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[Federal Register: February 18, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 31)] 

[Rules and Regulations] 

[Page 7549-7552] 

From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] 

[DOCID:fr18fe09-2] 

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA-2009-0122; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-223-AD; Amendment 39-15813; 

AD 2009-04-07] 

RIN 2120-AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330-200 and -300 Series Airplanes, and Airbus 

Model A340-200, -300, -500, and -600 Series Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments. 

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This 

AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation 

authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The 

MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: 

An A330 aircraft experienced a sudden [uncommanded] nose down order [event] while in 

cruise. This order was preceded by an automatic autopilot disconnection and triggering of 

the ''NAV IR1 FAULT'' Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) Caution. 

Investigations highlighted that at time of the event the Air Data Reference 1 (ADR) part 

of ADIRU1 [Air Data Inertial Reference Unit] was providing erroneous and temporary 

wrong parameters in a random manner. This abnormal behaviour of the ADR1 led to 

several consequences such as unjustified stall and over speed warnings, loss of attitude 

information on Captain Primary Flight Display (PFD) and several ECAM warnings. 

Among the abnormal parameters, the provided Angle of Attack (AoA) value was such 

that the flight control computers commanded a sudden nose down aircraft movement, 

which constitutes an unsafe condition. * * * * * * * * 

These anomalies could result in high pilot workload, deviation from the intended flight path, and 

possible loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the 

unsafe condition described in the MCAI. 
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DATES: This AD becomes effective March 5, 2009. 

 The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain 

publications, listed in the AD as of March 5, 2009. 

 We must receive comments on this AD by March 20, 2009. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for 

submitting comments. 

• Fax: (202) 493-2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground 

Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 

5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

Examining the AD Docket 

 You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at 

the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is 

in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., 

Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1138; fax (425) 227-1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

 The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member 

States of the European Community, has issued EASA Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2009-

0012-E, dated January 15, 2009 (referred to after this as ''the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition 

for the specified products. The MCAI states: 

An A330 aircraft experienced a sudden [uncommanded] nose down order [event] while in 

cruise. This order was preceded by an automatic autopilot disconnection and triggering of 

the ''NAV IR1 FAULT'' Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) Caution. 

Investigations highlighted that at time of the event the Air Data Reference 1 (ADR) part 

of ADIRU1 [Air Data Inertial Reference Unit] was providing erroneous and temporary 

wrong parameters in a random manner. This abnormal behaviour of the ADR1 led to 

several consequences such as unjustified stall and over speed warnings, loss of attitude 

information on Captain Primary Flight Display (PFD) and several ECAM warnings. 

Among the abnormal parameters, the provided Angle of Attack (AoA) value was such 

that the flight control computers commanded a sudden [uncommanded] nose down 

aircraft movement, which constitutes an unsafe condition. At this stage of the 

investigation, the analysis of available data indicates that ADIRU1 abnormal behaviour is 

likely at the origin of the event. Due to similar design, the A340 aircraft are also impacted 

by this issue. 
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In order to prevent the ADR from providing erroneous data to other aircraft systems, 

EASA [Emergency] AD 2008-0203-E [dated November 19, 2008] was issued to require, 

in case faulty Inertial Reference (IR) is detected, to isolate both the IR and ADR by 

accomplishment of a modified Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) operational procedure. 

Since that AD [EASA AD 2008-0203-E, dated November 19, 2008] was issued, it has 

been reported that the ''OFF'' light did not illuminate in the cockpit after setting the IR 

and ADR pushbuttons to OFF. Investigation has determined that the ADIRU was indeed 

sometimes affected by another failure control. 

To prevent such a failure, the operational procedure has been updated to instruct the 

flight crew to de-energize the ADIRU if the ''OFF'' light is not illuminated after setting 

the IR and ADR pushbuttons to OFF. Consequently, [EASA Emergency] AD 2008-0225-

E [dated December 18, 2008], which superseded [EASA Emergency] AD 2008-0203-E 

[dated November 19, 2008], requires accomplishment of the updated AFM operational 

procedure. 

Since this second AD was issued [EASA Emergency AD 2008-0225-E, dated December 

18, 2008], a new service event has been reported highlighting that, in some failure cases, 

even though the ''OFF'' light illuminates in the cockpit after setting the IR and ADR 

pushbuttons to OFF, the IR could keep providing erroneous data to other systems. 

In order to address all identified failure cases, de-energizing the affected ADIRU must be 

done by setting the IR mode rotary selector to OFF. Consequently, this AD, which 

supersedes AD 2008-0225-E [dated December 18, 2008], requires accomplishment of the 

updated AFM operational procedure. 

The anomalies described above could result in high pilot workload, deviation from the intended flight 

path, and possible loss of control of the airplane. You may obtain further information by examining 

the MCAI in the AD docket. 

Relevant Service Information 

 Airbus has issued A330 Temporary Revision 4.02.00/46, Issue 3, dated January 13, 2009, to the 

A330 (Airbus) Flight Manual; and A340 Temporary Revision 4.02.00/54, Issue 3, dated January 13, 

2009, to the A340 (Airbus) Flight Manual. The actions described in this service information are 

intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI. 

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This AD 

 This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for 

operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, 

we have been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information 

referenced above. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all pertinent information and 

determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same 

type design. 

Differences Between the AD and the MCAI or Service Information 

 We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their 

substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to 

ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not 
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intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service 

information. 

 We might also have required different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to 

follow FAA policies. Any such differences are highlighted in a Note within the AD. 

FAA's Determination of the Effective Date 

 An unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD. The FAA has found 

that the risk to the flying public justifies waiving notice and comment prior to adoption of this rule to 

prevent the ADR from providing erroneous data to other aircraft systems, which could result in high 

pilot workload, deviation from the intended flight path, and possible loss of control of the airplane. 

Therefore, we determined that notice and opportunity for public comment before issuing this AD are 

impracticable and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in fewer than 30 days. 

Comments Invited 

 This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety, and we did not precede 

it by notice and opportunity for public comment. We invite you to send any written relevant data, 

views, or arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES 

section. Include ''Docket No. FAA-2009-0122; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-223-AD'' at the 

beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, 

environmental, and energy aspects of this AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing 

date and may amend this AD because of those comments. 

 We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including 

any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive 

verbal contact we receive about this AD. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

 Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. 

Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. ''Subtitle VII: Aviation 

Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority. 

 We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in ''Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, 

Section 44701: General requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting 

safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and 

procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the 

scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking action. 

Regulatory Findings 

 We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. 

This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the 

national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 

various levels of government. 

 For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD: 

 1. Is not a ''significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866; 

 2. Is not a ''significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, 

February 26, 1979); and 

 3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of 

small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. 
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 We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD and placed it 

in the AD docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 

39 as follows: 

PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: 

 Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD: 
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FAA 

Aircraft Certification Service

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

www.faa.gov/aircraft/safety/alerts/ 

www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/advanced.html

2009-04-07 Airbus: Amendment 39-15813. Docket No. FAA-2009-0122; Directorate Identifier 

2008-NM-223-AD. 

Effective Date 

 (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective March 5, 2009. 

Affected ADs 

 (b) None. 

Applicability 

 (c) This AD applies to Airbus Model A330-200 and -300; and A340-200, -300, -500, and -600 

series airplanes, certificated in any category, as listed in paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) of this AD. 

 (1) A330-201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342, and -343 

airplanes, all serial numbers, equipped with Northrop-Grumman (formerly Litton) Air Data Inertial 

Reference Units (ADIRUs), part number (P/N) 465020-0303-03ZZ (with ZZ from 09 up to 16 

inclusive). 

 (2) A340-211, -212, -213, -311, -312, -313, -541, and -642 airplanes, all serial numbers, 

equipped with Northrop-Grumman (formerly Litton) ADIRUs, P/N 465020-0303-03ZZ (with ZZ 

from 09 up to 16 inclusive). 

Subject 

 (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 34: Navigation. 

Reason 

 (e) The mandatory continued airworthiness information (MCAI) states: 

An A330 aircraft experienced a sudden [uncommanded] nose down order [event] while in 

cruise. This order was preceded by an automatic autopilot disconnection and triggering of 

the ''NAV IR1 FAULT'' Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) Caution. 

Investigations highlighted that at time of the event the Air Data Reference 1 (ADR) part 

of ADIRU1 [Air Data Inertial Reference Unit] was providing erroneous and temporary 

wrong parameters in a random manner. This abnormal behaviour of the ADR1 led to 

several consequences such as unjustified stall and over speed warnings, loss of attitude 

information on Captain Primary Flight Display (PFD) and several ECAM warnings. 

Among the abnormal parameters, the provided Angle of Attack (AoA) value was such 

that the flight control computers commanded a sudden [uncommanded] nose down 

aircraft movement, which constitutes an unsafe condition. At this stage of the 

investigation, the analysis of available data indicates that ADIRU1 abnormal behaviour is 
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likely at the origin of the event. Due to similar design, the A340 aircraft are also impacted 

by this issue. 

In order to prevent the ADR from providing erroneous data to other aircraft systems, 

EASA [Emergency] AD 2008-0203-E [dated November 19, 2008] was issued to require, 

in case faulty Inertial Reference (IR) is detected, to isolate both the IR and ADR by 

accomplishment of a modified Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) operational procedure. 

Since that AD [EASA AD 2008-0203-E, dated November 19, 2008] was issued, it has 

been reported that the ''OFF'' light did not illuminate in the cockpit after setting the IR 

and ADR pushbuttons to OFF. Investigation has determined that the ADIRU was indeed 

sometimes affected by another failure control. 

To prevent such a failure, the operational procedure has been updated to instruct the 

flight crew to de-energize the ADIRU if the ''OFF'' light is not illuminated after setting 

the IR and ADR pushbuttons to OFF. Consequently, [EASA Emergency] AD 2008-0225-

E [dated December 18, 2008], which superseded [EASA Emergency] AD 2008-0203-E 

[dated November 19, 2008], requires accomplishment of the updated AFM operational 

procedure. 

Since this second AD was issued [EASA Emergency AD 2008-0225-E, dated December 

18, 2008], a new service event has been reported highlighting that, in some failure cases, 

even though the ''OFF'' light illuminates in the cockpit after setting the IR and ADR 

pushbuttons to OFF, the IR could keep providing erroneous data to other systems. 

In order to address all identified failure cases, de-energizing the affected ADIRU must be 

done by setting the IR mode rotary selector to OFF. Consequently, this AD, which 

supersedes AD 2008-0225-E [dated December 18, 2008], requires accomplishment of the 

updated AFM operational procedure. 

The anomalies described above could result in high pilot workload, deviation from the intended flight 

path, and possible loss of control of the airplane. 

Actions and Compliance 

 (f) Unless already done: Within 14 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the applicable 

section of the A330 or A340 (Airbus) Flight Manual (FM) by inserting a copy of A330 (Airbus) 

Temporary Revision (TR) 4.02.00/46, or A340 (Airbus) TR 4.02.00/54, both Issue 3, both dated 

January 13, 2009, as applicable. Thereafter, operate the airplane according to the limitations and 

procedures in the TRs. When information identical to that in the TR has been included in the general 

revisions of the FM, the general revisions may be inserted in the FM, and the TR may be removed. 

FAA AD Differences 

 Note 1: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information as follows: No differences. 

Other FAA AD Provisions 

 (g) The following provisions also apply to this AD: 

 (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, International Branch, ANM116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Vladimir 
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Ulyanov, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1138; fax 

(425) 227-1149. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), as 

appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office. 

 (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a 

manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are 

considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated 

agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service. 

 (3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of 

the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the 

information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056. 

Related Information 

 (h) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2009-

0012-E, dated January 15, 2009; A330 (Airbus) TR 4.02.00/46, Issue 3, dated January 13, 2009; and 

A340 (Airbus) TR 4.02.00/54, Issue 3, dated January 13, 2009; for related information. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

 (i) You must use A330 (Airbus) Temporary Revision 4.02.00/46, Issue 3, dated January 13, 

2009, to the A330 (Airbus) Flight Manual; or A340 (Airbus) Temporary Revision 4.02.00/54, Issue 

3, dated January 13, 2009, to the A340 (Airbus) Flight Manual; as applicable; to do the actions 

required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

 (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service 

information under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

 (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Airbus SAS–Airworthiness Office–

EAL, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; fax +33 5 61 93 45 80; e-mail 

airworthiness.A330-A340@airbus.com; Internet http://www.airbus.com. 

 (3) You may review copies of the service information that is incorporated by reference at the 

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For information 

on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221 or 425-227-1152. 

 (4) You may also review copies of the service information at the National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-

6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_ 

locations.html. 

 Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 23, 2009. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service.