BEFORE THE 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

________________________________________ 

 ) 

Application of ) 

 ) 

NORWEGIAN AIR INTERNATIONAL LIMITED ) 

 ) Docket No. OST--2013-0204 

for an exemption under 49 U.S.C. § 40109 and ) 

a foreign air carrier permit pursuant to ) 

49 U.S.C. § 41301 (US-EU Open Skies) ) 

_________________________________________ )

REPLY OF NORWEGIAN AIR INTERNATIONAL LIMITED 

Communications with respect to this document should be addressed to:

Josh Romanow 

Peter Nelson 

PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP 

2300 N Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20037 

Tel: (202) 663-8000 

Fax: (202) 663-8007 

E-mail: romanow@pillsburylaw.com 

E-mail: peter.nelson@pillsburylaw.com 

 

February 21, 2014 Counsel for NORWEGIAN AIR 

INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
1 

BEFORE THE 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

________________________________________ 

 ) 

Application of ) 

 ) 

NORWEGIAN AIR INTERNATIONAL LIMITED ) 

 ) Docket No. OST--2013-0204 

for an exemption under 49 U.S.C. § 40109 and ) 

a foreign air carrier permit pursuant to ) 

49 U.S.C. § 41301 (US-EU Open Skies) ) 

_________________________________________ )

REPLY OF NORWEGIAN AIR INTERNATIONAL LIMITED 

Norwegian Air International Limited (“Norwegian International”) submits its 

reply in accordance with the Department’s Notice of January 30, 2014 (the “Notice”), as 

amended. 

Norwegian International recently received its Air Operator Certificate (“AOC”) 

from the Irish Aviation Authority (“IAA”) and its Operating License from the Irish 

Commission for Aviation Regulation and on February 20, 2014, operated its first revenue 

flight. Norwegian International is a fully operational air carrier duly licensed by Ireland, a 

Member State of the European Union (“EU”). As such, it is entitled to the full operating 

rights provided under the open skies U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement (the “Open Skies 

Agreement” or the “Agreement”). The Department should now conclude this proceeding, 

so Norwegian International can bring long-awaited new service and a competitive 

transatlantic option to the U.S. traveling public. As Norwegian International plans to 

commence service immediately and before April 1, 2014, any further procedural delay 

would directly harm Norwegian International and the traveling public. 
2 

I. NORWEGIAN INTERNATIONAL HAS SATISFIED THE ELEMENTS OF 

THE DEPARTMENT’S STREAMLINED APPLICATION PROCEDURES 

AND IS ENTITLED TO APPROVAL 

Norwegian International’s application for U.S. operating authority has produced a 

classic David and Goliath aviation story,1 where a newly-formed airline with a handful of 

aircraft and a business plan to offer low-cost transatlantic service and long overdue 

competition is under siege by the large immunized alliance carriers, with thousands of 

aircraft and routes, and by the U.S. and European trade unions representing the pilots and 

flight attendants who operate alliance aircraft. The answers of the parties who have filed 

in objection to Norwegian International’s application (referred to herein as the “Objecting 

Parties”) are a transparent attempt to distort the Department’s streamlined procedures for 

handling these proceedings, adopted by the U.S.-EU Joint Committee (the “Joint 

Committee”).2 The goal of the Objecting Parties is clear: to delay and impede Norwegian 

International’s plans to provide competitive service on a handful of transatlantic routes in 

2014 using eight aircraft that will challenge the three immunized global alliances that 

together operate over 11,000 aircraft3 and control 87% of transatlantic traffic.4 

 

1

 Norwegian International and its affiliates are familiar with story, where entrenched interests resist new 

competition. More than a decade ago, Norwegian International’s parent company Norwegian Air Shuttle 

ASA successfully challenged the dominant carrier in the Scandinavian market, to the undisputed benefit of 

leisure and business travelers alike and to the community and economy at large. 2

 See Application Procedures for Foreign Air Carriers of the European Union (Feb. 19, 2009) available at 

http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/Application%20Procedures%20for%20EU%20carriers-02-19-

2009.pdf (the “Streamlined Procedures”). 3

 Based on statistics reported by the alliances at http://www.starallianceemployees.com/index.php?id=162 

&type=1; http://www.skyteam.com/en/About-us/Press/Facts-and-Figures/; and http://www.one 

world.com/news-information/oneworld-fact-sheets/oneworld-at-a-glance/. 4

 Edward Russell, Capacity Grip Tight on Transatlantic Market, FLIGHTGLOBAL (Aug. 20, 2012), available 

at http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/analysis-capacity-grip-tight-on-transatlantic-market-375623/. 

See also Comments of the Washington Airports Task Force (Feb. 13, 2014) (“Airline concentration over 

the last few years within the U.S., and indeed within the broader worldwide air transport industry, has 

increased fares and further depressed the demand for travel, to the detriment of passengers and the 

economies of the United States and other countries.”). 
3 

No basis for further delay exists. Norwegian International: 

(1) has received its AOC and Operating License and thus qualifies as an airline of 

the EU and its Member States entitled to exercise the rights granted in Article 3 of the 

Agreement; 

(2) consistent with Article 4 of the Agreement, has submitted every piece of 

information “in the form and manner prescribed” by the Department’s Streamlined 

Procedures5 and is thus entitled to the “grant [of] appropriate authorizations ... with 

minimum procedural delay”;6 

(3) pursuant to Article 6 bis of the Agreement, is entitled to reciprocal recognition 

by the Department of the fitness and citizenship determination made by the Irish aviation 

authorities; and 

(4) has received explicit endorsement for Departmental approval from: (a) the 

delegation of the EU and its Member States at the Joint Committee meeting on January 8, 

2014; (b) Norwegian Minister of Transport and Communications Ketil Solvik-Olsenin;7

and (c) Irish Minister for Transport, Tourism and Sport Leo Varadkar.8

Confronting these simple facts, the Objecting Parties have resorted to repetitive 

pleadings aimed at persuading the Department to initiate exhaustive factual inquiries that 

 

5

 See Streamlined Procedures. Indeed, Norwegian International has submitted more information than 

required by the Streamlined Procedures in an effort to aid the Department in its decision-making process. 

Although not required and outside of the scope of this proceeding, Norwegian International has provided 

information on its business rationale, its hiring practices, and its salary information – information that 

historically has not been provided by other similarly situated applicants – in an effort to receive its 

authority in a timely manner from the Department. 

6

 Open Skies Agreement, at art. 4. 

7 Letter from the Royal Norwegian Minister of Transport and Communications to Secretary of 

Transportation Anthony R. Foxx (Feb. 3, 2014). 

8

 Letter from the Irish Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport to Secretary of Transportation Anthony 

R. Foxx (Feb. 13, 2014). 
4 

are outside of the scope of the Streamlined Procedures and not relevant to a decision in 

this proceeding.9

 Doing as the Objecting Parties suggest would be unprecedented in a 

proceeding under the Open Skies Agreement. 

II. FILINGS BY THE OBJECTING PARTIES DISTORT THE MEANING 

AND PURPOSE OF THE OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT 

The principal arguments10 of the Objecting Parties hinge on a two-part contention 

with respect to Article 17 bis of the Agreement, neither of which has merit. The first 

contention is that Article 17 bis empowers the Department, acting unilaterally, to deny 

authorization to an EU airline even though (1) that airline has received an AOC and 

Operating License from an EU Member State and (2) its application to the Department 

has been endorsed by the EU in the Joint Committee, by the Member State government 

that issued the AOC and operating license, and by the government of the country of the 

nationality of the individuals who substantially own and effectively control the airline. 

The second contention is that Article 17 bis establishes substantive labor standards that 

Norwegian has violated. Each prong of this argument is fundamentally flawed. 

In its Consolidated Reply, Norwegian International laid out in detail why the 

language, purpose, and negotiating history of Article 17 bis do not support the view that 

 

9

 Indeed, no legal basis exists to deviate from the Streamlined Procedures. The only bases for deviation 

relate to (1) questions about whether the conditions prescribed in Article 4 of the Agreement for the grant 

of authorizations have been met (see the Streamlined Procedures at para 3(a)), in which case the U.S. is to 

advise those authorities directly or (2) criteria concerning air carrier control (see the Streamlined 

Procedures at para. 4(a)), in which case such changes must be communicated to the other Party. The 

Objecting Parties’ feeble attempts to question whether Ireland has properly applied the principal place of 

business test to Norwegian International have been resolved by Ireland’s issuance of the AOC. If the U.S. 

has questions regarding an EU Member State’s licensing determinations, the proper venue to address these 

is through the Joint Committee pursuant to the Streamlined Procedure. 

10 Despite the limited scope of the Notice, the answers filed by several of the Objecting Parties raise 

arguments regarding whether approval of Norwegian International would serve the “public interest.” 

Norwegian International’s Consolidated Reply described the ways in which Norwegian International will 

promote the public interest through new service, competitive fares, economic development, and support of 

the U.S. aviation industry as a leading Boeing customer. See Consolidated Reply of Norwegian Air 

International Limited (Dec. 31, 2013) (the “Consolidated Reply”). 
5 

the article allows the Department to deny Norwegian International’s application. The 

Answers of the Objecting Parties offer no new arguments to rebut this analysis. For 

example, one of the Objecting Parties asserts in sweeping terms that Article 17 bis was 

included “precisely to prevent” the practice of enticing airlines to “shop around for a 

better deal.”11 This assertion is simply wrong.12 Were it correct, it would eviscerate the 

most important right obtained by the EU and its Member States in the Agreement: the 

right of every European citizen to establish, own, and control an airline in any EU 

Member State and to operate that airline from any point in the EU to any point in the 

United States. Moreover, it would be at odds with the four fundamental pillars of the 

single market that form the basis of the European Union, namely the free movement of 

goods, persons, services and capital between Member States.13 The Objecting Parties 

would have preferred an Article 17 bis that conformed to their protectionist desires, but it 

is not the Article 17 bis that was negotiated by the U.S. and the EU.14

The Objecting Parties’ second contention that Norwegian International would 

“undermine labor standards . . . contained in the Parties’ respective laws”15 and that its 

actions and business plans “violate” Article 17 bis is likewise fatally flawed. Norwegian 

 

11 Answer of AFL-CIO, and Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO (Feb. 14, 2014), at 3. 

12 See Consolidated Reply, at 8-12. 

13 See The EU Single Market: General Policy Framework (Jan. 1, 2014), available at 

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/top_layer/index_en.htm. 

14 The Objecting Parties criticize Norway and Ireland as well as the European Union for “ignor[ing]” and 

“walking away from” Article 17 bis (Answer of AFL-CIO, at 3) and attack the EU delegation for views that 

ALPA terms “mystifyingly at odds with the purposes set out in the preamble [of the Open Skies agreement] 

and in the plain text of Article 17 bis.” (Answer of Air Line Pilots Association to DOT Notice (Feb. 14, 

2014), at 15.) What is actually mystifying is that these Objecting Parties would arrogate to themselves the 

right to pronounce the intent of the European Union and its Member States. The Objecting Parties are 

certainly free to voice their opinions and advance their interpretations—they have done so at great length in 

this docket—but it is inappropriate for them to malign the bona fides of sovereign states that were actual 

negotiators of the Agreement, not mere observers. 15 Open Skies Agreement, at art. 17 bis. 
6 

International is offering competitive wages and working conditions to all of its 

employees.16 

The decision of the Irish government to grant an AOC and Operating License, 

coupled with the letter from Minister Varadkar, make clear that Ireland does not agree 

with this assertion about Norwegian International’s allegedly corrosive effects. Nor do 

Norway and the European Union, based on the letter from Minister Solvik-Olsen and the 

EU presentation at the Joint Committee. The Objecting Parties have pointed to nothing in 

the “respective laws” of the European Union or any of its Member States that Norwegian 

International’s business model would violate. Instead, their assertions appear to be based 

on their conclusion that Norwegian International does not measure up against amorphous 

“labor standards” they themselves have invented. 

III. THE FACTS IN THE DEPARTMENT’S NOTICE SUPPORT 

NORWEGIAN INTERNATIONAL’S PRO-CONSUMER BUSINESS 

MODEL 

At the request of several of the Objecting Parties, the U.S. Government asked the 

European Union to provide information on the affiliated Norwegian airlines at the 

January 8, 2014 meeting of the Joint Committee—precisely the process envisioned for 

consideration of the social effects of the Open Skies Agreement in Articles 17 bis and 18. 

Displeased with the information presented to the Joint Committee, the Objecting Parties 

have resorted to a grab-bag of allegations and questions in an attempt to fill the gap 

between the information presented by the EU delegation and their sinister depiction of 

Norwegian International’s motives. Indeed, the Objecting Parties, largely ignoring the 

 

16The number of Americans seeking employment with Norwegian International is a testament to the 

attractiveness of the employment terms it offers. See More Than 5,500 Americans Want to Work for 

Norwegian Air (Jan. 31, 2014), available at http://media.norwegian.com/en/#/pressreleases/more-than-5-

500-americans-want-to-work-for-norwegian-air-955535 (the “Employment Press Release”). 
7 

information provided by the EU delegation, have offered their own version of the “true 

goal and purpose”17 for Norwegian’s decision to establish an airline in Ireland, leaving 

unstated how they would have the Department “conclusively establish the true facts,” as 

certain of the Objecting Parties so quaintly put it. 18 The Department, consistent with 

long-established precedent should not allow a licensing proceeding to be misused in this 

fashion, and should instead direct its attention to several salient “true facts”: 

(1) As an airline with an AOC from an EU Member State, Norwegian 

International enjoys substantially greater traffic rights than do carriers with an AOC from 

a non-EU state, such as Norway. For example, the rights contained in the comprehensive 

air transport agreements between the EU and both Canada and Israel have not been 

extended to Norwegian carriers: thus, a Norwegian airline does not have the right to fly 

to either of these countries from, for example, the UK or Spain; a carrier from an EU 

Member State, in contrast, is so authorized. Equally limiting is the fact that none of the 

many “horizontal mandate agreements” negotiated by the Commission and the Member 

States with third countries allow a Norwegian airline to exercise the traffic rights 

available to airlines of the EU Member States. These agreements do, however, allow 

ownership and control of an airline of an EU Member State by nationals of European 

Free Trade Association countries, i.e., Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein. Currently, 

several hundred existing bilateral air services agreements between EU Member States 

and third countries have been amended to allow carriers from other EU Member States to 

exercise traffic rights under such agreements. As the Norwegian group’s leadership 

looked to significant international expansion in the future, backed by large U.S. aircraft 

 

17 Answer of AFL-CIO, at 2. 

18 Joint Answer of Delta Air Lines, Inc., United Airlines, Inc., and American Airlines, Inc. (Feb. 13, 2014), 

at 2. 
8 

orders, it was a fully rational decision to establish an air carrier in an EU Member State, 

something that is explicitly authorized by European law as well as by the Open Skies 

Agreement. 

(2) The Objecting Parties’ focus on Norwegian’s business rationale for locating in 

Ireland not only misses the point about the advantages offered by Ireland that were cited 

by the EU delegation, but also fails to recognize that the selection of a headquarters 

location is a business decision akin to selecting an airport hub or fleet of aircraft and 

therefore outside of the factors to be considered by the Department. 19 These 

advantages—better aircraft financing due to Ireland’s adherence to the Cape Town 

Convention and its status under the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 

Development “home country” understanding, as well as the “considerable aviation 

cluster” and “highly regarded aviation authority”20 in Ireland providing robust safety and 

regulatory oversight—were not reasons for selecting Ireland over Norway but rather for 

choosing Ireland instead of other EU Member States. Norwegian International’s business 

decision to establish its principal place of business in Ireland was lawful, rational, and 

based on many commercial factors. The Objecting Parties make decisions based on their 

 

19 Department precedents demonstrate a strong preference against intervention in airline business decisions. 

See, e.g., Order 92-5-30 (May 15, 1992), at 12 (“In view of the industry's deregulation, such matters as 

employee hiring and salaries should be determined by the private parties—labor and management—rather 

than the government”); Order 91-5-3 (May 3, 1991), at 5 (TWA has made a business decision to sell these 

routes . . . It would be totally improper for us to second-guess the wisdom of this decision”); Order 89-1-56 

(Jan. 30, 1989), at 3 (“It has been and continues to be our policy to allow carriers to operate freely in 

markets that are available, according to their market assessment and business judgment.”); Order 85-8-25 

(Aug. 9, 1985), at 6 (citing range of instances in which the Department allowed carrier management to 

make business decisions “without unnecessary regulatory interference”). 20 Notice, at 1. Norwegian International’s business decisions to locate in Ireland, to establish crew bases in 

a number of different countries, and to use recruitment agencies for initial hiring were based on an array of 

corporate, financing, legal, and regulatory environment considerations, consistent with its long term 

business plan. The business plan includes options for aircraft financing, aircraft registration, corporate 

governance, future growth, brand image, overall company strategy, employee satisfaction and retention, tax 

consequences, aviation expertise and other matters. To suggest that any single factor “explains” 

Norwegian’s decision disregards how an effective business manages its operations for success. 
9 

own business, financial, environmental, and commercial goals within the existing legal 

and regulatory frameworks in which they operate. Norwegian International’s motivations 

should not be second-guessed by the United States any more than the EU should secondguess the decisions of American, Delta, and United to incorporate in the State of 

Delaware rather than in Texas, Georgia, or Illinois.21

(3) As the information contained in the Department’s Notice illustrates, the pilots 

and flight attendants of Norwegian International will be compensated at levels that are 

not substantially different from the salaries earned by counterparts at airlines in the 

United States, Europe, and other parts of the world. These levels of compensation and 

other conditions of employment cannot be characterized as constituting “low” labor 

standards or “unfair” wages. Like any competent business, Norwegian International 

researched the salary levels and terms and conditions of employment offered by its 

competitors, including in the U.S., to ensure the competitiveness of its own employment 

terms. Whether the salaries and benefits provided to the pilots and flight attendants of 

Norwegian International conform to every aspect of the compensation arrangements for 

the mainline pilots and flight attendants operating aircraft for American, Delta, and 

United (or even other U.S. carriers like FedEx, UPS, and Southwest) cannot be a relevant 

line of inquiry in this proceeding. With both captains and first officers at Norwegian 

International receiving average gross payments of over $100,000 annually, it is hard to 

take seriously the statements of U.S. labor union leaders that Norwegian is acting “at the 

 

21 See Certificates of Incorporation available at http://www.aa.com/content/images/amrcorp/aag-certificateof-incorporation.pdf; http://ir.delta.com/files/doc_downloads/governance/Certificate5109.pdf; http://www 

.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/100517/000119312510221657/dex41.htm. 
10 

expense of middle-class jobs.”22 Likewise, the fact that some 5,500 Americans applied 

for the initial 300 U.S.-based flight attendant positions with the Norwegian group23 –

positions offering average gross payments well in excess of $30,000 – strongly suggests 

that, far from being “an affront to middle-class airline jobs,”24 Norwegian International 

offers Americans seeking employment, including first-time employment, an enormously 

appealing and valuable opportunity. 

(4) In the Notice, the EU delegation stated that Norwegian group employees “are 

organized in labor unions” and that the group has “no tradition of discouraging 

unionization.”25 Alas, these facts did not support the anti-Norwegian narrative spun by 

the Objecting Parties, who have reacted with a parade of allegations of “anti-union” 

animus and activities by Norwegian's management. Of course, it is to be expected that 

trade unions want every employee at every airline in every country to be unionized. Yet 

some large airline employee groups in the United States have seen matters differently: 

the pilots at JetBlue, for example, have twice voted against unionization26 and the flight 

attendants at Delta have for years rebuffed union drives, even after the merger with 

Northwest. 27 Despite protestations to the contrary, “high labor standards” cannot be 

 

22 TTD Press Statement (Feb. 4, 2014), available at http://www.ttd.org/press-releases/2014-pressreleases/ttd-joins-effort-in-oslo-to-combat-norwegian-air-internationals-scheme/. Employment with 

Norwegian International may be attractive given the U.S. airline industry’s “recent history of instability, 

poor pay and benefits,” recently acknowledged by the President of the Air Line Pilots Association. See 

ALPA Release #14.10 (Feb. 4, 2014), available at http://www.alpa.org/Portals/Alpa/PressRoom/Press 

Releases/2014/2-4-14_14.10.htm. 

23 See the Employment Press Release. 

24 TTD Unions Mobilize Against Policies and Business Models That Threaten Transportation Jobs (Feb. 

17, 2014), available at http://www.ttd.org/press-releases/2014-press-releases/ttd-unions-mobilize-againstpolicies-and-business-models-that-threaten-transportation-jobs/. 

25 Notice, at 2. 

26 See Susan Carey, JetBlue Nonunion Pilots Stay Nonunion, WALL ST. JOURNAL (Aug. 16, 2011), 

available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424053111903392904576512571422803488. 

27 See Mike Esterl, Delta Flight Attendants Reject Union, WALL ST. JOURNAL (Nov. 16, 2011), available at

http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703506904575592622828568924. 
11 

defined as, or equated with, the degree of union membership. As recognized in the 

answer filed by FedEx, “there are many different ways that employees of both U.S. and 

European airlines have chosen to organize (or not to organize) themselves, and thus far, 

no government has found those to be an indicia of a lack of fitness” 28 to operate. 

Norwegian International has stated and again affirms that U.S. labor organizations 

representing aviation workers will be entitled under U.S. labor law29—and indeed will be 

welcome—to propose unionization to the hundreds of new employees hired by 

Norwegian International in the United States. 

(5) The trade unions among the Objecting Parties use polemical terms and slogans 

– e.g., “flag of convenience,” “race to the bottom,” and “social dumping” – to suggest 

that it is inconsistent with “fair wages and working conditions” and “high labor 

standards” for an airline to seek to control or reduce its labor costs. Not only is this 

incorrect as a matter of law and contrary to the established practices of airlines around the 

world, but it also flies in the face of decades of efforts by U.S. airline managements—

efforts that continue to this very day—to cut labor costs through a myriad of measures: 

for example, the hiring of “B scale” employees at “airlines within airlines” such as Song 

at Delta and TED at United; the contracting out of hundreds of flights daily to “regional” 

airlines that carry the mainline carriers’ codes but pay their employees far less than 

mainline crews (moreover, regional carrier employees are not usually part of the mainline 

carriers’ collective bargaining units);30 and the repeated use of Chapter 11 reorganization 

 

28 Answer of Federal Express Corporation (Feb. 12, 2014), at 3. 

29 See, e.g., Airline Pilots Ass’n, Int’l. v. Taca Int’l. Airlines, S.A., 748 F. 2d 965 (5th Cir. 1984). 30 See, e.g., the very recent article by aviation analyst Brett Snyder, American Eagle Envoy Pilots Throw 

Down Gauntlet, Try to Call American’s Bluff, CRANKYFLIER (Feb. 17, 2014) (“For years, the regional 

strategy was the same for most carriers. Mainline airlines looked to a variety of regional carriers to carry 

passengers for cheaper than they could themselves. Naturally that meant the regional carriers paid lower 
12 

to void existing union contracts and massively reduce labor costs.31 One can appreciate 

that trade unions want to advance the interests of their members, but they should not do 

so through protectionist legal maneuvers to prevent a qualified foreign competitor from 

entering the market. 

(6) Finally, the Objecting Parties continue to sow confusion where, in fact, there 

is absolute clarity with respect to the safety of Norwegian International and the 

effectiveness of Irish safety oversight. The pilots and flight attendants on each and every 

Norwegian International aircraft will be subject to Irish training and certification 

requirements. The Answers of the Objecting Parties ignore these facts and instead attack 

Ireland’s exemplary record of safety oversight.32 

In closing, Norwegian International is confident in its ability to provide low-cost, 

high quality service that will find favor among American consumers and lay the 

foundation for an expansion of transatlantic service in the future. At the same time, 

Norwegian International is bewildered at the Chicken Little “sky is falling” hysteria 

propagated by some of the Objecting Parties.33 With 87% of the transatlantic market in 

their control, with massive networks spanning the globe, and with grants of antitrust 

immunity that allow them to set prices and capacity jointly, the three major U.S. carriers 

and their European alliance partners are most certainly not in danger of “devastation” 

 wages as one way of keeping costs down.”), available at http://crankyflier.com/2014/02/17/americaneagle-envoy-pilots-throw-down-the-gauntlet-try-to-call-americans-bluff/?utm_source=feedburner& 

utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CrankyFlier+%28The+Cranky+Flier%29. 

31 For additional examples of practices by U.S. air carriers, see the docketed submission by “A Concerned 

Citizen for a Fair America” (Feb. 20, 2014) (noting the contracting out of jobs in ground handling, 

reservations, aircraft maintenance, and crew). 

32 As a Part 129 carrier, Norwegian International’s crew and flight attendants are subject to the licensing 

requirements of EASA and the IAA, not the FAA. 

33 One of them has gone so far as to argue that Norwegian’s “business plan ... will set a devastating 

precedent that will have far reaching implications for the global aviation industry, U.S. and European 

airlines and airline employees.” Answer of the AFL-CIO, at 3. 
13 

from a young, admittedly ambitious, yet modestly sized airline. It beggars the 

imagination to think that any one of these alliances will be wiped off the face of the earth 

– or even threatened – by Norwegian International. Their goal is simply to stop new 

competition, bolster profitability, and deny consumers on both sides of the Atlantic the 

right to choose between their offerings and those of Norwegian International. It would be 

a travesty—for competition, for economic growth, and for consumers—were the 

Department to allow this to happen.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Norwegian International respectfully 

requests that the Department act in accordance with its well-established precedents and 

grant the exemption and foreign air carrier permit requested in its application without 

delay. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Josh Romanow Peter Nelson 

PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP 

2300 N Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20037 

Tel: (202) 663-8000 

Fax: (202) 663-8007 

romanow@pillsburylaw.com 

peter.nelson@pillsburylaw.com 

February 21, 2014 Counsel for NORWEGIAN AIR 

INTERNATIONAL LIMITED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 The undersigned certifies that on February 21, 2014, a true and correct copy of the 

foregoing Comments of Norwegian Air International Limited was served by electronic 

mail on the individuals identified below: 

Steve Morrissey 

Thomas N. Bolling 

United Airlines 

steve.morrissey@united.com 

thomas.bolling@united.com 

Dan Weiss 

Continental Airlines 

dan.weiss@coair.com 

Sascha Vanderbellen 

Delta Airlines 

sascha.vanderbellen@delta.com 

Howard Kass 

U.S. Airways 

howard.kass@usairways.com 

Malcolm L. Benge 

Counsel for North 

American/World Airways 

mlbenge@zsrlaw.com 

Russell E. Pommer 

Atlas Air Inc. 

rpommer@atlasair.com 

Russell Bailey 

Jonathan A. Cohen 

Air Line Pilots Association, Int’l 

russell.bailey@alpa.org 

jonathan.cohen@alpa.org 

Edward Wytkind 

Transportation Trades 

Department, AFL-CIO 

edw@ttd.org 

J. Christopher Lytle 

Port of Oakland 

clytle@portoakland.com

Kent George 

Broward County Aviation 

Department 

kgeorge@broward.org 

Mark Richardson 

Southwest Airlines Pilots’ 

Association 

mrichardson@swapa.org 

Robert Wirick 

Francis Heil 

American Airlines, Inc. 

robert.wirick@aa.com 

francis.heil@aa.com 

Nick Tsokris 

Jesse Elliot 

John Chen 

FAA New York IFU 

jesse.elliot@faa.gov 

nicholas.tsokris@faa.gov 

john.chen@faa.gov 

John M. Allen 

Director, Flight Standards 

Federal Aviation Administration 

john.allen@faa.gov 

Anita Mosner 

Jennifer Nowak 

Counsel for UPS 

Holland & Knight 

anita.mosner@hklaw.com 

jennifer.nowak@hklaw.com 

Nancy S. Sparks 

Bailey Leopard 

Federal Express Corporation 

nssparks@fedex.com 

gbleopard@fedex.com 

David Berg 

James L. Casey 

Keith A. Glatz 

Airlines for America 

dberg@airlines.org 

jcasey@airlines.org 

kglatz@airlines.org 

Celine Canu 

European Cockpit Association 

cc@eurocockpit.be 

Edgar N. James 

Allied Pilots Association 

ejames@jamhoff.com 

Krishna Urs 

Department of State 

urskr@state.gov 

Steve Shur 

Travel Technology Association 

sshur@traveltech.org 

Eugene Alford 

Department of Commerce 

eugene.alford@trade.gov 

Matthew Baldwin 

Director of Air Transport 

European Commission 

Matthew.Baldwin@ec.europa.eu 

Dr. Felix Leinemann 

First Secretary 

Delegation of the European 

Union to the USA 

Felix.LEINEMANN@eeas.euro

pa.eu 

David Batchelor 

SJU Liason Officer 

SESAR Joint Undertaking 

Delegation of the European 

Union to the USA 

David.Batchelor@sesarju.eu 

Ottar Ostnes 

Director General, Norwegian 

Ministry of Transport and 

Communications 

Ottar.Ostnes@sd.dep.no 

John Hanlon 

European Low Fares Airline 

Association 

John.Hanlon@ELFAA.com 

Paul Gretch 

Robert Finamore 

U.S. Department of 

Transportation 

paul.gretch@dot.gov 

Robert.Finamore@dot.gov 

/s/ Peter Nelson 

Peter Nelson