Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the Pacific Reporter.

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264

- 0608, fax (907) 264

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corrections@akcourts.gov.

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

In the M atter of the Estate of

F E PEREZ ABAD

______________________________

In the Matter of the Estate of

SANDRA LEE BOATNER )

) Supreme Court No s . S

- 18380/18450

(Consolidated)

Superior Court No. 3KO

- 20

- 00057 PR

O P I N I O N

No. 7678

– December 22, 2023

Superior Court No. 4FA

- 20

- 00520 PR

Appeal in File No. S

- 18380 from the Superior Court o f the

State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kodiak

, Stephen B.

Wallace , Judge. Appeal in File No. S

- 18450 from the

Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial

District, Fairbanks , Earl A. Peterson, Judge.

A ppearances: Karen L. Lambert, Lambert Law LLC

, Kodiak

, for Estate of Abad

. Heather M. Brown, Franich

Law Office, LLC, Fairbanks, for Estate of Boatner. Laura

Fox, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and

Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for State of

Alaska.

Before: Maassen , Chief Justice, and Carney, Borghesan, and

Henderson

, Justices. [Pate, Justice, not participating.]

BORGHESAN , Justice

. )

)

__ )

)

)

)

)

)

)

INTRODUCTIONUnd er Alaska’s probate code the deadline for filing a claim against a

decedent’s estate depends on when the claim arose. For claims arising “before the death

of the decedent,

. . . w hether due or to become due, absolute or contingent ,” the creditor

must file within four months after the representative of the estate first publishe d notice

to creditors. 1 For claims arising “ at or after the death of the decedent,” the creditor must

file within four months after the claim arose. 2 The question in these cons olidated

appeals is which deadline applies to the State’s claim against the decedent’s estate for

reimbursement for Medicaid services provided to the decedent while alive.

We hold that Medicaid estate recovery claims arise before death and

therefore must be filed within four months after notice to creditors. Although the State

may not pursue these claims until after the Medicaid beneficiary has died, these claims

arise when Medicaid services are provided, not when the claims become enforceable.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

A. Statutory Framework

“ The Medicaid program is ‘ a cooperative federal

- state partnership under

which participating states provide federally

- funded medical services to needy

individuals. ’ ” 3 In de termining who qualifies for Medicaid, f ederal law excludes the

value of a person’s home

. 4 As a result some people receive Medicaid services despite

owning a valuable asset. Congress addressed this “ anomaly ” by authorizing states to

1 AS 13.16.460(a)(1).

2 AS 13.16.460(b) (1)

.

3 Smart v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs. , 237 P.3d 1 010, 1012

(Alaska 2010) (quoting Hidden Heights Assisted Living, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Health

& Soc. Servs. , 222 P.3d 258, 261 (Alaska 2009) ).

4 The Medicaid Act generally excludes an individual ’ s principal residence

for purposes of calculating Medicaid eligibility

. W est Virginia v. U.S. Dep ’ t of Health

& Hum. Servs. , 289 F.3d 281, 284 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§

1382b(a)(1)

, 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(II)

, 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(V ), 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III) ).

-2- 7 678seek reimbursement for the cost of certain Medicaid services from the estates of

deceased beneficiaries

. 5 Estate recovery was initially optional for state Medicaid

programs

. 6 But in the face of rapidly escalating Medicaid costs, Congress amended the

law to require states to conduct estate recovery. 7 Because the State of Alaska has

chosen to participate in Medicaid, it is obliged to comply with this federal statutory

requirement. 8

Accordingly the Alaska Legislature ena cted AS 47.07.055, authorizing

the State’s Division of Health Care Services to seek reimbursement from the estates of

deceased Medicaid recipients. Under this statute

, “after an individual’s death, the

individual’s estate is subject to a claim for reimbur sement for [Medicaid] payments

made on behalf of the individual

. . . to the extent that those services were provided

when the individual was 55 years of age or older.” 9 The claim “may be made only after

the death of the individual’s surviving spouse, if any,” and only if the individual has no

surviving child who is younger than 21, blind, or totally and permanently disabled

. 10

R egulations adopted under AS 47.07.055 provide that the State will pursue estate

recovery claims only if “the potential recovery amount would result in twice the

administrative and legal cost of pursuing the claim, with a minimum pursuable net

5 Id. at 284

.

6 Id.

7 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103

– 66,

§ 13612, 107 Stat. 312, 627

- 28 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) ).

8 Smart , 237 P.3d at 1012 ( quoting Hidden Heights , 222 P.3d at 261 ).

9 AS 47. 07 .055(e). Only certain kinds of services, such as “services

received while an inpatient in a nursing facility ” and “ home and community

- based

services provided through waiver ,” give rise to a claim for reimbursement by the State.

AS 47.07.055(e)(1)

- (2).

10 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (A) ; AS 47.07.055(f).

-3

- 7 678amount of $10,000 .” 11 The State may also waive estate recovery where it would cause

undue hardship. 12

B. Abad Proceedings

Fe Perez Abad passed away on August 19, 2020 after receiving Medicaid

home and community

- based services

. Her daughter opened an informal probate case

approximately two months later and was appointed the personal representative of

Abad’s estate

. Abad’s estate issu ed its first notice to creditors on October 19, 2020.

On December 30 , 2020

— less than four months after the estate published its first notice

to creditors, but more than four months after Abad’s death

— the State filed a claim

against the estate for $200 ,621.62 in Medicaid reimbursement. The estate disallowed

the State’s claim.

The State then petitioned the superior court to allow its Medicaid

reimbursement claim. The estate objected, arguing the claim was time

- barred

. The

e state reasoned that beca use the claim could be asserted only against Abad’s e state, and

not against Abad herself while alive, the claim arose at the time of Abad’s death for

purposes of AS 13.16.460. Because the claim had not been filed within four months of

her death, the e stat e argued, it was untimely. The State argued that it s claim arose

before Abad’s death, triggering the “before death” notice

- based filing deadline under

AS 13.16.460. Accordingly, the State argued, it was timely because it was filed within

four months of w hen notice to creditors was first published.

The superior court agreed with the estate, holding that the State ’s

Medicaid recovery claim did not arise during Abad’s lifetime and should have been

brought within four months of her death. Noting that no published Alaska decision

addressed the interaction of AS 47.07.055 and AS 13.16.460, the superior court

11 7 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 160.210(c).

12 7 AAC 160.240 (a)

- (b)

.

-4

- 7 678examined decisions from the Nebraska, Iowa, and Washington supreme courts

. The

superior court also rejected the State’s policy argument that a deadline tethered to death,

rather than notice to creditors, would hamper the State ’s ability to pursue estate

recovery in accordance with federal law.

The State filed a motion for reconsideration , which the superior c ourt

denied.

The State then appeal ed

.

C. Boatner Proceedings

Sandra Lee Boatner passed away on September 1, 2020. During her life

she was the beneficiary of Medicaid services. Roughly two months after her death,

David E. Cook opened an informal probate case ; he was ap pointed the personal

representative of her estate

. The estate issued its first notice to creditors on December

22 , 2020. On March 24, 2021

— less than four months after the estate published its

first notice to creditors, but more than fou r months after Boatner ’s death

— the State

filed a claim against the estate for $ 300,647.29 in Medicaid reimbursement.

In May of that year the estate disallowed the claim, maintaining that it was

not timely filed. The State petitioned the superior cour t to permit its claim against

Boatner ’s estate, asserting that its claim was timely filed under AS 13.16.460 (a)(1)

.

The parties each moved for summary judgment. The ir arguments paralleled those in

the Estate of Abad litigation.

A standing master recommended that the superior court adopt the State ’s

reading of Alaska’s probate filing deadlines. The standing master acknowledged that

Medicaid estate recovery claims become enforceable after death. B ut b ecause the se

claims concern ed medical expenses that Boatner incurred during her lifetime , the

standing master concluded they arose before her death. The superior court adopted the

standing master’s recommendation

.

-5- 7678Boa tner ’s estate filed a motion for reconsideration , and the superi or court

denied it. The court explained that the State seeks to recover debt arising from medical

expenses, and that “ [a] ll medical expenses occur while the person is still deemed alive.”

The court further explained that the provision of AS 47.07.055(a) limiting recovery

until after the recipient’s death “does not shift the accrual date ” or “change the fact that

the person still received that care during her lifetime .” R ather

, the court described this

provision as “an offer of grace for the benefitted pe rson to live out her life without

worry of being refused care for lack of payment.”

Boatner ’s e state appeal ed

. We consolidated the Boatner e state’s appeal

with the Abad e state’s appeal for purposes of oral argument and decision.

DISCUSSION

These two cases present a single question of statutory interpretation: For

purposes of the probate code’s claim filing deadlines under AS 13.16.460, d oes a

Medicaid estate recovery claim under AS 47.07.055(e) arise “ before death ” or “ at or

after death ”? The answer determines the deadline for the State to present its claim for

reimbursement to the estate.

Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. 13

“W e apply our independent judgment to the interpretation of Alaska statutes and will

interpret statutes ‘ according to reason, practicality, and common sense, taking into

account the plain meaning and purpose of the law as well as the intent of the

drafters. ’ ” 14 “Statutory interpretation begins with the plain meaning of the text, b ut it

does not stop there.” 15 Instead, we subscribe to a “sliding scale approach to statutory

13 Rosauer v. Manos

, 440 P.3d 145, 147 (Alaska 2019).

14 In re Est. of Rodman , 498 P.3d 1 054, 1062 (Alaska 2021) (quoting Taylor

v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg.

, 301 P.3d 182, 188 (Alaska 2013) ).

15 Am. Marine Corp. v. Sholin , 295 P.3d 924, 926 ( Alaska 2013) (citing

State, Com. Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Carlson , 270 P.3d 755, 762 (Alask a 2012))

.

-6- 7 678interpretation ,” 16 under which “[t]he plainer the statutory language is, the more

con vincing the evidence of contrary legislative purpose or intent must be.” 17

We conclude that Medicaid estate recovery claims arise before death for

purposes of the probate code’s filing deadline. This conclusion is supported by

statutory text, the underlying legislative purpose of the Medicaid estate recovery statute,

and the weight of precedent from other jurisdictions.

A. Statutory Text Suggests T hat Medicaid E state R ecovery C laims A rise

B efore A Beneficiary’s D eath Even Though They Cannot Be Enforce d

Until After Death

.

The estates emphasize the text of the estate recovery statute. They argue

that because the State may bring a Medicaid estate recovery claim only “after an

individual’s death” and only against the deceased individual’s estate, 18 the State’s claim

for reimbursement arises “at or after” the individual’s death. 19 The State instead

emphasizes the text of the probate code. It points out that the probate code refers to

when claims “arise,” rather than when they “accrue,” and recognizes th at claims arising

before death include those that are “ due or to become due, absolute or contingent .” 20

Accordingly the State argues that a Medicaid estate recovery claim arises when the

services are provided to the beneficiary, even if it is not enforceable and therefore

remains contingent until the beneficiary’s death. The State also asserts that other

language in the probate code suggests that claims arising “at or after” death are related

16 McDonnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 299 P.3d 715, 721 (Alaska

2013) (citing Peninsula Mktg. Ass’n v. State , 817 P.2d 917, 922 (Alaska 1991)).

17 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Graham

Gonzalez , 107 P.3d 279, 284 (Alaska 2005)).

18 AS 47.07.055(e) (“[A]fter an individual’s death, the individual’s estate is

subject to a claim for reimbursement

. . . .”).

19 AS 13.16.460(b)

.

20 AS 13.16.460(a).

-7- 7678to esta te administration, rather than to obligations incurred by the beneficiary while

alive. The State’s position is ultimately more persuasive.

The probate code’s use of “arise” rather than “accrue” does not, on its

own, resolve the dispute . According to the State, a claim arises when the underlying

events take place, but a claim only accrues when it is enforceable. Yet the dictionary

does not suggest such a clear distinction between these terms. 21 The Revised Fourth

Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, which would have been available to the legislature

when it enacted AS 13.16.460 , states that “ [a] cause of action ‘accrues’ when a suit may

be maintained thereon” or “[w]henever one person may sue another.” 22 The entry for

“arise” notes that the term is not a synonym for “ accrue. ” 23 It defines “arise” as “[t]o

spring up, originate, to come into being or notice, to become operative, sensible, visible,

or audible; to present itself.” 24 This definition tends to support the State’s position, as

the Medicaid estat e recovery claim “came into being” or “originated” with the provision

of Medicaid services. But Black’s Law Dictionary also states that a cause of action or

suit “ ‘arises,’ so as to start running of limitation, when a party has a right to apply to

the pr oper tribunal for relief.” 25 Because AS 13.16.460 is a statute of limitation, this

second definition of “ arise ” is more on

- point and therefore tends to support the estates’

position

.

21 “In the absence of a [statutory] defi nition, we construe statutory terms

according to their common meaning[;] [d]ictionaries provide a useful starting point for

this exercise.” State v. Recall Dunleavy , 491 P.3d 343, 359 (Alaska 2021) (alterations

in original) (quoting Alaska Pub. Def. Agency v. Superior Ct

. , 450 P.3d 246, 253

(Alaska 2019 ))

.

22 Accrue

, B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTIONARY (4 th ed. 1968 ).

23 Arise

, B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTIONARY (4 th ed. 1968 ).

24 Id.

25 Id.

-8

- 7678However

, the legislature’s decision to explain that a claim may arise

whether it is “due or to b ecome due” and whether “absolute or contingent ” favors the

State’s position. 26 These qualifiers suggest that the legislature meant that a claim might

arise even before the claimant could enforce it. A “contingent claim” is, according to

Black’s, “[o]ne which has not accrued and which is dependent on some future event

that may never happen.” 27 This language supports the conclusion that a claim may

“arise” before it becomes enforceable. A Medicaid estate recovery claim, though

contingent and unenforceable before the beneficiary’s death and the death of a surviving

spouse, can therefore fall in the category of claims arising before death.

T he probate code’s definition of “claim” reinforces the conclusion that

Medicaid estate recovery claims arise before death for purposes of

AS 13.1 6 .460 (a)(1) ’s filing deadline. The probate code defines “claims” in a way that

mirrors AS 13.16.460’s distinction between claims arising b efore death and claims

arising “at or after” death. 28 “ ‘ [C]laims, ’ in respect to estates of decedents,” include

both “liabilities of the decedent

. . . , whether arising in contract, in tort, or another way,

and liabilities of the estate that arise at or after the death of the decedent

. . . , including

funeral expenses and expenses of administration.” 29 A Medicaid estate recovery claim

is akin to a cont ract claim: in exchange for receiving services, the beneficiay incurs a

contingent obligation to repay after death, with funds from the beneficiary’s estate. It

26 AS 13.16.460(a)(1) (emphasis added). These qualifiers are used both for

claims that arose before death under AS 13.16.460(a)(1) and for claims that arise at or

after death under AS 13.16.460(b)(1).

27 Contingent Claim , B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTIONARY (4 th ed. 1968 ).

28 AS 13.06.050 (providing de finitions for AS 13.06

–. 36, “[s] ubject to

additional definitions contained in AS 13.06

– AS 13.36 that are applicable to specific

provisions of AS 13.06

– AS 13.36”).

29 Id. (emphasis added).

-9- 7678is far less similar to “funeral expenses and expenses of administration,” the kinds of

claims the statute offers as examples of claims arising at or after death. 30

Se condary sources support this distinction and confirm that Medicaid

estate recovery claims fall in the category of claims arising before death for probate

purposes

. Richard Wellman ’s Uniform Probate Code P ractice M anual, which we have

found useful in the past, 31 explains that claims that “arise at or after death” are

“commonly classified as expenses of administration.” 32 The Stein on Probate treatise

agrees, explaining that “[b] eca use claims arising after death usually originate from acts

by the personal representative, they occur primarily during administration. ” 33

The Stein treatise illustrates the distinction between claims arising before

death and claims arising after death with helpful examples

. 34 Before

- death claims

include “last illness charges, charges for illness during the year immediately preceding

death, personal service charges during lifetime, recovery on warranties, liability as a

surety or guarantor, claims of the state or county for support in state or county mental

institutions, equitable claims, and other general contract claims .” 35 C laims that aris e

after death include “ accountants ’ fees, representative ’ s and attorneys ’ fees, repair and

maintenance expenses of property of the estate, insurance premiums, storage costs,

30 AS 13.06.050 (6).

31 See In re Est. of Baker , 386 P.3d 1228, 1234 (Alaska 2016)

( acknowledging that “m embers of the Alaska House Judiciary Committee found

Richard Wellman’s writings on the Uniform Probate Code to be helpful in clarifying

the concepts underlying the code ,” and citing to Richard Wellm an’s Uniform Probate

Code Practice Manual ).

32 1 U NIFORM P ROBATE C ODE P RACTICE M ANUAL 343 (Richard V.

Wellman, ed., 2d ed. 1977).

33 1 S TEIN ON P ROBATE

, § 6.01(c)

, at 117 ( Robert A. Stein, ed., 3d ed. 1995).

34 Id

.

35 Id.

- 10

- 7678platting costs, and charges for all services rendered to the personal representative for

the estate. ” 36 Medicaid estate recovery claims, which are based on healthcare costs

incurred prior to a recipient’s death rather than estate administration expenses, are

similar to the kinds of claims that the treatise describes as claims arising before death

.

B. Classifying Medicaid Estate Recovery Claims As Claims Arisi ng

Before Death Is More Consistent With Legislative Purpose.

The parties argue that their respective interpretations are more consistent

with the purpose s underlying the probate code and the Medicaid statutes. The estates

argue that classifying Medicaid estate recovery claims as claims arising at or after death

will cause the claims to be asserted earlier, furthering the goal of speedier estate

administration. The State does not agree that classifying probate claims this way will

necessarily expedite pr obate administration. It also argues that subjecting Medicaid

estate recovery claims to a potentially more restrictive filing deadline is inconsistent

with the priority the Legislature has assigned these claims vis -à- vis the claims of other

creditors. 37 Again we find the State’s arguments on these points more persuasive.

Alaska’s probate statutes are intended to “promote a speedy and efficient

system for liquidating the estate of the decedent” 38 and “facilitate the prompt settlement

of e states ,” 39 among other purposes. Abad’s estate contends that treating Medicaid

estate recovery claims as arising at or after death would expedite probate administration.

Generally, the decedent’s heirs and creditors have up to three years after death to open

a probate proceeding. 40 The estates argue that if the State’s claim arises “at or after”

36 Id.

37 See AS 13.16.470(a); AS 47.07.055(g).

38 AS 13.06.010(b)(3).

39 AS 13.16.005.

40 AS 13.16.040 (a)

. B ut see AS 12.16.040(a)(1)

- (5) ( providing exceptions to

the general rule).

- 11

- 7 678death, then its claim will expire unless filed within four months after death. 41 If by that

time no one has stepped forward to administer the decedent’s estate, then the State will

be forced to seek appointment as the personal representative of the estate in order to

preserve its claim. 42 Accordingly, the estates argue, the probate process will unfold

more quickly , which is more consistent with the goal of the p robate code.

Though the estates’ theory may be correct in some cases, it is not

universally true. In other cases treating Medicaid estate recovery claims as arising at

or after death could prolong estate administration. For example, a claim c annot be ma de

against the decedent’s estate if there is a surviving spouse or child under 21. 43 If a

Medicaid estate recovery claim does not arise until it becomes enforceable, then the

claim could arise several years after the beneficiary’s death

, upon the death of the

surviving spouse or the 21 st birthday of a child. If the estate were still in the process of

probate, the State would have four more months from that point to present its claim,

even if all other creditors’ claims had been filed long ago. For that reason classifying

Medicaid estate recovery claims as arising at or after death does not necessarily mean

that the probate process will unfold more quickly. The uncertain and marginal effect

on the speed of probate administration is not a persuasive reason to interpret Medicaid

estate recovery claims as arising at or after death when the statutory text clearly places

them in the category of claims arising before death.

The State argues that classifying Medicaid estate recovery claims as

arising before death furthers the underlying purpos e of estate recovery: “recovering

from those with an ability to pay so as to make future funds available for those having

41 See AS 13.16.460(b).

42 See AS 13.16.065(a) (establishing order of priority for personal

representative of estate, with creditor lowest priority)

.

43 See 42 U.S.C

. § 1396p(b)(2); AS 47.07.055(f).

- 12

- 7678the most need.” 44 Abad’s estate essentially argues that federal legislative intent is

irrelevant because the Alaska legislature pass ed AS 47.07.055 to comply with federal

requirements and access federal Medicaid funding

— not necessarily to recover costs.

But in order to access federal funding, Alaska needed a program that effectuates the

federal act

. 45 W e must assume that legislatur e’s purpose was consistent with that of the

federal law it implemented.

Interpreting Medicaid estate recovery claims as arising at or after death

wou ld undermine this legislative purpose by making it more expensive to pursue estate

recovery

. It is true, as the estates point out, that the State could prevent its claim from

expiring four months after death by applying to be the personal representative within

that time. But doing so would require the State to incur additional costs in administering

44 Es t. of Melby v. Lohman , 841 N.W. 2d 867, 875

- 76 (Iowa 2014) (“Our

interpretation creating the debt immediately upon provision of assistance rather than at

the death of the recipient, and allowing recovery from the corpus of the trust, is

consistent with the Medicaid program’s goal

. . . . ”) ; s ee also Belshe v. Hop e , 3 8 Cal.

Rptr

. 2d 917, 925 (Cal. App. 1995) ( explaining that Medicaid estate recovery “furthers

the broad purpose of providing for the medical care of [a state’s] needy; the greater

amount recovered by the state allows the state to have more funds to pro vide future

services”); Jon M. Zieger, The State Giveth and the State Taketh Away: In Pursuit of a

Practical Approach to Medicaid Estate Recovery , 5 E LDER L.J . 359, 374 (1997) (“The

foremost consideration behind estate recovery is the reduction of the ove rall cost of

Medicaid to states by recouping some portion of Medicaid expenditures. ” ).

45 See c h. 102 , § 1, SLA 1994 (stating that purpose of the act was to, among

other things, “bring the state into compliance with federal law with respect to the

recovery of Medicaid payments from the estates and trusts of individuals under certain

circumstances”); Sen. Ste ve Frank, Sponsor Statement for S.B. 366, 1 8th Leg. 2d Sess.

(Mar

. 26, 1994) (“In large part, the statutory changes proposed in this bill relating to

. . . estate recoveries by Medicaid, and Medicaid

- qualifying trusts are required by the

federal Omnibus Bu dget Reconciliation Act of 1993

. . . , and DHSS will face a penalty

— loss of federal financial Medicaid participation

— if legislation is not adopted by

July 1, 1994.”); 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) (B) (“ In the case of an individual who was 55

years of age or older when the individual received such medical assistance, the State

shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual’s estate

. . . .”).

- 13

- 7678the dec edent’s estate. These additional costs would diminish the State’s net recovery,

undermining the goal of recovering funds to be ma de available for other needy people.

Classifying Medicaid estate recovery claims as arising at or after death

would also sub ject the State to a risk of nonrecovery not faced by other creditors. One

reason creditors whose claims arise before death are given four months from the date

on which the estate publishes notice to creditors is that these creditors may not be aware

that the person who owes them money has died:

It is foreseeable that holders of [pre

- death] contractual

claims may be unaware of the death of the decedent and thus

could lose their right to assert their claim due to no fault of

their own, unless notice is given to them .

. . . On the other

hand, individuals with claims arising after death, largely due

to expenses arising out of the administration of the e state, do

not encounter similar difficulties. Because [the latter group

of creditors] know [s] of the death of the decedent, [the state

probate statute] does not require notice and sets forth only a

four

- month limitation period from the time the claim

arose. [ 46 ]

The State concedes that administrative processes make it more likely than other

credi tors to learn of a Medicaid beneficiary’s death. But if Medicaid is not providing

services to the beneficiary at the time of death, it may not immediately become aware

of the death. Applying the deadline for claims arising at or after death risks preclud ing

the State from pursuing legitimate claims when other creditors still can, with no clear

policy justification.

Subjecting the State to these costs and risks would be directly at odds with

the legislature’s decision to give Medicaid estate recovery cla ims priority over other

creditors’ claims. The legislature designated Medicaid estate recovery claims as “debts

- 14

- 7678 46 In re Est

. of Hadaway

, 668 N.W.2d 920, 924 (Minn. App. 20 0 3)

.with preference.” 47 An estate is required to pay such debts before “all other claims”

—

excluding estate administration, funeral expenses, and a few other debt categories. 48

Creditors whose claims are based on obligations incurred by the decedent while alive

(like doctors, lenders, or business partners) are subject to the deadline for claims arising

before death: four months after notice to creditors is published, or three years after

death if no notice is published. 49 Medicaid estate recovery claims are also based on

obligations incurred by the decedent while alive. Making these claims subject to a

different and sometimes more restrictive deadline (four months after death if the

decedent had no surviving spouse or qualifying child) than other creditors’ claims

would be inconsistent with the legislature’s decision to give Medicaid claims priority.

In light of the overall purpose of Medicaid estate recovery claims and the

ex press priority these claims are assigned, it is more logical to classify these claims as

arising before death.

C. Decisions From Other States Support The Conclusion That Medicaid

Estate Recovery Claims Arise Before Death.

T he parties cite opinions from ot her state appellate courts supporting their

respective positions on whether a Medicaid estate recovery claim arises before or after

death. These opinions fall into three sets: (1) opinions deciding when claims that

become enforceable after death arise fo r purposes of the probate code; (2) opinions

deciding when Medicaid estate recovery claims arise generally; and (3) opinions

deciding when Medicaid estate recovery claims arise for purposes of probate filing

deadlines. On balance, these decisions support the conclusion that M edicaid e state

r ecovery c laims a rise b efore d eath f or p urposes of probate claim deadlines.

47 AS 47.07.055 (g) (“ For purposes of AS 13.16 .470, the claims authorized

under this section are debts with preference under the laws of the state. ”).

48 AS 13.16.470 (a)

.

49 AS 13.16.460(a) (1)

- (2)

.

- 15

- 7678The first set of decisions establish es that, generally speaking , claims

against an estate can arise before death even if they are only enforceable after death. In

In re Estate of Hadaway

, a Minnesota court discussed a claim based on a divorce

settlement agreement that the decedent had entered into during his life, but that was

payable only a fter he died. 50 The court concluded that the claim for payment arose

during the decedent’s life for the purpose of Minnesota’s probate claim deadlines

, 51

which are similar to Alaska’s

. 52 “Simply because the payment was made absolute when

decedent died,” the court held , “it does not follow that the contractual duty necessarily

arose at the time of decedent’s death. Rather, it is apparent that from the time of the

settlement agreement

. . . decedent was oblig ated [to fulfill his contract obligations].” 53

Estate of Evitt v. Hiatt also concerned a divorce settlement agreement

executed years before death but not enforceable until after death

. 54 Th e Arizona Court

of Appeals

, applying Arizona’s probate code, 55 held “that when a person enters into a

contract obligating him to act while living to ensure a payment to the claimant at or

after his death, a claim for breach arises before the decedent’s death.” 56 And Ader v.

50 668 N.W.2d at 920

- 21

.

51 Id. at 923.

52 Minn esota Statutes §§ 524.3

– 803(a) and (b)(2), like AS 13.16.460(a) and

(b)(2), require creditors whose claims against an estate “arose before the death of the

decedent” to file within four months after a notice to creditors and claims that “arise at

or after the death of the decedent” to be filed within four months after they arise.

53 In re Est. of Hadaway, 668 N.W. 2d at 923 (emphasis in original)

.

54 429 P.3d 1146 , 1147

- 48 (Ariz. App. 2018).

55 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14

- 3803 likewise assigns a different filing deadline

to creditors whose claims arose “before the death of the decedent” than to those whose

claims “arise at or after the death of the decedent.”

56 Est

. of Evitt , 429 P.3d at 1147 ; s ee also Spohr v. Berryman , 589 So. 2d

225, 227

- 28 (Fla. 1991) (holding that a claim against the decedent ’ s estate based on a

- 16

- 7678Estate of Felger distinguished the terms “ accrue” and “arise” when extending this logic

to fraud claims. 57 While “ [a] cause of action accrues .

. . when one party is able to sue

another,” the Felger court explained, “in the context of a nonclaim statute, ‘arise’ refers

to the decedent’s act or co nduct upon which a claim is based.” 58

These cases support the idea that when a claim arises, for purposes of the

probate code’s claim filing deadlines, depends on the timing of the events that give rise

to the claim, rather than when that claim becomes e nforceable

.

The second set of decisions addresses the distinct but related issue of when

a claim for Medicaid estate recovery arises in general

. 59 Most of these decisions support

the State’s view that Medicaid reimbursement claims arise when caretakers provide

services rather than when a recipient passes away.

Most jurisdictions that have addressed th e issue have concluded that

Medicaid estate recovery claims arise when caretakers provide services to a living

Medicaid recipient. In Estate of Melby v. Lohman

, for example, the Iowa Supreme

divorce agreement “arose before the death of the decedent” because the claim “was

based upon an agreement which was made many years before [the decedent ’ s] death”).

57 375 P.3d 97 , 103

- 04 (Ariz. App. 2016).

58 Id . at 104 ( quoting Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of

Am., 898 P.2d 964, 966 (Ariz. 1995) ).

59 Two cases the estates cite

— In re Est. of Baker , 627 S.W.3d 523 (Tex.

App. 2021) and In re Est. of Hutchinson

, 577 P.2d 1074 (Alaska 1978)

— are

inapposite. In re Est. of Baker distinguishes two kinds of claims: (1) an equitable right

of reimbursement arising from the dissolution of marriage and (2) a debt to one’s

spouse. See 627 S.W.3d at 532

. It does not discuss “reimbursement” in the Medicaid

recovery context. Id. at 527 (“The right of reimbursement is not an interest in property

or an enforceable debt, per se, but an equitable right which arises upon dissolution of

the marriage.”). In re Est. of Hutchinson examines whether family allowances qualify

as claims against an estate. 577 P.2d at 1074

- 76. It is unclear that there is any

connection to the matter at hand, other than a mere reference t o the definition of

“claims” and the claim priority statute, AS 13.16.470(a)

. Id.

- 17

- 7678Court concluded that although the governing statute “mandat[es] the department will

refrain from collecting that debt until the death o f the recipient,” it nonetheless

“establishes a debt owed by the recipient of medical services when the services are

provided. ” 60 Courts reached the same conclusion in Arkansas, Nebraska, and

Washington. 61

Only one state, California, appears to have reached the opposite

conclusion outside of the probate claim deadline context. The holding of Kizer v.

Hanna

— that California’s Medicaid recovery statute applied to care that took place

60 841 N.W. 2d 867

, 877 (Iowa 2014)

. Abad’s estate attempts to distinguish

Iowa’s Medicaid recovery statute from Alaska’s, pointing out that the Iowa statute

conceptualizes Medicaid recovery as debt collection rather than reimbursement.

Compare Iowa Code § 249A.53(2) (formerly Iowa Code § 249A.5(2)) (“The provision

of medical assistance to an individual

. . . creates a debt due the department from the

individual’s estate .

. . .”), with AS 47.07.055 (e) (“[T]he individual’s estate is subject to

a claim for reimbursement for medical assistance payments

. . . . ”)

. But the slightly

different language used do es not seem to indicate a different underlying legislative

intent. The two statutes arise from the same federal mandate to implement state

Medicaid recovery programs , and therefore share the same purpose. See Est

. of Melby

, 841 N.W. at 875

- 76 (“Our interpretation creating the debt immediately upon provision

of assistance rather than at the death of the recipient, and allowing recovery from the

corpus of the trust, is consistent with the Medicaid program’s goal of recovering from

those with an ability to pay so as to make future funds available for those having the

most need.”).

61 See, e.g.

, Est

. of Wood v. Ark. Dep ’ t of Hum

. Servs. , 894 S.W.2d 573, 576

( Ark. 1995) ( explaining that the relationship created by Arkansas ’ s estate recovery

statute “was as if [the recipient] had a loan from [the department] to be repaid from the

assets of her estate”); Est

. of Reimers v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.

, 746

N.W.2d 724, 728 (Neb. 2008) (“While the debt arising under [the estate recovery]

statute accrues duri ng the recipient ’ s lifetime, it is held in abeyance for payment until

the recipient ’ s death.”) ; In re Est. of Burns

, 928 P.2d 1094, 1099 ( Wash. 1997) ( “T he

precipitating event [of a Medicaid reimbursement claim] is .

. . the receipt of the

benefits giving rise to the contingent indebtedness, and not the creation of the

decedent ’ s estate.” ).

- 18

- 7678before the statute went into effect 62

— is irrelevant here. But the Kizer court reached

that conclusion by reasoning that “ [t] he plain language of the statute dictates that the

[state agency ’s ] right to reimbursement is against the recipient’s estate . Consequently,

the [state agency ’s ] right to reimbursement arises, if at all, at the time of the recipient’s

death.” 63

The third set of decisions address es the precise question at hand: For

purposes of probate code filing deadlines, d o Medicaid estate recovery claims arise

before death , or “at or after” death ? These two opinions

— Estate of Hooey v.

Mowbray 64 and Estate of Tvrz v. Tvrz 65

— reached opposite conclusions.

In Estate of Hooey the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that “ [t] he

requirement that the [state agency] refrain from pursuing its claim until after the death

of the recipient does not define when that claim arose.” 66 Rather, the court viewed this

requirement as one of several contingencies that must occur before the government may

62 767 P.2d 679, 686 (Cal. 1989)

.

63 Id . at 683 (emphasis in original)

. Boatner’s estate cites to another

California decision, Maxwell

- Jolly v. Martin , for the p roposition that the reimbursement

right is strictly a statutory right to recover from a decedent recipient’s estate and is not

based on any promise or agreement to repay by the still

- living recipient. 1 29 Cal. Rptr.

3d 278 (Cal. App. 2011). The Maxwell -J olly court relied on the California Supreme

Court’s reasoning in Kizer in reaching that conclusion. Id. at 288

. But the majority of

jurisdictions have taken the opposite approach , and we find the reasoning of those

courts more persuasive.

64 521 N.W.2d 85 (N.D. 1994).

65 620 N.W.2d 757 (Neb. 2001), superseded by statute , 2001 Neb. Laws,

L.B. 257, § 1, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 68

– 1036.02(2) (2001), as recognized in Est. of Cushing

v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. , 810 N.W.2d 741 , 745 (Neb. 2012) (“ In re Estate

of Tvrz is no longer authoritative on when DHHS’ claim arises.”).

66 521 N.W.2d at 86 (citations omitted)

.

- 19

- 7678recover Medicaid funds. 67 The court reasoned that “the obligation to repay, if any,

arises upon receipt of the benefits, i.e., prior to the decedent’s death,” whereas the

decedent’s death and the death of any surviving spouse merely determined when the

government’s “right to recov er ripens .” 68

In Estate of Tvrz the Supreme Court of Nebraska adopted the opposite

interpretation of Nebraska’s Medicaid estate recovery statute. 69 That court deemed it

significant that Nebraska’s statute “ specifically provid e[d] that ‘[n] o debt to the

department shall exist ’ if the recipient is survived by a spouse or by a child who is under

the age of 21, blind, or totally and permanently disabled .” 70 The court reasoned that

“the existence of indebtedness on the part of a [Nebraska] recipient ’ s estate depends

upon factors which can be determined only after the recipient ’ s death ” and that a

Nebraska Medicaid estate recovery claim therefore arises o nly at or after death. 71

Despite this seemingly even tally, the scale ultimately tips in the State’s

favor. One year after the Estate of Tvrz decision, the Nebraska legislature effectively

abrogated it by amending Nebraska’s Med icaid estate recovery st atute to provide that

the debt “arises during the life of the recipient but shall be held in abeyance until death

of the recipient.” 72 Th e Nebraska legislature’s response to the court’s ruling suggests

67 See id . at 86

- 87 ( quoting De p’ t of Pub

. Welfare v. Anderson

, 384 N.E.2d

628, 633

- 34 (Mass. 1979)).

68 Id . at 87 (quoting Anderson

, 384 N .E.2d at 633

- 34).

69 620 N.W.2d at 762

- 63

.

70 Id . (quoting former Neb. Rev. Stat. § 68

– 1036.02(2) ).

71 Id

. at 763 (emphasis in original).

72 Est. of Cushing v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. , 810 N.W.2d at

745 -4 6 (quoting Neb. Rev. Stat. § 68

– 919) (holding, in light of statutory change, that

Medicaid estate recovery claim arose before beneficiary’s death)

.

- 20

- 7678t hat subjecting Medicaid estate recovery claims to the “before death” probate claim

deadline is more consistent with the underlying purpose of the program.

Overall, the decisions from other jurisdictions confirm our analysis of the

text and purpose of Ala ska’s probate and Medicaid statutes. A Medicaid estate recovery

claim arises before the death of the decedent. Such a claim is timely if presented to the

estate within four months after notice to creditors is first published, or within three years

of dea th if no notice is published

.

C ONCLUSION

For the reasons above, we REVERSE the superior court’s decision in

Estate of Abad and AFFIRM the superior court’s decision in Estate of Boatne r

.

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- 7 678