United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-4013

___________

Carroll E. Heatherly, as Independent *

Administrator of the Estate of *

Margaret M. Heatherly, deceased; *

Carroll E. Heatherly, individually, *

*

Plaintiffs - Appellants, *

*

Thomas C. Heatherly, individually; * Appeal from the United States

Margaret C. Heatherly, individually; * District Court for the District

Bridget C. Heatherly, individually; * of Nebraska.

Patrick B. Heatherly, individually, *

*

Plaintiffs, *

*

v. *

*

Steven Alexander; *

Black Creek Transport, Inc., *

*

Defendants, *

*

Midwest Specialized Transportation; *

David Gilbertson, *

*

Defendants - Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: November 17, 2004

Filed: August 26, 2005 

___________
1

A deceleration lane on a freeway is the initial portion of an exit ramp,

designed to handle traffic entering the ramp at highway speeds and to provide space

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Before SMITH, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

On the afternoon of June 26, 1999, Carroll Heatherly, his wife Margaret

Heatherly, and their four children Thomas, Brigid, Meg, and Patrick, embarked in a

motor home on a vacation trip to Yellowstone National Park from their home in Lisle,

Illinois. Tragically, the trip ended in Nebraska with the death of Margaret, and

serious injury to Carroll. This personal injury and wrongful death litigation ensued.

Heatherly, individually and in his capacity as independent administrator of the

estate of his deceased wife, appeals the district court's grant of judgment as a matter

of law (JML) to defendants Midwest Specialized Transportation (MST) and its

employee David Gilbertson. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

I. BACKGROUND

We recount the facts of this case in the light most favorable to Heatherly, the

non-moving party. Sip-Top, Inc. v. Ekco Group, Inc., 86 F.3d 827, 830 (8th Cir.

1996).

On June 26, 1999, David Gilbertson, a professional truck driver working for

MST of Rochester, Minnesota, who had nine years of trucking experience, was

hauling a load of paper from Minnesota to California in his tractor-trailer unit.

Around 1:15 a.m. June 27, he became tired and decided to pull off Interstate 80 to

sleep at the Phillips rest area located at mile marker 317. Gilbertson parked his truck

on the shoulder (or emergency lane) of the deceleration portion of the exit ramp1
for deceleration to the appropriate speed once off the freeway. Gilbertson's truck was

parked very close to the traveled portion of Interstate 80 near the beginning of the

deceleration lane.

2

Black Creek Transport, Inc. had originally been sued because of an alleged

interest in the truck that Alexander was driving. But the company contended that

though it had at one time leased the tractor that Alexander drove, it had returned it to

the lessor over a year prior to the accident and had no interest in the tractor at the time

of the accident. The parties stipulated to the company's dismissal from the case.

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leading into the rest area. He and his son Dennis, who was riding with him, went to

sleep in the tractor's sleeper bunks. At around 2:30 a.m., the Heatherlys' motor home

approached mile marker 317 from the east. They were towing a Ford Escort.

Another tractor-trailer rig, stolen and being driven by Steven Alexander, was coming

up behind the motor home at a speed of nearly ninety miles-per-hour. A series of four

collisions ensued. First, Alexander's truck struck the back of the towed Escort. This

propelled the Escort forward, striking the back of the motor home. The Escort rotated

and was briefly sandwiched between the motor home and Alexander's truck before

Alexander's truck ran over the top of the Escort. The third impact involved

Alexander's truck striking the back of the motor home. This forced the motor home,

still traveling at some sixty-seven miles-per-hour, head-long into the back of the

parked MST truck, the fourth and final impact. Alexander's truck proceeded,

unimpeded, across the deceleration lane, and across the shoulder of the lane. It came

to rest in the grassy ditch next to the shoulder of the lane. The motor home and MST

truck trailer were soon engulfed in flames. All four of the Heatherly children and

Carroll Heatherly were rescued, though Carroll Heatherly was badly injured.

Margaret Heatherly was killed in the collision. Doctors had to amputate Carroll

Heatherly's right leg below the knee.

Heatherly commenced this diversity action in the United States District Court

for the District of Nebraska. Before trial, Alexander and Black Creek Transport, Inc.2

were dismissed as defendants, leaving defendants Gilbertson and MST. At the close
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of the evidence, defendants moved for JML pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Taking the motion under advisement, the district court submitted

the case to the jury. After the jury deadlocked, the district court declared a mistrial,

granted defendants' JML motion and then dismissed the case. The district court

concluded, as a matter of law, that Gilbertson's conduct in parking the MST truck

where he did on the exit ramp was not a proximate cause of the Heatherlys' injuries,

but merely created a condition by which those injuries were made possible through

the negligence of Alexander. Heatherly appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

 The question before us is whether it was error to grant JML to defendants on

this issue of proximate cause. "In a diversity action for negligence, we apply the law

of the forum state," Jordan v. NUCOR Corp., 295 F.3d 828, 834 (8th Cir. 2002), in

this case, Nebraska. Heatherly contends that, in granting JML to defendants, the

district court misapplied Nebraska law regarding proximate cause and failed to

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Heatherly, the non-moving party.

We review a district court's grant of JML de novo and apply the same standards as the

district court. Sip-Top, 86 F.3d at 830. A motion for JML is properly granted where

"a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary

basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party" on that issue. Id. (quotation

omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. Judgment as a matter of law "is appropriate where the

evidence is such that . . . there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict."

Sip-Top, 86 F.3d at 830 (quotation omitted).

Thus, this case requires us to undertake a de novo review of the law of

proximate cause in Nebraska and its application by the court in this particular case.

Proximate cause analysis invariably involves complex issues of tort law in general,

and this case is no exception.
3

While the Nebraska Supreme Court, in Sacco v. Carothers, 567 N.W.2d 299

(Neb. 1997), instructed Nebraska courts to discontinue separately instructing juries

about efficient intervening causes, it did not remove the notion from proximate cause

doctrine in Nebraska. The court, in fact, reaffirmed that "the question of efficient

intervening causation is, in essence, one of proximate causation. The concepts of

negligence and proximate cause are sufficient to encompass notions of efficient

intervening causation without the [separate instruction]." Id. at 306.

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A. Foreseeability: The Crux of Nebraska Proximate Cause Law

Under Nebraska negligence law, proximate cause consists of three elements:

that (1) but for the negligence, the injury would not have occurred, (2) the injury is

the natural and probable result of the negligence, and (3) there is no efficient

intervening cause.3

 Shelton v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 320 N.W.2d 748,

752 (Neb. 1982). The foreseeability of an injury that results from a negligent act

determines whether that injury is the "natural and probable result" of the act. "To

constitute proximate cause . . . the injury must be the natural and probable result of

the negligence, and be of such a character as an ordinarily prudent person could have

known, or would or ought to have foreseen might probably occur as the result." 

Steenbock v. Omaha Country Club, 195 N.W. 117, 118 (Neb. 1923) (emphasis

added). "The law does not require precision in foreseeing the exact hazard or

consequence which happens. It is sufficient if what occurs is one of the kind of

consequences which might reasonably be foreseen." Brown v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist.,

306 N.W.2d 167, 171 (Neb. 1981) (quotation omitted). Further, "[a] proximate cause

is a cause that produces a result in a natural and continuous sequence, unaccompanied

by an efficient intervening cause, and without which the result would not have

occurred." Tapp v. Blackmore Ranch, Inc., 575 N.W.2d 341, 348 (Neb. 1998). An

efficient intervening cause

is a new and independent act, itself a proximate cause of a result, which

breaks the causal connection between the original wrong and the result.

A person is not legally responsible for a result if it would not have
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resulted but for the interposition of an efficient intervening cause, which

he should not have reasonably anticipated or reasonably foreseen.

Id. (emphasis added).

Causation is "ordinarily a question for the trier of fact." Id. See King v.

Crowell Mem'l Home, 622 N.W.2d 588, 594 (Neb. 2001); Sharkey v. Bd. of Regents

of the Univ. of Neb., 615 N.W.2d 889, 900 (Neb. 2000) ("[I]n the proximate cause

context . . . foreseeability is a question of fact for the finder of fact."); Knoll v. Bd.

of Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 601 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Neb. 1999) (same); Kozicki

v. Dragon, 583 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Neb. 1998) ("Determination of causation is

ordinarily a matter for the trier of fact."). Only where the evidence is such that "only

one inference can be drawn" is it "for the court to decide whether a given act or series

of acts is the proximate cause of the injury." Tapp, 575 N.W.2d at 348. See Tess v.

Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 557 N.W.2d 696, 706 (Neb. 1997) ("The issue of proximate

cause, in the face of conflicting evidence, is ordinarily a question for the trier of

fact."). The determination of causation is for the trier of fact because of the unique

role foreseeability plays in causation. In Kozicki, the Nebraska Supreme Court cited

Hill v. Yaskin, 380 A.2d 1107 (N.J. 1977), in holding that the role of foreseeability

as it applies to determinations of duty and causation presents "two separate issues,"

a point upon which we elaborate below. 583 N.W.2d at 339.

In the instant case, it is difficult to tell the extent to which the role of

foreseeability was considered in the analysis of proximate cause. This leaves us with

two concerns. First, the question of causation was decided as a matter of law, when

it is generally a matter of fact under Nebraska law. Second, though the district court

relied on relevant precedent, our analysis of Nebraska proximate cause law dictates

a different outcome. As an initial matter, proximate cause appears to have been

analyzed from the standpoint that "'X' is a condition, therefore 'X' is not a cause."

Instead, we think the question should have been "Is 'X' a proximate cause?" and if it
-7-

is not, then "X" may be merely a condition. This latter approach follows the weight

of Nebraska law which makes foreseeability the axis around which the causecondition analysis rotates. It also makes more sense of the difficult inquiry involved

in distinguishing cause from condition. This is so because it makes the finding of a

condition the product of the proximate cause analysis.

Finally, though Alexander's negligence was determined to have been an

intervening cause of the collision, which it was, we believe an analysis of the

foreseeability of that negligence acting in concert with the parked MST truck should

have been a more prominent factor in the overall analysis. The question of whether

an act is a proximate cause, or simply a non-actionable condition, is determined by

whether it was foreseeable that the initial act could join with the intervening act to

cause the alleged injuries.

1. Causation a Matter for the Trier of Fact

As earlier noted, under Nebraska law, causation is generally a determination

for the trier of fact because of the function foreseeability plays in the analysis. When

legal duty is the issue, foreseeability is also a necessary element but it shoulders a

different burden. Indeed, the Nebraska Supreme Court has specifically recognized

the confusion caused by these differing roles. "[T]he distinction between

foreseeability as it applies to duty and as it applies to proximate cause is a critical

distinction that is too often and too easily overlooked." Sharkey, 615 N.W.2d at 900.

See Knoll, 601 N.W.2d at 763; Kozicki, 583 N.W.2d at 339 ("The district court did

not make a distinction between the application of foreseeability to determining duty

and the role foreseeability plays in determining proximate cause. However, duty and

proximate cause are two separate issues."). In Yaskin, upon which the Nebraska

Supreme Court relied in Kozicki, the court explained that foreseeability in terms of

causation "relate[s] to the question of whether the specific act or omission of the

defendant was such that the ultimate injury to the plaintiff was a reasonably
4

Referring to the classic debate between Judge Cardozo and Judge Andrews in

Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), over the extent of and

distinction between duty and causation.

-8-

foreseeable result so as to constitute a proximate cause of the injury." 380 A.2d at

1109.

Foreseeability that affects proximate cause . . . relates to the question of

whether the specific act or omission of the defendant was such that the

ultimate injury to the plaintiff reasonably flowed from defendant's

breach of duty . . . . Foreseeability in the proximate cause context

relates to remoteness rather than the existence of a duty.

Knoll, 601 N.W.2d at 763 (second alteration in original) (quotation omitted). 

By contrast, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that "foreseeability, in the

duty context, is a legal question for the court." Id. (emphasis added). "'[Duty] is

entirely a question of law . . . and it must be determined only by the court. It is no

part of the province of a jury to decide . . . whether the Long Island Railroad is

required to protect Mrs. Palsgraf from fireworks explosions.'" Id. (alterations in

original) (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §

37 at 236 (5th ed. 1984)).4

 That is because

[f]oreseeability as it impacts duty determinations refers to

the knowledge of the risk of injury to be apprehended. The

risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be

obeyed; it is the risk reasonably within the range of

apprehension, of injury to another person, that is taken into

account in determining the existence of the duty to exercise

care.

Id. (quotations omitted). In Knoll, the Nebraska Supreme Court specifically

overruled some of its earlier cases that, in the court's view, had tended to confuse the
5

The parties do not contest that the MST truck was negligently parked, and that

the district court based its ruling on the issue of proximate cause. Thus, we need not

concern ourselves with an analysis of foreseeability in the duty context. We mention

the differing treatment only to show the contrast.

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role of foreseeability by stating that foreseeability as to duty and causation were both

for the trier of fact. Id. at 762-63. In the process of overruling those cases, the court

clearly stated that duty is a question of law, while causation is a question of fact. Id.5

By deciding the question of causation as a matter of law after the jury

deadlocked, a jury was not allowed–in this case, a future jury, after declaration of the

mistrial–to consider the evidence presented and determine from it whether the

Heatherlys' injuries reasonably flowed, at least in part, from Gilbertson's negligent

parking of the MST truck on the shoulder of the exit ramp. That is, the jury was not

allowed to perform its duty of calibrating the limits of liability flowing from an

established duty and breach thereof with regard to the collision between the motor

home and the negligently parked MST truck. Unless there was insufficient evidence

for a jury to determine causation, or the evidence was such that a reasonable jury

could draw but one inference about the foreseeability of the resulting accident, JML

was not appropriate.

We believe that there was sufficient evidence to create a jury question

regarding causation. Given the evidence in the record, we cannot say that it would

be unreasonable for a jury to determine that it was foreseeable that the parking of the

MST truck on the shoulder of the exit ramp could result in a collision and injuries of

the type suffered by the Heatherlys. 

Michael Williams testified as an expert for the plaintiffs, basing his opinions

on his experience as an over-the-road truck driver with approximately forty-four years

of work in the trucking industry. At various times, he worked as a driver, corporate

safety director, general fleet manager, truck driver trainer, Federal Motor Carrier
-10-

Safety Regulations compliance consultant, and truck driver training program

developer. Williams testified that, in his opinion, (1) Gilbertson had parked in an

unsafe location, (2) truck drivers are trained not to park adjacent to a deceleration

lane because of the risk of collision with high-speed traffic exiting a freeway, and (3)

truck drivers should park at truck stops away from traffic. 

Nebraska State Patrol Trooper Ross Lyon, a fourteen-year veteran with

expertise in accident reconstruction testified that (1) most high-speed traffic on the

freeway travels in the right-hand lane, the one adjacent to the deceleration lane and

shoulder where the MST truck was parked, (2) the MST truck was not at all parked

within the confines of the rest area, (3) the shoulder of deceleration lane where the

MST truck was parked was not designed for truck drivers to stop for rest, and (4) the

MST truck was illegally parked in an unsafe location, creating a hazard. Nebraska

State Patrol Trooper Darwin Daily, a sixteen-year veteran who became an accident

reconstruction specialist in 1989, testified that at the time of the accident, a "No

Parking" sign was posted on the shoulder of the exit ramp to the rest area. Gilbertson

himself testified that parking within the rest area or at a truck stop would have been

safer alternatives to parking the MST truck on the shoulder of the exit ramp. 

Stephen Fenton, an engineer who specializes in accident reconstruction using

photogrammetry (the science of gathering dimensions from photographs), testified

that had the MST truck not been parked where it was that night, the Heatherlys' motor

home, instead of colliding with the MST truck, would have followed a parallel path

to that of the Alexander truck and would have ended up in the grassy area beyond the

shoulder of the deceleration lane. It was the impact between the motor home,

traveling at the time at an estimated sixty-seven miles-per-hour, and the parked MST

truck, that Fenton likened to "hit[ting] . . . a brick wall." That impact surpassed, by

some twenty-seven miles-per-hour, the forty mile-per-hour difference in velocity at

which point collisions are denoted "extreme," according to Fenton. Fenton testified

that, by contrast, the impact between the truck driven by Alexander and the motor
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home was "very minor" given that their speeds at the time of impact differed by only

six miles-per-hour. Several aerial and close-range photographs of the accident scene,

as well as diagrams of how the accident occurred, show that the MST truck was

parked very close to the high-speed traffic lanes of the interstate highway before and

during the accident. This, along with other evidence we find unnecessary to recount,

was sufficient to create a jury question about the issue of foreseeability and, thus,

causation.

2. Finding of Condition Derives From Analysis of

Foreseeability in Proximate Cause Context

The district court relied primarily on Steenbock and Knuth v. Singer, 116

N.W.2d 291 (Neb. 1962), for its conclusion that Gilbertson's parking of the MST

truck on the exit ramp merely created a condition for, and therefore was not a cause

of, the fatal collision. However, the cause-condition analysis, in light of more recent

precedent, reveals that a finding of a condition derives from, and does not determine,

proximate cause. A finding of proximate cause emerges from an analysis of the

foreseeability that the injury could arise from the negligent act. In fact, the decision

in Steenbock rests on the matter of foreseeability. In Steenbock, an Omaha Country

Club employee had placed a flagpole across a club driveway for repair. A car

negligently drove on the driveway in such a fashion that it struck the flagpole and

propelled one end of it "with great violence" into the back of the plaintiff sitting

nearby, causing unspecified injuries. 195 N.W. at 118. In holding that it was the

negligent driving, and not any assumed negligent placement of the flagpole, that was

the proximate cause of the employee's injuries, the Nebraska Supreme Court

explained that a proximate cause must "be of such a character as an ordinarily prudent

person could have known, or would or ought to have foreseen might probably occur

as the result." Id. The court continued:
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It is not sufficient that the negligence charged does nothing more than

furnish a condition by which the injury is made possible, and if such

condition causes an injury by the subsequent independent act of a third

person, the two acts are not concurrent and the existence of the

condition is not the proximate cause of the injury.

Id.

The results in Steenbock were such that it could not be said that they were the

foreseeable consequence of the country club employee's placement of the flagpole

across the driveway for repair. That is, the injuries were not such that "an ordinarily

prudent person could have known, or would or ought to have foreseen" that they

might result from placing the flagpole across the driveway. Id. (emphasis added).

While it might be foreseeable that placing a flagpole across a driveway could create

a hazard to cars (or their passengers) which might hit it or try to avoid it, or to

pedestrians, who might trip over it, it is much less foreseeable that someone sitting

near the driveway would be injured by the movement of a flagpole placed across it.

Thus, the court first rejected the placing of the pole as a proximate cause, because of

the unforeseeability of the injury, and then concluded that the pole "simply furnished

a condition" for the accident. Id. In the present case, the district court did not

mention that it considered the foreseeability of the Heatherlys' injuries being caused

by the negligently parked MST truck, and apparently did not analyze causation in that

context. It instead determined that the parking of the truck was a condition, and thus

not a cause, seemingly inverting the analysis.

The district court also relied upon Singer, where plaintiff was a passenger in

a car (for clarity, "plaintiff's car") that came upon the scene of a collision. Three cars

had been proceeding in the lane ahead of plaintiff's car. The first of these cars,

wanting to make a left turn, had stopped for oncoming traffic. The second car

stopped behind the first. The third car did not stop and struck the second car, causing

the third car to block a portion of the highway. Plaintiff's car then struck the third car,
-13-

causing plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff sued the driver of the third car. The Nebraska

Supreme Court held that the position of the third car was but a condition that made

the accident possible, and that the negligence of the driver of plaintiff's car in failing

to keep a proper lookout was the efficient intervening cause of plaintiff's damages.

Singer is also distinguishable. Indeed, rather than turning on foreseeability,

Singer turns on a more fundamental failure of proximate causation that is not at issue

in this case–failure of the "but-for" element under Nebraska law. It appears that the

Singer court held that the second collision was not at all caused by the first. The

evidence showed that had the third automobile not been negligently operated, but

instead had come to a safe stop behind the second vehicle, plaintiff's car would still

have collided with it as a result of plaintiff's car being driven negligently. Since

plaintiff would have been injured regardless of the actions or position of the third

automobile, the court held that the third automobile was but a condition, and not a

cause, of the accident. The intervening negligent driving of plaintiff's car was the

sole cause of plaintiff's injuries.

3. Continuing Negligence, Intervening Causes, and the

Role of Foreseeability

Moreover, other Nebraska cases seemingly more on-point with the instant case

indicate that parking and maintaining the MST truck on the shoulder of the exit ramp

may have constituted continuing negligence that was a cause of the accident, and not

merely a condition.

In Johnson v. Metropolitan Utilities District, 125 N.W.2d 708 (Neb. 1964),

plaintiff was injured when the car in which she was riding collided with a front-end

loader tractor that defendants had parked off the side of a street, but left protruding

into the street some two feet. Defendants argued that the parked tractor "was at most

a condition and not a proximate cause of the injuries to the plaintiff." Id. at 710.
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They cited Singer, stating that an obstruction on a highway is a condition and not a

proximate cause of any subsequent injuries. The court, however, noted that the

difference between a mere condition that makes an intervening cause possible, and

continuing negligence that is a proximate cause, is the foreseeability of that

intervention:

[T]he doer of an original wrongful act that should reasonably cause one

to anticipate an injury therefrom is not relieved from liability for an

injury immediately brought about by an intervening cause . . . that is set

into operation by such original wrongful act, and that alone would not

have caused the injury, but which with the aid of the original wrong

does cause such injury.

Id. at 711 (emphasis added). See Brown, 306 N.W.2d at 171 (reversing summary

judgment for power district that had started fire to burn weeds, the smoke from which

caused a fatal accident on adjacent highway, stating that an intervening cause, if

foreseeable, does not relieve original actor of liability, and that "[t]he question

whether such negligence is a continuing and substantial factor in producing the

accident so as to be a proximate cause of the injury is . . . a question of fact . . . [for]

the jury"); Drawbridge v. Douglas County, 311 N.W.2d 898 (Neb. 1981) (holding that

failure to warn of car blocking highway was continuing negligence and not a

condition); Looney v. Pickering, 439 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Neb. 1989) (reversing

directed verdict for defendant who had parked truck and trailer in the curb lane of

busy Omaha street and where plaintiff negligently drove and collided with back of

truck, stating that "foreseeability is an important determinant of whether the

defendants are relieved of liability for their own negligence by the intervening

negligence of another" because plaintiff's negligence was not foreseeable by the

defendants, and concluding that "[w]e cannot make that finding as a matter of law").

The Johnson court also emphasized that the jury has a unique responsibility to make

the foreseeability determination when it said that where "the original negligence is

of a character which, according to the usual experience of mankind, is liable to invite
6

Nebraska Revised Statute § 60-6,164(2) provides: 

No person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle on a freeway

except in areas designated . . . except that when a vehicle is disabled

or inoperable or the driver of the vehicle is ill or incapacitated, such

vehicle shall be permitted to park, stop, or stand on the shoulder facing

in the direction of travel with all wheels and projecting parts of such

vehicle completely clear of the traveled lanes, but in no event shall such

parking, standing, or stopping upon the shoulder of a freeway exceed

twelve hours.

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or induce the intervention of some subsequent cause, the intervening cause will not

excuse it, and the subsequent mischief will be held to be the result of the original

negligence." 125 N.W.2d at 711 (emphasis added). In Johnson, the court concluded

that the failure of the defendants to warn motorists of the parked tractor constituted

"continuing negligence as distinguished from a condition." Id. "[A]nd if reasonable

minds could conclude from the evidence that such negligence proximately caused an

accident, then the issue should be submitted to a jury for its determination." Id. In

dismissing the applicability of Singer and the condition analysis, the court stated:

There is . . . a group of cases in which this court has held that where a

party creates an obstruction upon a highway and fails to use due care to

warn others of its danger, his negligence may be a proximate cause of

the injuries to another. . . . In these cases, it was held that it is a question

for the jury as to whether the original negligence was a proximate cause

of the injuries.

Id. In the present case, though the MST truck did not obstruct one of the driving

lanes, it did obstruct an emergency lane intended only for emergency stopping.6

 And

while warnings of the truck's location may have made little or no difference in this

instance, it is for a jury to decide whether a collision, regardless of the exact
7

In fact, the current edition of the Nebraska Jury Instructions states that

"[d]iscussion of conditions versus causes is discouraged." 1 Nebraska Jury

Instructions § 3.43 Comment IV (2d ed. 2004). That is because many of the cases

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circumstances, was reasonably foreseeable as a result of the MST truck being parked

so close to such high-speed traffic.

Finally, the Nebraska Supreme Court indicated in Delaware v. Valls, 409

N.W.2d 621 (Neb. 1987), that use of the cause-condition distinction may be falling

out of favor in Nebraska, and instead discussed causation in that case in terms of

active preexisting negligence. In Valls, plaintiff was injured as a passenger on a dirt

bike that collided with a car in an intersection. She sued the owners of property on

the corner of the intersection for failing to maintain vegetation and for parking a truck

near the intersection that made it difficult to see approaching traffic. The trial court

granted summary judgment in favor of the property owners, concluding their

negligence merely created a condition, and did not cause the accident. The Nebraska

Supreme Court recognized a number of cases that had applied the condition analysis,

but noted that 

situations involving passive preexisting negligence have been

distinguished from those situations in which active preexisting

negligence combines with subsequent independent acts of negligence to

cause injury. In the latter situations the preexisting and subsequent

negligence have been held to combine and become concurrent acts of

negligence such that each may be a proximate cause of the resulting

injury.

Id. at 623. The court pointed to cases like Brown and Johnson as examples. Notably,

the court recognized some merit in an argument that the cause-condition analysis

should be abandoned as "meaningless" in the sense that it "provid[es] no more

guidance than calling something blamable or not blamable," and that it had been

"almost entirely discredited."7

 Id. at 623-24 (quotations omitted). Nevertheless, the
making a distinction between cause and condition "are merely saying that the socalled condition was not a proximate cause of the injury." Id. (emphasis added). The

instructions also note cases involving two acts that concur to cause injury where the

first act merely provides the circumstance necessary for the second to bring about the

injury.

Some of these cases speak in terms of whether the first act was a cause

or a condition. But these cases, too, really turn upon whether the first

act was "a" proximate cause or the second act, "the" sole proximate

cause. Talk of conditions versus causes is really incidental to analysis

of proximate and superseding cause. . . . To the extent that [discussion

of conditions versus causes] confuses the real issues, it should be

avoided. In any event, recognizing that the real issue is proximate,

superseding cause, or both, can minimize the difficulties encountered

with many of these cases.

Id. at § 3.42 Comment (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 

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court avoided reexamining the distinction, deciding the case instead as a matter of

intervening cause. It upheld the grant of summary judgment because, unlike the

instant case, the evidence in Valls was not in conflict and reasonably pointed only to

the conclusion that the defendants could not have foreseen that the plaintiff would

negligently enter an intersection when the view was not clear. Id. at 624.

Under the facts, the present litigation is, in our analysis, better viewed in light

of cases about continuing negligence and the foreseeability of an intervening cause

rather than in light of, in particular, Singer. And Valls, in conjunction with language

from the Nebraska Jury Instructions, teaches us to proceed with caution in making the

cause-condition distinction in the first place.
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III. CONCLUSION

Because the question of causation was a matter for the jury to decide in this

case, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

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