alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### FIELDS v. STATE.

No. 24261.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 9, 1949.

On Motion to Reinstate Appeal March 16, 1949.

No appearance for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Presiding Judge.

Conviction is for the transportation of intoxicating liquor in dry area, punishment assessed being a fine of $500 and 30 days in the county jail.

The record contains no notice of appeal as is required by Art. 827, C.C.P.

The appeal is dismissed.

On Motion to Reinstate Appeal.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Appellant has filed herein supplemental transcript correcting the record, which failed to contain a notice of appeal entered of record. Accordingly, his motion to reinstate the appeal is granted.

We are asked to reverse the case on the ground that the complaint was not sworn to or certified by any person. The record does not sustain this contention.

The other ground presents the contention that there is a variance between the complaint and information. The complaint, signed and sworn to by J. T. Morgan on the 7th day of May, 1948, charges the unlawful transportation of “whisky and wine.” The information filed by the district attorney contains two counts, one charging transportation of an alcoholic beverage, “to-wit: Forty-Eight (48) Four-Fifths quarts of wine.” The second count sets out that appellant did unlawfully transport “an alcoholic beverage * * * to-wit, Twenty-Four (24) pints of whiskey.” Together the two counts in the information describe the same thing that is alleged in the complaint. In addition the exact amounts are specified and it is further stated that it was on “State Highway No. 180,” in Borden County, whereas the complaint only states that it was in Borden County.

The pleading is awkward and subject to criticism, but we are unable to find a conflict. We do not think there is authority for sustaining appellant’s contention in this respect. *

The court’s charge further confuses the issues but no complaint was lodged against it and, consequently, that matter is not before us for consideration.

The case is now considered on its merits and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
#### PHARISS v. STATE.

No. 22648.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 8, 1943.

Aubrey Davee, of Brady, for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Appellant was convicted in the county court of McCulloch County for the violation of the liquor law, Vernon’s Ann.P.C. art. 666 — 1 et seq., and his punishment was assessed at a fine of $100.

The complaint and information appear regular. The record is before this court without statement of facts or bills of exceptions. In the absence of the evidence adduced upon the trial, this court is unable to appraise the matters presented in the motion for new trial.

The judgment of the trial court, therefore, will be in all things affirmed.
Exhibit 31.1



CERTIFICATION



I, Thomas S. Smith, certify that:



1.

I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Superior Silver Mines, Inc.

2.

Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.

4.

The Registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the Registrant and we have:

a)

Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the Registrant is made known to us by others within the entity, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b)

Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;

c)

Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

d)

Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the Registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Registrants internal control over financial reporting.

5.

The Registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the Registrants auditors and the audit committee of the Registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

a)

All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b)

Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the Registrants internal control over financial reporting.



Date: November 13, 2009

By:    /s/ Thomas S. Smith



Thomas S. Smith, President and Director
#### TEXAS CO. v. HENDON.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Dec. 11, 1953.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing March 12, 1954.

Nat Ryan Hughes, Murray, for appellant.

Wells Overbey, Murray, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Motion for an appeal from the Calloway Circuit Court, Honorable Ira D. Smith, Judge.

Judgment for $1,000 for personal injury sustained by the collapsing of a scaffold and platform upon which a gasoline storage tank rested. It was a question for the jury whether the defendant exercised ordinary care in maintaining the tank in a reasonably safe condition, and the plaintiff’s injuries were the proximate result of its failure to do so.

•The motion for an appeal is overruled, and the judgment stands affirmed.
Exhibit 32.2








CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the report of Worldwide Biotech & Pharmaceutical Company (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending September 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Peiyi Tian, Principal Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.











/s/ Peiyi Tian


Peiyi Tian


Chief Financial Officer


November 16, 2009
Exhibit 10

Amended Schedule 2.1 to the Directors Deferred Compensation and

Benefits Trust Agreement

Schedule 2.1 to the Directors Deferred Compensation and Benefits Trust Agreement

Benefit Plans and Other Arrangements Subject to Trust

(1) Sunoco, Inc.
Directors Deferred Compensation Plan I;

(2) Sunoco, Inc. Directors Deferred Compensation Plan II;

(3) The entire funding for all the Indemnification Agreements with the directors set forth below shall be Five Million Dollars ($5,000,000.00) in the
aggregate upon a Potential Change in Control, and an amount upon a Change in Control calculated on the basis of the Indemnification Agreements with the following directors:



| | (a) | Robert J. Darnall
| | --- | -----------------



| | (b) | Ursula O. Fairbairn
| | --- | -------------------



| | (c) | Thomas P. Gerrity
| | --- | -----------------



| | (d) | Rosemarie B. Greco
| | --- | ------------------



| | (e) | John P. Jones, III
| | --- | ------------------



| | (f) | James G. Kaiser
| | --- | ---------------



| | (g) | R. Anderson Pew
| | --- | ---------------



| | (h) | G. Jackson Ratcliffe
| | --- | --------------------



| | (i) | John W. Rowe
| | --- | ------------



| | (j) | John K. Wulff
| | --- | -------------

(4) Benefits payable to former directors
of the Company (or their beneficiaries) in pay status as of the date of termination of the Sunoco, Inc. Non-Employee Directors Retirement Plan.
#### FORD v. STATE.

No. 26443.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 27, 1953.

J. W. Reid, Abilene, for appellant.

Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is the possession of beer for the purpose of. sale in a dry area; the punishment, five months in jail and a fine of $250.

The Sheriff of Taylor County and his deputy, while on patrol on a Sunday afternoon, went into appellant’s place of business for the purpose of observing the conduct of the patrons. As they entered they saw several people seated at tables with paper cups before them. The officers-walked to the rear of the. establishment, picked- up one paper cup, and detected the odor of beer therefrom. Thereafter, they saw six quart bottles of beer in an open cooler, and a further search yielded three-additional quarts of beer. Certain broken, empty beer bottles were also found behind' the counter.

These are the facts upon which the conviction rests. It is apparent therefrom that the appellant was shown to be in possession-of 288 ounces of beer and no more. This-amount is just short of what is required to-raise a presumption that the beer was possessed for the purpose of sale. Article-667-25, Vernon’s Ann.P.C.

Appellant complains because of the refusal of the court to grant his specially requested charge on circumstantial evidence..

*317We must determine whether the paper cups, one of which smelled of beer, the broken, empty beer bottles and the fact that such were found in a place of business constitute direct or circumstantial evidence of guilt of the charge against the appellant.

We have concluded that such facts were circumstances rather than direct proof of the fact that appellant had the beer for sale and that, therefore, the learned trial court fell into error in not giving the requested charge. Miller v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 309, 119 S.W.2d 1052, and Hinton v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 400, 120 S.W.2d 1053.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
IB 

Union Calendar No. 186 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2922 

[Report No. 113–259] 

To extend the authority of the Supreme Court Police to protect court officials 

away from the Supreme Court grounds. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

AUGUST 1, 2013 

Mr. HOLDING (for himself, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. COBLE, Mr. WATT, and Mr. 

MARINO) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

NOVEMBER 12, 2013 

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union 

and ordered to be printed 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 2922 RH

A BILL 

To extend the authority of the Supreme Court Police to 

protect court officials away from the Supreme Court grounds. 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

HR 2922 RH

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY OF SUPREME 

4 COURT POLICE TO PROTECT COURT OFFI5 CIALS OFF SUPREME COURT GROUNDS. 

6 Section 6121(b)(2) of title 40, United States Code, 

7 is amended by striking ‘‘2013’’ and inserting ‘‘2019’’. 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
Union Calendar No. 186 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2922 

[Report No. 113–259] 

A BILL 

To extend the authority of the Supreme Court Popreme Court grounds. lice to protect court officials away from the SuNOVEMBER 12, 2013 

Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 

State of the Union and ordered to be printed 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
February 4, 2014

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

DANIEL E. SUPKINS, JR., M.D., Appellant

NO. 14-14-00018-CV V.

THE METHODIST HOSPITAL, Appellee

________________________________

Today the Court heard the parties’ joint motion to dismiss the appeal from 

the judgment signed by the court below on September 23, 2013. Having considered 

the motion and found it meritorious, we order the appeal DISMISSED.

We further order that each party shall pay its costs by reason of this appeal.

We further order that mandate be issued immediately.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-6788

In Re: RODNEY T. WILLIAMS,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CA-02-648)

Submitted: July 9, 2003 Decided: August 11, 2003

Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Rodney T. Williams, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Rodney T. Williams petitions for a writ of mandamus, alleging

the district court has unduly delayed acting on his 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241 (2000) petition. He seeks an order from this court directing

the district court to act. We find there has been no undue delay in

the district court. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed

in forma pauperis, we deny the petition for a writ of mandamus. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
FORM 10-Q FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                       7,631,502
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,679,023
<ALLOWANCES>                                    60,596
<INVENTORY>                                  8,903,912
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            20,413,621
<PP&E>                                       3,244,226
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,081,650
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              46,524,587
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        5,596,461
<BONDS>                                      6,138,583
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        41,475
<OTHER-SE>                                  34,389,555
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                46,524,587
<SALES>                                      6,394,144
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,523,784
<CGS>                                        2,335,400
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,335,400
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,411,198
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 5,326
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             135,564
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,777,186
<INCOME-TAX>                                   550,880
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,226,306
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,226,306
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .30
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .30
        

</TABLE>
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 290 

To amend title 31, United States Code, to eliminate the statutory cap on 

the public debt and to place limitations on the purposes for which 

public debt may be issued. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 15, 2013 

Mr. NADLER (for himself, Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia, Mr. MORAN, Mr. BLUMENAUER, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Mr. ELLISON, Ms. MCCOLLUM, and Mr. 

WELCH) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend title 31, United States Code, to eliminate the 

statutory cap on the public debt and to place limitations 

on the purposes for which public debt may be issued. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Full Faith and Credit 

5 Act of 2013’’. 

6 SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON OBLIGATIONS. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 3101 of title 31, United 

8 States Code, is amended to read as follows: 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with 
2 

•HR 290 IH

1 ‘‘§ 3101. Limitation on obligations 

2 ‘‘Obligations may only be issued under this chapter 

3 to fund commitments incurred by the Federal Government 

4 that require current funding.’’. 

5 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.— 

6 (1) Section 3130(e)(2) of title 31, United 

7 States Code, is amended by inserting ‘‘, as in effect 

8 on the day before the date of the enactment of the 

9 Full Faith and Credit Act of 2011’’ before the pe10 riod at the end. 

11 (2) The table of contents for chapter 31 of title 

12 31, United States Code, is amended by amending 

13 the item relating to section 3101 to read as follows: 

‘‘3101. Limitation on obligations.’’. 

Æ 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with
Exhibit 32

Written Statement of the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350

Solely for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, we, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer of Superior Uniform Group, Inc. (the Company), hereby certify, based on our knowledge, that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended September 30, 2010 (the Report) fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                                                    
|--------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Michael Benstock                                                
|Michael Benstock                                                    
|Chief Executive Officer                                             
|(Principal Executive Officer)                                       
|                                                                    
|/s/ Andrew D. Demott, Jr.                                           
|Andrew D. Demott, Jr.                                               
|Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
|                                                                    
|Date: October 21, 2010
#### LYLES v. STATE.

No. 26396.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 29, 1953.

*311J. H. Starley, Pecos, for appellant.

Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is driving while intoxicated; the punishment, a fine of $50.

Appellant moved the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict of “not guilty,” one ground being that the State had failed to prove, that the offense was committed in Culberson County, Texas, as alleged in the complaint and information. This motion was overruled, and appellant reserved his exception. The question is properly before us for review. See Hodges v. State, 151 Tex.Cr.R. 511, 209 S.W.2d 611.

There is no evidence found in the record showing that the offense was committed in Culberson County, Texas. Appellant testified that he did not on the day in question, operate a motor vehicle upon Highway 80 in Culberson County, Texas, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. .,

.  The issue having been raised in the trial court, we are not permitted to presume that venue was proven as provided in article, 847, C.C.P..

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
#### WILLIAMS v. STATE.

No. 22718.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 19, 1944.

Eugene F. Mathis, of Lubbock, for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

The unlawful possession of whiskey for the purpose of sale in a dry area is the offense; the punishment, a fine of $250.

Appellant was the owner and operator of the Lamar Cafe, in Lubbock. Attached to, and operated in connection with, the cafe was a small dance hall, around the walls of which were “booths,” for the use of the patrons. A toilet was attached to the cafe, the use of which was available to the patrons.

Agents of the Texas Liquor Control Board searched the premises mentioned and found in and around the toilet three and one-third pints of whiskey, in pint bottles. In the dance hall, and in one of the booths, were two pints of whiskey. At the time of the search, patrons were in the cafe and ■dance hall. Of the whiskey found in the toilet, appellant claimed the one-third pint. He denied any knowledge of, or connection with, all the other whiskey so found. At the time the search was begun, appellant was in the front of the cafe, at the cash register, where he remained until the search was completed. There is an absence of any testimony showing that, prior to the search, appellant had been in the toilet or dance hall.

There is affirmative defensive testimony to the effect that at least two of the pint bottles of whiskey found in the toilet and that found in the dance hall belonged to, and had been placed there by, patrons of the cafe.

Under the facts stated, the trial court, though requested, refused to charge upon circumstantial evidence. In this, he was in error. Under the facts stated, the State’s case was one of circumstantial evidence. Schenk v. State, 106 Tex.Cr.R. 564, 293 S.W. 1101; McFarlan v. State, 106 Tex.Cr.R. 384, 292 S.W. 885; Young v. State, 114 Tex.Cr.R. 135, 24 S.W.2d 829; Bickerstaff v. State, 139 Tex.Cr.R. 69, 139 S.W.2d 110; Thursby v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 295, 158 S.W.2d 539; Green v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 337, 158 S.W.2d 771; Lollar v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 420, 159 S.W.2d 130.

For the reason assigned, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.