NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RYAN M. KOHANSBY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-35926 

D.C. No. 3:13-cv-05653-BHS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 23, 2017**

Before: NELSON, TROTT, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

Ryan Kohansby appeals the district court’s decision affirming the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Kohansby’s application for social 

security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 8 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 14-35926 

Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. We review de novo, Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 

2014), and we affirm. 

The ALJ identified several specific, clear and convincing reasons that are 

supported by substantial evidence for discounting Kohansby’s credibility regarding

the debilitating effects of his symptoms: (1) Kohansby underreported the benefits 

of his treatment and made inconsistent statements to medical providers; (2) 

Kohansby made exaggerated or inconsistent statements with respect to why he did 

not pursue treatment; (3) an examining physician noted that Kohansby had 

exaggerated his symptoms in recent medical examinations; and (4) Kohansby 

made inconsistent statements reporting his limitations and his daily activities. See 

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (listing among proper 

considerations for credibility assessment an inadequately explained failure to seek 

treatment and engagement in activities of daily living that are inconsistent with the 

alleged symptoms); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(explaining that evidence of a claimant’s favorable response to minimal and 

conservative treatment undermines credibility). 

The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial 

evidence for assigning little weight to Dr. Gritzka’s opinion: (1) objective findings

such as MRI and x-ray reports and treatment notes support the rejection of Dr. 
3 14-35926 

Gritzka’s opinion that Kohansby could not perform “sedentary work”; and (2) Dr. 

Gritzka’s opinion was not supported by Kohansby’s activities. Lester v. Chater, 81

F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the ALJ must make findings setting 

forth specific and legitimate reasons for doing so that are supported by substantial 

evidence in order to reject the contradicted opinion of an examining physician). 

The ALJ properly concluded that, to the extent that Dr. Gritzka’s opinion 

was more restrictive than the residual functional capacity (RFC), Dr. Gritzka’s 

opinion was inconsistent with the objective medical findings of MRI and x-ray 

reports and Kohansby’s Sea Mar Community Health Center treatment notes, which

showed no significant findings or treatment recommendations. The October 2008 

x-rays of Kohansby’s lumbar spine were normal. The state agency consultants 

concluded that Kohansby could perform light work. Thus, the ALJ properly 

assigned little weight to Dr. Gritzka’s opinion because Dr. Gritzka’s opinion was 

inconsistent with his own objective findings and the mild to moderate imaging 

studies, conservative course of treatment recommended by the treating sources, 

and the physical findings on exam. Dr. Iuliano reviewed the same imaging studies 

as Dr. Gritzka and concluded that they were essentially normal. Tommasetti, 533 

F.3d at 1041 (finding that inconsistency with other medical evidence is a specific, 

legitimate reason for rejecting a medical provider’s opinion). Accordingly, the 
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ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for assigning little weight to Dr. 

Gritzka’s opinion regarding Kohansby’s ability to work.

The new evidence that the Appeals Council considered, Dr. Gritzka’s 

August 2012 opinion, does not change the fact that substantial evidence supports 

the ALJ’s decision. Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1159-

60 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]hen a claimant submits evidence for the first time to the 

Appeals Council, which considers that evidence in denying review of the ALJ’s 

decision, the new evidence is part of the administrative record, which the district 

court must consider in determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence.”).

AFFIRMED.