### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 338 -CV

M ar y K ayM c Quig g a /k/a M ar y K at he r ine Ca r r , A ppe lla nt
v. Don L. Carr , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF HAY S COUNTY , 207TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 05- 0921 , HO NORAB LE WI LLIAM HENRY , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Th is i s a pa rt iti on c a se in wh ic h re a l pro pe rt y ow ne d b y a fa mil y bu sin e ss p art

ne rs hip was sold by

a re ceive r appointed by

the district co u rt
. T h e court then a llocated the ne t proce eds from the sa le amongthe par tners. One of the pa

rtners, a ppellant Mary

Kay McQuig g , challeng es (1) c erta in equitable fa ctors the district cour t considere d in its allocation of the sale pr ocee ds, and (2 ) t he e vid e nti ary

su ff ic ie nc y fo r t he c ourt ’s fi nd ing s. We af fi rm the jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
. T h i s s u i ti n v o l v es t h e d i s s o l u t i o nan d wi n d i n g u

p o f ap ar t n er s h i p b et we en M cQ u i gg and h e r b r o th e r , a

p p e ll e e D o n L
. Ca

r r . M c Q u ig g an d Ca

r r b e g an p u r c h a s in g r e a l e s tate toge ther in M arc h 1 98 3. Th e y

ow ne d th e re a l pr op e rt y joi ntl y , a lth ou g h th e y

ne ve r f or ma lize d th e ir relationship t hroug h a wr itten partner ship ag ree ment. After a number of y ear s, the parties de cided to divest themselves of their jointly owned proper

ty
. They did so without l itigation until there w as a sing le jointly

owned a sset rema ining. The final a s s et h eld by the par tnership, re fer

red to by2

t h e p art i e s a s t h e “ J u n c t i o n P r o p e rt y, ” c o n s i s t e d o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y s i x a c r e s o f l an d i nW i mb e r l e y, Hay s County , Texas. McQuig g and Carr wer e unable to rea ch agree ment on the disposition of the J unction Property , and on May 26, 2005, Carr f

iled suit in Hay s County district c ourt to partition the proper ty
. See Tex. P rop. Code Ann. § 23.001 ( West 2000) (joint owner of r eal pr operty may compel partition of the prope rty

), § 23.002(a) (West 2000) (par tition ac tion may be broug ht in dist rict cour t of county in which prope rty

located)

. On Fe b ru ary

2 8 , 2 0 0 6 , t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt i s s u ed an o rd er t o t h e e ff ec tt h at M cQ u i gg and Carr eac h owned a

n undivided one-ha lf interest in the J unction Property in f ee simple, a

nd that the prope rty

was not susce ptible to fair and e quitable par tition i n kind. SeeTex. R. C iv. P. 760 (cour t shall determine the share or interest of eac h joint owne r), 761 (cour t sha ll determine be fore enter ing de cre e of pa

rtition whether the pr operty , or any part ther eof, is susceptible of pa rtition). The district court appointed a

rec eiver to ma rket and sell the J unction Property , and orde red the parties to set a hea

ring befor e the c ourt following the sale of the prope rty

to “obtain final orde rs direc ting the distribution of the net sales proc eeds of the J unction Property .” See Tex. R. Civ. P . 770 (setting out proce dures f

or par tition action in which property incapa ble of division). The re ceive r sold the prope rty to Mc Quig g for $450,000 on Ma y 23, 2007, resulting in $41 4, 66 4. 67 in ne t sal e pr oc e e ds to the pa rt ne rs hip

. Th e re c e ive r f

ile d a re po rt of the sa le wi th the district c ourt. Following a bench trial, the district court ente red judg ment on Fe bruar y 27, 2008, distributing the net pr ocee ds from the sale of the Ju n cti on Property . I n finding s of fa ct and conclusions of l aw i s sued on Mar ch 13, 2008, the district cour t found that the par

ties eac h contributed to the proper

ty , with Ca

rr contributing labor, mate rials, and money from his construc tion3

bu sin e ss, and

Mc Qu ig g co nt ri butin g mon e y fo r t he do wn pa y me nt a nd so me mor

tg a g e pa y me nts
. Ba sed on Carr’ s stipulation t o owing the par tnership an amount in ex cess of $8,000 in sales proc eeds fr om t wo oth e r i nv e stm e nt p ro pe rt ie s o f t he pa rt ie s, the c ourt

div ide d th e Ju ncti on

Pr op e rt y
s al e p ro ce ed s $ 2 0 3 , 2 8 2
. 3 4 t o C arr a n d $ 2 1 1 , 3 8 2
. 3 3 t o M cQ u i gg. McQuig g appea ls the judgme nt of the district c ourt, asser ting that th e f

o l l o wi ng para g raph of

the cour t’s finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law c ontains erro r re quiring that the judgme nt be re verse d:
M ar y K ay M c Q u i g g i s d

u e $ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 f

o r h e r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e J u n c t i o nP r o p e rt y. Howeve r, Mar

y Kay McQuig g purcha sed the Junction P roper ty for $450,000 whe n the Property

had a f air mar k et v al u e of $600,000, so Mary Kay McQuig g has rec eived va lue of $150,000 ove r her purcha se price . The Court conclude s that the amount she is due has be en fully satisfied by her rece ipt of this additional land value over he r purc hase pr ice.
M cQ u i gg ch al l en ges t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s p o we r t o o ff s et t h e p ar t n er s h i p ’s o b l i gat i o nt o M cQ u i gg based on the rec eiver shi p s al e b eing below fa ir marke t value whe n that sale ha d been a pproved by the cour t. McQuig g also cha lleng es the e videntiary sufficie ncy

for the f indings on whic h the dis tr ic t c ourt

ba se d s uc h o ff

se t. A par tition s uit does not procee d independe ntly of the rule s of equity

. SeeTe x. R. Civ. P . 760 (“U

pon the hearing of t he cause, the court shall dete rmine the shar e or inter est of ea ch of the joint owners or

claimants in the real estate soug ht to be divi ded, and all questions of l aw or
e qu ity a ff e c tin g the tit le to suc h la

nd wh ic h ma

y ari se .” ); Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement &Dev

. Co. , 123 S.W .2d 290, 296 (Tex. 19 3 9 ) (“I n this state partition by suit, whether br oug ht under the statute or without the aid of the statute, does not proce ed indepe ndently of the rule s of equity .”). TheTex. Rev. Ci v. Stats. Ann. arts. 6132b-1.01 to -11.05 (West Supp. 2008). 1 4 trial court may

apply rules of e quity

in determining the broa d question of how prope rty is to be partitioned. Y

tur ria v . Ki mb ro , 921 S.W .2d 338, 342 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, no writ). I ndeed, in its finding s and conclusions, the di strict court stated that it took into account “the equities pe rt a ini ngto e a c h p art

y ’s c on tr ibutio ns to t

he Junc ti on P rop erty

a s w e ll a s th e ir

oth e r p ro pe rt ie s,
an d ea ch p ar t y ’s co n d

u ct i nco n n ec t i o nwi t ht h ei r o wn er s h i p o f t h e J u n ct i o n P ro p er t y . ” M cQ u i gg contends, howe ver, that the district court’s a uthor i t y to apply rules of e quity

in partitioning the Junc tio n P ro pe rt

y sa le pr oc e e ds did

no t e xten d to re vis iti ngthe a mou nt f or wh ic h th e c ourt
a p p o i n t e d r e c e i v e r h a d s o l d t h e p r o p e rt y. Acco rd i n g to McQuig g , the Texas Revised Partner ship Act (TRPA) c on tr ols 1 the division of the J unction Property sale proc eeds. G en er al l y , t he TRPA g overns the r elations betwee n partne rs abse nt ag ree ment otherwise. S e e Co le m a n v . Co le m an , 1 7 0 S.W .3d 231, 236 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied). Section 8.06(b) of the TRPA gove rns the disposition of the partne rship assets upon the windingup of the pa rtnership. See id.
Eac h partne r is entitled to a settlement of all par tnership ac counts on winding up the partne rship business. . . . The par tnership s hall make a

distribution t o a par

tner in an a mou nt e qu a l to tha

t pa rt ne r’ s p os iti ve ba lanc e in t he pa rt ne r’ s capi tal ac c ount. Ex cept as provided by

Section 3.07 or 3.08(a ), a pa rtner sha ll contribute to the partne rship an amount equal to that pa rtner’ s neg ative balanc e in the par tner’s c apital a c c ount.
Te x. Re v. Civ . St a ts. Ann. art . 6 13 2b -8 .0 6( b) (We st Su pp . 2 00 8) . A lth ou g h s e c tio n 8 .0 6( b) its e lf does not contemplate an equ i t able of fset, princ iples of equity continue to apply

when not5

contra dicted by

the statute. See id. art
. 6 1 3 2 b

- 1
. 0 4 ( a ) ( W e s tS u p p . 2 0 0 8 ) ( “ U n l e s s d i s p l a c e d b y a particula r provision of

this Act, the principles of la w and e quity

supplement this Act.”); Te x . R. Civ. P. 776 (“No provision of the statutes or rules r elatingto partition shall

. . . prec lude par tition i n any other manne r authorized by the rules of equity , which rule s shall gove rn in proce eding s for pa rtition in all respec ts not provided for by law or these rules.”). Since sec tion 8.06(b) does not prohibit the court fr om adjusting a

partne r’s ba lance or intere st in procee ds of partnership assets, t he dis trict court was authorized to do so under pr inciples of equity

. Se e Gi lle lan d v . M e ad ows , 351 S.W .2d 656, 658 (T e x. Civ . App .—Da lla s 1 96 1, no wr it) (e qu ity re qu ir e d o ffs e t a g a ins t c la im f or c on tr ibutio n in partition suit). McQuiggref ers to ca se law holdingthat a re ceive r’s sale should not be set aside ba se d o n th e sa le s p ri c e be ingina de qu a te un le ss t he re is a sh ow ingof fr a

ud or mate ri a l ir

re g ula ri tie s, or a showingthat the inadequa cy of the pric e re ceive d is so g reat as to shock the consc ience of the court. Se e Sa lay me h v . P laz a Ce ntr o, LLC , 258 S.W .3d 236, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2 0 0 8 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Gar d n er v. Un i o n Bank &Trust Co. , 176 S.W .2d 789, 793 (Tex. Civ. Ap p. —F or

t Wor th 1 94 3, no wr it) ). Th is sta nd ard do e s no t a

pp ly he re be c a

us e Carr did no t se e k to set aside the r ece iver’s sale. McQuig g argues, howe ver, that beca use Carr did not seek to set aside the sale and the district c ourt approve d the sale, the district c ourt could not revisit the ade quacy of the sa le s p ri c e a s p art

of it s equ ita

ble c on sid e ratio ns in t

he dis tr ibutio n o f t

he sa le pr oc e e ds

. Acc ording to McQuig g , the cour t’s finding that the sales pric e wa s $150,000 below fa ir marke t value “irre concilably

conflicts” w ith its confirmation of the rec eiver ship sale.6 Under the circ umstances of this c ase, we disag ree . This mig ht be a c loser question if the only

applicable evidenc e wa s the rec eiver ’s sale itself a nd ap p ra i s als or other

evidenc e demonstratingthat the prope rty was wor th more, but this is not suc h a case . To the contra ry , there
was a lso evidence befor e the cour t of McQuig g ’s behavior neg atively impactingthe par

tnership’s ability to obtain the full fair ma

rket va lue of the J unction Property upon its sale. Carr te stified that Mc Qu ig g a llo we d he r so n Mark Mc Qu ig g to mov e on to the pr op e rt y a g a ins t Carr’s wishe s. Acc ording to Carr, McQ uiggand Mark “tra shed t he prope rty ,” allowe d junk to accumulate on the proper ty , dissuaded potential buy ers f rom coming onto the p ro p er t y , and appr oache d the re ceive r numerous times in a “ha

rassingand thre ateningmanner .” A ne ighbor who lived a f

ew hundr ed y ards from the Junction P roper ty testified to extremely

loud music playing da

y and nig ht from Mark’s house, eve n when no one was there

. Two former busi ness t enants on the J unction Property testified separ ately to rude a nd threatening behavior

by McQuig g and Mar

k betwee n 2004 and 2 0 0 7 that eventua lly

cause d them to discontinue their lease s. The ne ighbor also testified to his approa ching the prope rty

with a re al estate ag ent after it was placed on sale, but neve r ente ring the prope rty due to Mark’s “intimi dating ” presence
. There was also evidenc e that Mar k had plac ed “sold” signs on top of the prope rty ’s “for sale” signs whe n no sale ha d y et occ urre d. Once McQuig g purcha sed the pr op e rt y , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e n e i g hb o r , t h e d i s r u p t i v e b e h a v i o r o n t h e p r o p e rt y c e a s e d

. C ar r a lso testified to Mc Quig g ’s ref usal to e x plore purcha se options with adjac ent landowne rs who in 2004 had indicate d interest in purc hasing the prope rty for a pproxi mately

$500,000. The re ceive r’s re port of sale itself a lludes to these extraneous cir cums t an ces. The re port states that $450,000 wa s the “maximum price curr ently obtainable,” in light of “ limi t ing c onditions of the property unknownMc Qu ig g a l l e g e s t h a tt h e d i s t r i c tc o urt ’ s o f f s e tg r an t e d

a r e m e dy n o ts o u g h tb y

C ar r in 2 his pleading s. To the contra ry , Carr’ s pleading s state that “De fenda nt ha s diminis hed the va lue of the Property” and that “any claim for c ontr i b u t i o n b y Def endant should be of

fset by Def endant’ s disputed occupa

ncy of the Proper

ty adver se to Plaintiff’s interest and by all of De fenda

nt’s wrong ful conduct a lleg ed her ein.” 7 to the Rece iver at the time of the entry of the Court’s Or d er . . . but discove red in the c ourse of marke ting the pr operty .”

There fore, t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s o ff s et t i n g M cQ u i gg’s i n t er es ti nt h e sale proce eds base d on the J unction Property ’s s ales price being below fair ma rket va lue is rec oncilable with the c ourt’s confirmation of the rec eiver ’s sale. In confirminga re ceive r’s sale , the cour t’s det er m i nation whether the bid rec eived wa s fair an d rea sonable is base d on all of the fa cts and e vidence

. See Salaymeh , 2 58 S.W. 3d

a t 24 0; B.B.M.M., Ltd. v. T exas Comme rce Bank

-Chem. , 777 S.W .2d 193, 197 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 1989, no writ) (a pproving sale whe re e vidence included fa ct that a c c e pte d of

fe r wa s b e st o ne re c e ive d in e ig hte e n mo nth s p ro pe rt

y ha d b e e n o n s a le ). We h old that while the pric e paid f or the Junction P roper

ty may have been fair and rea sonable based on the
c on dit ion of the pr op e rt

y a t th e tim e of

sa le , it wa s w ith in t

he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s e qu ita

ble po we r t o adjust the amount of sale proce eds distributed to McQuig g in the partition suit because the evidenc e was suff icient for the court to conclude that McQuig g was re sponsible for dama g ing the condition of the prope rty

in such a manne r as to re duce the fair a nd re as o n ab l e sales pric e. Se e Cal lic oa tte v. C all ic oa tte , 4 1 7 S. W. 2 d 6 1 8 , 6 2 1 ( T e x. Ci v . Ap p . —Wa c o 1 9 6 7 , w r it r e f ’ d n . r . e . ) ( h o ld in g th at in partition suit, “all equities” should be consider ed and a djusted). 2

N e xt, M c Q u ig g

a r g u e s th a t t h e evide nce is leg ally

and fa ctually

insufficient to support the finding s of the district cour t under whic h it made its offset. Specifica lly , McQuig g challeng es8

the cour t’s finding s that her c ontributions to t he par tnership be r eimburs ed o n l y i n t he amount of $150,000, and that the f

air mar ket value of

the J unction Property

was $600,000. F or a le g a l su ff ic ie nc y c ha lle ng e , we re vie w t he e vid e nc e in t

he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the judgme nt, cre diting fa vorable evidenc e if reasona ble jurors c ould and disreg ardingcontra ry evidenc e unless re asonab l e j urors c ould not. City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2005). We will sust ain McQuig g ’s leg al suffic iency complaint if the re cord r evea ls: (1) the complete a

bsence of a vital fa ct; (2) the c ourt i s b ar re d b y rules of la

w or e vidence from g iving weig ht to the only

evidenc e off

ere d to prove a vital fac t; (3) the evidenc e offere d to prove a vital fac t i s n o m o re t han a me re sc intill a; or (4) the evidenc e conc lusively establishes the opposite of the vital fac t. See id. at 810. More tha n a scintilla of evide nce e x ists if the evidence rises to a leve l that would enable rea sonable a nd fair- minded people to diffe r in their conc lusions. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 135 S.W .3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004).

F or a fa c tua l suf

fi c ie nc y c ha lle ng e , we mus t con sid e r an d we ig h all the e vid e nc e in the rec ord, both suppor

ting and ag ainst the finding , to de cide whether the finding should be set aside. Se e Do w Ch e m. Co. v . F

ra nc is , 46 S.W .3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001). I n revie wing McQuig g ’s fa ctual sufficie ncy challeng e, we will set aside the judg ment only if the finding is so ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e as to be c lear ly wrongand unjust. Id. ; Cai n v . B ain , 709 S.W .2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).

Th e di stric t c ourt

fo un d th a t Mc Qu ig g wa s d ue $1 50 ,0 00 fo r h e r c on tr ibutio ns to the J unction Property
. At trial, McQuig g testified t hat s he had “put i nto this partnership” a total of $227,383.60. Howeve r, Carr testified that this amount included moni es contributed to other9

proper ties previously

owned a nd sold by

the par tnership. Docume nts admitted into evidence listing Mc Qu ig g ’s pa

y me nts pr ov ide date s, amou nts , and pa

y e e s fo r the se pa

rate pa y me nts , b ut g e ne ra lly provid e n o information as to how they wer e used a

nd whether

the amounts had be en re cover ed. McQuig g argues that s h e is entitled to rec over a ll her contributions to the partne rship, but Carr testified t hat under the partnership ag ree ment, McQuig g and C arr would own the prope rty

in equal share s and McQuig g ’s financ ial contributions w ould g ener ally be offse t by his contributions of c on str uc tio n a nd re nta l ma na g e me nt. I t is wi thi n the purv ie w of the tr ia l c ourt to m a ke c re dib ili ty deter minations reg arding co n fl icting e vidence and testimony

. Kendall Builders, Inc. v. Chesson , 149 S.W .3d 796, 810 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2004, pet. denied)

. As the fa ct-finde r, the district cour t had the discr etion not to acce pt all of McQuig g ’s evidenc e of he r contributions and her entitlement to r e p ay me n t a s tr

u e . S ee Ga r n er v. Garne r , 200 S.W .3d 303, 308 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006,
no pe t.) . We wi ll n ot d ist

ur b a tr ia l c ourt ’s re so lut ion

of e vid e nti ary c on fl ic ts that turn on c re dib ili ty d eter minations or the weig ht of the evide nce. Navasota Res., Ltd. v. Hee p Petroleum, I

nc. , 212 S.W .3d 463, 468 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.). Gi ven Carr ’s testimony controve rting McQuig g ’s evidenc e, we will not dis turb the di s t ri ct co u rt ’s ac cepta nce of some, but not all, of Mc Qu ig g ’s e vid e nc e of

c on tr ibutio ns re qu ir ingre imb ur se me nt f ro m th e sa le pr oc e e ds

. McQuig g also cha lleng es the district cour t’s finding that the J unction Property had a fa ir marke t value of $600,000. Acc ording to the rec eiver ’s repor t of sale, “ it is t he opinion of the Rece iver that the f

air mar ket value of

the prope rty is $450,000, and that the s ale r eporte d here in was made f or the max imum price curr ently obtainable f or the prope rty .” McQ uiggcontends that ther e was insuffic ient evidenc e to depa rt from this amount. However , as McQuig g conce des, there wasThe c onclusion tha t McQuig g owed the pa rtnership $150,000 c an be r eac hed in two 3 independe nt way s in acc ordanc e with the re levant evide nce. Considering that McQuig g purcha sed the prope rty for $450,000 whe n it had a fa ir marke t value of $600,000, Mc Quig g rec eived a $1 50 ,0 00 dis c ount t

hat sh ou ld h ave g on e to the pa rt ne rs hip a s sa le pr oc e e ds . A lte rn a tiv e ly , e ve n if Mc Qu ig g ha d n ot be e n the purc ha se r, he r a c tio ns on the pr op e rt

y wo uld have g ive n th e pa

rt ne rs hip a loss of $150,000 in sa le proce eds. Acc ording to its findings and c onclusions, the district court used the forme r appr oach. 10 also evidenc e of other valuations. Particular ly , McQuig g enter ed into evidenc e a D ece mber 15, 2005 appra isal of the J unction Property by Randy D. Posey at the amount of $320,000, a nd Carr e ntere d into e v i d en ce a

n April 19, 2005 appra isal of the prope rty by Donald W. Graha

m at the amount of $6 00 ,0 00 . A t th e F e br

ua ry 20 08 tr ia l, C arr te sti fi e d that he be lie ve d th e pr op e rt y wa s st ill wo rt

h close to $600,000, and G raha m testified b y aff

idavit that as of January

2008, the prope rty

had

a c ur re nt f a ir mark e t va lue of

“ at lea st $600 ,0 00 .” We c on c lud e the re wa s le g a lly and fa c tua lly sufficie nt evidenc e to support the district cour t’s finding s both that McQuig g was due $150,000 for he r contributions to the partne rship and that the Jun ct i o n P roperty had a f air mar ket value of $600,000. See City of Keller , 168 S.W. 3d a t 810 (l e g a l su ff ic ie nc y sta nd ard ); Dow Chem. Co. , 46 S.W .3d at 242 (fa ctual suff iciency standard)

. Fi n al l y , M cQ u i gg co n t en d s t h at ev en i f w e ta k e as t ru e t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs that McQuig g was due $150,000 for he r contributions to the J unction Property and that she h a d r e c e iv e d p r o p e rty v a lu e o f $ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 o v e r

h e r p u r c h a s e p r ic e , s u c ha mo u n ts d o n o t o f f s e t. We d i s ag r e e . T h e p ar t n er s h i p o we d M cQ u i gg $ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 fo r h er p re v i o u s co n tri b u t i o n s , b u tM cQ u i gg owed the pa

rtnership $150,000 a s a re sult of her purc hase pr ice be ing be low fair ma rket va lue. At

3 oral a rg ument, McQuig g argued that while he r half por tio n o f the sale proce eds wa s reduc ed by $75,000 due to the sale beingbelow fa i r m arket value, he r portion should have be en incr ease d byTo illustrate, if the only applicable adjustment to the 50% division o f proce eds had 4 been pa y ment to McQuig g for he r unre imbursed contributions o f $150,000, she should have rec eived $282,332.33 ( half the pr ocee ds plus $75,000), leavingCa r r w it h $132,332.34. As should be expected, in this scenar io McQuig g rec eives $150,000 more than C arr . Under McQuig g ’s appr oach, ho we ve r, sh e wo uld have re c e ive d $3 57 ,3 32 .3 3 (h a lf the pr oc e e ds plu s $ 15 0, 00 0) , le a vin g Carr wi th only $57,332.34. 11 a full $150,000 for her unreimburse d contributions, r esulting in a total distributi on of $75,000 more than she actua lly rec eived from the court. Howeve r, this arg ument is based on the incor rec t assertion that as a result of McQuig g ’s t otal contributions of $150,000, Carr owed McQuig g $150,000. Carr did not owe McQuig g $150,000. The pa rtnership owe d McQuig g $150,000. Thus, her ha lf portion should have be en incr ease d by only $75,000, which o ffse ts the $75,000 by which it had bee n reduc ed. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c a lc ulatio n w a s c or re c t. 4 The district cour

t’s adjustment of McQuig g ’s unre imbu rs ed contributions to the partne rship based on her purchase of t he Junction P roper ty from the pa

rtnership at below fa ir marke t
va lue wa s w ith in t

he e qu ita ble po we r of the dis tr ic t c ourt and wa s su pp or te d b y le g a lly and fa c tua lly
su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e . We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pemberton a nd Waldrop Affir med Filed: Oc tober 2, 2009