UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2406

DEWEY TEEL; GAY TEEL,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA, LLC,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (5:11-cv-00005-FPS)

Submitted: September 30, 2013 Decided: October 17, 2013

Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Isak J. Howell, LAW OFFICE OF ISAK HOWELL, Lewisburg, West 

Virginia; Joseph M. Lovett, Lewisburg, West Virginia, for 

Appellants. Timothy M. Miller, Joseph K. Merical, ROBINSON & 

MCELWEE, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Dewey and Gay Teel (collectively the Teels) appeal the 

district court’s order granting summary judgment to Chesapeake 

Appalachia, LLC (Chesapeake), on their claim of trespass under 

West Virginia common law arising from Chesapeake’s construction 

of natural gas wells on a portion of the Teels’ property.∗ The 

issues the Teels raise are indistinguishable from those we 

recently considered in Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 

__ F.3d __, 2013 WL 4734969 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 2013). We 

affirm. 

Whiteman explained that “a claim for trespass under 

West Virginia common law can only lie if one’s entry upon the 

land of another—or one’s leaving a thing upon the land of 

another—is without lawful authority.” Whiteman, 2013 WL 

4734969, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted). In 

situations, like here, where a property’s surface and mineral 

estates have been severed, and in the absence of contrary 

language in the severance deed, the lawful authority of the 

mineral estate owner to enter and burden the surface estate is

implied and limited to activities that are reasonably necessary 

for the exploitation of the mineral rights. Id. at *4-*7. The

 ∗ The Teels voluntarily dismissed the remainder of their 

claims with prejudice.
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reasonable necessity analysis is fact-specific, and “what is 

necessary is a fluid concept that must be determined on a case 

by case basis.” Id. at *4. Accordingly, when a mineral estate 

owner seeks to use the corresponding surface estate to 

facilitate mineral extraction, “it must be demonstrated . . . 

that the [use] is reasonably necessary for the extraction of the 

mineral” and does not substantially burden the surface estate. 

Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, 

the surface owner claims trespass based on the mineral estate 

owner’s activities, the burden is on the surface owner to show a 

lack of reasonable necessity or a substantial burden. Id. at 

*7-*8.

As a threshold matter, the Teels argue that the 

district court erred by examining Chesapeake’s activities only 

for reasonableness. As in Whiteman, however, we conclude that 

the district court applied the correct standard and did not err 

in looking to relevant case law from courts in other districts. 

Id. at *9-*10 & n.17. Similarly, there is no merit in the 

Teels’ suggestion that the district court improperly examined 

West Virginia statutes and regulations to inform itself 

regarding the practices of the state’s oil and gas industry and, 

thereby, the reasonable necessity of Chesapeake’s actions. Id.

at *10. 
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Turning to the sufficiency of the Teels’ evidence to 

survive summary judgment, we conclude that Whiteman controls. 

As in Whiteman, the Teels’ generalized evidence regarding 

Chesapeake’s mining operations in dissimilar locations and at 

times subsequent to the events at issue here does not satisfy 

the fact-intensive and case-specific inquiry into the reasonable 

necessity of Chesapeake’s actions on the Teels’ property. Id.

at *8-*9. The Teels also have failed to muster evidence

plausibly suggesting that Chesapeake’s operations impose a

substantial burden on their property. Id. at *8. 

Accordingly, we affirm the award of summary judgment 

to Chesapeake. We deny as moot Chesapeake’s motion to dismiss 

the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this Court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED