J-S17014-16 

_____________________________ 

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

TONY R. HARPER IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

v. 

DORINA VARNER, CHIEF GRIEVANCE 

OFFICER IN HER OFFICIAL AND 

PERSONAL CAPACITY, UNIT MANAGER 

BEARJAR IN HIS OFFICIAL AND 

PERSONAL CAPACITY 

 Appellees No. 1250 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order July 13, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County 

Civil Division at No(s): 394 CIVIL 2015 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED APRIL 28, 2016

 Appellant, Tony R. Harper, appeals pro se from the order entered in 

the Somerset County Court of Common Pleas, which denied Appellant’s 

petition to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and dismissed his complaint as 

frivolous pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 240(j)(1). We affirm. 

 The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

Appellant is an inmate currently incarcerated at SCI—Laurel Highlands. On 

January 29, 2015, Appellant filed an inmate grievance (“Grievance No. 

548992”) in which he asked prison staff to move his bed away from the wall. 

Specifically, in Grievance No. 548992, Appellant complained the placement 
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of his bed interfered with his ability to get restful sleep because other 

inmates would throw items on his bed. On February 10, 2015, Appellant 

filed a second inmate grievance (“Grievance No. 550792”) in which he 

complained prison staff failed to pick up his time-sensitive mail in a timely 

fashion. In Grievance No. 550792, Appellant specifically alleged he placed 

his mail in the collection box at 3:45 a.m., and prison staff failed to pick it 

up until the following day. 

On February 17, 2015, prison officials issued a denial of Grievance No. 

548992, which explained that Appellant’s current cell placement was due to 

his medical needs. On February 19, 2015, Mr. Bearjar (“Appellee Bearjar”), 

a Unit Manager at SCI—Laurel Highlands, issued a denial of Grievance No. 

550792, which explained that if Appellant deposited his mail at 3:45 a.m., 

prison staff might not mail it until the following day due to the prison’s mail 

collection policy. Appellant appealed to the facility manager, who affirmed 

the denial of both grievances. Appellant then filed a final appeal to Dorina 

Varner (“Appellee Varner”), the Chief Grievance Officer of the State Office of 

Inmate Grievance Appeals (“SOIGA”), who upheld the denials of Grievance 

Nos. 548992 and 550792 on April 19, 2015 and April 21, 2015, respectively. 

 Appellant subsequently filed a civil complaint against Appellees in 

which Appellant asserted the prison’s failure to fix his bed issue constituted 

cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

Appellant’s complaint also alleged the prisons’ mail collection policy violated 
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Appellant’s due process rights. On July 8, 2015, Appellant submitted a 

petition to proceed IFP. On July 14, 2015, the court denied Appellant IFP 

status and dismissed Appellant’s complaint as frivolous pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 

240(j)(1). Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on July 24, 2015. On 

August 4, 2015, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant 

timely complied on August 28, 2015. 

 Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ERR[] IN DISMISSING THE 

COMPLAINT WITHOUT GIVING APPELLANT A CHANCE [TO] 

CORRECT THE CONTENT[?] 

DID THE UNIT MANAGER BEARJAR OVERSTEP HIS 

AUTHORITY WHEN HE CHANGED THE TIME WHEN LEGAL 

MAIL GOES OUT THE JAIL[?] 

IS A PRISONER DENIED A RESTFUL SLEEP WHEN TRAFFIC 

IS WALKING BACK AND FORTH IN FRONT OF HIS BED[?] 

WHEN THE U.S. MAIL IS COLLECTED AT 6:00 A.M. EVERY 

MORNING, SINCE BEING LOCATED AT SCI[—]LAUREL 

HIGHLANDS, AND THAT POLICY IS CHANGE[D] [SO] THAT 

THE MAIL IS COLLECTED AT 12:00 ONE NIGHT, THEN AT 

10:00 THE NEXT NIGHT; 3:00 THE NEXT NIGHT, WOULD 

YOU NOT ASSUME THAT AN OFFICIAL IS PLAYING WITH 

THE OUTGOING MAIL[?] 

DID THE [TRIAL] COURT ERR[] WHEN [IT] TOOK 

[APPELLEES’] SIDE WHEN THEY DID NOT HAVE [A] 

CHANCE TO REVIEW THE EXHIBITS SUPPORTED BY 

[APPELLANT]? 

(Appellant’s Brief at 4). 

 Preliminarily, we observe: 
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[A]ppellate briefs and reproduced records must materially 

conform to the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. This Court may 

quash or dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to conform 

to the requirements set forth in Pennsylvania Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. Id. Although this Court is willing to 

liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se

status confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To 

the contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a 

legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume 

that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his 

undoing. 

Wilkins v. Marsico, 903 A.2d 1281, 1284-85 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal 

denied, 591 Pa. 704, 918 A.2d 747 (2007) (some internal citations omitted). 

 The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provide guidelines 

regarding the required content of an appellate brief as follows: 

Rule 2111. Brief of the Appellant 

(a) General Rule.—The brief of the appellant, except as 

otherwise prescribed by these rules, shall consist of the 

following matters, separately and distinctly entitled and in 

the following order: 

(1) Statement of jurisdiction. 

(2) Order or other determination in question. 

(3) Statement of both the scope of review and the 

standard of review. 

(4) Statement of the questions involved. 

(5) Statement of the case. 

(6) Summary of argument. 

(7) Statement of the reasons to allow an appeal to 

challenge the discretionary aspects of a sentence, if 

applicable. 
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(8) Argument for appellant. 

(9) A short conclusion stating the precise relief 

sought. 

(10) The opinions and pleadings specified in 

Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule. 

(11) In the Superior Court, a copy of the statement

of errors complained of on appeal, filed with the trial 

court pursuant to Rule 1925(b), or an averment that

no order requiring a statement of errors complained

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) was 

entered. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a). Additionally, Rule 2119(a) provides: 

Rule 2119. Argument 

(a) General rule. The argument shall be divided into as 

many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall 

have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in 

type distinctively displayed—the particular point treated 

therein, followed by such discussion and citation of 

authorities as are deemed pertinent. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Importantly: 

The argument portion of an appellate brief must include a 

pertinent discussion of the particular point raised along 

with discussion and citation of pertinent authorities. This 

Court will not consider the merits of an argument, which 

fails to cite relevant case or statutory authority. Failure to 

cite relevant legal authority constitutes waiver of the claim 

on appeal. 

In re Estate of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 209 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal 

denied, 620 Pa. 724, 69 A.3d 603 (2013) (internal citations and quotation 

marks omitted). 

 As an equally important matter, Rule 240(j)(1) of the Pennsylvania 
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Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 

Rule 240. In Forma Pauperis 

* * * 

(j)(1) If, simultaneous with the commencement of an

action or proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party 

has filed a petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 

the court prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the 

action, proceeding or appeal if the allegation of poverty is 

untrue or if it is satisfied that the action, proceeding 

or appeal is frivolous. 

Note: A frivolous action or proceeding has been 

defined as one that “lacks an arguable basis either in 

law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 

109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). 

Pa.R.C.P. 240(j)(1) (emphasis added) and Note. “Appellate review of a 

decision dismissing an action pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 240(j) is limited 

to...whether an appellant’s constitutional rights have been violated and 

whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law.” 

Bell v. Mayview State Hosp., 853 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa.Super. 2004). 

 Section 1983 in pertinent part provides: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or 

the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 

within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in 

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding 

for redress, except that in any action brought against a 

judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s 

judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted 

unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory 

relief was unavailable. ... 
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42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. To prevail on a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff 

must establish the violation of some cognizable federal right by state action 

or action under color of law. Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 542 Pa. 555, 

565, 669 A.2d 309, 314 (1995). Prisoners have a right of access to the 

courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 

(1996). Importantly, a prison’s policy does not violate this right, unless an 

inmate suffers an actual injury to his ability to litigate a claim. Id. at 352-

53, 116 S.Ct. at 2180, 135 L.Ed.2d at ___. An actual injury occurs when a 

prison’s actions hinders an inmate’s ability to pursue a non-frivolous, 

arguable legal claim. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415, 122 

S.Ct. 2179, 2187, 153 L.Ed.2d 413, ___ (2002). 

 Moreover, an inmate in Pennsylvania does not have the right to be 

housed in a particular facility or in a particular area within a facility. 37 Pa. 

Code § 93.11(a). Significantly, “prison officials must be allowed to exercise 

their judgment in the execution of policies necessary to preserve order and 

maintain security free from judicial interference.” Bronson v. Central 

Office Review Committee, 554 Pa. 317, 321, 721 A.2d 357, 358 (1998). 

Prison rules and regulations are presumptively valid unless a prisoner proves 

otherwise. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132, 123 S.Ct 2162, 2168 

156 L.Ed.2d 162, ___ (2003). 

 Instantly, Appellant is pro se on appeal, and his appellate brief falls 

woefully short of the requisite standards. Specifically, Appellant’s brief lacks 
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a statement of jurisdiction, a statement of both the scope of review and 

standard of review, and a summary of the argument. See Pa.R.A.P. 

2111(a)(1), (3), and (6). Also, Appellant failed to divide his argument 

section into distinct parts for each of his five issues raised on appeal. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Further, Appellant’s brief presents no cogent argument 

for his issues raised on appeal and includes only extraneous legal citations 

that do not support his contentions. See In re Estate of Whitley, supra. 

Appellant’s argument is merely a string of conclusory statements and vague 

references to constitutional rights, which makes review of Appellant’s issues 

difficult if not impossible. The substantial defects in Appellant’s brief 

arguably preclude meaningful review and constitute sufficient grounds for 

this Court to suppress his brief and dismiss the appeal. 

 Furthermore, the court reasoned as follows: 

Upon review of the [c]omplaint we were unable to identify 

a plausible cause of action based on the facts. While 

Appellant characterizes [Appellees] actions [as in violation] 

of the Constitution, he fails to identify in any fashion a 

precise constitutional violation performed by the Appellees 

under color of state law which forms the basis of a

[Section 1983] claim. 

The failure of the Department of Corrections to place his 

bed in a location which was better conducive to his sleep is 

not a constitutional violation. It certainly does not amount 

to cruel and unusual punishment. 

* * * 

Similarly, no inmate has a constitutional right to have the 

inmate mail picked up at a certain time of the day or night 

to accommodate his personal mailing. 
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Finally, there is no suggestion that Appellee Varner...did 

anything more than review the appealed grievance and 

make a decision in denial. This does not amount to the 

personal involvement requirement for a [Section 1983] 

claim. 

[Because] the [c]ourt could not find under any version of 

the facts that a constitutional violation occurred, the in 

forma pauperis petition was denied pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 

240(j)(1) as having no arguable basis under law or fact. 

(See Trial Court Opinion, filed October 19, 2015, at 3-4) (internal citations 

omitted). The record supports the court’s conclusion that Appellant’s 

complaint failed to raise a cognizable claim under Section 1983. See Bell, 

supra. Therefore, aside from the defects in Appellant’s brief which are 

arguably fatal to his claims, we conclude the court properly dismissed 

Appellant’s complaint as wholly frivolous pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 240(j)(1). 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

 Order affirmed. 

 Shogan, J. joins this memorandum. 

 Fitzgerald, J. concurs in the result. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/28/2016