IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 65A20

Filed 18 December 2020

IN RE INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NO. 18-193

EDWIN D. CLONTZ, Respondent

This matter is before the Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-376 and -377 upon 

a recommendation by the Judicial Standards Commission entered on 23 January 

2020 that respondent Edwin D. Clontz, a Judge of the General Court of Justice, 

District Court Division, Judicial District Twenty-Eight, be publicly reprimanded for 

conduct in violation of Canons 2A and 3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial 

Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the 

judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376. Heard in the Supreme 

Court on 12 October 2020. 

Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson P.A., by Mark A. Hiller, John R. Wester and 

Matthew W. Sawchak, Counsel for the Judicial Standards Commission. 

Devereux & Banzhoff PLLC, by Andrew B. Banzhoff for respondent. 

ORDER

The issue before this Court is whether Judge Edwin D. Clontz, respondent, 

should be publicly reprimanded, as recommended by the North Carolina Judicial 

Standards Commission, for violations of Canons 2A and 3A(4) of the North Carolina 

Code of Judicial Conduct amounting to conduct prejudicial to the administration of 

justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-
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376(b). For the reasons stated below, we agree with and adopt the recommendations 

from the Commission. 

On 4 February 2019 the Commission filed a Statement of Charges against 

respondent alleging respondent violated Canons 1, 2A, 3A(3), and 3A(4) when he held 

a probable-cause hearing without a defendant’s court-appointed counsel present on 

or about 18 July 2018. Respondent waived personal service and filed an answer to 

the Factual Allegations in the Statement of Charges on 28 February 2019.

Respondent’s hearing before the Commission was originally scheduled for 11 October 

2019 but was continued until 13 December 2019. Prior to this hearing, counsel for the 

Commission and respondent filed a Stipulation of Facts on 19 November 2019. 

On 13 December 2019 a disciplinary hearing was held before the Commission 

Chair Judge Wanda G. Bryant and Commission members Judge Jeffrey B. Foster, 

Judge Sherri Elliot, Mr. William H. Jones Jr., Ms. Allison Mullins, Mr. Cresswell D. 

Elmore, and Mr. Grady H. Hawkins. Based on the Stipulation of Facts and its 

exhibits, the Commission found the following facts by clear, cogent and convincing 

evidence: 

1. On or about July 18, 2018, Respondent was presiding 

over probable cause hearings in criminal district court 

when Assistant District Attorney (ADA) Kristin 

Terwey, representing the State, made a motion to 

continue State v. Jermaine Logan, Buncombe County 

File Nos. 18CR86478–84. 

2. In response to ADA Terwey’s motion to continue, Mr. 

Logan’s court-appointed attorney Roger Smith objected 
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to the State’s motion and demanded a probable cause 

hearing on behalf of his client. Respondent then held 

the matter open for the parties to confer and instructed 

them both to return to court at 2:00 pm. 

3. Respondent did not realize that Mr. Smith was courtappointed, but was obviously aware that Mr. Logan was 

represented by counsel in his felony criminal matter. 

4. At or about 2:00 pm, Respondent resumed court. ADA 

Terwey was present for the State and had secured the 

necessary witnesses to proceed with Mr. Logan’s 

probable cause hearing. Mr. Logan, who had remained 

in custody since his arrest, was brought from the jail to 

a holding cell adjacent to the courtroom with a barred 

window looking into Respondent’s courtroom as 

indicated in the photographs attached as Exhibits 1 and 

2 to the Stipulation of Facts. 

5. Mr. Smith failed to return to the courtroom at 2:00 pm 

as Respondent had instructed. Respondent knew Mr. 

Smith from other criminal cases and had previously 

experienced situations when Mr. Smith was not present 

in a timely manner for court appearances. Respondent 

then directed the courtroom bailiff to communicate with 

the other courtrooms in an effort to determine if Mr. 

Smith was elsewhere in the courthouse. The bailiff 

could not locate Mr. Smith in any other courtroom. 

6. At or around 2:50 pm, Respondent had concluded the 

day’s calendar with the exception of Mr. Logan’s case 

and one other matter and Mr. Smith still had not 

returned to the courtroom. 

7. Without Mr. Smith present, and knowing that Mr. 

Logan was represented by counsel in the felony criminal 

matter before him, Respondent then instructed ADA 

Terwey to call Mr. Logan’s case for hearing. Specifically, 

at the start of the probable cause hearing, Respondent 

stated on the record as follows: “Defense attorney has 

asked for a probable cause hearing. He was told to be 
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here at 2 p.m. It is now 2:50 p.m., and the attorney is 

not present. State is prepared to proceed on probable 

cause. They will call their first witness.” 

8. Upon receiving Respondent’s instruction to proceed 

without Mr. Logan’s counsel present, ADA Terwey 

hesitated but then called her first witness as directed 

by Respondent. 

9. During the probable cause hearing, Mr. Logan 

remained in the holding cell adjacent to the courtroom. 

Mr. Logan cross-examined the State’s two witnesses 

through the barred window of the prisoner holding area 

while he remained handcuffed and without access to 

pen or paper. It is routine in Buncombe County for in 

custody defendants to remain in the prisoner holding 

cell during court proceedings unless a specific request 

is made by a party to bring the defendant into the 

courtroom and no such request was made in this case

. 

10.After the State concluded its evidence, ADA Terwey 

approached the bench to express to Respondent her 

discomfort with the hearing and her concern that Mr. 

Logan, if he testified without his attorney present, may 

incriminate himself. In response to ADA Terwey’s 

concerns, Respondent then advised Mr. Logan that he 

would not be permitted to testify because he may 

incriminate himself. Specifically, Respondent informed 

Mr. Logan that he would not be allowed to speak to 

avoid accidentally incriminating himself and stated to 

Mr. Logan as follows: “I’m not going to allow you to 

make any statements, because this is a probable cause 

hearing. The State has presented their case. The 

standard of proof is so low – or it’s lower than what 

would be beyond a reasonable doubt. I will let them 

make their argument.” 

11.Following Respondent’s instructions to the State to 

make its argument, ADA Terwey proffered no closing 

argument and stated “I would simply ask that probable 

cause be found.” Without giving Mr. Logan any 
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opportunity to be heard or make any arguments in his 

behalf, Respondent immediately ruled in the State’s 

favor and announced his finding that there was 

sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for each 

of Mr. Logan’s charges and bound Mr. Logan’s matters 

over to superior court. 

12.Shortly after Mr. Logan’s probable cause hearing 

concluded, Mr. Smith returned to Respondent’s 

courtroom to find that his client’s case had been 

adjudicated in his absence. Mr. Smith, along with ADA 

Terwey and two other ADAs who were present during 

the probable cause hearing then went into a meeting 

with Respondent in his chambers. 

13.While in Respondent’s chambers, Mr. Smith explained 

that he was in the District Attorney’s office discussing 

Mr. Logan’s case. Just as he had made a point to put on 

the record at the start of the probable cause hearing 

that Mr. Smith was told to be in court at 2:00 pm and 

was not present by 2:50 p.m., Respondent again 

indicated to the parties that he proceeded with Mr. 

Logan’s case without Mr. Smith to “make a point” 

because Mr. Smith was not present at 2:00 pm when he 

had been told to return to court and Mr. Smith did not 

otherwise communicate his location to the Court or 

courtroom personnel. 

14.Respondent also acknowledged in the chambers 

meeting that he would not have proceeded with Mr. 

Logan’s case had he known that the Superior Court 

ADA prosecuting Mr. Logan’s case communicated that 

no plea bargain would be offered if Mr. Logan insisted 

on a probable cause hearing that day. 

15.Respondent also told Mr. Smith that because his 

findings had already been entered by the clerk, Mr. 

Smith could appeal the finding of probable cause. 

16.At the conclusion of the meeting in Respondent’s 

chambers, Mr. Smith requested to be heard on Mr. 
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Logan’s bond. Respondent informed the parties that he 

would entertain such a motion. After the parties 

reentered the courtroom, Mr. Smith advocated for a 

lower bond, which was opposed by the State. 

Respondent then lowered Mr. Logan’s bond from 

$100,000 secured to $25,000 secured. 

(citations to pages of the Stipulation and Record omitted). Based on these findings of 

fact, the Commission concluded as a matter of law that: 

1. The Statement of Charges alleges Respondent violated 

Canon 1, Canon 2A, Canon 3A(3), and Canon 3A(4) of 

the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Commission 

concludes that the findings of fact support the 

conclusion that Respondent violated Canon 2A and 

Canon 3A(4). 

2. Canon 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that 

“[a] judge should conduct himself/herself at all times in 

a manner that promotes public confidence in the 

integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” Based on 

the findings of fact, the Commission concludes that on 

July 18, 2018, Respondent failed to conduct himself in 

a manner that promotes public confidence in the 

integrity and impartiality of the judiciary in violation of 

Canon 2A of the North Carolina Code of Judicial 

Conduct. 

3. Specifically with respect to Canon 2A, the Commission’s 

findings of fact concerning Respondent’s conduct show 

that Respondent knowingly proceeded with defendant’s 

probable cause hearing without the defendant’s counsel

present to “make a point” about the lawyer’s failure to 

appear in court at the time Respondent had directed. 

Respondent noted this point on the record at the outset 

of the hearing and reiterated it in the chambers 

conference thereafter. At the hearing itself, Respondent 

made no effort to ascertain if Mr. Logan wished to 

continue the hearing or waive his right to counsel and 

proceed. Respondent’s conduct not only forced Mr. 
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Logan to proceed without his court-appointed counsel, 

but also required Mr. Logan to cross-examine witnesses 

from behind bars while handcuffed without access to 

pen and paper. Respondent’s conduct also threatened 

Mr. Logan’s 5th Amendment right against selfincrimination, a point that ADA Terwey had to raise to 

Respondent. Finally, Respondent’s conduct sent a clear 

message that a criminal defendant will be held 

accountable for the tardiness of his court-appointed 

lawyer. This is a point that Respondent himself stated 

was not directed just at Mr. Smith, but at the entire 

Buncombe County Bar. Such conduct undoubtedly 

undermines public confidence in the fairness of criminal 

proceedings in violation of Canon 2A. 

4. The Commission further finds that Canon 2A is 

violated, and conduct prejudicial to the administration 

of justice occurs, when a judge employs improper means 

to discipline an attorney for conduct the judge 

considered to be unprofessional or frustrating. See, e.g., 

In re Bullock, 328 N.C. 712, 717–718, 403 S.E.2d 264, 

267 (1991) (censuring Respondent for violation of Canon 

2A and conduct prejudicial to the administration of 

justice upon a finding that Respondent improperly 

ordered an attorney into custody and further demanded 

information subject to the attorney-client privilege); In 

re Scarlett, Inquiry No. 10-209, Judicial Standards 

Commission, June 15, 2011)[sic] (publicly reprimanding 

Respondent for violation of Canon 2A among other 

violations and conduct prejudicial to the administration 

of justice for holding a disciplinary hearing against an 

attorney for unprofessional conduct without basic due 

process afforded to the attorney and dictating that the 

proceeding be closed to the public).

5. Canon 3A(4) requires a judge to “accord every person 

who is legally interested in a proceeding, or the person’s 

lawyer, full right to be heard according to law . . . .”

Based on the findings of fact, the Commission further 

concludes that Respondent failed to afford Mr. Logan 

and Mr. Smith a full right to be heard according to the 
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law in violation of Canon 3A(4) of the North Carolina 

Code of Judicial Conduct. 

6. Specifically with respect to Canon 3A(4), the 

Commission’s findings of fact concerning Respondent’s 

conduct on July 18, 2018, and as supported by the 

transcript and audio proceeding with the hearing, show 

that Respondent stated at the outset of the hearing that 

he was proceeding with the hearing regardless of Mr. 

Smith’s absence and directed the State to proceed. 

Respondent did so without giving Mr. Logan any 

opportunity to be heard regarding the absence of his 

court-appointed counsel, whether he wished to continue 

the matter, or whether he wished to waive his right to 

counsel and proceed. In addition to denying Mr. Logan 

the opportunity to be heard on these critical issues, 

Respondent also interfered with the attorney-client 

relationship by denying Mr. Logan the right to consult 

with his court-appointed attorney and have 

representation at the hearing. Moreover, Respondent 

also intentionally denied Mr. Logan the right to be 

heard following the close of the State’s evidence, at 

which time Respondent directly and unequivocally 

informed Mr. Logan that he would not have the 

opportunity to be heard: “I’m not going to allow you to 

make any statements, because this is a probable cause 

hearing. The State has presented their case. The 

standard of proof is so low—or it’s lower than what 

would be beyond a reasonable doubt. I will let them 

make their argument.” Although Respondent’s denial of 

Mr. Logan’s right to be heard was rooted in the concerns 

ADA Terwey rightfully raised to Respondent about 

whether Mr. Logan if allowed to testify could 

incriminate himself in violation of his 5th Amendment 

rights, this was a situation caused by Respondent’s 

conduct in forcing Mr. Logan to proceed without his 

court-appointed counsel. Based on the totality of these 

circumstances, Respondent’s conduct denied Mr. Logan 

a full right to be heard as required under Canon 3A(4). 

See also Charles Gardner Geyh et al., Judicial Conduct 

and Ethics § 2.05 at 2-33 (5th Edition 2013) (“A judge 
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violates the duty under the Code to accord litigants 

their full right to be heard when the judge interferes 

with the litigant’s relationship with counsel. The most 

overt interference with the attorney-client relationship 

occurs if court proceedings are conducted with counsel 

absent when the judge knows the party has 

representation.”) 

7. Although the Statement of Charges alleges that 

Respondent’s conduct constituted willful misconduct in 

office in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A- 376(b), the 

Commission concludes that the clear and convincing 

evidence does not support a conclusion of willful 

misconduct in office. The Commission does conclude, 

however, that Respondent engaged in conduct 

prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings 

the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 7A- 376(b). See also Code of Judicial Conduct, 

Preamble (“[a] violation of this Code of Judicial Conduct 

may be deemed conduct prejudicial to the 

administration of justice that brings the judicial office 

into disrepute.”)

8. The Supreme Court first defined conduct prejudicial to 

the administration of justice in In re Edens, 290 N.C. 

299, 226 S.E.2d 5 (1976) as “conduct which a judge 

undertakes in good faith but which nevertheless would 

appear to an objective observer to be not only unjudicial 

conduct but conduct prejudicial to the public esteem for 

the judicial office.” Id. at 305, 226 S.E.2d at 9. Unlike 

willful misconduct in office, therefore, the motives or 

potential bad faith of the judge are not in issue. Instead, 

as the Supreme Court explained in Edens, conduct 

prejudicial to the administration “depends not so much 

upon the judge’s motives, but more on the conduct itself, 

the results thereof, and the impact such conduct might 

reasonably have upon knowledgeable observers.” Id. at 

305–306 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

9. Based upon the Commission’s conclusions that 

Respondent’s conduct violated Canon 2A and Canon 
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3A(4) as set forth in Paragraphs 2 through 6 above, the 

Commission further concludes that Respondent’s 

conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice 

and brings the judicial office into disrepute. 

10.As noted above, the subjective motives or good faith of 

the Respondent are not the focus of an inquiry into 

whether his conduct was prejudicial to the 

administration of justice. The focus is on the impact 

Respondent’s conduct might have on objective 

observers. Eden, 290 N.C. at 305, 226 S.E.2d at 9. 

Nevertheless, the Commission does address the 

assertions of Respondent’s Counsel at the hearing of 

this matter that Respondent’s conduct was the result of 

a good faith legal error and thus he cannot be subject to 

discipline. Respondent’s Counsel asserted that 

Respondent forced Mr. Logan to proceed without his 

counsel at the probable cause hearing because he felt he 

was obligated to do so after consulting the statutes, 

specifically N.C.G.S. § 15A-606(e) & (f), which govern 

probable cause hearings, and § 15A-611(c), which 

governs the procedures in probable cause hearings if a 

defendant appears without counsel. 

a. As a factual matter, Respondent’s defense of good faith 

legal error is not supported in the record. The 

Stipulation of Facts entered into by Respondent 

specifically addresses the agreed facts as to 

Respondent’s motives and statements regarding his 

decision to proceed without Mr. Logan’s courtappointed counsel present. It is undisputed that he did 

so to “make a point” to Mr. Smith and other lawyers 

about being on time to court. Nowhere in the 

Stipulation of Facts is there any reference to 

Respondent’s alleged belief that he was required under 

N.C.G.S. § 15A-606(e) to proceed with a probable cause 

hearing involving a represented criminal defendant 

without counsel present. The audio and transcript of the 

probable cause hearing further establish that 

Respondent at no time indicated to the parties that he 

was proceeding with the hearing as he allegedly 
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believed was required under § 15A-606(e). Instead, as 

the audio and transcripts make clear, he informed the 

parties he was proceeding because defense counsel 

asked for the hearing and then had failed to appear on 

time. For these reasons, there is no factual support in 

the record that Respondent proceeded with the hearing 

for any other reason than to “make a point” about 

attorney tardiness to court. 

b. As a procedural matter, the Commission further finds 

that any alleged good faith legal error in interpreting

§ 606(e) does not preclude a finding that Respondent 

violated Canon 2A or 3A(4) or that his objective conduct 

and statements were prejudicial to the administration 

of justice and public esteem for the judicial office. 

Specifically, the Commission does not need to consider 

or decide whether Respondent’s interpretation of 

§ 606(e) was correct as a matter of law to determine that 

Respondent denied Mr. Logan an opportunity to be 

heard at the probable cause hearing or engaged in 

conduct that undermines public confidence in the 

impartiality and integrity of the judiciary as 

established in Paragraphs 2 through 6 above. 

11. In reaching these conclusions of law, the Commission

also recognizes that judges have a duty under Canon 

3B(3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct to take 

disciplinary action against attorneys for unprofessional 

conduct, and further, that there is a possibility that 

disciplinary action may have been warranted in the 

case of Mr. Smith’s apparent chronic tardiness to court 

and failure to appear at 2:00 p.m. as Respondent 

directed. This is without question a problem that vexes 

many good judges across the state. But there are many 

tools available to judges to discipline attorneys for 

failure to appear on time. That being said, forcing a 

criminal defendant known to be represented by counsel 

to proceed to represent himself in a probable cause 

hearing to which he was entitled and requiring him to 

cross-examine witnesses while handcuffed and confined 

in a small holding cell is not a disciplinary measure 
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against the defendant’s attorney that comports with the 

Code of Judicial Conduct or promotes public confidence 

in the administration of justice. 

12.Finally, the Commission recognizes that it is not 

empowered to determine matters of law and does not 

pass upon the legal question of whether Respondent’s 

findings of probable cause was supported in fact or law. 

That matter, as Respondent acknowledged and 

informed Mr. Smith, was an appealable issue to be 

addressed by the appellate courts. As noted above, the 

Commission also does not decide the appropriate 

interpretation on N.C.G.S. § 611(c) or § 606(e) or their 

application to the facts of this matter. The Commission 

instead must evaluate Respondent’s conduct at the 

probable cause hearing and “the impact such conduct 

might reasonably have upon knowledgeable observers.” 

Edens, 290 N.C. at 305–306, 226 S.E.2d at 9. Based on 

the findings of fact and for all the foregoing reasons, the 

Commission concludes as a matter of law that 

Respondent’s conduct not only violated Canon 2A and 

Canon 3A(4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, but was 

conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that 

brings the judicial office into disrepute. 

(citations to pages of the Stipulation and Record omitted). Based on these findings of 

fact and conclusions of law, the Commission recommended that this Court publicly 

reprimand respondent. In support of this recommendation, the Commission offered 

the following information: 

1. The Supreme Court in In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 

223 S.E.2d 822 (1975) first addressed sanctions under 

the Judicial Standards Act and stated that the purpose 

of judicial discipline proceedings “is not primarily to 

punish any individual but to maintain due and proper 

administration of justice in our State’s courts, public 

confidence in its judicial system, and the honor and 

integrity of its judges.” Id. at 602, 223 S.E.2d at 825. 
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2. Under the statutes governing the Commission, a public 

reprimand is appropriate where “a judge has violated 

the Code of Judicial Conduct and has engaged in 

conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, but 

that misconduct is minor.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-374.2(7). The 

Commission considers Respondent’s misconduct to be 

“minor” because of the lack of prejudice to Mr. Logan in 

his criminal proceeding given the low bar for the State 

to establish probable cause and his ability to appeal the 

probable cause determination. The Commission also 

considers Respondent’s conduct in reducing Mr. Logan’s 

bond following the finding of probable cause and the 

isolated nature of the incident. 

3. Finally, in recommending reprimand as opposed to a 

more severe sanction, the Commission considers as 

mitigating factors Respondent’s willingness to enter 

into the Stipulation of Facts and the character 

affidavits submitted by Respondent that attest to 

Respondent’s professionalism, reputation for 

impartiality in criminal cases, and courteous demeanor 

as a jurist. 

(citations to pages of the Stipulation and Record omitted).

In proceedings brought pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-376, this Court acts as a 

court of original jurisdiction rather than an appellate court. In re Hill, 357 N.C. 559, 

564 (2003) (citing In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147 (1978)). The Commission’s 

recommendations are not binding on this Court, and this Court makes its own 

independent judgment when considering the evidence. In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 

244 (1977). This Court may “adopt the Commission’s findings of fact if they are 

supported by clear and convincing evidence, or [we] may make [our] own findings.” 

In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. 418, 428 (2012) (quoting In re Badgett, 362 N.C. 202, 206
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(2008)). If this Court finds that the Commission’s findings of fact are supported by 

clear and convincing evidence and chooses to adopt them, we must determine whether 

those findings support the Commission’s conclusions of law. In re Stone, 373 N.C. 368, 

379 (2020) (citing In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. at 429) 

The Commission based its findings of fact on the stipulated facts and exhibits, 

and respondent does not contest these findings. After careful review, we agree that 

the Commission’s findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing 

evidence, and we adopt them as our own. 

Respondent does not contest the fact that he held a probable-cause hearing 

without defendant’s counsel present but instead argues that an objectively reasonable 

reading of our statutes allows a district court to conduct a probable-cause hearing 

without a defendant’s counsel present. As an initial matter, this Court need not find 

a violation of our statutes in order to find a violation of our Code of Judicial Conduct. 

See In re Tucker, 350 N.C. 649, 651 (1999) (finding that respondent violated our Code 

of Judicial Conduct by rejecting a guilty plea and entering a verdict of not guilty

without determining whether the judge’s conduct also violated our General Statutes).

Instead, this Court must determine whether respondent’s statements, actions, and 

inactions constitute “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings 

the judicial office into disrepute.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b) (2019). 

Although our analysis hinges on respondent’s conduct rather than his 

compliance with our General Statutes, we reject respondent’s argument that his 
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conduct was the result of an objectively reasonable interpretation of our statutes 

governing probable-cause proceedings. Respondent argues that N.C.G.S. § 15A-606(e) 

allows probable-cause hearings to proceed without defense counsel present and 

N.C.G.S. § 15A-606(f) barred him from continuing the matter. A thorough 

examination of these statutes shows why this argument fails. These two sub-sections 

provide that: 

(e) If an unrepresented defendant is not indigent and has 

indicated his desire to be represented by counsel, the 

district court judge must inform him that he has a choice 

of appearing without counsel at the probable-cause hearing 

or of securing the attendance of counsel to represent him 

at the hearing. The judge must further inform him that the 

judge presiding at the hearing will not continue the 

hearing because of the absence of counsel except for 

extraordinary cause. 

(f) Upon a showing of good cause, a scheduled probablecause hearing may be continued by the district court upon 

timely motion of the defendant or the State. Except for 

extraordinary cause, a motion is not timely unless made at 

least 48 hours prior to the time set for the probable-cause 

hearing. 

N.C.G.S. § 15A-606(e)–(f) (2019). Although § 15A-606(e) allows for a probable-cause 

hearing to proceed without counsel present, it only applies to defendants who are not 

indigent, and it also requires that the trial court inform the defendant that they have 

a choice of appearing without counsel or securing the attendance of counsel and that 

the hearing will not be continued due to counsel’s absence except for extraordinary 

cause. Respondent’s conduct does not objectively comply with this statute because 
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there is no evidence that he ascertained whether defendant was indigent, as a 

threshold matter, and there is no evidence that he informed defendant of his choice 

between appearing without counsel or securing the attendance of counsel. 

Sub-section 15A-606(f) does not justify respondent’s conduct either because it 

explicitly only applies to motions made by the defendant or the State, not the trial 

court. Respondent’s admission that he would not have conducted the hearing if he 

had known that the ADA threatened to withhold a plea offer if defendant challenged 

probable cause further negates his original argument that § 15A-606(f) barred him 

from continuing the matter.

Additionally, if respondent attempted to objectively follow all relevant statutes 

he would have followed N.C.G.S. § 15A-611, which is titled “Probable-cause hearings.” 

Subsection (c) provides that: 

If a defendant appears at a probable-cause hearing without 

counsel, the judge must determine whether counsel has 

been waived. If he determines that counsel has been 

waived, he may proceed without counsel. If he determines 

that counsel has not been waived, except in a situation 

covered by G.S. 15A-606(e) he must take appropriate action 

to secure the defendant’s right to counsel. 

N.C.G.S. § 15A-611(c). The plain language of this subsection requires the trial court 

to inquire whether a defendant has waived counsel if they appear without counsel 

and further requires “appropriate action” if counsel has not been waived and the 

defendant is indigent. There is no evidence that the trial court ascertained whether 

defendant waived counsel, and respondent failed to take any “appropriate action to 
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secure the defendant’s right to counsel.” Id. Therefore, respondent’s conduct failed to 

reflect an objectively reasonable reading and interpretation of our General Statutes 

governing probable-cause proceedings. 

Respondent further argues that subjecting him to punishment for a legal error 

would create a slippery slope and “extend the disciplinary provisions in the Code of 

Judicial Conduct to cover legal errors committed by trial judges[.]” He cites to our 

recent decision in State v. Simpkins, 373 N.C. 530 (2020), in which we held that the 

trial court erred by determining the defendant had waived his right to counsel and 

remanded the matter for a new trial. Id. at 541. This analogy is inapposite. Unlike 

respondent here, the trial court in Simpkins made multiple attempts to determine 

whether the defendant wished to waive counsel and appointed standby counsel. Id. 

at 532. These additional actions by the trial court in Simpkins would foster public 

faith and confidence in the judiciary, even though the trial court was ultimately 

wrong in its determination that defendant waived counsel. Unlike the trial court in 

Simpkins, respondent rushed to hold a hearing without counsel present, he failed to 

explore other options regarding counsel prior to commencing the proceeding, and he 

made comments about “making a point” after the proceeding. This conduct 

demonstrated a disregard for the defendant’s statutory and constitutional rights, and 

that disregard undermines public faith and confidence in the judiciary. 

For the reasons articulated above, we agree with and adopt as our own the 

Commission’s conclusions that respondent’s conduct violates Canons 2A and 3A(4) of 
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the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and is prejudicial to the administration 

of justice, thus bringing the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A376(b). 

The Commission recommended that respondent be publicly reprimanded. This 

Court is not bound by the recommended sanction of the Commission. Hartsfield, 365 

N.C. at 429. “[W]e may exercise our own judgment in arriving at a disciplinary 

decision in light of respondent’s violations of the North Carolina Code of Judicial 

Conduct.” In re Stone, 373 N.C. 368, 379 (2020) (citing Hartsfield, 365 N.C. at 429). 

Therefore, “[w]e may adopt the Commission’s recommendation, or we may impose a 

lesser or more severe sanction.” Id. This Court does not have established guidelines 

for determining the appropriate sanction and “each case should be decided upon its 

own facts.” In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 305 (1978).

We recognize the multiple affidavits submitted on respondent’s behalf from 

attorneys in the Buncombe County Bar that attest to his fairness and further 

recognize that respondent has never been the subject of discipline from this Court. In 

light of this mitigating evidence and the fact that respondent voluntarily entered into 

a Stipulation of Facts, we conclude that the Commission’s additional findings and 

recommendation of public reprimand are appropriate, and we adopt them as our own.

Therefore, the Supreme Court of North Carolina orders that respondent Edwin 

D. Clontz be publicly reprimanded for conduct in violation of Canon 2A and Canon 

3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, and for conduct prejudicial to 
IN RE CLONTZ

Order of the Court

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the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation 

of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376.

By order of the Court in Conference, this the 15th day of December, 2020. 

s/Davis, J.

For the Court 

WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, this 

the 15th day of December, 2020. 

AMY L. FUNDERBURK

Clerk of the Supreme Court

s/M.C. Hackney

Assistant Clerk 
Justice EARLS dissenting from Order.

A public reprimand is appropriate where the Supreme Court finds that “a 

judge has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and has engaged in conduct 

prejudicial to the administration of justice, but that misconduct is minor.” 

N.C.G.S. § 7A-374.2(7) (2019). Because it is not clear to me that respondent’s conduct, 

while misguided, was so egregious as to be prejudicial to the administration of justice, 

I would have remanded to the Judicial Standards Commission for the issuance of a 

private letter of caution rather than issue a public reprimand from this Court. As a 

result, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s Order in this matter.

This Judicial Standards Commission case proceeded on stipulated facts, and 

the Commission entered findings of fact based on the record before it. Respondent 

was presiding over probable cause hearings in criminal district court when the case 

of defendant Jermaine Logan was called. The assistant district attorney, Ms. Terwey, 

requested a continuance. Defense counsel, Mr. Smith, objected and demanded a 

probable cause hearing. The respondent held the matter open and instructed the 

parties to return at two o’clock that afternoon. 

At two o’clock, ADA Terwey was present with the necessary witnesses and the 

defendant, Mr. Logan, had been brought from jail to a holding cell adjacent to the 

courtroom that had a barred window looking into the room. However, defense counsel, 

Mr. Smith, was not there.
IN RE CLONTZ

Earls, J., dissenting from Order

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After dealing with other matters on the calendar and having the bailiff check 

the other courtrooms to try to find Mr. Smith, respondent proceeded with the probable 

cause hearing without defense counsel present. Mr. Logan was allowed to crossexamine the State’s witnesses “through the barred window of the prisoner holding 

area while he remained handcuffed and without access to pen or paper, which is 

routine in Buncombe County for in custody defendants, unless a specific request is 

made by a party to bring the defendant into the courtroom.” 

At the conclusion of the State’s evidence, ADA Terwey indicated that she was 

uncomfortable with the proceedings. She stated that Mr. Logan might incriminate 

himself if he testified. Respondent advised Mr. Logan that he wouldn’t be allowed to 

testify. ADA Terwey did not give a closing argument and respondent found that there 

was probable cause for the charges. 

After the hearing concluded, Mr. Smith returned and the parties met in 

respondent’s chambers. Mr. Smith reported that he had been in the district attorney’s 

office discussing Mr. Logan’s case, where a Superior Court assistant district attorney 

threatened to withhold a plea deal if Mr. Smith pressed for a probable cause hearing. 

Respondent stated that if he had known about the threat he would not have proceeded 

with the hearing. He stated at this point “that he proceeded with Mr. Logan’s case 

without Mr. Smith to ‘make a point’ because Mr. Smith was not present at 2:00 pm 

when he had been told to return to court and Mr. Smith did not otherwise 

communicate his location to the Court or courtroom personnel.” In a bond hearing 
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Earls, J., dissenting from Order

-3-

after the meeting in chambers, respondent lowered Mr. Logan’s bond from $100,000 

secured to $25,000 secured.

Respondent entered into evidence character affidavits from four witnesses who 

attest that he is generally well-regarded in the community, generally sensitive to the 

interests of defendants who appear before him, and that his conduct on this occasion 

was not part of a pattern of repeated misbehavior. 

As the majority notes, respondent argues without merit that in these 

circumstances he was legally prohibited by statute from continuing the probable 

cause hearing and was permitted to proceed in the absence of defense counsel. 

However, this legal mistake, even combined with respondent’s admitted improper 

motive, does not rise to the level of conduct which has warranted public reprimand in 

other cases. In the last five years, this Court has issued four public reprimands, the 

sum of which suggest that the instant case is inappropriate for public reprimand.

For example, in another case adjudicated on stipulated facts, a district judge, 

perceiving unfair treatment from her Chief District Court Judge, began complaining 

about the Chief Judge “to other judges in her district, retired judges, court staff, and 

local attorneys” and “also suggested to her case manager and a courtroom clerk that 

the Chief Judge’s decisions regarding her schedule were based in part on racial 

prejudice.” In re Smith, 372 N.C. 123, 126, 827 S.E.2d 516, 518 (2019). In addition to 

consistent complaints about the Chief Judge, which we concluded on the evidence 

were unwarranted, id. at 127, 827 S.E.2d at 518–19, the respondent in that case 
IN RE CLONTZ

Earls, J., dissenting from Order

-4-

sometimes openly “announce[d] that she was adjourning court early for personal 

appointments, such as for hair and nail salon visits or to spend time with her child,” 

which “created a perception that her judicial duties did not take precedence over her 

personal commitments and work schedule preferences.” Id. at 127–28, 827 S.E.2d at 

519. As a result of the respondent’s conduct, “several members of the domestic bar” 

requested that the respondent be removed from their cases, and “several judicial and 

court colleagues” brought concerns to the Chief Judge about the respondent’s 

behavior. Id. at 128, 827 S.E.2d at 519. We concluded that a public reprimand was 

appropriate. Id. at 135, 827 S.E.2d at 523.

Similarly, we considered the case of a trial judge who “(1) failed to issue a 

ruling for more than two (2) years on a motion for attorney’s fees and expenses . . .; 

(2) failed to respond or delayed responding to party and attorney inquiries as to the 

status of the pending ruling; and (3) failed to respond in a timely manner to numerous 

communications from the Commission’s investigator regarding the status of the 

ruling during the Commission’s investigation into this matter.” In re Henderson, 371 

N.C. 45, 46, 812 S.E.2d 826, 827 (2018). The respondent in that case admitted “that 

he had no excuses for the delay other than his ‘dread’ of the case.” Id. at 47, 812 S.E.2d 

at 828. We concluded that the respondent should be publicly reprimanded. Id. at 52, 

812 S.E.2d at 830.

We also considered the case of a Deputy Commissioner of the North Carolina 

Industrial Commission, where it was charged that the respondent had “wrecked his 
IN RE CLONTZ

Earls, J., dissenting from Order

-5-

vehicle while driving under the influence of an impairing substance, putting at risk 

his own life and the lives of others.” In re Shipley, 370 N.C. 595, 596, 811 S.E.2d 556, 

557 (2018). The Judicial Standards Commission’s factual findings, unchallenged by 

the respondent, stated that the respondent was involved in an accident with another 

vehicle at around nine o’clock in the evening, after which two breath alcohol tests 

produced results indicating that the respondent had been driving while impaired. Id.

at 596–97, 811 S.E.2d at 557–58. We issued a public reprimand. Id. at 600, 811 S.E.2d 

at 560.

In another case, we considered a recommendation by the Commission 

concerning a district judge who was charged with failing to report extrajudicial 

income and “presiding over a criminal case that he had initiated and agreeing to the 

dismissal of the case after receiving restitution in chambers.” In re Mack, 369 N.C. 

236, 237, 794 S.E.2d 266, 267–68 (2016). The Commission’s factual findings, 

unchallenged by the respondent, indicated that the respondent received rental 

income from two residential properties, but failed to report that income for a number 

of years. Id. at 238–42, 794 S.E.2d at 268–70. Moreover, the respondent presided over 

a criminal case, calendared in his courtroom by the Assistant District Attorney, in 

which he was the complainant against a former tenant who had damaged the 

respondent’s rental home. Id. After acknowledging the judge’s remedial efforts and 

strong dedication to the community, we determined that a public reprimand was 

appropriate. Id. at 247–49, 794 S.E.2d at 273–74.
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Earls, J., dissenting from Order

-6-

In contrast to our prior cases issuing public reprimands, here respondent’s 

conduct occurred in one proceeding over the course of one afternoon. In Smith, 

Henderson, and Mack, on the other hand, the respondent’s conduct persisted over a 

significant period of time. See In re Smith, 372 N.C. at 126–28, 827 S.E.2d at 518–19; 

In re Henderson, 371 N.C. at 46, 812 S.E.2d at 827; In re Mack, 369 N.C. at 238–42, 

794 S.E.2d at 268–70. Respondent’s conduct in the present case involved no allegation 

of criminal conduct. However, the respondent in Shipley was accused of driving while 

under the influence of an impairing substance in violation of N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1. In 

re Shipley, 370 N.C. at 596, 811 S.E.2d at 557. Here, respondent’s conduct was not 

part of a pattern of unprofessional or unbecoming behavior. The respondent in Smith, 

however, received a public reprimand after “attorneys that frequently appeared” 

before her reported that she “regularly rushed to conclude cases” so that they were 

concerned about having a full and fair opportunity to be heard, and after several 

complaints were lodged regarding this and other behavior. In re Smith, 372 N.C. at 

125–29, 827 S.E.2d at 517–20. Moreover, none of the other cases in which the Court 

has issued a public reprimand in the last five years included an arguable claim of 

legal authority for the respondent’s conduct. Upon review of the similar cases 

considered recently by this Court, I am convinced that the present case does not 

demonstrate the level of conduct warranting a public reprimand.

It is well-established that “[t]he Supreme Court ‘acts as a court of original 

jurisdiction, rather than in its typical capacity as an appellate court’ when reviewing 
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Earls, J., dissenting from Order

-7-

a recommendation from the Commission.” In re Smith, 372 N.C. at 134, 827 S.E.2d 

at 522. In Smith we observed that:

This Court is not bound by the recommendations of the 

Commission. Rather, we may exercise our own judgment in 

arriving at a disciplinary decision in light of Respondent's 

violations of several canons of the North Carolina Code of 

Judicial Conduct. Accordingly, ‘[w]e may adopt the 

Commission's recommendation, or we may impose a lesser 

or more severe sanction.”

In re Smith, 372 N.C. at 135, 827 S.E.2d at 523 (citations omitted) (quoting In re 

Hartsfield, 365 N.C. 418, 429, 722 S.E.2d 496, 503 (2012)). Indeed, “[i]n arriving at a 

disciplinary decision, this Court employs its own judgment and ‘is unfettered by the 

Commission's recommendations.’ ” In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. at 429, 722 S.E.2d at 

503 (quoting In re Badgett, 362 N.C. 202, 207, 657 S.E.2d 346, 349 (2008)). 

In making that independent judgment, it is important to remember that a 

judicial standards inquiry “is merely an inquiry into the conduct of one exercising 

judicial power.” In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 241, 237 S.E.2d 246, 250 (1977). “Its aim 

is not to punish the individual but to maintain the honor and dignity of the judiciary 

and the proper administration of justice.” Id. On the facts of this case, accurately 

described by the Court’s order, a public reprimand is not required to ensure the honor 

of the judiciary and the proper administration of justice. Rather, a letter of caution is 

sufficient. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s order of public 

reprimand.
IN RE CLONTZ

Earls, J., dissenting from Order

-8-

EARLS, J. dissenting from order; Justices NEWBY and DAVIS join in this 

dissent.