COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Elder and Fitzpatrick 

CAROLINE SJOBLOM 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0204-97-4 PER CURIAM 

 JULY 29, 1997 

THOMAS SJOBLOM 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

M. Langhorne Keith, Judge 

 (Ilona Ely (Freedman) Grenadier; Benton S. 

Duffett, III; Grenadier, Davis & Simpson, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 (James Ray Cottrell; Christopher W. 

Schinstock; Gannon, Cottrell & Ward, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Caroline Sjoblom (wife) appeals the decision of the circuit 

court ordering Thomas Sjoblom (husband) to pay $50,000 in a lump 

sum spousal support and $3,000 in attorney's fees. Wife contends 

that the trial court erred by (1) failing to award permanent 

periodic spousal support; (2) awarding only $50,000 in lump sum 

support; (3) requiring wife to show a change in circumstances at 

the expiration of the lump sum award to receive periodic spousal 

support; and (4) awarding insufficient attorney's fees in light 

of the parties' circumstances and conduct during litigation. By 

way of cross-error, husband contends the trial court erred by 

denying him the right to discover evidence of wife's prior 

marriages and, possibly, prior deceptive practices. Upon 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that 

this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm 

the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. 

 I. 

 Based upon the evidence presented by the parties, including 

the parties' large accumulation of debt in the course of a 

four-year marriage, the trial court ruled that the circumstances 

warranted the award to wife of $50,000 in lump sum spousal 

support, paid at the rate of $1,250 two times a month. The court 

reviewed the statutory factors set out in Code § 20-107.1, 

including the parties' financial needs, earning capacities, 

health, and the inflated standard of living established during 

the marriage. 

 In awarding spousal support, the chancellor 

must consider the relative needs and 

abilities of the parties. He is guided by 

the nine factors that are set forth in Code 

§ 20-107.1. When the chancellor has given 

due consideration to these factors, his 

determination will not be disturbed on appeal 

except for a clear abuse of discretion. 

Collier v. Collier, 2 Va. App. 125, 129, 341 S.E.2d 827, 829 

(1986). 

 Based in part on wife's health problems and her expressed 

desire to enter the design field despite her current lack of 

training, the court determined that wife needed "an assured 

source of financial support, not subject to modification." The 

court adequately considered the statutory factors prior to 

reaching this determination, which is supported by the evidence. 
 3 

 We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's lump sum 

spousal support award. 

 II. 

 Wife claims that the lump sum award is inadequate to meet 

her immediate or foreseeable future needs and that the only 

appropriate form of support for her is permanent periodic 

payments. As noted above, the court did not err in awarding wife 

a lump sum award assuring her undiminished payments for a set 

period of time. 

 Moreover, we find no evidence that the awarded amount was 

erroneous. The court balanced husband's ability to pay against 

wife's needs. See Floyd v. Floyd, 1 Va. App. 42, 45, 333 S.E.2d 

364, 366 (1985). Husband's gross monthly earnings were 

approximately $7,977. The court stated that "[husband] has more 

earning capacity [than wife] but he is not a bottomless well." 

The trial court required husband to pay $16,585, or two-thirds, 

of the parties' marital debt. Wife never held steady employment 

during the marriage and had no employment at the time of the 

hearing. Wife listed monthly expenses of $5,500. The court 

noted that the parties spent wife's medical malpractice 

settlement award of $263,000 in a little over a year, that both 

parties spent money recklessly, and that wife "bears equal if not 

more responsibility for the running up of debt." We cannot say 

the trial court's award of $50,000, payable at the rate of $2,500 

per month, was erroneous. 
 4 

 III. 

 Wife also contends that the trial court erred in restricting 

her right to receive additional support until the completion of 

the lump sum payout and in requiring her to then show a change in 

circumstances. The court's letter opinion provided that 

"[b]ecause of the intrinsic elements of uncertainty in making a 

lump sum award, the Court will also reserve the right of [wife] 

to receive additional spousal support at the expiration of the 

above award in the event of a change in circumstances." Thus, 

the order is a reservation to wife of the right to additional 

support if it is warranted after the final payment of the lump 

sum support award. See Poliquin v. Poliquin, 12 Va. App. 676, 

681, 406 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1991); Blank v. Blank, 10 Va. App. 1, 

6, 389 S.E.2d 723, 726 (1990). 

 Wife herself argues that there is no way to know the period 

for which she will need support. The court's award assures her a 

steady stream of income for a set period of time, and provides 

for the possibility she may receive additional support if needed 

beyond that time. The lump sum also addresses husband's need for 

stability as he establishes improved financial footing. 

Therefore, we find no error. 

 IV. 

 An award of attorney's fees is a matter submitted to the 

sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewable on appeal 

only for an abuse of discretion. See Graves v. Graves, 4 Va. 
 5 

App. 326, 333, 357 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1987). The key to a proper 

award of counsel fees is reasonableness under all the 

circumstances. See McGinnis v. McGinnis, 1 Va. App. 272, 277, 

338 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1985). 

 Wife incurred $62,000 in attorney's fees and expenses, and 

husband incurred at least $40,000. The court noted that "[b]oth 

parties over-litigated this case," that wife "incurred some 

[$]37,000.00 of expenses for a forensic accountant who did not 

testify," and that both parties "share at least equal 

responsibility for such remarkable attorneys fees." Recognizing 

that husband had the greater ability to pay, the court ordered 

him to pay $3,000 of wife's fees. We cannot say that the award 

was unreasonable or that the trial judge abused his discretion in 

making the award. 

 V. 

 We find no reversible error in the trial court's decision to 

limit husband's discovery. The sole issues remaining at trial 

were spousal support, equitable distribution and attorney's fees, 

as the parties agreed to a one-year separation as the basis for 

their divorce. The court allowed husband to introduce evidence 

relevant to wife's credibility, including that wife had been 

married at least six times but did not disclose the actual number 

of her previous marriages to husband. The parties also 

introduced financial information concerning the assets wife 

brought into the marriage and her past work experience. Husband 
 6 

sought to explore wife's alleged wrongdoing in previous 

marriages. We cannot say that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it required husband to limit his discovery to 

matters relevant to the outstanding property-related issues of 

the parties' marriage. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.