SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2469-21

 A-2766-21 

M&T BANK, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

VAROUJAN KHOROZIAN, 

 Defendant-Appellant, 

and 

ANGELA KHOROZIAN, 

 Defendant-Respondent, 

and 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Defendant. 

______________________________

M&T BANK, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
 2 A-2469-21 

VAROUJAN KHOROZIAN, 

 Defendant-Respondent, 

and 

ANGELA KHOROZIAN, 

 Defendant-Appellant, 

and 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Defendant. 

_______________________________

Submitted April 9, 2024 – Decided May 10, 2024 

Before Judges Sumners and Torregrossa-O’Connor. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Bergen County, Docket No. 

F-006389-19.

Asatrian Law Group, LLC, attorneys for appellant in A2469-21 and respondent in A-2766-21 Varoujan 

Khorozian (Vartan Asatrian, of counsel and on the 

briefs; Jeffrey Zajac, on the briefs).

Jay Kanetkar, Esq., LLC, attorney for appellant in A2766-21 and respondent in A-2469-21 Angela 

Khorozian (Jayat Pramod Kanetkar, of counsel; Jeffrey 

Zajac, on the brief). 

Parker McCay PA, attorneys for respondent M&T Bank 

(Eugene R. Mariano, on the brief). 
 3 A-2469-21 

PER CURIAM 

In these separate but related residential foreclosure appeals which we 

consolidate to issue a single opinion, Angela Khorozian and Varoujan 

Khorozian1 challenge the Chancery court's March 18, 2022 order denying 

reconsideration of its November 8, 2021 order denying Angela's motion to 

vacate default and its January 28, 2022 order denying her motion to compel

amendment of the foreclosure complaint to add her as defendant. 

Plaintiff, M & T Bank, commenced foreclosure after Varoujan's default on 

a loan, which Varoujan, allegedly unbeknownst to Angela, secured with a 

mortgage on their home (the property) in Alpine. Central to both appeals is the 

Chancery court's determination that Angela, seeking to vacate default against 

her over two years after its entry, lacked good cause under Rule 4:43-3. 

Specifically, the court denied the motion as an unsuccessful delay tactic, finding 

Angela inexcusably failed to respond earlier despite having actual notice of the 

foreclosure and default, and she nevertheless held no interest in the property, 

having relinquished both ownership and possessory rights decades earlier when 

Varoujan simultaneously purchased the property as sole owner. 

1

 For clarity, we reference the Khorozians by their first names. 
 4 A-2469-21 

After careful review of the record and the Chancery court's trio of 

decisions repeatedly exploring and rejecting the claims raised here, we discern 

no abuse of discretion and affirm.

I.

A. The Deeds and The Loan

We glean the following facts and procedural history from the record. 

Angela and Varoujan were married in 1980 and currently reside in the property, 

purchased by Varoujan in 1998. Varoujan acquired the property solely in his 

name because Angela admittedly "had recently filed a bankruptcy to address a 

large business loss, and [they] could not get financing for the purchase." 

Consequently, the deed, dated January 14, 1998, and recorded on January 28, 

1998 (Deed I), lists Varoujan as sole owner. 

A second deed (Deed II), labelled a "quitclaim deed" and 

contemporaneously executed on January 14, 1998 and filed on January 28, 1998, 

on its face memorializes Angela's intent to irrevocably "release," "assign," 

"extinguish," and "alienate" her present and future rights and claims to the 

property to Varoujan. Deed II specifically states that Angela, as "Grantor," 

"grants and conveys (transfers ownership of) the property . . . to the Grantee," 

designated as Varoujan. Deed II bears the Grantor's signature and declares:
 5 A-2469-21 

"In accordance with N.J.S.A. 37:2-18 etc. and the 

amendment and supplements thereto it is specifically 

intended hereby to release and assign irrevocably to the 

party of the second part herein [, Varoujan,] any vested, 

inchoate or possible future estate of (dower or curtesy, 

as applicable) arising by virtue of statute, court 

decision, public policy or implication of law out of the 

marital relationship of the parties hereto and to 

equitable distribution under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. It is 

also the intention of the Grantor herein to release, 

extinguish and alienate any right of possession the

Grantor may have pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:28-3." 

Ten years later, to fund a business opportunity, Varoujan executed a 

$2,800,000 promissory note in favor of plaintiff's predecessor, Hudson City 

Savings Bank, secured by a mortgage on the property. Only Varoujan signed 

the note and mortgage, and the Khorozians claim Angela knew nothing of the 

loan at the time. Varoujan defaulted on payment in late 2018, and plaintiff 

accelerated the loan, demanding the remaining principal and unpaid interest. 

After mailing to Varoujan the notice of intent to accelerate and foreclose, 

plaintiff, on April 3, 2019, filed the present foreclosure complaint. 

B. Early Foreclosure Proceedings 

Plaintiff captioned the foreclosure complaint: "M & T Bank v. Varoujan 

Khorozian; Mrs. Varoujan Khorozian, His Wife; State of New Jersey" and the 

case information statement designated Mrs. Varoujan Khorozian as a "fictitious 

party." After four unsuccessful attempts to serve Mrs. Varoujan Khorozian 
 6 A-2469-21 

personally at the residence, plaintiff effectuated service via certified mail to the 

post office box mailing address for the property. A lis pendens was recorded on 

March 23, 2019. 

Varoujan filed a contesting answer on June 24, 2019, making no reference 

to Angela or her alleged spousal interest in the property. On July 19, 2019, the 

court granted default against "Mrs. Varoujan Khorozian," as no answer or 

pleading had been filed. After plaintiff moved for summary judgment against 

Varoujan in October 2019, Varoujan cross-moved to compel discovery, opposed 

plaintiff's summary judgment motion, and moved to dismiss, again apparently 

with no mention of Angela or her potential interest.

2

 On December 31, 2019, 

the court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied Varoujan's 

cross-motions. 

Varoujan filed but withdrew a motion for reconsideration, instead entering 

into three consecutive consent orders between March 2020 and March 2021, in 

which plaintiff voluntarily stayed application for final judgment giving Varoujan 

the ability to sell the property. In exchange, Varoujan expressly waived his right 

to appeal any final judgment entered by the trial court. Varoujan never sold the 

2

 It appears the only mention of Angela Khorozian in Varoujan's filings was a 

demand to produce "any and all notices made to Angela Khorozian, the wife and 

proof of service of the foreclosure on Angela Khorozian." 
 7 A-2469-21 

property or satisfied the obligation, nor did he raise or invoke Angela's alleged 

interest to oppose foreclosure. By late 2021, the extensions expired, and 

foreclosure proceeded toward final judgment. 

C. Angela's Motions

Around that same time in October of 2021, Angela, for the first time, 

moved to vacate the 2019 default. She acknowledged the deliberate strategy 

back in 1998 to have Varoujan acquire the home as sole owner due to her 

bankruptcy. Asserting a spousal possessory interest in the property where she 

claimed to reside since the time of its purchase, Angela denied signing Deed II 

or having knowledge of Varoujan's loan. Challenging service, Angela contended 

she was not properly named and was away at the time of service by mail to the 

post office box Varoujan maintains. Admitting that she returned home in late 

2019 and knew of the foreclosure and default as far back as January of 2020, 

Angela alleged that she delayed taking action because she consulted counsel 

who gave her wrongful advice that the courts were closed and that she lacked a 

defense. Angela indicated she would retain a handwriting expert to prove the 

signature on Deed II was forged. She alleged, alternatively, that even if she had 

signed Deed II, the law at the time, specifically N.J.S.A. 3B:28-3 establishing 

spousal possessory rights, required both spouses' signatures and prohibited 

unilateral renunciation of possessory rights to a marital residence. 
 8 A-2469-21 

Plaintiff urged that Angela was inexcusably late and nonetheless lacked 

standing because she relinquished all rights and claims to the marital property 

via Deed II. As such, plaintiff explained that it never considered Angela a party 

to the case and instead named "Mrs. Varoujan Khorizian" to cover any possible 

subsequent spouse that might have acquired an interest after Angela 

extinguished her rights. Plaintiff argued that the 1998 version of N.J.S.A. 

3B:28-3 required only the "consent" of both spouses, not both signatures, to 

extinguish one spouse's possessory right, which could be readily inferred here 

from Varoujan's simultaneously purchasing the property as sole owner by grant 

from Angela. 

The Chancery court, applying Rule 4:43-3's "good cause" standard, denied 

Angela's motion. In a written decision accompanying the November 8, 2021 

order, the court found that Angela, aware of the default since at least January 

2020, offered no sufficient "excuse or reason for why [she] waited nearly two 

years to take action as to the default." The court characterized the motion as 

"simply a tactic to delay this action further," taking issue with counsel's 

admission that throughout the proceedings, including the seventeen months of 

consent stays, the Khorozians made no attempt to sell the property. The court 

relied on Deed II and determined that Angela lacked a meritorious defense as 
 9 A-2469-21 

she "never signed the mortgage or note" and had no "interest in the subject 

property because she waived her interest in 1998." 

Thereafter, plaintiff moved for entry of final judgment. In support, 

plaintiff's counsel certified that the pleadings reflected that "Angela Khorozian 

may be the spouse of Varoujan . . . ." The certification further referenced Deed 

II as conveying entirely Angela's interest in the property and identified a March 

23, 2020 deed conveying an interest from Varoujan to Angela. As such, counsel 

confirmed plaintiff's position that Angela's "interest is subject to and bound by 

Plaintiff's foreclosure and the request for Final Judgment . . . ." Plaintiff’s 

counsel further certified that "Mrs. Varoujan Khorozian, his wife, remains a 

necessary defendant," because "she was served with the complaint and the 

marital status of Varoujan Khorozian has not been confirmed by Varoujan 

Khorozian." 

Varoujan filed only a general objection to the foreclosure amount baldly 

claiming it was "inaccurate, inflated, and in violation of the Rules of the Court," 

which the court denied for lack of specificity under Rules 4:64-1(d)(3) and 4:64-

9. Angela filed a "cross-motion" to compel plaintiff to amend the complaint to 

include her as a specific defendant and to allow her to file an answer. She 

renewed her prior arguments and claimed that a judgment against "Mrs. 

Varoujan Khorozian" would mislead creditors to assume the judgment was 
10 A-2469-21 

against her without first allowing her the ability to answer and contest. Plaintiff 

again countered that Angela has no interest in the property, further urging that 

Angela's attempt to relitigate the default fell outside the limited scope of 

permissible Rule 4:64-1(d)(3) objections. 

The court denied Angela's motion calling it "the latest effort to prolong 

the foreclosure action" when Angela "does not have an interest in the subject 

property." Finding her claims outside the reach of Rule 4:64-1 relief, the court 

found Angela sought to improperly "re-litigate the entire matter" despite the 

court's earlier ruling that she lacked a meritorious defense. The court deemed 

the fictitious spouse designation "irrelevant," explaining that "the fact remains 

that Angela Khorozian expressly and irrevocably released and assigned all her 

interest in the property to Mortgagor." Further, the court explained:

Because of that fact, [p]laintiff is unable to 

independently confirm that [m]ortgagor has been 

married to Angela Khorozian at all times since she 

transferred her interest in the subject property to

Mortgagor in 1998. Therefore, [p]laintiff intentionally 

chose to list [d]efendant as “Mrs. Varoujan Khorozian, 

his wife” because, despite the admission [p]laintiff 

knew [d]efendant was Mortgagor's wife, [p]laintiff did 

not want to risk excluding [d]efendant from its [m]otion 

for [f]inal [j]udgment since [p]laintiff must insure clear

title after the subject property is sold at Sherriff Sale. 

Final judgment was entered on February 7, 2022. 
11 A-2469-21 

Angela filed a motion for reconsideration on February 16, 2022, joined by 

Varoujan with no independent filing, which was denied. The court found the 

motion raised for the third time the same previously rejected arguments and 

amounted to "nothing more than an attempt to take another bite at the proverbial 

apple after Final Judgment was entered . . . ." From this order, both Angela and 

Varoujan appeal. 

II.

A. Angela's Appeal

Angela raises the following arguments for our consideration:

BECAUSE THE CHANCERY DIVISION 

COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN DENYING 

ANGELA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, 

THE FINAL JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST THE 

MORTGAGOR SHOULD BE VACATED. 

A. The Chancery Division Committed 

Reversible Error In Denying the Motion to 

Vacate the Entry of Default. 

B. The Defendant Possesses a Meritorious 

Defense Under the Possessory Rights 

Granted to Her By N.J.S.A. 3B:28-3.

C. The Chancery Division's Decision and 

Reasoning With Respect to . . . Plaintiff's 

Fictitious Spouse Designation Fails to 

Comport With Well[-]Established Law. 
12 A-2469-21 

Angela contends that the Chancery court abused its discretion in denying 

reconsideration of its earlier decisions. She again argues that good cause existed 

to vacate the default as "[t]here was no willful or bad faith conduct" and "[t]he 

default was entered without her knowledge, and her failure to answer was the 

result of excusable neglect." She reiterates her claim that she was not properly 

named in the complaint or served, despite having actual notice as far back as 

January 2020 by her own admission. Angela asserts that nevertheless the court 

ignored that she "possesse[d] a strong defense on the merits." 

She maintains that although she deeded the property to her husband at the 

time of its purchase, her rights in the property were not extinguished as she did 

not sign Deed II and, relying on the 1998 version of N.J.S.A. 3B:28-3, the deed 

is invalid nonetheless without Varoujan's signature. She further contends that, 

under Rules 4:26-5 and 4:26-6, the court improperly failed to compel 

amendment of the complaint to allow her to assert her position and insists that 

default judgment should not stand against a fictitious party when her identity is 

known. 

Plaintiff responds that the court properly denied reconsideration of its 

decisions because Angela holds no interest in this property, as Deed II, taken 

together with Deed I, simultaneously created and recorded, reflects that both 

Angela and Varoujan intended and consented that Angela have no present or 
13 A-2469-21 

future interest in the property to admittedly avoid her creditors in 1998. As such, 

plaintiff asserts that it properly named "Mrs. Varoujan Khorozian, his wife" as 

the defendant and judgment must stand as entered. Further, plaintiff contends 

that Angela's unreasonably belated attempt to vacate default failed to justify the 

two-year delay or show a meritorious defense supporting the Chancery court's 

repeated rejection of those arguments. 

B. Varoujan's Appeal 

Varoujan's appeal mirrors Angela's, with a brief identical to Angela's with 

the exception of a slightly edited cover page. Plaintiff responds that Varoujan's 

appeal should be summarily dismissed as waived by his consent orders in the 

matter foregoing his right to appeal. Alternatively, plaintiff incorporates and 

repeats its arguments in response to Angela's indistinguishable claims. In his 

reply brief, Varoujan counters that his consent agreements do not bar his appeal 

because the Chancery court applied incorrect legal standards and debuts a 

challenge to the calculation of the final judgment amount. 

III.

A.

We review with deference a trial court's denial of a motion for 

reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2 and disturb those findings only upon an abuse 

of discretion. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). A 
14 A-2469-21 

dissatisfied litigant's desire to reargue an unsuccessful motion does not warrant 

reconsideration. Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App. Div. 2010). 

Indeed, "a motion for reconsideration provides the court, and not the litigant, 

with an opportunity to take a second bite at the apple to correct errors inherent 

in a prior ruling." Medina v. Pitta, 442 N.J. Super. 1, 18 (App. Div. 2015). Thus, 

a trial court's discretion will not be disturbed unless its determination lacked "a 

rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested 

on an impermissible basis." U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 

467 (2012) (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007)). 

Likewise, we do not disturb trial court decisions on motions to vacate 

default absent an abuse of discretion. See U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Curcio, 444 

N.J. Super. 94, 105 (App. Div. 2016); see also Guillaume, 209 N.J. at 467. It is 

well-settled that "the requirements for setting aside a default under Rule 4:43-3 

are less stringent than . . . those for setting aside an entry of default judgment 

under Rule 4:50-1." N.J. Mfr.'s Ins. v. Prestige Health Grp., 406 N.J. Super. 354, 

360 (App. Div. 2009) (citing Bernhardt v. Alden Cafe, 374 N.J. Super. 271, 277 

(App. Div. 2005)). Under Rule 4:43-3, a court may vacate the entry of default 

upon a mere showing of "good cause," which exists in the "presence of a 

meritorious defense . . . and the absence of any contumacious conduct . . . ." 

O'Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 129 (1975). Considering whether good cause to 
15 A-2469-21 

vacate default exists "requires the exercise of sound discretion by the court in 

light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case." Ibid.; see also 

Delaware Valley Wholesale Florist, Inc. v. Addalia, 349 N.J. Super. 228, 232 

(App. Div. 2002) (explaining that the application of good cause "requires the 

exercise of sound discretion in light of the facts and circumstances of the 

particular case considered in the context of the purposes of the Court Rule being 

applied"). Applying this standard, we discern no basis to disturb the Chancery 

court's decisions that are grounded in the record and applicable law. 

In denying Angela's motion to vacate default and her cross-motion to 

compel amendment of the complaint to include her as defendant, the court 

reasonably concluded that Angela's failure to take timely action, admittedly 

knowing of the forfeiture action and default for approximately two years, 

undermined any claim of good cause. Attuned to the history of the proceedings, 

the court viewed Angela's motion, coming just as Varoujan's stays of litigation 

expired and the matter verged on final judgment as a deliberate delay tactic. As 

contumacious conduct is antithetical to good cause, we take no issue with the 

court's conclusion that the motions were designed to stall the matter as final 

forfeiture became imminent.

Further, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court's reliance upon 

Deed II to conclude Angela held no interest in the property and therefore lacked 
16 A-2469-21 

a meritorious defense. On its face, Deed II unambiguously identified its scope 

and intent to "irrevocably" transfer and extinguish vested and future rights and 

claims to ownership, spousal possessory interest, and equitable distribution of 

the property. N.J.S.A. 3B:28-3, in its present and prior forms, entitles "married 

individuals to joint possession" of any jointly occupied "principal marital 

residence." That right, then and now, is not absolute. Angela correctly observes 

that N.J.S.A. 3B:28‐3 in 1998, provided that a spousal possessory interest "may 

not be released, extinguished or alienated without the consent of both spouses." 

Here, however, Deeds I and II, executed and filed in tandem, clearly support the 

inference that the transfer of Angela's rights occurred by consent of both Angela 

and Varoujan to admittedly avoid Angela's creditors. We also find unavailing 

Angela's belated claim that Deed II was forged. Without a handwriting expert 

or further explanation, the court was not compelled to accept at face value her 

certification denying the authenticity of her signature. See Miller v. Bank of 

Am. Home Loan Servicing, L.P., 439 N.J. Super. 540, 551 (App. Div. 2015) 

(finding in the context of summary judgment that "self-serving assertions, 

unsupported by documentary proof . . . are insufficient to create a genuine issue 

of material fact."). 

Likewise, we find no error in the Chancery court's denial of Angela's 

motion to compel amendment of the complaint. Awaiting final judgment under 
17 A-2469-21 

Rule 4:64-1(d)(3), objections were restricted to specific and detailed disputes of 

the amount due. Ibid. (requiring objections to state "with specificity the basis 

of the dispute" and present "a specific objection to the calculation of the amount 

due . . ."). Angela's motion made no such challenge. Instead, ignoring the court's 

prior ruling that she had no interest in the property, she filed a "cross-motion" 

in an improper effort to resuscitate her prior failed claims. We concur with the 

court's determination that Angela's attempted retread of her prior arguments was 

not cognizable at that juncture.

Despite viewing Angela's application as procedurally flawed, the court 

again recounted its basis for rejecting her arguments. Regarding the decision to 

proceed to final judgment against "Mrs. Varoujan Khorozian," the court 

explained that although plaintiff knew of Angela's existence, plaintiff was 

"unable to independently confirm that Mortgagor has been married to Angela 

. . . at all times since she transferred her interest in the subject property . . . ." 

Recognizing that plaintiff was obligated to insure good title, the court did not 

abuse its discretion in finding the general designation appropriate in these 

circumstances. See R. 4:26-5 (allowing for the designation of an unknown 

spouse in a Rule 4:4-5 in rem action by the “given name and surname . . . ” of 

the known defendant spouse with “Mrs. [or alternatively Mr. as appropriate] 

prefixed thereto”). 
18 A-2469-21 

Angela's claims fell far outside the "narrow corridor" of cases ripe for 

reconsideration "in which either 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based 

upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt 

either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, 

competent evidence . . . ." Triffin v. SHS Grp., LLC, 466 N.J. Super. 460, 466 

(App. Div. 2021). We therefore see no abuse of discretion in the Chancery 

court's denying Angela's application for reconsideration of these prior decisions.

B.

We need not reach the merits of Varoujan's appeal as he expressly waived 

his right to appeal each time he executed three separate and consecutive consent 

agreements to delay foreclosure. See Mt. Hope Dev. Assocs. v. Mt. Hope 

Waterpower Project L.P., 154 N.J. 141, 147 (1998) (recognizing that voluntary 

and knowing waiver of the right to appeal is valid and enforceable). 

Nevertheless, we comment only to state the obvious—as Angela's appeal fails, 

so does Varoujan's as it simply echoes Angela's arguments and repeats verbatim 

her claims and brief on appeal. 

To the extent we have not specifically addressed Varoujan's remaining 

arguments, we conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion 

in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

The consolidated appeals are affirmed.