I 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5734 

To provide compensation for the deadly acts by elements of the Pakistani 

military and intelligence services against United States citizens. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 10, 2012 

Mr. ROHRABACHER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on 

Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To provide compensation for the deadly acts by elements 

of the Pakistani military and intelligence services against 

United States citizens. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Pakistan Terrorism 

5 Accountability Act of 2012’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress finds the following: 


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1 (1) Pakistan, through the Inter-Services Intel2 ligence (ISI) organization, maintains control and in3 fluence in Afghanistan through militant Islamic net4 works, such as the Haqqani Network, in order to se5 cure its strategic position and expand its sphere of 

6 influence, not only in Afghanistan, but also in Kash7 mir and against India. 

8 (2) A 2011 report published by the Combating 

9 Terrorism Center at West Point states that during 

10 the 1980s: ‘‘[T]he Pakistani state has long been a 

11 core sponsor and beneficiary of the Haqqani net12 work. During the 1980s Jalaluddin [Haqqani] 

13 quickly rose to be one of the ISI’s most favored field 

14 commanders and the support he provided would have 

15 a significant impact upon Pakistan’s security estab16 lishment and the jihad in Kashmir in the years to 

17 follow . . . Yet, Pakistan’s favored Afghan proxy is 

18 also the very same actor that has served as al19 Qaida’s primary local enabler for over two decades. 

20 Given the ISI’s historical sponsorship of the 

21 Haqqani network, it is highly unlikely that Pakistan 

22 has not been aware of this history.’’. 

23 (3) The Government of Pakistan, including the 

24 ISI Directorate, has long supported the Haqqani 

25 Network, including by supporting the following: 


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1 (A) Attacks on the United States Embassy 

2 in Kabul and NATO Headquarters on Sep3 tember 12, 2011. 

4 (B) Attack on the Combat Post Sayed 

5 Abad, Wardak Province, Afghanistan, on Sep6 tember 10, 2011. 

7 (C) Attack on the Hotel-Intercontinental 

8 Kabul on June 28, 2011. 

9 (D) Attack on the Kabul Bank on Feb10 ruary 19, 2011. 

11 (E) Continued attacks on United States12 funded road construction projects across Af13 ghanistan. 

14 (F) Attack on Forward Operating Base 

15 Chapman on December 30, 2009. 

16 (G) Attack on Forward Operating Base 

17 Salerno on May 13, 2009. 

18 (H) Attack on the Khost Governor’s office 

19 on May 12, 2009. 

20 (I) Attack on Forward Operating Base 

21 Salerno on May 13, 2009. 

22 (J) Attacks on the Afghan Ministries of 

23 Justice, Education, and Prison Directorate on 

24 February 11, 2009. 


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1 (K) Attack on the Germany Embassy in 

2 Kabul in January 2009. 

3 (L) Attack on Afghan Intelligence Head4 quarters, Khost, in December 2008. 

5 (M) Kidnapping of journalist David Rohde 

6 on November 10, 2008. 

7 (N) Bombing of the Indian Embassy in 

8 Kabul on July 7, 2008. 

9 (O) Assassination attempt on Hamid 

10 Karzai on April 27, 2008. 

11 (P) Kidnapping of British journalist Sean 

12 Langan in March 2008. 

13 (Q) Attack on Sabari district center in 

14 Khost on March 3, 2008. 

15 (R) Attack on Kabul Serena Hotel on Jan16 uary 14, 2008. 

17 (4) On September 17, 2011, the Voice of Amer18 ica reported that ‘‘The United States has suspected 

19 Pakistan’s intelligence agency has ties to the 

20 Haqqani network and other militant groups in Af21 ghanistan but rarely says so publicly. The U.S. and 

22 NATO have blamed the Haqqani network for at23 tacks on U.S. and NATO troops and on U.S. tar24 gets, including the September 13 strike against the 

25 U.S. Embassy in Kabul.’’. 


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1 (5) Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

2 Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, stated that ‘‘with ISI 

3 support, Haqqani operatives planned and conducted 

4 that truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on 

5 our embassy [in September 2011] . . . We also have 

6 credible evidence that they were behind the June 

7 28th attack against the Inter-Continental Hotel in 

8 Kabul and a host of other smaller but effective oper9 ations.’’. Mullen continued ‘‘the Haqqani network 

10 acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services 

11 Intelligence agency.’’. 

12 (6) Admiral Mike Mullen was quoted in Dawn, 

13 a major English language newspaper in Pakistan, 

14 that ‘‘It’s fairly well known that the ISI has a long15 standing relationship with the Haqqani network . . . 

16 Haqqani is supporting, funding, training fighters 

17 that are killing Americans and killing coalition part18 ners.’’. 

19 (7) On April 19, 2012, the Associated Press re20 ported that the United States Ambassador to Af21 ghanistan, Ryan Crocker, stated that there is ‘‘no 

22 question’’ that the Haqqani network was behind this 

23 week’s brazen attacks on Kabul and other eastern 

24 cities and said Pakistan needs to do more to clamp 

25 down on the group’s safe havens and that ‘‘There is 


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1 no question in our mind that the Haqqanis were re2 sponsible for these attacks.’’. Crocker also stated 

3 that ‘‘We know where their leadership lives and we 

4 know where these plans are made. They’re not made 

5 in Afghanistan. They’re made in Miram Shah, which 

6 is in North Waziristan, which is in Pakistan.’’. 

7 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

8 It shall be the policy of the United States to limit 

9 United States foreign assistance to Pakistan if Pakistan’s 

10 military or intelligence services continue to support or pro11 vide assistance to organizations that target United States 

12 citizens. 

13 SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSIST14 ANCE TO PAKISTAN. 

15 (a) LIMITATION.—Of the amounts made available for 

16 assistance to Pakistan for fiscal year 2013 or any subse17 quent fiscal year, the President shall withhold 

18 $50,000,000 for each United States citizen who is killed 

19 as a result of actions of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intel20 ligence (ISI) or support provided by the ISI to other orga21 nizations or individuals, including the Haqqani Network. 

22 (b) CERTIFICATION.—The Secretary of Defense shall, 

23 not later than the first day of each month of the fiscal 

24 years described in subsection (a), certify to Congress the 

25 number of United States citizens who, during the immeVerDate Mar 15 2010 05:29 May 13, 2012 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H5734.IH H5734

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1 diately preceding month, have been killed as a result of 

2 actions or support described in subsection (a). 

3 (c) FUND.—Amounts withheld pursuant to sub4 section (a) shall, notwithstanding any other provision of 

5 law, be administered by the Department of Defense and 

6 made available on an equitable basis to provide payments 

7 to survivors of United States citizens described in sub8 section (a). 

Æ 


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