alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit
32.1



CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO

18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In
connection with the Annual Report of St. Joseph, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the period ending December
31, 2013 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Gerald McIlhargey,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|1. | The
    Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                  
|-- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   |                                                                                                                                                            
|2. | The information
    contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
    Company.



| | /s/
    Gerald McIlhargey                
| | -----------------------------------------
| | Gerald McIlhargey                        
| | President and
    Chief Executive Officer
| |                                          
| | March 31, 2014
#### READER’S WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTORS, Inc. v. TRAHAN.

No. 12141.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.

Dec. 8, 1949.

*460Ross, Banks & May and Geo. B. Banks, all of Houston, for appellant.

Godard & Dazey, of Texas City, for ap-pellee.

MONTEITH, Chief. Justice.

This is an appeal from an order sustaining a plea of privilege in an action brought by ' appellant, Reader’s Wholesale Distributors, Inc., in the. district court of Harris County, for recovery1 from appellee, J. C. Trahan, d/b/a .Trahan’s, of the sum of $1,052.45. Appellee timely filed his plea of privilege to- be sued in Galveston County, the County of his residence.

In its original petition, appellant alleged that it had sold and delivered to appellee on the dates specified in its verified statement of account which was made a part thereof, certain goods, wares and merchandise. In response to appellee’s plea of privilege, appellant timely filed its controverting affidavit in which it adopted the allegations of its original petition and made them a part thereof. It alleged for the first time in its controverting plea that said goods, wares and merchandise were sold and delivered to appellee upon written orders in which appellee had promised to pay therefor at appellant’s office in Houston, Harris County, Texas.

The trial court sustained appellee’s plea of privilege and ordered the cause transferred for trial to the District Court of Galveston County.

Tne trial court prepared and caused to be filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it was found that appellee signed and delivered the orders for merchandise upon which the suit was based but that appellant did not', in its original' petition, plead a contract in writing promising to pay the account in Harris County, Texas, and that the first and only pleading alleging a contrae* promising to pay the account in Harris County, Texas, was contained in appellant’s controverting plea. The court found as a matter of law, that the promise to pay said account in Harris County, Texas, was within the meaning of Subdivision 5 of art. 1995, R.C.S., Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 1995, subd. 5, and that the allegations of appellant’s controverting plea could not be looked to to determine the proper venue in said cause.

The precise question presented in this appeal was decided by this court in the case of Elliott Finance Company v. Brown et al., Tex.Civ.App., 208 S.W.2d 622.

In that case, under a state'of facts similar in al-1 material respects to the facts in this case, this court overruled appellant’s plea of privilege and held that, under Rule 86, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, in the absence of allegations in plaintiff’s original petition as to where the note sued on was payable, the allegations . contained in plaintiff’s controverting affidavit could not' be looked to in determining proper venue.

These conclusions require an affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. It will be so ordered.

Affirmed.
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 00-1988

___________ Kansas Bankers Surety Company, * * Appellee, *

* v. * * First Premier Bank, N.A.; * T. Denny Sanford, * * Appellants. *

__________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of No. 00-2111 South Dakota.

__________ [UNPUBLISHED] Kansas Bankers Surety Company, * * Appellant, *

* v. * * First Premier Bank, N.A.; * T. Denny Sanford, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: December 11, 2000 Filed: December 19, 2000-2- ___________ Before LOKEN, HEANEY, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. First Premier Bank, N.A. obtained directors and officers insurance from Kansas Bankers Surety Company. After First Premier's chief executive officer, T. Denny Sanford, was sued in South Dakota state court, Kansas Bankers brought this declaratory judgment action asserting it had no duty to defend Sanford. Kansas B ankers and First Premier filed opposing motions for summary judgment, and the district court granted Kansas Bankers's motion. Applying South Dakota law, the district court concluded Kansas Bankers had no duty to defend because the claims against Sanford in the state-court action fall outside policy coverage under the personal profit exclusion. The district court found no need to decide the issue of whether First Premier and Sanford complied with the policy's notice provisions, and declined to awardattorney's fees or costs. First Premier and Sanford appeal asserting all of their claims did not fall within the personal profit exclusion, and Kansas Bankers crossappeals on the notice issue. Having carefully considered the record, we affirm this diversitycase on the basis of the district court's memorandum opinion and order. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACO WAO DIVISION

WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC

vs.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL NO:

WA:20-CV-00458-ADA

ORDER SETTING DISCOVERY DISCOVERY HEARING

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above entitled and numbered case is set for

DISCOVERY HEARING by Zoomoom on Thursday, October 07, 2021 at 01:30 PM.

set

IT 6th day of October, 2021.

Alan D Albright

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 6:20-cv-00458-ADA Document 85 Filed 10/06/21 Page 1 of 1
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jake Clark, Appellant.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (Cowhey, J.), rendered May 4, 1987, convicting him of murder in the second degree (two counts), attempted murder in the second degree, robbery in the first degree, and assault in the first degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant argues that the court improperly admitted *553into evidence testimony of his prior drug use and of his theft of drugs since he was not charged with these crimes. However, under the circumstances of this case, this evidence was admissible to show motive *(see, People v Alvino,*71 NY2d 233; *People v Allweiss,*48 NY2d 40, 47; *People v Johnson,*155 AD2d 924, 925), and a common plan or scheme *(see, People v Vails,*43 NY2d 364, 368). Also, it was necessary to complete the narrative of events *(see, People v Hardwick,*140 AD2d 624, 625). Furthermore, the probative value of this evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect *(see, People v Ventimiglia,*52 NY2d 350, 359-360).

The defendant further argues that he was denied adequate notice since the bill of particulars did not include drugs as one of the things alleged to have been stolen. However, the theft of drugs was offered only to prove motive and thus did not have to be included in the bill of particulars *(see, People v Morris,*61 NY2d 290, 295).

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the prosecutor did obtain a proper court ruling at a pretrial hearing before introducing evidence of uncharged crimes and thus the evidence was properly admitted *(see, People v Ventimiglia,*52 NY2d 350, 362, *supra).*

Finally, the defendant argues that the court improperly admitted into evidence photographs that aroused the emotions of the jurors and unduly prejudiced him. However, we find that these photographs had probative value and corroborated and illustrated trial testimony and thus were properly admitted *(see, People v Whitaker,*146 AD2d 723, 724). Mangano, P. J., Bracken, Lawrence and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5669 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 5669

 To suspend temporarily the rate of duty on Bis(2,2,6,6-tetramethyl-4-
                          piperidyl)sebacate.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 9, 2012

  Mr. Bonner introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To suspend temporarily the rate of duty on Bis(2,2,6,6-tetramethyl-4-
                          piperidyl)sebacate.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. BIS(2,2,6,6-TETRAMETHYL-4-PIPERIDYL)SEBACATE.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``     9902.01.00        Bis(2,2,6,6-        Free            No change      No change      On or before     ''.
                          tetramethyl-4-                                                    12/31/2015
                          piperidyl)sebacat
                          e (CAS No. 52829-
                          07-9) (provided
                          for in subheading
                          2933.99.82)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
ERNST & YOUNG LLP
370 17th Street
Suite 3300
Denver, Colorado 80202-5663

Report on Management's Assertion on Compliance with
Minimum Servicing Standards Set Forth in the
Uniform Single Attestation Program for Mortgage Bankers
Report of Independent Accountants

Board of Directors
Aurora Loan Services Inc.

We have examined management's assertion, included in the
accompanying report titled Report of Management, that Aurora Loan
Services Inc. (the Company) complied with the minimum servicing
standards set forth in the Mortgage Bankers Association of
America's Uniform Single Attestation Program for Mortgage Bankers
(USAP) during the year ended November 30, 2002. Management is
responsible for the Company's compliance with those requirements.
Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management's
assertion about the Company's compliance based on our
examination.

Our examination was made in accordance with attestation standards
established by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants and, accordingly, included examining, on a test
basis, evidence about the Company's compliance with those
requirements and performing such other procedures as we
considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our
examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our
examination does not provide a legal determination on the
Company's compliance with specified requirements.

In our opinion, management's assertion, that Aurora Loan Services
Inc. complied with the aforementioned requirements during the
year ended November 30, 2002, is fairly stated, in all material
respects.

This report is intended solely for the information and use of the
board of directors, management, and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, Federal National Mortgage Association,
Government National Mortgage Association, and the Company's
private investors and is not intended to be and should not be
used by anyone other than these specified parties.

March 14, 2003
Ernst & Young LLP
Order filed, Auguat 17, 2016.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 16

- 00116

- CV

____________ OSAMA ABDULLATIF AND ALI MOKARAM , Appellant

V.

ALI CHOUNDHRI , Appellee

On Appeal from the 190th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2012

- 27197



### ORDER
The reporter’s record in this case was due May 12, 2016

. See Tex. R. App.
P. 35.1. On June 30, 2016 , this court ordered the court reporter to file the record within 30 days. The record has not been filed w ith the court. Because the reporter’s record has not been filed timely, we issue the following order.

We order Patricia Palmer , the substitute court reporter, to file the record in this appeal within 30 days of the date of this order

. No further extensio n will beentertained absent exceptional circumstances. The trial and appellate courts are

jointly responsible for ensuring that the appellate record is timely filed. See Tex. R. App. P. 35.3(c). If Patricia Palmer does not timely file the record as ord ered, we will issue an order directing the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine the
reason for the failure to file the record.

PER CURIAM
Cite as 2015 Ark. 385 

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS 

Opinion Delivered October 22, 2015

IN RE ARKANSAS SUPREME 

COURT COMMISSION ON 

CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND 

FAMILIES

PER CURIAM 

Representative David Meeks, Dr. Karen Farst, and Mary Claire Hyatt are appointed 

to the Arkansas Supreme Court Commission on Children, Youth, and Families for threeyear terms to expire on December 31, 2018. We reappoint Judge Wiley Branton, Jr., Judge 

Ken Coker, Jr., Dr. Sherece West, and Ms. Claire Babineaux-Fontenot for three-year terms 

to expire on December 31, 2018. We recognize Johnny Key, Commissioner of Education, 

as a standing member of the commission. We thank all of them for their willingness to serve 

on this important committee. We designate Justice Rhonda K. Wood to succeed Retired 

Chief Justice Jim Hannah as chair. 

 The court expresses its gratitude to outgoing members: Retired Chief Justice Jim 

Hannah, Dr. Tom Kimbrell, Dr. Tony Woods, John Selig, Senator Missy Irvin, 

Representative Stephanie Malone, Dr. Jonathan Bates, and Ms. Sedella White for their years 

of valuable service to this commission.
Exhibit 99b


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant to Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
the undersigned, as chief financial officer of The L.S. Starrett
Company (the "Company"), does hereby certify that to the undersigned's
knowledge:

1) the Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and

2) the information contained in the Company's Quarterly Report on
Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.






Roger U. Wellington, Jr.
Chief Financial Officer


Dated: February 7, 2003
#### GARCIA v. STATE.

No. 24611.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 1, 1950.

Rehearing Denied March 22, 1950.

Piranio & Piranio, Dallas, Angelo Pi-ranio, Dallas, for appellant.

George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

The offense is assault with intent to murder; the punishment, seven years in the penitentiary.

That appellant shot the injured party three times with a pistol is not disputed. According to the State’s testimony, the shooting was without justification or excuse; according to appellant’s testimony, he shot in self-defense.

The defensive theory, which the jury rejected, was pertinently submitted by the trial court in his charge. The facts warrant the jury’s finding..

No bills of exception appear in the record, without which we cannot consider appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a continuance.

The judgment is affirmed.

Opinion approved by the Court.

On Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing

BEAUCHAMP, Judge. .

The attorneys who filed the motion for rehearing for appellant did not represent him on the trial of his case and his motion for rehearing states that they had no responsibility for the failure to bring to this court bill of exception complaining of the court overruling his motion for continuance. They now ask that this motion be considered, in as much as it is found in the record in its fullness.

This we cannot do. The legislature makes the laws designated as The Code of Criminal Procedure and we have no authority to change the same. The action of the court on the motion for continuance of the case can only be considered when brought before this court by a proper bill of exception. Branch’s Annotated Penal Code, Section 304, page 183; Cald*570well v. State, 132 Tex.Cr.R. 256, 103 S.W.2d 758; and Newton v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 400, 180 S.W.2d 946.

The motion. for rehearing is overruled.
#### Anthony Rando, Plaintiff, *v.*Impresa Navigazione Commercialle, S. A., et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Kings County,

December 3, 1957.

*Stanley Stern*for plaintiff.

*Michael E. Hanrahan*for Impresa Navigazione Commercialle, S. A., defendant.

Frank E. Johnson, Off. Bef.

Testimony has been taken under the order to determine if the defendant corporation was duly served; a summons was delivered to this person who testified, but whether service was thus *duly*obtained on defendant is the question here. No testimony was offered here by plaintiff to contradict that witness; he was examined by defendant’s counsel when plaintiff did not appear on the day the hearing was duly set before the undersigned; no motion to open that ex parte hearing has been made. Upon his testimony the com*577pany has not been doing business here, and by service on him the court did not acquire jurisdiction. At a later hearing plaintiff first raised the question of defendant’s right to question the effect of the service because of its failure to *1 ‘*appear specially.” After the 1956 service date several stipulations were signed by both sides, enlarging the time of defendant to “specially and/or generally appear, and/or answer, and/or otherwise move.” The defendant’s original motion papers did not use the words “ appearing specially.” Since 1951, section 237-a of the Civil Practice Act has governed the procedure considered here, but it does not specifically require the use of those words on the *motion papers.*Even before 1951 it was apparently not necessary to use them on those papers *(Bernstein*v. *Hakim,*126 Misc. 582; *Odiens*v. *Odiens,*265 App. Div. 641). In *Robinson*v. *Robinson*(123 Misc. 80) Cabswell, J., made it clear, by citations, that appearing by motion (apparently not using those words) is not a general appearance in the action (see cases cited, p. 82). The 1951 enlargement of section 237, proposed by the Judicial Council (see Seventeenth Annual Report of N. Y. Judicial Council, 1951), does not exclude the reasoning of Justice Cabswell as to how to avoid a general appearance, nor does it profess to specify what, if any, language must be used to make the motion a “ special appearance.” It implies that no particular words are necessary when the obvious object of the motion is to *not*appear generally. If defendant, on its motion, by reason of the absence of such words did not “ appear specially,” plaintiff has waived that objection by the language of the stipulations. No jurisdiction was acquired by the service, in view of the testimony given. Settle order.
Exhibit 32.2


CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of The Stephan Co. (the
"Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2005
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the "Report"), I, David Spiegel, Chief Financial Officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to my knowledge:

(1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934; and

(2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.



/s/ David A. Spiegel
__________________________________
David A. Spiegel
Chief Financial Officer
November 21, 2005
EXHIBIT31.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14(a) OR
   15d-14(a) OF THE SECURITIES
   EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE
   SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Mark W. Blodgett, certify that:

|Date:   May 14, 2004 | /s/ Mark W. Blodgett                
|-------------------- | ------------------------------------
|                     | Mark W. Blodgett                    
|                     | Chairman and Chief Executive Officer




|Exhibit 31.1  /  STKR | END | 2004 Form 10-Q
|--------------------- | --- | --------------
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-7155

DOMINICO L. LEE, Petitioner - Appellant,

versus GENE M. JOHNSON, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Jerome B. Friedman, District Judge. (2:07-cv-00262-JBF) Submitted: October 11, 2007 Decided: October 18, 2007 Before MICHAEL and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Dominico L. Lee, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Dominico L. Lee seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude Lee has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED