2020 IL App (1st) 190701-U

No. 1-19-0701 

Order filed April 16, 2020

Fourth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

CARMELITA JACKSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

THE CITY OF CHICAGO, PATRICK MARTINEZ, 

CHANITA PAUL, DESIREE TRIPLETT, CHARITA 

PAUL, ANDREA ROBERSON, BRANDON PAUL, 

MICHAEL DINEEN, HAROLD HUFF, MICHAEL 

McDEVITT, KEVIN GARDNER, SHERMAN MORRIS, 

PAUL DOWNING, MICHAEL GAINES, DAMON 

STEWART, JOHN KILL, and THE POLICE 

DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO,

Defendants,

(Patrick Martinez, Defendant-Appellee).

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 15 L 8605 

Honorable 

Sandra G. Ramos, 

Judge, presiding 

JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice Gordon and Justice Burke concurred in the judgment. 
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ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court neither abused its discretion by continuing the trial one day after the 

scheduled trial date nor deprived the plaintiff of her right to an impartial trial. 

¶ 2 Plaintiff Carmelita Jackson sued defendant Patrick Martinez and others, alleging, inter alia, 

intentional infliction of emotional distress and battery. After a hearing on the claims against 

defendant only, the trial court dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and 

found defendant not liable for battery. 

¶ 3 Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court committed reversible error because it 

(1) rescheduled the hearing and thereby deprived her of ample time to rearrange her work schedule 

and reschedule the appearance of her witnesses, and (2) violated her right to an impartial trial 

where the court’s “outburst and other mishaps” showed that the trial judge was biased against her.

¶ 4 Defendant has not filed a brief on appeal, so this matter is taken for consideration on the 

record and plaintiff’s pro se brief only. 

¶ 5 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.1

 

¶ 6 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 7 In 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, several other private individuals, the 

City of Chicago and its police department, and several Chicago police officers, alleging battery, 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence and defamation. According to her 

complaint, plaintiff alleged that her tenant and several of the tenant’s acquaintances (including 

defendant) confronted plaintiff on three occasions in August 2013 and struck her multiple times 

about her face and body, threatened her with a baseball bat, and shot her in the chest with a pistol. 

1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this 

appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order. 
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Regarding defendant, plaintiff alleged that “a pistol came loose” during the third encounter and 

defendant picked up the pistol, aimed it at plaintiff and shot her in the chest. According to plaintiff, 

the police who investigated this offense falsely claimed that she ran from the scene and “were 

disinclined to believe [her].” 

¶ 8 In his answer, defendant denied plaintiff’s allegations and asserted that he tried to defend 

himself when plaintiff attacked him first with a bat, then with her gun, and finally with a club. 

¶ 9 The court’s February 13, 2018 order, which stated that plaintiff’s “attorney did not show 

or appear,” set this matter for trial on the allegations against defendant for March 11, 2019. 

On February 19, 2019, plaintiff’s attorney moved the court to allow him to withdraw as counsel 

due to “a breakdown in communication” and “irreconcilable differences” with his client. Counsel 

also asked the court to grant plaintiff 21 days to seek other counsel. The court heard that motion 

on March 1, 2019, and entered and continued it to the March 11 trial date. On March 5, 2019, 

plaintiff’s counsel filed an emergency motion to continue the March 11 trial date, stating that 

plaintiff had two key eyewitnesses who were unavailable and would not confirm their appearance 

at the March 11 trial date. That motion, however, did not identify the eyewitnesses or elaborate on 

the nature of their unavailability. On March 7, 2019, the court denied plaintiff’s motion to continue 

the March 11 trial date.

¶ 10 On the morning of March 11, 2019, the court ruled that the March 11 trial date would stand 

and ordered defendant to tender instanter a copy of his deposition transcript upon plaintiff’s 

payment of the transcript prior to the start of the hearing. Furthermore, defendant moved the court 

to bar the testimony of plaintiff’s eyewitness Brian Brown based on plaintiff’s alleged violation of 

discovery rules. Also, the parties filed a signed stipulation regarding the costs billed to plaintiff for 
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her emergency medical treatment and medical services and defendant’s agreement to admit into 

evidence plaintiff’s medical records and bills. In addition, the court entered an oral order that 

continued the bench trial to March 12, 2019, at 9 a.m. 

¶ 11 On March 12, 2019, after hearing evidence on plaintiff’s claims against defendant, the trial 

court (1) dismissed plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress pursuant to 

section 2-1110 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1110 (West 2018)) for failure to 

meet her burden of proof to establish a prima facie case, and (2) found defendant not liable for 

battery.

¶ 12 Plaintiff timely appealed.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 First, plaintiff argues the trial court committed reversible error because it “abruptly shut 

down the trial” on the initial March 11, 2019 hearing date and “continued it to the next day, March 

12, 2019,” and thereby deprived her of ample time to rearrange her work schedule and reschedule 

the appearance of her witnesses. Plaintiff contends that the abrupt change of the trial date caused 

her to lose witnesses and prevented her from presenting her full case to the court. 

¶ 15 The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion 

of the trial court and should not be overturned on appeal unless that discretion has been abused. 

Huber v. Reznick, 107 Ill. App. 3d 529, 543 (1982). The trial court abuses its discretion when its 

decision is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would adopt its view. 

People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Kotara. L.L.C., 379 Ill. App. 3d 276, 286 (2008). 

A critical factor in the review of such rulings is whether the party who sought the continuance 

showed diligence in proceeding with the cause. Trillet v. Bachman, 96 Ill. App. 3d 477, 481 (1981). 
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Once a cause is reached for hearing, a motion for continuance should show sufficient excuse for 

the delay and the movant should present especially grave reasons to support her request. 

Teitelbaum v. Reliable Welding Co., 106 Ill. App. 3d 651, 656 (1982). 

¶ 16 In order to support a claim of error on appeal, the appellant has the burden to present a 

sufficiently complete record. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). In fact, “[f]rom 

the very nature of an appeal it is evident that the court of review must have before it the record to 

review in order to determine whether there was the error claimed by the appellant.” Id. at 391. 

Where the issue on appeal relates to the conduct of a hearing or proceeding, this issue is not subject 

to review absent a report or record of the proceeding. Instead, absent a record, “it [is] presumed 

that the order entered by the trial court [is] in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual 

basis.” Id. at 392. Any doubts arising from an incomplete record will be resolved against the 

appellant. Id. 

¶ 17 The record before this court consists of only common law documents, which nevertheless 

indicate that the trial court afforded the parties the opportunity to conduct discovery and present 

evidence over the two consecutive hearing days held in this matter. Furthermore, plaintiff’s 

assertion on appeal—that the abrupt “shut down” of the scheduled March 11 hearing prevented 

her from presenting eyewitness testimony—is inconsistent with her arguments in her motions 

before the trial court to continue the March 11 trial date due to her eyewitnesses’ unavailability. 

¶ 18 There is no indication in the record that, when the court issued its oral order continuing the 

bench trial to the next day, plaintiff moved the court for another continuance. In addition, there is 

no indication that the case against defendant was complex or difficult to prepare, or that plaintiff’s 

preparation was frustrated by any unique or unforeseeable intervening circumstances. Moreover, 
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plaintiff failed to indicate before the trial court and here on appeal the identity of her necessary 

witnesses, the nature of their expected testimony or the steps taken to secure their appearance at 

the trial.

¶ 19 Without a report of proceedings, this court has no knowledge of what arguments the parties 

made before the court, what facts were presented and found credible by the court, or if there was 

any additional reasoning and rationale that provided the basis for the trial court’s rulings. Under 

these circumstances, this court must presume that the trial court acted in conformity with the law 

and ruled properly after considering the evidence before it. Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc., 

217 Ill. 2d 144, 156-57 (2005); Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92. We cannot say the trial court’s decision 

to commence the bench trial on March 11, 2019, as scheduled, and continue the trial to its 

completion the next day was arbitrary or resulted from an abuse of discretion. 

¶ 20 Finally, plaintiff argues that the court violated her right to an impartial trial due to an 

“outburst and other mishaps during hearings and the actual trial, [which] were clearly biased.” She 

also states that the trial judge “went further and began to chant in open court ‘she is from a certain 

community in the Chicago area that is very dangerous and drug infected.’ ” 

¶ 21 We cannot review this claim due to the condition of the record on appeal, which does not 

contain any hearing transcript, report of proceedings or bystander’s report, pursuant to Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 323 (eff. July 1, 2017). Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92. 

¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 

¶ 24 Affirmed.