NOT RECOMMENDED F OR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION F ile Nam e: 12a0010n.06
No. 08-2015
UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT ADRON L . FL OYD, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. COUNTY OF KENT, e t al., Def endants-A

ppellees. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE

UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN
OPI NI ON

Before: BOGG S, SUHRHE INRICH, and S TRANCH, Circ uit Jud ges. JANE B. STRANCH , Circuit Judge. Adron Floy d was incar cer ated for six and one-ha lf
y ea rs af t er a M i chig an state judge imposed an incorre ct sentenc e. Floy d filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleg ing that his trial attorney , Timothy Hay nes, Unknown Traine r(s), Kent County , Unknown Parole Boa rd Members, Gover

nor J ennife r Gra

nholm, and the State of Michig an violated his fede ral constitutional rig hts. Upon initial scre ening , the dist rict court sua sponte dismiss ed the in forma pauperis complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)( 1), concluding that Floy d failed to state a

claim ag ainst any

defe ndant. We AF F IRM

.Floyd v. County of Kent, et al.

No. 08-2015 I. F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND 1
I n Fe bruar

y 1999, the State of Michig an charg ed Floy d in Kent C ounty with conspirac y to deliver less than 50 g rams of a mix ture containing coca ine, in violation of Mic h

. C o m p. L aws § 750.157(a) (1998), and manufa cture , delivery , or possession with intent to manufa cture or deliver less than 50 g rams of a mix ture containing coca ine, in v i o l at i o n of Mich. Comp. L aws § 333.7401(2)( a)( iv) (1998). As to the latter count, the felony information provided that the penalty for c onviction on that char g e wa s a minimum of one y ear to a maxi mum of twenty

y ear s, a fine of
up to $25,000, or probation for life. The information also stated that the court had authority to depar t from the minimum term if the court found on the rec ord that there wer e substantial and compelling

rea sons to depar

t. T he information further stated that Floy d could fac e an enhanc ed sentenc e beca use he had been previously convicted of a felony drug offe nse. The Kent County C i rc u i t C ourt appointed attorne y

Timothy Hay nes to repr esent F loy d on the cha rg es. Floy d alleg ed that Ha

y nes for ced him to waive his preliminary examination and instructed him to plead g uilty to the char g e of possession with intent to deliver coca ine without conducting any investigation into the case or discussing any potential defe nses with Floy d. He also alleg ed that, afte r pleading g uilty to the charg e, h e i n fo rm ed Hay nes t hat he wanted to withdraw his g uilty plea, but Hay nes pre ssured him not to withdraw the plea

.

We g lean the fac ts from the pro se complaint and its attachme nts. We may consider exhibi ts 1 attache d to the complaint so long as t h ey are ref err ed to in the complaint and are centr al to the claims. See Rondigo, L.L .C. v. Twp. of Ri chmond , 641 F.3d 673, 680- 81 (6th Cir. 2011). 2Floyd v. County of Kent, et al.

No. 08-2015 The sentenc ing hear ing occur red in April 1999. Floy d alleg ed that Hay nes was unprepa

red for sentenc ing, Hay

nes did not mention the corr ect sentenc ing g uidelines, and Hay nes g uessed about what the a

ppropriate sentenc e would be. Howeve r, t he sentencingtranscr ipt, which is attache d to the complaint, contra dicts Floy d’s alleg ations.
Acc ording to the transcr ipt, Hay nes confirme d that he had rea d the prese ntence investigation
repor t and provided a copy of it to Floyd. Hay nes acknow ledg ed that Floy d’s sentenc ing g uidelines
rang e wa s 0 to 11 months a nd that Floy d also fac ed a sta tutory mandatory

minimum sentenc e of 1

to 20 y ear s. See Mich. Comp. L aws § 333.7401(2)( a)( iv) (1999). But Hay nes argued that the judge still possessed authority to impose a sentenc e of probation. His argument was supported by section § 333.7401(2)( a)( iv), which provided that an offe nder “shall be imprisoned for not less than 1 y ear

n o r m o re than 20 y ear s, and may be fined not more than $25,000.00, or place d on probat i o n fo r life[,] ” and by Mich. Comp. L aws § 769.34(4)( b) (1999), which provided (empha sis added) : “I f the offe nse is a violation of [§ 333.]7401(2)(a) (iv)

. . . and the upper limit of the rec ommended minimum

sentenc e rang e is 18 months or less, the cou rt s h a l l i mp ose a sentenc e of life probation absent a departure .” Hay

nes specific ally asked the court not to depar t from the g uidelines beca use any depar ture would obviate the mandatory sentenc e of probation called for in § 769.34(4)( b). I nstead, he aske d the cour

t to impos e an inter

mediate sa

nction of proba

tion with tether restric tions. The sentenc ing judge ignor ed Hay nes’s argument that t he sentenc ing statutes mandated a
sentenc e of probation

. T h e judge imposed the statutory mandatory minimum sentenc e of 1 to 20
y ear s in prison with a rec ommendati o n fo r d ru g trea tment, explaining that he had been taug ht in training that statutory mandatory minimum terms trumped the sentenc ing g uidelines if the two wer e 3Floyd v. County of Kent, et al.

No. 08-2015 in conflict. Due to Floy d’s prior drug conviction and his g uilty plea to conduct that was “something

more than the ty

pical user- deale r activity on the street,” the court deter mined the statutory mandatory prison sentenc e wa s appropr iate and pr oportional. Floy d did not appeal.
Over two and one-ha lf y ear s later, Floy d filed a pro se motion for relief from judgme nt. The trial court denied the motion, expres s l y fi nding that Floy d failed to show his trial counsel’s perf ormanc e fell below an objective standard of rea sonablene ss, that Floyd could not challeng e the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e beca use he pled g uilty to the char g e, and that the rea sons for the sentenc e

wer e adequa

tely set forth on the rec ord of the sentenc ing hear ing. The Michig an Court of Appea ls denied F loy d’s application for leave to appea l.
I n 2005 the Michig an Supreme Court considere d Floyd’s furt h er appli cation for leave to
appea l. The court vacated Floy d’s sentenc e, rema nded the case , and instructed the trial court to either impose a sentence of life probation or articulate on the record a s u b s t an t ial and compelling

rea son to depar

t from the sentenc ing g uidelines rang e, as require d by People v. Babcoc k , 666 N.W.2d
231 (Mich. 2003), a case decide d afte r the trial court sentenc ed Floy d. In all other respe cts the court denied Floy d’s application for leave to appea l and also exp l i citly denied Floy d’s motion for
pere mptory reve rsal. These ruling s left intact the trial court’s determ i n at i o n t h at Floyd failed to establish ineffe ctive assistanc e of tria l counsel with reg ard to the c onviction or the sentenc e. On rema nd, the trial court sentenc ed Fl o y d t o life probation and 12 months’ time serve d. Floy d was discha

rg ed fr om prison on Aug ust 31, 2005, after serving more than six y ear s. Fl oy d then filed the instant § 1983 complaint alleg ing violation of his Six th, Eig hth , an d
Four teenth Amendment rig hts d u e to h is leng thy incar cer ation in violation of the sentenc ing statutes.

4Floyd v. County of Kent, et al.

No. 08-2015 Floy d soug ht compensa tory damag es from Hay nes and the Unknown Traine r(s) who trained the trial judge , in their individual capa city , for phy sical, emotional, and mental injuries Floy d sustained due

to unlawful imprisonment. Floy d soug ht compensatory damag es from Unknown Parole Boa rd Members and Gover

nor Gra nholm, in their officia l and individual capa cities, beca use he broug ht the

sentenc ing defe ct to their attention, but they did not rec ommend or g rant a commutation or repr ieve. Floy d further reque st ed p u nitive damag es from eac h of the named individual defe ndants, but he expressly did not seek dama g es fr om the State of Michig an. I n addition to his reque sts for damag es, Floy d soug ht decla ratory relief that: (1) the State of Michig an is obligated under the Six th A mendment to the United States Constit ution a nd Article I , § 20 of the Michig an Constit ution to provide assistance of counsel to eac h criminal defe ndant who

cannot aff ord private counsel; (2) Kent County ’s failure to provide adequate funding and oversig ht for the public defe nse sy stem violated his Six th and Four teenth Amendment rig hts beca use adequate leg al counsel is not provided to those acc used of crimes who cannot aff ord to hire attorney s; (3) Kent County ’s failure to adopt training or qualifica tion standards for appointed defe nse attorney s resulted in Hay nes’s ineffe ctive assistance and Floyd’s unlawful incar cer ation, in violation o f t h e S i x th, Eig hth and Four

teenth Amendments; (4) the ref us al of unknown Parole Boa rd Members to

rec ommend, and Gover

nor Gra nholm to g rant, a commutation or repr ieve wh en they wer e awa re Floy d was u n l awf

ully held in prison violated his Eig hth and Four teenth Amendment rig hts; (5) imprisonment contra

ry to § 769.34( 4)(b) violated Floyd’s Four teenth Amendme nt due proc ess rig hts; and (6) Hay

nes’s ineffe ctive assistance and the Unknown Traine r(s)’ improper training of the judge violated Floy d’s Six th, Eighth, a nd Four teenth Amendme nt rig hts.
5Floyd v. County of Kent, et al.

No. 08-2015 The district cour

t refe rre d the complaint t o the m ag istrate judge for i nitial scre ening under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The district court subsequently adopted a Report and Rec ommendation and dismissed the complaint for f ailure to state a

claim.
II. ST ANDAR

D OF REVIEW This Court revie ws de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismiss al of a prisoner’ s complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Thomas v. Eby , 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007). When deciding whether a complaint states a claim for relief , all well-plea ded fac tual al leg ations are acc epted as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); W illiams v. Curtin , 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011). The complaint must contain “enoug h fac ts to state a claim t o relief that is plausi b l e on its fac e[,] ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. T wombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and a “claim has facial plausibi lity when the plaintiff pl eads factua l cont en t t h at allows the court to draw the rea sonable infere nce that t h e d ef en d an t is liable for the misconduct alleg ed.” Iqbal , 129 S. Ct . at 1949. A complaint sug g esting “the mer e possibility of misconduct” is insufficient. Id. at 1950. Pro se complaints are liberally construed, howeve r, and are held to less stringe nt standards than the formal plea dings pr epar ed by attorney s. W

illiams , 631 F.3d a

t 383.
III. ANALYSIS Section 1983 cre ates a civil cause of action ag ainst a defe ndant who, while acting under color of state law, deprive s another person of the “rig hts, privileg es o r i m m unities secur ed by the Constit ution or laws of the United States.” Barker v. Goodrich , 649 F.3d 428, 432 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoted case omitted). To state a claim for relief under § 1983, “a plaintiff must a lleg e a violation of a rig ht secur ed by the fede ral Constit ution or laws and must show that the violation was 6Floyd v. County of Kent, et al.

No. 08-2015 committed by a person acting under color of state l aw.” Flanory v. Bonn , 604 F.3d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 2010). We consider in seque nce F loy d’s claims ag ainst the named de fenda nts. 2
A. Att orney Tim othy Haynes Fl o y d ca n n o t state a claim for ineffe ctive assistance ag ainst Hay nes in this § 1983 suit. Def ense attorney s, whether compensa ted by the State or reta ined by a client, do not act under color of state law when they perf orm a lawy er’ s traditional functions as counsel to the acc used in a criminal proc eeding

. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson , 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).
B. Unk now n Train er( s)
F loyd alleg ed in the complaint that the Unknown Traine r(s) incorre ctly trained th e s e n te n c in g judge by providing an interpre tation of sentenc ing s t at utes and g uidelines that was contra ry to § 769.34(4)( b), resulting in a period of unlawful confine ment for Floy d. He specific ally alleg ed that the Unknown Tr ainer (s) a cted ne g lige ntly or throug h mistake.
Even assuming the Unknown Traine r(s) incorre ctly trained the sentenc ing judge (a position

u n d ercut by the sentenc ing transcr ipt)–mere neg lige nce or mistake, without proof of the culp ab l e mental state applicable to the underlying constitutional rig ht alleg ed, cannot sustain a cause of action under § 1983. League of W omen Voters of Ohio v. Brunner , 548 F.3d 463, 476 (6th Cir. 2008); Ellis

v. W ashington Cnty. , 198 F.3d 225, 227 (6th Cir. 1999). Floy d did not identify wher e or for whom

Floy d clar ified in his reply brief that he no longe r challeng es the district court’s ruling s that 2 the State of Michig an an d the Unknown Parole Boa rd Members are immune from liability for damag es and that the complaint fails to state a claim ag ainst the Gover nor and Un k n o wn Parole Boa rd Member s for their f

ailure to g rant F loy d a commutation or re prieve

.

7Floyd v. County of Kent, et al.

No. 08-2015 the Unknown Traine r(s) worke d, but even further assuming that the Unknown Traine r(s) wer e state officia ls a cting under color of state law, a neg lige nt a ct causing unintended loss of liberty to F loy d does not implicate the Due Process Clause. See Daniels v. W illiams , 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986).
On appea l, Floy d argues that he can pursue a theory of supervisory liability , but he does not expli citly identify any “super visors,” nor did he plead in the complaint any fac ts ag ainst supervisory defe ndants. Floy d may be contending that the Unknown Traine r(s) and cer tain unspeci fi ed “super visory officia ls” had supervisory authority over the trial judge , improperly supervised the trial judge , or cre ated a policy or custom under which the trial judge eng ag ed in unconstitutional action.
But if these are his claims, he has not cited any case s supporting such novel theories. Wit hout leg al support, any rema

nd to allow Floy d t o p l ea d ad ditional fac ts in an amende d complaint would be futile. Floy d further insists that he stated a due-pr ocess violation beca use he was deprive d of liberty when the judge imposed a sentenc e that did not adher e to the State’s own sentenc ing statutes and was
not authorized by state law. Had Floy d promptly raised this argument on direc t appea l, he may well have achie ved reve rsal and rema nd for re- sentenc i n g at t h at time, shortening the leng th of his imprisonment. The very purpose of direc t r eview is to corr ect tria l court er rors, lea ding to f

inality of judg ment. See Lopez v . W ilson, 426 F.3d 339, 351 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (en ba nc) ( citing Lambert v.
W arden , 81 F. App’x 1, 8 (6th Cir. 2003)). But Floy d did not appea l, and he waited more than two
y ears afte r his sentenc ing to file a motion for relief from judgme nt, ultimately pers u ad i n g t h e Michig an Supreme Court in 2005 to reve rse the err oneous sentenc e and rema nd for re- sentenc ing.

8Floyd v. County of Kent, et al.

No. 08-2015 I n this § 1983 action seeking damag es for the depriva tion of liberty , Floy d did not name as

a defe ndant the trial judge who made the sentenc ing err or. Even if he had, the judge enjoy s absolute immunit y from a lawsuit seeking to hold him liable in damag es for acts committed within his judicial jurisdiction. See Pierson v. Ray , 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967); Doe v. Boland , 630 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. 2011). Ther efor e, F loy d failed to state a claim ag ainst a proper defenda nt under the Due Process Clause. C. The State of Michigan, Gover nor Gr anhol m , and Kent County
We turn now to Floy d’s claims ag ainst the State of Michig an, Gover nor Gra nholm, and Kent County . Floyd fails to state a c laim ag ainst any of these de fenda

nts. Floy d soug ht a decla

ration that the State of Michig an and Gover nor Gra nholm are obligated

u n d er t he S ix th Amendment to the Unit ed S tates C onstitut ion and Article I , § 20 of t he Mi chig an Constit ution to provide eff ective assistance of counsel to eac h criminal defe ndant who cannot aff ord private counsel. He alleg es that the failure to provide adequate funding for appointed attorney s and the failure to adopt training and qualifica tion standards for appointed attorney s results i n the provision of ineffe ctive assistance o f co u n s el to indige nt defe ndants and specific ally resulted in Hay nes’s inef fec tive assistance to Floy d. Floy d cannot obtain the reque sted decla ration ag ainst the State of Mich ig a n b e cause any form of relief soug ht ag ainst a State in fede ral court is barr ed under the Eleventh Amendment unless the
State has waived its sovere ign immunit y . See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla. , 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Hamilton’s Bogarts, Inc.

v. Mich. , 501 F.3d 644, 654 n.8 (6th Cir. 2007 ). Fl o y d d i d not alleg e that the State of Michig an 9Floyd v. County of Kent, et al.

No. 08-2015 waived its sovere ign immunit y to s u i t

. There fore , any decla ratory relief ag ainst the State of Michig an is barr ed by

the Eleve nth Amendment.
A fede ral court m ay i m p o s e prospec tive decla ratory relief to compel a State officia l to comply with fede ral law “re g ardle ss of whether compliance m i gh t h ave an ancillar y eff ect on the

s t at e trea sury [.] ” S & M Brands, Inc. v. Cooper , 527 F.3d 500, 507 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing W ill v. Mich. Dep’ t of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71 & n.10 (1989), and Ex parte Y oung , 209 U.S. 123, 160-
62 (1908))

. For example, in Luckey v. Harri s , 8 6 0 F. 2 d 1012, 1013-14 (11th Cir. 1988), the Eleventh Circuit allowed a suit to proce ed aga i n st Geor g ia’s Gover nor and the state judge s responsible for providing assistance of counsel to indige nt criminal defe ndants wher e the plaintiffs claimed that sy stemic defic ienci es v i olated their constitutional rig hts. The state officia l sued, howeve r, must have, by virtue of the office , some connec tion with the alleg ed unconstitutional a ct or conduc t of which the pla intiff complains. See id. at 1015-16.
I n his complaint Floy d complained of inadequ at e fundi ng , training , qualifica tion, and

o v er s i ght of attorney s appointed to repr esent indige nt defe ndants, but he did not alleg e any fa ct s showing how Governor Granholm is connec ted t o, or has any responsibility for, the alleg ed S i x th Amendment violation s, nor did he name as defe ndants any state judge s or court administrators responsible for administering the criminal-de fense sy stem. See Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570. T h er efor e, the district court did not err in dismiss ing Floy d’s S ix th Amendment claims ag ainst the State of Michig an and G overnor Gra nholm. 3

The parties informed us that the adequa cy of Michig an’s indige nt-defe nse sy stem is be ing 3 litigated in Michig an state courts in a class-a ction lawsuit. Duncan v. State , 774 N.W.2d 89 (Mich. 10Floyd v. County of Kent, et al.

No. 08-2015 Floy d also did not state a claim for relief ag ainst Kent County for perc eived defic iencies in providing counsel to indige nt de fenda nts. At the time of Floy d’s sentenc ing, Michig an law place d responsibility for appoin t i n g an attorney for an indige nt acc used on the chief judge of the circ uit

court in the county wher e the offe nse occur red, and not dir ec t l y o n the county or its executive officia ls. Mich. Comp. L aw § 775.16 (1999). The statute provided that appointed defe nse attorney s

wer e paid from the county trea sury , but only afte r the chief judge of the circ uit court in that c ounty

cer tified that the appointed attorney rende red profe ssional service s and was entitled to rec eive

rea sonable compensat i o n for the service s perf ormed. Id. Floy d did not alleg e any fac ts in his

4 complaint to show that an officia l policy , custom or prac tice of Kent County was the “moving forc e” behind any asser

ted violation of hi s constitutional rig hts by the circuit court. See Monell v. Dep’ t of Soc. Servs. , 4 36 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Miller v. Sanilac Cnty. , 606 F.3d 240, 254-55 (6th Cir. 2010).

Ct. App. 2009), aff’d on other grounds , 780 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 2010), reconsideration granted and order vacated , 784 N.W.2d 51 (Mich. 2010), order vacated on reconsideration , 790 N.W.2d 695 (Mich. 2010), reconsideration denied , 791 N.W.2d 713 (Mich. 201 0). Acc ording to Floy d’s appellate co u n s el, that case includes claims ag ainst the State of Michig an and the Michig an Gover nor, and the case has bee n rema nded to the trial c ourt for f urther pr ocee dings. After Floy

d was sentenc ed in 1999, Michig an Court Rule 8.123 was adopted in 2002, 4 eff ective J anuar

y 1, 2004. That rule curr ently prov i d es t hat “[e]ach trial court must adopt a local administrative order that descr ibes the court’s proce dures for selec ting, appointing, and compensa ting counsel who represent indige nt parties in that court.” MCR 8.123(B ). The State Court Administrator must approve the local administrative order

. MCR 8.123(C). Th e rule also contains provi sions requiring trial courts to submit cer tain annual repor

ts to the State Court Administrator, including repor ts of the total public funds paid to eac h attorney for appointments by the cour t, and the public funds pa id for appointments by eac h judge . MCR 8.123(D) & (F ). 11Floyd v. County of Kent, et al.

No. 08-2015 Finally , there is another rea son why the district court proper ly dismiss ed Floy d’s complaint.
I n his pro se pleading , Floy d challeng ed more than the err oneous sentenc e. He also alleg ed that his trial counsel did not conduct any investigation of his cri m inal case , forc ed him to waive his preliminary examination, and forc ed him to plead g uilty , due in larg e part to sy stemic defic iencies. These a lleg ations impli cate Floy d’s conviction, not his sentence

. I n Hadley v. W

erner , 753 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), this Court affi rm ed dismiss al wi thout prejudice of a § 1983 suit challeng ing the Michig an sy stem for appointing and
compensa ting defe nse attorney s wher e the plaintiff had not y et attempted to establish throug h habea s
corpus that he actua lly recei v ed i n effective assistance of state trial counsel. See also Hec k v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). I n Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Defende r Comm’n , 501 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2007), t his Court held t hat Hec k did not bar a § 1983 suit challeng ing the Ohio public defe nder sy stem wher e the defe ndant was in custody for only a short time and was t h u s foreclosed from challeng ing the incar cer ation in a habea s action. I n Miranda v. Clark Cnty. , 319 F.3d 465, 470-71 (9th Cir. 2003) ( en banc ), t he Ninth Circuit allowed a § 1983 suit challeng ing a policy of the county public defe nder’ s office to proce ed wher e the plaintiff first obtained reve rsal of his state court c onviction throug h habea s corpus. Floy d stands in a worse position than the plaintiffs in Hadley , Powers , and Miranda

. Floy d

actua lly filed a motion for relief from j u dg ment in state court collater ally attacking both his conviction and his sentence. Whil e the Michig an Supreme Court vaca ted the er roneous se ntence , it aff irmed the trial court’s deter mination on the merits that Floy d rec eived the eff ective assistance of counsel during his crimi n al p ro cee ding as require d by the Six th Amendment. The court also 12Floyd v. County of Kent, et al.

No. 08-2015 denied Floy d’s motion for pere mptory reve rsal. Floy d did not furthe r ch al l en ge the Michig an Supreme Court’s ruling on ineffe ctive assist ance in a habeas corpus petition filed i n fe d er al court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Thus, the district court proper ly dismiss ed Floy d’s § 1983 complaint as it rela tes to Floy d’s conviction beca use he cannot show that the conviction was obtained as a result of ineffe ctive assistanc e of tria l counsel. Although the defe ndants asser t other rea sons why we should aff irm the dismiss al order , we need not r eac h those arguments here

. IV. CONCLUSION Fl o y d ’s complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim for relief ag ainst any named defe ndant.
Acc ording ly , we AF F IRM

.

13