No. 0 1-607 

12; THE SUPREME COLKr OF THE STATE OF MONT.A.i;A 

200'2 MT 220K 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

'\.C'ILL,IAM HOSTETLER, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, 

111 and for the County of Gallatin, 

The Honorable Mark L. Guenther, Judge presiding. 

C'OLNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

U7dham Hostetler, Pro Se, Bomnan. Montana 

For Respondent: 

Hon M~ke McGratli, Attomey General, C Viark Foxler, 

Ass~stant Attomey General, Helena, Montana 

Jon hl Hesse, Belgrade C~ty Attorney, Livlngston, Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Bnefs: August 15, 2002 

Dccided. October 1, 2002 
Chief Justice Karla . Gray delivcrcd the Opinion of thc C'ourt 

;t Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3(cj, Montana Supreme Coua 19% lntcrnal 

Operaring Rules. the following decision shall not he cited as prccedcni:, it shall hc iilcd as 

a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by casc title, 

Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter Publishing Company and to 

Wcst Group in the quarterly table of noncitablc cases issued by this Court. 

'12 William Hostetlcr's vehicle collided with another vehicle when he drove out of the 

IGA parking lot onto Silverbow Street in Belgrade, Montana. After a bench trial, the 

Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, convicted fiostctlcr of operatin, ~7 a motor 

vehicle without liability insurance and failing to yield the right-of-way. Hostetler appeals 

and we affirm. 

73 Hostetler raises numerous issues on appeal. For the reasons set forth herein. we 

address on the merits only the issues of whether the District Court erred in treating the 

operation of a motor vehicle without liability insurance as an absolute liability offense and 

whether thc evidence is sufficient to support Fiostetler's conviction for failing to yield the 

right-of-way. 

4'1 1. Did the District Court err in trcating the operation of a motor vehicle without 

liability insurance as an absolute liability offense? 

115 Section 35-2-104, MCA, provides tbat absol~~te liability--that is, liability without 

h, 'rclng .. a nlental state of knowingly, negligently or purposely--may be irt~posed only for an 
offense punishable by a fine of not more than 5500 or for which the statutory definition 

clearly indicates a !egis!ati-c.c purposc to iinpose absolute liability. Pursuant :c $ 61-6-3134, 

MCA, operating a motor vchiele without liability insurance is punishable by imprisonment 

in the county jail and, therefore, the first portion of $ 45-2-104, MCA, dating to the 

punishment for an offense, does not impose absolute liability for the offense of driving 

wtthout hability Insurance Hostetler contends that 6 61-6-301. MCA. wh~ch defincs the 

offense; does not clearly indicate a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability. 

6 To ascertain legislative intent in an absolute liability case, we look to the language 

empioyed and the apparent purpose served. 3ure 1;. Hztehner (l992j, 252 Monr. iX4. 188. 

827 P.2d 1260, 1263 (citation omittedj. The language contained in $ 61-6-301(1), blC4, 

states that the olvner of a Montana-registered and operated vehicle "shall contin~iously 

providc" liability insurance. Section 6 1-6-301 (4), MCA, renders it "unlawf~~l" for a person 

to drive a vcl~iele on public roads in Montana "without a valid policy of liability insurance 

in effect" in the statutorily-required amount. Thus, $ 61-6-301; MCA, contains no mental 

state element. 

77 With regard to clear legislative purpose to impose absolute liability, we have held that 

an ohviotis statutory intent to preserve game resources for the benefit of the ptrblic in 

recognition of the state's duty to protect public wildlife resources met that standard. See 

fIuehtzer, 252 Mont. at 158-89, 827 P.2d at 1263. The clear put-posc of 9 51-6-301, MCA, 

is to protect innocent members of the public who are injured on the highways through thc 

negligence of financially irresponsible motorists. See tlorcrceMur~tz Im. I;. ffanzptorz (I 9891, 

3 
235 Mont. 354,357: 757 P.2d 343,341. (citation omitted). We conclude the clear legislative 

pu-pox of$ Gi -6-301. MCA-to prcitcct thcptrblic on Montana highways---indicates an inicnr 

to in~pose ilb~01~1te liability for the offense of driving without liability insurance. 

78 2. is the widenee sufficient to support I-tostetler's conviction for failing to yield the 

right-of-way'? 

9 The elements of proof necessary to establish that Hostetler failed to yield the right-ofway are that (I) Hostetler was the driver of a motor vehicle (2) who was about to enter or 

cross a highway (3) from a private road, driveway, or public approach ramp and (4) failed 

to yield the right-of-way to ali .i-ehicies approaching on rhe hig'n~~ay. See 5 6i -8-343, PAC!\. 

Hostetlcr argues the evidence is insufficient to support element (21, in that there were no 

clear boundaries to forewarn a driver that Silverbow Street was a highway. 

0 This Court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction 

to determine whether, vie~ving the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the case beyond a 

reasonable doubt. State v. N~ruer, 2002 MT 7,1/ 15, 308 Mont. 99,q 15, 30 P.3d 089, li 15 

(citations omitted). Mere, Belgrade Police Ofticer Mikc Dixon testified that the intersection 

at which the collision occuned was marked by "plenty" of features indicating it was an 

intersection. He listed dit'fcrenees between the colors of the IGA parking lot and Silverbow 

Street road st~rfaces, alight post. fire hydrants on either side ofthe road, a street sign, a stop 

sign, a speed limit sign with a sign above it indicating weight limit for city streets, and a 

fence line beside the road. Jason Karp, Belgrade city planner, testified that Silverhow Street 

4 
complicd with all Iocai and state requirements for traffic control devices and markings. In 

addition, both parlies sirbmirtcd plhotographs of the intersccf on into cvidencc. Viewing thc 

cvidence in the !ig!~r most favorable to the prosecution, \vc conclude a rational trier of fact 

could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that, when the collision occurred, Hostctler was 

about to enter or cross a highway 

7 1 1 We need not address Hostetler's rematnmg issues at length. Hostetler first asserts the 

District Court erred in signing an order at the motions hearing which contained material not 

of record. This matter is not properly before us because he failed to raise the issue bcfore the 

District Court. 'Tee 46-20-i04(2j, MCA; %re v. Sclznzniz. i908 MT 2i0, ?Ti I i-i3, 290 

Mon:. 420, fl 11-13, 964 P.2d 763: 77 11-13, 

712 Hostetler also ciaims the District Court erred in stating as part of its rationale for rts 

decision that 

even in the absence of the absolute liability, there's evidence bcfore the Court 

that Mr. Hostetler was aware of the insurance requirements of the State of 

Montana and for wkatevcr reason elected to drive the 1082 Subaru without 

insurance or other evidence of meeting the financial responsibility laws of the 

State of Montana. 

This rationale is an alternatne basis for the court's decision. Having alrcady determ~ned the 

District Court correctly concluded that driving without liability insurance is an absolute 

liability offense, we need not address the alternative basis or Hostetler's claim in that regard, 

because it was unnecessary to the court's decision and a defendant may appeal only from 

matters which affect his substantial rights. See 5 40-20-104, MCA. 
:j? 3 Finally, Hostctkr contends that the District C'ourlcominitted "other significant abuses 

ofjudicial discrcticiri," Failed to reprimand the prmccutor leading to plain cmor at trial, "had 

a flawed theory of prosecution." and shorrld have dismissed the case bccausc the prosecutor 

ignored exculpatory cvidence. An appellant must support contentions on appeal with 

citations to authorities w17ich support his position. Rule 23(a)(4), M.R.App.P. We will not 

consider arguments unsupported by cited authority. Rienznrz 11. Ander-son (1 997)> 282 Mont. 

139, 147, 935 P.2d 1122, 1126-27. 

'1 I4 Here, most of Hostetler's final contentions are not supported by any authority and, 

t1ie1.efor.c. \ve revisc to address ihcrri. i-ioskiict dues acivatice iwo statutory rrtaxim.: of 

jurisprudence, but they are not relevant in the present case because they relate to Hostctler's 

argument--rejected above-that driving without liability insurance requires proof of a mental 

state. He also advances one decision from this Court which relates to his argument that the 

prosecutor. did not conduct himself properly, which apparently is intended to support 

Hostetler's argument that his motion to dismiss should have been granted because the 

prosecution could not prove its case. Having concluded above that suftleient evidence 

supported Hostetler's conviction for failure to yield the right-of-\vay, we need not address 

this somecvhat unintelligible argument further. Finally, Hostetler makes a passing reference 

to his due process right to notice under both the United States and Montana Constitutions. 

This argument is premised on a purported lack of notice that Silvcrbow Street exists, or was 

properly marked. As such, itl too, is subsunled in our conclusion that sufficient evidence 

supports his con\:iction. 

6 
Wc concur: