Present: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, 

and Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 

RALPH LEE JORDAN 

v. Record No. 061211 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 April 20, 2007 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Ralph Lee Jordan was convicted of possession with the 

intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled substance in 

violation of Code § 18.2-248, and felonious obstruction of 

justice in violation of Code § 18.2-460(C). On appeal, 

Jordan claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 

both convictions. We agree and will therefore reverse the 

judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia. 

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

The relevant facts are not in dispute, as Jordan 

introduced no evidence at his bench trial in the Circuit 

Court of Henrico County on the charges at issue.1

 On April 

24, 2004 at approximately 4:10 a.m., a Henrico County 

police officer, F.P. Kern, stopped an automobile driven by 

Jordan after Officer Kern observed the vehicle crossing 

over and striking the double yellow line in the center of 

 1

 Jordan was tried jointly with Curtis Wright, III, 

who was also charged with possession with the intent to 

distribute a Schedule I controlled substance. At trial, 

Wright likewise presented no evidence. 
2

the roadway several times. Officer Kern stopped his police 

vehicle behind Jordan’s automobile and illuminated its 

interior with both his headlights and his spotlight. As 

Officer Kern approached the driver’s side of Jordan’s 

vehicle, he observed a passenger, later identified as 

Curtis Wright, III, lean over, use his left hand to open 

the front passenger door approximately two to three inches, 

and then drop a cylindrical object out of his hand onto the 

ground. Upon reaching the driver’s side of the vehicle, 

Officer Kern detected the odor of alcohol on Jordan’s 

breath and noticed that Jordan had “glassy eyes.” 

Officer Kern then approached the passenger side of the 

vehicle and found a small prescription bottle lying on the 

wet gravel just under the “rocker panel” of the front 

passenger door. The prescription bottle was dry, although 

the road was wet from a recent rain. Considering the 

bottle’s location on the ground, Officer Kern believed the 

tires of Jordan’s vehicle would have crushed it if the 

bottle had been there previously. Officer Kern opened the 

bottle and found “thirty tablets with nine pieces and 

powder.” According to Officer Kern, the intact tablets 

“were marked on either side, with a flower or a wagon wheel 

type design.” Based on his training and experience, 

Officer Kern suspected the tablets were a controlled 
3

substance commonly known as “ecstasy.” Subsequent testing 

by the Division of Forensic Science confirmed that the 

tablets were “3,4-Methylenedioxyamphetamine,” i.e., 

ecstasy. Officer Kern asked Wright if he knew anything 

about the bottle. Wright responded that he did not, but 

admitted that he had just come from “a club.” 

After Jordan failed a variety of field sobriety tests, 

Officer Kern arrested Jordan for driving under the 

influence of alcohol. He arrested Wright for possession 

with the intent to distribute ecstasy. Incident to the 

arrests, Officer Kern searched Jordan’s vehicle and found 

in the glove compartment what Officer Kern described as “a 

roll of money . . . rolled sequentially [in] fives, tens, 

twenties, and hundreds” and “held in place by a rubber 

band.” The roll of cash contained a total of $3,400. When 

Officer Kern asked Jordan about the money, Jordan admitted 

that it belonged to him, but claimed “that he had his 

automobile dealer[’]s license” and used the money to 

“purchase and deal automobiles.” Officer Kern testified 

that he told Jordan the roll of money was evidence linking 

Jordan to the distribution of ecstasy. 

Officer Kern placed the roll of money that he had 

recovered in between the two front seats of his police 

vehicle. With Jordan sitting in the front passenger seat, 
4

handcuffed, and restrained by a seatbelt, Officer Kern then 

transported Jordan to the magistrate’s office. Upon 

arriving at the magistrate’s office, Officer Kern went 

inside to lock up his weapon and, while doing so, left 

Jordan alone in the vehicle. After Officer Kern removed 

Jordan from the vehicle and took him before the magistrate, 

the roll of cash fell from Jordan’s pants. Jordan admitted 

taking the money from the police vehicle and told Officer 

Kern that he did so because he believed that the officer 

was going to steal the money. 

Deciding to use more caution with Jordan, Officer Kern 

again handcuffed him.2

 According to Officer Kern, Jordan 

“stiffen[ed] his arms and began pulling away . . . any 

time[] that he had the opportunity.” Officer Kern 

testified that he had to “forcefully put [Jordan’s] arms 

behind his back, after pinning [Jordan] to the counter.” 

While walking to the probable cause hearing and to his bond 

hearing, Jordan walked slowly and pulled away, requiring 

Officer Kern to pin Jordan against a door or wall several 

times. On the way out of the magistrate’s office after the 

probable cause determination, Jordan stopped repeatedly, 

causing Officer Kern to bump into him. Officer Kern 

 2

 The record is not clear as to when Officer Kern had 

removed the handcuffs. 
5

testified that, when he removed the handcuffs so that 

Jordan could be fingerprinted and photographed, Jordan put 

his hands “down the front of his pants and began playing 

with his genitalia.” After Jordan refused three requests 

to remove his hands, Officer Kern forcibly did so. During 

the intake process, Jordan also refused to answer questions 

in a timely fashion, instead answering a question after 

three or four other questions had been asked. 

The Commonwealth’s only other evidence came from 

Michael J. Barren, an investigator with the Narcotics Unit 

of the Henrico County Police Department, who testified as 

an expert witness regarding ecstasy and how it is packaged 

and sold. Barren stated that ecstasy is “commonly referred 

to as club drugs” and is generally used in clubs that have 

dancing all night. According to Barren, a pill of ecstasy 

typically sells for approximately $20 to $25. Barren also 

testified that the bottle recovered by Officer Kern was 

approximately one-quarter full and that the quantity of 

pills in the bottle was not consistent with personal use. 

Finally, Barren opined the $3,400 in cash recovered by 

Officer Kern was representative of the sale of 

approximately 130 to 170 pills of ecstasy. 

At the close of the evidence, Jordan moved to strike 

the evidence on both charges. The trial court denied the 
6

motion and found Jordan guilty of possession of ecstasy 

with the intent to distribute and obstruction of justice. 

With regard to the latter offense, the trial court found 

that Jordan had impeded Officer Kern by taking the roll of 

money after Officer Kern had seized it. The trial court 

also denied Jordan’s post-trial motion to dismiss the 

charges. 

Jordan appealed his convictions to the Court of 

Appeals of Virginia. A three-judge panel of the Court of 

Appeals denied Jordan’s petition for appeal for the reasons 

stated in its prior unpublished per curiam order. Jordan 

v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1642-05-2 (May 16, 2006). In 

that per curiam order, the Court of Appeals concluded that 

the fact-finder could reasonably have inferred from the 

evidence that the $3,400 represented proceeds from the sale 

of the ecstasy pills that were no longer in the bottle that 

Officer Kern recovered and that, consequently, Jordan and 

Wright jointly possessed the ecstasy. Jordan v. 

Commonwealth, Record No. 1642-05-2, slip op. at 3 (Feb. 15, 

2006). The Court of Appeals also concluded that Jordan 

impeded Officer Kern by removing the $3,400 from the police 

vehicle and “by using force” to prevent Officer Kern from 

performing his duties and handcuffing Jordan. Id. Jordan 

appeals from the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
7

ANALYSIS 

On appeal, Jordan challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to sustain each of his convictions. He first 

asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish 

that he jointly possessed the ecstasy actually found in 

Wright’s possession. Next, Jordan claims the evidence was 

insufficient to establish that he either threatened Officer 

Kern with bodily harm or used any force to impede the 

officer. We will address the issues in that order. 

When the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal 

case is challenged on appeal, this Court must view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth 

and accord to it the benefit of all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible from the evidence. Welch v. Commonwealth, 

271 Va. 558, 561, 628 S.E.2d 340, 341 (2006); Walton v. 

Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 425–26, 497 S.E.2d 869, 871 

(1998). We will not disturb a trial court’s judgment on 

appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it. Code § 8.01-680; Walton, 255 Va. at 426, 497 

S.E.2d at 871. However, “it is just as obligatory upon the 

appellate court, to set aside . . . the judgment of a 

court, when it is, in its opinion, contrary to the law and 

evidence, and therefore plainly wrong, as it is to sustain 

it when the reverse is true.” Bland v. Commonwealth, 177 
8

Va. 819, 821, 13 S.E.2d 317, 317 (1941); accord Tarpley v. 

Commonwealth, 261 Va. 251, 256, 542 S.E.2d 761, 763 (2001); 

Hickson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 383, 387, 520 S.E.2d 643, 

645 (1999). 

 To convict Jordan of possession of ecstasy with the 

intent to distribute, the Commonwealth had to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Jordan was aware of the 

presence and character of the drug and that he 

consciously possessed it. See Walton, 255 Va. at 426, 

497 S.E.2d at 871; Andrews v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 179, 

182, 217 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1975). “An accused’s mere 

proximity to an illicit drug, however, is not sufficient 

to prove possession.” Walton, 255 Va. at 426, 497 S.E.2d 

at 872; accord Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 27, 

630 S.E.2d 326, 330 (2006); Drew v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 

471, 473, 338 S.E.2d 844, 845 (1986). Nor does an 

accused’s ownership or occupancy of the premises or 

vehicle where an illegal drug is found create a 

presumption of possession. Walton, 255 Va. at 426, 497 

S.E.2d at 872; Garland v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 182, 184, 

300 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1983). 

The Commonwealth did not, however, have to establish 

that Jordan actually possessed the ecstasy; proof of 

constructive possession is sufficient. See Wilson, 272 
9

Va. at 26–27, 630 S.E.2d at 330; Walton, 255 Va. at 426, 

497 S.E.2d at 872. Constructive possession may be 

established when there are “‘acts, statements, or conduct 

of the accused or other facts or circumstances which tend 

to show that the [accused] was aware of both the presence 

and character of the substance and that it was subject to 

his dominion and control.’” Drew, 230 Va. at 473, 338 

S.E.2d at 845 (quoting Powers v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 

474, 476, 316 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1984)). That an accused 

occupied or owned the premises or vehicle where a 

controlled substance was found is one circumstance that 

can be considered along with the other evidence in 

determining whether the accused constructively possessed 

the illegal drug. Lane v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 713, 

716, 292 S.E.2d 358, 360 (1982); Gillis v. Commonwealth, 

215 Va. 298, 301, 208 S.E.2d 768, 770–71 (1974). When, 

as here, a conviction is based on circumstantial 

evidence, the issue before us is not whether there was 

some evidence to support Jordan’s hypotheses of 

innocence, but whether a reasonable fact-finder, upon 

consideration of all the evidence, could have rejected 

Jordan’s theories in his defense and found him guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Hudson v. Commonwealth, 

265 Va. 505, 513, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003). 
10

The Commonwealth argues that there was sufficient 

circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer that Jordan was aware of the presence 

and character of the ecstasy and that the ecstasy was 

subject to his dominion and control. In support of this 

argument, the Commonwealth relies primarily on the $3,400 

in cash found in the glove compartment of Jordan’s 

vehicle, the manner in which the money was rolled, 

Jordan’s acknowledgement that the money belonged to him, 

his subsequent taking of the money from the police 

vehicle after being informed it was evidence against him 

on the drug charge, Jordan’s close proximity to the 

bottle of ecstasy when Wright opened the vehicle’s door 

and dropped the bottle on the ground, Wright’s admission 

that he had just come from “a club,” and Barren’s 

testimony about how ecstasy is packaged and sold and that 

it is “commonly referred to as club drugs.” We do not 

agree with the Commonwealth’s position. 

The evidence did not establish either that Jordan 

was aware of the character and presence of the ecstasy or 

that the ecstasy was under Jordan’s dominion and control. 

When Officer Kern stopped the vehicle, he observed only 

Wright making furtive movements. Wright admitted that he 

had been to “a club,” but he did not indicate that Jordan 
11

accompanied him to the club. Other than the roll of 

money, the search of the vehicle and of Jordan’s person 

did not reveal any other contraband or items associated 

with the distribution of controlled substances. Even 

though Jordan admitted the cash belonged to him, it was 

rolled sequentially according to denominations rather 

than in amounts corresponding to the price of an ecstasy 

pill. See Archer v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 416, 417, 303 

S.E.2d 863, 863 (1983) (“currency was grouped in amounts 

corresponding to the street price of a Preludin pill”). 

The Commonwealth argues on brief that the roll of 

cash was in denominations commonly used in drug 

transactions, but the record contains no such evidence. 

Admittedly, Jordan removed the money from the police 

vehicle, but he did so after Officer Kern told him the 

cash was evidence that would link him to the distribution 

of ecstasy. Thus, as the Commonwealth recognizes on 

brief, Jordan could have stolen the roll of cash in order 

to hamper the prosecution of the drug charge against him 

irrespective of whether the money represented proceeds 

from the sale of ecstasy. 

In sum, we conclude that the circumstantial evidence 

“at most, create[d] a mere suspicion. ‘Suspicion, 

however, no matter how strong, is insufficient to sustain 
12

a criminal conviction.’” Garland, 225 Va. at 184, 300 

S.E.2d at 785 (quoting Stover v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 

618, 624, 283 S.E.2d 194, 197 (1981)). Thus, we hold 

that the evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, 

to prove constructive possession of the ecstasy by 

Jordan. Upon consideration of all the evidence, a 

reasonable fact-finder could not have found Jordan guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Hudson, 265 Va. at 513, 

578 S.E.2d at 785. 

Turning now to Jordan’s conviction for obstructing 

justice, we again conclude that the evidence was 

insufficient to sustain the conviction under Code § 18.2-

460(C). Jordan was indicted for using threats of bodily 

harm or force knowingly to attempt to intimidate or 

impede a law-enforcement officer in the discharge of his 

duty “relating to a violation of or conspiracy to violate 

[Code] § 18.2-248 or [Code] § 18.2-248.1 (a)(3), (b) or 

(c) or any violent felony offense listed in subsection C 

of [Code] § 17.2-805.” See Washington v. Commonwealth, 

273 Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (this day decided) 

(discussing the elements of the offense set forth in Code 

§ 18.2-460(C)). We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ 

conclusion that Jordan’s act of removing the roll of cash 

from the police vehicle and his conduct in the 
13

magistrate’s office and during the intake process 

amounted to the use of force knowingly to attempt to 

impede Officer Kern in the discharge of his duties. 

In Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 505 

S.E.2d 388 (1998), the Court of Appeals stated that 

“obstruction of justice does not occur when a person 

fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the 

person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more 

difficult but does not impede or prevent the officer from 

performing that task.” Id. at 429, 505 S.E.2d at 389. 

That statement undermines the Court of Appeals’ decision 

in this case but is consistent with our explanation of 

what constitutes obstruction of justice: 

To constitute obstruction of an officer in 

the performance of his duty, it is not necessary 

that there be an actual or technical assault upon 

the officer, but there must be acts clearly 

indicating an intention on the part of the 

accused to prevent the officer from performing 

his duty, as to ‘obstruct’ ordinarily implies 

opposition or resistance by direct action and 

forcible or threatened means. It means to 

obstruct the officer himself not merely to oppose 

or impede the process with which the officer is 

armed. 

Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478–79, 126 S.E. 74, 

77 (1925) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 
14

Contrary to the Commonwealth’s argument, Jordan did 

not violate Code § 18.2-460(C) by removing the roll of 

cash from the police vehicle. Regardless of whether that 

action impeded Officer Kern in the discharge of his 

duties, it did not involve the use of force. The mere 

act of removing the roll of cash from its location 

between the seats in the police vehicle was not the type 

of “force” contemplated by Code § 18.2-460(C). See

Black’s Law Dictionary 673 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the 

term “force” as “[p]ower, violence, or pressure directed 

against a person or thing”). 

Similarly, we reject the Commonwealth’s argument 

that the evidence concerning Jordan’s conduct in the 

magistrate’s office and during the intake process was 

sufficient to sustain his conviction for obstructing 

justice. Unquestionably, Jordan was less than 

cooperative and his conduct rendered Officer Kern’s 

discharge of his duties more difficult, but Jordan’s 

conduct again did not involve the use of force. 

Furthermore, it did not impede or prevent Officer Kern 

from performing his tasks. See Jones, 141 Va. at 479, 

126 S.E. at 77 (throwing a bag of barley into a road in 

front of an officer’s vehicle did not obstruct the 
15

officer himself); Ruckman, 28 Va. App. at 429, 505 S.E.2d 

at 389. 

Thus, we conclude that the evidence was 

insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that Jordan 

obstructed justice in violation of Code § 18.2-460(C).3

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of 

the Court of Appeals and dismiss the indictments. 

Reversed and dismissed. 

 3

 In contrast to the situation in Washington v. 

Commonwealth, 273 Va. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___, there was 

evidence in this case that Officer Kern was discharging his 

duties “relating to a violation of [Code] § 18.2-248.” 

Code § 18.2-460(C). At the time Jordan allegedly 

obstructed justice, he had been charged with possession 

with the intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled 

substance.