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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED December 13, 2016

v No. 328117 Wayne Circuit Court WESLEY NEAL, JR., LC No. 06-001860-01-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: J ANSEN , P.J., and C AVANAGH and B OONSTRA , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Defendant appeals by right his convictions, following a jury t rial, of carjacking, MCL 750.529a, armed robbery, MCL 750.529, assault with intent t o commit murder, MCL 750.83; felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, andpossession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, second offense, MCL 750.227b (1). The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent prison terms of 40 to 70 years each for the carjacki ng, robbery, and assault convicti ons, three to five years for the felon-in-possession conviction, and a consecutive five-year ter m of imprisonment for the felonyfirearm conviction. We affirm.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant’s convictions arise f rom the robbery and nonfatal sh ooting of Bruce Clark on November 7, 2005. Shanna McElroy, defendant’s occasional girlf riend, testified that she and defendant had planned to commit a crime that involved her posin g as a prostitute and then keeping her “date” occupied until defendant arrived, at which p oint they would rob him. On the night of the shooting, McElroy was on the corner of Joanne and Petoskey Streets in Detroit posing as a prostitute when Clark stopped and picked her up. A fter Clark picked up McElroy, they parked at another location. Shortly thereafter, defendant arrived, approached Clark’s car, pointed a gun at Clark, and demanded money. Clark grabbed the gun, and as the two struggled over it, Clark was shot nine times. McElroy also fought with C lark and hit him with her shoe. Clark was robbed of his car and other belongings, but survived the shooting. Clark identified defendant from a photographic lineup as the person who had shotand robbed him.

Defendant was originally tried by the court without a jury and found guilty as charged. This Court previously affirmed defendant’s convictions in People v Neal , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 23, 2007 (Do cket No. 272244). However,-2- defendant obtained a new trial th rough federal habeas corpus pr oceedings, Neal v Wolfenbarger
, 57 F Supp 3d 804, 811 (ED Mich, 2014), and was convicted again in April 2015, this time by a jury. Defendant then sought a new trial, raising claims of ine ffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. This appeal followed.

II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in th ree respects. We disagree, and conclude that the trial court did not err by denying defend ant’s motion for a new trial. The trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial is reviewed fo r an abuse of discretion, but its factual findings are reviewed for clear error. People v Miller
, 482 Mich 540, 544; 759 NW2d 850 (2008). Whether a defendant has been denied effective assi stance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. People v LeBlanc , 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW 2d 246 (2002). While the trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error , this Court determines de novo whether the facts properly found by the trial court establish i neffective assistance of counsel. Id

. The effective assistance of counsel is presumed and the defend ant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise. People v Eloby (After Remand) , 215 Mich App 472, 476; 547 NW2d 48 (1996). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of coun sel, the defendant must “show both that counsel’s performance fell below objective standards of re asonableness, and that it is reasonably probable that the results of the proceeding would ha ve been different had it not been for counsel’s error.” People v Frazier , 478 Mich 231, 243; 733 NW2d 713 (2007). “This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Rockey , 237 Mich App 74, 76-77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). However, the trial strategy must b e sound, and “a court cannot insulate the review of counsel’s performance by calling it tria l strategy.” People v Trakhtenberg
, 493 Mich 38, 52; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). Therefore, counsel may b e found ineffective with regard to a strategic decision if the strat egy employed was nota sound or reasonable one. People v Dalessandro , 165 Mich App 569, 577-578; 419 NW2d 609 (1988).

A. MCELROY’S PRIOR FALSE ACCUSATION

Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failin g to undermine McElroy’s testimony by adequately impeaching her credibility with evidenc e that she had lied about the identity of the gunman in a previous, similar crime, the robber y and shooting death of Carlos Wells, a cab driver. McElroy had given a written witness state ment to the police in that 2005 case, in which she had identified defendant’s friend, Grayling Regains, as the gunman. Specifically, McElroy had claime d that she, defendant, Regains, and Regains’s girlfriend, in need of money to buy drugs, planned that she or Regains’s girlf riend would pose as a prostitute and pick up a customer, whereupon Regains would “jump out with the gun and rob them.” She stated that defendant was present when the plan was made, but d id not go with them. Before carrying out that plan, they st opped at a fast-food restaurant. They spotted Wells in the drivethrough lane and decided to rob him instead. Regains was charg ed with murder, but it was later discovered that Regains was in the hospital when that offense o ccurred and, on the prosecutor’s motion, the court dismissed the charges against Regains.-3- Defendant’s counsel did cross-ex amine McElroy about that other offense at the trial in this case. However, defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not introduce evidence showing that Regains had an alibi and that t he charges against him were dismissed, and did not introduce evidence showing that the init ial plan for the August 2005 offense for which McElroy had given a false witness statement w as the same plan carried out in the instant case. We disagree th at trial counsel was ineffecti ve in this respect.

Decisions regarding what evidence to present, whether to call witnesses, and whether to question or cross-examine witnesses are matters of trial strate gy. Rockey , 237 Mich App at 76; People v Hopson , 178 Mich App 406, 412; 444 NW2d 167 (1989). Decisions regard ing how to cross-examine and impeach witnesses are also matters of trial s trategy. In re Ayres
, 239 Mich App 8, 23; 608 NW2d 132 (1999); People v McFadden , 159 Mich App 796, 800; 407 NW2d 78 (1987). Ineffective assistance of counsel can be established b y defense counsel’s failure to present evidence or to call witne sses if the failu re deprives t he defendant of a substantial defense. People v Dunigan , 299 Mich App 579, 589; 831 NW2d 243 (2013); People v Julian
, 171 Mich App 153, 159; 429 NW2d 615 (1988). Counsel may also provide in effective assistance “if counsel unreasonably fails to develop the defendant’s defenses by adequately impeaching the witnesses against the defendant.” People v Lane , 308 Mich App 38, 68; 862 NW2d 446 (2014).

Defendant does not identify a rule of evidence under which McE lroy’s witness statement would have been admissible at trial. Counsel could have called Regains to testify that he was charged with the August 2005 murder of Wells but did not commit the crime because he was in the hospital when the crime occurred, and that he had evidence to establish that claim. Likewise, counsel could have called the assi stant prosecutor to testify t hat she had doubts about her ability to prove Regains’s guilt, given records showing that he was in the hospital when the crime occurred, and that she thus elected to dismiss the charges agai nst him. Counsel could have corroborated that testimony with documentary evidence. However , none of that would have been material to this case unless McElroy’s witness statement w as admissible at trial, which defendant has not established.

Even assuming that McElroy’s witness statement was admissible, however, there was ample reason for counsel not to move for its admission. The fa ct that McElroy had falsely implicated Regains in a similar scheme permits an inference tha t she had falsely implicated defendant in the robbery of Clar k. However, it could have had just the opposite effect, providing counsel a legitimate strategic reason for not introducing the e vidence. See People v Gioglio (On Remand) , 296 Mich App 12, 22- 23; 815 NW2d 589 (2012) , remanded for res entencing 493 Mich 864 (2012). The original plan in both cases was to rob a prost itute’s date to get money for drugs. McElroy testified that defendant had participated in that plan when Clark was robbed. Highlighting McElroy’s witness st atement could have prompted th e jury to infer that McElroy had falsely implicated Regains in shooting Wells in order to pr otect defendant, and that defendant was the other participa nt in the plan to rob a prosti tute’s date, just as he was accused of having done in this case. Thus, it was reasonable strategy for counsel to forgo this avenue of impeachment.

Finally, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by couns el’s error. The entire purpose of the evidence was to impeach McElroy’s credibility. Counsel was able to elicit from McElroy testimony that she had falsely accused another person o f being involved in the other-4- shooting and robbery, that she was a long-time user of crack co caine, and that she had received a plea bargain in return for her testimony. Defense counsel also presented evidence that McElroy had written letters to defendant from jail despite her denial o f having done so. Further, the jury may have wholly discredited McE lroy’s testimony and still convi cted defendant based on Clark’s testimony. Therefore, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek the admission of further impeachment evidence related to the shooting of Wells, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying this as pect of defendant’s motion. Frazier , 478 Mich at 243.

B. DEFENDANT’S ALIBI DEFENSE

Defendant also contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call Regains and Robert Taylor to provide an alibi. The robbery and shooting of Clark occurred on November 7, 2005. Defendant contends that he was at home th at night with Regains and Taylor. Although the crime had occurred almost 10 years earlie r, both men specifically recalled being at defendant’s house because it was the same night that a blackout occurred. Defendant presented other evidence from DTE Energy showing that the power outage had occurred on November 7, 2005.

Defense counsel has a duty to prepare, investigate, and presen t all “potentially viable” or “substantial” defenses. People v Shahideh , 277 Mich App 111, 118; 743 NW2d 233 (2007), rev’d on other grounds 482 Mich 1156 (2008). “A substantial de fense is one that might have made a difference in the outcome of the trial.” People v Kelly , 186 Mich App 524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990).

The trial court found that trial counsel did investigate Taylo r as a potential alibi witness, but that Taylor had refused to cooperate or confirm defendant’s alleged alibi. Those findings are supported by counsel’s testimony. Because Taylor would not con firm that he could provide defendant with an alibi for the time of the offense, counsel wa s not ineffective for failing to call him as a witness. Further, defe nse counsel’s dec ision not to s ubpoena Taylor as a witness when he could not verify what Taylor would say on the stand was soun d trial strategy. Rockey , 237 Mich App at 76.

Trial counsel apparently did not investigate Regains as a pote ntial alibi witness, but the trial court found that defendant was not prejudiced by the erro r because Regains could not actually account for defendant’s w hereabouts at the time of the offense. Regains testified that he was at home with defendant on the night of November 7, 2005. R egains specifically recalled the date because it was the same day as a power outage, which began sometime during the afternoon or evening hours of November 7, 2005, and Regains testified tha t he and defendant were at home from the time the power went out until the following morning. The documents from DTE Energy confirmed that there was a power outage in the area, inc luding at defendant’s address, on November 7, 2005, but did not indicate the time during which th e outage occurred. The evidence thus supported that Reg ains was with defendant on the night of November 7-8, 2005, the night of the power outage. However, the offense occurred o n the night of November 6-7, 2005. Clark testified that he picked up McElroy around 1:00 a. m. on November 7, 2005, such that the robbery had to have occurred shortly thereafter. That is supported by Clark’s witness statement, which shows that Clark was questioned at the hospita l between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. on November 7, 2005. Regains did not testify to being with defend ant on the night of November 6--5- 7, 2005, or even during the early morning hours of November 7, 2005. Because Regains’ affidavit and testimony did not account for defendant’s whereab outs at the time of the offense, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to investigat e Regains as a potential alibi witness or to call him to testify at trial. Therefore, defense counsel did not deprive defendant of a substantial defense, and was not ineffective for failing to c all Regains or Taylor as witnesses. Kelly , 186 Mich App at 526. The trial court did not abuse its discr etion by denying this aspect of defendant’s motion. Frazier , 478 Mich at 243.

C. CLARK’S IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY

Defendant also argues that Clark’s in-court identification of defendant at the first trial was unnecessarily suggestive, and thus that trial counsel was i neffective for failing to move to suppress Clark’s identification testimony at the second trial. We disagree. As noted, defendant was previously tried before the court without a jury. At the f irst trial, Clark identified defendant as the man who had shot and robbed him.

Counsel’s decision whether to move to suppress identification testimony is a matter of trial strategy. People v Wilki , 132 Mich App 140, 145; 347 NW2d 735 (1984). A defense attorney’s failure to move for the suppression of evidence may, under proper circumstances, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Thomas
, 184 Mich App 480, 482; 459 NW2d 65 (1990). The failure to object to evidence can constitu te ineffective assistance of counsel where the evidence was inadmissible and its introductio n was so prejudicial that it could have affected the outcome of the case. People v Ullah , 216 Mich App 669, 685-686; 550 NW2d 568 (1996).

We note first the inaccuracy of defendant’s contention that Cl ark first identified defendant at the first trial. To the contrary, Clark testified at the first trial that he had tentatively identified defendant at a corporeal lineup on January 28, 2006, stating, “The third one looks like the one that shot me, but he had a little more beard” at the ti me of the offense. Clark also testified that he identified defendant at the preliminary exami nation, and that is borne out by his preliminary examination testimony. Defendant has offered no ar gument that the preliminary examination identification was unduly suggestive. Moreover, ev en assuming that defendant was correct, he has not shown that Cl ark’s in-court identification testimony at the first trial was inadmissible.

In People v Kevin Williams , 244 Mich App 533, 542-543; 624 NW2d 575 (2001), this Court stated:

An identification procedure th at is unnecessari ly suggestive a nd conducive to irreparable misidentification constitutes a denial of due pr ocess. In order to challenge an identification on th e basis of lack of due process , “a defendant must show that the pretrial identification procedure was so suggesti ve in light of the totality of the circumstances that it led to a substantial like lihood of misidentification.” If the trial court finds the procedure was impermissibly suggestive, evidence concerning the identification is inadmissi ble at trial unless an independent basis for in-court identification can be establi shed “that is untainted by the suggestive pretri al procedure.” [Citations om itted.]-6- It has been held that an identi fication at a prior court proce eding may be so suggestive as to require suppression of identification testimony, People v Solomon , 47 Mich App 208, 217- 221; 209 NW2d 257 (L ESINSKI , C.J., dissenting), rev’d for the reasons stated by the dissent 391 Mich 767 (1974), although not all such confrontations are imper missibly suggestive. People v Manuel Johnson , 58 Mich App 347, 353; 227 NW2d 337 (1975). “Simply because a n identification procedure is suggestive does not mean it is nece ssarily constitutionally defective.” People v Colon , 233 Mich App 295, 304; 591 NW2d 692 (1998). An in-court iden tification is not, in itself, “inherently sugge stive since the witness knows that the defendant is the person charged with the offense and is the person the witness is asked to identify.” People v Michael Fuqua , 146 Mich App 133, 143; 379 NW2d 396 (1985), overruled in part on other grounds by People v Heflin , 434 Mich 482, 498; 456 NW2d 10 (1990). There must be other f actors that create the possibility of misidentification. Fuqua , 146 Mich App at 143-144. An in-court identification could be unduly suggestive if, for instance, the defendant is in prison garb, Colon
, 233 Mich App at 305, or if there are several witnesses whose de scriptions of the suspect differed substantially from the defendant’s appearance, they were able t o observe the defendant in court for some time, and they were able to communicate with one anoth er after one identified the defendant for the fir st time in court. Fuqua , 146 Mich App at 144.

The record in this case does not indicate the amount of time d uring which Clark was able to observe defendant at the time of the robbery, or whether he gave the police a description of defendant before he identified hi m at the first trial; however, Clark did testify at the first trial that he saw defendant’s face clearly during the robbery. As noted, Clark tentatively identified defendant at a lineup held two months after the robbery, identi fied him at the preliminary examination three months after the robbery, and identified him at the first trial seven months after the robbery. There is no evidence that the lineup was un duly suggestive and there is no evidence of any unusual circumstances such as those described i n the above cases that would render either in-court iden tification undul y suggestive.

Defendant alternatively argues that even if Clark’s identification testimony was admissible, trial counsel was nonetheless ineffective for “fail ing to introduce evidence of the massive blackout which engulfed the area that evening.” Presum ably, defendant views this evidence as potentially raising doubts about the availability o f sufficient lighting during the attack for Clark to identify defe ndant as his attacker. Howeve r, as discussed ear lier, the evidence produced at the hearing showed that there was a power outage on the night of November 7-8, 2005, but that the offense occurred before then, on the night o f November 6-7, 2005. Thus, defense counsel’s use of this evidence to challenge Clark’s in- court identification would have been futile. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise f utile objections. People v Ackerman
, 257 Mich App 434, 455; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). Therefore, the tri al court did not abuse its discretion by denying this aspe ct of defendant’s motion. Frazier , 478 Mich at 243.

II. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE

Defendant also argues that he is entitled to a new trial on th e basis of newly discovered evidence, and that the trial court erred by denying his motion on this ground. Specifically, Myrick Buckner testified at the e videntiary hearing that he sawMcElroy on November 11, 2005. According to Buckner, McElroy told him at that time that “we hi t a lick about a week ago and it went ba[d],” meaning that someone had been shot. Buckner asked if she “and her man” had-7- committed the crime, and “she sa id no, it was somebody else,” “ the guy that she was hanging out that was in the bike club.” Defendant did not learn about McEl roy’s statement to Buckner until he encountered Buckner in prison in 2015.

On a defendant’s motion, the court may order a new trial on an y ground that would support appellate reversal of the conviction or because it beli eves the verdict has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. MCR 6.431(B). A new trial may be gran ted on the basis of newly discovered evidence. People v Rao , 491 Mich 271, 279; 815 NW2d 105 (2012). To obtain a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, the defend ant must show that (1) the evidence itself, and not just its materiality, was newly discov ered; (2) the evidence was not cumulative; (3) the evidence w ould probably cause a different r esult upon retrial; and (4) the defendant could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial. People v Cress , 468 Mich 678, 692; 664 NW2d 174 (2003). The trial court’s ru ling on a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but its factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Miller
, 482 Mich at 544.

Buckner’s testimony was evidence of a prior inconsistent state ment by McElroy; while she named defendant as her accomplice at trial, she previously had told Buckner that her accomplice was a man she knew from “the bike club.” A witness’ s prior inconsistent statement constitutes hearsay, People v Kohler , 113 Mich App 594, 599; 318 NW2d 481 (1981), which is not admissible as substantive evidence unless the defendant can establish that it comes within a recognized exception to the hears ay rule. It is, however, admi ssible as impeachment evidence, provided that a proper foundation for its admission can be esta blished. Barnett v Hidalgo , 478 Mich 151, 165; 732 NW2d 472 (2007); People v Jenkins , 450 Mich 249, 273; 537 NW2d 828 (1995); Kohler , 113 Mich App at 599. “The purpose of extrinsic impeachment e vidence is to prove that a witness made a prior inconsistent statement—not to prove the contents of the statement.” Jenkins , 450 Mich at 256. “[N]ewly discovered impeachment evidence or dinarily will not justify the grant of a new trial.” People v Grissom , 492 Mich 296, 318; 821 NW2d 50 (2012). In rare cases, however, “newly discovered impeachment evidence satisfies Cress when (1) there is an exculpatory connection on a material matter bet ween a witness’s testimony at trial and the new evidence and (2) a different result is probable on retrial.” Id . at 318-319 (footnote omitted).

Defendant has not offered any argument showing that Buckner’s testimony regarding McElroy’s statement to him was admissible as substantive eviden ce. Absent such a showing, it was admissible for impeachment purposes only. As the trial cou rt found, because counsel had adequately impeached McElroy’s cr edibility in several other way s, it is not reasonably likely that, had her credibility been impeached in yet another way, th e outcome of the trial would have been different. Moreover, the jury could have rejected McElroy ’s testimony in its entirety and still convicted defendant based on Clark’s testimony. Therefor e, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying this asp ect of defendant’s motion. Frazier , 478 Mich at 243.

Affirmed.

/s/ Kathleen Jansen /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh /s/ Mark T. Boonstra