[Cite as In re B.A., 2013-Ohio-596.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HIGHLAND COUNTY 

 : 

IN THE MATTER OF : Case No: 12CA18 

 : 

B.A. : RELEASED 02/01/13

 : 

DEPENDENT CHILD. : DECISION AND

 : JUDGMENT ENTRY

 : 

APPEARANCES:

Lynn W. Turner, Hillsboro, Ohio, for Appellant Mother. 

Anneka P. Collins, Highland County Prosecutor, and Molly Bolek, Highland County 

Assistant Prosecutor, Hillsboro, Ohio, for Appellee Highland County Children Services. 

Lee Koogler, Hillsboro, Ohio, Guardian Ad Litem. 

Kline, J.: 

{¶1} Mother appeals the judgment of the Highland County Court of Common 

Pleas, Juvenile Division. After finding that B.A. (hereinafter the “Child”) had been 

abandoned, the juvenile court awarded permanent custody of the Child to Highland 

County Children Services (hereinafter “Children Services”). On appeal, Mother 

contends that Children Services filed for permanent custody too early. Mother claims 

that Children Services had to wait until the Child had been in its temporary custody for 

at least 12 months. We disagree. Children Services sought permanent custody on 

grounds other than R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). Therefore, the motion for permanent 

custody was clearly authorized, and the juvenile court had the authority to grant 
Highland App. No. 12CA18 2 

permanent custody of the Child to Children Services. Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s 

assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the juvenile court. 

I. 

{¶2} The Child was born on March 17, 2011. The next day, Children Services 

moved for temporary custody of the Child. 

{¶3} On April 14, 2011, the juvenile court found the Child “to be a Dependent 

Child.” Entry of Adjudication and Disposition at 1. As a result, the juvenile court 

ordered “that temporary custody of the [Child] shall be vested in [Children Services] for 

a period of six (6) months, to automatically terminate on September 17, 2011[,] unless a 

timely motion is filed in the Court.” Id. at 2. 

{¶4} On August 31, 2011, Children Services filed a motion to extend temporary 

custody of the Child. The juvenile court granted the motion and ordered that “temporary 

custody of the [Child] shall remain vested with [Children Services] for a period of six (6) 

months, to automatically terminate on March 15, 2012 * * *.” Entry Extending 

Temporary Custody. 

{¶5} On February 14, 2012, Children Services filed a motion for permanent 

custody “pursuant to Ohio Juvenile Rule 34, O.R.C. §2151.414, and O.R.C. §2515.413.” 

Motion to Modify Disposition to Permanent Custody at 1. According to the motion, 

“Permanent Custody is an appropriate disposition in this matter as the child has been 

abandoned by both of his parents pursuant to O.R.C. §2151.414(B)(1)(b) [sic] and 

cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable amount of time pursuant to 

O.R.C. §2151.414(E).” Id. 
Highland App. No. 12CA18 3 

{¶6} On August 23, 2012, the juvenile court found that both parents had 

abandoned the Child. As a result, the juvenile court placed the Child in the permanent 

custody of Children Services. 

{¶7} Mother appeals and asserts the following assignment of error: I. “THE 

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PERMANENT CUSTODY TO THE AGENCY 

BECAUSE OF FINDINGS INCONSISTENT WITH STATUTE [sic].” 

II. 

{¶8} In her sole assignment of error, Mother contends that the juvenile court 

erred in awarding permanent custody of the Child to Children Services. 

{¶9} A parent’s “interest in the care, custody, and control of [his or her] children 

‘is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests * * *.’” In re D.A., 113 Ohio 

St.3d 88, 2007-Ohio-1105, 862 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 8, quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 

57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). 

“[P]ermanent termination of parental rights has been 

described as ‘the family law equivalent of the death penalty 

in a criminal case.’ In re Smith (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 

16, 601 N.E.2d 45, 54. Therefore, parents ‘must be afforded 

every procedural and substantive protection the law allows.’ 

Id.” In re Hayes (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 

680. 

In re D.A., 2007-Ohio-1105, at ¶ 10. 

{¶10} “A public or private child-placement agency may file a motion under R.C. 

2151.413(A) to request permanent custody of a child after a court has committed the 
Highland App. No. 12CA18 4 

child to the temporary custody of the agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(2).” In re 

C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 22. Once a R.C. 

2151.413(A) motion is filed, the court must follow R.C. 2151.414. Id. A juvenile court 

may grant the agency’s motion for permanent custody if it determines by clear and 

convincing evidence that: (1) one of the four conditions outlined in R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(d) applies; and (2) it is in the child’s best interest. R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1); In re McCain, 4th Dist. No. 06CA654, 2007-Ohio-1429, ¶ 13. 

{¶11} Ordinarily, we review permanent-custody cases to determine whether 

competent, credible evidence supports the juvenile court’s factual findings. See, e.g., In 

re M.S., D.S., and A.S., 4th Dist. Nos. 11CA823 & 11CA824, 2012-Ohio-3207, ¶ 17. 

Mother does not, however, dispute either the juvenile court’s finding (1) of abandonment 

or (2) that permanent custody is in the Child’s best interest. Instead, Mother argues that 

the juvenile court misapplied the relevant statutes. Therefore, our review is de novo. 

See State v. Sufronko, 105 Ohio App.3d 504, 506, 664 N.E.2d 596 (4th Dist.1995) 

(“When interpreting statutes and their application, an appellate court conducts a de 

novo review, without deference to the trial court’s determination.”). Furthermore, Mother 

did not raise her argument at the trial-court level. Therefore, Mother has forfeited all but 

plain error. See In re C.B., 3d Dist. Nos. 13-12-06 & 13-12-07, 2012-Ohio-2691, ¶ 33. 

In appeals of civil cases, the plain error doctrine is not 

favored and may be applied only in the extremely rare case 

involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no 

objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the 

basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial 
Highland App. No. 12CA18 5 

process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying 

judicial process itself. Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 

116, 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997), syllabus. 

Accord In re D.N., 4th Dist. No. 11CA3203, 2011-Ohio-4627, ¶ 24. 

{¶12} Essentially, Mother argues that, because the juvenile court found the Child 

to be abandoned under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b), Children Services could not have filed 

for permanent custody under R.C. 2151.413(A). Instead, Mother claims that Children 

Services had to wait and file for permanent custody under R.C. 2151.413(D)(1) -- that 

is, wait until after the Child had been in the custody of Children Services “for twelve or 

more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period.” R.C. 2151.413(D)(1). And 

because Children Services did not wait and file under R.C. 2151.413(D)(1), Mother 

claims that the juvenile court did not have the authority to grant permanent custody of 

the Child to Children Services. 

{¶13} We find no merit in Mother’s argument. First, we disagree that the juvenile 

court misapplied the relevant statutes. Under R.C. 2151.413(A), “A public children 

services agency or private child placing agency that * * * is granted temporary custody 

of a child who is not abandoned or orphaned may file a motion in the court that made 

the disposition of the child requesting permanent custody of the child.” And here, 

Children Services was not granted temporary custody of an abandoned child. Rather, 

Children Services was granted temporary custody on the basis of dependency. The 

Child was not found to be abandoned until the juvenile court granted permanent custody

of the Child to Children Services. Therefore, for purposes of filing under R.C. 
Highland App. No. 12CA18 6 

2151.413(A), Children Services had temporary custody of a child who was dependent, 

not temporary custody of a child who was abandoned. 

{¶14} Furthermore, based on Supreme Court of Ohio precedent, the motion for 

permanent custody was clearly permissible. The Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the 

issue of permanent custody in In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163, 2004-Ohio-6411, 818 

N.E.2d 1176. The holding of In re C.W. is: “Before a public children-services agency or 

private child-placing agency can move for permanent custody of a child on R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(d) grounds, the child must have been in the temporary custody of an 

agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period.” (Emphasis added.) 

Id. at syllabus. However, the court also noted that this “holding does not preclude an 

agency from moving for permanent custody before a child has been in the agency’s 

temporary custody for at least 12 months. If a ground other than R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(d) exists to support a grant of permanent custody, the agency may 

move for permanent custody on that other ground.” Id. at ¶ 27. And here, Children 

Services moved for permanent custody on grounds other than R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) -- 

namely, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) and 2151.414(E). Therefore, Children Services did not 

have to wait 12 months to file the motion for permanent custody. 

{¶15} Furthermore, the Ninth Appellate District rejected a similar argument in In 

re M.W., G.B., and C.B., 9th Dist. No. 11CA9975, 2011-Ohio-3886. In that case, the 

trial court found (among other things) that the children had been abandoned. See id. at 

¶ 11. And on appeal, the mother argued “that [Lorain County Children Services] failed 

to comply with R.C. 2151.413(D)(1) by filing the permanent custody motion before the 
Highland App. No. 12CA18 7 

children had been in its temporary custody for a period of 12 months.” Id. at ¶ 12. The 

court of appeals disagreed for the following reasons: 

Although it is well settled that a children services 

agency must have temporary custody of children for at least 

12 months at the time its [sic] files a permanent custody 

motion under the “12 of 22” provision of R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(d), see In re C. W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163, 

2004-Ohio-6411, [Lorain County Children Services] did not 

allege the “12 of 22” ground in its permanent custody motion. 

Instead, it based the first prong of the permanent custody 

test on abandonment by the parents and Mother’s failure to 

substantially remedy the conditions that led to the continued 

removal of the children from her home. See R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(b) and (E)(1). 

Given that [Lorain County Children Services] did not 

base its permanent custody motion on the “12 of 22” ground, 

Mother’s argument is without merit. In re M.W., G.B., and 

C.B., 2011-Ohio-3886, at ¶ 13-14. 

We agree with the Ninth Appellate District and apply the reasoning of In re M.W., G.B., 

and C.B. to the present case. 

{¶16} Because Children Services sought permanent custody on the basis of 

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) and 2151.414(E), the motion for permanent custody was clearly 

authorized. Children Services did not have to wait until the Child had been in its 
Highland App. No. 12CA18 8 

temporary custody for at least 12 months, and the juvenile court had the authority to 

grant permanent custody of the Child to Children Services. Accordingly, we reject 

Mother’s sole assignment of error and affirm the juvenile court’s judgment. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
Highland App. No. 12CA18 9 

JUDGMENT ENTRY

 It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay the costs 

herein taxed. 

The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Juvenile 

Division of the Highland County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this 

judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. 

McFarland, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion. 

For the Court 

 

 

 BY:_____________________________ 

 Roger L. Kline, Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment 

entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing 

with the clerk.