2024 IL App (1st) 240312-U

No. 1-24-0312B 

Order filed June 7, 2024 

Fifth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

DAVID BYNUM, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County. 

No. 23 CR 92301 

Honorable 

Alfredo Maldonado, 

Judge Presiding. 

JUSTICE NAVARRO delivered the judgment of the court.

 Presiding Justice Mitchell and Justice Lyle concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant detained while 

awaiting trial. 

¶ 2 Defendant David Bynum was charged with first-degree murder and denied bail. Thereafter, 

Public Acts 101-652 and 102-1104 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness 

Act (Act), became effective and amended Article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 

(Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2022)). Due to the Act, Bynum filed a petition for pretrial 

release, and the State filed its own verified petition for pretrial detention. Following a hearing, the 
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circuit court ordered Bynum detained while awaiting trial. Bynum now appeals the detention order

and contends that the court erred by detaining him while awaiting trial. For the reasons that follow, 

we affirm the court’s detention order. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In July 2023, Bynum was arrested and charged with first-degree murder for allegedly 

pushing his wife down a flight of stairs and killing her. Following a bond hearing, the circuit court 

held him on no bail and denied him pretrial release. Two months later, the Act became effective. 

See Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52.

¶ 5 On February 1, 2024, Bynum filed a petition to grant pretrial release pursuant to the Act, 

asserting that pretrial release conditions such as electronic monitoring, GPS monitoring or home 

confinement would mitigate any concerns the circuit court had about his threat to the safety of the 

community. The same day, the State filed a verified petition for pretrial detention under section 

110-6.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)), asserting that Bynum was a danger to the 

community. In the petition, the State posited that no condition or combination of conditions of 

release could mitigate that risk. The State’s petition included an attachment that detailed the 

specifics of the alleged first-degree murder, Bynum’s criminal history, and other instances of 

alleged violence he committed against the victim and one of their children. 

¶ 6 The circuit court subsequently held a detention hearing, where the State proffered that, on 

the evening of June 28, 2023, Bynum and the victim had been arguing. When Bynum refused to 

leave their residence after the victim’s request, she called her sister to come help. At around 2 a.m., 

Bynum and the victim were outside their residence arguing while their two children and one of 

their children’s friends observed the argument from inside the residence. The children saw the 

victim “reach[] toward” Bynum, and Bynum subsequently “shove” her down concrete stairs. One 
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of the children observed Bynum use both of his hands. The couple’s children ran to the landing of 

the stairs and observed that the victim was unresponsive. When officers arrived at the scene, they 

did not observe any injuries to Bynum. Following the incident, the children and the victim’s sister 

were interviewed about their observations. According to a recorded statement from the victim’s

sister, there was nothing that the victim could have tripped over to fall down the stairs by herself. 

Two days later, the victim died, and her cause of death was blunt force trauma due to assault. 

¶ 7 The State asserted that Bynum had a lengthy criminal history, including a 2003 conviction 

for possession of a controlled substance for which he was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, 

a 2007 conviction for resisting a peace officer for which he was sentenced to 15 months’ 

imprisonment, a 2009 conviction for aggravated robbery and aggravated discharge of a firearm for 

which he was sentenced to 4.5 years’ imprisonment, and a 2015 conviction for unlawful use of a 

weapon by a felon for which he received a sentence of 6 years’ imprisonment. The State also noted 

that there had been 10 documented police calls involving Bynum and the victim between 2020 and 

2022, several of which involved Bynum allegedly committing acts of violence toward her. The 

State further observed that, during the interview of the couple’s 14-year-old daughter, she reported 

that Bynum had previously been violent toward her on multiple occasions. Ultimately, the State 

contended that the proof was evident, or the presumption great, Bynum committed first-degree 

murder, and he posed a real and present threat to the safety of the community.

¶ 8 In response, Bynum’s defense counsel asserted that the victim had been drinking heavily

the night of her fall due to the passing of her cousin and she was upset with him for not being more 

sympathetic. According to counsel, the victim’s blood-alcohol concentration that night was 0.24. 

After the victim told him to leave the residence, Bynum called a taxi and packed his belongings. 

As Bynum was waiting in front of the residence, the victim came out and confronted him about 
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allegedly taking some of her belongings. The victim began to physically accost him, including 

pulling out one of his dreadlocks. Counsel disagreed that Bynum did not have any injuries and 

noted that the police inventoried a dreadlock and a dreadlock could be seen missing from his head 

in a photograph. Later, when Bynum and the victim were by the concrete stairs, she began pushing 

him. After Bynum regained his balance, the victim backpedaled away from him and accidentally 

fell down the stairs. Bynum rushed to the victim’s aid, and an ambulance was called. 

¶ 9 Defense counsel posited that there was various evidence contradicting the State’s proffer 

of an alleged murder. For one, counsel highlighted that medical records reflected the family telling 

medical personnel that the victim fell down the stairs. Additionally, based on video from the 

responding officers’ body-worn cameras, the blinds of the window near the stairs were down 

resulting in a view of the stairs being obstructed. Further, according to counsel, the victim’s sister 

initially told medical personnel that Bynum had been punching the victim, but medical personnel 

told the police that they did not observe any evidence of Bynum punching the victim. Counsel also 

pointed out various inconsistencies from the interviews of the children such that counsel theorized 

they did not even observe the moment when the victim fell down the stairs.

¶ 10 Concerning the allegations of violence raised by the couple’s daughter, defense counsel 

asserted that they were never reported to the police. Counsel also noted that, despite several calls 

to the police by the victim, only one incident resulted in Bynum being arrested and charged. The 

charge was for criminal damage to property, and the case was later dismissed. In addition, counsel 

observed that Bynum had never been arrested for domestic battery or assault, which was in contrast 

to the victim’s own criminal history. According to counsel, she was a convicted felon and had been 

arrested for multiple batteries, including domestic battery. Lastly, counsel discussed various 

alleged mitigating evidence, including Bynum’s employment prior to his arrest for murder. 
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Ultimately, counsel contended that the State failed to show the proof was evident, or the 

presumption great, Bynum committed first-degree murder and failed to show he was a danger to 

any identifiable individual or the community at large. Counsel also concluded that there were 

conditions of pretrial release that would mitigate any concerns the circuit court had, including 

electronic monitoring or GPS monitoring. 

¶ 11 Following the parties’ arguments, the circuit court orally found the proof was evident that 

Bynum committed first-degree murder, and he posed a real and present threat to the safety of the 

community given his extensive criminal history and the apparent animosity between him and 

members of his family. Additionally, the court concluded that no condition or combinations of 

conditions of pretrial release could mitigate that threat because of his lengthy criminal history, 

including multiple periods of incarceration. The court observed that his previous incarcerations for 

“serious felony convictions” were “pretty strong evidence” that there were not conditions of 

release that could mitigate the risk he posed. Specifically regarding electronic monitoring, the court 

asserted that Bynum could easily remove the device and be a danger to the community. 

Consequently, the court orally ordered Bynum to be detained while awaiting trial. 

¶ 12 In the circuit court’s written order, it found that the proof was evident, or the presumption 

great, Bynum committed first-degree murder. The court also found that he posed a real and present 

threat to the safety of the community because of the alleged acts of violence between him and the 

victim, the animosity between him and members of his family, and his history of violent offenses. 

Lastly, the court concluded no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and 

present threat that Bynum posed because he has been in prison previously for serious offenses, 

which did not deter his alleged behavior in the present case. The court therefore ordered Bynum 

detained while awaiting trial. 
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¶ 13 This appeal followed. 

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 Bynum contends that the circuit court erred in concluding the State had met its burden of 

proving all three elements necessary to detain him pretrial under the Act: (1) that the proof was 

evident, or the presumption great, he committed an eligible offense; (2) that he posed a real and 

present threat to the community or a specific person; and (3) that no condition or combination of 

conditions could mitigate the real and present threat he posed. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1)-(3) 

(West 2022).

¶ 16 In the instant case, Bynum was arrested in July 2023 for first-degree murder, which was 

before the September 18, 2023, effective date of the Act (see Rowe, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52) and 

has been in custody ever since. Under these circumstances, Bynum had the option to remain in 

pretrial detention or file a petition to reconsider. See People v. Kurzeja, 2023 IL App (3d) 230434, 

¶ 14. Bynum chose the latter, triggering section 110-7.5(b)(1) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-

7.5(b)(1) (West 2022)). Under that section, individuals, like Bynum, who were previously held on 

no bail and detained pretrial before the Act became effective and had been charged with certain 

offenses, including first-degree murder, must be given a hearing within 90 days of filing a “motion 

for reconsideration of pretrial release conditions,” i.e., the petition to grant pretrial release that 

Bynum filed. Id. Section 110-7.5(b)(1) of the Code, in turn, references a hearing proceeding under 

section 110-6.1 of the Code (id. § 110-6.1). Although under that section, the court may only deny 

a defendant pretrial release upon a verified petition by the State (id. § 110-6.1(a)), the State filed 

one in the instant case in response to Bynum’s petition for reconsideration, which was proper. See 

Kurzeja, 2023 IL App (3d) 230434, ¶ 14. 
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¶ 17 Turning to the pretrial detention hearing under section 110-6.1 of the Code, before 

conducting such a hearing, all defendants begin with the presumption that they are eligible for 

pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). As relevant to Bynum, in order to continue 

his pretrial detention, the State “bear[ed] the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence” 

three elements. Id. First, the State had to show “the proof [was] evident or the presumption great” 

that Bynum committed first-degree murder, which is an eligible offense under the Act. Id. § 110-

6.1(a), (e)(1). Second, the State had to show that he “pose[d] a real and present threat to the safety” 

of the community or any specific person based on the specific articulable facts of the case. Id. § 

110-6.1(e)(2). Third, the State had to show that “no condition or combination of conditions *** 

[could] mitigate *** the real and present threat to the safety” of the community or any specific 

person based on the specific articulable facts of the case. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(3). 

¶ 18 We review the circuit court’s determinations on whether the State met its burden on these

three elements under the manifest-weight standard. People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 

12. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is 

clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence 

presented.” People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008). However, the court’s ultimate decision

to detain a defendant pretrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Inman, 2023 IL App 

(4th) 230864, ¶¶ 10-11. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the [circuit] court’s decision is 

arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable [citation] or where no reasonable person would agree with the 

position adopted by the [circuit] court.” People v. Becker, 239 Ill. 2d 215, 234 (2010).

¶ 19 As to the first element, the State proffered that Bynum intentionally pushed the victim 

down concrete stairs based on the observations of multiple witnesses, including his own children, 

and committed first-degree murder, an offense detainable under the Act. See 725 ILCS 5/110-
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6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022). The State supported its proffer with evidence that Bynum previously 

committed acts of violence against the victim. It is true that Bynum’s defense counsel highlighted 

the victim’s significant blood-alcohol concentration and evidence that was inconsistent with the 

State’s theory of first-degree murder. But given that the State’s proffer credibly showed that 

Bynum intentionally pushed the victim down the stairs, which was corroborated by evidence he 

had been violent toward her in the past, the court’s finding that the State met its burden to show 

the proof was evident, or the presumption great, that Bynum committed first-degree murder was 

reasonable and based on the evidence presented. See People v. Reed, 2023 IL App (1st) 231834, ¶ 

25 (observing that, even though the defendant may have a defense at trial to the charged offense, 

that does not necessarily negate the State’s showing). Consequently, the court did not commit 

manifest with its finding on the first element. 

¶ 20 Turning to the second element, given the allegations of the instant case, Bynum’s alleged 

acts of violence toward the victim and his daughter in the past, and his lengthy criminal history, 

which included convictions for aggravated discharge of a firearm, resisting a peace officer and 

another weapons-related offense, the State demonstrated that Bynum is a real and present threat to 

the safety of the community and his family. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1), (2) (West 2022) 

(providing that, in determining whether the defendant is a danger to the community or a specific 

person, the circuit court may consider “[t]he nature and circumstances of any offense charged” and 

“[t]he history and characteristics of the defendant”). Given this, the court’s finding that he was a 

real and present threat to the safety of the community and his family was reasonable and based on 

the evidence presented. See People v. Boyd, 2024 IL App (1st) 240202-U, ¶ 20 (finding “the State 

undoubtedly demonstrated that [the defendant was] a clear danger to the community” based on the 

allegations underlying his first-degree murder charge and his criminal background, which 
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consisted of violent offenses involving firearms).1

 Consequently, the court did not commit 

manifest with its finding on the second element. 

¶ 21 Lastly, we turn to the third element, where Bynum argues that the State did not present any 

evidence that pretrial release conditions would be inappropriate for him. Bynum posits that the 

State jumbled all the evidence it proffered and never discussed the conditions of pretrial release 

other than in conclusory fashion.

¶ 22 It is indisputable that, when arguing for Bynum to be detained while awaiting trial during 

the detention hearing, the State did not reference the third factor. In fact, the State’s only reference 

to the factor was in a preprinted assertion in its verified petition for pretrial detention. Nevertheless, 

the evidence the State proffered during the hearing provided a sufficient basis for the circuit court 

to make a finding that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the threat Bynum 

posed such that the court could find the State met its burden. In turn, through the court’s oral and 

written findings, which we may consider in tandem (see People v. Vance, 2024 IL App (1st) 

232503, ¶¶ 29, 32), it concluded that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the 

threat Bynum posed because he had been incarcerated previously on serious felony offenses, which 

did not deter his alleged behavior in the instant case. See 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(3) (West 2022) 

(outlining the various factors the circuit court should consider in determining the conditions, if 

any, of pretrial release including “the history and characteristics of the defendant”). The court’s 

conclusion was exemplified by its concern that, if it ordered Bynum to be on electronic monitoring, 

he could simply remove the device from his body and render the condition futile. The fact that 

Bynum has four previous convictions, including one for resisting a peace officer, demonstrates a 

1 Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023), unpublished Rule 23 orders 

filed on, or after, January 1, 2021, “may be cited for persuasive purposes.”
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clear disregard of the law. See People v. Andino-Acosta, 2024 IL App (2d) 230463, ¶ 25 (finding 

the circuit “court could reasonably infer that *** conditions of release would be insufficient” for 

the defendant where he was charged with resisting a peace officer, which “show[ed] disrespect 

toward the law”). Bynum’s criminal history demonstrates an inability or unwillingness to be a lawabiding citizen such that the court’s concern about a similar disregard of pretrial release conditions 

was founded upon reason and logic. See People v. Davis, 2023 IL App (1st) 231856, ¶ 31 

(observing that the “[d]efendant’s history showed an unwillingness to follow the rules set out by 

law enforcement authorities” and given the State’s proffer about his criminal history, the circuit 

court did not err “in concluding that [he] presented a threat to the community that no conditions of 

pretrial release could mitigate”). 

¶ 23 In arguing that the State failed to meet its burden on the third element, Bynum heavily 

relies upon People v. White, 2024 IL App (1st) 232245, ¶ 27 and Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, 

¶ 21, where this court found that the circuit court erred in finding the State met its burden on the 

third element. In White, 2024 IL App (1st) 232245, ¶¶ 8, 13, the defendant had no previous criminal 

convictions, and Pretrial Services recommended that he be released with pretrial monitoring while 

awaiting trial. Similarly, in Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶¶ 7, 19, the defendant had no 

criminal history and had the lowest possible scores from Pretrial Services on whether he would 

commit new criminal activity or fail to appear. Moreover, the circuit court’s order and its oral 

pronouncement were devoid of any reasoning as to why less restrictive means would be 

insufficient to mitigate the threat the defendant posed. Id. ¶ 20.

¶ 24 In the present case, unlike in White and Stock, Bynum has an extensive criminal history, 

including multiple convictions involving weapons, and the record is devoid of the Pretrial Services 

assessment score—though we cannot fathom someone with Bynum’s background would score low 
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or be recommended for release. And critically, the circuit court provided detailed reasons as to 

why less restrictive means would be insufficient to mitigate the threat Bynum posed. As such, the 

court’s finding that the State met its burden to show no condition or combination of conditions 

could mitigate the real and present threat he posed was reasonable and based on the evidence 

presented. Consequently, the court did not commit manifest with its finding on the third element. 

¶ 25 Where the circuit court did not commit manifest error in finding the State met its burden 

to show all three elements necessary for Bynum’s pretrial detention (see 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1)-

(3) (West 2022)), its ultimate decision to order him detained pretrial was not arbitrary, fanciful or 

unreasonable. Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Bynum detained 

while awaiting trial. 

¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 27 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 28 Affirmed.