[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-11719

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 4:12-cv-00841-CLS

MICHELLE KING, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

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(December 19, 2013)

Before WILSON, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM: 

Michelle King appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the 

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (“Commissioner”) denial of 

her applications for disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security 

Income, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). On appeal, King first argues 

that the district court should have remanded to the Appeals Council (“AC”)

because the AC erred in denying review in the light of King’s additional evidence. 

Second, King contends that the AC’s written denial of review failed to show that it 

adequately evaluated King’s additional evidence. Third, King believes that a 

reasonable possibility, based on King’s additional evidence, exists that the 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) would have reversed her opinion and 

determined that King was eligible for benefits under Listings 12.04 (Affective 

Disorders) or 12.05(c) (Mental Retardation).

The “final” decision of the Commissioner is subject to judicial review. 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether it 

is supported by substantial evidence. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 

1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007). “With a few exceptions, the claimant is allowed to 

present new evidence at each stage of [the] administrative process.” Id. at 1261. 

“The [AC] must consider new, material, and chronologically relevant evidence and 

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must review the case if the [ALJ’s] action, findings, or conclusion is contrary to 

the weight of the evidence currently of record.” Id. (quotations omitted).

We review de novo the judgment of the district court. Id. at 1260. When a 

claimant properly submits additional evidence to the AC, a reviewing court must 

consider the entire record, including the additional evidence submitted to the AC, 

to determine whether the denial of benefits was substantially erroneous. Id. at 

1262. 

We must affirm a decision that is supported by substantial evidence even if 

the evidence preponderates against the ALJ’s findings. Crawford v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004). “Substantial evidence is more 

than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 1158. Moreover, we may not reweigh 

the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 

F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). 

A person claiming Social Security disability benefits must prove that she is 

disabled. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). The ALJ uses a 

five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant has proved

that she is disabled. Id. A claimant must show that (1) she is not performing 

substantial gainful activity; (2) she has a severe impairment; (3) the impairment or 

combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment listed in the 

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regulations; or (4) she cannot perform her past relevant work; and (5) she cannot 

perform other work, based on her age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520; Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004). 

The ALJ must “assess and make a finding about the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity [(“RFC”)] based on all the relevant medical and other evidence 

in the case.” Id. at 1238 (quotations and alterations omitted). We have recognized 

that a one-time examiner is not a treating medical provider, and the examiner’s 

opinion is not entitled to deference. McSwain v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617, 619 (11th 

Cir. 1987). A condition that is controlled by medication may not be a substantial 

limitation for purposes of a claimant’s RFC. See id. at 620 n.1 (explaining that the 

ALJ did not err in failing to include epilepsy in his hypothetical restrictions as 

presented to the vocational expert where the claimant testified that his epilepsy was 

substantially controlled by medication).

Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we 

affirm.

King’s first argument -- that the district court should have remanded -- is 

largely inapposite because we review, in regard to substantial evidence supporting 

the Commissioner’s decision, the Commissioner’s final decision, not the district 

court’s decision. On this record, the Commissioner’s decision was supported by 

substantial evidence.

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Second, when King withdrew her motion to remand in the district court, 

King conceded at least the Commissioner’s point* that the AC is not required to 

meet a particular standard of clear articulation when it denies review; and we

generally will not consider an issue that the claimant failed to raise and preserve in 

the district court. See Stewart v. Dept. of Health and Human Serv’s, 26 F.3d 115, 

115 (11th Cir. 1994).

Third, King does not object to the AC’s denial of review or the ALJ’s 

decision based solely on the evidence that was before the ALJ. Therefore, King has 

abandoned those arguments on appeal. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Swann, 27 F.3d 

1539, 1542 (11th Cir. 1994) (explaining that issues not raised on appeal are 

ordinarily considered abandoned). Furthermore, none of King’s additional 

evidence was material, chronologically relevant, and contradictory to the ALJ’s 

decision. Thus, King has failed to show that her additional evidence renders the 

Commissioner’s denial of benefits erroneous. 

AFFIRMED.

 * The withdrawal contains these words:

“The points in the Commissioner’s response [to Plaintiff’s motion to remand] are well 

taken. The motion to remand is hereby withdrawn.”

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