alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 

Date: October 1, 2015 

Subject: Minutes of the conference calls with representatives of the Aerospace Industries 

Association to discuss comments on proposed amendments to the Aerospace 

Manufacturing and Rework Facilities NESHAP on September 2, 3, and 25, 2015. 

I. Introduction 

Representatives of the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) and the requested a conference call 

with U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) staff on September 2, 2015. The purpose of 

the meeting was to discuss comments on the proposed rule amendments for the Aerospace 

Manufacturing and Rework NESHAP (40 CFR 63, subpart GG) published on February 17, 2015 

(80 FR 8392). The meeting ran long and was continued (and concluded) during a subsequent 

conference call on September 3, 2015. The AIA also requested and held a final conference call 

with the EPA on September 25, 2015 to provide additional information as a follow up to the calls 

on September 2 and 3. This memorandum summarizes the major topics discussed during all three 

conference calls. 

II. Participants 

Shannon Broome, Katten Munchin Rosenman (AIA) 

Chuck Knauss, Katten Munchin Rosenman (AIA) 

Julie Cress, Katten Munchin Rosenman (AIA) 

Carl Jacobsen, Lockheed Martin 

George Jung, Northrop Grumman 

Chris Santucci, Pratt & Whitney 

Dave Moore, The Boeing Company 

Matt Iwicki, The Boeing Company 

Kim Teal, USEPA/OAQPS 

Keith Barnett, USEPA/OAQPS 

Brian Palmer, ERG 

John Carter, ERG 

III. Discussion 

The purpose of this meeting was to discuss AIA’s comments on the aerospace rule relative to 

NESHAP exemptions. The AIA provided comments and suggested edits to the rule text related to 

the following requested changes to subpart GG that were also included in their comments 

submitted on the proposed rule: 

• Exemption from all requirements for specialty coatings used in low volumes and for 

specialty coatings that are HAP-free; 

• Exemption from inorganic HAP limitations for certain types of coating application 

methods and in certain situations; 

• Exemption from organic HAP limits for coatings used in certain situations; and 

• Exemption from application equipment requirements for certain types of coatings; and 
2 

• Allowing certain types of coating application equipment without having to demonstrate 

equivalency to the currently allowed high-efficiency equipment. 

 

A copy of document provided by the AIA with their suggested edits to the rule text with AIA's 

comments are attached to this summary of the meeting. AIA explained their position on each 

issue and provided input from industry members who were also participating in the calls. In 

response to the issues raised by AIA’s comments, EPA either acknowledged the input provided by 

AIA, provided some basic feedback to AIA on the issue, or responded that EPA understood the 

comments and would respond accordingly in the final version of the rule.
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<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME AND CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
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<CASH>                                              21
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 1,437
<PP&E>                                           4,773
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0<F1>
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   6,619
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,747
<BONDS>                                            977
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
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<OTHER-SE>                                       1,910
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     6,619
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 1,455
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    1,368
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  31
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     69
<INCOME-TAX>                                        23
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 46
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                        46
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
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<FN>
<F1>NOT SEPARATELY IDENTIFIED IN THE CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OR
ACCOMPANYING NOTES THERETO.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00516-CR

Ex parte Dwight Ervine Brown §

§

§

§

§

From the 158th District Court

of Denton County (F-90-578-B)

December 21, 2012

Per Curiam

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

the appeal should be dismissed. It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed for 

want of jurisdiction.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

PER CURIAM
2

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00515-CR

NO. 02-12-00516-CR

NO. 02-12-00517-CR

NO. 02-12-00518-CR

EX PARTE DWIGHT ERVINE 

BROWN

----------

FROM THE 158TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

Appellant Dwight Ervine Brown pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain to 

the felony offenses of burglary of a habitation, aggravated robbery, and two 

counts of aggravated sexual assault. He subsequently filed an application for 

writ of habeas corpus in the trial court “seeking to obtain a copy of his complete 

trial records without cost.” The district clerk returned the application to Brown 

because it did not comply with rule of appellate procedure 73.1. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 73.1 (requiring use of specific form for application for post-conviction 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
3

habeas corpus relief from felony case). In his notice of appeal, Brown stated that 

he considered the application denied by operation of law.

As one of our sister courts recently observed,

This court has jurisdiction over criminal appeals only when 

expressly granted by law. No statute vests this court with jurisdiction 

over an appeal from an order denying a request for a free copy of 

the trial record when such a request is not presented in conjunction 

with a timely filed direct appeal. Furthermore, an intermediate court 

of appeals has no jurisdiction over post-conviction writs of habeas 

corpus in felony cases.

Williamson v. State, Nos. 10-12-00146-CR, 10-12-00147-CR, 10-12-00148-CR, 

10-12-00149-CR, 2012 WL 2353684, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco June 13, 2012, no 

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citations omitted).

On October 29, 2012, we notified Brown of our concern that this court 

lacked jurisdiction over these appeals, and we informed him that unless he or 

any party desiring to continue the appeals filed with the court, on or before 

November 19, 2012, a response showing grounds for continuing the appeals, the 

appeals would be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.3. 

We have received no response. Accordingly, we dismiss these appeals for want 

of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).

PER CURIAM

PANEL: MEIER, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and GABRIEL, J.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: December 21, 2012
#### MODGLING v. STATE.

No. 24264.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 16, 1949.

Horace H. Shelton and Wright Stubbs, both of Austin, for appellant.

James K. Evetts, Dist. Atty., of Belton, Taylor & Taylor, Sp. Pros., by Henry Taylor, all of Temple, and Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, *Judge.*

The appeal is from a conviction for murder with malice in which the jury assessed the punishment of 99 years in the penitentiary.

 There could be no question that the evidence introduced by the State is sufficient to sustain the conviction. The record before us contains no bills of exception. There is no1 brief in the case and we are not advised of the legal authority upon which appellant relies to support his one exception to the court’s charge. This exception was taken to the failure of the court to- charge that if the jury believed from the evidence, or had a reasonable doubt, that defendant was in real danger of his life or serious bodily injury at the hands of the deceased at the time the fatal shot was fired it would then be their duty to acquit the defendant, “whether or not the defendant had actual knowledge of this fact.” This seems to be the only question raised by the appeal. The proposition of law asserted by appellant is not tenable and, further, we think that the evidence in the case would be insufficient, even if communicated to appellant, under all of the facts in the case, to justify the shooting. Certainly no error under the circumstances has been pointed out.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

RICHARD HERNANDEZ, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D16-3008 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed February 14, 2018. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; William Fuente, Judge. Rachael E. Bushey of O'Brien Hatfield, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Chelsea S. Alper, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

CASANUEVA, SLEET, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2768 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2768

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             August 1, 2013

     Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to clarify that a duty of 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is to ensure that Internal Revenue 
  Service employees are familiar with and act in accord with certain 
                            taxpayer rights.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Taxpayer Bill of Rights Act of 
2013''.

SEC. 2. DUTY TO ENSURE THAT IRS EMPLOYEES ARE FAMILIAR WITH AND ACT IN 
              ACCORD WITH CERTAIN TAXPAYER RIGHTS.

    Section 7803 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by 
redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4) and by inserting after 
paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:
            ``(3) Execution of duties in accord with taxpayer rights.--
        In discharging his duties, the Commissioner shall ensure that 
        employees of the Internal Revenue Service are familiar with and 
        act in accord with taxpayer rights as afforded by other 
        provisions of this title, including--
                    ``(A) the right to be informed,
                    ``(B) the right to be assisted,
                    ``(C) the right to be heard,
                    ``(D) the right to pay no more than the correct 
                amount of tax,
                    ``(E) the right of appeal,
                    ``(F) the right to certainty,
                    ``(G) the right to privacy,
                    ``(H) the right to confidentiality,
                    ``(I) the right to representation, and
                    ``(J) the right to a fair and just tax system.''.

            Passed the House of Representatives July 31, 2013.

            Attest:

                                                 KAREN L. HAAS,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

No. 07-13-0085-CV 

No. 07-13-0086-CV 

________________________

In re Fernando Duarte, Relator 

 

April 17, 2013 

 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ. 

Relator, Fernando Duarte, has filed petitions requesting writs of mandamus 

directed at the District Clerk of Hemphill County, Texas, concerning his two criminal 

convictions. Relator complains of the district clerk’s purported failure to transmit orders 

and records to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, State Jail Division regarding 

jail credit earned and asks that we remedy the default via mandamus. We dismiss the 

petitions.

 Mandamus is intended to be an extraordinary remedy, available only in limited 

circumstances. In re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., L.P., 235 S.W.3d 619, 623 

(Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding). Texas Government Code § 22.221 expressly limits our 
2

jurisdiction to issue such relief to writs necessary to enforce our jurisdiction and writs 

directed at specified district or county court judges within the appellate court’s district. 

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.221(a), (b) (West 2004). Consequently, unless necessary to 

enforce our jurisdiction, we have no jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against the 

district clerk. In re Coronado, 980 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1998, orig. 

proceeding) (per curiam) (noting because a district clerk is not a judge, a relator must 

show issuance of a writ of mandamus is necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of the 

court of appeals). Relator’s mandamus petitions do not claim, nor do they appear to 

seek relief designed to enforce this court’s jurisdiction. Nor does the relief pertain to an 

appeal wherein he is a party. Thus, we have no jurisdiction to direct the district clerk to 

act. 

Accordingly, we dismiss the petitions for want of jurisdiction. 

Brian Quinn

Chief Justice
#### HENSLEY v. STATE.

No. 23681.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 4, 1947.

No appearance for appellant.

W. K. Baldridge, Co. Atty., and Rogers Teel, Asst. Co. Atty., both of Denton, and Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

Appellant was convicted on a charge of attempting to pass a forged instrument, and his punishment assessed at two years in the penitentiary.

The record is before us without a statement of facts or bills of exception. Nothing is presented to this court for review.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
H. R. 5738 

One Hundred Twelfth Congress 

of the 

United States of America 

AT THE SECOND SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, 

the third day of January, two thousand and twelve 

An Act 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 15285 

Samohin Drive in Macomb, Michigan, as the ‘‘Lance Cpl. Anthony A. DiLisio 

Clinton-Macomb Carrier Annex’’. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. LANCE CPL. ANTHONY A. DILISIO CLINTON-MACOMB CARRIER ANNEX. 

(a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States Postal 

Service located at 15285 Samohin Drive in Macomb, Michigan, 

shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Lance Cpl. Anthony A. 

DiLisio Clinton-Macomb Carrier Annex’’. 

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation, 

document, paper, or other record of the United States to the facility 

referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference 

to the ‘‘Lance Cpl. Anthony A. DiLisio Clinton-Macomb Carrier 

Annex’’. 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Daniel C. Thurston, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: On appeal from his convictions of rape in the first degree and burglary in the third degree, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor was unable to produce a jailhouse informant to whom the prosecutor had referred in his opening statement. When it came to the prosecutor’s attention during trial that this witness had been acting as a police agent when he extracted admissions from defendant, the prosecutor immediately informed the court and conceded that the testimony of this witness should be suppressed. Finding no bad faith on the part of the prosecutor, the court denied defendant’s request for a missing witness charge but allowed defense counsel to comment on summation about the People’s failure to produce this witness.

Defendant did not move for a mistrial so he failed to preserve this issue for review as a matter of law *(see, People v Broadus,*129 AD2d 997), and we decline to reverse the conviction in the interest of justice. The general rule when the prosecutor is unable to produce all the evidence promised in his opening statement is that, "absent bad faith or undue prejudice, a trial will not be undone” *(People v De Tore,*34 NY2d 199, 207, *cert denied sub nom. Wedra v New York,*419 US 1025). Here, the trial court found no evidence of bad faith on the part of the People and, in light of the overwhelming proof of defendant’s guilt, we conclude that defendant did not suffer undue prejudice.

We reject defendant’s contention that the trial court violated CPL 300.10 (4) when it charged coercion in the second degree as a lesser included offense of rape in the first degree. Defense counsel was apprised of the court’s intention to so charge prior to summation, and the court registered counsel’s objection to the charge. Although coercion in the second degree is not a lesser included offense of rape in the first degree *(see, People v Corley,*162 AD2d 1020), that error was *965harmless because defendant was convicted of rape in the first degree.

Although several of the comments made by the prosecutor on summation were improper, most were unobjected to and we conclude that defendant was not deprived of a fair trial *(see, People v Morgan,*66 NY2d 255, 259). We have examined the remaining issues raised by defendant and find them lacking in merit. (Appeal from judgment of Cayuga County Court, Contiguglia, J.—rape, first degree.) Present—Doerr, J. P., Denman, Boomer, Pine and Lawton, JJ.
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<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                         523,243
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
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<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                159,452,923
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<ALLOWANCE>                                (5,696,222)
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</TABLE>
Order entered October 19, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-15-01570-CR

RANDOLPH GLENN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F14-76290-M

ORDER

The Court REINSTATES the appeal.

On September 19, 2016, we ordered the trial court to make findings regarding why the 

appellant’s brief had not been filed. We ADOPT the October 11, 2016 findings that: (1) 

appellant desires to pursue the appeal; (2) appellant is indigent and represented by counsel 

Lawrence Mitchell who has not abandoned the appeal; (3) counsel’s back surgery resulted in his 

inability to work for a period of time; and (4) he requests sixty additional days to file the brief. 

We ORDER appellant to file his brief no later than December 19, 2016. 

/s/ ADA BROWN 

JUSTICE
EXHIBIT 22

Case 6:20-cv-00507-ADA Document 84-3 Filed 06/09/23 Page 1 of 5
Case 6:20-cv-00507-ADA Document 84-3 Filed 06/09/23 Page 2 of 5
Case 6:20-cv-00507-ADA Document 84-3 Filed 06/09/23 Page 3 of 5
Case 6:20-cv-00507-ADA Document 84-3 Filed 06/09/23 Page 4 of 5
Case 6:20-cv-00507-ADA Document 84-3 Filed 06/09/23 Page 5 of 5
Exhibit 32.1








CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the report of Worldwide Biotech & Pharmaceutical Company (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending September 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Wenxia Guo, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.











/s/ Wenxia Guo


Wenxia Guo


Chief Executive Officer


November 16, 2009