1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO DIVISION

RUBEN ORTEGA, JR., §

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § NO. EP-20-CV-00171-MAT

§

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, §

Commissioner of §

the Social Security §

Administration,

1 §

Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The instant case is a civil action seeking judicial review of an administrative decision 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff Ruben Ortega (“Plaintiff”) appeals from the decision of 

the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”) denying his 

application for Social Security disability benefits. (ECF No. 4, p. 1). The parties consented to the 

transfer of the case to this Court for determination and entry of judgment. (ECF No. 1-4, p. 1); 

(ECF No. 14, p. 1); See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Local Court Rule CV-72. For the reasons set forth 

below, the Commissioner’s decision denying benefits will be AFFIRMED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background 

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits on September 16, 2016, alleging disability 

beginning on July 25, 2016. (ECF No. 17, p. 1); (R. 12). Plaintiff was fifty-six years old at the 

alleged onset, and his past relevant work included warehouse associate, forklift operator, and 

material handler. (R. 19, 60).

1 Kilolo Kijakazi replaced former Commissioner Andrew Saul to become the Acting Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration in July 2021. See Acting Commissioner: Dr. Kilolo Kijakazi, SOCIAL 

SECURITY, https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner/ (last visited Sep. 3, 2021).

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After the Commissioner denied his initial application on November 14, 2016, and then

denied the reconsideration, Plaintiff requested a hearing before the Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”). (R. 12, 95). At the February 26, 2018 hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff, 

who was represented by counsel, and from a vocational expert. (R. 95). In the resulting August 14, 

2018 opinion, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act. (R. 102). Plaintiff then requested Appeals Council review. (R. 108-09). 

The Appeals Counsel vacated the decision and remanded the matter to the ALJ for further 

proceedings. Id. Specifically, on April 26, 2019, the Appeals Council directed the ALJ to further 

investigate Plaintiff’s past relevant work, and his capacity to do past relevant work. (R. 108). 

Consequently, the ALJ held another hearing on August 23, 2019, again taking testimony from 

Plaintiff and a vocational expert. (R. 56-73). On September 13, 2019, the ALJ’s written decision 

found that Plaintiff was not disabled, “based on a residual functional capacity for the full range of 

light work, considering the claimant’s age, education, and transferable work skills.” (R. 23). The 

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the second ALJ decision, thereby making 

the ALJ’s September 13, 2019 decision the Commissioner’s final administrative decision. (R. 1). 

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on June 18, 2020. (ECF No. 4). 

B. Standard of Review

Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to two inquiries: (1) whether the 

decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; and (2) whether the 

Commissioner applied the proper legal standards. Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 

2005); Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 619 (5th Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence “means—and 

means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

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Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). It is more than a scintilla of evidence, but 

less than a preponderance. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Spellman v. 

Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993)). If the Commissioner’s findings are supported by 

substantial evidence, “they are conclusive and must be affirmed.” Spellman, 1 F.3d at 360. Fifth 

Circuit precedent directs the reviewing district court to apply the harmless error standard in Social 

Security disability cases, and Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that harmful error warrants 

remand. Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2007); Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 

409 (2009). 

C. Commissioner’s Evaluation Process 

In evaluating a disability claim, the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential process 

to determine whether: (1) the claimant is presently engaged in substantial gainful employment; (2) 

the claimant has a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment; (3) the claimant’s 

impairment meets or equals an impairment listed in the appendix to the regulations; (4) the 

impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5) the impairment prevents 

the claimant from performing other substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); 

Salmond v. Berryhill, 892 F.3d 812, 817 (5th Cir. 2018). 

Courts employ four elements of proof to determine whether there is substantial evidence 

of disability: (1) objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining 

physicians; (3) the claimant’s subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) the claimant’s 

age, education, and work history. Perez, 415 F.3d at 462; 20 C.F.R. § 1520(b-f). A court may not 

reweigh the evidence or try the issues de novo. Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000). 

Indeed, it is the Commissioner, not the court, who must resolve evidentiary conflicts. Spellman, 1 

F.3d at 360.

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D. The ALJ’s Findings 

In his written decision, the ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s disability application under the fivestep evaluation process. (R. 12-23). First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of July 25, 2016. (R. 14). Second, the ALJ 

found Plaintiff’s only severe impairment to be the mild degenerative changes of the lumbar spine. 

Id.2 Third, Plaintiff was not found to have an impairment or combination of impairments that met

or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1. (R. 17). Prior to proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s RFC, concluding 

that Plaintiff “has the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of light work as defined 

in 20 C.F.R 404.1567(b),” and furthermore “is capable of performing work-related activities such 

as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, and carrying, as well as the basic mental abilities required for 

sustained work activity.” (R. 18, 21). The ALJ then proceeded to step four, and found that Plaintiff 

was unable to perform any past relevant work. (R. 22). 

Finally, at step five, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had acquired work skills transferable 

to other jobs existing in the national economy. (R. 22, 23). Therefore, the ALJ found that “[b]ased 

on a [RFC] for the full range of light work, considering the claimant’s age, education, and 

transferable work skills, a finding of ‘not disabled’ is reached by the direct application of the 

Medical-Vocational Rule 202.07.” (R. 23). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “has not 

been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from July 25, 2016, through the date 

of this decision” pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). (R. 23). 

II. ANALYSIS

In this appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

2 The ALJ declined to find that the following medical conditions constituted severe impairments: gastroesophageal 

reflux disease (GERD), mood disorder, left-finger fracture, and frontal lobe atrophy. (R. 15). 

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determination is not supported by substantial evidence. (ECF No. 17, p. 2). Plaintiff first alleges 

that the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ disregarded evidence that 

Plaintiff’s lumbago and mental impairments were severe impairments. Id. at 2-4.3 He further 

contends that the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff’s ability to perform sustained work on a regular 

and continuing basis. Id. at 5. The Commissioner argues that Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ 

committed reversible error in the step two analysis of severe impairment, and that substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC finding. (ECF No. 20, p. 1, 7). 

An individual’s RFC is the most the individual can do on a regular and continuing basis 

despite limitations due to the impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a); SSR 96-8p. An RFC finding 

is not a medical determination, but rather an administrative assessment based on all relevant 

evidence. See Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d 600, 602-03 (5th Cir. 2012). All medically determinable 

impairments will be considered in the RFC assessment, including those that are not “severe.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2). An RFC finding is used to determine whether the claimant can still do 

his past work. Perez, 415 F.3d at 462. If not, then the RFC finding is used to assess whether the 

claimant can do other jobs in the national economy. Id.

The Court will address each argument Plaintiff raises in turn below. 

3 While Plaintiff begins by contending that his lumbago and mental impairments are “severe,” the substance of his 

brief does not address “severe” impairments as a term of art in the Social Security context. (ECF No. 17, p. 2). Rather, 

Plaintiff’s analysis largely concerns the RFC determination in the context of substantial evidence review, and thus the 

Court structures this Opinion under that framework. (ECF. No. 17, p. 3-6). The Court notes that when an ALJ does 

not find a claimant’s condition to be severe, but does continue the analysis to discuss and include the condition in the 

claimant’s RFC, any step two error is deemed harmless. Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 481 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Even 

if an impairment is deemed ‘severe’ ... this fact does not require a remand when the Secretary has gone beyond the 

second step, as here, as not all ‘severe’ impairments are disabling.”). Here, the ALJ did consider whether Plaintiff’s 

lumbago and mental health conditions were severe impairments at step two, and after review of the record concluded 

that Plaintiff’s low back condition was severe, but mental health impairments were not severe. (R. 16-17). The ALJ 

then considered these, along with other impairments, when formulating the light work RFC. (R. 18-21). Thus, the 

Court finds that any alleged error at step two is harmless.

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A. Substantial evidence supports the RFC determination because the ALJ did not 

disregard medical evidence of lumbago.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to incorporate medical evidence of lumbago as a severe 

impairment, and as such the RFC analysis is flawed. (ECF No. 17, p. 2-3). At the outset, the Court 

notes that the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s mild degenerative changes of the lumbar spine were 

severe, and thus Plaintiff has a severe low back impairment. (ECF No. 20, p. 2); (R. 14). However, 

Plaintiff does not cite any authority in case law or the record showing that lumbago differs in a 

meaningful way from the mild degenerative changes to the lumbar spine which the ALJ found 

severe.4 Indeed, at the hearing, Plaintiff characterized the issue as “major disfunction . . . in his 

back,” specifically the lumbar region. (R. 58). 

While the records Plaintiff cites in support of lumbago as a severe impairment do not 

specifically use the term “lumbago” as a separate diagnosis, even if they did, a diagnosis of 

lumbago alone would not establish a severe or disabling impairment. See Harrell v. Brown, 862 

F.2d 471, 481 (5th Cir. 1988); Singleton v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin, No. 6:20-cv-00931, 2021 

WL 5239980, at *11 (W.D. La. Aug. 3, 2021), report and recommendation adopted., Singleton v. 

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 6:20-cv-00931, 2021 WL 5237297 (W.D. La. Nov. 10, 2021) (“[I]t 

is axiomatic that a diagnosis is not sufficient to establish that an impairment is severe, to establish 

that an impairment meets or equals a listing, or to establish that an impairment is disabling.”); 20 

C.F.R. § 220.110(b). In large part these records reflect Plaintiff’s treatment for low back pain. 

(ECF No. 17, p. 2, 3). First, Plaintiff references that he takes Tramadol for chronic back pain. (R. 

42, 314, 448-50, 770-71). Next Plaintiff underwent opioid therapy for back pain treatment. (R. 

850-56). Then, he points to an MRI showing a mild bulging disc consistent with the back pain. (R. 

4 The Court notes that “lumbago” is defined as “pain in the lumbar region,” and “lumbar” refers to “the parts of the 

sides of the back between the thorax and pelvis.” W.B. Saunders Co., Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary

1029 (Douglas M. Anderson et al. eds., 29th ed. 2000). 

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693-95). Finally, Plaintiff received a lumbar spine injection to reduce back pain. (R. 729-32).

Moreover, in fashioning the light work RFC, the ALJ factored in Plaintiff’s reports of pain and 

associated low back symptoms. (R. 20-21). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff argues the ALJ should 

have found his back pain severe, the ALJ already delivered a favorable outcome through finding 

that Plaintiff’s mild degenerative changes of the lumbar spine constituted a severe impairment. (R. 

14). In sum, the record fails to support Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ disregarded medical 

evidence of lumbago.5

For the above reasons, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC 

determination as it relates to Plaintiff’s lumbago argument. 

B. Substantial evidence supports the RFC determination because the ALJ did not 

disregard medical evidence of frontal lobe dementia and major depression.

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in failing to incorporate “the evidence of organic 

brain syndrome frontal lobe dementia” and major depression as severe impairments, which also 

undercut the RFC finding.

6 (ECF No. 17, p. 3). A special set of criteria is used to determine whether 

mental impairments rise to the level of severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(a). The special criteria

evaluates a claimant’s functional limitation in four broad functional areas: (1) understanding, 

remembering, or applying information, (2) interacting and relating with others, (3) concentrating, 

persisting, and maintaining pace, and (4) adapting and managing oneself. Id. § 404.1520a(c)(3). If 

5 The Court notes that Plaintiff points to the ALJ’s August 2018 decision where the ALJ identified lumbago as a severe 

impairment. (ECF No. 17, p. 3). However, the Commissioner correctly identifies that the Appeals Council vacated 

that decision, and ordered further evaluation of Plaintiff’s past relevant work. (ECF No. 20, p. 2) (R. 108-09). The 

Court concurs that the ALJ’s evaluation of severe impairment at step two is not inconsistent with the Appeals 

Council’s remand order. The Court further notes the inconsistency of Plaintiff’s argument insofar as the 2018 decision 

found that Plaintiff could do medium work, while the present ALJ decision found light work. Id. at 3. 6 Both Plaintiff and the Commissioner appear to use the terms “frontal lobe dementia” and “frontal lobe atrophy” 

interchangeably. See (ECF No. 17, p. 3); (ECF No. 20, p. 3, 6). For the sake of clarity, the Court will refer to this 

condition at “frontal lobe dementia.” 

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the degree of limitation is rated as “mild” or better in each category, the impairment is generally 

not severe. Id. § 404.1520a(d)(1).

Applying the criteria, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had mild restrictions in each of the four 

categories. (ECF No. 20, p. 3). Without reciting the ALJ’s findings at length, the Court notes that

both the ALJ and the Commissioner scrutinized the record and cited to specific reports and 

examinations regarding mental impairment during the relevant time period, and the ALJ’s decision 

did so in a comprehensive manner. (R. 15-17); (ECF No. 20, p. 3-5).7 Moreover, the ALJ 

specifically noted that Plaintiff’s self-reported short attention span conflicted with his regular 

activities like reading and watching television. (R. 16). In fact, a 2017 psychiatrist examination 

noted improvement in his depression, and at that time Plaintiff reported a positive mental status, 

as well as functional concentration and immediate memory. Id. 

In support of his argument, Plaintiff marshals evidence of his diagnoses of and treatment 

for both major depression and frontal lobe dementia. (ECF No. 17, p. 3). However, Plaintiff wholly

fails to address the special psychiatric criteria formulated specifically for mental impairment 

severity evaluation. Id. at 4. While Plaintiff cites evidence of diagnoses and treatment, he does not 

connect that evidence to any alleged error by the ALJ in application of the four-part mental 

impairment criteria. Further, upon its own review of the record, the Court notes that in 2018, 

Plaintiff’s depression screen was negative, and that in 2019, Plaintiff denied memory loss and 

suicidal thoughts. (R. 793, 838). In sum, the record fails to support Plaintiff’s position that the ALJ 

7 As to the first domain, Plaintiff reported that he could manage money and personal affairs without reminders. (R. 

16, 305-306). In 2017, Plaintiff reported functional memories (R. 16, 156), along with an examination revealing that 

Plaintiff had no recent or remote memory impairment. (R. 750). Regarding the second category, from 2017-2019 

Plaintiff presented as cooperative and receptive (R. 16-17, 517, 612, 785), and denied interpersonal problem including 

at work. (R. 16, 292-93, 307-08, 334, 516). In the third area, Plaintiff reported functional concentration (R. 16, 516, 

543,606, 701), and examinations showed normal attention and concentration (R. 750). Finally, Plaintiff could prepare 

food, do basic chores, drive, shop, and go out alone (R. 16, 305-06), and 2017 status examinations showed judgment, 

insight, and impulse control (R. 16-17, 517, 612). 

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disregarded medical evidence of frontal lobe dementia and major depression. It is not clear to the 

Court what error Plaintiff alleges the ALJ committed in the four-step test of the evidence presented. 

For the above reasons, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC 

determination as it relates to Plaintiff’s mental impairment argument. 

C. Substantial evidence supports the RFC determination because the ALJ considered 

Plaintiff’s ability to perform sustained work on a regular and continuing basis.

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial 

evidence because the ALJ allegedly failed to discuss Plaintiff’s ability to perform sustained work 

activities on a regular and continuing basis. (ECF No. 17, p. 5). Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to 

consider Plaintiff’s impairments alone and in combination with exertional and non-exertional 

factors, such that Plaintiff cannot perform light work.

8 Id. However, the only specific fact Plaintiff 

says the ALJ failed to consider is his ability to drive on a full-time basis. Id. 

Review of the evidence does not support Plaintiff’s allegations as to this point of error. The 

Court notes at least three instances where the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s ability to do regular work 

on a sustained basis. (R. 19-21). The first reference arises in the ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s 

employment since the alleged onset. (R. 19). The second reference appears in the ALJ’s analysis 

regarding the “time-relevant medical evidence” as being inconsistent with Plaintiff’s disability 

claims. (R. 20). Finally, the third reference arrives in the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff can do 

physical activities and has the mental ability “required for sustained work activity.” (R. 21). 

Moreover, the ALJ specifically considered Plaintiff’s testimony that he was able to drive, 

8 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing 

up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal 

of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg 

controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do 

substantially all of these activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).

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“although he did not drive long distances.” (R. 20). Thus, the ALJ did not fail to conduct the 

analysis Plaintiff alleges.

Further, the medical and testimonial evidence shows that the ALJ considered the exertional 

and non-exertional factors. Initially, an examination showed full range of motion in the low back, 

passing straight leg raise, normal gait, and full range of motion. (R. 20, 449). In 2016 and 2017, 

lumbar scans showed minimum to mild degenerative changes in Plaintiff’ lumbar spine. (R. 20-

21, 419, 647, 695). Notably, after Plaintiff’s lumbar steroid injection in December 2017, treatment 

notes indicated that Plaintiff could do light duty work the following day, and resume regular 

activity two days after. (R. 21, 684). Examinations in 2018 further documented complaints of back 

and joint pain, but no weakness or swelling, normal ambulation, and appropriate affect (R. 21,

785-87 793-94, 831-33). Plaintiff also indicated he was satisfied with his pain treatment in 2018. 

(R. 837). Similarly, under the non-exertional factors, the ALJ accounted for Plaintiff’s stated 

proficiency in remembering his medication, handling his money, going out alone, reading books, 

and watching television, along with his normal neurological examination in 2017. (R. 20-21). 

Consideration of these factors is consistent with the RFC determination that Plaintiff is not 

disabled from all work activity.

The ALJ also accounted for Plaintiff’s ability to work on a continued basis when examining 

the non-medical evidence. Two State agency medical consultants who reviewed Plaintiff’s 2016 

and 2017 medical records opined that Plaintiff could perform medium work, in contrast to the 

ALJ’s more restrictive light work finding.9 (ECF No. 20, p. 8); (R. 21, 80, 87-88); 20 C.F.R §

9 “Dr. Ligon opined that Plaintiff could lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently, sit for about 

6 hours in an 8-hour workday; and stand/walk for about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday (Tr. 21, 80)” with no 

recommended limitations. (ECF No. 20, p. 8). Further, “[i]n January 2017, Dr. Herman recommended the same 

limitations (Tr. 21, 87-88). These opinions, consistent with medium work, support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff 

could perform light work (Tr. 18, 21, 80, 87-88).” Id. 

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404.1567(b-c). Further, Plaintiff’s part-time work and earnings therefrom were properly 

considered, including his testimony that he works between eighteen and twenty-four hours per 

week. (R. 19, 59); see Murray v. Astrue, 419 F. App’x, 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2011) (allowing the ALJ 

to consider Plaintiff’s part-time work assisting her neighbor during the period she claimed to be 

disabled in evaluating substantial evidence). Finally, the ALJ factored Plaintiff’s reported daily 

activities of chores, meals, shopping, walking, and driving into the light work determination. (R. 

18-20, 304-308); see Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 565 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted) 

(considering Plaintiff’s ability to care for his daughters, do household chores, and cut grass in 

denying disability). This evidence also does not support finding that Plaintiff is disabled from all 

work activity. 

For the above reasons, the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence. 

D. Plaintiff’s legal error argument fails to show that the ALJ erred in the RFC finding. 

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ rejected or gave little weight to a treating 

specialist’s opinion pursuant to Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2000). (ECF No. 17, p. 5). 

In turn, the Commissioner contends that Plaintiff has not properly raised the issue because he failed 

to identify which treating source opinion(s) the ALJ allegedly declined to give weight, or where 

in the record these rejected opinions supposedly appear. (ECF No. 20, p. 10, n. 2). Assuming that 

Plaintiff is referring to the “treating physician rule,” the Court notes that while this doctrine was 

in effect at the time Plaintiff filed his disability application, it was later repealed on March 17, 

2017 such that treating physician opinions now receive no deference. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)(a).

Notwithstanding, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not properly raised the issue. Plaintiff has 

wholly failed to develop a cognizable argument in terms of which opinions the ALJ supposedly 

rejected regarding which medical conditions. Plaintiff cites no alleged instances for the Court to 

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consider in this regard. See Hardman v. Colvin, 820 F.3d 142, 152 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Keelan 

v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332, 340 (5th Cir. 2005)) (stating that “[a] party must ‘press 

and not merely intimate the argument during proceedings before the district court.’”). 

For the above reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ’s finding is not the result of legal error.

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the ALJ failed to consider 

his lumbago and mental impairments in formulating the RFC such that he cannot perform the 

requirements of the light work. The Court also finds that Plaintiff’s arguments regarding his ability 

to perform sustained work activities on a regular and continuing basis and legal error fail as well.

The Court further finds that the ALJ properly considered the objective medical evidence, 

Plaintiff’s own testimonial evidence, as well as the vocational expert testimony in reaching his 

decision. Accordingly, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings 

regarding Plaintiff’s RFC, and the ALJ applied the correct legal standards.

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the 

Commissioner denying benefits will be AFFIRMED.

SIGNED and ENTERED this _31__ day of March, 2022. 

___________________________________

MIGUEL A. TORRES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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