alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### RODRIGUEZ v. RODRIGUEZ.

No. 11465.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

Feb. 7, 1945.

Rehearing Denied March 7, 1945.

Leo N. Duran, of Corpus Christi, for appellant.

Lloyd & Lloyd, of Alice, for appellee.

MURRAY, Justice.

This is a divorce suit instituted by Santos G. Rodriguez against his wife, Concepcion Fuentes Rodriguez. The trial court granted the divorce and the wife has appealed.

The evidence shows that the parties were married December 29, 1940, and separated October 5, 1941. During the time they lived together they did not get along well, but their troubles amounted to nothing more than family quarrels and arguments. Ap-pellee joined the army on March 16, 1942, and is still serving in the army, being stationed in California. He was forced to make the usual allotment to his wife. This suit was not filed until September 23, 1943.

The evidence is not sufficient to establish cruel treatment such as would render their further living together as man and wife insupportable.

In Blake v. Blake, Tex.Civ.App., 263 S. W. 1075, 1076, Chief Justice Fly, in speaking for this Court, said:

“[The statutory provision,] ‘Where either the husband or wife is guilty of excesses, cr'uel treatment or outrages toward the other, if such ill treatment is of such a nature as to render their living together insupportable.’ *. * * should be strictly construed, and not so as to mean incompatibility and so as to include every whim or love of change, or the desire to marry ¡fume one else, or anything except such excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages as would render living together insupportable, meaning unendurable, intolerable, insufferable.”

See also 15 Tex.Jur., § 14, p. 450; McAlister v. McAlister, 71 Tex. 695, 10 S.W. 294; Warfield v. Warfield, Tex.Civ.App., 161 S.W.2d 533; McCullough v. McCullough, 120 Tex. 209, 36 S.W.2d 459; Aylesworth v. Aylesworth, Tex.Civ.App., 292 S.W. 963.

The judgment of the trial court will be reversed and judgment here rendered denying the divorce.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-6857

RAYMOND GRIFFIN,

 Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

DONNIE HARRISON; OFFICER GILLIAM; OFFICER LAMAR; SERGEANT 

BRIDGES; OFFICER BEY-ADAMS; SERGEANT SMITH; OFFICER

HAMMONDS; JOHN AND JANE DOE,

 Defendants – Appellees,

and

CAPTAIN STEINBECK,

 Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever, III, 

Chief District Judge. (5:15-ct-03276-D)

Submitted: October 13, 2016 Decided: October 18, 2016

Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Raymond Griffin, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Raymond Griffin seeks to appeal the district court’s order 

dismissing, in part, Griffin’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) 

complaint. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final 

orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and 

collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-

46 (1949). The order Griffin seeks to appeal is neither a final 

order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. 

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, *v.*James F. McManus, Defendant.

City Magistrates’ Court of the City of New York, Borough of Queens,

August 3, 1956.

*973
      *Patrick J. Falvey*for plaintiff.

*James F. McManus,*defendant in person.

Milton Solomon, M.

The defendant is charged with violation of subdivision 8 of section 1 of the New York Port Authority Traffic Rules (L. 1951, ch. 206), in that he did park or stand a vehicle in a metered parking space at a time when the parking meter, number 73, displayed a sign or signal showing violation. The defendant raised questions of law and also questions the constitutionality of the section and law involved. A number of exhibits are in evidence; number of resolutions adopted by the Port of New York Authority and testimony was taken, from the officer who served the summons and placed it on the defendant’s automobile.

The court finds as a matter of law that the metered parking space in question is an air terminal highway within the meaning of the section. The court also finds as a matter of law that the Port of New York Authority has the right to install parking meters and collect specified fees for limited parking. The court further finds that the charge and limited parking are not unreasonable or excessive.

Under section 130 of the New York City Criminal Courts Act, specifying the power of the city magistrate, under subdivision n, this court is clothed with the authority to hear and determine a case of this kind. That section reads as follows: “ Any violation, within the city of New York, of an order, rule or regulation of the Port of New York Authority, which is punishable as an offense triable in a magistrate’s court.” Under section 102-a of the New York City Criminal Courts Act, city magistrates have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any complaint alleging the violation of any provision of law, rule or regulation relating to vehicular or pedestrian traffic. I think it is on page 14 of the Rules and Regulations of the Port of New York Authority where prescribed penalties and punishment appear, and under that section it refers, as I recall it, to the same penalties as would be involved if it were committed in a municipality on any of the streets or highways.

However, in view of the fact that in the court’s opinion, the defendant here did act in good faith in questioning the constitutionality of the law involved as well as the law itself, the sentence of the court is, suspended sentence.
Exhibit ‘D’

Subject to Protective Order. Provided to Court for in camera review pursuant to 

Order. 

Case 5:20-cv-00746-JKP Document 112-4 Filed 10/27/22 Page 1 of 1
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATIONS

I,
Barry C. Kohn, certify that:

1.        I
have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Vertis, Inc.;

2.        Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.        Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.        The
registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the
registrant and have:



5.        The
registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and
the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



| |  | /s/BARRY C. KOHNName: Barry C. KohnTitle: Chief Financial Officer
| |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------

Date: April 3, 2008

---



QuickLinks
#### In the Matter of Abraham Schoen, Petitioner, against Joseph Schechter et al., Constituting the Department of Personnel and City Civil Service Commission for the City of New York, Respondents.

Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County,

December 5, 1957.

*A. Marh Levien*for petitioner.

*Peter Campbell Brown, Corporation Counsel,*for respondents.

Irvihg H. Saypol, J.

The petitioner’s application for an order under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act was denied on March 19, 1956 (N. Y. L. J., March 20, 1956, p. 7, col. 1), with direction to settle order. Counter orders were not submitted until a year and a half later on October 29, 1957. The application was deemed abandoned and signature was declined pursuant to the Special Rule as to Long Form Order, effective April 19, 1955. (N. Y. L. J., Oct. 31, 1957, p. 5, col. 8; see, also, the separate Rule III, subd. 10, of the rules of this court, added March 1, 1955.)

The respondents have presented another order with a supporting affidavit which states that petitioner’s original counsel has been substituted, that new counsel has instituted another proceeding and that the contemplated defense of *res judicata*can only rest on entry of the proposed order. It is urged that the rule for abandonment of a motion can have no application to a special proceeding. The petitioner reverses his position, opposes the entry of the order and argues that the rule is applicable to all motions and orders.

I am satisfied that the rule has no application to a final order in a special proceeding. Such an order lays the basis for the judgment in the special proceeding and the language of the statute, sections 1300 to 1303 inclusive of the Civil Practice Act, supports that view. It decrees a final enforcible remedy as distinguished from the usual order on motion within an action or special proceeding. *(Matter of La Fountain*v. *Todd,*259 *824App. Div. 788; *Matter*of *Rosenthal*v. *Graves,*168 Misc. 845.) There is no statutory limitation of time for entry of judgment; it is doubtful that any such restriction could validly be imposed by rule.

The respondents’ order has been signed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
REGISTRANT'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31, 1998, AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                              12
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      322
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        482
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   884
<PP&E>                                             482
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    1737
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              499
<BONDS>                                            216
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            38
<OTHER-SE>                                         496
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                      1737
<SALES>                                            485
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   485
<CGS>                                              319
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      400
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   8
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     78
<INCOME-TAX>                                        27
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 51
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                        51
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .89
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .88
        

</TABLE>
#### James Serino, Respondent, v Miller Brewing Company, Appellant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, et al., Defendant. Riley Stoker Corporation, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant, et al., Third-Party Defendant.

(Appeal No. 1.)

Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Same memorandum as in *Serino v Miller Brewing Co.*([appeal No. 2] 167 AD2d 917 [decided herewith]). (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Oswego County, Miller, J.—amended complaint.) Present—Callahan, J. P., Doerr, Boomer, Green and Balio, JJ.
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS

Appeal of - )

)

FutureNet Group, Inc. ) ASBCA No. 62066

)

Under Contract No. W912P6-12-C-0024 )

APPEARANCE FOR THE APPELLANT: Kevin M. Cox, Esq.

 Camardo Law Firm, P.C.

 Auburn, NY

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Michael P. Goodman, Esq.

 Engineer Chief Trial Attorney

Kevin J. Jerbi, Esq.

 Engineer Trial Attorney

 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Chicago District

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

The dispute has been settled. The appeal is dismissed with prejudice.

Dated: September 9, 2021

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Order of Dismissal of the Armed 

Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 62066, Appeal of FutureNet Group, 

Inc., rendered in conformance with the Board’s Charter.

Dated: September 9, 2021 

J. REID PROUTY

Administrative Judge

Vice Chairman

Armed Services Board

of Contract Appeals

PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS

Recorder, Armed Services

Board of Contract Appeals
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 203 (Thursday, October 19, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 62737-62738]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-26858]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Cancer Institute; Notice of Closed Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended (5 U.S.C. Appendix 2), notice is hereby given of the following 
meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Cancer Institute Special Emphasis 
Panel; Improving DNA, RNA, and Protein Availability in Fixed Tissue.
    Date: November 15, 2000.
    Time: 8 a.m. to 3 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: Ramada Inn Rockville, 1775 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 
20852.
    Contact Person: Gerald G. Lovinger, PhD, Scientific Review 
Administrator, Grants Review Branch, Division of Extramural 
Activities, National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of 
Health, 6116 Executive Boulevard, Room 8070, Rockville, MD 20892-
7405, 301/496-7987.


(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.392, 
Cancer Construction; 93.393, Cancer Cause and Prevention Research; 
93.394, Cancer Detection and Diagnosis Research; 93.395, Cancer 
Treatment Research; 93.396, Cancer Biology Research; 93.397, Cancer 
Centers Support;

[[Page 62738]]

93.398, Cancer Research Manpower; 93.399, Cancer Control, National 
Institutes of Health, HHS)

    Dated: October 11, 2000.
LaVerne Y. Stringfield,
Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 00-26858 Filed 10-18-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M
Bank of America
Bank of America Mortgage
101 E Main Street,
Suite 400 Box 35140
Louisville. Kentucky 40232 5140
Management's Assertion Concerning Compliance with USAF Minimum
Servicing Standards

March 7, 2003
As of and for the year ended December 31, 2002, BA Mortgage LLC,
and the Mortgage - division of Bank of America, N.A.
(collectively, the "Company"), which together comprise an
operating division of Bank of America, N .A., has complied in all
material respects with the minimum servicing standards set forth
in the Mortgage Bankers Association of America's Uniform Single
Attestation Program for Mortgage Bankers ("USAP").
As of and for this same period, the Company had in effect a
fidelity bond and errors and omissions policy in the amounts of
$400,000,000 and $475,000,000 respectively.

/s/Kevin M. Shannon

-------------------
Kevin M. Shannon
President Senior Vice President
Consumer Real Estate
Bank of America, N .A.

/s/H. Randall Chestnut

--------------------
H. Randall Chestnut
Senior Vice President
Bank of America, N .A.

/s/ David H. Rupp

---------------------
David H. Rupp
Senior Vice President
Bank of America, N.A.

/s/ Gary K. Bettin

---------------------
Gary K. Bettin
Senior Vice President
National Servicing Executive
Bank of America, N.A.

/s/ J. Mark Hanson

-------------------
J. Mark Hanson
Senior Vice President
Bank of America, N.A.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 22, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-51056

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CARLOS ORTEGA-HERNANDEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:04-CR-196-ALL

--------------------

Before WIENER, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Carlos OrtegaHernandez raises arguments that are foreclosed by AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held

that a prior conviction is a sentencing factor under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(b)(2) and not a separate criminal offense. The

Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Order filed April 4, 2013 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-13-00237-CV

____________

MICHAEL NORVIL, Appellant

V.

BANK OF AMERICA, Appellee

On Appeal from the Co Civil Ct at Law No 4

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1022597

ORDER

This appeal is from a judgment signed December 3, 2012. Appellant filed a 

timely motion for new trial. The notice of appeal was due March 4, 2013. See Tex. 

R. App. P. 26.1. Appellant, however, filed his notice of appeal on March 18, 2013, 

a date within 15 days of the due date for the notice of appeal. A motion for 

extension of time is Anecessarily implied@ when the perfecting instrument is filed 

within fifteen days of its due date. Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 

1997). Appellant did not file a motion to extend time to file the notice of appeal. 
While an extension may be implied, appellant is still obligated to come forward 

with a reasonable explanation to support the late filing. See Miller v. Greenpark 

Surgery Center Assocs., Ltd., 974 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th 

Dist.] 1998, no pet.). 

Accordingly, we ORDER appellant to file a proper motion to extend time to 

file the notice of appeal on or before 12 days after the date of this order. See Tex. 

R. App. P. 26.3;12.5(b). If appellant does not comply with this order, we will 

dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3.

PER CURIAM
#### COLLIER et al. v. HIGHTOWER OIL *&*REFINING CORPORATION.

No. 2755.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Eastland.

Dec. 9, 1949.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 6, 1950.

*463Frost & Frost, Eastland, for appellants.

Levie Old, Brownwood, for appellee.

LONG, Justice.

The parties will be designated as in the trial court. On the 25th day of September, 1947, plaintiff .and defendants entered into a written contract whereby plaintiff agreed to drill an oil and gas well for the defendants in Coleman County. Under the terms of the contract plaintiff agreed to furnish all tools, equipment, labor and casing except the oil string and any pipe which might be required by defendants or the Railroad Commission to be cemented permanently in the well. Plaintiff instituted this suit to recover from defendants for the following amounts alleged to be due under said drilling contract:

(1) 63 feet of 10 inch pipe at $5.00 per foot . $315.00

(2) 15 sacks of cement 15.00

(3) trucking cement 15.00

(4) paid Halliburton for cementing pipes 120.00

Total $465.00

Upon a trial before the court without a jury, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff against defendants for the sum of $465 from which judgment defendants have appealed.

Plaintiff drilled the well to the required depth and defendant paid the consideration therefor. This suit is to recover the cost of permanently cementing casing in the well. The contract provided that defendants were to pay extra for such casing in the event that it was required by the defendants or the Railroad Commission to be cemented permanently in the well. Plaintiff alleged that the casing was cemented in the well at the request of the ■ defendants. There is no proof in the record to sustain this allegation. On the contrary, the only evidence offered on that issue is that defendants did not instruct plaintiff to cement the casing in the well. There is no competent evidence in the record that the casing was cemented in the well under an order of the Railroad Commission. If there had been such testimony in the record, there was no pleading to sustain the judgment upon this theory. The only allegation in the plaintiff’s petition is that the pipe was cemented in the well under the instructions received by plaintiff from the defendants.

The judgment of the trial court not being based upon any pleading or competent evidence cannot stand and it, therefore, becomes our duty to reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court.

The judgment is reversed and remanded.
#### HARRISON v. STATE.

No. 23435.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 23, 1946.

Reid & Reid, of Abilene, for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

BEAUCHAMP, Judge.

Earnest Harrison was convicted on a charge that he had in his possession for the purpose of sale liquor, in violation of *934law, in Taylor County, Texas. He was assessed a fine of $100.

It appears that the search warrant was for a described apartment on the north side in a duplex at 1012 Cedar Street, and that the name of the occupant as well as a description of him were unknown. The officers testifying to the search warrant and presenting the whisky seizeti by them said that they secured it from a search of the premises situated at 1016 Cedar Street. Whether this number is the north apartment in a duplex and fits the description given in detail in the search warrant, so as to identify it, is not revealed. For that reason we think that the objection to the evidence as to the fruits of the search should have been sustained and that an instructed verdict should have been given on the ground of the variance thus revealed. See Balch v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 327, 115 S.W.2d 676, in which we find a very exhaustive and pointed discussion of the question in an opinion by Judge Christian.

Because of the variance pointed out, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded.