IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION ONE

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to

B.D.M.B.,

Minor Child.

No. 80429-4-I

(consolidated with No. 80585-1-I)

ORDER CHANGING CASE 

TITLE, WITHDRAWING

OPINION, AND SUBSTITUTING 

OPINION

The Supreme Court of Washington granted discretionary review of the 

opinion filed on November 23, 2020 and on October 6, 2021 remanded the case

with instructions to change the case title consistent with In re the Welfare of K.D., 

198 Wn.2d 67, 491 P.3d 154 (2021). This court has considered the order and on 

its own motion a majority of the panel has determined that the names of the parents 

should be removed from the opinion and that the opinion should be withdrawn and 

a substitute opinion filed; now, therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that the opinion filed on November 23, 2020 is withdrawn; and it 

is further

ORDERED that the case title shall be changed consistent with K.D.; and it is 

further

ORDERED that the names of the parents be removed from the opinion; and

it is further
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to

B.D.M.B.,

Minor Child.

No. 80429-4-I

(consolidated with No. 80585-1-I)

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

APPELWICK, J. — After a dependency of more than four years, the trial court 

terminated the mother’s and father’s parental rights to B.D.M.B. The mother

contends the termination statutes, RCW 13.34.180 and .190, are unconstitutional 

as applied to this case. She also contends that the Department did not prove all 

statutory elements or that termination was in the best interests of the child. The 

father claims the Department failed to prove that it offered or provided all 

necessary services capable of correcting his parental deficiencies and that he was 

currently unfit to parent B.D.M.B. We affirm.

FACTS

This appeal concerns B.D.M.B., the middle child of the mother’s and father’s

three children.1 B.D.M.B. was born in January 2010 and has “seen a lot in her little 

life.” 

 

1 Although the record reveals B.D.M.B.’s siblings share a similar childhood 

experience, we summarize the facts as related to B.D.M.B. only.
No. 80429-4-I/2

2

Within the first six years of her life, B.D.M.B. observed her parents 

frequently drinking to the point of intoxication, the mother cutting and stabbing the 

father, and the father breaking the mother’s nose multiple times. The mother and 

father also subjected B.D.M.B. to acts of physical violence, emotional abuse, and 

neglect. During this time, the family had several encounters with law enforcement, 

had numerous Child Protective Services referrals, and received various family 

support services. These early years of constant chaos and domestic violence 

caused B.D.M.B. to suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 

In December 2014, the Department of Social and Health Services 

(Department)2removed B.D.M.B. from the parent’s care and filed a dependency 

petition. B.D.M.B. was initially placed into foster care. 

In January 2015, the mother and father agreed to the entry of a dependency 

and dispositional order placing B.D.M.B. in relative care. The parties stipulated to 

the facts establishing dependency and the court entered an agreed dependency 

order for B.D.M.B. The court ordered the mother and father to participate in 

domestic violence services, substance abuse treatment, and random urinalysis 

(UAs). The court authorized weekly visitation for the mother and father. 

In March 2015, the Department later placed B.D.M.B. with her paternal 

grandmother. At that time, the court found both parents were making progress 

towards reunification and expanded visitation to include weekend visits. 

 

2 As of July 1, 2018, child welfare functions were transferred from the 

Department of Social and Health Services to the Department of Children, Youth, 

and Families. See RCW 43.216.906. We refer to both as “the Department.”
No. 80429-4-I/3

3

In August 2015, after the mother and father successfully completed all 

court-ordered services, B.D.M.B. was returned to her parents’ care for a “trial inhome placement.” But, by December 2015, the parents relapsed into alcohol 

abuse and family violence. 

In January 2016, B.D.M.B. was again removed from the parents’ care and 

placed with the paternal grandmother. B.D.M.B. remained in this placement 

throughout the remainder of the dependency proceedings. 

At a February 2016 review hearing, the court ordered the mother to continue 

substance abuse treatment, complete random UAs, attend sober support 

meetings, participate in domestic violence service and in a “Parenting After 

Violence” class, and continue in family counseling. The court ordered the father

to participate in an updated substance abuse evaluation and in an “Effects of 

Violence on Children” class, complete random UAs and a domestic violence 

batterer’s assessment, and undergo individual mental health counseling. The 

court later required the parents to complete a Foster Care Assessment Program 

(FCAP) to examine reunification barriers, and changed B.D.M.B.’s primary 

permanent plan to adoption with an alternative plan to return home to the parents.

In September 2016, an FCAP report was completed. According to that 

report, the mother and father denied alcohol abuse during B.D.M.B.’s trial return 

home. Relatedly, the report determined: “It will be difficult to see a decrease in 

[B.D.M.B.’s] PTSD arousal scores until there is acknowledgement by [the parents] 

of the impact of the abuse and their past behavior has had had on their children, 
No. 80429-4-I/4

4

and her permanent placement is determined.” The report also stated in pertinent 

part:

Reunification is not recommended. The family has been 

provided with a significant level of services over time and there are 

no additional services for the parents that could result in a 

recommendation for reunification within the mandated time frame for 

these three siblings. Encourage the parents to relinquish parental 

rights and adoption by [the paternal grandmother]. If the Court 

determines that reunification should occur, then Alternatives for 

Families: a Cognitive Behavior Therapy (AF-CBT) is the evidencebased treatment intervention designed to improve the relationships 

between children and caregivers in families involved in arguments, 

frequent conflict, physical force/discipline, or child physical-abuse. 

[The mother and father] are not currently good candidates for AFCBT, because they have continued to deny their behavior. 

In October 2016, the Department filed a petition to terminate the mother’s 

and the father’s parental rights to B.D.M.B. The petition alleged that the 

Department offered numerous services to the parents, including: drug and alcohol 

evaluations, substance abuse treatment, random UAs, domestic violence 

assessment and treatment, Parenting after Violence class, family counseling, 

mental health assessments and services, age-appropriate parenting education, 

case management services and monitoring, assisting caregiver services, and 

facilitating implementation of services. The petition also alleged, despite the 

Department’s provision of these services, the parents were not fit to parent 

B.D.M.B. due to

the following parental deficiencies that have not been corrected and 

necessitate termination of parental rights as to the parents: history of 

substance abuse, domestic violence, mental health issue, and a lack 

of parenting skills. For these reasons, the parents do not understand 

and are incapable of providing for their child’s emotional, physical, 

mental and developmental needs. The parent[s are] incapable of 

safely parenting the child. 
No. 80429-4-I/5

5

In December 2016, for the first time, the mother and father acknowledged 

their relapse on alcohol abuse in December 2015. Not only did they refuse to 

disclose their relapse to their respective service providers for an entire year, they 

also maintained that B.D.M.B. was lying about witnessing their relapse and return 

to violence during the trial return home. 

In March 2017, the assigned Department social worker, Zavtra Adams, 

began inquiring into AF-CBT services as suggested in the FCAP report since the 

parents had recently acknowledged their relapse. Adams eventually contacted 

two potential service providers, one in King County and another in Snohomish 

County. Both service providers declined the referrals. The King County provider 

indicated that reunification needed to be imminent in order to be effective, “the 

children needed to be in home for a large portion of that timeframe,” its program 

required weekly sessions and travel to King County (from Whatcom County). The 

Snohomish County provider advised that its program was only for families 

traumatized by events such as a house fire or a murder, and did not offer a program 

for family reunification.

In April 2017, even though it was not yet a court-ordered service, Adams 

started searching for family counseling options. Before this time, B.D.M.B.’s 

individual therapist did not recommend family counseling due to the child’s fear of 

her parents. In June 2017, the Department retained family therapist Victoria 

McGuinness, noting the following as the presenting issue: “They are being referred 

for family therapy at the request of the parents in support of reunification efforts.” 

But, after initial and separate meetings with B.D.M.B. and the parents, McGuinness 
No. 80429-4-I/6

6

determined that she was “unable to proceed” for two reasons. The first was due 

to B.D.M.B.’s “level of resistance and her fears with regard to family therapy.” The 

second was “the parents’ insistence that it be reunification therapy, that was not 

the goal. The goal was to rebuild trust.” Ultimately, McGuinness indicated that 

“she was not the right person for the job and wasn’t willing to force” B.D.M.B. into

sessions with her parents. 

In October 2017, after a referral to Licensed Mental Health Therapist Amy 

Glasser, the family began participating in family counseling sessions. B.D.M.B. 

did not trust the mother or the father and the primary goal of this counseling 

sessions was to “create a trusting relationship with the parents.” The family’s 

counseling with Glasser lasted until the end of September 2018, totaling a 

combined 37 individual and group sessions during that time. At the conclusion of 

family counseling, Glasser opined that the parents “telling the kids they weren’t 

telling the truth” about the relapse “is what really stuck in terms of progress [the 

family] could make in therapy.” Glasser also opined that family counseling would 

have been inappropriate prior to the parents taking “responsibility for all of their 

actions.” 

In April 2018, after the parents’ visitation switched from supervised to 

monitored, B.D.M.B. began to refusing visits and contact with her parents. She 

last visited her parents in May 2018 but continued to see them in family counseling 

sessions. 
No. 80429-4-I/7

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In January 2019, the Department retained Psychiatric Nurse Practitioner 

JoAnne Solchany, Ph.D. to conduct a psychiatric evaluation of B.D.M.B. The 

pertinent parts of Dr. Solchany’s written summary and recommendations state:

[B.D.M.B.] is a very traumatized little girl. She meets criteria 

for PTSD. [B.D.M.B.] experienced a lot of trauma, she witnessed a 

lot of violence, she witnessed her parents engaging in behaviors that 

had the power to kill—including strangulation and stabbing, she 

reports her mother threatening to kill her and her siblings, and she 

experienced a significant level of neglect. Her fears were chronic 

and she was powerless to do anything to make it better for herself or 

her siblings. [B.D.M.B.’s] primary traumas were laid down during 

early childhood, the time in her life when she should have been able 

to trust her parents, feel safe, and feel well taken care of. This did 

not happen for her, she repeatedly experienced chaos, violence, 

drunkenness, and abuse.

. . . . 

. . . [The mother and father] both did a good job acknowledging 

and owning many of the issues. However, they never directly 

addressed the physical abuse and significant neglect that [B.D.M.B.] 

and her siblings have described occurring. Without this, it is highly 

unlikely that [B.D.M.B.] will be able to move forward with truly healing 

her relationship with her parents. Honesty is a very important step 

in healing and building trust. [B.D.M.B.] cannot repair and rebuild 

her relationship with her parents until she knows she can trust 

them. . . .

. . . . 

. . . Forcing her to reunite or even visit her parents will, more 

likely than not, lead to regression and the presentation of more 

significant and serious behavioral and emotional issues. It is also 

more likely than not that she will feel forced to disrupt the visits or 

any attempts at placement by engaging in big, concerning acting out. 

[B.D.M.B.] would also lose the trust in those she currently has, whom 

she feels are there to protect her, because a return to her parents 

means those people failed her. 
No. 80429-4-I/8

8

In addition to these recommendations, the Department asked Dr. Solchany 

to answer several questions, including this one:

5. What is the potential impact of reunification to [B.D.M.B.’s] mental 

health?

[B.D.M.B.’s] primary plan should be to remain with her 

grandmother, a guardianship should be considered. However, 

both aunt and grandmother need to stop disparaging the parents, 

this is not healthy or helpful for [B.D.M.B.]—[B.D.M.B.] is still a 

product of both her parents and disparaging them can whittle 

away at her own sense of self and self esteem. That said, her 

grandmother’s [house] is where she feels safe. This does not 

mean that [B.D.M.B.] cannot eventually have a positive 

relationship with her parents. If reunification is off the table for 

now, then this should help [B.D.M.B.] relax and feel safer, allowing 

her to actually begin considering having a relationship with her 

parents. 

Dr. Solchany’s report concludes that “it is not recommended to try and move 

B.D.M.B. towards a return home.” 

The five day termination trial began in May 2019. The court heard testimony 

from nine witnesses and considered 26 admitted exhibits. 

Summer Justus, the assigned Department social worker from July 2015 and 

March 2017, testified to how the parents’ lack of honesty regarding their relapse 

presented “a barrier” for them making progress. When asked about B.D.M.B.’s 

general feelings after the relapse, Justus responded, “She was mostly fearful of 

her mother. She was fearful that her father would not be protective with her 

mother.”

Adams, the assigned social worker after March 2017, testified about 

referrals to the parents for court-ordered services. Adams said that there are no 

additional services the Department could offer that would help remedy the parents’ 
No. 80429-4-I/9

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deficiencies, and B.D.M.B. was “happy,” “healthy,” and “stable” in her placement 

with the grandmother. Adams also explained why she considered B.D.M.B.’s “near 

future” to be three to six months. Adams recalled the father voicing concern earlier 

in the dependency that his mother’s animosity and distrust for him and the mother

could influence B.D.M.B. and undermine reunification. However, Adams said she 

had no reason to believe that the grandmother was undermining reunification 

efforts and recommended that the parents’ rights to B.D.M.B. be terminated.

Erin Smith, a mental health therapist, testified to being B.D.M.B.’s therapist 

for two years beginning in 2015. According to Smith, B.D.M.B. talked a lot about 

“witnessing violence in the home, and also being the recipient of violence.” 

Willow Myers testified to being a family and child therapist who had been 

treating B.D.M.B. monthly since July 2018. Myers spoke about how B.D.M.B. 

“voiced to me that she’s afraid to be alone with her parents.” Myers noted how 

B.D.M.B. “doesn’t want to reexperience her trauma,” “would need to have some 

control” in initiating any reunification, and the process “would have to be done so 

very slowly.”

Michelle Gordon, the assigned guardian ad litem, testified that B.D.M.B. has 

“trauma when it comes to the thought of having to return home,” and the parents 

cannot meet her emotional needs because there “is no trust,” no “parent/child 

bond.” Gordon does not believe the parents can correct their parental deficiencies 

in B.D.M.B.’s near future, which she described as between one and three months 

based on conversations with the child. According to Gordon, B.D.M.B. is “very 
No. 80429-4-I/10

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bonded with her grandmother,” needs permanency, and termination of parental 

rights is in B.D.M.B.’s best interests.

Glasser testified that she could not imagine B.D.M.B. getting to the point of 

wanting to live with her parents and opined, “reunification is virtually impossible if 

one of the parties cannot trust the other party.” Glasser also rejected the notion 

the grandmother’s alleged bad influence played a significant role in B.D.M.B.’s lack 

of trust in her parents because B.D.M.B.’s “got enough memories of her own to

remember what she doesn’t trust.”

Dr. Solchany opined that the mother and father will not “be able to 

successfully or safely parent [B.D.M.B.] and have her live with them,” B.D.M.B. 

does not have a healthy bond with the parents and “does not trust her parents to 

keep her safe and take good care of her.” Dr. Solchany testified, “I wouldn’t 

recommend reunification, so I wouldn’t have any services to recommend in that 

direction,” “I can’t even imagine” how long it would take to move towards 

reunification, and “I don’t know that it could ever happen.” Her testimony did not 

mention, much less recommend, guardianship as an option.

The mother acknowledged that B.D.M.B. “trusted and believed that” she 

and the father had changed but they “destroyed” that trust “when we had our 

relapse.” She admitted to denying the relapse for an entire year and making her 

“children look like they were lying.” Asked if she had any response to Dr. 

Solchany’s report, the mother testified, “I feel that she stated that it could be 

harmful emotionally to [B.D.M.B.] if she was forced to go home. I feel that she 

listed a very, a variety of things as in she could have some, she could have 
No. 80429-4-I/11

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depression, anxiety. She could not behave.” The mother further responded, “the 

possibility of those things may be having a higher probability of having since she’s 

been exposed to trauma and whatnot, but that is all may. That is not certain. That 

is not, we cannot tell the future that that is what would happen.” (Emphasis in 

original).

The father testified about exposing his children to “lots of arguing,” “physical 

violence,” and parental intoxication. He said that the children were removed for 

“good cause” and it took him a long time to “own up” to his actions. The father also 

testified that he and the mother have a very strained relationship with his mother, 

B.D.M.B.’s paternal grandmother.

At the conclusion of trial, the court entered written findings of fact and 

conclusions of law terminating the mother’s and the father’s parental rights to 

B.D.M.B. Both of the parents appeal and we consolidate the two appeals for 

review.

DISCUSSION

Parents enjoy fundamental liberty interests in “the continued care, custody, 

and management of their children.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 

S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982). But, “when parental actions or decisions 

seriously conflict with the physical or mental health of the child, the State has a 

parens patriae right and responsibility to intervene to protect the child.” In re 

Welfare of Sumey, 94 Wn.2d 757, 762, 621 P.2d 108 (1980).

In order to terminate the parent-child relationship, the Department must first 

prove the six termination factors set forth in RCW 13.34.180(1) by clear, cogent, 
No. 80429-4-I/12

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and convincing evidence.3In re Dependency of K.N.J., 171 Wn.2d 568, 576-77, 

257 P.3d 522 (2011). Next, due process requires the trial court to expressly or 

impliedly find by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the parent is currently 

unfit.4Id. at 577. If all of these elements are proven, the court must also find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child. 

Id.; RCW 13.34.190(b).

Where, as here, the trial court has weighed the evidence, our review is limited 

to determining whether substantial evidence supports the court’s findings of fact and 

whether those findings support the court’s conclusions of law. In re Dependency of 

P.D., 58 Wn. App. 18, 25, 792 P.2d 159 (1990). Unchallenged findings of fact are 

verities on appeal. In re Welfare of A.W., 182 Wn.2d 689, 711, 344 P.3d 1186 (2015). 

Challenged findings will be upheld “[i]f there is substantial evidence which the lower 

court could reasonably have found to be clear, cogent[,] and convincing.” In re Welfare 

of Aschauer, 93 Wn.2d 689, 695, 611 P.2d 1245 (1980). We defer to the trier of fact 

on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the 

evidence. State v. Killingsworth, 166 Wn. App. 283, 287, 269 P.3d 1064 (2012). Such 

deference is particularly important in proceedings affecting the parent and child 

relationship because of “the trial judge’s advantage in having the witnesses before him 

or her.” A.W., 182 Wn.2d at 711.

 

3

“Clear, cogent, and convincing” means highly probable. In re Welfare of 

M.R.H., 145 Wn. App. 10, 24, 188 P.3d 510 (2008). 

4

“Satisfying all six of the statutory elements raises an implied finding of 

parental unfitness.” In re Parental Rights to K.M.M., 186 Wn.2d 466, 479, 379 

P.3d 75 (2016).
No. 80429-4-I/13

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I. Mother’s As-Applied Substantive Due Process Challenges

The mother asserts that RCW 13.34.180 and .190 are unconstitutional and 

violate substantive due process, as applied to cases in which the Department’s 

child expert has recommended a guardianship be considered, because the 

Department is not required to prove that a guardianship is not a viable alternative 

to termination. This assertion is not persuasive.

Washington courts presume statutes are constitutional. In re Dependency 

of C.B., 79 Wn. App. 686, 689, 904 P.2d 1171 (1995). The party challenging a 

statute’s constitutionality has the burden of proving otherwise. Id. A party 

challenging the constitutionality of a statute as applied must show “that application 

of the statute in the specific context of the party’s actions or intended actions is 

unconstitutional.”5 City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664, 668-69, 91 P.3d 

875 (2004).

The mother’s as-applied challenge rests solely on her claim that “Dr. 

Solchany recommended that B.D.M.B. remain with her grandmother, but she also 

explicitly recommended ‘a guardianship should be considered.’” But, the record 

does not support this claim. First, in Dr. Solchany’s 13 page report, she includes 

three pages of summary and recommendations. None of those pages mention 

“guardianship” as an option to consider. Second, Dr. Solcharny did not testify 

about a guardianship when detailing her report recommendations at trial. Lastly, 

none of the parties ever raised or argued the issue of guardianship at trial.

 

5 Determining a statute unconstitutional as applied forbids future application 

of the statute under similar circumstances, but such a determination does not 

totally invalidate the statute. Moore, 151 Wn.2d at 669. 
No. 80429-4-I/14

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It is well-settled that a “court must consider a dependency guardianship as 

an alternative to termination only when a petition for a dependency guardianship 

has been filed.” In re Dependency of I.J.S., 128 Wn. App. 108, 121, 114 P.3d 1215 

(2005); In re Dependency of T.C.C.B., 138 Wn. App. 791, 800, 158 P.3d 1251 

(2007) (where there is no dependency guardianship pending, there is no 

constitutional or other requirement to consider a “theoretical dependency 

proceeding”). Here, the record contains no guardianship petition nor an explicit 

recommendation that one should have been considered. 

The mother cannot demonstrate that the termination statutes are 

unconstitutional as applied to this case.

II. Mother’s As-Applied Procedural Due Process Challenge

Next, the mother similarly argues that as applied here, Washington’s 

termination statutes violate her rights to procedural due process. She contends 

that, when the Department’s expert recommends consideration of a guardianship, 

due process requires the Department to prove a guardianship is not available 

before parental rights may be terminated.

Again, because there is no support in the record that a guardianship was 

ever filed, we reject the mother’s procedural due process claim. In re Dependency 

of K.S.C., 137 Wn.2d 918, 931, 976 P.2d 113 (1999) (Washington’s termination 

statutes do not require a court to consider dependency guardianship as an 

alternative to termination where no petition has been filed).
No. 80429-4-I/15

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III. Mother’s Early Integration into Permanent Home Challenge 

The mother argues that the Department’s evidence was insufficient to 

support the finding under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f), that “continuation of the parent and 

child relationship clearly diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into 

a stable and permanent home.” She contends that there was no evidence 

establishing that if her and the father’s legal relationship with B.D.M.B. remained 

intact that it would somehow disrupt B.D.M.B. finding permanency with her 

grandmother.

Notably, the mother does not advance any legal argument to challenge the 

findings under RCW 13.34.180(1)(e), that there is little likelihood that conditions 

will be remedied so that the child can be returned to her in the near future. This 

finding is, therefore, a verity on appeal. A.W., 182 Wn.2d at 711. There is also 

ample support for this finding in the record. Guardian ad Litem Gordon testified 

that the parents could not correct their parental deficiencies in B.D.M.B.’s near 

future of one to three months. Family therapist Glasser indicated that the 

possibility of the parents reunifying with B.D.M.B. was “virtually impossible.” Social 

worker Adams said that the parents “have not made progress in repairing their 

relationship with [B.D.M.B.],” and after more than four years of services towards 

that goal, B.D.M.B. “remains extremely fearful of returning home, and it would be 

against the recommendations of her mental health providers.” Under this 

evidence, which we do not re-weigh on review, the trial court had no good reason 

to believe that the parents would correct their deficiencies at any time meaningful 

to B.D.M.B.
No. 80429-4-I/16

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“Facts supporting a conclusion under RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) may, but do not 

necessarily, also support a conclusion under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f).” In re 

Dependency of K.D.S., 176 Wn.2d 644, 655, 294 P.3d 695 (2013). Here, the 

evidence supporting the trial court’s finding under RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) also 

supports its RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) finding. Even if this were not the case, the court’s 

finding under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) is well supported by independent evidence in 

the record. Dr. Solchany warned, “Forcing her to reunite or even visit her parents 

will, more likely than not, lead to regression and the presentation of more 

significant and serious behavioral and emotional issues,” and that B.D.M.B. “would 

also lose the trust in those she currently has, whom she feels are there to protect 

her, because a return to her parents means those people failed her.”

The court had sufficient evidence to conclude that continuing the mother’s

and father’s parental rights to B.D.M.B. diminished her prospects for early 

integration into a stable and permanent home.

IV. Mother’s Best Interests of the Child Challenge

Lastly, the mother argues that the court’s findings do not support its 

conclusion that termination of her parent-child relationship was in the best interests 

of B.D.M.B. pursuant to RCW 13.34.190(b). She admits that the court’s finding on 

this factor “establishes it is in B.D.M.B.’s best interest that the dependency end.” 

But, the mother claims that the finding “does not establish that termination of the 

legal relationship between B.D.M.B. and her parents was in her” best interest if 

B.D.M.B. were subject to a guardianship.
No. 80429-4-I/17

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We accept the mother’s admission that the finding sufficiently establishes it 

is in B.D.M.B.’s best interest to terminate the dependency. And, because a 

termination petition was the only proceeding before the court, we reject the 

remainder of the mother’s argument. The court appropriately found that 

terminating the mother’s and the father’s parental rights to B.D.M.B. was in the 

best interest of the child.

V. Father’s Provision of Necessary Services Challenge

The father argues that the Department failed to satisfy RCW 

13.34.180(1)(d), because it failed to offer reunification therapy.

In order to terminate parental rights, the Department must prove that it 

offered “all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the 

parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.” RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). 

“Necessary services” are those services “‘needed to address a condition that 

precludes reunification of the parent and child.’” In re Parental Rights to K.M.M., 

186 Wn.2d 466, 480, 379 P.3d 75 (2016) (quoting In re Dependency of A.M.M., 

182 Wn. App. 776, 793, 332 P.3d 500 (2014)). Here, the court found, in pertinent 

part,

2.11 . . . Despite the offering of these services, there has been little 

improvement in parental functioning as to this child.

A. [The parents], social worker Summer Justus and social worker 

Zavtra Adams all testified as to the extensive and helpful 

services provided to this family

B. The Court finds that the Department did provide and [the 

parents] did undergo a variety of services, and most of their 

parental deficiencies were corrected due to their participation in 

these services. As the result of these services, the youngest 
No. 80429-4-I/18

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sibling was returned to their care. The only parental deficiency 

that remains is an inability to parent this particular child due to 

broken trust and her lack of attachment to her parents at this 

time.

C. The Court considered In re Parental Rights of B.P., 186 Wn.2d 

292[, 376 P.3d 350] (2016) and [K.M.M.]. B.P. involved a much 

younger child than [B.D.M.B.], and that court could not find that 

services would have been futile had they been offered. K.M.M.

involved an older child, who refuses to have contact with her 

father, and the Court finds that reunification therapy was not a 

necessary service[] because it would have been futile in that 

case. The Court finds this case very close to and with more 

similarities to K.M.M. In both this case and in K.M.M., while it is 

possible that attachment and bonding services might have 

prevented child detachment from a parent had they been 

previously provided, the parties cannot go back in time to prevent 

the damage from occurring. No service is now capable of 

correcting the parental deficiency within the foreseeable future. 

D. The Court does not find any fault with the Department’s decision 

not to offer reunification therapy. In this case, the Department 

presented compelling evidence that reunification therapy would 

have been detrimental to the child before sufficient progress was 

made in the child’s personal therapy. Family therapist Amy 

Glasser, child’s therapists Willow Myers and Erin Smith, social 

worker Zavtra Adams, and Dr. JoAnne Solchany, professionals 

who were involved with the care and evaluation of [B.D.M.B.], all 

testified that reunification therapy was not a recommended 

service for this family at any point of this case because it would 

have been detrimental to [B.D.M.B.]. Until further progress could 

be made in [B.D.M.B.’s] personal therapy, reunification therapy 

could be damaging or traumatic to [B.D.M.B.] emotionally. Amy 

Glasser and Dr. JoAnne Solchany both testified that it could take 

years if [B.D.M.B.] was ever going to be ready for reunification 

therapy. 

E. Given that [B.D.M.B.] has not progressed far enough in her 

individual therapies or counseling to attempt reunification 

therapy with [the parents], nor has she been since it’s been 

introduced in the case, reunification therapy would have been 

futile as it is not capable of correcting the parental deficiency in 

the foreseeable future. The Court finds by clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence that the Department has provided all 

necessary services that are reasonable and capable of 

correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future.
No. 80429-4-I/19

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(Emphasis added.)

The record supports the court’s finding that the Department offered 

numerous services over the course of several years to address the father’s

parental deficiencies and to build his relationship with B.D.M.B. Despite significant 

progress in completing court ordered services, the record also indicates that the 

father’s actions contributed to the broken bond and lack of trust with B.D.M.B.

Likewise, there is no record of any of the numerous professionals and 

mental health providers ever recommending reunification therapy as a necessary 

service. In fact, reunification therapy services were not recommended at any point 

during this dependency proceeding. Where there is no evidence that the parentchild bond could be repaired within a time frame that would be conducive to the 

child’s “emotional development and well-being[,]” the Department had met its 

obligation under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). K.M.M., 186 Wn.2d at 487.

Substantial evidence supports the court’s findings regarding this termination 

factor.

VI. Father’s Unfit Parent Challenge

The father also contends the Department did not prove he is currently unfit 

and unable to care for B.D.M.B. To establish current unfitness in a termination 

proceeding, the Department must prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence

that the parental deficiencies “prevent the parent from providing the child with 

‘basic nurture, health, or safety.’” In re Welfare of A.B., 181 Wn. App. 45, 61, 323 

P.3d 1062 (2014) (quoting RCW 13.34.020). He argues that none of his 
No. 80429-4-I/20

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deficiencies make him unfit to parent B.D.M.B., but rather, it is B.D.M.B.’s “current 

status in treatment that made her unable to bond with her father.”

The K.M.M. court explained that the absence of attachment to a parent is a 

condition that interferes with a parent’s ability to provide for a child’s health, safety, 

and well-being and may ultimately render a parent unfit. 186 Wn.2d at 493-94. 

Here, several witnesses testified about the absence of any trust or a bond between 

the parents and B.D.M.B. Gordon testified that B.D.M.B.’s parents cannot meet 

her emotional needs because there is no trust and no parent-child bond. Dr. 

Solchany explained that B.D.M.B. does not have a healthy bond with her parents 

and “does not trust her parents to keep her safe and take good care of her.” The 

mother spoke about how she and the father “destroyed” B.D.M.B.’s trust in them. 

Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that the father was currently unfit 

to parent B.D.M.B.

CONCLUSION

In sum, we reject the constitutional challenges to the termination statutes 

and conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s termination 

findings. 

Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:
No. 80429-4-I/2

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ORDERED that a substitute unpublished opinion shall be filed.