IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: Appeal of Dylan Bell :

:

:

: No. 1165 C.D. 2016

: Submitted: March 24, 2017

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge

OPINION

BY JUDGE COSGROVE FILED: December 19, 2017

Dylan Bell (Appellant), appeals from an order of the Court of Common

Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) which dismissed his appeal of a ruling by the

City of Pittsburgh (City) Civil Service Commission (Commission) that the City had

just cause for passing over Appellant for consideration as a City f irefighter. Upon

review, we affirm.

In January 2014, Appellant applied for a position as a firefighter with

the City. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 36

- 37.) The City Fire Chief (Fire Chief)

passed over Appellant’s application for just cause because App ellant did not reside

within the City for one year prior to his application as required by Section 3 of the

Firemen’s Civil Service Act (Act) for Cities of the Second Class. 1 Appellant

appealed to the Commission and a hearing was held December 15, 2015. The

Commission found Appellant failed to provide evidence that would justify

1 Act of June 27, 1939, P.L. 1207, as amended

, 53 P.S. § 23493.2

overturning the decision of the Fire Chief. Further, the Commission found the Fire

Chief acted within the broad discretion conferred upon him. The Commission noted

the burden of proof for residency was on Appellant, a burden he did not meet, thus

providing just cause for the Fire Chief to pass over him. Consequently, the

Commission declined Appellant’s invitation to substitute its judgment for that of the

Fire Chief and denied A ppellant’s appeal. Appellant appealed the Commission’s

ruling to the trial court which took no additional evidence and affirmed the

Commission’s ruling. This appeal followed. 2

Discussion

Appellant argues the trial court erred by ruling the City establi shed just

cause before the Commission for passing over Appellant for a position as a City

firefighter because the Commission relied upon improper hearsay testimony for its

decision.

The process for application and appointment as a City firefighter is

gove rned by Section 3 of the Act, which provides in pertinent part that no application

shall be “received from any person who shall not have been a bona fide resident of

the [C]ity for one year next preceding the date of his application.” 53 P.S. §23493.

The application and appointment process is also governed by Section 3.1 of the Act. 3

Section 3.1 of the Act provides that “appointments and promotions

... shall be made

only from the top of the competitive list

... [but] the appointing officer may pass over

2 Our review, in an appeal from a civil service commission adjudication where the trial

court took no additional evidence, must focus upon the decision of the commission and a

determination whether the commission abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or made

findings unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. Civil Service Commission of City of

Pittsburgh v. Parks

, 471 A.2d 154, 156 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984).

3 Added by Act of July 3, 1963, P.L. 186, 53 P.S. §23493.1(a).3

the person on the top of the competitive list for just cause in writing.” 53 P.S.

§23493.1(a).

A determination of an individual’s legal residence is a question of law

which is dependent upon the facts as found by the appropriate fact finder, who draw s

inferences from the evidence presented and weighs the credibility of the witnesses.

Homan v. Civil Service Commission, City of Philadelphia

, 368 A.2d 883 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1977). The relevant facts are determined by each individual case. Civil

Service Comm ission of City of Pittsburgh

, 471 A.2d at 156. The findings of fact of

the Commission are conclusive upon appeal, however, the legal conclusions drawn

therefrom remain subject to judicial review. Foley v. Civil Service Commission of

City of Philadelphia

, 423 A.2d 1351, 1353 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980).

Residence is a matter of intent and intent is established by the actual

state of the facts. In re Shimkus, 946 A.2d 139, 149 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008); see also In

re Lesker

, 105 A.2d 376 (Pa. 1954). “Intent, being pure ly subjective, must to a large

extent be determined by the acts which are manifestations of that intent.” Wallace

v. Wallace, 89 A.2d 769, 771 (Pa. 1952) (establishment of residency for purposes of

a divorce).

Appellant argues that a residency determination is based on a collection

of facts taken into consideration, and not on a single factor. Appellant asserts that

domicile is a well

- settled matter in Pennsylvania, requiring two elements to be met:

physical p resence, or residence, and intent to make the residence the principal home

of the applicant.

The Commission, however, argues that where there is “substantial

evidence of noncompliance with the requirements of the application process,” the

Fire Chief ma y exercise his discretion to pass over an applicant from the position of4

fire fighter recruit. Civil Service Statutes, As Amended, & Rules Governing The Civil

Service, City of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh Civil Service Rules), Rule VI, §2(B)(7)

. 4 To

this end, t he Commission contends that the Fire Chief also has discretion to choose

the method for obtaining information in an accreditation process. Title One, Chapter

116 of the Pittsburgh City Code §116.02 ; 5 see also City of Pittsburgh v. Bachner

,

912 A.2d 368, 3 73 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (“the just cause provisions of the [Act]... [ do ]

not confer upon candidates the right to challenge the information

- gathering

procedures utilized to determine whether just cause exists.”) As long as the

information used by the Fire Chief to pass over the applicant supports just cause, the

Commission argues, the Fire Chief’s decision will not be overturned: Appellant did

not meet his burden of proving his City residency and that failure is just cause for

passing over Appellant for conside ration as a City firefighter.

Per Section 3 of the Act, Appellant was required to be a resident of the

City one year prior to the date of his application. Therefore, Appellant needed to

establish residency in the City as of January 2013.

At the hear ing held before the Commission on December 15, 2015,

Lieutenant Thomas Trochan, Jr. (Trochan) testified on behalf of Appellant. Trochan

testified he is employed by the Prince William County Department of Fire and

Rescue in Virginia (Prince William). (Rep roduced Record (R.R.) at 26

- 27.)

Trochan is Appellant’s supervisor; Appellant worked for him at Prince William for

a year and a half. Id. at 26. When questioned about his knowledge of Appellant’s

4 See http:/ /pittsburghpa.gov/personnel/files/policies/10_ Civil_ Service_ Statutes_

Rules.pdf (last visited December 4

, 2017).

5 See https:// library.municode.com/pa/pittsburgh/codes/code_ of_ ordinances

?nodeId=COOR_ TITONEAD_ ARTIIIOR_ CH116DEPUSA_ S116.02PODUBUCHDIPUSA

(last visited December 4

, 2017).5

residence, Trochan responded, “As far as I’m aware, he li ves in Pittsburgh.” Id. at

26. Trochan testified that Appellant’s correspondence is sent to Pittsburgh, his

driver’s license is “in Pennsylvania” and he has Pennsylvania plates. Id. When

Appellant leaves his shift in the morning, he “heads back to Pitt sburgh.” Id. Trochan

explained that several firefighters live outside Virginia due to the cost of living. Id.

Appellant testified as follows. He graduated from high school in

Monroeville, Pennsylvania and still lived with his parents when he began

e mployment in Prince William. (R.R. at 32.) Appellant resided with his parents

until he moved to Henderson Street in Pittsburgh and resided with Dan Doyle

(Doyle), a City firefighter, and Doyle’s wife. Id. at 31

- 32. Appellant moved in with

Doyle in Janu ary 2014 and considered that his residence. Id. at 33, 40. At the time

of the December 15, 2015 hearing, Appellant lived with his girlfriend at 3212 Joe

Hammer Square in the City (Joe Hammer Square). Id. at 30, 38

- 39. Appellant

testified when off duty from his job in Virginia, he “go[es] to his girlfriend’s house.”

Id. at 39. While there, Appellant uses his girlfriend’s visitor parking pass, which he

can use because he isn’t parking consecutively for five days. Id. at 42. Appellant

established bank accounts in 2012, while he was still in high school. Id. at 44.

Doyle also testified on behalf of Appellant. He owns a house at 156

Henderson Street in the City (Henderson Street) and Appellant lived with him and

his w ife for a “good year and a half.” (R.R. at 47.) Appellant rented a room from

him for $200.00 per month. Id. at 48. Doyle was close friends with Appellant’s

father and the living arrangement was informal. Id. Appellant resided with him

beginning in “l ate fall, early winter...December, January maybe of ‘13ish,

somewhere around there.” Id. at 49. Doyle testified Appellant moved in with him

not long after Appellant graduated from high school. Id.6 A neighbor of the Joe Hammer Square property

, Mia Satory (Satory)

testified that Appellant’s truck is “always” parked in the neighborhood. (R.R. at 55.)

Satory testified it was “hard to miss” and “[took] up a lot of room.” Id. Elizabeth

Owens, Appellant’s girlfriend, testified Appellant began living with her at the Joe

Hammer Square property in September 2015. Id. at 56. Appellant is at the house

every two days for 24 hours. Id. at 57.

In support of his testimony that he complied with the residency

requirements of Section 3 of the Act, Appellant submitte d the following exhibits.

Appellant’s certificate of voter registration indicating the Joe Hammer Square

address with an enrollment date of February 2, 2012 and valid

- on date of October 1,

2015 or upon receipt by the voter. (Appellant Exhibit #1; R.R. at 81.) Appellant’s

Pennsylvania driver’s licenses issued January 28, 2015 and September 19, 2015,

which respectively indicate Henderson Street and Joe Hammer Square as his

addresses. (Appellant’s Exhibit #2

- 3; R.R. at 82

- 83.) A letter dated December 2,

2 015 fro m PNC B ank which indicated he opened three accounts on June 14, 2012.

(Appellant’s Exhibit #4; R.R. at 84.) Three cancelled checks to Appellant’s

landlord, drawn on Appellant’s bank account, dated September 25, 2015, October

28, 2015, and December 1, 2015. (Appellant’s Exhibit # 5; R.R. at 85

- 87.) All three

checks indicate a Monroeville, P A address. Id.

The City presented the testimony of Erin Kathleen Bruni (Bruni), who

investigated Appellant’s residency. Appellant objected to her testimony as based on

inadmissible hearsay. The City responded that the records which formed the basis

of her testimony constituted business records, an exception to the hearsay rule. The

Commission allowed Bruni to testify and indicated it would weigh Appellant’ s7

inability to cross examine the witnesses who provided Bruni with information when

making its final determination. (R.R. at 17.)

Even excluding the objected

- to testimony and exhibits offered by

Bruni, Appellant has not established he resided in Pittsb urgh in January 2013.

Appellant’s documentary evidence indicates, at best, he changed his address to

Pittsburgh in January 2015. The enrollment date on Appellant’s registration card

does not establish he resided in Pittsburgh in February 2012, merely tha t he

registered to vote at that time. In June 2012, when Appellant opened the PNC B ank

accounts, Appellant was in high school and living with his parents. The letter from

PNC B ank merely establishes a Joe Hammer Square address as of December 2015.

In ad dition, the address listed on Appellant’s checks identifies the Monroeville, PA

address of his parents. The first check Appellant wrote to his landlord was dated

September 25, 2015, well beyond the January 2014 application filed by Appellant

and January 2 013 time frame required to establish residency. Further, Appellant

failed to offer or produce a lease to substantiate Appellant did, in fact, change his

residency to Joe Hammer Square in the City.

As to the Henderson Street address, no substantive evidence was

presented to support the argument that Appellant actually resided there since

approximately January of 2013. In fact, not only did Doyl e testify he had no lease

with A ppellant, he also testified that Appellant only paid the rent in cash, thus

precluding presentation of evidence such as cancelled checks. Finally, Appellant’s

testimony regarding when he moved to the Henderson Street address actually

conflicted with Doyle’s and suggested he moved there in January 2014. On the other

hand, Doyle’ s testimony as to exactly when Appellant moved in was

, at best,

equivocal.8 Our review of the evidence establishes that Appellant’s proof of

residency was insufficient and did not satisfy Appellant’s burden of proving he was

a bona fide resident of the C ity and domiciled within the City no later than January

of 2013. Appellant may have resided in the City prior to January 2014, but the

evidence fails to show that this occurred at least as of January 2013.

In sum, the Commission’s findings are support ed by the record.

Matters of witness credibility, evidentiary conflict and evidentiary weight are with in

the province of the Commission, not this Court. Homan. All factors, not simply one

single factor, were considered to create a full picture determina tion. Civil Service

Commission of City of Pittsburgh; Foley.

Thus, we discern no error in the determination that the City had just

cause for passing over Appellant for consideration as a City firefighter because he

did not reside within the City for one year prior to his January 2014 application.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.

___________________________ JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, JudgeI N THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: Appeal of Dylan Bell :

:

:

: No. 1165 C.D. 2016

:

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 19 th day of December

, 2017, the order of the Court of

Common Pleas of Allegheny Count is affirmed.

___________________________ JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge