[Cite as LeBlanc v. Wells Fargo, 134 Ohio St.3d 250, 2012-Ohio-5458.]

LEBLANC ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. WELLS FARGO ADVISORS, L.L.C.;

BURCHFIELD, APPELLEE. 

[Cite as LeBlanc v. Wells Fargo, 134 Ohio St.3d 250, 2012-Ohio-5458.] 

Civil procedure—Interpleader—Contract—When the custodian of an individual 

retirement account files an interpleader action against the parties 

claiming to be the beneficiaries of the account, the custodian waives its 

contractual change-of-beneficiary procedures, and a person who proves 

that the owner clearly intended to designate him or her as the beneficiary 

does not need to also prove that the owner substantially complied with the 

change-of-beneficiary procedures in order to recover. Instead, the 

account owner’s clearly expressed intent controls.

(Nos. 2011-2160 and 2011-2073—Submitted July 11, 2012—Decided 

November 28, 2012.) 

APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, 

No. 24348, 196 Ohio App.3d 213, 2011-Ohio-5553. 

__________________ 

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

When the custodian of an individual retirement account files an interpleader 

action against the parties claiming to be the beneficiaries of the account, 

the custodian waives its contractual change-of-beneficiary procedures, and 

a person who proves that the owner clearly intended to designate him or 

her as the beneficiary does not need to also prove that the owner 

substantially complied with the change-of-beneficiary procedures in order 

to recover. Instead, the account owner’s clearly expressed intent controls. 

__________________

 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

O’CONNOR, C.J. 

{¶ 1} In this appeal, we resolve a conflict between the decisions of the 

Ninth District Court of Appeals and the Second District Court of Appeals 

concerning the effect of an individual retirement account (“IRA”) custodian’s 

filing of an interpleader action against competing claimants. We hold that when 

the custodian of an individual retirement account files an interpleader action 

against the parties claiming to be the beneficiaries of the account, the custodian 

waives its contractual change-of-beneficiary procedures, and a person who proves 

that the owner of the account clearly intended to designate him or her as the 

beneficiary does not also need to prove that the owner substantially complied with 

the change-of-beneficiary procedures in order to recover. Instead, the account 

owner’s clearly expressed intent controls. 

{¶ 2} Because our holding rejects the analysis adopted by the Second 

District Court of Appeals in this case and because there exists a genuine issue of 

fact as to the intent of the account owner, John F. Burchfield, we reverse the court 

of appeals’ judgment and remand this case to the common pleas court for trial. 

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

The disputed accounts 

{¶ 3} This is a dispute over money that Wells Fargo Advisors, L.L.C., 

was holding in two IRAs for John F. Burchfield when he committed suicide on 

December 16, 2009. In 2002, John designated his mother, appellant Gloria 

Welch, and his stepfather, Bruce Leland, as beneficiaries, 75 percent and 25 

percent respectively. 

{¶ 4} On May 5, 2007, John married appellee Cynthia Burchfield. 

Shortly before the marriage, John designated Cynthia as the sole beneficiary on 

both accounts. 

 
January Term, 2012 

3

The disputed intent 

{¶ 5} On October 28, 2009, John sent an e-mail to his Wells Fargo 

advisor, Aaron Michael, stating that he and Cynthia were getting divorced and 

requesting paperwork to remove Cynthia as the beneficiary on his IRAs. 

Thereafter, by telephone, John gave Michael specifics regarding a change in the 

beneficiary designation for the IRAs. Michael prepared change-of-beneficiary 

forms that again designated Welch and Leland as the beneficiaries, 75 percent and 

25 percent respectively. In addition, John’s sister, appellant Lori LeBlanc, was 

listed as the contingent beneficiary. Michael predated the forms “November 2, 

2009” and mailed them to John, along with a self-addressed, stamped envelope. 

{¶ 6} On November 2, 2009, Cynthia filed a divorce complaint against 

John. Around the same time, John spoke with Michael and informed him that the 

change-of-beneficiary forms were “already taken care of.” Approximately six 

weeks later, John committed suicide. He left a note that contained a postscript in 

which he expressed his love for Cynthia. 

{¶ 7} After John’s death, Leland and LeBlanc asked Michael to look 

through John’s financial documents to wind up John’s affairs. Around January 

25, 2010, Michael and one of John’s co-workers discovered the signed change-ofbeneficiary forms in an envelope among John’s papers.1

 That same morning, 

Michael gave the forms to his manager at Wells Fargo. Cynthia, LeBlanc, and 

Welch made conflicting demands of Wells Fargo for the IRA proceeds. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 8} In March 2010, LeBlanc2

 and Welch filed a complaint against 

Wells Fargo and Cynthia,3

 seeking a declaratory judgment4 that Cynthia was not 

 

1. The parties dispute whether the signatures on the forms are John’s. 

2. LeBlanc filed suit on behalf of John’s estate and in her individual capacity. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4

entitled to the proceeds of John’s IRAs. In turn, Cynthia sought a contrary 

declaration that she, as the beneficiary named on the form in Wells Fargo’s 

possession at John’s death, was solely entitled to the proceeds. 

{¶ 9} In response, Wells Fargo filed an action in interpleader against 

LeBlanc, Welch, and Cynthia, in which it represented that it was “unable to 

determine the validity of the conflicting demands.” Wells Fargo disclaimed any 

interest in the proceeds of John’s IRA accounts and offered to deposit the funds 

with the court’s clerk or to maintain the account until the dispute was resolved. 

The trial court granted summary judgment to Cynthia, the beneficiary designated 

on the form in Wells Fargo’s possession at the time of John’s death. 

{¶ 10} The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed. LeBlanc v. Wells 

Fargo Advisors, L.L.C., 196 Ohio App.3d 213, 2011-Ohio-5553, 962 N.E.2d 872. 

In doing so, it emphasized that John had not complied with the Wells Fargo 

policy, which required that change-of-beneficiary forms be returned to the 

company. Id. at ¶ 12. And it concluded that Wells Fargo had not waived 

compliance with its change-of-beneficiary procedure by filing an action in 

interpleader against the claimants. Id. at ¶ 11. 

{¶ 11} In reaching that conclusion, the Second District rejected the Ninth 

District Court of Appeals’ decision in Kelly v. May Assoc. Fed. Credit Union, 9th 

Dist. No. 23423, 2008-Ohio-1507, which held that an IRA custodian waives 

compliance with its change-of-beneficiary procedures when it interpleads 

disputed funds. 

{¶ 12} The Second District further held that even if Kelly’s holding on 

this narrow legal point was correct and the custodian’s filing of an interpleader 

 

3. Leland was also named as a defendant, but he disclaimed any interest in the IRAs, along with 

all of John’s other probate and nonprobate assets. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Leland as a 

party. 

4. The complaint set forth a number of other causes of action that are not relevant here. 
January Term, 2012 

5

action waived its right to enforce the change-of-beneficiary procedure, the parties 

claiming to be the “clearly intended” beneficiaries must still prove that the 

decedent had substantially complied with the change-of-beneficiary procedure. 

LeBlanc at ¶ 13. In doing so, it again rejected yet another Kelly holding—that the 

account holder’s clearly expressed intent controls. 

{¶ 13} Accordingly, the Second District concluded that John’s failure to 

return the forms to Wells Fargo before his death constituted a failure to 

substantially comply with Wells Fargo’s procedure and that that failure was fatal 

to Welch and LeBlanc’s claims, without regard to John’s actual intent. It 

affirmed summary judgment in favor of Cynthia. 

{¶ 14} We granted LeBlanc and Welch’s discretionary appeal, 131 Ohio 

St.3d 1456, 2012-Ohio-648, 961 N.E.2d 1135, and certified that a conflict exists 

between the Second District’s decision in this case and the Ninth District’s 

decision in LeBlanc, 131 Ohio St.3d 1455, 2012-Ohio-648, 961 N.E.2d 1134. We 

consolidated the actions, which present the same legal question. 

QUESTION PRESENTED

{¶ 15} The question certified by the Second District is: “In a dispute 

between (1) a specifically designated and (2) a clearly intended beneficiary of an 

individual retirement account (IRA), where the account custodian files an 

interpleader action and purportedly waives compliance with its change of 

beneficiary procedure, is the ‘clearly intended’ beneficiary required to show that 

the owner of the IRA account substantially complied with the change of 

beneficiary procedure in order to recover?” 

{¶ 16} We answer the certified question in the negative. 

ANALYSIS

{¶ 17} Resolution of the issues before us requires that we answer two 

unsettled questions. First, when an IRA custodian files an interpleader action 

against competing claimants, does it waive its contractual change-of-beneficiary 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

procedures? And if so, what is the test for determining who is entitled to the 

disputed funds? 

{¶ 18} Because we agree with the Ninth District’s analysis and holding, 

we first turn our discussion to its opinion in Kelly, which squarely dealt with both 

questions. 

The Ninth District Opinion 

{¶ 19} Barbara Kelly opened an IRA at May Associates Federal Credit 

Union in 1992 and named her nephew, Richard Wachter, as the beneficiary. 

Kelly, 2008-Ohio-1507, at ¶ 4. She also granted Richard a general power of 

attorney and named him co-owner of a number of certificates of deposit. 

{¶ 20} Barbara later granted a power of attorney to her daughter, Janice 

Kelly, and revoked the one she had given Richard. Barbara also made Janice the 

co-owner of her certificates of deposit and told Richard that she was going to 

make Janice the beneficiary of her IRA. 

{¶ 21} On November 19, 1998, Barbara telephoned May Associates to 

name Janice the beneficiary of her IRA. Even though May Associates required 

that a beneficiary could be changed only by the member completing and signing 

an IRA beneficiary-designation form, the teller with whom Barbara spoke 

completed the change-of-beneficiary form and wrote “per member” on the 

signature line. The teller mailed a copy of the form she had completed to 

Barbara, placed a copy in the credit union’s file, and sent a copy to the third-party 

administrator handling the IRA. Barbara was not told that she needed to sign the 

form. 

{¶ 22} Barbara died in 2003. By that time, May Associates was using a 

different third-party administrator for the IRA. The new company had the 

designation of Richard on file that Barbara made when she opened the account 

but had no information about the form the teller filled out in 1998. The 
January Term, 2012 

7

administrator told Richard that he was the beneficiary. Janice and Richard made 

competing claims for the IRA proceeds. No money was paid out. 

{¶ 23} Janice filed a complaint against Richard and May Associates, 

seeking a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to the IRA proceeds. May 

Associates filed an interpleader action against Janice and Richard. The trial court 

granted summary judgment to Janice on the ground that Barbara had clearly 

expressed her intent that Janice be the beneficiary of the IRA. 

{¶ 24} The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed. Kelly, 2008-Ohio1507, at ¶ 2. In doing so, it acknowledged that Barbara had not complied with the 

May Associates procedures, which required that changes to beneficiaries “be 

made by completing and signing an IRA beneficiary designation form.” Id. at ¶ 5. 

But it concluded that May Associates waived the signature requirement when it 

filed the interpleader action. Id. at ¶ 13. 

{¶ 25} To reach that conclusion, the Kelly court applied our holdings in 

cases dealing with life-insurance-policy proceeds and justified doing so because 

life-insurance policies and individual retirement accounts share a salient feature—

they both “typically include a procedure for designating and changing 

beneficiaries.” Id. The court then explained that “[i]t has long been the rule in 

Ohio that those procedures are intended to protect the insurer from duplicate 

liability and the insurer is free to waive them.” Id., citing Rindlaub v. Travelers 

Ins. Co., 175 Ohio St. 303, 305, 194 N.E.2d 577 (1963), and Atkinson v. Metro. 

Life Ins. Co., 114 Ohio St. 109, 150 N.E. 748 (1926), paragraph four of the 

syllabus. 

{¶ 26} Indeed, “if, in the face of conflicting claims to insurance proceeds, 

the insurer interpleads those proceeds, it has waived any interest in the resolution 

of the claims, including enforcement of the procedure set forth in its policy for 

designating and changing beneficiaries.” Id., citing Rindlaub and Atkinson. “In 

such a case, if the insured communicated to the insurer her ‘clearly expressed 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

intent’ to change beneficiaries, the proceeds will be paid to the newly designated 

beneficiary rather than the originally designated beneficiary * * *.” Id., citing 

Rindlaub at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶ 27} There was no question that Barbara had telephoned May 

Associates and told a teller to change her beneficiary designation. “Based on [the 

teller’s] testimony, coupled with the change of beneficiary form completed by the 

teller,” the Ninth District concluded that there was no genuine issue of fact 

whether Barbara had clearly expressed to May Associates her intent to change her 

beneficiary. Kelly, 2008-Ohio-1507, at ¶ 27. Accordingly, it affirmed summary 

judgment in favor of Janice. Id. at ¶ 32. 

The Second District opinion 

{¶ 28} The Second District refused to apply our holdings in the lifeinsurance cases to the dispute over John’s IRA proceeds, and it therefore 

concluded that Wells Fargo did not waive its change-of-beneficiary procedures by 

interpleading the disputed funds. See LeBlanc, 196 Ohio App.3d 213, 2011-Ohio5553, 962 N.E.2d 872, ¶ 23. In its view, an IRA is fundamentally different from a 

life-insurance policy because an IRA is a present asset of the account holder 

during her life, but a life-insurance policy—in one form—has no value to the 

insured during the insured’s life. But in so holding, the Second District conceded 

that “there are many and varied financial products that come under the heading of 

‘life insurance’ * * * some of which have a cash value that the owner of the 

policy can withdraw or borrow against.” Id. at fn. 5. 

{¶ 29} The appellate court concluded that IRAs are more akin to joint and 

survivorship accounts. Id. It reasoned that both are present assets of an account 

holder and both transfer outside of probate upon the death of the account holder. 

Id. For that reason, the Second District applied our holding in Wright v. Bloom, 

69 Ohio St.3d 596, 635 N.E.2d 31 (1994), which is the leading case law 

applicable to disputes over joint bank accounts. 
January Term, 2012 

9

{¶ 30} In Wright, we held that in the absence of fraud, duress, undue 

influence, or lack of capacity, the opening of a joint and survivorship account was 

conclusive evidence of an intent to transfer the balance of the account upon the 

death of an account holder. Id. at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. And 

there is “no need to go beyond the account contract to ascertain the creator’s 

intent.” Id. at 605. Instead, the dispositive question is simply whether the 

signature card or account documents specify that the joint account holders have 

survivorship rights. Id. at 606. 

{¶ 31} In deciding LeBlanc, the Second District conceded that joint and 

survivorship accounts transfer purely by virtue of contract, while IRA proceeds 

transfer by virtue of the Uniform Transfer-On-Death Security Registration Act, 

which provides: 

“Any transfer-on-death resulting from a registration in beneficiary 

form is effective by reason of the contract regarding the 

registration between the owner of the security and the registering 

entity and by reason of sections 1709.01 to 1709.11 of the Revised 

Code and is not testamentary.” 

LeBlanc, 196 Ohio App.3d 213, 2011-Ohio-5553, 962 N.E.2d 872, ¶ 16, quoting 

R.C. 1709.09(A). It therefore justified applying the contracts rule developed in 

the joint-and-survivorship-account cases by emphasizing that the transfer of IRA 

proceeds “derives its effectiveness from the contract.”5

 Id. Accordingly, the 

Second District concluded that Wells Fargo’s requirements for a change of 

 

5. On that point, the Second District warned: “[I]f a transfer upon death is effective by reason of 

the ‘clearly expressed intent’ of the insured, * * * R.C. 1709.09(A) does not save it from being 

included in the estate, subject to the formalities of the statute of wills and subject to the statutory 

benefits and elections that a surviving spouse may choose to receive.” LeBlanc at ¶ 16. Our 

decision here makes clear that that result would be improper. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10

beneficiary controlled, and “because John did not comply with them, he did not 

change the beneficiary before his death.” Id. at ¶ 23. 

{¶ 32} The Second District also held, in the alternative, that even if 

insurance law applies and an IRA custodian waives its change-of-beneficiary 

procedures when it interpleads disputed funds, a party claiming that the account 

holder clearly intended to designate him or her as beneficiary is nonetheless 

required to prove that the account holder substantially complied with the 

custodian’s change-of-beneficiary procedures in order to recover. Id. at ¶ 25. The 

appellate court concluded that John’s failure to return the forms naming LeBlanc 

and Welch as beneficiaries was also a failure to substantially comply with the 

policy, even if John had otherwise clearly expressed his intent to change his 

beneficiary. Id. at ¶ 27. 

{¶ 33} The Second District’s holding applied the substantial-compliance 

test often used in disputes between life-insurance companies and claimants. Id. at 

¶ 25. See State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Am. v. Holmes, 10th Dist. No. 88AP-377, 

1988 WL 92435 (Aug. 30, 1988) (holding that in a dispute between an insurance 

company and a life-insurance claimant, the insured, before his death, substantially 

complied with the insurance company’s procedures in converting a whole-life 

policy to a universal-life policy, and thus the insurance company was required to 

pay the insured’s beneficiary and not the insurance company’s beneficiary under 

the temporary insurance agreement); see also Benton v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 

110 Ohio App. 151, 159 N.E.2d 912 (1st Dist.1959) (holding that in a dispute 

between an insurance company and a life-insurance claimant, the insurance 

company was required to pay the party whom the account holder clearly intended 

to designate as his beneficiary because the insured had substantially complied 

with the insurance company’s change-of-beneficiary procedures). 

{¶ 34} The Second District also claimed that its holding was not 

inconsistent with our decision in Rindlaub, because “substantial compliance with 
January Term, 2012 

11

the rules for a change of beneficiary was a part of the Rindlaub result.”6 LeBlanc, 

196 Ohio App.3d 213, 2011-Ohio-5553, 962 N.E.2d 872, ¶ 26. We do not agree 

with either assertion. 

{¶ 35} In Rindlaub, Bruce Rindlaub purchased two life-insurance policies 

from the Travelers Insurance Company. Rindlaub, 175 Ohio St. at 304-305, 194 

N.E.2d 577. Travelers’ procedures provided that a change of beneficiary had to 

be made in writing and had to be approved in writing by Travelers. 

{¶ 36} Initially, Bruce designated his wife, Alice Rindlaub, as his primary 

beneficiary and his daughter, Cornelia, as the contingent beneficiary. Thereafter, 

Bruce and Alice divorced and Bruce sent Travelers a witnessed statement “clearly 

indicating his intention to cancel all previous designations of beneficiaries,” to 

name Margaret Walker as the new primary beneficiary, and to rename Cornelia as 

the contingent beneficiary. Id. at 306. 

{¶ 37} Travelers responded by letter inquiring as to the relationship 

between Bruce and his newly designated primary beneficiary. The letter stated 

that the contracts had been issued in a community-property state and therefore 

Alice had certain rights under the policies unless she had waived those rights or a 

court action had disposed of them. 

{¶ 38} There was no proof that Bruce ever received the letter. Nothing 

further was done, either by Bruce or by Travelers. Six months later, Bruce and 

Margaret married. Thirteen years later, Bruce died. At the time of Bruce’s death, 

the life-insurance policies listing Alice as the primary beneficiary were in his 

possession. Alice and Margaret made conflicting demands of Travelers for the 

IRA proceeds. No money was paid out. 

 

6. The Second District also relied on Magruder v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 512 F.2d 507 

(6th Cir.1975), a federal court of appeals’ decision applying Tennessee law. In Magruder, the 

insured completed a change-of-beneficiary form but did not mail it to the insurer before his death. 

We find its reliance on Magruder unpersuasive. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12

{¶ 39} Margaret sued Travelers for the proceeds, and Travelers responded 

by filing an interpleader action against Margaret and Alice. We rejected Alice’s 

claim to the proceeds, which was based on the fact that she was the beneficiary 

named on the policies. In describing the strength of Margaret’s claim that she 

was the clearly intended beneficiary, we noted that absent evidence that Bruce 

had received the insurer’s letter, it was “entirely reasonable to infer that [Bruce] 

believed he had done all that was necessary to effectuate a change of beneficiary.” 

Id. at 306. We explained, therefore, that there was “no basis for inferring that 

[Bruce] abandoned his purpose * * * to change the beneficiary,” as Alice had 

contended. Id. 

{¶ 40} But we made clear that change-of-beneficiary procedures are for 

the benefit of the insurance company only. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 

Indeed, they are “a means of establishing the fact that the insurer has received 

notice of the change of beneficiary.” Id. at 305. 

{¶ 41} We explained that such procedures may be determinative in 

litigation between an insurance company and the insured or a single beneficiary, 

but when “the insurer ‘washes its hands’ by interpleader,” the controversy is 

between the parties who claim to be the rightful beneficiary. Id. “In such case the 

relative rights of the litigants should depend upon the expressed intention of the 

insured. If he has clearly indicated to the insurer his intention to change 

beneficiaries, his intention must be given effect.” Id. 

We adopt the Ninth District’s view 

{¶ 42} The Ninth District’s rationale and holdings represent the betterreasoned view. 

{¶ 43} We agree that it is material that life-insurance policies and IRAs 

both typically have a procedure for designating and changing beneficiaries. We 

recognize that the Uniform Transfer-On-Death Security Registration Act, which 

the parties agree governs distribution of IRA proceeds, establishes that a security 
January Term, 2012 

13

may be registered in beneficiary form. R.C. 1709.03; see R.C. 1709.01(A) 

(defining “beneficiary form” as “a registration of a security that indicates the 

present owner of the security and the intention of the present owner regarding the 

person who will become the owner of the security upon the death of the present 

owner”). And we recognize that the act establishes how a security registered in 

beneficiary form is transferred upon the death of the account holder. R.C. 

1709.07 (upon the death of the account holder, ownership of a security registered 

in beneficiary form “shall pass to the beneficiary”). 

{¶ 44} But the transfer of IRA proceeds derives its effectiveness from the 

contract, as the Second District emphasized, and “from R.C. 1709.01 to 1709.11.” 

R.C. 1709.09(A). And R.C. 1709.01 through 1709.11 provide protections to the 

custodian. R.C. 1709.08(A) (“If a registration in beneficiary form is offered by a 

registering entity, the owner requesting registration in beneficiary form assents to 

the protections given to the registering entity by sections 1709.01 to 1709.11 of 

the Revised Code”). 

{¶ 45} For all these reasons, we conclude that IRA change-of-beneficiary 

procedures are intended to protect the IRA custodian, and the custodian alone. 

Id.; see also Rindlaub, 175 Ohio St. at 305, 194 N.E.2d 577 (change-ofbeneficiary procedures are “a means of establishing the fact that the insurer has 

received notice of the change of beneficiary,” thereby avoiding duplicate liability 

for the insurer). Therefore, a custodian is free to waive the procedures by filing 

an action in interpleader against the claimants. 

{¶ 46} We also adopt the “clearly expressed intent” test from our 

insurance cases. See Rindlaub at paragraph two of the syllabus. Therefore, if an 

IRA custodian files an interpleader action, and the account owner’s intent to 

change beneficiaries was clearly communicated to the custodian, the proceeds 

will be paid to the newly designated beneficiary rather than to the original 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14

beneficiary. Id. In such a case, proof of substantial compliance with the 

custodian’s procedures for changing the beneficiary is not required. 

CONCLUSION

{¶ 47} We answer the certified question in the negative and, therefore, 

reverse the court of appeals’ judgment. Because there is a genuine issue of fact as 

to the clearly expressed intent of the account owner, this case is remanded to the 

trial court for trial. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, CUPP, and 

MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 

__________________ 

 Brannon & Associates and David D. Brannon, for appellants. 

 Dungan & LeFevre Co., L.P.A., and James D. Brookshire, for appellee. 

______________________