UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO DIVISION

LAURA RODRIGUEZ, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

 Defendant.

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 NO. EP-20-CV-00174-LS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff appeals the denial of her application for disability supplemental security income

benefits. The parties consent to my determination of the case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Appendix C of the Local Court Rules for the Western District of Texas. I AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision denying Rodriguez’s application.

I. Facts and Proceedings

Rodriguez alleges she became disabled on April 25, 20181 because of multiple physical 

impairments.2 An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing on May 2, 2019 and heard 

testimony from Rodriguez, who was represented by counsel, and a vocational expert (“VE”).

3 In 

an opinion dated July 24, 2019, the ALJ determined that Rodriguez was not disabled within the 

meaning of the Social Security Act.4 The Appeals Council denied her request for review on May

15, 2020, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.5 Rodriguez argues 

in this appeal that the ALJ erroneously disregarded her chronic pain syndrome diagnoses.

1 R:35. 2 R:224. 3 R:32-66. 4 R:16-24. 5 R:1-4.

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II. Discussion

A. Legal Standards

Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to two inquiries: (1) whether 

the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; and (2) whether the 

Commissioner applied the proper legal standard.

6 Substantial evidence “is more than a mere 

scintilla and less than a preponderance.”7 The Commissioner’s findings will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.8 In evaluating a disability claim, the Commissioner must follow a 

five-step sequential process to determine whether: (1) the claimant is presently working; (2) the 

claimant has a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment; (3) the claimant’s 

impairment meets or equals an impairment listed in the appendix to the regulations; (4) the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5) the claimant can perform 

other relevant work.9

Courts utilize four elements of proof to determine whether there is substantial evidence of 

disability: (1) objective medical evidence; (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining 

physicians; (3) the claimant’s subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) the claimant’s 

age, education, and work history.10 A court cannot, however, reweigh the evidence, try the issues 

de novo, or substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s.

11 The Commissioner, not the courts, 

must resolve conflicts in the evidence.12

6 Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 

(5th Cir. 2005)). 7 Hill v. Berryhill, 718 F. App’x 250, 253-54 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d

267, 272 (5th 2002)). 8 Masterson, 309 F.3d at 272. 9 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704-05 (5th Cir. 2001).

10 Perez, 415 F.3d at 462. 

11 Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000). 

12 Id.

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B. Residual Functional Capacity

Residual functional capacity, or RFC, is the most an individual can still do despite his or 

her limitations.13 The responsibility to determine a claimant’s RFC belongs to the ALJ.14 The 

ALJ must consider a claimant’s abilities despite his or her physical and mental limitations based 

on the relevant evidence in the record.15 The ALJ must consider the limiting effects of an individual’s impairments, even those that are non-severe, and any related symptoms.16 An RFC finding is used to determine if the claimant can still do his or her past jobs.17 If the claimant cannot, 

the RFC is then used to determine whether the claimant can do other jobs in the national economy.18

C. The ALJ’s Findings

In this case, the ALJ found that Rodriguez’s severe impairments were “degenerative disk 

disease of the lumbar and cervical spine, and hypertension.”19 They were not, however, individually or in combination severe enough to meet or equal an impairment listed in the appendix to 

the regulations.

20 The ALJ found that Rodriguez could still perform “light work,”21 including her 

past work as a wedding planner.

22 Accordingly, the ALJ found Rodriguez not disabled and not 

13 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). 14 Id. at § 416.946(c); Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 557 (5th Cir. 1995).

15 Perez, 415 F.3d at 461-62. 

16 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(d)(4), 416.945(a)(2). 17 Perez, 415 F.3d at 462; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). 18 Id. 19 R:18. 20 R:18. 21 R:22-23. “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying 

of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time 

with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or 

wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities.” 20 C.F.R. §

416.967(b). 22 R:23.

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entitled to supplemental security income.

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D. Chronic Pain Syndrome

Rodriguez’s sole argument is that “the ALJ disregarded the objective medical evidence of 

[Rodriguez’s] chronic pain syndrome.” I note initially that Rodriguez did not assert chronic pain 

syndrome as an ostensible basis for disability in her original application,

24 during her hearing 

before the ALJ,

25 or at the Appeals Council level.26 I also note that all medical records on which 

Rodriguez relies for her chronic pain syndrome argument predate her ostensible April 2018 disability onset date.

There are no medical records supporting a chronic pain syndrome diagnosis during the 

relevant time period, April 2018 to July 2019. Indeed, a July 2018 medical record does not even 

include chronic pain syndrome in Rodriguez’s “past medical history.”27 The doctor who conducted this July 2018 examination noted that Rodriguez was “general[ly] able to do usual activities, [had] good exercise tolerance, [had] good general state of health, no fatigue...[and] no 

weakness.”28 The ALJ concluded that these July 2018 records reflected no “significant physical 

deficits upon examination that would warrant any type of physical limitations upon the claimant’s physical functioning.”29 Moreover, as the ALJ’s opinion reflects, Rodriguez reported during a February 2019 examination no pain whatsoever, and no musculoskeletal or neurological 

problems.30 The examiner recorded that Rodriguez’s musculoskeletal and neurological exam 

23 R:24. 24 R:224.

25 R:35-36.

26 R:303-304.

27 R:1141.

28 R:1142.

29 R:21.

30 R:1217-18.

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findings were normal and unremarkable.31 These February 2019 records also omit altogether any 

reference to chronic pain syndrome in Rodriguez’s “past medical history.”32

Conclusion

My review of the record reflects that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision 

and there is no legal error.

AFFIRMED.

SIGNED and ENTERED March 10, 2022.

_ ________________________________

LEON SCHYDLOWER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

31 R:1219.

32 R:1216.

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