#24062-aff in pt & rev in pt & rem-SLZ 

2007 SD 122 

IN THE SUPREME COURT 

OF THE 

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 

* * * * 

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee, 

 v. 

JOSHUA STEVEN BECKLEY, Defendant and Appellant. 

* * * * 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT 

OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 

MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 

* * * * 

HONORABLE PETER H. LIEBERMAN 

Judge 

* * * * 

LAWRENCE E. LONG 

Attorney General 

CRAIG M. EICHSTADT 

Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for plaintiff 

Pierre, South Dakota and appellee. 

STEVEN R. BINGER Attorney for defendant 

Sioux Falls, South Dakota and appellant. 

* * * * 

 CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS 

 ON FEBRUARY 13, 2007 

 OPINION FILED 12/5/07 
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ZINTER, Justice 

[¶1.] Joshua Beckley (Beckley) appeals his conviction of possession of a 

controlled substance. He contends that the trial court failed to properly advise him 

of his right to compel witnesses prior to receiving his guilty plea. He also contends 

that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to continue the sentencing 

hearing to allow a psychological evaluation. We affirm on the advisement of rights 

issue, but reverse and remand for resentencing for the failure to grant the 

continuance. 

[¶2.] After being previously told to leave, Beckley was observed videotaping 

a young woman at a retail store in Sioux Falls. He was again asked to leave and 

law enforcement responded. Earlier that day Beckley was involved in another 

incident where he stopped two young women in a car, approached them with a video 

camera, and asked them to get out of their vehicle. He claimed he was a city 

employee investigating littering. The women refused his request, left the scene, 

and reported the incident to law enforcement. 

[¶3.] During a search incident to his subsequent arrest, methamphetamine 

was found in Beckley’s sock and a methamphetamine pipe with residue was found 

in his vehicle. While he was free on bond on these charges, Beckley was observed 

taking pictures of a young girl from behind. In yet another incident, Beckley was 

observed staring in windows and attempting to enter a university dormitory 

wearing only underwear and a tank top. In a final incident, Beckley was arrested 

for driving under the influence. As a result of the foregoing conduct, Beckley was 
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charged with possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, 

unlawful occupancy, window peeking and third offense driving under the influence. 

[¶4.] On April 6, 2005, Beckley was arraigned before Magistrate Judge Julie 

Irvine. During the arraignment he was advised of his constitutional and statutory 

rights, including the right to compel witnesses. On May 16, 2005, Beckley appeared 

before Circuit Judge Peter H. Lieberman for a second arraignment. Beckley was 

again advised of his constitutional and statutory rights, including the right to 

compel witnesses. Thereafter, Beckley entered into a plea agreement under which 

he agreed to plead guilty to possession of methamphetamine in exchange for a 

dismissal of the remaining charges and reduction of the third offense DUI to a 

misdemeanor. 

[¶5.] On January 13, 2006, Beckley appeared with counsel at his change of 

plea hearing. Judge Lieberman again informed Beckley of his constitutional and 

statutory rights, but this time did not inform him of his right to compel witnesses. 

The court did, however, canvass defense counsel concerning Beckley’s 

understanding of his rights. Counsel indicated Beckley understood the 

consequences of his plea after their “considerable discussion.” Beckley then entered 

a guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. The DUI charge was the subject 

of a separate proceeding that is not at issue in this appeal. 

[¶6.] On March 8, 2006, Beckley appeared for sentencing on the 

methamphetamine offense. Judge Lieberman asked Beckley’s separate counsel on 

the DUI charge if she and Beckley had also discussed his constitutional and 

statutory rights. She indicated they had. Defense counsel on the 

methamphetamine charge then attempted to call two sentencing mitigation 
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witnesses and sought a continuance to obtain psychological testing at the 

defendant's own expense to be utilized at sentencing. This motion for the 

continuance was accompanied by a subpoena for Jack Dodge, a former doctor and 

one of Beckley’s fellow inmates who was awaiting sentencing on federal drug 

charges. Counsel sought to call Dodge as a witness to Beckley’s mental state, which 

would have further supported the request for the psychological testing in mitigation 

of punishment. A handwritten note from Dodge explained the nature of his 

proposed testimony. The motion was finally supported by an affidavit of counsel 

indicating that the continuance was necessary because of a conflict in the 

scheduling of a professional examination. The circuit court denied the request to 

call the witness and denied the request for a continuance. Beckley was sentenced to 

eight years in the state penitentiary. He appeals raising two issues. 

I. 

[¶7.] Whether Beckley should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea 

because the sentencing court did not advise him of his right to 

compel witnesses prior to receiving the guilty plea. 

[¶8.] “[I]n order for a conviction based upon a guilty plea to stand the plea 

must be intelligent and voluntary. Such a plea is intelligent and voluntary when 

the accused has a full understanding of his constitutional rights and, having that 

understanding, waives these rights by a plea of guilty.” Lodermeier v. State, 273 

NW2d 163, 164 (SD 1978) (citations omitted).1 SDCL 23A-7-4 (Rule 11(c)) 

1. Furthermore, “a plea of guilty cannot stand unless the record in some 

manner indicates a free and intelligent waiver of the three constitutional 

rights mentioned in Boykin self-incrimination, confrontation and jury trial 

and an understanding of the nature and consequences of the plea.” 

Lodermeier, 273 NW2d at 165. Beckley does not contend he was not properly 

advised of these Boykin rights. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US 238, 243, 89 

SCt 1709, 1712, 23 LEd2d 274, 280 (1969). 
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“establishes a procedure for the judge to follow to ensure that a guilty plea is 

knowing and voluntary.” State v. Goodwin, 2004 SD 75, ¶7, 681 NW2d 847, 850. 

That statute provides: 

Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere a 

court must address the defendant personally in open 

court, subject to the exception stated in 23A-7-5, and 

inform him of, and determine that he understands, the 

following: 

(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is 

offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided 

by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty 

provided by law; 

(2) If the defendant is not represented by an 

attorney, that he has the right to be represented by 

an attorney at every stage of the proceedings 

against him and, if necessary, one will be appointed 

to represent him; 

(3) That he has the right to plead not guilty or to 

persist in that plea if it has already been made, and 

that he has the right to assistance of counsel, the 

right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 

against him, and the right not to be compelled to 

incriminate himself; 

(4) That if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere 

there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that 

by pleading guilty or nolo contendere he waives the 

right to a trial, the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses against him, and the right not 

to be compelled to incriminate himself; and 

(5) That if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, 

 the court may ask him questions about the offense 

 to which he has pleaded, and if he answers these 

 questions under oath, on the record, and in the 

 presence of counsel, his answers may later be used 

 against him in a prosecution for perjury. 

[¶9.] Although SDCL 23A-7-4 does not specifically require an advisement of 

the right to compel witnesses, both the United States and South Dakota 
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Constitutions guarantee that right. US Const amend VI; SD Const art VI, sec 7. 

This Court has reiterated the United States Supreme Court's characterization of 

the right to compulsory process: 

The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to 

compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms 

the right to present a defense, the right to present the 

defendant’s version of the facts as well as the 

prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth 

lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the 

prosecution’s witnesses for the purpose of challenging 

their testimony, he has the right to present his own 

witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a 

fundamental element of due process of law. 

State v. Wiegers, 373 NW2d 1, 8 (SD 1985) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 US 

14, 19, 87 SCt 1920, 1923, 18 LEd2d 1019, 1023 (1967)).2

[¶10.] Although compulsory process has been recognized as a fundamental 

element of due process, the failure to advise a defendant of all constitutional and 

statutory rights does not necessarily vitiate a guilty plea. For example, SDCL 23A7-4 has been characterized as only a “procedural safeguard” for determining that a 

guilty plea is knowing and voluntarily entered. State v. Miller, 2006 SD 54, ¶18, 

717 NW2d 614, 620. “There is no requirement that the record show an express 

enumeration by the court nor an express waiver by the defendant . . . as a condition 

precedent to a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea.” State v. Moeller, 511 NW2d 

803, 810 (SD 1994) (citation omitted). Furthermore, even “[s]pecific articulation of 

the Boykin rights by the trial judge is not an indispensable requisite for the record 

to establish a valid plea.” Id. “It is sufficient when the record in some manner

shows the defendant entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily.” Id. “The 

2. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(e) specifically requires an 

advisement of the defendant’s right to compel the attendance of witnesses. 
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record need only show that he knew of his rights and the consequences of his guilty 

plea.” Id. 

[¶11.] Beckley, however, cites this Court’s decision in State ex rel. Henning v. 

Jameson, 71 SD 144, 22 NW2d 731 (1946), for the proposition that the failure to 

advise of the right to compel witnesses before receiving a guilty plea requires 

automatic reversal. In that case, this Court held that a failure to advise a pro se

defendant of various rights, including the right to confront the witnesses against 

him, the right to compulsory process for the witnesses on his behalf, and the right to 

a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county was a jurisdictional defect 

entitling the defendant to habeas relief when the record indicated the defendant did 

not sufficiently understand these rights. Id. at 732-33. At the time Henning was 

decided, this Court recognized a presumption that a defendant represented by 

counsel waived these rights by a guilty plea; however, a pro se defendant did not. 

Id. This dichotomy was abandoned following the United States Supreme Court 

decision in Boykin, which required the record to affirmatively establish the waiver 

of the three constitutional rights mentioned in Boykin- self-incrimination, 

confrontation and jury trial. Nachtigall v. Erickson, 85 SD 122, 128, 178 NW2d 

198, 201 (1970). 

[¶12.] Under the modern framework, the more analogous South Dakota cases 

are Lodermeier, 273 NW2d at 165, and State v. Gagne, 421 NW2d 502, 503 (SD 

1988). In Lodermeier, the defendant was not advised of his right to confront 

witnesses (a Boykin right) or his right to compel witnesses on his behalf (a nonBoykin right). 273 NW2d at 165. In Gagne, the defendant was not advised of his 

right to confront and cross-examine witnesses (a Boykin right) or his right to 
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compulsory process to secure witnesses (a non-Boykin right). 421 NW2d at 503. In 

both cases, the Court reversed in accord with Boykin. However, in this case Beckley 

was advised of his Boykin rights, and Boykin rights do not include compulsory 

process. 

[¶13.] Additionally, in both Lodermeier and Gagne, the record did not 

indicate the defendants were otherwise aware of their rights. “The standard was 

and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among 

the alternative causes of action open to the defendant.” Moeller, 511 NW2d at 810. 

Therefore, although it is advisable to inform a defendant of his right to compulsory 

process, not doing so is not automatic reversible error. As the Colorado Supreme 

Court explained: 

[W]e reject the defendant’s claim that the trial court’s 

advisement did not satisfy the requirements of due 

process because the trial court failed to advise the 

defendant that he could subpoena out-of-state witnesses 

at the state’s expense. Due process of law does not 

require that a court inform a defendant of every 

conceivable constitutional right that might be waived by a 

guilty or nolo contendere plea. Carried to its logical 

extreme, this argument would require a court before 

accepting a guilty or nolo contendere plea, to inform a 

defendant, among other things, of his right to be free from 

cruel and unusual punishment, his right to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures, his right to be 

protected against being placed twice in jeopardy for the 

same crime, and his right to reasonable bail. 

People v. Drake, 785 P2d 1257, 1272 (Colo 1990). See also State v. Moses, 127 P3d 

330, 335-40 (Kan 2006) (recognizing the failure to advise a defendant of compulsory 

process and other rights does not automatically result in the withdrawal of a guilty 

plea and examining the circumstances surrounding that plea including a written 

waiver, representation by counsel, familiarity with the criminal justice system and 
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defendants familiarity with the case against him and the benefit of the plea 

agreement); State v. Salter, 515 So2d 609, 610 (LaCtApp 1987) (concluding “[t]he 

right to compulsory process is not one of the rights required by the trial judge in 

order to [e]nsure that a guilty plea is knowingly and intelligently made.”); State v. 

Rau, 367 NW2d 613, 616 (MinnCtApp 1985) (holding failure to advise of right to 

subpoena witnesses does not affect the validity of a guilty plea); State v. Miller, 518 

P2d 127, 129 (Ariz 1974) (holding failure to advise of right to compel witnesses and 

plead not guilty are not required by Boykin and there “is absolutely no requirement 

that [defendant] be advised of any other rights in order to be able to enter a valid 

guilty plea.”). 

[¶14.] Rather than mechanically determining whether certain rights were 

given, we look to “the totality of the circumstances when ascertaining whether a 

plea was made knowingly and voluntarily.” Goodwin, 2004 SD 75, ¶11, 681 NW2d 

at 852. “In examining the ‘totality of the circumstances’ we have taken into 

consideration the following factors: the defendant’s age; his prior criminal record; 

whether he is represented by counsel; the existence of a plea agreement; and the 

time between advisement of rights and entering a plea of guilty.” Goodwin, 2004 

SD 75, ¶ 11, 681 NW2d at 852 (internal citations omitted). 

[¶15.] In this case, Beckley was thirty years old; he was represented by 

counsel; and although this was his first felony, he had a prior criminal history of 

driving under the influence, theft, reckless driving and driving without a license. In 

addition to the knowledge gained from the foregoing experiences, he was advised on 

three occasions, including the day he entered his guilty plea, of the required 

constitutional and statutory rights in accord with Boykin and SDCL 23A-7-4. Most 
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significantly, he negotiated a plea agreement and was twice advised of his right to 

compel witnesses. Thereafter, Beckley actually subpoenaed a witness to testify at 

his sentencing hearing, demonstrating that he was aware of this right. On this 

record, we conclude that Beckley's plea was not unknowingly or involuntarily 

entered simply because the trial court did not advise him of his right to compel 

witnesses a third time. 

II. 

[¶16.] Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to 

continue the sentencing hearing to allow Beckley to obtain a 

psychological evaluation. 

[¶17.] On March 2, 2006, six days before sentencing, Beckley moved to 

continue the sentencing hearing in order to obtain a psychological evaluation at his 

own expense. The motion was supported by an affidavit from defense counsel 

indicating that a professional evaluator (Michael McGrath) had been contacted but 

was unable to complete the evaluation in time for the sentencing hearing. Counsel 

indicated he only learned of this on March 1, 2006. The motion was also supported 

by the letter from Dodge, the fellow inmate and former doctor, recommending that 

Beckley receive a psychological examination. 

[¶18.] At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel again sought permission to 

call Dodge as a witness to Beckley’s mental state. The trial court immediately 

asked to see both attorneys in chambers for an off-the-record discussion. Upon 

returning, the court indicated a record needed to be made to support the need for 

the psychological evaluation. After argument from counsel, the trial court denied 

the request to call Dodge, finding he lacked credibility and the presentence 
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investigation was “extremely complete.” The trial court also denied permission to 

allow Beckley’s foster father to testify. 

[¶19.] After the testimonial requests were denied, defense counsel proceeded 

to argue the request for continuance to obtain the psychological evaluation from the 

professional evaluator. The trial court denied that motion stating: 

I have a report from the Human Services Center and I 

also have an extensive letter from your client. Okay, so 

[defense counsel] we are going to proceed with sentencing 

and if you would, please, proceed with your sentencing 

comments. 

This possession of other psychological information is the only reasoning reflected in 

the record for denial of the motion for continuance. Although Beckley is not 

appealing the trial court’s denial of the witness’ testimony, he argues that the trial 

court erred in refusing to continue the hearing. Beckley contends that an 

evaluation would have allowed him to present psychological evidence in mitigation 

at the sentencing hearing, particularly concerning his sexual proclivities. 

[¶20.] A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a continuance is reviewed 

under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Letcher, 1996 SD 88, ¶29, 552 

NW2d 402, 407. “An abuse of discretion refers to a discretion exercised to an end or 

purpose not justified by, and clearly against reason and evidence.” State v. 

Asmussen, 2006 SD 37, ¶13, 713 NW2d 580, 586 (citations omitted). 

[¶21.] “In deciding whether to grant a continuance, a trial court must 

consider: (1) whether the delay resulting from the continuance will be prejudicial to 

the opposing party; (2) whether the continuance motion was motivated by 

procrastination, bad planning, dilatory tactics or bad faith on the part of the moving 

party or his counsel; (3) the prejudice caused to the moving party by the trial court’s 
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refusal to grant the continuance; and, (4) whether there have been any prior 

continuances or delays." In re J.G.R., 2004 SD 131, ¶15, 691 NW2d 586, 591. 

Furthermore, before imposing sentence, the trial court must acquire a thorough 

acquaintance with the character and history of the defendant: 

[T]he circuit court must “acquire a thorough acquaintance 

with the character and history of the [person] before it.” 

The Hinger/Bonner factors are the appropriate factors for 

the circuit court to consider when determining 

sentencing, which include the defendant’s “general moral 

character, mentality, habits, social environment, 

tendencies, age, aversion or inclination to commit crime, 

life, family, occupation, and previous criminal record.” In 

addition, the trial court considers the rehabilitation 

prospects of the particular defendant. 

State v. Blair, 2006 SD 75, ¶27, 721 NW2d 55, 63-64 (internal citations omitted). 

[¶22.] In this case, the trial court was presented with a presentence 

investigation detailing Beckley’s comments regarding the offense. It also included 

personal information such as Beckley's family, marital, educational, military, 

religious, medical, employment and financial history. The presentence report 

finally included Beckley's plea agreement, prior criminal record, and a discussion of 

his drug and alcohol problems. Although the professional evaluations contained in 

the presentence report mentioned past problems with depression, as well as sexual, 

emotional and physical abuse, they did not go into any detail about those issues. 

Those evaluations focused on Beckley’s drug and alcohol addiction, which was 

understandable considering the fact that Beckley was being sentenced for the 

possession of a controlled substance. The presentence report did, however, 

specifically recommend further assessment in the areas of Beckley's sexual abuse 

and depression. It was also recommended that Beckley “[b]e seen by a 

physician/psychiatrist through the Community Health Clinic for medical assistance 
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and possible medication management for mental health issues.” There is no 

indication that such assessments were conducted, and the presentence report does 

not include any detail on these issues.3

[¶23.] Despite these omissions and the denial of Beckley's request for his own 

psychological evaluation, the sentencing transcripts indicate that the court 

proceeded with sentencing focusing on Beckley’s sexual proclivities. In fact, that 

was the trial court’s main concern and motivating factor for the sentence it imposed. 

The trial court’s statement in sentencing speaks for itself: 

I don’t even know where to start here. If this were just a 

methamphetamine case, I would treat it as I do with 

other possession of methamphetamine cases where we 

have a jail sentence and a person goes into treatment and 

I try to keep them out of the penitentiary. I am sorry to 

say that this is more—more than a methamphetamine 

case. He is being sentenced on methamphetamine, but as 

we all know I am required to take into consideration all of 

the facts of someone’s life and it isn’t the possession of 

methamphetamine that is of greater concern to me, in 

this case, it is the sexual proclivity of Mr. Beckley. It 

appears to me that during the period of time that he was 

under the jurisdiction of this Court or immediately before 

that time he was involved in three separate sexual 

incidents and I share [victim’s father’s] concern about the 

defendant involving his daughter. When I hear that this 

man had weapons on him, that he was stopping young 

girls and video taping them and saying that he was a 

personal investigator for the City and I heard he had 

knives on his person, [victim’s father], you are not the 

only one who got the chills, I did also. 

3. SDCL 23A-27-6 provides: 

The report of a presentence investigation shall contain any prior 

criminal record of the defendant and such information about his 

characteristics, his financial condition, and the circumstances affecting 

his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or in granting 

probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant, and such 

other information as may be required by the court. 
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* * * 

We then have the incident at the [university] where Mr. 

Beckley is in underwear and he is peeking into the 

windows of young women, and then I also remember that 

the State brought Mr. Beckley before this Court to have 

his bond revoked based on the fact that he was out at the 

driver’s license bureau and, again, was taking 

photographs and it should be noted that he wasn’t taking 

pictures of any women’s behinds, but, again, my memory 

serves me that he was taking photographs of the behinds 

of very young women. This is a real problem here and the 

particular problem is that Mr. Beckley, under the 

jurisdiction of this Court, knew that he was facing 

penitentiary time and despite that was unable to control 

his sexual proclivities. 

Frankly, in this case, I have reached the point where I am 

frightened. I am frightened for the young women of this 

community as to where this is going. Mr. Beckley has 

knives, he’s stopping women saying he is a private 

investigator, taping them, and all the while he was under 

the supervision of this Court. This situation has gotten 

too scary for me to take any chances. 

You talk about throwing someone else away, I don’t throw 

people away, I work with people who have 

methamphetamine problems, but when someone keeps 

committing sexual crimes, the Court gets scared and I am 

scared. Now, at some point the balance has to shift. I 

have some concern for Mr. Beckley and I realize that he 

has serious problems, but at some point the balance of the 

scale has to shift towards the safety of girls in our 

community, and I am afraid that through his repeated 

actions over and over and over again that has caused that 

balance to shift traumatically. If he needs help, he’ll have 

to receive that help at the penitentiary. At this point he 

needs to get himself under control. He’s too scary at this 

point to be on the streets of this city and community. I 

am imposing a sentence of eight years in the South 

Dakota State Penitentiary. 

These concerns continued after sentencing. The trial court's judgment of conviction 

recommended that the Parole Board obtain a psychosexual evaluation and have 

Beckley placed in a sex offender group. This record demonstrates that Beckley’s 
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psychosexual state was the major motivating factor and weighed heavily in the trial 

court's formulation of its sentence. 

[¶24.] Notwithstanding this focus, the court denied the continuance twice 

stating its belief that it had adequate information on this subject. The record does 

not support the trial court's conclusion. The information in the presentence report 

(or otherwise before the Court) was wholly lacking concerning the psychological 

aspects of Beckley's sexual proclivities, the area of main concern to the trial court in 

determining punishment. More importantly, the denial of Beckley's requests for 

continuance to present highly relevant and potentially mitigating evidence violated 

SDCL 23A-27-1. That statute provides in relevant part: 

At such hearing, the court shall allow the defense counsel 

an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant and 

shall address the defendant personally and ask him if he 

wishes to make a statement in his own behalf and to 

present any information in mitigation of punishment. 

[¶25.] Although we are not suggesting that the failure to include particular 

information in a presentence investigation is a matter that is generally appealable, 

in this case we consider that fact because it was the sole basis for the trial court's 

denial of the continuance and Beckley had a right to present that information to the 

sentencing court. “Fundamental principles of procedural fairness apply with no less 

force at the penalty phase of a criminal trial than they do in the guilt-determining 

phase of a criminal trial.” State v. Phelps, 297 NW2d 769, 776 (ND 1980) (citing 

Presnell v. Georgia, 439 US 19, 99 SCt 235, 58 LEd2d 207 (1978)).4 

4. It is important to note that this is not a case where a defendant sought to 

contest the factual allegations contained in a presentence report. See Hansen 

v. Kjellsen, 2002 SD 1, ¶11, 638 NW2d 548, 552 (recognizing “the defense has 

a right to comment on the presentence report and may introduce evidence.”); 

State v. Jensen, 1998 SD 52, ¶58, 579 NW2d 613, 623 (“[D]ue process 
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[¶26.] Unable to procure the mitigating psychological evaluation allowed 

under SDCL 23A-27-1, counsel proceeded to the request for a continuance. This 

was denied by the trial court without an analysis of the In re J.G.R. factors. See 

supra ¶21. We have also been pointed to no evidence in the record that a 

continuance would have been prejudicial to the State or that it was motivated by 

bad faith or dilatory tactics.5 Yet, there is evidence that such an evaluation would 

have provided the trial court with relevant psychological information concerning 

Beckley’s mental state and sexual proclivities.6 The trial court recognized that fact, 

requires a defendant who contests the accuracy of factual information relied 

upon by a sentencing court be given an opportunity to rebut or explain that 

information.”). Rather, Beckley sought to supplement that report with 

relevant evidence relating to the topic of most concern to the trial courtinformation that was otherwise absent. 

5. While there is some contention in the brief that the motion for a continuance 

was not filed as quickly as it could have been because of informal discussions 

occurring between the State and Beckley’s trial counsel relating to further 

psychological testing, that evidence is not contained in the record and we do 

not consider it here. 

6. Even if the dissent were correct in noting that the trial court "was well 

informed as to the detail and extent of Beckley's perverse conduct," infra ¶36, 

that is not the question. The question is whether Beckley was denied the 

statutory right to present mitigating evidence relating to that conduct. 

Moreover, that right was not satisfied because "both Beckley and defense 

counsel had an opportunity to speak at the . . . sentencing hearing." See infra

¶39. Neither Beckley nor his counsel was competent to provide a 

psychological evaluation, and without that type of evaluation we can only 

speculate whether the trial court's ultimate sentence would have been 

different. Further, the dissent’s assertion that our decision here will 

discourage trial courts from ordering presentence reports in the future is 

untenable. A defendant’s statutory right to present mitigation evidence is 

not dependent upon a trial court’s decision to order a presentence report. 
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recommending such an evaluation after Beckley was incarcerated. 7 

[¶27.] On this record, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the 

continuance to allow Beckley to obtain the psychological evaluation to mitigate the 

evidence relating to his sexual misconduct. The trial court failed to consider the 

relevant continuance factors, its sole reason for denying the continuance was not 

supported, and its denial of Beckley's attempt to present this mitigation witness 

violated the statutory right to present mitigation evidence. Compare, State v. Milk, 

2000 SD 28, ¶23, 607 NW2d 14, 21 (foreclosing the defendant from seeking to reopen the sentencing phase to allow psychological evidence because he did not 

attempt to call the witness or seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing). 

Therefore, we reverse and remand for resentencing after Beckley has been provided 

an opportunity to obtain a psychological evaluation. 

[¶28.] Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. 

[¶29.] SABERS, KONENKAMP and MEIERHENRY, Justices, concur. 

[¶30.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, concurs in part and dissents in part. 

7. This case is distinguishable from State v. Jensen, 1998 SD 52, ¶57, 579 

NW2d at 623 (holding decision denying expert witness testimony during 

sentencing concerning impact of prison term on juvenile offender was not a 

denial of due process) and State v. Iron Necklace, 430 NW2d 66, 81-82 (SD 

1988) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a 

continuance to allow defendant to present mitigating evidence in the form of 

letters and affidavits from family members when they were not requested 

until the day before the hearing). Beckley’s motion was filed six days prior to 

the sentencing hearing and one day after learning that his expert could not 

complete the evaluation in time. Finally, the purpose of the requested 

continuance was to obtain mitigating evidence concerning conduct that was 

not the subject of the guilty plea but nevertheless was the most aggravating 

sentencing factor in the view of the court and was an area virtually 

untouched in the presentence report. 
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GILBERTSON, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

[¶31.] While I concur with the Court’s holding on Issue 1, I write to dissent 

with its holding on Issue 2 – that the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing 

to continue the sentencing hearing to allow Beckley to obtain a psychological 

evaluation pertaining to his sexual proclivity. The Court’s decision is based on its 

position that the presentence report was incomplete and that the circuit court had 

inadequate information to pass sentence without the psychological evaluation that 

Beckley argues would have provided the justification for mitigating his sentence. I 

cannot agree. 

[¶32.] It is the duty of a sentencing court to insure that the punishment 

“fit[s] the offender and not merely the crime.” State v. Anderson, 1996 SD 46, ¶32, 

546 NW2d 395, 403 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 US 241, 247, 69 SCt 1079, 

1083, 93 LEd 1337, 1342 (1949)). In order to impose an appropriate sentence, the 

sentencing court must “acquire a thorough acquaintance with the character and 

history of [the defendant.]” State v. Blair, 2006 SD 75, ¶27, 721 NW2d 55, 63 

(citing State v. Bonner, 1998 SD 30, ¶19, 577 NW2d 575, 580 (quoting State v. 

Chase in Winter, 534 NW2d 350, 354-55 (SD 1995))). Appropriate factors to 

consider when determining sentence include, “the defendant’s ‘general moral 

character, mentality, habits, social environment, tendencies, age, aversion or 

inclination to commit crime, life, family, occupation, and previous criminal record.’” 

Id. (citing Bonner, 1998 SD 30, ¶19, 577 NW2d at 580 (quoting Chase in Winter, 

534 NW2d at 354-55)). “This consideration may include . . . ‘uncharged conduct.’”8 

 

8. While the sentencing court has “wide latitude” in determining an appropriate 

sentence, see McKinney II, 2005 SD 74, ¶17, 699 NW2d at 466 (citing State v. 

Milk, 2000 SD 28, ¶10, 607 NW2d 14, 17 (citation omitted)), in order to 
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Id. ¶27, 721 NW2d at 64 (quoting State v. McKinney, 2005 SD 74, ¶17, 699 NW2d 

460, 466 (McKinney II) (citing United States v. Schaefer, 291 F3d 932, 944 (7thCir 

2002))). However, “[t]he primary criterion in sentencing is good order and 

protection of the public and society, and all other factors must be subservient to 

that end.” Anderson, 1996 SD 46, ¶31, 546 NW2d at 403 (citations omitted). 

[¶33.] Whether, a presentencing investigation and report is ordered is a 

discretionary matter. SDCL 23A-27-5.9 When there is sufficient evidence in the 

record, enabling the meaningful exercise of sentencing discretion, the presentence 

report is superfluous. Id. See supra note 9 (setting out that when there is sufficient 

evidence in the record on which to base a sentence, a sentencing court need only 

then state said basis for the record). 

 

consider uncharged conduct, the State must prove such conduct by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Id. ¶18, 699 NW2d at 466 (citations omitted). 

 Although Beckley argues that the circuit court did not adequately consider 

the psychological underpinnings of his perverse sexual behavior, he did not 

object to the sentencing court’s consideration of this uncharged conduct nor 

does he on appeal claim error in the sentencing court’s consideration of same. 

9. SDCL 23A-27-5 provides: 

A presentence investigation may be ordered in the discretion of a court. The 

court services officer of a court shall make a presentence investigation and 

report to the court before the imposition of sentence or the granting of 

probation unless, with the permission of the court, the defendant waives a 

presentence investigation and report, or the court finds there is in the record 

information sufficient to enable the meaningful exercise of sentencing 

discretion, and the court explains this finding on the record. 

The report shall not be submitted to a court or its contents disclosed to 

anyone unless the defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or has 

been found guilty, except that a judge may, with the written consent of the 

defendant, inspect a presentence report at any time. 

(Emphasis added). 
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[¶34.] In this case, the sentencing court ordered a sentencing hearing that 

was held on March 8, 2006. In advance of this hearing, the court reviewed a 

presentence report. After reviewing the record, it is apparent, as the court pointed 

out at the hearing, the report is “very complete.” It contains voluminous 

information about Beckley including family and marital history, his level of 

education, military service, employment and financial and medical records as well 

as information about his religious background. In addition, the report also noted 

that Beckley had had periods of depression and that he had been sexually abused.10

 Further, the report discussed in detail Beckley’s problems with drugs and alcohol. 

Nevertheless, the Court concludes that since the sentencing court emphasized its 

concern over Beckley’s history of perverse sexual behavior when imposing sentence, 

Beckley was entitled to a continuance in order to include a psychological evaluation 

aimed at explaining his sexual proclivity, thereby providing a basis to mitigate his 

sentence. 

[¶35.] Despite the fact that Beckley offered no explanation as to why the 

evaluation had not been completed in advance of the March 8, 2005 sentencing 

hearing,11 the Court bases its conclusion that Beckley was entitled to the 

continuance on an interpretation of SDCL 23A-27-6 that it believes required the 

presentence report to include more findings about Beckley’s sexual proclivity. 

SDCL 23A-27-6 provides: 

10. The report indicates that Beckley received a substantial monetary award as a 

participant in a class-action law suit seeking damages for victims of sexual 

abuse that occurred in a group home operated by the State of Washington. 

11. The fact that Beckley’s expert was unable to attend the sentencing hearing 

does not constitute a reason for why the psychological evaluation had not 

been completed by that late date. 
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 The report of a presentence investigation shall contain 

any prior criminal record of the defendant and such 

information about his characteristics, his financial condition, 

and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be 

helpful in imposing sentence or in granting probation or 

in the correctional treatment of the defendant, and such 

other information as may be required by the court. 

(Emphasis added). The only requirement under this statute is that the presentence 

report “shall contain any prior criminal record.” After ordering a presentence 

investigation and report, the sentencing court then has the discretion to direct that it 

include whatever other information “as may be helpful” and “required” in imposing 

sentence. 

[¶36.] In addition to the detailed presentence report in this case, the record 

indicates that the sentencing court was well informed as to the detail and extent of 

Beckley’s perverse conduct. As reflected in the Court’s opinion, supra note 10, the 

sentencing court went to great lengths to establish for the record the basis for its 

sentence. 

[¶37.] The sentencing court discussed at length how Beckley had pulled over 

a car with two young girls on April 5, 2005, under the false pretence of working 

undercover for the City of Sioux Falls. The court discussed how he attempted to 

videotape the girls. Later that day, Beckley was arrested for methamphetamine 

possession at the Best Buy in Sioux Falls after police had been summoned there to 

investigate his strange behavior, which included videotaping other young women. 

There, Beckley was found in possession of the video camera and knives. The 

camera’s videotape contained footage of the rear ends of young women at Best Buy. 

 The videotape also included footage of Beckley engaged in sex acts. After being 

released on bail, Beckley was again taken into custody on May 10, 2005, when 
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police were summoned to the driver’s licensing office in Sioux Falls after Beckley 

was observed photographing another young girl. Finally, on September 13, 2005, 

Beckley was arrested for window peeking and attempting to force his way into a 

women’s dormitory on the campus of a Sioux Falls University. During this episode, 

Beckley was wearing only underwear and a tank top. 

[¶38.] Despite the obvious and extensive justification for the sentence handed 

down by the court, this Court now determines that Beckley was entitled to a 

continuance on the chance that a psychological evaluation of his perverse sexual 

behavior would have rendered some finding that the sentencing court would have 

justified as a reason to impose a lesser sentence. This defies reason. The record is 

replete with evidentiary support for the sentencing court’s determination that 

Beckley’s behavior posed a clear and present danger to the community, thereby 

justifying the lengthy sentence that he received. 

[¶39.] The Court also concludes that the sentencing court’s refusal to grant a 

continuance violated SDCL 23A-27-1.12 However, the Court is mistaken in this 

assessment as well since, as required by that statute, both Beckley and defense 

12. SDCL 23A-27-1 provides in pertinent part: 

Sentences shall be imposed without unreasonable delay, but not within fortyeight hours after determination of guilt. A defendant may waive the fortyeight hour delay. Before imposing a sentence, a court may order a hearing in 

mitigation or aggravation of punishment. At such hearing, the court shall 

allow the defense counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant 

and shall address the defendant personally and ask him if he wishes to make 

a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of 

punishment. 

(Emphasis added). 
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counsel had an opportunity to speak at the discretionary sentencing hearing. See 

supra note 12 (SDCL 23A-27-1). While under the statute Beckley was entitled “to 

present any information in mitigation of punishment,” see supra note 12 (SDCL 

23A-27-1), the only thing that the Court can point to that Beckley was not able to 

present was the psychological evaluation. Again, it is beyond reason to conclude 

that the evaluation would have contained any finding for which the sentencing 

court would have justified imposition of a shorter sentence. 

[¶40.] There was support in the record for the sentence imposed by the court; 

the presentence report notwithstanding. The Court’s holding imposes mandatory 

content in a discretionary report. The result of this holding will be that sentencing 

courts will forego ordering presentence reports in favor of determination based on 

the trial court record in order to avoid the threat of reversal established by this 

Court today.