Exemption No. 10598A

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20591

In the matter of the petition of

BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2012-0123

CANADA LIMITED

for an exemption from § 27.1

of Title 14, Code of

Federal Regulations

DECISION ON PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION

By letter dated January 16, 2012, Mr. M. Peryea, VP BHTCL Engineering, Bell Helicopter 

Textron Canada Limited (Bell Canada), petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

on behalf of Bell Canada for an exemption from § 27.1 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations 

(14 CFR). The exemption, if granted, would have allowed type certification of the Bell 429 

model helicopter with an increase in the maximum gross weight from 7,000 pounds to 7,500 

pounds under part 27 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 27) as a normal category 

rotorcraft.

By decision dated August 13, 2012, the FAA denied the petition. On October 10, 2012, Bell 

Canada submitted its Petition for Reconsideration.

Standard/Regulatory basis:

A petition for an exemption from the requirements of a current regulation must include specific 

information to be submitted to the FAA. 14 CFR §§ 11.15, 11.81. That information must include

the reasons why granting the request would benefit the public as a whole, and the reasons why 

granting the exemption would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule 

under which the exemption is sought. 14 CFR § 11.81(d)-(e). The FAA publishes information 

about petitions for exemption in the Federal Register and invites comments from the public to 

assist in evaluation of the petition. 14 CFR § 11.85.
2

Where a petition for exemption is denied, the petitioner may request that the FAA reconsider the 

denial. The FAA will accept petitions for reconsideration that show: (1) there is a significant 

additional fact with an explanation why the fact was not presented in the original petition; (2) 

that the FAA made an important factual error in its denial of the original petition; or (3) that the 

FAA did not correctly interpret a law, regulation, or precedent. 14 CFR § 11.101.

Summary of comments received and FAA’s response:

The FAA published a summary of the Petition for Reconsideration in the Federal Register on 

December 18, 2012 (77 FR 74914), to allow interested parties to submit their comments to the 

FAA. The FAA received fifty-seven comments. The majority of the commenters were from 

Bell 429 operators or those associated with the product, and they supported the reconsideration 

petition. These included part 27 rotorcraft manufacturers, several emergency medical service 

(EMS) organizations, law enforcement departments, helicopter maintenance facilities, 

governmental officials at both state and local levels (including the Governor of Texas and Mayor 

of Fort Worth), and other businesses and individuals who own or were looking to purchase 

Bell 429 helicopters. The comments opposing the reconsideration petition were from three other 

part 27 rotorcraft manufacturers.

Several commenters submitted general comments in support of granting the petition without 

providing any additional information or quantifiable data not already addressed in the original 

denial decision for the FAA to consider.

Some comments discussed the rotorcraft competitive market in the U.S. and considered the 

FAA’s denial of the exemption to be political in nature. Similarly, commenters stated that U.S. 

economic considerations should take priority over the economics of non-domestic 

manufacturers. We disagree that denial of the exemption was based on political considerations. 

The Denial Order (“Denial”) noted that the exemption sought by Bell Canada would place the 

Bell 429 at a competitive advantage. This point illustrated the unfair consequence that would 

result from granting the exemption request, which essentially amounted to a request to deviate 

from the applicability sections in parts 27 and 29. 

The majority of the comments supporting the reconsideration petition cite many benefits the 

Bell 429 would provide with an increased weight. One commenter preferred the design and 

technology of the Bell 429 to that of other, older part 27 rotorcraft. However, these comments 

are either the same as those provided by the petitioner in its original petition or do not provide 

any additional information for the FAA to consider.

Two commenters state that because the Bell 429 is certificated to operate at 7,500 pounds with 

an external load, it is clearly capable of safely operating at that weight. We disagree, and the 

commenters do not show how the certification standards for maximum take-off weight equate to 

the certification standards for total weight with a jettisonable external load.

Several commenters suggested the exemption should be granted because the FAA has granted

previous exemptions for maximum gross weight. These comments are the same as those 
3

provided by the petitioner in its original petition or do not provide any additional information for 

the FAA to consider.

A few commenters stated that certification of the Bell 429 under part 29 would either be 

economically unfeasible or would result in an increased cost to Bell Canada’s customers. The 

FAA’s exemption process addressed whether a petitioner has met the agency’s standards, not the 

costs involved. If Bell were to pursue certificating the 429 to part 29, which it has not to this 

point, the costs and benefits of stepping up to part 29 standards would be a business decision for 

Bell and its current Bell 429 customers.

Lastly, some commenters stated the current 7,000 pound maximum gross weight limit for part 27 

rotorcraft is arbitrary and addressed the need for a regulatory change. There were also comments 

relating to a product gap for rotorcraft, mostly due to economic reasons, in the 7,000 to 10,000 

pound range. The FAA finds these comments more relevant to the request for public interest on 

regulatory reform of the certification standards for parts 27 and 29 rotorcraft initiated in February

2013. Interest in Restructure of Rotorcraft Airworthiness Standards, 78 FR 12254 (Feb. 22, 

2013). These comments are outside of the scope of the petition for reconsideration but will be 

retained for future rulemaking consideration.

Issues raised by the petitioner:

1. Whether the Denial Order made an important factual error or did not correctly interpret a law, 

regulation, or precedent as to whether granting the exemption would provide a level of safety at 

least equal to that provided by § 27.1.

2. Whether the Denial Order made an important factual error or did not correctly interpret a law, 

regulation, or precedent as to whether granting the exemption would be in the public interest.

3. Whether the petitioner presents a significant additional fact not presented in its original 

petition and showing why the additional fact was not presented in the original petition.

The FAA’s analysis follows:

At the outset, the FAA observes that Bell Canada’s petitions fail to address the threshold legal 

issue of whether it may seek an exemption to an applicability provision of the FAA’s regulations. 

It may not. Even were it able to request such an exemption, neither Bell Canada’s original 

petition nor its latest petition seek to show how a grant would not adversely affect safety or 

would provide an equal level of safety. Instead, Bell Canada seeks to associate its situation with 

other exemptions that the FAA has granted in the past. Finally, Bell Canada does not show how 

grant of its petition would benefit the public as a whole.

Exemptions apply to requirements

A grant of exemption relieves an individual or entity from the requirements of a current 

regulation and thus does not apply to Bell Canada’s petition. The petition for exemption at issue 
4

requests relief from the “7,000 pound maximum gross weight limit” of section 27.1(a). That 

section defines the rotorcraft to which part 27 applies. That section does not itself contain 

regulatory requirements. The FAA’s regulations describe an exemption as a request for relief 

from the requirements of a regulation, 14 CFR § 11.15. By requesting an exemption to the 

applicability of part 27, the petitioner, in essence, requested an exemption from all of the 

regulatory requirements of part 29 (which applies to rotorcraft weighing more than 

7,000 pounds). This legal issue is the heart of the petitioner’s exemption request, and one that the 

FAA cannot, as a matter of law, grant. From one perspective, Bell Canada’s petition is, as is 

evident from the comments above, the equivalent of a petition for rulemaking to change the 

applicability of part 27. If not that, Bell Canada might have been better served by petitioning for 

an exemption to the provisions with which it takes issue in part 29.

While we recognize that a denial on this basis appears contrary to an exemption granted to ICON 

Aircraft1 (ICON) from multiple regulations applicable to special light sport aircraft (SLSA), the 

conditions of each situation are quite different. Where Bell attempted to avoid certain 

requirements of part 29, the ICON exemption allowed the FAA to effectively account for the 

innovative spin-resistant airframe (SRA) technology that it had not considered in its original 

rulemaking. ICON sought to operate above the maximum takeoff weight for light sport aircraft 

so that it could incorporate an SRA in the design of its Model A5. As a threshold matter, SLSA 

are not produced under type and production certification procedures. Unlike airplanes under 

parts 23 and 25, and rotorcraft under parts 27 and 29, there are no airworthiness standards for 

SLSA that are required to be met before the FAA will issue a type certificate. The only 

certification regulations concerning SLSA are found in part 21, and they do not specify 

airworthiness standards. ICON’s only alternative in designing the A5 with an SRA would have

been to seek type certification under part 23 as an airplane weighing 12,500 pounds or less with a 

seating capacity of nine or fewer passengers. This would have required ICON to demonstrate 

compliance with the airworthiness standards contained in part 23, much of which are 

unnecessary to establish a level of safety appropriate for the type of operation permitted for 

SLSA. For example, SLSA are prohibited from being used for compensation or hire except in 

limited circumstances. They are limited to carrying no more than one passenger. Compared with 

airplanes certificated under part 23, they are significantly limited in airspeed, equipment, engine 

power, and weight. 

Moreover, the ICON exemption, which was granted after issuance of the Denial to Bell Canada, 

specifically recognized that ICON’s petition was unique and distinguishable from previous 

denials of petitions for relief from weight limitations. In granting the ICON exemption, the FAA

recognized its seeming departure from previous actions concerning maximum takeoff weight and 

emphasized the non-precedential value and limited application of granting such an exemption. 

Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement

Contrary to the arguments in the petition, the FAA acted in accord with the international 

validation request process. Validation procedures and the provisions of the Bilateral Aviation 

 1 ICON Aircraft, Exemption No. 10829 (July 24, 2013).
5

Safety Agreement (BASA) between the United States and Canada do not cover exemptions. In 

fact, Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) made no statement of compliance when granting 

its exemption to the petitioner. The FAA/TCCA BASA, and its Implementing Procedures for 

Airworthiness, provides an exchange of validity only for certifications made by the exporting 

civil airworthiness authority, and not for exemptions. Although the petitioner claims the FAA 

departed from the international validation and should have instead accepted the findings of 

TCCA as to the safety aspects of granting a gross weight exemption, as well as the determination 

of TCCA that the exemption was in the public interest, we do not presume that the conditions 

imposed by TCCA in granting Bell Canada its exemption for the Bell 429 would achieve part 29 

compliance or equivalence. The petitioner is required to make that showing, and did not do so.

Past exemptions

The Denial is consistent with the FAA’s past grants of exemption. The petitioner contends that 

the FAA’s decision to continue to distinguish part 27 from part 29 certification by weight 

contradicts grants of exemption issued to Terrafugia, Inc. (Terrafugia),2 Indigenous People 

Technology and Education Center (ITEC),3 and Ameriflight, Inc. (Ameriflight).4 However, these 

grants of exemption are distinguishable from Bell Canada’s petition.

Terrafugia sought an exemption from § 21.190(c)(2), which requires a light-sport aircraft to meet 

consensus standard provisions. Terrafugia sought certification of its aircraft in the special lightsport category under the consensus standards for roadable aircraft. Under §1.1, light-sport 

aircraft have a maximum takeoff weight of not more than 1,320 pounds (when not intended for 

operation on water) or 1,430 pounds (when intended for operation on water). Terrafugia 

designed its roadable aircraft for dual-use operation in two separate transportation modes. As a 

result, and in order to meet Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, the aircraft needed 

additional systems similar to those required for light-sport aircraft intended for operation on 

water. The FAA issued a partial grant of exemption to Terrafugia, subject to specific conditions 

and limitations. Unlike Bell Canada’s petition for the Bell 429, Terrafugia had no alternative for 

certification, as consensus standards did not exist to address light-sport roadable aircraft. 

Moreover, not only was the increase in weight limited to use for those safety features required 

for driving on the road, but it satisfied § 1.1’s definition of one kind of light sport aircraft, 

namely, light-sport aircraft intended for operation on water, because it weighed less than the 

1,430 pounds of the definition. The grant of exemption issued to Terrafugia specifically did not 

extend to an increase in weight for conventional configuration safety enhancing equipment. The 

exemption request for ITEC was granted based on similar circumstances and reasons.

Likewise, there is no similarity between Bell Canada’s petition and the Ameriflight grant of 

exemption. The petitioner claims in granting the Ameriflight request the FAA “breached the 

wall” between parts 135 and 121 to permit an aircraft to be operated above the 7,500 pound 

weight limit for on-demand (part 135) operations. But unlike the petition for the Bell 429, the 

 2 Terrafugia, Inc., Exemption No. 10072 (May 27, 2010).

3 Indigenous Peoples Technology and Education Center, Inc., Exemption No. 10450 (Feb. 15, 2012). 4 Ameriflight, Inc., Exemption No. 8480A (April 21, 2006).
6

Ameriflight grant of exemption did not involve an increase in the aircraft’s certificated 

maximum takeoff weight. Additionally, the Ameriflight grant of exemption was limited and 

conditioned upon Ameriflight’s compliance with regulatory provisions above those required for 

an operation under part 135. In granting the exemption, the FAA found the conditions and 

limitations of the exemption ensured an equivalent level of safety to part 121 supplemental 

operations and in part exceeded part 121 requirements. The FAA also found that Ameriflight’s 

circumstances met a unique demand that only a limited population of aircraft could fill. Contrary 

to the arguments by the petitioner, the FAA has found that the features of the Bell 429 are 

common on other rotorcraft without the need for an increased weight.

Safety

The petitioner argues that by focusing exclusively on gross weight, the Denial ignores the effect 

of the 1999 amendment to part 27 and results in a decision that places form over substance. This 

argument neither provides new information nor shows how the Denial made an important factual 

error or incorrectly interpreted a law, regulation, or precedent. As with its original petition, rather 

than demonstrating that grant would not impair safety or provides an equivalent level of safety, 

Bell Canada focuses instead on arguing similarity with other grants and contesting the FAA’s 

approach to improved safety standards through rulemaking over time.

It is the petitioner’s burden to demonstrate that granting its exemption request would not 

adversely affect safety. Both the original petition and the petition for reconsideration fail to meet 

this burden. The petitioner questions the failure of the Denial to make specific findings as to 

whether Bell Canada has met the safety requirement of part 11. The petitioner is correct that the 

Denial did not address the relative safety of the Bell 429 with an increased weight. However, 

while Bell Canada’s original petition discussed several features of the Bell 429, it did not address 

how those features would provide a level of safety at least equal to that currently provided by the 

7,000 pound limit on maximum gross weight for normal category rotorcraft.

5 Thus, the petitioner 

provided the FAA no basis upon which to assess the safety issue.

The petitioner also argues that, with additional equipment required by TCCA, the Bell 429 meets 

97.8% of part 29 requirements or provides an equivalent level of safety to part 29 requirements.

Similarly, throughout the petition, the comparison is made between the part 29 bird strike and 

flaw tolerance exemptions granted to Eurocopter and the section 27.1(a) applicability exemption

sought by Bell Canada. The petitioner’s assertion that the Bell 429 meets “almost all” of the 

current part 29 requirements gives even more weight to the FAA’s position that the petitioner 

could have, and should have (as Eurocopter did), sought certification of the Bell 429 under 

part 29 and requested exemptions for those part 29 requirements the aircraft could not meet. 

Understandably, certification under part 29 is more burdensome. Yet it appears the petitioner 

wishes to be granted the same regulatory relief as Eurocopter and other manufacturers who 

pursued the more burdensome path, without the petitioner taking that path itself.

 5 It is also for this reason that the ICON grant of exemption is distinguishable. ICON provided sufficient data for the 

FAA to determine that the ICON A5 provides an equivalent level of safety, and possibly a greater level of safety, 

than aircraft that meet the maximum weight set forth in14 CFR § 1.1 for light sport aircraft.
7

The additional equipment required by TCCA, which the petitioner claims provides the Bell 429 

with almost an equivalent level of safety to part 29, is not unique to the Bell 429. Such 

equipment is readily available and exists in many other part 27 rotorcraft for which a weight 

exemption was not sought or needed.

6 Moreover, as suggested in the Denial, Bell 429 operators 

have the option of removing some equipment in order to seek and obtain approval to install 

additional equipment and still comply with the part 27 weight limitation. The petitioner states 

this amounts to “removing safety equipment to increase payload” as a solution. While the 

petitioner acknowledges its business decision to include many safety enhancements as standard 

features for the Bell 429, it fails to acknowledge that this same decision resulted in designing the 

Bell 429 at the maximum gross weight allowed under part 27, impeding any opportunity for 

future growth and safety enhancing design improvements. The petitioner’s election to certificate 

the Bell 429 to part 27 under those circumstances has resulted in challenges with its customers’ 

desires.

The argument throughout the petition that the FAA is applying a regulatory “grandfathering” 

unfairly to Bell Canada is unavailing and fails to establish the safety of the exemption. The 

petitioner states that other helicopter models operate under part 29 without meeting current 

regulatory standards and therefore, it cannot be unsafe for the Bell 429 to do so. The petitioner is 

correct to the extent that, before the FAA certificates any helicopter model, we require that 

model to meet the airworthiness standards in effect at the time of application for certification. 

This is true for any helicopter manufacturer, including Bell Canada and its older rotorcraft

models. Over the years, airworthiness standards have continued to advance the required 

minimum level of safety. The reality of such an evolving set of standards is that a more 

recently-certificated rotorcraft can claim to exceed the standards to which older (or derivative) 

models were certificated—a claim Bell Canada itself may take advantage. However, this 

argument, as well as the petitioner’s comparison of the Bell 429 to older part 29 rotorcraft 

models, is not relevant to whether the exemption should have been granted.

The petitioner’s contention that the FAA erred as a matter of law and fact in finding that an 

exemption would not serve the public interest is also unpersuasive. The petitioner claims 

precedent and the agency’s own economic analysis establish that granting the exemption would 

provide important public benefits, and argues that its exemption request is “almost identical” to 

previous weight limitation exemptions granted to Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta), McDonnell Douglas 

Helicopter Corp. (McDonnell Douglas), and Kaman Aerospace Corp.

7 While the FAA reviews 

such exemptions for precedent, the fact that other exemptions have been granted does not ensure 

that further exemptions will be granted. Each case must be analyzed individually as to whether 

 6 Again, unlike Bell Canada, ICON did not seek relief to incorporate a safety feature that already existed in designs 

by other manufacturers who had not exceeded the established weight limit. Rather, ICON sought approval for extra 

weight solely to incorporate a new and unique safety feature, spin resistance, not found in other SLSA. ICON’s spin 

resistance technology directly addressed the leading cause of general aviation fatal accidents. In addition, the FAA 

had not initially considered SRA in establishing the regulatory maximum takeoff weight for light sport aircraft. 7 Agusta S.p.A. Exemption No. 6518 (Oct. 9, 1996); McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems, Exemption No. 6505 

(Sept. 5, 1996); Kaman Aerospace Corp., Exemption No. 6433 (April 25, 1996).
8

the conditions and rationale justify relief from a regulatory requirement. As explained in the 

Denial, the exemptions cited by the petitioner were granted after the FAA determined that an 

increase in gross weight for part 27 helicopters was necessary for the entire helicopter 

community, but prior to final rulemaking. Such is not the case here. To the extent the petitioner 

understood the Denial to require that rulemaking for the entire community be underway or an 

industry consensus exists before Bell Canada’s petition could be granted, we did not intend for 

the Denial to imply that the FAA relied on such thinking. Instead, the Denial merely provided the 

historical context for those exemptions. Additionally, to the extent those exemptions addressed 

applicability provisions, they suffer the same logical flaws as Bell’s current petition as discussed 

above.

Public interest

The Denial did not exclude EMS patients from its consideration of public interest, despite the 

petitioner’s argument that it did. In fact, the FAA’s position is that public interest includes more 

than Bell 429 customers and EMS patients. Public interest includes the entire populous, and the 

Denial found that there would be very minimal economic benefit to the overall public from 

granting the petition. As stated in the Denial, other normal category helicopters that do not 

require a gross weight exemption are currently operating or available in the market and can 

achieve similar operational capabilities proposed by the petitioner.

The Denial did not err in its competitive analysis by considering the interests of manufacturers 

located outside the United States. The Denial does not affect whether Bell Canada produces the 

Bell 429; rather, it affects under which part of the regulations the helicopter is certificated.

Bell Canada is also a non-domestic (non-U.S.) manufacturer, and it is not the only non-domestic 

manufacturer to have facilities in the United States. Similarly, the petitioner argues the Denial 

should have considered the impact of the exemption on U.S. jobs. However, the denial of the 

petitioner’s exemption request does not prevent the manufacture of the Bell 429. Bell Canada 

can create the same number of jobs by pursuing certification of the Bell 429 under part 29 or by 

building other Bell Canada helicopters.

Lastly, to the extent the petition states it has presented significant additional facts, they are not 

clearly identified or explained in the petition. In addition, when significant additional facts are 

submitted with a reconsideration request, they must include an explanation of why they were not 

presented in the original petition (14 CFR § 11.101). The petitioner provides two explanations 

for its submission of additional facts. The first is that the Denial relied upon information 

submitted by commenters during the comment period, which failed to give the petitioner a 

procedural opportunity to respond. This argument not only incorrectly describes the findings in 

the Denial, but it also depicts a situation present for every exemption request published in the 

Federal Register. The second is that the petitioner did not believe certain information was 

necessary because of prior exemptions granted by the FAA. Petitioner’s strategic decision failed 

to account for differences between its petition and the earlier exemptions on which it relied. 

Neither explanation adequately justifies the petitioner’s failure to submit its data with its original 

exemption request or supports the petitioner’s position that the FAA erred by considering all 

information before it prior to rendering its decision.
9

The FAA’s Decision:

In consideration of the foregoing, I find that this grant of exemption would not be in the public 

interest and that the case presented on reconsideration does not warrant a change to the original 

conclusions. The petitioner may have submitted additional details to support its exemption 

petition but there was no new information to consider beyond that provided in the original 

petition for exemption. I find that there were no factual errors or incorrect interpretations of law, 

regulation, or precedent by the FAA in the denial of the original petition. Therefore, pursuant to 

the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. §§ 40113 and 44701, reconsideration of the petition of Bell 

Helicopter Textron Canada Limited for an exemption from 14 CFR § 27.1 is denied.

Issued in Washington, DC, on October 17, 2014.

//s//

Michael G. Whitaker

Deputy Administrator