1 14-1328-cv Briggs v. Bremby

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3

4 August Term, 2014 5

6 (Argued: March 3, 2015 Decided: July 6, 2015) 7 8 Docket No. 14-1328-cv 9

10

11 JAMES BRIGGS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PERSONS 12 SIMILARLY SITUATED, 13

14 Plaintiff-Appellee

, 15

16

– v. – 17

18 RODERICK BREMBY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE 19 STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 20

21 Defendant-Appellant. 22

23

24 Before: CALABRESI, HALL, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges

. 25

26 Plaintiff brought suit on behalf of a class of food stamp applicants, arguing that the 27 Food Stamp Act requires the Connecticut Departm ent of Social Services to provide food 28 stamp benefits to all eligible households with in 30 or 7 days of appl ication (depending on 29 the household’s level of economic need). The Di strict Court granted Pl aintiff classwide relief 30 through a preliminary injunction, and Defendant now appeals, arguing that there is no 31 private right of action to enforce the time limits of the Food Stamp Act under 42 U.S.C. § 32 1983. Defendant further argues that federal re gulations permit the Connecticut Department 33 of Social Services to take more time to proc ess food stamp applications, thereby excusing it 34 from the seeming requirements of the statute. We co nclude that (1) food stamp applicants 35 can sue under § 1983 to enforce the statutory time limits for provision of food stamps, and 36 (2) federal regulations do not excuse Defend ant from providing food stamps within the 37 statutory time limits. We therefore AFFI RM the judgment of the District Court. 38

MARC COHAN, National Center for Law and 39 Economic Justice, New York, NY (Mary R. Mannix and 40 Greg Bass, National Center for Economic Justice, and 41 Giovanna Shay, Lucy Potter, and Cecil Thomas, Greater 42 Hartford Legal Aid, on the brief ), for Plaintiffs-Appellees

. 432 1 HUGH BARBER, Assistant Attorney General 2 (Rosemary M. McGovern, Assistant Attorney General, 3 on the brief ), for George Jepsen, Attorney General of 4 Connecticut, for Defendant-Appellant

. 5

6

7

8

CALABRESI, Circuit Judge : 9

I. BACKGROUND 10

Plaintiff James Briggs brings this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the 11

Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Social Services (“DSS”) to enforce the 12

Food Stamp Act’s time limits for awarding food stamp benefits. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) and 13

(9) provide that participating states shall give such benefits within 30 days of application to 14

eligible households, and within 7 days of applic ation to especially needy households that 15

qualify for expedited benefits. Plaintiff sued in the United States District Court for the 16

District of Connecticut to enfo rce these time limits, and moved to certify a class of similarly 17

situated plaintiffs. 18

The District Court (Bryant, J. ) certified a class consisting of all past, current, and 19

future Connecticut food stamp applicants whose applications are not processed in a timely 20

manner. The District Court also found that there was credible evidence that “there is 21

ongoing, persistent systemic failure to comp ly with the strict unambiguous mandates 22

imposed by the [Food Stamp Act] ,” and entered a preliminary injunction requiring the DSS 23

to process food stamp applications within the statutory deadlines. Briggs v. Bremby , 2012 WL 24

6026167 at *18-19 (D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2012). Defenda nt now appeals, arguing a) that the 25

Food Stamp Act does not give Plaintiff a right to the timely receipt of food stamps and, 26

therefore, that Plaintiff cannot seek to enforce these time limits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 273 b) that, in any event, federal regulations excuse the DSS from abiding by the seeming 1

statutory deadlines for prov iding food stamp benefits. 2

II. DISCUSSION 3

Where allegations of error in a preliminary injunction involve questions of law, our 4

review is de novo

. Am. Express Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Thorley , 147 F.3d 229, 231 (2d Cir. 1998). 5

A. Plaintiff can maintain a private lawsui t under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the 6 statutory time limits in 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) and (9) 7

8 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) states: 9

The State plan of operation . . . . shall provide . . . . (3) that the State 10 agency shall thereafter promptly determin e the eligibility of each applicant 11 household by way of verification of inco me . . . . household size (in any case 12 such size is questionable), and such o ther eligibility factors as the Secretary 13 determines to be necessary . . . . so as to complete certification of and provide 14 an allotment retroactive to the period of application to any eligible household 15 not later than thirty days following its filing of an application[.] 16

17

7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9) states: 18

The State plan of operation . . . . shall provide . . . . (9) that the State 19 agency shall – (A) provide benefits no later than 7 days after the date of 20 application to any household which-- (i) (I) has gross income that is less than 21 $150 per month; or (II) is a destitute migrant or a seasonal farmworker 22 household in accordance with the regula tions governing such households in 23 effect July 1, 1982; and (ii) has liquid resources that do not exceed $100[.] 24

25

In Blessing v. Freestone , 520 U.S. 329 (1997), the Supreme Court established a three26

part test for determining whether a federal law creates a right that can presumptively be 27

enforced by private suit through § 1983: 1) “Con gress must have intended that the provision 28

in question benefit the plaintiff,” 2) “the plaint iff must demonstrate that the right assertedly 29

protected by the statute is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain 30

judicial competence,” and 3) “the statute mu st unambiguously impose a binding obligation 314 on the States.” Id. at 340-41 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court has 1

further clarified that “it is rights , not the broader or vaguer ‘ben efits’ or ‘interests,’ that may 2

be enforced” under § 1983, and that nothing shor t of an “unambiguously conferred right” 3

will support a cause of action under § 1983. Gonzaga University v. Doe , 536 U.S. 273, 283 4

(2002). If these requirements are met, then there is a rebuttable presumption that the 5

statutory right can be enforced through § 1983. Id. at 341. 6

The two statutory time limits at issue in th is case clearly meet the second and third 7

prongs of the Blessing test. They establish a right that is neither vague nor amorphous (both 8

provisions require the allotment of food stam ps within a definite number of days), and they 9

impose binding obligations on the States (b oth provisions use the mandatory “shall”). 10

Whether Congress intended these provisions to benefit food stamp applicants, as the first 11

Blessing prong requires, justifies a bit more discussion. 12

Plaintiff argues that the time limits were i ntended to benefit food stamp applicants by 13

ensuring the prompt provision of food stam ps. Defendant contends instead that the time 14

limits were meant only to guide the States in how to marshal their resources when 15

administering food stamp programs. Three Supre me Court decisions inform our analysis of 16

whether these statutory provisions are suffici ently focused on benefitting the relevant 17

plaintiffs to be individually enforceable under § 1983. 18

First, in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority , 479 U.S. 418 19

(1987), the Court held that a re nt ceiling provision of the Public Housing Act empowered 20

tenants to sue under § 1983 to collect for past overcharges. The relevant provision, 42 21

U.S.C. § 1437a, imposed the following rent ceilin g requirement on local housing authorities: 22

Dwelling units assisted under this chap ter shall be rented only to families 23 who are lower income families at the ti me of their initial occupancy of such 245 units. Reviews of family income shall be made at least annually. A family 1 shall pay as rent for a dwelling unit assisted under this chapter . . . the highest 2 of the following amounts, rounded to the nearest dollar: 3 (1) 30 per centum of the family 's monthly adjusted income; 4 (2) 10 per centum of the fami ly's monthly income; or 5 (3) if the family is receiving payments for welfare assistance from a public 6 agency and a part of such payments, adju sted in accordance with the family's 7 actual housing costs, is specifically designated by such agency to meet the 8 family's housing costs, the portion of such payments which is so designated. 9

10

Wright , 479 U.S. at 420 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 11

This rent ceiling provision was part of a detailed statutory scheme that established 12

requirements for state and local housing authorities. But despit e the fact that the statute was 13

directed at government agencies, the Court in Wright held that the rent ceiling provision was 14

enacted to benefit tenants. See Wright at 430. In drawing this co nclusion, the Court focused 15

on the fact that the provision was calibrated to the economic needs of individual families, 16

determining each family’s rent based on a perc entage of their monthly income. According to 17

the Court, this constituted powerful evidence that the provision was intended to benefit the 18

families, and not merely to direct the allocation of government resources. See Id. at 430 19

(“The [rent ceiling provision] could not be clea rer: . . . tenants could be charged as rent no 20

more and no less than 30 percent of their income . This was a mandatory limitation focusing 21

on the individual family and its income. Th e intent to benefit tenants is undeniable.”). 22

Subsequently, in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association , 496 U.S. 498 (1990), the Court 23

found a private right of acti on under § 1983 to enforce a re imbursement provision of the 24

Medicaid Act. Wilder involved a statutory provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A), that 25

required state Medicaid plans to provide “rea sonable and adequate” ra tes of reimbursement 26

for health care providers treating needy in dividuals. In relevant part, § 1396a(a)(13)(A) 27

stated the following: 286 [A] State plan for medical assistance mu st – . . . . provide . . . for payment 1 . . . of the hospital services, nursing facility services, and services in an 2 intermediate care facility for the menta lly retarded provided under the plan 3 through the use of rates (determine d in accordance with methods and 4 standards developed by the State . . .) which the State finds, and makes 5 assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to meet 6 the costs which must be incurred by e fficiently and economically operated 7 facilities in order to provide care and services in conformity with applicable 8 State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety standards . . . . 9

10

Wilder , 496 U.S. at 502-03 (emphasis and in ternal quotation marks omitted). 11

This provision was explicitly directed at government actors. It referred to 12

requirements of the “State plan” and the proc edures and policies developed by the “State.” 13

Nonetheless, the Court found that its terms we re individually enforceable through private 14

lawsuits brought by health care providers under § 1983. The Court did so in part because the 15

language indicated a clear intent to benefit these providers. Id. at 510 (“There can be little 16

doubt that health care providers are the inte nded beneficiaries of the [reimbursement 17

provision]. The provision establishes a system for reimbursement of providers and is 18

phrased in terms benefiting heal th care providers . . . .”). Wilder thus demonstrates that a 19

statute imposing a requirement on a “State pl an” for administering a social welfare program 20

may nevertheless in appropriate circumstances gi ve rise to a right enforceable under § 1983, 21

for instance if it includes a specific mandate in tended to give rights to a particular group. 22

Finally, in Gonzaga University v. Doe , 536 U.S. 273 (2002), the Court held that a 23

provision of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”) could not be 24

individually enforced through § 1983. The relevant provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1), 25

stated: 26

No funds shall be made available und er any applicable program to any 27 educational agency or institution which ha s a policy or practice of permitting 28 the release of education records (or personally identifiable information 297 contained therein . . . ) of students wi thout the written conse nt of their parents 1 to any individual, agency, or organization. 2

3

Gonzaga , 536 U.S. at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted). 4

The Court distinguished this provision from those in Wright and Wilder , noting three 5

of its features. First, the statutory language at issue in Gonzaga is focused on the educational 6

agencies being regulated rather than on the interests of students or parents. That is to say, 7

the provision lacks “the sort of ‘rights-creatin g’ language critical to showing the requisite 8

congressional intent to create new rights.” Id. at 287. Second, the prov ision regulates only 9

the general “policy or practice” of educat ional agencies and institutions regarding 10

disclosure, rather than focusing on specific in stances of disclosure. Third, the provision 11

serves primarily to direct the di stribution of federal resources. Id. at 287-91. Based on these 12

factors, the Court concluded that the provision was not intended to confer individual rights 13

upon students or parents, but was instead intend ed to impose a general rule for the use of 14

funds under FERPA. See also Loyal Tire & Auto Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Woodbury , 445 F.3d 136, 15

149 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that the Gonzaga Court had used these three factors to distinguish 16

privately enforceable “rights” from v aguer “benefits” or “interests”). 17

Wright and Wilder both strongly counsel in favor of finding the time limits of 7 18

U.S.C. §§ 2020(e)(3) and (9) privately enforc eable under § 1983. Like the provisions in 19

Wright and Wilder , the Food Stamp Act’s time limits are drafted in a way that focuses on the 20

needs of the individual beneficiaries. They re quire that households’ eligibility be determined 21

“promptly,” and that allotments be provided re troactive to the period of application. They 22

are also calibrated to household income – eligib le households are to be provided food stamp 23

benefits within 30 days, but espe cially needy ones are to receiv e such benefits within 7 days. 248 And, while the Food Stamp Act’s time limits are written as requirements for a “State plan of 1

operation,” the Court in Wilder concluded that such a formulation can be fully consistent 2

with a legislative intent to confer enforc eable rights upon the relevant plaintiffs. Wilder , 496 3

U.S. at 523. Indeed, it is commonplace that la ws designed to protect individual rights are 4

formulated as restrictio ns on government action. See, e.g. , U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress 5

shall make no law . . .”). 6

Nor does Gonzaga undercut the applicability of Wright and Wilder to the case before 7

us. None of the three factors that the Supreme Court used to distinguish the statute in 8

Gonzaga from those in Wright and Wilder apply to the provisions here. Unlike the funding 9

provision involved in Gonzaga , the Food Stamp Act’s time limits (1) contain language that is 10

focused on the interests of the applicant households and calibrat ed to their economic needs, 11

(2) create a specific requirement that must be followed for every food stamp applicant, 12

rather than a generalized “policy or practice,” an d (3) do not merely direct the distribution 13

of funds. These factors establish that Congre ss has conferred individual rights upon food 14

stamp applicants in clear and unambiguous terms, and Gonzaga is thus distinguishable. 15

The law of our circuit concerning the private enforceability of time limits in social 16

welfare statutes is, moreover, in full accord with our reading of these three Supreme Court 17

cases. See, e.g.

, Shakhnes v. Berlin , 689 F.3d 244, 247, 254, 256-57 (2d Cir. 2012) (concluding 18

that private plaintiffs can sue under § 1983 to enforce a Medicaid provision, 42 U.S.C. § 19

1396a(a)(3), which requires that a “State plan ” must provide “an opportunity for a fair 20

hearing before the State agency to any individu al whose claim for medical assistance under 21

the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness,” and concluding, also, 229 that such plaintiffs can enforce a regulation providing that such a hearing will occur 1

“ordinarily within 90 days” of a hearing request). 2

Accordingly, we find that 7 U.S. C. § 2020(e)(3) and (9) satisfy the Blessing test, and 3

therefore create a rebuttable presumption that the time limits in those sections are privately 4

enforceable under § 1983. Blessing , 520 U.S. at 341. This presumption can, however, be 5

overcome if Congress precluded recourse to § 1983 either “expressly,” or “impliedly, by 6

creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual 7

enforcement under § 1983.” Id. 8

Briggs’s assertion that Congress intended to confer individual rights to timely 9

determination of food stamp eligibility is undermined, Defendant argues, by Congress’s 10

authorization of administrative enforcement of the Food Stamp Act’s time limits. In 11

particular, 7 U.S.C. § 2020(g) empowers the Se cretary of Agriculture to investigate State 12

noncompliance, withhold federa l funds, and refer a noncomplia nt State to the Attorney 13

General to seek an injunction. Defendant asse rts that Congress’s grant of those enforcement 14

powers to the Secretary demonstrates that Congress did not intend to permit parallel 15

enforcement by individuals in federal and state courts. Notably, the Supreme Court 16

concluded in Gonzaga that Congress did not mean to confer individual rights under FERPA, 17

in part because that statute created a co mprehensive and centralized agency hearing 18

procedure to deal with individual complaints. See Gonzaga , 536 U.S. at 289-90. In stark 19

contrast with FERPA, however, the Food Stamp Act contains no similar agency 20

adjudication process or enforcement structure that could take the place of private lawsuits. 21

Rather, the statute before us is analogous to those in Wright and Wilder . The statutes in both 22

of those cases gave the appropriate federal age ncies the power to exercise oversight and 2310 withhold funds, but that a uthority was held to be consistent with a private right to sue under 1

§ 1983 because the statutes at i ssue did not construct framewor ks for resolving individuals’ 2

complaints. See Wright , 479 U.S. at 427-28; Wilder , 496 U.S. at 521-23. 3

We conclude that Congress di d not impliedly preclude pr ivate enforcement of the 4

Food Stamp Act’s time limits by granting enforcement powers to the Secretary of 5

Agriculture. 1 And we therefore hold that the time limi ts for allocating food stamps provided 6

in 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) and (9) are privatel y enforceable through la wsuits brought under § 7

1983. 2 8

B. Federal regulations do not excuse th e DSS from processing food stamp 9 applications within th e statutory time limits 10

11 Defendant argues that the preliminary in junction issued by the District Court 12

conflicts with a number of federal regulations. See, e.g. , 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(h) (establishing 13

procedures for situations where the State agenc y is at fault for not allocating food stamps 14

within 30 days of an application, and for situations where the applicant household is at fault 15

for not completing the eligibility determ ination process within 30 days); 7 C.F.R. § 16

273.2(i)(3)(iv) (providing that if the initial screening for “expedited” (7-day) food stamp 17

eligibility fails to identify that a household is eligible, then the State agency is only required 18

to process the application within 7 days of the da te it discovers that the household is eligible 19

1 If more were needed, we note that this conc lusion is amply supported by the legislative history of the Food Stamp Act. See, e.g. , H.R. Rep. No. 95-464, at 398 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1978, 2327 (“The administrative remedies against the state contained in section 11(f) and elsewhere should not be cons trued as abrogating in any way private causes of action against states for failure to comply with Federal statutory or regulatory requirements.”).

2 This holding puts us in agreement with the Eleventh Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, which have both held that analogous statutory time limi ts in prior iterations of the Food Stamp Act were individually enforceable. See Gonzalez v. Pingree , 821 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1987); Victorian v. Miller , 813 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).11 for expedited service). Defendant interprets these regulations as excusing the DSS from 1

having to follow the Food Stamp Act’s time limits. 2

In support of its reading of these regulations, Defendant argues that 7 U.S.C. § 3

2020(e)(3) requires only that the DSS complete the certificat ion of “eligible households” 4

within 30 days, and that “eligibility” need on ly be determined “promptly.” To make this 5

point, Defendant contrasts two statutory phrase s. The first provides that “the State agency 6

shall thereafter promptly determine the eligibil ity of each applicant household.” The second 7

requires that the State agency must “complete certification of and provide an allotment 8

retroactive to the period of application to an y eligible household not later than thirty days 9

following its filing of an application.” 7 U. S.C. § 2020(e)(3). Defend ant contends that while 10

the second phrase imposes a specific 30-day ti me limit as to eligible households, the DSS 11

need only “determine the eligibility” of no n-eligible applicant households “promptly” 12

(rather than within any set time period). 13

The obvious problem with this interpretati on is that there would be no way for the 14

DSS to complete certification and provide an allotment of food stamps to all “eligible 15

households” within 30 days of the filing of an application, as 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) expressly 16

requires, if the DSS did not first determine – not only “promptly,” but well within 30 days – 17

which households are “eligible” and which ar e not. We therefore agree with the District 18

Court that both the eligibility determinations and the allotments must be made within 30 19

days. And, accordingly, there is no basis for Defendant’s interpre tation of these regulations. 20

The regulations simply provide additional procedures in case something goes wrong 21

and a statutory deadline is missed. Regulation s which anticipate that a State agency will 22

sometimes fail to meet statutory deadlines, and which provide food stamp applicants with 2312 fallback procedures to deal with such situation s, cannot be read to re peal those deadlines. 1

Such regulations supplement 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e) (3) and (9); they do not override them. 2

Indeed, if the regulations did pu rport to repeal or limit the st atutory time limits, they would 3

likely be ultra vires , for no agency regulation can overturn a clear statutory mandate. 4

5

III. CONCLUSION 6

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court. 7