Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the 

case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

ELIZABETH A. BELLIN GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Cohen Law Offices Attorney General of Indiana

Elkhart, Indiana

BRIAN REITZ

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

ROBERT BRANDON, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 20A05-1202-CR-53

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE ELKHART CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Terry Shewmaker, Judge

Cause No. 20C01-1103-FA-7

August 29, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BARNES, Judge
2

Case Summary

Robert Brandon appeals his convictions and sentence for Class A felony robbery, 

Class A felony burglary, and Class B felony conspiracy to commit robbery. We affirm in 

part, reverse in part, and remand.

Issues

The issues before us are:

I. whether Brandon’s convictions for both Class A felony 

robbery and Class A felony burglary violate double 

jeopardy principles;

II. whether there is sufficient evidence to support 

Brandon’s conviction for Class A felony robbery; and

III. whether Brandon’s aggregate sixty-year sentence is 

inappropriate.

Facts

The evidence most favorable to the convictions is that on the evening of February 

4, 2011, Dawn Alwine was having a birthday party for her daughter, Chelsea, at her 

home in Elkhart. Earlier in the day, Dawn’s acquaintance, disabled sixty-seven-year-old 

Army veteran Roy Tittle, saw Dawn in a drug store parking lot. Tittle and Dawn had an 

argument about a man Dawn was dating, and Tittle told Dawn to stay away from his 

house.

Tittle then returned to his home and began drinking. At about 10:30 p.m., Dawn 

and Chelsea left the birthday party and walked into Tittle’s nearby house without 

knocking. Another argument ensued. This time, Tittle, who was now intoxicated, 
3

punched Dawn in the mouth. Dawn and Chelsea then left Tittle’s house and returned to 

the party. Tittle resumed drinking and eventually passed out on his recliner.

When Dawn returned to the party with a bloody mouth, she told people that Tittle 

had punched her and that she wanted someone to hit him in return. Brandon, Alex Jones, 

and Cameron O’Neal were at the party, and Dawn asked them if they would go to Tittle’s 

house and punch him in the mouth a couple of times, and they all agreed. Dawn also 

enticed Brandon and the others into going to Tittle’s house by telling them that he kept 

$300 in cash and $100 in change in the house. Brandon also asked Dawn if Tittle had 

any televisions in the house, and Dawn told him that Tittle did.

At about 2:00 a.m. on February 5, 2011, Dawn, Brandon, Jones, O’Neal, and 

another individual, Darnell Brown, walked to Tittle’s house. Brandon and Jones wore 

masks that Dawn provided. When they arrived at Tittle’s house, Jones kicked the door in 

and all the individuals went inside. Brandon and Jones both then began punching and 

stomping on the passed-out Tittle. Jones repeatedly asked Tittle, “where’s your wallet, 

n*****?” Tr. p. 190. Tittle did not respond, but Dawn found his wallet and gave it to 

Jones. The parties ransacked the house, looking for items to steal. O’Neal found and 

took a coffee can full of change, Jones took a television, Dawn took some pills, and 

Brandon took clothes and jewelry. Dawn also believed that Brandon was considering 

stealing Tittle’s car, but she and Jones talked him out of it. Dawn, Brandon, Jones, 

O’Neal, and Brown returned to the party, with Brandon and Jones excitedly discussing 

how they had beaten Tittle and acting out their motions. Brandon also exclaimed, “we 
4

got that n***** naked.” Tr. p. 393. Courtney then drove Brandon and the others to 

Brandon’s residence, where they stashed the items stolen from Tittle’s house.

At 2:32 a.m., Elkhart Police Department Corporal Andy Rucker responded to a 

911 call placed by a person who lived in Tittle’s basement. Corporal Rucker found Tittle 

sitting in his recliner covered in blood, apparently conscious but unable to remember 

anything that had happened. Tittle was transported to a hospital emergency room. His 

left eye was swollen shut, and he had abrasions to his left shoulder and arm, including 

loose skin hanging off of it. He also told the treating physician that his pain was a ten on 

a scale from one to ten. A CAT scan revealed that Tittle had a comminuted fracture of 

his left orbital socket, meaning it was broken into little pieces, and a complex fracture of 

the lamina papyracea, another part of the eye orbit. Tittle had to have a total of twelve 

stitches around his left eye. After being in the emergency room for about four hours, 

Tittle was discharged with a Vicodin prescription.

Eventually, Dawn confessed what had happened to police. For his role in the 

incident, the State charged Brandon with Class A felony robbery, based on serious bodily 

injury, Class A felony burglary, based on bodily injury, and Class B felony conspiracy to 

commit robbery resulting in bodily injury. A jury trial was held on December 5-7, 2011, 

after which Brandon was found guilty as charged. The trial court entered convictions on 

all three verdicts and sentenced Brandon as follows: forty-eight years for the robbery and 

burglary convictions, to run concurrently, and twelve years for the conspiracy conviction, 
5

to run consecutive to the other two sentences for an aggregate term of sixty years. 

Brandon now appeals.

Analysis

I. Double Jeopardy

We first address Brandon’s argument that there is an irreconcilable double 

jeopardy conflict between his convictions for Class A felony robbery and Class A felony 

burglary, because they depend upon the same injuries to Tittle. The base offense of 

robbery is a Class C felony, but it is a Class B felony if it is committed with a deadly 

weapon or causes bodily injury to anyone other than a defendant and is further elevated 

to a Class A felony if it results in serious bodily injury to anyone other than a defendant. 

Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1. The base offense of burglary of a dwelling is a Class B felony, 

but it is elevated to a Class A felony if it results in either bodily injury or serious bodily 

injury to anyone other than a defendant. I.C. § 35-43-2-1. 

For purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Indiana Constitution, two 

offenses are identical and one must be vacated if the evidentiary facts establishing the 

essential elements of one offense also establish all of the essential elements of a second 

offense. Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 833 (Ind. 2002). The State correctly notes that 

the scenario in this case—where the same evidence allegedly supports an enhancement of 

two different offenses, but not all of the elements of both offenses—does not violate the 

Indiana Constitution. However, Indiana courts have long adhered to a series of rules of 

statutory construction and common law holding, among other things, that two different 
6

offenses cannot be enhanced based on precisely the same injury or injuries to one victim. 

Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind. 2002).

The tests for determining whether constitutional or common law rules against 

double jeopardy have been violated are largely co-extensive. We must “consider the 

evidence, charging information, final jury instructions and arguments of counsel in 

determining what facts the trier-of-fact used to establish each element of an offense.” 

Boss v. State, 964 N.E.2d 931, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). If there is a reasonable 

possibility that the fact finder relied upon the same evidentiary facts to support an 

enhancement of two offenses, one of the offenses must be lowered to an offense level that 

does not depend upon the enhancement. See id. at 938.

Here, the charging information generically alleged only that Tittle sustained 

serious bodily injury under the robbery count and bodily injury under the burglary count. 

There also was nothing in the presentation of evidence or jury instructions that would 

support a distinction between injuries sustained as part of the burglary and those 

sustained as part of the robbery. The State directs us to the following portions of the 

prosecutor’s closing argument, where it claims a differentiation was made regarding the 

burglary, the robbery, and the injuries Tittle sustained:

And once they get inside and they’re getting the 

televisions and the money, Alex and Robert are beating on 

Roy. . . . Burglary is a crime against property, but we have 

injury here. . . . They beat on Roy, and Alex is saying where 

is the money. And Dawn gets the money, and she told you 

after that they keep beating on Roy. . . . [C]onsider what they 

were intending to do, to take the money and the television 
7

sets and consider the fact that Roy was experiencing physical 

pain at this point, and that’s bodily inquiry [sic], and that is 

Count II [burglary].

The final conscious decision made by the five of them 

that night was to treat Roy’s house like a Wal-Mart, a free for 

all if you will. And the reason you criminalize this separately 

is because they had the money; they had the opportunity to 

leave with the televisions; but they stayed in that house. They 

stayed in that house long enough to start ransacking it and 

looking for extra stuff, and that’s why this is a separate and 

distinct crime.

* * * * *

. . . . And what happens to Roy here? What’s the 

serious bodily inquiry [sic]? . . . It can be extreme pain. It 

can be unconsciousness. It could be comminuted fracturing, 

ladies and gentlemen, to Roy’s eye socket. . . . What 

happened to Roy’s eye socket? The floor fell out. 

Comminuted, crushed, pulverized. Bone that has been broken 

into little pieces. And how about the lamina papyracea, the 

other bone near the sinus, that’s a complex fracture. Just 

another word, ladies and gentlemen, meaning multiple 

fractures. This did not have to happen but for Robert 

Brandon and Alex Jones and the others making the decision 

to say in that house, to continue to beat Roy, and to take all 

that extra stuff: the clothing, the gold jewels, and the pills. 

Three conscious decisions, ladies and gentlemen, three 

separate crimes. They must be treated separately by you.

Tr. pp. 678-80.

Contrary to the State’s contention, we do not see an attempt to differentiate the 

evidence regarding Tittle’s injuries. Clearly, the prosecutor was making an attempt to 

differentiate generally between the burglary, robbery, and conspiracy charges. Brandon 

makes no argument that there is a double jeopardy problem with being convicted of all 
8

three offenses. Regarding Tittle’s injuries, however, the prosecutor’s argument does not 

differentiate at all between the burglary and the robbery. 

Indeed, we cannot perceive how the evidence could have supported such a 

differentiation. After breaking into the house, Jones and Brandon immediately joined 

together to severely batter Tittle while some of the others looked for property to steal in 

his house. This battering took place immediately and, as even argued by the prosecutor, 

it occurred while Jones was asking Tittle where his wallet was. There was no evidence of 

separate, distinct episodes of beating Tittle. Thus, all of Tittle’s injuries were sustained 

during the course of one continuous beating immediately after the conspirators entered 

his house and while Jones was demanding property from him. We conclude there is a 

more than reasonable possibility that the jury relied on the same evidence to support the 

bodily injury enhancement of the burglary charge and the serious bodily injury 

enhancement of the robbery charge.

The question is how to remedy this double jeopardy violation. Brandon argues 

that his robbery conviction should be reduced to a base Class C felony and that his 

conspiracy conviction based on that conviction should likewise be reduced to a Class C 

felony. See I.C. § 35-41-5-2(a) (providing that except for murder, a conspiracy 

conviction is a felony of the same class as the underlying offense). The State argues that 

this would result in a “windfall” to Brandon and that if we find a double jeopardy 

violation, we ought to instead reduce the burglary conviction to a Class B felony. 

Appellee’s Br. p. 16.
9

When two convictions contravene double jeopardy principles, we may remedy the 

violation by reducing either conviction to a less serious form of the same offense if doing 

so will eliminate the violation. Moala v. State, 969 N.E.2d 1061, 1065 (Ind. Ct. App.

2012) (quoting Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 54 (Ind. 1999)). Generally, in 

deciding which conviction to reduce or vacate, a reviewing court will reduce or vacate 

the conviction with the less severe penal consequences. Id. The severity of the penal 

consequences largely is determined by the class of crime or by the length of sentence 

imposed. Id. at 1066. Additionally, parties do not have the discretion to choose which 

conviction should be reduced or vacated in the event of a double jeopardy violation. See

id. at 1067 (holding State could not direct that conviction with more severe immediate 

penal consequences be vacated instead of conviction with less severe consequences).

This case is somewhat unusual, in that both the robbery and burglary convictions

have equal penal consequences and Brandon was given equal sentences for each 

conviction. However, we believe that in this particular case, the burglary conviction 

clearly has the less severe penal consequences. That is, the robbery conviction carries not 

only its own penal consequences, but is also related to the Class B felony conspiracy 

conviction and its twelve-year sentence. As a whole, therefore, the robbery conviction 

carries more severe penal consequences than the burglary conviction. Additionally, we 

may remedy this double jeopardy violation by only reducing the burglary conviction to a 

Class B felony, while if we did not reduce the burglary conviction we would be legally 

required to reduce Brandon’s A felony robbery and B felony conspiracy convictions both 
10

to Class C felonies. We believe that in remedying a double jeopardy violation, we should

strive to maintain convictions and a resulting sentence that are as close as legally possible 

to the original convictions and sentence. 

We direct that Brandon’s conviction for Class A felony burglary be reduced to a 

Class B felony, which does not require any proof of bodily injury, leaving his robbery 

and conspiracy convictions intact. Furthermore, in the interest of efficient judicial 

administration, remand for the trial court to resentence Brandon for the burglary count is 

not required and we may make this determination ourselves, based on the penalty the trial 

court found appropriate. See id. at 1066. We believe that a sentence of eighteen years 

for Class B felony burglary, to be served concurrent with the robbery sentence, is 

consistent with the sentence originally imposed by the trial court.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Next, we address Brandon’s contention that there is insufficient evidence of 

serious bodily injury to Tittle to support his Class A felony robbery conviction. When 

reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence to support a conviction, we neither reweigh the 

evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses, because this is the exclusive province 

of the fact finder. Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind. 2012). We consider only the 

evidence most favorable to the State together with all reasonable and logical inferences 

that may be drawn from that evidence. Id. If a reasonable finder of fact could have 

found from the evidence that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we 

will uphold the conviction. Id.
11

“Serious bodily injury” is statutorily defined as bodily injury “that creates a 

substantial risk of death or that causes . . . (1) serious permanent disfigurement; (2) 

unconsciousness; (3) extreme pain; (4) permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the 

function of a bodily member or organ; or (5) loss of a fetus.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-292. On 

rare occasions, an appellate court may determine as a matter of law that certain injuries 

do not qualify as “serious bodily injury.” See Davis v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1176, 1178 

(Ind. 2004) (holding that evidence victim suffered lacerated lip, knee abrasion, and 

broken pinky finger and was not given any prescription-strength pain medication did not 

establish serious bodily injury). Generally, however, we exercise considerable deference 

to the fact finder when determining whether a victim suffered serious bodily injury. 

Mendenhall v. State, 963 N.E.2d 553, 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “There is 

no bright line rule differentiating ‘bodily injury’ from ‘serious bodily injury.’” Id.

Here, as a result of Brandon and Jones’s stomping and punching, Tittle had severe 

bruising and abrasions of his left arm, including having some skin hanging loose off of 

the arm. Tittle also told the treating physician that his pain was a ten on a scale from one 

to ten, which by itself would seem to be indicative of extreme pain. A CAT scan 

revealed that Tittle had a comminuted fracture of his left orbital socket, meaning it was 

broken into little pieces, and a complex fracture of the lamina papyracea, another part of 

the eye orbit. Tittle had to have a total of twelve stitches around his left eye. After being 

in the emergency room for about four hours, Tittle was discharged with a Vicodin 

prescription. We readily conclude a reasonable fact-finder could find this to be enough 
12

evidence of serious bodily injury. See Fuller v. State, 875 N.E.2d 326, 333 (Ind. Ct. App.

2007) (holding there was sufficient evidence of serious bodily injury where defendant 

punched and kicked victim and pushed her down flight of stairs, and victim had 

comminuted eye socket fracture, multiple severe bruises, complained of “sharp pain,” and 

was given prescription-strength pain medication), trans. denied, abrogated on other 

ground by statute.

III. Sentence

Brandon’s final argument is that his sixty-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate 

under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.1 

Although Rule 7(B) does not require us to be “extremely” deferential to a trial court’s 

sentencing decision, we still must give due consideration to that decision. Rutherford v. 

State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We also understand and recognize the 

unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions. Id. “Additionally, a 

defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that his or her sentence is 

inappropriate.” Id.

The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, 

and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement 

of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” 

Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We “should focus on the forest—

the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of 

 

1 Our reduction of Brandon’s burglary conviction to a Class B felony does not alter his aggregate 

sentence.
13

counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Id. Whether a sentence is

inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the 

crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given 

case. Id. at 1224.

Brandon argues in part that maximum sentences should be reserved only for the 

class of offenses and offenders that can be characterized as “the worst.” See Payton v. 

State, 818 N.E.2d 493, 498 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. However, Brandon’s 

aggregate sixty-year sentence does not approach the maximum sentence he could have 

received, even with our reduction of the Class A burglary conviction to a Class B felony. 

With one Class A felony and two Class B felonies, the maximum sentence Brandon could 

have received if all the sentences were served consecutively was ninety years, or fifty 

plus twenty plus twenty. See I.C. §§ 35-50-2-4 & 35-50-2-5. Thus, we will not review 

Brandon’s sentence as if it were a maximum one.

Regarding the nature of the offenses, Brandon willingly agreed to Dawn’s request 

to punch Tittle, a disabled Army veteran, in the mouth a couple of times, lured by the 

prospect of also stealing some money from him. Upon arriving at the house, Brandon, 

along with Jones, did much more than punch Tittle in the mouth a couple of times.2 

Instead, they viciously beat him after finding him passed out in his recliner. Furthermore, 

 

2 Brandon argues there was conflicting evidence as to whether he actually participated in the beating of 

Tittle. Dawn in particular could not recall if Brandon participated in the beating or whether Jones did so 

by himself. The evidence most favorable to the convictions and sentence, however, clearly is that 

Brandon joined with Jones in stomping and punching Tittle.
14

rather than just stealing Tittle’s money as Dawn had originally suggested, Brandon and 

his cohorts ransacked Tittle’s house looking for items to steal. Brandon also had to be 

talked out of stealing Tittle’s car. The nature of the offenses is egregious.

Turning to Brandon’s character, as an adult, he has a felony conviction for 

receiving stolen property and misdemeanor convictions for driving while suspended, 

criminal mischief, and battery.3 He also had some juvenile delinquency adjudications, 

including one for burglary, and admitted to having smoked marijuana regularly since the 

age of sixteen. He was on probation when he committed these offenses. Brandon was 

only twenty-one at the time of these offenses and while he had not previously committed 

any offenses that were as serious as the current ones, the previous offenses were similar 

in character to the current ones and close in time. 

Moreover, regarding Brandon’s character, there was evidence that he was excited 

and bragging about the offenses afterwards, demonstrating a complete lack of remorse. 

That lack of remorse carried over into Brandon’s statement at his sentencing hearing, 

wherein he apologized to his family but not Tittle. Even if Brandon was maintaining his 

innocence, he expressed no concern for Tittle’s well-being. Instead, he said the 

prosecutor’s job was to “destroy[] people’s lives . . . .” Tr. p. 753. He also said, “life is a 

bitch,” and said he would pray for his “persecutors” like Jesus Christ did. Id. at 754. 

This complete lack of respect and contrition at sentencing, combined with Brandon’s 

 

3 Unfortunately, Brandon has not included his pre-sentence investigation report in his appendix, nor did 

the State file an appendix including it. Brandon’s criminal history was partially related at the sentencing 

hearing.
15

behavior immediately after the crimes were committed, does not reflect well upon his 

character.

We acknowledge Brandon’s argument that his sentence should be closer to that of 

Jones, who received a forty-eight-year sentence and whose participation in the offenses 

was at least roughly equivalent to Brandon’s. If there is a “‘stark’” disparity between two 

co-defendants’ sentences, it may be a factor to consider as to whether the greater of the 

two sentences is inappropriate. See Coleman v. State, 952 N.E.2d 377, 385-86 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2011) (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1226). We do not believe the twelve-year 

difference between Brandon’s and Jones’s sentences is “stark.” This is especially true, 

given that Jones pled guilty and evidently had the Class B felony conspiracy to commit 

robbery charge against him dismissed as part of the plea bargain.4 That alone would 

account for the twelve-year difference between Jones’s and Brandon’s sentences. 

Additionally, the fact of Jones’s guilty plea would have been a potentially significant 

mitigating circumstance in considering his sentence. See Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 

525 (Ind. 2005). That circumstance is lacking in Brandon’s case. In sum, despite Jones’s 

lesser sentence, we find nothing in either the nature of the offenses or Brandon’s 

character that would make his sixty-year sentence inappropriate. 

Conclusion

Under double jeopardy principles, Brandon’s convictions for both Class A felony 

robbery and Class A felony burglary cannot stand. To remedy that violation, we direct 

 

4 Brandon included Jones’s chronological case summary in his appendix for our review.
16

that the burglary conviction be reduced to a Class B felony and that he be sentenced to 

eighteen years on that count, to be served concurrent with the forty-eight-year sentence 

for robbery. There is sufficient evidence to support Brandon’s conviction for Class A 

felony robbery, and his aggregate sixty-year sentence is not inappropriate. We affirm in 

part, reverse in part, and remand for the trial court to amend its records and abstract of 

judgment in accordance with this opinion.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

VAIDIK, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.