2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-25-2012

USA v. Cyrus Sanders

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 10-3929

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Cyrus Sanders" (2012). 2012 Decisions. Paper 942.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 10-3929

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

CYRUS R. SANDERS

Appellant

_______________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C. Crim. Action No. 1-09-cr-00316-004)

District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell

_______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 26, 2012

_______________

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., ROTH, and TASHIMA*, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: May 25, 2012)

_______________

OPINION

________________

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

 

* Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals 

for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
2

Appellant Cyrus R. Sanders (“Sanders”) appeals the District Court’s September 

22, 2010 Order sentencing him to a term of thirty-three months of imprisonment. 

Sanders moved for a downward departure, based on “unduly harsh and inappropriate 

conditions during pre-trial confinement at the Dauphin County Prison.” Specifically, 

Sanders’s request for a downward departure was based on a brutal assault he allegedly 

suffered while incarcerated in the Dauphin County Prison. 

The District Court denied Sanders’s motion. Sanders contends that the District 

Court denied his motion because it incorrectly assumed that it did not have the authority 

to grant the downward departure, particularly since he had filed a civil rights action under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Sanders argues that the sentence imposed was unreasonable. For the 

following reasons, we will dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and shall recount only the 

essential facts. Sanders was charged, along with twelve other co-conspirators, in a 

thirteen-count indictment related to conspiracy to manufacture and the manufacture of 

counterfeit United States currency. He pled guilty to Count nine, Pass and Utter

Counterfeit United States currency, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 472. As part of a written 

plea agreement between the Government and Sanders, the Government agreed to 

recommend a three-level reduction in Sanders’s sentence for acceptance of responsibility. 

Sanders agreed to cooperate, and if it was determined that he provided substantial 
3

assistance, the Government indicated that it would file a § 5K1.1 motion seeking a 

downward departure.

After his guilty plea, a Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) was filed under 

seal. Sanders objected to the PSR on several grounds, including the fact that he did not 

receive a two-level reduction in his sentence for a mitigating role under U.S.S.G. § 

3B1.2.1

At the sentencing hearing, Sanders withdrew his objections to the criminal history 

points calculation. At that time, Sanders also moved for a downward departure, pursuant 

to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, because of the treatment he received in the Dauphin County Prison. 

Specifically, Sanders alleged that he was severely beaten by several prison guards, while 

he was detained. He filed a prisoner’s civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

against Manny Rose, the Commanding Officer, who allegedly slammed Sanders to the

floor and punched him several times. Sanders also named the Dauphin County Prison, 

and other individual defendants based on his injuries. The Government suggested that 

the District Court should consider the circumstances of the prison beating under 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a).

 He also objected to the assessment of criminal history points. He claimed that 

because he had engaged in a crime spree, each crime that made up part of his criminal 

history should be aggregated, resulting in fewer criminal history points.

 1 After oral argument, the District Court determined that Sanders was not a minor 

participant in the conspiracy and overruled his objection.
4

The District Court denied Sanders’s motion for downward departure, and 

sentenced him to 33 months of imprisonment. Sanders filed a timely appeal.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Our jurisdiction 

to consider Sanders’s argument “depends on the basis for the district court’s ruling.” 

United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2000). “We do not have jurisdiction 

to review discretionary decisions by district courts to not depart downward. Jurisdiction 

arises, however, if the district court’s refusal to depart downward is based on the 

mistaken belief that it lacks discretion to do otherwise.” United States v. Vargas, 477 

F.3d 94, 103 (3d Cir. 2007), abrogated by U.S. v. Arrelucea-Zamudio

III. ANALYSIS

, 581 F.3d 142 (3d 

Cir. 2009). (Internal citations omitted.)

Sanders argues that the District Court erred in basing its refusal to grant his motion 

for a downward departure on an unreasonable understanding that it could not depart 

because Sanders filed a prisoner’s civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 

Government contends that this appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over 

the District Court’s discretionary denial of a motion for downward departure. 

The sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the range established 

by the applicable guidelines, if the court finds that there exists an 

aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 

adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 

formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from 

that described.’. . . The decision as to whether and to what extent departure 

is warranted rests with the sentencing court on a case-specific basis . . . . 
5

[the] [p]resence of any such factor may warrant departure from the 

guidelines, under some circumstances, in the discretion of the sentencing 

court.

Stevens

Here, the District Court’s colloquy with the Government at sentencing exemplifies 

a clear understanding that the court may exercise its discretion, if appropriate. The 

Government commented initially that “[t]he Court certainly could consider that 

information [relating to Sanders’s complaints of brutality], as it can consider all 

information in sentencing, and if it determines that it should give some kind of credit for 

that story, it certainly is within the Court’s discretion to do that under the [§] 3553(a) 

factors.” 

, 223 F.3d at 247 n.8 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0).

The District Court responded “I recognize that. I just don’t see how I can get 

involved in determining which side of this thing is correct. I mean, that’s why you have 

filed a lawsuit against the people at the Dauphin County Prison. But as regrettable as the 

incident was, however it happened, I just don’t think that that’s anything that I can 

consider in mitigation at this point. So I’m going to have to deny that motion for a 

downward departure.” (App. Vol. 2, 25a-26a.)

The District Court’s statement evidences that the court understood that it may 

exercise its discretion and take the Dauphin County jail incident into account for 

sentencing purposes. The facts here are similar to those in Stevens, where we concluded 

that the District Court’s consideration of the information presented by the defendant was 

within its discretion. 
6

“When the district court stated that ‘I don’t think what has been represented 

to the court here is the type of incarceration that would warrant any 

consideration on the guidelines for departure,’ the Court was not stating 

that it had no legal authority to grant a departure based on the conditions of 

Stevens’s pretrial confinement, but rather that Stevens had not persuaded 

the court that a departure was appropriate in his case. This was an exercise 

of discretion and therefore unreviewable.”

See Stevens, 223 F.3d at 248.

As was true in Stevens

IV. CONCLUSION

, we have no jurisdiction over a district court’s discretionary 

denial of a motion for downward departure. Here, the District Court appropriately 

exercised its discretion. 

We will dismiss this appeal from the District Court’s sentencing order.