In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-23-00095-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 4

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1774483R

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr

MICHAEL AARON JOBSON, Appellant

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Michael Aaron Jobson appeals his sentence of 25 years’ incarceration

for failure to comply with sex-offender-registration requirements. See Tex. Code Crim. 

Proc. Ann. art. 62.102. In a single point, Jobson argues that his sentence is illegal 

because it is outside the lawful punishment range. We agree that the trial court 

imposed an illegal sentence, and we therefore reverse Jobson’s sentence and remand 

for a new punishment trial.

I. BACKGROUND

Jobson was indicted for failing to comply with the requirements of the sexoffender-registration statute, a third-degree felony. See id. art. 62.102(b)(2). In two 

enhancement paragraphs, the indictment alleged that Jobson had previously been 

convicted of two felony-sex-offender-registration offenses.

Jobson pleaded not guilty to the alleged offense and not true to the two 

enhancement paragraphs. The jury found Jobson guilty, found both enhancement 

paragraphs true, and assessed Jobson’s punishment at 25 years’ incarceration. The trial 

court sentenced him accordingly. Jobson now appeals the imposition of that sentence.

II. DISCUSSION

In a single point, Jobson argues that his sentence is illegal because it exceeds 

the lawful punishment range. The State concedes the point, and we agree.
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A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

A sentence that is outside the authorized punishment range is an illegal

sentence. O’Reilly v. State, 501 S.W.3d 722, 728–29 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no pet.) 

(citing Ex parte Parrott, 396 S.W.3d 531, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). “If a defendant’s 

range of punishment is improperly enhanced, in the sense that the prior convictions 

alleged do not actually support enhancement under the applicable statutory provision, 

then the defendant has been sentenced in violation of the law and his sentence is 

‘illegal.’” Bell v. State, 635 S.W.3d 641, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Ex parte Rich, 

194 S.W.3d 508, 511–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). This is an unwaivable complaint 

that may be challenged at any time. O’Reilly, 501 S.W.3d at 729 (first citing Ex parte 

Pena, 71 S.W.3d 336, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); and then citing Baines v. State, 

418 S.W.3d 663, 674 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d)). Whether a sentence 

exceeds the punishment range authorized by statute is a legal question that we review 

de novo. See Yazdchi v. State, 428 S.W.3d 831, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Fountain v. 

State, No. 03-17-00699-CR, 2018 WL 3677871, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 3, 

2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

B. Improper Punishment-Range Enhancement

The punishment range for Jobson’s charged offense was improperly enhanced.

See Bell, 635 S.W.3d at 645. Jobson’s sex-offender-registration offense is a third-degree 

felony. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102(b)(2). The trial court’s punishment 

charge instructed the jury that if it found both of the indictment’s enhancement
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paragraphs to be true, it must assess Jobson’s punishment within the range for a firstdegree felony—that is, “confinement . . . for any term of not less than 5 years or more 

than 99 years or life.” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.32. Thus, the charge allowed the 

enhancements to be “stacked” such that the first enhancement raised the punishment 

range to a second-degree felony and the second enhancement paragraph raised the 

punishment range to a first-degree felony. This was improper.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has made clear that enhancements under

both Article 62.102(c) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 12.42 of 

the Texas Penal Code “operate only to increase the level of punishment, not to

elevate the grade of the offense of conviction.” Crawford v. State, 509 S.W.3d 359, 

363 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing Ford v. State, 334 S.W.3d 230, 234–35 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2011)). Therefore, when, as here, an indictment alleges multiple 

enhancements under Article 62.102(c) and Penal Code Section 12.42, “the first 

enhancement does not raise the first offense itself to a higher grade of felony, [rather] 

every subsequent enhancement . . . proceed[s] from the identical baseline, raising the 

punishment to exactly the same ‘next highest degree of felony’ as the first 

enhancement.” Id.

Because both alleged enhancements should have proceeded from the same 

baseline rather than being “stacked,” Jobson’s offense should have been punished as a 

second-degree felony, see id., the maximum sentence for which is 20 years’
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incarceration, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33. Jobson’s 25-year sentence is thus illegal.

See O’Reilly, 501 S.W.3d at 728–29. Accordingly, we sustain Jobson’s sole point.

III. CONCLUSION

Having sustained Jobson’s sole point, we reverse his sentence and remand this 

case to the trial court for a new punishment hearing.

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr

Elizabeth Kerr

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: February 8, 2024