### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jun e 7, 200 5

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. CU RTIS PA LME R

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 03-04188 Jam es C. Beasley, Jr ., Judge

No. W2004-01748-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Dece m ber 9, 2005

Following a jury

trial, Def endant, Curtis Palmer, wa s convicted of first deg ree felony

murder in the pe rp e tr a tio n o f a g g ra vate d bur g lary in c ou nt o ne of the ind ic tme nt andfi rs t de g re e fe lon y mur de r i n the per petration of theft of prope rt y i n t h e sec ond count, and wa s sentence d to life imprisonment without the possibil ity

of par ole. The trial court merg ed Def endant’ s conviction for f

elony murder in count two into his convic tion f or felony murder in c ount one. I n his appea l, Defe ndant ar g ues (1) that the evidenc e is insufficient to support his conviction on the c harg e of f elony murder; (2) that he
wa s d e nie d his rig ht to a

sp e e dy tr ia l; ( 3) that th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in de nying his mot ion s to su pp re ss; (4) that the trial court e rre d in its evidentiary ruling s; (5) that the trial c ourt err ed in fa iling to instruct the jury on voluntary

manslaug hter a s a lesser included off ense of the cha rg ed off enses; and ( 6) that t h e p ro s ec u t i o n en gage d i n p r o s e c u t o ri al m i s co n d u ct d u ri n g cl o s i n g ar gu m en t

. Af t era t h o ro u gh
re vie w o f the re c or d, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f thetr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., joined. J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J ., filed a c oncurring opinion.

Mark Me sler, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Curtis Palmer.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; El iza be th B

. M a

rn e y , As sis ta nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, Distr i ct At t o rney Gene ral; Philli p Ger ald Har ris, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral; and Patienc e B ranha m, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, the St ate of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

I. Trial
Patrice Johnson and the victim, Patricia Miller, wer e friends and wo rked toge ther at the Reg ional Medica l Center in Memphis. Ms. Johnson said that she rec eived a call fr om the medical-2-

cente r on January

1, 2002, beca

use the victim had not re ported to work that morning. Concerne d, Ms. John so n d ro ve to the vic tim ’s ho me a ndfo un d a do or ne ar the c arp ort c ra c ke d o pe n. Ms. J ohnson called the police. Of fice rs found the vic tim dead inside her home

. Carmalita Harris, t he victim ’s daughter , said she st ay ed with a friend on New Yea r’s Eve and spoke with her mother

by telephone a

round 12:45 a.m. on January 1, 2002. Ms. H arris sa id that the victim owned three car speake rs and an amplifier which she was attempting t o sell. The spea kers
we re wh ite , bla c k, a nd re d, a nd the ma te ri a l on the fa c e of on e of the sp e ake rs wa s to rn . M s. Ha rris ide nti fi e d th e sp e ake rs fo un d in De fe nd a nt’ s c ar a s h e r m oth e r’ s.
Ms. Harris said she inspected he r bedr oom after the victim was discover ed. She found various items on her be d which we re not ther e the day befor e, and a bullet hole in the ce iling. He r bedroom window w as ra ised, and the a ir conditioner ha d been r emoved.

Of fi c e r Wi lli e Ma the na

wi th the Me mph is Poli c e De pa rt me nt re sp on de d to the c a ll f ro m Ms

. John so n. Of

fi c e r Ma the na fo un d th e vic tim ly ing on the fl oo r i n th e de n. I n M s. Ha rris’ be dr oo m, Offic er Eric Fr eema n found a “bullet strike” on a bedside table, and noticed that the air c onditioner had been taken out of the bedroom window. There was a bullet hole in the ceiling. A bullet fra g ment was found ne ar the victim, and a second bullet fra g ment and thre e shell ca sings we re f ound in the den. Serg eant Ge rald Crowson a nd Serg ean t T o d d Pi e r c e , w it

hth eSo u thh aven, Mississippi P olice Depa rtment, o b serve d Def

endant drive his Chevy

Caprice into a Bloc kbuster par king lot ar ound 6:00 p.m. on J an u ar y 1 , 2002. Def endant we nt inside the Blockbuste r store. Ser g eant Pierc e aske d Def endant to step outside the store so he could ask him a few questions. Serg eant Pierc e said that Def endant wa s cooper ative. Serg eant Crowson looked in a window of De fenda nt’s car and noticed a two-tone , small caliber se miautomatic pistol ly ing on the floorboard of the driver’ s side of the c ar.
Offic er D anielle Mc Kenzie, with the Horn L ake, Mississippi P oli ce De p ar tment, was dis patc he d to the sc e ne
. S he re a d D e fe nd a nt h is Miranda rig hts. Office r McKe nzie said that Def endant told her

he did not “ understand what an attorney was.” Offic er McKe nzie e x plained the role of an attorney

and said that Defendant appea red to unde rstand. Of

fice r McKe nzie said that the office rs discover ed thre e ca r spea kers a nd an amplifier

in the trunk of De fenda nt’s vehicle. Serg eant Nathan B erry man with the Memphis Police Depa rtm e n t s aid

th at o ne of the victim’s friends told him she had spoken with the victim on the telephone a round 10:30 p.m. on Dec ember 31, 2001. The victim told her f riend that she ha d another call coming in and put the frie nd on hold. When the victim r eturne d to the line, she told the friend that she neede d to spe ak to the man on the other line a

bout se lling him he r car

speake rs and a mplifier. Def endant wa s identified as the c aller f r o m th e v ic ti m’ s te le p h o n e c a ll e r id e n ti f ic a ti o n b o x. Serg eant B erry man said that De fenda nt’s aunt called the police depa rtment on J anuary

2, 2002, and informe d them that Def endant had been incarc erated i n Mississ ippi. Serg eant B erry man-3-

and Serg eant Gosse tt t ra v el ed to Hernando, Mississippi, and beg an intervie wing Def endant at
app ro xima te ly 5:0 0 p.m. De fe nd a nt w a s r e a d h is Miranda ri g hts a ndsig ne d a wa ive r o f tho se ri g hts

. Serg eant B erry man said that De fenda nt was ca lm and appea red t o u n d erstand his rig hts. After of fe ri ng dif fe re nt v e rs ion s o f h ow he ha d g a ine d p os se ssi on of the sp e ake rs fo un d in the trun k of h is
c ar, De fe nd a nt t old Ser g e a nt B e rry ma n, “ I me sse d u p, did n’ t I .” De fe nd a nt a sk e d to sp e ak to Se rg e a nt B e rry ma n a lon e a nd imp lic a te d hims e lf in the c omm iss ion of the ho mic ide of

the vic tim

. Sergea nt B e rry ma n r e a d D e fe nd a nt h is Miranda rig hts a second time a round 6:30 p.m., and De fe nd a nt g a ve a

writt e n s ta te me nt w hic h w a s r e a d to the jury du ri ng the tr ia l.

I n his statement, Def

endant sa id that he met the victim a few day s befor e Christmas, and she told Defe ndant she ha d th re e car speake rs and a n amplifier f or sale. D efe ndant said that while he
w a s tr yi n g t o r a i s e t h e c a s h t o b u y t h e e q u i p m e n t , h e a n d t h e v i c t i mb e g a n s e e i n g e a c h o t h e r s o c i a l l y. Def endant sa id he ca lled the victim severa l times on Dec ember 31, 2001, but did not ge t an answe r. He went to the vi ctim’s home “about eig ht something that nig ht and par ked in the drive way .” The vic tim didno t a ns we r the do or

wh e n h e kn oc ke d a ndrang the do or be ll. De fe nd a nt sa id h e we nt t o the ba c k o f the ho us e a nd too k an a ir c on dit ion e r out of on e of the wi nd ow s. He he ard the vic tim
ca l l o u t , “W h o ’s t h er e. ” D ef en d an ts ai d h e r an aw ayb u td ec i d ed t o go b ac k

. He j u m p ed t h ro u gh the open window in the ba ck of the house. He said the vi ctim walked a way from him say ing, “ I ’m fix in[ g ] t o blow y o[ur] ass off.” Def endant sa id he shot the victim five or six t imes wi t h a .380 caliber handg un. Def

endant retrie ved the victim’s c ar speake rs and amplifier from a r o o m i n t he victim’s house and put them in the trunk of his ca r. De fenda nt said that the victim was still breathing when he left. De fenda nt said he drove to Missi ssippi after stopping at a store to buy beer , and aske d a friend to hook up the spea kers a nd amplifier in his ca r.
On cr oss-examination, S erg eant B erry man said that the shell casing s found at the victim’s home wer e .380 ca liber. He said that differ ent ki nds of weapons wer e ca pable of firing .380 caliber bullets.

Dr. Te resa Al l en Campbell stated that she was a fore nsic patholog ist and perf ormed a n autopsy on th e v i ctim on J anuary 2, 2002. Dr. Campbell said that the vic tim died as a re sult of multipl e g unshot wounds. Dr. Campbell said that the abse nce of soot or g unpowder

on the victim’s clothing indicated that the shooter w as st anding more than two feet a way from the victim when the
we apo n w a s f

ir e d. On e bu lle t pe ne tr a te d th e vic tim ’s up pe r rig ht b a c k c a us ing th e ri ght lun g to hemorrha g e and c ollapse. Dr. Ca mpbell said this wound was sufficie nt to cause death, a lthough the vict im c o u ldh a v e p o s s ib ly

r e c o v e r e d f

r o m th is w o u n d if

s h e h a d r e c e iv e d im me d iate me d ical treatment. Asecond bullet e ntere d the victim’s body in the middle of her ba ck, tra veled throug h her bo dy , a ndpie rc e d h e r a

bd omi na l w a ll. Dr . Campb e ll sa id thi s wou nd wa s a lso su ff ic ie nt t o c a us e death. Dr . Campbell said that there was not a lot of bl eeding associate d with the abdominal wound be c a us e sh e be lie ve d that the vic tim ha d a lr e a dy e xpir e d f ro m th e c he st w ou nd . T wo oth e r b ull e ts
ca u s ed s u p er fi ci al wo u n d s t o t h e v i ct i m ’s b ac k an d u p p erl eg.-4-

II. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence
Def endant does not c ontend that he did not kill the victim. De fenda nt arg ues, howe ver, that the evidenc e wa s insufficient to support a f inding that the vic tim was shot during the perpe tration of a the ft or bu rg la ry . In s up po rt of his arg ume nt, De fe nd a nt re fe rs to se ve ra l inc on sis te nc ie s in his statement. F or example, Def endant sa id in his statement t hat he arrived at the victim’s house around 8:0 0 p.m. on De c e mbe r 3 1, 20 02 . T he vic tim ’s daug hte r, ho we ve r, te sti fi e d th a t sh e la st s po ke wi th her mother

around 12:45 a .m. on J anuary 1, 2002. At one point in his statement to the police, Def endant sa id that the victim was ly ing dow n on the bed in her d au gh t er ’s bedroom when De fe nd a nt e nte re d the ho us e
. At a no the r p oin t in the state me nt, De fe nd a nt r e c a lle d th a t th e vic tim “rose d [si c] up from the floor be side the bed.” Def endant a rg ues that this inconsistence “ makes no logic al sense.”

Def endant a rg ues that the fac t that he went with his friend to g et a r efund on his ca r spea kers so he could buy

the victim’s speake rs, that he pa rked in the vic tim’s drivewa ythat night, a nd that he re pe a te dly rang the do or be ll i nd ic a te s th a t he didno t g o to the vic tim ’s ho us e wi th the int e nt t o ste a l he r s pe ake rs
. Howeve r illogic al Defendant’s statement appeare d at t imes, his challeng e to the suff iciency of the evidenc e addre sses matters lef t to the jury

for r esolution. I n examining whethe r the e vidence is sufficient to support Def endant’ s conviction of first de g ree felony murder, w e must review the evidenc e in a lig ht most favor able to the prosecution in determining whether a rational trier of fa ct could have found all the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond a re asonabledoubt. J a c k s on v. Vi rg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 , 9 9 S. Ct. 27 81 , 2 78 9, 61 L . E d. 2d56 0 ( 19 79). Once a jury fi nd s a defe ndant g uilty , his or her pr esumption of innocenc e is remove d and repla ced with a presumption of g uilt. State v. Black , 815 S.W .2d 166, 175 (Tenn. 1991)

. T h e d ef en d an t has the burde n of
overc oming this presumption, and the St at e is entitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the evidenc e along with all rea sonable infe renc es which ma y be dra wn f

rom that evidenc e. Id

.; Sta te
v . Tu gg le , 639 S.W. 2d 91 3, 91 4 (T e nn . 198 2) . The jury is p re su me d to ha ve re so lve d a ll c on fl ic ts and dra wn any

rea sonable infe renc es in favor of the State. State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W .2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984) . Questions conce rning the cr edibilityof witnesses, the w eig ht and val u e t o be g iven the e vid e nc e , a nda ll f

a c tua l is su e s r a ise d b y

the e vid e nc e are re so lve d b y thetr ie r o f f a c t a ndno t th is court. State v. Bland , 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). These r ules are applicable to findings of g uilt predicate d upon direc t e vidence , circ umstantial e vidence , or a combination of both dire ct and circ umstantial evidence

. Sta te v . M att he ws , 805 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)

. First deg ree felony

murder , as relevant here , is the “killing of another c ommitt ed in the perpe tration of or attempt to perpet ra t e any . . . burg lary .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 202(a) (2). Ag g rava ted burglary is the burg lary of a ha bitation. Id. § 39-14-403( a). “ A per son commits burgla ry who, wit h o u t t h e effec tive consent of the property owner . . . enter s a building a nd commits or attempts to commit a felony , theft or a ssault.” Id

. § 39-14-402( a)( 3). “A pe rson commits theft of property if, with intent to deprive the owne r of pr operty , the person knowing ly obtains or exercises control over

the prope rty

without the owner’ s eff

ective c onsent.” Id . § 39-14-103.-5-

Def endant sa id in his st atement that he and the victim discussed his purc hasing the victim’s
car speake rs and a mplifier during the day s immediately befor e Ne w Yea

r’s Eve

. The c aller ide nti fi c a tio n b ox on the vic tim ’s te le ph on e sh ow e d th a t th e vic tim sp ok e to so meo ne f

ro m a te le ph on e nu mbe r l ist e d in De fe nd a nt’ s n a me aro un d 1 0:3 0 p .m. on De c e mbe r 3 1, 20 02 . The vic tim t o l d an o t h er c aller that the telephone c all was fr om the man who wa nted to buy her c ar ster eo equipm en t. Ms. Harris said that she last spoke with her mother at appr ox imately

12:45 a.m. on J anuary 1, 2002. Def

endant said that he enter ed the victim’s home by removing the air c onditioner from a w indow in the back of the house. De fenda nt said that he wa lked behind the victim af ter she had conf ronted him and re peate dly shot at her. He took the victim’s speake rs and amplifier from the house, plac ed the equipment in the t runk of his car , and drove to Missi ssippi. Ms. Harris identified the ca r spea kers a nd amplifier f

ound in the trunk of De fenda nt’s car as the victim’s. Viewing the evidenc e in a lig ht most fa vorable to the State, and leaving the re solution of any inconsist en ci es to the jury , we c onclude that a rational trier

or fa ct could conc lude bey ond a
rea sonable doubt that De fenda nt co m m i tted the offe nse of f irst deg ree felony

murder during the perpe tration of a bur g lary and thef t. Defe ndant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

III . M ot ion s t o Supp r e ss
Def endant a rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in denying his motions to suppress the evidenc e obtained during a sea

rch of his car and in his statement to the police. At the suppression hea

ring , Serg eant Pierc e testified that he rec eived a bulletin at
app ro xima te ly

5:1 5 p .m. on Janu ary

1, 20 02 , to beonthe loo k o ut f or a bla c k Ch e vr ole t or

F or d w ith shiny rims around the hubc aps. The dispatcher descr ibed the drive r as a

male Af rica n -A m er i can with corn row s in his hair, and he was acc ompanied by a Hispanic male and a child. The dispatche r sa id that th e su sp e c t w a s a rm e d a ndwa s w a nte d in c on ne c tio n w ith a n a rm e d r ob be ry

a t a Son ic Re staur a nt i n H orn L ake, Missis sip pi. An oth e r o ff ic e r s po tte d a

c ar anddrive r m a tc hin g thi s de sc ri pti on , a ndSe rg e a nt P ie rc e re sp on de d to the of fi c e r’ s re qu e st fo r b a c k- up . Se rg e a nt P ie rc e sa id that Def endant pulled his Chevrole t Caprice into a parking lot and went inside a B lockbuster store

. Def endant wa s the only

person in the c ar. Serg eant Pierce enter ed the store a nd asked D efe ndant to step outside. Def endant identifie d him self a ndsa id that he wa s d ri vin g the Capric e . Se rg e a nt P ie rc e patte d d ow n D e fe nd a nt b ut d id not fi n d a we ap o n
. He sa id that Serg eant Crowson a rrived and walked ove r to Def endant’ s car
. Serg eant Crowson told Serg eant Pierc e that ther e w as a gun in the c ar. Ser g eant Pierc e ar rested De fe nd a nt andha nd c uf

fe d h im. He didno t r e a d D e fe nd a nt h is Miranda rig hts and did not question him further. Serg eant Crowson said that he used a flashlig ht when he looke d inside Defe ndant’s ca r. He
sa w a sma ll c a lib e r, se miauto ma tic pis tol in the fl oo rb oa rd , lying pa

rt ia lly be ne a th the drive r’ s se a t. He a lso saw cups a nd paper bag s with the S onic l abel. Serg eant Crowson sa id that he and Ser g eant Pierce did not question Def endant because the armed robbery was not t heir c ase. Ser g eant Crowson-6-

identified the g un in Defe ndant’s c ar as a .380 caliber pistol. Serg eant Crowson sa id he did not
sear ch the interior of De fenda nt’s car

. Offic er Mc Ke n z i e b roug ht the victims of the arme d robbery to the parking lot where De fe nd a nt w a s d e ta ine d. Th e vic tim s id e nti fi e d D e fe nd a nt as the ir a ssaila nt. Of

fi c e r M c Ke nzie
arr e ste d D e fe nd a nt andre a d h im h is Miranda rig hts. Offic er Mc Kenzie said De fenda nt told her he did not know what an attorney was. Of fice r McKe nzie ex plained that an at t o rn eywould be the pe rs on wh o w ou ld h e lp h im i n his de fe ns e . D e fe nd a nt s a id h e un de rs too d, a ndOf fi c e r M c Ke nzie
re a d D e fe nd a nt h is Miranda rig hts ag ain. Afte r De fenda nt was ar rested, his accompli ce, Robe rt Sno w, wa s d e ta ine d a s h e c a me ou t of a ne arb y K- Ma rt

. Offic er Mc Kenzie sea

rche d Def endant’ s car and saw pa

per ba g s with the Sonic logo a nd a black a nd silver g un that was partially beneath the driver’ s seat. Of fice r McKe nzie also opened the
car ’s t runk because one of the vi ctims said that just before she was robbe d, Mr. Snow was lea ning into the trunk “messing with someth i n g i n t h e trunk” while Def endant stood nea

rby . Offic er McKe nzie saw a box of car speake rs in the trunk.

Def endant ga ve a written st atement at approximately 7:53 p.m. admitting his involvement in the arm e d r ob be ry

in H orn L ake , M iss iss ipp i.

Offic er Mc Kenzie said that a detec tive from the Memphis Police Depa rtment ca lled her the
n e x tm o r n i n g a n d a s k e d w h e t h e r t h e H o r n L ak e P o l i c e D e p ar t m e n th a d D e f e n d a n t i n c u s t o d y. Offic er Mc Kenzie conf

irmed De fenda nt’s incar cer ation. I n response to the office r’s que stions, she described the pistol and speake rs that wer e found in D efe ndant’s car
. After the Memphis detec tives
arrived, Off

icer McKe nzie prepa

red a sear ch warra nt for Defe ndant’s car. The war rant wa s signe d by a municipal city

judge who happe ned to be at the police station.

Detec tive Scott Evans with the Ho rn L ake Poli ce D epartment testified that he sat in as a n observe r d u r in g D e f

e n d a n t’ s in te r v ie w b y

th e M e mp h is p o li c e o f

f ic e r s
. O f f ic e r E v a n s s a idhe
reme mbere d that Def

endant wa s rea d his rights a nd that he sig ned a w ritten waiver

. Offic er Evans did not remember

whether or not Def

endant re q u es t ed the pre sence of an attorney . He de scribed Def endant a s calm, quiet and “laid back.” Detec tive Evans believed Defenda nt’s interview be g an around 3:00 p.m. on January 2, 2002. Serg eant B erry man said that he spoke w ith Detective E vans and O ffice r McKe nzie when he
arrived in Horn L ake, Mississippi, on J anuary 2, 2002. Offic er Mc Kenzie conf irmed that the pistol found in Def

endant’ s car

was a .380 caliber

handg un. Serg eant B erry man also had a descriptio n o f t he spea kers whic h wer e the only thing ide nti fi e d a s mi ssi ng fr om the vic tim ’s home . Se rg e a nt B e rry ma n in te rv ie we d M r. Sno w a ndhis g irlfriend, D ece mber P owell, before he interviewe d Def endant. Both said that De fenda nt arrive d at Mr. Snow’s house in the early morning hours of J anuary 1, 2002, with some car speake rs in his trunk and aske d Mr. Snow to install them. Their description of the speake rs matche d the desc ription of-7-

the victim’s speake rs. Mr. Snow sa id D efe ndant paid him $50.00 to install t he spea kers in his ca

r. Serg eant B erry man said he obta ined a se arc h war rant for Def endant’ s car afte r he interviewed Mr

. Snow and Ms. Powe ll a nd found speake rs matching the description of the victim’s speake rs in the trunk of the c ar. Serg eant B erry m an and S erg eant Gosse tt beg an questioning Def endant a bout the victim’s
mur de r a ro un d 5 :00 p. m. S e rg e a nt G os se tt r e a d D e fe nd a nt h is Mi r a nda rig hts, and Def

endant sig ned
a written waiver . Serg eant Be rryman said De fenda nt ga ve two or thre e ver sions as to how he
a c qu ir e d th e sp e ake rs . Se rg e a nt B e rry ma n s a id D e fe nd a nt s top pe d ta lki ng a nd ask ed if h e c ou ld speak w ith Ser g eant Be rryman alone. Serg eant Gosse tt left the room. Def endant then de scribed the sequenc e of e vents leading up to the shooting of the vi ctim. Serg eant Gosse tt rejoined the intervie w, a ndDe fe nd a nt w a s a g a in r e a d h is Miranda rig h t s. Serg eant Gosse tt beg an ty ping D efe ndant’s statement at 6:30 p.m. Def endant r ead over the statement, made a few corr ections, and sig ned the statement at 9:40 p.m. Serg eant Be rryman said that Def endant’ s demea nor during the interview was

“ c a lm, qu ie t sp ok e n, ” a lth ou g h h e c ri e d at on e po int

. On cr oss-examination, S erg eant B erry man said that no one thre atene d Def endant. Ser g eant Be rryman said t hat Def

endant did not ask to spea

k to a lawy er or

his mother during the interrog ation.

Se rg e a nt G os se tt c on fi rm e d th a t D e fe nd a nt w a s r e a d h is Miranda rig hts before the interview beg an at 5:00 p.m. and a g ain bef ore Ser g eant Gossett beg an ty ping D efe ndant’s stateme nt at 6:30 p. m. S e rg e a nt G os se tt s a id that D e fe nd a nt a sk e d to sp e ak to Se rg e a nt B e rry ma n a lon e be c a us e Def endant ha d built up a rapport with him. On cross-e x amination, Serg eant Gosse tt said that neither he nor Ser g eant B erry man made any promises to Defe ndant i n exchang e for him giving the state me nt.
A. Se arc h o f the Ve hic le

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d th a t th e Sou thh a ve n po li ce offic e rs ha d p ro ba ble c a us e to d e ta in Def endant based on the i nformation dis patche d by the Horn L ake Poli ce D epartment conce rning the
a rm e d rob b e r y

a tt h e S o n i c D r i v e
- I n
. T h e tr i a l c o u r tf o u n d t h a tt h e g u n w a s i n p l a i n v i e w in Def endant’ s car . Following the victims’ identification of De fenda nt as the per petrator of the a

rmed
ro bb e ry , the tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d th a t O ff

ic e r M c Ke nzie ha d p ro ba ble c a us e to a

rr e st D e fe nd a nt andto
sear ch his car prior to its impoundm ent. The tria l court noted that De fenda nt did not challeng e the validity of the sea

rch w arr ant subsequently

issued for De fenda nt’s car , and that the speake rs in the
c ar’ s tr un k w e re pr op e rl y

dis c ov e re d d uring the e xec uti on of the wa rr a nt. The finding s of fa ct made by the trial court at the hearing on a motion to suppress a re binding upon this court unless the evidenc e conta ined in the re co rd p re p o n d erates ag ainst them. State v. Ro ss , 4 9 S. W. 3 d 8 3 3 , 8 3 9 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 1 )

. T h e tria l c o u r t, a s th e trie r o f f a c t, is ab le to a s s e s s the
cre dibilit y

of the witnesse s, determine the weig ht and value to be afforde d the evidence and resolve any conflicts in the evide nce. State v. Odom , 9 28 S.W. 2d18 , 2 3 (T e nn
. 19 96 ). Th e pr e va ili ng pa rt y is entitled to the stronge st leg itimate view of the e vidence and all rea sonable infe renc es dra wn from-8-

that evidenc e. State v. Hick s , 55 S.W .3d 515, 521 (Tenn. 2001)

. Howeve r, t his court is not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law. State v. Simpson , 968 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. 1998) . The application of the law to the fa cts found by the t rial court are questions of law that this court re views de novo

. State v. Daniel , 1 2 S. W. 3 d 4 2 0 , 4 2 3 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 0 )

. T h e d e f e n d a n t h a s th e b urden of establishing that the evidenc e contained in the rec ord preponde rate s ag ainst the finding s of fa ct made by the trial court. Br

az ie l v . S tat e , 529 S.W .2d 501, 506 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975)

. Def endant a rg ues that the wa

rra ntless searc h of his vehicle by the Mississi ppi police offic ers did not fall within any

of the limited exceptions to the warrant require ment, and that the e vidence discovere d by

Offic ers Crowson a nd McKe nzie should be suppressed.

“Unde r bot h the Unit ed States and Te nnessee Constit utions, a sear ch or se izure conducte d without a war

rant is pr esumed unrea sonable.” Sta te v . S mi th , 21 S.W .3d 251, 254 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (c itations omi tted). “The ref ore, e vidence seized as a r esult of a se arc h or seizure c onducted without a war

rant must be suppre ssed unless that sear ch or seizure was conducte d pursuant to one of the re cog nized ex ceptions to the wa rra nt require ment.” Id

. (c i t i n g Coo lid ge v . Ne w H

am ps hire , 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L . Ed. 2d 564 (1971))

. On e of the se e xce pti on s is the plain v ie w e xce pti on wh ic h ap pli e s w he n a se ize d it e m is in “plain view” from a lawf u l v an t age point of the office r who c onducts the sea rch. See H

arris v. United States , 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S. C t. 9 9 2 , 9 9 3 , 1 9 L

. Ed. 2d 1067 (1968). The plain view exception require s proof that the of fice r “did not v i o late the F ourth Amendment in ar riving at the place from which the evidenc e could be plainly viewed,” that the evidenc e wa s in plain view, and that the i ncriminating nature of the e vidence was immediately appar ent. Ho rto n v . Ca lif or nia , 496 U.S. 128, 136, 110 S. C t. 2301, 2308, 110 L . Ed. 2d 112 (1990).

Offic er Crow son had information that the sus p e c t m atc h ing Def endant’ s phy sical desc ription
a nddrivi ng a

sim ila r c ar w a s a

rm e d. Of fi c e r Cro ws on te sti fi e d tha t D e fe nd a nt’ s c ar w a s p ark e d in a publi c park in g lo t, a n d th a t D e f e n d a n t’ s g u n , w h il e p ar ti a ll y b e n e a thth e d r iv e r ’ s s e a t of Def endant’ s car , was visi ble from Offic er Crowson’s vantag e point from the driver’s side w indow. Of fi c e r M c Ke nzie , a lso arm e d wi th inf orma tio n fr om the vic tim s that a g un ha d be e n us e d to c omm it the robbe ry , testified that Def endant’ s g un was partially visible f rom the window. As r ecog nized by the Supreme Court in Pa

y ton v . Ne w York , 4 4 5 U

. S

. 5 7 3 , 5 8 6

- 8 7 , 1 0 0 S

. C t

. 1 3 7 1 , 1 3 8 0

- 8 1 , 6 3 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1980), “objects such as wea pons or contra

band found in a

public place may

be seized by the police without a wa

rra nt. The seizure of pr operty in plain view involves n o i n v as ion of privac y and i s p resumpti vely

rea sonable, a ssuming that ther e is probable cause to associate the property with criminal ac tivity .” B ased on our revie w, the seizure of

the g un in Defe ndant’s ca r by the Mis sis sip pi p oli c e of

fi c e rs wa s pr op e r un de r the plain vie w e xce pti on to the wa rr a nt r e qu ir e me nt. Moreove r, bec ause a

g un was discove red in plain view in Defe ndant’s ca r, the police office rs had probable cause to se arc h Def endant’ s entire vehicle, including the trunk. Un ite d S tat e s v . R os s , 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. C t. 2157, 2173, 72 L

. Ed. 2d 572 (1982). Def endant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.-9- B. Suppre ssion of Defe ndant’s Statement

Def endant a rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in not suppressing his statement to Serg eant Be rryman bec ause the statement wa s the result of phy sical or psy cholog ical coe rcion. Se e Ro ge rs v. Richm ond , 3 65 U. S. 5 34 , 5 40 -5 41 , 8 1 S. Ct. 73 5, 74 0, 5 L

. Ed . 2d 7 60 (1 96 1) . D e fe nd a nt a lso
c on te nd s th a t th e te sti mon y pr e se nte d at th e su ppre ssi on he ari ng le ft un re so lve d “ le g iti ma te qu e sti on s” a s to wh e the r D e fe nd a nt u nd e rs too d h is Miranda rig hts or whet h er h e re q uested the assistance of an attorney

during the interrog ation. The trial c ourt found that both the Memphis and Mis sis sip pi p oli c e de pa

rt me nts pr op e rl y

a dv ise d D e fe nd a nt o f h is Miranda rig hts on sever al
occa sions, that Defe ndant said he understood those rig hts, a nd that he fr eely and voluntarily

waived tho se ri g hts

. “[I ]n order for

a conf ession to be admissible, it must be ‘fr ee and voluntary ; that is, must not be e xtra c te d b y

a ny so rt of thr e a ts o r v iol e nce, no r ob tain e d b y a ny dir e c t or imp lie d p ro mis e s, howeve r slight, nor

by the exertion of any

improper influe nce . . . .’ ” State v. Smi th , 933 S.W .2d 4 5 0 , 4 5 5 (T en n
. 1 9 9 6 ), (q u o t i n g Bram v. United States , 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S. Ct. 183, 187, 42 L . Ed. 2d 568 (1897))

. The totality of the c ircumstance s surrounding the g iving of the statement must be ex amined. Se e Sta te v . B us h , 942 S.W .2d 489, 500 (Tenn. 1997) . “A de fenda nt’s subjective perc eption alone is not suf f ic ie n t to just ify

a conc lusion of involuntariness in the constitutional sense. Rather c oerc ive pol ice activity is a necessary predic ate to finding that a conf ession is not volunt ary .” Sm ith , 933 S.W .2d at 455 (c itations omi tted).

De fe nd a nt d oe s not poi nt to an y e xamp le s o f w hat he pe rc e ive s to be c oe rc ive po lic e a c tiv ity during his interrogat ion. Serg eant B erry man and Ser g eant Gosse tt testified that no promises or t h r e a t s w e r e m a d e d u r i n g t h e i n t e r v i e w , a n d D e f e n d a n t d i d n o t r e q u e s tt h e a s s i s t a n c e o f a n a t t o r n e y. Th e of fi c e rs sa id that D e fe nd a nt w a s c a lm d uring the int e rv ie w. De fe nd a nt w a s r e a d h is Miranda rig hts before the ora l interview a nd befor e Serg eant Gosse tt be g an typing his state ment. Def endant made c orre ctions to the statement and sig ned it

. Ba sed on our review of the record, we conc lude that the evidenc e does not pre ponderate ag ainst the trial court’s finding that Def endant’ s statement was voluntarily

g iven to police. IV. Speedy Trial Iss ues Rely ing on B a r

k e r v
. W ingo , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. C t. 2182, 33 L . Ed. 2d 101 (1972), De fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in no t di smi ssi ng the c harges a g a ins t hi m be c a us e his Sixth Am e nd me nt ri g ht to a sp e e dy tr ia l w a s v iol a te d. De fe nd a nt w a s in dic te d b y the She lby

Cou nty Gra nd J ury

on J une 24, 2003, for the victim’s mur der. Def endant was extradited to T ennesse e fr om Mississ ippi where he was in custody for c harg es arising out of the a rmed robbe ry

in Horn L ake. Def endant was arr aig ned on the Tennessee charg es on September 24, 2003, and his trial commenc ed April 26, 2004.

Def endant contends that his right to a spee dy trial was trig g ere d when the Me mphis poli ce office rs interview ed him in Missi ssippi on J anuary 2, 2002, althoug h he wa s not charg ed with the-10-

Tenne ssee of

fense s until hi s indictment in J une 20 0 3

. De fenda nt arg ues that the de lay of approximately

twenty -seve n months between the g iving of a stateme nt to the Mem p h i s police of fi c e rs , a ndhis tr ia l on the c ha rg e s, wa s “ pres um pt iv ely pr e jud ic ia l” a ndhin de re d h is a bil ity to prese nt a def

ense.
Th e Sta te arg ue s th a t th e date of the ind ic tme nt, no t his ini tia l int e rv ie w wi th the Me mph is police office rs, trig g ere d Def endant’ s rig ht to a speedy

trial. Def endant wa s ext radited a nd arr aig ned in Shelby Countyon the curr ent char g es in Septe mber 2003, and Def endant a sserted his rig ht to a speedy t ri al b ya pro se mot ion fi le d in Se pte mbe r 2 00 3, a nda mot ion to d ism iss fi le d b y his
ap p o i n t e d c o u n s e l i n D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 3

. D e f e n d a n t ’ s tr i a l c o m m e n c e d A p r i l 2 6 , 2 0 0 4

. Th e Sta te arg ues, there fore , that the appr ox imately ten months de lay betwee n the date of the indictment and De fe nd a nt’ s tria l w a s n ot p re su mpt ive ly pr e jud ic ia l.

At the hearing on Def

endant’ s motion to dismiss , the prosec utor said that the d i s trict attorney ’s offic e re ceive d Def endant’ s file i n J anuary

2002. I nitially , no action wa s taken pe nding
rec eipt of test re sults from the T.B.I . The State a cknowledg ed, howe ver, that the bulk of the dela y was c aused by

oversig ht or inadvertence . The prose cutor stated that as soon as he discovere d that Def endant’ s file had not bee n acte d upon, he submitt ed the case to the g rand jury on J une 24, 2003.

The trial c ourt found that althoug h part of the cause of the de lay rested w ith t h e dis trict attorney ’s offic e, ther e wa s n o i n d i ca t ion that Defe ndant had be en pre judiced. De fenda nt was i n carce rate d in Missi ssippi unti l he was a rra igne d on the cur

rent c harg es in Tenne ssee. The testimonyof Mr. Snow and Ms. Powe ll wa s prese rved in statements, and the tria l court found that D e f e n d a n td i d n o ts h o w t h a th e w a s i n a n y o t h e r w a y p r e j u d i c e d b y t h e d e l a y.
The Six th Amendment to the United States Constitut ion, as we l l as t he Te nnessee Con sti tut ion , g ua

rante e s th os e a c c us e d in a c ri min al pr os e c uti on the ri g ht t o a sp e e dy tr ia l. U .S. Con st. a me nd . V I ; T e nn . Co ns t. A rt . I , § 9; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-14-101 (“I n all criminal prosec utions, the acc used is e ntitled to a speedy trial

. . . .”). “The speedy trial g uara ntee is desig ned to p ro te c t th e a ccus ed fr om o pp re ssi ve pr e -t ri a l in c arc e ratio n, the a nxie ty a ndc on c e rn du e to unresolved c riminal char g es, and the risk that the accused’ s defe nse wil l be im paire d by dimming memories or lost evidenc e.” State v. Simmons , 5 4 S

. W

. 3 d 7 5 5 , 7 5 8 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Do gg e tt v. United States , 505 U. S. 647 , 654 , 112 S. Ct. 268 6, 26 92 , 1 20 L . E d. 2d52 0 ( 19 92 ); State v. Utley , 956 S.W .2d 489, 492 (Tenn. 1997) ).

“Ge nera lly , post-acc usation delay must a pproac h one y ear

to trigg er a

speedy trial inquiry .” Simmons , 5 4 S

. W

. 3 d at 7 5 9 (c i t i n g Do gg e tt , 5 05 U. S. at 65 2 n .1 , 1 12 S. Ct. a t 26 91 n. 1; Utley , 956 S.W .2d at 494). The leng th of delay that will trigg er a s p ee d y trial ana ly sis depends upon the peculiar circ umstances of

the ca se, and the “re asonable ness of the de lay depends upon the complexit y

and natur e of the case .” Barker , 4 07 U. S. a t 53 0- 53 1, 92 S. Ct . at 21 92 ; Simmons , 54 S.W .3d at 759. I f this threshold is crossed, Barker ou tli ne d a

fo ur -f a c tor ba la nc ing te st f

or c ou rt s to apply in evaluating the merits of a speedy trial claim base d on (1) the leng th of the delay ; (2) the
rea son of the delay ; (3) the defe ndant’s assertion of the rig ht to a speedy trial; and (4) the pre

judice-11-

suffe red by

the defe ndant. Barker , 4 07 U. S. at 53 0, 92 S. Ct . at 21 92 ; State v. Bishop , 493 S.W .2d 81, 83-85 (Te nn. 1973).

When an acc used seeks the dismiss al of char g es based upon the deni al o f a co nstitut ional rig ht to a speedy trial, he or she m ust establish a period of delay that is “presumptively prejudicia l.” Simmons , 5 4 S. W.3 d at 75 9. Ou r i nit ia l in qu iry , th e n, is w hich S tat e act io n inthe ins ta nt c a se trig g ere d a spee dy

trial ana ly sis for the purpose o f determining whe ther or not the de lay was “pre sumptivelyprejudicia l.” Both the provisions of the United States Constit ution and the Tenne ssee c onstitut ion “apply , by their own terms, to per sons ‘ac cused’ in a ‘c riminal prosec ution.’” State v. W ood , 924 S.W .2d 342, 345 (Tenn. 1996). “Clear ly , to be an ‘ac cused’ one mus t be fa ced with a ‘formal acc usation’” suc h as a formal indictment, information or arre st. Id ; see also United State v. Marion , 4 04 U. S. 307 , 313 , 92 S. Ct. 45 5, 45 9- 60 , 30 L . E d. 2d46 8 ( 19 71 ); State v. Baker , 614 S.W .2d 352, 353 (Tenn. 1981)

. I n Utley , a n ar

re st wa rr a nt wa s is su e d f

or the de fe nd a nt i n 1 98 7, bu t he wa s n ot s e rv e d w ith the warrant until J une 1992. Utley , 956 S.W .2d at 491. An indictment was re turned in September 1992, and in Dec ember

1992, the def

endant moved for the dismiss al of the charg es aga inst him on a spee dy trial claim. Id . T he de fe nd a nt’ s mo ti on was g rante d in F e br ua ry 19 93 , a ndthe Sta te appea led. Id . I n Utley , the Court conclude d that an ar re s t “w arr ant alone doe s not trigg er spe edy tr i al an al y s is; to t he contr ary , a formal g rand jury action or the actua l restra ints of an ar rest ar e require d.” Id. The Court c oncluded that a delay of eig ht months in bringing Def endant to trial a fter h e w a s in d ic te d in 1 9 9 2 w a s n o t p r e s u mp ti v e ly p r e ju d icial under Barker

without addressing the
rema ining f

actor s. Id.

I n t h e c as e sub judice , the trig g ering event f or spee dy trial purposes unde r Utley w as Def endant’ s indictment for the c urre nt char g es in J une 2003, not hi s initi al interview with the Memphis police on J anuary 2, 2002. After his indictment, Defendant was ar raig ned in September 2003, and his tria l commence d April 26, 2004, approximately ten months after

he wa s indicted. The leng th of the dela y

in the instance c ase wa s n o t presumptively prejudicia l under Barker v . W ingo

. Ba sed upon our r eview of the re cord, w e conclude that Def endant’ s rig ht to a speedy trial was not violated.

We no te tha

t De fe nd a nt fo c us e d h is s pe e dy tr ia l arg ume nt at th e mot ion he ari ng a ndin h is brie f p ri ma

ri ly on the de la y

wh ic h o c c ur

re d be tw e e n the c omm iss ion of the c ri me a ndhis ind ic tme nt. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d th a t th e de la y

be tw e e n the c omm iss ion of the c ri me a ndDe fe nd a nt’ s tria l di d not violate Defenda nt’s Six th Amendment rights under the g uidelines of Barker v . W ingo

. Al t h o u gh a delay betwee n the commission of a crime and the commenceme nt of adversarial proce eding s does not violate an acc used’s right to a speedy trial, it may raise due proce ss conce rns. State v. Carico , 9 6 8 S

. W

. 2 d 2 8 0 , 2 8 4 (T en n
. 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g State v. Gray , 917 S.W .2d 668, 671 (Tenn. 1996) ).

Wh e r e t h e S t a t e h a s k n o w l e d g e t h a t a c r i m e h a s b e e n c o m m i t t e d , a n d t h e r e i s a d e la yin bring ing c harg es, the a ccuse d must show that “‘(a ) there was a delay , (b) the a ccuse d sustained ac tual pr e jud ic e a s a

dir e c t a ndpr oximate re su lt of the de la y , an d (c ) the Sta te c a us e d the de la y in or de r t o-12-

g ain tactica l advantag e over or to hara ss the acc used’” in order to g et re lief base d on a pre -ac cusation delay

. Gray , 9 1 7 S

. W

. 2 d at 6 7 1 (q u o t i n g State v. Dy kes , 803 S.W .2d 250, 255 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)). Clearly , the S tate was awa re that a crime had been commi tted in the instant case. D efe ndant g ave a statement implicating himself in the commission of the crime on J anuary 2, 2002. He wa s not indicted, howeve r, until June 2003, a delay of eig hteen months. During that time, Defe ndant was incar cer ated in Mississ ippi on an unre lated armed robbe ry conviction. The State a cknowledg ed that its failure to bring the ca se to the Shelby CountyGra nd J ury

befor e June 200 3 wa s a matter of
ov e rs ig ht, a nd De fe nd a nt ha s of fe re d no e vid e nc e oth e rw ise that th e Sta te c a us e d th e de la y to g a in a tac tical adva ntag e. De fenda nt also did not contend that he wa s denied the be nefit of witnesse s who became unavailable or that evide nce w as lost during the delay . Thus, absent a ny evidenc e that the Sta te ’s pr e -a c c us a tio n d e la y wa s in te nti on a l, o r that De fe nd a nt su ff e re d a c tua l pr e

jud ic e a s a

re su lt of the de la y , a ny

failu re on the pa

rt of the tr ia l c ou rt

to a dd re ss D e fe nd a nt’ s p re -a c c us a tio n d e la y in te rm s o f a du e pr oc e ss c la im r a the r tha n a sp e e dy tr ia l c la im d oe s n ot rise to the le ve l of re ve rs ibl e err or.
V. P rior Bad Acts

Def endant a rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in allowi n g Officer Mc Kenzie and Ser g eant Be rryman to mention during their testimony Def endant’ s arr est in Missis sippi on an unrelate d char g e. De fenda nt contends that this testimony was unfairly prejudicia l and place d befor e the jury evidenc e of D efe ndant’s other crimes in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Evidence

. Prior to the impanelment of the jury , and out of the pr esenc e of the jury , the State initiated
a dis c us sio n in ope n co urt con c e rn ing the pr ob le ms a sso c ia te d w ith De fe nd a nt’ s in iti a l de te nti on in Mis sis sip pi w hic h u lti ma te ly le d to the dis c ov e ry

of the vic tim ’s c ar s pe ake rs : [S TATE]: There is one m at t er that’s g oing to c ome up, Your Ho no r. We n e e d to a dd re ss i t. B e c a us e of a n a rr e st i n Mississ ippi . . . it i s cog ent and ve ry rele vant in the
case relative to the issue of g uilt, possession of stol en property . We’re g oing to have to put office rs on from two ag encie s in Missi ssippi, both t he Ho rn L ake Po lice De partment a nd the Southhaven Police De pa rt me nt. I

ha ve ta lke d to the se of fi c e rs thi s morning. As the Court knows, they talked or the y testified in the motion to suppress. I have told them and tol d th e m an d to ldth e m th a t I ’ m g o in g to lead them, and they

are to use words like . . . “ detain,” not “ar rest” be cause of the proble m of the ot her case. . . . And I think we can ski rt around that, but I think when-13- it c ome s ti me to p ut that on , th a t it mig ht be he lpf

ul i f the Court reminded a ll three of the m . . . [TH E CO UR T]: Al l r ig ht.

De fe nd a nt d id n ot o bje c t to the re le va nc y of the te sti mon y

c on c e rn ing his de te ntion in Mis sis sip pi on Janu ary 1, 20 02

. De fe nd a nt a rg ue s, ho we ve r, that th e Sta te ’s qu e sti on ing du ri ng its
case -in-chie f improper ly

elicited information from the witnesses be y ond a me re re fe re nce to a detention.

On cr oss-examination, defense counsel as ked Of fice r McKe nzie if she took Defe ndant’s statement whe n she t ransported hi m to the police station, and Of fice r McKe nzie responded, “ y es.” On re direc t examination, t he prose cutor a sked:
[PROS ECU TO R]: Th e state me nt that y ou too k f ro m hi m a t th a t ti me did
no t r e la te to any

c ri me in M e mph is?
[OFFI CER MC KENZ I E]: No, sir.
[P ROSECUTOR] : All rig ht. I t was about a nother unre lated matter ?
[OF F I CERMCKEN Z I E]: Cor re c t.

Du ri ng his dir e c t e xami natio n, Se rg e a nt B e rry ma n e xplai nedthat th e re a so n th e Me mph is Pol ic e De pa

rt me nt c ou ld n ot i nit ia lly fi ndDe fe nd a nt “ wa s b e c a us e he wa s in c arceratedin Mississ ippi, had g ot loc ked up that night.” Serg eant B erry man said that De fenda nt’s interview took place in the “DeSoto County Sheriff’ s Offic e which is the j ail” because Def endant ha d been move d fr om H orn L ake to H e rn a nd o, Mis sis sip pi.

De fe n d an t ’s s t at em en twa s re ad t o t h e j u ry
. I ti n cl u d ed t h e f o l l o wi n g: [S ERGEANT B ERRYMAN]: Were y ou arr ested in Southhaven, Mississ ippi on J anuary

the 1 , 2002 at approximately 6:00 st p.m.?
[DE F EN DA NT ]: Ye a h, a t B loc kb us te r b y Wal -M art

. At the close of

his direc t examination, S erg eant B erry man said that he did not take Def endant into custody

at that time but “left him in Hernando.” At this point , defe nse counse l reque sted a be nch conf ere nce.-14-

[DE F EN SE CO UN SEL ]: Yo ur Ho no r, I wa s loo kin g fo r a br e akin g po int , bu t it
n ever rea lly

came . I want to object. Seve ral times questions wer e asked that wer e not nece ssary , like the la st o ne , th e mo st re c e nt o ne , “ Di d y ou le a ve him there i n He rn a nd o o r d id y ou bring him ba c k w ith y ou ? ” Ithi nk

that c re a te s a n impr op e r i nf e re nc e in fr on t of the jury
. An oth e r qu e sti on wa s a sk e d e arl y in the conve rsation, and ag ain, I didn’t want to stand up in the mid dle a nd bring it the jury ’s a tte nti on , but – so he was being detained – he’d a lrea dy been tr ansfe rre d from [DeSoto] Countyto Herna ndo or fr om Herna ndo to [D e Sot o]. And tho se are a g a in i rr e le va nt andjus t questions —
[THE COURT] : (I ndiscernible.)
[DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: Okay

. But Ij u s t wa n t t o s t at e t h at for the rec ord. Ag ain, I think had I

jumped up an d raised the objection at the time, that it would have, y ou know —
[T H E CO U RT ]: Well, I th in k it ’ s o b v io u s f r o m th e te s ti mo n y th a t he
wa s b e ing de ta ine d b y

th e Missis sip pi a

uth oriti e s. Now, I can g ive them a curative instruction, i f t h at’s what y ou want me to do –
[DE F EN SE C OU NSE L ]: I t’ s just that y ou do n’ t have to do it now

. . . . I g ue ss with the ot her instructions if y ou don’t mind. Ag ain, my fea r is that if y ou g ive it now, it’s calling too much attention to it so t o speak.

Def ense c ounsel subsequently approve d the t rial court’s proposed inst ruction t o the jury as fo llo ws :
Me mbe rs of the jury , the re ha s be e n me nti on of a n inc ide nt inv olv ing [ Defen dan t] in the S t at e of Missi ssippi. W hether or not [Defenda nt] had any problems in the State of Mississippi [i s] not for y our consider ation and that should not have any bearing on y our ver dict in this case.

I nitially , we a ddress the State’ s contention that Def endant arg ues for the first time on appe al that the admission of ce rtain portions of Of fice r McKe nzie’s and Sergean t Berryman’s testimony
conce rning his “dete ntion” violated R ule 404(b)’s proscription ag ainst propensity evidenc e of othe r crimes. See Te nn . R. Evid . 404 (b ) (“ Ev ide nc e of oth e r crime s, wr on g s, or a c ts i s n ot a dmi ssi ble to prove the char acte r of a

person in orde r to show ac tion in conformity with the char acte r trait.”)-15-

Although e videnc e co n cerning Def endant’ s arr est for a

rmed robbe ry

in Missi ssippi constitutes evidence of “othe r crimes” as c ontemplated by Rule 404(b) , De fe n dant’s objec tion at tr ia l and in his mot ion fo r n e w t ri a l w a s b a se d o n th e pr e

jud ic ia l natur e of

the te sti mon y , n ot R ule 404(b). Be cause Def

endant did not reque st a hearing under Rule 404(b)(1), the trial court did not

“ de te rm ine [wh e the r] a

ma te ri a l is su e e xist[e d] othe r tha n c on du c t c on fo rm ing wi th a c ha ra c te r t rait” that would have supported admission of the evidence, and, if so, whether the probative value of the evidenc e was outweig hed by the “da ng er of

unfair pr ejudice.” See Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b)( 2) and (3)

. Our Supreme Court has recently observe d that a re viewing court will not consider w hether evidenc e is inadmissi ble under

Rule 404(b) whe re the defe ndant di d not reque st a R ule 404(b) hearing at trial or in the motions before the trial cour t. State v. Jone s , 151 S.W. 3d 49 4, 49 8 n.3 (T e nn . 2 00 4) . T his Court has also pre viouslyconclude d that a “de fenda nt may not base his objection t o the admission of evide nce on r eleva nce at trial and then ba se his a rg ument on another g round, such a s violation of Rule 404(b), Te nn. R. Evid., on appeal.” State v. Korsakov , 34 S.W .3d 534, 545 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g State v. Miller , 6 68 S.W. 2d28 1, 28 5 ( Te nn . 198 4) ). Th us , D e fe nd a nt h a s w a ive d h is arg ument on this basis. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a)

. Th e Sta te arg ue s th a t defen se c ou ns e l’ s q ue sti on du ri ng Of fi c e r M c Ke nzie ’s c ro ssexamination as to w hether she had taken Def endant’ s statement was a

classic e x ample of “ opening the door.” Rely ing on State v. Robinson , 146 S.W .3d 469 (Tenn. 2004), the S tate contends that the prosec utor properly

cla ri fied Of

fice r McKe nzie’s testimonyduring redire ct examination that the statement was taken in c onnection with an unrelated matter. Def endant’ s counsel explained in the brief that he aske d the question bec ause he d i d n o t b el ieve that Of fice r McKe nzie had taken Def endant’ s statement, and t h at h e subseque ntly did not object to the prosec utor’s follow-up question because he did not want “to draw any further attention to the matter.” Gene rally , “‘[w]here
a de fe nd a nt ha s inj e c te d a n iss ue int o the c a se , the Sta te ma y be a llo we d to a dm it ot herw ise inadmissable evidenc e i n o rd er to ex plain or counte rac t a neg ative infe renc e ra ised by the issue defe ndant injects.’” State v. Land , 34 S.W .3d 516, 531 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (c itations omi tted). The doc trine’s ap p l i ca t ion, however , is “limit ed by ‘the ne cessity

of re moving pr ejudice in the interest of f

airne ss.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Crawf ord v. United States , 198 F. 2d 976, 979 ( D.C. Cir. 1952)).

The State re lied in larg e part on Defe ndant’s state ment to Serg eant B erry man to support Def endant’ s convictions. Offic er Mc Kenzie’s testimony left the jury

with the impression, without fu rthe r c lari fi c a tio n, that De fe nd a nt a c tua lly ma de tw o state me nts , a nd it w a s u nc le ar w he the r this second state ment, which wa s not introduced into evidenc e, wa s made in conne ction with the murder in Tennesse e. Ba sed on our review, we conclude that the S tate’s c larification of Offic er Mc Kenzie’s te sti mon y du ri ng c ro ss- e xami natio n w a s pr op e r. Mo re ov e r, a de fe nd a nt “ ‘w ill no t be pe rm itt e d to tak e a d v a n t a g e o f e rr o r s w h i c h h e h i m s e l f c o m m i t t e d , o r i n v i t e d , o r i n d u c e d t h e tr i a l c o u r t to commit, or which were the natural c onsequenc e of his own ne g lect or misconduc t.’” Robinson , 146 S.W .3d at 493 (c itations omi tted). De fenda nt is not entit led to relief on this iss ue.
As noted above , Def

endant did not object on r eleva ncy g rounds to the State’s witnesses ref erring to D efe ndant’s “dete ntion” in Mississippi. See State v . Thompson , 36 S.W .3d 102, 108 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (F ailure to make a conte mporane ous objection to tes t i m o ny waives-16-

appellate consideration of the issue). Def endant arg ues, howeve r, that Serg eant B erry man’s more specific ref

ere nces to his a

rre st w ere unfairly prejudicia l. T he State ar g ues that any unfair pr ejudice arising out of these r efe renc es wa s dispelled by the trial cou rt ’s cu ra tive instruction, which was reque sted and a

pproved by

defe nse counse l.

At the conc lusion of Serg eant B erry man’s dire ct examination, Defe ndant re quested a he a ring
ou t of the pr e se nc e of

the jury and vo ice d his o bje c tio ns to S e rg e a nt B e rry ma n’ s r e fe re nc e s to Def endant’ s arr est in Missis sippi. At De fenda nt’s reque st, the trial court ag ree d to g ive a cur ative instruction. Defe ndant then aske d the t rial court to wait and provide the instruc tion “just in t he [trial court’s] instructions .

. . befor e we g ive closing arg uments.” De fenda nt subsequently ag ree d that the trial court’ s proposed instruction on the issue wa s “cur ative.”

I t has long been the rule in Tenne ssee that “limiting instructions can c ure a n err or in the trial of a c ase, e ven one involving ref ere nce by a w i t n es s t o a prior crime in which the defe ndant was involved, unless rea l doubt is raised as to w hether the cautionary instruction was ef

fec tive.” Sta te v. Scruggs , 589 S.W .2d 89 9 , 9 0 0 (T enn. 1979). The jury is presumed to follow the tria l court’s instruction. S ta t e v . S mi th , 8 9 3 S .W.2d 908, 914 (Tenn. 1994). B ased upon our revie w of the
re co rd , the trial court’s curative instruction was suffic ient to corre ct any possible prejudice that resulted f rom Serg eant B erry man’s re fer ence s. Defe ndant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

VI. Lesser Included Of fenses

Def endant a rg ues th at t h e trial c ourt err ed in fa iling to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaug hter a s a lesser

included o ff

en s e of fe lony

murder. Prior to the submission of the trial court’s instruc tions to the jury , Def endant or ally

reque sted on the re cord that the trial court pr ovide an ins truction on the l esser included offense of voluntary

manslaug hter. De fenda nt contended that the e v id e n c e w a s s u f

f ic ie n t to s u p p o r t s u c h a n in s tr u c ti o n b a s e d o n D e f

e n d a n t’ s s tate me n t th a t he and the victim had be en see ing e ach othe r socially , that there wer e si g ns of a strug g le i n the victim’s daug hter’s be droom, and that Def endant said that the victim said she was g oing to shoot him rig ht befor e he disc harg ed his wea pon. The trial c ourt responde d:

Wel l, I un de rs ta ndy ou r a

rg ume nt [c ou ns e l], b ut u nd e r the la w a s I un de rs ta ndit t o be, voluntar[y ] m anslaug hter is not an included of fense for murde r during the perpe tration of a felonybeca use of the e lements of the of fense of voluntary manslaug hter, a nd fra nkly , I don’t find that t here is any basis to char g e that base d on the proof that we have in the rec ord.

The State a

rg ues initiallythat Def

endant has waived this issue for f ailure to c omply

with the require ments of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-18-110. Pursuant to these statutory provisions, the trial court’s failure to instruct the j ury on a particular lesse r included of fense may not be ra ised on appe al or in a motion for new t rial unless the de fenda nt reque sts in writing that the trial court provide such an instruc tion prior to the trial court’ s char g e to the j ury
. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 18-110(c ). Howe ver, a

panel of this Court has re ce n t l y co n cluded that “an ora l reque st for an-17-

instruction of a lesse r included of fense which is made on the rec ord in a fe lony case wher e by

law
a c ou rt re po rt e r mus t be pr e se nt t o p re pa re a ve rb a tim re c or d o f the pr oc e e din g s, sa tis fi e s th e ‘i n writi ng ’ r e qu ir e me nt o f T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d se c tio n 4 0- 18 -1 10 so lon g a s th e or a l r e qu e st i s made prior to the trial court’s char g e to the jury . . . .” State v. Ronald Eugene Hall and Henry Lee Dixon , No. M2003-02326-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 292432, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Fe b. 8, 2005), no perm. to appeal filed . T hu s, we wi ll a dd re ss D e fe nd a nt’ s is su e on the me ri ts.
Th e tr ia l c ou rt ins truc te d th e jury on se c on d d e g re e mur de r, re c kle ss h omi c ide a ndc ri min a lly
ne g lig e nt ho mi cid e a s le sse r i nc lud e d o ff e ns e s o f f e lon y mur de r i n b othc ou nts of the ind ic tme nt. I t is well established that these thre e off enses a re le ss er i n cl u d ed o ffe nses of fe lony murder. See Sta te v . E ly , 48 S.W .3d 710, 721-22 (Te nn. 2001). Althoug h El y did not specifica lly

addre ss whether
vo lun tary ma ns laug hte r i s a le sse r inc lud e d o ff e ns e of fe lon y mur de r, thi s Co urt ha s p re vio us ly he ld that it is. Sta te v . M

ar lon Ma rk tav ias Fi tzgerald , N o
. W2 0 0 1

- 0 3 0 9 6

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 3 WL 261940, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, F eb. 7, 2003), perm. to appeal de nied (Tenn. July7, 20 03 ); State v. Alfonzo W i l liams , W2001-00452-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL1482695, at *5 (Te nn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Ma r. 15, 2002), perm. to appeal denied (T en n
. S ep t

. 2 3 , 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Sta te v. Daniel W

ade W ilson , N o. E2 00 0- 01 88 5-CCA -R 3- CD , 2 00 1 WL 87 24 42 , at *1 4 ( Te nn . Crim. App., at Knoxvill e, Aug . 2, 2001), perm. to appeal de nied (Tenn. Ma r. 11, 2002))

. I f an of fense is found to b e a lesser include d offe nse, we must nex t determine w hether the evidenc e jus tified an ins truction on the l esser included off

ense. State v. Bowles , 52 S.W .3d 69, 75 (Tenn. 2000) . “I n making this determination, the trial judg e shall view the evidenc e libera lly in the light most favor able to the e x istence of the lesser inc luded offe nse without making any judgme nt on the c re dib ili ty

of su c h e vid e nc e .” Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 18 -1 10 (a ). “ Whe the r an in str uc tio n is require d depends upon the evidenc e, not th e t h eory of the de fense or the State.” Robinson , 146 S

. W

. 3 d at 4 8 6 (c i t i n g State v. Allen , 6 9 S. W.3 d 1 81 , 1 88 (T enn. 2 00 2) ); State v. Richm ond , 90 S.W .3d 181, 188 (Tenn. 2002)

. Voluntary

manslaug hter is the “intentional or knowing killing of a nother in a state of passion produce d by

adequate provoc ation sufficie nt to lead a r easona b l e p er s on to act in an irr ational
manner .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 211(a) . Def endant r elies primarily

on his statement to support his contention that there w as suffic ient evidenc e in the record to support a f inding that he shot the victim in a state of passion produc ed by adequate provoc ation.

I n his statement, Def

endant sa id he met the vi ctim about five day s befor e Christmas in front of Ad va nc e Au to Part s, a nd the ir c on ve rs a tio n le d to the vic tim ’s of fe r t o s e ll h im h e r c ar s pe ake rs
. The two c ontinued to speak ove r the nex t few day s by telephone, and Def

endant e ventually

visited the victim in her home. Def endant said that on the night of the shooting, he called the victim, but
no one answ ere d. Def

endant c ontinued in his statement to the police:

Then a fter that, afte r an hour went by I called a g ain, nobody

answe red a fter se vera l calls, and I went over to [t he victim’s] bymy self about [eig ht o’clock] something that night a nd parke d in the driveway under the shed and knocked on the door and r ung-18-

the doorbe ll repeatedly . No one c ame to the door . And I s t arted to leave, and I turn[ed] around a nd then went a nd beat on the door and rung the doorbe ll. And I went to the fr ont windows and knocke d on it a nd went to the bac k window and then raised the window up and took the air conditioner out, and [the victim] said, “Who’s that?” a ndI ran a way a nd jumpe d the g a te a nd the n c a me ba c k a ndjumpe d th e g a te aga i n i n t o [t he victim’s] y ard a nd kept running full speed a nd jumped straig ht throug h the window. The victim was on the bed at first in the room I jumped into, then she rose d [si c] up from the floor f rom beside the be d and wa lked away to the den. I walked be hi nd her a nd she said, “I ’m fixi n [si c] to blow [ y our] ass off” and I shot her re peate dly

and wa lked bac k to the room and g ot the speake rs.
Def endant said that the victim told him she was g oing to shoot him, a nd he fire d his gun f ive or six times at the victim as she wa lked away from him into the den. Base d on the fore g oing, and viewing the evidenc e liberally in the light most fa vorable to the exis tence of the les s er included offe n s e, we conclude that the evidenc e wa s sufficient to wa rra nt an instruction on voluntary manslaug hter.
We conclude, how ever , that the tri al court’s failure to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaug hter wa s harmless er ror. Our supreme c ourt has found ha rmless err or whe re the jury was instructed o n at l east one lesser inc luded offe nse, and the jury convicted on the indicted g reater offe nse. State v. W

illiams , 977 S.W .2d 101, 105 (Tenn. 1998) (holding failure to instruct on voluntary manslaug hter a s a lesser

included off

ense of first deg ree murder w as harmless error wher e jury convicted on f

irst deg ree murder and declined to c onvict on second de g ree murder) . The trial court inst ru ct ed the jury

on second de g ree murder, r eckle ss homicide and criminallyneg lige nt homicide in the ca se sub judice

. Th e jury c ho se to c on vic t De fe nd a nt of the g re a te r o ff

e ns e of fi rs t deg ree felony

murder. B ased upon our

revie w of the r ecor d, we conclude that the fa ilure to instruct the jury on voluntary

manslaug hter did not affe ct the outcome of the trial, and the err or, if any , was harmless be y ond a re asonable doubt. State v. Allen , 69 S.W .3d 181, 189 (Tenn. 2002)

. VII. P rosec utorial Misconduct

Def endant a rg ues that the prosec utor improperly made inflammatory statements and injecte d his personal opinion into his closing ar g uments in the g uilt phase of the t ri al an d t h e sentencing phase. The State arg ues t hat Defenda nt did not object to the prosecutor’s arg ument, and the issue of pr os e c uto ri a l misc on du c t is thu s wa ive d for pu rp os e s of ap pe a l. Altho ug h d e fe ns e c ou ns e l di d not object to the prosec utor’s statement at the time the s t at ements were made , the issue of prosec utorial misconduct was r aised in De fenda nt’s motion for new trial. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e)

. Rul e 3( e ) o f the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f A pp e llate Pr oc e du re pr ov ide s, in p e rt ine nt p art : Provided, howeve r, that in all ca ses tried by a j u ry , no issue prese nted for revie w shall be pre dicated upon e rror in the . .

. m i s conduct of jurors, parties, or-19-

c ou ns e l . . . u nle ss the sa me wa s sp eci fi c a lly state d in a

mot ion fo r a

ne w t ri a l; otherwise suc h issues will be treate d as wa ived.
Rule 36(a) of t he Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e also provides that re lief may not be g rante d to a party

who fa ils to t ake w hateve r ac tion is reasonably available to preve nt or

nullify the harmful eff

ect of the er ror. Thus, “ relief

may not be gra nted in contra vention of the provinc e of the tr ie r o f f

a c t,” a ndfailu re to p re se nt an is su e to the tr ia l c ou rt , th e re fo re , w ill ty pic a lly no t me ri t appellate relief

. See T e n n
. R

. A p p
. P

. 3 a n d 3 6 A d v i s o r y C o m m i s s i o n C o m m e n t s
. S p e c i f i c a l l y, failure to object to a prosec utor’s alleg ed improper c omments typically results in a wa iver on a

ppeal of a ny c omp la int

c on c e rn ing the pr os e c uto r' s c omm e nts . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 6( a ); State v. Thornton, 10 S.W. 3d 22 9, 23 4 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 99 ); State v. Gre en, 94 7 S. W.2 d 1 86 , 1 88 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 97 ); State v. Little, 854 S.W .2d 643, 651 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

. Nonethele ss, issues that rise to the level of pla in error lie within the sound discretion of the appellate court a nd may

be conside red: (1) to preve nt needless litigation; (2) to preve nt injury to the interests of the public; a nd (3) to pr event prejudice to the judicial proce ss, pr event manifest injustice, or to do substantial justice. See Te nn . R. App . P. 13 (b ); Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 5 2( b) ; State v. Adk isson , 899 S.W .2d 626, 638-39 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1994).

Th us , if thi s c ou rt

is t o r e vie w the Ap pe lla nt' s cla im of pr os e c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t, w e mus t do so utili zing plain er

ror rev i ew p u rs u an t to Tenn. R. Crim. P . 52(b) whic h provides: " [a] n err or which has a ffe cted the substantial rights of an accuse d may be noti ced at any time, even thoug h not
raise d in the mot ion fo r n e w t ri a l or a ssi g ne d a s e rror on app e a l, i n th e dis c re tio n o f the app e llate
co u rt wh er e n ec es s ar y

t o d o s u b s t an t i al j u s t i ce
. " Ho we v er , i n t h i s ca s e, we co n cl u d e t h at al t h o u gh
certain rema

rks by the prosec utor during closing arg ument wer e improper , the nature and conte x t of the comments do not rise to the leve l of plain err or.
Clo sin g arg ume nt i s a

va lua ble privi le g e fo r both the Sta te a ndthe de fe nd a nt, a ndou r c ou rt s have g ener ally

extended counsel wide lat i t ude in ar g uing be fore the jury

. Sta te v . Ca uth e rn , 967 S.W. 2d72 6, 73 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 4) . Co ns e qu e ntl y , tria l ju dg e s a re a lso a c c or de d w ide dis c re tio n in the ir control of c losing a

rg ument, and t h i s discretion will not be disturbed on appe al in the abse nce of abuse. Sm ith v . S tat e , 5 27 S.W. 2d73 7, 73 9 ( Te nn . 1 97 5) ; Sta te v. Z ir kle , 910 S.W .2d 874, 888 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Closing arg ument, howeve r, “must be temper ate, ba sed upon the e vidence at trial, re levant to the issues being t ri ed , an d not otherwise imprope r under the fa cts or the law .” Sta te v . G olt

z , 1 1 1 S

. W

. 3 d 1 , 5 (T en n
. C ri m
. Ap p
. 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Coke r v . S tat e , 911 S.W .2d 357, 368 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 95 )) . Sp e c if ic a lly , “[i]t is unpr of

e ssi on a l c on du c t f

or the pr os e c uto r t o e xpre ss his personal belief or opinion as to the truth or f alsity of any testimonyor evide nce or

the g uilt of the defe ndant.” Go ltz , 1 11 S.W. 3da t 6 ( c itatio ns omi tte d) . N or sh ou ld the pr os e c uto r “ us e arg ume nts calc ulated to inflame the passions or pre judices of the jury .” Id . (citations omitted).

I f a pr osecutor’ s arg ument is found to be improper,-20-

the established test for de termining whether there is rever sible err or is whether the conduct wa s so improper or the arg ument so inflammatory that it affe cted the ve rdict to the [defendant’ s] detriment. Ha rri ng ton v . S tat e , 215 Tenn. 338, 385 S .W.2d 758, 75 9 ( 19 65 ). I n me a su ri ng the pr e jud ic ia l impa c t of an y mis c on du c t, thi s c ou rt sh ou ld consider: ( 1) the fa cts and c ircumstance s of the ca se; (2) a ny curat ive measur es undertaken by the court and the prosec utor; (3) the intent of the prosec ution; (4) the cumulative ef

fec t of the improper

conduct a nd any

other e rror s in the rec ord; and (5) the relative streng th or wea kness of the c ase. J

ud ge v . S tat e , 539 S.W .2d 340, 344 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 76 ); see also State v . Buck , 670 S.W .2d 600, 609 (Tenn. 1984)

. Id . at 5-6. A. Closing Ar g ument at Trial

Def endant a rg ues that t h e p rosecutor interjec ted his persona l opinion int o his closing arg ument when he told the jury , [p]r os e c uto rs are pe op le , to o. I ’m lou d. I rant andI

ra ve , a ndI ’m

fr us tr a te d, thi rt y y ear s of dea ling with this, and I ’m not the most sophist icated huma n being i n the
wo rl d, a ndy e a h, I

a m ma d, bu t I ’m

a hu ma n b e ing , too. I

do n’ t w a nt i nn oc e nt p e op le in the penitentiary

. That’s just not rig ht.

. . . What we ask y ou to do is to watch over us, watch ove r the prose cution, do just what [defense co u nsel] said to do. That’s wh a t he ’s he re fo r. I t’ s w hat y ou ’r e he re fo r, is t o w a tc h o ve r u s. Although a

prosec utor must not ex pr e s s a p e r s o n a l b e li e f

or opinion, whether

the prosec utor’s comments qualify

as such of ten depe nds upon the specif ic terminolog y

used. F or example, arg ument predic ated by

the words “ I

think” or “I s u b m i t ” does not nec essarily indicate a n expression of persona l opinion. United States v. Stulga , 5 84 F .2 d 1 42 (6 th Cir . 197 8)

. Th us , it is n ot n e c e ssa ri ly improper each time the prosecutor uses the word “I ” or “ we.” See State v. Thomas D ee H uskey , No. E1999-00438-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1400059, at *129 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knox ville, J une 28, 2002), perm. to appeal de nied (T e nn . F e b. 18 , 20 03 ). I n thi s ins ta nc e , the pr os e c uto r d id n ot e xpre ss a per sonal opinion as to “the truth or f alsity of any testimonyor evide nce or the g uilt of the defe ndant.” Go ltz , 111 S.W .3d at 6. The prose cutor, a lbeit phrasing his arg ument in the first person, ref err ed to something said by defe nse counse l. As previously noted, there was no c ontemporane ous objecti o n t o the prosec utor’s statement. What was impliedly stated by

defe nse counse l is not included in the rec ord. I t is Def endant’ s responsibility to insure that the appe llate re cord c ontains
a ll re le va nt

p o r t i o n s o f

t h e tr i a l c o u r tp r o c e e d i n g s
. T h e p r o s e c u t o r ’ s c o m m e n t s , t ak e n i n c o n t e xt,
wer e not improper.

The prosec utor’s description of Def endant as a “bac k-shooting woman killer,” howeve r, wa s improper. I t is improper for t he prosecutor to use epithets to char acte rize the defendant. Cau the rn , 967 S.W .2d at 737. L ooking at the statement in context, the prosecutor c ommented,-21-

[t ]he first element, “T hat the defe ndant unlawfully killed the alleg ed victim.” Any question about that? Any question about it being unlawful, a back- shooting woma n killer? That’s who y ou’re looking at, folks. That’s not rhetoric from [the prosec utor]. That comes from the medical ex aminer. Where [di d] gunshot wound A g o? Where did it enter her body ? I n her back. Where did g unshot B a nd C go? I n h e r b a c k. Yo u g ot the wo un d c ha rt

. Th e pr os e c uto r the n co nti nu e d with his arg ume nt n oti ng that “ y ou sa w w he re the se bu lle ts w e nt i n her, a nd I ’m sorry

but when y ou – I

ain’t sorry

either. This is a ba ck-shooting woman killer.”

Th e pr os e c uto r, of

c ou rs e , may

c omm e nt o n th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tria l a ndthe r e a so na ble infere nces which may be draw n there from. Howe ver, phr asing evidentiary comments in the form
o f a n e p ith e t “ s o a s p o te n ti a ll y to ap p e a l t o [t h e ] j u r y ’ s b ia s a n d p a s s io n is improper.” Id

. Nonethele ss, based on the f acts a nd circ umstances of the ca se and the relative streng th of the State’s case-in-c hief, we conclude that the prosec utor’s statements do not af firmatively

appea r to have aff ecte d the ver dict. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a).

Th e ne xt se t of

c ha lle ng e d c omm e nts oc c ur re d d uring the Sta te ’s re bu tta l c los ing arg ume nt. Def ense c ounsel arg ued during closing arg ument that the State failed to pr esent any expert testimony to e xpla in th e tr aje cto ry

of the bu lle ts f

ou ndin t he vic tim ’s ho me , p oin tin g ou t th a t “ if he c a me throug h the window and shot [t he victim ] in the hallway , how was a case shelling behind a spea ker
acr oss the room nea

r the fr ont of the house, two of them, and a bullet f

rag ment.” I n rebuttal, the prosec utor stated,
[t ]here wa s one bullet shell casing found in th e
. . . hallway . That’s what the defe ndant said. He said he fired t he first shot i n the hallway . Then he went into the den. Now, I g uess he’s g ot us. We c an’t tell y ou about how fa r a .380 hull is g oing to fly , what ang le it’s g oing to f ly when i t ’s fi red f

rom its gun . . . whe ther [Defenda nt] was holding it like this . . . whe ther he had [the g un] i n his left hand or his right ha nd, so I

g uess y ou[‘ve] got to turn him loose because we didn’t bring somebody

in here to show y ou to an exact scienc e whe re his hand was when he fired those s h ots and those hulls were ejec ted. And I ’m g oing to tell y ou one re ason we didn’t do it is because that person doesn’ t exi st. That’s [ sic] not a science to tell y ou how and how far these shells a re g oing to g o. Nobody knows that. Be cause they ’re ejec ted, who knows, one ’s g oing to g o twenty fee t, one ’s g oing to g o eig hteen, one ’s go i n g t o go t h re e.
. . . He m o v es h i s h an d , an d i tgo es u p i th i t s a w al l , a c ei l i n g.
L ater , in response to the porti on of Defenda nt’s statement i n which he said, “and I pray to the L or d th a t I

wi ll g e t a

c ha nc e to b e wi th m y

so n b e fo re he ge t[s] ol de r, ” the pr os e c uto r s ta te d in rebuttal, “ I

g ot news for

y ou, [Defenda nt] , a lot of fathers spend New Year ’s Eve with their sons.” Th e pr os e c uto r al so po int e d out that De fe nd a nt did no t say in his state me nt that he wi sh e d th e vic tim
was not de ad. I nstead he said, “I wish at this moment I had neve r thoug ht about shooting he r. . . .” T h e p r o s e c u to r

r e s p o n d e d in r e b u tt a l a

r g u me n t, “ T h a n k

y o u f o r s h ar in g th a t w ith u s , [D e f e n d a n t]

.-22-

Com e on , c ome on , s he ’s de a d, [De fe nd a nt]. I t’ s y ou r time to sha re the re sp on sib ili ty

a nda ssu me all of the re sponsibili ty , not just part of it, and not just weak excuses.”

Du ri ng c los ing arg ume nt, de fe ns e c ou ns e l f oc us e d o n th e int e rn a l in c on sis te nc ie s in Def endant’ s statement when c ompare d to the State’s evidenc e, as well as t he inconsistency betwee n De fe nd a nt’ s d e me a no r, wh ic h th e po lic e de sc ri be d v ari ou sly a s c a lm, qu ie t a ndc oo pera ti ve , w ith the pe rs on a lit y

of so me on e wh o wou ld do “this g ha stl y thi ng .” Th e pr os e c uto r’ s c omm e nts a s to how fa r the spent bullet shells trave led when ejec ted from Def endant’ s g un or how De fenda nt was sta nd ing wh e n h e sh ot his we apo n, a lth ou g h of fe re d a s sp e c ulatio n, bo rd e r c los e ly on imp e rm iss ibl e comments on evidenc e not in the rec ord. Additionally , the prosec utor’s comments wh i ch we re addre ssed to Def

endant pe rsonally

instead of the jury

serve d only to inflame the jury . Ba sed on our revie w of c ounsels’ closing arg uments, howeve r, the prosec utor’s comments in re buttal were for the most part in response to de fense counsel’s points of c ontention during his c losing arg ument and we re not so inflammatory as to rende r the proc eeding s fundamenta lly unfair or unduly prejudicia l. The
c omm e nts thu s do no t ri se to the le ve l of plain e rr or , a ndDe fe nd a nt i s n ot e nti tle d to re lie f o n th is issue.

B . Cl os ing Ar g ume nt d uring Se nte nc ing Pha se
At the se nte nc ing ph a se , the Sta te int ro du c e d a c e rt if

ie d c op y of De fe nd a nt’ s c on vic tio n in Mississ ippi a s a statutory ag g ravating c ircumstance

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204(i)( 2). The State also called the victim’s daug hter, Celeisia Harris, to testifyconce rning the impact the victim’s de a th h a d on th eir fam ily . F or the de fe ns e , D e fe nd a nt’ s mo the r, Va le nc ia Pa lme r, te sti fi e d a s to Def endant’ s g ood qualities during childhood, and Def endant a pologized to the victim’s fa mily . As statutory mitigating c i rc u m s t an ce s , d ef en s e c o u n s el ar gu ed De fe n d an t ’s l ac k o f c ri m i n al hi story

prior to the mur de r andarmed rob bery of fe ns e s, a ndthe De fe nd a nt’ s y ou th at th e tim e of the of fe ns e s. Se e id . §§ 39-13-204 (

j)(1) a nd (7). The prosecu t o r b as ed the foc us of his closing a rg ument on the loss experience d by the victim’s daug hters as a

result of their mother’s death, stating, at one point , “[t] he per spective I see it from it is t hree daug hters who’ ve los t their m other. That gets to me. I don’t like that.” L ater , the prosec utor arg ued:

wh y sh ou ld [De fe nd a nt] g e t pa ro le wh e n th e se y ou ng la die s b a c k h e re – th e y ’r e a ll y oung
. . . [t ]hey ’re g oing to ha ve to suf fer for the rest of their lives, not just the fact the ir mothe r d ie d. Th a t’ s ba d e no ug h, bu t th e c oll e g e e du c a te d y ou ng la dy [Ce le isi a Ha rris] w ho wa s mu c h le ss e mot ion a l th a n me a bo ut this , w hat di d s he sa y , th a t de a th is to be expected. It’s to be dea lt with. I t’s part of w hat we do, but whe n it comes like this, when it’s murder, it’s ha rder to deal with. We start by

noting that “[i] n the s entenc ing proce eding , evidenc e may be presented as to any matter that the c ourt dee ms r eleva nt to the punishment a nd may include, but not be limit ed to, the nature and cir cumstance s of the crime; the defe ndant’s cha rac ter, ba ckg round history and phy sical-23-

condition; any

evidenc e tending to establish or rebut the ag g ravating c ircumstance s in subsection (j); and any evidenc e tending to establish or re but any mitigating fac tors.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(c) . The bre adth of the statute’s lang uag e embra ces the introduction of victim impac t evidence and prose cutorial a

rg ument on the evidenc e, so long as the e vidence in not so “ ‘unduly prejudicia l that it rende rs t he trial fundame ntally unfair.’ ” Sta te v . Ne sb it , 978 S.W .2d 872, 889-91 (Te nn. 1998) (q u o t i n g Payne v. Tennesse e , 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2608, 115 L . Ed. 2d 720 (1991))

. “Ge nera lly , victim impac t e vidence should be limit ed to inf ormation desig ned to show those unique char acte ristics which provide a brief glimpse into the l ife of the individual who has bee n killed, the
c on te mpo rane ou s a nd pr os pe c tiv e c ir c ums ta nc e s sur ro un din g the ind ivi du a l’ s death, a ndho w tho se circ u ms ta n c e s f in an c ially , emotionally , psy cholog ically or phy sically

impacted upon membe rs of the victim’s immediate family .” Ne sb it , 978 S.W. 2d a t 891 (c itatio ns omi tte d) . “ Simi larl y , w hil e vic tim impact ar g ument by

the prosec ution about the evidenc e is permissible , r e s tr ain t s h ould be exercised.” Id. “Ar g ument on rele vant, thoug h emotional consi derations is permissi ble, but inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury ’s attention from it s proper role or invites a n irrational, pur ely emotional response to the evidenc e is not permissible . . . .” Id.

Al tho ug h at ti me s e mot ion a l, w e c a nn ot co nc lud e that the pr os e c uto r’ s com me nts that he fe lt sorry for the vic tim’s daug hters we re imprope r “i n flammatory rhetoric ” whe n viewed w ithin the context of his closing ar g ument. See State v. Thacke r , 164 S.W 3d 208, 253 (Tenn. 2005) (Stating that a prose cutor’s state ments during closing arg ument that he wa s sad and that he felt sorry for the victim’ s wife, a lthough e motional, was not improper “ inflammatory rhetoric .”). D efe ndant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

CO NC LU SION

Af te r a tho ro ug h r e vie w o f the re c or d, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE