In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 18‐2767

CATHERINE WANKO,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF INDIANA

UNIVERSITY,

Defendant‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 16‐cv‐02789 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MARCH 28, 2019 — DECIDED JUNE 17, 2019

____________________

Before RIPPLE, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge.  Catherine Wanko brought this

suit under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d,

alleging Indiana University (IU) discriminated against her by

having her retake her entire first‐year curriculum at IU’s

School of Dentistry. In discovery, IU produced spreadsheets

containing the demographics and grades of the students in

Wanko’s class. Those spreadsheets showed no student, let

alone one outside of a protected class, was similarly situated
2 No. 18‐2767

to Wanko. Wanko moved to compel the production of the ac‐

tual student records, but that motion was denied. As Wanko

was unable to show a sufficient comparator for her discrimi‐

nation claim, the district court granted summary judgment to

IU. We affirm.

I.

Wanko is a naturalized United States citizen from Came‐

roon. She began her dental studies at IU in Fall 2014. During

the 2014–2015 school year, Wanko failed to complete success‐

fully two courses: Removable Prosthodontics (RP) and Single

Tooth Indirect Restorations (STI). Based on her grades in

those classes, IU allowed Wanko the opportunity to remedi‐

ate RP in Summer 2015 and retake STI in Spring 2016.

A total of eight students, including Wanko, attempted to

remediate RP. To pass the remediation course, a student had

to score at least 80% on the exam. Wanko scored 71%. On June

22, 2015, IU notified Wanko she would have to repeat the

whole first‐year curriculum. She was the only student in her

class to be held back. After Wanko failed to complete her sec‐

ond attempt at STI in Spring 2016, IU dismissed her.

Not long thereafter, Wanko, through counsel, reached out

to IU. In response, IU’s general counsel emailed Wanko’s

counsel stating one other student, identified as “Student #2,”

also failed STI in Spring 2015. IU’s counsel explained IU al‐

lowed Student #2 to proceed into the second‐year curriculum

“because she failed only one class and had a cumulative GPA

above 2.0.” The email showed Student #2 had a Spring 2015

GPA of 2.131. Wanko’s GPA was 1.965.

Wanko brought suit in October 2016. She claimed IU dis‐

criminated against her on the basis of race when it failed to
No. 18‐2767 3

promote herto the second‐year curriculum.1 In her complaint,

Wanko alleged two or three similarly situated, non‐black stu‐

dents were promoted when she was not. That charge was

based on a conversation Wanko had with the professor who

taught STI in 2015. He told her two or three students failed his

course and would retake it the next year. He did not reveal

any demographics about those students.

In discovery, Wanko sought information about the de‐

mographics and grades of her former classmates. In response,

IU produced spreadsheets showing the GPA, grades, race,

and gender of each student in Wanko’s class. IU did not pro‐

vide the students’ names, but it assigned every student a

number as an identifier. IU says it chose this method of pro‐

duction out of concern for its responsibilities under the Fam‐

ily Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA),

which set up safeguards concerning the release of student in‐

formation. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. IU’s spreadsheets showed

only two students had failed both RP and STI in the 2014–2015

school year: Wanko and another black female, the “Student

#2” from the general counsel’s email (IU identifies her as “Stu‐

dent #57 in the spreadsheets, but we will continue to refer to

her as “Student #2”). Unlike Wanko, however, Student #2 suc‐

cessfully remediated RP and was allowed to proceed to the

second‐year curriculum despite her failing grade in STI.

Wanko was not satisfied with IU’s spreadsheets. She

moved to compel production of the actual student records,

claiming she needed them to know which white students in

                                                 

1 Wanko also claimed racial discrimination motivated her dismissal

from IU in 2016. The district court dismissed that claim on IU’s motion.

Wanko does not appeal that ruling.
4 No. 18‐2767

her class failed STI. She argued the spreadsheets are unrelia‐

ble because the GPA for Student #2 is different than the GPA

the general counsel had reported earlier. The general counsel

had provided a GPA of 2.131, whereas the spreadsheets re‐

ported a GPA of 2.568. Responding to Wanko’s motion, IU

explained the discrepancy was because the general counsel

provided Student #2’s Spring 2015 GPA, but the spreadsheets

provided Student #2’s cumulative GPA.

A magistrate judge orally denied Wanko’s motion during

a telephonic discovery conference. Because IU had provided

Wanko with the demographic and grade information in the

spreadsheets, the judge concluded Wanko had not shown she

needed the actual student records. The judge also concluded

Wanko had not shown the spreadsheets lacked veracity. After

that oral denial, Wanko filed a written motion making the

same arguments, which the magistrate judge also denied.

Wanko objected to the district court. While that objection

was pending, IU moved for summary judgment. Wanko, ra‐

ther than responding to the motion, moved to postpone rul‐

ing on summary judgment because of the student‐records is‐

sue.

The district court resolved all three motions in one order.

First, it overruled Wanko’s objection to the magistrate judge’s

decisions, holding the magistrate judge reasonably concluded

the information in the spreadsheets was sufficient. Second, it

denied Wanko’s motion to postpone ruling on summary

judgment, finding Wanko had not shown a good faith reason

why she could not respond to IU’s motion for summary judg‐

ment. Third, the district court granted IU’s motion for sum‐

mary judgment, concluding Wanko could not succeed on her
No. 18‐2767 5

discrimination claim because she could not identify a simi‐

larly situated, non‐black student who received better treat‐

ment.

II.

In this appeal, for good reason Wanko does not contest the

merits of the district court’s ruling on summary judgment. A

careful review of the record before us compels the entry of

summary judgment for IU. Wanko has no evidence of a simi‐

larly situated, non‐black student who received better treat‐

ment than she received. See Brewer v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of

Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 921 (7th Cir. 2007) (requiring a plaintiff to

show she experienced “worse treatment than that of similarly

situated students not in the protected class”). The closest pos‐

sible comparator is Student #2, a black female who failed to

complete RP and STI on her first tries. But she, unlike Wanko,

managed to remediate RP, so she is not similarly situated to

Wanko. See Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680

(7th Cir. 2002) (explaining a comparator must be “directly

comparable to [the plaintiff] in all material respects”).

Because the record weighs significantly against her,

Wanko insists parts of it are not accurate. She argues the dis‐

trict court erred when it (1) overruled her objection to the

magistrate judge’s decision denying her motion to compel

discovery of the actual student records and (2) denied her mo‐

tion to postpone summary judgment.

“Managing the discovery process is the district court’s

business ... .” Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d 1266, 1275 (7th Cir.

1997). “The district court is in the best position to decide the

proper scope of discovery and to settle any discovery dis‐

putes.” Scott v. Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., 725 F.3d 772, 785 (7th
6 No. 18‐2767

Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gile v.

United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 1996)). Accord‐

ingly, we deferentially review discovery decisions for abuse

of discretion. Vallone v. CNA Fin. Corp., 375 F.3d 623, 629 (7th

Cir. 2004). This includes decisions whether to defer ruling on

summary judgment motions. See Helping Hand Caregivers, Ltd.

v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 900 F.3d 884, 890 (7th Cir. 2018).

There is no such abuse here.

Concerning the denial of Wanko’s motion to compel,

Wanko wants actual student records to help her find a com‐

parator for her Title VI claim. She says IU’s spreadsheets are

not acceptable because they are unreliable, pointing to the

GPA discrepancy relating to Student #2. But the magistrate

judge considered that argument and rejected it, and the dis‐

trict court accepted that rejection. Wanko has given us no rea‐

son to conclude those decisions were beyond the bounds of

discretion.

We reach the same conclusion concerning the denial of

Wanko’s motion to postpone summary judgment. Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) allows the district court to “de‐

fer consider[ation]” of a motion for summary judgment “[i]f

a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for spec‐

ified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its op‐

position.” Essentially, the rule requires the party facing sum‐

mary judgment to “make a good faith showing that it cannot

respond” to the motion for summary judgment. See United

States v. All Assets & Equipment of West Side Bldg. Corp., 58 F.3d

1181, 1190 (7th Cir. 1995) (referring to the deferral provision’s

former location at subsection (f)).

Wanko argues she could not respond to the motion for

summary judgment without the actual student records.
No. 18‐2767 7

Wanko certainly has a need for information about her fellow

classmates (races, grades, etc.), and without such information

could not meaningfully respond to a motion for summary

judgment. The problem for Wanko is she already has this in‐

formation in the spreadsheets IU provided. Having rejected

Wanko’s argument concerning the veracity of those spread‐

sheets, the district court reasonably concluded Wanko had no

need for the actual student records. Thus, Wanko did not pro‐

vide “a good faith reason” for her failure to respond to IU’s

motion. It was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny

Wanko’s Rule 56(d) motion and rule on IU’s motion for sum‐

mary judgment.2

III.

As the district court did not abuse its discretion in resolv‐

ing these discovery disputes, we AFFIRM.

                                                 

2 In her brief, Wanko couches her arguments in terms of due process,

i.e., without the student records she was not given “the opportunity to be

heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” See Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). There was no due

process violation here. The magistrate judge and the district court al‐

lowed Wanko to argue her discovery issues. Just because they ruled

against her on discovery matters does not mean they deprived her of due

process.