Filed 12/21/21 In re A.R. CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re A.R., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A162909

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. J21-00230)

Alexis R. (Minor) appeals from a disposition order committing him to 

the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility (Orin Allen) after he admitted 

that he possessed a weapon on school grounds (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, 

subd. (a)).

1 He contends: (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion by 

ordering his placement at Orin Allen; and (2) the court failed to specify his

maximum period of physical confinement as required under section 726, 

subdivision (d)(1). We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in the 

commitment, but will remand the matter for the court to determine the 

maximum term of confinement.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code unless otherwise indicated.
2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Minor and his brother got into a verbal argument with a group of 

students at their high school and physical fighting broke out though it 

remains unclear who started it. During the altercation, the victim slammed 

Minor’s brother to the ground and was punching and kicking him when

Minor stabbed the victim once in his back. Minor immediately fled and tried 

to dispose of the knife, which the police later found. The knife had a two- to 

three-inch blade. The victim survived but suffered a punctured right lung, 

which required six staples. Eventually, the wound became infected, 

preventing the victim from playing sports and causing him to feel depressed. 

The People filed a wardship petition pursuant to section 602, 

subdivision (a), charging Minor with felony possession of a weapon (a knife)

on school grounds (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a)). Minor pled no contest to 

the count. 

In advance of the disposition hearing, the probation officer authored a 

report detailing the circumstances of the incident and Minor’s interview with 

the probation officer. Minor said he “always” carries a knife and claimed he

stabbed the victim to stop him from hurting his brother, not to kill. Minor

reported he had ongoing issues with the other group of students, some of

whom “ ‘jumped’ ” him the year prior. 

The probation report detailed various concerns about Minor, including 

concern for his academic performance. Specifically, Minor—a 17-year-old in 

the tenth grade—failed almost all his high school classes, earned only 15 out 

of 205 credits needed to graduate, and was absent from school nearly 20 
3

percent of the time.

2 Minor had been suspended six times, of which three 

were related to fighting and one was for possessing a vape “pen” and a knife. 

The report also related concerns about substance abuse, i.e., Minor reported

he smoked marijuana twice a day for about a year, which drew parental 

scolding but never punishment. Per the report, Minor had a good 

relationship with his family. Minor’s parents reported being “shocked” by 

Minor’s actions, describing Minor as “nice, quiet, and well behaved.” 

The probation report also indicated Minor was assessed using the “Ohio 

Youth Assessment System” (OYAS) in order to “identify the youth’s 

underlying motivation for delinquent behavior” and to target his specific 

needs. OYAS indicated low concern based on Minor’s juvenile justice history;

peer and social support network; and values, beliefs and attitudes. But there 

was moderate concern based on his family and living arrangements;

education and employment; and substance abuse, mental health, and 

personality. Moreover, there was a high concern based on his pro-social 

skills. Overall, under OYAS, Minor was deemed a low risk of re-offense.

Ultimately, the probation report recommended the juvenile court 

commit Minor to Orin Allen for nine months, plus 180 days of aftercare. In 

the probation officer’s assessment, Minor’s actions were impulsive and 

dangerous: he brought a knife onto school grounds and lacked the ability to 

foresee the consequences of his actions. Minor did not seem genuinely 

remorseful and could not explain how his actions impacted the victim. 

Minor’s academic performance was of great concern. The probation officer 

believed Minor must be held accountable while receiving services to address 

2 Minor has an “individualized education program” (IEP). Per the 

probation report, “[Minor’s] IEP indicated his Primary Disability is a Specific 

Learning Disability, due to deficits in auditory and visual memory.”
4

his issues, and Minor would also benefit from a more structured academic 

setting and from substance abuse counseling and programs at Orin Allen. 

At the disposition hearing, Minor requested that he be released into his 

parents’ custody on an ankle monitor with any terms the court believed were 

appropriate. Among other things, Minor alleged the People made a decision 

to charge him with weapon possession rather than an assaultive offense, 

because there were facts showing he acted in defense of his younger brother.

3

Minor noted his OYAS score, his supportive family, and the circumstance 

that he had never received services before. The probation officer opposed 

release on home supervision, indicating it was not in Minor’s best interest. 

The People agreed with probation. 

The juvenile court adjudged Minor a ward without specifying a

termination date and adopted various of the recommendations in the 

probation report, including committing Minor to Orin Allen for a nine-month 

regular program with 180 days of aftercare. The court explained in detail the 

various factors underlying its decision to commit Minor to Orin Allen. 

DISCUSSION

A. The Camp Commitment

Minor contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering him 

committed to Orin Allen because there was no reason to believe that removal

from his parents’ custody was necessary to serve the purposes of juvenile 

court law, i.e., to hold him accountable for his conduct, protect public safety, 

redress the victims’ injuries, and serve Minor’s best interests. We are 

unpersuaded.

3 The prosecutor neither confirmed nor denied this, stating: “I’m not here 

to articulate to the Court or anybody else the reasons why we make the filing 

decisions that we make.” 
5

The purpose of juvenile court law “is to provide for the protection and 

safety of the public and each minor . . . and to preserve and strengthen the 

minor’s family ties whenever possible, removing the minor from the custody 

of his or her parents only when necessary for his or her welfare or for the 

safety and protection of the public.” (§ 202, subd. (a).) “Minors under the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct shall, 

in conformity with the interests of public safety and protection, receive care, 

treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that holds 

them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their 

circumstances. This guidance may include punishment that is consistent 

with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter.” (Id., subd. (b).)

“[T]he court has broad discretion to choose probation and/or various 

forms of custodial confinement in order to hold juveniles accountable for their 

behavior, and to protect the public.” (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 

507.) “[J]uvenile placements need not follow any particular order under 

section 602 . . . , including from the least to the most restrictive. [Citations.] 

Nor does the court necessarily abuse its discretion by ordering the most 

restrictive placement before other options have been tried.” (Ibid.)

A juvenile court may remove a minor who has been adjudged a ward 

from the physical custody of a parent if, after a hearing, it finds “the welfare 

of the minor requires that custody be taken from the minor’s parent or 

guardian.” (§ 726, subd. (a)(3).) In determining the judgment and order to be 

made, a court must consider “in addition to other relevant and material 

evidence, (1) the age of the minor, (2) the circumstances and gravity of the 

offense committed by the minor, and (3) the minor’s previous delinquent 

history.” (§ 725.5.) Courts should also consider “the safety and protection of 

the public, the importance of redressing injuries to victims, and the best 
6

interests of the minor in all deliberations.” (§ 202, subd. (d).) Additionally, 

courts must “consider ‘the broadest range of information’ in determining how 

best to rehabilitate a minor and afford him [or her] adequate care.” (In re 

Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329 (Robert H.).) When making 

disposition orders, the court is free to evaluate credibility, weigh evidence, 

and accept or reject the recommendations of the probation officer. (Ibid.)

“A juvenile court’s commitment order may be reversed on appeal only 

upon a showing the court abused its discretion. [Citation.] ‘ “We must 

indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court 

and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support 

them.” ’ ” (Robert H., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1329–1330.)

Here, the juvenile court explained it was formulating the disposition to 

maximize Minor’s opportunity at rehabilitation, while bearing public safety

in mind. The court went on to discuss, at length, its reasons for declining 

Minor’s request for home supervision and for ordering his commitment to 

Orin Allen. First, the court observed the underlying conduct was “extremely 

dangerous and violent.” Indeed, there was no dispute that Minor brought a 

knife to school and stabbed the victim in the back with it—a potentially fatal 

act. While the victim survived, he suffered ongoing injury that impacted his 

life. 

Beyond the gravity of the offense, the juvenile court also discussed

Minor’s poor academic performance and his school disciplinary record. With 

regard to his disciplinary history, the court noted three of Minor’s six 

suspensions were related to fighting, and one was for carrying a knife on 

campus, which was conduct similar to what precipitated the underlying 

incident. The court further observed that Minor has issues with marijuana 

abuse. Moreover, the court did not “find much indication of sincere remorse 
7

in [Minor’s] statements in the probation report,” and believed it was 

important that Minor be separated from the people he fought with during the 

underlying incident. 

With regard to Minor’s family, the juvenile court observed the parents’ 

supervision had not been adequate to prevent the underlying incident, 

despite their best efforts. Indeed, the probation report supplied ample 

grounds to be skeptical that Minor’s parents could adequately supervise him, 

as they showed little awareness of his issues and needs.

4

In addition to the foregoing, the juvenile court observed the probation

report indicated that Orin Allen could offer Minor behavioral, substance 

abuse, and educational programming, all of which both Orin Allen and the 

probation department believed would be beneficial to Minor.

Based on the evidence before it, the juvenile court reasonably concluded 

that a commitment to Orin Allen would best protect Minor and provide him

care, treatment, and guidance, while also holding him accountable and 

protecting the public from further schoolyard violence.

In disputing the juvenile court’s order, Minor argues there was no 

evidence that a custodial commitment was necessary to protect the public or 

that he posed a danger to public safety. He claims he only brought the knife 

to school to protect himself, and only used it to protect his brother who was 

4 As recounted, the probation report showed that the parents described 

Minor as nice, quiet and well behaved, and said they were shocked by his 

conduct. This contrasted with other facts in the report, such as Minor’s poor 

school disciplinary record (which included him being disrespectful toward 

staff), and his marijuana abuse. Minor told the probation department that 

his parents disapproved of his smoking marijuana, but never issued 

consequences. 
8

being “brutally beaten.”

5 This is unconvincing. Regardless of his insistence 

that he stabbed the victim to defend his brother—which seems somewhat 

contradicted by Minor’s own acknowledgement that he could have “gone to 

the office” for help instead of engaging in the fight—the evidence at the 

hearing still established that he brought a knife to school more than once;

fought with others more than once; and ultimately stabbed someone 

impulsively with a knife during his latest fight, causing serious injury. 

Thereafter, Minor did not express genuine remorse; he could not even explain 

how he believed his actions affected the victim. Thus, there is substantial 

evidence that Minor posed a danger to the public.

Minor claims his OYAS score did not support the conclusion he posed a 

danger to public safety. This claim is unavailing. While acknowledging

OYAS was a valuable tool, the juvenile court determined that Minor’s

“conduct is so dangerous and so violent that it is not appropriate to address it 

through home supervision” and that home supervision would not “protect the 

community or provide [Minor] with the resources he needs.” It was the 

court’s prerogative to weigh the evidence before it. (Robert H., supra, 96 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1329.) We do not reweigh evidence on review.

Additionally, Minor argues there was no evidence that a custodial 

commitment was necessary to protect the public because he was not charged 

with stabbing, but only with possessing a weapon. The fact that the 

prosecution did not charge Minor with a more serious crime is of no moment. 

Initially, we note there is no evidence explaining the prosecution’s charging 

decision, leaving only speculation as to why Minor was charged as he was. 

Regardless, the juvenile court knew of and considered the circumstances and 

5 The probation report, however, indicated Minor’s brother suffered no 

injuries requiring medical treatment as a result of the fight. 
9

gravity of the offense. (§ 725.5; Robert H., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1320, 

1329 [court properly considered the fact that the minor fired a gun at 

someone and fortuitously missed, even though the minor only admitted to a 

charge of possession of a firearm].) The circumstances of the offense amply 

support the conclusion that Minor is impulsive, prone to violence, and lacking 

in genuine remorse or any deeper understanding of his actions, which in turn 

supports the conclusion that Minor posed a danger to the public.6

Next, Minor contends a custodial commitment was unnecessary to hold 

him accountable. In his view, he had already been held accountable since he 

spent a month at Juvenile Hall where he behaved himself; he cooperated 

with the probation officer who interviewed him; and he had been ordered as 

part of his disposition to write an apology letter to the victim. Relatedly and 

for the same reasons, Minor claims a custodial commitment was unnecessary 

to redress injuries to the victims. These contentions are unpersuasive. The 

probation report indicates Minor did not appear to have genuine remorse for 

stabbing the victim. Minor said he “ ‘felt bad’ ” but could not explain why, 

stating he “felt bad for his ‘brother and the victim, I guess.’ ” Notably, Minor

could not explain how he thought his actions affected the victim. 

Additionally, the victim and his legal guardian made statements about the 

harm Minor’s actions caused to their family and asked the court to commit 

Minor for 12 months rather than nine. All this amply supports the 

conclusion that commitment was either necessary or optimal to hold him 

6 With regard to his argument about whether he posed a risk to public 

safety, Minor goes on to assert that he agrees there was a need to separate 

him from those he had been fighting with, but there were less restrictive 

means available. That may be, but the court here had “broad discretion to 

choose probation and/or various forms of custodial confinement in order to 

hold [Minor] accountable . . . , and to protect the public.” (In re Eddie M., 

supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 507.)
10

accountable and redress the harm he inflicted on the victim and the victim’s 

family.

Minor also argues a custodial commitment was unnecessary to protect 

his best interests because his marijuana abuse and academic problems could 

have been addressed by less restrictive means. But the evidence showed that 

Orin Allen could offer Minor specific programming aimed at his substance 

abuse. Orin Allen could also offer Minor “an extended year school, [sic] in Mt. 

McKinley-Bryon campus, where he could attain credits toward graduation. 

Additionally, he would be tested to see if he qualifies for the Read To Live 

program, which could also help expedite his education.” Orin Allen thus had 

educational programming available to at least address Minor’s absenteeism 

and deficiency in earned credits towards graduation.7 The probation officer 

believed Minor would benefit from a more structured academic setting and 

also from Orin Allen’s substance abuse counseling and programs. On this 

record, the court could reasonably find Minor would most benefit from 

programming at Orin Allen.

In sum, we conclude the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion

in committing Minor to Orin Allen.

B. Calculating the Maximum Period of Physical Confinement

Finally, Minor contends a remand is necessary because the juvenile 

court failed to indicate the maximum period of physical confinement as 

required by section 726, subdivision (d)(1). The People concede the issue, and 

we accept that concession.

7 The probation report contained no information about whether Orin 

Allen could effectively address the learning disability identified in Minor’s 

IEP.
11

Section 726, subdivision (d)(1) provides: “If the minor is removed from 

the physical custody of the minor’s parent . . . as the result of an order of 

wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order shall specify that the 

minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the 

middle term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult 

convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor 

under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” “ ‘Physical confinement’ means 

placement in a juvenile hall, ranch, camp, forestry camp or secure juvenile 

home pursuant to Section 730, or in any institution operated by the 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice.” 

(§ 726, subd. (d)(5).) The court may orally pronounce the maximum length of 

physical confinement or specify it in its written commitment order. (In re 

Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 497.) Here, the court did neither, so we will 

remand the matter for the court to make the requisite determination.

DISPOSITION

The matter is remanded to the juvenile court to specify the maximum 

term of confinement. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
12

_________________________

Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Tucher, P. J.

_________________________

Petrou, J.

A162909/In re A.R.