J-S09038-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JEREMIAH GEIGER 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 545 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 8, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008900-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JEREMIAH GEIGER 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 546 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 8, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008901-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JEREMIAH GEIGER 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 547 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 8, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008893-2020
J-S09038-23

- 2 -

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JEREMIAH GEIGER 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 548 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 8, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008895-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JEREMIAH GEIGER 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 549 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 8, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008898-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JEREMIAH GEIGER 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 550 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 8, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008899-2020
J-S09038-23

- 3 -

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JEREMIAH GEIGER 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 565 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 8, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0000013-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: AUGUST 8, 2023

Jeremiah Geiger (“Geiger”) appeals from the judgments of sentence 

imposed following his guilty pleas, across seven dockets, to, inter alia, several

counts of strangulation.1 We affirm.

On October 22, 2021, Geiger pleaded guilty across seven cases, to 

strangulation, a second-degree felony, and related offenses. See N.T., 

10/22/21, at 6-9. Geiger stipulated to the factual bases of the offenses. See 

id. at 2. We synopsize the facts, chronologically, as follows. At No. 8901-

2020, Geiger admitted to choking A.V. on February 14, 2020, at around 11:00 

a.m., and striking her with both a closed, and an open, hand. See Criminal 

Complaint, No. 8901-2020, 3/2/20, at 5. At No. 8900-2020, Geiger admitted 

to strangling his victim, A.V., on April 14, 2020 at about 6:00 p.m. 

Responding officers observed “recent red marks” on A.V.’s neck. See Criminal 

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2718(a)(1).
J-S09038-23

- 4 -

Complaint, No. 8900-2020, 4/14/20, at 5. At No. 8899-2020, Geiger admitted 

to, on April 22, 2020, pushing A.V. up against the wall and choking her until 

she could not breathe and punching her in the face three or four times. 

Officers responded following a report from a third party, and found A.V. sitting 

on the front porch of her residence crying, after which she relayed to them 

the details of the assault. See Criminal Complaint, No. 8899-2020, at 5. At 

No. 0013-2021, Geiger admitted to, on May 8, 2020, punching A.V. in the 

body and face before pushing her up against a wall on the front porch and 

choking her with both hands around her throat, until a witness, who was there 

to perform repairs on A.V.’s car, intervened and pulled Geiger off A.V. Geiger 

then “took a fighting stance” toward the witness before striking A.V. again and 

fleeing on foot. See Criminal Complaint, No. 0013-2021, at 5. At No. 8898-

2020, Geiger admitted to, on May 21, 2020, punching A.V. outside her left 

eye and strangling her by wrapping both hands around her throat before she 

pushed him off her and ran to a neighbor’s house to call 911. A.V. later 

received texts from Geiger stating, “u snitch,” and “ill [sic] fucking kill you.” 

See Criminal Complaint, No. 8898-2020, at 6. At No. 8895-2020, Geiger 

admitted to choking A.V., on June 22, 2020, with one hand to the point where 

she could no longer breathe; responding officers also observed bruising 

around A.V.’s left eye, caused by Geiger punching her in the face the previous 

week. See Criminal Complaint, No. 8895-2020, at 5. At No. 8893-2020, 

Geiger admitted to strangling A.V. on August 26, 2020, at approximately 4:42 

p.m., while sitting in the back seat of her car while she was operating the 
J-S09038-23

- 5 -

vehicle. A.V. managed to pull the vehicle over and get out of the car, but 

Geiger knocked her to the ground, got on top of her, and strangled her until 

a nearby witness started to yell for help. Geiger fled. See Criminal Complaint, 

No. 8893-2020, at 6. 

As part of the plea negotiations, the Commonwealth agreed that, 

following Geiger’s guilty plea across all seven cases, his sentence for three of 

the cases would run concurrently with every other case, for the purpose of 

“limiting his exposure significantly.” N.T., 10/22/21, at 15.

2

 The trial court 

deferred sentencing for the preparation of a presentence investigation report 

(“PSI”). See id. at 16. 

The trial court held a sentencing hearing on March 8, 2022. At the 

sentencing hearing, the trial court indicated that it had reviewed the PSI. See 

N.T., 3/8/22, at 7. The Commonwealth informed the court that, while the PSI 

did not include mental health information, Geiger had been diagnosed as 

having ADHD, major depressive disorder, stimulant use disorder, and 

cannabis abuse disorder. See id. at 7. Geiger did not otherwise supplement 

or offer corrections to the PSI. See id. at 6-7. Geiger’s mother and father 

testified on his behalf at the hearing. See id. at 8-10. Geiger also exercised 

his right to allocution, during which he informed the court that he had only 

recently begun taking medication to “help my mental health state,” and he 

____________________________________________

2 The three cases to run concurrently to the others were Nos. 8900-2020, 

8899-2020, and 8898-2020. See N.T., 10/22/21, at 15; see also Disposition 

Sheet, No. 8900-2020, 3/8/22.
J-S09038-23

- 6 -

had seen improvements, and that it was the “best thing [he] ever did.” Id. 

at 17. Geiger stated, in response to questioning by the court, that he had not 

thought he “needed it[, i.e., medication] at the time,” and that he failed to 

seek treatment even though others told him, as he “got older and progressed 

in life,” that he needed medication. Id. at 19. 

The trial court sentenced Geiger to, inter alia, three to six years of 

incarceration for strangulation at No. 8893-2020; three to six years of 

incarceration for strangulation at No. 8898-2020 to be served consecutively; 

and three to six years of incarceration for strangulation at No. 8901-2020 to 

be served consecutively. See N.T., 3/8/22, at 23-29.3 Following several pro 

se filings,4 Geiger’s newly-appointed counsel filed at each docket number nunc 

____________________________________________

3 The trial court also imposed concurrent terms of incarceration across the 

other cases, along with five years of probation at No. 8898-2020 (count two),

to be served consecutively to all periods of incarceration. See N.T., 3/8/22, 

at 25-26. The trial court additionally imposed a ten-year period of probation 

at No. 0013-2021 (count one), to be served consecutively with the terms of 

incarceration, but concurrently with the other probationary period. See id. at 

28. 

4 Pro se filings by counseled defendants are generally considered legal 

nullities, though counseled defendants may act on their “behalf to protect 

important rights where counsel remains technically attached to the case, but 

is no longer serving his client’s interest.” Commonwealth v. Muhammed, 

219 A.3d 1207, 1210 (Pa. Super. 2019). That said, a pro se notice of appeal 

that pre-dates a timely counseled post-sentence motion does not necessarily 

divest the trial court of jurisdiction to act on the counseled post-sentence 

motion. See Commonwealth v. Cooper, 27 A.3d 994, 1008 (Pa. 2011). 

Thus, Geiger’s pro se March 15, 2022 motions to withdraw his guilty plea were 

legal nullities, because his first attorney had not withdrawn; and Geiger’s

March 17, 2022 pro se notices of appeal did not divest the trial court of 

jurisdiction to consider his subsequent counseled post-sentence motions.
J-S09038-23

- 7 -

pro tunc motions to file post-sentence motions, which the trial court granted. 

See Order, 3/21/22. Geiger subsequently filed post-sentence motions for a 

sentence modification, which the trial court denied. See Order, 5/4/22. 

Geiger timely appealed,5 and both he and the trial court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.6

Geiger raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by sentencing [] Geiger 

without noting on the record that it considered the sentencing 

guidelines? 

2. Did the trial court fail to apply all relevant sentencing criteria, 

including the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense, 

and [] Geiger’s character and rehabilitative needs, as required 

by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) . . ., thus making [] Geiger’s 

sentences excessive and unreasonable? 

Geiger’s Brief at 17 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Both of Geiger’s issues present challenges to the discretionary aspects 

of sentencing. Our standard of review for challenges to the discretionary 

aspects of sentencing is well-settled: “[S]entencing is vested in the discretion 

of the trial court, and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of that 

discretion[, which] involves a sentence which was manifestly unreasonable, 

or which resulted from partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. It is more than just 

____________________________________________

5 When a trial court grants a request to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro 

tunc, the post-sentence motion filed as a result must be treated as though it 

were filed within the 10-day period following the imposition of sentence. See 

Commonwealth v. Wright, 846 A.2d 730, 734 (Pa. Super. 2004).

6 This Court consolidated Geiger’s appeals sua sponte. See Order, 6/1/22.
J-S09038-23

- 8 -

an error in judgment.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 249 A.3d 1206, 1211 

(Pa. Super. 2021).

Further, this Court has explained that challenges to the discretionary 

aspects of sentencing are not appealable as of right, but, rather,

an appellant challenging the sentencing court’s discretion must 

invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by (1) filing a timely notice of 

appeal; (2) properly preserving the issue at sentencing or in a 

motion to reconsider and modify the sentence; (3) complying with 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), which requires a separate section of the brief 

setting forth “a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for 

allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a 

sentence[;]” and (4) presenting a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing 

Code.

Commonwealth v. Padilla-Vargas, 204 A.3d 971, 975 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citation omitted; brackets in original); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). 

Regarding the requirement that an appellant raise a “substantial 

question,” this Court has explained:

A substantial question exists where an appellant sets forth a 

plausible argument that the sentence violates a particular 

provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental 

norms underlying the sentencing process.

Brown, 249 A.3d at 1211 (internal citation omitted). “The determination of 

whether a particular issue raises a substantial question is to be evaluated on 

a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. 

Super. 2004). Where an “appellant argues that the lower court 

inappropriately applied correct information when imposing sentence[, he or 

she] is effectively asking this [C]ourt to substitute [its] judgment for that of 
J-S09038-23

- 9 -

the lower court, [and has thereby] failed to present us with a substantial 

question . . ..” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 637 A.2d 1015, 1017 (Pa. Super. 

1994). 

Before addressing the merits of Geiger’s issues, we must discern 

whether he has properly invoked our jurisdiction. We note that Geiger timely 

filed an appeal from his judgment of sentence following the trial court’s denial 

of his post-sentence motion. See Notice of Appeal, 5/5/22. Additionally, 

Geiger preserved these issues in his post-sentence motion. See PostSentence Motion, 4/4/22, at ¶ 5(a), (c). Geiger is also in technical compliance 

with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) in that he has included a separate section of his brief

setting forth a concise statement of the reasons for which this Court should 

exercise jurisdiction over the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Geiger’s 

assertion that the trial court failed to consider the guidelines raises a 

substantial question. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Scassera, 965 A.2d 

247, 250-51 (Pa. Super. 2009). Geiger’s assertion that the trial court also 

failed to consider, among other things, his rehabilitative needs, and thereby 

imposed an unreasonable and excessive sentence, likewise presents a 

substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Rush, 162 A.3d 530, 543-44 

(Pa. Super. 2017). Accordingly, we proceed to review the merits of Geiger’s 

issues.

Geiger first argues the trial court “did not mention the sentencing 

guidelines or the correct range on the record.” Geiger’s Brief at 33. Geiger 
J-S09038-23

- 10 -

maintains, “[i]n fact, the phrase ‘sentencing guidelines’ appears nowhere in 

the sentencing transcript.” Id. Geiger infers from the absence of discussion 

about the guidelines on the record that the trial court lacked “the correct 

starting point for the sentencing process,” and thereby abused its discretion. 

Id.

The trial court considered Geiger’s assertions and concluded they were 

meritless:

Here, [Geiger] pled guilty to seven [] separate counts of

[s]trangulation, which each carried a standard guideline range of 

[thirty to forty-two] months’ imprisonment. In accordance with 

its usual practice, the court considered the sentencing guidelines 

in determining the appropriate sentence, which is evidenced by

the actual sentences that were imposed at each case number. 

Indeed, the court’s sentence of [three to six] years at each 

[s]trangulation conviction was squarely within the standard 

guideline range for each case. The fact that this court ran three 

[] of those sentences consecutively to one another does not

transform the total sentence into an above-guideline 

sentence . . ..

Trial Court Opinion, 8/10/22, at 5-6.

Based on our review, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by failing to consider the sentencing guidelines. It is undisputed 

that the strangulation convictions each carried a standard guideline range of 

thirty to forty-two months of imprisonment. See, e.g., Guidelines, No. 8893-

2020 (providing for a standard range, for Geiger, of thirty to forty-two months 

of imprisonment for a strangulation conviction). The sentence for each 

conviction (three years of incarceration) was thus squarely in the standard 

range of the guidelines. Accordingly, the trial court presumptively considered 
J-S09038-23

- 11 -

the guidelines. See Commonwealth v. Hunzer, 868 A.2d 498, 514 (Pa. 

Super. 2005) (holding that it is “well-settled that if the court sentences within 

the guidelines’ suggested ranges, there is no need for the sentencing court to 

otherwise manifest on the record that it considered the guidelines. In such a 

case, consideration of the guidelines is presumed to be evidenced by the 

actual sentence imposed”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). We also 

note that the trial court later reiterated that it considered the guidelines. See 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/10/22, at 5-6. Geiger’s argument is thus meritless, and 

he is due no relief.7

In his second issue, Geiger asserts the trial court failed to consider his 

rehabilitative needs and mitigating evidence. “Where the sentencing judge 

had the benefit of a presentence investigation report, it will be presumed that 

he or she was aware of the relevant information regarding the defendant’s 

character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory 

factors.” Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 329 (Pa. Super. 

2019). Further, “where the sentencing court imposed a standard-range 

sentence with the benefit of a [PSI], we will not consider the sentence 

____________________________________________

7

It is clear that the substance of Geiger’s actual assertion of error is not that 

the trial court failed to consider the guidelines but that the trial court did not 

mention the word “guidelines” on the record. See Geiger’s Brief at 33. Had 

Geiger accurately stated his issue in his Rule 2119(f) statement, he would not 

have presented a substantial question. See Rush, 162 A.3d at 543 (rejecting 

an argument that a trial court’s failure to “state the guideline ranges at 

sentencing raises a substantial question”).
J-S09038-23

- 12 -

excessive.” Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 298 (Pa. Super. 2011); 

see also Commonwealth v. Hill, 210 A.3d 1104, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(stating that “where a sentence is within the standard range of the guidelines, 

Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing 

Code”) (internal citation omitted). Lastly, a trial court does not abuse its 

discretion by merely giving a defendant’s mitigation evidence less weight than 

the defendant would like. See Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 

778 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating, “The . . . court merely chose not to give the 

mitigating factors as much weight as Appellant would have liked and decided 

that the facts did not warrant . . . a sentence lower than the standard range. 

We cannot re-weigh the sentencing factors and impose our judgment 

[instead]”). 

Geiger notes that the trial court learned at sentencing that he “has been 

diagnosed with ADHD, major depressive disorder, stimulant use disorder, and 

cannabis abuse disorder.” Geiger’s Brief at 35 (unnecessary capitalization 

omitted). Geiger also highlights his troubled youth, including having “heroin 

addict” parents, “behavioral and educational problems at school,” and his early 

addiction to controlled substances. Id. at 36. Geiger argues the trial court 

“discounted the positive effects of [his] medication,” and emphasizes that he 

had attempted to explain how “drugs caused him to make terrible mistakes,”

but the trial court was unwilling to listen. Id. at 37. According to Geiger, the 

trial court “considered only the gravity of the offense and did not consider all 
J-S09038-23

- 13 -

the other required [sentencing factors], especially the rehabilitative needs of 

the defendant.” Id. at 38.

The trial court considered Geiger’s assertions and concluded they were 

meritless:

. . . Pursuant to its consistent practice, the court carefully 

reviewed [the PSI] at least two . . . times prior to sentencing –

once when it first received the report, and then again in 

preparation for sentencing.

* * * *

[The court also] consulted the [sentencing] guidelines, and 

factored in the testimony from [Geiger’s] family, the parties’

sentencing arguments, and [Geiger’s] allocution to the court.

By way of the [PSI], the court was aware of and familiar 

with [Geiger’s] background, history, and rehabilitative needs. It 

well understood his position that his crimes were a product of 

substance abuse and mental health issues, which involved 

diagnoses of ADHD, major depressive disorder, stimulant use 

disorder, and cannabis abuse disorder. Given this court’s position 

as the supervising judge of the Allegheny County Mental Health 

Court . . ., [Geiger’s] mitigation argument was presented to a 

sympathetic audience, and the court did consider that when 

determining what an appropriate sentence would be in this 

case. . . .

Nevertheless, other, far more compelling factors 

substantially outweighed those mitigating factors. First, [Geiger]

admitted to committing over a half dozen strangulations, against 

the same victim, in a six [] month period. . . . That the same 

crime was repeatedly committed in such a short timeframe was 

already problematic, but the fact that the crime was

[s]trangulation made [Geiger’s] conduct all the more troubling[, 

because, as the court noted at sentencing, it was a sign of 

“lethality,” meaning Geiger’s capability of killing A.V.]

* * * *
J-S09038-23

- 14 -

In addition to the severity of [Geiger’s] crimes, it is not . . . 

[his] first foray into the criminal justice system. At [forty-two] 

years[’] old, [Geiger] carrie[d] with him a criminal history that

dates all the way back to 1994, when he was [fourteen] years[’]

old[ and includes convictions for, inter alia, firearms offenses]. . .. 

More significantly, [Geiger] served four [] years in state 

prison . . . for the firearm[-]related convictions, but he continued 

his life of drugs and crime upon his release, acquiring new cases 

in 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020. This shows 

that his prior, more lenient sentences failed to deter him from 

engaging in criminal activity.

During his allocution, [Geiger] expressed to this court that 

he started taking medication for the first time, and he was feeling 

better and “normal” as a result. While the court was pleased to 

hear that [Geiger] was finally amenable to treatment by the time 

of the sentencing, the court noted that he had been aware of his 

substance abuse and mental health issues for decades, but he 

never took accountability for his actions and never willingly sought 

treatment despite his awareness that he needed assistance. Thus, 

while the court considered his rehabilitative needs and imposed 

sentencing conditions to ensure that [Geiger] could continue to 

seek substance abuse and mental health treatment while 

incarcerated[;] his rehabilitative needs were not so dire or unique 

that they overshadowed the need for the sentence to account for 

the other relevant sentencing factors that weighed heavily in favor 

of a serious period of incarceration.

[Geiger’s] central complaint in this appeal is that the court 

did not assign more weight to the mitigating factors. However, 

this court “was only obligated to consider mitigating 

circumstances, not to accept or appreciate them.”

Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 850 (Pa. Super. 2006).

Simply because mitigating factors were at play did not mean that 

this court was required to assign them more weight at the expense 

of other, more serious concerns that far outweighed any 

mitigating evidence. [Geiger’s] contention also substantially 

overlooks the fact that his sentencing exposure was greatly 

mitigated by this court’s acceptance of the parties’ plea agreement

that allowed three of his cases to run concurrently with one 

another. By accepting the terms of the plea bargain, this court 

already showed [Geiger] a great deal of leniency where it 

otherwise likely would not have absent the agreement.
J-S09038-23

- 15 -

Against this backdrop, [Geiger’s] sentence was not 

manifestly excessive. The court considered all of the relevant 

statutory factors in imposing sentence, and it did not consider one 

factor to the exclusion of any others. The aggregate sentence was 

reasonable and necessary to address the seriousness of his 

offenses, the impact on the victim, the need to protect the public, 

and the need to provide adequate deterrence and promote respect 

for the law.

* * * *

Ultimately, [Geiger] was not entitled to a “volume discount”

for his crimes, particularly in light of the extremely serious and 

troubling nature of them. . ..

Trial Court Opinion, 8/10/22, at 11-19 (citations to the record and 

unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court. 

As the court explained in its well-reasoned opinion, it was aware of Geiger’s 

mental health and substance abuse history, but its mitigating effect was offset 

by Geiger’s failure to seek treatment despite his pre-existing awareness of 

these issues. See N.T., 3/9/22 at 6-7, 18-19 (trial court learning of Geiger’s 

mental health and substance abuse issues and noting that Geiger failed to 

seek treatment notwithstanding his awareness that he needed it). 

Additionally, the trial court, informed by, inter alia, the PSI and sentencing 

guidelines, considered the public’s need for protection, the gravity of the 

offenses vis-à-vis A.V. and the community, Geiger’s risk of reoffending given 

his prior criminal history, and Geiger’s rehabilitative needs. The trial court 

thus considered Geiger’s mitigating evidence and rehabilitative needs, albeit 

without according them as much weight as Geiger sought. Geiger’s 
J-S09038-23

- 16 -

argument—that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing standardrange consecutive terms of incarceration, across just three of the seven cases 

in which he pleaded guilty to strangulation—is meritless. See Akhmedov, 

216 A.3d at 329 (holding that the trial court, having reviewed a PSI, is 

presumed to be aware a defendant’s mitigating evidence); Corley, 31 A.3d at 

298 (stating that a standard-range sentence, imposed following review of a 

PSI, is not excessive); Macias, 968 A.2d at 778 (holding that the trial court 

does not abuse its discretion by giving a defendant’s mitigating evidence less 

weight than a defendant desires); Fullin, 892 A.2d 850 (holding that the trial 

court must consider, not accept, a defendant’s mitigating evidence). 

Accordingly, we affirm Geiger’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/8/2023