Opinion issued February 26, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NOS. 01-13-00267-CV

 01-13-00233-CV

———————————

JAY H. COHEN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE JHC 

TRUSTS I AND II, Appellant

V.

SANDCASTLE HOMES, INC., Appellee

* * * *

JAY H. COHEN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE JHC 

TRUST I AND II, Appellant

V.

NEWBISS PROPERTY, LP, Appellee

On Appeal from the 234th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case Nos. 2010-20973A & 2010-20973B
2

O P I N I O N

In related proceedings, appellant Jay H. Cohen, Individually and as Trustee 

of the JHC Trusts I and II, challenges the trial court’s summary judgments granted 

in favor of appellees Sandcastle Homes, Inc. and NewBiss Property, LP 

Specifically, Cohen challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the Sandcastle and 

NewBiss established their status as bona-fide purchasers of certain real property in 

which Cohen claims an interest. The primary issue we must resolve is whether the 

purchaser of real property can establish bona-fide purchaser status if that purchaser 

has actual knowledge about information contained in a notice of lis pendens that 

has been filed, and then later expunged, on the property. We answer that question 

in the affirmative, and affirm the trial court’s judgments. 

BACKGROUND

The underlying suit involves Cohen’s claims against numerous defendants 

related to several parcels of real estate. The summary judgments at issue in favor 

of Sandcastle and NewBiss were severed from the remaining claims against other 

parties, rendering them final and appealable.1 Because only these two judgments 

 

1

The summary judgment in favor of NewBiss was severed into 2010-20973A; the 

summary judgment in favor of Sandcastle was severed into cause number 2010-

20973B. 
3

are at issue, we limit our discussion to basic background facts and discussion of the 

summary-judgment evidence relevant to these judgments.

Through a series of transfers over the years, Cohen transferred several pieces 

of real estate into different partnerships. In the underlying lawsuit, Cohen claims 

that defendant Mathew Dilick acted wrongfully and fraudulently (both individually 

and through entities he controlled) with respect to management of the properties 

through a series of transfers, sales, and debt encumbrances. In conjunction with 

his lawsuit, Cohen also filed numerous notices of lis pendens on various properties. 

This appeal involves properties covered by Cohen’s July 27, 2010 Second 

Supplemental Notice of Lis Pendens. That notice impacts several properties, 

including the property at issue in this case, i.e., 2.4373 acres known as the “West 

Newcastle Property.” That notice identifies the underlying suit and states its 

purpose is to set aside certain transfers of real property, including the prior transfer 

of the West Newcastle Property from Flat Stone II, Ltd. to West Newcastle Ltd, 

and to “set aside and cancel liens” granted by Flat Stone II to Regions Bank. 

Several defendants in the underlying proceedings filed emergency motions 

to expunge the notices of lis pendens. 
4

September 1 & 7, 2010. The trial court signed orders granting all the 

motions to lift the lis pendens notices,2concluding that Cohen failed to state direct 

real-property claims, and specifically noting that it “did not consider evidence or 

make a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence.” Cohen challenged these 

interlocutory expungement orders in this Court, filing a petition for writ of 

mandamus and a motion to stay the trial court’s orders. 

September 30, 2010. This Court granted Cohen’s motion to stay the trial 

court’s orders expunging the notices of lis pendens.

October 8, 2010. Defendant Dilick made the first of two property transfers 

relevant to the subject matter of this appeal. Specifically, he effectuated the sale 

from titleholder West Newcastle Ltd. of a 0.95 acres portion of the West Newcastle 

Property (“West Newcastle Tract I”) to appellant Sandcastle Homes for $750,000. 

April 14, 2011. This Court conditionally granted Cohen’s request for 

mandamus relief from the trial court’s orders expunging all of the notices of lis 

pendens. In re Cohen, 340 S.W.3d 889, 899–900 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2011, orig. proceeding). In our opinion, we first noted that—because of recent 

statutory amendments—there are two ways to successfully establish that a notice 

of lis pendens should be expunged, i.e., by establishing that: (1) the pleadings do 

not “contain a real property claim” or (2) that the claimant has not shown the 

 

2

The order relating to the West Newcastle Property at issue here was signed on 

September 7, 2010.
5

“probable validity” of the claim. Id. at 892 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 

12.0071(c)). We held that the trial court erred by concluding that the face of 

Cohen’s pleadings did not articulate a real-property claim. Id. at 899. Although 

we accordingly directed the trial court to vacate its orders expunging the notices of 

lis pendens based on the pleadings, we expressed no opinion about whether Cohen 

could demonstrate the “probable validity” of his claims following an evidentiary 

hearing. Id. at 900. 

May 11, 2011. Cohen added Sandcastle as a defendant in the underlying 

suit, seeking to set aside its purchase of West Newcastle Tract I. 

May 17, 2011. The trial court held another hearing, this time to hear 

evidence Cohen offered in support of his July 27, 2010 Second Supplemental 

Notice of Lis Pendens, which burdened the entire West Newcastle Property and 

other properties. 

June 23, 2011. Defendant Dilick transferred the remaining 1.483 acre 

portion of the West Newcastle Property (West Newcastle Tract II) from titleholder 

West Newcastle, Ltd. to a previous titleholder, Flat Stone II. 

June 29, 2011. The trial court entered an order stating that Cohen “failed to 

establish by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validly of a real property 

claim” and that the “Second Supplemental Notice of Lis Pendens filed by Plaintiff 

on July 27, 2010 is void.” Accordingly, the court ordered the notice burdening the 
6

West Newcastle Property (now split into Tracts I and II) was “cancelled and 

expunged in its entirety.” 

Cohen filed a petition for writ of mandamus and motion for emergency stay 

in this Court challenging the trial court’s expungement orders. We denied the 

motion and petition.

September 26, 2011. Defendant Dilick made the second property transfer 

relevant to this appeal. He effectuated a sale of West Newcastle Tract II to from 

Flat Stone II to appellee NewBiss for approximately $1.8 million. 

November 10, 2011. Cohen added NewBiss as a defendant in the 

underlying suit, seeking to set aside its purchase of West Newcastle Tract II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENTS

A. Sandcastle Homes

Sandcastle filed a traditional motion for summary judgment on its 

affirmative defense that it was a “bona fide purchaser, based on the fact that it 

purchased [West Newcastle Tract I] from West Newcastle, Ltd., in good faith, for 

value, and without knowledge of any competing claims of Cohen or the Cohen 

Trusts.” Sandcastle acknowledged that there was a lis pendens in effect on the 

property at the time of purchase, but argued that “[s]ince the instrument was 

subsequently declared void, it has no force and effect and cannot serve as 

‘constructive’ notice to Sandcastle.” Sandcastle contended that its summary-
7

judgment evidence otherwise established its status as a bona fide purchaser as a 

matter of law. 

Cohen responded that summary judgment in Sandcastle’s favor was not 

appropriate because, he alleged, (1) there was a fact issue about whether 

Sandcastle had actual notice, (2) there was a fact issue about whether Sandcastle 

had constructive notice, (3) the trial court erred by expunging the lis pendens, and 

(4) the statute providing for expungement of notices of lis pendens is 

unconstitutional. 

On September 12, 2012, the trial court granted Sandcastle’s motion. On 

February 22, 2013, the trial court severed the summary judgment in favor of 

Sandcastle and rendering judgment between Cohen and Sandcastle final. 

B. NewBiss

NewBiss filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, also asserting 

that it was entitled to summary judgment because its summary-judgment evidence 

established, as a matter of law, that it was a protected bona-fide purchaser for 

value. It acknowledges that it was aware of this lawsuit, but argued that it 

“rightfully relied on [the] court’s order of expungement as an affirmative 

determination of [Cohen’s] lack of right or interest” in the West Newcastle Tract 

II. Because, it asserted, it had “no independent knowledge of any other facts that 
8

would place it on notice that Flat Stone II did not have full authority to convey” the 

property, “NewBiss was a good faith purchaser as a matter of law.” 

Cohen responded that summary judgment in NewBiss’s favor was not 

appropriate because, he alleged, (1) NewBiss had actual notice of his lawsuit, 

which was not legally impacted by expungement of the lis pendens, (2) the trial 

court erred by expunging the lis pendens, (3) the statute providing for 

expungement of notices of lis pendens is unconstitutional, (4) NewBiss’s summary 

judgment motion did not address his direct claim against NewBiss. 

On September 12, 2012, the trial court granted NewBiss’s motion. On 

February 8, 2013, the trial court severed the summary judgment in favor of 

NewBiss, rendering judgment between Cohen and NewBiss final.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

A. Issues Cohen raises challenging the Sandcastle judgment

1. “The trial court erred in granting Sandcastle’s summary 

judgment because Cohen raised a fact issue as to whether 

Sandcastle had actual notice of his claims.” 

2. “The trial court erred in granting Sandcastle’s summary 

judgment because Cohen raised a fact issue as to whether 

Sandcastle had constructive notice of his claims.”

3. “To the extent that the trial court concluded that its June 29, 

2011 order expunging Mr. Cohen’s Second Supplemental 

Notice of Lis Pendens obliterated from existence and from all 

effect any other kind of notice arising independently of the Lis 

Pendens obtained by Sandcastle in any manner and at any time 

whatsoever, such conclusion was erroneous as a matter of law.” 
9

4. “The trial court erred in granting Sandcastle’s summary 

judgment because Cohen’s Second Supplemental Lis Pendens 

should not have been expunged and therefore Sandcastle was 

not a bona fide purchaser.” 

5. “Even if Sandcastle was a bona fide purchaser, the trial court 

erred in granting summary judgment because the sale to 

Sandcastle was void, and therefore Sandcastle could not take 

good title.”

6. “The trial court erred in granting Sandcastle’s summary 

judgment because Tex. Prop. Code § 12.0071 is 

unconstitutional and did not provide the trial court a permissible 

basis by which to expunge Mr. Cohen’s lis pendens, and 

therefore Sandcastle is not a bona fide purchaser.” 

7. “The trial court abused its discretion by expunging Mr. Cohen’s 

Second Supplemental Lis Pendens.”

B. Issues Cohen raises challenging the NewBiss judgment

1. “The trial court erred in granting NewBiss’s summary judgment 

because NewBiss failed to conclusively establish its bona fide 

purchaser affirmative defense.” 

2. “The trial court erred in granting NewBiss’s summary judgment 

because Cohen’s summary judgment evidence raised a fact 

issue as to whether NewBiss had actual notice of Cohen’s 

claims.”

3. “To the extent that the trial court concluded that its June 29, 

2011 order expunging Cohen’s Second Supplemental Notice of 

Lis Pendens obliterated from existence and from all effect any 

other kind of notice arising independently of the lis pendens, 

however or whenever obtained by NewBiss, such conclusion 

was erroneous as a matter of law.” 

4. “The trial court erred in granting NewBiss’s summary judgment 

because Cohen’s Second Supplemental Lis Pendens should not 

have been expunged and therefore NewBiss is not a bona fide 

purchaser.”
10

5. “Even if NewBiss was bona fide purchaser, the trial court erred 

in granting summary judgment ‘in all respects,’ because the 

sale to NewBiss was void, and therefore NewBiss could not 

take good title.” 

6. “The trial court erred in granting NewBiss’s summary judgment 

because the statute pursuant to which the trial court expunged 

Cohen’s lis pendens is unconstitutional and did not provide the 

trial court a permissible basis by which to expunge Cohen’s lis 

pendens, and therefore NewBiss was not a bona fide 

purchaser.”

7. The trial court abused its discretion by expunging Cohen’s 

Second Supplemental Lis Pendens.”

8. “The trial court abused its discretion by expunging Cohen’s 

November 14, 2012 lis pendens.” 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a summary judgment de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. 

Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). Under the traditional summaryjudgment standard, the movant has the burden to show that no genuine issues of 

material fact exist and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R.

CIV. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985).

In determining whether there are disputed issues of material fact, we take as true 

all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference in 

the nonmovant’s favor. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548–49. A defendant moving for 

summary judgment must conclusively negate at least one essential element of each 

of the plaintiff’s causes of action or conclusively establish each element of an 

affirmative defense. Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex.
11

1997). If the summary judgment does not specify the grounds on which it was 

granted, the appealing party must demonstrate on appeal that none of the proposed 

grounds is sufficient to support the judgment. Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 

S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. 1989); Tilotta v. Goodall, 752 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied). 

LIS PENDENS

“[D]uring the pendency of an action involving title to real property, the 

establishment of an interest in real property, or the enforcement of an encumbrance 

against real property,” a party seeking affirmative relief may file a lis pendens in 

the real property records of the county where the property is located. TEX. PROP.

CODE ANN. § 12.007(a) (West 2014). The notice must contain certain information, 

including the style and cause number of the proceedings, the court where it is 

pending, the names of the parties, identification of the kind of proceedings, and a 

description of the property affected. Id. § 12.007(b). 

A properly filed lis pendens is not itself a lien, but rather it operates as 

constructive notice “to the world of its contents.” See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 

13.004(a) (West 2014); see also B & T Distribs., Inc. v. White, 325 S.W.3d 786, 

789 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.) (“The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is 

to put those interested in a particular tract of land on inquiry about the facts and the 
12

issues involved in the suit and to put prospective buyers on notice that they acquire 

any interest subject to the outcome of the pending litigation.”). 

The Property Code expressly provides that a properly filed notice of lis 

pendens prevents a purchaser for value from acquiring property free and clear of 

the encumbrance referenced in the lis pendens: 

A transfer or encumbrance of real property involved in a proceeding 

by a party to the proceeding to a third party who has paid a valuable 

consideration and who does not have actual or constructive notice of 

the proceeding is effective, even though the judgment is against the 

party transferring or encumbering the property, unless a notice of the 

pendency of the proceeding has been recorded and indexed under that 

party’s name as provided by Section 12.007(c) in each county in 

which the property is located.

TEX. PROP. CODE § 13.004(b); see also Cherokee Water Co. v. Advance Oil & Gas 

Co., 843 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, writ denied) (“The rule 

effectively prevents a grantee from being an innocent purchaser.”). 

A notice of lis pendens may be expunged, however, if certain procedures are 

followed and the trial court determines that the party filing the notice either has not 

pleaded a real-property claim or demonstrated the probable validity of the claim: 

(a) A party to an action in connection with which a notice of lis 

pendens has been filed may:

(1) apply to the court to expunge the notice; and

(2) file evidence, including declarations, with the motion to 

expunge the notice.

. . . .

(c) The court shall order the notice of lis pendens expunged if the 

court determines that:
13

(1) the pleading on which the notice is based does not contain a 

real property claim; [or]

(2) the claimant fails to establish by a preponderance of the 

evidence the probable validity of the real property claim;

. . . .

TEX. PROP. CODE § 12.0071(c). If an order expunging a notice is properly 

recorded, there are statutory limitations on the ability of a party to charge a 

purchaser with notice based upon the notice of lis pendens:

(f) After a certified copy of an order expunging a notice of lis pendens 

has been recorded, the notice of lis pendens and any information 

derived from the notice:

(1) does not:

(A) constitute constructive or actual notice of any 

matter contained in the notice or of any matter relating to 

the proceeding;

(B) create any duty of inquiry in a person with 

respect to the property described in the notice; or

(C) affect the validity of a conveyance to a 

purchaser for value or of a mortgage to a lender for 

value; and

(2) is not enforceable against a purchaser or lender described by 

Subdivision (1)(C), regardless of whether the purchaser or lender 

knew of the lis pendens action.

TEX. PROP. CODE § 12.0071(f). 

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF AN EXPUNGED LIS PENDENS?

The parties disagree about how the trial court’s expungement of the notices 

of lis pendens on Tract I and Tract II impacted Sandcastle’s and NewBiss’s ability 

to establish bona-fide purchaser status. The notice of lis pendens on Tract I was 
14

expunged after Sandcastle’s purchase; the notice of lis pendens was expunged on 

Tract II before NewBiss’s purchase. Cohen asserts that, in both cases, the 

purchasers were not entitled to bona-fide purchaser protection because they 

otherwise had notice of his lawsuit. We disagree. 

A. Sandcastle

With regard to Sandcastle, in his first issue Cohen points to evidence he 

contends raises a fact issue about Sandcastle’s actual notice of his lawsuit. 

Specifically, he cites Dilick’s deposition testimony that he told Sandcastle—both 

prior to its purchase and again at closing—about the lawsuit. Dilick also altered 

the disclosure statement at closing to change “Owner is not a part to any pending 

law suits” to “Owner is not a future party to any pending future known law suits.” 

Cohen argues that while the lis pendens operated as constructive notice “to the 

world of its contents,” TEX. PROP. CODE § 13.004(a), “actual notice is binding 

independent of any question of constructive notice.” Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d 

692, 693–94 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928, judgm’t adopted). Thus, he asserts, “[b]y 

granting Sandcastle’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court may have 

impermissibly conflated the issue of actual notice with the issue of constructive 

notice.” 

Alternatively, in his second issue Cohen argues that his filing this Court’s 

stay of the order expunging the lis pendens on Tract I in the real-property records 
15

put Sandcastle on constructive notice of his lawsuit because it was in the chain of 

title. See Hexter, 10 S.W.2d at 693. Thus, he contends, “[b]ecause on the day it 

purportedly purchased the [Tract I] Sandcastle had constructive notice of Cohen’s 

claims thereto (and presumed actual knowledge as well), from publically available 

information other than that derived from Cohen’s lis pendens, i.e., from a separate, 

independent and publicly filed document, Sandcastle did not qualify as a bona fide 

purchaser, and summary judgment in its favor was improper.”

Finally, in his third issue, Cohen argues to the extent that the trial court 

concluded its order expunging the lis pendens on Tract I “obliterated from 

existence and from all effect any other kind of notice arising independently of the 

lis pendens, however or whenever obtained by Sandcastle, such conclusion was 

erroneous as a matter of law.” Cohen acknowledges that that this “issue appears to 

be one of first impression,” and argues that section 12.0071(f) should be construed 

narrowly, such that a party cannot be a bona-fide purchaser—even if a notice of lis 

pendens has been expunged—if the party has obtained any information about the 

lawsuit independent of the actual lis pendens. 

B. NewBiss

With regard to NewBiss, in his first issue Cohen points to NewBiss’s own 

summary-judgment evidence that he contends conclusively establishes NewBiss’s 

actual notice of his lawsuit. Specifically, he cites an affidavit by Greg Lewis, a 
16

NewBiss representative, which states “[d]uring our discussion on the terms of the 

sale, Dilick advised me a lis pendens had been filed on the Property.” Thus, Cohen 

contends, NewBiss “admitted [it] did not learn of Cohen’s lis pendens, or the 

information within it, via the lis pendens itself.” Because Dilick instead told Lewis 

about the notice of lis pendens, Cohen argues that NewBiss had actual notice that 

rendered the lis pendens and its expungement irrelevant.

In his second issue, Cohen alternatively argues that his summary-judgment 

evidence raises a fact issue about NewBiss’s actual notice. Cohen cites an 

affidavit by John Riddle, who stated that—when he learned that NewBiss had 

Tract II under contract—he asked Lewis if he knew about Cohen’s lawsuit and 

offered to get Lewis a copy of the petition. Lewis declined the offer, telling Riddle 

that “he knew all about it.” Cohen contends that this evidence defeats any 

argument that NewBiss did not have actual knowledge about his lawsuit.

Finally, Cohen argues that, if the trial court’s summary judgment was 

premised upon its conclusion that the expungement of his Second Supplemental 

Notice of Lis Pendens obliterated all forms of notice (actual and constructive) 

about his claims, that holding is erroneous. 

C. Analysis 

 Cohen’s first three issues with regard to both the Sandcastle and NewBiss 

judgments require us to determine, as a matter of first impression, the impact of the 
17

trial court’s expungement of the notices lis pendens on the Newcastle Property 

Tract I and Tract II on the appellees’ ability to avail themselves of bona-fide 

purchaser status. 

In Texas, prior to 2009, if a party pleaded a real-property claim, it could 

effectively encumber a property with a lis pendens notice until the underlying 

proceedings concluded without regard for the merits of the underlying claim. This 

approach had been criticized because it allowed real-property interests to be 

significantly burdened with no evidentiary support and with no showing that the 

notice of lis pendens was filed in good faith. See, e.g., Herbert A. Janzen, Texas 

Statutory Notice of Lis Pendens: A Deprivation of Property Interest without Due 

Process?, 19 ST. MARY’S L.J. 377, 385 (1987) (“Under the [prior version of] the 

Texas statute, the only way a seller c[ould] remove the cloud on his title caused by 

a lis pendens notice [was] to post a bond or give an undertaking pursuant to the 

statute, or proceed to trial on the underlying suit and obtain a favorable 

judgment.”). Recognizing that a lis pendens notice “produces a cloud on title 

which may devastate the marketability of the encumbered property,” some states 

“enacted statutes requiring a trial court to determine, in a hearing on discharge, that 

the claim is probably valid, or that the proponent is likely to prevail in the action.” 

Hon. David M. Gersten, The Doctrine of Lis Pendens: the Need for a Balance, 59 

FLORIDA BAR J. 83 (June 1995) (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 405.32 (West 
18

1995) (“[T]he court shall order that the notice be expunged if the court finds that 

the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable 

validity of the real property claim.”); NEV. REV. STAT. §14.015.3 (1993) (requiring 

party filing notice of lis pendens to establish it was “not brought in bad faith or for 

an improper motive” and that it “is likely to prevail in the action” or “has a fair 

chance of success on the merits in the action” and that harm from lifting the notice 

would be sufficiently serious); N.J. REV. STAT. §2A:15-7(b)(1995) (“If the court 

determines that there is a sufficient probability of final judgment in favor of the 

plaintiff, the notice of lis pendens shall be continued of record. . . . If the court fails 

so to determine, the court shall forthwith order the notice of lis pendens discharged 

of record.”)).

In 2009, the Texas Legislature similarly amended section 12.0071 of the 

Texas Property Code to require a trial court to “order the notice of lis pendens 

expunged if the court determines that . . . the claimant fails to establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim.” 

Probable validity is not defined in the statute, but other jurisdictions have defined 

this phrase in the lis pendens expungement context to mean “where it is more 

likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on 

that claim.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 481.190.
19

Cohen’s Second Supplemental Notice of Lis Pendens was expunged under 

this new provision. The parties disagree about the effect of that expungement, 

which is governed by section 12.0071(f): 

(f) After a certified copy of an order expunging a notice of lis pendens 

has been recorded, the notice of lis pendens and any information 

derived from the notice:

(1) does not:

(A) constitute constructive or actual notice of any 

matter contained in the notice or of any matter relating to 

the proceeding;

(B) create any duty of inquiry in a person with 

respect to the property described in the notice; or

(C) affect the validity of a conveyance to a 

purchaser for value or of a mortgage to a lender for 

value; and

(2) is not enforceable against a purchaser or lender described by 

Subdivision (1)(C), regardless of whether the purchaser or lender 

knew of the lis pendens action.

TEX. PROP. CODE § 12.0071(f). 

Cohen urges us to interpret this provision to mean that expungement 

extinguishes only (1) constructive notice caused by the filing of the notice of lis 

pendens, and (2) actual notice derived by reading the notice of lis pendens. Thus, 

under Cohen’s interpretation, if a party learns of a lis pendens or the underlying 

lawsuit other than by reading the actual lis pendens notice, the party has “actual 

notice” of that claim, defeating bona-fide purchaser status regardless of whether 

the lis pendens is expunged. 
20

Sandcastle and NewBiss argue that Cohen’s interpretation eliminates the 

benefit of—and is contrary to the purpose of—the expungement statute because it 

allows a party to burden title to property even when that party cannot meet the 

threshold requirement of adequately pleading and establishing the probable validity 

of an alleged real-property claim. We agree.

“We use definitions prescribed by the Legislature and any technical or 

particular meaning the words have acquired, but otherwise, we construe the 

statute’s words according to their plain and common meaning unless a contrary 

intention is apparent from the context, or unless such a construction leads to absurd 

results.” FKM P’ship, Ltd. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Houston Sys., 255 S.W.3d 

619, 633 (Tex. 2008) (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.011; Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. 

Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2004)). We presume the 

Legislature intended a just and reasonable result by enacting the statute. TEX.

GOV’T CODE § 311.021(3).

A notice of lis pendens is designed to put persons who might acquire the 

property on notice that there is a potential claim to the property. There are two 

methods to terminate a lis pendens. Anyone interested in a burdened property can 

petition for a “cancellation” of lis pendens if the court determines “the party 

seeking affirmative relief can be adequately protected by the deposit of money into 

court or by giving of an undertaking.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 12.008. In other words, 
21

without regard to the merits of a real property claim, a party can unburden real 

property by providing security in its place. 

But section 12.0071—the provision at issue here—uses the word “expunge” 

rather than “cancel.” Unlike section 12.008 (providing for cancellation based upon 

posting security), a court under 12.0071 must find that the plaintiff either did not 

plead a real-property claim or has not shown the probable validity of its claims 

before expungement is appropriate. “Expunge” means to “erase or destroy”; to 

“declare . . . null and outside the record,” so that it “is noted in the original record 

as expunged, and redacted from all future copies.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(10th ed. 2014). Once a notice of expungement has been properly filed, “the notice 

of lis pendens and any information derived from the notice” does not amount to 

constructive, actual, or inquiry notice about the underlying lawsuit, and is “not 

enforceable against a purchaser or lender . . . regardless of whether the purchaser 

or lender knew of the lis pendens action.” 

Cohen argues the concepts of actual and constructive notice are different and 

that expungement of a notice of lis pendens can operate only to extinguish 

constructive notice, but not actual notice (except the actual notice that comes from 

physically reading a lis pendens notice). We reject that argument because the plain 

language of section 12.0071 shows that—for purposes of establishing bona fide 

purchaser status—expungement of a lis pendens notice extinguishes both actual 
22

and constructive notice. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 12.0071(f)(1)(A) (“After a 

certified copy of an order expunging a notice of lis pendens has been recorded, the 

notice of lis pendens and any information derived from the notice . . . does not . . . 

constitute constructive or actual notice of any matter contained in the notice or of 

any matter relating to the proceeding.” (emphasis added)), § 12.0071(f)(2) (“After 

a certified copy of a notice of lis pendens has been recorded, the notice of lis 

pendens any information derived from the notice . . . is not enforceable against a 

purchaser. . . regardless of whether the purchaser . . . knew of the lis pendens 

action.” (emphasis added)). What is less clear, however, is exactly what 

expungement extinguishes actual and constructive notice of. 

The statute states that expungement extinguishes “notice of lis pendens and 

any information derived from the notice.” (emphasis added). Our resolution of 

this appeal turns on what “any information derived from” means. Cohen advances 

a narrow interpretation of this provision, insisting that expungement of a lis 

pendens should have no effect on any actual notice unless the purchaser gained the 

actual notice from reading the notice of lis pendens. Under this interpretation, 

whether an expungement can remove the cloud of a lis pendens does not turn on 

whether the party encumbering the real property can demonstrate a probable right 

of recovery on an underlying real-property claim, but instead on details about 
23

exactly how the purchaser seeking to rely on an expungement learns of the 

underlying claim.

For example, under Cohen’s interpretation, if a potential purchaser first 

learns of a lawsuit involving a claim to real property by reading a properly filed 

notice of lis pendens in the real property records, then the potential seller’s 

successfully moving to expunge that lis pendens—either before or after the 

purchaser came across the lis pendens notice—would restore that purchaser’s 

ability to take the property as a bona-fide-purchaser. 

The result would be different, however, if the day before inspecting the real 

property records, that same potential purchaser was told by a real estate agent 

showing the property: 

The seller told me that there is a lawsuit in which someone was 

claiming an interest in this property. The plaintiff in that suit filed a 

notice of lis pendens on the property, but the seller went to court and 

got that notice expunged, so everything is fine now. 

Under Cohen’s interpretation, the buyer told about the suit by the realtor could 

never take the property as a bona-fide purchaser, despite a trial court finding that 

the plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit failed to establish, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, the probable validity of the real-property claim. 

The statutory provisions providing for expungement of lis pendens notices—

the aim of which is to curtail burdening of real property pretrial, for lengthy 

periods, without evidentiary support—would be of little use if every case 
24

necessitated inquiry into, and turned on, whether a purchaser physically read the lis 

pendens or was told about the lis pendens or the underlying lawsuit by another 

person. Read as a whole, the lis pendens and expungement scheme is designed to 

differentiate cases in which the proponent of the notice of lis pendens can 

demonstrate a probable right of recovery on an underlying real-property claim 

from cases in which the proponent cannot; nothing indicates that the legislature 

intended the determination of whether title to a property is encumbered to turn 

instead on whether each potential buyer learns of an underlying claim that is the 

subject of a lis pendens notice by literally reading the notice or by some other 

means. 

We thus conclude that the more reasonable interpretation intended by the 

legislature is that a lawsuit identified in a notice of lis pendens does not preclude 

subsequent purchasers from proving bona-fide purchaser status if the trial court has 

expunged that lis pendens following a determination that the proponent has not 

shown the probable validity of the real-property claim. Unlike the dissent’s 

interpretation of the statute, ours has the benefit of furthering the purpose of the 

statute and creating a bright-line rule.

The dissent criticizes our interpretation as too broad and argues that section 

12.0071 should instead be interpreted to extinguish only notice that came from the 

notice of lis pendens itself or from information derived from that recorded notice. 
25

It contends that our interpretation “imbu[es] an expungement of a notice of lis 

pendens with the claim-preclusive effect of a full-blown adverse judgment on the 

merits.” The dissent acknowledges, as it must, that the statute expressly mandates 

such a result for some types of actual and constructive notice about the underlying 

lawsuit, but argues that result should not extend to other types of actual notice. In 

support of its interpretation, the dissent expresses a concern that “the procedural 

standard for expunging a notice of lis pendens is much lower than the standard that 

would apply to defeat the underlying claim on the merits.” But, by the same token, 

a plaintiff’s filing a notice of lis pendens wields power not available to a plaintiff 

in any other context, i.e., the ability to effectively completely encumber a 

defendant’s property before any right to that property is litigated.3 

Cohen does not argue that Sandcastle or NewBiss had notice of any legal 

claims other than those identified in his Second Supplemental Notice of Lis 

Pendens burdening the West Newcastle Property. He argues only that fact issues 

exist about whether Sandcastle’s and NewBiss’s knowledge about those claims 

came from the actual lis pendens or from other sources providing information 

about the claims and/or lis pendens. Because we have held that expunction of 

notices of lis pendens for failure to establish the probable validity of the underlying 

 

3 We also note that expungement under section 12.0071 does not impact a plaintiff’s 

ability to enforce a perfected lien against real property if its claim to the property 

meets the statutory prerequisites, nor does it impact the plaintiff’s ability to 

recover monetary damages from the defendant. 
26

claims effectively extinguishes “notice” of the claims identified in the notice of lis 

pendens, we overrule Cohen’s first three issues in the Sandcastle appeal and the 

first three issues in the NewBiss appeal. 

THE EXPUNGEMENT

 In issues four and seven related to the Sandcastle appeal and in issues 

four and seven related to the NewBiss appeal, Cohen argues that the trial court 

erred by expunging his Second Supplemental Notice of Lis Pendens, rendering the 

summary judgments in favor of Sandcastle and NewBiss erroneous. In his eighth 

issue in the NewBiss appeal, he complains that the trial court erred in expunging 

another notice of lis pendens he filed on Tract II of the West Newcastle property 

on November 14, 2012. Specifically, he argues that expunging his notices of lis 

pendens was improper because he established the probable validity of his realproperty claims against the Dilick defendants in the underlying lawsuit. 

Orders related to lis pendens are addressable by mandamus4and, in some 

situations, on direct appeal from the final judgment resolving the alleged real-

 

4

E.g., First Nat’l Petroleum Corp. v. Lloyd, 908 S.W.2d 23, 24–25 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding) (“Mandamus has been recognized as 

the appropriate remedy when issues have arisen concerning the issuance of notices 

of lis pendens.”); see also Flores v. Haberman, 915 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Tex. 1995) 

(orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief from trial court’s erroneously denial 

of motion to cancel notice of lis pendens without analysis of adequate remedy by 

appeal). 
27

property claim for which the lis pendens gives notice.5 Neither of these situations 

is presented here. Cohen raised the same arguments he makes here in the petition 

for writ of mandamus he filed, and we denied, when the trial court expunged his 

notices of lis pendens. See In re Cohen, 01-11-00544-CV (Dec. 22, 2011). And 

the underlying real-property claims against the Dilick defendant upon which the 

notices of lis pendens gave notice are still pending in in the trial court. We will not 

consider Cohen’s collateral challenge to the trial court’s expungement orders in 

this direct appeal from severed summary judgments establishing Sandcastle’s and 

NewBiss’s bona-fide purchaser status.

We accordingly overrule Cohen’s fourth and seventh issues in the 

Sandcastle appeal and his fourth, seventh, and eighth issues in the NewBiss appeal. 

SALES TO SANDCASTLE AND NEWBISS VOID?

In his fifth issues in both the Sandcastle and NewBiss appeals, Cohen argues 

that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because even if Sandcastle 

and NewBiss were bona-fide purchasers, their purchases were void. Specifically, 

 

5

See In re Moody Nat’l Kirby Houston S, LLC, 412 S.W.3d 570, 571 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, orig. proceeding) (denying mandamus petition 

challenging trial court’s denial of motion to expunge lis pendens because 

mandamus was filed after notice of appeal from final judgment resolving realproperty claim in underlying proceeding rendering appeal from final judgment 

(into which interlocutory order denying expungement merged) an adequate 

remedy). But see Nat’l City Bank of Indiana v. Ortiz, 401 S.W.3d 867, 887 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (addressing merits of mandamus 

petition challenging denial of motion to expunge notice of lis pendens that was 

filed after notice of appeal filed from final disposition of underlying real-property 

dispute). 
28

Cohen alleges that the sales to Sandcastle and NewBiss amounted to improper and 

illegal diversion of partnership property because Dilick took the sales proceeds for 

improper personal use, which violated his fiduciary duties and the Texas Penal 

Code. 

Sandcastle and NewBiss argue that the transactions were not void. They 

dispute that Dilick’s actions were improper or violated any law, and argue that—in 

any event—Dilick’s actions were within the scope of his authority such that his 

misuse of sale proceeds would not void the sale. We agree that Cohen has not 

demonstrated that the sales were void. 

Cohen does not dispute that Dilick was specifically authorized under the 

relevant partnership agreements to conduct transactions involving the West 

Newcastle property, including the authority to sell or encumber the property. In 

other words, Dilick did not exceed the scope of his authority by conveying the 

properties. The two cases Cohen cites for the proposition that we should 

nonetheless void the sales as being against public policy are inapposite and do not 

support his argument that a sale within an agent’s authority to a third party is void 

if the agent involved in the sale later improperly diverts proceeds from the sale for 

an impermissible personal use. See GNG Gas Sys, Inc. v. Dean, 921 S.W.2d 421, 

426–27 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, writ denied); Guaranty Bank (S. Oak Cliff 

Bank) v. Nat’l Surety Corp., 508 S.W.2d 928, 929 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1974, 
29

writ ref’d n.r.e.). In Guaranty Bank, the court of appeals affirmed a summary 

judgment that the defendant was not liable for tortious interference of a contract 

because performance of that contract required the misappropriation of trust funds 

that would have violated public policy. 508 S.W.2d at 932–33. In GNG Gas 

Systems, Inc., 921 S.W.2d at 427, the court articulated the general proposition that 

a corporate transaction in which an officer or director diverts assets of the 

corporation for his own use, “the transaction is presumptively fraudulent and 

void.” The “transaction” that is subject to being voided, however, is the 

transaction that allegedly violated the fiduciary duty. Applying this general 

principle, and accepting Cohen’s allegations as true, the voidable transaction here 

would not be the authorized sales to NewBiss and Sandcastle, but instead the one 

in which Dilick allegedly diverted funds. 

Because Cohen has not demonstrated that the sales to Sandcastle and 

NewBiss were void, we overrule Cohen’s fifth issues in both the Sandcastle and 

NewBiss appeals. 

CONSTITUTIONALITY

In Cohen’s sixth issue in both the Sandcastle and NewBiss appeals, he 

argues that section 12.0071 of the Texas Property Code is unconstitutional. 

Specifically, he contends it violates the open courts provision of the Texas 
30

Constitution, and his due process rights under both the United States and Texas 

Constitutions. Tex. Const. art. I, §13; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. 

A. Open Courts 

 The open-courts provision prohibits arbitrary or unreasonable legislative 

action that abrogates well-established, common-law remedies. Lebohm v. City of 

Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 199 275 S.W.2d 951, 955 (1955) (op. on reh’g). It 

ensures that Texas citizens bringing common-law causes of action will not 

unreasonably be denied the right to redress in the courts. Rose v. Doctor’s Hosp., 

801 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. 1990).

We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo, see Stockton v. 

Offenbach, 336 S.W.3d 610, 614–15 (Tex. 2011), beginning with the presumption 

that the statute is constitutional. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.021(1) (West 

2013); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 664 (Tex. 1983); see also Methodist 

Healthcare Sys. of San Antonio, Ltd. v. Rankin, 307 S.W.3d 283, 285 (Tex. 2010).

To establish an open-courts violation, Cohen must demonstrate that (1) the 

statute restricts a well-recognized, common-law cause of action (the wellrecognized prong) and (2) the restriction is unreasonable or arbitrary when 

balanced against the Act’s purpose (the balance prong). Thomas v. Oldham, 895 

S.W.2d 352, 357 (Tex. 1995); Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 666. A statute does not violate 

the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution if there are adequate substitute 
31

methods for obtaining redress. Liggett v. Blocher, 849 S.W.2d 846, 851 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (“In determining the restrictive effect of 

the statutory provision at issue, the court must also consider whether the legislature 

has avoided an unconstitutional result by providing a substitute remedy or by 

leaving a reasonable alternative at common law.”). A statute may, however, 

violate the open-courts provision “when it makes a remedy by due course of law 

contingent on an impossible condition.” In re D.M., 191 S.W.3d 381, 391 (Tex. 

App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied). 

Cohen argues that the procedures for expunging notices of lis pendens under 

section 12.0071 are “unreasonably truncated,” and may cause a person filing a 

notice of lis pendens to “forever lose[] its ability to obtain rescission of the 

wrongful conveyance or to impose a constructive trust on the property wrongfully 

conveyed.” In other words, Cohen does not argue that he has lost the right to 

pursue a particular cause of action, but instead argues that—by requiring him to 

comply with section 12.0071—he may lose the “ability to obtain remedies (i.e., 

retrieve the property wrongfully conveyed) provided [him] under common law, 

thereby restricting, in a rather profound way, [his] common law claims.” 

We reject Cohen’s open-courts challenge because he has not been deprived 

of a common law right. Cohen has not been prevented from suing for damages 

under the theories of breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, constructive fraud, and breach 
32

of contract. Cohen’s challenge is directed only at the statutory provision allowing 

for expungement of a lis pendens if the requisite evidentiary showing is not met. 

TEX. PROP. CODE §12.0071(c)(2). A lis pendens is not a cause of action or a lien; it 

is a means of providing constructive notice of an alleged real property claim. TEX.

PROP. CODE §13.004(a). Cohen was allowed, by statute, to file a notice of lis 

pendens to serve as constructive notice of his claims. He was given the 

opportunity to maintain that notice of lis pendens by demonstrating the probable 

validity of his real property claim. He had the opportunity to challenge, in an 

original proceeding in this Court, the trial court’s determination that he had not 

demonstrated the probable validity of his real property claim. He has not 

established an open courts violation. Cf. Francis v. Coastal Oil & Gas, Inc., 130 

S.W.3d 76, 92 (Tex App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (holding that statute 

eliminating liability of property owner for independent contractor’s injuries unless 

the property owner exercises sufficient control over the work and has knowledge 

of the danger does not violate the open courts provision because it only “delineates 

the evidentiary showing a plaintiff must meet to prevail on a claim of negligence 

against a property owner”); Freedman v. Univ. of Houston, 110 S.W.3d 504, 508 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (holding that statute requiring 

legislative consent to sue university for breach of contract did not violate open 

courts because it does not eliminate right to sue). 
33

B. Due Process

Finally, Cohen argues that section 12.0071 violates his procedural and 

substantive due process rights. 

Procedural due process requires reasonable notice and the opportunity to be 

heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. v. 

Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex. 1995). The trial court held a hearing on the 

motion to expunge Cohen’s Second Supplemental Notice of Lis Pendens. The 

parties filed evidence and the court accepted testimony at the hearing. Other than 

his claims that the expungement procedure is “truncated” such that the court 

should err “on the side of preserving the status quo,” Cohen cites no authority in 

support of his argument that he was deprived of procedural due process. 

Cohen likewise does not articulate how section 12.0071’s application to him 

violates substantive due process. He argues only that the state needed “a 

compelling interest to curtail” his property rights, and “must do it as narrowly as 

possible.” Cohen has not provided argument or authority to overcome the 

presumption that section 12.0071 is constitutional. 

We overrule Cohen’s sixth issue in both the Sandcastle and NewBiss 

appeals. 

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgments. 
34

Sherry Radack

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Massengale and Huddle. 

Justice Massengale, dissenting.