[Cite as State v. Brown , 2018-Ohio-2267.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ROSS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, : Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 17CA3603

vs. : LARRY E. BROWN II, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Defendant-Appellee. :

_________________________________________________________________ APPEARANCES: Matthew S. Schmidt, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jeffrey C. Marks, Assistant Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, Ch illicothe, Ohio, for Appellant. Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Nikki Trautman Baszynski, Assistant State Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. 1

CRIMINAL CASE FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT DATE JOURNALIZED:6-6-18 ABELE, J. {¶1} This is an appeal from a Ross County Co mmon Pleas Court judgment that dismissed the indictment filed against Larry E. Brown II, defendant below and appellee herein. The State of Ohio, plaintiff below and appellant herei n, assigns the following errors for review:

i. ii.

1 Different counsel represented appellee during the trial court proceedings.ROSS, 17CA3603 2

iii. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

iv. “THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED THE APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS BY RETROACTIVELY APPLYING THE PROTECTIONS OF O.R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b) TO THIS OFFENDER, AS THE OFFENSE AT ISSUE OCCURRED APPROXIMATELY SIX (6) MONTHS PRIOR TO THE STATUTORY EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE PROTECTIONS AFFORDED OFFENDERS UNDER THE ABOVE LISTED STATUTE.”

v. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

vi. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED THE APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS BY FINDING THAT THE APPELLEE COMPLLIED [SIC] WITH O.R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b)(ii), BECAUSE NO EVIDENCE WAS OFFERED TO SHOW THE QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL OBTAINED A SCREENING AND RECEIVED A REFERRAL FOR TREATMENT FROM A COMMUNITY ADDICTION SERVICES PROVIDER OR A PROPERLY CREDENTIALED ADDICTION TREATMENT PROFESSIONAL WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF HIS OVERDOSE.”

vii. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

viii. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED THE APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS BY FINDING THAT THE APPELLEE COMPLIED WITH O.R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b)(iii), BECAUSE THE QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL DID NOT SUBMIT DOCUMENTATION TO THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY TO VERIFY THAT HE SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS OF O.R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(ii).” {¶2} On May 27, 2016, a Ross County Grand Jury returned an indictment that charged appellant with fifth-degr ee felony cocaine-possession, in violation of R.C. 2925.11. In September 2016, the General Assembly amende d the drug-possession statute, R.C. 2925.11, to generally grant immunity to a “qualified individual” who otherw ise could be charged with a misdemeanor- orROSS, 17CA3603 3

fifth-degree felony drug-possession offense. For immunity to attach, the individual must satisfy the statutory requirements. {¶3} On January 25, 2017, appellee filed a motion to dismiss the indictment and alleged that he is a qualified indivi dual who is immune from prosecution under R.C. 2925.11(B)(2). In particular, appellee asserted that on (1) March 15, 2016, he required medical assistance due to a drug overdose; (2) law enforcement officers obtained cocaine from his person as a result of appellee receiving that me dical assistance; (3) after emergenc y personnel revived him with Narcan, appellee consented to a search of his person; (4) during the se arch, law enforcement officers discovered a bag that contained a wh ite powdery substance that later testing revealed to be cocaine; and (5) within thirty days of needing medical assistance for his drug-overdose, he sought and obtained a screening and received a treatment-refe rral. Appellee alleged that on March 29, 2016, he entered a drug-treatment program thro ugh Pike County Recovery Council (PCRC). {¶4} Appellee thus contended th at he fulfilled the R.C. 2925.11(B)(2) requirements: (1) law enforcement officers obtained cocaine as a result of appellee experiencing an overdose and needing medical assistance; and (2) within thirty days of receiving medical assistance for his overdose, he sought and obtained a screening and received a treatment-referral. Appellee asserted that he is, therefore, immune under R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b). {¶5} In support of his motion, appellee attached a document from SelfRefind that states that on August 29, 2016, appellee entered a drug- addiction treatment pr ogram and that he continues to participate in the program. Appellee also included a document from PCRC that lists appellee’s dates of service. Appellee’s firs t date of service was December 15, 2015, but the document reflects no other services provide d to appellee until March 29, 2016. The documentROSS, 17CA3603 4

contains codes for the activities and procedures provided to appellee, but it does not reveal what

the codes mean. {¶6} On March 1, 2017, the trial court held a h earing to consider appellee’s motion to dismiss. At the hearing, the parties stipulat ed that on December 15, 2015, appellee received an assessment from PCRC, and that when he returned on March 29, 2016, he received treatment. The parties further stipulated that in Augu st 2016, appellee obtained an assessment through

SelfRefind and he has been in treatment since that time. {¶7} The trial court asked the parties whether R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b) applies when an

individual overdoses before the ef fective date of the statute, as appellee did. The prosecutor responded:

i. I think that it does in this particul ar case because when you look at (B)(2)(b) of 2925.11, it says that a qualified individual shall not be arrested, charged, prosecuted, or c onvicted or penalized. So I think at least those last two or the last three sections apply to him being convicted or penalized, even though the act itself had occurred prior to the effective date of the [statute]. The prosecutor asserted, however, that appellee did not satisfy the conditions listed in the statute to be entitled to immunity. The prosecutor agreed that appellee met the first condition, i.e., that the cocaine was obtained as a result of receiving medical assistance. However, the prosecutor did not agree that appellee met the second condition, i.e ., that he sought and obtained a screening and received a treatment-referral within thirty days of receiving medical assistance. The prosecutor asserted that appellee received “an assessment” three months before his overdose and then “appeared for treatment” two weeks after his over dose. The prosecutor contended that receiving

an assessment three months before an overdose a nd entering a treatment program within thirty days after the overdose does not satisfy the second condition listed in the statute. The prosecutorROSS, 17CA3603 5

asserted that the statute instead requires the individual to receive an assessment within thirty days after seeking or obtaining medical assistance, an d that the statute does not include conduct that

occurred before the individual seeks or obtains medical assistance. {¶8} Appellee argued that he “went above and beyond what was required of him by the statute.” He has undergone trea tment, and he has followed-up w ith that treatment. Appellee recognized that PCRC completed an assessment three months before his overdose. He further asserted, however, that two weeks after his ove rdose, he returned to PCRC, “sign[ed] up, [obtained] a treatment plan and [went] to trea tment.” Appellee contende d that he “clearly had some type of plan formed once he re-establishe[d his] relationship” with PCRC. Appellee alleged that his re-entry three months after his initial assessment sufficiently illustrates that PCRC screened him and that his subsequent treatment shows that PCRC referred him for treatment. Appellee also claimed that even though he completed an asse ssment three months before his overdose, he returned to PCRC within thirty da ys of his overdose and that his re turn to treatment shows that he sought and obtained a screening and received a treatment-referral. {¶9} The trial court noted that the statute doe s not define the type of screening or assessment an individual must undergo. The cour t believed, however, that an individual “receives an assessment every time he goes for counseling, b ecause they assess where he is in his addiction and they assess what they need to do at that hearing or at that meeting, and what’s going to happen

to him down the road.” The court further believed that it would be “absurd” to read the statute so as to give immunity to an individual who seeks and obtains a screening and treatment-referral and who does not actually engage in a treatment progra m, but to deny immunity to an individual whoROSS, 17CA3603 6

obtained a screening and treatment-referral before the overdose that resulted in medical assistance and then actually engages in treatment after the overdose. {¶10} The trial court thus granted appellee’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The court noted that, even though appellee did not undergo an evaluation within thirty days, he had received

one earlier. The court further found “that as part of ongoing treatment being received an assessment would be completed within the specified time.” This appeal followed.

I {¶11} Appellant’s three assignments of error all challenge the trial court’s decision to grant appellee’s motion to dismiss the indictment. For ease of discussion, we first set forth the applicable standard of review. {¶12} Generally, appellate courts conduct a de novo review of a trial court’s decision regarding a motion to dismiss an indictment. State v. Wheatley , 2018-Ohio-464, 94 N.E.3d 578, ¶5 (4th Dist.); State v. Kirk , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104866, 2016-Ohio-8296, 2016 WL 7496605, ¶4; State v. Anderson , 148 Ohio St.3d 74, 2016-Ohio-5791, 68 N. E.3d 790, ¶20 (“Appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review when reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on the grounds of double jeopardy.”); State v. Workman , 4th Dist. Athens No. 14CA25, 2015-Ohio-4483, 2015 WL 6549290, ¶9. Accordingly, an appellate court does not defer to a trial court’s decision, but instead indepe ndently determines whether the tr ial court’s decision is legally

correct. Wheatley at ¶5.

II {¶13} In its first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by granting appellee’s motion to dismiss the indictment. Specifically, appellant contends that the trial courtROSS, 17CA3603 7

erred by determining that R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b) a pplies retroactively so as to render appellee immune from prosecution for a minor drug-possession offense. Appellant claims that the General Assembly did not expressly indicate that the stat ute applies retroactively, and thus, the statute applies prospectively only. {¶14} Appellee points out, however, that during th e trial court procee dings, appellant expressly agreed that R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b) applies retroactively. Appellee thus contends that appellant forfeited the right to argue that R. C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b) applies prospectively only, or alternatively, that appellant invited any error that the trial court may have committed by applying the statute to appellee’s situation. {¶15} We agree with appellee that appellant invited any error that the trial court may have committed by applying R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b). Our re view of the record reveals that during the hearing, the court specifically questioned the parties whether the statute applied to appellee, who

had overdosed and entered treatment before the effective date of the statute. Appellant asserted that the statute indeed applies to appellee and did not give any indication that it believed the statute could apply prospectively only. Under these circ umstances, we believe that appellant invited any error that may have occurred. See State ex rel. Kline v. Carroll , 96 Ohio St.3d 404, 2002–Ohio– 4849, 775 N.E.2d 517, ¶27 (“Under [the invited-error] doctrine, a party is not entitled to take advantage of an error that he himself invited or induced the court to make”). {¶16} We additionally recognize that appellant argues that the trial court plainly erred by applying the statute to appellee. The invited-e rror doctrine is not, however, rendered inapplicable when a party claims plain error:

i. While invocation of the plain error doctrine is often justified in order to promote public confidence in the judicial process, “[it is doubtfulROSS, 17CA3603 8

that] the public’s confidence in the jury system is undermined by requiring parties to live with the results of errors that they invited, even if the errors go to ‘crucial matters.’ In fact, the idea that parties must bear the cost of their own mistakes at trial is a central presupposition of our adversarial system of justice.” Goldfuss v. Davidson , 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121–122, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997), quoting Montalvo v. Lapez , 77 Hawaii 282, 305, 884 P.2d 345, 368 (1994)(Nakayama, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Rohrbaugh , 126 Ohio St.3d 421, 2010–Ohio–3286, 934 N.E.2d 920, ¶10 (stating that even plain error is waived when error is invited). Thus, even if the trial court arguably erred by applying R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b), a ppellant cannot take advantage of a plain error

that it invited. 2 {¶17} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant’s first assignment of error.

III {¶18} Appellant’s second and third a ssignments of error challenge the trial court’s finding that appellee’s conduct following his overdose satisfied the R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b)(ii) and (iii) requirements. For ease of discu ssion, we consider the two assignme nts of error together. {¶19} In its second assignment of error, appellant contends th at appellee did not present any evidence that he obtained a screening and received a treatment-referral within thirty days of receiving medical attention for his overdose. Instead, appellant asserts that the evidence shows that appellee received a screening and treatment-referral more than three months before his

2 Assuming, arguendo, appellant had not invited any error, we rece ntly determined that R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b) may apply to indivi duals who committed the minor drug possession offense before the amendment’s effective date. State v. Simmons , 4

th Dist. Washington No. 17CA16, 2018-Ohio------.ROSS, 17CA3603 9

overdose. Appellant thus claims that appellee’ s pre-overdose screening and treatment-referral do not satisfy the plain language of the statute. {¶20} Appellant recognizes that appellee entered treatment within thirty days of his overdose. Appellant further charges, however, that obtaining treatment within thirty days of the overdose without also presenting evidence that th e individual received a screening and treatmentreferral within that same time period does not satisfy the plain language of the statute. {¶21} Appellee asserts that the documents he presented permitted the trial court to “reasonably infer[]” that appellant received a sc reening and treatment-referral. Appellee further contends that the trial court interpreted the “screening” requirement so as to avoid an “absurd” result: an individual who actually engages in treatment following an overdose would not be entitled to immunity under R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b), but an i ndividual who seeks and obtains a screening and treatment-referral without engaging in trea tment would be entitled to immunity. Appellee argues that the trial court had “discretion to interpret the ‘screening’ and ‘referral for treatment’ condition broadly so that evidence of a more on erous task–actual participation in treatment–

satisfied it.” {¶22} In its third assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred by concluding that appellee satisfied R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b)(iii). Appella nt asserts that appellee did not present documentation to verify that he obtaine d a screening or treatment-referral within thirty days of his overdose. Instead, appellant argues, appellee submitted a document that shows he

obtained a treatment-referral three months before his overdose. {¶23} Appellee contends that a ppellant’s failure to reque st that he produce written documentation to show that he sought and obtaine d a screening and received a treatment-referralROSS, 17CA3603 10

means that the trial court could make reasonable inferences from the evidence appellee presented

with his motion to dismiss. {¶24} After appellee’s indictme nt, the General Assembly amended R.C. 2925.11. The amendment added R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b), which gran ts immunity to “a qualified individual.” See R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(f) (describing R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b) as granting immunity). More specifically, the statute provides: {¶25} [A] qualified individual sha ll not be arrested, charge d, prosecuted, convicted, or penalized pursuant to this chapter for a minor drug possession offense if all of the following apply: (I) The evidence of the obtaining, possession, or use of the controlled substance or controlled substance analog that would be the basis of the offense was obtained as a result of the qualified individual seeking the medical assistance or experiencing an overdose and needing medical assistance. ii. (ii) Subject to division (B)(2)(g) of this section, within thirty days after seeking or obtaining the medical assistance, the qualified individual seeks and obtains a scr eening and receives a referral for treatment from a community addi ction services provider or a properly credentialed addicti on treatment professional. iii. (iii) Subject to division (B)(2)(g) of this section, the qualified individual who obtains a screen ing and receives a referral for treatment under division (B)(2)(b)(ii) of this section, upon the request of any prosecuting attorney, submits documentation to the prosecuting attorney that verifi es that the qualified individual satisfied the requirements of th at division. The documentation shall be limited to the date and time of the screening obtained and referral received. {¶26} A “’[q]ualified individual’ means a person who is not on community control or postrelease control and is * * * a person who expe riences a drug overdose and who seeks medical assistance for that overdose.” R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)( a)(viii). A “‘[m]inor drug possession offense’ROSS, 17CA3603 11

means a violation of this section that is a misdem eanor or a felony of the fifth degree.” R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(a)(iv). {¶27} In the case sub judice, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by determining that appellee (1) within thirty days after he receive d medical treatment for his overdose, sought and obtained “a screening and receive[d] a referral fo r treatment,” and (2) “s ubmit[ted] documentation to the prosecuting attorney that verifies that [appellee] satisfied the requirements of [R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(ii)].” Appellant claims that appellee’s re-entry in to a treatment program after being assessed three months earlier does not satisfy the “screening” requirement. {¶28} Appellee, on the other hand, argues that the trial court app lied an appropriate interpretation of the term “scree ning” and found that appellant’s re -entry into treatment on March 29, 2016, would have involved additi onal screening and treatment-referr al. Resolving the parties’ dispute requires us to consider the meaning of the terms “screening” and “referral to treatment” as used in R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b). {¶29} A court that is ascertaining the meaning of a statute first must “consider the ‘plain meaning of the statutory language.’” State v. D.B. , 150 Ohio St.3d 452, 2017-Ohio-6952, 82 N.E.3d 1162, ¶10, quoting Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 106, 2006-Ohio954, 846 N.E.2d 478, ¶52. “If that language is ‘ unambiguous and definite ,’ we apply it ‘in a manner consistent with the plain mean ing of the statutory language.’” Id. , quoting State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 9. Accordingly, a court’s first step when considering the meaning of a statute “is always to determine whether the statute is ‘plain and unambiguous.’” Jacobson v. Kaforey , 149 Ohio St.3d 398, 2016-Ohio-8434, 75 N.E.3d 203, quoting State v. Hurd , 89 Ohio St.3d 616, 618, 734 N.E.2d 365 (2000); see also State ex rel.ROSS, 17CA3603 12

Cordray v. Midway Motor Sales, Inc. , 122 Ohio St.3d 234, 2009-Ohio-2610, 910 N.E.2d 432, ¶15, quoting Slingluff v. Weaver , 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus (stating that if words used in statute “‘be fre e from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and distinctly, the sense of the law-making body, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation’”). “‘If [the statute] is not ambiguous, then we need not interpret it; we must simply apply it.’” Wilson v. Lawrence , 150 Ohio St.3d 368, 2017-Ohio-1410, 81 N.E.3d 1242, ¶11, quoting State v. Hairston , 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶13. When the language used in a statute “‘is plai n and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what the General Assembly has said.’” Id. , quoting Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc. , 98 Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-1099, 784 N.E.2d 1172, ¶12, citing Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth , 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000). Additionally, courts must “give effect only to the words the legislature used, making neither additions to, nor deletions from, the statutory language.” Id. , citing Columbia Gas Transm. Corp.

v. Levin , 117 Ohio St.3d 122, 2008-Ohio-511, 882 N.E.2d 400, ¶19. Furthermore, “‘[t]he interpretation of statutes and admin istrative rules should follow the principle that neither is to be construed in any way other than as the words demand.’” State ex rel. Baroni v. Colletti , 130 Ohio St.3d 208, 2011-Ohio-5351, 957 N.E.2d 13, ¶18, quoting Morning View Care Ctr.–Fulton v. Ohio Dept. of Human Servs. , 148 Ohio App.3d 518, 2002-Ohio-2878, 774 N.E.2d 300, ¶36 (10th Dist.). {¶30} Consequently, when interpreting a statute, c ourts first look to the text of the rule, “reading words and phrases in context and construing them according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey , 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶21. When, however, a legislative “def inition is available, we construe the wordsROSS, 17CA3603 13

of the statute accordingly.” State v. Gonzales , 150 Ohio St.3d 276, 2017-Ohio-777, 81 N.E.3d 419, ¶4, citing R.C. 1.42; accord Stewart v. Vivian , 151 Ohio St.3d 574, 2017-Ohio-7526, 91 N.E.3d 716, ¶25. Additionally, “[w]ords and phrases that have acquired a t echnical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly.” R.C. 1.42; accord State ex rel. Natl. Lime & St one Co. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 2017-Ohio-8348, 2017 WL 4990584, ¶14; Hoffman v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio , 113 Ohio St.3d 376, 2007-Ohio-2201, 865 N.E.2d 1259, ¶26; State v. Reyes-Rosales , 4th Dist. Adams No. 15CA1010, 2016-Ohio-3338, 2016 WL 3216241, ¶21. Terms that are not statutor ily-defined or that have not acquired a technical or particular meaning “are acco rded their common, everyday meaning.” Stewart at ¶25, citing R.C. 1.42. {¶31} In general, a statute is ambiguous when th e language “is ‘capable of bearing more than one meaning.’” Jacobson at ¶8, quoting Dunbar v. State , 136 Ohio St.3d 181, 2013-Ohio2163, 992 N.E.2d 1111, ¶16; see Dana Corp. v. Testa, Tax Commr. , — Ohio St.3d —, 2018-Ohio-1561, — N.E.3d. —, ¶23, quoting Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Bowers , 173 Ohio St. 74, 77, 179 N.E.2d 915 (1962) (explaining that ambiguity may result not only from “‘the indefiniteness of the meaning of a word or phrase,’” but also “ from a word or phrase that by itself is ‘perfectly clear in its meaning’ but that becomes ‘clouded with obscurity when considered in relation to other words in a statement containing the word or phrase’”). A court that is reviewing a statute for ambiguity should direct its “‘attention * * * beyo nd single phrases, and * * * should consider, in proper context, all words used by the General Asse mbly in drafting [the relevant statute] with a view to its place in the overall [statutory] scheme.’” Gonzales at ¶5, quoting D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo–Lucas Cty. Bd. of Health , 96 Ohio St.3d 250, 2002-Ohio-4172, 773 N.E.2d 536, ¶19.ROSS, 17CA3603 14

“When the language of a statute is ambiguous, we resort to the rule s of construction to discern its meaning.” Turner v. Hooks , — Ohio St.3d —, 2018-Ohio-556, — N.E.3d —, ¶10, citing Cline v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles , 61 Ohio St.3d 93, 96, 573 N.E.2d 77 (1991). “Without ‘an initial finding’ of ambiguity, ‘inquiry into legislative intent, legislative history, public policy, the consequences of an interpretation, or any other fa ctors identified in R.C. 1.49 is inappropriate.’”

Jacobson at ¶8, quoting Dunbar at ¶16. {¶32} In the case sub judice, the General Assembly did not define the terms “screening” or “referral to treatment.” We therefore “first consider the dictionary definition of the term[s].”

Stewart at ¶26. {¶33} The dictionary definition of “screening” doe s not yield a satisfactory meaning of the word as used within R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b)(ii). Merriam-Webster’s Di ctionary offers the following four definitions of “screening”: (1) “the act or process of one that screens”; (2) “material (such as waste or fine coal) separated out by means of a screen”; (3) “metal or plastic mesh (as for window screens)”; and (4) “a showing of a motion picture.” https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/screening. The term “screen” includes “a system for examining and separating into different groups.” https:// www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/screens. Reading these definitions together suggests that “screening,” as used in R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b)(ii), could mean the act or process of examining an d separating into different groups. We do not believe, however, that this definition fully explains the meaning of “screening” as used in R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b)(ii). Instead, we believe that the word “screening,” in addition to the phrase “referral to treatment,” is a term of art commonly used in the field of substance abuse treatment services. We therefore believe that the terms “screening” and “referral to treatment” as used inROSS, 17CA3603 15

R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b) have acquired technical or pa rticular meanings that we should employ to ascertain the meaning of the statute. {¶34} The United States Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and

Mental Health Services Administr ation, Center for Substance Abus e Treatment, has issued several publications regarding substance abuse that offer insight into the meaning of the terms “screening” and “referral to treatment” as used in R.C. 2925.11(B) (2)(b)(ii). As used in the field of substance abuse services, “screening” generally means a process of identifying patients with possible substance misuse or abuse problems and determining the appropriate course of future action for these individuals. The screening process does not exactly identify what kind of problem a person might have or how serious it migh t be; screening simply determines whether a problem exists or whether further assessment is needed. Systems-Level Implementation of Screening, Br ief Intervention, and Referral to Treatment,

Technical Assistance Publi cation (TAP) Series 33, HHS P ublication No. (SMA) 13-4741, Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental H ealth Services Adminis tration (2013), 8 (“TAP 33"), available at https://store.sam hsa.gov/shin/content//SMA13-4741/TAP33.pdf. {¶35} While screening aims to identify individuals with possible substance abuse issues, [t]he primary goals of referral to treatment (RT) are to identify an appropriate treatment program and to facilitate engagement of the patient in treatment. RT can be a complex process involving coordination across different types of services. It requires a proactive and collaborative effort between SBIRT [Screening, Brief Intervention, and Referral to Treatment] pr oviders and those providing specialty treatment to ensure that a patient, once re ferred, has access to and engages in the appropriate level of care. To facilitate patient engagement, SBIRT providers may use motivational enhancemen t techniques to help patie nts with any ambivalence toward treatment, provide tr ansportation to intake a ppointments, follow up with patients after an appointment , and maintain contact with the specialty treatment provider.

Id. at 9.ROSS, 17CA3603 16

{¶36} In the case at bar, the parties also appear to have used the term “assessment” synonymously with “screening.” “Assessment” generally means [a] process for defining the nature of a problem and developing specific treatment recommendations for addressing the probl em. A basic assessment consists of gathering key information and engaging in a process with the client that enables the counselor to understand the client’s readiness for change, problem areas, any diagnosis(es), disabilities, and strengths. The assessment process typically requires trained professionals to administer and interpret results, based on their experience and training.

Center for Substance Abuse Treatment. Substanc e Abuse Treatment for Adults in the Criminal Justice System. Treatment Improvement Protocol (TIP) Series 44. HHS Publication No. (SMA) 13-4056. Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Ad ministration (2005), 8 (“TIP 44"), available at https://store.s amhsa.gov/shin/content//SMA13-4056/SMA13-4056.pdf. {¶37} Thus, [s]creening differs from assessment in the following ways: i. Screening is a process for evaluating the possible presence of a particular problem. The outcome is normally a simple yes or no. ii. Assessment is a process for defini ng the nature of that problem, determining a diagnosis, and de veloping specific treatment recommendations for addressing the problem or diagnosis.

of Women, Treatment Im provement Protocol (TIP) Series, No. 51

Center for Substance Abuse Treatment, Substance Abuse a nd Mental Health Services Administration (2009), 58 (“TIP 51"), ava ilable at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov /books/NBK83252/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK83252.pdf/. {¶38} Furthermore, “[s]creening and assessment are not single events but continuous processes that can be repeated by a variety of prof essionals in a variety of settings.” TIP 44 at 14. Thus, “[s]creening can be repeated at interv als, as needed.” TAP 33 at 10. Likewise,ROSS, 17CA3603 17

“[a]ssessment should be a fluid process throughout treatment. It is not a once-and-done event. Considering the complexity of withdrawal and the potential influence of alcohol and drugs on physical and psychological functioning, it is very im portant to reevaluate as the client engages into recovery.” TIP 51 at 75. “Another key re ason for conducting multiple screenings and assessments over time is that previous information obtained may become outdated and may not

include recent events that are relevant to treatme nt, such as relapse episodes, undetected mental disorders, or domestic violence.” TIP 44 at 16. {¶39} After considering the foregoing definitions, we believe that the term “screening” as used in R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b) means the “process of identifying patients with possible substance misuse or abuse problems and dete rmining the appropriate course of future action for these individuals.” The phrase “referral to treatment” means the process that identifies an appropriate treatment program and facilitates patient engagement. Therefore, we believe that the plain language of the statute requires a qualified individua l to seek and undergo, within thirty days of seeking medical assistance for a drug overdose, a “process” to identify possible substance misuse or abuse problems and to deter mine the appropriate course of future action. In addition, the

individual must receive a treatme nt-referral, which involves identif ying an appropriate treatment program and facilitating pa tient engagement. Although the pa rties appear to use the terms “screening” and “assessment” interchangeably, we point out that the published literature indicates that the terms are not synonymous. {¶40} Having defined the terms used in R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b)(ii), we now can determine whether the trial court correctly concluded that appellant sought and obtained a screening and treatment-referral within the thirty-day window. The evidence appellee submitted shows that heROSS, 17CA3603 18

received services at PCRC on December 15, 2015, a nd that his next service did not occur until March 29, 2016. The documentary evidence does not reveal what type of services appellee received during his visits to PCRC. The partie s stipulated, however, that appellee received an “assessment” on December 15, 2015, and that he began a treatment prog ram on March 29, 2016. The trial court found it logical to conclude that when appellee began the treatment program on March 29, 2016, PCRC would have administered a sc reening and would have referred appellee to treatment; otherwise, PCRC would not have admitted appellee into a treatment program. The trial

court believed that given the three-month interval between appellee’s December 2015 “assessment” and his March 2016 treatment, PCRC lik ely re-screened and re-referred appellee to treatment, assuming that is what P CRC had, in fact, done in December 2015. {¶41} The technical meanings of “screening” and “referral to treatment” appear to support the trial court’s conclusions. The literature indicates that a person may undergo more than one screening to account for lapses in time, relapses, ov erdoses, etc. This is precisely what happened to appellee. He visited PCRC in December 2015. Three months elapsed without any evidence that appellee engaged in treatment. He then overdosed. Two weeks later, he returned to PCRC. Given this set of circumstances, we do not find the trial court’s conclusion that appellee satisfied the screening and treatment-referral requirements to be unreasonable or contrary to the plain language of the statute, 3 especially when appellant never requested appellee to submit written documentation to verify the screenin g and treatment-referral requirements. 4

3 The parties have not fully developed argume nts concerning the standard of review that appellate courts should apply to evaluat e a trial court’s screening and treatment-referral findings. We therefore do not address the issue at this time.

4 We observe that the trial court also applied the “absurd-result” rule.[Cite as State v. Brown , 2018-Ohio-2267.]

“The absurd result principle in statut ory interpretation provides an exceptio n to the rule that a statute should be interpreted according to its plain meaning.” (Emphasis a dded.) Dougherty, Absurdity an d the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpre tation, 44 Am.U.L.Rev. 127 (1994). It is premised on a guiding principle of statutory construction: that when the General Assembly enacts a statute, it does not intend to produce an absurd result. See R.C. 1.47(C).

State ex rel. Clay v. Cuyahoga Cty. Med. Examiner’s Office , 152 Ohio St.3d 163, 2017-Ohio-8714, 94 N.E.3d 498, ¶22.

The absurd-result exception to the plain-meaning rule of construction “entails the imputation of legislative intent based on the judge’s perception” and “vastly ex pands the [c]ourt’s authorit y.” Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv.L.Rev. 2387, 2476 (2003). Therefore, all courts should exercise restraint in the application of the absurd-result exception, employing it in only those cases in which the plain language of a statute results in an obviously unintended result. Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Inte rpretation of Legal Texts 23 9 (2012) (“The doctrine of absurdity is meant to correct obvious unintended dispositions, not to revise purposeful dispositions that, in light of other provisions of the applicable code, make little if any sense”).

Id.

at ¶26 (2017). In the case sub judice, we do not believe that the plain language of the statute leads to an obviously unintended result. We therefore need not consider the absurd-results rule.[Cite as State v. Brown , 2018-Ohio-2267.] {¶42} With respect to appellant’s assertion that the trial court improperly concluded that appellee complied with R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b)(iii )’s requirement to submit documentation verifying the screening and treatment-referral requirements, the statut e plainly requires the prosecuting attorney to make a request for verifi cation. In the case sub judice, the trial court specifically found that appellant never made any request. Thus, according to the plain meaning of the statute, appellee did not have a duty to submit documentation verifying the requirements. {¶43} Finally, we find it appropriate to note:

i. Because our role as members of the judiciary is not “‘to establish legislative policies or to sec ond-guess the General Assembly’s policy choices,’” Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C. , 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-1029, 927 N.E.2d 1092, ¶ 35, quoting Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 212, or to declare that the General Assembly by way of inadve rtence or inattention made a slip of the pen in an attempt to rewrite the statute in a manner that is pleasing to us, we must adhere to th e plain language of the statute. If after reflection on our decision, the General Assembly finds that its original intention was not accomplished in the words that it chose, then it, and it alone, has the constitutional authority to amend the statute to conform to its intention. State ex rel. Clay v. Cuyahoga Cty. Med. Examiner’s Office , 152 Ohio St.3d 163, 2017-Ohio-8714, 94 N.E.3d 498, ¶40. {¶44} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant’s second and third assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.[Cite as State v. Brown , 2018-Ohio-2267.] JUDGMENT ENTRY It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that appellee recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.

The Court finds there were reas onable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. If a stay of execution of sentence and releas e upon bail has been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continue d stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuan t to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if th e Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appella te Procedure. Hoover, P.J. & Harsha, J.: C oncur in Judgment & Opinion

For the Court

BY: Peter B. Abele, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this documen t constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.