J-A10009-18  

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*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37  

LSF9 MASTER PARTICIPATION TRUST 

   v. 

 NORMAN ROSETSKY AND DIANE 

ROSETSKY A/K/A DIANA ROSETSKY A/K/A DIANE GOCHIN 

 APPEAL OF: DIANE GOCHIN 

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  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF            PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 471 EDA 2017 

Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 18, 2017 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at No(s):  2013-21495 

BEFORE:  GANTMAN, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and RANSOM*, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JUNE 21, 2018 

 Appellant, Diane Rosetsky a/k/a Diana Rosetsky a/k/a Diane Gochin, 

appeals pro se from the judgment entered in the Montgomery County Court 

of Common Pleas, in favor of Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (“Bayview”), 

predecessor in interest to Appellee, LSF9 Master Participation Trust (“Trust”),1 

in this mortgage foreclosure action.2  We affirm.   

 In its opinion, the trial court sets forth the relevant facts and 

procedurally history.  Therefore, we have no need to restate them.  We add 

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1 On September 19, 2017, Bayview filed in this Court an application to 

substitute Trust as plaintiff-appellee per Pa.R.C.P. 2352(a), which this Court granted on October 10, 2017.   

 2 Norman Rosetsky did not file a notice of appeal, and he is not a party to this 

appeal.   

J-A10009-18 

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Appellant filed an answer to the amended complaint on March 16, 2015.  

Bayview filed a motion for summary judgment on May 6, 2015.  On May 24, 

2015, Appellant filed counterclaims, to which Bayview filed preliminary 

objections on June 10, 2015.  The court sustained Bayview’s preliminary 

objections and dismissed Appellant’s counterclaims with prejudice on 

September 17, 2015.   

On January 3, 2017, the court entered summary judgment in favor of 

Bayview.  On January 16, 2017, Appellant filed a premature pro se notice of 

appeal.  Bayview subsequently filed a praecipe to enter judgment and assess 

damages, which the court entered on January 18, 2017.3  The court did not 

order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant filed none.   

 Appellant raises two issues for our review:  

DID THE TRIAL COURT FAIL TO ESTABLISH JURISDICTION 

AND THE STANDING OF [APPELLEES]?  

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR AND/OR ABUSE ITS 

DISCRETION IN THE GRANTING OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENIAL OF A JURY TRIAL AND OBSTRUCTING 

THE SUBMISSION OF A COUNTERCLAIM?[4] ____________________________________________ 

3 Appellant’s premature notice of appeal relates forward to January 18, 2017.  See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (stating notice of appeal filed after court’s 

determination but before entry of appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on date of entry).   

 4 To the extent Appellant raises an issue concerning her counterclaims, we 

interpret Appellant’s claim as a challenge to the court’s order sustaining Bayview’s preliminary objections to Appellant’s counterclaims and dismissing 

J-A10009-18 

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 (Appellant’s Brief at 8). 

 Initially we observe: 

Our scope of review of an order granting summary judgment 

is plenary.  We apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing all the evidence of record to determine whether 

there exists a genuine issue of material fact.  We view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 

and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party.  

Only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 

as a matter of law will summary judgment be entered.   

 Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly 

implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of [its] cause of action.  Summary judgment is proper if, after the 

completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will 

bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense 

which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury.  Thus, a record that supports summary judgment 

will either (1) show the material facts are undisputed or (2) contain insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima 

facie cause of action or defense and, therefore, there is no issue to be submitted to the jury.  Upon appellate review, 

we are not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law, but 

may reach our own conclusions.  The appellate Court may disturb the trial court’s order only upon an error of law or 

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the counterclaims with prejudice.  The record indicates Appellant did not file 

her counterclaims with her answer to the amended complaint.  Rather, Appellant filed her counterclaims separately more than two months after she 

filed her answer and after Bayview had filed its motion for summary judgment.  Appellant’s counterclaims were procedurally improper when filed.  Therefore, 

the trial court properly dismissed her counterclaims.  See Pa.R.C.P. 1031(a) (stating: “The defendant may set forth in the answer under the heading 

‘Counterclaim’ any cause of action cognizable in a civil action which the defendant has against the plaintiff at the time of filing the answer”).  Thus, 

we give this particular matter no further attention.   

J-A10009-18 

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an abuse of discretion.    

Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law on facts and circumstances before the trial court 

after hearing and consideration.  Consequently, the court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the issue for 

decision, it misapplies the law or exercises its discretion in a manner lacking reason.  Similarly, the 

trial court abuses its discretion if it does not follow legal procedure.   

 Where the discretion exercised by the trial court is 

challenged on appeal, the party bringing the challenge bears a heavy burden.   

It is not sufficient to persuade the appellate court that it might have reached a different conclusion 

if...charged with the duty imposed on the court below; it is necessary to go further and show an abuse of the 

discretionary power.  An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a 

conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the 

result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.   

 Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141, 145-46 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted).   

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Thomas C. 

Branca, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief.  The trial court opinion 

comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented.  

(See Trial Court Opinion, filed July 3, 2017, at 6-11) (finding: in her answer 

to amended complaint, Appellant admitted she had sole legal possession of 

mortgaged property and admitted her status as mortgagor in mortgage 

J-A10009-18 

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agreement; as result of Appellant’s failure to respond to certain other 

averments in amended complaint, Appellant was deemed to have admitted 

she had been in default since November 1, 2010, amount due on principal 

balance, and that she was sent requisite foreclosure notices; Appellant’s bald 

claims that MERS lacked authority to transfer note and mortgage and that 

Freddie Mac is owner of note have no merit; Appellant failed to cite supporting 

authority for claim MERS lacked authority to assign mortgage; also, when 

Appellant executed mortgage, she expressly granted MERS authority to 

transfer mortgage; Appellant’s claim that proper service had not been 

effectuated upon Norman Rosetsky also fails, because Appellant lacks 

standing to assert such claim on Mr. Rosetsky’s behalf; in her response to 

motion for summary judgment, Appellant failed to establish existence of issue 

of material fact; rather, Appellant repeated meritless claims from her answer 

to amended complaint and failed to attach or reference any evidence; even 

though court granted Appellant leave to conduct additional discovery after 

Bayview filed its summary judgment motion, Appellant failed to incorporate 

any such discovery into record to demonstrate genuine issue of material fact).  

The record supports the trial court’s rationale, and we see no reason to disturb 

it.  See Lineberger, supra.  Accordingly, we affirm. 

Judgment affirmed. 

J-A10009-18 

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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 6/21/18 

A 10 OD PHILA.11AY 02 2610ated 06/08/2018 01:24 PM 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW 

BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, ET AL. : 

Plaintiff : 

v. 

NORMAN ROSETSKY AND DIANA ROSETSKY, : 

A/KJA DIANE ROSETSKY, A/K/A DIANE GOCHIN: Defendants 

OPINION Branca, J. July 3, 2017 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Diane Rosetsky, a/k/a Diane Gochin ("Ms. Gochin") appeals from this Court's Order dated 

January 3, 2017, granting Plaintiff, Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC's ("Plaintiff") Motion for Summary 

Judgment to enter in rem judgment against Defendants, Ms. Gochin, and Mr. Rosetsky, for property 

NO. 13-21495 471 EDA 2017 

11111REAW Ill 2013-21495-0121 7.'312017 10:40 AM 4 11348036 

opinion 

Reptte3171075 Fee:$0.00 

Mark Levy - MontCo Prothonotary 

situate at 931 Thrush Lane, Huntingdon Valley, Pennsylvania (the "Property,")1 For the reasons that 

follow, the Court's Order should be AFFIRMED. 

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

The instant dispute arises from a Mortgage ("the Mortgage") securing the Property located at 931 

Thrush Lane, Huntingdon Valley, Pennsylvania, executed and entered into on November 20, 2006 by 

former husband and wife, Norman Rosetsky and Diane Gochin (collectively "Defendants,") and 

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc, ("MERS,") acting solely as nominee for Lender, Central 

[Order docketed 1/5/17]. Upon praecipe by Plaintiff, the Prothonotary entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants on January 18, 2017. Because Ms. Gochin proceeded pro se, and Mr. Rostesky never appeared, nor responded, despite proper service on him of the Act 9I/Act 6 Notices, the Amended Complaint, and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court took judicial notice of the parties' divorce action and Agreed Order entered into on January 15, 2009, granting Ms. Gochin exclusive possession of the underlying property, and evicting Mr. Rosetsky from the same; thus explaining Mr. Rosetsky's total disregard of the underlying proceedings. [See Montco. Civ. A. 2007-12909].