RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3058-18T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LEVAR MARTINBOROUGH,

Defendant-Respondent.

____________________________

Submitted August 27, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Gilson and Mawla.

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior 

Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, 

Indictment No. 18-02-0073.

Jennifer Davenport, Acting Union County Prosecutor, 

attorney for appellant (Michele C. Buckley, Special 

Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, 

of counsel and on the brief).

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

September 4, 2019
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The State was granted leave to appeal from a February 7, 2019 decision,

which required it to turn over communications from a victim advocate, records

and communications of the Union County Prosecutor's Office investigation, and 

the decision to deny defendant Levar Martinborough admission to pre-trial 

intervention (PTI). We reverse the order requiring the State to furnish defendant 

discovery on these items.

We take the facts from the record. Defendant was indicted by a Union 

County grand jury for third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b), in 

relation to an early-morning incident outside an Elizabeth lounge in May 2017. 

Defendant observed the victim speaking with defendant's girlfriend. Defendant 

allegedly approached and struck the victim multiple times, causing multiple 

lacerations to his face, elbow, and left eye. The assault caused the victim to 

suffer a nasal fracture and an orbital fracture of the left eye, which required 

surgery and a bone graft. 

The victim gave a statement to police describing the incident. He stated 

he overheard defendant arguing with his girlfriend during the assault. 

Specifically, he heard the girlfriend ask defendant "how he could do that," 

meaning attack the victim, and heard defendant respond "cause he's with you, 

you're my girl." Following the statement, the assistant prosecutor assigned to 
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the matter declined to charge defendant. However, the prosecutor's office 

continued the investigation due to the seriousness of the victim's injuries and 

defendant's indictment followed. 

Defendant applied for PTI and the criminal division manager approved 

the application. The State then informed defendant it had overridden the initial 

determination and denied him entry to PTI. The reasons for the denial were set 

forth in a fourteen-paragraph, three-page email, which addressed the guidelines 

for admission pursuant to Rule 3:28 and the N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) factors. 

The PTI denial noted the crime was not victimless, given the serious 

injuries inflicted by defendant. The State noted "[d]efendant engaged in an 

unprovoked, deliberate and intentional attack upon the victim on a public street." 

The State also considered that the victim, through the victim advocate, advised 

that he wished to pursue the charges in an email sent to the prosecutor, which 

the State had turned over to defendant in discovery. The State cited the need to 

protect the victim, and the public, from such unprovoked attacks in the future. 

The State also considered the factors in favor of admitting defendant to PTI, 

namely, his age, education level and desire to continue his education, 

employment history, his experience as a corrections officer, and lack of a 
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criminal record or history of violence. However, the State concluded these 

factors were outweighed by the factors against admission. 

The PTI denial concluded "defendant's crime is of such a nature that the 

value of supervisory treatment is outweighed by the public need for 

prosecution. . . . For those same reasons, the State submits the harm done to 

society by abandoning criminal prosecution outweighs the benefits to society 

from channeling defendant into diversionary supervisory treatment[.]" 

Defendant filed a motion to compel discovery from the prosecutor's office 

"concerning any contacts, communications and involvement by the victim's 

advocate/civil attorney" relating to defendant's case. Defendant sought "the 

dates, times, places of and persons attending any meetings or verbal 

communications with [the victim advocate] and any emails from [the former 

assistant prosecutor who had handled the matter] regarding the investigation and 

. . . prosecution of this matter." 

During oral argument of defendant's motion, counsel explained he sought 

the discovery because "[i]t goes to the bias in the way the prosecutor's office 

dealt with [the victim advocate,] the access [the victim advocate] had to the 

[prosecutor's] office, . . . the access he had to the victim and his involvement 
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actually in the case going up."1 Defense counsel also argued the advocate had 

provided inaccurate information to the State regarding the incident itself, which 

"differ[ed] from the States' own theory of the case." Therefore, counsel argued 

he was "entitled to know what other inaccuracies he's provided to the State[.]"

On August 28, 2018, the motion judge issued a written decision granting 

defendant's motion. Citing State v. Barath, 169 N.J. Super. 181 (Law Div. 

1979), the judge stated: 

This court does find that the circumstances 

surrounding this case, including but not limited to: the 

original charging decision, the victim's refusal to speak 

with the police, the victim's interference with the 

investigation, and the email from [the victim advocate] 

to the prosecutor's office, support at minimum, 

defendant's instant request for discovery as a matter of 

fairness. However, the requested discovery will be 

reviewed in camera by this court to determine if 

disclosure is necessary and appropriate.

The State sought interlocutory review of this decision, however, we denied the 

application because the judge had not had an opportunity to conduct the in 

camera review.

After the judge reviewed the discovery in camera, she issued a written 

decision on February 7, 2019, challenged in this appeal. Again citing Barath, 

 

1 By "going up" we infer counsel meant the victim advocate's influence on the 

State's decision to charge defendant.
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the judge recited the broad authority of the court to order discovery. The judge 

also stated: 

It is also well settled that under [Rule] 3:13-3, a 

criminal defendant is entitled to broad discovery, and 

due process requires that the State disclose information 

it possesses which is material to the defense, as well as 

evidence of a favorable character to the defendant. 

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

The judge recited the statutory factors the State addressed in its PTI 

determination. The judge also noted the State relied upon fifteen items, 

including: the victim's recorded statement; medical records and photographs of 

his injuries; six investigation reports; three recorded statements from defendant's 

girlfriend; a recorded conversation between the victim and defendant's 

girlfriend; the girlfriend's grand jury testimony; and a statement from the 

victim's best friend who was with the victim after the assault. 

The judge then stated:

The current analysis then becomes whether the 

discovery at issue is material and favorable to 

defendant, requiring its disclosure. In other words, is 

there a reasonable probability the discovery shows the 

State did not consider all relevant factors, based their 

consideration on irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or 

clearly erred in their judgment when denying 

defendant's PTI application. [State v.] Bender, 80 N.J. 

[84,] 92-94 [(1979).]
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After reviewing the discovery, this court finds it 

material and favorable as it contradicts and undermines 

the factors relied upon by [the prosecutor] in his 

rejection decision. The discovery tends to show the 

State did not consider all relevant factors and based 

their consideration on irrelevant and inappropriate 

factors.

The issue currently before this court relates only 

to the discovery. Accordingly, this court holds 

defendant is entitled to the discovery in order to purse 

his appeal of the State's veto of his admission into PTI. 

This appeal followed.

On appeal, the State argues as follows:

POINT I – DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO 

DISCOVERY OF ANY RECORDS RELATING TO 

PTI.

I.

Although the issue before us is whether defendant is entitled to discovery 

regarding the decision of whether to prosecute or admit him into PTI, certain 

principles unique to PTI nonetheless frame the limited decisions a trial court 

may make at the PTI stage. The decision to admit a defendant to PTI is a 

"quintessentially prosecutorial function." State v. Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 624 

(2015) (quoting State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 582 (1996)). Thus, the scope of 

judicial review of a prosecutor's determination is severely limited. State v. 

Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 246 (1995); State v. Hermann, 80 N.J. 122, 127-28 (1979). 
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Prosecutors have wide latitude in deciding whom to divert into the PTI program 

and whom to prosecute. Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 246. "Reviewing courts must 

accord the prosecutor 'extreme deference.'" State v. Waters, 439 N.J. Super. 

215, 225 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 246). "We must apply 

the same standard as the trial court. Therefore, we review the [trial court's

ruling] of the prosecutor's decision de novo." Id. at 226. Likewise, we review 

any legal conclusions de novo. State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540-41 (2013).

"[A] defendant may obtain a hearing to review the prosecutor's decision 

only after he or she has demonstrated in a motion that the prosecutor abused his 

or her discretion." State v. Benjamin, 228 N.J. 358, 374 (2017). An abuse of 

discretion is "manifest if defendant can show that a prosecutorial veto (a) was 

not premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors, (b) was based upon a 

consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c) amounted to a clear 

error in judgment." Wallace, 146 N.J. at 583 (quoting Bender, 80 N.J. at 93). 

"[I]t must further be shown that the prosecutorial error complained of will 

clearly subvert the goals underlying [PTI]." Bender, 80 N.J. at 93. Absent 

evidence to the contrary, a reviewing court must "presume the prosecutor 

considered all relevant factors before rendering a decision." State v. Dalglish, 

86 N.J. 503, 509 (1981) (emphasis added) (citing Bender, 80 N.J. at 94).
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II.

Our de novo review of the record does not support the trial judge's 

decision to grant defendant discovery. The State provided a detailed 

explanation, which considered all of the guidelines and statutory factors for 

admission to PTI. The State also considered evidence supporting defendant's 

admission to PTI. Although the victim advocate's communication with the State 

was forceful and at times adversarial, we are not convinced the communication 

did anything other than underscore the victim's desire for the State to pursue the 

charges. Indeed, considering the substantial evidence related to the assault, 

namely, the multiple investigation reports, witness statements, and medical 

evidence, the State's decision to deny defendant PTI was not an abuse of 

discretion. 

More importantly, the record demonstrates the prosecutor made the 

decision to re-visit the investigation two weeks after the incident occurred and 

months before any communication from the victim advocate. Further, the bulk 

of the communications from the victim advocate concerned whether the 

prosecutor would file charges against defendant and did not concern PTI. 

Therefore, the record provides no support for defendant's claims that the 

decision to prosecute or deny PTI was biased by the victim advocate.
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Furthermore, the motion judge's reliance on Barath is inapposite. Barath

involved a defendant who sought documents, including investigation reports at 

the time of his arrest and medical records the prosecutor had relied upon to make 

the PTI determination, which defendant had never seen. Barath, 169 N.J. Super. 

at 183-87. The court in Barath cited State v. White, 145 N.J. Super. 257 (Law 

Div. 1976) and State v. Masucci, 156 N.J. Super. 272 (Law Div. 1978). The 

Barath court distinguished White by noting the defense in that case was denied 

discovery where it sought information relating to the mental process of the PTI 

director in evaluating the information provided by the defendant seeking 

admission into PTI. Barath, 169 N.J. Super. at 185-86. The Barath court also 

distinguished Masucci by noting the defense there was denied discovery 

regarding the scope and sufficiency of the underlying criminal investigation

from the PTI director. Ibid. 

The defense discovery request was granted in Barath because it was 

limited to the police reports and the defendant's medical/psychiatric records, 

which the PTI director had relied upon to make the PTI determination. Barath,

169 N.J. Super. at 187-89. Here, defendant's request went beyond the actual 

records relied upon by the prosecutor and ventured into the mental decision 

making process, which is beyond the scope of permissible discovery. Defendant 
11 A-3058-18T4

had all of the materials and an explanation for the prosecutor's PTI 

determination, which was grounded in the materials in defendant's possession. 

Finally, the judge's reliance on Brady as the basis for ordering discovery 

regarding a PTI determination was wrong as a matter of law. In Brady, the 

United States Supreme Court held the State violated due process when it 

suppressed and refused to produce in discovery evidence favorable to the 

defense on the issue of a defendant's guilt or innocence. 373 U.S. at 87. The 

Brady standard is inapplicable to a prosecutor's PTI decision, which is unrelated 

to the parties' separate discovery obligation during the prosecution of a criminal 

matter. 

Reversed. We do not retain jurisdiction.