NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPI RES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

TAMMI JO EDGE, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D14-6021 ) TIMOTHY WALLACE EDGE, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________ ) Opinion filed June 15, 2016. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County; G. Keith Cary, Judge.

Robert L. Donald of Law Office of Robert L. Donald, Fort Myers, for Appellant. Paul A. Rocuant of Rocuant Law Firm, Estero, for Appellee.

KHOUZAM, Judge. Tammi Jo Edge timely appeals the final judgment of dissolution of her marriage to Timothy Wallace Edge, raising seven claims. Becaus e the trial court erred in calculating the Former Husband's income, we reverse and rema nd for the trial court to correct the income calculation and reconsider the final judg ment in light of the update. As to all the remaining issues, we affirm without comment.- 2 - In calculating the Former Husband's income, the trial court use d the amount of gross income that the Former Husband reported on his financial affidavit, even though he testified that he had since gotten a raise. The Former Husband also stated that he had been receiving a bonus of $7000 to $9000 eve ry year since 2009. The court noted these bonuses, c oncluding that they were not gu aranteed because they were given at his employer's discretion. But under these circu mstances the trial court should have included the bonuses as part of the Former Husband' s income. See Drew v. Drew, 27 So. 3d 802, 802 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ("[W]hen a trial court calculates income for the purpose of awarding child support or alimony, it may no t exclude from

consideration bonuses that a re regular and continuous.").

The Former Husband also testified that the amount that he liste d on his financial affidavit as "mandatory re tirement payments" was actu ally his repayment of a loan on his 401(k). Accordingly, this amount should not have b een deducted. See Fuesy v. Fuesy, 64 So. 3d 151, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) ("Althoug h for purposes of calculating child support, mandatory retirement payments are in cluded as allowable deductions under section 61.30(3)(d), voluntary retirement paym ents are not."); Moore v. Moore, 120 So. 3d 194, 197 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) ("[I]t is app arent that neither the 401(k) contribution nor the health savings account qualifies as an authorized deduction for calculation of net income under section 61.30(3), Florida S tatutes (2011)."). The Former Husband appears to concede th is point, only claiming tha t the inaccuracy was

"de minimis." But we must rever se even where it is unclear whe ther an updated figure will affect the final result. See Moore, 120 So. 3d at 197 ("I t is unclear whether this additional available income would have affected the final judgm ent; however, we are- 3 - bound to remand for reconsideration of the judgment in light of the correct net income of Former Wife."). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the court to recalculate the Former Husband's income and, in light of the updated income fig ure, reconsider the child support award and alimony award as well as the requiremen t that the Former Wife pay for counseling. We remind the trial court that it is inapp ropriate to condition—even implicitly—visitation rights on a financial obligation. See Pe rez v. Fay, 160 So. 3d 459, 466 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ("[A] parent's visitation rights may not be conditioned on the payment of the parent's financial obligations." (quoting Hastings v. Rigsbee, 875 So. 2d 772, 777 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004))). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructi ons.

VILLANTI, C.J., and LaRO SE, J., Concur.