Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 206 / Tuesday, October 24, 2000 / Notices 63637

NRC staff can determine whether the

request can be accommodated.

Members of the public may send

written comments on the environmental

scoping process for the supplement to

the GEIS to

Chief, Rules and Directives Branch

Division of Administrative Services

Office of Administration

Mailstop T–6 D 59

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555–0001

Comments may be hand-delivered to

the NRC at 11545 Rockville Pike,

Rockville, Maryland, between 7:45 a.m.

and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays. To

be considered in the scoping process,

written comments should be

postmarked by December 22, 2000.

Electronic comments may be sent by the

Internet to the NRC at

TurkeyPointEIS@nrc.gov. Electronic

submissions should be sent no later

than December 22, 2000, to be

considered in the scoping process.

Comments will be available

electronically and accessible through

the NRC’s Public Electronic Reading

Room (PERR) link http://www.nrc.gov/

NRC/ADAMS/index.html at the NRC

Homepage.

At the conclusion of the scoping

process, the NRC will prepare a concise

summary of the determination and

conclusions reached, including the

significant issues identified, and will

send a copy of the summary to each

participant in the scoping process. The

summary will also be available for

inspection through the PERR link. The

staff will then prepare and issue for

comment the draft supplement to the

GEIS, which will be the subject of

separate notices and a separate public

meeting. Copies will be available for

public inspection at the abovementioned addresses, and one copy per

request will be provided free of charge.

After receipt and consideration of the

comments, the NRC will prepare a final

supplement to the GEIS, which will also

be available for public inspection.

Information about the proposed

action, the supplement to the GEIS, and

the scoping process may be obtained

from Mr. Wilson at the aforementioned

telephone number or e-mail address.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day

of October 2000.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Charles E. Ader,

Acting Deputy Director, Division of

Regulatory Improvement Programs, Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 00–27288 Filed 10–23–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

Sunshine Act Meeting

AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETING: Nuclear

Regulatory Commission

DATE: Weeks of October 23, 30,

November 6, 13, 20, and 27, 2000.

PLACE: Commissioners’ Conference

Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,

Maryland.

STATUS: Public and Closed.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: 

Week of October 23

Monday, October 23

3:00

Affirmation Session (Public Meeting)

a: Final Rules—10 CFR Part 35,

‘‘Medical Use of Byproduct

Material’’ and 10 CFR Part 20,

‘‘Standards for Protection Against

Radiation’’

Week of October 30—Tentative

There are no meetings scheduled for

the Week of October 30.

Week of November 6—Tentative

There are no meetings scheduled for

the Week of November 6.

Week of November 13—Tentative

Friday, November 17

9:25 a.m.

Affirmation Session (Public Meeting)

(If needed)

9:30 a.m.

Briefing on Risk-Informed Regulation

Implementation Plan (Public

Meeting) (Contact: Tom King, 301–

415–5790)

This meeting will be webcast live at

the Web address—www.nrc.gov/

live.html.

Week of November 20—Tentative

There are no meetings scheduled for

the Week of November 20

Week of November 27—Tentative

There are no meetings scheduled for

the Week of November 27.

*The schedule for commission

meetings is subject to change on short

notice. To verify the status of meetings

call (recording)—(301) 415–1292.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION:

Bill Hill (301) 415–1661.

The NRC Commission Meeting

Schedule can be found on the Internet

at: http://www.nrc.gov/SECY/smj/

schedule.htm.

This notice is distributed by mail to

several hundred subscribers; if you no

longer wish to receive it, or would like

to be added to it, please contact the

Office of the Secretary, Attn: Operations

Branch, Washington, DC 20555 (301–

415–1661). In addition, distribution of

this meeting notice over the Internet

system is available. If you are interested

in receiving this Commission meeting

schedule electronically, please send an

electronic message to wmh@nrc.gov or

dkw@nrc.gov.

Dated: October 20, 2000.

William M. Hill, Jr.,

SECY Tracking Officer, Office of the

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 00–27414 Filed 10–20–00; 2:09 pm]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–321 and 50–366]

Southern Nuclear Operating Company

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1

and 2; Issuance of Director’s Decision

Under 10 CFR 2.206

By letter dated May 3, 2000, Mr.

David A. Lochbaum, on behalf of the

Union of Concerned Scientists

(Petitioner), pursuant to Section 2.206 of

Title 10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations (10 CFR 2.206), requested

that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (Commission or NRC) ask

questions via a demand for information

concerning the liquid and gaseous

radwaste systems at Edwin I. Hatch

Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Hatch),

which is operated by Southern Nuclear

Operating Company (SNC). As the basis

for the Petitioner’s request, the

Petitioner contended that Hatch is being

operated outside its design and

licensing bases because the material

condition of piping, tanks, and other

components of the liquid and gaseous

radwaste systems is not being properly

inspected and maintained.

The NRC, in a letter dated June 27,

2000, requested SNC to furnish the

information requested by the Petitioner,

which, in essence, satisfied the action

requested by the Petitioner. SNC

provided this information in a letter to

NRC dated July 26, 2000. The Director

of the Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation has addressed the technical

concerns raised by the Petitioner in the

‘‘Director’s Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR

2.206’’ (DD–00–05). DD–0–05 concludes

that the NRC staff does not agree with

the Petitioner’s contention that Hatch is

being operated outside its design and

licensing bases because the material

condition of piping, tanks, and other

components of the liquid and gaseous

radwaste systems is not being properly

inspected and maintained. The

63638 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 206 / Tuesday, October 24, 2000 / Notices

complete text of the Director’s Decision

is available for public inspection at the

Commission’s Public Document Room

located at 1 White Flint North, 11555

Rockville Pike (1st floor), Rockville,

MD., and is accessible electronically

from the Agencywide Documents

Access and Management System

(ADAMS) public library component on

the NRC Web site, http://www.nrc.gov

(the electronic reading room).

A copy of the Director’s Decision will

be filed with the Secretary of the

Commission in accordance with 10 CFR

2.206(c) of the Commission’s

regulations. As provided by this

regulation, the Director’s Decision will

constitute the final action of the

Commission 25 days after issuance of

the Director’s Decision unless the

Commission, on its own motion,

institutes a review of the Director’s

Decision within that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day

of October 2000.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Collins,

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

Director’s Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

I. Introduction

By letter dated May 3, 2000, Mr.

David A. Lochbaum, on behalf of the

Union of Concerned Scientists

(Petitioner), pursuant to Section 2.206 of

Title 10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations (10 CFR 2.206), requested

that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (Commission or NRC) take

action with respect to Edwin I. Hatch

Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Hatch).

Hatch is owned and operated by the

Southern Nuclear Operating Company

(the licensee). The Petitioner requested

that the NRC ask questions of the

licensee via a demand for information,

related to the liquid and gaseous

radwaste systems at Hatch.

II. Background

The Petitioner contended that Hatch

is being operated outside its design and

licensing bases because the material

condition of the piping, tanks, and other

components of the liquid and gaseous

radwaste systems is not being properly

inspected and maintained. The NRC, by

letter of June 27, 2000, asked for the

information from the licensee, which

partially satisfied the action requested

by the Petitioner. The licensee

responded in its letter of July 26, 2000.

The NRC staff has reviewed the

licensee’s response and concluded that

the information provided by the

licensee is responsive to your

contentions.

III. Discussion

Contention No. 1: The Hatch Nuclear

Plant is being operated outside its

design and licensing bases because the

material condition of piping, tanks, and

other components of the liquid radwaste

system [is] not being properly inspected

and maintained.

The Petitioner cited General Design

Criterion (GDC) 60 and GDC 4 as the

design and licensing bases. The

Petitioner stated the following three

specific concerns as the reason for the

Petitioner’s assertion that the liquid

radwaste system at Hatch does not

conform to its licensing and design

bases: (1) Susceptibility of liquid

radwaste system piping to degradation,

(2) susceptibility of liquid radwaste

system tanks and vessels to degradation,

and (3) degraded capability of valves

that isolate liquid radwaste discharge.

The Petitioner asserts that the liquid

radwaste system is vulnerable to

degradation mechanisms, such as flowaccelerated corrosion and

microbiologically induced corrosion,

but the liquid radwaste system piping is

not covered by aging management

programs. These aging management

programs include the flow-accelerated

corrosion program, the treated-water

systems piping inspection program, and

the evaluation program for buried or

embedded piping. The Petitioner

asserted, therefore, that it is reasonable

to expect that the liquid radwaste

system is degraded to an unknown

extent and that it appears that Hatch is

not in compliance with the licensing

requirements.

Response: The liquid radwaste system

is not needed to mitigate the effects of

accidents and therefore is not

considered safety related. The staff

agrees with the Petitioner on the

applicability of GDC 60 as a design and

licensing basis, but GDC 4 does not

apply. Standard Review Plan (SRP) 11.2,

‘‘Liquid Waste Management Systems,’’

discusses the regulations that apply to

the liquid radwaste system. GDC 60 is

included as one of the regulatory

requirements because the nuclear power

plant needs to be designed to control the

release of radioactive materials in liquid

and gaseous effluents during normal

reactor operation, including anticipated

operational occurrences. The staff has

reviewed Section 9.2 of the Hatch Unit

1 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

and Section 11.2.1 of the Hatch Unit 2

FSAR and confirmed that GDC 4 is not

a design or licensing basis for the liquid

radwaste system.

In support of the contention that the

liquid radwaste system at Hatch is being

operated outside of its design and

licensing bases, the Petitioner cites an

installation deficiency in the liquid

radwaste system at Hatch, evidence of

degradation in other systems at Hatch,

and evidence of degradation in the

liquid radwaste system at Millstone.

The Petitioner cites an installation

deficiency in the Hatch Unit 1 liquid

radwaste system which was reported in

the Notice of Reportable Occurrence No.

50–321/1979–43, dated June 29, 1979.

Subsequent to this notice, Licensee

Event Report (LER) 79–43 was

submitted on August 17,1979, to

address the installation deficiency. The

LER included corrective action taken

and stated that ‘‘the piping supports

were redesigned and installed to meet

seismic Class I requirements.’’

The Petitioner cites degradation

problems with other systems at Hatch,

such as plant service water and residual

heat removal service water. The

Petitioner states that the liquid radwaste

system is as vulnerable as these other

systems to certain degradation

mechanisms. The Petitioner also cites

three examples, in systems other than

the radwaste systems, of the detrimental

effects of valve aging at Hatch. The

licensee, in its July 26, 2000, response

stated that the conditions such as

pressure, volume, and quality of the

fluid in the liquid radwaste system are

different than the conditions in other

systems. Thus, the licensee concludes

that the radwaste system is not as

susceptible to many of the aging

mechanisms that could affect other

systems at Hatch.

The Petitioner cites NRC Information

Notices (IN) 79–07 and 96–14 as

examples of degradation that actually

occurred at U.S. nuclear power plants;

both involved the Millstone Nuclear

Power Station. IN 79–07 stated that

‘‘such events can be avoided by proper

procedures and periodic examination if

personnel are aware of the problem’’. IN

96–14 stated that ‘‘a lack of continuing

and preventive maintenance appeared

to have allowed several systems and

components to significantly degrade’’.

The licensee, in its July 26, 2000,

response stated that Hatch operations

personnel perform daily rounds during

which systems are observed for proper

performance and material condition

(major portions of the radwaste systems

at Hatch are accessible for observation).

NRC resident inspectors, during their

inspection rounds, regularly tour the

plant, including the radwaste systems.

In addition, NRC inspectors specializing

in radiation protection periodically

inspect portions of the liquid radwaste

system. Recent inspections of this

nature have not identified any

significant problems. For example, as

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 206 / Tuesday, October 24, 2000 / Notices 63639

discussed in Inspection Report Nos. 50–

321/99–08 and 50–366/99–08, dated

January 20, 2000, NRC inspectors

reviewed the performance of several

radiation monitors and the

quantification of selected liquid

samples, and found no problem. The

Inspection Report stated that the

radiation doses resulting from liquid

effluent releases were a small percent of

regulatory limits.

If a degraded condition is identified

by the licensee, or is reported to the

licensee by the NRC, the licensee should

generate a condition report and the

condition should be evaluated and

repaired as required in accordance with

the plant’s corrective action program. In

addition, these condition reports are

trended by the licensee. Further

evaluation and appropriate corrective

actions would be taken if an adverse

trend was identified. Periodic

inspections of the corrective action

program are conducted according to the

NRC inspection program to verify that

licensees are identifying and correcting

plant problems. For example, ‘‘NRC

Integrated Inspection Report Nos. 50–

321/99–11, 50–366/99–11 and 76–36/

00–01,’’ dated March 6, 2000, stated that

inspectors reviewed the Hatch

Condition Reporting System procedure,

which describes the licensee’s program

for identifying and correcting

deficiencies. The Inspection Report

concluded that the licensee had

satisfactorily identified and corrected

deficiencies.

The Petitioner raised a concern

related to the consequences of failures

in the liquid radwaste system. The

consequences of a potential

simultaneous failure of all liquid

radwaste tanks have been analyzed and

reviewed by the staff in the ‘‘Safety

Evaluation of the Edwin I. Hatch

Nuclear Plant Unit 1,’’ dated May 11,

1973. The analyses showed that the

resulting releases would be a small

fraction of 10 CFR Part 20 release limits.

In the ‘‘Safety Evaluation Report Related

to Operation of Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear

Plant, Unit 2,’’ (Unit 2 SER) dated June

1978, the NRC staff ‘‘determined that

the estimated releases due to postulated

failure of components of the liquid

radwaste system will not result in

concentrations in the unrestricted area

in excess of the limits set forth in Table

II of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 20.’’ In

addition, Hatch has a Radiological

Environmental Monitoring Program in

place, as required by 10 CFR Part 50,

Appendix I. This surveillance and

monitoring program applies to various

pathways through which radioactive

material might be released to the air,

river water, milk, and vegetation and

entails taking periodic samples and

conducting analyses of these samples.

Any detected concentrations of

radioactive material above

predetermined limits are required to be

reported. Also, the Georgia Department

of Natural Resources monitors ground

water in the vicinity around the plant.

Neither program has identified

concentrations of radioactive material

above or near permitted limits.

The Petitioner asserts that a break in

a liquid radwaste pipe inside one of the

plant’s buildings could result in

significant exposure to the plant

workers. The licensee is required by

regulation (10 CFR part 20) to have and

maintain a radiation protection program

to ensure that radiation exposure of

plant workers is not only controlled

below limits, but to go further and have

a program to keep doses as low as

reasonably achievable (ALARA). As part

of this program, plant workers wear

digital alarming dosimeters when

entering plant areas containing liquid

radwaste system piping. Furthermore,

radiation monitors are located in these

areas. Therefore, the NRC staff

concludes that there is reasonable

assurance the plant workers will not

receive a significant exposure in the

event of a break in a liquid radwaste

pipe inside one of the plant’s buildings.

The liquid radwaste system is

operated on a regular basis to control

effluents, and any significant

degradation of the material condition of

the system would be quickly detected.

Thus, operability of the system is

demonstrated without the need for

special inspections or testing. However,

the licensee does perform quarterly

testing on the discharge valves which

close to terminate the release of

radioactive water to the river.

The liquid radwaste system is

designed and licensed to limit the doses

from effluents to individual members of

the public to levels as low as reasonably

achievable (ALARA) to comply with

Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50. Based on

the discussion above, the NRC believes

that the liquid radwaste system is being

operated within its design and licensing

bases.

Contention No. 2: The Hatch Nuclear

Plant is being operated outside its

design and licensing bases because the

material condition of piping and

components of the gaseous radwaste

system [is] not being properly inspected

and maintained.

The Petitioner cited GDC 60 and GDC

4 as the design and licensing bases. The

Petitioner stated the following two

specific concerns as the reason for the

Petitioner’s assertion that the gaseous

radwaste system at Hatch does not

conform to its licensing and design

bases: (1) Susceptibility of gaseous

radwaste system piping to degradation

and (2) degraded capability of the

gaseous radwaste system to preclude

hydrogen burns and detonations. The

Petitioner asserted that the offgas

systems at Hatch are vulnerable to aging

degradation but are not covered by aging

management programs.

Response: The gaseous radwaste

system is not needed to mitigate the

effects of accidents and therefore is not

considered safety related. The staff

agrees with the Petitioner on the

applicability of GDC 60 as a design and

licensing basis, but GDC 4 does not

apply. SRP 11.3, ‘‘Gaseous Waste

Management Systems,’’ discusses the

regulations that apply to the gaseous

radwaste system. GDC 60 is included as

one of the regulatory requirements

because the nuclear power plant needs

to be designed to control the release of

radioactive materials in liquid and

gaseous effluents during normal reactor

operation, including anticipated

operational occurrences. The staff has

reviewed Section 9.4 of the Hatch Unit

1 FSAR and Section 11.3.1 of the Hatch

Unit 2 FSAR and confirmed that GDC 4

is not a design or licensing basis for the

gaseous radwaste system.

The Petitioner raises concerns that the

piping and other components of the

offgas system may be degraded to an

unknown extent. Evidence of

degradation is monitored by operations

personnel through daily rounds during

which systems are observed for proper

performance and material condition.

NRC resident inspectors, during their

inspection rounds, regularly tour the

plant, including the radwaste systems.

In addition, NRC inspectors specializing

in radiation protection periodically

inspect portions of the gaseous radwaste

system. Recent inspections of this

nature have not identified any

significant problems. If a degraded

condition is identified by the licensee or

reported to the licensee by NRC

inspectors, the licensee should generate

a condition report and the condition

should be evaluated and repaired as

required in accordance with the plant’s

corrective action program. Periodic

inspections of the corrective action

program are conducted according to the

NRC inspection program to verify that

licensees are identifying and correcting

plant problems.

The Petitioner raised concerns

regarding a break in the offgas system

piping running to the main stack. In

section 9.4.6.1 of the Unit 1 FSAR and

section 15.4.15.1.4.1 of the Unit 2 FSAR,

the licensee has evaluated the

consequences of a potential complete

63640 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 206 / Tuesday, October 24, 2000 / Notices

rupture of this piping and concluded

that the resulting calculated doses at the

plant site boundary would not exceed

the limits for normal plant operation

specified in 10 CFR part 20. The NRC

staff has reviewed the results of the

licensee’s analyses and finds that the

results satisfy the criteria stated in

Branch Technical Position ETSB 11–5

and are therefore acceptable. In

addition, Hatch has a Radiological

Environmental Monitoring Program in

place, as required by 10 CFR Part 50,

Appendix I. This surveillance and

monitoring program applies to various

pathways through which radioactive

material might be released to the air,

river water, milk, and vegetation. Any

detected concentrations of radioactive

material above predetermined limits are

required to be reported. This program

has not identified concentrations of

radioactive material above or near

permitted values. Any leakage from the

offgas system in the plant building

would be detected by plant radiation

monitoring instrumentation.

The Petitioner asserts that a break of

the offgas piping running to the main

stack could cause the radiation

exposures to individuals in the power

block to increase above negligible. As

previously mentioned, the licensee is

required by regulation to have and

maintain a radiation protection program

to limit radiation exposure of plant

workers. As part of this program,

workers wear digital alarming

dosimeters when entering plant areas in

the power block that contain the offgas

piping which runs to the main stack.

Furthermore, radiation monitors are

located in these areas. Therefore, the

NRC staff concludes that there is

reasonable assurance that individuals in

the power block will not receive

significant radiation exposure in the

event of a break of the offgas piping

which runs to the main stack.

NRC inspectors periodically review

portions of the gaseous radwaste system.

For example, Inspection Report Nos.

50–321/99–04 and 50–366/99–04, dated

August 4, 1999, stated that inspectors

observed the filter change out for the

Unit 1 and Unit 2 gaseous and

particulate effluent monitors and

determined that it was done in

accordance with licensee procedures.

The Inspection Report also stated that,

based on a review of the licensee’s 1998

Annual Effluent Release Report issued

prior to May 1, 1999, the amounts of

activity released from the plant in liquid

and gaseous effluents had remained

stable over the last several years and the

radiation doses resulting from those

releases were a small percentage of

regulatory limits.

The Petitioner questions the degraded

capability of the gaseous radwaste

systems to preclude hydrogen burns and

detonations. Hydrogen burns and

detonations are prevented by keeping

the hydrogen concentration of gases

from the air ejector below the flammable

limit. This goal is achieved by

maintaining adequate process steam

flow for dilution at all times. This steam

flow is monitored and alarmed in the

control room. Hydrogen analyzers are

used to monitor the offgas system to

provide further assurance that the

hydrogen concentration is maintained

below the flammable limit. However, in

the unlikely event of an uncontrollable

hydrogen increase, plant procedures

require that the plant be shut down. The

offgas system piping and components

are designed to withstand the unlikely

event of a hydrogen burn or detonation.

The NRC staff stated in the Unit 2 SER

that design provisions incorporated to

reduce the potential for gaseous releases

due to hydrogen explosions in the

gaseous radwaste system were

acceptable.

The Petitioner states that there have

been more than 25 hydrogen burns and

detonations in offgas systems at plants

similar to Hatch. In 1990, Hatch

experienced an event involving possible

ignition of hydrogen in the Unit 1 offgas

system. The event was discussed in LER

321/90–012, dated July 20, 1990. The

LER included corrective actions to

replace valves and to revise system

operating and abnormal occurrence

procedures to assure specific actions are

taken if hydrogen concentrations exceed

certain limits. The LER also stated that

Hatch Unit 2 was not susceptible to the

identified cause of the Unit 1 event

because of a difference in design of the

offgas system. The LER concluded that

the health and safety of the public was

not affected by the event. The LER was

reviewed by NRC inspectors and

discussed in an inspection report dated

June 23, 1992. The inspection report

discusses a number of corrective actions

that were taken following the event.

These corrective actions included repair

or replacement of various components

in the offgas system and revisions to

procedures which directly affect the

operation of the offgas system. The

inspection report stated that these

procedural revisions properly

implemented corrective actions for this

event.

The gaseous radwaste system is

operated on a regular basis to control

effluents, and any significant

degradation of the material condition of

the system would be quickly detected.

Thus, operability of the system is

demonstrated without the need for

special inspections or testing.

The gaseous radwaste system is

designed and licensed to limit the doses

from effluents to individual members of

the public to ALARA levels to comply

with Appendix I to 10 CFR part 50.

Based on the discussion above, the NRC

concludes that the gaseous radwaste

system is being operated within its

design and licensing bases.

IV. Conclusion

The NRC requested information from

the licensee, which, in essence, satisfied

the action requested by the Petitioner.

However, for the reasons discussed

above, the NRC staff does not agree with

the Petitioner’s contentions that Hatch

is being operated outside its design and

licensing bases because the material

condition of piping, tanks, and other

components of the liquid and gaseous

radwaste systems is not being properly

inspected and maintained.

A copy of this Director’s Decision will

be filed with the Secretary of the

Commission in accordance with 10 CFR

2.206(c). As provided by that regulation,

this Director’s Decision will constitute

the final action of the Commission 25

days after the date of issuance of this

Director’s Decision unless the

Commission, on its own motion,

institutes a review of this Director’s

Decision within that time.

[FR Doc. 00–27289 Filed 10–23–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT

CORPORATION

Submission for OMB Review;

Comment Request

AGENCY: Overseas Private Investment

Corporation, IDCA.

ACTION: Request for comments.

SUMMARY: Under the provisions of the

Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C.

Chapter 35), agencies are required to

publish a Notice of the Federal Register

notifying the public that the Agency is

preparing an information collection

request for Office of Management and

Budget (OMB) review and approval and

to request public review and comment

on the submission. Comments are being

solicited on the need for the

information, its practical utility, the

accuracy of the Agency’s burden

estimate, and on ways to minimize the

reporting burden, including automated

collection techniques and uses of other

forms of technology. The proposed

information collection request under

review is summarized below.