15-681 Sedunova v. City of New York



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT**



## SUMMARY ORDER

**R ULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT**  **. C**  **ITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED**
**ON OR AFTER J** **ANUARY 1,**  **2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY**  **F EDERAL**  **R ULE OF**  **A PPELLATE**  **P ROCEDURE**  **32.1 AND THIS COURT**  **’ S**  **L OCAL**  **R ULE**  **32.1.1. W**  **HEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A**
**DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT ,**  **A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE F**  **EDERAL A** **PPENDIX OR AN**
**ELECTRONIC DATABASE (**  **WITH THE NOTATION “**  **SUMMARY ORDER ”).**  **A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST** 
**SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL .**  **At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals** 1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United** 2 **States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,** 3 **on the 15 th** **day of June, two thousand sixteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,** 6 **BARRINGTON D. PARKER,** 7 **REENA RAGGI,** 8 **Circuit Judges**

**.** 9 10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 11 **NATASHA SEDUNOVA,** 12 **Plaintiff-Appellant ,**  13 14 **-v.- 15-681** 15 16 **CITY OF NEW YORK, MATTHEW COLLINS,** 17 **MICHAEL HOPKINS,** 18 **Defendants-Appellees ,**  19 20 **CHRIS ANDY GRARY, ANGELA MYERS, JOHN** 21 **and JANE DOES 1-10, (the names of** 22 **John and Jane doe being fictitious as** 23 **the true names are presently** 24 **unknown), JOHNE DOE 1-2, JOHN OR JANE** 25 **DOE 3-7, CHARLES HYNES, ED PURCE,** 26 **Defendants**

**.** 27 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 28

11 **FOR APPELLANT:** WILLIAM J. HARRINGTON, Goodwin 2 Procter LLP, New York, New York. 3 4 J. Andrew Kent, on the brief
, 5 Lincoln Square Legal Services at 6 Fordham Law School, New York, 7 New York. 8 9 **FOR APPELLEES:** INGRID R. GUSTAFSON (with 10 Richard Dearing and Devin Slack 11 on the brief), for Zachary W. 12 Carter, New York City 13 Corporation Counsel, New York, 14 New York. 15 16 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District 17 Court for the Eastern District of New York (Johnson, J. ). 18 19 **UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED** 20 **AND DECREED**that the judgment of the district court be 21
**AFFIRMED**

. 22 23 Plaintiff Natasha Sedunova appeals from the judgment of 24 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 25 New York (Johnson, J. ), dismissing her complaint for failure 26 to state a claim. The complaint alleges, under 42 U.S.C. 27 § 1983, that NYPD detectives Matthew Collins and Michael 28 Hopkins, and seven John Doe defendants (collectively, the 29 “defendants”) violated her civil rights, specifically, 30 (1) that she was denied a fair trial because her confession 31 was fabricated, and (2) that the knowing use of fabricated 32 evidence constituted a malicious prosecution. 33 34 We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for 35 failure to state a claim, and we accept all factual 36 allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in 37 favor of the plaintiff. N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. 38 Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC , 709 F.3d 109, 119 (2d Cir. 39 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 40 underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues 41 presented for review. 42 43 1. The plaintiff claims that her confession was 44 fabricated because it was produced as the result of coercive 45 interrogation techniques. When a police officer creates 46 false information likely to influence a jury’s decision and 47

2forwards that information to prosecutors, the accused’s 1 constitutional right to a fair trial is violated. See 2 Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. , 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 3 1997). 1Failure to administer Mirandawarnings alone cannot 4 serve as the basis of a § 1983 action; however, a § 1983 5 claim may arise if coercion was applied to obtain 6 inculpatory statements, and the statements thereby obtained 7 were used against the plaintiff in a criminal proceeding. 8 Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safir , 156 F.3d 340, 346 (2d 9 Cir. 1998) (citing Weaver v. Brenner , 40 F.3d 527, 535 (2d 10 Cir. 1994)); see alsoJocks v. Tavernier , 316 F.3d 128, 138 11 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Mirandaviolations, absent coercion, do not 12 rise to the level of constitutional violations actionable 13 under § 1983.”). 14 15 A plaintiff alleging coercion must allege more than 16 that police told her she was a suspect, suggested that it 17 would be to her benefit to cooperate, or promised leniency 18 in exchange for cooperation. See United States v. Ruggles
, 19 70 F.3d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1995). A plaintiff must point to 20 circumstances indicating that she could not make a knowing 21 and voluntary decision. See United States v. Taylor , 745 22 F.3d 15, 24 (2d Cir. 2014). 23 24 The factual allegations in this case, even accepted as 25 true and viewed in the light most favorable to Sedunova, do 26 not amount to coercion sufficient to sustain a § 1983 claim. 27 The salient allegations are that John Does 1 and 2 tried to 28 “convince” her that it would be “better for her” and “good 29 for her” if she confessed to the murder and claimed self30 defense, and that she was told that she would be “free to 31 leave” if she confessed. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32-35. None of the 32 allegations amount to circumstances under which the 33 plaintiff could not make a knowing and voluntary decision. 34 35

1 Although Sedunova attempts to plead a fabrication claim, she has not alleged that her confession was forged (she acknowledges that she made the videotaped confession and adopted the written confession), nor has she alleged any other circumstances that lead to a reasonable inference that any defendant knew her confession was false when made. See Ricciuti , 124 F.3d at 129-30. Accordingly, we analyze her claim as one alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment under § 1983.

32. The complaint also alleges that the knowing use of 1 the fabricated confession constituted a malicious 2 prosecution. SeeJocks , 316 F.3d at 138. However, as 3 discussed above, the fabrication claim is rejected because 4 the confession was not coerced. The use of the confession 5 therefore was not the use of fabricated evidence. 6 7 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in the 8 plaintiff’s other arguments, we hereby **AFFIRM** the judgment 9 of the district court. 10 11 FOR THE COURT: 12 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 13 14

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