IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 1, 2020

DAVID DYKES v. VICTOR OKORIE ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Rutherford County

No. 74901 Barry R. Tidwell, Judge

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No. M2019-01332-COA-R3-CV

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Pro se appellants appeal from the trial court’s judgment in favor of their former landlord. 

We affirm the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN 

STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., joined.

Victor Okorie and Odinachi Okorie, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, Pro Se.

James P. Barger, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellee, David Dykes.

OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

On October 18, 2014, Appellants Victor and Odinachi Okorie (“tenants”) executed 

a residential lease agreement to rent a residence in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, from 

Appellee David Dykes (“landlord”) for an initial two-year term beginning on November 

1, 2014 and ending on October 31, 2016. The tenants lived in the residence located on 

the premises with their two children, and paid monthly rent of $1,250.00. After the initial 

two-year term, the lease continued on a month-to-month basis at the same rental amount. 

The tenants decided to purchase a home, gave notice of their intent to vacate the premises 

to the landlord, and vacated the premises on July 31, 2018.

The residential lease between the landlord and the tenants includes the following 

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provisions:

On signing this Agreement, Tenant will pay to Landlord the sum of $1,250 

as a security deposit. Tenant may not, without Landlord’s prior written 

consent, apply this security deposit to the last month’s rent or to any other 

sum due under this Agreement. 

Tenant will: (1) keep the premises clean, sanitary, and in good condition 

and, upon termination of the tenancy, return the premises to Landlord in a 

condition identical to that which existed when Tenant took occupancy, 

except for ordinary wear and tear; . . . (3) reimburse Landlord, on demand 

by Landlord, for the cost of any repairs to the premises damaged by Tenant 

or Tenant’s guests or business invitees through misuse or neglect. Tenant 

has examined the premises, including appliances, fixtures, carpets, drapes, 

and paint, and has found them to be in good, safe, and clean condition and 

repair, except as noted in the Landlord-Tenant checklist. 

. . . 

In any action or legal proceeding to enforce any part of this Agreement, the 

prevailing party [X] shall recover reasonable attorney fees and court costs. 

. . . 

Additional provisions are as follows: The home is in good condition and I 

will only come out if something major breaks (AC – Oven – Refrig., etc.). 

After the tenants moved out, the landlord discovered that they had failed to 

maintain the premises and had caused considerable damage to the premises. As a result, 

on August 27, 2018, the landlord filed a civil warrant against the tenants in the 

Rutherford County General Sessions Court for “breach of contract/Lease agreement, 

unpaid rent, property damages, atty fees, process fees, court costs, [and] pre- and postjudgment interest.” The tenants failed to appear at the September 11, 2018, hearing, so a 

default judgment of $14,616.33 was entered. On September 19, 2018, the tenants 

appealed the judgment to the Rutherford County Circuit Court (“trial court”). Trial was 

set for November 27, 2018. The landlord testified and presented evidence, but the 

tenants did not appear. Finding that the “damages of $14,616.33 are fair and reasonable 

considering the severity of the damage to his real property and the cost to repair,” the trial 

court entered judgment in the landlord’s favor for $14,616.33, by order entered 

December 11, 2018. 

The tenants requested that the order and judgment be set aside, citing their 

confusion about which courtroom to go to on November 27. The trial court set aside its 
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order. The matter was assigned to another judge, and a new trial was set for June 25, 

2019.1 At trial, the court heard testimony from tenant Victor Okorie and from the 

landlord. The trial court found that “prior to the lease being consummated, photographs 

presented by [the landlord] establish that the home was in immaculate condition and 

everything was in order. . . . [U]pon the tenants leaving the house, based upon multiple 

photos as well as [the landlord’s] own testimony, [] the home was in deplorable 

condition.” The court found the landlord “to be extremely credible on these issues” and 

found that tenant Victor Okorie was not credible. The court further found that the 

landlord’s damages sought for costs, labor, and lost rent were “entirely reasonable and 

reflect[ed] the damages sustained by [the landlord].” Accordingly, the trial court entered 

a judgment against the tenants in the amount of $14,616.33, plus court costs, by order 

entered July 2, 2019. This appeal followed. 

 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a non-jury case de novo upon the record, with a presumption of 

correctness as to the findings of fact unless the preponderance of the evidence is 

otherwise. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn.

2000). This presumption of correctness applies only to findings of fact and not to 

conclusions of law. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996). 

The trial court’s conclusions of law are subject to a de novo review with no presumption 

of correctness. Blackburn v. Blackburn, 270 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tenn. 2008); Union Carbide 

Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). The trial court’s determinations 

regarding witness credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal and shall not be 

disturbed absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Morrison v. Allen, 

338 S.W.3d 417, 426 (Tenn. 2011). 

III. DISCUSSION

A.

There are two preliminary matters. First, there is neither a trial transcript nor a 

statement of the evidence in the record. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(a), (c). “When no 

transcript or statement of the evidence is included in the record on appeal, we 

conclusively presume that the findings of fact made by the trial court are supported by the 

evidence and are correct.” In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)

(citing J.C. Bradford & Co. v. Martin Constr. Co., 576 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tenn. 1979)). 

 

Second, the tenants’ brief fails to conform to Tennessee Rule of Appellate 

 

1

The landlord states that the tenants “refused to agree to a trial date and [he] was forced to set a 

hearing.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 40. 
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Procedure 27. The landlord asks us to dismiss the appeal for this reason. In Young v. 

Barrow, this court stated:

Parties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal 

treatment by the courts. The courts should take into account that many pro 

se litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial 

system. However, the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between 

fairness to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant’s adversary. 

Thus, the courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the 

same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected 

to observe.

The courts give pro se litigants who are untrained in the law a certain 

amount of leeway in drafting their pleadings and briefs. Accordingly, we 

measure the papers prepared by pro se litigants using standards that are less 

stringent than those applied to papers prepared by lawyers.

Pro se litigants should not be permitted to shift the burden of the litigation 

to the courts or to their adversaries. They are, however, entitled to at least 

the same liberality of construction of their pleadings that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 7, 

8.05, and 8.06 provide to other litigants. Even though the courts cannot 

create claims or defenses for pro se litigants where none exist, they should 

give effect to the substance, rather than the form or terminology, of a pro se 

litigant’s papers.

Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 62-63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted).

Although we are mindful of their pro se status, our review of this case is somewhat 

hindered by the tenants’ failure to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 

27 which instructs that the appellant’s brief “shall contain:”

(1) A table of contents, with references to the pages in the brief;

(2) A table of authorities, including cases (alphabetically arranged), statutes 

and other authorities cited, with references to the pages in the brief where 

they are cited;

. . .

(4) A statement of the issues presented for review;

(5) A statement of the case, indicating briefly the nature of the case, the 

course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below;
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(6) A statement of facts, setting forth the facts relevant to the issues 

presented for review with appropriate references to the record;

(7) An argument, which may be preceded by a summary of argument, 

setting forth: (A) the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues 

presented, and the reasons therefor, including the reasons why the 

contentions require appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and 

appropriate references to the record (which may be quoted verbatim) relied 

on; and (B) for each issue, a concise statement of the applicable standard of 

review (which may appear in the discussion of the issue or under a separate 

heading placed before the discussion of the issues);

(8) A short conclusion, stating the precise relief sought.

Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a). 

The tenants’ brief falls short of meeting Rule 27’s requirements. Nevertheless, we 

have fully reviewed the record and considered arguments from both the landlord and the 

tenants. At the outset, the tenants state that they do not think they received a fair trial 

because of the landlord’s family’s “influence in the court system in Murfreesboro.” 

There is nothing in the record to support such a contention, and we find it to be without 

merit. 

Next, the tenants admit that they damaged a wall when they were moving out of 

the premises. They agreed to pay the landlord an “additional amount to help fix the wall 

area that was damaged,” which appears to be $150.00 paid by a check dated July 31, 

2018. The tenants state that their $1,250.00 security deposit “could have gone for the 

damaged wall, but [the landlord] just wanted to get more money from us.” We find these 

arguments to be meritless because the record contains photographic evidence of extensive 

damage inflicted by the tenants to the premises, in violation of the lease. See also Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 66-28-401(2) (“The tenant shall [k]eep that part of the premises that the 

tenant occupies and uses as clean and safe as the condition of the premises when the 

tenant took possession.”). When comparing the photographs taken before the tenants 

took possession of the premises to those taken after they moved out, the only reasonable 

conclusion is that the tenants trashed the premises, in violation of Clause 11 of the lease. 

The trial court found that the tenants left the premises in “deplorable condition,” and the 

tenants do not challenge this finding on appeal. 

Furthermore, both the terms of the lease itself and the applicable statutes entitled 

the landlord to apply the $1,250.00 security deposit toward repairing the damages caused 

by the tenants and to seek recovery for additional physical damage to the premises over 

and above the amount of the security deposit. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 66-28-104(13); 
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66-28-301; 66-28-506; 66-28-510. 

The evidence in this record does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

B.

The landlord requests his costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney fees on appeal 

pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122, which provides as follows:

When it appears to any reviewing court that the appeal from any court of 

record was frivolous or taken solely for delay, the court may, either upon 

motion of a party or of its own motion, award just damages against the 

appellant, which may include but need not be limited to, costs, interest on 

the judgment, and expenses incurred by the appellee as a result of the 

appeal.

The decision whether to award damages for a frivolous appeal rests solely in our 

discretion. Chiozza v. Chiozza, 315 S.W.3d 482, 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). Appellate 

courts exercise their discretion to award fees under this statute ‘“sparingly so as not to 

discourage legitimate appeals.”’ Eberbach v. Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d 467, 475 (Tenn. 

2017) (quoting Whalum v. Marshall, 224 S.W.3d 169, 181 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)).

‘“Successful litigants should not have to bear the expense and vexation of groundless 

appeals.”’ Whalum, 224 S.W.3d at 181 (quoting Davis v. Gulf Ins. Grp., 546 S.W.2d 583, 

586 (Tenn. 1977)). “A frivolous appeal is one that is ‘devoid of merit,’ or one in which 

there is little prospect that it can ever succeed.” Indus. Dev. Bd. v. Hancock, 901 S.W.2d 

382, 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Exercising our discretion, we deny the request for 

attorney fees and costs on appeal. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The case is remanded for such further 

proceedings as may be necessary and consistent with this Opinion. Costs of the appeal 

are taxed to the appellants, Victor Okorie and Odinachi Okorie, for which execution may 

issue if necessary. 

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JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JUDGE