alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-2155

___________________________

Harold B. Holloway

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Wendy Kelley, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction; Does

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

___________________________

No. 15-2446

___________________________

Harold B. Holloway

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Wendy Kelley, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction; Does

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeals from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Pine Bluff

____________
Submitted: August 13, 2015

Filed: August 18, 2015

[Unpublished]

____________

Before LOKEN, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Arkansas inmate Harold Holloway appeals several orders of the district court,1

including the dismissal without prejudice of his civil-rights suit for failure to comply

with a court order to file an amended complaint, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). After

careful review, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the

civil-rights suit, see Smith v. Gold Dust Casino, 526 F.3d 402, 404-05 (8thCir. 2008);

in denying Holloway’s request to consolidate a habeas suit with the civil-rights suit;

or in denying appointment of counsel, see Phillips v. Jasper Cty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791,

794 (8th Cir. 2006). The judgment is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern 1

District of Arkansas.

-2-
EXHIBIT
32





CERTIFICATION





Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Subsections (a) and (b) of
Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code)








Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of
Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), each of the
undersigned officers of The L.S. Starrett Company, a Massachusetts corporation
(the "Company"), does hereby certify, to such officer's knowledge,
that:





The
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 27, 2008 (the "Form
10-Q") of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the
Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.








Date
            February
      5, 2009
            
            /S/
      Douglas A. StarrettDouglas
      A. Starrett
              Chief
      Executive OfficerDate
            February
      5, 2009
            
            /S/
      Randall J. HylekRandall
      J. Hylek
              Chief
      Financial Officer








The
foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63
of Title 18, United  States Code) and is not being filed as part of
the Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure document.





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
The L.S. Starrett Company and will be retained by The L.S. Starrett Company and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
Slip Op. 03 - 109 

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

____________________________________ 

AMERICAN SILICON TECHNOLOGIES, :

ELKEM METALS COMPANY, :

GLOBE METALLURGICAL, INC. and :

SKW METALS & ALLOYS, INC., :

:

Plaintiffs, :

:

v. : Before: MUSGRAVE, JUDGE

:

UNITED STATES : Consolidated Court No. 97-02-00267

:

Defendant, :

:

and :

:

COMPANHIA BRASILEIRA : 

CARBURETO DE CALCIO, :

COMPANHIA FERROLIGAS :

MINAS GERIAS-MINASLIGAS and :

RIMA INDUSTRIAL S/A, :

:

Defendant-Intervenors. :

____________________________________:

ORDER

In view of the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, American Silicon

Technologies v. United States, 334 F.3d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 2003), it is hereby 

ORDERED that, the Department of Commerce’s Remand Results are remanded again for

a determination consistent with the appellate decision; and it is further

ORDERED that Commerce shall have 90 days to submit its remand determination. The

parties shall then have 30 days to submit comments on the remand determination. Any rebuttal

comments shall be submitted within 15 days thereafter. 

 __________________________________________

 R. KENTON MUSGRAVE, JUDGE 

Dated: August 25, 2003

 New York, New York
U.S. Department 

of Transportation 

Federal Aviation 

Administration 

Office of the Chief Counsel 

BY CERTIFIED MAIL and FACSIMILE 

January 22, 2013 

The Honorable Ronnie A. Yoder 

Chief Administrative Law Judge 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (E11-310) 

Washington, DC 20591 

Fax: 202-366-7536 

800 Independence Ave., S.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

RECEIVED 

JAN 2 2 2013 

HEAR,NG DOCKET 

Re: In the Matter ofTrans Time Express; FDMS No. FAA-2012-1260, 

FAA case no. 2011SW700220 

Judge Yoder: 

On January 22, 2013, the parties in the above referenced matter agreed to propose the 

following procedural schedule in accordance with your December 21, 2012, procedural 

order: 

• Apri126, 2013- Completion of discovery. 

• May 31, 2013- Filing of stipulations and witness lists, including summaries of 

proposed testimony; exchange of exhibits. 

The FAA is aware that Respondent plans to file a motion requesting additional time to file 

its Answer. 

The parties have renewed settlement discussions in an attempt to conclude this matter prior 

to a hearing. 

The parties have agreed to propose Washington, DC for the location of the hearing. 

Sincerely, 

Peter Lynch 

Assistant Chief Counsel 

By:Cf2 Charles Raley, Attorney 

Office of the Chief Counsel 
2 

Certificate of Service 

I hereby certifY that on this date I have placed in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, 

certified return-receipt, and sent by facsimile, copies of this letter in the case of In the Matter 

of Trans Time Express, FDMS No. FAA-20I2-I260, FAA Case no. 20I 1SW700220, 

addressed to: 

The Honorable Ronnie A. Yoder 

Chief Administrative Law Judge 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (Ell-310) 

Washington, DC 20591 

Fax: 202-366-7536 

In addition, I hereby certifY that on this date I have delivered in person the original 

and one copy of the foregoing document to: 

Federal Aviation Administration 

600 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building- Suite 2Wl000 

In addition, I hereby certifY that on this date I have placed in the U.S. mail, postage 

prepaid, certified return-receipt, and sent by electronic transmission, copies of the foregoing 

document to: 

Cameron Niakan, Esq. 

10101 Grosvenor Pl. #620 

Rockville, MD 20852 

Dated: January 22, 2013
#### In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Philip H. Oswald, Deceased.

Surrogate’s Court, Nassau County,

November 29, 1957.

*John L. Skinner*for proponent.

*Frank Lawkins*for Francis J. Parks and another, contestants.

John D. Behhett, S.

The contestants in this probate proceeding request that the temporary administrator be directed to pay the stenographer’s fees for minutes of the examination before trial in the examination of subscribing witnesses to the propounded instrument. The application is opposed by the estate.

Section 275 of the Surrogate’s Court Act provides that costs in this court “ shall be awarded in special proceedings in surrogate’s court solely in accordance with the following sections, and shall include all disbursements of the party to whom they are awarded, which might be taxed in the supreme court. ’ ’

*668The above language has been interpreted by the courts as prohibiting any costs other than those expressly provided for in the statutes *(Matter of Watson,*241 App. Div. 842, affd. 264 N. Y. 697).

These costs are generally fixed at the termination of the proceeding to which they relate. The court in *Matter of Manzi (Tietjen)*(155 Misc. 670, 673-674), said: *“*There is no provision in the law permitting the payment of any sum as costs or allowances except upon the entry of an order or a decree, and in only a single instance is the surrogate authorized to direct the payment of any disbursement whatsoever except in connection with the entry of a decree. This sole exception is found in the last sentence of the second paragraph of section 278, in which it is provided that 1 the surrogate may order a copy of the stenographer’s minutes to be furnished to the contestant’s counsel, and charge the expense thereof to the estate, if he shall be satisfied that the contest is made in good faith ’.”

Again in *Matter of Mackenzie*(155 Misc. 822, 824), the court in commenting on the above statement in *Matter of Manzi Tietjen (supra)*said: “ This analysis demonstrated to its [the court’s] own'satisfaction at least, that no authority exists for the allowance of any disbursements prior to the termination of a proceeding, except to authorize the furnishing to contestants of a copy of the minutes of *trial*if satisfied of the *bona fides*of the contest ”.

It is noted that in the last quotation the court referred to the minutes which may be furnished to the contestant under section 278 as minutes of the *trial.*

It is therefore this court’s opinion that any allowance by way of costs to the contestant prior to the decree for the payment of stenographer’s minutes of an examination before trial or examination of subscribing witnesses would be premature. Accordingly the relief at this time is denied.

If the contestant is successful, the court may, in its discretion, allow such costs as are permitted by statute upon the signing of the decree herein.

The temporary administrator is directed pursuant to section 30 of the Surrogate’s Court Act, to pay to the official stenographer, from the estate, his fees for the transcribing of minutes supplied to the court.

Settle order on five days’ notice.
#### Edgar SMITH, Petitioner, v. TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILWAY CO., Respondent.

No. A—391.

Supreme Court of Texas.

March 14, 1945.

Rehearing Denied April 11,1945.

Scarborough, Yates & Scarborough, Edmund C. Yates, and J. R. Black, all of Abilene, for petitioner.

Shropshire & Bankhead, of Weatherford, and Donald L. Case, of Dallas, for respondent.

FOLLEY, Commissioner.

This cause is a companion case to that of Atchison v. Texas & Pacific Railway Company, Tex.Sup., 186 S.W.2d 228.

It is an action by the petitioner, Edgar Smith, against the respondent, Texas & Pacific Railway Company, to recover damages for injuries sustained by his wife, Mrs. Elva Smith, when the automobile she was driving collided with that of a third party upon a highway adjacent to respondent’s railroad while the highway was enveloped in smoke from a grass fire alleged to have been negligently started by respondent on its right of way. The trial was before the court without a jury and judgment was rendered for petitioner in the sum of $1,497.50. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed such judgment and rendered one for the railway company. 183 S.W.2d 182.

*233This cause and the Atchison case are substantially the same. They both arose from the same collision. In all material aspects the pleadings, the evidence and the findings of the trial court are identical in both cases. The same questions are presented in both cases and our conclusions and holdings in the Atchison case are controlling herein. We therefore adopt the opinion of the Atchison case for our disposition of this case.

The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court is affirmed.

Opinion adopted by the Supreme Court.
#### MURRAY et al. v. McGRANNAHAN et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Dec. 4, 1953.

Chesley A. Lycan, Ashland, Wheeler & Wheeler, Paintsville, for appellants.

No brief for appellees.

MOREMEN, Justice.

Appellants, Arthur B. Murray and his wife, Audra Murray, have appealed from a judgment which established a passway over a certain portion of property belonging to them.

The road involved is designated as “road up Easton Branch,” which road serves the appellees and their neighbors in a community which lies northwesterly of the land owned by appellants. The use of a portion of the passway over the land is hot disputed. However, the road forks at a point not far from the main highway U.S. 23 with which the Easton Branch road connects and the dispute presented here concerns which branch of .the bifurcation has been properly established by use as a passway to U.S. 23. One branch of the forks, as shown on the map in the record which both parties agree is accurate, leads in a northeasterly direction to the main highway while the second branch moves in a direct continuation of the Easton Branch road in a southeasterly direction to the concrete highway. (This fork of the road has been designated on the map as “A to B”.)

The proof conclusively shows that the short route to the highway has been continuously used since U.S. 23 was constructed in the year 1922. This use was interrupted only for a short time when the appellants, who purchased their property about six years before the suit was brought, temporarily barricaded the road.

The chancellor found upon a great preponderance of evidence that the use of the branch of the road which leads directly in a southeasterly direction to the main highway had been established even though the other branch had been occasionally used in the past and, upon that finding, based a judgment that the passway in this action should be designated as that one marked on the map as being from point A to B.

We believe this judgment is correct in every respect and it is therefore affirmed.
#### Ex parte MEADOWS.

No. 23325.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 16, 1946.

*732Nat Gentry, Jr., of Tyler, for appellant.

Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

Relator was convicted in our Cause No. 21151 of robbery by assault and sentenced to serve ten years in the state penitentiary.’ This cause was appealed to this court and by it affirmed, see Meadows v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 79, 143 S.W.2d 389, there being no statement of facts nor bills of exceptions filed in the record. Relator now comes before us by writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the judgment in Cause No. 21151 supra was void in that he was charged by indictment therein with an assault and robbery by exhibiting a firearm, and found guilty by a jury “as charged” and given a term of ten years in the penitentiary; that the judgment merely found him guilty of “robbery by assault,” and that the sentence follows the judgment. It is therefore contended that the judgment and sentence are void and that relator is entitled to his discharge from the prison authorities. Such a judgment as this can only be attacked in case it is void. 12 Tex.Jur., Sec. 337, page 689. See Ex parte Cox, 53 Tex.Cr.R. 240, 109 S.W. 369; 19 Texas Digest, Habeas Corpus,

The contention that the judgment and sentence failed to follow the verdict of the jury was a matter that should have been reached and called to our attention on the appeal of our Cause No. 21151, at which time, if necessary, such matters could have been corrected. A writ of ha-beas corpus cannot be used to serve the purpose of an appeal. See Branch’s Penal Code, p. 151, and many cases there cited. Ex parte Crawford, 36 Tex.Cr.R. 180, 36 S.W. 92; Ex parte Dickerson, 30 Tex.App. 448, 17 S.W. 1076.

It seems that under the facts, and the charge of the court in the original cause, relator was charged with a robbery by assault, and the exhibition therein of a firearm, the same being a deadly weapon. The punishment for an assault being confinement in the penitentiary for life, or any term of years not less than five; and the punishment for an assault in which a deadly weapon was exhibited being by death, or confinement in the penitentiary for any term not less than* five years. Relator’s sentence came within a period reached by the commission of robbery by assault, and by such an assault coupled' with the use of a deadly weapon. We do not think the judgment and sentence in Cause No. 21151 were void; it could be applied to either method of committing the robbery, and if relator was dissatisfied therewith, he should have evidenced such upon his appeal therein ; he did not do so, and such cannot now be the basis of a writ of habeas corpus.

Relator is therefore remanded to the custody of the penitentiary authorities for the purpose of serving the remaining portion of his original sentence in our Cause No. 21151 in accordance with the law governing such matters.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACOACO DIVISION

WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC

vs.

§

§

§

§

NO: WA:20-CV-00475-ADA

DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC., DELL INC., §

EMC CORPORATION

ORDER SETTING DISCOVERY DISCOVERY HEARING

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above entitled and numbered case is set for

DISCOVERY HEARING by Zoomoom on December 07, 2021 at 03:00 PM.

set

30th day of November, 2021.

Alan D Albright

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 6:20-cv-00475-ADA Document 127 Filed 11/30/21 Page 1 of 1
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without **

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

1

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KNARIK MKRTCHYAN; SAMVEL

MKRTCHYAN; KRISTINE

MKRTCHYAN,

 Petitioners,

 v.

MICHAEL B. MUKASEY,

 Respondent.

No. 08-71730

Agency Nos. A075-690-229

A075-690-230

A078-015-989

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 9, 2012** 

San Francisco, California

Before: FARRIS, NOONAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

Petitioners Knarik Mkrtchyan, Samvel Mkrtchyan, and Kristine Mkrtchyan,

citizens of Armenia, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’

FILED

NOV 16 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

affirmance of the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of their applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under article 3 of the Convention against

Torture. The IJ found Petitioners’ claim incredible based on “significant

discrepancies and inconsistencies” in their testimony. We find that the IJ’s adverse

credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and deny the petition

for review. See Rivera v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1271, 1274 (9th Cir. 2007).

Knarik, the lead petitioner, asserted past persecution and fear of future

persecution on account of her membership in the Armenian National Movement

and related actions. The IJ correctly found that Knarik provided insufficient

credible or specific evidence to show there is a reasonable possibility that either

she or her husband Samvel would be subject to persecution in Armenia. See

Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(42)(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A).

There were numerous discrepancies in the testimony of both Knarik and Kristine,

the only witnesses to testify. The discrepancies concerned significant facts going to

the heart of their claims. Knarik testified inconsistently regarding the number of

times she was detained by police and alleged threats made against her daughters,

and Kristine testified inconsistently regarding her whereabouts during periods

material to her claim.

Because the IJ cited specific reasons to doubt Petitioners’ credibility, this
3

court finds that substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility finding. We

therefore deny Petitioners' petition for review.

PETITION DENIED.
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of MONY Holdings, LLC on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof (the Report), I, Kenneth Levine, President of MONY Holdings, LLC, hereby certify to the best of my knowledge and belief that (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of MONY Holdings, LLC.



|                  
|------------------
|/s/ Kenneth Levine
|Kenneth Levine    
|April 14, 2004    



This statement is being furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit to the Report.
Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACO DIVISION

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a 

BRAZOS LICENSING AND 

DEVELOPMENT,

Plaintiff,

 v.

HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES USA INC.; 

HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.,

Defendant.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO.6:20-cv-00544-ADA

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF THE FILING OF A 

PETITION FOR INTER-PARTES REVIEW 

Pursuant to the Court’s Order Governing Proceeding – Patent Case (“Order Governing 

Proceeding”), namely General Issue No. 6, Plaintiff WSOU Investments, LLC d/b/a Brazos 

Licensing and Development (“WSOU”) hereby provides notice that defendant Huawei 

Technology Co, Ltd. filed a petition requesting inter-partes review of the patent in-suit, U.S. Patent 

No. 8,429,480, on November 30, 2020. See IPR2021-00229. The USPTO has not yet accorded a 

filing date, but one is expected soon. Based on a file accord date of December 15, 2020, the 

expected time for an institution decision is June 15, 2021. If instituted, the expected time for a 

final written decision is June 15, 2022.

Dated: December 14, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Ryan S. Loveless

James L. Etheridge

Texas Bar No. 24059147

Ryan S. Loveless

Texas Bar No. 24036997

Brett A. Mangrum

Texas Bar No. 24065671

Travis L. Richins

Texas Bar No. 24061296

Jeff Huang

Case 6:20-cv-00544-ADA Document 37 Filed 12/14/20 Page 1 of 2
Page 2 of 2

Etheridge Law Group, PLLC

2600 E. Southlake Blvd., Suite 120 / 324

Southlake, TX 76092

Tel.: (817) 470-7249

Fax: (817) 887-5950

Jim@EtheridgeLaw.com

Ryan@EtheridgeLaw.com

Brett@EtheridgeLaw.com

Travis@EtheridgeLaw.com

Jeff@EtheridgeLaw.com

ATTORNEYS FOR WSOU

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that all counsel of record, who are deemed to have consented to electronic 

service are being served this December 14, 2020, with a copy of this document via the Court’s 

ECF system.

/s/ Ryan S. Loveless

Ryan S. Loveless

Case 6:20-cv-00544-ADA Document 37 Filed 12/14/20 Page 2 of 2
EXHIBIT 2

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Case 6:20-cv-00475-ADA Document 88-3 Filed 03/17/21 Page 6 of 8
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