J-S46017-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ANTHONY WILLIAMS

Appellant No. 2089 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgments of Sentence January 8, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0003248-2012

CP-39-CR-0003366-2012

BEFORE: MUNDY, OLSON and MUSMANNO, JJ.: 

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED OCTOBER 07, 2015

Appellant, Anthony Williams, appeals pro se from the judgment of 

sentence entered on January 8, 2014, as made final by the resolution of his 

post-sentence motion on June 13, 2014. We quash in part and affirm in 

part.

The factual background and procedural history of this case are as 

follows.1 On the morning of June 24, 2012, Jocelyn Kyte (“Kyte”) was 

attending church services. Kyte’s three children remained at the family 

residence, located in Allentown. Appellant broke into Kyte’s residence and 

stole two video game systems, a laptop, and a cellular telephone. On June 

27, 2012, Nelly Negron (“Negron”) was in the upstairs portion of her home, 

 

1

For simplicity, we only discuss the procedural history relevant to the issues 

in this appeal. 
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also located in Allentown. Appellant broke into her home and stole her 

laptop. He also attempted to steal Negron’s television, but was 

unsuccessful. 

Negron confronted Appellant as he fled with the laptop. A physical 

confrontation ensued and Appellant struck Negron during the altercation. 

Appellant was seen running away from Negron’s residence. A police 

broadcast went out with a physical description of the suspect and the 

direction he was last seen traveling. Officer Michael Mancini saw Appellant, 

who matched the suspect’s physical description, walking in the vicinity where 

the suspect was last observed. Appellant was carrying two bags, one of 

which Officer Mancini believed to be a laptop bag. Officer Mancini exited his 

vehicle and asked Appellant if he could speak with him. Appellant turned 

and fled the scene on foot. Officer Mancini gave chase. During the ensuing 

pursuit, Appellant dropped the bags he was carrying. Eventually, Appellant 

was apprehended after Officer Mancini deployed his taser. Police then 

recovered the two bags that Appellant abandoned during the chase. 

On June 27, 2012, Appellant was interviewed by Detective Andrew 

Hackman regarding the Negron burglary. During that interview, Appellant 

confessed to stealing Negron’s laptop but did not admit to entering her 

residence. On July 17, 2012, Appellant was interviewed by now-Officer2

Michael Popovich regarding the Kyte burglary. During that interview, 

 

2 See page 22, infra. 
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Appellant made incriminating statements about his involvement in the Kyte 

burglary. Appellant attempted to discuss the Negron burglary with Officer 

Popovich; however, Officer Popovich told Appellant that they could not 

discuss the Negron burglary because counsel was appointed in that case. 

On June 27, 2012, Appellant was charged via criminal complaint at 

docket 39-CR-0003248-2012 (“case 3248”) with burglary,3criminal 

trespass,4theft by unlawful taking,5receiving stolen property,6simple 

assault,7and resisting arrest.8 The charges in case 3248 arose from 

Appellant’s burglary of Negron’s residence. On July 23, 2012, Appellant was 

charged via criminal complaint at docket 39-CR-0003366-2012 (“case 

3366”) with burglary, criminal trespass, theft by unlawful taking, and 

receiving stolen property. The charges in case 3366 arose from Appellant’s 

burglary of Kyte’s residence. On August 2, 2012, Attorney David Ritter was 

appointed to represent Appellant. On August 31, 2012, criminal 

informations were filed in both cases charging the same offenses as the 

criminal complaints. 

 

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a).

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(ii).

5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).

6 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a).

7 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).

8 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104.
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On November 8, 2012, Appellant filed a pro se motion to waive his 

right to counsel and proceed pro se. On December 3, 2012, the trial court 

held a hearing on Appellant’s motion. At the conclusion of that hearing, the 

trial court granted Appellant’s motion to proceed pro se and appointed 

Attorney Ritter to serve as standby counsel. That same day, Appellant also 

filed an omnibus pre-trial motion. Appellant amended his omnibus pre-trial 

motion on January 22, 2013. In that motion, he sought suppression of the 

two videotaped confessions and the bags recovered when he fled from 

police. He also sought consolidation of cases 3248 and 3366. On January 

28, 2013, the trial court granted Appellant’s request to consolidate the two 

cases for trial. 

On March 28, 2013, a suppression hearing was held but no ruling was 

immediately forthcoming. Over the next several months Appellant filed 

dozens of discovery related motions. These included a motion seeking to 

examine Officer Popovich’s personnel file and a motion seeking permission to 

view his videotaped confession. Appellant also sought discovery from the 

Commonwealth of a police report used during one of his interrogations and 

videos from city cameras. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to 

examine Officer Popovich’s personnel file. Originally, the trial court ordered 

the county jail to permit Appellant to view his videotaped confessions; 

however, the jail lacked the necessary technology. Therefore, the district 

attorney permitted Appellant and Attorney Ritter to view the confessions in 
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the district attorney’s office. In addition, although the Commonwealth 

initially denied possessing the police report used during Appellant’s 

interrogation, the report was produced to Appellant after it was located. On 

June 26, 2013, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. 

On September 3, 2013, Appellant sought dismissal of the charges on 

the grounds that the Commonwealth delayed production of the police report 

and his inability to view the confessions in jail. That same day, Appellant 

also sought dismissal for violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 600. On November 5, 2013, Appellant again waived his right to 

counsel. On November 15, 2013, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to 

dismiss for alleged discovery violations and denied Appellant’s motion to 

dismiss for violation of Rule 600. 

On November 19, 2013, trial commenced. On the second day of trial, 

November 20, 2013, Appellant no longer wanted to represent himself. 

Attorney Ritter therefore stepped in and became trial counsel. That same 

day, the Commonwealth moved in limine to prohibit cross-examination of 

Officer Popovich regarding his personnel file and to prohibit evidence relating 

to the Commonwealth’s alleged discovery violations. The trial court granted 

the Commonwealth’s motion in limine.

On November 21, 2013, the jury retired to deliberate. During its 

deliberations, the jury asked to view Appellant’s videotaped confession 
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relating to case 3366.9 The trial court permitted the jury to view the 

confession on a laptop in the jury room. That same evening, the jury found 

Appellant guilty of burglary, criminal trespass, theft by unlawful taking, and 

receiving stolen property in cases 3248 and 3366. The jury found Appellant 

not guilty of simple assault and resisting arrest in case 3248. 

On December 17, 2013, Appellant filed a motion seeking to proceed 

pro se on this direct appeal. On December 24, 2013, the trial court denied 

that motion. On January 8, 2014, Appellant orally moved for arrest of 

judgment. The trial court denied that motion and immediately proceeded to 

sentencing. Appellant was then sentenced in cases 3248 and 3366. In 

both cases, Appellant was sentenced to 6 to 20 years’ imprisonment for 

burglary. The remaining six counts merged with the burglary convictions. 

The two sentences were ordered to run consecutively. 

On January 16, 2014, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion. 

Appellant argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred by permitting one of 

his confessions to go back with the jury. Thereafter, Attorney Ritter joined 

the Lehigh County Public Defender’s office which raised a conflict in his 

representation of Appellant. On March 6, 2014, the trial court appointed 

Attorney Sean Poll to represent Appellant. Appellant filed an amended postsentence motion on March 17, 2014. That same day, Appellant moved to 

 

9 The jury did not request to view the confession in case 3248 and the DVD 

with that confession was not sent back with the jury. 
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waive his right to counsel. On April 21, 2014, the trial court denied 

Appellant’s motion to waive counsel. 

On June 13, 2014, the trial court granted in part and denied in part 

Appellant’s post-sentence motion. The trial court agreed that it erred by 

sending one of Appellant’s confessions out with the jury. The trial court 

concluded that the error prejudiced Appellant in case 3366. Therefore, the 

trial court vacated Appellant’s judgment of sentence in case 3366. The trial 

court concluded, however, that the error did not prejudice Appellant as to 

case 3248. Thus, it denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion as to case 

3248. This timely appeal followed.

Thereafter, on July 11, 2014, Appellant once again moved to waive 

counsel for this direct appeal. On July 17, 2014, the trial court ordered 

Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

(“concise statement”). See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On July 18, 2014, the 

Commonwealth filed a motion to reconsider. In that motion, the 

Commonwealth alleged that the submission of Appellant’s confession to the 

jury prejudiced him in both case 3248 and case 3366. As the notice of 

appeal had already been filed, however, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 

reach the merits of the Commonwealth’s motion to reconsider. On July 25, 

2014, Appellant filed his concise statement, which included all issues raised 

on appeal. On August 29, 2014, a hearing was held regarding Appellant’s 

motion to proceed pro se on this direct appeal. The trial court granted 
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Appellant’s motion at the conclusion of that hearing and appointed Attorney 

Poll as standby counsel. On September 5, 2014, the trial court issued its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion. Thereafter, this Court remanded this case to the trial 

court to permit supplementation of the certified record. The case is now ripe 

for disposition. 

Appellant presents 11 issues for our review:

1. [Did the trial court possess jurisdiction in this case?

2. Did the prosecution of Appellant violate his right to equal 

protection?

3. Was Appellant entitled to have the charges dismissed because 

the Commonwealth violated Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 600?

4. Did the Commonwealth’s discovery violation warrant dismissal of 

all charges?

5. Was the evidence at trial sufficient to find Appellant guilty?

6. Did the violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 646 

prejudice Appellant?

7. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s discovery request 

relating to Officer Popovich’s personnel file?

8. Did the trial court err by not suppressing Appellant’s 

confessions? 

9. Did the trial court err by not suppressing Appellant’s bags?

10. Did the trial court err by granting the Commonwealth’s motion 

 in limine?

11. Was the verdict against the weight of the evidence]?
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Appellant’s Brief at vi.10

Prior to addressing the merits of this appeal, we must first determine if 

we have jurisdiction. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 114 A.3d 1, 6 (Pa. 

Super. 2015) (citation omitted) (“[W]e may sua sponte consider whether we 

have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the claims presented.”). “As a 

general rule, this Court has jurisdiction only over appeals taken from final 

orders.” Angelichio v. Myers, 110 A.3d 1046, 1048 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citation omitted). Typically, in criminal cases only judgments of sentence 

are final appealable orders. Commonwealth v. Heilman, 876 A.2d 1021, 

1026 (Pa. Super. 2005). The judgment of sentence in case 3366 was 

vacated. Therefore, as to Appellant, no final order has been entered in case 

3366. We therefore quash this appeal insomuch as Appellant challenges the 

trial court’s orders in case 3366. 

We next turn to the merits of Appellant’s appeal as it relates to case 

3248. In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction over this case. “Issues pertaining to jurisdiction are pure 

questions of law, and an appellate court's scope of review is plenary. 

Questions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review.” In re J.A., 

107 A.3d 799, 813 n.15 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). “Jurisdiction 

relates to the court’s power to hear and decide the controversy presented. 

All courts of common pleas have statewide subject matter jurisdiction in 

 

10 We have re-numbered the issues for ease of disposition. 
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cases arising under the Crimes Code.” Commonwealth v. Gross, 101 A.3d 

28, 32 (Pa. 2014) (internal citation, quotation marks, and alteration 

omitted). In this case, the burglary occurred in Lehigh County, which is in 

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Therefore, all courts of common pleas 

in the Commonwealth, including the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh 

County, possessed jurisdiction over this case.

Appellant essentially argues that he is a “sovereign citizen” and, 

therefore, is not subject to the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 

Cf. Charles E. Loesser, From Paper Terrorists to Cop Killers: The Sovereign 

Citizen Threat, 93 N.C. L. Rev. 1106, 1120-1125 (2015) (describing the 

beliefs held by sovereign citizens). Courts in this Commonwealth and across 

the nation have rejected such sovereign citizen claims. Moyer v. Zoning 

Hearing Bd. of W. Pottsgrove Tp., 2010 WL 9517394, *18–19 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. July 8, 2010); see United States v. Himmelreich, 481 F. App’x 

39, 40 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam), citing United States v. Benabe, 

654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011); Charlotte v. Hanson, 433 F. App’x 660, 

661 (10th Cir. 2011). We agree with these courts that such sovereign 

citizen claims are frivolous. 

In his second issue, Appellant argues that his prosecution violated the 

equal protection clause of the United States constitution because neither he 

nor his ancestors consented to the Pennsylvania constitution. As this 

presents a pure question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our 
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scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Atwell, 785 A.2d 123, 

125 (Pa. Super. 2001). Appellant argues that his prosecution violates the 

equal protection clause for the same reason that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction over his case, i.e., neither he nor his ancestors consented to the 

Pennsylvania constitution. As noted above, such sovereign citizen 

arguments are wholly frivolous. Accordingly, Appellant’s prosecution does 

not violate the equal protection clause. 

In his third issue, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth violated 

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600. Rule 600 provides, in 

pertinent part:

(A) . . . . (3) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is 

filed against the defendant, when the defendant is at liberty on 

bail, shall commence no later than 365 days from the date on 

which the complaint is filed. 

* * *

(C) In determining the period for commencement of trial, there 

shall be excluded therefrom

* * *

(3) such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as 

results from:

(a) the unavailability of the defendant or the defendant's 

attorney;

(b) any continuance granted at the request of the defendant or 

the defendant's attorney.

* * *
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(G) For defendants on bail after the expiration of 365 days, at 

any time before trial, the defendant or the defendant’s attorney 

may apply to the court for an order dismissing the charges with 

prejudice on the ground that this rule has been violated. A copy 

of such motion shall be served upon the attorney for the 

Commonwealth, who shall also have the right to be heard 

thereon.

If the court, upon hearing, shall determine that the 

Commonwealth exercised due diligence and that the 

circumstances occasioning the postponement were beyond the 

control of the Commonwealth, the motion to dismiss shall be 

denied and the case shall be listed for trial on a date certain. . . . 

If, at any time, it is determined that the Commonwealth did not 

exercise due diligence, the court shall dismiss the charges and 

discharge the defendant.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.11

As we have stated:

In evaluating Rule 600 issues, our standard of review of a trial 

court’s decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion. 

Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon 

facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing 

and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an 

error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is 

overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill 

will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is 

abused.

The proper scope of review is limited to the evidence on the 

record of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the findings of 

the trial court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing party.

 

11 Rule 600 was rescinded on October 1, 2012 and a new Rule 600 was 

promulgated. As both complaints were filed prior to October 1, 2012, this 

case is governed by the former Rule 600. 
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Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 A.3d 478, 486–487 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(internal alterations, ellipses, and citation omitted). 

Although we review the trial court’s determinations as to whether a 

period is excludable time, excusable delay, or attributable to the 

Commonwealth for an abuse of discretion, we review all questions of law, 

including the application of Rule 600, de novo. Cf. Commonwealth v. 

Dixon, 907 A.2d 468, 472 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted) (whether a 

defendant is entitled to release under Rule 600 is a question of law reviewed 

de novo). Our scope of review on such questions of law is plenary. See id. 

This Court has explained:

To summarize, the courts of this Commonwealth employ three 

steps in determining whether Rule 600 requires dismissal of 

charges against a defendant. First, Rule 600(A) provides the 

mechanical run date. Second, we determine whether any 

excludable time exists pursuant to Rule 600(C). We add the 

amount of excludable time, if any, to the mechanical run date to 

arrive at an adjusted run date.

If the trial takes place after the adjusted run date, we apply the 

due diligence analysis set forth in Rule 600. As we have 

explained, Rule 600 encompasses a wide variety of 

circumstances under which a period of delay was outside the 

control of the Commonwealth and not the result of the 

Commonwealth’s lack of diligence. Any such period of delay 

results in an extension of the run date. Addition of any Rule 600 

extensions to the adjusted run date produces the final Rule 600 

run date. If the Commonwealth does not bring the defendant to 

trial on or before the final run date, the trial court must dismiss 

the charges.

Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 74 A.3d 228, 236 (Pa. Super. 2013), aff’d, 

107 A.3d 735 (Pa. 2014) (per curiam) (citation and ellipsis omitted). 
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In this case, the mechanical run date was June 27, 2013. On 

December 3, 2012, Appellant filed his omnibus pre-trial motion. On June 

26, 2013, the trial court ruled on that pretrial motion. When “delay in the 

commencement of trial is caused by the filing of the pretrial motion,” that 

time is excludable. Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1190 (Pa. 

Super. 2005), appeal denied, 890 A.2d 1057 (Pa. 2005 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). In this case, the delay in Appellant’s trial was 

attributable to his pre-trial motion. Thus, at a minimum, the adjusted run 

date was January 18, 2014.12 Appellant’s trial commenced well before that 

date. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied his Rule 600 motion. 

In his fourth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court should have 

dismissed the charges because of the Commonwealth’s discovery violations. 

As it relates to case 3248, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth 

committed two discovery violations. First, he argues that the 

Commonwealth failed to furnish a police report that was read to him during 

his confession. Second, he argues that videotapes from city cameras were 

not furnished to him. 

We review a trial court’s order relating to a discovery violation for an 

abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Burke, 781 A.2d 1136, 1146 

(Pa. 2001). “[W]here there is no evidence of deliberate, bad faith 

 

12 The Commonwealth argues that other time was also excludable. We need 

not address those time periods, however, because even if they were not 

excludable Appellant was still tried before the adjusted run date. 
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overreaching by the prosecutor intended to provoke the defendant into 

seeking a mistrial or to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, the proper 

remedy for the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose exculpatory materials 

should be less severe than dismissal.” Id.

In this case, there was no discovery violation warranting dismissal. As 

to the police report, the Commonwealth did produce the report in an 

untimely manner; however, there is no evidence of deliberate bad faith on 

the part of the Commonwealth. As soon as the Commonwealth realized the 

report was in its possession, it turned the report over to Appellant. This 

occurred six weeks prior to trial. As to the videotapes from city cameras, 

Appellant concedes that he was able to view the videos with his standby 

counsel in the district attorney’s office. Appellant’s Brief at 10. This 

accommodation was made because Appellant was having difficulty viewing 

the videos with the equipment provided in jail. As Appellant was provided 

the report and videos at least six weeks prior to trial, Appellant is also 

unable to prove any prejudice that resulted from delayed production of the 

materials. Accordingly, the Commonwealth did not violate the trial court’s 

discovery orders and Appellant was not entitled to dismissal of these 

charges. 

In his fifth issue, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

find him guilty. “Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is 

a question of law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review 
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is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 792 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (citation omitted). In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, 

we must determine whether “viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, there is 

sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 

A.3d 711, 716 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal alteration and citation omitted). 

“The evidence does not need to disprove every possibility of innocence, and 

doubts as to guilt, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the

evidence are for the fact-finder to decide.” Commonwealth v. Forrey, 108 

A.3d 895, 897 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

Appellant makes two arguments related to the sufficiency of the 

evidence. First, he argues that Negron would have been unable to see him 

because of the layout of her house. This argument is without merit. Negron 

testified that she saw Appellant fleeing her residence with the laptop. There 

was no physical evidence to contradict her testimony and Appellant 

presented no expert testimony that it would have been physically impossible 

for her to see Appellant given the layout of her residence. Appellant’s 

arguments to the contrary go to the weight of the evidence and not its 

sufficiency. Thus, there was sufficient evidence that Appellant burglarized 

Negron’s residence. 
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Second, Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence 

regarding the value of the laptop for purposes of grading the receiving stolen 

property offense. This argument is waived. “[T]o preserve a claim that the 

evidence was insufficient, [an appellant’s concise] statement needs to 

specify the element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient.” 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008). In 

his concise statement, Appellant merely alleged that “[t]he evidence was not 

sufficient to support the verdict on all the charges in both cases[.]” Concise 

Statement, 7/25/14. Appellant did not specify in his concise statement that 

there was insufficient evidence regarding the valuation for the receiving 

stolen property conviction in case 3248. The trial court did not address that 

element in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. As this deficiency has hampered our 

review of Appellant’s claim, we find Appellant’s argument waived. See

Commonwealth v. Orie Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 42 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). 

In his sixth issue, which the trial court described as the crux of this 

appeal, Appellant argues that he was prejudiced by the jury having access to 

his videotaped confession in the jury room in violation of Pennsylvania Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 646. As noted above, the trial court granted Appellant 

relief with respect to this claim as it relates to case 3366. The trial court 

vacated his judgment of sentence in that case and ordered a new trial. The 

trial court determined, however, that the error did not prejudice Appellant as 
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it relates to case 3248. Therefore it denied Appellant relief with respect to 

that case. 

We conclude that Appellant has waived this issue. “Issues not raised 

in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on 

appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). “Rule 302(a) has [never] been interpreted as 

meaning that issues may be raised at any time during the lower court 

proceedings in order to preserve them. Rather, it is axiomatic that issues 

are preserved when objections are made timely to the error or offense.” 

Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 960 A.2d 59, 73 (Pa. 2008).

In this case, Appellant did not object to the confession going back with 

the jury. See N.T., 11/21/13 v.2, at 4-8.13 Instead, when the jury 

requested to view the confession, the trial court sought suggestions on how 

to accommodate the request. After some discussion between the jury 

foreman, the trial court, the Commonwealth, and Appellant’s counsel, the 

DVD of the confession was sent back with the jury to view on a laptop. 

When this occurred, the trial court asked if there were any objection. 

Defense counsel responded “No[.]”14 Id. at 8. 

 

13 The notes of testimony for November 21, 2013 are divided into two 

volumes. We refer to volume 2 as that volume which includes the trial court 

adjourning at 10:19 p.m. 

14 We note that counsel’s failure to object to the confession going back with 

the jury raises a colorable claim of ineffectiveness because, during 

Appellant’s confession in case 3366, he referenced case 3248. However, we 

leave that issue for post-conviction proceedings.
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Like the trial court, we are unaware of any cases in which this Court or 

our Supreme Court found that a defendant waived a Rule 646(C)(2) claim.15 

See Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/14, at 6. We find instructive, however, this 

Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Morton, 774 A.2d 750 (Pa. Super. 

2001), appeal denied, 788 A.2d 374 (Pa. 2001). In Morton, this Court, 

prior to reaching the defendant’s Rule 1114 (later renumbered Rule 646) 

issue, emphasized that the appellant had objected prior to the confession 

being sent back with the jury. Id. at 752. This indicates that an objection 

must be made prior to the confession going out with the jury in order for the 

issue to be preserved. 

We also find instructive the case cited by the trial court in its opinion. 

The trial court, when determining it had erred by sending Appellant’s 

confession back with the jury, cited Commonwealth v. Young, 767 A.2d 

1072 (Pa. Super 2001). See Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/15, at 5. In Young, 

a defendant’s written confession was sent back with the jury without 

objection by the defendant. The defendant thereafter filed a post-sentence 

motion and the trial court granted a new trial. This Court affirmed. Young, 

767 A.2d at 1076. This Court did not affirm, however, because of the trial 

court’s error in sending the written confession out with the jury. Instead, 

this Court affirmed because the defendant’s counsel was ineffective in failing 

 

15 Rule 646(c)(2) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, 

“(c) during deliberations, the jury shall not be permitted to have...(2) a copy 

of any written or otherwise recorded confession by the defendant.”
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to object to the confession going back with the jury.16 Id. This indicates 

that, in order to preserve the issue for a direct appeal, a defendant is 

required to object before the confession goes back with the jury. 

To the extent the trial court believes Appellant preserved this issue 

because he did not affirmatively consent to the confession going back with 

the jury, see Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/14, at 6, we disagree. This 

misconstrues Rule 302. Under Rule 302, waiver may be found whenever 

there has been a failure to place a timely and specific objection on the 

record. For example, if hearsay is wrongly admitted at trial, a litigant must 

raise a timely objection in order to preserve appellate review of that issue. 

Even in the absence of affirmative consent, a litigant waives his appellate 

challenge if he fails to raise an objection to the admission of the hearsay 

statement. Lower Makefield Tp. v. Lands of Chester Dalgewicz, 67 

A.3d 772, 776-777 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). The same is true with 

respect to a confession going back with the jury in violation of Rule 

646(C)(2). The defendant is required to make a timely objection, i.e., an 

objection prior to the confession being sent back with the jury. In this case, 

Appellant failed to make such an objection. Therefore, Appellant’s sixth 

issue on appeal is waived. 

 

16 Young was decided prior to Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 

(Pa. 2002), in which our Supreme Court held that ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims could not be raised on direct appeal. 
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In his seventh issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by 

denying him access to Officer Popovich’s personnel file. We conclude that 

this issue is waived as it relates to case 3248, the only appeal over which we 

have jurisdiction. In his brief, Appellant only argues that Officer Popovich’s 

credibility was important in case 3366. See Appellant’s Brief at 14. He 

makes no argument as to how Officer Popovich’s credibility was important as 

to case 3248. Therefore, Appellant waived this issue as it relates to case 

3248. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101, 2119(a).

Furthermore, even if we reached the merits of this issue we would 

conclude that it is without merit. We review a trial court’s denial of a 

defendant’s requested discovery for an abuse of discretion. Orie Melvin, 

103 A.3d at 34–35 (citation omitted). Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 573 provides, in relevant part: 

[I]f the defendant files a motion for pretrial discovery, the court 

may order the Commonwealth to allow the defendant’s attorney 

to inspect and copy or photograph any of the following requested 

items, upon a showing that they are material to the preparation 

of the defense, and that the request is reasonable . . . any other 

evidence specifically identified by the defendant, provided the 

defendant can additionally establish that its disclosure would be 

in the interests of justice.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(A)(2)(a)(iv). A defendant is not entitled to wholesale 

inspection of a police officer’s personnel file. Commonwealth v. MejiaArias, 734 A.2d 870, 876 (Pa. Super. 1999). Instead, in order to examine a 

police officer’s personnel file, a defendant is required to demonstrate a 
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reasonable basis for his request which is likely to produce admissible 

evidence. See id. 

Appellant argues that Officer Popovich was demoted from detective to 

officer during the pendency of these charges. He argues that Officer 

Popovich’s personnel file may reveal the reasons for the demotion. 

Appellant contends that Officer Popovich’s demotion could be related to 

illegal interrogation tactics, similar to those Appellant argues that Officer 

Popovich used in the case sub judice. 

In denying Appellant’s request, the trial court found that Appellant 

failed to present any evidence that Officer Popovich was demoted from 

detective to police officer. Trial Court Opinion, 6/26/13, at 8. We conclude 

that this finding is not supported by the record. At the suppression hearing, 

Officer Popovich testified that he was a detective at the time he interviewed 

Appellant but was a patrol officer at the time of the suppression hearing. 

N.T., 3/28/13, at 66-67. Thus, Appellant did present evidence that Officer 

Popovich was demoted from detective to patrol officer. 

The trial court, however, found that even if Officer Popovich were 

demoted, Appellant failed to provide any evidence that Officer Popovich was 

demoted for conduct related to interrogations, i.e., anything that would be 

relevant. See id. We ascertain no abuse of discretion on the part of the 

trial court in reaching this alternative holding. On appeal, Appellant points 

to no evidence that connects Officer Popovich’s demotion to the conduct of 
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the interrogation. Thus, even if we reached the merits of this issue, we 

would conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief. 

In his eighth and ninth issues, Appellant argues that the trial court 

erred in denying his motion to suppress. He argues that his confessions 

should have been suppressed because the police officers interrogating him 

offered leniency in return for his confessions. Appellant further argues that 

the trial court erred in not suppressing the contents of his bags. He argues 

that police lacked probable cause to pursue him and that his abandonment 

of the bags was forced. 

Our “standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a 

suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s 

factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. 

Garibay, 106 A.3d 136, 138 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “[O]ur 

scope of review is limited to the factual findings and legal conclusions of the 

suppression court.” In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1080 (Pa. 2013) (citation 

omitted). “We may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence and so 

much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read 

in the context of the record as a whole.” Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 

102, 106 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). “Once a defendant files a motion to 

suppress, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving that the evidence in 

question was lawfully obtained without violating the defendant’s rights.” 
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Commonwealth v. Fleet, 114 A.3d 840, 844 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation 

omitted). 

We first consider whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s 

suppression motion as it relates to his confessions. As noted above, we lack 

jurisdiction to consider the suppression of the confession in case 3366. 

Thus, we focus on the confession in case 3248. “A confession obtained 

during a custodial interrogation is admissible where the accused’s right to 

remain silent and right to counsel have been explained and the accused has 

knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights.” Commonwealth v. 

Harrell, 65 A.3d 420, 433 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 

785 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). “When a court is called upon to determine 

whether a confession is voluntary and, hence, admissible at trial, it examines 

the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession to ascertain 

whether it is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by 

its maker.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 85 A.3d 530, 537 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted). “The question of voluntariness is not whether the 

defendant would have confessed without interrogation, but whether the 

interrogation was so manipulative or coercive that it deprived the defendant 

of his ability to make a free and unconstrained decision to confess.” 

Commonwealth v. Ogrod, 839 A.2d 294, 320 (Pa. 2003) (citation 

omitted). Among the factors we consider when assessing the totality of the 

circumstances are “the duration and means of the interrogation; the physical 
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and psychological state of the accused; the conditions attendant to the 

detention; the attitude of the interrogator; and any and all other factors that 

could drain a person’s ability to withstand suggestion and coercion.” 

Commonwealth v. Templin, 795 A.2d 959, 966 (Pa. 2002). “Promises of 

benefits or special considerations, however benign in intent, comprise the 

sort of persuasions and trickery which easily can mislead suspects into 

giving confessions.” Commonwealth v. Morgan, 606 A.2d 467, 469 (Pa. 

Super. 1992), aff’d, 652 A.2d 295 (Pa. 1994) (citation omitted). 

We have carefully reviewed the videotaped confession, other exhibits 

entered into evidence at the suppression hearing, and the notes of testimony 

from the suppression hearing. After reviewing those materials, we conclude 

that Appellant’s confession was voluntary. Detective Hackman begin the 

interview by informing Appellant that he could not make any promises. He 

also informed Appellant that he was under arrest. Detective Hackman 

proceeded to inform Appellant of his right to remain silent, his right to speak 

with an attorney, his right to have an attorney present, and his right to stop 

the interview at any time. Appellant then signed an “Advice of Rights” form 

which outlined these rights. Suppression Hearing Exhibit 1. Detective 

Hackman informed Appellant that the district attorney appreciates full 

cooperation and truthfulness. The interrogation then continued and 

Appellant eventually confessed to stealing Negron’s laptop. 
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Based upon this review of the confession, all of the Templin factors 

weigh in favor of finding Appellant’s confession voluntary. The interrogation 

was relatively short, approximately 25 minutes in length. There were no 

other police officers in the room except Detective Hackman. Appellant was 

not in handcuffs. Appellant informed Detective Hackman that he was in 

good physical and mental shape. The interrogation occurred in a normal 

sized room with a table, four chairs, and a telephone. Furthermore, 

Detective Hackman and Appellant had a previous relationship as Detective 

Hackman was investigating a crime in which Appellant was the victim. 

Detective Hackman did inform Appellant that the district attorney 

appreciates full cooperation. This statement, however, is not an offer of 

leniency in exchange for Appellant’s confession. Instead, this type of 

statement is permitted in Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v. Nester, 709 

A.2d 879, 884 (Pa. 1998) (citations omitted) (“Encouraging a suspect to 

cooperate with the investigation and answer questions honestly is a 

permissible interrogation tactic.”). Detective Hackman never promised 

leniency or special benefits. Instead, he informed Appellant that he “can’t 

make any promises.” Suppression Hearing Exhibit 2, at 1:50:20-1:50:30.17 

Accordingly, after considering the totality of the circumstances, we agree 

with the trial court that Appellant’s confession was voluntary. 

 

17 We cite to the time stamp appearing on Appellant’s videotaped confession. 
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We thus turn to Appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in not 

suppressing the bags he abandoned. Specifically, Appellant argues that 

Officer Mancini lacked probable cause to pursue him. Thus, according to 

Appellant, his abandonment of the bags was forced. Appellant contends that 

he maintained a privacy interest in the abandoned bags and the police 

search of the bags was unconstitutional. The Commonwealth argues that 

Officer Mancini possessed reasonable suspicion to pursue Appellant. 

Consequently, the Commonwealth maintains, Appellant’s forced 

abandonment claim must fail. 

“Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 

Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect citizens from 

unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 103 

A.3d 115, 118 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “To safeguard these 

rights, courts require police to articulate the basis for their interaction with 

citizens in three increasingly intrusive situations.” Commonwealth v. 

Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal alterations, 

quotation marks, and citation omitted). 

The first of these is a mere encounter (or request for 

information) which need not be supported by any level of 

suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to 

respond. The second, an investigative detention must be 

supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a 

stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such 

coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of 

an arrest. Finally, an arrest or custodial detention must be 

supported by probable cause. 
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Commonwealth v. Ranson, 103 A.3d 73, 76-77 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal 

denied, 117 A.3d 296 (Pa. 2015) (internal alteration, quotation marks, and 

citation omitted). 

“It is axiomatic that a defendant has no standing to contest the search 

and seizure of items which he has voluntarily abandoned.” Commonwealth 

v. Byrd, 987 A.2d 786, 790 (Pa. Super. 2009). “Abandonment can be 

established where an individual’s surrender of possession of the property 

constitutes such a relinquishment of interest in the property that a 

reasonable expectation of privacy may no longer be asserted.” 

Commonwealth v. Clark, 746 A.2d 1128, 1134 (Pa. Super. 2000), appeal 

denied, 764 A.2d 1064 (Pa. 2000) (internal alteration and citation omitted). 

“Although abandoned property may normally be obtained and used for 

evidentiary purposes by the police, such property may not be utilized where 

the abandonment is coerced by unlawful police action.” Commonwealth v. 

Tillman, 621 A.2d 148, 150 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citation omitted).

In this case, Officer Mancini testified that he exited his patrol vehicle 

and asked Appellant if he could speak with him. It is well-settled that a 

police officer may approach an individual in public and ask to speak to him 

or her without raising the interaction from a mere encounter to an 

investigative detention a custodial detention. Commonwealth v. Guess, 

53 A.3d 895, 901 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 67 A.3d 794 (Pa. 

2013); Commonwealth v. Au, 42 A.3d 1002, 1007 (Pa. 2012); 
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Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111, 1116-1117 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

Thus, when Officer Mancini asked to speak with Appellant, their interaction 

was a mere encounter.

Upon hearing Officer Mancini’s request, Appellant immediately begin 

sprinting away from Officer Mancini. At this point, Officer Mancini gave 

chase. As soon as Officer Mancini gave chase, the encounter escalated to an 

investigative detention. See Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769, 

771–776 (Pa. 1996). Thus, we turn to whether there was reasonable 

suspicion for Officer Mancini’s pursuit. 

As this Court has explained: 

Reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than probable 

cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest, and depends 

on the information possessed by police and its degree of 

reliability in the totality of the circumstances. . . . In assessing 

the totality of the circumstances, courts must also afford due 

weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn from the 

facts in light of the officer’s experience and acknowledge that 

innocent facts, when considered collectively, may permit the 

investigative detention.

The determination of whether an officer had reasonable 

suspicion . . . is an objective one, which must be considered in 

light of the totality of the circumstances. 

Clemens, 66 A.3d at 379 (ellipsis and citation omitted). 

Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that 

reasonable suspicion existed for Officer Mancini’s pursuit of Appellant. 

Officer Mancini received a radio call that a burglary just occurred. A fellow 

police officer informed Officer Mancini of the direction the suspect was last 
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seen running. Officer Mancini was informed that the suspect was an AfricanAmerican male wearing black shorts and a white t-shirt. Officer Mancini also 

knew the burglar stole a laptop computer. Officer Mancini then spotted 

Appellant (an African-American male) wearing a gray t-shirt, black shorts, 

and carrying a laptop computer bag. Officer Mancini therefore exited his 

vehicle and asked if he could speak with Appellant. It was at this time that 

Appellant sprinted away from Officer Mancini and the foot pursuit began. 

Appellant makes two main arguments as to why this information did 

not constitute reasonable suspicion. First, he argues that he was walking, 

and not running. This, however, is insufficient to overcome the substantial 

circumstantial evidence Officer Mancini possessed. The fact that Appellant 

challenges the characterization of his pace does not mean that he did not fit 

the description of the suspect. Second, Appellant argues that because he 

was wearing a gray t-shirt, and not a white t-shirt, he did not match the 

suspect’s description. White and gray, however, can easily be confused with 

each other. When evaluating the totality of the suspect’s description, it is 

evident that Appellant sufficiently matched the description of the suspect to 

give Officer Mancini reasonable suspicion once Appellant fled for no apparent 

reason. Furthermore, Officer Mancini testified at the suppression hearing 

that, in his experience, it was not uncommon for suspects to change shirts 

after committing a crime. Therefore, we conclude that reasonable suspicion 

existed for Officer Mancini’s pursuit of Appellant. Thus, Appellant’s 
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abandonment of his bags was not forced. Accordingly, Appellant did not 

have a privacy interest in the bags and the trial court properly denied his 

motion to suppress. 

In his tenth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by 

granting the Commonwealth’s motion in limine. He argues that he should 

have been able to cross-examine Officer Popovich regarding his demotion. 

He further argues that he should have been able to present evidence and 

argument relating to the Commonwealth’s alleged discovery violations. 

“When reviewing a ruling on a motion in limine, we apply an evidentiary 

abuse of discretion standard of review. The admission of evidence is 

committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and our review is for an 

abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Parker, 104 A.3d 17, 21 (Pa. 

Super. 2014), appeal denied, 117 A.3d 296 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). 

“[A] police witness [may] be cross-examined about misconduct as 

long as the wrongdoing is in some way related to the defendant’s underlying 

criminal charges and establishes a motive to fabricate.” Commonwealth v. 

Bozyk, 987 A.2d 753, 757 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations omitted). “However, 

if the prior police behavior is unrelated to the present matter and irrelevant, 

the trial court is permitted to restrict questioning on the prior incident.” Id.

(citations omitted).

In this case, Appellant presented no evidence as to how Officer 

Popovich’s alleged demotion was related to his case. He presents two 
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theories as to how Officer Popovich’s alleged demotion was related to his 

case. First, he argues that Officer Popovich was demoted because of 

inadequate job performance. Appellant has no evidence to support this 

claim. 

Appellant also argues that Officer Popovich’s demotion may have 

shown a pattern of lying which would go to his credibility. Appellant offered 

no proof of this claim. Moreover, Appellant’s generalized claim has been 

previously rejected. See id. at 758; Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 846 

A.2d 75, 96 (Pa. 2004) (collateral matters are irrelevant and inadmissible on 

cross-examination). The same is true in this case. Officer Popovich’s 

demotion was collateral to the issues in this case. Accordingly, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Appellant’s cross-examination of 

Officer Popovich. 

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in barring evidence 

regarding alleged discovery violations. As noted above, however, the trial 

court ruled (and we affirm today) that no discovery violations occurred. As 

such, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

prohibiting Appellant from presenting evidence relating to the alleged 

discovery violations. 

Finally, Appellant contends that the conviction is against the weight of 

the evidence. A challenge to the weight of the evidence must first be raised 

at the trial level “(1) orally, on the record, at any time before sentencing; 
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(2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or (3) in a postsentence motion.” In re J.B., 106 A.3d 76, 97 (Pa. 2014) (citation 

omitted). Appellant properly preserved his weight of the evidence claim by 

raising the issue in his post-sentence motion. 

“[A] new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is only 

warranted where the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it 

shocks one’s sense of justice.” Tejada, 107 A.3d at 795–796 (internal 

alteration and citation omitted). “[W]e do not reach the underlying question 

of whether the verdict was, in fact, against the weight of the evidence. . . . 

Instead, this Court determines whether the trial court abused its discretion 

in reaching whatever decision it made on the motion[.]” Commonwealth 

v. Ferguson, 107 A.3d 206, 213 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

When ruling on Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim, the trial court 

concluded, “The verdict in this case does not shock one's sense of justice. 

The jury evidently considered and weighed all the evidence presented, 

determined witness credibility, and found that the Commonwealth met its 

burden. The jury’s verdict is adequately supported by the credible evidence 

presented at trial[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/14, at 8. We ascertain no 

abuse of discretion in this determination. Appellant confessed to stealing 

Negron’s laptop. His explanation for the theft during his confession, that he 

stole it from the stairs of her back porch, was nonsensical. Negron’s 

description of the events, on the other hand, made sense and was consistent 
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with the physical evidence. Accordingly, we will not disturb the trial court’s 

ruling on Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim. 

In sum, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over the claims related 

to case 3366 as no final appealable order has been entered as to those 

claims. As to case 3248, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief 

on any of his claims. Accordingly, we quash in part and affirm in part. 

Appeal quashed as to case 3366. Judgment of sentence affirmed in 

case 3248. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/7/2015