Exhibit 10.8







SUNOCO, INC.

EXECUTIVE INCENTIVE
PLAN

(As Amended and Restated effective as of July 2, 2008)









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ARTICLE I

Background and Purpose

1.1 Purpose. The purpose of the Executive Incentive Plan is to
promote the achievement of the Companys short-term, targeted business objectives by providing competitive incentive reward opportunities to those employees who can significantly impact the Companys performance. The Plan enhances the
Companys ability to attract, develop and motivate individuals as members of a talented management team while aligning their interest with those of the shareholders. As described herein, the awards made under the Plan may recognize Company,
business unit, team and/or individual performance.

1.2 Effective Date. The initial amended and restated Plan was approved by the
shareholders at Sunoco, Inc.s 2001 Annual Meeting of Shareholders in accordance with Section 162(m) of the Code. The amended and restated version of the Plan to be presented at Sunoco, Inc.s 2006 Annual Meeting of Shareholders will
continue to be effective upon requisite shareholder approval at such meeting. No awards shall be made under this Plan with respect to years after December 31, 2011, unless this date is extended by shareholder approval to a date no later than
December 31, 2016.

1.3 Administration. The Committee shall have full power and authority to construe, interpret and administer
the Plan and to make rules and regulations subject to the provisions of the Plan. All decisions, actions, determinations or interpretations of the Committee shall be made in its sole discretion and shall be final, conclusive and binding on all
parties.

1.4 Eligibility and Participation. Participation in the Plan is limited to Executive Resources Employees and other
employees evaluated in positions with Grades 11, 12 and 13 at any time during the Plan Year.

ARTICLE II

Definitions

As used in this Plan,
the following terms shall have the meanings herein specified:

2.1 Board of Directorsshall mean the Board of Directors of the
Company.

2.2 Business Combinationshall have the meaning provided herein at Section 2.4(c).

2.3 CEOshall mean the Chief Executive Officer of the Company.



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2.4 Change in Controlshall mean the occurrence of any of the following events:

(a) The acquisition by any individual, entity or group (within the meaning of Section 13(d)(3) or 14(d)(2) of the Exchange Act)
(a Person) of beneficial ownership (within the meaning of Rule 13d-3 promulgated under the Exchange Act) of 20% or more of either (1) the then-outstanding shares of common stock of the Company (the Outstanding Company Common
Stock) or (2) the combined voting power of the then-outstanding voting securities of the Company entitled to vote generally in the election of directors (the Outstanding Company Voting Securities); provided,
however, that, for purposes of this Section (a), the following acquisitions shall not constitute a Change in Control: (A) any acquisition directly from the Company, (B) any acquisition by the Company, (C) any acquisition by any
employee benefit plan (or related trust) sponsored or maintained by the Company or any company controlled by, controlling or under common control with the Company, or (D) any acquisition by any entity pursuant to a transaction that complies
with Sections (c)(1), (c)(2) and (c)(3) of this definition;

(b) Individuals who, as of September 6, 2001, constitute
the Board of Directors (the Incumbent Board) cease for any reason to constitute at least a majority of the Board of Directors; provided, however, that any individual becoming a director subsequent to the date hereof whose
election, or nomination for election by the Companys shareholders, was approved by a vote of at least a majority of the directors then comprising the Incumbent Board shall be considered as though such individual were a member of the Incumbent
Board, but excluding, for this purpose, any such individual whose initial assumption of office occurs as a result of an actual or threatened election contest with respect to the election or removal of directors or other actual or threatened
solicitation of proxies or consents by or on behalf of a Person other than the Board of Directors;

(c) Consummation of a
reorganization, merger, statutory share exchange or consolidation or similar corporate transaction involving the Company or any of its subsidiaries, a sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of the Company, or the
acquisition of assets or stock of another entity by the Company or any of its subsidiaries (each, a Business Combination), in each case unless, following such Business Combination, (1) all or substantially all of the individuals and
entities that were the beneficial owners of the Outstanding Company Common Stock and the Outstanding Company Voting Securities immediately prior to such Business Combination beneficially own, directly or indirectly, more than 60% of the
then-outstanding shares of common stock and the combined voting power of the then-outstanding



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voting securities entitled to vote generally in the election of directors, as the case may be, of the corporation resulting from such Business Combination
(including, without limitation, a corporation that, as a result of such transaction, owns the Company or all or substantially all of the Companys assets either directly or through one or more subsidiaries) in substantially the same proportions
as their ownership immediately prior to such Business Combination of the Outstanding Company Common Stock and the Outstanding Company Voting Securities, as the case may be, (2) no Person (excluding any corporation resulting from such Business
Combination or any employee benefit plan (or related trust) of the Company or such corporation resulting from such Business Combination) beneficially owns, directly or indirectly, 20% or more of, respectively, the then-outstanding shares of common
stock of the corporation resulting from such Business Combination or the combined voting power of the then-outstanding voting securities of such corporation, except to the extent that such ownership existed prior to the Business Combination, and
(3) at least a majority of the members of the board of directors of the corporation resulting from such Business Combination were members of the Incumbent Board at the time of the execution of the initial agreement or of the action of the Board
of Directors providing for such Business Combination; or

(d) Approval by the shareholders of the Company of a complete
liquidation or dissolution of the Company.

2.5 CIC Incentive Awardshall mean the incentive award payable in cash following a
Change in Control, as such award is described herein at Article VII.

2.6 CIC Participantshall mean a Participant described in
any of the following:

(a) a Participant who was employed by the Company on the date of the Change in Control and who does
not incur a termination for Just Cause before payment of the CIC Incentive Award;

(b) a Participant who was, immediately
before the Change in Control, eligible for a prorated award under the provisions of Section 5.2;

(c) a Participant who
is a participant in the Companys Special Executive Severance Plan and incurs a Qualifying Termination as defined in such plan before the Change in Control;

(d) a Participant whose employment was terminated by the Company (other than for Just Cause) before the Change in Control, or a
Participant who terminated employment for one of the reasons set forth in Sections 2.6(d)(1), (2), and (3) below, if the Participant can demonstrate that



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such termination or circumstance in Section 2.6(d)(1), (2), or (3) below leading to the termination was at the request of a third party with which
the Company had entered into negotiations or an agreement with regard to a Change in Control or otherwise occurred in connection with a Change in Control; provided, however, that in either such case, the Change in Control actually occurs
within one (1) year following the Employment Termination Date:

(1) the assignment to such Participant of any duties
inconsistent in a way significantly adverse to such Participant, with such Participants positions, duties, responsibilities and status with the Company immediately prior to the Change in Control, or a significant reduction in the duties and
responsibilities held by the Participant immediately prior to the Change in Control, in each case except in connection with such Participants termination of employment by the Company for Just Cause; or

(2) a reduction by the Company in the Participants combined annual base salary and guideline (target) bonus as in effect immediately
prior to the Change in Control; or

(3) the Company requires the Participant to be based anywhere other than the
Participants present work location or a location within thirty-five (35) miles from the present location; or the Company requires the Participant to travel on Company business to an extent substantially more burdensome than such
Participants travel obligations during the period of twelve (12) consecutive months immediately preceding the Change in Control;

provided,
however, that in the case of a Participant whose employment terminates under this subparagraph (d), such Participant shall not be deemed to be a CIC Participant on the basis of such termination unless the termination occurs within 120 days after
the occurrence of the event or events constituting the reason for the termination.

2.7 CIC Short Periodshall mean the portion
of the Plan Year from January 1 to the date of the occurrence of a Change in Control.

2.8 Codeshall mean the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

2.9 Committeeshall mean the committee appointed to administer this Plan by the Board of
Directors of the Company, as constituted from time to time. The Committee shall consist of at least two (2) members of the Board of Directors, each of whom shall meet applicable requirements set forth in the pertinent regulations under
Section 16 of the Exchange Act and Section 162(m) of the Code.

2.10 Companyshall mean Sunoco, Inc., a Pennsylvania
corporation. The term Company shall include any successor to Sunoco, Inc., any subsidiary or affiliate which has adopted the Plan, or



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a corporation succeeding to the business of Sunoco, Inc., or any subsidiary or affiliate, by merger, consolidation or liquidation or purchase of assets or
stock or similar transaction.

2.11 Exchange Actshall mean the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

2.12 Executive Resources Employeeshall mean any individual who has been designated by the Company as a member of the Companys
Executive Resources group. Generally, such group shall include employees in Grades 14 and above and all other employees subject to Section 16 of the Exchange Act.

2.13 Executive Teamshall mean the senior executives who have significant operating and/or strategic responsibilities for the Company as designated by the CEO.

2.14 Guideline Incentive Awardshall mean the result of the individual Participants actual annualized salary multiplied by the
guideline percentage, as determined under Article III.

2.15 Incentive Awardshall mean the award granted to a Participant.

2.16 Incumbent Boardshall have the meaning provided herein at Section 2.4(b).

2.17 Just Causeshall mean, for any Participant who is a participant in the Companys Special Executive Severance Plan, Just
Cause as defined in such plan, and for any other Participant:

(a) the willful and continued failure of the
Participant to perform substantially the Participants duties with the Company (other than any such failure resulting from incapacity due to physical or mental illness or following notice of employment termination by the Participant pursuant to
Section 2.6(c), (d) or (e)), after a written demand for substantial performance is delivered to the Participant by the Board of Directors or any employee of the Company with supervisory authority over the Participant that specifically
identifies the manner in which the Board of Directors or such supervising employee believes that the Participant has not substantially performed the Participants duties, or

(b) the willful engaging by the Participant in illegal conduct or gross misconduct that is materially and demonstrably injurious to the
Company.

2.18 Outstanding Company Common Stockshall have the meaning provided herein at Section 2.4(a).

2.19 Outstanding Company Voting Securitiesshall have the meaning provided herein at Section 2.4(a).

2.20 Participantshall mean a person participating or eligible to participate in the Plan, as determined under Section 1.4.



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2.21 Performance Factorshall mean:

(a) for a Participant who is one of the top five most highly compensated officers of the Company during the applicable Plan Year: the
various payout percentages related to the attainment levels of one or more Performance Goals, as determined by the Committee; and

(b) for a Participant who is not one of the top five most highly compensated officers of the Company during the applicable Plan Year: such payout percentages related to the attainment levels of one or more Performance Goals, as determined
by the CEO, or any authorized delegate thereof.

2.22 Performance Goalsshall mean:

(a) for a Participant who is one of the top five most highly compensated officers of the Company during the applicable Plan Year: the
objective financial or operating goals established by the Committee in accordance with Section 162(m) of the Code. Such Performance Goals may include specific targeted amounts of, or changes in, revenues; expenses; net income; operating income;
equity; return on equity, assets or capital employed; working capital; shareholder return; operating capacity utilized; production or sales volumes; throughput; or other objective criteria; and

(b) for a Participant who is not one of the top five most highly compensated officers of the Company during the applicable Plan Year: such
annual financial, operating, or other goals and objectives as may be established from time to time in the sole discretion of the CEO, or any authorized delegate thereof.

Such goals may be applicable to the Company as a whole, to one or more of the Companys business units or teams, or to an individual Participant in the Plan. Performance Goals may be applied in total or on a per
share, per barrel or percentage basis and on an absolute basis or relative to other companies, industries or indices or any combination thereof, as determined by the Committee (in the case of Performance Goals established by the Committee with
respect to a Participant who is one of the top five most highly compensated officers of the Company during the applicable Plan Year) or by the CEO, or any authorized delegate thereof (in the case of a Participant who is not one of the top five most
highly compensated officers of the Company during the applicable Plan Year).

2.23 Personshall have the meaning provided
herein at Section 2.4(a).



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2.24 Planshall mean the Companys Executive Incentive Plan as amended and restated
effective as of July 2, 2008.

2.25 Plan Yearshall mean the performance (calendar) year.

2.26 Pro-rated Bonus Award

(a) For purposes of Section 5.2(a) shall mean an amount equal to the Incentive Award otherwise payable to a Participant for the Plan Year in which the Participants initiation of employment with the Company
(new hires) or termination of employment with the Company (other than for Just Cause) is effective, multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of days in the applicable Plan Year beginning on the date such Participants
employment with the Company began or through the date of termination of such Participants employment, as applicable, and the denominator of which is 365 (366 days in a leap year).

(b) For purposes of Section 5.2(b) shall mean an amount of Incentive Award equal to the sum of (i) the Participants actual
salary on the last day of the final pay period of the Participants previous position during the applicable Plan Year multiplied by the applicable guideline percentage in his or her previous position, multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of
which is the number of days in the applicable Plan Year in which the Participant was in the previous position, and the denominator of which is 365 days (366 days in a leap year), and (ii) the Participants actual salary on the last day of
the final pay period of the Participants new position during the applicable Plan Year multiplied by the applicable guideline percentage in his or her new position, multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of days in the
applicable Plan Year in which the Participant has been in the new position, and the denominator of which is 365 days (366 days in a leap year).

(c) Pro-rated Bonus Awards shall be determined in accordance with and subject to the provisions of Article III.

ARTICLE III

Determination of Guideline Incentive Awards

3.1 Guideline Percentages. Within the time prescribed by Section 162(m) of the Code, the Committee will establish, in writing, for the
applicable Plan Year, the guideline incentive



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opportunities for Participants as a percentage of actual salary in effect on the last day of the final pay period of the current Plan Year.

3.2 Guideline Incentive Award. The Guideline Incentive Award is calculated for each Participant by multiplying the individual Participants
actual salary range in effect on the last day of the final pay period of the Current Plan Year by the applicable guideline percentage established by the Committee.

Actual incentive awards to individual Participants may be greater or lesser than this guideline depending on Company and, as necessary, business unit, team and/or individual Participant performance.

ARTICLE IV

Determination of
Incentive Award

4.1 Performance Goals.

(a) Five Most Highly Compensated Officers:For a Participant who is one of the top five most highly compensated officers of the
Company during the applicable Plan Year, the amount of any Incentive Award earned will be based upon the attainment of Performance Goals established by the Committee in accordance with Section 162(m) of the Code. Within the time prescribed by
Section 162(m) of the Code, the Committee will establish, in writing, the weighted Performance Goals and related Performance Factors for various goal achievement levels for the applicable Plan Year, and will determine the appropriate
methodology for including Company, business unit, team and/or individual performance in the Incentive Award computations for such year.

In establishing the weighted Performance Goals, the Committee shall take the necessary steps to insure that the ability to achieve the pre-established goals is uncertain at the time the goals are set. The established
written Performance Goals, assigned weights, and Performance Factors shall be written in terms of an objective formula, whereby any third party having knowledge of the relevant Company, business unit, team and/or individual performance results could
calculate the amount to be paid. Such Performance Goals may vary by Participant and by award.

(1) Adjustment or
Modification of Performance Goals. The Committee, in its discretion (and within the time prescribed by Section 162(m) of the Code), may



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adjust or modify the calculation of Performance Goals to prevent dilution or enlargement of the rights of Participants:

(i) in the event of, in recognition of, or in anticipation of, any unanticipated, unusual nonrecurring or extraordinary corporate item,
transaction, event, or development; or

(ii) in response to, or in anticipation of, changes in applicable laws,
regulations, accounting principles, or business conditions.

Unless otherwise determined by the Committee, if any provision
of the Plan or any Incentive Award granted to an individual who is one of the top five most highly compensated officers of the Company hereunder would not comply with Section 162(m) of the Code, such provision or Incentive Award shall be
construed or deemed amended to conform to Section 162(m) of the Code.

(2) Determination of Performance Factor.
After the end of each Plan Year, the Committee will determine:

(i) the extent to which the Company, business unit and/or
team performance goals have been met; and

(ii) the Company, business unit and/or team Performance Factor (each of which
may vary from 0% to 200%), appropriate to the level of performance achieved with respect to each Performance Goal.

(b)
Other Participants:For a Participant who is not one of the top five most highly compensated officers of the Company during the applicable Plan Year, the amount of any Incentive Award earned will be based upon the attainment of Performance
Goals established as provided in this Section 4.1(b). For each Plan Year, the CEO, and if so delegated, other members of the Executive Team will determine the appropriate methodology for including Company, business unit, team and individual
performance in the Incentive Award computations for such year. While Company Performance will always be included in the computation, the other factors may or may not be included as deemed appropriate by the Executive Team. The applicable Performance
Factors shall be determined as follows:

(1) Determination of Performance Factor Applicable to Company. For each Plan
Year, the Compensation Committee shall establish annual Performance Goal(s) for the Company, based on one or more criteria that the Compensation



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Committee, in its sole discretion, determines to be applicable.

After the end of each calendar year, the Compensation Committee will determine the extent to which such Performance Goals have been met and the appropriate Company Performance Factor, from 0% to 200%, that is
appropriate with the varying levels of performance for each goal.

(2) Determination of Business Unit and Team
Performance Factors. The CEO, and if so delegated, other members of the Executive Team shall determine the annual business unit Performance Goal(s) and the applicable levels of performance based on one or more factors. Business unit leaders will
establish annual Performance Goal(s) for any teams within their respective business units.

After the end of each calendar
year, the CEO, and if so delegated, other members of the Executive Team will determine the extent to which the business unit Performance Goals have been met and the business unit Performance Factor, from 0% to 200%, that is appropriate with the
varying levels of performance for each goal. Business unit leaders will similarly evaluate the performance of any teams to determine the appropriate Performance Factor applicable to such team.

4.2 Individual Performance Factors. Incentive Awards under this Plan may be based, in whole or in part, upon the attainment of individual
performance objectives or targets. For a Participant who is one of the top five most highly compensated officers of the Company during the applicable Plan Year, the Committee will establish, in writing, individual performance objectives or targets
in accordance with Section 162(m) of the Code and Section 4.1 hereof. For all other Participants, the recommended individual performance assessment process is briefly outlined as follows:

(a) Prior to the beginning of each Plan Year or other appropriate time, the Participant and his or her manager will agree on individual
performance targets or objectives (which may be related to the Participants collaboration on a work team) to be attained during the Plan Year.

(b) Progress toward attainment of such individual targets or objectives will be formally reviewed on a periodic basis.

(c) At the end of the year, the manager will assess the degree to which the individual performance targets or objectives have been achieved, keeping in mind environmental or circumstantial changes that may have
affected the original targets or objectives. Specifically, consideration should be given to:



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(1) level of contributions relative to peers.

(2) degree of difficulty of performance targets.

(3) reaction to unanticipated changes in the business environment.

(4) unplanned contributions.

(5) team performance, as appropriate.

(d) While the level of individual performance for the
Plan should be based primarily on annual targets and objectives, the performance factors utilized for this program should be consistent with appraisals used for the purposes of salary administration as updated to reflect performance since the last
appraisal.

(e) The performance appraisal should be documented in such a way as to identify the performance targets and
objectives, the assessment of individual performance against such targets and objectives, and any other significant information to support the recommendation.

(f) The Participants individual performance factor should be determined based upon the individual performance assessment as outlined
below:



|                                                   |  |                                                 
|-------------------------------------------------- |  | ------------------------------------------------
|Individual Performance Assessments                 |  | Adjustment to IndividualPerformance Components *
|Exceed all performance targets                     |  | 150% to 200%                                    
|Exceed most performance targets                    |  | 115% to 145%                                    
|Met most performance targets                       |  | 90% to 110%                                     
|Met some/few performance targets                   |  | 50% to 85%                                      
|Completely unacceptable performance                |  | 0%                                              
|                                                   |  |                                                 
|*       All assessments should be multiples of 5%. |  |                                                 

(g) The Participants individual performance assessment will be determined by
his or her manager and approved by the appropriate member of the Executive Team and, where appropriate, the CEO.

ARTICLE V

Forfeiture and/or Proration of Incentive Award

5.1 Forfeiture. Provided that no Change in Control of the Company has occurred, if a Participant voluntarily terminates his or her employment with the Company (for any reason other than retirement, death,
permanent disability, approved leave of absence) prior to December 31 of any Plan Year, such Participant will not receive payment of any Incentive Award for such Plan Year.



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Likewise, a Participant will not receive payment of any Incentive Award for a particular Plan Year if no Change in Control has occurred and the
Participants employment with the Company is terminated for Just Cause before March 15 of the succeeding calendar year.

5.2
Proration.

(a) A Pro-rated Bonus Award, reflecting participation for a portion of the Plan Year, will be paid to any
Participant whose employment status changed during the year as a result of death or permanent disability (as determined by the Committee), or due to retirement, approved leave of absence, or termination at the Companys request (other than for
Just Cause). New hires and part-time employees also will receive a Pro-rated Bonus Award.

(b) If a Participant has a change
in level of employment after the beginning of the Plan Year, the Participant will receive a Pro-rated Bonus Award, pro-rated based on the length of time, actual salary and applicable guideline percentage in the previous and new positions, as
described in Section 2.26.

(c) Unless otherwise required by applicable law, any Pro-rated Bonus Award payable
hereunder will be paid on the date when Incentive Awards are otherwise payable as provided in the Plan.

ARTICLE VI

Timing and Form of Payment

6.1
Timing and Form of Payment.

(a) Certification in
Writing. Prior to the payment of any Incentive Award under this Plan, the Committee will certify in writing that the applicable Performance Goals, and any other material terms or conditions of such award, have been satisfied. In making this
certification, the Committee will be entitled to rely upon an appropriate officers certificate from the Companys Chief Financial Officer. Upon approval by the Committee of the individual Incentive Awards for the top five most highly
compensated officers of the Company and the aggregate amount of all Incentive Awards for the Plan Year, payment of the individual awards will be made in cash less the withholding of appropriate taxes. Payment will be made within two and one-half (2
1/2) months after the end of the Plan Year to which the Incentive Award relates.



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(b) Negative Discretion. The Committee will have the discretion, by Participant
and by grant, to reduce (but not to increase) some or all of the amount of any Incentive Award that would otherwise be payable by reason of the satisfaction of the Performance Goals. In making any such determination, the Committee is authorized to
take into account any such factor or factors it determines are appropriate, including but not limited to Company, business unit and individual performance; provided, however,the exercise of such negative discretion with respect to one
executive may not be used to increase the amount of any award otherwise payable to another executive.

ARTICLE VII

Change in Control

7.1 Effect of
Change in Control. The terms of this Article VII shall immediately become operative, without further action or consent by any person or entity, upon a Change in Control, and once operative shall supersede and control over any other provisions of
this Plan.

7.2 Acceleration. The CIC Incentive Award shall be payable in
cash within thirty (30) days following the occurrence of a Change of Control (or as soon as it is practicable to determine the level of attainment of applicable Performance Factors under subsection (a) below, but in no event later than two
and one-half (2 1/2) months following the end of the Plan Year in which the Change of Control occurred) to all CIC Participants.
Such award shall be calculated according to the terms of the Plan, except as follows:

(a) The applicable Performance
Factors shall be determined based upon performance of the Company, business unit and/or team, as the case may be, from January 1 through the end of the most recent quarter (prior to the Change in Control) for which the Company has reported its
earnings to the public. Notwithstanding the methodology established by the Committee for the Plan Year, there shall be no adjustment for individual performance factors in the determination of the CIC Incentive Award. If a specified percentage of the
Guideline Incentive Award was to be based upon individual performance, such percentage will be adjusted using the weighted average of the Performance Factors applicable to Company and, as necessary, business unit and/or team performance used to
determine the non-individual performance components of the CIC Participants award.

(b) The amount of the CIC
Incentive Award shall be equal to the respective annual



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Guideline Incentive Award adjusted to reflect the Performance Factors applicable to Company and, as necessary, business unit and/or team performance
(calculated in accordance with subsection (a) hereof), multiplied by the number of full and partial months in the CIC Short Period divided by twelve (12). Such result shall be further adjusted to reflect participation for only a portion of the
CIC Short Period in accordance with Section 5.2.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 8.3 hereof, no
action taken by the Committee or the Board of Directors after a Change in Control, or before, but in connection with, a Change in Control, may (1) terminate or reduce the CIC Incentive Award or prospective CIC Incentive Award payable to any
Participant in connection with such Change in Control without the express written consent of such Participant, or (2) adversely affect a Participants rights under Section 7.3 in connection with such Change in Control.

7.3 Attorneys Fees. The Company shall pay all legal fees and related expenses incurred by or with respect to a Participant during his
lifetime or within ten (10) years after his death in seeking to obtain or enforce payment of the CIC Incentive Award to which such Participant may be entitled under the Plan after a Change in Control; provided, however, that the
Participant (or a Participants representative) shall be required to repay any such amounts to the Company to the extent a court of competent jurisdiction issues a final and non-appealable order setting forth the determination that the position
taken by the Participant (or the Participants representative) was frivolous or advanced in bad faith. Reimbursement shall be made on or before the close of the calendar year following the calendar year in which the expense was incurred. The
amount of expenses eligible for reimbursement under this provision in one calendar year may not affect the amount of expenses eligible for reimbursement under this provision in any other calendar year.

ARTICLE VIII

Miscellaneous

8.1 Funding of Plan. In a meeting to be held not later than December 31st of each Plan Year, the Committee may determine, by
appropriate resolution, an estimate of the amount of monies, if any, that should be set aside for the current Plan Year for payment to Participants in the following



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calendar year.

8.2 Construction. Nothing
in this Plan or in any agreement or other instrument executed pursuant thereto shall be construed as conferring upon any Participant the right to receive executive incentive compensation or to be continued in the employ of the Company and any rights
conferred by this Plan may not be transferred, sold, assigned, pledged, anticipated or otherwise disposed of other than by will or intestate laws.

8.3 Amendment. This Plan may be amended at any time by the Committee and may be terminated in whole or in part at any time by the Board of Directors (except as set forth in Sections 1.2 and 7.2(c)).

ARTICLE IX

Forfeiture

9.1 Forfeiture. Unless otherwise determined by the Committee, if (a) the Company is required to prepare a material
negative accounting restatement due to the noncompliance of the Company with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws as a result of misconduct, and the Committee determines that (1) the Participant knowingly engaged in the
misconduct, (2) was grossly negligent with respect to such misconduct or (3) knowingly or grossly negligently failed to prevent the misconduct or (b) the Committee concludes that a Participant engaged in willful fraud, embezzlement or
other similar misconduct materially detrimental to the Company, the Company may require the Participant to pay to the Company an amount (the Forfeiture Amount) equal to (i) in the case of a forfeiture pursuant to
clause (a) hereof, the sum of all amounts paid in settlement of any Incentive Award granted to the Participant that pertains to performance during the Plan Year that includes the period covered by the financial restatement or (ii) in the
case of a forfeiture pursuant to clause (b) hereof, the sum of all amounts paid in settlement of any Incentive Award granted to the Participant during any Plan Year that includes the period during which such misconduct occurred, such Forfeiture
Amount to be paid in each case by the Participant within ten days of receipt from the Company of written notice requiring payment by the Participant of the Forfeiture Amount.

9.2 Committee Determination Binding. The Committee shall make all determinations required pursuant to this Article IX in its sole and absolute
discretion, and such determinations shall be conclusive and binding on all persons.



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9.3 Committee Discretion. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the Committee has sole and
absolute discretion not to require a Participant to pay a Forfeiture Amount, and its determination not to require any Participant to pay the Forfeiture Amount with respect to any particular Incentive Award or any particular act by any particular
Participant shall not in any way reduce or eliminate the Committees authority to require payment of any Forfeiture Amount with respect to any other Incentive Award, other act or other Participant.

9.4 Effect of Change in Control. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Article IX shall not be applicable to any Participant following a Change in
Control, nor shall this Article IX be applicable to any Participant who is a participant in the Companys Special Executive Severance Plan and incurs a Qualifying Termination (as defined in such plan) before a Change in Control.

9.5 Prospective Application. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the provisions set forth in this Article IX shall apply only to awards
granted on or after July 2, 2008.

9.6 Non-Exclusive Remedy. This Article IX shall be a non-exclusive remedy and nothing
contained in this Article IX shall preclude the Company from pursuing any other applicable remedies available to it, whether in addition to, or in lieu of, application of this Article IX.



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