FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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Case No. 5D23-0485 

LT Case No. 2020-CF-002169

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ANTWAN STAFFORD, 

Appellant, 

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Appellee. 

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. 

R. Anthony Salem, Judge.

Howard Sohn, of Law Office of Howard Sohn, Boynton Beach, for 

Appellant. 

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Daren Shippy, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 

February 2, 2024

PER CURIAM.

Antwan Stafford appeals the judgment and sentence entered 

against him following a jury trial. We find no error in the trial 

court’s admission of Williams1 rule evidence, nor do we find that 

1 Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959). 
2 

the court erred in denying Stafford’s motion for judgment of 

acquittal. Stafford’s remaining argument on appeal is that the 

State made numerous improper comments throughout the 

proceedings below which deprived him of his right to a fair trial. 

We agree. 

In 2020, Richard Giglio and Joseph Licandro, assistant state 

attorneys in the Fourth Judicial Circuit, prosecuted Stafford for 

trafficking in eutylone as well as several other related drug 

offenses. The record in this case is replete with instances where 

these prosecutors made highly improper comments to the jury—

starting with opening statement and continuing in closing 

argument. These comments included improperly personalizing the 

case and interjecting their personal opinions as to Stafford’s guilt;2

improperly bolstering the State’s evidence by reference to the 

police and judge;3 disparaging and mocking the defense;4 and 

2 The State told the jury, “[W]e see this stuff all the time. We 

see how these houses are run. We see how the defendants try to 

outschool the police. Now you see it.” See D’Ambrosio v. State, 736 

So. 2d 44, 48 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (holding it is improper for

prosecutor to give personal opinion as to guilt of accused); see also 

United States v. Bentley, 561 F.3d 803, 812 (8th Cir. 2009) 

(explaining prosecutor’s interjection of personal belief is improper 

when it suggests government has special knowledge of evidence 

not presented to jury, carries implied guarantee of truthfulness, or 

expresses personal opinion about credibility). 

3 “It did not take the police long to figure it out. It should not 

take us very long to figure it out either.” See Gonzalez v. State, 136 

So. 3d 1125, 1141 (Fla. 2014) (“Improper bolstering occurs when 

the State places the prestige of the government behind the witness 

or indicates that information not presented to the jury supports 

the witness’s testimony.” (quoting Williamson v. State, 994 So. 2d 

1000, 1013 (Fla. 2008))). 

4 “I guarantee if there was a print on that bag, the defense 

would be telling you, it just means he touched the bag at one point. 

Maybe he made a sandwich. Maybe he brought along some cold 

cuts and some pulled pork. He touched the bag and then someone 

else filled it with drugs. There is an explanation for everything.”
3 

insinuating that Stafford committed the unrelated and uncharged 

felony offense of money laundering.5 But as we will explain, the 

most egregious of the State’s improper comments was a blatant 

misuse of the otherwise properly admitted Williams rule evidence. 

The case against Stafford began in 2020 when law 

enforcement executed a search warrant at a home where Stafford 

resided. Drugs and related paraphernalia were found throughout 

the residence, the majority of which was located in hidden 

containers and cut-outs throughout the house. In 2019, less than a 

year earlier, law enforcement executed another search warrant on 

the same residence. Again, Stafford was found in the residence and 

drugs were found hidden throughout. The State declined to file 

charges against Stafford following the first warrant; however, they 

successfully argued to the trial court that evidence from that initial 

search should be admissible as Williams rule evidence relevant to 

show that Stafford had knowledge of the drugs found in 2020 and 

control of the house in which they were found. This Williams rule 

evidence was utilized by the State numerous times during trial, 

and each time the court instructed the jury that it should only 

consider the evidence from the 2019 search for the limited purpose 

of considering Stafford’s knowledge of the drugs, a material 

element of each charge for which Stafford was ultimately 

convicted. 

Despite the trial court’s directive, the prosecutors made 

repeated improper references to the 2019 case during closing 

argument, not to show knowledge but rather to convince the jury 

that Stafford was guilty of the same crime a year earlier. These 

improper comments included the statements that: (1) Stafford 

See D’Ambrosio, 736 So. 2d at 48 (holding prosecutor’s remarks 

that defense theory was a “sea of confusion” that defense counsel 

“prays you will get lost in” was improper attack of defense and 

defense counsel). 

5 See Brooks v. State, 868 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)

(holding it was improper for prosecutor to suggest defendant 

committed uncharged crime of unlawful possession of firearm by 

convicted felon).
4 

went to jail following the 2019 search but the arrest “changed 

nothing,” had “no effect on him” and that his drug trafficking was 

an “ongoing operation;” (2) the evidence from the 2019 search was 

admitted by the judge because it proved Stafford’s knowledge,

suggesting an endorsement of the evidence by the judge; and 

perhaps most egregious, the very last thing the jury heard from 

the State before retiring to deliberate was (3) Stafford “got away 

with it in 2019. Don’t let him get away with it in 2020.” 

The State correctly points out that these comments, even if 

improper, were not objected to by defense counsel.6 It is true that 

where a defendant does not object to improper comments made by 

the prosecutor during opening and closing arguments, any 

objection to those comments is unpreserved. Braddy v. State, 111 

So. 3d 810, 846 (Fla. 2012). “The general rule is that the failure to 

raise a contemporaneous objection to those comments constitutes 

a waiver of the right to claim error on appeal.” Davis v. State, 937 

So. 2d 273, 275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). “The sole exception to the 

general rule is where the unobjected-to comments rise to the level 

of fundamental error, which has been defined as error that ‘reaches 

down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict

of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of 

the alleged error.’” Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 898–99 (Fla. 

2000) (quoting McDonald v. State, 743 So. 2d 501, 505 (Fla. 1999)

(additional citations omitted)). “[W]here prejudicial conduct in its 

collective import is so extensive as to pervade the trial, a new trial 

should be awarded regardless of the want of an objection.” Silva v. 

Nightingale, 619 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (citation omitted).

Having determined that most, if not all, of the complained of 

comments were in fact improper and impermissible, we next must 

determine whether they rise to the level of fundamental error. 

“Fundamental error in closing argument occurs when the 

prejudicial conduct, in its collective import, is so extensive that its 

influence pervades the trial, gravely impairing a calm and 

dispassionate consideration of the evidence and the merits by the 

jury.” Capron v. State, 948 So. 2d 954, 956–57 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). 

6 Stafford’s appellate counsel was not his attorney in the trial 

proceedings. 
5 

Appellate courts are cautioned to exercise “very guardedly” our 

discretion when determining whether fundamental error has 

occurred, applying the doctrine only in rare cases. Fike v. State, 4 

So. 3d 734, 739 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). The improper comments in 

this case, considered collectively, and in light of both the evidence 

presented and the elements of each charge, pervaded the trial and

undermine our confidence in the jury’s verdict, leading us to 

conclude that the error is fundamental and that a new trial is 

warranted. We find the State’s reliance on the strength of the 

evidence presented at trial unpersuasive because the most 

egregious statements in closing argument inexcusably distorted 

the State’s most powerful evidence of guilt—the Williams rule 

evidence. 

While defense counsel’s failure to object to any of these 

statements is incomprehensible, prosecutors are nevertheless

required to “refrain from engaging in inflammatory and abusive 

arguments, to maintain their objectivity, and to behave in a 

professional manner.” Rodriguez v. State, 210 So. 3d 750, 756 (Fla. 

5th DCA 2017) (quoting Cardona v. State, 185 So. 3d 514, 516 (Fla. 

2016)). These prosecutors failed to meet that standard. 

REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial. 

EISNAUGLE, HARRIS, and MACIVER, JJ., concur. 

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331. 

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