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*********************************************** 
DANIEL MCGOVERN v. PAULA MCGOVERN

(AC 45028)

(AC 45029)

Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Prescott, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

dissolving his marriage to the defendant after the plaintiff and his counsel

failed to appear for trial. The plaintiff’s counsel had filed several motions

on the day of the trial prior to the time trial was to start. After trial

began, counsel filed a motion for a continuance in which she stated

that she had suddenly become ill and could not proceed. The court

denied the motion that day, stating that it had waited for counsel and

her client for a reasonable amount of time before starting the proceeding

and had not been informed of the motion for a continuance until well

into the proceeding. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint and

rendered judgment on the defendant’s cross complaint. The court thereafter denied the plaintiff’s motion to reconsider its ruling on the request

for a continuance and denied his motion to open the judgment. Held:

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion

for a continuance: the record revealed a pattern of violation by the

plaintiff of deadlines set by the court, including his failure to file a

financial affidavit and to comply with trial management orders, the

financial affidavit he ultimately filed was wholly inadequate, and he only

belatedly and partially complied with the trial management orders after

the defendant filed a motion for sanctions; moreover, the court reasonably could have considered the impact of the delay on the defendant,

as the start date of the trial had been set six months previously and the

dissolution action had been pending for more than one year, and,

although sudden illness of a party’s counsel could form a legitimate

reason for a continuance, the plaintiff’s motion was not filed until after

the start of trial, and no reason was offered in the motion for the failure

of the plaintiff himself to appear.

2. The plaintiff’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying

his motion to open the judgment was unavailing; the court acted reasonably in rejecting the plaintiff’s reasons for opening the judgment, namely,

his counsel’s sudden illness and a claim of immeasurable harm resulting

from the dissolution of the marriage, and the plaintiff did not file either

a notice pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 64-1 (b)) seeking

the required oral or written decision from the court for its denial of the

motion to open or a motion asking the court to articulate the factual

and legal basis for its ruling.

Argued January 18—officially released February 14, 2023

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the defendant filed a cross

complaint; thereafter, the matter was tried to the court,

Price-Boreland, J.; subsequently, the court dismissed

the complaint; thereafter, the court, Price-Boreland, J.,

rendered judgment on the cross complaint and dissolved the marriage and granted certain other relief;

subsequently, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion to

open and vacate the judgment, and the plaintiff filed

separate appeals with this court; thereafter, the appeals

were consolidated. Affirmed.

Jessica C. Wilson, for the appellant (plaintiff).

John F. Morris, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The plaintiff, Daniel McGovern, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the defendant, Paula McGovern, and denying

his motion to open the judgment of dissolution. On

appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court abused its

discretion in (1) denying his motion for a continuance

and (2) denying his motion to open the judgment of

dissolution.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the plaintiff’s appeal. The parties are the parents of a child born in February, 2005.

The parties were married in October, 2005. A prior

action for dissolution of the marriage was commenced

by Paula in a self-represented capacity in August, 2018

(2018 dissolution proceeding). See McGovern v. McGovern, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven,

Docket No. FA-18-5043830-S. The court rendered a judgment of dissolution in the 2018 dissolution proceeding

in January, 2019, but subsequently granted Daniel’s

motion to open the judgment in June, 2019, filed by his

counsel. In August, 2019, Paula, who remained selfrepresented, withdrew the 2018 dissolution action.

In May, 2020, the plaintiff commenced the present

dissolution action. The defendant filed an answer and

cross complaint, which was amended on October 9,

2020, and August 24, 2021. A remote trial was scheduled

to be held on August 27, 2021, at 2 p.m.2 Earlier that

day, the trial was rescheduled to 3 p.m. to accommodate

the court’s schedule. All parties were notified of the

time change.

The court commenced the remote trial at 3:05 p.m.

and noted that neither the plaintiff nor his attorney was

present. The court noted that the defendant had filed

a cross complaint and offered her counsel the opportunity to be heard. The defendant’s counsel requested that

the court dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint and render

judgment on the defendant’s cross complaint in accordance with the defendant’s proposed orders. The court

took a recess. After it returned on the record, the court

reviewed the procedural history of the case with the

defendant’s counsel, following which it dismissed, with

prejudice, the plaintiff’s complaint and considered the

defendant’s cross complaint to be the matter before the

court. The court then took another recess. When it

returned on the record, the court considered the defendant’s proposed orders.

The court examined relevant documents in the file:

both parties’ financial affidavits3 and the child support

guidelines worksheet that had been filed by the plaintiff’s counsel in May, 2021. With respect to the parties’

then sixteen year old child, the child support guidelines

worksheet prepared by the plaintiff indicated that his

presumptive child support payment would be $16 per
week. The defendant confirmed with the court that she

was not seeking child support.

The defendant was sworn in and provided testimony.

With respect to the real estate asset listed on the defendant’s financial affidavit, the defendant testified that

she had purchased the home in Hamden four years

prior to the marriage with her own money and that

she had paid the mortgage herself since the date of

purchase. The defendant testified that she had paid all

expenses related to the parties’ child and their home,

both prior to the parties’ separation in 2014, when the

plaintiff left the home and family, and after the separation. The defendant testified that the plaintiff was not

a partner in sharing the financial responsibilities of the

marriage. The defendant requested that the court award

her the home. With respect to the defendant’s pension,

the defendant testified that she has been employed as

a teacher by the city of New Haven for thirty-five years

and has made contributions from her wages to her

pension plan for the entirety of her employment, which

included years both prior to the marriage, during the

nine years the plaintiff was living with the family, and

after the parties’ separation in 2014.

The court then adopted most of the defendant’s proposed orders and incorporated them into the judgment

of dissolution. Specifically, the court granted the defendant sole custody of the parties’ child and ordered that

the plaintiff ‘‘may have visitation with the child solely

at the [defendant’s] discretion.’’ The court did not award

alimony or child support to either party.4 The court

ordered that each party retain his or her own assets

and liabilities as identified on each party’s respective

financial affidavit.5 This order included the defendant’s

retaining her retirement plan assets and the home in

Hamden where she and the child were living.

Several filings were made on the day of the trial but

prior to the scheduled 3 p.m. start of the trial. First,

the defendant filed a motion for sanctions, arguing that

the plaintiff had failed to comply with the court’s standing orders by not submitting, among other documents,

a current financial affidavit and written proposed orders

for trial.6 The court did not rule on this motion.7 The

plaintiff’s counsel then filed amended, proposed orders8

and a motion captioned ‘‘motion for order to reassign

trial date to status conference.’’ In the motion, the plaintiff’s counsel stated that the matter had been assigned

to be heard from 3 p.m. to 5 p.m. and that she expected

the case to take between two and four days of trial.

The plaintiff’s counsel also represented in the motion

that, despite her good faith efforts to proceed with

trial and prepare her client, ‘‘the plaintiff’s status at

a rehabilitation center with limited access to outside

contact has been a barrier to full preparation.’’ Additionally, the plaintiff’s counsel represented in the motion

that depositions had not yet been conducted due to
the defendant’s unavailability and limited access to the

plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff’s counsel requested in the

motion that the trial date be used as a status conference

wherein only the attorneys’ presence would be required.

The court did not rule on this ‘‘motion for order.’’

The plaintiff’s counsel also filed, after the scheduled

3 p.m. start of the trial, a motion for continuance, in

which it was represented that she ‘‘ha[d] become suddenly ill (dehydrated to a severe extent) and [could

not] proceed today.’’9 By order dated the same day, the

court denied the motion for continuance, stating: ‘‘The

matter was initially scheduled for 2 p.m. today, August

27, 2021; however, it was moved to 3 p.m. due to the

court’s conflict with an ongoing hearing. The court was

ready at 3 p.m.; however, [the court] waited for [the

plaintiff’s counsel] and her client for a reasonable

amount of time before starting the proceedings. The

court was informed of [the plaintiff’s] motion [for continuance] well into the proceeding.’’10

On September 16, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion

seeking reargument and reconsideration of the court’s

ruling on his motion for continuance, the ruling on his

motion to seal, and the judgment of dissolution and

attendant orders. On September 17, 2021, the court

denied the plaintiff’s motion for reargument and reconsideration. Also on September 17, 2021, the plaintiff

filed a motion to open the dissolution judgment.

Therein, he argued that ‘‘[c]ounsel for the plaintiff was

not able to proceed on [August 27, 2021] and notified

the court, through a colleague11 as soon as she was able

. . . . This case involves the custody of a minor child

as well as the finances of a sixteen (16) year marriage;

a grave injustice and immeasurable harm would result

if the plaintiff were not allowed his right to be heard.’’

(Footnote added.) On September 20, 2021, the court

denied the plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment. This

appeal followed.12

I

The plaintiff’s first claim on appeal essentially challenges the court’s denial of his motion for continuance.

Specifically, he argues that, ‘‘despite alternatives and

ability to conduct a trial on the merits, the postponement of which would have prejudiced no one, the trial

court instead chose to proceed without plaintiff’s counsel in an exercise of judicial conduct that can only be

seen as so arbitrary ‘as to vitiate logic.’ ’’ The defendant

responds that the court acted well within its discretion

in declining to continue the matter. We agree with the

defendant.

‘‘The matter of continuance is traditionally within the

discretion of the trial judge, and it is not every denial

of a request for more time that violates due process

even if the party fails to offer evidence or is compelled

to defend without counsel. . . . There are no mechani-
cal tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance

is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer

must be found in the circumstances present in every

case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial

judge at the time the request is denied. . . . [I]f the

reasons given for the continuance do not support any

interference with [a] specific constitutional right, the

[reviewing] court’s analysis will revolve around whether

the trial court abused its discretion. . . .

‘‘Decisions to grant or to deny continuances are very

often matters involving judicial economy, docket management or courtroom proceedings and, therefore, are

particularly within the province of a trial court. . . .

Whether to grant or to deny such motions clearly

involves discretion, and a reviewing court should not

disturb those decisions, unless there has been an abuse

of that discretion, absent a showing that a specific constitutional right would be infringed. . . .

‘‘Our Supreme Court has articulated a number of

factors that appropriately may enter into an appellate

court’s review of a trial court’s exercise of its discretion

in denying a motion for a continuance. Although resistant to precise cataloguing, such factors revolve around

the circumstances before the trial court at the time it

rendered its decision, including: the timeliness of the

request for continuance; the likely length of the delay;

the age and complexity of the case; the granting of

other continuances in the past; the impact of delay on

the litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court;

the perceived legitimacy of the reasons proffered in

support of the request; [and] the [movant’s] personal

responsibility for the timing of the request . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) McNamara v.

McNamara, 207 Conn. App. 849, 866–67, 263 A.3d

899 (2021).

In the present case, the trial had been scheduled

approximately six months earlier for the date of August

27, 2021. The plaintiff’s counsel did not file the motion

for continuance of the trial until after the remote proceeding had begun.13 At the time of trial, the dissolution

action had been pending for more than one year, as it

had been filed in June, 2020. The record reveals a pattern of the plaintiff’s violation of deadlines set by the

court throughout the dissolution proceedings. First, the

plaintiff twice failed to comply with orders directing

him to file a financial affidavit, only filing it after the

defendant filed a motion for contempt. The financial

affidavit he ultimately filed was wholly inadequate, lacking in reliable financial information. Second, the plaintiff failed to comply with the court’s trial management

orders, which required him to file written proposed

orders and witness and exhibit lists, among other documents. Again, the plaintiff only belatedly and partially

complied with the court’s orders after the defendant

filed a motion for sanctions.
Furthermore, as noted previously, the parties had

been involved in dissolution proceedings for approximately three years, beginning with the 2018 dissolution

action that went to judgment before being opened based

on the plaintiff’s motion and withdrawn by the defendant. The court reasonably could have considered the

impact of the delay on the defendant, who had been a

party to dissolution proceedings for approximately

three years. With respect to the legitimacy of the reason

for the request for continuance, although sudden illness

of a party’s counsel could form a legitimate reason

for a continuance, the motion for continuance in the

present case was not filed until after the start of the

proceeding, and no reason was offered in that motion

for the failure of the plaintiff himself to appear.

On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the

court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for a continuance,

made after the start of the proceeding, was not an abuse

of its discretion. See, e.g., Watrous v. Watrous, 108

Conn. App. 813, 828, 949 A.2d 557 (2008) (‘‘We are especially hesitant to find an abuse of discretion when the

motion is made on the day of trial. . . . Every reasonable presumption in favor of the proper exercise of the

trial court’s discretion will be made.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

II

The plaintiff’s next claim on appeal is that the court

abused its discretion in denying his motion to open the

judgment. We disagree.

‘‘The principles that govern motions to open or set

aside a civil judgment are well established. Within four

months of the date of the original judgment, Practice

Book [§ 17-4] vests discretion in the trial court to determine whether there is a good and compelling reason

for its modification or vacation. . . . The exercise of

equitable authority is vested in the discretion of the

trial court and is subject only to limited review on

appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Farren v.

Farren, 142 Conn. App. 145, 152, 64 A.3d 352, cert.

denied, 309 Conn. 903, 68 A.3d 658 (2013). ‘‘We do not

undertake a plenary review of the merits of a decision

of the trial court to grant or to deny a motion to open

a judgment. . . . In an appeal from a denial of a motion

to open a judgment, our review is limited to the issue

of whether the trial court has acted unreasonably and

in clear abuse of its discretion. . . . In determining

whether the trial court abused its discretion, this court

must make every reasonable presumption in favor of

its action. . . . The manner in which [this] discretion

is exercised will not be disturbed so long as the court

could reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zilkha v. Zilkha, 167 Conn. App.

480, 494, 144 A.3d 447 (2016).

In the present case, the court summarily denied the
plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment. Although the

denial of a motion to open is a judgment for which an

oral or written decision is required; see Practice Book

§ 64-1 (a) (6); Valenzisi v. Connecticut Education

Assn., 150 Conn. App. 47, 51, 90 A.3d 324 (2014); the

plaintiff did not file a notice pursuant to Practice Book

§ 64-1 (b) with the appellate clerk’s office, nor did he

file a motion asking the court to articulate the factual

and legal basis for its ruling. Given our duty to make

every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of the court’s decision; see, e.g., Gordon v. Gordon,

148 Conn. App. 59, 67–68, 84 A.3d 923 (2014); our review

of the record before us leads us to conclude that the

court acted reasonably and did not abuse its discretion

in rejecting the plaintiff’s reasons offered in support of

his motion to open the judgment, namely, counsel’s

sudden illness and a claimed ‘‘immeasurable harm’’ arising out of the court’s dissolution of the parties’ sixteen

year marriage.14 See Brehm v. Brehm, 65 Conn. App.

698, 706, 783 A.2d 1068 (2001) (court did not abuse

its discretion in denying motion to open dissolution

judgment rendered without defendant present where

defendant was aware of conflict with trial date in

advance and did not request continuance until day of

trial).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Although the plaintiff’s first claim, as phrased in the plaintiff’s statement

of issues, could be construed as challenging the court’s custodial and property division orders, the argument contained in the plaintiff’s brief focuses

on the court’s decision to proceed with the dissolution trial in the absence

of the plaintiff and its denial of his motion for continuance. The plaintiff

does not provide any argument or analysis in support of any claim that the

court misapplied the law or abused its discretion in distributing the parties’

marital assets. ‘‘[When] a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but

thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive

discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630, 273 A.3d

271 (2022). Accordingly, any claim that the court improperly distributed the

parties’ marital assets is deemed abandoned.

In his appellate brief, the plaintiff also raised an unpreserved constitutional

claim. Specifically, he argued that he was deprived of his ‘‘fundamental

liberty interest in the care and custody of his child without due process’’

when the court awarded the defendant sole custody of the parties’ child,

without having heard from the plaintiff, who did not appear on the date of

trial. The parties’ child was born in February, 2005, and attained the age of

eighteen in February, 2023. During oral argument before this court on January 18, 2023, the plaintiff’s counsel conceded that the plaintiff’s unpreserved

claim with respect to custody of the child is moot.

2 The judicial notice scheduling the trial for August 27, 2021, was issued

on February 3, 2021.

3 The defendant filed an updated financial affidavit on August 19, 2021.

The plaintiff did not file an updated financial affidavit, and the court relied

on his June 7, 2021 financial affidavit. See footnote 6 of this opinion.

4 Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56c, the court retained jurisdiction

to enter educational support orders for the parties’ child.

5 We note that the financial affidavit filed by the plaintiff was egregiously

lacking in reliable financial information. Under certain categories, including

utilities and transportation, the plaintiff put ‘‘TBD.’’ Debts were not identified

as sole or joint. Certain assets reflect a value of ‘‘TBD,’’ and the affidavit

does not indicate whether those assets are owned solely or jointly.

6

In April, 2021, the court ordered the plaintiff to file a financial affidavit

by April 26, 2021. The plaintiff did not file a financial affidavit in compliance
with the court’s order. On May 3, 2021, the court again ordered the plaintiff

to file a financial affidavit by May 10, 2021. On May 17, 2021, the defendant

filed a motion for contempt on the basis of the plaintiff’s failure to comply,

repeatedly, with the court’s orders. On June 7, 2021, the plaintiff filed a

financial affidavit.

7 The court issued an order stating that it would address the issue at the

beginning of trial but did not thereafter issue a ruling on the motion.

8

In the plaintiff’s principal appellate brief, the plaintiff’s counsel represents that the amended proposed orders were filed on August 26, 2021. The

official case detail, however, reflects a filing date of August 27, 2021, the

date of the trial.

9

In the plaintiff’s principal appellate brief, his counsel represents: ‘‘[The]

plaintiff’s counsel, a solo practitioner, reached out to the only other attorney

associated with her firm, an intern, to see if he might be able to appear on

her behalf at 3:00 p.m. Although he was unable to appear, the intern assisted

[the] plaintiff’s counsel with the electronic filing (e-filing) of a Motion for

Continuance . . . which was e-mailed directly to the trial court’s attention

via Case Flow Coordinator . . . and opposing counsel at 3:08 p.m. with

the subject heading URGENT: PLEASE SEE MOTIONS FILED WITH THE

COURT TODAY.’’ The email contained in the plaintiff’s appendix, which

also was filed as an exhibit in connection with the plaintiff’s motion for

reargument and reconsideration, indicates that it was sent by Richard L.

Straube, Esq., of Wilson Family Law, LLC.

10 The plaintiff also filed, on the day of trial, a motion to seal his previously

filed ‘‘motion for order to reassign trial date to status conference’’ on the

ground that it contained ‘‘sensitive information.’’ By order issued the same

day, the court denied the motion to seal.

11 See footnote 9 of this opinion.

12 The plaintiff filed two separate appeals, which were consolidated.

13 To the extent that this court were to construe the plaintiff’s motion for

order ‘‘to reassign [the] trial to [a] status conference,’’ filed earlier on the

date of the trial, as, in substance, a request for a continuance, it would not

change our analysis. The motion for order was filed within six hours of the

start of trial, there was no indication in the record that the court was aware

of the motion for order, and the plaintiff’s counsel did not appear for the

proceeding that she requested to have reassigned to a status conference.

14 As noted previously, although the plaintiff’s motion claimed harm arising

out of the determination of custody of the parties’ minor child, the plaintiff’s

counsel, at oral argument before this court, stated that he was not seeking

relief relative to custody, given the age of the parties’ child. See footnote 1

of this opinion.