deference to the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial 

evidence and not clearly erroneous but review the court's application of 

the law to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 

P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005). 

First, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing 

to prepare for trial. Specifically, appellant claims that investigator J. 

Osterman did not meet with appellant until right before trial, resulting in 

a failure to investigate a list of potential leads due to time constraints, and 

that counsel failed to timely provide appellant with the transcripts from a 

pretrial hearing until a few days before trial, thereby preventing an 

adequate investigation of appellant's "list of salient points" to rebut 

testimony from that hearing. Appellant's bare claims have failed to 

demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. See Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 

502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). Appellant does not attempt to explain why 

he did not provide the leads to counsel in the several years preceding trial, 

nor does he dispute the district court's finding, which was supported by 

evidence in the record, that counsel had been utilizing a different 

investigator until shortly before trial. Further, appellant fails to state 

what leads or "salient points" should have been investigated, what the 

results would have been, or how it would have affected the outcome of the 

trial. See Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 192, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004). We 

therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Second, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to conduct a pretrial interview of victim J. Lopez, Jr. Appellant has 

failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Appellant has not shown 

that counsel was objectively unreasonable in not interviewing a victim 

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who repeatedly told police that he could not remember details of the 

shooting and who did not identify appellant in a photographic lineup. At 

trial, the victim maintained that he could not remember, and at the 

evidentiary hearing for the instant petition, the victim testified that at the 

time of trial he felt that the best way to help appellant was to continue to 

maintain that he could not remember. We therefore conclude that the 

district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Third, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing 

to request that the jury be instructed that it must presume the two 

murder weapons lacked appellant's fingerprints because the State failed to 

test the murder weapons for fingerprints. Appellant has failed to 

demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Appellant admitted at trial to 

handling, and was previously convicted of crimes involving the discharge 

of, one of the firearms, and he was acquitted of the crime involving the 

other firearm. Thus a lack of prints would not have exculpated him. 

Further, two defense witnesses, one of whom was a former member of 

appellant's gang, testified that gang members passed guns among 

themselves, and accordingly, the presence of prints other than appellant's 

would also not have been exculpatory. We therefore conclude that the 

district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Fourth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object to the hearsay testimony of A. Melendez, which allegedly 

portrayed him as a violent man with criminal tendencies. Appellant has 

failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. The testimony of the 

witness, who was subject to cross-examination, was elicited as a prior 

inconsistent statement, which is excluded from the definition of hearsay. 

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See NRS 51.035(2)(a). Further, appellant had pleaded guilty to the crime 

about which the witness was testifying, which included an enhancement 

for gang activity. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err 

in denying this claim. 

Fifth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing 

to object to leading questions posed by the State. Appellant has failed to 

demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Most of the questions to which 

appellant refers did not lead but rather recapped the witness's prior 

testimony before posing a new question. The few that could arguably be 

considered leading were of such minor consequence that counsel was not 

objectively unreasonable in not objecting to them. We therefore conclude 

that the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Sixth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing 

to object to the expert testimony of a witness who had not been noticed as 

an expert. Appellant has failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. 

Appellant did not ask counsel about this witness at the evidentiary 

hearing nor demonstrate that it was objectively unreasonable for counsel 

to refrain from objecting to testimony that is only questionably expert in 

nature. Further, the allegedly expert testimony to which appellant now 

objects had already largely been admitted via other witnesses such that he 

could not demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome at 

trial had the testimony been excluded. We therefore conclude that the 

district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Seventh, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to move for a new trial based on juror misconduct. Appellant has 

failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. The district court's findings 

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that the jurors were aware of the existence of, but not the content of, 

various media reports of the trial, as well as that the existence of such 

reports did not affect the jurors' ability to render a fair and impartial 

verdict, was supported by substantial evidence in the record. We therefore 

conclude that the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Eighth, appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for 

admitting appellant's guilt during the opening statements to the penalty 

phase of the trial. Appellant has failed to demonstrate deficiency or 

prejudice. Counsel did not insinuate appellant's guilt, but rather 

commented on the jury's ability to sift through a lot of disparate 

information during the guilt phase of trial. We therefore conclude that the 

district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Finally, appellant argues that the cumulative effect of 

counsel's errors warrants reversal of his conviction. Because appellant 

failed to demonstrate error, he necessarily failed to demonstrate 

cumulative error. 

Next appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial based 

on newly discovered evidence: the testimony of J. Lopez, Jr. Even were 

such a claim cognizable in a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus, appellant's claim is untimely. A motion for new trial based on new 

evidence must be raised within two years of the verdict. NRS 176.515(3). 

Appellant's verdict was rendered on May 1, 2007, but the instant petition 

was filed more than three years later. Moreover, as a separate and 

independent ground to deny relief, appellant could not have met the 

requirements for a new trial even had his motion been timely filed. The 

district court found Mr. Lopez to be utterly lacking in credibility, such that 

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J. 

his new information would not have "render[ed] a different result probable 

upon retrial." Sanborn v. State, 107 Nev. 399, 406, 812 P.2d 1279, 1284 

(1991). 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that appellant's claims 

are without merit, and we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

J. 

Hardesty 

Douglas 

Lxl Aia J. 

cc: Hon. Abbi Silver, District Judge 

Oronoz & Ericsson 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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