J-S31031-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: Y.A.P., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: N.N.L., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1546 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered May 16, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Orphans’ Court at No(s): 

2021-A9094

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 4, 2022

Appellant N.N.L. (hereinafter “Mother”) appeals from the Decree entered 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Orphans’ Court Division on 

May 16, 2022, granting the Petition filed by the Bucks County Children and 

Youth Social Services Agency (hereinafter the “Agency”) to involuntarily 

terminate Mother’s parental rights to her minor child Y.A.P. (hereinafter 

“Child”).

1

 Following a careful review, we affirm. 

The orphans’ court detailed the relevant facts and procedural history 

herein as follows:

Y.A.P. was born [i]n March [] 2011. See N.T. 11/05/2021,

p. 24. Mother’s own actions were the catalysts that brought Child 

under the care of the Agency. Id. at p. 30. The initial referral of 

Child to the Agency was in October 2018, when concerns were 

raised as to Child’s welfare following an instance of alleged 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Child was born in March of 2011. 
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physical abuse at the hands of Mother. Id. As a result, Mother was 

criminally charged with and subsequently pled guilty to one count 

of Endangering the Welfare of a Child2 and one count of Simple 

Assault.3 She was sentenced to two years of probation.4Id. at 

pp. 79-80.

Child came into care of the Agency on October 11, 2018, 

pursuant to an Emergency Order issued by the Bucks County 

Dependency Court. Id. at pp. 73-74. A Shelter Care Order was 

entered the next day. Id. at p. 74. A subsequent dependency

hearing occurred on November 26, 2018, wherein Child was 

adjudicated dependent. Id. Child has been in the care of the 

Agency since that date more than three and one-half years ago. 

Id.

After Child was adjudicated dependent, the Agency sought 

to implement a Family Service Plan with the ultimate goal of 

reunifying Mother and Child. Id. at p. 75. This plan primarily 

focused on having Mother acknowledge the incident that brought 

Child into the care of the Agency, and to provide Child with the 

support she needed going forward. Id. On February 1, 2019, 

Ashley Lorenz (“Ms. Lorenz”), an Agency caseworker involved in

this case from December 2018 until March 2019, met with Mother 

to review the Family Service Plan. Id. at pp. 65, 76. At the 

meeting, it was also requested of Mother that she provide income 

verification. Id. at p. 76. Mother refused to sign the Family Service 

Plan and was also unwilling to provide income verification. Id.

On March 15, 2019, a meeting took place with the Agency, 

Mother, Child’s foster parents, Child’s guardian ad litem, and 

Mother's legal counsel. Id. The purpose of this meeting initiated 

by the Agency was to review the reunification objectives of the 

Family Service Plan and to discuss Child’s progress.5Id. at pp. 76-

77. Again, Mother refused to sign the Family Service Plan. Id. at 

p. 78.

On April 25, 2019, Desiree Mullen (“Ms. Mullen”), a 

supervisor in the permanency division of the Agency, and Kristen 

Griego (“Ms. Griego”), the caseworker involved in this matter from 

March 2019 until June 2020, went to Mother’s residence in another 

attempt to discuss the Family Service Plan. Id. at pp. 64-65, 68, 

78. While at the residence, Ms. Mullen attempted to discuss with 

Mother the reasons for Child’s removal from her care, referring to 

the physical abuse perpetrated by Mother against Child. Id. at p. 

78. Mother, once again, refused to review the Family Service Plan.

Id. Mother also denied that the allege[d] abuse occurred. Id. at p. 

79-80. She also accused Ms. Mullen of “overcommunicating” with 

her about changes that had occurred to the visitation schedule. 
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Id. Mother then proceeded to “kick [ Ms. Mullen] out of her home.”

Id. at pp. 78-79. Later that day, Mother left a voicemail with the 

Agency stating that Ms. Mullen was no longer allowed in her home 

because Ms. Mullen had not been “understanding of her migraine 

that she had that day.” Id. at p. 81.

On June 21, 2019, there was a meeting between Ms. Griego 

and Mother where another attempt was made to have Mother sign 

the Family Service Plan. Id. at p. 82. Mother, once again, refused 

to sign the Plan.

In early November 2019, Mother communicated to the 

Agency that she would not meet with their workers unless her 

attorney was present at the meetings. Id. From November 2019 

into early December 2019, the Agency attempted to contact 

Mother concerning her request to meet with the Agency. Id. 

Mother was unresponsive to the Agency’s attempts to have a 

meeting. Id. However, a meeting was ultimately scheduled and 

held on December 13, 2019. At this meeting, Mother did 

acknowledge that “she needed to work on her relationship with 

[Child].” Id. at pp. 82-83. In April 2020, the Agency sent Mother 

a letter concerning the objectives of the Family Service Plan. Id. 

However, the Agency did not receive a response or any 

communication regarding the contents of its letter. Id. at p. 83.

During the time Child has been under the care of the 

Agency, numerous therapeutic services have been offered to both 

Mother and Child.

6

Id. at p. 84. One such therapist was Tedd 

Bradford (“Mr. Bradford”) of K/S Services, who remained actively

involved in this matter from December 2019 until August 2020.7

Id. at pp. 84, 86. Mr. Bradford’s involvement was for the purpose 

of “work[ing] on” the relationship between Mother and Child. Id. 

at p. 85. More specifically, Mr. Bradford sought to facilitate an

apology from Mother, to Child, regarding the physical abuse 

incident that initially brought Child into the care of the Agency. An 

additional goal was having family therapy sessions between 

Mother and Child. Id. at pp. 85-87.

On July 8, 2020, there was a meeting among Mother, 

Mother’s attorney, Mr. Bradford, and Child’s individual therapist. 

Id. at p. 88. At this meeting, the Agency explicitly informed Mother 

what must occur in order for her to be reunified with Child. Id. 

Mother was informed that in order to move forward with 

reunification, she would be required to acknowledge the past 

abuse and to apologize to Child for what happened, for the 

purpose of rebuilding trust with Child. Id. at pp. 88-89. Mother 

was also told that for family therapy sessions to commence with 

Mr. Bradford, she would be required to acknowledge and apologize 
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for the abuse so that Child would feel comfortable attending family 

therapy sessions with Mother. Id. at p. 99. While Mother initially 

agreed to engage in reunification therapy with Child, during an

August 14, 2020 home visit, Mother recanted her agreement and 

told the Agency that she would not write an apology letter because 

she did not feel comfortable putting anything in writing. Id. at pp. 

90-91.

At a September 3, 2020 meeting with Mr. Bradford, Child’s 

individual therapist, and Mother, Mother was once again, explicitly 

told that she needed to be honest with Child about the physical 

abuse, and that she needed to apologize to Child. Id. at p. 91. 

Mother purportedly replied that she had already agreed to 

apologize to Child and that “she didn’t understand why the issue 

was continuing to be brought up.” Id. at p. 92. On January 12,

2021, there was a virtual meeting among the Agency's clinical 

team, Mother, and Mother’s attorney. Id. at p. 94. The Agency, 

yet again, explained to Mother that she needed to acknowledge 

the past abuse, provide Child with an apology, and provide 

assurances to Child that it would not happen again. Id. At this 

meeting, Mother indicated that if Laura Reynolds (“Ms. 

Reynolds”), another family therapist at K/S Services, believed that 

an apology was necessary to move forward, then Mother would 

provide the apology. Id. at p. 94.

During a February 19, 2021 telephone call between Mother 

and the Agency, it was reiterated that in order to move forward 

with the goal of reunification, Mother needed to acknowledge the 

abuse, apologize to Child, and assure Child that it would not 

happen again. Id. at p. 95. Despite Mother stating that she was 

ready to apologize, Mother failed to provide an apology to Child. 

Id. Approximately one month later, on April 13, 2021, Mother 

lamented “about how everybody wants her to apologize to [Child] 

but no one... has ever apologized to her for the things that [have 

been] said to her.” Id. at pp. 95-96.

On April 22, 2021, Child’s case was transferred to Deborah 

Selby (“Ms. Selby”), a caseworker in the Agency’s permanency 

division. Id. at pp. 134-35. At that point, the Agency was still 

considering two options with regard to permanency for Child; that 

is, reunification with Mother or adoption. Id. at p. 135. Ms. Selby 

was also aware that the Agency was requiring Mother to 

acknowledge and take ownership of the physical abuse that she 

had directed toward Child. Id. at p. 137.

On April 29, 2021, Mother told Ms. Selby that she was not 

to contact her by phone, and that instead, Ms. Selby should only 

contact her via email, with Mother’s attorney copied on the 
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communications. Id. at p. 138. Mother also banned Ms. Selby from 

entering her residence. Id. At the time Ms. Selby took over the 

case, Mother was scheduled for visitation once a week for four 

hours, with family therapy facilitated by Ms. Reynolds to occur 

during the last hour of the visit. Id. at pp. 139-40. In April 2021, 

Mother attended three out of the four visitations offered. Id. at p. 

141. From May 2021 to September 2021, Mother only attended 

seven of the 20 visitation opportunities offered. Id.

In early May 2021, a conference was held among various 

members of the Agency to discuss the direction of Child’s case, 

since it had been nearly three years since Child had come into the 

care of the Agency, and little progress toward reunification had 

been made on the case. Id. at p. 170. On May 7, 2021, the Agency 

sent an email to Mother’s attorney, indicating that the Agency 

would support the goal of reunification if Mother “would agree to 

acknowledge, take ownership of the abuse, apologize to [Child] 

and reassure her that this abuse would not occur again. (The 

Agency) offered that this could be done in the presence of [Child's 

guardian ad litem].” Id. at pp. 171-72. The Agency proposal was 

articulated as follows:

Good Afternoon [Mother’s attorney]:

I have spoken with [the Agency] and I am authorized to 

make the following proposal to you on behalf of your 

client, [Mother].

For almost the entirety of this case, the Agency has 

advised you and previous counsel in correspondence and 

your client and her attorneys, during court proceedings, 

that there were two things that [Mother] would need to 

do for the Agency to support reunification with [Child].

The first was for her to unconditionally apologize to 

[Child] for what she did. The second was to provide 

assurances to [Child] that she would never do anything 

inappropriate again. [Mother] was never willing to do so.

At this point in time the Agency prepares to make the 

proposal one last time and here are the specifics:

1. An in-person meeting will be set up between 

[Mother], [Child], [Child’s guardian ad litem] and 

no one else at a neutral location.
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2. There will be no discussion, no questions, no 

comments and no statements other than what 

[Mother] will say to [Child].

3. [Child] will be told, before the meeting, that 

[Mother] wants to say some things to her and it is 

expected that she will listen.

4. [Child] will be told, before the meeting, that she 

will be unable to ask any questions or make any 

comments, as will her mother.

5. [Mother] will say the following and only the 

following: “[Child] I have thought carefully and I 

want to say two things to you — First, I am truly 

sorry that I have hit you in the past. Second, I 

promise that I will never hit you again with my 

hands or anything else.”

6. After this statement is made, all parties will leave 

the meeting.

If [Mother] is in agreement and follows through, the 

Agency will recommend to the Court that [Child] be 

returned to [Mother's] custody and that the case be 

closed.

See Exhibit CY5. Mother’s counsel responded to the email that 

Mother was unwilling to participate in the scenario proposed by 

the Agency. N.T. 11/05/2021, p. 173. Thereafter, on August 30, 

2021, the Agency filed a petition to terminate Mother’s Parental 

Rights and Duties pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), and ( 8) 

of the Adoption Act.

While the Agency’s petition was pending, Mother continued 

to be offered visits with Child. During a September 24, 2021 

visitation between Mother and Child, Patricia Samuel (“Ms. 

Samuel”), a case aide for the Agency, observed and memorialized 

the following interaction between Mother and Child8:

[Mother] was on time for the visit. Upon this 

worker's arrival, [Mother] and her two children, 

[Child’s Sister] and [Child’s Brother] came 

downstairs so that this worker could take them to 

the supermarket.

While in the supermarket, [Mother] purchased food 

and snacks for the children and the following 

dialogue took place. [The Child who is the subject
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of these proceedings] said: I didn't get one. 

Referring to a bag of donuts.

[Mother] replied: Where do you live? And then she 

repeated: Where do you live?

[Child] replied: With you. [Mother] then replied: 

No, you don’t. You live with [a foster family]. The 

food that I’m buying are for them, referring to 

[Child’s Sister] and [ Child’s Brother], because they 

live with me. You should be asking [your foster 

family] to buy your snacks because they are getting 

child support from me along with money from the 

Agency. Be grateful you’re getting this bag of 

[donuts].

While on the way back, [Mother] mentioned an 

upcoming TPR hearing, and the following dialogue 

took place. [Mother] stated: [Child], do you want to

come back home with me or do you want to be 

adopted? [Child] replied: Be adopted.

...

[Mother] replied: That’s okay. You go ahead and let 

them adopt you. I bet the Agency didn't tell you 

that when you are adopted, you won't see me or

your sister and brother again. You are running 

around, acting like you are crazy and telling these 

people that you are scared to come home. Did you

think about this -- do you think about how this is 

affecting your sister and brother?

Okay. You keep listening to these people and letting 

them tell you that if you are adopted you will be 

able to see your mother and siblings. These people

don’t care about you, and I keep telling you that. 

Oh, and just so you know, you are just a paycheck 

to them. Wait until they adopt you and they are no

longer receiving money from you or the Agency. Do 

you see how you are dressed now? Is that what the 

fuck you want. Tell them be careful what they wish 

for and you need to be careful of what you wish for. 

Oh, and if you think that you are going to be 
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adopted and still be able to come home--come to 

my house, you got me fucked up. Since you don’t 

give a fuck, guess what? I don’t give a fuck either.

[Ms. Samuel] said: [Mother], just so you know, I’m 

going to have to document this conversation. 

[Mother] replied: Go ahead. I don't give a fuck. I 

want you to tell them exactly what I said. I might 

write Debbie a letter.

When we arrived back to [Mother’s] house, [Child’s 

Sister] was crying. Mother stated: Why are you 

crying? Turn around and show your sister

[(referring to Child)] your tears. Do you see any 

tears on her face?

[Child’s Sister]: Mommy, please give [Child] one 

more chance. And [Mother] replied: I’m not keeping 

[Child] from coming home. Why don't you ask her

why she’s not coming home.

[Child's Sister] replied: [Child] will you please 

change your mind and come home? And [Child] 

replied: Maybe. [Child's Sister]: Mommy, she said

maybe.

[Mother] replied: Is that answer good enough for 

you? [Child’s Sister] replied: Yes. [Mother] said: 

This will be the last visit. I do not want any more

visits.

[Ms. Samuel] asked [Child’s Sister] and [Child’s 

Brother] to give their sister [(Child)] a hug and a 

kiss. Once [Ms. Samuel and Child] left, [Ms. 

Samuel] spoke to [Child] to help her unpack what 

just happened. [Child] yelled out: No child should 

be afraid to get hit by their mother.

This worker continued talking to [Child] and allowed 

her to vent. This worker drove [Child] to McDonald's 

and she ate dinner before returning to her foster

home.
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Upon arrival at the foster home, this worker briefed 

[Child's foster mother] so that she could have a talk 

with [Child] if necessary.

N.T. 11/05/2021, pp. 55-62.

Evidentiary hearings regarding the termination of Mother's 

Parental Rights took place on November 5, 2021, January 24, 

2022, March 30, 2022, and April 26, 2022.9 During the course of 

the hearings, the Court heard evidence from Agency caseworkers,

social workers, a family therapist, a former foster parent, and 

Mother.10 On May 12, 2022, this Court signed a Decree 

terminating Mother's Parental Rights and Duties concerning Child. 

On June 9, 2022, Mother filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the 

Superior Court from our May 12, 2022 Decree.

____

2 18 Pa. C.S. § 4304(a)(1).

3 18 Pa. C.S. § 2701(a)(1).

4 Mother pled guilty to these charges on September 17, 2019. See

N.T. 11/05/2021, p. 80; see also Criminal Docket number CP-09-

CR-0002145-2019.

5 During this meeting, a miscommunication occurred between 

Mother and Ms. Lorenz. During the meeting, Ms. Lorenz 

referenced an incident where Child made statements about 

wanting to harm herself. Ms. Lorenz made these statements with 

the belief that the foster care agency had previously relayed this 

information to Mother; however, it had not. Mother became 

understandably upset and subsequently “accused Ms. Lorenz of 

being a liar and that she was providing gross miscommunication 

and that she did not want to work with her.” N.T. 11/05/2021, p. 

77. Ms. Lorenz was subsequently removed from the case.

6

In addition to having an individual therapist and a family 

therapist, Child received trauma-focused cognitive behavioral 

therapy and wrap-around services from several different service 

providers, beginning in October 2018. N.T. 11/05/2021, pp. 123-

27.

7Mother subsequently requested that Mr. Bradford be removed 

because she felt “it was a waste of time, he was dragging his feet 

with starting the family therapy sessions and that he didn't 

communicate enough with her.” Id. at p. 86.

8 Mother has two additional children, a 4-year-old son and an 8-

year-old daughter, who are not in the custody or care of the 

Agency.
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9 Mother sought, and was granted, a continuance of the January 

24, 2022 Hearing because the individual who was to watch her 

two younger children was exposed to COVID-19, and, as a result, 

she did not have childcare. Mother failed to appear at the April 26, 

2022 Hearing, apparently out of fear of being arrested on an 

outstanding Domestic Relations bench warrant. N.T. 04/26/2022, 

p. 5.

10 Mother participated in her direct examination at the March 30, 

2022 hearing; however, she was not cross-examined by other 

interested parties due to her failure to appear at the April 26, 2022 

hearing. We further note that facts of record pertinent to the 

needs and welfare of Child are recited throughout Sections IVb 

and IVc of this Opinion, pages 14-22.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed 7/7/22, at 1-10. 

 The orphans’ court granted the Agency’s termination petition pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b). Mother filed her Concise 

Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on June 9, 2022, and the 

orphans’ court filed its Opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on July 7, 2022. 

 On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for this Court’s review: 

1. Did the trial court erroneously grant Bucks County Children & 

Youth Social Services Agency's petition to involuntarily 

terminate the parental rights of Appellant pursuant to 23 Pa. 

C.S. § 2511(a)(2) when the Agency failed to prove the grounds 

thereunder by clear and convincing evidence?

2. Did the trial court erroneously grant the Agency’s petition to 

involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Appellant 

pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(a)(5) when the Agency failed to 

prove the grounds thereunder by clear and convincing 

evidence?

3. Did the trial court erroneously grant the Agency’s petition to 

involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Appellant 

pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. § 2511(a)(8) when the Agency failed 

to prove the grounds thereunder by clear and convincing 

evidence?
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4. Did the trial court erroneously move its inquiry to the needs 

and welfare of the child pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b) and 

erroneously find that termination would best meet said needs 

and welfare when the Agency failed to prove grounds for 

involuntary termination of parental rights pursuant to the 

grounds alleged under 23 Pa. C.S. § 2511(a)(2), ( 5) and ( 8) 

by clear and convincing evidence?

5. Did the trial court erroneously find that the needs and welfare 

of the child as contemplated under 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b) were 

best met by terminating the parental rights of Appellant? 

Brief for Appellant at 5. 

 In support of her first claim, Mother states that she completed her 

probation and has remedied the abuse which caused Child to be removed from 

her care. She believes her reformation is evident in the fact that she is caring 

for her other two children and “no abuse continues toward Child.” Brief for 

Appellant at 15. She explains one of the therapists who had worked with the 

family, Laura Reynolds, LCSW, testified that “she (Ms. Reynolds) did not want 

to orchestrate an apology because it would not be true.” Id. (citing N.T. 

3/30/22, at 85-86). Appellant stresses that Ms. Reynolds also testified Child 

seems to enjoy Mother’s company and that she believed further family therapy 

would be useful. Id. (citing N.T., 3/30/22 at 100, 114). 

 In her next two issues, Mother asserts the Agency failed to prove the 

grounds for termination under Subsections (a)(5) and (8) of Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. 

Mother reiterates that the reason for the Child’s removal, the physical abuse, 

no longer exists. She also relies upon Ms. Reynolds’ observations that Child 

was affectionate with her siblings during visits, did not appear fearful of 
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Mother, and would benefit from additional therapy. Brief for Appellant at 17-

19. 

 In support of her final two issues, Mother posits the orphans’ court erred 

when engaging in an analysis under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b), because the 

Agency had failed to prove grounds for termination under Section 2511(a). 

She argues that ending contact between Mother and Child and between Child 

and her two siblings would fail to serve Child’s needs and welfare. Brief for 

Appellant at 19-21. 

This Court’s standard of review of a ruling on the 

involuntary termination of parental rights is as follows:

[A]ppellate review is limited to a determination of whether the 

decree of the termination court is supported by competent 

evidence. This standard of review corresponds to the standard 

employed in dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record, but it does not 

require the appellate court to accept the lower court's inferences 

or conclusions of law. ... An abuse of discretion does not result 

merely because the reviewing court might have reached a 

different conclusion; we reverse for an abuse of discretion “only 

upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill will.” ... “We have previously emphasized our 

deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of 

the parties spanning multiple hearings.” However, “[w]e must 

employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to 

determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported by 

competent evidence.”

In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358-59 (Pa. 2021) (citations omitted).

When considering a petition to terminate parental rights, an orphans’

court must balance a parent’s fundamental “right to make decisions 
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concerning the care, custody, and control” of his or her child with the “child's 

essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and support.” Id., at 358. The 

court also must consider Subsections 2511(a) and (b) independently:

 Termination of parental rights is controlled by statute. See 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511[.] Our case law has made clear that 

under Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated 

process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is 

on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must 

prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated 

in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s 

conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does 

the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant 

to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the 

child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major 

aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close 

attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing 

any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (case citations omitted).

Our Supreme Court has explained:

[T]he burden of proof is upon the party seeking termination to 

establish by “clear and convincing” evidence the existence of the 

statutory grounds for doing so. “[C]lear and convincing evidence 

is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty, and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in 

issue.’”

In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d at 358 (citations omitted). 

Where the orphans’ court terminates parental rights pursuant to 

multiple subsections of the Adoption Act, this Court need only agree with the 

orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 

2511(b), to affirm a termination of parental rights. In re Adoption of C.J.P., 
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114 A.3d 1046, 1050 (Pa.Super. 2015). As previously stated, the orphans’ 

court herein terminated Mother’s parental rights under Subsections 

2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We will analyze the court’s decision to 

terminate pursuant to Subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as 

follows:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the 

parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

With regard to termination under Section 2511(a)(2), this Court has

determined:
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[T]he following three elements must be met: (1) repeated and 

continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). 

“The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot be 

remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal[,] as well as incapacity to perform 

parental duties.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citation 

omitted).

[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a continued inability to 

conduct his [,or her] life in a fashion that would provide a safe 

environment for a child, whether that child is living with the parent 

or not, and the behavior of the parent is irremediable as supported 

by clear and competent evidence, the termination 

of parental rights is justified.” “A parent's vow to cooperate, after 

a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or 

availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or 

disingenuous.

Id. at 1105 (citation omitted).

In the instant case, we first address whether the orphans’ court abused 

its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§2511(a)(2). The court has determined that Mother’s refusal to act in an 

appropriate and reasonable parental capacity toward Child, and her refusal to 

remedy the situation, has caused Child to have been without essential parental 
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care. Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed 7/7/22, at 15. The court notes that Mother 

refused on three occasions to review and sign the Family Service Plan and 

repeatedly “obstinately and inexplicably refused to provide the 

acknowledgement, apology, and assurances necessary to promote rebuilding 

trust with Child, so that a loving parent-child relationship could be promoted 

and restored.” Id. at 16.

2

 

The orphans’ court also stresses Mother’s refusal to cooperate with 

school officials’ repeated requests to complete an evaluation has prevented

Child from having access to necessary educational services. Id. at 16-17. 

The court concludes: 

We heard no credible, reasonable explanations for Mother’s

failure to comply with the Agency’s proposed Family Service Plan, 

her failure to acknowledge the abuse, her refusal to provide Child 

with an apology, and her refusal to provide assurances to her 

understandably anxious Child that it would not happen again. Nor 

did we hear a reasonable explanation for Mother’s failure to sign 

the educational evaluation forms so that Child has access to the 

____________________________________________

2 Significantly, the orphans’ court explained:

We want to be clear that we are not holding that a parent 

must necessarily follow every dictate of the Agency in order to 

avoid termination of parental rights. In this case, the reunification 

predicate of acknowledgement, apology, and assurance was a 

reasonable consensus decision of mental health professionals 

which was intended to address the clear needs and welfare of 

Child- emotionally as well as physically. Mother’s continued failure 

to cooperate with reasonable Agency directives was harmful to 

Child in multiple significant ways, including Child’s needs for 

stability and security, and for a relationship with Mother which 

would be built upon a foundation of trust and love. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed 7/7/22, at 16 n. 12. 
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educational services she requires. Mother’s continued refusal to 

perform even the most basic parental duties regarding Child has 

been to the detriment of not only Child’s educational well-being, 

but to her emotional health as well. Accordingly, based on the 

evidence and testimony provided, and consistent with pertinent 

statutory and decisional law, we found that there was ample 

evidence which clearly and convincingly compelled us to terminate 

Mother's parental rights as to Child, pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(2).

Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed 7/7/22, at 17. 

Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s findings. Ms. 

Mullen testified that when she began working on this case in 2019, the primary 

objective of her fellow caseworkers and her was reunification. Most vital to 

this objective was Mother’s need to accept responsibility for the abuse she 

perpetrated upon Child and to develop an understanding of the impact it had 

had upon Child. N.T., 11/5/21 at 72-73. While the testimony of therapist 

Laura Reynolds (N.T., 3/30/22, at 68-173) suggests that Mother did make 

some progress toward reunification with Child, we agree with the orphans’

court, sitting as the factfinder, that Mother has failed to demonstrate 

consistent improvement.3 

____________________________________________

3 The orphans’ Court stated: 

Ms. Reynolds expressed her opinion that during therapy sessions 

she facilitated with both Mother and Child present, trust and 

communication had improved in 2020-2021. Given Ms. Reynold’s 

apparent view of her role as an advocate for Mother, and given 

the overwhelming evidence which contradicted her opinion, we 

found her testimony to be unpersuasive.

Orphans Court Opinion, filed 7/7/22, at 20, n. 13. 
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At meetings which occurred on February 1, 2019; March 15, 2019; April 

25, 2019; June 21, 2019; December 13, 2019; and in a letter in April of 2020, 

the Agency, through various caseworkers, attempted to have Mother review 

and execute the Family Service Plan, although she refused. Id. at 65, 76-83. 

Indeed, Mother admits “there were times throughout the pendency of this 

matter when Mother refused to sign the Agency’s Family Service Plans.”

However, Mother makes numerous excuses for her refusals, including being 

upset at learning Child had threatened to harm herself in one instance and 

suffering from a migraine at another time. See N.T. 3/30/22, at 176-199; 

Brief for Appellant at 7-8. 

Mother also admits she sees no need to apologize according to what she 

characterizes as a “pre-written script,” and instead claims she stated 

repeatedly to caseworkers that she would apologize in a “therapeutic setting.” 

Brief for Appellant at 9-10. She also represents that she would only apologize 

if Ms. Reynolds thought an apology was necessary. N.T. 11/5/21, at 94. 

Notwithstanding, Mother does not deny that she never made atonement. This 

evinces that Mother continues to see her noncompliance as nothing more than 

a refusal to follow a “script”; however, her inaction is a barrier to her ability 

to move forward in developing a trusting and loving relationship with Child. 

The record further demonstrates that Mother’s repeated and continued 

neglect and refusal to comply with the Agency’s permanency goals, as well as 

her failure to accept responsibility for her role in Child’s physical, mental and 
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emotional injuries, have resulted Child being without essential parental care, 

control, or subsistence necessary for her physical or mental wellbeing. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2); In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 

at 1272. Further, the conditions and causes of Mother’s neglect and refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied. See id. Ms. Mullen testified that she believes 

she and her colleagues did everything they could to work towards reunification 

between Mother and Child. N.T. 11/5/21, at 97. 

Indeed, Mother’s refusal to accept responsibility for her past actions and

repair her relationship with Child is reflected in her own arguments before this 

Court. Mother posits that Child’s difficulties most likely stem from the 

behavior of others, including the Agency and Child’s current foster parents. 

Additionally, Mother suggests that Child may have suffered physical abuse 

from someone else when she was four years old and that this abuse is 

responsible for her anxiety. Mother also complains she was not granted a 

concession to attend the final hearing in this matter virtually, because she 

feared she would be arrested on an outstanding warrant related to child 

support, which resulted in many aspects of “her side of the story” lacking in 

the record.

4 Brief for Appellant at 10-11. 

____________________________________________

4 We note that Mother presented her direct testimony at the March 30, 2022. 

The orphans’ court rightly explained its reasons for continuing with the hearing 

as follows:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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We also do not find persuasive or relevant Mother’s repeated references 

to the fact that she is parenting her other two minor children. This Court’s 

focus herein is on the needs and welfare of Child whom she has plead guilty 

to abusing, a crucial fact Mother is unwilling to acknowledge. The manner in 

which Mother parents Child’s siblings is inapposite to a determination of 

whether Mother has taken the steps necessary for reunification with Child. 

Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the 

orphans’ court in concluding Mother’s conduct warranted termination pursuant 

to Section 2511(a)(2). 

Next, we consider whether termination was proper under Section 

2511(b). Section 2511(b) 

focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best 

serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child.” ... “Section 2511(b) does not explicitly 

require a bonding analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in 

the Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of the 

emotional bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to be 

considered as part of our analysis.

____________________________________________

So I do want to say, though, it is very, very regrettable that 

Mother chose—made an active choice not to be here today. And 

at this point, everyone understand, the [c]ourt cannot be and will 

not be complicit in the fugitive status of an individual, and that’s 

what I was being asked to do, to allow her to testify virtually. That 

would absolutely render the [c]ourt complicit in the fugitive 

status. I will not do that. 

N.T., 4/26/22, at 31. 
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In re K.R., 200 A.3d at 969, 982 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc) (citation 

omitted).

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider 

the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability 

the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, ... the 

trial court should consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be 

severed without detrimental effects on the child.

Id. (citation omitted). 

The extent of any bond analysis necessarily depends upon the 

circumstances of each, particular case. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 

(Pa.Super. 2008). A court should consider “whether a parent is capable of 

providing for a child's safety and security or whether such needs can be better 

met by terminating a parent’s parental rights.” Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 

517, 524 (Pa.Super. 2018).

In addition, our Supreme Court has stated “[c]ommon sense dictates 

that courts considering termination must also consider whether the children 

are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster 

parents.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 268 (Pa. 2013). “In weighing the 

difficult factors discussed above, courts must keep the ticking clock of 

childhood ever in mind. Children are young for a scant number of years, and 

we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.” Id. at 

269.
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Here, the orphans’ court found that Child has been in placement for over 

three years and with her foster family since February of 2019. Child has 

conveyed to her guardian ad litem a “steadfast desire” not to be returned to 

Mother and a desire for her counsel to advocate for that outcome “any and 

every way possible.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed 7/7/22, at 21 (citing N.T., 

11/05/21, at 30). Child considers her foster parents “mom and dad,” and 

they support her in her schoolwork, ensure she receives medical treatments, 

and enable her to build friendships. The orphans’ court also stressed the fear 

Child harbors at the thought of being returned to Mother. Id. at 22. The 

orphans’ court concluded: 

Regrettably, the record is replete with clear and convincing 

evidence that Mother has not made sufficient reasonable or 

responsible strides toward adequately being able to parent Child. 

Mother’s continued unwillingness and refusal to place Child’s 

needs over her own, and to take the steps necessary to reunify 

with Child, are of great concern. When these considerations are 

taken into account, along with Child’s needs for permanence and 

stability, this Court is constrained to firmly conclude that it is in 

the best interests of Child to grant the Agency’s Petition to 

Terminate Mother’s Parental Rights.

Opinion at 22-23. 

The certified record supports the orphans’ court conclusion 

that termination was proper under Subsection 2511(b). Mother admittedly 

has refused to cooperate with the Agency in furthering the goals set forth in 

the Family Service Plan, and instead she has made numerous excuses for her 

refusal to apologize to Child for her past conduct. Rather than work toward 

fostering a bond with Child, Mother’s words and actions have caused
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dissension as is evidenced by the profanity-laced exchange documented by 

Ms. Samuel; during a supervised visit, Mother refused to purchase the snacks 

for Child as she was buying for her other children, told Child that she is only 

a source of money for her foster parents, and placed the blame for Child’s

situation and that of her siblings squarely on Child’s shoulders. N.T., 11/5/21, 

at 54-62. 

Furthermore, in lieu of ensuring Child’s educational potential is 

maximized, Mother has inexplicably thwarted school officials’ attempts on 

multiple occasions to put her in a proper placement, which would necessitate 

testing her as a gifted child. N.T. 11/5/21, at 184-187. 

Finally, Child is happy with her current foster family who has provided 

for her educational, medical, physical, and emotional needs and has 

attempted, unsuccessfully, to work with Mother to facilitate visitation and 

phone calls. Id. at 192, 200, 204. The family continues to be an adoptive 

resource for Child. Id. at 192; N.T., 3/30/22, at 7. On this record, we 

conclude the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in 

finding termination of Parents’ parental rights was consistent with Child's 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant 

to Section 2511(b).

 Accordingly, because we conclude that the orphans' court did not abuse 

its discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother's parental rights to Child 
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pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), we affirm the Decree of the orphans’

court.

Decree affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/4/2022