FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES,

Review Board and The Department

C. RICHARD MARTIN of Workforce Development

Martin & Martin

Boonville, Indiana GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Attorney General of Indiana

KATHY BRADLEY

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JAMES BROXTON, )

)

Appellant, )

)

vs. ) No. 93A02-1301-EX-79

)

REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA )

DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE )

DEVELOPMENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF )

INDIANA WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, AND)

SODEXO, )

)

Appellees. )

APPEAL FROM THE REVIEW BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT

OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT

Cause No. 12-R-3680

January 9, 2014

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

BARNES, Judge
2

Case Summary

James Broxton appeals the denial of his request for unemployment benefits by the 

Review Board of the Department of Workforce Development (“Review Board”). We 

affirm.

Issues

Broxton raises five issues, which we restate as:

I. whether the Review Board properly determined that 

his employer was not required to give notice under 

Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5(c);

II. whether the Review Board properly denied 

unemployment benefits to him pursuant to Indiana 

Code Section 22-4-3-5; 

III. whether the Review Board properly determined that he

was not regularly and customarily employed on an “on 

call” or “as needed basis” under Indiana Code Section 

22-4-3-3; 

IV. whether the Review Board’s interpretation of Indiana 

Code Section 22-4-3-5 conflicts with other statutory 

provisions of the Indiana Employment Security Act 

(the “Act”), Indiana Code Article 22-4; and

V. whether the Review Board’s interpretation of Indiana 

Code Section 22-4-3-5 violates the policy behind the 

Act.

Facts

Broxton has been employed by SDH Education Service West, LLC, also known 

as Sodexo Food Services (“Sodexo”), since 2008 as a cook at St. Joseph’s College in 

Rensselaer. From August through May, Broxton works full time. During the summer 

months, he is only “on call.” Appellant’s App. p. 13. He is required to call Sodexo each 
3

Tuesday to find out if work is available. If he fails to call in, Broxton could lose his job. 

In 2012, Broxton was on call from May 7th to August 18th, but he was never called in to 

work. 

In prior summers, Broxton received unemployment insurance benefits. Broxton 

filed a claim for unemployment benefits, and on August 13, 2012, a claims deputy 

concluded that Broxton was not entitled to unemployment benefits because he “was on a 

vacation week mandated by the employer.” Id. at 20. Broxton appealed that 

determination to an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), and Sodexo did not participate in 

the appeal. After a hearing, the ALJ concluded:

Although the Claimant is on an on-call or as needed basis 

with the Employer during summer break every year, the 

period is a reduction in hours that regularly occurs as “a 

matter of practice, policy or procedure of which the Claimant 

was aware and to which the Claimant has agreed,” 646 IAC 

5-8-1 (2011). Alternatively, the time is also a scheduled 

period during which activity is suspended, or a vacation, that 

is part of the Employer’s regular policy or practice and the 

Claimant has reasonable assurance of employment when the 

period ends. The Claimant is ineligible for benefits based on 

[his] employment status with this Employer during the 

summer break period.

Id. at 38. Thus, the ALJ affirmed the claims deputy’s determination that Broxton was 

ineligible for unemployment benefits.

Broxton appealed the ALJ’s determination to the Review Board. There was no 

hearing before the Review Board, and no additional evidence was admitted. The Review 

Board adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact but struck the ALJ’s conclusions of law and 

concluded that Broxton was “not partially or part-totally unemployed” because he 
4

“agreed to perform services for the Employer during the school year,” he was aware of 

the summer break, and he “agreed to this reduction or suspension of work hours during 

scheduled breaks through continued employment with the Employer.” Appellee’s App. 

p. 2. 

The Review Board also concluded that Broxton was not entitled to benefits due to

Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5, which denies unemployment benefits to certain

employees on “a vacation week” without remuneration pursuant to a contract or regular 

policy. Although the Review Board noted that Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 was 

inapplicable if an employer “fails to comply with a department rule or policy regarding 

the filing of a notice, report, information, or claim in connection with an individual, 

group, or mass separation arising from the vacation period,” the Review Board also noted 

that the “Department currently has no rules or policies requiring employers to file a 

notice regarding a claim arising out of a vacation period, nor is the Department statutorily 

required to enact a policy on this matter.” Id. at 3 (discussing Ind. Code § 22-4-3-5(c)). 

The Review Board held that the term “vacation week” referenced “an employermandated period in which work is not performed.” Id. Further, the Review Board 

concluded that, “[b]ecause [Broxton] was on an unpaid vacation period and had 

reasonable assurance of employment following the summer break, [Broxton] was not 

totally, part-totally, or partially unemployed.” Id. at 4. 

The Review Board also concluded that Broxton was “voluntarily unemployed 

during the summer break” due to his “assent” to Sodexo’s practices. Id. at 5. Thus, the 
5

Review Board found that Broxton was not eligible for unemployment benefits. Broxton 

now appeals.

At the Review Board’s request, in May 2013, this appeal was consolidated with 

numerous other appeals raising similar issues based on the Review Board’s interpretation 

of Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5. In June 2013, after a pre-appeal conference, this 

appeal and two other appeals, D.B. v. Review Board of the Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 

No. 93A02-1301-EX-71, and Amerson v. Review Board of the Ind. Dep’t of Workforce 

Dev., No. 93A02-1301-EX-67, were designated as “test cases” and allowed to proceed. 

The remaining appeals were held in abeyance pending completion of the test cases. On 

November 5, 2013, a panel of this court affirmed the denial of unemployment benefits in 

D.B., __ N.E.2d __, No. 93A02-1301-EX-71 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2013), and on 

November 26, 2013, another panel of this court affirmed the denial of unemployment 

benefits in Amerson, No. 93A02-1301-EX-67 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013).

Analysis

Broxton argues that the Review Board erred when it denied his request for 

unemployment benefits. On appeal, we review the Review Board’s (1) determinations of 

specific or basic underlying facts; (2) conclusions or inferences from those facts, or 

determinations of ultimate facts; and (3) conclusions of law. McClain v. Review Bd. of 

Indiana Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314, 1317 (Ind. 1998). The Review 

Board’s findings of basic fact are subject to a “substantial evidence” standard of review. 

Id. In this analysis, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of 

witnesses and consider only the evidence most favorable to the Review Board’s findings. 
6

Id. Reversal is warranted only if there is no substantial evidence to support the Review 

Board’s findings. Id. (citing KBI, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dep’t of Workforce 

Dev., 656 N.E.2d 842, 846 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)). Next, the Review Board’s 

determinations of ultimate facts, which involve an inference or deduction based upon the 

findings of basic fact, are generally reviewed to ensure that the Review Board’s inference 

is reasonable. Id. at 1317-18. Finally, we review conclusions of law to determine 

whether the Review Board correctly interpreted and applied the law. McHugh v. Review 

Bd. of Indiana Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 842 N.E.2d 436, 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 

When interpreting a statute, we will give great weight to an interpretation of the

statute by an administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute, unless such 

interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute itself. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. 

Two Market Square Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 679 N.E.2d 882, 886 (Ind. 1997). This same 

rule of deference applies to agency interpretation of administrative regulations that it has 

drafted and is charged with enforcing. Id. “Deference to an agency’s interpretation of a 

statute becomes a consideration when a statute is ambiguous and susceptible of more than 

one reasonable interpretation.” South Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Lucas, 881 N.E.2d 30, 

32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). When faced with two reasonable interpretations of a statute, one 

of which is supplied by an administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute, we 

defer to the agency. Id. If we determine that an agency’s interpretation is reasonable, we 

terminate our analysis and will not address the reasonableness of the other party’s 

proposed interpretation. Id. “Terminating the analysis recognizes ‘the general policies of 

acknowledging the expertise of agencies empowered to interpret and enforce statutes and 
7

increasing public reliance on agency interpretations.’” Id. (quoting State v. Young, 855 

N.E.2d 329, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). 

I. Notice Requirement under Ind. Code § 22-4-3-5

Broxton first argues that the Review Board erred when it interpreted the notice 

provisions of Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5. That statute provides:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) and subject to 

subsection (b), an individual is not totally unemployed, 

part-totally unemployed, or partially unemployed for 

any week in which the department finds the individual:

(1) is on a vacation week; and

(2) has not received remuneration from the 

employer for that week, because of:

(A) a written contract between the employer 

and the employees; or

(B) the employer’s regular vacation policy 

and practice.

(b) Subsection (a) applies only if the department finds that 

the individual has a reasonable assurance that the 

individual will have employment available with the 

employer after the vacation period ends.

(c) Subsection (a) does not apply to an individual whose 

employer fails to comply with a department rule or 

policy regarding the filing of a notice, report, 

information, or claim in connection with an individual, 

group, or mass separation arising from the vacation 

period.
8

Ind. Code § 22-4-3-5.

1

The Department of Workforce Development (“Department”) issued a policy 

regarding Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 on February 3, 2012. See Appellant’s App. p. 

39; DWD Policy 2011-07, Planned Shutdown Effects upon Unemployment Insurance 

Benefits (“Policy”). In the Policy, the Department determined that it would consider 

several factors when deciding whether a mandated or planned facility shutdown would be

considered a vacation week. One of the factors is whether “the employer, on their own 

initiative, has provided the Department with advance notice of any vacation week or 

 

1

Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 was added in 2011 by Pub. L. No. 2-2011, § 3, effective July 1, 2011, 

and was amended by Pub. L. No. 6-2012, § 162, effective February 22, 2012. The statute previously 

provided:

(a) An individual is not totally unemployed, part-totally 

unemployed, or partially unemployed for any week in which the 

department finds the individual:

(1) is on a vacation week; and

(2) has not received remuneration from the employer for 

that week, because of:

(A) a written contract between the employer and the 

employees; or

(B) the employer’s regular vacation policy and 

practice.

(b) Subsection (a) applies only if the department finds that the 

individual has a reasonable assurance that the individual will 

have employment available with the employer after the vacation 

period ends.

(c) Subsection (a) does not apply to an individual whose employer 

fails to comply with a department rule or policy regarding the 

filing of a notice, report, information, or claim in connection 

with an individual, group, or mass separation arising from the 

vacation period.
9

shutdown period.” Appellant’s App. p. 41. The Department did not issue a rule or policy 

that required an employer to file “a notice, report, information, or claim in connection 

with an individual, group, or mass separation arising from the vacation period.” I.C. § 

22-4-3-5(c). 

On appeal, Broxton argues that the Department is “attempting to render subsection 

(c) a nullity by not requiring such notice prior to applying subsection (a).”

2

 Appellant’s 

Br. p. 8. Despite Broxton’s arguments, we conclude that subsection (c) of the statute 

does not mandate that an employer file a notice in the event of a “separation arising from 

the vacation period.” 

The relevant portion of the statute provides: “Subsection (a) does not apply to an 

individual whose employer fails to comply with a department rule or policy regarding the 

filing of a notice, report, information, or claim in connection with an individual, group, or 

mass separation arising from the vacation period.” I.C. § 22-4-3-5(c). The statute gives 

the Department discretion to create a “department rule or policy” regarding such a notice.

See also I.C. § 22-4-19-1 (“The board shall have the power and authority to adopt, 

amend, or rescind such rules and regulations . . . and take such other action as it may 

deem necessary or suitable for the proper administration of this article.”). The statute 

 

2 The Review Board argues that Broxton waived this argument by failing to raise it below. The issue of 

whether Broxton received adequate notice involves a legal, not a factual conclusion. We have previously 

declined to find waiver of an issue not raised in an administrative proceeding where resolution of the 

issue did not require any factual determinations, and required only legal conclusions. See Tokheim Corp. 

v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 440 N.E.2d 1141, 1142 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); cf. Highland 

Town Sch. Corp. v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 892 N.E.2d 652, 656 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008) (“The ALJ is not required to brainstorm about every possible legal theory that might be available to 

a pro se claimant.”). The arguments on appeal concern the interpretation of statutes, which are legal 

conclusions. Consequently, we will address Broxton’s argument on the merits.
10

does not specifically require an employer to provide such a notice. If the legislature had 

intended to require such a notice, it could have provided so in the statute. Instead, the 

statute merely requires an employer to comply with the Department’s rule or policy; it 

does not specify the content of the rule or policy. Given the Department’s substantial 

discretion, we conclude that Broxton’s argument regarding the notice provisions of 

Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5(c) fails. 

II. Denial of Benefits under Ind. Code § 22-4-3-5

Next, Broxton argues that the Review Board erred when it concluded that he was 

on a “vacation” under Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 during the summer of 2012. 

Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 disqualifies an individual from receiving unemployment 

benefits if: (1) the individual “is on a vacation week”; (2) the individual “has not received 

remuneration from the employer for that week, because of: (A) a written contract 

between the employer and the employees; or (B) the employer’s regular vacation policy 

and practice;” and (3) the Department “finds that the individual has a reasonable 

assurance that the individual will have employment available with the employer after the 

vacation period ends.” 

Broxton argues that he was not on a “vacation” during the summer of 2012. In 

support of his argument, Broxton relies on American Bridge Co. v. Review Bd. of Ind. 

Employment Sec. Division, 121 Ind. App. 576, 98 N.E.2d 193 (1951), and Indiana State 

University v. LaFief, 888 N.E.2d 184 (Ind. 2008). We do not find that either case is 

controlling here.
11

In American Bridge, this court held that employees subject to a company 

shutdown for the purpose of taking inventory were entitled to unemployment benefits. 

American Bridge, 121 Ind. App. at 578-84, 98 N.E.2d at 194-96. However, our supreme 

court distinguished American Bridge in Adams v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. 

Division, 237 Ind. 63, 143 N.E.2d 564 (1957). In Adams, the employees were subject to

a shutdown for a vacation period covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The 

court pointed out that the shutdown in American Bridge was distinguishable because it 

was for inventory purposes rather than vacation purposes. Adams, 237 Ind. at 71, 143 

N.E.2d at 568. Similarly, American Bridge is not persuasive because the “vacation” at 

issue here is more similar to that in Adams than the temporary shutdown for inventory 

purposes in American Bridge.

In LaFief, our supreme court held that an assistant professor who was notified that 

his one-year contract would not be renewed was entitled to unemployment benefits. 

LaFief, 888 N.E.2d at 185. However, the facts in LaFief are not comparable to the facts 

here. In fact, the court in LaFief noted:

This holding does not alter the general rule that employees 

who contractually agree to mandatory vacation periods or 

temporary shut downs are not eligible for unemployment 

benefits so long as they have reasonable assurance that they 

will continue to be employed after the mandatory vacation 

period or temporary shut down ends. See Ind. Code Ann. § 

22-4-14-7(a) (individuals employed by educational 

institutions are not entitled to unemployment benefits during 

the period between two successive academic years if they 

were employed during one period and there is a reasonable 

assurance that they will be employed during the successive 

term); Ind. Code Ann. § 22-4-14-8 (individuals whose 

employment consists of participating in sports are not entitled 
12

to unemployment benefits between seasons if they were 

employed during one season and there is a reasonable 

assurance that they will be employed during the successive 

season); Pope v. Wabash Valley Human Serv., Inc., 500 

N.E.2d 209, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (“Where the 

employment contract or collective bargaining agreement 

provides for a shutdown or vacation period, the employees 

who signed or assented to the contract are not ‘unemployed’

within the meaning contemplated by the [Unemployment 

Compensation Act]”).

LaFief, 888 N.E.2d at 187.3

The Legislature has not defined “vacation” in the context of unemployment 

insurance benefits, and the Review Board found that the term “vacation” as used in 

Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 was ambiguous. The Review Board pointed out that 

Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 required reasonable assurance of employment after the 

vacation, which would not normally be required by an employee taking a traditional 

vacation for leisure or pleasure. Thus, the Review Board determined that the traditional 

definition of “vacation” was inapplicable and that Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 must 

concern “an employer-mandated period in which work is not performed.” Appellant’s 

App. p. 4. Given the great weight we must give to an interpretation of a statute by an 

administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute, we cannot say that the Review 

Board’s interpretation of the term “vacation” in Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 is 

unreasonable. See Two Market Square Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 679 N.E.2d at 886 (“When 

 

3 We also note that LaFief was decided in 2008, prior to the enactment of Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5. 

Some of the language of Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 is similar to the language found in LaFief. 

Compare LaFief, 888 N.E.2d at 187 (“[E]mployees who contractually agree to mandatory vacation 

periods or temporary shut downs are not eligible for unemployment benefits so long as they have 

reasonable assurance that they will continue to be employed after the mandatory vacation period or 

temporary shut down ends.”); with I.C. § 22-4-3-5. 
13

the meaning of an administrative regulation is in question, the interpretation of the 

administrative agency is given great weight unless the agency’s interpretation would be 

inconsistent with the regulation itself.”).

With the Review Board’s interpretation of the term “vacation” in mind, we must 

determine whether Broxton was properly denied benefits pursuant to Indiana Code 

Section 22-4-3-5. The Department has determined that it will consider several factors in 

determining whether an employee is on a vacation week under Indiana Code Section 22-

4-3-5, including: 

1. Whether a written contract between the employer and 

the employee provides for a paid or unpaid vacation 

week designation;

2. Whether a vacation week was the result of an 

employer’s regular vacation policy and practice; 

3. Whether an employer provided a reasonable assurance 

to the employee that they would have employment 

available with the employer after the vacation period 

ends. Such an assurance is not required to be provided 

by explicit declaration or direct communication but 

may be inferred by past employer or employee 

conduct, policy, practice, or custom, such that the 

employee knew or should have known of their 

employment availability. Additionally, such an 

assurance shall provide more than a speculative date of 

return to employment in order to be reasonable;

4. Whether, as part of the above-mentioned reasonable 

assurance, an employer gave reasonable notice to the 

employee concerning the vacation week or facility 

shutdown. Such notice is not required to be provided 

by explicit declaration or direct communication, but 

may be inferred by past employer or employee 

conduct, policy, practice or custom, such that the 
14

employee knew or should have known of the vacation 

week or mandated facility shutdown;

5. Whether the employer, on their own initiative, has 

provided the Department with advance notice of any 

vacation week or shutdown period.

Appellant’s App. pp. 40-41. This list of factors is “not exclusive,” and the Department 

makes determinations on such “vacation” issues “on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 41.

Here, Broxton states that he was employed “under a labor agreement,” but there is 

no evidence of such agreement in the record. Appellant’s Br. p. 12 n.10. During the 

college’s summer break, it was Sodexo’s regular practice to reduce its services because of 

the lack of students. Broxton regularly does not work and is unpaid from May to August, 

except that he is “on call” and must call Sodexo each Tuesday to see if work is available. 

Tr. p. 4. Broxton had worked for Sodexo since 2008 and was clearly aware of the 

summer “vacation” practice and had reasonable assurances that he would return to 

employment in August when the students returned. The Review Board applied the 

relevant factors and concluded that, under Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5, Broxton was 

not totally, part-totally, or partially unemployed. 

The Review Board’s determination that Broxton was on an unpaid “vacation 

week” because of Sodexo’s regular vacation policy and practice and had a reasonable 

assurance of employment after the vacation period ended is reasonable. Based on the 

factors set out by the Department, we cannot say that the Review Board erred when it 

determined that Broxton was ineligible for unemployment benefits due to Indiana Code 

Section 22-4-3-5. 
15

III. On Call

Next, Broxton argues that he was totally unemployed because no “on call” work 

was available to him during the summer of 2012. In support of his argument, he relies on 

Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-3, which provides:

An individual is not totally unemployed, part-totally 

unemployed, or partially unemployed for any week in which 

the individual:

(1) is regularly and customarily employed on an on call or 

as needed basis; and

(2) has:

(A) remuneration for personal services payable to 

the individual; or

(B) work available from the individual’s on-call or 

as needed employer.

The Review Board held that this statutory provision was inapplicable because Broxton 

was “not regularly and customarily employed on an ‘on call’ or ‘as needed’ basis.” 

Appellant’s App. pp. 3-4. 

Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-3 provides an exception to the definition of totally 

unemployed, part-totally unemployed, or partially unemployed. If the employee falls 

under the exception, he or she is not entitled to unemployment benefits. Because the 

Review Board found that Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-3 was inapplicable, it did not use 

this statutory provision to deny unemployment benefits to Broxton. On appeal, the 

Review Board argues that “although Broxton is ineligible for unemployment 

compensation benefits based on other statutory sections, any claims or arguments made 
16

by Broxton based on Section 22-4-3-3 need not be addressed because they are immaterial 

to whether . . . Broxton was properly denied benefits.” Appellee’s Br. p. 24. We agree 

with the Review Board. Because we have determined that the Review Board properly 

denied Broxton benefits under Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5, we need not address this 

argument.

IV. Inconsistent with Other Provisions

Next, Broxton argues that the Review Board’s decision is inconsistent with other 

provisions of the Act. Specifically, Broxton argues that the Review Board’s application 

of Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5 conflicts with: (1) the eligibility provisions of the Act; 

(2) the Act’s seasonal work provision found at Indiana Code Section 22-4-14-11; (3) 

provisions that “focus on claims by unemployed individuals with respect to specific 

weeks of unemployment;” and (4) the notice provision of Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5. 

Appellant’s Br. p. 20. 

We have already held that the Review Board’s interpretation of Indiana Code 

Section 22-4-3-5’s notice provisions is reasonable. Broxton admits that the seasonal 

worker provisions do not apply to him. As such, we fail to understand how the seasonal 

worker provisions conflict with the Review Board’s interpretation. As for the remaining 

arguments, Broxton offers neither cogent arguments nor citations to relevant authority in 

support of these assertions; the arguments are therefore waived. Doughty v. Review Bd. 

of Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 784 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

V. Purpose of the Act
17

Finally, Broxton argues that the Review Board’s interpretation of Indiana Code 

Section 22-4-3-5 conflicts with the purpose of the Act. The Act provides:

As a guide to the interpretation and application of this 

article, the public policy of this state is declared to be as 

follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is 

declared hereby to be a serious menace to the health, morale, 

and welfare of the people of this state and to the maintenance 

of public order within this state. Protection against this great 

hazard of our economic life can be provided in some measure 

by the required and systematic accumulation of funds during 

periods of employment to provide benefits to the unemployed 

during periods of unemployment and by encouragement of 

desirable stable employment. The enactment of this article to 

provide for payment of benefits to persons unemployed 

through no fault of their own, to encourage stabilization in 

employment, and to provide for integrated employment and 

training services in support of state economic development 

programs, and to provide maximum job training and 

employment opportunities for the unemployed, 

underemployed, the economically disadvantaged, dislocated 

workers, and others with substantial barriers to employment, 

is, therefore, essential to public welfare; and the same is 

declared to be a proper exercise of the police powers of the 

state. To further this public policy, the state, through its 

department of workforce development, will maintain close 

coordination among all federal, state, and local agencies 

whose mission affects the employment or employability of 

the unemployed and underemployed.

I.C. § 22-4-1-1. The Act is “given a liberal construction in favor of employees because it 

is social legislation meriting such construction in order to promote its underlying 

humanitarian purposes.” Scott v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 725 

N.E.2d 993, 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

According to Broxton, the Review Board’s interpretation conflicts with the 

purpose of the Act to provide unemployment benefits to those workers involuntarily 
18

unemployed. Broxton argues that his summer unemployment is not voluntary and occurs 

through no fault of his own. Although we acknowledge the general policy behind the Act 

and sympathize with the hardship that Broxton and similarly situated employees suffer, 

we must also acknowledge the Review Board’s argument that its “interpretation of this 

statute prevents employers from using unemployment benefits to subsidize employees 

who have a reasonable assurance of returning to work after a regularly scheduled 

vacation break.” Appellee’s Br. p. 9. We simply cannot say that the Review Board’s 

interpretation of the relevant statutes is unreasonable.

Conclusion

We cannot say that the Review Board erred when it denied unemployment benefits 

to Broxton pursuant to the provisions of Indiana Code Section 22-4-3-5. We affirm.

Affirmed.

CRONE, J., and PYLE, J., concur.