WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a BRAZOS 

LICENSING AND DEVELOPMENT,

Plaintiff,

v.

DELL Technologies INC., DELL INC., EMC 

CORPORATION, AND VMWARE, INC.,

Defendants.

Case No. 6:20-cv-00480-ADA

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

PUBLIC VERSION

DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSED MOTION TO DISMISS 

FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 

UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(1)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

WACO DIVISION

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 1 of 27
i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................1

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.........................................................................................3

A. The Assignment History of the ’133 Patent .........................................................3

B.

......................................3

C.

.................6

D. .......................................7

III. WSOU BEARS THE BURDEN TO PROVE STANDING.............................................7

IV. WADE NEVER ASSIGNED THE ’133 PATENT TO WSOU .....................................10

A. ........................................10

B. ....................................11

V. WSOU LACKS STANDING TO SUE FOR PRE-ASSIGNMENT DAMAGES ...........14

A. ...............................14

B.

................................................................15

1.

..................................................................................15

2. ....17

3. The USPTO Assignment Records Confirm 

.........................................................18

VI. CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................18

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 2 of 27
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Abbott Point of Care Inc. v. Epocal, Inc., 

666 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2012)............................................................................................7

Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 

625 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010).................................................................................. 7, 9, 12

Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus.,

939 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1991)................................................................................ 8, 14, 15

Barlow & Haun, Inc. v. United States, 

805 F.3d 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2015)............................................................................................9

Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 

583 F.3d 832 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 563 U.S. 776 (2011)............................................ 15, 16

Bowmer v. Bowmer, 

50 N.Y.2d 288 (N.Y. 1980) ...............................................................................................18

Campbell v. Thomas, 

897 N.Y.S.2d 460 (2010)...................................................................................................13

DDB Techs., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 

517 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2008)..........................................................................................15

Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., 

134 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 1998)............................................................................................2

Epistar Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 

566 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..........................................................................................11

F.D.I.C. v. McFarland,

243 F.3d 876 (5th Cir. 2001)..............................................................................................11

Faison v. Lewis, 

25 N.Y.3d 220 (N.Y. 2015) ...............................................................................................12

Gellman v. Telular Corp., 

2010 WL 5173213 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2010) .............................................................. 15, 16

Green Tech. Lighting Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 

No. 1:18-CV-01799 (PAC), 2020 WL 2036705 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020)..........................17

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 3 of 27
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LNV Corp. v. Sorrento, 

31 N.Y.S.3d 922, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 50250(U), (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Feb. 29, 

2016) ................................................................................................................................12

Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp.,

925 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2019)........................................................................................8, 9

Mas-Hamilton Grp. v. LaGard, Inc., 

156 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1998)............................................................................................9

Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc.,

95 F.3d 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996)............................................................................................14

Moore v. Marsh, 

74 U.S. 515 (1868)........................................................................................................9, 14

Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 

499 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2007)......................................................................................8, 10

Muzak Corp. v. Hotel Taft Corp., 

1 N.Y.2d 42 (N.Y. 1956)...................................................................................................18

Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 

510 U.S. 249 (1994)............................................................................................................9

Neutron Depot, LLC v. All Web Leads, Inc.,

No. AU-16-CA-00901-SS, 2017 WL 9538893 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2017).......................2, 3

S.O.T.A.T., Inc. v. Frank’s Int’l, Inc., 

No. 2:06 CV 523, 2008 WL 4093599 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2008)........................................14

Script Sec. Sol., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 

No. 2:15-CV-1030-WCB, 2016 WL 6433776 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2016)...............................8

Sicom Sys., Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 

427 F.3d 971 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..........................................................................................2, 7

Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc.,

211 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2000)..........................................................................................15

Sphere Drake Insurance Ltd. v. Clarendon National Insurance Co., 

263 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2001)................................................................................................. 13

Spota v. Jackson, 

10 N.Y.3d 46 (2008)..........................................................................................................13

Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Google LLC, 

508 F. Supp. 3d 556 (N.D. Cal. 2020)..................................................................................9

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 4 of 27
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Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 

2020 WL 7122617 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2020) ........................................................................9

Wacoh Co. v. Chrysler LLC, 

No. 08-cv-456-slc, 2009 WL 36666 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 1, 2008).............................................8

WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 

631 F.3d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2010)........................................................................................8, 9

OTHER AUTHORITIES

MPEP, § 301 (June 2020)........................................................................................................18

TREATISES

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) .............................................................................12

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(c) (Am. L. Inst. 1981)..............................................18

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 328 (Am. L. Inst. 1981) ..................................................11

5B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1350 (3d ed. 2004)..................................8

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 5 of 27
v 

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Term

’133 patent U.S. Patent No. 7,539,133 

Dell Dell Technologies Inc., Dell Inc., EMC Corporation, and VMware, Inc. 

NPE Non-practicing entity

Amended PPA Amended Patent Purchase Agreement 

PPA Patent Purchase Agreement

Wade Wade and Company 

WSOU WSOU Investments, LLC 

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 6 of 27
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TABLE OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit Document

A USPTO Reel 017726 Frame 0867

B USPTO Reel 022446 Frame 0223

C USPTO Reel 049636 Frame 0201

D USPTO Reel 044000 Frame 0053

E 

F 

G 

H Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (example provided under definition of 

“VOID”) 

I 

J 

2020 Patent Dispute Report: Year in Review, available at 

https://www.unifiedpatents.com/insights/2020-patent-dispute-report-year-inreview

K 

Analytics: The Most Litigious District Court Patent Plaintiffs, available at 

https://lawstreetmedia.com/news/tech/analytics-the-most-litigious-districtcourt-patent-plaintiffs

L Etchegoyen Deposition Exhibit 8 (BRAZOS-GOOALL-0002132) 

M Etchegoyen Deposition Exhibit 9 (BRAZOS-GOOALL-0007904) 

N 

O Excerpt from Deposition Transcript of Stuart Shanus, dated April 12, 2022 

P 

Federal Trade Commission, Patent Assertion Entity Activity: An FTC Study 

(2016), available at 

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entityactivity-ftcstudy/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf 

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 7 of 27
1 

I. INTRODUCTION

WSOU lacks standing for multiple independent reasons. By way of background, WSOU

is an NPE founded by Craig Etchegoyen. Its primary business is threatening and filing lawsuits 

based on patents that it purportedly acquired from Nokia and related entities such as Alcatel 

Lucent. However, WSOU never actually acquired the ’133 patent. This is not the first time Mr. 

Etchegoyen failed to acquire sufficient rights to patents before asserting them. In just the last two 

years, Uniloc0 F

1

—another NPE founded by Mr. Etchegoyen—has had lawsuits against Apple and 

Google dismissed because it did not have exclusionary rights in the asserted patents. With fact 

discovery now closed and all fact depositions completed, it is clear that WSOU does not have any

rights—let alone exclusionary rights—to the ’133 patent for several reasons.

First, the ’133 patent was never assigned to WSOU, period. 

. 1 F

2

 

1

2

Defendants move under FRCP 12(b)(1) to dismiss WSOU’s lawsuit for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. WSOU does not own the ’133 patent (the sole asserted patent in this action) 

and thus lacks standing to bring this lawsuit. 

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 8 of 27
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2 F

Finally, even if WSOU’s standing as to the ’133 patent did not suffer from the previous 

fatal deficiencies, 

All of these defects are jurisdictional and cannot retroactively be cured because “[s]tanding 

must be present at the time the suit is brought.” Sicom Sys., Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 

971, 975–76 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 

1093 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[N]unc pro tunc assignments are not sufficient to confer retroactive 

standing.”); Neutron Depot, LLC v. All Web Leads, Inc., No. AU-16-CA-00901-SS, 2017 WL 

9538893, at *2, n.3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2017) (rejecting argument that after suit was filed Plaintiff 

gained the retroactive right to sue for past infringement). As a result, the case must be dismissed.

3

 See infra p. 13 n.9.

 No interest in that patent was ever assigned to WSOU.

Second, even if there were some purported assignment to WSOU of some interest in 

the ’133 patent—and there was not—WSOU still has a fatal standing problem. 

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Assignment History of the ’133 Patent

On March 21, 2006, the ’133 patent’s named inventors assigned to Lucent Technologies 

Inc. the “entire right, title and interest in” the patent application that ultimately issued as the ’133 

patent. Ex. A (USPTO Reel 017726 Frame 0867), at 2. The assignment was recorded with the 

USPTO on March 23, 2006. Id. at 1. Lucent Technologies Inc. then assigned the ’133 patent to 

Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. Ex. B (USPTO Reel 022446 Frame 0223). After that assignment, 

Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc. changed its name to Nokia of America Corporation and assigned the ’133 

patent to Alcatel Lucent. Ex. C (USPTO Reel 049636 Frame 0201). 

On September 25, 2017, WSOU recorded, at the Patent Office, several documents 

purporting to relate to the ’133 patent. 3 F

4

 WSOU recorded an assignment of assignor’s interest from 

Alcatel Lucent to Wade. Ex. D (USPTO Reel 044000 Frame 053). 

B.

 

 

4 Although WSOU recorded this assignment as purporting to be from Alcatel Lucent to 

WSOU, the included documentation reflects that the patents were assigned from Alcatel 

Lucent to Wade. 

 See infra Section II.D. Moreover, WSOU recorded this 

assignment at the Patent Office as having an “[e]xecution date” of July 22, 2017. 

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 10 of 27
4 

. 

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 11 of 27
5 

. Id. 

 

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C.

 

 See infra Section V.

 

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Id. 

III. WSOU BEARS THE BURDEN TO PROVE STANDING

“Standing to sue is a threshold requirement in every federal action.” Sicom Sys., Ltd. v.

Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2005). As the plaintiff, WSOU bears “the burden 

to show necessary ownership rights to support standing to sue.” Abbott Point of Care Inc. v. 

Epocal, Inc., 666 F.3d 1299, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012). To meet its burden, WSOU “must demonstrate

that it held enforceable title to the patent at the inception of the lawsuit” or else its infringement 

claims must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 625 

D.

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 14 of 27
8 

5 Where, as here, the standing challenge is “factual” rather than “facial,” the Court “does not 

assume the correctness of the factual allegations in the complaint. Rather, in the case of a 

factual challenge to jurisdiction, the question is whether the facts actually establish that the 

court has jurisdiction over the matter. In that setting, the burden is on the plaintiff to show

jurisdiction, and parties may offer factual evidence bearing on that question.” Script Sec. 

Sol., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1030-WCB, 2016 WL 6433776, at *2 (E.D.

Tex. Oct. 31, 2016) (citing 5B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1350, at

154–80 (3d ed. 2004)). In a factual 12(b)(1) challenge, it is appropriate to consider 

documentary evidence produced in the litigation, such as the agreements referenced herein. 

Script Sec., 2016 WL 6433776, at *2.

F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

5 These standards apply to “each claim [a plaintiff] seeks to

4F

press,” including for past infringement. Wacoh Co. v. Chrysler LLC, No. 08-cv-456-slc, 2009 WL 

36666, at *9 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 1, 2008). 

The plaintiff must also satisfy the requirements of both Article III of the U.S. Constitution 

(constitutional standing) and 35 U.S.C. § 281 (statutory standing). See, e.g., Lone Star Silicon 

Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 F.3d 1225, 1234–36 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Constitutional 

standing determines whether a plaintiff “may invoke the judicial power” at all, while statutory 

standing “establish[es] when a party may obtain relief under the patent laws.” Id. at 1235. To

meet the “injury in fact” requirement for constitutional standing, the plaintiff must possess 

exclusionary rights in the patent. Id. at 1234 (citing WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 

1257, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). “Exclusionary rights” are “the ability to exclude others from 

practicing an invention or ‘to forgive activities that would normally be prohibited under the patent 

statutes.’” Id. (quoting Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). A 

plaintiff lacking exclusionary rights cannot have constitutional standing because no injury in fact 

can occur. Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1340–41.

Further, “the general rule is that one seeking to recover money damages for infringement 

of a United States patent (an action ‘at law’) must have held the legal title to the patent during the 

time of the infringement.” Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., 939 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 15 of 27
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6 

The mere reference in an assignment to all right, title, and interest in the patent does not transfer 

the right to sue for past infringement. Moore v. Marsh, 74 U.S. 515, 522 (1868). “A party may 

sue for past infringement transpiring before it acquired legal title to a patent if a written assignment 

expressly grants the party a right to do so.” Abraxis, 625 F.3d at 1367 (emphasis added). Standing 

to sue for past infringement cannot be cured. See Mas-Hamilton Grp. v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 

1206, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that a nunc pro tunc assignment cannot cure a standing 

defect existing at the time the suit was filed).

The right to sue for damages predating patent assignment is an exclusionary right because 

it provides the plaintiff with the right to exclude others from practicing the invention during that 

period (which is the legally protected interest that is harmed by an alleged infringement). Lone 

Star, 925 F.3d at 1234; WiAV Sol., 631 F.3d at 1264–65. Whether the plaintiff holds the right to 

sue for alleged infringement during that pre-assignment period is therefore a constitutional 

standing issue. Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1234–35. A challenge to a plaintiff’s constitutional 

standing is properly raised under FRCP 12(b)(1). Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Google LLC, 508 F. Supp. 

3d 556, 564 (N.D. Cal. 2020); see also Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 2020 WL 7122617 (N.D. 

Cal. Dec. 4, 2020) (dismissing case for lack of standing).

6

 The plaintiff’s lack of constitutional

5 F

standing can be raised at any time by a defendant, or sua sponte by the Court. Nat’l Org. for 

Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 (1994); Barlow & Haun, Inc. v. United States, 805 

F.3d 1049, 1060 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

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10 

IV. WADE NEVER ASSIGNED THE ’133 PATENT TO WSOU

WSOU cannot and does not own any rights in the ’133 patent because there has never been

any valid assignment to WSOU of that patent. 

Each of these 

arguments is discussed in turn below. Because WSOU never obtained any rights in the ’133 patent, 

it suffers no injury in fact from alleged infringement, and therefore lacks Article III standing to 

assert the ’133 patent against Defendants. See Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1339.

A.

WSOU never obtained exclusionary rights to the ’133 patent because 

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 17 of 27
11 

It is black-letter law that 

 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 328 (Am. L. Inst. 1981). (“[A]ssignment 

in similar general terms is an assignment of the assignor’s rights and a delegation of his 

unperformed duties under the contract.”); Epistar Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 566 F.3d 1321, 

1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Black letter contract law states that the assignment of a contract to an 

assignee . . . only changes the obligated party, not the scope of the obligation.”); see also F.D.I.C.

v. McFarland, 243 F.3d 876, 887 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[A]n assignee takes all of the rights of the

assignor, no greater and no less.”). 

B.

Even if Wade had successfully assigned the ’133 patent to WSOU 

 

 The phrase “void ab initio” 

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 18 of 27
12 

7 F

inventors at the time of the purported inventions of their patents, and did not research or develop 

any of the technology claimed by its patents. Rather, WSOU activities to date have consisted of 

monetization of the patents through licensing and filing lawsuits. E.g., Ex. J 

(2020 Year Review), at 1 (“WSOU Investments accounted for 5% of all patent litigation in 2020 

and was the most active assertor with 187 cases brought in district court.”); Ex. K (Analytics), at 

7

8 The Federal Trade Commission has referred to NPEs as “Patent Assertion Entities,” 

(“PAEs”) and defined PAEs as businesses that acquire patents from third parties and seek to 

generate revenue by asserting them against alleged infringers. Ex. P (FTC Study), at 1.

means: “Null from the beginning, as from the first moment when a contract is entered into.”

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (example provided under definition of “VOID”) (Ex. 

H); Faison v. Lewis, 25 N.Y.3d 220, 222, 224, 230 (N.Y. 2015) (holding that something void ab 

initio “is never entitled to legal effect” because “[v]oid things are as no things”) (internal citations

omitted); LNV Corp. v. Sorrento, 31 N.Y.S.3d 922, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 50250(U), at *3 (Sup. Ct. 

N.Y. Feb. 29, 2016) (citing Faison for its explanation of the term “void ab initio”). 

 WSOU therefore has

not met, and cannot meet, its burden to demonstrate standing. See Abraxis, 625 F.3d at 1364. 

WSOU is an NPE. 

8 Since its inception, WSOU has been an NPE. WSOU has never employed any

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13 

8 F

To the extent WSOU argues that 

 WSOU’s argument is a red herring and wrong. 

 Spota v. Jackson, 10 N.Y.3d 46, 52 (2008) (“This 

conclusion is supported by the clause, present in each version, that ‘[a]ny lease, contract or 

agreement . . . shall be void,’ as such language would be meaningless if the tribe could, by its 

actions, “agree” to accept an outsider and change such person’s status as an ‘intruder.’”) (emphasis 

added); Campbell v. Thomas, 897 N.Y.S.2d 460, 466 (2010) (explaining that “the parties to a void 

marriage (and everyone else) are free to treat the marriage as a nullity without the involvement of 

a court”); Sphere Drake Insurance Ltd. v. Clarendon National Insurance Co., 263 F.3d 26, 31 (2d 

Cir. 2001) (“[I]f an agreement is void, it cannot be a contract.”). Thus, Defendants are not 

enforcing the terms of a contract, but rather challenging standing (due to the absence of a contract).

9

 

3 (“WSOU Investments averages approximately five new case filings per week.”). Thus, to the 

extent WSOU argues 

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14 

V. WSOU LACKS STANDING TO SUE FOR PRE-ASSIGNMENT DAMAGES

In addition to the preceding fatal standing problems, WSOU also never obtained the right

to sue for past damages relating to the ’133 patent. 

A.

WSOU claims it “is the owner of all rights, title, and interest in and to the ’133 patent, 

including the right to assert all causes of action arising under the ’133 Patent and the right to any 

remedies for the infringement of the ’133 Patent.” Dkt. 35 ¶ 14 (emphasis added). But WSOU 

lacks standing to sue for past infringement of the ’133 patent because 

 Moore, 74 

U.S. at 522; Arachnid, 939 F.2d at 1579 & n.7; see also Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 95 

F.3d 1109, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“As the Supreme Court stated, it is a ‘great mistake’ to ‘suppose’

that the assignment of the patent carries with it the right to sue for past infringement.”); S.O.T.A.T., 

Inc. v. Frank’s Int’l, Inc., No. 2:06 CV 523, 2008 WL 4093599, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2008) 

(“It is settled law that a transfer of a right of action for past infringement must be express, and 

cannot be inferred from an assignment of the patent itself.”) (internal citation omitted). 

 

Thus, because WSOU never obtained any rights to the ’133 patent from Wade—even if 

Wade had rights to give, which it did not—WSOU lacks standing and its claim for patent 

infringement should be dismissed in its entirety. 

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15 

B.

1.

To the extent WSOU argues that 

When a contract’s language is prospective and states that rights “shall be the property of 

the client” and/or that “all rights thereto will be assigned,” the contract is not a present assignment 

but an agreement or promise to assign in the future. See Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 

1245, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (emphases added) (citing Arachnid, 939 F.2d at 1574, 1576–81). Such 

a contract does not operate as an immediate assignment of legal title. Bd. of Trustees of Leland 

Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 841–42 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 

563 U.S. 776 (2011). “To determine whether a contractual provision is a present assignment of 

future rights or a promise to assign rights in the future, the language of the contract is dispositive.” 

Gellman v. Telular Corp., 2010 WL 5173213, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2010); see also DDB 

Techs., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 517 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[W]e have 

 

Accordingly, the Court should dismiss WSOU’s claims for infringement before this date.

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 22 of 27
16 

9 F

10 State law generally governs who owns patent rights and on what terms. Stanford, 583 F.3d at 

841. However, whether contractual language effects a present assignment of patent rights, or

an agreement to assign rights in the future, is a question of Federal Circuit law. Id.

held that whether an assignment of patent rights in an agreement such as the one in this case is 

automatic, requiring no further act on the part of the assignee, or merely a promise to assign 

depends on the contractual language.”).

 Stanford, 583 F.3d at 841–42; see Gellman v. Telular Corp., 2010 WL 5173213, at 

*3 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2010), aff’d, 449 F. App’x 941 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Because Plaintiff has not

produced a written assignment of the patent in suit and her alternative theories create an obligation 

to assign the patent rather than an actual assignment, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate complete 

legal title to the patent-in-suit.”).

10

 

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 23 of 27
17 

, 

WSOU would be wrong. Isolating words “flies in the face of the basic principle of New York 

contract interpretation that the Court must read the [contract] as a whole, and not myopically 

scrutinize individual words and provisions in isolation.” Green Tech. Lighting Corp. v. Liberty 

Surplus Ins. Corp., No. 1:18-CV-01799 (PAC), 2020 WL 2036705, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 

2020). 

2.

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 24 of 27
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3. The USPTO Assignment Records Confirm 

Finally, 

 See Ex. D (USPTO Reel 044000 Frame 0053). It would make no sense to have 

a specific assignment execution document be filed with the USPTO if a different, privately held

document were to override it and impose different terms on the transfer. To do so would impair

the public notice function of the USPTO assignment registration database, cause confusion over 

ownership of rights, and be prejudicial to any subsequent defendant who might be subjected to a 

claim for past damages from either or both transacting parties. See MPEP, § 301, Part V(A) (June 

2020). 

In contract law, a more specific provision controls over a more general one. See, e.g., 

Bowmer v. Bowmer, 50 N.Y.2d 288, 294 (N.Y. 1980) (“[T]he specific provisions [of a contract]

tend to restrict the general.”); Muzak Corp. v. Hotel Taft Corp., 1 N.Y.2d 42, 46–47 (N.Y. 1956) 

(“Even if there was an inconsistency between a specific provision and a general provision of a 

contract . . . the specific provision controls.”); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(c) 

(Am. L. Inst. 1981) (“[S]pecific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general 

language.”). Thus, 

VI. CONCLUSION

Defendants respectfully request that the Court dismiss with prejudice the entirety of

WSOU’s claim. Alternatively, WSOU never received the right to assert claims for infringement 

of the ’133 patent WSOU has no legal right to seek relief 

from this Court to bring any claim involving the time period prior to such date.

Dated: June 8, 2022 By: /s/ Barry K. Shelton

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 25 of 27
19 

Barry K. Shelton

Texas State Bar No. 24055029

bshelton@winston.com

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP

2121 North Pearl Street, Suite 900

Dallas, TX 75201 

Telephone: 214-453-6407 

Facsimile: 214-453-6400 

Benjamin Hershkowitz

bhershkowitz@gibsondunn.com 

Brian A. Rosenthal

brosenthal@gibsondunn.com 

Allen Kathir

akathir@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

200 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10166-0193 

Telephone: 212.351.4000

Facsimile: 212.351.4035 

Y. Ernest Hsin

ehsin@gibsondunn.com

Jaysen S. Chung

jschung@gibsondunn.com

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

555 Mission Street, Suite 3000

San Francisco, CA 94105-0921

Telephone: 415.393.8200

Facsimile: 415.393.8306

Ryan K. Iwahashi

riwahashi@gibsondunn.com 

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

1881 Page Mill Road

Palo Alto, CA 94304-1211 

Telephone: 650.849.5300

Facsimile: 650.849.5333 

Attorneys for Defendants

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 26 of 27
20 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that on June 8, 2022, all counsel of record who are deemed to 

have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document through the 

Court’s CM/ECF system under Local Rule CV-5(a). 

/s/ Barry K. Shelton

Barry K. Shelton

Case 6:20-cv-00480-ADA-DTG Document 198 Filed 06/14/22 Page 27 of 27