J-A13045-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v.

PAUL LITTLE,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1444 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 28, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0000735-2018

BEFORE: BENDER P.J.E., LAZARUS, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED OCTOBER 14, 2020

Paul Little (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence of 71⁄2 to 

20 years’ imprisonment imposed following his convictions for possession of a 

controlled substance, possession with intent to deliver (PWID) a controlled 

substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Upon review, we affirm.

The evidence presented at Appellant’s jury trial can be summarized as 

follows. On December 20, 2017, at about 10:30 a.m., Trooper Brian 

Konopka of the Pennsylvania State Police was conducting a stationary patrol 

on Interstate 78 in Lehigh County. Trooper Konopka was patrolling in a 

marked vehicle and in full uniform, and observing westbound traffic at mile 

marker 62.9. Trooper Konopka observed a black Nissan Versa with dark

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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aftermarket tint on its rear passenger windows and rear windshield in 

violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 4524, traveling westbound 

on Interstate 78. Trooper Konopka initiated a traffic stop, utilizing his 

emergency lights, in the area of mile marker 61.4. Appellant, the driver of 

the Nissan Versa, pulled over without incident.

Trooper Konopka ran Appellant’s New York registration plate and 

determined the vehicle was registered to a female. Trooper Konopka 

approached the passenger side of the vehicle. Appellant, a male, was the 

sole occupant of the vehicle. Appellant lowered both the front and rear 

passenger side windows of the vehicle. Trooper Konopka told Appellant why 

he initiated the traffic stop, and observed four air fresheners, one in each of

the four individual vents, located in the front dash of the vehicle. Trooper 

Konopka requested that Appellant provide his driver’s license, vehicle 

registration, and proof of insurance. Appellant provided his license, but he 

had difficulty finding the vehicle registration and proof of insurance. In the 

meantime, Appellant stated that he frequently drove the vehicle, but his 

aunt, Sharon Patterson, with whom he resides in New York, was the owner 

of the vehicle.

Trooper Konopka requested that Appellant exit the vehicle, but 

Appellant ignored his request and continued to search the vehicle for the 

requested documents. It appeared to Trooper Konopka that Appellant was 

aimlessly searching in an effort to stall. Trooper Konopka again requested 
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Appellant exit the vehicle. Appellant ignored Trooper Konopka and avoided 

eye contact as he continued to search for the vehicle registration and proof 

of insurance. Appellant eventually found the vehicle registration and 

provided it to Trooper Konopka, but continued to search for his proof of 

insurance instead of exiting the vehicle as requested. For a third time, 

Trooper Konopka requested Appellant exit the vehicle, to which Appellant 

inquired if he was required to do so and stated that he did not want to exit 

the vehicle. Trooper Konopka replied that he was required to do so by law,

and Appellant complied.

Once outside the vehicle, Appellant avoided eye contact with Trooper 

Konopka and stood in a “defensive posture,” where his body was beyond 

perpendicular to Trooper Konopka’s body, with his hands in his pockets. 

N.T., 2/4/2019, at 44. Trooper Konopka inquired if he could do a pat down 

search of Appellant’s person for officer safety reasons. Appellant inquired if 

Trooper Konopka asks everyone to consent to a pat down search, to which 

Trooper Konopka replied that he does. Appellant nodded affirmatively to 

consent to the Terry1frisk. As he conducted the pat down search, Trooper 

Konopka began to inquire about his travels, and Appellant’s demeanor

became more evasive as he started speaking in a lower tone of voice from 

his prior communication with Trooper Konopka. Trooper Konopka described 

____________________________________________

1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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Appellant’s demeanor as “I want nothing to do with you; defensive; looking 

away from me.” N.T., 2/4/2019, at 50. Appellant stated that he was on his 

way to Roanoke, Virginia from New York City, New York, and later added 

that it was a business trip. Appellant had a lanyard with "Blue Raven Solar" 

on it along with his name and photograph, but there was no other indication

that he was traveling for business. Trooper Konopka completed the pat 

down search without incident. 

Nonetheless, based on Trooper Konopka’s experience and training,

Trooper Konopka observed several indicators of drug trafficking during his 

interaction with Appellant. Specifically, Trooper Konopka testified that 

Appellant was driving a third-party vehicle, which is common when 

trafficking narcotics as an attempt to distance the operator of the vehicle 

from ownership of contraband that may be found inside the vehicle. Air 

fresheners were in every vent of the vehicle, which, according to Trooper 

Konopka may be used as a masking agent for narcotics. He further 

explained that the tint on the rear passenger windows and rear windshield 

can allow cover for drug deals to occur within the rear seat of the vehicle, 

and the further concealment of any hidden compartments. Trooper Konopka 

also testified that Appellant was traveling from New York City, a common 

source city in drug trafficking, to Roanoke, a high crime area and destination 

city for drugs, via Interstate 78, which is a highway notorious for trafficking 

drugs. Additionally, the vehicle lacked luggage, clothing, and bags that one 
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would expect for an overnight business trip. Based upon the aforementioned 

observations, Trooper Konopka asked Appellant if there was anything in the 

vehicle that would be of concern. Appellant remained defensive and 

deflected the question by discussing the tint on his vehicle’s windows.

Trooper Konopka returned to his police vehicle and requested backup 

due to Appellant’s defensive demeanor. In the meantime, Trooper Konopka

ran a criminal history check and a National Crime Information Center

(NCIC)2 check on Appellant. Trooper Konopka discovered Appellant was 

previously charged with PWID and gun-related offenses. Trooper Konopka 

returned to Appellant’s vehicle and asked Appellant specifically if there was 

marijuana, heroin, cocaine, a large quantity of U.S. currency, or firearms in 

the vehicle that he needed to know about. Appellant said “no” and shook his 

head negatively. At this point, 10 to 12 minutes had elapsed from the 

initiation of the traffic stop. Believing that Appellant was engaged in 

narcotics trafficking, Trooper Konopka asked Appellant if he would consent 

to a search of the vehicle. Appellant vehemently refused. Therefore, 

Trooper Konopka requested that a state police canine respond to the scene

to conduct a canine search of the exterior of the vehicle. Appellant became 

even more defensive and argumentative in response.

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2 NCIC is a database comprised of criminal justice information, i.e., names of 

individuals for whom a warrant has been issued, missing persons, and stolen 

property.
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At 11:13 a.m.,

3 Trooper Daniel Reed arrived on scene with his canine 

partner (Canine Edo).

4 Canine Edo performed an exterior search of the 

vehicle. Canine Edo alerted, which means he relayed to Trooper Reed that 

he smelled the presence of drugs, on the exterior of the front driver’s side 

door of the vehicle. Trooper Reed advised Trooper Konopka of Canine Edo’s 

alert, and Trooper Konopka proceeded to perform a search of the interior of 

the vehicle in the vicinity of the driver’s seat. Trooper Konopka observed a 

bulge under the carpet running from the console to the rear seat, which he 

believed to consist of wires; two bolts screwed into the rear seats; and 

carpet glued to the floor. Conspicuously, the rear seat of the vehicle would

not lift up or move at all. Being unable to confirm the presence of what he 

believed to be a hidden compartment underneath the rear seat, Trooper 

Konopka again requested the assistance of Canine Edo. Canine Edo was 

placed inside the rear of the vehicle to conduct a search. Canine Edo alerted 

and then indicated, which is when the canine pinpoints the drug’s location,

to the rear floorboard in front of the rear seat. Trooper Konopka used an 

upholstery tool to lift between the top of the seat and its base to verify 

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3 Trooper Reed was responding from a location 50 miles away, as his 

territory is Schuylkill and Lebanon counties.

4 Canine Edo is a Belgian Malinois that started training with Trooper Reed in 

September of 2015. Canine Edo is certified in the detection of marijuana, 

cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine. He and Trooper Reed achieved 

certification as a team on November 20, 2015.
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whether a hidden after-market compartment existed under the rear 

passenger seat. He noted the presence of gray carpet that was atypical for 

the space, and a piston-driven actuator5that extended the seats when 

connected to electricity. Trooper Konopka did not possess the tools to open 

the compartment on the side of the road, and arranged for the vehicle to be 

towed to the Fogelsville Barracks of the Pennsylvania State Police in order to 

complete the search with the necessary tools. Consequently, Appellant was 

handcuffed, detained, and transported to the barracks along with the 

vehicle.

Once at the barracks, a scope was used to see below the rear seat. 

Through the scope, Trooper Konopka observed Dinomat, an insulation 

material typically used in hidden compartments to protect the items within. 

The hidden compartment was opened using an electronic device. Inside the 

compartment were one black and one brown plastic bag, each containing a

clear vacuum-sealed bag stored with dryer sheets. The substances inside 

the bags were tested to reveal that one bag contained 574 grams of cocaine, 

and the other contained 498.96 grams of phenacetin, a common cutting 

agent for cocaine. Also obtained from the vehicle were car maintenance 

receipts dated July 2, 2017, and July 28, 2017, and signed by Appellant. 

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5 A short cylinder within a tube that moves up and down against a gas to 

cause a machine or other device to operate.
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Appellant was charged as indicated hereinabove, as well as for the improper 

sunscreening motor vehicle violation.

On April 16, 2018, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion alleging, 

inter alia, that police instituted an illegal traffic stop, and therefore, the 

vacuum-sealed bags that the police discovered inside the vehicle required 

suppression. Appellant’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 4/16/2018, at 2-3 

(unpaginated). The trial court held a suppression hearing on November 19 

and November 28, 2018, where the trial court heard testimony from

Troopers Konopka and Reed. Trooper Konopka testified to his drug 

interdiction training and experience, including trainings involving hidden 

compartments. Further, he testified to the traffic stop involving Appellant 

and the subsequent search of his vehicle. During cross-examination, 

Appellant’s counsel assailed Trooper Konopka’s account of the search that 

involved Canine Edo. Appellant’s counsel argued during cross-examination 

that the canine search was tainted, claiming Trooper Reed provided Trooper 

Konopka a treat to put in his pocket, thereby intentionally exciting Canine 

Edo around the vehicle to fabricate probable cause to search. Trooper 

Konopka denied the accusations. Trooper Reed also testified to his drug 

interdiction training and experience, as well as his training as a handler of a 

canine and Canine Edo’s training and certifications. He then explained the 

manner he and Canine Edo searched the vehicle, and stated that Canine Edo 

alerted to the presence of drugs and indicated the rear floorboard in front of 
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the rear seat. On cross-examination, Trooper Reed testified that Canine Edo 

has a “fantastic alert,” but his indication is not always perfect and he can be 

overly excited at times. N.T., 11/28/2018, at 16-17. Appellant’s counsel did 

not question Trooper Reed about the alleged treat-giving, and did not 

present any additional argument. The trial court took the matter under 

advisement, and denied Appellant’s motion on December 21, 2018. In doing 

so, the suppression court concluded that (1) the stop and detention were 

lawful because they were supported by reasonable suspicion and probable 

cause; (2) Trooper Konopka possessed probable cause to search the vehicle; 

and (3) Trooper Konopka possessed probable cause to arrest Appellant. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/2018, at 8.

Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on February 4-5, 2019, where the 

aforementioned facts were established.6 Additionally, the Commonwealth 

presented testimony from Detective John Gill as an expert in the field of 

narcotics investigation, which the trial court summarized as follows.

Detective Gill[] opined that [Appellant] was in possession of the 

cocaine with the intent to deliver it. Indeed, Detective Gill based 

his opinion on, inter alia, the large quantity of cocaine located in 

the vehicle. He indicated that one-half kilo of cocaine has a 

street value between $25,000.00 and $37,500.00 without a 

cutting agent, or $50,000.00 to $75,000.00 by combining the 

cocaine with phenacetin. In addition, Detective Gill explained 

that the absence of use paraphernalia [and] the storage of the 

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6 Simultaneously, Appellant proceeded to a nonjury trial on the summary 

charge of improper sunscreening. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial 

court found Appellant guilty of this summary offense.
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drugs in vacuum[-]sealed bags were further indicia of 

[Appellant’s] intent to deliver the controlled substance. Also, the 

hidden compartment with the hydraulic pistons in the vehicle 

further demonstrated [Appellant’s] intent to deliver the cocaine, 

as this device is used to conceal narcotics from the authorities as 

well as from rival drug dealers. Detective Gill also discussed that 

tinted car windows are [] common in the vehicles driven by drug 

dealers, as they prevent people from seeing within the vehicle.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/24/2019, at 10.

In his defense, Appellant presented the testimony of his aunt, the 

owner of the vehicle. The trial court provided the following summary of her 

testimony.

Sharon Patterson, [Appellant’s] aunt, testified that her now 

deceased husband, Alonso Williams, Sr., from whom she 

separated in 2016, used the subject Nissan Versa more than 

anyone else.[7] She explained that she was suspicious of his 

source of funds and feared for her safety due to his associates. 

[] Patterson also testified that her husband was an electrician 

who was mechanically inclined.

Id.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of the 

aforementioned crimes. On March 28, 2019, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to an aggregate term of 71⁄2 to 20 years’ imprisonment for the 

charges related to drug possession, and ordered no further penalty on the

charge of improper sunscreening.

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7 Patterson’s husband was deceased at the time of trial but still living at the 

time of the traffic stop.
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Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion, in which he challenged 

the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. On April 24, 2019, the trial court 

denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion and filed an opinion in support

thereof. This timely-filed notice of appeal followed.

8

Appellant raises three issues on appeal, which we have reordered for

ease of disposition: 1) a claim that the suppression court erred in denying 

his motion to suppress due to the illegal extension of a valid traffic stop, and 

the subsequent warrantless search of his vehicle; 2) a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence; and 3) a claim that the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence.

9

 Appellant’s Brief at 5-6.

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8 Appellant filed his court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on June 10, 

2019, wherein he also requested additional time to file a supplemental 

1925(b) statement because he had not yet received the entire transcript of 

the proceedings. The trial court granted Appellant until July 11, 2019, to file 

his supplemental 1925(b) statement. On July 11, 2019, Appellant again 

requested additional time. On July 12, 2019, the trial court denied 

Appellant’s second request. Having not received a supplemental 1925(b) 

statement, the trial court issued an order directing this Court to its April 24, 

2019 opinion, in compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). Order, 7/29/2019.

9 Appellant also raises two additional claims: that the trial court erred when 

excluding hearsay testimony and that the trial court violated Appellant’s due 

process rights when it cross-examined a defense witness and purportedly 

indicated that it did not find the witness credible. These issues are waived 

because Appellant failed to raise them in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. 

See Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) (“Any issues 

not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.”).
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Motion to Suppress

We begin with Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress. Specifically, Appellant argues that Trooper Konopka 

impermissibly extended the traffic stop past its initial purpose of

investigating improper sunscreening, and conducted a warrantless search of 

the vehicle with no applicable exception. Appellant’s Brief at 30, 36. 

When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, the appellate court 

may only determine if the record supports the trial court’s factual findings 

and whether the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are correct. See 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 177 A.3d 915, 918 (Pa. Super. 2017). We may 

consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the 

evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted, because the 

Commonwealth was the verdict winner. Id. Our review of suppression 

rulings includes only the suppression hearing record itself. See In re L.J.,

79 A.3d 1073, 1085 (Pa. 2013).

Instantly, Appellant does not challenge the initial traffic stop. 

Therefore, we address instead whether Trooper Konopka possessed the 

requisite reasonable suspicion to extend the stop beyond investigating the 

illegal sunscreening. After a traffic stop that was justified at its inception by 

a perceived traffic violation, an officer who develops a reasonable, 

articulable suspicion of criminal activity may expand the scope of an inquiry 

beyond the reason for the stop and detain the vehicle and its occupants for 
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further investigation. Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 117 (Pa. 

Super. 2005). We must look to the totality of the circumstances when 

determining whether a reasonable suspicion exists. Commonwealth v. 

Riley, 715 A.2d 1131, 1135 (Pa. Super. 1998). “Merely because a suspect’s 

activity may be consistent with innocent behavior does not alone make 

detention and limited investigation illegal. Rather, we view the 

circumstances through the eyes of a trained officer, not an ordinary citizen.” 

Id. (citations omitted). 

During Trooper Konopka’s initial investigation into the improper 

sunscreening, he observed the tint and its location on the vehicle, the 

registration of the vehicle to a third-party, and the presence of several air 

fresheners. When Trooper Konopka twice asked Appellant to exit his 

vehicle, he ignored both requests and avoided eye contact. He did not exit 

the vehicle until Trooper Konopka specified law required it. While outside 

the vehicle, Trooper Konopka observed Appellant avoiding eye contact and 

standing in a defensive posture. Appellant indicated that he was traveling 

from New York City to Roanoke for a business trip, but Trooper Konopka 

observed Appellant’s vehicle was lacking luggage or clothing necessary for 

an overnight business trip. During the suppression hearing, Trooper 

Konopka stated several times that Appellant appeared nervous, and his 

nervousness escalated during the stop. N.T., 11/19/2018, at 15, 51, 72-73. 

When Trooper Konopka ran Appellant’s information, he discovered Appellant 
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had a criminal history that included drug offenses and gun-related charges. 

Based upon these factors together along with Trooper Konopka’s drug 

trafficking experience and training, Trooper Konopka believed criminal 

activity was afoot. Specifically, he believed that Appellant was carrying 

drugs from New York City to sell elsewhere. Based on the totality of the 

circumstances, viewed through the eyes of a trained officer, we conclude the 

suppression court properly determined Trooper Konopka had specific and 

articulable facts to substantiate a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, 

warranting an extension of the initial traffic stop. See Commonwealth v.

Green, 168 A.3d 180, 185 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding based on trooper’s 

training and experience, a combination of observations made by trooper 

during routine traffic stop provided basis for reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity, including Green’s nervousness, third-party vehicle ownership, travel 

from a source city of drugs, and Green’s criminal background check that 

revealed a criminal history of drug offenses).

Appellant next challenges the canine search of the exterior of the 

vehicle and the subsequent search of the interior by Trooper Konopka on 

scene and at the barracks.

“[A] search warrant is required before police may conduct a search.” 

Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 900 (Pa. 1995). As an exception 

to this rule, police may search a vehicle where there is probable cause to 

believe that an automobile contains contraband. Commonwealth v. Gary, 
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91 A.3d 102, 242 (Pa. 2014). Pursuant to the Constitution of this 

Commonwealth, a canine sniff is a search, but “considering the relatively 

minor privacy interest in the exterior of the vehicle and the minimal intrusion 

occasioned by a canine sniff ... mere reasonable suspicion, rather than 

probable cause, is required prior to a dog sniffing the exterior of a vehicle.” 

Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1021 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(citation omitted). A positive alert following a police dog sniff, standing 

alone, provides a police officer with probable cause to conduct a warrantless 

drug search of a vehicle that was validly detained. Green, 168 A.3d at 187.

With this background, we examine whether the trial court erred in 

concluding that Canine Edo’s sniffing of the exterior and subsequent search 

by the troopers of the interior of the vehicle passed constitutional muster. 

As discussed supra, Trooper Konopka had reasonable suspicion before 

Canine Edo arrived at the scene. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 

denying Appellant’s motion to suppress based on the canine search. After 

Canine Edo alerted to the driver’s side door, which indicated to the officers 

that he had detected the presence of drugs, reasonable suspicion ripened 

into probable cause. Id. Because Trooper Konopka possessed probable 

cause, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress 

the evidence seized as a result of Trooper Konopka’s search of the interior of 
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the vehicle. See Gary, 91 A.3d at 242. Accordingly, Appellant is not 

entitled to relief on this claim.

10

Sufficiency of the Evidence

On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support his possession, PWID, and possession of drug paraphernalia 

convictions because the Commonwealth did not prove that he was aware of 

the presence of the cocaine and phenacetin in the hidden compartment of 

his aunt’s vehicle, and therefore failed to prove he possessed the items. 

Appellant’s Brief at 18-25. 

“Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a question 

of law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is 

plenary.” Commonwealth v. Giron, 155 A.3d 635, 638 (Pa. Super. 2017). 

Further, to address a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must 

determine

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10 Appellant argues for the first time on appeal that a warrant was required

to search the vehicle after it was impounded. Appellant’s Brief at 37-38. He 

claims the automobile exception to the warrant requirement does not apply 

because the vehicle was taken out of the field, and the inventory search 

exception does not apply because it was an ongoing criminal investigation 

when the vehicle was impounded and searched. Id. Appellant was required 

to raise this argument in his suppression motion or at the suppression 

hearing, not for the first time on appeal. See Pa.R.C.P. 581(D) (“The motion 

shall state specifically and with particularity the evidence sought to be 

suppressed, the grounds for suppression, and the facts and events in 

support thereof.”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the 

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). 

Therefore, Appellant failed to preserve this argument and we do not address 

it.
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whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, [is]

sufficient to establish all elements of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. We may not weigh the evidence or substitute 

our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Additionally, the 

evidence at trial need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence, and the fact-finder is free to resolve any doubts 

regarding a defendant’s guilt unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. When evaluating the 

credibility and weight of the evidence, the fact-finder is free to 

believe all, part or none of the evidence. For purposes of our 

review under these principles, we must review the entire record 

and consider all of the evidence introduced.

Commonwealth v. Carr, 227 A.3d 11, 19 (Pa. Super. 2020). Additionally, 

the Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 716 (Pa. Super. 

2015).

The only element Appellant challenges is whether the Commonwealth 

proved that he possessed the contraband found in the vehicle. Appellant’s 

Brief at 18. Specifially, Appellant assails Trooper Konopka’s testimony 

concerning Appellant’s behavior during the traffic stop and states that he 

“conducted no investigation whatsoever” into whether Appellant had any 

knowledge of the after-market compartment. Id. at 22. Moreover, 

Appellant argues that Patterson’s trial testimony leads to “the reasonable 

inference” that her “husband was using the car for running drugs.” Id. at 

23. Appellant asserts that he “had no reason to know about the hidden 

compartment in the car, and even if this Court determines the evidence 
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sufficient on that point, he had no reason to know what was inside of it.” 

Id. at 24.

Because Appellant was not in actual possession of the contraband, the 

Commonwealth needed to prove that he had constructive possession.

Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct 

to deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement. We have 

defined constructive possession as conscious dominion, meaning 

that the defendant has the power to control the contraband and 

the intent to exercise that control. To aid application, we have 

held that constructive possession may be established by the 

totality of the circumstances.

It is well established that, as with any other element of a 

crime, constructive possession may be proven by circumstantial 

evidence. In other words, the Commonwealth must establish 

facts from which the trier of fact can reasonably infer that the 

defendant exercised dominion and control over the contraband 

at issue. 

[A] defendant’s mere presence at a place where 

contraband is found or secreted is insufficient, standing alone, to 

prove that he exercised dominion and control over those items. 

Thus, the location and proximity of an actor to the contraband 

alone is not conclusive of guilt. Rather, knowledge of the 

existence and location of the contraband is a necessary 

prerequisite to proving the defendant’s intent to control, and, 

thus, his constructive possession.

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 36-37 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, the evidence presented at trial related to possession includes the 

following: 1) Appellant was the driver and only person in the vehicle when it 

was stopped; 2) Appellant stated that he frequently drives the vehicle; 3) 

receipts for car maintenance were located in the vehicle and signed by 

Appellant; 4) Trooper Konopka’s testimony that Appellant was nervous, 
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defensive, and evasive during the traffic stop; 5) the presence of several air 

fresheners, which are commonly used by drug couriers as masking agents; 

6) his travel from a source city of drugs to a drug destination; 7) his lack of

luggage, clothing, or bags despite claiming he was on a business trip; and 8) 

the fact finder was free to disbelieve Patterson’s testimony blaming her 

husband. Accordingly, based on the totality of the circumstances and when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, the Commonwealth 

set forth sufficient evidence to prove that Appellant was aware of the 

presence of contraband in the vehicle, and thus established constructive 

possession.

Weight of the Evidence

Finally, Appellant contends that his convictions were against the 

weight of the evidence because the testimony of Patterson and Trooper 

Konopka tended to show Patterson’s deceased husband was the owner of the 

contraband rather than Appellant. Appellant’s Brief at 27-29. Appellant also 

attempts to discredit portions of Trooper Konopka’s testimony, claiming that 

Appellant acted differently from the testimony Trooper Konopka provided. 

Id. at 28-29.

Our standard of review when examining a challenge to the weight of 

the evidence is as follows.

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion 

of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a 

mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same 
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facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. When a trial 

court considers a motion for a new trial based upon a weight of 

the evidence claim, the trial court may award relief only when 

the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s 

sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so 

that right may be given another opportunity to prevail. The 

inquiry is not the same for an appellate court. Rather, when an 

appellate court reviews a weight claim, the court is reviewing the 

exercise of discretion by the trial court, not the underlying 

question of whether the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence. The appellate court reviews a weight claim using an 

abuse of discretion standard.

Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1080 (Pa. 2017) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted).

Patterson testified that her husband used the vehicle more than 

anyone else, had unexplained funds, and possessed a mechanical 

background. Despite this testimony, the jury determined Appellant 

possessed the cocaine and the drug paraphernalia, i.e., the vacuum-sealed 

bags. The jury was free to determine the credibility of Patterson. Jacoby, 

170 A.3d at 1078. Appellant’s assertion that the evidence points to the guilt 

of Patterson’s husband is a claim that essentially amounts to asking us to 

reweigh the evidence in his favor, substituting our judgment for that of the 

jury and the trial court. We cannot do so. Id. Moreover, even if the jury 

inferred from Patterson’s testimony that her husband installed the 

compartment and was involved in drug trafficking, that did not preclude it 

from also concluding that Appellant was aware of the compartment and was 

involved in this specific drug trafficking. Therefore, after examining the 
J-A13045-20

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evidence in this case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/14/2020