UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ERIC W. PRIOR,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

AFSCME COUNCIL 92,

No. 99-1141

Defendant-Appellee,

and

AFSCME COUNCIL 92 STAFF UNION,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge.

(CA-98-3044-JFM)

Submitted: June 29, 1999

Decided: September 23, 1999

Before NIEMEYER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges,

and HALL,* Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

*Senior Judge Hall participated in the consideration of this case but

died prior to the time the decision was filed. The decision is filed by a

quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
COUNSEL

Martin P. Hogan, GROMFINE & TAYLOR, P.C., Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Joel A. Smith, KAHN, SMITH & COLLINS,

P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Eric Prior appeals the district court order entering summary judgment against him on his complaint alleging breach of contract and

breach of duty of fair representation. We affirm.

This Court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo. See

Evans v. Technologies App. & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 958 (4th Cir.

1996). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine

issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1381 (4th Cir. 1995).

Prior asserts that he was an AFSCME Council 92 ("Council 92")

employee and thus was a member of the bargaining unit to which the

Council 92 Staff Union owed a duty of fair representation. Even if

Prior raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether he was a Council 92

employee, the district court properly found that no genuine issue of

material fact existed as to whether Prior was covered by the collective

bargaining agreement. Prior's reliance on the union recognition provision of the collective bargaining agreement to demonstrate that he

was a member of the bargaining unit is misplaced. Reading the collective bargaining agreement as a whole and in conjunction with the

other evidence of record, the union recognition provision does not

support Prior's assertion that he was a member of the bargaining unit

as contemplated by the agreement. Because Prior submitted no evi-

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dence other than his self-serving allegations disputing the verified

evidence put forth by Council 92 demonstrating that as a grant-funded

employee he was not a member of the Staff Union and that only Staff

Union members were covered by the collective bargaining agreement,

the district court properly awarded Council 92 and the Staff Union

summary judgment.

Prior's claim that the district court erred in awarding the Staff

Union summary judgment sua sponte is also without merit. District

courts possess the power to enter summary judgment sua sponte so

long as the losing party is provided the opportunity to come forward

with all of his evidence. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

326 (1986). Here, Prior had the opportunity to present evidence in

support of his claim and his inability to set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial warranted an award of summary judgment

in favor of the Staff Union.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court order awarding Council

92 and the Staff Union summary judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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