PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 21-1162

______

FERNANDO SAINT-JEAN

v.

PALISADES INTERSTATE PARK COMMISSION; 

PALISADES INTERSTATE PARKWAY POLICE 

DEPARTMENT; MICHAEL HOLLAND, Palisades 

Interstate Parkway Police Officer, Badge #403; FABRICIO 

M. SALAZAR, Palisades Interstate Parkway Police Officer, 

Badge #362; PETER WOJCKIK, Palisades Interstate 

Parkway Police Officer, Badge #406; RICHARD DEY, 

Palisades Interstate Parkway Police Officer; JOHN/JANE 

DOES #1-10, Palisades Interstate Parkway Police Officer 

(fictitiously named); ANDREW SAMSON, Palisades 

Interstate Parkway Municipal Prosecutor; MICHAEL 

COPPOLA, Palisades Interstate Parkway Police Chief

Palisades Interstate Park Commission; Palisades Interstate 

Parkway Police Department; Michael Holland; Fabricio M. 

Salazar; Peter Wojckik; Richard Dey; Andrew Samson,

Appellants

____________
2

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 2-19-cv-10680)

District Judge: Honorable Kevin McNulty

____________

Argued: June 29, 2022

Before: JORDAN, PORTER, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: September 23, 2022)

____________

Dara C. Goodman [Argued]

Callinan & Smith

3361 Park Avenue

Suite 104

Wantagh, NY 11793

Counsel for Appellee

Justine M. Longa [Argued]

Bryan E. Lucas

Robert J. McGuire

Office of Attorney General of New Jersey

Division of Law

Hughes Justice Complex

25 Market Street

Trenton, NJ 08625

Counsel for Appellants
3

_______________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________________

PHIPPS, Circuit Judge.

In searching the car of a Massachusetts man who was 

driving through New Jersey on a Sunday afternoon, police 

officers misidentified heart-shaped Valentine’s Day candies as 

illegal drugs. On that basis, the officers arrested and 

prosecuted the man. After the heart-shaped objects were lab 

tested over two months later, the truth came out: they were just 

candies. Even with that knowledge, it still took nearly four 

additional months to drop the charges against the driver. 

After that, the script flipped. The falsely accused driver 

sued the officers, a prosecutor, and three governmental entities

for violations of several constitutional rights and for torts under 

New Jersey law. Each of those defendants moved to dismiss

the complaint, and in their brief, the officers raised qualified 

immunity defenses. 

The District Court partially granted that motion. It rejected 

the officers’ request for qualified immunity for the driver’s 

Fourth Amendment and related state-law claims. But it 

granted the motion to dismiss for one of the constitutional 

claims against the officers and all of the claims against the 

prosecutor and the governmental entities. Each of the 

dismissals was without prejudice, and the order permitted the 

driver 30 days to amend his complaint. 
4

The officers filed a notice of appeal to challenge the District 

Court’s denial of qualified immunity under federal and New 

Jersey law. But before the officers appealed, the driver had 

amended his complaint. Due to that prior amendment, the 

District Court’s order was not final when the officers appealed. 

And without a final order, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, or any other 

basis for appellate jurisdiction, we will dismiss this appeal. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

(AS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT)

After travelling to New Jersey for a family birthday party 

the day before, Fernando Saint-Jean, who was in his early 30s,

began the return trip home to Massachusetts. As he drove with 

his uncle along the Palisades Interstate Parkway in New Jersey

in the early afternoon of Sunday, May 6, 2018, a Palisades 

Interstate Park Police Officer pulled the vehicle over for 

driving too slowly and for having tinted windows. That 

officer, Michael Holland, requested identification from both 

men, and he asked them what country they were from. SaintJean replied that he was originally from Haiti but had become 

a United States citizen. Around that time, another Park Police 

Officer, Fabricio Salazar, arrived on the scene, and the officers 

ordered Saint-Jean and his uncle out of the car. The officers 

began to frisk the two men, and a third Park Police Officer, 

Peter Wojckik, also arrived. The officers then requested to 

search the vehicle, and Saint-Jean signed a consent-to-search 

form. 

In searching a storage compartment between the two front 

seats, the officers found three small, sealable plastic bags 

containing several heart-shaped objects. Those objects had the 

appearance of Valentine’s Day candies, but Valentine’s Day 
5

was two-and-a-half months earlier, and the officers suspected 

that the items were actually controlled substances – MDMA or 

ecstasy. They asked Saint-Jean what the items were, and he 

replied that they were Valentine’s Day candies received from 

a coworker, Tammy. Saint-Jean offered to provide Tammy’s 

contact information, but the officers declined. Instead, they 

arrested Saint-Jean, handcuffed him, and took him to a police 

station.

The intake process at the police station included 

photographing and fingerprinting Saint-Jean; it did not involve

administering any tests on the small, heart-shaped objects. 

Despite not testing the suspected drugs or calling Saint-Jean’s 

coworker, two officers, Holland and Richard Dey, initiated 

legal proceedings against Saint-Jean. Those included a traffic 

summons and a criminal summons for possessing a controlled 

substance, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-10a(1). After receiving 

those summonses, Saint-Jean left the police station two to three 

hours after the initial stop. 

The criminal charges against Saint-Jean were unsuccessful. 

Before his initial appearance, the drug charge was downgraded 

to a disorderly persons offense, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:36-2. 

Also, over two months after his initial appearance, the New 

Jersey State Police Office of Forensic Sciences analyzed the 

small, heart-shaped objects and determined that they were not 

controlled substances. Despite learning that information, the 

prosecution continued for about four more months, until the 

charges were dismissed in November 2018. 
6

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

To vindicate his rights under federal and state law, SaintJean filed this suit in April 2019. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. 

He brought several claims against the four officers in their 

individual capacities for arresting, detaining, and charging 

him. Those included claims for false arrest and malicious 

prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments, as well as claims alleging violations of 

procedural and substantive due process. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

In addition to the claims against the officers, Saint-Jean sued 

the prosecutor who litigated the criminal charges against him, 

and two governmental entities: the Palisades Interstate 

Parkway Police Department and the Palisades Interstate Park 

Commission.

1 Saint-Jean also brought tort claims under New 

Jersey law against all the defendants for false imprisonment 

and abuse of process. 

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of

jurisdiction and for failure to state plausible claims. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). The officers’ leading argument was 

that they should receive qualified immunity for Saint-Jean’s 

constitutional and state-law tort claims. The prosecutor 

asserted absolute prosecutorial immunity, and the 

governmental defendants relied on state sovereign immunity. 

The defendants also argued that the due process claims did not 

state a claim for relief. 

1 Saint-Jean also sued Bergen County, New Jersey, and several 

unidentified officers and prosecutors as John Does. But he 

voluntary dismissed Bergen County, and as of the motion to 

dismiss, he had not identified or served the John Doe 

defendants.
7

The District Court granted the motion to dismiss in part

through an order on December 28, 2020. In the accompanying 

opinion, the District Court explained that state sovereign 

immunity applied to the governmental entities and that 

absolute immunity applied to the prosecutor, and on those 

grounds, it dismissed all counts against them without 

prejudice. See Saint-Jean v. Cnty. of Bergen, 509 F. Supp. 3d 

87, 99 (D.N.J. 2020) (entities, federal claims); id. at 114

(entities, state claims); id. at 99–100 (prosecutor, federal 

claims); id. at 114–15 (prosecutor, state claims). The District 

Court also concluded that Saint-Jean’s allegations did not state 

a claim for due process violations, and it dismissed those 

counts, also without prejudice. See id. at 113.

But some of Saint-Jean’s claims against the officers 

survived dismissal. After accepting the allegations in the 

complaint as true, the District Court determined that Saint-Jean 

demonstrated a violation of a constitutional right – an arrest 

and prosecution without probable cause – that applied with 

obvious clarity to Saint-Jean’s particular circumstances, such 

that the constitutional violation was clearly-established. See 

id. at 109–12. On that basis, the District Court denied qualified 

immunity to the officers under federal law and the New Jersey 

Tort Claims Act. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:3-1; Saint-Jean, 

509 F. Supp. 3d. at 111–12 (federal claims); id. at 115 (state 

claims). And without qualified immunity under either federal 

or state law, the District Court permitted Saint-Jean’s

remaining constitutional and tort claims for false arrest and 

malicious prosecution to proceed. See Saint-Jean, 509 F. 

Supp. 3d. at 114–16.

The District Court’s order permitted Saint-Jean 30 days to 

amend his complaint to cure his pleading deficiencies. Saint-
8

Jean amended within that time period – 25 days after the order. 

The officers also filed a notice of appeal within that time period 

– 30 days after the order. 

The officers’ notice of appeal did not automatically stay the 

proceedings in District Court. And without a stay, the officers 

had to respond to Saint-Jean’s amended complaint. They did 

so through a motion to dismiss, again on qualified immunity 

grounds. After that motion was fully briefed the District Court 

stayed all proceedings in the case for the pendency of this 

appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Saint-Jean contends that his filing of an amended complaint 

moots the appeal. Mootness applies when events occurring 

after a court has assumed jurisdiction extinguish the 

controversy such that the court can no longer award any 

effectual relief to the prevailing party. See Chafin v. Chafin, 

568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013); Church of Scientology of Cal. v.

United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992). But here, the District 

Court’s order permitted Saint-Jean to amend his complaint 

within 30 days, and he did so within that time period and before 

the officers appealed. Because the original complaint was 

superseded before the appeal, the District Court’s order was 

not final as to the officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity 

based on the pleadings, and this Court never had jurisdiction to 

hear this appeal. Cf. Adam v. Barone, 41 F.4th 230, 233 (3d 

Cir. 2022) (explaining that, for purposes of original 

jurisdiction, the doctrine of standing addresses events 

occurring before the filing of a lawsuit, whereas mootness 

governs those arising after). Thus, as explained below, this 

appeal should be dismissed for that reason, not mootness. 
9

1. An order denying qualified immunity 

under federal and New Jersey law at the 

motion-to-dismiss stage is ordinarily 

immediately appealable only with respect 

to federal qualified immunity.

Ordinarily, an order denying federal qualified immunity 

based on allegations in the complaint is immediately 

appealable. Because federal qualified immunity provides 

“immunity from suit,” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 

(1985) (emphasis omitted), a party may appeal an order 

denying federal qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss 

stage under the collateral order doctrine. See Behrens v.

Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996); George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 

562, 571 (3d Cir. 2013).

The same is not true for an order denying qualified 

immunity under New Jersey’s Tort Claims Act. That law 

confers immunity from liability, not immunity from suit. See

Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1107–09 (3d Cir. 1990); 

see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:3-1. That difference is 

dispositive: because New Jersey’s Tort Claims Act does not 

provide immunity from suit, an order denying New Jersey 

qualified immunity under that statute is not immediately

appealable. See Lozano v. New Jersey, 9 F.4th 239, 244 (3d 

Cir. 2021). Consequently, this Court lacks appellate 

jurisdiction over the officers’ appeal of the denial of qualified 

immunity under New Jersey law. 
10

2. An order denying federal qualified 

immunity based on a complaint is not

immediately appealable if the order allows 

for amendment and the complaint is 

amended before an appeal is filed. 

Although an order denying federal qualified immunity does 

not terminate the proceedings, it is ordinarily immediately 

appealable under the collateral order doctrine. See Behrens, 

516 U.S. at 308; George, 738 F.3d at 571. See generally 

Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) 

(explaining that, typically, to be final, an order must “terminate 

an action” such that “a district court disassociates itself from a 

case” (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 

42 (1995) and Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 

541, 545 (1949))). That doctrine recognizes a “small class” of 

orders that, even without terminating the proceedings, are 

nonetheless subject to appeal. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. To fit 

within that class, an order must have three characteristics: 

(1) It must conclusively determine the 

disputed question; 

(2) It must resolve an important issue 

completely separate from the merits of the 

action; and 

(3) It must be effectively unreviewable on 

appeal from a final judgment. 

Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 106 (quoting Swint, 514 U.S. at 

42); Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. 

The District Court’s order here, however, did more than 

deny qualified immunity to the officers based on the original 
11

complaint. It also permitted Saint-Jean 30 days to amend his 

complaint. He did so within that time and before the officers 

appealed. Due to the timing of his amendment, the order did

not satisfy the first prong of the collateral order doctrine at the 

time of the officers’ appeal.

This appeal will not conclusively resolve a disputed 

question. Appellate review of the District Court’s order would 

resolve the officers’ qualified immunity only with respect to 

the allegations in the original complaint. And here, Saint-Jean 

amended his complaint before the officers appealed. Because 

an amended complaint “supersedes the pleading it modifies,” 

the original complaint “no longer perform[ed] any function in 

the case” when the officers appealed, and a ruling on qualified 

immunity based on such a pleading would not conclusively 

resolve a disputed question. 6B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 

R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (3d ed.); see 

also Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 220 (3d Cir. 2017); 

Snyder v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 303 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 

2002). And even if this Court were to rule on qualified 

immunity now, the District Court would still need to compare 

the original complaint with the amended complaint and 

analyze whether the appellate ruling would apply after SaintJean’s amendments. Due to the need for that subsequent 

comparison of the pleadings, immediate appellate review of the 

order would not conclusively determine the officers’ 

entitlement to qualified immunity. See Swint, 514 U.S. at 42 

(explaining that the collateral order doctrine “disallow[s] 

appeal from any decision which is tentative, informal or 

incomplete” (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546)). 

The officers nonetheless want to know whether they are 

entitled to qualified immunity based on the allegations in the 
12

original complaint. They fear that law-of-the-case principles 

would obligate the District Court to adhere to its initial order 

denying them qualified immunity. For that reason, they submit 

that the original order is conclusive. That concern is 

unfounded. 

As a prudential principle, law of the case holds that a rule 

of law announced in a case should later be applied to “the same 

issues in subsequent stages in the litigation.” In re Resyn 

Corp., 945 F.2d 1279, 1281 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Devex 

Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 857 F.2d 197, 199 (3d Cir. 

1988)).2

 Law of the case may counsel against, but does not 

prevent, a district court from reconsidering its prior rulings. 

See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983) (“Law of 

the case directs a court’s discretion, [but] it does not limit the 

tribunal’s power.”).3

 Because it is discretionary, law of the 

2 See also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983) 

(“[L]aw of the case is an amorphous concept. As most 

commonly defined, the doctrine posits that when a court 

decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to 

govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same 

case.”); 18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Federal 

Practice & Procedure § 4478 (3d ed.) (describing law-of-the- case doctrine as a “reluctan[ce] to reopen a ruling once made”). 

3 See also Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912) 

(explaining that law-of-the-case doctrine “merely expresses 

the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has 

been decided, not a limit to their power”); In re City of Phila. 

Litig., 158 F.3d 711, 718 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he law of the case 

doctrine does not restrict a court’s power but rather governs its 

exercise of discretion.”); 18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 

Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478 (3d ed.) 

(“Although courts are eager to avoid reconsideration of 
13

case does not compel the same outcome as before for the 

officers’ now pending motion to dismiss the amended 

complaint. Even more, an appellate court “is not bound by 

district court rulings under the law-of-the-case doctrine” 

because “[a]n appellate court’s function is to revisit matters 

decided in the trial court.” Musacchio v. United States, 

577 U.S. 237, 245 (2016); see also 18B Charles Alan Wright 

& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478.6 

(3d ed.) (observing “the basic principle that adherence by a 

lower court to its own ruling as the law of the case does not 

defeat appellate review when the issue is properly preserved 

and presented”). And even if the District Court applied law of 

the case to the officers’ request for qualified immunity based 

on the amended complaint, that ruling would ordinarily still be 

subject to immediate appellate review as a denial of qualified 

immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See Behrens, 

516 U.S. at 308; George, 738 F.3d at 571.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court lacks appellate 

jurisdiction over the officers’ appeal of the order denying 

qualified immunity under federal and New Jersey law, and this 

case will be dismissed.

questions once decided in the same proceeding, it is clear that 

all federal courts retain power to reconsider if they wish.”).