[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-12106

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

SHERMAN ANDERSON MORTON, III, 

ASHLYN AIKEN MORTON, 

Plaintiffs-Counter Defendants-Appellants,

versus

LIEN FILERS, ETC. OF HEATH W. WILLIAMS, L.L.C., 

Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellee,

HEATH W. WILLIAMS, L.L.C., 

Defendant-Appellee.

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____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-03211-TWT

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This case arises under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(“FDCPA”). Plaintiffs Sherman Anderson Morton, III and Ashyln 

Aiken Morton (“Mortons”) engaged in a dispute with Tigeski, 

L.L.C., over a bill Tigeski issued the Mortons for remediation work 

it performed at the Mortons’ residence. The Mortons, through 

their attorney Ronald Daniels, mailed Tigeski and its attorney,

Heath Williams, from Lien Filers, Etc. of Heath W. Williams, 

L.L.C. (“Lien Filers”), a proposed settlement for $2,000. Without 

including Williams on the response e-mail, a Tigeski employee 

accepted the offer. When Williams found out about the 

settlement, he expressed his strong disapproval of Daniels 

resolving a settlement with Williams’s client without Williams’s 

approval. Daniels then stated that he assumed Tigeski was no 

longer interested in the deal. Williams responded that Tigeski 

would take the deal but requested an additional $450 in attorneys’ 

fees. The Mortons filed a motion to enforce the original $2,000 

settlement, and Tigeski agreed to settle for $2,000. 

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After the parties settled, the Mortons brought this federal 

suit, alleging that Williams’ request for $450 in attorneys’ fees 

violated the FDCPA. The district court adopted a magistrate 

judge’s report and recommendation granting summary judgment 

to Williams. Because we find that Williams’s e-mail was a 

counteroffer in an ongoing settlement negotiation, rather than an 

attempt to collect a debt, we hold that the e-mail falls outside the 

FDCPA. Accordingly, we affirm. 

I. Background

In July 2019, the Mortons entered into a work authorization 

contract with Tigeski for Tigeski to perform water remediation 

work at the Mortons’ residence. The Mortons disputed the final

bill. On August 28, 2019, Tigeski filed a “Materialman’s and 

Mechanic’s Claim of Lien.” On October 4, 2019, the Mortons filed 

and recorded a notice that they were contesting the lien. Tigeski 

then engaged the law firm, Lien Filers, to perfect its lien by 

initiating a lien action. On November 12, 2019, Williams, an 

attorney for Lien Filers, initiated the lien action by filing a claim in 

the Magistrate Court of Dekalb County. 

On December 11, 2019, Daniels, the Mortons’ lawyer,

mailed a letter to both Williams and Tigeski proposing to settle “all 

of these interrelated claims” for $2,000. Daniels represented that if 

the offer was not accepted “by close of business on December 20, 

2019,” the Mortons would “be filing responsive pleadings including 

a counterclaim against [Tigeski] and seeking to have the case 

transferred to State Court.” 

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On December 19, 2019, without including Williams, a 

Tigeski employee named Sue Jefcoat initiated a series of e-mails 

with Daniels and “communicated acceptance” of the settlement to 

Daniels. The day after, Jefcoat reached out to Daniels to confirm 

that he had received her “acceptance.” Daniels acknowledged that 

he had received the acceptance. On December 23, 2019, Jefcoat

asked Daniels for an update on “the status of payment and

settlement agreement.”

On December 26, 2019, Daniels replied asking for Tigeski’s 

attorney’s e-mail information, noting that the rules of professional 

conduct required him to communicate with the company’s lawyer

because the company was represented by counsel. Jefcoat 

responded with Williams’s e-mail address and phone number, this 

time copying Williams on the e-mail. On December 27, 2019, 

Williams responded, acknowledging receipt of Daniels’ and 

Jeffcoats’ e-mail, and stating that Daniels could either e-mail 

Williams or call him. 

On December 30, 2019, Daniels e-mailed Williams a 

“proposed release.” A contentious exchange followed. Williams 

responded, “Can you tell me why you negotiated a resolution with 

my client that has been represented by counsel since the outset?”

Daniels then explained the nature of his e-mail communications 

with Jefcoat. But Williams responded that he “really [didn’t] care 

what [his] client did” and that Daniels “knew [Tigeski] w[as]

represented by counsel” yet still communicated with a Tigeski 

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employee without involving counsel. Williams demanded to 

know how long Daniels had been practicing law. 

Based on the previous exchange, Daniels responded that he 

assumed Tigeski was “no longer interested in resolving this 

matter,” so he would “proceed accordingly.” Williams responded 

that Daniels was “intentionally avoiding the point” that Daniels

“had absolutely no right to discuss anything with [Williams’s] client 

knowing they were represented and in doing so ha[d] violated

several ethics guidelines.” Williams concluded the e-mail by again

asking Daniels how long he had been practicing law, emphasizing 

that he “want[ed] an answer.” Daniels responded that he had been 

practicing since 2012, to which Williams responded, “Then [you] 

should know better.” 

Daniels then asked Williams to “[p]lease confirm whether 

your client still intends to accept the terms sent to your office on 

December 11, 2019 by 5:00 P.M. today[;] [o]therwise we will 

proceed as advised in the letter.” Williams responded telling 

Daniels to “[g]o fuck [him]self,” that Daniels was “[at] minimum . 

. . looking at a reprimand from the state bar if this [wa]s reported,” 

and that he would not “put up with [Daniels] placing any kind of 

arbitrary and short timeline” on the matter.

The next day, December 31, 2019, Williams e-mailed 

Daniels, stating that Tigeski had told him they would “accept the 

$2,000 and split their attorneys fees to date of $900.00,” meaning

“this [matter] would resolve for $2,450.00.” Daniels relayed this 

information to the Mortons. The same day, Daniels, on behalf of 

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the Mortons, filed responsive pleadings in the lien action, and a 

motion to enforce the settlement agreement, or alternatively, to 

transfer the case to DeKalb County State Court. 

On January 3, 2020, Williams e-mailed Daniels that,

although the Mortons’ motion to enforce the settlement 

agreement had “zero” chance of being granted, Tigeski wished to 

go through with the original $2,000 deal. Daniels responded that 

he would forward the check to Williams as soon as it was received. 

Following payment, the parties filed a mutual dismissal of the lien 

action with prejudice. 

After the state action was dismissed, the Mortons, now 

represented by different counsel, brought the instant suit against

Lien Filers and Williams in federal court. The Mortons alleged that 

Williams’s e-mails with Daniels violated several provisions of the

FDCPA. Specifically, focusing on the e-mails from December 30 

and 31, 2019, the Mortons alleged that defendants, who were debt 

collectors within the meaning of the FDCPA, (1) violated 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692d by telling Daniels to “go fuck” himself, (2) violated § 

1692e(2)(A) and § 1692f(1) by “seeking to collect amounts” they 

“were not authorized to collect,” (3) violated § 1692e(11) by “not 

disclosing in the initial communication” that “the communication 

was from a debt collector and was an attempt to collect a debt,”

and (4) violated § 1692g by not providing the required notices in its 

communications. 

After a contentious discovery period, defendants moved for 

summary judgment. Following oral argument on the motion, the 

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magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”), 

recommending that the defendants’ motion be granted. The 

magistrate judge divided his analysis of the communications into

two parts: (1) the December 30, 2019 e-mail chain, ending with

Williamstelling Daniels to “go fuck” himself, and (2) the December 

31, 2019, e-mail where Williams told Daniels that Tigeski would

settle the case for $2,000 plus an additional $450 in attorneys’ fees. 

As to the December 30, 2019, e-mail chain, the magistrate 

judge ruled that the communications were not made in connection 

with the collection of any debt, noting that the e-mails did not 

allege the Mortons owed a debt, demand payment, or threaten 

future collection proceedings. Instead, the magistrate judge held 

that the December 30, 2019, e-mailsrelated to “Williams’s opinion” 

that Daniels had violated the rules of professional conduct “by 

communicating directly with [an entity] whom” Daniels knew was 

represented by counsel. 

As to the December 31, 2019, e-mail from Williams stating 

that Tigeski would settle for $2,000 plus an additional $450 in 

attorneys’ fees, the magistrate judge held that this e-mail was also

not debt collection activity. While the magistrate judge

acknowledged that this was a “closer call” because it was a request 

for payment of money, it held that “no reasonable jury could 

conclude” that the e-mail “qualified as debt collection activity”

because it “lack[ed] virtually all the hallmarks of a debt collection 

communication.” Rather, according to the magistrate judge, 

Williams’s e-mail was prompted by Daniels’s request that Williams 

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“confirm whether [Tigeski] still intend[ed] to accept the terms sent 

to [his] office on December 11, 2019 by 5:00 P.M. today.” Daniels’s 

request, the magistrate judge reasoned, “created an air of 

ambiguity about whether settlement had been reached in the 

parties’ minds.” Thus, the magistrate judge reasoned that 

Williams’s response was a counteroffer, not an affirmative demand 

for payment. 

The district court adopted the R&R over plaintiffs’ 

objections, holding that “the only reasonable way to interpret Mr. 

Williams’s [December 31] e-mail is as an effort to continue 

negotiating the amount of a settlement payment to resolve the 

DeKalb Action, and not toward the collection of a debt.” 

The Mortons appealed. 

II. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo. Owens v. Governor’s Off. of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327, 

1333 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. denied 143 S. Ct. 2465 (2023). Summary 

judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

(quotations omitted). “A genuine issue of material fact does not 

exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving 

party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.” Chapman 

v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

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(quotations omitted). All submitted evidence is viewed in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party. Owens, 52 F.4th at 1333.

III. Discussion

The Mortons raise two issues on appeal. First, they argue 

that a jury could find that Williams’s December 31, 2019, e-mail

stating that Tigeski would settle for $2,450 was a demand for more 

money post-settlement in violation of the FDCPA.1 Second, they 

argue that the district court erred by granting summary judgment 

on grounds that were not raised by the parties: the unenforceability 

of the settlement agreement that Jefcoat accepted on December 19, 

2019. 

A. FDCPA Challenge

As relevant to the Mortons’ challenge on appeal, the FDCPA

prohibits a “debt collector” from using “any false, deceptive, or 

misleading representation or means in connection with the 

collection of any debt,” including a false representation of “the 

character, amount, or legal status of any debt[.]” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692e(2)(A). The FDCPA also prohibits a “debt collector” from 

using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to 

collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Such prohibited conduct 

includes collecting “any amount (including any interest, fee, 

charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless 

1 The Mortons do not challenge the district court’s ruling as to the December 

30, 2019, e-mail exchange that ended with Williams telling Daniels to “go 

fuck” himself. 

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such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the 

debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).2

Thus, the FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show (1) that the 

defendant is a debt collector, (2) that the challenged conduct 

related to debt collection, and (3) that the challenged conduct was

prohibited under the statute. See Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & 

Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012). Defendants 

concede that they qualify as a debt collector for purposes of the first 

element.

As to the second element, we have held that “[a]

communication has the necessary nexus to debt collection under 

the FDCPA if it conveys information about a debt and its aim is at 

least in part to induce the debtor to pay.” Lamirand v. Fay Servicing, 

LLC, 38 F.4th 976, 979 (11th Cir. 2022). We make this 

determination by viewing the communication “holistically.” Id. 

Several aspects of a communication suggest that it is 

connected to debt collection. For example, (1) explicit language 

that a lender is “attempting to collect a debt,” (2) demands for “full 

and immediate payment of all amounts due,” (3) threats that fees 

2 Along with violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) and § 1692f(1), the Mortons’ 

complaint also alleged violations of § 1692a(2), § 1692d, § 1692e(11), and 

§ 1692g. But the Mortons make no arguments related to these alleged other 

violations on appeal, so those claims are abandoned. See Sapuppo v. Allstate 

Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We have long held that 

an appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references 

to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and 

authority.”).

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will be added or legal action will be commenced if all amounts on 

the debt are not paid, (4) instructions on how the debt must be paid, 

or (5) filing a lawsuit to collect the debt. See Reese, 678 F.3d at 1217

(debt collection activity found where lender sent letter that 

demanded “full and immediate payment of all amounts due,” 

threatened that attorney’s fees would be added unless payment 

was made, and was enclosed with other documents that stated that 

the lender was “attempting to collect a debt” (emphasis omitted)); 

Caceres v. McCalla Raymer, LLC, 755 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2014)

(debt collection activity found where lender sent letter that stated 

it was “for the purpose of collecting a debt,” referred throughout 

to “collection efforts,” stated the debt amount and how to pay it, 

and stated that additional attorneys’ fees would accrue as collection 

efforts continued); Leblanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 

1188, 1193 (11th Cir. 2010) (debt collection activity found where 

lender sent letter stating legal action might ensue if debt was not 

resolved within 35 days, and lender subsequently filed lawsuit); 

Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 34 F.4th 1260, 1268 (11th Cir. 

2022) (debt collection activity plausibly stated where lender sent 

mortgage statement noting it was “an attempt to collect a debt,” 

asked for payment of a certain amount by a certain date, and 

provided for a late fee). 

The Mortons’ FDCPA challenge fails because Williams’s 

December 31, 2019, e-mail was not debt collection activity. The 

e-mail—stating that Tigeski would accept the proposed settlement 

of $2,000 but was requesting $450 additional dollars for attorneys’ 

fees—contained none of the recognized hallmarks of debt

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collection activity. The e-mail was not a letter stating that it was 

“attempting to collect a debt” or demanding “full and immediate 

payment.” See Reese, 678 F.3d at 1217. Nor did the e-mail threaten 

legal action or additional fees if the Mortons did not pay within a 

certain time. See Lamirand, 38 F.4th at 980; Leblanc, 601 F.3d at 

1188, 1193. 

Instead, given the context of the e-mail, we agree with the 

district court that the e-mail was a counteroffer in what was 

reasonably perceived to be an ongoing settlement negotiation. 

While the parties do not dispute that Jefcoat’s December 19, 2019, 

e-mail was an acceptance of the $2,000 settlement, the subsequent 

e-mails created ambiguity as to the finality of that agreement. To 

recap, because Tigeski’s counsel, Williams, was not copied on the 

e-mail when Jefcoat accepted Daniels’s offer, Williams told Daniels 

that Daniels “had absolutely no right” to do what he did and that a 

motion to enforce that settlement had “zero” chance of being 

granted. And after Williams expressed his strong disapproval of 

Daniels’s actions, Daniels stated that he assumed Tigeski was “no 

longer interested in resolving this matter,” and asked Williams to 

“confirm whether” Tigeski “still intend[ed] to accept” the $2,000 

settlement offer. 

These communications suggest that negotiations were still

ongoing. Given this backdrop, Williams’s December 31, 2019, 

e-mail—accepting the proposed settlement agreement of $2,000, 

but requesting $450 additional dollars for attorneys’ fees—was a 

counteroffer in a continuing negotiation, rather than a demand for 

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collection of a debt. See Daniels, 34 F.4th at 1271 (suggesting that 

“the history of the parties” reflects whether communication was a 

debt collection attempt). Thus, this e-mail was not debt collection 

activity and so falls outside the scope of the FDCPA.3

B. Whether the district court violated Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 56(f)(2) 

The Mortons also argue that the district court violated

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(2) when it “ma[d]e the 

enforceability of the underlying settlement agreement an issue” in 

its ruling. They argue that neither party made arguments about

the enforceability of the settlement agreement, nor did the district 

court give the parties notice and a reasonable time to respond that 

it was planning to rule on the enforceability of the underlying 

settlement agreement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(2) (providing that a

court may grant a motion for summary judgment “on grounds not 

raised by a party” after “giving notice and a reasonable time to 

respond”).

The Mortons’ challenge fails because the district court did 

not rule on the enforceability of the settlement agreement. Recall 

that the magistrate judge found that “Daniels’s request that Mr. 

Williams confirm the settlement amount created an air of

3 Because a communication must be debt collection activity to fall within the 

FDCPA, our holding that Williams’s e-mail was not debt collection activity 

resolves the case. Thus, we need not address the third prong: whether the 

debt collection activity involved conduct that was prohibited by § 1692e(2)(A)

and § 1692f. 

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ambiguity about whether settlement had been reached in the 

parties’ minds.” It then clarified that “[w]hether the Mortons could

move to enforce the terms of the $2,000 settlement is a separate 

question from whether the parties believed they were still

negotiating, and whether those negotiations could have resulted in 

a modification of the settlement terms without offense to the 

FDCPA.” Thus, rather than ruling on the enforceability of the 

alleged settlement agreement, the magistrate judge, in 

determining whether the exchange constituted debt collection 

activity, merely considered the context of the e-mail exchange and 

concluded that Williams’s e-mail was intended to be a counteroffer

and not a demand for payment of a debt.4 

Regardless, even accepting the Mortons’ argument that the 

district court’s ruling effectively passed on the enforceability of the 

settlement, there still was no Rule 56(f) violation. First, the parties 

put the e-mail exchange related to the settlement directly at issue 

in this appeal by asserting that the e-mails violated the FDCPA. 

Second, the parties argued in their respective summary judgment 

motions that an enforceable settlement agreement existed. Third,

the magistrate judge held oral argument and, according to 

Tigeski’s brief on appeal, questioned the parties about the existence 

4 Nor did the district court, in adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, make a ruling as to the enforceability of the settlement agreement. It similarly stated that “the only reasonable way to interpret Mr. Williams’s e-mail is as an effort to continue negotiating the amount of a settlement 

payment to resolve the DeKalb Action, and not toward the collection of a 

debt.” 

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of the settlement agreement and advised the parties that the 

existence of a settlement agreement was a question of law for the 

court to decide.5 In other words, the parties had adequate notice 

and opportunity to be heard on the existence and enforceability of 

the settlement agreement. Accordingly, the Mortons are not 

entitled to relief on this issue either. 

AFFIRMED. 

5 Although we do not have a transcript of the oral argument, the Mortons do 

not dispute Tigeski’s contention. 

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