PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. WALTER R. FLAUGHER, Defendant - Appellant. No. 14-3206

________________ _________________ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

(D.C. No. 2:06-CR-20043-JWL-8)

________________ _________________ Daniel T. Hansmeier, Appella te Chief (Melody Brannon Evan s, Federal Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Office of the Federa l Public Defender for the District of Kansas, Kansas City, Kansas, appearing for Defendant-Appellant. Carrie N. Capwell, Assistant United States A ttorney (Barry R. Grissom, United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Office of the United Stat es Attorney for the District of Kansas, Kansas City, Kansas, a ppearing for Plaintiff-Appellee.

________________ _________________ Before KELLY , SEYMOUR , and MATHESON , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ MATHESON , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________ I. BACKGROUND Walter Flaugher pled guilty in 2006 to one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. He was sentenced to 57 FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

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Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - months in prison and 5 years of supervised release. In 2014, the U.S. Probation Office filed a petition to re voke his supervised release, alleging several violations. Mr. Flaugher stipulated to one of the vi olations—use of me thamphetamine. The district court revoked his supervised release, resent enced him to another 12 months and 1 day in prison, and imposed 3 years of supervised release. Over his counsel’s objections, the court also im posed the following supervised release condition: [H]e shall submit his person, house, residence, ve hicles, papers, business, and place of employment a nd any property under his control to a search conducted by the Unite d States probation officer at a reasonable time and in a reasonabl e manner based upon reasonable suspicion of contraband or eviden ce of a violation of condition of release. Failure to submit to a sear ch may be grounds for revocation. He shall warn any other residents that the premises may be subject to be searched pursuant to this condition. Aplt. Br. at 5-6. On appeal, Mr. Flaugher argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) prohibits district courts from imposing warrantle ss-search conditions except in cases involving felons required to register under SORNA the Se x Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). He challenges the cond ition imposed on him because he is not required to register under SORNA. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we affirm.- 3 - II. DISCUSSION The issue is whether a district c ourt may impose a warrantless-search condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) on a person who is not a felon required to register under SORNA.
A. Standard of Review “When the defendant objects to a special condition of supervised release at the time it is announced, this Court re views for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Dougan , 684 F.3d 1030, 1034 (10th Cir. 201 2). “Thus, we will not disturb the district court’s ruling absent a showing it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or an erroneous conclu sion of law or manifests a cl ear error of judgment.” United States v. Bear , 769 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Ci r. 2014) (quotation omitted). Because Mr. Flaugher challenges the dist rict court’s statutory authority to enter the warrantless-search condition, we review this question de novo. See United States v. Handley , 678 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 2012).
B. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) Three parts of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) are the keys to decidi ng this appeal. First, under the “any other condition” pr ovision, a district court may impose “any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation in section 3563(b) 1 and any other condition it consid ers to be appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). One of the provisions found in § 3563( b) authorizes warrantless se arches when the defendant is “required to register under [SOR NA].” 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(23).

1 With one limitation not im plicated in this appeal.- 4 - Second, under the “three limitations ” provision, a court may impose a condition based on the “any other c ondition” provision provided it: (1) is reasonably related to the fact ors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and (3) is consistent with any pertinen t policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission purs uant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a). Id. Third, under the SORNA provision: The court may order, as an explicit condition of supervised release for a person who is a felon and required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, th at the person submit his person, and any property, house, residence, ve hicle, papers, computer, other electronic communications or data storage devices or media, and effects to search at any time, with or wit hout a warrant, by any law enforcement or probation officer with reasonable suspicion concerning a violation of a condition of supervised release or unlawful conduct by the person, and by any probation officer in the lawf ul discharge of the officer’s supervision functions. Id. C. Analysis Mr. Flaugher urges us to read th e SORNA provision in § 3583(d) as precluding a warrantless-sear ch condition for a defendant who is not a felon required to register under SORNA. Th is interpretation is incompa tible with a full reading of the statute.
1. Authorization of Warrantless-Search Conditions- 5 - The text of § 3583(d) does not limit th e possibility of a warrantless-search condition to felons required to register under SORNA. Indeed, it plainly authorizes warrantless-search conditions for defendant s who are not felons and who are not required to register under SORNA. The “any other condition” provision author izes district cour ts to impose “any condition set forth as a disc retionary condition of proba tion in section 3563(b) and any other condition it consid ers to be appropriate ” so long as the “three limitations” of § 3583(d)(1)-(3) are met. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (emphasis added). A district court may therefore impose a warrantless-sear ch condition on a defendant who is not required to register under SORNA so long as the court considers the condition appropriate and the § 3583(d )(1)-(3) limitations are met. 2 This understanding of § 3583( d) is consistent with the policy statement found at United States Sentencing Guidelines (“ U.S.S.G.”) § 5D1.3( d). It recommends district courts impose a warr antless-search condition in cases involving a sex offense, but also explains such a cond ition “may otherwise be appropri ate in particular cases.” U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(7)(C). The po licy statement therefore indicates warrantless-search conditions may be appropria te in cases other th an those involving sex offenders. If a district court d ecided a warrantless-search condition was

2 In United States v. Hanrahan , 508 F.3d 962 (10th Cir. 2007), we affirmed a warrantless-search condition imposed on a de fendant who was not a felon required to register under SORNA. Although Hanrahan is consistent with our disposition in the instant case, we do not rely on it becau se we agree with Mr. Flaugher that Hanrahan did not consider the statutory in terpretation issue presented here.- 6 - appropriate in a case not involving a se x offense, it would therefore satisfy § 3583(d)(3) because it would be consistent with the relevant policy statement.
2. Warrantless-Search Conditions for SORNA Felons In 2006, Congress amended § 3583(d) by adding the SORNA provision. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Ac t, Pub. L. No. 10 9-248, § 210(b), 120 Stat. 587, 615-16 (2006) (codifi ed at 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)). It authorizes a court to order a warrantless-search condition of superv ised release for a fe lon who is required to register under SORNA. Mr. Flaugher argues that adding the SORN A provision limited district courts’ authority under § 3583(d) by negative imp lication to impose warrantless-search conditions only on those defendants iden tified in the SORNA provision—felons required to register under SORNA. We di sagree. The SORNA provision is a grant of authority, not a limitation. The plain language of the provision describes what a district court “may order,” and does not describe what the court may not order. Moreover, Mr. Flaugher’s interpretation igno res and would conflict with a critical cross-reference in the “any other condition” provision of § 3583(d) that also was added to the statute in 2006, § 3563(b )(23). Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act § 210(a)(3).
3. Section 3563(b) Warrantless-Search Conditions Section 3583(d) states dist rict courts may impose “an y condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation in s ection 3563(b)” as long as the condition satisfies the “three limita tions” in § 3583(d)(1)-(3). One such § 3563(b) condition- 7 - authorizes warrantless search es when the defendant is “r equired to register under [SORNA].” 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(23). Th is warrantless-sear ch provision grants district courts authority over more SORNA defendants than the SORNA provision because § 3563(b)(23) does not require the de fendant to be a felon. Section 3583(d) therefore explicitly allows a district c ourt to impose a warrant less-search condition on a defendant who is required to register under SORNA, wh ether or not he or she is a felon, so long as the § 3583(d )(1)-(3) limitations are met. Accordingly, when Cong ress enacted the SORNA pr ovision, rather than limiting the district courts’ authority to impose warrantless-search conditions, as Mr. Flaugher contends, it added to the author ity already contained in the “any other condition” provision. It did so by aut horizing a district court to impose a warrantless-search condition on a category of defendants—felons who are required to register under SORNA—without having to satisfy the “three limitations” in § 3583(d)(1)-(3). This interpretation permits all of the § 3583(d) provisions to have meaningful effect.
4. No Void or Superfluous Text Mr. Flaugher’s proposed interpretation— that warrantless-se arch conditions can be imposed only under the SORNA provi sion in § 3583(d) a nd only upon felons who must register under SORNA—would render void or superfl uous the statutory authorization of a warrantless-search condition under the cross-reference of § 3583(d) to § 3563(b)(23), wh ich allows district courts to impose warrantless-search conditions on non-felons re quired to register under SORNA. The Supreme Court- 8 - recently instructed: “We have long held that ‘a statut e ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause’ is rendered ‘superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1352 (2015) (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews , 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)); see In re Dawes , 652 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting that “one of th e most basic interpretive canons” of statutory construction is that a “statute should be constr ued so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part wi ll be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant”). We theref ore reject Mr. Flaugher’s proposed interpretation as contrary to this basic canon a nd the full text of § 3583(d). We instead conclude that the proper inte rpretation of § 3583( d) gives all parts of the statute meaningful effect and avoids superfluity. As described above, the “any other condition” provision of § 3583(d) gives district c ourts broad authority to impose any conditions they cons ider appropriate so long as the conditions satisfy the “three limitations” of § 35 83(d)(1)-(3), including warra ntless-search conditions on SORNA defendants under the cross-refere nce to § 3563(b). The SORNA provision would therefore be superfluous if it aut horized a warrantless-search condition only when the § 3583(d)(1)-(3) limit ations are met. But th e SORNA provision does not contain these limitations. Instead, it au thorizes district courts to impose a warrantless-search condition on a felon wh o is required to register under SORNA provided a “law enforcement or probati on officer” has “rea sonable suspicion concerning a violation of a condition of supervised release or unlawful conduct by- 9 - the person” or the search is conducted “i n the lawful discharg e of [a probation] officer’s supervision functions .” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Understanding the parts of § 3583(d) —the “any other condition,” “three limitations,” and SORNA provisions—in this way gives meaningful effect to all three, avoids superfluity, and forecloses Mr. Flaugher’s proposed interpretation.
* * * * Mr. Flaugher does not further argue th e § 3583(d)(1)-(3) limitations warrant reversal of the warrantless- search condition imposed on hi m. His challenge to his warrantless-search supervised re lease condition therefore fails.
III. CONCLUSION We affirm Mr. Flaugher’s supervised release conditi on that he challenges on appeal.