In The Matter Of: 

## SERVED: June 11, 2014 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS WASHINGTON, DC ) 

### ZJ14 JUN 

### I2 A 

## q: 3 b ) ) ) DocketNo. FAA-2013-0853 MARY E. BOCHIARDY Case No. 2011EA170066 Respondent )

ORDERFINDING THE REQUEST FORHEARING UNTIMELY, RESERVING THE FAA'S MOTIONTO DISMISS AND SETTING DEADLINE FOR FILING SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL On January 17, 2014, the FAA served Ms. Mary E. Bochiardy ("Respondent") with its Complaint, and with its Motion to Dismiss Late-Filed Appeal ("Motion"). The FAA.then filed

· both documents withthe Office ofHearings ("OH") $even (7) days later, onJanuary 24, 2014. On February 11,2014, the Respondent**serv~d** the FAA with her Response to Agency's Motion to Dismiss Late-Filed Appeal ("Response"). The Respondent then filed this document with the OH nine (9) days later, on February 20, 2014. On February 21,2014, the FAA served the Respondent with the Agency's Motion to Strike Respondent's Response to Agency's Motion to Dismiss Late-Filed Appeal ("Motion to Strike"). The FAA filed this document with the OH three (3) days later, on February 24, 2014. OnFebruary 25, 2014, the Respondent servedthe FAA with her Motion to Dismiss Agency's Motion·to Strike Respondent'sResponse to Agency's Motion to Dismiss Late-Filed Appeal ("Answer to Motion"). 1 The Respondent then filed this document with the OH seven (7) days later, on March 4, 2014. On April 7, 2014, an Order Denying the FAA's Motion to Strike Respondent's Response to Agency's Motion to Dismiss was filed.

1The Rules ofPractice, 14 C.F.R. Part 13, subpart G, do not specifically provide for a motion to dismiss a pending motion. 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(d) provides for answers to motions. Thus, the Respondent's February 25, 2014 filing is more properly titled an Ans'Yer to the Motion to Strike.I. BriefCase Background On October 29, 20l3,the FM asserts that it served a Final Notice ofProposed Civil Penalty ("FNPCP") onthe Respondent's attorney, Mr. GregReigel ("Mr. Reigel") and onthe Respondent. The FAA asserts that the FNPCP was served on Mr. Reigel by first class mail, and onthe Respondent by certified mail, return receipt requested (Motion,Exs. C and D). It was undisputedthatthe Respondent received the certified mail copy ofthe FNPCP onNovember 18, 2013. (Response, 1;_ Motion, Ex. G.) On December 12, 2013, afterreceiving no response from either Mr. Reigel or the Respondent, the FAA served them both with an Order Assessing Civil Penalty 2("0ACP"). (Motion, Ex. G.) This OACP was served on Mr. Reigel by first class mail, and on the Responqent by certified mail, return receipt requested. (ld.) Five (5) days later, on December 17, 2013, the Respondent signed for the certified mailing, and "received" the OACP. (Motion, Ex. G.) On December 24,2013, seven (7) days after receiving the.OACP, the Respondent e-mailed Mr. Reigel and asked about the status ofher request for hearing. (Motion, Ex. E.at 5.) That same day, December 24, 2013, Mr. Reigel emailed the Respondent, and told herthathe had not filed a request for hearing "perher instructions" (date ofcommunication, and specifics ofcommunication unidentified). (/d.) OnJanuary 8, 2014,**t~e** Respondent served the Hearing Docket Clerk with a

### prose Request for Hearingby "overnight request." (ld.) II. ProofofReceipt ofthe FNPCP- Discussion and**An~lysis** Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 13.16(g)(2), a respondent must, within 15 days of

### receipt ofthe FNPCP, either pay the proposed penalty or request ahearing. 

### In re Canuck Industries, FAA2000-7726, Decision and Order, 2 (May 10, 2002), 

### modifiedon othergrounds, FAA OrderNo. 2002-17, Order Granting Petition to Modify (May 24, 2002).

2 The OACP found that the Respondent had been advised through an October 29,2013 FNPCP that the FAA proposed to assess a $7,700 civil penalty for violations of 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.580 and 121.306(a). The OACP found that the Respondent had committed the aJleged violations·[by default] and assessed a $7,700 civil penalty.• Page 2 of 13It was undisputed that on November 18,2013 the Respondent signed for, and "received," the certified mailing ofthe FNPCP. In its Motion, however, the FAA asserts that service ofthe FNPCP was perfected thirteen (13) days earlier, "on orbefore November 5, 2013"when the Respondent's attorney, Mr. Reigel, allegedly "received" the FNPCP by regular U.S. mail. (Motion, 1, Ex. D). A. Lack ofProoffor Mr. Reigel's Receipt ofthe FNPCP 14 C.F.R. 

### § 13.16(g)(2) specifically requires proofofthe date ofreceipt ofthe FNPCPby eitherthe Respondent or her designated agent. The record is silentregarding when (ifever) the Respondent specifically designated Mr. Reigel to accept service on her behalfpursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 13.16(g). Nevertheless, even without specific party designation for alternate service, service on an attorney who has been identified to the FAA

- in some fashion3

- as a party representative is well-established in these proceedings. Although the regulation does anticipatethat a respondent may designate in writing alternative means ofservice, nothing in this provision undermines the settled principle, routinely followed in a variety oflitigation contexts and generally required by the rules of professional conduct, that service on a party is effectively accomplished by service on identified counsel. Canuck, supra at 4.4 This ''settledprinciple" recognizes the long established federal service practice codified in Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(1), whichrequires service to be "made onthe [party's] attorney, unless the court orders service onthe party." Rule 5.1; See, Steven Baicker-McKee, et.al, Federal Civil Rules Handbook, West Publishing (2012)(Rule 5- Service on Attorney, Not Party). In the case herein, on June 25, 2013, Mr. Reigel contacted the FAAby email and identified himselfas counsel onbehalfofthe Respondent. (Motion, Ex. A). In this same email, Mr. Reigel requested participation in settlement negotiations (!d.) The FAAbeganto

3 In FAA proceedings, the means ofidentifying an attorney representative is not limited to the formal filing ofa notice ofappearance. See, e.g., Canuck, supra at 1-2 (attorney called the FAA, sent written notice confirminghis representative status, and participated in settlement negotiations).

4 In the year 2002, at time ofthe FAA Administrator's Decision and Order in the Canuck case, the regulation was contained in 14 C.F.R. § 13.16(e). In 2005, and again in 2006, the regulation was amended. The applicable regulatory language is now found in 14 C.F.R. § 13.16(g). Page 3 of 13communicate directly with Mr. Reigel about the case. (Motion, Ex. B.) It appeared undisputed that at the time ofthe alleged service ofthe FNPCP, both the FAA and the Respondent believed Mr. Reigel to still be ofcounsel. Thus, as the FAA correctly pointed out, the FAA'snotice to counsel wouldpresumptivelybenotice to the Respondent. (Motion, 3). The FAAcounsel asserts generally, underpenalty ofperjury, thatthe FAA mailed a copy ofthe FNPCP by regular mail to Mr. Reigel onthe same date that it sent a certified mail copy to the Respondent (Motion, Ex. D). The FAA counsel did not, however, identify the person(s) who actually mailedthe documents by regular and certified mailings, nor did the FAA submit any direct evidence from such witness(es) that such mailings were bothperformed and accomplished onthe date alleged. (14 C.F.R. § 13.211(c)). While the FAA counsel clearly believesthat such double mailings by certified and regular mail occurred, counsel does not provide any factual basis for that belief. (Motion, Ex. D.) The FAA argued inpartthat Mr. Reigel received the FNPCP "onorbeforeNovember 5, 2013" because any mailing sentto him (assuming such mailing occurred) was notreturned as undeliverable. (Motion 1; Ex. D). The FAA's assertion that the Mr. Reigel's mail was not "returned" appears to reference the "valid service" presumptions outlined in 14 C.F

### .R. §13.212 (g). However, the minimum standards of 14 C.F.R. §13.212 (g) were not met in this case, and thus the "lack ofreturned mail" argument will notbe further addressed herein. In essence, the FAA has no actual proofofservice, orreceipt ofservice, onMr. Reigel. Nevertheless, the FAA argues that its proofofcertified mailing to the Respondent should serve as the basis for assuming that Mr. Reigel was properly servedbyU.S. Mail atthe same time, and that Mr. Reigel presumablyreceivedthe FNPCP by U.S. mail pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 13.21l(e).5 Based onthat argument, the FAA asserts that Mr. Reigel actually received the FNPCP thirteen (13) days (i.e., almost 2 weeks) priorto the Respondent actually receiving the FNPCP by certified mail service. Accordingto the FAA, this means that the Respondent's 15 day time clock for filing the appeal expired onNovember 20, 2013-justtwo (2) days afterthe

5 Section 13.211(e) is commonly referredto as the "mailing rule." It allows for service ofdocuments by mail, and generally provides a party five additional days to act when service is made by mail. 14 C.F.R. § l3.2ll(e). Page 4 of13Respondent actually received her certified mailing oftheFNPCP on November 18,2013. (Motion,3 andEx. F.) The FAA cites to Exhibit C and 14 C.F.R. 

### § 13.211(e) as evidentiary support for its assertions. Exhibit Cis a copy ofthe FNPCP. It is addressed to the Respondent. Exhibit Cis not dated. Itdoes not have a certificate ofservice attached. There is no postmark on it. 14 C.F.R. §13.211(d). However, attached to Exhibit Cis a certified mail certificate, showing a postmark date ofOctober 29, 2013 for the certified mailing date ofthe FNPCP to the Respondent at her address ofrecord. On the last page ofExhibit Cthere is also a reference to Mr. Reigel as a "cc" recipient ofthe FNPCP, with an address listed. The listed address for Mr. Reigel is the same address as the one·he provided in his original, June 25, 2012 "representation notice" email. (Motion, Ex. A). However, Exhibit C does not contain or attach any proofofservice regarding service ofany kind actually occurring for Mr·. Reigel. (Motion,Exh. C, 4-5.). The FAA Administrator has found that "[a] rebuttable presumption arises that mail was received by the addressee when there is proofthat it was properly addressed, stamped, and mailed." In re Charles D. Eaddy, OrderNo. 92-13, at 4 (May 5, 1992) (citing Hanger

# v. US., 285 U.S. 427 (1932)). The burden ofproofofservice is on the party attempting service. Steven Baicker-McKee, et.al, Federal Civil Rules Handbook, West Publishing (2012)(Rule 4- Burden ofProving Service ofProcess). Based on the evidence submitted, there is insufficient proofto demonstrate that any FAA employee "properly addressed, stamped, and mailed" a copy ofthe FNPCP to Mr. Reigel, on or about the date ofOctober 29, 2013, by regular or other mail service. Thus, there is insufficientproofofa rebuttable presumption ofproper service orreceipt of service ofthe FNPCP in regards to Mr. Reigel. B. Proofofthe Respondent's Receipt ofthe FNPCP Itwas undisputed, however, that on November 2, 2013, the United States Postal Service left notice with the Respondent ofa certified mailing. (/d., Exh. F.) On November 18, 2013, the Respondent signed for the certified mailing, and "received" the FNPCP. (Resp. Mot. Dismiss 1; Motion,Ex. G.) The record also reflects that Mr. Riegel had at least constructive notice of

### a certified mailing to the Respondent onNovember 18, 2013, when the Respondent e-mailed Mr. Riegel earlierthat day (before picking up the mailing) to tell him she hadjustgotten notice of

### a . Page 5 of 13certified mail delivery. The Respondent's November 18, 2013 email to Mr. Reigel indicatesthat she believedthe certified mail might contain the FNPCP. (Motion, Ex. Eat 5-6.) C. Date Established for Receipt ofthe FNPCP- November 18, 2013 The service provisions in 14 C.F.R. 

### § 13.16(g), anddiscussed inFAA case decisions and orders, are very similarto the provisions in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) and (h). The primary purpose of these service rules is to ensure that the responding party is timely notified that "alegal action has been filed" and to ensure thatthe responding party has "afair opportunity to answerthe·pleading and raise defenses and objections." StevenBaicker-McKee, et.al, 

### Federal CivilRules Handbook, West Publishing (2012)(Rule 4 -The Goal ofService). The record demonstrates thatthe Respondent notified Mr. Reigel onNovember 18, 2013 of

### a certified mailing. Laterthat same day, onNovember 18, 2013, the Respondent actually received the FNPCP. Four (4) days later, onNovember 22, 2013, the Respondent again exchanged emails with Mr. Reigel

- her designated attorney representative

- discussing what action(s) to take regarding the FNPCP. The evidence submitted in this case, as a whole, is sufficient to find that the Respondent's actual service date ofNovember 18,2013- the known date ofactual receiptby the Respondent and potential constructive notice to Mr. Riegel

- satisfies the requirements and primarypurpose ofservice. 

### III. The Respondent's Request for Hearing

### was Untimely Based onthe undisputed evidence that the Respondent received the FNPCP onNovember 18, 2013, the 15 day time clockbeganto run onNovember 19, 2013.6 Thus, the deadline for the Respondentto request a hearing was December 3, 2013 (i.e., the fifteenth day afterNovember 18, 2013). The Respondent did not file a request for hearing on December 3, 2013.

6 Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 13.212(b), "[t]he date ofan act, event, ordefault, after which a designated time period begins to run, is not included in a computation oftime under this subpart." Although 14 C.F.R. § 13.16(g)(2) appears in a different subpart (i.e., subpart C), the governing subpart in this proceeding is subpart G, which lists the Rules ofPractice. Thus, the date ofreceipt is not included in the 15 day time count. Page 6 of 13Itis undisputed that Mr. Reigel's attorney relationship with the Respondent was severed sometime between December 17, 2013 and December 24, 2013. (Response, 1**~** 8 and 13). It was also undisputed that the Respondent did not file aprose request for hearing until January 8, 2014- thirty-six (36) days after the December.3, 2013 deadline for filing. Thus, the Respondent'srequest for hearing was untimely. 

### IV. Parties' Primary Requests for Reliefbecause ofUntimely Request for Hearing In its Motion, the FAA primarily requests thatthe Respondent's late-filed appeal be dismissed. (Motion, 1.) As part ofthat request, the FAA asserts that the Respondent was indecisive arid disingenuous, failed to act promptly, engaged in wilful negligence, and has failed to provide any persuasive orcredible facts in support ofa good cause finding (Motion, 3-5, Reply, 3-4.) In her Response to the FAA's Motion, the Respondent requests her untimely request for hearingbe accepted because ofmultiple good cause factors, including her.mistaken reliance on her attorney, the inactionofher attorney, herpromptprose action once she realized the filing had not occurred, and various assertions involving health, family and holiday schedules. (Response, 1-2.) 

### V. BriefReview ofGood Cause Standard Anuntimelyrequest for hearing will only be excused for good cause. In re Carl P. Langton, FAA OrderNo. 93-12 (Mar. 25, 1993); see also, In re Titan Coatings, Inc., FAA-2011- 1011, Order Granting Motion to Dismiss (Feb. 2, 2012). Good cause is·a "nebulous" standard. 21A Fed. Proc. L.Ed. §51:64 (2014). It is an evaluationthatrests within the discretion ofthe trial court, since there is a strong preference for deciding cases on their merits. lOA Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. §2693 (3d ed. 2014); See, e.g., In re DavidLloydCornwall, FAA OrderNo. 92-47 at 7 (July 22, 1992) (Whereverpossible, cases should be heard "onthe merits"). In evaluating good cause, there is "no fixed, rigid standard" that can anticipate "all the situations" which might arise for a party's failure to file a timely response. 21A Karl Oakes, Fed. Proc. L. Ed. §51 :64 (2014). A good cause evaluation does not rest on one factor, because there is a strong presumption on deciding cases onthe merits. Instead, a good cause evaluation is a Page 7 of 13considerationof"allthe circumstances ofthecase, viewed with a forgiving eye." In re Safety EquipmentandSign Co., Ltd., FAA OrderNo. 92-76 at 5 (Dec. 21, 1992). Therefore, in determining whether good cause exists ordoes not exist, the court may considerthe nature ofthe default, whetherthere is a meritorious defense, whetherthe opposing party will be prejudiced, the timeliness ofthe request for relief, the amount involved in the litigation, as well as the availability and effectiveness oflessdrastic solutions. 29 A.L.R. Fed. 7, Good Cause General Considerations, §4 (1976). Other considerations in evaluating good cause (not inclusive) may include the inaction ofa party's counsel, aparty's mistakenbeliefaboutthe time requirements, the willfulness oftheparty's non-compliance, any factors demonstrating excusable neglect, surprise, orinadvertence, or aparty's erroneous reliance on settlement negotiations. 29 A.L.R. Fed. 7, Sufficiency of ParticularReasons for Inaction,§§ A and B (1976), See also, Edes v. Fredson, 344 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D. Me. 2004). 

### VI. Partial Discussion ofthe Respondent's Primary Good Cause Assertions Only certain matters will be addressed herein. As noted earlier, onNovember 18, 2013, the Respondent signed for, and "received"the certified mailing ofthe FNPCP. (Motion, Exh. F.) Four days later, onNovember 22, 2013, the Respondente-mailed Mr. Reigel and statedthat she wanted to "go withthe Appeal.

..incourt." (Motion, Ex. Eat6; Response, 1.) This directionto Mr. Reigel occurred priorto the December 3, 2013 filing deadline. Based onthat instruction, the Respondent asserts that she believedthat 

### Mr. Reigel had submitted a timely appeal request. (Response, 1**~** 6.) The record also demonstrates that on December 17, 2013 (i.e., fourteen (14) days after the December 3, 2013 filing deadline) the Respondentreceivedthe OACP by certified mail. (Motion, Ex. G.) The OACP found that the Respondent had committedthe alleged violations [by default], and assessed a total $7,700 civil penalty againsther [by default]. (Motion, Ex. G.) On December 24, 2013, seven (7) days afterreceiving the OACP, the Respondent emailed Mr. Reigel, asking aboutthe status ofher request for hearing. (Motion, Ex. Eat 5.) That same day, December 24, 2013, 

### Mr. Reigel e-rriailed the Respondent, and told herthathehad not filed a request for hearing "perher instructions" (date/communication unspecified). (!d.) Page 8 of13Itwas undisputed that Mr. Reigel was an experienced aviation lawyer, who represented the Respondent through December 17,2013. (Motion, 3; Response,**I~** 8 and 13). The FAA asserted that the Respondent should be bound by her attorney's inaction in failing to file a timely request on orbefore December 3, 2013. In addition, and inthe alternative, the FAA asserted that the Respondent should be held accountable for her own dilatory action in filing a request for hearing after her relationship with Mr. Reigel was severed on or about December 24, 2013. (Motion, 3-4). In response to the FAA's assertions, the Respondent presented multiple arguments, some ofwhich may be immediately addressed. A. Attorney's Physical "Remoteness" is Immaterial

. The Respondent asked the court to consider, as part ofa good cause finding, that her relationship with Mr. Reigel had been "remote". (Response, 2.) This is not a persuasive factor. The advances ofmodern technology have allowed all manner ofprofessional and personal relationships to survive the barriers formerly imposed by mere physical distance. Itwas the Respondent's choice to engage in the on-line services ofan attorney. While the Respondent might nowregret such choice, it was her right to make it and to contractthe relationship. Thus, the remoteness inphysical distance between the Respondent and Mr. Reigel is presumptively immaterial, absent a showing oflegal invalidity ofthe relationship itselfor other factors. No such showing has been made in this case. B. Attorney's "Limited" Services Presumed Sufficient The Respondent explained that she had found Mr. Reigel through an "on line query" (Response, 2). The Respondent asserted that Mr. Reigel's services were "limited", because he was located in the state ofMinnesota, and she could not afford to pay his travel costs. 7 (Response, 1**~** 1 and 5.) The Respondent also asserted that she had told Mr. Reigel that once she was advised ofthe hearing location, she planned to hire "local" counsel, orrepresent herself. (Response, 1**~** 5.) Itis not unusual for a party to consult with an attorney in the beginning stages of litigation, and then hire someone else to actually try the case. Itis not unusual for a consulting

7 [NB: Judicial notice is taken that the Respondent's address ofrecord throughout these proceedings has been in the state ofFlorida]. Page 9 of 13attorney to also recommend to a client that a case be referred to another lawyer, given the specialization oflaw in today's marketplace. Given this common practice by the public consumer and the specialist, it simply cannot be presumed that initial consultation services with an attorney are automatically insufficient. In the case herein, the Respondent has not demonstrated sufficient grounds for the court to make a finding that Mr. Reigel's "limited" services as a consulting aviation lawyer (i.e., initial discussion and assistance) shouldbe presumed to have been insufficient, or incompetent. C. Evidence regarding Attorney "Inaction" before December 3, 2013 The Respondent asserted that she asked Mr. Reigel, on November 22, 2013 to file a request for hearing.for her. She alleged that Mr. Reigel only "infrequently" advised her, primarily via email communications, and that she relied upon him to tell her the status ofthe case. (Response,I 

### ,-r 1 and 8.) According to the Respondent, she had depended on Mr. Reigel to file the request for hearing, and hehad -unbeknownstto her

- failed to take timely action. The FAAhas characterizedthis argument as "suspect". (Motion, 4). This court agrees with the FAA that this argument is suspect. The proofcurrently submitted by theprose Respondent is inconsistent with parts ofher argument. For example, in her November 18, 2013 email (10:33am), the Respondent states: Ijusttoday got a notice ofcertified delivery that will be redelivered tomorrow hopefully. Once get [sic] the letter in my hand, opened and reviewed, Iwill respondwith mynext step. The 15-day clockshouldnotstart untilIam in receipt of the letter

... [sic] not when the FAA office mailedit. (Motion, Exh. E, 5 (emphasis added).) This November 18,2013 email demonstrates that the Respondent had a leadership role in the case process, despite her claim that she did not "closely manage" Mr. Reigel's activity. (Response, 1 

### ,-r 12.) It also shows that the Respondent had a familiarity with the FAA's Rules of Practice, since she knew about both the "15-day clock" and the "receipt" rules. Thus, based on the evidence, the Respondent clearly knewthather appeal neededto be filed on orbefore December 3, 2013 (i.e., the deadline for appeal).

Page 10of 13On November 22, 201_3, four (4) days after the Respondent received the FNPCP by certified mailing, she e-mailed Mr. Riegel again, advising him ofher next step: Let'sjustgo with the appeal.

..[sic] at least I canpresent what actually happened on.that flight in court." (Motion, Exh. Eat 6.) It is after this point in time that the Respondent's evidentiary proofchanges. There is a distinct lack of'information proffered. For example, according to the Respondent's submission ofproof, she becomes passive. She appears to cease all email communications with Mr. Reigel, and does not averthat she spoke with him at all. Instead, she asserts that she·waited forMr. Reigel to file the request, and advise her ofa hearing location. Between November 22, 2013 and December 3, 2013 the Respondent asserts [by inference] that she said_and did nothing to ensure that her appeal has been timely filed. Then, on December 17, 2013, the Respondent receives the certified mailing ofthe OACP. (Motion, Exh. G; Response, 1**~** 7.) Despjte receipt ofthe OACP, her prior activityinthe case, and her evident knowledge ofthe FAA's Rules ofPractice, she says and does nothing for the next seven (7) days. Then, on December 24, 2013, the Respondent emails Mr. Reigel and asks him ifhe has heard "[a]ny response on the appeal?" (Motion, Exh. E, 5)

.

.The evidence shows that Mr. Reigel promptly responds via email that same day. He·tells the Respondent that he did not file an appeal, based on the directions she had previously provided. (Motion, Exh. E, 5.) [Mr. Reigel] I did not file an appeal. Your last instructions tome were that you were going to pursue the appeal on your own or using a local attorney who may be more cost effective andI confirmedthatIwouldnot be doing anything further on the matter. (Motion, Exh. E, 5)(emphasis added). Itis noteworthy thatthe Respondent dtd not submit to this court either her instructions to

.Mr. Reigel, orthe responsive confirmation to those instructions that Mr. Reigel references in his December 24, 2013 email. Giventhe fact that the communications between the Respondent and Mr. Reigel**we~e** primarily via email, it seems to weigh against the Respondent that she has not Page 11 of 13profferedthese communicationsto this court. (Response, 1**at~** 1 and 8.) Itis also noteworthy thatthe

### pro se Respondent generally alleges a variety ofgood cause factors (e.g., cancer, family death, etc.), but then does not provide any information about them. (Response, 1.) D. 

### ProSe Respondent Shouldbe GivenTime to Perfect the Record This case involves a default finding ofsafety violations, witha $7,700 default civil penalty assessment, with attendant 6% interest attached. (12/12/13 OACP, 2-3). Forthe majority ofAmerican citizens, this is a substantial sum ofmoney that mighttake years to fully pay.


# .

. Itmay well be that the

### pro se Respondenthas full email correspondence available to support her good cause arguments asserting a miscommunication between herselfand Mr. Reigel regarding the filing ofan appeal. Ifso, the Respondent needs to immediately file the full email correspondence, or inthe alternative, fully disclose the date(s) and specific content ofall missing communications, to perfect any good cause argument. In addition, the

### pro se Respondent has generally referenced other good cause factors in support ofher untimely request (e.g., cancer diagnosis, death inthe family, etc.), buthas failed to provide any specificity about such factors. (Response, 1.) Ifthe Respondent believesthese · factors have merit and should be considered, she should·immediately provide specific information about them. 

### VII. Conclusion Based onthe foregoing, andpursuantto 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.205(a)(8) and 13.218(f)(2), and after reviewing all relevant caselaw, regulations, statutory authority, and being fully advised;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: l) Baseduponthe evidence submitted, the date ofservice established for the Respondent's receipt oftheFNPCP is November 18, 2013. 2) Basedupon the evidence submitted, the last date for timely filing ofthe Respondent's Request for Hearingis established as December 3, 2013.

Page 12of133) Based upon the evidence submitted, the Respondent's Request for Hearing, filed January 8, 2014, is deemed untimely. 4) The FAA's Motionto Dismiss Late-Filed Appeal is reserved. 5) On or before June 25, 2014, the Respondent may file supplemental materials to perfect her good cause arguments. 6) Ifthe Respondent does not file any supplemental materials, a further Order will issue after June 25, 2014. 7) Ifthe Respondent does file supplement materials, then the FAA may file a supplemental reply (ifany) on or before July 15, 2014, or in the alternative, file a prompt notice (i.e., as soon as possible after June 25, 2014) that no reply will be filed.

Attachment: Service List

Page 13 of 13SERVICE LIST- BY U.S. MAIL ORIGINAL & ONE COPY Federal Aviation Administration 800 Independence Avenue, S:W. Washington, DC 20591 Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC--430 Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W10008



## Ms. Judith 

### L. Vaughan 

### Complainant's Counsel ONE COPY

Office ofthe Regional Counsel, Eastern Region Federal Aviation Administration 1 Aviation Plaza Jamaica, NY 11434 TEL: 718-553-3255 FAX: 718-995-5699 Ms. Mary E.· Bochiardy 

### Respondent 1450 Sunset Point Road Clearwater, FL 33755-1536 TEL: 386-214-0414 FAX: NOT PROVIDED
Judge J.E. Sullivan 

### US. Administrative LawJudge Office ofHearings, M-20 U.S. Department ofTransportation 1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (Ell-310) Washington, DC 20590 TEL: 202-366-6941 FAX: 202-366-7536 FDMS No. FAA-2013-0853 (Civil Penalty Action)

8 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: Federal Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1000, Washington, DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC--430.