# United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________
No. 15-1716

___________________________
United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.
John Ways, Jr., also known as John Blacksteel

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the District of Nebraska - Omaha

____________ Submitted: February 12, 2016 Filed: August 11, 2016

____________ Before SHEPHERD, BEAM, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________ KELLY, Circuit Judge.

John Ways appeals from his convic tions for conspiracy to sell drug paraphernalia, conspiracy to distribute Sc hedule I controlled substances, conspiracy to commit money laundering, a nd being a felon in possessi on of ammunition, as well as the associated forfeiture. Upon careful consideration of the issues presented, we

reverse Ways’ conviction for being a felon in possession of ammunition and otherwise affirm the judgment of the district court.I. Background

This case stems from Ways’ operation of f our shops in Iowa and Nebraska. The shops were called Exotica, and were lo cated in Sioux City, Council Bluffs, and Omaha. The Exotica stores were what are commonly referred to as “head shops.” 1 Ways’ stores typically 2 had two separate areas—for ex ample, the Sioux City shop had a main floor, accessible from th e street, and a basement ar ea. The main area of the stores offered clothing, posters, tobacco products, knickknacks, and other novelties for sale. The second, less accessible area (usu ally the basement or a back room) was referred to as the “pipe room ,” and had display cases offe ring various pipes and other drug paraphernalia for sale. Before a custom er was allowed to enter the pipe room, they were required to provide identificati on and read a list of words that were not permitted to be used in the store. The list of prohibited words included a variety of common slang terms for drugs and drug paraphernalia, su ch as “bong” and “meth pipe.” Various substances were also ava ilable for purchase. If the substances were legal, they were sold for hum an consumption; but if they were controlled substances, they were sold under such names as “glass cleaner” or “herbal in cense.” For example, when the substance K2, a synthetic cannabi noid, was criminalized, Ways continued to sell it in his shops under the label “aroma therapy” or “herbal incense.” This and other “herbal incenses” sold at Ways’ shops ranged in price from approximately $40–$100 per gram.

Focusing on the drug paraphern alia and the substances sold there, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) be gan an investigation into Ways’ Exotica shops. The investigation included severa l purchases made by undercover ATF agents between April and September 2012, as we ll as several controlled buys made by a

1 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines head shop as “a shop specializing in articles (as ha shish pipes and roach clips) of interest to drug users.”

2 The Council Bluffs store apparently had only one room.

-2-cooperating informant between May and August 2012. Based in part on the evidence gathered during these buys, on September 13, 2012, search warrants were executed on Ways’ four shops as well as at his resi dence. Officers seized various items of paraphernalia, substances offe red for sale, computers, m oney, and financial records from the shops. At Ways’ residence, officers seized forty boxes of 5 .56 milli meter (.223 caliber) ammunition. A second set of search warrants was executed on December 21, 2012. Again, officers sei zed paraphernalia including pipes, bongs, scales, grinders, and concealment containers, as well as financial records, money, and substances offered for sale.

Ways was ultimately charged with cons piracy to sell drug paraphernalia (Count 1), conspiracy to distribute Schedule I controlled substances (Count 2), 3 conspiracy to commit money launderi ng (Count 3), and being a felon in possession of ammunition (Count 4). The superseding indictment also included a forfeiture allegation. After his indictment, Ways moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the September a nd December search warrants, arguing that the warrants were not supported by probable cause. The district court denied Ways’ motion, and the case proceeded to trial.

After a 13-day trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty against Ways on all counts. The jury also returned a verdict of forfeiture. The pr operty forfeited included

3 The drugs were identified in the superseding indictment as 3,4- methylenedioxypyrovalerone (MDPV), 3,4-methylenedioxy-N-methcathinone (Methylone), 1-pentyl-3-(4-met hl-1-naphthoyl)indole (JWH-122), 1-pentyl-3-(2-methoxyphenylacetyl)indole (JWH-250), 1-pentyl-3-(1-naphthoyl)indole (JWH-018), 1-pentyl-3-(2-chlorophenylacetyl)indole (JWH-203), and 1-(5-fluoropentyl)-3-(1-n aphthoyl)indole (AM2201). MDPV and Methylone are hallucinogenic substances , and JWH-122, JWH-250, JWH-018, JWH203, and AM2201 are cannabimimetic agen ts. All are Schedule I controlled substances. 2 1 U.S.C. § 812 (MDPV, JWH-122, JWH- 250, JWH-018, JWH-203, AM2201); 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (Methylone).

-3-money seized from Ways’ shops and his bank accounts, drug paraphernalia, ammunition and gun safes, two vehicles , and various computers and computer equipment. On December 31, 2014, the district court entered a preliminary order of forfeiture. On Marc h 27, 2014, the district court sentenced Ways to 36 months’ imprisonment on Count I of the indictment, 180 months’ imprisonment on Counts II and III, respectively, and 120 months’ imprisonment on Count IV, all to run concurrently. Judgment, including a fi nal order of forfeitu re, was entered on March 30, 2014. On appeal, Wa ys challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, asserts that there was insu fficient evidence to support his conviction on all four charges, and argues that the forfeiture of his property was not supported by sufficient evidence. 4 We address each issue in turn.

II. Motion to Suppress

Ways asserts that the search warrants 5 in this case were not supported by probable cause, and that the district cour t therefore erred in denying his motion to suppress. In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review legal conclusions de novo and factual determinations for clear error. United States v. Ingram , 594 F.3d 972, 976 (8th Cir. 2010). Ways argues first that the warrants were defective because some of the informati on in the affidavits supporting the warrants was provided by an insufficiently reliable in formant. Whether an affidavit provides probable cause for issuance of a search warra nt is determined based on the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Gladney , 48 F.3d 309, 312 (8th Cir. 1995). The totality of the circumstances includes “the veracity and basis of knowledge” of

4 We note that Ways filed a supplemental pro se appeal brief, as well as a supplemental addendum and a pro se 28(j) le tter. We have revi ewed and considered all pro se filings in resolving this appeal.

5 Nineteen different warrants were issued and executed in this case, eleven in September and eight in Decembe r. Ways draws no distinc tions between the individual warrants in challenging their validity, l eaving us to treat them collectively.

-4-informants, id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (internal quotations omitted)), and “[ w]here probable cause depends upon information supplied by an informant, ‘[t]he core question . . . is whether the information is reliable.’” United States v. Keys , 721 F.3d 512, 518 (8th Cir. 2013) (second two alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Williams , 10 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993)). Among other things, independent corrobora tion may demonstrate an informant’s reliability. See id.

Here, ATF agent Paul White completed an affidavit in support of each warrant application. The relevant affidavits stated that an informant had been used to conduct controlled buys of suspected illegal subs tances from Ways’ shops. The affidavits further stated that the informant had “been used extensively” by ATF and the Omaha Police Department “for a period of severa l years and has always been considered reliable.” More importantly, the affidavits stated that White and other ATF agents had also made undercover buys from Ways’ shops, and described the parallel financial investigation into Ways and his businesses. The affidavits stated that the financial investigation revealed large deposits into several personal and business accounts, and that an ATF investigator had determined that checks drawn on those accounts were written to sellers of drug paraphernalia.

The district court concluded that the a ffidavits were sufficient to establish probable cause, and we agree. The cour t found that the informant had provided reliable information in the past, that the information given in this case was corroborated by the undercover buys made by ATF agents, and that the evidence gathered through the buys was corroborated by the financial investigation. These factual determinations are not clearly e rroneous, and support the conclusion that the affidavits provided probable cause in support of the warrants. Ways’ argument to the contrary essentially amounts to an attack on the informant’s credibility; he notes that the informant had been previously convicted of felony offenses, and had served as an informant on prior occasions to “work off” criminal charges. While the credibility of

-5-the informant is an appropriate factor to consider, simply argui ng that the informant is not credible is insufficient to render the district court’s factual determinations clearly erroneous. See Gladney , 48 F.3d at 313 (“When an informant’s information is at least partly corroborated, as it was in the instant case, ‘attacks upon credibility and reliability are not crucial to the fi nding of probable cause.’” (quoting United States v. Humphreys , 982 F.2d 254, 259 (8th Cir. 1992))).

Second, Ways argues that the search warrants were defective because the controlled substances he was charged with distributing were not defined as Schedule I drugs until October 1, 2012—after the c ontrolled buys took place and the warrants were issued. Therefore, he argues, there could have b een no probable cause to believe that illegal activity was occurring at the time the warrants were app lied for and issued. Ways’ argument turns on the effective date of the Synthetic Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 (SDAPA). SDAPA was intended to combat the rising use of synthetic drugs and, in part, amended the statutor y drug schedules codified at 21 U.S.C. § 812 to add certain synthetic drugs to Schedule I. Among the synthetic drugs added to Schedule I were JWH-018, JWH-205, JW H-122, AM2201, JWH-203, and MDPV, all of which are cannibimimetic agents. Bef ore the effective date of SDAPA, these substances were not classified as Schedul e I drugs, and their distribution would have been unlawful only if they were contro lled substance analogues intended for human consumption. See 21 U.S.C. § 813 (“A controlled substance analogue shall, to the extent intended for human consumption, be treated, for purposes of any Federal law as a controlled substance in schedule I.”).

Ways asserts that SDAPA’s effectiv e date was October 1, 2012, and that distribution of the drugs it placed on Schedule I could not create probable cause for illegal activity before that date. However, SDAPA was enacted on July 9, 2012, as Subtitle D of Title XI of the FDA Safety and Innovation Act of 2012. Synthetic Drug Abuse Prevention Act, Pub. L. No . 112–144, 126 Stat. 993, 1130 (2012). Though Titles I, II, III, and IV of that Act specified October 1, 2012, as their effective date,

-6-Titles V–XI had no specified effective date. Id. at 1002, 1007, 1024, 1039. Further, the effective dates in Titles I–IV were limited by their term s to the titles in which they appeared. Id. When a statute does not specify its effective date, and there is no clear congressional directive to the contrary, the st atute takes effect on the date it is enacted. Johnson v. United States , 529 U.S. 694, 702 (2000). The statutory title of which SDAPA is a part had no specified effective date and, if anything, the legislative history reflects an intention that the ba n on various synthetic drugs be effective immediately. See, e.g. , 158 Cong. Rec. S4449-01 (2012) (statement of Sen. Grassley). We therefore conclude that SDAPA’ s effective date was July 9, 2012.

Ways correctly points out that a significant portion of the investigation in this case took place before July 9, 2012. We agree that an investigation involving undercover buys that revealed only the sale of lawful substances would not provide probable cause for issuance of a search warra nt. But the substances sold at Ways’ shops included JWH-018, JWH-205, JWH-122, AM2201, JWH-203, and MDPV, which he does not dispute were controlled substance analogues even before SDAPA’s enactment. See 21 U.S.C. § 8 02(32); 21 U.S.C. § 813. Methylone was also temporarily identified as a Schedule I drug in October 2011, pursuant to the temporary scheduling provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 811(h). See 21 U.S.C. § 811; 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(d)(47). So, even before SDAPA’s enactment, distribution of these substances was unlawful under some circumstances. Moreover, SDAPA did not affect the legality of the drug parapherna lia sold at Ways’ shops—the sale of drug paraphernalia was undisputedly unlawful at all times duri ng the investigation into Ways’ business.

Ultimately, Ways’ argument fails to appreciate the distinction between conduct that is the proper subject of investigati on and conduct that is the proper subject of indictment. Even pre-SDAPA, distributi on of controlled substance analogues was unlawful if they were “intende d for human consumption.” See 21 U.S.C. § 813. True, Ways was not ultimately indicted under the an alogue statute. But the indictment was based on what the investigation revealed, and does not mean th at Ways’ conduct was

-7-not properly the subject of a pre-SDAPA i nvestigation. And the conduct for which he was ultimately actually indicted was, in fact, unlawful at the time it occurred. 6

The execution of a search warrant—s o long as it is supported by probable cause—may reveal the expected criminal conduct, criminal conduct other than what was expected, or no criminal conduct at all. Here, the undercover buys, in combination with the financial informati on, provided probable cau se to believe that evidence of one or more crimes would be found at Ways’ shops and at his home. The district court did not err in finding that probable cause supported the search warrants in this case, and in denying Ways’ motion to suppress.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Ways next asserts that there was insuffi cient evidence to sustain his convictions and that the district court erred in denyi ng his motion for acquittal. We review the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s ve rdict and reversing the verdict only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Cole , 721 F.3d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 2013) . Ways challenges, with varying degrees of specificity, the sufficien cy of the evidence as to all four counts.

As to Count 1, Ways asserts that ther e was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that the items sold in his shops were drug paraphernalia. We disagree. Each shop had signs posted (at least one of which was entitled “Watch Your Mouth!”) listing words customers were not allowed to sa y inside the shop, including common terms for drug paraphernalia. When ATF agen t White, during an undercover buy, asked to see the bongs available for purchase and poi nted to a large glass bong with the word

6 Ways was charged for distribution that began “at least as early as” July 9, 2012, rather than for distribution of contro lled substance analogues before that date.

-8-“Zong” on it, Ways told the agent: “I don’t know what you think you saw but we don’t sell bongs here and you can’t say bongs so you need to watch what you’re saying [in the shop].” Ways also sold vari ous concealment containers. At one of the Omaha shops, White saw a sign advertising “C ontainers For Your Stash.” White then purchased a can that was designed to look and feel like a full can of Diet Coke but contained a space to hide small items. Wh ite also bought a pipe that looked like a package of dental floss. Ways argues the government offered no evidence that he himself gave customers any instructions about how to use the items sold at his shop, but the evidence showed that Ways expressly instructed his employees not to speak with customers about what they were likely to do with the items they purchased. That way, according to one employee, they c ouldn’t be accused of knowingly selling illegal drug paraphernalia. Based on th e evidence presented at trial, a jury considering “all . . . logically relevant factors” could reas onably have concluded that many of the items sold in Ways’ shops were i ndeed drug paraphernalia. See 21 U.S.C. § 863(e).

Next, Ways argues that there was insuffi cient evidence for th e jury to find that he knew the substances he was selling were controlled s ubstances, as required for a guilty verdict on Count 2. To estab lish knowledge under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), there must be evidence that the de fendant either knew that the substance in question was a controlled substance, or that he knew th e identity of the substance. McFadden v. United States , 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2305 (2015). Ways argues that there was no evidence of his knowledge; he points out that there was, in fact, evidence that he had attempted to make sure his shops were in compliance with the law. We c onsider the sufficiency of the evidence on this count a somewhat cl oser question, particularly because Ways apparently communicated openly with hi s federal probation officer about his business. 7 The probation officer visited one of Ways’ shops on multiple occasions, sometimes in the company of other federa l probation officers or local police. Ways

7 We note that Ways does not raise this fact in the context of a legal defense—i.e., mistake of law—but rather only as additional evidence that he did not know the substances sold at his shops were controlled substances.

-9-also worked with an attorney and an accountan t, ostensibly in an effort to make sure he was not in violation of the law. Ev idence of knowledge, particularly in cases involving synthetic drugs or analogues, ma y include “a defendant’s concealment of his activities [and] evasive behavior with respect to law enforcement,” neither of which were present here. United States v. Ramos , 814 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting McFadden , 135 S. Ct. at 2304 n.1).

While the evidence Ways points to supports his claim that he did not know he was selling controlled substances, there was al so substantial evidence to the contrary. During the course of the undercover buys made by ATF agents, Ways’ employees checked the agents’ identification and dire cted their attention to the posted signs forbidding the use of various drug-related terms in the shop. The employees then provided advice on how to use the various s ubstances available for purchase, and they sold the agents a variety of them. Fo r example, in June 2012, ATF agent White purchased two packets marked “Eight Ba llz Premium Glass Cleaner” and one packet marked “Crystaal Bubbly Glass Cleaner” for a total of $190.11. As White left the store, the employee who sold him the pack ets advised him that once he got used to using the Eight Ballz, he should combine it with the Crystaal Bubbly for a “whole new level.” During one of the cooperating informant’s contro lled buys, Ways himself soldthe informant several different substances, some of which tested positive for JWH018, AM2201, JWH-122, JWH-250, JWH-210, and J WH-081—all of which are Schedule I controlled substances. On one occasion, Ways to ld the informant that the substance he was purchasing, which was te sted to contain alpha-PVP, would “Cheech and Chong” him. On another occasion, Wa ys sold the informant K2, cautioning him that it was “ten times more powerful than anything Mother Nature can make.” One of Ways’ employees testified that when K2 became illegal, Ways told them to continue selling it, but under the name “aromatherapy” or “herbal incense.”

Substances in Ways’ shops were also sometimes sold in unmarked packages. An employee testified that Ways told him the packages were unmarked so that

-10-customers “[wouldn’t] know who to sue” if th e substances affected them adversely. The same employee testified that Ways gave him a substance called Blue Velvet (which was later determined to contain Methylone) and told him not to get caught with it. Finally, an employee testified that Ways kept lab reports, ostensibly indicating that the substances he was selling did not contai n certain controlled substances, in the shops so that they c ould be shown to anyone who “came in asking questions.” Based on this evidence, as well as the evidence supporting Count 1, a reasonable jury could have concluded thatWays knew that some of the substances sold in his shops were controlled substances . The evidence did s uggest that Ways did not try to hide his activities from law enforcement, including his own federal probation officer. 8 But the jury heard this evidence and was apparently not persuaded that Ways’ communications with legal a nd business professiona ls and any tacit approval of his probation officer meant thatWays didn’t know what he was selling at the Exotica stores.

With regard to Count 3, Ways assert s generally that there was no evidence he knew that the identified transactions invol ved the proceeds of unlawful activity, and no evidence that the transactions were knowingly designed to conceal the nature, source, ownership, or control of the money. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B). There appears to be no dispute that the mone y in question was the proceeds from Ways’ shops; for the reasons discussed above, we c onclude that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Ways knew th at the transactions involved the proceeds of unlawful activity.

To prove that the transactions were designed to conceal the nature, source, ownership, or control of the money, the government relied on the theory that the proceeds from Ways’ shops were partially th e proceeds of lawful activity (attributable

8 There was evidence that Ways told his pr obation officer that the substances

w ere not intended for human consumption, wh ich could have misled him as to the legality of Ways’ operations.

-11-to the sale of legal goods), and partially the proceeds of unlawful activity (attributable to the sale of controlled substan ces and drug paraphe rnalia). See United States v. Posters N Things Ltd , 969 F.2d 652, 661 (8th Cir. 1992), aff’d 511 U.S. 513 (1994); United States v. Shoff, 151 F.3d 889, 891 (8th Cir. 1998) (discussing cases where money laundering involved commingling funds). The government introduced evidence that Ways’ corporate alter ego was NKOSI, Inc., which he incorporated under the name Jon Blacksteel, an alias Ways used. Ways was the minority owner of NKOSI, and his teenage daughter was th e majority owner. Ways opened bank accounts under his corporate identity, into which he deposited the proceeds from all sales at his shops, legal and illegal alike. Ways also opened and closed accounts at multiple banks, ultimately moving funds be tween accounts at six separate banks.

The evidence that Ways conducted the identified transactions knowing that those transactions were designed to launde r the proceeds from the unlawful sales at his shops is circumstantial and limited. Bu t Ways’ conclusory a ssertions give us no basis to find that the jury’s verdict wa s unreasonable. Ways makes no effort to reconcile his general denial with the ev idence. For instance, he argues his bank accounts “were not concealed or disguised in any manner whatsoever.” Yet the jury heard evidence that these accounts were ope ned and maintained under an alias rather than his true name. He also had numer ous bank accounts at six different banks, and he used a corporate alter ego. This ev idence showed more than mere spending of illegal funds, and more than mere comming ling of funds. United States v. Vanhorn
, 296 F.3d 713, 718 (8th Cir. 2002) . We also note the high degree of deference to which the jury’s verdict is entitled. See Posters N Things , 969 F.2d at 661. Like the Posters N Things court, “[i]f we had sat on the jury, we might not have convicted [the defendant] for mone y laundering.” Id. But based on the evidence adduced at trial, we cannot say that no reasonable jury could ha ve found that Ways c onducted the financial transactions related to his business knowing that the trans actions were at least partly designed to conceal the nature, source, owners hip, or control of some of the proceeds from his shops.

-12-Finally, as to Count 4, Ways argues th ere was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that he had knowingly possessed ammunition that had been transported in interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) . As to this count, we agree. The ammunition in question was f ound in a storage area in th e basement of the Lincoln, Nebraska, home where Ways’ daughter and gi rlfriend lived. Wa ys had given the address to his probation officer and identif ied the home as his daughter’s residence. Items of men’s clothing were found in the master bedroom. A few business records related to Ways’ shops were also found in the house, and in the living room there was a cardboard box with shipping labels addresse d to “Frank Foitz” at one of the Exotica stores. The ammunition was stored in a military ammunition can in the east storage room of the basement. A bong and three gl ass pipes were also found on the east side of the basement, though apparently not in the storage room itself. Finally, one of Ways’ employees testified that Ways had toldhim he owned an AR-15 rifle. An ATF agent testified that he used 5.56 mm ammun ition in his own AR-15 rifle, implying that 5.56mm ammunition is generally compa tible with that type of firearm.

Though the evidence does establish that Wa ys had a connection to the residence and was present there, “mere presence [in a house where contraband is located] is not sufficient to support a conviction for po ssession.” United States v. Jackson , 610 F.3d 1038, 1043 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding constructive possession where there was evidence that the defendant lived in the house, that he sold drugs there, and that his personal belongings were in the rooms where the agents found drugs) (quoting United States v. Boyd , 180 F.3d 967, 979 (8th Cir. 1999)). Rather, constructive possession requires both knowledge that the contraband is pres ent and dominion over the premises where the contraband is located. United States v. McClellon , 578 F.3d 846, 854 (8th Cir. 2009). Where, as here, the defendant doe s not own the residence where contraband is found, “it takes more evidence of know ledge and control” to prove that the defendant possessed that contraband. United States v. Cruz , 285 F.3d 692, 697–98 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding insufficient evid ence of possession where the defendant

-13-stayed in the residence, but there was no evidence that he knew of or exercised control over the contraband found there).

We consider the sufficiency of the evidence on this count a close call, but ultimately conclude that the evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ways possessed the ammunition. Cf. Jackson , 610 F.3d at 1043. Though Ways admittedly stayed in the house regularly, he did not own the house and it was not his only—or prim ary—residence. Ways’ probation officer testified that a different addr ess “ha[d] always been liste d” as Ways’ primary address, and that Ways had provided the additiona l address only because it was where his daughter lived. The government cites to clothing found in the master bedroom and business records found in an unspecified lo cation in the house as evidence that Ways had a connection to the house—but a mere connection to a house is insufficient to prove constructive possession of contraband therein. See Cruz , 285 F.3d at 697–98. The shipping labels on the cardboard box in the living room also showed some connection between Ways’ shops and the resi dence, but again, that connection does nothing to show Ways’ knowledge of the ammunition in the basement. To the extent that the government relies on an assumption that the bong and glass pipes demonstrated Ways’ access to and use of the basement space in gene ral, it cites to no evidence actually tying the bong and glass pipes to Ways or to his shops. In addition, there were other items (“boxes and junk”) stored in the basement, but the record shows that none of it was identified as bei ng connected to any pa rticular person. In fact, one of the ATF agents testified that he found nothing “relating to Mr. Ways in the east storage area of the basement.” Mo reover, a hearsay statement suggesting that Ways at some point possessed an AR-15 doe s very little to bolster a conclusion that he possessed the ammunition stored in the basement of someone else’s home, without stronger and more specific evidence tying the ammunition to that particular firearm. To convict Ways of being a felon in posse ssion of ammunition, the jury was required to find more than a suspicion that he possessed the ammunition—it was required to

-14-find that the evidence established know ing possession beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence in this case was in sufficient to support this finding.

Accordingly, we conclude that the evid ence presented was sufficient to sustain the convictions on Counts 1–3 charged in the indictment, but insufficient to sustain Count 4.

IV. Forfeiture

Finally, Ways challenges the district c ourt’s entry of a preliminary order of forfeiture. After the jury in this case found by special verdict that the property named in the indictment was subject to forfeiture , the district court concluded that the government had established the requisite ne xus between the property and the offenses of conviction. The court accordingly entere d a preliminary order of forfeiture. Ways argues that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the nexus. We review the ultimate legal conclusion of wh ether property is subject to forfeiture de novo, and review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. United States v. Beltramea , 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015).

For the property in this case to be subj ect to forfeiture as a result of Ways’ convictions, the government was required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the property sought to be fo rfeited was obtained as a result of the offenses, was used to commit the offenses, or was otherwis e traceable to the offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) and (2); Beltramea , 785 F.3d at 290. In arguing that the government failed to a dduce sufficient evid ence to support this finding, Ways urges a reexamination of the trial evidence—a ttacking the credibility of various witnesses, among other things—but does not identify any clear error in the district court’s factual findings. Ways’ ar gument that his property was not subject to forfeiture relies on the premise that his bu siness was entirely le gal, which we have rejected for the reasons discussed above. Ways also fails to identify which specific

-15-pieces of property should not be subject to forfeiture—failing to distinguish, for example, between the drug paraphernalia , which is illegal to possess under any circumstances, and the computer equipment. The jury found that the evidence at trial linked the money, the parapherna lia, the ammunition and gun safes, 9 the computers and computer equipment, and the two vehicl es to Ways’ offenses, and we cannot say that the district court’s subsequent factua l determination that there was the requisite nexus between the property and the offenses was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the district court did not err in entering the pr eliminary order of forfeiture against Ways’ property.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Ways’ conviction for being a felon in possession of ammunition, and affirm the judgm ent of the district court in all other respects.

______________________________

9 We note, with regard to Count 4, thatthese safes were seized from his shops, no firearms were found inside, and there is no evidence in the record connecting the gun safes to the ammunition found in the residence.

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