1

08
- 03 22
- cr U SA v. W ri ght (M cC al l um ) U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT

__________________ Dec ember

Term, 2008 (Argued: Dec ember

2, 2008 Dec ided: October 19, 2009 ) Docke t No. 08-0322-c r

__________________ U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA , Appellee , — v .— J OHN M C C AL L UM J R ., A LSO K N O WN A S J OHN J OHN , A LSO K N O WN A S C.O. B LACK , Defendant-

Appellant , D A RR Y L W R I GHT , A LSO K N O WN A S “D” , Defendant
.

_________________ Be fore : J A COBS , Chief Judge, M C L AUGHL I N and B .D. P ARKE R , Circuit Judges
.

__________________2

Appea l from a judg ment of convic tion on charg es involving va rious narc otics offe nses. See 21 U. S.C. §§ 84 6, 81 2, 84 1( a )( 1) , ( b) (1 )( A) , ( b) (1 )( C) . We c on c lud e tha t th e Di str ic t Co ur

t e rr e d in admitting the de fenda

nt’s two prior convic tions, but t hat this error was ha rmless. AF FI RMED.

__________________ Nola B . Heller , Assistant United States Attorney (Jonathan S. Kolodner, Assistant United States Attorney , on the brief ), for Michae l J . Gar cia, United States A ttorney for the Southern District of Ne w York, N ew Yor k, N.Y., for Appellee
. J oseph A. Vita, L aw Of

fice of Jos eph A. Vita, E sq., Port Chester, N.Y., for Appellant
.

__________________
B AR R I NGTON D. P ARKE R , Circuit Judge : Def

endant- Appellant John McCallum J r. appe als from a judgme nt of conviction in the United States District Court for the Southern D istrict of NewYork (Robinson, J .). McCallum
was c onvicted of va

rious narc otics offe nses involving c rac k coca ine and wa s sentence d principally

to 240 months’ incarc eration. W e wr ite to addre ss McCallum’s primary contention, which is that the District Court abused its discre tion in admitt ing a s simil ar a cts evidenc e two of his pr ior na rc oti c s c onvic tio ns . We c on c lud e that th e a dmi ssi on of thi s e vid e nc e , whil e an a bu se of discre tion, was harmless e rror . In a re lated but sepa rate ly filed summary

order , we dispose of McCallum’s other c laims of trial err or. BACK GR OUND At trial, the g overnme nt proved that McCa llum and his co-conspirators operated a substantial cra ck coc aine distribution business in and around SpringValley , New Y ork. The3

conspirac y

and substantive off

enses c harg ed in the indictment involved nar cotics ac tiviti es that
oc c ur re d b e tw e e n a

pp ro ximate ly

Se pte mbe r o f 2 00 4 a

nd Ma y of 20 05 , a nd that c ulm inate d in four c ontrolled buy s of nar cotics in April and Ma y of 2005. Afte r the fina l controlled buy , police office rs executed a

sear ch wa

rra nt at McCallum’s residenc e and r ecove red substantial qua ntities of drug s. At trial, the g overnme nt proved McCa llum’s involvement in the conspiracy throug h the testimony of co- conspirator

and coope ratingwitness Dar ryl Wright, who wa s McCallum’s partne r and r esided in the same apar tment as McCallum. The g overnme nt also offe red the testimony of L enell B rookins, a roommate of McCallum and Wrig ht, and the testimony of police office rs who had obse rved Mc Callum eng ag ing in na rcotics tra nsactions and ha d sear ched the
a pa rtme nt whe re the na

rc oti c s w e re se ize d. Th e g ov e rnme nt’ s o the r e vid e nc e inc lud e d a ud io
rec ording s in which a c onfidential informa nt, David DeF ree se, purc hased c rac k coca ine from Wright and Mc Callum, and phone re cords indicating na rcotics tra nsactions. Prior to trial, the g overnme nt informed the c ourt that it intended to introduce e vidence of McCallum’s two prior nar cotics fe lony convictions for possession and attempted sale of c ocaine
. Although the g overnme nt had at hand the drug s that had bee n seized, the testimony of McCallum’s partne r about their e x tensive drug -dea ling, a nd a plethora

of other e vidence of prior
narc otics activities, the g overnme nt never theless ar g ued that evide nce of the 2003 convictions
was c ritical to prove that McCallum knew that the substance s he sold wer e nar cotics and that he intended to sell them. The g overnme nt also asserte d that it wished to introduce the pe riods of incar cer ation McCallum had serve d on the two convictions bec ause, w ithout them, “much of theThe stipulation stated: 1 On

Ap ri l 9, 20 03 , John M c Ca llum, Jr ., the de fe nd ant, wa s c onvic te d a ft e r p le a din gg uil ty to criminal possession in the third deg ree of a c ontrolled substance , namely , coca ine, which is a Class B felony . This crime wa s committed on March 14, 2002. O n April 9, 20 03 , John M c Ca llum, Jr ., wa s c onvic te d a ft e r p le a din gg uil ty to atte mpt e d c ri min a l sa le in t he se c on d d e g re e of

a c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e , n ame ly , c oc a ine , whic h is a Cla ss C felony . This crime wa s committed on Dece mber 3, 2002. Th e po rt ion

of the jur y c ha rg e re latin gto t

he pr ior c onvic tio ns e vid e nc e wa s a s f oll ow s: 2 [A] stipulation was rea d that indicated that the de fenda nt had bee n convicted in 2003 of two differ ent offe nses re lating to his possession and sale of coc aine. . . . The Gover nment of fe re d th is e vid e nc e to d e mon str ate the de fe nd ant’ s inte nt a nd kn ow le dg e , a

nd to establish the abse nce of

mistake or ac cident with re g ard to the of fense s char g ed in the instant indictment. You may not consider this evidenc e as a substitut e for

proof that the defe ndant committed any of the c rimes cha

rg ed in the indictment. Nor ma y y ou consider this proof as evide nce that the defe ndant has a criminal per sonality

or a ba d char acte r. This evidence about the def endant’ s prior convic tions was admitted for a much more limit ed purpose and you may only consider it for

that limit ed purpose
. Spe c if ic a lly , if y ou de te rm ine that th e de fe nd ant c omm itt e d a ny of the a c ts char g ed in the indictment, then you may , but y ou need not, dr aw a n infere nce, f

rom the

4 char g ed conspira cy

will be difficult for the jury to understand.” The c ourt ag ree d, without signific ant discussion, to rece ive the convic tions but notevidenc e of the periods of inc arc eration. The re cord she ds litt le light on why the cour t believed the c onvictions were admissible. Du ri n g v oir

dire , potential jurors we re a sked whe ther they would be able to follow instructions requiringthem to consider the c onvictions only for the limited purpose of evaluating the de fe nd ant’ s k

no wl e dg e and

int e nt, and

wh e the r, a ft e r l e arn ingof the c onvic tio ns , th e y

wo uld be able to maintain their presumption of the de fenda nt’s innocenc e. Ove r the de fense ’s objections, the District Court rec eived e vidence of the c onvictions in the form of a stipulation duringthe g overnme nt’s case in chief. Duringthe cour t’s final cha

rg e, the jury

was g iven a 1 limit ing instruc tion with respect to the c onvictions. At the conc lusion of the trial, McCallum 2evidenc e of the defe ndant’s prior c onvictions, that the defe ndant ac ted knowing ly and intentionally

with respec t to the specific c harg e as c harg ed in the indictment, and not beca use of some mistake, a ccide nt, or innocent other rea son. The evide nce of the defe ndant’s prior c onvictions may be conside red by

y ou only for the pur

pose that I

have just ex plained to you.

5 was c onvicted of thre e of the four c ounts in the indictment, including conspira cy and two substantive narc otics offe nses. This appea l followed. DISCUSSIO N We reviewa district cour t’s admission of evidenc e of pr ior crimes f or abuse of discre tion. Se e Un ite d S

tates v . Lo mb ar

dozzi , 491 F.3d 61, 78- 79 (2d Cir. 2007). Abuse of discre tion occurs when the c ourt ac ts in “an ar bitrary and irrational manner.” Id. A d istri c t c ourt ’s de c isi on to
a dmi t e vid e nc e is s ub

je c t to ha rm le ss e rr or

ana ly sis . F e d. R. C ri m. P . 5 2( a ); United States v. Ma do ri , 419 F.3d 159, 168 ( 2d Cir. 2005). The main ha rmless err or inquiry

is whether the contested te stimony

was unimportant in re lation to every thing e lse the jury

considere d on the issue in question, as reve aled in the r ecor d. Se e Un ite d S tates v . G arc ia , 413 F.3d 201, 217 ( 2d Cir. 2005) (holdingthat err oneous admission of evidenc e wa s harmless whe re it “ha d no substantial and injurious effe ct or influenc e on the jury verdic t” (interna l quotation marks omitted)). Evidence of prior c onvictions may be admissible under

Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show “intent, . . . knowledg e, identity , or abse nce of mistake or ac cident,” but not to show char acte r or pr opensity . Fe d. R. Evid. 404(b). Where prior convictions ar e conc erne d, the line betwee n intent or knowledg e and c hara cter or prope nsity

is often a f

ine one, r equiringthe6

thoughtf ul, focused attention of the district court. The most im portant re ason why this attention is require d is that the introduction of prior c onvictions, unless care fully handled, will under

mine the pre sumption of innocence
. When review ing the admission of evidenc e pursua nt to Rul e 404(b) , we c onsider whether (1) the pr ior crimes e vidence was “ offe red f or a pr oper pur

pose;” (2) the evidenc e wa s rele vant to a disputed issue; (3) the probative va lue of the e vidence was substantially outweig hed by its potential for unfair

prejudice pursuant to Rule 403; and (4) the cour t administered an appropr iate limiting instruction. Huddleston v. United States , 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988). O ur Circuit takes an inc lusionary approa ch to the admission of prior c rimes evidenc e, under which such evide nce “ is admissibl e for any purpose other

than to show the def

endant’ s criminal propensity .” United States v. Paulino , 4 4 5 F. 3 d 2 1 1 , 2 2 1 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Pi tre , 960 F.2d 1112, 1118- 19 (2d Cir. 1992)). Y et this inclusionary approa ch does not invite the g overnme nt “to offe r, ca

rte blanc he, any

prior ac t of the def

endant in the same categ ory of crime.” Un ite d S

tates v . G arc ia , 2 91 F .3 d 1 27 , 1 37 (2 d Ci r. 20 02 ); see also id. at 138 (holding that prior convic tion for selling coca ine should not have be en admitted to prove intent and knowledg e of the char g ed sale of coc aine, be cause “the g overnme nt offer ed and the court
a dmi tte d th e pr ior

c onvic tio n a s r e le va

nt f or a ve ry sp e c if ic purp os e —to sh owthat [de fe nd ant] knew that [a] taped phone c onversation was about a c oded drugtransac tion—but made no attempt to link the transaction on that basis”)
. W h er e s u ch ev i d en ce i s o ff er edfo r t h e p urp o s e o f e s t ab l i s h i n g th e d ef en d an t ’s kn o wl ed ge or intent, we r equire that the g overnme nt “identify a similarity

or conne ction betwee n the two7

acts that make s the prior a ct re levant to establishingknowledg e of the curr ent ac t.” Id. at 137; see also id. at 13 8 ( ho ldi ngthat a dmi ssi on of pr ior c onvic tio n w a s a

bu se of dis c re tio n b e c a

us e “the g overnme nt did not establish that [ the] prior drugconviction was me aning fully probative of [the de fe nd ant’ s] kn ow le dg e ” wi th r e sp e c t to the c ha rg e d n arc oti c s c on sp ir a c y ; “ [t]he on ly simil arity betwee n the two drugtransac tions . . . [ was] that both involved cocaine ”; and “ [t ]he g overnme nt did not offer e vidence of any other similarity

or conne ction betwee n the two tr ans a c tio ns ” ); United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 197 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (g overnme nt must show “similarity

or some conne ction” of pr ior ac t evidence to char g ed cr ime in order to e stablish that the prior a ct is releva

nt to a disputed element, such a s intent (internal quotation marks omitted)) ; United States v. LaFlam , 369 F.3d 153, 156 n.1 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (same ). Although the rec ord is not entirely clea r, the g overnme nt offer ed McCallum’s prior convictions ostensibly

to establish McCallum’s intent to deal drug s and his knowledg e of dr ug de a lin g . In a

ny e ve nt, a s th e g ov e rnme nt c or re c tly c on te nd s, Mc Ca llum di d n ot c on c e de tho se issues. In a pre trial memorandum a ddressingthe point, counsel stated: “A s McCallum’s counsel Icannot sa

y at this point unequivocally whether or not knowledg e and or intent will be disputed issues in this case.” B eca use McCallum’s counse l did not make a stateme nt to the court of sufficie nt clarity

to indicate that intent and knowle dg e would not be disputed, those issues
rema ined suffic iently

in dispute for the similar ac ts evidence to be re levant and he nce a dmissibl e. See U nited States v. Colon , 880 F.2d 650, 659 ( 2d Cir. 1989). Under these c ircumstance s, the evidenc e wa s admissible during the g overnme nt’s case in chief. Se e Un ite d S tates v . I ns e rra , 34 F .3 d 8 3, 89 -9 0 ( 2d

Cir . 1 99 4) ; United States v. Zack son , 12 F.3d 1178, 1182- 83 (2d Cir. 1993).8

Once the first two prong s of Huddleston are sa tis fi e d, the c ourt

is the n r e qu ir e d to
c on sid e r t he thi rd pr on gand

de c ide wh e the r t

he pr ob ativ e va lue of

the pr ior c ri me s is substantially

outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice. In Ol

d Ch ie f v . U nite d S tates, 519 U. S.1 72 (1 99 7) , th e Sup re me Court de fi ne d “ un fa ir

pr e jud ic e ” a s “ an und

ue te nd e nc y

to s ug g e st decision on an imprope r basis,” id. at 180 (interna l quotation marks omitted), and invoked a s an example a jury ’s “g ener alizing a de fenda nt’s ear lier bad a ct into bad cha rac ter a nd takingthat as raisingthe odds that he did the late r bad a ct now cha rg ed (or , worse, a s callingfor pr eventive conviction eve n if he should happe n to be innocent momentar ily),” id. at 180-81. In this reg ard, evidenc e of pr ior convictions merits par ticularly sear ching , conscie ntious scrutiny . Such evidenc e ea sily

lends itself to g ener alized rea soning a bout a def

endant’ s criminal prope nsity and there by undermines the pr esumption of innocenc e. De spite the most care ful instructions from the cour t, the risk is present that juror s are likely to believe that if a

defe ndant pre viously

was convicted of

drugoffe nses, there is a hig h probability that he is guilty

of the drugoffe nse for which he is on trial. See 1A Wigmore , Evidence § 58.2 (Tillers re v. 1983) (statingthat, wher e pr ior c ri me s e vid e nc e is a dd

uc e d, “ [t]he natur a l and

ine vit a ble te nd e nc y

of the tr ibu na l . . . is to g ive excessive we ight to the vicious re cord of crime thus exhibited and either to a llow it to bear too strongly

on the pre sent cha

rg e or to take the proof of it as justify ing a

condemnation, irrespe ctive of the acc used’s guilt of the prese nt char g e”)
. Moreove r, prior c onvictions are f ar mor e lik e ly

to b e re c e ive d a s p ote nt e vid e nc e of pr op e ns ity

tha n o the r p ri or

ba d a c ts r outin e ly offe red unde r Rule 404(b) be cause they bear the imprimatur of the judicia l sy stem and indicia of officia l reliability
. See 1 Mueller & Kirkpatric k, Fe dera l Evidence § 4:30 (3d ed. 2007) ( “In the9

co m m o ns i tu at i o ni nwh i ch a p ri o r c ri m e i s p ro v edb y m ea n s o f aco n v i ct i o n , th i s v ery fa ctb ri n gs home to a jury

that another

jury considere d the def

endant guilty

and blamew orthy , which in that sense magnifies the under lying de ed.”)
. Consequently , as we have r epeatedly held, prior c onvictions should not be admitted
un l e s s th e c o urth a s c ar e f u l l y c o n d u c t e d th e R u l e 4 0 3 b a l an c i n gt e s tr e qu i r e d b y Huddleston
. See, e .g. , United States v. Salame h , 1 52 F .3 d 8 8, 11 0 ( 2d Cir . 1 99 8) (p e r c ur iam) (“ To avo id
a c tin garb itr ari ly , th e dis tr ic t c ourt mus t make a

‘c on sc ie nti ou s a sse ssm e nt’ of wh e the r u

nf a ir p re j u d i ce s u b s t an t i al l y

o u twe i gh s p ro b at i v e v al u e. ” ( qu o t i n g United States v. Birney , 686 F.2d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1982))) ; United States v. W illiams , 596 F.2d 44, 51 ( 2d Cir. 1979) (“D istrict jud g e s mu st c ar e

ful ly sc ru tin izebo th t

he ba sis fo r t

he c la ime d r e le va

nc e of [pr ior c ri me s]
e vid e nc e and

the ba lanc e be tw e e n it s p ro bativ e va lue and pr e jud ic ia l e ff

e c t. T he ke y

to a fa ir tr ia l in su c h c a se s is careful dete rmination by the trial judg e of both issues, par ticularly the latter.” (empha ses adde d)). There is no indication in the recor d that the District Court eng ag ed at a ll in the Rul e 403 inq uir y , le t a lon e the re qu ir e d c on sc ie nti ou s o ne . In r uli ngon the g ov e rnme nt’ s p re -t

ri a l Ru le 404(b) motion, the cour

t stated: Iwill allow the g overnme nt to admit information of Mr. McCallum’s two felony drug convictions in 2003. Ag ain, it is relevant unde r 404(b) showing intent, knowledg e and motive. I t is relevant unde r 609 if we wer e to look at it as a c ross-examination issue. But I ’m rulingthat the g overnme nt will be able to offe r that information in their case in c hief. The c ourt’s sole re fer ence to prejudice occur red a fter it had de cided to admit the convic tions, and even the n, the cour

t expressed conc ern only

over the prejudicia l impact of proof of McCallum’s periods of inc arc eration. At that point, defense c ounsel rene wed its objection to the admission of10

the evidenc e and stated, “I would cer

tainly ask that your Honor not pe rmit any proof of the sentenc e re ceive d [for the 2003 convictions]. . . . Ibelieve that fac tor may be a pr ejudicial one.” To this, the court re plied, “You know what? I ’m g oing to a g ree with that,” and the g overnme nt ag ree d to reda ct the proof of inca rce ration fr om the stipulation. Be cause the cour

t ga ve no explanation for its conc lusion that the prior convictions evidenc e should be a dmitted, we ar e sig nificantly constraine d in our revie w of the c ourt’s application of the unfair pr ejudice pr ongof Huddleston . Wit hout the benef it of its reasoningwe are in no positi on to assume that the cour t appre ciated the seriousness of the risk that introducing the convictions would under mine the fa irness of the tr ial. McCallum’s two prior convic tions for the same ty

pe of c on du c t f

or wh ic h h e wa s o n tr ia l a

pp e ars to u s to be c la ssi c , a nd po we rf ul,
e v i d e n c e o f

p r o p e n s i ty. Th e c onvic tio ns we re of

fe re d f or the os te ns ibl e purp os e of pr ov ingkn ow le dg e and

int e nt. Even thoug h these issues we re not c oncede d, we a re una ble to discern f

rom the re cord why

the District Court thought the issues we re se riously in dispute or why

the prior c onvictions were appropr iate proof

. See 2 Weinstein, Fede ral Evidenc e § 403.02 (Joseph M. McL aug hlin, Ed., Matth e w B e nd e r & Co. 20 09 ) ( statin gthat a tr ia l ju dg e a

pp lyingthe Rul e 40 3 b a lanc ingte st t o cer tain evidenc e “must re

ject any method that treats eac h item of evidenc e ‘a s an island,’” and
mu s ti n s t ea d

“e v al u at e a l l th e p i ec es o f e v i d en ce go i n g t o th e s am e p o i n t , ” t h er eb y “c o mp ar i [ n g] . . . evidentiar

y alternatives”). The g overnme nt had ava ilable for pr esentation to the jury extensive testimony

from McCallum’s co- conspirator about the oper ation of the c harg ed
c on sp ir a c y

and the ir dr ugde a lin g s sp ann ingmany months . T he g ov e rnme nt a lso ha d ava ila ble11

drug s that had bee n seized as well as the results of audio a nd visual surveillance . Given all of this evidence , we a

re at a loss to understand how the c ourt or the g overnme nt could believe that the prior c onvictions were nece ssary to prove McCa llum’s intent and knowledg e and that they passed muster unde r Rule 403. See id. § 4 04 .2 1 ( “ [T]he ava ila bil ity of oth e r, le ss p re

jud ic ia l,
e vid e nc e on

the same po int

or din ari ly

re du c e s th e pr ob ativ e va lue of a g ive n it e m of

e xtri ns ic evidenc e. . . . I f the incr emental va lue is slight, and the possibility of pre judice throug h misuse by the jury g reat, the court should exclude the evide nce unde r Rule 403.”) . Our re view of the rec ord thus leads us to conclude that the District Court rec eived the c onvictions as propensity evidenc e in s he e p’ s c lot

hin gand did so wi th i ns uf

fi c ie nt r e g ard

fo r t he un fa ir pr e jud ic e that sure ly

wo uld result from their

admission. Se e Un ite d S tates v . B e ll , 5 1 6 F
. 3 d

4 3 2 , 4 4 7 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 8 )
. We the re fo re c on c lud e that th e c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

a dmi tti ngthe c onvic tio ns . We next must determine whe ther this err or wa s harmless. As we stated in United States v. Al-M oayad , “ [a] d istri c t c ourt ’s e rr on e ou s a dmi ssi on of e vid e nc e is h arm le ss i f t

he a pp e llate court c an conc lude with fair a ssuranc e that the e vidence did not substantially influence the jury .” 54 5 F .3 d 1 39 , 1 64 (2 d Ci r. 20 08 ) ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . In r e vie wi ngfo r h arm le ss err or, “w e princ ipally

consider: ( 1) the ove rall streng th of the prose cution’s ca se; (2) the prosec utor’s conduc t with respec t to the improperly admitted evidenc e; (3) the importance of the
wr on g ly a dmi tte d [e vid e nc e ]; and (4 ) whe the r s uc h e vid e nc e wa s c umu lativ e of oth e r p ro pe rl y admitted evidenc e.” United States v. Kaplan , 490 F.3d 110, 123 ( 2d Cir. 2007) (interna l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) . We have re pe ate dly he ld t hat th e str e ng th o f t

he g ov e rnme nt’ s c a se is the most critical fa ctor in asse ssing whe ther e rror was ha rmless. See, e .g., United States v.12

Lom ba rd oz zi , 491 F.3d 61, 76 ( 2d Cir. 2007). The g overnme nt’s case ag ainst McCallum was indisputably strong . Both Wrig ht and Br ookins provided detailed te stimony about McCallum’s role in, a nd knowledg e of, the char g ed conspirac y . The police office rs’ e y ewitness testimony and the a udio rec ording s confirming McCallum’s prese nce a

t the controlled buy s also wer e compe lling evide nce of g uilt. Finally , the g overnme nt introduced phy sical evide nce inc luding substantial quantities of na rcotics se ized from the a

partment a

nd found inside McCallum’s boot. This evidence cer tainly would allow a
rea sonable juror

to conclude that McCallum had dealt drug s. We also note that the g overnme nt did not draw undue attention to the prior convic tions, omi tting as it did any discussion of the convictions in its sum mation or rebuttal. In light of the se consider ations, and the fa ct that the prior convic tions were c umulative of other a dmissibl e evide nce be aringon McCallum’s knowledg e and intent, we conclude that the District Court’s admission of the convic tions was harmless e rror . In a diffe rent c ase, in whic h prior convic tions were a dmitted but the gove rnment’s other
e vid e nc e wa s n ot o ve rwhe lmi ng , o r whe re the oth e r h arm le ss e rr or fa c tor s ti lte d mo re str on g ly in the def endant’ s favor , or whe re the g overnme nt’s summation emphasized the prior convictions, a dif fe re nt r e su lt c ou ld w e ll b e ind ic ate d. I t be ars re pe atin gthat pr ior c onvic tio ns pr e se nt a singula r risk of se rious prejudice and that their introduc tion can jeopa rdize the fair

ness of a trial. Ty pically , their potenc y

in this reg ard doe s not depend on testimony or ar g ument by

the prosec utors; standing a lone, prior c onvictions are c apable of under mining the pr esumption of innocenc e and distra ctingthe jury from the business of de termining g uilt or innocence based on13

proof of the cha rg es in the indictment. I f the de cision is made to admit such evidenc e, the c ourt
mus t pr ov ide a

pp ro pr iate lim iti ngins tr

uc tio ns and

mus t e xpla in i ts d e c isi on su ff ic ie ntl y to p e rm it appellate revie w. CO NC LU SION The judg ment of the District Court is aff irmed.