No. 66286 

FILED 

JUL 1 3 2016 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

CLARENCE WILLIS; AND THOMAS 

WILLIS, 

Appellants, 

vs. 

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE 

ASSOCIATION, 

Respondent. 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

This is an appeal from a district courtS summary judgment in 

an unlawful detainer and real property action.' Eighth Judicial District 

Court, Clark County; Adriana Escobar, Judge. 

Appellants first contend that the district court lacked 

jurisdiction over the underlying matter because respondent did not 

transfer the case from justice court in compliance with EDCR 7.85. We 

disagree. See Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 667, 221 P.3d 699, 704 

(2009) ("Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo 

review."). 2As respondent points out, EDCR 7.85's mandatory dismissal 

'Having considered the parties' arguments on the issue, we conclude 

that jurisdiction over this appeal is proper. Because appellants' defenses 

were treated as de facto counterclaims, the underlying matter was not 

simply an unlawful detainer action. Thus, appellants' July 28, 2014, 

motion for reconsideration effectively tolled the time for appealing the 

district court's July 8, 2014, final judgment. See AA Primo Builders, LLC 

v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 585, 245 P.3d 1190, 1195 (2010). 

2Because appellants' argument regarding EDCR 7.85 fails for the 

reasons set forth in this order, we assume without deciding that EDCR 

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provision is applicable only when one of two conditions is satisfied. 

Because it does not appear from the record that either condition was 

satisfied and because appellants have failed to address the issue, we 

conclude that jurisdiction in the district court was proper. See Ogawa, 125 

Nev. at 667, 221 P.3d at 704; cf. Ozawa v. Vision Airlines, Inc., 125 Nev. 

556, 563, 216 P.3d 788, 793 (2009) (treating a party's failure to respond to 

an argument as a concession that the argument is meritorious). 

Appellants next contend that the district court erred in 

granting summary judgment based on claim and issue preclusion. We 

need not determine whether the district court properly applied claim and 

issue preclusion because even if appellants' de facto counterclaims were 

construed as an "action" challenging the November 2010 trustee's sale 

under NRS 107.080(5) (2010), that action was time-barred by NRS 

107.080(5)(b) (2010). Specifically, appellants did not raise their argument 

regarding the chain of beneficial interest (which appears to be the basis for 

their de facto counterclaims) until after 90 days from the November 2010 

sale. 3Thus, summary judgment on appellants' counterclaim for wrongful 

foreclosure was proper, and because appellants' counterclaim for quiet 

title was predicated on the purported invalidity of the trustee's sale, 

...continued 

7.85 implicates the district court's jurisdiction and that appellants' twoyear delay in raising the argument did not amount to a waiver. 

3Even if appellants' initial filing in justice court were construed as 

the "action" for purposes of NRS 107.080(5)(b)'s 90-day limitation period, 

they failed to comply with NRS 107.080(5)(c)'s requirement that a lis 

pendens be recorded within 30 days after the action is commenced. 

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summary judgment on the quiet title counterclaim was likewise proper. 4 

See Rosenstein v. Steele, 103 Nev. 571, 575, 747 P.2d 230, 233 (1987) 

("[T]his court will affirm the order of the district court if it reached the 

correct result, albeit for different reasons."). 

Appellants also contend that the district court should have 

dismissed the underlying matter because respondent (1) did not timely file 

an opposition to one of appellants' motions, (2) did not hold an NRCP 16.1 

case conference, (3) violated Local Justice Court Rule of Practice 17 when 

submitting the proposed transfer order to the justice court judge, (4) 

violated Local Justice Court Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b) upon the transfer 

order's entry, or (5) lacked standing to institute the underlying action 

based on a failure to comply with NRS 80.055 and NRCP 7.1. We conclude 

that none of these arguments warrant reversal because, among other 

reasons (1) the district court was not obligated under EDCR 2.20 to grant 

appellants' motion, (2) the district court had discretion under NRCP 

16.1(e) to not dismiss the underlying action, (3) appellants have not 

identified any authority suggesting that a purported violation of Rule 17 

would have warranted dismissal, (4) appellants have not identified any 

authority suggesting that a purported violation of Rule 5(b) would have 

warranted dismissal, and (5) appellants have not cogently argued that 

respondent is an entity that would need to comply with NRS 80.055 and 

4Although appellants argue on appeal that they should have been 

permitted to conduct discovery, they did not provide the district court with 

an affidavit articulating a specific issue that warranted discovery or why 

they had not been able to procure that discovery. See NRCP 56(f). 

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Cherry 

,J. 

J. 

Gibbons 

NRCP 7.1, see Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 

130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006); cf. Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 417, 168 

P.3d 1050, 1054 (2007) (noting that this court will not entertain an 

argument made for the first time in a motion for reconsideration when the 

district court did not entertain the motion on its merits). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

cc: Hon. Adriana Escobar, District Judge 

Robert F. Saint-Aubin, Settlement Judge 

Kurth Law Office 

Wright, Finlay & Zak, LLP/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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