NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.V.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0036 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

JD29462

The Honorable Pamela S. Gates, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

John L. Popilek, P.C., Scottsdale

By John L. Popilek

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Jennifer R. Blum 

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 6-27-2023
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.V.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Mattique J. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her child, B.V. Because reasonable 

evidence supports the termination order, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In March 2019, Mother and Brandon V. (“Father”) took their 

six-month-old child, B.V., to the hospital when the child began shaking 

uncontrollably. B.V. was diagnosed with a seizure disorder.

¶3 While the parents and B.V. were at the hospital, DCS received 

a report that the police had been called to the scene after Mother claimed 

that Father grabbed her by the throat. The record does not make clear 

whether the police arrested Father.1

¶4 During the ensuing DCS investigation, Mother reported that, 

before she and Father separated shortly after B.V.’s birth, she had “made 

many [police] reports” about Father’s acts of domestic violence over the 

course of their relationship. Mother nonetheless stated she had no concerns

about B.V.’s safety with Father, explaining that, notwithstanding his acts of 

domestic violence, Father is “a good guy.” At DCS’s request, Mother 

underwent a hair follicle test; the results were positive for cocaine and THC

(marijuana).

¶5 Although B.V.’s hospital discharge instructions included

scheduling both a follow-up appointment and an appointment with a 

neurologist, neither Mother nor Father ever scheduled either appointment

for the child.

¶6 DCS removed B.V. from the parents’ custody and filed a 

dependency petition in May 2019. The dependency petition alleged that 

1 The record indicates, however, that the police arrested Mother on an 

outstanding warrant for prostitution.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.V.

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Mother did not provide “proper and effective parental care” due to 

substance abuse, mental health issues, domestic violence, and a failure “to 

provide for the child’s basic needs.” The petition further alleged that Father 

did not properly care for B.V. due to domestic violence and was neglecting

B.V.’s basic needs. The juvenile court adjudicated B.V. dependent as to both 

parents. B.V. was placed with her paternal grandmother in California.

¶7 In April 2020, Mother self-referred for substance abuse 

treatment. In her intake, she indicated that she “used to struggle with 

cocaine” but had “not been hooked on it for 3-4 years.” She admitted, 

however, that she had not given up on cocaine use entirely, stating that she 

“would only use recreational now.”

¶8 Mother successfully completed her substance abuse 

treatment in October 2020. After that, Mother engaged in substance abuse 

testing sporadically, going months at a time without testing at all.

2 Not until 

February 2022 did Mother begin to undergo testing consistently. In 

February 2022, she underwent a hair follicle test that was negative for

cocaine. In April 2022, however, she underwent a urinalysis test that was 

positive for cocaine. Three months later, Mother stopped testing altogether.

¶9 In September 2022, DCS moved to terminate Mother’s and 

Father’s parental rights to B.V. on the grounds of substance abuse, see A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(3), and B.V.’s extended out-of-home placement, see A.R.S. § 8-

533(B)(8)(a), (c).

¶10 The matter proceeded to trial in November 2022. At trial, 

Mother testified that she first used cocaine—“just a one-time use”—when 

she was sixteen years old. She testified that she began using “like twice a 

month” during her two-year relationship with Father but had not used 

cocaine since their relationship ended in 2018. Mother explained that, 

during their relationship, she felt compelled to use cocaine whenever Father

did for fear that he “would beat the heck out of [her]” if she refused to 

“party” with him. Mother disputed the accuracy of the April 2022 positive

urinalysis test results, explaining that, upon receiving the results, she 

immediately offered to undergo a hair follicle test because she “knew [the 

positive result] wasn’t possible.”

¶11 Mother also testified that she maintained a relationship with 

B.V. over the course of the dependency proceedings by calling or video 

2 When she did test, Mother consistently tested positive for THC, which was 

unsurprising because she had a medical marijuana card.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.V.

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chatting daily. She stated that she traveled to placement’s home in 

California to visit B.V. in September 2022, and that she would have visited 

B.V. more often if she could have afforded to do so.

¶12 DCS Case Manager Christopher Melton testified, inter alia, 

that Mother told him in November 2021 that she was participating in 

weekly domestic violence counseling at the Family Involvement Center.

When Melton contacted the Family Involvement Center to verify Mother’s 

report, he learned that Mother was not engaged in domestic violence 

counseling or receiving any services other than housing support. Moreover, 

Melton learned that the person that Mother identified as her counselor at 

the Family Involvement Center was no longer employed there. At trial, 

Mother did not controvert Melton’s testimony on this point. 

¶13 The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights under 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) (substance abuse) and A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8) (fifteen 

months’ time-in-care). Mother appealed, and we have jurisdiction.3 See

A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A), -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶14 Parents’ right to the custody and control of their children, 

while fundamental, is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 

Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11-12 (2000). Termination of a parent’s rights requires 

proof, by clear and convincing evidence, of one of the statutory grounds set 

forth in A.R.S. § 8-533(B). Id. at 249, ¶ 12. Evidence is “clear and convincing” 

if it is “highly probable or reasonably certain.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 

279, 284-85, ¶ 25 (2005) (citation omitted). The court must also find, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the child’s best 

interests. Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474, ¶ 13 (2022).

¶15 “We review an order terminating a parent’s relationship with 

his or her child . . . in the light most favorable to sustaining the superior 

court’s ruling.” Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 296, ¶ 17 (App. 2013). 

We “will accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact unless no reasonable 

evidence supports those findings, and we will affirm a severance order 

unless it is clearly erroneous.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 

278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). This Court does not reweigh the evidence on 

review but “look[s] only to determine if there is evidence to sustain the 

3 The court also terminated Father’s rights, but he is not a party to this 

appeal.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.V.

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court’s ruling.” Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 

(App. 2004).

¶16 A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) establishes grounds for termination if 

“the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of . . . a 

history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, controlled substances or 

alcohol and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will 

continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” “[D]rug abuse need not be 

constant to be considered chronic.” Raymond F. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 

Ariz. 373, 377, ¶ 16 (App. 2010) (emphasis added). Rather, chronic drug 

abuse is that which “last[s] a long time” and is “long-continued, lingering, 

and inveterate.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶17 Mother argues that the evidence at trial did not establish that 

she “had a continuing issue with cocaine” after her relationship with Father

ended, asserting that she successfully completed substance abuse treatment 

in October 2020, tested “clean” in February 2022, and disputed the positive 

results of the drug test in April 2022. “Even if the April 2022 test was 

accurate,” Mother argues, “it showed nothing more than one ‘stumble’ over 

a multi-year period.”

¶18 We disagree. The undisputed evidence shows that Mother 

used cocaine before, during, and after her relationship with Father. Mother 

testified at trial that she first used cocaine when she was sixteen years old 

and that she used it multiple times each month throughout her two-year

relationship with Father. Mother underwent a hair follicle test in April 2019 

that was positive for cocaine. Evidence in the record establishes that a 

positive hair follicle test result “indicates chronic long-term use.” Although 

Mother testified that she had not used cocaine since “probably like October 

of 2018,” she admitted during her substance abuse treatment intake in 2020 

that she “would only use recreational now.” And though Mother disputed 

the positive results of the April 2022 urinalysis test, it is the juvenile court’s 

prerogative to weigh conflicting evidence and make credibility 

determinations. See Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 47, ¶ 8. Because Mother’s 

cocaine use started when she was a teenager and continued into 

adulthood—and as recently as seven months before the termination trial—

a reasonable fact finder could find it highly probable or reasonably certain 

that Mother has a history of chronic cocaine use. See Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of 

Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287, ¶ 17 (App. 2016) (“Chronic substance abuse” 

within the meaning of A.R.S. § 8-533(B) is “long-lasting but not necessarily 

constant substance abuse.”) 
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¶19 Moreover, a fact finder could reasonably find grounds to 

believe that Mother’s cocaine use would continue for a “prolonged” and 

“indeterminate period.” See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). When assessing whether 

“the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period,” a court 

may consider “the length and frequency” of a parent’s “prior substance 

abuse” and the results of the parent’s “prior efforts to maintain sobriety.” 

Jennifer S., 240 Ariz. at 287, ¶¶ 19-20. “It is not the number of times that [a 

parent] has tested positive or negative for drug abuse that is key, but rather, 

it is the fact that [the parent] has consistently failed to abstain from drugs.” 

Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 379, ¶ 29.

¶20 Here, Mother not only has a lengthy history of cocaine use but 

also failed to engage consistently in drug testing during the dependency 

proceedings, leaving the court unable to assess her current sobriety. 

Mother’s claim to have abstained from cocaine use since 2018 cannot be 

accepted at face value, particularly since she was found to have lied when 

she claimed to be engaged in domestic violence counseling in November 

2021. And Mother’s failure to undergo any testing at all after July 2022, even 

after DCS filed its termination motion in September 2022, further shows 

that she is unable to rise above her addiction. See Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 

379, ¶ 29 (noting that a parent’s “failure to remedy his [or her] drug abuse[,] 

despite knowing the loss of his [or her] children was imminent, is evidence 

[the parent] has not overcome” his or her drug dependence); see also Jennifer 

S., 240 Ariz. at 287-88, ¶¶ 21, 25 (citing mother’s “refus[al] to take most of 

her required drug tests” as record support for juvenile court’s finding that 

“reasonable grounds exist to believe the condition will continue for a 

prolonged indeterminate period”). We therefore conclude that the juvenile 

court properly found, by clear and convincing evidence, reasonable 

grounds to believe Mother’s chronic drug use would continue for a 

prolonged, indeterminate period.

¶21 The juvenile court found that Mother’s chronic substance 

abuse leaves her “unable to discharge parental responsibilities” because her 

“inability to maintain sobriety” deprives B.V., a young and vulnerable 

child, of “a safe and stable home.” Among other things, the court noted, 

Mother failed to arrange follow-up medical care for B.V.’s seizure disorder 

after the child’s discharge from the hospital in March 2019. Mother does not 

challenge this finding, and we need not address it further. Reasonable 

evidence, therefore, supports the juvenile court’s finding of statutory 

grounds for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).

¶22 Because clear and convincing evidence supports termination 

of Mother’s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) (substance abuse), we 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.V.

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need not evaluate whether reasonable evidence also supports the court’s 

termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8) (fifteen months’ time-in-care). See 

Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 3 (“If clear and convincing evidence supports 

any one of the statutory grounds on which the juvenile court ordered 

severance, we need not address claims pertaining to the other grounds.”).

¶23 A court cannot terminate a parent’s rights without first 

finding that termination is in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); 

Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249, ¶ 12. Here, the court found that termination was 

in B.V.’s best interests because she was in an adoptive kinship placement 

where her needs were being met. Indeed, the court found, B.V. was 

“thriving in her current placement.” Mother does not challenge the court’s

best interests determination on appeal. We therefore accept it and need not 

address it further. See Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, 97, 

¶ 20 n.7 (App. 2009) (affirming termination order in part because appellant 

did not “challenge the juvenile court’s finding that termination of her 

parental rights was in the best interests of the children”).

CONCLUSION

¶24 We affirm.