DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ROBERT GLEGG,

Appellant,

v.

KATALIN VAN DEN HURK and RICHARD PEACEY,

Appellees.

No. 4D2023-0026

[January 10, 2024]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Martin J. Bidwill, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE18017682. 

Laura M. Arcaro of the Arcaro Law Group, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for 

appellant.

C. Edward McGee, Jr., of McGee & Huskey, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for 

appellees.

KLINGENSMITH, C.J.

Appellant Robert Glegg (“the Father”) brought tort claims in a civil

action in civil court against appellees Katalin Van Den Hurk (“the Mother”) 

and Richard Peacey (“the Stepfather”) alleging intentional interference with 

custodial rights and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) 

against both in a dispute stemming from the custody of their then-teenage 

daughter.1 The trial court entered final summary judgment in favor of the 

appellees on both counts, and the Father now appeals. We affirm the 

summary judgment in favor of the Mother without comment. See Stone v. 

Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038, 1047 (Fla. 1999). For the reasons set forth below, 

we also affirm summary judgment in favor of the Stepfather.

Relating to the Stepfather, the allegations centered around his alleged 

conspiracy with the Mother’s failure to force the daughter to return to 

Canada and back to the Father’s custody against the daughter’s adamant 

wishes to remain in Florida. The Father describes this conspiracy as an 

1 In 2016, the daughter was granted the right to withdraw from parental control 

by an Ontario court.
2

“international kidnapping.” Relating to the Stepfather, the conspiracy as 

alleged included the Stepfather’s failure to prevent the daughter’s 

enrollment in a Florida high school, and his acquiescence and failure to 

intervene in the daughter’s and the Mother’s plans. This included allowing 

the daughter to stay in his home, driving the daughter to attend classes 

after enrolling in her Florida high school, allowing the purchase of the 

daughter’s school supplies and uniforms, and failing to intervene as the 

daughter pursued early admission to attend the University of Miami. The 

Father also accuses the Stepfather of assisting the Mother in allegedly 

persuading the daughter to obtain her emancipation from the Father in

Canada. 

The standard of review for an entry of summary judgment is de novo. 

Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 

(Fla. 2000). Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(a), the summary 

judgment standard mirrors the standard for directed verdict; the focus of 

the analysis is whether “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Mane FL Corp. v. Beckman, 355 

So. 3d 418, 425 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (quoting In re Amends. to Fla. R. Civ. 

P. 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 75 (Fla. 2021)).

Florida recognizes a cause of action for the tortious interference of a 

parent’s custodial rights but only in the context of a parent suing a thirdparty for such interference. See Stone, 734 So. 2d at 1039. As aptly noted 

by Judge Gross, when the purported interference is by a co-parent, “the 

family court is better suited than the civil court to address such issues. 

In the time that a defendant in a civil suit has to file a motion to dismiss, 

a family court judge can hold a hearing, take evidence, and fashion a 

remedy.” Davis v. Hilton, 780 So. 2d 974, 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (Gross, 

J., concurring specially). Further, family courts have “remedial tools” that 

civil courts do not have that can address custody issues between parents 

“before it festers into a problem beyond control.” Id. In keeping with the 

rationale set forth in Stone and Davis, we hold that such tort claims by 

one parent against another should be brought in the family courts, not the 

civil courts.

In contrast, the Father was entitled to bring his tortious interference 

action in civil court against any person like the Stepfather who is a third 

party to the parent-child relationship. But to prove a claim for intentional 

interference of custodial rights, a plaintiff must show:

(1) the complaining parent has a right to establish or maintain 

a parental or custodial relationship with his/her minor child; 

(2) a party outside of the relationship between the complaining 
3

parent and his/her child intentionally interfered with the 

complaining parent’s parental or custodial relationship with 

his/her child by removing or detaining the child from 

returning to the complaining parent, without that parent’s 

consent, or by otherwise preventing the complaining parent 

from exercising his/her parental or custodial rights; (3) the 

outside party’s intentional interference caused harm to the 

complaining parent’s parental or custodial relationship with 

his/her child; and (4) damages resulted from such 

interference.

Stone, 734 So. 2d at 1042.

We agree with the trial court that the record was devoid of any evidence 

supporting the Father’s claim on the custodial interference count against 

the Stepfather. The Stepfather was not involved in the relationship 

between the daughter and her parents and he left all decisions relating to 

custody and the daughter’s residence to her parents. The Stepfather’s 

alleged conduct, including providing housing and transportation for the 

daughter or failing to intervene in the Mother’s relationship with the 

daughter, simply does not constitute intentional interference with the

Father’s parental or custodial relationship with the daughter. As 

explained in Stone, the custodial interference tort typically requires more 

tortious conduct than the Stepfather is alleged to have committed here. 

See id. at 1043.

Similarly, the Father’s IIED claim against the Stepfather also fails

because the record evidence does not pass the high threshold for IIED 

claims under Florida law. To support a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must 

prove:

(1) the wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or reckless, that 

is, he intended his behavior when he knew or should have 

known that emotional distress would likely result;

(2) the conduct was outrageous, that is, as to go beyond all 

bounds of decency, and to be regarded as odious and utterly 

intolerable in a civilized community;

(3) the conduct caused emotional distress; and

(4) the emotional distress was severe.

Brown v. Brown, 800 So. 2d 359, 362–63 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (quoting 

Clemente v. Horne, 707 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)); see also

Mellette v. Trinity Mem’l Cemetery, Inc., 95 So. 3d 1043, 1048 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2012) (quoting Gallogly v. Rodriguez, 970 So. 2d 470, 471 (Fla. 2d DCA 
4

2007)). The question of whether conduct is sufficiently outrageous enough 

to support an IIED claim is a question of law, not a question of fact. Baker 

v. Fla. Nat’l Bank, 559 So. 2d 284, 287 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). While the 

Father wildly exaggerates when describing the Stepfather’s conduct as a 

conspiracy to “kidnapping,” courts do not focus on the alleged victim’s 

subjective response to, or description of, the actor’s conduct. See Liberty 

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steadman, 968 So. 2d 592, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Based 

on a review of the record, the Stepfather’s actions and inactions are 

nowhere near the level of “outrageous” conduct necessary to establish an 

IIED claim under Florida law. See Escadote I Corp. v. Ocean Three Condo. 

Ass’n, Inc., 307 So. 3d 938, 943 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (affirming summary 

judgment on the plaintiff’s IIED claim because the record did not contain 

any evidence sustaining the claim). 

Therefore, the trial court’s final summary judgment in favor of appellees 

was proper.

Affirmed.

GROSS and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.