Filed 5/27/22 Vorobiev v. Wolf CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

DAVID VOROBIEV,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ERIC WOLF et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 B312666

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. 20STCV39035)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Maurice A. Leiter, Judge. Affirmed.

Eric Wolf, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

Pettit Kohn Ingrassia Lutz & Dolin, Douglas A. Pettit and 

Matthew C. Smith for Defendants and Appellants Robert J. 

Hudock and Hudock Employment Law Group, APC.

Law Offices of Rodney T. Lewin and Chandler Owen 

Bartlett for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * * * * * *
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Defendants and appellants Robert J. Hudock and Hudock 

Employment Law Group, APC, appeal from the order denying 

their special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 

section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP motion). All further undesignated 

statutory references are to this code. Defendant and appellant 

Eric Wolf, who joined in the motion, also appeals from the court’s 

denial.

We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This appeal arises from a long-running dispute between 

property owners in a planned community known as Bell Canyon. 

Eric Wolf is a property owner and resident of Bell Canyon, as 

well as a longtime member of the board of directors for the Bell 

Canyon homeowners’ association.

Leon and Marina Reingold, a married couple, also own 

property in Bell Canyon. They are not parties to this appeal. 

Since at least 2016, the Reingolds have had a contentious 

relationship with Wolf stemming primarily from the Reingolds’ 

belief that Wolf had engaged in misconduct as a member of the 

board and had unfairly interfered with their efforts to develop 

their property. Marina’s father is plaintiff and respondent David 

Vorobiev. Vorobiev apparently did not have any personal 

interactions with Wolf.

In 2016, while the Reingolds were beginning to develop 

their property, they used an e-mail account set up by Marina 

under her father’s name. When e-mails were sent from that 

account, the sender was identified as “David Vorobiev” with the 

actual e-mail address identified as jem***@*********.net

(partially redacted for privacy). On October 1, 2016, Leon, using 

the Vorobiev e-mail account, sent an e-mail to Barry Schehr, 
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another member of the Bell Canyon board of directors. The email outlined numerous complaints and accusations of 

misconduct against Wolf regarding his alleged interference in the 

Reingolds’ development plans. Among other things, the e-mail

asserted that Wolf had threatened the Reingolds, telling them 

their development plans would not be approved if they used a 

builder (Nissim David-Chai) who was in litigation against the 

homeowners’ association. Wolf was a defendant in that action. 

Leon also said Wolf told him he better do whatever he says or 

Leon would not get the approvals for his property.

In October 2017, Wolf, represented by Robert J. Hudock 

and his firm, Hudock Employment Law Group, filed an action for 

defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress 

against the Reingolds and Vorobiev in Ventura County Superior 

Court (the Defamation Action). Wolf alleged the Reingolds and 

Vorobiev, along with unidentified Doe defendants, engaged in 

numerous illegal acts, either personally or as members of a 

conspiracy, that were intended to defame Wolf, damage his 

reputation and cause him distress. Wolf alleged the Reingolds 

and Vorobiev fraudulently obtained Wolf’s private cellular phone 

records from Sprint and then used the information to

anonymously contact Wolf’s friends, family and colleagues, 

accusing Wolf of unethical and corrupt behavior. Wolf further 

alleged the the Reingolds and Vorobiev made and published 

numerous oral and written defamatory statements over a period 

of several months. The statements in the October 1, 2016 e-mail 

sent to Schehr from the Vorobiev e-mail account were described

in detail in the complaint. Wolf alleged the statement was made 

by Leon and published by Vorobiev via e-mail.
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In September 2019, Vorobiev filed a motion for summary 

judgment in the Defamation Action. In a supporting declaration, 

Vorobiev stated he was not computer literate, did not own or use 

a computer, was not fluent in English, and primarily spoke his 

native language, Russian. Vorobiev further attested he had 

nothing to do with the October 1, 2016 e-mail and had first 

learned of its existence when he was sued by Wolf. 

In October 2019, prior to the hearing on Vorobiev’s 

summary judgment motion, Wolf filed a voluntary dismissal of 

Vorobiev from the Defamation Action with prejudice. 

Vorobiev then filed this action, stating a sole cause of action 

for malicious prosecution against Wolf, Hudock and Hudock 

Employment Law Group, APC, based on the filing and 

prosecution of the Defamation Action. 

Hudock and Hudock Employment Law Group filed an antiSLAPP motion. Wolf, proceeding in propria persona, joined in 

the motion and did not submit any additional evidence on his 

own behalf. Defendants argued that Vorobiev could not establish 

the essential elements of a malicious prosecution claim of 

favorable termination, lack of probable cause and malice.

In his supporting declaration, Hudock attested to his efforts 

to negotiate a dismissal of Vorobiev from the Defamation Action, 

including requesting a declaration from Vorobiev acknowledging 

he played no role in the publication of the October 1, 2016 e-mail. 

He explained that counsel for Vorobiev rebuffed all of his efforts 

in that regard. 

Vorobiev opposed defendants’ motion, conceding that a 

malicious prosecution claim involves protected activity under the 

anti-SLAPP statute, but arguing that his evidence established a 

probability of prevailing on the merits. Vorobiev argued 
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defendants’ motion focused solely on the October 1, 2016 e-mail 

and did not address the other allegations made in the Defamation 

Action, including the alleged conspiracy to steal cell phone

records. The opposition included Vorobiev’s declaration stating 

the same facts he had attested to in his summary judgment 

motion, and declarations from Leon and Marina Reingold.

In his declaration, Leon said he used the e-mail account set 

up by his wife in the name of Vorobiev to regularly correspond 

with Wolf, the other Bell Canyon board members, and the 

architectural committee. Copies of several e-mail exchanges 

between April to October 2016 were attached as exhibits. Leon

said he was the one who sent the October 1, 2016 e-mail to 

Schehr and that his father-in-law, Vorobiev, had nothing to do 

with it. In an e-mail dated October 27, 2016, from Wolf to the 

Vorobiev e-mail account, Wolf wrote “Dear Mr. and 

Mrs. Reingold” and concluded the e-mail with the following 

statement: “For the record, I notice that David Vorobiev is an 

alias for your email. I have noticed this fact on other 

communications. Please consider any email to this email address 

a delivery to Mr. and Mrs. Reingold.” 

Leon also said that well before Wolf filed the Defamation 

Action, Wolf threatened to drag his elderly father-in-law into 

“this situation,” referencing their ongoing dispute. Wolf told

Leon that if he did not retract the statements he had made in the 

October 1, 2016 e-mail, he would sue Vorobiev. Wolf also told 

Leon “[w]e might approve you and you can build your house, but 

I’ll own it if you don’t retract” the October 1, 2016 e-mail. 

Vorobiev also presented portions of deposition transcripts 

from the lawsuit filed by Nissim David-Chai against Wolf, the 

Bell Canyon homeowners’ association and others. Hudock was 
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present at the depositions as Wolf’s counsel. The deposition of 

Wolf took place on August 15, 2017. He admitted that he 

considered the Vorobiev e-mail account to be “an alias” of Leon. 

The deposition of Leon took place on October 26, 2017. Leon 

admitted he was the one who wrote and sent the October 1, 2016 

e-mail. Yet the Hudock defendants filed the Defamation Action 

against Vorobiev on October 5, 2017, after Wolf admitted in 

deposition that he knew the Vorobiev e-mail account was an alias 

of Leon, and continued to prosecute it after Leon admitted he 

sent the allegedly defamatory e-mail. 

The hearing on the motion took place on May 5, 2021. The 

court entertained argument and then took the motion under 

submission. Later that day, the court issued a written order 

denying the motion, finding Vorobiev had established sufficient 

facts on the elements of favorable termination, lack of probable 

cause, malice and damages. 

This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

1. Applicable Law

The anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to provide a 

procedure for the early dismissal of frivolous causes of action that 

infringe on the rights to free speech and to petition for a redress 

of grievances. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State 

University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060.) The statute states that 

“[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that 

person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free 

speech under the United States Constitution or the California 

Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to 

a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the 
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plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the 

plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) 

In resolving an anti-SLAPP motion, the court engages in a 

two-step analysis. The court must first determine whether the 

moving defendant “has made a threshold showing that the 

challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity.” 

(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88.) If the court 

determines the defendant met this initial burden, the burden 

shifts to the plaintiff and the court “must then determine 

whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of 

prevailing on the claim.” (Ibid.) Only those causes of action that 

satisfy both prongs of section 425.16 (arising from protected 

activity and lacking minimal merit) are subject to being stricken 

under the statute. (Navellier, at p. 89.) 

We independently review a ruling on an anti-SLAPP 

motion, applying the same two-step procedure as the trial court. 

(Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 

269, fn. 3 (Soukup).) We consider the pleadings and the 

admissible evidence submitted in the moving and opposing 

papers. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) We accept as true all evidence 

favorable to the nonmoving plaintiff and do not compare the 

weight of the parties’ evidence or make credibility 

determinations. We only evaluate the moving defendant’s

evidence to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s evidence as a 

matter of law. (Soukup, at p. 269, fn. 3.) 

2. Step One: Protected Activity

Vorobiev’s sole cause of action against defendants is for 

malicious prosecution of a civil action. He concedes, as he did 

below, that a malicious prosecution claim is subject to an antiSLAPP motion. We agree. (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche
8

(2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 735 [every reviewing court “that has 

addressed the question has concluded that malicious prosecution 

causes of action fall within the purview of the anti-SLAPP 

statute”].) 

3. Step Two: Minimal Merit 

To defeat defendants’ motion, Vorobiev was required to 

demonstrate his malicious prosecution claim was “both legally 

sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of 

facts” to sustain a judgment in his favor if his evidence was 

credited. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 

811, 820.) “ ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may 

proceed.’ ” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 385.)

A malicious prosecution claim consists of three elements. 

The plaintiff must demonstrate the underlying action 

(1) terminated favorably to plaintiff, (2) was brought or 

maintained without probable cause and (3) was brought or 

maintained with malice. (Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker

(1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 871 (Sheldon Appel); accord, Parrish v. 

Latham & Watkins (2017) 3 Cal.5th 767, 775 (Parrish).)

a. Favorable termination 

“ ‘In order for a termination of a lawsuit to be considered 

favorable with regard to a malicious prosecution claim, the 

termination must reflect on the merits of the action and the 

plaintiff’s innocence of the misconduct alleged in the lawsuit.’ ” 

(Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 720.) A voluntary 

dismissal generally reflects on the merits. (Medley Capital Corp. 

v. Security National Guaranty, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 33, 47.)

Defendants admit they dismissed Vorobiev from the 

Defamation Action after he filed the summary judgment motion 

declaring his lack of involvement with, or knowledge of, the 
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allegedly defamatory October 2016 e-mail. Defendants claim the 

dismissal does not reflect on the merits because it was merely a 

strategic decision to refocus the litigation on the Reingolds and 

avoid additional litigation costs in opposing the summary 

judgment motion. Vorobiev’s evidence is sufficient at this stage 

of the proceedings to support a finding defendants dismissed 

their claims against Vorobiev because he was not liable on the 

merits, which satisfies the favorable termination element. 

b. Lack of probable cause

The probable cause element requires “ ‘the trial court to 

make an objective determination of the “reasonableness” of the 

defendant’s conduct, i.e., to determine whether, on the basis of the 

facts known to the defendant, the institution [or maintenance] of 

the prior action was legally tenable.’ ” (Parrish, supra, 3 Cal.5th

at p. 776, italics added.)

Where the facts known to the defendant are in dispute, 

“that dispute must be resolved by the trier of fact before the 

objective standard can be applied by the court.” (Mendoza v. 

Wichmann (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1450; accord, Sheldon 

Appel, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 881.) The facts here are in dispute 

as to Wolf’s and Hudock’s knowledge regarding Vorobiev’s 

involvement in any of the allegedly defamatory conduct. 

Vorobiev argues the evidence shows defendants knew the e-mail 

account was used by the Reingolds and that Vorobiev had no 

involvement in any of the communications or in any of the other 

alleged conduct. Defendants assert they had a reasonable basis 

for believing Vorobiev sent the October 1, 2016 e-mail because it 

came from an e-mail account in his name, he was related to the 

Reingolds, and he had refused, until the filing of the summary 
10

judgment motion, to provide a declaration attesting to his lack of 

involvement. 

Our task is not to resolve the disputed facts. We are not 

deciding the merits of Vorobiev’s malicious prosecution claim. 

We are only deciding whether Vorobiev has shown his claim has 

the requisite minimal merit to defeat the anti-SLAPP motion. As 

explained above, in making that assessment, we accept as true 

all evidence favorable to Vorobiev and do not weigh the evidence 

or make credibility determinations. We only consider and 

evaluate defendants’ evidence to determine if it defeats 

Vorobiev’s evidence as a matter of law. (Soukup, supra, 

39 Cal.4th at p. 269, fn. 3.) 

The e-mail correspondence between Leon and Wolf, as well 

as other members of the Bell Canyon board, supports a finding

that Wolf knew, long before the filing of his Defamation Action, 

that Leon was the author and sender of the e-mails and that 

Vorobiev, Leon’s elderly father-in-law, was not involved. We

cannot rule out at this stage the reasonable inference that 

Hudock, as Wolf’s counsel, was also aware of this same 

information. There was no other evidence raising a reasonable 

belief Vorobiev had any involvement in an alleged conspiracy to 

defame Wolf. 

c. Malice 

The malice element requires a showing the underlying 

action was filed due to actual ill will or some other improper 

motive. (Gruber v. Gruber (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 529, 538.) 

“Malice requires more than proof that the party acted without 

probable cause.” (Ibid.)

Here, the same evidence discussed above regarding 

probable cause is sufficient to establish the malice element. Leon 
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testified that Wolf directly threatened to sue his elderly father-inlaw in order to extort a retraction from him of the accusations he 

made against Wolf. That evidence, accepted as true for purposes 

of the motion, supports a finding the action was initiated and 

maintained with the requisite malice. 

The evidence, including the e-mail correspondence from 

April to October 2016 and the depositions in the David-Chai 

lawsuit, also demonstrates that Hudock knew or had reason to 

know well before the filing of the Defamation Action that 

Vorobiev was not the one who sent the October 1, 2016 e-mail. 

No other evidence was presented supporting any bases for 

concluding Vorobiev had conspired to defame Wolf. Nevertheless, 

Hudock, acting as Wolf’s attorney, continued to prosecute the 

Defamation Action for almost another two years before 

dismissing Vorobiev. The evidence is sufficient to raise an 

inference of malice by the Hudock defendants.

d. Damages

Damages are an element of any tort cause of action but 

defendants did not assert in their anti-SLAPP motion below that 

Vorobiev could not show he suffered damages. Thus, Vorobiev

did not offer evidence of damages in opposition to the anti-SLAPP 

motion. In their reply papers in the trial court, the Hudock 

defendants argued that Vorobiev failed to submit any evidence he 

suffered either emotional distress or monetary damages in the 

form of attorney fees defending the Defamation Action. The trial 

court found damages could be inferred. On this record, we agree 

with the trial court that damages could be inferred from 

Vorobiev’s evidence in opposition to the motion.
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DISPOSITION

The order denying the special motion to strike by 

defendants and appellants Robert J. Hudock and the Hudock 

Employment Law Group, APC, and denying the joinder by 

defendant and appellant Eric Wolf is affirmed. 

Plaintiff and respondent David Vorobiev shall recover costs 

of appeal. 

GRIMES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J. 

WILEY, J.