1

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re C.S.

No. 22-592 (Kanawha County 22-JA-73)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Father J.S.

1 appeals the Circuit Court of Kanawha County’s June 30, 2022,

order terminating his parental rights to C.S.

2 Upon our review, we have determined that oral 

argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is 

appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21(c).

In February of 2022, the DHHR filed a petition alleging that petitioner neglected and 

psychologically abused C.S. According to the petition, petitioner frequently belittled the child, 

repeatedly referring to him as “pussy” and “retard,” and also telling the child he will “be nothing 

when he grows up” and that he should “leave and never come back.” The petition further alleged

that the child disclosed physical abuse by petitioner. Finally, the petition alleged that petitioner

neglected the child due to substance use, citing C.S.’s disclosure that petitioner is “the most 

violent and aggressive when drunk” and drinks “three to four times weekly.” The DHHR later 

amended the petition to include allegations regarding petitioner’s conduct during the 

proceedings. Thereafter, petitioner waived the preliminary hearing.

An adjudicatory hearing was held on May 11, 2022. A DHHR worker testified that, 

roughly two weeks after the preliminary hearing, petitioner tested positive for amphetamines and 

methamphetamines and that he was then offered in-patient and out-patient treatment but declined

both. Petitioner failed to respond to at least five other testing requests and tested positive for 

1

Petitioner appears by counsel Rebecca Stollar Johnson. The West Virginia Department 

of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”) appears by Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and 

Assistant Attorney General Heather L. Olcott. Jennifer N. Taylor appears as the child’s guardian 

ad litem. 

2

We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. 

See W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e). 

FILED

May 16, 2023

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
2

methamphetamines again on April 20, 2022. The court also heard testimony from the child and 

petitioner, after which the circuit court adjudicated petitioner as an abusing and neglectful parent.

On May 19, 2022, less than two weeks from the adjudicatory hearing, the DHHR filed a 

motion to cease petitioner’s services because petitioner “is uncooperative . . . and continues to 

send harassing text messages to service providers.” The motion referenced several instances of 

text communications between petitioner and various DHHR workers and providers, including

messages from petitioner stating the following: “I’m not participating. You guys can keep that 

soft ass rat kid. He doesn’t deserve to have my last name”; “I’m not jumping through stipid [sic] 

human trick hoops taking meaningless classes that I’ve probably already taken”; “if he’s that

soft, he doesn’t belong here”; and “take his bitch ass to foster care.” The motion also referenced

the fact that petitioner sent another DHHR worker ten harassing text messages in one day. The 

motion was granted on an emergency basis until the parties could convene for a hearing. 

On May 31, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing to address the motion to cease services, 

noting that petitioner “failed to respond to the [m]otion; failed to appear at the hearing after 

receiving proper notice; and failed to otherwise cooperate with his counsel and the Department.”

Ultimately, the court granted the DHHR’s motion to cease services and granted the guardian’s 

motion prohibiting petitioner from having any contact with the child and the child’s mother. The 

order also prohibited petitioner from speaking directly with any DHHR caseworkers and directed 

all communication between petitioner and the DHHR to be made through petitioner’s counsel. 

Despite these extreme measures, the DHHR filed a petition for contempt on June 9, 2022, based 

on petitioner’s continued harassment of DHHR workers. Three days prior to the petition’s filing, 

petitioner was criminally charged with intimidation of a public official based on this conduct. 

Just two days after his criminal charge, petitioner continued harassing a DHHR worker via text.

The petition also alleged that he violated the confidentiality of the proceedings by sending 

paragraphs of messages to a friend of the child’s mother with confidential information about the 

case, stating, “I just wanted to let you know the quality of the individual I know you have been 

close to in your life.”

The circuit court reconvened in this matter on June 22, 2022, for a disposition hearing. 

During the hearing, the DHHR presented evidence that petitioner refused to participate with the 

services offered and violated the court’s orders by threatening DHHR personnel and sharing 

confidential information about the case. The court also found that petitioner’s text messages 

“reflected anger and disrespect towards his son,” which “demonstrated that he was not 

committed to a healthy relationship with his child, and had made no efforts to establish one.”

After taking testimony and evidence, the court concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood 

that petitioner could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future 

and ordered that terminating petitioner’s parental rights to C.S. was necessary for the welfare of 

the child.

3 It is from this order that petitioner appeals. 

3

The mother’s parental rights were also terminated. The permanency plan for C.S. is 

guardianship in his current placement. 
3

On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the 

circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, In re 

Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). First, petitioner argues that the DHHR failed to 

make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Petitioner argues that the exceptions listed in West

Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(7) absolving the DHHR of its responsibility to make such efforts do 

not apply to this case; therefore, petitioner argues that the DHHR “failed to make any effort, let 

alone ‘reasonable’ efforts.”

Petitioner is correct in asserting that the DHHR is required, in most circumstances, “to 

provide supportive services in an effort to remedy circumstances detrimental to a child.” W. Va. 

Code § 49-4-601(d). However, it is abundantly clear from the record that any claim that the 

DHHR “failed to make any effort” has no merit. Here, the DHHR offered petitioner numerous 

services, yet petitioner not only expressly refused to cooperate with the services offered, he went 

so far as to harass the DHHR personnel responsible for assisting him in completing those 

services to the point that he was charged criminally for his conduct. The record is replete with 

petitioner’s anger, outbursts, threats, and defiance with the DHHR workers and service

providers, thus showing his refusal to participate in a reasonable plan designed to reunify the 

family.

Petitioner’s argument that the DHHR “made no effort to attempt to accommodate” him is 

also without merit, as the record shows that the DHHR immediately complied with his requests 

for accommodation, such as changing the location of his services, only for petitioner to continue 

in his lack of cooperation. As the circuit court noted, petitioner simply refused to attend services, 

traveled out of town for extended stays without notifying workers, and, eventually, stated that he 

was no longer participating in certain services. Simply put, there is no basis in the record for any 

of petitioner’s contentions that the DHHR did not make reasonable efforts to reunify the family, 

given that the DHHR offered extensive accommodation in the face of petitioner’s openly hostile 

actions. As such, he is entitled to no relief.

Next, in his second and final assignment of error, petitioner argues that the circuit court 

erred in terminating his parental rights “when the least restrictive alternative was termination of 

custodial rights.”4 Petitioner’s argument here is largely based on C.S.’s inability to inherit 

benefits from him and his unsupported assertion that terminating parental rights to a sixteenyear-old child “flies in the face of public policy.” Not only is there no authority for a parent 

being permitted to retain their parental rights simply because of a child’s advanced age, 

petitioner ignores the fact that C.S. being sixteen years old at the time of disposition required the 

court to give consideration to his wishes. See W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)(C) (“[T]he court 

shall give consideration to the wishes of a child 14 years of age or older . . . regarding the 

permanent termination of parental rights.”). Throughout the case and through C.S.’s own 

testimony, C.S. consistently expressed his fear of his father. When asked by the court if he 

4

Petitioner erroneously alleges that termination was inappropriate “when the least 

restrictive alternative had already been accomplished through relinquishment of custodial

rights.” There is no evidence in the record that petitioner relinquished his custodial rights to the 

child.
4

wanted to return to live with his father prior to turning eighteen, C.S. responded “no.”

Additionally, the circuit court made the findings necessary for termination of petitioner’s 

parental rights upon ample evidence. See W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) (permitting a circuit 

court to terminate parental rights upon finding that there is no reasonable likelihood that the 

conditions of neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future and when necessary for the 

child’s welfare); see also Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) 

(permitting termination of parental rights “without the use of intervening less restrictive 

alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood . . . that conditions of neglect 

or abuse can be substantially corrected”). Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to no relief.

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its 

June 30, 2022, order is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: May 16, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Tim Armstead

Justice John A. Hutchison

Justice William R. Wooton

Justice C. Haley Bunn