`[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 203 (Thursday, October 19, 2000)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 62812-62898]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-26088]



[[Page 62811]]

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Part II





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Parts 401, 417, and 420



Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site; Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 203 / Thursday, October 19, 2000 / 
Rules and Regulations  

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 401, 417, and 420

[Docket No. FAA-1999-5833; Amendment No. 401-2, 417-1 and 420-1]
RIN 2120-AG15


Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments on handling of solid 
propellants and cooperation with the National Transportation Safety 
Board.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Transportation's (DOT or the Department) 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends its commercial space 
transportation licensing regulations to add licensing and safety 
requirements for the operation of a launch site. To date, commercial 
launches have occurred principally at federal launch ranges under 
safety procedures developed by federal launch range operators. To 
enable the development and use of launch sites that are not operated by 
a federal launch range, rules are needed to establish specific 
licensing and safety requirements for operating a launch site, whether 
that site is located on or off of a federal launch range. These rules 
will provide licensed launch site operators with licensing and safety 
requirements to protect the public from the risks associated with 
activities at a launch site.

DATES: Effective Date: December 18, 2000. An application pending at the 
time of the effective date must conform to any new requirements of this 
rulemaking as of the effective date. All license terms and conditions, 
and all safety requirements of this rulemaking also apply as of the 
effective date.
    Comment Date: Comments on handling of solid propellants and 
cooperation with the National Transportation Safety Board must be 
submitted on or before December 18, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Address your comments to the Docket Management System, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Room Plaza 401, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 
Washington, DC 20590-0001. You must identify the docket number FAA-
1999-5833 at the beginning of your comments, and you should submit two 
copies of your comments. If you wish to receive confirmation that FAA 
received your comments, include a self-addressed, stamped postcard.
    You may also submit comments through the Internet to http://dms.dot.gov. You may review the public docket containing comments to 
these regulations in person in the Dockets Office between 9:00 a.m. and 
5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Dockets 
Office is on the plaza level of the NASSIF Building at the Department 
of Transportation at the above address. Also, you may review public 
dockets on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: J. Randall Repcheck, Licensing and 
Safety Division (AST-200), Commercial Space Transportation, Federal 
Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 20591; 
telephone (202) 267-8602; or Laura Montgomery, Office of the Chief 
Counsel (AGC-250), FAA, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 20591; 
telephone (202) 267-3150.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed explosive siting requirements for 
facilities on a launch site that would handle solid and liquid 
propellants and other explosives. The FAA did not propose rules for 
solid explosives other than ``division 1.3,'' as described below.
    As noted in the NPRM, the FAA is adopting the United Nations 
Organization (UNO) classification system for the transport of dangerous 
goods. The hazard classification system consists of nine classes for 
dangerous goods, of which explosives are included as UNO ``Class 1, 
Explosives.'' Class 1 explosives are further subdivided into six 
``divisions'' based on the character and predominance of the associated 
hazards and on the potential for causing casualties or property damage. 
Two explosive divisions that are likely to be present on a launch site 
are division 1 and division 3, referred to as division 1.1 and 1.3, 
respectively. Division 1.1 consists of explosives that have a mass 
explosion hazard, and division 1.3 consists of explosives that have a 
fire hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection 
hazard or both, but not a mass explosion hazard.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed criteria only for division 1.3 
because the FAA believed that the only solid explosives for commercial 
launches that would likely affect separation distances on a launch site 
were division 1.3 propellants. The FAA noted that although launch 
vehicles frequently have components incorporating division 1.1 
explosives, such as those used to initiate flight termination systems, 
the quantity is small. The FAA also noted that division 1.1 explosives 
would not likely be present in sufficient quantities to affect the 
application of Q-D criteria. The only division 1.1 solid rocket motors 
existing today are from old military missiles, which are not likely to 
be used at a commercial launch site.
    One government commenter, the 45th Space Wing Range Safety 
Engineering Support (45SW/SESE), pointed out that this was not a 
correct assumption, and the FAA agrees. As noted by the 45SW/SESE, 
experience with explosive siting at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station 
shows that division 1.1 explosives are often significant enough to 
influence explosive site plans.
    Accordingly, section 420.65, Handling of Solid Propellants, now 
includes requirements for division 1.1 explosives. Because this change 
is being adopted without prior notice and public comment, interested 
persons are also invited to submit written comments on section 420.65.
    The FAA also includes a new requirement in this rulemaking 
explicitly requiring a launch site operator licensee to cooperate with 
the National Transportation Safety Board in section 420.59 for launch 
accidents as well as for launch site accidents. The FAA will implement 
this change without prior notice and comment and therefore invites 
interested persons to submit written comments on section 420.59. 
Pending the evaluation of the public comments, the FAA has decided to 
proceed with due diligence to implement its requirements.
    The FAA will consider and respond to comments on the new 
provisions. The FAA will consider all comments received, and will 
publish in the Federal Register a summary of the disposition of those 
comments and, if appropriate, changes to the rule that may result from 
consideration of those comments.
    Comments must include the regulatory docket or amendment number and 
must be submitted in triplicate to the address above. The FAA will 
review all comments received and will file all comments in the public 
docket. The docket is available for public inspection before and after 
the comment closing date.
    Commenters who want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their 
comments submitted in response to this final rule must include a 
preaddressed, stamped postcard with those comments on which the 
following statement is made: ``Comments to Docket No. FAA-1999-5833.'' 
The postcard will be date-

[[Page 62813]]

stamped by the FAA and mailed to the commenter.

Availability of Final Rules

    You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by taking the 
following steps:
    (1) Go to the search function of the Department of Transportation's 
electronic Docket Management System (DMS) Web page (http://dms.dot.gov/search).
    (2) On the search page type in the last four digits of the Docket 
number shown at the beginning of this rulemaking document. Click on 
``search.''
    (3) On the next page, which contains the Docket summary information 
for the Docket you selected, click on the final rule.
    You can also get an electronic copy using the Internet through 
FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the 
Federal Register's web page at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.
    You can also get a copy by submitting a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make 
sure to identify the amendment number or docket number of this final 
rule.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for 
information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations 
within its jurisdiction. Therefore, any small entity that has a 
question regarding this document may contact its local FAA official, or 
the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. You can find 
out more about SBREFA on the Internet at our site, http://www.gov/avr/arm/sbrefa.htm. For more information on SBREFA, e-mail us [email protected].

Outline of Final Rule

I . Background
    A. The FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Role
    B. Growth and Current Status of Launch Site Industry
    C. Current Practices
II. Summary of the Regulations and Discussion of Comments
    A. Overview
    B. Environment
    C. Policy
    D. Explosive Site Plan Review
    E. Explosive Mishap Prevention Measures
    F. Launch Site Location Review
    G. License Conditions
    H. Operational Responsibilities
III. Part Analysis
IV. Required Analyses

I. Background

    The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as codified at 49 U.S.C. 
Subtitle IX--Commercial Space Transportation, ch. 701--Commercial Space 
Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121 (the Act), authorizes the 
Secretary of Transportation to license a launch or the operation of a 
launch site carried out by a U.S. citizen or within the United States. 
49 U.S.C. 70104, 70105. The Act directs the Secretary to exercise this 
responsibility consistent with public health and safety, safety of 
property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the 
United States. 49 U.S.C. 70105. On August 4, 1994, a National Space 
Transportation Policy reaffirmed the government's commitment to the 
commercial space transportation industry and the critical role of the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) in encouraging and facilitating 
private sector launch activities. A National Space Policy released on 
September 19, 1996, notes and reaffirms that DOT is responsible as the 
lead agency for regulatory guidance pertaining to commercial space 
transportation activities.

A. The FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Role

    On November 15, 1995, the Secretary of Transportation delegated 
commercial space licensing authority to the Federal Aviation 
Administration. The FAA licenses commercial launches and the operation 
of launch sites pursuant to the Act and implementing regulations at 14 
CFR Ch. III. The first commercial launch licensing regulations were 
issued in April 1988, 53 FR 11004, when no commercial launches had yet 
taken place. Accordingly, DOT established a flexible licensing process 
intended to be responsive to an emerging industry while ensuring public 
safety. The Department noted that it would ``continue to evaluate and, 
when necessary, reshape its program in response to growth, innovation, 
and diversity in this critically important industry.'' 53 FR 11006.
    Under the 1988 regulations, DOT implemented a case-by-case approach 
to evaluating launch and launch site operator license applications. At 
the time, it was envisioned that most commercial launches would take 
place from federal launch ranges, which imposed extensive ground and 
flight safety requirements on launch operators, pending the development 
of commercial launch sites. The federal launch ranges provided 
commercial launch operators with facilities and launch support, 
including flight safety services.
    Since 1988, DOT and now the FAA have taken steps designed to 
simplify further the licensing process for launch operators. The 
regulatory and licensing emphasis during the past decade has been on 
launch operators. The emergence of a commercial launch site sector has 
only become a reality during the past few years.

B. Growth and Current Status of Launch Site Industry

    The United States government has, since the 1950s, built, operated, 
and maintained a space launch infrastructure for launching satellites 
into space. Much of the demand for and use of these launch sites has 
traditionally come from U.S. military and civil government agencies. 
Beginning in the early 1980s, a number of the government-operated 
launch sites began providing support for commercial launch activities 
as well, with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
acting as the primary intermediary for providing launch services to 
satellite operators. Following the Challenger accident, a White House 
decision in August 1986 allowed launch customers to solicit bids 
directly from the launch vehicle builders who would, in turn, lease 
launch facilities from NASA or the United States Air Force (USAF). This 
decision, coupled with the 1984 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Act and 
its 1988 amendments, did much to foster commercial launch business, 
which continues to grow to this day.
    The number of commercial space launches has steadily grown over the 
years since the first licensed commercial launch in 1989. From March 
29, 1989 to July 28, 2000, 130 licensed launches have taken place. 
Launch vehicles have included traditional orbital launch vehicles such 
as the Atlas, Titan and Delta, as well as suborbital vehicles such as 
the Starfire. New vehicles using traditional launch techniques include 
Lockheed Martin Corporation's (Lockheed Martin) Atlas III and Athena, 
EER's Conestoga, Orbital Sciences Corporation's (Orbital) Taurus, and 
The Boeing Company's (Boeing) Delta III. Unique vehicles such as 
Orbital's Pegasus and the Zenit 3-SL of Sea Launch Limited Partnership 
(Sea Launch), launched from a modified oil rig located in the Pacific 
Ocean, are included in this count. New launch vehicles are proposed 
every year. On the horizon are Lockheed Martin's Atlas V

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and Boeing's Delta IV. A number of companies are proposing partially 
and fully reusable launch vehicles. In addition, some companies are 
participating in partnership with NASA to develop X-33 and X-34 launch 
vehicles incorporating reusable and single-stage-to-orbit technology, a 
partnership which could result in vehicles for commercial use.
    The launch site industry, the focus of this final rule, has also 
made progress. Commercial launch site operations are coming on line 
with the stated goal of providing flexible and cost-effective 
facilities both for existing launch vehicles and for new vehicles. When 
the commercial launch industry began, commercial launch companies based 
their launch operations chiefly at federal launch ranges operated by 
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). Federal launch ranges that have supported 
licensed launches include the Eastern Range, located at Cape Canaveral 
Air Force Base in Florida (CCAFB), and the Western Range located at 
Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), in California, both operated by the 
U.S. Air Force; Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia, operated by NASA; 
White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in New Mexico, operated by the U.S. 
Army; and the Kauai Test Facility in Hawaii, operated by the U.S. Navy. 
Federal launch ranges provide the advantage of existing launch 
infrastructure and range safety services. Launch companies are able to 
obtain a number of services from a federal launch range, including 
radar, tracking and telemetry, flight termination and other launch 
services.
    Today, most commercial launches still take place from federal 
launch ranges; however, this pattern may change as other launch sites 
become more prevalent. On September 19, 1996, the FAA granted the first 
license to operate a launch site to Spaceport Systems International to 
operate California Spaceport. That launch site is located within VAFB. 
Three other launch site operators have received licenses. Spaceport 
Florida Authority (SFA) received an FAA license to operate Launch 
Complex 46 at CCAS as a launch site. Virginia Commercial Space Flight 
Authority (VCSFA) received a license to operate Virginia Spaceflight 
Center (VSC) within NASA's Wallops Flight Facility. Most recently, 
Alaska Aerospace Development Corporation (AADC) received a license to 
operate Kodiak Launch Complex (KLC) as a launch site on Kodiak Island, 
Alaska. It is evident from this list that federal launch ranges still 
play a role in the licensed operation of a number of launch sites. 
California Spaceport, Spaceport Florida and VSC are located on federal 
launch range property. Two launches each have taken place from 
California Spaceport, KLC, and SFA.
    Other commercial launch sites are being considered in other states. 
The New Mexico Office of Space Commercialization proposes to operate 
Southwest Regional Spaceport adjacent to the White Sands Missile Range 
as a site for reusable launch vehicles. The State of Montana is 
proposing to fly reusable launch vehicles from a site near Great Falls, 
Montana and Malmstrom Air Force Base. The state of Nevada is supporting 
the development of a launch site at the Nevada Test Site, Nye County, 
Nevada. The State of New Mexico proposes to construct and operate the 
Southwest Regional Spaceport (SRS) located in south central New Mexico 
for use by private companies conducting commercial space activities and 
operations. The State of Texas has enabled the development of a 
commercial Spaceport for reusable launch vehicles. Lastly, in Utah, the 
Wah Wah Valley Interlocal Cooperation Entity, proposes to construct and 
operate a commercial launch site utilizing approximately 70,000 acres 
of Utah State Trust lands located 30 miles southwest of Milford, Utah.
    Whether launching from a federal launch range, a launch site 
located on a federal launch range, or a non-federal launch site, a 
launch operator is responsible for ground and flight safety under its 
FAA license. At a federal launch range a launch operator must comply 
with the rules and procedures of the federal launch range. The safety 
rules, procedures and practice, in concert with the safety functions of 
the federal launch ranges, have been assessed by the FAA, and found to 
satisfy the majority of the FAA's safety concerns. In contrast, when 
launching from a non-federal launch site, a launch operator's 
responsibility for ground and flight safety takes on added importance. 
In the absence of federal launch range oversight, it will be incumbent 
upon each launch operator to demonstrate the adequacy of its ground and 
flight safety to the FAA.

C. Current Practices

    Because of the time and investment involved in bringing a 
commercial launch facility into being, several entities that have been 
planning to establish these facilities asked the DOT for guidance 
concerning the information that might be requested as part of an 
application for a license to operate a launch site. In response to 
these requests, DOT's then Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
(Office) published ``Site Operators License, Guidelines for 
Applicants,'' on August 8, 1995, as guidance for potential launch site 
operators. The guidelines described the information that DOT, and then 
the FAA, expected from an applicant for a license to operate a 
commercial launch site. This information included launch site location 
information, a hazard analysis, and a launch site safety operations 
document that governed how the facility would be operated to ensure 
public safety and the safety of property. The Office intended that the 
guidelines would assist an applicant with the parts of the application 
that are critical to assessing the suitability of the launch site 
location, the applicant's organization, and the facility for providing 
safe operations.
    The Office issued the guidelines as an interim measure for 
potential developers of launch sites pending this rulemaking, and the 
guidelines describe the information that the FAA requests of an 
applicant as part of its application for a license to operate a launch 
site. The pace of development of the launch site industry has resulted 
in the FAA describing the process and requirements for applications for 
launch site operator licenses under the guidelines. As noted above, the 
FAA issued its first license to operate a launch site to Spaceport 
Systems International for the operation of California Spaceport. The 
FAA issued this license under its general authority under 49 U.S.C. 
70104 and 70105 and 14 CFR Ch. III to license the operation of a launch 
site. Because the operation of California Spaceport as a launch site 
occurs at a federal launch range, the U.S. Air Force plays a 
significant role in California Spaceport's safety process. In fact, the 
FAA was able to review the Spaceport Systems International application 
expeditiously because the applicant certified its intention to observe 
the safety requirements currently applied by the Western Range and 
contained in ``Eastern and Western Range 127-1, Range Safety 
Requirements (EWR 127-1),'' (Mar. 1995).\1\ The FAA determined that 
applicant compliance with EWR 127-1, together with Air Force approval 
of other important elements of the operation of a launch site protected 
public health and safety and the safety of property. In general, the 
FAA deems the compliance by a licensed launch site

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operator with these requirements in combination with other safety 
practices imposed by a federal launch range as acceptable for purposes 
of protecting the public and property from hazards associated with 
launch site activities at a licensed launch site operator's facilities. 
In 1997, the FAA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Department 
of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration regarding 
safety oversight of licensed launch site operators located on federal 
launch ranges.
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    \1\ EWR 127-1 is updated on an ongoing basis. The latest version 
of these requirements may be found at http://www.pafb.af.mil/450SW/.
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    On June 25, 1999, the FAA released a notice of proposed rulemaking, 
Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site, 64 FR 
34316 (Jun. 25, 1999). This will be referred to throughout this 
document as the Launch Site NPRM.
Comparison of the Guidelines and the Final Rule
    The existing guidelines will no longer be in effect as of the 
effective date of this final rule. A comparison of some of the 
similarities and differences may therefore prove of assistance. The one 
aspect of the licensing process that will not change is that the FAA 
will issue a license to operate a launch site only if the operation of 
the launch site will not jeopardize the public health and safety, the 
safety of property, or national security or foreign policy interests of 
the United States. The guidelines were flexible and were intended to 
identify the major elements of an application and lead the applicant 
through the application process with the FAA. The final rule codifies 
the requirements that must be met before a license will be issued.
    The guidelines and the final rule share some common elements, 
namely, the need for the applicant to supply information to support the 
FAA's environmental determination under the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) and the FAA's policy review that addresses national 
security and foreign policy issues. These requirements are discussed in 
detail below, in the description of the final regulations. Under the 
final regulations, the information requirements for these reviews 
remain for the most part unchanged from the guidelines.
    A review of the suitability of the proposed location of the launch 
site is an important component of both the guidelines and the final 
regulations. Although both approaches call for a site location review, 
the reviews differ in breadth and specificity. The guidelines request 
an applicant to provide information regarding geographic 
characteristics, flight paths and impact areas and the meteorological 
environment. To describe a launch site's geographic characteristics, an 
applicant is requested to provide information regarding the launch site 
location, size, and shape, its topographic and geological 
characteristics, its proximity to populated areas, and any local 
commercial and recreational activities that may be affected by launches 
such as air traffic, shipping, hunting, and offshore fishing. An 
applicant also provides planned possible flight paths and general 
impact areas designated for launch. If planned flight corridors overfly 
land, the guidelines request that an applicant provide flight safety 
analyses for generic sets of launch vehicles and describe, where 
applicable, any arrangements made to clear the land of people prior to 
launch vehicle flight. With respect to the meteorological environment, 
the guidelines request an applicant to provide data regarding 
temperature, surface and upper wind direction and velocity, temperature 
inversions, and extreme conditions that may affect the safety of launch 
site operations. Under the guidelines, an application includes the 
frequency (average number of days for each month) of extremes in wind 
or temperature inversion that could have an impact on launch.
    In contrast to the guidelines, the final rules require an applicant 
to use specified methods to demonstrate the suitability of the launch 
site location for launching at least one type of launch vehicle, 
including orbital, guided sub-orbital, or unguided sub-orbital 
expendable launch vehicles, and reusable launch vehicles. Each proposed 
launch point on the launch site must be evaluated for each type of 
launch vehicle that the applicant wishes to have launched from the 
launch point. An applicant is provided with a choice of methods to 
develop a flight corridor for a representative launch of an orbital or 
guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, or to develop a set of 
impact dispersion areas for a representative launch of an unguided sub-
orbital expendable launch vehicle. If a flight corridor or set of 
impact dispersion areas exists that does not encompass populated areas, 
no additional analysis is required. Otherwise, an applicant is required 
to conduct a risk analysis to demonstrate that the risk to the public 
from a representative launch does not exceed a casualty expectation 
(Ec) of 30  x  10-6. The FAA will review the 
applicant's analyses to ensure the applicant's process was correct, and 
will approve the launch site location if the Ec risk 
criteria were met.
    Under either the guidelines or the final regulations, little or no 
launch site location review is needed if the applicant proposes to 
locate a launch site at a federal launch range. The fundamental purpose 
of the FAA's proposed launch site location review--to determine whether 
a launch may potentially take place safely from the proposed launch 
site-- has been amply demonstrated at each of the ranges. Exceptions 
may occur if a prospective launch site operator plans to use a launch 
site at a federal launch range for launches markedly different from 
past federal launch range launches, or if an applicant proposes a new 
launch point from which no launch has taken place.
    The guidelines and final regulations differ markedly in their 
approach to ground and flight safety. For ground safety under the 
guidelines, applicants perform a hazard analysis and develop a 
comprehensive ground safety plan and a safety organization. Explosive 
safety is part of the analysis and safety plan. In contrast, the final 
regulations require the submission of an explosive site plan, but 
impose fewer operational ground safety responsibilities on a launch 
site operator. For flight safety, under the guidelines and final rules, 
a launch site operator license contains minimal flight safety 
responsibilities. The FAA assigns almost all responsibility for flight 
safety and significant ground safety responsibility to a licensed 
launch operator. Extensive ground and flight safety requirements will 
accompany a launch license. This does not mean a launch site operator 
cannot offer flight safety services or equipment to its customers. 
However, the adequacy of such services and equipment typically will be 
assessed in the FAA's review of a launch license application.

II. Summary of the Regulations and Discussion of Comments

    With this rulemaking, the FAA creates in 14 CFR Chapter III a new 
part 420 to contain the requirements for obtaining and possessing a 
license to operate a launch site. If a prospective launch site operator 
proposes to offer its launch site to others, that person must obtain a 
license to operate a launch site.
    Part 420 does not apply in two notable situations. A launch 
operator operating a private site for its own launches does not need a 
license to operate a launch site because its launch license would cover 
the safety issues associated with the launch site. A person wishing to 
operate a site to support amateur rocket activities, as defined in 14 
CFR 401.5, also does not need a license to operate a launch site 
because the launches taking place from

[[Page 62816]]

the site are exempt from AST's regulations.
    By means of operational, explosive safety, and site location 
requirements, the FAA's regulations will address public safety issues 
associated with launches that take place from a launch site whose 
operation the FAA has licensed. Additionally, the FAA will address 
environmental issues, and will have international obligations and 
national security interests reviewed by the appropriate agencies, in 
the course of a license review. Environmental review may precede or 
take place concurrently with the licensing process.
    The grant of a license to operate a launch site does not guarantee 
that a launch license will be granted for any particular launch 
proposed for the site. All launches will be subject to separate FAA 
review and licensing.
    AST received comments from 11 members of the public and one 
government organization. The one government commenter was the 45th 
Space Wing Range Safety Engineering Support (45SW/SESE). The public 
commenters were:

--ACTA, Inc. \2\
--New Mexico Office for Space Commercialization
--Kistler Aerospace Corporation
--Lockheed Martin Corporation
--National Fire Protection Association
--Don A. Nelson
--Nelson Engineering Co.
--Oklahoma Aeronautics and Space Commission
--Christopher Shove, Ph.D.
--Space Access, LLC
--Texas Aerospace Commission
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    \2\ ACTA, Inc. divided its comments into those from ACTA itself 
and those from ACTA staff.
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A. Overview

    The FAA's approach to licensing the operation of a launch site 
focuses on five areas of concern critical to ensuring that operation of 
a launch site will not jeopardize public health and safety, the safety 
of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests or 
international obligations of U.S. interests. These reviews encompass 
the environment, policy considerations, the siting of explosives and 
other explosive safety measures, the safety of a launch site location, 
and operational responsibilities.
    Part 420 is divided into four subparts. Subpart A includes the 
scope and applicability of the part, and definitions applicable to the 
part. Subpart B includes the criteria and information requirements for 
obtaining a license. Subpart C lists the terms and conditions of a 
license to operate a launch site. Subpart D lists the other 
responsibilities of a licensee.
    Part 420 separates the requirements to obtain a license from the 
responsibilities of a licensee. Much of the information required by 
subpart B pertains to how the applicant will meet its responsibilities 
in accordance with subpart D.
    Under the regulations, an applicant is required to provide the FAA 
with information sufficient to conduct environmental and policy reviews 
and determinations. An applicant is also required to submit an 
explosive site plan that shows the location of all explosive hazard 
facilities and distances between them, and the distances to public 
areas.
    The regulations provide an applicant options for proving to the FAA 
that a launch could be conducted from the site without jeopardizing 
public health and safety. The requirement for a launch site location 
approval would not normally apply to an applicant who proposes to 
operate an existing launch point at a federal launch range, unless the 
applicant plans to use a launch point different than used previously by 
the federal launch range, or to use an existing launch point for a 
different type or larger launch vehicle than used in the past. The fact 
that launches have taken place safely from any particular launch point 
at a federal launch range may provide the same demonstration that is 
accomplished by the FAA's launch site location review: namely, a 
showing that launch may occur safely from the site.
    The FAA is imposing specific operational ground safety 
responsibilities on a licensed launch site operator, and requires that 
a license applicant demonstrate how those requirements will be met. A 
launch site operator licensee's responsibilities include: preventing 
unauthorized public access to the site; properly preparing the public 
and customers to visit the site; informing customers of limitations on 
use of the site; scheduling and coordinating hazardous activities 
conducted by customers; maintaining agreements with the U.S. Coast 
Guard and with the FAA regional office having jurisdiction over the 
airspace through which launches will take place and among other 
measures, the issuance of a Notice to Mariners and Notice to Airmen, 
respectively, prior to a launch from the launch site; and notifying 
adjacent property owners and local jurisdictions of the pending flight 
of a launch vehicle. Part 420 also contains launch site operator 
responsibilities with regard to record keeping, license transfer, 
compliance monitoring, accident investigation and explosives. Other 
federal government agencies have jurisdiction over a number of ground 
safety issues, and the FAA does not intend to duplicate their 
efforts.\3\
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    \3\ The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) play a 
role in regulating ground activities at a launch site. OSHA 
regulations cover worker safety issues, and may, as a by-product, 
help protect public safety as well. One provision of particular note 
is 29 CFR 1910.119, process safety management of highly hazardous 
chemicals (PSM). The requirements of the PSM standard are intended 
to eliminate or mitigate the consequences of releases of highly 
hazardous chemicals that may be toxic, reactive, flammable, or 
explosive. Management controls are emphasized to address the risks 
associated with handling or working near hazardous chemicals. These 
requirements may apply to some launch site and launch operators. EPA 
regulations are designed to protect the public health and safety 
from releases of chemicals. One regulation of note is 40 CFR part 
68, Accidental release prevention provisions. It applies to an owner 
or operator of a stationary source that has more than a threshold 
quantity of a regulated substance in a process, and requires the 
owner or operator to develop and implement a risk management program 
to prevent accidents and limit the severity of any accidents that 
occur. The EPA rule further requires sources to conduct an offsite 
consequence analysis to define the potential impacts of worst-case 
releases and other release scenarios. For any process whose worst-
case release would reach the public, the source must develop and 
implement a prevention program and an emergency response program. 
Both the EPA and OSHA prevention rules require regulated entities to 
conduct formal analyses of the risks involved in the use and storage 
of covered substances and consider all possible ways in which 
existing systems could fail and result in accidental releases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Discussion of Comments Regarding Overview
    A few commentors provided comments that focussed on the FAA's 
regulatory approach.
    Space Access believed that instead of focussing on the launch site 
location, the rule should put primary interest on the activity 
occurring on a site, including preparation for a launch, launch, and 
any activity or process conducted on or near the site that might 
endanger the public health and safety. Space Access at 1. The FAA 
agrees, but believes that a launch site location analysis is necessary 
in order to determine whether a launch could safely take place from the 
location selected. As noted in the NPRM, the FAA does not plan to 
license the operation of a launch site from which even a hypothetical 
launch could not take place and has devised the location review to 
avoid such an eventuality. The other requirements in part 420, in 
conjunction with the ground and flight safety requirements of a launch 
license, should address the activity occurring on a site.
    Space Access also notes that the rule must achieve minimum safety 
standards but not require excessive agency

[[Page 62817]]

oversight or business duplication of effort. Space Access at 2. The 
desire to avoid duplication of effort was also expressed by Kistler 
Aerospace Corporation and Christopher Shove, Ph.D., a Senior Consultant 
for Space Data Systems, Inc. Although Kistler commends the FAA for 
striving to keep the regulatory environment free from redundant 
requirements levied by multiple agencies, Kistler Aerospace Corporation 
at 2; Christopher Shove at 1. Kistler also states that this goal should 
be expanded to include launch site operators operating out of 
localities that already address similar concerns through local rules or 
ordinances.
    The FAA agrees that it should not impose requirements that 
duplicate other federal regulations. That is why there are relatively 
few operational responsibilities of a launch site licensee in part 420. 
For example, OSHA and the EPA have many regulations that apply to 
launch site operators, which the FAA does not duplicate. If an 
applicant is required to fulfill other safety requirements because of 
state or local regulations, or rules of property owners, the FAA will 
work with the applicant to avoid duplication of paper work. However, 
applicants must meet FAA and other federal standards.
    The New Mexico Office for Space Commercialization (NMOSC) thought 
that the proposed regulations should not relate only to launch 
operations. NMOSC suggested that the proposed regulations be expanded 
to include recovery operations. New Mexico Office for Space 
Commercialization at 1. The FAA agrees that recovery operations are 
important. However, recovery operations are covered in another 
rulemaking. Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and 
Reentry Licensing, 65 FR 56617 (Sept. 19, 2000).
    Because the FAA stated in the NPRM that when launching from a non-
federal launch site, a launch operator's responsibility for ground and 
flight safety takes on added importance, NMOSC suggested that the FAA 
is willing to accept a double standard on safety. NMOSC believes that 
New Mexico will be treated differently from Florida and California 
because their launch sites are federal, and New Mexico's is not. NMOSC 
at 2. This is not true. The FAA did not mean to imply that a launch 
operator has more responsibility for flight safety from a commercial 
launch site than from a federal launch site. In both cases, the launch 
operator is responsible for the safety of its flight. The FAA was only 
pointing out that a launch operator at a non-federal launch site will 
not be able to depend on an established flight safety infrastructure 
that currently exists at federal launch ranges.
    Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMC) recommended, in the interest of 
standardization and interoperability, that a launch site operator be 
required to establish and maintain at its facility a range safety/
tracking system that functions at an industry-wide standard and 
demonstrate that it meets the standard. LMC at 4. A launch operator 
should be required to demonstrate to the FAA that its launch vehicle 
interfaces with this standardized range safety/tracking system. The FAA 
agrees on the importance of range safety and tracking for most launch 
operations. Because launch safety is the responsibility of the launch 
operator, because interoperability and standardization are business 
issues about which a launch site operator may wish to make its own 
decisions, the FAA notes with interest but declines to pursue this 
suggestion. Although the federal launch ranges offer a standardized 
form of range safety and tracking, the FAA is reluctant to enshrine 
particular standards through regulation, especially when the ranges 
themselves are re-visiting how to provide tracking, transmission and 
other launch safety services. Nothing precludes a launch site operator 
from providing such services as well; a launch operator will continue, 
of course, to remain responsible under its launch license for the 
safety of the flight of its vehicle, regardless of with whom it 
contracts for supporting services.

B. Environmental

    Licensing the operation of a launch site is a major federal action 
for purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 
et seq. As a result, the FAA is required to assess the environmental 
impacts of constructing and operating a proposed launch site to 
determine whether these activities will significantly affect the 
quality of the environment. Because the FAA is responsible under NEPA 
regulations for preparing an environmental assessment or environmental 
impact statement (EIS), part 420 requires a license applicant to 
provide the FAA with sufficient information to conduct an analysis in 
accordance with the requirements of the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ) Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of 
NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500-1508, and the FAA's Procedures for Considering 
Environmental Impacts, FAA Order 1050.1D. An applicant will typically 
engage a contractor with specialized experience in the NEPA process to 
conduct the study underpinning the FAA's environmental analysis.
    The FAA encourages an applicant to begin the environmental review, 
including the gathering of pertinent information to perform the 
assessment, early in the planning process, but after the applicant has 
defined its proposed action and considered feasible alternatives. The 
FAA will determine whether a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) 
may be issued after an environmental assessment, or whether an 
environmental impact statement followed by a record of decision is 
necessary. An applicant may be subject to restrictions on activities at 
a proposed launch site. An applicant may acquire property for future 
use as a launch site; however, absent a FONSI, the FAA must prepare an 
environmental review that includes consideration of reasonable 
alternatives to the site. According to the CEQ regulations as 
interpreted by the courts, an applicant may not use the purchase of a 
site or construction at the site to limit the array of reasonable 
alternatives. As a result, an applicant must complete the environmental 
process before construction or improvement of the site. The FAA will 
not issue a license if the FAA has not concluded an environmental 
review in accordance with all applicable regulations and guidelines.

Discussion of Comments Regarding the Environmental Review

    Nelson Engineering Co. stated that the X-33 EIS process included 
overflight and safety issues. Nelson Engineering felt that including 
overflight and safety issues for licensed activities was a duplication 
of effort since these safety issues are covered in the license process 
as well. It noted that the public has the right to know and comment on 
overflight and safety issues, but it would be best to handle it 
separate from the EIS process. Nelson Engineering at 2. The FAA agrees. 
Safety issues are better addressed in the licensing process where 
safety standards exist. When the question of safety comes up during the 
FAA's environmental review process, the FAA notes in the environmental 
documentation that safety issues are addressed in the licensing 
process.
    NMOSC commented on the FAA's statement that an applicant may 
acquire property for future use as a launch site. NMOSC states that 
according to the CEQ regulations as interpreted by the courts, an 
applicant may not use the purchase of a site or construction at the 
site to limit the array of reasonable alternatives. NMOSC at 2. The FAA 
partially agrees with NMOSC in that purchasing a site with the intent 
to

[[Page 62818]]

build a launch facility, without looking at other possible locations, 
limits the launch site selection and evaluation of alternatives and is 
contrary to the requirements of the National Environmental Protection 
Act (NEPA). NEPA requires an applicant to show that it looked at 
several feasible sites based on certain criteria and that it chose one 
of those sites as the preferred or selected alternative. However, an 
applicant can in fact purchase property for future use as a launch site 
if the applicant can show that it looked at several sites and picked a 
particular site based on certain parameters. It must also document the 
evaluation of those alternative sites.

C. Policy

    The FAA conducts a policy review of an application for a license to 
operate a launch site to determine whether operation of the proposed 
launch site would jeopardize national security, foreign policy 
interests, or international obligations of the United States. The FAA 
conducts the policy review in coordination with other federal agencies 
that have responsibility for national and international interests. The 
Department of Defense is consulted to determine whether a license 
application presents any issues affecting national security. The 
Department of State reviews an application for issues affecting foreign 
policy or international obligations. Other agencies, such as NASA, are 
consulted as appropriate. By this rulemaking, the regulations require 
an applicant to supply information relevant to the FAA's policy 
approval, including, for example, identification of foreign ownership 
of the applicant. The FAA will obtain other information required for a 
policy review from information submitted by an applicant in other parts 
of the application. During a policy review, the FAA will consult with 
an applicant regarding any questions or issues before making a final 
determination. An applicant would have the opportunity to address any 
questions before completion of the review.
    No comments regarding policy review were received and no changes 
have been made to part 420 from the Launch Site NPRM.

D. Explosive Site Plan Review

    The final rules establish criteria and procedures for the siting of 
facilities at a launch site where solid propellants, liquid 
propellants, and other explosives are located to prepare launch 
vehicles and payloads for flight. These criteria and procedures are 
commonly referred to as quantity-distance (Q-D) requirements because 
they provide minimum separation distances between explosive hazard 
facilities, surrounding facilities and locations where the public may 
be present on the basis of the type and quantity of explosive material 
located within the area. Minimum prescribed separation distances are 
necessary to protect the public from explosive hazards on a launch site 
so that the effects of an explosion do not reach the public.
    An applicant must provide the FAA with an explosive site plan that 
demonstrates compliance with the Q-D requirements. Because the FAA must 
approve this plan, applicants are cautioned not to begin construction 
of facilities requiring an explosive site plan until obtaining FAA 
approval. Note also that the Q-D requirements do not address any toxic 
hazards. Toxic hazards may be mitigated through procedural means, and 
the FAA addresses toxic hazards in a separate rulemaking on licensing 
and safety requirements for launch. If a toxic hazard is a controlling 
factor in siting, a prudent launch site operator will address the issue 
when preparing its site plan.
    The quantity-distance criteria are a critical mitigation measure 
required in a launch site operator application to provide the public 
protection from ground operations at a launch site. The final rules 
have other mitigation measures, including launch site operator 
responsibilities that address accident prevention measures, and 
procedural requirements to protect other launch site customers and 
visitors on the launch site. Any other procedural requirements 
necessary to protect the public from explosive hazards will be the 
responsibility of a launch operator under a launch license.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ A launch license encompasses ground activities involved in 
the preparation of a launch vehicle for flight at a launch site in 
the United States. This may include the storage and handling of 
explosives involved with the handling and assembly of launch 
vehicles at a launch site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA has made certain changes in response to comments to part 
420, from what was proposed in the Launch Site NPRM regarding the 
explosive site plan requirements. A brief summary of these changes is 
discussed below and is discussed in further detail in the Part 
analysis.
     The NPRM did not require an applicant proposing to locate 
a launch site at a federal launch range to submit an explosive site 
plan. In the final rule, the applicant must submit an explosive site 
plan to the federal launch range operator.
     Q-D requirements for hazard class 1.1 were added, 
including a provision for public traffic route distance.
     The assumption that solid and liquid stages on a launch 
vehicle would not explode simultaneously has been removed from the Q-D 
requirements for locating solid and liquid propellants together.
     The explosive site plan requirements were moved from 
subpart B, Application Requirements, to subpart D, Licensee 
Responsibility. Although an applicant must complete an explosive site 
plan to obtain a license, this section was moved because the explosive 
site plan is a document with which a licensee must comply and keep up 
to date at all times.
     A provision was added to clarify that explosive siting 
issues outside the scope of the part 420 requirements will be evaluated 
by the FAA on an individual basis consistent with industry safety 
standards.
    A discussion of launch site explosive hazards, the reason the FAA 
is adopting explosive siting criteria, current Q-D standards, the FAA's 
use of NASA and DOD Q-D standards, other approaches to explosive 
safety, and the application of ATF, DOD or NASA standards are covered 
in the Launch Site NPRM. 64 FR at 34320--34322. Solid explosive 
divisions, future changes in liquid propellant requirements, and solid 
and liquid bi-propellants at launch pads are discussed below.
Solid Explosive Divisions
    The Launch Site NPRM proposed requirements for division 1.3 solid 
explosives. As noted in the Launch Site NPRM, the FAA is adopting the 
United Nations Organization (UNO) classification system, a system that 
governs transport of dangerous goods. The Department of 
Transportation's Research and Special Programs Administration assigns 
dangerous goods to the appropriate class in accordance with 49 CFR part 
173. The hazard classification system consists of nine classes for 
dangerous goods, of which ammunition and explosives are included as the 
UNO ``Class 1, Explosives.'' Class 1 explosives are further subdivided 
into ``divisions'' based on the character and predominance of the 
associated hazards and on the potential for causing casualties or 
property damage. As defined in 49 CFR 173.50:
     Division 1.1--consists of explosives that have a mass 
explosion hazard. A mass explosion is one which affects almost the 
entire load instantaneously.

[[Page 62819]]

     Division 1.2--consists of explosives that have a 
projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard.
     Division 1.3--consists of explosives that have a fire 
hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or 
both, but not a mass explosion hazard.
     Division 1.4--consists of explosives that present a minor 
explosion hazard.
     Division 1.5--consists of very insensitive explosives.
     Division 1.6--consists of extremely insensitive articles 
which do not have a mass explosion hazard.
    The FAA originally proposed criteria only for division 1.3 because 
it believed that the only solid explosives for commercial launches that 
would likely affect separation distances on a launch site were division 
1.3 propellants. The FAA noted that although launch vehicles frequently 
have components incorporating division 1.1 explosives, such as those 
used to initiate flight termination systems, the quantity is small. The 
FAA also noted that division 1.1 explosives will not likely be present 
in sufficient quantities to affect the application of Q-D criteria. The 
only division 1.1 solid rocket motors existing today are from old 
military missiles, which are not likely to be used at a commercial 
launch site.
    In response to comments from the 45th Space Wing pointing out the 
errors underlying this assumption, part 420 now includes quantity-
distance requirements for explosive division 1.1 explosives. Compared 
with explosive division 1.3 explosives, the distances are greater due 
to their more hazardous nature.
Future Change in Liquid Propellant Requirements
    The DOD Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) initiated a DOD Explosive 
Safety Standard for Energetic Liquids Program, and established an 
interagency advisory board called the Liquid Propellants Working Group 
(LPWG). The FAA is a member of this group. A number of possible 
inconsistencies and irregularities have been identified in the current 
approach to siting liquid propellants. These include Q-D criteria for 
most liquid propellants, possible inconsistencies in hazard group and 
compatibility group definitions, and possible inaccurate 
characterization of blast overpressure hazards of liquid propellant 
explosions. The purpose of the LPWG is to address issues of explosive 
equivalence, compatibility mixing, and quantity-distance criteria, and 
to develop recommended revisions to DOD STD 6055.9, which addresses 
liquid propellants and other liquid energetic materials.
    The DDESB work is almost completed, and the recommendations of the 
LPWG should be incorporated in the DOD standard in the near future. 
Because the DDESB is possibly the best-equipped group in the country to 
address these issues, the FAA will carefully consider its 
recommendations. The basic approach outlined in the final rule should 
not change. However, the DDESB is likely to specify new hazard and 
compatibility groups, distance values, and equivalency values, and the 
public may anticipate their eventual consideration and possible 
adoption by the FAA.
Solid and Liquid Bi-Propellants at Launch Pads
    In the Launch Site NPRM, the FAA proposed a special requirement at 
launch pads for launch vehicles that use liquid bi-propellant and solid 
propellant components. The required separation distance would be the 
greater of the distance determined by the explosive equivalent of the 
liquid propellant alone or the solid propellant alone. An applicant 
would not have to add the separation distances of both. This proposal 
rested on the conclusion that, generally, no credible scenario existed 
that could produce a simultaneous explosion reaction of both liquid 
propellant tanks and solid propellant motors. This requirement has 
changed because the assumption may not always be correct.
    Under the final rule, an applicant must conduct an analysis of the 
maximum credible event (MCE), or the worst case explosion that is 
expected to occur. If analysis shows that an explosion caused by the 
liquid propellants will not cause a simultaneous explosion of the solid 
propellants, and an explosion due to the solid propellants will not 
cause a simultaneous explosion of the liquid propellants, the distance 
between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive hazard 
facilities and public areas should be based on the MCE.
Discussion of Comments
    The 45th Space Wing Range, Safety Engineering Support division 
(45SW/SESE), provided a number of comments on the FAA's proposed 
explosive safety requirements. First, the 45SW/SESE suggests including 
alternative approaches to Q-D standards such as risk-based thresholds 
and limits. 45th Space Wing Range, Safety Engineering Support division 
at 1. The FAA agrees that alternative approaches to Q-D may be 
appropriate. However, the FAA will not formally adopt such an approach 
at this time for the following reasons.
    On December 9, 1999, the DDESB approved, for limited use at DOD 
facilities, the use of risk-based explosives safety siting of 
explosives facilities for calendar years 2000 through 2002. 
Specifically, on a case-by-case basis, a risk-based explosives safety 
analysis that supports an explosives facility siting may be submitted 
to the DDESB Secretariat for review and approval.\5\ A risk based 
analysis is used when a waiver or exemption would be required to 
approve a facility. The FAA will monitor the experience of the DDESB 
during those three years, and may take regulatory action at that time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Memorandum from USAF Colonel Daniel T. Tompkins to the Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps board members (Dec. 9, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the meantime, an applicant unable to meet the Q-D requirements 
might attempt a risk-based approach if able to provide a clear and 
convincing demonstration that the proposed method provides an 
equivalent level of safety to that required by Q-D. Such a 
demonstration would have to include an explosives safety analysis that 
analyzes hazards associated with handling explosive materials on the 
launch site. The applicant should examine the relationship between an 
explosive hazard facility and an exposed facility to determine what 
effect one has on the other in the event of an accidental explosion. As 
discussed in the NPRM, net explosives weight is used to calculate Q-D 
separations by means of the formula: D=KW 1/3, where D is 
the required distance (in feet), K is the protection factor depending 
on the degree of risk assumed or permitted, and W 1/3 is the 
cube root of the net explosives weight (NEW) in pounds. This formula is 
also used for assessing risk. Dividing the distance by the cube root of 
the NEW will give the actual K factor of protection. A K factor equates 
to an overpressure, as shown in table 1. Knowing the expected 
overpressure can help in understanding the facility or equipment damage 
and the personnel injuries expected to be sustained by a particular 
blast overpressure. Hazardous fragments must also be considered when 
preparing a risk assessment.
    For more information on blast pressure, blast effects, and fragment 
hazards, see Air Force Manual

[[Page 62820]]

(AFMAN) 91-201, Explosives Safety Standards, sections 4.48 and 4.49 
(Mar. 7, 2000).

               Table 1.--K-Factor to PSI Relationship \6\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            K-factor                  PSI        K-factor        PSI
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.0............................        1000             20          3.0
1.2............................         763             21          2.8
1.4............................         597             22          2.6
1.6............................         475             23          2.4
1.8............................         384             24          2.3
2.0............................         315             25          2.2
2.5............................         200             26          2.1
3.0............................         135             27          2.0
3.5............................          95             28          1.9
4.0............................          70             29          1.8
4.5............................          53             30          1.7
5.0............................          42             31          1.63
6.0............................          28             32          1.56
7.0............................          20             33          1.5
8.0............................          15             34          1.4
9.0............................          12             35          1.4
10.............................           9.6           36          1.3
11.............................           8.0           37          1.3
12.............................           6.8           38          1.25
13.............................           5.9           39          1.2
14.............................           5.2           40          1.2
15.............................           4.7           45          1.0
16.............................           4.2           50          0.9
17.............................           3.8           60          0.7
18.............................           3.5           70          0.6
19.............................           3.2           80          0.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    45SW/SESE asks whether there is an assumption that all DOD 
explosive site plan approval is current for launch sites on a federal 
range? What if formal DDESB approval is not on record? 45SW/SESE at 1. 
The FAA does assume that all DOD explosive site plan approval is 
current for launch sites on a federal range and that formal DDESB 
approval is on record. The FAA's launch site safety assessments of the 
national launch ranges show that the DOD ranges enforce their 
standards. However, if the FAA discovers through its safety inspection 
program that a licensee is operating out of compliance with the DDESB 
approved explosive site plan, it will consider this a violation of the 
license and may take appropriate enforcement action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Table 4.2 in AFMAN 91-201 (Mar. 7, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the FAA's statement that a launch site operator is 
responsible for preventing unauthorized public access to the site, the 
45SW/SESE commented that this should include surrounding areas 
designated as posing an environmental or explosives hazard. 45SW/SESE 
at 2. The FAA agrees in principle. With respect to environmental 
hazards, surrounding areas posing an environmental hazard will be 
addressed in the environmental review process.
    With respect to explosives, to comply with these rules adopted 
today, areas posing an explosive hazard during ground activities must, 
by regulatory requirement, be contained within the launch site. A 
launch site operator is responsible for preventing unauthorized access 
to the site. It is also responsible for ensuring that hazardous areas 
within the site are clear and that other users of the site are not 
placed at risk during hazardous operations. In the NPRM, the FAA stated 
that minimum prescribed separation distances are necessary to protect 
the public from explosive hazards on a launch site so that the effects 
of an explosion do not reach the public. 45SW/SESE notes that some 
other reasons for separation distances include to prevent unnecessary 
injuries or casualty to workers related to the explosive operation; to 
protect property; to avoid propagation from one explosive location to 
another; and remote explosives testing. 45SW/SESE at 2. The FAA agrees, 
but wishes to stress that these requirements are intended to protect 
public safety because public safety is the FAA's mandate. Property 
belonging to members of the public also achieves some measure of 
protection in accordance with these requirements. Also, propagation 
from one explosive location to another is covered through part 420's 
intraline distance requirements.
    In the NPRM, the FAA states that it must approve the explosive site 
plan that an applicant provides to the FAA. The 45SW/SESE asks whether 
explosive site plans already approved by the DDESB will be granted FAA 
approval. 45SW/SESE at 3. The answer is yes. A new requirement from the 
NPRM is that the FAA now requires applicants for launch sites located 
on a federal launch range to provide the FAA with a copy of an 
explosive site plan. However, the FAA will not approve it. The FAA will 
use the explosive site plan for compliance monitoring purposes only.
    The 45SW/SESE notes that ``launch site'' in some contexts implies 
``launch complex,'' which excludes other launch processing facilities 
or areas at the launch range. 45SW/SESE at 3. The FAA does not wish to 
imply that a launch site is merely a launch complex on a launch site. 
To clarify, a launch site includes the entire land area operated by a 
launch site operator, including all launch complexes and facilities 
within.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ The Act and the regulations define launch site as the 
location on Earth from which a launch takes place (as defined in a 
license the Secretary issues or transfers under this chapter) and 
necessary facilities. 49 USC 70102(6); 14 CFR 401.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the NPRM, the FAA stated that the proposed requirements do not 
account for the use of barricades and other protective measures to 
mitigate the effect of an explosion on exposed areas.

[[Page 62821]]

An applicant proposing to use such measures in order to deviate from 
the proposed siting rules may, during the application process, provide 
a clear and convincing demonstration that its proposed method provides 
an equivalent level of safety to that required by Q-D. 45SW/SESE states 
that this use of a waiver is inconsistent with the way the Air Force 
uses them. A waiver is used to document a condition or requirement that 
is not achieved, not one where the condition or requirement is being 
met. 45SW/SESE at 4. The FAA did not mean ``waiver'' in the way the Air 
Force uses it. If a launch site operator plans to use barricades or 
other protective measures to mitigate the effect of an explosion on 
exposed area, the applicant would have to submit a clear and convincing 
demonstration of an equivalent level of safety.
    In the NPRM, the FAA stated that proposed subpart B would establish 
criteria and procedures for the siting of facilities at a launch site 
where solid and liquid propellants are located to prepare launch 
vehicles and payloads for flight. 45SW/SESE notes that propellants are 
not enough. The requirements should include other explosives as well 
including linear shaped charges, safe and arm devices, initiators, and 
igniters. 45SW/SESE at 2, 4. The FAA agrees, and has modified the 
explosive siting requirements to include those explosives, which are 
division 1.1 explosives.
    In the NPRM, the FAA stated that division 1.1 explosives would not 
likely be present in sufficient quantities to affect the application of 
Q-D criteria. 45SW/SESE points out that this is incorrect, and the FAA 
agrees. The linear shaped charge, which is an explosive division 1.1 
explosive, is the driver of distance requirements because in most cases 
a solid rocket booster is zero percent trinitrotoluene (TNT) 
equivalency. 45SW/SESE at 5. ACTA adds that DOD 6055.9 states that the 
inhabited building distance for division 1.1 solid propellants ranging 
from 1-35,000 lb is 1250 ft. Proposed table E-1 only requires 800 ft. 
for quantities up to 1,000,000 lb. This is true even when quantities of 
1.1 explosives are present. ACTA at 5. The FAA agrees that its 
assumption that division 1.1 explosives would not likely be present in 
sufficient quantities to affect the application of Q-D criteria was 
incorrect. The FAA has added division 1.1 explosives to this final 
rule.
    In the NPRM, the FAA also stated that because division 1.3 solid 
propellants are all compatible, the proposed regulations do not 
incorporate compatibility groups for solid propellants. 45SW/SESE asks 
how compatibility would be determined if there was a need to store 
other explosives with the solids? 45SW/SESE at 5. Ensuring that 
explosives in an explosives hazard facility are compatible is a 
procedural requirement of a launch operator. Ground safety will be 
covered in a separate proposed rulemaking on licensing and safety 
requirements for launch.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed a special requirement at launch pads 
for launch vehicles that use liquid bi-propellant and solid propellant 
components. The required separation distance would be the greater of 
the distance determined by the explosive equivalent of the liquid 
propellant alone or the solid propellant alone. An applicant did not 
have to add the separation distances of both. The NPRM assumed that 
generally, no credible scenario existed that could produce a 
simultaneous explosion reaction of both liquid propellant tanks and 
solid propellant motors. 45SW/SESE states that the general assumption 
that a simultaneous explosion reaction of both liquid propellant tanks 
and solid propellant motors is unlikely is not a prudent approach. 
45SW/SESE recommends analyses be performed on a case-by-case basis to 
determine a credible scenario. A number of current Q-D site plans 
considered TNT equivalencies from both the solids and liquids. 45SW/
SESE at 5, 6; but see Lockheed Martin at 3 (agreeing with the NPRM 
proposal as permitting greater flexibility in operations and launch 
vehicle design).
    The FAA agrees with 45SW/SESE, and adopts the suggestion to require 
that an applicant address an explosion of both solid and liquid 
propellants at the same time. Air Force standard AFMAN 91-201, section 
3.8 states that the combined bulk explosive weight of explosive items 
is not necessarily the weight used for Q-D calculations. Q-D is based 
on the maximum credible event (MCE), namely, the worst case explosion, 
that is expected to occur. Section 3.8.3 further states the basic rule 
when combining mass-detonating (e.g., the explosive equivalent of 
liquid propellants) and nonmass-detonating explosives (e.g., an 
explosive division 1.3 solid rocket motor). Consider the distance for 
the combined explosives weight of 1.1 and 1.3 first as 1.1. Then 
consider the distance for the combined explosives weight of 1.1 and 1.3 
as 1.3. The required distance is the greater of the two. However, 
section 3.8 further states that exceptions are granted when analyses or 
test results demonstrate that the explosive division 1.1 (for liquid 
propellants) will not cause detonation of the explosive division 1.3 
explosives.
    This approach has now been incorporated into the final rule, in 
section 420.69. Note that the FAA still considers a simultaneous 
explosion reaction of both liquid propellant tanks and solid propellant 
motors to be unlikely. The FAA requires that this improbability be 
demonstrated. Otherwise, a launch site operator will have to use the 
combined explosive weight of the solids and liquids to determine 
required distances.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to adopt a provision of DOD STD 
6055.9 that exempts the need for a lightning protection system when a 
local lightning warning system is used to terminate operations before 
the incidence of an electrical storm, if all personnel can and will be 
provided with protection equivalent to a public traffic route distance. 
The 45SW/SESE notes that this exception is not prudent in Florida where 
lightning strikes can occur without warning, except possibly an 
unmanned small licensed location where the value of the facility and 
its content are assumable risks. 45SW/SESE at 6.
    The FAA agrees that if lightning strikes can occur without warning, 
then it would be prudent to have a lightning protection system. The 
final rule would require a lightning protection system in that 
situation. A licensee must ensure the withdrawal of the public to a 
public area distance prior to an electrical storm. If this is not 
possible, then a lightning protection system is required. Note also 
that the objective is not to protect the licensee's property or that of 
its contractors, subcontractors, or customers, but members of the 
public and their property.
    In the NPRM, the FAA defined intraline distance as the minimum 
distance permitted between any two explosive hazard facilities in the 
ownership, possession or control of one launch site customer. The FAA 
notes that unlike distances to protect the public, intraline distance 
will not protect workers with the same level or protection as the 
public. If intraline distances are not maintained between two explosive 
hazard facilities, then the larger area encompassing both quantities 
must be used for Q-D purposes when determining prescribed distances to 
the public. The 45SW/SESE questions how that could be acceptable when 
worker safety is diminished, and personnel protection must be 
established to be consistent with OSHA. 45SW/SESE at 7. Worker safety 
comes under the jurisdiction of OSHA, and, as noted in the NPRM, the 
FAA does not

[[Page 62822]]

plan to duplicate the requirements of other regulatory agencies.
    45SW/SESE also notes that inhabited building distance, which the 
FAA proposed as public area distance, has an assumed 20% facility 
damage and some injury. 45SW/SESE states that this may be a reasonable 
risk on a DOD installation, and asks whether 20% facility damage and 
injury is acceptable to the general public? 45SW/SESE at 8; see also 
ACTA at 3 (noting that the Q-D criterion for public buildings allows a 
glass fragment serious injury probability of up to 30%). This would not 
be acceptable if Q-D requirements were the only measures taken to 
protect the public. The protection offered by Q-D along with the 
procedural requirements covered in a proposed rulemaking governing 
licensing and safety requirements for launch will be adequate to 
protect the public to an acceptable level. These other safety controls 
are the responsibility of a launch operator and will be covered in a 
separate proposed rulemaking on licensing and safety requirements for 
launch.
    ACTA staff notes that the FAA uses DOD and NASA standards as the 
basis for explosive safety requirements. ACTA asked that since OSHA, 
EPA, and ATF have the responsibility for safety during production and 
assembly of hazardous materials, why shouldn't this apply to launch 
site operations as well. ACTA at 8.
    OSHA and EPA regulations do apply on launch sites, but neither 
agency has Q-D requirements. ATF does have Q-D requirements, but, as 
noted in the NPRM, they only cover the storage of explosives at a 
launch site. ATF regulations do not cover the handling of explosives, 
which includes the majority of hazardous activities at launch sites. 
DOD and NASA standards are currently used at every major launch site in 
the United States, and the FAA requirements reflect the current 
practice. Note also that the distances used in this final rule for the 
``use'' of explosives are consistent with ATF regulations on the 
``storage'' of explosives, and that the FAA is not duplicating the ATF 
storage requirements. An ACTA staff member stated that the NPRM 
provides excruciating details on how to handle explosives but does not 
consider public risks associated with either toxicity or blast 
overpressure focussing. These are major factors in siting decisions. 
ACTA at 7. The FAA agrees that these are important issues, but are not 
critical for the layout of a launch site. These issues are covered in 
the proposed rulemaking governing licensing and safety requirements for 
launch.
    Space Access, LLC, (Space Access) also commented on the explosive 
siting requirements. In the NPRM, the FAA stated that the DDESB is 
likely to specify new hazard and compatibility groups, distance values, 
and equivalency values, and the public may anticipate their eventual 
consideration and possible adoption by the FAA. Space Access recommends 
the FAA accelerate this work and provide these values as soon as 
possible. These proposed changes could have a major financial impact to 
both the site operators and launch vehicle operators in terms of launch 
acquisition, usage, safety separation distances for storage and public 
access and procedures for use in all phases of operations leading up to 
the launch. Space Access was concerned that launch operators will never 
achieve aircraft-like operations if they are continually evacuating 
sites and areas to meet outdated policies and suggested that no 
flexibility to meet safety criteria by means other than total 
separation distance. Space Access at 2. The FAA would like to stress 
that the work is being conducted by the DDESB, and is not in the 
control of the FAA. It is, however, near completion and the FAA will 
consider it once it is completed and adopted by the DDESB.
    Space Access also states that there seems to be a lack of 
discussion of the distances required by the Department of 
Transportation (DOT). Space Access wants a single standard for 
propellants. DOT uses numbers in tens of feet for public safety 
distances. Other standards also exist in the National Fire Protection 
Agency (NFPA) publications and in local fire codes. Space Access at 2, 
3. The FAA agrees that other liquid Q-D standards are much different 
than those proposed by the FAA, but the FAA selected standards 
representing current procedures for the launch industry. That is why 
the new liquid Q-D standards that the DDESB will likely adopt are 
important since they are based on a review of all relevant government 
and industry standards in this area, including those of DOT. There will 
not likely be a single standard for propellants, as Space Access would 
like, but the standards applicable to launch sites will be more 
consistent with other commercial and government standards.
    Space Access also notes that in addition to having realistic 
numbers for Q-D, there needs to be procedures and policies such that 
incentives are in place for actually designing and operating in a safe 
manner. For example, earthen berms can be used to reduce separation 
distances. This should be the same with adequate design and procedures. 
According to Space Access, there is no motivation for improving the 
design or procedures because all that matters is total quantity or TNT 
equivalency. Space Access strongly recommends the FAA adopt a 
methodology that trades design and procedures for distance. Space 
Access at 3.
    The FAA agrees that separation distances can be reduced if certain 
features are built into a facility. The FAA has chosen not to include 
design standards in the final rule at this time because of their 
complexity. In recognition of the availability of such substitutes, the 
final rule now provides that for explosive siting issues not otherwise 
addressed by the requirements of Secs. 420.65-420.69, a launch site 
operator must clearly and convincingly demonstrate a level of safety 
equivalent to that otherwise required by part 420. This means that the 
FAA may permit design features that provide an equivalent level of 
safety to substitute for separation distances.
    Lockheed Martin Corporation also commented on the Q-D requirements. 
First, it believes the FAA should consider applying DOD Standard 6055.9 
at non-federal launch sites instead of developing a new standard 
because 6055.9 represents a well-developed and mature regime with an 
impressive safety record; and because implementation of 6055.9 at non-
federal launch sites would help ensure consistent regulation of 
explosives both at federal and non-federal launch ranges. Lockheed 
Martin at 3. The FAA agrees that 6055.9 represents a well-developed and 
mature regime with an impressive safety record. That is why the FAA's 
Q-D standards are modeled after this standard. The FAA believes, 
however, that codifying, instead of adopting by reference, the basic 
requirements of the standard in a regulation are beneficial for a 
number of reasons. First, codification permits the standard to be 
tailored to the needs of commercial launch sites. DOD standard 6055.9 
is applicable to all military bases, worldwide. Second, the language 
within standards such as DOD regulation 6055.9 is not always stated in 
a regulatory manner. Often, discretion based on military need by the 
DDESB or other body is embedded in the standard. Third, changes to that 
standard by the DDESB could not automatically apply to applicants for a 
license. By adopting the basic requirements of that standard in the 
final rule, the FAA can monitor changes in the DDESB standard, consider 
the applicability and appropriateness of changes to commercial launch 
sites, and go through

[[Page 62823]]

notice and comment rulemaking to adopt any change. Therefore, the FAA 
retains the approach of adopting pertinent requirements of that 
standard in the final rule rather than referencing the entire DOD 
standard 6055.9.
    Lockheed Martin agrees with the FAA's approach to addressing 
hardening on a case-by-case basis, and suggests referring to National 
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70 and 496. Lockheed Martin at 3. 
NFPA 70, the National Electrical Code (1999), includes safety 
requirements for all types of electrical installations. It is useful 
for work that involves electrical design, installation, identification, 
or inspection. NFPA 496, Standard for Purged and Pressurized Enclosure 
for Electrical Equipment, 1988, specifies requirements for design and 
operation of purged and pressurized electrical equipment enclosures to 
reduce or eliminate the hazardous location classification within the 
enclosures.
    Those two standards are incorporated by reference in OSHA's 
Occupational Safety and Health Regulations at 29 CFR 1910.6. Because 
OSHA requires them, and because the FAA is seeking to avoid duplicating 
the requirements of other civilian regulatory agencies, the standards 
will not be incorporated into this final rule. In any event, the FAA 
will be willing to consider those standards in the event a launch site 
operator attempts to use them to demonstrate an equivalent level of 
safety.

E. Explosive Mishap Prevention Measures.

    Application of the quantity-distance rules alone will not prevent 
mishaps from occurring on a launch site. The Q-D rules merely reduce 
the risk to the public to an acceptable level if a mishap occurs, and 
if the public is kept away from the mishap by a distance that is at 
least as great as the public area distance. Safe facility design and 
prudent procedural measures are critical to preventing a mishap from 
occurring in the first place. Because the public at a launch site 
cannot be protected by prudent site planning alone, the FAA today 
adopts launch site operator responsibilities to prevent mishaps 
involving propellants and other explosives.
    Part 420 focuses on measures that are appropriate to be taken by a 
launch site operator. For the most part, the FAA considers it prudent 
to place the responsibility on a launch site operator for those 
measures that must be built into facilities. Requirements of a more 
operational nature will be covered in another FAA rulemaking.
    Part 420 focuses on appropriate measures. These are particularly 
important for electro-explosive devices. Electric hazards include 
lightning, static electricity, electric supply systems, and 
electromagnetic radiation. The FAA is adopting launch site operator 
requirements for two of these electric hazards: lightning and electric 
supply systems. A full discussion of these can be found in the Launch 
Site NPRM. 64 FR at 34324-34325.
    Other measures were considered but rejected because the FAA's 
proposed rulemaking on licensing and safety requirements for launch 
will cover other procedural measures to guard against inadvertent 
initiation of propellants from electricity. Moreover, launch and launch 
site operators should implement prudent design and construction 
measures to comply with local, state, and other federal law, such as 
OSHA requirements.
Discussion of Comments
    In the NPRM, the FAA noted that the National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA), Batterymarch Park, Quincy, Massachusetts, has 
published NFPA 780, Standard for the Installation of Lightning 
Protection Systems. The latest edition was published in 1997. NFPA 780 
provides for the protection of people, buildings, special occupancies, 
heavy duty stacks, structures containing flammable liquids and gases, 
and other entities against lightning damage. The FAA asked for the 
public's views on the use and applicability of this code.
    A number of commenters supported the FAA's adoption of NFPA 780. 
45SW/SESE noted that the Air Force uses NFPA 780 as a core document to 
design lightning protection systems. 45SW/SESE at 6. The NFPA stated 
that the FAA should adopt NFPA 780, which dates back to Benjamin 
Franklin's era. NFPA at 1, 2; see also Lockheed Martin at 3. The FAA 
agrees with the commentors regarding the importance of NFPA 780. 
However, the FAA will not incorporate NFPA 780 by reference because it 
does not always include mandatory language. Due to its importance and 
utility, the FAA will undoubtedly refer to it for appropriate guidance.
    Although LMC believes NFPA 780 is an appropriate and useful 
standard for a lightning protection system, it states that a launch 
site operator should not be required to install and maintain an 
independent lightning protection system. A launch operator will likely 
have one as a way to attract customers. Lockheed Martin at 3. The FAA 
disagrees. The FAA has learned from experience that while most launch 
site operators might be expected to adhere to commonly held standards; 
this is not always the case. Without such requirements, an adequate 
level of safety or risk mitigation cannot be achieved. If most would do 
this anyway, then the impact is minimal. In any event, because it 
involves the construction of facilities, the FAA has made the 
installation of a lightning protection system a requirement for a 
launch site operator license to ensure its availability.
    In addition to NFPA 780, the 45SW/SESE suggested that the FAA 
review DOD 6055.9, and applicable Air Force instructions to provide 
full regulatory requirements. The FAA has reviewed DOD 6055.9, Air 
Force Manual 91-201, and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration's (NASA) ``Safety Standard for Explosives, Propellants, 
and Pyrotechnics,'' NSS 1740.12 (Aug.1993). The FAA believes that the 
requirements in the final rule cover the basic safety issues that need 
to be addressed for lightning protection systems. The FAA expects 
applicants to achieve the level of safety represented by the DOD and 
NASA standard.
    Another explosive mishap prevention measure is the control of 
static electricity. The FAA did not propose any requirements in the 
NPRM regarding the control of static electricity because the FAA 
believed that the control of static electricity in launch operations is 
primarily procedural in nature, and is best covered by the FAA in 
another proposed rulemaking governing licensing and safety requirements 
for launch. The FAA asked for the public's view.
    LMC agreed with the FAA and noted that new rules on control of 
static electricity should reflect current procedures used by the launch 
operators. Lockheed Martin at 4. The NFPA recommended NFPA 77, 
Recommended Practice on Static Electricity (1993), as a reference 
document. NFPA 77 provides a basic understanding of the phenomena of 
static electric discharges and how they can serve as ignition sources, 
and includes useful information on bonding and grounding.

F. Launch Site Location Review

    The FAA intends a launch site location review to determine whether 
the location of a proposed launch site could support launches that 
would not jeopardize public health and safety, and the safety of 
property. To that end, the FAA will determine whether at least one 
hypothetical launch could take place safely from a launch point at the 
proposed site. The FAA will not license

[[Page 62824]]

the operation of a launch site from which a launch could never safely 
take place. An applicant should, however, bear in mind that an FAA 
license to operate a launch site does not guarantee that a launch 
license would be issued for any particular launch proposed from that 
site. Accordingly, much of the decision making with respect to whether 
a particular site will be economically successful will rest, as it 
should, with a launch site operator, who will have to determine whether 
the site possesses sufficient flight corridors for economic viability.
    Accordingly, prior to issuing a license to operate a launch site at 
the proposed location, the FAA will ascertain whether it is 
hypothetically possible to launch at least one type of launch vehicle 
on at least one trajectory from each launch point at the proposed site 
while meeting the FAA's collective risk criteria. The FAA wants to 
ensure that there exists at least one flight corridor or set of impact 
dispersion areas from a proposed launch site that would contain debris 
away from population. Launch is a dangerous activity that the FAA will 
allow to occur only when the risk to people is below an expected 
casualty (Ec) of 30  x  10-6. In other words, if 
there are too many people around a launch site or in a flight corridor 
the FAA will not license the site.
    All this is not to say that the FAA is requiring an applicant for a 
license to operate a launch site to perform a complete flight safety 
analysis for a particular launch. The FAA recognizes that an applicant 
may or may not have customers or a particular launch vehicle in mind. 
Accordingly, the FAA's launch site location review methods only 
approximate, on the basis of certain assumptions and recognizing that 
not all factors need to be taken into account, a full flight safety 
analysis that would normally be performed for an actual launch. Of 
course, if an applicant does have a customer who satisfies the FAA's 
flight safety criteria for launch and obtains a license for launch from 
the site, that showing would also demonstrate to the FAA that a launch 
may occur safely from the proposed site, and the FAA could issue a 
license to operate the launch site on the basis of the actual launch 
proposed.
    The launch site location review applies to both expendable launch 
vehicles (ELVs) and reusable launch vehicles (RLVs). Detailed 
methodologies for the launch site location review are only provided for 
expendable launch vehicles with a flight history. The reusable launch 
vehicles currently proposed by industry vary quite a bit. Accordingly, 
the FAA considered it unwise to define a detailed analytical method for 
determining the suitability of a launch site location for RLVs. An 
applicant proposing a launch site limited to the launch of reusable 
launch vehicles would still need to define a flight corridor and 
conduct a risk analysis if population were present within the flight 
corridor, but the FAA will review such an analysis on a case-by-case 
basis, consistent with the principles discussed in this rulemaking.
    Similarly, the FAA has chosen not to define a detailed analytical 
method for determining the suitability of a launch site location for 
unproven launch vehicles. An applicant proposing a launch site limited 
to the launch of unproven launch vehicles would have to demonstrate to 
the FAA that the launch site is safe for the activity planned.
    A launch site location review provides an applicant with 
alternative methods for demonstrating that a proposed launch site 
satisfies FAA safety requirements. Specifically, the applicant must 
demonstrate that a flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas 
exist that do not encompass populated areas or that do not give rise to 
an Ec risk of greater than 30  x  10-6. Each 
proposed launch point must be evaluated for each type of launch 
vehicle, whether expendable orbital, guided sub-orbital or unguided 
sub-orbital, or reusable, that an applicant proposes would be launched 
from each point.
    Each of the three methods for evaluating the acceptability of a 
launch site's location require an applicant to identify an area, 
whether a flight corridor or a set of impact dispersion areas, 
emanating from a proposed launch site. That area identifies the public 
that the applicant must analyze for risk of impact and harm. An 
applicant who anticipates customers who use guided orbital launch 
vehicles must define a flight corridor for a class of vehicles launched 
from a specific point along a specified trajectory, that extends 5,000 
nautical miles from the launch point or until the launch vehicle's 
instantaneous impact point leaves the Earth's surface, whichever is 
shorter. For guided sub-orbital launch vehicles, the flight corridor 
ends at an impact dispersion area of a final stage. An applicant must 
demonstrate either that there are no populated areas within the flight 
corridor or that the risk to any population in the corridor does not 
exceed the FAA's risk criteria. Similarly, for the sub-orbital launch 
of an unguided vehicle, an applicant must analyze the risks associated 
with a series of impact dispersion areas around the impact points for 
spent stages. If there are people in the dispersion areas, the 
applicant must demonstrate that the expected casualties from stage 
impacts do not exceed the FAA's risk criteria.
    Ec, or casualty expectancy, represents the FAA's measure 
of the collective risk to a population exposed to the launch of a 
launch vehicle. The measure represents the expected average number of 
casualties for a specific launch mission. In other words, if there were 
thousands of the same mission conducted and all the casualties were 
added up and the sum divided by the number of missions, the answer and 
the mission's expected casualty should statistically be the same. This 
Ec value defines the acceptable collective risk associated 
with a hypothetical launch from a launch point at a launch site, and, 
as prescribed by the regulations, shall not exceed an expected average 
number of casualties of 0.00003 (30  x  10-6) for each 
launch point at an applicant's proposed launch site. This Ec 
value defines acceptable collective risk.
    The FAA's methods for identifying a flight corridor or impact 
dispersion areas distinguish between guided orbital expendable launch 
vehicles with a flight termination system (FTS), guided sub-orbital 
expendable launch vehicles with an FTS, and unguided sub-orbital 
expendable launch vehicles without an FTS.\8\ For purposes of part 420, 
references to a guided expendable launch vehicle, whether orbital or 
sub-orbital, may be taken to mean that the vehicle has an FTS. 
References to an unguided sub-orbital may be understood to mean that 
the vehicle does not possess an FTS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Part 420 does not include a means for analyzing risks posed 
by a launch site for the launch of unguided suborbital launch 
vehicles that employ FTS. Historically, few of these vehicles have 
been launched. In the event an applicant for a license to operate a 
launch site wishes to operate a launch site only for such vehicles, 
the FAA will handle the request on a case by case basis. The FAA 
does note, however, that unguided suborbital launch vehicles that in 
the past have been launched with an FTS were usually launched with 
the FTS because the launch was otherwise too close to populated 
areas for the type of vehicle and trajectory flown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Part 420 divides guided orbital expendable launch vehicles into 
four classes, with each class defined by its payload weight capability, 
as shown in table 2. Sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles are not 
divided into classes by payload weight, but are categorized as either 
guided or unguided. Table 3 shows the payload weight and corresponding 
classes of existing orbital expendable launch vehicles. For a launch 
site intended for the use of orbital launch vehicles, an applicant

[[Page 62825]]

defines a hypothetical flight corridor from a launch point at the 
proposed launch site for the largest launch vehicle class anticipated'' 
which the FAA anticipates will be based on expected customers.

                   Table 2.--Orbital Expendable Launch Vehicle Classes by Payload Weight (lbs)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Weight class
              100 nm orbit               -----------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Small            Medium         Medium large          Large
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 degrees inclination *................   4400  >4400 to 11100 to 18500
                                                                    eq>11100      thn-eq>18500
90 degrees inclination..................   3300  >3300 to 8400 to 15000
                                                                     eq>8400          eq>15000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* 28 degrees inclination orbit from a launch point at 28 degrees latitude.


                  Table 3.--Classification of Common Guided Orbital Expendable Launch Vehicles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Payload weight (lbs)  Payload weight (lbs)
                                    --------------------------------------------
              Vehicle                100 nm Orbit 28 deg.  100 nm Orbit 90 deg.               Class
                                             inc.                  inc.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conestoga 1229.....................                   600                   450  Small.
Conestoga 1620.....................                 2,250                 1,750  Small.
Athena-1...........................                 1,755                 1,140  Small.
Athena-2...........................                 4,390                 3,290  Small.
Pegasus............................                   700                   N/A  Small.
Pegasus XL.........................                 1,015                   769  Small.
Scout..............................                   560                   460  Small.
Taurus.............................                 3,100                 2,340  Small.
Atlas II...........................                14,500                12,150  Medium/Large.
Atlas IIA..........................                16,050                13,600  Medium/Large.
Atlas IIAS.........................                19,050                16,100  Large.
Atlas IIIA.........................                19,050                15,700  Large.
Atlas IIIB.........................                23,630                20,240  Large.
Atlas V 404........................                27,550                23,700  Large.
Atlas V 552........................                44,200                37,400  Large.
Delta 6920.........................                 8,780                 6,490  Medium.
Delta 7920.........................                11,330                 8,590  Medium/Large.
Delta 3............................                18,280                14,920  Medium/Large.
Delta 4 M..........................                18,600                15,150  Large.
Delta 4 M (5,4)....................                30,000                23,000  Large.
Delta 4 Heavy......................                56,900                46,000  Large.
Titan II...........................                   N/A                 4,200  Medium.
Titan III..........................                31,200                   N/A  Large.
Titan IV...........................                47,400                41,000  Large.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Methods for estimating the risk posed by the operation of a launch 
site for guided orbital and sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles are 
presented in appendices A, B and C. Appendix A contains instructions 
for creating a flight corridor for guided orbital and sub-orbital 
expendable launch vehicles. Appendix B provides an alternative method 
to appendix A. Appendix B also instructs an applicant how to create a 
flight corridor for guided expendable launch vehicles, but provides 
more detailed calculations to employ so that, although an appendix B 
flight corridor is typically less conservative than that of appendix A, 
it should prove more representative of actual vehicle behavior. 
Appendix C contains the FAA's method for applicants to analyze the risk 
posed by guided expendable launch vehicles within a flight corridor 
created in accordance with appendix A or B. Unguided sub-orbital 
expendable launch vehicles are presented in appendix D, which describes 
how an applicant should estimate impact dispersion areas and analyze 
the risk in those areas.
    Appendix A is less complex, but generates a larger flight corridor 
than the methodology of appendix B. No local meteorological or vehicle 
trajectory data are required to estimate a flight corridor under 
appendix A. Because appendix A provides a more simple methodology, an 
applicant may want to use it as a screening tool. If an applicant can 
define a flight corridor for a single trajectory, using appendix A, 
that does not overfly populated areas, the applicant may satisfy the 
launch site location review requirements with the least effort. If, 
however, the corridor includes populated areas, the applicant may 
create an appendix B flight corridor that may be more narrow, or may 
conduct a casualty expectancy analysis. An applicant is not required to 
try appendix A before employing appendix B.
    The FAA's location review reflects a number of assumptions designed 
to keep the review general rather than oriented toward or addressing a 
particular launch. These assumptions are discussed more fully below, 
but may be summarized briefly. The location reviews for appendices A 
and B flight corridors reflect an attempt to ensure that launch failure 
debris would be contained within a safe area. Successful containment 
must assume a perfectly functioning flight termination system. A 
perfectly functioning flight termination system would ensure that any 
debris created by a launch failure would be contained within a flight 
corridor. When the high risk event is not launch failure but launch 
success, as tends to be the case with an unguided sub-orbital 
expendable launch vehicle that does not employ an FTS, the FAA still 
proposes

[[Page 62826]]

a location review based on an assumption of containment.
    The approaches provided in the four location review appendices are 
based on some common assumptions that reflect limitations of the launch 
site location review analysis. The FAA is not requiring an applicant to 
analyze the risks posed to the public by toxic materials that might be 
handled at the proposed site, nor the risk to ships or aircraft from 
launch debris or planned jettisoning of stages. The FAA recognizes that 
these assumptions represent a limitation in the launch site location 
review. The FAA intends that these three risks will be dealt with 
through pre-flight operational controls and flight commit criteria 
which are partially addressed through part 420 coordination 
requirements and which also will be identified as part of a launch 
license review. All launches that take place from a U.S. launch site 
whose operation is licensed will either be regulated by the FAA through 
a launch license or will be U.S. government launches that the 
government carries out for the government.
    The two methods for creating guided expendable launch vehicle 
flight corridors are intended to account for expendable launch vehicle 
failure rate, malfunction turn capability, and the expendable launch 
vehicle guidance accuracy as defined by the impact dispersions of these 
vehicles. The premise undergirding each of these methods is that debris 
would be contained within the defined flight corridor or impact 
dispersion areas. Accordingly, for purposes of a launch site location 
review, only the populations within the defined areas need to be 
analyzed for risk. The FAA recognizes that were a flight termination 
system to fail to destroy a vehicle as intended, a launch vehicle could 
stray outside its planned flight corridor. That concern will be better 
accommodated through another forum, namely, the licensing of a launch 
operator and the review of that launch operator's flight safety system. 
Because a containment analysis only looks at how far debris would 
travel in the event an errant vehicle were destroyed, the containment 
analysis has to assume a perfectly functioning flight termination 
system. In other words, for purposes of analyzing the acceptability of 
a launch site's location for launching guided expendable launch 
vehicles, the FAA will assume that a malfunctioning vehicle will be 
destroyed and debris will always impact within acceptable boundaries. 
Accordingly, the FAA does not propose to explore, for purposes of 
determining the acceptability of a launch site's location, the 
possibility that a vehicle's flight termination system may fail and 
that the vehicle could continue to travel toward populated areas. Any 
proposed site may present such risks--indeed, any proposed launch 
presents such risks--but they are best addressed in the context of 
individual launch systems. This working assumption of a perfectly 
reliable flight termination system will not, of course, apply to the 
licensing of a launch of a launch vehicle. The FAA will consider the 
reliability of any particular launch vehicle's FTS in the course of a 
launch license review. From a practical standpoint, this means that for 
the launch site location review, both nominal and failure-produced 
debris would be contained within a flight corridor, obviating the need 
for risk analyses that address risk outside of a defined flight 
corridor or set of impact dispersion areas.
    Additionally, the FAA does not propose to require an applicant to 
analyze separately the risks posed by the planned impact of normally 
jettisoned stages from a guided expendable launch vehicle, except for 
the final stage of a guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle. The 
FAA does not consider intermediate stage impact analysis necessary to 
assess the general suitability of a launch point for guided expendable 
launch vehicles because the impact location of stages is inherently 
launch vehicle-specific, and the trajectory and timing for a guided 
expendable launch vehicle can normally be designed so that the risks 
from nominally jettisoned stages will be kept to acceptable levels. A 
launch license review will have to ensure that vehicle stages are not 
going to impact in densely populated areas. Risk calculations performed 
for launches from federal launch ranges demonstrate a relatively low 
risk posed by controlled disposition of stages in comparison to the 
risk posed by wide-spread dispersion of debris due to vehicle failure.
    Each of the FAA's approaches to defining flight corridors or impact 
dispersion areas is designed to analyze the highest risk launch event 
associated with a particular vehicle technology. This is not meant to 
imply that lower risk launch events are necessarily acceptable; only 
that they will not be considered in the course of this review. For a 
guided orbital expendable launch vehicle, that event is vehicle 
failure. For an unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, the 
launch event of highest risk is vehicle success, namely, the predicted 
impact of stages. For a guided expendable launch vehicle the overflight 
risk, which results from a vehicle failure followed by its destruction 
(assuming no FTS failure), is the dominant risk. Risks from nominally 
jettisoned debris are subsumed in the overflight risk assessment. For 
an unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, the FAA proposes 
that risk due to stage impact be analyzed instead of the overflight 
risk. This distinction is necessitated by the fact that the failure 
rate during thrust is historically significantly lower for unguided 
vehicles than for guided vehicles. Current unguided expendable launch 
vehicles with many years of use are highly reliable. They do not employ 
an FTS; therefore, debris pieces usually consist of vehicle components 
that are not broken up. Another reason for the difference between 
analyses is that unguided vehicle stage impact dispersions are 
significantly larger than guided vehicle impact dispersions. These 
differences add up to greater risk within an unguided expendable launch 
vehicle stage impact dispersion area than the areas outside the 
dispersion areas. Therefore, a risk assessment is only performed on 
those populations within an unguided expendable launch vehicle stage 
impact dispersion area.
    An applicant must define an area called an overflight exclusion 
zone (OEZ) around each launch point, and the applicant must demonstrate 
that the OEZ can be clear of members of the public during a flight. An 
OEZ defines the area where the public risk criteria of 30 
x 10-6 would be exceeded if one person were present in the 
open. The overflight exclusion zone was estimated from risk 
computations for each expendable launch vehicle type and class. An 
applicant must define an OEZ because expendable launch vehicle range 
rates are slow in the launch area, launch vehicle effective casualty 
areas, the area within which all casualties are assumed to occur 
through exposure to debris, are large, and impact dispersion areas are 
dense with debris so that the presence of one person inside this 
hazardous area is expected to produce Ec values exceeding 
the public risk criteria. Accordingly, an applicant must either own the 
property, demonstrate to the FAA that there are times when people are 
not present, or that it could clear the public from the overflight 
exclusion zone prior to flight. Evacuating an overflight exclusion zone 
for an inland site, might, for example, require an applicant to 
demonstrate that agreements have been reached with local communities to 
close any public roads during a launch.
    The FAA has made a few changes to the Launch Site NPRM for this 
final rule. First, the launch site location

[[Page 62827]]

review regulatory text has been expanded to better map out the launch 
site location review for both ELVs and RLVs. The appendices remain 
essentially the same.
    Second, the size of the flight corridors that are generated in 
either appendix A or B are now assumed in appendix C to reflect a 
three-sigma event. The NPRM had used five-sigma. To review, for 
purposes of the launch site location review, a flight corridor is an 
area on the Earth's surface estimated to contain debris of a ballistic 
coefficient of 3 pounds per square foot from nominal and 
non-nominal flight of a launch vehicle, assuming a perfectly 
functioning flight termination system. The land encompassed by the 
flight corridor includes the population most at risk due to a launch. 
The data used to develop a flight corridor does not directly provide 
statistical significance. However, the relative risk to any specific 
populated area can be assumed to vary proportionally with the populated 
area's distance from the nominal trajectory ground trace. The NPRM 
assumed the boundaries were five-sigma distances, which proved unwise 
because the statistical probability of an event occurring between 
three-sigma and five-sigma is extremely small. The launch site location 
review procedures are not precise enough for the FAA to claim that a 
flight corridor contains all of the population at risk at such a low 
probability level. Assuming that the distance to the flight corridor 
boundary is three-sigma is a more reasonable assumption.
    Third, the multipliers in the launch site location review have been 
taken out. In the Launch Site NPRM, to add conservatism to the launch 
site location review, applicants would multiply the final Ec 
value obtained through either appendix C or appendix D by a multiplier 
of two and five, respectively. This final rule does not make use of 
multipliers because the FAA, upon reconsideration, now believes that 
the procedures for estimating risk in appendices A-D are conservative 
enough to not require a multiplier at the end of the process.
    Lastly, the FAA clarified in the regulatory text that orbital 
expendable launch vehicles are classified by weight class, based on the 
weight of payload the launch vehicle can place in a 100-nm orbit, as 
defined in table 2.
Discussion of Comments
    The FAA received comments on the launch site location review from 
ACTA, Inc; the New Mexico Office for Space Commercialization; Oklahoma 
Aeronautics and Space Commission; Space Access, LLC; Christopher Shove; 
and the Texas Aerospace Commission.
    ACTA stated that medium to large vehicles launched from Cape 
Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) do not meet the risk criteria. ACTA at 1. 
The FAA disagrees. Using Appendix B, medium to large vehicles do pass 
the launch site location review.
    ACTA stated that unlike under EWR 127-1, the FAA has decided not to 
permit any risk above 30 x 10-6. This coupled with a very 
conservative approach to risk analysis could prove detrimental to the 
U.S. industry. ACTA at 1. The FAA disagrees. The expected casualty 
acceptable risk level, 30 x 10-6, is not new. It is a 
current requirement for launches. Second, the very conservative 
approach proposed is conservative because simplifying assumptions were 
made. In many instances the FAA believes that such approaches 
adequately demonstrate the acceptability of the site location without 
the added burden of more complex analysis. It should not prove 
detrimental because applicants may do a more refined, less conservative 
analysis. To make this option explicit, sections 420.23 and 420.25, 
covering the flight corridor and risk analysis, respectively, 
explicitly state that the FAA will approve an alternate method if an 
applicant provides a clear and convincing demonstration that its 
proposed method provides an equivalent level of safety to that required 
in the appendices.
    ACTA also states that the risk analysis methodology presented in 
the document is very simplistic. There are better methods available, 
albeit more complex, but the NPRM does not allow for any other 
methodology. ACTA recommended that an applicant be allowed to use 
equivalent approved analysis methods and processes that have been 
validated by use at federal ranges involved in ELV and RLV activities. 
ACTA at 2, 6 and 7. The FAA agrees and has modified the launch site 
location review to allow such methods without a waiver. The analysis 
methodology is intended to be simplistic and conservative. The actual 
risks will be less than that estimated by the methodologies provided. 
In many cases, the site applicant may not have available the inputs 
necessary to provide a detailed risk analysis. In addition, many launch 
sites are so remote that they do not need detailed analyses to show 
that the risk levels are acceptable. New under these final rules is 
that an applicant has the option of using higher fidelity 
methodologies.
    ACTA states that the NPRM offers no insight into the source of 
numbers, such as casualty areas, that the FAA directs the license 
applicant to use. The references should be identified. ACTA at 1. 
Review of the Launch Site NPRM shows that the FAA provided its sources. 
The NPRM stated, for example, to address the issues raised, that the 
FAA derived the effective casualty areas in table C-3 from DAMP, a 
series of risk estimation computer programs used at federal launch 
ranges, to evaluate the vehicle classes described in table 1, section 
420.21. 64 FR at 34353.
    ACTA and ACTA staff raised concerns regarding issues not addressed 
in this rulemaking. ACTA stated that the NPRM did not address launch-
related risk from potential toxic releases, from far-field window 
breakage, or debris risk to ships and aircraft. ACTA at 1, 2. ACTA 
staff added that ignoring the existence of established major air 
corridors or shipping lanes seems shortsighted. ACTA at 9. The FAA 
disagrees. Air corridors and shipping lanes are not ignored. A launch 
site operator must have an agreement in place with FAA Air Traffic and 
the Coast Guard covering those issues before it will get a license.
    The FAA agrees that the issues of toxicity and windows breaking 
should not be ignored for launch safety, and launch -related risk from 
potential toxic releases, from far-field window breakage, or debris 
risk to ships and aircraft are covered in launch license application 
reviews. Toxic and blast risks were not covered in this rulemaking 
because launching only when circumstances such as wind are favorable 
can minimize such risks. The FAA considers these issues better 
addressed through the launch license. Second, debris risk to ships and 
aircraft are addressed in these regulations. An applicant must conclude 
agreements with the Coast Guard and the FAA Air Traffic in order to 
address ship and aircraft risk, and a separate rulemaking addresses 
these issues with additional specificity.
    ACTA states that the level of analysis in the NPRM seems to assume 
that the applicant will be very naive, and not have access to good 
tools or consultant support. ACTA at 2. The FAA disagrees. Not all 
applicants are flight safety specialists. The FAA believes that 
providing tools and data to conduct risk and other analyses is 
beneficial to the industry. The proposed appendices take an applicant 
step by step through the process.
    ACTA states that the FAA's lack of methodology for risk analysis in 
the back azimuth direction other than the

[[Page 62828]]

exclusion zone implies that there is no back azimuth risk. ACTA at 2. 
The FAA does not wish to imply that there is no back azimuth risk. 
There is. However, as noted in the NPRM, the launch site location 
review assumes a perfectly functioning flight safety system. Therefore, 
population behind the launch site is only addressed if it is within the 
overflight exclusion zone or within the flight corridor due to wind 
effects. Otherwise back azimuth population is not reviewed. A launch 
license applicant will need to adequately address all flight risks in 
order to receive a license.
    ACTA states that the instantaneous impact point (IIP) rates are 
unrealistically low, particularly late in flight. If only powered 
flight is considered, the average IIP rate will increase. Using a lower 
IIP rate inflates the computed risk. ACTA at 2. The FAA notes that the 
IIP range rate data was intended to be conservative but, as discussed 
in the NPRM, they are not unrealistically low. 64 FR at 34342.
    ACTA states that the effective casualty areas seem very high. The 
casualty area numbers are a prime contributor to the unrealistically 
high risks computed by these methods. ACTA at 2. The FAA disagrees that 
the casualty area are unrealistically high if one considers, for each 
piece of debris, its size, the path angle of its trajectory, impact 
explosions, the size of a person, and debris skip, splatter, and 
bounce. They are also intended to be conservative. Higher fidelity 
analyses will be necessary for the launch license application. Also, 
now that the FAA will permit higher fidelity analyses that produce an 
equivalent level of safety, the FAA finds that the concern is 
addressed.
    ACTA states that the overflight exclusion zone (OEZ) is designed to 
protect an individual in the public at a risk level of 
30 x 10-6 casualties. ACTA further states that this seems 
rather loose, and that the Range Commanders Council Standard suggests 
1 x 10-7 fatalities and the Eastern Range (ER) and Western 
Range (WR) have used 1 x 10-6 casualties as an individual 
risk limit for the general public. ACTA at 3. The FAA disagrees. ACTA 
misunderstood what was stated in the NPRM. The NPRM actually states 
that an overflight exclusion zone is the area where the collective risk 
to the public would be greater than 30 x 10-6 if one person 
were present in the open. 64 FR 34329. The overflight exclusion zone 
does not incorporate an individual risk standard per se, but is merely 
an area that must be clear of population for the collective risk 
standard to be met.
    ACTA states that if 30 x 10-6 was used as the basis for 
developing the distance Dmax, then Dmax appears 
quite conservative for that risk level. ACTA at 3. The FAA did not use 
the criteria of 30 x 10-6 as the basis for developing the 
distance Dmax. The basis for Dmax is the 
estimated maximum distance from a launch point that debris travels 
given a worst-case launch vehicle failure and flight termination at 10 
seconds into flight.
    ACTA also opposed the FAA's use of a ballistic coefficient of 
three. The NPRM stated that although the FAA proposes to assume a 
ballistic coefficient of three as the smallest piece of wind sensitive 
debris hazardous to the public, ballistic coefficient is not directly 
related to fatality criteria based on the kinetic energy of debris. The 
ballistic coefficient of three is related to a kinetic energy of 58 ft/
lbs, which represents a probability of fatality of 50 percent for a 
standing person. ACTA states that historically, the national ranges 
have used impact kinetic energy as a criterion for determining whether 
an inert fragment may or may not produce a casualty. ACTA has been 
performing biomechanical simulations, which are still in progress, to 
investigate these criteria in support of the Air Force federal launch 
ranges. However, one conclusion is that impact kinetic energy by itself 
is an inadequate predictor of whether or not an inert impacting 
fragment will produce a casualty. ACTA at 4, 5. The FAA notes that the 
method suggested is far too complex for the scope of this final rule. 
This final rule very simply assumes that a hit is a casualty. Note that 
the risk criterion is based on the generation of a casualty not a 
fatality.
    NMOSC also disagreed with the FAA's statement that a ballistic 
coefficient of three is related to a kinetic energy of 58 ft/lbs, which 
represents a probability of fatality of 50 percent for a standing 
person. NMOSC states that 58 ft-lbs is a better number to use than 11, 
but asks what is the basis for the 50% lethality claim for 58 ft-lbs 
and ballistic coefficient of three. Furthermore, sheltering should also 
be considered. NMOSC at 3.
    The basis for the 50% lethality claim is for a standing person and 
is found in the Range Commanders Council (RCC) Supplement to Standard 
321-97, ``Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges, Inert 
Debris'', Figure 4-3, on page 4-5. However, the FAA would like to 
modify its statement made in the NPRM with respect to how ballistic 
coefficient relates to kinetic energy and the 50% lethality claim. 
Ballistic coefficient () is very difficult to relate to 
kinetic energy. () is equal to an object's weight divided by 
the product of the object's drag coefficient and it's projected area 
and expressed in units of lbs/ft2. Kinetic energy units are 
joules or ft-lbs/sec. Various combinations of weight, drag coefficient, 
and projected area can equate to the same , but each 
combination would produce a different kinetic energy.
    ACTA makes a number of points about launch corridors. First, ACTA 
states that impulsive velocities imparted to fragments from explosives 
are ignored throughout. ACTA at 6. The FAA did consider whether it was 
appropriate to address explicitly impulsive velocities but decided that 
the conservatism incorporated into appendix B obviates the need for 
including them in the appendix B analysis. Additionally, these analyses 
are not intended to be high fidelity analyses or require inputs that a 
launch site applicant may not have. These analyses are believed to be 
adequate for most coastal site applicants. More detailed analysis will 
be required from launch operators.
    Second, ACTA states that no justification is given for the use of 
five-sigma for the launch corridor boundaries. ACTA at 6. The FAA does 
agree that the use of five-sigma to define the flight corridor boundary 
was not appropriate. As noted above, the final rule assumes the 
boundaries are three-sigma.
    Third, ACTA states that there does not appear to be any real 
probabilistic basis for any of the dispersion analyses. ACTA at 6. ACTA 
is correct. No attempt is made to determine the variations of risk 
within the corridor. In the downrange direction, the chance of a 
failure is considered equal at any given point on the flight 
trajectory. In the crossrange direction, the chance that debris will 
impact any given point within the flight corridor is based on its 
distance from the trajectory ground trace. Impacting the boundary of 
the flight corridor is considered a three-sigma event, and all points 
in between the trajectory ground trace and the flight corridor boundary 
vary linearly from zero to three-sigma.
    Lastly, ACTA notes that in the risk analysis, the crossrange 
standard deviations are used to compute Ec. Using downrange 
risk models such as those found in appendix B, one can choose to vary 
the crossrange sigma up and down and compute the Ec as a 
function of sigma. Then a maximum Ec can be obtained within 
reasonable limits of the possible range of the crossrange sigma. This 
helps to eliminate the controversy about the determination of the width 
of the corridor. ACTA at 6.

[[Page 62829]]

The FAA agrees with ACTA in that the approach would provide a more 
accurate assessment of risk. If an applicant conducted such an 
analysis, it might consider offering the analysis as demonstrating an 
equivalent level of safety. However, the method appears to require an 
applicant to make several launch corridor computations adjusting the 
sigma value until an optimum value is found that produces exactly 
30 x 10-6 Ec for the enclosed population. The FAA 
does not believe this is necessary for assessing most launch site 
locations, and has not adopted the suggested change. The analyses 
provided by the FAA are presented in a fashion that produces a binary 
decision. The risk computations for the populations enclosed by the 
corridor will either pass or fail the Ec criteria. If the 
resultant Ec is above the threshold the applicant can 
quickly decide if an azimuth or launch point adjustment will resolve 
the problem.
    ACTA next states that the equation for casualty expectancy in 
appendix C contains the ratio of the casualty area to the populated 
area. This ratio should be limited to one, to avoid the possibility of 
predicting more casualties, given impact, than the number of people in 
the population center. ACTA at 6. The FAA agrees and the change is 
reflected in the appendix.
    In the NPRM's discussion of the launch site location review, the 
FAA notes that for the sub-orbital launch of an unguided expendable 
launch vehicle, an applicant would analyze the risks associated with a 
series of impact dispersion areas around the impact points for spent 
stages. ACTA staff suggests that the FAA should also be concerned about 
any population centers within the three-sigma dispersions along the 
entire trajectory, as is done for orbital launch vehicles. ACTA at 8. 
As discussed in the NPRM, the FAA selected the event of greatest risk 
for guided and unguided launch vehicles. 64 FR 34353. For proven 
unguided launch vehicles, that risk stems from success. For purposes of 
assessing a launch point, the FAA does not believe it is necessary to 
address failures scenarios for launch points that are going to support 
proven unguided suborbital launch vehicles. Malfunction scenarios are 
discounted due to the very low probability of failure in proven 
unguided suborbital launch vehicles. An unguided suborbital launch 
vehicle will fly a wind-weighted trajectory in most cases. The impact 
dispersion areas for the rocket's stages account for the impact points 
within three-sigma probability of occurrence given the rocket does not 
experience a malfunction. If a launch point is to be used solely for 
unproven unguided suborbital launch vehicles, then an applicant must 
look at failure scenarios.
    ACTA staff also believes the FAA should establish criteria for 
individual risk because it is a significant consideration needed to 
adequately provide protection for the public. ACTA at 9. The FAA does 
not disagree, and may revise its launch site regulations in the future. 
At this time, however, the FAA has decided to cover individual risk 
issues through a launch license, and has determined that the OEZ and 
other requirements are suitable for making a decision on the 
suitability of a launch site.
    In the NPRM, in justifying the fact that stage impact is not 
assessed during the launch site location review for orbital launch 
vehicles, the FAA stated that risk calculations performed for launches 
from federal launch ranges demonstrate a relatively low risk posed by 
controlled disposition of stages in comparison to the risk posed by 
wide-spread dispersion of debris due to vehicle failure. ACTA suggests 
that this statement be tempered because risks posed by normally 
jettisoned Delta 2 GEMS are a significant element of concern from VAFB. 
ACTA at 9.
    The FAA does not wish to imply that stage disposition is of no 
concern. Stage disposition is a critical safety issue and will be 
covered in launch license applications. However, because the location 
of drop zones is different for every launch vehicle, and because the 
launch site location review is not meant to assess specific launch 
vehicles, the FAA has designed the launch site location so that a 
launch site that does not have safe areas to dispose of stages will not 
likely pass the launch site location review. Significant population 
within the flight corridor, particularly near the flight trajectory 
ground trace, would raise the estimated Ec above the 
acceptable limit.
    ACTA staff had a few comments on definitions. First, the NPRM 
defined ``flight corridor'' as an area on the Earth's surface estimated 
to contain the majority of hazardous debris from nominal and non-
nominal flight of an orbital or guided suborbital launch vehicle.'' 
ACTA staff asked what about the other potential 49% of the debris? ACTA 
at 9. The FAA agrees that the definition should not have used the term 
``majority'' and the word ``majority'' has been removed from the 
definition.
    Second, the NPRM defined ``instantaneous impact point (IIP)'' as an 
impact point, following thrust termination of a launch vehicle, 
calculated in the absence of atmospheric drag effects.'' The definition 
should acknowledge that several forms of IIP calculations are possible. 
IIPs can be calculated based on vacuum, drag or oblateness corrections 
depending on the application. ACTA at 9, 10. The FAA agrees. The 
definition no longer states that it must be calculated in the absence 
of atmospheric drag effects. However, for purposes of part 420, IIP is 
calculated in the absence of atmospheric drag.
    ACTA staff next commented on proposed section 420.15(b), in which 
the proposed rule stated ``For launch sites analyzed for expendable 
launch vehicles, an applicant shall provide each month and any percent 
wind data used in the analysis.'' ACTA at 10. For percent wind data, 
ACTA suggests use of mean winds. ACTA also suggests the use of a wind 
covariance matrix. Mean winds are called out in the launch site 
location review. An applicant should be able to use worse winds, e.g. 
three-sigma winds, if it desires. ACTA at 10. The FAA does not believe 
a statistical analysis of winds such as using a wind covariance matrix 
is necessary to assess a launch point. Wind covariance matrices are 
also not readily available from the suggested wind data source, so 
therefore the FAA will not incorporate the suggested changes.
    Proposed section 420.23 stated that the FAA will evaluate the 
adequacy of a launch site location for unproven launch vehicles 
including all new launch vehicles, whether expendable or reusable, on a 
case-by-case basis. ACTA requested additional criteria. ACTA at 10. The 
FAA will rely on the goal of the launch site location review--to show 
that a launch vehicle can be launched safety from a given launch point. 
Unproven launch vehicles must be looked at carefully due to their 
inherently high probability of failure.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed an overflight exclusion zone (OEZ) 
that an applicant must demonstrate is either unpopulated, is 
uninhabited at certain times, or from which the public can be excluded 
during launch. ACTA staff notes that using this overly conservative 
approach to risk analysis would likely prevent X-33 launches from the 
Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC). ACTA at 11. Similarly, NMOSC 
states that the requirement for, and specifications of, an OEZ should 
depend on the vehicle's reliability and whether it has multiple stages. 
NMOSC suggests that it not be required for a highly reliable, non-
staging RLV. NMOSC at 3. The FAA agrees in part with ACTA and NMOSC. 
The size or existence of an OEZ for a reliable non-staging RLV,

[[Page 62830]]

depends on whether any area exists around the launch point where the 
Ec risk is equal to or greater than 30  x  10-6, 
if one member of the public is inside. An overflight exclusion zone may 
or may not apply to an RLV, depending on the circumstances of a 
particular case analyzed. The approval of a flight corridor for an RLV, 
such as the X-33, would be handled on a case-by-case basis.
    ACTA staff noted that the appendix A launch area is based on a 
Delta II. ACTA states that this has several shortcomings because the 
families of launch vehicles based on Castor-120 SRMs, such as Athena 
and Taurus, are more representative of those likely to be launched from 
a non-federal launch site. ACTA at 11. The FAA notes that an appendix A 
launch area is large enough to encompass launch vehicles based on 
Castor-120 SRMs. Although turning rates for the Athena and Taurus may 
be higher than Delta II, this is not critical for the appendix A flight 
corridor lines because appendix A can accommodate the Athena and Taurus 
turns.
    ACTA states that in the launch area, ignoring the IIP displacement 
caused by a vehicle's malfunction turn rates until 50,000 ft. seems 
unwise based on the turning potential of most ELVs, especially the 
Athena and Taurus. ACTA at 11. The debris dispersion radius accounts 
for a number of failure scenarios, including the IIP displacement 
caused by a vehicle's malfunction turn rate. The debris dispersion 
radius is the estimated maximum distance from a launch point that 
debris travels given a worst-case launch vehicle failure and flight 
termination at 10 seconds into flight.
    Other than the debris dispersion radius, ACTA is correct in that 
malfunction turns and trajectory dispersions are not explicitly 
accounted for in the launch area computations. The FAA does not believe 
this is necessary to assess the viability of a launch point. In the 
launch area, winds are the dominant dispersion effect for low- 
debris pieces, accounting for up to 70% of the total launch area 
dispersion effect. Conservative assumptions in the appendix B method 
adequately cover the remaining percentage contributions to the overall 
impact dispersion.
    ACTA staff suggests that in the launch area, the FAA should better 
communicate that the 10 and 100 mile limits are based on IIP and not on 
present position. ACTA at 11. The FAA agrees and has modified 
appendices A and B accordingly.
    ACTA staff notes that for the launch and downrange areas, an 
applicant is to compute Pi for each populated area using the 
following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.000

    ACTA suggests that this be replaced by the normal integral with a 
single footnote saying that it can be approximated using Simpson's 
rule. ACTA at 11. The FAA agrees that there are other ways to 
approximate the normal integral that are just as accurate as Simpson's 
rule. An applicant is not precluded from using other ways of computing 
the normal integral.
    Space Access LLC also had a number of comments on the launch site 
location review. First, Space Access found the proposed rule difficult 
to accept in two areas. First, flight Ec issues should be 
outside the scope of site licensing and all flight-related and mission-
based calculations are the responsibility of the launch operator. 
Providing several methods to simplify Ec is confusing, 
conflicting with other published guidance, and could be considered 
precedent setting. Space Access at 2. Much of what Space Access 
suggests is already reflected in the final rule. For individual 
launches, all flight-related and mission-based calculations are part of 
a launch operator license. The launch site location review is intended, 
however, to ensure that the FAA does not issue a license that cannot 
support the launch vehicles intended for launch from the launch site. 
Providing several methods to simplify Ec is meant to provide 
flexibility to applicants. Lastly, review of the appendices unearthed 
no conflicts with other published guidance.
    Second, Space Access believes the proposed rule effectively 
precludes approval of any new commercial launch sites, because under 
appendix A and C, Cape Canaveral would be disapproved as a launch site 
for Delta, Atlas, and Titan vehicles if it were not on federal 
property. Space Access at 4. The FAA disagrees. Cape Canaveral would 
fail the proposed appendix A analysis but would not fail the proposed 
analysis under appendix B and C. The simplicity of appendix A is 
designed for launch sites that are in remote locations. Cape Canaveral 
is not a remote site.
    Space Access adds that appendix B and C would not help the 
shortcomings of appendix A because this method uses the same casualty 
area numbers, which are the significant driver in the calculations. 
Space Access also comments that the casualty area provided in Table C-3 
is too large and appendix C provided data would appear to be 
excessively conservative and overwhelms all other calculations. Space 
Access at 4. In response, the casualty area numbers are indeed 
conservative, but not excessively so. An applicant is also permitted to 
utilize a more refined analysis and provide a clear and convincing 
demonstration that its proposed method provides an equivalent level of 
safety to that provided in the appendices.
    Similarly, Space Access states that appendix C may only allow the 
approval of small launch vehicles. This will encourage more launches of 
small payloads and therefore increase overall risk to the public by 
exposing the public to a large number of launches. A normalized risk 
evaluation, such as risk per pound of payload, minimizes total risk and 
should be considered in any risk methodology. Space Access at 5. The 
FAA disagrees that the proposed appendix C allows only for the approval 
of small launch vehicles. Space Access offers no support for this 
argument.
    Space Access further states that the impact of appendix C is that 
potential launch site operators will fail to get sufficient local and 
state support, financial and legislative inputs, to work through issues 
with the FAA and potential launch operators. The enforcement of these 
proposed rules at this time would negatively affect the development of 
new safe launch sites for all classes of launch vehicles. Space Access 
at 5. The Texas Aerospace

[[Page 62831]]

Commission stated that the proposed rules preclude approval of any new 
launch sites, which are not already on federal launch ranges. These 
proposed rules would stop the progress being made in Texas and other 
states to secure investments and commitments for the development of 
safe, efficient and modern commercial spaceports. Texas Aerospace 
Commission at 1. Because Space Access and Texas Aerospace Commission do 
not offer evidence in support of their concerns, the FAA will continue 
to rely on the reasons it gave in the NPRM. The launch site location 
review is designed to avoid licensing the operation of a launch site 
that cannot safely support a launch. The launch site location review 
should not preclude the licensing of any launch site that can safely 
support launches.
    Space Access suggests that the FAA delete all Ec 
calculations from the proposed rule for site operators. It comments 
that the appendix A and C methodology appears to be extremely 
inaccurate, the appendix B and C methodology lacks the fidelity 
required for use by launch operators for licensing, and actual vehicle 
Ec data is the only valid method. Space Access at 5. The 
Texas Aerospace Commission recommends the FAA consult with the RLV 
developers and proposed launch site operators/developers to establish a 
safe, less conservative, and simple method of calculating 
Ec. Texas Aerospace at 1. The FAA disagrees, noting that the 
appendices are designed to offer flexibility in ascertaining whether a 
site is acceptable. The FAA has determined that a review of a launch 
site location is a necessary component of any license application 
process. Moreover, an applicant is not tied to the appendices. For 
expendable launch vehicles, the FAA will accept other analyses that 
provides a clear and convincing demonstration that an applicant's 
proposed method provides an equivalent level of safety to that provided 
by the appendices. For reusable launch vehicles, an applicant defines a 
flight corridor that contains the hazardous debris from nominal and 
non-nominal flight of a reusable launch vehicle. The applicant must 
provide a clear and convincing demonstration of the validity of its 
flight corridor.
    Space Access states that the launch point, debris dispersion area, 
and overflight exclusion zone definition and descriptions are of 
specific concern to a site operator and should be formalized. This 
guidance will directly benefit potential site operators by providing 
clear planning and procedures to use for proper land acquisition and 
site development work. Space Access at 5. In response, the FAA agrees 
that providing clear planning and procedures to use for proper land 
acquisition and site development work is important. The primary purpose 
of the launch site location review is to avoid the development of 
launch sites that can never support launches due to the proximity of 
population. Note that the debris dispersion area and overflight 
exclusion zones are only used to assess the adequacy of a launch point 
to support launches. The actual hazards areas for specific launch 
vehicles will be determined in the launch license process.
    Space Access states that the FAA should delete the discussion of 
launch area and downrange area from the proposed rule. According to 
Space Access, these areas should not be of concern to a site operator 
because a site operator has little or no legal control, liability or 
responsibility in these areas--the launch operator does. Possible 
demarcation of responsible areas for a site operator is when a launch 
vehicle enters into international airspace (100 km or 300,000 feet or 
the crossing of a vehicle into airspace above international waters). 
Another possible definition is when takeoff or liftoff occurs. Space 
Access at 6.
    The FAA agrees that a launch operator is responsible for the safety 
of a launch. However, the purpose of the launch site location review is 
to assess the safety of the launch point, not the policies and 
procedures of a specific launch operator, and these regulations place 
certain responsibilities upon a launch site operator. To adequately 
assess the safety of a launch point, one must look at more than just 
the local population. Downrange activities must be considered in 
evaluating the acceptability of the launch location, therefore launch 
area and downrange area requirements remain in the final rule.
    Space Access believes that current reliability data for probability 
of failure (Pf) should be used for the specific vehicle or 
class of launch vehicles under consideration. Space Access at 6. The 
FAA would like to point out that an applicant may use probability 
values that reflect the type of launch vehicle it intends on launching 
from the launch point. The value must be reasonable. A good value 
should have a 95% confidence that the actual Pf is equal to 
or less than the value used.
    Space Access believes that all commercial launches should be 
treated equally from any location. The FAA should not exempt commercial 
site operators from these rules at federal ranges. No benefits are 
provided by a federal launch range exemption to these rules. The 
perception by new commercial launch operators and new commercial site 
operators is they are being held to a higher standard. Space Access at 
7; see also Texas Aerospace at 1 (all commercial launches should be 
treated equally from any location). In response, commercial site 
applicants at federal ranges are not exempted from all requirements of 
the final rule. If a launch point has already supported a launch of a 
particular class of launch vehicle, there is no reason for an applicant 
to repeat a demonstration already made.
    Space Access recommends the FAA provide proposed universal rules 
applicable to all launch sites, i.e. for RLVs and ELVs, as soon as 
possible instead of making rules applicable only to ELVs. Space Access 
at 7. Similarly, NMOSC believes that since the focus of the launch site 
location review is expendable launch vehicles, the FAA does not see 
RLVs as credible launch vehicles. NMOSC at 2. In response, the basic 
public safety goals are the same for ELVs, RLVs, and reentry vehicles. 
In other words, the level of safety that is required by the FAA is 
universal. However, the means to achieve public safety with an RLV 
mission may be different from an ELV mission. The credibility of RLV's 
is not at issue here. The reason the FAA has well defined methods of 
assessing a launch site for expendable launch vehicles is because 40 
years of empirical data exists to define such methods.
    Space Access lastly states that the unproven vehicle exclusion is 
unjustified. The FAA should provide a clear definition of unproven 
vehicles. Space Access at 7. The FAA has asked the RLV industry for 
suggestions on what definition they might suggest. Space Access does 
not provide a suggestion. There are a number of factors that the FAA 
has considered in whether to provide a precise definition to the term 
``unproven.'' NASA, for example, does not consider a vehicle's 
demonstrated reliability adequate for placing a NASA payload on the 
vehicle, unless the vehicle has flown at least 14 times. Another 
approach might be to examine the flight history as an ``unproven'' 
vehicle and determine that statistical point in which the probability 
of catastrophic failure can be shown to be equal to or less than some 
number at the 95% confidence level. Historically, the flights of new 
vehicles have demonstrated failure rates much higher than design 
analyses indicated. The data presented for use in the final rule is 
specifically based on mature vehicles. For these reasons and its 
concern for

[[Page 62832]]

public safety, the FAA will address unproven vehicles on a case-by-case 
basis based on the facts available.
    NMOSC also had many comments on the launch site location review. 
First, for the most part, NMOSC states that the draft requirements do 
not adequately address the launch of RLVs or unproven vehicles, and is 
concerned that an operator could spend a lot of money and time 
preparing an application, only to find that the application is 
incomplete or the site unacceptable. The FAA should provide more in the 
way of guidelines for RLV-only sites. NMOSC at 1.
    The FAA disagrees that an RLV operator has to guess what the FAA 
will look for in a license application. The FAA's flight safety goals 
are clear--the risk to the public must be at an acceptable level, that 
is, an expected casualty of less than or equal to 30  x  
10-6. What is acceptable for RLVs is described in the rule 
concerning reentry. 65 FR 56617.
    The flight safety approach for RLVs and ELVs are different, so 
naturally a launch point suitable for a RLV may not be suitable for an 
ELV. The reason the FAA has articulated clear methods of assessing a 
launch site for ELVs is because 40 years of empirical data exists to 
promulgate such methods.
    In the NPRM, the FAA stated that references to a guided launch 
vehicle, whether orbital or sub-orbital, may be taken to mean that the 
vehicle has an FTS. References to an unguided sub-orbital could be 
understood to mean that the vehicle does not possess an FTS. NMOSC 
believes that this does not accommodate RLVs very well. NMOSC at 2. In 
response, the FAA did not mean to imply that RLV's would have to have 
an FTS. This applies only to guided ELV's. The final rule has been 
modified to clarify this point.
    In the NPRM, the FAA stated, as an example, that because a launch 
licensee will need to assure the adequacy of ground tracking, approval 
of ground tracking systems will be handled in the launch license 
process even if a launch site operator provides the service. NMOSC asks 
what about tracking from space? NMOSC at 2. Tracking systems were not a 
subject of the NPRM. The FAA was only pointing out that flight safety 
services such as tracking will be assessed for a launch license, not 
for a launch site operator license. No implication was intended about 
how tracking is accomplished.
    In the NPRM, the FAA states that for the ``semi-automated method'' 
of plotting on maps, the ``Mercator'' and ``Oblique Mercator'' are 
adequate cylindrical projections, the ``Lambert-Conformal'' and 
``Albers Equal-Area'' are adequate conic projections, and the ``Lambert 
Azimuthal Equal-Area'' and ``Azimuthal Equidistant'' are adequate plane 
projections. An applicant may use other maps, but the applicant would 
be required to demonstrate an equivalent level of accuracy over the 
required distances. NMOSC suggest the FAA provide clarification on 
``equivalent level of accuracy over the required distances.'' NMOSC at 
2.
    As noted in the NPRM, all map projections have inherent 
distortions. The distortions are virtually unavoidable and are directly 
related to the techniques for displaying latitude and longitude lines 
on a flat surface area. The flight corridor methods are primarily 
sensitive to azimuthal direction and geodetic length of the flight 
corridor line segments. The launch site location review methods require 
an applicant to use cylindrical, conic, and plane map projections 
because they produce only small error with straight-line measurements. 
Therefore, ``equivalency'' would be based on how well the applicant-
proposed map projection preserves the accuracy of scale and direction.
    NMOSC suggests the FAA provide corridor standards for vehicles that 
do not employ destructive termination. NMOSC at 3. The FAA disagrees. A 
flight corridor is a means of defining the population that is at risk 
due to a launch. Destructive flight termination is not specifically 
ingrained in the standard provided. The appendices provided corridor 
standards for ELV's because reliable flight termination systems allow 
one to determine the worse-case reach of debris due to a failure. 
Corridors for RLV's are not as straightforward, and are dependent on 
the technology involved. That is why the FAA has opted for a case-by-
case approach. What is of interest are all failures that could lead to 
exposure of the uninvolved public. Note that a final rule has been 
published with standards for the operation of RLVs and reentry 
vehicles. 65 FR 56617.
    NMOSC notes that failure probability is a big issue for both this 
and the RLV NPRM, suggesting that ninety percent (90%) reliability is 
way too low for an RLV. For purposes of site licensing, NMOSC suggests 
no lower than ninety nine percent (99%) reliability be assumed for the 
analyses; this is the proven reliability of the Space Shuttle. NMOSC at 
3. The FAA disagrees. There are accepted ways to estimating the design 
reliability of a vehicle and for proving what the reliability is. 
Unfortunately, historically, design reliability has never been achieved 
during the first flights of any new vehicle. Proof comes only through 
verification and validation with empirical flight data. There is no 
basis for the statement that 90% is too low for an RLV. This number may 
be well below intended design reliability, but 99% reliability has 
never been shown for any new RLV. The Shuttle's historic data does not 
support a value of 99% at any reasonable confidence level. At a 95% 
confidence level, the shuttle's demonstrated reliability is only about 
97%. In any case, RLV flight safety standards are covered in the final 
rule for RLVs and reentry operations. 65 FR 56617.
    Christopher Shove, Ph.D., Senior Consultant, Space Data Systems, 
Inc, states that for some launch vehicles, the proposed failure rate of 
10% is five times greater than those vehicles' historical failure rate. 
The FAA should use actual failure rates and double them for 
conservatism. The proposed constant failure rate creates an unfair 
playing field among different vehicle types by lumping them into one 
category. Shove at 2. The FAA disagrees that for some launch vehicles, 
the proposed failure rate of 10% is five times greater than those 
vehicles' historical failure rate. No vehicle has a failure rate of 2% 
at any reasonable confidence level. The failure rate of 10% was chosen 
to find an acceptably conservative value while not overly penalizing 
seasoned launch vehicles. The seasoned launch vehicles currently have 
failure rates ranging from 2.5% for Ariane to 6.4% for Proton. Doubling 
any failure rate exceeding 5% would burden the industry by adding 
unnecessary conservatism at a 95% confidence level.
    In the NPRM, after an applicant has computed casualty expectancy 
for a flight corridor, the proposed regulations required that it be 
multiplied by a safety factor of two. NMOSC suggested that the FAA 
eliminate the safety factor and set the standard at 15  x  
10-\6\. NMOSC at 3. As noted above in the summary section, 
the multiplier has been taken out in the final rule.
    NMOSC states that appendix C seems to favor coastal sites because 
appendix C provides the option for an applicant to further simplify the 
estimation of casualty expectancy by making worst-case assumptions that 
would produce a higher value of the corridor EC compared 
with the analysis defined in appendix C, subparagraphs (c)(1)-(8). 
NMOSC at 3. The FAA disagrees. The simplifying options in the 
appendices were directed at launch sites that are remote enough that 
they pass a test that is simple but extremely conservative. This does 
not preclude other launch

[[Page 62833]]

sites. The FAA's concern is that it be demonstrated that operations can 
be conducted safely from the site. If circumstances are such that it is 
easier for one site to make this demonstration than another, so be it.
    Lastly, NMOSC commented on the proposed requirement that at least 
two days prior to flight of a launch vehicle, the licensee shall notify 
local officials and all owners of land adjacent to the launch site of 
the flight schedule. This should not be required for highly reliable, 
non-staging RLVs. If it is, what methods of notification are 
acceptable? NMOSC at 3. In response, when RLV's begin to have routine 
operations that make this requirement unworkable, the FAA will 
reevaluate the requirement. The intent will remain unchanged, however, 
which is to ensure that the local community has reasonable notice of 
upcoming launch activity to make any necessary preparations.
    Mr. Shove noted that the FAA states that the proposed rule would 
allow the FAA to disapprove any launch site request because the 
applicant could not prove it is safe, which proof, according to 
scientific method, is impossible. Shove at 1. The FAA disagrees. Launch 
activities take place today from sites that clearly meet these 
standards. The final rule articulates an objective standard that is 
quite possible to demonstrate. The FAA is not free to arbitrarily turn 
down a launch site application. The potential operators of a launch 
site must demonstrate that operations can be safely conducted from the 
site. It the applicant can not, then the FAA will not issue a license.
    He also questioned whether the FAA definition of sub-orbital launch 
vehicle would include the vehicles used in programs such as ``Rockets 
for Schools,'' and thus require those states, schools, and launch areas 
to apply for a launch site operator license. Shove at 2. Such sites 
would not. If a launch meets the definition of amateur rocket activity, 
no launch license is required. Similarly, launch sites that support 
such vehicles do not require a license.
    Mr. Shove also states that the U.S. Census Bureau's TIGER files 
provide the data to create census block polygons. The FAA should allow 
the use of such data to calculate populated areas, so that greater 
accuracy can be obtained. Calculating populated areas by block groups 
may give an inaccurately high population estimate to the detriment of 
what could be a safe launch area and flight trajectory. Shove at 2.
    The FAA would like to stress that an applicant is always free to 
use a more accurate method. The method in the NPRM requires that 
population be at least at a census block group level. It does not 
preclude more accurate data. The launch site location review is written 
so that census block groups are the largest size populated area 
allowed. An applicant may certainly use census block polygons, which 
are smaller and therefore allow for a higher fidelity analysis.
    Lastly, Mr. Shove commented on the appendix B requirement that an 
applicant obtain the launch point geodetic latitude on the WGS-84 
ellipsoidal Earth model. An applicant may do this using the Global 
Positioning System. His question is whether this means the single 
receiver accuracy of 100 meters, differential GPS with two 
receiver accuracy of less than a meter, or differential GPS using a 
base station and a receiver accuracy of 10 cm? Shove at 2.
    The launch site location review requires the launch area map scale 
to be ``not less than 1:250,000 inches per inch.'' An applicant is 
required to show that the measurement instruments provide the required 
accuracy. Latitude and longitude can be mechanically measured to four 
decimal point accuracy on that scale map. Four decimal point accuracy 
in degrees latitude/longitude at the equator is approximately 36 feet 
[11 meters].
    The Oklahoma Aeronautics and Space Commission (OASC) had one 
comment on the launch site location review. It requests clarification 
on what constitutes sounding rockets. There is great variance in the 
capability of sounding rockets and the altitudes they reach. OASC 
recommends classification based on altitude and propellant utilized. 
Oklahoma Aeronautics and Space Commission at 1.
    A sounding rocket is a common term for suborbital launch vehicles. 
These final rules adopted today do not use that term. However, 
suborbital launch vehicles are defined, and mean exactly what their 
name implies--launch vehicles that do not obtain orbital velocity. The 
FAA used altitude in the NPRM to classify sounding rockets, but not 
propellant. The type of propellant used by a sounding rocket was not 
used as a factor because it is not an important consideration for 
purposes of the launch site location review.
    Don A. Nelson commented that the proposed rules do not specifically 
address the flight testing of launch vehicles from a proposed launch 
site. He believed that the FAA must establish an experimental flight-
testing category for flights from launch sites under FAA jurisdiction. 
Anything less would subject the public to very high risks. This is 
because, historically, all launch vehicles during the flight test 
period have experienced catastrophic in-flight failures. This 
unacceptable failure rate requires that all population, including 
ground and air traffic, be removed from the areas defined by the 
instantaneous impact points of the nominal and worst-case dispersed 
trajectories of the flight test vehicle. The flight test corridor must 
be free of all-high value property and hazardous storage areas. White 
Sands Missile Range (WSMR) has set the standard for testing 
experimental launch vehicles within the continental United States. WSMR 
requires population be removed from the test range, and all ground and 
air traffic in the test range is prohibited during the flight test. Don 
A. Nelson at 1.
    The FAA agrees that the flight safety issues of an unproven vehicle 
are valid concerns and addresses the issue in the rulemaking governing 
reentry. 65 FR 56617. Note that the FAA's intent is to ensure that all 
operations conducted on a launch site are done so in a manner that 
protects public health and safety and safety of property. The FAA does 
not intend to allow experimental flight testing under any circumstance 
which places the public at greater risk. This may mean that the 
proposed operations are restricted or limited in scope in order to 
ensure public safety is achieved. These issues will be covered in a 
launch license application review process.
    Kistler Aerospace Corporation commented that treating RLV's on a 
case-by-case manner is the proper approach and fully justified in light 
of the new capabilities and operational concepts that will be brought 
to the industry by reusable launch systems. Kistler at 1.

G. License Conditions

    Subpart C contains standard terms and conditions of a license. It 
covers such items as the need for a licensee to operate a launch site 
in accordance with the representations contained in its license 
application, the duration of a license, transfer of a license, license 
modification, and compliance monitoring.
    A license may also contain conditions flowing from the various 
reviews conducted during the application process. For example, a 
license granted following approval of a launch site location is limited 
to the launch points analyzed, and the type and class of launch vehicle 
used in the demonstration of site location safety. An applicant may 
choose to analyze all three types of launch vehicles in its 
application. An FAA launch site operator license authorizing the

[[Page 62834]]

operation of a launch site for launch of an orbital expendable launch 
vehicle allows the launch of vehicles from the site that were less than 
or equal to the class of launch vehicle, based on payload weight, used 
to demonstrate the safety of the site location. If a licensee later 
wanted to offer the launch site for the launch of a larger class of 
vehicles or a different type of launch vehicle, such as an unguided 
sub-orbital launch vehicle, the licensee would be required to request a 
license modification and demonstrate that the larger vehicle or 
different type of vehicle could be safely launched from the launch 
site. Likewise, the addition of a new launch point would require a 
license modification. The demonstration would be based on the same 
kinds of analyses used for the original license. In some cases, a 
licensee might be able to use the safety analyses performed by a launch 
operator to meet location review requirements.
Discussion of Comments
    The agency did not receive any specific comments on the conditions 
of a license but one change was made in this area between the final 
rule and the Launch Site NPRM. The section on license modifications has 
been changed to clarify that changes in operations require prior 
approval of the FAA

H. Operational Responsibilities

    The FAA is imposing certain operational responsibilities on an 
operator of a launch site. In addition, the FAA distinguishes between 
activities covered by a license to operate a launch site and those 
covered by a launch license. Any activity that will be approved as part 
of a launch license will not be covered in a launch site operator 
license even if the launch site operator provides the service. For 
example, because a launch licensee will need to ensure the adequacy of 
ground tracking, approval of ground tracking systems will be handled in 
the launch license process even if a launch site operator provides the 
service. Similarly, in the case of ground safety, a launch site 
operator may provide fueling for a launch licensee, but safe procedures 
for fueling will be addressed in the launch license.
    The operational requirements being adopted for the operator of a 
launch site addresses control of public access, scheduling of 
operations at the site, notifications, recordkeeping, launch site 
accident response and investigation, and explosive safety. A launch 
site operator licensee is required to control access to the site. 
Security guards, fences, or other physical barriers may be used. Anyone 
entering the site must, on first entry, be informed of the site's 
safety and emergency response procedures. Alarms or other warning 
signals are required to alert persons on the launch site of any 
emergency that might occur when they are on site. If a launch site 
licensee has multiple launch customers on site at one time, the 
licensee must have procedures for scheduling their operations so that 
the activities of one customer do not create hazards for others.
    An operator of a launch site has responsibilities regarding 
explosives, specifically, those dealing with lightning and electric 
power lines.
    The launch site operator is responsible for all initial 
coordination with the appropriate FAA regional office having 
jurisdiction over the airspace where launches will take place as well 
as the U.S. Coast Guard. The FAA's Air Traffic Service and, if 
applicable the Coast Guard, issues Notices to Airmen and Mariners, 
respectively, to ensure that they avoid hazardous areas. An FAA Air 
Route Traffic Control Center also closes airways during a launch 
window, if necessary. A launch site operator is required to obtain an 
agreement regarding procedures for coordinating contacts with these 
agencies for launches from the site. The requirement for coordinating 
with the Coast Guard might not, of course, always be applicable, for 
example, for an inland launch site.
    The regulatory text has been changed from the Launch Site NPRM to 
clarify that the Coast Guard and FAA agreements must be completed 
during the application process, and must be complied with during the 
term of the license.
    A launch site operator licensee must also notify local officials 
with an interest in the launch. These include officials with 
responsibilities that might be called into play by a launch mishap, 
such as fire and emergency response personnel.
    A launch site operator is required to develop and implement a 
launch site accident investigation plan containing procedures for 
investigating and reporting a launch site accident. This extends 
similar reporting, investigation and response procedures currently 
applicable to launch related accidents and incidents to accidents 
occurring during ground activities at a launch site.
    The FAA did not propose the definition of mishap in the Launch Site 
NPRM. The definition that currently exists in section 401.5 was 
modified to include launch site accidents.
    Of more significance, the accident investigation plan section has 
been modified to require a licensee to participate in an investigation 
of a launch accident for launches launched from the launch site, and to 
cooperate with FAA or National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
investigations of a launch accident for launches launched from the 
launch site. This was added because launch mishaps may have a 
connection with the launch site.
Discussion of Comments
    In the NPRM, the FAA stated that a launch site operator is 
responsible for ground and flight safety under its FAA license, and 
that the FAA would revisit ground safety issues in its development of 
rules for launches from non-federal launch sites. ACTA staff noted that 
ground safety issues are equally critical to this rule because it 
requires an explosive site plan. ACTA at 8. The New Mexico Office for 
Space Commercialization (NMOSC) suggested that it should be a site 
operator's responsibility to ensure that procedures are in place to 
preclude human error accidents involving explosive materials and static 
discharge events. NMOSC at 1.
    The FAA disagrees. Most ground safety issues are directly related 
to operations of a launch operator, not those of a launch site 
operator. Requirements addressing ground safety procedures are more 
appropriate requirements for launch operators, since launch operators 
conduct these types of hazardous operations. Most other risks and 
phenomena associated with pre-flight operations are typically mitigated 
by restrictions on the operations. That said, however, nothing 
precludes a launch site operator from imposing additional requirements 
on customers on the facility as long as those requirements do not 
violate FAA requirements or other laws.
    NMOSC made the point that ground safety issues would be better left 
to other agencies such as OSHA, ATF, and state licensing organizations. 
Vast quantities of liquid oxygen (LO2), liquid hydrogen 
(LH2), and nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4), 
and other materials are shipped and used in interstate commerce. Why 
single out the launch industry for special regulations? NMOSC at 1. The 
FAA agrees in principal, and has attempted to only add requirements 
where those other agency regulations do not apply.
    LMC had comments concerning whether the proposed requirements might 
affect launch operators performing services at commercial launch sites, 
and whether the

[[Page 62835]]

requirements are consistent with ground and flight safety requirements 
imposed on launch operators by DOD and NASA at federal launch ranges. 
The Air Force tailors the standards set forth in EWR 127-1 to each 
operator prior to such operator entering the federal range for the 
purposes of conducting launch activities. LMC strongly recommends that 
the FAA, like the Air Force, employ a case-by-case tailoring of the 
standards. NMOSC at 2.
    In response, the FAA has two comments. First, requirements for 
launch operators are covered in a separate proposal on licensing and 
safety requirements for launch. Second, for launch site operators, the 
rules that the FAA is adopting today should be general enough to fit 
most launch site scenarios. The FAA recognizes, however, that there may 
be more than one way of meeting a requirement. That is why a 
prospective applicant is required to consult with the FAA, in 
accordance with 14 CFR 413.5, before submitting an application. Early 
consultation enables an applicant to identify unique approaches to 
meeting regulatory requirements. The FAA and an applicant can then work 
together to resolve such issues.
    The 45SW/SESE commented on the Accident Investigation Plan 
requirements. It asks what agency or agencies will have responsibility 
to maintain accident investigation reports and why? 45SW/SESE at 2. If 
a launch site accident occurs, the NTSB or FAA will investigate, and 
will maintain an investigation record. A launch site operator may also 
conduct an investigation of its own, and will be responsible for 
maintaining the investigation record in accordance with section 420.61.
    ACTA also had comments on the Accident Investigation Plan 
requirements and suggests that the definition of ``launch site 
accident'' be clarified by either deleting ``ground'' or changing the 
definition of ``launch site accident'' to read ``ground or launch 
activity.'' The NPRM defined ``launch site accident'' as ``an unplanned 
event occurring during a ground activity at a launch site resulting in 
a fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person 
who is not associated with the activity, or any damage estimated to 
exceed $25,000 to property not associated with the activity.'' ACTA at 
10. The FAA does not agree with ACTA suggestion. A launch site accident 
is strictly one that occurs during a ground activity. An accident 
caused by the flight of a launch vehicle is a launch accident, as 
defined in 14 CFR 401.5.
    LMC commented on the Accident Investigation Plan requirements, 
requesting clarification of whether the launch site operator or the 
launch operator accident investigation plans have priority if there 
were conflicts between plans. LMC at 4.
    The FAA offers the following guidance. Although no accident 
investigation plan has priority per se, the applicability of an 
accident investigation plan depends on the nature of a mishap. Compared 
to the NPRM, the definition of mishap has been changed in this final 
rule to accord with another rule governing reentry. 65 FR 56617. A 
mishap is now defined in section 401.5 as a launch or reentry accident, 
launch or reentry incident, launch site accident, failure to complete a 
launch or reentry as planned, or an unplanned event or series of events 
resulting in a fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2), 
or resulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to property. The 
purpose of this definition is to encompass all incidents that must be 
reported, responded to, or investigated in some manner by a launch 
operator, a reentry operator, or launch site operator.
    At a launch site operated under an FAA license, the launch site 
operator would have a launch site accident investigation plan and each 
launch operator on the launch site would have an individual launch 
accident investigation plan. Each plan would cover different mishaps, 
although there is some overlap, as discussed below. Table 4 is also 
provided as a guide.
    A launch site operator's launch site accident investigation plan 
covers launch site accidents only. A launch site accident is an 
unplanned event occurring during a ground activity at a launch site 
resulting in a fatality or serious injury to any person who is not 
associated with the activity, or any damage estimated to exceed $25,000 
to property not associated with the activity. In other words, if a 
member of the public is injured or property belonging to a member of 
the public over $25,000 is damaged due to a ground activity on the 
launch site, a launch site operator must report, respond to, and 
investigate the mishap. The FAA considers any licensee or its 
employees, or any licensee customer, contractor, or subcontractor or 
the employees of any of these persons to be associated with a ground 
activity. Property not associated with the activity will typically 
include any property belonging to members of the public. Property 
associated with the activity includes the property of a launch site 
operator or launch licensee, or either licensee's customers, 
contractors or subcontractors.
    A launch operator's launch accident investigation plan, on the 
other hand, covers launch accidents, launch incidents, and other 
mishaps. Launch accidents and launch incidents are strictly related to 
the flight of a launch vehicle, not ground activities. So, for launch 
accidents and launch incidents, there is no overlap with launch site 
operator reporting requirements.
    Where there is overlap in launch operator and launch site operator 
accident investigation plans is when a mishap occurs on the ground. A 
launch operator must notify the FAA immediately in the event of a 
mishap that involves a fatality or serious injury, and within 24 hours 
in the event of a mishap that does not involve a fatality or serious 
injury. The person injured does not have to be a member of the public. 
Also, a launch operator must notify AST or the Washington Operations 
Center within 24 hours in the event damage is estimated to exceed 
$25,000 to property not associated with the activity.
    In summary, both a launch site operator and a launch operator must 
report, respond to, and investigate a mishap occurring during a ground 
activity at a launch site resulting in a fatality or serious injury to 
any person who is not associated with the activity, or any damage 
estimated to exceed $25,000 to property not associated with the 
activity. The reason this type of mishap is covered by both plans is 
that both a launch site operator and launch operator have a 
responsibility to protect the public from hazardous ground activities. 
Note, however, that either the launch site or launch operator may agree 
to lead one investigation for both.

[[Page 62836]]



                                         Table 4.--Mishap Investigations
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Launch operator reporting          Launch site operator reporting
                Event                    requirement  (14 CFR 415.41(b))       requirement  (14 CFR 420.59(b))
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Launch accident--an unplanned event   Immediate notification to the         None.
 occurring during the flight of a      Federal Aviation Administration
 launch vehicle resulting in the       (FAA) Washington Operations Center
 known impact of a launch vehicle,
 its payload or any component
 thereof outside designated impact
 limit lines; or a fatality or
 serious injury (as defined in 49
 CFR 830.2) to any person who is not
 associated with the flight; or any
 damage estimated to exceed $25,000
 to property not associated with the
 flight that is not located at the
 launch site or designated recovery
 area.
Launch incident--an unplanned event   Immediate notification to the         None.
 occurring during the flight of a      Federal Aviation Administration
 launch vehicle, other than a launch   (FAA) Washington Operations Center
 accident, involving a malfunction
 of a flight safety system or
 failure of the licensee's safety
 organization, design or operations.
Launch site accident--an unplanned    Immediate notification to the         Immediate notification to the
 event occurring during a ground       Federal Aviation Administration       Federal Aviation Administration
 activity at a launch site resulting   (FAA) Washington Operations Center    (FAA) Washington Operations Center.
 in a fatality or serious injury (as   in the event of a fatality or
 defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any       serious injury.
 person who is not associated with    Notification within 24 hours to AST
 the activity, or any damage           or the Washington Operations Center
 estimated to exceed $25,000 to        in the event of damage estimated to
 property not associated with the      exceed $25,000 to property not
 activity.                             associated with the activity
Other Mishap*:                        Immediate notification to the         None.
 Failure to complete a to      Federal Aviation Administration
 launch as planned.                    (FAA) Washington Operations Center
 An unplanned event or         in the event of a fatality or
 series of events resulting in a       serious injury
 fatality or serious injury to any    Notification within 24 hours to AST
 person who is associated with the     or the Washington Operations Center
 activity.                             in the event of failure to complete
 An unplanned event or         a launch as planned, or greater
 series of events resulting in         than $25,000 worth of damage to a
 greater than $25,000 worth of         payload, a launch vehicle, a launch
 damage to a payload, a launch         support facility or government
 vehicle, a launch support facility    property located on the launch
 or government property located on     site.
 the launch site.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Mishap means a launch or reentry accident, launch or reentry incident, launch site accident, failure to
  complete a launch or reentry as planned, or an unplanned event or series of events resulting in a fatality or
  serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2), or resulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to property.

IV. Part Analysis

Part 401--Organization and Definitions

    Section 401.5 contains definitions of significant terms used in all 
of Chapter III. The term ``mishap'' has been revised to include launch 
site accidents as part of the definition of mishap. The term ``mishap'' 
is a general term for all unplanned events at a launch site or that 
occur during a launch or reentry resulting in injury, or damage to or 
loss of equipment or property. Mishaps include but are not limited to 
launch or reentry accidents, launch or reentry incidents, and launch 
site accidents. Mishaps also include failure to complete a launch or 
reentry as planned, or an unplanned event or series of events resulting 
in a fatality or serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2), or 
resulting in greater than $25,000 worth of damage to property.

Part 417--License to Operate a Launch Site

    The FAA removes and reserves part 417 and creates part 420 to 
address licensing and safety requirements for operation of a launch 
site.

Part 420--License to Operate a Launch Site

    Section 420.1 describes the scope of part 420. Part 420 encompasses 
the information and demonstrations that must be submitted as part of a 
license application, the bases for license approval, license terms and 
conditions, and post-licensing requirements with which a licensee must 
comply to remain licensed.
    Section 420.3 specifies the person who must apply for a license to 
operate a launch site, and the person who must comply with regulations 
that apply to a licensed launch site operator. Because a launch site 
operator is someone who offers a launch site to others for launch, only 
someone proposing such an offer need obtain a license to operate a 
launch site. A launch operator proposing to launch from its own launch 
site need only obtain a launch license because a launch license will 
address safety issues related to a specific launch and because a launch 
license will encompass ground operations. In response to comments, as 
discussed earlier, a person operating a launch site that only supports 
amateur rocket activities does not need a license under part 420.
    Section 420.5 adds terms that have not been previously defined by 
the FAA. These definitions apply in the context of part 420, which 
governs the licensing and safety requirements for operation of a launch 
site. These terms do not apply outside part 420. Specifically, the 
following terms are defined. Unless otherwise noted, they remain 
unchanged from the definitions proposed in the Launch Site NPRM.
    Ballistic Coefficient () means the weight (W) of an object 
divided by the

[[Page 62837]]

quantity product of the coefficient of drag (Cd) of the 
object and the area (A) of the object.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.001

A ballistic coefficient is a parameter used to describe flight 
characteristics of an object.
    Compatibility means the chemical property of materials that may be 
located together without adverse reaction. Compatibility in storage 
exists when storing materials together does not increase the 
probability of an accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of 
the effects of such an accident. Compatibility determines whether 
materials require segregation.
    Debris dispersion radius (Dmax) means the estimated 
maximum distance from a launch point that debris travels given a worst-
case launch vehicle failure and flight termination early in flight. For 
an expendable launch vehicle, flight termination is assumed to occur at 
10 seconds into flight. No assumptions are made for reusable launch 
vehicles. If an expendable launch vehicle failure occurs shortly after 
ignition, and a flight termination system is employed, the FAA expects 
the debris to be contained within an area described by Dmax.
    Downrange area means a portion of a flight corridor beginning where 
a launch area ends and ending 5,000 nautical miles (nm) from the launch 
point for an orbital launch vehicle, and ending with an impact 
dispersion area for a guided sub-orbital launch vehicle.
    E,F,G coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed, 
geocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system is 
at the center of an ellipsoidal Earth model. The E-axis is positive 
directed through the Greenwich meridian. The F-axis is positive 
directed though 90 degrees east longitude. The EF-plane is coincident 
with the ellipsoidal Earth model's equatorial plane. The G-axis is 
normal to the EF-plane and positive directed through the north pole.
    E,N,U coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed, 
topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system 
is at a launch point. The E-axis is positive directed east. The N-axis 
is positive directed north. The EN-plane is tangent to an ellipsoidal 
Earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to the geodetic 
vertical. The U-axis is normal to the EN-plane and positive directed 
away from the Earth.
    Effective casualty area (Ac) means the aggregate 
casualty area of each piece of debris created by a launch vehicle 
failure at a particular point on its trajectory. The effective casualty 
area for each piece of debris is the area within which 100 percent of 
the unprotected population on the ground are assumed to be a casualty, 
and outside of which 100 percent of the population are assumed not to 
be a casualty. This area is based on the characteristics of the debris 
piece including its size, the path angle of its trajectory, impact 
explosions, and debris skip, splatter, and bounce. An effective 
casualty area also accounts for the size of a person.
    Explosive means any chemical compound or mechanical mixture that, 
when subjected to heat, impact, friction, detonation or other suitable 
initiation, undergoes a rapid chemical change that releases large 
volumes of highly heated gases that exert pressure in the surrounding 
medium. The term applies to materials that either detonate or 
deflagrate.
    Explosive division has also been added since the Launch Site NPRM 
and means the hazard class 1 division of an explosive as defined by the 
United Nations Organization classification system for transport of 
dangerous goods, and as determined in accordance with 49 CFR part 173, 
subpart C. The term ``division 1.3 explosive'' was proposed but not 
adopted because the general terms for hazard class and explosive 
division have been added instead.
    Explosive equivalent means a measure of the blast effects from 
explosion of a given quantity of material expressed in terms of the 
weight of trinitrotoluene (TNT) that would produce the same blast 
effects when detonated.
    Explosive hazard facility means a facility at a launch site where 
solid propellant, liquid propellant, or other explosives are stored or 
handled. This term has been slightly modified from the Launch Site NPRM 
to include other explosives other than propellants.
    Flight azimuth means the initial direction in which a launch 
vehicle flies relative to true north expressed in degrees-decimal-
degrees. For example, due east is 90 degrees.
    Flight corridor means an area on the Earth's surface estimated to 
contain the hazardous debris from nominal flight of a launch vehicle, 
and non-nominal flight of a launch vehicle assuming a perfectly 
functioning flight termination system or other flight safety system. 
This has been changed from the Launch Site NPRM in two respects. The 
proposed definition included the phrase ``contain the majority of 
hazardous debris'' which, as discussed in the comment section, is 
incorrect. The new definition also makes clear that the flight corridor 
is based on a perfectly functioning flight termination system.
    Guided sub-orbital launch vehicle means a sub-orbital rocket that 
employs an active guidance system.
    Hazard class has been added since the NPRM and means the class of 
dangerous good defined by the United Nations Organization 
classification system for transport of dangerous goods, and as 
determined in accordance with 49 CFR part 173, subpart C.
    Impact dispersion area means an area representing an estimated 
three standard deviation dispersion about a nominal impact point of an 
intermediate or final stage of a sub-orbital launch vehicle.
    Impact dispersion factor means a constant used to estimate, using a 
stage apogee, a three standard deviation dispersion about a nominal 
impact point of an intermediate or final stage of a sub-orbital launch 
vehicle. Intermediate stages include all stages up to the final stage.
    Impact dispersion radius (Ri) means a radius that 
defines an impact dispersion area. It applies to all launch vehicle 
stages.
    Impact range means the distance between a launch point and the 
impact point of a sub-orbital launch vehicle stage.
    Impact range factor means a constant used to estimate, when 
multiplied by a stage apogee, the nominal impact point of an 
intermediate or final stage of a suborbital launch vehicle.
    Instantaneous impact point (IIP) means an impact point, following 
thrust termination of a launch vehicle. IIP may be calculated with or 
without atmospheric drag effects. This is a change from the Launch Site 
NPRM. The NPRM limited the definition to a vacuum IIP. Note that the 
analyses of part 420 use vacuum IIP.
    Instantaneous impact point (IIP) range rate means a launch 
vehicle's estimated IIP velocity along the Earth's surface. It is 
typically abbreviated as R, or R-dot.
    Intraline distance means the minimum distance permitted between any 
two explosive hazard facilities in the ownership, possession or control 
of one launch site customer. Intraline distance prevents the 
propagation of an explosion. In other words, with an appropriate 
intraline distance, an explosive mishap at one explosive hazard 
facility would not cause an explosive event at another explosive hazard 
facility. The FAA anticipates that worker safety requirements will 
dictate protection of employees and anticipates that all licensees will 
familiarize themselves with those

[[Page 62838]]

requirements and conform to them in accordance with the law. Unlike 
distances used to protect the public, intraline distance will not offer 
workers the same level of protection as the public.
    Launch area means, for a flight corridor defined in accordance with 
appendix A, the portion of a flight corridor from the launch point to a 
point 100 nm in the direction of the flight azimuth. For a flight 
corridor defined in accordance with appendix B, a launch area is the 
portion of a flight corridor from the launch point to the enveloping 
line enclosing the outer boundary of the last debris dispersion circle.
    Launch point means a point on the Earth from which the flight of a 
launch vehicle begins, and is defined by the point's geodetic latitude, 
longitude and height on an ellipsoidal Earth model.
    Launch site accident means an unplanned event occurring during a 
ground activity at a launch site resulting in a fatality or serious 
injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person who is not associated 
with the activity, or any damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to 
property not associated with the activity. The FAA considers any 
licensee or its employees, or any licensee customer, contractor, or 
subcontractor or the employees of any of these persons to be associated 
with a ground activity. Property not associated with the activity will 
typically include any property belonging to members of the public or 
personal property of employees. Property associated with the activity 
includes the property of a launch site operator or launch licensee, or 
either licensee's customers, contractors or subcontractors.
    Net explosive weight (NEW) means the total weight, expressed in 
pounds, of explosive material or explosive equivalency contained in an 
item. This term is used for applying Q-D criteria to solid propellants 
and other explosives, and for liquid propellants when explosive 
equivalency applies. Explosive equivalency applies to liquid 
propellants when a liquid fuel and a liquid oxidizer are close enough 
together that their explosive potential combined must be used when 
determining prescribed distances to the public.
    Nominal means, in reference to launch vehicle performance, 
trajectory, or stage impact point, a launch vehicle flight where all 
launch vehicle aerodynamic parameters are as expected, all vehicle 
internal and external systems perform as planned, and there are no 
external perturbing influences (e.g., winds) other than atmospheric 
drag and gravity.
    Overflight dwell time means the period of time it takes for a 
launch vehicle's IIP to move past a populated area. For a given 
populated area, the overflight dwell time is the time period measured 
along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace from the time point whose 
normal with the trajectory intersects the most uprange part of the 
populated area to the time point whose normal with the trajectory 
intersects the most downrange part of the populated area.
    Overflight exclusion zone means a portion of a flight corridor, 
which must remain clear of the public during the flight of a launch 
vehicle.
    Populated area means a land area with population. For a part 420 
site location risk analysis of a populated area within the first 100 nm 
of a launch point, a populated area is no greater than a census block 
group in the United States, and an equivalent size outside the United 
States. For analysis of a part 420 flight corridor more than 100 nm 
downrange from the launch point, a populated area is no greater than a 
1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude/longitude grid, whether the populated area is 
in the United States or not.
    Population density means the number of people per unit area in a 
populated area.
    Position data means data referring to the current position of a 
launch vehicle with respect to time using the x, y, z coordinate 
system.
    Public means people or property that are not involved in supporting 
a licensed launch, and includes those people and property that may be 
located within the boundary of a launch site, such as visitors, any 
individual providing goods or services not related to launch processing 
or flight, and any other launch operator and its personnel. This is a 
new definition and was added to clarify how the FAA defines the public.
    Public area means any area outside a hazard area, and is an area 
that is not in the possession, ownership or other control of a launch 
site operator or of a launch site customer who possesses, owns or 
otherwise controls that hazard area. For purposes of Q-D criteria, the 
final rules treat any location outside a launch site boundary as a 
public area for any activity at a launch site. Certain areas within a 
launch site are also considered public areas for purposes of applying 
Q-D criteria. For any given launch operator, areas where other launch 
operators are located are public areas.
    Public area distance means the minimum separation distance 
permitted between a public area and an explosive hazard facility.
    Public traffic route distance means the minimum distance permitted 
between a public highway or railroad line and an explosive hazard 
facility. This is a new definition. It was necessary to add the 
definition because explosive division 1.1 explosives were added to the 
explosive safety requirements. The distance requirements for explosive 
division 1.1 explosives differentiate between public traffic routes and 
inhabited buildings, a differentiation not made for explosive division 
1.3 explosives.
    Trajectory means the position and velocity components as a function 
of time of a launch vehicle relative to an x, y, z coordinate system, 
expressed in x, y, z, x, y, z. The x, y, z coordinates describe the 
position of the vehicle both for projecting the proposed flight path 
and during actual flight. The x, y, z variables describe the velocity 
of the vehicle.
    Unguided sub-orbital launch vehicle means a sub-orbital rocket that 
does not have a guidance system.
    X,Y,Z coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed, 
topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system 
is at a launch point. The X-axis coincides with the initial launch 
azimuth and is positive in the downrange direction. The Y-axis is 
positive to the left looking downrange. The XY-plane is tangent to the 
ellipsoidal Earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to 
the geodetic vertical. The Z-axis is normal to the XY-plane and 
positive directed away from the Earth.
    o,o,om
eans a latitude, longitude, height system where o 
is the geodetic latitude of a launch point, o is 
the east longitude of the launch point, and o is 
the height of the launch point above a reference ellipsoid. 
o and o are expressed in 
degrees-decimal-degrees, which is abbreviated as DDD.
    Subpart B contains the criteria and information requirements for 
obtaining a license to operate a launch site. Section 420.15 specifies 
the information that an applicant for a launch site operator license 
must submit as part of its license application. The FAA requires this 
information to evaluate issues affecting national security and foreign 
policy, environmental impacts, whether the launch site location could 
safely be used to conduct launches, explosive site safety, and whether 
the applicant will operate the launch site safely.

[[Page 62839]]

    Section 420.15 has been modified slightly from the NPRM. The first 
and only substantive change is section 420.15(a). It states that an 
applicant shall identify the name and address of the applicant, and the 
name, address, and telephone number of any person to whom inquiries and 
correspondence should be directed. It also requires the applicant to 
provide the name and location of the proposed launch site, including 
downrange equipment; and describe the layout of the launch site, 
including launch points; the types of launch vehicles to be supported 
at each launch point; the range of launch azimuths planned from each 
launch point; and the scheduled operational date. The FAA determined 
that it was necessary to obtain this basic general information from an 
applicant in order to conduct the licensing process and to review 
compliance with the requirements of this part. Section 420.15(a) also 
requires foreign ownership information, as did the Launch Site NPRM's 
section 420.15(b).
    The other changes to section 420.15 are organizational only. 
Section 420.15(b) contains the environmental review requirements, which 
replace requirements currently located at sections 417.105-107.
    Section 420.15(c) states that an applicant must provide the 
information necessary for the review of the launch site location. An 
applicant who is proposing to locate a launch site at an existing 
launch point at a federal launch range is not required to submit a 
launch site location review analysis if a launch vehicle of the same 
type and class as proposed for the launch point has been safely 
launched from the launch point.
    Section 420.15(d) states that an applicant must provide the 
information necessary for the review of the explosive site plan. If an 
applicant plans to operate a launch site located on a federal launch 
range, and if the applicant is required by the federal launch range to 
comply with the federal launch range's explosive safety requirements, 
the applicant shall submit the explosive site plan submitted to the 
federal launch range. The requirement to submit the federal launch 
range approved explosive site plan is new. The FAA proposed in the 
Launch Site NPRM that no explosive site plan would have to be 
submitted. The FAA will not approve the explosive site plan. Rather, 
the FAA will use it to assess the adequacy of other aspects of an 
applicant's application, such as the applicant's coordination 
procedures under section 420.55(a).
    Section 420.15(e) requires an applicant to demonstrate how it will 
satisfy the launch site operation requirements of sections 420.53 
through 420.61, and section 420.71. Specifically, a license applicant 
must show how the applicant proposes to control public access pursuant 
to section 420.53, how it proposes to comply with the scheduling 
requirements of section 420.55, and how it proposes to satisfy the 
notification obligations of section 420.57. The FAA requires this 
information to ascertain whether an applicant will be able to satisfy 
the launch site operation performance requirements and for compliance 
monitoring purposes. With regard to the notification obligations of 
section 420.57, an applicant must submit its agreements with the U.S. 
Coast Guard district and the FAA regional air traffic control facility 
having jurisdiction over the affected airspace to demonstrate 
satisfaction of the requirements of 420.57(b) and (c). A license 
applicant must also show how it proposes to comply with the accident 
investigation requirements of section 420.59, the record requirements 
of section 420.61, and the requirements governing lightning protection 
of section 420.71.
    Section 420.17 establishes the bases upon which the FAA will make 
its license determination. This includes the FAA's determination of the 
adequacy of information provided by the applicant, the conclusions of 
the environmental and policy reviews, the adequacy of the explosive 
site plan, and satisfaction of site location requirements. The FAA will 
notify the applicant of, and allow the applicant to address any 
deficiencies in the application.
    A few changes were made from the NPRM. All were structural, except 
for section 420.17(a)(2) which now states that one basis for the 
issuance of a license is that the FAA has completed an analysis of the 
environmental impacts associated with the proposed operation of the 
launch site, in accordance with NEPA, 40 CFR Parts 1500-1508, and FAA 
Order 1050.1D. The NPRM had only stated that the National Environmental 
Policy Act review must be completed, but the FAA decided that it would 
be more informative to advise of the full extent of the FAA's review.
    Sections 420.19 through 420.29 require an applicant to demonstrate 
that its proposed launch site location will allow for the safe launch 
of at least one type of launch vehicle by defining flight corridors or 
impact dispersion areas and estimating casualty expectancy. The launch 
site location review remains largely unchanged from the Launch Site 
NPRM, with a few exceptions, which will be discussed below. The 
treatment of the launch site location review in this final rule has 
been enhanced for two reasons. The FAA decided to outline the process 
more distinctly. Additionally, the FAA decided to clarify what parts of 
the launch site location review apply to reusable launch vehicles and 
which do not.
    Section 420.19 provides general requirements. To gain approval for 
a launch site location, an applicant must demonstrate that for each 
launch point proposed for the launch site, at least one type of 
expendable or reusable launch vehicle can be flown from the launch 
point safely. For purposes of the launch site location review, a safe 
launch must possess a risk level estimated not to exceed an expected 
average number of 0.00003 casualties (Ec) to the collective 
member of the public exposed to hazards from the flight (Ec 30  x  10--6).
    Types of launch vehicles include orbital expendable launch 
vehicles, guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles, unguided sub-
orbital expendable launch vehicles, and reusable launch vehicles. 
Orbital expendable launch vehicles are further classified by weight 
class, based on the weight of payload the launch vehicle can place in a 
100-nm orbit. If an applicant proposes to have more than one type of 
launch vehicle flown from a launch point, the applicant must 
demonstrate that each type of expendable or reusable launch vehicle 
planned to be flown from the launch point can be flown from the launch 
point safely. If an applicant proposes to have more than one weight 
class of orbital expendable launch vehicles flown from a launch point, 
the applicant must demonstrate that the heaviest weight class planned 
to be flown from the launch point can be flown from the launch point 
safely.
    The three types of expendable launch vehicles account for the 
significant distinctions between launch vehicles designed for orbital 
or sub-orbital flight, and between those with and without guidance 
systems. Guided orbital expendable launch vehicles typically require an 
FTS, which means that the greatest risk to the public stems from debris 
caused by destruction of a vehicle. Guided sub-orbital launch vehicles 
will be treated similarly to orbital launch vehicles, except for the 
nominal impact of the final stage. In contrast, current unguided sub-
orbital launch vehicles generally have high reliability levels, and 
therefore create the greatest public risk through nominal stage impact. 
The launch site location review is designed to account for these 
differences in public risk.

[[Page 62840]]

    Section 420.21 provides minimum distance requirements governing the 
separation of a launch point from a launch site boundary. The distance 
from any proposed launch point to the closest launch site boundary must 
be at least as great as the debris dispersion radius of the largest 
launch vehicle type and weight class proposed for the launch point. For 
launch sites supporting expendable launch vehicles, an applicant may 
use the largest distance listed in table 2 for the type and weight 
class of launch vehicles proposed for the launch point. For launch 
sites supporting reusable launch vehicles, an applicant must determine 
the debris dispersion radius that represents the maximum distance from 
a launch point that debris travels given a worst-case launch vehicle 
failure in the launch area. An applicant shall clearly and convincingly 
demonstrate the validity of its proposed radius.
    Section 420.23 provides the requirement for applicants to define a 
flight corridor. The section is divided up into flight corridor 
requirements for guided orbital expendable launch vehicles, guided sub-
orbital expendable launch vehicles, unguided sub-orbital expendable 
launch vehicles, and reusable launch vehicles. For guided orbital 
expendable launch vehicles, an applicant must define a flight corridor 
that encompasses an area that is estimated, in accordance with the 
requirements of this part, to contain debris with a ballistic 
coefficient of  3 pounds per square foot, from any non-
nominal flight of a guided orbital expendable launch vehicle from the 
launch point to a point 5000 nm downrange, or where the IIP leaves the 
surface of the Earth, whichever is shorter. The IIP for most orbital 
expendable launch vehicles goes well beyond 5000 nm. The requirement is 
the same for guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles, except that 
the flight corridor ends with an impact dispersion area for the launch 
vehicle's last stage where it impacts the Earth's surface. For either 
type of launch vehicle, the flight corridor includes an overflight 
exclusion zone where the public risk criteria of 
30 x 10-6 would be exceeded if one person were 
present in the open. An applicant must use one of the methodologies 
provided in appendix A or B to define a flight corridor. These are 
discussed below.
    Because the FAA realizes that applicants may have other methods to 
determine a flight corridor, the FAA will approve an alternate method 
if an applicant provides a clear and convincing demonstration that its 
proposed method provides an equivalent level of safety to that required 
by appendix A or B.
    Section 420.23(c) addresses unguided sub-orbital expendable launch 
vehicles. For an unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, an 
applicant must define impact dispersion areas that are estimated, in 
accordance with the requirements of this part, to contain the impact of 
launch vehicle stages from nominal flight of an unguided sub-orbital 
expendable launch vehicle from the launch point to impact with the 
Earth's surface, and an overflight exclusion zone where the public risk 
criteria of 30 x 10-\6\ would be exceeded if one person were 
present in the open. An applicant must follow the methodology provided 
in appendix D. The FAA will approve an alternate method if an applicant 
provides a clear and convincing demonstration that its proposed method 
provides an equivalent level of safety to that required by appendix D.
    An important point to note about the launch site location review 
for unguided sub-orbital launch vehicles is that it is based on the 
apogee of the unguided suborbital launch vehicle used in the analysis. 
The apogee used in the analysis must represent the maximum apogee 
intended to be reached by a launch vehicle launched from the launch 
point.
    Section 420.23(d) addresses reusable launch vehicles. For a 
reusable launch vehicle, an applicant must define a flight corridor 
that contains the hazardous debris from nominal and non-nominal flight 
of a reusable launch vehicle. The applicant must clearly and 
convincingly demonstrate the validity of the flight corridor.
    Section 420.25 provides the requirement for applicants to conduct a 
risk analysis. If a flight corridor or impact dispersion area contains 
a populated area, the applicant must estimate the casualty expectation 
associated with the flight corridor or impact dispersion area. An 
applicant must use the methodology provided in appendix C to this part 
for guided orbital or suborbital expendable launch vehicles and 
appendix D for unguided suborbital launch vehicles. For reusable launch 
vehicles, the FAA will evaluate the adequacy of an applicant's casualty 
expectancy analysis on a case-by-case basis. If the estimated expected 
casualty exceeds 30 x 10-\6\, the FAA will not approve the 
location of the proposed launch point.
    Section 420.27 contains the information that an applicant must 
submit in its application for a launch site location review. The FAA 
recognizes that not all information is applicable to all analyses.
    Section 420.29 contains an important caveat to the launch site 
location review as discussed so far. The FAA must evaluate the adequacy 
of a launch site location for unproven launch vehicles on a case-by-
case basis. An applicant for a license to operate a launch site for an 
unproven launch vehicle must provide a clear and convincing 
demonstration that its proposed launch site location provides an 
equivalent level of safety to that required by this part. A launch site 
that is safe for proven launch vehicles may not be safe for new 
vehicles. The probability of failure is likely to be higher, and the 
risk to populated areas may increase significantly.
    Section 420.31 requires an applicant to complete two agreements 
necessary for the safety of aircraft and ships during a launch. An 
applicant must complete an agreement with the local U.S. Coast Guard 
district to establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice to 
Mariners prior to a launch and other such measures as the Coast Guard 
deems necessary to protect public health and safety. An applicant must 
also complete an agreement with the FAA Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
office having jurisdiction over the airspace through which launches 
will take place, to establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice 
to Airmen prior to a launch and for closing of air routes during the 
launch window and other such measures as the FAA ATC office deems 
necessary to protect public health and safety.
    If an applicant plans to operate a launch site located on a federal 
launch range and is using existing federal launch range agreements; the 
applicant does not have to comply with section 420.31. These agreements 
are with the U.S. Coast Guard and the FAA ATC office having 
jurisdiction over the airspace through which launches will take place.

Appendix A

    Of the two methods allowing an applicant to demonstrate the 
existence of a guided expendable launch vehicle flight corridor that 
satisfies the FAA's risk criteria, appendix A is the simplest of the 
methods. Appendix A typically offers the more conservative approach in 
that it produces a larger area for guided orbital and suborbital 
expendable launch vehicles. In order to achieve the simplicity this 
approach offers, the FAA based certain decisions regarding the 
methodology on a series of what it intends as conservative assumptions 
and on hazard areas previously developed by the federal

[[Page 62841]]

launch ranges for the guided expendable launch vehicles listed in table 
1 of section 420.19.
    The greater simplicity of the approach derives from the fact that, 
unlike the method of appendix B, an applicant need obtain no 
meteorological data and need not plot the trajectory of a particular 
launch vehicle. Instead, recognizing that a typical flight corridor 
consists of a series of fans of decreasing angle extending out from a 
launch point, appendix A employs a variation on that typical corridor.
    The appendix A flight corridor estimation contains a number of 
elements, each of which an applicant must define for each of its 
proposed launch points. An appendix A flight corridor consists of a 
circular area around a selected launch point, an overflight exclusion 
zone, a launch area and a downrange area. A flight corridor for a 
guided orbital expendable launch vehicle ends 5,000 nautical miles from 
the launch point, and, for a guided suborbital expendable launch 
vehicle, the flight corridor ends with the impact dispersion area of 
the launch vehicle's final stage.
    Once an applicant has produced an appendix A flight corridor, the 
applicant must ascertain whether the flight corridor contains 
population, and, if so, whether the use of the corridor would present 
unacceptable risk to that population. If no members of the public 
reside within the corridor, the FAA will approve the proposed location 
of the site.\9\ If the flight corridor is populated, the FAA will 
require an applicant to perform a risk analysis in accordance with 
appendix C. If the proposed corridor satisfies the FAA's risk criteria, 
the FAA will approve the location of the site. If, however, the 
proposed corridor fails to satisfy the FAA's risk criteria, an 
applicant has certain options. The applicant may attempt another 
appendix A flight corridor by selecting a different flight azimuth or 
by selecting a different launch point at the proposed launch site, or 
by selecting a different launch vehicle type or class. Or, the 
applicant may, using the more accurate but more complicated 
calculations of appendix B, narrow its flight corridor and determine 
whether that flight corridor satisfies the FAA's risk criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ An applicant must still obtain written agreements with the 
FAA Air Traffic Control office having jurisdiction over the airspace 
where launches will take place and, if appropriate, with the U.S. 
Coast Guard regarding procedures for coordinating launches with the 
launch site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To create a hypothetical flight corridor under appendix A an 
applicant must first determine from where on the launch site a guided 
expendable launch vehicle would take flight. That position is defined 
as a launch point. An applicant must determine the geodetic latitude 
and longitude of each launch point that it proposes to offer for 
launch, and select a flight azimuth for each launch point. An applicant 
should know whether it plans to offer the site for the launch of guided 
orbital or sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles. If planning for the 
launch of guided orbital expendable launch vehicles, the applicant must 
decide what expendable launch vehicle class, as described by payload 
weight in section 420.19, table 1, best represents the largest 
expendable launch vehicle class the launch site would support.
    Once an applicant has made the necessary decisions regarding 
location and vehicle class, the next step in creating an appendix A 
flight corridor is to look up the maximum distance (Dmax) 
that debris is expected to travel from a launch point if a worst-case 
expendable launch vehicle failure were to occur and flight termination 
action destroyed the expendable launch vehicle at 10 seconds into 
flight. Dmax serves as a radius that defines a circular area 
around the launch point. The FAA has estimated, on the basis of federal 
launch range experience, the Dmax for a guided suborbital 
expendable launch vehicle and for each guided orbital expendable launch 
vehicle class and provided the results that an applicant should employ 
in table A-1, appendix A.
    The circular area, defined by Dmax, is part of an 
overflight exclusion zone. An overflight exclusion zone in an appendix 
A flight corridor consists of a rectangular area of the length 
prescribed by table A-2, capped up-range by a semi-circle with radius 
Dmax centered on the launch point. Its downrange boundary is 
defined by an identical semi-circular arc with a radius Dmax 
centered on the endpoint prescribed by table A-2. The crossrange 
boundaries consist of two lines parallel to and to either side of the 
flight azimuth. Each line is tangent to the uprange and downrange 
Dmax circles as shown in appendix A, figure A-1.
    An appendix A flight corridor also contains a launch area. The 
launch area extends from the uprange boundary, which is coextensive 
with the circle created by the radius Dmax, to a line drawn 
perpendicular to the flight azimuth one hundred nautical miles down 
range of the launch point. The launch area's crossrange boundaries are 
a function of the lengths of two lines perpendicular to the flight 
azimuth: one drawn ten nautical miles down range from the launch point 
and the other line drawn one hundred nautical miles down range from the 
launch point. Table A-3 provides the lengths of the line segments.
    Adjacent to the launch area is the downrange area. For purposes of 
appendix A, a corridor's downrange area extends from the one hundred 
nautical miles line to a line, perpendicular to the flight azimuth, 
that is 5,000 nautical miles downrange from the launch point for the 
guided orbital expendable launch vehicle classes, and to an impact 
dispersion area for a guided suborbital expendable launch vehicle 
corridor. The down range area's crossrange boundaries connect the 
prescribed endpoints of the perpendicular lines at one hundred nautical 
miles and 5,000 nautical miles. Table A-3 provides the lengths of the 
line segments.
    An applicant must determine whether the public resides within this 
flight corridor. If no populated areas exist, an applicant may submit 
its analysis for the FAA's launch site location review. If there is 
population located within the flight corridor, the applicant must 
calculate the risk to the public in accordance with the requirements of 
appendix C. The expected casualty (Ec) result for the flight 
corridor must not exceed 30 x 10-6 for the applicant to 
satisfy the location requirements.

Map Requirements and Plotting Methods

    To describe a flight corridor and any populated areas within that 
corridor, an applicant must observe data and methodology requirements 
for mapping a flight corridor and analyzing populations. These 
requirements apply to all appendices.
    The FAA requires certain geographical data for use in describing 
flight corridors for each appendix. The geographical data must include 
the latitude and longitude of each proposed launch point at a launch 
site, and all populated areas in a flight corridor. The accuracy 
requirement for the launch area portion of the analyses calls for map 
scales of no smaller than 1:250,000 inches per inch. The actual map 
scale will depend on the smallest census block group size in a launch 
area. The FAA bases its scale requirement on average range rates in the 
launch area, because range rates have a direct impact on dwell times 
over populated areas. While in the launch area of a flight corridor, 
the instantaneous impact point (IIP) ground trace tends to linger over 
any populated areas, which increases the Ec for an 
individual populated area. The map scale required by the FAA is large 
enough to allow an applicant to

[[Page 62842]]

determine the dwell time and size for each applicable populated area.
    Using a similar approach, the FAA establishes an accuracy 
requirement for the downrange area of a flight corridor. A map scale 
may be no smaller than 1:20,000,000 inches per inch. The scale is to be 
smaller than that required for the launch area because the dwell times 
over downrange populated areas are small and the map scale must only be 
large enough to allow an applicant to determine the dwell time and the 
size of each populated area downrange. Maps satisfying these accuracy 
requirements are readily available. For example, civil aeronautical 
charts are published and distributed by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and 
are also published by the Defense Mapping Agency and distributed by 
NOAA.
    Besides scale, appendices A, B, C and D require an applicant to use 
cylindrical, conic, and plane map projections. The FAA uses these map 
projections for the analyses because they produce only small error with 
straight line measurements.
    Scale requirements, geographic location of the launch site, and 
plotting method are the main considerations for choosing a map 
projection. Of these considerations, the plotting method selected for 
development and depiction of the flight corridor line segments is the 
most important. Three plotting methods are provided by appendix A.
    The ``mechanical method'' is the least complex, least costly, but 
also the least accurate of the methods suggested here. The ``semi-
automated method'' provides more accurate techniques for determining 
the endpoint coordinates of each flight corridor line segment. The 
fully automated method makes use of geographic information system (GIS) 
software with global mapping data.
    Appendix A provides an applicant with equations to perform range 
and bearing computations for the purpose of plotting a flight corridor 
on a map. The range and bearing from a launch point are used to 
determine the latitude and longitude coordinates of a point on the 
flight corridor. Range and bearing equations are standard geodesic 
computations, which can be found in most geodesy textbooks.
    An applicant may create line segments to describe a flight corridor 
by using range and bearings from the launch point along various 
azimuths. Appendix A provides equations to calculate geodetic latitude 
(+N) and longitude (+E) given the launch point geodetic latitude (+N), 
longitude (+E), range (nm), and bearing (degrees, positive clockwise 
from North). The same equations may also be used to calculate an impact 
dispersion area by substituting a final stage impact point for the 
launch point. Appendix A also provides equations to calculate the 
distance of a geodesic between two points.
    As noted above, an alternative to range and bearing computations is 
to use geographic information system (GIS) software with global mapping 
data. GIS software is an effective tool for constructing and evaluating 
a flight corridor, and has the advantage of allowing an applicant to 
create maps of varying scales in the launch and downrange areas. 
Commercially available GIS products are acceptable to the FAA for use 
in appendices A, B, C and D if they meet the map and plotting method 
requirements of paragraph (b) of appendix A. An applicant should note, 
however, that maps of different scales in GIS software may not match 
each other. For instance, the coastline of Florida on a U.S. map may 
not match the coastline on a world map. Applicants shall resolve such 
contradictions by referring to more accurate maps such as NOAA maps.
    Once an applicant has selected a map for displaying a flight 
corridor's launch area, the line segment lengths may be scaled to the 
chosen map. Map scale units are actual distance units measured along 
the Earth's surface per unit of map distance. Most map scale units are 
given in terms of inches per inch (in/in). An applicant converts 
appendix A flight corridor line segment distances to the map scale 
distance by dividing the launch area flight corridor line segment 
length (inches) by the map scale (in/in). If, for example, an applicant 
selected a map scale of 250,000 in/in and the line segment for the 
launch area flight corridor was 1677008 inches, the equivalent scaled 
length of the line segment for constructing an appendix A launch area 
is (1677008/250,000) = 6.7 inches of map distance. An applicant would 
then plot the line segment on the map for display purposes using the 
scaled line segment length of 6.7 inches. If an applicant were to 
choose a map with scale units other than inches per inch, the FAA 
requires a description of the conversion algorithm to inches per inch 
and sample computations. Also note that the FAA will accept straight 
lines for distances less than or equal to 7.5 times the map scale on 
map scales greater than or equal to 1:1,000,000 inches per inch; or 
straight lines representing 100 nm or less on map scales less than 
1:1,000,000 in/in.

Weight Classes for Guided Orbital Expendable Launch Vehicles

    Appendix A distinguishes between the guided orbital expendable 
launch vehicles represented in the appendix on the basis of four 
separate weight class. These are used to determine the size of the 
debris dispersion radius around a launch point, and the size of an 
appendix A flight corridor. The FAA selected the four expendable launch 
vehicle classes based on the size and characteristics of expendable 
launch vehicles that currently exist in the U.S. commercial inventory 
and that should approximate any proposed new expendable launch vehicle 
as well. An applicant planning to support the launch of guided orbital 
expendable launch vehicles must choose the largest expendable launch 
vehicle class anticipated for launch from the chosen launch point. This 
maximizes the area of the flight corridor. Also, selection of the 
largest class anticipated lessens the possibility of having to obtain a 
license modification to accommodate a larger customer than an 
application may have originally encompassed.
    A 100-nm orbit is the standard for inter-class launch vehicle 
comparison purposes. It is a standard reference orbit used by launch 
vehicle manufacturers for descriptive purposes and allows the uniform 
comparison of launch vehicle throw weight capability. The FAA obtained 
the payload weights for the 28 deg. and 90 deg. orbital inclinations 
from the ``International Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems,'' S. 
J. Isakowitz, 2d ed. (1995). They represent capabilities from CCAS and 
VAFB, respectively.

Dmax Circle

    A radius, maximum distance (Dmax), is employed to define 
a circular area about a launch point. The circular area indicates the 
limits for both flight control and explosive containment following a 
worst-case expendable launch vehicle failure and flight termination 
system activation at 10 seconds into flight. The worst-case failure 
represents a failure response, immediately following first motion, 
which causes the launch vehicle to fly in the uprange direction on a 
trajectory that maximizes the impact range. The ten second flight time 
represents a conservative estimate of the earliest elapsed time after 
launch that a flight safety officer would be able to detect the 
malfunction, initiate flight termination action, and actuate the flight 
termination system on the expendable launch vehicle. The radius is the 
estimated Dmax from the launch point that inert debris is 
expected to travel

[[Page 62843]]

and beyond which the overpressure from explosive debris is not expected 
to exceed 0.5 pounds per square inch (psi). Dmax accounts 
for the public risk posed by the greater of the wind-induced impact 
distance of a hazardous piece of inert debris, or the sum of the wind-
induced impact distance of an explosive piece of debris and the debris' 
0.5 psi overpressure radius from the explosion.

Overflight Exclusion Zone

    Table A-2 and figure A-1 define an overflight exclusion zone. 
Because of the risks the early stages of flight create, the FAA 
requires an applicant to demonstrate that the public will not be 
present in this area during a launch. An overflight exclusion zone is 
an area in close proximity to a launch point where the mission risk is 
greater than an Ec of 30 x 10 -6 if one member of 
the public is present in the open.
    Early in the flight phase expendable launch vehicles have large 
explosive potential, a low IIP range rate, and an historically higher 
probability of failure relative to the rest of pre-orbital flight. The 
relatively simple risk estimation analysis defined by appendix C does 
not adequately model the true risk during this stage of flight, and 
does not serve as the basis for determining that the overflight 
exclusion zone represents an area where the FAA's risk threshold is not 
satisfied. Instead, the FAA derived the overflight exclusion zone using 
a high fidelity risk assessment computer program in use by the national 
ranges. The program is a launch area risk analysis program called DAMP 
(facility DAMage and Personal injury). DAMP relies on information about 
a launch vehicle, its trajectory and failure responses, and facilities 
and populations in the launch area to estimate hit probabilities and 
casualty expectation. The hazards analyzed by DAMP include impacting 
inert debris, and blast overpressures and debris projected from impact 
explosions.
    Risk assessments were also conducted for the time of flight 
immediately after the first major staging event. The results showed a 
significant decrease in the Ec estimates, and those 
estimates were within the Ec criteria of 30 x 10 
-6 . The decrease results from a combination of decreasing 
dwell times and a significant reduction in the size of an effective 
casualty area following a major staging event.
    The FAA requires that an applicant demonstrate either that the 
overflight exclusion zone is unpopulated, that there are times when no 
one is present, or that the public can be excluded from this area 
during launch. Although a determination of this nature encompasses 
issues that will be addressed in a launch license, a launch site cannot 
support safe launches unless overflight of the highest risk area in 
close proximity to a launch point takes place without the public 
present.
    An applicant must display an overflight exclusion zone on maps in 
accordance with the requirements of paragraph (b) of appendix A.

Launch Area

    As noted at the beginning of this discussion, appendix A employs a 
series of fans as the shape of the foundation of its flight corridor. 
The flight corridor fans account for the turning capabilities and wind 
dispersed debris of a guided expendable launch vehicle. The launch area 
fans have been divided into two regions, of 60 and 30 degrees, 
representing the malfunction turn capability of the launch vehicle 
relative to its velocity in the downrange direction. Each region is 
represented by the estimated maximum turning capability over a ground-
range interval. These angles are the FAA's estimates for the maximum 
angles that the launch vehicle velocity vector may turn within a five 
second time period.
    The initial fan area is described by a 60 deg. half angle extending 
ten nautical miles downrange from a launch point. The ten nautical mile 
threshold represents the FAA's estimate of where a vehicle's maximum 
turning rate capability is reduced to approximately 30 degrees due to 
increasing velocity in the downrange direction. A 30 deg. half angle 
was used to define the secondary fan area beginning 10 nautical mile 
downrange and ending 100 nautical mile downrange. Once an expendable 
launch vehicle IIP has reached the 100 nautical mile downrange point, 
the increasing velocity in the downrange direction continues to reduce 
the launch vehicle's ability to maneuver through a large malfunction 
turn.
    A 100 nautical mile distance is used as a delimiter between the 
launch area and the downrange area. From the launch point out to 
approximately the point where the IIP is 100 nautical miles downrange, 
most expendable launch vehicles will be subjected to the aerodynamic 
forces of wind and drag. Once an expendable launch vehicle's IIP has 
cleared the 100 nm limit, the FAA is willing to assume for purposes of 
appendix A that most launch vehicles are outside the atmosphere.

Downrange Area

    The FAA derived the appendix A flight corridor's downrange area 
from hazard areas previously developed by federal launch ranges for the 
weight classes of expendable launch vehicles defined in table 1 of 
section 420.19. The downrange fan area of the flight corridor is based 
on turning capabilities and impact dispersions of guided expendable 
launch vehicles. The size of the fan area is necessary for containing 
expendable launch vehicle debris in the event that an expendable launch 
vehicle failure initiates a maximum-rate malfunction turn and the 
flight termination system must be activated. In the later stages of 
flight a guided expendable launch vehicle's turn capability is reduced 
due to increasing velocities in the downrange direction. Therefore, a 
10 deg. half angle was used to define the downrange area, which 
reflects a combination of normal vehicle dispersions and malfunction 
turns.
    The downrange area of a flight corridor begins 100 nm from a launch 
point and, for the guided orbital expendable launch vehicle weight 
classes, extends 5,000 nm downrange from the launch point. Overflight 
dwell times for the flight time remaining after 5,000 nm typically 
result in an insignificant increase in risk to the public. In general, 
after an orbital expendable launch vehicle IIP has passed the 5,000 nm 
point its IIP range rates increase very rapidly as the expendable 
launch vehicle approaches orbital insertion. As a result, the dwell 
times decrease significantly, reducing the overflight risk to 
insignificant levels. For an applicant employing a guided suborbital 
expendable launch vehicle, a flight corridor ends with the impact 
dispersion area of a final stage.

Appendix B

    Appendix B provides another means for creating a hypothetical 
flight corridor from an applicant's proposed launch site. As with a 
flight corridor created pursuant to appendix A, an appendix B corridor 
identifies the populations, those within the defined flight corridor, 
that must be analyzed for risk. An appendix B analysis offers an 
applicant a means to demonstrate whether a flight corridor from its 
launch site satisfies the FAA's risk criteria for a guided orbital or 
suborbital expendable launch vehicle. Appendix B allows an applicant to 
perform a more individualized containment analysis rather than relying 
on the more conservative estimates the FAA derived for appendix A. 
Because an appendix B analysis uses actual meteorological data and a 
trajectory, whether actual or computer simulated, of a real expendable 
launch vehicle, it produces a flight corridor of greater accuracy than 
one created in accordance with appendix A. The FAA derived the

[[Page 62844]]

assumptions and simplifications in the appendix B analysis from 
expendable launch vehicle data representing historical expendable 
launch vehicle malfunction behavior.
    A flight corridor created using appendix B contains, on its face, 
the same elements as an appendix A flight corridor, including a 
circular area around a launch point with a radius of Dmax, 
an overflight exclusion zone, a launch area and a downrange area. 
Appendix B, however, produces and configures the last two elements 
differently than appendix A. The launch area of an appendix B flight 
corridor shows where launch vehicle debris would impact in the event of 
a vehicle failure, and takes into account local meteorological 
conditions. The downrange area of a flight corridor also shows where 
launch vehicle debris would impact given a vehicle failure, but takes 
into account vehicle imparted velocity, malfunctions turns, and vehicle 
guidance and performance dispersions. Also, like an appendix A flight 
corridor, the uprange portion of the flight corridor is described by a 
semi-circle arc that is a portion of either the most uprange dispersion 
circle, or the overflight exclusion zone, whichever is further uprange.
    The appendix B launch area analysis assumes a vehicle failure and 
destruction at one second intervals along a trajectory z value, which 
denotes height as measured from the launch point, up to 50,000 feet. An 
applicant must determine the maximum distance a hazardous piece of 
debris would travel under local meteorological conditions. The 
distances that the debris travels provide the boundaries of an appendix 
B flight corridor's launch area. After a height of 50,000 feet, which 
is where the FAA estimates, for purposes of this analysis, that debris 
created by an expendable launch vehicle's destruction has less exposure 
to atmospheric forces, an applicant shall determine how far harmful 
debris created by destruction of an expendable launch vehicle would 
travel based only on malfunction imparted velocity and vehicle 
dispersion in order to create a downrange area. Although the effects of 
wind above 50,000 feet are not, in reality, non-existent, once an 
expendable launch vehicle reaches an altitude of 50,000 feet its 
velocity vector has pitched down range so that a malfunction turn and 
explosion velocity, rather than atmospheric drag and wind effects, play 
the dominant role in determining the dispersion of debris as the debris 
falls to the surface.

Dmax Circle

    As with an appendix A flight corridor, an applicant must select 
each launch point at its proposed launch site from which it expects a 
guided expendable launch vehicle to take flight. An applicant must 
obtain the latitude and longitude of the launch point to four decimal 
places. If relying on a guided orbital expendable launch vehicle, the 
applicant must also select an expendable launch vehicle weight class 
from section 420.19, table 1, that best represents the largest class 
each proposed launch point would support. With this information, the 
applicant then ascertains the Dmax that debris is expected 
to travel from a launch point if a mishap were to occur in the first 10 
seconds of flight by employing table A-1, appendix A. Table A-1 also 
provides a maximum distance for guided sub-orbital expendable launch 
vehicles. The Dmax distance provided by table A-1 defines a 
circular area around the launch point.

Overflight Exclusion Zone

    That circular area is part of an overflight exclusion zone. Again, 
an applicant uses information from appendix A to create an overflight 
exclusion zone. An overflight exclusion zone consists of the circular 
area defined by the radius Dmax at the launch point and a 
corridor of the length prescribed by table A-2. Its downrange boundary 
is defined by an arc with a radius Dmax centered on the 
endpoint prescribed by table A-2. The crossrange boundaries consist of 
two lines parallel to and to either side of the flight azimuth. Each 
line is tangent to the uprange and downrange Dmax circles as 
shown in appendix A, figure A-1. Creation of an overflight exclusion 
zone is predetermined by the requirements of appendix A and does not 
require a trajectory for an actual launch vehicle. As with an appendix 
A overflight exclusion zone, and for the reasons described in this 
notice's discussion of appendix A, the FAA requires that the public be 
excluded from this area during launch.

Launch Vehicle Trajectory

    An applicant must also obtain or generate a launch vehicle 
trajectory. The applicant may use either commercially available 
software or a trajectory provided by the launch vehicle's manufacturer. 
Because appendix B is based on equations of motion in three dimensions, 
the appendix B analysis requires that the trajectory be described using 
a three axis coordinate system. The FAA recommends that an applicant 
use a WGS-84 ellipsoidal Earth model \10\ as the trajectory coordinate 
system reference ellipsoid in the appendices, because of its wide 
availability and its development in accordance with military standards 
and requirements. The WGS-84 model reflects the most current and the 
most accurate Department of Defense standards for Earth models. WGS-84 
provides a basic reference frame and geometric figure for the Earth and 
provides a means for relating positions on various local geodetic 
coordinate systems, including x,y,z, to an Earth-centered, Earth-fixed 
coordinate system such as the EFG system employed in the appendix B 
analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ Department of Defense World Geodetic System, Military 
Standard 2401 (Jan. 11, 1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA requires time intervals used in the trajectory analysis of 
no greater than one second for both launch and downrange areas. Data 
frequency of one second is a compromise between the low data frequency 
requirements of the launch area, where dwell times are relatively long, 
and the high frequency requirements of the downrange area, where dwell 
times are correspondingly shorter. Accordingly, one second time 
intervals are sufficient to accommodate linear interpolation between 
trajectory time points, in the launch and downrange areas, and not 
degrade the accuracy requirements of the analysis.
    In the launch area, an applicant's trajectory must include position 
data in terms of time after liftoff in right-handed x,y,z coordinates 
centered on the proposed launch point, with the X-axis aligned with the 
flight azimuth. In the downrange area, the applicant's trajectory must 
show state vector data in terms of time after liftoff in right-handed 
x, y, z x, y, z, coordinates, centered on the proposed launch point, 
with the X-axis aligned with the flight azimuth.

Launch Area

    A launch area contains a launch point and an overflight exclusion 
zone, and constitutes the part of the flight corridor calculated using 
the effects of atmospheric drag forces on debris produced by a series 
of hypothetical destructions of an expendable launch vehicle at one 
second intervals along that trajectory. For purposes of an appendix B 
analysis, a launch area extends from the further uprange of an OEZ arc 
or dispersion circle arc downrange to a point on the surface of the 
Earth that corresponds to the debris impact locations, assuming a 
failure of the vehicle in flight at a height of 50,000 feet. Typically, 
federal launch ranges account for five major parameters to

[[Page 62845]]

estimate the size of a flight corridor. These include the effects of 
vehicle-imparted velocity on debris, the change in launch vehicle 
position and velocity due to a malfunction turn, guidance errors, the 
ballistic coefficient of debris, and wind. However, imparted velocity, 
malfunction turn, and trajectory dispersion, although not 
insignificant, do not play as great a role early in flight as the wind 
effects on debris. The wind effect on debris, in turn, depends on the 
ballistic coefficient of the debris. The FAA determined that for 
purposes of the launch area, of these parameters, launch vehicle debris 
and meteorological conditions constitute the most significant, and the 
FAA therefore focuses on these two factors in the launch area.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Note that the determination of the size of Dmax 
included considerations of malfunction turns as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA requires an applicant to calculate circles that approximate 
the debris dispersion for each one second time point on a launch 
vehicle trajectory. The crossrange lines tangent to those circles 
provide the borders of a launch area. Calculating the circles consists, 
in general terms, of a two step process. An applicant must first define 
15 mean geometric height intervals along the proposed trajectory in 
order to obtain data, in accordance with subparagraph (c)(4) of 
appendix B, accounting for the mean atmospheric density, maximum wind 
speed, fall times and debris dispersions in each of those height 
intervals. An applicant must then use that data in the calculations in 
subparagraph (c)(5) to derive the radius applicable to each height 
interval (zi). Having obtained that radius, an applicant 
uses it to describe, pursuant to subparagraph (c)(6), a circle referred 
to as a debris dispersion circle (Di), around each one 
second time interval along the vehicle's trajectory, starting at the 
launch point. An applicant will then ascertain the crossrange 
boundaries of a flight corridor's launch area by drawing lines that are 
tangent to all dispersion circles. The final Di dispersion 
circle forms the downrange boundary of a flight corridor's launch area.
    The launch area represents the effects of meteorological conditions 
on how far inert debris with a ballistic coefficient of 3 lb/ft.\2\ 
would travel. Debris comes in many sizes and shapes, but the FAA does 
not propose to require an applicant's location review analysis to take 
all such possibilities into account. A complete analysis for an actual 
launch entails the determination of the type and size of debris created 
by each credible failure mode, and the velocity imparted to each piece 
of debris due to the failure. Instead, for purposes of the appendix B 
analysis, the FAA categorizes launch vehicle debris by a ballistic 
coefficient that accounts for the smallest inert debris that may cause 
harm and that also accounts for the debris most sensitive to wind. A 
ballistic coefficient reflects the sensitivity of weight and area 
ratios to drag forces, such as wind dispersion effect.
    In addition to knowing what debris is of concern, an applicant must 
know the local meteorological conditions. The FAA requires an applicant 
to obtain meteorological data for 15 height intervals in a launch area 
up to 50,000 feet. Appendix B has an upper limit of 50,000 feet in the 
launch area containment analysis of debris because winds above this 
altitude contribute little to drift distance. As noted above, once an 
expendable launch vehicle reaches an altitude of 50,000 feet its 
velocity vector has pitched down range so that a malfunction turn and 
explosion velocity, rather than atmospheric drag and wind effects, play 
the dominant role in determining the dispersion of debris as the debris 
falls to the surface. The combination of these two factors 
significantly reduces the effect of winds on uprange and crossrange 
dispersion after an expendable launch vehicle reaches 50,000 feet. For 
altitudes less than 50,000 feet, at the same time as low ballistic 
coefficient debris pieces are highly sensitive to drag forces, the 
velocity of an explosion caused by destroying an expendable launch 
vehicle contributes relatively little to the dispersion effect because 
the drag produced on these light weight pieces results in a high 
deceleration so they achieve terminal velocity almost instantaneously 
and drift with the wind. Therefore, launch vehicle induced explosion-
velocities are not considered for the launch area of an appendix B 
containment analysis. Instead, an applicant uses local statistical wind 
data by altitude for fifteen height intervals. The data must include 
altitude, atmospheric density, mean East/West meridianal (u) and North/
South zonal wind (v), the standard deviation of u and v wind, a 
correlation coefficient, the number of observations and the wind 
percentile.
    Data acceptable to the FAA is available from NOAA's National 
Climatic Data Center (NCDC). NOAA Data Centers, of which the NCDC is 
the largest, provide long-term preservation of, management, and ready 
accessibility to environmental data. The Centers are part of the 
National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service. The 
NCDC data set acceptable to the FAA is the ``Global Gridded Upper Air 
Statistics, 1980--1995, V1.1, March 1996 (CD-ROM).'' The Global Gridded 
Upper Air Statistics (GGUAS) CD-ROM data set describes the atmosphere 
for each month of the represented year on a 2.5 degree global grid at 
15 standard pressure levels. NCDC provides compiled mean and standard 
deviation values for sea level pressure, wind speed, air temperature, 
dew point, height and density. GGUAS also complies eight-point wind 
roses. The spatial resolution is a 73 x 144 grid spaced at 2.5 degrees 
and the temporal resolution is one month.
    To simplify the containment analysis, an applicant may use a mean 
wind of 50%. An applicant may also assume that an applicant's launch 
pad height is equal to the surface level of the wind measurements 
provided by the NCDC database. The actual pad height could be lower or 
higher than the surface level wind measurement height. The difference 
between the actual pad height and the surface level measurement height 
is considered insignificant in terms of its effect on the impact 
dispersion radius.
    The FAA notes that the NCDC database will not necessarily contain 
measurements of winds for any particular launch site proposed. If a 
launch point is located in the center of a 2.5 degree NCDC weather grid 
cell, the farthest distance to a grid cell corner would be along a 
diagonal from the center of the grid cell to a corner of the grid cell. 
The wind measurements will be no more than approximately 106 nm from 
the launch point. This distance is close enough for purposes of a 
location review containment analysis, and occurs only for a grid 
located on the equator. In general, the topography within approximately 
106 nm of a launch point is assumed to be relatively similar with 
respect to height above mean-sea-level. As the launch point latitude 
increases the distance from the wind measurement grid point will 
decrease, which will reduce errors introduced by this assumption.
    Having obtained the necessary meteorological data, an applicant 
would use data from the GGUAS CD-ROM to estimate the mean atmospheric 
density, maximum wind speed, height interval fall times, and height 
interval debris dispersions for 15 mean geometric height intervals. 
Altitude intervals are denoted by the subscript ``j''. An applicant 
would then calculate the debris dispersion radius (Di) for 
each trajectory position whose ``Z'' values,

[[Page 62846]]

are less than 50,000 ft. Each trajectory time considered is denoted by 
the variable subscript ``i''. The initial value of ``i'' is one and the 
value is increased by increments of one for each subsequent ``Z'' value 
evaluated. The major dispersion factors are a combination of wind 
velocity and debris fall time. Because the atmospheric density is a 
function of altitude and affects the resultant fall time, Di 
is estimated by summing the radial dispersions computed for each 
altitude interval the debris intersects on its descent trajectory. Once 
all the debris dispersion radii have been calculated, the flight 
corridor's launch area is produced by plotting each debris dispersion 
circle on a map, and drawing enveloping lines that enclose the outer 
boundary of the debris dispersion circles. The uprange portion of the 
flight corridor is described by a semi-circle arc that is a portion of 
either the most uprange Di dispersion circle, or the 
overflight exclusion zone, whichever is further uprange.\12\ The 
enveloping lines that enclose the final Di dispersion circle 
forms the downrange boundary of a flight corridor's launch area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ Note that even if a dispersion circle is further uprange 
than the overflight exclusion zone, the overflight exclusion zone 
remains the same. That is, it is not extended uprange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Downrange Area Containment Analysis

    A containment analysis also describes the dimensions of a flight 
corridor's downrange area. The FAA designed the downrange area analysis 
to accommodate expendable launch vehicle imparted velocity, malfunction 
turns, and vehicle guidance and performance dispersions. The analysis 
to obtain the downrange area of a flight corridor for guided orbital 
and suborbital expendable launch vehicle trajectories starts with 
trajectory positions with heights greater than 50,000 feet, that is, 
the point where the launch area analysis ends. A downrange area for a 
guided orbital expendable launch vehicle ends 5,000 nautical miles from 
the launch point, or where the IIP leaves the surface of the earth, 
whichever is shorter. If an applicant has chosen a guided suborbital 
expendable launch vehicle for the analysis, the analysis must define 
the impact dispersion area for the final stage, and that impact 
dispersion area marks the end of a downrange area.
    An applicant computes the crossrange boundaries of the downrange 
area of a flight corridor by calculating the expendable launch vehicle 
position after a simulated worst-case four second turn, rotating the 
launch vehicle state vector to account for vehicle guidance and 
performance dispersions, and then computing an instantaneous impact 
point. The locus of IIPs describes the impact boundary.
    As a first step, an applicant computes a reduction ratio factor 
that decreases with increasing launch vehicle range. Secondly, an 
applicant computes the launch vehicle position after a simulated worst-
case four-second malfunction turn for each altitude interval along a 
trajectory. For purposes of the launch site location review, the FAA 
relies on a velocity vector malfunction turn angle initially set at 
45 deg.. This turn angle is decreased, using a reduction ratio factor, 
as a function of downrange distance to simulate the constraining 
effects of increasing velocity in the downrange direction on 
malfunction turn capability. See figure B-2. The FAA assumes this 
worst-case delay (4 seconds) result in order to account for the maximum 
dispersion of the vehicle during the time necessary for a person in 
charge of destroying a launch vehicle to detect a vehicle failure and 
cause the vehicle's destruction. Figure B-2 in appendix B depicts the 
velocity vector movement in the yaw plane of the vehicle body axis 
coordinate system. Figure 1 below depicts the state vector axes and 
impact locations for a malfunction turn failure and for an on-
trajectory failure.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ For clarity, the flight azimuth in the figure is not 
aligned with the x-axis, as would be the case in the launch site 
location review.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 62847]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.002

    The second step described above assumes perfect performance of the 
launch vehicle up until the beginning of the malfunction turn. In 
order, however, to account for normal three sigma (3) 
performance and guidance dispersions of the launch vehicle prior to the 
malfunction turn, the applicant next rotates the trajectory state 
vector. The trajectory state-vector rotation is accomplished in 
conjunction with an XYZ to ENU coordinate system transformation. This 
transformation rotates the X and Y axes about the Z axis. The Z and U 
axes are coincident. Both position and velocity components are rotated. 
The FAA intends the trajectory azimuth rotation to account for the 
normal 3-sigma launch vehicle performance and guidance dispersions that 
may exist at the beginning of a malfunction turn. The rotation angle 
decreases from three degrees to one degree as the vehicle proceeds 
downrange, and the rate of decrease is a function of distance from the 
launch point. This is done because the trajectory azimuth of an 
expendable launch vehicle with 3-sigma performance and guidance 
dispersions early in flight could be approximately 3 
degrees from the nominal flight azimuth. Since this azimuth offset is 
not considered a failure response, the guidance, navigation, and 
control system is expected to achieve steering corrections. These 
corrections will eventually reduce the angular offset later in flight 
as the launch vehicle targets the mission objectives for orbital 
insertion. If an expendable launch vehicle has 3-sigma performance and 
guidance dispersions later in flight, the effects of increasing 
velocity in the downrange direction limits an expendable launch 
vehicle's capability to alter the trajectory's azimuth. Launch vehicles 
in the four expendable launch vehicle weight classes were reviewed to 
determine the typical range of malfunction-turning rates in the 
downrange area. The FAA found these rates to be relatively small 
compared to launch area rates. The FAA uses the three and one degree 
turn rates because they encompass the turn rates found during the 
review process.
    Before initiating the IIP computations, an applicant must transform 
the ENU coordinate system to an EFG coordinate system. This EFG 
coordinate transformation is employed to simplify the IIP computation.
    The IIP computations proposed in appendix B are used for 
determining the IIPs to either side of a trajectory by creating 
latitude and longitude pairs for the left and right flight corridor 
boundaries. Connecting the latitude and longitude pairs describes the 
boundary of the downrange area of a flight corridor. The launch site 
location review IIP calculations assume the absence of atmospheric drag 
effects. Equations B46-B69 implement an iterative solution to the 
problem of determining an impact point. This iterative technique 
includes checks for conditions that will not result in impact point 
solutions. The conditions prohibiting impact solutions are: (1) An 
initial launch vehicle position below the Earth's surface, (2) a 
trajectory orbit that is not elliptical, but, parabolic or hyperbolic, 
(3) a positive perigee height, where the trajectory orbit does not 
intersect the Earth, and (4) the iterative solution does not converge. 
Any one of the conditions given above will prohibit

[[Page 62848]]

the computation of an impact point. The iterative approach of equations 
B46-B69 solves these problems.

Estimating Public Risk

    Upon completing a flight corridor, an applicant must estimate the 
risk to the public within the flight corridor to determine whether that 
risk falls within acceptable levels. If an applicant demonstrates that 
no part of the flight corridor is over a populated area, the flight 
corridor satisfies the FAA's risk thresholds, and an applicant's 
application may rely on its appendix B analysis. If a flight corridor 
includes a populated area, an applicant has the option of rotating an 
appendix B flight corridor using a different launch point or azimuth to 
avoid population, or of conducting an overflight risk analysis in 
accordance with appendix C.

Appendix C

    Under a launch site location review, once an applicant has created 
a flight corridor employing either appendix A or B, the applicant must 
ascertain whether there is population within the flight corridor. If 
there is no population, the FAA will approve the location of the 
proposed launch point for the type and weight class of expendable 
launch vehicle analyzed. If there is population, an applicant must 
employ appendix C to perform an overflight risk analysis for the 
corridor. An appendix C risk analysis determines whether or not the 
risk to the public from a hypothetical launch exceeds the FAA's risk 
threshold of an estimated expected casualty (Ec) of no more 
than 30  x  10-\6\ per launch. The purpose of the 
Ec analysis as part of the launch site location review is 
not to determine a value of Ec but rather to confidently 
demonstrate that Ec is less than the acceptable threshold 
value.
    An appendix C risk analysis estimates the Ec overflight 
contribution from a single hypothetical launch whose flight termination 
system is assumed to work perfectly. The analysis takes into account 
the probability of a vehicle failing throughout its trajectory, dwell 
times \14\ over individual populated areas, and the probability of 
impact within those areas. The analysis also takes into account the 
effective casualty area of a vehicle class, the size of the populated 
area, and the population density of the exposed population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ Although an applicant who calculates an appendix B flight 
corridor will know actual dwell times for its Ec 
analysis, the FAA has supplied a constant to approximate dwell time 
for an applicant who relies on an appendix A flight corridor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Estimating Ec for an actual launch takes a large number 
of variables and considerations into account. The risk analysis 
provided in appendix C provides a somewhat simpler approach to 
estimating Ec within the boundaries of a flight corridor 
than might be necessary in performing a risk analysis for an actual 
launch. For purposes of determining the acceptability of a launch 
site's location, the FAA relies only on variables relevant to ensuring 
that the site itself offers at least one flight corridor sufficiently 
isolated from population for safety. Accordingly, many of the factors 
that a launch operator will take into account will not be reflected 
here.
    In brief, in order for an applicant to perform an appendix C risk 
analysis, the applicant must first determine whether any populated 
areas are present within an appendix A or B flight corridor. If so, the 
applicant must obtain area and population data. At this point an 
applicant has a choice. Appendix C requires that an applicant calculate 
the probability of impact for each populated area, and then determine 
an Ec value for each populated area. To obtain the estimated 
Ec for an entire flight corridor, the applicant adds--or 
sums--the Ec results for each populated area. If the 
population within the flight corridor is relatively small, an applicant 
may wish to conduct a less rigorous analysis by making conservative 
assumptions. Appendix C also offers the option of analyzing a worst-
case flight corridor for those flight corridors where such an approach 
might save time and analysis. Examples of such simplifications are 
provided.

Identification and Location of Population

    In order to perform an Ec analysis, an applicant must 
first identify the populated areas within a flight corridor. For the 
first 100 nautical miles from a launch point downrange a U.S. census 
block group serves as the maximum size of an individual populated area 
permitted under an appendix C analysis. The maximum permitted size of 
an individual populated area beyond 100 nautical miles downrange is a 1 
degree latitude  x  1 degree longitude grid. The size of the areas 
analyzed will play out differently depending on the location of the 
proposed launch site. For example, if an applicant proposed a coastal 
site, the applicant would presumably present the FAA with a flight 
corridor mostly over water. Population may be limited to that of a few 
islands, minimizing the amount of data and analysis necessary. If an 
applicant proposes a launch site located further inland, the applicant 
would need to obtain the area and population of each census block group 
in the first 100 nm of the flight corridor. This may prove time 
consuming, although the FAA has alternative approaches that may 
simplify the process for such applicants. An applicant may also propose 
to operate a launch site on foreign territory, where U.S. census data 
does not apply. In that event, the FAA will apply the principles 
underlying a launch site location review to the available data on a 
case-by-case basis.
    The final regulations require the analysis of populations at the 
census block group level for the first 100 nm from the launch point in 
the flight corridor. An applicant shall employ data from the latest 
census. An applicant must also include population that may not be 
included in the U.S. census, such as military base personnel. The FAA 
recognizes a census block group to be a reasonable populated area for 
analysis because the risk early in flight is greatest due to long dwell 
times. IIP range rates in a launch area are relatively slow, which 
exposes the launch area populations to launch vehicle risks for a 
longer period of time when compared to similar populations in the 
downrange area. Depending on the launch site and the launch vehicle, a 
census block group could be exposed to launch vehicle risks for tens of 
seconds. In contrast to the size of a populated area in the downrange 
area, the increased risk due to longer dwell times requires a more 
detailed evaluation of the launch area for Ec purposes. A 
census block group is an appropriate size for analysis because it is 
small enough to accommodate the assumption that a populated area 
contains homogeneously distributed population without grossly 
distorting the outcome of the Ec estimates, and because the 
data is readily available for populations in the United States. An 
applicant may find the need to use only a portion of a census block 
group, such as when a populated area is divided by a flight corridor 
boundary. In that case an applicant should use the population density 
of the block group to reflect the population in that portion of the 
census block group.
    The FAA allows an applicant to evaluate the presence of people in 
larger increments of area in the downrange area of a flight corridor 
than in the launch area of a flight corridor. Populations in the 
downrange area of a flight corridor must be analyzed in areas no 
greater than 1 deg.  x  1 deg. latitude and longitude grid coordinates. 
Because dwell times downrange are shorter, the risk to the individual 
populated areas is less and, therefore, the FAA is willing to accept a 
different degree of accuracy. IIP range rates in the downrange area

[[Page 62849]]

can achieve speeds of 500 nm/second. Because the longest distance in a 
grid space would be approximately 85 nm for a grid on the equator, 
which is where the largest grid area will be found, the launch vehicle 
IIP dwell time would be less then 0.20 seconds over that grid. This 
reduces the risk to population in that grid significantly compared with 
population in the launch area.
    The data needed for a downrange area analysis is also readily 
available. One source for population data in an area no greater than 
1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude and longitude grid coordinates is a database 
of the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory. The CDIAC database is ``Global Population 
Distribution (1990), Terrestrial Area and Country Name Information on a 
One by One Degree Grid Cell Basis.'' This database contains one degree 
by one degree grid information on the world-wide distribution of 
population for 1990 and country specific information on the percentage 
of a country's population present in each grid cell.
    The CDIAC obtained its population estimates from the United Nations 
FAO Yearbook, \15\ the Guinness World Data Book,\16\ and the Rand 
McNally World Atlas \17\ for approximately 6,000 cities with 
populations greater than 50,000 inhabitants. The population data was 
updated by CDIAC to 1990 values with available census data. For the 
rural population allocation, the CDIAC developed global rural 
population distribution factors based on national population data, data 
on approximately 90,000 cities and towns, and the assumption that rural 
population is proportional to the number of cities and towns within 
each grid cell for each country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ United Nations FAO Yearbook, Vol. 47, Rome, 1993.
    \16\ The Guinness World Data Book, Guinness Pub. Ltd., 
Middlessex, England, 1993.
    \17\ Rand McNally World Atlas, Rand McNally, New York, 1991.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Probability of Impact

    The next step in the process is to ascertain the probability of 
impact for each populated area. In other words, an applicant must find 
the probability that debris will land in each populated area within the 
flight corridor under analysis. For this, the applicant must find the 
probability of impact in both the crossrange and downrange directions, 
by employing equation C1 for an appendix A flight corridor for an 
orbital launch or equations C2 through C4 for an appendix A corridor 
that describes a suborbital launch. For an analysis based on an 
appendix B flight corridor, an applicant will employ equation C5 for an 
orbital launch or equations C6 through C8 for a suborbital launch. For 
both appendix A and B corridors, the probability of impact 
(Pi) within a particular populated area is equal to the 
product of the probability of impact in the downrange (Px) 
and cross range (Py) directions, and the probability of 
vehicle failure (Pf).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.003

    The analysis applicable to both appendix A and B flight corridors 
is the same for the crossrange direction, but employs a different 
equation to determine the probability of impact in the downrange 
direction. For an appendix A corridor, the FAA specifies a constant in 
equation C1 to approximate dwell time for the downrange direction. In 
equation C5 an applicant will employ actual dwell times obtained from 
the trajectory generated in accordance with appendix B.
    An applicant who relies on an appendix A flight corridor will use 
equation C1 to determine the probability of impact for a particular 
populated area in the downrange direction by finding the range rate and 
assuming a total thrusting time of 643 seconds. Equation C1 reflects 
the fact that appendix A does not employ trajectory data, and 
therefore, employs a technique for estimating dwell times as a function 
of range and range rate to determine the probability of impact in the 
downrange direction. Table C-2 provides the appendix A flight corridor 
IIP range intervals and corresponding IIP range rates for use in 
Equation C1.
    To create table C-2, the FAA employed actual trajectory data to 
determine individual range rates for Atlas, Delta and Titan expendable 
launch vehicles.
    The FAA derived the total average thrusting time of 643 seconds 
from the data in table 5 below by dividing the difference of the upper 
value of adjacent IIP ranges by the average IIP range rate 
corresponding to the largest IIP range and summing the results over the 
set of IIP ranges.

                                  Table 5.--Data To Derive Total Thrusting Time
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              IIP Range Rate (nm/s)
                IIP Range (nm)                ---------------------------------------------------- t(s)
                                                  Delta        Atlas        Titan         Avg
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-100........................................         1.03         0.85         0.96         0.91        110.50
101-500......................................         3.33         3.77         2.23         3.00        133.33
501-1500.....................................         4.17         3.66         2.73         3.20        312.99
1500-2500....................................         9.01        21.74        12.99        17.37         57.59
2501-3000....................................        33.33        50.00        41.67        45.84         10.91
3001-4000....................................        66.67        90.91        83.33        87.12         11.48
4001-5000....................................       166.67       142.86       166.67       154.77          6.46
                                                                                     -------------
    Total-t.........................  ...........  ...........  ...........       643.26
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ``X'' distances were measured directly off the mapping 
information source.
    An applicant who relies on an appendix B flight corridor will 
employ equation C5 or equations C6 through C8 depending on whether the 
flight corridor culminates in an impact dispersion area or not. 
Equation C5 reflects the fact that, unlike an appendix A flight 
corridor, the trajectory data used to create an appendix B flight 
corridor provides downrange instantaneous impact points (IIPs). 
Accordingly, the dwell time associated with a populated area may be 
ascertained for the difference between the closest and furthest 
downrange distances of the populated area. See figure C-2.
    An applicant may find the following six step procedure helpful in 
determining for individual populated areas the dwell time that equation 
C5 calls for. The subscripts do not correspond to subscripts in the 
appendix.

[[Page 62850]]

    Step 1: Determine the trajectory time (t1) associated 
with the trajectory IIP position (x1) that immediately 
precedes the uprange point on the populated area boundary. This is 
accomplished by locating the IIP points in the vicinity of the 
populated area, drawing lines normal to the trajectory IIP ground 
trace, and choosing the trajectory time for the IIP point whose normal 
is closest to the uprange boundary of the populated area but does not 
intersect it. The distance from the launch point to x1 may 
be determined using the range and bearing equations in appendix A, 
paragraph (b).
    Step 2: Determine the trajectory time (t2) associated 
with the trajectory IIP position (x2) that just exceeds the 
downrange point on the populated area boundary. This is accomplished by 
locating the IIP points in the vicinity of the populated area, drawing 
lines normal to the trajectory IIP ground trace, and choosing the 
trajectory time for the IIP point whose normal is closest to the 
downrange boundary of the populated area but does not intersect it. The 
distance from the launch point to x2 may be determined using 
the range and bearing equations in appendix A, section (b).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.133

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.004

    Step 4: Determine the distance along the nominal trajectory to the 
uprange point (x3) on the populated area boundary. This is 
accomplished by drawing a line normal to the trajectory IIP ground 
trace and tangent to the uprange boundary of the populated area, and 
determining the distance along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace 
from the launch point to the intersection of the normal and the ground 
trace.
    Step 5: Determine the distance along the nominal trajectory to the 
downrange point (x4) on the populated area boundary. This is 
accomplished by drawing a line normal to the trajectory IIP ground 
trace and tangent to the downrange boundary of the populated area, and 
determining the distance along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace 
from the launch point to the intersection of the normal and the ground 
trace.
    Step 6: The dwell time (td) is estimated by the 
following equation.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.005

    For either type of flight corridor, an applicant determines the 
probability of impact in the crossrange direction, (Py), 
through a series of steps, of which the first is measuring the distance 
from the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace to the closest and 
furthest points in the crossrange direction of the area that contains 
population. The populated area may consist of a census block group or a 
1 degree latitude by 1 degree longitude grid. See figure C-1. To 
determine the distribution of the debris pattern in that populated 
area, the applicant needs to estimate the standard deviation of debris 
impacts. For purposes of an appendix C analysis, the crossrange 
boundaries of a flight corridor represent three standard deviations 
(3) of all debris impacts from normal and malfunction 
trajectories. To apply this to a populated area, an applicant must 
first find the distance from the nominal trajectory to the crossrange 
boundary, measured on a line normal to the trajectory through the 
geographic center of the populated area, and then divide that distance 
by three.
    Finally, the probability of failure is also an element in 
calculating the probability of impact. The FAA assigns a failure 
probability (Pf) constant of Pf = 0.10 for guided 
expendable launch vehicles. This represents what the FAA intends as a 
conservative estimate of the failure percentage of current expendable 
launch vehicles, and may be conservative because many current 
expendable launch vehicles are more reliable. The appendix C process 
assumes that the probability of impacting within the corridor is one, 
and the probability of impacting outside the corridor is zero. The 
flight termination system is assumed to function perfectly in all 
failure scenarios.
    A final variation on computing the probability of impact for a 
particular populated area is used when computing the probability of 
impact (Pi ) within the impact dispersion area of a guided 
suborbital expendable launch vehicle. In this case, the probability of 
success (Ps) is substituted for the probability of failure 
(Pf), and an applicant shall employ a method similar to that 
used in appendix D to calculate the probability of impact for any 
populated areas inside the impact dispersion area. This divergence, the 
use of probability of success rather than probability of failure, from 
the variable used for an orbital expendable launch vehicle arises out 
of the relative risk associated with an impact dispersion area of a 
guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle. The same risks associated 
with a guided orbital launch are also associated with a guided sub-
orbital launch except for the designated impact area for the final 
stage of the guided sub-orbital launch vehicle. The final stage is 
intended to return to Earth rather than to enter orbit. On the basis of 
past history, the risk due to a planned impact in the dispersion area 
is higher than an unplanned impact. The FAA accordingly requires the 
use of Ps inside the impact dispersion area rather than 
Pf for determining the probability of impact in a guided 
suborbital expendable launch vehicle's impact dispersion area.

Totaling Risk of All Populated Areas in Flight Corridor

    The Ec estimate for a flight corridor is a summation of 
the risk to each populated area and results in an estimate of 
Ec inside the corridor, E (Corridor). This means that an 
applicant estimates Ec for each individual populated area 
within a flight corridor, using the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.006

    Pi is the probability of hitting the populated area. 
Ac is the effective casualty area of the vehicle and may be 
obtained from table C-3. Ak is the area of the populated 
area. Nk is the population in Ak, and is obtained 
from census data. The label ``k'' is used to identify the individual 
populated area. The summed Ec for all populated areas added 
together is the Ec (Corridor).
    The FAA requires an applicant to use an effective casualty area 
specific to an expendable launch vehicle class and range when 
performing the Ec calculation. An effective casualty area 
(Ac) means the aggregate casualty area of each piece of 
debris created by a launch vehicle failure at particular points on its 
trajectory. The casualty area for each piece of debris is the area 
within which 100 percent of the unprotected population on the ground is 
assumed to be a casualty. This area is based on the characteristics of 
the debris piece including its size, the path angle of its trajectory, 
impact explosions, and debris skip, splatter, and bounce. In each of 
the vehicle classes, the Ac decreases, resulting in a 
smaller casualty area, as a function of distance downrange because 
vehicle size and explosive potential decreases as explosive propellant 
is consumed and expended stages are ejected during vehicle flight.
    An effective casualty area as a function of time-after-liftoff is 
provided

[[Page 62851]]

in table C-3 for expendable launch vehicle classes listed in table 1 of 
section 420.19. The FAA derived the effective casualty areas in table 
C-3 from DAMP, a series of risk estimation computer programs used at 
federal launch ranges, to evaluate the vehicle classes described in 
table 1, section 420.19. DAMP considers other factors besides debris 
characteristics, such as the size of a standing person, which increases 
the casualty area, and sheltering, which would tend to decrease the 
casualty area. Because considering sheltering has a greater effect than 
considering the size of a standing person, and was not assumed in table 
C-3, the effective casualty areas in table C-3 are conservative with 
regards to those factors.
    An applicant calculates casualty expectancy for each populated area 
within a flight corridor. After the casualty expectancies have been 
estimated for all populated areas, the Ec values are summed 
to obtain the total corridor risk.
    The FAA will not approve the proposed launch site location if the 
estimated expected casualty exceeds 30 x 10-6. An 
applicant may either modify its proposal, or if the flight corridor 
used was generated by the method in appendix A, use the typically less 
conservative but more accurate method in appendix B to narrow the 
flight corridor and perform another appendix C overflight risk 
analysis. An applicant may employ specified variations to the analysis 
described above. Six variations are identified in appendix C. The first 
four variations permit an applicant to make conservative assumptions 
that would lead to an overestimation of the corridor Ec 
compared with the more detailed process described. Although appendix 
C's approach simplifies a typical launch safety analysis somewhat by 
providing conservative default parameters to use, it may also prove 
unnecessarily complex for applicants proposing launch sites with launch 
corridors encompassing extremely few people. For those situations, 
appendix C, through subparagraphs (c)(1)-(8), provides the option for 
an applicant to further simplify the estimation of casualty expectancy 
by making worst-case assumptions that produce a higher value of the 
corridor Ec compared with the analysis otherwise defined by 
appendix C. This may be particularly useful when an applicant believes 
Ec is well below the acceptable value.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ As noted above, the purpose of the Ec analysis 
as part of the launch site location review is not to determine a 
value of Ec but rather to confidently demonstrate that 
Ec is less than the acceptable threshold value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These variations allow an applicant to assume that Px 
and Py have a value of 1.0 for all populated areas, or 
combine populated areas into one or more larger populated areas and use 
the greatest population density of the component populated areas for 
the combined area or areas. An applicant may also assume Py 
has a value of one for any given populated area, or, for any given 
Px sector, assume Py has a value of one and use a 
worst case population density for the sector. A Px sector is 
an area spanning the width of a flight corridor and bounded by two time 
points on the trajectory IIP ground trace. All four of these reduce the 
number of calculations required for applicants with little population 
within a flight corridor.
    Another option permitted by appendix C is for an applicant who 
would otherwise fail the baseline analysis to perform a more refined EC 
analysis by negating the baseline approach's overestimation of the 
probability of impact in each populated area. If the flight corridor 
includes populated areas that are irregular in shape, the equations for 
probability of impact in appendix C may cause Ec to be 
overestimated. This is because the result of the Pi 
computation for each populated area represents the probability of 
impacting within a rectangular area that bounds the populated area. As 
shown in figure C-1 of appendix C, the length of two sides of the 
rectangle would be x2-x1, and the length of the 
other two sides would be y2--y1. Populated areas 
used to support the appendix C analysis must be no bigger than a U.S. 
census block group for the first 100 nautical miles from a launch point 
and no bigger than a 1 degree latitude x 1 degree longitude grid 
(1 deg. x 1 deg. grid) beyond 100 nautical miles downrange. Whether the 
populated area is a census block group, a 1 deg. x 1 deg. grid, or a 
land mass such as a small island, it will not likely be a rectangle. 
Even a 1 deg. x 1 deg. grid near the equator, which approximates a 
rectangle, will not line up with the trajectory ground trace. Thus, a 
portion of the Pi rectangle includes area outside the 
populated area being evaluated. The probability of impacting in the 
rectangle is higher than impacting just in the populated area being 
evaluated. The value of the probability of impact calculated in 
accordance with appendix C will thus likely be overestimated.
    One approach permitted by appendix C is to divide any given 
populated area into smaller rectangles, determine Pi for 
each individual rectangle, and sum the individual impact probabilities 
to determine Pi for the entire populated area. A second 
approach permitted by appendix C is, for a given populated area, to use 
the ratio of the populated area to the area of the original 
Pi rectangle.
    If the estimated expected casualty exceeds 30 x 10-6, 
the FAA will not approve the proposed launch site location. In that 
event, the only remaining options for an applicant would be to rely on 
one of its potential customers obtaining a launch license for launch 
from the proposed site.

Appendix D

    Appendix D contains the FAA's method for determining the 
acceptability of the location of a launch site for launching unguided 
suborbital expendable launch vehicles. Appendix D describes how to 
define an overflight exclusion zone and each impact dispersion area to 
be analyzed for risk for a representative launch vehicle. Appendix D 
also describes how to estimate whether risk to the public, measured by 
expected casualty, falls within the FAA's threshold of acceptable risk. 
In short, the approach requires an applicant to define an overflight 
exclusion zone around a launch point, determine the impact point for 
each spent stage and then define an impact dispersion area around each 
impact point. If populated areas are located in the impact dispersion 
areas and cannot be excluded by altering the launch azimuth, the FAA 
requires a risk analysis that demonstrates that risk to the public 
remains within acceptable levels.
    As a first step, an applicant selects which launch points at the 
proposed launch site would be used for the launch of an unguided 
suborbital expendable launch vehicle. An applicant must also then 
select an existing suborbital expendable launch vehicle, for which 
apogee data is available, whose final stage apogee represents the 
maximum altitude of any unguided suborbital expendable launch vehicle 
intended for launch from that launch point. The applicant would then 
plot the distance, which is referred to as the impact range, from the 
launch point to the nominal impact point on the azimuth for each stage. 
Employing the impact dispersion radius of each stage, the applicant 
would define an impact dispersion area around each nominal impact 
point.
    The methodology for the impact dispersion area requirements is 
grounded in three assumptions which reflect current practice. For 
purposes of this location review, the FAA assumes

[[Page 62852]]

that unguided suborbital expendable launch vehicles are not equipped 
with a flight termination system, and that public risk criteria are 
accordingly met through the implementation of a wind weighting system, 
launch procedures and restrictions, and the proper selection of a 
launch azimuth and elevation angles. These aspects are currently 
reflected in FAA guidelines and will be addressed in its regulations 
for launches from non-federal launch sites. The cumulative launch 
experience in unguided suborbital expendable launch vehicles 
demonstrates that risk to the public from launches of these vehicles is 
attributable to planned stage impact during a successful flight. 
Controlling these risks solely through measures implemented prior to 
flight rather than relying on active measures during flight, as is the 
case for a vehicle equipped with an FTS, has provided historically an 
acceptable approach to protection of the public. Accordingly, the 
appendix D analysis should adequately address the general suitability 
of each launch point for unguided suborbital expendable launch vehicle 
launches up to the altitude proposed. Operational requirements imposed 
on a launch licensee through license conditions should adequately 
address risks posed by the actual launch of unguided suborbital 
expendable launch vehicles.
    The location review for a launch point that will support unguided 
suborbital expendable launch vehicles also assumes that intermediate 
and final stages impact the Earth within three standard deviations 
(3) of each nominal, no wind, impact point. This means that an 
appendix D analysis does not account for failures outside of three 
standard deviations from each intended impact point.
    It also means that an appendix D analysis does not simulate an 
actual launch in actual wind conditions. For actual launches, wind 
weighting can be used to obtain the nominal, no wind, impact point for 
the final stage only. In order to ensure that the launch meets 
Ec, ship hit, and aircraft hit probabilities, launch 
operators compute the wind drifted impact points of all stages using 
the launcher settings determined through wind weighting so that 
intermediate stage impacts are determined just prior to launch. 
Although appendix D does not address this fact directly, it does show 
whether at least some launches can be conducted depending on the wind 
conditions.

Defining an Overflight Exclusion Zone and Impact Dispersion Areas

    The areas an applicant will analyze for risk to the public posed by 
the launch of an unguided suborbital expendable launch vehicle consist 
of an overflight exclusion zone and stage impact dispersion areas. 
Having selected a launch point and a launch vehicle for which empirical 
data is available, an applicant must define each zone and area using 
the methodology provided. An overflight exclusion zone shall consist of 
a circle with a radius of 1600 feet centered on a launch point. An 
overflight exclusion zone is the area which must be free of the public 
during a launch. Creation of each impact dispersion area involves 
several more steps. For each stage of the analyzed vehicle an applicant 
must identify the nominal stage impact point on the azimuth where the 
stage is supposed to land, and draw a circle around that point, using 
the range and bearing equations of appendix A or geographic information 
system (GIS) software. That circle describes the impact dispersion 
area, and an applicant defines an impact dispersion area for each 
stage.
    An applicant must at the outset provide the geodetic latitude and 
longitude of a launch point that it proposes to offer for launch, and 
select a flight azimuth. Once an applicant has selected a launch point 
location and azimuth, the next step is to determine a 1600 foot radius 
overflight exclusion zone for that launch point. As with an overflight 
exclusion zone created pursuant to appendices A and B, an applicant 
must show that the public would be cleared from its overflight 
exclusion zone prior to launch. Although suborbital vehicles have a 
very low likelihood of failure, failure is more likely to occur in the 
early stages of the launch. Consequently, the FAA is guarding against 
that risk through requiring an applicant to show the ability to 
evacuate an overflight exclusion zone. As with the flight corridors of 
appendices A and B, the FAA bases the size of the overflight exclusion 
zone on the maximum distance that debris is expected to travel from a 
launch point if a mishap were to occur very early in flight. The FAA 
has estimated the Dmax for an unguided suborbital expendable 
launch vehicle, and the result is 1600 feet. Accordingly, an applicant 
would define an appendix D overflight exclusion zone as a circle with a 
radius of 1600 feet.
    Because an applicant must choose the maximum altitude anticipated 
of a suborbital expendable launch vehicle for launch from its site, an 
applicant needs to acquire the apogee of each stage of a representative 
vehicle. An applicant need not possess full information regarding a 
specific representative launch vehicle. All that is necessary is the 
apogee of each stage. The apogee height must be obtained from an actual 
launch conducted at an 84 deg. elevation angle. If needed, data is 
available from the FAA. The FAA has compiled apogee data from past 
launches from Wallops Flight Facility for a range of launch vehicles 
and payloads. This data will be provided to an applicant upon request 
and may be used to perform the analysis.
    An applicant then defines impact dispersion areas for each stage's 
nominal impact point. Having selected a launch vehicle most 
representative of what the applicant intends for launch from the 
proposed launch point, an applicant will use either its own empirical 
apogee data or data from one of the vehicles in the FAA's data base. 
Whether an applicant uses vehicle apogee data obtained from the FAA or 
from elsewhere, the applicant must employ the range and dispersion 
factors to determine the location of each nominal impact point and the 
size of each impact dispersion area.
    Under appendix D, an applicant would estimate the impact range and 
dispersion parameters by multiplying the apogee of a launch vehicle 
intended for the prospective launch site by factors. Impact range and 
impact dispersion factors are derived from launch vehicle pedigrees of 
sounding rockets used by NASA Wallops Flight Facility in its sounding 
rocket program.\19\ The factors provide estimators of staging data for 
an unguided vehicle launched at a standard launcher elevation, which is 
the angle between the launch vehicle's major axis (x) and the ground, 
of 84 deg.. The appendix defines the relationship between the apogee of 
a launch vehicle stage, an impact range and a 3 dispersion 
radius of a stage. This relationship is expressed as two constants, 
which vary with the altitude of the apogee, an impact range factor and 
an impact dispersion factor.
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    \19\ These vehicles include Nike Orion, Black Brant IX, Black 
Brant XI, and Black Brant XII. They are representative of the 
current launch vehicle inventory and should approximate any proposed 
new launch vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To locate each nominal impact point, an applicant will calculate 
the impact range for the final stage and all other stages. An impact 
range describes the distance between an applicant's proposed launch 
point and the nominal impact point of a stage, or, in other words, its 
estimated landing spot along

[[Page 62853]]

the azimuth selected for analysis. For this estimation, an applicant 
would employ the FAA's impact range factors of 0.4 or 0.7 as 
multipliers for the apogee of the stage. If an apogee is less than 100 
kilometers, the applicant shall employ 0.4 as the impact range factor 
for that stage. If the apogee of a stage is 100 kilometers or more, the 
applicant shall use 0.7 as a multiplier. In plotting the impact points 
on a map, an applicant shall employ the plotting methods provided by 
appendix A.
    An impact dispersion radius describes the impact dispersion area of 
a stage. The FAA relies on an estimated impact dispersion radius of 
three standard deviations (3) because significant population, 
such as a densely populated city, in areas within distances up to 
3 of the impact point could cause significant public risk. An 
applicant shall obtain the radius of the impact dispersion area by 
multiplying the stage apogee by the FAA's impact dispersion factor of 
0.4 for an apogee less than 100 kilometers and of 0.7 for an apogee of 
100 kilometers or more. The final stage would typically produce the 
largest impact dispersion area.
    Once an applicant determines the impact dispersion radii, the 
applicant must plot each impact dispersion area on a map in accordance 
with the requirements of paragraph (b). This is depicted in figure D-1. 
An applicant may then determine if flight azimuths exist which do not 
affect populated areas. If all potential flight azimuths contain impact 
dispersion areas, which encompass populated areas, then the FAA 
requires an Ec estimation of risk.

Public Risk Ec Estimation

    The FAA will approve a launch point in accordance with this 
appendix if there exists a set of impact dispersion areas for a 
representative launch vehicle in which the sum of risk to the public 
does not exceed the FAA's acceptable risk threshold. An overflight 
exclusion zone must contain no people. If a populated area is present 
within the impact dispersion areas, an applicant shall estimate the 
risk to the public posed by possible stage impact. An applicant must 
then determine whether its estimated risk satisfies the FAA requirement 
of an Ec of no more than 30  x  10 -6. The 
Ec estimation is performed by computing the sum of the risk 
for the impact of each stage and accounting for each populated area 
located within a 3 dispersion of an impact point. The equation 
used to accomplish this is the same as that used in the impact 
probability computation in appendix C. Unlike, however, the method in 
appendix C, which accounts for an impact due to a failure, the 
probability of a stage impact occurring is Ps = 
1-Pf, where Ps is the probability of success, and 
Pf is the probability of failure. For the purposes of the 
launch site location review, a constant of 0.98 is used for the 
probability of success for unguided suborbital expendable launch 
vehicles. The probability of success is used in place of Pf 
in calculating both the crossrange and downrange probability of impact.
    The location review for launch points intended for the launch of 
unguided suborbital expendable launch vehicles differs from the review 
of the location of launch points intended for the launch of guided 
orbital and suborbital expendable launch vehicles. In analyzing whether 
risk remains at acceptable levels, Ec equations in appendix 
D rely on the probability of success rather than the probability of 
failure. The use of stage impact probability, typified as the 
probability of success (Ps), for suborbital expendable 
launch vehicles is necessary because stage impacts are high probability 
events which occur near the launch point with dispersions which may 
overlap or be adjacent to the launch point. The difference between the 
methods of appendices A, B and C and appendix D reflects the 
fundamental differences between the likely dominant source of risk to 
the public from guided and unguided vehicles and the methods that have 
been developed for guarding public safety against the risks created by 
each type of vehicle. In other words, the methods for defining impact 
dispersion areas and for conducting an impact risk assessment for an 
unguided vehicle are premised on the risks posed by a successful 
flight, that is, the planned deposition of stages and debris. In 
contrast, the methodology for developing a flight corridor and 
associated risk methodology for guided vehicles assumes that the likely 
major source of risk to the public arises out of a failure of a mission 
and the ensuing destruction of the vehicle.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ The one exception is the impact dispersion area for a 
guided suborbital launch vehicle. That area is analyzed assuming 
launch success.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The high degree of success recorded for unguided expendable launch 
vehicles renders the probability of success the greater source of risk. 
Because of their relative simplicity of operation, the failure rate, 
over time, for unguided expendable launch vehicles has amounted to 
between one and two percent. At this level of reliability, the FAA 
believes that its primary focus of concern for assessing the safety of 
a launch site should be the more likely event, namely, the public's 
exposure to the planned impact of vehicle stages and other vehicle 
components, such as fairings, rather than the risk posed by exposure to 
debris resulting from a failure. Success is the high risk event. 
Although failure rates are low for unguided expendable launch vehicles, 
their spent stages have large impact dispersions. Moreover, the FAA's 
impact dispersion area estimations generally produce impact dispersion 
areas large enough to encompass most of the populations exposed to a 
possible failure as well as to a nominal flight, thus ensuring the 
inclusion of any large, densely populated area in the analysis. Thus, 
all but a small percentage of populated area will be analyzed to some 
extent, albeit using impact probabilities based on success.
    For appendix D, the FAA assumes that the stage impact dispersion in 
both the downrange and cross range directions are equal. This is a 
valid assumption for assessing a launch site for suborbital expendable 
launch vehicles because their trajectories produce near circular 
dispersions. NASA data on sounding rocket impact dispersion supports 
this conclusion.
    The impact dispersion area is based on a 3 dispersion. 
Appendix D uses the effective casualty area data, table D-1, which 
contains information similar to appendix C, table C-3. This data 
represents the estimation of the area produced by both suborbital 
expendable launch vehicle inert pieces. The risk estimation approach in 
appendix D has the applicant calculate the probability of impact for 
each populated area, and then determining an Ec value for 
each populated area. To obtain the estimated Ec for an 
entire impact dispersion area, the applicant adds the Ec 
results for each populated area. If the population within the impact 
dispersion area is relatively small, an applicant may wish to conduct a 
less rigorous analysis by making conservative assumptions. Appendix D 
offers the option of analyzing a worst-case impact dispersion area for 
those locations where such an approach might save time and analysis, 
similar to the approach of appendix C.
    The final section in subpart B is section 420.31. It requires an 
applicant to complete an agreement with the local U.S. Coast Guard 
district to establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice to 
Mariners prior to a launch and other such measures as the Coast Guard 
deems necessary to protect public health and safety. An applicant must 
also complete an agreement with the FAA Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
office having jurisdiction over the airspace

[[Page 62854]]

through which launches will take place, to establish procedures for the 
issuance of a Notice to Airmen prior to a launch and for closing of air 
routes during the launch window and other such measures as the FAA 
regional office deems necessary to protect public health and safety.
    These two provisions clarify from the Launch Site NPRM that the FAA 
and Coast Guard agreements must be completed as a requirement for a 
license. Section 420.31(c) adds that an applicant that plans to operate 
a launch site located on a federal launch range does not have to enter 
into those agreements if the applicant is using existing federal launch 
range agreements with the U.S. Coast Guard and the FAA ATC office 
having jurisdiction over the airspace through which launches will take 
place.
    Subpart C contains license term and conditions. Section 420.41 
specifies the authority granted to a launch site operator by a license 
and the licensee's obligation to comply with representations contained 
in the license application as well as the FAA's license terms and 
conditions. The provision limits a licensee's authorization to the 
launch points on the launch site and to the types of launch vehicles 
used to demonstrate the safety of the launch site location, and, for 
orbital launch vehicles, to vehicles no larger than the weight class 
analyzed. The provision also clarifies the licensee's obligation to 
comply with any other laws or regulations applicable to its licensed 
activities and identifies certain rights that are not conveyed by a 
launch site operator license.
    Section 420.43 specifies the duration of a license to operate a 
launch site, the grounds for shortening the term, and that a license 
may be renewed.
    Section 420.45 provides the procedures that an applicant must 
follow to obtain FAA approval for the transfer of an existing license 
to operate a launch site.
    Section 420.47 specifies the procedures that the FAA will follow to 
modify a license through a license order or written approval, and the 
procedures that a launch site operator licensee must follow to obtain 
an FAA license modification. A licensee must obtain a license 
modification if the licensee proposes to operate the launch site in a 
manner not authorized by its license. This means, among other things, 
that if a representation in the license application regarding an issue 
material to public safety is no longer accurate or does not describe 
the licensee's operation or intended operation of the site, a licensee 
must obtain a license modification. This is because the representations 
a licensee makes in its application become part of the terms and 
conditions of its license. A licensee must obtain FAA approval prior to 
modifying its operations. In the event of special circumstance and 
where safety warrants, the FAA will work with a licensee to accommodate 
any timing problems.
    Section 420.47 also specifies the procedures for a licensee to 
obtain and the FAA to issue a license modification. The FAA may modify 
a license using a written approval rather than a license order. This 
may occur, for example, in cases where the change addresses an activity 
or condition that was represented in the license application but not 
spelled out in a license order.
    Section 420.49 imposes an obligation on a launch site operator 
licensee, its customers, and its contractors to cooperate with the FAA 
in compliance monitoring of licensed activities. This requirement 
recognizes an FAA compliance monitor's need to observe operations 
conducted by all parties at the site and to have access to records and 
personnel if the FAA is to be assured that public safety is being 
protected.
    Subpart D contains the responsibilities of a licensee. Section 
420.51 describes a licensee's obligation to operate its launch site in 
accordance with the representations in its license application, 49 
U.S.C. Subtitle IX, ch. 701 and the FAA's regulations.
    Section 420.53 requires a launch site operator licensee to control 
public access to the launch site and to protect the public present at 
the launch site. The regulation seeks to protect the public from the 
consequences of flight and pre-flight activities by separating the 
public from hazardous launch procedures. The public could also be at 
risk if allowed to enter the launch site or move about without adequate 
safeguards. This provision requires the licensee to prevent the public 
from gaining unauthorized access to the launch site. The applicant will 
be given broad discretion in selecting the method for controlling 
access. The provision will also hold the licensee responsible for 
informing members of the public of safety precautions before entry and 
for warning of emergencies on-site. A licensee will also be responsible 
for escorting the public between hazard areas not otherwise controlled 
by a launch operator at the launch site, and employing warning signals 
or alarms to notify persons on the launch site of any emergency.
    Section 420.55 requires a licensee to develop and implement 
procedures to schedule operations to ensure that each operation carried 
out by a customer at the launch site does not create the potential for 
a mishap that could result in harm to the public because of the 
proximity of the operations, in time or place, to operations of any 
other customer. Customers include any launch operator, and any 
contractor, subcontractor or customer of the launch site operator's 
customer at the launch site. This requirement is necessary to ensure 
that the operations of one launch site customer do not interact with 
the operations of another customer to create a public safety hazard at 
the launch site or beyond. For example, the testing of equipment using 
radio frequency transmissions could trigger ordnance used by someone 
elsewhere on the site if the two launch preparation activities are not 
coordinated or warnings issued. Likewise, hazardous operations by one 
customer with the potential to reach another customer must be 
coordinated by the launch site operator. A launch site operator is 
required to ensure that all customers at the site are informed of 
procedures and adhere to scheduling requirements before commencing 
operations at the launch site.
    Section 420.57 establishes notification requirements for a 
licensee. The licensee is responsible for notifying customers of any 
limitations on use of the site. This provision ensures that customer 
activities are compatible with other activities at the launch site. It 
also ensures that limitations on the use of facilities provided to 
customers by a launch site operator are communicated to the customer. 
Examples include the maximum quantity of propellant allowed in a 
facility, or weight limitations on lifting devices within the facility. 
The licensee will be responsible for maintaining agreements with the 
Coast Guard to arrange for issuance of Notices to Mariners prior to 
launch and with the regional FAA ATC office for Notices to Airmen and 
closure of air routes. In addition, the licensee will notify local 
officials and landowners adjacent to the launch site of the flight 
schedule. This provision places an on-going responsibility on the site 
operator licensee for establishing notification procedures, rather than 
on the numerous launch licensees whose involvement with the launch site 
may be more sporadic and temporary. The requirement does, however, 
leave open the option of a launch licensee implementing the procedures 
established by the launch site operator.
    Section 420.59 requires a licensee to develop and implement a 
launch site accident investigation plan containing procedures for 
reporting, investigating

[[Page 62855]]

and responding to a launch site accident. The provision extends 
reporting, investigation and response procedures currently applicable 
to launch related accidents and incidents to accidents occurring during 
ground activities at a launch site.
    A launch site operator may satisfy the requirements of section 
420.59 by using accident investigation procedures developed in 
accordance with the requirements of the U.S. Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) at 29 CFR 1910.119 and 120, and the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at 40 CFR part 68, to the extent 
that the procedures include the elements required by section 
420.59.\21\ The FAA wishes to ease the regulatory burden here and in 
other parts of the final regulations where other federal regulatory 
agencies impose requirements on launch site operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ The EPA's requirements in 40 CFR 68 apply to ``incidents 
which resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a 
catastrophic release.'' 40 CFR 68.60(a). OSHA's requirements in 29 
CFR 1910.119 are similar, applying to ``each incident which resulted 
in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release of a 
highly hazardous chemical in the workplace'' 29 CFR 1910.119(m)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA's standard at 29 CFR 1910.119 includes provisions for 
investigating incidents and emergency response. See 29 CFR 1910.119(m) 
and (n). In addition, 29 CFR 1910.120, hazardous waste operations and 
emergency response (HAZWOPER), provides for emergency response planning 
for operations involving hazardous materials, including those listed by 
the Department of Transportation under 49 CFR 172.101.\22\ Launch 
operators and launch site operators in compliance with these 
requirements will be taking steps to protect the public as well as 
their workers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Hazardous materials in AST regulations, section 401.5, are 
defined as hazardous materials as defined in 49 CFR Sec. 172.101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA's requirements at 40 CFR 68 also include standards for incident 
investigation and emergency response. See 40 CFR 68.60, 68.81, 68.90, 
and 68.180. For both the OSHA and EPA requirements, compliance with 42 
U.S.C. 11003, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know, satisfies 
many of the emergency response provisions.
    Section 420.59(e) is new since the Launch Site NPRM, and states 
that a launch site accident investigation plan must contain procedures 
for participating in an investigation of a launch accident for launches 
that take place from the launch site. This provision also requires the 
licensee to cooperate with FAA or National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) investigations of a launch accident for launches that take place 
from the launch site. The FAA believes that any investigation of a 
launch accident must have the participation of the launch site 
operator. The FAA requests comment on this new provision.
    Section 420.61 provides the requirements for launch site operator 
retention of records, data, and other material needed to verify that 
launch site operator operations are conducted in accordance with 
representations contained in the license application, and for record 
production in the event of launch site accident investigation, or 
compliance monitoring.
    Sections 420.63 through 420.69 contains the FAA's explosive 
facility siting standards for the protection of the public from launch 
site explosive hazards created by liquid and solid propellants and 
other explosives. These standards shall be used by an applicant to site 
facilities that support activities involving liquid and solid 
propellants and other explosives, or facilities potentially exposed to 
such activities, and to document the layout of these facilities.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ An analysis may include evaluations of blast hazards; 
fragment hazards; protective construction; grounding, bounding and 
lightning protection systems; electrical installations; natural or 
man-made terrain features; or other mission or local requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 420.63(a) requires a launch site operator to ensure that 
the configuration of the launch site is in accordance with the 
licensee's explosive site plan, and that its explosive site plan is in 
compliance with the requirements of sections 420.65-420.69. Section 
420.63 identifies items that must be in an explosive site plan. The 
explosive site plan must include a scaled map or maps that show the 
location of all proposed explosive hazard facilities where solid and 
liquid propellants would be stored or handled.\24\ An applicant must 
identify the class and division for each solid propellant and other 
explosive and the hazard and compatibility group for each liquid 
propellant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ Areas where solid propellants and other explosives would be 
stored must be included in the plan even though ATF requirements 
apply. Applicants with magazines where solid propellants and other 
explosives are to be stored must obtain an ATF permit and meet ATF 
quantity-distance requirements. The FAA will use the information to 
ensure that those of its requirements unrelated to storage are 
satisfied and to coordinate with AFT when necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to the location of explosive hazard facilities, the map 
or maps must indicate actual and minimum allowable distances between 
each explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard facilities 
and each public area, including the launch site boundary. One means by 
which an applicant could show that the distances are at least the 
minimum required is by drawing a circle or arc with a radius equal to 
the minimum allowed distance centered on each explosive hazard 
facility.
    In addition to containing maps, an explosive site plan should also 
describe, through tables or lists, the maximum quantities of liquid and 
solid propellants and other explosives to be located at each explosive 
hazard facility, and the activities to be conducted within each 
explosive hazard facility.
    Pursuant to section 420.63(b), a licensee operating a launch site 
located on a federal launch range does not have to demonstrate 
compliance with the requirements of Secs. 420.65-420.69 if the licensee 
is in compliance with the federal launch range's explosive safety 
requirements. As proposed in the Launch Site NPRM, this provision 
stated that a launch site operator did not have to comply with the 
FAA's explosive safety requirements. Out of concern that this might be 
misinterpreted as permitting a launch site operator not to comply with 
either the range requirements, which are substantially similar to those 
contained in this part, or those of the FAA, the FAA wishes to clarify 
that it only intended that a launch site operator not have to 
demonstrate compliance to the FAA where a launch site operator 
demonstrates explosive safety to a federal launch range. Federal launch 
ranges have separate rules which are either identical or similar to the 
rules proposed, or require mitigation measures which otherwise ensure 
safety. The FAA only wishes to see, in accordance with section 
420.15(d)(2), the launch site operator's explosive site plan submitted 
to the federal launch range.
    In accordance with section 420.63(c), for explosive siting issues 
not otherwise addressed by the requirements of sections 420.65-420.69, 
a launch site operator must clearly and convincingly demonstrate a 
level of safety equivalent to that otherwise required by part 420. This 
provision is new since the Launch Site NPRM, and has been added because 
the explosive siting requirements are designed to codify only core 
explosive siting standards. The FAA realizes that some launch site 
siting scenarios will involve safety issues not otherwise addressed in 
this rulemaking. Thus, this provision was added to make clear that 
explosive siting issues outside the provisions issued with this 
rulemaking will be resolved in accordance with the requirements of 
safety. DOD Standard

[[Page 62856]]

6055.9 is perhaps the best example of a standard governing many more 
explosive safety issues than those addressed to date in this part.
    In order to demonstrate compliance with the explosive site 
standards, a launch site operator applicant first determines those 
areas at its proposed launch site where solid or liquid propellant and 
other explosives will be stored or handled, and which the FAA 
designates as explosive hazard facilities. Explosive hazard facilities 
may include payload processing facilities, launch pads, propellant 
storage or transfer tanks, and solid rocket motor assembly buildings. A 
launch site operator must then determine the types and maximum quantity 
of propellants and other explosives to be located at each explosive 
hazard facility. For solid propellants and other explosives, the 
applicant determines the total weight, expressed in pounds, of 
explosive material to be contained in the items that will be located at 
each explosive hazard facility. For liquid propellants, the applicant 
determines either the explosive equivalency of a fuel and oxidizer 
combination if fuels and oxidizers would be located together at, what 
is referred to as, incompatible distances; or, if fuels and oxidizers 
would not be located together, an applicant would determine the net 
weight in pounds of liquid propellant in each explosive hazard 
facility.
    The next step for a launch site operator applicant would be to 
determine the minimum allowable separation distance between each 
explosive hazard facility and all other explosive hazard facilities, 
the launch site boundary, and other public areas such as the launch 
complex of another launch operator, public railways and highways 
running through the launch site, and any visitor centers. The distances 
between explosive hazard facilities are important to ensure that an 
explosive event in one explosive hazard facility would not cause an 
explosive event in another explosive hazard facility. The distances 
between explosive hazard facilities and public areas are important to 
ensure that the public is protected from blast, debris, and thermal 
hazards. Exact distances must be given between the wall or corner of 
the facility closest to the closest wall or corner of other explosive 
hazard facilities and public areas. Minimum allowable distances are 
determined using tables in appendix E. These tables reflect distances 
based on the type and quantity of propellant or other explosive to be 
located within an explosive hazard facility. Determining the minimum 
allowable distance between two explosive hazard facilities is 
accomplished by applying the applicable criteria to each and then 
separating them by at least the greater distance prescribed for each 
explosive hazard facility. For example, if a certain amount of 
explosive division 1.3 solid propellant would be located at explosive 
hazard facility A, and twice as much explosive division 1.3 solid 
propellant would be located at explosive hazard facility B, the 
prescribed distance generated by explosive hazard facility B would 
serve as the minimum distance permitted between explosive hazard 
facility A and explosive hazard facility B.
    The criteria for determining the minimum required distances between 
each explosive hazard facility and all other explosive hazard 
facilities and each public area, including the launch site boundary, 
are contained in section 420.65 for solid propellants and other solid 
explosives and section 420.67 for liquid propellants. Section 420.69 
includes rules for when liquid and solid propellants and other 
explosives are located together.
    Section 420.65 covers quantity determinations and minimum required 
distances for explosive hazard facilities where solid propellants and 
other solid explosives would be handled. Under section 420.65(a), an 
applicant first determines the maximum total quantity, by class and 
division, of explosive in each explosive hazard facility where solid 
propellants and other solid explosives would be handled. The total 
quantity of explosives in an explosive hazard facility shall be the 
maximum total weight, expressed in pounds, of explosive material in the 
contents of the explosive hazard facility. For example, if a facility 
could hold up to ten solid rocket motors of a particular type, even 
though it might only rarely hold that many motors, the applicant would 
calculate the total weight of division 1.3 explosive material in the 
ten motors.
    Section 420.65(b) addresses the situation where explosive divisions 
1.1 and 1.3 explosives are located in the same explosive hazard 
facility. The section states that when explosive divisions 1.1 and 1.3 
explosives are planned to be located in the same explosive hazard 
facility, the total quantity of explosive shall be considered division 
1.1 for quantity-distance determinations, or, the applicant may add the 
net explosive equivalent weight of the division 1.3 items to the net 
weight of division 1.1 items to determine the total quantity of 
explosives. This latter provision will decrease the required distance.
    Once a launch site operator has determined the total quantity of 
solid propellants and other solid explosives in each explosive hazard 
facility, section 420.65(c) requires a launch site operator to separate 
each explosive hazard facility where solid propellants and other solid 
explosives will be handled from all other explosive hazard facilities 
and each public area, including the launch site boundary, in accordance 
with the minimum separation distances contained in table E-1 in 
appendix E. Table E-1 provides two distances for each quantity and 
division level. The first, a public area distance, is the minimum 
distance permitted between a public area and an explosive hazard 
facility. The second, an intraline distance, is the minimum distance 
permitted between any two explosive hazard facilities used by one 
launch site customer. Other explosive hazard facilities may constitute 
public areas, because the definition of public area includes any area 
in the possession or ownership, or otherwise under the control of a 
launch site operator's other customers. Distance calculations would be 
made accordingly.
    Section 420.65(d) provides separation rules. Section 420.65(d)(1) 
states that a launch site operator shall employ no less than the 
applicable public area distance to separate an explosive hazard 
facility from each public area and from the launch site boundary. 
Section 420.65(d)(2) states that a launch site operator shall employ no 
less than an intraline distance to separate an explosive hazard 
facility from all other explosive hazard facilities that will be used 
by a single customer.
    Section 420.65(d)(3) allows a launch site operator to employ no 
less than 60% of the applicable public area distance, or the public 
traffic route distance, to separate an explosive hazard facility from a 
public area that consists only of a public highway or railroad line, 
for explosive division 1.1 only. This is new since the Launch Site NPRM 
and was included because explosive division 1.1 explosives have been 
added. This option does not apply to explosive division 1.3 because for 
explosive division 1.3 explosives, the public traffic route distance is 
the same as the public area distance. Public traffic route distance can 
be applied to division 1.1 explosives when a public area consists of 
airplane taxiways, open recreational facilities not possessing 
structures, and public traffic routes. Streets and roads within the 
licensee's control are not considered public highways unless they are 
used for through traffic other than that related to the work of the 
launch site.

[[Page 62857]]

    Section 420.65(d)(4) allows a launch site operator to use linear 
interpolation for NEW quantities between table entries.
    Finally, section 420.65(d)(5) states that a launch site operator 
shall measure separation distance from the closest debris or explosive 
hazard source in an explosive hazard facility. For example, for a 
building, a launch site operator would measure from the wall or corner 
of the facility closest to the closest wall or corner of other 
explosive hazard facilities and public areas. When solid rocket motors 
or motor segments are freestanding, an applicant would measure from the 
closest motor or motor segment. An acceptable way to demonstrate that 
minimum distance requirements are met is to draw a circle or arc 
centered on the closest source of debris or hazard showing that no 
other explosive hazard facility or public area is within the distance 
permitted.
    Note that Q-D requirements address siting of facilities, not 
operational control of hazard areas. During actual operations, the 
existence and size of a hazard area is dependent on the actual amount 
of explosive material in an explosive hazard facility.
    Section 420.67 remains unchanged from the Launch Site NPRM, and 
covers quantity determinations and distance requirements for explosive 
hazard facilities that support the storage or handling of liquid 
propellants. In addition to applying to distances between an explosive 
hazard facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas, 
distance requirements may apply within an explosive hazard facility as 
well.
    Liquid propellants are classified and separated differently than 
solid propellants and other solid explosives. Where solid propellants 
and other solid explosives are classified by class and division, each 
liquid propellant is assigned to one of three hazard groups and one of 
two compatibility groups. A hazard group categorizes liquid propellants 
according to the hazards they cause. Hazard group 1 represents a fire 
hazard, hazard group 2 represents a more serious fire hazard, and, 
because a liquid propellant in hazard group 3 can rupture a storage 
container, it represents a fragmentation hazard. Each liquid propellant 
also falls into one of two compatibility groups. Liquid propellants are 
compatible when storing them together does not increase the probability 
of an accident or, for a given quantity of propellant, the magnitude of 
the effects of such an accident. Propellants in the same compatibility 
group do not increase the probability or magnitude of an accident. 
Group A represents oxidizers such as LO2 and N2O4, and group C 
represents fuels such as RP-1 and LH2. Appendix E provides the hazard 
and compatibility groups for current launch vehicle liquid propellants 
in table E-3.
    Explosive equivalency serves as another source of difference 
between the treatment of solid explosives and liquid propellants. Only 
if fuels and oxidizers are to be located within certain distances of 
each other do the separation requirements designed to account for the 
hazardous consequences of their potential combination apply. That 
combination is measured in terms of explosive equivalency. Explosive 
equivalency for liquid propellants is a measure of the blast effects 
from explosion of a given quantity of fuel and oxidizer mixture 
expressed in terms of the weight of TNT that would produce the same 
blast effects when detonated. Fuels should not be located near 
oxidizers if possible. The significance of the hazard groups and 
compatibility groups is that if fuels are located far enough from 
oxidizers, the minimum distance requirements to public areas and other 
explosive hazard facilities depend only on the quantity and hazard 
group of the individual liquid propellants. If operational requirements 
require fuels and oxidizers to be located near each other, that is, at 
less than the minimum public area and incompatible distances contained 
in tables E-4, E-5 and E-6, the explosive equivalency of the 
incompatible propellants must be calculated and used to determine the 
distances required by table E-7 to other explosive hazard facilities 
and public areas.
    Appendix E contains four distance tables with separation 
requirements for liquid propellants. Tables E-4, E-5 and E-6 contain 
separation distances for hazard groups 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Table 
E-7 contains separation distances for when fuels and oxidizers are 
located less than prescribed distances apart so that explosive 
equivalency applies. Table E-7 contains distances similar to those for 
explosive division 1.1 solid explosives. This is because the 
``explosive equivalency'' of a fuel and oxidizer mixture is measured in 
terms of its equivalent explosive blast effect to TNT, which is a class 
1.1 explosive. Table E-7 also prescribes public area and intraline 
distances.
    Tables E-4, E-5, and E-6 have two distances listed for each 
quantity of liquid propellant by hazard group. The first, a ``public 
area and incompatible'' distance, is the minimum distance permitted 
between a given quantity of liquid propellant and a public area. The 
distance is also the same distance by which incompatible propellants 
must be separated (e.g., the minimum distance between a fuel and an 
oxidizer) for explosive equivalency and table E-7 not to apply to the 
distance calculations. The second distance, an ``intragroup and 
compatible'' distance, is the distance by which propellants in the same 
hazard group, or propellants in the same compatibility group must be 
separated (e.g. the minimum distance between two fuels) to avoid adding 
the quantity of each propellant container being separated in 
calculating distances. This is because if two propellant tanks are far 
enough apart, they cannot react with one another, even were a mishap to 
occur. This introduces the third difference between liquid propellant 
separation requirements and the requirements for solid propellants and 
other explosives.
    The third area where liquid propellant separation requirements are 
different than those for solid propellants and other explosives may be 
found in calculations of the quantity of liquid propellant that 
determines the distance relationship with other explosive hazard 
facilities and public areas. Quantity calculations may depend on 
distance. As an example, suppose one was determining the minimum 
distance required between a tank farm having many containers of fuel, 
and a launch site boundary. If the containers were all close together 
the applicant would simply take the total amount of fuel, look up the 
``public area and incompatible'' distance in the table that 
corresponded to the hazard group of the fuel, and ensure that the 
distance between the closest wall or corner of the explosive hazard 
facility and the launch site boundary was at least the distance listed 
in the table. However, if the containers were separated from each other 
so that the distance between each container met the minimum 
``intragroup and compatible'' \25\ distance in the table, the total 
quantity of propellant to be used for the ``public area'' distance 
determination is only the quantity in each container. Therefore, as 
discussed below, although quantity determination requirements may be 
found in section 420.67(a), and section 420.67(b) contains distance 
determination requirements, quantity determinations for liquid 
propellants may depend on distances between containers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ The category is called ``intragroup and compatible'' to 
cover propellants that are in different hazard groups but are still 
compatible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Like the procedure for solid propellant quantity and distance 
determinations, an applicant's first step in siting liquid propellants 
would be to

[[Page 62858]]

determine the quantity of liquid propellant or, if applicable, the 
explosive equivalent of the liquid propellant to be located in each 
explosive hazard facility. An applicant determines this through three 
steps specified in section 420.67(a). First, section 420.67(a)(1) 
requires that the quantity of propellant in a tank, drum, cylinder, or 
other container is the net weight in pounds of the propellant in that 
container. The weight of liquid propellant in associated piping must be 
included in the determination of quantity to any point where positive 
means, such as shutoff valves, are provided for interrupting the flow 
through the pipe, or for interrupting a reaction in the pipe in the 
event of a mishap.
    Next, section 420.67(a)(2) applies when two or more containers of 
compatible propellants are stored together in an explosive hazard 
facility. When liquid propellants are compatible, the quantity of 
propellant used to determine the minimum separation distance between 
the explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard facilities and 
public areas shall be the total quantity of liquid propellant in all 
containers unless either the containers are separated one from the 
other by the ``intragroup and compatible'' distance contained in 
appendix E, table E-4, E-5 or E-6, depending on the hazard group, or 
the containers are subdivided by intervening barriers to prevent their 
mixing. In those two cases, the quantity of propellant in the explosive 
hazard facility requiring the greatest separation distance must be used 
to determine the minimum separation distance between the explosive 
hazard facility and all other explosive hazard facilities and public 
areas.
    Finally, section 420.67(a)(3) applies to quantity determinations 
when two or more containers of incompatible liquid propellants are 
stored together in an explosive hazard facility. If each container is 
not separated from every other container by the ``public area and 
incompatible'' distances identified in appendix E, tables E-4, E-5 and 
E-6, an applicant must determine the total quantity of explosives by 
calculating the explosive equivalent in pounds of the combined liquids, 
using formulas contained in table E-2, to determine the minimum 
separation distance between the explosive hazard facility and other 
explosive hazard facilities and public areas. If the containers are, in 
fact, to be separated one from the other by the appropriate 
``incompatible'' distance, an applicant would determine the minimum 
separation distance to another explosive hazard facility or public area 
using the quantity of propellant within the explosive hazard facility 
requiring the greatest separation distance.
    Section 420.67(a)(4) requires an applicant to convert liquid 
propellant quantities from gallons to pounds using conversion factors 
in table E-3, and the equation provided.
    After an applicant has determined the quantity of liquid propellant 
or, if applicable, the explosive equivalent of the liquid propellants 
to be located in each explosive hazard facility, an applicant must then 
determine the separation distances between each explosive hazard 
facility and public areas. Section 420.67(b) specifies the rules by 
which an applicant determines the separation distances between 
propellants within explosive hazard facilities, and between explosive 
hazard facilities and public areas. An applicant would first use table 
E-3 to determine hazard and compatibility groups. An applicant would 
then separate propellants from each other and from each public area 
using at least the distances provided by tables E-4 through E-7.
    Section 420.67(b)(1) requires that an applicant measure minimum 
separation distances from the container, building, or positive cutoff 
point in piping which is closest to each public area or explosive 
hazard facility requiring separation.
    Section 420.67(b)(2) imposes a minimum separation distance between 
compatible propellants. An applicant measures the separation distance 
between compatible propellants using the ``intragroup and compatible'' 
distance for the propellant quantity and group that requires the 
greater distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, and E-6. The distance 
between any two propellants is computed by first determining what the 
minimum required distance is for each propellant based on the quantity 
and hazard group of that propellant. The one requiring the greater 
distance is controlling for the pair.
    Section 420.67(b)(3) applies to the minimum separation distance 
between incompatible propellants. An applicant must measure the 
separation distance between propellants of different compatibility 
groups using the ``public area and incompatible'' distance for the 
propellant quantity and group that requires the greater distance 
prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, and E-6, unless the propellants of 
different compatibility groups are subdivided by intervening barriers 
to prevent their mixing. If intervening barriers are to be present, the 
minimum separation distance shall then be the ``intragroup and 
compatible'' distance for the propellant quantity and group that 
requires the greater distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, and E-6.
    Section 420.67(b)(4) applies to the separation of liquid 
propellants from public areas. A launch site operator shall separate 
these propellants from public areas using no less than the ``public 
area'' distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, and E-6.
    Section 420.67(b)(5) applies to propellants where explosive 
equivalents apply prescribed by subparagraph (a)(3). A launch site 
operator shall separate each explosive hazard facility that will 
contain propellants where explosive equivalents apply from all other 
explosive hazard facilities that are under the control of the same 
customer using at least the intraline distance in table E-7. The 
minimum separation distance from public areas is the public area 
distance in table E-7.
    Section 420.69 specifies the rules to be used when solid and liquid 
propellants are located together, such as at launch pads and test 
stands. This provision has changed since the Launch Site NPRM. The 
Launch Site NPRM allowed applicants to site an explosive hazard 
facility where solid and liquid propellants were to be located together 
based on either the liquid propellants or solid propellants alone. As 
discussed in the comments section above, this is not always 
appropriate.
    Section 420.69 now provides three options for a launch site 
operator proposing an explosive hazard facility where solid and liquid 
propellants are to be located together. First, an applicant may 
determine the minimum separation distances required for the liquid 
propellants and then add the minimum separation distances required for 
the solid propellants, treating the solid propellants as explosive 
division 1.1.
    The second option is similar in that a launch site operator would 
determine the minimum separation distances required for the liquid 
propellants and then add the minimum separation distances required for 
the solid propellants. However, in this option, a launch site operator 
that knows the explosive equivalent of the explosive division 1.3 solid 
propellants may use it instead of treating the solid propellants as 
explosive division 1.1.
    The third option for a launch site operator is to conduct an 
analysis of the maximum credible event (MCE), or the worst case 
explosion that is expected to occur. If it shows that an explosion due 
to the liquid propellants will not cause a simultaneous explosion of 
the solid propellants, and an explosion due to the

[[Page 62859]]

solid propellants will not cause a simultaneous explosion of the liquid 
propellants, the distance between the explosive hazard facility and all 
other explosive hazard facilities and public areas should be based on 
the MCE.
    Section 420.71(a) requires a launch site operator to ensure that 
the public is not exposed to hazards due to the initiation of 
explosives by lightning. Unless an explosive hazard facility has a 
lightning warning system to permit termination of operations and 
withdrawal of the public to public area distance prior to the incidence 
of an electrical storm, or the explosive hazard facility is to contain 
explosives that cannot be initiated by lightning, it must have a 
lightning protection system to ensure explosives are not initiated by 
lightning. A lightning protection system shall include an air terminal 
to intentionally attract a lightning strike, a low impedance path--
called a down conductor--connecting an air terminal to an Earth 
electrode system, and an Earth electrode system to dissipate the 
current from a lightning strike to ground.
    A lightning protection system shall also include measures for 
bonding and surge protection. For bonding, all metallic bodies shall be 
bonded to ensure that voltage potentials due to lightning are equal 
everywhere in the explosive hazard facility. Fences within six feet of 
the lightning protection system shall have bonds across gates and other 
discontinuations and shall be bonded to the lightning protection 
system. Railroad tracks that run within six feet of the lightning 
protection system shall be bonded to the lightning protection system. 
For surge protection, a lightning protection system shall include surge 
protection for all metallic power, communication, and instrumentation 
lines coming into an explosive hazard facility to reduce transient 
voltages due to lightning to a harmless level.
    Lightning protection systems shall be visually inspected 
semiannually and shall be tested once each year for electrical 
continuity and adequacy of grounding. A record of results obtained from 
the tests, including action taken to correct deficiencies noted, must 
be maintained at the explosive hazard facility.
    Section 420.71(b) requires a launch site operator to ensure that 
electric power lines on the launch site meet the distance requirements 
provided. A full discussion of explosive hazard mitigation measures is 
provided in the general preamble above.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This rule contains an information collection requirement. As 
required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, (44 U.S.C. 3507(d), 
the U.S. Department of Transportation submitted the information 
collection requirements to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
for its review and assignment of an OMB control number. The agency 
received no comments on the paperwork burden. According to the 
regulations implementing the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (5 CFR 
1320.8(b)(2)(vi), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is 
not required to respond to a collection of information unless an agency 
displays a currently valid OMB control number. The OMB control number 
for this information collection is 2120-0644.

Regulatory Evaluation Summary

    Final changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs each Federal agency to 
propose or adopt a regulation only if the agency makes a reasoned 
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its 
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies 
to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. 
Third, the Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. section 2531-2533) prohibits 
agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to 
the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. 
standards, this Trade Act requires agencies to consider international 
standards. Where appropriate, agencies are directed to use those 
international standards as the basis of U.S. standards. And fourth, the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires agencies to prepare a 
written assessment of the costs, benefits and other effects of proposed 
or final rules. This requirement applies only to rules that include a 
Federal mandate on State, local or tribal governments or the private 
sector, likely to result in a total expenditure of $100 million or more 
in any one year (adjusted for inflation.)
    In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined this rule: (1) Has 
benefits which do justify its costs, is not a ``significant regulatory 
action'' as defined in the Executive Order; (2) will not have a 
significant impact on a substantial number of small entities; (3) does 
not affect international trade; and (4) does not impose an unfunded 
mandate on state, local, or tribal governments, or on the private 
sector.
    The FAA has placed these analyses in the docket and summarized them 
below. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is amending its 
commercial space licensing regulations to add licensing requirements 
for the operation of a launch site. The final rule will provide launch 
site operators with licensing and operating requirements to protect the 
public from the risks associated with operations at a launch site. The 
FAA currently issues licenses to launch site operators on a case-by-
case approach. Elements of that approach are reflected in the 
guidelines, ``Site Operators License Guidelines for Applicants,'' which 
describe the information that applicants provide the FAA for a license 
to operate a launch site. The FAA's interpretation and implementation 
of the guidelines constitute another element of the case-by-case 
approach and additional elements, such as policy review, not reflected 
in the guidelines.
    The final rule represents quantifiable changes in costs compared to 
the guidelines (current practice) in the following two areas. They are 
the launch site location review and approval and the launch site 
operations review and approval. The FAA has estimated the costs and 
cost savings of these changes under two different cost scenarios over a 
10-year period discounted at 7 percent in 2000 dollars. The total 10-
year undiscounted cost savings is estimated to be between $93,000 and 
$172,000 (or between $65,000 and $124,000, discounted). The most 
burdensome cost scenario (where net cost savings is the least) to the 
industry will result in the costs to the launch site operators of 
$3,000 (or $2,000, discounted) for the launch site location reviews and 
approval provisions and a cost savings of $12,000 (or $9,000, 
discounted) for the launch site operations review and approval 
provisions. Although there will be no cost impact to the FAA, there 
will be cost savings to the FAA from the most burdensome cost scenario 
of $114,000 or $84,000 discounted.
    There are significant nonquantifiable benefits in two areas. First, 
the final rule eliminates overlapping responsibilities. Second, the 
final rule provides increased details and specificity, which are not 
present in the guidelines.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes ``as a 
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, 
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes, 
to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the 
business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to 
regulation.'' To achieve that principle,

[[Page 62860]]

the Act requires agencies to solicit and consider flexible regulatory 
proposals and to explain the rationale for their actions. The Act 
covers a wide-range of small entities, including small businesses, not-
for-profit organizations and small governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or 
final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. If the determination is that it will, the 
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in 
the Act.
    However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule is 
not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities, section 605(b) of the 1980 act provides that 
the head of the agency may so certify and an regulatory flexibility 
analysis is not required. The certification must include a statement 
providing the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning 
should be clear.

Potentially Affected Entities

    Entities who are licensed, or have begun the licensing process, 
were contacted to determine their size and to gain insight into the 
impacts of the final regulations on the licensing process. Spaceport 
Florida Authority (SFA), Spaceport Systems International, L.P. (SSI), 
the Virginia Commonwealth Space Flight Authority (VCSFA), and the 
Alaska Aerospace Development Corporation (AADC) are all licensed to 
operate launch sites.
    The Virginia Commonwealth Space Flight Authority (VCSFA) is a not-
for-profit subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia, responsible for 
oversight of the activities of the Virginia Commercial Space Flight 
Center (VCSFC). The VCSFC is located within the boundaries of the 
Wallops Flight Facility (WFF). As a subdivision of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, the VCSFA is empowered by the Acts of the General Assembly to 
do all things necessary to carry out its mission of stimulating 
economic growth and education through commercial aerospace activities.
    The Spaceport Florida Authority (SFA) was created by Florida's 
Governor and Legislature as the nation's first state government space 
agency. The authority was established to develop space-related 
enterprise, including launch activities, industrial development and 
education-related projects. SFA operates Spaceport Florida (SPF), 
located on Cape Canaveral Air Station.
    Launch site operator California Spaceport is located on Vandenberg 
Air Force Base. The launch site is operated and managed by Spaceport 
Systems International, L.P. who is in partnership with ITT Federal 
Services Corporation (ITT FSC). ITT FSC is one of the largest U.S.-
based technical and support services contractors in the world.
    The Kodiak Launch Complex is being built by the Alaska Aerospace 
Development Corporation. AADC is a public corporation created by the 
State of Alaska to develop aerospace related economic and technical 
opportunities for the state.

Definition of Small Entities

    The Small Business Administration has defined small business 
entities relating to space vehicles [SIC codes 3761, 3764 and 3769] as 
entities comprising fewer than 1000 employees. Although the above 
mentioned entities have fewer than 1000 employees in their immediate 
segment of the business, they are affiliated with/or funded by state 
governments and large parent companies. The VCSFA is a not-for-profit 
subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia; the SFA is a government 
space agency; the SSI is affiliated with ITT FSC; and AADC is a 
government sponsored corporation.
    The FAA conducted the required review of this final rule and 
determined that they will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, pursuant to the 
regulatory Flexibility Act, U.S.C. 605(b), the Federal Aviation 
Administration certifies that this rule will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from 
engaging in any standards or related activities that create unnecessary 
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Legitimate 
domestic objectives, such as safety, are not considered unnecessary 
obstacles. The statute also requires consideration of international 
standards and where appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. 
standards. In addition, consistent with the Administration's belief in 
the general superiority and desirability of free trade, it is the 
policy of the Administration to remove or diminish to the extent 
feasible, barriers to international trade, including both barriers 
affecting the export of American goods and services to foreign 
countries and barriers affecting the import of foreign goods and 
services into the United States.
    The Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch 
Site (14 CFR part 420) will not constitute a barrier to international 
trade, including the export of U.S. goods and services out of the 
United States. The final rule affects launch sites that are currently 
located or being proposed within the United States.
    The final rule is not expected to affect trade opportunities for 
U.S. firms doing business overseas or for foreign firms doing business 
in the United States.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Assessment

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act), enacted as Pub. 
L. 104-4 on March 22, 1995, is intended, among other things, to curb 
the practice of imposing unfunded Federal mandates on State, local, and 
tribal governments.
    Title II of the Act requires each Federal agency to prepare a 
written statement assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a 
proposed or final agency rule that may result in a $100 million or more 
expenditure (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year by State, 
local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private 
sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory 
action.''
    This final rule does not meet the cost thresholds described above. 
Furthermore, this final rule will not impose a significant cost or 
uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, the requirements of Title 
II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not apply.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this 
action will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the 
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government. Therefore, we determined that this final rule does not have 
federalism implications.

Environmental Assessment

    FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically 
excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). 
In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, appendix 4, paragraph 4(i), 
regulatory documents which cover administrative or procedural 
requirements qualify for a categorical exclusion. Sections in subpart B 
of part 420 would require an applicant to submit sufficient 
environmental information for the FAA

[[Page 62861]]

to comply with NEPA and other applicable environmental laws and 
regulations during the processing of each license application. 
Accordingly, the FAA proposes that this rule qualifies for a 
categorical exclusion because no significant impacts to the environment 
are expected to result from finalization or implementation of its 
administrative provisions for licensing.

Energy Impact

    The energy impact of the rulemaking action has been assessed in 
accordance with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) and 
Public Law 94-163, as amended (42 U.S.C. 6362). It has been determined 
that it is not a major regulatory action under the provisions of the 
EPCA.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Parts 401, 417, and 420

    Confidential business information, Environmental protection, 
Organization and functions, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
Rockets, Space transportation and exploration.

The Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration amends Chapter III of Title 14 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations to read as follows:

PART 401--ORGANIZATION AND DEFINITIONS

    1. The authority citation for part 401 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.


Sec. 401.5  [Amended]

    2. Section 401.5 is amended by adding the words ``launch site 
accident,'' after the word ``incident.''

PART 417--[REMOVED AND RESERVED]

    3. Part 417 is removed and reserved.

    4. Subchapter C of Chapter III, title 14, Code of Federal 
Regulations, is amended by adding a new part 420 to read as follows:

PART 420--LICENSE TO OPERATE A LAUNCH SITE

Subpart A--General
Sec.
420.1   Scope.
420.3   Applicability.
420.5   Definitions.
420.6-420.14   [Reserved]
Subpart B--Criteria and Information Requirements for Obtaining a 
License
420.15  Information requirements.
420.17   Bases for issuance of a license.
420.19   Launch site location review--general.
420.21   Launch site location review--launch site boundary.
420.23   Launch site location review--flight corridor.
420.25   Launch site location review--risk analysis.
420.27   Launch site location review--information requirements.
420.29   Launch site location review for unproven launch vehicles.
420.31   Agreements.
420.32--420.40   [Reserved]
Subpart C--License Terms and Conditions
420.41   License to operate a launch site--general.
420.43   Duration.
420.45   Transfer of a license to operate a launch site.
420.47   License modification.
420.49   Compliance monitoring.
Subpart D--Responsibilities of a Licensee
420.51   Responsibilities--general.
420.53   Control of public access.
420.55   Scheduling of launch site operations.
420.57   Notifications.
420.59   Launch site accident investigation plan.
420.61   Records.
420.63   Explosive siting.
420.65   Handling of solid propellants.
420.67   Storage or handling of liquid propellants.
420.69   Solid and liquid propellants located together.
420.71   Lightning protection.
Appendix A to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor
Appendix B to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor
Appendix C to Part 420--Risk Analysis
Appendix D to Part 420--Impact Dispersion Areas and Casualty 
Expectancy Estimate for Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicles
Appendix E to Part 420--Tables for Explosive Site Plan

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.

Subpart A--General


Sec. 420.1  Scope.

    This part prescribes the information and demonstrations that must 
be provided to the FAA as part of a license application, the bases for 
license approval, license terms and conditions, and post-licensing 
requirements with which a licensee shall comply to remain licensed. 
Requirements for preparing a license application are contained in part 
413 of this subchapter.


Sec. 420.3  Applicability.

    This part applies to any person seeking a license to operate a 
launch site or to a person licensed under this part. A person operating 
a site that only supports amateur rocket activities, as defined in 14 
CFR 401.5, does not need a license under this part to operate the site.


Sec. 420.5  Definitions.

    For the purpose of this part.
    Ballistic coefficient means the weight of an object divided by the 
quantity product of the coefficient of drag of the object and the area 
of the object.
    Compatibility means the chemical property of materials that may be 
located together without increasing the probability of an accident or, 
for a given quantity, the magnitude of the effects of such an accident.
    Debris dispersion radius (Dmax) means the estimated 
maximum distance from a launch point that debris travels given a worst-
case launch vehicle failure and flight termination early in flight. For 
an expendable launch vehicle, flight termination is assumed to occur at 
10 seconds into flight.
    Downrange area means a portion of a flight corridor beginning where 
a launch area ends and ending 5,000 nautical miles from the launch 
point, or where the IIP leaves the surface of the Earth, whichever is 
shorter, for an orbital launch vehicle; and ending with an impact 
dispersion area for a guided sub-orbital launch vehicle.
    E,F,G coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed, 
geocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system is 
at the center of an ellipsoidal Earth model. The E-axis is positive 
directed through the Greenwich meridian. The F-axis is positive 
directed though 90 degrees east longitude. The EF-plane is coincident 
with the ellipsoidal Earth model's equatorial plane. The G-axis is 
normal to the EF-plane and positive directed through the north pole.
    E,N,U coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed, 
topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system 
is at a launch point. The E-axis is positive directed east. The N-axis 
is positive directed north. The EN-plane is tangent to an ellipsoidal 
Earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to the geodetic 
vertical. The U-axis is normal to the EN-plane and positive directed 
away from the Earth.
    Effective casualty area (Ac) means the aggregate 
casualty area of each piece of debris created by a launch vehicle 
failure at a particular point on its trajectory. The effective casualty 
area for each piece of debris is the area within which 100 percent of 
the unprotected population on the ground are assumed to be a casualty, 
and outside of which 100 percent of the population are assumed not to 
be a casualty. An effective casualty area accounts for the

[[Page 62862]]

characteristics of the debris piece, including its size, the path angle 
of its trajectory, impact explosions, and debris skip, splatter, and 
bounce. An effective casualty area also accounts for the size of a 
person.
    Explosive means any chemical compound or mechanical mixture that, 
when subjected to heat, impact, friction, detonation or other suitable 
initiation, undergoes a rapid chemical change that releases large 
volumes of highly heated gases that exert pressure in the surrounding 
medium. The term applies to materials that either detonate or 
deflagrate.
    Explosive division means the division within hazard class 1 of an 
explosive as defined in the United Nations Organization classification 
system for transport of dangerous goods, and as determined in 
accordance with 49 CFR part 173, subpart C.
    Explosive equivalent means a measure of the blast effects from 
explosion of a given quantity of material expressed in terms of the 
weight of trinitrotoluene (TNT) that would produce the same blast 
effects when detonated.
    Explosive hazard facility means a facility at a launch site where 
solid propellant, liquid propellant, or other explosives are stored or 
handled.
    Flight azimuth means the initial direction in which a launch 
vehicle flies relative to true north expressed in degrees-decimal-
degrees.
    Flight corridor means an area on the Earth's surface estimated to 
contain the hazardous debris from nominal flight of a launch vehicle, 
and non-nominal flight of a launch vehicle assuming a perfectly 
functioning flight termination system or other flight safety system.
    Guided suborbital launch vehicle means a suborbital rocket that 
employs an active guidance system.
    Hazard class means the class of an explosive as defined by the 
United Nations Organization classification system for transport of 
dangerous goods, and as determined in accordance with 49 CFR part 173, 
subpart C.
    Impact dispersion area means an area representing an estimated 
three standard deviation dispersion about a nominal impact point of an 
intermediate or final stage of a suborbital launch vehicle.
    Impact dispersion factor means a constant used to estimate, using a 
stage apogee, a three standard deviation dispersion about a nominal 
impact point of an intermediate or final stage of a suborbital launch 
vehicle.
    Impact dispersion radius (Ri) means a radius that 
defines an impact dispersion area.
    Impact range means the distance between a launch point and the 
impact point of a suborbital launch vehicle stage.
    Impact range factor means a constant used to estimate, when 
multiplied by a stage apogee, the nominal impact point of an 
intermediate or final stage of a suborbital launch vehicle.
    Instantaneous impact point (IIP) means an impact point, following 
thrust termination of a launch vehicle. IIP may be calculated with or 
without atmospheric drag effects.
    Instantaneous impact point (IIP) range rate means a launch 
vehicle's estimated IIP velocity along the Earth's surface.
    Intraline distance means the minimum distance permitted between any 
two explosive hazard facilities in the ownership, possession or control 
of one launch site customer.
    Launch area means, for a flight corridor defined in accordance with 
appendix A of this part, the portion of a flight corridor from the 
launch point to a point 100 nautical miles in the direction of the 
flight azimuth. For a flight corridor defined in accordance with 
appendix B of this part, a launch area is the portion of a flight 
corridor from the launch point to the enveloping line enclosing the 
outer boundary of the last debris dispersion circle.
    Launch point means a point on the Earth from which the flight of a 
launch vehicle begins, and is defined by its geodetic latitude, 
longitude and height on an ellipsoidal Earth model.
    Launch site accident means an unplanned event occurring during a 
ground activity at a launch site resulting in a fatality or serious 
injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person who is not associated 
with the activity, or any damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to 
property not associated with the activity.
    Net explosive weight (NEW) means the total weight, expressed in 
pounds, of explosive material or explosive equivalency contained in an 
item.
    Nominal means, in reference to launch vehicle performance, 
trajectory, or stage impact point, a launch vehicle flight where all 
launch vehicle aerodynamic parameters are as expected, all vehicle 
internal and external systems perform as planned, and there are no 
external perturbing influences (e.g., winds) other than atmospheric 
drag and gravity.
    Overflight dwell time means the period of time it takes for a 
launch vehicle's IIP to move past a populated area. For a given 
populated area, the overflight dwell time is the time period measured 
along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace from the time point whose 
normal with the trajectory intersects the most uprange part of the 
populated area to the time point whose normal with the trajectory 
intersects the most downrange part of the populated area.
    Overflight exclusion zone means a portion of a flight corridor 
which must remain clear of the public during the flight of a launch 
vehicle.
    Populated area means a land area with population.
    Population density means the number of people per unit area in a 
populated area.
    Position data means data referring to the current position of a 
launch vehicle with respect to flight time expressed through the X, Y, 
Z coordinate system.
    Public means people and property that are not involved in 
supporting a licensed launch, and includes those people and property 
that may be located within the boundary of a launch site, such as 
visitors, any individual providing goods or services not related to 
launch processing or flight, and any other launch operator and its 
personnel.
    Public area means any area outside a hazard area and is an area 
that is not in the possession, ownership or other control of a launch 
site operator or of a launch site customer who possesses, owns or 
otherwise controls that hazard area.
    Public area distance means the minimum distance permitted between a 
public area and an explosive hazard facility.
    Public traffic route distance means the minimum distance permitted 
between a public highway or railroad line and an explosive hazard 
facility.
    Trajectory means the position and velocity components as a function 
of time of a launch vehicle relative to an x, y, z coordinate system, 
expressed in x, y, z, x, y, z.
    Unguided sub-orbital launch vehicle means a sub-orbital rocket that 
does not have a guidance system.
    X, Y, Z coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed, 
topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system 
is at a launch point. The x-axis coincides with the initial launch 
azimuth and is positive in the downrange direction. The y-axis is 
positive to the left looking downrange. The xy-plane is tangent to the 
ellipsoidal earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to 
the geodetic vertical. The z-axis is normal to the xy-plane and 
positive directed away from the earth.
    0,0,h0 means a 
latitude, longitude, height system where 0 is the 
geodetic latitude of a launch point, 0 is the east

[[Page 62863]]

longitude of the launch point, and h0 is the height of the 
launch point above the reference ellipsoid. 0 and 
0 are expressed in degrees-decimal-degrees.


Secs. 420.6-420.14  [Reserved]

Subpart B--Criteria and Information Requirements for Obtaining a 
License


Sec. 420.15  Information requirements.

    (a) General. (1) Launch site operator. An applicant shall identify 
the name and address of the applicant, and the name, address, and 
telephone number of any person to whom inquiries and correspondence 
should be directed.
    (2) Launch site. An applicant shall provide the name and location 
of the proposed launch site and include the following information:
    (i) A list of downrange equipment;
    (ii) A description of the layout of the launch site, including 
launch points;
    (iii) The types of launch vehicles to be supported at each launch 
point;
    (iv) The range of launch azimuths planned from each launch point; 
and
    (v) The scheduled operational date.
    (3) Foreign ownership. Identify foreign ownership of the applicant, 
as follows:
    (i) For a sole proprietorship or partnership, all foreign owners or 
partners;
    (ii) For a corporation, any foreign ownership interest of 10 
percent or more; and
    (iii) For a joint venture, association, or other entity, any 
foreign entities participating in the entity.
    (b) Environmental. An applicant shall provide the FAA with 
information for the FAA to analyze the environmental impacts associated 
with the operation of the proposed launch site. The information 
provided by an applicant must be sufficient to enable the FAA to comply 
with the requirements of the National Environment Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 
4321 et seq. (NEPA), the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations 
for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500-
1508, and the FAA's Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts, 
FAA Order 1050.1D. An applicant shall submit environmental information 
concerning a proposed launch site not covered by existing environmental 
documentation, and other factors as determined by the FAA.
    (c) Launch site location. (1) Except as provided by paragraph 
(c)(2) of this section, an applicant shall provide the information 
necessary to demonstrate compliance with Secs. 420.19-420.29.
    (2) An applicant who is proposing to locate a launch site at an 
existing launch point at a federal launch range is not required to 
comply with paragraph (c)(1) of this section if a launch vehicle of the 
same type and class as proposed for the launch point has been safely 
launched from the launch point.
    (d) Explosive site plan. (1) Except as provided by paragraph (d)(2) 
of this section, an applicant shall submit an explosive site plan that 
complies with Secs. 420.63, 420.65, 420.67, and 420.69.
    (2) If an applicant plans to operate a launch site located on a 
federal launch range, and if the applicant is required by the federal 
launch range to comply with the federal launch range's explosive safety 
requirements, the applicant shall submit the explosive site plan 
submitted to the federal launch range.
    (e) Launch site operations. An applicant shall provide the 
information necessary to demonstrate compliance with the requirements 
of Secs. 420.53, 420.55, 420.57, 420.59, 420.61, and 420.71.


Sec. 420.17  Bases for issuance of a license.

    (a) The FAA will issue a license under this part when the FAA 
determines that:
    (1) The application provides the information required by 
Sec. 420.15;
    (2) The FAA has completed an analysis of the environmental impacts 
associated with the proposed operation of the launch site, in 
accordance with NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500-1508, and FAA Order 1050.1D;
    (3) The launch site location meets the requirements of 
Secs. 420.19, 420.21, 420.23, 420.25, 420.27, and 420.29;
    (4) The applicant has completed the agreements required by 
Sec. 420.31;
    (5) The application demonstrates that the applicant shall satisfy 
the requirements of Secs. 420.53, 420.55, 420.57, 420.59, 420.61 and 
420.71;
    (6) The explosive site plan meets the criteria of Secs. 420.63, 
420.65, 420.67 and 420.69; and
    (7) Issuing a license would not jeopardize foreign policy or 
national security interests of the United States.
    (b) The FAA advises an applicant, in writing, of any issue arising 
during an application review that would lead to denial. The applicant 
may respond in writing, submit additional information, or amend its 
license application.


Sec. 420.19  Launch site location review--general.

    (a) To gain approval for a launch site location, an applicant shall 
demonstrate that for each launch point proposed for the launch site, at 
least one type of expendable or reusable launch vehicle can be flown 
from the launch point safely. For purposes of the launch site location 
review:
    (1) A safe launch must possess a risk level estimated, in 
accordance with the requirements of this part, not to exceed an 
expected average number of 0.00003 casualties (Ec) to the 
collective member of the public exposed to hazards from the flight 
(Ec 30  x  10-6).
    (2) Types of launch vehicles include orbital expendable launch 
vehicles, guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicles, unguided sub-
orbital expendable launch vehicles, and reusable launch vehicles. 
Orbital expendable launch vehicles are further classified by weight 
class, based on the weight of payload the launch vehicle can place in a 
100-nm orbit, as defined in table 1.
    (b) If an applicant proposes to have more than one type of launch 
vehicle flown from a launch point, the applicant shall demonstrate that 
each type of expendable or reusable launch vehicle planned to be flown 
from the launch point can be flown from the launch point safely.
    (c) If an applicant proposes to have more than one weight class of 
orbital expendable launch vehicles flown from a launch point, the 
applicant shall demonstrate that the heaviest weight class planned to 
be flown from the launch point can be flown from the launch point 
safely.

           Table 1 of Sec.  420.19.--Orbital Expendable Launch Vehicle Classes by Payload Weight (lbs)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Weight class
              100 nm orbit               -----------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Small            Medium         Medium large          Large
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28 degrees inclination*.................   4400  >4400 to 11100 to 18500
                                                                    eq>11100      thn-eq>18500
90 degrees inclination..................   3300  >3300 to 8400 to 15000
                                                                     eq>8400          eq>15000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* 28 degrees inclination orbit from a launch point at 28 degrees latitude.


[[Page 62864]]

Sec. 420.21  Launch site location review--launch site boundary.

    (a) The distance from any proposed launch point to the closest 
launch site boundary must be at least as great as the debris dispersion 
radius of the largest launch vehicle type and weight class proposed for 
the launch point.
    (b) For a launch site supporting any expendable launch vehicle, an 
applicant shall use the largest distance provided by table 2 for the 
type and weight class of any launch vehicle proposed for the launch 
point.
    (c) For a launch site supporting any reusable launch vehicle, an 
applicant shall determine the debris dispersion radius that represents 
the maximum distance from a launch point that debris travels given a 
worst-case launch vehicle failure in the launch area. An applicant must 
clearly and convincingly demonstrate the validity of its proposed 
debris dispersion radius.

           Table 2 of Sec.  420.21.--Minimum Distance From Launch Point to Launch Site Boundary (feet)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Orbital expendable launch vehicle class                     Type of suborbital launch vehicle
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Small              Medium          Medium large          Large              Guided            Unguided
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          7300               9300              10600              13000               8000               1600
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 420.23  Launch site location review--flight corridor.

    (a) Guided orbital expendable launch vehicle. For a guided orbital 
expendable launch vehicle, an applicant shall define a flight corridor 
that:
    (1) Encompasses an area that the applicant estimates, in accordance 
with the requirements of this part, to contain debris with a ballistic 
coefficient of  3 pounds per square foot, from any non-
nominal flight of a guided orbital expendable launch vehicle from the 
launch point to a point 5000 nm downrange, or where the IIP leaves the 
surface of the Earth, whichever is shorter;
    (2) Includes an overflight exclusion zone where the public risk 
criteria of 30 x 10-\6\ would be exceeded if one person were 
present in the open; and
    (3) Uses one of the methodologies provided in appendix A or B of 
this part. The FAA will approve an alternate method if an applicant 
provides a clear and convincing demonstration that its proposed method 
provides an equivalent level of safety to that required by appendix A 
or B of this part.
    (b) Guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle. For a guided sub-
orbital expendable launch vehicle, an applicant shall define a flight 
corridor that:
    (1) Encompasses an area that the applicant estimates, in accordance 
with the requirements of this part, to contain debris with a ballistic 
coefficient of  3 pounds per square foot, from any non-
nominal flight of a guided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle from 
the launch point to impact with the earth's surface;
    (2) Includes an impact dispersion area for the launch vehicle's 
last stage;
    (3) Includes an overflight exclusion zone where the public risk 
criteria of 30 x 10-\6\ would be exceeded if one person were 
present in the open; and
    (4) Uses one of the methodologies provided in appendices A or B to 
this part. The FAA will approve an alternate method if an applicant 
provides a clear and convincing demonstration that its proposed method 
provides an equivalent level of safety to that required by appendix A 
or B of this part.
    (c) Unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle.
    (1) For an unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, an 
applicant shall define the following using the methodology provided by 
appendix D of this part:
    (i) Impact dispersion areas that the applicant estimates, in 
accordance with the requirements of this part, to contain the impact of 
launch vehicle stages from nominal flight of an unguided sub-orbital 
expendable launch vehicle from the launch point to impact with the 
earth's surface; and
    (ii) An overflight exclusion zone where the public risk criteria of 
30 x 10-\6\ would be exceeded if one person were present in 
the open.
    (2) The FAA will approve an alternate method if an applicant 
provides a clear and convincing demonstration that its proposed method 
provides an equivalent level of safety to that required by appendix D 
of this part.
    (3) An applicant shall base its analysis on an unguided suborbital 
launch vehicle whose final launch vehicle stage apogee represents the 
intended use of the launch point.
    (d) Reusable launch vehicle. For a reusable launch vehicle, an 
applicant shall define a flight corridor that contains the hazardous 
debris from nominal and non-nominal flight of a reusable launch 
vehicle. The applicant must provide a clear and convincing 
demonstration of the validity of its flight corridor.


Sec. 420.25  Launch site location review--risk analysis.

    (a) If a flight corridor or impact dispersion area defined by 
section 420.23 contains a populated area, the applicant shall estimate 
the casualty expectation associated with the flight corridor or impact 
dispersion area. An applicant shall use the methodology provided in 
appendix C to this part for guided orbital or suborbital expendable 
launch vehicles and appendix D for unguided suborbital launch vehicles. 
The FAA will approve an alternate method if an applicant provides a 
clear and convincing demonstration that its proposed method provides an 
equivalent level of safety to that required by appendix C or D of this 
part. For a reusable launch vehicle, an applicant must provide a clear 
and convincing demonstration of the validity of its risk analysis.
    (b) If the estimated expected casualty exceeds 
30 x 10-\6\, the FAA will not approve the location of the 
proposed launch point.


Sec. 420.27  Launch site location review--information requirements.

    An applicant shall provide the following launch site location 
review information in its application:
    (a) A map or maps showing the location of each launch point 
proposed, and the flight azimuth, IIP, flight corridor, and each impact 
range and impact dispersion area for each launch point;
    (b) Each launch vehicle type and any launch vehicle class proposed 
for each launch point;
    (c) Trajectory data;
    (d) Wind data, including each month and any percent wind data used 
in the analysis;
    (e) Any launch vehicle apogee used in the analysis;
    (f) Each populated area located within a flight corridor or impact 
dispersion area;
    (g) The estimated casualty expectancy calculated for each populated 
area within a flight corridor or impact dispersion area;
    (h) The effective casualty areas used in the analysis;

[[Page 62865]]

    (i) The estimated casualty expectancy for each flight corridor or 
set of impact dispersion areas; and
    (j) If populated areas are located within an overflight exclusion 
zone, a demonstration that there are times when the public is not 
present or that the applicant has an agreement in place to evacuate the 
public from the overflight exclusion zone during a launch.


Sec. 420.29  Launch site location review for unproven launch vehicles.

    An applicant for a license to operate a launch site for an unproven 
launch vehicle shall provide a clear and convincing demonstration that 
its proposed launch site location provides an equivalent level of 
safety to that required by this part.


Sec. 420.31  Agreements.

    (a) Except as provided by paragraph (c) of this section, an 
applicant shall complete an agreement with the local U.S. Coast Guard 
district to establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice to 
Mariners prior to a launch and other such measures as the Coast Guard 
deems necessary to protect public health and safety.
    (b) Except as provided by paragraph (c) of this section, an 
applicant shall complete an agreement with the FAA Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) office having jurisdiction over the airspace through which 
launches will take place, to establish procedures for the issuance of a 
Notice to Airmen prior to a launch and for closing of air routes during 
the launch window and other such measures as the FAA ATC office deems 
necessary to protect public health and safety.
    (c) An applicant that plans to operate a launch site located on a 
federal launch range does not have to comply with section 420.31 if the 
applicant is using existing federal launch range agreements with the 
U.S. Coast Guard and the FAA ATC office having jurisdiction over the 
airspace through which launches will take place.


Secs. 420.32-420.40  [Reserved]

Subpart C--License Terms and Conditions


Sec. 420.41  License to operate a launch site--general.

    (a) A license to operate a launch site authorizes a licensee to 
operate a launch site in accordance with the representations contained 
in the licensee's application, with terms and conditions contained in 
any license order accompanying the license, and subject to the 
licensee's compliance with 49 U.S.C. subtitle IX, ch. 701 and this 
chapter.
    (b) A license to operate a launch site authorizes a licensee to 
offer its launch site to a launch operator for each launch point for 
the type and any weight class of launch vehicle identified in the 
license application and upon which the licensing determination is 
based.
    (c) Issuance of a license to operate a launch site does not relieve 
a licensee of its obligation to comply with any other laws or 
regulations; nor does it confer any proprietary, property, or exclusive 
right in the use of airspace or outer space.


Sec. 420.43  Duration.

    A license to operate a launch site remains in effect for five years 
from the date of issuance unless surrendered, suspended, or revoked 
before the expiration of the term and is renewable upon application by 
the licensee.


Sec. 420.45  Transfer of a license to operate a launch site.

    (a) Only the FAA may transfer a license to operate a launch site.
    (b) The FAA will transfer a license to an applicant who has 
submitted an application in accordance with 14 CFR part 413, satisfied 
the requirements of Sec. 420.15, and obtained each approval required by 
Sec. 420.17 for a license.
    (c) The FAA may incorporate by reference any findings made part of 
the record that supported a prior related licensing determination.


Sec. 420.47  License modification.

    (a) Upon application or upon its own initiative, the FAA may modify 
a license to operate a launch site at any time by issuing a license 
order that adds, removes, or modifies a license term or condition to 
ensure compliance with the Act and the requirements of this chapter.
    (b) After a license to operate a launch site has been issued, a 
licensee shall apply to the FAA for modification of its license if:
    (1) The licensee proposes to operate the launch site in a manner 
that is not authorized by the license; or
    (2) The licensee proposes to operate the launch site in a manner 
that would make any representation contained in the license application 
that is material to public health and safety or safety of property no 
longer accurate and complete.
    (c) An application to modify a license shall be prepared and 
submitted in accordance with part 413 of this chapter. The licensee 
shall indicate any part of its license or license application that 
would be changed or affected by a proposed modification.
    (d) The FAA approves a modification request that satisfies the 
requirements of this part.
    (e) Upon approval of a license modification, the FAA issues either 
a written approval to the licensee or a license order modifying the 
license if a stated term or condition of the license is changed, added, 
or deleted. A written approval has the full force and effect of a 
license order and is part of the licensing record.


Sec. 420.49  Compliance monitoring.

    A licensee shall allow access by and cooperate with federal 
officers or employees or other individuals authorized by the FAA to 
observe any activities of the licensee, its customers, its contractors, 
or subcontractors, associated with licensed operation of the licensee's 
launch site.

Subpart D--Responsibilities of a Licensee


Sec. 420.51  Responsibilities--general.

    (a) A licensee shall operate its launch site in accordance with the 
representations in the application upon which the licensing 
determination is based.
    (b) A licensee is responsible for compliance with 49 U.S.C. 
Subtitle IX, ch. 701 and for meeting the requirements of this chapter.


Sec. 420.53  Control of public access.

    (a) A licensee shall prevent unauthorized access to the launch 
site, and unauthorized, unescorted access to explosive hazard 
facilities or other hazard areas not otherwise controlled by a launch 
operator, through the use of security personnel, surveillance systems, 
physical barriers, or other means approved as part of the licensing 
process.
    (b) A licensee shall notify anyone entering the launch site of 
safety rules and emergency and evacuation procedures prior to that 
person's entry unless that person has received a briefing on those 
rules and procedures within the previous year.
    (c) A licensee shall employ warning signals or alarms to notify any 
persons at the launch site of any emergency.


Sec. 420.55  Scheduling of launch site operations.

    (a) A licensee shall develop and implement procedures to schedule 
operations to ensure that each operation carried out by a customer at 
the launch site does not create the potential for a mishap that could 
result in harm to the public because of the proximity of the 
operations, in time or place, to operations of any other customer. A

[[Page 62866]]

customer includes any launch operator, and any contractor, 
subcontractor or customer of the launch site operator's customer at the 
launch site.
    (b) A licensee shall provide its launch site scheduling 
requirements to each customer before the customer begins operations at 
the launch site.


Sec. 420.57  Notifications.

    (a) A licensee shall notify each launch operator and any other 
customer of any limitations on the use of the launch site. A licensee 
shall also communicate limitations on the use of facilities provided to 
customers by the launch site operator.
    (b) A licensee shall maintain its agreement, made in accordance 
with Sec. 420.31(a), with the local U.S. Coast Guard district.
    (c) A licensee shall maintain its agreement, made in accordance 
with Sec. 420.31(b), with the FAA ATC office having jurisdiction over 
the airspace through which launches will take place.
    (d) At least two days prior to flight of a launch vehicle, the 
licensee shall notify local officials and all owners of land adjacent 
to the launch site of the flight schedule.


Sec. 420.59  Launch site accident investigation plan.

    (a) General. A licensee shall develop and implement a launch site 
accident investigation plan that contains the licensee's procedures for 
reporting, responding to, and investigating launch site accidents, as 
defined by Sec. 420.5, and for cooperating with federal officials in 
case of a launch accident. The launch site accident investigation plan 
must be signed by an individual authorized to sign and certify the 
application in accordance with Sec. 413.7(c) of this chapter.
    (b) Reporting requirements. A launch site accident investigation 
plan shall provide for--
    (1) Immediate notification to the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) Washington Operations Center in the event of a launch site 
accident.
    (2) Submission of a written preliminary report to the FAA, 
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, within 
five days of any launch site accident. The report must include the 
following information:
    (i) Date and time of occurrence;
    (ii) Location of the event;
    (iii) Description of the event;
    (iv) Number of injuries, if any, and general description of types 
of injuries suffered;
    (v) Property damage, if any, and an estimate of its value;
    (vi) Identification of hazardous materials, as defined by 
Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, involved in the event;
    (vii) Any action taken to contain the consequences of the event; 
and
    (viii) Weather conditions at the time of the event.
    (c) Response plan. A launch site accident investigation plan shall 
contain procedures that--
    (1) Ensure the consequences of a launch site accident are contained 
and minimized;
    (2) Ensure data and physical evidence are preserved;
    (3) Require the licensee to report to and cooperate with FAA or 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigations and 
designate one or more points of contact for the FAA or NTSB; and
    (4) Require the licensee to identify and adopt preventive measures 
for avoiding recurrence of the event.
    (d) Investigation plan. A launch site accident investigation plan 
must contain--
    (1) Procedures for investigating the cause of a launch site 
accident;
    (2) Procedures for reporting launch site accident investigation 
results to the FAA; and
    (3) Delineated responsibilities, including reporting 
responsibilities for personnel assigned to conduct investigations and 
for any one retained by the licensee to conduct or participate in 
investigations.
    (e) Launch accidents. A launch site accident investigation plan 
shall contain--
    (1) Procedures for participating in an investigation of a launch 
accident for launches launched from the launch site;
    (2) Require the licensee to cooperate with FAA or National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigations of a launch accident 
for launches launched from the launch site.
    (f) Applicability of other accident investigation procedures. 
Accident investigation procedures developed in accordance with 29 CFR 
1910.119 and 40 CFR part 68 will satisfy the requirements of paragraphs 
(c) and (d) of this section to the extent that they include the 
elements required by paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section.


Sec. 420.61  Records.

    (a) A licensee shall maintain all records, data, and other material 
needed to verify that its operations are conducted in accordance with 
representations contained in the licensee's application. A licensee 
shall retain records for three years.
    (b) In the event of a launch or launch site accident, a licensee 
shall preserve all records related to the event. Records shall be 
retained until completion of any federal investigation and the FAA 
advises the licensee that the records need not be retained.
    (c) A licensee shall make available to federal officials for 
inspection and copying all records required to be maintained under the 
regulations.


Sec. 420.63  Explosive siting.

    (a) Except as otherwise provided by paragraph (b) of this section, 
a licensee shall ensure that the configuration of the launch site is in 
accordance with an explosive site plan, and that the licensee's 
explosive site plan is in compliance with the requirements of 
Secs. 420.65--420.69. The explosive site plan shall include:
    (1) A scaled map that shows the location of all proposed explosive 
hazard facilities at the proposed launch site and that shows actual and 
minimal allowable distances between each explosive hazard facility and 
all other explosive hazard facilities and each public area, including 
the launch site boundary;
    (2) A listing of the maximum quantities of liquid and solid 
propellants and other explosives to be located at each explosive hazard 
facility, including the class and division for each solid explosive and 
the hazard and compatibility group for each liquid propellant; and
    (3) A description of each activity to be conducted in each 
explosive hazard facility.
    (b) A licensee operating a launch site located on a federal launch 
range does not have to comply with the requirements in Secs. 420.65-
420.69 if the licensee is in compliance with the federal launch range's 
explosive safety requirements.
    (c) For explosive siting issues not otherwise addressed by the 
requirements of Secs. 420.65-420.69, a launch site operator must 
clearly and convincingly demonstrate a level of safety equivalent to 
that otherwise required by part 420.


Sec. 420.65  Handling of solid propellants.

    (a) A launch site operator shall determine the maximum total 
quantity of solid propellants and other solid explosives by class and 
division, in accordance with 49 CFR part 173, Subpart C, to be located 
in each explosive hazard facility where solid propellants or other 
solid explosives will be handled.
    (b) When explosive divisions 1.1 and 1.3 explosives are located in 
the same explosive hazard facility, the total quantity of explosive 
shall be treated as

[[Page 62867]]

division 1.1 for quantity-distance determinations; or, a launch site 
operator may add the net explosive equivalent weight of the division 
1.3 items to the net weight of division 1.1 items to determine the 
total quantity of explosives.
    (c) A launch site operator shall separate each explosive hazard 
facility where solid propellants and other solid explosives are handled 
from all other explosive hazard facilities, each public area and the 
launch site boundary by a distance no less than those provided for each 
quantity and explosive division in appendix E, table E-1.
    (d) A launch site operator shall follow the following separation 
rules:
    (1) A launch site operator shall employ no less than the applicable 
public area distance to separate an explosive hazard facility from each 
public area and from the launch site boundary.
    (2) A launch site operator shall employ no less than an intraline 
distance to separate an explosive hazard facility from all other 
explosive hazard facilities used by a single customer.
    (3) For explosive division 1.1 only, a launch site operator may 
employ no less than 60% of the applicable public area distance, or the 
public traffic route distance, to separate an explosive hazard facility 
from a public area that consists only of a public highway or railroad 
line.
    (4) A launch site operator may use linear interpolation for NEW 
quantities between table entries.
    (5) A launch site operator shall measure separation distance from 
the closest debris or explosive hazard source in an explosive hazard 
facility.


Sec. 420.67  Storage or handling of liquid propellants.

    (a) For an explosive hazard facility where liquid propellants are 
handled or stored, a launch site operator shall determine the total 
quantity of liquid propellant and, if applicable pursuant to paragraph 
(a)(3) of this section, the explosive equivalent of liquid propellant 
in each explosive hazard facility in accordance with the following:
    (1) The quantity of liquid propellant in a tank, drum, cylinder, or 
other container is the net weight in pounds of the propellant in the 
container. The determination of quantity shall include any liquid 
propellant in associated piping to any point where positive means are 
provided for interrupting the flow through the pipe, or interrupting a 
reaction in the pipe in the event of a mishap.
    (2) Where two or more containers of compatible liquid propellants 
are handled or stored together in an explosive hazard facility, the 
total quantity of propellant to determine the minimum separation 
distance between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive 
hazard facilities and each public area shall be the total quantity of 
liquid propellant in all containers, unless:
    (i) The containers are separated one from the other by the 
appropriate distance as provided by paragraph (b)(2) of this section; 
or
    (ii) The containers are subdivided by intervening barriers, such as 
diking, that prevent mixing.
    (iii) If paragraph (a)(2)(i) or (ii) of this section apply, a 
launch site operator shall use the quantity of propellant requiring the 
greatest separation distance pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section 
to determine the minimum separation distance between the explosive 
hazard facility and all other explosive hazard facilities and each 
public area.
    (3) Where two or more containers of incompatible liquid propellants 
will be handled or stored together in an explosive hazard facility, a 
launch site operator shall determine the explosive equivalent in pounds 
of the combined liquids, using the formulas provided in appendix E, 
table E-2, to determine the minimum separation distance between the 
explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard facilities and 
public areas unless the containers are separated one from the other by 
the appropriate distance as determined in paragraph (b)(3) of this 
section. A launch site operator shall then use the quantity of liquid 
propellant requiring the greatest separation distance to determine the 
minimum separation distance between the explosive hazard facility and 
all other explosive hazard facilities and each public area.
    (4) A launch site operator shall convert quantities of liquid 
propellants from gallons to pounds using the conversion factors 
provided in appendix E, table E-3 and the following equation:
    Pounds of propellant = gallons x density of propellant (pounds per 
gallon).
    (b) A launch site operator shall use appendix E, table E-3 to 
determine hazard and compatibility groups and shall separate liquid 
propellants from each other and from each public area using distances 
no less than those provided in appendix E, tables E-4 through E-7 in 
accordance with the following:
    (1) A launch site operator shall measure minimum separation 
distances from the hazard source in an explosive hazard facility, such 
as a container, building, segment, or positive cutoff point in piping, 
closest to each explosive hazard facility.
    (2) A launch site operator shall measure the minimum separation 
distance between compatible liquid propellants using the ``intragroup 
and compatible'' distance for the propellant quantity and hazard group 
that requires the greater distance prescribed by appendix E, tables E-
4, E-5, and E-6.
    (3) A launch site operator shall measure the minimum separation 
distance between liquid propellants of different compatibility groups 
using the ``public area and incompatible'' distance for the propellant 
quantity and hazard group that requires the greater distance provided 
in appendix E, tables E-4, E-5, and E-6, unless the propellants of 
different compatibility groups are subdivided by intervening barriers 
that prevent mixing. If such barriers are present, the minimum 
separation distance shall be the ``intragroup and compatible'' distance 
for the propellant quantity and group that requires the greater 
distance provided in appendix E, tables E-4, E-5, and E-6.
    (4) A launch site operator shall separate liquid propellants from 
each public area using a distance no less than the ``public area and 
incompatible'' distance provided in appendix E, tables E-4, E-5, and E-
6.
    (5) A launch site operator shall separate each explosive hazard 
facility that contains liquid propellants where explosive equivalents 
apply pursuant to paragraph (a)(3) of this section from all other 
explosive hazard facilities of a single customer using the intraline 
distance provided in appendix E, table E-7, and from each public area 
using the public area distance provided in appendix E, table E-7.


Sec. 420.69  Solid and liquid propellants located together.

    (a) A launch site operator proposing an explosive hazard facility 
where solid and liquid propellants are to be located together shall 
determine the minimum separation distances between the explosive hazard 
facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas in 
accordance with one method provided in paragraphs (b), (c), or (d) of 
this section.
    (b) A launch site operator shall determine the minimum separation 
distances between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive 
hazard facilities and public areas required for the liquid propellants 
in accordance with section 420.67(b)(5), and add the minimum separation 
distances between

[[Page 62868]]

the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive hazard facilities 
and public areas required for the solid propellants in accordance with 
section 420.65, treating the solid propellants as explosive division 
1.1.
    (c) A launch site operator shall determine the minimum separation 
distances between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive 
hazard facilities and public areas required for the liquid propellants 
in accordance with section 420.67(b)(5), and add the minimum separation 
distances between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive 
hazard facilities and public areas required for the solid propellants 
in accordance with section 420.65, using the explosive equivalent of 
the explosive division 1.3.
    (d) A launch site operator shall conduct an analysis of the maximum 
credible event (MCE), or the worst case explosion that is expected to 
occur. If the MCE shows that there will be no simultaneous explosion 
reaction of the liquid propellant tanks and the solid propellant 
motors, then the minimum distance between the explosive hazard facility 
and all other explosive hazard facilities and public areas must be 
based on the MCE.


Sec. 420.71  Lightning protection.

    (a) Lightning protection. A licensee shall ensure that the public 
is not exposed to hazards due to the initiation of explosives by 
lightning.
    (1) Elements of a lighting protection system. Unless an explosive 
hazard facility meets the conditions of paragraph (a)(3) of this 
section, all explosive hazard facilities shall have a lightning 
protection system to ensure explosives are not initiated by lightning. 
A lightning protection system shall meet the requirements of this 
paragraph and include the following:
    (i) Air terminal. An air terminal to intentionally attract a 
lightning strike.
    (ii) Down conductor. A low impedance path connecting an air 
terminal to an earth electrode system.
    (iii) Earth electrode system. An earth electrode system to 
dissipate the current from a lightning strike to ground.
    (2) Bonding and surge protection. A lightning protection system 
must meet the requirements of this paragraph and include the following:
    (i) Bonding. All metallic bodies shall be bonded to ensure that 
voltage potentials due to lightning are equal everywhere in the 
explosive hazard facility. Any fence within six feet of a lightning 
protection system shall have a bond across each gate and other 
discontinuations and shall be bonded to the lightning protection 
system. Railroad tracks that run within six feet of the lightning 
protection system shall be bonded to the lightning protection system.
    (ii) Surge protection. A lightning protection system shall include 
surge protection to reduce transient voltages due to lightning to a 
harmless level for all metallic power, communication, and 
instrumentation lines entering an explosive hazard facility.
    (3) Circumstances where no lightening protection system is 
required. No lightning protection system is required for an explosive 
hazard facility when a lightning warning system is available to permit 
termination of operations and withdrawal of the public to public area 
distance prior to an electrical storm, or for an explosive hazard 
facility containing explosives that cannot be initiated by lightning. 
If no lightning protection system is required, a licensee must ensure 
the withdrawal of the public to a public area distance prior to an 
electrical storm.
    (4) Testing and inspection. Lightning protection systems shall be 
visually inspected semiannually and shall be tested once each year for 
electrical continuity and adequacy of grounding. A licensee shall 
maintain at the explosive hazard facility a record of results obtained 
from the tests, including any action taken to correct deficiencies 
noted.
    (b) Electrical power lines. A licensee shall ensure that electric 
power lines at its launch site meet the following requirements:
    (1) Electric power lines shall be no closer to an explosive hazard 
facility than the length of the lines between the poles or towers that 
support the lines unless an effective means is provided to ensure that 
energized lines cannot, on breaking, come in contact with the explosive 
hazard facility.
    (2) Towers or poles supporting electrical distribution lines that 
carry between 15 and 69 KV, and unmanned electrical substations shall 
be no closer to an explosive hazard facility than the public area 
distance for that explosive hazard facility.
    (3) Towers or poles supporting electrical transmission lines that 
carry 69 KV or more, shall be no closer to an explosive hazard facility 
than the public area distance for that explosive hazard facility.

    Issued in Washington, DC on September 29, 2000.
Patricia G. Smith,
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation.

Appendix A to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor

(a) Introduction

    (1) This appendix provides a method for constructing a flight 
corridor from a launch point for a guided suborbital launch vehicle 
or any one of the four classes of guided orbital launch vehicles 
from table 1, Sec. 420.19, without the use of local meteorological 
data or a launch vehicle trajectory.
    (2) A flight corridor includes an overflight exclusion zone in a 
launch area and, for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an impact 
dispersion area in a downrange area. A flight corridor for a guided 
suborbital launch vehicle ends with the impact dispersion area, and, 
for the four classes of guided orbital launch vehicles, 5000 
nautical miles (nm) from the launch point.

(b) Data requirements

    (1) Maps. An applicant shall use any map for the launch site 
region with a scale not less than 1:250,000 inches per inch in the 
launch area and 1:20,000,000 inches per inch in the downrange area. 
As described in paragraph (b)(2), an applicant shall use a 
mechanical method, a semi-automated method, or a fully-automated 
method to plot a flight corridor on maps. A source for paper maps 
acceptable to the FAA is the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Ocean Service.
    (i) Projections for mechanical plotting method. An applicant 
shall use a conic projection. The FAA will accept a ``Lambert-
Conformal'' conic projection. A polar aspect of a plane-azimuthal 
projection may also be used for far northern launch sites.
    (ii) Projections for semi-automated plotting method. An 
applicant shall use cylindrical, conic, or plane projections for 
semi-automated plotting. The FAA will accept ``Mercator'' and 
``Oblique Mercator'' cylindrical projections. The FAA will accept 
``Lambert-Conformal'' and ``Albers Equal-Area'' conic projections. 
The FAA will accept ``Lambert Azimuthal Equal-Area'' and ``Azimuthal 
Equidistant'' plane projections.
    (iii) Projections for fully-automated plotting method. The FAA 
will accept map projections used by geographical information system 
software scaleable pursuant to the requirements of paragraph (b)(1).
    (2) Plotting Methods.
    (i) Mechanical method. An applicant may use mechanical drafting 
equipment such as pencil, straight edge, ruler, protractor, and 
compass to plot the location of a flight corridor on a map. The FAA 
will accept straight lines for distances less than or equal to 7.5 
times the map scale on map scales greater than or equal to 
1:1,000,000 inches per inch (in/in); or straight lines representing 
100 nm or less on map scales less than 1:1,000,000 in/in.
    (ii) Semi-automated method. An applicant may employ the range 
and bearing techniques in paragraph (b)(3) to create

[[Page 62869]]

latitude and longitude points on a map. The FAA will accept straight 
lines for distances less than or equal to 7.5 times the map scale on 
map scales greater than or equal to 1:1,000,000 inches per inch (in/
in); or straight lines representing 100 nm or less on map scales 
less than 1:1,000,000 in/in.
    (iii) Fully-automated method. An applicant may use geographical 
information system software with global mapping data scaleable in 
accordance with paragraph (b)(1).
    (3) Range and bearing computations on an ellipsoidal Earth 
model.
    (i) To create latitude and longitude pairs on an ellipsoidal 
Earth model, an applicant shall use the following equations to 
calculate geodetic latitude (+N) and longitude (+E) given the launch 
point geodetic latitude (+N), longitude (+E), range (nm), and 
bearing (degrees, positive clockwise from North).
    (A) Input. An applicant shall use the following input in making 
range and bearing computations. Angle units must be in radians.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.007

    (B) Computations. An applicant shall use the following equations 
to determine the latitude (2) and longitude 
(2) of a target point situated ``S'' nm from the 
launch point on an azimuth bearing (12) degrees.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.008

where:

a = WGS-84 semi-major axis (3443.91846652 nmi)
b = WGS-84 semi-minor axis (3432.37165994 nmi)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.009

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.010

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.011

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[[Page 62870]]


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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.029


[[Page 62871]]


    (ii) To create latitude and longitude pairs on an ellipsoidal 
Earth model, an applicant shall use the following equations to 
calculate the distance (S) of the geodesic between two points 
(P1 and P2), the forward azimuth 
(12) of the geodesic at P1, and the 
back azimuth (21) of the geodesic at 
P2, given the geodetic latitude (+N), longitude (+E) of 
P1 and P2. Azimuth is measured positively 
clockwise from North.
    (A) Input. An applicant shall use the following input. Units 
must be in radians.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.030

    (B) Computations. An applicant shall use the following equations 
to determine the distance (S), the forward azimuth 
(12) of the geodesic at P1, and the 
back azimuth (12) of the geodesic at 
P2.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.031

where:

a = WGS-84 semi-major axis (3443.91846652 nmi)
b = WGS-84 semi-minor axis (3432.37165994 nmi)

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.032

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.033

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[[Page 62872]]


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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.046

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.047

(c) Creation of a Flight Corridor

    (1) To define a flight corridor, an applicant shall:
    (i) Select a guided suborbital or orbital launch vehicle, and, 
for an orbital launch vehicle, select from table 1 of Sec. 420.19 a 
launch vehicle weight class that best represents the launch vehicle 
the applicant plans to support at its launch point;
    (ii) Select a debris dispersion radius (Dmax) from 
table A-1 corresponding to the guided suborbital launch vehicle or 
orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph (c)(1)(i);
    (iii) Select a launch point geodetic latitude and longitude; and
    (iv) Select a flight azimuth.
    (2) An applicant shall define and map an overflight exclusion 
zone using the following method:
    (i) Select a debris dispersion radius (Dmax) from 
table A-1 and a downrange distance (DOEZ) from table A-2 
to define an overflight exclusion zone for the guided suborbital 
launch vehicle or orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph 
(c)(1)(i).
    (ii) An overflight exclusion zone is described by the 
intersection of the following boundaries, which are depicted in 
figure A-1:
    (A) An applicant shall define an uprange boundary with a half-
circle arc of radius Dmax and a chord of length twice 
Dmax connecting the half-circle arc endpoints. The 
uprange boundary placement on a map has the chord midpoint 
positioned on the launch point with the chord oriented along an 
azimuth 90 deg.from the launch azimuth and the half-
circle arc located uprange from the launch point.
    (B) An applicant shall define the downrange boundary with a 
half-circle arc of radius Dmax and a chord of length 
twice Dmax connecting the half-circle arc endpoints. The 
downrange boundary placement on a map has the chord midpoint 
intersecting the nominal flight azimuth line at a distance 
DOEZ inches downrange with the chord oriented along an 
azimuth 90 deg.from the launch azimuth and the half-
circle arc located downrange from the intersection of the chord and 
the flight azimuth line.

[[Page 62873]]

    (C) Crossrange boundaries of an overflight exclusion zone are 
defined by two lines segments. Each is parallel to the flight 
azimuth with one to the left side and one to the right side of the 
flight azimuth line. Each line connects an uprange half-circle arc 
endpoint to a downrange half-circle arc endpoint as shown in figure 
A-1.
    (iii) An applicant shall identify the overflight exclusion zone 
on a map that meets the requirements of paragraph (b).
    (3) An applicant shall define and map a flight corridor using 
the following method:
    (i) In accordance with paragraph (b), an applicant shall draw a 
flight corridor on one or more maps with the Dmax origin 
centered on the intended launch point and the flight corridor 
centerline (in the downrange direction) aligned with the initial 
flight azimuth. The flight corridor is depicted in figure A-2 and 
its line segment lengths are tabulated in table A-3.
    (ii) An applicant shall define the flight corridor using the 
following boundary definitions:
    (A) An applicant shall draw an uprange boundary, which is 
defined by an arc-line GB (figure A-2), directly uprange from and 
centered on the intended launch point with radius Dmax.
    (B) An applicant shall draw line CF perpendicular to and 
centered on the flight azimuth line, and positioned 10 nm downrange 
from the launch point. The applicant shall use the length of line CF 
provided in table A-3 corresponding to the guided suborbital launch 
vehicle or orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph 
(c)(1)(i).
    (C) An applicant shall draw line DE perpendicular to and 
centered on the flight azimuth line, and positioned 100 nm downrange 
from the launch point. The applicant shall use the length of line DE 
provided in table A-3 corresponding to the guided suborbital launch 
vehicle or orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph 
(c)(1)(i).
    (D) Except for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an applicant 
shall draw a downrange boundary, which is defined by line HI and is 
drawn perpendicular to and centered on the flight azimuth line, and 
positioned 5,000 nm downrange from the launch point. The applicant 
shall use the length of line HI provided in table A-3 corresponding 
to the orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph (c)(1)(i).
    (E) An applicant shall draw crossrange boundaries, which are 
defined by three lines on the left side and three lines on the right 
side of the flight azimuth. An applicant shall construct the left 
flight corridor boundary according to the following, and as depicted 
in figure A-3 :
    (1) The first line (line BC in figure A-3) is tangent to the 
uprange boundary arc, and ends at endpoint C of line CF, as depicted 
in figure A-3;
    (2) The second line (line CD in figure A-3) begins at endpoint C 
of line BC and ends at endpoint D of line DH, as depicted in figure 
A-3;
    (3) For all orbital launch vehicles, the third line (line DH in 
figure A-3) begins at endpoint D of line CD and ends at endpoint H 
of line HI, as depicted in figure A-3; and
    (4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, the line DH begins 
at endpoint D of line CD and ends at a point tangent to the impact 
dispersion area drawn in accordance with paragraph (c)(4) and as 
depicted in figure A-4.
    (F) An applicant shall repeat the procedure in paragraph 
(c)(3)(ii)(E) for the right side boundary.
    (iii) An applicant shall identify the flight corridor on a map 
that meets the requirements of paragraph (b).
    (4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an applicant shall 
define a final stage impact dispersion area as part of the flight 
corridor and show the impact dispersion area on a map, as depicted 
in figure A-4, in accordance with the following:
    (i) An applicant shall select an apogee altitude 
(Hap) for the launch vehicle final stage. The apogee 
altitude should equal the highest altitude intended to be reached by 
a guided suborbital launch vehicle launched from the launch point.
    (ii) An applicant shall define the impact dispersion area by 
using an impact range factor [IP(Hap)] and a dispersion 
factor [DISP(Hap)] as shown below:
    (A) An applicant shall calculate the impact range (D) for the 
final launch vehicle stage. An applicant shall set D equal to the 
maximum apogee altitude (Hap) multiplied by the impact 
range factor as shown below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.048

where: IP(Hap) = 0.4 for an apogee less than 100 km; and 
IP(Hap) = 0.7 for an apogee 100 km or greater.

    (B) An applicant shall calculate the impact dispersion radius 
(R) for the final launch vehicle stage. An applicant shall set R 
equal to the maximum apogee altitude (Hap) multiplied by 
the dispersion factor as shown below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.049

where: DISP(Hap) = 0.05

    (iii) An applicant shall draw the impact dispersion area on a 
map with its center on the predicted impact point. An applicant 
shall then draw line DH in accordance with paragraph 
(c)(3)(ii)(E)(4).

(d) Evaluate the Flight Corridor

    (1) An applicant shall evaluate the flight corridor for the 
presence of any populated areas. If an applicant determines that no 
populated area is located within the flight corridor, then no 
additional steps are necessary.
    (2) If a populated area is located in an overflight exclusion 
zone, an applicant may modify its proposal or demonstrate that there 
are times when no people are present or that the applicant has an 
agreement in place to evacuate the public from the overflight 
exclusion zone during a launch.
    (3) If a populated area is located within the flight corridor, 
an applicant may modify its proposal and create another flight 
corridor pursuant to appendix A, use appendix B to narrow the flight 
corridor, or complete a risk analysis in accordance with appendix C.

            Table A-1.--Debris Dispersion Radius (Dmax) (in)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Orbital launch vehicles                    Suborbital
-----------------------------------------------------------    launch
                                                              vehicles
    Small          Medium      Medium large      Large     -------------
                                                               Guided
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      87,600        111,600        127,200        156,000        96,000
   (1.20 nm)      (1.53 nm)      (1.74 nm)      (2.14 nm)     (1.32 nm)
------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 62874]]


  Table A-2.--Overflight Exclusion Zone Downrange Distance (Doez) (in)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Orbital launch vehicles                    Suborbital
-----------------------------------------------------------    launch
                                                              vehicles
    Small          Medium      Medium large      Large     -------------
                                                               Guided
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     240,500        253,000        310,300        937,700       232,100
   (3.30 nm)      (3.47 nm)      (4.26 nm)     (12.86 nm)     (3.18 nm)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                            [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.050
                                                            

[[Page 62875]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.051


[[Page 62876]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.052


[[Page 62877]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.053


[[Page 62878]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.054

Appendix B to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor

(a) Introduction

    (1) This appendix provides a method to construct a flight 
corridor from a launch point for a guided suborbital launch vehicle 
or any one of the four weight classes of guided orbital launch 
vehicles from table 1, Sec. 420.19, using local meteorological data 
and a launch vehicle trajectory.
    (2) A flight corridor is constructed in two sections--one 
section comprising a launch area and one section comprising a 
downrange area. The launch area of a flight corridor reflects the 
extent of launch vehicle debris impacts in the event of a launch 
vehicle failure and applying local meteorological conditions. The 
downrange area reflects the extent of launch vehicle debris impacts 
in the event of a launch vehicle failure and applying vehicle 
imparted velocity, malfunctions turns, and vehicle guidance and 
performance dispersions.
    (3) A flight corridor includes an overflight exclusion zone in 
the launch area and, for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an 
impact dispersion area in the downrange area. A flight corridor for 
a guided suborbital launch vehicle ends with an impact dispersion 
area and, for the four classes of guided orbital launch vehicles, 
5,000 nautical miles (nm) from the launch point, or where the IIP 
leaves the surface of the Earth, whichever is shorter.

(b) Data Requirements

    (1) Launch area data requirements. An applicant shall satisfy 
the following data requirements to perform the launch area analysis 
of this appendix. The data requirements are identified in table B-1 
along with sources where data acceptable to the FAA may be obtained.
    (i) An applicant must select meteorological data that meet the 
specifications in table B-1 for the proposed launch site.

[[Page 62879]]



                Table B-1.--Launch Area Data Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Data category               Data item            Data source
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Meteorological Data.........  Local statistical     These data may be
                               wind data as a        obtained from:
                               function of          Global Gridded Upper
                               altitude up to        Air Statistics,
                               50,000 feet.          Climate
                               Required data         Applications Branch
                               include: altitude     National Climatic
                               (ft), atmospheric     Data Center.
                               density (slugs/ft
                               \3\), mean East/
                               West meridianal (u)
                               and North/South
                               zonal (v) wind (ft/
                               sec), standard
                               deviation of u and
                               v wind (ft/sec),
                               correlation
                               coefficient, number
                               of observations and
                               wind percentile (%).
Nominal Trajectory Data.....  State vector data as  Actual launch
                               function of time      vehicle trajectory
                               after liftoff in      data; or trajectory
                               topocentric launch    generation software
                               point centered        that meets the
                               X,Y,Z,X,Y,Z           requirements of
                               coordinates with      paragraph
                               the X-axis aligned    (b)(1)(ii).
                               with the flight
                               azimuth. Trajectory
                               time intervals
                               shall not be
                               greater than one
                               second. XYZ units
                               are in feet and
                               X,Y,Z units are in
                               ft/sec.
Debris Data.................  A fixed ballistic     N/A.
                               coefficient equal
                               to 3 lbs/ft \2\ is
                               used for the launch
                               area.
Geographical Data...........  Launch point          Geographical surveys
                               geodetic latitude     or Global
                               on a WGS-84           Positioning System.
                               ellipsoidal Earth
                               model.
                              Launch point
                               longitude on an
                               ellipsoidal Earth
                               model.
                              Maps using scales of  Map types with scale
                               not less than         and projection
                               1:250,000 inches      information are
                               per inch within 100   listed in the
                               nm of a launch        Defense Mapping
                               point and             Agency, Public
                               1:20,000,000 inches   Sale, Aeronautical
                               per inch for          Charts and
                               distances greater     Publications
                               than 100 nm from a    Catalog. The
                               launch point.         catalog and maps
                                                     may be ordered
                                                     through the U.S.
                                                     Dept. of Commerce,
                                                     National Oceanic
                                                     and Atmospheric
                                                     Administration,
                                                     National Ocean
                                                     Service.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) For a guided orbital launch vehicle, an applicant shall 
obtain or create a launch vehicle nominal trajectory. An applicant 
may use trajectory data from a launch vehicle manufacturer or 
generate a trajectory using trajectory simulation software. 
Trajectory time intervals shall be no greater than one second. If an 
applicant uses a trajectory computed with commercially available 
software, the software must calculate the trajectory using the 
following parameters, or clearly and convincingly demonstrated 
equivalents:
    (A) Launch location:
    (1) Launch point, using geodetic latitude and longitude to four 
decimal places; and
    (2) Launch point height above sea level.
    (B) Ellipsoidal Earth:
    (1) Mass of Earth;
    (2) Radius of Earth;
    (3) Earth flattening factor; and
    (4) Gravitational harmonic constants (J2, J3, J4).
    (C) Vehicle characteristics:
    (1) Mass as a function of time;
    (2) Thrust as a function of time;
    (3) Specific impulse (ISP) as a function of time; and
    (4) Stage dimensions.
    (D) Launch events:
    (1) Stage burn times; and
    (2) Stage drop-off times.
    (E) Atmosphere:
    (1) Density as a function of altitude;
    (2) Pressure as a function of altitude;
    (3) Speed of sound as a function of altitude; and
    (4) Temperature as a function of altitude.
    (F) Winds:
    (1) Wind direction as a function of altitude; and
    (2) Wind magnitude as a function of altitude.
    (I) Aerodynamics: drag coefficient as a function of mach number 
for each stage of flight showing subsonic, transonic and supersonic 
mach regions for each stage.
    (iii) An applicant shall use a ballistic coefficient () 
of 3 lbs/ft2 for debris impact computations.
    (iv) An applicant shall satisfy the map and plotting 
requirements for a launch area of appendix A, paragraph (b).
    (2) Downrange area data requirements. An applicant shall satisfy 
the following data requirements to perform the downrange area 
analysis of this appendix.
    (i) The launch vehicle weight class and method of generating a 
trajectory used in the launch area shall be used by an applicant in 
the downrange area as well. Trajectory time intervals must not be 
greater than one second.
    (ii) An applicant shall satisfy the map and plotting data 
requirements for a downrange area of appendix A, paragraph (b).

(c) Construction of a Launch Area of a Flight Corridor

    (1) An applicant shall construct a launch area of a flight 
corridor using the processes and equations of this paragraph for 
each trajectory position. An applicant shall repeat these processes 
at time points on the launch vehicle trajectory for time intervals 
of no greater than one second. When choosing wind data, an applicant 
shall use a time period of between one and 12 months.
    (2) A launch area analysis must include all trajectory positions 
whose Z-values are less than or equal to 50,000 ft.
    (3) Each trajectory time is denoted by the subscript ``i''. 
Height intervals for a given atmospheric pressure level are denoted 
by the subscript ``j'.
    (4) Using data from the GGUAS CD-ROM, an applicant shall 
estimate the mean atmospheric density, maximum wind speed, height 
interval fall times and height interval debris dispersions for 15 
mean geometric height intervals.
    (i) The height intervals in the GGUAS source data vary as a 
function of the following 15 atmospheric pressure levels expressed 
in millibars: surface, 1000, 850, 700, 500, 400, 300, 250, 200, 150, 
100, 70, 50, 30, 10. The actual geometric height associated with 
each pressure level varies depending on the time of year. An 
applicant shall estimate the mean geometric height over the period 
of months selected in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph for each of 
the 15 pressure levels as shown in equation B1.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.055

where:

Hj = mean geometric height hm = geometric 
height for a given month nm = number of observations for 
a given month
k = number of wind months of interest


[[Page 62880]]


    (ii) The atmospheric densities in the source data also vary as a 
function of the 15 atmospheric pressure levels. The actual 
atmospheric density associated with each pressure level varies 
depending on the time of year. An applicant shall estimate the mean 
atmospheric density over the period of months selected in accordance 
with subparagraph (1) of this paragraph for each of the 15 pressure 
levels as shown in equation B2.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.056

where:

j = mean atmospheric density
__
m = atmospheric density for a given month
nm = number of observations for a given month
k = number of wind months of interest

    (iii) An applicant shall estimate the algebraic maximum wind 
speed at a given pressure level as follows and shall repeat the 
process for each pressure level.
    (A) For each month, an applicant shall calculate the monthly 
mean wind speed (Waz) for 360 azimuths using equation B3;
    (B) An applicant shall select the maximum monthly mean wind 
speed from the 360 azimuths;
    (C) An applicant shall repeat subparagraphs (c)(4)(iii)(A) and 
(B) for each month of interest; and
    (D) An applicant shall select the maximum mean wind speed from 
the range of months. The absolute value of this wind is designated 
Wmax for the current pressure level.
    (iv) An applicant shall calculate wind speed using the means for 
winds from the West (u) and winds from the North (v). An applicant 
shall use equation B3 to resolve the winds to a specific azimuth 
bearing.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.057

where:

az = wind azimuth
u = West zonal wind component
v = North zonal wind component
Waz = mean wind speed at azimuth for each month

    (v) An applicant shall estimate the interval fall time over a 
height interval assuming the initial descent velocity is equal to 
the terminal velocity (VT). An applicant shall use 
equations B4 through B6 to estimate the fall time over a given 
height interval.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.058

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.059

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.060

where:

HTj= height difference between two mean 
geometric heights
= ballistic coefficient
__
x= mean atmospheric density for the corresponding mean 
geometric heights
 VTj = terminal velocity

    (vi) An applicant shall estimate the interval debris dispersion 
(Dj) by multiplying the interval fall time by the 
algebraic maximum mean wind speed (Wmax) as shown in 
equation B7.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.061

    (5) Once the Dj are estimated for each height interval, an 
applicant shall determine the total debris dispersion 
(Di) for each Zi using a linear interpolation 
and summation exercise, as shown below in equation B8. An applicant 
shall use a launch point height of zero equal to the surface level 
of the nearest GGUAS grid location.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.124

where:
n = number of height intervals below jth height interval

    (6) Once all the Di radii have been calculated, an 
applicant shall produce a launch area flight corridor in accordance 
with the requirements of subparagraphs (c)(6)(i)-(iv).
    (i) On a map meeting the requirements of appendix A, paragraph 
(b), an applicant shall plot the Xi position location on 
the flight azimuth for the corresponding Zi position;
    (ii) An applicant shall draw a circle of radius Di 
centered on the corresponding Xi position; and
    (iii) An applicant shall repeat the instructions in 
subparagraphs (c)(6)(i)-(ii) for each Di radius.
    (iv) The launch area of a flight corridor is the enveloping line 
that encloses the outer boundary of the Di circles as 
shown in Fig. B-1. The uprange portion of a flight corridor is 
described by a semi-circle arc that is a portion of either the most 
uprange Di dispersion circle, or the overflight exclusion 
zone (defined by subparagraph (c)(7)), whichever is further uprange.
    (7) An applicant shall define an overflight exclusion zone in 
the launch area in accordance with the requirements of appendix A, 
subparagraph (c)(2).
    (8) An applicant shall draw the launch area flight corridor and 
overflight exclusion zone on a map or maps that meet the 
requirements of table B-1.

[[Page 62881]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.062

    (d) Construction of a Downrange Area of a Flight Corridor
    (1) The downrange area analysis estimates the debris dispersion 
for the downrange time points on a launch vehicle trajectory. An 
applicant shall perform the downrange area analysis using the 
processes and equations of this paragraph.
    (2) The downrange area analysis shall include trajectory 
positions at a height (the Zi-values) greater than 50,000 
feet and nominal trajectory IIP values less than or equal to 5,000 
nm. For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, the final IIP value for 
which an applicant must account is the launch vehicle final stage 
impact point. Each trajectory time shall be one second or less and 
is denoted by the subscript ``i'.
    (3) An applicant shall compute the downrange area of a flight 
corridor boundary in four steps, from each trajectory time 
increment: determine a reduction ratio factor; calculate the launch 
vehicle position after simulating a malfunction turn; rotate the 
state vector after the malfunction turn in the range of three 
degrees to one degree as a function of Xi distance 
downrange; and compute the IIP of the resulting trajectory. The 
locus of IIPs describes the boundary of the downrange area of a 
flight corridor. An applicant shall use the following subparagraphs, 
(d)(3)(i)-(v), to compute the downrange area of the flight corridor 
boundary:
    (i) Compute the downrange Distance to the final IIP position for 
a nominal trajectory as follows:
    (A) Using equations B30 through B69, determine the IIP 
coordinates (max, max) for 
the nominal state vector before the launch vehicle enters orbit 
where  in equation B30 is the nominal flight azimuth angle 
measured from True North.
    (B) Using the range and bearing equations of appendix A, 
paragraph (b)(3), determine the distance (Smax) from the 
launch point coordinates (lp, 
lp) to the IIP coordinates 
(max, max) computed in 
accordance with (3)(i)(A) of this paragraph.
    (C) The distance for Smax may not exceed 5000 nm. In 
cases when the actual value exceeds 5000 nm the applicant shall use 
5000 nm for Smax.
    (ii) Compute the reduction ratio factor (Fn) for each 
trajectory time increment as follows:
    (A) Using equations B30 through B69, determine the IIP 
coordinates (i, i) for the 
nominal state vector where  in equation B30 is the nominal 
flight azimuth angle measured from True North.
    (B) Using the range and bearing equations of appendix A, 
paragraph (b)(3), determine the distance (Si) from the 
launch point coordinates (lp, 
lp) to the IIP coordinates 
(i, i) computed in 
(3)(ii)(A) of this paragraph.
    (C) The reduction ratio factor is:
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.122
    
    (iii) An applicant shall compute the launch vehicle position and 
velocity components after a simulated malfunction turn for each 
Xi using the following method.
    (A) Turn duration (t) = 4 sec.
    (B) Turn angle ()
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.123
    
    The turn angle equations perform a turn in the launch vehicle's 
yaw plane, as depicted in figure B-2.

[[Page 62882]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.063

    (C) Launch vehicle velocity magnitude at the beginning of the 
turn (Vb) and velocity magnitude at the end of the turn 
(Ve)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.064

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.065

    (D) Average velocity magnitude over the turn duration (V)
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.066
    
    (E) Velocity vector path angle (i) at turn 
epoch
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.121

    (F) Launch vehicle position components at the end of turn 
duration

[[Page 62883]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.067

where: g1 = 32.17405 ft/sec2
    (G) Launch vehicle velocity components at the end of turn 
duration
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.068

    (iv) An applicant shall rotate the trajectory state vector at 
the end of the turn duration to the right and left to define the 
right-lateral flight corridor boundary and the left-lateral flight 
corridor boundary, respectively. An applicant shall perform the 
trajectory rotation in conjunction with a trajectory transformation 
from the X90, Y90, Z90, 
X90, Y90, Z90, components to E, N, 
U, E, N, U. The trajectory subscripts ``R'' and ``L'' from equations 
B15 through B26 have been discarded to reduce the number of 
equations. An applicant shall transform from to E,N,U,E,N,U to 
E,F,G,E,F,G. An applicant shall use the equations of paragraph 
(d)(3)(iv)(A)-(F) to produce the EFG components necessary to 
estimate each instantaneous impact point.
    (A) An applicant must calculate the flight angle ()
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.069
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.101
    
    (B) An applicant shall transform 
X90,Y90,Z90 to E,N,U

[[Page 62884]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.102

    (C) An applicant shall transform to X90, 
Y90, Z90 to E, N, U.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.103

    (D) An applicant shall transform the launch point coordinates 
(00,h0) to 
E0,F0,G0
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.104

    (E) An applicant shall transform E,N,U to 
E90,F90,G90
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.070

    (F) An applicant shall transform to E,N,U TO E,F,G
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.071
    
    (v) The IIP computation implements an iterative solution to the 
impact point problem. An applicant shall solve equations B46 through 
B69, with the appropriate substitutions, up to a maximum of five 
times. Each repetition of the equations provides a more accurate 
prediction of the IIP. An applicant shall use the required IIP 
computations of paragraphs (d)(3)(v)(A)-(W) below. An applicant 
shall use this IIP computation for both the left-and right-lateral 
offsets. The IIP computations will result in latitude and longitude 
pairs for the left-lateral flight corridor boundary and the right-
lateral flight corridor boundary. An applicant shall use the lines 
connecting the latitude and longitude pairs to describe the entire 
downrange area boundary of the flight corridor up to 5000 nm or a 
final stage impact dispersion area.
    (A) An applicant shall approximate the radial distance 
(rk,l) from the geocenter to the 
IIP. The distance from the center of the Earth ellipsoid to the 
launch point shall be used for the initial approximation of 
rk,l as shown in equation B46.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.072

    (B) An applicant shall compute the radial distance (r) from the 
geocenter to the launch vehicle position.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.073

    If r  rk,l then the launch 
vehicle position is below the Earth's surface and an impact point 
cannot be computed. An applicant must restart the calculations with 
the next trajectory state vector.
    (C) An applicant shall compute the inertial velocity components.

[[Page 62885]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.074

where:  = 4.178074 x 10-\3\ deg/sec

    (D) An applicant shall compute the magnitude of the inertial 
velocity vector.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.075

    (E) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the 
trajectory ellipse multiplied by the cosine of the eccentric anomaly 
at epoch c).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.076

where: K = 1.407644 x 1016 ft3/sec2

    (F) An applicant shall compute the semi-major axis of the 
trajectory ellipse (at).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.077

    If at 0 or at then the trajectory orbit is 
not elliptical, but is hyperbolic or parabolic, and an impact point 
cannot be computed. The launch vehicle has achieved escape velocity 
and the applicant may terminate computations.
    (G) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the 
trajectory ellipse multiplied by the sine of the eccentric anomaly 
at epoch s).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.078

    (H) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the 
trajectory ellipse squared t(1-)-aE] > 0 and  0 then the trajectory perigee height is positive and an 
impact point cannot be computed. The launch vehicle has achieved 
Earth orbit and the applicant may terminate computations.
    (I) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the 
trajectory ellipse multiplied by the cosine of the eccentric anomaly 
at impact (ck).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.080

    (J) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the 
trajectory ellipse multiplied by the sine of the eccentric anomaly 
at impact (sk).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.081

    If sk  0 then the trajectory orbit does not 
intersect the Earth's surface and an impact point cannot be 
computed. The launch vehicle has achieved Earth orbit and the 
applicant may terminate computations.
    (K) An applicant shall compute the cosine of the difference 
between the eccentric anomaly at impact and the eccentric anomaly at 
epoch (ck).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.082

    (L) An applicant shall compute the sine of the difference 
between the eccentric anomaly at impact and the eccentric anomaly at 
epoch (sk).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.083

    (M) An applicant shall compute the f-series expansion of 
Kepler's equations.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.084

    (N) An applicant shall compute the g-series expansion of 
Kepler's equations.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.085

    (O) An applicant shall compute the E,F,G coordinates at impact 
(Ei,Fi,Gi).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.086

    (P) An applicant shall approximate the distance from the 
geocenter to the launch vehicle position at impact 
(rk,2).

[[Page 62886]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.087

where:

aE = 20925646.3255 ft
e\2\ = 0.00669437999013
    (Q) An applicant shall let rk+1,1 = rk,2, 
substitute rk+1,1 for rk,1 in equation B55 and 
repeat equations B55--B64 up to four more times increasing ``k'' by 
an increment of one on each loop (e.g. k{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}). 
If |r5,1-r5,2| > 1 then the iterative solution 
does not converge and an impact point does not meet the accuracy 
tolerance of plus or minus one foot. An applicant must try more 
iterations, or restart the calculations with the next trajectory 
state vector.
    (R) An applicant shall compute the difference between the 
eccentric anomaly at impact and the eccentric anomaly at epoch 
().
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.088

    (S) An applicant shall compute the time of flight from epoch to 
impact (t).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.089

    (T) An applicant shall compute the geocentric latitude at impact 
(').
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.090

Where: +90 deg.>'i> -90 deg.

    (U) An applicant shall compute the geodetic latitude at impact 
().
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.091

Where: +90 deg.>i> -90 deg.

    (V) An applicant shall compute the East longitude at impact 
().
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.092

    (W) If the range from the launch point to the impact point is 
equal to or greater than 5000 nm, an applicant shall terminate IIP 
computations.
    (4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an applicant shall 
define a final stage impact dispersion area as part of the flight 
corridor and show the area on a map using the following procedure:
    (i) For equation B70 below, an applicant shall use an apogee 
altitude (Hap) corresponding to the highest altitude 
reached by the launch vehicle final stage in the applicant's launch 
vehicle trajectory analysis done in accordance with paragraph 
(b)(1)(ii).
    (ii) An applicant shall define the final stage impact dispersion 
area by using a dispersion factor [DISP(Hap)] as shown 
below. An applicant shall calculate the impact dispersion radius (R) 
for the final launch vehicle stage. An applicant shall set R equal 
to the maximum apogee altitude (Hap) multiplied by the 
dispersion factor as shown below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.093

where: DISP(Hap) = 0.05

    (5) An applicant shall combine the launch area and downrange 
area flight corridor and any final stage impact dispersion area for 
a guided suborbital launch vehicle.
    (i) On the same map with the launch area flight corridor, an 
applicant shall plot the latitude and longitude positions of the 
left and right sides of the downrange area of the flight corridor 
calculated in accordance with subparagraph (d)(3).
    (ii) An applicant shall connect the latitude and longitude 
positions of the left side of the downrange area of the flight 
corridor sequentially starting with the last IIP calculated on the 
left side and ending with the first IIP calculated on the left side. 
An applicant shall repeat this procedure for the right side.
    (iii) An applicant shall connect the left sides of the launch 
area and downrange portions of the flight corridor. An applicant 
shall repeat this procedure for the right side.
    (iv) An applicant shall plot the overflight exclusion zone 
defined in subparagraph (c)(7).
    (v) An applicant shall draw any impact dispersion area on the 
downrange map with the center of the impact dispersion area on the 
launch vehicle final stage impact point obtained from the 
applicant's launch vehicle trajectory analysis done in accordance 
with subparagraph (b)(1)(ii).

(e) Evaluate the Launch Site

    (1) An applicant shall evaluate the flight corridor for the 
presence of populated areas. If no populated area is located within 
the flight corridor, then no additional steps are necessary.
    (2) If a populated area is located in an overflight exclusion 
zone, an applicant may modify its proposal or demonstrate that there 
are times when no people are present or that the applicant has an 
agreement in place to evacuate the public from the overflight 
exclusion zone during a launch.
    (3) If a populated area is located within the flight corridor, 
an applicant may modify its proposal or complete an overflight risk 
analysis in accordance with appendix C.

Appendix C to Part 420--Risk Analysis

(a) Introduction

    (1) This appendix provides a method for an applicant to estimate 
the expected casualty (Ec) for a launch of a guided 
expendable launch vehicle using a flight corridor generated either 
by appendix A or appendix B. This appendix also provides an 
applicant options to simplify the method where population at risk is 
minimal.
    (2) An applicant shall perform a risk analysis when a populated 
area is located within a flight corridor defined by either appendix 
A or appendix B. If the estimated expected casualty exceeds 30 x 10 
-\6\, an applicant may either modify its proposal, or if 
the flight corridor used was generated by the appendix A method, use 
the appendix B method to narrow the flight corridor and then redo 
the overflight risk analysis pursuant to this appendix. If the 
estimated expected casualty still exceeds 30 x 10 -\6\, 
the FAA will not approve the location of the proposed launch point.

(b) Data Requirements

    (1) An applicant shall obtain the data specified by 
subparagraphs (b)(2) and (3) and summarized in table C-1. Table C-1 
provides sources where an applicant may obtain data acceptable to 
the FAA. An applicant must also employ the flight corridor 
information

[[Page 62887]]

from appendix A or B, including flight azimuth and, for an appendix 
B flight corridor, trajectory information.
    (2) Population data. Total population (N) and the total landmass 
area within a populated area (A) are required. Population data up to 
and including 100 nm from the launch point are required at the U.S. 
census block group level. Population data downrange from 100 nm are 
required at no greater than 1 deg.  x  1 deg. latitude/longitude 
grid coordinates.
    (3) Launch vehicle data. Launch vehicle data consist of the 
launch vehicle failure probability (Pf), the launch 
vehicle effective casualty area (Ac), trajectory position 
data, and the overflight dwell time (td). The failure 
probability is a constant (Pf = 0.10) for a guided 
orbital or suborbital expendable launch vehicle. Table C-3 provides 
effective casualty area data based on IIP range. Trajectory position 
information is provided from distance computations provided by this 
appendix for an appendix A flight corridor, or trajectory data used 
in appendix B for an appendix B flight corridor. The dwell time 
(td) may be determined from trajectory data produced when 
creating an appendix B flight corridor.

            Table C-1.--Overflight Analysis Data Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Data category               Data item            Data source
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Population Data.............  Total population      Within 100 nm of the
                               within a populated    launch point: U.S.
                               area (N).             census data at the
                                                     census block-group
                                                     level. Downrange
                                                     from 100 nm beyond
                                                     the launch point,
                                                     world population
                                                     data are available
                                                     from:
                              Total landmass area   Carbon Dioxide
                               within the            Information
                               populated area (A).   Analysis Center
                                                     (CDIAC) Oak Ridge
                                                     National Laboratory
                                                    Database--Global
                                                     Population
                                                     Distribution
                                                     (1990), Terrestrial
                                                     Area and Country
                                                     Name Information on
                                                     a One by One Degree
                                                     Grid Cell Basis
                                                     (DB1016 (8-1996)
Launch Vehicle Data.........  Failure probability-- N/A.
                               Pf = 0.10.
                              Effective casualty    See table C-3.
                               area (Ac).
                              Overflight dwell      Determined by range
                               time.                 from the launch
                                                     point or trajectory
                                                     used by applicant.
                              Nominal trajectory    See appendix B,
                               data (for an          table B-1.
                               appendix B flight
                               corridor only).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

(c) Estimating Corridor Casualty Expectation

    (1) A corridor casualty expectation [EC(Corridor)] 
estimate is the sum of the expected casualty measurement of each 
populated area inside a flight corridor.
    (2) An applicant shall identify and locate each populated area 
in the proposed flight corridor.
    (3) An applicant shall determine the probability of impact in 
each populated area using the procedures in subparagraphs (5) or (6) 
of this paragraph. Figures C-1 and C-2 illustrate an area considered 
for probability of impact (Pi ) computations by the 
dashed-lined box around the populated area within a flight corridor, 
and figure C-3 illustrates a populated area in a final stage impact 
dispersion area. An applicant shall then estimate the EC 
for each populated area in accordance with subparagraphs (7) and (8) 
of this paragraph.
    (4) The Pi computations do not directly account for 
populated areas whose areas are bisected by an appendix A flight 
corridor centerline or an appendix B nominal trajectory ground 
trace. Accordingly, an applicant must evaluate Pi for 
each of the bi-sections as two separate populated areas, as shown in 
figure C-4, which shows one bi-section to the left of an appendix A 
flight corridor's centerline and one to its right.
    (5) Probability of impact (Pi) computations for a 
populated area in an appendix A flight corridor. An applicant shall 
compute Pi for each populated area using the following 
method:
    (i) For the launch and downrange areas, but not for a final 
stage impact dispersion area for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, 
an applicant shall compute Pi for each populated area 
using the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.094

where:

x1, x2 = closest and farthest downrange 
distance (nm) along the flight corridor centerline to the populated 
area (see figure C-1)
y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range 
distance (nm) to the populated area measured from the flight 
corridor centerline (see figure C-1)
y = one-third of the cross range distance from 
the centerline to the flight corridor boundary (see figure C-1)
exp = exponential function (e \x\)
Pf = probability of failure = 0.10
R = IIP range rate (nm/sec) (see table C-2)
C = 643 seconds (constant)


                Table C-2.--IIP Range Rate vs. IIP Range
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              IIP range
                      IIP range  (nm)                         rate  (nm/
                                                                  s)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-75.......................................................         0.75
76-300.....................................................         1.73
301-900....................................................         4.25
901-1700...................................................         8.85
1701-2600..................................................        19.75
2601-3500..................................................        42.45
3501-4500..................................................        84.85
4501-5250..................................................       154.95
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (ii) For each populated area within a final stage impact 
dispersion area, an applicant shall compute Pi using the 
following method:

[[Page 62888]]

    (A) An applicant shall estimate the probability of final stage 
impact in the x and y sectors of each populated area within the 
final stage impact dispersion area using equations C2 and C3:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.095

where:

X1,X2 = closest and farthest downrange 
distance, measured along the flight corridor centerline, measured 
from the nominal impact point to the populated area (see figure C-3)
x = one-third of the impact dispersion radius 
(see figure C-3)
exp = exponential function (e \x\)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.096

where:

y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range 
distance to the populated area measured from the flight corridor 
centerline (see figure C-3)
y = one-third of the impact dispersion radius 
(see figure C-3)
exp = exponential function (e \x\)

    (B) If a populated area intersects the impact dispersion area 
boundary so that the x2 or y2 distance would 
otherwise extend outside the impact dispersion area, the 
x2 or y2 distance should be set equal to the 
impact dispersion area radius. The x2 distance for 
populated area A in figure C-3 is an example. If a populated area 
intersects the flight azimuth, an applicant shall solve equation C3 
by obtaining the solution in two parts. An applicant shall 
determine, first, the probability between y1 = 0 and 
y2 = a and, second, the probability between y1 
= 0 and y2 = b, as depicted in figure C-4. The 
probability Py is then equal to the sum of the 
probabilities of the two parts. If a populated area intersects the 
line that is normal to the flight azimuth on the impact point, an 
applicant shall solve equation C2 by obtaining the solution in two 
parts in the same manner as with the values of x.
    (C) An applicant shall calculate the probability of impact for 
each populated area using equation C4 below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.097

where: Ps = 1-Pf = 0.90

[[Page 62889]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.098

    (6) Probability of impact computations for a populated area in 
an appendix B flight corridor. An applicant shall compute 
Pi using the following method:
    (i) For the launch and downrange areas, but not for a final 
stage impact dispersion area for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, 
an applicant shall compute Pi for each populated area 
using the following equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.099

where:

y1,y2 = closest and farthest cross range 
distance (nm) to a populated area measured from the nominal 
trajectory IIP ground trace (see figure C-2)
y = one-third of the cross range distance (nm) 
from nominal trajectory to the flight corridor boundary (see figure 
C-2)
exp = exponential function (ex)
Pf = probability of failure = 0.10
t = flight time from lift-off to orbital insertion (seconds)
td = overflight dwell time (seconds)

    (ii) For each populated area within a final stage impact 
dispersion area, an applicant shall compute Pi using the 
following method:
    (A) An applicant shall estimate the probability of final stage 
impact in the x and y sectors of each populated area within the 
final stage impact dispersion area using equations C6 and C7:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.100

where:

x1,x2 = closest and farthest downrange 
distance, measured along nominal trajectory IIP ground trace, 
measured from the nominal impact point to the populated area (see 
figure C-3)

[[Page 62890]]

x = one-third of the impact dispersion radius 
(see figure C-3)
exp = exponential function (ex)

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.105

where:

y1,y2 = closest and farthest cross range 
distance to the populated area measured from the nominal trajectory 
IIP ground trace (see figure C-3)
y = one-third of the impact dispersion radius 
(see figure C-3)
exp = exponential function (ex)

    (B) If a populated area intersects the impact dispersion area 
boundary so that the x2 or y2 distance would 
otherwise extend outside the impact dispersion area, the x2 
or y2 distance should be set equal to the impact 
dispersion area radius. The x2 distance for populated 
area A in figure C-3 is an example. If a populated area intersects 
the flight azimuth, an applicant shall solve equation C7 by 
obtaining the solution in two parts. An applicant shall determine, 
first, the probability between y1 = 0 and y2 = 
a and, second, the probability between y1 = 0 and y2 
= b, as depicted in figure C-4. The probability Py is 
then equal to the sum of the probabilities of the two parts. If a 
populated area intersects the line that is normal to the flight 
azimuth on the impact point, an applicant shall solve equation C6 by 
obtaining the solution in two parts in a similar manner with the 
values of x.
    (C) An applicant shall calculate the probability of impact for 
each populated area using equation C8 below:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.106

where: Ps = 1-Pf = 0.90

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.107


[[Page 62891]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.108

    (7) Using the Pi calculated in either subparagraph 
(c)(5) or (6) of this paragraph, an applicant shall calculate the 
casualty expectancy for each populated area within the flight 
corridor in accordance with equation C9. Eck is the 
casualty expectancy for a given populated area as shown in equation 
C9, where individual populated areas are designated with the 
subscript ``k''.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.109


[[Page 62892]]


where:

Ac = casualty area (from table C-3)
Ak = populated area
Nk = population in Ak

                 Table C-3.--Effective Casualty Area (miles \2\) as a Function of IIP Range (nm)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Orbital launch vehicles                                        Suborbital
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    launch
                                                                                                      vehicles
             IIP Range  (nmi)                   Small        Medium     Medium large      Large    -------------
                                                                                                       Guided
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-49......................................          0.43          0.53          0.71          1.94          0.43
50-1749...................................          0.13        0.0022          0.11          0.62          0.13
1750-5000.................................   3.59 x 10-6    8.3 x 10-4   1.08 x 10-1   7.17 x 10-1   3.59 x 10-6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (8) An applicant shall estimate the total corridor risk 
using the following summation of risk:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.110

    (9) Alternative casualty expectancy (EC ) analyses. 
An applicant may employ specified variations to the analysis defined 
by subparagraphs (c)(1)-(8). Those variations are identified in 
subparagraphs (9)(i) through (vi) of this paragraph. Subparagraphs 
(i) through (iv) permit an applicant to make conservative 
assumptions that would lead to an overestimation of the corridor 
EC compared with the analysis defined by subparagraphs 
(c)(1)-(8). In subparagraphs (v) and (vi), an applicant that would 
otherwise fail the analysis prescribed by subparagraphs (c)(1)-(8) 
may avoid (c)(1)-(8)'s overestimation of the probability of impact 
in each populated area. An applicant employing a variation shall 
identify the variation used, show and discuss the specific 
assumptions made to modify the analysis defined by subparagraphs 
(c)(1)-(8), and demonstrate how each assumption leads to 
overestimation of the corridor EC compared with the 
analysis defined by subparagraphs (c)(1)-(c)(8).
    (i) Assume that Px and Py have a value of 
1.0 for all populated areas.
    (ii) Combine populated areas into one or more larger populated 
areas, and use a population density for the combined area or areas 
equal to the most densely populated area.
    (iii) For any given populated area, assume Py has a 
value of one.
    (iv) For any given Px sector (an area spanning the 
width of a flight corridor and bounded by two time points on the 
trajectory IIP ground trace) assume Py has a value of one 
and use a population density for the sector equal to the most 
densely populated area.
    (v) For a given populated area, divide the populated area into 
smaller rectangles, determine Pi for each individual 
rectangle, and sum the individual impact probabilities to determine 
Pi for the entire populated area.
    (vi) For a given populated area, use the ratio of the populated 
area to the area of the Pi rectangle from the 
subparagraph (c)(1)-(8) analysis.

(d) Evaluation of Results

    (1) If the estimated expected casualty does not exceed 
30x10-\6\, the FAA will approve the launch site location.
    (2) If the estimated expected casualty exceeds 
30 x 10-\6\, then an applicant may either modify its 
proposal, or, if the flight corridor used was generated by the 
appendix A method, use the appendix B method to narrow the flight 
corridor and then perform another appendix C risk analysis.

Appendix D to Part 420--Impact Dispersion Areas and Casualty Expectancy 
Estimate for an Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicle

(a) Introduction

    (1) This appendix provides a method for determining the 
acceptability of the location of a launch point from which an 
unguided suborbital launch vehicle would be launched. The appendix 
describes how to define an overflight exclusion zone and impact 
dispersion areas, and how to evaluate whether the public risk 
presented by the launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle 
remains at acceptable levels.
    (2) An applicant shall base its analysis on an unguided 
suborbital launch vehicle whose final launch vehicle stage apogee 
represents the intended use of the launch point.
    (3) An applicant shall use the apogee of each stage of an 
existing unguided suborbital launch vehicle with a final launch 
vehicle stage apogee equal to the one proposed, and calculate each 
impact range and dispersion area using the equations provided.
    (4) This appendix also provides a method for performing an 
impact risk analysis that estimates the expected casualty 
(Ec) within each impact dispersion area. This appendix 
provides an applicant options to simplify the method where 
population at risk is minimal.
    (5) If the estimated Ec is less than or equal to 
30 x 10-6, the FAA will approve the launch point for 
unguided suborbital launch vehicles. If the estimated Ec 
exceeds 30 x 10-6, the proposed launch point will fail 
the launch site location review.

(b) Data Requirements

    (1) An applicant shall employ the apogee of each stage of an 
existing unguided suborbital launch vehicle whose final stage apogee 
represents the maximum altitude to be reached by unguided suborbital 
launch vehicles launched from the launch point. The apogee shall be 
obtained from one or more actual flights of an unguided suborbital 
launch vehicle launched at an 84 degree elevation.
    (2) An applicant shall satisfy the map and plotting data 
requirements of appendix A, paragraph (b).
    (3) Population data. An applicant shall use total population (N) 
and the total landmass area within a populated area (A) for all 
populated areas within an impact dispersion area. Population data up 
to and including 100 nm from the launch point are required at the 
U.S. census block group level. Population data downrange from 100 nm 
are required at no greater than 1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude/longitude 
grid coordinates.

(c) Overflight Exclusion Zone and Impact Dispersion Areas

    (1) An applicant shall choose a flight azimuth from a launch 
point.
    (2) An applicant shall define an overflight exclusion zone as a 
circle with a radius of 1600 feet centered on the launch point.
    (3) An applicant shall define an impact dispersion area for each 
stage of the suborbital launch vehicle chosen in accordance with 
subparagraph (b)(1) in accordance with the following:
    (i) An applicant shall calculate the impact range for the final 
launch vehicle stage (Dn). An applicant shall set 
Dn equal to the last stage apogee altitude 
(Hn) multiplied by an impact range factor 
[IP(Hn)] in accordance with the following:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.111

where:

IP(Hn) = 0.4 for an apogee less than 100 km, and
IP(Hn) = 0.7 for an apogee of 100 km or greater.


[[Page 62893]]


    (ii) An applicant shall calculate the impact range for each 
intermediate stage (Di), where i  {1, 2, 3, . . 
. (n- 1)}, and where n is the total number of launch vehicle stages. 
Using the apogee altitude (Hi) of each intermediate 
stage, an applicant shall use equation D1 to compute the impact 
range of each stage by substituting Hi for Hn. 
An applicant shall use the impact range factors provided by equation 
D1.
    (iii) An applicant shall calculate the impact dispersion radius 
for the final launch vehicle stage (Rn). An applicant 
shall set Rn equal to the last stage apogee altitude 
(Hn) multiplied by an impact dispersion factor 
[DISP(Hn)] in accordance with the following:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.112

where:

DISP(Hn) = 0.4 for an apogee less than 100 km, and
DISP(Hn) = 0.7 for an apogee of 100 km or greater.

    (iv) An applicant shall calculate the impact dispersion radius 
for each intermediate stage (Ri), where i  {1, 
2, 3, . . . (n- 1)} and where n is the total number of launch 
vehicle stages. Using the apogee altitude (Hi) of each 
intermediate stage, an applicant shall use equation D2 to compute an 
impact dispersion radius of each stage by substituting Hi 
for Hn. An applicant shall use the dispersion factors 
provided by equation D2.
    (4) An applicant shall display an overflight exclusion zone, 
each intermediate and final stage impact point (Di 
through Dn), and each impact dispersion area for the 
intermediate and final launch vehicle stages on maps in accordance 
with paragraph (b)(2).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.113

(d) Evaluate the Overflight Exclusion Zone and Impact Dispersion 
Areas

    (1) An applicant shall evaluate the overflight exclusion zone 
and each impact dispersion area for the presence of any populated 
areas. If an applicant determines that no populated area is located 
within the overflight exclusion zone or any impact dispersion area, 
then no additional steps are necessary.
    (2) If a populated area is located in an overflight exclusion 
zone, an applicant may modify its proposal or demonstrate that there 
are times when no people are present or that the applicant has an 
agreement in place to evacuate the public from the overflight 
exclusion zone during a launch.
    (3) If a populated area is located within any impact dispersion 
area, an applicant may modify its proposal and define a new 
overflight exclusion zone and new impact dispersion areas, or 
perform an impact risk analysis in accordance with paragraph (e).

(e) Impact Risk Analysis

    (1) An applicant shall estimate the expected average number of 
casualties, EC, within the impact dispersion areas 
according to the following method:
    (i) An applicant shall calculate the Ec by summing 
the impact risk for the impact dispersion areas of the final launch 
vehicle stage and all intermediate stages. An applicant shall 
estimate Ec for the impact dispersion area of each stage 
by using equations D3 through D7 for each of the populated areas 
located within the impact dispersion areas.
    (ii) An applicant shall estimate the probability of impacting 
inside the X and Y sectors of each populated area within each impact 
dispersion area using equations D3 and D4:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.114

where:


[[Page 62894]]


x1, x2 = closest and farthest downrange 
distance to populated area (see figure D-2)
x = one-third of the impact dispersion radius 
(see figure D-2)

exp = exponential function (e\x\)

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.115

where:

y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range 
distance to the populated area (see figure D-2)
y = one-third of the impact dispersion radius 
(see figure D-2)
exp = exponential function (e\x\)

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.116

    (iii) If a populated area intersects the impact dispersion area 
boundary so that the x2 or y2 distance would 
otherwise extend outside the impact dispersion area, the 
x2 or y2 distance should be set equal to the 
impact dispersion area radius. The x2 distance for 
populated area A in figure D-2 is an example.
    (iv) If a populated area intersects the flight azimuth, an 
applicant shall solve equation D4 by obtaining the solution in two 
parts. An applicant shall determine, first, the probability between 
y1 = 0 and y2 = a and, second, the probability 
between y1 = 0 and y2 = b, as depicted in 
figure D-3. The probability Py is then equal to the sum 
of the probabilities of the two parts. If a populated area 
intersects the line that is normal to the flight azimuth on the 
impact point, an applicant shall solve equation D3 by obtaining the 
solution in two parts in the same manner as with the values of x.

[[Page 62895]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.117

    (v) An applicant shall calculate the probability of impact 
(Pi) for each populated area using the following 
equation:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.118

where:
Ps = probability of success = 0.98

    (vi) An applicant shall calculate the casualty expectancy for 
each populated area. Eck is the casualty 
expectancy for a given populated area as shown in equation D6, where 
individual populated areas are designated with the subscript ``k''.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.119

where:

 k { {1, 2, 3, . . . , n}
Ac = casualty area (from table D-1)
Ak = populated area
Nk = population in Ak


        Table D-1.--Effective Casualty Area (Ac) vs. Impact Range
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Effective
                    Impact range (nm)                      casualty area
                                                            (miles\2\)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-4.....................................................      9 x 10-\3\
5-49....................................................      9 x 10-\3\
50-1,749................................................    1.1 x 10-\5\
1,750-4,999.............................................    3.6 x 10-\6\
5,000-more..............................................    3.6 x 10-\6\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (vii) An applicant shall estimate the total risk using the 
following summation of risk:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19OC00.120

    (viii) Alternative casualty expectancy (Ec) analysis. 
An applicant may employ specified variations to the analysis defined 
by subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii). Those variations are identified in 
subparagraphs (viii)(A) through (F) of this paragraph. Subparagraphs 
(A) through (D) permit an applicant to make conservative assumptions 
that would lead to an overestimation of Ec compared with 
the analysis defined by subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii). In 
subparagraphs (E) and (F), an applicant that would otherwise fail 
the analysis prescribed by subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii) may avoid 
(d)(1)(i)-(vii)'s overestimation of the

[[Page 62896]]

probability of impact in each populated area. An applicant employing 
a variation shall identify the variation used, show and discuss the 
specific assumptions made to modify the analysis defined by 
subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii), and demonstrate how each assumption 
leads to overestimation of the corridor Ec compared with 
the analysis defined by subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii).
    (A) Assume that Px and Py have a value of 
1.0 for all populated areas.
    (B) Combine populated areas into one or more larger populated 
areas, and use a population density for the combined area or areas 
equal to the most densely populated area.
    (C) For any given populated area, assume Px has a 
value of one.
    (D) For any given populated area, assume Py has a 
value of one.
    (E) For a given populated area, divide the populated area into 
smaller rectangles, determine Pi for each individual 
rectangle, and sum the individual impact probabilities to determine 
Pi for the entire populated area.
    (F) For a given populated area, use the ratio of the populated 
area to the area of the Pi rectangle used in the 
subparagraph (d)(1)(i)-(vii) analysis.
    (2) If the estimated expected casualty does not exceed 30  x  
10-\6\, the FAA will approve the launch point.
    (3) If the estimated expected casualty exceeds 30  x  
10-6, then an applicant may modify its proposal and then 
repeat the impact risk analysis in accordance with this appendix D. 
If no set of impact dispersion areas exist which satisfy the FAA's 
risk threshold, the applicant's proposed launch site will fail the 
launch site location review.

Appendix E to Part 420--Tables for Explosive Site Plan

                         Table E-1.--Quantity Distance Requirements for Solid Explosives
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Public area     Public area      Intraline       Intraline
                                     Quantity     distance (ft.)  distance (ft.)  distance (ft.)  distance (ft.)
     Quantity (lbs.) (over)         (lbs.) (not    for division    for division    for division    for division
                                       over)            1.1             1.3             1.1             1.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0...............................           1,000           1,250              75     D = 18 W1/3              50
1,000...........................           5,000  ..............             115  ..............              75
5,000...........................          10,000  ..............             150  ..............             100
10,000..........................          20,000  ..............             190  ..............             125
20,000..........................          30,000  ..............             215  ..............             145
30,000..........................          40,000     D = 40 W1/3             235  ..............             155
40,000..........................          50,000  ..............             250  ..............             165
50,000..........................          60,000  ..............             260  ..............             175
60,000..........................          70,000  ..............             270  ..............             185
70,000..........................          80,000  ..............             280  ..............             190
80,000..........................          90,000  ..............             195  ..............             195
90,000..........................         100,000  ..............             300  ..............             200
100,000.........................         200,000          D=2.42             375  ..............             250
                                                        W\0.577\
200,000.........................         250,000  ..............             413  ..............             275
250,000.........................         300,000     D = 50 W1/3             450  ..............             300
300,000.........................         400,000  ..............             525  ..............             350
400,000.........................         500,000  ..............             600  ..............             400
500,000.........................       1,000,000  ..............             800  ..............             500
Greater than 1,000,000..........  ..............     D = 50 W1/3      D = 8 W1/3     D = 5 W1/3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
``D'' equals the minimum separation distance in feet.
``W'' equals the NEW of propellant.


           Table E-2.--Liquid Propellant Explosive Equivalents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Propellant combinations                Explosive equivalent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LO2/LH2................................  The larger of: 8W2/3 where W is
                                          the weight of LO2/LH2, or
                                         14% of W.
LO2/LH2 + LO2/RP-1.....................  Sum of (20% for LO2/RP-1) + the
                                          larger of: 8W2/3 where W is
                                          the weight of LO2/LH2, or
                                         14% of W.
LO2/R-1................................  20% of W up to 500,000 pounds
                                          plus 10% of W over 500,000
                                          pounds, where W is the weight
                                          of LO2RP-1.
N2O4/N2H4 (or UDMH or UDMH/N2H4          10% of W, where W is the weight
 Mixture).                                of the propellant.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


   Table E-3.--Propellant Hazard and Compatibility Groupings and Factors To Be Used When Converting Gallons of
                                             Propellant Into Pounds
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                  At temperature
            Propellant                   Hazard group       Compatibility group   Pounds/ gallon       deg.F
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hydrogen Peroxide.................  II                     A                               11.6               68
Hydrazine.........................  III                    C                                8.4               68
Liquid Hydrogen...................  III                    C                                0.59            -423
Liquid Oxygen.....................  II                     A                                9.5             -297
Nitrogen Tetroxide................  I                      A                               12.1               68
RP-1..............................  I                      C                                6.8               68
UDMH..............................  III                    C                                6.6               68
UDMH/Hydrazine....................  III                    C                                7.5               68
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 62897]]


                                                               Table E-4.--Hazard Group I
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Pounds of propellant                             Public area   Intragroup    Pounds of propellant     Public area   Intragroup
-------------------------------------------------------------------------      and          and     --------------------------      and          and
                                                                          incompatible   compatible                            incompatible   compatible
                                                                         ---------------------------                          --------------------------
                            Over                               Not over    Distance in  Distance in      Over       Not over    Distance in  Distance in
                                                                              feet          feet                                   feet          feet
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0..........................................................          100            30           25        5,000        6,000            80           60
100........................................................          200            35           30        6,000        7,000            85           65
200........................................................          300            40           35        7,000        8,000            85           65
300........................................................          400            45           35        8,000        9,000            90           70
400........................................................          500            50           40        9,000       10,000            90           70
500........................................................          600            50           40       10,000       15,000            95           75
600........................................................          700            55           40       15,000       20,000           100           80
700........................................................          800            55           45       20,000       25,000           105           80
800........................................................          900            60           45       25,000       30,000           110           85
900........................................................        1,000            60           45       30,000       35,000           110           85
1,000......................................................        2,000            65           50       35,000       40,000           115           85
2,000......................................................        3,000            70           55       40,000       45,000           120           90
3,000......................................................        4,000            75           55       45,000       50,000           120           90
4,000......................................................        5,000            80           60       50,000       60,000           125           95
60,000.....................................................       70,000           130           95      500,000      600,000           185          140
70,000.....................................................       80,000           130          100      600,000      700,000           190          145
80,000.....................................................       90,000           135          100      700,000      800,000           195          150
90,000.....................................................      100,000           135          105      800,000      900,000           200          150
100,000....................................................      125,000           140          110      900,000    1,000,000           205          155
125,000....................................................      150,000           145          110    1,000,000    2,000,000           235          175
150,000....................................................      175,000           150          115    2,000,000    3,000,000           255          190
175,000....................................................      200,000           155          115    3,000,000    4,000,000           265          200
200,000....................................................      250,000           160          120    4,000,000    5,000,000           275          210
250,000....................................................      300,000           165          125    5,000,000    6,000,000           285          215
300,000....................................................      350,000           170          130    6,000,000    7,000,000           295          220
350,000....................................................      400,000           175          130    7,000,000    8,000,000           300          225
400,000....................................................      450,000           180          135    8,000,000    9,000,000           305          230
450,000....................................................      500,000           180          135    9,000,000   10,000,000           310          235
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                                               Table E-5.--Hazard Group II
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Pounds of propellant                             Public area   Intragroup    Pounds of propellant     Public area   Intragroup
-------------------------------------------------------------------------      and          and     --------------------------      and          and
                                                                          incompatible   compatible                            incompatible   compatible
                                                                         ---------------------------                          --------------------------
                            Over                               Not over    Distance in  Distance in      Over       Not over    Distance in  Distance in
                                                                              feet          feet                                   feet          feet
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0..........................................................          100            60           30       50,000       60,000           250          125
100........................................................          200            75           35       60,000       70,000           255          130
200........................................................          300            85           40       70,000       80,000           260          130
300........................................................          400            90           45       80,000       90,000           265          135
400........................................................          500           100           50       90,000      100,000           270          135
500........................................................          600           100           50      100,000      125,000           285          140
600........................................................          700           105           55      125,000      150,000           295          145
700........................................................          800           110           55      150,000      175,000           305          150
800........................................................          900           115           60      175,000      200,000           310          155
900........................................................        1,000           120           60      200,000      250,000           320          160
1,000......................................................        2,000           130           65      250,000      300,000           330          165
2,000......................................................        3,000           145           70      300,000      350,000           340          170
3,000......................................................        4,000           150           75      350,000      400,000           350          175
4,000......................................................        5,000           160           80      400,000      450,000           355          180
5,000......................................................        6,000           165           80      450,000      500,000           360          180
6,000......................................................        7,000           170           85      500,000      600,000           375          185
7,000......................................................        8,000           175           85      600,000      700,000           385          190
8,000......................................................        9,000           175           90      700,000      800,000           395          195
9,000......................................................       10,000           180           90      800,000      900,000           405          200
10,000.....................................................       15,000           195           95      900,000    1,000,000           410          205
15,000.....................................................       20,000           205          100    1,000,000    2,000,000           470          235
20,000.....................................................       25,000           215          105    2,000,000    3,000,000           505          255
25,000.....................................................       30,000           220          110    3,000,000    4,000,000           535          265
30,000.....................................................       35,000           225          110    4,000,000    5,000,000           555          275
35,000.....................................................       40,000           230          115    5,000,000    6,000,000           570          285
40,000.....................................................       45,000           235          120    6,000,000    7,000,000           585          295
45,000.....................................................       50,000           240          120    7,000,000    8,000,000           600          300
                                                                                                       8,000,000    9,000,000           610          305
                                                                                                       9,000,000   10,000,000           620          310
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 62898]]


                                                              Table E-6.--Hazard Group III
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Pounds of propellant                             Public area   Intragroup    Pounds of propellant     Public area   Intragroup
-------------------------------------------------------------------------      and          and     --------------------------      and          and
                                                                          incompatible   compatible                            incompatible   compatible
                                                                         ---------------------------                          --------------------------
                            Over                               Not over    Distance in  Distance in      Over       Not over    Distance in  Distance in
                                                                              feet          feet                                   feet          feet
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0..........................................................          100           600           30       60,000       70,000         1,200          130
100........................................................          200           600           35       70,000       80,000         1,200          130
200........................................................          300           600           40       80,000       90,000         1,200          135
300........................................................          400           600           45       90,000      100,000         1,200          135
400........................................................          500           600           50      100,000      125,000         1,800          140
500........................................................          600           600           50      125,000      150,000         1,800          145
600........................................................          700           600           55      150,000      175,000         1,800          150
700........................................................          800           600           55      175,000      200,000         1,800          155
800........................................................          900           600           60      200,000      250,000         1,800          160
900........................................................        1,000           600           60      250,000      300,000         1,800          165
1,000......................................................        2,000           600           65      300,000      350,000         1,800          170
2,000......................................................        3,000           600           70      350,000      400,000         1,800          175
3,000......................................................        4,000           600           75      400,000      450,000         1,800          180
4,000......................................................        5,000           600           80      450,000      500,000         1,800          180
5,000......................................................        6,000           600           80      500,000      600,000         1,800          185
6,000......................................................        7,000           600           85      600,000      700,000         1,800          190
7,000......................................................        8,000           600           85      700,000      800,000         1,800          195
8,000......................................................        9,000           600           90      800,000      900,000         1,800          200
9,000......................................................       10,000           600           90      900,000    1,000,000         1,800          205
10,000.....................................................       15,000         1,200           95    1,000,000    2,000,000         1,800          235
15,000.....................................................       20,000         1,200          100    2,000,000    3,000,000         1,800          255
20,000.....................................................       25,000         1,200          105    3,000,000    4,000,000         1,800          265
25,000.....................................................       30,000         1,200          110    4,000,000    5,000,000         1,800          275
30,000.....................................................       35,000         1,200          110    5,000,000    6,000,000         1,800          285
35,000.....................................................       40,000         1,200          115    6,000,000    7,000,000         1,800          295
40,000.....................................................       45,000         1,200          120    7,000,000    8,000,000         1,800          300
45,000.....................................................       50,000         1,200          120    8,000,000    9,000,000         1,800          305
50,000.....................................................       60,000         1,200          125    9,000,000   10,000,000         1,800          310
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


         Table E-7.--Distances When Explosive Equivalents Apply
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     TNT equivalent weight of propellants           Distance in feet
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                To public     Intraline
                   Not over                        area     unbarricaded
------------------------------------------------------------------------
100..........................................         1250            80
200..........................................         1250           100
300..........................................         1250           120
400..........................................         1250           130
500..........................................         1250           140
600..........................................         1250           150
700..........................................         1250           160
800..........................................         1250           170
900..........................................         1250           180
1,000........................................         1250           190
1,500........................................         1250           210
2,000........................................         1250           230
3,000........................................         1250           260
4,000........................................         1250           280
5,000........................................         1250           300
6,000........................................         1250           320
7,000........................................         1250           340
8,000........................................         1250           360
9,000........................................         1250           380
10,000.......................................         1250           400
15,000.......................................         1250           450
20,000.......................................         1250           490
25,000.......................................        1,250           530
30,000.......................................        1,250           560
35,000.......................................        1,310           590
40,000.......................................        1,370           620
45,000.......................................        1,425           640
50,000.......................................        1,475           660
55,000.......................................        1,520           680
60,000.......................................        1,565           700
65,000.......................................        1,610           720
70,000.......................................        1,650           740
75,000.......................................        1,685           770
80,000.......................................        1,725           780
85,000.......................................        1,760           790
90,000.......................................        1,795           800
95,000.......................................        1,825           820
100,000......................................        1,855           830
125,000......................................        2,115           900
150,000......................................        2,350           950
175,000......................................        2,565         1,000
200,000......................................        2,770         1,050
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[FR Doc. 00-26088 Filed 10-18-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P`