United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MICHAEL YANKO, AS AN INDIVIDUAL, AND ON 

BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PART-TIME GS AND WG 

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES WHO ARE OR WERE 

EMPLOYED BY ALL FEDERAL AGENCIES AND 

WHO ARE SIMILARLY SITUATED,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2017-1177

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-01560-SGB, Chief Judge Susan G. 

Braden.

______________________ 

Decided: September 6, 2017

______________________ 

 IRA M. LECHNER, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant.

 MARK E. PORADA, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented 

by CHAD A. READLER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

REGINALD T. BLADES, JR. 
2 YANKO v. UNITED STATES

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, BRYSON and STOLL, Circuit 

Judges.

BRYSON, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Michael Yanko is a part-time federal employee of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. In his 

class action complaint, which he filed for himself and “on 

behalf of all other part-time GS and WG federal employees who are or were employed by all federal agencies and 

who are similarly situated,” he asserts that the class 

members are entitled to premium pay for work performed 

on each day designated by statute or Executive Order as

an “in-lieu-of” holiday. The Court of Federal Claims 

rejected his claim. We affirm.

I 

A 

There are ten federal holidays each year. Six of them 

are celebrated on Mondays, while the other four (New 

Year’s Day, Independence Day, Thanksgiving Day, and 

Christmas Day) are celebrated on the day on which they 

fall.1 Federal employees, including part-time employees,

are paid for holidays that fall on a workday but on which 

the employee is not required to work. 5 C.F.R. §§ 610.405, 

610.406. When employees are required to work on holidays, they are entitled to premium pay for their work on 

that day that is not in excess of eight hours and is not 

overtime work. 5 U.S.C. § 5546(b). The rate of premium 

pay for holiday work is equal to the employee’s rate of 

basic pay, id., which means that an employee who works 

1 For employees in the District of Columbia and certain nearby areas, Inauguration Day is also recognized as 

a federal holiday. 5 U.S.C. § 6103(c). 

 
YANKO v. UNITED STATES 3

on a holiday is in effect paid double time for that work. 

Both full-time and part-time employees are entitled to 

premium pay for designated holidays on which they are 

required to work. 5 C.F.R. § 610.202(a).

In addition to holidays that fall on employees’ workdays, holidays sometimes fall on days that particular 

employees are not scheduled to work. By statute and 

Executive Order, certain employees whose basic workweek of five workdays is Monday through Friday are 

granted days off “in-lieu-of” holidays for those days. In 

the case of a holiday that falls on a Saturday, Congress 

has provided that the Friday before that Saturday is a 

holiday. 5 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1)(A). In the case of a holiday 

that falls on a Sunday, an Executive Order provides that 

the Monday after that Sunday is a holiday for those

employees. Exec. Order No. 11,582, § 3(a), 36 Fed. Reg. 

2957 (Feb. 11, 1971). Such Friday and Monday holidays 

are referred to as “in-lieu-of holidays.” Employees who 

are entitled to such in-lieu-of holidays are relieved from 

having to work on those days or, if required to work, earn

premium pay for those days. 5 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1)(A); 

Exec. Order No. 11,582, § 3(a). 

Employees whose basic workweek of five workdays is 

other than Monday through Friday enjoy corresponding 

benefits. For such employees, if a holiday falls on a day 

outside the employee’s basic workweek, the employee’s inlieu-of holiday is observed during the employee’s workweek, on either the day before or the day after the actual 

holiday. 5 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2); Exec. Order No. 11,582, 

§ 3(b).2 The employees are relieved from work on that in2 The statute and Executive Order use somewhat 

convoluted language, but the upshot is that a holiday that 

falls on the day that is treated as the employee’s Saturday 

is observed as an in-lieu-of holiday on the last workday 

before that day, and a holiday that falls on the day that is 

 
4 YANKO v. UNITED STATES

lieu-of day or given premium pay if they are required to 

work. See 5 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2); Exec. Order No. 11,582, 

§ 3(b). 

There is no dispute between the parties regarding 

how the in-lieu-of provisions operate with regard to fulltime employees. The dispute concerns whether, and to 

what extent, the in-lieu-of provisions apply to part-time 

employees such as Mr. Yanko. 

B 

Mr. Yanko has been employed by the Department of 

Veterans Affairs on a part-time basis for some time, 

including the entire six-year period prior to the filing of 

his complaint. His regular workweek consists of five 

days, from Sunday through Thursday. Thus, his weekly 

non-workdays regularly fall on Fridays and Saturdays. 

Between December 15, 2009, and May 16, 2016, there 

were eight official public holidays that fell on either a 

Friday or a Saturday (New Year’s Day of 2010, 2011, and 

2016; Independence Day of 2014 and 2015; and Christmas 

Day of 2009, 2010, and 2015). Because Mr. Yanko is a 

part-time employee, he was not credited with an in-lieu-of 

treated as the employee’s Sunday is observed as an inlieu-of holiday on the next workday after that day. For 

example, a full-time employee may work Wednesday 

through Sunday, with Monday off in place of Saturday, 

and Tuesday off in place of Sunday. For such an employee, if a holiday falls on the non-workday in place of Saturday (Monday, in the example), the employee’s 

immediately preceding workday (Sunday) is treated as an 

in-lieu-of holiday. See 5 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2). If a holiday 

falls on the employee’s non-workday in place of Sunday 

(Tuesday, in the example), the employee’s immediately 

following workday (Wednesday) is treated as an in-lieu-of 

holiday. See Exec. Order No. 11,582, § 3(b).

 
YANKO v. UNITED STATES 5

holiday during the preceding or succeeding workweek for 

any of those eight days.

It is the longstanding policy of the Office of Personnel 

Management (“OPM”) that part-time employees are not 

entitled to an in-lieu-of holiday corresponding to a particular holiday when that holiday falls on a non-workday for 

the part-time employee. That policy is reflected in regulations issued by OPM pursuant to notice-and-comment 

rulemaking. 5 C.F.R. §§ 610.405, 610.406. Contending 

that OPM’s policy and regulations are contrary to section 

6103(b) and Executive Order 11,582, Mr. Yanko seeks to 

recover an amount equal to the premium pay to which he 

would have been entitled if he had been credited with inlieu-of holidays for the eight holidays that fell outside his 

normal workweek during the past six years.

The Court of Federal Claims disagreed with Mr. 

Yanko’s statutory argument. Instead, the court held that 

the governing statute and Executive Order do not provide 

part-time employees such as Mr. Yanko with a right to inlieu-of holidays when federal holidays fall on days outside 

the employees’ normal workweek. In particular, the court 

concluded that the term “basic workweek,” which appears 

in the statute governing in-lieu-of holidays and in Executive Order No. 11,582, refers only to full-time employees, 

and not to part-time employees. On appeal, Mr. Yanko 

challenges that construction of the statute and the Executive Order. 

II

A 

To begin with, Mr. Yanko objects to the trial court’s 

dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim on 

which relief can be granted. He argues that he has made 

factual allegations that preclude the entry of judgment 

against him as a matter of law. In fact, however, the trial 

court correctly found that this case turns not on a factual 
6 YANKO v. UNITED STATES

dispute, but on a pure legal issue of statutory interpretation: whether part-time federal employees are entitled to 

in-lieu-of holidays when federal holidays fall on days on 

which they are not scheduled to work. For that reason, 

the court properly resolved this case on legal grounds 

under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the Court of Federal 

Claims. See Amoco Oil Co. v. United States, 234 F.3d 

1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 

B 

On the merits, Mr. Yanko argues that section 6103(b) 

of title 5 and Executive Order No. 11,582, which provide 

for in-lieu-of holidays, apply by their terms to part-time 

employees. For that reason, he argues, OPM’s regulations

and its longstanding practice of excluding part-time 

employees from the in-lieu-of holiday benefits of section 

6103(b) and the Executive Order, are invalid.

Mr. Yanko’s statutory argument proceeds from his 

contention that part-time employees are “employees” 

within the meaning of the pertinent statutes, and that 

once that proposition is accepted, the in-lieu-of holiday 

provisions of section 6103(b) and the Executive Order 

necessarily apply with full force to part-time employees. 

While we agree that part-time employees are “employees” 

as that term is used in the pertinent provisions, see 

Fathauer v. United States, 566 F.3d 1352, 1356-57 (Fed. 

Cir. 2009), that point does not carry the day for Mr. 

Yanko.3 

3 Mr. Yanko places heavy reliance on this court’s 

decision in Fathauer. That case, however, merely held 

that the term “employee” in the Sunday premium pay 

statute, 5 U.S.C. § 5546(a), comprises both part-time and 

full-time employees. 566 F.3d at 1356. The issue in this 

case is quite different—whether the statutory term “basic 

 
YANKO v. UNITED STATES 7

Under both section 6103(b) and section 3 of Executive 

Order No. 11,582, in-lieu-of holiday benefits are limited to 

employees who work a “basic workweek,” whether that 

constitutes Monday through Friday or some period other 

than Monday through Friday. Referencing 5 U.S.C. 

§ 6101, the government argues that the term “basic 

workweek” refers to the basic 40-hour workweek worked 

by full-time employees. 

 Section 6101 directs each executive agency to “establish a basic administrative workweek of 40 hours for each 

full-time employee.” 5 U.S.C. § 6101(a)(2)(A). The statute 

also provides that “the basic 40-hour workweek is scheduled on 5 days, Monday through Friday when possible, 

and the 2 days outside the basic workweek are consecutive.” Id. § 6101(a)(3)(B). The government argues that 

the term “basic workweek,” as used in section 

6101(a)(3)(B) and elsewhere in sections 6101 and 6103, is 

simply shorthand for “basic 40-hour workweek” or “basic 

administrative workweek of 40 hours,” as used in section 

6101. Accordingly, the government asserts, the use of the 

shorthand term “basic workweek” in section 6103(b) and 

in the corresponding portion of Executive Order No. 

11,582 necessarily limits the scope of those provisions to 

employees who work a 40-hour week, i.e., full-time employees. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 3401(2) (part-time employees work 

between 16 and 32 hours per week, or between 32 and 64 

hours during a biweekly pay period).

Mr. Yanko disagrees, arguing that when Congress 

intended to refer to the “basic workweek” of full-time 

employees, it used the term “basic 40-hour workweek” or 

“basic administrative workweek of 40 hours,” and that 

when it used the unmodified term “basic workweek,” it 

intended the provisions in question to apply to both fullworkweek” in 5 U.S.C. § 6103(b) refers to the workweek of 

all federal employees or only full-time employees.

 
8 YANKO v. UNITED STATES

time and part-time employees. For that reason, he contends that “there is no ambiguity” and that the in-lieu-of 

holiday provisions in section 6103(b) and the Executive 

Order clearly apply to part-time employees. Appellant’s 

Br. at 33.4

While the text of section 6103 and the Executive 

Order does not explicitly answer the question, an examination of the history of those provisions and the way they 

have been interpreted over the past 70 years persuades us

to reject Mr. Yanko’s contention that the provisions 

unambiguously support his position that in-lieu-of holiday 

benefits are available to part-time workers.

1 

The statutory provisions at issue in this case trace 

their origins to the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945, 

Pub. L. No. 79-106, 59 Stat. 295 (“the 1945 Pay Act”). 

Section 604 of that Act, entitled “Establishment of Basic 

Workweek; Pay Computation Methods,” contained the 

core provisions governing the establishment of “a basic 

administrative workweek of forty hours” for full-time 

federal employees. 59 Stat. at 303. That section was the 

precursor of the current section 6101.

Seven years after the enactment of the 1945 Pay Act, 

President Truman issued an Executive Order that provided for in-lieu-of holidays for federal employees for the first 

time. See Exec. Order No. 10,358, 17 Fed. Reg. 5269 

4 Executive Order No. 11,582 uses the term “basic 

workweek” without further defining it. However, neither 

party in this case has suggested that the term “basic 

workweek” should be construed differently for the Executive Order than for section 6103(b). We agree that there 

is no textual or contextual basis for drawing a distinction 

between the two and we therefore treat them as being in 

pari materia. 

 
YANKO v. UNITED STATES 9

(June 9, 1952). That Executive Order provided that when 

a holiday fell on a Sunday, an employee “whose basic 

workweek does not include Sunday” would be excused 

from work on the next workday of the employee’s basic 

workweek. In the case of an employee “whose basic 

workweek includes Sunday,” the Executive Order provided that when a holiday fell on a day that had been administratively scheduled as the employee’s regular nonworkday in lieu of Sunday, the employee would be excused from work on the next workday of his basic workweek. Finally, the Executive Order provided that when a 

holiday such as Labor Day or Thanksgiving Day (which 

always occur on a specific day of the week) fell on a day 

outside a particular employee’s regular basic workweek, 

the employee would be “excused from work on the next 

workday of his basic workweek.” The Executive Order 

made no equivalent provision for holidays falling on a 

Saturday. The Executive Order also made no explicit 

reference to whether those rules would apply to part-time 

employees. 

The question whether the Executive Order extended 

to part-time employees did not remain unresolved for 

long, however. An opinion was promptly sought from the 

Comptroller General as to whether Executive Order No. 

10,358 applied to part-time employees. In a decision 

issued in early 1953, the Comptroller General ruled that 

it did not. The Comptroller General determined that the 

holiday benefit provisions of the Executive Order “are for 

application only to employees who have a regularly established basic workweek of at least 40 hours and do not

apply to part-time employees.” Acting Comptroller Gen. 

Yates to the Adm’r of Veterans Affairs, 32 Comp. Gen. 378, 

378 (1953).

The Comptroller General concluded that the term 

“basic workweek,” as used in the Executive Order, should 

be construed “accord[ing to] the commonly understood 

meaning of said term[,] as employed in the [1945] Pay Act 
10 YANKO v. UNITED STATES

and applicable civil service regulations,” to “relat[e] only 

to employees who have a regularly established workweek 

of at least 40 hours.” Id. at 380.

Six years later, Congress amended the 1945 Pay Act 

by adding a provision that extended the in-lieu-of holiday 

rule to Saturdays. The amendment provided that when a 

holiday fell on a Saturday, the day immediately preceding 

the Saturday would be recognized as a legal public holiday. Pub. L. No. 86-362, 73 Stat. 643 (1959). In addition, 

Congress added a provision that is essentially the same as 

the provision now found in 5 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2). It stated 

that if a holiday fell on a regular non-workday for an 

employee whose basic workweek was other than Monday 

through Friday, and that day was not the non-workday 

scheduled for the employee in lieu of Sunday, the workday 

immediately preceding that non-workday would be treated as a holiday for that employee. Id. Other than changes in language and organization made as part of a 

recodification of title 5 in 1966, Congress has left the 

substance of the in-lieu-of holiday rules unaltered since 

the legislation in 1959.

In 1971, President Nixon issued Executive Order No. 

11,582, which replaced Executive Order No. 10,358. As 

relevant here, the 1971 order preserved the portions of 

Executive Order No. 10,358 relating to employees with 

regularly scheduled workweeks whose basic workweeks 

did not include Sundays, see Exec. Order No. 11,582, 

§ 3(a), as well as those employees whose basic workweeks

included Sundays, id. § 3(b).

Nothing in the history of the in-lieu-of holiday provisions lends any support to Mr. Yanko’s argument that 

either Congress or the President clearly intended those 

provisions to apply to part-time employees. Nothing in 

the statute or the Executive Order suggests that the term 

“basic workweek” applies to part-time employees. Instead, from as early as the 1945 Pay Act, the term was 
YANKO v. UNITED STATES 11

consistently used in reference to full-time employees. 

Reading section 6101, section 6103, and Executive Order 

No. 11,582 as a whole, it is reasonable to interpret the use 

of the term “basic workweek” to be a shorthand expression for “basic 40-hour workweek,” as used in both the 

text and the heading of section 6101. See Florida Dep’t of 

Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 

(2008) (“[A] subchapter heading cannot substitute for the 

operative text of a statute,” but “statutory titles and 

section headings are tools available for the resolution of 

doubt about the meaning of a statute.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore reject Mr. Yanko’s 

argument that the text of the statute by itself makes clear 

that the “in-lieu-of” holiday rules apply to part-time 

employees. 

2 

 There are only two possible plain meaning constructions of “basic workweek,” as used in section 6103 and the 

Executive Order: (1) “basic workweek” refers to the 40-

hour workweek of a full-time employee, or (2) “basic 

workweek” includes the schedules of part-time employees. 

We have rejected Mr. Yanko’s argument that the latter is 

an unambiguous, plain meaning interpretation. Although 

the government argues the former, i.e., that the text of 

the statute and the Executive Order unambiguously 

supports its position, we find it unnecessary to decide that 

question, because the consistent administrative interpretation of the statute and the Executive Order by OPM—

the agency charged by Congress with administering the 

federal personnel laws—supports the government’s interpretation. Applying familiar principles of deference to 

agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 

U.S. 837 (1984), we hold that, even assuming the language of section 6103 and Executive Order No. 11,582 

does not plainly support the government’s interpretation, 
12 YANKO v. UNITED STATES

OPM’s interpretation of the statute and Executive Order 

is entitled to deference and thus governs this case.

When a statute is ambiguous or silent with respect to 

an issue of statutory construction, the Supreme Court has 

held that “administrative implementation of a particular 

statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when 

it appears that Congress has delegated authority to the 

agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, 

and that the agency interpretation claiming deference 

was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” 

United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). 

Delegation of such authority can be shown, for example, 

by an agency’s power to engage in notice-and-comment 

rulemaking. Id. at 227; see also In re Cuozzo Speed 

Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Mercier 

v. United States, 786 F.3d 971, 977-78 (Fed. Cir. 2015); 

Wilder v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 675 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed. 

Cir. 2012); Carrow v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 564 F.3d 1359, 

1365 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Applying those principles, we hold 

that OPM’s interpretation of the in-lieu-of holiday provisions of section 6103(b) as inapplicable to part-time 

employees is entitled to deference. 

In 5 U.S.C. § 6101(c), Congress granted OPM the 

authority to “prescribe regulations, subject to the approval of the President, necessary for the administration of 

this section insofar as this section affects employees in or 

under an Executive agency.” By Executive Order, the 

President has designated and empowered OPM to exercise, “without the approval, ratification, or other action of 

the President,” the authority to issue regulations necessary for the administration of the 1945 Pay Act (of which 

current section 6101 was a part). Exec. Order No. 10,552

(Aug. 10, 1954), as modified by Exec. Order No. 12,107 

(Dec. 28, 1978). Thus, in this case there is a clear authorization, both from Congress and the President, for OPM to 

engage in formal rulemaking, authority that the Supreme 
YANKO v. UNITED STATES 13

Court has described as “a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.

Pursuant to that authority, OPM has promulgated 

regulations that specifically provide that “[w]hen a holiday falls on a non-workday of a part-time employee, he or 

she is not entitled to an in-lieu-of day for that holiday.” 5 

C.F.R. §§ 610.405, 610.406.5 OPM has consistently taken 

that position since the regulations were promulgated in 

1983, and the rule has been consistently applied in that 

manner since much earlier. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 

U.S. 212, 220-21 (2002) (noting that the “Agency’s interpretation is one of long standing” and according Chevron

deference in light of, inter alia, “the careful consideration 

the Agency has given the question over a long period of 

time”); Butterbaugh v. Dep’t of Justice, 336 F.3d 1332, 

1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (extra deference due to agency’s 

longstanding interpretations of statutory prescriptions). 

Similar principles apply to interpretations of Executive Orders by the agency charged with administering 

them. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1965). 

This court has applied that principle to cases in which 

OPM has interpreted Executive Orders or other Presidential directives governing personnel matters in which, as in 

this case, OPM has been charged with the responsibility 

to apply and administer the Executive Order or directive. 

5 Although the two cited regulations apply specifically to part-time employees on flexible or compressed 

work schedules, OPM made clear in comments accompanying the promulgation of those regulations that it interprets in-lieu-of holiday benefits as inapplicable to parttime employees generally and that the specific regulations 

were based on that general principle. See Hours of Duty; 

Alternative Work Schedules, 48 Fed. Reg. 44,059, 44,059 

(Office Pers. Mgmt. Sept. 27, 1983) (“A part-time employee is not entitled to in-lieu-of holidays.”). 

 
14 YANKO v. UNITED STATES

In such cases, we have held that the court must accord 

broad deference to the agency’s interpretation of the 

Executive Order. See Wagner v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 783 

F.2d 1042, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Alaniz v. Office of Pers. 

Mgmt., 728 F.2d 1460, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also

Montana Wilderness Ass’n v. Connell, 725 F.3d 988, 994 

(9th Cir. 2013); El-Ganayni v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 591 

F.3d 176, 187 (3d Cir. 2010); Dehainaut v. Peña, 32 F.3d 

1066, 1073 (7th Cir. 1994). 

Further support for the government’s interpretation 

of the in-lieu-of holiday provisions comes from the 

longstanding and consistent line of authority from the 

Comptroller General holding that the in-lieu-of holiday 

provisions do not apply to part-time employees. That line 

of authority began with the 1953 Comptroller General 

opinion discussed above, which issued shortly after the 

promulgation of the first Executive Order granting inlieu-of holiday benefits. See Acting Comptroller Gen. 

Yates to the Adm’r of Veterans Affairs, 32 Comp. Gen. 378 

(1953). As shown in a series of subsequent opinions, the 

Comptroller General has adhered to that position ever 

since: Matter of Commissary Employees—Entitlement to 

Holiday, B-192104, 1978 WL 11300 (Comp. Gen. Sept. 1, 

1978); Matter of Gladys Noon Spellman, House of Representatives, B-198472, 1980 WL 16572 (Comp. Gen. May 

21, 1980); Matter of Shirley A. Lombardo—Part-Time 

Employee’s Entitlement to Holiday, 63 Comp. Gen. 306

(1984); Matter of Part-time Employees, B-214156, 1984 

WL 44280 (Comp. Gen. May 29, 1984). While opinions of 

the Comptroller General are not binding on this court, we 

have looked to them for guidance in areas in which the 

Comptroller General has been assigned legal responsibilities, see Cleveland Telecomms. Corp. v. Goldin, 43 F.3d 

655, 658 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1994), as was formerly the case

with regard to the resolution of federal employees’ claims 

as to compensation and leave, see Adams v. Hinchman, 

154 F.3d 420, 422 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
YANKO v. UNITED STATES 15

The reasonableness of OPM’s position is buttressed by 

the point made in one of the Comptroller General’s opinions from 1984. In that opinion, the Comptroller General 

pointed out that interpreting the in-lieu-of holiday rule to 

apply to part-time employees would mean that part-time 

employees working fewer than five days per week would 

obtain disproportionately favorable in-lieu-of holiday 

benefits compared to their full-time colleagues; as the 

opinion noted, “the smaller the number of regularly 

scheduled workdays [for such an employee], the greater 

the proportional entitlement to designated or in lieu of 

holidays.” Matter of Shirley A. Lombardo, 63 Comp. Gen. 

at 307. It is not unreasonable for OPM to conclude that 

Congress would not have intended to implement a system 

having such a perverse outcome.

In sum, we hold that it was reasonable for OPM, in its 

formal regulations, to interpret the reference to “basic 

workweek” as applying only to full-time employees. That 

position is consistent with the position taken by the 

Comptroller General in interpreting the statute, and it is 

consistent with the position taken by OPM since OPM 

first issued regulations on the issue. Because the language and context of the statute do not clearly indicate 

that Congress or the President intended a contrary interpretation of the term “basic workweek,” we sustain OPM’s 

interpretation of that term as applicable only to full-time 

employees. 

Each party shall bear its own costs for this appeal.

AFFIRMED