Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons and 

Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 

DEMETRIUS COVIL OPINION BY 

 SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 

 v. Record No. 040036 November 5, 2004 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 This appeal involves the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the grand larceny conviction of a person found in 

possession of recently stolen property who was known not to be 

the original thief. Pursuant to familiar principles, the 

evidence will be summarized in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial. 

 On April 8, 2002, Tanya M. Bray rented a red Oldsmobile 

Alero from a car rental company in Virginia Beach. On the 14th 

of that month, she left her workplace in Portsmouth at 

approximately 7:30 a.m., entered the rental car and started 

the engine. A man unknown to her approached the car and took 

it from her at gunpoint. 

 Two days later, at 6:10 p.m., Detective T. McAndrew of 

the Portsmouth police was on routine patrol when he saw 

Demetrius Covil, whom he knew from previous encounters, 

driving a red Alero eastbound on Duke Street. Knowing that 

Covil’s driver’s permit was suspended, McAndrew followed him. 

Covil made a right turn and then stopped voluntarily. Learning 
2

that the Alero had been reported stolen, McAndrew arrested 

Covil and charged him with grand larceny of the vehicle. 

Covil was subsequently indicted for that offense under Code 

§ 18.2-95, tried at a bench trial, and was convicted. 

 Tanya Bray was unable to identify the original thief from 

a photo lineup that included Covil’s picture and testified at 

trial that Covil “doesn’t look like him”. She stated on crossexamination that she had never seen Covil before. In oral 

argument at the bar of this Court, the Attorney General 

conceded that Covil was not the person who took the Alero from 

Tanya Bray on April 14th. 

 Covil, a convicted felon, testified at trial that he had 

asked a friend of his mother to find him a rental car in which 

he and his girlfriend could drive to King’s Dominion “on 

Saturday.” As a result of this contact, he testified, two men 

unknown to him came up to him and gave him the keys to the 

Alero in exchange for $50.00. He further testified that he did 

not know the way to King’s Dominion, but was relying on 

another friend, named “Twin,” who was “locked up” at the time 

of trial, to drive him there. Covil did not give the date of 

this transaction, but April 16, 2002, the date on which he was 

arrested in possession of the stolen car, fell on a Tuesday. 

 At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found 

Covil’s testimony incredible, stating, “I just don’t believe 
3

his story. I think it’s got too many holes in it”. Covil was 

convicted of grand larceny and sentenced to one year and seven 

months incarceration. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished 

opinion, affirmed the conviction. 

 For well over a century, Virginia law has made the crime 

of receiving stolen goods a species of larceny. Code § 18.2-

108, like its statutory predecessors, provides: 

If any person buy or receive from another person, or aid 

in concealing, any stolen goods or other thing, knowing 

the same to have been stolen, he shall be deemed guilty 

of larceny thereof, and may be proceeded against, 

although the principal offender be not convicted. 

 We have therefore long held that a person indicted for 

simple larceny may be tried, convicted and punished for that 

offense merely upon proof that property was stolen by some 

other person and received by the accused, knowing it to have 

been stolen. Stapleton v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 475, 488, 124 

S.E. 237, 241 (1924); Price v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 

Gratt.) 846, 853 (1872).*

 In the present case, it is undisputed 

that the property was stolen by another person, that its value 

was sufficient to meet the requirements of grand larceny under 

Code § 18.2-95, and that Covil received the property and had 

 *

 Formerly, Code § 18.2-111 contained a provision 

permitting the accused to demand from the Commonwealth a 

written statement specifying the particular statute upon which 

the prosecution would rely in seeking a conviction of larceny. 

That provision was deleted by 1994 Acts, Ch. 555. 
4

it in his exclusive possession on the second day after the 

theft. Thus, the dispositive question is whether the 

Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to support a finding of 

guilty knowledge on Covil’s part. Stated differently, if the 

case were tried to a jury, would the evidence have been 

sufficient to submit to the jury the factual issue whether 

Covil knew the car was stolen property? 

 In Roberts v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 264, 270, 337 S.E.2d 

255, 259 (1985), we said: 

 It is true, of course, that an essential element of the 

offense of receiving stolen property is guilty knowledge. 

It is also true that no witness testified directly that 

the defendant knew the property in question was stolen. 

But the element of guilty knowledge may be supplied by 

circumstantial evidence, including the circumstance that 

the accused was in possession of recently stolen 

property. 

(Citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

 Another circumstance proper for consideration by the 

trier of fact is the explanation, or lack of it, given by the 

accused. Because proof of possession of recently stolen goods 

establishes a prima facie case that the defendant received 

them with guilty knowledge, the burden is cast upon him to go 

forward with evidence in explanation. Roberts, 230 Va. at 271, 

337 S.E.2d at 260. 

 Covil was not, of course, required to testify but he 

voluntarily did so and gave an account that the trier of fact 
5

rejected as inherently incredible. The inference of guilty 

knowledge arising from an accused’s possession of recently 

stolen property may be repelled by a credible explanation, but 

the trier of fact is under no obligation to accept an account 

it finds unworthy of belief. In cases of this kind, when a 

defendant’s “hypothesis of innocence” is rejected as 

unreasonable, evidence of his possession of recently stolen 

goods is sufficient to support a conviction. Roberts, 230 Va. 

at 272, 337 S.E.2d at 260; Westcott v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 

123, 127, 216 S.E.2d 60, 64 (1975). Further, a fact-finder, 

having rejected a defendant’s attempted explanation as untrue, 

may draw the reasonable inference that his explanation was 

made falsely in an effort to conceal his guilt. Emmett v. 

Commonwealth, 264 Va. 364, 372, 569 S.E.2d 39, 45 (2002), 

cert. denied, 538 U.S. 929 (2003); Carter v. Commonwealth, 223 

Va. 528, 532, 290 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1982); Toler v. 

Commonwealth, 188 Va. 774, 782, 51 S.E.2d 210, 214 (1949). A 

false or evasive account is a circumstance, similar to flight 

from a crime scene, that a fact-finder may properly consider 

as evidence of guilty knowledge. 

 Because these circumstances were properly considered by 

the trial court and were sufficient to support the conviction, 

we will affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 

Affirmed.