### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-13-00473- CV

Rebec ca Ter rell, Appellant

v. Com m ission er of Edu cation Michael L. Williams, Texas Education Agency, and

P am pa In dependent S chool District , Appellees

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 201 ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GN-1 2-0 0298 1, H ONO RAB LE GISELA D. TRI ANA, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Rebec ca Terr ell, acting pro se, appea ls the trial court’s order g ranting the pleas to the jurisdiction of appellee s Commi ssioner of Educa tion Michae l L

. Wil liams, Texas Educa tion Ag ency (the Commi ssioner), and Pampa I ndepende nt School District. For the following rea sons, we aff irm the trial cour

t’s order

. 1

BACK GR OUND Terr ell was employ ed by the School District under a probationar y teac hing contra ct during the 2008-2009 school y ear . I n M ar ch 2 0 0 9, the School District’s Boa rd of Trustee s (the Boa rd) voted to terminate Terr ell’s teac hing contra ct at the end of its term. I n Aug ust 2009, Terr ell

Be cause the parties are familiar with the fac ts of the case and its proce dural history , we do 1 not rec ite them in this opinion except as nece ssary to advise the parties of the Court’s decision and the basic r easons f

or it. See Tex. R. App. P . 47.1, 47.4.prese nted six g rieva nces to the Boa

rd about perf

ormanc e appra isals, student discipline, paid leave , and her termination. After the School District denied the g rieva nces, Terr ell appeal ed t o t he Commi ssioner. See Tex. Educ. Code § 7.057.

The Commi ssioner issued his decision on J uly 2, 2012. The Commi ssioner g rante d Terr ell’s appe al as t o ap p raisal repor ts but denied or dismiss ed her other claims. Terr ell filed a motion for rehe aring in w hich she claimed, among other arguments, that the Commi ssioner’s fifth finding of fa ct was not supported by evidenc e and that the sevente enth finding of fac t w as wrong . The Commi ssioner extended the time to t ake ag ency action until September 4, 2012, and subsequently issued a decision on motion for rehea ring on August 24, 2012. I n the August order , the Commi ssioner chang ed the date ref ere nced in the fifth finding of fac t and chang ed the ref ere nce to “ cer tificate of service ” in the J uly order to “ cer tificate of confe renc e” in the sevente enth finding of fa ct. Terr ell there afte r filed suit for judicial revie w of the Commi ssioner’s order pursuant to se ction 7.057(d) of the Educa tion Code a

nd section 2001.176 of the G overnme nt Code. See id. § 7.057(d); Tex. Gov’ t Code § 2001.176. She also soug ht r elief for the Boa rd’s alleg ed violations of her constitutional rig hts of “impart i al t ri b unal and due proce ss” and “equa l protec tion.” See U.S. Const. amend. XI V, § 1; Tex. Const. art. I , §§ 3, 19. She contende d that the Boa rd violated her due proce ss rig hts beca

use it was not impartial and that her due proce ss and equal protec tion rig hts

wer e violated when the School District “manipulated and tamper ed with g overnme nt rec ord”

conce rning the appra isals and walkthroug hs and when it ref used to remove studen t s fr o m her classroom. She further soug ht relief from the School District for brea ch of contra ct and a decla ratory

2judgme nt to construe her rig hts under her employ ment contra ct wit h t h e S chool District. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.004. She asser ted that she was underpa id by $3,200 during the 2008-2009 school y ear .

Appellee s filed pleas t o t h e jurisdiction and motions to dismiss

. I n his plea, the Commi ssioner contende d that the trial court did n o t h av e j u risdiction over: (i) Terr ell’s administrative claims, beca use she failed to exhaust her administrative reme dies; (ii) her decla ratory judgme nt claims, beca

use she soug ht an impermissible redunda nt reme dy ; and (iii) her cons ti tu ti onal claims, beca

use they wer e not distinct but pa rt of the administrative case and beca use, even if they

wer e distinct, Terr ell was still require d to satisfy statutory prer equisites to suit and failed to do so. I n its plea and brie fing to the trial court, the School District r aised similar ar g uments.

After a hear ing, the trial court g rante d appellee s’ pleas to the jurisdiction. The trial court a lso entere d finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law. This appe al followed.

ANALYSIS Terr ell raises eleve n issues on appea l. Her first six issues addre ss her alleg ed failure to exhaust her administrative reme dies, her next three issues addre ss the trial court’s jurisdiction to consider her constitutional, brea ch of contra ct, and decla ratory claims, and her two rema ining issues challeng e the tria l court’s finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law and reque st that specia l costs be imposed on appellee s.

3Stand ard of Review Terr ell challeng es the trial court’s order g ranting appellee s’ pleas to the jurisdiction. We revie w a plea questioning the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See Texas Dep’ t of Parks & W

ildlif e v. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). We focus first on the plaintiff’s petition to deter

mine whether the fac ts that wer e pled aff irmatively demonstrate that subject matter jurisdiction exis ts. Id

. We construe the pleading s liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Id

. I f a plea to the jurisdiction challeng es the exis tence of jurisdictional fac ts, the trial court may consider evidenc e and must do so when nece ssary to r esolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Id

. at 227; Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W .3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000).

Sovereig n immunit y

from suit deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction and is there fore proper ly asser

ted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Harris Cnty. v. Syke s , 136 S.W .3d 635, 638 (Tex. 200 4 ); Mi randa , 133 S.W .3d at 225–26. Gover nmental immunit y aff

ords political subdi v i s i o ns the same protec tion aff orded the state by sovere ign immunit y . Rolling Plains Groundwater Conservation Dist. v. City of Aspermont , 353 S.W .3d 756, 759 n.4 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam); Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consol. Indep. Sc h

. D is t. v . Texas Political Subdivisions Prop./Cas. Joint Self-Ins. Fund , 212 S.W .3d 320, 324 (Tex. 2006). I mmunity from sui t deprive s a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction unless the leg islature has expressly consen t ed to the suit. City of Dallas v. Albert , 354 S.W .3d 368, 373 (Tex. 2011).

Terr ell also challeng es the trial court’s finding s of fac t and conclusions of law. A trial court’s finding s of fac t are subject to revie w for leg al and fac tual sufficie ncy of the evidenc e by the

same standards applied to a jury verdic t. Ortiz v. Jones , 917 S.W .2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996); see City

4of

Keller v. W

ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005) (desc ribing revie w of evidenc e under leg al and fac tual sufficie ncy standards of revie w). We revie w a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo and will uphold the conclusions if the judg ment can be sustained on any leg al t heory supported by the evidenc e. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand , 83 S.W .3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002).

Adm inis trat ive Appeal

I n her first si x issues, Terr ell contends that the trial court had jurisdiction over her administrative claims beca use she exhausted her administrative reme dies. Acc ording to Terr ell, (1) she was not require d to file a second motion for rehe aring beca use the Commi s s i o n er’ s order dated Aug ust 24, 2012, was a nunc pro tunc order ; (2) cler ical corr ect i o n s d o n o t require administrative exhaustion and such a require ment would violate her constitutional rig hts; (3) section 2001.145(a) of the Gover nment Code and a subsequent orde r by the Commiss ioner do not re quire

a second motion for rehe aring ; ( 4) the Commi ssioner’s final order was the J uly order , and the trial court “er red in assuming that leg al basis of J uly Orde r was modified or chang ed in Aug ust Orde r”; (5) the Commi ssioner’s Au gu s t order overr uled her motion for rehe aring or, alternatively , it was

overr uled when the Commi ssioner’s plenar y power expired; and (6 ) t h e C o mmissi oner and the School District “fa iled to carry their burden” of showing that the chang es in the Aug ust order chang ed the leg al basis of the July order

. Among the require ments for exhausting administrative reme dies, a timely motion for rehe aring g ener ally is a prer equisite for an ap p ea l fr o m a decision by the Commi ssioner. See T ex . Go v ’t Code § 2001.145(a) ; 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 157.1061(a) (Tex. Educ. Ag ency , Motions for Rehea

ring ); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.171; In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. , 5235 S.W .3d 619, 625 (T ex . 2007) (orig

. proce eding ) (“I f an ag ency has exclusive jurisdiction to

resolve a dispute, a party must first exhaust administrative reme dies befor e a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction.”); Lazarides v. Farris , 367 S.W .3d 788, 798 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (“The require ment of ad m inistrative exhaustion compels a party to ‘pursue all available reme dies within the administrative proce ss befor e seeking judicial relief .’” (quoting Larry Koch, Inc. v. Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n , 52 S.W .3d 833, 839 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2001, pet. denied) )).

Terr ell focuse s on the nature of the modifications to the Aug ust order to support her position that the order was a nunc pro tunc order that did not require her to file a further motion for rehe aring

. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 316 (allowing nunc pro tunc judgme nts to corre ct cler ical errors in judgme nts), 329b(f) (allowing nunc pro tunc judgme nts afte r plenar y power expires); W

illow Vista Estates Homeowne rs Ass’n v. Haight , No. 02-12-00432- CV, 2013 Tex. App. L EXI S 10629, at *3–6 (Tex. App.—For

t Worth Aug

. 22, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (desc ribing nunc pro tunc judgme nts). Acc ord i n g to Terr ell, the m odifications t o the August order wer e clerica l corr ections and thus did not require her to file a

further motion for rehe aring to exhaust her administrative re medies. To support her positi on, Terr ell cites Anadarko E& P Co. v. Railroad Commission , No

. 0 3 -04-00027-CV, 2009 WL 47112 (Tex. App.—Austin J an. 7, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). I n that case , this Court applied t h e s u p re me court’s “‘more prag matic and flexibl e approa ch’ to evalua te t he finality of an ag ency ’s order” to conclude that a sec ond motion for rehea ring was not require d. Id

. at *10 (quoting Texas-New Mex ico Power Co. v. Texas Indus. Energy Consumers , 806 S.W .2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1991)). Unlike here , howeve r, the Railroad Commi ssion denied the

6orig inal motion for rehe aring and no longe r had jurisdiction to act on th e m atter when it issued a

nunc pro tunc o rd er . S

ee i d

. at *3. I n contra st to the fac ts of that case , the Commi ssioner here modified his order in Aug ust at a time when he had jurisdiction to act on the matter and in response to points raised in Terr ell’s motion for rehe aring

. Thus, we find the proce dural posture of Anadarko distinguishable.

Fur ther, this Court has held that a petitioner must fi l e a new motion for rehe aring when the ag ency mod i fi es its order in response to a mot ion for rehea ring , reg ardle ss of t he nature of the modifica tions. See Cisneros v. Stat e Bd. for Educator Certification , No. 03-05-00657- CV, 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 11125, at *10 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec

. 29, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“This Court has addressed this issue at l east twice and both times held that the petitioner wa s statutorily require d to file a second motion for rehe aring following the ag ency ’s modified order .”); see also Ector Cnty. Comm’rs Court v. Central Educ. Agenc y , 786 S.W .2d 449, 450–51 (Tex. App.—Austin 19 9 0 , wr it denied) (re

jecting argument that no new motion for rehe aring require d beca use order s “r ea ch ed t he same result” and explaining that “fina lity of an order does not turn on whether the chang es ref

lected in such a new order are of a substantial or minor nature ”); Southern Union Gas Co. v. Rail road Comm’n , 690 S.W .2d 946, 948 (Tex. App.—Austi n 1985, writ ref ’d n.r.e.) (requiring

new motion for rehe aring and concluding that order “ca nnot be final and appea lable when of fac t it has bee n chang ed by

a subseque nt order” ).

7Guided by the analy sis and holding by thi s C o u rt in Cisneros , we conclude that

Terr ell failed to exhaust her administrative reme dies by failing to file a motion for rehe aring of the Aug ust order and overr

ule her first s i x i s s u es o n this basis. See 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 11125, at *10.

Constitutional Clai m s

I n her seventh issue, T er rell contends that the trial court had jurisdiction over her “impartial tribunal claim and other constitutional c la im s ” b e c a u s e th e y w e re distinct and independe nt of her administrative appea l. She claims that her rig hts of “due proce ss, liberty interest, and equal protec tion” wer e violated “re g ar d i n g h er perf ormanc e appra isals and walkthroug hs, and her leg al rig ht to remove students” from her classroom. See U.S. Const. amend. XI V, § 1; Tex. Const. art. I , §§ 3, 19; see also Tex. Educ. Code §§ 21.351 (addr essi n g re co m m ended appra isal proce ss and perf ormanc e criter ia of teac hers) , 37.002 (desc ribing when tea ch er may remove student from cla ssroom).

Appellee s counter tha

t T e r r e ll ’ s p u r p o r te d c o n s ti tu

ti o n a l c la im s w e r e not distinct from but rathe r part o f h er ad m i n istrative case and that, in any case , Terr ell was require d to satisfy statutory prer equisites for suit and she failed to do so. Be cause it is dispositi ve, howeve r, we limit

our revie w to the substance of Terr ell’s constitutional claims to deter mine if Terr ell has pleade d valid claims. See City of Dallas v. Jones , 331 S.W .3d 781, 787 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 2010, pet. dism’d); see also Andrade v. v. NAACP of Austin , 345 S.W .3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2011) (conside ring substance of constitutional claim in revie wing plea to jurisdiction and noting that immunit y was reta ined unless “viable claim” p l ea d ed); Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 226 (re viewing g rant of plea to jurisdiction de

8novo an d co n s i d ering whether fac ts that wer e pled aff irmatively demonstrated that subject m atter jurisdiction ex ists).

“To asser t a n equal protec tion c laim, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) he or she

was trea ted differ ently than other simil arly situated parties; and (2) he or she was trea ted differ ently without a rea sonable basis.” See Price v. Texas Alcoholic Bev erage Comm’n , No. 01-12-01164- CV, 2014 Tex. App. L EXI S 7495, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houst o n [1st Dist.] J uly 10, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.). “The situations and conduct of the employ ees in question must be ‘nea rly identical.’” AutoZone, Inc. v. Rey es , 272 S.W .3d 588, 594 (Tex. 2008) (citation omitted); see Y sleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Monarrez , 177 S.W .3d 915, 917 (Tex

. 2005) (“Employ ees are simil arly situated if their circ umstances are compar able in all materia l respe cts, including simil ar standards, supervisors, and conduct.”); Jones , 331 S.W .3d at 787 (re quiring plaintiff to alleg e “he is being trea ted differ ently from those whose situat i o n i s direc tly compar able in all materia l aspec ts” to plead a “valid equal protec tion claim”)

. Terr ell has not alleg ed or identified a simil arly situated person who was trea ted differ ently than she was by the School District conce rning the perf ormanc e appra isals or the remova l of students from classrooms. Thus, she did n o t al l ege a v alid equal protec tion claim. See Jones , 331 S.W .3d at 787.

T errell also failed to alleg e valid due proce ss claims based on impartialit y o f t h e Boa rd, t he perf

ormanc e appra isals, or the remova l of students from her classroom. Due proce ss

conce rns arise “whe n the stat e or its ag ents deprive a person of a protec ted liberty or proper ty interest.” McM

aster v. Public Util. Comm’n , No. 03-11-00571- CV, 2012 Tex. App. L EXI S 7502, at *21 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 3 1, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); see U.S. Const. amend. XI V, § 1;

9Tex. Const. art. I , § 19. To bring a valid due proce ss claim, a plaintiff must asser t a protec ted liberty

or proper ty interest. See Concerned Cmty. Involv ed Dev ., Inc. v. City of Houston , 209 S.W .3d 666, 671 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (“The Due Process Clause is only activate d when there is some substantial liberty or proper ty i n t ere st which is deser ving of proce dural prote ctions.”).

Terr ell has failed to identify a protec ted liberty or proper ty interest that would entitle her to more proce ss than she rec eived administratively conce rning her complaints about the Boa rd’s alleg ed impartiality , the perf ormanc e appra isals, a

nd the remova l of students from her classroom. See University of Tex. Med. Sch. v. Than , 901 S.W .2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1995) (“What proce ss is due is me a s ured by a flexibl e standard that depends on the prac tical require ments of the circ umstances.” ) ; State v. Crank , 666 S.W .2d 91, 94 (Tex. 1984) (“[T]he ultimate test of due proce ss of law in an administrative hearing is the presence of rudiments of fair play long known to ou r law.”)

. Terr ell

was aff orded the opportunity to prese nt g rieva nces as to her complaints, and the Commi ssioner considere d the g rieva

nces a s part of Te rre ll’s administrative appea l. Terr ell also does not have a protec ted proper ty interest in continued empl o y ment with the School D istrict ba sed on her probationar y teac hing contra ct. See Tex. Educ

. Code § 21.204(e) (“A teac her does not have a proper ty interest in a contra ct bey ond its ter m.”); see also id

. § 21.102 (addres s i n g probationar

y contra cts); Ramirez v. Red Oak Indep. Sch. Dist. , No. 03-01-00154-CV, 2001 Tex. App. L EXI S 6645, at *6 n.3 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 4, 2001, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that “tea cher s have no constitutionally protec ted proper ty interest in a probationar y position”). Her probationar

y contra ct expired at the end of the 2008-2009 school y ear , the Boa rd deter mined that it

10was in the School District’s best interest to terminate Terr ell’s employ ment, and the Boa

rd provided timely notice to Terr ell of its decision. See Tex. Educ. Code § 21.103(a) (authoriz i n g school district’s board to terminate teac her’ s employ ment at end of probationar y contra ct’s term if “in the board’ s judgme nt the best interests of the di strict will be served”)

. Fur ther, the Boa

rd’s d ecision 2

wa s fi nal and not appea lable. See id

. Thus, Terr ell did not alleg e a valid due process cl ai m . S ee Jones , 331 S.W .3d at 787. Be cause we have con cl u d ed t h at Terr ell did not alleg e valid constitutional claims, we over rule he r seve nth issue.

Breac h of

Contrac t Claim I n her ei gh t h issue, Terr ell contends that the trial court had jurisdiction over her brea ch of contra ct claim and that the trial court should have allowed additional evidenc e. She asser ts that she was underpa id by $3,200 during the 2008-2009 school y ear and t h at she was not allowed adequate time to present this complaint at the loca l level.

I n 2009, section 21.103(a ) of the E ducation Code stated: 2

The board of trustees of a school district may terminate the employ ment of a teac her employ ed under a probationar y contra ct at the end of the contra ct p er i o d i f in the board’ s judgme nt the best interests of the district will be served by terminating the employ ment. The board of trustees must g ive notice of its decision to terminate the employ ment to the teac her not later than the 45th day before the last day of instruction require d under the contra ct. The board’ s decis i on is final and may not be appe aled.

Act of May 30 , 1 9 9 9 , 76th L eg ., R.S., ch. 396, § 2.05, 1999 Tex. Gen. L aws 2471, 2491 (cur rent version at Tex. Educ. Code § 21.103(a) ). Terr ell does not contend that she rec eived untimely notice of the B oard’ s decision. 11Appellee s respond that Te rre ll has not exhausted her administrative reme dies as t o

her brea ch of contra ct claim beca use she failed to raise the claim of underpa y ment befor e the Boa

rd

or the Commi ssioner. See Tex. Educ. Code § 7.057 (authorizing appea ls to Commi ssioner if actions of school district board violate “provision of a written employ m en t co n t ract betwee n the school district and a school district employ ee , i f a v i o l ati on cause s or would cause monetary harm to the employ ee” ); In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. , 235 S.W .3d at 625 (re quiring party to first exhaust administrative reme d i es before trial court has subject m atter jurisdiction); Lazarides , 367 S.W .3d at 798 (same) ; North E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kelley , 277 S.W .3d 442, 444–45 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (conc luding trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider teac her’ s brea ch

o f contract claim); see also Davison v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist ., No. 05-12-01308- CV, 2014 T ex . App. L EXI S 2007, at *15–20 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 20, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that trial court proper ly g rante d plea as t o t eac her’ s brea ch of contra ct claims based on failure to exhaust administrative reme dies). Be cause Terr ell had an administrative avenue for addre ssing her complaint of underpa

y ment during the school y ear , we ag ree with appellee s that she has failed to exhaust her administrative reme dies as to this cl ai m. On this basis, we overr ule Terr ell’s eig hth issue.

Dec larator y Judgme nt Claim s

I n her ninth i s s u e, T er re ll contends that the trial court had jurisdiction over her decla ratory judgme nt claims. I n her pleading s, Terr ell soug ht a declaratory judgme nt “construing her ri gh t s under her employ ment contra ct with defe ndant PI SD, decla ring her leg al rig hts, and

12awa

rding rea sonabl e and nece ssary attorney s’ fee s.” See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 37.001–.011 (UDJA).

To establish a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction to g rant relief under the UDJA, “a party must plead the exis tence of an ‘under ly ing controve rsy ’ within the scope of section 37.004 of the civil prac tice and reme dies code.” Strayhorn v. Raytheon E-Sys., Inc ., 101 S.W .3d 558, 572 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied); see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Re m. Code § 37.004(a) (addr essing subject m atter of relief

). The UD J A, howeve r, “doe s not enlarg e a tr ial court’s jurisdiction, and a litigant’s reque st for decla ratory rel i ef d o es not alter a suit’s underly ing nature .” City of El Paso v. He inrich , 284 S.W .3d 366, 370–71 (Tex. 2009). Fur ther, “ [w] hen a sta tute provides an a venue fo r at tacking an ag ency order , a decla ratory -judg ment action will not lie to provide redunda n t

reme dies.” Poole v. Karnack Indep. Sch. Dist ., 344 S.W .3d 440, 445 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.) (c iting Raytheon E- Sys., Inc ., 101 S.W .3d at 572).

On ap p ea l , Terr ell contends that her decla ratory judgme nt action is “not an im p e r mi ssible redunda

nt reme dy as to the Commi ssioner” beca use she “ca

n obtain more specific and equitable reme dies u n d er [ her] decla ratory judgme nt action.” She focuse s on the claims for decl ar at o ry judgme nt as to the perf ormanc e appra isals, ethics complaints that she made ag ainst educators of the School District, and her rig ht to remove students. As stated above, Terr ell broug ht g rieva nces about the perf

ormanc e appra isals, the remova l of students from her classroom, and other alleg ed violations of the Educa tion Code by the School Distri ct an d i ts employ ees in the administrative proce eding , and Terr ell had an avenue for attacking the Commi ssioner’s order from that proce eding

. See Tex. Educ. Code § 7.057; Poole , 344 S.W .3d at 445; Kelley , 277 S.W .3d at 445

13(conc luding trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider teac her’ s decla ratory judgme nt claims). She further has failed to establish an “underly ing controver sy ” withi n the s cope of section 37.004 of the UDJA as to ethics complaints that she made. See T ex . Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.004; Raytheon E- Sys., Inc , 101 S.W .3d at 572. We overr ule Ter rell’s ninth issue.

F ind ings of

F act and Conclusion s of L aw I n her tenth issue, Terr el l contends that the trial court’s finding s of fac t and conclusions of law are err oneous and lack support in law or fac t and that the trial court err ed when it did not enter additional or amende d finding s of fac t a nd conclusions of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 296, 298. Terr ell specific ally challeng es finding s of fac t 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 13, and 14 and conclusions of law 1, 3, 5 and 7. These finding s and conclusions corr elat e wi t h Terr ell’s issues that we have alre ad y addre ssed and overr uled. For the rea sons stated above as to the other issues, we overr ule Terr ell’s tenth issue. See BMC Software Belg., N.V. , 83 S.W .3d at 794. Special Costs I n her eleve nth issue, Terr ell contends that “spec ial costs” should be imposed ag ainst appellee s based on alleg ed improper c o n d u c t b y a p p e ll e e s a n d T e r r e ll’s char acte rization of appellee s’ pleas as frivolous. She, howeve r, has failed to cite any authority to support an awa rd of specia l costs. See T ex . R

. App. P. 38.1(i). Fur ther, we have conclude d that the trial court proper ly g rante d appellee s’ pleas to the jurisdiction. We overr ule Ter rell’s e leventh issue.

14CONCLUSION For these rea sons, we aff irm the trial court’s order g ranting appellee s’ pleas to the jurisdiction. 3

__________________________________________ Melissa Goodwin, Jus tice Be fore Chief J ustice Rose, Jus tices Goodwin a nd Bour land Affir med Filed: May

21, 2015

I n her reply brief, Terr ell reque sts that we strike the School District’s entire brief beca use 3 it ref ere nces a “phantom rec ord.” We deny this reque st. The School District’s brief confor ms with Rule 38.2 of the Rules of Appellate Procedur e. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.2 (addr essing require ments of appe llee’s br ief). 15