Affirmed and Opinion filed June 13, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-12-00619-CV

COMUNIDAD BALBOA, LLC, Appellant

V.

THE CITY OF NASSAU BAY, DON MATTER (MAYOR), JOHN HAUGEN 

(CITY COUNCIL POSITION 1), DR. SANDRA MOSSMAN (COUNCIL 

POSITION 2), RON SWOFFORD (COUNCIL POSITION 3), BRAD 

BAILEY (COUNCIL POSITION 4), MARK DENMAN (COUNCIL 

POSITION 5), BOB WARTERS (COUNCIL POSITION 6), AND CHRIS 

REED (CITY MANAGER), Appellees

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 3

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 994944

O P I N I O N

In a single issue, Comunidad Balboa, LLC (“Comunidad”) contends the trial 

court erred by granting the plea to the jurisdiction filed by The City of Nassau Bay, 

Don Matter (Mayor), John Haugen (City Council Position 1), Dr. Sandra Mossman 
2

(Council Position 2), Ron Swofford (Council Position 3), Brad Bailey (Council 

Position 4), Mark Denman (Council Position 5), Bob Warters (Council Position 6), 

and Chris Reed (City Manager).

1

 We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In December 2003, Comunidad purchased an apartment complex (“the 

Complex” or, more generally, “the Property”) located within the City’s boundaries 

and built in 1969. Comunidad is a non-profit corporation and intended to use the 

Complex to make affordable housing available to low-income persons. 

Comunidad alleges the following facts in its first amended petition and first 

and second supplements to the amended petition (we refer to these pleadings 

collectively as “petition”). In late 2005 and 2006, Comunidad attended several 

meetings to which the City invited private developers interested in purchasing the 

Property. Nevertheless, Comunidad never consummated a sale with a developer. 

Consequently, the City began a course of action to hinder Comunidad’s use of the 

Complex. 

The City first filed a lawsuit challenging Comunidad’s property tax 

exemption related to the Complex.2 The City then amended its fire-prevention

ordinances to require the installation of sprinkler systems in certain newly-built 

and existing structures.3 The Complex is the only existing structure in the City 

subject to compliance with the ordinances. The ordinances also provided that 

 

1 We will use the term “the City” when referring to The City of Nassau Bay by itself and 

all appellees collectively.

2

In 2011, our court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the City in the taxexemption lawsuit. See generally Comunidad Balboa, LLC v. City of Nassau Bay, 352 S.W.3d 

72 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

3

See City of Nassau Bay Code of Ordinances, Part II, ch. 8, art. III, §§ 8-30–8-35 

(available as of June 2013 at 

http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientID=11324&stateID=43&statename=Texas). 
3

those in noncompliance “shall be punished by a fine not to exceed two thousand 

dollars ($2,000.00)” for each day of noncompliance.4 Comunidad alleges it would 

need to spend over $1 million dollars to retrofit the Complex with the required 

sprinkler system. The City rejected Comunidad’s architects’ alternative methods

for upgrading fire suppression in the Complex. Moreover, Comunidad alleges it 

was awarded a grant by the State which included funds for the sprinkler system, 

but the City was instrumental in convincing the State to revoke the grant. At the 

time Comunidad filed its amended petition, the City had issued Comunidad over 

50 citations for noncompliance with the ordinances (although Comunidad asserts 

the citations were sent to another entity, not Comunidad). 

In June 2011, Comunidad sued the City for conspiracy and inverse 

condemnation and sought injunctive and declaratory relief. Shortly thereafter, the 

trial court issued a temporary restraining order, restraining the City from enforcing 

the ordinances. Comunidad later added a nuisance claim against the City. The 

City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, requesting dismissal of all Comunidad’s 

claims. The trial court granted the plea, rendering a final judgment. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW: PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION 

In a single issue, Comunidad contends the trial court erred by granting the 

City’s plea to the jurisdiction. Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a 

question of law we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 

217, 226, 228 (Tex. 2004). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the 

pleadings, we determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively

demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 226. We should glean the plaintiff’s 

intent and construe the pleadings liberally in favor of jurisdiction. Id. If the 

factual allegations of the pleadings neither affirmatively demonstrate that the trial 

 

4 City Ordinances, § 8-33, see footnote 3, supra.
4

court has jurisdiction nor affirmatively demonstrate incurable jurisdictional 

defects, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be afforded 

an opportunity to amend. Id. at 226–27. If the pleadings affirmatively negate 

jurisdiction, the court should sustain the plea and dismiss the suit without allowing 

the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Id. at 227. 

III. INVERSE CONDEMNATION 

Comunidad first argues the trial court erred by dismissing Comunidad’s 

inverse condemnation claim for want for jurisdiction.

The Texas Constitution provides a clear and unambiguous waiver of 

immunity from suit for inverse condemnation claims under article I, section 17 

(Takings Clause). Tex. Const. art. I, § 17; City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 

562, 568 (Tex. 2012). However, a “trial court lacks jurisdiction and should grant a 

plea to the jurisdiction where a plaintiff cannot establish a viable takings claim.” 

Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, --- S.W.3d ---, No. 10-1020, 

2013 WL 1365936, at *2 (Tex. Apr. 5, 2013) (citation omitted); see also Rusk 

State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex. 2012) (explaining trial court lacks 

subject-matter jurisdiction if governmental unit has immunity from suit).

The elements of an inverse condemnation claim are (1) the governmental 

entity intentionally performed an act in the exercise of its lawful authority, (2) that 

resulted in the taking, damaging, or destruction of the claimant’s property, (3) for 

public use. City of Houston v. Trail Enters., Inc., 377 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. filed). An inverse condemnation claim may 

be based on a physical or regulatory taking. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 

S.W.2d 922, 933 (Tex. 1998); City of Houston v. Maguire Oil Co., 342 S.W.3d 

726, 735 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). Comunidad’s 

inverse condemnation claim is based solely on a regulatory-taking theory. There 
5

are several types of regulatory taking. See Maguire Oil Co., 342 S.W.3d at 735

(describing theories of regulatory taking). Relevant to this case are (1) a “total

regulatory taking” and (2) a “Penn Central taking.” Id. at 735–36.

A. Total Regulatory Taking

A total regulatory taking occurs when “a restriction denies the landowner all 

economically viable use of the property or totally destroys the value of the property 

if the restriction renders the property valueless.” Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 935; see 

also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (“[W]hen the 

owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial 

uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically 

idle, he has suffered a taking.”). This is a per se taking entailing a relatively 

simple analysis of whether value remains in the property after the governmental 

action. Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 935; Maguire Oil Co., 342 S.W.3d at 736 n.6. To 

deprive an owner of all economically viable use of land is tantamount to depriving 

him of the land itself. Sheffield Dev. Co., Inc. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 

S.W.3d 660, 671 (Tex. 2004). This theory is limited to the extraordinary 

circumstance when no productive or economically viable use of land is permitted, 

and the landowner is left with a token interest. Id. (citations omitted).

As described above, Comunidad essentially alleges the cost of installing a 

sprinkler system is prohibitively high and it cannot continue to operate the 

Complex without installing the sprinkler because of continued ticketing. 

According to Comunidad, these facts “render the property wholly useless” and 

“cause a total destruction of value.” However, the thrust of Comunidad’s 

complaint is not that the ordinances left its property with no economic use or value,

but that the ordinances are too financially burdensome for Comunidad. Even if 

Comunidad cannot afford to continue using the Complex for low-income housing 
6

because of the ordinances, Comunidad does not allege any facts supporting the 

extraordinary circumstance that the property (of which the Complex is only a part) 

is rendered totally valueless.5 We decline to hold Comunidad’s alleged inability to 

afford the required sprinkler system or continued ticketing has “denie[d]

[Comunidad] all economically viable use of the property or totally destroy[ed] the 

value of the property [by] render[ing] the property valueless.” Mayhew, 964 

S.W.2d at 935. Accordingly, Comunidad has not alleged facts affirmatively 

demonstrating the trial court’s jurisdiction over Comunidad’s claim for a total 

regulatory taking. 

B. Penn Central Taking 

We next address whether Comunidad has sufficiently alleged a Penn Central

taking. A Penn Central taking occurs when a government regulation has 

unreasonably interfered with a property owner’s right to use and enjoy his property 

considering the following three factors: (1) “the economic impact of the regulation 

on the claimant;” (2) “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 

 

5 A plaintiff may not rely on the per se rule of a total regulatory taking by alleging a 

portion of his real property was rendered valueless.

“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and 

attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely 

abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a 

taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the 

nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole—here, 

the city tax block designated as the “landmark site.” 

Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978); see also Centeno v. 

City of Alamo Heights, No. 04-02-00677-CV, 2004 WL 624554, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

Mar. 31, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[W]hether a regulation denies a landowner the 

economically viable use of a part of the property is not the test. The test is whether the zoning 

regulations deprive the Centenos of all economically viable use of their property.” (citation 

omitted)); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 71 S.W.3d 18, 44 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2002) (“[W]here part of a land owner’s property is allegedly ‘taken,’ the 

effect of the regulation must be viewed with respect to the impact on the property as a whole to 

determine whether a taking has actually occurred.”), aff’d, 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004). 
7

investment-backed expectations;” and (3) “the character of the governmental 

action.” Maguire Oil Co., 342 S.W.3d at 736 n.7 (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 

104, 124). However, consideration of whether a Penn Central taking has occurred 

typically involves an ad hoc, highly fact-specific analysis. Trail Enters., Inc., 377 

S.W.3d at 878. In other words, there is usually no bright-line test and the relevant 

factors may vary from case to case. Id. In determining whether the plaintiff 

alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating the trial court’s subject-matter 

jurisdiction over a Penn Central taking claim, we construe the facts liberally in 

favor of the plaintiff. See Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 

476, 482 n.27, 491 (Tex. 2012).

1. Economic Impact on Comunidad 

We must take as true Comunidad’s allegations that it cannot afford the 

required $1 million sprinkler system or to continue paying tickets for 

noncompliance with the ordinance. Because of the ordinance, Comunidad will not 

be able to use the Complex for low-income housing. Furthermore, without being 

granted a variance or other accommodation, Comunidad is not able to convert the 

building into business space because the fire-sprinkler requirement would still 

apply under the ordinance. We also recognize Comunidad is a non-profit 

corporation which purchased the property for the purpose of providing low-income 

housing to the community. Thus, the ordinance has a substantial economic impact 

on Comunidad. Nonetheless, “[p]urchasing and developing real estate carries with 

it certain financial risks, and it is not the government’s duty to underwrite this risk 

as an extension of obligations under the takings clause.” Sheffield, 140 S.W.3d at 

677. Accordingly, although this factor weighs in favor of a taking, it is not 

dispositive.
8

2. Extent of Interference with Comunidad’s Distinct InvestmentBacked Expectations

When Comunidad purchased the Complex, it was occupied and did not 

violate existing fire ordinances. Comunidad intended to use the property for lowincome housing and sought and received a tax exemption for that purpose. 

Subsequently, the City amended the fire ordinances in such a way that makes it

economically infeasible for Comunidad to operate the Complex. “The existing and 

permitted uses of the property constitute the ‘primary expectation’ of the 

landowner that is affected by regulation.” Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 936 (citation 

omitted). Thus, the ordinances substantially interfere with Comunidad’s 

investment-back expectations. 

Nevertheless, the City acted well within its police powers to modernize 

ordinances pertaining directly to life-saving fire suppression in a multi-family 

dwelling. It is axiomatic that safety equipment, procedures, and technology are 

constantly being improved. Thus, the owner of a large apartment complex should 

anticipate additional expenditures due to enactment of new safety regulations. See 

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (“It seems to us that the property owner necessarily 

expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various 

measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers.”). 

Each owner of any property and particularly of a multi-tenanted 

dwelling must, it seems to this Court, be deemed to have purchased 

same with a consciousness of the possibility (if not indeed, in these 

volatile times, of the probability) that new technological 

developments and sociological advances would insistently and 

inescapably require the installation of newly-perfected protections of 

life and limb. It would be a strange kind of government and a 

particularly hazardous way of life where all advance was confined to 

newly-erected structures while those residing in older buildings were 

condemned to exposure to dangers which latter-day research had 

developed means to prevent or, at the very least, to minimize.
9

People v. Halpern, 304 N.Y.S.2d 183, 188 (N.Y. City Ct. 1969). “[I]n no case 

does the owner of property acquire immunity against exercise of the police power 

because he constructed it in full compliance with the existing laws.” Queenside 

Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 83 (1946). Therefore, we conclude the 

ordinances’ interference with Comunidad’s investment-back expectations does not 

weigh in favor of a taking.

3. Character of Governmental Action

We first note the City’s ordinances do not directly restrict Comunidad’s use 

of the property; instead, they create a financial burden for Comunidad. See Hearts 

Bluff, 381 S.W.3d at 480 (“We have held that a lack of a direct governmental 

restriction of the owner’s use of her land or a lack of regulatory authority over the 

land-use decision at issue is dispositive in takings cases.”). However, 

Comunidad’s primary contention regarding why the ordinances effect a taking is 

that the City enacted the ordinances as part of a continuing course of bad-faith 

actions aimed to harm Comunidad. 

We must take as true the following allegations: (1) the City began targeting 

Comunidad’s property after the City’s failed attempts to facilitate a sale of the 

Property to private developers in 2005 and 2006; (2) the City sought to create 

problems for Comunidad by challenging its tax exemption; (3) the City enacted the 

ordinances for the purpose of causing “a huge financial burden” to Comunidad; (4) 

the Complex is the only existing building in the City which must be retrofitted 

under the ordinances; (5) the City rejected all of Comunidad’s architect’s proposals 

for less-expensive fire-safety upgrades to the Complex; (6) after Comunidad 

received a state grant to pay for the required sprinkler system, the City was 

“instrumental in having the grant revoked”; (7) in August 2010, the City began 

issuing citations for Comunidad’s noncompliance but apparently has been ticketing 
10

the wrong entity; over 50 citations have been issued6; and (8) the City and mayor 

“have encouraged tenants to move from the [Complex].” 

Whether the governmental entity acted in bad faith has often been a 

consideration in determining whether a governmental action gives rise to a 

compensable taking. See id. at 487. In San Antonio River Authority v. Garrett 

Brothers, a city caused a taking by intentionally disrupting a landowner’s 

development of a subdivision in order to prevent an increase in the value of the 

land (which the city wanted to acquire for public use), despite the city attorney’s 

opinion that the city could not legally halt development for such a reason. 528 

S.W.2d 266, 268–70 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The 

court of appeals explained,

[W]here the purpose of the governmental action is the prevention of 

development of land that would increase the cost of a planned future 

acquisition of such land by government . . . [, the government] can no 

longer pretend to be acting as a neutral arbiter. It is no longer an 

impartial weigher of the merits of competing interest among its 

citizens. Instead, it has placed a heavy governmental thumb on the 

scales to insure that in the forthcoming dispute between it and one, or 

more, of its citizens, the scales will tip in its own favor.

Id. at 274; see State v. Biggar, 873 S.W.2d 11, 12, 14 (Tex. 1994) (concluding 

taking occurred because State denied an easement exchange to landowners solely 

to reduce the value of their tract, which the County wanted to purchase for public

use); City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 393–94 (Tex. 1978) (concluding 

taking occurred because city passed an ordinance and denied plaintiffs’ application 

for land-use permit for the purpose of acquiring the property for a scenic easement 

without having to pay for it; the City “singled out plaintiffs to bear all of the cost 

for the community benefit without distributing any cost among the members of the 

 

6

In its brief, Comunidad asserts “approximately 69 citations” have been issued.
11

community.”); see also Sheffield, 140 S.W.3d at 678.

In Hearts Bluff, the supreme court recently addressed governmental bad faith 

in the context of a Penn Central analysis. 381 S.W.3d at 487–88. The court 

explained, “Evidence of bad faith is given due weight, but must be considered 

against other circumstances, including legitimate public benefits furthered by the 

action.” Id. at 488. The court also noted, “If the State had targeted one particular 

landowner and treated him unfairly, there might be more merit to the claim.” Id.; 

see also Sheffield, 140 S.W.3d at 676 (“[I]t ordinarily is, and should be, harder for 

the government to show that its interests have been substantially advanced by 

regulation directed at one lone landowner.”).

According to Comunidad’s pleadings, the City targeted Comunidad when 

amending the ordinances—Comunidad is the only existing structure subject to 

compliance with the amended ordinances. However, the new ordinances also 

require “installation of an automatic fire sprinkler system . . . in any new 

commercial building or commercial structure [of a certain size],” and that such 

installation “comply with all applicable adopted city codes and ordinances 

including all NFPA [National Fire Prevention Association] references and or 

codes.”7 Hence, the City’s amendments were not solely directed at Comunidad. 

Furthermore, in a document attached to, and incorporated as part of, Comunidad’s 

petition, Comunidad’s architect admitted NFPA rules would require installation of 

a sprinkler system for a new building with the same specifications as the Complex.

Additionally, the ordinances expressly state, “The purpose of this article is to 

provide a reasonable degree of safety to persons occupying existing buildings by 

providing for the installation of automatic fire sprinkler systems in such buildings 

 

7 City Ordinances, § 8-34, see footnote 3, supra.
12

that do not already have such systems.”8 Requiring a fire sprinkler upgrade—even 

though the Complex is the only existing building affected by the ordinances and 

even if the City’s intent was to harm Comunidad and lower its property value—

cannot be said to be wholly arbitrary or capricious when installation of the system 

must “meet the requirements and specifications of the current edition of the 

International Fire Code, Life Safety Code and the National Fire Codes.”9

We also note the ordinances provide a three-year compliance schedule: (1) 

submission of plans and a permit application within one year; (2) installation of an 

approved, operational sprinkler system to 50% of the structure within two years; 

and (3) installation of an approved, operational sprinkler system to 100% of the 

structure within three years. Additionally, further tempering the City’s alleged bad 

faith is the fact that the City did not begin issuing citations against Comunidad for 

noncompliance with any of these milestones until August 2010, even though the 

City could have begun citing Comunidad in July 2008. 

We recognize that, even for important public-safety reasons, such as fire 

suppression, the government may not take private property in violation of the 

Texas Constitution. See Garrett Bros., 528 S.W.2d at 273 (“If there is a taking the 

constitution requires payment, even though the taking be for the purpose of 

promoting the public health, safety, morals or welfare and, therefore, involves an 

exercise of the police power.”). Nonetheless, the importance of the public benefits 

furthered by governmental action is a factor for consideration, see Hearts Bluff,

381 S.W.3d at 488, and promoting fire safety in multi-family dwellings is 

inarguably an important governmental function. 

 

8 City Ordinances, § 8-35, see footnote 3, supra.

9 City Ordinances, § 8-35, see footnote 3, supra.
13

This Court has consistently affirmed that States have broad power to 

regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant 

relationship in particular without paying compensation for all 

economic injuries that such regulation entails. . . . Consequently, our 

holding today in no way alters the analysis governing the State’s 

power to require landlords to comply with building codes and provide 

utility connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, 

and the like in the common area of a building.

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982).

Protection of the safety of persons is one of the traditional uses of the 

police power of the States. Experts may differ as to the most 

appropriate way of dealing with fire hazards in lodging houses. . . . 

But the legislature may choose not to take the chance that human life 

will be lost in lodging house fires and adopt the most conservative 

course which science and engineering offer. It is for the legislature to 

decide what regulations are needed to reduce fire hazards to the 

minimum. Many types of social legislation diminish the value of the 

property which is regulated. The extreme cases are those where in the 

interest of the public safety or welfare the owner is prohibited from 

using his property. We are dealing here with a less drastic measure. 

But in no case does the owner of property acquire immunity against 

exercise of the police power because he constructed it in full 

compliance with the existing laws. The police power is one of the 

least limitable of governmental powers, and in its operation often cuts 

down property rights.

Saxl, 328 U.S. at 82–83.

Accordingly, because the ordinances were reasonably tempered, provided an

extended compliance schedule, and pertained to a significant governmental 

concern, we conclude the City’s alleged bad faith does not transform its 

amendment of the ordinances into an unconstitutional taking. Therefore, 

considering our whole Penn Central analysis, we hold Comunidad has not alleged 

a viable regulatory takings claim.
14

Admittedly, one of Comunidad’s primary bad-faith allegations is that, after 

receiving a grant from the State, a portion of which was to pay for the sprinkler 

system, the City was instrumental in convincing the State to revoke the grant. 

Because Comunidad alleges only a part of the grant was to be used for the new 

sprinkler system, it is unclear why the City allegedly opposed the grant. 

Comunidad argues the City blocked funds necessary to pay for the sprinkler 

system in order to reduce the property’s value. According to Comunidad, the City 

sought to spur economic development and eventually increase tax revenue

resulting from a commercial use of the property. 

Comunidad asserts in its brief, “[P]roperty in Texas cannot be condemned 

for the purpose of transferring the property to a private entity for the primary 

purpose of economic development or enhancement of tax revenues. Tex. Const. 

art. I, § 17(b).” As amended in 2009, article I, section 17 excludes from the 

definition of “public use” transfers of property to private entities for the primary 

purpose of economic development or enhancement of tax revenues. Tex. Const. 

art. I, § 17(b); Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, 

LLC, 363 S.W.3d 192, 195 n.3 (Tex. 2012).

10

 We will assume this version of 

article I, section 17 applies because of Comunidad’s reliance on it and because the 

City does not argue otherwise. Thus, to the extent Comunidad alleges the City 

enacted the ordinances and committed other acts in order to increase tax revenues, 

it has failed to allege a viable takings claim.

 

10 But see generally Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding 

government’s taking and transferring private property to another private person for purpose of 

increasing tax revenue was proper use of eminent domain power under Fifth Amendment of

United States Constitution).
15

In sum, we overrule the portion of Comunidad’s sole issue in which it 

contends the trial court erred by dismissing Comunidad’s inverse condemnation 

claim.

IV. COMUNIDAD’S OTHER CLAIMS

In its petition, Comunidad also asserted claims for nuisance and conspiracy 

and requested injunctive and declaratory relief. Additionally, Comunidad 

apparently asserted a claim that the City deprived Comunidad of property without 

due course of law, in violation of Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution. 

See Tex. Const. art. I, § 19. 

On appeal, Comunidad does not assert any argument relative to its nuisance 

claim. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the trial court’s dismissal of this claim.

Regarding conspiracy, the City moved for dismissal of this claim based on 

absolute legislative immunity and under section 101.106 of the Texas Civil 

Practice and Remedies Code. In its appellate briefing, Comunidad does not 

address these bases for dismissal; instead, Comunidad merely rehashes the factual 

basis for its conspiracy claim. Because Comunidad does not address the City’s

legal arguments for dismissal of the conspiracy claim, we overrule this portion of 

Comunidad’s issue. See Ollie v. Plano Ind. Sch. Dist., 383 S.W.3d 783, 790 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied); Clifton v. Walters, 308 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied). 

Comunidad also seeks to enjoin enforcement of the ordinances, and a 

declaration that the ordinances are unconstitutional, because the City’s amendment

of the ordinances violated Comunidad’s right to due course of law. In its plea to 

the jurisdiction, the City argued, and cited authorities for the proposition, that the 

trial court does not have jurisdiction over Comunidad’s claims for injunctive and 
16

declaratory relief based on the unconstitutionality of the ordinances because such 

claims must be resolved in a criminal proceeding resulting from enforcement of the 

penal ordinance at issue. See City of La Marque v. Braskey, 216 S.W.3d 861, 863–

64 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (concluding district court

lacked civil jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of penal ordinance because criminal 

proceeding was proper venue for plaintiff’s constitutional challenge to ordinance); 

see also Ryan v Rosenthal, 314 S.W.3d 136, 141–42 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). Comunidad did not address this argument in its response 

to the plea or appellate briefing. Thus, we overrule that portion of Comunidad’s 

issue regarding its claims for equitable relief based on the unconstitutionality of the 

ordinances. See Clifton, 308 S.W.3d at 99.11

Finally, Comunidad argues in its brief, “[The City] set upon a course of 

action to attempt to intentionally decrease the value of the property since the [City]

could not condemn the property to transfer to a third party.” According to 

Comunidad,

The city ordinance was enacted to apply only to Comunidad’s 

property and has unlawfully deprived [Comunidad] of the use, benefit 

and enjoyment of the property and has drastically reduced the value of 

the property because of the actions of the defendants; through the 

issuance of citations for violations of the city ordinance and the 

encouragement of tenants to move from the property. 

Comunidad cites no authority supporting that the City’s actions amounted to a duecourse-of-law violation, other than citing article I, section 19. Thus, we overrule 

that portion of Comunidad’s issue regarding its due-course-of-law claim based on 

the City’s alleged plan to transfer the property to another private party. See id.

 

11 We do not consider whether the trial court actually lacked jurisdiction to consider 

Comunidad’s claims for injuctive and declaratory relief based on the unconstitutionality of the 

ordinances.
17

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.12

/s/ John Donovan

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Boyce and Donovan.

 

12 We do not remand for Comunidad to have an opportunity to amend its pleadings 

because Comunidad did not request such opportunity in the trial court. See Tara Partners, Ltd. 

v. City of S. Houston, 282 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) 

(“[T]hrough inaction, a plaintiff may lose the opportunity to amend.”); see also Ogueri v. Tex. S.

Univ., No. 01-10-00228-CV, 2011 WL 1233568, at *6 n.6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar.

31, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); Rebecca Simmons & Suzette Kinder Patton, Plea to the 

Jurisdiction: Defining the Undefined, 40 St. Mary’s L.J. 627, 659–60 (2009).