IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

WACO DIVISION 

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a 

BRAZOS LICENSING AND 

DEVELOPMENT, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC., 

DELL INC., AND EMC 

CORPORATION, 

Defendants.

Case No.: 6:20-cv-00476-ADA 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 

FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER 

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(1) 

PUBLIC VERSION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................ 3

A. Brazos Is The Rightful Owner Of The ’144, ’435, ’800, ’133, ’360 And 

’489 Patents ............................................................................................................ 3

B.

 3

C.

 6

D.

 9

E. Dell Waited Two Years Before (1) Claiming Lack Of Subject Matter 

Jurisdiction Due To Brazos’s Purported Lack Of Right To Sue For Past 

Damages And (2) Moving To Dismiss The Patent Infringement Claims for 

Past Damages ....................................................................................................... 10

III. ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... 10

A. The Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction Because The Cases Against 

Dell Were Filed Under The Patent Act And Brazos’s Right To Sue For 

Past Damages Does Not Implicate Subject Matter Jurisdiction .......................... 10

B. Dell’s 12(b)(1) Motion Seeking To Dismiss Brazos’s Past Damages 

Claims For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Is Procedurally Defective ....... 13

C.

 14

IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 19

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

 Page(s) 

Cases 

Beal Sav. Bank v. Sommer, 

8 N.Y.3d 318 (1st Dep’t 2007) ................................................................................................15 

C.R. Daniels, Inc. v. Naztec Int’l Grp., LLC, 

2012 WL 1268623 (D. Md. Apr. 13, 2012) .............................................................................16 

Cara Assocs., L.L.C. v. Milstein, 

140 A.D.3d 657 (1st Dep’t 2016) ............................................................................................15 

Corhill Corp. v S.D. Plants, Inc., 

9 N.Y.2d 595 (1961) ................................................................................................................15 

DDB Techs., LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LP, 

517 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................................16 

Domain Protection, LLC v. Sea Wasp, LLC, 

23 F.4th 529 (5th Cir. 2022) ....................................................................................................11 

Fed. Ins. Co. v. Ams. Ins. Co., 

258 A.D.2d 39 (1st Dep’t 1999) ..............................................................................................18 

Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 

939 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991)................................................................................................17 

Greenfield v. Philles Recs., Inc., 

98 N.Y.2d 562 (N.Y. 2002) ...............................................................................................14, 15 

Kenyon & Kenyon LLP v. Sightsound Techs., LLC, 

No. 650795/2014, 2021 WL 1856980 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. May 10, 2021) .............................18 

Lawyers’ Fund for Client Prot. of State of N.Y. v. Bank Leumi Tr. Co. of N.Y., 

727 N.E.2d 563 (N.Y. 2000) ....................................................................................................15 

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 

572 U.S. 118 (2014) .....................................................................................................11, 12, 17 

Lipper Holdings, LLC v. Trident Holdings, LLC, 

1 A.D.3d 170 (1st Dep’t 2003) ................................................................................................15 

Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 

925 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2019)......................................................................................1, 11, 12 

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Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 

499 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2007)................................................................................................10 

Muzak Corp. v. Hotel Taft Corp., 

1 N.Y.2d 42 (N.Y. 1956) .........................................................................................................16 

N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 

215 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2000)................................................................................................13 

Nova Cas. v. Harleysville Worchester Ins. Co., 

146 A.D.3d 428 (1st Dep’t 2017) ............................................................................................15 

Parallax Grp. Int’l, LLC v. Incstores.com, LLC, 

No. 8:16-cv-00929, 2017 WL 3017059 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2017) ..........................................17 

Schwendimann v. Arkwright Advanced Coating, Inc., 

959 F.3d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2020)..........................................................................................11, 12 

Slingshot Printing LLC v. HP Inc., 

No. 1:20-CV-00184-ADA, 2020 WL 6120177 (W.D. Tex. July 7, 2020) ..............................17 

Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 

211 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2000)................................................................................................17 

Univ. of S. Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. Fujifilm Med. Sys., 

19 F.4th 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ................................................................................................11 

Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 

No. 6:10-CV-417, 2012 WL 12897214 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2012) ........................................17 

W.W.W. Assoc. v Giancontieri, 

77 N.Y.2d 157 (1990) ..............................................................................................................15 

Matter of Westmoreland Coal Co. v Entech, Inc., 

100 N.Y.2d 352 (2003) ............................................................................................................15 

Statutes 

35 U.S.C. § 281 ..................................................................................................................11, 12, 17 

Rules 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)..............................................................................................................1, 10 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)..................................................................................................................13 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ......................................................................................................................13 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ...........................................................................................................................13 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ......................................................................................................................13 

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Plaintiff WSOU Investments, LLC d/b/a Brazos Licensing and Development (“Plaintiff” 

or “Brazos”) files this opposition to Defendants Dell Technologies Inc., Dell Inc., and EMC 

Corporation’s (together, “Dell”) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 

FRCP 12(b)(1) (“Motion” or “Mot.”).

I. INTRODUCTION 

Dell’s motion to dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the 

argument that Brazos is not entitled to pre-assignment damages for the ’435 Patent is both meritless 

and procedurally defective. 

First, there is no question that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. 

Dell does not deny that this is a case or controversy under the Patent Act, so the relevant inquiry 

ends here. Moreover, Dell tacitly admits Brazos was assigned the ’435 Patent. And the Federal 

Circuit already rejected Dell’s argument that an assignee does not have Article III standing due to 

its purported lack of past damages rights, explicitly holding that whether the assignee “possesses 

all substantial rights in a patent does not implicate standing or subject-matter jurisdiction.” Lone 

Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 F.3d 1225, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 2019). As 

such, the Motion is meritless. 

Second, because Dell’s argument that Brazos was not assigned the right to past damages 

does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction, Dell’s 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss the case for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction is procedurally defective and should be denied for this reason alone. 

Third, even if the Court is inclined to overlook this procedural defect and treat the Motion 

as one under 12(b)(6), Dell still loses because there is no question that Brazos was assigned the 

right to past damages. 

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Accordingly, the Motion should be denied. 

1

 “Ex. __” refers to the Exhibits to the Declaration of Jonathan K. Waldrop filed concurrently 

herewith.

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

A. Brazos Is The Rightful Owner Of The ’144, ’435, ’800, ’133, ’360 And ’489 

Patents 

Brazos is the owner of all rights, title and interest in the following U.S. patents asserted in 

six individual actions: U.S. Patent Nos. (i) 9,137,144 (“the ’144 Patent”) in Case No.: 6:20-cv00473-ADA; (ii) 7,565,435 (“the ’435 Patent”) in Case No.: 6:20-cv-00476-ADA; (iii) 9,164,800 

(“the ’800 Patent”) in Case No.: 6:20-cv-00481-ADA; (iv) 7,539,133 (“the ’133 Patent”) in Case 

No.: 6:20-cv-00480-ADA; (v) 7,092,360 (“the ’360 Patent”) in Case No.: 6:20-cv-00486-ADA; 

and (vi) 8,913,489 (“the ’489 Patent”) in Case No.: 6:20-cv-00477-ADA. 

On June 2, 2020, Brazos filed the aforementioned cases for patent infringement against 

Dell. For more than two years Dell actively litigated these cases and never challenged Brazos’s 

standing despite the fact that the USPTO assignment records (on which Dell now relies to claim 

purported defective assignments) have been publicly available long before the commencement of 

these cases. 

B.

 

2

 

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I 

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C.

 

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3

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D.

 

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E. Dell Waited Two Years Before (1) Claiming Lack Of Subject Matter 

Jurisdiction Due To Brazos’s Purported Lack Of Right To Sue For Past 

Damages And (2) Moving To Dismiss The Patent Infringement Claims for 

Past Damages 

On June 2, 2020, Brazos filed six separate actions against Dell for infringing the ’144, ’435, 

’800, ’133, ’360, and ’489 Patents, respectively. See, e.g., Dkt. 1. 

On October 5, 2020, Dell filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim for induced 

and contributory infringement in the six actions but did not attack the Court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction or argue that Brazos could not recover past damages. 

On June 8, 2022, Dell filed Rule 12(b)(1) motions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

(likely to avoid this Court’s dispositive motion page limitations) in the six actions, arguing for the 

first time since the case commencement two years ago that Brazos was not assigned the right to 

past damages and moving to dismiss Brazos’s patent infringement claims for past damages. 

III. ARGUMENT 

A. The Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction Because The Cases Against Dell 

Were Filed Under The Patent Act And Brazos’s Right To Sue For Past 

Damages Does Not Implicate Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

There is no question that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this and the other 

five actions. 

Dell argues that Brazos lacks exclusionary rights and thus cannot have constitutional 

standing because no injury in fact can occur. Mot. at 5 (citing Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 

F.3d 1332, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 

Dell is wrong. Exclusionary rights are not a prerequisite for Article III standing. Indeed, 

the binding law4 is clear that a patent plaintiff has Article III standing as long as he alleges facts 

4

 The Federal Circuit applies regional circuit law when reviewing a dismissal of a complaint for 

lack of standing unless the issue is unique to patent law and therefore exclusively assigned to the 

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for case or controversy under the Patent Act, and the question of what rights were assigned to the 

patentee does not implicate Article III standing. Schwendimann v. Arkwright Advanced Coating, 

Inc., 959 F.3d 1065, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (exclusionary rights in a patent are not necessary for 

Article III standing); see also Domain Protection, LLC v. Sea Wasp, LLC, 23 F.4th 529, 535-36 

(5th Cir. 2022) (whether the assignment of a right to domain names was valid did not implicate 

Article III standing). 

Dell itself emphasizes the fundamental difference between Article III constitutional 

standing and 35 U.S.C. § 281 statutory standing. Mot. at 5. Ironically, this very difference is the 

reason why Dell loses here. 

In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court was the first one to analyze this issue and conclude that 

“statutory standing” defects do not implicate Article III or subject-matter jurisdiction: 

We have on occasion referred to this inquiry as “statutory standing” and treated it 

as effectively jurisdictional. That label is an improvement over the language of 

“prudential standing,” since it correctly places the focus on the statute. But it, too, 

is misleading, since “the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action 

does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s statutory or 

constitutional power to adjudicate the case.’” 

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.4 (2014) (internal 

citation omitted). 

The Federal Circuit followed Lexmark and similarly held that whether the assignee 

“possesses all substantial rights in a patent does not implicate standing or subject-matter 

jurisdiction.” Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 F.3d 1225, 1235-36 

(Fed. Cir. 2019). 

Federal Circuit. See Univ. of S. Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. Fujifilm Med. Sys., 19 F.4th 1315, 

1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2021). 

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Specifically, in Lone Star, the original assignee of the patents executed an agreement 

transferring “all right, title and interest” in the patents to the plaintiff, but also imposed certain 

assignment limits. See Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1227-28. The defendant argued that plaintiff lacked 

Article III jurisdictional standing because it did not possess “all substantial rights” in the patents, 

and thus was not a “patentee” entitled to sue for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 281. Id. at 1234. 

The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that the so-called “statutory standing” defects do not 

implicate a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction: 

Where intervening Supreme Court precedent makes clear that our earlier decisions 

mischaracterized the effects of § 281, we are bound to follow that precedent rather 

than our own prior panel decisions. . . . We therefore firmly bring ourselves into 

accord with Lexmark and our sister circuits by concluding that whether a party 

possesses all substantial rights in a patent does not implicate standing or subjectmatter jurisdiction. 

Id. at 1235-36. 

As noted above, the Federal Circuit later clarified by explicitly holding that exclusionary 

rights in a patent are not necessary for Article III standing. See Schwendimann, 959 F.3d at 1071 

(“[W]e made clear that whether one qualifies as a patentee under 35 U.S.C. § 281 is a statutory 

prerequisite to the right to relief in a patent infringement action, but does not implicate the district 

court’s subject matter jurisdiction .... As long as a plaintiff alleges facts that support an arguable 

case or controversy under the Patent Act, the court has both the statutory and constitutional 

authority to adjudicate the matter.”). 

Here, just like in Schwendimann, there is no Article III standing issue because Brazos has 

alleged that: (i) Brazos is the owner of the asserted patent; (ii) Dell has infringed the asserted 

patent; (iii) Brazos suffered economic injury caused by Dell; and (iv) Brazos is entitled to recover 

damages. See Dkt. 1. As such, Dell’s argument that Brazos cannot sue for patent infringement 

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under the Patent Act because Brazos was not assigned the right to past damages is meritless and 

contrary to established precedent, and must be rejected. 

B. Dell’s 12(b)(1) Motion Seeking To Dismiss Brazos’s Past Damages Claims 

For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Is Procedurally Defective 

Because Dell’s argument that Brazos was not assigned the right to past damages does not 

implicate subject matter jurisdiction, Dell’s 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction is procedurally improper and must be denied on this basis alone. At best, Dell 

could have filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss since Dell is asking the Court to dismiss Brazos’s 

infringement claims for past damages. However, there is no reason for the Court to treat sua sponte

Dell’s motion as a 12(b)(6) because even a 12(b)(6) motion would fail for all the reasons outlined 

infra, Section III.C. 

Furthermore, the assignment and patent ownership issues that Dell raises implicate the 

merits of the case, and not jurisdiction. As such, Dell’s motion is understood as one for summary 

judgement. But the summary judgement standard requires Dell to show no issue of material fact, 

which Dell has failed to do here given Dell’s assertion of purported contract ambiguity. See N. 

Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 215 F.3d 1281, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c)). 

Further, because Dell relies on external evidence and facts beyond which the Court may 

take judicial notice, the Motion cannot simply be converted to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 

Nor does Rule 12(d)5 provide means for converting Dell’s motion into one for summary judgment. 

5 FRCP 12(d) authorizes the Court to convert only a “motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c)” into a 

Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. As such, a 12(b) motion is not the proper vehicle for the 

adjudication of this issue. But it is a way around the Court’s dispositive motion briefing limits. 

See OGP 4.1 at 9.

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Accordingly, Dell’s Motion should be denied as procedurally defective. 

C.

 

 

 

The binding New York law6 makes it abundantly clear that contracts and their 

schedules/exhibits should be read together as 

one document for the purposes of contract interpretation. See Greenfield v. Philles Recs., Inc., 98 

N.Y.2d 562, 572 (N.Y. 2002) (A contract should be “read as a whole to determine its purpose and 

6

 

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intent.”) (quoting W.W.W. Assoc. v Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162 (1990)); Lawyers’ Fund for 

Client Prot. of State of N.Y. v. Bank Leumi Tr. Co. of N.Y., 727 N.E.2d 563, 566 (N.Y. 2000) 

(Courts should interpret an agreement “as a whole” and read the document “in its entirety” instead 

of focusing exclusively on the provision in question.); Beal Sav. Bank v. Sommer, 8 N.Y.3d 318, 

324-25 (1st Dep’t 2007) (A contract should be “read as a whole, and every part will 

be interpreted with reference to the whole [].”) (quoting Matter of Westmoreland Coal Co. v 

Entech, Inc., 100 N.Y.2d 352, 358 (2003)). 

 

 See Lipper Holdings, LLC v. Trident Holdings, LLC, 1 A.D.3d 170, 171 (1st Dep’t 2003) 

(“A contract should not be interpreted to produce a result that is absurd, commercially 

unreasonable or contrary to the reasonable expectations of the parties.”) (internal citations 

omitted); Nova Cas. v. Harleysville Worchester Ins. Co., 146 A.D.3d 428, 428 (1st Dep’t 2017) 

(“We reject this interpretation, because it renders a portion of the contract meaningless and fails 

to read all contractual clauses together contextually.”); Cara Assocs., L.L.C. v. Milstein, 140 

A.D.3d 657, 658 (1st Dep’t 2016) (A cardinal rule of construction is that “a court should not adopt 

an interpretation which will operate to leave a provision of a contract without force and effect.”) 

(quoting Corhill Corp. v S.D. Plants, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 595, 599 (1961)). 

7

 

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And Dell admits (Mot. at 11) that it is a seminal contract interpretation principle that a 

more specific provision controls over a more 

general one See Muzak Corp. 

v. Hotel Taft Corp., 1 N.Y.2d 42, 46-47 (N.Y. 1956) (“Even if there was an inconsistency between 

a specific provision and a general provision of a contract [] the specific provision controls.”). 

 First, the Federal Circuit already rejected this very argument, holding that an executed 

assignment pursuant to the express language of an agreement does not affect the conclusion that 

the agreement itself assigned the referenced rights. See DDB Techs., LLC v. MLB Advanced 

Media, LP, 517 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (rejecting the argument that an assignment was 

the operative document and reasoning that nothing in the assignment conflicted with the 

assignment provision in the agreement). See also C.R. Daniels, Inc. v. Naztec Int’l Grp., LLC, 

2012 WL 1268623, at *15 (D. Md. Apr. 13, 2012) (DDB Technologies “ma[kes] clear that the fact 

of a later execution or recordation of ‘assignment’ does not govern whether, based on a prior 

document, there was an earlier transfer of legal title.”). 

 

 

 See 

DDB Techs., LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LP, 517 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (contract 

Case 6:20-cv-00476-ADA-DTG Document 194 Filed 07/13/22 Page 21 of 27
17 

that “agrees to and does hereby grant and assign” was an express assignment rather than a promise 

to assign in the future); Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 

(contract providing that “[employee] hereby conveys, transfers and assigns to [employer]” was an 

express assignment rather than a promise to assign in the future); Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal 

Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (contract providing that the inventor “agrees to grant 

and does hereby grant” all rights in future inventions was an express assignment rather than a 

promise to assign in the future). 

 

 

8

 Dell argues that the Motion should be granted because Brazos did not have standing to sue at 

the time Brazos filed the 2020 complaint. Mot. at 4-5. Dell is wrong. First, as shown above, 

Brazos did have both Article III constitutional standing and 35 U.S.C. § 281 statutory standing at 

the time the complaint was filed. As such, Dell’s cases decided before Lexmark and stating that 

constitutional standing cannot be cured retroactively (Mot. at 1-2, 6) are inapplicable. 

 See, e.g., Slingshot Printing 

LLC v. HP Inc., No. 1:20-CV-00184-ADA, 2020 WL 6120177, at *2 (W.D. Tex. July 7, 2020) (a 

party “may cure prudential standing defects after it files suit”) (quoting Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 

Inc., No. 6:10-CV-417, 2012 WL 12897214, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2012)); Parallax Grp. Int’l, 

LLC v. Incstores.com, LLC, No. 8:16-cv-00929, 2017 WL 3017059, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2017) 

(plaintiff was not assigned the right to sue for past damages but subsequently obtained that right, 

thereby curing retroactively the prudential standing defect). 

Case 6:20-cv-00476-ADA-DTG Document 194 Filed 07/13/22 Page 22 of 27
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 See Kenyon & Kenyon LLP v. 

Sightsound Techs., LLC, No. 650795/2014, 2021 WL 1856980, at *10 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. May 

10, 2021) (Where extrinsic evidence is introduced to aid in construction, “sworn affidavits by both 

original parties to a contract and those parties’ conduct after 

the contract was formed 

 are significant evidence of the parties’ 

intent.”) (quoting N.Y. Pattern Jury Instr.—Civil 4:1, Contracts—Elements); see also Fed. Ins. 

Co. v. Ams. Ins. Co., 258 A.D.2d 39, 44-45 (1st Dep’t 1999) (“[T]here could be no more 

compelling evidence of intent than the sworn testimony and affidavits of both parties to the 

Case 6:20-cv-00476-ADA-DTG Document 194 Filed 07/13/22 Page 23 of 27
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contract.”). 

Finally, Dell admits that Schedule G1 has been available on the USPTO’s public website 

since January 18, 2018 (more than two years before this action was filed on June 2, 2020). Mot. 

at 2. Because Dell has no legitimate excuse for its blatant failure to file a timely 12(b)(6) motion 

to dismiss Brazos’s past damages claim and because a 12(b)(6) motion would only potentially 

exclude past damages (and not dispose of the case which is Dell’s goal here), Dell instead 

strategically filed this Motion under 12(b)(1), claiming that the Court does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction. But as demonstrated above, Dell’s subject matter jurisdiction argument is unfounded 

and nonsensical. The Court should thus see through Dell’s gamesmanship and deny the Motion. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Dell’s meritless and procedurally 

defective Motion. 

Case 6:20-cv-00476-ADA-DTG Document 194 Filed 07/13/22 Page 24 of 27
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Dated: July 6, 2022 

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 

By: /s/ Jonathan K. Waldrop 

Jonathan K. Waldrop (CA Bar No. 297903) 

(Admitted in this District) 

jwaldrop@kasowitz.com 

Darcy L. Jones (CA Bar No. 309474) 

(Admitted in this District) 

djones@kasowitz.com 

Marcus A. Barber (CA Bar No. 307361) 

(Admitted in this District) 

mbarber@kasowitz.com 

Heather S. Kim (CA Bar No. 277686) 

(Admitted in this District) 

hkim@kasowitz.com 

John W. Downing (CA Bar No. 252850) 

(Admitted in this District) 

jdowning@kasowitz.com 

ThucMinh Nguyen (CA Bar No. 304382) 

(Admitted in this District) 

tnguyen@kasowitz.com 

KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP 

333 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 200 

Redwood Shores, California 94065 

Telephone: (650) 453-5170 

Facsimile: (650) 453-5171 

Shelley Ivan (NY Bar No. 4338067) 

(Admitted in this District) 

sivan@kasowitz.com 

KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP 

1633 Broadway 

New York, New York 10019 

Telephone: (212) 506-1700 

Facsimile: (212) 835-5235 

Case 6:20-cv-00476-ADA-DTG Document 194 Filed 07/13/22 Page 25 of 27
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Mark D. Siegmund (TX Bar No. 24117055) 

mark@swclaw.com 

STECKLER WAYNE COCHRAN CHERRY 

PLLC 

8416 Old McGregor Road 

Waco, Texas 76712 

Telephone: (254) 651-3690 

Facsimile: (254) 651-3689 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

WSOU INVESTMENTS, LLC d/b/a 

BRAZOS LICENSING AND 

DEVELOPMENT 

Case 6:20-cv-00476-ADA-DTG Document 194 Filed 07/13/22 Page 26 of 27
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that the foregoing document was served on all counsel of record via the Court’s 

CM/ECF system on July 6, 2022. 

/s/ Jonathan K. Waldrop 

Jonathan K. Waldrop 

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