In The Matter Of: 

SERVED: June 11, 2014 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, DC 

) 

ZJ 14 JUN I 2 A q: 3 b 

) 

) 

) 

Docket No. FAA-2013-0853 

MARY E. BOCHIARDY 

Case No. 2011 EA170066 

Respondent ) 

ORDER FINDING THE REQUEST FOR HEARING UNTIMELY, 

RESERVING THE FAA'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND 

SETTING DEADLINE FOR FILING SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

On January 17, 2014, the FAA served Ms. Mary E. Bochiardy ("Respondent") with its 

Complaint, and with its Motion to Dismiss Late-Filed Appeal ("Motion"). The F AA.then filed 

· both documents with the Office of Hearings ("OH") $even (7) days later, on January 24, 2014. 

On February 11,2014, the Respondent serv~d the FAA with her Response to Agency's 

Motion to Dismiss Late-Filed Appeal ("Response"). The Respondent then filed this document 

with the OH nine (9) days later, on February 20, 2014. 

On February 21,2014, the FAA served the Respondent with the Agency's Motion to 

Strike Respondent's Response to Agency's Motion to Dismiss Late-Filed Appeal ("Motion to 

Strike"). The FAA filed this document with the OH three (3) days later, on February 24, 2014. 

On February 25, 2014, the Respondent served the FAA with her Motion to Dismiss 

Agency's Motion·to Strike Respondent's Response to Agency's Motion to Dismiss Late-Filed 

Appeal ("Answer to Motion"). 1 The Respondent then filed this document with the OH seven (7) 

days later, on March 4, 2014. 

On April 7, 2014, an Order Denying the FAA's Motion to Strike Respondent's Response 

to Agency's Motion to Dismiss was filed. 

1 The Rules of Practice, 14 C.F.R. Part 13, subpart G, do not specifically provide for a motion to dismiss a pending 

motion. 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(d) provides for answers to motions. Thus, the Respondent's February 25, 2014 filing is 

more properly titled an Ans'Yer to the Motion to Strike. 
I. Brief Case Background 

On October 29, 20l3, the FM asserts that it served a Final Notice of Proposed Civil 

Penalty ("FNPCP") on the Respondent's attorney, Mr. Greg Reigel ("Mr. Reigel") and on the 

Respondent. The FAA asserts that the FNPCP was served on Mr. Reigel by first class mail, and 

on the Respondent by certified mail, return receipt requested (Motion,Exs. C and D). It was 

undisputed that the Respondent received the certified mail copy ofthe FNPCP on November 18, 

2013. (Response, 1;_ Motion, Ex. G.) 

On December 12, 2013, after receiving no response from either Mr. Reigel or the 

Respondent, the FAA served them both with an Order Assessing Civil Penalty 2("0ACP"). 

(Motion, Ex. G.) This OACP was served on Mr. Reigel by first class mail, and on the 

Responqent by certified mail, return receipt requested. (ld.) 

Five (5) days later, on December 17, 2013, the Respondent signed for the certified 

mailing, and "received" the OACP. (Motion, Ex. G.) On December 24,2013, seven (7) days 

after receiving the.OACP, the Respondent e-mailed Mr. Reigel and asked about the status of her 

request for hearing. (Motion, Ex. E.at 5.) That same day, December 24, 2013, Mr. Reigel emailed the Respondent, and told her that he had not filed a request for hearing "per her 

instructions" (date of communication, and specifics of communication unidentified). (/d.) 

On January 8, 2014, t~e Respondent served the Hearing Docket Clerk with a prose 

Request for Hearing by "overnight request." (ld.) 

II. Proof of Receipt of the FNPCP- Discussion and An~lysis 

Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 13.16(g)(2), a respondent must, within 15 days of receipt of the 

FNPCP, either pay the proposed penalty or request a hearing. In re Canuck Industries, FAA2000-7726, Decision and Order, 2 (May 10, 2002), modified on other grounds, FAA Order No. 

2002-17, Order Granting Petition to Modify (May 24, 2002). 

2 The OACP found that the Respondent had been advised through an October 29,2013 FNPCP that the FAA 

proposed to assess a $7,700 civil penalty for violations of 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.580 and 121.306(a). The OACP found 

that the Respondent had committed the aJleged violations·[by default] and assessed a $7,700 civil penalty .• 

Page 2 of 13 
It was undisputed that on November 18,2013 the Respondent signed for, and "received," 

the certified mailing ofthe FNPCP. In its Motion, however, the FAA asserts that service ofthe 

FNPCP was perfected thirteen (13) days earlier, "on or before November 5, 2013" when the 

Respondent's attorney, Mr. Reigel, allegedly "received" the FNPCP by regular U.S. mail. 

(Motion, 1, Ex. D). 

A. Lack of Proof for Mr. Reigel's Receipt ofthe FNPCP 

14 C.F.R. § 13.16(g)(2) specifically requires proof of the date of receipt of the FNPCP by 

either the Respondent or her designated agent. The record is silent regarding when (if ever) the 

Respondent specifically designated Mr. Reigel to accept service on her behalf pursuant to 14 

C.F .R. § 13 .16(g). Nevertheless, even without specific party designation for alternate service, 

service on an attorney who has been identified to the FAA - in some fashion3 - as a party 

representative is well-established in these proceedings. 

Although the regulation does anticipate that a respondent may designate in writing 

alternative means of service, nothing in this provision undermines the settled principle, 

routinely followed in a variety of litigation contexts and generally required by the rules of 

professional conduct, that service on a party is effectively accomplished by service on 

identified counsel. 

Canuck, supra at 4.4 

This ''settled principle" recognizes the long established federal service practice codified 

in Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(1), which requires service to be "made on the [party's] attorney, unless the 

court orders service on the party." Rule 5.1; See, Steven Baicker-McKee, et.al, Federal Civil 

Rules Handbook, West Publishing (2012)(Rule 5- Service on Attorney, Not Party). 

In the case herein, on June 25, 2013, Mr. Reigel contacted the FAA by email and 

identified himself as counsel on behalf of the Respondent. (Motion, Ex. A). In this same email, 

Mr. Reigel requested participation in settlement negotiations (!d.) The FAA began to 

3 In FAA proceedings, the means of identifying an attorney representative is not limited to the formal filing of a 

notice of appearance. See, e.g., Canuck, supra at 1-2 (attorney called the FAA, sent written notice confirming his 

representative status, and participated in settlement negotiations). 

4 In the year 2002, at time of the FAA Administrator's Decision and Order in the Canuck case, the regulation was 

contained in 14 C.F.R. § 13.16(e). In 2005, and again in 2006, the regulation was amended. The applicable 

regulatory language is now found in 14 C. F. R. § 13 .16(g). 

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communicate directly with Mr. Reigel about the case. (Motion, Ex. B.) It appeared undisputed 

that at the time of the alleged service of the FNPCP, both the FAA and the Respondent believed 

Mr. Reigel to still be of counsel. Thus, as the FAA correctly pointed out, the FAA's notice to 

counsel would presumptively be notice to the Respondent. (Motion, 3). 

The FAA counsel asserts generally, under penalty of perjury, that the FAA mailed a copy 

of the FNPCP by regular mail to Mr. Reigel on the same date that it sent a certified mail copy to 

the Respondent (Motion, Ex. D). The FAA counsel did not, however, identify the person(s) who 

actually mailed the documents by regular and certified mailings, nor did the FAA submit any 

direct evidence from such witness( es) that such mailings were both performed and accomplished 

on the date alleged. (14 C.F.R. § 13.211(c)). While the FAA counsel clearly believes that such 

double mailings by certified and regular mail occurred, counsel does not provide any factual 

basis for that belief. (Motion, Ex. D.) 

The FAA argued in part that Mr. Reigel received the FNPCP "on or before November 5, 

2013" because any mailing sent to him (assuming such mailing occurred) was not returned as 

undeliverable. (Motion 1; Ex. D). The FAA's assertion that the Mr. Reigel's mail was not 

"returned" appears to reference the "valid service" presumptions outlined in 14 C.F .R. § 13.212 

(g). However, the minimum standards of 14 C.F.R. §13.212 (g) were not met in this case, and 

thus the "lack of returned mail" argument will not be further addressed herein. 

In essence, the FAA has no actual proof of service, or receipt of service, on Mr. Reigel. 

Nevertheless, the FAA argues that its proof of certified mailing to the Respondent should serve 

as the basis for assuming that Mr. Reigel was properly served by U.S. Mail at the same time, and 

that Mr. Reigel presumably received the FNPCP by U.S. mail pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 

13.21l(e).5 Based on that argument, the FAA asserts that Mr. Reigel actually received the 

FNPCP thirteen (13) days (i.e., almost 2 weeks) prior to the Respondent actually receiving the 

FNPCP by certified mail service. According to the FAA, this means that the Respondent's 15 

day time clock for filing the appeal expired on November 20, 2013- just two (2) days after the 

5 Section 13.211(e) is commonly referred to as the "mailing rule." It allows for service of documents by mail, and 

generally provides a party five additional days to act when service is made by mail. 14 C.F.R. § l3.2ll(e). 

Page 4 of13 
Respondent actually received her certified mailing ofthe FNPCP on November 18,2013. 

(Motion,3 and Ex. F.) 

The FAA cites to Exhibit C and 14 C.F .R. § 13.211 (e) as evidentiary support for its 

assertions. Exhibit Cis a copy of the FNPCP. It is addressed to the Respondent. Exhibit Cis not 

dated. It does not have a certificate of service attached. There is no postmark on it. 14 C .F .R. 

§13.211(d). However, attached to Exhibit Cis a certified mail certificate, showing a postmark 

date of October 29, 2013 for the certified mailing date of the FNPCP to the Respondent at her 

address of record. On the last page of Exhibit C there is also a reference to Mr. Reigel as a "cc" 

recipient of the FNPCP, with an address listed. The listed address for Mr. Reigel is the same 

address as the one·he provided in his original, June 25, 2012 "representation notice" email. 

(Motion, Ex. A). However, Exhibit C does not contain or attach any proof of service regarding 

service of any kind actually occurring for Mr·. Reigel. (Motion,Exh. C, 4-5.). 

The FAA Administrator has found that "[a] rebuttable presumption arises that mail was 

received by the addressee when there is proof that it was properly addressed, stamped, and 

mailed." In re Charles D. Eaddy, Order No. 92-13, at 4 (May 5, 1992) (citing Hanger v. US., 

285 U.S. 427 (1932)). The burden of proof of service is on the party attempting service. Steven 

Baicker-McKee, et.al, Federal Civil Rules Handbook, West Publishing (2012)(Rule 4- Burden 

of Proving Service of Process). Based on the evidence submitted, there is insufficient proofto 

demonstrate that any FAA employee "properly addressed, stamped, and mailed" a copy of the 

FNPCP to Mr. Reigel, on or about the date of October 29, 2013, by regular or other mail service. 

Thus, there is insufficient proof of a rebuttable presumption of proper service or receipt of 

service of the FNPCP in regards to Mr. Reigel. 

B. Proof of the Respondent's Receipt of the FNPCP 

It was undisputed, however, that on November 2, 2013, the United States Postal Service 

left notice with the Respondent of a certified mailing. (/d., Exh. F.) On November 18, 2013, the 

Respondent signed for the certified mailing, and "received" the FNPCP. (Resp. Mot. Dismiss 1; 

Motion,Ex. G.) The record also reflects that Mr. Riegel had at least constructive notice of a 

certified mailing to the Respondent on November 18, 2013, when the Respondent e-mailed Mr. 

Riegel earlier that day (before picking up the mailing) to tell him she had just gotten notice of a . 

Page 5 of 13 
certified mail delivery. The Respondent's November 18, 2013 email to Mr. Reigel indicates that 

she believed the certified mail might contain the FNPCP. (Motion, Ex. Eat 5-6.) 

C. Date Established for Receipt of the FNPCP- November 18, 2013 

The service provisions in 14 C.F.R. § 13.16(g), anddiscussed in FAA case decisions and 

orders, are very similar to the provisions in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) and (h). The primary purpose of 

these service rules is to ensure that the responding party is timely notified that "a legal action has 

been filed" and to ensure that the responding party has "a fair opportunity to answer the· pleading 

and raise defenses and objections." Steven Baicker-McKee, et.al, Federal Civil Rules 

Handbook, West Publishing (2012)(Rule 4 -The Goal of Service). 

The record demonstrates that the Respondent notified Mr. Reigel on November 18, 2013 

of a certified mailing. Later that same day, on November 18, 2013, the Respondent actually 

received the FNPCP. Four (4) days later, on November 22, 2013, the Respondent again 

exchanged emails with Mr. Reigel - her designated attorney representative - discussing what 

action(s) to take regarding the FNPCP. 

The evidence submitted in this case, as a whole, is sufficient to find that the Respondent's 

actual service date ofNovember 18,2013- the known date of actual receipt by the Respondent 

and potential constructive notice to Mr. Riegel - satisfies the requirements and primary purpose 

of service. 

III. The Respondent's Request for Hearing was Untimely 

Based on the undisputed evidence that the Respondent received the FNPCP on November 

18, 2013, the 15 day time clock began to run on November 19, 2013.6 Thus, the deadline for the 

Respondent to request a hearing was December 3, 2013 (i.e., the fifteenth day after November 

18, 2013). 

The Respondent did not file a request for hearing on December 3, 2013. 

6 Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 13.212(b), "[t]he date of an act, event, or default, after which a designated time period 

begins to run, is not included in a computation of time under this subpart." Although 14 C.F.R. § 13.16(g)(2) 

appears in a different subpart (i.e., subpart C), the governing subpart in this proceeding is subpart G, which lists the 

Rules of Practice. Thus, the date of receipt is not included in the 15 day time count. 

Page 6 of 13 
It is undisputed that Mr. Reigel's attorney relationship with the Respondent was severed 

sometime between December 17, 2013 and December 24, 2013. (Response, 1 ~ 8 and 13 ). It 

was also undisputed that the Respondent did not file a prose request for hearing until January 8, 

2014- thirty-six (36) days after the December.3, 2013 deadline for filing. Thus, the 

Respondent's request for hearing was untimely. 

IV. Parties' Primary Requests for Relief because of Untimely Request for Hearing 

In its Motion, the FAA primarily requests that the Respondent's late-filed appeal be 

dismissed. (Motion, 1.) As part of that request, the FAA asserts that the Respondent was 

indecisive arid disingenuous, failed to act promptly, engaged in wilful negligence, and has failed 

to provide any persuasive or credible facts in support of a good cause finding (Motion, 3-5, 

Reply, 3-4.) In her Response to the FAA's Motion, the Respondent requests her untimely 

request for hearing be accepted because of multiple good cause factors, including her .mistaken 

reliance on her attorney, the inaction of her attorney, her prompt prose action once she realized 

the filing had not occurred, and various assertions involving health, family and holiday 

schedules. (Response, 1-2.) 

V. Brief Review of Good Cause Standard 

An untimely request for hearing will only be excused for good cause. In re Carl P. 

Langton, FAA Order No. 93-12 (Mar. 25, 1993); see also, In re Titan Coatings, Inc., FAA-2011-

1 011, Order Granting Motion to Dismiss (Feb. 2, 20 12). 

Good cause is·a "nebulous" standard. 21A Fed. Proc. L.Ed. §51:64 (2014). It is an 

evaluation that rests within the discretion of the trial court, since there is a strong preference for 

deciding cases on their merits. lOA Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & 

Proc. Civ. §2693 (3d ed. 2014); See, e.g., In re David Lloyd Cornwall, FAA Order No. 92-47 at 

7 (July 22, 1992) (Wherever possible, cases should be heard "on the merits"). 

In evaluating good cause, there is "no fixed, rigid standard" that can anticipate "all the 

situations" which might arise for a party's failure to file a timely response. 21 A Karl Oakes, Fed. 

Proc. L. Ed. §51 :64 (2014). A good cause evaluation does not rest on one factor, because there 

is a strong presumption on deciding cases on the merits. Instead, a good cause evaluation is a 

Page 7 of 13 
consideration of"all the circumstances ofthe case, viewed with a forgiving eye." In re Safety 

Equipment and Sign Co., Ltd., FAA Order No. 92-76 at 5 (Dec. 21, 1992). 

Therefore, in determining whether good cause exists or does not exist, the court may 

consider the nature of the default, whether there is a meritorious defense, whether the opposing 

party will be prejudiced, the timeliness of the request for relief, the amount involved in the 

litigation, as well as the availability and effectiveness ofless drastic solutions. 29 A.L.R. Fed. 7, 

Good Cause General Considerations, §4 (1976). Other considerations in evaluating good cause 

(not inclusive) may include the inaction of a party's counsel, a party's mistaken belief about the 

time requirements, the willfulness of the party's non-compliance, any factors demonstrating 

excusable neglect, surprise, or inadvertence, or a party's erroneous reliance on settlement 

negotiations. 29 A.L.R. Fed. 7, Sufficiency of Particular Reasons for Inaction,§§ A and B 

(1976), See also, Edes v. Fredson, 344 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D. Me. 2004). 

VI. Partial Discussion of the Respondent's Primary Good Cause Assertions 

Only certain matters will be addressed herein. 

As noted earlier, on November 18, 2013, the Respondent signed for, and "received" the 

certified mailing of the FNPCP. (Motion, Exh. F.) Four days later, on November 22, 2013, the 

Respondent e-mailed Mr. Reigel and stated that she wanted to "go with the Appeal. . .in court." 

(Motion, Ex. Eat 6; Response, 1.) This direction to Mr. Reigel occurred prior to the December 

3, 2013 filing deadline. Based on that instruction, the Respondent asserts that she believed that 

Mr. Reigel had submitted a timely appeal request. (Response, 1 ~ 6.) 

The record also demonstrates that on December 17, 2013 (i.e., fourteen (14) days after 

the December 3, 2013 filing deadline) the Respondent received the OACP by certified mail. 

(Motion, Ex. G.) The OACP found that the Respondent had committed the alleged violations 

[by default], and assessed a total $7,700 civil penalty against her [by default]. (Motion, Ex. G.) 

On December 24, 2013, seven (7) days after receiving the OACP, the Respondent emailed Mr. Reigel, asking about the status of her request for hearing. (Motion, Ex. Eat 5.) That 

same day, December 24, 2013, Mr. Reigel e-rriailed the Respondent, and told her that he had not 

filed a request for hearing "per her instructions" (date/communication unspecified). (!d.) 

Page 8 of13 
It was undisputed that Mr. Reigel was an experienced aviation lawyer, who represented 

the Respondent through December 17,2013. (Motion, 3; Response, I~ 8 and 13). The FAA 

asserted that the Respondent should be bound by her attorney's inaction in failing to file a timely 

request on or before December 3, 2013. In addition, and in the alternative, the FAA asserted that 

the Respondent should be held accountable for her own dilatory action in filing a request for 

hearing after her relationship with Mr. Reigel was severed on or about December 24, 2013. 

(Motion, 3-4). In response to the FAA's assertions, the Respondent presented multiple 

arguments, some of which may be immediately addressed. 

A. Attorney's Physical "Remoteness" is Immaterial . 

The Respondent asked the court to consider, as part of a good cause finding, that her 

relationship with Mr. Reigel had been "remote". (Response, 2.) This is not a persuasive factor. 

The advances of modern technology have allowed all manner of professional and personal 

relationships to survive the barriers formerly imposed by mere physical distance. It was the 

Respondent's choice to engage in the on-line services of an attorney. While the Respondent 

might now regret such choice, it was her right to make it and to contract the relationship. Thus, 

the remoteness in physical distance between the Respondent and Mr. Reigel is presumptively 

immaterial, absent a showing of legal invalidity of the relationship itself or other factors. No 

such showing has been made in this case. 

B. Attorney's "Limited" Services Presumed Sufficient 

The Respondent explained that she had found Mr. Reigel through an "on line query" 

(Response, 2). The Respondent asserted that Mr. Reigel's services were "limited", because he 

was located in the state of Minnesota, and she could not afford to pay his travel costs. 

7 

(Response, 1 ~ 1 and 5.) The Respondent also asserted that she had told Mr. Reigel that once she 

was advised of the hearing location, she planned to hire "local" counsel, or represent herself. 

(Response, 1 ~ 5.) 

It is not unusual for a party to consult with an attorney in the beginning stages of 

litigation, and then hire someone else to actually try the case. It is not unusual for a consulting 

7 [NB: Judicial notice is taken that the Respondent's address of record throughout these proceedings has been in the 

state of Florida]. 

Page 9 of 13 
attorney to also recommend to a client that a case be referred to another lawyer, given the 

specialization of law in today's marketplace. Given this common practice by the public 

consumer and the specialist, it simply cannot be presumed that initial consultation services with 

an attorney are automatically insufficient. In the case herein, the Respondent has not 

demonstrated sufficient grounds for the court to make a finding that Mr. Reigel's "limited" 

services as a consulting aviation lawyer (i.e., initial discussion and assistance) should be 

presumed to have been insufficient, or incompetent. 

C. Evidence regarding Attorney "Inaction" before December 3, 2013 

The Respondent asserted that she asked Mr. Reigel, on November 22, 2013 to file a 

request for hearing. for her. She alleged that Mr. Reigel only "infrequently" advised her, 

primarily via email communications, and that she relied upon him to tell her the status of the 

case. (Response, I ,-r 1 and 8.) According to the Respondent, she had depended on Mr. Reigel to 

file the request for hearing, and he had -unbeknownst to her - failed to take timely action. The 

FAA has characterized this argument as "suspect". (Motion, 4). 

This court agrees with the FAA that this argument is suspect. The proof currently 

submitted by the prose Respondent is inconsistent with parts of her argument. For example, in 

her November 18, 2013 email (1 0:33am), the Respondent states: 

I just today got a notice of certified delivery that will be redelivered tomorrow hopefully. 

Once get [sic] the letter in my hand, opened and reviewed, I will respond with my next 

step. The 15-day clock should not start until I am in receipt of the letter ... [sic] not when 

the FAA office mailed it. 

(Motion, Exh. E, 5 (emphasis added).) 

This November 18,2013 email demonstrates that the Respondent had a leadership role in 

the case process, despite her claim that she did not "closely manage" Mr. Reigel's activity. 

(Response, 1 ,-r 12.) It also shows that the Respondent had a familiarity with the FAA's Rules of 

Practice, since she knew about both the "15-day clock" and the "receipt" rules. Thus, based on 

the evidence, the Respondent clearly knew that her appeal needed to be filed on or before 

December 3, 2013 (i.e., the deadline for appeal). 

Page 10 of 13 
On November 22, 201_3, four (4) days after the Respondent received the FNPCP by 

certified mailing, she e-mailed Mr. Riegel again, advising him of her next step: 

Let's just go with the appeal. .. [sic] at least I can present what actually happened on. that 

flight in court." 

(Motion, Exh. Eat 6.) 

It is after this point in time that the Respondent's evidentiary proof changes. There is a 

distinct lack of' information proffered. 

For example, according to the Respondent's submission of proof, she becomes passive. 

She appears to cease all email communications with Mr. Reigel, and does not aver that she spoke 

with him at all. Instead, she asserts that she·waited for Mr. Reigel to file the request, and advise 

her of a hearing location. Between November 22, 2013 and December 3, 2013 the Respondent 

asserts [by inference] that she said _and did nothing to ensure that her appeal has been timely 

filed. 

Then, on December 17, 2013, the Respondent receives the certified mailing of the OACP. 

(Motion, Exh. G; Response, 1 ~ 7.) Despjte receipt of the OACP, her prior activity in the case, 

and her evident knowledge ofthe FAA's Rules of Practice, she says and does nothing for the 

next seven (7) days. Then, on December 24, 2013, the Respondent emails Mr. Reigel and asks 

him if he has heard "[a]ny response on the appeal?" (Motion, Exh. E, 5) . 

. The evidence shows that Mr. Reigel promptly responds via email that same day. He ·tells 

the Respondent that he did not file an appeal, based on the directions she had previously 

provided. (Motion, Exh. E, 5.) 

[Mr. Reigel] I did not file an appeal. Your last instructions tome were that you were 

going to pursue the appeal on your own or using a local attorney who may be more cost 

effective and I confirmed that I would not be doing anything further on the matter. 

(Motion, Exh. E, 5)(emphasis added). 

It is noteworthy that the Respondent dtd not submit to this court either her instructions to 

. Mr. Reigel, or the responsive confirmation to those instructions that Mr. Reigel references in his 

December 24, 2013 email. Given the fact that the communications between the Respondent and 

Mr. Reigel we~e primarily via email, it seems to weigh against the Respondent that she has not 

Page 11 of 13 
proffered these communications to this court. (Response, 1 at~ 1 and 8.) It is also noteworthy 

that the pro se Respondent generally alleges a variety of good cause factors (e.g., cancer, family 

death, etc.), but then does not provide any information about them. (Response, 1.) 

D. ProSe Respondent Should be Given Time to Perfect the Record 

This case involves a default finding of safety violations, with a $7,700 default civil 

penalty assessment, with attendant 6% interest attached. (12/12/13 OACP, 2-3). For the majority 

of American citizens, this is a substantial sum of money that might take years to fully pay. 

. . 

It may well be that the pro se Respondent has full email correspondence available to 

support her good cause arguments asserting a miscommunication between herself and Mr. Reigel 

regarding the filing of an appeal. If so, the Respondent needs to immediately file the full email 

correspondence, or in the alternative, fully disclose the date(s) and specific content of all missing 

communications, to perfect any good cause argument. 

In addition, the pro se Respondent has generally referenced other good cause factors in 

support of her untimely request (e.g., cancer diagnosis, death in the family, etc.), but has failed to 

provide any specificity about such factors. (Response, 1.) If the Respondent believes these · 

factors have merit and should be considered, she should· immediately provide specific 

information about them. 

VII. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, and pursuant to 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.205(a)(8) and 13.218(f)(2), and 

after reviewing all relevant caselaw, regulations, statutory authority, and being fully advised; 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

l) Based upon the evidence submitted, the date of service established for the Respondent's 

receipt ofthe FNPCP is November 18, 2013. 

2) Based upon the evidence submitted, the last date for timely filing of the Respondent's 

Request for Hearing is established as December 3, 2013. 

Page 12 of13 
3) Based upon the evidence submitted, the Respondent's Request for Hearing, filed January 

8, 2014, is deemed untimely. 

4) The FAA's Motion to Dismiss Late-Filed Appeal is reserved. 

5) On or before June 25, 2014, the Respondent may file supplemental materials to perfect 

her good cause arguments. 

6) If the Respondent does not file any supplemental materials, a further Order will issue 

after June 25, 2014. 

7) If the Respondent does file supplement materials, then the FAA may file a supplemental 

reply (if any) on or before July 15, 2014, or in the alternative, file a prompt notice (i.e., 

as soon as possible after June 25, 2014) that no reply will be filed. 

Attachment: Service List 

Page 13 of 13 
SERVICE LIST- BY U.S. MAIL 

ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S:W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC--430 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1 0008 

Ms. Judith L. Vaughan 

Complainant's Counsel 

ONE COPY 

Office of the Regional Counsel, Eastern Region 

Federal Aviation Administration 

1 Aviation Plaza 

Jamaica, NY 11434 

TEL: 718-553-3255 

FAX: 718-995-5699 

Ms. Mary E.· Bochiardy 

Respondent 

1450 Sunset Point Road 

Clearwater, FL 33755-1536 

TEL: 386-214-0414 

FAX: NOT PROVIDED 

Judge J.E. Sullivan 

US. Administrative Law Judge 

Office ofHearings, M-20 

U.S. Department ofTransportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (Ell-310) 

Washington, DC 20590 

TEL: 202-366-6941 

FAX: 202-366-7536 

FDMS No. FAA-2013-0853 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

8 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1000, Washington, 

DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC--430.