20 20 IL App (1st) 190 701

- U No. 1-19-0701 Order f iled April 16, 20 20 Fourth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ CARMELITA JACKSON,

Plaintiff -Appellant,

v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, PATRICK MARTINEZ, CHANITA PAUL, DESIREE TRIPLETT, CHARITA PAUL, ANDREA ROBERSON, BRANDON PAUL, MICHAEL DIN EEN, HAROLD HUFF, MICHAEL McDEVITT, KEVIN GARDNER, SHERMAN MORRIS, PAUL DOWNING, MICHAEL GAINES, DAMON STEWART, JOHN KILL, and THE POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendants, (Patrick Martinez, Defendant

- Appellee). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County.

No. 15 L 8605

Honorable Sandra G. Ramos, Judge, presiding

JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Gordon and Justice Burke concurred in the judgment.No. 1-19-0701

- 2 - O RDER ¶ 1 Held : The trial court neither abused its discretion by continuing the trial one day after the scheduled trial date nor deprived the plaintiff of her right to an impartial trial. ¶ 2 Plaintiff Carmelita Jackson sued defendant Patrick Martinez and others, alleging, inter alia , intentional infliction of emotional distress and battery. After a hearing on the claims against defendant only, the trial court dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and found defendant not liable for battery. ¶ 3 Plaintiff appe aled, arguing that the trial court committed reversible error because it (1) rescheduled the hearing and thereby deprived her of ample time to rearrange her work schedule and reschedule the appearance of her witnesses, and (2) violated her righ t to an impartial trial where the court’s “outburst and other mishaps” showed that the trial judge was biased against her. ¶ 4 Defendant has not filed a brief on appeal, so this matter is taken for consideration on the record and plaintiff’s pro se brief only. ¶ 5 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1 ¶ 6 I. BACKGROUND ¶ 7 In 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, several other private individuals, the City of Chicago and its police department, and several Chicago poli ce officers, alleging battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence and defamation. According to her complaint, plaintiff alleged that her tenant and several of the tenant’s acquaintances (including defendant) confronted plaintiff on three occasions in August 2013 and struck her multiple times about her face and body, threatened her with a baseball bat, and shot her in the chest with a pistol.

1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.No. 1-19-0701

- 3 - Regarding defendant, plaintiff alleged that “a pistol came loose” during the third encounter an d defendant picked up the pistol, aimed it at plaintiff and shot her in the chest. According to plaintiff, the police who investigated this offense falsely claimed that she ran from the scene and “were disinclined to believe [her].” ¶ 8 In his answer, defendant denied plaintiff’s allegations and asserted that he tried to defend himself when plaintiff attacked him first with a bat, then with her gun, and finally with a club. ¶ 9 The court’s February 13, 2018 order, which stated that plaintiff’s “attorney did not s how or appear,” set this matter for trial on the allegations against defendant for March 11, 2019. On February 19, 2019, plaintiff’s attorney moved the court to allow him to withdraw as counsel

due to “a breakdown in communication” and “irrecon cilable differences” with his client. Counsel also asked the court to grant plaintiff 21 days to seek other counsel. The court heard that motion on March 1, 2019, and entered and continued it to the March 11 trial date. On March 5, 2019, plaintiff’s counsel filed an emergency motion to continue the March 11 trial date, stating that plaintiff had two key eyewitnesses who were unavailable and would not confirm their appearance at the March 11 trial date. That motion, however, did not identify the eyewitnesses or elaborate on the nature of their unavailability. On March 7, 2019, the court denied plaintiff’s motion to continue

the March 11 trial date. ¶ 10 On the morning of March 11, 2019, the court ruled that the March 11 trial date would stand

and ordered defendant to tender instanter a copy of his deposition transcript upon plaintiff’s payment of the transcript prior to the start of the hearing. Furthermore, defendant moved the court to bar the testimony of plaintiff’s eyewitness Brian Brown based on plaintiff’s alleged violation of discovery rules. Also, the parties filed a signed stipulation regarding the costs billed to plaintiff forNo. 1-19-0701

- 4 - her emergency medical treatment and medical services and defendant’s agreement to admit into evidence plaintiff’s medical records a nd bills. In addition, the court entered an oral order that continued the bench trial to March 12, 2019, at 9 a.m. ¶ 11 On March 12, 2019, after hearing evidence on plaintiff’s claims against defendant, the trial court (1) dismissed plaintiff’s claim of intenti onal infliction of emotional distress pursuant to

section 2

- 1110 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2

- 1110 (West 2018)) for failure to meet her burden of proof to establish a prima facie case, and (2) found defendant not liable for battery. ¶ 12 Plainti ff timely appealed. ¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 14 First, plaintiff argues the trial court committed reversible error because it “abruptly shut down the trial” on the initial March 11, 2019 hearing date and “continued it to the next day, March 12, 2019,” and thereby dep rived her of ample time to rearrange her work schedule and reschedule the appearance of her witnesses. Plaintiff contends that the abrupt change of the trial date caused her to lose witnesses and prevented her from presenting her full case to the court. ¶ 15 T he decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion

of the trial court and should not be overturned on appeal unless that discretion has been abused. Huber v. Reznick , 107 Ill. App. 3d 529, 543 (1982). The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would adopt its view. People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Kotara. L.L.C. , 379 Ill. App. 3d 276, 286 (2008).

A critical factor in the rev iew of such rulings is whether the party who sought the continuance showed diligence in proceeding with the cause. Trillet v. Bachman , 96 Ill. App. 3d 477, 481 (1981).No. 1-19-0701

- 5 - Once a cause is reached for hearing, a motion for continuance should show sufficient excuse for the delay and the movant should present especially grave reasons to support her request

. Teitelbaum v. Reliable Welding Co. , 106 Ill. App. 3d 651, 656 (1982). ¶ 16 In order to support a claim of error on appeal, the appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record. Foutch v. O’Bryant , 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391

- 92 (1984). In fact, “[f]rom the very nature of an appeal it is evident that the court of review must have before it the record to

review in order to determine whether there was the err or claimed by the appellant.” Id . at 391. Where the issue on appeal relates to the conduct of a hearing or proceeding, this issue is not subject to review absent a report or record of the proceeding. Instead, absent a record, “it [is] presumed that the order entered by the trial court [is] in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual

basis.” Id . at 392. Any doubts arising from an incomplete record will be resolved against the appellant. Id

. ¶ 17 The record before this court consists of only common law documents, which nevertheless indicate that the trial court afforded the parties the opportunity to conduct discovery and present evidence over the two consecutive hearing days held in this matter. Furthermore, plaintiff’s assertion on appeal

— that the abrupt “shut down” of the scheduled March 11 hearing prevented her from presenting eyewitness testimony

— is inconsistent with her arguments in her motions before the trial court to continue the March 11 trial date due to her eyewitnesses’ unavailability. ¶ 18 Ther e is no indication in the record that, when the court issued its oral order continuing the bench trial to the next day, plaintiff moved the court for another continuance. In addition, there is no indication that the case against defendant was complex or di fficult to prepare, or that plaintiff’s preparation was frustrated by any unique or unforeseeable intervening circumstances. Moreover,No. 1-19-0701

- 6 - plaintiff failed to indicate before the trial court and here on appeal the identity of her necessary witnesses, the natur e of their expected testimony or the steps taken to secure their appearance at

the trial. ¶ 19 Without a report of proceedings, this court has no knowledge of what arguments the parties made before the court, what facts were presented and found credible by the court, or if there was any additional reasoning and rationale that provided the basis for the trial court’s rulings. Under these circumstances, this court must presume that the trial court acted in conformity with the law and ruled properly after considering the evidence before it. Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc ., 217 Ill. 2d 144, 156

- 57 (2005); Foutch , 99 Ill. 2d at 391

- 92. We cannot say the trial court’s decision to commence the bench trial on March 11, 2019, as scheduled, and continue the trial to its completion the next day was arbitrary or resulted from an abuse of discretion. ¶ 20 Finally, plaintiff argues that the court violated her right to an impartial trial due to an “outburst and other mishaps during hearings and the actual trial, [which] were clearly biased.” She also states that the trial judge “went further and began to chant in open court ‘she is from a certain community in the Chicago area that is very dangerous and drug infected.’ ” ¶ 21 We cannot review this claim due to the condition of the record on appeal, which does not contain any hearing transcript, report of proceedings or bystander’s report, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323 (eff. July 1, 2017). Foutch , 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92. ¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION ¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. ¶ 24 Affirmed.