IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William Schenk & Sons; Silver, Green :

and William Schenk & Sons; Silver, :

Green, Winitsky and William Schenk :

& Sons; Glendale Enterprises, Inc.; :

Huntingdon Valley Enterprises, Inc.; :

William Schenk & Sons, equitable :

owner; Silver, Green and William :

Schenk & Sons, Inc., equitable owner; :

Huntingdon Valley Enterprises, :

equitable owner, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 1881 C.D. 2013

: Argued: June 20, 2014

Northampton, Bucks County, Municipal :

Authority :

BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: July 30, 2014 

Nonresidential property owners (Property Owners)1appeal from an 

order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (trial court). The trial court 

overruled Property Owners’ preliminary objections to the petitions for appointment 

of a Jury of View (Petitions) filed by the Northampton, Bucks County Municipal 

 

1 As indicated in the caption, Property Owners include: William Schenk & Sons; Silver, 

Green and William Schenk & Sons; Silver, Green, Winitsky and William Schenk & Sons; 

Glendale Enterprises, Inc.; and Huntingdon Valley Enterprises, Inc. The Property Owners own 

property in Northampton Township (Township) in Bucks County.
2

Authority (Authority).

2

 The Authority filed the Petitions in order to recoup the 

costs of extending a public sewer system into the area in which Property Owners’ 

properties are located. We affirm the trial court’s order, but on slightly different 

grounds.

I. BACKGROUND

The Authority and Property Owners acknowledge that, on 

April 30, 2008, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection issued 

an order directing the Township to extend its public sewer facilities into certain 

areas, including what is referred to as “Sewer District 3,” in which all of the 

subject properties are located. On or about December 15, 2010, the Authority 

completed construction of the sewer system extension into Sewer District 3.

On February 2, 2011, following the completion of the sewer extension 

project, the Authority adopted Resolution 2011-1098 (Resolution 1098), relating to 

the costs of the construction of the sewer system expansion into Sewer District 3. 

In Resolution 1098, the Authority notes its powers under the Municipal Authorities

 

2

The Authority was created in 1965, and its purpose is to provide public water and sewer 

services to Northampton Township (Township). (Property Owners’ Complaint in their related 

declaratory judgment action docketed by the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County under the 

same docket number as the present Petitions, at ¶ 8.) The declaratory judgment action involved a 

resolution the Authority adopted relating to tapping fees and its determination of what is referred 

to as equivalent dwelling units or “EDUs.” As indicated in Count II of the declaratory judgment 

action, Property Owners also challenged the Authority’s intention to charge each Property 

Owner $10,000 for the cost of construction and installation of a “manhole sampling chamber,” 

and $100 each for the cost of “manhole/sampling chamber vacuum testing fee[s].” (Id. at ¶ 27.) 

In its opinion issued under Pa. R.A.P. 1925, the trial court explained that it had intended to sever 

the declaratory judgment action from the Petitions, but that had not been accomplished. Thus, 

the certified record contains all docketed materials from both matters.
3

Act (Act)3to assess and recover the costs of sewer construction, and it specifically 

notes that the Act “provide[s] that the benefit assessment shall be assessed in a 

manner provided under the Act for the exercise of eminent domain.” Resolution 

1098 indicates that “the Authority has determined that each of the Residential

Properties abutting the [construction] Project have been presently benefitted by the 

Project.” (Emphasis added.) Resolution 1098 thereafter provides:

[I]n accordance with the benefit assessment 

method provided for in the Act, the Authority Board has 

determined that the fair and reasonable benefit 

assessment for each of the Residential Properties 

benefitted by the Project shall be in the amount of 

[$1,878.44] after consideration of all relevant assessment 

factors and adjustments for all governmental grants 

acquired by the Authority, and

. . .

[T]hat the owners of record of each of the 

Residential Properties may execute and present to the 

Authority on or before April 1, 2011, a document 

entitled, “Western End Sanitary Sewer Project, Phase II 

Residential Public Sewer Payment Plan Agreement 

(“Agreement”) . . . and,

. . . 

[T]hat any owner of record of the Residential 

Properties within the Project that have failed or refused 

to enter into the Agreement, the Authority’s solicitor is 

authorized to file Petitions for Appointment of Board of 

View to Assess Benefits and thereafter to collect the 

entirety thereof from the subject property owners as 

determined by the Act.

(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 95a-96a; emphasis added.)

 

3

53 Pa. C.S. §§ 5601-5623.
4

On the same day, the Authority adopted Resolution 2011-1099

(Resolution 1099), which in most respects is identical to Resolution 1098 except 

that it pertains to the nonresidential properties in the sewer expansion area. (R.R. 

at 105a-09a.) Resolution 1099 includes an Exhibit A, which, unlike the $1,878.44 

assessment determined in Resolution 1098 for residential properties, identifies

individual assessments on the nonresidential properties in varying amounts. All of 

the nonresidential assessment amounts are in increments of $11,873.93, the highest 

being $189,982.88 (which is 16 x $11,873.93). 

By letters dated February 3, 2011, the Authority informed Property 

Owners that it had “determined the benefit Assessment of your property” as a 

result of the sewer system extension. (R.R. at 110a-120a.) The letter also 

provides:

A Benefit Assessment Payment Plan Agreement is 

being offered by the Authority to help property 

owners .... This agreement allows each property owner 

to finance the payment of the determined benefit 

Assessment and administration costs over a five (5) year 

period payable in monthly installments at a 3.8% interest 

rate . . . . 

Please note that you are not required to enter into 

the Benefit Assessment Installment Agreement. You may 

choose to make payment in full or choose to have the 

Jury of View selected by the Bucks County Court of 

Common Pleas determine the benefit Assessment to your 

property and make payment in accordance with that 

determination.

In the event that our office does not receive 

payment or an executed Benefit Assessment Installment 

Agreement by April 1, 2011, the Authority will assume 

that you have selected the Jury of View determination 

method . . . . Commencing in April 2011, the Authority 

will file a required petition in the Bucks County Court of 

Common Pleas seeking a hearing before a Jury of View 

to determine the benefit Assessment to your property 
5

based upon improvements incurred, i.e., public sanitary 

sewer service.

(Id. (emphasis added).) The letters indicated that the Authority attached a copy of 

the proposed agreement to the letter.

By way of example, one of the Public Sanitary Sewer Payment Plan 

Agreements signed by a residential owner provides, in pertinent part:

[T]he ability of the Authority to determine assessment on 

the Property through the right of the eminent domain 

process is intended to be waived by the parties herein by 

entering into this Agreement . . . .

(R.R. at 409a-410a (emphasis added).)

After Property Owners failed to sign and submit the offered 

Agreements, the Authority filed the Petitions for the appointment of a jury of view,

requesting a “Board of View to assess benefit to the premises.”4 (Supplemental 

Reproduced Record (S.R.R.) at 39b-78b.) The Petitions allege that the 

construction had provided Property Owners’ properties with a benefit, that the 

Authority had “notified [Property Owner] of the proposed benefit assessment” (in 

the amount indicated in the particular individual Property Owner’s Agreement), 

and that, in accordance with the Act, the Authority was requesting the trial court to 

appoint a “Board of Viewers to assess the benefit to the Premises in accordance 

with municipal law.” (Id. at ¶ 9 of each Petition.)

Property Owners filed preliminary objections to the Petitions. Among 

the objections to the Petitions, Property Owners faulted the amounts of the 

 

4

Property Owners’ Petitions refer to the appointment of a Jury of View. Because the 

applicable case law and statutory provisions generally refer to a board of view or board of 

viewers, when referencing the appointed body to which the Authority refers we will hereafter 

refer to a board of viewers. 
6

assessments the Authority deemed to be appropriate for the construction, as 

identified in the Authority’s letters and proposed Agreements. With regard to the 

assessments the Authority proposed in its letters, Property Owners asserted that the 

amounts improperly imported charges that were inappropriate to the calculation of 

construction costs and the associated benefit to Property Owners. Further, 

Property Owners, which as noted above are all nonresidential owners, objected to 

the disparity between the assessments proposed by the Authority to residential 

owners and the assessments proposed to the nonresidential owners. Thus, although 

the Petitions sought only the appointment of a board of viewers to determine the 

proper assessment, Property Owners claimed that the trial court should dismiss the 

Petitions based upon arguments relating to the Authority’s method of determining 

the proposed assessments and the Authority’s alleged misapplication of its rates, 

rules, and regulations. Property Owners also claimed that the Petitions failed to 

state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.

By order dated September 27, 2013, the trial court overruled the 

preliminary objections. Property Owners filed a notice of appeal and, in 

compliance with the trial court’s direction, submitted a statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. It is clear that the essential claims Property Owners 

asserted in their preliminary objections pertain to the Authority’s conduct in 

reaching settlements with some property owners in the subject sewer district. As 

indicated by the quotations above from the letters, the Authority stated that it was 

acting in accordance with its rights under the Act to proceed under the law of 

eminent domain to collect construction costs. Property Owners argued that in 

order to comply with the Act, the Authority was required to follow the eminent 
7

domain process, namely to have a board of viewers determine the amount of 

benefit to be assessed upon all properties in the sewer district.

The trial court rejected Property Owners’ arguments. First, the trial 

court rejected Property Owners’ claim that the letters and Agreements constituted 

something other than a settlement offer. Next, the trial court concluded that the 

Authority either had inherent power to enter contracts or that the Authority had the 

power under the Eminent Domain Code (Code)5to settle monetary disputes with 

property owners. Finally, the trial court rejected a claim by Property Owners that 

the Authority’s disparate offers as between residential and nonresidential property 

owners violated Property Owners’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause to the 

United States Constitution.

Property Owners appealed to this Court,6raising the following issues: 

(1) whether the trial court erred in concluding that the Authority complied with the 

requirements for assessment of benefits; and (2) whether the trial court erred in 

concluding that the Authority did not improperly treat nonresidential owners 

disparately from residential owners. We note, however, that the focus of Property 

Owners’ argument rests on their claim that a board of viewers is not capable of

performing a proper assessment because of the Agreements between the Authority 

and some residential property owners.

 

5

26 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-1106.

6

The standard of review of a trial court’s order overruling preliminary objections to a 

petition to appoint a board of viewers under the Code is limited to considering whether 

competent evidence in the record supports necessary factual findings and whether the trial court 

erred as a matter of law. Ristvey v. Dep’t of Transp., 52 A.3d 425, 429 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). 
8

II. DISCUSSION

Because this matter presents a challenge to the Petitions for 

appointment of a board of viewers under the Code, we begin by noting that 

preliminary objections in the context of proceedings under the Code are distinct 

from preliminary objections in the context of a proceeding under the Pennsylvania 

Rules of Civil Procedure. In re Redevelopment Auth. of City of Philadelphia,

891 A.2d 820, 824 (Pa. Cmwlth.), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 

938 A.2d 341 (Pa. 2006). In the context of a case where preliminary objections are 

raised in response to the appointment of a board of viewers, the courts have held 

that the scope of preliminary objections is the same as preliminary objections to a 

declaration of taking. 26 Pa. C.S. § 504(d) (“An objection to the appointment of 

viewers may be raised by preliminary objections filed within 30 days after receipt 

of notice of the appointment of viewers.”). Section 306 of the Code addresses such 

preliminary objections and provides that a trial court may make an evidentiary 

record in order to resolve factual issues. 26 Pa. C.S. § 306(f)(2). In proceedings 

under the Code, preliminary objections are intended as a procedure to resolve all 

legal and factual challenges to a declaration of taking before proceeding to the 

damages issue—i.e., hearing by an appointed board of viewers.

Sections 5607(d)(21) and (22) of the Act provide two specific 

methods by which a municipal authority may recover the costs of sewer 

construction, providing authorities with the following powers:

(21) To charge the cost of construction of any 

sewer . . . constructed by the authority against the 

properties benefited, improved or accommodated thereby 

to the extent of such benefits. These benefits shall be 

assessed in the manner provided under this chapter for 

the exercise of the right of eminent domain.
9

(22) To charge the cost of construction of a sewer

. . . constructed by the authority against the properties 

benefited, improved or accommodated by the 

construction according to the foot front rule. Charges 

shall be based upon the foot frontage of the properties 

benefited and shall be a lien against such properties. 

Charges may be assessed and collected and liens may be 

enforced in the manner provided by law for the 

assessment and collection of charges and the enforcement 

of liens of the municipality in which such authority is 

located. No charge shall be assessed unless prior to the 

construction of a sewer . . . the authority submitted the 

plan of construction and estimated cost to the 

municipality in which the project is to be undertaken and 

the municipality approved it. The properties benefited, 

improved or accommodated by the construction may not 

be charged in the aggregate amount in excess of the 

approved estimated cost.

(Emphasis added.) These provisions are commonly referred to as the benefits 

method of assessment and the foot front or foot frontage method of assessment, 

respectively. 

Property Owners argue that these two methods are the only means by 

which a municipal authority may act to collect construction costs for the benefit 

conferred upon properties for sewer improvements and that the Authority exceeded 

its powers by entering into agreements with property owners rather than submitting 

to a board of viewers the task of determining the benefit to be assessed all 

properties improved by the construction project. As we explain below, we agree 

with Property Owners’ argument that municipal authorities may seek to recover 

their construction costs only through one of these methods (or a combination of 

both), but we conclude that, despite the Authority’s error, a board of viewers may 

still assess the benefit bestowed by the construction on their properties.
10

Our Supreme Court’s decision in Whitemarsh Township Authority v. 

Elwart, 196 A.2d 843, 846 (Pa. 1964), discusses the two methods and also helps to 

clarify the reasons why municipal authorities must elect one of these methods or a 

combination of the two methods. In Whitemarsh, a municipal authority sought to 

recover costs associated with a sewer construction project. Initially, the municipal 

authority adopted a resolution indicating that it would use the foot front method for 

all properties benefited by the construction. Later, the municipal authority adopted 

a second resolution indicating that if the foot front method could not be used in a 

legal manner—i.e., a fair and equitable manner, to assess any properties, the 

benefit would be determined by a board of viewers. The municipal authority filed 

a municipal claim against one property owner, seeking to recover costs allegedly 

based upon the benefits method. The property owner in that case challenged the 

action by asserting that the municipal authority should have applied the foot front 

method.

The Supreme Court rejected the suggestion that the Second Class 

Township Code7provisions for benefits assessments applied. Rather, the Supreme 

Court referred to the Act and the two methods:

It can be seen that the Legislature vested in every 

authority the right to charge certain costs of construction 

by the “benefits method” and the “foot front method,” the 

two long known and familiar methods of imposing such 

charges. In the event the Authority chooses the “benefits 

method,” the charges to be made by the Authority are 

determined by a jury of view, this being the procedure 

provided in all municipal codes for eminent domain 

proceedings. If the Authority chooses the “foot front 

method,” the charges to be made by the Authority are 

 

7 Act of May 1, 1933, P.L. 103, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 65101-68701.
11

determined by “the plan of construction and estimated 

cost” that are approved by the municipality. Thus it can 

be seen that in either event the basis for the charges, and 

therefore the control, are not within the purview of the 

Authority. It can also be seen from [Sections 5607d)(21) 

and (22)] . . . that either or both methods may be used by 

the Authority and that they both may be used 

simultaneously on the same project. No restricting words 

appear, such as are present in The Second Class 

Township Code; the disjunctive “or,” which would 

restrict the simultaneous use of both methods, is not 

present.

Whitemarsh, 196 A.2d at 846 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court recognized 

that in some cases, the use of a single method would not result in “an adequate 

measurement of the fair proportions of the cost of constructing the sewer.” Id. at 

848. Moreover, as indicated by the highlighted language, the Supreme Court 

recognized that the power of municipal authorities to determine an assessment is 

limited—i.e., “not within the purview of the Authority.” Id. The Supreme Court 

observed the overarching goal of benefits assessment as follows:

This is a matter of balancing the equities between one 

property owner and the remainder of the property owners 

also serviced by the sewer system. If the [owners] in this 

case do not pay their fair share of the cost of constructing 

this sewer, the remaining property owners must 

necessarily pay more than their fair share; if not in the 

form of assessment, then ultimately in the form of sewer 

service charges which will and must pay for the system.

Whitemarsh, 196 A.2d at 848. Thus, the Supreme Court made clear that the 

recovery of sewer construction costs must be done in an equitable manner. Strict 

compliance with Section 5607(d)(21) or (22) of the Act (or a combination of both) 

furthers the apparent legislative goal of assessing benefits in a fair and equitable 

manner. The Agreements the Authority executed with some property owners 

represent a method at odds with the Supreme Court’s admonishment in 
12

Whitemarsh that the “basis of the charges” not be controlled by a municipal 

authority. The Agreements in this case could potentially thwart the legislative 

objectives of the Act if, as suggested by the Supreme Court in Whitemarsh, the 

Agreements were to affect the equitable assessment of other properties by a board 

of viewers.

8

We believe, however, that a board of viewers could assess Property 

Owners’ properties in a manner that is equitable even given the allegedly favorable 

deals reflected in the Agreements between the Authority and some property 

owners. We have confidence in such an outcome, and note that, although a total 

assessment of benefited properties cannot exceed the total cost of construction, see 

Stockdale Borough v. Astle, 189 A.2d 152, 154 (Pa. 1963), there is nothing in the 

Act that prohibits an under-recovery of costs where the equities suggest that an 

assessment might otherwise cause some property owners to bear a greater 

proportional burden than they would have had a municipal authority complied with 

the construction provisions of the Act.

 

8 Our conclusion regarding the Authority’s error in proceeding to enter into the 

Agreements with some property owners and by failing to comply strictly with 

Section 5607(d)(21) of the Act finds additional support in this Court’s recent decision in 

Township of Summit v. Property Located at Vacant Land in Summit Township, ___ A.3d ___ 

(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 399 C.D. 2013, filed May 23, 2014). In Township of Summit, we concluded 

that Summit Township’s attempt to collect money associated with a sewer improvement project 

by filing a lien under the Municipal Claim Act, Act of May 16, 1923, P.L. 207, as 

amended, 53 P.S. §§ 7101-7505, was improper, because the township failed to comply with the 

statutory provisions of the Second Class Township Code for the assessment of costs for sewer 

improvements. “Absent compliance with statutory requirements for assessment, the Municipal 

Claim Act’s requirement that the municipal claim must be ‘lawfully imposed or assessed’ on the 

property therefore is not satisfied and the claim cannot become a lien on the property by 

operation of law.” Township of Summit, slip op. at 10-11.
13

 In Whitemarsh, our Supreme Court, by holding that a municipal 

authority is not bound to a single assessment method (of the two available) in 

seeking to recoup its sewer construction costs, implicitly confirmed that a 

municipal authority need not include all properties in a petition for the appointment 

of a board of viewers. In seeking to arrive at equitable and fair benefit 

assessments, however, a board of viewers will necessarily have to consider the 

larger picture, including the nature of the Agreements between the Authority and 

the settling property owners.

Although it may be that the Authority may not seek or may lack the 

power to recover any further direct costs of construction from those parties with 

whom it has entered into the Agreements, the Agreements do not affect a board of 

viewer’s duty and powers under Section 5607(d)(21) of the Act. A board of 

viewers may consider all evidence relevant to its determination of the benefit 

conferred upon the remaining properties, including the Agreements between the 

Authority and some property owners. 

This Court has no power to direct the board of viewers as to how it 

should perform its task, but we observe below some possibilities regarding how a 

board of viewers’ evaluation and decision could ultimately reflect the amounts paid 

by settling property owners. For example, in keeping in mind the Supreme Court’s 

admonishment in Whitemarsh regarding the equities in a benefits assessment 

determination and the Supreme Court’s comment that all property owners should 

contribute their fair share to a construction project, a board of viewers could 

consider, among other things, the ratio between the amount the settling property 

owners paid to the Authority to the portion of the costs of construction attributable 
14

to that segment of property owners.9 In turn, with regard to Property Owners, the 

board of viewers might consider what similar ratio exists as to that segment of 

owners relative to the costs attributable to that segment. Such an approach might 

avoid the consequence of inequitable assessments that the Supreme Court 

recognized in Whitemarsh. Thereafter, in accordance with the process afforded in 

the Code, if Property Owners believe that the board of viewers’ decision still 

results in inequity, Property Owners have the right to seek de novo review before a 

court of common pleas.10

Property Owners also contend that the Authority lacked the power to 

enter into the Agreements with the residential property owners. The trial court 

 

9 We recognize that the number of residential property owners who elected to enter into 

an agreement with the Authority is considerably smaller than the total number of residential 

property owners. Refinement of this suggested approach, if a board of viewers deems the 

approach useful, will depend on the evidence presented to a board of viewers.

10 Sections 516 and 517 of the Code, 26 Pa. C.S. §§ 516-17 provide for appeals, in 

pertinent part, as follows:

§ 516. Right of appeal

(a) Extent of right.—

(1) Any person aggrieved by the decision of 

the viewers may appeal to the court.

§ 517. Appeals

(a) Contents.—The appeal shall set forth:

. . . .

(5) A demand for a jury trial, if desired.

(b) Jury trial.—

. . . .

(2) If no party makes a demand for a jury 

trial . . . the court shall try the case without a jury.
15

viewed the letters the Authority sent to Property Owners as an offer of settlement 

to recoup the construction costs, thus enabling the Authority to avoid proceeding 

under Section 5607(d)(21) of the Act and the Code. The trial court concluded that 

Section 5607(13) of the Act11 provided the Authority with the power to enter into 

contracts, including those the Authority executed with some property owners as a 

means to recover constructions costs, notwithstanding the specific provisions of the 

Act pertaining to the recovery of such costs—i.e., Sections 5607(21) and (22) of 

the Act. The trial court alternatively concluded that Section 501 of the Code, 

26 Pa. C.S. § 501, also authorized the Authority to settle with property owners 

before proceeding to the appointment of a board of viewers.

As we discussed above, we believe that a board of viewers has the 

power to make benefit assessments in this case despite the Agreements. Thus, we

need not address the question of whether the Authority exceeded its powers. We 

note, however, in passing, that while Section 5607(d)(13) does provide municipal 

authorities with the power to enter into contracts, the more specific provisions of 

the Act, Sections 5607(d)(21) and (22) compel strict compliance in order to serve 

the goal of equity in benefits assessments. We also note that although 

Section 501 of the Code does vest condemnors and condemnees with the right to 

enter settlement agreements as to the amount of damages associated with a taking, 

we are not convinced that all provisions of the Code apply in benefit assessment 

proceedings. First, that provision applies only to pending proceedings, and, in this 

 

11 Section 5607(d)(13) of the Act provides authorities with the power “[t]o make 

contracts of every name and nature and to execute all instruments necessary or convenient for the 

carrying on of its business.”
16

case, there were no pending proceedings under the Code at the time the Authority 

entered into the Agreements. 

Based upon the foregoing reasoning, we affirm the trial court’s order 

overruling Property Owners’ preliminary objections.12

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

 

12 We also note briefly Property Owners’ argument regarding the applicability of the 

eminent domain provisions of the Second Class Township Code. The only reference to the law 

of eminent domain in the applicable Chapter of the Act is found in Section 5615 of the Act. 

Although that provision primarily relates to the acquisition of land, subsection (b) provides that 

the “right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the authority in the manner provided by law 

for the exercise of such right by municipalities of the same class as the municipality which 

organized the authority.” Section 5615(b) of the Act, 53 Pa. C.S. § 6515(b). See Bern Twp.

Auth. v. Hartman, 451 A.2d 567 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982). Although Property Owners may be correct 

in arguing that the Second Class Township Code may have some applicability by virtue of the 

language in Section 5615 of the Act, we do not need to address this issue based upon our 

conclusion above regarding the board of viewers’ ability to perform an assessment.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William Schenk & Sons; Silver, Green :

and William Schenk & Sons; Silver, :

Green, Winitsky and William Schenk :

& Sons; Glendale Enterprises, Inc.; :

Huntingdon Valley Enterprises, Inc.; :

William Schenk & Sons, equitable :

owner; Silver, Green and William :

Schenk & Sons, Inc., equitable owner; :

Huntingdon Valley Enterprises, :

equitable owner, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 1881 C.D. 2013

: 

Northampton, Bucks County, Municipal :

Authority :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 30th day of July, 2014, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Bucks County is AFFIRMED.

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge