[Cite as State v. Robinson, 124 Ohio St.3d 76, 2009-Ohio-5937.]

T HE S TATE OF O HIO , A PPELLANT , v . R OBINSON , A PPELLEE
. [Cite as State v. Robinson, 124 Ohio St.3d 76, 2009-Ohio-5937.] Criminal law — R.C 2909.04(A)(3) — The damaging of a single private telephone or cellular telephone disrupts public services in violation of R.C.2909.04(A)(3) if the conduct substantially impairs the ability of lawenforcement officers, firefighters, rescue personnel, emergency-medicalservices personnel, or emergency- facility personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and preserve any person or property from serious physical harm. (Nos. 2008-1942 and 2008-2170 — Submitte d September 29, 2009 — Decided November 18, 2009.)
A PPEAL from and C ERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Union County, No. 14-07-20, 177 Ohio App.3d 560, 2008-Ohio-4160.

______________________ S YLLABUS OF THE C OURT The damaging of a single private tele phone or cellular telephone disrupts public services in violation of R.C. 2909.04( A)(3) if the conduct substantially impairs the ability of law-enforcement officers, firefighters, rescue personnel, emergency-medical-services personnel, or emergency-facility personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and preserve any person or property from serious physical harm.

__________________ O’C ONNOR , J. {¶ 1} In this appeal, we must determine whether the damaging of a single private telephone or cellular telephone disrupts public services sufficiently to constitute a violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 {¶ 2} The state asserts that the statutory language of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) is unambiguous and plainly contemplates a violation of Ohio law when a person has damaged a single privat e telephone or cellular telephone. The state further
contends that there was sufficient evid ence that destruction of a phone by appellee, Raynell Robinson, substantially impaired the ability of law-enforcement and emergency medical personnel to re spond to an emergent situation. {¶ 3} Conversely, Robinson contends that R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) does not apply to the damaging of a single priv ate telephone and a pplies only to utility services provided to a sizeable segment of the public. In the alternative, Robinson maintains that his destruction of the phone did not substantially impair the ability of law-enforcement and emergency medical personnel to respond. {¶ 4} We hold that the damaging of a single private telephone or cellular telephone disrupts public se rvices in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) if the conduct substantially im pairs the ability of law-enforcement officers, firefighters, rescue personnel, emergency-medical-serv ices personnel, or emergency-facility personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and preserve any person or property from serious physical harm. We further hold that Robinson’s conductsubstantially impaired the ability of law-enforcement officers and emergencymedical-services personnel to respond. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court convicting Robinson for disrupting public services in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3). Relevant Background {¶ 5} Anthony Robinson (“Anthony”), Antonio Robinson (“Antonio”), and Heather Hoge attended a party at the apartment of Raynell Robinson (“Robinson”) and his girlfriend, Judy Newh ard, in the early morning hours of September 2, 2006. Anthony is Robinson’ s brother, Antonio is Robinson’s nephew, and Hoge is Antonio’s friend. Robinson and Newhard reside at the Meadows apartment complex in Marysville, Ohio. The Meadows has twoJanuary Term, 2009

3 entrances and includes several apartment buildings with addresses that are
numbered from the 400s to the 700s. {¶ 6} Robinson was not home when An thony, Antonio, and Hoge
arrived. Robinson arrived hom e a couple of hours later; shortly thereafter, he became upset and told everyone to leave. Hoge proceeded to leave, and Antonio
went with her. {¶ 7} As they were getting into Hoge’s truck to leave, Robinson appeared and asked Antonio what Newhar d had been doing in the apartment. Antonio responded to Robinson’s question, and then Robinson hit Antonio in the
back of the head. Robinson continued to attack Antonio; eventually, Antonio was able to call 9-1-1 on his cell phone. {¶ 8} Antonio told the 9-1-1 dispatcher that he was at the Meadows and his face was split open. While Antonio was talking to the 9-1-1 dispatcher, Robinson grabbed the phone and smashed it. The dispatcher asked Antonio for his specific location at the Meadows, but the call was disconnected before Antonio could answer the dispatcher’s i nquiry. The 9-1-1 operator dispatched the fire department, an ambulance, and police to the Meadows and told them that she
did not know the address. {¶ 9} Soon thereafter, Hoge called 9-1-1, and Robinson told her to show him her hands and that she had better not be calling the police. Robinson then began attacking Antonio again, and Antonio ended up on the ground. The dispatcher repeatedly asked Hoge for a specific address and stressed the importance of emergency personnel havi ng a specific location, but Hoge was unable to give the dispatcher the informa tion because Robinson told her to get off the phone and threatened to shoot anyone who called the police. Hoge later called
9-1-1 a third time and set her cell phone on the seat of her truck so Robinson would not see her using it.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 {¶ 10} Officers Bartholomew and Collier were dispatched to the Meadows for a suspected assault. Officers are required to make sure the scene is safe before medics can come in and assist the injured parties. Officer Bartholomew went to the main entrance of the Meadows and made a quick circle looking for anyone trying to get his attention. Officer Collier headed toward the other end of the apartments but stopped to talk to Newhard, who was walking on the main road. Officer Bartholomew pr oceeded into the area around the highernumbered apartments. A man standing out side of his apartment directed the
officer to the area where the assault had occurred. {¶ 11} As Officer Bartholomew approach ed a group of males, Robinson
came toward him and told him he needed to leave. Officer Bartholomew radioed Officer Collier for assistance. A few minutes after Officer Collier arrived, the officers were able to ask for an ambulance. After speaking with the people involved, the police cited Robinson for disorderly conduct, and Antonio was taken to the hospital. {¶ 12} The Union County Grand Jury indi cted Robinson for the felonious assault of Antonio, disruptin g public services in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3), and intimidation of a victim of a crime. The felonious-assault charge was dismissed upon the state’s motion after Ant onio moved to Arizona and refused to voluntarily return to Ohio to testify. That charge is not at issue in this appeal. {¶ 13} The case proceeded to trial on the remaining charges, and the jury returned a verdict finding Robinson guilty of disrupting public services in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) and guilt y of intimidation of a victim in a
criminal case in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B). Robinson was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment for disrupting public services and two years for intimidation of a victim, with the sentences to run concurrently. {¶ 14} Robinson appealed to the Third Dist rict Court of Appeals, arguing that the verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence and notJanuary Term, 2009

5 supported by sufficient evidence. The Thir d District affirmed the conviction for
intimidation of a victim but reversed Robinson’s conviction for disruption of public services. State v. Robinson , 177 Ohio App.3d 560, 2008-Ohio-4160, 895 N.E.2d 262. The court of appeals held that R.C. 2909.04(A) clearly and unambiguously prohibits substantial inte rference with public emergency systems and utilities, not the destruction of a single private telephone or cell phone. Id. at ¶ 25. {¶ 15} The Third District Court of Appeals recognized that its decision is
in conflict with decisions of the cour ts of appeals for the Second, Fifth, and Eighth districts that hold that dest ruction of a private telephone constitutes disruption of public services. 1 Id. at ¶ 30. The Third District further held that even if destruction of a cell phone cons tituted disruption of public services, the state failed to prove the element of substantial impairment because the officers arrived at the scene of the assault within a few minutes of being dispatched. Id. at ¶ 31, 33. {¶ 16} We recognized the conflict between the courts of appeals and asserted jurisdiction over the state’s discre tionary appeal, and we consolidated the appeals. State v. Robinson , 120 Ohio St.3d 1452, 2008-Ohio-6813, 898 N.E.2d 967. In the certified conflict, we are aske d to determine whether the damaging of a single private telephone or cellula r telephone disrupts public services sufficiently to constitute a violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3). 120 Ohio St.3d 1451, 2008-Ohio-6813, 898 N.E.2d 966. The state’s di scretionary appeal requires us to
determine whether the destruction of a single private tele phone or cellular phone substantially impairs the ability of law-enforcement officers, firefighters, rescue

1. The court of appeals certified that its decision was in conflict with the judgments rendered in State v. Yoakum (Jan. 17, 2002), 5th Dist. No. 01CA005, 2002 WL 63696; State v. Thomas , 2nd Dist. No. 19435, 2003-Ohio-5746; State v. Johnson , 8th Dist. Nos. 81692 and 81693, 2003-Ohio3241; and State v. Brown (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 293, 646 N.E.2d 838.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 personnel, emergency-medical-services personnel, or emergency-facility personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and preserve any person or property from serious physical harm. Robinson , 120 Ohio St.3d 1452, 2008- Ohio-6813, 898 N.E.2d 967. {¶ 17} We answer the certified question in the affirmative and further hold that Robinson substantially impaired the ability of law-enforcement officers and emergency-medical-services pers onnel to respond to the 9-1-1 call. Analysis Disruption of Public Services {¶ 18} Initially, we must decide whether the damaging of a single private telephone or cellular telephone constitutes a violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3). The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 11. In interpreting a statute, th is court has held th at “the intent of the lawmakers is to be sought first of all in the language employed, and if the words be free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly, and distinctly the sense of the lawmaking body, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.” Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 19} We find that the language of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) is plain and unambiguous. Robinson was convicted of disrupting public services under R.C. 2909.04, which provides as follows: {¶ 20} “(A) No person, purposely by any means or knowingly by damaging or tampering with any property, shall do any of the following: {¶ 21} “ * * * {¶ 22} “(3) Substantially impair the ability of law enforcement officers, firefighters, rescue personnel, emerge ncy medical services personnel, orJanuary Term, 2009

7 emergency facility personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and preserve any person or property from serious physical harm.” {¶ 23} The language in R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) is clear in that it prohibits (1) conduct that substantially impairs the abilit y of emergency-services personnel (2) to either respond to an emergency or pr otect and preserve any person or property from serious physical harm. The statute unambiguously specifies that in order for one to disrupt public services under R.C. 2909.04(A)(3), the conduct involved must be the knowing damaging of or tampering with any property. {¶ 24} The word “property” is defined in R.C. 2901.01(A)(10)(a) as
follows: {¶ 25} “ ‘Property’ means any property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, and any interest or license in th at property. ‘Property’ includes, but is
not limited to * * * telecommunications devices * * *.” {¶ 26} R.C. 2901.01(A)(10)(c) provides that the term “telecommunications device,” as it is us ed in division (A)(10), has the same meaning as in R.C. 2913.01. {¶ 27} “Telecommunications device” is defined in R.C. 2913.01(Y) as: {¶ 28} “[A]ny instrument, equipment, machine, or other device that facilitates telecommunication, including, but not limited to, a computer, computer network, computer chip, com puter circuit, scanner, telephone, cellular telephone
, pager, personal communications device, tr ansponder, receiver, radio, modem, or device that enables the use of a modem.” (Emphasis added.) {¶ 29} In accordance with the foregoin g statutory provisions, a private telephone or cellular telephone constitutes property as the word is used in R.C. 2909.04(A). Therefore, the destruction of a private telephone or cellular telephone constitutes damaging or tampering with property under R.C. 2909.04(A).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 {¶ 30} The plain language of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) does not limit its application to the interference with public emergency systems and utilities on a large scale, as the Third District found. Division (A)(3) of R.C. 2909.04 does not contain any reference to the words “public emergency systems” or “utilities.” Thus, the Third District’s interpretation that the statute does not apply to the destruction of a single pr ivate telephone or cellular telephone is not a sound reading of the plain language. {¶ 31} Despite finding that the statutory language is unambiguous, the court of appeals reviewed the legisl ative history of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) and examined the statute in pari materia with subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2). 177 Ohio App.3d 560, 2008-Ohio-4160, 895 N.E.2d 262, ¶ 25-26. Because the language of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) is clear, it is not nece ssary to resort to other means of interpretation as the court of appeals did. Slingluff , 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, at paragraph two of the syllabus. We ther efore decline to resort to other means of interpreting the statute. {¶ 32} For the reasons stated above, we hold that the damaging of a single private telephone or cellular telephon e constitutes a violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) if the conduct substantially impairs the ability of law-enforcement officers, firefighters, rescue personnel, emergency-medical-services personnel, or emergency-facility personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and preserve any person or property from serious physical harm. Substantial Impairment {¶ 33} The remaining issue for our consideration is whether the
destruction of Antonio Robinson’s ce llular phone substantially impaired the ability of law-enforcement officers and emergency personnel to respond to Antonio’s 9-1-1 call or to protect and preserve any person or property from serious physical harm. The court of a ppeals held that Robinson’s conviction for disrupting public services was not supported by sufficient evidence, because theJanuary Term, 2009

9 officers arrived on the scene of the assau lt within minutes of being dispatched. 177 Ohio App.3d 560, 2008-Ohio-4160, 895 N. E.2d 262, ¶ 33-34. The appellate
court therefore found that the destructi on of the cell phone did not substantially impair the ability of emergency service provi ders to respond to the incident. Id. We disagree. {¶ 34} In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law, “[t] he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most fa vorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essentia l elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560. In Jenks, we emphasized that “[w]here
reasonable minds can reach different conclusions upon conflicting evidence, determination as to what occurred is a question for the trier of fact. It is not the function of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder. Rather, upon appellate review, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id. at 279. {¶ 35} The determination as to whether there was sufficient evidence to support Robinson’s conviction for disruption of public services in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) turns solely on whethe r the destruction of Antonio’s cell phone substantially impaired the ability of the law-enforcement officers and emergency medical personnel to respond to Antonio’s 9-1-1 call. 2 The phrase “substantially impaired” is not defined in the Revised Code, and thus it must be given the meaning generally understood in common usage. State v. Zeh (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 99, 103, 31 OBR 263, 509 N.E.2d 414.

2. For purposes of this appeal, Robinson does not dispute that sufficient evidence existed to prove the other elements of his disruption-of-public-services conviction.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 {¶ 36} Applying this principle, the term “substantial” is commonly understood to mean “not seeming or imagina ry,” “not illusive,” “considerable in amount,” and “being that specified to a la rge degree or in the main.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary ( 1986) 2280. “Impair” means “to make worse” or “diminish in quantity, value, ex cellence, or strength.” Id. at 1131. A rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the destruction of Antonio’s phone considerably diminished th e ability of the police and emergency medical personnel to respond to the 9-1-1 call. {¶ 37} Both the appellate court and Robinson focused on the fact that the
officers arrived on the scene within mi nutes of being dispatched as being dispositive of whether the officers’ ability to respond was substantially impaired. R.C. 2909.04(A)(3), however, does not require proof of a substa ntial impairment
of the officers’ response time . The pertinent inquiry is directed toward their ability to respond

. {¶ 38} Antonio was able to tell the 9-1-1 dispatcher only that he was at the Meadows and that his face had been injured. When Robinson smashed the phone and disconnected the call, the dispat cher was attempting to elicit a more specific location from Antonio. The impor tance of emergency-services personnel knowing a caller’s exact location is critical so that police and medical responders can reach the location as quickly as possible. This is especially true in the case of a suspected assault, when the officers must reach the scene of the incident and make sure it is safe before they can a llow emergency medical personnel to attend to the victim’s injuries. It is additionally important for emergency personnel to reach the victim immediately to prevent further harm to the victim. {¶ 39} The significance of the 9-1-1 dispatcher obtaining a caller’s precise location is further exhibited by comment s made by the dispatcher when Hoge made the second call to 9-1-1. The disp atcher repeatedly asked Hoge for herJanuary Term, 2009

11 exact location and emphasized that em ergency personnel could not help her unless they had a more specific location. {¶ 40} As a result of the negligible information that Antonio was able to provide to the 9-1-1 dispatcher before Robinson destroyed the cell phone, the police could not go directly to the scene of the incident. Rather, the police had to search a large apartment complex and question bystanders before locating Antonio. While the police were attempting to respond to Antonio’s request for help, Robinson continued to strike Antonio. Also during this time frame, Robinson threatened physical harm if anyone called police, which the jury found
sufficient to sustain an additional convi ction for intimidation of a victim. Once Officer Bartholomew eventually f ound Antonio, it took an additional few moments for him to call for backup and asse ss the situation before he was able to call for an ambulance. Under the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for the jury to determine that the delay in locating Antonio substantially impaired the officers’ ability to respond to Antonio’s call. {¶ 41} Additional factors support a finding that Robinson’s destruction of the cell phone substantially impaired the ability of emergency personnel to respond to Antonio’s 9-1-1 call. The o fficers had to presume that Antonio had been the victim of an assault based upon the content of the calls to 9-1-1. However, the officers did not know whethe r an assault had actually occurred, how the assault occurred, the extent of Anto nio’s injuries, how many people were involved in the incident, or whether the pe rpetrator or perpetrators had weapons. As a result, they did not know how many officers were needed on the scene or what type of medical assistance was necessary. The inability to get the required information created a safety issue not only for the 9-1-1- caller but also for the police officers, the emergency responders, and the public. The information was significant to the officers’ ability to res pond to Antonio’s 9-1-1 call, and the lack of information substantially impaired the officers’ ability to respond to the call.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 {¶ 42} The jury was appropriately inst ructed that in order to find Robinson guilty of disrupting public services, it had to find that he “did knowingly by damaging or tampering with any property substantially impair the ability of law enforcement officers, fire fighters, rescue personnel, emergency medical services personnel, or emergenc y facility personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and preserve any person or property from serious physical harm.” The trial court reemphasized that there must have been a substantial impairment when it defined the term “knowingly.” {¶ 43} Applying the jury instructions to the evidence, the jury could have rationally found beyond a reasonable doubt that Robinson’s destruction of Antonio’s phone substantially impaired th e ability of emergency personnel to respond to the 9-1-1 call. By focusing solely on the length of the delay in reaching Antonio, the Third District errone ously substituted its judgment for that of the jury and failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. {¶ 44} For the reasons stated above, we hold that Robinson’s conductsubstantially impaired the ability of law-enforcement officers and emergencymedical-services personnel to re spond to Antonio’s 9-1-1 call.
Conclusion {¶ 45} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the damaging of a single private telephone or cellula r telephone disrupts public se rvices in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3) if that conduct substa ntially impairs the ability of lawenforcement officers, firefighters, rescue personnel, emergency-medical-services personnel, or emergency-facility personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and preserve any person or prope rty from serious physical harm. We
further hold that Robinson’s conduct subs tantially impaired the ability of lawenforcement officers and emergency-me dical-services personnel to respond.January Term, 2009

13 {¶ 46} We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial cour t convicting Robinson of disrupting public services in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3). Judgment reversed.
M OYER , C.J., and P FEIFER , L UNDBERG S TRATTON , O’D ONNELL , L ANZINGER , and C UPP , JJ., concur.

__________________ David W. Phillips III, Union County Prosecuting Attorney, and Melissa A. Chase, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, Elisabeth A. Long, Deputy Solicitor, and Lori J. Weisman, Assistant Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Attorney General of Ohio.

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