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Alexander Lanham, appellant and cross-appellee, 

v. BNSF Railway Company, appellee 

and cross-appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed February 28, 2020. No. S-19-114.

1. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. When a jurisdictional 

question does not involve a factual dispute, determination of a jurisdictional issue is a matter of law which requires an appellate court to reach 

a conclusion independent from the trial court’s.

2. Constitutional Law: Due Process: Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases.

Personal jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal to subject and bind a 

particular person or entity to its decisions. This power is limited by the 

14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause because a state court’s assertion 

of jurisdiction exposes defendants to the state’s coercive power.

3. Constitutional Law: Due Process. The Due Process Clause protects an 

individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments 

of a forum with which he or she has established no meaningful contacts, 

ties, or relations.

4. Constitutional Law: Jurisdiction: Statutes: Due Process: States. A 

two-step analysis is used to determine whether a Nebraska court may 

validly exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. 

First, a court must consider whether Nebraska’s long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Second, a 

court must consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 

the defendant comports with due process.

5. Constitutional Law: Due Process: Jurisdiction: States: Appeal and 

Error. Nebraska’s long-arm statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-536 (Reissue 

2016), extends Nebraska’s jurisdiction over nonresidents having any 

contact with or maintaining any relation to this state as far as the U.S. 

Constitution permits. Thus, an appellate court needs only to look to the 

Due Process Clause when determining personal jurisdiction.

6. Due Process: Jurisdiction: States. Generally, the analysis of whether a 

court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant requires a determination 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

03/27/2020 08:08 AM CDT
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of whether the defendant’s minimum contacts with the forum state are 

such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into 

court there. However, this analysis is not required when the parties have 

consented to the exercise of personal jurisdiction.

7. Jurisdiction: Waiver. Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction 

represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, 

be waived.

8. ____: ____. In order to be valid, the waiver of the requirement of personal jurisdiction must, at the very least, be clear.

9. Due Process: Jurisdiction: Corporations. The Due Process Clause 

precludes a state from exercising general jurisdiction over a corporation 

that is not at home in the forum.

10. Jurisdiction: States: Corporations. Absent exceptional circumstances, 

a corporation is only at home in two places: the state in which it is 

incorporated and the state in which its principal place of business 

is located.

11. Jurisdiction: Corporations. A corporation’s registration under Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 21-19,152 (Reissue 2012) does not provide an independent 

basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Robert 

R. Otte, Judge. Reversed.

Corey L. Stull and Jeanette Stull, of Atwood, Holsten, 

Brown, Deaver & Spier, P.C., L.L.O, and Christopher H. 

Leach, of Hubbell Law Firm, L.L.C., for appellant.

Nichole S. Bogen, of Lamson, Dugan & Murray, L.L.P., 

Wayne L. Robbins, Jr., of Robbins Travis, P.L.L.C., and Andrew 

S. Tulemello, of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, L.L.P., for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Heavican, C.J.

INTRODUCTION

This is an appeal from a negligence action under the Federal 

Employers’ Liability Act (FELA).1 Appellant, Alexander 

Lanham, appeals the order of the district court for Lancaster 

1 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 through 60 (2012).
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County, Nebraska, granting summary judgment in favor of 

appellee, BNSF Railway Company (BNSF). BNSF crossappeals, arguing the district court erred in holding that it 

had personal jurisdiction over BNSF. We reverse the district 

court’s order overruling BNSF’s motion to dismiss for lack 

of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

On January 16, 2014, Lanham was seriously injured while 

working for his employer, BNSF, on a section of train tracks 

near Houston, Texas. Lanham generally worked for BNSF as 

a track laborer on a rail production “gang” in Iowa, Nebraska, 

and Minnesota. Rail production gangs work to repair and 

replace rail on train tracks. Lanham’s regular gang “shut down” 

during the winter months. To avoid a layoff during the winter 

of 2013, Lanham bid for a position replacing railroad ties in 

Texas, with the intent to return to his regular rail gang position 

when it opened back up in March. Lanham was working on 

a section of train tracks in Texas when he hit his foot with a 

sledge hammer and sustained injuries as a result.

Lanham filed a complaint in the district court under FELA, 

alleging BNSF was negligent in failing to provide him with a 

reasonably safe place to work, reasonably safe equipment for 

work, and reasonably safe methods for work. Lanham further 

alleged that his injuries were a result of BNSF’s negligence.

At the time Lanham’s complaint was filed, he was a resident 

of Dorchester, Nebraska. BNSF is a Delaware corporation with 

its principal place of business in Fort Worth, Texas. BNSF 

currently operates railroads in 28 states, including Nebraska. 

Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-19,152 (Reissue 2012), 

BNSF registered with the Secretary of State to do business 

in Nebraska and designated an agent for service of process in 

the state.

BNSF filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds 

that the district court had neither general nor specific jurisdiction over BNSF. Citing a U.S. Supreme Court case decided in 
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2014,2 BNSF argued the district court lacked general jurisdiction because BNSF was incorporated in Delaware and has its 

principal place of business in Fort Worth; thus, BNSF is not 

“‘at home’” in Nebraska. BNSF also argued that the district 

court lacked specific jurisdiction over BNSF because Lanham’s 

injuries had occurred in Texas, and the complaint failed to 

allege any connection between those injuries and Nebraska, or 

BNSF’s activities in Nebraska.

The district court overruled the motion to dismiss after finding that BNSF consented to personal jurisdiction by registering 

to do business in Nebraska under § 21-19,152. In its order, 

the district court extensively relied on the holding of the U.S. 

District Court for the District of Nebraska in Consolidated 

Infrastructure Group, Inc. v. USIC, LLC.3 Consolidated 

Infrastructure Group, Inc. is an unpublished opinion in which 

the court concluded that under Nebraska law, “‘[b]y designating an agent upon whom process may be served within this 

state, a defendant has consented to the jurisdiction in personam 

by the proper court’”4 based on this court’s prior holding in 

Mittelstadt v. Rouzer.

5

Because the district court found that BNSF had consented 

to personal jurisdiction, the court did not engage in an analysis 

of BNSF’s minimum contacts in the state. However, it quoted 

Consolidated Infrasructure Group, Inc.6 and noted that BNSF’s 

“‘activities in this state are not the sort of random or attenuated conduct that has been insufficient to confer jurisdiction on 

the court.’”

2 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 134 S. Ct. 746, 187 L. Ed. 2d 624 

(2014).

3 Consolidated Infrastructure Group, Inc. v. USIC, LLC, No. 8:16CV472, 

2017 WL 2222917 (D. Neb. May 18, 2017) (unpublished opinion).

4 Id. at *7 (quoting Mittelstadt v. Rouzer, 213 Neb. 178, 328 N.W.2d 467 

(1982)).

5 Mittelstadt, supra note 4.

6 See Consolidated Infrastructure Group, Inc., supra note 3.
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BNSF subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment 

on the grounds that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over BNSF and, alternatively, that Lanham was unable to 

present any evidence of BNSF’s negligence. The district court 

overruled the motion on the issue of jurisdiction and sustained 

it on the issue of negligence.

Lanham appeals the district court’s order granting summary 

judgment in favor of BNSF. BNSF filed a cross-appeal, arguing 

that the district court erred in holding it had personal jurisdiction over BNSF.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Lanham’s sole assignment of error is that the district court 

erred in granting summary judgment in favor of BNSF. In its 

cross-appeal, BNSF assigns, restated, that the district court 

erred in holding BNSF’s registration to do business in the State 

of Nebraska constituted consent to personal jurisdiction.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] When a jurisdictional question does not involve a factual 

dispute, determination of a jurisdictional issue is a matter of 

law which requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion 

independent from the trial court’s.7

ANALYSIS

BNSF argues that Nebraska law does not provide for consent 

by registration and that even if Nebraska’s registration statute 

could be construed to extract consent to personal jurisdiction, 

such an exercise of general jurisdiction would violate the Due 

Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Because we believe 

this issue is dispositive, we will discuss it first.

[2,3] Personal jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal to 

subject and bind a particular person or entity to its decisions.8

7 Hand Cut Steaks Acquisitions v. Lone Star Steakhouse, 298 Neb. 705, 905 

N.W.2d 644 (2018).

8 Id.
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This power is limited by the 14th Amendment’s Due Process 

Clause because “‘[a] state court’s assertion of jurisdiction 

exposes defendants to the State’s coercive power.’”9 The Due 

Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in 

not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with 

which he or she has established no meaningful contacts, ties, 

or relations.10

[4] A two-step analysis is used to determine whether a 

Nebraska court may validly exercise personal jurisdiction over 

an out-of-state defendant.11 First, a court must consider whether 

Nebraska’s long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over the defendant.12 Second, a court must consider 

whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant 

comports with due process.13

[5] Nebraska’s long-arm statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-536 

(Reissue 2016), extends Nebraska’s jurisdiction over nonresidents having any contact with or maintaining any relation to 

this state as far as the U.S. Constitution permits.14 Thus, we 

need only look to the Due Process Clause when determining 

personal jurisdiction.15

[6-8] Generally, this analysis requires a determination of 

whether the defendant’s minimum contacts with the forum 

state are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate 

9 Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Ct. of CA, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 

1773, 1779, 198 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2017) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires 

Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 180 L. Ed. 2d. 

796 (2011)).

10 Ameritas Invest. Corp. v. McKinney, 269 Neb. 564, 694 N.W.2d 191 

(2005) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S. Ct. 

2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985)).

11 Hand Cut Steaks Acquisitions, supra note 7.

12 Id.

13 Id.

14 Abdouch v. Lopez, 285 Neb. 718, 829 N.W.2d 662 (2013).

15 See id.
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being haled into court there.16 However, this analysis is not 

required when the parties have consented to the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction.17 “Because the requirement of personal 

jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can, like 

other such rights, be waived.”18 In order to be valid, the waiver 

“must, at the very least, be clear.”19

Consent by Registration.

In concluding that BNSF had consented to jurisdiction in 

Nebraska, the district court relied on this court’s prior holding 

in Mittelstadt,

20 where we appear to have held that a corporation’s appointment of an agent for service constitutes implied 

consent to general jurisdiction in the state.21 In that case, 

Nebraska residents sued an Arkansas corporation for damages 

arising out of an automobile accident that occurred in Arizona, 

and the defendant corporation had no contacts with Nebraska 

other than its trucks’ limited use of the highways.22 We held 

that by appointing a resident agent for service as required by 

the federal Motor Carrier Act, the “nonresident corporation 

ha[d] consented to jurisdiction within this state at least as to 

any cause of action arising out of its activities as a motor carrier in interstate commerce.”23

The reasoning in Mittelstadt reflects the 19th century’s traditional view of personal jurisdiction, where personal jurisdiction could be obtained over a nonresident by personal service 

16 McKinney, supra note 10.

17 See id.

18 Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 703, 102 S. Ct. 

2099, 72 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1982).

19 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 

(1972) (emphasis omitted).

20 Mittelstadt, supra note 4.

21 See John P. Lenich, Nebraska Civil Procedure § 3:9 (2019).

22 Mittelstadt, supra note 4.

23 Id. at 184, 328 N.W.2d at 470.
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in the state.24 Under the rigid territorial approach espoused in 

the U.S. Supreme Court case of Pennoyer v. Neff,

25 state courts 

could only exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant that 

was physically present within the state’s borders because a 

tribunal’s jurisdiction was limited to the territorial limits of the 

state in which it was established. A natural person was deemed 

to be physically present in a state and subject to personal 

jurisdiction if he or she could be served with process in the 

state.26 However, because a corporation was only deemed to be 

physically present in its state of incorporation, courts lacked 

authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state 

corporations.27

With the rise of interstate commerce, many states began 

“assimilating corporations to natural persons”28 and enacted 

statutes requiring foreign corporations to appoint an instate 

agent for service of process when seeking to do business in the 

state.29 Based on this “purely fictional” doctrine of “consent 

and presence,” courts permitted substituted service on a foreign corporation’s registered instate agent.30 In 1917 and 1939, 

the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed this procedure in Penna. 

Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co.31 and Neirbo Co. v. 

Bethlehem Corp.32

24 See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., Marin County, 495 U.S. 604, 110 

S. Ct. 2105, 109 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1990).

25 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877).

26 Id.

27 St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 1 S. Ct. 354, 27 L. Ed. 222 (1882).

28 See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 169, 60 S. Ct. 153, 84 

L. Ed. 167 (1939).

29 Neirbo Co., supra note 28.

30 Burnham, supra note 24, 495 U.S. at 618 (plurality opinion).

31 Penna. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 U.S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 

61 L. Ed. 610 (1917).

32 Neirbo Co., supra note 28.
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Mittelstadt was decided in 1982.33 At that time, many other 

states had similarly held that a foreign corporation’s authorization of an agent to accept service of process within a state 

constitutes consent to personal jurisdiction in the state.34 Since 

that time, the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding 

the scope of general jurisdiction permitted by the Due Process 

Clause has resulted in a tremendous shift.

In 2011 and 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court set significantly 

narrower due process limits on the states’ exercise of general 

jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations. The Court abandoned the territorial approach of Pennoyer,

35 and the central 

focus became the “‘relationship among the defendant, the 

forum, and the litigation.’”36

In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown,

37 the 

Court clarified the difference between general (all-purpose) 

jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction when holding that general 

jurisdiction over a defendant is limited to jurisdictions in which 

the defendant’s contacts “render them essentially at home in 

the forum State.” In doing so, the Court articulated: “A corporation’s ‘continuous activity of some sorts within a state,’ . . . 

33 Mittelstadt, supra note 4.

34 See, e.g., Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th 

Cir. 1990) (applying Minnesota law when holding “[a]ppointment of a 

registered agent for service is . . . a traditionally recognized and wellaccepted species of general consent”); Bohreer v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 

216 Ariz. 208, 214, 165 P.3d 186, 192 (Ariz. App. 2007) (“by agreeing to 

appoint an agent for service of process to do business in a state, a foreign 

corporation expressly consents to general personal jurisdiction without any 

need for minimum contact analysis”). See, also, Merriman v. Crompton 

Corp., 282 Kan. 433, 146 P.3d 162 (2006); Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 

1105 (Del. 1988); Sharkey v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 373 N.W.2d 421 

(S.D. 1985).

35 Pennoyer, supra note 25.

36 Daimler AG, supra note 2, 571 U.S. at 133 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 

U.S. 186, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977)).

37 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A., supra note 9, 564 U.S. at 919.
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‘is not enough to support the demand that the corporation be 

amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.’”38

[9,10] In Daimler AG v. Bauman,

39 the Court made clear 

that the Due Process Clause precludes a state from exercising 

general jurisdiction over a corporation that is not “‘at home 

in the forum.’” The Court clarified that absent exceptional 

circumstances, a corporation is only at home in two places: 

the state in which it is incorporated and the state in which 

its principal place of business is located.40 The Court rejected 

the argument that a foreign corporation’s “‘continuous and 

systematic’” business activities in a state are sufficient for the 

exercise of general jurisdiction as being inconsistent with due 

process.41 The Court stated that this type of “global reach” 

was “unacceptably grasping” and “exorbitant.”42 The Court 

also warned that cases “decided in the era dominated by 

Pennoyer’s territorial thinking . . . should not attract heavy 

reliance today.”43

In the present case, the district court concluded BNSF had 

consented to jurisdiction based solely on its compliance with 

§ 21-19,152.

Section 21-19,152 provides:

Each foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this state must continuously maintain in this state:

(1) A registered office with the same address as that 

of its current registered agent. A post office box number 

may be provided in addition to the street address of the 

registered agent; and

38 Id., 564 U.S. at 927 (quoting Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 

310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)).

39 Daimler AG, supra note 2, 571 U.S. at 122 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop 

Tires Operations, S. A., supra note 9).

40 Daimler AG, supra note 2.

41 Id., 571 U.S. at 138 (quoting Internat. Shoe, supra note 38).

42 Id., 571 U.S. at 137, 139.

43 Id., 571 U.S. at 138 n.18.
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(2) A registered agent, who may be:

(i) An individual who resides in this state and whose 

office is identical with the registered office;

(ii) A domestic business or nonprofit corporation whose 

office is identical with the registered office; or

(iii) A foreign business or nonprofit corporation authorized to transact business in this state whose office is 

identical with the registered office.

Section 21-19,152 does not explicitly state that compliance 

with the statute constitutes a waiver of the foreign corporation’s right to require personal jurisdiction. Therefore, BNSF 

could not be said to have expressly consented to jurisdiction 

by merely complying with the statute. Lanham asserts that a 

corporation’s consent may be implied when § 21-19,152 operates in tandem with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2,207(b) (Cum. Supp. 

2018). Section 21-2,207(b) includes a provision stating that 

a foreign corporation with a valid certificate of authority “is 

subject to the same duties, restrictions, penalties, and liabilities 

now or later imposed on a domestic corporation of like character.” But, even assuming BNSF’s registration to do business in 

Nebraska constitutes implied consent, the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction must comport with due process.

We conclude that treating BNSF’s registration to do business 

in Nebraska as implied consent to personal jurisdiction would 

exceed the due process limits prescribed in Goodyear Dunlop 

Tires Operations, S. A.44 and Daimler AG.

45 Currently, every 

state requires a foreign corporation “doing business in the state 

to register . . . and appoint an agent for service of process.”46

Consequently, consent by registration would permit a corporation to be subject to general jurisdiction in every state in 

which it does business. This is the same type of “global reach” 

44 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A., supra note 9.

45 Daimler AG, supra note 2.

46 Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the 

Fallacy of Consent, 36 Cardozo L. Rev. 1343, 1363 (2015).
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jurisdiction the U.S. Supreme Court expressly rejected as being 

inconsistent with due process.47 The Second Circuit Court of 

Appeals has observed:

If mere registration and the accompanying appointment 

of an in-state agent—without an express consent to general jurisdiction—nonetheless sufficed to confer general 

jurisdiction by implicit consent, every corporation would 

be subject to general jurisdiction in every state in which 

it registered, and Daimler’s ruling would be robbed of 

meaning by a back-door thief.48

[11] Since Daimler AG was decided, the vast majority of 

state and federal courts have rejected consent by registration as 

being irreconcilable with Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 

S. A. and Daimler AG.

49 In light of the due process limits 

prescribed in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. and 

Daimler AG, we join the majority of jurisdictions and hold that 

a corporation’s registration under § 21-19,152 does not provide 

47 See Daimler AG, supra note 2, 571 U.S. at 139.

48 Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 640 (2d Cir. 2016).

49 See, e.g., Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 145 n.120 (Del. 

2016) (overruling Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105 (Del. 1988), and 

holding consent by registration is incompatible with Daimler AG); Howe 

v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., No. 1:16cv386, 2018 WL 2212982 

at *5 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2018) (unpublished opinion) (“requirement 

to designate a registered agent is not intended to—and in any event 

under the Due Process Clause could not—subject a corporation to an 

action over which a state’s courts cannot properly exercise jurisdiction. 

Were it otherwise, the Supreme Court’s decisions recognizing limits 

on personal jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations would be nearly 

meaningless”). See, also, Am Trust v. UBS AG, 681 Fed. Appx. 587 

(9th Cir. 2017); Beasley v. Providence Hospital, No. 18-0004, 2018 

WL 2994380 (S.D. Ala. June 13, 2018) (unpublished opinion); Perry 

v. JTM Capital Management, LLC, Nos. 17 C 7601, 17 C 7769, 2018 

WL 1635855 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2018) (unpublished opinion). But see 

American Dairy Queen Corporation v. W.B. Mason Co., Inc., No. 

18-cv-693, 2019 WL 135699 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2019) (unpublished 

opinion) (holding consent by registration remains independent basis for 

personal jurisdiction).
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an independent basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction. 

Accordingly, we overrule Mittelstadt to the extent that applying 

it outside the context of the federal Motor Carrier Act conflicts 

with Daimler AG and Daimler AG’s progeny.50

“At Home” for Purposes of 

General Jurisdiction.

During oral argument, Lanham asserted that while BNSF 

is neither incorporated in nor maintains its principal place of 

business in Nebraska, exceptional circumstances exist making BNSF “at home” in the state. Lanham contends the 

fact that BNSF owns approximately $108 million of property in Nebraska, maintains 11 percent of its workforce in 

Nebraska, is the second highest tax payer in Nebraska, and 

has stated that Nebraska is one of the most important states 

in which it operates, suffices to make BNSF “at home” in the 

state for purposes of general jurisdiction. However, the U.S. 

Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in BNSF Ry. Co. 

v. Tyrrell.51

In Tyrrell, the Court held that notwithstanding BNSF’s over 

2,000 miles of railroad tracks and more than 2,000 employees in Montana, BNSF was not subject to general jurisdiction 

in Montana because BNSF is not incorporated in Montana, 

did not maintain its principal place of business in Montana, 

and was not “so heavily engaged in activity in Montana ‘as 

to render [it] essentially at home’ in that State.”52 The Court 

articulated that “‘the general jurisdiction inquiry does not focus 

solely on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.’”53

Instead, the Court explained, “the inquiry ‘calls for an appraisal 

of a corporation’s activities in their entirety’; ‘[a] corporation 

50 See Mittelstadt, supra note 4.

51 BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 198 L. Ed. 2d 36 

(2017).

52 Id., 137 S. Ct. at 1559 (quoting Daimler AG, supra note 2).

53 Id.
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that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home 

in all of them.’”54

Clarifying the “exceptional case,” the Tyrrell Court recognized Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co.,55 as an example of a 

case in which a corporation was “‘at home’” in a forum other 

that its state of incorporation or principal place of business.56

In Perkins, the defendant corporation was incorporated under 

the laws of the Philippines, where it operated gold and silver 

mines.57 During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in 

World War II, the corporation ceased its mining operations and 

the corporation’s president moved to Ohio, “where he kept 

an office, maintained the company’s files, and oversaw the 

company’s activities.”58 The Daimler AG Court stated that the 

Perkins Court concluded that the corporation was subject to 

personal jurisdiction in Ohio because Ohio had become “‘the 

corporation’s principal, if temporary, place of business.’”59

In the present case, BNSF is not incorporated in Nebraska, 

nor does it maintain its principal place of business in Nebraska. 

BNSF is incorporated in Delaware, and it is undisputed that 

BNSF’s principal place of business is in Fort Worth. All 

of BNSF’s principal officers and managing departments are 

located in Texas, along with its central network operations center, which monitors BNSF’s network operations and dispatches 

trains. BNSF’s interstate rail system includes 32,500 miles of 

train tracks in 28 states and three Canadian provinces. Only 

1,478 miles of these tracks are located in Nebraska, and only 

54 Id.

55 Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448, 72 S. Ct. 413, 96 L. 

Ed. 485 (1952).

56 Tyrrell, supra note 51, 137 S. Ct. at 1558 (quoting Daimler AG, supra

note 2).

57 See Daimler AG, supra note 2.

58 Id., 571 U.S. at 129.

59 Id. (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 104 S. Ct. 

1473, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1984)).
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4,479 of BNSF’s 41,000 employees are employed in Nebraska. 

Finally, of BNSF’s nationwide revenues, less than 8 percent are 

revenues from Nebraska.

BNSF’s business in Nebraska, although significant, is not 

“so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at 

home”60 in the state. Consequently, BNSF’s business activities 

in Nebraska do not permit the exercise of general jurisdiction 

over BNSF for claims that are unrelated to BNSF’s activity 

occurring in the state. We hold that BNSF is not “at home” in 

Nebraska for purposes of general jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the district court erred in determining it 

could exercise personal jurisdiction over BNSF for claims that 

are unrelated to BNSF’s instate activity. Because of this determination, we do not reach Lanham’s assignment of error. The 

district court’s order overruling BNSF’s motion to dismiss for 

lack of jurisdiction is reversed.

Reversed.

60 Id., 571 U.S. at 127 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A., 

supra note 9).