).

• Division 1.2—consists of explosives

that have a projection hazard but not a

mass explosion hazard.

• Division 1.3—consists of explosives

that have a fire hazard and either a

minor blast hazard or a minor projection

hazard or both, but not a mass explosion

hazard.

• Division 1.4—consists of explosives

that present a minor explosion hazard.

• Division 1.5—consists of very

insensitive explosives.

• Division 1.6—consists of extremely

insensitive articles which do not have a

mass explosion hazard.

The FAA originally proposed criteria

only for division 1.3 because it believed

that the only solid explosives for

commercial launches that would likely

affect separation distances on a launch

site were division 1.3 propellants. The

FAA noted that although launch

vehicles frequently have components

incorporating division 1.1 explosives,

such as those used to initiate flight

termination systems, the quantity is

small. The FAA also noted that division

1.1 explosives will not likely be present

in sufficient quantities to affect the

application of Q–D criteria. The only

division 1.1 solid rocket motors existing

today are from old military missiles,

which are not likely to be used at a

commercial launch site.

In response to comments from the

45th Space Wing pointing out the errors

underlying this assumption, part 420

now includes quantity-distance

requirements for explosive division 1.1

explosives. Compared with explosive

division 1.3 explosives, the distances

are greater due to their more hazardous

nature.

Future Change in Liquid Propellant

Requirements

The DOD Explosive Safety Board

(DDESB) initiated a DOD Explosive

Safety Standard for Energetic Liquids

Program, and established an interagency

advisory board called the Liquid

Propellants Working Group (LPWG).

The FAA is a member of this group. A

number of possible inconsistencies and

irregularities have been identified in the

current approach to siting liquid

propellants. These include Q–D criteria

for most liquid propellants, possible

inconsistencies in hazard group and

compatibility group definitions, and

possible inaccurate characterization of

blast overpressure hazards of liquid

propellant explosions. The purpose of

the LPWG is to address issues of

explosive equivalence, compatibility

mixing, and quantity-distance criteria,

and to develop recommended revisions

to DOD STD 6055.9, which addresses

liquid propellants and other liquid

energetic materials.

The DDESB work is almost

completed, and the recommendations of

the LPWG should be incorporated in the

DOD standard in the near future.

Because the DDESB is possibly the bestequipped group in the country to

address these issues, the FAA will

carefully consider its recommendations.

The basic approach outlined in the final

rule should not change. However, the

DDESB is likely to specify new hazard

and compatibility groups, distance

values, and equivalency values, and the

public may anticipate their eventual

consideration and possible adoption by

the FAA.

Solid and Liquid Bi-Propellants at

Launch Pads

In the Launch Site NPRM, the FAA

proposed a special requirement at

launch pads for launch vehicles that use

liquid bi-propellant and solid propellant

components. The required separation

distance would be the greater of the

distance determined by the explosive

equivalent of the liquid propellant alone

or the solid propellant alone. An

applicant would not have to add the

separation distances of both. This

proposal rested on the conclusion that,

generally, no credible scenario existed

that could produce a simultaneous

explosion reaction of both liquid

propellant tanks and solid propellant

motors. This requirement has changed

because the assumption may not always

be correct.

Under the final rule, an applicant

must conduct an analysis of the

maximum credible event (MCE), or the

worst case explosion that is expected to

occur. If analysis shows that an

explosion caused by the liquid

propellants will not cause a

simultaneous explosion of the solid

propellants, and an explosion due to the

solid propellants will not cause a

simultaneous explosion of the liquid

propellants, the distance between the

explosive hazard facility and all other

explosive hazard facilities and public

areas should be based on the MCE.

Discussion of Comments

The 45th Space Wing Range, Safety

Engineering Support division (45SW/

SESE), provided a number of comments

on the FAA’s proposed explosive safety

requirements. First, the 45SW/SESE

suggests including alternative

approaches to Q–D standards such as

risk-based thresholds and limits. 45th

Space Wing Range, Safety Engineering

Support division at 1. The FAA agrees

that alternative approaches to Q–D may

be appropriate. However, the FAA will

not formally adopt such an approach at

this time for the following reasons.

On December 9, 1999, the DDESB

approved, for limited use at DOD

facilities, the use of risk-based

explosives safety siting of explosives

facilities for calendar years 2000

through 2002. Specifically, on a case-bycase basis, a risk-based explosives safety

analysis that supports an explosives

facility siting may be submitted to the

DDESB Secretariat for review and

approval.5 A risk based analysis is used

when a waiver or exemption would be

required to approve a facility. The FAA

will monitor the experience of the

DDESB during those three years, and

may take regulatory action at that time.

In the meantime, an applicant unable

to meet the Q–D requirements might

attempt a risk-based approach if able to

provide a clear and convincing

demonstration that the proposed

method provides an equivalent level of

safety to that required by Q–D. Such a

demonstration would have to include an

explosives safety analysis that analyzes

hazards associated with handling

explosive materials on the launch site.

The applicant should examine the

relationship between an explosive

hazard facility and an exposed facility

to determine what effect one has on the

other in the event of an accidental

explosion. As discussed in the NPRM,

net explosives weight is used to

calculate Q–D separations by means of

the formula: D=KW1/3, where D is the

required distance (in feet), K is the

protection factor depending on the

degree of risk assumed or permitted,

and W1/3 is the cube root of the net

explosives weight (NEW) in pounds.

This formula is also used for assessing

risk. Dividing the distance by the cube

root of the NEW will give the actual K

factor of protection. A K factor equates

to an overpressure, as shown in table 1.

Knowing the expected overpressure can

help in understanding the facility or

equipment damage and the personnel

injuries expected to be sustained by a

particular blast overpressure. Hazardous

fragments must also be considered when

preparing a risk assessment.

For more information on blast

pressure, blast effects, and fragment

hazards, see Air Force Manual

62820 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

6Table 4.2 in AFMAN 91–201 (Mar. 7, 2000).

7The Act and the regulations define launch site

as the location on Earth from which a launch takes

place (as defined in a license the Secretary issues

or transfers under this chapter) and necessary

facilities. 49 USC 70102(6); 14 CFR 401.5.

(AFMAN) 91–201, Explosives Safety Standards, sections 4.48 and 4.49 (Mar.

7, 2000).

TABLE 1.—K-FACTOR TO PSI RELATIONSHIP 6

K-factor PSI K-factor PSI

1.0 ........................................................................................................................................................ 1000 20 3.0

1.2 ........................................................................................................................................................ 763 21 2.8

1.4 ........................................................................................................................................................ 597 22 2.6

1.6 ........................................................................................................................................................ 475 23 2.4

1.8 ........................................................................................................................................................ 384 24 2.3

2.0 ........................................................................................................................................................ 315 25 2.2

2.5 ........................................................................................................................................................ 200 26 2.1

3.0 ........................................................................................................................................................ 135 27 2.0

3.5 ........................................................................................................................................................ 95 28 1.9

4.0 ........................................................................................................................................................ 70 29 1.8

4.5 ........................................................................................................................................................ 53 30 1.7

5.0 ........................................................................................................................................................ 42 31 1.63

6.0 ........................................................................................................................................................ 28 32 1.56

7.0 ........................................................................................................................................................ 20 33 1.5

8.0 ........................................................................................................................................................ 15 34 1.4

9.0 ........................................................................................................................................................ 12 35 1.4

10 ......................................................................................................................................................... 9.6 36 1.3

11 ......................................................................................................................................................... 8.0 37 1.3

12 ......................................................................................................................................................... 6.8 38 1.25

13 ......................................................................................................................................................... 5.9 39 1.2

14 ......................................................................................................................................................... 5.2 40 1.2

15 ......................................................................................................................................................... 4.7 45 1.0

16 ......................................................................................................................................................... 4.2 50 0.9

17 ......................................................................................................................................................... 3.8 60 0.7

18 ......................................................................................................................................................... 3.5 70 0.6

19 ......................................................................................................................................................... 3.2 80 0.5

45SW/SESE asks whether there is an

assumption that all DOD explosive site

plan approval is current for launch sites

on a federal range? What if formal

DDESB approval is not on record?

45SW/SESE at 1. The FAA does assume

that all DOD explosive site plan

approval is current for launch sites on

a federal range and that formal DDESB

approval is on record. The FAA’s

launch site safety assessments of the

national launch ranges show that the

DOD ranges enforce their standards.

However, if the FAA discovers through

its safety inspection program that a

licensee is operating out of compliance

with the DDESB approved explosive site

plan, it will consider this a violation of

the license and may take appropriate

enforcement action.

With respect to the FAA’s statement

that a launch site operator is responsible

for preventing unauthorized public

access to the site, the 45SW/SESE

commented that this should include

surrounding areas designated as posing

an environmental or explosives hazard.

45SW/SESE at 2. The FAA agrees in

principle. With respect to

environmental hazards, surrounding

areas posing an environmental hazard

will be addressed in the environmental

review process.

With respect to explosives, to comply

with these rules adopted today, areas

posing an explosive hazard during

ground activities must, by regulatory

requirement, be contained within the

launch site. A launch site operator is

responsible for preventing unauthorized

access to the site. It is also responsible

for ensuring that hazardous areas within

the site are clear and that other users of

the site are not placed at risk during

hazardous operations. In the NPRM, the

FAA stated that minimum prescribed

separation distances are necessary to

protect the public from explosive

hazards on a launch site so that the

effects of an explosion do not reach the

public. 45SW/SESE notes that some

other reasons for separation distances

include to prevent unnecessary injuries

or casualty to workers related to the

explosive operation; to protect property;

to avoid propagation from one explosive

location to another; and remote

explosives testing. 45SW/SESE at 2. The

FAA agrees, but wishes to stress that

these requirements are intended to

protect public safety because public

safety is the FAA’s mandate. Property

belonging to members of the public also

achieves some measure of protection in

accordance with these requirements.

Also, propagation from one explosive

location to another is covered through

part 420’s intraline distance

requirements.

In the NPRM, the FAA states that it

must approve the explosive site plan

that an applicant provides to the FAA.

The 45SW/SESE asks whether explosive

site plans already approved by the

DDESB will be granted FAA approval.

45SW/SESE at 3. The answer is yes. A

new requirement from the NPRM is that

the FAA now requires applicants for

launch sites located on a federal launch

range to provide the FAA with a copy

of an explosive site plan. However, the

FAA will not approve it. The FAA will

use the explosive site plan for

compliance monitoring purposes only.

The 45SW/SESE notes that ‘‘launch

site’’ in some contexts implies ‘‘launch

complex,’’ which excludes other launch

processing facilities or areas at the

launch range. 45SW/SESE at 3. The

FAA does not wish to imply that a

launch site is merely a launch complex

on a launch site. To clarify, a launch site

includes the entire land area operated

by a launch site operator, including all

launch complexes and facilities within.7

In the NPRM, the FAA stated that the

proposed requirements do not account

for the use of barricades and other

protective measures to mitigate the

effect of an explosion on exposed areas.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62821

An applicant proposing to use such

measures in order to deviate from the

proposed siting rules may, during the

application process, provide a clear and

convincing demonstration that its

proposed method provides an

equivalent level of safety to that

required by Q–D. 45SW/SESE states that

this use of a waiver is inconsistent with

the way the Air Force uses them. A

waiver is used to document a condition

or requirement that is not achieved, not

one where the condition or requirement

is being met. 45SW/SESE at 4. The FAA

did not mean ‘‘waiver’’ in the way the

Air Force uses it. If a launch site

operator plans to use barricades or other

protective measures to mitigate the

effect of an explosion on exposed area,

the applicant would have to submit a

clear and convincing demonstration of

an equivalent level of safety.

In the NPRM, the FAA stated that

proposed subpart B would establish

criteria and procedures for the siting of

facilities at a launch site where solid

and liquid propellants are located to

prepare launch vehicles and payloads

for flight. 45SW/SESE notes that

propellants are not enough. The

requirements should include other

explosives as well including linear

shaped charges, safe and arm devices,

initiators, and igniters. 45SW/SESE at 2,

4. The FAA agrees, and has modified

the explosive siting requirements to

include those explosives, which are

division 1.1 explosives.

In the NPRM, the FAA stated that

division 1.1 explosives would not likely

be present in sufficient quantities to

affect the application of Q–D criteria.

45SW/SESE points out that this is

incorrect, and the FAA agrees. The

linear shaped charge, which is an

explosive division 1.1 explosive, is the

driver of distance requirements because

in most cases a solid rocket booster is

zero percent trinitrotoluene (TNT)

equivalency. 45SW/SESE at 5. ACTA

adds that DOD 6055.9 states that the

inhabited building distance for division

1.1 solid propellants ranging from 1–

35,000 lb is 1250 ft. Proposed table E–

1 only requires 800 ft. for quantities up

to 1,000,000 lb. This is true even when

quantities of 1.1 explosives are present.

ACTA at 5. The FAA agrees that its

assumption that division 1.1 explosives

would not likely be present in sufficient

quantities to affect the application of Q–

D criteria was incorrect. The FAA has

added division 1.1 explosives to this

final rule.

In the NPRM, the FAA also stated that

because division 1.3 solid propellants

are all compatible, the proposed

regulations do not incorporate

compatibility groups for solid

propellants. 45SW/SESE asks how

compatibility would be determined if

there was a need to store other

explosives with the solids? 45SW/SESE

at 5. Ensuring that explosives in an

explosives hazard facility are

compatible is a procedural requirement

of a launch operator. Ground safety will

be covered in a separate proposed

rulemaking on licensing and safety

requirements for launch.

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed a

special requirement at launch pads for

launch vehicles that use liquid bipropellant and solid propellant

components. The required separation

distance would be the greater of the

distance determined by the explosive

equivalent of the liquid propellant alone

or the solid propellant alone. An

applicant did not have to add the

separation distances of both. The NPRM

assumed that generally, no credible

scenario existed that could produce a

simultaneous explosion reaction of both

liquid propellant tanks and solid

propellant motors. 45SW/SESE states

that the general assumption that a

simultaneous explosion reaction of both

liquid propellant tanks and solid

propellant motors is unlikely is not a

prudent approach. 45SW/SESE

recommends analyses be performed on

a case-by-case basis to determine a

credible scenario. A number of current

Q–D site plans considered TNT

equivalencies from both the solids and

liquids. 45SW/SESE at 5, 6; but see

Lockheed Martin at 3 (agreeing with the

NPRM proposal as permitting greater

flexibility in operations and launch

vehicle design).

The FAA agrees with 45SW/SESE,

and adopts the suggestion to require that

an applicant address an explosion of

both solid and liquid propellants at the

same time. Air Force standard AFMAN

91–201, section 3.8 states that the

combined bulk explosive weight of

explosive items is not necessarily the

weight used for Q–D calculations. Q–D

is based on the maximum credible event

(MCE), namely, the worst case

explosion, that is expected to occur.

Section 3.8.3 further states the basic rule

when combining mass-detonating (e.g.,

the explosive equivalent of liquid

propellants) and nonmass-detonating

explosives (e.g., an explosive division

1.3 solid rocket motor). Consider the

distance for the combined explosives

weight of 1.1 and 1.3 first as 1.1. Then

consider the distance for the combined

explosives weight of 1.1 and 1.3 as 1.3.

The required distance is the greater of

the two. However, section 3.8 further

states that exceptions are granted when

analyses or test results demonstrate that

the explosive division 1.1 (for liquid

propellants) will not cause detonation of

the explosive division 1.3 explosives.

This approach has now been

incorporated into the final rule, in

section 420.69. Note that the FAA still

considers a simultaneous explosion

reaction of both liquid propellant tanks

and solid propellant motors to be

unlikely. The FAA requires that this

improbability be demonstrated.

Otherwise, a launch site operator will

have to use the combined explosive

weight of the solids and liquids to

determine required distances.

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to

adopt a provision of DOD STD 6055.9

that exempts the need for a lightning

protection system when a local

lightning warning system is used to

terminate operations before the

incidence of an electrical storm, if all

personnel can and will be provided

with protection equivalent to a public

traffic route distance. The 45SW/SESE

notes that this exception is not prudent

in Florida where lightning strikes can

occur without warning, except possibly

an unmanned small licensed location

where the value of the facility and its

content are assumable risks. 45SW/SESE

at 6.

The FAA agrees that if lightning

strikes can occur without warning, then

it would be prudent to have a lightning

protection system. The final rule would

require a lightning protection system in

that situation. A licensee must ensure

the withdrawal of the public to a public

area distance prior to an electrical

storm. If this is not possible, then a

lightning protection system is required.

Note also that the objective is not to

protect the licensee’s property or that of

its contractors, subcontractors, or

customers, but members of the public

and their property.

In the NPRM, the FAA defined

intraline distance as the minimum

distance permitted between any two

explosive hazard facilities in the

ownership, possession or control of one

launch site customer. The FAA notes

that unlike distances to protect the

public, intraline distance will not

protect workers with the same level or

protection as the public. If intraline

distances are not maintained between

two explosive hazard facilities, then the

larger area encompassing both

quantities must be used for Q–D

purposes when determining prescribed

distances to the public. The 45SW/SESE

questions how that could be acceptable

when worker safety is diminished, and

personnel protection must be

established to be consistent with OSHA.

45SW/SESE at 7. Worker safety comes

under the jurisdiction of OSHA, and, as

noted in the NPRM, the FAA does not

62822 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

plan to duplicate the requirements of

other regulatory agencies.

45SW/SESE also notes that inhabited

building distance, which the FAA

proposed as public area distance, has an

assumed 20% facility damage and some

injury. 45SW/SESE states that this may

be a reasonable risk on a DOD

installation, and asks whether 20%

facility damage and injury is acceptable

to the general public? 45SW/SESE at 8;

see also ACTA at 3 (noting that the Q–

D criterion for public buildings allows

a glass fragment serious injury

probability of up to 30%). This would

not be acceptable if Q–D requirements

were the only measures taken to protect

the public. The protection offered by Q–

D along with the procedural

requirements covered in a proposed

rulemaking governing licensing and

safety requirements for launch will be

adequate to protect the public to an

acceptable level. These other safety

controls are the responsibility of a

launch operator and will be covered in

a separate proposed rulemaking on

licensing and safety requirements for

launch.

ACTA staff notes that the FAA uses

DOD and NASA standards as the basis

for explosive safety requirements. ACTA

asked that since OSHA, EPA, and ATF

have the responsibility for safety during

production and assembly of hazardous

materials, why shouldn’t this apply to

launch site operations as well. ACTA at

8.

OSHA and EPA regulations do apply

on launch sites, but neither agency has

Q–D requirements. ATF does have Q–D

requirements, but, as noted in the

NPRM, they only cover the storage of

explosives at a launch site. ATF

regulations do not cover the handling of

explosives, which includes the majority

of hazardous activities at launch sites.

DOD and NASA standards are currently

used at every major launch site in the

United States, and the FAA

requirements reflect the current

practice. Note also that the distances

used in this final rule for the ‘‘use’’ of

explosives are consistent with ATF

regulations on the ‘‘storage’’ of

explosives, and that the FAA is not

duplicating the ATF storage

requirements. An ACTA staff member

stated that the NPRM provides

excruciating details on how to handle

explosives but does not consider public

risks associated with either toxicity or

blast overpressure focussing. These are

major factors in siting decisions. ACTA

at 7. The FAA agrees that these are

important issues, but are not critical for

the layout of a launch site. These issues

are covered in the proposed rulemaking

governing licensing and safety

requirements for launch.

Space Access, LLC, (Space Access)

also commented on the explosive siting

requirements. In the NPRM, the FAA

stated that the DDESB is likely to

specify new hazard and compatibility

groups, distance values, and

equivalency values, and the public may

anticipate their eventual consideration

and possible adoption by the FAA.

Space Access recommends the FAA

accelerate this work and provide these

values as soon as possible. These

proposed changes could have a major

financial impact to both the site

operators and launch vehicle operators

in terms of launch acquisition, usage,

safety separation distances for storage

and public access and procedures for

use in all phases of operations leading

up to the launch. Space Access was

concerned that launch operators will

never achieve aircraft-like operations if

they are continually evacuating sites

and areas to meet outdated policies and

suggested that no flexibility to meet

safety criteria by means other than total

separation distance. Space Access at 2.

The FAA would like to stress that the

work is being conducted by the DDESB,

and is not in the control of the FAA. It

is, however, near completion and the

FAA will consider it once it is

completed and adopted by the DDESB.

Space Access also states that there

seems to be a lack of discussion of the

distances required by the Department of

Transportation (DOT). Space Access

wants a single standard for propellants.

DOT uses numbers in tens of feet for

public safety distances. Other standards

also exist in the National Fire Protection

Agency (NFPA) publications and in

local fire codes. Space Access at 2, 3.

The FAA agrees that other liquid Q–D

standards are much different than those

proposed by the FAA, but the FAA

selected standards representing current

procedures for the launch industry. That

is why the new liquid Q–D standards

that the DDESB will likely adopt are

important since they are based on a

review of all relevant government and

industry standards in this area,

including those of DOT. There will not

likely be a single standard for

propellants, as Space Access would like,

but the standards applicable to launch

sites will be more consistent with other

commercial and government standards.

Space Access also notes that in

addition to having realistic numbers for

Q–D, there needs to be procedures and

policies such that incentives are in

place for actually designing and

operating in a safe manner. For

example, earthen berms can be used to

reduce separation distances. This

should be the same with adequate

design and procedures. According to

Space Access, there is no motivation for

improving the design or procedures

because all that matters is total quantity

or TNT equivalency. Space Access

strongly recommends the FAA adopt a

methodology that trades design and

procedures for distance. Space Access at

3.

The FAA agrees that separation

distances can be reduced if certain

features are built into a facility. The

FAA has chosen not to include design

standards in the final rule at this time

because of their complexity. In

recognition of the availability of such

substitutes, the final rule now provides

that for explosive siting issues not

otherwise addressed by the

requirements of §§ 420.65–420.69, a

launch site operator must clearly and

convincingly demonstrate a level of

safety equivalent to that otherwise

required by part 420. This means that

the FAA may permit design features that

provide an equivalent level of safety to

substitute for separation distances.

Lockheed Martin Corporation also

commented on the Q–D requirements.

First, it believes the FAA should

consider applying DOD Standard 6055.9

at non-federal launch sites instead of

developing a new standard because

6055.9 represents a well-developed and

mature regime with an impressive safety

record; and because implementation of

6055.9 at non-federal launch sites

would help ensure consistent regulation

of explosives both at federal and nonfederal launch ranges. Lockheed Martin

at 3. The FAA agrees that 6055.9

represents a well-developed and mature

regime with an impressive safety record.

That is why the FAA’s Q–D standards

are modeled after this standard. The

FAA believes, however, that codifying,

instead of adopting by reference, the

basic requirements of the standard in a

regulation are beneficial for a number of

reasons. First, codification permits the

standard to be tailored to the needs of

commercial launch sites. DOD standard

6055.9 is applicable to all military

bases, worldwide. Second, the language

within standards such as DOD

regulation 6055.9 is not always stated in

a regulatory manner. Often, discretion

based on military need by the DDESB or

other body is embedded in the standard.

Third, changes to that standard by the

DDESB could not automatically apply to

applicants for a license. By adopting the

basic requirements of that standard in

the final rule, the FAA can monitor

changes in the DDESB standard,

consider the applicability and

appropriateness of changes to

commercial launch sites, and go through

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62823

notice and comment rulemaking to

adopt any change. Therefore, the FAA

retains the approach of adopting

pertinent requirements of that standard

in the final rule rather than referencing

the entire DOD standard 6055.9.

Lockheed Martin agrees with the

FAA’s approach to addressing

hardening on a case-by-case basis, and

suggests referring to National Fire

Protection Association (NFPA) 70 and

496. Lockheed Martin at 3. NFPA 70, the

National Electrical Code (1999),

includes safety requirements for all

types of electrical installations. It is

useful for work that involves electrical

design, installation, identification, or

inspection. NFPA 496, Standard for

Purged and Pressurized Enclosure for

Electrical Equipment, 1988, specifies

requirements for design and operation

of purged and pressurized electrical

equipment enclosures to reduce or

eliminate the hazardous location

classification within the enclosures.

Those two standards are incorporated

by reference in OSHA’s Occupational

Safety and Health Regulations at 29 CFR

1910.6. Because OSHA requires them,

and because the FAA is seeking to avoid

duplicating the requirements of other

civilian regulatory agencies, the

standards will not be incorporated into

this final rule. In any event, the FAA

will be willing to consider those

standards in the event a launch site

operator attempts to use them to

demonstrate an equivalent level of

safety.

E. Explosive Mishap Prevention

Measures.

Application of the quantity-distance

rules alone will not prevent mishaps

from occurring on a launch site. The Q–

D rules merely reduce the risk to the

public to an acceptable level if a mishap

occurs, and if the public is kept away

from the mishap by a distance that is at

least as great as the public area distance.

Safe facility design and prudent

procedural measures are critical to

preventing a mishap from occurring in

the first place. Because the public at a

launch site cannot be protected by

prudent site planning alone, the FAA

today adopts launch site operator

responsibilities to prevent mishaps

involving propellants and other

explosives.

Part 420 focuses on measures that are

appropriate to be taken by a launch site

operator. For the most part, the FAA

considers it prudent to place the

responsibility on a launch site operator

for those measures that must be built

into facilities. Requirements of a more

operational nature will be covered in

another FAA rulemaking.

Part 420 focuses on appropriate

measures. These are particularly

important for electro-explosive devices.

Electric hazards include lightning, static

electricity, electric supply systems, and

electromagnetic radiation. The FAA is

adopting launch site operator

requirements for two of these electric

hazards: lightning and electric supply

systems. A full discussion of these can

be found in the Launch Site NPRM. 64

FR at 34324–34325.

Other measures were considered but

rejected because the FAA’s proposed

rulemaking on licensing and safety

requirements for launch will cover other

procedural measures to guard against

inadvertent initiation of propellants

from electricity. Moreover, launch and

launch site operators should implement

prudent design and construction

measures to comply with local, state,

and other federal law, such as OSHA

requirements.

Discussion of Comments

In the NPRM, the FAA noted that the

National Fire Protection Association

(NFPA), Batterymarch Park, Quincy,

Massachusetts, has published NFPA

780, Standard for the Installation of

Lightning Protection Systems. The latest

edition was published in 1997. NFPA

780 provides for the protection of

people, buildings, special occupancies,

heavy duty stacks, structures containing

flammable liquids and gases, and other

entities against lightning damage. The

FAA asked for the public’s views on the

use and applicability of this code.

A number of commenters supported

the FAA’s adoption of NFPA 780.

45SW/SESE noted that the Air Force

uses NFPA 780 as a core document to

design lightning protection systems.

45SW/SESE at 6. The NFPA stated that

the FAA should adopt NFPA 780, which

dates back to Benjamin Franklin’s era.

NFPA at 1, 2; see also Lockheed Martin

at 3. The FAA agrees with the

commentors regarding the importance of

NFPA 780. However, the FAA will not

incorporate NFPA 780 by reference

because it does not always include

mandatory language. Due to its

importance and utility, the FAA will

undoubtedly refer to it for appropriate

guidance.

Although LMC believes NFPA 780 is

an appropriate and useful standard for

a lightning protection system, it states

that a launch site operator should not be

required to install and maintain an

independent lightning protection

system. A launch operator will likely

have one as a way to attract customers.

Lockheed Martin at 3. The FAA

disagrees. The FAA has learned from

experience that while most launch site

operators might be expected to adhere to

commonly held standards; this is not

always the case. Without such

requirements, an adequate level of

safety or risk mitigation cannot be

achieved. If most would do this anyway,

then the impact is minimal. In any

event, because it involves the

construction of facilities, the FAA has

made the installation of a lightning

protection system a requirement for a

launch site operator license to ensure its

availability.

In addition to NFPA 780, the 45SW/

SESE suggested that the FAA review

DOD 6055.9, and applicable Air Force

instructions to provide full regulatory

requirements. The FAA has reviewed

DOD 6055.9, Air Force Manual 91–201,

and the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration’s (NASA) ‘‘Safety

Standard for Explosives, Propellants,

and Pyrotechnics,’’ NSS 1740.12

(Aug.1993). The FAA believes that the

requirements in the final rule cover the

basic safety issues that need to be

addressed for lightning protection

systems. The FAA expects applicants to

achieve the level of safety represented

by the DOD and NASA standard.

Another explosive mishap prevention

measure is the control of static

electricity. The FAA did not propose

any requirements in the NPRM

regarding the control of static electricity

because the FAA believed that the

control of static electricity in launch

operations is primarily procedural in

nature, and is best covered by the FAA

in another proposed rulemaking

governing licensing and safety

requirements for launch. The FAA

asked for the public’s view.

LMC agreed with the FAA and noted

that new rules on control of static

electricity should reflect current

procedures used by the launch

operators. Lockheed Martin at 4. The

NFPA recommended NFPA 77,

Recommended Practice on Static

Electricity (1993), as a reference

document. NFPA 77 provides a basic

understanding of the phenomena of

static electric discharges and how they

can serve as ignition sources, and

includes useful information on bonding

and grounding.

F. Launch Site Location Review

The FAA intends a launch site

location review to determine whether

the location of a proposed launch site

could support launches that would not

jeopardize public health and safety, and

the safety of property. To that end, the

FAA will determine whether at least

one hypothetical launch could take

place safely from a launch point at the

proposed site. The FAA will not license

62824 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

8Part 420 does not include a means for analyzing

risks posed by a launch site for the launch of

unguided suborbital launch vehicles that employ

FTS. Historically, few of these vehicles have been

launched. In the event an applicant for a license to

operate a launch site wishes to operate a launch site

only for such vehicles, the FAA will handle the

request on a case by case basis. The FAA does note,

however, that unguided suborbital launch vehicles

that in the past have been launched with an FTS

were usually launched with the FTS because the

launch was otherwise too close to populated areas

for the type of vehicle and trajectory flown.

the operation of a launch site from

which a launch could never safely take

place. An applicant should, however,

bear in mind that an FAA license to

operate a launch site does not guarantee

that a launch license would be issued

for any particular launch proposed from

that site. Accordingly, much of the

decision making with respect to

whether a particular site will be

economically successful will rest, as it

should, with a launch site operator, who

will have to determine whether the site

possesses sufficient flight corridors for

economic viability.

Accordingly, prior to issuing a license

to operate a launch site at the proposed

location, the FAA will ascertain

whether it is hypothetically possible to

launch at least one type of launch

vehicle on at least one trajectory from

each launch point at the proposed site

while meeting the FAA’s collective risk

criteria. The FAA wants to ensure that

there exists at least one flight corridor

or set of impact dispersion areas from a

proposed launch site that would contain

debris away from population. Launch is

a dangerous activity that the FAA will

allow to occur only when the risk to

people is below an expected casualty

(Ec) of 30 × 10¥6. In other words, if there

are too many people around a launch

site or in a flight corridor the FAA will

not license the site.

All this is not to say that the FAA is

requiring an applicant for a license to

operate a launch site to perform a

complete flight safety analysis for a

particular launch. The FAA recognizes

that an applicant may or may not have

customers or a particular launch vehicle

in mind. Accordingly, the FAA’s launch

site location review methods only

approximate, on the basis of certain

assumptions and recognizing that not all

factors need to be taken into account, a

full flight safety analysis that would

normally be performed for an actual

launch. Of course, if an applicant does

have a customer who satisfies the FAA’s

flight safety criteria for launch and

obtains a license for launch from the

site, that showing would also

demonstrate to the FAA that a launch

may occur safely from the proposed site,

and the FAA could issue a license to

operate the launch site on the basis of

the actual launch proposed.

The launch site location review

applies to both expendable launch

vehicles (ELVs) and reusable launch

vehicles (RLVs). Detailed methodologies

for the launch site location review are

only provided for expendable launch

vehicles with a flight history. The

reusable launch vehicles currently

proposed by industry vary quite a bit.

Accordingly, the FAA considered it

unwise to define a detailed analytical

method for determining the suitability

of a launch site location for RLVs. An

applicant proposing a launch site

limited to the launch of reusable launch

vehicles would still need to define a

flight corridor and conduct a risk

analysis if population were present

within the flight corridor, but the FAA

will review such an analysis on a caseby-case basis, consistent with the

principles discussed in this rulemaking.

Similarly, the FAA has chosen not to

define a detailed analytical method for

determining the suitability of a launch

site location for unproven launch

vehicles. An applicant proposing a

launch site limited to the launch of

unproven launch vehicles would have

to demonstrate to the FAA that the

launch site is safe for the activity

planned.

A launch site location review

provides an applicant with alternative

methods for demonstrating that a

proposed launch site satisfies FAA

safety requirements. Specifically, the

applicant must demonstrate that a flight

corridor or set of impact dispersion

areas exist that do not encompass

populated areas or that do not give rise

to an Ec risk of greater than 30 × 10¥6.

Each proposed launch point must be

evaluated for each type of launch

vehicle, whether expendable orbital,

guided sub-orbital or unguided suborbital, or reusable, that an applicant

proposes would be launched from each

point.

Each of the three methods for

evaluating the acceptability of a launch

site’s location require an applicant to

identify an area, whether a flight

corridor or a set of impact dispersion

areas, emanating from a proposed

launch site. That area identifies the

public that the applicant must analyze

for risk of impact and harm. An

applicant who anticipates customers

who use guided orbital launch vehicles

must define a flight corridor for a class

of vehicles launched from a specific

point along a specified trajectory, that

extends 5,000 nautical miles from the

launch point or until the launch

vehicle’s instantaneous impact point

leaves the Earth’s surface, whichever is

shorter. For guided sub-orbital launch

vehicles, the flight corridor ends at an

impact dispersion area of a final stage.

An applicant must demonstrate either

that there are no populated areas within

the flight corridor or that the risk to any

population in the corridor does not

exceed the FAA’s risk criteria.

Similarly, for the sub-orbital launch of

an unguided vehicle, an applicant must

analyze the risks associated with a

series of impact dispersion areas around

the impact points for spent stages. If

there are people in the dispersion areas,

the applicant must demonstrate that the

expected casualties from stage impacts

do not exceed the FAA’s risk criteria.

Ec, or casualty expectancy, represents

the FAA’s measure of the collective risk

to a population exposed to the launch

of a launch vehicle. The measure

represents the expected average number

of casualties for a specific launch

mission. In other words, if there were

thousands of the same mission

conducted and all the casualties were

added up and the sum divided by the

number of missions, the answer and the

mission’s expected casualty should

statistically be the same. This Ec value

defines the acceptable collective risk

associated with a hypothetical launch

from a launch point at a launch site,

and, as prescribed by the regulations,

shall not exceed an expected average

number of casualties of 0.00003 (30 ×

10¥6) for each launch point at an

applicant’s proposed launch site. This

Ec value defines acceptable collective

risk.

The FAA’s methods for identifying a

flight corridor or impact dispersion

areas distinguish between guided orbital

expendable launch vehicles with a flight

termination system (FTS), guided suborbital expendable launch vehicles with

an FTS, and unguided sub-orbital

expendable launch vehicles without an

FTS.8 For purposes of part 420,

references to a guided expendable

launch vehicle, whether orbital or suborbital, may be taken to mean that the

vehicle has an FTS. References to an

unguided sub-orbital may be understood

to mean that the vehicle does not

possess an FTS.

Part 420 divides guided orbital

expendable launch vehicles into four

classes, with each class defined by its

payload weight capability, as shown in

table 2. Sub-orbital expendable launch

vehicles are not divided into classes by

payload weight, but are categorized as

either guided or unguided. Table 3

shows the payload weight and

corresponding classes of existing orbital

expendable launch vehicles. For a

launch site intended for the use of

orbital launch vehicles, an applicant

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62825

defines a hypothetical flight corridor

from a launch point at the proposed

launch site for the largest launch vehicle

class anticipated’’ which the FAA

anticipates will be based on expected

customers.

TABLE 2.—ORBITAL EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE CLASSES BY PAYLOAD WEIGHT (LBS)

100 nm orbit

Weight class

Small Medium Medium large Large

28 degrees inclination * .................................................................... ≤4400 >4400 to ≤11100 >11100 to

≤18500

>18500

90 degrees inclination ...................................................................... ≤3300 >3300 to ≤8400 >8400 to ≤15000 >15000

* 28 degrees inclination orbit from a launch point at 28 degrees latitude.

TABLE 3.—CLASSIFICATION OF COMMON GUIDED ORBITAL EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES

Vehicle

Payload weight (lbs) Payload weight (lbs)

Class

100 nm Orbit 28° inc. 100 nm Orbit 90° inc.

Conestoga 1229 .......................................................................................... 600 450 Small.

Conestoga 1620 .......................................................................................... 2,250 1,750 Small.

Athena-1 ...................................................................................................... 1,755 1,140 Small.

Athena-2 ...................................................................................................... 4,390 3,290 Small.

Pegasus ....................................................................................................... 700 N/A Small.

Pegasus XL ................................................................................................. 1,015 769 Small.

Scout ........................................................................................................... 560 460 Small.

Taurus ......................................................................................................... 3,100 2,340 Small.

Atlas II ......................................................................................................... 14,500 12,150 Medium/Large.

Atlas IIA ....................................................................................................... 16,050 13,600 Medium/Large.

Atlas IIAS ..................................................................................................... 19,050 16,100 Large.

Atlas IIIA ...................................................................................................... 19,050 15,700 Large.

Atlas IIIB ...................................................................................................... 23,630 20,240 Large.

Atlas V 404 .................................................................................................. 27,550 23,700 Large.

Atlas V 552 .................................................................................................. 44,200 37,400 Large.

Delta 6920 ................................................................................................... 8,780 6,490 Medium.

Delta 7920 ................................................................................................... 11,330 8,590 Medium/Large.

Delta 3 ......................................................................................................... 18,280 14,920 Medium/Large.

Delta 4 M ..................................................................................................... 18,600 15,150 Large.

Delta 4 M (5,4) ............................................................................................ 30,000 23,000 Large.

Delta 4 Heavy .............................................................................................. 56,900 46,000 Large.

Titan II ......................................................................................................... N/A 4,200 Medium.

Titan III ........................................................................................................ 31,200 N/A Large.

Titan IV ........................................................................................................ 47,400 41,000 Large.

Methods for estimating the risk posed

by the operation of a launch site for

guided orbital and sub-orbital

expendable launch vehicles are

presented in appendices A, B and C.

Appendix A contains instructions for

creating a flight corridor for guided

orbital and sub-orbital expendable

launch vehicles. Appendix B provides

an alternative method to appendix A.

Appendix B also instructs an applicant

how to create a flight corridor for guided

expendable launch vehicles, but

provides more detailed calculations to

employ so that, although an appendix B

flight corridor is typically less

conservative than that of appendix A, it

should prove more representative of

actual vehicle behavior. Appendix C

contains the FAA’s method for

applicants to analyze the risk posed by

guided expendable launch vehicles

within a flight corridor created in

accordance with appendix A or B.

Unguided sub-orbital expendable

launch vehicles are presented in

appendix D, which describes how an

applicant should estimate impact

dispersion areas and analyze the risk in

those areas.

Appendix A is less complex, but

generates a larger flight corridor than

the methodology of appendix B. No

local meteorological or vehicle

trajectory data are required to estimate

a flight corridor under appendix A.

Because appendix A provides a more

simple methodology, an applicant may

want to use it as a screening tool. If an

applicant can define a flight corridor for

a single trajectory, using appendix A,

that does not overfly populated areas,

the applicant may satisfy the launch site

location review requirements with the

least effort. If, however, the corridor

includes populated areas, the applicant

may create an appendix B flight corridor

that may be more narrow, or may

conduct a casualty expectancy analysis.

An applicant is not required to try

appendix A before employing appendix

B.

The FAA’s location review reflects a

number of assumptions designed to

keep the review general rather than

oriented toward or addressing a

particular launch. These assumptions

are discussed more fully below, but may

be summarized briefly. The location

reviews for appendices A and B flight

corridors reflect an attempt to ensure

that launch failure debris would be

contained within a safe area. Successful

containment must assume a perfectly

functioning flight termination system. A

perfectly functioning flight termination

system would ensure that any debris

created by a launch failure would be

contained within a flight corridor. When

the high risk event is not launch failure

but launch success, as tends to be the

case with an unguided sub-orbital

expendable launch vehicle that does not

employ an FTS, the FAA still proposes

62826 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

a location review based on an

assumption of containment.

The approaches provided in the four

location review appendices are based on

some common assumptions that reflect

limitations of the launch site location

review analysis. The FAA is not

requiring an applicant to analyze the

risks posed to the public by toxic

materials that might be handled at the

proposed site, nor the risk to ships or

aircraft from launch debris or planned

jettisoning of stages. The FAA

recognizes that these assumptions

represent a limitation in the launch site

location review. The FAA intends that

these three risks will be dealt with

through pre-flight operational controls

and flight commit criteria which are

partially addressed through part 420

coordination requirements and which

also will be identified as part of a

launch license review. All launches that

take place from a U.S. launch site whose

operation is licensed will either be

regulated by the FAA through a launch

license or will be U.S. government

launches that the government carries

out for the government.

The two methods for creating guided

expendable launch vehicle flight

corridors are intended to account for

expendable launch vehicle failure rate,

malfunction turn capability, and the

expendable launch vehicle guidance

accuracy as defined by the impact

dispersions of these vehicles. The

premise undergirding each of these

methods is that debris would be

contained within the defined flight

corridor or impact dispersion areas.

Accordingly, for purposes of a launch

site location review, only the

populations within the defined areas

need to be analyzed for risk. The FAA

recognizes that were a flight termination

system to fail to destroy a vehicle as

intended, a launch vehicle could stray

outside its planned flight corridor. That

concern will be better accommodated

through another forum, namely, the

licensing of a launch operator and the

review of that launch operator’s flight

safety system. Because a containment

analysis only looks at how far debris

would travel in the event an errant

vehicle were destroyed, the containment

analysis has to assume a perfectly

functioning flight termination system. In

other words, for purposes of analyzing

the acceptability of a launch site’s

location for launching guided

expendable launch vehicles, the FAA

will assume that a malfunctioning

vehicle will be destroyed and debris

will always impact within acceptable

boundaries. Accordingly, the FAA does

not propose to explore, for purposes of

determining the acceptability of a

launch site’s location, the possibility

that a vehicle’s flight termination

system may fail and that the vehicle

could continue to travel toward

populated areas. Any proposed site may

present such risks—indeed, any

proposed launch presents such risks—

but they are best addressed in the

context of individual launch systems.

This working assumption of a perfectly

reliable flight termination system will

not, of course, apply to the licensing of

a launch of a launch vehicle. The FAA

will consider the reliability of any

particular launch vehicle’s FTS in the

course of a launch license review. From

a practical standpoint, this means that

for the launch site location review, both

nominal and failure-produced debris

would be contained within a flight

corridor, obviating the need for risk

analyses that address risk outside of a

defined flight corridor or set of impact

dispersion areas.

Additionally, the FAA does not

propose to require an applicant to

analyze separately the risks posed by

the planned impact of normally

jettisoned stages from a guided

expendable launch vehicle, except for

the final stage of a guided sub-orbital

expendable launch vehicle. The FAA

does not consider intermediate stage

impact analysis necessary to assess the

general suitability of a launch point for

guided expendable launch vehicles

because the impact location of stages is

inherently launch vehicle-specific, and

the trajectory and timing for a guided

expendable launch vehicle can normally

be designed so that the risks from

nominally jettisoned stages will be kept

to acceptable levels. A launch license

review will have to ensure that vehicle

stages are not going to impact in densely

populated areas. Risk calculations

performed for launches from federal

launch ranges demonstrate a relatively

low risk posed by controlled disposition

of stages in comparison to the risk posed

by wide-spread dispersion of debris due

to vehicle failure.

Each of the FAA’s approaches to

defining flight corridors or impact

dispersion areas is designed to analyze

the highest risk launch event associated

with a particular vehicle technology.

This is not meant to imply that lower

risk launch events are necessarily

acceptable; only that they will not be

considered in the course of this review.

For a guided orbital expendable launch

vehicle, that event is vehicle failure. For

an unguided sub-orbital expendable

launch vehicle, the launch event of

highest risk is vehicle success, namely,

the predicted impact of stages. For a

guided expendable launch vehicle the

overflight risk, which results from a

vehicle failure followed by its

destruction (assuming no FTS failure),

is the dominant risk. Risks from

nominally jettisoned debris are

subsumed in the overflight risk

assessment. For an unguided sub-orbital

expendable launch vehicle, the FAA

proposes that risk due to stage impact be

analyzed instead of the overflight risk.

This distinction is necessitated by the

fact that the failure rate during thrust is

historically significantly lower for

unguided vehicles than for guided

vehicles. Current unguided expendable

launch vehicles with many years of use

are highly reliable. They do not employ

an FTS; therefore, debris pieces usually

consist of vehicle components that are

not broken up. Another reason for the

difference between analyses is that

unguided vehicle stage impact

dispersions are significantly larger than

guided vehicle impact dispersions.

These differences add up to greater risk

within an unguided expendable launch

vehicle stage impact dispersion area

than the areas outside the dispersion

areas. Therefore, a risk assessment is

only performed on those populations

within an unguided expendable launch

vehicle stage impact dispersion area.

An applicant must define an area

called an overflight exclusion zone

(OEZ) around each launch point, and

the applicant must demonstrate that the

OEZ can be clear of members of the

public during a flight. An OEZ defines

the area where the public risk criteria of

30 ×10¥6 would be exceeded if one

person were present in the open. The

overflight exclusion zone was estimated

from risk computations for each

expendable launch vehicle type and

class. An applicant must define an OEZ

because expendable launch vehicle

range rates are slow in the launch area,

launch vehicle effective casualty areas,

the area within which all casualties are

assumed to occur through exposure to

debris, are large, and impact dispersion

areas are dense with debris so that the

presence of one person inside this

hazardous area is expected to produce

Ec values exceeding the public risk

criteria. Accordingly, an applicant must

either own the property, demonstrate to

the FAA that there are times when

people are not present, or that it could

clear the public from the overflight

exclusion zone prior to flight.

Evacuating an overflight exclusion zone

for an inland site, might, for example,

require an applicant to demonstrate that

agreements have been reached with

local communities to close any public

roads during a launch.

The FAA has made a few changes to

the Launch Site NPRM for this final

rule. First, the launch site location

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62827

review regulatory text has been

expanded to better map out the launch

site location review for both ELVs and

RLVs. The appendices remain

essentially the same.

Second, the size of the flight corridors

that are generated in either appendix A

or B are now assumed in appendix C to

reflect a three-sigma event. The NPRM

had used five-sigma. To review, for

purposes of the launch site location

review, a flight corridor is an area on the

Earth’s surface estimated to contain

debris of a ballistic coefficient of ≥3

pounds per square foot from nominal

and non-nominal flight of a launch

vehicle, assuming a perfectly

functioning flight termination system.

The land encompassed by the flight

corridor includes the population most at

risk due to a launch. The data used to

develop a flight corridor does not

directly provide statistical significance.

However, the relative risk to any

specific populated area can be assumed

to vary proportionally with the

populated area’s distance from the

nominal trajectory ground trace. The

NPRM assumed the boundaries were

five-sigma distances, which proved

unwise because the statistical

probability of an event occurring

between three-sigma and five-sigma is

extremely small. The launch site

location review procedures are not

precise enough for the FAA to claim

that a flight corridor contains all of the

population at risk at such a low

probability level. Assuming that the

distance to the flight corridor boundary

is three-sigma is a more reasonable

assumption.

Third, the multipliers in the launch

site location review have been taken

out. In the Launch Site NPRM, to add

conservatism to the launch site location

review, applicants would multiply the

final Ec value obtained through either

appendix C or appendix D by a

multiplier of two and five, respectively.

This final rule does not make use of

multipliers because the FAA, upon

reconsideration, now believes that the

procedures for estimating risk in

appendices A–D are conservative

enough to not require a multiplier at the

end of the process.

Lastly, the FAA clarified in the

regulatory text that orbital expendable

launch vehicles are classified by weight

class, based on the weight of payload

the launch vehicle can place in a 100-

nm orbit, as defined in table 2.

Discussion of Comments

The FAA received comments on the

launch site location review from ACTA,

Inc; the New Mexico Office for Space

Commercialization; Oklahoma

Aeronautics and Space Commission;

Space Access, LLC; Christopher Shove;

and the Texas Aerospace Commission.

ACTA stated that medium to large

vehicles launched from Cape Canaveral

Air Station (CCAS) do not meet the risk

criteria. ACTA at 1. The FAA disagrees.

Using Appendix B, medium to large

vehicles do pass the launch site location

review.

ACTA stated that unlike under EWR

127–1, the FAA has decided not to

permit any risk above 30×10¥6. This

coupled with a very conservative

approach to risk analysis could prove

detrimental to the U.S. industry. ACTA

at 1. The FAA disagrees. The expected

casualty acceptable risk level, 30×10¥6,

is not new. It is a current requirement

for launches. Second, the very

conservative approach proposed is

conservative because simplifying

assumptions were made. In many

instances the FAA believes that such

approaches adequately demonstrate the

acceptability of the site location without

the added burden of more complex

analysis. It should not prove detrimental

because applicants may do a more

refined, less conservative analysis. To

make this option explicit, sections

420.23 and 420.25, covering the flight

corridor and risk analysis, respectively,

explicitly state that the FAA will

approve an alternate method if an

applicant provides a clear and

convincing demonstration that its

proposed method provides an

equivalent level of safety to that

required in the appendices.

ACTA also states that the risk analysis

methodology presented in the document

is very simplistic. There are better

methods available, albeit more complex,

but the NPRM does not allow for any

other methodology. ACTA

recommended that an applicant be

allowed to use equivalent approved

analysis methods and processes that

have been validated by use at federal

ranges involved in ELV and RLV

activities. ACTA at 2, 6 and 7. The FAA

agrees and has modified the launch site

location review to allow such methods

without a waiver. The analysis

methodology is intended to be

simplistic and conservative. The actual

risks will be less than that estimated by

the methodologies provided. In many

cases, the site applicant may not have

available the inputs necessary to

provide a detailed risk analysis. In

addition, many launch sites are so

remote that they do not need detailed

analyses to show that the risk levels are

acceptable. New under these final rules

is that an applicant has the option of

using higher fidelity methodologies.

ACTA states that the NPRM offers no

insight into the source of numbers, such

as casualty areas, that the FAA directs

the license applicant to use. The

references should be identified. ACTA

at 1. Review of the Launch Site NPRM

shows that the FAA provided its

sources. The NPRM stated, for example,

to address the issues raised, that the

FAA derived the effective casualty areas

in table C–3 from DAMP, a series of risk

estimation computer programs used at

federal launch ranges, to evaluate the

vehicle classes described in table 1,

section 420.21. 64 FR at 34353.

ACTA and ACTA staff raised

concerns regarding issues not addressed

in this rulemaking. ACTA stated that the

NPRM did not address launch-related

risk from potential toxic releases, from

far-field window breakage, or debris risk

to ships and aircraft. ACTA at 1, 2.

ACTA staff added that ignoring the

existence of established major air

corridors or shipping lanes seems

shortsighted. ACTA at 9. The FAA

disagrees. Air corridors and shipping

lanes are not ignored. A launch site

operator must have an agreement in

place with FAA Air Traffic and the

Coast Guard covering those issues

before it will get a license.

The FAA agrees that the issues of

toxicity and windows breaking should

not be ignored for launch safety, and

launch -related risk from potential toxic

releases, from far-field window

breakage, or debris risk to ships and

aircraft are covered in launch license

application reviews. Toxic and blast

risks were not covered in this

rulemaking because launching only

when circumstances such as wind are

favorable can minimize such risks. The

FAA considers these issues better

addressed through the launch license.

Second, debris risk to ships and aircraft

are addressed in these regulations. An

applicant must conclude agreements

with the Coast Guard and the FAA Air

Traffic in order to address ship and

aircraft risk, and a separate rulemaking

addresses these issues with additional

specificity.

ACTA states that the level of analysis

in the NPRM seems to assume that the

applicant will be very naı ̈ve, and not

have access to good tools or consultant

support. ACTA at 2. The FAA disagrees.

Not all applicants are flight safety

specialists. The FAA believes that

providing tools and data to conduct risk

and other analyses is beneficial to the

industry. The proposed appendices take

an applicant step by step through the

process.

ACTA states that the FAA’s lack of

methodology for risk analysis in the

back azimuth direction other than the

62828 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

exclusion zone implies that there is no

back azimuth risk. ACTA at 2. The FAA

does not wish to imply that there is no

back azimuth risk. There is. However, as

noted in the NPRM, the launch site

location review assumes a perfectly

functioning flight safety system.

Therefore, population behind the

launch site is only addressed if it is

within the overflight exclusion zone or

within the flight corridor due to wind

effects. Otherwise back azimuth

population is not reviewed. A launch

license applicant will need to

adequately address all flight risks in

order to receive a license.

ACTA states that the instantaneous

impact point (IIP) rates are

unrealistically low, particularly late in

flight. If only powered flight is

considered, the average IIP rate will

increase. Using a lower IIP rate inflates

the computed risk. ACTA at 2. The FAA

notes that the IIP range rate data was

intended to be conservative but, as

discussed in the NPRM, they are not

unrealistically low. 64 FR at 34342.

ACTA states that the effective

casualty areas seem very high. The

casualty area numbers are a prime

contributor to the unrealistically high

risks computed by these methods.

ACTA at 2. The FAA disagrees that the

casualty area are unrealistically high if

one considers, for each piece of debris,

its size, the path angle of its trajectory,

impact explosions, the size of a person,

and debris skip, splatter, and bounce.

They are also intended to be

conservative. Higher fidelity analyses

will be necessary for the launch license

application. Also, now that the FAA

will permit higher fidelity analyses that

produce an equivalent level of safety,

the FAA finds that the concern is

addressed.

ACTA states that the overflight

exclusion zone (OEZ) is designed to

protect an individual in the public at a

risk level of 30×10¥6 casualties. ACTA

further states that this seems rather

loose, and that the Range Commanders

Council Standard suggests 1×10¥7

fatalities and the Eastern Range (ER) and

Western Range (WR) have used 1×10¥6

casualties as an individual risk limit for

the general public. ACTA at 3. The FAA

disagrees. ACTA misunderstood what

was stated in the NPRM. The NPRM

actually states that an overflight

exclusion zone is the area where the

collective risk to the public would be

greater than 30×10¥6 if one person were

present in the open. 64 FR 34329. The

overflight exclusion zone does not

incorporate an individual risk standard

per se, but is merely an area that must

be clear of population for the collective

risk standard to be met.

ACTA states that if 30×10¥6 was used

as the basis for developing the distance

Dmax, then Dmax appears quite

conservative for that risk level. ACTA at

3. The FAA did not use the criteria of

30×10¥6 as the basis for developing the

distance Dmax. The basis for Dmax is the

estimated maximum distance from a

launch point that debris travels given a

worst-case launch vehicle failure and

flight termination at 10 seconds into

flight.

ACTA also opposed the FAA’s use of

a ballistic coefficient of three. The

NPRM stated that although the FAA

proposes to assume a ballistic

coefficient of three as the smallest piece

of wind sensitive debris hazardous to

the public, ballistic coefficient is not

directly related to fatality criteria based

on the kinetic energy of debris. The

ballistic coefficient of three is related to

a kinetic energy of 58 ft/lbs, which

represents a probability of fatality of 50

percent for a standing person. ACTA

states that historically, the national

ranges have used impact kinetic energy

as a criterion for determining whether

an inert fragment may or may not

produce a casualty. ACTA has been

performing biomechanical simulations,

which are still in progress, to investigate

these criteria in support of the Air Force

federal launch ranges. However, one

conclusion is that impact kinetic energy

by itself is an inadequate predictor of

whether or not an inert impacting

fragment will produce a casualty. ACTA

at 4, 5. The FAA notes that the method

suggested is far too complex for the

scope of this final rule. This final rule

very simply assumes that a hit is a

casualty. Note that the risk criterion is

based on the generation of a casualty not

a fatality.

NMOSC also disagreed with the

FAA’s statement that a ballistic

coefficient of three is related to a kinetic

energy of 58 ft/lbs, which represents a

probability of fatality of 50 percent for

a standing person. NMOSC states that

58 ft–lbs is a better number to use than

11, but asks what is the basis for the

50% lethality claim for 58 ft–lbs and

ballistic coefficient of three.

Furthermore, sheltering should also be

considered. NMOSC at 3.

The basis for the 50% lethality claim

is for a standing person and is found in

the Range Commanders Council (RCC)

Supplement to Standard 321–97,

‘‘Common Risk Criteria for National

Test Ranges, Inert Debris’’, Figure 4–3,

on page 4–5. However, the FAA would

like to modify its statement made in the

NPRM with respect to how ballistic

coefficient relates to kinetic energy and

the 50% lethality claim. Ballistic

coefficient (β) is very difficult to relate

to kinetic energy. (β) is equal to an

object’s weight divided by the product

of the object’s drag coefficient and it’s

projected area and expressed in units of

lbs/ft2. Kinetic energy units are joules or

ft–lbs/sec. Various combinations of

weight, drag coefficient, and projected

area can equate to the same β, but each

combination would produce a different

kinetic energy.

ACTA makes a number of points

about launch corridors. First, ACTA

states that impulsive velocities imparted

to fragments from explosives are ignored

throughout. ACTA at 6. The FAA did

consider whether it was appropriate to

address explicitly impulsive velocities

but decided that the conservatism

incorporated into appendix B obviates

the need for including them in the

appendix B analysis. Additionally, these

analyses are not intended to be high

fidelity analyses or require inputs that a

launch site applicant may not have.

These analyses are believed to be

adequate for most coastal site

applicants. More detailed analysis will

be required from launch operators.

Second, ACTA states that no

justification is given for the use of fivesigma for the launch corridor

boundaries. ACTA at 6. The FAA does

agree that the use of five-sigma to define

the flight corridor boundary was not

appropriate. As noted above, the final

rule assumes the boundaries are threesigma.

Third, ACTA states that there does

not appear to be any real probabilistic

basis for any of the dispersion analyses.

ACTA at 6. ACTA is correct. No attempt

is made to determine the variations of

risk within the corridor. In the

downrange direction, the chance of a

failure is considered equal at any given

point on the flight trajectory. In the

crossrange direction, the chance that

debris will impact any given point

within the flight corridor is based on its

distance from the trajectory ground

trace. Impacting the boundary of the

flight corridor is considered a threesigma event, and all points in between

the trajectory ground trace and the flight

corridor boundary vary linearly from

zero to three-sigma.

Lastly, ACTA notes that in the risk

analysis, the crossrange standard

deviations are used to compute Ec.

Using downrange risk models such as

those found in appendix B, one can

choose to vary the crossrange sigma up

and down and compute the Ec as a

function of sigma. Then a maximum Ec

can be obtained within reasonable limits

of the possible range of the crossrange

sigma. This helps to eliminate the

controversy about the determination of

the width of the corridor. ACTA at 6.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62829

The FAA agrees with ACTA in that the

approach would provide a more

accurate assessment of risk. If an

applicant conducted such an analysis, it

might consider offering the analysis as

demonstrating an equivalent level of

safety. However, the method appears to

require an applicant to make several

launch corridor computations adjusting

the sigma value until an optimum value

is found that produces exactly 30×10¥6

Ec for the enclosed population. The FAA

does not believe this is necessary for

assessing most launch site locations,

and has not adopted the suggested

change. The analyses provided by the

FAA are presented in a fashion that

produces a binary decision. The risk

computations for the populations

enclosed by the corridor will either pass

or fail the Ec criteria. If the resultant Ec

is above the threshold the applicant can

quickly decide if an azimuth or launch

point adjustment will resolve the

problem.

ACTA next states that the equation for

casualty expectancy in appendix C

contains the ratio of the casualty area to

the populated area. This ratio should be

limited to one, to avoid the possibility

of predicting more casualties, given

impact, than the number of people in

the population center. ACTA at 6. The

FAA agrees and the change is reflected

in the appendix.

In the NPRM’s discussion of the

launch site location review, the FAA

notes that for the sub-orbital launch of

an unguided expendable launch vehicle,

an applicant would analyze the risks

associated with a series of impact

dispersion areas around the impact

points for spent stages. ACTA staff

suggests that the FAA should also be

concerned about any population centers

within the three-sigma dispersions

along the entire trajectory, as is done for

orbital launch vehicles. ACTA at 8. As

discussed in the NPRM, the FAA

selected the event of greatest risk for

guided and unguided launch vehicles.

64 FR 34353. For proven unguided

launch vehicles, that risk stems from

success. For purposes of assessing a

launch point, the FAA does not believe

it is necessary to address failures

scenarios for launch points that are

going to support proven unguided

suborbital launch vehicles. Malfunction

scenarios are discounted due to the very

low probability of failure in proven

unguided suborbital launch vehicles.

An unguided suborbital launch vehicle

will fly a wind-weighted trajectory in

most cases. The impact dispersion areas

for the rocket’s stages account for the

impact points within three-sigma

probability of occurrence given the

rocket does not experience a

malfunction. If a launch point is to be

used solely for unproven unguided

suborbital launch vehicles, then an

applicant must look at failure scenarios.

ACTA staff also believes the FAA

should establish criteria for individual

risk because it is a significant

consideration needed to adequately

provide protection for the public. ACTA

at 9. The FAA does not disagree, and

may revise its launch site regulations in

the future. At this time, however, the

FAA has decided to cover individual

risk issues through a launch license, and

has determined that the OEZ and other

requirements are suitable for making a

decision on the suitability of a launch

site.

In the NPRM, in justifying the fact

that stage impact is not assessed during

the launch site location review for

orbital launch vehicles, the FAA stated

that risk calculations performed for

launches from federal launch ranges

demonstrate a relatively low risk posed

by controlled disposition of stages in

comparison to the risk posed by widespread dispersion of debris due to

vehicle failure. ACTA suggests that this

statement be tempered because risks

posed by normally jettisoned Delta 2

GEMS are a significant element of

concern from VAFB. ACTA at 9.

The FAA does not wish to imply that

stage disposition is of no concern. Stage

disposition is a critical safety issue and

will be covered in launch license

applications. However, because the

location of drop zones is different for

every launch vehicle, and because the

launch site location review is not meant

to assess specific launch vehicles, the

FAA has designed the launch site

location so that a launch site that does

not have safe areas to dispose of stages

will not likely pass the launch site

location review. Significant population

within the flight corridor, particularly

near the flight trajectory ground trace,

would raise the estimated Ec above the

acceptable limit.

ACTA staff had a few comments on

definitions. First, the NPRM defined

‘‘flight corridor’’ as an area on the

Earth’s surface estimated to contain the

majority of hazardous debris from

nominal and non-nominal flight of an

orbital or guided suborbital launch

vehicle.’’ ACTA staff asked what about

the other potential 49% of the debris?

ACTA at 9. The FAA agrees that the

definition should not have used the

term ‘‘majority’’ and the word

‘‘majority’’ has been removed from the

definition.

Second, the NPRM defined

‘‘instantaneous impact point (IIP)’’ as an

impact point, following thrust

termination of a launch vehicle,

calculated in the absence of atmospheric

drag effects.’’ The definition should

acknowledge that several forms of IIP

calculations are possible. IIPs can be

calculated based on vacuum, drag or

oblateness corrections depending on the

application. ACTA at 9, 10. The FAA

agrees. The definition no longer states

that it must be calculated in the absence

of atmospheric drag effects. However,

for purposes of part 420, IIP is

calculated in the absence of atmospheric

drag.

ACTA staff next commented on

proposed section 420.15(b), in which

the proposed rule stated ‘‘For launch

sites analyzed for expendable launch

vehicles, an applicant shall provide

each month and any percent wind data

used in the analysis.’’ ACTA at 10. For

percent wind data, ACTA suggests use

of mean winds. ACTA also suggests the

use of a wind covariance matrix. Mean

winds are called out in the launch site

location review. An applicant should be

able to use worse winds, e.g. threesigma winds, if it desires. ACTA at 10.

The FAA does not believe a statistical

analysis of winds such as using a wind

covariance matrix is necessary to assess

a launch point. Wind covariance

matrices are also not readily available

from the suggested wind data source, so

therefore the FAA will not incorporate

the suggested changes.

Proposed section 420.23 stated that

the FAA will evaluate the adequacy of

a launch site location for unproven

launch vehicles including all new

launch vehicles, whether expendable or

reusable, on a case-by-case basis. ACTA

requested additional criteria. ACTA at

10. The FAA will rely on the goal of the

launch site location review—to show

that a launch vehicle can be launched

safety from a given launch point.

Unproven launch vehicles must be

looked at carefully due to their

inherently high probability of failure.

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed an

overflight exclusion zone (OEZ) that an

applicant must demonstrate is either

unpopulated, is uninhabited at certain

times, or from which the public can be

excluded during launch. ACTA staff

notes that using this overly conservative

approach to risk analysis would likely

prevent X–33 launches from the Air

Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC).

ACTA at 11. Similarly, NMOSC states

that the requirement for, and

specifications of, an OEZ should depend

on the vehicle’s reliability and whether

it has multiple stages. NMOSC suggests

that it not be required for a highly

reliable, non-staging RLV. NMOSC at 3.

The FAA agrees in part with ACTA and

NMOSC. The size or existence of an

OEZ for a reliable non-staging RLV,

62830 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

depends on whether any area exists

around the launch point where the Ec

risk is equal to or greater than 30 × 10¥6,

if one member of the public is inside.

An overflight exclusion zone may or

may not apply to an RLV, depending on

the circumstances of a particular case

analyzed. The approval of a flight

corridor for an RLV, such as the X–33,

would be handled on a case-by-case

basis.

ACTA staff noted that the appendix A

launch area is based on a Delta II. ACTA

states that this has several shortcomings

because the families of launch vehicles

based on Castor-120 SRMs, such as

Athena and Taurus, are more

representative of those likely to be

launched from a non-federal launch site.

ACTA at 11. The FAA notes that an

appendix A launch area is large enough

to encompass launch vehicles based on

Castor-120 SRMs. Although turning

rates for the Athena and Taurus may be

higher than Delta II, this is not critical

for the appendix A flight corridor lines

because appendix A can accommodate

the Athena and Taurus turns.

ACTA states that in the launch area,

ignoring the IIP displacement caused by

a vehicle’s malfunction turn rates until

50,000 ft. seems unwise based on the

turning potential of most ELVs,

especially the Athena and Taurus.

ACTA at 11. The debris dispersion

radius accounts for a number of failure

scenarios, including the IIP

displacement caused by a vehicle’s

malfunction turn rate. The debris

dispersion radius is the estimated

maximum distance from a launch point

that debris travels given a worst-case

launch vehicle failure and flight

termination at 10 seconds into flight.

Other than the debris dispersion

radius, ACTA is correct in that

malfunction turns and trajectory

dispersions are not explicitly accounted

for in the launch area computations.

The FAA does not believe this is

necessary to assess the viability of a

launch point. In the launch area, winds

are the dominant dispersion effect for

low-β debris pieces, accounting for up

to 70% of the total launch area

dispersion effect. Conservative

assumptions in the appendix B method

adequately cover the remaining

percentage contributions to the overall

impact dispersion.

ACTA staff suggests that in the launch

area, the FAA should better

communicate that the 10 and 100 mile

limits are based on IIP and not on

present position. ACTA at 11. The FAA

agrees and has modified appendices A

and B accordingly.

ACTA staff notes that for the launch

and downrange areas, an applicant is to

compute Pi for each populated area

using the following equation:

P

y y y y y y

i

yy y y =

 −











⋅

−































+ ⋅

−

 +











































+

−





















































2 1

1

2 1 2

2

2

2

6 2 2

4

2

2 2

σ

π

σ σσ

exp exp exp 





⋅ ⋅

 ( ) −



 



 P

C

x x

R

f 2 1

 ̇

ACTA suggests that this be replaced

by the normal integral with a single

footnote saying that it can be

approximated using Simpson’s rule.

ACTA at 11. The FAA agrees that there

are other ways to approximate the

normal integral that are just as accurate

as Simpson’s rule. An applicant is not

precluded from using other ways of

computing the normal integral.

Space Access LLC also had a number

of comments on the launch site location

review. First, Space Access found the

proposed rule difficult to accept in two

areas. First, flight Ec issues should be

outside the scope of site licensing and

all flight-related and mission-based

calculations are the responsibility of the

launch operator. Providing several

methods to simplify Ec is confusing,

conflicting with other published

guidance, and could be considered

precedent setting. Space Access at 2.

Much of what Space Access suggests is

already reflected in the final rule. For

individual launches, all flight-related

and mission-based calculations are part

of a launch operator license. The launch

site location review is intended,

however, to ensure that the FAA does

not issue a license that cannot support

the launch vehicles intended for launch

from the launch site. Providing several

methods to simplify Ec is meant to

provide flexibility to applicants. Lastly,

review of the appendices unearthed no

conflicts with other published guidance.

Second, Space Access believes the

proposed rule effectively precludes

approval of any new commercial launch

sites, because under appendix A and C,

Cape Canaveral would be disapproved

as a launch site for Delta, Atlas, and

Titan vehicles if it were not on federal

property. Space Access at 4. The FAA

disagrees. Cape Canaveral would fail the

proposed appendix A analysis but

would not fail the proposed analysis

under appendix B and C. The simplicity

of appendix A is designed for launch

sites that are in remote locations. Cape

Canaveral is not a remote site.

Space Access adds that appendix B

and C would not help the shortcomings

of appendix A because this method uses

the same casualty area numbers, which

are the significant driver in the

calculations. Space Access also

comments that the casualty area

provided in Table C–3 is too large and

appendix C provided data would appear

to be excessively conservative and

overwhelms all other calculations.

Space Access at 4. In response, the

casualty area numbers are indeed

conservative, but not excessively so. An

applicant is also permitted to utilize a

more refined analysis and provide a

clear and convincing demonstration that

its proposed method provides an

equivalent level of safety to that

provided in the appendices.

Similarly, Space Access states that

appendix C may only allow the

approval of small launch vehicles. This

will encourage more launches of small

payloads and therefore increase overall

risk to the public by exposing the public

to a large number of launches. A

normalized risk evaluation, such as risk

per pound of payload, minimizes total

risk and should be considered in any

risk methodology. Space Access at 5.

The FAA disagrees that the proposed

appendix C allows only for the approval

of small launch vehicles. Space Access

offers no support for this argument.

Space Access further states that the

impact of appendix C is that potential

launch site operators will fail to get

sufficient local and state support,

financial and legislative inputs, to work

through issues with the FAA and

potential launch operators. The

enforcement of these proposed rules at

this time would negatively affect the

development of new safe launch sites

for all classes of launch vehicles. Space

Access at 5. The Texas Aerospace

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62831

Commission stated that the proposed

rules preclude approval of any new

launch sites, which are not already on

federal launch ranges. These proposed

rules would stop the progress being

made in Texas and other states to secure

investments and commitments for the

development of safe, efficient and

modern commercial spaceports. Texas

Aerospace Commission at 1. Because

Space Access and Texas Aerospace

Commission do not offer evidence in

support of their concerns, the FAA will

continue to rely on the reasons it gave

in the NPRM. The launch site location

review is designed to avoid licensing

the operation of a launch site that

cannot safely support a launch. The

launch site location review should not

preclude the licensing of any launch site

that can safely support launches.

Space Access suggests that the FAA

delete all Ec calculations from the

proposed rule for site operators. It

comments that the appendix A and C

methodology appears to be extremely

inaccurate, the appendix B and C

methodology lacks the fidelity required

for use by launch operators for

licensing, and actual vehicle Ec data is

the only valid method. Space Access at

5. The Texas Aerospace Commission

recommends the FAA consult with the

RLV developers and proposed launch

site operators/developers to establish a

safe, less conservative, and simple

method of calculating Ec. Texas

Aerospace at 1. The FAA disagrees,

noting that the appendices are designed

to offer flexibility in ascertaining

whether a site is acceptable. The FAA

has determined that a review of a

launch site location is a necessary

component of any license application

process. Moreover, an applicant is not

tied to the appendices. For expendable

launch vehicles, the FAA will accept

other analyses that provides a clear and

convincing demonstration that an

applicant’s proposed method provides

an equivalent level of safety to that

provided by the appendices. For

reusable launch vehicles, an applicant

defines a flight corridor that contains

the hazardous debris from nominal and

non-nominal flight of a reusable launch

vehicle. The applicant must provide a

clear and convincing demonstration of

the validity of its flight corridor.

Space Access states that the launch

point, debris dispersion area, and

overflight exclusion zone definition and

descriptions are of specific concern to a

site operator and should be formalized.

This guidance will directly benefit

potential site operators by providing

clear planning and procedures to use for

proper land acquisition and site

development work. Space Access at 5.

In response, the FAA agrees that

providing clear planning and

procedures to use for proper land

acquisition and site development work

is important. The primary purpose of

the launch site location review is to

avoid the development of launch sites

that can never support launches due to

the proximity of population. Note that

the debris dispersion area and overflight

exclusion zones are only used to assess

the adequacy of a launch point to

support launches. The actual hazards

areas for specific launch vehicles will be

determined in the launch license

process.

Space Access states that the FAA

should delete the discussion of launch

area and downrange area from the

proposed rule. According to Space

Access, these areas should not be of

concern to a site operator because a site

operator has little or no legal control,

liability or responsibility in these

areas—the launch operator does.

Possible demarcation of responsible

areas for a site operator is when a

launch vehicle enters into international

airspace (100 km or 300,000 feet or the

crossing of a vehicle into airspace above

international waters). Another possible

definition is when takeoff or liftoff

occurs. Space Access at 6.

The FAA agrees that a launch

operator is responsible for the safety of

a launch. However, the purpose of the

launch site location review is to assess

the safety of the launch point, not the

policies and procedures of a specific

launch operator, and these regulations

place certain responsibilities upon a

launch site operator. To adequately

assess the safety of a launch point, one

must look at more than just the local

population. Downrange activities must

be considered in evaluating the

acceptability of the launch location,

therefore launch area and downrange

area requirements remain in the final

rule.

Space Access believes that current

reliability data for probability of failure

(Pf) should be used for the specific

vehicle or class of launch vehicles

under consideration. Space Access at 6.

The FAA would like to point out that

an applicant may use probability values

that reflect the type of launch vehicle it

intends on launching from the launch

point. The value must be reasonable. A

good value should have a 95%

confidence that the actual Pf is equal to

or less than the value used.

Space Access believes that all

commercial launches should be treated

equally from any location. The FAA

should not exempt commercial site

operators from these rules at federal

ranges. No benefits are provided by a

federal launch range exemption to these

rules. The perception by new

commercial launch operators and new

commercial site operators is they are

being held to a higher standard. Space

Access at 7; see also Texas Aerospace at

1 (all commercial launches should be

treated equally from any location). In

response, commercial site applicants at

federal ranges are not exempted from all

requirements of the final rule. If a

launch point has already supported a

launch of a particular class of launch

vehicle, there is no reason for an

applicant to repeat a demonstration

already made.

Space Access recommends the FAA

provide proposed universal rules

applicable to all launch sites, i.e. for

RLVs and ELVs, as soon as possible

instead of making rules applicable only

to ELVs. Space Access at 7. Similarly,

NMOSC believes that since the focus of

the launch site location review is

expendable launch vehicles, the FAA

does not see RLVs as credible launch

vehicles. NMOSC at 2. In response, the

basic public safety goals are the same for

ELVs, RLVs, and reentry vehicles. In

other words, the level of safety that is

required by the FAA is universal.

However, the means to achieve public

safety with an RLV mission may be

different from an ELV mission. The

credibility of RLV’s is not at issue here.

The reason the FAA has well defined

methods of assessing a launch site for

expendable launch vehicles is because

40 years of empirical data exists to

define such methods.

Space Access lastly states that the

unproven vehicle exclusion is

unjustified. The FAA should provide a

clear definition of unproven vehicles.

Space Access at 7. The FAA has asked

the RLV industry for suggestions on

what definition they might suggest.

Space Access does not provide a

suggestion. There are a number of

factors that the FAA has considered in

whether to provide a precise definition

to the term ‘‘unproven.’’ NASA, for

example, does not consider a vehicle’s

demonstrated reliability adequate for

placing a NASA payload on the vehicle,

unless the vehicle has flown at least 14

times. Another approach might be to

examine the flight history as an

‘‘unproven’’ vehicle and determine that

statistical point in which the probability

of catastrophic failure can be shown to

be equal to or less than some number at

the 95% confidence level. Historically,

the flights of new vehicles have

demonstrated failure rates much higher

than design analyses indicated. The data

presented for use in the final rule is

specifically based on mature vehicles.

For these reasons and its concern for

62832 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

public safety, the FAA will address

unproven vehicles on a case-by-case

basis based on the facts available.

NMOSC also had many comments on

the launch site location review. First, for

the most part, NMOSC states that the

draft requirements do not adequately

address the launch of RLVs or unproven

vehicles, and is concerned that an

operator could spend a lot of money and

time preparing an application, only to

find that the application is incomplete

or the site unacceptable. The FAA

should provide more in the way of

guidelines for RLV-only sites. NMOSC

at 1.

The FAA disagrees that an RLV

operator has to guess what the FAA will

look for in a license application. The

FAA’s flight safety goals are clear—the

risk to the public must be at an

acceptable level, that is, an expected

casualty of less than or equal to 30 ×

10¥6. What is acceptable for RLVs is

described in the rule concerning

reentry. 65 FR 56617.

The flight safety approach for RLVs

and ELVs are different, so naturally a

launch point suitable for a RLV may not

be suitable for an ELV. The reason the

FAA has articulated clear methods of

assessing a launch site for ELVs is

because 40 years of empirical data exists

to promulgate such methods.

In the NPRM, the FAA stated that

references to a guided launch vehicle,

whether orbital or sub-orbital, may be

taken to mean that the vehicle has an

FTS. References to an unguided suborbital could be understood to mean

that the vehicle does not possess an

FTS. NMOSC believes that this does not

accommodate RLVs very well. NMOSC

at 2. In response, the FAA did not mean

to imply that RLV’s would have to have

an FTS. This applies only to guided

ELV’s. The final rule has been modified

to clarify this point.

In the NPRM, the FAA stated, as an

example, that because a launch licensee

will need to assure the adequacy of

ground tracking, approval of ground

tracking systems will be handled in the

launch license process even if a launch

site operator provides the service.

NMOSC asks what about tracking from

space? NMOSC at 2. Tracking systems

were not a subject of the NPRM. The

FAA was only pointing out that flight

safety services such as tracking will be

assessed for a launch license, not for a

launch site operator license. No

implication was intended about how

tracking is accomplished.

In the NPRM, the FAA states that for

the ‘‘semi-automated method’’ of

plotting on maps, the ‘‘Mercator’’ and

‘‘Oblique Mercator’’ are adequate

cylindrical projections, the ‘‘LambertConformal’’ and ‘‘Albers Equal-Area’’

are adequate conic projections, and the

‘‘Lambert Azimuthal Equal-Area’’ and

‘‘Azimuthal Equidistant’’ are adequate

plane projections. An applicant may use

other maps, but the applicant would be

required to demonstrate an equivalent

level of accuracy over the required

distances. NMOSC suggest the FAA

provide clarification on ‘‘equivalent

level of accuracy over the required

distances.’’ NMOSC at 2.

As noted in the NPRM, all map

projections have inherent distortions.

The distortions are virtually

unavoidable and are directly related to

the techniques for displaying latitude

and longitude lines on a flat surface

area. The flight corridor methods are

primarily sensitive to azimuthal

direction and geodetic length of the

flight corridor line segments. The

launch site location review methods

require an applicant to use cylindrical,

conic, and plane map projections

because they produce only small error

with straight-line measurements.

Therefore, ‘‘equivalency’’ would be

based on how well the applicantproposed map projection preserves the

accuracy of scale and direction.

NMOSC suggests the FAA provide

corridor standards for vehicles that do

not employ destructive termination.

NMOSC at 3. The FAA disagrees. A

flight corridor is a means of defining the

population that is at risk due to a

launch. Destructive flight termination is

not specifically ingrained in the

standard provided. The appendices

provided corridor standards for ELV’s

because reliable flight termination

systems allow one to determine the

worse-case reach of debris due to a

failure. Corridors for RLV’s are not as

straightforward, and are dependent on

the technology involved. That is why

the FAA has opted for a case-by-case

approach. What is of interest are all

failures that could lead to exposure of

the uninvolved public. Note that a final

rule has been published with standards

for the operation of RLVs and reentry

vehicles. 65 FR 56617.

NMOSC notes that failure probability

is a big issue for both this and the RLV

NPRM, suggesting that ninety percent

(90%) reliability is way too low for an

RLV. For purposes of site licensing,

NMOSC suggests no lower than ninety

nine percent (99%) reliability be

assumed for the analyses; this is the

proven reliability of the Space Shuttle.

NMOSC at 3. The FAA disagrees. There

are accepted ways to estimating the

design reliability of a vehicle and for

proving what the reliability is.

Unfortunately, historically, design

reliability has never been achieved

during the first flights of any new

vehicle. Proof comes only through

verification and validation with

empirical flight data. There is no basis

for the statement that 90% is too low for

an RLV. This number may be well

below intended design reliability, but

99% reliability has never been shown

for any new RLV. The Shuttle’s historic

data does not support a value of 99% at

any reasonable confidence level. At a

95% confidence level, the shuttle’s

demonstrated reliability is only about

97%. In any case, RLV flight safety

standards are covered in the final rule

for RLVs and reentry operations. 65 FR

56617.

Christopher Shove, Ph.D., Senior

Consultant, Space Data Systems, Inc,

states that for some launch vehicles, the

proposed failure rate of 10% is five

times greater than those vehicles’

historical failure rate. The FAA should

use actual failure rates and double them

for conservatism. The proposed constant

failure rate creates an unfair playing

field among different vehicle types by

lumping them into one category. Shove

at 2. The FAA disagrees that for some

launch vehicles, the proposed failure

rate of 10% is five times greater than

those vehicles’ historical failure rate. No

vehicle has a failure rate of 2% at any

reasonable confidence level. The failure

rate of 10% was chosen to find an

acceptably conservative value while not

overly penalizing seasoned launch

vehicles. The seasoned launch vehicles

currently have failure rates ranging from

2.5% for Ariane to 6.4% for Proton.

Doubling any failure rate exceeding 5%

would burden the industry by adding

unnecessary conservatism at a 95%

confidence level.

In the NPRM, after an applicant has

computed casualty expectancy for a

flight corridor, the proposed regulations

required that it be multiplied by a safety

factor of two. NMOSC suggested that the

FAA eliminate the safety factor and set

the standard at 15 × 10¥6. NMOSC at 3.

As noted above in the summary section,

the multiplier has been taken out in the

final rule.

NMOSC states that appendix C seems

to favor coastal sites because appendix

C provides the option for an applicant

to further simplify the estimation of

casualty expectancy by making worstcase assumptions that would produce a

higher value of the corridor EC

compared with the analysis defined in

appendix C, subparagraphs (c)(1)–(8).

NMOSC at 3. The FAA disagrees. The

simplifying options in the appendices

were directed at launch sites that are

remote enough that they pass a test that

is simple but extremely conservative.

This does not preclude other launch

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62833

sites. The FAA’s concern is that it be

demonstrated that operations can be

conducted safely from the site. If

circumstances are such that it is easier

for one site to make this demonstration

than another, so be it.

Lastly, NMOSC commented on the

proposed requirement that at least two

days prior to flight of a launch vehicle,

the licensee shall notify local officials

and all owners of land adjacent to the

launch site of the flight schedule. This

should not be required for highly

reliable, non-staging RLVs. If it is, what

methods of notification are acceptable?

NMOSC at 3. In response, when RLV’s

begin to have routine operations that

make this requirement unworkable, the

FAA will reevaluate the requirement.

The intent will remain unchanged,

however, which is to ensure that the

local community has reasonable notice

of upcoming launch activity to make

any necessary preparations.

Mr. Shove noted that the FAA states

that the proposed rule would allow the

FAA to disapprove any launch site

request because the applicant could not

prove it is safe, which proof, according

to scientific method, is impossible.

Shove at 1. The FAA disagrees. Launch

activities take place today from sites

that clearly meet these standards. The

final rule articulates an objective

standard that is quite possible to

demonstrate. The FAA is not free to

arbitrarily turn down a launch site

application. The potential operators of a

launch site must demonstrate that

operations can be safely conducted from

the site. It the applicant can not, then

the FAA will not issue a license.

He also questioned whether the FAA

definition of sub-orbital launch vehicle

would include the vehicles used in

programs such as ‘‘Rockets for Schools,’’

and thus require those states, schools,

and launch areas to apply for a launch

site operator license. Shove at 2. Such

sites would not. If a launch meets the

definition of amateur rocket activity, no

launch license is required. Similarly,

launch sites that support such vehicles

do not require a license.

Mr. Shove also states that the U.S.

Census Bureau’s TIGER files provide the

data to create census block polygons.

The FAA should allow the use of such

data to calculate populated areas, so that

greater accuracy can be obtained.

Calculating populated areas by block

groups may give an inaccurately high

population estimate to the detriment of

what could be a safe launch area and

flight trajectory. Shove at 2.

The FAA would like to stress that an

applicant is always free to use a more

accurate method. The method in the

NPRM requires that population be at

least at a census block group level. It

does not preclude more accurate data.

The launch site location review is

written so that census block groups are

the largest size populated area allowed.

An applicant may certainly use census

block polygons, which are smaller and

therefore allow for a higher fidelity

analysis.

Lastly, Mr. Shove commented on the

appendix B requirement that an

applicant obtain the launch point

geodetic latitude on the WGS–84

ellipsoidal Earth model. An applicant

may do this using the Global Positioning

System. His question is whether this

means the single receiver accuracy of

±100 meters, differential GPS with two

receiver accuracy of less than a meter,

or differential GPS using a base station

and a receiver accuracy of ±10 cm?

Shove at 2.

The launch site location review

requires the launch area map scale to be

‘‘not less than 1:250,000 inches per

inch.’’ An applicant is required to show

that the measurement instruments

provide the required accuracy. Latitude

and longitude can be mechanically

measured to four decimal point

accuracy on that scale map. Four

decimal point accuracy in degrees

latitude/longitude at the equator is

approximately 36 feet [11 meters].

The Oklahoma Aeronautics and Space

Commission (OASC) had one comment

on the launch site location review. It

requests clarification on what

constitutes sounding rockets. There is

great variance in the capability of

sounding rockets and the altitudes they

reach. OASC recommends classification

based on altitude and propellant

utilized. Oklahoma Aeronautics and

Space Commission at 1.

A sounding rocket is a common term

for suborbital launch vehicles. These

final rules adopted today do not use that

term. However, suborbital launch

vehicles are defined, and mean exactly

what their name implies—launch

vehicles that do not obtain orbital

velocity. The FAA used altitude in the

NPRM to classify sounding rockets, but

not propellant. The type of propellant

used by a sounding rocket was not used

as a factor because it is not an important

consideration for purposes of the launch

site location review.

Don A. Nelson commented that the

proposed rules do not specifically

address the flight testing of launch

vehicles from a proposed launch site.

He believed that the FAA must establish

an experimental flight-testing category

for flights from launch sites under FAA

jurisdiction. Anything less would

subject the public to very high risks.

This is because, historically, all launch

vehicles during the flight test period

have experienced catastrophic in-flight

failures. This unacceptable failure rate

requires that all population, including

ground and air traffic, be removed from

the areas defined by the instantaneous

impact points of the nominal and worstcase dispersed trajectories of the flight

test vehicle. The flight test corridor

must be free of all-high value property

and hazardous storage areas. White

Sands Missile Range (WSMR) has set

the standard for testing experimental

launch vehicles within the continental

United States. WSMR requires

population be removed from the test

range, and all ground and air traffic in

the test range is prohibited during the

flight test. Don A. Nelson at 1.

The FAA agrees that the flight safety

issues of an unproven vehicle are valid

concerns and addresses the issue in the

rulemaking governing reentry. 65 FR

56617. Note that the FAA’s intent is to

ensure that all operations conducted on

a launch site are done so in a manner

that protects public health and safety

and safety of property. The FAA does

not intend to allow experimental flight

testing under any circumstance which

places the public at greater risk. This

may mean that the proposed operations

are restricted or limited in scope in

order to ensure public safety is

achieved. These issues will be covered

in a launch license application review

process.

Kistler Aerospace Corporation

commented that treating RLV’s on a

case-by-case manner is the proper

approach and fully justified in light of

the new capabilities and operational

concepts that will be brought to the

industry by reusable launch systems.

Kistler at 1.

G. License Conditions

Subpart C contains standard terms

and conditions of a license. It covers

such items as the need for a licensee to

operate a launch site in accordance with

the representations contained in its

license application, the duration of a

license, transfer of a license, license

modification, and compliance

monitoring.

A license may also contain conditions

flowing from the various reviews

conducted during the application

process. For example, a license granted

following approval of a launch site

location is limited to the launch points

analyzed, and the type and class of

launch vehicle used in the

demonstration of site location safety. An

applicant may choose to analyze all

three types of launch vehicles in its

application. An FAA launch site

operator license authorizing the

62834 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

operation of a launch site for launch of

an orbital expendable launch vehicle

allows the launch of vehicles from the

site that were less than or equal to the

class of launch vehicle, based on

payload weight, used to demonstrate the

safety of the site location. If a licensee

later wanted to offer the launch site for

the launch of a larger class of vehicles

or a different type of launch vehicle,

such as an unguided sub-orbital launch

vehicle, the licensee would be required

to request a license modification and

demonstrate that the larger vehicle or

different type of vehicle could be safely

launched from the launch site.

Likewise, the addition of a new launch

point would require a license

modification. The demonstration would

be based on the same kinds of analyses

used for the original license. In some

cases, a licensee might be able to use the

safety analyses performed by a launch

operator to meet location review

requirements.

Discussion of Comments

The agency did not receive any

specific comments on the conditions of

a license but one change was made in

this area between the final rule and the

Launch Site NPRM. The section on

license modifications has been changed

to clarify that changes in operations

require prior approval of the FAA

H. Operational Responsibilities

The FAA is imposing certain

operational responsibilities on an

operator of a launch site. In addition,

the FAA distinguishes between

activities covered by a license to operate

a launch site and those covered by a

launch license. Any activity that will be

approved as part of a launch license will

not be covered in a launch site operator

license even if the launch site operator

provides the service. For example,

because a launch licensee will need to

ensure the adequacy of ground tracking,

approval of ground tracking systems

will be handled in the launch license

process even if a launch site operator

provides the service. Similarly, in the

case of ground safety, a launch site

operator may provide fueling for a

launch licensee, but safe procedures for

fueling will be addressed in the launch

license.

The operational requirements being

adopted for the operator of a launch site

addresses control of public access,

scheduling of operations at the site,

notifications, recordkeeping, launch site

accident response and investigation,

and explosive safety. A launch site

operator licensee is required to control

access to the site. Security guards,

fences, or other physical barriers may be

used. Anyone entering the site must, on

first entry, be informed of the site’s

safety and emergency response

procedures. Alarms or other warning

signals are required to alert persons on

the launch site of any emergency that

might occur when they are on site. If a

launch site licensee has multiple launch

customers on site at one time, the

licensee must have procedures for

scheduling their operations so that the

activities of one customer do not create

hazards for others.

An operator of a launch site has

responsibilities regarding explosives,

specifically, those dealing with

lightning and electric power lines.

The launch site operator is

responsible for all initial coordination

with the appropriate FAA regional

office having jurisdiction over the

airspace where launches will take place

as well as the U.S. Coast Guard. The

FAA’s Air Traffic Service and, if

applicable the Coast Guard, issues

Notices to Airmen and Mariners,

respectively, to ensure that they avoid

hazardous areas. An FAA Air Route

Traffic Control Center also closes

airways during a launch window, if

necessary. A launch site operator is

required to obtain an agreement

regarding procedures for coordinating

contacts with these agencies for

launches from the site. The requirement

for coordinating with the Coast Guard

might not, of course, always be

applicable, for example, for an inland

launch site.

The regulatory text has been changed

from the Launch Site NPRM to clarify

that the Coast Guard and FAA

agreements must be completed during

the application process, and must be

complied with during the term of the

license.

A launch site operator licensee must

also notify local officials with an

interest in the launch. These include

officials with responsibilities that might

be called into play by a launch mishap,

such as fire and emergency response

personnel.

A launch site operator is required to

develop and implement a launch site

accident investigation plan containing

procedures for investigating and

reporting a launch site accident. This

extends similar reporting, investigation

and response procedures currently

applicable to launch related accidents

and incidents to accidents occurring

during ground activities at a launch site.

The FAA did not propose the

definition of mishap in the Launch Site

NPRM. The definition that currently

exists in section 401.5 was modified to

include launch site accidents.

Of more significance, the accident

investigation plan section has been

modified to require a licensee to

participate in an investigation of a

launch accident for launches launched

from the launch site, and to cooperate

with FAA or National Transportation

Safety Board (NTSB) investigations of a

launch accident for launches launched

from the launch site. This was added

because launch mishaps may have a

connection with the launch site.

Discussion of Comments

In the NPRM, the FAA stated that a

launch site operator is responsible for

ground and flight safety under its FAA

license, and that the FAA would revisit

ground safety issues in its development

of rules for launches from non-federal

launch sites. ACTA staff noted that

ground safety issues are equally critical

to this rule because it requires an

explosive site plan. ACTA at 8. The New

Mexico Office for Space

Commercialization (NMOSC) suggested

that it should be a site operator’s

responsibility to ensure that procedures

are in place to preclude human error

accidents involving explosive materials

and static discharge events. NMOSC at

1.

The FAA disagrees. Most ground

safety issues are directly related to

operations of a launch operator, not

those of a launch site operator.

Requirements addressing ground safety

procedures are more appropriate

requirements for launch operators, since

launch operators conduct these types of

hazardous operations. Most other risks

and phenomena associated with preflight operations are typically mitigated

by restrictions on the operations. That

said, however, nothing precludes a

launch site operator from imposing

additional requirements on customers

on the facility as long as those

requirements do not violate FAA

requirements or other laws.

NMOSC made the point that ground

safety issues would be better left to

other agencies such as OSHA, ATF, and

state licensing organizations. Vast

quantities of liquid oxygen (LO2), liquid

hydrogen (LH2), and nitrogen tetroxide

(N2O4), and other materials are shipped

and used in interstate commerce. Why

single out the launch industry for

special regulations? NMOSC at 1. The

FAA agrees in principal, and has

attempted to only add requirements

where those other agency regulations do

not apply.

LMC had comments concerning

whether the proposed requirements

might affect launch operators

performing services at commercial

launch sites, and whether the

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62835

requirements are consistent with ground

and flight safety requirements imposed

on launch operators by DOD and NASA

at federal launch ranges. The Air Force

tailors the standards set forth in EWR

127–1 to each operator prior to such

operator entering the federal range for

the purposes of conducting launch

activities. LMC strongly recommends

that the FAA, like the Air Force, employ

a case-by-case tailoring of the standards.

NMOSC at 2.

In response, the FAA has two

comments. First, requirements for

launch operators are covered in a

separate proposal on licensing and

safety requirements for launch. Second,

for launch site operators, the rules that

the FAA is adopting today should be

general enough to fit most launch site

scenarios. The FAA recognizes,

however, that there may be more than

one way of meeting a requirement. That

is why a prospective applicant is

required to consult with the FAA, in

accordance with 14 CFR 413.5, before

submitting an application. Early

consultation enables an applicant to

identify unique approaches to meeting

regulatory requirements. The FAA and

an applicant can then work together to

resolve such issues.

The 45SW/SESE commented on the

Accident Investigation Plan

requirements. It asks what agency or

agencies will have responsibility to

maintain accident investigation reports

and why? 45SW/SESE at 2. If a launch

site accident occurs, the NTSB or FAA

will investigate, and will maintain an

investigation record. A launch site

operator may also conduct an

investigation of its own, and will be

responsible for maintaining the

investigation record in accordance with

section 420.61.

ACTA also had comments on the

Accident Investigation Plan

requirements and suggests that the

definition of ‘‘launch site accident’’ be

clarified by either deleting ‘‘ground’’ or

changing the definition of ‘‘launch site

accident’’ to read ‘‘ground or launch

activity.’’ The NPRM defined ‘‘launch

site accident’’ as ‘‘an unplanned event

occurring during a ground activity at a

launch site resulting in a fatality or

serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR

830.2) to any person who is not

associated with the activity, or any

damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to

property not associated with the

activity.’’ ACTA at 10. The FAA does

not agree with ACTA suggestion. A

launch site accident is strictly one that

occurs during a ground activity. An

accident caused by the flight of a launch

vehicle is a launch accident, as defined

in 14 CFR 401.5.

LMC commented on the Accident

Investigation Plan requirements,

requesting clarification of whether the

launch site operator or the launch

operator accident investigation plans

have priority if there were conflicts

between plans. LMC at 4.

The FAA offers the following

guidance. Although no accident

investigation plan has priority per se,

the applicability of an accident

investigation plan depends on the

nature of a mishap. Compared to the

NPRM, the definition of mishap has

been changed in this final rule to accord

with another rule governing reentry. 65

FR 56617. A mishap is now defined in

section 401.5 as a launch or reentry

accident, launch or reentry incident,

launch site accident, failure to complete

a launch or reentry as planned, or an

unplanned event or series of events

resulting in a fatality or serious injury

(as defined in 49 CFR 830.2), or

resulting in greater than $25,000 worth

of damage to property. The purpose of

this definition is to encompass all

incidents that must be reported,

responded to, or investigated in some

manner by a launch operator, a reentry

operator, or launch site operator.

At a launch site operated under an

FAA license, the launch site operator

would have a launch site accident

investigation plan and each launch

operator on the launch site would have

an individual launch accident

investigation plan. Each plan would

cover different mishaps, although there

is some overlap, as discussed below.

Table 4 is also provided as a guide.

A launch site operator’s launch site

accident investigation plan covers

launch site accidents only. A launch site

accident is an unplanned event

occurring during a ground activity at a

launch site resulting in a fatality or

serious injury to any person who is not

associated with the activity, or any

damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to

property not associated with the

activity. In other words, if a member of

the public is injured or property

belonging to a member of the public

over $25,000 is damaged due to a

ground activity on the launch site, a

launch site operator must report,

respond to, and investigate the mishap.

The FAA considers any licensee or its

employees, or any licensee customer,

contractor, or subcontractor or the

employees of any of these persons to be

associated with a ground activity.

Property not associated with the activity

will typically include any property

belonging to members of the public.

Property associated with the activity

includes the property of a launch site

operator or launch licensee, or either

licensee’s customers, contractors or

subcontractors.

A launch operator’s launch accident

investigation plan, on the other hand,

covers launch accidents, launch

incidents, and other mishaps. Launch

accidents and launch incidents are

strictly related to the flight of a launch

vehicle, not ground activities. So, for

launch accidents and launch incidents,

there is no overlap with launch site

operator reporting requirements.

Where there is overlap in launch

operator and launch site operator

accident investigation plans is when a

mishap occurs on the ground. A launch

operator must notify the FAA

immediately in the event of a mishap

that involves a fatality or serious injury,

and within 24 hours in the event of a

mishap that does not involve a fatality

or serious injury. The person injured

does not have to be a member of the

public. Also, a launch operator must

notify AST or the Washington

Operations Center within 24 hours in

the event damage is estimated to exceed

$25,000 to property not associated with

the activity.

In summary, both a launch site

operator and a launch operator must

report, respond to, and investigate a

mishap occurring during a ground

activity at a launch site resulting in a

fatality or serious injury to any person

who is not associated with the activity,

or any damage estimated to exceed

$25,000 to property not associated with

the activity. The reason this type of

mishap is covered by both plans is that

both a launch site operator and launch

operator have a responsibility to protect

the public from hazardous ground

activities. Note, however, that either the

launch site or launch operator may

agree to lead one investigation for both.

62836 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

TABLE 4.—MISHAP INVESTIGATIONS

Event Launch operator reporting requirement

(14 CFR 415.41(b))

Launch site operator reporting requirement

(14 CFR 420.59(b))

Launch accident—an unplanned event occurring during the flight of a launch vehicle resulting in the known impact of a launch vehicle, its payload or any component thereof

outside designated impact limit lines; or a fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR

830.2) to any person who is not associated

with the flight; or any damage estimated to

exceed $25,000 to property not associated

with the flight that is not located at the launch

site or designated recovery area.

Immediate notification to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) Washington Operations Center

None.

Launch incident—an unplanned event occurring

during the flight of a launch vehicle, other

than a launch accident, involving a malfunction of a flight safety system or failure of the

licensee’s safety organization, design or operations.

Immediate notification to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) Washington Operations Center

None.

Launch site accident—an unplanned event occurring during a ground activity at a launch

site resulting in a fatality or serious injury (as

defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person who

is not associated with the activity, or any

damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to

property not associated with the activity.

Immediate notification to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) Washington Operations Center in the event of a fatality or

serious injury.

Notification within 24 hours to AST or the

Washington Operations Center in the event

of damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to

property not associated with the activity

Immediate notification to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) Washington Operations Center.

Other Mishap*:

• Failure to complete a to launch as planned.

• An unplanned event or series of events resulting in a fatality or serious injury to any

person who is associated with the activity.

• An unplanned event or series of events resulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to a payload, a launch vehicle, a launch

support facility or government property located on the launch site.

Immediate notification to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) Washington Operations Center in the event of a fatality or

serious injury

Notification within 24 hours to AST or the

Washington Operations Center in the event

of failure to complete a launch as planned,

or greater than $25,000 worth of damage to

a payload, a launch vehicle, a launch support facility or government property located

on the launch site.

None.

* Mishap means a launch or reentry accident, launch or reentry incident, launch site accident, failure to complete a launch or reentry as

planned, or an unplanned event or series of events resulting in a fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2), or resulting in greater

than $25,000 worth of damage to property.

IV. Part Analysis

Part 401—Organization and Definitions

Section 401.5 contains definitions of

significant terms used in all of Chapter

III. The term ‘‘mishap’’ has been revised

to include launch site accidents as part

of the definition of mishap. The term

‘‘mishap’’ is a general term for all

unplanned events at a launch site or

that occur during a launch or reentry

resulting in injury, or damage to or loss

of equipment or property. Mishaps

include but are not limited to launch or

reentry accidents, launch or reentry

incidents, and launch site accidents.

Mishaps also include failure to

complete a launch or reentry as

planned, or an unplanned event or

series of events resulting in a fatality or

serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR

830.2), or resulting in greater than

$25,000 worth of damage to property.

Part 417—License to Operate a Launch

Site

The FAA removes and reserves part

417 and creates part 420 to address

licensing and safety requirements for

operation of a launch site.

Part 420—License to Operate a Launch

Site

Section 420.1 describes the scope of

part 420. Part 420 encompasses the

information and demonstrations that

must be submitted as part of a license

application, the bases for license

approval, license terms and conditions,

and post-licensing requirements with

which a licensee must comply to remain

licensed.

Section 420.3 specifies the person

who must apply for a license to operate

a launch site, and the person who must

comply with regulations that apply to a

licensed launch site operator. Because a

launch site operator is someone who

offers a launch site to others for launch,

only someone proposing such an offer

need obtain a license to operate a

launch site. A launch operator

proposing to launch from its own

launch site need only obtain a launch

license because a launch license will

address safety issues related to a

specific launch and because a launch

license will encompass ground

operations. In response to comments, as

discussed earlier, a person operating a

launch site that only supports amateur

rocket activities does not need a license

under part 420.

Section 420.5 adds terms that have

not been previously defined by the

FAA. These definitions apply in the

context of part 420, which governs the

licensing and safety requirements for

operation of a launch site. These terms

do not apply outside part 420.

Specifically, the following terms are

defined. Unless otherwise noted, they

remain unchanged from the definitions

proposed in the Launch Site NPRM.

Ballistic Coefficient (β) means the

weight (W) of an object divided by the

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62837

quantity product of the coefficient of

drag (Cd) of the object and the area (A)

of the object.

β = ( ) ⋅

W

C Ad

A ballistic coefficient is a parameter

used to describe flight characteristics of

an object.

Compatibility means the chemical

property of materials that may be

located together without adverse

reaction. Compatibility in storage exists

when storing materials together does not

increase the probability of an accident

or, for a given quantity, the magnitude

of the effects of such an accident.

Compatibility determines whether

materials require segregation.

Debris dispersion radius (Dmax) means

the estimated maximum distance from a

launch point that debris travels given a

worst-case launch vehicle failure and

flight termination early in flight. For an

expendable launch vehicle, flight

termination is assumed to occur at 10

seconds into flight. No assumptions are

made for reusable launch vehicles. If an

expendable launch vehicle failure

occurs shortly after ignition, and a flight

termination system is employed, the

FAA expects the debris to be contained

within an area described by Dmax.

Downrange area means a portion of a

flight corridor beginning where a launch

area ends and ending 5,000 nautical

miles (nm) from the launch point for an

orbital launch vehicle, and ending with

an impact dispersion area for a guided

sub-orbital launch vehicle.

E,F,G coordinate system means an

orthogonal, Earth-fixed, geocentric,

right-handed system. The origin of the

coordinate system is at the center of an

ellipsoidal Earth model. The E-axis is

positive directed through the Greenwich

meridian. The F-axis is positive directed

though 90 degrees east longitude. The

EF-plane is coincident with the

ellipsoidal Earth model’s equatorial

plane. The G-axis is normal to the EFplane and positive directed through the

north pole.

E,N,U coordinate system means an

orthogonal, Earth-fixed, topocentric,

right-handed system. The origin of the

coordinate system is at a launch point.

The E-axis is positive directed east. The

N-axis is positive directed north. The

EN-plane is tangent to an ellipsoidal

Earth model’s surface at the origin and

perpendicular to the geodetic vertical.

The U-axis is normal to the EN-plane

and positive directed away from the

Earth.

Effective casualty area (Ac) means the

aggregate casualty area of each piece of

debris created by a launch vehicle

failure at a particular point on its

trajectory. The effective casualty area for

each piece of debris is the area within

which 100 percent of the unprotected

population on the ground are assumed

to be a casualty, and outside of which

100 percent of the population are

assumed not to be a casualty. This area

is based on the characteristics of the

debris piece including its size, the path

angle of its trajectory, impact

explosions, and debris skip, splatter,

and bounce. An effective casualty area

also accounts for the size of a person.

Explosive means any chemical

compound or mechanical mixture that,

when subjected to heat, impact, friction,

detonation or other suitable initiation,

undergoes a rapid chemical change that

releases large volumes of highly heated

gases that exert pressure in the

surrounding medium. The term applies

to materials that either detonate or

deflagrate.

Explosive division has also been

added since the Launch Site NPRM and

means the hazard class 1 division of an

explosive as defined by the United

Nations Organization classification

system for transport of dangerous goods,

and as determined in accordance with

49 CFR part 173, subpart C. The term

‘‘division 1.3 explosive’’ was proposed

but not adopted because the general

terms for hazard class and explosive

division have been added instead.

Explosive equivalent means a measure

of the blast effects from explosion of a

given quantity of material expressed in

terms of the weight of trinitrotoluene

(TNT) that would produce the same

blast effects when detonated.

Explosive hazard facility means a

facility at a launch site where solid

propellant, liquid propellant, or other

explosives are stored or handled. This

term has been slightly modified from

the Launch Site NPRM to include other

explosives other than propellants.

Flight azimuth means the initial

direction in which a launch vehicle flies

relative to true north expressed in

degrees-decimal-degrees. For example,

due east is 90 degrees.

Flight corridor means an area on the

Earth’s surface estimated to contain the

hazardous debris from nominal flight of

a launch vehicle, and non-nominal

flight of a launch vehicle assuming a

perfectly functioning flight termination

system or other flight safety system.

This has been changed from the Launch

Site NPRM in two respects. The

proposed definition included the phrase

‘‘contain the majority of hazardous

debris’’ which, as discussed in the

comment section, is incorrect. The new

definition also makes clear that the

flight corridor is based on a perfectly

functioning flight termination system.

Guided sub-orbital launch vehicle

means a sub-orbital rocket that employs

an active guidance system.

Hazard class has been added since the

NPRM and means the class of dangerous

good defined by the United Nations

Organization classification system for

transport of dangerous goods, and as

determined in accordance with 49 CFR

part 173, subpart C.

Impact dispersion area means an area

representing an estimated three

standard deviation dispersion about a

nominal impact point of an intermediate

or final stage of a sub-orbital launch

vehicle.

Impact dispersion factor means a

constant used to estimate, using a stage

apogee, a three standard deviation

dispersion about a nominal impact

point of an intermediate or final stage of

a sub-orbital launch vehicle.

Intermediate stages include all stages up

to the final stage.

Impact dispersion radius (Ri) means a

radius that defines an impact dispersion

area. It applies to all launch vehicle

stages.

Impact range means the distance

between a launch point and the impact

point of a sub-orbital launch vehicle

stage.

Impact range factor means a constant

used to estimate, when multiplied by a

stage apogee, the nominal impact point

of an intermediate or final stage of a

suborbital launch vehicle.

Instantaneous impact point (IIP)

means an impact point, following thrust

termination of a launch vehicle. IIP may

be calculated with or without

atmospheric drag effects. This is a

change from the Launch Site NPRM.

The NPRM limited the definition to a

vacuum IIP. Note that the analyses of

part 420 use vacuum IIP.

Instantaneous impact point (IIP)

range rate means a launch vehicle’s

estimated IIP velocity along the Earth’s

surface. It is typically abbreviated as R,

or R-dot.

Intraline distance means the

minimum distance permitted between

any two explosive hazard facilities in

the ownership, possession or control of

one launch site customer. Intraline

distance prevents the propagation of an

explosion. In other words, with an

appropriate intraline distance, an

explosive mishap at one explosive

hazard facility would not cause an

explosive event at another explosive

hazard facility. The FAA anticipates

that worker safety requirements will

dictate protection of employees and

anticipates that all licensees will

familiarize themselves with those

62838 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

requirements and conform to them in

accordance with the law. Unlike

distances used to protect the public,

intraline distance will not offer workers

the same level of protection as the

public.

Launch area means, for a flight

corridor defined in accordance with

appendix A, the portion of a flight

corridor from the launch point to a

point 100 nm in the direction of the

flight azimuth. For a flight corridor

defined in accordance with appendix B,

a launch area is the portion of a flight

corridor from the launch point to the

enveloping line enclosing the outer

boundary of the last debris dispersion

circle.

Launch point means a point on the

Earth from which the flight of a launch

vehicle begins, and is defined by the

point’s geodetic latitude, longitude and

height on an ellipsoidal Earth model.

Launch site accident means an

unplanned event occurring during a

ground activity at a launch site resulting

in a fatality or serious injury (as defined

in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person who is

not associated with the activity, or any

damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to

property not associated with the

activity. The FAA considers any

licensee or its employees, or any

licensee customer, contractor, or

subcontractor or the employees of any of

these persons to be associated with a

ground activity. Property not associated

with the activity will typically include

any property belonging to members of

the public or personal property of

employees. Property associated with the

activity includes the property of a

launch site operator or launch licensee,

or either licensee’s customers,

contractors or subcontractors.

Net explosive weight (NEW) means

the total weight, expressed in pounds, of

explosive material or explosive

equivalency contained in an item. This

term is used for applying Q-D criteria to

solid propellants and other explosives,

and for liquid propellants when

explosive equivalency applies.

Explosive equivalency applies to liquid

propellants when a liquid fuel and a

liquid oxidizer are close enough

together that their explosive potential

combined must be used when

determining prescribed distances to the

public.

Nominal means, in reference to

launch vehicle performance, trajectory,

or stage impact point, a launch vehicle

flight where all launch vehicle

aerodynamic parameters are as

expected, all vehicle internal and

external systems perform as planned,

and there are no external perturbing

influences (e.g., winds) other than

atmospheric drag and gravity.

Overflight dwell time means the

period of time it takes for a launch

vehicle’s IIP to move past a populated

area. For a given populated area, the

overflight dwell time is the time period

measured along the nominal trajectory

IIP ground trace from the time point

whose normal with the trajectory

intersects the most uprange part of the

populated area to the time point whose

normal with the trajectory intersects the

most downrange part of the populated

area.

Overflight exclusion zone means a

portion of a flight corridor, which must

remain clear of the public during the

flight of a launch vehicle.

Populated area means a land area

with population. For a part 420 site

location risk analysis of a populated

area within the first 100 nm of a launch

point, a populated area is no greater

than a census block group in the United

States, and an equivalent size outside

the United States. For analysis of a part

420 flight corridor more than 100 nm

downrange from the launch point, a

populated area is no greater than a 1° x

1° latitude/longitude grid, whether the

populated area is in the United States or

not.

Population density means the number

of people per unit area in a populated

area.

Position data means data referring to

the current position of a launch vehicle

with respect to time using the x, y, z

coordinate system.

Public means people or property that

are not involved in supporting a

licensed launch, and includes those

people and property that may be located

within the boundary of a launch site,

such as visitors, any individual

providing goods or services not related

to launch processing or flight, and any

other launch operator and its personnel.

This is a new definition and was added

to clarify how the FAA defines the

public.

Public area means any area outside a

hazard area, and is an area that is not

in the possession, ownership or other

control of a launch site operator or of a

launch site customer who possesses,

owns or otherwise controls that hazard

area. For purposes of Q–D criteria, the

final rules treat any location outside a

launch site boundary as a public area for

any activity at a launch site. Certain

areas within a launch site are also

considered public areas for purposes of

applying Q–D criteria. For any given

launch operator, areas where other

launch operators are located are public

areas.

Public area distance means the

minimum separation distance permitted

between a public area and an explosive

hazard facility.

Public traffic route distance means

the minimum distance permitted

between a public highway or railroad

line and an explosive hazard facility.

This is a new definition. It was

necessary to add the definition because

explosive division 1.1 explosives were

added to the explosive safety

requirements. The distance

requirements for explosive division 1.1

explosives differentiate between public

traffic routes and inhabited buildings, a

differentiation not made for explosive

division 1.3 explosives.

Trajectory means the position and

velocity components as a function of

time of a launch vehicle relative to an

x, y, z coordinate system, expressed in

x, y, z, x

 ̇

, y

 ̇

, z

 ̇

. The x, y, z coordinates

describe the position of the vehicle both

for projecting the proposed flight path

and during actual flight. The x

 ̇

, y

 ̇

, z

 ̇

variables describe the velocity of the

vehicle.

Unguided sub-orbital launch vehicle

means a sub-orbital rocket that does not

have a guidance system.

X,Y,Z coordinate system means an

orthogonal, Earth-fixed, topocentric,

right-handed system. The origin of the

coordinate system is at a launch point.

The X-axis coincides with the initial

launch azimuth and is positive in the

downrange direction. The Y-axis is

positive to the left looking downrange.

The XY-plane is tangent to the

ellipsoidal Earth model’s surface at the

origin and perpendicular to the geodetic

vertical. The Z-axis is normal to the XYplane and positive directed away from

the Earth.

φo,λo,ηomeans a latitude, longitude,

height system where φo is the geodetic

latitude of a launch point, λo is the east

longitude of the launch point, and ηo is

the height of the launch point above a

reference ellipsoid. φo and λo are

expressed in degrees-decimal-degrees,

which is abbreviated as DDD.

Subpart B contains the criteria and

information requirements for obtaining

a license to operate a launch site.

Section 420.15 specifies the information

that an applicant for a launch site

operator license must submit as part of

its license application. The FAA

requires this information to evaluate

issues affecting national security and

foreign policy, environmental impacts,

whether the launch site location could

safely be used to conduct launches,

explosive site safety, and whether the

applicant will operate the launch site

safely.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62839

Section 420.15 has been modified

slightly from the NPRM. The first and

only substantive change is section

420.15(a). It states that an applicant

shall identify the name and address of

the applicant, and the name, address,

and telephone number of any person to

whom inquiries and correspondence

should be directed. It also requires the

applicant to provide the name and

location of the proposed launch site,

including downrange equipment; and

describe the layout of the launch site,

including launch points; the types of

launch vehicles to be supported at each

launch point; the range of launch

azimuths planned from each launch

point; and the scheduled operational

date. The FAA determined that it was

necessary to obtain this basic general

information from an applicant in order

to conduct the licensing process and to

review compliance with the

requirements of this part. Section

420.15(a) also requires foreign

ownership information, as did the

Launch Site NPRM’s section 420.15(b).

The other changes to section 420.15

are organizational only. Section

420.15(b) contains the environmental

review requirements, which replace

requirements currently located at

sections 417.105–107.

Section 420.15(c) states that an

applicant must provide the information

necessary for the review of the launch

site location. An applicant who is

proposing to locate a launch site at an

existing launch point at a federal launch

range is not required to submit a launch

site location review analysis if a launch

vehicle of the same type and class as

proposed for the launch point has been

safely launched from the launch point.

Section 420.15(d) states that an

applicant must provide the information

necessary for the review of the explosive

site plan. If an applicant plans to

operate a launch site located on a

federal launch range, and if the

applicant is required by the federal

launch range to comply with the federal

launch range’s explosive safety

requirements, the applicant shall submit

the explosive site plan submitted to the

federal launch range. The requirement

to submit the federal launch range

approved explosive site plan is new.

The FAA proposed in the Launch Site

NPRM that no explosive site plan would

have to be submitted. The FAA will not

approve the explosive site plan. Rather,

the FAA will use it to assess the

adequacy of other aspects of an

applicant’s application, such as the

applicant’s coordination procedures

under section 420.55(a).

Section 420.15(e) requires an

applicant to demonstrate how it will

satisfy the launch site operation

requirements of sections 420.53 through

420.61, and section 420.71. Specifically,

a license applicant must show how the

applicant proposes to control public

access pursuant to section 420.53, how

it proposes to comply with the

scheduling requirements of section

420.55, and how it proposes to satisfy

the notification obligations of section

420.57. The FAA requires this

information to ascertain whether an

applicant will be able to satisfy the

launch site operation performance

requirements and for compliance

monitoring purposes. With regard to the

notification obligations of section

420.57, an applicant must submit its

agreements with the U.S. Coast Guard

district and the FAA regional air traffic

control facility having jurisdiction over

the affected airspace to demonstrate

satisfaction of the requirements of

420.57(b) and (c). A license applicant

must also show how it proposes to

comply with the accident investigation

requirements of section 420.59, the

record requirements of section 420.61,

and the requirements governing

lightning protection of section 420.71.

Section 420.17 establishes the bases

upon which the FAA will make its

license determination. This includes the

FAA’s determination of the adequacy of

information provided by the applicant,

the conclusions of the environmental

and policy reviews, the adequacy of the

explosive site plan, and satisfaction of

site location requirements. The FAA

will notify the applicant of, and allow

the applicant to address any

deficiencies in the application.

A few changes were made from the

NPRM. All were structural, except for

section 420.17(a)(2) which now states

that one basis for the issuance of a

license is that the FAA has completed

an analysis of the environmental

impacts associated with the proposed

operation of the launch site, in

accordance with NEPA, 40 CFR Parts

1500–1508, and FAA Order 1050.1D.

The NPRM had only stated that the

National Environmental Policy Act

review must be completed, but the FAA

decided that it would be more

informative to advise of the full extent

of the FAA’s review.

Sections 420.19 through 420.29

require an applicant to demonstrate that

its proposed launch site location will

allow for the safe launch of at least one

type of launch vehicle by defining flight

corridors or impact dispersion areas and

estimating casualty expectancy. The

launch site location review remains

largely unchanged from the Launch Site

NPRM, with a few exceptions, which

will be discussed below. The treatment

of the launch site location review in this

final rule has been enhanced for two

reasons. The FAA decided to outline the

process more distinctly. Additionally,

the FAA decided to clarify what parts of

the launch site location review apply to

reusable launch vehicles and which do

not.

Section 420.19 provides general

requirements. To gain approval for a

launch site location, an applicant must

demonstrate that for each launch point

proposed for the launch site, at least one

type of expendable or reusable launch

vehicle can be flown from the launch

point safely. For purposes of the launch

site location review, a safe launch must

possess a risk level estimated not to

exceed an expected average number of

0.00003 casualties (Ec) to the collective

member of the public exposed to

hazards from the flight (Ec ≤ 30 × 10¥-6).

Types of launch vehicles include

orbital expendable launch vehicles,

guided sub-orbital expendable launch

vehicles, unguided sub-orbital

expendable launch vehicles, and

reusable launch vehicles. Orbital

expendable launch vehicles are further

classified by weight class, based on the

weight of payload the launch vehicle

can place in a 100-nm orbit. If an

applicant proposes to have more than

one type of launch vehicle flown from

a launch point, the applicant must

demonstrate that each type of

expendable or reusable launch vehicle

planned to be flown from the launch

point can be flown from the launch

point safely. If an applicant proposes to

have more than one weight class of

orbital expendable launch vehicles

flown from a launch point, the applicant

must demonstrate that the heaviest

weight class planned to be flown from

the launch point can be flown from the

launch point safely.

The three types of expendable launch

vehicles account for the significant

distinctions between launch vehicles

designed for orbital or sub-orbital flight,

and between those with and without

guidance systems. Guided orbital

expendable launch vehicles typically

require an FTS, which means that the

greatest risk to the public stems from

debris caused by destruction of a

vehicle. Guided sub-orbital launch

vehicles will be treated similarly to

orbital launch vehicles, except for the

nominal impact of the final stage. In

contrast, current unguided sub-orbital

launch vehicles generally have high

reliability levels, and therefore create

the greatest public risk through nominal

stage impact. The launch site location

review is designed to account for these

differences in public risk.

62840 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

Section 420.21 provides minimum

distance requirements governing the

separation of a launch point from a

launch site boundary. The distance from

any proposed launch point to the closest

launch site boundary must be at least as

great as the debris dispersion radius of

the largest launch vehicle type and

weight class proposed for the launch

point. For launch sites supporting

expendable launch vehicles, an

applicant may use the largest distance

listed in table 2 for the type and weight

class of launch vehicles proposed for

the launch point. For launch sites

supporting reusable launch vehicles, an

applicant must determine the debris

dispersion radius that represents the

maximum distance from a launch point

that debris travels given a worst-case

launch vehicle failure in the launch

area. An applicant shall clearly and

convincingly demonstrate the validity of

its proposed radius.

Section 420.23 provides the

requirement for applicants to define a

flight corridor. The section is divided

up into flight corridor requirements for

guided orbital expendable launch

vehicles, guided sub-orbital expendable

launch vehicles, unguided sub-orbital

expendable launch vehicles, and

reusable launch vehicles. For guided

orbital expendable launch vehicles, an

applicant must define a flight corridor

that encompasses an area that is

estimated, in accordance with the

requirements of this part, to contain

debris with a ballistic coefficient of ≥ 3

pounds per square foot, from any nonnominal flight of a guided orbital

expendable launch vehicle from the

launch point to a point 5000 nm

downrange, or where the IIP leaves the

surface of the Earth, whichever is

shorter. The IIP for most orbital

expendable launch vehicles goes well

beyond 5000 nm. The requirement is the

same for guided sub-orbital expendable

launch vehicles, except that the flight

corridor ends with an impact dispersion

area for the launch vehicle’s last stage

where it impacts the Earth’s surface. For

either type of launch vehicle, the flight

corridor includes an overflight

exclusion zone where the public risk

criteria of 30×10¥6≤ would be exceeded

if one person were present in the open.

An applicant must use one of the

methodologies provided in appendix A

or B to define a flight corridor. These are

discussed below.

Because the FAA realizes that

applicants may have other methods to

determine a flight corridor, the FAA

will approve an alternate method if an

applicant provides a clear and

convincing demonstration that its

proposed method provides an

equivalent level of safety to that

required by appendix A or B.

Section 420.23(c) addresses unguided

sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles.

For an unguided sub-orbital expendable

launch vehicle, an applicant must

define impact dispersion areas that are

estimated, in accordance with the

requirements of this part, to contain the

impact of launch vehicle stages from

nominal flight of an unguided suborbital expendable launch vehicle from

the launch point to impact with the

Earth’s surface, and an overflight

exclusion zone where the public risk

criteria of 30×10¥6 would be exceeded

if one person were present in the open.

An applicant must follow the

methodology provided in appendix D.

The FAA will approve an alternate

method if an applicant provides a clear

and convincing demonstration that its

proposed method provides an

equivalent level of safety to that

required by appendix D.

An important point to note about the

launch site location review for unguided

sub-orbital launch vehicles is that it is

based on the apogee of the unguided

suborbital launch vehicle used in the

analysis. The apogee used in the

analysis must represent the maximum

apogee intended to be reached by a

launch vehicle launched from the

launch point.

Section 420.23(d) addresses reusable

launch vehicles. For a reusable launch

vehicle, an applicant must define a

flight corridor that contains the

hazardous debris from nominal and

non-nominal flight of a reusable launch

vehicle. The applicant must clearly and

convincingly demonstrate the validity of

the flight corridor.

Section 420.25 provides the

requirement for applicants to conduct a

risk analysis. If a flight corridor or

impact dispersion area contains a

populated area, the applicant must

estimate the casualty expectation

associated with the flight corridor or

impact dispersion area. An applicant

must use the methodology provided in

appendix C to this part for guided

orbital or suborbital expendable launch

vehicles and appendix D for unguided

suborbital launch vehicles. For reusable

launch vehicles, the FAA will evaluate

the adequacy of an applicant’s casualty

expectancy analysis on a case-by-case

basis. If the estimated expected casualty

exceeds 30×10¥6, the FAA will not

approve the location of the proposed

launch point.

Section 420.27 contains the

information that an applicant must

submit in its application for a launch

site location review. The FAA

recognizes that not all information is

applicable to all analyses.

Section 420.29 contains an important

caveat to the launch site location review

as discussed so far. The FAA must

evaluate the adequacy of a launch site

location for unproven launch vehicles

on a case-by-case basis. An applicant for

a license to operate a launch site for an

unproven launch vehicle must provide

a clear and convincing demonstration

that its proposed launch site location

provides an equivalent level of safety to

that required by this part. A launch site

that is safe for proven launch vehicles

may not be safe for new vehicles. The

probability of failure is likely to be

higher, and the risk to populated areas

may increase significantly.

Section 420.31 requires an applicant

to complete two agreements necessary

for the safety of aircraft and ships

during a launch. An applicant must

complete an agreement with the local

U.S. Coast Guard district to establish

procedures for the issuance of a Notice

to Mariners prior to a launch and other

such measures as the Coast Guard

deems necessary to protect public

health and safety. An applicant must

also complete an agreement with the

FAA Air Traffic Control (ATC) office

having jurisdiction over the airspace

through which launches will take place,

to establish procedures for the issuance

of a Notice to Airmen prior to a launch

and for closing of air routes during the

launch window and other such

measures as the FAA ATC office deems

necessary to protect public health and

safety.

If an applicant plans to operate a

launch site located on a federal launch

range and is using existing federal

launch range agreements; the applicant

does not have to comply with section

420.31. These agreements are with the

U.S. Coast Guard and the FAA ATC

office having jurisdiction over the

airspace through which launches will

take place.

Appendix A

Of the two methods allowing an

applicant to demonstrate the existence

of a guided expendable launch vehicle

flight corridor that satisfies the FAA’s

risk criteria, appendix A is the simplest

of the methods. Appendix A typically

offers the more conservative approach

in that it produces a larger area for

guided orbital and suborbital

expendable launch vehicles. In order to

achieve the simplicity this approach

offers, the FAA based certain decisions

regarding the methodology on a series of

what it intends as conservative

assumptions and on hazard areas

previously developed by the federal

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62841

9An applicant must still obtain written

agreements with the FAA Air Traffic Control office

having jurisdiction over the airspace where

launches will take place and, if appropriate, with

the U.S. Coast Guard regarding procedures for

coordinating launches with the launch site.

launch ranges for the guided expendable

launch vehicles listed in table 1 of

section 420.19.

The greater simplicity of the approach

derives from the fact that, unlike the

method of appendix B, an applicant

need obtain no meteorological data and

need not plot the trajectory of a

particular launch vehicle. Instead,

recognizing that a typical flight corridor

consists of a series of fans of decreasing

angle extending out from a launch

point, appendix A employs a variation

on that typical corridor.

The appendix A flight corridor

estimation contains a number of

elements, each of which an applicant

must define for each of its proposed

launch points. An appendix A flight

corridor consists of a circular area

around a selected launch point, an

overflight exclusion zone, a launch area

and a downrange area. A flight corridor

for a guided orbital expendable launch

vehicle ends 5,000 nautical miles from

the launch point, and, for a guided

suborbital expendable launch vehicle,

the flight corridor ends with the impact

dispersion area of the launch vehicle’s

final stage.

Once an applicant has produced an

appendix A flight corridor, the

applicant must ascertain whether the

flight corridor contains population, and,

if so, whether the use of the corridor

would present unacceptable risk to that

population. If no members of the public

reside within the corridor, the FAA will

approve the proposed location of the

site.9 If the flight corridor is populated,

the FAA will require an applicant to

perform a risk analysis in accordance

with appendix C. If the proposed

corridor satisfies the FAA’s risk criteria,

the FAA will approve the location of the

site. If, however, the proposed corridor

fails to satisfy the FAA’s risk criteria, an

applicant has certain options. The

applicant may attempt another

appendix A flight corridor by selecting

a different flight azimuth or by selecting

a different launch point at the proposed

launch site, or by selecting a different

launch vehicle type or class. Or, the

applicant may, using the more accurate

but more complicated calculations of

appendix B, narrow its flight corridor

and determine whether that flight

corridor satisfies the FAA’s risk criteria.

To create a hypothetical flight

corridor under appendix A an applicant

must first determine from where on the

launch site a guided expendable launch

vehicle would take flight. That position

is defined as a launch point. An

applicant must determine the geodetic

latitude and longitude of each launch

point that it proposes to offer for launch,

and select a flight azimuth for each

launch point. An applicant should

know whether it plans to offer the site

for the launch of guided orbital or suborbital expendable launch vehicles. If

planning for the launch of guided

orbital expendable launch vehicles, the

applicant must decide what expendable

launch vehicle class, as described by

payload weight in section 420.19, table

1, best represents the largest expendable

launch vehicle class the launch site

would support.

Once an applicant has made the

necessary decisions regarding location

and vehicle class, the next step in

creating an appendix A flight corridor is

to look up the maximum distance (Dmax)

that debris is expected to travel from a

launch point if a worst-case expendable

launch vehicle failure were to occur and

flight termination action destroyed the

expendable launch vehicle at 10

seconds into flight. Dmax serves as a

radius that defines a circular area

around the launch point. The FAA has

estimated, on the basis of federal launch

range experience, the Dmax for a guided

suborbital expendable launch vehicle

and for each guided orbital expendable

launch vehicle class and provided the

results that an applicant should employ

in table A–1, appendix A.

The circular area, defined by Dmax, is

part of an overflight exclusion zone. An

overflight exclusion zone in an

appendix A flight corridor consists of a

rectangular area of the length prescribed

by table A–2, capped up-range by a

semi-circle with radius Dmax centered on

the launch point. Its downrange

boundary is defined by an identical

semi-circular arc with a radius Dmax

centered on the endpoint prescribed by

table A–2. The crossrange boundaries

consist of two lines parallel to and to

either side of the flight azimuth. Each

line is tangent to the uprange and

downrange Dmax circles as shown in

appendix A, figure A–1.

An appendix A flight corridor also

contains a launch area. The launch area

extends from the uprange boundary,

which is coextensive with the circle

created by the radius Dmax, to a line

drawn perpendicular to the flight

azimuth one hundred nautical miles

down range of the launch point. The

launch area’s crossrange boundaries are

a function of the lengths of two lines

perpendicular to the flight azimuth: one

drawn ten nautical miles down range

from the launch point and the other line

drawn one hundred nautical miles

down range from the launch point.

Table A–3 provides the lengths of the

line segments.

Adjacent to the launch area is the

downrange area. For purposes of

appendix A, a corridor’s downrange

area extends from the one hundred

nautical miles line to a line,

perpendicular to the flight azimuth, that

is 5,000 nautical miles downrange from

the launch point for the guided orbital

expendable launch vehicle classes, and

to an impact dispersion area for a

guided suborbital expendable launch

vehicle corridor. The down range area’s

crossrange boundaries connect the

prescribed endpoints of the

perpendicular lines at one hundred

nautical miles and 5,000 nautical miles.

Table A–3 provides the lengths of the

line segments.

An applicant must determine whether

the public resides within this flight

corridor. If no populated areas exist, an

applicant may submit its analysis for the

FAA’s launch site location review. If

there is population located within the

flight corridor, the applicant must

calculate the risk to the public in

accordance with the requirements of

appendix C. The expected casualty (Ec)

result for the flight corridor must not

exceed 30 x 10¥6 for the applicant to

satisfy the location requirements.

Map Requirements and Plotting

Methods

To describe a flight corridor and any

populated areas within that corridor, an

applicant must observe data and

methodology requirements for mapping

a flight corridor and analyzing

populations. These requirements apply

to all appendices.

The FAA requires certain

geographical data for use in describing

flight corridors for each appendix. The

geographical data must include the

latitude and longitude of each proposed

launch point at a launch site, and all

populated areas in a flight corridor. The

accuracy requirement for the launch

area portion of the analyses calls for

map scales of no smaller than 1:250,000

inches per inch. The actual map scale

will depend on the smallest census

block group size in a launch area. The

FAA bases its scale requirement on

average range rates in the launch area,

because range rates have a direct impact

on dwell times over populated areas.

While in the launch area of a flight

corridor, the instantaneous impact point

(IIP) ground trace tends to linger over

any populated areas, which increases

the Ec for an individual populated area.

The map scale required by the FAA is

large enough to allow an applicant to

62842 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

determine the dwell time and size for

each applicable populated area.

Using a similar approach, the FAA

establishes an accuracy requirement for

the downrange area of a flight corridor.

A map scale may be no smaller than

1:20,000,000 inches per inch. The scale

is to be smaller than that required for

the launch area because the dwell times

over downrange populated areas are

small and the map scale must only be

large enough to allow an applicant to

determine the dwell time and the size

of each populated area downrange.

Maps satisfying these accuracy

requirements are readily available. For

example, civil aeronautical charts are

published and distributed by the U.S.

Department of Commerce, National

Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA), and are also

published by the Defense Mapping

Agency and distributed by NOAA.

Besides scale, appendices A, B, C and

D require an applicant to use

cylindrical, conic, and plane map

projections. The FAA uses these map

projections for the analyses because

they produce only small error with

straight line measurements.

Scale requirements, geographic

location of the launch site, and plotting

method are the main considerations for

choosing a map projection. Of these

considerations, the plotting method

selected for development and depiction

of the flight corridor line segments is the

most important. Three plotting methods

are provided by appendix A.

The ‘‘mechanical method’’ is the least

complex, least costly, but also the least

accurate of the methods suggested here.

The ‘‘semi-automated method’’ provides

more accurate techniques for

determining the endpoint coordinates of

each flight corridor line segment. The

fully automated method makes use of

geographic information system (GIS)

software with global mapping data.

Appendix A provides an applicant

with equations to perform range and

bearing computations for the purpose of

plotting a flight corridor on a map. The

range and bearing from a launch point

are used to determine the latitude and

longitude coordinates of a point on the

flight corridor. Range and bearing

equations are standard geodesic

computations, which can be found in

most geodesy textbooks.

An applicant may create line

segments to describe a flight corridor by

using range and bearings from the

launch point along various azimuths.

Appendix A provides equations to

calculate geodetic latitude (+N) and

longitude (+E) given the launch point

geodetic latitude (+N), longitude (+E),

range (nm), and bearing (degrees,

positive clockwise from North). The

same equations may also be used to

calculate an impact dispersion area by

substituting a final stage impact point

for the launch point. Appendix A also

provides equations to calculate the

distance of a geodesic between two

points.

As noted above, an alternative to

range and bearing computations is to

use geographic information system (GIS)

software with global mapping data. GIS

software is an effective tool for

constructing and evaluating a flight

corridor, and has the advantage of

allowing an applicant to create maps of

varying scales in the launch and

downrange areas. Commercially

available GIS products are acceptable to

the FAA for use in appendices A, B, C

and D if they meet the map and plotting

method requirements of paragraph (b) of

appendix A. An applicant should note,

however, that maps of different scales in

GIS software may not match each other.

For instance, the coastline of Florida on

a U.S. map may not match the coastline

on a world map. Applicants shall

resolve such contradictions by referring

to more accurate maps such as NOAA

maps.

Once an applicant has selected a map

for displaying a flight corridor’s launch

area, the line segment lengths may be

scaled to the chosen map. Map scale

units are actual distance units measured

along the Earth’s surface per unit of map

distance. Most map scale units are given

in terms of inches per inch (in/in). An

applicant converts appendix A flight

corridor line segment distances to the

map scale distance by dividing the

launch area flight corridor line segment

length (inches) by the map scale (in/in).

If, for example, an applicant selected a

map scale of 250,000 in/in and the line

segment for the launch area flight

corridor was 1677008 inches, the

equivalent scaled length of the line

segment for constructing an appendix A

launch area is (1677008/250,000) = 6.7

inches of map distance. An applicant

would then plot the line segment on the

map for display purposes using the

scaled line segment length of 6.7 inches.

If an applicant were to choose a map

with scale units other than inches per

inch, the FAA requires a description of

the conversion algorithm to inches per

inch and sample computations. Also

note that the FAA will accept straight

lines for distances less than or equal to

7.5 times the map scale on map scales

greater than or equal to 1:1,000,000

inches per inch; or straight lines

representing 100 nm or less on map

scales less than 1:1,000,000 in/in.

Weight Classes for Guided Orbital

Expendable Launch Vehicles

Appendix A distinguishes between

the guided orbital expendable launch

vehicles represented in the appendix on

the basis of four separate weight class.

These are used to determine the size of

the debris dispersion radius around a

launch point, and the size of an

appendix A flight corridor. The FAA

selected the four expendable launch

vehicle classes based on the size and

characteristics of expendable launch

vehicles that currently exist in the U.S.

commercial inventory and that should

approximate any proposed new

expendable launch vehicle as well. An

applicant planning to support the

launch of guided orbital expendable

launch vehicles must choose the largest

expendable launch vehicle class

anticipated for launch from the chosen

launch point. This maximizes the area

of the flight corridor. Also, selection of

the largest class anticipated lessens the

possibility of having to obtain a license

modification to accommodate a larger

customer than an application may have

originally encompassed.

A 100-nm orbit is the standard for

inter-class launch vehicle comparison

purposes. It is a standard reference orbit

used by launch vehicle manufacturers

for descriptive purposes and allows the

uniform comparison of launch vehicle

throw weight capability. The FAA

obtained the payload weights for the 28°

and 90° orbital inclinations from the

‘‘International Reference Guide to Space

Launch Systems,’’ S. J. Isakowitz, 2d ed.

(1995). They represent capabilities from

CCAS and VAFB, respectively.

Dmax Circle

A radius, maximum distance (Dmax), is

employed to define a circular area about

a launch point. The circular area

indicates the limits for both flight

control and explosive containment

following a worst-case expendable

launch vehicle failure and flight

termination system activation at 10

seconds into flight. The worst-case

failure represents a failure response,

immediately following first motion,

which causes the launch vehicle to fly

in the uprange direction on a trajectory

that maximizes the impact range. The

ten second flight time represents a

conservative estimate of the earliest

elapsed time after launch that a flight

safety officer would be able to detect the

malfunction, initiate flight termination

action, and actuate the flight

termination system on the expendable

launch vehicle. The radius is the

estimated Dmax from the launch point

that inert debris is expected to travel

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62843

and beyond which the overpressure

from explosive debris is not expected to

exceed 0.5 pounds per square inch (psi).

Dmax accounts for the public risk posed

by the greater of the wind-induced

impact distance of a hazardous piece of

inert debris, or the sum of the windinduced impact distance of an explosive

piece of debris and the debris’ 0.5 psi

overpressure radius from the explosion.

Overflight Exclusion Zone

Table A–2 and figure A–1 define an

overflight exclusion zone. Because of

the risks the early stages of flight create,

the FAA requires an applicant to

demonstrate that the public will not be

present in this area during a launch. An

overflight exclusion zone is an area in

close proximity to a launch point where

the mission risk is greater than an Ec of

30×10 ¥6 if one member of the public is

present in the open.

Early in the flight phase expendable

launch vehicles have large explosive

potential, a low IIP range rate, and an

historically higher probability of failure

relative to the rest of pre-orbital flight.

The relatively simple risk estimation

analysis defined by appendix C does not

adequately model the true risk during

this stage of flight, and does not serve

as the basis for determining that the

overflight exclusion zone represents an

area where the FAA’s risk threshold is

not satisfied. Instead, the FAA derived

the overflight exclusion zone using a

high fidelity risk assessment computer

program in use by the national ranges.

The program is a launch area risk

analysis program called DAMP (facility

DAMage and Personal injury). DAMP

relies on information about a launch

vehicle, its trajectory and failure

responses, and facilities and

populations in the launch area to

estimate hit probabilities and casualty

expectation. The hazards analyzed by

DAMP include impacting inert debris,

and blast overpressures and debris

projected from impact explosions.

Risk assessments were also conducted

for the time of flight immediately after

the first major staging event. The results

showed a significant decrease in the Ec

estimates, and those estimates were

within the Ec criteria of 30×10 ¥6 . The

decrease results from a combination of

decreasing dwell times and a significant

reduction in the size of an effective

casualty area following a major staging

event.

The FAA requires that an applicant

demonstrate either that the overflight

exclusion zone is unpopulated, that

there are times when no one is present,

or that the public can be excluded from

this area during launch. Although a

determination of this nature

encompasses issues that will be

addressed in a launch license, a launch

site cannot support safe launches unless

overflight of the highest risk area in

close proximity to a launch point takes

place without the public present.

An applicant must display an

overflight exclusion zone on maps in

accordance with the requirements of

paragraph (b) of appendix A.

Launch Area

As noted at the beginning of this

discussion, appendix A employs a series

of fans as the shape of the foundation of

its flight corridor. The flight corridor

fans account for the turning capabilities

and wind dispersed debris of a guided

expendable launch vehicle. The launch

area fans have been divided into two

regions, of 60 and 30 degrees,

representing the malfunction turn

capability of the launch vehicle relative

to its velocity in the downrange

direction. Each region is represented by

the estimated maximum turning

capability over a ground-range interval.

These angles are the FAA’s estimates for

the maximum angles that the launch

vehicle velocity vector may turn within

a five second time period.

The initial fan area is described by a

60° half angle extending ten nautical

miles downrange from a launch point.

The ten nautical mile threshold

represents the FAA’s estimate of where

a vehicle’s maximum turning rate

capability is reduced to approximately

30 degrees due to increasing velocity in

the downrange direction. A 30° half

angle was used to define the secondary

fan area beginning 10 nautical mile

downrange and ending 100 nautical

mile downrange. Once an expendable

launch vehicle IIP has reached the 100

nautical mile downrange point, the

increasing velocity in the downrange

direction continues to reduce the launch

vehicle’s ability to maneuver through a

large malfunction turn.

A 100 nautical mile distance is used

as a delimiter between the launch area

and the downrange area. From the

launch point out to approximately the

point where the IIP is 100 nautical miles

downrange, most expendable launch

vehicles will be subjected to the

aerodynamic forces of wind and drag.

Once an expendable launch vehicle’s IIP

has cleared the 100 nm limit, the FAA

is willing to assume for purposes of

appendix A that most launch vehicles

are outside the atmosphere.

Downrange Area

The FAA derived the appendix A

flight corridor’s downrange area from

hazard areas previously developed by

federal launch ranges for the weight

classes of expendable launch vehicles

defined in table 1 of section 420.19. The

downrange fan area of the flight corridor

is based on turning capabilities and

impact dispersions of guided

expendable launch vehicles. The size of

the fan area is necessary for containing

expendable launch vehicle debris in the

event that an expendable launch vehicle

failure initiates a maximum-rate

malfunction turn and the flight

termination system must be activated. In

the later stages of flight a guided

expendable launch vehicle’s turn

capability is reduced due to increasing

velocities in the downrange direction.

Therefore, a 10° half angle was used to

define the downrange area, which

reflects a combination of normal vehicle

dispersions and malfunction turns.

The downrange area of a flight

corridor begins 100 nm from a launch

point and, for the guided orbital

expendable launch vehicle weight

classes, extends 5,000 nm downrange

from the launch point. Overflight dwell

times for the flight time remaining after

5,000 nm typically result in an

insignificant increase in risk to the

public. In general, after an orbital

expendable launch vehicle IIP has

passed the 5,000 nm point its IIP range

rates increase very rapidly as the

expendable launch vehicle approaches

orbital insertion. As a result, the dwell

times decrease significantly, reducing

the overflight risk to insignificant levels.

For an applicant employing a guided

suborbital expendable launch vehicle, a

flight corridor ends with the impact

dispersion area of a final stage.

Appendix B

Appendix B provides another means

for creating a hypothetical flight

corridor from an applicant’s proposed

launch site. As with a flight corridor

created pursuant to appendix A, an

appendix B corridor identifies the

populations, those within the defined

flight corridor, that must be analyzed for

risk. An appendix B analysis offers an

applicant a means to demonstrate

whether a flight corridor from its launch

site satisfies the FAA’s risk criteria for

a guided orbital or suborbital

expendable launch vehicle. Appendix B

allows an applicant to perform a more

individualized containment analysis

rather than relying on the more

conservative estimates the FAA derived

for appendix A. Because an appendix B

analysis uses actual meteorological data

and a trajectory, whether actual or

computer simulated, of a real

expendable launch vehicle, it produces

a flight corridor of greater accuracy than

one created in accordance with

appendix A. The FAA derived the

62844 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

10 Department of Defense World Geodetic System,

Military Standard 2401 (Jan. 11, 1994).

assumptions and simplifications in the

appendix B analysis from expendable

launch vehicle data representing

historical expendable launch vehicle

malfunction behavior.

A flight corridor created using

appendix B contains, on its face, the

same elements as an appendix A flight

corridor, including a circular area

around a launch point with a radius of

Dmax, an overflight exclusion zone, a

launch area and a downrange area.

Appendix B, however, produces and

configures the last two elements

differently than appendix A. The launch

area of an appendix B flight corridor

shows where launch vehicle debris

would impact in the event of a vehicle

failure, and takes into account local

meteorological conditions. The

downrange area of a flight corridor also

shows where launch vehicle debris

would impact given a vehicle failure,

but takes into account vehicle imparted

velocity, malfunctions turns, and

vehicle guidance and performance

dispersions. Also, like an appendix A

flight corridor, the uprange portion of

the flight corridor is described by a

semi-circle arc that is a portion of either

the most uprange dispersion circle, or

the overflight exclusion zone,

whichever is further uprange.

The appendix B launch area analysis

assumes a vehicle failure and

destruction at one second intervals

along a trajectory z value, which

denotes height as measured from the

launch point, up to 50,000 feet. An

applicant must determine the maximum

distance a hazardous piece of debris

would travel under local meteorological

conditions. The distances that the debris

travels provide the boundaries of an

appendix B flight corridor’s launch area.

After a height of 50,000 feet, which is

where the FAA estimates, for purposes

of this analysis, that debris created by

an expendable launch vehicle’s

destruction has less exposure to

atmospheric forces, an applicant shall

determine how far harmful debris

created by destruction of an expendable

launch vehicle would travel based only

on malfunction imparted velocity and

vehicle dispersion in order to create a

downrange area. Although the effects of

wind above 50,000 feet are not, in

reality, non-existent, once an

expendable launch vehicle reaches an

altitude of 50,000 feet its velocity vector

has pitched down range so that a

malfunction turn and explosion

velocity, rather than atmospheric drag

and wind effects, play the dominant role

in determining the dispersion of debris

as the debris falls to the surface.

Dmax Circle

As with an appendix A flight corridor,

an applicant must select each launch

point at its proposed launch site from

which it expects a guided expendable

launch vehicle to take flight. An

applicant must obtain the latitude and

longitude of the launch point to four

decimal places. If relying on a guided

orbital expendable launch vehicle, the

applicant must also select an

expendable launch vehicle weight class

from section 420.19, table 1, that best

represents the largest class each

proposed launch point would support.

With this information, the applicant

then ascertains the Dmax that debris is

expected to travel from a launch point

if a mishap were to occur in the first 10

seconds of flight by employing table A–

1, appendix A. Table A–1 also provides

a maximum distance for guided suborbital expendable launch vehicles. The

Dmax distance provided by table A–1

defines a circular area around the

launch point.

Overflight Exclusion Zone

That circular area is part of an

overflight exclusion zone. Again, an

applicant uses information from

appendix A to create an overflight

exclusion zone. An overflight exclusion

zone consists of the circular area

defined by the radius Dmax at the launch

point and a corridor of the length

prescribed by table A–2. Its downrange

boundary is defined by an arc with a

radius Dmax centered on the endpoint

prescribed by table A–2. The crossrange

boundaries consist of two lines parallel

to and to either side of the flight

azimuth. Each line is tangent to the

uprange and downrange Dmax circles as

shown in appendix A, figure A–1.

Creation of an overflight exclusion zone

is predetermined by the requirements of

appendix A and does not require a

trajectory for an actual launch vehicle.

As with an appendix A overflight

exclusion zone, and for the reasons

described in this notice’s discussion of

appendix A, the FAA requires that the

public be excluded from this area

during launch.

Launch Vehicle Trajectory

An applicant must also obtain or

generate a launch vehicle trajectory. The

applicant may use either commercially

available software or a trajectory

provided by the launch vehicle’s

manufacturer. Because appendix B is

based on equations of motion in three

dimensions, the appendix B analysis

requires that the trajectory be described

using a three axis coordinate system.

The FAA recommends that an applicant

use a WGS–84 ellipsoidal Earth

model 10 as the trajectory coordinate

system reference ellipsoid in the

appendices, because of its wide

availability and its development in

accordance with military standards and

requirements. The WGS–84 model

reflects the most current and the most

accurate Department of Defense

standards for Earth models. WGS–84

provides a basic reference frame and

geometric figure for the Earth and

provides a means for relating positions

on various local geodetic coordinate

systems, including x,y,z, to an Earthcentered, Earth-fixed coordinate system

such as the EFG system employed in the

appendix B analysis.

The FAA requires time intervals used

in the trajectory analysis of no greater

than one second for both launch and

downrange areas. Data frequency of one

second is a compromise between the

low data frequency requirements of the

launch area, where dwell times are

relatively long, and the high frequency

requirements of the downrange area,

where dwell times are correspondingly

shorter. Accordingly, one second time

intervals are sufficient to accommodate

linear interpolation between trajectory

time points, in the launch and

downrange areas, and not degrade the

accuracy requirements of the analysis.

In the launch area, an applicant’s

trajectory must include position data in

terms of time after liftoff in right-handed

x,y,z coordinates centered on the

proposed launch point, with the X-axis

aligned with the flight azimuth. In the

downrange area, the applicant’s

trajectory must show state vector data in

terms of time after liftoff in right-handed

x, y, z x ̇, y ̇, z ̇, coordinates, centered on

the proposed launch point, with the Xaxis aligned with the flight azimuth.

Launch Area

A launch area contains a launch point

and an overflight exclusion zone, and

constitutes the part of the flight corridor

calculated using the effects of

atmospheric drag forces on debris

produced by a series of hypothetical

destructions of an expendable launch

vehicle at one second intervals along

that trajectory. For purposes of an

appendix B analysis, a launch area

extends from the further uprange of an

OEZ arc or dispersion circle arc

downrange to a point on the surface of

the Earth that corresponds to the debris

impact locations, assuming a failure of

the vehicle in flight at a height of 50,000

feet. Typically, federal launch ranges

account for five major parameters to

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62845

11Note that the determination of the size of Dmax

included considerations of malfunction turns as

well.

estimate the size of a flight corridor.

These include the effects of vehicleimparted velocity on debris, the change

in launch vehicle position and velocity

due to a malfunction turn, guidance

errors, the ballistic coefficient of debris,

and wind. However, imparted velocity,

malfunction turn, and trajectory

dispersion, although not insignificant,

do not play as great a role early in flight

as the wind effects on debris. The wind

effect on debris, in turn, depends on the

ballistic coefficient of the debris. The

FAA determined that for purposes of the

launch area, of these parameters, launch

vehicle debris and meteorological

conditions constitute the most

significant, and the FAA therefore

focuses on these two factors in the

launch area.11

The FAA requires an applicant to

calculate circles that approximate the

debris dispersion for each one second

time point on a launch vehicle

trajectory. The crossrange lines tangent

to those circles provide the borders of a

launch area. Calculating the circles

consists, in general terms, of a two step

process. An applicant must first define

15 mean geometric height intervals

along the proposed trajectory in order to

obtain data, in accordance with

subparagraph (c)(4) of appendix B,

accounting for the mean atmospheric

density, maximum wind speed, fall

times and debris dispersions in each of

those height intervals. An applicant

must then use that data in the

calculations in subparagraph (c)(5) to

derive the radius applicable to each

height interval (zi). Having obtained that

radius, an applicant uses it to describe,

pursuant to subparagraph (c)(6), a circle

referred to as a debris dispersion circle

(Di), around each one second time

interval along the vehicle’s trajectory,

starting at the launch point. An

applicant will then ascertain the

crossrange boundaries of a flight

corridor’s launch area by drawing lines

that are tangent to all dispersion circles.

The final Di dispersion circle forms the

downrange boundary of a flight

corridor’s launch area.

The launch area represents the effects

of meteorological conditions on how far

inert debris with a ballistic coefficient of

3 lb/ft.2 would travel. Debris comes in

many sizes and shapes, but the FAA

does not propose to require an

applicant’s location review analysis to

take all such possibilities into account.

A complete analysis for an actual

launch entails the determination of the

type and size of debris created by each

credible failure mode, and the velocity

imparted to each piece of debris due to

the failure. Instead, for purposes of the

appendix B analysis, the FAA

categorizes launch vehicle debris by a

ballistic coefficient that accounts for the

smallest inert debris that may cause

harm and that also accounts for the

debris most sensitive to wind. A

ballistic coefficient reflects the

sensitivity of weight and area ratios to

drag forces, such as wind dispersion

effect.

In addition to knowing what debris is

of concern, an applicant must know the

local meteorological conditions. The

FAA requires an applicant to obtain

meteorological data for 15 height

intervals in a launch area up to 50,000

feet. Appendix B has an upper limit of

50,000 feet in the launch area

containment analysis of debris because

winds above this altitude contribute

little to drift distance. As noted above,

once an expendable launch vehicle

reaches an altitude of 50,000 feet its

velocity vector has pitched down range

so that a malfunction turn and

explosion velocity, rather than

atmospheric drag and wind effects, play

the dominant role in determining the

dispersion of debris as the debris falls

to the surface. The combination of these

two factors significantly reduces the

effect of winds on uprange and

crossrange dispersion after an

expendable launch vehicle reaches

50,000 feet. For altitudes less than

50,000 feet, at the same time as low

ballistic coefficient debris pieces are

highly sensitive to drag forces, the

velocity of an explosion caused by

destroying an expendable launch

vehicle contributes relatively little to

the dispersion effect because the drag

produced on these light weight pieces

results in a high deceleration so they

achieve terminal velocity almost

instantaneously and drift with the wind.

Therefore, launch vehicle induced

explosion-velocities are not considered

for the launch area of an appendix B

containment analysis. Instead, an

applicant uses local statistical wind data

by altitude for fifteen height intervals.

The data must include altitude,

atmospheric density, mean East/West

meridianal (u) and North/South zonal

wind (v), the standard deviation of u

and v wind, a correlation coefficient, the

number of observations and the wind

percentile.

Data acceptable to the FAA is

available from NOAA’s National

Climatic Data Center (NCDC). NOAA

Data Centers, of which the NCDC is the

largest, provide long-term preservation

of, management, and ready accessibility

to environmental data. The Centers are

part of the National Environmental

Satellite, Data and Information Service.

The NCDC data set acceptable to the

FAA is the ‘‘Global Gridded Upper Air

Statistics, 1980—1995, V1.1, March

1996 (CD–ROM).’’ The Global Gridded

Upper Air Statistics (GGUAS) CD–ROM

data set describes the atmosphere for

each month of the represented year on

a 2.5 degree global grid at 15 standard

pressure levels. NCDC provides

compiled mean and standard deviation

values for sea level pressure, wind

speed, air temperature, dew point,

height and density. GGUAS also

complies eight-point wind roses. The

spatial resolution is a 73 x 144 grid

spaced at 2.5 degrees and the temporal

resolution is one month.

To simplify the containment analysis,

an applicant may use a mean wind of

50%. An applicant may also assume

that an applicant’s launch pad height is

equal to the surface level of the wind

measurements provided by the NCDC

database. The actual pad height could

be lower or higher than the surface level

wind measurement height. The

difference between the actual pad height

and the surface level measurement

height is considered insignificant in

terms of its effect on the impact

dispersion radius.

The FAA notes that the NCDC

database will not necessarily contain

measurements of winds for any

particular launch site proposed. If a

launch point is located in the center of

a 2.5 degree NCDC weather grid cell, the

farthest distance to a grid cell corner

would be along a diagonal from the

center of the grid cell to a corner of the

grid cell. The wind measurements will

be no more than approximately 106 nm

from the launch point. This distance is

close enough for purposes of a location

review containment analysis, and

occurs only for a grid located on the

equator. In general, the topography

within approximately 106 nm of a

launch point is assumed to be relatively

similar with respect to height above

mean-sea-level. As the launch point

latitude increases the distance from the

wind measurement grid point will

decrease, which will reduce errors

introduced by this assumption.

Having obtained the necessary

meteorological data, an applicant would

use data from the GGUAS CD–ROM to

estimate the mean atmospheric density,

maximum wind speed, height interval

fall times, and height interval debris

dispersions for 15 mean geometric

height intervals. Altitude intervals are

denoted by the subscript ‘‘j’’. An

applicant would then calculate the

debris dispersion radius (Di) for each

trajectory position whose ‘‘Z’’ values,

62846 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

12Note that even if a dispersion circle is further

uprange than the overflight exclusion zone, the

overflight exclusion zone remains the same. That is,

it is not extended uprange.

13For clarity, the flight azimuth in the figure is

not aligned with the x-axis, as would be the case

in the launch site location review.

are less than 50,000 ft. Each trajectory

time considered is denoted by the

variable subscript ‘‘i’’. The initial value

of ‘‘i’’ is one and the value is increased

by increments of one for each

subsequent ‘‘Z’’ value evaluated. The

major dispersion factors are a

combination of wind velocity and debris

fall time. Because the atmospheric

density is a function of altitude and

affects the resultant fall time, Di is

estimated by summing the radial

dispersions computed for each altitude

interval the debris intersects on its

descent trajectory. Once all the debris

dispersion radii have been calculated,

the flight corridor’s launch area is

produced by plotting each debris

dispersion circle on a map, and drawing

enveloping lines that enclose the outer

boundary of the debris dispersion

circles. The uprange portion of the flight

corridor is described by a semi-circle arc

that is a portion of either the most

uprange Di dispersion circle, or the

overflight exclusion zone, whichever is

further uprange.12 The enveloping lines

that enclose the final Di dispersion

circle forms the downrange boundary of

a flight corridor’s launch area.

Downrange Area Containment Analysis

A containment analysis also describes

the dimensions of a flight corridor’s

downrange area. The FAA designed the

downrange area analysis to

accommodate expendable launch

vehicle imparted velocity, malfunction

turns, and vehicle guidance and

performance dispersions. The analysis

to obtain the downrange area of a flight

corridor for guided orbital and

suborbital expendable launch vehicle

trajectories starts with trajectory

positions with heights greater than

50,000 feet, that is, the point where the

launch area analysis ends. A downrange

area for a guided orbital expendable

launch vehicle ends 5,000 nautical

miles from the launch point, or where

the IIP leaves the surface of the earth,

whichever is shorter. If an applicant has

chosen a guided suborbital expendable

launch vehicle for the analysis, the

analysis must define the impact

dispersion area for the final stage, and

that impact dispersion area marks the

end of a downrange area.

An applicant computes the crossrange

boundaries of the downrange area of a

flight corridor by calculating the

expendable launch vehicle position

after a simulated worst-case four second

turn, rotating the launch vehicle state

vector to account for vehicle guidance

and performance dispersions, and then

computing an instantaneous impact

point. The locus of IIPs describes the

impact boundary.

As a first step, an applicant computes

a reduction ratio factor that decreases

with increasing launch vehicle range.

Secondly, an applicant computes the

launch vehicle position after a

simulated worst-case four-second

malfunction turn for each altitude

interval along a trajectory. For purposes

of the launch site location review, the

FAA relies on a velocity vector

malfunction turn angle initially set at

45°. This turn angle is decreased, using

a reduction ratio factor, as a function of

downrange distance to simulate the

constraining effects of increasing

velocity in the downrange direction on

malfunction turn capability. See figure

B–2. The FAA assumes this worst-case

delay (4 seconds) result in order to

account for the maximum dispersion of

the vehicle during the time necessary

for a person in charge of destroying a

launch vehicle to detect a vehicle failure

and cause the vehicle’s destruction.

Figure B–2 in appendix B depicts the

velocity vector movement in the yaw

plane of the vehicle body axis

coordinate system. Figure 1 below

depicts the state vector axes and impact

locations for a malfunction turn failure

and for an on-trajectory failure.13

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62847

The second step described above

assumes perfect performance of the

launch vehicle up until the beginning of

the malfunction turn. In order, however,

to account for normal three sigma (3σ)

performance and guidance dispersions

of the launch vehicle prior to the

malfunction turn, the applicant next

rotates the trajectory state vector. The

trajectory state-vector rotation is

accomplished in conjunction with an

XYZ to ENU coordinate system

transformation. This transformation

rotates the X and Y axes about the Z

axis. The Z and U axes are coincident.

Both position and velocity components

are rotated. The FAA intends the

trajectory azimuth rotation to account

for the normal 3-sigma launch vehicle

performance and guidance dispersions

that may exist at the beginning of a

malfunction turn. The rotation angle

decreases from three degrees to one

degree as the vehicle proceeds

downrange, and the rate of decrease is

a function of distance from the launch

point. This is done because the

trajectory azimuth of an expendable

launch vehicle with 3-sigma

performance and guidance dispersions

early in flight could be approximately

±3 degrees from the nominal flight

azimuth. Since this azimuth offset is not

considered a failure response, the

guidance, navigation, and control

system is expected to achieve steering

corrections. These corrections will

eventually reduce the angular offset

later in flight as the launch vehicle

targets the mission objectives for orbital

insertion. If an expendable launch

vehicle has 3-sigma performance and

guidance dispersions later in flight, the

effects of increasing velocity in the

downrange direction limits an

expendable launch vehicle’s capability

to alter the trajectory’s azimuth. Launch

vehicles in the four expendable launch

vehicle weight classes were reviewed to

determine the typical range of

malfunction-turning rates in the

downrange area. The FAA found these

rates to be relatively small compared to

launch area rates. The FAA uses the

three and one degree turn rates because

they encompass the turn rates found

during the review process.

Before initiating the IIP computations,

an applicant must transform the ENU

coordinate system to an EFG coordinate

system. This EFG coordinate

transformation is employed to simplify

the IIP computation.

The IIP computations proposed in

appendix B are used for determining the

IIPs to either side of a trajectory by

creating latitude and longitude pairs for

the left and right flight corridor

boundaries. Connecting the latitude and

longitude pairs describes the boundary

of the downrange area of a flight

corridor. The launch site location

review IIP calculations assume the

absence of atmospheric drag effects.

Equations B46–B69 implement an

iterative solution to the problem of

determining an impact point. This

iterative technique includes checks for

conditions that will not result in impact

point solutions. The conditions

prohibiting impact solutions are: (1) An

initial launch vehicle position below the

Earth’s surface, (2) a trajectory orbit that

is not elliptical, but, parabolic or

hyperbolic, (3) a positive perigee height,

where the trajectory orbit does not

intersect the Earth, and (4) the iterative

solution does not converge. Any one of

the conditions given above will prohibit

62848 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

14Although an applicant who calculates an

appendix B flight corridor will know actual dwell

times for its Ec analysis, the FAA has supplied a

constant to approximate dwell time for an applicant

who relies on an appendix A flight corridor.

the computation of an impact point. The

iterative approach of equations B46–B69

solves these problems.

Estimating Public Risk

Upon completing a flight corridor, an

applicant must estimate the risk to the

public within the flight corridor to

determine whether that risk falls within

acceptable levels. If an applicant

demonstrates that no part of the flight

corridor is over a populated area, the

flight corridor satisfies the FAA’s risk

thresholds, and an applicant’s

application may rely on its appendix B

analysis. If a flight corridor includes a

populated area, an applicant has the

option of rotating an appendix B flight

corridor using a different launch point

or azimuth to avoid population, or of

conducting an overflight risk analysis in

accordance with appendix C.

Appendix C

Under a launch site location review,

once an applicant has created a flight

corridor employing either appendix A

or B, the applicant must ascertain

whether there is population within the

flight corridor. If there is no population,

the FAA will approve the location of the

proposed launch point for the type and

weight class of expendable launch

vehicle analyzed. If there is population,

an applicant must employ appendix C

to perform an overflight risk analysis for

the corridor. An appendix C risk

analysis determines whether or not the

risk to the public from a hypothetical

launch exceeds the FAA’s risk threshold

of an estimated expected casualty (Ec) of

no more than 30 × 10¥6 per launch. The

purpose of the Ec analysis as part of the

launch site location review is not to

determine a value of Ec but rather to

confidently demonstrate that Ec is less

than the acceptable threshold value.

An appendix C risk analysis estimates

the Ec overflight contribution from a

single hypothetical launch whose flight

termination system is assumed to work

perfectly. The analysis takes into

account the probability of a vehicle

failing throughout its trajectory, dwell

times 14 over individual populated

areas, and the probability of impact

within those areas. The analysis also

takes into account the effective casualty

area of a vehicle class, the size of the

populated area, and the population

density of the exposed population.

Estimating Ec for an actual launch

takes a large number of variables and

considerations into account. The risk

analysis provided in appendix C

provides a somewhat simpler approach

to estimating Ec within the boundaries

of a flight corridor than might be

necessary in performing a risk analysis

for an actual launch. For purposes of

determining the acceptability of a

launch site’s location, the FAA relies

only on variables relevant to ensuring

that the site itself offers at least one

flight corridor sufficiently isolated from

population for safety. Accordingly,

many of the factors that a launch

operator will take into account will not

be reflected here.

In brief, in order for an applicant to

perform an appendix C risk analysis, the

applicant must first determine whether

any populated areas are present within

an appendix A or B flight corridor. If so,

the applicant must obtain area and

population data. At this point an

applicant has a choice. Appendix C

requires that an applicant calculate the

probability of impact for each populated

area, and then determine an Ec value for

each populated area. To obtain the

estimated Ec for an entire flight corridor,

the applicant adds—or sums—the Ec

results for each populated area. If the

population within the flight corridor is

relatively small, an applicant may wish

to conduct a less rigorous analysis by

making conservative assumptions.

Appendix C also offers the option of

analyzing a worst-case flight corridor for

those flight corridors where such an

approach might save time and analysis.

Examples of such simplifications are

provided.

Identification and Location of

Population

In order to perform an Ec analysis, an

applicant must first identify the

populated areas within a flight corridor.

For the first 100 nautical miles from a

launch point downrange a U.S. census

block group serves as the maximum size

of an individual populated area

permitted under an appendix C

analysis. The maximum permitted size

of an individual populated area beyond

100 nautical miles downrange is a 1

degree latitude × 1 degree longitude

grid. The size of the areas analyzed will

play out differently depending on the

location of the proposed launch site. For

example, if an applicant proposed a

coastal site, the applicant would

presumably present the FAA with a

flight corridor mostly over water.

Population may be limited to that of a

few islands, minimizing the amount of

data and analysis necessary. If an

applicant proposes a launch site located

further inland, the applicant would

need to obtain the area and population

of each census block group in the first

100 nm of the flight corridor. This may

prove time consuming, although the

FAA has alternative approaches that

may simplify the process for such

applicants. An applicant may also

propose to operate a launch site on

foreign territory, where U.S. census data

does not apply. In that event, the FAA

will apply the principles underlying a

launch site location review to the

available data on a case-by-case basis.

The final regulations require the

analysis of populations at the census

block group level for the first 100 nm

from the launch point in the flight

corridor. An applicant shall employ

data from the latest census. An

applicant must also include population

that may not be included in the U.S.

census, such as military base personnel.

The FAA recognizes a census block

group to be a reasonable populated area

for analysis because the risk early in

flight is greatest due to long dwell times.

IIP range rates in a launch area are

relatively slow, which exposes the

launch area populations to launch

vehicle risks for a longer period of time

when compared to similar populations

in the downrange area. Depending on

the launch site and the launch vehicle,

a census block group could be exposed

to launch vehicle risks for tens of

seconds. In contrast to the size of a

populated area in the downrange area,

the increased risk due to longer dwell

times requires a more detailed

evaluation of the launch area for Ec

purposes. A census block group is an

appropriate size for analysis because it

is small enough to accommodate the

assumption that a populated area

contains homogeneously distributed

population without grossly distorting

the outcome of the Ec estimates, and

because the data is readily available for

populations in the United States. An

applicant may find the need to use only

a portion of a census block group, such

as when a populated area is divided by

a flight corridor boundary. In that case

an applicant should use the population

density of the block group to reflect the

population in that portion of the census

block group.

The FAA allows an applicant to

evaluate the presence of people in larger

increments of area in the downrange

area of a flight corridor than in the

launch area of a flight corridor.

Populations in the downrange area of a

flight corridor must be analyzed in areas

no greater than 1° × 1° latitude and

longitude grid coordinates. Because

dwell times downrange are shorter, the

risk to the individual populated areas is

less and, therefore, the FAA is willing

to accept a different degree of accuracy.

IIP range rates in the downrange area

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62849

15United Nations FAO Yearbook, Vol. 47, Rome,

1993.

16The Guinness World Data Book, Guinness Pub.

Ltd., Middlessex, England, 1993.

17Rand McNally World Atlas, Rand McNally,

New York, 1991.

can achieve speeds of 500 nm/second.

Because the longest distance in a grid

space would be approximately 85 nm

for a grid on the equator, which is where

the largest grid area will be found, the

launch vehicle IIP dwell time would be

less then 0.20 seconds over that grid.

This reduces the risk to population in

that grid significantly compared with

population in the launch area.

The data needed for a downrange area

analysis is also readily available. One

source for population data in an area no

greater than 1° x 1° latitude and

longitude grid coordinates is a database

of the Carbon Dioxide Information

Analysis Center (CDIAC), Oak Ridge

National Laboratory. The CDIAC

database is ‘‘Global Population

Distribution (1990), Terrestrial Area and

Country Name Information on a One by

One Degree Grid Cell Basis.’’ This

database contains one degree by one

degree grid information on the worldwide distribution of population for 1990

and country specific information on the

percentage of a country’s population

present in each grid cell.

The CDIAC obtained its population

estimates from the United Nations FAO

Yearbook, 15 the Guinness World Data

Book,16 and the Rand McNally World

Atlas 17 for approximately 6,000 cities

with populations greater than 50,000

inhabitants. The population data was

updated by CDIAC to 1990 values with

available census data. For the rural

population allocation, the CDIAC

developed global rural population

distribution factors based on national

population data, data on approximately

90,000 cities and towns, and the

assumption that rural population is

proportional to the number of cities and

towns within each grid cell for each

country.

Probability of Impact

The next step in the process is to

ascertain the probability of impact for

each populated area. In other words, an

applicant must find the probability that

debris will land in each populated area

within the flight corridor under

analysis. For this, the applicant must

find the probability of impact in both

the crossrange and downrange

directions, by employing equation C1

for an appendix A flight corridor for an

orbital launch or equations C2 through

C4 for an appendix A corridor that

describes a suborbital launch. For an

analysis based on an appendix B flight

corridor, an applicant will employ

equation C5 for an orbital launch or

equations C6 through C8 for a suborbital

launch. For both appendix A and B

corridors, the probability of impact (Pi)

within a particular populated area is

equal to the product of the probability

of impact in the downrange (Px) and

cross range (Py) directions, and the

probability of vehicle failure (Pf).

PPPP i yxf = * *

The analysis applicable to both

appendix A and B flight corridors is the

same for the crossrange direction, but

employs a different equation to

determine the probability of impact in

the downrange direction. For an

appendix A corridor, the FAA specifies

a constant in equation C1 to

approximate dwell time for the

downrange direction. In equation C5 an

applicant will employ actual dwell

times obtained from the trajectory

generated in accordance with appendix

B.

An applicant who relies on an

appendix A flight corridor will use

equation C1 to determine the probability

of impact for a particular populated area

in the downrange direction by finding

the range rate and assuming a total

thrusting time of 643 seconds. Equation

C1 reflects the fact that appendix A does

not employ trajectory data, and

therefore, employs a technique for

estimating dwell times as a function of

range and range rate to determine the

probability of impact in the downrange

direction. Table C–2 provides the

appendix A flight corridor IIP range

intervals and corresponding IIP range

rates for use in Equation C1.

To create table C–2, the FAA

employed actual trajectory data to

determine individual range rates for

Atlas, Delta and Titan expendable

launch vehicles.

The FAA derived the total average

thrusting time of 643 seconds from the

data in table 5 below by dividing the

difference of the upper value of adjacent

IIP ranges by the average IIP range rate

corresponding to the largest IIP range

and summing the results over the set of

IIP ranges.

TABLE 5.—DATA TO DERIVE TOTAL THRUSTING TIME

IIP Range (nm)

IIP Range Rate (nm/s)

∆t(s)

Delta Atlas Titan Avg

0–100 ....................................................................................................... 1.03 0.85 0.96 0.91 110.50

101–500 ................................................................................................... 3.33 3.77 2.23 3.00 133.33

501–1500 ................................................................................................. 4.17 3.66 2.73 3.20 312.99

1500–2500 ............................................................................................... 9.01 21.74 12.99 17.37 57.59

2501–3000 ............................................................................................... 33.33 50.00 41.67 45.84 10.91

3001–4000 ............................................................................................... 66.67 90.91 83.33 87.12 11.48

4001–5000 ............................................................................................... 166.67 142.86 166.67 154.77 6.46

Total-∆t ............................................................................................. .................... .................... .................... 643.26

The ‘‘X’’ distances were measured

directly off the mapping information

source.

An applicant who relies on an

appendix B flight corridor will employ

equation C5 or equations C6 through C8

depending on whether the flight

corridor culminates in an impact

dispersion area or not. Equation C5

reflects the fact that, unlike an appendix

A flight corridor, the trajectory data

used to create an appendix B flight

corridor provides downrange

instantaneous impact points (IIPs).

Accordingly, the dwell time associated

with a populated area may be

ascertained for the difference between

the closest and furthest downrange

distances of the populated area. See

figure C–2.

An applicant may find the following

six step procedure helpful in

determining for individual populated

areas the dwell time that equation C5

calls for. The subscripts do not

correspond to subscripts in the

appendix.

62850 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

Step 1: Determine the trajectory time

(t1) associated with the trajectory IIP

position (x1) that immediately precedes

the uprange point on the populated area

boundary. This is accomplished by

locating the IIP points in the vicinity of

the populated area, drawing lines

normal to the trajectory IIP ground trace,

and choosing the trajectory time for the

IIP point whose normal is closest to the

uprange boundary of the populated area

but does not intersect it. The distance

from the launch point to x1 may be

determined using the range and bearing

equations in appendix A, paragraph (b).

Step 2: Determine the trajectory time

(t2) associated with the trajectory IIP

position (x2) that just exceeds the

downrange point on the populated area

boundary. This is accomplished by

locating the IIP points in the vicinity of

the populated area, drawing lines

normal to the trajectory IIP ground trace,

and choosing the trajectory time for the

IIP point whose normal is closest to the

downrange boundary of the populated

area but does not intersect it. The

distance from the launch point to x2

may be determined using the range and

bearing equations in appendix A,

section (b).

 Step 3: Determine the average IIP 

range rate ( for the flight period 

determined in steps 1 and 2 above.

 ̇

R)

R ̇ x x

t t = ( ) −

( ) −

2 1

2 1

 (units in nm/s)

Step 4: Determine the distance along

the nominal trajectory to the uprange

point (x3) on the populated area

boundary. This is accomplished by

drawing a line normal to the trajectory

IIP ground trace and tangent to the

uprange boundary of the populated area,

and determining the distance along the

nominal trajectory IIP ground trace from

the launch point to the intersection of

the normal and the ground trace.

Step 5: Determine the distance along

the nominal trajectory to the downrange

point (x4) on the populated area

boundary. This is accomplished by

drawing a line normal to the trajectory

IIP ground trace and tangent to the

downrange boundary of the populated

area, and determining the distance along

the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace

from the launch point to the intersection

of the normal and the ground trace.

Step 6: The dwell time (td) is

estimated by the following equation.

t x x

R

d = ( ) 4 3 −

 ̇ (units in seconds)

For either type of flight corridor, an

applicant determines the probability of

impact in the crossrange direction, (Py),

through a series of steps, of which the

first is measuring the distance from the

nominal trajectory IIP ground trace to

the closest and furthest points in the

crossrange direction of the area that

contains population. The populated area

may consist of a census block group or

a 1 degree latitude by 1 degree longitude

grid. See figure C–1. To determine the

distribution of the debris pattern in that

populated area, the applicant needs to

estimate the standard deviation of

debris impacts. For purposes of an

appendix C analysis, the crossrange

boundaries of a flight corridor represent

three standard deviations (3σ) of all

debris impacts from normal and

malfunction trajectories. To apply this

to a populated area, an applicant must

first find the distance from the nominal

trajectory to the crossrange boundary,

measured on a line normal to the

trajectory through the geographic center

of the populated area, and then divide

that distance by three.

Finally, the probability of failure is

also an element in calculating the

probability of impact. The FAA assigns

a failure probability (Pf) constant of Pf

= 0.10 for guided expendable launch

vehicles. This represents what the FAA

intends as a conservative estimate of the

failure percentage of current expendable

launch vehicles, and may be

conservative because many current

expendable launch vehicles are more

reliable. The appendix C process

assumes that the probability of

impacting within the corridor is one,

and the probability of impacting outside

the corridor is zero. The flight

termination system is assumed to

function perfectly in all failure

scenarios.

A final variation on computing the

probability of impact for a particular

populated area is used when computing

the probability of impact (Pi ) within the

impact dispersion area of a guided

suborbital expendable launch vehicle.

In this case, the probability of success

(Ps) is substituted for the probability of

failure (Pf), and an applicant shall

employ a method similar to that used in

appendix D to calculate the probability

of impact for any populated areas inside

the impact dispersion area. This

divergence, the use of probability of

success rather than probability of

failure, from the variable used for an

orbital expendable launch vehicle arises

out of the relative risk associated with

an impact dispersion area of a guided

sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle.

The same risks associated with a guided

orbital launch are also associated with

a guided sub-orbital launch except for

the designated impact area for the final

stage of the guided sub-orbital launch

vehicle. The final stage is intended to

return to Earth rather than to enter orbit.

On the basis of past history, the risk due

to a planned impact in the dispersion

area is higher than an unplanned

impact. The FAA accordingly requires

the use of Ps inside the impact

dispersion area rather than Pf for

determining the probability of impact in

a guided suborbital expendable launch

vehicle’s impact dispersion area.

Totaling Risk of All Populated Areas in

Flight Corridor

The Ec estimate for a flight corridor is

a summation of the risk to each

populated area and results in an

estimate of Ec inside the corridor, E

(Corridor). This means that an applicant

estimates Ec for each individual

populated area within a flight corridor,

using the following equation:

E P A

A ck i N c

k

= ⋅ k





 



 ⋅

Pi is the probability of hitting the

populated area. Ac is the effective

casualty area of the vehicle and may be

obtained from table C–3. Ak is the area

of the populated area. Nk is the

population in Ak, and is obtained from

census data. The label ‘‘k’’ is used to

identify the individual populated area.

The summed Ec for all populated areas

added together is the Ec (Corridor).

The FAA requires an applicant to use

an effective casualty area specific to an

expendable launch vehicle class and

range when performing the Ec

calculation. An effective casualty area

(Ac) means the aggregate casualty area of

each piece of debris created by a launch

vehicle failure at particular points on its

trajectory. The casualty area for each

piece of debris is the area within which

100 percent of the unprotected

population on the ground is assumed to

be a casualty. This area is based on the

characteristics of the debris piece

including its size, the path angle of its

trajectory, impact explosions, and debris

skip, splatter, and bounce. In each of the

vehicle classes, the Ac decreases,

resulting in a smaller casualty area, as

a function of distance downrange

because vehicle size and explosive

potential decreases as explosive

propellant is consumed and expended

stages are ejected during vehicle flight.

An effective casualty area as a

function of time-after-liftoff is provided

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62851

18As noted above, the purpose of the Ec analysis

as part of the launch site location review is not to

determine a value of Ec but rather to confidently

demonstrate that Ec is less than the acceptable

threshold value.

in table C–3 for expendable launch

vehicle classes listed in table 1 of

section 420.19. The FAA derived the

effective casualty areas in table C–3

from DAMP, a series of risk estimation

computer programs used at federal

launch ranges, to evaluate the vehicle

classes described in table 1, section

420.19. DAMP considers other factors

besides debris characteristics, such as

the size of a standing person, which

increases the casualty area, and

sheltering, which would tend to

decrease the casualty area. Because

considering sheltering has a greater

effect than considering the size of a

standing person, and was not assumed

in table C–3, the effective casualty areas

in table C–3 are conservative with

regards to those factors.

An applicant calculates casualty

expectancy for each populated area

within a flight corridor. After the

casualty expectancies have been

estimated for all populated areas, the Ec

values are summed to obtain the total

corridor risk.

The FAA will not approve the

proposed launch site location if the

estimated expected casualty exceeds

30×10¥6. An applicant may either

modify its proposal, or if the flight

corridor used was generated by the

method in appendix A, use the typically

less conservative but more accurate

method in appendix B to narrow the

flight corridor and perform another

appendix C overflight risk analysis. An

applicant may employ specified

variations to the analysis described

above. Six variations are identified in

appendix C. The first four variations

permit an applicant to make

conservative assumptions that would

lead to an overestimation of the corridor

Ec compared with the more detailed

process described. Although appendix

C’s approach simplifies a typical launch

safety analysis somewhat by providing

conservative default parameters to use,

it may also prove unnecessarily

complex for applicants proposing

launch sites with launch corridors

encompassing extremely few people.

For those situations, appendix C,

through subparagraphs (c)(1)–(8),

provides the option for an applicant to

further simplify the estimation of

casualty expectancy by making worstcase assumptions that produce a higher

value of the corridor Ec compared with

the analysis otherwise defined by

appendix C. This may be particularly

useful when an applicant believes Ec is

well below the acceptable value.18

These variations allow an applicant to

assume that Px and Py have a value of

1.0 for all populated areas, or combine

populated areas into one or more larger

populated areas and use the greatest

population density of the component

populated areas for the combined area

or areas. An applicant may also assume

Py has a value of one for any given

populated area, or, for any given Px

sector, assume Py has a value of one and

use a worst case population density for

the sector. A Px sector is an area

spanning the width of a flight corridor

and bounded by two time points on the

trajectory IIP ground trace. All four of

these reduce the number of calculations

required for applicants with little

population within a flight corridor.

Another option permitted by

appendix C is for an applicant who

would otherwise fail the baseline

analysis to perform a more refined EC

analysis by negating the baseline

approach’s overestimation of the

probability of impact in each populated

area. If the flight corridor includes

populated areas that are irregular in

shape, the equations for probability of

impact in appendix C may cause Ec to

be overestimated. This is because the

result of the Pi computation for each

populated area represents the

probability of impacting within a

rectangular area that bounds the

populated area. As shown in figure C–

1 of appendix C, the length of two sides

of the rectangle would be x2¥x1, and

the length of the other two sides would

be y2—y1. Populated areas used to

support the appendix C analysis must

be no bigger than a U.S. census block

group for the first 100 nautical miles

from a launch point and no bigger than

a 1 degree latitude x 1 degree longitude

grid (1° x 1° grid) beyond 100 nautical

miles downrange. Whether the

populated area is a census block group,

a 1° x 1° grid, or a land mass such as

a small island, it will not likely be a

rectangle. Even a 1° x 1° grid near the

equator, which approximates a

rectangle, will not line up with the

trajectory ground trace. Thus, a portion

of the Pi rectangle includes area outside

the populated area being evaluated. The

probability of impacting in the rectangle

is higher than impacting just in the

populated area being evaluated. The

value of the probability of impact

calculated in accordance with appendix

C will thus likely be overestimated.

One approach permitted by appendix

C is to divide any given populated area

into smaller rectangles, determine Pi for

each individual rectangle, and sum the

individual impact probabilities to

determine Pi for the entire populated

area. A second approach permitted by

appendix C is, for a given populated

area, to use the ratio of the populated

area to the area of the original Pi

rectangle.

If the estimated expected casualty

exceeds 30×10¥6, the FAA will not

approve the proposed launch site

location. In that event, the only

remaining options for an applicant

would be to rely on one of its potential

customers obtaining a launch license for

launch from the proposed site.

Appendix D

Appendix D contains the FAA’s

method for determining the

acceptability of the location of a launch

site for launching unguided suborbital

expendable launch vehicles. Appendix

D describes how to define an overflight

exclusion zone and each impact

dispersion area to be analyzed for risk

for a representative launch vehicle.

Appendix D also describes how to

estimate whether risk to the public,

measured by expected casualty, falls

within the FAA’s threshold of

acceptable risk. In short, the approach

requires an applicant to define an

overflight exclusion zone around a

launch point, determine the impact

point for each spent stage and then

define an impact dispersion area around

each impact point. If populated areas

are located in the impact dispersion

areas and cannot be excluded by

altering the launch azimuth, the FAA

requires a risk analysis that

demonstrates that risk to the public

remains within acceptable levels.

As a first step, an applicant selects

which launch points at the proposed

launch site would be used for the

launch of an unguided suborbital

expendable launch vehicle. An

applicant must also then select an

existing suborbital expendable launch

vehicle, for which apogee data is

available, whose final stage apogee

represents the maximum altitude of any

unguided suborbital expendable launch

vehicle intended for launch from that

launch point. The applicant would then

plot the distance, which is referred to as

the impact range, from the launch point

to the nominal impact point on the

azimuth for each stage. Employing the

impact dispersion radius of each stage,

the applicant would define an impact

dispersion area around each nominal

impact point.

The methodology for the impact

dispersion area requirements is

grounded in three assumptions which

reflect current practice. For purposes of

this location review, the FAA assumes

62852 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

19These vehicles include Nike Orion, Black Brant

IX, Black Brant XI, and Black Brant XII. They are

representative of the current launch vehicle

inventory and should approximate any proposed

new launch vehicle.

that unguided suborbital expendable

launch vehicles are not equipped with

a flight termination system, and that

public risk criteria are accordingly met

through the implementation of a wind

weighting system, launch procedures

and restrictions, and the proper

selection of a launch azimuth and

elevation angles. These aspects are

currently reflected in FAA guidelines

and will be addressed in its regulations

for launches from non-federal launch

sites. The cumulative launch experience

in unguided suborbital expendable

launch vehicles demonstrates that risk

to the public from launches of these

vehicles is attributable to planned stage

impact during a successful flight.

Controlling these risks solely through

measures implemented prior to flight

rather than relying on active measures

during flight, as is the case for a vehicle

equipped with an FTS, has provided

historically an acceptable approach to

protection of the public. Accordingly,

the appendix D analysis should

adequately address the general

suitability of each launch point for

unguided suborbital expendable launch

vehicle launches up to the altitude

proposed. Operational requirements

imposed on a launch licensee through

license conditions should adequately

address risks posed by the actual launch

of unguided suborbital expendable

launch vehicles.

The location review for a launch point

that will support unguided suborbital

expendable launch vehicles also

assumes that intermediate and final

stages impact the Earth within three

standard deviations (3σ) of each

nominal, no wind, impact point. This

means that an appendix D analysis does

not account for failures outside of three

standard deviations from each intended

impact point.

It also means that an appendix D

analysis does not simulate an actual

launch in actual wind conditions. For

actual launches, wind weighting can be

used to obtain the nominal, no wind,

impact point for the final stage only. In

order to ensure that the launch meets Ec,

ship hit, and aircraft hit probabilities,

launch operators compute the wind

drifted impact points of all stages using

the launcher settings determined

through wind weighting so that

intermediate stage impacts are

determined just prior to launch.

Although appendix D does not address

this fact directly, it does show whether

at least some launches can be conducted

depending on the wind conditions.

Defining an Overflight Exclusion Zone

and Impact Dispersion Areas

The areas an applicant will analyze

for risk to the public posed by the

launch of an unguided suborbital

expendable launch vehicle consist of an

overflight exclusion zone and stage

impact dispersion areas. Having

selected a launch point and a launch

vehicle for which empirical data is

available, an applicant must define each

zone and area using the methodology

provided. An overflight exclusion zone

shall consist of a circle with a radius of

1600 feet centered on a launch point.

An overflight exclusion zone is the area

which must be free of the public during

a launch. Creation of each impact

dispersion area involves several more

steps. For each stage of the analyzed

vehicle an applicant must identify the

nominal stage impact point on the

azimuth where the stage is supposed to

land, and draw a circle around that

point, using the range and bearing

equations of appendix A or geographic

information system (GIS) software. That

circle describes the impact dispersion

area, and an applicant defines an impact

dispersion area for each stage.

An applicant must at the outset

provide the geodetic latitude and

longitude of a launch point that it

proposes to offer for launch, and select

a flight azimuth. Once an applicant has

selected a launch point location and

azimuth, the next step is to determine

a 1600 foot radius overflight exclusion

zone for that launch point. As with an

overflight exclusion zone created

pursuant to appendices A and B, an

applicant must show that the public

would be cleared from its overflight

exclusion zone prior to launch.

Although suborbital vehicles have a

very low likelihood of failure, failure is

more likely to occur in the early stages

of the launch. Consequently, the FAA is

guarding against that risk through

requiring an applicant to show the

ability to evacuate an overflight

exclusion zone. As with the flight

corridors of appendices A and B, the

FAA bases the size of the overflight

exclusion zone on the maximum

distance that debris is expected to travel

from a launch point if a mishap were to

occur very early in flight. The FAA has

estimated the Dmax for an unguided

suborbital expendable launch vehicle,

and the result is 1600 feet. Accordingly,

an applicant would define an appendix

D overflight exclusion zone as a circle

with a radius of 1600 feet.

Because an applicant must choose the

maximum altitude anticipated of a

suborbital expendable launch vehicle

for launch from its site, an applicant

needs to acquire the apogee of each

stage of a representative vehicle. An

applicant need not possess full

information regarding a specific

representative launch vehicle. All that is

necessary is the apogee of each stage.

The apogee height must be obtained

from an actual launch conducted at an

84° elevation angle. If needed, data is

available from the FAA. The FAA has

compiled apogee data from past

launches from Wallops Flight Facility

for a range of launch vehicles and

payloads. This data will be provided to

an applicant upon request and may be

used to perform the analysis.

An applicant then defines impact

dispersion areas for each stage’s

nominal impact point. Having selected

a launch vehicle most representative of

what the applicant intends for launch

from the proposed launch point, an

applicant will use either its own

empirical apogee data or data from one

of the vehicles in the FAA’s data base.

Whether an applicant uses vehicle

apogee data obtained from the FAA or

from elsewhere, the applicant must

employ the range and dispersion factors

to determine the location of each

nominal impact point and the size of

each impact dispersion area.

Under appendix D, an applicant

would estimate the impact range and

dispersion parameters by multiplying

the apogee of a launch vehicle intended

for the prospective launch site by

factors. Impact range and impact

dispersion factors are derived from

launch vehicle pedigrees of sounding

rockets used by NASA Wallops Flight

Facility in its sounding rocket

program.19 The factors provide

estimators of staging data for an

unguided vehicle launched at a

standard launcher elevation, which is

the angle between the launch vehicle’s

major axis (x) and the ground, of 84°.

The appendix defines the relationship

between the apogee of a launch vehicle

stage, an impact range and a 3σ

dispersion radius of a stage. This

relationship is expressed as two

constants, which vary with the altitude

of the apogee, an impact range factor

and an impact dispersion factor.

To locate each nominal impact point,

an applicant will calculate the impact

range for the final stage and all other

stages. An impact range describes the

distance between an applicant’s

proposed launch point and the nominal

impact point of a stage, or, in other

words, its estimated landing spot along

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62853

20The one exception is the impact dispersion area

for a guided suborbital launch vehicle. That area is

analyzed assuming launch success.

the azimuth selected for analysis. For

this estimation, an applicant would

employ the FAA’s impact range factors

of 0.4 or 0.7 as multipliers for the

apogee of the stage. If an apogee is less

than 100 kilometers, the applicant shall

employ 0.4 as the impact range factor

for that stage. If the apogee of a stage is

100 kilometers or more, the applicant

shall use 0.7 as a multiplier. In plotting

the impact points on a map, an

applicant shall employ the plotting

methods provided by appendix A.

An impact dispersion radius describes

the impact dispersion area of a stage.

The FAA relies on an estimated impact

dispersion radius of three standard

deviations (3σ) because significant

population, such as a densely populated

city, in areas within distances up to 3σ

of the impact point could cause

significant public risk. An applicant

shall obtain the radius of the impact

dispersion area by multiplying the stage

apogee by the FAA’s impact dispersion

factor of 0.4 for an apogee less than 100

kilometers and of 0.7 for an apogee of

100 kilometers or more. The final stage

would typically produce the largest

impact dispersion area.

Once an applicant determines the

impact dispersion radii, the applicant

must plot each impact dispersion area

on a map in accordance with the

requirements of paragraph (b). This is

depicted in figure D–1. An applicant

may then determine if flight azimuths

exist which do not affect populated

areas. If all potential flight azimuths

contain impact dispersion areas, which

encompass populated areas, then the

FAA requires an Ec estimation of risk.

Public Risk Ec Estimation

The FAA will approve a launch point

in accordance with this appendix if

there exists a set of impact dispersion

areas for a representative launch vehicle

in which the sum of risk to the public

does not exceed the FAA’s acceptable

risk threshold. An overflight exclusion

zone must contain no people. If a

populated area is present within the

impact dispersion areas, an applicant

shall estimate the risk to the public

posed by possible stage impact. An

applicant must then determine whether

its estimated risk satisfies the FAA

requirement of an Ec of no more than 30

× 10 ¥6. The Ec estimation is performed

by computing the sum of the risk for the

impact of each stage and accounting for

each populated area located within a 3σ

dispersion of an impact point. The

equation used to accomplish this is the

same as that used in the impact

probability computation in appendix C.

Unlike, however, the method in

appendix C, which accounts for an

impact due to a failure, the probability

of a stage impact occurring is Ps = 1¥Pf,

where Ps is the probability of success,

and Pf is the probability of failure. For

the purposes of the launch site location

review, a constant of 0.98 is used for the

probability of success for unguided

suborbital expendable launch vehicles.

The probability of success is used in

place of Pf in calculating both the

crossrange and downrange probability

of impact.

The location review for launch points

intended for the launch of unguided

suborbital expendable launch vehicles

differs from the review of the location

of launch points intended for the launch

of guided orbital and suborbital

expendable launch vehicles. In

analyzing whether risk remains at

acceptable levels, Ec equations in

appendix D rely on the probability of

success rather than the probability of

failure. The use of stage impact

probability, typified as the probability of

success (Ps), for suborbital expendable

launch vehicles is necessary because

stage impacts are high probability

events which occur near the launch

point with dispersions which may

overlap or be adjacent to the launch

point. The difference between the

methods of appendices A, B and C and

appendix D reflects the fundamental

differences between the likely dominant

source of risk to the public from guided

and unguided vehicles and the methods

that have been developed for guarding

public safety against the risks created by

each type of vehicle. In other words, the

methods for defining impact dispersion

areas and for conducting an impact risk

assessment for an unguided vehicle are

premised on the risks posed by a

successful flight, that is, the planned

deposition of stages and debris. In

contrast, the methodology for

developing a flight corridor and

associated risk methodology for guided

vehicles assumes that the likely major

source of risk to the public arises out of

a failure of a mission and the ensuing

destruction of the vehicle.20

The high degree of success recorded

for unguided expendable launch

vehicles renders the probability of

success the greater source of risk.

Because of their relative simplicity of

operation, the failure rate, over time, for

unguided expendable launch vehicles

has amounted to between one and two

percent. At this level of reliability, the

FAA believes that its primary focus of

concern for assessing the safety of a

launch site should be the more likely

event, namely, the public’s exposure to

the planned impact of vehicle stages

and other vehicle components, such as

fairings, rather than the risk posed by

exposure to debris resulting from a

failure. Success is the high risk event.

Although failure rates are low for

unguided expendable launch vehicles,

their spent stages have large impact

dispersions. Moreover, the FAA’s

impact dispersion area estimations

generally produce impact dispersion

areas large enough to encompass most of

the populations exposed to a possible

failure as well as to a nominal flight,

thus ensuring the inclusion of any large,

densely populated area in the analysis.

Thus, all but a small percentage of

populated area will be analyzed to some

extent, albeit using impact probabilities

based on success.

For appendix D, the FAA assumes

that the stage impact dispersion in both

the downrange and cross range

directions are equal. This is a valid

assumption for assessing a launch site

for suborbital expendable launch

vehicles because their trajectories

produce near circular dispersions.

NASA data on sounding rocket impact

dispersion supports this conclusion.

The impact dispersion area is based

on a 3σ dispersion. Appendix D uses the

effective casualty area data, table D–1,

which contains information similar to

appendix C, table C–3. This data

represents the estimation of the area

produced by both suborbital expendable

launch vehicle inert pieces. The risk

estimation approach in appendix D has

the applicant calculate the probability of

impact for each populated area, and

then determining an Ec value for each

populated area. To obtain the estimated

Ec for an entire impact dispersion area,

the applicant adds the Ec results for

each populated area. If the population

within the impact dispersion area is

relatively small, an applicant may wish

to conduct a less rigorous analysis by

making conservative assumptions.

Appendix D offers the option of

analyzing a worst-case impact

dispersion area for those locations

where such an approach might save

time and analysis, similar to the

approach of appendix C.

The final section in subpart B is

section 420.31. It requires an applicant

to complete an agreement with the local

U.S. Coast Guard district to establish

procedures for the issuance of a Notice

to Mariners prior to a launch and other

such measures as the Coast Guard

deems necessary to protect public

health and safety. An applicant must

also complete an agreement with the

FAA Air Traffic Control (ATC) office

having jurisdiction over the airspace

62854 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

through which launches will take place,

to establish procedures for the issuance

of a Notice to Airmen prior to a launch

and for closing of air routes during the

launch window and other such

measures as the FAA regional office

deems necessary to protect public

health and safety.

These two provisions clarify from the

Launch Site NPRM that the FAA and

Coast Guard agreements must be

completed as a requirement for a

license. Section 420.31(c) adds that an

applicant that plans to operate a launch

site located on a federal launch range

does not have to enter into those

agreements if the applicant is using

existing federal launch range

agreements with the U.S. Coast Guard

and the FAA ATC office having

jurisdiction over the airspace through

which launches will take place.

Subpart C contains license term and

conditions. Section 420.41 specifies the

authority granted to a launch site

operator by a license and the licensee’s

obligation to comply with

representations contained in the license

application as well as the FAA’s license

terms and conditions. The provision

limits a licensee’s authorization to the

launch points on the launch site and to

the types of launch vehicles used to

demonstrate the safety of the launch site

location, and, for orbital launch

vehicles, to vehicles no larger than the

weight class analyzed. The provision

also clarifies the licensee’s obligation to

comply with any other laws or

regulations applicable to its licensed

activities and identifies certain rights

that are not conveyed by a launch site

operator license.

Section 420.43 specifies the duration

of a license to operate a launch site, the

grounds for shortening the term, and

that a license may be renewed.

Section 420.45 provides the

procedures that an applicant must

follow to obtain FAA approval for the

transfer of an existing license to operate

a launch site.

Section 420.47 specifies the

procedures that the FAA will follow to

modify a license through a license order

or written approval, and the procedures

that a launch site operator licensee must

follow to obtain an FAA license

modification. A licensee must obtain a

license modification if the licensee

proposes to operate the launch site in a

manner not authorized by its license.

This means, among other things, that if

a representation in the license

application regarding an issue material

to public safety is no longer accurate or

does not describe the licensee’s

operation or intended operation of the

site, a licensee must obtain a license

modification. This is because the

representations a licensee makes in its

application become part of the terms

and conditions of its license. A licensee

must obtain FAA approval prior to

modifying its operations. In the event of

special circumstance and where safety

warrants, the FAA will work with a

licensee to accommodate any timing

problems.

Section 420.47 also specifies the

procedures for a licensee to obtain and

the FAA to issue a license modification.

The FAA may modify a license using a

written approval rather than a license

order. This may occur, for example, in

cases where the change addresses an

activity or condition that was

represented in the license application

but not spelled out in a license order.

Section 420.49 imposes an obligation

on a launch site operator licensee, its

customers, and its contractors to

cooperate with the FAA in compliance

monitoring of licensed activities. This

requirement recognizes an FAA

compliance monitor’s need to observe

operations conducted by all parties at

the site and to have access to records

and personnel if the FAA is to be

assured that public safety is being

protected.

Subpart D contains the

responsibilities of a licensee. Section

420.51 describes a licensee’s obligation

to operate its launch site in accordance

with the representations in its license

application, 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, ch.

701 and the FAA’s regulations.

Section 420.53 requires a launch site

operator licensee to control public

access to the launch site and to protect

the public present at the launch site.

The regulation seeks to protect the

public from the consequences of flight

and pre-flight activities by separating

the public from hazardous launch

procedures. The public could also be at

risk if allowed to enter the launch site

or move about without adequate

safeguards. This provision requires the

licensee to prevent the public from

gaining unauthorized access to the

launch site. The applicant will be given

broad discretion in selecting the method

for controlling access. The provision

will also hold the licensee responsible

for informing members of the public of

safety precautions before entry and for

warning of emergencies on-site. A

licensee will also be responsible for

escorting the public between hazard

areas not otherwise controlled by a

launch operator at the launch site, and

employing warning signals or alarms to

notify persons on the launch site of any

emergency.

Section 420.55 requires a licensee to

develop and implement procedures to

schedule operations to ensure that each

operation carried out by a customer at

the launch site does not create the

potential for a mishap that could result

in harm to the public because of the

proximity of the operations, in time or

place, to operations of any other

customer. Customers include any

launch operator, and any contractor,

subcontractor or customer of the launch

site operator’s customer at the launch

site. This requirement is necessary to

ensure that the operations of one launch

site customer do not interact with the

operations of another customer to create

a public safety hazard at the launch site

or beyond. For example, the testing of

equipment using radio frequency

transmissions could trigger ordnance

used by someone elsewhere on the site

if the two launch preparation activities

are not coordinated or warnings issued.

Likewise, hazardous operations by one

customer with the potential to reach

another customer must be coordinated

by the launch site operator. A launch

site operator is required to ensure that

all customers at the site are informed of

procedures and adhere to scheduling

requirements before commencing

operations at the launch site.

Section 420.57 establishes notification

requirements for a licensee. The

licensee is responsible for notifying

customers of any limitations on use of

the site. This provision ensures that

customer activities are compatible with

other activities at the launch site. It also

ensures that limitations on the use of

facilities provided to customers by a

launch site operator are communicated

to the customer. Examples include the

maximum quantity of propellant

allowed in a facility, or weight

limitations on lifting devices within the

facility. The licensee will be responsible

for maintaining agreements with the

Coast Guard to arrange for issuance of

Notices to Mariners prior to launch and

with the regional FAA ATC office for

Notices to Airmen and closure of air

routes. In addition, the licensee will

notify local officials and landowners

adjacent to the launch site of the flight

schedule. This provision places an ongoing responsibility on the site operator

licensee for establishing notification

procedures, rather than on the

numerous launch licensees whose

involvement with the launch site may

be more sporadic and temporary. The

requirement does, however, leave open

the option of a launch licensee

implementing the procedures

established by the launch site operator.

Section 420.59 requires a licensee to

develop and implement a launch site

accident investigation plan containing

procedures for reporting, investigating

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62855

21The EPA’s requirements in 40 CFR 68 apply to

‘‘incidents which resulted in, or could reasonably

have resulted in a catastrophic release.’’ 40 CFR

68.60(a). OSHA’s requirements in 29 CFR 1910.119

are similar, applying to ‘‘each incident which

resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a

catastrophic release of a highly hazardous chemical

in the workplace’’ 29 CFR 1910.119(m)(1).

22Hazardous materials in AST regulations,

section 401.5, are defined as hazardous materials as

defined in 49 CFR Sec. 172.101.

23An analysis may include evaluations of blast

hazards; fragment hazards; protective construction;

grounding, bounding and lightning protection

systems; electrical installations; natural or manmade terrain features; or other mission or local

requirements.

24Areas where solid propellants and other

explosives would be stored must be included in the

plan even though ATF requirements apply.

Applicants with magazines where solid propellants

and other explosives are to be stored must obtain

an ATF permit and meet ATF quantity-distance

requirements. The FAA will use the information to

ensure that those of its requirements unrelated to

storage are satisfied and to coordinate with AFT

when necessary.

and responding to a launch site

accident. The provision extends

reporting, investigation and response

procedures currently applicable to

launch related accidents and incidents

to accidents occurring during ground

activities at a launch site.

A launch site operator may satisfy the

requirements of section 420.59 by using

accident investigation procedures

developed in accordance with the

requirements of the U.S. Occupational

Safety and Health Administration

(OSHA) at 29 CFR 1910.119 and 120,

and the U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) at 40 CFR part 68, to the

extent that the procedures include the

elements required by section 420.59.21

The FAA wishes to ease the regulatory

burden here and in other parts of the

final regulations where other federal

regulatory agencies impose

requirements on launch site operators.

OSHA’s standard at 29 CFR 1910.119

includes provisions for investigating

incidents and emergency response. See

29 CFR 1910.119(m) and (n). In

addition, 29 CFR 1910.120, hazardous

waste operations and emergency

response (HAZWOPER), provides for

emergency response planning for

operations involving hazardous

materials, including those listed by the

Department of Transportation under 49

CFR 172.101.22 Launch operators and

launch site operators in compliance

with these requirements will be taking

steps to protect the public as well as

their workers.

EPA’s requirements at 40 CFR 68 also

include standards for incident

investigation and emergency response.

See 40 CFR 68.60, 68.81, 68.90, and

68.180. For both the OSHA and EPA

requirements, compliance with 42

U.S.C. 11003, Emergency Planning and

Community Right-to-Know, satisfies

many of the emergency response

provisions.

Section 420.59(e) is new since the

Launch Site NPRM, and states that a

launch site accident investigation plan

must contain procedures for

participating in an investigation of a

launch accident for launches that take

place from the launch site. This

provision also requires the licensee to

cooperate with FAA or National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

investigations of a launch accident for

launches that take place from the launch

site. The FAA believes that any

investigation of a launch accident must

have the participation of the launch site

operator. The FAA requests comment on

this new provision.

Section 420.61 provides the

requirements for launch site operator

retention of records, data, and other

material needed to verify that launch

site operator operations are conducted

in accordance with representations

contained in the license application,

and for record production in the event

of launch site accident investigation, or

compliance monitoring.

Sections 420.63 through 420.69

contains the FAA’s explosive facility

siting standards for the protection of the

public from launch site explosive

hazards created by liquid and solid

propellants and other explosives. These

standards shall be used by an applicant

to site facilities that support activities

involving liquid and solid propellants

and other explosives, or facilities

potentially exposed to such activities,

and to document the layout of these

facilities.23

Section 420.63(a) requires a launch

site operator to ensure that the

configuration of the launch site is in

accordance with the licensee’s explosive

site plan, and that its explosive site plan

is in compliance with the requirements

of sections 420.65–420.69. Section

420.63 identifies items that must be in

an explosive site plan. The explosive

site plan must include a scaled map or

maps that show the location of all

proposed explosive hazard facilities

where solid and liquid propellants

would be stored or handled.24 An

applicant must identify the class and

division for each solid propellant and

other explosive and the hazard and

compatibility group for each liquid

propellant.

In addition to the location of

explosive hazard facilities, the map or

maps must indicate actual and

minimum allowable distances between

each explosive hazard facility and other

explosive hazard facilities and each

public area, including the launch site

boundary. One means by which an

applicant could show that the distances

are at least the minimum required is by

drawing a circle or arc with a radius

equal to the minimum allowed distance

centered on each explosive hazard

facility.

In addition to containing maps, an

explosive site plan should also describe,

through tables or lists, the maximum

quantities of liquid and solid

propellants and other explosives to be

located at each explosive hazard facility,

and the activities to be conducted

within each explosive hazard facility.

Pursuant to section 420.63(b), a

licensee operating a launch site located

on a federal launch range does not have

to demonstrate compliance with the

requirements of §§ 420.65–420.69 if the

licensee is in compliance with the

federal launch range’s explosive safety

requirements. As proposed in the

Launch Site NPRM, this provision

stated that a launch site operator did not

have to comply with the FAA’s

explosive safety requirements. Out of

concern that this might be

misinterpreted as permitting a launch

site operator not to comply with either

the range requirements, which are

substantially similar to those contained

in this part, or those of the FAA, the

FAA wishes to clarify that it only

intended that a launch site operator not

have to demonstrate compliance to the

FAA where a launch site operator

demonstrates explosive safety to a

federal launch range. Federal launch

ranges have separate rules which are

either identical or similar to the rules

proposed, or require mitigation

measures which otherwise ensure

safety. The FAA only wishes to see, in

accordance with section 420.15(d)(2),

the launch site operator’s explosive site

plan submitted to the federal launch

range.

In accordance with section 420.63(c),

for explosive siting issues not otherwise

addressed by the requirements of

sections 420.65–420.69, a launch site

operator must clearly and convincingly

demonstrate a level of safety equivalent

to that otherwise required by part 420.

This provision is new since the Launch

Site NPRM, and has been added because

the explosive siting requirements are

designed to codify only core explosive

siting standards. The FAA realizes that

some launch site siting scenarios will

involve safety issues not otherwise

addressed in this rulemaking. Thus, this

provision was added to make clear that

explosive siting issues outside the

provisions issued with this rulemaking

will be resolved in accordance with the

requirements of safety. DOD Standard

62856 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

6055.9 is perhaps the best example of a

standard governing many more

explosive safety issues than those

addressed to date in this part.

In order to demonstrate compliance

with the explosive site standards, a

launch site operator applicant first

determines those areas at its proposed

launch site where solid or liquid

propellant and other explosives will be

stored or handled, and which the FAA

designates as explosive hazard facilities.

Explosive hazard facilities may include

payload processing facilities, launch

pads, propellant storage or transfer

tanks, and solid rocket motor assembly

buildings. A launch site operator must

then determine the types and maximum

quantity of propellants and other

explosives to be located at each

explosive hazard facility. For solid

propellants and other explosives, the

applicant determines the total weight,

expressed in pounds, of explosive

material to be contained in the items

that will be located at each explosive

hazard facility. For liquid propellants,

the applicant determines either the

explosive equivalency of a fuel and

oxidizer combination if fuels and

oxidizers would be located together at,

what is referred to as, incompatible

distances; or, if fuels and oxidizers

would not be located together, an

applicant would determine the net

weight in pounds of liquid propellant in

each explosive hazard facility.

The next step for a launch site

operator applicant would be to

determine the minimum allowable

separation distance between each

explosive hazard facility and all other

explosive hazard facilities, the launch

site boundary, and other public areas

such as the launch complex of another

launch operator, public railways and

highways running through the launch

site, and any visitor centers. The

distances between explosive hazard

facilities are important to ensure that an

explosive event in one explosive hazard

facility would not cause an explosive

event in another explosive hazard

facility. The distances between

explosive hazard facilities and public

areas are important to ensure that the

public is protected from blast, debris,

and thermal hazards. Exact distances

must be given between the wall or

corner of the facility closest to the

closest wall or corner of other explosive

hazard facilities and public areas.

Minimum allowable distances are

determined using tables in appendix E.

These tables reflect distances based on

the type and quantity of propellant or

other explosive to be located within an

explosive hazard facility. Determining

the minimum allowable distance

between two explosive hazard facilities

is accomplished by applying the

applicable criteria to each and then

separating them by at least the greater

distance prescribed for each explosive

hazard facility. For example, if a certain

amount of explosive division 1.3 solid

propellant would be located at

explosive hazard facility A, and twice as

much explosive division 1.3 solid

propellant would be located at

explosive hazard facility B, the

prescribed distance generated by

explosive hazard facility B would serve

as the minimum distance permitted

between explosive hazard facility A and

explosive hazard facility B.

The criteria for determining the

minimum required distances between

each explosive hazard facility and all

other explosive hazard facilities and

each public area, including the launch

site boundary, are contained in section

420.65 for solid propellants and other

solid explosives and section 420.67 for

liquid propellants. Section 420.69

includes rules for when liquid and solid

propellants and other explosives are

located together.

Section 420.65 covers quantity

determinations and minimum required

distances for explosive hazard facilities

where solid propellants and other solid

explosives would be handled. Under

section 420.65(a), an applicant first

determines the maximum total quantity,

by class and division, of explosive in

each explosive hazard facility where

solid propellants and other solid

explosives would be handled. The total

quantity of explosives in an explosive

hazard facility shall be the maximum

total weight, expressed in pounds, of

explosive material in the contents of the

explosive hazard facility. For example,

if a facility could hold up to ten solid

rocket motors of a particular type, even

though it might only rarely hold that

many motors, the applicant would

calculate the total weight of division 1.3

explosive material in the ten motors.

Section 420.65(b) addresses the

situation where explosive divisions 1.1

and 1.3 explosives are located in the

same explosive hazard facility. The

section states that when explosive

divisions 1.1 and 1.3 explosives are

planned to be located in the same

explosive hazard facility, the total

quantity of explosive shall be

considered division 1.1 for quantitydistance determinations, or, the

applicant may add the net explosive

equivalent weight of the division 1.3

items to the net weight of division 1.1

items to determine the total quantity of

explosives. This latter provision will

decrease the required distance.

Once a launch site operator has

determined the total quantity of solid

propellants and other solid explosives

in each explosive hazard facility,

section 420.65(c) requires a launch site

operator to separate each explosive

hazard facility where solid propellants

and other solid explosives will be

handled from all other explosive hazard

facilities and each public area,

including the launch site boundary, in

accordance with the minimum

separation distances contained in table

E–1 in appendix E. Table E–1 provides

two distances for each quantity and

division level. The first, a public area

distance, is the minimum distance

permitted between a public area and an

explosive hazard facility. The second,

an intraline distance, is the minimum

distance permitted between any two

explosive hazard facilities used by one

launch site customer. Other explosive

hazard facilities may constitute public

areas, because the definition of public

area includes any area in the possession

or ownership, or otherwise under the

control of a launch site operator’s other

customers. Distance calculations would

be made accordingly.

Section 420.65(d) provides separation

rules. Section 420.65(d)(1) states that a

launch site operator shall employ no

less than the applicable public area

distance to separate an explosive hazard

facility from each public area and from

the launch site boundary. Section

420.65(d)(2) states that a launch site

operator shall employ no less than an

intraline distance to separate an

explosive hazard facility from all other

explosive hazard facilities that will be

used by a single customer.

Section 420.65(d)(3) allows a launch

site operator to employ no less than

60% of the applicable public area

distance, or the public traffic route

distance, to separate an explosive

hazard facility from a public area that

consists only of a public highway or

railroad line, for explosive division 1.1

only. This is new since the Launch Site

NPRM and was included because

explosive division 1.1 explosives have

been added. This option does not apply

to explosive division 1.3 because for

explosive division 1.3 explosives, the

public traffic route distance is the same

as the public area distance. Public traffic

route distance can be applied to

division 1.1 explosives when a public

area consists of airplane taxiways, open

recreational facilities not possessing

structures, and public traffic routes.

Streets and roads within the licensee’s

control are not considered public

highways unless they are used for

through traffic other than that related to

the work of the launch site.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62857

25The category is called ‘‘intragroup and

compatible’’ to cover propellants that are in

different hazard groups but are still compatible.

Section 420.65(d)(4) allows a launch

site operator to use linear interpolation

for NEW quantities between table

entries.

Finally, section 420.65(d)(5) states

that a launch site operator shall measure

separation distance from the closest

debris or explosive hazard source in an

explosive hazard facility. For example,

for a building, a launch site operator

would measure from the wall or corner

of the facility closest to the closest wall

or corner of other explosive hazard

facilities and public areas. When solid

rocket motors or motor segments are

freestanding, an applicant would

measure from the closest motor or motor

segment. An acceptable way to

demonstrate that minimum distance

requirements are met is to draw a circle

or arc centered on the closest source of

debris or hazard showing that no other

explosive hazard facility or public area

is within the distance permitted.

Note that Q–D requirements address

siting of facilities, not operational

control of hazard areas. During actual

operations, the existence and size of a

hazard area is dependent on the actual

amount of explosive material in an

explosive hazard facility.

Section 420.67 remains unchanged

from the Launch Site NPRM, and covers

quantity determinations and distance

requirements for explosive hazard

facilities that support the storage or

handling of liquid propellants. In

addition to applying to distances

between an explosive hazard facility

and other explosive hazard facilities and

public areas, distance requirements may

apply within an explosive hazard

facility as well.

Liquid propellants are classified and

separated differently than solid

propellants and other solid explosives.

Where solid propellants and other solid

explosives are classified by class and

division, each liquid propellant is

assigned to one of three hazard groups

and one of two compatibility groups. A

hazard group categorizes liquid

propellants according to the hazards

they cause. Hazard group 1 represents a

fire hazard, hazard group 2 represents a

more serious fire hazard, and, because a

liquid propellant in hazard group 3 can

rupture a storage container, it represents

a fragmentation hazard. Each liquid

propellant also falls into one of two

compatibility groups. Liquid propellants

are compatible when storing them

together does not increase the

probability of an accident or, for a given

quantity of propellant, the magnitude of

the effects of such an accident.

Propellants in the same compatibility

group do not increase the probability or

magnitude of an accident. Group A

represents oxidizers such as LO2 and

N2O4, and group C represents fuels

such as RP–1 and LH2. Appendix E

provides the hazard and compatibility

groups for current launch vehicle liquid

propellants in table E–3.

Explosive equivalency serves as

another source of difference between the

treatment of solid explosives and liquid

propellants. Only if fuels and oxidizers

are to be located within certain

distances of each other do the

separation requirements designed to

account for the hazardous consequences

of their potential combination apply.

That combination is measured in terms

of explosive equivalency. Explosive

equivalency for liquid propellants is a

measure of the blast effects from

explosion of a given quantity of fuel and

oxidizer mixture expressed in terms of

the weight of TNT that would produce

the same blast effects when detonated.

Fuels should not be located near

oxidizers if possible. The significance of

the hazard groups and compatibility

groups is that if fuels are located far

enough from oxidizers, the minimum

distance requirements to public areas

and other explosive hazard facilities

depend only on the quantity and hazard

group of the individual liquid

propellants. If operational requirements

require fuels and oxidizers to be located

near each other, that is, at less than the

minimum public area and incompatible

distances contained in tables E–4, E–5

and E–6, the explosive equivalency of

the incompatible propellants must be

calculated and used to determine the

distances required by table E–7 to other

explosive hazard facilities and public

areas.

Appendix E contains four distance

tables with separation requirements for

liquid propellants. Tables E–4, E–5 and

E–6 contain separation distances for

hazard groups 1, 2, and 3, respectively.

Table E–7 contains separation distances

for when fuels and oxidizers are located

less than prescribed distances apart so

that explosive equivalency applies.

Table E–7 contains distances similar to

those for explosive division 1.1 solid

explosives. This is because the

‘‘explosive equivalency’’ of a fuel and

oxidizer mixture is measured in terms of

its equivalent explosive blast effect to

TNT, which is a class 1.1 explosive.

Table E–7 also prescribes public area

and intraline distances.

Tables E–4, E–5, and E–6 have two

distances listed for each quantity of

liquid propellant by hazard group. The

first, a ‘‘public area and incompatible’’

distance, is the minimum distance

permitted between a given quantity of

liquid propellant and a public area. The

distance is also the same distance by

which incompatible propellants must be

separated (e.g., the minimum distance

between a fuel and an oxidizer) for

explosive equivalency and table E–7 not

to apply to the distance calculations.

The second distance, an ‘‘intragroup

and compatible’’ distance, is the

distance by which propellants in the

same hazard group, or propellants in the

same compatibility group must be

separated (e.g. the minimum distance

between two fuels) to avoid adding the

quantity of each propellant container

being separated in calculating distances.

This is because if two propellant tanks

are far enough apart, they cannot react

with one another, even were a mishap

to occur. This introduces the third

difference between liquid propellant

separation requirements and the

requirements for solid propellants and

other explosives.

The third area where liquid

propellant separation requirements are

different than those for solid propellants

and other explosives may be found in

calculations of the quantity of liquid

propellant that determines the distance

relationship with other explosive hazard

facilities and public areas. Quantity

calculations may depend on distance.

As an example, suppose one was

determining the minimum distance

required between a tank farm having

many containers of fuel, and a launch

site boundary. If the containers were all

close together the applicant would

simply take the total amount of fuel,

look up the ‘‘public area and

incompatible’’ distance in the table that

corresponded to the hazard group of the

fuel, and ensure that the distance

between the closest wall or corner of the

explosive hazard facility and the launch

site boundary was at least the distance

listed in the table. However, if the

containers were separated from each

other so that the distance between each

container met the minimum ‘‘intragroup

and compatible’’ 25 distance in the table,

the total quantity of propellant to be

used for the ‘‘public area’’ distance

determination is only the quantity in

each container. Therefore, as discussed

below, although quantity determination

requirements may be found in section

420.67(a), and section 420.67(b)

contains distance determination

requirements, quantity determinations

for liquid propellants may depend on

distances between containers.

Like the procedure for solid

propellant quantity and distance

determinations, an applicant’s first step

in siting liquid propellants would be to

62858 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

determine the quantity of liquid

propellant or, if applicable, the

explosive equivalent of the liquid

propellant to be located in each

explosive hazard facility. An applicant

determines this through three steps

specified in section 420.67(a). First,

section 420.67(a)(1) requires that the

quantity of propellant in a tank, drum,

cylinder, or other container is the net

weight in pounds of the propellant in

that container. The weight of liquid

propellant in associated piping must be

included in the determination of

quantity to any point where positive

means, such as shutoff valves, are

provided for interrupting the flow

through the pipe, or for interrupting a

reaction in the pipe in the event of a

mishap.

Next, section 420.67(a)(2) applies

when two or more containers of

compatible propellants are stored

together in an explosive hazard facility.

When liquid propellants are compatible,

the quantity of propellant used to

determine the minimum separation

distance between the explosive hazard

facility and other explosive hazard

facilities and public areas shall be the

total quantity of liquid propellant in all

containers unless either the containers

are separated one from the other by the

‘‘intragroup and compatible’’ distance

contained in appendix E, table E–4, E–

5 or E–6, depending on the hazard

group, or the containers are subdivided

by intervening barriers to prevent their

mixing. In those two cases, the quantity

of propellant in the explosive hazard

facility requiring the greatest separation

distance must be used to determine the

minimum separation distance between

the explosive hazard facility and all

other explosive hazard facilities and

public areas.

Finally, section 420.67(a)(3) applies to

quantity determinations when two or

more containers of incompatible liquid

propellants are stored together in an

explosive hazard facility. If each

container is not separated from every

other container by the ‘‘public area and

incompatible’’ distances identified in

appendix E, tables E–4, E–5 and E–6, an

applicant must determine the total

quantity of explosives by calculating the

explosive equivalent in pounds of the

combined liquids, using formulas

contained in table E–2, to determine the

minimum separation distance between

the explosive hazard facility and other

explosive hazard facilities and public

areas. If the containers are, in fact, to be

separated one from the other by the

appropriate ‘‘incompatible’’ distance, an

applicant would determine the

minimum separation distance to another

explosive hazard facility or public area

using the quantity of propellant within

the explosive hazard facility requiring

the greatest separation distance.

Section 420.67(a)(4) requires an

applicant to convert liquid propellant

quantities from gallons to pounds using

conversion factors in table E–3, and the

equation provided.

After an applicant has determined the

quantity of liquid propellant or, if

applicable, the explosive equivalent of

the liquid propellants to be located in

each explosive hazard facility, an

applicant must then determine the

separation distances between each

explosive hazard facility and public

areas. Section 420.67(b) specifies the

rules by which an applicant determines

the separation distances between

propellants within explosive hazard

facilities, and between explosive hazard

facilities and public areas. An applicant

would first use table E–3 to determine

hazard and compatibility groups. An

applicant would then separate

propellants from each other and from

each public area using at least the

distances provided by tables E–4

through E–7.

Section 420.67(b)(1) requires that an

applicant measure minimum separation

distances from the container, building,

or positive cutoff point in piping which

is closest to each public area or

explosive hazard facility requiring

separation.

Section 420.67(b)(2) imposes a

minimum separation distance between

compatible propellants. An applicant

measures the separation distance

between compatible propellants using

the ‘‘intragroup and compatible’’

distance for the propellant quantity and

group that requires the greater distance

prescribed by tables E–4, E–5, and E–6.

The distance between any two

propellants is computed by first

determining what the minimum

required distance is for each propellant

based on the quantity and hazard group

of that propellant. The one requiring the

greater distance is controlling for the

pair.

Section 420.67(b)(3) applies to the

minimum separation distance between

incompatible propellants. An applicant

must measure the separation distance

between propellants of different

compatibility groups using the ‘‘public

area and incompatible’’ distance for the

propellant quantity and group that

requires the greater distance prescribed

by tables E–4, E–5, and E–6, unless the

propellants of different compatibility

groups are subdivided by intervening

barriers to prevent their mixing. If

intervening barriers are to be present,

the minimum separation distance shall

then be the ‘‘intragroup and

compatible’’ distance for the propellant

quantity and group that requires the

greater distance prescribed by tables E–

4, E–5, and E–6.

Section 420.67(b)(4) applies to the

separation of liquid propellants from

public areas. A launch site operator

shall separate these propellants from

public areas using no less than the

‘‘public area’’ distance prescribed by

tables E–4, E–5, and E–6.

Section 420.67(b)(5) applies to

propellants where explosive equivalents

apply prescribed by subparagraph (a)(3).

A launch site operator shall separate

each explosive hazard facility that will

contain propellants where explosive

equivalents apply from all other

explosive hazard facilities that are

under the control of the same customer

using at least the intraline distance in

table E–7. The minimum separation

distance from public areas is the public

area distance in table E–7.

Section 420.69 specifies the rules to

be used when solid and liquid

propellants are located together, such as

at launch pads and test stands. This

provision has changed since the Launch

Site NPRM. The Launch Site NPRM

allowed applicants to site an explosive

hazard facility where solid and liquid

propellants were to be located together

based on either the liquid propellants or

solid propellants alone. As discussed in

the comments section above, this is not

always appropriate.

Section 420.69 now provides three

options for a launch site operator

proposing an explosive hazard facility

where solid and liquid propellants are

to be located together. First, an

applicant may determine the minimum

separation distances required for the

liquid propellants and then add the

minimum separation distances required

for the solid propellants, treating the

solid propellants as explosive division

1.1.

The second option is similar in that

a launch site operator would determine

the minimum separation distances

required for the liquid propellants and

then add the minimum separation

distances required for the solid

propellants. However, in this option, a

launch site operator that knows the

explosive equivalent of the explosive

division 1.3 solid propellants may use it

instead of treating the solid propellants

as explosive division 1.1.

The third option for a launch site

operator is to conduct an analysis of the

maximum credible event (MCE), or the

worst case explosion that is expected to

occur. If it shows that an explosion due

to the liquid propellants will not cause

a simultaneous explosion of the solid

propellants, and an explosion due to the

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62859

solid propellants will not cause a

simultaneous explosion of the liquid

propellants, the distance between the

explosive hazard facility and all other

explosive hazard facilities and public

areas should be based on the MCE.

Section 420.71(a) requires a launch

site operator to ensure that the public is

not exposed to hazards due to the

initiation of explosives by lightning.

Unless an explosive hazard facility has

a lightning warning system to permit

termination of operations and

withdrawal of the public to public area

distance prior to the incidence of an

electrical storm, or the explosive hazard

facility is to contain explosives that

cannot be initiated by lightning, it must

have a lightning protection system to

ensure explosives are not initiated by

lightning. A lightning protection system

shall include an air terminal to

intentionally attract a lightning strike, a

low impedance path—called a down

conductor—connecting an air terminal

to an Earth electrode system, and an

Earth electrode system to dissipate the

current from a lightning strike to

ground.

A lightning protection system shall

also include measures for bonding and

surge protection. For bonding, all

metallic bodies shall be bonded to

ensure that voltage potentials due to

lightning are equal everywhere in the

explosive hazard facility. Fences within

six feet of the lightning protection

system shall have bonds across gates

and other discontinuations and shall be

bonded to the lightning protection

system. Railroad tracks that run within

six feet of the lightning protection

system shall be bonded to the lightning

protection system. For surge protection,

a lightning protection system shall

include surge protection for all metallic

power, communication, and

instrumentation lines coming into an

explosive hazard facility to reduce

transient voltages due to lightning to a

harmless level.

Lightning protection systems shall be

visually inspected semiannually and

shall be tested once each year for

electrical continuity and adequacy of

grounding. A record of results obtained

from the tests, including action taken to

correct deficiencies noted, must be

maintained at the explosive hazard

facility.

Section 420.71(b) requires a launch

site operator to ensure that electric

power lines on the launch site meet the

distance requirements provided. A full

discussion of explosive hazard

mitigation measures is provided in the

general preamble above.

Paperwork Reduction Act

This rule contains an information

collection requirement. As required by

the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,

(44 U.S.C. 3507(d), the U.S. Department

of Transportation submitted the

information collection requirements to

the Office of Management and Budget

(OMB) for its review and assignment of

an OMB control number. The agency

received no comments on the

paperwork burden. According to the

regulations implementing the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (5

CFR 1320.8(b)(2)(vi), an agency may not

conduct or sponsor, and a person is not

required to respond to a collection of

information unless an agency displays a

currently valid OMB control number.

The OMB control number for this

information collection is 2120–0644.

Regulatory Evaluation Summary

Final changes to Federal regulations

must undergo several economic

analyses. First, Executive Order 12866

directs each Federal agency to propose

or adopt a regulation only if the agency

makes a reasoned determination that the

benefits of the intended regulation

justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory

Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies

to analyze the economic impact of

regulatory changes on small entities.

Third, the Trade Agreements Act (19

U.S.C. section 2531–2533) prohibits

agencies from setting standards that

create unnecessary obstacles to the

foreign commerce of the United States.

In developing U.S. standards, this Trade

Act requires agencies to consider

international standards. Where

appropriate, agencies are directed to use

those international standards as the

basis of U.S. standards. And fourth, the

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

requires agencies to prepare a written

assessment of the costs, benefits and

other effects of proposed or final rules.

This requirement applies only to rules

that include a Federal mandate on State,

local or tribal governments or the

private sector, likely to result in a total

expenditure of $100 million or more in

any one year (adjusted for inflation.)

In conducting these analyses, FAA

has determined this rule: (1) Has

benefits which do justify its costs, is not

a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ as

defined in the Executive Order; (2) will

not have a significant impact on a

substantial number of small entities; (3)

does not affect international trade; and

(4) does not impose an unfunded

mandate on state, local, or tribal

governments, or on the private sector.

The FAA has placed these analyses in

the docket and summarized them below.

The Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA) is amending its commercial space

licensing regulations to add licensing

requirements for the operation of a

launch site. The final rule will provide

launch site operators with licensing and

operating requirements to protect the

public from the risks associated with

operations at a launch site. The FAA

currently issues licenses to launch site

operators on a case-by-case approach.

Elements of that approach are reflected

in the guidelines, ‘‘Site Operators

License Guidelines for Applicants,’’

which describe the information that

applicants provide the FAA for a license

to operate a launch site. The FAA’s

interpretation and implementation of

the guidelines constitute another

element of the case-by-case approach

and additional elements, such as policy

review, not reflected in the guidelines.

The final rule represents quantifiable

changes in costs compared to the

guidelines (current practice) in the

following two areas. They are the

launch site location review and

approval and the launch site operations

review and approval. The FAA has

estimated the costs and cost savings of

these changes under two different cost

scenarios over a 10-year period

discounted at 7 percent in 2000 dollars.

The total 10-year undiscounted cost

savings is estimated to be between

$93,000 and $172,000 (or between

$65,000 and $124,000, discounted). The

most burdensome cost scenario (where

net cost savings is the least) to the

industry will result in the costs to the

launch site operators of $3,000 (or

$2,000, discounted) for the launch site

location reviews and approval

provisions and a cost savings of $12,000

(or $9,000, discounted) for the launch

site operations review and approval

provisions. Although there will be no

cost impact to the FAA, there will be

cost savings to the FAA from the most

burdensome cost scenario of $114,000

or $84,000 discounted.

There are significant nonquantifiable

benefits in two areas. First, the final rule

eliminates overlapping responsibilities.

Second, the final rule provides

increased details and specificity, which

are not present in the guidelines.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980

(RFA) establishes ‘‘as a principle of

regulatory issuance that agencies shall

endeavor, consistent with the objective

of the rule and of applicable statutes, to

fit regulatory and informational

requirements to the scale of the

business, organizations, and

governmental jurisdictions subject to

regulation.’’ To achieve that principle,

62860 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

the Act requires agencies to solicit and

consider flexible regulatory proposals

and to explain the rationale for their

actions. The Act covers a wide-range of

small entities, including small

businesses, not-for-profit organizations

and small governmental jurisdictions.

Agencies must perform a review to

determine whether a proposed or final

rule will have a significant economic

impact on a substantial number of small

entities. If the determination is that it

will, the agency must prepare a

regulatory flexibility analysis as

described in the Act.

However, if an agency determines that

a proposed or final rule is not expected

to have a significant economic impact

on a substantial number of small

entities, section 605(b) of the 1980 act

provides that the head of the agency

may so certify and an regulatory

flexibility analysis is not required. The

certification must include a statement

providing the factual basis for this

determination, and the reasoning should

be clear.

Potentially Affected Entities

Entities who are licensed, or have

begun the licensing process, were

contacted to determine their size and to

gain insight into the impacts of the final

regulations on the licensing process.

Spaceport Florida Authority (SFA),

Spaceport Systems International, L.P.

(SSI), the Virginia Commonwealth

Space Flight Authority (VCSFA), and

the Alaska Aerospace Development

Corporation (AADC) are all licensed to

operate launch sites.

The Virginia Commonwealth Space

Flight Authority (VCSFA) is a not-forprofit subdivision of the Commonwealth

of Virginia, responsible for oversight of

the activities of the Virginia Commercial

Space Flight Center (VCSFC). The

VCSFC is located within the boundaries

of the Wallops Flight Facility (WFF). As

a subdivision of the Commonwealth of

Virginia, the VCSFA is empowered by

the Acts of the General Assembly to do

all things necessary to carry out its

mission of stimulating economic growth

and education through commercial

aerospace activities.

The Spaceport Florida Authority

(SFA) was created by Florida’s Governor

and Legislature as the nation’s first state

government space agency. The authority

was established to develop space-related

enterprise, including launch activities,

industrial development and educationrelated projects. SFA operates Spaceport

Florida (SPF), located on Cape

Canaveral Air Station.

Launch site operator California

Spaceport is located on Vandenberg Air

Force Base. The launch site is operated

and managed by Spaceport Systems

International, L.P. who is in partnership

with ITT Federal Services Corporation

(ITT FSC). ITT FSC is one of the largest

U.S.-based technical and support

services contractors in the world.

The Kodiak Launch Complex is being

built by the Alaska Aerospace

Development Corporation. AADC is a

public corporation created by the State

of Alaska to develop aerospace related

economic and technical opportunities

for the state.

Definition of Small Entities

The Small Business Administration

has defined small business entities

relating to space vehicles [SIC codes

3761, 3764 and 3769] as entities

comprising fewer than 1000 employees.

Although the above mentioned entities

have fewer than 1000 employees in their

immediate segment of the business, they

are affiliated with/or funded by state

governments and large parent

companies. The VCSFA is a not-forprofit subdivision of the Commonwealth

of Virginia; the SFA is a government

space agency; the SSI is affiliated with

ITT FSC; and AADC is a government

sponsored corporation.

The FAA conducted the required

review of this final rule and determined

that they will not have a significant

economic impact on a substantial

number of small entities. Accordingly,

pursuant to the regulatory Flexibility

Act, U.S.C. 605(b), the Federal Aviation

Administration certifies that this rule

will not have a significant economic

impact on a substantial number of small

entities.

International Trade Impact Assessment

The Trade Agreement Act of 1979

prohibits Federal agencies from

engaging in any standards or related

activities that create unnecessary

obstacles to the foreign commerce of the

United States. Legitimate domestic

objectives, such as safety, are not

considered unnecessary obstacles. The

statute also requires consideration of

international standards and where

appropriate, that they be the basis for

U.S. standards. In addition, consistent

with the Administration’s belief in the

general superiority and desirability of

free trade, it is the policy of the

Administration to remove or diminish

to the extent feasible, barriers to

international trade, including both

barriers affecting the export of American

goods and services to foreign countries

and barriers affecting the import of

foreign goods and services into the

United States.

The Licensing and Safety

Requirements for Operation of a Launch

Site (14 CFR part 420) will not

constitute a barrier to international

trade, including the export of U.S. goods

and services out of the United States.

The final rule affects launch sites that

are currently located or being proposed

within the United States.

The final rule is not expected to affect

trade opportunities for U.S. firms doing

business overseas or for foreign firms

doing business in the United States.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

Assessment

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

of 1995 (the Act), enacted as Pub. L.

104–4 on March 22, 1995, is intended,

among other things, to curb the practice

of imposing unfunded Federal mandates

on State, local, and tribal governments.

Title II of the Act requires each

Federal agency to prepare a written

statement assessing the effects of any

Federal mandate in a proposed or final

agency rule that may result in a $100

million or more expenditure (adjusted

annually for inflation) in any one year

by State, local, and tribal governments,

in the aggregate, or by the private sector;

such a mandate is deemed to be a

‘‘significant regulatory action.’’

This final rule does not meet the cost

thresholds described above.

Furthermore, this final rule will not

impose a significant cost or uniquely

affect small governments. Therefore, the

requirements of Title II of the Unfunded

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not

apply.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

The FAA has analyzed this final rule

under the principles and criteria of

Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We

determined that this action will not

have a substantial direct effect on the

States, or the relationship between the

national Government and the States, or

on the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various

levels of government. Therefore, we

determined that this final rule does not

have federalism implications.

Environmental Assessment

FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA

actions that may be categorically

excluded from preparation of a National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

environmental assessment (EA) or

environmental impact statement (EIS).

In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D,

appendix 4, paragraph 4(i), regulatory

documents which cover administrative

or procedural requirements qualify for a

categorical exclusion. Sections in

subpart B of part 420 would require an

applicant to submit sufficient

environmental information for the FAA

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62861

to comply with NEPA and other

applicable environmental laws and

regulations during the processing of

each license application. Accordingly,

the FAA proposes that this rule qualifies

for a categorical exclusion because no

significant impacts to the environment

are expected to result from finalization

or implementation of its administrative

provisions for licensing.

Energy Impact

The energy impact of the rulemaking

action has been assessed in accordance

with the Energy Policy and

Conservation Act (EPCA) and Public

Law 94–163, as amended (42 U.S.C.

6362). It has been determined that it is

not a major regulatory action under the

provisions of the EPCA.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Parts 401,

417, and 420

Confidential business information,

Environmental protection, Organization

and functions, Reporting and

recordkeeping requirements, Rockets,

Space transportation and exploration.

The Amendment

In consideration of the foregoing, the

Federal Aviation Administration

amends Chapter III of Title 14 of the

Code of Federal Regulations to read as

follows:

PART 401—ORGANIZATION AND

DEFINITIONS

1. The authority citation for part 401

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101–70121.

§ 401.5 [Amended]

2. Section 401.5 is amended by

adding the words ‘‘launch site

accident,’’ after the word ‘‘incident.’’

PART 417—[REMOVED AND

RESERVED]

3. Part 417 is removed and reserved.

4. Subchapter C of Chapter III, title 14,

Code of Federal Regulations, is

amended by adding a new part 420 to

read as follows:

PART 420—LICENSE TO OPERATE A

LAUNCH SITE

Subpart A—General

Sec.

420.1 Scope.

420.3 Applicability.

420.5 Definitions.

420.6–420.14 [Reserved]

Subpart B—Criteria and Information

Requirements for Obtaining a License

420.15 Information requirements.

420.17 Bases for issuance of a license.

420.19 Launch site location review—

general.

420.21 Launch site location review—launch

site boundary.

420.23 Launch site location review—flight

corridor.

420.25 Launch site location review—risk

analysis.

420.27 Launch site location review—

information requirements.

420.29 Launch site location review for

unproven launch vehicles.

420.31 Agreements.

420.32—420.40 [Reserved]

Subpart C—License Terms and Conditions

420.41 License to operate a launch site—

general.

420.43 Duration.

420.45 Transfer of a license to operate a

launch site.

420.47 License modification.

420.49 Compliance monitoring.

Subpart D—Responsibilities of a Licensee

420.51 Responsibilities—general.

420.53 Control of public access.

420.55 Scheduling of launch site

operations.

420.57 Notifications.

420.59 Launch site accident investigation

plan.

420.61 Records.

420.63 Explosive siting.

420.65 Handling of solid propellants.

420.67 Storage or handling of liquid

propellants.

420.69 Solid and liquid propellants located

together.

420.71 Lightning protection.

Appendix A to Part 420—Method for

Defining a Flight Corridor

Appendix B to Part 420—Method for

Defining a Flight Corridor

Appendix C to Part 420—Risk Analysis

Appendix D to Part 420—Impact Dispersion

Areas and Casualty Expectancy Estimate

for Unguided Suborbital Launch

Vehicles

Appendix E to Part 420—Tables for

Explosive Site Plan

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101–70121.

Subpart A—General

§ 420.1 Scope.

This part prescribes the information

and demonstrations that must be

provided to the FAA as part of a license

application, the bases for license

approval, license terms and conditions,

and post-licensing requirements with

which a licensee shall comply to remain

licensed. Requirements for preparing a

license application are contained in part

413 of this subchapter.

§ 420.3 Applicability.

This part applies to any person

seeking a license to operate a launch site

or to a person licensed under this part.

A person operating a site that only

supports amateur rocket activities, as

defined in 14 CFR 401.5, does not need

a license under this part to operate the

site.

§ 420.5 Definitions.

For the purpose of this part.

Ballistic coefficient means the weight

of an object divided by the quantity

product of the coefficient of drag of the

object and the area of the object.

Compatibility means the chemical

property of materials that may be

located together without increasing the

probability of an accident or, for a given

quantity, the magnitude of the effects of

such an accident.

Debris dispersion radius (Dmax) means

the estimated maximum distance from a

launch point that debris travels given a

worst-case launch vehicle failure and

flight termination early in flight. For an

expendable launch vehicle, flight

termination is assumed to occur at 10

seconds into flight.

Downrange area means a portion of a

flight corridor beginning where a launch

area ends and ending 5,000 nautical

miles from the launch point, or where

the IIP leaves the surface of the Earth,

whichever is shorter, for an orbital

launch vehicle; and ending with an

impact dispersion area for a guided suborbital launch vehicle.

E,F,G coordinate system means an

orthogonal, Earth-fixed, geocentric,

right-handed system. The origin of the

coordinate system is at the center of an

ellipsoidal Earth model. The E-axis is

positive directed through the Greenwich

meridian. The F-axis is positive directed

though 90 degrees east longitude. The

EF-plane is coincident with the

ellipsoidal Earth model’s equatorial

plane. The G-axis is normal to the EFplane and positive directed through the

north pole.

E,N,U coordinate system means an

orthogonal, Earth-fixed, topocentric,

right-handed system. The origin of the

coordinate system is at a launch point.

The E-axis is positive directed east. The

N-axis is positive directed north. The

EN-plane is tangent to an ellipsoidal

Earth model’s surface at the origin and

perpendicular to the geodetic vertical.

The U-axis is normal to the EN-plane

and positive directed away from the

Earth.

Effective casualty area (Ac) means the

aggregate casualty area of each piece of

debris created by a launch vehicle

failure at a particular point on its

trajectory. The effective casualty area for

each piece of debris is the area within

which 100 percent of the unprotected

population on the ground are assumed

to be a casualty, and outside of which

100 percent of the population are

assumed not to be a casualty. An

effective casualty area accounts for the

62862 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

characteristics of the debris piece,

including its size, the path angle of its

trajectory, impact explosions, and debris

skip, splatter, and bounce. An effective

casualty area also accounts for the size

of a person.

Explosive means any chemical

compound or mechanical mixture that,

when subjected to heat, impact, friction,

detonation or other suitable initiation,

undergoes a rapid chemical change that

releases large volumes of highly heated

gases that exert pressure in the

surrounding medium. The term applies

to materials that either detonate or

deflagrate.

Explosive division means the division

within hazard class 1 of an explosive as

defined in the United Nations

Organization classification system for

transport of dangerous goods, and as

determined in accordance with 49 CFR

part 173, subpart C.

Explosive equivalent means a measure

of the blast effects from explosion of a

given quantity of material expressed in

terms of the weight of trinitrotoluene

(TNT) that would produce the same

blast effects when detonated.

Explosive hazard facility means a

facility at a launch site where solid

propellant, liquid propellant, or other

explosives are stored or handled.

Flight azimuth means the initial

direction in which a launch vehicle flies

relative to true north expressed in

degrees-decimal-degrees.

Flight corridor means an area on the

Earth’s surface estimated to contain the

hazardous debris from nominal flight of

a launch vehicle, and non-nominal

flight of a launch vehicle assuming a

perfectly functioning flight termination

system or other flight safety system.

Guided suborbital launch vehicle

means a suborbital rocket that employs

an active guidance system.

Hazard class means the class of an

explosive as defined by the United

Nations Organization classification

system for transport of dangerous goods,

and as determined in accordance with

49 CFR part 173, subpart C.

Impact dispersion area means an area

representing an estimated three

standard deviation dispersion about a

nominal impact point of an intermediate

or final stage of a suborbital launch

vehicle.

Impact dispersion factor means a

constant used to estimate, using a stage

apogee, a three standard deviation

dispersion about a nominal impact

point of an intermediate or final stage of

a suborbital launch vehicle.

Impact dispersion radius (Ri) means a

radius that defines an impact dispersion

area.

Impact range means the distance

between a launch point and the impact

point of a suborbital launch vehicle

stage.

Impact range factor means a constant

used to estimate, when multiplied by a

stage apogee, the nominal impact point

of an intermediate or final stage of a

suborbital launch vehicle.

Instantaneous impact point (IIP)

means an impact point, following thrust

termination of a launch vehicle. IIP may

be calculated with or without

atmospheric drag effects.

Instantaneous impact point (IIP)

range rate means a launch vehicle’s

estimated IIP velocity along the Earth’s

surface.

Intraline distance means the

minimum distance permitted between

any two explosive hazard facilities in

the ownership, possession or control of

one launch site customer.

Launch area means, for a flight

corridor defined in accordance with

appendix A of this part, the portion of

a flight corridor from the launch point

to a point 100 nautical miles in the

direction of the flight azimuth. For a

flight corridor defined in accordance

with appendix B of this part, a launch

area is the portion of a flight corridor

from the launch point to the enveloping

line enclosing the outer boundary of the

last debris dispersion circle.

Launch point means a point on the

Earth from which the flight of a launch

vehicle begins, and is defined by its

geodetic latitude, longitude and height

on an ellipsoidal Earth model.

Launch site accident means an

unplanned event occurring during a

ground activity at a launch site resulting

in a fatality or serious injury (as defined

in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person who is

not associated with the activity, or any

damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to

property not associated with the

activity.

Net explosive weight (NEW) means

the total weight, expressed in pounds, of

explosive material or explosive

equivalency contained in an item.

Nominal means, in reference to

launch vehicle performance, trajectory,

or stage impact point, a launch vehicle

flight where all launch vehicle

aerodynamic parameters are as

expected, all vehicle internal and

external systems perform as planned,

and there are no external perturbing

influences (e.g., winds) other than

atmospheric drag and gravity.

Overflight dwell time means the

period of time it takes for a launch

vehicle’s IIP to move past a populated

area. For a given populated area, the

overflight dwell time is the time period

measured along the nominal trajectory

IIP ground trace from the time point

whose normal with the trajectory

intersects the most uprange part of the

populated area to the time point whose

normal with the trajectory intersects the

most downrange part of the populated

area.

Overflight exclusion zone means a

portion of a flight corridor which must

remain clear of the public during the

flight of a launch vehicle.

Populated area means a land area

with population.

Population density means the number

of people per unit area in a populated

area.

Position data means data referring to

the current position of a launch vehicle

with respect to flight time expressed

through the X, Y, Z coordinate system.

Public means people and property

that are not involved in supporting a

licensed launch, and includes those

people and property that may be located

within the boundary of a launch site,

such as visitors, any individual

providing goods or services not related

to launch processing or flight, and any

other launch operator and its personnel.

Public area means any area outside a

hazard area and is an area that is not in

the possession, ownership or other

control of a launch site operator or of a

launch site customer who possesses,

owns or otherwise controls that hazard

area.

Public area distance means the

minimum distance permitted between a

public area and an explosive hazard

facility.

Public traffic route distance means

the minimum distance permitted

between a public highway or railroad

line and an explosive hazard facility.

Trajectory means the position and

velocity components as a function of

time of a launch vehicle relative to an

x, y, z coordinate system, expressed in

x, y, z, x ̇, y ̇, z ̇.

Unguided sub-orbital launch vehicle

means a sub-orbital rocket that does not

have a guidance system.

X, Y, Z coordinate system means an

orthogonal, Earth-fixed, topocentric,

right-handed system. The origin of the

coordinate system is at a launch point.

The x-axis coincides with the initial

launch azimuth and is positive in the

downrange direction. The y-axis is

positive to the left looking downrange.

The xy-plane is tangent to the

ellipsoidal earth model’s surface at the

origin and perpendicular to the geodetic

vertical. The z-axis is normal to the xyplane and positive directed away from

the earth.

φ0,λ0,h0 means a latitude, longitude,

height system where φ0 is the geodetic

latitude of a launch point, λ0 is the east

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62863

longitude of the launch point, and h0 is

the height of the launch point above the

reference ellipsoid. φ0 and λ0 are

expressed in degrees-decimal-degrees.

§§ 420.6–420.14 [Reserved]

Subpart B—Criteria and Information

Requirements for Obtaining a License

§ 420.15 Information requirements.

(a) General. (1) Launch site operator.

An applicant shall identify the name

and address of the applicant, and the

name, address, and telephone number of

any person to whom inquiries and

correspondence should be directed.

(2) Launch site. An applicant shall

provide the name and location of the

proposed launch site and include the

following information:

(i) A list of downrange equipment;

(ii) A description of the layout of the

launch site, including launch points;

(iii) The types of launch vehicles to be

supported at each launch point;

(iv) The range of launch azimuths

planned from each launch point; and

(v) The scheduled operational date.

(3) Foreign ownership. Identify

foreign ownership of the applicant, as

follows:

(i) For a sole proprietorship or

partnership, all foreign owners or

partners;

(ii) For a corporation, any foreign

ownership interest of 10 percent or

more; and

(iii) For a joint venture, association, or

other entity, any foreign entities

participating in the entity.

(b) Environmental. An applicant shall

provide the FAA with information for

the FAA to analyze the environmental

impacts associated with the operation of

the proposed launch site. The

information provided by an applicant

must be sufficient to enable the FAA to

comply with the requirements of the

National Environment Policy Act, 42

U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (NEPA), the Council

on Environmental Quality Regulations

for Implementing the Procedural

Provisions of NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500–

1508, and the FAA’s Procedures for

Considering Environmental Impacts,

FAA Order 1050.1D. An applicant shall

submit environmental information

concerning a proposed launch site not

covered by existing environmental

documentation, and other factors as

determined by the FAA.

(c) Launch site location. (1) Except as

provided by paragraph (c)(2) of this

section, an applicant shall provide the

information necessary to demonstrate

compliance with §§ 420.19–420.29.

(2) An applicant who is proposing to

locate a launch site at an existing launch

point at a federal launch range is not

required to comply with paragraph

(c)(1) of this section if a launch vehicle

of the same type and class as proposed

for the launch point has been safely

launched from the launch point.

(d) Explosive site plan. (1) Except as

provided by paragraph (d)(2) of this

section, an applicant shall submit an

explosive site plan that complies with

§§ 420.63, 420.65, 420.67, and 420.69.

(2) If an applicant plans to operate a

launch site located on a federal launch

range, and if the applicant is required by

the federal launch range to comply with

the federal launch range’s explosive

safety requirements, the applicant shall

submit the explosive site plan submitted

to the federal launch range.

(e) Launch site operations. An

applicant shall provide the information

necessary to demonstrate compliance

with the requirements of §§ 420.53,

420.55, 420.57, 420.59, 420.61, and

420.71.

§ 420.17 Bases for issuance of a license.

(a) The FAA will issue a license under

this part when the FAA determines that:

(1) The application provides the

information required by § 420.15;

(2) The FAA has completed an

analysis of the environmental impacts

associated with the proposed operation

of the launch site, in accordance with

NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500–1508, and

FAA Order 1050.1D;

(3) The launch site location meets the

requirements of §§ 420.19, 420.21,

420.23, 420.25, 420.27, and 420.29;

(4) The applicant has completed the

agreements required by § 420.31;

(5) The application demonstrates that

the applicant shall satisfy the

requirements of §§ 420.53, 420.55,

420.57, 420.59, 420.61 and 420.71;

(6) The explosive site plan meets the

criteria of §§ 420.63, 420.65, 420.67 and

420.69; and

(7) Issuing a license would not

jeopardize foreign policy or national

security interests of the United States.

(b) The FAA advises an applicant, in

writing, of any issue arising during an

application review that would lead to

denial. The applicant may respond in

writing, submit additional information,

or amend its license application.

§ 420.19 Launch site location review—

general.

(a) To gain approval for a launch site

location, an applicant shall demonstrate

that for each launch point proposed for

the launch site, at least one type of

expendable or reusable launch vehicle

can be flown from the launch point

safely. For purposes of the launch site

location review:

(1) A safe launch must possess a risk

level estimated, in accordance with the

requirements of this part, not to exceed

an expected average number of 0.00003

casualties (Ec) to the collective member

of the public exposed to hazards from

the flight (Ec ≤ 30 × 10¥6).

(2) Types of launch vehicles include

orbital expendable launch vehicles,

guided sub-orbital expendable launch

vehicles, unguided sub-orbital

expendable launch vehicles, and

reusable launch vehicles. Orbital

expendable launch vehicles are further

classified by weight class, based on the

weight of payload the launch vehicle

can place in a 100-nm orbit, as defined

in table 1.

(b) If an applicant proposes to have

more than one type of launch vehicle

flown from a launch point, the applicant

shall demonstrate that each type of

expendable or reusable launch vehicle

planned to be flown from the launch

point can be flown from the launch

point safely.

(c) If an applicant proposes to have

more than one weight class of orbital

expendable launch vehicles flown from

a launch point, the applicant shall

demonstrate that the heaviest weight

class planned to be flown from the

launch point can be flown from the

launch point safely.

TABLE 1 OF § 420.19.—ORBITAL EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE CLASSES BY PAYLOAD WEIGHT (LBS)

100 nm orbit

Weight class

Small Medium Medium large Large

28 degrees inclination* .................................................................... ≤4400 >4400 to ≤11100 >11100 to

≤18500

>18500

90 degrees inclination ...................................................................... ≤3300 >3300 to ≤8400 >8400 to ≤15000 >15000

* 28 degrees inclination orbit from a launch point at 28 degrees latitude.

62864 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

§ 420.21 Launch site location review—

launch site boundary.

(a) The distance from any proposed

launch point to the closest launch site

boundary must be at least as great as the

debris dispersion radius of the largest

launch vehicle type and weight class

proposed for the launch point.

(b) For a launch site supporting any

expendable launch vehicle, an applicant

shall use the largest distance provided

by table 2 for the type and weight class

of any launch vehicle proposed for the

launch point.

(c) For a launch site supporting any

reusable launch vehicle, an applicant

shall determine the debris dispersion

radius that represents the maximum

distance from a launch point that debris

travels given a worst-case launch

vehicle failure in the launch area. An

applicant must clearly and convincingly

demonstrate the validity of its proposed

debris dispersion radius.

TABLE 2 OF § 420.21.—MINIMUM DISTANCE FROM LAUNCH POINT TO LAUNCH SITE BOUNDARY (FEET)

Orbital expendable launch vehicle class Type of suborbital launch vehicle

Small Medium Medium large Large Guided Unguided

7300 9300 10600 13000 8000 1600

§ 420.23 Launch site location review—

flight corridor.

(a) Guided orbital expendable launch

vehicle. For a guided orbital expendable

launch vehicle, an applicant shall

define a flight corridor that:

(1) Encompasses an area that the

applicant estimates, in accordance with

the requirements of this part, to contain

debris with a ballistic coefficient of ≥ 3

pounds per square foot, from any nonnominal flight of a guided orbital

expendable launch vehicle from the

launch point to a point 5000 nm

downrange, or where the IIP leaves the

surface of the Earth, whichever is

shorter;

(2) Includes an overflight exclusion

zone where the public risk criteria of

30×10¥6 would be exceeded if one

person were present in the open; and

(3) Uses one of the methodologies

provided in appendix A or B of this

part. The FAA will approve an alternate

method if an applicant provides a clear

and convincing demonstration that its

proposed method provides an

equivalent level of safety to that

required by appendix A or B of this part.

(b) Guided sub-orbital expendable

launch vehicle. For a guided sub-orbital

expendable launch vehicle, an applicant

shall define a flight corridor that:

(1) Encompasses an area that the

applicant estimates, in accordance with

the requirements of this part, to contain

debris with a ballistic coefficient of ≥ 3

pounds per square foot, from any nonnominal flight of a guided sub-orbital

expendable launch vehicle from the

launch point to impact with the earth’s

surface;

(2) Includes an impact dispersion area

for the launch vehicle’s last stage;

(3) Includes an overflight exclusion

zone where the public risk criteria of

30×10¥6 would be exceeded if one

person were present in the open; and

(4) Uses one of the methodologies

provided in appendices A or B to this

part. The FAA will approve an alternate

method if an applicant provides a clear

and convincing demonstration that its

proposed method provides an

equivalent level of safety to that

required by appendix A or B of this part.

(c) Unguided sub-orbital expendable

launch vehicle.

(1) For an unguided sub-orbital

expendable launch vehicle, an applicant

shall define the following using the

methodology provided by appendix D of

this part:

(i) Impact dispersion areas that the

applicant estimates, in accordance with

the requirements of this part, to contain

the impact of launch vehicle stages from

nominal flight of an unguided suborbital expendable launch vehicle from

the launch point to impact with the

earth’s surface; and

(ii) An overflight exclusion zone

where the public risk criteria of

30×10¥6 would be exceeded if one

person were present in the open.

(2) The FAA will approve an alternate

method if an applicant provides a clear

and convincing demonstration that its

proposed method provides an

equivalent level of safety to that

required by appendix D of this part.

(3) An applicant shall base its analysis

on an unguided suborbital launch

vehicle whose final launch vehicle stage

apogee represents the intended use of

the launch point.

(d) Reusable launch vehicle. For a

reusable launch vehicle, an applicant

shall define a flight corridor that

contains the hazardous debris from

nominal and non-nominal flight of a

reusable launch vehicle. The applicant

must provide a clear and convincing

demonstration of the validity of its flight

corridor.

§ 420.25 Launch site location review—risk

analysis.

(a) If a flight corridor or impact

dispersion area defined by section

420.23 contains a populated area, the

applicant shall estimate the casualty

expectation associated with the flight

corridor or impact dispersion area. An

applicant shall use the methodology

provided in appendix C to this part for

guided orbital or suborbital expendable

launch vehicles and appendix D for

unguided suborbital launch vehicles.

The FAA will approve an alternate

method if an applicant provides a clear

and convincing demonstration that its

proposed method provides an

equivalent level of safety to that

required by appendix C or D of this part.

For a reusable launch vehicle, an

applicant must provide a clear and

convincing demonstration of the

validity of its risk analysis.

(b) If the estimated expected casualty

exceeds 30×10¥6, the FAA will not

approve the location of the proposed

launch point.

§ 420.27 Launch site location review—

information requirements.

An applicant shall provide the

following launch site location review

information in its application:

(a) A map or maps showing the

location of each launch point proposed,

and the flight azimuth, IIP, flight

corridor, and each impact range and

impact dispersion area for each launch

point;

(b) Each launch vehicle type and any

launch vehicle class proposed for each

launch point;

(c) Trajectory data;

(d) Wind data, including each month

and any percent wind data used in the

analysis;

(e) Any launch vehicle apogee used in

the analysis;

(f) Each populated area located within

a flight corridor or impact dispersion

area;

(g) The estimated casualty expectancy

calculated for each populated area

within a flight corridor or impact

dispersion area;

(h) The effective casualty areas used

in the analysis;

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(i) The estimated casualty expectancy

for each flight corridor or set of impact

dispersion areas; and

(j) If populated areas are located

within an overflight exclusion zone, a

demonstration that there are times when

the public is not present or that the

applicant has an agreement in place to

evacuate the public from the overflight

exclusion zone during a launch.

§ 420.29 Launch site location review for

unproven launch vehicles.

An applicant for a license to operate

a launch site for an unproven launch

vehicle shall provide a clear and

convincing demonstration that its

proposed launch site location provides

an equivalent level of safety to that

required by this part.

§ 420.31 Agreements.

(a) Except as provided by paragraph

(c) of this section, an applicant shall

complete an agreement with the local

U.S. Coast Guard district to establish

procedures for the issuance of a Notice

to Mariners prior to a launch and other

such measures as the Coast Guard

deems necessary to protect public

health and safety.

(b) Except as provided by paragraph

(c) of this section, an applicant shall

complete an agreement with the FAA

Air Traffic Control (ATC) office having

jurisdiction over the airspace through

which launches will take place, to

establish procedures for the issuance of

a Notice to Airmen prior to a launch and

for closing of air routes during the

launch window and other such

measures as the FAA ATC office deems

necessary to protect public health and

safety.

(c) An applicant that plans to operate

a launch site located on a federal launch

range does not have to comply with

section 420.31 if the applicant is using

existing federal launch range

agreements with the U.S. Coast Guard

and the FAA ATC office having

jurisdiction over the airspace through

which launches will take place.

§§ 420.32–420.40 [Reserved]

Subpart C—License Terms and

Conditions

§ 420.41 License to operate a launch site—

general.

(a) A license to operate a launch site

authorizes a licensee to operate a launch

site in accordance with the

representations contained in the

licensee’s application, with terms and

conditions contained in any license

order accompanying the license, and

subject to the licensee’s compliance

with 49 U.S.C. subtitle IX, ch. 701 and

this chapter.

(b) A license to operate a launch site

authorizes a licensee to offer its launch

site to a launch operator for each launch

point for the type and any weight class

of launch vehicle identified in the

license application and upon which the

licensing determination is based.

(c) Issuance of a license to operate a

launch site does not relieve a licensee

of its obligation to comply with any

other laws or regulations; nor does it

confer any proprietary, property, or

exclusive right in the use of airspace or

outer space.

§ 420.43 Duration.

A license to operate a launch site

remains in effect for five years from the

date of issuance unless surrendered,

suspended, or revoked before the

expiration of the term and is renewable

upon application by the licensee.

§ 420.45 Transfer of a license to operate a

launch site.

(a) Only the FAA may transfer a

license to operate a launch site.

(b) The FAA will transfer a license to

an applicant who has submitted an

application in accordance with 14 CFR

part 413, satisfied the requirements of

§ 420.15, and obtained each approval

required by § 420.17 for a license.

(c) The FAA may incorporate by

reference any findings made part of the

record that supported a prior related

licensing determination.

§ 420.47 License modification.

(a) Upon application or upon its own

initiative, the FAA may modify a license

to operate a launch site at any time by

issuing a license order that adds,

removes, or modifies a license term or

condition to ensure compliance with the

Act and the requirements of this

chapter.

(b) After a license to operate a launch

site has been issued, a licensee shall

apply to the FAA for modification of its

license if:

(1) The licensee proposes to operate

the launch site in a manner that is not

authorized by the license; or

(2) The licensee proposes to operate

the launch site in a manner that would

make any representation contained in

the license application that is material

to public health and safety or safety of

property no longer accurate and

complete.

(c) An application to modify a license

shall be prepared and submitted in

accordance with part 413 of this

chapter. The licensee shall indicate any

part of its license or license application

that would be changed or affected by a

proposed modification.

(d) The FAA approves a modification

request that satisfies the requirements of

this part.

(e) Upon approval of a license

modification, the FAA issues either a

written approval to the licensee or a

license order modifying the license if a

stated term or condition of the license

is changed, added, or deleted. A written

approval has the full force and effect of

a license order and is part of the

licensing record.

§ 420.49 Compliance monitoring.

A licensee shall allow access by and

cooperate with federal officers or

employees or other individuals

authorized by the FAA to observe any

activities of the licensee, its customers,

its contractors, or subcontractors,

associated with licensed operation of

the licensee’s launch site.

Subpart D—Responsibilities of a

Licensee

§ 420.51 Responsibilities—general.

(a) A licensee shall operate its launch

site in accordance with the

representations in the application upon

which the licensing determination is

based.

(b) A licensee is responsible for

compliance with 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX,

ch. 701 and for meeting the

requirements of this chapter.

§ 420.53 Control of public access.

(a) A licensee shall prevent

unauthorized access to the launch site,

and unauthorized, unescorted access to

explosive hazard facilities or other

hazard areas not otherwise controlled by

a launch operator, through the use of

security personnel, surveillance

systems, physical barriers, or other

means approved as part of the licensing

process.

(b) A licensee shall notify anyone

entering the launch site of safety rules

and emergency and evacuation

procedures prior to that person’s entry

unless that person has received a

briefing on those rules and procedures

within the previous year.

(c) A licensee shall employ warning

signals or alarms to notify any persons

at the launch site of any emergency.

§ 420.55 Scheduling of launch site

operations.

(a) A licensee shall develop and

implement procedures to schedule

operations to ensure that each operation

carried out by a customer at the launch

site does not create the potential for a

mishap that could result in harm to the

public because of the proximity of the

operations, in time or place, to

operations of any other customer. A

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customer includes any launch operator,

and any contractor, subcontractor or

customer of the launch site operator’s

customer at the launch site.

(b) A licensee shall provide its launch

site scheduling requirements to each

customer before the customer begins

operations at the launch site.

§ 420.57 Notifications.

(a) A licensee shall notify each launch

operator and any other customer of any

limitations on the use of the launch site.

A licensee shall also communicate

limitations on the use of facilities

provided to customers by the launch

site operator.

(b) A licensee shall maintain its

agreement, made in accordance with

§ 420.31(a), with the local U.S. Coast

Guard district.

(c) A licensee shall maintain its

agreement, made in accordance with

§ 420.31(b), with the FAA ATC office

having jurisdiction over the airspace

through which launches will take place.

(d) At least two days prior to flight of

a launch vehicle, the licensee shall

notify local officials and all owners of

land adjacent to the launch site of the

flight schedule.

§ 420.59 Launch site accident

investigation plan.

(a) General. A licensee shall develop

and implement a launch site accident

investigation plan that contains the

licensee’s procedures for reporting,

responding to, and investigating launch

site accidents, as defined by § 420.5, and

for cooperating with federal officials in

case of a launch accident. The launch

site accident investigation plan must be

signed by an individual authorized to

sign and certify the application in

accordance with § 413.7(c) of this

chapter.

(b) Reporting requirements. A launch

site accident investigation plan shall

provide for—

(1) Immediate notification to the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

Washington Operations Center in the

event of a launch site accident.

(2) Submission of a written

preliminary report to the FAA,

Associate Administrator for Commercial

Space Transportation, within five days

of any launch site accident. The report

must include the following information:

(i) Date and time of occurrence;

(ii) Location of the event;

(iii) Description of the event;

(iv) Number of injuries, if any, and

general description of types of injuries

suffered;

(v) Property damage, if any, and an

estimate of its value;

(vi) Identification of hazardous

materials, as defined by § 401.5 of this

chapter, involved in the event;

(vii) Any action taken to contain the

consequences of the event; and

(viii) Weather conditions at the time

of the event.

(c) Response plan. A launch site

accident investigation plan shall contain

procedures that—

(1) Ensure the consequences of a

launch site accident are contained and

minimized;

(2) Ensure data and physical evidence

are preserved;

(3) Require the licensee to report to

and cooperate with FAA or National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

investigations and designate one or

more points of contact for the FAA or

NTSB; and

(4) Require the licensee to identify

and adopt preventive measures for

avoiding recurrence of the event.

(d) Investigation plan. A launch site

accident investigation plan must

contain—

(1) Procedures for investigating the

cause of a launch site accident;

(2) Procedures for reporting launch

site accident investigation results to the

FAA; and

(3) Delineated responsibilities,

including reporting responsibilities for

personnel assigned to conduct

investigations and for any one retained

by the licensee to conduct or participate

in investigations.

(e) Launch accidents. A launch site

accident investigation plan shall

contain—

(1) Procedures for participating in an

investigation of a launch accident for

launches launched from the launch site;

(2) Require the licensee to cooperate

with FAA or National Transportation

Safety Board (NTSB) investigations of a

launch accident for launches launched

from the launch site.

(f) Applicability of other accident

investigation procedures. Accident

investigation procedures developed in

accordance with 29 CFR 1910.119 and

40 CFR part 68 will satisfy the

requirements of paragraphs (c) and (d)

of this section to the extent that they

include the elements required by

paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section.

§ 420.61 Records.

(a) A licensee shall maintain all

records, data, and other material needed

to verify that its operations are

conducted in accordance with

representations contained in the

licensee’s application. A licensee shall

retain records for three years.

(b) In the event of a launch or launch

site accident, a licensee shall preserve

all records related to the event. Records

shall be retained until completion of

any federal investigation and the FAA

advises the licensee that the records

need not be retained.

(c) A licensee shall make available to

federal officials for inspection and

copying all records required to be

maintained under the regulations.

§ 420.63 Explosive siting.

(a) Except as otherwise provided by

paragraph (b) of this section, a licensee

shall ensure that the configuration of the

launch site is in accordance with an

explosive site plan, and that the

licensee’s explosive site plan is in

compliance with the requirements of

§§ 420.65—420.69. The explosive site

plan shall include:

(1) A scaled map that shows the

location of all proposed explosive

hazard facilities at the proposed launch

site and that shows actual and minimal

allowable distances between each

explosive hazard facility and all other

explosive hazard facilities and each

public area, including the launch site

boundary;

(2) A listing of the maximum

quantities of liquid and solid

propellants and other explosives to be

located at each explosive hazard facility,

including the class and division for each

solid explosive and the hazard and

compatibility group for each liquid

propellant; and

(3) A description of each activity to be

conducted in each explosive hazard

facility.

(b) A licensee operating a launch site

located on a federal launch range does

not have to comply with the

requirements in §§ 420.65–420.69 if the

licensee is in compliance with the

federal launch range’s explosive safety

requirements.

(c) For explosive siting issues not

otherwise addressed by the

requirements of §§ 420.65–420.69, a

launch site operator must clearly and

convincingly demonstrate a level of

safety equivalent to that otherwise

required by part 420.

§ 420.65 Handling of solid propellants.

(a) A launch site operator shall

determine the maximum total quantity

of solid propellants and other solid

explosives by class and division, in

accordance with 49 CFR part 173,

Subpart C, to be located in each

explosive hazard facility where solid

propellants or other solid explosives

will be handled.

(b) When explosive divisions 1.1 and

1.3 explosives are located in the same

explosive hazard facility, the total

quantity of explosive shall be treated as

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62867

division 1.1 for quantity-distance

determinations; or, a launch site

operator may add the net explosive

equivalent weight of the division 1.3

items to the net weight of division 1.1

items to determine the total quantity of

explosives.

(c) A launch site operator shall

separate each explosive hazard facility

where solid propellants and other solid

explosives are handled from all other

explosive hazard facilities, each public

area and the launch site boundary by a

distance no less than those provided for

each quantity and explosive division in

appendix E, table E–1.

(d) A launch site operator shall follow

the following separation rules:

(1) A launch site operator shall

employ no less than the applicable

public area distance to separate an

explosive hazard facility from each

public area and from the launch site

boundary.

(2) A launch site operator shall

employ no less than an intraline

distance to separate an explosive hazard

facility from all other explosive hazard

facilities used by a single customer.

(3) For explosive division 1.1 only, a

launch site operator may employ no less

than 60% of the applicable public area

distance, or the public traffic route

distance, to separate an explosive

hazard facility from a public area that

consists only of a public highway or

railroad line.

(4) A launch site operator may use

linear interpolation for NEW quantities

between table entries.

(5) A launch site operator shall

measure separation distance from the

closest debris or explosive hazard

source in an explosive hazard facility.

§ 420.67 Storage or handling of liquid

propellants.

(a) For an explosive hazard facility

where liquid propellants are handled or

stored, a launch site operator shall

determine the total quantity of liquid

propellant and, if applicable pursuant to

paragraph (a)(3) of this section, the

explosive equivalent of liquid

propellant in each explosive hazard

facility in accordance with the

following:

(1) The quantity of liquid propellant

in a tank, drum, cylinder, or other

container is the net weight in pounds of

the propellant in the container. The

determination of quantity shall include

any liquid propellant in associated

piping to any point where positive

means are provided for interrupting the

flow through the pipe, or interrupting a

reaction in the pipe in the event of a

mishap.

(2) Where two or more containers of

compatible liquid propellants are

handled or stored together in an

explosive hazard facility, the total

quantity of propellant to determine the

minimum separation distance between

the explosive hazard facility and all

other explosive hazard facilities and

each public area shall be the total

quantity of liquid propellant in all

containers, unless:

(i) The containers are separated one

from the other by the appropriate

distance as provided by paragraph (b)(2)

of this section; or

(ii) The containers are subdivided by

intervening barriers, such as diking, that

prevent mixing.

(iii) If paragraph (a)(2)(i) or (ii) of this

section apply, a launch site operator

shall use the quantity of propellant

requiring the greatest separation

distance pursuant to paragraph (b) of

this section to determine the minimum

separation distance between the

explosive hazard facility and all other

explosive hazard facilities and each

public area.

(3) Where two or more containers of

incompatible liquid propellants will be

handled or stored together in an

explosive hazard facility, a launch site

operator shall determine the explosive

equivalent in pounds of the combined

liquids, using the formulas provided in

appendix E, table E–2, to determine the

minimum separation distance between

the explosive hazard facility and other

explosive hazard facilities and public

areas unless the containers are separated

one from the other by the appropriate

distance as determined in paragraph

(b)(3) of this section. A launch site

operator shall then use the quantity of

liquid propellant requiring the greatest

separation distance to determine the

minimum separation distance between

the explosive hazard facility and all

other explosive hazard facilities and

each public area.

(4) A launch site operator shall

convert quantities of liquid propellants

from gallons to pounds using the

conversion factors provided in appendix

E, table E–3 and the following equation:

Pounds of propellant = gallons x

density of propellant (pounds per

gallon).

(b) A launch site operator shall use

appendix E, table E–3 to determine

hazard and compatibility groups and

shall separate liquid propellants from

each other and from each public area

using distances no less than those

provided in appendix E, tables E–4

through E–7 in accordance with the

following:

(1) A launch site operator shall

measure minimum separation distances

from the hazard source in an explosive

hazard facility, such as a container,

building, segment, or positive cutoff

point in piping, closest to each

explosive hazard facility.

(2) A launch site operator shall

measure the minimum separation

distance between compatible liquid

propellants using the ‘‘intragroup and

compatible’’ distance for the propellant

quantity and hazard group that requires

the greater distance prescribed by

appendix E, tables E–4, E–5, and E–6.

(3) A launch site operator shall

measure the minimum separation

distance between liquid propellants of

different compatibility groups using the

‘‘public area and incompatible’’ distance

for the propellant quantity and hazard

group that requires the greater distance

provided in appendix E, tables E–4, E–

5, and E–6, unless the propellants of

different compatibility groups are

subdivided by intervening barriers that

prevent mixing. If such barriers are

present, the minimum separation

distance shall be the ‘‘intragroup and

compatible’’ distance for the propellant

quantity and group that requires the

greater distance provided in appendix E,

tables E–4, E–5, and E–6.

(4) A launch site operator shall

separate liquid propellants from each

public area using a distance no less than

the ‘‘public area and incompatible’’

distance provided in appendix E, tables

E–4, E–5, and E–6.

(5) A launch site operator shall

separate each explosive hazard facility

that contains liquid propellants where

explosive equivalents apply pursuant to

paragraph (a)(3) of this section from all

other explosive hazard facilities of a

single customer using the intraline

distance provided in appendix E, table

E–7, and from each public area using

the public area distance provided in

appendix E, table E–7.

§ 420.69 Solid and liquid propellants

located together.

(a) A launch site operator proposing

an explosive hazard facility where solid

and liquid propellants are to be located

together shall determine the minimum

separation distances between the

explosive hazard facility and other

explosive hazard facilities and public

areas in accordance with one method

provided in paragraphs (b), (c), or (d) of

this section.

(b) A launch site operator shall

determine the minimum separation

distances between the explosive hazard

facility and all other explosive hazard

facilities and public areas required for

the liquid propellants in accordance

with section 420.67(b)(5), and add the

minimum separation distances between

62868 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

the explosive hazard facility and all

other explosive hazard facilities and

public areas required for the solid

propellants in accordance with section

420.65, treating the solid propellants as

explosive division 1.1.

(c) A launch site operator shall

determine the minimum separation

distances between the explosive hazard

facility and all other explosive hazard

facilities and public areas required for

the liquid propellants in accordance

with section 420.67(b)(5), and add the

minimum separation distances between

the explosive hazard facility and all

other explosive hazard facilities and

public areas required for the solid

propellants in accordance with section

420.65, using the explosive equivalent

of the explosive division 1.3.

(d) A launch site operator shall

conduct an analysis of the maximum

credible event (MCE), or the worst case

explosion that is expected to occur. If

the MCE shows that there will be no

simultaneous explosion reaction of the

liquid propellant tanks and the solid

propellant motors, then the minimum

distance between the explosive hazard

facility and all other explosive hazard

facilities and public areas must be based

on the MCE.

§ 420.71 Lightning protection.

(a) Lightning protection. A licensee

shall ensure that the public is not

exposed to hazards due to the initiation

of explosives by lightning.

(1) Elements of a lighting protection

system. Unless an explosive hazard

facility meets the conditions of

paragraph (a)(3) of this section, all

explosive hazard facilities shall have a

lightning protection system to ensure

explosives are not initiated by lightning.

A lightning protection system shall meet

the requirements of this paragraph and

include the following:

(i) Air terminal. An air terminal to

intentionally attract a lightning strike.

(ii) Down conductor. A low

impedance path connecting an air

terminal to an earth electrode system.

(iii) Earth electrode system. An earth

electrode system to dissipate the current

from a lightning strike to ground.

(2) Bonding and surge protection. A

lightning protection system must meet

the requirements of this paragraph and

include the following:

(i) Bonding. All metallic bodies shall

be bonded to ensure that voltage

potentials due to lightning are equal

everywhere in the explosive hazard

facility. Any fence within six feet of a

lightning protection system shall have a

bond across each gate and other

discontinuations and shall be bonded to

the lightning protection system.

Railroad tracks that run within six feet

of the lightning protection system shall

be bonded to the lightning protection

system.

(ii) Surge protection. A lightning

protection system shall include surge

protection to reduce transient voltages

due to lightning to a harmless level for

all metallic power, communication, and

instrumentation lines entering an

explosive hazard facility.

(3) Circumstances where no lightening

protection system is required. No

lightning protection system is required

for an explosive hazard facility when a

lightning warning system is available to

permit termination of operations and

withdrawal of the public to public area

distance prior to an electrical storm, or

for an explosive hazard facility

containing explosives that cannot be

initiated by lightning. If no lightning

protection system is required, a licensee

must ensure the withdrawal of the

public to a public area distance prior to

an electrical storm.

(4) Testing and inspection. Lightning

protection systems shall be visually

inspected semiannually and shall be

tested once each year for electrical

continuity and adequacy of grounding.

A licensee shall maintain at the

explosive hazard facility a record of

results obtained from the tests,

including any action taken to correct

deficiencies noted.

(b) Electrical power lines. A licensee

shall ensure that electric power lines at

its launch site meet the following

requirements:

(1) Electric power lines shall be no

closer to an explosive hazard facility

than the length of the lines between the

poles or towers that support the lines

unless an effective means is provided to

ensure that energized lines cannot, on

breaking, come in contact with the

explosive hazard facility.

(2) Towers or poles supporting

electrical distribution lines that carry

between 15 and 69 KV, and unmanned

electrical substations shall be no closer

to an explosive hazard facility than the

public area distance for that explosive

hazard facility.

(3) Towers or poles supporting

electrical transmission lines that carry

69 KV or more, shall be no closer to an

explosive hazard facility than the public

area distance for that explosive hazard

facility.

Issued in Washington, DC on September

29, 2000.

Patricia G. Smith,

Associate Administrator for Commercial

Space Transportation.

Appendix A to Part 420—Method for

Defining a Flight Corridor

(a) Introduction

(1) This appendix provides a method for

constructing a flight corridor from a launch

point for a guided suborbital launch vehicle

or any one of the four classes of guided

orbital launch vehicles from table 1, § 420.19,

without the use of local meteorological data

or a launch vehicle trajectory.

(2) A flight corridor includes an overflight

exclusion zone in a launch area and, for a

guided suborbital launch vehicle, an impact

dispersion area in a downrange area. A flight

corridor for a guided suborbital launch

vehicle ends with the impact dispersion area,

and, for the four classes of guided orbital

launch vehicles, 5000 nautical miles (nm)

from the launch point.

(b) Data requirements

(1) Maps. An applicant shall use any map

for the launch site region with a scale not less

than 1:250,000 inches per inch in the launch

area and 1:20,000,000 inches per inch in the

downrange area. As described in paragraph

(b)(2), an applicant shall use a mechanical

method, a semi-automated method, or a fullyautomated method to plot a flight corridor on

maps. A source for paper maps acceptable to

the FAA is the U.S. Dept. of Commerce,

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration, National Ocean Service.

(i) Projections for mechanical plotting

method. An applicant shall use a conic

projection. The FAA will accept a ‘‘LambertConformal’’ conic projection. A polar aspect

of a plane-azimuthal projection may also be

used for far northern launch sites.

(ii) Projections for semi-automated plotting

method. An applicant shall use cylindrical,

conic, or plane projections for semiautomated plotting. The FAA will accept

‘‘Mercator’’ and ‘‘Oblique Mercator’’

cylindrical projections. The FAA will accept

‘‘Lambert-Conformal’’ and ‘‘Albers EqualArea’’ conic projections. The FAA will accept

‘‘Lambert Azimuthal Equal-Area’’ and

‘‘Azimuthal Equidistant’’ plane projections.

(iii) Projections for fully-automated

plotting method. The FAA will accept map

projections used by geographical information

system software scaleable pursuant to the

requirements of paragraph (b)(1).

(2) Plotting Methods.

(i) Mechanical method. An applicant may

use mechanical drafting equipment such as

pencil, straight edge, ruler, protractor, and

compass to plot the location of a flight

corridor on a map. The FAA will accept

straight lines for distances less than or equal

to 7.5 times the map scale on map scales

greater than or equal to 1:1,000,000 inches

per inch (in/in); or straight lines representing

100 nm or less on map scales less than

1:1,000,000 in/in.

(ii) Semi-automated method. An applicant

may employ the range and bearing

techniques in paragraph (b)(3) to create

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62869

latitude and longitude points on a map. The

FAA will accept straight lines for distances

less than or equal to 7.5 times the map scale

on map scales greater than or equal to

1:1,000,000 inches per inch (in/in); or

straight lines representing 100 nm or less on

map scales less than 1:1,000,000 in/in.

(iii) Fully-automated method. An applicant

may use geographical information system

software with global mapping data scaleable

in accordance with paragraph (b)(1).

(3) Range and bearing computations on an ellipsoidal Earth model.

(i) To create latitude and longitude pairs on an ellipsoidal Earth model, an applicant shall use the following equations to calculate

geodetic latitude (+N) and longitude (+E) given the launch point geodetic latitude (+N), longitude (+E), range (nm), and bearing (degrees,

positive clockwise from North).

(A) Input. An applicant shall use the following input in making range and bearing computations. Angle units must be in radians.

φ

φ π

λ

λ π

π

α

α

π

1

1

=

⋅

⋅

⋅

=

⋅

Geodetic latitude of launch point (radians)

= (DDD) 180 (radians per degree)

= Longitude of launch point (DDD)

= (DDD) 180 (radians per degree)

S = Range from launch point (nm)

= S (DDD) 180 (radians per degree)

Azimuth bearing from launch point (deg)

= (DDD) 180 (radians per degree)

1

12

12

(B) Computations. An applicant shall use the following equations to determine the latitude (φ2) and longitude (λ2) of a target

point situated ‘‘S’’ nm from the launch point on an azimuth bearing (α12) degrees.

f b

a = −1 (Equation A1)

where:

a = WGS–84 semi-major axis (3443.91846652 nmi)

b = WGS–84 semi-minor axis (3432.37165994 nmi)

ε2

2 2

2 = ( ) a b −

b (Equation A2)

θ = S

b

 (radians) Equation A3) (

β φ

φ 1

1 1

1

= ( ) ⋅

( ) ⋅

















− tan

sin

cos

(

b

a

Equation A4)

g = ( )( ) cos cos β α 1 12 (Equation A5)

h = ( )( ) cosβ α 1 12 sin (Equation A6)

m

h

=

+





 





















1 [ ] − 21

2

2

1

ε 2 sin β

(Equation A7)

2

62870 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

n

g

=

+





 





















1 [ ] ( )( ) + ⋅( )( ) 2

2

2

11 1

ε sin sin sin β β θ βθ

(Equation A8)

2 2 cos sin

Lh f fn f m= ⋅− ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅

 ⋅⋅⋅ − ⋅



 



θ θ  θ θθ 3 3

2

2

2

sin + (radians) (Equation A9) ( sin cos )

M m= ⋅ε2 (Equation A10)

N n = ⋅ε2 (Equation A11)

A N 1 = ⋅sin θ (Equation A12)

A M

2 2 = 





 ( ) sin cos (Equation A13) θ θθ ⋅ −

A3

5

2 = 





 ( ) N sin cos (Equation A14) ⋅ ⋅ 2 θ θ

A M

4

2

2 3

16 = 11 13 8 10 









( ) ⋅− ⋅ ⋅ −⋅⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ θ θθθ θ θ θ sin cos cos sin cos Equation A15 ( )

A M N

5

2

2 = 32 5  ⋅





( ) ⋅ +⋅⋅ −⋅ ⋅ sin cos sin cos θθθ θ θ ( ) Equation A16

δ θ =− + + + + A A A A XA radians 1234 ( ) ( ) 5 Equation A17

sin sin cos sin β βδ δ 2 1 = ⋅ +⋅ g Equation A18 ( )

cos cos sin sin β δβδ 2

2

1

2

1

2 = +⋅ − ⋅ [ ] h g Equation A19 ( ) ( )

φ β

β π 2

1 2

2

180 = ( ) ⋅

( ) ⋅





































⋅









( )( ) − tan

sin

cos

a

b geodetic latitude of target point, DDD Equation A20

Λ = ( ) ⋅

( ) ⋅ − ⋅⋅















 ( ) − tan

sin sin

cos cos sin sin cos

1 12

1 1 12

δ α

β δ β δα Equation A21

λ λ

π

2 1

180

= ++ ( )





 Λ L longitude of target point, DDD Equation A22 ( )( )

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62871

(ii) To create latitude and longitude pairs on an ellipsoidal Earth model, an applicant shall use the following equations to calculate

the distance (S) of the geodesic between two points (P1 and P2), the forward azimuth (α12) of the geodesic at P1, and the back

azimuth (α21) of the geodesic at P2, given the geodetic latitude (+N), longitude (+E) of P1 and P2. Azimuth is measured positively

clockwise from North.

(A) Input. An applicant shall use the following input. Units must be in radians.

φ

φ π

λ

λ π

π

α

α

π

1

1

1

1

12

12

180

180

180

180

=

= ( )⋅ ( )

=

( )⋅ ( )

=

= ( )⋅ ( )

=

= ( )⋅ ( )

Geodetic latitude of launch point (radians)

radians per degree

Longitude of launch point (DDD)

= radians per degree

Range from launch point (nm)

radians per degree

Azimuth bearing from launch point (deg)

radians per degree

DDD

DDD

S

S DDD

DDD

(B) Computations. An applicant shall use the following equations to determine the distance (S), the forward azimuth (α12) of

the geodesic at P1, and the back azimuth (α12) of the geodesic at P2.

f b

a = −1 Equation A23 ( )

where:

a = WGS–84 semi-major axis (3443.91846652 nmi)

b = WGS–84 semi-minor axis (3432.37165994 nmi)

L = − λ λ 2 1 ( ) Equation A24

β φ

α φ 1

1 1

1

= ( ) ⋅

⋅





 



 ( ) − tan

sin

cos

b

Equation A25

β φ

α φ 2

1 2

2

= ( ) ⋅

⋅





 



 ( ) − tan

sin

cos

b

Equation A26

A = ⋅ sin sin β β 1 2 ( ) Equation A27

B = ⋅ cos cos β β 1 2 ( ) Equation A28

cos cos δ= + ⋅ A B L Equation A29 ( )

n

a b

a b = ( ) −

( ) + ( ) Equation A30

ββ φφ φφ 21 21

23 23 ( ) − = − ( ) +⋅ ⋅ + + 2   ( ) −⋅ − + ( ) 2 1 A n n n B n n n radians ⋅ − sin Equation A31 ( ) ( )

62872 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

sin sin cos sin cos sin sin / δ β ββ β β = ⋅ { } ( ) L L 2 + − [ ] ( ) +⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ( ) ( ) 2

21 2 1

2 2

1

2 2 2 Equation A32

δ δ

δ = π 



 



 ≤ ( ) − tan

sin

cos

1 evaluated in positive radians Equation A33

c

B L = ⋅ ( ) sin

sin δ Equation A34

m c = −1 ( ) 2 Equation A35

S b

ff Aff f

m ff f

A f

f m

= ⋅

⋅ ++ [ ] +⋅ + ( )⋅ −⋅ ( ) ( ) ⋅ [ ] −( )[ ] ( ) + ( ) + ⋅ − ⋅ ( ) ( )

− ⋅ ( )⋅ ⋅

+ ⋅ ( ) + ⋅ −⋅

δ δδ δ

δ δδ δ δ

δ δ

δ δδ

1 2

2

2

16 2

2 2 22

2 22

2 2

2 2

sin / sin

/ sin cos / tan

/ sin cos

/ sin cos sin δ δδ δ

δ δδ δ

[ ] ⋅ − ( )

+ ⋅⋅ ( )[ ] ⋅ ++ ( )





















































( )

cos / tan

/ sin cos / sin

3 2

22 2 2

8

A m f in the same units as "a" and "b" 2

Equation A36

Λ= + ⋅

⋅ + ( ) − ⋅ ( )[ ] + ( )

+ ⋅ ( )[ ] − + ( )





















L c ( )

f f Af

m f

δ δδ δ

δ δδδ δ

22 2

2 2

2 2

4 54

/ sin / sin

/ sin cos / tan

radians Equation A37

α

β

ββ β β π

12

1 2

21 2 1

2 2 2

180 = ( ) ⋅

[ ] ( ) − +⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ( )





















⋅







 ( ) − tan

cos sin

sin cos sin sin /

Λ

Λ degrees Equation A38

α

β

β β ββ π

21

1 1

1 2

2

2 1 2 2

180 = ( ) − ⋅

[ ] ⋅⋅⋅ ( ) − − ( )





















⋅







 ( ) − tan

cos sin

cos sin sin / sin

Λ

Λ degrees Equation A39

(c) Creation of a Flight Corridor

(1) To define a flight corridor, an applicant

shall:

(i) Select a guided suborbital or orbital

launch vehicle, and, for an orbital launch

vehicle, select from table 1 of § 420.19 a

launch vehicle weight class that best

represents the launch vehicle the applicant

plans to support at its launch point;

(ii) Select a debris dispersion radius (Dmax)

from table A–1 corresponding to the guided

suborbital launch vehicle or orbital launch

vehicle class selected in paragraph (c)(1)(i);

(iii) Select a launch point geodetic latitude

and longitude; and

(iv) Select a flight azimuth.

(2) An applicant shall define and map an

overflight exclusion zone using the following

method:

(i) Select a debris dispersion radius (Dmax)

from table A–1 and a downrange distance

(DOEZ) from table A–2 to define an overflight

exclusion zone for the guided suborbital

launch vehicle or orbital launch vehicle class

selected in paragraph (c)(1)(i).

(ii) An overflight exclusion zone is

described by the intersection of the following

boundaries, which are depicted in figure A–

1:

(A) An applicant shall define an uprange

boundary with a half-circle arc of radius Dmax

and a chord of length twice Dmax connecting

the half-circle arc endpoints. The uprange

boundary placement on a map has the chord

midpoint positioned on the launch point

with the chord oriented along an azimuth

±90°from the launch azimuth and the halfcircle arc located uprange from the launch

point.

(B) An applicant shall define the

downrange boundary with a half-circle arc of

radius Dmax and a chord of length twice Dmax

connecting the half-circle arc endpoints. The

downrange boundary placement on a map

has the chord midpoint intersecting the

nominal flight azimuth line at a distance

DOEZ inches downrange with the chord

oriented along an azimuth ±90°from the

launch azimuth and the half-circle arc

located downrange from the intersection of

the chord and the flight azimuth line.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62873

(C) Crossrange boundaries of an overflight

exclusion zone are defined by two lines

segments. Each is parallel to the flight

azimuth with one to the left side and one to

the right side of the flight azimuth line. Each

line connects an uprange half-circle arc

endpoint to a downrange half-circle arc

endpoint as shown in figure A–1.

(iii) An applicant shall identify the

overflight exclusion zone on a map that

meets the requirements of paragraph (b).

(3) An applicant shall define and map a

flight corridor using the following method:

(i) In accordance with paragraph (b), an

applicant shall draw a flight corridor on one

or more maps with the Dmax origin centered

on the intended launch point and the flight

corridor centerline (in the downrange

direction) aligned with the initial flight

azimuth. The flight corridor is depicted in

figure A–2 and its line segment lengths are

tabulated in table A–3.

(ii) An applicant shall define the flight

corridor using the following boundary

definitions:

(A) An applicant shall draw an uprange

boundary, which is defined by an arc-line GB

(figure A–2), directly uprange from and

centered on the intended launch point with

radius Dmax.

(B) An applicant shall draw line CF

perpendicular to and centered on the flight

azimuth line, and positioned 10 nm

downrange from the launch point. The

applicant shall use the length of line CF

provided in table A–3 corresponding to the

guided suborbital launch vehicle or orbital

launch vehicle class selected in paragraph

(c)(1)(i).

(C) An applicant shall draw line DE

perpendicular to and centered on the flight

azimuth line, and positioned 100 nm

downrange from the launch point. The

applicant shall use the length of line DE

provided in table A–3 corresponding to the

guided suborbital launch vehicle or orbital

launch vehicle class selected in paragraph

(c)(1)(i).

(D) Except for a guided suborbital launch

vehicle, an applicant shall draw a downrange

boundary, which is defined by line HI and

is drawn perpendicular to and centered on

the flight azimuth line, and positioned 5,000

nm downrange from the launch point. The

applicant shall use the length of line HI

provided in table A–3 corresponding to the

orbital launch vehicle class selected in

paragraph (c)(1)(i).

(E) An applicant shall draw crossrange

boundaries, which are defined by three lines

on the left side and three lines on the right

side of the flight azimuth. An applicant shall

construct the left flight corridor boundary

according to the following, and as depicted

in figure A–3 :

(1) The first line (line BC in figure A–3) is

tangent to the uprange boundary arc, and

ends at endpoint C of line CF, as depicted in

figure A–3;

(2) The second line (line CD in figure A–

3) begins at endpoint C of line BC and ends

at endpoint D of line DH, as depicted in

figure A–3;

(3) For all orbital launch vehicles, the third

line (line DH in figure A–3) begins at

endpoint D of line CD and ends at endpoint

H of line HI, as depicted in figure A–3; and

(4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle,

the line DH begins at endpoint D of line CD

and ends at a point tangent to the impact

dispersion area drawn in accordance with

paragraph (c)(4) and as depicted in figure A–

4.

(F) An applicant shall repeat the procedure

in paragraph (c)(3)(ii)(E) for the right side

boundary.

(iii) An applicant shall identify the flight

corridor on a map that meets the

requirements of paragraph (b).

(4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle,

an applicant shall define a final stage impact

dispersion area as part of the flight corridor

and show the impact dispersion area on a

map, as depicted in figure A–4, in

accordance with the following:

(i) An applicant shall select an apogee

altitude (Hap) for the launch vehicle final

stage. The apogee altitude should equal the

highest altitude intended to be reached by a

guided suborbital launch vehicle launched

from the launch point.

(ii) An applicant shall define the impact

dispersion area by using an impact range

factor [IP(Hap)] and a dispersion factor

[DISP(Hap)] as shown below:

(A) An applicant shall calculate the impact

range (D) for the final launch vehicle stage.

An applicant shall set D equal to the

maximum apogee altitude (Hap) multiplied by

the impact range factor as shown below:

D H IP H = ⋅ ap ap ( ) ( ) Equation A40

where: IP(Hap) = 0.4 for an apogee less than

100 km; and IP(Hap) = 0.7 for an apogee

100 km or greater.

(B) An applicant shall calculate the impact

dispersion radius (R) for the final launch

vehicle stage. An applicant shall set R equal

to the maximum apogee altitude (Hap)

multiplied by the dispersion factor as shown

below:

R H DISP H = ⋅ ap ap ( ) ( ) Equation A41

where: DISP(Hap) = 0.05

(iii) An applicant shall draw the impact

dispersion area on a map with its center on

the predicted impact point. An applicant

shall then draw line DH in accordance with

paragraph (c)(3)(ii)(E)(4).

(d) Evaluate the Flight Corridor

(1) An applicant shall evaluate the flight

corridor for the presence of any populated

areas. If an applicant determines that no

populated area is located within the flight

corridor, then no additional steps are

necessary.

(2) If a populated area is located in an

overflight exclusion zone, an applicant may

modify its proposal or demonstrate that there

are times when no people are present or that

the applicant has an agreement in place to

evacuate the public from the overflight

exclusion zone during a launch.

(3) If a populated area is located within the

flight corridor, an applicant may modify its

proposal and create another flight corridor

pursuant to appendix A, use appendix B to

narrow the flight corridor, or complete a risk

analysis in accordance with appendix C.

TABLE A–1.—DEBRIS DISPERSION RADIUS (Dmax) (IN)

Orbital launch vehicles Suborbital launch vehicles

Small Medium Medium large Large Guided

87,600

(1.20 nm)

111,600

(1.53 nm)

127,200

(1.74 nm)

156,000

(2.14 nm)

96,000

(1.32 nm)

62874 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

TABLE A–2.—OVERFLIGHT EXCLUSION ZONE DOWNRANGE DISTANCE (Doez) (IN)

Orbital launch vehicles Suborbital launch vehicles

Small Medium Medium large Large Guided

240,500

(3.30 nm)

253,000

(3.47 nm)

310,300

(4.26 nm)

937,700

(12.86 nm)

232,100

(3.18 nm)

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62875

62876 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62877

62878 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

Appendix B to Part 420—Method for

Defining a Flight Corridor

(a) Introduction

(1) This appendix provides a method to

construct a flight corridor from a launch

point for a guided suborbital launch vehicle

or any one of the four weight classes of

guided orbital launch vehicles from table 1,

§ 420.19, using local meteorological data and

a launch vehicle trajectory.

(2) A flight corridor is constructed in two

sections—one section comprising a launch

area and one section comprising a downrange

area. The launch area of a flight corridor

reflects the extent of launch vehicle debris

impacts in the event of a launch vehicle

failure and applying local meteorological

conditions. The downrange area reflects the

extent of launch vehicle debris impacts in the

event of a launch vehicle failure and

applying vehicle imparted velocity,

malfunctions turns, and vehicle guidance

and performance dispersions.

(3) A flight corridor includes an overflight

exclusion zone in the launch area and, for a

guided suborbital launch vehicle, an impact

dispersion area in the downrange area. A

flight corridor for a guided suborbital launch

vehicle ends with an impact dispersion area

and, for the four classes of guided orbital

launch vehicles, 5,000 nautical miles (nm)

from the launch point, or where the IIP

leaves the surface of the Earth, whichever is

shorter.

(b) Data Requirements

(1) Launch area data requirements. An

applicant shall satisfy the following data

requirements to perform the launch area

analysis of this appendix. The data

requirements are identified in table B–1

along with sources where data acceptable to

the FAA may be obtained.

(i) An applicant must select meteorological

data that meet the specifications in table B–

1 for the proposed launch site.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62879

TABLE B–1.—LAUNCH AREA DATA REQUIREMENTS

Data category Data item Data source

Meteorological Data ........................................... Local statistical wind data as a function of altitude up to 50,000 feet. Required data include: altitude (ft), atmospheric density

(slugs/ft 3), mean East/West meridianal (u)

and North/South zonal (v) wind (ft/sec),

standard deviation of u and v wind (ft/sec),

correlation coefficient, number of observations and wind percentile (%).

These data may be obtained from:

Global Gridded Upper Air Statistics, Climate

Applications Branch National Climatic Data

Center.

Nominal Trajectory Data .................................... State vector data as function of time after liftoff in topocentric launch point centered

X,Y,Z,X,Y,Z coordinates with the X-axis

aligned with the flight azimuth. Trajectory

time intervals shall not be greater than one

second. XYZ units are in feet and X,Y,Z

units are in ft/sec.

Actual launch vehicle trajectory data; or trajectory generation software that meets the

requirements of paragraph (b)(1)(ii).

Debris Data ........................................................ A fixed ballistic coefficient equal to 3 lbs/ft 2 is

used for the launch area.

N/A.

Geographical Data ............................................. Launch point geodetic latitude on a WGS–84

ellipsoidal Earth model.

Geographical surveys or Global Positioning

System.

Launch point longitude on an ellipsoidal Earth

model.

Maps using scales of not less than 1:250,000

inches per inch within 100 nm of a launch

point and 1:20,000,000 inches per inch for

distances greater than 100 nm from a

launch point.

Map types with scale and projection information are listed in the Defense Mapping

Agency, Public Sale, Aeronautical Charts

and Publications Catalog. The catalog and

maps may be ordered through the U.S.

Dept. of Commerce, National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration, National Ocean

Service.

(ii) For a guided orbital launch vehicle, an

applicant shall obtain or create a launch

vehicle nominal trajectory. An applicant may

use trajectory data from a launch vehicle

manufacturer or generate a trajectory using

trajectory simulation software. Trajectory

time intervals shall be no greater than one

second. If an applicant uses a trajectory

computed with commercially available

software, the software must calculate the

trajectory using the following parameters, or

clearly and convincingly demonstrated

equivalents:

(A) Launch location:

(1) Launch point, using geodetic latitude

and longitude to four decimal places; and

(2) Launch point height above sea level.

(B) Ellipsoidal Earth:

(1) Mass of Earth;

(2) Radius of Earth;

(3) Earth flattening factor; and

(4) Gravitational harmonic constants (J2, J3,

J4).

(C) Vehicle characteristics:

(1) Mass as a function of time;

(2) Thrust as a function of time;

(3) Specific impulse (ISP) as a function of

time; and

(4) Stage dimensions.

(D) Launch events:

(1) Stage burn times; and

(2) Stage drop-off times.

(E) Atmosphere:

(1) Density as a function of altitude;

(2) Pressure as a function of altitude;

(3) Speed of sound as a function of

altitude; and

(4) Temperature as a function of altitude.

(F) Winds:

(1) Wind direction as a function of altitude;

and

(2) Wind magnitude as a function of

altitude.

(I) Aerodynamics: drag coefficient as a

function of mach number for each stage of

flight showing subsonic, transonic and

supersonic mach regions for each stage.

(iii) An applicant shall use a ballistic

coefficient (β) of 3 lbs/ft2 for debris impact

computations.

(iv) An applicant shall satisfy the map and

plotting requirements for a launch area of

appendix A, paragraph (b).

(2) Downrange area data requirements. An

applicant shall satisfy the following data

requirements to perform the downrange area

analysis of this appendix.

(i) The launch vehicle weight class and

method of generating a trajectory used in the

launch area shall be used by an applicant in

the downrange area as well. Trajectory time

intervals must not be greater than one

second.

(ii) An applicant shall satisfy the map and

plotting data requirements for a downrange

area of appendix A, paragraph (b).

(c) Construction of a Launch Area of a Flight

Corridor

(1) An applicant shall construct a launch

area of a flight corridor using the processes

and equations of this paragraph for each

trajectory position. An applicant shall repeat

these processes at time points on the launch

vehicle trajectory for time intervals of no

greater than one second. When choosing

wind data, an applicant shall use a time

period of between one and 12 months.

(2) A launch area analysis must include all

trajectory positions whose Z-values are less

than or equal to 50,000 ft.

(3) Each trajectory time is denoted by the

subscript ‘‘i’’. Height intervals for a given

atmospheric pressure level are denoted by

the subscript ‘‘j’.

(4) Using data from the GGUAS CD–ROM,

an applicant shall estimate the mean

atmospheric density, maximum wind speed,

height interval fall times and height interval

debris dispersions for 15 mean geometric

height intervals.

(i) The height intervals in the GGUAS

source data vary as a function of the

following 15 atmospheric pressure levels

expressed in millibars: surface, 1000, 850,

700, 500, 400, 300, 250, 200, 150, 100, 70, 50,

30, 10. The actual geometric height

associated with each pressure level varies

depending on the time of year. An applicant

shall estimate the mean geometric height

over the period of months selected in

subparagraph (1) of this paragraph for each

of the 15 pressure levels as shown in

equation B1.

H

h n

n

j

m m

m l

k

m

m

k =

⋅

=

=

∑

∑

1

(Equation B1)

where:

H

 ̄

j = mean geometric height hm = geometric

height for a given month nm = number

of observations for a given month

k = number of wind months of interest

62880 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

(ii) The atmospheric densities in the source

data also vary as a function of the 15

atmospheric pressure levels. The actual

atmospheric density associated with each

pressure level varies depending on the time

of year. An applicant shall estimate the mean

atmospheric density over the period of

months selected in accordance with

subparagraph (1) of this paragraph for each

of the 15 pressure levels as shown in

equation B2.

ρ

ρ

j

m m

m

k

m

m

k

n

n

⋅

=

=

∑

∑

1

1

(Equation B2)

where:

ρj = mean atmospheric density

ρm = atmospheric density for a given month

nm = number of observations for a given

month

k = number of wind months of interest

(iii) An applicant shall estimate the

algebraic maximum wind speed at a given

pressure level as follows and shall repeat the

process for each pressure level.

(A) For each month, an applicant shall

calculate the monthly mean wind speed (Waz)

for 360 azimuths using equation B3;

(B) An applicant shall select the maximum

monthly mean wind speed from the 360

azimuths;

(C) An applicant shall repeat

subparagraphs (c)(4)(iii)(A) and (B) for each

month of interest; and

(D) An applicant shall select the maximum

mean wind speed from the range of months.

The absolute value of this wind is designated

Wmax for the current pressure level.

(iv) An applicant shall calculate wind

speed using the means for winds from the

West (u) and winds from the North (v). An

applicant shall use equation B3 to resolve the

winds to a specific azimuth bearing.

W u az v az az =⋅ − cos sin ( ) 90 90 Equation B3 +⋅ − ( ) ( )

where:

az = wind azimuth

u = West zonal wind component

v = North zonal wind component

Waz = mean wind speed at azimuth for each

month

(v) An applicant shall estimate the interval

fall time over a height interval assuming the

initial descent velocity is equal to the

terminal velocity (VT). An applicant shall use

equations B4 through B6 to estimate the fall

time over a given height interval.

∆HH H jj j = − +1 ( ) Equation B4

VTj

j j =

⋅

( ) +





























( ) +

2

2

1

0 5 β

ρ ρ

.

Equation B5

t

H

V j

j

Tj

= ( ) ∆Equation B6

where:

∆HTj= height difference between two mean

geometric heights

β= ballistic coefficient

ρx= mean atmospheric density for the

corresponding mean geometric heights

VTj = terminal velocity

(vi) An applicant shall estimate the interval

debris dispersion (Dj) by multiplying the

interval fall time by the algebraic maximum

mean wind speed (Wmax) as shown in

equation B7.

D tW j j = ⋅ max ( ) Equation B7

(5) Once the Dj are estimated for each

height interval, an applicant shall determine

the total debris dispersion (Di) for each Zi

using a linear interpolation and summation

exercise, as shown below in equation B8. An

applicant shall use a launch point height of

zero equal to the surface level of the nearest

GGUAS grid location.

D D Z H

H H i j D i i

j i

n

n

j

= ⋅ −

−











 + ( ) + =

−

∑

1 1

1

Equation B8

where:

n = number of height intervals below jth

height interval

(6) Once all the Di radii have been

calculated, an applicant shall produce a

launch area flight corridor in accordance

with the requirements of subparagraphs

(c)(6)(i)–(iv).

(i) On a map meeting the requirements of

appendix A, paragraph (b), an applicant shall

plot the Xi position location on the flight

azimuth for the corresponding Zi position;

(ii) An applicant shall draw a circle of

radius Di centered on the corresponding Xi

position; and

(iii) An applicant shall repeat the

instructions in subparagraphs (c)(6)(i)–(ii) for

each Di radius.

(iv) The launch area of a flight corridor is

the enveloping line that encloses the outer

boundary of the Di circles as shown in Fig.

B–1. The uprange portion of a flight corridor

is described by a semi-circle arc that is a

portion of either the most uprange Di

dispersion circle, or the overflight exclusion

zone (defined by subparagraph (c)(7)),

whichever is further uprange.

(7) An applicant shall define an overflight

exclusion zone in the launch area in

accordance with the requirements of

appendix A, subparagraph (c)(2).

(8) An applicant shall draw the launch area

flight corridor and overflight exclusion zone

on a map or maps that meet the requirements

of table B–1.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62881

(d) Construction of a Downrange Area of a

Flight Corridor

(1) The downrange area analysis estimates

the debris dispersion for the downrange time

points on a launch vehicle trajectory. An

applicant shall perform the downrange area

analysis using the processes and equations of

this paragraph.

(2) The downrange area analysis shall

include trajectory positions at a height (the

Zi-values) greater than 50,000 feet and

nominal trajectory IIP values less than or

equal to 5,000 nm. For a guided suborbital

launch vehicle, the final IIP value for which

an applicant must account is the launch

vehicle final stage impact point. Each

trajectory time shall be one second or less

and is denoted by the subscript ‘‘i’.

(3) An applicant shall compute the

downrange area of a flight corridor boundary

in four steps, from each trajectory time

increment: determine a reduction ratio factor;

calculate the launch vehicle position after

simulating a malfunction turn; rotate the

state vector after the malfunction turn in the

range of three degrees to one degree as a

function of Xi distance downrange; and

compute the IIP of the resulting trajectory.

The locus of IIPs describes the boundary of

the downrange area of a flight corridor. An

applicant shall use the following

subparagraphs, (d)(3)(i)–(v), to compute the

downrange area of the flight corridor

boundary:

(i) Compute the downrange Distance to the

final IIP position for a nominal trajectory as

follows:

(A) Using equations B30 through B69,

determine the IIP coordinates (φmax, λmax) for

the nominal state vector before the launch

vehicle enters orbit where α in equation B30

is the nominal flight azimuth angle measured

from True North.

(B) Using the range and bearing equations

of appendix A, paragraph (b)(3), determine

the distance (Smax) from the launch point

coordinates (φlp, λlp) to the IIP coordinates

(φmax, λmax) computed in accordance with

(3)(i)(A) of this paragraph.

(C) The distance for Smax may not exceed

5000 nm. In cases when the actual value

exceeds 5000 nm the applicant shall use

5000 nm for Smax.

(ii) Compute the reduction ratio factor (Fn)

for each trajectory time increment as follows:

(A) Using equations B30 through B69,

determine the IIP coordinates (φi, λi) for the

nominal state vector where α in equation B30

is the nominal flight azimuth angle measured

from True North.

(B) Using the range and bearing equations

of appendix A, paragraph (b)(3), determine

the distance (Si) from the launch point

coordinates (φlp, λlp) to the IIP coordinates (φi,

λi) computed in (3)(ii)(A) of this paragraph.

(C) The reduction ratio factor is:

F S

S ri

i = − 



 



 1 ( ) max

Equation B9

(iii) An applicant shall compute the launch

vehicle position and velocity components

after a simulated malfunction turn for each

Xi using the following method.

(A) Turn duration (∆t) = 4 sec.

(B) Turn angle (θ)

θ = ( ) Fri * 45 degrees. Equation B10 ( )

The turn angle equations perform a turn in

the launch vehicle’s yaw plane, as depicted

in figure B–2.

62882 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

(C) Launch vehicle velocity magnitude at the beginning of the turn (Vb) and velocity magnitude at the end of the turn (Ve)

V X Y Z ft b = ++ i i 





 ( ) ⋅⋅⋅

1

2 22

0 5.

/sec Equation B11

V X Y X ft e = ++ 





 ( ) ⋅⋅⋅

i+5

2

i+5

2

i+5

2 Equation B12

0 5.

/sec

(D) Average velocity magnitude over the

turn duration (V ̄)

V

V V

i ft Equation B b e = ( ) + ( ) 2

/sec 13

(E) Velocity vector path angle (γi) at turn

epoch

γ i

i

i i

Z

X Y

= Equation B

+ 



 

































( ) −

⋅

⋅ ⋅

tan .

1

2 2 0 5 14

(F) Launch vehicle position components at the end of turn duration

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62883

X XVt

X XVt

Y YV t

Y YV t

Z ZVt

L ii i

R ii i

L ii

R ii

L ii

90

90

90

90

90

2

2

2

2

2

= +⋅⋅  −







⋅ ( )

= +⋅⋅ 







⋅ ( )

= +⋅⋅  −







= +⋅⋅ 







= +⋅⋅  −







⋅

∆

∆

∆

∆

∆

cos cos

cos cos

sin

sin

cos

θ

γ

θ

γ

θ

θ

θ sin

cos sin

γ

θ

γ

i

R ii i

g t Equations 

Z ZVt g t

( ) − 







⋅ ⋅ ( )

= +⋅⋅ 







⋅ ( ) − 







⋅ ⋅

1

2

2

1

2

1

2

90 1

2

∆

∆ ∆

B15- B20

where: g1 = 32.17405 ft/sec2

(G) Launch vehicle velocity components at the end of turn duration

X X Xt

X X Xt

Y Y Yt

Y Y Y t Equations 

Z Z Zt

Z Z Zt

L L i

R R i

L L i

R R i

L L i

R R i

⋅

⋅

⋅

⋅

⋅

⋅

= − ( )

= − ( )

= − ( )

= −( )⋅ − ( ) ( )

= − ( )

= − ( )

90 90

90 90

90 90

90 90

90 90

90 90

1

/

/

/

/

/

/

∆

∆

∆

∆

∆

∆

B21- B26

(iv) An applicant shall rotate the trajectory

state vector at the end of the turn duration

to the right and left to define the right-lateral

flight corridor boundary and the left-lateral

flight corridor boundary, respectively. An

applicant shall perform the trajectory rotation

in conjunction with a trajectory

transformation from the X90, Y90, Z90, X

 ̇

90,

Y

 ̇

90, Z

 ̇

90, components to E, N, U, E ̇

, N

 ̇

, U

 ̇

. The

trajectory subscripts ‘‘R’’ and ‘‘L’’ from

equations B15 through B26 have been

discarded to reduce the number of equations.

An applicant shall transform from to

E,N,U,E ̇,N

 ̇

,U

 ̇ to E,F,G,E ̇

,F

 ̇

,G

 ̇

. An applicant

shall use the equations of paragraph

(d)(3)(iv)(A)–(F) to produce the EFG

components necessary to estimate each

instantaneous impact point.

(A) An applicant must calculate the flight

angle (α)

∆αi ri =−⋅ ⋅ − 32 1 f F Equation B 1 ( ) ( ) 27

α

α

Li i

Ri i

ri

ri

Flight Azi

Equation B

OR

Flight Azi

Equation B

F

F

= − ( )

( )

= − ( )

( )

= ≥

<













muth

 for left lateral boundary computations 28

 -

 muth

 for right lateral boundary computations 29 

 where: f1

∆α

∆α

00 08

10 08

.: .

.: .

(B) An applicant shall transform X90,Y90,Z90 to E,N,U

62884 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

EX Y

X Y Equations 

U Z

= ( ) − ( )

= ( ) + ( ) ( )

=

90 90

90 90

90

sin cos

cos sin

α α

N B30 - B32 α α

(C) An applicant shall transform to X ̇

90, Y

 ̇

90, Z

 ̇

90 to E ̇

, N ̇, U ̇.

EX Y

X Y Equations 

U Z

⋅⋅ ⋅

⋅⋅ ⋅

⋅ ⋅

= ( ) − ( )

= ( ) + ( ) ( )

=

90 90

90 90

90

sin cos

cos sin

α α

N B33- B35 α α

(D) An applicant shall transform the launch point coordinates (φ0λ0,h0) to E0,F0,G0

Ra e

where a

E R h Equations 

F Rh

G Re h

E

E

= − { } [ ] ( )

=

=

= + ( ) () () ( )

= + ( ) () ()

= − ( ) + [ ] ( )

−

1

20925646 3255

0 00669437999013

1

2 2

0

0 5

0 000

0 0 00

0

2

0 0

sin

: .

.

cos cos

cos sin

sin

.

φ

φ λ

φ λ

φ

 ft

e

B36 - B39

2

(E) An applicant shall transform E,N,U to E90,F90,G90

E E N U Equations 

FE N U

GN U G

90 0 0 0 0 0

90 0 0 0 0 0

90 0 0

270 90 270 90 270

270 90 270 90 270

90 90

= − ( ) + − ( ) ( ) − − − ( ) ( ) − ( )

= − ( ) + − ( ) ( ) − − − ( ) ( ) −

= − ( ) + − ( ) +

cos cos sin sin sin

sin cos cos sin cos

sin cos

λ φλ φλ

λ φλ φλ

φ φ

B40 - B42

0

(F) An applicant shall transform to E ̇,N

 ̇

,U

 ̇ TO E ̇

,F

 ̇

,G

 ̇

E E N U Equations 

FE N U

G N

⋅⋅ ⋅ ⋅

⋅⋅ ⋅ ⋅

⋅ ⋅

= − ( ) + − ( ) ( ) − − − ( ) ( ) − ( )

= − ( ) + − ( ) ( ) − − − ( ) ( ) −

= − ( ) +

90 0 00 00

90 0 00 00

90 0

270 90 270 90 270

270 90 270 90 270

90

cos cos sin sin sin

sin cos cos sin cos

sin

λ φλ φλ

λ φλ φλ

φ

B43 - B45

U

⋅

cos 90 ( ) − φ0

(v) The IIP computation implements an

iterative solution to the impact point

problem. An applicant shall solve equations

B46 through B69, with the appropriate

substitutions, up to a maximum of five times.

Each repetition of the equations provides a

more accurate prediction of the IIP. An

applicant shall use the required IIP

computations of paragraphs (d)(3)(v)(A)–(W)

below. An applicant shall use this IIP

computation for both the left-and right-lateral

offsets. The IIP computations will result in

latitude and longitude pairs for the leftlateral flight corridor boundary and the rightlateral flight corridor boundary. An applicant

shall use the lines connecting the latitude

and longitude pairs to describe the entire

downrange area boundary of the flight

corridor up to 5000 nm or a final stage

impact dispersion area.

(A) An applicant shall approximate the

radial distance (rk,l) from the geocenter to the

IIP. The distance from the center of the Earth

ellipsoid to the launch point shall be used for

the initial approximation of rk,l as shown in

equation B46.

r E F G Equation B k,

.

1 0

2

0

2

0

2 0 5

= ++ ( ) ( ) 46

(B) An applicant shall compute the radial distance (r) from the geocenter to the launch vehicle position.

r E F G Equation B = ++ ( ) 90 ( ) 2

90

2

90

2 0 5.

47

If r < rk,l then the launch vehicle position is below the Earth’s surface and an impact point cannot be computed. An applicant

must restart the calculations with the next trajectory state vector.

(C) An applicant shall compute the inertial velocity components.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62885

 ̇  ̇

 ̇  ̇ (

El E F

Fl F E

90 90 90

90 90 90

= −⋅

= +⋅

ω

ω Equations B48-B49)

where: ω = 4.178074×10¥3 deg/sec

(D) An applicant shall compute the

magnitude of the inertial velocity vector.

v EI FI G 0 90

2

90

2

90

2 0 5  ̇  ̇  ̇ ( .

( ) + + Equation B50)

(E) An applicant shall compute the

eccentricity of the trajectory ellipse

multiplied by the cosine of the eccentric

anomaly at epoch εc).

ε

ν c

r

K =  ⋅









 − 0

2

1 (Equation B51)

where: K = 1.407644×1016 ft3/sec2

(F) An applicant shall compute the semimajor axis of the trajectory ellipse (at

).

a

r t

c

= 1− ε(Equation B52)

If at 0 or at then the trajectory orbit is not

elliptical, but is hyperbolic or parabolic, and

an impact point cannot be computed. The

launch vehicle has achieved escape velocity

and the applicant may terminate

computations.

(G) An applicant shall compute the

eccentricity of the trajectory ellipse

multiplied by the sine of the eccentric

anomaly at epoch εs).

εs

E EI F FI G G = ( ) + +

( ) ⋅

90 90 90 90 90 90

0 5

 ̇  ̇  ̇

( . K a

Equation B53)

t

(H) An applicant shall compute the

eccentricity of the trajectory ellipse squared

ε2).

ε εε 2 22 = + ( ) c s (Equation B54)

If at(1¥ε)¥aE] > 0 and ε ≥ 0 then the

trajectory perigee height is positive and an

impact point cannot be computed. The

launch vehicle has achieved Earth orbit and

the applicant may terminate computations.

(I) An applicant shall compute the

eccentricity of the trajectory ellipse

multiplied by the cosine of the eccentric

anomaly at impact (εck).

εc

t k

t k

a r

a = ( ) − ,1 (Equation B55)

(J) An applicant shall compute the

eccentricity of the trajectory ellipse

multiplied by the sine of the eccentric

anomaly at impact (εsk).

ε εε s c k =− − ( ) k

2 2 0 5.

(Equation B56)

If εsk < 0 then the trajectory orbit does not

intersect the Earth’s surface and an impact

point cannot be computed. The launch

vehicle has achieved Earth orbit and the

applicant may terminate computations.

(K) An applicant shall compute the cosine

of the difference between the eccentric

anomaly at impact and the eccentric anomaly

at epoch (∆εck).

∆εc

cc ss

k

k k = ( ) εε εε ⋅ + ⋅ ( )

ε2 (Equation B57)

(L) An applicant shall compute the sine of the difference between the eccentric anomaly at impact and the eccentric anomaly

at epoch (∆εsk).

∆εs

sc cs

k

k k = ( ) εε εε ⋅ − ⋅ ( )

ε2 (Equation B58)

(M) An applicant shall compute the f-series

expansion of Kepler’s equations. f

l

c c

c

k

2 = ( ) −

( ) −

∆ε ε

ε

(Equation B59)

(N) An applicant shall compute the g-series

expansion of Kepler’s equations.

g

a

K s ss t 2 k k

3 0 5

= +− ( )







 ∆ε ε ε 

.

(Equation B60)

(O) An applicant shall compute the E,F,G

coordinates at impact (Ei,Fi,Gi).

E f E g El

F f F g Fl

G fG gG

k

k

k

=⋅ + ⋅

=⋅ + ⋅

=⋅ + ⋅

2 90 2 90

2 90 2 90

2 90 2 90

 ̇

 ̇ (

 ̇

Equations B61-B63)

(P) An applicant shall approximate the distance from the geocenter to the launch vehicle position at impact (rk,2).

62886 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

r

a

e

l e

G

r

k

E

k

k

,

,

2 . 2

2

1

2 0 5

1

=

−





 















 +

















(Equation B64)

where:

aE = 20925646.3255 ft

e2 = 0.00669437999013

(Q) An applicant shall let rk∂1,1 = rk,2,

substitute rk∂1,1 for rk,1 in equation B55 and

repeat equations B55—B64 up to four more

times increasing ‘‘k’’ by an increment of one

on each loop (e.g. kε{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}). If

|r5,1¥r5,2| > 1 then the iterative solution does

not converge and an impact point does not

meet the accuracy tolerance of plus or minus

one foot. An applicant must try more

iterations, or restart the calculations with the

next trajectory state vector.

(R) An applicant shall compute the difference between the eccentric anomaly at impact and the eccentric anomaly at epoch (∆ε).

∆ε

∆ε

∆ε = 









 − tan (Equation B65) 1 5

5

s

c

(S) An applicant shall compute the time of flight from epoch to impact (t).

t

a

K s s t = +− ( )







 ∆ε ε ε 5 

3 0 5.

(Equation B66)

(T) An applicant shall compute the

geocentric latitude at impact (φ’).

φ ′= 



 



 −

i Equation B67) 1 sin

,2 ( Gr

5

5

Where: +90°>φ′i> ¥90°

(U) An applicant shall compute the

geodetic latitude at impact (φ).

φ

φ

i

e =

 ′



 





( ) −

























− tan

i

l Equation B68) 1

tan

( 2

Where: +90°>φi> ¥90°

(V) An applicant shall compute the East

longitude at impact (λ).

λ ω i

F

E = t 









 − − tan l (Equation B69) 5

5

(W) If the range from the launch point to

the impact point is equal to or greater than

5000 nm, an applicant shall terminate IIP

computations.

(4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle,

an applicant shall define a final stage impact

dispersion area as part of the flight corridor

and show the area on a map using the

following procedure:

(i) For equation B70 below, an applicant

shall use an apogee altitude (Hap)

corresponding to the highest altitude reached

by the launch vehicle final stage in the

applicant’s launch vehicle trajectory analysis

done in accordance with paragraph (b)(1)(ii).

(ii) An applicant shall define the final stage

impact dispersion area by using a dispersion

factor [DISP(Hap)] as shown below. An

applicant shall calculate the impact

dispersion radius (R) for the final launch

vehicle stage. An applicant shall set R equal

to the maximum apogee altitude (Hap)

multiplied by the dispersion factor as shown

below:

R H DISP H = ⋅ ap ap ( ) (Equation B70)

where: DISP(Hap) = 0.05

(5) An applicant shall combine the launch

area and downrange area flight corridor and

any final stage impact dispersion area for a

guided suborbital launch vehicle.

(i) On the same map with the launch area

flight corridor, an applicant shall plot the

latitude and longitude positions of the left

and right sides of the downrange area of the

flight corridor calculated in accordance with

subparagraph (d)(3).

(ii) An applicant shall connect the latitude

and longitude positions of the left side of the

downrange area of the flight corridor

sequentially starting with the last IIP

calculated on the left side and ending with

the first IIP calculated on the left side. An

applicant shall repeat this procedure for the

right side.

(iii) An applicant shall connect the left

sides of the launch area and downrange

portions of the flight corridor. An applicant

shall repeat this procedure for the right side.

(iv) An applicant shall plot the overflight

exclusion zone defined in subparagraph

(c)(7).

(v) An applicant shall draw any impact

dispersion area on the downrange map with

the center of the impact dispersion area on

the launch vehicle final stage impact point

obtained from the applicant’s launch vehicle

trajectory analysis done in accordance with

subparagraph (b)(1)(ii).

(e) Evaluate the Launch Site

(1) An applicant shall evaluate the flight

corridor for the presence of populated areas.

If no populated area is located within the

flight corridor, then no additional steps are

necessary.

(2) If a populated area is located in an

overflight exclusion zone, an applicant may

modify its proposal or demonstrate that there

are times when no people are present or that

the applicant has an agreement in place to

evacuate the public from the overflight

exclusion zone during a launch.

(3) If a populated area is located within the

flight corridor, an applicant may modify its

proposal or complete an overflight risk

analysis in accordance with appendix C.

Appendix C to Part 420—Risk Analysis

(a) Introduction

(1) This appendix provides a method for an

applicant to estimate the expected casualty

(Ec) for a launch of a guided expendable

launch vehicle using a flight corridor

generated either by appendix A or appendix

B. This appendix also provides an applicant

options to simplify the method where

population at risk is minimal.

(2) An applicant shall perform a risk

analysis when a populated area is located

within a flight corridor defined by either

appendix A or appendix B. If the estimated

expected casualty exceeds 30×10 ¥6, an

applicant may either modify its proposal, or

if the flight corridor used was generated by

the appendix A method, use the appendix B

method to narrow the flight corridor and then

redo the overflight risk analysis pursuant to

this appendix. If the estimated expected

casualty still exceeds 30×10 ¥6, the FAA will

not approve the location of the proposed

launch point.

(b) Data Requirements

(1) An applicant shall obtain the data

specified by subparagraphs (b)(2) and (3) and

summarized in table C–1. Table C–1 provides

sources where an applicant may obtain data

acceptable to the FAA. An applicant must

also employ the flight corridor information

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62887

from appendix A or B, including flight

azimuth and, for an appendix B flight

corridor, trajectory information.

(2) Population data. Total population (N)

and the total landmass area within a

populated area (A) are required. Population

data up to and including 100 nm from the

launch point are required at the U.S. census

block group level. Population data

downrange from 100 nm are required at no

greater than 1° × 1° latitude/longitude grid

coordinates.

(3) Launch vehicle data. Launch vehicle

data consist of the launch vehicle failure

probability (Pf), the launch vehicle effective

casualty area (Ac), trajectory position data,

and the overflight dwell time (td). The failure

probability is a constant (Pf = 0.10) for a

guided orbital or suborbital expendable

launch vehicle. Table C–3 provides effective

casualty area data based on IIP range.

Trajectory position information is provided

from distance computations provided by this

appendix for an appendix A flight corridor,

or trajectory data used in appendix B for an

appendix B flight corridor. The dwell time

(td) may be determined from trajectory data

produced when creating an appendix B flight

corridor.

TABLE C–1.—OVERFLIGHT ANALYSIS DATA REQUIREMENTS

Data category Data item Data source

Population Data .................................................. Total population within a populated area (N) .. Within 100 nm of the launch point: U.S. census data at the census block-group level.

Downrange from 100 nm beyond the launch

point, world population data are available

from:

Total landmass area within the populated

area (A).

Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center

(CDIAC) Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Database—Global Population Distribution

(1990), Terrestrial Area and Country Name

Information on a One by One Degree Grid

Cell Basis (DB1016 (8–1996)

Launch Vehicle Data .......................................... Failure probability—Pf = 0.10 .......................... N/A.

Effective casualty area (Ac) ............................. See table C–3.

Overflight dwell time ........................................ Determined by range from the launch point or

trajectory used by applicant.

Nominal trajectory data (for an appendix B

flight corridor only).

See appendix B, table B–1.

(c) Estimating Corridor Casualty Expectation

(1) A corridor casualty expectation

[EC(Corridor)] estimate is the sum of the

expected casualty measurement of each

populated area inside a flight corridor.

(2) An applicant shall identify and locate

each populated area in the proposed flight

corridor.

(3) An applicant shall determine the

probability of impact in each populated area

using the procedures in subparagraphs (5) or

(6) of this paragraph. Figures C–1 and C–2

illustrate an area considered for probability

of impact (Pi ) computations by the dashedlined box around the populated area within

a flight corridor, and figure C–3 illustrates a

populated area in a final stage impact

dispersion area. An applicant shall then

estimate the EC for each populated area in

accordance with subparagraphs (7) and (8) of

this paragraph.

(4) The Pi computations do not directly

account for populated areas whose areas are

bisected by an appendix A flight corridor

centerline or an appendix B nominal

trajectory ground trace. Accordingly, an

applicant must evaluate Pi for each of the bisections as two separate populated areas, as

shown in figure C–4, which shows one bisection to the left of an appendix A flight

corridor’s centerline and one to its right.

(5) Probability of impact (Pi) computations

for a populated area in an appendix A flight

corridor. An applicant shall compute Pi for

each populated area using the following

method:

(i) For the launch and downrange areas,

but not for a final stage impact dispersion

area for a guided suborbital launch vehicle,

an applicant shall compute Pi for each

populated area using the following equation:

P

y y y y y y

i

yy y y =

 −











⋅

−































+ ⋅

−

 +











































+

−





















































2 1

1

2 1 2

2

2

2

6 2 2

4

2

2 2

σ

π

σ σσ

exp exp exp 





⋅ ⋅

 ( ) −



 



 P

C

x x

R

f 2 1

 ̇ (Equation C1)

where:

x1, x2 = closest and farthest downrange

distance (nm) along the flight corridor

centerline to the populated area (see

figure C–1)

y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range

distance (nm) to the populated area

measured from the flight corridor

centerline (see figure C–1)

σy = one-third of the cross range distance

from the centerline to the flight corridor

boundary (see figure C–1)

exp = exponential function (e x)

Pf = probability of failure = 0.10

R

 ̇

= IIP range rate (nm/sec) (see table C–2)

C = 643 seconds (constant)

TABLE C–2.—IIP RANGE RATE VS. IIP

RANGE

IIP range

(nm)

IIP range

rate

(nm/s)

0–75 .......................................... 0.75

76–300 ...................................... 1.73

301–900 .................................... 4.25

901–1700 .................................. 8.85

1701–2600 ................................ 19.75

TABLE C–2.—IIP RANGE RATE VS. IIP

RANGE—Continued

IIP range

(nm)

IIP range

rate

(nm/s)

2601–3500 ................................ 42.45

3501–4500 ................................ 84.85

4501–5250 ................................ 154.95

(ii) For each populated area within a final

stage impact dispersion area, an applicant

shall compute Pi using the following method:

62888 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

(A) An applicant shall estimate the probability of final stage impact in the x and y sectors of each populated area within the

final stage impact dispersion area using equations C2 and C3:

P

x x x x x x

x

x x xx =

 −











⋅

−

 





















+ ⋅

−

 +



 

































+

−

 

















































2 1

1

2 1 2

2

2

2

6 2 2

4

2

2 2

σ

π

σ σσ

exp exp exp (Equation C2)

where:

X1,X2 = closest and farthest downrange distance, measured along the flight corridor centerline, measured from the nominal impact

point to the populated area (see figure C–3)

σx = one-third of the impact dispersion radius (see figure C–3)

exp = exponential function (e x)

P

y y y y y y

y

yy y y =

 −











⋅

−































+ ⋅

−

 +











































+

−





















































2 1

1

2 1 2

2

2

2

6 2 2

4

2

2 2

σ

π

σ σσ

exp exp exp 





(Equation C3)

where:

y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range

distance to the populated area measured

from the flight corridor centerline (see

figure C–3)

σy = one-third of the impact dispersion

radius (see figure C–3)

exp = exponential function (e x)

(B) If a populated area intersects the impact

dispersion area boundary so that the x2 or y2

distance would otherwise extend outside the

impact dispersion area, the x2 or y2 distance

should be set equal to the impact dispersion

area radius. The x2 distance for populated

area A in figure C–3 is an example. If a

populated area intersects the flight azimuth,

an applicant shall solve equation C3 by

obtaining the solution in two parts. An

applicant shall determine, first, the

probability between y1 = 0 and y2 = a and,

second, the probability between y1 = 0 and

y2 = b, as depicted in figure C–4. The

probability Py is then equal to the sum of the

probabilities of the two parts. If a populated

area intersects the line that is normal to the

flight azimuth on the impact point, an

applicant shall solve equation C2 by

obtaining the solution in two parts in the

same manner as with the values of x.

(C) An applicant shall calculate the

probability of impact for each populated area

using equation C4 below:

P PPP l sxy =⋅⋅ (Equation C4)

where: Ps = 1¥Pf = 0.90

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62889

(6) Probability of impact computations for a populated area in an appendix B flight corridor. An applicant shall compute Pi

using the following method: (i) For the launch and downrange areas, but not for a final stage impact dispersion area for a guided suborbital launch vehicle,

an applicant shall compute Pi for each populated area using the following equation:

P

y y y y y y

i

yy y y =

 −











⋅

−































+ ⋅

−

 +











































+

−





















































2 1

1

2 1 2

2

2

2

6 2 2

4

2

2 2

σ

π

σ σσ

exp exp exp 





⋅ ⋅









P

t

t f

d (Equation C5)

where:

y1,y2 = closest and farthest cross range distance (nm) to a populated area measured from the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace

(see figure C–2) σy = one-third of the cross range distance (nm) from nominal trajectory to the flight corridor boundary (see figure C–2) exp = exponential function (ex)

Pf = probability of failure = 0.10 t = flight time from lift-off to orbital insertion (seconds)

td = overflight dwell time (seconds)

(ii) For each populated area within a final stage impact dispersion area, an applicant shall compute Pi using the following method: (A) An applicant shall estimate the probability of final stage impact in the x and y sectors of each populated area within the

final stage impact dispersion area using equations C6 and C7:

P

x x x x x x

x

x x xx =

 −











⋅

−

 





















+ ⋅

−

 +



 

































+

−

 

















































2 1

1

2 1 2

2

2

2

6 2 2

4

2

2 2

σ

π

σ σσ

exp exp exp (Equation C6)

where:

x1,x2 = closest and farthest downrange distance, measured along nominal trajectory IIP ground trace, measured from the nominal

impact point to the populated area (see figure C–3)

62890 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

σx = one-third of the impact dispersion radius (see figure C–3)

exp = exponential function (ex)

P

y y y y y y

y

yy y y =

 −











⋅

−































+ ⋅

−

 +











































+

−





















































2 1

1

2 1 2

2

2

2

6 2 2

4

2

2 2

σ

π

σ σσ

exp exp exp 





(Equation C7)

where:

y1,y2 = closest and farthest cross range distance to the populated area measured from the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace (see

figure C–3)

σy = one-third of the impact dispersion radius (see figure C–3)

exp = exponential function (ex)

(B) If a populated area intersects the impact dispersion area boundary so that the x2 or y2 distance would otherwise extend

outside the impact dispersion area, the x2 or y2 distance should be set equal to the impact dispersion area radius. The x2 distance

for populated area A in figure C–3 is an example. If a populated area intersects the flight azimuth, an applicant shall solve equation

C7 by obtaining the solution in two parts. An applicant shall determine, first, the probability between y1 = 0 and y2 = a and,

second, the probability between y1 = 0 and y2 = b, as depicted in figure C–4. The probability Py is then equal to the sum of

the probabilities of the two parts. If a populated area intersects the line that is normal to the flight azimuth on the impact point,

an applicant shall solve equation C6 by obtaining the solution in two parts in a similar manner with the values of x.

(C) An applicant shall calculate the probability of impact for each populated area using equation C8 below:

P PPP 1 =⋅⋅ sxy (Equation C8)

where: Ps = 1¥Pf = 0.90

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62891

(7) Using the Pi calculated in either subparagraph (c)(5) or (6) of this paragraph, an applicant shall calculate the casualty expectancy

for each populated area within the flight corridor in accordance with equation C9. Eck is the casualty expectancy for a given populated

area as shown in equation C9, where individual populated areas are designated with the subscript ‘‘k’’.

E P A

A ck i N c

k

= ⋅ k





 



 ⋅ (Equation C9)

62892 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

where:

Ac = casualty area (from table C–3)

Ak = populated area

Nk = population in Ak

TABLE C–3.—EFFECTIVE CASUALTY AREA (MILES 2) AS A FUNCTION OF IIP RANGE (NM)

Orbital launch vehicles Suborbital

launch vehicles IIP Range

(nmi) Small Medium Medium large Large

Guided

0–49 ............................................................................................... 0.43 0.53 0.71 1.94 0.43

50–1749 ......................................................................................... 0.13 0.0022 0.11 0.62 0.13

1750–5000 ..................................................................................... 3.59×10¥6 8.3×10¥4 1.08×10¥1 7.17×10¥1 3.59×10¥6

(8) An applicant shall estimate the total corridor risk using the following summation of risk:

Ec Corridor Ec

k

n

k ( ) =











 =

∑

1

(Equation C10)

(9) Alternative casualty expectancy (EC )

analyses. An applicant may employ specified

variations to the analysis defined by

subparagraphs (c)(1)–(8). Those variations are

identified in subparagraphs (9)(i) through (vi)

of this paragraph. Subparagraphs (i) through

(iv) permit an applicant to make conservative

assumptions that would lead to an

overestimation of the corridor EC compared

with the analysis defined by subparagraphs

(c)(1)–(8). In subparagraphs (v) and (vi), an

applicant that would otherwise fail the

analysis prescribed by subparagraphs (c)(1)–

(8) may avoid (c)(1)–(8)’s overestimation of

the probability of impact in each populated

area. An applicant employing a variation

shall identify the variation used, show and

discuss the specific assumptions made to

modify the analysis defined by

subparagraphs (c)(1)–(8), and demonstrate

how each assumption leads to overestimation

of the corridor EC compared with the analysis

defined by subparagraphs (c)(1)–(c)(8).

(i) Assume that Px and Py have a value of

1.0 for all populated areas.

(ii) Combine populated areas into one or

more larger populated areas, and use a

population density for the combined area or

areas equal to the most densely populated

area.

(iii) For any given populated area, assume

Py has a value of one.

(iv) For any given Px sector (an area

spanning the width of a flight corridor and

bounded by two time points on the trajectory

IIP ground trace) assume Py has a value of

one and use a population density for the

sector equal to the most densely populated

area.

(v) For a given populated area, divide the

populated area into smaller rectangles,

determine Pi for each individual rectangle,

and sum the individual impact probabilities

to determine Pi for the entire populated area.

(vi) For a given populated area, use the

ratio of the populated area to the area of the

Pi rectangle from the subparagraph (c)(1)–(8)

analysis.

(d) Evaluation of Results

(1) If the estimated expected casualty does

not exceed 30x10¥6, the FAA will approve

the launch site location.

(2) If the estimated expected casualty

exceeds 30×10¥6, then an applicant may

either modify its proposal, or, if the flight

corridor used was generated by the appendix

A method, use the appendix B method to

narrow the flight corridor and then perform

another appendix C risk analysis.

Appendix D to Part 420—Impact

Dispersion Areas and Casualty

Expectancy Estimate for an Unguided

Suborbital Launch Vehicle

(a) Introduction

(1) This appendix provides a method for

determining the acceptability of the location

of a launch point from which an unguided

suborbital launch vehicle would be

launched. The appendix describes how to

define an overflight exclusion zone and

impact dispersion areas, and how to evaluate

whether the public risk presented by the

launch of an unguided suborbital launch

vehicle remains at acceptable levels.

(2) An applicant shall base its analysis on

an unguided suborbital launch vehicle whose

final launch vehicle stage apogee represents

the intended use of the launch point.

(3) An applicant shall use the apogee of

each stage of an existing unguided suborbital

launch vehicle with a final launch vehicle

stage apogee equal to the one proposed, and

calculate each impact range and dispersion

area using the equations provided.

(4) This appendix also provides a method

for performing an impact risk analysis that

estimates the expected casualty (Ec) within

each impact dispersion area. This appendix

provides an applicant options to simplify the

method where population at risk is minimal.

(5) If the estimated Ec is less than or equal

to 30×10¥6, the FAA will approve the launch

point for unguided suborbital launch

vehicles. If the estimated Ec exceeds

30×10¥6, the proposed launch point will fail

the launch site location review.

(b) Data Requirements

(1) An applicant shall employ the apogee

of each stage of an existing unguided

suborbital launch vehicle whose final stage

apogee represents the maximum altitude to

be reached by unguided suborbital launch

vehicles launched from the launch point. The

apogee shall be obtained from one or more

actual flights of an unguided suborbital

launch vehicle launched at an 84 degree

elevation.

(2) An applicant shall satisfy the map and

plotting data requirements of appendix A,

paragraph (b).

(3) Population data. An applicant shall use

total population (N) and the total landmass

area within a populated area (A) for all

populated areas within an impact dispersion

area. Population data up to and including

100 nm from the launch point are required

at the U.S. census block group level.

Population data downrange from 100 nm are

required at no greater than 1° x 1° latitude/

longitude grid coordinates.

(c) Overflight Exclusion Zone and Impact

Dispersion Areas

(1) An applicant shall choose a flight

azimuth from a launch point.

(2) An applicant shall define an overflight

exclusion zone as a circle with a radius of

1600 feet centered on the launch point.

(3) An applicant shall define an impact

dispersion area for each stage of the

suborbital launch vehicle chosen in

accordance with subparagraph (b)(1) in

accordance with the following:

(i) An applicant shall calculate the impact

range for the final launch vehicle stage (Dn).

An applicant shall set Dn equal to the last

stage apogee altitude (Hn) multiplied by an

impact range factor [IP(Hn)] in accordance

with the following:

D H IP H nn n = ⋅ ( ) (Equation D1)

where:

IP(Hn) = 0.4 for an apogee less than 100 km,

and

IP(Hn) = 0.7 for an apogee of 100 km or

greater.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62893

(ii) An applicant shall calculate the impact

range for each intermediate stage (Di), where

i ε {1, 2, 3, . . . (n¥ 1)}, and where n is the

total number of launch vehicle stages. Using

the apogee altitude (Hi) of each intermediate

stage, an applicant shall use equation D1 to

compute the impact range of each stage by

substituting Hi for Hn. An applicant shall use

the impact range factors provided by

equation D1.

(iii) An applicant shall calculate the impact

dispersion radius for the final launch vehicle

stage (Rn). An applicant shall set Rn equal to

the last stage apogee altitude (Hn) multiplied

by an impact dispersion factor [DISP(Hn)] in

accordance with the following:

R H DISP H nn n = ⋅ ( ) (Equation D2)

where:

DISP(Hn) = 0.4 for an apogee less than 100

km, and

DISP(Hn) = 0.7 for an apogee of 100 km or

greater.

(iv) An applicant shall calculate the impact

dispersion radius for each intermediate stage

(Ri), where i ε {1, 2, 3, . . . (n¥ 1)} and where

n is the total number of launch vehicle

stages. Using the apogee altitude (Hi) of each

intermediate stage, an applicant shall use

equation D2 to compute an impact dispersion

radius of each stage by substituting Hi for Hn.

An applicant shall use the dispersion factors

provided by equation D2.

(4) An applicant shall display an overflight

exclusion zone, each intermediate and final

stage impact point (Di through Dn), and each

impact dispersion area for the intermediate

and final launch vehicle stages on maps in

accordance with paragraph (b)(2).

(d) Evaluate the Overflight Exclusion Zone

and Impact Dispersion Areas

(1) An applicant shall evaluate the

overflight exclusion zone and each impact

dispersion area for the presence of any

populated areas. If an applicant determines

that no populated area is located within the

overflight exclusion zone or any impact

dispersion area, then no additional steps are

necessary.

(2) If a populated area is located in an

overflight exclusion zone, an applicant may

modify its proposal or demonstrate that there

are times when no people are present or that

the applicant has an agreement in place to

evacuate the public from the overflight

exclusion zone during a launch.

(3) If a populated area is located within any

impact dispersion area, an applicant may

modify its proposal and define a new

overflight exclusion zone and new impact

dispersion areas, or perform an impact risk

analysis in accordance with paragraph (e).

(e) Impact Risk Analysis

(1) An applicant shall estimate the

expected average number of casualties, EC,

within the impact dispersion areas according

to the following method:

(i) An applicant shall calculate the Ec by summing the impact risk for the impact dispersion areas of the final launch vehicle

stage and all intermediate stages. An applicant shall estimate Ec for the impact dispersion area of each stage by using equations

D3 through D7 for each of the populated areas located within the impact dispersion areas.

(ii) An applicant shall estimate the probability of impacting inside the X and Y sectors of each populated area within each

impact dispersion area using equations D3 and D4:

P

x x x xx x

x

xx x x x =

− 



 





⋅

−





 

































+ ⋅

−

 +



 

































+

−





 





































 21 1

2

1 2

2

2

2

6 2 2

4

2

2 2

σ σ

π

σ σσ

exp exp exp 





















(Equation D3)

where:

62894 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

x1, x2 = closest and farthest downrange distance to populated area (see figure D–2)

σx = one-third of the impact dispersion radius (see figure D–2)

exp = exponential function (ex)

P

y y y y y y

y

yy y y y =

− 











⋅

−































+ ⋅

−

 +











































+

−

















































2 1

1

2 1 2

2

2

2

6 2 2

4

2

2 2

σ σ

π

σ σσ

exp exp exp











(Equation D4)

where:

y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range distance to the populated area (see figure D–2)

σy = one-third of the impact dispersion radius (see figure D–2)

exp = exponential function (ex)

(iii) If a populated area intersects the impact dispersion area boundary so that the x2 or y2 distance would otherwise extend

outside the impact dispersion area, the x2 or y2 distance should be set equal to the impact dispersion area radius. The x2 distance

for populated area A in figure D–2 is an example.

(iv) If a populated area intersects the flight azimuth, an applicant shall solve equation D4 by obtaining the solution in two parts.

An applicant shall determine, first, the probability between y1 = 0 and y2 = a and, second, the probability between y1 = 0 and

y2 = b, as depicted in figure D–3. The probability Py is then equal to the sum of the probabilities of the two parts. If a populated

area intersects the line that is normal to the flight azimuth on the impact point, an applicant shall solve equation D3 by obtaining

the solution in two parts in the same manner as with the values of x.

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62895

(v) An applicant shall calculate the

probability of impact (Pi) for each populated

area using the following equation:

P PPP i sxy =⋅⋅ (Equation D5)

where:

Ps = probability of success = 0.98

(vi) An applicant shall calculate the

casualty expectancy for each populated area.

Eck is the casualty expectancy for a given

populated area as shown in equation D6,

where individual populated areas are

designated with the subscript ‘‘k’’.

E P A

A ck i N c

k

= ⋅ k





 



 ⋅ (Equation D6)

where:

k { {1, 2, 3, . . . , n}

Ac = casualty area (from table D–1)

Ak = populated area

Nk = population in Ak

TABLE D–1.—EFFECTIVE CASUALTY AREA (Ac) VS. IMPACT RANGE

Impact range (nm)

Effective casualty area

(miles2)

0–4 ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9×10¥3

5–49 ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9×10¥3

50–1,749 .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 1.1×10¥5

1,750–4,999 ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 3.6×10¥6

5,000–more .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 3.6×10¥6

(vii) An applicant shall estimate the total risk using the following summation of risk:

Ec Corridor Ec

k

n

k ( ) = 









 =

∑

1

(Equation D7)

(viii) Alternative casualty expectancy (Ec)

analysis. An applicant may employ specified

variations to the analysis defined by

subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)–(vii). Those

variations are identified in subparagraphs

(viii)(A) through (F) of this paragraph.

Subparagraphs (A) through (D) permit an

applicant to make conservative assumptions

that would lead to an overestimation of Ec

compared with the analysis defined by

subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)–(vii). In

subparagraphs (E) and (F), an applicant that

would otherwise fail the analysis prescribed

by subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)–(vii) may avoid

(d)(1)(i)–(vii)’s overestimation of the

62896 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

probability of impact in each populated area.

An applicant employing a variation shall

identify the variation used, show and discuss

the specific assumptions made to modify the

analysis defined by subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)–

(vii), and demonstrate how each assumption

leads to overestimation of the corridor Ec

compared with the analysis defined by

subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)–(vii).

(A) Assume that Px and Py have a value of

1.0 for all populated areas.

(B) Combine populated areas into one or

more larger populated areas, and use a

population density for the combined area or

areas equal to the most densely populated

area.

(C) For any given populated area, assume

Px has a value of one.

(D) For any given populated area, assume

Py has a value of one.

(E) For a given populated area, divide the

populated area into smaller rectangles,

determine Pi for each individual rectangle,

and sum the individual impact probabilities

to determine Pi for the entire populated area.

(F) For a given populated area, use the ratio

of the populated area to the area of the Pi

rectangle used in the subparagraph (d)(1)(i)–

(vii) analysis.

(2) If the estimated expected casualty does

not exceed 30 × 10¥6, the FAA will approve

the launch point.

(3) If the estimated expected casualty

exceeds 30 × 10¥6, then an applicant may

modify its proposal and then repeat the

impact risk analysis in accordance with this

appendix D. If no set of impact dispersion

areas exist which satisfy the FAA’s risk

threshold, the applicant’s proposed launch

site will fail the launch site location review.

Appendix E to Part 420—Tables for

Explosive Site Plan

TABLE E–1.—QUANTITY DISTANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR SOLID EXPLOSIVES

Quantity (lbs.) (over) Quantity (lbs.)

(not over)

Public area

distance (ft.)

for division 1.1

Public area

distance (ft.)

for division 1.3

Intraline distance (ft.) for

division 1.1

Intraline distance (ft.) for

division 1.3

0 ........................................................................................... 1,000 1,250 75 D = 18 W1/3 50

1,000 .................................................................................... 5,000 ........................ 115 ........................ 75

5,000 .................................................................................... 10,000 ........................ 150 ........................ 100

10,000 .................................................................................. 20,000 ........................ 190 ........................ 125

20,000 .................................................................................. 30,000 ........................ 215 ........................ 145

30,000 .................................................................................. 40,000 D = 40 W1/3 235 ........................ 155

40,000 .................................................................................. 50,000 ........................ 250 ........................ 165

50,000 .................................................................................. 60,000 ........................ 260 ........................ 175

60,000 .................................................................................. 70,000 ........................ 270 ........................ 185

70,000 .................................................................................. 80,000 ........................ 280 ........................ 190

80,000 .................................................................................. 90,000 ........................ 195 ........................ 195

90,000 .................................................................................. 100,000 ........................ 300 ........................ 200

100,000 ................................................................................ 200,000 D=2.42 W0.577 375 ........................ 250

200,000 ................................................................................ 250,000 ........................ 413 ........................ 275

250,000 ................................................................................ 300,000 D = 50 W1/3 450 ........................ 300

300,000 ................................................................................ 400,000 ........................ 525 ........................ 350

400,000 ................................................................................ 500,000 ........................ 600 ........................ 400

500,000 ................................................................................ 1,000,000 ........................ 800 ........................ 500

Greater than 1,000,000 ........................................................ ........................ D = 50 W1/3 D = 8 W1/3 D = 5 W1/3

‘‘D’’ equals the minimum separation distance in feet.

‘‘W’’ equals the NEW of propellant.

TABLE E–2.—LIQUID PROPELLANT EXPLOSIVE EQUIVALENTS

Propellant combinations Explosive equivalent

LO2/LH2 ..................................................................................................... The larger of: 8W2/3 where W is the weight of LO2/LH2, or

14% of W.

LO2/LH2 + LO2/RP–1 ................................................................................ Sum of (20% for LO2/RP–1) + the larger of: 8W2/3 where W is the

weight of LO2/LH2, or

14% of W.

LO2/R–1 .................................................................................................... 20% of W up to 500,000 pounds plus 10% of W over 500,000 pounds,

where W is the weight of LO2RP–1.

N2O4/N2H4 (or UDMH or UDMH/N2H4 Mixture) ....................................... 10% of W, where W is the weight of the propellant.

TABLE E–3.—PROPELLANT HAZARD AND COMPATIBILITY GROUPINGS AND FACTORS TO BE USED WHEN CONVERTING

GALLONS OF PROPELLANT INTO POUNDS

Propellant Hazard

group

Compatibility

group

Pounds/

gallon

At temperature

°F

Hydrogen Peroxide ........................................................................................... II A 11.6 68

Hydrazine .......................................................................................................... III C 8.4 68

Liquid Hydrogen ................................................................................................ III C 0.59 ¥423

Liquid Oxygen ................................................................................................... II A 9.5 ¥297

Nitrogen Tetroxide ............................................................................................ I A 12.1 68

RP–1 ................................................................................................................. I C 6.8 68

UDMH ............................................................................................................... III C 6.6 68

UDMH/Hydrazine .............................................................................................. III C 7.5 68

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations 62897

TABLE E–4.—HAZARD GROUP I

Pounds of propellant Public area

and

incompatible

Intragroup

and

compatible

Pounds of propellant Public area

and

incompatible

Intragroup

and

compatible

Over Not over Distance in

feet

Distance in

feet

Over Not over Distance in

feet

Distance in

feet

0 ............................................................... 100 30 25 5,000 6,000 80 60

100 ........................................................... 200 35 30 6,000 7,000 85 65

200 ........................................................... 300 40 35 7,000 8,000 85 65

300 ........................................................... 400 45 35 8,000 9,000 90 70

400 ........................................................... 500 50 40 9,000 10,000 90 70

500 ........................................................... 600 50 40 10,000 15,000 95 75

600 ........................................................... 700 55 40 15,000 20,000 100 80

700 ........................................................... 800 55 45 20,000 25,000 105 80

800 ........................................................... 900 60 45 25,000 30,000 110 85

900 ........................................................... 1,000 60 45 30,000 35,000 110 85

1,000 ........................................................ 2,000 65 50 35,000 40,000 115 85

2,000 ........................................................ 3,000 70 55 40,000 45,000 120 90

3,000 ........................................................ 4,000 75 55 45,000 50,000 120 90

4,000 ........................................................ 5,000 80 60 50,000 60,000 125 95

60,000 ...................................................... 70,000 130 95 500,000 600,000 185 140

70,000 ...................................................... 80,000 130 100 600,000 700,000 190 145

80,000 ...................................................... 90,000 135 100 700,000 800,000 195 150

90,000 ...................................................... 100,000 135 105 800,000 900,000 200 150

100,000 .................................................... 125,000 140 110 900,000 1,000,000 205 155

125,000 .................................................... 150,000 145 110 1,000,000 2,000,000 235 175

150,000 .................................................... 175,000 150 115 2,000,000 3,000,000 255 190

175,000 .................................................... 200,000 155 115 3,000,000 4,000,000 265 200

200,000 .................................................... 250,000 160 120 4,000,000 5,000,000 275 210

250,000 .................................................... 300,000 165 125 5,000,000 6,000,000 285 215

300,000 .................................................... 350,000 170 130 6,000,000 7,000,000 295 220

350,000 .................................................... 400,000 175 130 7,000,000 8,000,000 300 225

400,000 .................................................... 450,000 180 135 8,000,000 9,000,000 305 230

450,000 .................................................... 500,000 180 135 9,000,000 10,000,000 310 235

TABLE E–5.—HAZARD GROUP II

Pounds of propellant Public area

and

incompatible

Intragroup

and

compatible

Pounds of propellant Public area

and

incompatible

Intragroup

and

compatible

Over Not over Distance in

feet

Distance in

feet

Over Not over Distance in

feet

Distance in

feet

0 ............................................................... 100 60 30 50,000 60,000 250 125

100 ........................................................... 200 75 35 60,000 70,000 255 130

200 ........................................................... 300 85 40 70,000 80,000 260 130

300 ........................................................... 400 90 45 80,000 90,000 265 135

400 ........................................................... 500 100 50 90,000 100,000 270 135

500 ........................................................... 600 100 50 100,000 125,000 285 140

600 ........................................................... 700 105 55 125,000 150,000 295 145

700 ........................................................... 800 110 55 150,000 175,000 305 150

800 ........................................................... 900 115 60 175,000 200,000 310 155

900 ........................................................... 1,000 120 60 200,000 250,000 320 160

1,000 ........................................................ 2,000 130 65 250,000 300,000 330 165

2,000 ........................................................ 3,000 145 70 300,000 350,000 340 170

3,000 ........................................................ 4,000 150 75 350,000 400,000 350 175

4,000 ........................................................ 5,000 160 80 400,000 450,000 355 180

5,000 ........................................................ 6,000 165 80 450,000 500,000 360 180

6,000 ........................................................ 7,000 170 85 500,000 600,000 375 185

7,000 ........................................................ 8,000 175 85 600,000 700,000 385 190

8,000 ........................................................ 9,000 175 90 700,000 800,000 395 195

9,000 ........................................................ 10,000 180 90 800,000 900,000 405 200

10,000 ...................................................... 15,000 195 95 900,000 1,000,000 410 205

15,000 ...................................................... 20,000 205 100 1,000,000 2,000,000 470 235

20,000 ...................................................... 25,000 215 105 2,000,000 3,000,000 505 255

25,000 ...................................................... 30,000 220 110 3,000,000 4,000,000 535 265

30,000 ...................................................... 35,000 225 110 4,000,000 5,000,000 555 275

35,000 ...................................................... 40,000 230 115 5,000,000 6,000,000 570 285

40,000 ...................................................... 45,000 235 120 6,000,000 7,000,000 585 295

45,000 ...................................................... 50,000 240 120 7,000,000 8,000,000 600 300

8,000,000 9,000,000 610 305

9,000,000 10,000,000 620 310

62898 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / Rules and Regulations

TABLE E–6.—HAZARD GROUP III

Pounds of propellant Public area

and incompatible

Intragroup

and compatible

Pounds of propellant Public area

and incompatible

Intragroup

and compatible

Over Not over Distance in

feet

Distance in

feet

Over Not over Distance in

feet

Distance in

feet

0 ............................................................... 100 600 30 60,000 70,000 1,200 130

100 ........................................................... 200 600 35 70,000 80,000 1,200 130

200 ........................................................... 300 600 40 80,000 90,000 1,200 135

300 ........................................................... 400 600 45 90,000 100,000 1,200 135

400 ........................................................... 500 600 50 100,000 125,000 1,800 140

500 ........................................................... 600 600 50 125,000 150,000 1,800 145

600 ........................................................... 700 600 55 150,000 175,000 1,800 150

700 ........................................................... 800 600 55 175,000 200,000 1,800 155

800 ........................................................... 900 600 60 200,000 250,000 1,800 160

900 ........................................................... 1,000 600 60 250,000 300,000 1,800 165

1,000 ........................................................ 2,000 600 65 300,000 350,000 1,800 170

2,000 ........................................................ 3,000 600 70 350,000 400,000 1,800 175

3,000 ........................................................ 4,000 600 75 400,000 450,000 1,800 180

4,000 ........................................................ 5,000 600 80 450,000 500,000 1,800 180

5,000 ........................................................ 6,000 600 80 500,000 600,000 1,800 185

6,000 ........................................................ 7,000 600 85 600,000 700,000 1,800 190

7,000 ........................................................ 8,000 600 85 700,000 800,000 1,800 195

8,000 ........................................................ 9,000 600 90 800,000 900,000 1,800 200

9,000 ........................................................ 10,000 600 90 900,000 1,000,000 1,800 205

10,000 ...................................................... 15,000 1,200 95 1,000,000 2,000,000 1,800 235

15,000 ...................................................... 20,000 1,200 100 2,000,000 3,000,000 1,800 255

20,000 ...................................................... 25,000 1,200 105 3,000,000 4,000,000 1,800 265

25,000 ...................................................... 30,000 1,200 110 4,000,000 5,000,000 1,800 275

30,000 ...................................................... 35,000 1,200 110 5,000,000 6,000,000 1,800 285

35,000 ...................................................... 40,000 1,200 115 6,000,000 7,000,000 1,800 295

40,000 ...................................................... 45,000 1,200 120 7,000,000 8,000,000 1,800 300

45,000 ...................................................... 50,000 1,200 120 8,000,000 9,000,000 1,800 305

50,000 ...................................................... 60,000 1,200 125 9,000,000 10,000,000 1,800 310

TABLE E–7.—DISTANCES WHEN

EXPLOSIVE EQUIVALENTS APPLY

TNT equivalent

weight of propellants

Distance in feet

Not over

To public

area

Intraline

unbarricaded

100 ................... 1250 80

200 ................... 1250 100

300 ................... 1250 120

400 ................... 1250 130

500 ................... 1250 140

600 ................... 1250 150

700 ................... 1250 160

800 ................... 1250 170

900 ................... 1250 180

1,000 ................ 1250 190

1,500 ................ 1250 210

2,000 ................ 1250 230

3,000 ................ 1250 260

4,000 ................ 1250 280

5,000 ................ 1250 300

6,000 ................ 1250 320

TABLE E–7.—DISTANCES WHEN EXPLOSIVE EQUIVALENTS APPLY—Continued

TNT equivalent

weight of propellants

Distance in feet

Not over

To public

area

Intraline

unbarricaded

7,000 ................ 1250 340

8,000 ................ 1250 360

9,000 ................ 1250 380

10,000 .............. 1250 400

15,000 .............. 1250 450

20,000 .............. 1250 490

25,000 .............. 1,250 530

30,000 .............. 1,250 560

35,000 .............. 1,310 590

40,000 .............. 1,370 620

45,000 .............. 1,425 640

50,000 .............. 1,475 660

55,000 .............. 1,520 680

60,000 .............. 1,565 700

65,000 .............. 1,610 720

TABLE E–7.—DISTANCES WHEN EXPLOSIVE EQUIVALENTS APPLY—Continued

TNT equivalent

weight of propellants

Distance in feet

Not over

To public

area

Intraline

unbarricaded

70,000 .............. 1,650 740

75,000 .............. 1,685 770

80,000 .............. 1,725 780

85,000 .............. 1,760 790

90,000 .............. 1,795 800

95,000 .............. 1,825 820

100,000 ............ 1,855 830

125,000 ............ 2,115 900

150,000 ............ 2,350 950

175,000 ............ 2,565 1,000

200,000 ............ 2,770 1,050

[FR Doc. 00–26088 Filed 10–18–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P