alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I,
Michael D. Milligan, certify that:

1.     I
have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of National Equipment Services, Inc.;

2.     Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.     The
registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:



5.     The
registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



|Date: March 30, 2004 | /s/MICHAEL D. MILLIGANMichael D. Milligan Chief
Financial Officer
|-------------------- | -----------------------------------------------------------------

---

QuickLinks
Exhibit 10.28   John
  V. Howard
  www.vertisinc.comTURN
  TO US
  
  
  Chief
  Legal Officer and Secretary250
  West Pratt Street Suite 1800 Baltimore, MD 21201D:
  410.361.8347 F: 410.454.8460jhoward@vertisinc.com  January 31,
2008  VIA HAND DELIVERY  Michael
T. DuBose   Dear
Mike:  This
letter (Letter Agreement) confirms the
agreement reached between the Board of Directors and you concerning relocation
of your principal employment location pursuant to the terms and conditions of
that certain employment agreement by and among Vertis, Inc. (the Company), Vertis Holdings, Inc. (Holdings)
and you, dated and effective as of November 28, 2006 (the Employment  Agreement), as
amended by the letter agreement dated as of November 18, 2007.  This Letter Agreement serves to further amend
the Employment Agreement as set forth below as of this date.  Section 3(f) of
the Employment Agreement, as previously amended, provides that your principal
employment location initially would be Williams, Oregon, that after December 31,
2007, your principal employment location would be at such Company office as is
mutually agreed upon between the Company and you, and that you will relocate
your principal place of residence to the metropolitan area encompassing such
agreed-upon Company office by or as soon as practicable after December 31,
2007.  Section 3(f) of the
Employment Agreement is hereby amended to provide that your principal
employment location on and after January 1, 2008, shall remain Williams, Oregon
unless and until the Company and you mutually agree to move your principal
employment location elsewhere.  This
Letter Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the
laws of the State of Maryland, without reference to principles of conflict of
laws.  Except as modified by the terms of
this Letter Agreement, the Employment Agreement remains in full force and
effect.  You acknowledge that nothing in
this Letter Agreement gives you any contractual or other rights to continued
employment for any period of time and your employment with the Company remains
at will at all times.  This Letter
Agreement shall not be modified, waived or amended except by a written
agreement executed by the parties hereto or their respective successors and
legal representatives.  This Letter
Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the Company and its
successors and assigns.


If
the foregoing terms are acceptable to you, please confirm your agreement by
signing your name below.  Your signature
below will indicate that you are entering into this Letter Agreement freely and
with a full understanding of its terms and effect.   Very
  truly yours,/s/
  John V. Howard, Jr.John
  V. Howard, Jr.On
  behalf of Vertis, Inc. andVertis
  Holdings, Inc.AGREED
  AND ACCEPTED:/s/
  Mike DuBoseMike
  DuBoseDate:
  January 31,
  2008
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2941 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2941

 To amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of 
  Veterans Affairs to make certain grants to assist nursing homes for 
                   veterans located on tribal lands.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             August 1, 2013

   Mrs. Kirkpatrick (for herself, Mr. Cole, Mr. Cook, Ms. Titus, Mr. 
  O'Rourke, Ms. Sinema, Mr. Barber, and Mr. Grijalva) introduced the 
   following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Veterans' 
                                Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of 
  Veterans Affairs to make certain grants to assist nursing homes for 
                   veterans located on tribal lands.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. GRANTS FOR STATE HOMES LOCATED ON TRIBAL LANDS.

    (a) State Home Defined.--Section 101(19) of title 38, United States 
Code, is amended by inserting ``or federally recognized Indian tribe'' 
after ``(other than a possession)''.
    (b) Payments to State Homes.--Section 1741 of title 38, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subsection:
    ``(g) In this subchapter, the term `State' means each of the 
several States and each federally recognized Indian tribe.''.
    (c) State Home Construction.--
            (1) In general.--Section 8131(2) of title 38, United States 
        Code, is amended by inserting ``includes each federally 
        recognized Indian tribe but'' before ``does not''.
            (2) Conforming amendment.--Section 8132 of such title is 
        amended by striking ``several''.
                                 <all>
```
#### Delbert BOATRIGHT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 27271.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Dec. 15, 1954.

*633Marvin C. Hanz, San Angelo, for appellant.

Wesley Dice, State’s Atty., Austin,' for the State.

MORRISON, Judge.

The offense is attempting to pass a forged instrument; the punishment, 2 years.

In view of our disposition of this case, a recitation of the facts shall not be deemed necessary other than to observe that, as in most cases of this nature, the proof of the knowledge on the part of the utterer that it was a forged instrument was deducible only from circumstances. There is no direct evidence that the appellant made the forged instrument or that he knew that it was a forgery when he attempted to pass it,

Appellant objected to the failure of the court to charge on circumstantial evidence.

In Nichols v. State, 39 Tex.Cr.R. 80, 44 S.W. 1091, 1092, we said:

> “In the offense of passing a forged instrument, ' an : essential ingredient thereof is that such instrument was forged,:,a»d *that the utterer .knew that it was at the time, he passed it.*- The mere passing of an instrument amounts to nothing unless the other essential elements be established, to-wit, the forgery *and the knowledge on the part of the utterer.”*

The Nichols case has been followed through the years. See Johnson v. State, 82 Tex.Cr.R. 585, 200 S.W. 522; Verner v. State, 117 Tex.Cr.R. 112, 35 S.W.2d 428; Mixon v. State, 129 Tex.Cr.R. 584, 90 S.W.2d 832; and Roach v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 382, 136 S.W.2d 614.

In view of another trial, we observe that the originals of the handwriting specimens should be offered in evidence or'an explanation made for their nonpro-duction.

It is not sufficient to say .that the originals were in the files of the Department of Public Safety iri Austin. This would show their availability rather than théir unavailability. The appellant timely objécted’tó the introduction of the carbon copies on the grounds that they were not the best evidence and that there had been no showing of any effort made to produce the originals. The objection should have been sustained!

For the errors pointed out, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

June 26, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver 133356 Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, PATRICIA LUTES, Justices Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 133356 COA: 272414 Macomb CC: 05-001813-NO ST. JOHN HOSPITA L AND MEDICAL CENTER, d/b/a ST. JOHN HOSPITAL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 26, 2007 order of the Court of Appeals is consider ed, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

C AVANAGH , J., would grant leave to appeal.

d0618 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

June 26, 2007

Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACO DIVISION

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a 

BRAZOS LICENSING AND 

DEVELOPMENT,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

Defendant.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§ 

§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:20-cv-458-ADA

§ 

§ JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

§ 

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 

Please take notice that attorney Ryan S. Loveless of the law firm ETHERIDGE LAW GROUP, PLLC 

appears as counsel of record for Plaintiff WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a BRAZOS LICENSING 

AND DEVELOPMENT. Mr. Loveless hereby requests that all notices required to be given, and all papers 

required to be served in the above-entitled and numbered cause, be copied to and served upon him.

Dated: June 4, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Ryan S. Loveless

Ryan S. Loveless

Texas State Bar No. 24036997

ETHERIDGE LAW GROUP, PLLC

2600 E. Southlake Blvd., Suite 120 / 324

Southlake, Texas 76092

Telephone: (817) 470-7249

Facsimile: (817) 887-5950

Ryan@EtheridgeLaw.com

Case 6:20-cv-00458-ADA Document 7 Filed 06/04/20 Page 1 of 2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that the foregoing document was served upon all counsel of record via the 

Court's CM/ECF electronic filing system in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure on June 4, 2020. 

/s/ Ryan S. Loveless

Ryan S. Loveless

Case 6:20-cv-00458-ADA Document 7 Filed 06/04/20 Page 2 of 2
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

___________________________

No. 20-1200

___________________________

 

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Cortez Lamar Kellum

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines

____________

Submitted: June 9, 2020

Filed: June 12, 2020

[Unpublished] 

____________

 

Before ERICKSON, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

____________

 

PER CURIAM.

Cortez Kellum appeals a below-Guidelines-range sentence of 6 months in 

prison for violating the conditions of supervised release. He challenges the 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence, and his attorney seeks permission to 

withdraw.
- 2 -

We conclude that Kellum’s sentence is substantively reasonable. See United 

States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 2009) (reviewing the reasonableness of 

a revocation sentence for an abuse of discretion). The record establishes that the 

district court1 sufficiently considered the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 3553(a), 3583(e)(3), and did not rely on an improper factor or commit a clear 

error of judgment. See United States v. Larison, 432 F.3d 921, 923–24 (8th Cir. 

2006). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and grant counsel permission to 

withdraw.

______________________________

1

The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, United States District Judge for the Southern 

District of Iowa.
#### HARTLAGE v. BUCHHEIT.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Jan. 16, 1953.

Lawrence S. Grauman, Louisville, for appellant.

John H. Dougherty and Ruth C. Dough-erty, Louisville, for appellee.

COMBS, Justice.

The appeal is from a judgment in the amount of $1,825 in favor of appellee, Josephine Buchheit, against the estate of George W. Berry for personal services rendered by the appellee to the decedent Berry. The appellee, on cross-appeal, contends the amount of the judgment is inadequate.

George Berry, a widower, operated a small grocery store. The appellee worked in the store as a clerk, but in 1946 she purchased the business and thereafter operated it in her own name. She lived in premises adjacent to the residence of Mr. Berry. In 1942 Mr. Berry learned he was a diabetic and from that time until his death in 1948 appellee gave him injections of insulin, performed certain housekeeping duties for him, and for some time prior to his death administered to him as a practical nurse.

The performance of the services is definitely established, but it is argued by appellant that there was no agreement to pay for the services and that the circumstances under which they were performed do not warrant a finding of a contract implied by law. We disagree. Although no specific contract is proved, there was no relationship between the parties from which a legal or moral obligation of appellee to perform the services may be inferred. Furthermore, there is positive testimony that Mr. Berry considered himself obligated to compensate the appellee for her services, and it is a reasonable inference from the testimony that appellee expected to be compensated. Mr. Berry developed gangrenous sores on his feet and legs before his death and required a great deal of nursing care and attention. The services performed by the appellee were burdensome and onerous, Where there is an absence of any presumption of gratuity and the facts justify it, the law will imply an enforceable contract. Kruse’s Adm’r v. Corder, 258 Ky. 774, 81 S.W.2d 600; Marshall v. Ireland, 228 Ky. *344354, 15 S.W.2d 289; Bard v. Bard, 279 Ky. 683, 132 S.W.2d *44;*Kellum v. Browning’s Adm’r, 231 Ky. 308, 21 S.W.2d 459.

We agree with the appellant that a portion of appellee's claim is barred by the 5-year statute of limitations, ICRS 413.120, but with that portion of the claim eliminated it cannot be said that the judgment is excessive. The judgment is based on a period of only one year at $5 per day.

As regards appellee’s cross-appeal, the judgment is based on conflicting testimony as to the value of her services and we are not prepared to say that the amount allowed is inadequate.

The judgment is affirmed on both the appeal and the cross-appeal.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert Ellis, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Castellino, J.), rendered October 26, 1989, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of attempted promoting prison contraband in the first degree.

We reject defendant’s claim that his second felony offender prison sentence of *IV2*to 3 years was harsh and excessive. The sentence was part of a negotiated plea agreement and was the most lenient sentence authorized *(see,*Penal Law § 70.06 [3] [e]; *People v Pardoe,*147 AD2d 820). As to his claim that he is innocent, insofar as defendant failed to move to withdraw his plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction, judicial review is precluded *(see, People v Claudio,*64 NY2d 858). In any event, the plea minutes reveal no deficiencies whatsoever concerning defendant’s admission of guilt *(see, People v Clickner,*128 AD2d 917, *lv denied*70 NY2d 644).

Judgment affirmed. Mahoney, P. J., Casey, Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., and Harvey, JJ., concur.
#### WILLMANN v. STATE.

No. 22427.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 3, 1943.

*184Glenn Capps, of Mason, for appellant.

Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

Upon his plea of guilty to the offense of swindling by check, appellant was assessed two years in the state penitentiary.

The record is before us without statement of facts or bills of exception. Nothing is presented for review.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the Court.
Exhibit 32.2

Certification

of

Periodic Financial Report

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, Thomas W. Hofmann, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Sunoco, Inc., certify that the Quarterly Report on Form
10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Sunoco, Inc.



|                       |  |  |  |                          
|---------------------- |  |  |  | -------------------------
|Date: November 6, 2008 |  |  |  | /s/ Thomas W. Hofmann    
|                       |  |  |  | Thomas W. Hofmann        
|                       |  |  |  | Senior Vice President and
|                       |  |  |  | Chief Financial Officer
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**

**OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

       Inconnection with the Annual Report of J.Crew Group, Inc., J. Crew IntermediateLLC and J.Crew Operating Corp. (collectively, the “Company”) on Form 10-K/A forthe period ended January 31, 2004 (the “Report”), Millard S. Drexler and AmandaJ. Bokman, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of theCompany, respectively, each certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, asadopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to thebest of his or her knowledge:

 

1.                                       The Reportfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.                                       The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Dated: October 22, 2004

 

 
| /s/  Millard S.  Drexler          |   |   |
|---------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
| Millard S. Drexler  Chief Executive Officer |   |

 

 
| /s/  Amanda J.  Bokman          |   |   |
|-------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
| Amanda J. Bokman  Chief Financial Officer |   |
Exhibit 10.4(b)

FIRST INSTRUMENT OF AMENDMENT

WHEREAS,
J. Crew Group, Inc. (the "Corporation") maintains the J. Crew Group, Inc. 2003 Equity Incentive Plan (the "Plan");

WHEREAS,
Section 8 of the Plan provides that the Plan may be amended by the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors of the Corporation (the "Committee") at any time, with
exceptions not here material;

WHEREAS,
the Committee wishes to amend the Plan to allow the Committee the authority to determine pursuant to Section 4 thereof (in lieu of the Board of Directors) the
(i) maximum number of shares of Common Stock to be reserved for issuance of Options at varying exercise prices and to be reserved for the issuance of shares of Restricted Stock out of the pool
of available Common Stock available for Awards under the Plan and (ii) the Exercise Price of any Award under the Plan.

WHEREAS,
all defined terms used herein shall have the meaning set forth in the Plan unless specifically defined herein;

NOW,
THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended as follows.



February 25,
2004

---



QuickLinks
**Exhibit
      32.2**








**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**








In
      connection with the Form 10-QSB of Worldwide Biotech & Pharmaceutical
      Company (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ending June 30, 2006, as
      filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, Peiyi Tian , Principal Accounting Officer of the Company, certify,
      pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
      of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and
      belief:





(1)
            the
                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
                of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                and





(2)
            the
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
                Company.














/s/
      Peiyi Tian


Peiyi
      Tian


Principal
      Accounting Officer


August
      1,
      2006





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
      authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
      in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been
      provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
      the
      Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
      request.