J-A22003-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DALE ROBERT MONROE

Appellant No. 101 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 13, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0001005-2013

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

JUDGMENT ORDER BY PANELLA, J. FILED FEBRUARY 19, 2015

Appellant, Dale Robert Monroe, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered December 13, 2013, by the Honorable John S. Kennedy, Court of 

Common Pleas of York County. No relief is due. 

The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows.

On December 10, 2012, at 6:47 p.m., Officer Albert 

Miles, was on patrol in his marked police vehicle, stationed 

at the Fawn Grove Boro Rutter[’]s parking lot. During his 

patrol he noticed a [b]lack 2008 Chevrolet Silverado 

parked in a parking [space] with a white male driver in the 

driver’s seat. Pursuant to his normal job duties, he ran a 

PennDOT records check which indicated that the registered 

owner, Dale Robert Monroe, the Appellant in this case, had 

a license status of DUI Suspended. The officer then pulled 

up the PennDOT picture of the registered owner and it 

matched the white male sitting in the driver seat. The 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A22003-14

- 2 -

officer observed the vehicle from a distance until the 

vehicle began to pull out of the Rutter’s parking lot. Upon 

exiting the parking lot, the officer activated his emergency 

lights and conducted a traffic stop. 

Officer Miles approached the vehicle and explained to 

the driver why he pulled him over. The driver related to 

the officer that he had a license, but handed him, instead, 

a change of address card. The driver then related that he 

does not have a picture license. The driver then handed 

the officer his oil change paper work along with his 

registration and insurance. While engaging the driver, the 

officer detected a moderate odor of an alcoholic beverage 

emanating from the driver’s breath and person. The 

driver’s eyes were also bloodshot and glassy. The driver 

indicated that he had not been drinking, when questioned. 

Officer Miles identified the driver as Dale Monroe, the 

Appellant in this case, by his passport. Appellant related 

that there was alcohol in one of the cup holders. Officer 

Miles requested that Appellant exit the vehicle and perform 

field sobriety tests. When Appellant opened the door, the 

officer observed an open glass bottle of Bud Light Lime in 

the driver['s] door cup holder that was half-full. Upon 

exiting the vehicle, Appellant was unsure of his footing. 

Upon complete of field sobriety tests, Officer Miles 

placed Appellant into custody and transported him to York 

Hospital for a blood draw. The lab results indicated a 

blood alcohol content of .101, and the presence of 

Diazepam, Nordiazepam, and Morphone-Free in Appellant’s 

blood. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/14/14 at 2-3 (unnumbered). 

Appellant was arrested and charged with four counts of Driving Under 

the Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance,1 Driving While BAC .02 or 

Greater While License Suspended-DUI Related,2 Careless Driving,3and 

____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), (b), (d)(1)(ii) and (d)(3). 

2 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1.1)(i).
J-A22003-14

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Restriction of Alcoholic Beverages.4 Appellant filed an Omnibus Pre-Trial 

Motion to suppress physical evidence. Following a suppression hearing, the 

trial court denied Appellant’s motion. A bench trial was conducted and the 

trial court convicted Appellant of two counts of DUI5and Driving While BAC 

.02 or Greater While License Suspended-DUI Related. The trial court 

sentenced Appellant on December 13, 2013. This timely appeal followed. 

On appeal, Appellant argues that Officer Miles lacked both reasonable

suspicion to believe that a violation of the vehicle code had occurred and 

probable cause to believe that Appellant was driving while impaired. We 

have reviewed Appellant’s brief, the relevant law, the certified record, and 

the well-written opinion of the able trial judge, the Honorable John S. 

Kennedy. We find that the trial court’s opinion, filed on March 14, 2014, ably 

and comprehensively disposes of Appellant’s issues on appeal, with 

appropriate reference to the record and without legal error. Therefore, we 

affirm on the basis of that opinion.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

3 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3714.

4 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3809. 

5 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(b) and (d)(1)(ii). 
J-A22003-14

- 4 -

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/19/2015
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL DIVISION 

COMMONWEALTH OF No. CP-67-CR-I00S-2013 

PENNSYLVANIA 

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DALE R. MONROE qO 

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APPEARANCES: -I 

For The Commonwealth: Duane Ramseur, Esquire ~/; 

For The Defendant: Jenna M. Fliszar, Esquire 

STATEMENT OF LOWER COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 1925(a) OF THE 

PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 

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Appellant, Dale Monroe, was charged with four counts (4) of Driving Under the 

Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance I , Driving Under Suspension-DUI Related and 

Alcohol in System2

, Careless Driving3

, and Restriction of Alcoholic Beverages4

. On 

November 13, 2013, during a stipulated bench trial, the court found Appellant guilty of 

Count lIS, Count rrr6

, and Count V7

,8 Appellant was sentenced on December 13, 2013, as 

follows: Count m9

, five (5) years ofintennediate punislunent ("IP") with direction to serve 

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3802(a)(1); §3802(b); §3802(d)(I)(ii); and §3801(d)(3). 

275 Pa.C.S.A. §1543(b)(1.l)(i). 

3 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3714(a). 

475 Pa.C.S.A. §3809(a). 

5 §3802(b). 

6 §3802(d)(1)(ii); 

7 See supra n.2. 

8 Appellant was found not guilty of Count r and Count IV. Count VI and VII were withdrawn. 

9 Count II and Count III merged for purposes of sentencing. 

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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL DIVISION 

COMMONWEALTH OF No. CP-67-CR-I00S-2013 

PENNSYLVANIA 

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DALE R. MONROE qO 

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Appellant . ('1 ::r; 

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APPEARANCES: -I 

For The Commonwealth: Duane Ramseur, Esquire ~/; 

For The Defendant: Jenna M. Fliszar, Esquire 

STATEMENT OF LOWER COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 1925(a) OF THE 

PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 

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Appellant, Dale Monroe, was charged with four counts (4) of Driving Under the 

Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance I , Driving Under Suspension-DUI Related and 

Alcohol in System2

, Careless Driving3

, and Restriction of Alcoholic Beverages4

. On 

November 13, 2013, during a stipulated bench trial, the court found Appellant guilty of 

Count lIS, Count rrr6

, and Count V7

,8 Appellant was sentenced on December 13, 2013, as 

follows: Count m9

, five (5) years ofintennediate punislunent ("IP") with direction to serve 

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3802(a)(1); §3802(b); §3802(d)(I)(ii); and §3801(d)(3). 

275 Pa.C.S.A. §1543(b)(1.l)(i). 

3 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3714(a). 

475 Pa.C.S.A. §3809(a). 

5 §3802(b). 

6 §3802(d)(1)(ii); 

7 See supra n.2. 

8 Appellant was found not guilty of Count r and Count IV. Count VI and VII were withdrawn. 

9 Count II and Count III merged for purposes of sentencing. 

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nine (9) months out-mate program followed by one year of house arrests with alcohol 

monitoring; and Count V, ninety (90) days on out-mate concurrent with count III. Appellant 

received a total aggregate sentence of nine (9) months of out-mate followed by one year of 

house attests during the term of his IP sentence. 

On December 13,2013, Appellant filed a Post-Sentence Motion, which was denied 

on the same. On January 13, 2014, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal ofthis Coures verdict 

entered on November 13, 2013. We directed Appellant to file a 1925(b) Statement of Matters 

Complained of on Appeal. On February 4, 2014, Appellant filed his timely 1925(b) 

statement. We now issue the following Opinion: 

FACTS AND PRODECURAL HISTORY 

On December 10,2012, at 6:47 p.m., Officer Albert Miles, was on patrol in his 

marked police vehicle, stationed at the Fawn Gl'Ove Boro Rutters parking lot. (Aff. Prb. Cs. 

Miles, ~ 1). During his patrol he noticed a Black 2008 Chevrolet Silverado parl~ed in a 

i 

parking stall with a white male in the driver's seat. ld. Pursuant to his normal jJb duties, he 

ran a Pe1111DOT records check which indicated that the registered owner, Dale Robert 

Monroe, the Appellant in this case, had a license status ofDUI Suspended. ld. The officer 

then pulled up the PennDOT picture of the registered owner and it matched theiwhite male 

sitting in the dtiver seat. ld. The officer observed the vehicle from a distance until the vehicle 

began to pull out of the Rutter's parking lot. ld. Upon exiting the parking lot, the officer 

activated his emergency lights and conducted a traffic stop. ld. 

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nine (9) months out-mate program followed by one year of house arrests with alcohol 

monitoring; and Count V, ninety (90) days on out-mate concurrent with count III. Appellant 

received a total aggregate sentence of nine (9) months of out-mate followed by one year of 

house attests during the term of his IP sentence. 

On December 13,2013, Appellant filed a Post-Sentence Motion, which was denied 

on the same. On January 13, 2014, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal ofthis Coures verdict 

entered on November 13, 2013. We directed Appellant to file a 1925(b) Statement of Matters 

Complained of on Appeal. On February 4, 2014, Appellant filed his timely 1925(b) 

statement. We now issue the following Opinion: 

FACTS AND PRODECURAL HISTORY 

On December 10,2012, at 6:47 p.m., Officer Albert Miles, was on patrol in his 

marked police vehicle, stationed at the Fawn Grove Boro Rutters parking lot. (Aff. Prb. Cs. 

Miles, ~ 1). During his patrol he noticed a Black 2008 Chevrolet Silverado parl~ed in a 

i 

parking stall with a white male in the driver's seat. ld. Pursuant to his normal jJb duties, he 

ran a Pe1111DOT records check which indicated that the registered owner, Dale Robert 

Monroe, the Appellant in this case, had a license status ofDUI Suspended. ld. The officer 

then pulled up the PennDOT picture of the registered owner and it matched theiwhite male 

sitting in the dtiver seat. ld. The officer observed the vehicle from a distance until the vehicle 

began to pull out of the Rutter's parking lot. ld. Upon exiting the parking lot, the officer 

activated his emergency lights and conducted a traffic stop. ld. 
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Officer Miles approached the vehicle and explained to the driver why he pulled him 

over. Id. at ~ 2. The driver related to the officer that he had a license, but handed him, 

instead, a change of address card. Id. The driver then related that he does not have a picture 

license. Id. The driver then handed the officer his oil change paper work along with his 

registration and insurance.ld. While engaging the driver, the officer detected a moderate 

odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from the driver's breath and person.ld. The driver's 

eyes were also bloodshot and glassy.ld. The driver indicated that he had not been drinking, 

when questioned.ld. 

Officer Miles identified the driver as Dale Monroe, the Appellant in this case, by his 

passpOli.ld. at ~ 3. Appellant related that there was alcohol in the one of the cup holders.ld. 

Officer Miles then requested that Appellant exit the vehicle and perfonn field sobriety tests. 

When Appellant opened the driver door, the officer observed an open glass bottle of Bud 

Light Lime in the driver door cup holder that was half-full.ld. Upon exiting the vehicle, 

Appellant was unsure of his footing.ld. 

Upon completion of the field sobriety tests, Officer Miles placed Appellant into 

custody and transported him to York Hospital for a blood draw.ld. at ~ 4. The lab results 

indicated a blood alcohol content of .101, and the presence of Diazepam, Nordiazepam, and 

Morphone-Free in Appellant's blood. 1D 

ISSUES PRESENTED 

10 The parties stipulated that if called to testifY, the toxicologist would testifY that the Morphine-Free came from 

heroin. NT., 11113/2013 at 5:19-21. 

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Officer Miles approached the vehicle and explained to the driver why he pulled him 

over. Id. at ~ 2. The driver related to the officer that he had a license, but handed him, 

instead, a change of address card. Id. The driver then related that he does not have a picture 

license. Id. The driver then handed the officer his oil change paper work along with his 

registration and insurance.ld. While engaging the driver, the officer detected a moderate 

odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from the driver's breath and person.ld. The driver's 

eyes were also bloodshot and glassy.ld. The driver indicated that he had not been drinking, 

when questioned.ld. 

Officer Miles identified the driver as Dale Monroe, the Appellant in this case, by his 

passpOli.ld. at ~ 3. Appellant related that there was alcohol in the one of the cup holders.ld. 

Officer Miles then requested that Appellant exit the vehicle and perfonn field sobriety tests. 

When Appellant opened the driver door, the officer observed an open glass bottle of Bud 

Light Lime in the driver door cup holder that was half-full.ld. Upon exiting the vehicle, 

Appellant was unsure of his footing.ld. 

Upon completion of the field sobriety tests, Officer Miles placed Appellant into 

custody and transported him to York Hospital for a blood draw.ld. at ~ 4. The lab results 

indicated a blood alcohol content of .101, and the presence of Diazepam, Nordiazepam, and 

Morphone-Free in Appellant's blood. 1D 

ISSUES PRESENTED 

10 The parties stipulated that if called to testifY, the toxicologist would testifY that the Morphine-Free came from 

heroin. NT., 11113/2013 at 5:19-21. 
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1. Whether the Trial Court erred in denying [Appellant]'s Motion to Suppress 

evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful traffic stop. More specifically, 

whether the officer possessed sufficient articulable facts to support a conclusion 

of reasonable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation was being committed when 

he executed the traffic stop of [Appellant]; and 

II. Whether the Trial Court erred in denying [Appellant] 's Motion to Suppress 

evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful arrest. More specifically, whether 

the officer possessed sufficient probable cause to arrest [Appellant] on suspicion 

of Driving Under the Influence and request a blood draw as a result. 

DISCUSSION 

A thorough and careful review of the record reveals that each of the issues raised by 

Appellant are without merit and thus, the instant appeal should be DENIED. 

I. Whether the court erred in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress evidence 

as a result of an unlawful traffic stop. 

Appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress because the 

officer did not possess sufficient articulable facts to support a conclusion of reasonable 

suspicion that a motor vehicle violation was being committed when he executed the traffic 

stop of Appellant. 

Appellant averred that, although the officer pulled up the PennDOT picture of the 

registered vehicle, the lightening was such that a proper identification of the driver was not 

possible. Appellant claims that the officer's description of the driver as a white male with 

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1. Whether the Trial Court erred in denying [Appellant]'s Motion to Suppress 

evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful traffic stop. More specifically, 

whether the officer possessed sufficient articulable facts to support a conclusion 

of reasonable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation was being committed when 

he executed the traffic stop of [Appellant]; and 

II. Whether the Trial Court erred in denying [Appellant] 's Motion to Suppress 

evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful arrest. More specifically, whether 

the officer possessed sufficient probable cause to arrest [Appellant] on suspicion 

of Driving Under the Influence and request a blood draw as a result. 

DISCUSSION 

A thorough and careful review of the record reveals that each of the issues raised by 

Appellant are without merit and thus, the instant appeal should be DENIED. 

I. Whether the court erred in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress evidence 

as a result of an unlawful traffic stop. 

Appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress because the 

officer did not possess sufficient articulable facts to support a conclusion of reasonable 

suspicion that a motor vehicle violation was being committed when he executed the traffic 

stop of Appellant. 

Appellant averred that, although the officer pulled up the PennDOT picture of the 

registered vehicle, the lightening was such that a proper identification of the driver was not 

possible. Appellant claims that the officer's description of the driver as a white male with 
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dark hair was not sufficient to match the picture of the registered driver and, therefore, the 

officer did not have reasonable suspicion to effectuate a traffic stop on the basis of a 

suspended license. 

The standard of review of a suppression court's ruling is well established in 

Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court ofPelIDsylvania has detennined that the scope of review is 

limited to determining whether the findings offact are supported by the record and 

whether the legal conclusions drawn fl.-om those facts are in error. Commonwealth v. 

Crompton, 545 Pa. 586, 682 A.2d 286 (1996); Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 403, 

598 A.2d 539 (1991). When a defendant has appealed an order denying a motion to 

suppress evidence, we must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of 

the evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, 

remains uncontradicted. Commonwealth v. Cortez, 507 Pa. 529,491 A.2d 111 (1985), 

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 950, 106 S. Ct. 349, 88 L.Ed.2d 297 (1985). If they are supported 

in the record, we are bound by the facts as the suppression court found them and we may 

reverse the suppression court only if the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in 

error.ld. 

Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 781 A.2d 110, 115 (Pa. 2001). It is within the suppression 

court's sole province as fact finder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be 

given to their testimony. Commonwealth v. Gr(fJen, 785 A.2d 501,505. (Pa. Super. 2001). 

The suppression court is free to believe all, some, or none of the evidence presented at the 

suppression hearing. Id. In the instant case, Appellant avers that the suppression court erred 

when it detennined that Officer Miles had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop upon 

suspicion that Appellant had committed a motor vehicle violation, namely, driving with a 

suspended license. 

A person violates the motor vehicle code when he or she drives with a suspended 

license. Specifically, a person commits Driving Under Suspension~ DUI Related and Alcohol 

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dark hair was not sufficient to match the picture of the registered driver and, therefore, the 

officer did not have reasonable suspicion to effectuate a traffic stop on the basis of a 

suspended license. 

The standard of review of a suppression court's ruling is well established in 

Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court ofPelIDsylvania has detennined that the scope of review is 

limited to determining whether the findings offact are supported by the record and 

whether the legal conclusions drawn fl.-om those facts are in error. Commonwealth v. 

Crompton, 545 Pa. 586, 682 A.2d 286 (1996); Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 403, 

598 A.2d 539 (1991). When a defendant has appealed an order denying a motion to 

suppress evidence, we must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of 

the evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, 

remains uncontradicted. Commonwealth v. Cortez, 507 Pa. 529,491 A.2d 111 (1985), 

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 950, 106 S. Ct. 349, 88 L.Ed.2d 297 (1985). If they are supported 

in the record, we are bound by the facts as the suppression court found them and we may 

reverse the suppression court only if the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in 

error.ld. 

Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 781 A.2d 110, 115 (Pa. 2001). It is within the suppression 

court's sole province as fact finder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be 

given to their testimony. Commonwealth v. Gr(fJen, 785 A.2d 501,505. (Pa. Super. 2001). 

The suppression court is free to believe all, some, or none of the evidence presented at the 

suppression hearing. Id. In the instant case, Appellant avers that the suppression court erred 

when it detennined that Officer Miles had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop upon 

suspicion that Appellant had committed a motor vehicle violation, namely, driving with a 

suspended license. 

A person violates the motor vehicle code when he or she drives with a suspended 

license. Specifically, a person commits Driving Under Suspension~ DUI Related and Alcohol 
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in System, where the person has a BAC equal or greater than .02% or any amount of a 

schedule I or nonprescribed Schedule II or III controlled substance, and who drives a motor 

vehicle on any highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth at a time when the person's 

operating privilege is suspended. 75 Pa.C,S.A. §1543(b)(1.1)(i). 

There are three types of interactions between police and a citizen: 

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has led to the development of three categories of 

interactions between citizens and the police. The first of these is a "mere encounter" 

(or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, 

but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an "investigative 

detention" must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop 

and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to 

constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest 01' "custodial 

detention" must be supported by probable cause. Commonwealth v. Au, 986 A.2d 

864,866-67 (Pa.Supel'.2009) (en bane), appeal granted on different grounds, 606 

Pa. 113, 995 A.2d 349 (2010). 

Commonwealth v. Downey, 39 A.3d 401, 405 (Pa. Super. 2012), A totality of the 

circumstances approach is used to determine whether or not a seizure has been executed. Id. 

(citing Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111,1116 (Pa. Super. 2011)). A police officer 

who has reasonable suspicion that a violation of the motor vehicle code is occurring or has 

occurred may stop a vehicle for the purposes of checking the driver's license. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6308(b). However, if the violation is such that it requires no additional investigation, the 

officer must have probable cause to initiate the stop. Commonwealth v. Feezko, 10 A.3d 

1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010). The police have probable cause where the facts and 

circumstances within the officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable 

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in System, where the person has a BAC equal or greater than .02% or any amount of a 

schedule I or nonprescribed Schedule II or III controlled substance, and who drives a motor 

vehicle on any highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth at a time when the person's 

operating privilege is suspended. 75 Pa.C,S.A. §1543(b)(1.1)(i). 

There are three types of interactions between police and a citizen: 

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has led to the development of three categories of 

interactions between citizens and the police. The first of these is a "mere encounter" 

(or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, 

but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an "investigative 

detention" must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop 

and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to 

constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest 01' "custodial 

detention" must be supported by probable cause. Commonwealth v. Au, 986 A.2d 

864,866-67 (Pa.Supel'.2009) (en bane), appeal granted on different grounds, 606 

Pa. 113, 995 A.2d 349 (2010). 

Commonwealth v. Downey, 39 A.3d 401, 405 (Pa. Super. 2012), A totality of the 

circumstances approach is used to determine whether or not a seizure has been executed. Id. 

(citing Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111,1116 (Pa. Super. 2011)). A police officer 

who has reasonable suspicion that a violation of the motor vehicle code is occurring or has 

occurred may stop a vehicle for the purposes of checking the driver's license. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6308(b). However, if the violation is such that it requires no additional investigation, the 

officer must have probable cause to initiate the stop. Commonwealth v. Feezko, 10 A.3d 

1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010). The police have probable cause where the facts and 

circumstances within the officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable 
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caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Commonwealth v. 

Hernandez, 935 A.2d 1275, 1284 (Pa. 2007). 

Officer Miles, in the course of his duties, ran the registration for Appellant's vehicle. 

Upon discovery that the owner of the vehicle's license was suspended, the officer pulled up 

the owner's picture through the PennDOT database. The officer then matched the description 

of the driver of the vehicle with that of the owner whose picture appeared in the PennDOT 

database with the status of a suspended license due to a previous DUI. Thus, when Appellant 

drove out of Rutter's parking lot, the officer had to have reasonable suspicion that Appellant 

had committed a motor vehicle violation in order to effectuate a traffic stop because further 

investigation is required to ensure that the driver is the owner with the suspended license. 

Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause. Reasonable suspicion 

"depends on the information possessed by police and its degree of reliability in the totality of 

the circumstances." Id. at 406. 

In order to justify the seizure, a police officer must be able to point to specific and 

atiiculable facts leading him to suspect criminal activity is afoot. In assessing the 

totality of the circumstances, coutis must also afford due weight to the specific, 

reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light of the officer's experience and 

acknowledge that hmocent facts, when considered collectively, may permit the 

investigative detention. 

Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473,477 (Pa. 2010». 

In this case, Appellant was the driver of the vehicle. Officer Miles ran the registration 

and discovered that the owner of the vehicle had a suspended license. In addition, Officer 

Miles pulled up the picture of the owner. In his experience as a police officer, Officer Miles 

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caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Commonwealth v. 

Hernandez, 935 A.2d 1275, 1284 (Pa. 2007). 

Officer Miles, in the course of his duties, ran the registration for Appellant's vehicle. 

Upon discovery that the owner of the vehicle's license was suspended, the officer pulled up 

the owner's picture through the PennDOT database. The officer then matched the description 

of the driver of the vehicle with that of the owner whose picture appeared in the PennDOT 

database with the status of a suspended license due to a previous DUI. Thus, when Appellant 

drove out of Rutter's parking lot, the officer had to have reasonable suspicion that Appellant 

had committed a motor vehicle violation in order to effectuate a traffic stop because further 

investigation is required to ensure that the driver is the owner with the suspended license. 

Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause. Reasonable suspicion 

"depends on the information possessed by police and its degree of reliability in the totality of 

the circumstances." Id. at 406. 

In order to justify the seizure, a police officer must be able to point to specific and 

atiiculable facts leading him to suspect criminal activity is afoot. In assessing the 

totality of the circumstances, coutis must also afford due weight to the specific, 

reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in light of the officer's experience and 

acknowledge that hmocent facts, when considered collectively, may permit the 

investigative detention. 

Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473,477 (Pa. 2010». 

In this case, Appellant was the driver of the vehicle. Officer Miles ran the registration 

and discovered that the owner of the vehicle had a suspended license. In addition, Officer 

Miles pulled up the picture of the owner. In his experience as a police officer, Officer Miles 
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concluded that the driver of the vehicle matched the picture of the owner in the PennDOT 

database. Knowing that the appellant's license was suspended and observing the appellant 

drive the vehicle, the officer not only had reasonable suspicion, but had probable cause that 

Appellant was committing the noted infraction because the officer observed the infraction for 

himself and unquestionably possessed facts to warrant belief by any reasonable person that 

Appellant violated the vehicle code. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence. 

II. Whether the court erred in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress evidence 

as a result of an unlawful arrest. 

Appellant's next argument is that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress 

because the officer did not possess sufficient probable cause to arrest Appellant on suspicion 

of Driving Under the Influence and to request a blood draw as a result. 

Appellant avers that the officer lacked any articulable reasons to arrest Appellant 

except for bloodshot, glassy eyes, unsteady balance upon exiting the vehicle, odor of alcohol, 

and the presence of alcohol in the vehicle. Appellant maintains that those reasons are 

insufficient in themselves to rise to the level of probable cause for a lawful arrest. 

Furthennore, Appellant claims that he displayed no erratic behavior, his medical conditions 

could cause the unsteadiness and bloodshot eyes, and he passed a field sobriety test, thus 

probable cause did not exist that Appellant was under the influence. 

As discussed above, the scope of review for the suppression court's denial of a motion to 

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concluded that the driver of the vehicle matched the picture of the owner in the PennDOT 

database. Knowing that the appellant's license was suspended and observing the appellant 

drive the vehicle, the officer not only had reasonable suspicion, but had probable cause that 

Appellant was committing the noted infraction because the officer observed the infraction for 

himself and unquestionably possessed facts to warrant belief by any reasonable person that 

Appellant violated the vehicle code. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence. 

II. Whether the court erred in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress evidence 

as a result of an unlawful arrest. 

Appellant's next argument is that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress 

because the officer did not possess sufficient probable cause to arrest Appellant on suspicion 

of Driving Under the Influence and to request a blood draw as a result. 

Appellant avers that the officer lacked any articulable reasons to arrest Appellant 

except for bloodshot, glassy eyes, unsteady balance upon exiting the vehicle, odor of alcohol, 

and the presence of alcohol in the vehicle. Appellant maintains that those reasons are 

insufficient in themselves to rise to the level of probable cause for a lawful arrest. 

Furthennore, Appellant claims that he displayed no erratic behavior, his medical conditions 

could cause the unsteadiness and bloodshot eyes, and he passed a field sobriety test, thus 

probable cause did not exist that Appellant was under the influence. 

As discussed above, the scope of review for the suppression court's denial of a motion to 

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suppress is limited to detennining whether the findings of fact are supported by the record 
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and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. Stallworth, 781 A.2d 

at 115. In the instant case, the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop to 

determine if Appellant was driving under suspension. Upon his detennination that Appellant 

was driving under suspension and in the course of this traffic stop, Officer Miles had 

renewed reasonable suspicion to believe that Appellant was also driving under the influence . 

After conducting field sobriety tests combined with his observations of Appellant, Officer 

Miles had probable cause to arrest Appellant for driving under the influence, 

As detennined above, the officer had reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause, to 

initiate a traffic stop of Appellant due the officer's beliefthat he was driving with a 

suspended license. Thus, at the point of the stop and confirmation of the motor vehicle 

violation, the investigatory detention concluded. Once the primary traffic stop has concluded, 

however, the officer's authority to order either driver or occupant from the car is 

extinguished. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 723 A.2d 644, 647 (Pa. 1999). Thus, if subsequently 

the officer directs or requests the occupants to exit the vehicle, his show of authority may 

constitute an investigatory detention subject to a renewed showing of reasonable suspicion. 

Commonwealth v, Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1202 (pa. Super. 2002), 

In Freeman, our Supreme Court defined multiple relevant circumstances on the basis of 

which we may recognize the end of a traffic stop and the commencement of another 

interaction: 

the existence and nature of any prior seizure; whether there was a clear and expressed 

endpoint to any such prior detention; the character of police presence and conduct in the 

encounter under review (for example-the number of officers, whether they were 

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and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. Stallworth, 781 A.2d 

at 115. In the instant case, the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop to 

determine if Appellant was driving under suspension. Upon his detennination that Appellant 

was driving under suspension and in the course of this traffic stop, Officer Miles had 

renewed reasonable suspicion to believe that Appellant was also driving under the influence . 

After conducting field sobriety tests combined with his observations of Appellant, Officer 

Miles had probable cause to arrest Appellant for driving under the influence, 

As detennined above, the officer had reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause, to 

initiate a traffic stop of Appellant due the officer's beliefthat he was driving with a 

suspended license. Thus, at the point of the stop and confirmation of the motor vehicle 

violation, the investigatory detention concluded. Once the primary traffic stop has concluded, 

however, the officer's authority to order either driver or occupant from the car is 

extinguished. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 723 A.2d 644, 647 (Pa. 1999). Thus, if subsequently 

the officer directs or requests the occupants to exit the vehicle, his show of authority may 

constitute an investigatory detention subject to a renewed showing of reasonable suspicion. 

Commonwealth v, Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1202 (pa. Super. 2002), 

In Freeman, our Supreme Court defined multiple relevant circumstances on the basis of 

which we may recognize the end of a traffic stop and the commencement of another 

interaction: 

the existence and nature of any prior seizure; whether there was a clear and expressed 

endpoint to any such prior detention; the character of police presence and conduct in the 

encounter under review (for example-the number of officers, whether they were 
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uniformed, whether police isolated subjects, physically touched them or directed their 

movement, the content or maImer of interrogatories or statements, and "excesses" factors 

[sic] stressed by the United States Supreme Court); geographic, temporal and 

environmental elements associated with the encounter; and the presence or absence of 

express advice that the citizen-subject was free to decline the request for consent to 

search. 

Reppert, 814 A.2d at 1202 (citing Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903,906-07 (Pa. 

2000)). 

Upon consideration of these circumstances we concluded that the prior traffic stop gave 

way to a new interaction when Officer Miles ordered Appellant to exit the vehicle. Officer 

Miles had renewed reasonable suspicion that Appellant was driving under the influence due 

to Appellant's glassy and bloodshot eyes, the smell of alcohol on his breath, and Appellant's 

admission of an open container in the vehicle. At this point, Officer Miles acting under 

reasonable suspicion, had the authority and upon that authority did order Appellant to exit the 

vehicle to perfOlID field sobriety tests. 

During this investigation, upon exiting the vehicle, Appellant was unsteady on his feet. 

Although initially saying he could complete all of the field tests, Appellant failed to complete 

the walk-and-tum test." N.T., 5/20/2013 at 11 :17-20; 12: 1-2. Upon administration ofthe 

HON,12 Appellant showed a lack of pursuit in both eyes and a distinctive sustained 

nystagmus at maximum deviation in both eyes. N.T. at 13:3-6. Appellant failed this field 

sobriety test. 13 Appellant next performed the one-leg stand. Id. at 13: 19. Although he 

11 Appellant indicated that he had bad knees from construction work and the pain would not allow him to 

complete the test. 

12 Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test. 

13 He showed four possible clues of intoxication out of a possible six, which is considered to be a fail. 

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uniformed, whether police isolated subjects, physically touched them or directed their 

movement, the content or maImer of interrogatories or statements, and "excesses" factors 

[sic] stressed by the United States Supreme Court); geographic, temporal and 

environmental elements associated with the encounter; and the presence or absence of 

express advice that the citizen-subject was free to decline the request for consent to 

search. 

Reppert, 814 A.2d at 1202 (citing Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903,906-07 (Pa. 

2000)). 

Upon consideration of these circumstances we concluded that the prior traffic stop gave 

way to a new interaction when Officer Miles ordered Appellant to exit the vehicle. Officer 

Miles had renewed reasonable suspicion that Appellant was driving under the influence due 

to Appellant's glassy and bloodshot eyes, the smell of alcohol on his breath, and Appellant's 

admission of an open container in the vehicle. At this point, Officer Miles acting under 

reasonable suspicion, had the authority and upon that authority did order Appellant to exit the 

vehicle to perfOlID field sobriety tests. 

During this investigation, upon exiting the vehicle, Appellant was unsteady on his feet. 

Although initially saying he could complete all of the field tests, Appellant failed to complete 

the walk-and-tum test." N.T., 5/20/2013 at 11 :17-20; 12: 1-2. Upon administration ofthe 

HON,12 Appellant showed a lack of pursuit in both eyes and a distinctive sustained 

nystagmus at maximum deviation in both eyes. N.T. at 13:3-6. Appellant failed this field 

sobriety test. 13 Appellant next performed the one-leg stand. Id. at 13: 19. Although he 

11 Appellant indicated that he had bad knees from construction work and the pain would not allow him to 

complete the test. 

12 Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test. 

13 He showed four possible clues of intoxication out of a possible six, which is considered to be a fail. 
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perfonned the test incorrectly, by counting when he put his foot down, Appellant was 

deemed to have passed this test. ld. at 14: 1-9. Lastly, Appellant tested positive for alcohol 

during the PBT test. 14 

As a result of Appellant's performance on the field sobriety tests as well as the fact that 

his license was indicated to be DUI suspended combined with the officer's observations of 

Appellant's unsteadiness, his glassy and bloodshot eyes, the smell of alcohol on his breath, 

and the open container of beer in his vehicle, Officer Miles, based on his training and 

education arrested Appellant for driving under the influence. 

Both the United States and Pemlsylvania Constitutions protect citizens against 

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8. 

To be constitutionally valid, an arrest must be based on probable cause. The existence or 

non-existence of probable cause is determined by the totality of the circumstances. The 

totality of the circumstances test requires a Court to detennine whether the facts and 

circumstances which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and 

of which he has reasonably trustworthy infonnation, are sufficient to warrant a man of 

reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 979 A.2d 913,916 (Pa. Super. 2009). The question we ask is not 

whether the officer's belief was "correct or more likely true than false, but rather if there is a 

probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity. Commonwealth v. 

Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa. 2009). The Superior Court has explained that, 

"[p Jrobable cause exists where the officer has knowledge of sufficient facts and 

circumstances to warrant a prudent person to believe that the driver has been driving under 

14 The portable breath test had a positive result for an alcoholic beverage. It was a .07 percent BAC. 

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perfonned the test incorrectly, by counting when he put his foot down, Appellant was 

deemed to have passed this test. ld. at 14: 1-9. Lastly, Appellant tested positive for alcohol 

during the PBT test. 14 

As a result of Appellant's performance on the field sobriety tests as well as the fact that 

his license was indicated to be DUI suspended combined with the officer's observations of 

Appellant's unsteadiness, his glassy and bloodshot eyes, the smell of alcohol on his breath, 

and the open container of beer in his vehicle, Officer Miles, based on his training and 

education arrested Appellant for driving under the influence. 

Both the United States and Pemlsylvania Constitutions protect citizens against 

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8. 

To be constitutionally valid, an arrest must be based on probable cause. The existence or 

non-existence of probable cause is determined by the totality of the circumstances. The 

totality of the circumstances test requires a Court to detennine whether the facts and 

circumstances which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and 

of which he has reasonably trustworthy infonnation, are sufficient to warrant a man of 

reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 979 A.2d 913,916 (Pa. Super. 2009). The question we ask is not 

whether the officer's belief was "correct or more likely true than false, but rather if there is a 

probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity. Commonwealth v. 

Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa. 2009). The Superior Court has explained that, 

"[p Jrobable cause exists where the officer has knowledge of sufficient facts and 

circumstances to warrant a prudent person to believe that the driver has been driving under 

14 The portable breath test had a positive result for an alcoholic beverage. It was a .07 percent BAC. 
Circulated 01/29/2015 12:37 PM

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the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance." Commonwealth v. Angel, 946 A.2d 115, 

118 (Pa. Super. 2008)(citing Commonwealth v. Hilliar, 943 A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. 2008)). 

Instantly, the record reflects that Officer Miles stopped Appellant's vehicle based on 

his reasonable suspicion that Appellant had committed violations of the Vehicle Code. When 

the officer spoke to Appellant, he detected classic signs of intoxication: an odor of alcohol 

together with Appellant's bloodshot and glassy eyes and admission of an open container of 

beer. Then, when exiting the vehicle, Appellant was unsteady on his feet. In addition, during 

the field sobriety tests, Appellant stated that he was unable. to perfonn the walk-and-turn test 

because of bad knees. 

Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Miles possessed the requisite 

probable cause to arrest Appellant for DUI in this case as he had knowledge of sufficient 

facts to warrant a belief that Appellant had been driving under the influence of alcohol or a 

controlled substance. Thus, Appellant's claim is without merit. 

CONCLUSION 

This Court has thoroughly reviewed all of the relevant pleadings and transcripts in 

this matter. We rely on and incorporate those pleadings and transcripts, including the within 

Opinion as its 1925(a) Opinion in the above-captioned matter. 

BY THE COURT: 

Date: March 14,2014 

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the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance." Commonwealth v. Angel, 946 A.2d 115, 

118 (Pa. Super. 2008)(citing Commonwealth v. Hilliar, 943 A.2d 984 (Pa. Super. 2008)). 

Instantly, the record reflects that Officer Miles stopped Appellant's vehicle based on 

his reasonable suspicion that Appellant had committed violations of the Vehicle Code. When 

the officer spoke to Appellant, he detected classic signs of intoxication: an odor of alcohol 

together with Appellant's bloodshot and glassy eyes and admission of an open container of 

beer. Then, when exiting the vehicle, Appellant was unsteady on his feet. In addition, during 

the field sobriety tests, Appellant stated that he was unable. to perfonn the walk-and-turn test 

because of bad knees. 

Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Miles possessed the requisite 

probable cause to arrest Appellant for DUI in this case as he had knowledge of sufficient 

facts to warrant a belief that Appellant had been driving under the influence of alcohol or a 

controlled substance. Thus, Appellant's claim is without merit. 

CONCLUSION 

This Court has thoroughly reviewed all of the relevant pleadings and transcripts in 

this matter. We rely on and incorporate those pleadings and transcripts, including the within 

Opinion as its 1925(a) Opinion in the above-captioned matter. 

BY THE COURT: 

Date: March 14,2014