NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAIRO MEJIA VEGA, Petitioner,
v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 11-70161 Agency No. A093-158-914
MEMORANDUM *

JAIRO ALBERTO MEJIA-VEGA, Petitioner,
v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 11-71551 Agency No. A093-158-914

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 

# FILED
JUL 15 2015 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.Submitted June 4, 2015 ** Pasadena, California Before: KOZINSKI and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges and SINGLETON, *** Senior District Judge. Jairo Mejia Vega seeks relief from the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) reinstatement of his prior order of removal and its denial of his motion to reopen. We deny his petitions for review. 1. Our review of a reinstatement order is limited to constitutional claims and questions of law where a petitioner can demonstrate a “gross miscarriage of justice” in the prior proceedings. Villa-Anguiano v. Holder , 727 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2013); Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec. , 539 F.3d 1133, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2008). Mejia Vega ha s failed to demonstrate a “gross miscarriage of justice” becau se the BIA properly sent notice of its decision to the detention center where Mejia Vega was confined. Moreover, Mejia Vega has failed to show prejudice. See Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales , 486 F.3d 484, 496 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (as amended). The BIA’s denial of Mejia Vega’s appeal from the deportation order issued in absentia was not “arbitrary, irrational, or

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable James K. Singleton, Senior District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation. 2contrary to law,” Singh v. I.N.S. , 295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted), because Mejia Vega did not show “that [his] failure to appear was because of exceptional circ umstances.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i). 2. We review the BIA’s denial of a mo tion to reopen for abuse of discretion, Movsisian v. Ashcroft , 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005), and we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s failure to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen. Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder , 633 F.3d 818, 823–24 (9th Cir. 2011). Contrary to Mejia Vega’s contention, the BIA, in denying Mejia Vega’s motion, did not impose any technical definition of due diligence, but simply held that in light of Mejia Vega’s presence in the United States since March 1999, he had not shown “reasonable diligence” in ascertaining th e status of his case or seeking relief from the BIA’s February 1999 order. MejiaVega has not presented a sufficient factual basis for holding that this decision was an abuse of discretion, and he has not shown that the BIA’s failure to exp licitly deny his request that it exercise its sua sponte authority, if judicially reviewable at all, was an abuse of discretion. The petitions for review are DENIED
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