NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONALD FRANK FIDGE,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF ’ S DEPARTMENT, AKA Lake County Sheriff ’ s Office; et al.,
Defendants

- Appellees. No. 15

- 17000
D.C. No. 4:13

- cv - 05182

- YGR

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 8, 2017 **
Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS , Circuit Judges.
Ronald Frank Fid ge appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising out of his arrest for trespassing

. We have juris diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Fidge’s request s for oral argument, set forth in his opening and reply brief s , are denied. 

# FILED

MAR 20 2017 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 15

- 17000

rev iew de novo

. Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego , 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul , 547 F.3d 1055, 1058

- 59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm. Summary judgment for Deputy Wright on Fidge’s unlawful arrest claim was
proper because Fidge failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Wright arrested him without probable cause. See United States v.
Gonzales , 749 F.2d 1329, 1337 (9th Cir. 1984) (probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists if “under the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that the suspect had committ ed a crime”)

. The district court pr operly granted summary judgmen t for Gask e ll, Hardester, and Harper on Fidge’ s unlawful arrest claim because Fidge failed to
raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether these defendant s acted under
the color of state law. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp. , 865 F.2d 1539, 1540 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (“ Private parties act under color of state law if they willfully participate in joint action with state officials to deprive others of constitutional rights. ”); see also Jones v. Williams , 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) ( t o establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an action occurred under color of state law and resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right).3 15

- 17000

To the extent that Fidge challenges summary judgment for Deputy Wright

on Fidge’s excessive force cla im , the district court properly granted summary judgment because Fidge failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether Deputy Wright’s use of less

- lethal force to effectuate Fidge’s arrest
violated Fidge’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Gra ham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (explaining that the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment requires “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, [and] whether

. . . [the arrestee] is actively resisting arrest . . . .” ). To the extent that Fidge alleges a claim under Monell v. Department of
Social Services , 436 U.S. 658 (1978), summary judgment was proper because Fidge failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether there was any underlying constitutional violation or whether actions were taken pursuant to established custom or policy. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller , 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) ( Monell liability is unavailable “[i]f a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer [.] ” ); Henry v. County of Shasta , 132 F.3d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1997) (municipal defendant can only be liable under § 1983 if actions were taken pursuant to custom or policy)

. Dismissal of Fidge’s false imprisonment claim against Lake County w as proper because the district court granted summary judgment for Deputy Wright on4 15

- 17000

this claim. See Cameron v. Craig , 713 F.3d 1012, 1023

- 24 (9th Cir. 2013) ( county is vicariously liable if a plaintiff prevails on a state law claim against a county employee). We reject as without merit Fidge’s contention that the district court improperly considered hearsay evidence submitted by defendants in support of
their motions for summary judgment

. Contrary to Fidge’s contention, the record reflects that the district court
considered Fidge’s evidence submitted in opposition to summary judgment. We reject as unsupported by the record Fidge’s contentions regarding alleged judicial bias.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). Fidg e’s motion to take judicial notice of documents (Docket Entry No. 45) is
denied. Fidge’s request for reassignment of the district court judge , set forth in his opening brief, is denied.
AFFIRMED.