NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

BREIGE H., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.W., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 18-0198 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD529056

The Honorable Arthur T. Anderson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Alison Stavris

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Amanda Adams

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 5-14-2019
BREIGE H. v. DCS, A.W.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Chief Judge Samuel A. Thumma

joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Breige H. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s order 

terminating her parental rights as to her daughter, A.W.1 For reasons that 

follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In July 2015, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) filed a 

dependency petition alleging that Mother was unable to parent A.W. due 

to substance abuse, domestic violence, and neglect. A.W. was placed with 

her maternal grandparents, and she was found dependent as to Mother in 

December 2015.

¶3 Mother has a history of chronic substance abuse, often 

following a pattern of brief sobriety and then relapse, and DCS provided a 

case plan of family reunification and services aimed at treating Mother’s

substance abuse. Mother first used marijuana and alcohol at the age of 14, 

methamphetamine at 16, and heroin at 17. She sought treatment for her 

substance abuse in December 2013 but relapsed shortly after treatment. In 

early 2014, she attended another treatment program, but she did not 

complete the program and relapsed on heroin. Then in 2015, DCS began 

providing Mother with drug testing services. That year, Mother failed to 

appear for testing on 12 out of 17 occasions, and when she did submit to 

testing, she tested positive for amphetamines, THC, and heroin. Mother 

also failed to appear for three scheduled substance abuse assessments, and 

she was closed out for non-participation in December 2015.

¶4 In May 2016, Mother was admitted to a residential treatment 

facility, and for a time appeared to be progressing well, but she was later 

 

1 After conducting a separate severance hearing, the superior court 

terminated the parental rights of A.W.’s father. He is not a party to this 

appeal.
BREIGE H. v. DCS, A.W.

Decision of the Court

3

asked to leave the program and relapsed shortly thereafter. In early 2017, 

Mother attended and completed the Lifewell treatment program, but she 

relapsed after completing the program. She tested positive for drugs 

several times, and submitted multiple diluted drug tests. In June 2017, 

Mother was arrested for driving under the influence, her fifth substance 

abuse-related arrest.

¶5 In light of Mother’s ongoing substance abuse, as well as 

concerns over her parenting abilities and A.W.’s need for permanency, DCS

requested and the court changed the case plan to severance and adoption. 

DCS moved for severance on grounds of substance abuse and 15 months’

out-of-home placement, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 8-533(B)(3), (8)(c), 

and the superior court conducted a severance hearing. After the hearing, 

the superior court terminated Mother’s parental rights as to A.W., finding 

both statutory grounds for severance and that severance was in A.W.’s best 

interests.

¶6 Mother timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 

A.R.S. § 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Termination of parental rights requires clear and convincing 

evidence of a statutory ground set out in A.R.S. § 8-533(B), Michael J. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12 (2000), and proof by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the 

child. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, 288, ¶¶ 22, 41 (2005). We 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to affirming the superior 

court’s ruling and will not overturn the court’s findings unless no 

reasonable evidence supports them. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 

223 Ariz. 547, 549, ¶ 7 (App. 2010).

I. Substance Abuse.

¶8 Mother argues that the superior court erred by finding clear 

and convincing evidence that severance was warranted based on substance 

abuse. Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), parental rights may be severed based on 

substance abuse if the “history of chronic substance abuse renders the 

parent ‘unable to discharge parental responsibilities’ and ‘reasonable 

grounds’ exist to ‘believe that the conditions will continue for a prolonged 

indeterminate period.’” Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287, 

¶ 17 (App. 2016). Chronic substance abuse is not necessarily constant 

substance abuse, and temporary abstinence must be balanced against a 

parent’s significant history of drug abuse and relapse. Id.
BREIGE H. v. DCS, A.W.

Decision of the Court

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¶9 Mother claims that DCS did not establish that her substance 

abuse would continue for a prolonged indeterminate period, asserting that 

she has been sober since July 2017. But the record demonstrates that Mother 

has repeatedly relapsed after brief periods of sobriety, rendering uncertain 

any prospects for long-term sobriety. See Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 29 (App. 2010). As the trier of fact, the superior 

court properly considered evidence of Mother’s prior substance abuse, 

prior efforts at sobriety, and prior relapses in determining whether 

reasonable grounds existed to believe Mother’s substance abuse would 

continue, notwithstanding a current period of sobriety. See Jennifer S., 240 

Ariz. at 287, ¶ 20. And the record supports the court’s finding that Mother

had not resolved her substance abuse issues.

¶10 As detailed above, Mother began using drugs when she was 

14 years old and never stopped completely, despite frequent efforts and 

brief pauses. She participated in services at four treatment facilities in five 

years but was not able to remain drug free. Although Mother claims to 

have been sober since July 2017, she provided a diluted urinalysis in 

January 2018, and a family member testified that Mother knew how to 

dilute her tests. The record thus supports the superior court’s finding that 

reasonable grounds existed to believe Mother’s substance abuse would

likely continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

¶11 Mother also claims the superior court erred by finding that 

her substance abuse rendered her unable to discharge her parental 

responsibilities, noting that she had taken parenting classes and had

demonstrated appropriate parenting skills. To sever parental rights based 

on substance abuse, the superior court must find that the parent’s chronic 

substance abuse renders her unable to discharge “parental responsibilities,” 

which include those duties that persons of ordinary intelligence understand 

a parent to owe to her child. Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 377–78, ¶¶ 19–20. And 

the record here demonstrates that Mother’s substance abuse rendered her 

unable to discharge those responsibilities.

¶12 Mother and A.W. were living in a home without electricity 

and were facing eviction, and Mother abused drugs in front of A.W. After 

A.W. was placed with her grandparents, Mother struggled to appropriately 

discipline A.W. during visitations, often becoming angry and cursing. 

Mother once threatened to “slit [A.W.’s] throat,” and on another occasion, 

she caused bruises “up and down” A.W.’s leg. Mother disappeared “for 

days” without contacting A.W. A.W. was confused about Mother’s

parental role in her life and struggled to bond with others. She also 

displayed aggression and other behavioral issues when Mother was living 
BREIGE H. v. DCS, A.W.

Decision of the Court

5

in the same home in 2017, and those issues did not subside until Mother 

moved out. Accordingly, the record supports the superior court’s finding 

as to Mother’s inability to discharge her parental responsibilities.

2

II. Best Interests.

¶13 Next, Mother argues that the superior court erred by finding 

that severance was in A.W.’s best interests. To find that termination of 

parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the superior court must 

conclude that the child would benefit from severance or be harmed by a 

denial of severance. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶ 13 

(2018).

¶14 Mother claims that severance is not in A.W.’s best interests 

because Mother is bonded to her child. But in light of the issues described

above, “[t]he existence and effect of a bonded relationship between a 

biological parent and a child, although a factor to consider, is not 

dispositive in addressing best interests.” See Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 98, ¶ 12 (App. 2016).

¶15 Mother also claims that severance is not in A.W.’s best 

interests because Mother is employed, has a residence, and has children’s 

items for A.W. The court must look at the totality of the circumstances, 

however, in assessing best interests, see id. at 99, ¶ 12, and the circumstances 

here support the superior court’s best interests finding. The court 

concluded that A.W. would benefit from severance because her 

grandparents provided her with a stable, loving home and were willing to 

adopt. Because a best interests finding may be supported by benefits to the 

child resulting from a potential adoption that provides the child with 

stability, see Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3–4, ¶ 12 (2016), the 

superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding that termination was 

in A.W.’s best interests.

 

2 Because sufficient evidence supports the superior court’s finding of 

substance abuse as a ground for severance, we need not address Mother’s 

arguments pertaining to the other severance ground of 15 months’ out-ofhome placement. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, 

¶ 3 (App. 2002).
BREIGE H. v. DCS, A.W.

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.