PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

WALTER R. FLAUGHER, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 14-3206 

_________________________________ 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 2:06-CR-20043-JWL-8)

_________________________________ 

Daniel T. Hansmeier, Appellate Chief (Melody Brannon Evans, Federal Public Defender, 

with him on the briefs), Office of the Federal Public Defender for the District of Kansas, 

Kansas City, Kansas, appearing for Defendant-Appellant. 

Carrie N. Capwell, Assistant United States Attorney (Barry R. Grissom, United States 

Attorney, with her on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney for the District of 

Kansas, Kansas City, Kansas, appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

_________________________________ 

Before KELLY, SEYMOUR, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

MATHESON, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

I. BACKGROUND 

Walter Flaugher pled guilty in 2006 to one count of conspiracy to distribute 

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. He was sentenced to 57 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

November 13, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
- 2 - 

months in prison and 5 years of supervised release. In 2014, the U.S. Probation 

Office filed a petition to revoke his supervised release, alleging several violations. 

Mr. Flaugher stipulated to one of the violations—use of methamphetamine. The 

district court revoked his supervised release, resentenced him to another 12 months 

and 1 day in prison, and imposed 3 years of supervised release. Over his counsel’s 

objections, the court also imposed the following supervised release condition: 

[H]e shall submit his person, house, residence, vehicles, papers, 

business, and place of employment and any property under his control 

to a search conducted by the United States probation officer at a 

reasonable time and in a reasonable manner based upon reasonable 

suspicion of contraband or evidence of a violation of condition of 

release. Failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation. 

He shall warn any other residents that the premises may be subject to be 

searched pursuant to this condition. 

Aplt. Br. at 5-6. 

On appeal, Mr. Flaugher argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) prohibits district 

courts from imposing warrantless-search conditions except in cases involving felons 

required to register under SORNA the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 

Act (“SORNA”). He challenges the condition imposed on him because he is not 

required to register under SORNA. 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we 

affirm. 
- 3 - 

II. DISCUSSION 

The issue is whether a district court may impose a warrantless-search 

condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) on a person who is not a felon required to 

register under SORNA. 

A. Standard of Review 

 “When the defendant objects to a special condition of supervised release at the 

time it is announced, this Court reviews for abuse of discretion.” United States v. 

Dougan, 684 F.3d 1030, 1034 (10th Cir. 2012). “Thus, we will not disturb the 

district court’s ruling absent a showing it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of 

fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear error of judgment.” 

United States v. Bear, 769 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted).

Because Mr. Flaugher challenges the district court’s statutory authority to 

enter the warrantless-search condition, we review this question de novo. See United 

States v. Handley, 678 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 2012). 

B. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) 

Three parts of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) are the keys to deciding this appeal. 

First, under the “any other condition” provision, a district court may impose 

“any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation in section 3563(b)1

and any other condition it considers to be appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). One of 

the provisions found in § 3563(b) authorizes warrantless searches when the defendant 

is “required to register under [SORNA].” 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(23). 

 1

 With one limitation not implicated in this appeal. 
- 4 - 

Second, under the “three limitations” provision, a court may impose a 

condition based on the “any other condition” provision provided it: 

(1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), 

(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); 

(2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably 

necessary for the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), 

and (a)(2)(D); and 

(3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the 

Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a). 

Id. 

Third, under the SORNA provision: 

The court may order, as an explicit condition of supervised release for a 

person who is a felon and required to register under the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act, that the person submit his person, and 

any property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, computer, other 

electronic communications or data storage devices or media, and effects 

to search at any time, with or without a warrant, by any law enforcement 

or probation officer with reasonable suspicion concerning a violation of 

a condition of supervised release or unlawful conduct by the person, and 

by any probation officer in the lawful discharge of the officer’s 

supervision functions. 

Id.

C. Analysis 

Mr. Flaugher urges us to read the SORNA provision in § 3583(d) as 

precluding a warrantless-search condition for a defendant who is not a felon required 

to register under SORNA. This interpretation is incompatible with a full reading of 

the statute. 

1. Authorization of Warrantless-Search Conditions 
- 5 - 

The text of § 3583(d) does not limit the possibility of a warrantless-search 

condition to felons required to register under SORNA. Indeed, it plainly authorizes 

warrantless-search conditions for defendants who are not felons and who are not 

required to register under SORNA. 

The “any other condition” provision authorizes district courts to impose “any 

condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation in section 3563(b) and 

any other condition it considers to be appropriate” so long as the “three limitations” 

of § 3583(d)(1)-(3) are met. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (emphasis added). A district court 

may therefore impose a warrantless-search condition on a defendant who is not 

required to register under SORNA so long as the court considers the condition 

appropriate and the § 3583(d)(1)-(3) limitations are met.2

This understanding of § 3583(d) is consistent with the policy statement found 

at United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 5D1.3(d). It recommends 

district courts impose a warrantless-search condition in cases involving a sex offense, 

but also explains such a condition “may otherwise be appropriate in particular cases.” 

U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(7)(C). The policy statement therefore indicates 

warrantless-search conditions may be appropriate in cases other than those involving 

sex offenders. If a district court decided a warrantless-search condition was 

 2

 In United States v. Hanrahan, 508 F.3d 962 (10th Cir. 2007), we affirmed a 

warrantless-search condition imposed on a defendant who was not a felon required to 

register under SORNA. Although Hanrahan is consistent with our disposition in the 

instant case, we do not rely on it because we agree with Mr. Flaugher that Hanrahan

did not consider the statutory interpretation issue presented here. 
- 6 - 

appropriate in a case not involving a sex offense, it would therefore satisfy 

§ 3583(d)(3) because it would be consistent with the relevant policy statement. 

2. Warrantless-Search Conditions for SORNA Felons 

In 2006, Congress amended § 3583(d) by adding the SORNA provision. 

Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 210(b), 120 

Stat. 587, 615-16 (2006) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)). It authorizes a court to 

order a warrantless-search condition of supervised release for a felon who is required 

to register under SORNA. 

Mr. Flaugher argues that adding the SORNA provision limited district courts’ 

authority under § 3583(d) by negative implication to impose warrantless-search 

conditions only on those defendants identified in the SORNA provision—felons 

required to register under SORNA. We disagree. The SORNA provision is a grant 

of authority, not a limitation. The plain language of the provision describes what a 

district court “may order,” and does not describe what the court may not order. 

Moreover, Mr. Flaugher’s interpretation ignores and would conflict with a critical 

cross-reference in the “any other condition” provision of § 3583(d) that also was 

added to the statute in 2006, § 3563(b)(23). Adam Walsh Child Protection and 

Safety Act § 210(a)(3). 

3. Section 3563(b) Warrantless-Search Conditions

Section 3583(d) states district courts may impose “any condition set forth as a 

discretionary condition of probation in section 3563(b)” as long as the condition 

satisfies the “three limitations” in § 3583(d)(1)-(3). One such § 3563(b) condition 
- 7 - 

authorizes warrantless searches when the defendant is “required to register under 

[SORNA].” 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(23). This warrantless-search provision grants 

district courts authority over more SORNA defendants than the SORNA provision 

because § 3563(b)(23) does not require the defendant to be a felon. Section 3583(d) 

therefore explicitly allows a district court to impose a warrantless-search condition 

on a defendant who is required to register under SORNA, whether or not he or she is 

a felon, so long as the § 3583(d)(1)-(3) limitations are met. 

Accordingly, when Congress enacted the SORNA provision, rather than 

limiting the district courts’ authority to impose warrantless-search conditions, as Mr. 

Flaugher contends, it added to the authority already contained in the “any other 

condition” provision. It did so by authorizing a district court to impose a 

warrantless-search condition on a category of defendants—felons who are required to 

register under SORNA—without having to satisfy the “three limitations” in 

§ 3583(d)(1)-(3). This interpretation permits all of the § 3583(d) provisions to have 

meaningful effect. 

4. No Void or Superfluous Text

Mr. Flaugher’s proposed interpretation—that warrantless-search conditions 

can be imposed only under the SORNA provision in § 3583(d) and only upon felons 

who must register under SORNA—would render void or superfluous the statutory 

authorization of a warrantless-search condition under the cross-reference of 

§ 3583(d) to § 3563(b)(23), which allows district courts to impose warrantless-search 

conditions on non-felons required to register under SORNA. The Supreme Court 
- 8 - 

recently instructed: “We have long held that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be 

so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause’ is rendered ‘superfluous, void, or 

insignificant.’” Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1352 (2015) 

(quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)); see In re Dawes, 652 F.3d 

1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting that “one of the most basic interpretive canons” 

of statutory construction is that a “statute should be construed so that effect is given 

to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or 

insignificant”). We therefore reject Mr. Flaugher’s proposed interpretation as 

contrary to this basic canon and the full text of § 3583(d). 

We instead conclude that the proper interpretation of § 3583(d) gives all parts 

of the statute meaningful effect and avoids superfluity. As described above, the “any 

other condition” provision of § 3583(d) gives district courts broad authority to 

impose any conditions they consider appropriate so long as the conditions satisfy the 

“three limitations” of § 3583(d)(1)-(3), including warrantless-search conditions on 

SORNA defendants under the cross-reference to § 3563(b). The SORNA provision 

would therefore be superfluous if it authorized a warrantless-search condition only 

when the § 3583(d)(1)-(3) limitations are met. But the SORNA provision does not 

contain these limitations. Instead, it authorizes district courts to impose a 

warrantless-search condition on a felon who is required to register under SORNA 

provided a “law enforcement or probation officer” has “reasonable suspicion 

concerning a violation of a condition of supervised release or unlawful conduct by 
- 9 - 

the person” or the search is conducted “in the lawful discharge of [a probation] 

officer’s supervision functions.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). 

Understanding the parts of § 3583(d)—the “any other condition,” “three 

limitations,” and SORNA provisions—in this way gives meaningful effect to all 

three, avoids superfluity, and forecloses Mr. Flaugher’s proposed interpretation. 

* * * * 

Mr. Flaugher does not further argue the § 3583(d)(1)-(3) limitations warrant 

reversal of the warrantless-search condition imposed on him. His challenge to his 

warrantless-search supervised release condition therefore fails. 

III.CONCLUSION 

We affirm Mr. Flaugher’s supervised release condition that he challenges on 

appeal.