[Cite as Freeman v. Turoczy Bonding Co., Inc., 2022-Ohio-937.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JAMES FREEMAN, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 110805 

 v. : 

 

TUROCZY BONDING CO., INC., ET AL., : 

 

 Defendants-Appellees. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 24, 2022 

 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-19-916741 

 

Appearances: 

Guarnieri & Secrest, P.L.L., and Michael D. Rossi, for 

appellant. 

Barnes & Thornburg, LLP, and Stephen L. Fink, for 

appellee. 

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J.: 

Plaintiff-appellant James Freeman (a.k.a. Abiodun Freeman) brings 

this appeal challenging the trial court’s August 24, 2021 judgment granting 

summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees, Turoczy Bonding Co., Inc., et 

al., in appellant’s action to collect purportedly outstanding commissions and “build-
up” funds pursuant to R.C. 3905.91. Appellant argues that genuine issues of 

material fact existed on both of his claims that precluded summary judgment in 

defendants-appellees’ favor. After a thorough review of the record and law, this 

court affirms. 

I. Factual and Procedural History 

Appellant, a bail bond agent, wrote bonds for defendant-appellee 

Turoczy Bonding Co., Inc., now known as Eddie Lee Legacy, Inc. (hereinafter 

“Turoczy”) between 2012 and 2014. Appellant’s employment was terminated on 

May 6, 2014. 

On June 13, 2019, in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-19-916741, appellant filed 

a complaint against defendants-appellees (1) Turoczy, (2) Cuffs Off Bail Bonds, Inc., 

and (3) Lake City Bank, Trustee of the Eddie E. Lee Irrevocable Trust Ltd. 

(collectively “defendants”). Therein, appellant alleged that defendants owed him 

$91,118 in commissions that appellant earned on “bail bonds written and premiums 

thereon collected from 2012 to date” (hereinafter “commission claim”). 

Appellant filed an amended complaint on October 2, 2019. Appellant 

filed a second amended complaint on May 19, 2020. In his second amended 

complaint, appellant changed the relevant dates regarding his commission claim to 

April 1, 2011, through May 31, 2014. Appellant further alleged that defendants owed 

him “the [R.C. 3905.91] ‘build-up funds’ posted and maintained in [appellant’s] 

individual build-up trust account throughout that same period of time” (hereinafter 

“BUF claim”). 
Defendants filed an answer on July 31, 2019. Furthermore, Turoczy 

filed a counterclaim against appellant alleging, in part, that appellant owed Turoczy 

$1,200 plus interest and attorney fees on a promissory note and that appellant owed 

Turoczy for “policy premiums [appellant] collected but failed to pay to Turoczy, net 

of [appellant’s] commission.” 

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on November 30, 

2020. Therein, defendants argued that Turoczy did not owe any commissions to 

appellant and that Turoczy was under no obligation to create, and did not create, a 

BUF account for appellant’s benefit. In support of its summary judgment motion, 

defendants submitted (1) an affidavit of Turoczy’s bookkeeper, Konnie Rodenbo,1

(2) an affidavit of Turoczy’s manager, Garrett McClellan, and (3) appellant’s 

responses to defendants’ request for admissions and interrogatories. Various 

documents were attached to the affidavits of Rodenbo and McClellan, including a 

contract executed between Turoczy and Universal Fire & Casualty Insurance 

Company (hereinafter “Universal”), and a spreadsheet of all of the activity on bonds 

written by appellant between 2012 and 2020. 

On December 9, 2020, appellant filed a motion “for order suspending 

summary judgment practice” until appellant’s counsel had an opportunity to depose 

defendants pursuant to Civ.R. 30(B)(5). The trial court granted appellant’s motion 

1 The record contains two spellings of Rodenbo’s first name: “Konnie” and 

“Connie.” 
on January 27, 2021, and held defendants’ motion for summary judgment in 

abeyance. 

On February 17, 2021, appellant filed a brief in opposition to 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Therein, appellant argued that genuine 

issues of material fact existed with respect to both his commission claim and his 

BUF claim. Appellant alleged that he is owed $25,431.29 in commission for the 

bond premiums collected between March 2012 and July 2020. 

In support of his brief in opposition, appellant submitted (1) an affidavit 

executed by appellant on February 16, 2021, (2) an agent’s contract executed 

between City Bonding, Inc. (hereinafter “City”) and appellant in 2012, (3) email 

correspondence between appellant’s counsel and defendants’ counsel, and (4) the 

spreadsheet of activity on bonds written by appellant. Appellant also filed a partial 

transcript of Rodenbo’s deposition on the same day as his brief in opposition. 

Although appellant alleged in his brief in opposition that Turoczy owed him 

$25,431.29 in commissions, appellant averred in his affidavit that Turoczy owed him 

“somewhere between $22,308.15 and $29,744.20[.]” 

On March 5, 2021, defendants filed a reply brief in support of its 

motion for summary judgment. Therein, regarding appellant’s commission claim, 

defendants confirmed that the spreadsheet of appellant’s bond activity shows that 

appellant kept $31,419.75 (approximately 44 percent) of the $71,715.50 that was 

eventually collected on the bond premiums generated by appellant. Regarding 

appellant’s BUF claim, defendants argued that appellant’s BUF claim was based on 
the terms of his 2012 contract with City, not any of the named defendants in the 

present matter. Defendants argued that the contract between appellant and City is 

not binding upon them. 

On July 22, 2021, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment. The trial court concluded, in relevant part, “the court finds that 

[appellant] has failed to produce evidence demonstrating entitlement to an amount 

of commissions from [defendants] named herein beyond that which he originally 

retained or the proceeds of a build up fund.” Subsequently, on August 24, 2021, the 

trial court dismissed defendants’ counterclaims without prejudice pursuant to 

Civ.R. 41(A). 

On September 3, 2021, appellant filed the instant appeal. Appellant 

assigns one error for review: 

I. The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of the 

Defendants below. 

II. Law and Analysis 

In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court 

erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

A. Standard of Review 

Summary judgment, governed by Civ.R. 56, provides for the expedited 

adjudication of matters where there is no material fact in dispute to be determined 

at trial. In order to obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that 

“(1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable 

minds can come to but one conclusion when viewing evidence in favor of the 

nonmoving party, and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party.” Grafton 

v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996), citing State ex 

rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 631 

N.E.2d 150 (1994). 

The moving party has the initial responsibility of establishing that it is 

entitled to summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 

N.E.2d 264 (1996). “[I]f the moving party meets this burden, summary judgment is 

appropriate only if the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of a genuine 

issue of material fact.” Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Najar, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 98502, 2013-Ohio-1657, ¶ 16, citing Dresher at 293. 

Once the moving party demonstrates no material issue of fact exists 

for trial and the party is entitled to judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving 

party to put forth evidence demonstrating the existence of a material issue of fact 

that would preclude judgment as a matter of law. Dresher at id. In order to meet 

this burden, the nonmoving party may not merely rely upon allegations or denials 

in his or her pleadings, and must set forth specific facts, by affidavit or as otherwise 

provided in Civ.R. 56(E), demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material 

fact for trial. See Houston v. Morales, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106086, 2018-Ohio1505, ¶ 7, citing Mootispaw v. Eckstein, 76 Ohio St.3d 383, 385, 667 N.E.2d 1197 
(1996). Summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails to meet this 

burden. Dresher at id. 

B. Commission Claim 

In the instant matter, the trial court concluded, in relevant part, that 

appellant “failed to produce evidence demonstrating entitlement to an amount of 

commissions from [defendants] named herein beyond that which he originally 

retained.” As noted above, in support of its motion for summary judgment, 

defendants submitted the affidavits of Rodenbo and McClellan, spreadsheets of all 

of the activity on bonds written by appellant, and appellant’s responses to 

defendants’ interrogatories. 

First, in his affidavit, Rodenbo averred that Freeman’s commission 

rate was 30 percent between November 2012 and appellant’s termination in May 

2014. Almost all of Turoczy’s agents receive a 30 percent commission rate. At one 

point in time, prior to November 2012, appellant worked on a “team” with Elizabeth 

Large and Donnell Mitchell. Eddie Lee had a “30%/40%” agreement with Large and 

Mitchell under which they would receive 30 percent on bond premiums for bonds 

of $5,000 or less, and they would receive 40 percent premiums for bonds greater 

than $5,000. Large and Mitchell had discretion as to how the agents on the “team” 

that reported to them, including appellant, would be compensated. 

Rodenbo averred that appellant would collect bond premiums, take 

his commission, and then remit the balance to Turoczy. She explained, 
Turoczy never owed [appellant] money for commissions. The entire 

system used by Turoczy and other general agents is designed so that 

the surety bail bond agent, like [appellant], would collect the premium 

(which included his commission), retain his commission, and remit the 

balance to Turoczy. Turoczy owes [appellant] nothing; no 

commissions or BUF. 

(Emphasis added.) Rodenbo’s affidavit, executed November 30, 2020, at ¶ 7. 

Rodenbo confirmed, “I have reviewed my records repeatedly, and I can state with 

certainty that Turoczy owes no commissions to [appellant].” Id. at ¶ 14. 

Attached to Rodenbo’s affidavit was a spreadsheet of all of the activity 

on bonds written by appellant. The spreadsheet lists the payments reported by 

appellant, the amount retained by appellant for his commission, and the amount 

appellant remitted to Turoczy. The record reflects that spreadsheet was prepared 

by Rodenbo. 

Appellant did not dispute the accuracy of the spreadsheet in the trial 

court. In fact, appellant submitted Rodenbo’s spreadsheet in support of his brief in 

opposition to defendants’ summary judgment motion. In appellant’s response to 

defendants’ fifth interrogatory, appellant indicated that he was not aware of any 

errors in the spreadsheet. 

McClellan averred in his affidavit that prior to November 2012, 

appellant worked on a team, team “Zero Down,” led by Large and Mitchell. Turoczy 

had an agreement with Large and Mitchell — not a direct agreement with appellant 

— under which they received 30 percent commission of the premium on bonds of 

$5,000 or less, and 40 percent commission of the premium on bonds more than 
$5,000. Turoczy paid the team, not appellant, pursuant to this “30%/40%” 

structure, and appellant received commissions from the team, not Turoczy. 

Appellant began reporting directly to Turoczy on November 16, 2012. 

At this point, appellant’s commission rate was fixed at 30 percent. McClellan 

explained, “[i]f things went as they should, [appellant] was to collect the premium 

payment, deduct his 30% commission, and pay the balance to Turoczy. Turoczy had 

no direct agreement with [appellant] until November 16, 2012.” McClellan’s 

affidavit, executed November 23, 2020, at ¶ 5. 

McClellan averred, 

[i]t is important to repeat that the surety bail bond agent[, appellant,] 

was responsible for collecting the premium, and remitting the 

premium, net of the agent’s commission, to Turoczy. * * * Because the 

agent retained the agent’s commission before remitting the bond 

premium to Turoczy, Turoczy never owed the agent a commission. 

(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 7. 

McClellan submitted the spreadsheets of activity on bonds written by 

appellant with his affidavit. He averred, 

[appellant] collected premiums, took his commission (or sometimes 

more than his commission), and then remitted the balance to Turoczy. 

Turoczy never owed [appellant] money for commissions. The entire 

system used by Turoczy and other general agents is designed so that 

the surety bail bond agent, like [appellant], would collect the premium, 

which included his commission, retain his commission, and remit the 

balance to Turoczy. Turoczy owes [appellant] nothing; no commissions 

or BUF. 

Id. at ¶ 8. 
The evidence submitted by defendants demonstrated that Turoczy did 

not owe any commissions to appellant. The burden then shifted to appellant to show 

the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on his commission claim. 

In this appeal, appellant argues that a genuine issue of material fact 

existed on his commission claim based on his affidavit and Turoczy’s spreadsheet of 

appellant’s bond activity: “[appellant] demonstrated that he earned commissions 

on premiums that were financed, paid and collected by Turoczy over time; that 

Turoczy accounted to [appellant] for none of those commissions; and that such 

[commissions] were calculated into the $22,308.15-$29,744.20 range.” Appellant’s 

brief at 7. 

Appellant submitted an affidavit and the spreadsheet of his bond 

activity in support of his brief in opposition. In his affidavit, appellant averred, in 

relevant part, 

* * * 

8. According to Columns 4 and 5 of the spreadsheet, [appellant] 

solicited and wrote the sum of $2,340,780 in bonds, thereby generating 

$234,000 in bond premium, throughout [the period of time between 

March 17, 2012 and July 31, 2020.]2

9. According to Column 8 of the spreadsheet, the sum of $137,869.50 

of the $234,000.00 in gross bond premium was initially uncollected. 

10. That “uncollected” sum is also known as [Accounts Receivable]. 

11. According to Column 21 of the spreadsheet, the sum of $63,509.00 

remained uncollected on [July 31, 2020]. 

2 Rodenbo’s spreadsheet was dated July 31, 2020. 
12. The difference between that amount remaining uncollected on [July 

31, 2020] ($63,509.00) and the initial amount uncollected 

($137,869.50) is $74,360.50, which is the amount of bond premium 

collected by Turoczy from [March 17, 2012 through July 31, 2020]. 

13. [Appellant’s] commission on the $74,360.50 in collected bond 

premium was either 30% or 40% as stated in Column 11 of the 

spreadsheet, or somewhere between $22,308.15 and $29,744.20, no 

part of which has ever been paid to [appellant] to date despite his 

demand therefor[e]. 

After reviewing the record, we find that appellant failed to meet his 

burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that 

precluded summary judgment in defendants’ favor on his commission claim. 

Appellant’s commission claim is based entirely on appellant’s “cherry-picking” of 

numbers from the spreadsheet to support his commission claim and his 

unsupported interpretation of the numbers in the spreadsheet. 

Turoczy does not dispute that (1) appellant generated $234,000 in 

bond premiums and (2) $137,869.50 of the bond premiums generated by appellant 

were initially uncollected. The spreadsheet reflects that Turoczy collected 

$71,715.50 of the uncollected bond premium, not $74,360.50 as appellant averred 

in his affidavit. Furthermore, the spreadsheet demonstrates that appellant retained 

$31,419.75 of the $71,715.50 collected by Turoczy. Accordingly, the spreadsheet 

indicates that appellant retained approximately 44 percent of the $71,715.50 

collected by Turoczy. 

As noted above, when appellant reported directly to Turoczy, his 

commission was fixed at 30 percent. When appellant worked on team “Zero Down” 

he was compensated by the team leaders, with whom Turoczy had a “30%/40%” 
commission arrangement. Regardless of which commission percentage is applied, 

the spreadsheet demonstrates that appellant retained more than he was entitled on 

the amount that was collected by Turoczy. 

Rodenbo, Turoczy’s bookkeeper and records keeper, oversaw 

accounts receivable. She prepared the spreadsheet of all activity on bonds written 

by appellant, based upon which appellant claims Turoczy owes him between 

$22,308.15 and $29,744.20 in commission. Rodenbo unequivocally testified that 

Turoczy does not owe appellant any commission. Appellant did not dispute the 

accuracy of Rodenbo’s spreadsheet. 

Finally, appellant did not present any evidence regarding the manner 

in which appellant collected his premiums. Appellant did not present any evidence 

contradicting Rodenbo’s and McClellan’s testimony that appellant collected the 

bond premium, deducted his commission, and then remitted the remaining balance 

to Turoczy. The evidence presented by defendants indicates that it was appellant’s 

responsibility to collect his commission, not Turoczy’s responsibility to pay the 

commission to appellant. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, appellant’s commission claim fails as 

a matter of law, and the trial court properly granted summary judgment in 

defendants’ favor in this respect. 
C. BUF Claim 

In the instant matter, the trial court concluded, in relevant part, that 

appellant “failed to produce evidence demonstrating entitlement to * * * the 

proceeds of a build up fund.” 

As noted above, defendants submitted the affidavits of Rodenbo and 

McClellan in support of its motion for summary judgment. 

Rodenbo averred in her affidavit that the original bail bond contract, 

executed on April 23, 2007, between Turoczy and Universal, was amended in May 

2012 to provide for the establishment of an indemnity or build-up fund. The funds 

deposited into the fund “are to be held until all liability on bonds written by surety 

bail bond agents reporting to Turoczy are fully satisfied.” Id. at ¶ 5. Rodenbo 

asserted that there was never an agreement or arrangement between Universal, 

Turoczy, and appellant that 40 percent of bond premiums would be deposited into 

a BUF account and then the funds in the account would be paid to appellant when 

the liability on a bond was terminated. When the liability on all bonds has been 

terminated, the money held in the fund is released to Turoczy — not to appellant. 

Rodenbo averred in her affidavit that “Turoczy has no liability to [appellant] for 

money held in a BUF account, indemnity fund, or for any other reason.” Id. at ¶ 6. 

During her January 20, 2020 deposition, which appellant submitted 

in support of his brief in opposition to defendants’ summary judgment motion, 

Rodenbo confirmed that Turoczy’s agents are “not entitled to any buildup fund.” 
(Tr. 51.) Rodenbo testified that she maintains one BUF account and that the BUF 

account “has nothing to do with the agent.” (Tr. 64-65.) 

McClellan averred in his affidavit that Turoczy did not owe money 

from a BUF account to appellant. He asserted that neither Turoczy nor Universal 

established a BUF account for appellant’s benefit. McClellan explained that 

appellant was a non-liable surety bail bond agent, and as a result, a BUF account 

was never established for appellant. McClellan asserted that no Ohio insurer, such 

as Universal, or managing general agency, such as Turoczy, establishes a BUF 

account for the benefit of a non-liable surety bail bond agent. Finally, McClellan 

averred that appellant never asked anything about a BUF account during the time 

he wrote bonds for Turoczy. 

The evidence submitted by defendants demonstrated that a BUF 

account was not established on appellant’s behalf or for appellant’s benefit and that 

Turoczy did not owe any money from a BUF account to appellant. The burden then 

shifted to appellant to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on his 

BUF claim. 

In opposing defendants’ motion for summary judgment, appellant 

averred in his affidavit that between 2012 and 2014, he wrote bonds pursuant to a 

contract he executed in January 2012 with City. Based on the terms of his contract 

with City, appellant asserted that he “understood and believed that [appellant’s] 

build-up funds were being held in escrow by [Universal].” Id. at ¶ 5. Appellant 

averred that under the City contract, the “build-up funds” were to have been held in 
escrow for his benefit pursuant to [R.C.] 3905.91, in an amount equal to 4% of the 

bonds he wrote or 40% of the bond premiums he thereby generated.” Id. at ¶ 3. 

The 2012 contract was executed between City and appellant. The 

contract was signed by Donnell Mitchell and “Large Bonds/Zero Down” was 

identified on the signature page. Universal was not a party to, nor referenced in, the 

2012 contract. 

Universal was, however, identified in the commission schedule that 

was attached to the 2012 City contract. This commission schedule provided, in 

relevant part, 

Build up funds will be held in escrow as required by [R.C.] 3905.91 

through the IC OF OHIO TRUST bank account unless otherwise agreed 

upon to be held by [Universal.] 

[Universal] will obtain 1% of premium per bond. Spring Break LLC will 

retain 1% per bond for the use of all trademarks and related 

tradenames[.] Under [R.C.] 3905.91 all agents will retain 4% on all 

bonds solicited to be held in agent “BUF” acct. On report day all signed 

agents will receive 3% on all bonds upfront with 1 % to [manager] 

report agent[.] 50% Liability will be assessed to agent and 50% 

Liability will be assessed to Spring Break LLC. 

Appellant also relied on R.C. 3905.91 in opposing defendants’ motion 

for summary judgment with respect to his BUF claim. R.C. 3905.91, which is 

referenced in the commission schedule attached to the 2012 City contract, provides, 

(A) All build-up funds posted by a surety bail bond agent or managing 

general agent, either with an insurer or managing general agent 

representing an insurer, shall be maintained in an individual build-up 

trust account for the surety bail bond agent by the insurer or the 

managing general agent. * * * 

(B) Build-up funds shall not exceed forty per cent of the premium as 

established by the surety bail bond agent’s contract agreement with the 
insurer or managing general agent. Build-up funds received shall be 

immediately deposited to the build-up trust account. Interest earned 

on build-up trust accounts shall accrue to the surety bail bond agent. 

(C) Build-up funds are due upon termination of the surety bail bond 

agent’s contract and discharge of liabilities on the bonds for which the 

build-up funds were posted. The insurer or managing general agent 

shall pay the funds to the surety bail bond agent not later than six 

months after the funds are due. 

(Emphasis added.) 

After reviewing the record, we find that appellant’s BUF claim is 

supported by the language of the 2012 City contract and R.C. 3905.91. However, 

appellant’s BUF claim is based entirely on the terms of the City contract. City is not 

a party in this civil action. 

The terms of appellant’s contract with City, which required build-up 

funds to be held in escrow pursuant to R.C. 3905.91, are not binding upon the named 

defendants in this matter. Appellant cannot hold Turoczy to City’s contractual 

obligations. 

Rodenbo testified in her affidavit that between November 2012 and 

May 2014, appellant never asked about the establishment of a BUF account: 

“[appellant] never asked if a BUF account had been established, or the amount being 

deposited into the BUF account. [Appellant] never mentioned a BUF account 

during the time he wrote bonds for Turoczy.” Id. at ¶ 9. McClellan also averred in 

his affidavit that appellant never asked about the establishment of a BUF account or 

made any inquiry pertaining to a BUF account during the time that appellant wrote 

bonds for Turoczy as a non-liable surety bail bond agent. 
Both Rodenbo and McClellan averred that BUF accounts or 

indemnity funds are not established for the benefit of a non-liable surety bail bond 

agent, such as appellant. Both Rodenbo and McClellan confirmed that Turoczy does 

not owe appellant any funds from a BUF account. 

Attached to Rodenbo’s affidavit was an April 23, 2007 “agent bail 

bond contract” executed between Universal and Turoczy. The original contract did 

not require Turoczy to deliver to Universal a percentage of the total liability for each 

bond written by Turoczy for purposes of establishing an indemnity fund or build-up 

fund. 

A May 2012 addendum to the contract between Universal and 

Turoczy was also attached to Rodenbo’s affidavit. The addendum required Turoczy 

to deliver to Universal a cash sum equal to 1 percent of the total liability for each 

bond written by Turoczy. The deposits of these sums were to be known as the 

indemnity fund or build-up fund. 

The original contract between Turoczy and Universal provided, in 

relevant part,3 “[u]pon termination of this Contract, only after every bond written 

by [Turoczy] is exonerated or otherwise determined satisfied and all other debts of 

[Turoczy] to [Universal] are paid, shall the balance of the Indemnity Fund(s) be 

delivered to [Turoczy].” (Emphasis added.) The contract further provided,4 

3 Section 19(g) of agent bail bond contract between Universal and Turoczy, 

governing “indemnity fund/buildup fund/BUF.” 

4 Section 19(k). 
All gains and losses derived from the investment of the Indemnity 

Fund(s) shall belong to [Turoczy], provided, however, that this shall 

not limit [Universal’s] rights to deal with Indemnity Fund(s) as 

otherwise described in this Contract. Indemnity Fund(s) shall benefit 

and burden [Turoczy] and not [Universal] except to the extent that 

gains or losses shall increase or decrease [Universal] security. 

[Turoczy] shall be solely responsible for any taxes on income and losses 

derived from Indemnity Fund(s). Such taxes shall not be paid out of 

Indemnity Fund(s). 

(Emphasis added.) 

After reviewing the record, we find that appellant failed to meet his 

burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that 

precluded summary judgment in defendants’ favor on his BUF claim. Turoczy was 

bound by the terms of the 2007 contract and 2012 addendum thereto with 

Universal, not the terms of the 2012 contract between appellant and City. The 

evidence submitted by defendants demonstrated that a BUF was established for the 

benefit of Turoczy, not the benefit of appellant. Furthermore, when the money in 

the BUF account was released, it was to be delivered to Turoczy, not appellant. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, appellant’s BUF claim fails as a matter 

of law, and the trial court properly granted summary judgment in defendants’ favor 

in this respect. 

III. Conclusion 

After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. Appellant failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of 

material fact that precluded judgment as a matter of law in defendants’ favor on 
either his commission or BUF claims. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment 

into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, PRESIDING JUDGE 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and 

LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR