alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                             832
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   25,114
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (236)
<INVENTORY>                                     11,445
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                39,790
<PP&E>                                          11,046
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (5,999)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  68,896
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           17,997
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           737
<OTHER-SE>                                      29,918
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    68,896
<SALES>                                         49,842
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                49,842
<CGS>                                           37,853
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   37,853
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 9,638
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   115
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 646
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,590
<INCOME-TAX>                                       764
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                826
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       826
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.11
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.11


</TABLE>
**Exhibit 10.49**

 

ACTION BY UNANIMOUS WRITTEN CONSENT

OF THE

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OFVERTIS HOLDINGS, INC.

 

WHEREAS, the undersigned, being all of the members of the Board ofDirectors (the “Board”) of Vertis Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Corporation”),hereby consent to the adoption of the following resolutions in lieu of ameeting of the Board, and approve and adopt such resolutions with the sameforce and effect as if they had been approved and adopted at a duly convenedmeeting of the Board of the Corporation and direct that this written consent ofthe Board (the “Consent”) be filed with the minutes of the proceedings of theBoard:

 

RESOLVED, that effective as of June 30, 2000, theBig Flower Holdings, Inc. 1999 Equity Award Plan will be changed to be the “VertisHoldings, Inc. 1999 Equity Award Plan” (the “Award Plan”); and further

 

RESOLVED, that all definitions, terms and conditions of the Award Planshall continue in full force and effect, without change or revision; andfurther

 

RESOLVED,that this consent may be executed in two or more counterparts, each of whichshall be deemed to be an original and all of which together shall be deemed toconstitute one and the same consent.

 

INWITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being all of the members of the Board ofDirectors, have hereunto executed this consent this 25th day of November, 2002.

 

 
|   | /s/ Donald E. Roland  |
|--------|-----------------------|
|   | Donald E. Roland      |
|   |                  |
|   |                  |
|   | /s/ Anthony J. DiNovi |
|   | Anthony J. DiNovi     |
|   |                  |
|   |                  |
|   | /s/ Thomas H. Lee     |
|   | Thomas H. Lee         |
|   |                  |
|   |                  |
|   | /s/ Soren L. Oberg    |
|   | Soren L. Oberg        |
|   |                  |
|   |                  |
|   | /s/ Scott M. Sperling |
|   | Scott M. Sperling     |
|   |                  |
|   |                  |
|   | /s/ Roger C. Altman   |
|   | Roger C. Altman       |
|   |                  |
|   |                  |
|   | /s/ Austin M. Beutner |
|   | Austin M. Beutner     |

 

----
**EXHIBIT
      32.B**








**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED
      PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**


**OF
      THE
      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**








In
      connection with
      the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ending
      September 30, 2007, of Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company (the “Company”)
      as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
      “Report”), I, John R. Sult, Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and
      Controller, certify (i) that the Report fully complies with the requirements
      of
      Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
      and
      (ii) that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.










*/s/
              JOHN
              R. SULT*John
                R.
                SultSenior
                Vice
                President, Chief Financial Officer and Controller(Principal
                Accounting and Financial Officer)








November
                6,
                2007
















A
      signed original
      of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Tennessee
      Gas Pipeline Company and will be retained by Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company
      and
      furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
      request.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

February 5, 2020

No. 04-19-00724-CV

Leticia Antoinette BOYD,

Appellant

v.

WESTWOOD PLAZA APARTMENTS,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019CV07739

Honorable J Frank Davis, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Appellant’s brief was due by January 22, 2020. Neither the brief nor a motion for 

extension of time has been filed. 

We therefore ORDER appellant to file her appellant’s brief and a written response 

reasonably explaining her failure to timely file the brief by February 18, 2020. If appellant fails 

to file a brief and the written response by the date ordered, we will dismiss the appeal for want of 

prosecution. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a). 

_________________________________

Beth Watkins, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 5th day of February, 2020.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ,

Clerk of Court
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACO DIVISION

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a BRAZOS 

LICENSING AND DEVELOPMENT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC., DELL INC., 

AND EMC CORPORATION, 

Defendants.

Case No. 6:20-cv-00478-ADA

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

LETTER OF REQUEST FOR FOREIGN DISCOVERY
1

Defendants Dell Technologies Inc., Dell Inc., and EMC Corporation, (collectively 

“Defendants”) seek foreign discovery from third party witnesses residing in the Netherlands.

Defendants have attached an Appendix with a Letter of Request which includes Document 

Requests and Deposition Topics. Defendants respectfully request that the Court execute the Letter 

of Request attached as Appendix E. Defendants further request that, after the Court has signed the 

Letter of Request, the Clerk of this Court authenticate the Court’s signature under the seal of this 

Court, and return the original signed and sealed executed Letter, and two certified copies of the 

signed and sealed executed Letters, to Defendants’ counsel, Barry K. Shelton, for delivery to the 

proper authority.

Plaintiff, WSOU Investments, LLC d/b/a Brazos Licensing and Development, indicated 

that it reserves the right to serve its own foreign discovery in the future.

Dated: November 6, 2020 By: /s/ Barry K. Shelton

Barry K. Shelton

Texas State Bar No. 24055029

bshelton@sheltoncoburn.com

SHELTON COBURN LLP

311 RR 620, Ste. 205

Austin, TX 78734-4775 

Telephone: 512.263.2165

Facsimile: 512.263.2166 

Attorneys for Defendants
2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on November 6, 2020, all counsel of record who are deemed 

to have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document through the 

Court’s CM/ECF system under Local Rule CV-5(b)(1). 

/s/ Barry K. Shelton

Barry K. Shelton
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department **1399 CAF 12-00011**  PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, FAHEY, CARNI, AND VALENTINO, JJ.

IN THE MATTER OF RONALD DAVID RAGIN, III, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER LATOYA DORSEY, RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. (APPEAL NO. 2.)

ALAN BIRNHOLZ, EAST AMHERST, FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT. LAW OFFICE OF PETER VASILION, WILLIAMSVILLE (PETER P. VASILION OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT. MARY ANNE CONNELL, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, BUFFALO, FOR AALIYAH R. Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Erie County (Rosalie Bailey, J.), entered October 24, 2011. The order dismissed the petition. It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs. Same Memorandum as in Matter of Ragin v Dorsey ([appeal No. 1] ___ AD3d ___ [Dec. 28, 2012]).

Entered: December 28, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
```

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 178 (Friday, September 13, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 56654-56655]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-22304]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

Agenda and Notice of Public Meeting of the Maine Advisory 
Committee

    Notice is hereby given, pursuant to the provisions of the rules and 
regulations of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (Commission), and 
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), that orientation and 
planning meetings of the Maine Advisory Committee to the Commission 
will convene at 11:00 a.m. (EDT) on September 26, 2013, 309 Cumberland 
Avenue, Suite 201, Portland, ME 04112. The purpose of the orientation 
meeting is to provide ethics training and to describe the rules of 
operation for SAC activities to the Committee members. The purpose of 
the planning meeting is to review recent Commission and regional 
activities, discuss current civil rights issues in the State and to 
plan future activities.
    Members of the public are entitled to submit written comments. The 
comments must be received in the regional office by October 30, 2013. 
Comments may be mailed to the Eastern Regional Office, U.S. Commission 
on Civil Rights, 1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, Suite 1150, Washington, DC 
20425, faxed to (202) 376-7548, or emailed to ero@usccr.gov. Persons 
who desire additional information may contact the Eastern Regional 
Office at 202-376-7533.
    Persons needing accessibility services should contact the Eastern 
Regional Office at least 10 working days before the scheduled date of 
the meeting.
    Records generated from this meeting may be inspected and reproduced 
at the Eastern Regional Office, as they become available, both before 
and after the meeting. Persons interested in the work of this advisory 
committee are advised to go to the Commission's Web site, 
www.usccr.gov, or to contact the Eastern Regional Office at the above 
phone number, email or street address.
    The meetings will be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the 
rules and regulations of the Commission and FACA.

[[Page 56655]]

    Dated on: September 10, 2013.
David Mussatt,
Acting Chief, Regional Programs Coordination Unit.
[FR Doc. 2013-22304 Filed 9-12-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6335-01-P
```
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

SUSAN A. FASSY,

Appellant,

v.

LYNN R. FASSY,

Appellee.

No. 2D23-458

March 8, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; Kevin Bruning, 

Judge.

Carmen R. Gillett of Carmen R. Gillett, PLLC, Sarasota, for Appellant.

Charles F. Johnson of Blalock Walters, P.A., Bradenton, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, LaROSE, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2834 

To include under Federal laws granting rights and responsibilities to married 

couples other couples in other legal unions similar to marriage, including 

domestic partnerships and civil unions. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 25, 2013 

Mr. HOLT introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To include under Federal laws granting rights and responsibilities to married couples other couples in other legal 

unions similar to marriage, including domestic partnerships and civil unions. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Federal Benefits 

5 Equality Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 7 of title 1, United States 

8 Code, is amended to read as follows— 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2834 IH

1 ‘‘§ 7. ‘Marriage’ as including civil unions and domes2 tic partnerships; ‘spouse’ as including 

3 members of such unions 

4 ‘‘In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, 

5 the term ‘marriage’ includes a marriage, a domestic part6 nership, a civil union, or any other similar legal union be7 tween 2 individuals that is recognized by a State, the Dis8 trict of Columbia, a territory or possession of the United 

9 States, or a federally recognized Indian tribe, and the 

10 word ‘spouse’ refers to either member of such a legal 

11 union.’’ . 

12 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The item for section 7 

13 in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 1 is 

14 amended to read as follows: 

‘‘7. ‘Marriage’ as including civil unions and domestic parnerships; ‘spouse’ as 

including members of such legal unions.’’. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSK6TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
#### COOPER v. STATE.

No. 22676.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 15, 1943.

Shelburne H. Glover, of Texarkana, for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Conviction was upon a charge of violating the liquor laws, with a penalty of $200.

The undisputed evidence in the case shows that J. L. Dendy bought a half pint of liquor from appellant, within the city limits of the town of Jefferson, Marion County, on about the 1st of May, 1943. The liquor was deposited with the sheriff and was introduced in evidence upon a trial of the case.

The record has three bills of exception. One complains that there is no proof that the sale took place in Precinct Three, and also that the record of the election is defective. The bill as to the place of the sale is not approved by the court and the statement of facts amply justifies him in refusing to approve the same. It will not be necessary to discuss the lengthy contention relative to the other bill, or the court’s, qualification of same. During the procedure, the attorney for appellant made the following statement in court, as found on page 9 of the statement of facts: “For the purpose of this trial and this case Defendant will admit that Precinct No. 3 of Marion County is a dry area and was a dry area on the date alleged in the complaint and information, and no election has. been had since that time legalizing the sale of intoxicating liquor in Marion County.”

It is true that the county attorney did not stop the procedure which he had started and rely altogether on the statement made by the attorney for appellant. It is sufficient to say that the court’s qualification of the bill leaves it without merit. Exception was taken to such qualification, but it is not shown that such exceptions were presented to the court, and they are not approved by him.

*192Bill of exception No. 2 complains of the argument of the county attorney, who said “the testimony of J. L. Dendy stands unimpeached.” Appellant did not testify in his case, and offered no evidence by any other person. Dendy testified that there was another person present who assisted appellant by giving him a bottle into which he poured the liquor for delivery to the witness. We cannot go so far as to assume that this statement was a reference to the failure of the accused to testify, inasmuch as there was another party present in the view of the county attorney, who could have denied some of the things that Dendy swore to. The act of pouring the liquor from a large bottle into a small one, with its delivery to the witness, was a visible transaction which could have been verified or denied by Mrs. Dendy or the child, who were near by. The argument was without force and is harmless unless it can be so construed as to be a reference to the failure of the accused to testified. See Volume 42, Tex.Jur., Sec. 271, p. 342, and authorities there cited.

Finding no error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

WAYNE MCMULLEN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-105

[July 18, 2019]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Lisa S. Porter, Judge; L.T. Case No. 17003441CF10A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Tatjana Ostapoff, Assistant 

Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Joseph D. Coronato, 

Jr., Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

WARNER, CIKLIN and CONNER, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
**Exhibit
      32**





**SECTION
      1350 CERTIFICATIONS**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of RadioShack Corporation
      (the
“Company”) for the period ended June 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and
      Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we, Julian C. Day, Chief
      Executive Officer of the Company, and James F. Gooch, Chief Financial Officer
      of
      the Company, certify to our knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted
      pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)  The
      Report fully
      complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The
      information
      contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
      condition and result of operations of the Company.








/s/
      Julian C.
      Day





Julian
      C.
      Day


Chief
      Executive
      Officer


July
      30,
      2007








/s/
      James F.
      Gooch





James
      F.
      Gooch


Chief
      Financial
      Officer


July
      30,
      2007








A
      signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
      provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
      the
      Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

AUG 6 2002

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

FRED RAYMOND WALLACE and

MARILYN JOYCE WALLACE, 

Plaintiffs - Appellants, No. 02-8032

v. ( D.C. No. 01-CV-180-J)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (D. Wyoming)

Defendant - Appellee.

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before KELLY, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). 

The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

The underlying action from which this appeal stems was filed in state court

framed as a quiet title action attacking a lien filed by the Internal Revenue

Service. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ objections, it was properly removed to
-2-

federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442 because it was against federal officers

or agencies.

After reviewing Plaintiffs’ many pleadings and claims, the trial court

properly determined that the case was simply an attempt to challenge the validity

of federal tax assessments and resulting liens. The trial court properly concluded

that Plaintiffs had not satisfied the necessary prerequisites to qualify for the

limited waiver of federal sovereign immunity provided for in tax refund cases by

28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). The trial court was also correct in concluding that

Plaintiffs could not rely on 26 U.S.C. § 7433(a) because they failed to allege

exhaustion of administrative remedies. Likewise, it properly held that 28 U.S.C.

§ 2410 does not permit a taxpayer to collaterally attack the merits of a tax

assessment. The trial court’s final obviously correct blow to Plaintiffs’ action

was its holding that the case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction because the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421, bars injunctive

relief as to the collection activities of the Internal Revenue Service.

The claims on appeal are various ways of raising the same claims. 

Therefore, after full review, we conclude that the trial court’s order dismissing

the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and its denial of a variety of post-judgment 
-3-

motions are correct. Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Conditional Petition for Declaratory

Relief is denied. The trial court’s judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Monroe G. McKay

Circuit Judge
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

JTK/Research

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FLAVIO ESCOBEDO GOMEZ,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 07-73368

Agency No. A079-264-217

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 16, 2010** 

Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Flavio Escobedo Gomez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen

based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

FILED

FEB 26 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JTK/Research 2 07-73368

§ 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen,

Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2003), and we review de novo due

process claims, Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510, 516 (9th Cir. 2001). We deny the

petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Escobedo Gomez’s second

motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred because it was filed over a

year after the BIA’s August 2, 2005, final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and

equitable tolling is unavailable to Escobedo Gomez where he did not establish

prejudice from the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, see Iturribarria, 321

F.3d at 897, 899; see also Lara Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir.

2004), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2005) (order) (counsel’s “unfortunate

immigration-law advice” was not ineffective assistance because it did not “pertain

to the actual substance of the hearing” or “call the hearing’s fairness into

question”). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.