COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

UNITED AIRLINES, INC. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2156-96-4 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 MARCH 18, 1997 

HELME V. WALTER 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Elizabeth A. Zwibel (Siciliano, Ellis, Dyer & 

Boccarosse, on brief), for appellant. 

 Helme V. Walter, pro se. 

 On appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation 

Commission awarding Helme V. Walter medical benefits, United 

Airlines contends that the commission erred (1) in determining 

that Ms. Walter's photosensitivity was a compensable disease, and 

(2) in finding that Ms. Walter had proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that her photosensitivity resulted from her employment 

by United Airlines. We do not address United Airlines' second 

contention because the Supreme Court's decision in The Stenrich 

Group v. Jemmott, 251 Va. 186, 467 S.E.2d 795 (1996), compels our 

holding that gradually incurred photosensitivity is a 

noncompensable cumulative trauma or injury. See Allied Fibers v. 

Rhodes, 23 Va. App. 101, 474 S.E.2d 829 (1996). Accordingly, we 

reverse the commission's award and dismiss Ms. Walter's claim. 

 Ms. Walter has worked as a reservation agent for United 

Airlines for approximately six years. On August 25, 1995, she 

moved to a new work station, which was equipped with bright 
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fluorescent lighting. At that time, her eyes began to burn. 

Within a week, she noticed darkening of a mole on her arm, 

developed speckles and coloration on her arms, and experienced 

joint pains and visual difficulty. 

 In awarding Ms. Walter medical benefits, the commission 

relied upon the medical opinions of Dr. Nancy V. Bruckner and Dr. 

Alan N. Moshell, both of whom diagnosed Ms. Walter as suffering 

from photosensitivity, defined as an "abnormal reactivity of the 

skin to sunlight." The Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal 

Dictionary 551 (1987). Based upon Dr. Moshell's March 27, 1996 

deposition, the commission held that Ms. Walter's condition was a 

disease, and that it resulted from long-term exposure to high 

intensity fluorescent lighting at her workplace. 

 In Jemmott, the Supreme Court rejected a definition of 

disease that 

 "'is so broad as to encompass any bodily 

ailment of whatever origin [and] would 

make unnecessary and meaningless the 

[injury-by-accident and occupational disease] 

categories specifically set forth in the 

Act.'" 

Jemmott, 251 Va. at 198, 467 S.E.2d at 801-02 (citations 

omitted). The Court held that whether a claimant suffers from a 

compensable disease remains a mixed question of law and fact, and 

"just because a doctor opines that a particular impairment is a 

disease does not necessarily make it so." Id. at 198, 467 S.E.2d 

at 801. In dismissing the commission's award of benefits, the 

Supreme Court held that 
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 job-related impairments resulting from 

cumulative trauma caused by repetitive 

motion, however labeled or however defined, 

are, as a matter of law, not compensable 

under the present provisions of the Act." 

Id. at 199, 467 S.E.2d at 802. The Court went on to say: 

 [T]he opinion represents a clear refusal "to 

broaden the scope of the Act to include 

job-related impairments arising from 

repetitive motion or cumulative trauma . . . [and] we [have] held that gradually incurred 

traumatic injuries or cumulative trauma 

conditions were not compensable under the 

existing injury by accident-occupational 

disease dichotomy." 

Id. at 199, 467 S.E.2d at 802 (quoting Merillat Indus., Inc. v. 

Parks, 246 Va. 429, 433, 436 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1993)) (emphasis 

added). 

 In Rhodes, we considered an award for hearing impairment 

caused by exposure to noise at work. In concluding that a 

hearing loss from cumulative noise exposure is not a disease 

under the Act, we noted that: 

 The Supreme Court's holding [under Jemmott] 

is clear and unequivocal, and leaves no doubt 

that in Virginia cumulative trauma 

conditions, regardless of whether they are 

caused by repetitive motion, are not 

compensable under the Act. 

Rhodes, at 104, 474 S.E.2d at 830. 

 Following Jemmott and Rhodes, we conclude that Ms. Walter's 

photosensitivity, resulting from cumulative exposure to radiation 

by fluorescent lights, is a gradually incurred injury and not an 

industrial disease within the meaning of the Workers' 

Compensation Act. Thus, Ms. Walter's photosensitivity is not 
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compensable. Accordingly, we reverse the commission's award of 

benefits and dismiss the claim. 

 Reversed and dismissed.