### 35861 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 118 / Monday, June 20, 2011 / Notices

**CONTESTING RECORD PROCEDURES :** 

The Army’s rules for accessing records, and for contesting contents and appealing initial agency determinations are contained in Army Regulation 340– 21; 32 CFR part 505; or may be obtained from the system manager.

**RECORD SOURCE CATEGORIES :** 

From the individual, military and civilian personnel records and reports, civilian maritime records, U.S. Coast Guard, commanders and vessel masters, and other appropriate sources able to
furnish relevant information.

**EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED FOR THE SYSTEM :** 

None.

[FR Doc. 2011–15272 Filed 6–17–11; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 5001–06–P**

**DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES**
**SAFETY BOARD**

**[Recommendation 2011–1]**

**Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment**
**and Immobilization Plant**

**AGENCY :**  Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

**ACTION :**  Notice, recommendation.

**SUMMARY :**  Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a(a)(5), the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a recommendation to the Secretary of Energy concerning the safety culture at
the Waste Treatment and
Immobilization Plant located at the Hanford site in the state of Washington.

**DATES :**  Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the
recommendation are due on or before July 20, 2011.

**ADDRESSES :**  Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington,

DC 20004–2901.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT :**  Brian Grosner or Andrew L. Thibadeau at the address above or telephone number (202) 694–7000.

Dated: June 14, 2011.
Peter S. Winokur,

Chairman.

RECOMMENDATION 2011–1 TO THE

SECRETARY OF ENERGY

Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment
and Immobilization Plant

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2286a(a)(5)

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As
Amended

Dated: June 09, 2011 Introduction

Secretary of Energy Notice SEN–35–

91, Nuclear Safety Policy, issued on September 9, 1991, and superseding policy statement #2 of DOE Policy

420.1, Department of Energy Nuclear Safety Policy, issued on February 8, 2011, state that the Department of Energy (DOE) is committed to establishing and maintaining a strong safety culture at its nuclear facilities. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has determined that the prevailing safety culture at the Waste
Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) is flawed and effectively defeats
this Secretarial mandate. The Board’s investigative record demonstrates that both DOE and contractor project management behaviors reinforce a subculture at WTP that deters the timely reporting, acknowledgement, and ultimate resolution of technical safety

concerns.
Background

In a letter to the Secretary of Energy dated July 27, 2010, the Board stated that it would investigate the health and safety concerns at the WTP at Hanford raised in a letter to the Board dated July 16, 2010, from Dr. Walter Tamosaitis.

The Board’s investigation focused on allegations raised by Dr. Tamosaitis, a contractor employee removed from his position at WTP, a construction project in Washington State funded by DOE and managed by Bechtel National, Incorporated (BNI). The Board’s inquiry did not attempt to assess the validity of Dr. Tamosaitis’s retaliation claim, but rather, as required by the Board’s statute, examined whether his allegations of a failed safety culture at WTP, if proven true, might reveal events or practices adversely affecting safety in the design, construction, and operation of this defense nuclear facility.

The Board is required by statute to investigate any event or practice at a defense nuclear facility which it determines may adversely affect public health and safety. The Board conducted this investigation pursuant to its investigative power under 42 U.S.C. § 2286a(a)(2). During the course of the Board’s inquiry, 45 witnesses were interviewed and more than 30,000 pages
of documents were examined. The Principal Investigator was Joel R. Schapira, Deputy General Counsel, assisted by John G. Batherson, Associate General Counsel, and Richard E. Tontodonato, Deputy Technical Director. The record of the investigation is non-public and will be preserved in
the Office of the General Counsel’s files. During the period of the investigation, the Board held a public hearing regarding safety issues at WTP. During that hearing the Board received
additional information related to the kind of safety culture concerns raised by Dr. Tamosaitis. Consequently, the investigation was expanded to review
these new concerns.

Secretary of Energy Notice SEN–35–

91, Nuclear Safety Policy, issued on September 9, 1991, and superseding policy statement #2 of DOE Policy

420.1, Department of Energy Nuclear Safety Policy, issued on February 8, 2011, state that DOE is committed to establishing and maintaining a strong safety culture at its nuclear facilities. The investigation’s principal conclusion is that the prevailing safety culture at this project effectively defeats this Secretarial mandate. The investigative
record demonstrates that both DOE and contractor project management
behaviors reinforce a subculture at WTP that deters the timely reporting, acknowledgement, and ultimate resolution of technical safety concerns.

A key attribute of a healthy safety culture as identified by DOE’s Energy Facility Contractors Group and endorsed by Deputy Secretary of Energy memorandum dated January 16, 2009, and in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s proposed policy statement on safety culture (NRC–2010– 0282, dated January 5, 2011), is that leaders demonstrate clear expectations and a commitment to safety in their
decisions and behaviors. The Board’s investigation found significant failures by both DOE and contractor management to implement their roles as advocates for a strong safety culture.

The record shows that the tension at the WTP project between organizations charged with technical issue resolution and development of safety basis scope, and those organizations charged with completing design and advancing construction, is unusually high. This unhealthy tension has rendered the WTP project’s formal processes to resolve safety issues largely ineffective. DOE reviews and investigations have failed to recognize the significance of this fact. Consequently, neither DOE nor contractor management has taken
effective remedial action to advance the Secretary’s mandate to establish and maintain a strong safety culture at WTP.

Taken as a whole, the investigative
record convinces the Board that the safety culture at WTP is in need of prompt, major improvement and that corrective actions will only be successful and enduring if championed by the Secretary of Energy. The successful completion of WTP’s mission


### 35862 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 118 / Monday, June 20, 2011 / Notices

to remove and stabilize high-level waste
from the tank farms is essential to protect the health and safety of the public and workers at Hanford. However, the flawed safety culture currently embedded in the project has a substantial probability of jeopardizing
that mission.

Findings

Finding One: A Chilled Atmosphere Adverse to Safety Exists

In a letter to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) dated July 16, 2010, Dr. Walter Tamosaitis, a former engineering manager at the
Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP), alleged that he was removed from the project because he
identified certain technical issues that in his view could affect safety. Dr. Tamosaitis also alleged that there was a failed safety culture at WTP. With full understanding that the formal claims of retaliation raised by Dr. Tamosaitis would be looked into by others, the
Board decided that his assertions raised serious questions about safety culture and safety management at WTP. From late July 2010 to May 2011, the Board reviewed a large number of documents
and interviewed a substantial number of persons, including Dr. Tamosaitis, to assess whether or not his allegations of safety issues and of a faulty safety
culture were borne out. The Board’s investigation later expanded in scope to
address matters related to the Board’s October 2010 public hearing at Hanford on safety issues at WTP. This phase of the investigation consisted of closed hearings at which sworn testimony was
elicited from DOE and contractor personnel.

The Board finds that the specific technical issues identified by Dr. Tamosaitis in his July 16, 2010, letter were known and tracked by the WTP project. In a WTP project managers’ meeting on July 1, 2010, Dr. Tamosaitis raised safety concerns related to the adequacy of vessel mixing, technical justifications for closing mixing issues, and other open technical issues. The next day he was abruptly removed from the project. This sent a strong message to other WTP project employees that individuals who question current practices or provide alternative points of view are not considered team players and will be dealt with harshly.

The Board finds that expressions of technical dissent affecting safety at WTP, especially those affecting schedule or budget, were discouraged, if not opposed or rejected without review. Project management subtly, consistently, and effectively communicated to employees that differing professional opinions counter to decisions reached by management
were not welcome and would not be
dealt with on their merits. There is a firm belief among WTP project personnel that persisting in a dissenting argument can lead, as in the case of Dr. Tamosaitis, to the employee being removed from the project or reassigned to other duties. As of the writing of this finding, Dr. Tamosaitis sits in a
basement cubicle in Richland with no meaningful work. His isolated physical placement by contractor management and the lack of meaningful work is seen by many as a constant reminder of what management will do to an employee who raises issues that might impact budget or schedule.

Other examples of a failed safety
culture include:

• The Board heard testimony from several witnesses that raising safety issues that can add to project cost or delay schedule will hurt one’s career and reduce one’s participation on project teams.

• A high ranking safety expert on the project testified that the expert felt next
in line for removal after Dr. Tamosaitis because of the expert’s refusal to yield to technically unsound positions on matters affecting safety advanced by DOE and contractor managers responsible for design and construction at the WTP. This safety expert’s concern was validated by a senior DOE official in separate sworn testimony.

• A report prepared by a subcontractor on the WTP project, ‘‘URS Report of Involvement in WTP Investigation,’’ discusses the ‘‘tension between organizations charged with
technical issue resolution and development of safety basis related scope and those organizations charged with completing design and advancing
construction. Some level of such tension is normal and healthy in projects of such scope and complexity; but at WTP, this tension is higher than what might be expected or desired. Some individuals whose personalities tend
toward avoidance of conflict could view the organizational environment as not conducive to raising issues or perhaps even potentially suppressing some issues that might deter progress or that might add cost.’’

• The investigative record shows that
the DOE Office of River Protection Employee Concerns program is not effective. One safety expert explicitly testified that employees would not and did not use the program, and believed that individuals running the program would ‘‘bury issues’’ brought to them.
The record shows that in the removal of Dr. Tamosaitis, Human Resources (HR) for URS was interested only in implementing management’s demand that the employee be removed immediately. The record shows HR did not assert any consideration or concern regarding the effect the process and
manner of his removal would have on the remaining workforce and the effectiveness of the contractor employee protection program required under 10

CFR Part 708.

• An independent review of the WTP safety culture performed by DOE’s Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) found that ‘‘a number of
individuals have lost confidence in management support for safety, believe
there is a chilled environment that discourages reporting of safety concerns,
and/or are concerned about retaliation for reporting safety concerns. These
concerns are not isolated and warrant timely management attention, including
additional efforts to determine the extent of the concerns.’’ Although the HSS report stated that most WTP personnel did not share these opinions, the Board notes that personnel interviewed by HSS were escorted to their interviews by management. The Board’s record shows that involving management with the interviews clearly can inhibit the willingness of employees to express concerns. In its own way, DOE’s decision to allow management to be involved in the HSS investigation raises concerns about safety culture.

This environment at WTP does not meet key attributes established by DOE’s Energy Facility Contractors Group, and endorsed by the Deputy Secretary of Energy, that describe a strong safety culture: DOE and contractor leadership must have a clear understanding of their commitment to safety; they are the leading advocates of safety and the public trust demands that they
demonstrate their commitment in both
word and action. The Board’s investigation concludes that the WTP project is not maintaining a safety
conscious work environment where personnel feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment, or
discrimination.

Finding Two: DOE and Contractor Management Suppress Technical

Dissent

The HSS review of the safety culture on the WTP project ‘‘indicates that BNI has established and implemented generally effective, formal processes for identifying, documenting, and resolving nuclear safety, quality, and technical concerns and issues raised by employees and for managing complex


### 35863 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 118 / Monday, June 20, 2011 / Notices

technical issues.’’ However, the Board finds that these processes are infrequently used, not universally trusted by the WTP project staff, vulnerable to pressures caused by budget or schedule, and are therefore not effective. Previous independent reviews, contractor surveys, investigations, and other efforts by DOE and contractors demonstrate repeated, continuing identification of the same safety culture deficiencies without
effective resolution.

Suppression of technical dissent is contrary to the principles that guide a high-reliability organization. It is essential that workers feel empowered to speak candidly without fear of
retribution or criticism. In extreme cases, refusal to consider a different view of a safety issue can lead to catastrophic consequences. WTP is a complex and difficult project that is
essential to the nation’s nuclear waste remediation program. Therefore, federal and contractor managers must make a special effort to foster a free and open atmosphere in which all competent opinions are judged on their technical merit, to sustain or improve worker and public safety first and foremost, and then evaluate potential impacts on cost
and schedule.

One of the primary examples of suppressing technical information is a study that was performed by BNI in July 2009 on deposition velocity, a parameter used in modeling the offsite transport of radioactive particles for nuclear facility safety analyses. The study found that the correct value of the dry deposition velocity for Hanford fell in the range of 0.1 to 0.3 cm/sec. The Board’s investigation includes testimony by the former manager of
DOE’s Office of River Protection and the DOE Chief of Nuclear Safety in Washington, DC, that the results of this study were not shared with them. Consequently, DOE continued to follow its policy requiring the WTP project to
use a less conservative default value of 1.0 cm/sec for dry deposition velocity. In the fall of 2010, the Chief of Nuclear Safety hired an independent consultant to investigate the issue. This consultant also found that deposition velocity fell in the range of 0.1 to 0.3 cm/sec, information that was already available to the project in the summer of 2009. Suppression of the 2009 study delayed the identification of properly conservative values for dry deposition velocity to use in the safety analysesthat determine the need for safetyrelated controls for WTP facilities. Once
this information was made available to DOE’s Office of Health, Safety and Security, a technical study ensued that determined the need for a more conservative value of deposition velocity to serve as a default value.

This problem also manifested itself when one of the expert witnesses, a nuclear safety professional, specifically asked by the Board to testify at the Board’s October 2010 public hearing on WTP safety issues, failed to support the DOE policy on the appropriate value for dry deposition velocity. This witness testified that using DOE’s prescribed default value for the dry deposition velocity in safety basis calculations could not be justified if it were known
to be non-conservative for the Hanford Site. At the time of the hearing, the
witness understood the correct value of deposition velocity was not being used in calculations of potential dose consequences to the public receptor and was unwilling to simply state the DOE position that a default value could be used or justified. The expert witness
later testified for the record that DOE was fully aware of the July 2009 study on dry deposition velocity at the time of the public hearing. The expert witness’ testimony during the public hearing clashed with the position taken by senior management in the DOE Office of River Protection and by the DOE Chief of Nuclear Safety.

The testimony of several witnesses confirms that the expert witness was verbally admonished by the highest level of DOE line management at DOE’s debriefing meeting following this session of the hearing. Although testimony varies on the exact details of the verbal interchange, it is clear that strong hostility was expressed toward the expert witness whose testimony strayed from DOE management’s policy while that individual was attempting to adhere to accepted professional standards. Testimony by a senior DOE official confirmed the validity of the expert witness’ concerns. In addition, the expert witness testified that they felt pressure to change their testimony, but
refused to do so.

Management behavior of this kind creates an atmosphere in which workers are reluctant to speak candidly for fear
of retribution or criticism. Whether or not this behavior possibly violates
federal law is not for the Board to determine; however, the Board does
assert that fear of retribution visited on a competent professional for offering an honest opinion in a public hearing is incompatible with the objective of designing and building a safe and operationally sound nuclear facility and sustaining a healthy safety culture.

Another example of failure to act on technical information in a timely manner concerns a report related to the occurrence of a potential criticality event at WTP. In April 2010, the WTP project issued a plan of action to
address recommendations of the WTP Criticality Safety Support Group, specifically, to review historical information on plutonium dioxide (PuO 2) wastes discharged by the Plutonium Finishing Plant to the tank farms. The report of the review was completed and submitted to the WTP project in August 2010. A key finding of the report was that the maximum PuO 2 particle size of 10 microns assumed in WTP criticality safety analyses was not conservative. Instead of receiving immediate attention, the report languished without action until February 2011.

Once the report was finally reviewed, the WTP project reached the initial conclusion that it may no longer be possible to assume that criticality in WTP is an incredible occurrence. (Based on this information, the Hanford Tank Farms operating contractor halted activities involving the affected tanks.) If criticality is confirmed to be credible, changes in the WTP criticality strategy will be required. This will result in changes to the existing safety basis and require an assessment of the existing WTP design to determine if design changes are required. Depending upon the magnitude of the criticality hazard, significant changes in the WTP design may be necessary. DOE was not informed of this important finding in a timely manner, and actions to better
characterize the PuO 2 problem were delayed by approximately 6 months because the WTP project delayed evaluation of the report.

Recommendation

Taken as a whole, the investigative
record convinces the Board that the safety culture at WTP is in need of prompt, major improvement and that corrective actions will only be successful and enduring if championed by the Secretary of Energy. The Board recommends that the Secretary of Energy:

1. Assert federal control at the highest level and direct, track, and validate the specific corrective actions to be taken to establish a strong safety culture within the WTP project consistent with DOE Policy 420.1 in both the contractor and federal workforces,

2. Conduct an Extent of Condition
Review to determine whether these safety culture weaknesses are limited to the WTP Project, and

3. Conduct a non-adversarial review
of Dr. Tamosaitis’ removal and his current treatment by both DOE and


### 35864 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 118 / Monday, June 20, 2011 / Notices

contractor management and how that is affecting the safety culture at WTP.

The Board urges the Secretary to avail himself of the authority under the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. § 2286d(e)) to ‘‘implement any such recommendation (or part of any such recommendation) before, on, or after the date on which the Secretary transmits the implementation plan to the Board
under this subsection.’’

Peter S. Winokur, Ph.D.,

Chairman.

[FR Doc. 2011–15146 Filed 6–17–11; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 3670–01–P**

**DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION**

**Notice of Submission for OMB Review**

**AGENCY :**  Department of Education.

**ACTION :**  Comment request.

**SUMMARY :**  The Director, Information Collection Clearance Division, Privacy, Information and Records Management Services, Office of Management, invites
comments on the submission for OMB review as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–13).

**DATES :**  Interested persons are invited to submit comments on or before July 20,

2011.

**ADDRESSES :**  Written comments should
be addressed to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,

Attention: Education Desk Officer, Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th Street, NW., Room 10222, New Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20503, be faxed to (202) 395–5806 or
e-mailed to

oira

_submission@omb.eop.gov with a

cc: to ICDocketMgr@ed.gov. Please note
that written comments received in response to this notice will be considered public records.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION :**  Section 3506 of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. chapter 35) requires that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provide interested Federal agencies and the public an early opportunity to comment on information collection requests. The OMB is particularly interested in comments which: (1) Evaluate whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have practical utility; (2) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used; (3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (4) Minimize the burden
of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology.

Dated: June 15, 2011.
Darrin A. King, Director, Information Collection Clearance Division, Privacy, Information and Records Management Services, Office of Management.

Institute of Education Sciences

Type of Review: Revision Title of Collection: National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) 2012 Wave II (Grade 4/8/12 Pilots, Grade 12 Economics, SD, ELL, and Special Studies)

OMB Control Number: 1850–0790 Agency Form Number(s): N/A Frequency of Responses: Once Affected Public: Individuals or
household

Total Estimated Number of Annual Responses: 35,955

Total Estimated Annual Burden

Hours: 14,603

Abstract: The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) is a federally authorized survey of student achievement at grades 4, 8, and 12 in various subject areas, such as mathematics, reading, writing, science, U.S. history, civics, geography, economics, and the arts. NAEP consists of two assessment programs: the NAEP Long-Term Trend (LTT) assessment and the main NAEP assessment. In 2012, both types of assessments will be delivered. The approved Wave 1 clearance package contained materials
related to the LTT assessment. The Wave 2 submittal seeks approval for the following components of the 2012 assessments (specifically related to the noncognitive, background questions): —Economics (national only at grade 12) —Writing pilot (national only at grade 4;

computer delivered) —Reading pilot (national at grade 12) —Mathematics pilot (national at grade

12) —Student Core Background pilot (at

grades 4 and 12, and at age 13) —Teacher Core Background pilot (at

grade 4, age 13) —School Core Background pilot (at

grades 4 and 12,and at age 13) —SD and ELL worksheets—completed

by teachers or administrators of
students identified as SD and/or as ELL (both main NAEP and LTT) —Special Pilot Study to evaluate the

new SD and ELL Decision Tree, based on the new SD and ELL policy established by the Governing Board (at ages 9 and 13 LTT) —Special Study to evaluate use of MP–

3 players for administering read-aloud accommodations (will include Background Questions from 2011 Mathematics assessment). Copies of the information collection submission for OMB review may be accessed from the RegInfo.gov Web site

at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/

PRAMain or from the Department’s Web

site at http://edicsweb.ed.gov, by selecting the ‘‘Browse Pending Collections’’ link and by clicking on link number 4643. When you access the information collection, click on
‘‘Download Attachments ’’ to view. Written requests for information should be addressed to U.S. Department of Education, 400 Maryland Avenue, SW., LBJ, Washington, DC 20202–4537. Requests may also be electronically
mailed to the Internet address ICDocketMgr@ed.gov or faxed to 202– 401–0920. Please specify the complete
title of the information collection and OMB Control Number when making your request.

Individuals who use a
telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) may call the Federal Information Relay Service (FIRS) at 1–800–877–

8339.

[FR Doc. 2011–15291 Filed 6–17–11; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4000–01–P**

**DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION**

**[CFDA 84.235M]**

**Proposed Priority; Special Demonstration Programs—National**  **Technical Assistance Projects To Improve Employment Outcomes for** 
**Individuals With Disabilities**

**AGENCY :**  Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, Department of
Education.

**ACTION :**  Notice of proposed priority.

**SUMMARY :**  The Assistant Secretary for the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services proposes a priority under the Special Demonstration Programs authorized under 303(b) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended (the Rehabilitation Act). The Assistant Secretary may use this priority for competitions in fiscal year (FY) 2011 and later years. We take
this action to focus technical assistance (TA) on areas of national need identified by the Rehabilitation Services Administration (RSA) through analyses of information obtained during monitoring and oversight of its grant