J-S53031-18

____________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

T.W., JR., O/B/O, T.W., III AND 

T.L.W., MINOR CHILDREN

Appellee

v.

M.T.M. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1050 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered March 22, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County 

Domestic Relations at No(s): C-48-PF-2017-1104

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OTT, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2018

Appellant, M.T.M., appeals from the order entered in the Northampton 

County Court of Common Pleas, which denied reconsideration of the order 

granting the Protection From Abuse (“PFA”) petitions of Appellee, T.W., Jr. 

(“Father”), filed against Appellant on behalf of T.W., III, and T.L.W. 

(“Children”), the minor children of Father and M.D. (“Mother”). We affirm. 

In its opinions, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant 

facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no need to 

restate them. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

WAS THE ISSUE OF CONSOLIDATION PROPERLY 

PRESERVED WHERE THE ISSUE WAS RAISED BY THE 

[TRIAL] COURT SUA SPONTE AND [MOTHER] REQUESTED 

THAT THE MATTERS BE HEARD SEPARATELY?
J-S53031-18

- 2 -

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 

CONSOLIDATING TWO PROTECTION FROM ABUSE CASES 

WHERE THE CONSOLIDATION PREJUDICED [APPELLANT]?

DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT AN ERROR OF LAW BY 

ADMITTING [FATHER]’S OFFER OF [APPELLANT]’s

STATEMENTS?

(Appellant’s Brief at 6-7).

The relevant scope and standard of review are as follows: “In the 

context of a PFA order, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions for an 

error of law or abuse of discretion.” Stamus v. Dutcavich, 938 A.2d 1098, 

1100 (Pa.Super. 2007) (quoting Drew v. Drew, 870 A.2d 377, 378 

(Pa.Super. 2005)). 

Additionally, “a trial court has broad discretion with regard to the 

admissibility of evidence, and is not required to exclude all evidence that may 

be detrimental to a party’s case.” Schuenemann v. Dreemz, LLC, 34 A.3d 

94, 102 (Pa.Super. 2011). “To constitute reversible error, an evidentiary 

ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or [unduly] prejudicial to 

the complaining party.” Ettinger v. Triangle-Pacific Corp., 799 A.2d 95, 

110 (Pa.Super. 2002), appeal denied, 572 Pa. 742, 815 A.2d 1042 (2003). 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinions of the Honorable Michael J. 

Koury, Jr., we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court 

opinions comprehensively discuss and properly dispose of the questions 

presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed March 22, 2018, at 9-12; Trial Court 
J-S53031-18

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Opinion, filed April 3, 2018, at 1) (finding: (1-2) Appellant failed to object to 

consolidation of PFA petitions before trial court, so Appellant has waived his 

challenge to consolidation; even if Appellant had not waived his consolidation 

claim, he would be entitled to no relief; based upon allegations in PFA 

petitions, court concluded both petitions stemmed from same purported

incidents and same evidence was necessary in both cases; (3) Appellant failed 

to make timely and specific objection to hearsay testimony before trial court; 

initially, Appellant objected to Father’s presentation of Mother’s statements,

which court determined were admissible as statements of party opponent; 

Appellant made no additional objection to admissibility of Mother’s 

statements; Appellant also failed to object to multiple levels of hearsay Father

presented in his testimony; further, Appellant failed to object to testimony of 

S.R., Children’s maternal grandmother, who testified to additional statements 

of Mother). The record supports the trial court’s rationale, and we see no 

reason to disturb it. Accordingly, we affirm based on the trial court’s opinions. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/20/18
Circulated 11/05/2018 02:3 :1)1 M 

IN-THE-COURTVF-COMMON PLEA HAMPTONCOUNTY 

T, Jr >j 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

PFA DIVISION 

o/b/o minors, 

Plaintiff, 

V. 

M. 'n 

Defendant. 

No.: C-48-PF-2017-1104 

PENNSYLVANIA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 

1925(a) STATEMENT 

AND NOW, this 3rd day of April, 2018, the Court issues the following 

statement: 

On April 3, 2018, Defendant M.7; /14, ; filed and served upon 

this Court a timely Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 

from the Order of Court entered on January 3, 2018 and made final by our 

Opinion and Order of Court entered on March 22, 2018. Together with his 

Notice of Appeal, Defendant filed a "Concise Statement of Errors Complained 

of on Appeal." For the reasons set forth in our Opinion and Order of Court 

entered on March 22, 2018, we respectfully suggest that Defendant's appeal 

lacks merit'andushould be dismissed. 

Lu 

BY THE COURT, 

S MICHAEL 1. K Y, 
Circulated 11/05/2018 02:36 PM 

I Pt-THE-COURT-GF-COM-140-N PLEAS-0-F-NORTtrAMPTON-COUNTY 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSyL,VANa, 

PFA DIVISION 

FI9 nni 1. L- r 2 1 

T; j Jr, - o/b/o minors, Noo:C-48-PF-21:117,7,11.04 

Plaintiff, 

Defendant. 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

Plaintiff )13,1./A f,F,,9,,rlfiled for a Protection from Abuse Order ("PFA") 

against Defendant) /1.4, 7: M. on behalf of his two minor children, 

izi - and T:L. (collectively, "the Children"). Plaintiff 

filed a second PFA against the Children's mother, M.D t-motkerlii in a 

separate docket averring nearly identical allegations of abuse. We granted 

the PFA with respect to Defendant and dismissed the PFA with respect to 

/10.0,ert, 

This matter is before the court on Defendant's "Motion for 

Reconsideration of Protection from Abuse Order Dated January 3, 2018," 

wherein Defendant requests that we vacate the final PFA entered against 

him, reinstate the temporary PFA, and set the matter for another hearing. 

See Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Protection from Abuse Order 

Dated January 3, 2018, T, 0,-,, v. m, No. C-48-PF-2017-1104 (C.P. 

Northampton Co. Jan. 23, 2018) ("Motion for Reconsideration"). We granted 

reconsideration and the parties presented argument on Defendant's motion 

'7 
on February 9, 2018. This matter is now ready for disposition. 

BACKGROUND 

On December 21, 2017, Plaintiff sought and obtained a temporary PFA 

on behalf of the Children. See Temporary Protection from Abuse Order, 

ob,Jriv, M, TM , No. C-48-PF-2017-1104 (C.P. Northampton Co. Dec. 21, 

2017). He alleged that Defendant had made verbal threats to harm the 

Children and that Defendant was physically abusive toward his girlfriend, 

MOA-ke r See id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff also obtained a temporary 

PFA against Mimic, alleging that mom,e,- placed the Children in imminent 

harm by allowing Defendant to reside with her and the Children. See 

Temporary Protection from Abuse Order,tv4,i6 v, M., D> , No. C-48-PF2017-1103 (C.P. Northampton Co. Dec. 21, 2017). 

Plaintiff, Defendant, and Mote,- appeared for a hearing on January 3, 

2018. See Transcript of Proceedings of January 3, 2018,tVV.,ac v. mitA,I, 

No. C-48-PF-2017-1104 (C.P. Northampton Co. Jan. 10, 2018) ("T.P. Jan. 

3"). Plaintiff was represented by April L. Cordts, Esq.; Defendant was 

represented by Michael J. Dohohue, Esq.; and Mokher was represented by 

Al Shirba, Esq. See id. at 1. 

Given the similar nature of the two PFA petitions, the cases were heard 

together. See id. at 4. Defendant made no objection to consolidation: 

THE COURT: Are we proceeding with a hearing in both 

of these cases? 

2 
MR. STIRBA: Yes, Your Honor. 

MR. DONOHUE: Yes, Your Honor. 

MR. STIRBA: They're companion cases, Judge. It's 

obviously the same plaintiff and I think similar 

accusations, but it's up to the Court. I have no 

problem if you want to do them together. 

MS. CORDTS: If they're taking the position that it's a 

common - I think it should be done separately but 

that's up to the Court. 

MR. STIRBA: I would request it be done separately. 

MS. CORDTS: If you want to get the prisoner out of 

here quicker. 

THE COURT: Which one are we doing first? 

MR. STIRBA: Your Honor, if we can, defendant /0,04.61,2,-; 

THE COURT: And who is Fh-Fin er 

PArt-FEK : Myself. 

THE COURT: So you're proceeding? 

MS. CORDTS: Yes, Your Honor. 'Fa{ -her filed on 

behalf of two minor children. 

THE COURT: Okay. Are they here? 

MS. CORDTS: The children? No. 

MS. CORDTS: The allegations are that there is a 

custody order. MO-Fka r , has 

primary physical custody of the two children. mo_HAerhas been in an on again off again relationship 

with m, rM, the second case. It came to my 

client's attention via statements made to him directly 

by Ma4htr that it had turned into a violent, 

3 
8. other also told Plaintiff that Defendant had threatene to it the 

Children and then kill Ma{ -her. See id. Motherinformed Plaintiff that she 

and Defendant fought with each other frequently in front of the Children. 

See id. at 10. IVID-Wler told Plaintiff that she intended to end her relationship 

with Defendant after the December 1, 2017 incident. See id. at 9. Later, 

Plaintiff learned from MA-her5 family that Mokirial had resumed cohabitating with Defendant. See id. 

Plaintiff called S. R;. , the Children's maternal grandmother 

and BA(keris mother, to testify. See id. at 25. lg. testified that, on 

December 9, 2017, Moklmx had confided in her that Defendant had 

threatened to harm her and the Children: 

Q. And specifically did your daughter make you aware 

at some time of some issues in the relationship 

between herself and M. I; A4, ? 

A. Yes, she did. 

Q. And what concern - what did she indicate to you? 

A. On November 16th she left him. She came into 

my house and she gave him a certain time to be out. 

At which time then she went back. She went back 

that day. She called me repeatedly crying. She's - I 

mean, she's repeatedly having issues and she left him 

on December 1st. She went to Fix+her's house. On 

December 8th she came to my nouse. She said he 

had three days to get out, until Sunday, December the 

9th. 

During that time she told me - she told me that 

if she didn't do what KTAA said that he was 

going to punish her and he was going to make her feel 

the pain of watching him kill both of my grandchildren 

and then he would kill her. 

5 
Id. at 26. Defendant did not object to the hearsay statements attributed to 

Moktner, Further, Defendant did not object to the hearsay within hearsay 

presented by the statements attributed to Defendant by M0-4-ktr, 

5, Ka -Further testified that, prior to the December 9, 2017 

conversation, (Gila had told her that Defendant would "grab things, he 

would break things, punch holes in the walls." Id. at 28. She also testified 

that in August 2017 she observed MO-I-ktr with a large bruise on her leg 

that Mbhir reported Defendant had caused when he pushed her, ripping a 

safety gate out of the wall. See id. at 32, 38. Immediately prior to the 

Christmas holiday, S. reported that Mo-km,r and Defendant were 

residing together again and that there "was a lot of fighting, crying." Id. at 

28. Neither Plaintiff, nor 5°R. expressed any concern over the safety and 

well-being of the Children when they were solely in 401 -inter 's care. See id. 

at 16, 35. 

During her testimony, MAkti denied all allegations in Plaintiff's PFA 

petitions. See id. at 42-43. She also denied that Defendant had been 

physically violent toward her. See id. at 52. Regarding the December 1, 

2017 incident, illth4e,rtestified that she left the house following a 

disagreement with Defendant about "principles," related to her iPhone. Id. 

at 53, 56. She further testified that she broke her own iPhone, bending it in 

half with her hands. See id. at 54, 57. 11404442r testified that 5, g, , was 

"incorrect" when she testified regarding the bruising on her leg and the 

6 
threats reportedly made by Defendant. See id. at 52. 

While 11404-Vvtrwas testifying about Defendant's current incarceration 

due to a probation violation, her counsel objected to the hearsay statements 

attributed to Defendant: 

[MS. CORDTS]. Okay. And did you become aware 

that day - did you hear Mr. - did 11407n say 

anything to the Court? 

MR. STIRBA: Objection. 

THE COURT: It would be - 

MR STIRBA: If we're talking about what happened in 

a criminal hearing without a transcript. This is not 

impeachment. He hasn't testified yet. It's not a prior 

inconsistent statement. Even if it's not hearsay 

because we're going to go with the party opponent, 

it's absolutely irrelevant and possibly very prejudicial. 

THE COURT: Well, what - it wouldn't be a party 

opponent because - kttyr, - how do you say 

his name? 

MR. STIRBA: kJ; 44° 

THE COURT: He's not a party against her. So how 

are you going to get past hearsay? 

MS. CORDTS: Well, I have M, r tvi= here right 

now so I can ask him. 

THE COURT: So you will ask him? 

MS. CORDTS: I can ask him. 

THE COURT: Okay. The objection, though, is 

sustained as hearsay. 

Id. at 48-49. The objection lodged by Mumtr's counsel concerned hearsay 
statements attributed to a defendant by a co-defendant, not a party 

opponent. See id. As such, the statements, which did not fall within any 

other exception to the rule against hearsay, were deemed inadmissible. See 

id. 

Defendant testified that he had never harmed or threatened to harm 

the Children. See id. at 58, 63. He stated that he was currently 

incarcerated in Northampton County Prison awaiting a Gagnon II hearing for 

allegations that he left the state without permission, consumed alcohol, and 

failed a drug test. See id. at 59. 

At the close of testimony, we dismissed Plaintiff's PFA against Mo.kar 

and granted Plaintiff a final PFA against Defendant for a period of three 

years. See id. at 70. Our ruling was based on a credibility determination, 

namely that Plaintiff's and 5, ,'c testimony were credible and plo+i/ter 

testimony was not credible. See id. 

Defendant filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" on January 23, 2018, 

arguing that, but for the allegedly inadmissible hearsay testimony, Plaintiff's 

allegations of abuse could not be proven. See generally Motion for 

Reconsideration. Defendant requested that we vacate the final PFA entered 

against him on January 3, 2018, reinstate the temporary PFA, and set the 

matter for a new hearing. See id. I; 20. We granted reconsideration and the 

8 
parties appeared for argument on Defendant's motion on February 9, 2018.1 

See Order of Court, -rt-wgr.v_pc:rivi. No. C-48-PF-2017-1104 (C.P. 

Northampton Co. Feb. 2, 2018). 

DISCUSSION 

Defendant argues that the two PFA cases were improperly joined and 

that, as a result, the hearsay statements introduced by Plaintiff and 5. Re 

were improperly admitted against Defendant. See generally Motion for 

Reconsideration. 

At the outset, we note that 

in order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a 

party must make a timely and specific objection at the 

appropriate stage of the proceedings before the trial 

court. Failure to timely object to a basic and 

fundamental error will result in waiver of that issue. 

On appeal the Superior Court will not consider a claim 

to the trial court's attention at a time when any error 

committed could have been corrected. In this 

jurisdiction . . . one must object to errors, 

improprieties or irregularities at the earliest possible 

stage of the adjudicatory process to afford the jurist 

hearing the case the first occasion to remedy the 

wrong and possibly avoid an unnecessary appeal to 

complain of the matter. 

Thompson v. Thompson, 963 A.2d 474, 475-76 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting 

Hong v. Pelagatti, 765 A.2d 1117, 1123 (Pa. Super. 2000)); see also 

1 Prior to our Order granting reconsideration, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal to 

the Superior Court. See Notice of Appeal, ti,v,,Jr, v, No. C-48-147-2017- 

1104 (C.P. Northampton Co. Feb. 2, 2018). Following our Order granting 

reconsideration, Defendant filed a "Praecipe to Strike Notice of Appeal." See 

Praecipe to Strike Notice of Appeal,TA Sr. V. M,TiKk No. C-48-PF-2017-1104 

(C.P. Northampton Co. Feb. 28, 2018); see also Pa.R.A.P, 1701. 

9 
Pa.R.A.P. 302 ("Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot 

be raised for the first time on appeal."). 

Here, Defendant failed to make a timely and specific objection to the 

consolidation of the PFA cases. See T.P. Jan. 3 at 3-4. In fact, defense 

counsel did not even participate in the discussion regarding a joint hearing. 

See generally id. Therefore, Defendant has waived the issue of 

consolidation. See Thompson, 963 A.2d at 475-76. 

Assuming, arguendo, that Defendant has not waived this issue, we 

conclude that it was entirely proper to hear the cases together. While, the 

Protection From Abuse Act does not specifically provide for consolidation, 

Section 6117 of the Act contemplates the application of the broader 

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6101 et 

seq.; see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6117(a) ("a proceeding under this chapter shall be 

in accordance with applicable general rules"). Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 

Procedure Rule 213 provides that 

[i)n actions pending in a county which involve a 

common question of law or fact or which arise from 

the same transaction or occurrence, the court on its 

own motion or on the motion of any party may order 

a joint hearing or trial of any matter in issue in the 

actions, may order the actions consolidated, and may 

make orders that avoid unnecessary cost or delay. 

Pa.R.C.P. 213(a). Where the individual cases in a consolidated action 

involve different parties or different theories of liability, the individual cases 

retain their separate identities. See Kincy v. Petro, 2 A.3d 490, 491 (Pa. 

10 
2010). 

Here, after a brief summary of Plaintiff's allegations, we concluded that 

the cases were related and would be heard together. See T.P. Jan. 3 at 3-4. 

We based our ruling on the fact that both PFA complaints stemmed from the 

same alleged incidents, wherein Defendant threatened to harm the Children. 

See id. The same testimony and evidence was necessary in both cases. See 

generally T.P. Jan. 3. Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy and 

because Plaintiff's claims against 1/1/104-14k and Defendant involved common 

questions of law and fact, we consolidated the cases for a final PFA hearing. 

See id. at 3-4. 

Defendant also failed to make timely and specific objections regarding 

the hearsay testimony admitted against him during the PFA hearing. 

Initially, Defendant objected to the hearsay statements of /110./,ho ) as 

presented by Plaintiff. See T.P. Jan. 3 at 7. We ruled that the statements 

were admissible because 11/4Their was a party opponent of Plaintiff. See id. 

Defendant made no further objection as to the scope of the admissibility of 

frio-ktr 's hearsay statements. See id.; Pa.R.E. 103 ("A party may claim 

error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only: (1) if the ruling admits 

evidence, a party, on the record: (A) makes a timely objection, motion to 

strike, or motion in limine; and (B) states the specific ground, unless it was 

apparent from the context."). Specifically, Defendant never requested that 

the hearsay statements only be admissible as against 11404 -Aar, ,rather than 

11 
abusive relationship, and that she also related to him 

verbal threats that he made directly against the 

children. 

THE COURT: I think they're related. I'd like to hear 

them together. 

MS. CORDTS: Very well. 

Id. at 3-4. 

Plaintiff testified regarding an incident that occurred on December 1, 

2017 at 1:00 a.m., wherein W 01-Iner appeared at Plaintiff's residence with 

the Children following an altercation between her and Defendant. See id. at 

6-9. When Plaintiff was asked to relate what Mokner had told him about 

the altercation, Defendant's counsel objected to the hearsay testimony: 

[MS. CORDTS]. And what, if anything did she say to 

you? 

MR. DONOHUE: Objection to the hearsay, Judge. 

MS. CORDTS: It's - 

THE COURT: She's a party opponent. It would be the 

party opponent exception to the hearsay rule so the 

objection would be overruled. You can answer. 

Id. at 7. 

Plaintiff testified that Mokner told him that there had been an 

altercation between her and Defendant that evening and that she became 

fearful. See id. Moktr\e" also told Plaintiff that Defendant had broken her 

iPhone and punched holes in the wall. See id. Situfhe.{ showed Plaintiff her 

iPhone, which Plaintiff described as being "shaped like a horseshoe." Id. at 

4 
both defendants. Further, Defendant did not object to the multiple levels of 

hearsay presented by Plaintiff's testimony. See T.P. at 7. Separately, 

Defendant did not object to any of the testimony offered by 624g. > wherein 

Mo-Nntri6 hearsay statements were again presented. See id. at 26. Given 

the allegations made in Plaintiff's PFA petition and Ms. Cordts's brief 

summary of the case at the outset of the hearing, Defendant was on notice 

that Plaintiff's complaint against him was based entirely on statements 

iVerlitly made to Plaintiff. See id. at 4 ("It came to my client's attention via 

statements made to him directly by MO-1-14,fr- that it had turned into a 

violent, abusive relationship, and that she also related to him verbal threats 

that he made directly against the children."). The Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania has held that hearsay testimony of a codefendant is competent 

evidence as against another defendant, where the later failed to object to 

the hearsay statements at trial. See Liuzzo v. McKay, 152 A.2d 265, 266 

(Pa. 1959). Because Defendant did not timely object, Defendant is now 

barred from raising the hearsay issue at this point. 

CONCLUSION 

Defendant has waived the issues he now brings before us in his 

"Motion for Reconsideration." As such, Defendant is not entitled to relief. 

WHEREFORE, we enter the following: 

12 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF NORTHAMPTON -COUNTY 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

PFA DIVISION 

vv..iro 0/b/o minors, 

Plaintiff, 

V. 

N M, 

Defendant. 

No.: C-48-PF-2017-1104 

ORDER OF COURT 

AND NOW, this 22nd day of March, 2018, upon consideration of 

Defendant M .1-$ M. 's "Motion for Reconsideration of Protection 

from Abuse Order Dated January 3, 2018," it is hereby ORDERED that 

Defendant's motion is DENIED. 

BY THE COURT: 

MICHAEL J. K MY, 

no