alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit ‘A’

Case 5:20-cv-00746-JKP Document 118-1 Filed 11/04/22 Page 1 of 3
-^DIGITAL

FORENSICS

Digital Forensics Corp.

3570 Warrensville Center Rd., Shaker Heights, OH 44122

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF )

COUNTY OF )

The undersigned Affiant, after being duly sworn upon oath, now deposes and states:

1. Iam over the age of 18.

2. Digital Forensics Corporation (“DFC”) is a computer forensics company with over a

decade ofexperience in digital forensic investigations.

3. I have retained the services ofDFC dba Digital Investigations and have authorized

them to request information on my behalf.

4. I authorize and request every Interest Service Provider (ISP), phone service provider

(PSP), online service provider (OSP), including but not limited to websites, third-party

software application vendors, and telecommunication companies, having custody or

control ofany documents, records, and other information pertaining to me to furnish to

DFC any such information.

5. The authorization under this Affidavit extended to DFC shall expire on

TVcernkyar .

[This space intentionally left blank]

D 000060

Case 5:20-cv-00746-JKP Document 118-1 Filed 11/04/22 Page 2 of 3
■^DIGITAL

FORENSICS

I DECLARE UNDER PENATLY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING

INFORMATION IS TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, TRUE, CORRECT, AND

COMPLETE.

FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT

Affiant’s Printed Name

Date

NOTARY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I, the undersigned Notary Public, do hereby affirm that

personally appeared before me on the | 6/^day of and signed

the above Affidavit as the Affiant’s free and voluntary act.

Notary Public

Page 2 of2

D 00006

Case 5:20-cv-00746-JKP Document 118-1 Filed 11/04/22 Page 3 of 3
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

STATE OF ARIZONA , Respondent ,

v.

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL NORRIS , Petitioner

.

No. 1 CA

- CR 18

- 0707 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. P1300CR20130 1 146 The Honorable Patricia A. Trebesch , Judge
REVIEW GRANTED; RELI EF DENIED

COUNSEL
Yavapai County Attorney’ s Office , P rescott By Joshua I. Fisher Counsel for Respondent
Christopher Michael Norris , Buckeye Petitioner

MEMORANDUM DECISION Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge James P. Beene joined. FILED 3-28-2019STATE v. NORRIS Decision of the Court

2 C A T T A N I , Judge:

¶1 Christopher Norris petitions for review from the superior court’s dismissal of his of

- right petition for post

- conviction relief. F or
reasons that follow , we grant review but deny relief.
¶2 Norris pleaded guilty to armed robbery, burglary in the first degree, kidnapping, and aggravated assault with a dangerous instrument. He was sentenced to a combination of concurrent and consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling 52 years. ¶3 Norris timely filed an of

- right notice of post

- conviction relief, and counsel was appointed to represent him. Counsel filed a petition for post

- conviction relief raising two issues: (1) the factual bases for Norris’s guilty pleas to the kidnapping and aggravated assault offenses were insufficient , and (2) trial counsel was ineffect ive for allowing Norris to plead guilty to those offenses with an insufficient factual basis

. The superior court dismissed his petition , finding that there was a sufficient factual bas i s for his guilty pleas based on accomplice liability and that he did n ot set forth a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

. ¶4 Norris then filed a pro se petition for review , but the petition raises five new arguments not raised before : ( 1) a ctual innocence , see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (h) ; ( 2) illegal sentence (enhancement with prior conviction s ) , see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (c) ; ( 3) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the enhanced sentence , see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a) ; ( 4) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to consecutive sentences , see id. ; and ( 5) prosecutorial misconduct based on the allegedly illegal sentenc e enhancements and consecutive sentences , see id

. We do not address these issues because Norris did not first present them to the superior court, and a petition for review may not include new arguments not first presented in the petition for post

- conviction relief . Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(4)(B)(ii), (D); State v. Ramirez , 126 Ariz. 464, 468 (App. 1980).
¶5 Accordingly, we grant review but de ny relief.
Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Each of the undersigned hereby certifies,
in his capacity as an officer of Tejon Ranch Co. (the Company), for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his own knowledge:



| |  |  | The Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2011 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | - |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| |  |  | The information contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.
| | - |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Tejon Ranch Co. and will be
retained by Tejon Ranch Co., and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

Dated: May 06, 2011



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ Robert A. Stine    
|Robert A. Stine,       
|Chief Executive Officer
|                       
|/s/ Allen E. Lyda      
|Allen E. Lyda          
|Chief Financial Officer
#### AVILA v. STATE.

No. 23230.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 28, 1945.

F. G. Garza, of Mercedes, for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

Appellant was convicted on a charge of driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated and assessed a punishment of thirty days in jail and a fine of $50.

The record is before us without a statement of facts or bills of exception.

Appellant insists that' his first application for a continuance should have been granted.

Complaints to the overruling of a continuance must be presented by a bill of exception. Attesting authorities will be found collated in 13 Texas Digest, p. 456, Criminal Law, <^1090(7).

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

*726PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AUDUBON SOCIETY OF PORTLAND, Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, Defendant - Appellee. No. 12-35988 D.C. No. 3:10-cv-01205-HZ
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding Submitted May 13, 2014 ** Portland, Oregon Before: GOODWIN, IKUTA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges. Audubon Society of Portland (“Audubon”) appeals following the district court’s judgment in Audubon’s action against the U.S. Natural Resources Conservation Service, assigning error to the order awarding Audubon attorneys’ 

# FILED
MAY 19 2014 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. SeeFed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).fees. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C . § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. See Barjon v. Dalton , 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997). We affirm. The district court’s award of attorneys’ fees was not an abuse of discretion. Courts calculate attorneys’ fees accordi ng to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community. See id. “Generally, the relevant community is the forum in which the district court sits.” Id. Although the district court is located in Portland, Oregon, its jurisdiction includes the entire state of Oregon. Because Audubon did not provide satisfactory evidence showing that Portland was the appropriate community for purposes of establishing its attorneys’ hourly rates, the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying Oregon statewide rates. AFFIRMED.

2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

WESTERN DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Respondent 

 v. 

MELISSA MARIE SPRING, 

 Petitioner 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 191 WAL 2016 

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 6th day of September, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

is DENIED. 

Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondent

v. ALISHA JOHNSON, Petitioner : : : : : : : : : : : No. 56 EAL 2015 Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER PER CURIAM AND NOW , this 12th day of August, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED
.
1 The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, Chie f Judge, United States District Court for the District of Nebraska. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 06-2222

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Nebraska. Walter Tomasino-Zapata, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: February 20, 2007 Filed: March 1, 2007

___________ Before SMITH, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Walter Tomasino-Zapata (Zapata) app eals the sentence the district court 1 imposed after he pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2), and to id entity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. His counsel has moved to withdraw and filed a brief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Zapata has filed a supplemental brief.-2- Zapata entered into a plea agreement in which he waived his right to appeal. We conclude that the waiver is valid, becau se the record shows that Zapata entered into both the plea agreement and wa iver knowingly and voluntarily. SeeUnited States v. Andis , 333 F.3d 886, 889-90 (8th Cir. 2003) (e n banc) (this court will enforce appeal waiver contained in plea agreement when “both th e waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily ”). To the extent Zapata argues his counsel was ineffective, we see no reason to depart from this court’s usual rule of requiring ineffective-assistance claims to be raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, where a proper record can be developed. SeeUnited States v. Ramirez-Hernandez , 449 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 2006) (this court “will consider ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal only where the record has been fu lly developed, where not to act would amount to a plain miscarriage of ju stice, or where counsel’s error is readily apparent”).
Having determined that Zapata’s plea and appeal waiver were voluntary and knowing, we conclude the waiver bars the arguments raised by Zapata and his counsel. In addition, we have reviewed the record in accordan ce with Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), and we find no nonfrivol ous issues that fall outside the scope of the appeal waiver. We conclude that no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver in this appeal. Cf. Andis , 333 F.3d at 890 (court will not enforce valid plea waiver where to do so would resu lt in miscarriage of justice). Thus, we specifically enforce the appeal waiver by dismissing this appeal. We also grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

______________________________
#### Girvin, Appellant, *v.*Jackson, Appellee.

(No. 27950

Decided January 17, 1940.)

*Mr. Clarence P. Ducey,*for appellant.

*Messrs. Welles, Kelsey, Cobourn & Harrington*and *Mr. Fred A. Smith,*for appellee.

*244It is ordered and adjudged that said appeal as of right be, and the same hereby is, dismissed for the reason no debatable constitutional question is involved in said cause.

*Appeal dismissed.*

Wbygandt, C. J., Day, Zimmerman, Williams, Myers, Matthias and Hart, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.2
 
 Statement of Chief Financial Officer Furnished
 Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 
 The undersigned, Gary F. Hoskins, is the Chief Financial Officer of Citizens South Banking Corporation (the “Company”).
 
 This statement is being furnished in connection with the filing by the Company of the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2009 (the “Report”).
 
 By execution of this statement, I certify that:
 
 A)
the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and
 
 B)
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods covered by the Report.
 
 
 
 March 12, 2010                                                                          /s/
Gary F. Hoskins
 Dated                                                                                         Gary
F. Hoskins
 Chief Financial Officer
 
 
 This statement is authorized to be attached as an exhibit to the Report so that this statement will accompany the Report at such time as the Report is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350.  It is not intended that this statement be
deemed to be filed for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
EX-10.9
                           PROMISSORY NOTE

                           PROMISSORY NOTE

Principal amount $12,667.67                          Date: April 26, 2004

     FOR VALUE RECEIVED, RMD Technologies, Inc. hereby promise to
pay to the order of Patrick A. Galliher the sum of Twelve Thousand Six
Hundred, Sixty Seven Dollars and Sixty Seven Cents, together with
interest thereon at the rate of 1% per month on the unpaid balance.
Said sum shall be paid upon demand.

     This note shall at the option of any holder thereof be
immediately due and payable upon the occurrence of any of the
following:  1) Breach of any condition of any security interest,
mortgage, loan agreement, pledge agreement or guarantee granted as
collateral security for this note. 2) Breach of any condition of any
loan agreement, security agreement or mortgage, if any, having a
priority over any loan agreement, security agreement or mortgage on
collateral granted, in whole or in part, as collateral security for
this note. 3) Upon the death, incapacity, dissolution or liquidation
of any of the undersigned, or any endorser, guarantor to surety
hereto. 4) Upon the filing by any of the undersigned of an assignment
for the benefit of creditors, bankruptcy or other form of insolvency,
or by suffering an involuntary petition in bankruptcy or receivership
not vacated within thirty (30) days.

     In the event this note shall be in default and placed for
collection, then the undersigned agree to pay all reasonable attorney
fees and costs of collection. All payments hereunder shall be made to
such address as may from time to time be designated by any holder.

     The undersigned and all other parties to this note, whether as
endorsers, guarantors or sureties, agree to remain fully bound until
this note shall be fully paid and waive demand, presentment and
protest and all notices hereto and further agree to remain bound,
notwithstanding any extension, modification, waiver, or other
indulgence or discharge or release of any obligor hereunder or
exchange, substitution, or release of any collateral granted as
security for this note. No modification or indulgence by any holder
hereof shall be binding unless in writing; and any indulgence on any
one occasion shall not be an indulgence for any other or future
occasion. Any modification or change in terms, hereunder granted by
any holder hereof, shall be valid and binding upon each of the
undersigned, notwithstanding the acknowledgement of any of the
undersigned, and each of the undersigned does hereby irrevocably grant
to each of the others a power of attorney to enter into any such
modification on their behalf. The rights of any holder hereof shall be
cumulative and not necessarily successive. This note shall take effect
as a sealed instrument and shall be construed, governed and enforced
in accordance with the laws of the State of California.

RMD Technologies, Inc.


By: /s/  Pat Galliher
Pat Galliher, President
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACO DIVISION

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a §

BRAZOS LICENSING AND §

DEVELOPMENT § CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:20-cv-571[ADA]

§

v. §

§

GOOGLE LLC §

UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR DEFENDANT GOOGLE 

LLC TO ANSWER OR OTHERWISE RESPOND

Defendant Google LLC moves for a 45-day extension to answer or otherwise respond to 

Plaintiff WSOU Investments, LLC d/b/a/ Brazos Licensing And Development’s Original 

Complaint for Patent Infringement (the “Complaint”) filed on June 29, 2020.

Defendant’s deadline to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint is currently due on 

July 28, 2020. With a 45-day extension, Defendant’s answer or other response would be due on 

September 11, 2020. This motion is not brought for the purpose of delay. Rather, this extension is 

necessary because Defendant has recently retained counsel and, as a result, needs additional time 

to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint.

Counsel for Defendant has conferred with counsel for Plaintiff. This motion is unopposed. 

Accordingly, Defendant Google LLC requests the Court grant the foregoing motion and enter an 

Order extending its deadline to answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint to September 11, 

2020.

Dated: July 20, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

By /s/ Michael E. Jones

Michael E. Jones

SBN: 10929400

Patrick C. Clutter

SBN: 24036374

Case 6:20-cv-00571-ADA Document 13 Filed 07/20/20 Page 1 of 2
POTTER MINTON, PC

110 North College, Suite 500

Tyler, Texas 75702

Tel: 903-597-8311

Fax: 903-593-0846

mikejones@potterminton.com

patrickclutter@potterminton.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 

GOOGLE LLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on July 20, 2020, I electronically filed this document with 

the Clerk of Court via the Court’s CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to 

all counsel of record, all of whom have consented to electronic service in this action. 

/s/ Michael E. Jones

Case 6:20-cv-00571-ADA Document 13 Filed 07/20/20 Page 2 of 2
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

RIDGE PETROLEUM, INC.,

 Appellant,

v.

ENERGY OPS, LLC,

 Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

 

No. 08-19-00078-CV

Appeal from the

109th District Court 

of Winkler County, Texas 

(TC# DC18-17380) 

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes there was no error in the 

judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court below. We further order that Appellee 

recover from Appellant and it’s sureties, if any, see TEX.R.APP.P. 43.5, on the judgment and all 

costs of this appeal, for which let execution issue. This decision shall be certified below for 

observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 24TH DAY OF APRIL, 2020.

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before Alley, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 21, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-60084

Conference Calendar

JIMMY L. TURNER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

HALEY BARBOUR, Governor of Mississippi; DONALD A. CABANA,

Superintendent; CHRISTOPHER B. EPPS, Mississippi Department of

Corrections System Commissioner; BILL STEIGER, Mississippi State

Penitentiary Hospital Unit 42; BRIAN LADNER, CMCF-7/20, Associate

Warden; ET AL,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 4:04-CV-380

--------------------

Before STEWART, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jimmy L. Turner, Mississippi prisoner # 57300, has filed a

motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal, challenging

the district court’s certification that his appeal is not taken

in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 199-202 (5th

Cir. 1997). The district court dismissed the suit for failure to
No. 05-60084

-2-

exhaust, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, and denied permission to

proceed IFP on appeal.

Turner has not demonstrated any nonfrivolous ground for

appeal. He argues only that he is entitled to proceed IFP

because he is financially eligible, because he submitted the

appropriate documentation of his poverty, and because at all

times he has been in imminent danger of injury and has been

seriously physically injured. He makes no argument regarding the

dismissal of his complaint for failure to exhaust. Turner’s IFP

motion is denied, and the appeal is dismissed as frivolous. See

Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. 

The dismissal of this appeal as frivolous counts as a strike

for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons,

103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996). Turner is cautioned that once

he accumulates three strikes, he may not proceed IFP in any civil

action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in

any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious

physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

IFP MOTION DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING

ISSUED.